Commitment without Control: The Burdensharing Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance

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Commitment without Control: The Burdensharing Dilemma in the US-Japan Alliance

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelors of Arts in Government from
The College of William and Mary

by

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Accepted for ______________________________
(Honors)

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Burdensharing Dilemma

On November 23, 2010, North Korean artillery shelled South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island, killing four in one of the most serious clashes since the Korean War. South Korean artillery responded in kind within minutes. The crisis eventually stabilized, but not before another exchange of fire.

Peace may not have prevailed, however, if the Washington had not restrained Seoul from further escalation. Robert Gates, the Secretary of Defense at the time of the incident, wrote in his memoir that “South Korea’s original plans for retaliation were, we thought, disproportionately aggressive, involving both aircraft and artillery.”1 The South Korean government has declined to comment on Gates’s version of events.2 Yet it is obvious there had been calls in the South for a more forceful approach to North Korea’s military provocations, especially since after the March 26 sinking of the Cheonan. South Korean President Park Geun-hye has since adopted a policy of ‘active deterrence.’ Her military commanders will now counter attacks immediately without regard for “political considerations,” perhaps including strikes on North Korean nuclear sites.3 This has raised the distinct possibility of US involvement in a peninsular war without either its foreknowledge or consent.4

This is just a brief story of one trilateral relationship, but it exposes a great deal about the nature of American alliances in the post-World War II era. In a November 2012 speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), National Security Adviser Thomas

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Donilon likened alliances to “assets on a balance sheet.” Yet the alliance problems detailed above show they can also be liabilities.

Since the early Cold War, the United States has maintained a system of extended deterrence around the world. Its centerpiece, in contradistinction to other eras of great power politics, has been the physical garrisoning of allied territory. To deter would-be aggressors, Americans have demonstrated with this ‘tripwire’ strategy that they could not possibly avoid involvement. Even so, Washington has often recognized the costs of such a total commitment for intra-alliance management. When an adversary knows the United States is automatically committed, so does the security partner. Although America may not want war and its enemy may be deterred, an ally’s actions may still spark conflict in a phenomenon known as ‘entrapment.’

I argue in the following chapters that in the postwar era, Americans have confronted a ‘burdensharing dilemma.’ There is risk to an ally having the capacity for independent military action. On the one hand, the demands of collective defense against American or mutual adversaries incentivize policymakers towards the growth of allied military power. In a myriad of ways, US officials have hoped countries like South Korea, Japan, and West Germany would share more of common burden in both cold and hot wars. Yet on the other hand, America has feared cases of ‘tactical entrapment’ and ‘strategic entrapment,’ whereby an ally’s autonomous capacity is used to cause war or destabilize a security environment such that war becomes more likely. When Washington enters into an extended deterrence that includes a tripwire, there are strong geopolitical reasons to suppress that ally’s ability to defend itself. Otherwise, in the analogy most beloved by International Relations (IR) scholars, an open-ended commitment would be like sitting in the passenger seat in a game of chicken.

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5 Tom Donilon, “President Obama's Asia Policy and Upcoming Trip to the Region” (speech, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., November 15, 2012).
By establishing mechanisms of control such as consultation, the discouragement of specific types of rearmament, and the removal of allied decisionmaking power over the activity of their own armed forces, Americans have tried to grab both horns of the burdensharing dilemma and overcome it. To some extent, they have been successful. But the burdensharing dilemma has not gone away. Its tradeoffs and dangers, whether recognized or not, continue to plague US alliance management in the Rebalance to Asia much as they did in the Cold War.\footnote{For a brief look at the burdensharing dilemma today, see Jake A. Douglas, “Why Washington Can’t Restrain Tokyo,” \textit{The Diplomat}, March 4, 2014.}

The outline of this essay is as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the literature on extended deterrence and alliance restraint, forward deployments and automaticity in post-WWII American alliances, and the economic rather than strategic explanations of alliance burdensharing. I also present my theory of the burdensharing dilemma more fully and explain my methods and scope. In Chapter 3, I examine my theory in the case of the US-Japan alliance in the Cold War, and in Chapter 4, I analyze a second case study of the same alliance in the Rebalance or Pivot to Asia. My conclusion is found in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2: The Burdensharing Dilemma in US Alliances

Introduction

In this chapter, I make a case for the existence and importance of a burdensharing dilemma in US alliances. First, I review the literature on alliance restraint, commitments, and burdensharing. Second, I outline my theory of the burdensharing dilemma. Third, I explain my methods and the scope of the theory.

Literature review

To explain the burdensharing dilemma, it is first necessary to explore the state of political science on three distinct but intertwined literatures: extended deterrence and alliance restraint; commitments and credibility in the American style of extended deterrence; and alliance burdensharing. Together, they provide the intellectual background for my theory.

**Extended deterrence and alliance restraint**

When a state uses extended deterrence to prevent international conflict, the dynamics internal to alliances are just as important as those external to it. Both allies and adversaries must be deterred from sparking an unwanted war. Scholars have encapsulated these twin imperatives into the terms “pivotal deterrence”\(^7\) and “dual deterrence.”\(^8\) In short, the multilateral character of

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extended deterrence means there are many members in a dispute. Restraint is required even of friendly parties.

Alliances almost always have more than one function, one of which is usually control. Too often, observers of world politics focus on alliances’ role as aggregators of national military power. This omission is understandable, since their most visible purpose is warfighting. When national survival seems at stake, all policy questions center around pooling resources. In peacetime, however, their goal is often manipulation. The first scholar to talk about alliance restraint, Paul Schroeder, argued that International Relations (IR) theorists and historians fixate on alliances as “weapons of power” at the expense of their function as “tools of management”—or “pacta de contrahendo.” In his study of traditional European diplomacy, Schroeder found states forming coalitions to increase their influence over one another. Likewise, Jeremy Pressman claims this activity has received little scholarly attention. He defines alliance restraint as “an actual or anticipated diplomatic effort to influence a second ally not to proceed with a proposed military policy or not to continue an existing military policy.”

Glenn Snyder similarly noted that “[a]lthough the primary purpose of most alliances is to gain security against an opponent, an important secondary goal is to restrain or control the ally.” Robert Osgood named two main functions of alliances: the “accretion of power” and “to restrain and control allies, particularly in order to safeguard one ally against actions of another that might endanger its

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9 “All alliances functioned as... restraining or controlling the actions of the partners in the alliance themselves. Frequently the desire to exercise such control over an ally’s policy was the main reason that one power, or both, entered into the alliance.” Paul W. Schroeder, “Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management,” in Klaus Knorr, ed. Historical Problems of National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press, 1976), 230-1. An example is the Austro-Neapolitan secret alliance of June 1815, which Schroeder says traded Austrian control over Naples’s domestic and foreign politics in return for security guarantees. Ibid., 232-233.


11 Ibid., 6.

12 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 320. He mentions, for instance, that a “secondary purpose of NATO is to control Germany.” Ibid.
security or otherwise jeopardize its interests.” Victor Cha has argued the East Asian alliance system has its origins in US “powerplay,” or “the construction of an asymmetric alliance designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions.” David A. Lake writes that states often create hierarchical relationships that exchange security for control over the subordinate state’s ability to act “opportunistically.” In fine, alliance restraint is a frequent concern of states and statesmen, and this worry often conditions alliance policies. Even Sun Tzu cautioned, “Not knowing the strategies of the feudal lords / One cannot ally with them.” The strategist must be wary even of his own friends, since they will have dreams and nightmares of their own.

The main reason that allies might want to restraint their partners is the possibility of entrapment. Tongfi Kim defines it as “a form of undesirable entanglement in which the entangling state adopts a risky or offensive policy not specified in the alliance agreement.” Theorists since Carl von Clausewitz have lamented that “a forced or tottering alliance” may bring war as “a matter of disagreeable duty.” Entrapment is one side of what Snyder called the “alliance security dilemma,” or the tradeoffs between entrapment and “abandonment” in alliance

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13 Robert E. Osgood, Alliances and American Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968): 21-22. Osgood adduces the U.S.-Japan alliance as an example of dual deterrence: “The treaties of peace and security with Japan… were intended to control Japan as well as to contain China and Russia,” arguing that “[i]n some cases America’s alliance have also served as useful restraints on allies, helping to stabilize international politics by giving the United States access to, and influence upon, governments with potentially disruptive local grievances and ambitions.” Ibid., 78, 114.


15 “In a protectorate, one state cedes control to another over important areas of national policy, most notably foreign affairs… Such delegations of authority transfer residual rights of control in the designated areas from the ‘protected’ state to the ‘protector’ and severely constrain the former’s ability to influence the policy choices the latter makes for it.” David A. Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations,” International Organization 50:1 (1996): 8.


17 Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrapment,” Security Studies 20:3 (2011): 353. As the title of his article suggests, Kim argues that entrapment is rare because policymakers consciously structure and manage alliances in ways that avoid it, and scholars usually conflate “entanglement,” which is desirable for the sake of extended deterrence, with “entrapment,” which is never desirable. Ibid., 354-355.

decisions. Excessively tight commitments could embolden an ally. Taking advantage of one’s support, the protected state may then intentionally or unintentionally provoke war with an adversary. As Osgood warned, “the luxury of assured protection encourages a freedom of maneuver and irresponsibility on the part of the protected that is denied the protector.” On the other hand, loose commitments may encourage an ally to defect to the other side or not support one’s cause. States may want to “distance” themselves from their allies in times of danger, but doing so risks shattering the alliance.

Adversary relations further complicate the desire to avoid entrapment. In his “composite security dilemma,” a model that integrates a state’s relationships with both its adversaries and its allies, Snyder offers two “subdilemmas.” In the deter versus restrain dilemma, “[a] state may wish to maintain an image of firmness in order to deter the adversary, but at the same time keep the ally in some doubt about its loyalty in order to hold the ally in check.” Being too tough to an adversary can galvanize the protected state into going too far. In the support versus conciliate dilemma, “too much accommodation of the adversary may alienate the ally. Conversely, too much alliance solidarity might ruin a possible accord with the opponent… or even provoke it to attack.” Without dissolving the alliance, a county’s leaders can never totally eliminate the risk that their foreign friends will draw them into an unwanted conflict. It is exactly the purpose of extended deterrence, after all, to entangle oneself in an ally’s security interests.

19 Osgood, Alliances, 7-8.
20 “To discourage the ally from defecting, one is constrained to frame one’s own policy, to some extent, to suit the ally’s interests… Rigidity of policy in a multipolar system may lead to entrapment in a war over the ally’s interests. Reducing this danger requires avoiding excessively tight commitments, but such avoidance risks abandonment by a dissatisfied ally. This is the ‘alliance security dilemma.’” Snyder, 19-20.
21 Ibid., 196.
22 Ibid.
23 Snyder cites an evocative passage by French Prime Minister Raymond Poincaré’s—his own formulation of the composite security dilemma. He addresses each the four imperatives of the dilemma: conciliating the adversary, deterring the adversary, avoiding abandonment, and avoiding entrapment. “On us rested two duties, difficult to reconcile but equally sacred: to do our utmost to prevent a conflict, and to do our utmost in order that, should it burst
Several scholars have suggested ways policymakers shape alliance relations for the purpose of restraint, as well as when restraint will be successful. All of their explanations revolve around the idea of bargaining power or leverage. Some believe the more powerful state tends to get its way in asymmetric alliances. Pressman notes that statesmen since Thucydides have believed “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” James D. Morrow writes that “[b]efore the larger protector is willing to extend that commitment, it demands some control over the behavior of the smaller state to reduce the possibility of entrapment.” According to Kim, “the likely victims of military entrapment (that is, suppliers of military protection) have a good chance of resisting entrapment exactly because they are more powerful than the lesser allies.” When a state fears entrapment and has strong bargaining power, it is likely to impose conditions and limits on its alliance obligations. The United States, especially, is more likely to entrap its allies than they are to entrap it. Lake also argues how close the relationship approximates anarchy, at one extreme, or empire, at the other, determines whether subordinate allies can act opportunistically towards dominant partners. As the asymmetry increases, the fewer “rights of residual control” are left to the protectorate. While Snyder suggests that alliances “tend to be dominated by the stronger member” because it is usually the

fortieth in spite of us, we should be prepared. And there were still two other duties which, also, at times ran the risk of being mutually contradictory: not to break up an alliance on which French policy has been based for a quarter of a century and the break-up of which would leave us in isolation at the mercy of our rivals; and nevertheless to do what lay in our power to induce our ally to exercise moderation in matters in which we are much less directly concerned than herself.” Cited in ibid., 329.

24 Ibid., 358. Says Kim, “Alliance agreements increase the cost of non-involvement and make it rational for self-interested states to become entangled into undesirable situations.” Kim, 356.
26 Pressman, 2.
28 Kim, 353.
29 Ibid., 358-9.
30 Ibid., 377.
31 Lake, 14-15.
32 “In an archic relations, ceteris paribus, the probability that the partner will behave opportunistically is comparatively high. In an empire, at the other extreme, states merge their formerly autonomous decision-making process and transfer rights of residual control to the dominant member.” Ibid., 14.
least dependent on the alliance for its security, he and Robert Jervis have also admitted weak states may actually enjoy bargaining power *because* of their vulnerability. Pressman, for his part, argues the success of restraint has more to do with the willingness of the powerful ally to “mobilize” its superior resources.

The essence of bargaining leverage is the existence of alternatives. George Liska mused that the “task of restraining is made easier when the commitment is not automatic.” Cha, as well, observes that “the large power’s successful control will also hinge on complex bargaining and leverage dynamics that emerge within the alliance.” A lack of substitutes may create an absolute commitment. Thus, “if patron A makes commitments to B such that B knows that patron A is ‘locked in’ (i.e., unconditionally obligated to intervene on B’s behalf), then control may fail because bargaining leverage effectively shifts to B.”

The mechanism and norm of consultation also serves as an entrée into an ally’s decisionmaking loops. As Liska discusses, “[t]he major ally wishes to be consulted chiefly in order to have the opportunity to authorize or veto action, or to be able to dissociate himself from the inception, implementation, and consequences of a lesser ally’s conduct.” Participation and

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33 Snyder, 12, 31.
34 “But a weak state, although it has an interest in the continued existence of its stronger partner, may have no interest in acting to preserve it, if the ally is strong enough to defend itself. Therefore, the strong state cannot credibly threaten to withhold support, whereas the weak state can do so.” Ibid., 170. Again: “On grounds of credibility, it is likely to be easier to restrain a strong ally than a weak one. It is credible to threaten non-support of a strong ally if the ally can defend itself. Obviously, this is not credible vis-à-vis a weak ally. The vulnerability of the weak ally gives it bargaining leverage in another way: it can more credibly threaten to realign with the enemy than if it were capable of its own defense.” Ibid., 326.
35 The success of mobilizing power resources in turn depends on (1) deception of the restrainer by the restraine, (2) unified leadership in the restrainer, (3) hierarchy of national security objectives between allies, and (4) the creation of an alternate pathway for the restraine. Pressman, 14-15.
36 George Liska, *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), 36. For example, “Prussia under Bismarck retained *his* alternative option in the target-state (Russia) to check the ally [Austria]; and to make up for a strict interpretation of the defense commitment… [but the] prerequisites of effective restrain collapsed when post-Bismarckian Germany threw up the Russian option.” Ibid., 35.
37 Cha, 195.
38 Ibid., footnotes.
39 Snyder, 13.
40 Liska, 74.
intervention in an ally’s decisionmaking may extend beyond a veto into the formulation of policy itself.⁴¹ The more serious the commitment, the deeper a guarantor state will want consultation.⁴²

Snyder provides a useful list of the many methods of restraint scholars have identified. States can (1) “threaten defection;” (2) “withhold diplomatic support… in a particular dispute;” (3) “insist on consultation;” (4) “urg[e] the ally to make concessions;” (5) use “reassurance;” (6) “point out that the alliance is defensive only;” and (7) “say that certain minor interests of the ally are not ‘worth’ a war.”⁴³ But he continues that “[t]he credibility of restraining threats will also be affected by the restrainer’s degree of commitment to the alliance.”⁴⁴ This key point, which most have at least acknowledged, has nevertheless been underappreciated for US alliances. America’s style of extended deterrence is unprecedented in the modern history of sovereign states. The absolute character of its commitments severely constrains its ability to employ the first and traditionally most important method of restraint: threatening abandonment or nonsupport for a risk-prone ally. Such threats are simply not credible in the American system of forward deployments.

_Forum deployments and automaticity in post-WWII American alliances_

Making a commitment credible is all about sending signals to adversaries and allies. Morrow, for example, points out it is necessary to _prove_ commitments are credible because international anarchy provides no ultimate assurances: No sovereign of sovereigns imposes

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⁴¹ “To be meaningful, participation in consultations must not stop with the right (and duty) to approve the policies of the major ally or allies. The range of participation must extend to formulation and implementation of alliance policy.” Ibid., 73.
⁴² “The scope of consultation depends on the immediate needs and conveniences of allies; but these in turn reflect the tendency of an alliance to be ‘limited’ or ‘total’ in terms of the degree of liability that allies commonly assume for each other’s actions and interests.” Ibid., 75.
⁴³ Snyder, 322-324.
⁴⁴ Ibid., 327
direct repercussions when a state fails to fulfill a contractual agreement. Thus, “the existence of credibility as an issue implies that states cannot predict one another’s actions. States considering the use of force cannot know whether their target’s allies will come to its aid.” To be persuasive, signaling must create a cost of some kind. Otherwise, “[i]f there were a signal that would always deter others by convincing them of the willingness of allies to come to one another’s aid, then even states that had no intention of aiding their allies would wish to send that signal.” As James D. Fearson mentions, states confront this credibility problem when they want to “convey to other states what are one’s ‘vital interests,’ which are precisely those interests over which a state is willing to fight if challenged.” A commitment requires the visible sacrifice of some highly valued goal or resource as a reflection of the value the state places on its ally’s security.

There are multiple ways allies can send costly signals, but Fearson identifies two broad categories: A state can either “sink costs” or “tie its hands.” Whereas sunk-cost signals “are costly for the state to take in the first place but do not affect the relative value of fighting versus acquiescing in a challenge,” tying hands involves “staking an action that increases the costs of backing down if the would-be challenger actually challenges but otherwise entails no costs if no challenge materializes.” Tying one’s hands creates domestic or international “audience costs,” such that if it fails to fulfill its obligations, the protector state will face challenges to its prestige and governing officials will face political pressure from voters and other domestic power groups.

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45 Morrow, 68. Also see Snyder, 325.
46 “Separation of types requires that sending the signal entails a cost.” Ibid., 68-69.
48 Fearson, 70.
49 Morrow, 71.
Beyond creating audience costs, the most important element in the tying hands approach is the elimination of the alternative options, like abandonment, that one might rationally consider in a military crisis. In the definitive work on commitment, Thomas C. Schelling reminds us that persuading others of our willingness to fight often requires “having those intentions, even deliberately acquiring them.”\(^{50}\) The commitment process here entails a differentiation between a current self and a future self, with the former locking in the behavior of the latter when he might have strong temptations to act otherwise. Or, perhaps more accurately, when there is domestic dissension over alliance decisions, certain officials remove the escape routes their opponents would use during a crisis. “The process of surrendering and destroying options that we might have been expected to find too attractive in an emergency” leaves only one possible option.\(^{51}\) Otherwise, “if the commitment is ill defined and ambiguous—if we leave ourselves loopholes through which to exit—our opponent will expect us to be under strong temptation to make a graceful exit (or even a somewhat graceless one) and he may be right.”\(^{52}\) Deterrence is bolstered when the adversary believes a state has no choice but to do what it says it is going to do—that it cannot fail to act.\(^{53}\)

\(^{50}\) Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 36, 43-44. On the decision to establish a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan: “We were not merely *communicating* an intention or obligation we already had, but actually *enhancing* the obligation in the process. The congressional message was not, ‘Since we are obliged to defend Formosa, we may as well show it.’ Rather: ‘In case we were not sufficiently committed to impress you, now we are. We hereby oblige ourselves. Behold us in the public ritual of getting ourselves genuinely committed.’ ” Ibid., 50.

\(^{51}\) Schelling, 44.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., 47-48.

\(^{53}\) “If commitments could be undone by declaration they would be worthless in the first place. The whole purpose of verbal or ritualistic commitments, of political and diplomatic commitments, of efforts to attach honor and reputation to a commitment, is to make the commitment manifestly hard to get out of on short notice. Even the commitments not deliberately incurred, and the commitments that embarrass one in unforeseen circumstances, cannot be undone cheaply.” Ibid., 66.
Choosing to bind oneself to a certain line of action is closely related to the “rationality of irrationality.” In Schelling’s words, a “paradox of deterrence is that it does not always help to be, or to be believed to be, fully rational, cool-headed, and in control of oneself or of one’s country.” According to his White House Chief of Staff, Richard Nixon had an explicit “madman theory” of diplomacy, and Niccolò Machiavelli once advised that it may be “a very wise thing to simulate craziness at the right time.” Lawrence Freedman writes that in nuclear deterrence, “choice could be wholly conceded… by making the threatened action automatic, beyond recall unless stopped by an act of compliance…. pass a line and nothing could be done to stop the denotation and the shared calamity.” This doomsday device was the inspiration for Stanley Kubrick’s film Dr. Strangelove, but the technique extends to conventional deterrence as well. As Freedman explains, “[t]here were some precedents: the Greeks burning their bridges to show they would stand and fight against the Persians; the Spanish conqueror Cortez conspicuously burning his ships in front of the Aztecs.” In his The Art of War commentary, for example, Du Mu interprets Sun Tzu to say that “[w]hen your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home.” If we again take every IR scholar’s favorite analogy, the game of

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55 Schelling, 37.
56 “I call it the Madman Theory, Bob. I want the North Vietnamese to believe I've reached the point where I might do anything to stop the war. We'll just slip the word to them that, ‘for God's sake, you know Nixon is obsessed about communism. We can't restrain him when he's angry—and he has his hand on the nuclear button’ and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris in two days begging for peace.” H. R. Haldeman, The Ends of Power (New York, NY: Times Books, 1978), 122.
58 Freedman, 164.
59 Ibid.
chicken, it is the equivalent of cutting the brake line and throwing away the steering wheel.\textsuperscript{61} The purpose is to publicly demonstrate you have removed the option of withdrawal.

This discussion is critical for an explanation of US deterrence strategy because America’s style of alliance is distinctly different from the European modal that preceded it. At the close of the Second World War, American officials were convinced that informal commitments to defend Western Europe against Russian invasion would not believed. Instead, the United States would establish formal alliances in peacetime and occupy the territory of its allies. Without these mechanisms, they assumed, stated US intentions would not be credible. Osgood explains why:

\begin{quote}
[I]n light of the isolationist history of the United States and the conviction that a firm advance commitment to the defense of Europe was essential to avoid another world war with belated American intervention, that members of the Brussels pact and the Truman-Acheson administration believed that a formal alliance was essential to establish a credible American pledge of military assistance.\textsuperscript{62}
\end{quote}

Likewise, Fearson writes that “[t]he costly US investment in NATO is… one where the justification for permanently stationing troops in Europe rested in part on the idea that the domestic and international audience costs created by an alliance treaty alone would not have convincingly committed the United States to fight.”\textsuperscript{63} Here he is talking about Western Europe, but ensuring credibility was just as vital in East Asia. Washington felt compelled to strike up alliances in the Pacific, Cha reasons, because “[a]mbivalence toward making major military commitments in Asia was a hallmark of the United States’ global strategy before World War II.”\textsuperscript{64} As Schelling opined, “[t]o have told the Soviets in the late 1940s that, if they attacked, we were obliged to defend Europe [or Asia, for that matter] might not have been wholly convincing.”\textsuperscript{65} “American demonstrations of intent, peacetime maneuvers, and conspicuous

\textsuperscript{62} Osgood, \textit{Alliances}, 42.
\textsuperscript{63} Fearson, 87.
\textsuperscript{64} Cha, 167.
\textsuperscript{65} Schelling, 47.
preparations for airlift,” Osgood wrote, “may not adequately compensate for the psychological
disadvantage, in terms of possible provocation as well as loss of credibility, of having to move
forces to a point of danger rather than having American forces already in the area.” It would be
an “agonizing decision for the President of the United States to move forces to the scene of a
crisis,” and America’s allies “cannot count on forces stationed in the United States being
earmarked for assistance to them in a time of competing needs.”

Ever since, the keystone of extended deterrence has been “tripwire” garrisons of
American troops. US overseas deployments are partly for the purpose of access and the
extension of power projection, but their main function is the absolute guarantee. Schelling
argued that “[t]he difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the
difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken, and the threats that
have to be made credible.” Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has
therefore tried to convince its friends, its enemies, and itself that it considers allied territory to be
as inviolable as its own—just as worth fighting and dying to protect. When a despairing skeptic
or hopeful opportunist has asked the US government whether it is really willing to trade New
York for Hamburg, or Los Angeles for Taipei, the response is a resounding yes, even if the
speaker is not actually certain of the answer himself. America stations soldiers abroad so it does
not have to decide when the time comes. The choice has already been made. Schelling writes that
“[n]otions like ‘trip wire’ or ‘plate glass window,’ though oversimplified, were attempts to

66 Osgood, _Alliances_, 141.
67 Ibid., 92.
68 Schelling, 36.
express this role. And while ‘trip wire’ is a belittling term to describe an army, the role is not a demeaning one.”

The positioning of large numbers of American troops in Berlin, West Germany, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and elsewhere is not so dissimilar to Kubrick’s doomsday device. The key element is automaticity. American commitments may not require an immediate military response legally, but forward deployments guarantee involvement in fact. Technically speaking, “there was no automatic commitment, because the treaty left to each party the right to decide when an armed attack had taken place,” but the “quality of automaticity was greatly reinforced later by the stationing of American ground forces in Europe and by the integration of the defenses of parties in the North Atlantic Treaty.” In a more modern example, the Defense Department’s (DoD) 1995 Nye Report states, “our treaty commitment and the presence of United States troops in South Korea help deter any North Korean aggression by making it unmistakably clear that the United States would automatically and immediately be involved in any such conflict.”

Automaticity does not even require a garrison force strong enough to defend itself. According to Samuel P. Huntington, military forces “may deter simply by being in place and thus increasing the uncertainties and potential costs to an aggressor, even though they could not mount an effective defense. Allied forces in Berlin have performed this role for years.” In a more gruesome but probably more candid expression, Schelling argued the Berlin garrison in particular was never meant to defeat a superior Red Army in combat: “What can 7,000 American

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71 Schelling, 47.
72 “The reasoning was probably that, whether we wished to be or not, we could not fail to be involved.” Ibid.
73 Osgood, Alliances, 44. “The importance of American forces in Europe is not primarily their speed of reaction to aggression but rather the assurance of their virtually automatic involvement in the event of aggression and their ability to test the potential aggressor’s intentions by their very presence without generating the excitement and provocation of a major military maneuver.” Ibid., 141.
troops do, or 12,000 Allied troops? Bluntly, they can die. They can die heroically, dramatically, and in a manner that guarantees that the action cannot stop there.”76 By “leav[ing] the Soviet Union in no doubt that the United States would be automatically involved in the event of any attack on Europe,” the sacrifice of “more troops being run over by the Soviet Army than we could afford to see defeated” ensured American deterrence in Germany, as well as East Asia.77

But while this may be desirable for assuaging allies’ fears of abandonment and adversaries’ hopes for US noninvolvement, it has also stripped alliance managers of their primary method of inducing restraint. So long as the removal of American troops from allied soil is not on the table, threats of defection lack any coherent bargaining leverage. Making the abandonment of an ally in a crisis impossible is the point, after all, of the strategy of automaticity. This means that in the post-WWII era, alliances have witnessed “several developments that have reduced their flexibility,” such as “their primarily deterrent function” and “the increased importance of peacetime military forces.”78 The “consequence of these new constraints… is that intra-alliance functions have assumed greater importance.”79

Others have not put as much emphasis on this, partly because scholars like Snyder focused on European alliances in the pre-World War I era.80 Because US negotiators have had little bargaining power over the ultimate question of the alliance, however, a different model of restraint must apply to post-WWII American alliances. As I explain in the theory section, it is concerned with burdensharing.

76 Schelling, 47.
77 “They represent the pride, the honor, and the reputation of the United States government and its armed forces; and they can apparently hold the entire Red Army at bay.” Ibid.
78 Osgood, Alliances, 30-31.
79 Ibid., 34.
80 Snyder’s definition of commitment is a better fit for a different historical epoch: “Existing analyses define [commitment], alternatively or simultaneously, as a physical act or move that forecloses all options but one, or as an arrangement of values that favors one option over the others, or as an obligation to fulfill a promise. I choose to define it in the second sense, as an arrangement of values.” Snyder, 169.
Economic (rather than strategic) explanations of alliance burdensharing

Studies of alliance burdensharing tend to wear an economic rather than a strategic lens. They begin by assuming the United States prefers to pay as little as possible towards the “public good” of security, and they lament the ‘freeriding problem’ in American alliances. In Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser’s model, any member of the alliance would like to freeride off the balancing efforts of its partners. Doing so might be feasible because

(1) if the common goal is achieved, everyone who shares this goal automatically benefits, or, in other words, nonpurchasers cannot be kept from consuming the good, and (2) if the good is available to any one person in a group, it is or can be made available to the other members of the group at little or no marginal cost.

The reality, however, is US allies piggyback off American commitments, not the other way around. Because they cannot exclude smaller members from enjoying the security the alliance provides, there is a tendency for larger members in asymmetric alliances to pay proportionally more than their fair share.

In 1968, Osgood bemoaned the fact that “[t]wo decades after a war from which [Western Europeans] have long since recovered economically, they show few signs of fulfilling the original postwar expectation that they would assume the major burden of their own defense in return for an American guarantee.” Likewise, according to Huntington’s estimates, in 1985 the US was responsible for more than 70% of total defense spending and 40%

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81 Olson and Zeckhauser were trying to explain a perplexing empirical anomaly: “The European members of NATO are much nearer the front line than the United States, and they are less able to defend themselves alone. Thus, it might be supposed that they would have an interest in devoting larger proportions of their resources to NATO that does the United States, rather than the smaller proportions they actually contribute.” Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” in Alliances: Latent War Communities in the Contemporary World, ed. Francis A. Beer (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), 122.
82 Ibid., 122-123.
83 Morrow also mentions the alliance freeriding problem. Morrow, 77.
84 Lake writes that hierarchical alliance relationships encourage freeriding: “The shift of residual control from one partner to the other distorts incentives for the efficient use of resources in the subordinate member of the dyad.” Lake, 17. Snyder also argues that “the logic of collective goods undercuts the balance of power theory, however. The collective good, of course, is security… if anyone supplies it (by stopping the aggressor), all parties enjoy it whether or not they contributed to its supply.” Snyder, 50.
85 Osgood, Alliances, 8.
of total personnel between NATO and Japan, despite having only 47.5% of the total GDP and less than one-third of the total allied population.\textsuperscript{86} In other words, the US may have been spending more on the defense of Western Europe than Western Europe was paying itself, and American figures for East Asia were twice as large as Japan’s.\textsuperscript{87}

Olson and others do mention what they mean by a “larger” member depends in part on the different strategic valuations. Whoever “place[s] a higher absolute value on the public good… [will] bear a disproportionate share of the burden” because it lacks credible bargaining power.\textsuperscript{88} This player has usually been Washington in the post-World War II era. As soon as the alliance treaty is signed, “the larger powers are immediately deprived of their strongest bargaining weapon—the threat that they will not help to defend the recalcitrant smaller powers—in any negotiations about the sharing of the common burden,” especially because US “alliances are often involved in situations that contain a strong element of irreversibility.”\textsuperscript{89} For very asymmetric alliances, moreover, any success in getting small allies to increase their share of the collective burden is likely to not be worth the effort, since “it would expect only a relatively small addition to the alliance force from the small nation.”\textsuperscript{90}

Olson and Snyder offer two scenarios in which the freeriding problem may be overcome. First, Olson mentions a “special case” to his general theory of burdensharing: “During periods of all-out war or exceptional insecurity, it is likely that defense is (or is nearly) a superior good, and in such circumstances alliances will not have any tendency toward disproportionate burden sharing.”\textsuperscript{91} Given extreme danger, “the more concerned nation would not only put a higher

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Olson and Zeckhauser, 124.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 132-133.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 134.
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 128.
valuation on the alliance’s military capacity, but would bear a share of the total alliance costs that was even greater than its share of the total benefits.”

Snyder likewise argues, “although the collective goods logic prevails early in an aggressor’s career, the balance of power eventually triumphs.” Second, an explicit distancing strategy may foster enough fear in an allied state for it to increase indigenous defense spending. States will hedge when abandonment is a serious possibility. Thus, “a decline in amity, unity, and community of interest among allies” tends to produce a “greater ratio of private to collective benefits.”

All of this analysis, however, works within a paradigm that assumes states wish to pay at little as possible. The practical application of this research, which has been adopted as a central tenet by many neoclassical realists, is that the United States should distance itself from its allies to stop freeriding. As I argue, however, there are critical strategic reasons for not thinking of freeriding as problem. For decades, in fact, American officials have explicitly or implicitly discouraged the growth of allied military expenditure.

Theory

My theory, simply, is that burdensharing affects alliance restraint. In asymmetric alliances, especially post-WWII US alliances in which extended deterrence has been guaranteed by the deployment of significant forces on allied territory, officials confront a ‘burdensharing dilemma.’ There is a tradeoff between how much collective burden a protectorate carries and how much control over entrapment the protector can exert. For the sake of bolstering collective deterrence and relieving immense financial burdens, alliance managers have wanted allies to

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92 Ibid., 130.
93 Snyder, 51.
94 Mancur and Zeckhauser, 131.
95 For an example, see Justin Logan, “China, America, and the Pivot to Asia,” Cato Institute, Policy Analysis #717 (January 2013), 12.
assume a more proactive security posture. However, they have not wanted the growth of independent power to reduce Washington’s ability to restrain. Policymakers condition alliance policy with reference to fearing a loss of control. At different times, and often simultaneously, Americans have wanted their allies to be both strong and weak.

There have been hints of this dilemma in the political science literature, but there has been no systematic exploration and refinement of the theory. A connection to how automatic commitments either create or exacerbate the burdensharing dilemma has also been lacking. Sun Tzu, for example, might also be read to warn against bolstering other power groups, even allies, in an imperial system: “Do not cultivate balance in all-under-heaven.”

Liska mentions that when trying to restrain one another, allies worry about each other’s relative strength. Because “the patterns of roles and claims within an alliance will change with the rise and decline of national capabilities,” “[u]nequal gains arouse fears… lest [the rising state] impose his conflict as the dominant issue for the alliance as a whole.”

Timothy W. Crawford remarks that “pivotal deterrence is more likely to succeed the more the military balance favors the pivot [the protector state] over the adversaries [the protectorate and the enemy].” Olson and Zeckhauser write in a footnote that in some scenarios, allied “nations may make policy concessions in order to get other members to assume a greater share of alliance costs.”

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97 “The procedures of consultation do not occur in a vacuum; they are conditioned by the relative capabilities of the allies and the adversaries.” Liska, 86-87.
98 Ibid., 88-89. He specifically addresses the issue of nuclear proliferation within an alliance: “Considering the alliance as a whole, the diffusion of nuclear capabilities might diminish cohesion. Allies forfeit the feeling of being responsible for each other’s defense; they come instead to fear involvement in a partner’s unilateral response to probing actions by the adversary.” The same might easily be said for less apocalyptic weapons, like independent, offensive missile capabilities that could be used in preemptive strikes. The only difference is the content of the warhead. Ibid., 94.
99 Crawford, 29.
100 Olson and Zeckhauser, 131.
The post-World War II era offers numerous instances of American policymakers fearing the potential application of allied military power. Cha, for example, notes that despite wanting to arm Taiwan for the sake of deterrence, the US was often more worried in the early Cold War about restraining Taiwan’s ability for independent action.¹⁰¹ This manifested in limitations and conditions placed on arms shipments.¹⁰² American officials similarly worried about South Korea’s possession of an autonomous capacity for warfighting.¹⁰³

A few scholars have actually acknowledged the burdensharing dilemma in American alliances but have explored neither the concept nor cases in great detail. Chalmers Johnson exposes the tradeoff without really understanding it as a tradeoff, instead chalkling up the apparent anomaly to strategic incoherence: “the United States has long pushed Japan to build up

¹⁰¹ “Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, was polite but firm in presenting Washington’s explicit quid pro quo: ‘[T]he U.S. has made, and is making, a heavy investment in the training, equipping and supplying of Chinese [ROC] forces. It hardly seemed fair for the Chinese [ROC] to have a completely free hand to move these forces out of the treaty area without any regard for the U.S. viewpoint.’” Cha, 171.
¹⁰² “Secretary of State Dulles warned that Chiang might use a pending shipment of U.S. F-84 aircraft against the mainland and called for the secret curtailment of arms shipments to Taiwan until Chiang committed to U.S. demands: ‘I have your memorandum of March 31 with reference to the worries of the JCS arising from the delivery of US F-84 aircraft to Formosa. I share these worries. . . . We are attempting to get an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek that he will not use the new equipment we give him against the China mainland without our prior consent. . . . I believe that the Defense Department should suspend any deliveries of aircraft capable of attacking the mainland until we get the political agreement we want.’ Two action items that emerged from an April 1953 NSC meeting reflected U.S. entrapment fears and a desire to use bilateral ties to exercise control over the United States’ rogue ally: ‘1) The U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific should be instructed to expedite obtaining a commitment from the Chinese Nationalist Government that the Chinese Nationalist forces will not engage in offensive operations considered by the United States to be inimical to the best interests of the United States; 2) Pending such a commitment, further shipments to the Chinese Nationalist Government of jet planes from the United States should be stopped and the transfer to the Chinese Nationalist Government of jet planes already shipped should be delayed.’” Ibid, 171-2.
¹⁰³ “[U.S. ambassador to South Korea John] Muccio’s cable to Washington in November 1949 framed the dilemma: ‘We were in a very difficult position, a very subtle position, because if we gave Rhee and his cohorts what they wanted, they could have started to move north the same as the North started to move south. And the onus would have been on us.’” Ibid, 174. “As an additional restraint, both Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles were wary of providing tanks or other offensive weaponry to Rhee. Dulles, in particular, opposed the transfer of jet aircraft as part of the U.S.-sponsored military modernization program in Korea on the grounds that these ‘mobile instruments of war’ should not be given to a country that ‘has a vested interest in starting a third world war.’ Dulles wanted Rhee to commit—as Chiang Kai-shek had done—not to use the planes against the North without explicit permission from the United States. Later, when the U.S. military withdrew four divisions from the Korean Peninsula following the declaration of a ceasefire, the question arose as to how much equipment the United States would leave behind as part of South Korea’s military modernization program. The Koreans wanted it all, but Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson bluntly stated: ‘Well, we will try to argue out what we think you need, what we think we can let you have, and tell you what it is. . . . Of course, frankly, we don’t want to give you enough equipment so you start the war up again.’” Ibid., 175-6.
exactly the same military power it is supposed to be containing.” Peter Liberman recognizes the twin goals of American alliance policy, burdensharing and control: “Primacy and nonproliferation goals would be compromised by Germany and Japanese renationalization [of military power and policy], however gradual. U.S. interests in greater allied contributions…, however, have softened U.S. opposition.” Osgood also alludes to the tension, mentioning containment of communism and containment of allies in the same breath. David S. Yost mentions a “problem” which for him seems solvable: “One of the main challenges for U.S. officials will be to find ways to persuade America's allies to accept more defense burdens without a correspondingly great decrease in U.S. influence in alliance policymaking.” Richard N. Haass has claimed that the US should encourage allies to rearm, but only so much and only under American guidance. Thomas J. Christensen has twice identified a dilemma between the

104 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), 60. “In addition, administration and Pentagon officials have urged their Japanese equivalents to be strategically bolder in deploying Japanese defense forces in Asia… This new, exceedingly vague doctrine indirectly acknowledges that the purpose of American forces in Japan is neither to defend nor to contain Japan but simply by their presence to prevent the assumed dangers of their absence.” Ibid., 61-62.
106 “Americans have dreamed of escaping the burdens of preponderance through the emergence of a pluralistic world in which progressively more interdependent states in homogenous regions would be largely responsible for their own defense… But the price of such a mitigation of preponderance will be the sacrifice of direct control and influence, as in the relationship of protector to dependent, for more indirect methods.” Osgood, Alliances, 13-14.
107 “These Asian-Pacific alliances, as their terms suggest, were intended, first, to protect American deterrent power against communist expansion and, second, to serve as political frameworks for building up local security forces… and restraining the foreign policies of allies.” Ibid., 80.
109 “Despite the end of the Cold War, [the U.S.-Japanese] alliance continues to provide a useful umbrella for Japan’s participation in the world, making it less necessary for Japan to become self-reliant for its own defense and thus avoiding a chain of events that could prove costly and destabilizing in the region. In this way, the American alliance with Japan performs a function similar to that with Germany… The goal should be a greater but still constrained Japanese military role so as not to alarm Japan’s neighbors and trigger regional realignments.” Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997), 85. “The question arises, though, as to why the United States should not simply spend less and wait for its friends and allies to do more. After all, both Japan and Europe could spend considerably more on promoting security and stability. The short answer, however, is that they probably wouldn’t—they lack a domestic basis to do more—and we might not welcome it if they did. A relatively modest Germany and Japanese military effort is not without its reassuring features. And when we do object, we need to keep in mind that we would suffer as well if conflict and misery increased as a result of our doing less and others not acting responsibly. Again, we pay a price—at times a
“somewhat contradictory goals” of greater burdensharing and the US role as a “regional stabilizer.” He writes, “All things being equal, alliance leaders… would have liked their weaker allies to shoulder a good bit of the alliance burden. On the other hand, they would have liked the allies to respect and follow the alliance leader’s general line.” The main obstacle to this is “[a]n ally’s increased independence reduces the ability of its partners to restrain it and thereby increases the risk of entrapment for those partners if the maverick ally behaves in belligerent ways.”

The burdensharing dilemma essentially poses two ideal types or choices. A protector state can either accept a low level of burdensharing in return for a high level of control, or it can accept a high level of burdensharing with a low level of control. The key is that as burdensharing increases within an asymmetric alliance, especially one where unilateral commitments are guaranteed by the basing of US troops, there are inherent tendencies towards a loss of control over the risk of entrapment.

For most of the post-WWII history of Americans alliances, policymakers have tried to not choose between the options the burdensharing dilemma offers. They have grabbed both horns of the dilemma rather than one. To some extent, they succeeded by adopting methods like a division of roles instead of just a division of labor, deep norms and mechanisms of consultation, and a level of operational control over allied militaries that is difficult to reconcile with liberal

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111 Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 10. In other words, “[t]he dilemma of burden-sharing versus political cohesion sets up a strategic bargaining situation whereby there can be trade-offs between what an ally agrees to contribute to an alliance and how much it is willing to toe the alliance leader’s line in its external relations… Efforts to get allies to do more can also trigger unintended negative reactions among allies and adversaries alike.” Ibid.
notions of international equality and sovereignty. Nevertheless, the high burdensharing-high control option is not a stable equilibrium; it is no equilibrium at all. When a protectorate significantly increases the share of the collective burden it carries, it will demand more control over its own units and a greater degree of independence from its protector. Inevitably, the allied military will be mainly used for the national purposes of the ally itself, not its guarantor.

When America has tried to restrain its allies, it has been concerned with two distinct but intertwined types of entrapment: ‘tactical entrapment’ and ‘strategic entrapment.’ Tactical entrapment refers to the physical ability of an ally to use its military capabilities to start a war. Elements include offensive military capabilities and doctrines that are involved in actual military operations. Like tactical entrapment, strategic entrapment is concerned with the growth of an ally’s independent power, but it is more about system effects. Americans consistently feared that the growth of Japanese or German power would upset regional collective security—sparking arms races and destabilizing security competitions. These effects would be beyond American control and could start wars to which the US was obligated.

Methods and scope

This thesis is more an exercise in policy studies than in social science, and more a theory of foreign policy than a theory of international relations. I am more concerned with American policymaking and strategic thinking than that of American allies, although the latter will

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112 One way of ameliorating this dilemma is by seizing control of an ally’s military: “U.S. archives reveal that the Eisenhower administration’s desire to control its South Korean ally was so intense that the United States opted to retain operational command authority of all ROK military forces on the peninsula within the alliance. Rhee originally gave operational command authority of ROK forces to the commander in chief of UN Forces (i.e., the United States) during the Korean War on July 14, 1950...The rationale for this extraordinary usurpation of state sovereignty was not only to facilitate combined warfighting capabilities, but also to restrain South Korea from undertaking aggressive unilateral actions against the North.” Cha, 176. Eisenhower also used the aircraft carriers of the Seventh Fleet to “neutralize” the Taiwan Strait, preventing the either the ROC or PRC from using it as an invasion route. Ibid., 169-170.
undoubtedly come out in the following chapters. My case study method is better than a quantitative method for this effort. Strategy is understood intuitively and qualitatively, and there are a limited number of relevant cases, making statistical analysis less meaningful. For a first attempt at a theory creation, case studies better illustrate the logic and importance of a model.

For my two cases, I have chosen the US-Japan alliance during the Cold War and the US-Japan alliance during the Rebalance to Asia. There are several reasons why. First, Japan is as intrinsically important a case in Asia as West Germany was in Europe. Second, in line with Mill’s method of difference, the two cases have practically everything in common save burdensharing. In the bipolar Cold War, the United States accepted a low level of burdensharing from Japan in return for the maintenance of control, while in the Pivot to Asia, the reality of economic multipolarity is forcing the United States to accept a higher level of burdensharing and a greater risk of entrapment. Third, the case is the most relevant and of greatest interest to current and future policymakers who must grapple with a US-Japan alliance that is visibly and rapidly undergoing fundamental changes in response to the rise of China.

Presumably, my theory is applicable to any alliance relationship in which forward deployments ensure the automatic involvement of the United States in its allies’ wars. Cold War cases include South Korea, Taiwan until the termination of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1980, the Philippines until the expulsion of the Seventh Fleet in 1991, and West Germany until the fall of the Soviet Union. Today, South Korea and Japan are obviously applicable. With new small deployments being planned for the Philippines, Australia, Singapore, and possibly Vietnam today, there is also the distinct possibility that the United States is skipping the stage of dominance and jumping straight to the stage of commitment without control. My theory may
also be relevant to alliance or alignment cases without physically assured commitment that
nevertheless near guarantees, but the cases I consider are more clear-cut.
Chapter 3: Burdensharing in the Cold War

Introduction

Burdensharing was a point of contention in US-Japan alliance management throughout the Cold War. The most common narrative is a simplistic picture of disagreement between America and Japan. With “the one weary, the other wary,” the United States repeatedly asked Japan to do more, and Japan opposed sinking any further costs. Yet, the US approach to Japanese burdensharing was hardly monolithic. Such analysis masks the complexity of Washington’s objectives. US attitudes towards Japanese rearmament actually revolved around two competing concerns. On the one hand, American officials wanted Japan to play a greater role in both cold and hot wars against Communism in Asia. On the other, many feared the revival of Japanese military power would cause instability both within and without the Asian ‘Free World’ and that the US would be unable to control independent Japanese power.

As a general rule, the imperative of collective defense (i.e. lifting up Japan) often won out over the imperative of collective security (i.e. suppressing Japan). This can be attributed partly to a compromise gradually accepted between US demands and Japanese opposition. The fact of Japanese opposition was important in itself, since it probably dampened concerns in the US that Japan was interested in becoming a great power. Also critical was the fact that Japanese territory rarely came under direct military threat for the duration of the Cold War, making genuine scenarios of tactical entrapment unlikely. However, the evidence shows that voices fearful of unleashing Japanese power persisted within high circles for most of the period. Concerns over

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114 As Cha says of this dual imperative, “The United States therefore saw the mutual defense treaty with Japan, signed on September 8, 1951, as serving two purposes. One was to build a bulwark against communism. The other was to control, manage, and restrain Japan’s reintegration into the international system.” Cha, 185.
both meanings of burdensharing—greater collective defense and instability and loss of control—often existed simultaneously within the minds of the same policymakers. At different times, trepidation at Japanese power successfully countered desire of it. The influence of the strategic entrapment fear can be seen even when the US did convince Japan to rearm, since Americans did their best to establish mechanisms of control over Japanese defense decisionmaking and rolesharing.

The new picture that emerges is one of US support for Japanese rearmament in times when a belief that it could be controlled predominated, much greater caution when beliefs that American control could slip gained ascendancy—as well as the manipulation of Japanese military structures to facilitate control.

**The End of WWII and the Early Cold War**

As with Germany, US plans for Japan in the postwar era originally aimed at ensuring Japan would never again threaten Asia or the United States. Many American policymakers welcomed Japan’s annihilation. In May 1943, one Navy Department official argued, “Japan should be bombed so that there was little left of its civilization, so that the country could not begin to recuperate fifty years.” The special adviser to the Secretary of State agreed, stating in December that “[i]t would be quite possible for us to let the Japanese nation disappear.”

Although couched in less extreme terms, all policy documents prior to and immediately following the Japanese surrender were based on the principle of Japan’s total demilitarization. The August 29, 1945 Initial Post-Surrender Policy Directive for Japan, for example, stated in no

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116 Quoted in ibid., 382.
uncertain terms that “[d]isarmament and demilitarization are the primary tasks of the military occupation” and forbid the existence of any Japanese military, police, or even civil aviation capacity.\footnote{117} A June 11 draft of the document envisioned the “creation of conditions that will insure [sic] that Japan will not again become a menace to the peace and security of the world.”\footnote{118} There was a general consensus that US annexation of Okinawa would help prevent the resurgence of Japanese militarism.\footnote{119} As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur was the foremost proponent of this line of thinking. His February 1946 guidance for the new constitution ordered the renunciation of Japan’s right to make war and maintain armed forces “even for preserving its own security.”\footnote{120}

With the coming of the Cold War, prompted in particular by the Korean War, American policy towards Japan began a great “Reverse Course.” The demilitarization regime, or what Victor Cha has called the ‘alpha option,’ was gradually rejected because, in essence, it meant Japan could not help kill Communists in the Far East.\footnote{121} In fact, anticipating America’s global struggle with the Soviet Union after the fall of Japan, US officers almost immediately began setting the foundations for new Japanese naval and intelligence organizations, without the knowledge of either MacArthur or Washington.\footnote{122} Lieutenant-General Robert Eichelberger, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, most senior members of the Pentagon, many in the State Department, and \textsl{Newsweek} editor Harry Kern became enthusiastic supporters of strengthening the military of Japan.
America’s new protectorate.\(^{123}\) If the United States wanted to defend Western Europe and the Western Pacific from further Communist advances, imperial Germany and Japan would have to be resurrected, albeit under American tutelage.\(^{124}\) With Japan rearmed, Eichelberger argued in 1948, Russia would have to divide its forces between Europe and Asia.\(^{125}\) In May 1947, Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson demanded that “the greatest workshops of Europe and Asia, Germany and Japan,” be put back to work.\(^{126}\) Then in April 1950, he and State Department Policy Planning Director Paul Nitze wrote in NSC-68 that containment required “creating global ‘situations of strength.’ ”\(^{127}\) The irony of this position was not lost on Navy Secretary James Forrestal. He told President Truman that defeating Communism necessitated the rebirth of Germany and Japan, “the two countries we have just destroyed.”\(^{128}\) By the time of the Korean War, MacArthur’s demilitarization campaign had been thoroughly revised. The Japanese Constitution now only renounced the threat or use of force “as a means of settling disputes.”\(^{129}\) The United States hoped to eventually offload many of its regional responsibilities on Japan, especially in the Korean Peninsula.\(^{130}\)

Yet even then, many American officials, themselves recently a target, were aware that promoting full-scale Japanese rearmament entailed certain costs. They had significant

\(^{123}\) Christensen, *Worse than a Monolith*, 35.


\(^{125}\) Welfield, 30.

\(^{126}\) Quoted in Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at Fifty,” 34.

\(^{127}\) Quoted in LaFeber, 283.

\(^{128}\) Quoted in Michael Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997): 14. “‘The original simple problem, ‘How can we hold down Japan?… has been replaced by the complex proposition, ‘How can we hold up Japan?’… It as though the hero and villain of a Japanese kabuki play had exchanged roles.’ ” LaFeber, 275.

\(^{129}\) Welfield, 64.

\(^{130}\) “In October 1949 George Kennan had told Dean Rusk that the United States should have ‘no objection’ to Japanese preponderance in Korea. Japanese control, Kennan suggested, ‘was to be preferred to Korean mismanagement, Chinese interference, or Russian bureaucracy’. ” Ibid., 91.
reservations about the ‘gamma option’ because the prospect of a remilitarized Japan deeply unsettled its neighbors.\footnote{Cha, 183.} In 1951, John Foster Dulles proposed to Australia, New Zealand, and other Asian governments the idea of rearming Japan and creating a Pacific Pact similar to NATO. According to US diplomat John Allison, Australian Foreign Minister Percy Spender became so infuriated he looked like he “would burst a blood vessel.”\footnote{Quoted in Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 33.} The Philippines and New Zealand voiced similar anxieties over the lack of controls on Japanese military adventurism.\footnote{Ibid., 36. “New Zealand’s foreign minister, Frederick Doidge, told Dulles that ‘Japan has been a nightmare to New Zealand and that the possibility of its resurgence was regarded with horror.’ ” Cha, 185.} George Kennan became particularly wary of significant Japanese rearmament over time. Dulles, the future Secretary of State under the Dwight Eisenhower administration, eventually came around to a view more similar to MacArthur than the Joint Chiefs, saying in 1952 that Japan “has a unique capacity for good or evil” and has “historically been susceptible to militarism.”\footnote{Quoted in LaFeber, 297-298. “Dulles privately told the Senate that any Russian attack on the Australians and New Zealanders ‘seems… very remote,’ but ‘they had the hot breath of Japan’s aggression blowing right on them’ in the early 1940s, and fear remained.’ ”} The DoD’s plans to turn Japan into a “major\footnote{Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 29. Emphasis original.} offensive air base,” he believed, could result in “overmilitarization,” which was not in America’s interest.\footnote{Cha, 183.}

Knowledge of these dangers, as well as strong opposition from the conservative Japanese government, resulted in a strategy that was a rough compromise between competing objectives. “Emerging between the alpha and gamma options,” Cha notes, “the beta option sought to create a postwar Japan that was not too weak but not too strong.”\footnote{Cha, 183.} Convinced by Dulles, Secretary of State Acheson and Defense Secretary George Marshall told the president that the nascent US-Japan alliance served a dual purpose: “assuring combined action as between the members to resist aggression from without and also to resist attack by one of the members, e.g. Japan, if
Japan should again become aggressive.”\textsuperscript{137} American policymakers continued to press their ally for greater contributions to collective defense and express frustration at its freeriding. Chief of the SCAP Economic and Scientific Bureau Major General William Marquat’s suggested the US rely on Japan more as a production center for armaments and less as a supplier of troops. His views gradually gained favor.\textsuperscript{138} In the short run, at least, Americans found enough satisfaction with Japan’s contributions of war materiel and acquiescence in hosting US military bases for the relationship to continue.

The Japanese government was satisfied as well given the limited incentives it faced to spend more on its own defense. Few thought a Soviet or Chinese attack on Japanese territory at all likely. They lacked the expeditionary capacity, for one, and Dean Acheson had already announced in January 1950 that Japan fell within the US defense perimeter. It mattered little that the Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty signed in 1952 did not explicitly obligate the United States to come to Japan’s aid. Generals like Mathew Ridgway were already acting like it did. He wrote to the Army Department that the “most vital factor in the achievement of US objectives in the Orient is the continued maintenance of Japanese faith in our commitment to guarantee the essential security of Japan.”\textsuperscript{139} MacArthur himself had come to favor a “tripwire” strategy of American troops stationed in Japan.\textsuperscript{140} Yoshida Shigeru, the first postwar prime minister, certainly recognized this. He stated in 1951 that Japan did “not have the slightest expectation that the Communist countries will invade Japan.”\textsuperscript{141} Unworried by the failure of the US to offer a legal obligation to protect Japan, Yoshida “was satisfied that ‘if Japan were invaded while

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 193.
\textsuperscript{139} Quoted in Buckley, 49.
\textsuperscript{140} Schaller, Altered States, 24.
\textsuperscript{141} Quoted in LaFeber, 286.
United States forces were actually stationed in that country they could hardly adopt a neutral attitude.’ A written guarantee was therefore unnecessary.”

Washington exerted as much control as possible over the rearmament the alliance was successful in achieving, which was not insignificant. American officials repeatedly emphasized the defensive nature of the Japanese military buildup. While in private, US policymakers noted the tight connection between Southeast Asian trade missions and securing the raw materials for Japanese rearmament, in public they were “anxious not to overemphasize the rearmament procurement side of these plans… [which] could easily be misinterpreted as a U.S. conspiracy to revive Japanese leadership of a Greater East-Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere with the added drive of U.S. backing.” To reassure Asian allies that Washington retained what Kennan called “veto power” over Tokyo, American negotiators signed a number of bilateral alliance treaties with the Philippines, Australia, and other nations. A hub-and-spokes structure quickly came to characterize American alliance system in Asia, in part because of fears of resurgent Japanese aggression. Additionally, Dulles tried to convince Yoshida to place the Police Reserve and the future Self-Defense Forces under an American Supreme Commander, similar to the wartime Operational Control mechanism in place in the US-ROK alliance to this day. Luckily for Japanese uninterested in fighting other Asians, he was not successful.

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142 Welfield, 52.
143 Buckley, 57.
144 Quoted in Schaller, Altered States, 53. Major General William Shepard did his best to obscure the military intent of Japan’s new National Police Reserve, from both other allies and the Japanese themselves. His deputy Colonel Frank Kowalski would be the “only one in the camp who will know that you are organizing an infantry battalion. Others, of course, will suspect it. But only you will know. As far as the Japanese are concerned, and that applies to all Japanese, the governor, the police and the NPR [recruits themselves]—you are organizing a police reserve. The Constitution of Japan prohibits an army. You will not call the men soldiers and you will not call the officers by any military ranks. The men are policemen and the officers will be superintendents. If you ever see a tank, it isn’t a tank, it’s a special vehicle. You can call a truck a truck.” Quoted in ibid., 45.
145 Welfield, 28.
146 Ibid.
From Korea to Vietnam

In the 1950s and early 1960s, while Washington policymakers continued to vent their frustrations with Japanese interlocutors, they did so in a routine that became almost ritualistic. Americans’ reservations about the consequences of pushing too far balanced even this relatively unenthusiastic push for large-scale rearmament. Eisenhower had promised as a presidential candidate that from now on, Asians would fight Asian wars of freedom themselves. His ‘New Look’ strategy aimed to replace US ground troops with Japanese levies.\textsuperscript{147} On Yoshida’s last trip to Washington in November 1954, Dulles pleaded for Japan “to develop the spirit and strength to resume a place as one of the great nations of the world.”\textsuperscript{148} In a fit of exasperation, diplomat John Allison avowed in the same year that the Japanese had “no abstract sense of right or wrong.”\textsuperscript{149} Far Eastern Command Chief of Staff General Carter Magruder, in an attempt to foster a “more aggressive spirit” in Japan, went so far as to suggest Washington tell Tokyo it “would view favorably the re-establishment of the Japanese Empire.”\textsuperscript{150} “It was difficult,” Secretary of State Dean Rusk had told President Lyndon Johnson in January 1964, “to draft boys from Kansas farms and Pittsburgh factories to send as riflemen to Japan which has a population of 95 million people.”\textsuperscript{151}

Yet throughout the period, and despite adamant protests from the US military, the majority view and the one held by Eisenhower himself was to look favorably on Japanese advancements to expand its military reach, while avoiding damaging the alliance by criticizing Tokyo too much.\textsuperscript{152} The president hoped for greater Japanese burdensharing when the

\textsuperscript{147} LaFeber, 297.
\textsuperscript{148} Quoted in Buckley, 61.
\textsuperscript{149} Quoted in Schaller, 71.
\textsuperscript{150} Quoted in ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{151} Quoted in Buckley, 99.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 108.
administration negotiated a Mutual Security Assistance Pact in 1952. Yet this would be limited to internal defense, since “to avoid frightening our other friends in the Pacific, we must always provide the naval and air strength required in that region by the free world.”\(^{153}\) Indeed, in June 1961, American Military High Commissioner on Okinawa Lieutenant General Paul Caraway blocked a call for greater Japanese administrative control from a special commission headed by presidential assistant Carl Kaysen. He believed that since “Japan was wholly expansionist in the 1930s, and indeed to the end of World War II – and beyond,” loosening military controls would damage the US in the long term.\(^{154}\) When Ambassador Erwin Reischauer arrived in Tokyo in April 1961, he privately told Japanese audiences, “America’s security umbrella restrained right-wing elements in Japan who favored large-scale rearmament.”\(^{155}\)

By 1954, Japan was equipped with a *de facto* army, air force, and navy. It would emerge as one of the world’s foremost military powers by the mid-60s. However, its capacity for independent, even defensive action was still fundamentally circumscribed. The May 1954 Defense Agency Establishment Bill created a Ministry of Defense, National Defense Council, Joint Staff Council, and the three Self-Defense Force armed services.\(^{156}\) By 1969, Japan’s defense budget was nearly as large as those of Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Thailand combined.\(^{157}\) Yet some scholars have suggested that neither the Second Defense Buildup (1962-66) nor the Third (1967-71) resulted in significant gains in terms of quality or mission capability. This would include

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\(^{153}\) Quoted in Schaller, 68.

\(^{154}\) Quoted in Welfield, 223-224.

\(^{155}\) Schaller, *Altered States*, 167. It is worth mentioning that Reischauer never believed Chinese or Soviet expansionism posed an existential threat to Southeast Asia, Japan, or the United States’ position in Asia, and as a result he eventually lost his post in the Johnson administration.

\(^{156}\) Welfield, 82.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., 364.
defending the home islands from invasion and protecting shipping.\textsuperscript{158} Japanese officials supported such limits because they worried that if Japan possessed substantial arms, they could be easily entrapped in US wars in the Far East. A capacity for inter-island defense “also implied a capacity, given American naval and air support, to launch an invasion of the Kuriles, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and, perhaps, the Korean peninsula of the Siberian Maritime Province.”\textsuperscript{159}

They were not wrong to suspect the US might try to restrict Japanese autonomy.\textsuperscript{160} Under the MSA aid scheme, the US supplied the vast majority of Japanese ammunition, weapons, communications equipment, and vehicles into the 1960s. The United States retained legal ownership over much of the war materiel, including approximately forty percent of the Japanese navy and naval air force in 1968. Even into the 1970s, a United States Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG-J) exercised control over Japanese strategic and tactical planning, maneuvers, and finances. In 1957, the Air Self Defence Headquarters were moved into the same building as the American Fifth Air Force in Fuchu to be monitored by their US advisers. Even its operational language was changed to English. Moreover, as Japanese ambassador to the UK Nishi Haruhiko noted, “Japan ha[d] no access to independent military intelligence with which it could counter [the contentions] of the United States side.”\textsuperscript{161} On September 2, 1959, Lieutenant-General Robert W. Burns (Fifth Air Force) had Air Marshall Matsumae Masuo (Air Defense Command) sign a secret agreement for emergency planning. The upshot was that an American intervention in Korea or elsewhere, or an attack on American forces stationed in East Asia, could automatically put Japanese Self-Defense Forces on alert.

\textsuperscript{158} Buckley, 105.  
\textsuperscript{159} Welfield, 80.  
\textsuperscript{160} This section draws heavily on Welfield, 111-113.  
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 145.
without any constitutional and legal procedures being observed.\textsuperscript{162} The US eventually accepted Japanese requests for more balanced MSA aid and began to direct it towards naval and air assets instead of manpower. Yet according Air Marshal Genda Minoru in 1964, “[t]he main objective of Japan’s air defence network is to protect America’s retaliatory power, to guard the bases from which America’s retaliatory power will take off. Our radar network and so on have the same function.”\textsuperscript{163} Protection of US forces in Japan was the chief function of the Air Self Defense Force for most of the Cold War; even advocates of a greater regional role for Japan “always assumed Japan would remain, indefinitely, an American satellite.”\textsuperscript{164}

The Nixon Shocks and Détente

Ironically, the culmination of American frustration with Japanese burdensharing at the height of the Vietnam War led to President Richard Nixon valuing the “containment” of Japan more highly than any previous or future administration. Japan’s participation in Vietnam never expanded beyond medical and humanitarian supplies, leading President Johnson to clarify, “what I am interested in is bodies.”\textsuperscript{165} Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara called for a new Japanese ‘leadership role’ in Asia. The State Department demanded that “this potential tower of strength for the Free World” play “its full constructive role in Asia or beyond,” but it was of no avail.\textsuperscript{166} Exasperated, Johnson sent a message to Tokyo saying America had kept “an arm around

\textsuperscript{162} “Postwar Japanese Prime Ministers, like their prewar predecessors, have had to consider the possibility that the armed forces might not be, in the last analysis, subject to Cabinet control. It has not been possible for them to dismiss altogether the unsettling thought that they sit with a time bomb on their desk, that this time the controlling device is not in the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters in Ichigaya, or in Kwantung Army Headquarters in Manchuria, but in Washington DC.” Ibid., 113.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., 110. In one of history’s great ironies, with which the Occupation era was replete, Genda was both the planner of the Pearl Harbor operation and the first chief of the postwar Air Self Defence Force Staff.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., 396.

\textsuperscript{165} Quoted in Schaller, 190.

\textsuperscript{166} Quoted in Buckley, 109.
the Japanese and held an umbrella over them” for far too long.\textsuperscript{167} So by the time of Nixon’s ascendance to the presidency, Japan’s intransigence on burdensharing issues had begun a sea change in how many thought about its place in America’s Asia.\textsuperscript{168}

Certainly, both the president and Congress believed American allies should carry more of what they considered to be the common burden. In a 1967 essay Nixon had argued for “Vietnamization” of the war, “a view Asians took to mean that they were to fight other Asians for U.S. objectives.”\textsuperscript{169} Indeed, in Article IV of the 1969 Joint Communiqué between Nixon and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, the United States managed to get Japan to state that the security of South Korea and Taiwan were “essential to Japan’s own security.”\textsuperscript{170} On July 25, 1969 at a press briefing in Guam, Nixon detailed what quickly became known as the ‘Nixon Doctrine’ or ‘Guam Doctrine.’ America would withdraw significant numbers of ground forces throughout Asia in light of the incredible economic and psychological cost of the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{171} Japan was expected to pick up the slack. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s 1971 Defense Report expressed this imminent prospect of offloading much of America’s burdens. It stated, “we do intend to maintain strong air, naval, and support capabilities… [b]ut we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”\textsuperscript{172} Washington would strive “to establish a new and stable structure reflecting the renewed vigor of small Asian states,” with an “expanding role” for Japan.\textsuperscript{173} Furthermore, the new administration hinted it would accept, if not outright encourage, Japanese acquisition of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{167} Quoted in Schaller,\textit{ Altered States}, 208.
\item\textsuperscript{168} Christensen,\textit{ Worse than a Monolith}, 211-212.
\item\textsuperscript{169} LaFeber, 348.
\item\textsuperscript{170} Quoted in Welfield, 250.
\item\textsuperscript{171} Christensen,\textit{ Worse than a Monolith}, 211.
\item\textsuperscript{172} Quoted in Osgood, 5.
\item\textsuperscript{173} Quoted in ibid., 15
\end{enumerate}
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nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{174} As Nixon began his presidency, all signs indicated he would continue to take up the anti-Communist mantle and pressure Japan for large-scale rearmament.\textsuperscript{175}

Yet all was not well in the alliance. Suspicion and contempt of Tokyo as a security and economic partner wracked Washington. Japan’s export sector had made great leaps in the previous quarter-century, so much so that many political and business leaders suggested the Japanese revival threatened US security. One Cabinet member maintained that in the 1970s, “the Japanese are still fighting the war” and had the intention to “dominate the Pacific and then perhaps the world.”\textsuperscript{176} In 1971, a Foreign Service Officer hinted privately that Nixon regarded Japan as an “enemy.” This was particularly true after the White House came to believe Prime Minister Sato was purposefully fudging a textiles deal struck up at the signing of the Joint Communiqué.\textsuperscript{177} At Kansas City in 1971, the president went on to announce the arrival of five “great economic superpowers” including Japan, signifying the US would treat Japan more as a rival than an ally.\textsuperscript{178}

The economic threat crept into perceptions of or reinforced Americans trepidations about Japanese security policy. A March 1971 poll jointly conducted by the \textit{Asahi Shimbun} and the Harris Corporation found little US interest in an active Japanese Self Defense Force. Seventy-two percent opposed the creation of a Japanese \textit{force de frappe}, or independent nuclear arsenal. By way of explanation, the \textit{Asahi Shimbun} noted that Japan and the United States had historically been rivals for mastery of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{179} For many American policymakers, the 1970 announcement by Defense Agency Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro that Japanese military


\textsuperscript{175} Welfield, 242. Such a stance would have paralleled a popular sentiment, channeled by Alabama Governor George Wallace in the 1972 presidential race, that “[t]he war in Vietnam would have been over a long time ago if Japanese troops had joined us,” and the U.S would no longer act as a shield for Japan. Quoted in LaFeber, 358.

\textsuperscript{176} Quoted in Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 4.

\textsuperscript{177} LaFeber, 351.

\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., 353.

\textsuperscript{179} Welfield, 285 and 287.
expenditure would double by 1975 under the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan was unnerving rather than gratifying.\textsuperscript{180} For many but not all Japanese officials, the defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam shifted the emphasis of their fears from entrapment in American wars to abandonment against China and the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{181} Yet, the “prospect of America’s disengagement from the Far East… threaten[ed] to bring to the forefront of Japanese attention painful and divisive issues that were suppressed when the nation was more confident of American protection.”\textsuperscript{182} Once out of office, Robert Osgood, a staff aide on Henry Kissinger’s National Security Council from 1969 to 1970, wrote that while American withdrawals aimed at transferring more responsibility for “national defense” to Asian allies, the Nixon administration clearly did “not envisage other states supplanting America’s security role.” Aside from a few hardline Cold Warriors, “the U.S. government does not expect or desire Japan to assume the security role the United States has played in East Asia.”\textsuperscript{183} The reason? “With its ties to the United States loosened or severed, Japan’s pursuit of this role would accentuate Sino-Japanese tensions and destabilize the Korean peninsula.”\textsuperscript{184} The benefits of greater burdensharing, or “devolution” of power to Japan, had to be weighed against the costs of loss of US control and the destabilization of the Asian military balance.\textsuperscript{185} Perhaps in recognition of this possible effect of US retrenchment, Nixon privately told members of Congress that he “wouldn’t be surprised if in five years we didn’t have to restrain” Japan.\textsuperscript{186} Nixon was widely suspected of being the anonymous “high American” official who told journalists in 1970 the US-Japan alliance was partly intended to “police Japan

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{180} LaFeber, 351.
\bibitem{182} Osgood, The Weary and the Wary, 1.
\bibitem{183} Ibid., 13.
\bibitem{184} Ibid., 74.
\bibitem{185} Ibid., 87-88.
\bibitem{186} Schaller, Altered States, 220.
\end{thebibliography}
against turning communist or returning to militarism.”

Perhaps the ultimate reason for this shift is what former US diplomat Harrison Holland suggested in later years, that “[o]ften in the past when the United States was strong and Japan weak, relations were reasonably free from friction and controversy. But when both nations were more equal in national power, relations turned cold and adversarial.”

The same fears of full-scale, autonomous rearmament distressed Japan’s Asian neighbors. As Osgood noted in 1972, Chinese and Soviet leaders at least publicly claimed “to see the rise of Japanese militarism as the sure result of the Nixon Doctrine.” Combined with the Sato-Nixon Joint Communiqué and expectation of a massive Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, Communist and non-Communist countries alike feared the US was encouraging the revival of Japanese hegemony under the false moniker of ‘burdensharing.’ In July 1971, Gough Whitlam, Australian Labour Party chief and future prime minister, told Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, “[we] have the same fear of the Japanese as I believe your people have now,” since the US-Australian alliance was designed to counter the “revival of Japanese militarism.” Zhou echoed the sentiments in a joint communiqué with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung in April 1970, declaring that “under the active protection of the American imperialists, Japanese militarism has already been revived.”

To the Romanians, he cited Japan’s economic expansion, the latent capacity for military power it would inevitably bring, and the inclusion of South Korean and Taiwan security in the 1969 U.S.-Japan Joint Communiqué. A substantial Japanese minority, too, developed anxiety that rearmament under the Sato government was destabilizing the region and could lead to the revival

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187 Quoted in ibid., 223.
190 Quoted in Welfield, 289.
191 Quoted in Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 213.
192 Ibid.
of militarism. Throughout the Cold War, the Chinese leadership had argued that encouraging Tokyo to break away from Washington’s vassalage was the best method for curbing imperialism in Asia. Yet by 1970, Zhou, at least, was privately considering whether America defending Japan was a better insurance policy for Chinese security than a Japan that defended itself.

Feeling the changing winds, Nixon and Kissinger decided to remold post-Vietnam Asia along the lines of a détente with Communist China. One of its first principles was a combined effort to suppress the reemergence of Japan as an independent pole of military power. On June 2, 1971, the president discussed his intentions with his staff. As he would later explain to Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, US retrenchment in Asia could have only two possible outcomes: alignment with the Soviet Union or full-scale rearmament. Mao and Zhou publicly demanded the US abandon its military presence in Japan and South Korea, but in fact they “don’t want that” because the American hub-and-spokes system was “China’s [best] hope for Jap restraint.” On two secret trips to China in July and October 1971, Kissinger argued with Zhou that a “Japan which defends itself with its own resources will be an objective danger to all countries around it because it will be so much more powerful.” He did not want to see Japan “heavily re-armed” because the US could not control a great power. Neither America nor China would benefit if the alliance no longer served as a tool of management. Kissinger went on to say the American government would oppose Japanese nuclear proliferation, the development

193 Welfield, 419.
194 See, for example, Osgood, The Weary and the Wary, 47.
195 Welfield recounts a telling episode between Zhou and members of Matsumura Kenzo’s Japanese Memorandum Trade delegation at the 1970 Canton Trade fair: “[Z]hou’s remarks, addressed as much to himself as his Japanese friends, were so subtle that their significance was not fully understood. Observing that the United States, in fact, controlled Japan through its military bases and other facilities on the archipelago Chou recalled that Fujiyama had fixed a ten-year time limit to the 1960 arrangements. The Sato Cabinet, he said, had apparently extended the treaty arrangements indefinitely. When Fujiyama explained that this was not so and that the treaty could now be terminated by either side on one year’s notice, the Chinese Premier reflected, enigmatically, ‘Then, Mr. Fujiyama, your achievement was very great!’ ” Ibid., 290.
196 Quoted in Schaller, Altered States, 227.
197 Quoted in Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 216.
198 Ibid.
of offensive military capabilities, and the “extension of military power” in the Far East. \(^{199}\) Zhou eventually agreed, stating, for instance, that “objectively speaking for you to keep forces on Taiwan to prevent Japan from sending its forces to Taiwan is beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East.”\(^{200}\)

The focus on containing Japan in the Kissinger-Zhou talks was echoed the following year between Nixon and Mao. On the eve of Nixon’s 1971 announcement, Secretary of Defense Laird told Japanese and South Korean audiences that he was “eminently satisfied with the status quo. Japan’s existing military power… would be sufficient to fulfill its tasks under the Nixon Doctrine.”\(^{201}\) When they met in February 1972, Zhou told Nixon that “Japan’s feathers have grown on its wings and it is about to take off.” Adding a second metaphor, he asked whether America could tame this “wild horse.”\(^{202}\) Nixon used yet a third metaphor (with more to come) to answer with a conditional yes: “The United States can get out of Japanese waters, but others will still fish there. If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to others for help or build their own capability to defend themselves.”\(^{203}\) A United States “shield” gave it a veto over the defense policies of the world’s second richest state.\(^{204}\) Without it, “our protests, no matter how loud, would be like firing an empty cannon. We would have no effect, because thousands of miles away is just too far to be heard.”\(^{205}\) At the final banquet and communiqué, Nixon chose not to contradict the Chinese leadership’s public diatribe against Japanese militarism.\(^{206}\)

\(^{199}\) Quoted in ibid., 217.  
\(^{200}\) Quoted in ibid., 215.  
\(^{201}\) Welfield, 295.  
\(^{202}\) Quoted in LaFeber, 356.  
\(^{203}\) Quoted in Buckley, 132.  
\(^{204}\) Quoted in Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at Fifty,” 55-56.  
\(^{205}\) Quoted in Welfield, 309.  
\(^{206}\) Ibid., 310.
Détente, based on the discouragement of Japanese assertiveness in defense policy, would continued relatively unchanged through the Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter administrations. So long as the relaxation of tensions continued, “Washington’s enthusiasm to have Japan assume the burdens of containment had temporarily faded.”207 By the middle of the decade, the Self Defense Forces had emerged as a significant power in the Western Pacific but still lacked any robust capability to project power in Korea, China, or Southeast Asia. In particular, Japan was unable to protect sea-lanes or transport expeditionary forces without the assistance of the United States. This situation was not totally unintended by the latter.208 The confluence of domestic opposition, a lack of strong encouragement from Washington, and the 1973 oil crisis led to significant reductions in the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan, which was not adopted at all until Prime Minister Tanaka returned from his own trip to China in 1972. As Osgood noted knowledgably, American strategists essentially sought to promote limited rearmament and stability through “close military collaboration in plans and operations and burdensharing in order to enlarge the scope of allied participation, while leaving the United States exclusive responsibility for the control of nuclear weapons and the preponderant role in managing the military balance.”209 However, the near total favoring of collective security concerns over collective defense concerns under the Nixon Doctrine lasted only as long as détente lasted between the superpowers.

The End of Détente to the End of the Cold War

Strident calls for Japanese burdensharing resumed when détente fell apart in the late 1970s, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Beginning in the spring of

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207 Ibid., 340.
208 Ibid., 354-357.
209 Osgood, The Weary and the Wary, 76.
1978, both Washington and Beijing began pressuring Japan to help contain the Soviet Union in a grand coalition. Congress adopted a resolution the same year calling for significant increases in Japanese defense spending.\textsuperscript{210} So when the Japanese government announced in December 1979 that it could only marginally grow its military expenditure due to budgetary pressures, Carter’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown criticized their ally publicly.\textsuperscript{211} Brown visited Tokyo the following December to tell the government personally that their burdensharing was “so modest that it conveys a sense of complacency which is simply not justified by the facts.”\textsuperscript{212} Writing in \textit{Foreign Affairs}, former US ambassador to the UN George Ball predicted irreparable damage to the alliance if Tokyo could not shake the ‘freerider’ label.\textsuperscript{213} When Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, he was committed to launching a massive arms race against the Soviet Union. This quest to reestablish global superiority required taking “better advantage of our political, economic and other assets – and those of our allies,” noted a senior State Department official.\textsuperscript{214} Reagan pledged he would force Japan to protect its own sea-lanes out to a distance of 1,000 miles and help bottle up the Soviet Fleet in eastern Siberia, to which Tokyo reluctantly agreed.\textsuperscript{215} Japan also received significant encouragement from China in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In 1979, Chairman Deng Xiaoping declared that the United States, China, and Japan must unite to defeat “the polar bear.” The following year, Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuquan announced his unconditional support for increasing the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.\textsuperscript{216}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{210} Ibid., 445.
\item \textsuperscript{211} Schaller, \textit{Altered States}, 253.
\item \textsuperscript{212} Buckley, 136-137.
\item \textsuperscript{213} Ibid., 140.
\item \textsuperscript{214} Quoted in ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{215} Schaller, “The United States, Japan, and China at Fifty,” 58.
\end{itemize}
While Reagan found a kindred spirit in Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro beginning in 1982, the same old fears of a Japanese military revival persisted, albeit at a lower level and in opposition to the majority view at the time. Nakasone poured considerable resources into the Japanese military machine during the 1983-87 defense plan period. Most went into new technology, the navy, and the air force.\textsuperscript{217} While the success seemed slight to American audiences and critical pressure for rearmament continued, Japan broke the one percent of GNP military expenditure ceiling in 1987. This had been a “psychologically important taboo” for decades.\textsuperscript{218} The speed of Nakasone’s military buildup, however modest by American standards, sent ripples of worry through US and Chinese diplomatic establishments.

A telling debate took place between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in 1982-83. Weinberger and his staff hoped Nakasone would rearm so quickly that Japan could take control over the defense of its own territory and the surroundings areas within the decade. Shultz, in contrast, was furious the DoD would countenance anything other than increased financial contributions. Although he eventually lost the argument within the administration, Shultz remained adamant that “the last thing Americans should want is the recreation of a massive Japanese military machine,” especially one capable of power projection in a 1,000-mile radius onto alarmed US allies like the Philippines.\textsuperscript{219}

By the mid-80s, fear of Japan’s aggressive military drive had ended the grand anti-Soviet coalition. Chinese officials again perceived danger from the rise of Japanese militarism, especially after Nakasone’s abolition of the one percent expenditure ceiling.\textsuperscript{220} Now out of office, Henry Kissinger sensed in 1987 that the trilateral détente he masterminded was cracking.

\textsuperscript{217} LaFeber, 373.
\textsuperscript{218} Buckley, 148.
\textsuperscript{219} LaFeber, 372.
\textsuperscript{220} Whiting, 130.
In a January *Washington Post* op-ed, he criticized “American leaders [who] seem to believe [Japan’s] growing military strength will ease America’s defense burdens” as a “quick fix.” If Washington tried to force the pace of major rearmament, it “could lead to destabilizing compensations by other Asian nations,” since “any increase in strength by one country produces almost automatic adjustments by all other nations in a position to see their own security.” At this point, Kissinger argued, any further increases in Japanese defense expenditure were “unnecessary,” and “Japan could make a more significant contribution to global peace by increasing aid to developing nations.”

Expressing similar sentiments, Marine Corps Major General Henry Stackpole caused a popular uproar in March 1990 by suggesting American forces “were acting as a ‘cap in the bottle’ to prevent future aggression by Japan.” By the end of the decade, its Asian neighbors had begun to worry once more as well. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew publicly expressed anxiety over the extension of Japanese power in Asia that would follow if the alliance were ever seriously disrupted.

The Cold War ended with Japan having one of the world’s largest military budgets and yet still reluctant and unequipped for power projection. As pressures for Japanese burdensharing continued to mount, especially following the 1990-91 Gulf War, Americans came to settle more and more for the “checkbook diplomacy” originally favored by Shultz and to some extent Kissinger. In 1987, the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding the Secretary of State negotiate either the increase of Japanese military spending to three percent of GNP or the forfeiture of an equivalent sum to the United States. Such calls were especially prevalent

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222 Buckley, 169. What is perhaps more upsetting than the comments themselves is the historical ignorance of the opprobrium they caused, as if such thoughts had not been entertained in decades. One SDF general reportedly said, “Oh, I see. US forces in Japan will resume their original role of the occupation forces of 45 years ago.” Ibid., 217.
223 Ibid., 218.
during negotiations with the Japanese over their refusal to participate in the liberation of Kuwait. Ultimately, Tokyo contributed $11 billion toward the overall cost.\footnote{Ibid., 258.} Probably speaking for the diplomatic rather than the defense establishment, former diplomat Harrison Holland explained in 1992 that US calls for greater burdensharing “is generally considered by both sides to mean an increase in financial support,” since “a strong Japanese military presence in Asia would destabilize security in the area.”\footnote{Holland, 208.} This approach was advantageous from an American standpoint because it allowed the United States to exert control on the cheap. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1987, “the preferable way of redistributing the burden would be for the allies to pay an increased share of the costs of the American forces protecting them.”\footnote{Lippman, 471–472.} Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, for example, asked Tokyo to begin paying more than 50 percent of support costs for US forces stationed in Japan under the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Yet, in the end, more than 70 percent of Japanese people surveyed in 1990 opposed paying greater sums for what they considered to be mercenary forces.\footnote{Buckley, 127.}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Throughout the Cold War, American policymakers confronted a burdensharing dilemma on the strategic place of Japan in Asia. On the one hand, there was consistent support for greater Japanese responsibility in local, regional, and global security. On the other, fears of a destabilizing revival of autonomous Japanese military power existed throughout the military and diplomatic services of the United States, its allies, and its adversaries. As a general rule, the imperative of collective defense usually won out over the imperative of collective security, but as
much as possible American officials tried to circumscribe Japan’s the capacity for independent decisionmaking and action. With the end of the Cold War, the burdensharing dilemma was not resolved, but the US and Japan could kick the can down the road until the next great power rivalry emerged between China and the United States in the late 2000s.
Chapter 4: Burdensharing in the Rebalance to Asia

Introduction

Burdensharing is even more important in America’s Rebalance to Asia than it was during the Cold War. The ultimate reason is simple: the United States cannot balance against China’s phenomenal economic and military rise alone. In light of the disastrous unilateralism of the Bush years, America’s continuing economic malaise following the 2007-8 Great Recession, and a reluctance to retrench in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, American deterrence strategy towards China is relying more and more on the defense spending and activism of its Asian allies. This is particularly true for Japan. The growth of Chinese power, along with the perception that this power is turning outward maliciously, has laid the foundation for an Asian arms race. Japanese territory is threatened now more than at any other period in the history of the alliance. Many American officials and nongovernmental observers are wholeheartedly encouraging Japan’s abandonment of its postwar pacifism. Yet, the extent to which Japan is increasingly defending itself within a virtually automatic American guarantee is undermining US control over the direction of the alliance. Already, attempts at alliance management have been frustrated in a series of dangerous and provocative incidents that together raise the specter of America’s ‘wire’ being ‘tripped,’ perhaps by its own ally. In remains to be seen whether mechanisms of control over Japanese burdensharing will be successful. They are increasingly under stress.

Reaffirming the American Commitment… to Burdensharing

President Barack Obama launched the first Global Force Posture Review since 2004 when he came to power in 2009. The goal was to make US defense strategy “strategically sound,
operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.” With conflicts brewing between a rising China and its neighbors, American officials came to the conclusion that Asia is the region most in need of US attention. Published just prior to the current president’s tenure, the 2008 National Defense Strategy had sought to “prevent the re-emergence of great power rivalry.” Like Nixon and Reagan, the Obama administration determined to reestablish its leadership around the world in its own way.

Yet policymakers quickly found they would have to rely on allied contributions more than in the past. The 2010 National Security Strategy notes that while America has a “unique responsibility to promote international security,” when “we act without partners, then our military is overstretched, [and] Americans bear a greater burden.” Allies would have to be “force multipliers.” Likewise, the 2011 National Military Strategy longs for the US role as the world’s “security guarantor”—not ‘one security guarantor among many’—to continue through the bilateral alliance structure. To reassure American allies and deter conflict at this “strategic inflection” point in world history, the document proclaims the US intention to remain a powerful force in Northeast Asia “for decades.” However, it also recognizes the infeasibility of acting alone as America did in the Bush years. To deter the strongest threats, the American defense establishment is urged to accept a “multi-nodal world” and “encourage the development of

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231 In a March 22, 2009 meeting, White House counterterrorism adviser John Brennan reassured King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud “that under President Obama we will restore our credibility… the U.S. is a great country and we know what we have to do.” “US Embassy Cables: Saudi King's Advice for Barack Obama,” The Guardian, WikiLeaks cache, November 28, 2010.


233 Ibid., 41.
security ties and commitments that are emerging among our allies and partners in the region.” This would include, for instance, “work[ing] with the Japan Self-Defense Forces to improve their out-of-area operational capabilities.” Although the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance announces optimistically that the US military “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region” and continue to “provide a stabilizing presence,” it emphasizes the necessity of low-cost, small footprint approaches and building “partner capacity.”

The American diplomatic service launched its own campaign in late 2011. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared in an October Foreign Policy article that America had reached a “pivot point” and it was time to “return to Asia.” She explained further in November that decades of US military predominance had discouraged conflict, thus sowing the seeds of Asian prosperity: “American ships patrol sea lanes and keep them safe for trade; American diplomats help settle disputes among nations before they escalate.” American commitments to its treaty allies were “rock solid.” When President Obama spoke before the Australian Parliament at the height of his Asian diplomatic tour in November 2011, he avowed that “as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping this region and its future.” Reductions in overall military expenditure, he claimed, would not come at the expense of US missions in Asia.

Ultimately, the various announcements and advertising of the Pivot may have convinced many Asian countries that American diplomacy is on focused their region. Yet the ongoing lack of resources to fund the military aspect of the Pivot has not convinced them of American staying

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236 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011.
237 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century” (speech, East-West Center, Honolulu, HI, November 10, 2011).
238 Barack H. Obama, “Remarks By President Obama to the Australian Parliament” (Speech, Parliament House, Canberra, Australia, November 17, 2011).
power. Instead, the reassurance dynamic US-Japan relations and others are experiencing now may be what Robert Osgood prophesied for the Nixon Doctrine in 1972: “incurring at least the added political burden, if not the military risk, of America’s retaining responsibility for the security of Japan’s international environment without being able to satisfy the Japanese that U.S. protection is adequate.”

The Eroding Asian Military Balance

For reasons that must include wishful thinking, it is now obvious that defense and diplomatic officials who expected the easy reestablishment of US military supremacy in Asia had visions of grandeur. Since the Budget Control Act of 2011 took effect on March 1, 2013, policymakers have been forced to grapple with severe, indiscriminate defense cuts costing the DoD $1 trillion over the next decade. The majority view among defense analysts and interested politicians is that sequestration is a disaster for the Rebalance. Even before the cuts, then Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta commented on an independent CSIS assessment by saying that “[s]equestration would devastate the Department’s ability to advance and sustain enhancements to our defense presence and posture in the Asia-Pacific region.” At Secretary of State John Kerry’s confirmation hearing on January 24, 2013, Senator Marco Rubio inquired sardonically of the nominee, “I congratulate the President for talking about pivoting to Asia, but if this sequester goes through, what are we going to pivot with?” The head of Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral Samuel J. Locklear III, also told the Senate Armed Services Committee soon after that “sequestration would have a catastrophic effect on our ability to do the

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type of global operations we’re doing today.” Later in 2013, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel lamented that under the sequester, US “military options and flexibility will be severely constrained.” House Armed Services Committee Buck McKeon has called the Rebalance strategy increasingly “unrealistic.” The atmosphere towards removing sequester-level caps has become so pessimistic that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Katrina McFarland was quoted in March as saying, “Right now, the pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it can’t happen.”

Much was originally made of Secretary Panetta’s announcement that by 2020, 60 percent of US naval assets would be posted in the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to the old 50-50 split two-ocean navy. Yet with even more cuts pending, a common refrain is now former Pacific Air Forces commander General William Begert prediction from 2012: 60 percent of the force may be devoted to the Pacific, but “that may be only because you decreased… every place else not because you increased force structure out in the Pacific.” American forces charged with defending the areas surrounding Japan are unlikely to be reduced in absolute terms. There have been some small successes, like the rotational deployment of two or three RQ-4 Global Hawk drones in Japan, two squadrons of MV-22 Osprey tiltrotors in Okinawa, and six advanced

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245 Quoted in Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “DoD Official: Asia Pivot 'Can't Happen' Due to Budget Pressures,” *Defense News*, March 4, 2014. Senior DoD officials immediately disowned her comments and she later retracted them, but the damage was done.
246 See, for example, Tom Donilon, “The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013” (speech, Asia Society, New York, NY, March 11, 2013).
P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft. Yet even under the ideal conditions originally envisioned before sequestration, the Pacific Fleet would only see a net increase of one aircraft carrier, four destroyers, three Zumwalt destroyers, ten Littoral Combat Ships, and two submarines. With the deployment of F-35B Joint Strike Fighters and two more Aegis-equipped ballistic-missile defense ships planned for 2017, American forces in Japan can expect to see some increased firepower. However, the increase will only be marginal unless drastic changes in defense policy occur in the near future. Most new ships and jets sent to the Pacific will simply be replacements for aging hardware already in the theater.

China, on the other hand, is widely seen as rapidly catching up with American military power in the Western Pacific. Even if milder cuts or even modest increases replaced sequestration, the current military balance is impossible to maintain. Baring a Chinese economic collapse or a fundamental revision of Asian international relations, the People’s Republic of China will continue to grow economically and increase its defense expenditure at a significantly higher rate than the United States or China’s neighbors. In March, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) announced a 12.2% budget increase for 2014. This continues decades-long annual growth in the double digits. By contrast, the DoD expects a 20% overall reduction between 2010 and 2017.

Certainly, the United States will retain global military superiority for decades to come, but Asians are not concerned with its global reach. The real contest is the balance of power in

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252 Phil Stewart and Nobuhiro Kubo, "U.S., in Nod to Tokyo, to Send More Ships to Japan, Prods China," Reuters, April 6, 2014.
China’s immediate periphery, or the “First Island Chain” running roughly from the Kurile Islands through the Japanese archipelago to Taiwan, the Philippines, and the South China Sea. Over the past decade, the PLA has developed a variety of asymmetric warfighting capabilities, such as anti-ship cruise (ASCMs) and ballistic missiles (ASBMs), designed to deny the United States access to seas adjacent to China’s coast. The aircraft carrier, America’s premier platform for power projection, now likely operates only at great risk within China’s Near Seas.

China is quickly constructing its own blue water navy in addition to this “anti-Navy.” According to recent reports, the PLA Navy (PLAN) eventually plans to build four of its own aircraft carriers. From there, it could begin to project power in the East China Sea, South China Sea, and beyond.

The United States may retain conventional superiority in these regions currently, but the near future is much more ambiguous. In May 2013, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace released an unclassified ‘net assessment’ of the balance between China’s military and the US-Japan alliance. It speculates that by the year 2030, “the U.S.-Japan alliance will either only narrowly retain military superiority in the airspace and waters near Japan or the balance will become uncertain at best.”

Caught between near constant pressure from the PLAN and Chinese Coast Guard on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and declining American relative influence, many Japanese officials feel they have little choice but to boost their own indigenous defense spending, perhaps even rapidly.

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255 For the definitive treatment of this threat to U.S. power projection, see Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories and Strategic Implications (Washington, D.C.: Jamestown Foundation: 2013).

256 For a discussion of some of these issues, see Jake A. Douglas, “Are Aircraft Carriers the New West Berlin?” The National Interest, March 26, 2014.


In sharp distinction with the modus vivendi of the Cold War, Japanese are increasingly convinced that the US alliance, while necessary, is no longer a sufficient guarantee of Japan’s security. Ishiba Shigeru, the Secretary General of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), wrote in an op-ed that he has come to realize the “[h]istory of mankind is [the] history of war.” Under such conditions, he wondered, “[i]f Chinese power rises as U.S. power relatively falls, how can military balance be maintained?” Combined with a growing nuclear threat from North Korea, LDP Deputy Secretary-General Gen Nakatani believes that for Tokyo to continue to wholly rely on Washington would be choosing to “just sit idly and await death.” Yosuke Isozaki, a parliamentarian and special national security adviser to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, said in March 2014 that “[t]ruth be told, the U.S. can no longer afford to play the world’s policeman.” The 2013 Defense of Japan White Paper names China as a significant threat, given “the rapid expansion and intensification of activities by China in the waters and airspace around Japan.” These fears have been stoked in part by the profession of many American officials that they are unwilling to go to war with China “over rocks.”

Despite significant domestic opposition, the Japanese government under Shinzo Abe has begun a fundamental revision of its attitude towards defense. Visiting Washington in February 2013, Prime Minister Abe addressed a distinguished group of officials and think tankers at CSIS. He declared, “[i]t is high time in this age of Asian resurgence for Japan to bear even more responsibilities.” Abe received a resounding applause when he pledged to “give back a strong

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Japan, strong enough to do even more good for the betterment of the world.”

To reinforce the point, he wore an aviator's jacket labeled “Japan Air Self-Defense Force” when he first arrived. During his meeting with President Obama, he said he planned to hasten plans for the modernization of the Self Defence Forces so as to “ease pressure on the U.S.” for countering China’s rise. Japan is increasing the size of its submarine force for the first time in 36 years. It announced in January 2013 that it would begin increasing its military budget after eleven years of decline. In December, the Ministry of Defense announced it would seek the largest increases in defense expenditure since the end of the Cold War at roughly three to five percent over the next five years. In 2010, Japan began realigning its most capable forces away from the old Cold War focus on Hokkaido and towards its southern islands, nearer the action over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The government accelerated this shift to “southern defense” in 2013. All within the span of two years, Abe has created Japan’s first National Security Council, published its first National Security Strategy, eased restrictions on the export of military technology, and taken the first steps towards revising the constitutional interpretation of Japan’s right to collective self-defense. All of these changes are indicative of a growing

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269 Sheila A. Smith, "For the First Time in 11 Years, Japan Is Beefing up Its Military," The Atlantic, January 14, 2013.
270 Linda Seig and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan to Bolster Military, Boost Asia Ties to Counter China,” Reuters, December 17, 2013.
trend in the US-Japan alliance: greater Japanese burden- and rolesharing. As Shinichi Kitaoka, president of International University of Japan and an Abe adviser, said in March, Japan needs “to become [more] independent” in order to “protect its security in the current conditions.”\textsuperscript{277} Abe believes that “Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front but also in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific.”\textsuperscript{278}

One result of this shift is that in the future, incidents and crises that could trigger US defense commitments may not initially involve American forces. Not US, but rather Japanese assets forward deployed in the East China Sea may be the first participants in skirmishes with Chinese forces in the area. Former defense official Kyouji Yanagisawa has noted that this would “fundamentally change the nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance” because the roles of “Japan holding the defensive ‘shield’ while America supplies the offensive ‘sword’ ” would be reversed.\textsuperscript{279} In January 2014, PACOM commander Admiral Locklear admitted that as the United States’ “historic dominance… is diminishing,”\textsuperscript{280} Asia is becoming the “the most militarized region in the world.”\textsuperscript{281} As it does, American will have to expect that its allies’ and adversaries’ “militaries are going to have to encounter and operate around each other” more than ever before. Journalist Trefor Moss has written that “[i]f Japan is to assume a greater share of the regional security burden, then the JSDF needs to acquire the capability to manage the country’s territorial disputes independently, without U.S. forces.”\textsuperscript{282} Indeed, there has been public speculation on the part of informed nongovernmental observers and former officials that the US may force Japan to handle

\textsuperscript{277} Quoted in Yuka, “Abe Tells Obama.”
\textsuperscript{279} Quoted in Sieg, “Insight: Japan Unease over U.S. Alliance.”
any initial hostilities or ‘gray zone’ incidents over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by itself. This may appear to be a small victory for those who demand flexibility in American alliance commitments and a step away from entrapment. In reality, allowing Japan to defend itself tactically within an overall extended deterrence framework that approaches automaticity cedes responsibility for escalation control to Tokyo. If conflict erupted over the disputed islands and spiraled into anything more than a small skirmish, US forces in nearby Okinawa would be destined to fight in it nevertheless.

Fears of Tactical and Strategic Entrapment

As Tacitus said of the Romans, it would not bother most Americans if “the provinces were conquered by the blood of the provinces.” Congress usually appreciates any easing of overseas military burdens by treaty allies, encouraging them as Senator Bill Nelson described it in 2012 to increase “their percentage of partnership costs.” There are very good reasons to desire burdensharing or even rolesharing. Indeed, notwithstanding the historical irony, US Marines today are training their Japanese counterparts in amphibious warfare and, essentially, island-hopping tactics. At an October 2013 “2+2” Security Consultative Conference in Tokyo with Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida and Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera, Kerry and Hagel affirmed their support for greater Japanese burdensharing. “The United States,”

they said in a joint statement, “welcomed Japan’s determination to contribute more proactively to regional and global peace and security.” The phrasing, worked out jointly between the four representatives and their staffs, has been interpreted as one of the “clearest signals yet that the United States backs Japan’s increasing though still limited moves to strengthen its military.”

Yet the document is also important for what it omitted. For some time now, the Japanese government has been mulling over the decision to acquire long-range strike capabilities, including aircraft but primarily missile technology. Currently, launching retaliatory or preemptive attacks on North Korean nuclear sites or Chinese missile facilities would require US support for attack aircraft and intelligence. The Japanese government under Shinzo Abe is dissatisfied with this lack of capacity for autonomy. In July 2013, a Defense Ministry official specified that the measures Japan seeks include the ability for “attacks by aircraft or missiles and sending soldiers directly to the site.” Possession of the offensive capabilities necessary for such military action is unconstitutional under the existing interpretation, but officials have been discussing revision since at least 2006. According to unnamed sources cited by The Asahi Shimbun, US officials offered no response at the two-plus-two meeting when Japan’s desire to possess a preemptive strike capability was mentioned. Yet in an account obtained by The Japan Times, one American official attending working-level preparatory talks in July lectured

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290 Quoted in ibid.
291 “[I]t is unconstitutional to possess offensive weapons that can be used exclusively for the massive destruction of other countries because these weapons would exceed the minimum required for self-defense. The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) describes such offensive weapons as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range strategic bombers, and offensive aircraft carriers,” Daniel A. Pinkston and Kazutaka Sakurai, “Japan Debates Preparing for Future Preemptive Strikes against North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 18:4 (2006): 109.
Tokyo on “the possible negative fallout on neighboring countries if the Abe administration embarks on such a policy shift.”293 Following American pressure, the subject was dropped from the content of the joint statement. Instead, it mentioned the desire for “Japan [to] continue coordinating closely with the United States to expand its role within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance;” “[s]ide-by-side… contingency response and crisis management;” “[i]mproved cooperation and coordination;” and “progress on bilateral planning and reaffirmed efforts toward refining bilateral plans.”294

Americans’ fears are twofold. They reflect the distinction and connection between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ entrapment. First, at an operational level, the possession of independent capabilities for offensive military action raises the possibility that Japan could strike North Korean or Chinese military bases preemptively or in retaliation without US support, or even foreknowledge and consent. US forces are stationed throughout Japan and particularly in Okinawa—situated close to the disputed southern Ryukyus. Their commitment is practically guaranteed if Sino-Japanese combat broke out. Any targeting of Japanese bases or future missile sites would necessarily fall on American units co-stationed there. Moreover, fearing US reprisals in support of Japan, Chinese military leaders might decide to strike predominantly American bases in Japan preemptively or in the heat of battle.295 The first evidence of American worry over this possibility may be a 2008 nongovernmental workshop on Japan, with a number of eminent statesmen in attendance.296 An anonymous participant was quoted as saying, “[t]here is clear

296 A summary of this discussion can be found in Appendix C of Mike Wheeler, “The Changing Requirements of Extended Deterrence,” Institute for Defense Analyses, June 2011. Attendees included Brad Roberts, Mike Green (Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS) and Jim Delaney (IDA), Brad Glosserman (Pacific Forum
evidence of rising Japanese interest in independent non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities. An improved Japanese capability to act unilaterally and preemptively is not self-evidently in the U.S. national interest.”

This is, perhaps, the classic definition of entrapment in theories of alliance management. In January 2013, the Ministry of Defense began considering authorizing the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) to fire warnings shots at Chinese planes entering Japanese-administered airspace over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. New guidelines were designed in October to justify shooting down Chinese drones in the same area, obviously risking escalation. According to reports in the Sankei Shimbun, the ASDF began definitively planning procedures in January 2014 to ground Chinese planes, with “[t]he authority of the pilot is limited to forced landing instructions and warning shots.” These possibilities may not represent a calculated decision to draw the United States into an unwanted war, but they nonetheless threaten one. With Japanese jets scrambled 415 times last year against Chinese incursions, up 36% from last year, the risk of accident, miscalculation, or irreversible provocation is reaching Cold War highs. And to a much greater extent than in that era, it is Japanese forces, not American, that are mobilizing against the enemy.
The question of mobile jets and ships as forward-deployed ‘spears’ may be more difficult to grapple with, but long-range strike capabilities receive the brunt of US officials’ ire because they also factor in the second fear: ‘strategic entrapment.’ Unlike military activity over the Senkaku/Diaoyu, missile strikes could hypothetically be used against other countries nervous about Japan’s military revival, like South Korea. However incredible it may seem to most Americans, some Asian countries are more worried about the growth of independent Japanese power than the growth of China’s.

Comments by Obama administration officials like State Department Policy Planning Director Anne-Marie Slaughter (2009-11) that Japan “is neither psychologically ready nor suitable for historical reasons” to “take the reins of global domination in the 21st century” are broadly in line with traditional American fears. The subject of entrapment is a very sensitive one in diplomacy between allies, so worries are usually expressed behind the scenes. Yet it has become a strong enough trepidation that current and former US officials have expressed concern in public. A former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (2009-13) who was instrumental in designing the Pivot, Kurt Campbell, has noted it is only natural for Japan to want stronger “indigenous capabilities,” but “there are probably, quietly some questions in the United States about where Japan is going… [s]o a degree of reassurance [from Japan] on these issues is absolutely essential.”

Although Japan has yet to win full support from US officials on acquiring the ability to strike enemy bases—and it is not likely to receive it—Abe may insist on including the line, “Japan will consider acquiring

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301 “62% of South Koreans Regard Japan as a Military Threat: Think Tank Poll,” The Japan Times, October 30, 2013.
303 Kurt Campbell, “Putting the East China Sea and East Asia into Strategic Context” (speech, Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., October 25, 2013). As one US research institute has put it, “Washington wants its allies, both Japan and also Korea, to carry more of the burden of preserving order, but it does not want to lose control over the initiation of conflict, which is a risk when the allies start taking on more responsibility and improving their power projection capabilities as they’ve done, for instance, with aerial refueling. This concern for allies’ ability to exercise restraint was apparent during North Korea’s latest round of provocations in April, and it’s a concern that will continue.” “Japan's Military Normalization and U.S. Relations,” Stratfor, August 8, 2013.
comprehensive response capabilities,” in the revision of the 1997 US-Japan Defense Guidelines taking place this year.\textsuperscript{304}

Certain incidents and the perception of resurgence Japanese nationalism are exacerbating these concerns over burdensharing. In 2012, Japan escalated its territorial row with China by nationalizing the islands against the explicit advice of the State Department that it would trigger a crisis.\textsuperscript{305} It has so far refused to admit even the existence of a dispute. Likewise, Tokyo is taking a more hardline approach than Washington to China’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea.\textsuperscript{306} Last December, Abe also refused to comply with Vice President Joe Biden’s plea not to visit the controversial Yasukini Shrine.\textsuperscript{307} Citing unnamed US government sources, a January 2014\textit{ New York Times} article explained that encouraging greater Japanese burdensharing “may draw protests from regional players, including China, and weaken the trilateral framework with South Korea that forms the basis of Washington’s ‘Asia pivot’ strategy.”\textsuperscript{308} Many Japanese themselves, especially the liberal media, have questioned whether more spending and activism in defense will lead to a destabilizing arms race with China and poorer relations with potential friends.\textsuperscript{309} According to the\textit{ Asahi Shimbun}, South Korean government representatives have cautioned that “[i]f matters are handled incorrectly, ties between South Korea and Japan would further worsen, and that could affect cooperation between South Korea, the United States and Japan.”\textsuperscript{310} The United States is terrified of just this possibility. Tokyo’s limited moves towards collective self-defense have sent ripples of dread

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\textsuperscript{304} Koji Sonoda, “Japan to Scale Back Tank Forces, Focus on Island Defense,”\textit{ The Asahi Shimbun}, November 22, 2013.

\textsuperscript{305} “U.S. Warned Government against Buying Senkaku Islands: Campbell,”\textit{ The Japan Times}, April 10, 2013.


\textsuperscript{307} “Biden Tried to Talk Abe out of Yasukuni Visit,”\textit{ The Japan Times}, January 29, 2014.

\textsuperscript{308} “Abe Steps on Washington’s Toes,”\textit{ The Japan Times}, January 4, 2014.


\textsuperscript{310} Quoted in “Japan Seeks Tough Stance.”
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across the Pacific.\textsuperscript{311} Even if Washington were not worried about a ‘Georgia scenario’\textsuperscript{312} or Japan taking unilateral preemptive action in a case of tactical entrapment, it is still “concerned that the current debate will inflame existing regional tensions and hinder attempts to improve Japanese–South Korean relations.”\textsuperscript{313} Chinese observers have already noted the sense of insecurity these moves may engender in their country, as well.\textsuperscript{314}

Anxieties about the most radical outcome of Japanese hedging and burdensharing have prompted officials to try to reassure Tokyo about the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. As worries mounted in 2013 over whether Japan might eventually weaponized its massive plutonium stockpiles, the Obama administration took the unprecedented step of allowing Japanese officials to tour American nuclear military facilities in Nebraska and Montana.\textsuperscript{315} \textit{The Asahi Shimbun} quoted unnamed sources saying that “[t]he move was also intended to prevent Japan from developing nuclear weapons using its massive stockpile of plutonium to counter potential threats from its neighbors in East Asia,” although Bradley Roberts, Obama’s former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, dismissed this

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\textsuperscript{311} “Abe’s Unacceptable Rush toward Collective Self-Defense.” \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, March 4, 2014. In October 2013, it was reported that a senior US military officer in South Korea cautioned against revising the war-renouncing Article IX of the Japanese Constitution as a means of expanding the strength of the Japanese military: “The official also said that discussion of revising the no-war constitutional clause ‘is always perceived’ as counterproductive in the region. Mr. Abe should be aware that the U.S. does not back his hawkish stance, which would increase tension in the region, especially with China, and that his moves are complicating the security environment and actually weakening Japan’s security rather than strengthening it.” “Inching toward Collective Self-Defense,” \textit{The Japan Times}, October 7, 2013.
\textsuperscript{312} “The risks of a ‘Georgia scenario’ are all too real if one considers the possibility that ideological zealotry could combine with pleas from small regional states to cause the United States to overstep its genuine national interests and capabilities.” Lyle J. Goldstein, “Resetting the US–China Security Relationship,” \textit{Survival} 53 (2011): 91.
\textsuperscript{314} “The U.S. support for Japan’s independent military growth and its interests in Diaoyu islands in the name of administrative rights will be a constant element of provocation in Sino-U.S. relations.” Yang Wenjing, “The US-Japan ‘2+2’ Meeting and Its Implication to China,” \textit{China-US Focus}, October 18, 2013.
\textsuperscript{315} Makino Yoshihiro, “Roberts: Japan Shown U.S. Military Facilities to Confirm ’Nuclear Umbrella’,” \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, July 31, 2013.
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Chinese and South Korean stress levels had continued to rise until the United States acquired control over some of the supplies in March 2014. It is still an open question whether Japan will eventually acquire nuclear weapons.

**Overcoming the Burdensharing Dilemma?**

Some senior American advisers are prepared to countenance greater allied burdensharing without even considering the possible negative ramifications. Most are not. A variety of organizational and conceptual frameworks, many only half-formed, are being debated and implemented to different degrees in an attempt to continue America’s ability to exert restraint and control over Japan’s expanding military activity. Yet they continue to run aground on the inherent difficulty of the burdensharing dilemma.

One method, as detailed above, is simply to oppose the acquisition of weapons and military postures that promise Japanese autonomy with a near absolute American commitment. A proponent of this mechanism is former National Security Council Asia director Michael Green. Worried that long-range ballistic and cruise missiles could risk tactical and strategic entrapment, Green has been quoted as suggesting that “[e]ven if Japan possessed the capability to attack enemy bases, it would be limited so it would be the United States that would have to

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319 In a recent report, Andrew Tellis argues that the first aim of American strategy towards China should be bolstering regional actors: "By increasing the national power of China’s neighbors, the United States can constrain Beijing’s behavior and limit its capacity for aggressiveness. This investment is in Washington’s best interest irrespective of whether it is repaid in kind because it will diminish China’s ability to misuse its growing strength and increase American geopolitical maneuverability in the Indo-Pacific.” Andrew J. Tellis, *Balancing without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 22, 2014). Emphasis added.
Likewise, James Schoff, former senior adviser for East Asia policy at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, has offered a “Front Office/Back Office Concept.” It would seek to maintain “the overall division of labor” while deepening “integration in certain support functions.” This would be different from the old sword-shield dichotomy, yet it would try to funnel greater Japanese contributions primarily into intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare, missile defense, and logistical support—functions that could not result in entrapment. Indeed, Schoff suggests, “[a] limit on Japanese forward presence, which this concept would provide, should receive a positive response in the region.” Yet, the concept also recognizes that there will inevitably be circumstances in which the front and back offices are reversed. And if Japanese civilian and military leaders are certain upon the path to more strategic autonomy, the US will be able to discourage them from seeking a more balanced and capable force only with great difficulty.

A second method is what Victor Cha has called an “adhesion” strategy, which is the opposite of a “distancing” approach. Since no one influential is contemplating the withdrawal of US forces in Japan in public, if at all, Washington cannot realistically hope that rhetorically distancing American policy from Japanese policy over, for example, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands is enough to nullify the burdensharing dilemma. ‘Strategic ambiguity’ is difficult when US garrisons physically ensure security commitments. Instead, many Americans policymakers believe binding themselves even closer to their allies can achieve a similar outcome of influence and control. Patrick Cronin, a senior director at CNAS and former senior director at the National Defense University, has delicately suggested, “we hug our Japanese ally very closely,” so that

320 Quoted in “Japan Seeks Tough Stance.”
322 Cha, 195.
the United States can “make sure that their capacity, their roles and missions as they change, are good for the overall region and good for U.S. interests.” For example, according to unnamed Japanese and US sources, Washington and Tokyo will “create a permanent consultative body to coordinate the operations of the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military” following the revision of the Defense Cooperation Guidelines later this year. Here again, Michael Green provides the most coherent explanation: “I would say to those that are worried about entrapment, that if you’re worried about entrapment, that Japan would somehow draw the U.S. into a conflict we don’t want, that’s all the more reason why we need to be joint, and we need a joint strategy, and thinking jointly about escalation.” In the US-Japan alliance, Green explained elsewhere, American policymakers lack the “joint and combined alliance,” or rather, high degree of asymmetric US control, that the United States has in NATO and the US-ROK alliance, primarily because Yoshida refused to subordinate his country’s military to American vassal status. The more “jointness” the United States can create, the easier it will be to get inside Japanese “decisionmaking loops.” Even Green, however, has acknowledged that if US officials “missed that opportunity, for whatever reason,” and Japan provokes an incident that escalates to war, the outcome is simple: “Then we have a problem.”

Conclusion

The burdernsharing dilemma is even more acute in the Rebalance or Pivot to Asia than it was during the Cold War. For perhaps the first time in the history of the alliance, Japan is more

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326 Green et al., “What To Do About Tensions in Asia.”
worried about abandonment than entrapment and the United States is more worried about entrapment than abandonment. The United States faces serious constraints in matching China’s increases in military power, and Asian geopolitical conflicts continue to fester. Tokyo is therefore beginning a serious hedging strategy. While Americans officials welcome greater Japanese enthusiasm for burdensharing, they also fear how the loss of control the US necessarily suffers could result in an unwanted war provoked by risky Japanese military behavior, as well as the creation of a general environment involving arms races and security spirals in which war is more likely. Washington has been trying to overcome the burdensharing dilemma by discouraging certain kinds and styles of Japanese rearmament. Yet it is limited by a fundamental inability to exert more or the same influence over a sovereign state that is increasingly capable and autonomous. The United States may be retaining all of its commitment, but it is also losing much of its control.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

Americans cannot decide whether they want their allies to be weak or strong. There are obvious geopolitical incentives for encouraging allies to contribute to collective defense. Allied military power bolsters deterrence and relieves the incredible financial burdens usually maintained by “security guarantors”—or hegemons and empires. Yet when an ally’s capabilities grow, so too does its capacity for independent action. The cultivation of a military protectorate’s own power inevitably results in a loss of control for its patron state. Burdensharing is a double-edged sword.

Certain characteristics of the post-World War II alliance structure make America particularly susceptible to this ‘burdensharing dilemma.’ In the case of the Japan, among many others, it was decided that extended deterrence necessitated the United States station its own forces on allied territory. If the US engineered its alliance so that it could not possibly avoid involvement in Japan’s wars, then the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and anyone else would be deterred from aggression. Yet when Beijing knows Washington is nearly automatically committed, so does Tokyo. America relinquished the most powerful and traditionally first method of restraint used in prewar European diplomacy—threatening nonsupport for behavior that could provoke unwanted war. The new model has created a new dynamic of alliance restraint and control: the burdensharing dilemma. So long as US garrisons continued to physically ensure the automaticity of commitments to defend Japan and other allies, the growth of allied military power will be looked on with fear and suspicion, especially if it is draped in
“1930s wrapping paper” that threatens to at least partially unravel Asia’s security environment.\textsuperscript{327}

America’s strategy towards its Asian allies now stands at a crossroads. In the Cold War, the burdensharing dilemma was usually resolved into the low burdensharing-high control option. That solution is reversing in today’s Rebalance to Asia. Perhaps US-China and Sino-Japanese relations will not deteriorate further. History, however, and a realistic assessment of the widening gap between privilege and power in the Asian international system, are not grounds for optimism. If the burdensharing dilemma proves to be an inescapable facet of America’s particular brand of extended deterrence, then US attempts to regulate the remilitarization of Japan will founder upon the rocks of the Senkaku/Diaoyu.

Beyond Japan, the United States is currently establishing small bases in Australia, Singapore, the Philippines, and perhaps Vietnam. If my theory is any guide, then Washington’s efforts may very well prove self-defeating. To deter China, these commitments would have to be strong enough to reassure US allies. If they are not, then the flexing of Chinese power will grow apace with its rapid increases in military strength, and the American strategy will fail. But even if US commitments are certain enough to invoke the element of automaticity, and China is at least more deterred, allied capitals will also identify the totality of the commitment. Aside from prudence, American allies will see little reason to compromise with Chinese demands. They have the automatic backing of the United States military behind them. Yet while the US commitment may be necessary and credible, it will not be sufficient. The rise of China and the stagnancy of America are contributing to the creation of an “Asian Power Web.”\textsuperscript{328} Arms races and the fashioning of links between the ‘spokes’ beyond the control of the ‘hub’ are following China’s

\textsuperscript{327} Quoted Ayako Mie, "Japan’s Image Hurt by Abe’s Militarist Facade: Nye," \textit{The Japan Times}, April 4, 2014.
disruption to the Asian order. The burdensharing dilemma predicts that as Asian militaries continue to expand their capabilities, the United States will be at a greater and greater risk of entrapment, both tactical and strategic.

The future for America in Asia is one of commitment without control. Washington may decide to accept the risks of alliance management, but the current arrangement promises no balance between deterring Beijing and restraining Tokyo. A new model of alliance relations is therefore necessary if Japan becomes an independent great power. The United States should accept that its role in the region is following a cyclical historical path. As Heraclitus understood, “a road up and down is one and the same road.”329 If the weakness of potential Asian allies was once reason to occupy them without fear—to overcome Snyder’s ‘alliance security dilemma’ between abandonment and entrapment—their strength today is reason to withdraw the automaticity of that commitment. America can no longer wholly suppress its allies’ desire for power and independence in security policy. The era of hegemony is over, and the epoch of the balance of power is begun again.

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