

7-2012

Shame of a Nation: The Evolution of Hanjian since the Late Qing

Stephen John Hurley
College of William and Mary

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorsthesis>



Part of the [Chinese Studies Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Hurley, Stephen John, "Shame of a Nation: The Evolution of Hanjian since the Late Qing" (2012).
Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 504.
<https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorsthesis/504>

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.


Shame of a Nation: The Evolution of *Hanjian* since the Late Qing

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Chinese Language and Culture from
The College of William and Mary

by

Stephen John Hurley

Accepted for High Honors
(Honors, High Honors, Highest Honors)


Yanfang Tang, Director


Craig Canning


Eric Han

Williamsburg, VA
May 3, 2012

Shame of a Nation

The Evolution of Hanjian since the Late Qing

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the
degree of Bachelor of Arts in Chinese Language and Culture

Stephen John Hurley
Chinese 495/496: Honors
Fall 2011-Spring 2012

Introduction

Ever since the execution of the heroic Song Dynasty general Yue Fei by the “archetypical traitor” Qin Hui, the epithet *hanjian* has persisted as one of the most damning in the Chinese language.¹ Almost a thousand years later, *hanjian* remains a particularly vitriolic part of Chinese political discourse. In 1995-1996, in response to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui’s apparent movement toward Taiwanese independence and formal American diplomatic recognition, the People’s Liberation Army bracketed the island with nuclear-capable missiles on two separate occasions.² As the culminating point of a slew of insults, Beijing condemned Lee’s father as a *hanjian* for having served in the Japanese colonial police.³ In 2008, the historian Yan Chongnian was publicly slapped and called a *hanjian* at a book signing for his new study of the Kangxi Emperor, while billionaire Fan Jianchuan announced he would open a museum dedicated to *hanjian* in order to highlight the nuances of a term that is all too frequently “hurled at anyone who disagrees with a speaker on sensitive issues, particularly those involving history or race.”⁴

The term itself consists of the Han ethonym 汉 and the word 奸 or 姦 (*jian*), meaning “treason,” “fornication,” or “adultery.” The *Hanyu dacidian*, the definitive dictionary of the Chinese language, states that *hanjian* “originally indicated the scum of the Han people. Later it

¹ Yingjie Guo and Baogang He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The ‘Zeng Guofan Phenomenon,’” *Modern China* 25, no. 2 (April 1999), p. 152; Xinhua News Agency, “Archeologists to Excavation of [sic] Possible Tomb of Qin Hui,” *China.org.cn*, December 27, 2006, accessed April 11, 2012, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/194112.htm>

² Warren Cohen, *America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), pp. 255-257.

³ The Chinese government also described Lee as “the scum of the nation” who belonged to “the rubbish bin of history.” Mark O’Neill, “The Dilemma Facing Beijing,” *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, July 17, 1999, accessed Oct 17, 2011. http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMPI&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=133B5B2BCC68A6A8&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated5&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5

⁴ Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Truth and Reconciliation.” *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, March 30, 2008, accessed Oct 17, 2011, http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMPI&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=13272E1E733C8420&svc_dat=InfoWeb:agdocs&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5

came to refer to someone who seeks refuge with a foreign race or a foreign invader, willingly follows their orders, and sells out the interests of his own nation and race.”⁵ The Taiwanese *Zhongwen dacidian* defines *hanjian* more concisely, as “the term for one who willingly sells out his own country for the benefit of foreigners.”⁶ In his article “*Hanjian!* (Traitor!) Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” China scholar Frederic Wakeman, Jr. states that the word also connotes feelings of betrayal, spiritual chaos, and sexual transgression.⁷

However, neither these definitions nor the *Hanyu dacidian*’s brief list of historical references serves to explain the wide variety of figures branded as *hanjian*. Throughout China’s dynastic history, *hanjian* described imperial officials who had betrayed their respective rulers like Qin Hui as well as ordinary Han who abandoned Chinese civilization. Over the past two centuries, the phrase’s frequency and virulence have both multiplied. China’s violent clashes with foreign imperialism and the chaos of her forced march to modernity have left a teeming host of compradors, turncoats, officials, and collaborators all marked with the stigma of *hanjianism*. In the twenty-first century, the term has lost much of its original meaning and has become a catchall slur for one’s political opponents, particularly online. In a 2011 post titled “In Today’s China, Who Isn’t a *Hanjian*?” Chinese blogger Wang Jinsi remarks that the term has recently become so prolific that “non-*hanjian* are even rarer than wild Manchurian tigers.”⁸

⁵ “原指汉族的败类。后泛指投靠外族或外国侵略者，甘心首期驱使，出卖祖国民族利益的人。” Luo Zhufeng, ed., *Hanyu dacidian* (Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1988), vol. 6, p. 49, col. B. Translation mine.

⁶ “谓为外人之利益而甘心为害本国之人也。” Zhang Qiyun, ed., *Zhongwen dacidian* (Taipei: Zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1982), p. 8463. Translation mine.

⁷ Frederic Wakeman, Jr., “*Hanjian* (Traitor!) Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai,” in Wen-hsin Yeh, ed., *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond* (Ewing, NJ: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 298-299. Following Wakeman’s analysis, perhaps “Hanfucker” would be a more accurate English rendering of the term in its pejorative context.

⁸ “‘非汉奸’已经比野生东北虎还稀罕。” Wang Jinsi, “Dangjin Zhongguo shei bu shi hanjian?” (“In Today’s China, Who Isn’t a *Hanjian*?”), *Fenghuang boke* (*Phoenix Blog*), posted December 2, 2011, accessed March 29, 2012, http://news.backchina.com/printnews.php?tid=170327&c_lang=gb2312.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to understand *hanjian*'s contemporary meaning, no matter how diluted, without a proper understanding of the word's history. A number of scholarly works have offered in-depth examinations of *hanjian* within a variety of narrow timeframes, particularly the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). Many of those works serve as foundational sources for this paper. However, as of yet there has been no overarching study of the term in English.⁹ Frederic Wakeman's aforementioned article on wartime *hanjian* opens with a brief overview of the term's etymology and Qing-era usage, but this information is provided as an ideological backdrop for the term's role in the underground warfare of occupied Shanghai and, understandably given the focus of his article, his analysis ends with the war period.¹⁰

This paper attempts to fill this lacuna by providing an overarching summary of the term *hanjian*'s development from the late Qing period to the present. The sheer number of Chinese who have been accused as *hanjian* can only be understood in the context of the strife that has plagued China for most of the past two centuries.¹¹ Moreover, although the term has been employed in pursuit of concrete political aims, and often without conscious consideration of its etymological or historical background, its changing meaning reflects larger questions about how to define the national community, the responsibilities of the individual toward the state, and, ultimately, what it means to be "Chinese." By providing the historical and ideological context of

⁹ The French website Sinopolis provides a thorough and scholarly French-language assessment by David Serfass of *hanjian* from its origins through the postwar collaboration trials. Serfass cites a number of broad-scope Chinese sources, notably Wang Ke, "*Hanjian* : Xiangxiang zhong de danyi minzu guojia huayu " (*Hanjian*: Discourse on an Imaginary Homogenous Nation-State) , *Ershiyi shiji (Twenty-First Century)*, No. 83, June 2004 and Li Ling "Hanjian fashengxue (Study of the Origins of the Term *Hanjian*)," *Dushu (Reading)*, Oct 1995. See David Serfass, "Hanjian 漢奸: définir la Chine à travers ses traîtres," *Sinopolis : le politique en Chine*, July 24, 2010, accessed March 29, 2012, <http://sinopolis.hypotheses.org/172>.

¹⁰ See Wakeman, "*Hanjian!*," pp. 298-301.

¹¹ During the First Opium War, one official in Zhejiang province reported that "half of the population were *hanjian*," while Fan Jianchuan estimates the number of collaborators during the war with Japan at as high as two million. See Tatlow, "Truth and Reconciliation," and Lawrence Wang-chi Wong, "Translators and Interpreters During the Opium War between Britain and China (1839-1842), in Myriam Salama-Carr, ed., *Approaches to Translation Studies, Volume 28: Translating and Interpreting Conflict* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007), p. 53.

these judgments, I hope to dust off the motley categories of *hanjian*, examining the fabric of each piece to show when and why it was cast on the ground to be trampled underfoot.

American historian Benjamin Azkin has described the literature on nationalism as a “terminological jungle.”¹² This is particularly true of the Chinese case, as the Chinese conceptual vocabulary does not always align seamlessly with the English one, and doubly so during the late Qing period, when early nationalists developed their novel formulations of nation and race with words calqued from Western thinkers, often by way of Japanese translation. Before casting the reader into this unknown world, I hope to clear it of a few vines by defining my own terms.

Following noted China scholar James Townsend, I take an “ethnicist” view of Chinese nationalism, in which the nation (民族 *minzu*) is defined as “a large, politicized ethnic group defined by common culture and alleged descent,” and ethnicity is defined by similar shared factors of culture and blood.¹³ However, Chinese nationalism’s many changes over the past century complicate this assessment. Since the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, the common Chinese term for the Chinese nation, *Zhonghua minzu* (中华民族) has carried the special meaning of a united nation that is nevertheless composed of multiple distinct ethnicities, which are each characterized as *minzu* (民族). In this paper, I will use the English phrase “Chinese nation” and variations when discussing the broader concept of an ethnically constituted Chinese community and *Zhonghua minzu* when explicitly referencing this specific formulation. I have striven for consistency, but the terminology will necessarily vary when discussing different Chinese thinkers’ individual views.

¹² Benjamin Azkin, *State and Nation* (London: Hutchinson, 1964), pp 7-10. Cited in James Townsend, “Chapter One: Chinese Nationalism,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., *Chinese Nationalism* (New York: Sharpe, 1996), p. 6.

¹³ Townsend, “Chapter One,” p. 7.

Given the *hanjian* category's close ties with the nature of the Chinese nation, it is apt that the first major shift in its meaning occurred during the waning days of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912), when the Chinese "nation" was born. My first chapter traces the development of Chinese nationhood as the reformers and revolutionaries of the late Qing era, drawing upon Western ideas of racial struggle and republican sovereignty, sought to define China as a modern nation-state.

As China began to be defined as ethnically (or in some cases racially) homogeneous and exclusively Han, the term *hanjian* took on a new meaning. While imperial scholar officials continued to use the term to describe those Chinese who rebelled against the central government, revolutionary nationalists applied the term to the imperial scholar-officials themselves, as they had "sold out the interests of their own nation and race" by serving the Manchu invaders. At the same time, the birth of the Chinese nation-state meant that its individual members were recast as modern citizens rather than imperial subjects, a new and complex role whose responsibilities would have lasting repercussions on the category of *hanjian*.

In the second chapter, I examine the issue of *hanjian* during the Second Sino-Japanese War. The physical and temporal extent of the Japanese occupation led thousands of Nationalist Party (GMD) officials, local elites, and ordinary Chinese to collude with the Japanese army, either to protect themselves and their families or in the name of preserving China itself. After the war, the Nationalist government launched an expansive judicial campaign to punish wartime collaborators as *hanjian*. As collaboration specialist Margherita Zanasi has argued, the role of these trials was not merely retributive; instead, the GMD hoped the trials would delegitimize both the justifications of such prominent collaborators such as Chen Gongbo, the president of the Japanese puppet government in Nanjing at the conclusion of the war, and the national narratives

their explanations entailed. In emphasizing resistance as the only true path to national loyalty, Chiang Kai-shek sought to strengthen his image as a defender against Japanese aggression and refute Communist accusations that he had failed to prevent the Japanese invasion. However, the GMD's extension of *hanjian* status to Taiwanese collaborators, many of whom were not Han and all of whom had experienced the war as Japanese subjects, also raises questions about its political applicability and lingering ethnic connotations.

The Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) record of stalwart wartime resistance played a key role in legitimizing their quest for power and ultimately contributed to their victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949. In my third chapter, I address the role of *hanjian* from the founding of the People's Republic to the present as the Chinese national community has continued to transform under the socialist state. During the Mao era (1949-1976), the *hanjian* label was extended to class enemies and traitors to communism, reflecting not only an attempt to demonize the Party's opponents through association with wartime quislings but also the development of a new cosmopolitan and revolutionary national body.

After Mao's death, China has gradually abandoned the idea of a revolutionary community, instead promoting a multiethnic national vision similar to Sun Yat-sen's original conception of a republic of the *Zhonghua minzu*. In this light, Chinese historians have begun to reconsider the status of figures traditionally characterized as *hanjian*, particularly those inherited from the anti-Qing revolutionaries. At the same time as this attempt at professional precision, the growth of mass media, and especially the internet, have broadened *hanjian*'s scope to unprecedented levels, severing its popular use almost completely from its etymological and historical roots. Nevertheless, as the Yan Chongnian slapping incident reveals, while the term's

ethnic origin remains peripheral, it still holds the potential to cause problems in a China that is nominally cosmopolitan but *de facto* dominated by the Han majority.

Chapter 1 Waking the Sleeping Lion: *Hanjian* and the Birth of Chinese Nationalism

The end of the Qing dynasty and founding of the Chinese Republic in 1912 marked a major shift in the meaning of the term *hanjian* as the center of national loyalty shifted from the person of the emperor to a more nebulous idea of the nation as a homogenous ethnic community. Until the late nineteenth century, *hanjian* were defined by their opposition to the ruling dynasty. The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) applied the parallel term *jianmin* (奸民 “traitorous people”) to “corrupt or otherwise discredited officials and to Ming subjects in league with the Japanese and other pirates.”¹⁴ After the Manchu invasion that ultimately led to the dynasty’s collapse in 1644, Ming loyalists used *hanjian* to designate those officials who had sided with the invaders,¹⁵ paralleling arch-traitor Qin Hui’s role in undermining the Southern Song’s military resistance to the invading Jurchen Jin state.¹⁶

Once in power, the Qing adopted many trappings of Chinese civilization in order to reassure the Chinese majority and consolidate their control. Although ethnically Manchu, their attempts at cultural assimilation extended to the *hanjian* category. Qing officials used “*hanjian*” to describe ethnic Han in the southern provinces who had moved beyond the pale of settlement, abandoning civilization to live among the “barbarians,” or who sided with minority rebels against the throne.¹⁷ In the face of a devastating succession of domestic revolts,¹⁸ these

¹⁴ Donald Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier in the Eighteenth Century,” in Pamela Kyle Crossley et al., ed., *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China* (Ewing, NJ: University of California Press, 2005), p. 221.

¹⁵ “At the time of the Ming-Qing transition, the greatest traitors in Ming officials’ eyes were *hanjian* who crossed over to the Manchus just before they “entered the pass” and occupied the Central Plains.” Wakeman, “*Hanjian!*,” p. 299.

¹⁶ The Song were supplanted by the ethnically Jurchen Jin Dynasty. In the seventeenth century the Jurchens, nomadic tribesman from north of the Great Wall, were renamed the Manchus by Qing founder Hong Taiji, whose father Nurhachi had originally named his dynasty the Later Jin in reference to the Jurchen conquest of the Song.

¹⁷ Sutton, “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier,” p. 193.

proclamations sought to reinforce the perception that, as the holders of the Mandate of Heaven (天命 *Tianming*), the Qing rulers embodied the well-being of Han civilization as a whole. At the same time, they severed Han rebels from the larger Han community.

The late Qing period also saw the evolution of *hanjian*'s most common meaning, that of Chinese who sell out their country to a foreign power. Translation scholar Laurence Wong describes how Lin Zexu, the Qing official whose attempts to halt the opium trade provoked the First Opium War (1839-1842), lamented the role of Chinese traders in promoting foreign aggression:

Foreign traders from various countries come to China to do business, the cargo ships enter the harbour, and those foreign traders staying in Guangzhou and Macao are all allowed to hire compradors and servants for assistance. This is permitted in our laws. But there is a kind of evil-doers who are not employed on a business basis. They secretly had contacts and intercourse with the foreigners, colluding with them for illicit businesses by ways and means. They are come to be known as *hanjian* in the inner areas.¹⁹

After the war, the forced establishment of treaty ports by the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842 further expanded Chinese merchants' chances to engage in Western trade. Meanwhile, the increasing number of foreign incursions onto Chinese soil throughout the nineteenth century furnished the opportunity to profit from selling intelligence or serving as interpreters for foreign soldiers.²⁰

C. Pat Giersch, "'A Motley Throng': Social Change on Southwest China's Early Modern Frontier, 1700-1880," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 2001), pp. 68, 86.

David G. Atwill, *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2005), pp. 51-54.

¹⁸ In addition to the fourteen-year civil war against the Taiping rebels (1850-1864), nineteenth-century China saw major uprisings by the White Lotus sect, the Nian movement, the Muslim Panthay kingdom, the Miao people, and Turkic Muslims in the northwest.

¹⁹ Lin Zexu, *Lin Zexuji: Gongdu (Writings of Lin Zexu: Official Letters)* (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963), p. 41, as cited in Wong, "Translators and Interpreters," pp. 53-54. For additional information on *hanjian* during the Opium War, see Yen Ching-Hwang, "Ch'ing Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644-1912)," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981), pp. 267-272.

²⁰ "After the war started, whole new classes of Hanchien [*hanjian*] arose: those who obtained maps and sea-charts for the enemy, who passed on political and military information to them, acted as pilots, worked as craftsmen on board foreign warships and so on. Later the expression became a term of abuse for anyone who favoured appeasement rather than war to the death, it often being assumed that, if he did so, it must be because he was in the

The combination of foreign incursions and domestic strife ultimately culminated in the Xinhai Revolution of 1911, which dethroned the Qing and established the Republic of China. As with the Ming-Qing transition before it, the advent of a new regime saw a polar shift in the meaning of *hanjian*. Victory over the Qing validated the nationalist claims of Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Alliance (同盟会 *Tongmenghui*).²¹ The revolutionaries' anti-Manchu rhetoric had renewed the condemnation of disloyal Ming officials such as Hong Chengchou, a leading general who swore allegiance to the Qing after he was defeated in battle, and Wu Sangui, the commander whose opening of the Shanhai pass (山海关 *Shanhaiguan*) between Hebei and Manchuria in 1644 had allowed the Qing to penetrate China proper.²² In addition to these seventeenth-century traitors, the revolutionaries extended the *hanjian* label to more contemporary officials in service to the Manchu, such as the prominent Confucian scholar-official and general Zeng Guofan.²³

However, the revolutionaries' denunciation of imperial officials as *hanjian* was more than an *ad hominem* attack on their political enemies. It was also the product of a monumental shift in the conception of China itself. The Xinhai Revolution marked the end of the millennia-

foreigners' pay." Arthur Waley, *The Opium War Through Chinese Eyes* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), p. 222.

²¹ The successor to Sun's previous revolutionary effort, the Revive China Society (兴中会 *Xingzhonghui*, 1894-1905), the Revolutionary Alliance was founded in Tokyo in 1905 and united the various anti-Qing revolutionary groups into a single organization. Its attempts to incite revolution proved repeatedly unsuccessful, and the Xinhai Revolution ultimately broke out independently of its members' efforts (in fact, Sun Yat-sen was in the United States at the time), but the Alliance laid the groundwork for the founding of the Nationalist Party in 1912.

²² Wu Sangui's surrender of the Shanhai pass is often regarded as the turning point of the Manchu invasion. After the founding of the Qing victory, he was awarded for his service with a fief in southwestern China. In 1673 Wu and two other southern warlords attacked the Qing in the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (三藩之乱 *Sanfan zhi Luan*), which was ultimately suppressed by the Kangxi Emperor in 1681. Wakeman, "*Hanjian!*" p. 299; Angela N. S. Hsi, "Wu San-kuei in 1644: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Feb., 1975), p. 443.

²³ Guo and He, "Reimagining the Chinese Nation," p. 144. One of the most important Qing officials of the nineteenth century, Zeng was equally noted for his military acumen and his steadfast commitment to Confucian principles. He commanded, financed, and organized the Xiang Army, the most important imperial force during the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864). While personally responsible for the Qing victory, Zeng voluntarily demobilized his army after the conclusion of the rebellion.

old imperial system and the birth of “China” as a modern national entity. By 1911, the word *hanjian* no longer just described “the scum of the Han race” who shifted loyalties from one dynasty to another or engaged in illicit dealings with foreign barbarians. Instead, it explicitly indicated Chinese who, through their service to a foreign power, betrayed the entire national community, which was locked in a desperate and increasingly existential struggle with the West.²⁴ In order to understand this paradigm shift in *hanjian*’s meaning, it is necessary to go back two decades and examine the complex relationship between the squabbling parents of modern Chinese nationalism, the Confucian reformers and anti-Manchu revolutionaries.

By the end of the nineteenth century, China was in a state of unprecedented crisis. Ever since the First Opium War, the Western powers had slowly expanded their presence in the Middle Kingdom by obtaining political concessions through the use of bald force, while wave after wave of domestic strife sapped the Qing court of vital funds, attention, and manpower. The combination of peasant revolt and natural disaster traditionally served as the death knell of dynasties, but this time it was not only the Qing who faced extinction.²⁵ The failure of the “self-strengthening” (自强 *zhiqiang*) programs implemented by leading Confucian officials during the Tongzhi Restoration of the 1860s²⁶ seemed to portend the fall of the entire imperial system and,

²⁴ “[Imperial expansion] served as a critical alarm to Chinese intellectuals who were facing the grave danger of their country being divided by foreign invaders. Suddenly, the fear of ‘ethnic extermination and national extinction’ spread among Chinese intellectuals and the phrase ‘slaves of an exterminated nation’ became a horrible image they used to warn one another.” Shen Sung-chiao, “Discourse on *Guomin* (‘The Citizen’) in Late Qing China, 1895-1911,” *Inter-Asian Cultural Studies* 7, no. 1 (2006), p. 7.

²⁵ In addition to the domestic risings listed above, the Qing were also faced with major flooding of both the Yellow and Yangzi rivers.

²⁶ Prompted by the crises of the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion, liberal Qing statesmen led by Li Hongzhang, Zeng Guofan, and Prince Gong implemented a series of reforms throughout the 1860s. Backed by dowager empress and imperial regent Cixi, the reformers hoped to modernize China’s industry, infrastructure, and military by adopting Western technology within a traditional Chinese framework. They succeeded in establishing the Jiangnan Arsenal, the Interpreters’ College (同文馆 *Tongwenguan*), and the Office for General Management (总理衙门 *Zongli Yamen*), a preliminary foreign policy organ, but in 1870 a massacre of French and Chinese Christians in Tianjin prompted renewed foreign intervention and put an end to the Tongzhi Restoration.

perhaps, of China itself.²⁷ This threat was driven home by the loss of Vietnam to France in 1885 and the surrender of Korea and Taiwan to Japan a decade later.²⁸

Two conflicting factions arose to stay China's descent, each with its own particular balm for its ills. Both the reformers, led by Confucian scholar Kang Youwei and his student Liang Qichao, and the revolutionaries, led by Hong Kong- and American-educated doctor Sun Yat-sen, turned to Western science and philosophy to revitalize China. While the reformers hoped to jump-start Chinese civilization's faltering Confucian heart through an injection of critical self-examination and nationwide programs of modernization, the revolutionaries believed that it would have to be torn out completely, calling for an end to the dynastic tradition and the restructuring of China as a democratic republic. Although the revolutionary worldview would win out in 1911, it was the dialectical conflict between these two nationalist strands that ultimately engendered the modern conceptions of both *hanjian* and the Chinese nation-state.

The reform movement began in 1895 in reaction to the humiliating Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan,²⁹ when the Confucian scholar Kang Youwei and over a thousand of his supporters submitted a memorandum to the reform-minded Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-1908) calling for "a complete transformation of China's economic and educational system."³⁰ Like the self-strengtheners before him, Kang Youwei hoped to save China from the Great Powers'

²⁷ Maria Hsia Chang, *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), p. 57.

²⁸ Skirmishes over the increasing French presence in Indochina led to the outbreak of open warfare in 1884. The French navy sailed up the Fuzhou River, passing multiple modern artillery batteries unopposed, before handily destroying the Chinese fleet and the modern Fuzhou Navy Yard. This defeat shattered the Qing's initial confidence after two decades of naval improvements under self-strengtheners Zuo Zongtang and forced China to recognize French control of Vietnam in the 1885 Treaty of Tianjin. The loss of the First Sino-Japanese War to a former tributary state a decade later only multiplied the feelings of national embarrassment provoked by the self-strengthening movement's failure.

²⁹ The Treaty of Shimonoseki ended the First Sino-Japanese War, granting Japan Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula in Manchuria, as well as practical control over Korea and the same invasive rights afforded the Western powers on Chinese soil.

³⁰ Jonathan Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1980* (New York: Viking, 1981), p. 37.

aggression and restore its international prominence by adopting Western technology, promoting industry, and developing modern networks of finance and infrastructure, but in contrast to the superficiality of the self-strengtheners' reforms, such as scholar-official Zhang Zhidong's program of "Western technology with a Chinese soul" (中学为体, 西学为用 *zhongxue wei ti, xixue wei yong*),³¹ Kang sought to fight the problem at the root, grafting Western knowledge onto the very core of Confucian scholarship.³²

This unorthodox solution was founded in Kang's interpretation of Confucianism, laid out in his ground-breaking *Study of Confucius as a Reformer* (孔子改制考 *Kongzi gaizhi kao*). To Kang, Confucius was an advocate of change, not of reactionary dogma, and to this end the great sage had "founded his teaching to reform [the] institutions" of his own time.³³ Kang's calls for reform eventually found the sympathetic ear of the Emperor Guangxu himself, who adopted Kang's recommendations when he launched the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898.³⁴ However, a reactionary coup led by Dowager Empress Cixi seized the capital, arrested the emperor, and sentenced Kang to death.³⁵ Although he escaped the headsman's axe, Kang Youwei never

³¹ Formerly an advocate of outright military opposition to Western incursions, Zhang changed his stance after the defeat in the Sino-French War and became one of the major self-strengtheners of the late nineteenth century. He focused on modernizing the Chinese army, establishing an arsenal and mint in the city of Wuhan and modernizing its garrison. These foreign-trained and -equipped troops would later be responsible for the Wuchang Uprising that prompted the Xinhai Revolution.

³² Spence, pp. 37-41.

"Indeed, if we make a complete change, we shall become strong, but if we only make limited changes, we shall still perish. If Your Majesty and his ministers investigate the source of the disease, you will know that this is the right prescription." Kang Youwei, "The Need for Reforming Institutions," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. 2*, ed. William Theodore de Bary, p. 269.

³³ Kang Youwei, "Confucius as a Reformer," in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, p. 266.

³⁴ "The Emperor issued edicts abolishing the formalistic 'eight-legged essay' system, establishing a national university, converting local temples into schools, setting up one group of local bureaus to develop Qing commerce and others to develop agriculture and industry." Spence, p. 50.

³⁵ The widow of the Xianfeng Emperor (r. 1850-1861), Cixi served as regent for twelve years during the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861-1875), and following his early death in she resumed control until Guangxu came of age in 1889. Despite her active role in the Tongzhi Restoration, by the time of Guangxu's reign Cixi had become one of the most implacable opponents of reform in the Qing court.

regained his lost influence,³⁶ and the Qing court did not implement any further reforms until the devastating indemnity imposed on China by the Boxer Protocol of 1901 convinced Cixi of the need for change.³⁷

After the failure of Hundred Days' Reform, the American-educated doctor Sun Yat-sen, who had previously submitted his own memorandum for reform to the eminent statesman Li Hongzhang,³⁸ now became "convinced that the Manchus must be dislodged by revolution if China's future were to be secured."³⁹ Sun's revolution, however, was not to be like the uprisings that had characterized dynastic change since the dawn of Chinese civilization. Instead, inspired by Western republican ideals, Sun hoped to abolish the imperial system altogether and replace it with democracy, the second of his "Three Principles of the People" (三民主义 *Sanmin Zhuyi*) that would later serve as the theoretical foundation for the Nationalist Party.⁴⁰ To this end, his Revolutionary Alliance launched a series of armed uprisings against the Qing government, ultimately culminating in the 1911 Xinhai Revolution that finally overthrew the Manchu regime.

Despite the political and ideological differences between the reformers and the revolutionaries, they were both propelled by the need to save China from the existential threat of Western imperialism. Monarchist intellectual Yan Fu's translations of Thomas Huxley's

³⁶ Ibid, pp. 59-60.

³⁷ Levied on China as punishment after a multinational army suppressed the anti-foreign Boxer Rebellion (1898-1901), the Boxer Protocol suspended the civil service examination, expanded and fortified Western legations on Chinese soil, and required China to pay the Western powers and Japan a combined sum of 450 million taels of silver. Despite this crippling economic burden, over the next decade the Manchu court implemented a number of major reforms, establishing public schools, finally abolishing the imperial examination system, and promising to transition to a constitutional monarchy.

³⁸ Like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang began as a provincial commander of a private force during the Taiping Rebellion. Unlike Zeng, Li did not disband his troops after the end of the uprising and his Huai Army's collection of the *lijin* tax in Anhui, Jiangsu, and Shanghai was a major source of funds for the self-strengthening movement. In the last decades of the nineteenth century, Li also became one of the most eminent Chinese statesmen, and was responsible for signing the Li-Ito Agreement of 1885, a treaty with Japan which tried to stave off war over the Korean peninsula.

³⁹ Chang, p. 114.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 119.

Evolution and Ethics in 1895 and *On Evolution* in 1898 had introduced the Chinese intelligentsia to the ideas of Social Darwinism, and the new nationalist discourse developed beneath the penumbra of Social Darwinism's millenarian doctrine of a final racial showdown.⁴¹ In this view, China's conflict with the West was merely an instance of a larger confrontation between the white and yellow races, while the Western powers' acquisition of China's former tributary states and deep penetration into China proper was a case of natural selection, proving the evolutionary fitness of Western technological and political ideas and portending China's ultimate defeat at their hands.⁴² The revolutionaries' conception of the Qing as ethnic foreigners, and of their retainers as *hanjian*, sprang from ideas founded in the idea of this racial confrontation.

In the eyes of reformers and revolutionaries alike, the only way China could endure in the apocalyptic struggle between the races was if it learned from the Western model and became "animated by the vigorous group 'spirit' (*jingsheng*) of 'nationalism' (*minzu zhuyi*)."⁴³ Liang Qichao, Kang Youwei's most prominent disciple, described the Chinese nation as a sleeping lion,

an intricate, man-made machine with "internal components which at a slight trigger would utilize feisty teeth and claws to bite and grab, defeating at least a thousand men." Regrettably, "the machine has been abandoned too long... unless the machine is renewed, this wonderful and Godlike creature shall sleep forever." In Liang's view, China's future can no longer be dependent upon a natural awakening, and must rely on human intervention to provide her with a new mechanism, thus offering her new hope for a safer tomorrow.⁴⁴

Similarly, Sun Yat-sen repeatedly despaired that the Chinese people were as divided and malleable as "a tray of loose sand," doomed to succumb to the predations of the West unless it

⁴¹ Shen, "Discourse on *Guomin*," p. 15; Kai-wing Chow, "Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China," in Kai-wing Chow and Poshek Fu, ed., *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001), p. 53. The first president of Peking University, Yan played a major role in introducing Western philosophy and science to China during a period when the Chinese intelligentsia turned increasingly to Western thought as the solution to China's endemic problems. For a further examination of his beliefs, see Chang, pp. 92-93.

⁴² Chow, "Narrating Nation," p. 54.

⁴³ Chang, *The Wounded Dragon*, p. 109.

⁴⁴ Shen, "Discourse on *Guomin*," pp. 4-5.

could somehow congeal into a unified nation.⁴⁵ Survival in the Darwinian conflict required cohesion, which in turn required the Chinese people to come together as a single people behind the banner of a unitary state.

However, the question of how this Chinese nation was to be defined soon proved “an integral part of the ideological battle between the reformists and the revolutionaries.”⁴⁶ Each group strove to justify its political agenda through its own interpretation of what it meant to be Chinese. While the reformers drew upon pan-Asian cultural and ethnic similarities to promote an alliance with other Asian nations as fellow members of the “yellow race,” the revolutionaries painted China as “a pure and untainted Han racial community” that could only achieve nation status once freed from the Manchu yoke.⁴⁷

For Kang Youwei, nations served as a natural step in the evolutionary process of human development.⁴⁸ His magnum opus, *The Great Commonality* (大同书 *Datong shu*), characterized history as divided into three eras, the Age of Disorder, the Age of Order, and the Age of Great Peace. China’s growing interaction with the West marked the transition from Disorder to Order, and as a result she needed to develop new institutions in harmony with the new epoch.⁴⁹ While the Age of Great Peace would be characterized by universal brotherhood and the dissolution of

⁴⁵ Chang, *The Wounded Dragon*, p. 114.

⁴⁶ Chow, “Narrating Nation,” p. 48.

⁴⁷ Leibold, “More than a Category,” p. 543.

⁴⁸ The course of humanity progresses according to a fixed sequence. From the clans come tribes, which in time are transformed into nations. And from nations the Great Commonality comes about. Kang Youwei, “The Three Ages,” in *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, p. 268.

⁴⁹ “The methods and institutions of Confucius aim at meeting with the particular times. If, in the Age of Disorder, before the advent of civilization, one were to put into effect the institutions of Great Peace, this would certainly result in great harm. But if, in the Age of Order, one were to continue to cling to the institutions of the Age of Disorder, this too would result in great harm.” Ibid.

national boundaries, for now China was in the midst of “an era of competition between states,” making reform impossible without a fixed national policy.⁵⁰

Fortunately, Kang believed, human beings are naturally inclined toward nationalist sentiments, which “give pleasure to man’s nature”:

Being that we are born into one country, have received [its] civilization...and... knowledge, then we have the responsibilities of a citizen. If we...abandon this country, this country will perish and its people will be annihilated, and then civilization will be destroyed.⁵¹

This “one country” was an inclusive identity, founded in the common Confucian underpinnings of Eastern civilization. In Kang’s portrayal of the clash of nations, Han and Manchu alike needed to unite to preserve their common lineage.⁵²

Kang’s student Liang Qichao saw China’s struggle with the West in even more stridently Darwinian terms, arguing that history was driven by “the citizenry’s struggle for survival, which is irrepressible according to the laws of natural selection and survival of the fittest.”⁵³ Of all the formations in which people could be arranged for this struggle, “the nation was ‘the most nearly perfect,’ for only through it could men defend themselves in war and share their lives in peace.”⁵⁴ However, although Liang believed that the nation itself was an organic unit, the vast majority of Chinese remained ignorant of their position as components of the national body.⁵⁵

The Chinese nation could only be preserved by plucking its members from their Platonic cave of imperial subjectivity and deliberately creating a new consciousness of their position as modern

⁵⁰ Kang, “The Need for Reforming Institutions,” p. 269.

⁵¹ Chang, *The Wounded Dragon* p. 94.

⁵² “The broad racial identity of ‘yellow race’ served the purpose well enough for reformers like Kang Youwei and Yan Fu. For them, the threat came primarily from the imperialist powers. The ‘yellow race,’ among whose peoples the Chinese were the most civilized, was an identity broad enough to include the Manchus. The reformers talked about ‘preserving the [yellow] race (*baozhong*), which included both the Han and the Manchus.” Chow, “Narrating Nation,” p. 54.

⁵³ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, p. 74.

⁵⁴ Chang, *The Wounded Dragon*, p. 93.

⁵⁵ “The nation, for Liang, was ‘the unit of self-love and the climax of human fraternity,’ without which man ‘would fare worse than the birds and beasts.’” Ibid.

citizens (国民 *guomin*), the act of “human intervention” that would awaken and refresh the sleeping lion.⁵⁶

To Liang Qichao, the source of China’s national ignorance was its lack of a unified national history. Throughout the millennia of imperial rule, history was

all written for the rulers and their officials; none was written for *nationals* (*guomin*). [The classical histories’] biggest flaw is that they did not know the distinction between the imperial regime and the state (*guojia*), knowing no state apart from the court...Therefore, there were debates over orthodox and illegitimate regimes...A has the Mandate of Heaven, and B is a rebel...Historians of the last few thousand years were responsible for China’s inability to develop nationalism.⁵⁷

The solution was to restructure China’s history and identity as that of a single nation, particularly through education and standardizing reforms to the Chinese language.⁵⁸ However, even though China’s dynastic past was the source of its national weakness, this new national consciousness did not require the overthrow of either the imperial system or even the Qing dynasty. The virtuous progression of the Mandate of Heaven had been delegitimized by China’s encounter with the West,⁵⁹ but just as Meiji Japan had internalized Western political ideas while keeping the emperor on the throne, Liang maintained that China “could have social revolution without dynastic overthrow.”⁶⁰ Furthermore, Liang founded his discussion of *guomin* in ethnically inclusive language, rallying both Han and Manchu to the banner of the Chinese nation. Liang described Chinese either as *Huangren* (黄人), the “yellow people/race,” or *Huazu* (华族), the

⁵⁶ “Further, only through the internalization of *guomin* consciousness could people (*renmin*) be awakened from their passive being-in-itself to become assured of their unique position as the political subject of a nation-state.” Shen, “Discourse on *Guomin*,” p. 3.

⁵⁷ Chow, “Narrating Nation,” p. 52.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 52, 71-72.

⁵⁹ “The belief in the Mandate of Heaven lost ground with the rejection of *tianxia* by the Europeans. A political regime could no longer be justified in terms of virtuous leadership but only in the sovereignty of the people—the Chinese nation.” Chow, pp. 51-52.

⁶⁰ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, p. 75.

“flower lineage.”⁶¹ Both Manchu and Han “belonged to the same yellow race,” while the term “Hua” described Chinese civilization as a whole, from overseas Chinese to China’s former tributaries to even the Japanese, on account of their common writing system and cultural foundation.⁶²

Like the reformers, the anti-Qing revolutionaries also characterized China’s encounter with the West in terms of a Darwinian evolutionary struggle, which ultimately informed both their definition of the Chinese nation and their creation of a new category of *hanjian*. In his famous tract *The Revolutionary Army* (革命军 *Gemingjun*), the young intellectual Zou Rong described this clash of civilizations:

The yellow and white races which are to be found on the globe have been endowed by nature with intelligence and fighting capacity. They are fundamentally incapable of giving way to each other. Hence, glowering and poised for a fight they have engaged in battle in the world of evolution, the great arena where strength and intelligence have clashed since earliest times, the great theater where for so long natural selection and progress have been played out.⁶³

The players in this spectacle are the nations of the world, which Zou, like Liang Qichao, saw as the natural outgrowth of tribes and clans.⁶⁴

Zou, however, had little concern for Kang and Liang’s respect for the imperial system and desire for Han-Manchu solidarity. In his view, China under the Qing regime had “lost its sovereignty to foreigners (*wairen*)” and could not possibly achieve the unity of nation and state as long as the Han people remained subjugated to Manchu rulers.⁶⁵ Zou’s tract is addressed to the “400 million of the great Han race,” whom he orders to “annihilate the five million and more

⁶¹ Chow, “Narrating Nation,” p. 54.

⁶² Ibid, p. 55.

⁶³ Zou Rong, John Lust, trans., *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903* (Paris: Mouton 1968). While *The Revolutionary Army* became the most widely-published and influential revolutionary work of the decade, Zou, a young Japanese-educated student, was arrested for publishing it and died in prison in 1905.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Chow, “Narrating Nation,” p. 53.

of the furry and horned Manchu.” The need for this revolution “arises precisely from the question of whether our race will go under and be exterminated,” and the assassination of the emperor, the expulsion of the Manchu from China proper, and the establishment of republican democracy are necessary if “China is to survive for long in the new world of the 20th century.”⁶⁶

While other revolutionaries were hardly as extreme in their views or vitriolic in their rhetoric, they too characterized China as “the China of the Chinese of the Han race.”⁶⁷ In an article published in *Guominbao* in 1901, the revolutionary Zhang Binglin attacked Liang Qichao’s inclusive national portrait by using the terms *hanren* (汉人), *hanzu* (汉族), and *hanzhong* (汉种) to differentiate the Manchus from Han Chinese. Two years later the revolution’s “golden boy” Wang Jingwei, himself later to become one of China’s most prominent *hanjian*, published an article that asked “who are the Chinese? It is the Han race (*Han renzhong*).”⁶⁸

Sun Yat-sen’s definition of the Chinese nation was more nuanced. Like Liang Qichao, he believed each human grouping (族 *zu*) was an organic collective that reflected humans’ innate desire for collective association. The largest of these groupings was race (人种 *renzhong*), which was then subdivided into ethnic nations (民族 *minzu*). Although the Han and Manchu were both

⁶⁶ Zou Rong, *The Revolutionary Army*.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ 人, 族, and 种 have the current meanings of “people” (in the sense of “persons”), “ethnicity,” and “race,” respectively. Late-Qing intellectuals used all three characters to express the Western concept of “race,” as well as the current terms 种族 and 人种. The common thread that tied together revolutionaries’ use of these disparate terms is the idea of the Han people as a unique bloodline, in opposition both to the inclusive cultural definition of Chinese as 华族 or 华人 and to the broader definition of a “yellow race” (黄种 and variants) that also incorporated other Asian groups such as the Mongolians, the Japanese, and most importantly, the Manchus. Chow, “Narrating Nation,” pp. 54-55.

members of the yellow race, each formed a separate *minzu* branch, along with the Mongols, Malays, and Japanese.⁶⁹ In Sun's view, it was only when the *minzu* of the world achieved political parity that Kang Youwei's "Great Harmony" could be realized.⁷⁰ To this end, he called for the construction of a Chinese state (国 *guo*), an artificial political body to provide the nation with control and guidance. This state's ideal form would be a democratic republic, which would preserve national unity by preventing a struggle for power within the *minzu*.⁷¹

Following the revolutionaries' victory in 1911, it was Sun Yat-sen's vision of the nation that ultimately defined the new China as a republican nation-state. Although some radicals launched anti-Manchu campaigns of revenge, Sun himself, always the pragmatist, further moderated his views after coming to power, declaring China "a Republic of Five Races (五族共和 *wuzu gonghe*) or a single, unified Chinese nation/race (中华民族 *Zhonghua minzu*)."⁷² Nevertheless, the racial ideology of the more rabid revolutionaries and Liang Qichao's views on national citizenship each had a lasting impact on Chinese nationalism and the meaning of *hanjian*.

The most enduring product of the revolutionaries' anti-Manchu rhetoric is the contemporary view of "Hanzu" as a unified ethnic group. In order to unify the Chinese against the Qing, and drawing on the Western racial ideas introduced by Yan Fu, the revolutionaries forged the previously loose Han descriptor into a common ethnic narrative, describing the Han as a people linked by the shared blood of Huangdi, the quasi-mythical founder of Chinese civilization. They created lineage histories with Huangdi as the founder of the "nation-state of

⁶⁹ Chang, *The Wounded Dragon*, p. 111.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 110.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 121.

⁷² Leibold, "More than a Category," p. 543.

the Han race” (汉种民族的国家 *Hanzhong minzu de guojia*) and common ancestor of all Han people.⁷³ In doing so, they sought, in the words of cultural historian Kai-wing Chow, to

...create a history of the Chinese as an aggressive, mobile, and outward-looking people, a race that had proven successful in surviving the ruthless competition dictated by the evolutionary law of the Darwinian world. This history provides the ground for the Hanzu to rebound from the conquest by the Manchus.⁷⁴

The establishment of *Hanzu* as a specific ethnic category has had lasting repercussions for the meaning of *hanjian*. Limiting “China” to the Han ethnic group indelibly marks Qing retainers as *hanjian*, even such popular officials such as Zeng Guofan, whose reputation was rehabilitated after the founding of the Republic, and Lin Zexu, whose prominent role in resisting Western aggression had previously left his virtue beyond question.⁷⁵ Despite both Nationalist and Communists’ repeated emphasis on national multiculturalism, the ethnic connotation that *hanjian* acquired as a result of the anti-Qing revolution has never been fully expunged, leading to a series of problems that will be further examined in the following chapters.

The shift in loyalty from the imperial throne to the national community has also created a new set of responsibilities for that community’s members. As Liang Qichao points out, “there can be no bodies where the limbs are broken, guts are rotten, and blood is dry; similarly, there can be no state where the *guomin* are frivolous, cowardly, and weak.”⁷⁶ However, loyalty to a nation is a much fuzzier idea than loyalty to a single man. Is national loyalty an obligation to land or to human beings? At what point has one failed one’s responsibility to the nation, and what should be the consequences? These became questions of first importance after the Second Sino-Japanese War, during the trials of collaborators I examine in my next chapter.

⁷³ Chow, “Narrating Nation,” pp. 59, 62.

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 63.

⁷⁵ Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” pp. 144, 150.

⁷⁶ Shen, “Discourse on *Guomin*,” p. 16.

Chapter 2 Prosecuting *Hanjian*: Collaboration and the Search for a Postwar Narrative

In contemporary Chinese, the term *hanjian* generally refers to collaborators in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), known in China as the War to Resist Japan (抗日战争 *Kangri Zhanzheng*). Even nearly seventy years after the conflict, this remains *hanjian*'s most commonly intended meaning, and with reason. The war against Japan lasted for eight years of brutal occupation, taking some twenty million Chinese lives and searing an indelible image into the Chinese mass consciousness.

Although collaboration is common to almost every experience of occupation, it was a particularly prominent feature of the stagnation and guerrilla warfare that characterized the Sino-Japanese conflict. Historian David Barrett describes the Japanese military's position in China as a system of "points and lines," with its strength concentrated in urban centers and major towns, as well as the lines of supply and communication between them. While this web remained strong throughout the war, the gaps between its strands meant that areas of countryside nominally under occupation remained hives of anti-Japanese activity.⁷⁷ In order to consolidate their authority and provide their occupation with some mantle of legitimacy, the Japanese established puppet regimes in the capital cities of Nanjing and Beiping.⁷⁸ At the grassroots level, Japanese officials coopted translators, businessmen, and local leaders to carry out the functions of day-to-day governance. All of these figures were labeled as *hanjian*, both by Chiang Kai-shek's government in Chongqing and by the Communist rebels in the countryside and revolutionary base areas. They were subject to violent reprisals and, eventually, legal persecution at the end of the war.

⁷⁷ David P. Barrett, Introduction to David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, ed. *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 2.

⁷⁸ Beiping (or Peip'ing, 北平) was the official name of Beijing from 1928, when Chiang Kai-shek established the new Nationalist government with its capital in Nanjing, until the founding of the People's Republic in Beijing on October 1, 1949.

After the conclusion of the war in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government passed the "Regulations for the Punishment of Hanjian," and *hanjian* expanded from a term of abuse to a legal category. This criminalization of *hanjian* is significant in several ways. The *hanjian* trials, particularly those of high-profile collaborators such as Chen Bijun, the wife of former president of the Japanese puppet government Wang Jingwei, Wang's successor Chen Gongbo, and Zhou Fohai, Chen Gongbo's second-in-command, played a key role in the postwar debate over national narratives of resistance and collaboration. In addition, the trials' nature as political witch hunts, and resulting fast-and-loose treatment of the *hanjian* category sparked the first debate over the nature of *hanjian*'s ethnic connotations when Taiwanese defendants protested against the application of the term to former Japanese subjects such as themselves.

Even before the outbreak of open conflict, the Japanese had played a crucial—and often antagonistic—role in the development of Chinese nationalism. Although Sun Yat-sen looked to Japan as a friend and ally in his pan-Asian vision, his feelings were not shared by many of his countrymen.⁷⁹ Chinese attitudes toward Japan had already begun to sour following the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, and further deteriorated in 1915 after Japanese Prime Minister Okuma Shigenobu presented Yuan Shikai, a former Qing marshal and the first president of the Republic of China, with a demeaning list of twenty-one demands including the installation of Japanese advisors at all levels of the Chinese government.⁸⁰ A few years later, after Japan secured legal possession of former German holdings in Shandong province in the Treaty of Versailles, China's

⁷⁹ Many of Sun's repeated periods of exile were spent in Japan, where he built an expansive network of supporters including future Japanese Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi. For a fuller analysis of this relationship, see Marius Jansen, *The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

⁸⁰ Okuma's demands were grouped into five groups, with the first four centered on expanding and consolidating Japan's holdings in Shandong and Manchuria. Yuan Shikai rejected the initial ultimatum, convincing the Japanese to drop the fifth group, which included the stipulation that advisors be posted to the Chinese government. Faced with renewed Japanese pressure and uncertain of his own position in a China divided between competing warlords, Yuan accepted the shortened list on May 7th, 1915. This act of wanton appeasement sparked massive anti-Japanese protests throughout China, leading May 7th to become known as "National Humiliation Day."

simmering resentment at these repeated offenses was unleashed in the May Fourth Incident, a massive popular wave of nationalistic, anti-Western, and anti-Japanese sentiment that swept the country in 1919, and a series of anti-Japanese boycotts that continued sporadically throughout the 1920s and 1930s.⁸¹

Despite escalating popular opinion against Japan, Chiang Kai-shek, Sun's successor in the Nationalist party and China's de facto ruler after 1928, retreated in the face of continuing Japanese aggression. He instead chose a policy of "domestic pacification before external resistance" (先安内后攘外 *xian annei hou rangwai*), focusing on eliminating the Chinese Communist Party, with whom the Nationalists had violently broken in 1927, before addressing the problem of the Japanese.⁸² When the Japanese Kwantung Army swept over Manchuria following the Mukden Incident (九一八事变 *Jiuyiba Shijian*) of September 18, 1931, Chiang ordered northeastern warlord Zhang Xueliang to pull back. Chiang's focus was only turned to Japan in 1936 by the so-called Xi'an Incident, in which he was kidnapped by Zhang Xueliang and forced at gunpoint to agree to a new anti-Japanese United Front with the Communists. The Nationalists' newly-firm position set the stage for open warfare, which began on July 7, 1937 with a skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge outside Beijing.

The war was, at first, a disaster for China. The Japanese launched a massive amphibious invasion of the Yangzi river delta, routing the Nationalist army outside Shanghai and brutally sacking the capital of Nanjing in December of that year. However, Chiang refused Japanese advances for a peace settlement, instead withdrawing his army and government inland to the city

⁸¹ See Karl Gerth, "Chapter 4: The Movement and Anti-Imperialists Boycotts, 1923-1937," in *China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 125-200.

⁸² Wang Ke-wen, "Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the 'Peace Movement,' 1932-1937," in Barrett and Shyu, *Chinese Collaboration with Japan*, p. 23.

of Chongqing, while Communist guerrillas remained active in the Shaan-Gan-Ning border region and even within Japanese-occupied areas.⁸³ This uneasy and violent balance remained the status quo for the remainder of the conflict, as the Japanese were unable to press inland and put a definitive end to the Nationalist resistance or to eliminate the Communist presence behind their own battle lines, while both Chinese armies lacked the organization, materiel, and manpower to expel the Japanese.

After Chiang Kai-shek rejected their initial peace proposals in January of 1938, Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro issued what came to be known as the “*aite ni sezu*” edict, in which he declared that Japan “would not deal” with the Chiang regime. Instead, Japan looked to “the establishment of a new Chinese regime, harmonious coordination with which [could] really be counted upon.”⁸⁴ As the war began to drag on, such a face-saving alternative became increasingly favorable, one the Japanese found in the person of Wang Jingwei. Termed the “golden boy of Chinese nationalism” by historian R. Keith Schoppa for a dramatic but unsuccessful attempt to assassinate a Qing official in his youth,⁸⁵ Wang was one of the leading figures of the GMD and had already headed a left-wing opposition government in Wuhan during the Northern Expedition that had reclaimed China for the Nationalists in 1928.⁸⁶ Following the *aite ni sezu* pronouncement, Wang opened his own peace negotiations with the Japanese, promising the support of left GMD officials. When this support failed to materialize, Wang fled

⁸³ The Shaan-Gan-Ning border region, so called because it stretched over the area between Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia provinces, was the center of Communist activity in China from the conclusion of the Long March in October 1935 until the final offensive against the GMD after the conclusion of the Second Sino-Japanese War.

⁸⁴ Gerard E. Bunker, *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937-1941* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 46.

⁸⁵ In 1910 Wang and a small group of co-conspirators attempted to assassinate Prince-Regent Chun with a bomb. Their plot was discovered, and Wang was sentenced to death, only to be released by an amnesty granted by the Qing court in an attempt to win popular support. R. Keith Schoppa, *Revolution and Its Past: Identities and Change in Modern China*, 2nd ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006), p. 137.

⁸⁶ John Hunter Boyle, *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 113.

to Hanoi before establishing a new “Reorganized Government of the Republic of China” in cooperation with Japan.

Founded in a dramatic “return to the capital” (还都 *huandu*) on March 30, 1940, the Reorganized Government appropriated Nationalist iconography and rhetoric, including the GMD flag and Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People, in an attempt to present itself as an authentic representative of the Chinese nation.⁸⁷ However, Wang’s regime was ultimately unable to satisfy either side. His “Nationalist” government never came to represent the entirety of occupied China, much less the Chinese people as a whole, since the northern puppet government established after the fall of Beijing in 1937 remained “a separate administrative enclave” under the North China Area Army’s direct control.⁸⁸ At the same time, Wang remained largely powerless to ameliorate the conditions of the occupation, as continuing conflict with Chiang Kai-shek in the west and launching of “pacification campaigns” into the occupied areas meant Japan’s approximate troop strength remained constant until the end of the war.⁸⁹

In addition to the formal collaborationist regimes, the Japanese occupation forces also relied heavily on local collaborators to fight communism and facilitate local administration. As the historian Timothy Brook notes in his monograph, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China*, Japanese intelligence forces would follow the military and enlist local elites, whose established resources and authority made them ideal interlocutors for their Japanese masters. The reasons for their compliance were diverse: some collaborators hoped to profit, either politically or financially, from the opportunity presented by the social upheaval of the Japanese invasion, while others feared for their survival or that of their family or village if they

⁸⁷ Barrett, Introduction, p. 5; Lo Jiu-Jung, “Survival as Justification for Collaboration,” in Barrett and Shyu, *Chinese Collaboration*, 118-9.

⁸⁸ Barrett, 5.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 7.

did not give the Japanese what they wanted. Most fell somewhere on the sliding scale between opportunism and survival. The scale and diversity of this group, as well as the hazy definition of collaboration, would contribute to the complexity of the definition, and eventual punishment, of wartime *hanjian*.⁹⁰

Unlike Wang Jingwei and his compatriots in Nanjing, protected by miles of Japanese-held territory and their own private security forces, local collaborators were open targets, and frequently subject to assassination.⁹¹ The Japanese military was spread too thin on the ground to provide adequate protection for rural collaborators,⁹² but even Japanese-occupied cities were not free from vengeance against *hanjian*. In his article “Hanjian!” Frederic Wakeman, Jr. examines anti-*hanjian* activities throughout the war in the city of Shanghai, which was one of the first to fall to Japan and had featured a significant Japanese presence since the 1932 Shanghai Incident.⁹³ He describes how communist resistance fighters appealed to Chinese citizens’ national loyalty to form assassination squads to seek out and eliminate collaborators.

Resentment of *hanjians*’ betrayal of their native land, relatively favorable wartime treatment by the occupation forces, and complicity in Japanese atrocities exploded after the war into an intensive two-year period of “dealing with *hanjian*.” The CCP carried out retributive attacks on former collaborators while the Nationalist government passed the Regulations for the Punishment of Hanjian, which made “hanjianism” a criminal charge. The Guomintang arrested

⁹⁰ Timothy Brook, *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 7-13.

⁹¹ Brook, *Collaboration*, pp. 76, 82, 85, 87, 107-108, 155, 166, 184-185, 197, 208, 215, 231.

⁹² *Ibid*, 87.

⁹³ Japan had secured a settlement in Shanghai as one of the provisions of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In January of 1932, following the slaying of several Buddhist priests, Japanese naval and marine forces launched a full-scale invasion of the city. Chiang once again sought settlement, and Shanghai was ultimately demilitarized under de facto Japanese control.

4692 persons by the end of 1945, and throughout the two-year period of prosecution more than 25,000 accused *hanjian* were brought to trial.⁹⁴

Wang Jingwei had died of natural causes in 1944, but his successor, Chen Gongbo, was put on trial in April of 1946. A longtime associate of Wang Jingwei, Chen had served as minister of industry in the Guomindang cabinet from 1932 to 1936, resigning after Wang retreated to Europe to recover from an assassination attempt.⁹⁵ Like Philippe Pétain, the leader of the Vichy regime and French arch-collaborator whose trial the Chinese news services followed eagerly, Chen conceded that he had cooperated with the enemy, but claimed he had done so for nationalist reasons.⁹⁶ Convinced that the war with Japan was lost, Wang and Chen had attempted to “preserve a little vitality for the nation, as the stepping-stone for future nation-building” by collaborating with the Japanese in order to preserve an economic base from which China could eventually regain its compromised sovereignty.⁹⁷

Similar arguments that they had protected the Chinese people were presented by prominent collaborators Zhou Fohai and Chen Bijun. Zhou, who had served as a member of Chiang’s CC Clique before defecting in 1938,⁹⁸ argued that he had consistently sought to serve China’s best interest, serving as an intermediary with Japan after the initial collapse of the front in south China and late secretly reestablishing contacts with Chongqing. Furthermore, he claimed

people in the occupied areas could make a stable living under the strong centralized leadership of the Nanjing Collaborationist Government, which...Chongqing had never been able to do during the war.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Dongyoun Hwang, “Wartime Collaboration in Question: An Examination of the Postwar Trials of the Chinese Collaborators,” *Inter-Asian Cultural Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), p. 75.

⁹⁵ Zanasi, p. 731. Hwang, p. 79.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 734.

⁹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 738.

⁹⁸ The CC (Central Club) Clique, led by brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Lifu, was a right-wing faction within the Nationalist Party consisting of Chiang Kai-shek’s strongest supporters. It controlled the party’s Organization Department as well as the secret police.

⁹⁹ Hwang, pp. 82-83.

According to Wang Jingwei's widow Chen Bijun, the "head female traitor" (头号女汉奸 *touhao nühanjian*),

when Guangdong was under Japanese attack in 1938, she could not find any state authorities whose responsibility was the protection of local people there, and that she and other collaborators in Guangdong on behalf of the state had to make every effort to save the people there, including peace and collaboration with Japan. From her perspective, Chiang Kai-shek and his government had committed a serious crime by not taking care of the people and the nation.¹⁰⁰

The Guomintang courts had little interest in such "traitors' reasoning" (汉奸理论 *hanjian lilun*).¹⁰¹ Chen Gongbo was sentenced to death after a six-day trial and promptly shot, while Zhou Fohai and Chen Bijun were both sentenced to life imprisonment. However, as collaboration specialist Margherita Zanasi points out, and as the wartime assassinations and extralegal postwar punishments of collaborators evince, "heightened nationalism and popular resentment would certainly have been enough to bring harsh retribution down on collaborators."¹⁰² Instead, the *hanjian* trials had simultaneous goals of nation-building and political expediency.

During the war Nationalists had used the charge of *hanjianism* as a blanket term to suppress Communists and other dissidents, and the postwar trials were therefore an extension of preexisting Nationalist policies.¹⁰³ By executing his former political opponents as *hanjian*, Chiang Kai-shek could finally avenge himself upon the GMD's left wing, with which he had clashed since the mid-1920s. Meanwhile, the sheer number of *hanjian* trials, conducted within such a short period, implies that legal accuracy was not the Nationalists' chief priority. Wakeman

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 85-86.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p. 82.

¹⁰² Margherita Zanasi, "Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 113, No. 3 (Jun 2008), p. 741.

¹⁰³ "A concerted move by the authorities in a number of provincial centres during July 1942 resulted in over 400 arrests among whom (with disastrous consequences for their movement) were a number of local communist leaders. According to an eye-witness account those arrested were usually accused of being traitors (*hanjian*)—an elastic term used by the authorities to describe Democratic League and Communist Party members as well as spies for the Japanese—and subjected to beatings and other forms of torture." Graham Hutchings, "A Province at War: Guangxi during the Sino-Japanese Conflict, 1937-45," *The China Quarterly*, no. 108 (December 1986), p. 665.

remarks that “right-wing Nationalists regarded the Communists as *hanjian* as well,” and it would be all too easy to ensure figures who caused trouble during the Guomindang’s reestablishment of national control met the same fate as Chen Gongbo.¹⁰⁴

This callously political aspect of the trials is reinforced by the intervention of the GMD secret police, or Juntong. Commanded by spymaster Dai Li, the *éminence grise* of the Nationalist regime, the secret police was responsible for the assassination of a number of high-ranking collaborationist officials during the war,¹⁰⁵ but the Juntong had also taken advantage of “its contact with ‘traitors’ (*hanjian*) in occupied areas to place special operations units in Shanghai, Nanjing, and other parts of southeastern China.”¹⁰⁶ After the war, Dai repaid his contacts by placing them into protective custody or ensuring their acquittal, regardless of their wartime behavior.¹⁰⁷ Zhou Fohai, who was initially given the death penalty, had frequently communicated with Dai during his time in Nanjing, and his Juntong contacts may have been the reason for the remission of his sentence.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, Chiang’s longstanding policy of domestic pacification before external resistance left him vulnerable to Communist accusations that he had not tried his utmost to expel the Japanese. On May 25, 1936, six months before the Xi’an Incident finally turned Chiang’s attention to the Japanese menace, Mao Zedong sent a letter to Shanxi warlord Yan Xishan

...likening "Mr Chiang's" (*Jiang shi*) behaviour to that of a “traitor to the Han race and to the nation” (*hanjian maiguozei wuyu weibi*) and calling on Yan's forces to unite with the CCP to "oppose Chiang and resist Japan" (*fan Jiang, kang Ri*) in order to “expel the common enemy of the Chinese people.” The use of the old slogan *fan Jiang*, rather than the new *bi Jiang* and other aspects of the letter

¹⁰⁴ Wakeman, “Hanjian!,” p. 301.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, “Hanjian!” p. 318.

¹⁰⁶ Wakeman, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 310.

¹⁰⁷ Wakeman, “Hanjian!” p. 323.

¹⁰⁸ Hwang, p. 82.

strongly implied that the “common enemy” to be expelled was none other than Chiang himself.¹⁰⁹

By rejecting the “collaborationist nationalism” of Chen and his ilk, then, Chiang hoped to reinforce his position as a figure of resistance in the eyes of the Chinese people and prepare for the upcoming showdown with the Communists.

Finally, the Nationalist courts’ fast-and-loose handling of the *hanjian* category also provoked questions about the term’s ethnic subtext. In 1947, following a popular uprising against the Guomindang occupation, the interim Taiwanese government submitted a forty-two point memorandum to Nanjing that included a request for the release of all Taiwanese *hanjian* imprisoned on the mainland.¹¹⁰ It argued that, as Taiwan had been a Japanese colony during the war, Taiwanese citizens could not possibly be traitors to China. This justification was further extended by ethnic Taiwanese who faced accusations of *hanjianism*. They were not Han, how could they possibly be *hanjian*? However, as with the trials of collaborationist officials, the Nationalists were largely uninterested in the arguments for the defense. In March of 1946, the Committee for Unified Interpretation of Rules and Regulations of the Judicial Ministry issued interpretation #3078, which established *hanjian* as a criminal charge for all individuals, not just Chinese. As a result, the Nationalists ultimately tried one Lithuanian, one Hungarian, one Russian, one Frenchman, and two Portuguese as *hanjian* in Shanghai.¹¹¹

Ultimately, the legal complexities of *hanjian*’s criminal status proved less important than the larger role of the postwar trials in shaping a monolithic narrative of resistance heroes pitted against Japanese invaders and their collaborator lackeys. For Chiang, the quibbles of quislings

¹⁰⁹ John W. Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party,” *The China Quarterly*, no. 113 (March 1988), p. 54.

¹¹⁰ Jiu-rong Lo, “Trials of the Taiwanese as *Hanjian* or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity,” in Chow and Fu, *Construction Nationhood*, p. 279.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 289.

were of paltry significance compared to legitimizing his return to national power and preparing for an ultimate confrontation with the Communists. However, the interpretations of the Chinese nation born from the experience of collaboration have had a far-reaching impact. As Timothy Brook notes,

the myth of resistance has been a powerful moral weapon in the arsenals that political elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have used to sustain their postwar dictatorships. Each party claims that it alone defeated the Japanese, and each stakes its moral legitimacy—its right to rule—on that claim.¹¹²

The primary role of anti-Japanese resistance in the foundational myths of the People's Republic brings us to my final chapter: *hanjian* in Red and contemporary China.

¹¹² Brook, *Collaboration*, p. 6.

Chapter 3 A Harmonious Society? *Hanjian* in the People's Republic

The founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing on October 1st, 1949 did not only establish a new state and a new government. It also brought with it a new conception of China as a revolutionary community, as well as new categories of *hanjian* as class and ideological enemies were attacked for their crimes against the new China. Since Mao's death in 1976, the People's Republic has increasingly abandoned this revolutionary conception of the nation as it has moved away from socialism, leading a number of Chinese scholars to reexamine the figures condemned as *hanjian* by the traditional Party historiography. However, as feelings of national pride among Chinese youth continue to grow, this search for academic precision has been offset by an explosion of anti-*hanjian* rhetoric, especially online. While the Chinese government has stoked these incendiary emotions through a number of patriotic initiatives, popular opposition to *hanjian* does not always serve its interests, and it must be increasingly careful not to be consumed by the flames.

Even before Mao's famous declaration that "the Chinese people have stood up,"¹¹³ nationalism was an integral component of CCP ideology. In an essay from 1937 describing the Communists' opposition to the Japanese invasion, Mao declared that "we are at once internationalists and patriots, and our slogan is, 'Fight to defend the motherland against the aggressors.'"¹¹⁴ Inspired by Soviet leader Joseph Stalin's theory of "socialism in one country,"¹¹⁵

¹¹³ Mao Zedong, "The Chinese People Have Stood Up!" (opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, Sept 21, 1949), accessed Apr 4, 2012, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm

¹¹⁴ Mao, *Quotations*, p. 176.

¹¹⁵ The orthodox Russian view in the 1920s and 1930s, established by Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin and supported by Leon Trotsky's United Opposition, maintained that the U.S.S.R. could not achieve socialism independently while the rest of Europe remained dominated by the forces of capital, and that the Bolsheviks should "build socialism in Russia in the expectation that states abroad, especially Germany, would eventually aid the task of completing the construction." Stalin, however, argued that it would be possible to complete the socialist

Mao sought to integrate Chinese nationalism with international socialism, characterizing the Communist struggle as a war against imperialist aggression,¹¹⁶ whether in the form of the Japanese invasion, “the running dog of imperialism” Chiang Kai-shek,¹¹⁷ or “U.S. aggressors” and “U.S. imperialists” during the Korean War.¹¹⁸ By pitting the CCP against the Western powers, he was able to synthesize Vladimir Lenin’s doctrine of predatory capitalist imperialism with longstanding Chinese resentment of the “hundred years of humiliation” it had suffered at the hands of the West.¹¹⁹ The pursuit of these national interests “constituted the CCP’s most potent basis of legitimacy because the party claimed to lead a revolution that had begun as a movement of national liberation,” even as that nation was being re-imagined along class lines.¹²⁰

Within this new China there were two places one could find *hanjian*: prisons and history books. A number of landlords, capitalists, Nationalist sympathizers, and other ideological undesirables were imprisoned as *hanjian* during the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (镇压反革命, *zhenya fan geming*) of 1950-1953.¹²¹ Meanwhile, Party historians applied the term to historical figures who were judged to be on the “wrong” side of history for their reactionary views or behavior.¹²² In his 1943 pamphlet *The Life of the Traitor-Butcher Zeng Guofan* (汉奸刽子手曾国藩的一生, *Hanjian guizishou Zeng Guofan de yisheng*),

transformation within the Soviet Union without first fomenting a global revolution. Robert Service, *Stalin: A Biography* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005), pp. 244-245.

¹¹⁶ Hung-yok Ip, “Cosmopolitanism and the Ideal Image of Nation in a Communist Revolutionary Culture,” in Chow and Fu, p. 225.

¹¹⁷ Mao, “The Chinese People Have Stood Up!”

¹¹⁸ Mao, “Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and Future Tasks” (speech given to the twenty-fourth session of the People’s Government Council, Sept 12, 1953), accessed Apr 4, 2012, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_34.htm

¹¹⁹ See Vladimir Lenin, “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism,” in *Essential Works of Lenin: “What Is to Be Done?” and Other Writings* (London: Dover, 1987).

¹²⁰ Ip, p. 217.

¹²¹ Julia C. Strauss, “Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People’s Republic of China, 1950-1953,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), p. 91.

¹²² Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” p. 149.

prominent Marxist historian Fan Wenlan, one of the most powerful voices in Communist historiography, denounced the nineteenth-century viceroy not only for his loyalty to the Qing but, more importantly, for his major role in suppressing the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), a fourteen-year-long uprising that engulfed south-central China and claimed some twenty million lives. In the eyes of the CCP historians, the largely peasant uprising was a “progressive” historical force, and Zeng’s opposition an act of social betrayal.¹²³

Neither class enemies nor historical “reactionaries” were *hanjian* by any previous definition, but the application of the term to the Party’s enemies had definite political benefits. The atmosphere of national resistance remained highly charged from the period of dealing with *hanjian* (which had concluded a scant three years before the campaign was initiated) and was only intensified during the Korean conflict, during which the Party “defined enemies of the state as saboteurs, fifth columns, and subverters of national unity.”¹²⁴ Invoking the term allowed also the CCP to channel rage over the still-fresh wounds of the Second Sino-Japanese War toward the enemies of the newly formed party-state.

The Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, the first attempt at mass mobilization and the consolidation of state control, was the perfect grounds for such a maneuver. Characterizing counterrevolutionary elements as *hanjian* would help to accomplish two of the campaign’s chief goals, those of motivating the populace and eliminating ideological opponents.¹²⁵ As in the postwar trials conducted by the Nationalist government, the flexibility of the accusations seems to indicated the trials were motivated by results and political expediency

¹²³ Chang-tai Hung, “Revolutionary History in Stone: The Making of a Chinese National Monument,” *The China Quarterly*, No. 166 (Jun., 2001), p. 464.

¹²⁴ Strauss, p. 83.

¹²⁵ “Whatever the realities of sabotage, spies, and counterrevolutionary activities and however genuine the fear of counterrevolutionaries might have been in 1950-1951, there is no question that the ensuing campaign was deliberately used for domestic political purposes to rally popular support behind the regime, extend the coercive instruments of the revolutionary state, and vertically integrate the bureaucracy.” *Ibid*, p. 84.

rather than balanced consideration and due process. Local cadres were ordered to “not fear executing people, only to fear mistakenly executing people,”¹²⁶ while the line between *hanjianism* and other forms of counterrevolutionary activity was often blurry, if drawn at all.¹²⁷

Nevertheless, the extension of the *hanjian* label to rightists, reactionaries, landlords, and capitalists rather than just collaborators can also be interpreted within the framework of Mao’s socialist nationalism. Communist China was defined in terms of “a revolutionary identity [based] on the foundation of a worker-peasant alliance.”¹²⁸ The Marxist-Leninist ideas that informed this worldview were extended to China’s past in order to create a monolithic narrative of a progressive and revolutionary Chinese nation, which had united to oppose feudalism and imperialism before the CCP was even founded. The key events in this nation’s history, from the Taiping movement through the “bourgeois-democratic” Xinhai Revolution and finally the war against Japan, constituted a gradual progression toward the eventual construction of a socialist society.¹²⁹

From this perspective, those who betrayed the revolution, whether literally or ideologically, were traitors to revolutionary China as a whole. During the Sino-Japanese War, Party members who had abandoned the struggle and “betrayed Marxism” or “betrayed their original class background” were branded as *hanjian* and eliminated.¹³⁰ Chen Duxiu, one of the CCP’s founding members and a major force in the development of Chinese Communism, was expelled from the Party in 1929 after accusations were brought by secret police chief Kang

¹²⁶ Ibid, p. 82.

¹²⁷ “Determining who were the bullies (*e’ba*), hardened bandits (*guaiifei*), the leaders of counterrevolutionary sects (*fandong huimen tou*), and traitors (*hanjian*) was an inherently much more difficult and subjective process given the absence of objective standards by which ‘counterrevolutionary crime’ was to be distinguished from ‘serious crime.’ In practice, these ostensibly separate counterrevolutionary categories often blended into each other...Devising an impartial and uniform set of standards for deciding which crimes in each merited which punishment was even more problematic, and there is no evidence that either the Party center or local cadres ever attempted to do...” Ibid, p. 91.

¹²⁸ Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” p. 155.

¹²⁹ Hung, “Revolutionary History,” p. 465.

¹³⁰ Wakeman, “Hanjian!” p. 301.

Sheng and Comintern-backed senior Communist Wang Ming that Chen had become a *hanjian* by working for the Japanese. However, the real reason for Chen's dismissal was doctrinal differences with Mao.¹³¹ To some extent, ideological opposition was worse, since incorrect ideas could infect other Party members and prevent them from adopting the proper class line, inflicting further harm to the national revolutionary community. The idea of this community, which Fan Wenlan's historical accounts were helping to create, influenced historical judgments in turn, as the reactionary Qing were condemned as national enemies.¹³² The Communists denounced scholar-officials like Zeng Guofan, then, for the same apparent reasons as the anti-Qing revolutionaries, although their judgments were informed by very different ideological contexts.

Despite the intensity and scope of Mao's vision, since his death the CCP has gradually moved away from its socialist roots and with them the conception of the nation as a revolutionary community. The Party's Marxist rhetoric has proven increasingly shallow as the government openly supports capitalism and MacDonald's restaurants sprout on Beijing street corners like hawthorn blossoms. Instead, the Chinese government emphasizes China's national character as *Zhonghua minzu* in a fusion of Soviet-style cosmopolitanism, Sun Yat-sen's Republic of Five Races, and Liang Qichao's vision of a nation founded on the shared history and culture of Chinese civilization. This nationalist pride has a broad appeal, and it is encouraged by the Party in order to instill loyalty through patriotism, fill the red sun-shaped hole left in people's hearts by the demise of Marxism, and counterbalance the increasing influence of Western culture resulting from globalization, foreign investment, and the international mass media.¹³³

¹³¹ Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Party Historiography in the People's Republic of China," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 17 (Jan., 1987), pp. 87-88.

¹³² Hung, "Revolutionary History," p. 466.

¹³³ Jonathan Unger, introduction to *Chinese Nationalism*, p. xi. See also Geremie R. Barmé, "Chapter Nine: To Screw Foreigners is Patriotic," in Unger, pp. 184-185.

The movement away from socialism, with its associated class judgments, has led Chinese scholars to reconsider figures traditionally considered *hanjian* within the Party historiography. Chen Duxiu was rehabilitated as early as 1980,¹³⁴ and Zeng Guofan has experienced a dramatic resurgence, both academically and popularly, since the mid-1980s.¹³⁵ The abandoning of class categories, and the additional emphasis on the PRC as a multiethnic state in the post-Mao era have called into question the reasons for which these figures were originally considered *hanjian*.¹³⁶ The general consensus among Chinese historians is that ideological considerations are an insufficient justification to condemn bourgeois officials as traitors, while their loyalty is equally untarnished since Manchus are included within the fifty-six ethnic groups that constitute *Zhonghua minzu*.¹³⁷

However, just as scholars are beginning to consider *hanjian* and their historical and national context in more depth, the term's popular usage has exploded. The combination of fervent nationalism and readily available Web access means that anyone can launch a diatribe against the *hanjian* of his or her choice, and many do. The frequency of these accusations has led one blogger to assert that the term "covers all the descendents of the Yan and Yellow Emperors" (覆盖所有炎黄子孙, *fugai suoyou Yan Huang zisun*), i.e., that every Chinese is a *hanjian*.¹³⁸

While these popular outbursts generally serve to reinforce the CCP's stance on various national issues, like the harsher strands of contemporary Chinese nationalism in general, in its extremity

¹³⁴ Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Party Historiography," pp. 87-88.

Gregor Benton, "Two Purged Early Leaders of Chinese Communism," review of *Memoirs de Peng Shuzhi: L'Envol du communisme en Chine*, by Claude Cadart, Cheng Yingxiang, and Peng Shuzhi, and *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party* by Lee Feigon, *The China Quarterly*, No. 102 (Jun., 1985), p. 318.

¹³⁵ Guo and He, "Reimagining the Chinese Nation," p. 142.

¹³⁶ Admittedly, Mao also emphasized a favorable stance toward minority nationalities. See Ip, "Cosmopolitanism," and Mao Zedong, "Criticize Han Chauvinism," http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_25.htm.

¹³⁷ Guo and He, "Reimagining the Chinese Nation," pp. 147-149.

¹³⁸ Wang, "Dangjin Zhongguo shei bu shi hanjian?"

this new phenomenon also threatens the ideological foundations of the People's Republic's nationality policies.

Accusations of *hanjianism* are common to discussions of China's relationship with Japan, reflecting that country's continued antagonistic role in Chinese foreign policy and nationalist sentiment. Chinese who support the Japanese government or express excessive admiration for Japanese culture are routinely labeled *hanjian*.¹³⁹ In 2002, *People's Daily* writer Ma Licheng published an article criticizing the more rabid attributes of anti-Japanese sentiment in China, including the description of Chinese Japanophiles as *hanjian* and the regular use of anti-Japanese slurs. His article sparked a public outcry, and Ma himself was depicted as a *hanjian* who encouraged the return of the "Japanese devils" (日本鬼子 *Riben guizi*).¹⁴⁰ In more extreme cases, the term *hanjian* is extended to Chinese whose support for Japan is vague, tangential, or merely implied by the accuser, such as when Zhang Ziyi took the lead role in the 2005 film *Memoirs of a Geisha* and was immediately declared a *hanjian* by thousands of Chinese netizens.¹⁴¹

Perhaps the area where *hanjian* fever is most amenable to the CCP's desires is the issue of Taiwan. Unlike the Nationalist government, during and immediately after the Second Sino-Japanese War the Communists never described Taiwanese in the service of Japan as *hanjian*.¹⁴² However, the establishment of the Republic of China government-in-exile under Chiang Kai-shek, himself already condemned as a *hanjian* for his conciliatory stance toward Japan, has led to a retrospective shift in outlook. The ROC's pro-Western and anti-revolutionary stance, combined

¹³⁹ After popular Chinese actress Zhao Wei was photographed in a dress with an Imperial Japanese flag print in September 2001 the usual mudslinging was joined by a rather different brown substance. At a concert later that year, she was attacked by an enraged Chinese man who pushed her over and smeared her dress with feces. Peter Hays Gries, "China's 'New Thinking' on Japan," *The China Quarterly*, No. 184 (Dec., 2005), p. 833.

¹⁴⁰ Ironically, the description of the Japanese as "devils" was one of the very slurs Ma had criticized. *Ibid.*, pp. 836-838.

¹⁴¹ Serfass, "Hanjian."

¹⁴² Frank S. T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Autumn, 1979), p. 451.

with Taiwan's continuing presence as the most significant piece of Chinese *irredenta*,¹⁴³ have led advocates of Taiwanese independence to continue to be labeled as *hanjian* by the mainland.

One of the most notable instances of this occurred during the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996. As early as 1994, Guomindang President Lee Teng-hui had begun to indicate his desire for a closer relationship with the United States and a peaceful independence settlement with the mainland. He hoped these appeals would broaden his appeal to the Taiwanese center in preparation for the 1996 presidential elections, in which the GMD would face the pro-independence Democratic People's Party. In June 1995 he secured a visa from the United States government to speak at his alma mater, Cornell University, becoming the first major Taiwanese leader to visit America since US-PRC relations were normalized in 1979.¹⁴⁴ China's reaction was furious and swift. Beijing issued a statement condemning Lee's behavior and describing then-his father, who had served as an officer of the Japanese colonial police, as a *hanjian*.¹⁴⁵ The People's Republic backed this rhetoric by withdrawing its ambassador from Washington and test-firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait, launches which were resumed in the run-up to the Taiwanese election the following year.¹⁴⁶

Although the incident was ultimately resolved peacefully, Lee himself has come under further attack because of his involvement in the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union. He tops one blogger's list of "Contemporary China's Ten Famous *Hanjian*,"¹⁴⁷ while a Baidu search for Lee's name and the term *hanjian* garners 416,000 results, with titles such as "Kill the

¹⁴³ "Unredeemed [land]," i.e. land that a nation considers to be culturally or historically a part of itself but which currently belongs to a different state.

¹⁴⁴ Warren Cohen, *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), p. 254-255.

¹⁴⁵ "The Dilemma Facing Beijing."

¹⁴⁶ Cohen, p. 256.

¹⁴⁷ "Dangdai Zhongguo zhuming de shi da hanjian" ("Contemporary China's Ten Famous Traitors"), accessed 4/3/12, <http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/201002/129673.html>. Translation mine.

Hanjian Lee Teng-Hui!” (杀死李登辉汉奸, *Shasi Li Denghui hanjian*), “The Ugly Face of the Great *Hanjian* Lee Teng-Hui” (大汉奸李登辉的丑恶嘴脸 *Da hanjian Li Denghui de chou'e zuilian*), and “Lee Teng-Hui, This Garbage Traitor!” (李登辉这个垃圾汉奸 *Lee Denghui zhege laji hanjian*).¹⁴⁸ This mass opprobrium for Lee, as well as other advocates of Taiwanese independence like novelist Shu Chin-chiang,¹⁴⁹ serves to reinforce the One China Policy and the CCP’s commitment to reunification. According to this view, Taiwan is a limb of the Chinese national body, and anyone who attempts to amputate it (particularly giving the enduring American commitment to the island) is immediately denounced as a traitor.¹⁵⁰

However, large-scale expressions of dissatisfaction against *hanjian* are not always in harmony with the CCP’s interests. In 2008, the prominent historian Yan Chongnian published *The Kangxi Emperor* (康熙大帝, *Kangxi dadi*), a history of the longest-reigned and arguably greatest emperor of the Qing dynasty detailing his many accomplishments and placing relatively little weight on the violence inflicted against Han Chinese during the consolidation of his rule. At a book signing in Wuxi, Yan was approached by Huang Haiqing, a clothing entrepreneur, who called Yan “*hanjian*” and slapped him twice in the face.¹⁵¹ Although Huang was promptly

¹⁴⁸“Search Results – ‘李登辉’‘汉奸’,” *Baidu.com*, accessed 4/3/12,

http://www.baidu.com/s?bs=%C0%EE%B5%C7%BB%D4%BA%BA%BC%E9&f=8&rsv_bp=1&rsv_spt=3&wd=%22%C0%EE%B5%C7%BB%D4%22%22%BA%BA%BC%E9%22&inputT=2860

¹⁴⁹ The former secretary and chairman of the pro-independence Taiwan Solidarity Union, Shu comes in at #2 on the list of contemporary China’s ten famous *hanjian*. “Dangdai Zhongguo zhuming de shi da hanjian.”

¹⁵⁰ The 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty committed America to defending Taiwan from external aggression. After the U.S. granted formal recognition to the People’s Republic in 1979, it was replaced by the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that “peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States” and that America will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means...a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The sale of American arms to the Republic of China has continued into the twenty-first century. “Taiwan Relations Act,” American Institute in Taiwan, accessed May 9, 2012, <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html>.

¹⁵¹ Leibold, “More than a Category,” pp. 539-540.

arrested, he received immediate support from internet commenters and other bloggers on the Han supremacist site Hanwang, who encouraged him to “Beat him good that old dog!” and remarked that “It should come as no surprise that a Han traitor who has forgotten his origins should be beaten.”¹⁵² Huang’s denunciation of Yan—exacerbated by his physical assault on an elder (Yan was 74 at the time)—sprung from belief in a Han-centered ethnic nation in direct conflict with the official policy of one *Zhonghua minzu* comprising fifty-six nationalities.

Throughout the PRC’s sixty-two year history, then, *hanjian* has continued to be a central part of the Chinese political discourse. Whether applied to national traitors or to ideological foes, it has isolated its users’ targets for public disdain. And whether used in harmony with or resistance to the Communist Party’s official stance, it has played a key role in shaping the identity of the Chinese nation as it continues to evolve to this day.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 540.

Conclusion

Over the past century and a half, China has faced constant and drastic changes that have shaken to the core every aspect of Chinese society and prompted questions about the very nature of China itself. From the “century of humiliation” through three decades of socialism and on to the twenty-first century, the Chinese nation has been defined in a number of ways by different groups whose common goal of a stronger China has been tinted by the individual lenses of their own ideology and worldview. While *hanjian* has itself been refracted by each of these prisms, it has nevertheless been an important and enduring part of these national projects.

Under the Qing, the term *hanjian* served to reinforce imperial authority and divide those Han who rebelled against the Manchu court from the mass of their peers, whether they allied with Ming remnants, minority insurrections, or invading Western powers. As faith in the Qing dynasty—and the imperial system as a whole—began to collapse around the turn of the twentieth century, the meaning of *hanjian* shifted to reflect Sun Yat-sen and other anti-Qing revolutionaries’ new definition of China as a modern nation consisting solely of the Han ethnic group. The Nationalist government established by Sun’s successor Chiang Kai-shek continued to promote this ethnic-national vision under the broader banner of *Zhonghua minzu*.

After the Japanese invasion, the GMD promoted resistance as the true expression of national loyalty, condemning collaborators like Wang Jingwei to reject their justifications of cooperation for national survival, while the Communist resistance denounced Chiang himself because of his appeasement of Japan. The CCP’s revolutionary nationalism further extended the term to class and ideological enemies, while the reinterpretation of Chinese history according to Marxist theory by Chinese intellectuals like Fan Wenlan retroactively applied the term to historical “reactionaries.” The Party’s recent movement away from the socialist principles at the

heart of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has inspired a new generation of Chinese scholars to reexamine the categories of *hanjian* inherited from Maoist historiography. At the same time, the combination of cresting nationalist sentiment and novel means of mass communication has led to a simultaneous explosion and banalization of its use in present-day China.¹⁵³

As this last conflict indicates, even as scholars begin trying to pin it down, the term's continuing evolution in contemporary Chinese discourse, its diverse and often contradictory history, and the heated emotions that spark its use make *hanjian* a moving target. However, even as it wriggles between the analytical tweezers, we can still study the contortions of this verminous word. Throughout the period of this study, *hanjian* has had political, ethnic, and national implications, and its use has significant repercussions for each of these areas.

Throughout the past two centuries, *hanjian* has been used as a political tool by imperial officials, Nationalists, and Communists alike. While the term's diversity reveals the protean nature of national sentiment in China, the use of *hanjian* for political ends also reflects its users' politicization of "the state-supporting loyalty," nationalism.¹⁵⁴ All nationalism, whether ethnic or otherwise, is political in nature, and Chinese nationalism is no exception. Its birth was midwived by the political question of whether to support or oppose the Qing regime, and both nationalism as a whole and the term *hanjian* in particular have played a major role in the political struggles that have raged in China throughout the twentieth century. However, *hanjian* is ultimately poisonous to political discourse. Using the term asserts an exclusive interpretation of Chinese nationhood that denies the possibility of competing perspectives. Even when both sides invoke the term against each other, as in the case of Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek, each political

¹⁵³ "Alors que l'usage du terme *hanjian* se banalise..." ("While the usage of the term *hanjian* grows increasingly banal...") Serfass, "Hanjian."

¹⁵⁴ Unger, introduction of *Chinese Nationalism*, p. xi.

discourse is nevertheless unilateral, a clash between two mutually exclusive visions with no space left—or desired—for common ground. Furthermore, the offhand rejection of “traitor logic” (汉奸理论 *hanjian lilun*) robs those accused of *hanjianism* of the possibility of engaging in debate, while the word’s potent nationalist charge makes it a natural tool of extremism.

Despite the word’s etymology, after the establishment of the Republic of China *hanjian* lost much of its ethnic charge, describing traitors to the nation as a whole with no specific reference to the Han ethnicity. Nevertheless, “Han” remains an integral part of the word’s literal, if not its common, definition. This lasting ethnic dimension can be specifically invoked, as seen in the case of Taiwanese collaborators and during the Yan Chongnian incident, and presents a major challenge to the official ethnic narrative endorsed by the CCP. Just as scholarly reassessments of Qing officials have abandoned the *hanjian* label because it “runs counter to the interest of the whole nation by dividing the Han and the Manchu peoples,”¹⁵⁵ the Han supremacist interpretation of Huang Haiqing and his fellow Hanwang posters proves antithetical to the official narrative of a harmoniously multiethnic society.

Finally, *hanjian* as a group have a unique relationship to the national community. As stated above, using the term presents an interpretation of the Chinese nation, but it also identifies an external enemy and places the word’s referent, i.e. the accused, between these two areas. *Hanjian* are rejected from the national body, but they cannot be expelled completely, as one must be part of the Chinese nation, however it is defined, in order to qualify as *hanjian*. In this regard, the word is ironically inclusive. Figures like the Dalai Lama or Yoshiko Kawashima, the Manchu princess, Japanese by adoption and upbringing, who was executed as *hanjian* for her role as a Japanese agent during the war, may not self-identify as Chinese. Nevertheless, they have

¹⁵⁵ Guo and He, “Reimagining the Chinese Nation,” p. 150.

Chineseness thrust upon them through accusations that they are (or were) *hanjian*. *Hanjian*, then, serves as a linguistic performative: calling someone “*hanjian*” brings—or drags—them into the Chinese nation. However, *hanjian* are not full-fledged nationals; instead, they live within the line that is drawn between Chinese and outsider, friend and enemy, between “one’s own country” and “a foreign race or a foreign invader.” In doing so, they add another layer between self and other, the “us” and “them” through whose opposition scholars consider national identity to be formed. As intermediary figures, *hanjian* undermine this dichotomy, forcing us to reconsider how we decide who is Chinese, who is not, and who is in between.

Bibliography

- American Institute in Taiwan. "Taiwan Relations Act." Accessed May 9, 2012.
<http://www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html>.
- Atwill, David G. *The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856-1873*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- Barmé, Geremie. "Chapter Nine: To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China's Avant-Garde Nationalists." In *Chinese Nationalism*, ed. Jonathan Unger.
- Barrett, David, and Lawrence N. Shyu, ed. *China in the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945: Politics, Culture, and Society*. New York: Peter Lang, 2001.
- Barrett, David, and Lawrence N. Shyu, ed. *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Benton, Gregor. "Two Purged Early Leaders of Chinese Communism." Review of *Chen Duxiu: Founder of the Chinese Communist Party*, by Lee Feigon, and *Memoirs de Peng Shuzhi: L'Envol du communisme en Chine*, by Claude Cadart, Cheng Yingxiang, and Peng Shuzhi. *The China Quarterly*, No. 102 (Jun., 1985).
- Boyle, John Hunter. *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972.
- Boyle, John Hunter. "The Road to Sino-Japanese Collaboration: The Background to the Defection of Wang Ching-Wei." *Monumenta Nipponica* Vol. 25, No. 3/4 (1970).
- Brook, Timothy. *Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- Bunker, Gerald E. *The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-Wei and the China War, 1937-1941*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972.
- Chang, Maria Hsia. *Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism*. Boulder: Westview, 2001.
- Chow, Kai-wing. "Narrating Nation, Race, and National Culture: Imagining the Hanzu Identity in Modern China." In Kai-wing Chow and Poshek Fu, *Constructing Nationhood in Modern East Asia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
- Cohen, Warren. *America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010.
- Crossley, Pamela Kyle. *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

“Dangdai Zhongguo zhuming de shi da hanjian” (“Contemporary China’s Ten Famous Traitors”).
Wuyouzhixiang (Utopia). Accessed 4/3/12.

<http://www.wyzxsx.com/Article/Class22/201002/129673.html>

Dickson, Robert Andrew, III., and College of William and Mary International Relations
Concentration. *A Chorus of Discord: The Many Voices of Contemporary Chinese
Nationalism*. 1997.

“The Dilemma Facing Beijing.” *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)* July 17, 1999.
Accessed Oct 17, 2011. http://docs.newsbank.com.proxy.wm.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMPI&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=133B5B2BCC68A6A8&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggregated5&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5

Dikötter, Frank. “Crime and Punishment in Post-Liberation China: The Prisoners of a Beijing
Gaol in the 1950s.” *The China Quarterly*, No. 149 (Mar., 1997).

Fu, Poshek. *Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai,
1937-1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993.

Garver, John W. “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese
Communist Party.” *The China Quarterly*, No. 113 (Mar 1988).

Gerth, Karl. “Chapter 4: The Movement and Anti-Imperialists Boycotts, 1923-1937,” in *China
Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation*. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2003.

Giersch, C. Pat. “‘A Motley Throng:’ Social Change on Southwest China’s Early Modern
Frontier, 1700-1880.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Feb., 2001).

Gries, Peter Hays. *China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 2004.

Gries, Peter Hays. “China’s ‘New Thinking’ on Japan.” *The China Quarterly*, No. 184 (Dec.,
2005).

Guo, Yingjie, and Baogang He. “Reimagining the Chinese Nation: The ‘Zeng Guofan
Phenomenon.’” *Modern China*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Apr., 1999).

Hsi, Angela N.S. “Wu San-kuei in 1644: A Reappraisal.” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34,
No. 2 (Feb., 1975).

Hsiao, Frank S. T., and Lawrence R. Sullivan. “The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of
Taiwan, 1928-1943.” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Autumn, 1979).

- Hughes, Christopher R. *Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era*. New York: Routledge, 2006.
- Hung, Chang-tai. "Revolutionary History in Stone: The Making of a Chinese National Monument." *The China Quarterly*, No. 166 (June 2001).
- Hwang, Dongyoun. "Wartime collaboration in question: an examination of the postwar trials of the Chinese collaborators." *Inter-Asian Cultural Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2005).
- Ip, Hung-yok. "Cosmopolitanism and the Ideal Image of Nation in a Communist Revolutionary Culture." In Chow and Fu.
- Johnson, Chalmers A. "Chapter Two: The Japanese Role in Peasant Mobilization," in *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China 1937-1945*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
- Leibold, James. "More than a Category: Han Supremacism on the Chinese Internet." *The China Quarterly*, No. 203 (Sep 2010).
- Lo, Jiu-rong. "Trials of the Taiwanese as *Hanjian* or War Criminals and the Postwar Search for Taiwanese Identity." In Chow and Fu.
- Luo Zhufeng, ed. *Hanyu dacidian*. Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe, 1988. Vol. 6.
- Mao Zedong. "The Chinese People Have Stood Up!" Opening address at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference, Sept 21, 1949. Accessed Apr 4, 2012. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm
- Mao Zedong. "Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and Future Tasks." Speech given to the twenty-fourth session of the People's Government Council, Sept 12, 1953. Accessed Apr 4, 2012, http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_34.htm
- McCarthy, Susan K. *Communist Multiculturalism: Ethnic Revival in Southwest China*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009.
- Rhoads, Edward J. M. *Manchus & Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China 1861-1928*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000.
- "Search Results – ‘李登辉’‘汉奸’.” *Baidu.com*. Accessed 4/3/12, http://www.baidu.com/s?bs=%C0%EE%B5%C7%BB%D4%BA%BA%BC%E9&f=8&rsv_bp=1&rsv_spt=3&wd=%22%C0%EE%B5%C7%BB%D4%22%22%BA%BA%BC%E9%22&inputT=2860
- Service, Robert. *Stalin: A Biography*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2005.

- Shen Sung-chiao. "Discourse on *Guomin* ('The Citizen') in Late Qing China, 1895-1911." *Inter-Asian Cultural Studies* Vol. 7, No. 1 (2006).
- Sutton, John S. "Violence and Ethnicity on a Qing Colonial Frontier: Customary and Statutory Law in the Eighteenth-Century Miao Pale." *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb, 2003).
- Tatlow, Didi Kirsten. "Truth and Reconciliation." *South China Morning Post (Hong Kong)*, March 30, 2008. Accessed Oct 17, 2011. http://docs.newsbank.com/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info:sid/iw.newsbank.com:AWNB:CMPI&rft_val_format=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rft_dat=13272E1E733C8420&svc_dat=InfoWeb:aggdocs&req_dat=0D0CB4F084AAC1B5
- Townsend, James. "Chapter One: Chinese Nationalism." In Unger.
- Tsou Jung (Zou Rong). *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*. Translated by John Lust. Paris: Mouton & Co., 1968.
- Unger, Jonathan, ed. *Chinese Nationalism*. New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.
- Wakeman Jr., Frederic. "*Hanjian* (Traitor)! Collaboration and Retribution in Wartime Shanghai." In Wen-hsin Yeh, *Becoming Chinese: Passages to Modernity and Beyond*. Ewing, NJ: University of California Press, 2000.
- Wakeman Jr., Frederic. *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
- Waley, Arthur. *The Opium War through Chinese Eyes*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1960.
- Wang Jinsi. "Dangjin Zhongguo shei bu shi hanjian?" ("In Today's China, Who Isn't a *Hanjian*?"). *Fenghuang boke (Phoenix Blog)*. Posted December 2, 2011. Accessed March 29, 2012. http://news.backchina.com/printnews.php?tid=170327&c_lang=gb2312
- Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, Susanne. "Party Historiography in the People's Republic of China." *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 17 (Jan., 1987).
- Wong, Lawrence Wang-chi. "Translators and Interpreters During the Opium War between Britain and China (1839-1842). In *Approaches to Translation Studies, Volume 28: Translating and Interpreting Conflict*, ed. Myriam Salama-Carr. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007.
- Xinhua News Agency. "Archeologists to Excavation of [sic] Possible Tomb of Qin Hui." *China.org.cn*, December 27, 2006. Accessed April 11, 2012. <http://www.china.org.cn/english/MATERIAL/194112.htm>
- Zanasi, Margherita. "Globalizing Hanjian: The Suzhou Trials and the Post-World War II Discourse on Collaboration." *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 113, No. 3 (Jun 2008).

Zanasi, Margherita. *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Zhang Qiyun, ed. *Zhongwen dacidian*. Taipei: Zhonghua xueshuyuan, 1982.

Zheng, Yongnian. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.