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Ratification and Reliability: The Strategic Logic of Formal Treaties

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelors of Arts in International Relations from the College of William and Mary

by

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Accepted for ____________________________
(Honors, High Honors, Highest Honors)

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Abstract

This thesis evaluates the connection between ratification and alliance structure, formation, and reliability. It hypothesizes that as ratification requirements become more rigorous, alliance formation becomes less likely and alliance structures become more likely. In the mean time, ratified alliances will be more reliable. This thesis tests these theories using both qualitative and quantitative evidence. Applying three case studies on the League of Nations, it illustrates how the increased rigor of ratification rules makes alliance formation more difficult. Meanwhile, member-level data from the Alliance Treaties and Obligations dataset between 1815 and 2000 suggests that ratification makes alliances more reliable. Overall, then, ratification does seem to have an impact on alliance politics.

In “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices,” Lisa Martin posits that presidents use formal military treaties as a signaling device. This device conveys to foreign leaders both the seriousness and reliability of security commitments, as the President invests in bearing “the costs of undergoing the formal… treaty procedure.” In the SALT II negotiations, for example, the Soviet foreign minister insisted the treaty be ratified, lest it attain “inferior status.”

Such strategic thinking raises numerous questions. Does the signal Martin describes, reflecting expectations of state behavior, actually play out as predicted in international relations? How important is the formal-informal distinction in alliance formation? This

For input on the theoretic principles of the thesis, thanks are due to Alexander Thompson. My appreciation as well to Paul Manna and Lindsay Hundley for providing help with quantitative research and data analytics, and to Amy Oakes and Laurie Koloski for advice and support. Thanks, too, to the ATOP project, Polity Project, and Patricia Weitsman and George Shambaugh for the data used in the quantitative analysis. Finally, special thanks to Robert Kenzer for advice, editing, and encouragement as well as to Sue Peterson for inspiring, driving, and supporting this project.

thesis analyzes these issues by addressing the role a state’s ratification structure plays in alliance formation, structure, and reliability.

My argument contains two parts. I hypothesize, first, that ratification plays a significant role in alliance formation and structure. As ratification requirements become more rigorous, alliance formation becomes less likely, and negotiators will increasingly structure alliances so as to attain domestic support. Second, ratified alliances will be more reliable. This behavior occurs because the balance of threat within and outside of the alliance is altered; alliance members perceive less offensive intent from friends who have put their domestic and international reputation on the line. Also, by driving alliances to be clearly structured, alliance ratification helps control for the dynamics of changing state interests, ideas, and policies.

This argument fills important gaps in the IR literature, tying together work on commitment, ratification, and alliances. Above all, comparing the literature on commitment formation and compliance to that on alliance formation and reliability allows us to observe how domestic variables drive alliance dynamics. Concurrently, alliances can be used to test theories of commitment, expanding understandings in both sub-fields. Finally, by linking ratification with alliances, I expand the still-nascent literature on ratification.

Merging these issue areas helps answer a number of wider theoretical, paradigmatic, and policy-oriented questions. For example, how do the second and third levels of analysis interact in security affairs? What if alliances, the key mechanism in realist balance-of-power, are driven not by simple cost-benefit analyses, but instead by interactions between domestic and international politics? Likewise, how do liberal and constructivist theories of commitment relate to realist theories of military alliances? Are
these theories compatible? Regarding policy, should the United States care whether friendly nations formally ratify alliance agreements? Should domestic audiences mobilize lobbyists and war chests over alliance ratification?

To investigate these questions, the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I review the international relations literature in four areas: commitments, ratification, alliance formation, and alliance reliability. Second, I outline my argument about how domestic politics and formal ratification alters alliance formation, structure, and reliability. Third, I perform a number of case studies on the ratification of League of Nations. Fourth, I perform regressions attempting to get at the connections between alliance ratification and structure, as well as ratification and reliability. Overall, I suggest that there exists inconclusive evidence that ratification, through the mechanisms of alliance structure and the balance of threat, increases alliance reliability but that the exact relationship between ratification and reliability is powerful.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

This section first reviews the literature on international commitments, broadly defined: Why do states commit? How do domestic actors influence commitments? And why do states choose to comply? After addressing these questions, I review several subsets of the commitment literature. First, I appraise theories of ratification, asking whether ratification affects commitment and compliance. Second, I evaluate the literature on a specific type of commitment, military alliances. This literature explores both alliance formation and alliance reliability. Key questions include why alliances form, why they can be unreliable, what determines alliance reliability, and whether alliance reliability and
formation are similar to commitment ratification and compliance. Tying together the literature on formal commitments (ratification) with the literature on alliances improves our understanding of the relationship between alliance formation, treaty ratification, and alliance reliability.

Commitment and Compliance

The literature on commitments and compliance is extensive. Commitments are defined as the act of contracting into a given agreement. The agreement can be either multilateral (a global trade agreement or a new human rights accord) or bilateral (an agreement to reduce arms between the United States and the Soviet Union or an agreement by the United States to come to Japan's aid in times of war). In either case, the agreement aspires to solicit some prescribed form of behavior, a “state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.” This state, as defined by Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, is compliance. In other words, compliance represents the pursuit of a prescribed behavior described in the commitment.2

In “Compliance with International Agreements,” Beth Simmons divides the compliance literature into four schools. Realism stresses the dominance of power and national interest over global legal institutions. To realists “international law [and the nature of commitments at large] is merely an epiphenomenon of interests or is only made

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effective through the balance of power." Rational functionalists also see states as driven by realpolitik motivations, but emphasize the capacity of international agreements to resolve "the collective good." Instead of emphasizing the need for collective action, democratic legalists argue that democracies "solve" the compliance puzzle because their normative and political structures make them more likely to comply. Finally, normative approaches argue that international standards of conduct drive compliance. Each of these schools frame compliance's nature differently, emphasizing different variables that lead to commitment. Each theory in turn proposes an alternate reason that states enter into commitments, whether to adjust the balance of power (realism), seek an otherwise unobtainable collective good (functionalism), or establish international legal order and norms (democratic legalism or normative approaches).

Regardless of school of thought, most theorists emphasize a rationalist framework of commitment formation. For example, many scholars argue that decision-makers commit because they perceive a need to cooperate internationally. Helen Milner, for instance, contends that cooperation (and by extension commitment) occurs when "political leaders... believe that the political benefits from international cooperation outweigh the costs; that is, the no cooperation outcome is seen as worse than the cooperative one."
Commitments are influenced both by international conditions and by pressures on national leaders. Systemic considerations include the fear of a potential military hegemony, concern over environmental degradation, and a desire to stabilize global trade flows. For example, Robert Jervis claims that the systemic incentives for states to commit to concerts includes the offense-defense balance, changes in payoffs, and increased gains from cooperation.

Domestic sources of commitment include a desire for a regime to stabilize its hold on power or a hope to please a powerful sub-state audience. Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse argue, for instance, that democratizing regimes commit to international organizations so as to credibly reform “by establishing a mechanism that increases the cost of deviating from these efforts [democratization] and backsliding.” James Vreeland also illustrates how second-image institutional designs may drive commitments. He alleges not only that autocracies commit less often to human rights treaties, but also that the structure of autocratic regimes influences their decision to commit. “Typical” dictatorships are more likely than “multiparty dictatorships” to agree to measures such as the United Nations Convention Against Torture. Vreeland asserts this occurs because “torture is more likely to occur when power is shared” among domestic actors.

Scholarship generally emphasizes that domestic factions, embedded in domestic structures, drive ratification. Robert Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The

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11 Ibid., 69.
Logic of Two-Level Games” paints an evocative picture of domestic determinants of foreign policy:

Each national political leader appears at both [the international and domestic] game boards. Across the international table sit his foreign counterparts, and at his elbow sit diplomats and other international advisers. Around his domestic table behind him sit party and parliamentary figures, spokesperson for domestic agencies, representative of key interest groups, and the leader’s own political advisors... Moves that are rational for a player at one board... may be impolitic for that same player at the other board. Nevertheless, there are powerful incentives for consistency between the two games.12

In his case study of the Bonn Conference of 1978, Putnam studies players on both boards. In particular, the “player” President Jimmy Carter had to balance the international demands for global deflation with domestic debate over his National Energy Program.13 Carter and other leaders, constrained by two semi-exclusive win-sets, were forced to merge their preferences as both second-level and third-level actors.14

In her “ratification game,” Milner also points to the role of domestic forces in treaty commitment. Milner argues that numerous considerations – including divided domestic government, asymmetry of information, and less informed “endorsers” – reduce the chance for global cooperation.15 According to Milner, “polyarchy [a system between hierarchy and anarchy both domestically and internationally, driven in part by the complexity of domestic politics] makes cooperation less likely.”16 Thus, for both Putnam and Milner, domestic politics limits the opportunities for commitment, as actors in the second image limit

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13 Ibid., 427-428.
14 Putnam defines win-sets as “the set of all possible Level I [international/systemic] agreements that would “win” – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or down.” Ibid., 437.
15 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 70-98.
16 Ibid., 98.
negotiable win-sets.17

So far, the literature has explained that commitment broadly defined may resolve both domestic and international problems. The motivations, and restraints on, these commitments may come from either or both the domestic and international levels. The question, then, is what leads to commitment violation – that is, a breakdown of compliance? Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes use an “efficiency model,” (also called the “managerial thesis”), to claim that changing cost-benefit calculations impact compliance.18 Commitments are typically violated due to “ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language... limitation of the capacity of parties... [or] the temporal dimension of the social and economic changes contemplated.”19 This managerial account of compliance is not without critics. Realists, for example, hark back to the words of Machiavelli: “a prudent ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him, and when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant.”20 Democratic legalists, meanwhile look to Vreeland or Martin, who argue that democracy’s commitments prove more “credible” than those of autocratic states.

The compliance literature, in sum, remains divided among multiple explanations. Overall, the literature shows that compliance remains imperfect, that both domestic and international forces drive both the decision to commit and the extent of compliance.

17 These works represent a functionalist/democratic legalist framework. Realists would likely contain these factors within the "black box." For a normative description of domestic-international interrelations related to commitment, see James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 418-419.
19 Ibid., 188. These arguments are in defiance of the “enforcement school,” which emphasizes the role of international enforcement mechanisms.
20 Ibid., 177.
Studying specific types of commitment, such as military alliances, can bring greater precision to these concepts and theories. Military alliances, commitments that aspire to elicit a prescribed behavior of cooperative military action, help us to understand commitment formation. The other piece of the puzzle, the nature of ratification, not only expands our understanding of compliance, but also of commitment.

Ratification

Ratification, the formal process whereby a domestic audience approves a commitment, represents a subset of the commitment literature focusing on the legal method of forming international agreements. Some may argue that ratification simply represents a mechanism of commitment. However, ratification also explains, at least in part, why states commit and in particular why they ally militarily with one another. Thus, discussing ratification allows for a nuanced exploration of commitment formation and compliance. Studying ratification also illustrates how commitments vary across issue areas.

Just as theorists ask, “why commit?” we may ask “why ratify?” Or rather, why commit by ratifying? Lisa Martin argues that a key reason that treaties are formalized is to signal the seriousness and reliability of the commitment. In many cases, domestic actors also prefer ratification as it grants them a voice in negotiations. Ratification may have numerous effects on the actual commitment. The most direct effect would be voiding the

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21 Ratification is often couched in terms of a formal process whereby domestic actors play a role in approving a treaty negotiated by the executive. This process may involve a referendum, a formal vote by the legislature, or other measures. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Daniel S. Morey, “The French ‘Petit Oui’: The Maastricht Treaty and the French Voting Agenda,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38, no. 1 (2007): 65-87 and Dan Caldwell and Michael Krepon, The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). Robert Putnam posits that this process does not have to be inherently democratic. For example, the Meiji Constitution ensured that the Japanese military would have a determining role in ratifying the London Naval Treaty. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 437.

22 Martin, “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices.”
commitment -- a legislature may fail to approve a commitment or a public may vote the commitment down in a referendum. Regarding Martin’s signaling device, ratification may also allow domestic actors to impose “costs” on the executive, such as increased oversight.

Many theorists posit that ratification represents a critical aspect of commitment formation. Specifically, the “two level perspective,” based on the work of Robert Putnam, contends that “leaders have interests in both the domestic and international domains and simultaneously calculate the domestic and international implications of their actions.” 23 In such a theory, constituent ratification represents one half of the game at play. 24 The nature of ratification also permits states to construct reservations and understandings. Such mechanisms allow a state to tailor treaty enforcement to its specific conditions, at times helping countries skirt the most critical aspects of a commitment. 25 The rigors of the ratification process may also drive international governmental organizations (IGOs) to create “offshoots” within their organization. The hope is that by simply expanding existing IGOs, the costs of “a new treaty that would require signature and ratification to take effect” can be avoided. 26 Thus, ratification represents a powerful check on commitment behavior, influencing IGO development, elite negotiating styles, and executive enforcement procedures.

An example of the influence of ratification on IGO’s occurred in the 1992 French referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The French public approved the treaty with only

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24 John Burton applies a particularly interesting version of this theory arguing that many commitments experience “entry problems,” where elites will commitments to fail, as they know that they cannot receive domestic support. Ibid., 171.
51% of the vote, a much smaller margin than expected. This “petit oui,” defied expectations of 75%+ support for the Treaty. Accordingly, as Michael Lewis-Beck and Daniel Morey note, “the evaporation of this support... sent a shock through the European political and economic community,” resulting in a more contentious and complex process in approving the 2005 European Union Constitution.27

Not only does ratification represent a critical aspect of the commitment process in many states it also provides a basis for compliance. For example, Robert Putnam suggests that authoritarian leaders cannot make credible commitments, as they have no reliable mechanism to pledge their domestic audience to a given treaty.28 J. Timmons Roberts, Bradley Parks, and Alexis Vasquez take this argument a step further, declaring “if a state’s willingness or ability to implement an international environmental treaty is weak, or even in question... cooperation is unlikely.”29 In other words, even when ratification proves successful, if there is significant domestic dissent, the nature of a state’s commitment and compliance may still come under question.

Considering the importance of ratification, one might expect a vibrant literature on the ratification of security commitments and alliances. Thus, it is surprising that no such literature exists. The importance of research on alliance formation becomes even clearer when we consider that ratification affects issue areas in different ways. For example, the ratification of environmental treaties is driven by the vibrancy of competition among lobbyist groups, state size, the state’s net wealth, and policymakers views of free trade and

global externalities. In contrast, Vreeland emphasizes that the ratification of human rights treaties are affected by regime and institutional structures. Meanwhile, Lewis-Beck and Morey’s discussion of the ratification of the Maastricht political treaty emphasizes both political conditions (elite discord, partisanship) and views on national sovereignty.

On the whole, a number of lessons can be gleaned from the ratification literature. First, a strategic logic of ratification exists, and this reasoning relates to the strategic logic of commitments. Second, ratification represents a critical aspect of the commitment process, impacting not only the formation of commitments but also long-time compliance with these agreements. Third, ratification theories emphasize that determinants of ratification vary across issue areas. All these concepts add “pieces” to the puzzle of alliance ratification. However, to gain a complete perspective, we must include two more literatures: works on alliance formation and alliance reliability.

**Alliances: Formation & Reliability**

If commitments are understood as “as an actor contracting into a given agreement,” then alliances may be conceived of as cooperative military agreements designed to commit a state to the maintenance, use, or potential use of force. In other words, alliances are a particular type of commitment based on military power. To investigate alliance ratification and reliability, this section follows a similar logic to previous ones, explaining the strategic

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31 Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights.”


33 For the sake of this thesis, I will focus on “entente” and “defensive” alliances. This typology is based in part on the typology used in the Correlates of War project. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Formal alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” *Journal of Peace Research* 3, no. 1 (1966): 1-32.
logic behind alliance formation, the role of domestic politics in alliance formation, the effect of alliance formation on alliance reliability, and the overall determinants of alliance reliability.

Systemic variables are typically used to explain alliance formation. For example, Stephen Walt in “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Threat” argues:

The proposition that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers lies at the heart of traditional balance of power theory. According to this hypothesis, states join alliances to protect themselves from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.34

In other words, states form alliances due to a series of cost-benefit analyses based on relative power. Other scholars have built on this realist model. Todd Sandler, for example, charges that alliance cost-benefit analysis is based upon concepts such as the reduced cost of defense, enhanced deterrence, and joint maneuvers.35 In “From Balance to Concert,” Jervis also highlights different variables driving alliance formation, including the offense-defense balance and systemic transparency.36 Similarly, Mark Cresenzi et al. use variables such as an alliance partner’s reputation of reliability, and Alistair Smith stresses the nature of defensive alliances and deterrent calculations.37

Little ground has been broken in how domestic politics impact alliance formation. Similarly, no ground has been broken regarding the role of ratification in alliance formation. The process of alliance formation is taken as a given; theorists posit that states form alliances based on a unitary cost-benefit analysis, not a debate between domestic and international actors.

Before discussing the causes of alliance reliability, it is worthwhile to discuss whether alliances generally appear to be reliable or unreliable. Just as theories of alliance formation underline the importance of systemic variables, theories about alliance reliability emphasizes the anarchic, morality-free nature of international politics. In other words, scholars contend that alliances are only reliable when the commitment’s goals suit both sides. In such a world, defection should be quite common. For example, scholars point out that even in one of the world’s most famous moments of alliance formation, the “Concerts of Europe,” cooperation was fleeting.

Numerous studies have investigated the reliability of alliances. For example, in “Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” J. David Singer and Melvin Small find that between 1815 and 1945, allies only aided one another twenty-three percent of the time. In a further eight percent of cases, states opposed their so-called ally. However, if only major power alliances were studied, then forty-eight percent of the time

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38 Alliance reliability is defined as actors adhering to the “constraints and obligations” placed upon them by formal military commitments.
39 “The term ‘Concert of Europe,’ is often applied to late 19th-century international politics, but the pursuit of self-interest was not sufficiently transformed to justify this label. The two 20th-century concerts were very brief, and one can argue that they did not really come into existence at all.” Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security,” 58-59. It should be noted that there is some theoretic pushback to this idea.
allies aided each other, forty-eight percent of the time they remained neutral, and five percent of the time they opposed one another.\textsuperscript{41} Meanwhile, Brett Ashley Leeds observes that alliance commitments “are fulfilled about 75 percent of the time.”\textsuperscript{42} Alistair Smith, on the other hand, claims the exact opposite: alliances are reliable only 25\% of the time.\textsuperscript{43} Smith also notes that the empirical record of alliance reliability is inherently muddled. Studies of alliance reliability are likely to face problems of selection bias, and only “a small proportion of alliances need to be unreliable to generate the empirical observation that alliances are on average unreliable.”\textsuperscript{44} Considering this empirical and theoretical record, it seems that alliances generally unreliable. Meanwhile, the literature has not been able to establish conclusively whether alliances are only somewhat unreliable or radically unreliable.

Robert Rothstein concludes in \textit{Alliances and Small Powers} “it is a truism to assert that the ultimate success or failure of an alliance depends on the way in which it is maintained. It involves translating the common interests and aims which unite the allies into effective operational policies.”\textsuperscript{45} Such arguments are common in regards to what make alliances reliable – the interests and aims of partners must be maintained. Beyond this congruence of interests, political scientists have pointed to numerous variables that drive alliance reliability. For example, Rothstein also notes that for an alliance to remain reliable,
states must maintain a “similar conception of power” alongside similar values and believe that they will receive an equitable distribution of benefits. In his theory, alliances fall apart because of changes in strategic calculations, or because new policymakers come to power with different beliefs about benefits and costs.\textsuperscript{46}

Other scholars emphasize different variables driving alliance reliability. Patricia Weitsman, in \textit{Dangerous Alliances}, concludes that states determine the viability of alliances by calculating the balance of internal versus external threat. In her formulation, the Allies fell out after World War II because the U.S. and Soviets saw each other as greater threats than any external power. Meanwhile NATO survived the fall of the USSR because member states did not see each other as threatening as external dangers latent in the system.\textsuperscript{47} Additionally, Keith Grant claims that the congruence of alliance portfolio’s, i.e. the size and capabilities of member states determine alliance reliability.\textsuperscript{48} Regardless of specific arguments, most theorists emphasize that a couple of key factors drive alliance reliability: the structure of power and threat within the alliance and the congruence of incentives and interests within the alliance. These theories of alliance reliability rarely reference the role of ratification or domestic politics.

\textbf{Conclusion}

A review of scholarship surrounding ratification, compliance, commitment, alliance formation, and alliance reliability illustrates that although the literatures are deeply

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item This latter conception obviously brings in the idea of domestic variables. Nonetheless, Rothstein and theorists like him have still failed to flesh out the full role of domestic variables. Robert Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, 55-59.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
connected, a theory linking them remains elusive. From a “levels of analysis” perspective, this poses a problem whereby most commitments are explained as a product of second-level variables, but military commitments are explained by third-level variables. In short, the de-linking of alliance, commitment, and compliance theories leaves an incomplete understanding of each topic.

These problems extend into the individual issue areas. For example, in “Compliance With International Agreements,” Simmons notes that the compliance literature suffers from two key problems: selection bias (much compliance occurs in areas of minimal difficulty) and endogeneity (“it is difficult to show that a rule, commitment, or norm per se influenced governments to take particular positions”). These problems have caused scholars to warn against typical measures of compliance. Lisa Martin, in “Against Compliance,” suggests that the study of compliance would benefit from “the direct measurement of the policies states implement and from counterfactual analysis.”

Studying alliance reliability resolves these problems. Alliances typically do not form meaninglessly; thus, they do not represent “easy compliance.” Moreover, it is relatively easy to see when states “comply” to the rules of a military alliance – did they defend their neighbor? Did they help in an aggressive war? Meanwhile, the study of alliance reliability would benefit from greater reference to domestic variables. Accordingly, this thesis will use a framework that synthesizes issue areas, paradigms, and IR “images.” Digging down into policymaker perceptions, it will suggest reliability, credibility, commitment, and

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49 Simmons notes, “If the central analytical issue is to understand the conditions under which states behave in accordance with rules to which they have committed themselves or, more broadly, in accordance with prevailing norms of international behavior, then it is important to isolate the impact of those rules and norms.” Beth Simmons, “Compliance With International Agreements,” 89.

compliance are interconnected. This theoretical net will bring together a selection of variables and theories. In the end, a more complete perspective will be granted, one that promotes a clearer understanding of global commitment and cooperation.

**A THEORY OF ALLIANCE RATIFICATION**

This thesis draws links between ratification and alliance formation, structure, and reliability. As a state’s treaty ratification mechanisms becomes more demanding, the state will be constrained in forming alliances. Meanwhile, as these mechanisms become more rigorous, alliances obligations will be more specified. Finally, ratified alliances will be more reliable, as they will mitigate both conflicts of interest and concerns over the balance of threat.

Ratification and Alliance Formation

“Alliance ratification” represents the mechanism by which domestic audiences approve an alliance commitment. Alliances, by their very nature as commitments towards the maintenance, use, or potential use of force often draw the interest, and sometimes the opprobrium, of domestic interest groups. Considering the attention of domestic forces and the structured nature of alliance commitments, we may conclude that ratification has the potential to impact both the formation of alliances and the structure of those alliances formed.

Domestic ratification and alliance formation are linked via a state’s ratification structure, as this structure will determine the ease with which the state formalizes its relationships with its allies. These ratification structures are defined as the formal and informal political structures that determine who ratifies international agreements and the
process by which these actors enact ratification. In part, these structures are based on regime types -- democratic checks and balances will often necessitate higher barriers to ratification than in authoritarian states. However, the regime type dichotomy fails to describe fully the variety of ways by which states ratify treaties.

To establish that the regime type dichotomy does not fully capture ratification rules, we can compare the American structure for ratification with those of democratic European governments. In the U.S., treaties move through any number of veto portals – a committee vote, a Senate-wide vote requiring two-thirds support, and Presidential endorsement. Meanwhile, ratification in Britain formally involves only signature and deposition by the Foreign Secretary, but in many instances includes a majority vote as well as consultation with Britain’s “devolved administrations.”51 Meanwhile, in France, treaties are formally ratified by “an act of Parliament.”52 Here, the process differs as treaty negotiations occur through the President and not the Prime Minister. Treaties, thus, may be more likely to face opposition in the face of “cohabitation,” or other instances of wider legislative dissent.

Thus, between these three democratic countries, ratification occurs through notably different mechanisms. We can thus see that an authoritarian-democratic dichotomy does not properly represent the variety of ratification structures possible.

51 For a more in-depth breakdown of British ratification, including legal definitions and the Ponsonbury Rule, see United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, *The Governance of Britain – War Powers and Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers* (Norwich: British Licensing Division, 2007): 69-89. Overall, it can be understood that ratification in the United Kingdom requires majority parliamentary approval – an approval that should generally prove straightforward given that parliamentary first-past-the-post administrations can be expected to win majority votes without competition.

52 “Article 53. Peace Treaties, Trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those committing the finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament. They shall not take effect until such ratification or approval has been secured.” Asemblee Nationale, Legal Text: Constitution of October 4, 1958, Last modification unknown, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english.
Ratification, thus, should be thought of along a spectrum of restrictiveness, not as a comparison between authoritarian and democratic states. Restrictiveness can be understood as those institutional moments that impede, slow down, or draw attention to the ratification process. Regardless of how many actors, values, or opinions towards ratification exist in the system, these informal and formal institutions will ensure that dissenting opinions, no matter how small, have the opportunity to voice their concerns or impede the ratification process. Such stopgaps could include the need for a majority (or two-thirds) vote in the legislature, mandatory approval from federal or devolved bodies, endorsement from the military, requirements towards a referendum, coalition politics, etc. Overall, then, “restrictions” are institutional mechanisms that make the ratification process more “rigorous.”

Although states can exist at any point along this spectrum, three “levels” of restriction predominate. At the low end of restrictiveness, there exists little check on treaty ratification. This may occur because the state has a one-party system, where the legislature can consistently be expected to actualize the executive’s desires. It may also occur in an authoritarian system where there exists no formal (or informal) check on the executive and no mechanism for ratification. Some democratic systems may also face few ratification restrictions – especially parliamentary governments using first-past-the-post electoral rules emphasizing two-party domination. In such systems, the prime minister can often expect treaties negotiated on his behalf to sail through legislative ratification.

Moderately restrictive state structures, on the other hand, will require some sort of legislative mechanism towards treaty ratification. For example, the treaty may require majority approval from parliament. Many political systems operate here – it acts as a happy
medium between highly restrictive ratification requirements and more carte blanche setups. Ratification will often progress unopposed, but at times it will become more wrought.

Finally, some states have extremely restrictive legislative mechanisms, such as requiring two-thirds approval. The most common example of this is the ratification structure embodied in the U.S. Senate. Such systems may also require a treaty to move through a rigorous committee system or to face opportunities for the inclusion of reservations. Restrictions on ratification, however, need not be based solely on legislative institutional design. For example, a multiparty system will gravitate towards the restrictive side of the spectrum, as treaties will require the support of numerous parties within a coalition government. Given the ideological gulf that may exist between parties in a multiparty system, day-to-day governance may prove difficult, let alone the ratification of international treaties. Likewise, federal systems may maintain restrictive ratification regimens. Belgian ratification, where the agreement requires approval from “two Federal chambers of parliament, as well as three separate regional governments,” embodies this principle.53

This spectrum of ratification restrictions relates generally to the idea of veto players, but not exactly. Haftel and Thompson define “veto players” as “a function of the number of actors whose agreements is [sic] needed for policy change and other institutional constraints on decision making.” Thompson and Haftel argue that these veto players constrain the executive and make ratification of trade treaties less likely.54

54 Ibid., 360.
Ratification structures are defined, however, not simply by the blockage points for approval, but also by those moments that allow for domestic input, oversight, and mobilization. For example, treaty reservations do not act as a stopgap towards legislative approval (a veto), but instead as a mechanism to alter the calculations and understandings behind the alliance. Such reservations, if properly exercised, could also alter the structure of the treaty, creating a direct line between alliance ratification and alliance organization. Thus, ratification restrictions influence international politics in ways that are more complex than veto player politics.

**FIGURE 1: THE SPECTRUM OF RATIFICATION RULES**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low Restrictions</th>
<th>Moderate Restrictions</th>
<th>High Restrictions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Minor, often cursory or nominal checks on ratification</td>
<td>• Existant restrictions to ratification</td>
<td>• Extremely restrictive ratification structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Procedural legislative approval, support from the governing cabinet</td>
<td>• Majority approval from the legislator, moderate coalition politics</td>
<td>• Approval from national and federal bodies, two-thirds approval needed, highly-fractured coalition politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Easy to form alliances, minimal incentive for structures</td>
<td>• Moderately easy to form alliances, some incentive for structures</td>
<td>• Difficult to form alliances, major incentive for structures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This scale is important for two reasons. First, states with steeper ratification restrictions will form fewer alliances. As ratification requirements increase, there will be more opportunities for veto players to shut down treaty ratification. Even if veto players do not resist ratification, longer negotiations over the treaty, inclusion of reservations, or

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55 This is something that Thompson and Haftel recognize – their model of bilateral treaty ratification includes other domestic-level variables, including the “predictability” of the political system, government capacity, and the rigor of ratification requirements. Ibid., 360-363.
more publicity about the treaty may engender elite or public backlash. If a state has a less structured or less restrictive system for ratifying alliance treaties, there will be fewer opportunities for opposition to arise or for veto players to defeat the treaty.

Second, states with steeper ratification requirements will negotiate alliances that more clearly spell out the alliance’s structures. This is because negotiators will argue that they have to “sell” the alliance at home, and thus the agreement will have to be clear regarding what is expected of both sides. Milner argues that “in all cases anticipation reaction is at work: the agenda setter(s) and/or amenders will always try to craft bills or negotiate agreements that the executive, a majority in parliament, and/or the public will ratify afterwards.”

Since negotiators will fear that domestic opposition will use a treaty’s ambiguities to defeat it, structuring the alliance represents a method for increasing the chance of ratification. Thus, negotiators will seek treaties that spell out obligations clearly, preventing the opposition from using ambiguities for their own benefit. Finally, alliance obligations will need to be clear so that information is easily transmitted to “endorsers,” those actors who help drive domestic legislative behavior by resolving problems of asymmetrical information.

*The Ideological Origins of Great Powers* by Mark Haas provides a compelling example of how domestic actors can limit alliance formation. Haas argues that between 1933 and 1939, the foreign policies of Britain and France were framed by the actions of their political parties. Haas contends that although realist theory can “explain important dimensions of British and French foreign policies in the 1930’s,” it cannot fully account for why Britain

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56 Milner, *Interests, Institutions, and Information*, 106.
and France failed to balance Nazi Germany. He suggests that this variation can be explained by looking at the dynamics of French and British political parties. Whereas conservatives in these countries often downplayed the German threat or alternatively favored using Italy to balance Germany, leftists were loath to aligning with Italy, instead favoring an alliance with the Soviets. Political conditions at the time meant that even when one of these factions was in the minority, it often became embroiled in governing coalitions or at least governing politics. The parties could thus veto alliances with countries they opposed. Thus, Haas provides a clear example of how domestic structures and politics can drive alliance formation – something that becomes even more explicit when considering alliance ratification’s role in alliance formation.

Variables that scholars have deemed relevant to ratification include the vibrancy of competition among lobbyist groups, policymaker’s views, regime type, institutional structure, elite discord, and partisanship. Many of these variables are clearly relevant in the ratification of alliance treaties. In the theoretic model proposed, regime type and institutional structure will drive the structure of alliance ratification. These structures, in turn, will help frame how lobbyist groups compete, how policymaker’s views arise, and

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59 Haas's analysis here is quite illuminating: "British and French conservatives desired alignment with Italy as an aid against possible German aggression, but for the bulk of the decade refused association with the Soviet Union. In fact, some British and French conservatives' antipathy to the USSR was so great that they advocated aligning with Nazi Germany against communist Russia. Conversely, the majority of members from parties from the British and French left pushed hard for an alliance with the Soviet union against Germany, but shunned alignment with Italy." Ibid., 121.

60 The French government between 1933 and 1940 was dominated by rightist/conservative alliances, although the Popular Front government between 1936 and 1938 proved influential enough to muddle conservative foreign policies. Likewise, although Labor was in the British parliamentary minority, they were "able to do significant damage to prospects of an Anglo-Italian détente through the imposition of sanctions after the 1935 Ethiopian invasion. See Ibid., 121.

how elite discord and partisanship drive the political process. As political structures provide for more restrictions and stopgaps in the ratification process, political variables are more likely to be expressed and are more likely to be communicated ferociously. Domestic political considerations will thus have the potential to prevent treaty ratification, limiting the scope of alliance formation for a given state. Likewise, uneasiness over the potential trouble posed by these variables will drive negotiators to insist that alliances are organized more explicitly, altering alliance structures. Thus, the theory that alliance ratification affects alliance structure and alliance formation fits neatly within the wider literature of treaty ratification. See figure 2 for a summary of the theory so far.

FIGURE 2: THE EFFECT OF RATIFICATION STRUCTURE ON ALLIANCE FORMATION AND STRUCTURE

Ratification And Alliance Reliability

To understand how ratification affects reliability, we must review the two key factors that drive alliance reliability. First, as argued by Patricia Weitsman, the balance of threat both within and outside of the alliance governs the commitment’s performance. In this formulation, states become unreliable partners when the balance of threat within the alliance becomes just as great as the balance of threat outside the alliance. For example, 

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62 Weitsman, 26.
the Triple Alliance between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany fell apart because alliance
members threatened each other’s security and territorial possessions.\textsuperscript{63} Second, as Robert
Rothstein claims, the congruence of interests and ideas within an alliance also drives
reliability. In other words, changing policymaker perception, as well as the shifting
interests of alliance members, governs alliance policies.\textsuperscript{64} The ratification of alliance
agreements moderates both these considerations, mitigating both the balance of threat and
the calculation of interests and perceptions.

How does ratification impact the balance of threat between alliance partners?
Ratification does not affect many mechanisms of balance of threat, namely proximity,
offensive capability, and aggregate power. Instead, alliance ratification’s impact lies in the
calculation of offensive intent. Offensive intentions, in Stephen Walt’s original formulation,
means simply “states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against
them.”\textsuperscript{65} Alliance ratification stems perceptions of offensive intent in two ways. First,
because states have already committed formally to the ratification process, they are
generally perceived as less likely to disavow commitments. Second, alliance ratification
imposes “audience costs” on violating an alliance. These losses include a “cost” in the
domestic sphere (the cost of appearing to be an untrustworthy leader) and an international
“cost” of appearing to be an untrustworthy country. This international cost hurts both a

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} “The reason the states chose to ally were the very factors that inhibited them from coordinating
goals or implementing joint policy. Italy and Austria-Hungary were historic adversaries, and nothing short of
Austria relinquishing the Italian provinces still in Hapsburg possession would have resolved the conflicts
besetting the Triple Alliance... By 1907, hostility among the members was so high that Germany and Austria
were compelled to renew their alliance with Italy to prevent Italy’s open defection to the Entente.” Ibid., 96.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Robert Rothstein, \textit{Alliances and Small Powers}, 55.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 12.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
state’s reputation and other states calculation of its offensive intent, doubly discouraging states from backtracking on such commitments.66

Alliance ratification also impacts the second facet of alliance reliability: the congruence of alliance partner’s ideas and interests. As suggested above, negotiators from states where treaties require ratification will attempt to clearly structure alliances. The hope will be that in doing so, domestic audiences will look upon the agreement more favorably. Given these specific structures, the cavalcade of future policymakers will understand what they have committed to, helping them adjust their policies as needed. Likewise, as interests and ideas shift within the alliance, structured alliance will help clarify the “plan” going forth – helping enshrine continuity along a changing international environment. Finally, a structured treaty may help differentiate what policies are within and outside of the alliance’s purview. Such mechanisms can help maintain the alliance when other issues threaten to tear it apart. For example, Weitsman describes the interests of Austria-Hungary and Germany as becoming “increasingly intertwined” as they worked together in the Dual Alliance. Such convergence included common work in “supporting the papacy and Catholic interests throughout Europe,” as well as unified balancing against Russia and France. Weitsman argues “the institutional aspects of the alliance in this case served to deepen the member states’ cooperation over time.”67 Thus, the structuring of alliances, driven by alliance ratification, enhances alliance reliability.

66 Although such costs would be applied both towards formal and informal alliances, the cost is considerably higher because the state is perceived as having committed more seriously.
67 Weisman, 76-77.
Conclusion

The above analysis hypothesizes the link between ratification and reliability – a link that also draws together domestic considerations and international conditions. In short, the rigors of a ratification process may limit what alliances states can make, but also act as a trial by fire – creating valuable partnerships. This is because such alliance's organization will be more clearly spelled out, controlling for changing interests, ideas, and policymaker preferences. Meanwhile, by tying domestic and international reputations to the alliance, ratification alters the balance of threat.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis addresses three concepts: one, the role of alliance ratification in alliance formation; two, the role of alliance ratification in alliance structure; and three, the role of alliance ratification in alliance reliability. To answer the first question, I will use a qualitative case study, comparing the ratification of League of Nations membership among the United States, Germany, and Turkey. A qualitative case study was selected for two reasons. First, describing alliance ratification in-depth allows us to see the role that different ratification rules play in driving alliance formation. Second, no dataset in
existence describes whether a country did or did not form an alliance. The case study establishes that as domestic restrictions towards ratification increase, the process by which a state forms an alliance becomes more rigorous and difficult. Thus, the study evinces evidence for the theory that stricter ratification rules limit alliance formation.

Meanwhile, the link between alliance ratification and alliance structure, as well as between alliance ratification and alliance reliability, will be addressed by a quantitative study. Unlike regarding alliance formation, usable data exists for these topics. Likewise, applying regressions allows us to view the role of these variables across history and geography. This quantitative study shows that some links exist between alliance ratification and alliance structure, as well as between ratification and reliability.

**QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE**

This section tests the relationship between ratification structures and alliance formation using a comparative case study of the League of Nations. Observing the ratification of League of Nations membership across states with different institutional structures illustrate how countries with different political constructions form alliances differently. In particular, when ratification structures are more rigorous, the path towards alliance formation will be more wrought. Illustrating this concept helps us understand the relationship between domestic variables and international outcomes, as well as the wider causation between alliance ratification and alliance reliability.

To illustrate that ratification structures drive alliance formation, a case study must illustrate a variety of institutional designs, each of which pursues alliance formation uniquely. Cases also need to occur in similar conditions, such as similar proximate threat and international rivalries, as well as a similar global balance of power. Likewise, each
country’s domestic considerations should be comparable, in that the balance between pro-ratification and anti-ratification should be analogous. A comparative case study across League of Nations ratifications effectively addresses each of these mandates. By studying countries ratifying the same treaty around the same time period, numerous variables, especially the global balance of power, are generally controlled for. Likewise, by tracing the same alliance across countries, we can see the role of similar motivations across different political systems. For instance, just as the question of League of Nations membership evinced American debate between isolationism and internationalism, it drove German and Turkish debates between those who hoped to join the European mainstream and those who dissented from it. In each of these countries ratification was rendered uncertain by these competing forces.

At its most basic level, a case study using the League of Nations proves useful because there exists a depth of research and public understanding about the case. Counter-intuitively, however, the case study also resolves misconceptions about the interwar era. For example I build on Bear Braumoeller’s argument that, “American isolationism is a myth.”68 Braumoeller contends that the general understanding of why America failed to ratify the Treaty of Versailles is deeply flawed – it was institutional structures, not domestic preferences, which drove the Senate to reject ratification.69 We may thus conclude that much remains misunderstood about American ratification about the League of Nations treaty. Likewise, discussions of U.S. ratification have overshadowed the equally

69 Braumoeller argues that the failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles “is a very misleading indicator, [of American foreign policy] for two reasons.” First, the treaty had majority support and was actually quite close to passing – it failed only because of the Senate’s two-thirds ratification requirement. Second, “the considerable majority proved willing to envision engagement with Europe. Only a small group of so-called Irreconcilables consistently voted against the treaty in any form... and even they were not opposed to internationalism in general...” Braumoeller, 355.
interesting narratives of ratification in Germany and Turkey. Accordingly, a comparative case study on the League of Nations has appeal both for how much is known and for how much remains unknown.

Using the League of Nations to examine my theory is not without fault. For example, although is will prove useful to outline the ratification process for League of Nations membership in France, Britain, and Italy, the cost of war in these countries was so powerful as to overwhelm any other calculations – ratification, in short, was driven less by political calculations and more by a desperation to stem war deaths.\textsuperscript{70} Meanwhile, in many cases, other aspects of the given treaty (besides those about the League of Nations) drove ratifications. For example, those that protested against the Treaty of Versailles in France often did so because they believed that the agreement did not sufficiently punish Germany.\textsuperscript{71} Likewise, the few dissenting votes in Britain were, A.J.P. Taylor finds, “protesting against the failure to apply self-determination to Ireland.”\textsuperscript{72} In both these cases, there is little reference to the League of Nations as a point of concern. Some of these problems are of minimal concern – any ratification process will naturally be co-opted by wider foreign or domestic concerns. Meanwhile, by focusing on ratifications that were

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{70} For example, by the end of the war, France had sustained 1,390,000 casualties. Amongst the great powers, there was simply no will to fight. Adam Hochschild, \textit{To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion} (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011): 337-341. This problem has motivated me to also ignore ratification procedures in countries at the center of the conflict, such as Poland. Generally, I selected cases that were separated from World War I’s epicenter either by time (Germany and Turkey) or geography (the United States).

\textsuperscript{71} “Most [French] critics [of ratification], apart from the Socialists, focused on what he [Clemenceau] had not obtained in securities and guarantees. The list was imposing. Germany had not been broken up; she was not completely disarmed, and the inspection regime was set up under the League of Nations for a fixed term, not permanently under the Allied military Command…” It should be noted that some concerns in this wider list are not specifically aimed at the treatment of Germany, for example that “Italy had been unnecessarily alienated.” Nonetheless, concerns over Germany certainly predominated the docket of concerns. See David S. Newhall, \textit{Clemenceau: A Life at War} (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991): 462-463.

peripheral to the center of conflict either by geography (Turkey, United States) or by time (Germany), we can somewhat control for war weariness.\footnote{There are, of course, other critiques that could be leveled towards my study. For example, I chose not to study the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it would have represented an excellent example of a state with few ratification requirements. I chose to not use the USSR because it joined the League too late – given that the commitment and global conditions were similar across the Turkish, American, and German cases, it makes little sense to include Soviet assent. The political dynamics in 1934 were simply too different to compare to those in the 1920’s. After all, by the time the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, Germany had already left the alliance.}

Finally, some could simply argue that the League of Nations did not represent an alliance – that it was a wider inter-governmental organization like the United Nations. Nonetheless, the Covenant of the League of Nations required members to consult one another before going to war, and ensured that if any member of the organization was attacked, that all member states would act to defend it.\footnote{Arnold Tonybee, “What Was Done,” In The Treaty of Versailles and After, ed. George Riddell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935) 91-92.} These principles fit neatly into my previously-stated definition of alliances as cooperative military agreements designed to commit a state to the maintenance, use, or potential use of force.

For each case below, I will overview which treaty was relevant to League of Nations ratification, as well as the given country’s formal institutional structure. Next, I will discuss the domestic constraints and considerations towards ratification. This discussion will particularly focus on instances where domestic opposition challenged hopes of ratification. Finally, in each case, I will explain how the ratification process drove the pattern of alliance formation.
Britain, France, and Italy

Before going in-depth regarding the German, Turkish, and American cases, I will compare the ratification of League of Nations membership in Italy, France, and Britain. These cases help establish a baseline with which to compare other, later ratifications.

In Britain, ratification required a majority vote in Parliament, while in Italy and France ratification involved votes in both chambers of the legislature. Although Britain was not exactly a two-party system at the time, larger conservative and labor parties dominated. Meshed with the British parliamentary system, the UK leaned towards the “least restrictive” spectrum of ratification structures. The French system was fractured between many political parties, although these smaller factions could generally be classified within larger, more cohesive ideological tents. This division and the semi-presidential system in place meant that France’s ratifications structures were “moderately restrictive.” The Italian party system was similarly fractured, and thus also represents an example of moderate restrictions.

Each country faced resistance to ratification, either from partisan bickering or from concerns based on the Treaty of Versailles’ content. Ferdinand Czernin makes a particularly evocative claim about British ratification overall: “as the great letdown [the failure of the U.S. to ratify the Treaty of Versailles] swept across the country... The English reverted to their traditional isolation which they found ‘splendid.’”

The specter of the upcoming 1918 election spurred the Liberals, Labor, and Union of Democratic Control to criticize Lloyd

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75 Ferdinand Czernin, Versailles, 1919: The Forces, Events, and Personalities That Shaped The Treaty, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1964): 420. Czernin also argues that “although enmity to France by no means prompted Britain’s actions, she was rapidly and determinedly withdrawing from the Continent and was quite prepared to let France adjust to the new circumstances as best she could.” Ibid., 419.
George’s management of the Versailles process. British parliamentarians argued that the treaty did not sufficiently punish Germany, that Versailles’ self-determination clause was too vague, and that the long-term conflict between Germany and France had not been managed. Academic elites correspondingly condemned the treaty. John Maynard Keynes “fired a broadside against reparations” in his *Economic Consequences of Peace*, where he not only condemned the Treaty as risking the ruination of the European economy, but also rebuked Britain for fighting such a destructive war in the first place.

Given this protestation, we may have expected to see serious confrontation over ratification in the United Kingdom. A well-organized opposition, however, did not materialize. In part, this was due to David Lloyd George’s effective statesmanship, particularly his speech to Parliament on April 16th. As Taylor describes, after the speech, “The House of Commons accepted the treaty almost without a murmur. Even Liberal and Labour members agreed that the Fourteen Points had been broadly applied. Only four members voted against the treaty…”

In *Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937*, Maxwell Macartney and Paul Cremona portray Italy’s frustration, not only with the treaty of Versailles, but also with the League of Nations. They contend, “Italy came out of the Peace Conference of 1919 a
dissatisfied nation because, in her view, the pledges undertaken by the Entente Powers in 
the Treaty of London of 1915... were not fulfilled at Versailles."\(^81\) The authors go on to 
claim that "the very birth of the League found Italy unprepared to subscribe 
wholeheartedly to its principles."\(^82\) Such principles included the unclear standing of Italy's 
and other country's borders, as well as a general sense that the League favored the status 
quo in terms of French and British domination. Italians also felt betrayed that the Big Four 
did not award them the port of Fiume. The outrage was so great that Italians under “a 
fervently nationalist Italian poet, D'Annunzio” invaded the village themselves.\(^83\) Debate 
over Fiume became so heated that Italian negotiator Vittorio Emanuele Orlando “in 
defiance,” left negotiations on April 23\(^{rd}\). He was received back in Italy by “a huge 
ovation.”\(^84\) Nonetheless, the political culture of the parliamentary system in Italy between 
1919 and 1922 ensured that “successive cabinets” were able to maintain sufficient 
majorities in parliament to pass their agendas. Put simply, there were no institutional 
constraints (beyond a majority vote) preventing ratification.\(^85\) Thus, on January 6\(^{th}\), 1920, 
Italy successfully ratified the Treaty of Versailles.

France, like Italy and Britain, left the Paris Peace Conference dissatisfied. Frenchmen 
fretted over the fact that Germany had not been broken up, that reparations depended on 
the League of Nation’s functionality, that the newly-created Eastern European states could 
not possibly balance Russia and Germany, and that Italy had been “unnecessarily
alienated.” Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch decried what many felt at the time: “This is not peace, it is an armistice for twenty years.” America’s failure to ratify the treaty put the French even more ill at ease – they had envisioned the League of Nations as a substitute for an “Anglo-American guarantee pact.” Without U.S. support, the League represented a meaningless security guarantees. Nonetheless, “France’s ultimate ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was never seriously in doubt. The government won a procedural motion, 262 to 188 (30 September), and the bill itself passed by a vote of 372 to 53 in the Chamber (2 October) and unanimously in the Senate (11 October).” This victory represented both French acceptance that they could not achieve a better deal and the efforts of George Clemenceau (Newhall writes that the Prime Minister’s speeches in favor of ratification were “among his most elevated and self-revealing.”). Ratification also illustrated the fact that the institutional design of France, like Britain, allowed the Prime Minister to drive ratification forward with ease.

These cases are enlightening even if calculations were in part corrupted by a desire to end the war. It is typically argued that ratification failed in the U.S. because there was a uniquely motivated resistance. However, in studying Britain, Italian, and French politics, we can see that many countries experienced serious resistance to joining the League of Nations and ratifying the Versailles accord. Thus, I would argue that alongside postwar exhaustion there was a latent variable driving ascendance into the League of Nations– the

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86 Newhall, 462-463.
88 “At the Paris Conference France had surrendered what she considered her minimum security program in exchange for the Anglo-American guarantee pact and the supposed protection of a League of Nations, back by the might of the United States. Suddenly she found herself without the Anglo-American guarantee, without the powerful backing of the League, and without her own security program.” Czernin, 420.
89 Newhall, 462.
permissive ratification structure in Britain, and the modestly open ratification rules in France and Italy. Nonetheless, these cases all take place close (both geographically and temporally) to the end of World War I, where the impetus for ratification partially lay in the desperation to stem losses. Thus, let us look elsewhere to study in-depth the link between ratification and alliance formation.

Germany

Germany’s entrance to the League of Nations occurred not by its ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, but instead by its acceptance of the Treaty of Locarno, signed in October 1925. The Treaty of Locarno, according to R.B. Mowat, was meant to “solve the tremendous problems of European security after five years of failure.”

Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, originally called for the Locarno Conference to settle “questions of disarmament and evacuation” between France and Germany. He also hoped to establish wider “nonaggression, arbitration, and military agreements between ‘those powers interested in the Rhine.’” The final treaty would not only attempt to enshrine peace on the European continent, but would also act as the mechanism for Germany’s membership to the League of Nations.

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91 “The present acute question of disarmament and evacuation are frequently considered in France from the standpoint of security against possible aggressive intentions on the part of Germany. For that reason it would probably be easier to find a solution for them if they were combined with an agreement of a general nature, the object of which would be to secure peace between Germany and France... She [Germany] is anxious to see the problems arising between her and France dealt with by no other method than that of friendly understanding, and is accordingly interested, for her part, in the establishment of a special treaty foundation for such a peaceful understanding.” See Edgar Vincent D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace; Pages from the Diary of Viscount D’Abernon, (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1931): 276.
Locarno settled German-French relations in a number of ways. First, Germany officially recognized the Western border imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles. Under this arrangement, Germany would possess the Rhineland (at the time it was under French occupation) and France would possess Alsace-Lorraine. The border would be maintained by a defensive pact between Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy. Second, France and Germany renounced war as a tool of statecraft “and bound themselves to settle all disputes by arbitration.”93 Third, Germany’s Eastern border was left unspecified and up for future arbitration.94 The Treaty did not formally mention Germany’s membership in the League of Nations, but it was an understood principle of the document that Germany would join the alliance and would be given veto privileges. Germany officially joined the League a year after Locarno’s ratification, in September 1926.95

The Weimar Republic’s structure required a majority vote to ratify treaties of alliance. However, unlike Britain, Italy, and France, Germany faced an extremely divided and disparate multiparty system. Numerous parties ran and successfully earned seats in the National Assembly and the Reichstag (the legislature after 1919). The median percentage of vote won by a political party between 1919 and 1924 was only 6 percent, and the maximum earned by any party after 1919 was only 26 percent.96 Such conditions forced complex coalition politics upon the country, creating numerous veto players to arrest ratification. These conditions were made even more problematic due to the presence (and relative electoral success) of the nationalist German National People’s Party

93 Otto Hoetzsch, Germany’s Domestic and Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929): 71. Pacts made at the same time as the primary treaty of Locarno also established an arbitration system between Germany and Belgium, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Frank Magee, “‘Limited Liability’? Britain and the Treaty of Locarno, Twentieth Century British History 6, no. 1 (1995): 1.
94 Ibid., 1.
95 Kolb, 64.
96 Calculated from data in Kolb, 224.
(Deutschnationale Volkspartei [DVNP]). Eberhard Kolb argues, “The DNVP considered itself as an anti-parliamentarian part of ‘integration’…”\textsuperscript{97} Considering that the DNVP represented a significant bloc in parliament, earning 103 seats in the 1924 parliament, it is to no surprise that their presence represented not only a potential veto, but also a very likely one. See figure 4.

Despite the fact that Foreign Minister (and for a while in 1923, Chancellor) Stresemann had achieved a diplomatic coup, the treaty faced significant resistance back at home. Most importantly, the DNVP, according to Hans Mommsen, “were determined to sabotage the security pact.” They and other nationalist parties “sharply criticized the treaty and attacked the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine and Germany’s entry into the League of Nations…”\textsuperscript{98} This immediately imperiled the treaty, given that the DNVP possessed 103 out of 493 seats in the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{99}

![FIGURE 4: PERCENT VOTE WON IN REICH ELECTIONS, 1919-1924\textsuperscript{100}]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>DNVP</th>
<th>NSDAP</th>
<th>W. Partei</th>
<th>D.H.P.</th>
<th>Landbund</th>
<th>DVP</th>
<th>Zentrum</th>
<th>BVP</th>
<th>DDP</th>
<th>SPD</th>
<th>USPD</th>
<th>KPD</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1924</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1924</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The DNVP proved difficult to negotiate with for two reasons. One, the party lacked internal cohesion, so driving commitments from one sector of the party did little to

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 71.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 203. See also Kolb, 224.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 224.
guarantee votes at the final ratification. Two, Mommsen notes that "with the active support of Alfred Hugenberg and his press empire, the party’s local and regional organizations brought increasingly heavy pressure to bear upon the NVP party leadership [to oppose the treaty]." These difficulties meant that Stresemann had to spend many months working with both rival parties and foreign negotiators before Locarno could be approved. In the end, Germany ratified Locarno, but the ratification brought down the parliamentary government (the DNVP left the governing coalition over Locarno’s ratification). The vote itself was highly partisan, with the SPD, Centre, DVP, DDP and BVP in favor and the DNVP, Völksche Partei, KPD, and Wirtschaftspartei against – a vote of 300 to 174.102

Given the fact that Locarno survived German ratification, why does it remain an interesting case? First, it illustrates how multiparty systems impose difficulties towards alliance formation – even if Locarno passed, it came with the fall of the government, and only occurred after many months of negotiation. Second, it continues to demonstrate that U.S. ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was not unique in regards to experiencing domestic resistance – Germany in many ways faced more resistance towards ratification than America due to the DNVP’s large parliamentary contingency. Third, it provides a vessel of comparison between ratification in the U.S. and ratification in France and Italy. Whereas ratification structures were very similar to those in France and Italy, Germany’s party system made ratification more rigorous, like in the United States. Hence, the German case is interesting because it illustrates the variety of ways states ratify, the varying rigors that ratification faces, and thus the varying difficulties in forming alliances.

101 Mommsen, 207.
102 Kolb, 74.
The United States

Unlike the other two case studies, the United State’s decision to join the League of Nations was oriented around the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. As stated before, the League represented a defensive alliance whereby each member state would protect the others from invasion, both from members and non-members of the League. The alliance also worked as an entente – Article 11, for example “gave each Member [of the League] the right to call upon the Council and Assembly to discuss any serious differences...”103 Alongside the Treaty of Versailles, the League represented an opportunity for the United States to exercise a greater role on the international stage, for the first time deeply embedding itself in Europe’s alliance system.

Ratification, famously, did not go as hoped. President Woodrow Wilson knew that ratification would prove difficult – from the start of the war a faction of anti-international Senators, known as “irreconcilables,” opposed most sorts of international participation by the U.S.104 However, as Bear Braumoeller argues, a majority of American elites could and did envision some role of the U.S. in international affairs (and international organizations):

The considerable majority [of Americans] proved willing to envision engagement with Europe. Only a small group of so-called Irreconcilables consistently voted against the Treaty in any form, and even they were not opposed to internationalism in general – a fact evidenced by the support of some for an immediate Anglo-American defensive treaty with France and other for an international judiciary to keep the peace.105

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104 “There was no possibility that the hard-shelled American isolationists – the group of a dozen or so Senators of whom the Republican William E. Borah of Idaho and the Democrat James A. Reed of Missouri were leaders – could be won over to American participation in an international political organization of any kind.” Byron Dexter, *The Years of Opportunity: The League of Nations, 1920-1926* (New York: The Viking Press, 1967): 59.
105 As the famed Henry Cabot Lodge declared, “when Washington [sic] warned us against entangling alliances he meant for one moment that we should not join with the other civilized nations of the world if a method could be found to diminish war and encourage peace.” See Braumoeller, 355.
Braumoeller effectively illustrates the popularity of the League of Nations in America. For example, he points to a survey of 174 newspapers and 35 magazines in which a majority of Americans favored membership in the League.\(^{106}\) American elite and popular resistance to ratification, then, cannot be characterized as any harsher than similar movements in Germany, Britain, and, as I will show soon, Turkey.

Thus the political structure of the American government, not its ideological structure, wrecked hopes for ratification. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations represented the first roadblock to ratification. The committee not only possessed the ability to delay ratification, but also had been recently staffed by Lodge with numerous “irreconcilables.” These senators used their capacity to delay ratification so as to help create the time for opposition to the Treaty of Versailles to mobilize. According to Ferdinand Czernin, “two weeks were consumed by having the Treaty read aloud, paragraph by paragraph, while six weeks were devoted to public hearings.”\(^{107}\) These public hearings were designed to galvanize sentiments against Wilson and the internationalists – negotiators and major diplomats were “subject to merciless cross-examination,” in an attempt to make them confess Versailles’ sins.\(^{108}\)

As resistance grew, Lodge proposed a series of reservations to the Treaty – legal mechanisms that could have been passed alongside ratification to clarify America’s position on League membership. These reservations enshrined the role of Congress in approving

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 355. Dexter also notes that American public opinion was divided, remarking that “public opinion in America was helpless. Audiences cheered Woodrow Wilson when he promised that if they would ‘make good their redemption of the world,’ the Covenant would lead them ‘into pastures of quietness and peace....’ They cheered Senator Lodge, too, when he begged fathers and mothers ‘to think, think well,’ lest the hopes of their families, the hope of this nation, the best of our youth, be sent on the errand of war through the League.” See Dexter, 63-64.

\(^{107}\) Czernin, 400.

\(^{108}\) Ibid., 400.
League protocols, and protected the right of the U.S. to abstain from League policies.\(^{109}\)

Lodge’s reservations were incorporated into the Treaty by a vote of 81 to 13. In response, ratification was prevented by a vote of 39 for to 55 against. Wilson encouraged his Democrat allies to vote against it, insisting the reservations were unacceptable. Thus, the coalition that defeated the treaty represented a coalition of “Wilsonian Democrats, moderates, and irreconcilables.”\(^{110}\) After some discussion and negotiation, a later vote brought the balance to 49 yeas and 35 nays, a vote that surpassed the majority needed (48) but fell short of the two-thirds vote needed.\(^{111}\)

Overall, then, the United States failed to ratify Wilson’s brainchild not due to ideological divisions, but to an institutional design that empowered the opposition to prevent ratification. In fact, opposition to ratification was quite similar to opposition in Britain, Italy, France, and Germany, and in many ways was less powerful. Opponents to American ratification, for example, did not belong to a party bent on regime change (Germany’s DNVP), nor did they form bands and invade nearby fishing villages (Italy’s ultranationalists). Nonetheless, the presence of a restrictive committee structure, the opportunity to tack on reservations, and the influence of a two-thirds vote rule ensured that the United States would neither ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of Nations.

\(^{109}\) For example, reservation eight declared, “The United States understands that the reparations commission will regulate or interfere with exports from the United States to Germany, or from Germany to the United States, only when the United States by act or joint resolution of Congress approves such regulation or interference.” Meanwhile, reservation two insisted, “The United States assumes no obligation to preserve the territorial integrity or political independence of any other country...” \(^{110}\) Ibid., 405.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., 414.

Braumoeller, 355. If the Senate worked in a majority fashion, it could be argued that the democrats would have only needed 48 votes, as Vice President Thomas Morrison could have cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of ratification. Note that only 49 votes were needed for a majority, as Alaska and Hawaii had not yet joined the union.
Turkey

Turkey’s membership to the League of Nations arose via the Treaty of Lausanne, which was negotiated between Greece, Turkey, Britain, France, the United States, Romania, and Yugoslavia starting in the fall of 1922.\textsuperscript{112} The Treaty was designed to stabilize post-war border conflicts in Turkey and the Balkans, given continued warring between the Greeks and Turks over the Dardanelles.\textsuperscript{113} According to Salahi Sonyel, just as the Treaty of Locarno ushered Germany back into the club of great powers, the Treaty of Lausanne, “was an epilogue of a defeated and apparently shattered nation which rose from its ruins... Turkey now stood before the whole world ‘free from foreign entanglement,’ independent and sovereign within her national boundaries.”\textsuperscript{114}

The Treaty’s major provisions re-oriented the Turkish boundaries, including clarification of its borders with Syria, Bulgaria, Iraq, and Greece. These stipulations were typically in Turkey’s favor, such as granting it an enclave in Greece around Karagach. The Treaty also settled Turkey’s reparations, cancelling the payments before they had even begun.\textsuperscript{115} Numerous other concerns were settled, such as the treatment of minorities in Turkey (such concerns would be referred to the League of Nations, the annexation by Britain of Cyprus, and the state of Ottoman public debt.\textsuperscript{116} Finally, the treaty ensured that Turkey would attain membership in the League of Nations.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{112} Mowat, 298.  \\
\textsuperscript{113} Military clashes between the two countries had recently been ceased via the Armistice at Mundanya (October 1922). See Feroz Ahmad, \textit{The Making of Modern Turkey} (New York: Routledge, 1993): 90.  \\
\textsuperscript{115} “The claims of the Contracting Powers for damages against each other were reciprocally renounced, without any payments by Turkey.” See Mowat, 303.  \\
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 303-304.
\end{flushleft}
Turkey’s political structures at the time of ratification were amorphous and in transition. The Constitution of 1923 had been ratified by the Grand National Assembly, but would not become the law of the land until 1924. However, I would argue that in 1924, two veto players existed. First, there was President Mustafa Kemal, whose power was not only institutional, but also social, as he was perceived as “the hero of the war of liberation.” As described below, Kemal would use this social position, as well as his political resources, to convert his social influence into greater informal political power. Second, there was the Grand National Assembly, which held the institutional authority to ratify. Importantly, as a bastion of anti-Kemalist elites, it represented a veto from the other half of the country – the conservatives and Islamists who dreamed of a very different Turkey. The exact space between these two institutions and ideologies was still very much in development. As a “shrewd observer” argued in November 1924:

> The monarchy and the Caliphate could be abolished by an act of parliament. But in order to be completely safe from the threat of these institutions it would be necessary to struggle for many years against the ideas and activities which gave them strength.\(^{118}\)

Accordingly, many elites at the time probably saw the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne as an opportunity to stake out the borders of modern Turkish society. Ratification of the treaty, in short, was a weapon by which the two competing factions (and institutions) could win the conflict over Turkey’s future.

Resistance to Lausanne’s ratification sprung both from strategic and political considerations. Strategically, a major concern was that the Treaty of Lausanne wrecked Turko-Soviet relations. Turkey and the Soviet Union had been initially close after

\(^{117}\) Ahmad, 53.

\(^{118}\) Ibid., 61.
World War I, signing a Treaty and National Pact some years before Lausanne. The negotiations in 1923 changed all that – by internationalizing the Straits (instead of leaving it to Russian and Turkish ships only), Turkey distressed one of its major interwar partners.\textsuperscript{119} These concerns muted the support of some secularists, many of whom had visited Russia and looked to their revolution as a model of modernization.\textsuperscript{120}

The negotiating at Lausanne also upset conservatives, who already opposed the Treaty in the principle of blocking Kemal’s agenda. The surrendering of Mosul to the British protectorate was a national embarrassment, and greatly upset the Grand National Assembly, which had insisted on keeping the city.\textsuperscript{121} The opposition blamed İsmet İnönü, the primary negotiator at Lausanne, for allegedly betraying Turkish ideals. During the ratification debate, this opposition defied Kemal and İsmet, as well as parliamentary decorum, by braying out protestations.\textsuperscript{122} Eventually, a vote of confidence was taken, which Kinross notes “showed less than a two-to-one majority for Kemal, while a large number of abstentions showed a great gulf which now existed between Parliament and government. It was virtually a vote of no confidence.”\textsuperscript{123} It seemed as if the Treaty of Lausanne had failed ratification.

If ratification had actually died here, then Turkey would represent a counter-argument to my theory – an example of a state with few requirements failing to ratify an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} When Turkey agreed to internationalize the straits, the Russian negotiator declared that he would not sign on to the treaty, announcing that he believed that the negotiations were "primarily directed against Russia."
\cite{Kinross, 405}
\item \textsuperscript{120} "Such people, influenced by Russian ideas imported to Istanbul by some Turks from Russia, formed a distinct, well-educated and self-conscious group who regarded themselves as the moulder of public opinion and the vanguard destined to lead Turkey into the modern world of civilized nations." \cite{Ahmad, 76}
\item \textsuperscript{121} Kinross, 406-408.
\item \textsuperscript{122} "Why do you cheer instead of weeping?" one cried, while another reiterated at intervals, "there won’t be any peace.” \cite{Kinross, 411}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 412.
\end{itemize}
extremely valuable strategic treaty. Kemal, however, dissolved parliament and ensured that the next attempt at ratification would proceed effortlessly. In part, this was done legitimately – Kemal spent the next months actively campaigning for the People Party’s victory.\textsuperscript{124} Kemal also actively discouraged opposition candidates from seeking or obtaining office. At one point, Kemal was even accused of murdering a key rival, Ali Shükrü, although he was later acquitted.\textsuperscript{125} Thus, through tireless campaigning and intimidation, Kemal ensured that the parliament of 1923 would no longer act as a veto player. The next Grand National Assembly was packed with pro-Kemalist supporters, and the treaty passed through ratification with no more resistance.

Thus, to secure his country’s alliance with Western powers, Kemal had shifted his country’s ratification structure from moderate-to-low restrictions, to only one restriction – that his word would be law. Kemal’s actions illustrate both the dynamism of formal and informal political structures and the ways in which ratification structures are constituted. Overall, then, the narrative of Turkish ratification is one of transitional, pseudo-formal institutions creating an unclear process of ratification.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This case study illustrates overall that as ratification restrictions increase, it becomes more difficult to form alliances. Whereas loud and active resistance in Britain and Turkey were seamlessly silenced, protestation in the United States and Germany brought down the government and, in one case, prevented the alliance from being formed. Importantly, too, we see that the United States is a unique case not because of its fierce

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 415-417. \textsuperscript{125} Ibid., 413.}
domestic opposition to ratification, but instead because of its institutional design. Ratification, thus, may always face opposition, but it is the institutional structure, not the ideology of a few elites, that ends up driving the historical narrative of treaty ratification.

FIGURE 5: RATIFICATION RULES AND RATIFICATION OUTCOMES

Low Ratification Requirements

**Britain:** Parliamentary opposition ignored

**Turkey:** Parliamentary opposition overturned by election

Moderate Ratification Requirements

**France:** Legislative opposition overriden

**Italy:** Legislative opposition overriden

High Ratification Requirements

**United States:** Committees, reservations, and 2/3 rule prevent ratification

**Germany:** Multiparty legislature narrowly ratifies, at cost of government

QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE

Quantitative research was used to analyze the relationship between ratification and alliance structure, as well as that between ratification and reliability. This examination uses coding from the Alliance Treaties and Obligations (ATOP) member-level dataset, which “includes a separate entry for each alliance member during each phase of each alliance.”

The dataset codes, per each member, various aspects of the alliance, including its start and

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126 Specifically, ATOP’s member-level nonaggression pact-excluding data was used. Brett Ashley Leeds defines non-aggression pacts as “agreements that commit states to nonaggression in their mutual relations but do not provide for any specific obligations regarding conflict with a third party.” Since this thesis defines alliances by commitment to the maintenance, use, or potential use of force, pacts that decidedly prevent such commitments stand outside the purview of this research. Note that alliances that included non-aggression alongside with other alliance commitments were still included. Brett Ashley Leeds, *Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook*, 2005.
end dates, its structural elements, and its termination. The data aspires to describe all
regions between the dates of 1815 to 2003. It was merged with data from two other
sources – Weitsman and Shambaugh’s “International Systems, Domestic Structures and
covers the years of 1816 to 1992, although data for at least one variable continues to 1994.
Meanwhile, Polity IV data was available between 1800 and 2012. Since Weitsman and
Shambaugh’s and Polity’s data were added to ATOP, the dataset continues to contain
information from 1815 to 2003. Nonetheless, many controls are only effectively used on
cases occurring between 1816 and 1992.\footnote{Data was manually recoded between the sets. Since Weitsman and Shambaugh's data only
describes between 1816 and 1993/1994, and only pertains to certain country codes, the final dataset is
incomplete. In cases where alliances were formed within two months of 1816 (i.e. November 1815) or 1994
(i.e. February 1993), Weitsman and Shambaugh’s data also did not code for every member present in the
ATOP dataset. Thus, SYSCH and CON were re-coded for all member-years possible, as these were global
variables irrespective of a given country’s conditions. Furthermore, Polity IV data was used in recoding the
DEM variable. This recoding was meant to expand the variable’s data points beyond the countries and the
times studied in Weitsman and Shambaugh’s article.}

For both sets of models, “ESTMODE” was the independent variable. ESTMODE is
dummy variable from ATOP coded “1” if “the written document establishing the alliance is
a formal treaty requiring domestic ratification.”\footnote{Leeds, \textit{Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook}, 16.} This variable clearly gets at the question
of ratification-versus-no-ratification, but is limited by its small scale. Nevertheless, it
provides a clear, if simplified picture of alliance ratification.\footnote{Ideally, a dataset would exist that would describe a state’s structure for the ratification of alliance agreements, or at least the ratification of treaties. Given the fact that this doesn’t exist, and since data on the role of veto players (a useful proxy) is hard to come by, it makes sense to resort to variables that describe the state of the treaty’s ratification (ESTMODE).}
Logit models were used to test the relationship between ratification and alliance structures. The independent variable ESTMODE was compared with four dependent variables describing alliance structure. The selected dependent variables would alter states balance-of-threat calculations, altering alliance reliability considerations. Such variables would also incur some sort of domestic interest. For example, specified military contribution levels could perhaps raise questions of guns-versus-butter in domestic debates. Each of the following dependent variables is a dummy variable describing a structural element of the alliance treaty: “DIVGAINS,” measuring any discussion of the division of future gains from the conflict, “CONTRIB,” measuring specific material contributions or the division of costs within the alliance, and “CONSUL,” measuring promises to consult alliance members in moments of inter-state militarized crises. Finally, MILAID, originally describing various forms of military aid granted in treaties, was recoded as a dummy variable where “0” indicated no delineation of military and “1” indicated the provision of aid. See figure 6 below for descriptive statistics on these variables.

Two concepts are visible in the above data. First, nearly eighty percent of treaties from 1815 to 2003 were ratified. Perhaps this is because regimes that don’t have treaty ratification mechanisms simply don’t make formal treaties, instead relying on understandings between autocrats. Another potential explanation is that a norm of treaty ratification has arisen, and even in states with questionable regime structures, ratification of some sort still occurs. Second, treaties rarely are structured towards the division of

131 In this model, data from Weitsman and Shambaugh, as well as from Polity, was correlated with the year the alliance was entered into.
gains, specified military contribution levels, or the provision of military aid. Only structures towards crisis consulting are particularly common.

**FIGURE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: RATIFICATION AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Alliance Ratified</th>
<th>Division Gains</th>
<th>Contrib. Levels</th>
<th>Crisis Consulting</th>
<th>Military Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1297</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>1126</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>1549</td>
<td>1371</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>1429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>1612</td>
<td>1615</td>
<td>1647</td>
<td>1622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls were constructed from all three datasets. First, this thesis uses ATOP’s dummy variable, “WARTIME,” which measures whether any member state was at war when the alliance was formed. Alliances organized in war are likely to be more conflict-oriented, and may be based more on unofficial, heat-of-the moment understandings. “Statethreat” and “conmen” were also taken from ATOP. The former was recoded from ATOP’s variable “STATTHR1” as a dummy variable, indicating a “0” if the treaty does not mention a specific state as a threat, and a “1” if a specific threat is mentioned. Alliances designed to combat a specific threat are likely to be more defensive in nature, and thus may affect structural variables. Finally, “conmen” is a dummy variable coded as “1” if “the alliance agreement mentions unresolved conflicts among the members on specific issues that are deferred to later resolution.”132 Presumably, allies with unresolved tensions may seek structured alliances aimed to ensure reliability.

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Meanwhile, three controls were taken from the Weitsman and Shambaugh dataset—DEMCH, CAP, and SYSCH. “DEMCH” measures “the aggregate estimate of change in regime type,” measured by the change in a country’s polity score over the course of a year. Alliances would likely be structured in instances of regime change, so as to establish guiding principles for whomever would lead the country next. “CAP” describes a state’s position in the global power hierarchy using data from the Correlates of War composite national capabilities index. Finally, “SYSCH” is a dummy variable defining whether systemic shifts in hegemony were occurring in the year of alliance formation. Both these variables, which define aspects of international power distribution and conflict proclivity, would alter how states would perceive alliance membership and structure.

Models A and B: Division of Gains and Specified Military Contribution

Three models were designed to test the relationship between ratification and structure. The first model uses all controls mentioned above. The second model removes measures of relative power and regime change, as these variables were not generalized across all cases. Finally, the third model only uses ATOP variables.

Treaty ratification does not drive the division of gains in a statistically significant way. Perhaps, then, negotiators worry that domestic opposition will attack specified divisions of gains as insufficient, no matter how much is actually given. Thus, diplomats are not drawn to specifying the division of gains. Wartime alliances, meanwhile, are statistically significant in promoting the division of gains. Such alliances, naturally taking place in case of military struggles, will likely attempt some conception of the post-war
world to prevent future conflict and incentivize alliance member action. The fact that this variable was only statistically significant in two out of three models, and was only significant at the 0.1 level, however, indicates that the drive to specify gains is not particularly strong. Meanwhile, specified threats are statistically significant towards the division of gains, meaning that like wartime alliances, alliances that are targeted against a particular enemy are likely to incentivize cooperation via specifically designated rewards. Notably, then, systemic change does not correlate with the division of gains, perhaps because actors cannot conceive of what the new change in power will bring.

Finally, previous disputes, regime change, and relative capacity do not impact the division of gains in a treaty in a statistically significant way. Presumably, then, states with greater relative capacities form treaties similarly to states with lower capabilities. The other two considerations here are interesting. One would think that when states with policy disputes ally together, or when member states are engaging in regime transitions, clearly-spelled out treaties would be a advisable. Perhaps the division of gains simply is not the ideal structure to incentivize treaty maintenance. This would make sense, given that only about four percent of treaties seem to mention the mechanism.

In the meantime, treaty ratification correlates with specified contributions in a statistically significant way.\textsuperscript{133} We may thus intuit that negotiators constitute contribution levels to incentivize both domestic and international actors. For domestic actors, specified contribution levels may spell out the maximum amount of troops or money they will be

\textsuperscript{133} Although ratification was not statistically significant in the first model, the fact that it is significant at .05 level in Model II and the .001 level in Model III is evidence towards the fact that a real trend is being discovered. Model II and Model III also have larger N's, granting them greater verisimilitude.
required to give, resolving anxiety towards potentially infinite contributions. Meanwhile, specified contributions are appealing at the international level because they indicate a minimum each state will be expected to contribute, helping resolve free rider problems.

**FIGURE 7: LOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION, DIVISION OF GAINS, AND CONTRIBUTION LEVELS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Division of Gains</th>
<th>Contribution Levels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model Ia</td>
<td>Model IIa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREATY RATIFICATION</td>
<td>-0.421</td>
<td>0.238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARTIME ALLIANCE</td>
<td>1.037*</td>
<td>0.869*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIED THREAT</td>
<td>3.348***</td>
<td>3.852***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVIOUS DISPUTE</td>
<td>1.299</td>
<td>0.757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.28)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME CHANGE</td>
<td>0.0549</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIVE CAPACITY</td>
<td>2.013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEMIC CHANGE</td>
<td>-0.757**</td>
<td>-0.778*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>-4.678***</td>
<td>-5.600***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Robust standard errors in the parentheses
**=p<0.01 ***=p<0.05 *=p<0.01
In case "A", the model reported that there was too much colinearity to test the given variable. Such errors may occur when models have a large number of variables, especially when many of them are dummy variables.

Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes. Dependent variables describe either if the treaty specifies a division of military gains or specifies military contribution levels. Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a lack of these factors.

For an example of the appeal of contribution levels, imagine a treaty of alliance where each member explicitly is told to contribute two percent of their domestic budget to
alliance-based military spending. For domestic audiences, the comfort will be in knowing this spending will hover around that two percent, leaving plenty left in state coffers for other priorities. Meanwhile, other states in the alliance will approve of the consistency of the commitment – assuming members uphold their part of the bargain, they can be confident in consistent spending on the commitment. Such conditions could promote greater alliance reliability – with specifications on contributions, the members are tied more closely together, increasing the costs of dissolving the alliance and preventing potential management disputes over alliance maintenance.

Most controls were not statistically significant towards specified contributions. Relative capacity may not be able to explain commitment levels because what matters is the constellation of states in the alliance and their ratios of relative powers, not the exact powers of a single state. Simultaneously, specified threat and wartime alliances may not explain specified contributions, as the exact nature of threats and wars may vary. In some conflicts and towards some threats, it may make sense to plan contribution levels. In other instances, the threat may already be at the door, and there is no time left to plan commitments.  

Finally, states with previous disputes are not statistically likely to form treaties with explicit contribution structures. Once again, a number of rational paths may lead us to this consideration. Perhaps allies in policy conflicts know that the alliance will prove ephemeral, and thus sometimes balk at the idea of concrete commitments. Or perhaps conflicting allies join together in the hopes of, counter intuitively, resolving conflicts

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134 Such moments where the threat is at the door may include instances of systemic change, explaining why “SYSCH” is statistically significant in the negative direction.
between them by committing to mutual protection. In such instances, specified contribution levels may often be a bridge too far towards establishing cordial relations.

Overall, then, considerations driving alliance structure appear to be less clear-cut than initially expected. Nonetheless, it can be discerned that ratification does not appear to promote the explicit division of gains. Meanwhile, ratification appears influential in driving specified contribution levels, a variable that has the potential to increase alliance reliability.

Models C and D: Crisis Consultation and Military Aid

The following models operate in the same way as above, with the same controls, and the same independent variables, as well as the same systems for each three models. However, in this case, the dependent variables are the structuring of crisis consultation and the promising of military aid. See figure 8 below.

Treaty ratification does not affect either dependent variable as expected. In regards to crisis consulting, ratification is only positively related and statistically significant in one of three models. Thus, we cannot fully conclude that ratification drives provisions of crisis consulting, nor can we fully reject the idea. Perhaps domestic audiences are generally apathetic towards this, a more evanescent structure. Alternately, crisis consulting may convince domestic audiences that the commitment has robustly tied alliance members together. Meanwhile, ratification negatively correlates with the provision of military aid at the .001 level. In other words, treaties that are ratified are less likely to provide for the sharing of military aid. This is not so remarkable – although military aid in some cases may
be low in cost and high in value, domestic actors are likely to view such provisions as an impetus for protest. Domestic actors may be particularly leery of supplying other states the hard-won hardware and technological advances developed by scientists at home. They may also argue that such mechanisms are simply too costly. Finally, the problem may originate from the fact that the military aid dummy variable is a blunt measurement – measuring neither who receives the aid, how much aid is provide, nor what sort of aid it is. Together, theoretic and data-based problems could be severely impeding the link between ratification and structure.

How did other variables fare in driving the provision of military aid or crisis consulting? Specified threats correlate negatively both with crisis consulting and military aid. Hence, when states form alliances to combat a threat, they may already preparing for do-or-die conflicts. They will thus likely see the provision of military aid or crisis consulting is meaningless. The crisis is at hand, and military aid will be embodied in the countries uniting militarily for each other’s survival.

Other variables, however, are given to a less one-sided analysis. Wartime alliances, for example, make crisis consulting less likely – the crisis, again, is already at hand. Nonetheless, wartime alliances are likely to promote provisions on military aid. This isn’t particularly surprising – alliances engaging in conflict wish to support partners in the field.
**FIGURE 8: LOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION, CRISIS CONSULTATION, AND MILITARY AID**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model lc</th>
<th>Model llc</th>
<th>Model llc</th>
<th>Model ld</th>
<th>Model lld</th>
<th>Model llld</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TREATY RATIFICATION</td>
<td>0.062</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.468 **</td>
<td>-1.514***</td>
<td>-1.502***</td>
<td>-1.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARTIME ALLIANCE</td>
<td>-0.689**</td>
<td>-0.794**</td>
<td>-0.672***</td>
<td>1.163**</td>
<td>1.15***</td>
<td>0.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPECIFIED THREAT</td>
<td>-0.728**</td>
<td>-0.867 ***</td>
<td>-1.286***</td>
<td>-0.728**</td>
<td>-0.863**</td>
<td>-0.890***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREVIOUS DISPUTE</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.731</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGIME CHANGE</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELATIVE CAPACITY</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYSTEMIC CHANGE</td>
<td>0.344*</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.46)</td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTANT</td>
<td>0.806***</td>
<td>0.834***</td>
<td>0.930***</td>
<td>-1.307***</td>
<td>-1.203**</td>
<td>-1.148***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>1605</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>1573</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in the parentheses
***=p<0.01 **=p,0.05 *=p<0.01

In models under “A”, the model reported that there was too much colinearity to test the given variable. Such errors may occur when models have a large number of variables, especially when many of them are dummy variables.

Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes. Dependent variables describe either if the treaty specifies planning for crisis consulting or specifies military aid. Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a lack of these factors.

Finally, systemic change, relative capacity, previous disputes, and regime change do not effectively explain crisis consulting or military aid. Systemic change was significant in one of four models, but only at the 0.1 level. This suggests that when the system is facing a new hegemon, states are not particularly driven towards or against the provision of military aid or consultation. The use of these structures may depend on how conflict-oriented the change in hegemony is – violent changes in hegemony would promote crisis...
consulting and military aid, while more peaceable transitions would not. Meanwhile, relative capacity was not statistically significant in any of the four models where it appeared. We may thus hypothesize that what matters in terms of structure is the dyadic relation between alliance members, not the power of a single member. Finally, regime change and previous disputes were not statistically significant in any one model. Presumably, then, neither t-1 changes in regime structures nor policy conflicts drive specific military considerations.

There are two ways to interpret these results. First, it could be argued that ratification should have the same impact on all alliance structures. In this case, when ratification does not correlate with alliance structure, we can simply excuse the data for being problematic. Second, one could claim that each aspect of alliance structure has its own domestic logic, making it either more or less palatable in cases of alliance ratification. In this formulation, ratification still may affect reliability through structures. However, in this new formulation, only specific structures link the effects of ratification with those of reliability. This thesis accepts this explanation, both for the fact that it responds effectively with the data on hand and promotes an interesting and logical concept.

Alliance Ratification & Alliance Reliability

Ordered logit models were used to test the relationship between ratification and reliability. The independent variable “ESTMODE” was compared with a recoded dependent variable “TERMIN.” The variable “TERMIN” was based on (ATOP’s “TERMCAUS”) is

135 When the alliance was recoded as still active in 2003, the Polity score for 2003 was used.
described below in figure 9. "TERMIN" can take five values, organized by the ferocity by which the alliance collapsed. See figure 10 below for a breakdown of TERMIN’s values.

From looking at figure 9, we can see that alliances are reliable, but not remarkably so. About fifty-three percent of alliances are either still active or end after their mission is fulfilled. Although this is a majority of cases, a notable number of alliances end because of policy disputes either within or outside of the alliance (249 cases), because provisions are ignored or violated (130 cases) or because allies attack one another (65 cases).

FIGURE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ALLIANCE RELIABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance Still Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replaced By New Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loss of Political Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions Fulfilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure – Unrelated Policy Dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departure – Alliance Policy Dispute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members Attacked One Another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisions Ignored/War Lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision Violated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 10: ORDINAL VALUES OF THE ALLIANCE TERMINATION (TERMIN) VARIABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Alliance Active/Provisions Fulfilled</th>
<th>(2) Alliance Members Depart Over Policy Dispute</th>
<th>(3) Alliance Provision Ignored</th>
<th>(4) Alliance Provision Violated</th>
<th>(5) Alliance Members Attack One Another</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Based on TERMIN, the ATOP variable describing alliance termination before being re-coded as an ordinal variable. ESTMODE’s distribution is the same in this model as before.
Controls used in the ologit model overlap with controls used in the above logit models: the variables for wartime alliance, previous disputes, and specified threats were used again. New controls were also brought in. First, ATOP’s “ASYMM” variable, a dummy variable describing whether the alliance established asymmetrical commitments, was applied. If a treaty includes asymmetrical commitments, the alliance may fall apart over a dispute regarding commitment levels. Second, the dummy variable “LINK” was recoded from ATOP’s “natrefal” variable. If the alliance was linked to or designed in conformance to another alliance, “LINK” was coded as “1.” Given theories of issue linkage, treaties associated with other commitments should be more reliable. Third, Model IV tested the effect of the treaty having a renunciation clause. This variable was recoded as an ordinal variable, with lower values representing restrictions on renouncing obligations and higher values representing more permissive rules on alliance renunciation. If states can easily (and legally) renounce their commitments, they will be more likely to do so. Finally, regime type, embodied in the Polity variable “DEM” was included in Model III and Model IV. This variable uses a scale from negative ten to ten, with higher values indicating a more democratic institutional structure. This variable was included because Putnam and other scholars have posited that democratic countries can more credibly commit and participate in agreements.\(^\text{137}\)

\(^{137}\) Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 449.
### FIGURE 11: OLOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION AND ALLIANCE TERMINATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
<th>Model IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>TREATY RATIFICATION</strong></td>
<td>-0.621***</td>
<td>-0.847***</td>
<td>-0.717***</td>
<td>-0.762***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ASYMMETRIC COMMITMENT</strong></td>
<td>0.699**</td>
<td>0.579*</td>
<td>0.397</td>
<td>0.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WARTIME ALLIANCE</strong></td>
<td>-1.364***</td>
<td>-1.462***</td>
<td>-0.915*</td>
<td>-0.823*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPECIFIED THREAT</strong></td>
<td>0.908***</td>
<td>0.435*</td>
<td>0.471*</td>
<td>0.229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREVIOUS DISPUTE</strong></td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.511</td>
<td>0.516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DEMOCRATIC REGIME</strong></td>
<td>-0.112***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LINKED TREATY</strong></td>
<td>-0.584**</td>
<td>-0.759**</td>
<td>-0.759**</td>
<td>-0.759**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RENUNCIATION CLAUSE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.573***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTANT CUT I</strong></td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>-0.216</td>
<td>-0.256</td>
<td>-0.596**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTANT CUT II</strong></td>
<td>1.398***</td>
<td>1.164***</td>
<td>1.195***</td>
<td>0.897***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTANT CUT III</strong></td>
<td>1.828***</td>
<td>1.496***</td>
<td>1.584***</td>
<td>1.292***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTANT CUT IV</strong></td>
<td>2.633***</td>
<td>2.448***</td>
<td>2.312***</td>
<td>2.028***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>976</td>
<td>898</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in the parentheses

***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *=p<0.01

Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes. The dependent variable, alliance termination, can take on five values (from one to five). Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a decrease in the acrimony that brought the alliance to a close. See figure 10 for variable TERMIN’s breakdown.

Treaty ratification is statistically significant in the negative direction for each model tested. Thus, we can presume that ratified alliances are more reliable. Asymmetric
commitments, too, were negatively correlated and statistically significant in two models, suggesting that asymmetrical commitments tend to make treaties more reliable. Two explanations can be given for this: first, it may just be an accident of the data – after all, in Models III and IV, asymmetric commitments make treaties less reliable (although this trend is not statistically significant). A narrative could also be constructed that explains this negative correlation: asymmetric commitments may often be between a great power and a smaller country. In such cases, the smaller state may bandwagon with the larger state in such a way that both are likely to fulfill their commitments. Bandwagoning could similarly explain why specified threats seem to correlate with less reliable alliances – threats may pluck allies away, even after they’ve committed against the supposed enemy.

No other statistically significant variable seems to decrease alliance reliability – previous disputes, as theorized, make alliances less likely, but the results are not significant even at the 0.1 level. Meanwhile, as predicted above, alliances with more democratic regimes, “linked” alliances, and wartime alliances are all more reliable. One final variable that is remarkable in making treaties more reliable, however, is the presence of renunciation clauses. According Model IV, the presence of renunciation clauses make alliances more reliable at the .001 level. Perhaps renunciation clauses act as a sort of act of trust – states that construct renunciation clauses are more likely to solve policy disputes peaceably, as they know that worse comes to worse, they can simply leave the given alliance.

Overall, then, treaty ratification does significantly promote alliance reliability. One question thus remains – how powerful is the effect of ratification on alliance reliability?
Measuring the Effect of Ratification

To test the effect of ratification on reliability, two SPOST predictions were created. First, a prvalue was designed based on Model III, whereby all variables were kept at their mean besides alliance ratification. For un-ratified alliances, 55 percent of the probability mass favors the treaty either being maintained or fulfilled. Similarly, the model predicts about a 30 percent chance the alliance is dissolved over a dispute, a 5 percent chance the treaty is ignored, a 6 percent chance the treaty is violated, and a 7 percent chance the alliance ends with inter-alliance war. Meanwhile, if the treaty is ratified, the alliance has about a 72 percent chance of being fulfilled. If the alliance is ratified, the chances that the treaty is ignored, violated, or ends in inter-alliance war all drop by about half. Although these latter percent changes are in truth small, that shift in probability masses may embody the avoidance of conflict between two great powers, hypothetically saving millions of lives from inter-alliance war. See figure 12 below for results. Thus, it can be seen from this prediction that treaty ratification has a powerful effect on alliance reliability. Ratification alone has the capacity to shift an alliance’s probability mass away from conflict towards the long-term maintenance of the agreement.
Finally, we can conceive of the substantive significance of alliance ratification through a listcoef prediction. For a one “unit” increase in treaty ratification (i.e. if the treaty is ratified) the odds of having a more peaceable resolution of the alliance increases by 53.3 percent. This percentage is noticeably similar to other variables driving alliance reliability. For instance, for a “unit” increase in the wartime alliance variable (the alliance is a wartime alliance), the odds of having a more peaceable resolution of the alliance increase by 56.1 percent. Similar trends are prevalent regarding treaty linkage (53.2 percent) and the presence of a renunciation clause (43.6 percent). Therefore, it is clear that not only is
treaty ratification statistically significant in driving alliance reliability, its effect also has a substantive power similar to other variables. See figure 13 below.

**FIGURE 13: LISCOEF FOR PERCENT CHANGE IN ODDS REGARDING ALLIANCE RELIABILITY**

The above graph is generated using a listcoef prediction of independent variable’s effect on reliability. The dependent variable, percent change in odds for unit increase in $X$, is calculated towards the statistical model’s variable of alliance termination, which can take on five values. Model III was used. All variables are dummy variables, except “renunciation clause,” which can take on three values. All variables are dummy variables except for “renunciation clause,” which can take on three values.

**Conclusion**

These results suggesting a strong relationship between alliance ratification and alliance reliability are tempered by the fact that they result from imperfect data. For example, the field has not yet constructed accurate, publicly available data on ratification rules. “ESTMODE” acts as shallow representations of a much deeper dynamic – it hints at the role of ratification, but does not effectively describes the strata of ratification rules as
discussed in this thesis’s theory. Simultaneously, merging Weitsman and Shabaugh’s data, for instance, left numerous holes in the data. These holes often represented countries (The Kingdom of Korea) or regions (parts of Sub-Saharan Africa) that would have proven difficult for Weitsman and Shambaugh to gather data on. Recoding was done so that measures of systemic change and global power concentration could be applied to more cases, but more could still be done.

Additionally, by focusing on member-level data, this thesis surrendered the opportunity to engage with dyadic variables. This decision was based on two considerations. First, most of ATOP’s variables were designed for the member-level dataset – recoding such information into dyadic data would have proven extremely difficult. Second, the theory proposed by this thesis is one at the member level – relating a country’s domestic structures to events and structures at the international level. Nonetheless, by using member-level data, certain datasets and controls were forfeited, such as data on dyadic rivalries of direct contiguity data. Thus, future research designs hoping to investigate alliance reliability or alliance structure should consider both a dyadic and member-level approach.

Overall, however, the findings suggest that treaties are more reliable when they are ratified. Importantly, this trend is both statistically and substantially significant. In other words, the theory enshrined from page one of this paper is supported, even if one of its intervening variables, alliance structures, returned muddled results.

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138 ATOP’s data can technically be used in six forms based on different units of analysis: member, alliance, alliance phase, state-year, dyad-year, and directed dyad-year. Only member-level data includes all ATOP’s variables regarding alliance reliability.
This thesis has asked whether states are correct when they assume ratification correlates with higher reliability in security affairs. In order to describe the relationship between alliance ratification and reliability, the thesis described three relationships: those between alliance ratification and alliance formation, alliance structure, and alliance reliability. Ratification and alliance formation are linked because as ratification structures become more rigorous, alliance formation becomes more restrictive. This is because as ratification structures become more restrictive, there will be more opportunities for the opposition to grow and agitate. Also, as these restrictions develop, more veto players will arise to block the legislative process. Meanwhile, as ratification restrictions increase, negotiators will construct treaties that specifically organize alliance member's obligations and expectations. Negotiators, aware that a clearer alliance structure can increase the probability of ratification success, tailor the level of specificity at the alliance level to resolve concerns at the domestic level.

These considerations at the domestic level relate to the dynamics of alliance reliability through two factors. First, clearer alliances with specific structures will be more likely to survive changes in policymakers or ideas among member states. Second, states that commit via ratification will appear less dangerous, altering the balance of threat within and outside of the alliance.

To test these hypotheses, this thesis engaged in both qualitative and quantitative research. In addressing the relationship between alliance ratification and alliance formation, this study analyzed a number of states ratification of League of Nations membership. Two key findings stood out – first, that the failure of ratification in the United
States cannot be explained by a lack of popularity for the alliance – such difficulties arose across countries. Second, in each country (including in the U.S.), state structures drove the ratification process. These structures often allowed ratification to happen, but in each case showed how alliance formation was concocted in a unique way. Meanwhile, numerous regressions suggested that there existed inconclusive but noteworthy relationships between alliance ratification and alliance structure and reliability. Thus, overall, evidence towards the links between ratification, formation, structure, and reliability have been found, although evidence that better ties these fields together must be found at a later date.

There are numerous ways that this thesis’s research design should be expanded into future studies. First, research should expand upon the methodologies used herein. For example, scholars should engage with other case studies besides the League of Nations to test the link between ratification and alliance reliability.139 Meanwhile, in quantitative research, better measures of treaty ratification and alliance structure should be created, and research should be performed using both a member-level and dyadic approach.

Second, future research should consider theoretic issues that have remained as of yet unaddressed. For instance, does ratification have the same impact on multilateral and bilateral alliances? Do both countries need to ratify an agreement for the treaty to be effective, or just one? Do domestic audiences operate differently in response to alliance treaties, as compared to other sorts of treaties?

Finally, the implications of this study should be considered from international law or policy prescriptive approaches. For example, how should security agreements, such as the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, be conceived of and applied in international politics? In particular, future qualitative research should aspire to study how authoritarian states “ratify,” form, and structure alliances. It should likewise analyze how authoritarian politics affect alliance reliability.

139 In particular, future qualitative research should aspire to study how authoritarian states “ratify,” form, and structure alliances. It should likewise analyze how authoritarian politics affect alliance reliability.
the coming decades, how should the United States strategically apply commitments that have not been ratified? As the United States slowly pivots to Asia, should new security agreements be constructed towards ratification, or left as loose political commitments? This thesis suggests that although commitments may be more difficult to establish via ratification, the costs may come with the benefit of reliability.

This thesis began with Martin’s “signal” -- an alleged gesture states grant one another through the ratification of security agreements. Martin suggests that states ratify to prove that the establish commitment was reliable. Through theoretic, qualitative, and quantitative reasoning, this thesis has suggested that states are acting rationally both by sending and receiving this signal. Ratification, therefore, does alter reliability calculations. Ratification and its signal, thus, are not ephemeral noises made in the hopes of garnering support. Instead, ratification produces its own rhythm, creating a unique tempo both in domestic affairs and alliance politics writ large.


