Achieving balance in the governance of intercollegiate athletics: An examination of power and authority over time

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ACHIEVING BALANCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
AN EXAMINATION OF POWER AND AUTHORITY OVER TIME

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Education
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fullfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

by
Robert E. Baker
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ACHIEVING BALANCE IN THE GOVERNANCE OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
AN EXAMINATION OF POWER AND AUTHORITY OVER TIME

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CHAPTER I

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS

Introduction

Who controls "big time" college athletics? How is that control executed? Has control changed over time? Why do various interest groups participate in intercollegiate athletics? These questions are not simple, but they can be approached through an analysis of the exercise of power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Media reports, from newspaper sports pages to extensive television coverage, respond to an intense public interest in intercollegiate athletics and often reveal substantial problems in the conduct of college athletics. The problems include unethical practices by some parties involved in the athletic governance process who compromise academic integrity for commercial interests. "The observer is confronted, on the one hand, with lofty ideals and, on the other, by rumors and even well-authenticated statements of questionable practices, deception, and hypocrisy which ... multiply." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 32) Savage's early observation is echoed today by the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (1993, p. I) in its concern "that athletics abuses threaten the very integrity of higher education." Lucas and Smith (1978) noted turn-of-the-century unethical practices that included recruiting, compensating, and playing ineligible athletes, such as post-graduates, in collegiate athletic contests. Recent documented
unethical practices demonstrate that athletic constituents have continued these practices by supplying illegal inducements to prospective athletes, providing improper benefits to athletes, and using ineligible athletes. (33 Institutions, 1994, p. A43)

From recruiting scandals, to eligibility questions, to over-commercialization, the accounts of the persistent abuses that accompany the reports on intercollegiate athletics demonstrate that these "myriad problems" have been going on for a long time. (ACE, 1979) By the mid-1980s, 92% of college presidents felt there were major problems in the governance of college athletics. (Gilley et al., 1986) A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of the general public surveyed thought college athletics were out of control and corrupted by big money; yet contest attendance, media attention, and advertising dollars have all steadily increased since public interest has continued to grow. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) A significant component of American society, athletics has become a $100 billion industry annually. (Andre & James, 1991) Due to their importance in our society, the perpetual problems in the operation of intercollegiate athletics merit attention. In investigating intercollegiate athletics, an examination of the roles and actions of the constituents participating in this enterprise is an initial step to understanding the use of power and authority in athletic governance.

Who are the constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics? Constituents, both on campus and off,
include governing boards, presidents, athletic directors, coaches, faculty, students, conferences, alumni, boosters, business leaders, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the media, and the general public. How do each of these constituents participate in, influence, or even control the governance of athletics to varying degrees at different institutions?

The control of intercollegiate athletics can be executed through regular channels of authority in the governance structure. However, the presence of continual problems in intercollegiate athletics suggests that constituents outside the hierarchy of authority utilize power in the governance process. The execution of specific constituent control is revealed through examining their use of power and authority in the athletic governance process.

Examining the methods of the constituents' use of power and authority can suggest possible motives for their participation in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. What motivates constituent participation? An examination of the needs leading to the decision-making process employed by constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics will provide insights into the continued systemic dysfunctioning of athletic governance.

What has led to the consistent problems over time? An explanation of the systemic dysfunction begins with an examination of the constituents participating in the governance
of athletics. An analysis of constituents' methods of participation, their execution of control through their role in the authority hierarchy and in the use of power that leads to the persistent problems, provides further insights into the breakdown in governance. Finally, an explanation of the apparent needs of the various constituent groups that motivate their decision-making and lead them to participation, or even positions of control within intercollegiate athletics governance will reveal the basis for the systemic dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

**Problem Statement**

The intent of this study is to explore constituent utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic dysfunctions in the governance of big time intercollegiate athletics, and to develop a model to examine the needs motivating the interested constituents, thus suggesting alternatives for reform.

Persistent problems in the operation of intercollegiate athletics support the need for continued examination of this controversial area of American higher education. In this study, I will analyze constituents' use of legitimate authority in the structure of intercollegiate athletic governance, and their use of power, both legitimate and illegitimate, in the process of governance in intercollegiate athletics. I will explain the needs motivating, and decision-making process employed by, constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance. I will describe the
systemic dysfunctions over time and recommend specific avenues for reform in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Research Questions

1. Who are the constituents using authority and power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics:
   a. in 1929?
   b. currently?

2. How do the constituents employ power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics:
   a. in 1929?
   b. currently?

3. What are the needs that appear to motivate the constituent's involvement in the governance of intercollegiate athletics:
   a. in 1929?
   b. currently?

4. How is the current governance of intercollegiate athletics similar to, or different from, that of 1929?

5. What recommendations emerge from this analysis that would reform the intensifying breakdown in the governance of intercollegiate athletics?

Purpose of Study

Why is this study necessary? Through an examination of the use of power and authority by various constituents in the governance of athletics, athletic reformers can recognize the vulnerable elements that exist in the current system and can
identify the areas in the structure and process of intercollegiate athletic governance that need reform. By viewing the systemic breakdown in governance, administrators seeking substantive reforms can identify significant areas in which to formulate policies and implement practices that will intensify effectual reform efforts. Constituents can examine their needs and clarify their roles in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The participation of a variety of athletic governance constituents in reform efforts is critical to success, yet can only be clearly defined if their needs and roles are mutually understood.

Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of the constituents and their use of power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise feasible governance alternatives. Only through understanding the players, problems, and process of athletic governance, can reformers have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the operation of intercollegiate athletics.

Definitions of Terms

In this study, specific definitions for certain terms must be delineated in order to maintain accuracy. Intercollegiate athletics involve not only the competition between athletes representing individual university athletic programs, but also the complex governance relationships of those individual athletic programs. Athletics are an on-campus activity as well as an inter-institutional system of competitive sports, and a social
institution including people, practices, policies, and events in complex relationships. (Sage, 1990) Big time athletic programs are generally housed within elite major research "multiversities" where, according to Kerr (1982), a series of related communities are held together. These elite big time institutions boast celebrated athletic programs competing in many sports, but emphasizing revenue-producing sports like football and basketball, which are operated in a conspicuous business-like manner and display prominent commercial values. (Savage, 1929; Gilley et al., 1986)

All big time athletic programs are members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I-A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) is the major national inter-institutional regulatory body that governs intercollegiate athletics. It is comprised of presidential delegates representing member schools, and administered by its own extensive executive and administrative staff. In general, the institutional members of the NCAA often recommend rules and regulations through a small group of presidents elected to the Presidents' Commission and then enact the proposed rules legislation through the votes of institutional delegates, the faculty athletic representatives. (Yaeger, 1991)

Rule compliance is the responsibility of the individual institutions, although an enforcement system has been implemented by the NCAA executive staff. The NCAA promotes the collective political and economic interests of intercollegiate athletics,
above the interests of individual member institutions. While all big time athletic programs are members of Division I-A—the highest level of intercollegiate athletic competition as designated by the NCAA—not all Division I-A universities have elite big time athletic programs. The focus of this study is the operation of these elite athletic programs. Over 100 Division I-A programs are included in the category of big time. The NCAA also includes other levels of competition. The majority of its 850-plus member institutions are less commercially-driven and more educationally-oriented. (Knight Commission, 1993)

At the core of this study of elite athletic institutions is the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Governance occurs when operating policies are established or changed, whereas administration involves making decisions on the basis of policies. (Westmeyer, 1990) In this study, governance in intercollegiate athletics includes the formation of policy and its administration both on-campus and inter-institutionally. Governance is executed through a variety of structures and processes. The governance structures of intercollegiate athletics include the hierarchy of constituent authority and prescribed procedures for policy formation and execution.

The governance of athletics involves the complex relationship of a variety of constituencies both within and outside of the university structure. Therefore, intercollegiate athletic governance structure is not wholly housed within the campus boundaries. For example, the NCAA and conferences are
component constituents of the inter-institutional governance structure. In addition, the process of intercollegiate athletic governance involves a complex network of constituents and special interest groups outside the university. Conflicting interests between these groups—both within and outside of the formal governance hierarchy—results in the struggle for control of big time intercollegiate athletics. For purposes of this study, control is the direct involvement of constituents in the operation of intercollegiate athletics, wherein they direct actions in both governance and administration. (Chu et al., 1985)

Certain constituents control athletics through the use of legitimate power and accepted lines of authority within the university governance structure. Other constituents use illegitimate power, outside the lines of institutional authority, in the process of governance, in order to gain control. The constituents involved in athletic governance on-campus include the governing board, the president, the athletic director, the coach, and, to a lesser degree, the faculty and students. The constituents involved in inter-institutional athletic governance include the NCAA, conferences, and the government. Additional external constituents involved in the governance process include the alumni, boosters, business leaders, and the media.

A hierarchy of authority is inherent in the governance structure and should be clearly delineated. Constituent authority is supported by the use of legitimate power within the hierarchy. If the authority hierarchy is not adhered to, gaps are created,
and illegitimate power is used by constituents to fill in the gaps in the hierarchy. The use of power and authority, whether legitimate or illegitimate, is reciprocal in relationships between constituents. (Burbules, 1986) According to Wolf (1990), constituents can use three types of power: interpersonal, tactical, and structural, which will be explained in detail later.

What needs motivate constituents to use power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics? Needs are drives that motivate behavior. They can be tangible or intangible factors. According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical, where basic needs such as security and safety serve as the foundation upon which higher level needs such as autonomy are built. Self-preservation will be presented in this study as an underlying deficiency need of individual constituents, that is, it takes precedence over other needs. (Maslow, 1970) For purposes of this study, self-preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in athletic governance to preserve their current status. The needs of various constituents, which result in their use of power and authority, will be determined by an analysis of the policies, practices, and circumstances of those constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Constituent needs that spur the exercise of power and authority ultimately initiate dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. In this study, a systemic dysfunction exists when the process of athletic governance is incongruent
with the prescribed structure of governance in intercollegiate athletics. These systemic dysfunctions are created when, within the governance structure, breaches in authority are generated by constituents who either exceed or neglect their prescribed role, which results in constituent use of power to fill these authority gaps in the process of athletic governance.

Limitations

This study examines, over time, the needs of constituents and their use of power and authority in order to analyze a systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, thus suggesting alternatives for reform. Limitations of this study include the individual and collective limitations of previous research that are employed in this analysis. Details of the methods used in the previous works used for the data in this study are available only to the degree that they are revealed within the original sources. Therefore, the data are limited in this study. For example, the case studies and survey research conducted as an integral part of some of the reports are limited in scope and by the reliability and validity of their methods.

Defining and using social concepts have inherent biases in perspectives. This study is reliant upon the work of a variety of other researchers, each having provided an essential component, concept, or theory that may in itself be biased, thus limiting this current application. However, many of the most accepted and respected authorities in their fields have provided the
foundation for this study. The impact of the work of the vast array of prominent researchers--from Maslow to Wolf, Baldridge, Savage, Kerr, Frey, Sage, and many others--upon this study are discussed in Chapter II.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Introduction

"We have managed, in the United States, to hide the structures of power relations beneath more layers of subtlety and complexity, in schools and throughout society." (Burbules, 1986, p. 111) In this study, I intend to remove the shroud confounding the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Constituents use power and authority to pursue their aims in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. These power and authority relationships are shaped by the needs of various constituents. Within the system of governance in higher education, athletics is the arena in which power and authority relationships are studied. Therefore, an examination of each of these components is essential. The works of researchers from a variety of disciplines are indispensable ingredients in the current study. As Wolf (1990, p. 588) stated, "We can use the work of our predecessors to raise new questions." This review of related literature is organized as follows to present the essential components upon which this study was constructed: power and authority, needs, governance, and athletics.

Power and Authority

Power is a social concept presented through a variety of biases by those attempting to explain it. (Burbules, 1986) Theorists in social psychology, sociology, political science, and
philosophy each bring unique perspective to the study of power
and authority, a subject of concern to "... social study in all
its fields and forms." (Crespi, 1992, p. vii) Traditional views
of power concerned themselves with the forms it takes and the
definitions of the associated terms rather than with defining
power itself. (Burbules, 1986) Some of these terms surrounding
power include rights, force, violence, coercive circumstance,
obligations, constraints, commands, exploitation, liberty,
manipulation, autonomy, sanction, incentive, enticement, freedom,
control, influence, reward, expertise, and authority.
(Airaksinen, 1988; Henderson, 1981; Shaver, 1981; Pennock &
Chapman, 1972; Oppenheim, 1961) While each of these terms is an
important concept, Henderson (1981, p. 11, 12) noted that the
"diverse terminology used in attempts to explicate ... power" can
create problems in the organization and structure of
conceptualizations regarding power. Many theorists have also
presented typologies of concepts related to power. Examples noted
by Burbules (1986) were: Nyberg's Force, Finance, Fiction, and
Fealty; Galbraith's Condign (punishment), Compensatory (reward),
and Conditioned (persuasive or manipulative); and Wrong's Force,
Manipulation, Persuasion, and Authority. The concentration on
defining the concepts and nature of power through typologies have
been restrictive. (Burbules, 1986)

Burbules (1986, p. 96) stated that "...traditional theories
of power have assumed that power is a property of individual
persons, wielded instrumentally as a means to particular intended
outcomes." Rather, he argued that power is reciprocal in social relations, that the "efficacy of power as a conservative system" can either direct outcomes or preserve the status quo, and that power is inherent in some relationships. (Burbules, 1986, p. 96)

Power occurs in social relations and as such is a reciprocal, "dynamic and interactive" relationship. (Oppenhiem, 1961; Henderson, 1981, p. 33) Burbules (1986, p. 96, 97) illustrated the concept of reciprocity: "X has power over Y and ... Y empowers X." Giddens (1979, p. 93) stated that power is "always two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social relationship is minimal compared to another." He described power interactions as relations of autonomy and dependence. (Giddens, 1979) Power is also "conflict oriented", that is it begins with and is the consequence of underlying conflicts of interest. (Airaksinen, 1988, p. 8; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981)

Actors in power relationships "suppress, disguise, preserve, or deny" these conflicts of interest in order to obtain a desired outcome or preserve the current state. (Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Burbules (1986, p. 111) stated that "power endures because underlying conflicts of interest endure." Hence, an examination of power requires a knowledge of where each actor's interests reside. Burbules (1986) concluded that if no conflict of interest exists, no exercise of power exists. Therefore, a power vacuum occurs where congruent objectives reign.

While conflicts of interest generate reciprocal power relations, different degrees of compliance and domination exist
in those relationships. (Nyberg, 1981; Burbules, 1986)
Interactive power relations usually exhibit tension between compliance and defiance, or consent and resistance. Burbules (1986) presented a continuum that placed power relations between domination and consent. Power relies on compliance, not consent, and uses domination in the extreme. (Burbules, 1986) Domination occurs when one actor uses superior power over a resistant inferior-powered actor. At the opposite end of the spectrum, consent occurs when the inferior-powered actor approves the use of power by the superior-powered actor. Compliance implies that the inferior-powered actor yields to the superior-powered actor. (Burbules, 1986) Similarly, Bailey (1969) categorized power relationships by degree from consensual to command. In command relationships, domination by the actor with superior power limits, or eliminates, the autonomy of the actor with inferior power. (Bailey, 1969; Burbules, 1986) While the inferior-powered actor's autonomy is a "threat" to the superior-powered actor's authority and control, consensual power relationships at the other end of the spectrum are "an expression of informed and autonomous judgement" in a reciprocal power relationship. (Szasz, in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 199; Burbules, 1986, p. 100) The continuum of power is perceived differently by actors with superior power and those with inferior power. However, power is "like a machine in which everyone is caught, those who exercise power just as much as those over whom it is exercised." (Foucault, in Burbules, 1986)
Power relations are "not merely synchronic, but diachronic", not momentary but relative to previous relations and affective in future relations. (Burbules, 1986, p. 98) Power relations are perpetual; their past history influences predispositions that establish propensities that "shape and constrain the relation and which are in turn reinforced by it." (Burbules, 1986, p. 98)

Power is a means of prevention as well as direction and control. (Burbules, 1986) Therefore, the intent of outcomes is central to the concept of control. (Bailey, 1969; Henderson, 1981) To obtain desired ends in power relations, or control those situations, a power actor employs a variety of methods; from obligation and permission, to incentives and inducements, to persuasion and manipulation, to constraints and sanctions, to coercion and commands, to force and violence. The continuum of methods employed by the superior-powered actor in power relations reveals the degree of acceptance of the superior’s outcomes by the inferior-powered actor. Crespi (1992) described alternative methods employed by power actors to achieve their objectives: negotiation, consensus, and coercion. According to Airaksinen (1988), actors with superior power also use coercion, force, violence, exploitation, obligation, commands, permission, and constraints in order to attain control. Bailey (1969) added the use of collusion. Henderson (1981) noted the role of dependence by the inferior-powered actor upon the superior-powered actor, and the use of constraints, inducements, and persuasion. Manipulation, sanction, coercion, incentive, and enticements are
methods employed by power actors in pursuit of control. (Pennock & Chapman, 1972)

Burbules (1986, p. 105) stated that we "use" power in a variety of ways in attempts to gain control, without recognizing that the power relation also "uses" us. Foucault (1977) argued that power struggles are the core of many power theories and that they involve not only an attempt by the inferior-powered actor to escape the power relation but also to wrestle power away from the superior-powered actor. Burbules (1986, p. 109) noted that power struggles are "... attempts to supplant one group in power with another without rejecting the basic power relation or conflicts of interest that have given rise to it." In this examination of interactive, reciprocal power struggles between actors in intercollegiate athletic governance, I will employ Wolf's (1990) delineation of modes of power.

Wolf (1990) argued that the study of modes of power would produce greater clarity in describing power relationships and, therefore, in applying the concept of power in future research. He identified four distinct modes of power. The first is a personal attribute of "potency or capability, the basic Nietzschean idea of power." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) This mode does not describe the "form and direction" of interactive power play; therefore, for purposes of this study, it will not be employed in examining the relationships and actions of power actors in intercollegiate athletics. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) The second mode of power is used in interpersonal relations. This way of using
power concentrates on the "sequences of interactions and transactions" among the actors involved in the power relationship, such as one actor's ability to impose will on another actor. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) However, interpersonal power does not involve the "arena" in which the interactions occur. The third mode of power does examine the "arena" of play as a component in power relations in which actors operate within determinate settings. Wolf (1990, p. 586) identified this mode as tactical or organizational power, wherein power is used to control the settings in which interactive power play occurs. For example, one actor can use power over the environment of another actor. The fourth mode of power identified by Wolf (1990, p. 586) is structural power "... that not only operates within settings or domains but that also organizes and orchestrates the settings themselves." Structural power shapes the field of play, establishing the social structure surrounding the arenas in which power relations occur. Structural power determines the possible actions of actors engaged in interactive power play, making some power relations possible and others impossible. However, structure is itself a social concept that has eluded an agreed-upon definition. (Giddens, 1979; Sewell, 1992)

Other theorists have identified concepts that support Wolf's (1990) description of structural power as a social force that determines possibilities for power play. Airaksinen (1988, p. 93-170) described the "coercive institution" that parallels Burbules' (1986, p. 96) description of the "inherence of power in
certain institutions, regardless of anyone's actively choosing or directing them." Such power in "coercive circumstance" is made necessary by surrounding situations and institutions, and is neither chosen nor avoided. (Airaksinen, 1988, p. 97) This reflects Wolf's (1990) delineation of "how the forces of the world impinge upon the people" through structural power.

Power is latent in structures of ideology, authority, and organization; however, "... ideology, authority, and organization each can take forms, and arise in contexts, in which they are relatively free from power." (Burbules, 1986, p. 95, 108) Ideology is used as a framework of legitimation and rationale for power relations that can facilitate or restrict action in relations of power. (Pennock & Chapman, 1972; Burbules, 1986)

Burbules (1986, p. 107) suggested that many view authority as the "... legitimate cousin of power: where power coerces, authority persuades." Oppenheim (1961) described legitimacy as the right to exercise power thus resulting in authority. Airaksinen (1988, p.126) presumed that "... some aspects of authority have a rational core that makes them socially unavoidable and even morally viable forms of human cooperation."

According to Burbules (1986), authority, whether claimed or granted, is underwritten by institutional arrangements such as symbols, rituals, and physical configurations; expertise can enter in as well. Social factors allow these arrangements to be taken as authority when often they are intended to maintain advantage or privilege. (Burbules, 1986) Privilege is an
expression of power and is associated with authority. (Burbules, 1986)

Burbules (1986, p. 107) stated, "Organization as a framework of power relates closely to ideology and authority." Within that framework, Airaksinen (1988, p. 121) stated that we "... need a hierarchical institution supported by authority." Burbules (1986, p. 107) describe the hierarchical institution, noting that "... bureaucratic organization is characterized by hierarchy, specialization, and relegated responsibility." Hierarchy often preserves the status quo. Within the hierarchy, privileges go with positions and specialization allows autonomy by position. Bureaucracy also creates conflict of interest through relegated responsibilities. (Burbules, 1986)

Authority in bureaucratic organizations can be "bounded by relevant and sensible limits" and grounded in consensual qualifications, it can promote common interests, and it can be maintained through "respect and trust". (Burbules, 1986, p. 108) Conversely, authority can be unquestioned; it can presume privilege and exercise prerogative beyond justified limits. (Burbules, 1986) Authority can be used to undermine the exercise of autonomy. (Szasz, in Rosenbaum, 1983, p. 200) An organization can be participatory rather than hierarchical in its decision making processes by developing collective rather than specialized tasks, and decentralizing rather than focussing responsibilities. (Burbules, 1986) Whether in a participatory or hierarchical field of interactive power play, power is contextual. The field of
play, the direction of play, the individual actors involved, and the interests of those actors, determine the use of power and authority.

**Needs**

Since power and authority are contextual, any study of power must identify where the actors' interests reside. (Burbules, 1986, p. 96) Interests and needs, whether individual or institutional, serve as motivation. **Motivation** is a complex series of desires and drives. (Owens, 1981) Motivation serves as an intervening variable between needs and outcomes (see figure 1). Without motivation, based upon needs, there would be no organized action directed toward outcomes. Thus, purposive behavior is motivated by needs and oriented toward a goal. (Schelling, 1978, p. 17)

![Figure 1: Motivation as an Intervening Variable](image-url)
Needs are drives that motivate behavior. They can be tangible or intangible factors. A pre-eminent need generating action, "self-preservation," as first described by James (1892/1977) was a category of action directed toward maintenance of the present state of self. For purposes of this study, self-preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in athletic governance to preserve their current status. Within this study, self-preservation is the objective of organisms and organizations alike, the need of individuals and institutions.

According to Maslow (1970), needs are hierarchical. Maslow (1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, placed the basic needs of survival, security, and safety at the foundation. Maslow (1970) theorized that human needs build to a peak of autonomous self-actualization. In this regard, the basic need of self-preservation serves as the foundation upon which higher level needs such as autonomy are built. However, the basic needs are deficiency needs, meaning that, if they are not met, the person will seek to make up for the deficiency, and this takes precedence over all other needs. (Maslow, 1970) If lower-order deficiency needs are not satisfied, they maintain greater potency and higher-order needs cannot arise. (Maslow, 1970) In this study, self-preservation is an underlying deficiency need of individuals and constituent groups in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Maslow (1970), in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggested that the basic needs of survival, safety, and security as deficiency needs
serve as the pre-eminent motivation for behavior. While Maslow directed his work toward general human behavior and motivation, these theories can be applied to individuals in work settings and to institutions as well. (Owens, 1981) Owens (1981) applied Maslow’s theories to educational organizations as well as individuals in those organizations. He drew four conclusions about the application of Maslow’s Hierarchy in organizations: 1) unmet needs have prepotency, needs that have been met are not motivators; 2) the "web of needs" is complex; 3) there is general intention to satisfy motivating needs, beginning with lower-order needs; and 4) there are many ways to meet higher-order needs, but relatively few ways to meet lower-order needs, which are pre-eminent. (Owens, 1981)

Herzberg (1966) described factors similar to general deficiency needs in organizational settings as hygiene or maintenance factors, upon which motivation factors could be built. His Two-Factor Theory of Motivation described the preventive quality of maintenance factors, that is, if they are not sufficiently present, they can prevent motivation. However, if maintenance factors are satisfied, motivation can occur. In this sense, Herzberg (1966) suggested that motivation arises from certain factors, and dissatisfaction arises from a separate set of factors and can stifle motivation.

Self-preservation, as an interest of individuals or organizations, is a deficiency need generating the motivation to use power and authority in interactive relationships. Authority
can be asserted in order to be maintained or extended; a variety of modes of power can be employed toward the same ends. (Burbules, 1986; Wolf, 1990) In the governance of intercollegiate athletics, power and authority relationships are shaped by the needs of various constituents and the field of play upon which power interaction occurs. Therefore, an examination of the governance of higher education, as the field of play where constituents use power and authority in intercollegiate athletics, is a foundation upon which to build this study.

**Governance of Higher Education**

Universities are complex organizations that vary from other organizations in a number of ways: they serve a variety clients; their employees have varying skills; they possess various technologies; they use diverse structures and methods of governance; and they have different relationships to external environments. (Baldridge, 1991) The organizational characteristics of universities include: institutional goals, hierarchical systems and structures, officials with specific responsibilities, policy-making processes, and "day-to-day" bureaucratic administration. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 39) In this section, I examine universities by looking at previous works on: 1) the pluralistic nature of the university and its mission and how that leads to a shared governance ideal; 2) the influence of external interests as universities pursue resources and the loose governance structures that ensue; 3) decision-making processes
and models; and 4) leadership and authority in higher education governance.

"Goal ambiguity" is common in higher education organizations and universities that often "try to be all things to all people" and thus "rarely have a single mission." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 39) Cohen and March (1991) suggested that rhetoric and ineffective efforts by university administrators to produce cohesive goals have usually resulted in "meaningless" mission statements. Kerr (1982, p. 41, 136) noted that there is no more bold vision of a singular mission and described the modern "multiversity" as a "city of infinite variety", a "pluralistic institution", wherein several purposes, several power centers, and various clientele were the norm. Kerr (1982) also noted the existence of "student power", "faculty power", and "public power," which are evidence that higher education serves many "clients with disparate, complicated needs." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 31) In attempting to serve many masters, universities "do not know clearly what they are trying to do, they often do not know how to do it either." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 31)

Universities are "people-processing" institutions where various clients demand, and often obtain, influence in governance. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 40) These clients can be mutually-dependent internal constituents, such as students, faculty, administrators, or trustees, who seek to share governance authority. (Berdahl, 1991; Mortimer & McConnell, 1991) Shared governance, while infrequent in practice, is therefore an

Institutional clientele include constituents in the external environment. Most "... of the threats to departmental, college, and campus autonomy and patterns of governance are generated by external forces and developments." (Mortimer & McConnell, 1991, p. 167) Universities, like any complex organizations, are "environmentally vulnerable" to outside influences. (Baldridge, 1991 , p. 42) On a "continuum from 'independent' to 'captured'," Baldridge (1991, p. 42) placed universities in the middle. While they had enjoyed "substantial insulation" as a whole, they are now facing "powerful external forces." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 42) When applied, this strong external pressure seriously reduces the "operating" or "procedural autonomy." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 33; Berdahl, 1991, p. 218) Kerr (in Keller, 1983, p. 24, 25) stated that "autonomy--to the extent it ever existed--is dead".

Berdahl (1991, p. 218) noted the impact of external constituents, such as donors, courts, state governments, and federal bureaucratic offices, that "often have the power of control, not even to mention the murky terrain of influence" in
higher education. He described the specific situation that may arise with:

... our good friends, the alumni, who, on the one hand, support alma mater with their money, their enthusiasm, and their volunteer efforts. But on occasion, their enthusiasm can go too far, particularly in such areas as intercollegiate athletics, where there have been instances of gross interference with campus decisions and priorities. ... Not only do they give money and support, but sometimes they want to help control the academy's decisions. (Bardahl, 1991, p. 219)

Furthermore, state governments are externally seeking control over institutional role, budget, and performance while the influence of "the flow of federal money" over the direction of the university is tied to policies designed to "broaden access" and assure "social justice and affirmative action." (Berdahl, 1991, pp. 221-222) Even the external forces involved in university governance have diverse interests and are not always cooperative, competing among themselves for influence. (Berdahl, 1991)

In relation to external constituents, Hackman (1991) defined environmental power as the ability to acquire needed outside resources, while institutional power was influence within the institution. External resources are sought out because "peripheral units," such as athletics, must "bring in financial resources" and "'pay their own way ... or they will shrink.'"
This predicament creates institutional conflict and ambiguity. Kerr (in Keller, 1983) noted:

There is a 'kind of lawlessness' in any large university with separate sources of initiative and power; and the task is to keep this lawlessness within bounds ...

There are several 'nations', of students, of faculty, of alumni, of trustees, of public groups. Each has its territory, its jurisdiction, its form of government. Each can declare war on the others; some have the power of veto... It is a pluralistic society with multiple cultures.

The lawlessness of an "organized anarchy" implies "confusion, disarray, and conflict" in higher education organizations. (Cohen & March, 1991, p. 399; Baldridge, 1991, p. 44) Four systemic ambiguities were identified as fundamental in "organized anarchies": ambiguity of purpose, ambiguity of power, ambiguity of experience, and ambiguity of success. (Cohen & March, 1991, p. 399 - 404) Cohen & March (1991, p. 399 - 404) concluded: universities have no clear goals; formal authority is limited and often not accepted, while "the real power" is hard to find; outcomes are dependent upon factors outside presidential experience; and goals and outcomes are independent of each other, creating diverse criteria for success.

The concept of "organized anarchy" supports the organizational characteristics of higher education institutions identified by Baldridge's (1991, p. 34): unclear goals, client
service, unclear technologies, problematic professionalism, and vulnerable environment. "Organized anarchy" also suggested a "looser, more fluid kind of organization," described by Weick (1991, p. 103) as "loosely coupled systems." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 34) Loose coupling refers to an independent, yet responsive connection between university elements with diverse interests, using task-induced technical or office-oriented authority coupling mechanisms. (Weick, 1991) Kerr (1982) described the looseness of university governance as:

... the multiversity with its strung-along type of unity, with its lack of devotion to any single faith and its lack of concentration on any single function, with a condition of cohesion at best or coexistence at next best or contiguity at least. (pp. 138-139)

Decision-making is problematic in a "loosely coupled, ambiguous organization." (Cohen & March, 1991, p. 404) In such organizations, decision making often results from unplanned activities. (Baldridge, 1991) Keller (1983, p. 26) called for an end to the "era of laissez-faire" governance and suggested the need for planning an "academic strategy" in university decision-making.

Organizational decision-making in higher education governance can be categorized in "bureaucratic", "collegial", or "political" models. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 38) However, Baldridge (1991, p. 45) stated that "... the search for an all-encompassing model is simplistic, for no one model can delineate the
intricacies of decision processes in complex organizations." While no model stands on its own, each has valid aspects to help examine higher education governance structures. Baldridge (1991, p. 35) suggested that these models be used "jointly to examine different aspects of the governance process."

Bureaucratic structures were described by Weber, in Baldridge, (1991, p. 46) as "networks of social groups dedicated to limited goals and organized for maximum efficiency." The elements of bureaucracy associated with university governance were summarized by Baldridge (1991): the state charter allows external state influence; the formal hierarchy specifies formal relationships; the communication channels are formalized; authority relations are definitive; rules and regulations formally govern the university; people processing and record-keeping abound; and decision processes for routine decisions are delegated. The bureaucratic model has weaknesses when applied to higher education because it explains the "formal structure" of governance and "authority--legitimate, formalized power," but it fails to provide illumination about the "dynamic processes" or the use of informal power and influence in institutions of higher education. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 47) While bureaucracies explain the most efficient manner of executing policies, they do not examine changes over time, nor do they address how policies are developed. (Baldridge, 1991)

The collegial governance model examines the process of policy-making in higher education. The university has been viewed
by some as a "collegium," a "community of scholars," wherein there is full participation by all members in decision-making. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Such a "roundtable" democracy suggests that academic institutions should process differently from bureaucratic hierarchies. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) The academic community achieves "coordination" in decision-making through "dynamic consensus." (Millet, in Baldridge, 1991, p. 48) Ideally, within the collegial model, the faculty's professional authority is based upon expertise rather bureaucratic position. (Baldridge, 1991) However, noting the "discontent and anxiety" of academicians with the governance structure of higher education, Baldridge (1991) suggests that the model of university governance ought to be a "utopian" collegium, not that it is one. The most obvious shortcoming of the collegial model in the governance of higher education is its incapacity to deal with conflicts of interest. (Baldridge, 1991)

Neither bureaucratic rule-making nor collegial consensus explains the "power plays, conflict, and the rough-and-tumble politics" of institutional governance. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 50) Within the "loosely coordinated, fragmented political system" of governance in higher education, the political model offers an explanation of the decision-making process that is less "systematic or formalistic" than the other models. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 54) In the political model where complex organizations are viewed as "miniature political systems, with interest-group dynamics and conflicts," policy-making is the focus. (Baldridge,
The model is based upon the following assumptions about the political process: inactivity prevails and decisions are made by small groups; participation in the process is fluid by those interested; universities are divided into "interest groups with different goals and vales"; conflict is normal and healthy in complex organizations; formal authority is limited by competing interest groups; and external interest groups are influential in internal governance processes. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 51, 52) In this light, the political model is particularly applicable in examining aspects of constituents' use of power and authority in governing athletics in higher education.

The governance of higher education involves a complex political community that creates a variety of pressures and many sources of power and influence that impact decision-making in the university setting. In addition, within the political model, university decision-making includes a "legislative stage" that generates policy based upon these various influences, and a "policy execution phase" that provides feedback and possibly creates new conflict. (Baldridge, 1991, p. 55, 56) In the political decision-making process, interest groups or bureaucratic processes determine the decision which needs to be addressed, and then the right of decision-making is "subject to conflict, power manipulation, and struggles between interest groups." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 52, 53) Committees, councils, and advisory groups are part of a diffuse, "complex decision network" in higher education that "allows a cumulative buildup of
expertise and advice." (Baldridge, 1991, pp. 53, 54) Baldridge (1991) described the process of decision-making in the political model:

First, powerful political forces--interest groups, bureaucratic officials, influential individuals, organizational subunits--cause a given issue to emerge from the limbo of ongoing problems and certain 'attention cues' force the political community to consider the problem. Second, there is a struggle over locating the decision with a particular person or group, for the location of the right to make the decision often determines the outcome. Third, decisions are usually 'performed' to a great extent by the time one person or group is given the legitimacy to make the decision; not all options are open and the choices have been severely limited by the previous conflicts. (p. 54)

Leadership in the governance of higher education is viewed differently based upon the model of governance applied. In the bureaucratic model, the leader plays the role of "hero" presiding over a "complex pyramid of power." (Baldridge, 1991, p. 57) The collegial leader is a negotiator and facilitator in obtaining "consensus in a community of scholars." (Millet, in Baldridge, 1991, p. 57) The political leader who "jockeys between power blocs", negotiating, facilitating, mediating, and networking to "fight for desired changes" is "... not at the peak of a pyramid but rather at the center of intersecting circles." (Berdahl, 1991; Baldridge, 1991, p. 58)
Whetten and Cameron (1991) identified the characteristics of successful leaders: they put equal emphasis on process and outcome; they are risk takers with a low fear of failure; they nurture support of strategic constituencies; they do not succumb to external demands; they leave a distinct imprint; they are excellent communicators; they respect the power of organizational cultures; and they highlight sources of opportunity that exist. For this study, effective leaders use power and authority in interactive relations either to maintain the status quo or to achieve intended outcomes. In order to achieve their ends, leaders can use two types of authority: administrative authority that is derived from a legitimate position within the power hierarchy; and professional authority that is derived from knowledge. (Etzioni, 1991) Leaders exercised authority as "line" authority that follows the chain of command or "staff" authority that occurs outside the "line" and contends with a degree of autonomy. (Etzioni, 1991)

Within the university hierarchy, the governing board and the president are responsible for providing leadership and direction. The president serves "at the pleasure of the board." (Kauffman, 1980) Effective boards are responsible for policy formation. (Chait et al., 1991) The formation of policy is an action of governance, while the application or execution of policy is an action of administration. (Westmeyer, 1990) Both are necessary for effective governance. The structure of governance remains similar to that described by Elliott (1935) wherein the board
could act unilaterally or through delegation of authority in the university hierarchy, which included the president, faculty, and other administrators serving as leaders. However, the processes in governance involve power relationships outside the formal university hierarchy.

Pfeffer (1991) concluded that leaders are constrained in their actions by external factors and circumstances beyond their control. These constraints can be an application of Wolf's (1990) notion of structural power. For example, Barrow (1990) noted the impact of capitalism on the "reconstruction of American higher education" prior to 1928. While "environmental forces" go "beyond administrative control," effective administrators can have an impact upon organizational effectiveness and performance. (Whetten & Cameron, 1991, p. 459) The impact of effective leaders in one arena of governance is described by Hackman (1991, p. 276): "Sports have increased because ... the president decided to emphasize it." While this is an over-simplified analysis, the arena of intercollegiate athletics merits the attention of research in the governance of higher education.

**Intercollegiate Athletics**

While reform efforts are abundant in college athletics today, current reform agendas take into account neither the possibility of long-term systemic breakdown of the higher education governance structure and processes relative to intercollegiate athletics, nor the power relationships of the constituencies involved. Lessons from history can be applied by
modern decision-makers addressing current problems. Thelin (1982, p. 1) noted the need to examine history because the complexities in structure and processes of universities are derived from "the fact that universities are historic institutions." Eitzen and Sage (1978, p. 25) stated: "Current social circumstances are related to events of the past, consequently sociologists use history to develop an understanding ..., making the current ... more meaningful."

Lucas and Smith (1978, p. vi) suggested that, in looking at history, finding "a continuous stream of ideas" is adequate, rather than attempting to observe a "single central theme"; however others have examined specified themes in relation to college athletics. Davenport (in Chu et al., 1985, p. 6) described a "paradox" in college athletics where the athletic pursuits of winning, commercialization, and money contradict the epitome of scholarship, academic integrity, and the positive qualities perceived in higher education. Lawrence (1987) concentrated on the development and pervasive role of the NCAA in college athletics. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 1) traced the evolution of sport relative to the economic and political factors that created "corporate athleticism", and the problems associated with that evolution. Smith (1988) concentrated upon the conflict between collegial "paternalism" and student "freedom" in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982) surveyed the development of intercollegiate athletics relative to institutional control and educational
value. Chu (in Chu et al., 1985) examined the formal incorporation of athletics into the ambiguous concept of American higher education. Andre and James (1991, p. xix) presented the "conflict and controversy" that surrounded the development of the institution of college athletics.

Lucas and Smith (1978, p. v - vii) stated that the history of American sport reflects the "dominant social themes in American society", and provides a deeper knowledge of athletics relative to modern society. Eitzen and Sage (1978, p. 25) concluded that athletics are "a microcosm of American society" that reinforce and reflect societal values as a "mirror of American life." The relationship between athletics and American societal values was described as "reciprocal" in nature by Eitzen and Sage (1978, p. 59) and Nyquist (in Chu et al., 1985). Sports "properly conducted provide values of enduring human significance." (Simon, 1991, p. 200) The dominant American values associated with athletics were presented by Eitzen and Sage (1978): Success (Individual Achievement); Competition; Means to Achieve (Hard Work); Progress; Materialism; and External Conformity. Violence has emerged as the ultimate method of "survival of the fittest" in the theory of Social Darwinism as it exists in society and as it is expressed in sports. (Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 68) Marmion (1979) stated that American college athletics have "truly become a part of the social fabric of our society." McPherson (1989) and Sage (1980) noted that athletics are pervasive in our society. It is because of sports'
pervasiveness that an examination of the "rise of sport in America" is important in providing "clues to understanding sport in its present form." (McPherson, 1989; Sage, 1980; Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 54)

Smith (1988) viewed extracurricular activities, including sports, as an expression of student rebellion, or freedom, against the paternalism of early universities. Intramural class competitions were documented early on the American college campus, with students "playing at ball" as far back as 1761. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 1, 2; Smith, 1988) However, things changed when Harvard met Yale in a crew race on August 3, 1852: the Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad company, in a commercial venture to promote its line to Lake Winnipesaukee, New Hampshire as a vacation destination, sponsored the first inter-college athletic competition. (Lucas & Smith, 1978, p. 196, 197) This marked the "watershed of intercollegiate sports", followed, on July 1, 1859, by baseball between Amherst College and Williams College, and English soccer-style football between Rutgers and Princeton on November 6, 1869. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18; Smith, 1988, p. 219; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p. 7) However, it was the debut of American rugby-style football on May 15, 1874 with a tie between Harvard University and McGill University of Canada, followed a year later on June 4, 1875 with Tuft University defeating Harvard, that prompted more widespread institutional and public interest in intercollegiate athletics. (Smith, 1988)
Football was received enthusiastically by students and spectators alike; however, it created controversy with respect to the "place of athletics in higher education." (Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p. 7) "King football" caught the attention not only of the public, but also of the college administrators of the day who recognized the publicity and revenue potential associated with a winning team. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18, 19)

As communication and transportation technologies advanced, college athletics became more pervasive in American society. (Eitzen & Sage, 1978; Sage, 1980; McPherson, 1989) As successful sports teams received newspaper attention, business-like, "win-at-all-cost" athletic programs emerged. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 6, 7) Veysey (1965) implied that a bandwagon effect of successful athletic programs at leading institutions such as Harvard existed within higher education:

Trustees of existing institutions ... sometimes preferred to risk experimentation rather than continue in the unpromising ways of the past ... Once one respectable institution moved in a new direction, others found themselves under a powerful compulsion to follow suit. (p. 10, 11)

Systemic problems have existed in the relationship of athletics to higher education since the advent of intercollegiate competition on August 3, 1852. (Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982) From early, unorganized student activities, student-run college athletic clubs "promoted and encouraged" inter-
college competitions. (Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 17; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 18) But "students erected within the gates a monster" that needed to be controlled. (Rudolph, 1962, p. 155) Kerr (1982, p. 16) concurred: "Once started, university spectator sports could not be killed even by the worst of teams or the best of de-emphasis; and few universities seriously sought after either." Athletics became a vehicle for campus unification, as Rudolph (1962, p. 381) suggested that "if every man did not take the same courses, at least he had an opportunity to cheer for the same team." College athletics had a variety of proponents, despite its uncomfortable fit in the academic environment.

Willing academicians, government leaders, and the American general public entertained the notion of new programs and objectives for higher education, and the colleges' business-minded presidents and trustees used athletics as a means of remedying financial and enrollment difficulties. Without a well-accepted understanding of the importance and responsibilities of the American college and university, leadership in higher education had to search creatively for funds and students, altering programs and educational philosophies in the process. (Chu, 1985, p. 36)

The control of college sports, whether shared or absolute, evolved among "students, alumni, presidents, faculty, and professional administrators", gradually shifting from its student origins to alumni and, later, college faculty and administrators.
concluded that students had lost control of athletics because they "lacked the responsibility to run them without conflicting with academic values." The faculty had quickly regulated student-run athletics; professional coaches then began to run individual sports; and the alumni and college authorities controlled the financial aspects. (Smith, 1988; Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982)

During the 1855 rematch of the Harvard-Yale crew regatta, the eligibility of an "already-graduated" Harvard competitor demonstrated the need for some collective regulation and governance for intercollegiate athletics. (Lucas & Smith, 1978, p. 198) Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982) stated that:

By the turn of the century, ... both supporters and detractors had adopted the posture that proper governance and regulation were necessary to (depending on one's position) improve, reform, or salvage the athletic pastimes which, like a weed, could neither be left alone nor completely eradicated. (p. 16)

The formation of the NCAA finally addressed the issue of inter-institutional governance of college athletics. (Smith, 1988) In response to public outcries bemoaning the brutality in college football, which had resulted in 18 deaths and 143 serious injuries in 1905 alone, President Theodore Roosevelt charged representatives of Harvard, Yale, and Princeton with the task of reforming the sport or abandoning it. (Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) The
purpose of the NCAA, to oversee college sports, was stated in its initial Constitution:

Its object shall be the regulation and supervision of college athletics throughout the United States, in order that the athletic activities in colleges and universities may be maintained on an ethical plane in keeping with the dignity and high purpose of education. (Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 22; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985, p. 8)


...the offering of inducements to players to enter colleges or universities because of their athletic abilities and of supporting or maintaining players while students on account of their athletic abilities, either by athletics organizations, individual alumni, or otherwise, directly or indirectly. (p. 21-23)

As amateurism was promoted by the NCAA, commercialized athletic programs were for the first time being formally recognized as components of higher education. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985) In their efforts to field winning and financially successful teams, universities ignored NCAA amateur rules. The NCAA continued to resolve through unenforceable regulations the amateur ideal despite its members ignoring the rules on amateur eligibility to a significant degree. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 24, 25)
Lucas and Smith (1978, p. 145) and McPherson (1989) viewed amateur rules as elitist, yet the existence of athletics had a "democratizing" effect as they allowed everyone in the emerging nation to share in the common American values reflected in sports. The "social aristocrats" immigrants, and the new middle class working "rabble" all supported and encouraged the growth of college athletics. (Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 49) The rise of the industrialized society and the development of urbanization in America, combined with technological advances, spurred the growth of widespread interest in "corporate sport." (Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 20, 43) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 17) suggested the historic links "between a growing, aggressive business system ... and the organization of intercollegiate athletics." By the 1920s, college athletics were part of "mass entertainment in a growing industrial society." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 23) As the nation offered new freedoms and opportunities, athletics became "the one big national denominator" in the "Golden Age" of college sports in the twenties. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 8; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 22)

In 1929, Howard Savage, for The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, conducted what "... was, and probably remains, the most thorough look ever taken at U.S. college sport." (Lawrence, 1986, p. 8) The Savage Report condemned the "highly organized commercial activity" of college athletics, and placed the responsibility for corrective action with the
"president and faculty." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 23)
The Savage Report outlined the abuses in college athletics and
prescribed solutions; however it was not well received. (Hart-
Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu, 1985) The NCAA
acknowledged the problems presented in the Savage Report, but did
little to correct the situation. (Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989)
Hanford (1979) noted that the Report had little effect on the
direction that intercollegiate athletics took.

The Great Depression, following close on the heals of the
Savage Report, affected "all facets of our society", including
intercollegiate athletics. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11)
Financial constraints led university athletics to become more
"influential and businesslike" in their pursuit of resources,
thereby intensifying illegal recruiting and other violations.
(Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989, p. 8; Lawrence, 1987; Davenport, in
Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986) World War II
initiated a "hiatus in the growth of intercollegiate sports" and
only one major change in NCAA regulation, freshman eligibility.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 11, 12; Lawrence, 1987)

After World War II, football, and "big time" newcomer
basketball, emerged to solidify their importance in society.
(Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 12) The 1950s were marred with
point-shaving and recruiting scandals where football and
basketball players had become little more than "commodities in a
growing mass entertainment industry". (Slaughter & Lapchick,
commercial interests and abundant abuses in college athletics pushed the NCAA to move from "an advisory body to a governing body with full power to police and penalize." (Davenport, in Chu, 1985, p. 12, 13; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 24, 25) In 1952, the NCAA devised an enforcement policy that was to control and punish member abuses. (Lawrence, 1987) Yet the advent of televised sports, with mass appeal and vast revenue, soon changed intercollegiate athletics as well as the role of the NCAA. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Lawrence, 1987)

Television enhanced the money-making prospects of commercialized intercollegiate athletics and led to the rise of "corporate athleticism". (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 25, 26) College sport had become "a spectacle, big business, and an extension of power politics" wherein the "goal of pleasure" was "replaced by extrinsic rewards, especially money." (Eitzen & Sage, 1978, p. 20) The "big time" commercial nature of athletics in the university has prompted great concern. (Atwell, 1979; Lopiano, 1979; Nyquist, 1979; Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) The finances associated with the control of televised sports reinforced the emergence of the NCAA as an economic cartel offering college athletics as its product. (Koch, in Frey, 1982; Sage, in Frey, 1982; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987; Wilson, 1994) As television money increased the commercialization of intercollegiate athletics, the civil rights movement and the campus unrest of the 1960s and 1970s increased the opportunity
for participation, reflecting the societal concerns of the day. (Davenport, in Chu, 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982; Hanford, 1979)

The 1960s reflected the civil rights movement with expanded athletic opportunity for blacks; however, many academically unprepared black athletes matriculated solely for athletic purposes into commercial athletic programs where they served as cheap labor in the production of massive athletic profits. (Sage, 1980; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Lawrence, 1987) Athletics themselves became a "commodity" in a "collusive intercollegiate athletic market." (Sage, 1990, p. 104; Koch, in Frey, 1982)

Slaughter & Lapchick (1989, p. 11) viewed the 1960s and 1970s as a period of "ascendancy" for profitable commercialized intercollegiate athletics. Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xi) noted the increasing cultural importance of athletics:

"Big-time sport, collegiate and professional, is becoming the new civil authority in our culture. It draws the pride and unifies the community the same way great cathedrals did in earlier times."

In the 1970s, the expanded women's movement prompted Title IX of the Higher Education Act, legislation that continues to have a significant impact upon intercollegiate athletics. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985; McPherson, 1989) Women's sports have continued to receive less attention and less money than those of men; however, the NCAA, which took over women's championships from the Association for
Intercollegiate Athletics for Women only after its efforts to thwart Title IX regulations failed, has witnessed, if not stimulated, increased opportunities for women in athletics. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Acosta & Carpenter, in Chu et al., 1985)

In the 1980s, reformers addressed their main concerns in athletics, institutional control, commercialization, and the academic integrity of the institutions involved, and often questioned the paradox of athletics in higher education. (Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985) While Hanford (1979) questioned whether institutions could maintain their autonomy while governing athletics, Sage (1990, p. 188) suggested that intercollegiate athletics have the typical problems of "conventional capitalistic entertainment enterprises." Serving in an entertainment role, athletics engage in intense competition for resources. Universities deviate from this role by avoiding payment to athletes for the product through invoking "the educational mission of the university" and using the "ideology of amateurism" in college athletics. (Sage, 1990, p. 188)

Many researchers (Chu, in Chu, et al., 1985; Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) have noted that commercial practices in "big-time" athletic programs and poorly defined university missions have allowed the influence of extramural constituents on college athletics. The need to match institutional goals with athletic governance structures is particularly difficult with
"ambiguous and conflicting goals" in universities, yet it has been central to the discussion on intercollegiate athletics since their inception. (Hardy & Berryman, in Frey, 1982, p. 25; Chu, in Chu et al., 1985)

As the 1990s proceed, reform advocates continue to discuss the issues of control, commercialization, and academic integrity in college athletics. Hardy and Berryman (in Frey, 1982, p. 17) stated: "Students, coaches, faculty, presidents, alumni and boosters all had differing notions as to the athletic interests of their institutions." Frequently internal constituents such as coaches, faculty, and administrators have conflicting interests. (Scott, in Frey, 1982; Bailey & Littleton, 1991) Gilley et al. (1986, p. 3) noted that "lack of internal control (including confused and fractured lines of responsibility) is a critical factor contributing to problems in university athletic programs."

In addition to internal interest-group conflicts, athletics have formed connections with external constituencies; in part because regularly administered institutional budgets have been restricted in relation to athletic costs. (Chu et al., 1985) Athletics have been deemed unworthy of full incorporation into the educational curriculum and as such are not fully funded. (Scott, in Frey, 1982) They are left to forge their external connections in pursuit of resources. In turn, as external constituencies provide revenue to college athletics, external influence is attached to the purse strings, and the external special interest constituencies seek control of commercial
collegiate athletics. (Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; Bailey & Littleton, 1991)

According to Gilley et al. (1986, p. 26), "Today, power is so widely diffused outside colleges and universities that an institution must strive to become a major shareholder of its own athletic material."

In a case study involving "...universities having major athletic problems" as well as "seven exemplary institutions", the problematic universities featured "an absence of adequate administrative supervision of the athletic program", while the comparison schools "were less administratively independent." (Gerber, in Gilley, 1986, p. 36-37). According to Frey (1982):

"Ever since the first intercollegiate athletic event in the mid 1850’s, the course of action of college athletic programs has been dictated by groups which, in fact, do not originate within the boundaries of the campus. That is, a great deal of what happens in intercollegiate athletics is the result of a response to the interests and demands of externally based constituencies." (p. 106)

Among the external interest groups are the alumni, the community, business interests, the general public, booster clubs, the government, and television. (Kjeldsen, in Frey, 1982; Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; McPherson, 1989; Sage, 1990; and Bailey & Littleton, 1991) College athletics serve the interests of the general public and the surrounding community by providing entertainment. (Michener, 1976)
Commercialized college sport spectacles also provide benefits to business interests, as Kjeldsen (in Frey, 1982) noted the "beneficiaries of intercollegiate athletics" include:

... community business people who either directly provide services and/or supplies to the athletic department or who benefit from the infusion of money into the local economy, and ... the seeker of entertainment services who realizes a period of diversion from the normal routines of life. (p. 201)

Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted that alumni interests are also served through personal satisfaction and ego-gratification derived from a connection to a highly visible, successful athletic program. Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 12, 13) contend that all successful college athletic teams have "strong booster groups" that influence college athletics through "a financial and economic infrastructure" without which a serious commercial college athletic program would be "unable to compete." Gilley et al. (1986, p. 7) concluded that the "... lack of control of boosters has caused more problems for ... universities than ... any other aspect of athletics." The university's loss of control over external constituencies was addressed by Bailey and Littleton (1991): "Fortunately for most university presidents, the control of fervent external groups is a matter of keeping the larger university purposes and their need for financial support in some perspective." (p. 43)

While "... some would argue that because of their own
indigenous decentralized form of governance, ... " universities are not able to " ... refute the claim that they are at the mercy of a subculture with alien values, one that is closely linked to ominous forms of wealth, egocentricity, and political power." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 61) Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989) argued that American universities must execute the responsibility of athletic control and that the regular governance structure of the institution should provide the means for control:

... of first importance, there must be firm leadership at the top from the board of trustees and the president of the college or university. Ethical direction for the coaches and athletic directors, for the faculty athletics committees, for student athletes, for the fans and especially the alumni, must come from the board and the president. The buck stops there. (p.xiv)

Presidents have the NCAA charge of "ultimate responsibility and final authority for the conduct of the intercollegiate athletics program." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 67) Presidents are becoming more collectively active in the governance of intercollegiate athletics through the NCAA Presidents’ Commission, which was established " ... because there was a perception that presidents did not have the means to play a definitive role in intercollegiate athletics." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 100)

The NCAA is a regulatory body acting in the interests of its
more than 850 voluntary member institutions (Tow, in Frey, 1982, p.108). It enacts and enforces rules governing intercollegiate athletics as approved by its member institutions, and yet it has significant authority over those same member institutions. Bailey and Littleton (1991, p. 128, 129) stated: "The structure of the NCAA membership and the policies for distribution of the association's revenues can influence significantly the ability of member institutions to control abuses in college sports." Noll (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 198) stated: "Judging from the popular literature, the moral high ground is occupied by the NCAA. ...depicted as fighting the good battle."

The NCAA's influence over its membership promotes the perception of the role of the NCAA as that of a cartel, an association designed to monopolize control over college athletics. (Sage, in Frey, 1982, p. 131-138) Noll (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 198) observed that "...the economic value of intercollegiate athletics have continued to grow, and the cartel practices of the NCAA have become more important. Lawrence (1987, p. xiii) viewed the NCAA as an "intercollegiate athletic cartel ... colluding to restrict output in an effort to raise prices and profits." The role of the NCAA as a cartel is supported also by the fact that the NCAA has its own legal department, and also the Governmental Affairs and Joint Legislative Committee to lobby for its interests and self-protection; at times against its own members. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 152) Nevertheless, the NCAA is
central to athletic reform movements, providing a structure for change at the national level.

The issue of control of intercollegiate athletics has gone beyond institutional walls and the NCAA. A variety of external constituents influence the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Government involvement, through legislation and the courts, has attempted to curtail the undesirable influences of some external constituents, but in the process has become an additional external influence on college athletics, a longstanding fear of higher education. (Bailey & Littleton, 1991)

While externally situated booster organizations and individual boosters exert significant commercial influence on athletic departments, and government exerts regulatory influence, the television medium has been called the "most important external influence on college sports" (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 11).

The media, in particular television, has played a key role in the development of commercialized, "win-at-all-cost", "corporate athletics." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 11) Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:

The media, including television, in its encompassing treatment of sports merely responds to what the public desires. And, partly as a result, the university itself remains in its purposes and modes of conduct the least understood of democratic institutions, its one visible and
significant connection to the lives of most Americans being intercollegiate athletics. (p. 47)

Television creates, promotes, and organizes "highly lucrative sports markets", thus raising the "financial stakes associated with college sports." (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986, p. 11) Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 68) concurred: "Of all the revenue-generating sources for college athletics none has had the dramatic impact of television." Examples of the financial gains to be made include a recent billion dollar NCAA contract with the CBS television network, a forty million dollar NBC television football contract with the University of Notre Dame, the College Football Association's 210 million dollar contract with the ABC television network, and Penn State University's creation of its own satellite television network. (Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1995)

The NCAA, itself receiving much of its operating revenues from television contracts, is currently discussing options for "revenue sharing" in order to distribute the extensive revenue more equitably among its membership. (Lederman, 1990; Blum, 1994) The revenue generated from the mass media's promotion of college athletics is tantalizing to university athletic programs, some with budgets up to 15 million dollars and deficits over one million dollars (Thelin & Wiseman, 1990). Padwe (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989, p. 123-135) described the role of the media in creating "the moral and ethical wasteland intercollegiate athletics have become." The media continues to influence
intercollegiate athletics as Bailey and Littleton (1991) explained:

Much has already been said about the importance of consensus development, and the roles of individual CEOs, the NCAA Presidents’ Commission, athletics conferences, and educational organizations in achieving that consensus. At this point in the reform movement, the media can be the strongest force in helping these entities in that effort by creating an awareness on the part of the public of the pressing need to control abuses in college sports and of the changes that must be made to accomplish this. (p. 108)

The commercial entertainment business of college athletics is at the same time influenced by the media and propelled by those it entertains, thus demanding media attention as noted by Andre and James (1991):

Americans spend almost $100 billion a year on sports. Only defense, education, and health get more of our gross national product. Most of that money is spent on spectator sport, and a sizable fraction of it on college sport. As a result, sport is always in the news. (p.ix)

The commercial practices in the business of college athletics have enhanced professionalism in college athletics through employing athletes for compensation, as Sage (in Chu et al., 1985) stated:

Big-time intercollegiate sport is a business enterprise...

Not only are big-time intercollegiate athletic programs a
commercial enterprise functioning as a part of a cartel and employing athletes, but the programs are operated with employees (athletes) who are being paid slave wages. (p. 211)

Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 10) proclaimed "...the reign of the amateur in intercollegiate athletics has ended. The present system of intercollegiate sport is highly professionalized." Receipt of any form of compensation constitutes a degree of professionalism:

... any difference between a student-athlete in a big-time sports program and a professional athlete lies only in the amount of the compensation, not in any special quality the amateur enjoys and the professional lacks. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 145)

Noll noted that, due to strict NCAA rules, a "strong college player ... is paid approximately 3 to 10 percent of his actual economic value to a university." (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 206) Bailey and Littleton (1991, p. 64) argued that the current NCAA regulations in intercollegiate athletics that foster the image of amateurism are "... keeping student-athletes in a kind of economic bondage even though their athletic efforts annually produce untold millions of dollars in revenue." The major sources of revenue in today's commercialized athletic system include "... gate receipts, television, and postseason play." (Noll, in Andre & James, 1991, p. 200)

Noll (in Andre & James, 1991, p. 197) concluded that
"American universities have an uneasy relationship with their commercial activities." Financial necessity can cause conflict with the intellectual mission of an institution. Financial pressures have at times led unscrupulous practitioners to obtain academically "substandard" student-athletes who are expected to remain eligible for play, if not for graduation. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 25; Nyquist, in Chu et al., 1985) As reform movements attempt to bring athletics and academics "... into a reciprocal relationship, the issue of use of public funds for athletics will have to be addressed more precisely." (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 125-126) Currently, public policy against using state funds for athletics serves as evidence of the fissure between athletics and academics, and as a stumbling block for incorporating athletics into the university mainstream; therefore, "...the overt translation of intercollegiate athletics into a commercial enterprise" occurs. (Frey, in Chu et al., 1985; Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 64)

A variety of interests in higher education, as well as athletics, have identified both abuses and benefits in college athletics. The search for blame has been directed in numerous arenas, including: The NCAA, the university, the board, the president, the faculty, the coaches, the players, the media, and extramural concerns. For example Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xiii) noted: "Faculty are especially crucial to the cause of ethics in athletics. ... Their records ... are embarrassingly weak." Lawrence (1987) concluded:
The NCAA has turned college sports into big business, with pressure to cheat on recruiting rules, to keep academically unfit students eligible, and to retain coaches who win but who sometimes do not exemplify the values generally believed to come from athletics. (p. xv)

The university itself has been charged with "hypocrisy" for housing athletic programs. (Bailey & Littleton, 1991, p. 61)

Bailey and Littleton (1991) observed:

...college sports are essentially a culture not sufficiently responsive to the educational and ethical rhythms of their environment and, left to their own dynamic, tend to seek constantly a life of their own outside that setting. Yet they must live there, within the university... (p. 30)

Identifying contributors to the problems facing college athletics demonstrates the scope of intercollegiate athletics and the need for a comprehensive, unified strategy in addressing these complex problems. The concern for the role of athletics in higher education is not a new one. Lapchick (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991) stated:

There is a great deal of debate over whether college athletics has changed significantly since its first appearance. ... In reviewing the history of sport at those schools, we would do well to be cautious in assigning sainthood to ancestors and damnation to contemporaries. Conflict and controversy have followed the development of
sport in America just as surely they have followed the development of any social institution. Nostalgia often blurs our vision ... Today's problems in sport are not new, nor have they just recently bloomed. In unearthing the precursors to today's problems, we must be careful to realize that, in reconstructing their contexts and environments, we tend to ignore the clouds for the sunshine and the hardships for the joys. (p. xix)

According to Lapchick (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xx), current observers of intercollegiate athletics "...are simply deluding themselves when they wax nostalgic for a time when things were better." Boyer (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. ix, x) argued that while "ethical issues in sport predate our own time," they have changed, becoming "... more serious than before. Changes in degree have become changes in kind. Now, sport programs involve staggering amounts of money, television contracts, and mass audiences." Giamatti (1988, p. 191) concluded: "To reform intercollegiate athletics is to begin to approach, again, a true examination of American higher education's nature and purpose."

Conclusion

A variety of reform recommendations have been made. Some suggest that athletics be moved off college campuses. (Simon, in Andre & James, 1991; Nyquist, in Chu et al., 1985) Lawrence (1987) demonstrated the inevitability of the connection:

"One obvious solution would be to abolish commercial
football at all universities. ... The history of intercollegiate sports shows, however, that this solution would be short lived. With the loss of big-time football, fans would turn to the next level of collegiate competition to satisfy their appetite for the game. Fraternities, for example, might start an interuniversity league. They would quickly find enough outside interest to play in stadiums and charge admission. Driven by the public recognition and potential television appearances, these teams would begin recruiting actively, and suddenly the cycle would start again. Thus, while it may be interesting to imagine what education would be like without big-time athletics, practically speaking, it would be difficult to abolish sports." (p. 144)

Noll (in Andre & James, 1987) and Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted a need for revenue sharing within the NCAA in conjunction with an increase in academic standards for participants. Hanford (in Chu et al., 1985) recommended that freshman should be deemed ineligible for competition. Atwell (in Chu et al., 1985) emphasized the need to begin reform at the scholastic level and to maintain high academic standards. Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985) deemed it critical to reduce commercialism and maintain academic integrity. Sperber (1990, p. 345) called on all interests involved in college athletics to "stop pretending" that they "are connected to the educational mission of American colleges and universities."
Uehling (in Chu et al., 1985), Davis (1979), Hanford (in Frey, 1982) recognized the need for increased presidential leadership. According to Gilley (1986, p. 9), "It is clear that strong presidential leadership, clear lines of authority and responsibility, and tighter internal university control are required." Boyer (in Chu et al., 1985) noted the need for Board support. Scott (in Frey, 1982, p. 35) echoed the presidents' need for the "steadfast support" of the board of trustees; and suggested "strengthening the head of the professional personnel in charge of athletics." Marmion (1979, p. 344) noted the need for administrators to get involved and warned of "governmental involvement." Atwell (1983) and Frey (in Chu et al., 1985, p. 187) also described the alternatives for increased government involvement in college sports. They warned that the government might install a "tsar" for intercollegiate athletics, as it has in the war on drugs, or that it might increase legislation specifically addressing athletic issues, or that it might increase its involvement as "a result of court actions."

Sage (1990, p. 184) called for the NCAA to stop "blaming the victim", to take responsibility and to address "the inherent structural problems." Slaughter and Lapchick (1989) called on the NCAA to establish a comprehensive policy for reform including prescribed responsibilities for presidents, coaches, and athletic administrators in dealing with academic and athletic achievement.

McPherson (1989, p. 81) suggested that neither a "total professional entertainment model" nor a "total amateur model"
would work for intercollegiate athletics in our society. Athletic and academic programs need to be "intimately integrated" in higher education. (McPherson, 1989, p. 81) Toward this end, Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (1986, p. 107-117) presented three reform options: a "commercially viable semiprofessional college sports system" that would function as a feeder system for professional athletics and be tangential to the university; a residual amateur system with university control and academic emphasis being the cornerstones; and a "corporate athleticism" model with commercial interests competing for influence over university athletics and the inherent conflicts with academic interests that would occur. However, each of the three models would extend the struggle between academic and commercial interests.

Since athletics reside within the university and are nourished by external sources, there appears to be no single formula for success in controlling intercollegiate athletics, as Bailey and Littleton (1991) noted:

There are many reasons for the lack of effective control of abuses in college sports. Perhaps the two most important are the failure of the leadership of higher education to recognize the seriousness of the problem and the fact that over the past century control has often been directed more toward the treatment of the symptoms than to the fundamental causes of the malady.... As a result, the complex matrix of causes has not been adequately clarified, and, therefore, no foundation has been developed for a holistic approach to the
control of abuses in college sports with emphasis on the fundamental causes. (p.ix)

Cooperative reform efforts involving "...leaders from higher education, business, the Congress, sports, and boards of trustees", in the form of the Knight Commission, have set out to jointly recommend reform in intercollegiate athletics." (Atwell et al., in Lederman, 1990, p.38) Boyer described the stakes at hand in the reform of college athletics:

I am confident we could meet the challenge of ethics in college sport. Indeed, we must, for if the institution of higher education allows unscrupulous practices and athletic scandals to undermine the integrity of the enterprise, that college or university loses its authority in society. ... It should be remembered that what is at stake is nothing less than the basic definition of the institution of higher education. (in Slaughter & Lapchick, 1991, p. xiv)

Through examining the persistent dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, practical reforms can be determined. This study pursues feasible reform alternatives based upon an examination of the needs motivating constituents to exercise authority and power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
CHAPTER III

DESIGN OF THE STUDY

Introduction

This study determines avenues for reform in big time intercollegiate athletics by looking at the systemic dysfunctions of governance over time as revealed by an analysis of the needs that have prompted constituents to exercise power and authority at two points in the development of intercollegiate athletics. First, an examination of the policies, practices, and circumstances of intercollegiate athletics in 1929 based upon the data provided in the Savage Report (1929) reveals the use of power and authority by various constituents at that time. Next, the current policies, practices, and circumstances of intercollegiate athletics are examined to determine constituent use of power and authority using recent data from a variety of reports and other sources. These examinations of constituent use of power and authority illustrate the systemic dysfunction in governance over time wherein constituents can either fulfill or relinquish their authority roles, which results in gaps in authority that are filled in by other constituents' use of power. Finally, the needs that drive these constituents to either use or not use authority and power in intercollegiate athletic governance emerge from the examination of their actions.

In order to effectively accomplish these ends, the design of this study must be grounded within a sound conceptual framework, founded upon the application of relevant source materials, and
conducted using viable methodological procedures. That is, in describing the design of this study, I must first establish the conceptual framework within which the study has been conducted. In so doing, I examine university governance and its component constituencies, the utilization of authority and power by these constituents, and the needs that prompt their exercise of authority and power. Based upon this conceptual framework, I then provide a description of the sources utilized in the study. I conclude with an explanation of the methodological procedures employed in this study.

**Conceptual Framework**

Although Westmeyer (1990) identified athletics as a major area for policy setting, many organizational theories and governance models in higher education have overlooked the complex, if not confused, relationship of intercollegiate athletics to institutional governance. Westmeyer (1990) defined governance as policy-making, distinct from administration, which is the execution of policy through decision-making, and management, which may not involve decision-making at all.

Governance occurs within a structure. A variety of institutional governance models are recognized in higher education research, including the collegial model, the political model, and the bureaucratic model. (Baldridge, 1991) No single theory is sufficient in explaining the governance of universities. The collegial model presents decision-making as a consensus-building process relying on professional, or expert,
authority rather than bureaucratic authority. The political model emphasizes the application of power, to resolve conflicting interests, in setting and administering policy. The bureaucratic model highlights in particular the structural hierarchy within the institution, the organizational chain of command, and the lines of authority. Each of these models illustrates certain aspects of institutional governance within which a variety of constituents operate.

Who are the constituents within the institutional hierarchy who are involved in governance and administration? Westmeyer (1990) identified participants within the governance structure of institutions of higher education: the state legislature, the state coordinating boards, governing boards, the president, other administrators, and the faculty. The state confers a charter upon the governing board of an institution, which then becomes the supreme legal authority responsible for university policy. (Kauffman, 1980) Presidents provide leadership in the operation of the university, serving at the will of the board. (Kauffman, 1980) Both boards and presidents are charged with the protection and fulfillment of the institutional mission. (Chait et al., 1993) Within the bureaucratic hierarchy of intercollegiate athletics governance, other administrators would include the athletic director and his/her assistants and the coaches. Athletic administrators and coaches are chiefly responsible for the daily operation of athletic departments. Conferences and the NCAA are also part of the bureaucratic structure of governance in
that, while they are housed off campus, they are involved in policy making for intercollegiate athletics.

The institutional governance structure operates through the processes of governance. The processes of governance occur within the interactions among the constituents. However, governance, which involves the processes, procedures, and practices of setting policy and administering policy through decision-making, can be influenced subtly from the outside. (Westmeyer, 1990) These "subtle influences" are actors outside the governance structure who have the potential to influence the processes of institutional governance.

These external constituents include the alumni, the federal government, the state governments, funding agencies, accrediting agencies, and the public. The alumni provide "the greatest source of support for sports programs." (Westmeyer, 1990, p. 126) The federal government utilizes finances, most with restrictions and regulations attached, and federal court decisions. State governments use funding, direct legislation, and board influence. Funding agencies, with regard to intercollegiate athletics, include individual donors, private companies, the media, foundations, and governmental agencies. They influence governance processes through their distribution of resources. The public, with regard to intercollegiate athletics, includes students, parents, fans, the college community, and the general public. The public influence is through their financial support as consumers of intercollegiate athletics.
For the purpose of this study, the constituents who are legitimately involved in the governance process of intercollegiate athletics consist of the state government, the board, the president, the faculty, the athletic administration, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 1993; Bailey & Littleton, 1991; Yaeger, 1991; Gilley et al., 1986; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey, 1982; Savage et al., 1929) On the other hand, constituents who influence the governance process from a position external to the formal governance structure include the alumni, local businesses and corporate sponsors, boosters, the local community, the general public, state governments, the federal government, the media, and in some circumstances the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 1993; Andre & James, 1991; Lawrence, 1987; Gilley et al., 1986; Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Chu et al., 1985; Frey, 1982; Savage et al., 1929)

Constituents, both within and external to the formal governance structure, may or may not influence the governance process through policy-setting and decision-making, regardless of their location on or off campus. For example, the NCAA, which is located off-campus, is part of the formal intercollegiate governance structure and has influence in athletic policy. While students reside on-campus, but are not part of the formal governance structure and have little or no influence in athletic policy. Yet the alumni, who are neither part of the formal governance structure nor on-campus, also have influence in
intercollegiate athletic policy. These apparent contradictions are clarified by an examination of constituents' use of authority and power.

Burbules (1986) defined authority as a legitimate right to govern, which in the case of higher education is granted by the state to governing boards. Legitimate authority is a function of position and includes components such as positional privilege and expertise. Bureaucratic hierarchy supports authority relationships through designating the roles and responsibilities of authorized actors. Constituents gain control by exercising legitimate authority through the formal governance structure. For purposes of this study, the legitimate authority of constituents in athletic governance is indicated by their prescribed roles and responsibilities, by official institutional policy and policy-setting structures, by the formal structure of the bureaucratic hierarchy, by the official channels of communication, and by the chain of command.

While authority is exercised legitimately through the governance hierarchy, power is exercised through both the formal and informal processes of intercollegiate athletic governance. Constituents can utilize power legitimately to support authority or illegitimately to circumvent authority. In examining the use of power by constituents, the distinct modes of power identified by Wolf (1990) are employed: interpersonal power centers on the capacity of an individual or group to impose its will upon another individual or group through interactive relationships;
tactical power involves the methods and strategies employed to obtain desired outcomes by controlling a specified environment; and structural power organizes and shapes the domains of power play, thereby determining the form and direction of possible interaction. These modes of power are applied in the examination of the arenas, circumstances, and constituent practices involved in policy setting and decision-making that reveal the use of power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

For the purpose of this study, power is evident through certain assumptions: a conflict of interest must exist in power relationships; power relationships are reciprocal in nature; and power relations exist within an environment which can be influenced by its constituents. (Burbules, 1986) The exercise of power by constituents includes obtaining control or influence through the use of coercion, exploitation, incentive, sanction, negotiation, or command, among others. (Crespi, 1992; Airaksinen, 1988; Burbules, 1986; Henderson, 1981; Pennock & Chapman, 1972; Bailey, 1969; Oppenheim, 1961)

When an actor relinquishes authority by not fulfilling his/her prescribed role and responsibilities, gaps in authority develop. Other actors then exercise various modes of power to fill these gaps in authority. An examination of the needs that motivate these actors to either exercise authority, relinquish authority, or utilize power can help clarify the systemic dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. (Owens, 1981; Maslow, 1970)
Sources

Since this study analyzes two time periods to determine the degree of consistent failure in authority, I must ground the analysis of governance structure and processes within its own time frame. Standard university governance procedures are delineated for both the 1929 period and the present. Elliott and his colleagues (1935) in *The Government of Higher Education* described the structure and procedures of governance in the American system of higher education. The authors delineated the roles and responsibilities of university constituents both within and outside of the campus authority hierarchy. (Elliott et al., 1935) The ultimate authority in university governance was bestowed by the state upon the governing board. The board typically retained authority in policy matters, particularly as they pertained to the mission. As capitalistic interest in higher education increased, universities began redefining and refining their missions in the 1920s. (Barrow, 1990) The general principle stood that "boards should legislate and presidents should execute." (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187) The board delegated to the president the authority to execute policy, except in areas of "legal responsibilities, and investments." (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187) The emerging capitalistic interests of the university resulted ultimately in "little else than businessmen" serving in the role of president. (Kauffman, 1980; Veysey, 1965, p. 346) Administrative officers carried out responsibilities with various degrees of authority in the hierarchy. In some institutions,
"dual organization" resulted in "several administrative officers who are not subordinate to the president." (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187)

Kerr (1982), Westmeyer (1990), and Baldridge (1991) are among the many scholars whose combined works reveal the current structure and procedures in university governance. Today's "multiversity" continues to lack clarity in its purpose. (Kerr, 1982) "Goal ambiguity" has led to such complexities in today's universities that their governance process cannot be explained using one prototype, but requires at least three models: the bureaucratic, the collegial, and the political. (Baldridge, 1991) The typical current governance structure remains similar to its 1929 counterpart, with the governing board at its pinnacle, and the president serving at the will of the board. (Westmeyer, 1990) Governing boards continue to be granted the ultimate authority in policy-making on individual campuses. (Chait et al., 1993) And presidents continue to have major responsibilities in policy execution. (Kauffman, 1980)

In order to analyze the governance issues earlier in the century, I used data from the 1929 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (CFAT) Report entitled American College Athletics (commonly referred to as the Savage Report). Lawrence (1987, p. 8) described the Savage Report as "... the most thorough look ever taken at U.S. college sport." Introducing the Report, Savage (1929) stated its purpose:

The present enquiry has for its object to ascertain the
significant facts concerning college athletics in the United States ... , to analyze these facts in relation to American college and university life, ... and to present a summary of American college athletics, their merits and their defects, together with such suggestions looking toward their improvement as may grow out of the materials at hand. (p. 3)

The Savage Report (1929) documented the policy and practices of the institution and the constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Scholars agree that the recommendations presented in the Savage Report (1929) were neither well received nor effective in changing the direction of American college athletics, yet, accurately reflected the condition of athletics in American colleges as they had developed in 1929. (Hart-Nibbrig & Cottingham, 1986; Davenport, in Chu et al., 1985; Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989; Hanford, 1979) Savage (1929) addressed the inefficacy of previous reform:

The present situation in American college athletics could be described and efficacious remedies proposed merely by setting forth a series of quotations from materials published before 1900. The complaints that have been voiced since 1900 have been in the main echoes or amplifications of the adverse criticisms of previous years. Some of the reasons these cries have gone unheeded are to be found in their general nature and lack of specific modern instances, but especially in the fact that the interests of individuals and the special pleadings which have been used to buttress
and justify their complaints have obscured the truth of their utterances. (p. 11, 12)

According to its authors, the Savage Report (1929, p. 12) was "not the final word" on intercollegiate athletics, nor did it propose "a formula for remediying" all of the problems in college athletics because college athletics were "so complex and so overlaid with the interests of individuals." Smith's (1988) historical analysis of the athletic governance and constituent roles is used in the current study to coordinate with the 1929 Savage Report.

With no single current report providing sufficient evidence for an analysis of contemporary athletic governance, a variety of national reports are employed to examine constituent use of power and authority. The Reports of the Knight Foundation’s Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (Knight Commission, 1993) resulted from a three year, three million dollar investigation of athletic abuses in higher education. The Knight Commission (1993) documented the roles of selected constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Its ultimate purpose was the proposal of a reform agenda, based upon redefining constituent roles and clarifying intercollegiate athletic goals.

Published in 1983, the NCAA Report of the Select Committee on Athletic Problems and Concerns in Higher Education (NCAA Report) was convened by the NCAA Council in order to:

... bring together a group of esteemed individuals, combining the highest standing in higher education with
extensive knowledge of intercollegiate athletics, to examine in detail the serious problems affecting college athletics today. (p. 23)


The American Council on Education (ACE) and George Mason University cooperatively issued the Special Report on Administration of University Athletic Programs: Internal Control and Excellence. (Gilley et al., 1986) This study presented data from a survey of 138 Division I-A university presidents, and included an historical examination of athletic problems, and comparisons of case studies from eight institutions. Four of the institutions exhibited problems in athletics and four were trouble-free. Gilley and his colleagues (1986) focused on leadership and control in intercollegiate athletics.

The NCAA Presidents' Commission Third National Forum (1988) offers perspectives and insights from a federal representative, the NCAA administration, and the NCAA presidential membership. Commission Chair John Slaughter noted that the NCAA Forum provided the "opportunity to discuss and to debate the substantive policy issues in college athletics." (NCAA Forum, 1988) The ultimate purpose was to enable Forum participants to recognize and define the problems and abuses in college athletics.
and to treat these problems through recommended reform legislation to be sponsored by the NCAA Presidents' Commission.

Additional sources used in interpreting modern college athletics include books and journal articles by contemporary social scientists who examine intercollegiate athletics. For example, many prominent researchers contributed to the ACE Report (1979), who after three years of investigation devoted an entire issue of its Educational Record to college athletics. A variety of scholars examining legal, financial, and governance issues in intercollegiate athletics are presented by Frey (1982) in Governance of Intercollegiate Athletics and in Government and Sport. (Johnson & Frey, 1985) In Sport and Higher Education, Chu and his colleagues (1985) compiled descriptive and analytical studies by contributing authors that focused on historical, financial, governance, and academic issues in intercollegiate athletics.


**Methodological Procedure**

The research questions delineated in Chapter I dictate the methods and procedures employed in this study. First of all, the constituents who use authority and power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics must be identified from within the source materials from both 1929 and the present. Using the explanation of legitimate governance structure presented by Elliott (1935) and Savage (1929), I isolated the actors who were designed to be in authority positions from those who were located outside the bona fide structures. I identified constituents using power by their actions in intercollegiate athletics through interpreting and generalizing examples presented in the source materials.

Second, the manner by which constituents utilize power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics had to be discovered. I determined the use of power and authority by interpreting constituent actions, practices, policies, structures, and circumstances in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Sources from both time periods are presented to demonstrate examples of the use of power and authority. If those in authority roles demonstrated that they had relinquished their proper roles, further examination sought to document the exercise of power to fill in the gaps in authority.
My interpretation of constituent uses of power through actions, practices, policies, structures, and circumstances is based upon the modes of power identified by Wolf (1990).

Third, the analysis proceeded to the needs that motivate the constituent to exercise power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Maslow's (1970) Hierarchy of Needs and his concept of deficiency needs are applied to the use of authority and power by constituents. Common factors that affect the concept of self-preservation in constituent use of power and authority were sought.

When, over time, authority roles are not executed properly and the resulting gaps are filled by the use of power, an incongruence between the governance structure and the processes employed by constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics occurs. This incongruence indicates a systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. An interpretation of source materials that determines who uses power and authority, how they use power and authority, and why they use power and authority are instruments of analysis that lead to the development of recommendations for systemic change in athletic governance. Reform alternatives are generated from this study based upon the answers to the research questions.

This study employs a variety of research methods in order to address the questions posed above. Each method has its strengths and shortcomings, as does the collective use of a number of
methodological techniques. All research methods and results, therefore, are subject to argument:

Methodological diversity is a phenomenon endlessly familiar to academic researchers, and they know its basis is partly technical and partly a matter of what researchers feel it is most important to explain. (Cohen & Garet, 1983, p. 304)

As Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted, "not all questions are linked to quantitative research"; therefore, this study employs elements of such qualitative research techniques as Content Analysis, Historical Interpretation, Descriptive Study, and Case and Field Study. The methodologies employed are qualitative designs in social research, employed to define and use social concepts such as power and authority, and as such are subject to inherent biases. (Burbules, 1986) While this study does not employ an empirical, quantitative analysis of data, some of the source materials utilized quantitative research methods.

Some elements of the Content Analysis methodology are used to identify and extract information from past and present sources. The analysis is systematic and sequential in nature, the material is examined in the context of its time and source, and inferences are made from the data collected. (Krippendorff, 1980) The content of the source documents identified are examined for specific examples indicating the use of power and authority by constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. One example of a specific breach in authority cited in a national report indicates a systemic occurrence if the context in which it
is referenced indicates that it is representative of similar occurrences. Such indicators are generalized to demonstrate the authority structure as well as the power relationships among constituents in the process of governance. For example, the Savage Report (1929, p. 90) specifically cited the University of Wisconsin's illegitimate use of a "slush fund" to emphasize the common existence of such funds at universities of the day.

Historical Interpretation is used to examine the distant and recent past. It requires "challenging and creative interaction" with source materials by historical "scavengers." (Kaestle, 1988, pp. 61, 71) Historical analysis is based on the sources at hand, but it is also based upon the historian's temperament, convictions, hunches, and explicit and implicit theoretical beliefs:

The rules of investigation and analysis help us less and less as we attempt to make broader generalizations about the past, or make judgments about its relation to the present, and this is part of what we mean when we say that history is also art. (Kaestle, 1988, p. 61)

Historical interpretation remains largely subjective, as Kaestle (1988, p. 68) noted that history "... is selective and interpretive, it is necessarily guided by the individual historian's sense of what is important, where to find meaning, and how social change and human motivation work."

Kaestle (1988, p. 67) noted the methodological problems associated with historical interpretation: "There is no single,
definable method of inquiry, and important historical
generalizations are rarely beyond dispute." Kaestle (1988)
presented four key problems to watch for: confusing correlations
with causal relationships; avoiding vagueness and presentism when
defining key terms; differentiating between evidence of ideas
about how people should behave and evidence of ideas about how
people in fact behave; and distinguishing between intent and
consequences. While no researcher can "completely transcend or
resolve the four problems," it is essential that researcher and
reader alike be aware of the problems and of the "associated
methodological challenges" in attempting to make meaningful
generalizations resultant to interpretive analyses. (Kaestle,
1988, p. 70)

Because this period of exploration and revision has resulted
in diverse eclectic methodologies, because no new
methodological or ideological consensus has emerged--in
short, because there is no successful paradigm in
educational history today--it is all the more important that
each reader of educational history be critically alert and
independent. (Kaestle, 1988, p. 71)

This study also employs elements of both Descriptive and
Case and Field Study methods. In its broadest sense, the term
Descriptive can include many types of studies designed to
describe situations or events. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) The
current study is Descriptive only in that it systematically
describes the facts and characteristics of a given population or
area of interest. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) The data described is generated from an analysis of other source materials. Many of the sources examined in this study utilized the Case and Field Study techniques, in that they intensively analyzed the background, current status, and environmental interactions of intercollegiate athletics governance. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) While the Case and Field Study method is vulnerable to subjective biases, it can provide useful anecdotes and examples from which to generalize. (Isaac & Michael, 1981) For example, case studies such as the one of UNLV basketball coach Tarkanian's battle with the NCAA, and the involvement of the board and president, provide examples of the use of power and authority by each of these constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance from which generalizations can be drawn. (Yaeger, 1991)

Elements of a variety of methodologies are used in this study to analyze constituent use of power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics by applying established concepts and theories to information obtained from the source materials. Specifically, Wolf's (1990) modes of power are applied to the content of relevant source materials from both 1929 and the present. In Chapters Four and Five, this study interprets circumstances, structures, actions, practices, policies, and resources through examples and generalizations in order to determine constituent use of power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Chapter Four identifies the constituents who use power and authority, analyzes how they
use power and authority, and determines dysfunctions in athletic governance in 1929. Chapter Five examines constituent use of power and authority and the subsequent systemic dysfunction in intercollegiate athletic governance. The need for conducting this study over time is evident in the application of the findings to the development of reform alternatives. Chapter Six describes the systemic breakdown of intercollegiate athletic governance over time and uses the work of Maslow (1970) to analyze the needs prompting constituent use of power and authority over time, thus, determining viable alternatives for reform in athletic governance.
CHAPTER IV

AUTHORITY AND POWER IN 1929 COLLEGE ATHLETICS

Introduction

In 1929, Howard Savage prepared a report for the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which he entitled American College Athletics. The Savage Report has been judged as the most comprehensive examination of intercollegiate athletics to date. (Lawrence, 1987) The purpose of the 1929 Savage Report was to determine the "significant facts" about American college athletics, to analyze these facts in order to form generalizations about athletics within the American university, to summarize the "merits and defects" of American college athletics, and to offer suggestions for improvement of American college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 3) In addition, Savage and his colleagues (1929, p. 3) noted that "some attention was paid to the bearings of college athletics upon the principles and practices of education."

In the preface of the Savage Report (1929), Henry Pritchett, President of the Carnegie Foundation at the time, highlighted the importance of this investigation into the arena of intercollegiate athletics:

In the United States the composite institution called a university is doubtless still an intellectual agency. But it is also a social, a commercial, and an athletic agency, and these activities have in recent years appreciably
overshadowed the intellectual life for which the university is assumed to exist. (p. viii)

Furthermore, Pritchett noted the importance of examining athletics in the context of its time and place. At the time, no "system" of American higher education existed; rather, there was "a high degree of institutional autonomy and diversity." (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 1) The university was a relatively new and changing entity. Could it "serve every cause--scholarship, science, business, salesmanship, organized athletics?" (Savage et al., 1929, p. xxi) Questions involving the purpose of the university were constantly being asked, yet remained unanswered. Graduate research studies had emerged on the same campuses as undergraduate colleges. Business and professional curricula were added to the arts and sciences.

The weakness of the American university as it exists today lies in its lack of intellectual sincerity. It stands nominally for high intellectual ideals. Its effort at intellectual leadership is diluted with many other efforts in fields wholly foreign to this primary purpose. Inter-college athletics form ... one of these. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xviii)

"Mass production in higher education" created a "financial load" on public resources and inspired "social and intellectual objections;" however, no single formula for effectively controlling college athletics existed among the 130 institutions studied. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xviii) The term "control"
itself connotes the need to contain a force that may get out of hand. The Savage Report (1929) defined athletic "control" as:

the conduct of games and contests through the definite delegation of authority and responsibility touching a vast number of phases of college life, including a clear assessment of purposes both actual and theoretical, the framing and execution of a policy that takes account of the interests, whether practical or sentimental, of various groups, the provision and care of suitable accommodations, medical attention, finance, including auditing and bookkeeping, the preparation and the holding of contests, their schedules, and external relations in competition.

(p. 78)

This section of the study examines the issue of control—the governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929—through analyzing constituent use of authority and power. The roles and responsibilities of constituents within the ideal athletic authority structure are presented, followed by an analysis of the discordant practices of those constituents that permitted gaps in the use of authority to occur. The study then examines the types of power utilized by constituents to fill in those authority gaps.

Authority

In the early decades of the Twentieth Century, institutions of higher education were governed within structures where constituent roles and responsibilities were specified.
Constituents were delegated degrees of authority within bureaucratic hierarchies and these roles enabled or restricted their participation in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The constituent roles that exercised authority in the typical collegiate governance structure of 1929 included the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic administrator, the coach, the alumni, the conferences, and the NCAA. (Savage, 1929; Elliott, 1935) Constituents did not always fulfill nor limit themselves to the use of their prescribed authority roles, thus they established breaches in the authority structure. These breaches were quickly filled by constituents who were not ordained with the authority to fulfill the role, but who began to use power, either legitimately or illegitimately.

In order to determine the dysfunctions of intercollegiate athletic governance in 1929, this study first explains the ideal authority roles and responsibilities of constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance. That explanation is followed by a description of authority gaps that emerged and the power used to fill those gaps, which are examined through the Savage Report's (1929) explanation of the practices, policies, and circumstances of the constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance.

**Ideal Authority: Institutional Actors**

State governments granted charters authorizing the operation of private institutions and served as the ultimate authority in public institutions as well. The institutional governing board
assumed, or was granted, the authority as the pinnacle of governance for the university and all of its programs. The governing board was primarily concerned with policy-making and procuring resources. (Elliott et al., 1935) At most institutions the authority to appoint athletic committees and personnel fell to the governing board. Some boards delegated this authority to the president or director of physical education. In rare instances, the board might contravene a president's recommendation, generally within financial or personnel matters. (Savage et al., 1929) However, the final authority over policy, whether university or athletic, usually rested with, and was delegated by, the university governing board. The "simple principle that boards should legislate and presidents should execute" applied to all areas of responsibility, with the rare exception of legal responsibilities and investments. (Elliott et al., 1935, p. 187)

The university president was generally appointed by the board as the chief executive officer and was delegated the authority to carry out university policy. In the ideal authority hierarchy, the president was responsible for athletics, although he delegated that authority to other university officials. The president often delegated the authority to control finances and maintain accounts to administrative officials such as the treasurer, or to athletic officials, such as the director or coach. Eligibility decisions were often delegated to the registrar or athletic committee.
Personnel selection decisions were not as consistent across institutions. Athletic personnel decisions, such as the choice of coaches, were often delegated to an athletic board, the athletic director, or even the alumni. (Savage et al., 1929) In some cases, the governing board retained its authority in athletic personnel matters, as well. For example, one-third of the institutions in the Savage Report required a cooperative effort in the selection of a coach. The final choice was usually made by the president, the athletic director, the alumni, or, far less frequently, the faculty. The choice was made in varying degrees of cooperation with the president, trustees, faculty, alumni, undergraduates, athletic director, or athletic committee. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) Boards, through presidents, delegated the authority of personnel selection to some form of athletic committee in 30% of the cases; to the alumni in 20%; to the athletic director in 20%; to the faculty in 17%; and to remain with the president in 17%. Appointments, equally as diverse among universities, were conferred by the trustees in 36% of the cases; the president in 28%; the athletic committee in 18%; the alumni in 11%; the athletic director in 3%; and the faculty in 2%. Approval of athletic personnel by the board trustees was required in 47% of all the institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The board and the president were most often responsible for the selection process, but rarely contravened the decisions of those to whom they had delegated authority.

Eliot (1908, p. 238) stated that the president should be "an
inventing and animating force, and often a leader; not a ruler or an autocrat." The president was charged with protecting the mission of the institution and inspiring the university constituents. Savage (1929, p. 265) suggested that he was "the man who is the most likely to succeed in uprooting the evils..." of college athletics. However the president did play the only part: "The defense of the intellectual integrity of the college and of the university lies with the president and faculty. With them also lies the authority." (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx)

Savage (1929, p. 100, 101) identified three types of faculty involvement: 1) pseudo-faculty control, wherein faculty authority was overshadowed by other interested parties such as coaches or athletic directors, or was restricted to certain issues such as eligibility, or was given to coaches and physical educators who were "elevated to faculty status"; 2) faculty guidance, wherein the faculty oversaw student-run athletic programs; and 3) true faculty control, wherein athletics were regulated, usually through committee, by academic faculty members. Princeton, Yale, Tulane, North Carolina, and Georgia were among only eight of the 130 universities that were identified as having true faculty control. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) In many institutions, the faculty did have some authority, manifested in a variety of structures, but by 1929, direct guidance of undergraduate sports by academic faculty had given way to other forms of governance. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) Faculty were involved generally on a limited basis: in only four institutions was a faculty member
responsible for athletic accounts, and in all four through athletic committees, councils, or boards. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 89)

Athletic personnel in academic enterprises were not endowed automatically with status within the system. Athletic coaches and directors had to gain legitimacy through "faculty" appointment by the board, and, with the institution's blessing. Subsequently they were delegated the responsibility and authority to oversee athletics. Athletic administrators and managers, who were often alumni, were delegated responsibility for athletic finances and daily operations in many institutions. (Savage et al., 1929) Like athletic administrators, physical education directors, coaches, and managers were usually very prominent in athletic policy making and generally were responsible for the execution of most athletic policies. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) Athletic managers and coaches were even authorized in some universities to control and maintain athletic accounts. However, they generally had little authority in personnel decisions, having the selection authority in 20% of the institutions and appointment authority in only 3% of the institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) In many instances, however, athletic managers and coaches were delegated the responsibility of verifying an athlete's eligibility. To have the eligibility approved, which was almost always the case, they typically reported to a representative body or some form of athletic association or committee. (Savage et al., 1929)
The majority of the 130 universities had some form of athletic association, committee, council, or board. (Savage et al., 1929) Athletic associations, committees, councils, and boards varied from institution to institution in their composition of members. The most common form of athletic board was based upon balanced representation of a number of athletic interests. Constituents involved in athletic boards included college administrators and officials, athletic managers and coaches, academic faculty members, alumni, and undergraduates. Athletic associations, generally possessing athletic interests, were often responsible for athletic accounts, finance, and personnel. (Savage et al., 1929) In 62% of the institutions offering athletic subsidies, athletic associations were involved in the funding and dispersal of subsidies to athletes. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 241)

Athletic board members varied in their degree of authority, in part based on the responsibilities delegated to the board. Alumni gained legitimate authority through athletic boards and associations. In many institutions, such as Brown, Columbia, and Pennsylvania, they legitimately controlled financial policy through the athletic board. In 20% of the institutions, the alumni selected athletic personnel, and in 11%, they had the authority to appoint athletic personnel through the athletic board. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 164) The relation of the alumni to their Alma Mater was ideally based upon an affection that led to service. In reality, however, alumni served as a "source of
funds" solicited in support of university finances. (Savage et al., p. 191) An estimated 20% of all alumni were active in either the control of athletic policies, or the recruiting and financing of athletes, or both. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 192) While alumni gained authority through the athletic boards, undergraduate participation on athletic boards was often superficial, such as at the University of Pennsylvania, where they were not permitted to vote on such key issues as finances. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 89)

The authority of athletic associations, committees, councils, and boards did vary from institution to institution. Those boards with alumni and athletic interests generally had final authority over critical issues such as finances and personnel, but faculty-controlled committees were typically advisory bodies. (Savage et al., 1929) The majority of boards that played a supervisory role did so because they had the ability to obtain the funds necessary for the operation of the athletic programs. (Savage et al., 1929) These athletic boards and committees were generally dominated by athletic interests such as physical education directors, managers, coaches, and even alumni. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 100, 101) Presidents had authority over athletic committees at Iowa and Minnesota, but generally the committees were appointed by, and responsible to, the governing board. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) Meanwhile, the faculty rarely dominated the athletic boards. Athletic committees with true faculty interests, such as those at Lafayette College
and the University of Southern California, remained advisory in nature, dealing with eligibility approval and only such policy that immediately concerned academics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100)

**Ideal Authority; External Actors**

Conferences were granted authority by their members, and exerted that authority in attempts to standardize practices across institutions in areas such as player eligibility and contest scheduling. These areas of standardization primarily addressed policy issues and practical concerns that enhanced competition but did little else. Conferences established minimum academic standards for athletic eligibility that, in some cases, were further strengthened by individual institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 96) Some conferences, such as the Pacific Coast, the Southwest, and the Mid-Western, required "certification" of athletes' eligibility through a normal institutional channel, such as the registrar. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 201) The Mid-Western and the Rocky Mountain conferences were among a number who required "faculty control" as a condition of membership. The typical athletic conference of the day was:

"... a voluntary regional association of colleges and universities through elected or appointed representatives for discussion of problems concerning intercollegiate athletics, formulation of regulations to govern athletic contests between member institutions, and usually the conduct of competitions in various branches of inter-college
... athletics. Thus its functions are deliberative, regulatory, and executive." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 199)

The authority of conferences varied, yet most possessed "police functions" in order to enforce rules. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 199) Conferences also influenced athletic scheduling of member schools, often determining who and when contests would be played. Conferences had the authority to approve or restrict opponents and to determine the sites of contests.

The Savage Report (1929, p. 199) explained the NCAA, which was founded in 1906, as a "national representative body" with "many of the characteristics of an athletic conference." The difference between the NCAA and conferences was essentially in its "size, membership, and geographic extent." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 199) Creating "countrywide affiliations, the NCAA was "open to all colleges, universities, and institutions of learning" in the U.S. and was "deliberative and legislative in its activities." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 208-209) Its resolutions nominally supported the notion of college amateurism and sportsmanship. With the support of its membership, the NCAA was granted authority as a national organization functioning as a collective body to promote the ideals of educationally-beneficial athletics. Its functions included framing the rules of athletics, preserving records, and arbitrating member disputes. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 209, 210) The rules and purposes of the NCAA were viewed by the Savage Report (1929) as "so important and ...so wholesome," that they were "almost impeccable." (p. 210, 211)
These rules called for "institutional control," "amateurism," "strict eligibility rules," and "the supervision of the regulation and conduct, by its constituent members, of intercollegiate sports." (Savage et al. 1929, p. 210)

Through its collective proclamations, the NCAA began to emerge as a national influence on athletics; however, the association held no enforcement authority for the rules or recommendations that it adopted. At the time, regional conferences actually exercised more authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Individual institutional members authorized conferences to enforce the conference rules on their campuses.

**Breaches in Authority**

The ideal governance structure on paper often does not represent reality. College athletics in 1929 was no exception. "Slogans", such as "athletics for all" or "every student a player", commonly took the place of genuine educationally-inspired athletic policy. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Authority breaches, which led to dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, occurred when constituents either did not fulfill or overextended their prescribed authority roles. For example, a "politically minded governing board" dominated by trustees with athletic interests could extend their authority, or override the authority they had delegated to the president to execute policy, if specific policies contradicted the board's athletic interests. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) While the
governing board could exert its authority in such manner legally, such action contravened the nature of the authority roles in the governance of higher education and athletics.

Presidents were generally authorized by trustees in the operation of college athletics; however, they were often too busy with day-to-day duties and they neglected athletic policy. (Savage et al., 1929) Recognizing the potential profits and prestige available to the institution, presidents "left the shaping of athletic policies" to constituents with athletic interests in order to capitalize on the external relations of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 80) Presidential involvement in athletic governance ranged from "deliberate unconcern" to "active participation", with most occupying the "mid-ground" in delegating authority. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Presidents at Wisconsin and Dickinson attempted to justify the administrative independence of athletics, while at Oglethorpe and Allegheny they participated fully in the minute details of athletic operation. (Savage et al., p. 79)

However, most university presidents were pragmatic in their delegation of authority in athletics. Some presidents overlooked activities inconsistent with proper administration because they coveted the financial rewards of winning athletic teams. The Savage Report (1929) noted the reluctance of some university authorities, including presidents, to take an unpopular stand; therefore, presidents, through the delegation of authority, allowed athletic policy to be determined by a variety of special
interest groups. Presidents were at times unconcerned with athletics or chose not to make decisions regarding athletics that would be unpopular with either the alumni or the undergraduates since student fees supplemented gate receipts, from alumni and students, and outside revenue in funding athletics. (Savage et al., 1929)

Undergraduates were generally supportive of commercialized athletics for its entertainment value and prompting of school spirit. Undergraduates retained some formal authority in athletics at a few institutions; however, their use of authority was rare and usually bound by the guidance of older, wiser constituents. (Savage et al., 1929) Students served on athletic committees, but in many cases could not vote on financial or eligibility matters. The Savage Report (1929) found the "meagerness" of undergraduate responsibility "regrettable," but noted that it would be unwise to entrust "all of the weight and the complexity of the financial burden" of intercollegiate athletics "upon undergraduate shoulders." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102) There was also no undergraduate involvement in the NCAA, which was influenced instead by "men to whom athletics are a vocation." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 211) The exclusion of undergraduates from authority in athletic governance was "by no means an accident" having been accomplished by "deliberate calculation" of higher authorities, including coaches and faculty. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102)

While some faculty attempted to collectively assert
themselves in athletics through advisory committees, most faculty members were "aloof from athletics ... concerning themselves with the study and the lamp," and leaving athletic governance to others. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Faculty control" often existed in name only, such as in the Missouri Valley Conference universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) In these institutions, faculty had nominal authority, usually through a committee, but athletics were controlled by alumni or administrators with athletic interests. The majority of faculty members maintained a "laissez-faire" policy toward the administration of college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) Of the three types of faculty control--pseudo-faculty control, faculty guidance, and true faculty control--the most prevalent was pseudo-faculty control. (Savage et al., 1929) The faculty nominally gained control at some institutions through coaches who received faculty appointments. Control of athletics by faculty members whose interest was in "physical education" was not held in high regard, as these faculty positions were not delineated clearly from athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 10, 11) In addition, the faculty involved in athletic boards often had personal athletic interests; faculty athletic representatives were likely to receive an "honorarium" from the athletic department. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 101)

Intercollegiate athletics, intramurals, and physical education were housed together at most institutions of the day. Physical education directors, athletic managers, and coaches,
while a part of the legitimate governance structure, had personal interests because, in many cases, they received money from athletics. In athletic governance, athletic managers, coaches, and physical education directors all served "many masters," and were criticized for their special interests. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 182) While many faculty members "began their careers as hired coaches of teams," the "faculty status" of professional coaches was not highly regarded by non-coaching faculty members, who were necessarily concerned only with the intellectual. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 22-23) The academic faculty, with intense demands on their time, did not actively fight to control athletics, despite some rhetorical complaints. "There was scarcely a struggle for control," as academic faculty directed their interests elsewhere than athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23)

"Faculty status" coaches, because of their athletic interests, were most often in physical education. (Savage et al., 1929) To the dismay of academic faculty, the "obvious" difference between physical and academic studies was often "neglected" with regard to coaches' salaries, particularly football, as football coaches' salaries averaged 18% higher than their academic counterparts' salaries at over 100 institutions. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 171, 172) However, the funds used to pay coaches were not always from the institution, coming from athletic revenues instead. Coaches who were paid through athletic associations generally received higher salaries, while coaches with "faculty
status received 27% less than their non-faculty counterparts. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches typically had low status among faculty on campus, but they received significant remuneration, and with it influence, from commercially-driven constituents. However, while coaches were typically well rewarded in financial terms, they had little security.

"Faculty status" did little to protect coaches from the pressures of producing victories. Losing teams were found to be a factor in the dismissal of coaches in many more instances than administrators were willing to admit. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 170) Coaches' status as faculty was viewed by academicians as insincere, although it was founded on the notion that a coach should be a man of high morals concerned with student learning. They also believed the practice of assigning faculty status to coaches was dishonest because coaches, whether broadly trained or specialized, were not considered equal to the faculty whose chief concerns were intellectual. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 167) The academic credentials of 104 football coaches showed that 17% had no college degree, 70% had at least a bachelors degree, 7% had a masters degree, and 6% had a doctoral degree. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 162-163) Coaches were typically regarded as "evil geniuses", operating against academic interests. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 187). The quality of coaches' character was questioned because many had come from physical education, athletic, or business backgrounds, not serious academic backgrounds.

Coaches were expected to "produce" (victories) in order to
retain their employment. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 182) They had to teach, tutor, and obtain players, and deal with extramural relations such as other colleges and coaches and with prospective players, local merchants, the alumni and townsmen who provided financial support, and the press who provided publicity. The "complexity of duties", legitimate or otherwise, associated with coaching was comparable "only with that of the president." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 175) The authority to fulfill the vast responsibilities associated with coaching rarely matched the expectations of the position, but was legitimized to a degree by awarding faculty status to coaches.

Conferences often required "complete faculty control" and a representative body; however, it was not unusual for "faculty control" to exist "in name but scarcely in fact." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 100, 201) Pseudo-faculty control resulted in academic faculty being authorized to control specified issues such as eligibility, usually through athletic committees that served in an advisory capacity. Through the assignment of faculty status to coaches, the "actual control" as authorized by the university was often determined to "rest with the directors or the coaches." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 100) The NCAA, because of its lack of enforcement authority, unwittingly allowed the control of athletics to be in the hands of athletic interests. The NCAA, like conferences, relied primarily on individual universities to monitor and enforce the rules and standards of practice. Without external enforcement, many universities relinquished control of
athletic governance to a variety of constituents with overriding commercial interests.

**Power**

The potential financial gains and the impact upon institutional reputation and "a thousand other forces" made college athletics in 1929 "joint cooperative enterprises involving presidents, trustees, faculties, alumni, townsmen, and the vast publics of the radio and the press." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Many institutions had "no settled athletic policy" as a result. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) With the control of athletic policy "grounded in human relationships," the desire for "power and influence" among a variety of constituents was the "source of most controversies over athletic administration and control." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Noting the need to differentiate between "theoretical and actual control,"--or for the purposes of this study between authority and power--Savage et al., (1929) stated:

> It is one thing to announce a program of athletic administration and another to effectuate it, it is a third and entirely different matter to maintain in its practical application the balance of powers which any such system is designed to guarantee." (p. 77)

While, ideally, athletic policy would be guided by educational motives, "in reality, athletics involve several groups," each of whom possessed "an interest which savors of the proprietary." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Conflicts of interests
resulted from the "necessity to control." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Control of college athletics resulted from the application of power and/or authority by constituents with personal interests in athletics. Different constituents exercised varying degrees of power at individual institutions. Some constituents utilized both authority and power in the governance of college athletics; others had official authority in the athletic governance structure, but exercised little or no power in the process of governance. Still others used power to influence or control athletic policy and practices, but had no legitimate authority in the governance structure. Savage et al., (1929) cited the constituents in this struggle for control:

Trustees, faculties, directors, alumni, townspeople, all, indeed, except for the undergraduates, who might profit most by athletics, have expected, and in some instances demanded, that the shaping of athletic policies be entrusted at least in part to them. (p. 81-82)

Noting the many masters to be served and the resultant "confusion of aims to which athletics at present are subject," the Report delineated myriad interests of the constituents involved in college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) First, the board was interested in athletics as a source of wealth to bolster the university, and found it "comforting to find one source of funds that gushes without the use of a rod." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Presidents were involved with athletic governance "by virtue of their responsibilities and
functions as coordinators of general policy." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Faculties were charged with promoting educational interests. Directors and departments of physical education were concerned because of their "convictions concerning the values inherent in athletics as well as because of more personal ambitions and reasons." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)

Alumni were interested in athletics because of their loyalty to Alma Mater, and "less admittedly," because their financial support of the institution "is an established fact of university policy, they are held to have in justice a right to a voice in the conduct of those activities which afford the spectacular and concentrated diversion." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Townsmen impacted athletics "because of the financial returns from the crowds of people who attend games, not to mention the active civic pride of trade and welfare organizations." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) Finally, undergraduates were not included, although they were interested, "not because athletics necessarily fire them with a spontaneous loyal enthusiasm but because it is nowadays assumed that athletics benefit the institution;" and because athletics spurred interest in physical activity, which was "regarded as 'good for' undergraduates;" and, "finally, because teams that 'represent' a university are traditionally composed of student members of the university." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81)

Based on varied motives and interests regarding athletics, some constituents vied for and other relinquished control,
whether through hierarchical lines of authority or informal channels of power. The Savage Report (1929) concluded that "the actual weight of authority and control rests upon quite other shoulders than those intended by the framers of the systems." The control exercised by these various constituents can be separated into three modes of power available to, or used by, constituents in college athletics, as identified by Wolf (1990). These modes of power are interpersonal, tactical, and structural.

**Interpersonal Power**

Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group to impose its will upon another individual or group, irrespective of the field of play. It results from the "sequences of interactions and transactions among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) The use of interpersonal power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics manifested itself through friendships, loyalties, and resource exchanges. Board members and presidents delegated and often relinquished control by authority, which permitted gaps to be formed and interpersonal power to be inserted by commercial influences. Personal friendships between coaches and board members, or coaches and presidents, overrode the normal lines of responsibility and control. This gap in authority resulted in the control of athletic finances by coaches who "assumed or maintained authority which was vested theoretically in the director of physical education" at institutions such as North Carolina and Ohio Wesleyan. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 167) Often this use of interpersonal power occurred
among football coaches who circumvented athletic administrators at some universities. However, athletic administrators were also involved in controlling athletic resources at institutions such as Amherst, Georgia, and Tennessee, where they had personal friendships with the president or board members. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 89)

In universities with predominantly commercial athletic endeavors, it was "not astonishing that the name of the modest gentleman who occupies the president’s chair should be less widely known than that of the coach who he hires to develop a team." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 214) A coach’s consistent popularity with undergraduates also strengthened his position. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 187) Coaches, and in some cases athletic directors, used the control of resources to obtain interpersonal power with other constituents. Coaches impacted the board members or presidents only when those constituents could profit from commercial athletics professionally or personally. If the board or president perceived a potential for gain, they were willing to ignore the operation of college athletics.

Coaches also used interpersonal power in obtaining resources for themselves and their program. For example, in the recruiting of prospective athletes, coaches commonly used interpersonal power to arrange jobs and other special conditions for athletes in order to persuade the recruit to attend their university. (Savage et al., 1929) Alumni and townsmen often provided the financial support for such endeavors, sometimes through their
interpersonal power in athletic associations, and thereby exerted interpersonal power over the coach in many instances as well. The friendship of a coach with an individual or group of alumni or townsmen, which was prompted by the financial interests of both parties, often led to a controlling influence by the alumni or townsmen. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 184)

The alumni, through "the persistence or the strength of character," came to dominate many of the athletic boards. An enthusiastic group of "well-meaning, but unwise," alumni with strong athletic interests and available resources could frequently influence athletic policy. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xx) These alumni used personal power to influence or control policy-making through the athletic board at institutions like Dartmouth, Colgate, Purdue, and the University of Pennsylvania. At Lehigh, Maryland, Purdue, Brown, and Amherst a single alumnus used interpersonal power to gain control of athletics. At Pennsylvania State, Allegheny, Dartmouth, and the University of Pennsylvania there was "absolute alumni control." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 82) The alumni gained this "dominion almost by default," since the faculty was not intimately involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, concentrating instead on academic concerns. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 24)

The alumni gained their interpersonal power through resource allocation. Since athletics offered "special training tables, the costly sweaters and extensive journeys in special Pullman cars," and since the costs of equipment and facilities rose steadily,
expenditures by commercial athletic departments rose accordingly; thus, increased funds were required for their support. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xxi, 23) Regular university sources could not support such commercial endeavors. Alumni who provided contributions received in return "a generous share" in the control of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) "Alumni who became active in that control gained or retained their power and prestige by their own contributions of money and by subscriptions they solicited from other alumni and friends of the college." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23)

The alumni sought personal financial gain and control of the visible athletic component of their Alma Mater. Their involvement extended into personnel decisions at some institutions. An unnamed "prominent coach," quoted in the Savage Report, explained that, "In most colleges coaches owe their jobs to different groups of alumni who are interested primarily in winning athletic contests for their institution." (1929, p. 164) The selection of the coach was usually "affected by the decisions of persons not immediately connected with the administration of the institution." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 165) In most institutions, the alumni was a "group to be placated at almost any sacrifice." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) The motive of many alumni involved in college athletics was often the pursuit of status and prestige. And that pursuit was often unchecked because of their use of personal resources to secure their interpersonal power.
**Tactical Power**

Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to "circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power was applied by constituents as an instrument of power to circumscribe authority because governing boards, presidents, or other university administrators delegated authority inappropriately. While boards and presidents were certainly too busy not to delegate authority, its over-delegation created gaps that were filled by constituents exercising tactical power. Conversely, university boards or presidents who under-delegated authority because of their desire to profit from athletics by increasing institutional prestige also generated authority gaps that were filled by the use of tactical power.

Boards and presidents at times permitted abuses, at times ignored abuses, and at times participated in abuses. Savage (1929) conjectured that in some cases there was a "powerlessness of educational leaders" to control commercialized intercollegiate athletics, in large part due to commercial influences filling authority gaps. (p. 23) Alumni, coaches, or athletic administrators set up unauthorized "slush funds" to cover expanding athletic operations. At the University of Wisconsin, for example, athletic revenues were used for illegitimate expenses such as illegal trips. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 90)

"Without exception," the Savage Report (1929) concluded, it
was better to have university administrators in direct control of athletic finances. (p. 90) "The control of athletic moneys by university officers eliminates slush funds ...," that could be used for inappropriate activities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 90) However, "slush funds" existed at many institutions, whether disbursed through individuals, athletic associations, or university officers. Equipment, travel, and "special personnel" were generally paid for by athletic funds. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) At Dartmouth and Ohio State even the salaries of some non-athletic university officers and employees were "charged against athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88)

Often when high salaries were paid to coaches, the president or other university officers had little power over the source of the funds; therefore, they had little power over the dispersal of the funds as well. For example, football coaches in particular gained financially through the gate receipts and publicity they provided the university through winning teams. Average salaries of football coaches was $6107, with a range of $1800 to $14,000; athletic managers and physical education directors ranged from $1000 to $14,000, averaging $5,095. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) In comparison, professors averaged $5158, with a high of $12,000; and deans averaged $6409, with a high of $15,000. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 171) Coaches' salaries were higher when athletic department funds were used, which occurred in the majority of cases. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 172) Coaches "elevated to faculty
status" generally received less than their non-faculty counterparts. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 171)

Faculties were supposed to protect academic interests and be involved in athletic governance for educational reasons. However, few researchers had "taken the trouble to analyze precisely what those educational reasons are or may be." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) In addition, the profit from intercollegiate athletics, especially football, "may be put to academic uses in the form of new buildings and increased equipment;" therefore, athletics were seen by some faculty as having residual value. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 81) However, most academic faculty voiced objection to commercial athletics. The "ideals to which so much lip service" was rendered by faculty were not actively pursued by those same faculty, though. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79)

Since the faculty was focused on other interests such as research, specialized coaches, physical education directors, and athletic managers emerged to run athletic operations. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 21) Along with the faculty, administrative officials such as registrars--even when involved with falsified eligibilities--were presented as the "victims" of the system they were supposed to prevent, while coaches were found to be the "evil geniuses" orchestrating the deception. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 99, 187). For example, coaches used students in fraternities to help recruit prominent athletes. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 239) Once within the student body, an athlete then "stated" (self-reported) his own eligibility, which was usually
verified by the coach and certified rather than scrutinized by the registrar, even when both knew his statement to be false. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 97-99)

Athletes were also recruited by paid professionals—athletic coaches and directors—and subsidized by the administration in the form of scholarships and other benefits. The "impecunious athlete," who would otherwise not go to college, often had his hand out. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 227) "Mercenary athlete(s)" used their athletic prowess as an instrument of tactical power by "shopping" for the best offer, being "coddled" along the way by coaches in need of their services. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 228, 229) However, prominent prospects whose services were obtained through subsidies—the majority of whom "valued dollars and cents"—were regarded as "hirelings." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 184, 232) In order to gain the services of these prized recruits, coaches used subsidies, which usually included room, board, tuition, books, supplies, and incidental fees, as an instrument of tactical power. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 259) The better athletes received jobs and spending money as well at some universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 258) The best performers even received "guarantees" or "pay checks." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 259, 260) Academically, the athlete could obtain "gratuitous assistance in study by his fellow undergraduates" at nearly all universities. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 262) Most of these arrangements were made by coaches in order to attract and maintain the best athletes.
While it was normal for coaches to be "elevated to faculty status," most often, the power of coaches and athletic directors was derived from the vast amounts of athletic wealth they oversaw. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102) While some institutions provided funds to athletics through normal university channels, often athletic departments were responsible for and unchecked when obtaining the vast sums of money used in the operation of commercialized intercollegiate athletics. These monies could be used as instruments of tactical power. Athletic funds were sometimes used as an "honorarium" to the faculty athletic representative, thus ensuring athletic interests were realized. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 101) Athletic department personnel dispersed "slush funds" to pay for athletic interests, such as subsidies to athletes, who sometimes received 60 cents per hour from the athletic department for the same job for which a non-athlete would receive half that wage. Athletic personnel provided game tickets to athletes for scalping; some tickets brought as much as $100.00. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 263)

Athletic coaches, directors, and managers attained a level of tactical power through their involvement in the daily conduct of athletic affairs. But, there were limits to their power. Losses reduced available resources, and the loss of too many games resulted in termination of many a coach. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 170) Coaches were expected to produce "results" as defined by a variety of constituent interests. (Savage et al.,
Among those constituents exerting control over coaches' employment was the alumni.

As alumni recognized that they had the control of some vital resources, they moved toward a "proprietary" role on campus in "governance and trusteeship, whether of the university or of athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 191) An estimated 20% of alumni were involved in athletics. Their interests were usually connected to tangible (financial) matters because that was the university's interest in them. Their relationship to athletics "manifested itself in two ways: the control of policies, and the recruiting and financing of athletes." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 192) In some institutions, such as Dartmouth, alumni had few limits placed on their legitimized authority. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 96) Within the hierarchical structure, they dominated some athletic associations that were responsible only to the governing board. And with the board often comprised of alumni, the associations enjoyed great latitude. As an avenue to service, the appointment of alumni advisory committees to governance positions in various branches of athletics was a practice that resulted in alumni domination of athletic governance.

Local merchants collaborated with alumni in recruiting and subsidizing by "offering rewards" to the best athletes, thereby gaining influence. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 184) Alumni and businessmen who provided resources obtained an "acquiescence of influence" from the institutions that led to a "domination of college athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 23) Alumni influence
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in recruiting became commonplace. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 228) They intervened with prospective athletes on behalf of the coach. They provided jobs to athletes, at times $150.00 per month when tuition averaged $270.00 per year. (Savage et al. 1929, p. 242) In 12% of the institutions offering subsidies, the alumni alone provided the money; and they provided at least a portion of the money in over 50% of the universities offering subsidies. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 241)

Prized athletes received not only subsidies from coaches, but also "such valuable considerations as automobiles, clothes, typewriters, and haberdashery ... if not cash" for advertising "typewriters, clothing, sweaters, and other merchandise." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 185, 277) Players also sold their names and photographs "for advertising cigarettes." At times, the athlete used tactical power within the press to gain profit and publicity against "good counsel from the athletic authorities of his college." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 276) Thereby, a small group of undergraduates, namely the athletes, while viewed by some as "exploited in news stories, columns of comment, and illustrations, and even in advertisements," individually used tactical power and reaped many personal rewards from the intercollegiate athletic system, which in turn empowered the media to influence the athletes directly. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 275)

As newspapers became "economic products," the press responded to public interest in college athletics by presenting a
"distorted" view of universities that emphasized the importance of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 266) Savage et al. (1929) feared that "overstressing" athletics would result in "seriously impaired" relations between colleges and the public. (p. 266) However, the Savage Report (1929) conceded that "college athletics are news and news that appeals to many readers as the most consistently interesting and important aspect of college life." (pp. 266-267) As a result of public interest, profits associated with college sports rose.

As profits for newspapers, advertisers, and college athletic programs increased, the press coverage of sports likewise increased. Newspaper circulation departments, "the thermometers of public interest and financial success," were concerned with the quantity of sporting news because of the increased public demands. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) The press responded to increased public interest in college athletics: 50% of all newspapers had over 15% of their pages dedicated to sports, while some dedicated as much as 25% for sports pages. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) In the 15 years prior to the Savage Report (1929), the amount of college sports coverage increased 300-400% in several major city papers, such as the New York Times. (pp. 267-272) "Sensationalism" was commonplace in sports reporting because it stimulated public interest in college athletics and increased readership; however, it also obscured the differences in college athletics from professional competition. (Savage et al., 1929,
Some college athletes and prospects even obtained "press agents." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 283)

Most universities obtained "publicity officers," many of whom were paid with athletic funds, to deal with the press. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 283) While accusations persisted that professional sports writers were bribed by coaches to write favorably about him or his team, this type of "graft" in the form of cash and perquisites was "not substantiated in a single case." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 278) It was certain, however, that advertising and positive publicity for the coach and his team did reflect favorably on the institution. The coach had to please the alumni and the general public; therefore, favorable press was an invaluable instrument in his tactical efforts. As Savage et al., (1929) indicated, "the desire of the colleges and their partisans for the good-will of the public is due much of the publicity hunting that now obtains in athletics." (p. 284) By the time of the Savage Report (1929), in no other area was the "public interest so keen as in athletics." (p. 194)

Public interest in college athletics was "largely ascribable to the emphasis laid by our newspapers upon athletics in college life." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 208, 287) The Savage Report (1929) noted the aphorism that "a newspaper is no better than its sporting page." (p. 287) Newspaper publishers were "fully alert to the interest of their public in athletics," recognizing this, some charged the highest premium for advertising space in the sports pages. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 288) Thus, the interest of
the press in college athletics was "wholly financial,--a question of profit or loss." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289) Propelled by the potential for profit, public interest fostered professionalized commercial athletics. The commercial interests of intercollegiate athletics were the source of the structural power various constituents exerted on their behalf in the university.

Structural Power

Structural power shapes the social field of action. In its broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and orchestrates" the playing field and specifies the form and direction of power play. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) College athletics had been "transformed from a game played by boys to a profitable professional enterprise," which reflected the changes in the American university and in society in general. (Savage et al., 1929, p. viii) The weaknesses resulting from the "educational growth" of universities during the five decades prior to the Report were "due to our national tendency to compete and imitate." (Savage et al., 1929, p. xiii) Universities wanted to be alike in order to serve the "masses." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. xvii, xviii) Mass education, a common outcome sought by many universities, was one component of structural power. Mass entertainment was another. Both were results of the evolving mass society; and all three supported the structural power of
commercialized athletic competition. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. xvii, xviii)

In describing what the authors perceived as the central problem in college athletics in 1929, the Savage Report cited "commercialism and all the evils that follow in its train," which appeared to encompass most facets of college athletics and drive most non-academic interests surrounding college athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The Savage Report (1929) defined "commercialism" in college athletics as:

... the placing of a higher value upon monetary and material returns, whether direct or indirect, from any athletic activity than is placed upon its returns in recreation, health, and physical and moral well-being. (p. 11)

Money stimulated the growth of and desire for "winning" athletic programs that, consequently, valued monetary and material returns more than any other potential benefits of athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 11) The control of the abundant financial resources surrounding athletics, which included the control of accounting procedures, revenue sources, expenditures and dispersement, scheduling, and facilities and equipment, was central to the development of commercialized athletics. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 102) In most cases, the execution of athletic policy, the day-to-day operation of athletic programs, and the daily supervision of athletic monies was left to and conducted by the professional athletic personnel paid with independent athletic, not university, funds. At times, these professionals were responsible
to a representative advisory body, which itself was usually comprised of constituents with commercial interests.

The vast and "steadily mounting" funds that athletics, "and especially athletic success," brought, created within the university an "exaggeration of the importance of athletics and especially football in American college life." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) Public interest, both reflected in and stimulated by the commercial press, empowered the athletic interests associated with the university. The power, prestige, and money of football in particular, derived from the vast public interest, subordinated academics and other sports. This domination was manifested in coaches' salaries, conference rules, and institutional administrative policies. Institutions were concerned, at least rhetorically, with the "administrative control" of college athletics, but athletics served "many masters," few of whom had the intellectual interests of the university at heart.

The administration of American college athletics is in reality a problem in the adjustment of human relationships, and its solution depends upon a compromise and cooperation which some of those concerned appear unable or unwilling to accord. Yet few college administrative officers appear to have attended sufficiently to the fact that the devising of a logically complete system for the control of athletics has little relation to the way in which that system may operate over a period of years. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 78)
University, conference, and NCAA rules were expanding, yet "no rule, however well intended, can be made binding without the consent and the active cooperation of those to whom it applies." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 208) NCAA, conference, and institution rules restricting recruiting, subsidizing, and compensation of athletes were "unmistakable." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 203) The stated intent was clearly to promote amateurism in college athletics. Yet, privately, 75% of all institutions offered subsidies to athletes, some through regular university funding, most through athletic revenue. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 241) In addition, the most "elastic" rules allowed professional summer baseball. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 204) The Savage Report (1929) noted the stretching of the rules "involving ethical values, 'the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'" (Savage et al. 1929, p. 203) The evasion of rules reveals the interests of constituents in maintaining the status quo of the structural power in which college athletics were played.

Whatever reasons are urged for countenancing procedures which contravene and nullify the fine phrases in which conferences indulge concerning the amateur status, the real reason is this: universities and colleges have found that unless they relax their rules regarding professionalism and wink at flagrant abuses they cannot win enough games to satisfy their constituents and continue their large expenditures." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)

The Savage Report (1929) determined that, rather than curtailing
commercial operations, "the university of the present day enters eagerly ..." into commercial athletics, and that the "weakness of the American university as it exists today lies in its lack of intellectual sincerity." (pp. xvi, xviii) "The availability of such resources stimulates" the desire for successful teams and the subsequent profits. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 88) The "compromises" that universities made to maintain commercialized athletic programs gave an air of hypocrisy to the whole of higher education. (Savage et al., 1929, p. xxi) While various types of power were being utilized by constituents to fill in gaps left by the use and misuse of legitimate authority, the structural power of commercialized athletics became the dominant force in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

The governing board and the president welcomed the additional revenues afforded by commercialized college athletics: demonstrated by board formation of policy, and by presidential execution of policy. Administrations accepted the "notion that the first essential to the execution of any athletic policy is money, and plenty of it." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 79) Governing boards and presidents used the structural power of commercial resources in some institutions by extending their own authority in areas of finance. As a result, boards and presidents "have profitted by it; the task of finding money for new equipment or new buildings has been lightened." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 307)

Boards and presidents also succumbed to the structural power of commercialized athletics by delegating authority to commercial
athletic interests. As noted above, they allowed athletic administrators or coaches to control athletic finances, or they placed prominent alumni in control of athletic boards, as was the case at universities such as Brown, Purdue, Colgate, Pennsylvania State, Lehigh, Amherst, Georgia, Dartmouth, Allegheny, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 81, 82) The Savage Report (1929) presented athletics as a relatively unrestricted commercial system wherein administrations directed athletic policy toward profit, coaches bought and players sold their services, and faculty disconnected themselves from the entire endeavor.

While boards and presidents either quietly succumbed to or openly promoted commercial athletics, and the faculty grew powerless in their wake, athletic administrators and coaches profited by the publicity as well as the revenues of intercollegiate athletics. In order to obtain the best athletes, and thereby increase the potential for greater profits that strengthened structural power, coaches recruited and subsidized prospective players. Once the athlete matriculated, the coach or athletic administrator was responsible for verifying his eligibility, which was nearly always "certified" by higher authorities.

It would be idle to complain that conference rules are not enforced. Considering their complexity, the overwhelming desire for victory, and the reprehensible tendency to win games by means of 'jokers,' exceptions, and far-fetched
interpretations of rules or resolutions, the regulations of conferences are generally well administered. But he who believes that clean and sportsmanlike games, chivalrous rivalry, and magnanimous competition are to be attained through mere administrative provisions and procedure is indeed naive. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 207)

Many rules in intercollegiate athletics were ideals that were yet to be successfully implemented by many institutions. "Rules do not enforce themselves," and their value lies in their "observance." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 9, 10) Coaches and athletic directors controlled the daily operations of college athletics largely because that was their charge. Coaches, athletic directors, athletes, and alumni each had commercial athletic interests which motivated them to circumvent the spirit of the rules whether by intent or by circumstance. Often with the consent of the university administration, coaches and alumni worked closely together in recruiting and subsidizing athletes. For example, a coach's letter to an alumnus suggested a "roundabout method of attack" in recruiting a standout athlete, while another alumnus offered to "take matters up" since "the coach cannot make direct contact with players." (Savage et al., 1929, pp. 323-324) As a controlling influence in these practices, the alumni utilized interpersonal, tactical, and structural power, often outside the normal line of authority in the university. Where they were formally incorporated into the
organizational hierarchy, alumni came to dominate as a result of their combined legitimate authority and structural power.

While the university administration had authority over the practices of recruiting and subsidizing, they either allowed these practices to go unchecked or, in some cases, encouraged the practices for the same reasons the athletic personnel gave: prestige and revenue resulting from the exposure by the press and increased public interest. The practices of recruiting and subsidizing athletes resulted from the structural power of constituents who were operating in an autonomous atmosphere that permitted the practices to go unchecked. These constituents were empowered by their access to abundant revenues and by the intense public interest in commercial athletics.

The administrations of individual universities, along with conferences and the NCAA, on the one hand generated idealistic rules that were not enforced, while on the other hand protected commercial interests through commercially-motivated scheduling. Scheduling athletic contests for increased profit, whether motivated by alumni rivalries or by "the possibility of securing legislative appropriations" in a state such as Pennsylvania, was more the rule than the exception. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 99) Many university constituents acquiesced to the structural power of commercialism. Motivated by commercial interests, conferences used structural power to dominate scheduling, often restricting less popular non-conference opponents and scheduling instead contests of great interest to the public. The end result was an
increased threat to the "athletic autonomy" of the institution. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 99) However, university athletic governance was far from autonomous, as many external constituents exercised power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Alumni and townspeople exercised structural power in college athletics through their control of financial resources. "Slush funds" were created through the resources of alumni and townsmen, and disbursed by athletic officials, the alumni themselves, or the university athletic association. Each of these constituents hoped to profit, either personally or professionally, in the pursuit of winning athletic teams. Athletic funds paid for advertising, athletic subsidies, athletic personnel, and facilities. These expenditures were prompted by "two forces, namely, ... alumni and townspeople, and the profits ... from vast crowds." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 92) Public interest in college athletics resulted in commercial profits for the constituents in control, while it also empowered those same constituents. Public interest in college athletics was not only reflected in but also generated by the press in order to produce increased advertising profits. The press became the connection between the general public and the university through college athletics. Thus, the capitalistic press was empowered through the public's interest in commercial endeavors such as athletics. The availability of advertising money and publicity, which translated into revenue as public interest increased, influenced coaches', players', and universities' relations with the press. As these constituents
were guided by commercial interests, the press began to exert structural power in the operation of college athletics. The Savage Report (1929) described the media’s structural power, noting that the role of the press "in leading public opinion to esteem the true value" of college athletics was crucial for reform: "It is certain that without the help of the American newspaper, little if any improvement is possible in college athletics." (Savage et al., 1929, p. 284) However, the commercially-driven media did not "meet the responsibilities that power brings" in terms of "public welfare," but it was giving the public what it wanted and deserved. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 289)

**Breakdown of Governance**

The extent of commercialization in intercollegiate athletics reflected the changes that had occurred in universities, which resulted from the impact of the evolving mass society. Commercial college athletics became a system dominated by resources. Constituents utilized authority and power to obtain and control resources, monetary and otherwise. The Savage Report identified three critical areas for "control" of athletic resources: 1) finances, including revenues, expenditures, scheduling, and facilities; 2) personnel, including the selection of personnel and the determination of "faculty status" and "control"; and 3) student athletes, including the determination of athletic and academic eligibility of players, and the recruiting and subsidizing of athletes. (Savage et al., 1929, p. 77) The control
of these resources in athletics was exercised by a variety of constituents.

In nearly every instance, the governing board of the university had, whether exercised or not, the authority to determine athletic procedure. The college president received by delegation from the board the authority to set athletic policies and control athletic practices. In turn, he generally delegated it into other hands. The academic faculty normally had authority in name only. The committees controlled by academic faculty were advisory in nature.

In many cases, boards, presidents, and faculty relinquished their authority to athletic managers and coaches. Authority over day-to-day operations was often delegated directly by the board to athletic personnel. Coaches and athletic directors often received "faculty status" in order to function within the hierarchy of authority. At times, alumni managers were also incorporated into the lines of legitimate authority through faculty appointment. More frequently, alumni managers obtained authority in college athletics through formal representation on athletic boards or associations.

Collectively, institutions invested authority in representative bodies. On the regional level, conferences were typically given collective authority over scheduling and eligibility issues. And on the national level, the NCAA represented its member institutions with limited authority over specific issues such as eligibility as well.
Interpersonal, tactical, and structural modes of power were exercised in varying degrees by constituents both inside and outside the authority hierarchy. The governing board and president used power to support their authority over the operation of college athletics. Academic faculty members, disinterested in athletics, abdicated their advisory authority and refrained from seizing opportunities to solidify power. Aloof academicians joined the board and president to hand opportunities to utilize power over to commercial athletic interests.

It is not evident, however, had any of these legitimate authorities wanted to, that they could have controlled the structural power of the vast external forces that stimulated a commercial athletic system based upon profit and loss. Coaches and athletic directors, whose careers depended upon serving athletic interests and fielding successful (i.e., winning and profitable) teams, exerted tactical power in the execution of daily operations. When supported by structural power, they served other masters, namely commercial interests rather than academic interests.

The alumni garnered great influence in college athletics through exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power. Because they provided vast resources, alumni gained a proprietary interest in athletics. Local townsmen and merchants supported, financially and philosophically, the commercial growth of athletics as well since it translated into profit.

The structural power that drove the commercial athletics
system stemmed from stimulating profit and public interest. The commercial press, which both reflected and stimulated public interest, had vast structural power, serving as the reciprocal link between the public and college athletics. In the end, the power utilized to control college athletics derived simply from resources.

The incongruity between university practices in controlling athletics, whether implemented through the use of legitimate authority or illegitimate power, and the ideal collective policies promoted by bodies representative of the university revealed a systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929. In the majority of cases, collective lofty policy, particularly with regard to the control of resources, was subservient to pragmatic university efforts to profit from college athletics. In short, through their individual actions, university administrators utilized structural, tactical, and interpersonal power to promote the professionalized, commercial athletics that were demanded by the press and the public interest. On their own campus, they promoted these interests, at times willingly and at times without guile, at the expense of the collective public ideals that they promoted through the NCAA and conference associations. Whether university administrators engaged in willing hypocrisy or acquiescence to the manipulation of the structurally powered athletic constituents, the result was a dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
The dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929 resulted from constituents' exercise of various modes of power to fill the gaps in authority. The delegation of authority is necessary for the efficient operation of any university. Yet, in the case of athletic governance, unchecked delegation resulted in commercially-motivated constituents exerting interpersonal, tactical, and structural power by which a modicum of control was gained.

Despite rhetoric and collective proclamations to the contrary, the administrations of individual universities sought the profits of commercial athletics. As legitimate authority yielded, the unchecked structural power that controlled college athletics emerged from outside the university; although constituents with commercial athletic interests were formally incorporated into the organizational hierarchy as well. Whether constituents were internally or externally situated, their structural power resulted from the availability of potential resources. Resource-driven, profit-oriented, publicity-seeking commercialized athletic interests reflected and fed the public interests of the emerging mass society. Commercialized athletics thus served the commercialized society that subsidized them and subsequently empowered them.
CHAPTER V

POWER AND AUTHORITY IN CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS

Introduction

In modern college athletics, "the desire to win and the financial and more intangible rewards associated with success have, at times, led participants, administrators, supporters, and institutions to compromise fundamental principles of honesty and integrity." (NCAA, 1983) In 1989, the Knight Foundation Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics began what would be a three year and $3 million investigation of college sports. Its purpose was "to propose a reform agenda for college sports," which would ultimately restore "the public's trust in the integrity of college sports." (Knight Commission, 1993, pp. I, VII) Intercollegiate athletics "never has been devoid of scandals;" however "media attention has heightened awareness of abuses." (NCAA, 1983) Introducing the American Council on Education study of 1986, ACE President Robert Atwell commented on college sports' growing need for attention:

Intercollegiate athletics is one of the most volatile areas in higher education. The reputations of many institutions and their leaders have been sullied by scandals growing out of the extreme pressure that surrounds big time college athletics. Yet despite the importance of the subject, there has been very little scholarship in this area. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. v)
Founded by the NCAA with the conviction that the "abuses needed to be dealt with forcefully," the Select Committee on Athletic Problems and Concerns in Higher Education noted: "Despite all of the problems that have been associated with college athletics programs, their contributions to the overall well-being of higher education have outweighed their negative aspects." (NCAA, 1983) But the Knight Commission (1993) emphasized that athletic problems highlighted in the Savage Report of 1929 had only gotten worse.

"Governance is a prime issue confronting all segments of intercollegiate athletics." (NCAA, 1983) Each of the aforementioned national reports called for legitimate campus authorities to control college athletics, which "must be grounded in the academic traditions that created and nurtured" them. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) While college sports have "a legitimate and proper role to play in college and university life," the myriad abuses reflect systemic problems in governance. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. I)

**Authority**

Institutions of higher education, like other organizations, devise structures through which the enterprise is governed. Within these structures, roles are specified and ascribed various degrees of authority. Constituents in prescribed roles in intercollegiate athletic governance are thereby enabled or restricted by their degree of authority in the decision-making and implementation process. The authority of a prescribed role is
dependent upon the place that the role occupies in the chain of command or organizational framework. (Westmeyer, 1990)

The constituents in a normative collegiate governance system that exercise various degrees of authority based on their prescribed roles and responsibilities in the governance of intercollegiate athletics include the governing board, the president, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. These prescribed authority roles and responsibilities in the governance of intercollegiate athletics are generally more clearly delineated today than they were in 1929; therefore, there is more concern with roles currently. (Chait et al., 1993; Westmeyer, 1990)

However, constituents who undertake these roles in athletic governance do not always fulfill or limit themselves to the ideal authority roles and responsibilities. Relinquishing the prescribed responsibility or authority of a governance role stimulates the creation of a breach in authority. Constituent actions that create the gaps in authority allow other constituents to use power to fill in those gaps. Within the realm of big time intercollegiate athletics, when an authority breach occurs in any part of the governance structure, the gap is filled quickly and eagerly by persons, without legitimate authority but with something to gain, using power in the place of legitimate authority.

**Ideal Authority; Institutional Actors**

Ideal collegiate authority is entrusted, on behalf of the
public, by state charter to institutional governing boards. The
governing board operates as the "final institutional authority."
(Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) Governing boards are "expected to
be the champions of the institutions they serve," charged with
protecting the institutional mission. (Kauffman, 1980, p. 54)
Boards are often comprised of prominent citizens, alumni, and
business leaders with an "individual and collective competence of
recognized weight." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The board has
supreme responsibility for both long-term policy formation
relative to the university mission and fiscal matters. (Kauffman,
1980, p. 53)

The governing board is responsible to be "a fundamental
defense of the vested interests of society in the educational
institution." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) Ultimately
responsible for overseeing the long-term direction of the
university, the governing board defines, refines, and protects
the institutional mission. Typical governing board
responsibilities also include the formation or approval of
university policy relating future needs to "predictable
resources," obtaining necessary resources and capital for
operation, and broadly dealing with personnel. (Peterson et al.,
1991, p. 160)

The governing board's authority derives from the
institutions charter or directly from the state. As the pinnacle
of the university hierarchy, the board formulates policy, leaving
the execution of policy to other constituents. (Chait et al.,
1993) As the board oversees the implementation of "the policies and procedures of the institution under its jurisdiction," it "entrusts the conduct of administration to administrative officers." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 160) The governing board should "genuinely respect the legitimate roles of others in the governance process." (Chait et al., 1993, p. 127) Because of its farsighted concerns, and the fact that most board members are "part-time, unpaid trustees" with outside interests in addition to university policy, the governing board delegates the authority to manage the daily affairs of the university to the president.

The president serves at the will of the governing board. (Kauffman, 1980) The president, or chancellor, is the chief executive officer of the university, having the formal authority to make and execute policies necessary to fulfill the mission of the institution. The president is supported by delegated authority from the board above and the faculty and staff below in the university governance hierarchy.

The president's work is to "plan, to organize, to direct, and to represent." (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) It is also the responsibility of the president to define and achieve goals, to take administrative action, to represent the institution publicly, and to engage in planning. (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161) In addition, the president is responsible for maintaining and expanding institutional resources and for defending the academic integrity of the institution. (Peterson et al., 1991, p. 161; Knight Commission, 1993, p. VI) The president is accountable
to the board for the all the major elements of a university's life, including both academic and athletic endeavors.

While maintaining authority over and responsibility for athletics, the president generally delegates the daily responsibilities of athletic policy execution and operation to the athletic director. Noting the "complexities" of college athletics and "myriad problems" confronting college presidents, the ACE Policy Statement (1979, p. 347, 348) addressed the need for presidents to delegate authority:

Presidential delegation of authority for all types of programs, including athletics, is necessary to effective administration. Presidents who delegate authority to an athletics director for the conduct of collegiate athletics are, nevertheless, responsible for assuring ... integrity.

Athletic directors are often delegated authority by university presidents to execute the policies associated with the operation of intercollegiate athletics. Athletic directors may formulate athletic policies necessary for the daily operation of athletics, but these policies must serve, not contradict, broader university policy. (Jensen, 1983) For example, unless university policy permits such deviation, the ideal athletic policy should not allow the admission or class-status promotion of athletes who have substandard academic records and do not meet general university requirements.

The authority of athletic directors typically extends to the execution of policy in areas of personnel, finances, and even
academic concerns related to athletics. Athletic directors have the responsibility for the overall operation of the athletic program subject to the approval of the president. In turn, the responsibility for the day-to-day training of players and the operation of specific sport programs is delegated by the athletic director to the coach.

Through the athletic administration, coaches are generally delegated the specific authority needed to operate their athletic team. They determine such procedures as practice planning, player discipline, and player selection. (Sabock, 1985) The responsibility and operational authority of the coach is derived from the athletic director in a hierarchical chain of command. Thus, the ideal scope of coaches' authority is generally limited to sport-specific training and the execution of related athletic policy within the university that has a clear administrative hierarchy.

**Ideal Authority: External Actors**

As the authority role and responsibilities of the NCAA has expanded over time, extrainstitutional authority has changed. The NCAA, a voluntary national association of more than 850 institutions, operates with a mission of ensuring a level playing field for intercollegiate athletics. The Association pursues this end through distributing collegiate teams into distinctive categories based upon their level of competition, and by developing and enforcing rules and regulations regarding athletic procedures for each of those categories. As a collective
organization comprised of various institutions with diverse intercollegiate athletic programs, the NCAA’s authority originates from its member institutions by virtue of their participation under its umbrella.

Presidents are expanding their collective authority in the NCAA and in conferences. (Knight Foundation, 1993) College presidents have policy formation authority within the NCAA, influencing the Association’s legislative and executive process through their delegates and the Presidents’ Commission. University presidents have begun to assert their collective authority in proposing legislation in the NCAA through the Presidents’ Commission. University presidents voluntarily participate in guiding NCAA policy primarily through the Presidents’ Commission. The presidents selected to sit on the Commission propose legislation founded on the educational interests of the presidents they represent. At the NCAA’s annual convention, presidents often delegate to their faculty athletic representatives the authority to vote in the legislative process. Presidents, however, can retain this authority if they choose to do so. (Knight Commission, 1993)

Thus legitimated by its membership, the NCAA’s authority is manifested in legislation that addresses all areas of athletic operations. Presidents have asserted their collective authority through the Presidents’ Commission, and through their faculty athletic representatives in the legislative process of the NCAA by proposing and supporting legislation such as Proposition 48,
which sets minimum academic eligibility standards for incoming student-athletes. (NCAA, 1983) While Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5) found that the NCAA had its greatest authority relative to eligibility and financial assistance, its role in other athletic concerns has increased. For example, the NCAA has passed legislation restricting the involvement of "non-institutional personnel" in recruiting either on or off campus, and other legislation restricting the salary and tenure of coaches. (NCAA, 1983, pp. 19, 22) The Knight Commission (1993) recognized the increased authority role of the NCAA in issues pertaining to academic integrity and finances.

NCAA authority now covers policy-making in the areas of recruiting, finances, eligibility, academics, and in other issues. For example, the NCAA has recently mandated several cost-cutting measures designed to limit institutional spending, such as further restricting the employment conditions of coaches and reducing the number of scholarships in some sports. As a result of the expansive legislation, the NCAA publishes a manual and several smaller guides, detailing its comprehensive rules and regulations. (NCAA, 1994) The NCAA's authority extends to the creation and enforcement of its rules, the investigation of infractions, and the imposition of sanctions, censure, probations, or the "death penalty"--the termination of competition for a specific athletic team--on offending members. For example, Southern Methodist University was forced to disband its football team and Tulane, its basketball team, as a result of
NCAA penalties. In the 1980s, over 50% of all NCAA Division I-A institutions had violated rules, received sanctions, and abided by the penalties. (Knight Commission, 1993) Between May and November of 1994, ten universities were sanctioned by the NCAA, joining 23 other institutions already on probation. (33 Institutions, 1994) The most common violations have occurred in the recruitment of prospective athletes. The NCAA has also extended its authority to ameliorate the problems it encounters. For example, to combat recruitment and eligibility problems, the NCAA has established a Clearing House to register all high school athletes interested in obtaining an athletic scholarship.

The authority of the NCAA is not unchecked with regard to its rules and its enforcement procedures. The Association has begun to face challenges in legislatures and in courts from some of its member schools, individual athletic interests, and even the federal and state governments. For example, the Florida legislature, like several other states, passed a due-process law which "prohibits the association from dealing with member institutions in Florida under its own rules." (Sidelines, 1994) Former Congressman Tom McMillen warned the NCAA Forum that Congress might "begin micro-managing the affairs of the NCAA." (NCAA, 1988, pp. 21, 22) While the NCAA's enforcement authority is limited by the federal and state governments through litigation, the inclusion of presidents in the NCAA's legislative process and the bolstering of its enforcement branch with more personnel has strengthened the NCAA's authority to enforce its
rules on individual campuses. The NCAA's expanded authority to enforce, along with its control over elements of intercollegiate athletics that impact institutional revenue, have strengthened its position as a major player in the "big-picture" of college athletics.

Athletic conferences, which are comprised of similarly constituted universities, function as regional versions of the NCAA in that they enact rules and regulations that derive from the characteristics and circumstances of their membership. (Knight Commission, 1993) Conference authority therefore arises from the needs of those institutions that comprise its membership. As a result of the relatively small number and homogeneous nature of conference members, conferences are closer to and therefore more accountable to their membership than the NCAA.

Conference authority manifests itself in rules that reflect members' needs in many areas of athletic operations, including academics, finances, and eligibility. For example, as in the Ivy League, conferences may choose to offer no athletic-based scholarships. Conferences might devise revenue sharing plans for member institutions. Conferences can establish and maintain eligibility standards, which can enhance but not conflict with NCAA minimum standards. Conference authority, although arising from its members, is limited externally by the NCAA, in that the rules and regulations of the NCAA supersede those of the conference.
Although Gilley et al. (1986, p. 5) did not consider conferences to be "major factors" in the control of athletics during the mid-1980s, larger "super conferences" have begun to emerge by result of conference realignments. The majority of the most prominent Division I-A universities are now affiliated with a conference in either football or basketball, or both. For example, Notre Dame and the University of Miami, traditionally prestigious and independent athletic programs, have joined the Big East Conference. The Big Ten Conference has added Penn State and may look to add another institution. The Big Eight has expanded by adding powerful new members such as Texas A & M. The renewed interest in conference membership, and the realignment into new conferences, suggests that the authority of conferences is reemerging.

As set forth in the Tenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, all powers, or authority given the definitions used in this study, not specifically given to the federal government pass to the state or the people. Since education is not specifically addressed, in the best interests of its citizens, it is within the authority of the state government to maintain a public higher education system. Government use of authority in the governance of higher education, and in particular intercollegiate athletics, arises in all three branches through executive, legislative, and judicial actions. For example, the governor appoints trustees to state institutions. The state legislatures appropriate funds to state institutions and grant
charters for the operation of private institutions. Both state and federal courts often interpret the application of broader policies to higher education. For example, federal courts determined the profound impact of Title IX gender equity legislation upon intercollegiate athletic governance at both public and private institutions. (Johnson & Frey, 1985)

While government authority has been exercised more regularly than in 1929, there are many comparisons to be drawn between the two periods. Current governing boards and presidents have retained their paramount authority over the university and its athletics program. However, the athletic director has consistently increased his/her authority role over that of 1929. Today's coach has gained legitimacy through additional authority roles as well. The NCAA has an increased inter-institutional authority role as a result of its economic impact and enforcement capability. However, conference authority is currently more restricted than in 1929, not by the members below, but by the NCAA above. The alumni no longer hold the same legitimacy that they had through their control of athletic boards in 1929. And the limited authority roles of faculty and undergraduates in 1929 have persisted.

**Actors Without Authority**

University constituents possessing limited or no authority in the governance of college athletics include the faculty, the undergraduates, the alumni, and the university community. University faculty, by virtue of their role, are concerned with
the academic interests of the university. Faculty react to athletics in one of three ways. Often they are critical of commercial intercollegiate athletics for their negative impact on academic concerns, such as admissions exemptions for an outstanding athlete who does not meet institutional standards, or grade manipulation by university officials. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 37) Some faculty, though, are staunch supporters of athletics for their entertainment value, institutional image enhancement, and revenue potential. These faculty believe that athletics can attract more students and, with them, an increase in revenue to be used for academic programs. Still other faculty members are indifferent to college athletics, having neither the time or inclination to take note of the role of athletics on campus.

Faculty play a limited role in "big-time" athletic programs. On some campuses, limited "authority for the athletics program [is] delegated to a faculty committee" by the university president. (ACE, 1979, p. 348) Through these advisory committees, the faculty has formal input into athletic policy. This input, though, is usually limited to academic concerns and is most often restricted to advice given to the athletic director. Participants on advisory committees are commonly supportive of athletics.

Undergraduates are also generally supportive of intercollegiate athletics. They are entertained and inspired by athletic success. Not always aware of the bigger picture of the university mission as a group, the students often place athletic interests ahead of academic interests. Universities, fearing
intentional or inept misuse of authority with regard to athletics by undergraduates, have elected to withhold authority from them. Although students do at times have a representative on athletic advisory committees, they have no formal authority in policy formation or execution. Their contributions to the administration and supervision of athletic operations are limited by the university that houses these operations. Athletic operations count on student activity fees, in addition to student gate receipts, as a considerable source of revenue, averaging 8% of total athletic revenues at Division I-A schools. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) Despite their generation of resources, students are not entrusted with any significant authority in college athletics.

The alumni contribution to athletic revenues is a substantial 15%, excluding their portion of ticket sales. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) Yet, like the undergraduate, their role, as a body, in the campus governance is very limited. The alumni perceive athletics as the window through which the world sees their Alma Mater. Therefore, they generally want winning athletic teams. While the alumni are products of the university, the most supportive often do not hold the same value for the academic mission of the institution, therefore supporting athletic interests over academic interests. (Knight Commissions, 1993) This manifests itself in formal alumni fundraising efforts. (NCAA, 1982)

Alumni, through their official associations, are a significant source of revenue for the university as well as for
its athletics program. While alumni do not have the legitimate authority to dictate policy, either academic or athletic, their spirited gifts through an official alumni association are essential for the very survival of the institution. (Gilley et al., 1986) It is through this formal alumni association, or an association specifically for athletic development, that alumni are incorporated into the authority hierarchy of university athletics programs. The authority of alumni associations is very limited by the university. The association, and its membership, are responsible for the acquisition of resources. They have the limited authority, in the name of the university, to raise funds, either for general accounts or earmarked for specified uses such as athletics.

Formal governance authority is withheld from the university community, which includes boosters, local citizens, business leaders, and the general public. The intrinsic and extrinsic support by these external constituents demonstrates a dual personality though. A 1989 Harris Poll indicated that 80% of the public felt that intercollegiate sports were out of control, corrupted by big money, and were undermining the traditional role of the university. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Yet, attendance at intercollegiate athletic events has steadily increased and televised contests have generated large viewing audiences. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Winning athletic programs, particularly football and basketball teams, generate vast revenue and notoriety through the media, and serve as a
source of pride for the university communities. However, once again the academic mission of the university often takes a back seat to the desire for victory among the community of university boosters, business leaders, and "fans" in the local community, whose interests often lie beyond intellectual pursuits. Like the alumni, the university boosters' resources are critical for maintenance of the present level of operation. Some officially sanctioned booster clubs generate over $5 million per year, while individual boosters have donated up to $1 million to an athletic department. (Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 38, 39)

Possessing no legitimate authority to make policy, the community and boosters are limited in the formal governance structure to the booster organization whose purpose is to provide resources without controlling the "purse strings."

**Breaches in Authority**

As in Chapter IV, breaches in authority occur when a constituent in the authority hierarchy does not fulfill its responsibilities within the prescribed role, or when a subordinate constituent is allowed by a superior to overstep the limits of its formal authority. The end result is a breach in the athletic governance structure. Such gaps are likely to be filled, from within or outside of the institution, by another constituent. Since the constituent stepping in does not have legitimate authority, it must revert to using interpersonal, tactical, or structural power.

The governing board can generate breaches in authority at
the top of the organizational hierarchy. Individual board members, some of whom possess athletic interests, guide institutional policy. These board members can overstep their authority roles by becoming involved in micro-managing athletic affairs. For example, they may become involved directly in the hiring or firing of a coach or in the efforts to raise athletic resources. Such was the case at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) with regard to the hiring and firing of basketball coaches. (Lederman, 1991, p. A44) In this case, a breakdown of the institutional hierarchy from the top created gaps in the chain of command allowing for commercial athletic interests to permeate those gaps. When the governing board micro-manages the daily affairs of athletics it over-extends its responsibilities, because the role of daily management is appropriately delegated to other authorities, such as the athletic director.

While the board can generate a breach in authority simply by not delegating authority, it can also produce authority gaps by over-delegating authority, and by relinquishing its responsibility through the hierarchy, thereby abdicating its authority in athletic governance. If the board and its members are oblivious to university athletics, the authority that they delegate may be misused by those to whom it was delegated, or challenged through the use of power by constituents with commercial athletic interests. In this instance, an authority gap occurs in part due to a lack of oversight by the board within the
hierarchy, thus allowing an ebb of power into the governance process.

Presidential "control" has been a central concern on all major reform agendas (Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et al., 1986). However, since direct institutional financial support of athletics amounts to only 6% of the average Division I-A athletic program's revenue, presidential authority has been challenged by commercially motivated constituents using power. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) While presidents must obtain and expand the resources necessary to preserve the university, they must, as a part of their role, simultaneously protect the integrity of the university mission. It is not uncommon that these purposes conflict, as the president faces a quandary of "disparate demands" on campus, where presidential authority is restricted by the complexity of university governance. (Kauffman, 1980, p. 79)

While the delegation of authority by the president is necessitated by this complexity, vagueness in the athletic hierarchy at some universities allows for fractured lines of authority in the athletic governance process. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 7) Delegated through regular university channels, authority roles and responsibilities have been placed in the hands of interested parties within the university, such as athletic directors. Seeking the resources needed to preserve their athletic interests, but not supplied through regular university channels, these athletics-oriented constituents have allowed external interests into the governance process. The
exercise of authority by the individual president is limited through the use of power by external constituencies with vast resources that are necessary for the operation of big time college athletics. In response to the challenges they face on their own campuses, presidents have expanded their authority externally through the NCAA. (Knight Commission, 1993)

The NCAA has itself become a major authority holder in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. While the NCAA receives its authority from its member institutions, it also functions both as an external regulator and as an economic cartel. As a cartel, the NCAA restricts its members, who collude to restrict the product of intercollegiate athletics. (Lawrence, 1987) The NCAA's regulatory authority derives in part from its control over economic resources. The 512 pages of NCAA rules are considered arbitrary by constituents with athletic interests and their enforcement selective by offending institutions and even the general public. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36; Knight Commission, 1993, p. 8) While the NCAA membership, and its presidents, make the rules, 57 out of 106 Division I member universities broke the rules during the 1980s alone. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) This situation reveals either the hypocrisy or the ineffectiveness of presidents on their own campus. It also suggests that NCAA enforcement authority is in part effective, but that its collective policy formation authority is not consistent with its members' practices. Thus, the NCAA has used its authority to emerge as a separate regulatory and economic
interest, intent on self-preservation and not necessarily reflecting the interests of a majority of its members. (Lawrence, 1987)

Within the hierarchy of athletic governance, the athletic administrator has emerged as a major player. Although athletic administrators are frequently products of athletic programs, having served as players or coaches at the high school, college, or professional level, the current trend is to hire administrators who are business-oriented individuals whose chief concerns are not academic. Charles Moore at Cornell University is one example of an ex-business executive recently hired as the director of athletics by a prominent university to manage their big budget athletic enterprise. (People in Athletics, 1995) At many of the NCAA sanctioned institutions, authority over admissions processes, remedial programs, academic advising, and record maintenance had been placed in the hands of the athletic department. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 33) In this sampling of institutions with a record of NCAA violations, "administrative independence" for the athletic department, with no clear lines of authority, was the rule. (Gilley et al., 1986, pp. 36, 37) Athletic governance had either been orphaned by the university or had run away of its own accord. In either event, athletics were governed independently of the regular university channels of authority in these institutions with athletic problems. (Gilley et al., 1986)

While in many institutions the athletic director is "the
central and most powerful figure on campus in regard to all aspects of the program," the authority of athletic administrators is delegated from the president, either by fully informed intention, lack of interest, or confused lines of responsibility. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5) Like presidents, athletic administrators face limits on their authority from external commercial constituents who exercise power as athletic administrators pursue external revenue sources. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 35) By not providing full funding for athletic programs through regular institutional channels, gaps in authority are generated.

The official authority of athletic administrators is often confined to matters of policy execution. However, the authority to execute policy can transform into the authority to form policy in a confused governance structure with fractured hierarchical lines. An athletic director given autonomy in controlling athletic operations can determine policy for that athletic department. For example, the lack of "supervision of any kind" over the athletic department in one institution allowed complete authority and self-determination by athletic interests. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36) On the other hand, in some universities, the authority of athletic directors over their own department, and the coaches within, is limited by an obscure hierarchy with tangled lines of responsibility. In one case, the athletic director’s position was created after the university president had already hired a coach. The channels of authority were
confused as both the coach and the athletic director reported directly to the president who "had little interest in the athletic program." (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)

Coaches are generally also products of the athletic system that they now guide. Like athletic administrators, their chief concerns are not commonly those of the academy. Most often, they are the most publicly recognizable representative of the university. This public recognition comes from extensive media coverage of the coaches of winning teams. Their salaries, which can exceed those of their university's president at some big time programs, are often supplemented by the resources of external athletic interests.

Higher authorities delegated more responsibilities within the athletic program to coaches, particularly if the coach consistently produced revenue for the athletic department. If the athletic program operates with administrative independence within a confused hierarchy, the lack of administrative supervision generates breaches in authority, allowing coaches to exert power either in the formation or execution of athletic policy. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36) At some institutions, the coach is not responsible to the athletic administrator but directly to the president or even the board, thus establishing a breach in authority. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36)

**Authority Breaches and Institutional Mission**

Indeed, various constituencies maintain assorted degrees of authority at individual institutions; however, generalizations
can be made based upon consistent governance patterns identified in the reports. (Knight Commission, 1993; Gilley et al., 1986) The reports describe the governance of intercollegiate athletics frequently as revolving around the loss of, and need for, "control" of athletics by academic interests. Thus, the reports imply disharmony between athletic and academic constituents who desire different ends, with each seeking to preserve and strengthen its own self-interests.

Due to the variety of roles fulfilled by the multiversity, the university mission is often not universally announced. (Kerr, 1982) Individual constituents perceive different institutional missions; therefore, the execution of authority by each constituent may be directed toward varying ends. Without these various components of the mission linked together, a muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure hierarchy, a confused chain of command, and fractured channels of responsibility and communication among the constituents involved. In the execution of athletic policy, constituents then fail to fulfill their responsibilities or over-extend their authority roles, generating authority gaps. These breaches in authority are filled with an influx of power into the governance process.

**Power**

Burbules (1986) noted not only that power is necessarily involved in every relationship, but also that power results from underlying conflicts of interest. The varied constituent interests associated with college athletics stimulate power
relationships due to conflicting goals and means that result in breaches in authority. In an attempt to control intercollegiate athletics, constituents with conflicting academic and athletic interests determine and execute university athletic policy through the combined exercise of authority and power. The constituents who possess some degree of power in the process of athletic governance include the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic administrator, the coach, the undergraduate, the alumni, the university community, the business community, the boosters, the general public, the media, the NCAA, the conferences, and the government. The modes of power used by these constituents to fill gaps in authority were identified by Wolf (1990): interpersonal, tactical, and structural.

**Interpersonal Power**

Interpersonal power is the ability of an individual or group to impose its will on another individual or group. It manifests itself through the "sequences of interactions and transactions among people." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) In the governance of intercollegiate athletics, relationships between specific individuals, whether on or between campuses, result in interpersonal power. Individuals serving as board members, presidents, athletic directors, coaches, players, boosters, and even government officials all may use interpersonal power in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Their utilization of interpersonal power often resembles that of their 1929 counterparts.
Board members with athletic interests continue to use interpersonal power to promote athletics on their campus. Athletic resources, tangible and intangible, are at times pursued irrespective of their compatibility with university mission. More than one university president has lost or resigned from his/her job over an athletic conflict with the board wherein the president's defense of mission contradicted a board member's commitment to athletic interests. After a prolonged "war over basketball," in which several university board members supported commercial athletic interests by getting directly involved in personnel decisions, a frustrated UNLV President, Robert Maxson, left for California State University at Long Beach. (Lederman, 1994, p. A44)

The athletic-minded president, athletic director, or coach may also direct interpersonal power toward obtaining resources or favors for athletic interests. Presidents and athletic administrators use personal power to procure money and other resources for personal, athletic, and university interests. For example, Winston-Salem State University was sanctioned for the financial violations of its chancellor. (33 Institutions, 1994) Their interests range from augmenting the institutional image, to winning contests, to blatant self-promotion. Coaches entice recruits--critical resources in college athletics--in order to enhance winning and job security. An attempt to gain the services of a valuable player through the use of illegitimate power by a coach, athletic administrator, or even a university president, in
the process of recruitment reflects the perception that self-preservation in intercollegiate athletics is tied directly to and often dependent upon resource acquisition.

Boosters have offered, and players have accepted or even expected, inducements to attend certain universities or to perform at a specified level. These boosters use interpersonal power to persuade these athletes. Former University of Georgia football players Jimmy Womack and Norris Brown recalled "padded handshakes" of $100.00 bills from boosters. (Sanoff & Schrof, 1990, pp. 46, 47) Boosters have provided a shoebox full of money for a top athlete, fishing trips for recruits, hotels, private jets, champagne, jobs for family members, summer employment for athletes, and even cash payments to prospects. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 38) In return, boosters gain influence over and, at times, profit from a winning athletic program. Texas A & M boosters, in one specific case, made $18,000.00 in improper payments to football players. Players at the University of Miami were promised incentives by athletic boosters for each big play they made, such as $500.00 for a touchdown. (Sidelines, 1994g, 1994h)

Athletic boosters apply interpersonal power frequently through giving money directly to the university's athletic department. Amounts vary, but Gilley et al. (1986, p. 38) noted a single one million dollar donation by one booster. Such donors are coddled by athletic officials in need of resources. Boosters also often have strong ties with board members or other
"individuals who are powerful in the university," even to the point of having been teammates at the university. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 39) Thus, while boosters utilize a variety of resources from cash to athletes in their exercise of interpersonal power, they also employ loyalty and friendship as instruments of power.

The booster, coach, or athletic director with a specific athletic agenda may gain the ear of a powerful board member and supersede the authority of the president. Gilley et al. (1986, p. 37) described one university case in which a successful athletic director had "important friends on the Board of Directors, and among boosters." After several NCAA violations in the athletic program, the university president resigned because of athletic differences with the board, which maintained support of the athletic director despite his repeated violations of regulations. The athletic director's use of interpersonal power to gain job security was successful because the board valued winning and commercial success in their athletic program.

Business leaders promote their interests, personal and financial, through their use of interpersonal power with athletic department officials or individual players. For example, sports agents supplied money and gifts worth $10,000.00 to Florida State University football players. (Sidelines, 1994e) Since many professional athlete's contracts are in the seven- and eight-figure range, if the agents obtained the right to represent these potential professional players, they could have received a large return on their $10,000.00 investment. However, this payoff was a
violation of NCAA rules on behalf of the players and resulted in an NCAA probe. In another instance, a ticket broker's request for the right to purchase 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets was approved by Chancellor Charles Young after the broker donated $100,000.00 to UCLA. (Sidelines, 1994f) The broker would certainly profit beyond the $100,000.00 he donated from the sale of 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets. The Chancellor, however, compromised the integrity of the institution in order to obtain additional resources, in this case $100,000.00, for the University because funding needs outweigh their availability.

Interpersonal power is dependent upon the individual involved. Most of the current actors are the same as their 1929 counterparts. The methods of exercising interpersonal power have changed little as well. However, the magnitude of resources has multiplied. As in 1929, the perceived need for resources can be a driving force in university governance and often, the use of interpersonal power involves both monetary and personal pressure. However, it is the power of the person, not the position, that is applied in individual relationships in order to achieve the intended results. The constituents using power benefit their own interests and obtain outcomes from which they profit. In each of these cases, constituent use of power in athletic governance derives from situations wherein a breach in authority has been generated.

**Tactical Power**

Tactical power refers to the instruments of power used to
"circumscribe the actions of others within determinate settings." (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It involves the methods and strategies employed by virtue of the specific arena of play. Tactical power emanates from the organization of intercollegiate athletics, its governance structure and processes, and its constituent interests. The application of tactical power in college athletics by actors with athletic interests is highly systematic. The current use of tactical power by circumventing rules and adjudicating conflicts is more sophisticated than that of 1929.

The NCAA regularly exerts tactical power to promote its own interests over those of its membership through the enforcement of rules. One might assume that the application of sanctions is within the authority of the NCAA. However, the rules presented in the 512 page NCAA Manual are perceived by athletic interest groups and the general public as arbitrarily applied and selectively enforced by the NCAA. The NCAA applies tactical power by selectively pursuing violations in certain athletic programs. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. 8; Gilley et al., 1986, p. 36) For example, a University of Florida football player violated NCAA rules by writing a satirical restaurant review column for the student newspaper. The player received no payments from the paper and paid for his own meals; however the NCAA selected to pursue and sanction his reviews as endorsements, which they consider an illegal activity. (Sidelines, 1994m) There are many other cases of more serious rule violations the NCAA has chosen to pursue, including "substantial inducements to recruits" at UNLV, cash
payments to players at Auburn University, improper loans to athletes at the University of Virginia, and the use of ineligible athletes at San Francisco State and University of New Mexico, to name but a few. (33 Institutions, 1994, p. A43)

The fact that 57 out of 106 Division I-A member universities were caught breaking NCAA rules during the 1980s alone suggests that the NCAA’s enforcement ability in imposing these rules over member institutions is effective. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) Yet, the extensive number of violations suggest that the NCAA’s policy formation does not curb all of its members’ practices that contradict those policies. In a counter-tactic to serve their own interests, most conferences and most major universities operate a compliance department. (Yaeger, 1991) When conferences or individual institutions conduct their own investigation or impose their own penalties prior to NCAA sanctions, they are treated favorably by the national association. For example, NCAA officials said that penalties would have been different for the University of Washington if the Pacific-10 Conference had not imposed sanctions on the university before the NCAA became involved. (Athletic Notes, 1994) Nonetheless, when over 50% of NCAA Division I-A members have been caught operating outside the rules made by their representative organization, the NCAA functions as a self-preserving body less responsive to its member universities than to its own ends. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) The NCAA uses tactical power to function as a cartel that controls the trade of intercollegiate
athletics and restricts its members from profiting independent of the cartel. (Lawrence, 1987)

Currently, the NCAA is using tactical power in considering a format for a Division I-A football playoff to determine a national champion. The four highest-bidding football bowl games would form an alliance as a part of a playoff system under NCAA control. (Sidelines, 1994i) While the NCAA has the authority to determine a national champion, this tactic would assure the NCAA a portion of the massive television revenues from such an endeavor. Thereby, the NCAA would maintain control over its most visible members, the top Division I-A football programs, who rely on the bowl revenues that can exceed $7 million. In this case the instrument of tactical power would be the playoff and the objective of the NCAA is increased profits. University membership in the NCAA would become less voluntary because of the NCAA’s economic power. Most universities’ athletic programs receive money from the NCAA’s revenue-sharing plan. Major university athletic programs perceive a need for the vast revenues they receive through NCAA television contracts, such as its $1.75 billion deal with C.B.S. to televise NCAA basketball championships. (Blum, 1995)

As Burbules (1986) points out, power is interactive. While membership of elite athletic programs in the NCAA seems compelled by economic circumstances, those very institutions recognize that they may tactically gain power through the NCAA’s dependence upon their market appeal. For example, some of the top football
universities, most of whom are also members of the College Football Association (CFA), have proposed creating a new level of competition within the NCAA for big time programs. This new category would offer them more autonomy in developing legislation and disbursing revenues; therefore, they could reduce financial and other limits imposed by the NCAA by creating new rules. (Sidelines, 1994) In addition, these institutions tactically use the courts to pursue their goals. For example, in 1981, the College Football Association (CFA) defied the NCAA control of television contracts. That same year, the University of Oklahoma and the University of Georgia each filed suit against the NCAA for "price fixing ... and monopolizing." In 1984, the Supreme Court decided in favor of the CFA, finding the NCAA in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Thus, the reciprocal nature of inter-active power play is clearly demonstrated by these constituents' use of tactical power against one another. (Burbules, 1986)

Likewise, the NCAA and other constituents tactically attempt to establish, maintain, or extend their power through the courts when the normal authority roles do not achieve their intended outcomes. Individual athletes, institutional employees, state boards, and individual institutions have challenged the NCAA, or member institutions following its rules, in court. In one of the most celebrated, and longest, legal battles, the NCAA was aligned with UNLV President Robert Maxson against UNLV basketball coach Jerry Tarkanian over the lack of due-process rights in NCAA
investigations. The U.S. Supreme Court decided that the NCAA, because of the voluntary nature of its membership, did not have to follow due-process procedure in its investigations. (Yaeger, 1991, p. 237) In other cases, a University of Montana student is contesting NCAA drug testing requirements, and gender equity issues are currently in litigation at NCAA institutions such as Baylor University and Saint Bonaventure. (Sidelines, 1992a; 1994b) In August 1994, the NCAA filed suit against the Florida Board of Regents in an attempt to overturn a Florida due process statute hindering its investigative processes. (Sidelines, 19941) In each case, the authority of the courts was used by the constituents as a tactic to realign the power when the constituents' interests were conflicting.

As the NCAA has joined individual institutions, university employees, and student-athletes in using tactical power in pursuit of their self-interests externally through the courts, the NCAA has taken on a life of its own. The organization has become more than the sum of its members. Tactically, it actively attempts to protect its own legal and commercial interests through organizational innovations. Its Governmental Affairs and Joint Legislative Committee promotes cooperation with various branches of government, its enforcement and compliance branches used to police its members, and its recent hiring of a "congressional liaison" to lobby for NCAA interests in Congress. (Sidelines, 1995a)

The NCAA obtains much of its power from external
economically-motivated sources, such as the multi-billion-dollar media interests. It derives authority from its members, but its power and resources are used to keep individual institutions at bay. Through its revenue-sharing plan, the NCAA uses tactical power over member institutions by enticing members to comply through NCAA control of the distribution of vast revenues generated from the public interest in college athletics. The NCAA's tactical power is also held over its individual members through the process of selective enforcement by the NCAA's enforcement branch.

Presidents initiate much of the NCAA legislation through the Presidents' Commission, tactically promoting their own academic interests collectively through the NCAA. However, while presidents support NCAA legislation publicly, in using tactical power, they do not always actively pursue the same goals on their own respective campuses. For example, Winston-Salem State University was recently cited for NCAA violations that included the "inappropriate use of university funds by the chancellor." (33 Institutions, 1994)

Presidents' delegates, faculty who represent their institutions, vote on the NCAA the rules. Yet, over half of NCAA Division I-A members were rule violators in the 1980s. While 92% of the presidents surveyed believed that there were major problems in college athletics, only 22% believed that problems existed at their own institution. (Gilley et al., 1986) Thus,
presidents appear to be either hypocritical or ineffective on their own campus.

Although seemingly inactive in policing their own campuses, presidents use their collective voice in the NCAA as a self-preserving tactic to maintain the balance between the need for athletic resources and the integrity of the institutional mission. They attempt to "legislate integrity" at the public NCAA level while their leadership at their own university does not "commit itself to complete integrity." (Slaughter & Lapchick, 1989, p. 161) Presidents' public postures bolster the image of academic integrity, while their private commissions and omissions give in to the pursuit of resources. For example, the President of the University of San Francisco, which had previously received the NCAA's "death penalty" for violations in basketball, Rev. LoSchiavo stated:

How can we contribute to the building of a decent, law-abiding society in this country if educational institutions are willing to suffer their principles to be prostituted and involve young people in that prostitution for any purpose, and much less for the purposes of winning some games and developing an ill-gotten recognition and income. (Chu, 1989, p. 155)

The private on-campus actions of individual presidents speak as loudly toward their interests as the collective public voice tactically presented in the NCAA and in other public forums. Chancellor Charles Young, who accepted a $100,000.00 donation to
UCLA from a ticket broker seeking 4,000 Rose Bowl tickets, was also a prominent member of the Knight Commission when it condemned commercialism in college athletics. (Sidelines, 1994f; Knight Commission, 1993)

At "four institutions identified as exemplary," (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5)—Michigan, Notre Dame, Penn State, and Virginia—the president "emerged as the most powerful figure" in the governance of athletics. However, the president was "clearly second in power" to the athletic director at most institutions. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 5) Athletic departments, administrators and coaches, assumed control of policy development and execution because of their administrative independence, which has resulted in increased commercialization of college athletics.

The autonomy of the athletic department originates with the application of tactical power by athletic administrators and coaches. Gilley et al. (1986) described the coalition of power sources that often converge with the athletic director: external revenue sources provide most of the funds for the operation of intercollegiate athletics, while internal university officials give the control of those funds to the athletic director. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) Thus, the athletic director uses tactical power as the connection between the external resources and the university. The ability of athletic departments, through their administrators and coaches, to attract resources empowers these departments and individuals. Therefore, the tactical power of the athletic director and coach is derived from the autonomy of the athletic
department. For example, in hopes of an improved winning percentage, an assistant basketball coach at UNLV became legal guardian of a touted recruit and supplied him with a car, a motorcycle, and cash in order to secure his services. (Dealy, 1990) In other areas, several coaches and athletic department officers have violated NCAA rules by modifying eligibility reports or circumventing reporting procedures in order to retain athletes' services or other resources they deemed necessary. (33 Institutions, 1994)

Coaches also apply tactical power on the national level collectively through associations such as the National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC). The NABC convened a National Summit to tactically promote specific NCAA rules changes that its members perceived to be in their interest, such as rescinding Proposition 48 eligibility standards. (Richardson, 1994, p. 9) Recently, the Black Coaches Association (BCA) proposed resolutions addressing eligibility requirements for NCAA athletes and the payment of athletes. The BCA has worked with Department of Justice mediators to negotiate with the NCAA, whose rules are not in line with the proposals of the BCA. (Blum, 1994) While these associations have no authority, they are applying tactical power in an attempt to collectively influence the NCAA and other legitimate authorities in the governance of intercollegiate athletics to modify their rules in favor of the NABC and BCA proposals.

From an external perspective, government officials use
tactical threats of direct involvement in intercollegiate athletics in attempts to stimulate self-regulation. Recognizing the government's lack of legitimate authority in governance issues, Maryland Congressman Tom McMillen (1988) stated, "The government might not have a role in these issues, you might say, but it will have a role." He was referring, of course, to the use of tactical power through which the government might have its "role". Legislative tactics, he said, were designed to "prod the system along." (NCAA, 1988, p. 22) McMillen (1988) pointed out, "I have to remind you only of Title IX and the Civil Rights Restoration Act to show you that the Federal government does get involved in these issues." Federal power, whose source is in the funds it provides to universities, outweighs the authority of internal university governance structures.

Additional Federal legislation presented by Paul Henry (MI), Bill Bradley (NJ), Ed Jenkins (GA), and Winston Winter (KS) addresses Internal Revenue Service tax-free status for athletics and due process procedures for the NCAA. Their measures serve as a tactic to support the legitimate authority of universities and the NCAA. Maryland's Tom McMillen introduced an NCAA Reform Bill that empowered the NCAA to negotiate television contracts for its members, required it to equitably share revenues, mandated presidential control of the NCAA, and determined due process standards, thus supporting the legitimate authorities in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. Finally, Illinois Senator Carol Mosely-Braun and Representative Cardiss Collins
sponsored the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, attached to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, which required public disclosure of athletic departments' revenues and expenditures. (Sidelines, 1994n) This was a tactic designed to bolster legitimate institutional control of athletic finances.

Federal legislation has often dealt with intercollegiate athletics as interstate commerce. The "big business" of college athletics has been the subject of the Ways and Means Committee as well as other federal agencies, such as the Education Department's Office of Civil Rights, the Justice Department, and the Department of Labor, which have directly addressed policy and compliance issues, such as gender equity in intercollegiate athletics. (33 Institutions, 1994; Sidelines, 1994j; NCAA, 1988, p. 21) In most cases, the federal government has employed tactic power to support the legitimate authority roles in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, thus circumscribing the illegitimate use of power by those not in authority.

State governments directly impact campus athletic policy and practice through legislation. At the state level, at least six states--California, Iowa, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, and Alabama--have proposed or enacted laws that provide criminal penalties to athletes, their families, or boosters who are convicted of involvement with illegal recruiting inducements. These laws are tactics designed to bolster the power of the NCRA and university governance structures over external constituents. Twelve states have previously introduced or enacted legislation
designed to curb NCAA investigative procedures on campuses in their state: Nebraska, Nevada, Florida, Kansas, Illinois, California, South Carolina, Iowa, Missouri, Minnesota, New York, and Connecticut. (Associated Press, 1994) These laws are tactics intended to increase the autonomy of individual institutions, or their athletic departments, in the governance of their athletic programs at the expense of the authority of the NCAA. Most recently, Mississippi, on the heels of an NCAA investigation at the University of Mississippi and on the verge of one at Mississippi State, has proposed legislation that would require due-process procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses and state court appeals of NCAA rulings. (Sidelines, 1995c)

Some state legislatures have proposed or passed laws that limit illegitimate or self-promoting behavior among interested parties. These range from Oklahoma’s 1951 attempt at requiring the University of Oklahoma to ignore NCAA rules regarding televised appearances, to laws that restrict the direct use of public funds for college athletics, to others that provide for legal action against boosters involved in actions that result in NCAA violations. Respectively, each of these laws is used as a tactic aimed toward achieving an intended outcome: from limiting or supporting the legitimate authority of the NCAA, to limiting or supporting legitimate university authority. The Nebraska state legislature has recently introduced a bill that would require the University of Nebraska to pay its football players, contrary to NCAA rules. (Sidelines, 1995b) This new proposal is a tactic
intended to empower Nebraska's football program at the expense of the legitimate authority of both the University and the NCAA. The New York legislature, supported by the governor, approved $3.6 million for a new football stadium at the State University of New York at Stony Brook over faculty complaints tactically supporting the athletic department's intent to move into NCAA Division I-A competition. While direct government support outside the university authority hierarchy amounts to 2% of college athletic revenues, the ability to impact finances, through tax exemptions as well as direct appropriations, is the true source of tactical power for the government. (Fulks, 1993)

The potential for large financial returns motivates business interests to use tactical power as a source of revenue for college athletics. Business leaders are empowered because they can make equipment available to athletic departments and hefty contracts available to coaches and universities. Coaches' shoe contracts, which can exceed seven-figures for a public endorsement, such as that given to Duke's basketball coach, Mike Krzyzewski, enable manufacturers to have their product prominently displayed by college athletes. (Sidelines, 1994d) The NCAA itself has bargained for an "undisclosed sum" with athletic-apparel manufacturer Starter, to give the company exclusive rights to provide shirts and caps to be worn after NCAA championships. (Sidelines, 1994d)

Companies employ these tactics because they receive profitable returns on their investments. The NCAA and coaches
each enter into these agreements in order to obtain the resources they presume they need. Thus, these arrangements between constituents with business interests and constituents in athletic governance are an example of the bilateral, reciprocal use of tactical power by both constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

Booster groups also supply revenues needed for the operation of athletic departments that are often under-funded through regular institutional channels, which permits tactical power to be employed. For example, Annapolis' Naval Academy Athletic Association, a private organization, bought the athletic director a condominium and paid for 100 officials and boosters to go to the Army-Navy game in Philadelphia. (Sidelines, 1994) At some institutions, these private booster groups provided as much as $5 million per year. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 38) Along with alumni contributions, they account for more than 15% of athletic revenues at Division I-A institutions. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) These instruments of tactical power are employed to bolster the autonomy of the athletic interests in the university, while at the same time, the alumni and booster groups are pursuing their goal of having a winning athletic program.

The media can offer notoriety to coaches and players and can impact, and even define, the image of the institution itself. Fame translates into money, giving the media the tactical power of resources. Resources available from the media are offered directly in the form of television dollars for athletic programs.
For example, the CFA's five-year television contract is worth $300 million to its 67 members. (Sidelines, 1994b) The most recent contract for the rights to televise the NCAA basketball championship between CBS and the NCAA is worth $1.75 billion. (Blum, 1995) As super conferences, such as the Southeastern, Big Ten, Pacific-10, Big East, and Atlantic Coast Conferences, emerge from conference realignments, each is seeking its own television deal, worth up to $100 million over five years. (Sidelines, 1994b) The University of Notre Dame has an individual agreement with NBC television. (Sidelines, 1994a) On the average, television revenues directly account for 8% of the athletic operating budget. (Fulks, 1993, p. 25) So major athletic conferences are using their audience draw as an instrument of tactical power to gain monetary resources while the television networks profit through additional advertisements.

With professional athletic contracts worth in excess of $100 million, athletes are indebted to the media for a potential professional sports career resulting from their collegiate fame. Yet most players, the best of whom generate as much as $1 million in revenue for their school, remain generally powerless. (Blum, 1994) They have yet to organize or recognize their potential in this high stakes game.

The resource-driven nature of power in intercollegiate athletics is evident in the use of tactical power by various constituents. Those individuals and groups who control the vast revenues associated with college athletics exercise power in the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. This commercial system derives, however, from the structural power surrounding intercollegiate athletics.

**Structural Power**

*Structural power* shapes the social field of action. In its broadest sense, it encompasses the societal influences surrounding intercollegiate athletics. It "organizes and orchestrates" the playing field and specifies the form and direction of power play. (Wolf, 1990, p. 586) It creates and maintains the reality of the environment in which college athletics exist. We necessarily address academic interests in the university environment; however, we must be aware that universities reside in a commercial society that values systemic capitalistic exploits. Thus, intercollegiate athletics have become commercial ventures, reflecting society's interests and bolstered by the inherent structural power of competition and commercialism. Broadly interpreted, structural power in intercollegiate athletics emanates from its connection to commercial societal values.

College sports' wide-spread popularity with the general public has resulted in mega-dollar television and business interests. In 1989, a Harris poll found that 78% of the general public felt that "big time" college athletics were "out of control", but by 1993, only 52% agreed with the same conclusion. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. 3) While a majority of the population still perceived a problem, the reduced dissatisfaction
among the general public reflects the expanded power of commercial values. Public interest in college sports remains high. Sold out 100,000 seat stadiums, with ticket sales accounting for 33% of athletic revenues, and $1.75 billion television deals reflect the high entertainment value of college athletics. (Blum, 1995) As commercial motives dominate college athletics, universities are seeking to maintain a share in the control of their athletic enterprises.

The composition of the Knight Commission, and those with whom they counselled, reveals the variety of interests connected to college athletics, thereby reflecting the structural power surrounding college athletics. The Commission was composed of eight university presidents, the chief executive officers of the NCAA and the U.S. Olympic Committee, three corporate CEOs, one alumni association representative, one trustee, a former member of Congress, and a former television network chair. In response to the varied interests in college athletics, the Commission also met with 12 conference commissioners, 13 faculty athletic representatives, 16 athletic directors, 11 basketball coaches, seven football coaches, six student-athletes, several authors who write about college athletics, several legal experts, print and television media personnel, NCAA personnel, a professional sports league representative, education association representatives, a high school representative, and a business association representative. While academic interests rest primarily with the presidents, the structural power of commercial interests resides
in the NCAA, government, alumni, media, and business interests now included in the Commission, as well as in resource-driven university athletic officials.

The co-chair of the Knight Commission, William C. Friday, President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina, noted the continued "capitulation to the pressures of money" by college athletics and the presidents, whom the Commission recommended take control of those pressures. (Blum, 1994) However, the pressure of money and resources is so great because their power is structural in nature. Tulane's Faculty Athletics Representative Gary Roberts summed it up: "The implications of the money, the compromises that might have to be made, are considered simply the cost of doing business." (Blum, 1995)

Money, and the image it helps create, is a driving force in society. Resources are not easily controlled by those who do not possess them, or those who rashly pursue them.

Breakdown of Governance

While loss of institutional control over athletics may be a function of the structural power of resources, it is also, in part, a result of administrative laxity. (Gilley et al., 1986, p. 37) Academic and athletic interests can conflict. The mission of the university is often referenced by academic interests, but rarely clearly defined. Various constituents perceive different institutional missions; therefore, the possession and application of power by constituents is often directed toward varying ends. This muddled sense of purpose has resulted in an obscure
hierarchy, a confused chain of command, and fractured channels of responsibility and communication among the constituents involved.

The Knight Commission (1993) found that college athletic policies often are not explicit; thus, leading to inconsistent application of authority and power in the execution of policies. The ambiguous governance structure opens the door for athletic interests to exert power in the execution of policy. (Gilley et al., 1986) At times, the power of athletic interests, located both within and outside of the governance structure, extends in actual practice beyond policy execution to the point of policy determination. Interested parties, from athletic directors to boosters, maintain control of athletics on individual campuses because they have either the resources or a mutually beneficial relationship with the sources of revenue. Athletic department members have been empowered by the university to control the product that makes the profits, college athletics, and thereby have obtained the power of resource control. Regular institutional authorities have at times abdicated their local control, and at other times have relinquished it to constituents exercising illegitimate power.

Educational aims are prominent in rhetorical, and sometimes substantive, reforms at the national level led by presidents through the NCAA's Presidents' Commission. However, the NCAA, now a self-serving entity, is driven by its own need to gain structural power within commercialized athletics. The structural power of resource-driven commerce combines with the interpersonal
and tactical power of constituents possessing resources to dictate the nature of intercollegiate athletics.

Actors with academic interests residing in legitimate authority roles and fulfilling prescribed responsibilities acquiesce to illegitimate power groups outside of the legitimate authority hierarchy because the former do not have the power or will to override the latter. Therefore, the presidents espouse their interests collectively through the NCAA, while knowing, or ignoring, the fact that they have increasingly abdicated or have never had the power to control the athletic machines on their own campuses. (Knight Commission, 1993; Savage et al., 1929)

Collective statements of policy through the NCAA reveal the public face of universities that, when compared to the individual implementation of policy, often contradicts the private actions of the university. The predisposition of colleges to collectively empower commercially-motivated constituents by saying one thing regarding public national athletic policy formation and doing another in individual policy execution is common.
CHAPTER VI

A MODEL OF BALANCE IN ATHLETIC GOVERNANCE

Introduction

Intercollegiate athletics are a component of America's system of higher education that demand the same attention from researchers that they have attained from the general public. Analyzing the application of power and authority at two points in the development of intercollegiate athletics, 1929 and the present, reveals continued systemic dysfunctions in their governance. Conflicting interests among constituents in athletics require decisions to be made by those constituents that have in some circumstances resulted in breaches in authority. The gaps have, in turn, often been filled by power exercised illegitimately by other constituents in the governance process.

Who are the constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics? The legitimately empowered constituents who have specified roles and responsibilities as well as internal limits on their power within the governance structure include the board, the president, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. Other constituents obtain their power through illegitimate channels, often commercial sources or resources; these constituents function within the process, but outside the legitimate authority structure, of athletic governance. These constituents include boosters, community business leaders, and the media.
This analysis of the use of power and authority in the governance process, exercised by constituents both within and outside of the governance structure, has revealed a systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that is often commercially driven and has remained consistent over time.

When the governance system is functioning properly, constituents use legitimate power through hierarchical authority. The board, for example, supervises the president, the president guides the athletic director, and the athletic director directs the activities of the coach. However, breaches in authority can occur, wherein constituents either abdicate or are robbed of their legitimate power through regular channels of authority, thereby creating gaps that are filled by the use of illegitimate power. For example, institutional administrators can empower constituents outside the governance structure if the resources needed to operate their programs are not provided through regular university channels and not controlled through that structure. If individual constituents can obtain needed resources through outside sources, such as contributions from boosters or businesses, these constituents are in a position to wield illegitimely-obtained power in the governance process that operates outside the organizational hierarchy of intercollegiate athletics.

The three types of power that Wolf (1990) has identified have been utilized within the legitimate hierarchical lines in
the governance structure by authorized constituents. They have also been used by unauthorized constituents through illegitimate channels to fill authority gaps in the governance structure left when legitimately authorized constituents do not fulfill or exceed their prescribed roles and responsibilities.

The continued use of legitimate and illegitimate power, through or in spite of lines of authority, reveals an historical systemic dysfunction in intercollegiate athletic governance. Why has this dysfunction occurred? Constituents, whether applying legitimate power through prescribed lines of authority or illegitimate power to fill in breaches in authority, are utilizing power for their own self-interests. For example, university presidents might legitimately use power to support their authority in executing policies that are presumably driven by academic interests, such as protecting the university mission. On the other hand, coaches might illegitimately use power to contravene the hierarchical lines of authority by promoting athletic interests that are commercially-driven and profit-oriented. Since academic and athletic interests often appear to conflict, each of the constituents seek to preserve his/her own self-interests. In describing the component parts of the Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, self-interest--ultimately self-preservation--becomes the foundation upon which governance decisions are made.

**Self-Preservation**

Self-preservation is the drive by individuals or groups in
athletic governance to preserve their current status. It is the
goal of organisms and organizations alike, the need of
individuals and institutions. Maslow (1970) has theorized that
humans build to a peak of autonomous self-actualization, but his
Hierarchy of Needs is founded on the basic needs of security and
safety. These basic needs are deficiency needs, meaning that, if
they are not met, the person will seek to make up for the
deficiency, and this takes precedence over all other needs.
(Maslow, 1970)

Owens (1981) applied Maslow's theories to educational
organizations and the individuals in those organizations. Owens
(1981, p. 114) noted that "a need that has been satisfied is not
a motivator" and only "unmet needs motivate people." Herzberg
(1966) described factors similar to Maslow's general deficiency
needs in organizational settings as "hygiene" or "maintenance"
factors, upon which "motivation" factors could be built. If
maintenance factors are sufficiently present, they can facilitate
motivation. Like deficiency needs, these maintenance factors have
a preventive function, however, and if they are not adequately
met, they can block motivation. For example, job security as a
deficiency need might be obtained in athletics by winning games.
If a coach needs job security as a part of his/her self-
preservation, he/she might feel pressure to win games in order to
ensure his/her survival, whether the pressure is real or self-
duced perception. The coach might pursue that end as a
deficiency need, first and foremost above others. Any resources
available to the coach would be directed toward self-preservation, any perceived need for resources that were deemed necessary to win--in order to maintain job security--would be sought above all else.

Maslow, in his Hierarchy of Needs, suggests that the basic needs of safety and security are deficiency needs that serve as the preeminent motivation for human behavior. Referring to athletics, University of Virginia Athletic Director James Copeland suggested that "...programs go through stages and growth just like human beings do." (Teel, 1995) Various constituents in college athletics perceive diverse needs to secure their own self-preservation. These needs include, but are not limited to job security, academic integrity, positive image, and resources, such as money or athletes.

As breaches in legitimate authority result from the pursuit of these needs, some constituents illegitimately use power to meet needs that have not been met through the authority hierarchy. Thus, constituents in the college athletic governance process are driven by self-preserving interests. Toward that end, certain constituents in athletic governance need and attempt to obtain the resources that will ensure their self-preservation when the mission they perceive is to win-at-all-costs.

**Perceived Resource Needs**

Resources are the various objects, actions, or concepts that are assigned value by the constituents involved in intercollegiate athletic governance. Resources sought by
universities include space, time, books, equipment, reputation, and money (Westmeyer, 1990, p. 107) Constituents perceive these valued resources as necessary for success in achieving their primary objective, self-preservation, within the system of intercollegiate athletics. More resources and better quality resources are continually sought by constituents as a source of self-preservation. (Westmeyer, 1990) Constituents' perception of resource needs is influenced by the mission of the institution, the type of resource sought, the accessibility of the resource, and the perceived impact of the resource on the constituent's own self-preservation within the organization.

Resources relative to intercollegiate athletic governance come in many forms, both tangible and intangible. Intangible resources may include a positive reputation, visibility/publicity/fame, influence, and athletic contest victories; whereas tangible resources might include prospective athletes, and, very often, money or other capital gains. Different constituents typically value, and therefore seek, the type of resources that they perceive necessary for self-preservation.

Promising athletes are a valuable resource to coaches because they represent the potential to field a winning team. A winning team can ensure the coaches' self-preservation. Some presidents value the visibility associated with winning programs, which yields increased revenues for the institution and perhaps larger and therefore more selective enrollment. Yet, presidents
must also protect the mission of the institution, and therefore, they value a positive academic reputation in order to preserve themselves as the educational leader of their institution. In pursuit of a positive academic reputation, presidents present public faces in leading the NCAA reform agenda. Simultaneously, they privately tolerate NCAA infractions on their own campus, demonstrating their pursuit of diverse self-preserving resources. (Gilley et al., 1986)

Booster leaders typically seek to profit from their association with college athletics and pursue money, publicity, and influence. Their actions ensure the continued commercialization of intercollegiate athletics and reflect the perception by these boosters and business leaders that such commercial endeavors are central to their self-preservation as athletic constituents. The NCAA has been seeking financial resources in order to expand its influence in college athletics. The NCAA’s $1.75 billion contract with CBS Television is an example of the magnitude of the monetary gains currently available in college athletics, wherein both parties perceive the need to attract billions of dollars in order to survive.

While perceived needs of the various groups tend to foster the pursuit of top athletic prospects, new stadiums, and cold cash, each constituent pursues those resources—first and foremost—that will best enhance his/her own self-preservation. The greater the perceived potential a resource has to impact upon a constituent’s self-preservation and the higher the level of
need for that resource, the greater the pursuit for that resource will be. For example, a "blue chip" athlete, one who can turn a program into a winner, will be a highly valued and pursued resource for a coach who perceives a great need to win.

In the actual pursuit and acquisition of resources, constituents must determine if the desired resources can be feasibly obtained. Access to resources can significantly impact a constituents' perceived level of need. In general, easily accessible resources will result in a lower perception of need. In contrast, inaccessible resources stimulate a heightened perception of need. For example, if an athletic department obtains $4 million per year, and that money covers the department's expenses, the perception of monetary resource needs would not be as great as that in a department not covering similar operating expenses by obtaining only $1 million per year. Both departments have similar actual resource needs in the form of operating expenses. However, their perception of need varies based upon the accessibility of resources, which impacts the degree of need. Subsequently, the departments vary in their perception of resource need.

The perception of need can reflect real need, like that resulting from concrete numbers as in the previous example. However, perceived need can also result from intangible elements or forces, such as self-created or situational pressure to win. (NCAA, 1983) If a coach, or president, perceives a need to obtain or maintain a winning season, whether or not it is real, he/she
will pursue a strategy to win which includes securing the resources necessary to win in order to enhance his/her self-preservation.

Ultimately, the perception of resource needs, whether real or imagined, is impacted by the constituents' access to and the availability of those resources, which are pursued to enhance self-preservation. In pursuit of the perceived need to win, if wins are realistically unobtainable, the coach or president must find the means to enhance his/her access to the needed resource.

The perception of resource needs is directed by the pursuit of self-preservation. A variety of resources, including athletes, money, and visibility, are pursued by athletic constituents. The perceived need of resources, and the degree to which the resource is pursued, is related to the perception of its relative impact upon self-preservation: the more the potential impact, the greater the perceived need. The accessibility of resources impacts the perception of resource needs as well, with less accessible resources heightening perceived needs. Influenced by the type and accessibility of the resource, the degree of need, the perception of resource needs and the subsequent pursuit of those resources impacts the integrity of constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.

**Integrity**

Integrity in higher education, and in particular, in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, involves both individuals and institutions. The integrity of institutions or
individual constituents in intercollegiate athletics reflects a "wholeness" based upon salubrious values. (Bailey & Littleton, 1991) Integrity requires an incorruptible adherence to specific values and a dedication to mission. Institutional integrity begins with a commitment to mission and requires the members of a university to embrace "transcendent goals and ideals while having to exist and be of service in a practical, imperfect world." (Bok, 1982, p. 11) However, the mission must be clearly defined.

Kerr (1982) defined modern "multiversities" as institutions with many components, each having a distinct yet related purpose. Kerr's conception of the American university allows disparate objectives to be defined by each of the many university constituents. Mission in this diffuse institution is sometimes neither clearly defined nor universally agreed upon. Institutional integrity becomes ill-defined as well, when diverse components housed under the university umbrella are directing their interests toward distinctly different, yet still related, goals. Academic, athletic, and external commercial constituents alike have distinct interests that can impact the university mission. Institutional integrity can be enhanced by clarifying the missions of these varied university components, and emphasizing their related goals.

Integrity, whether institutional or individual, is reflected in actions. Specifically, constituent integrity, defined here as commitment to the university mission, is revealed through the constituent's use of power and authority. In the athletic
governance process, constituents face many pressures, real or perceived, from a variety of interests, each of which may conflict with university interests and mission. The degree of integrity and therefore the adherence to authority and use of legitimate and illegitimate power by constituents reflects the pressures they perceive and the primary interest of each constituent, self-preservation. Constituent perceptions of the importance of integrity in self-preservation vary. Each individual constituent perceives his/her commitment to mission on a scale from essential to non-essential for his/her self-preservation. Therefore, constituent actions in power and authority relationships, directed toward self-preservation, reveal the role of integrity in decision-making.

Independence of purpose entails purposeful action in congruence with mission. The independence of purpose in constituent actions reflects the level of integrity with which they are acting. A high level of independence in constituent actions, without regard for consequences aside from the impact on mission, reveals a high level of integrity. In a university with a governing board influenced by commercial athletic interests, if the university president exercises the authority to remove a coach who is operating without regard for the mission of the institution, that president's independence of purpose reflects a high level of integrity since his/her actions are dictated by his/her commitment to the mission.

Constituents with a high level of independence perceive the
commitment to mission as a requisite for their self-preservation. In contrast, constituents perceiving the commitment to mission as irrelevant to self-preservation, whose decisions reveal little independence in purpose and are dictated by other interests, reflect a low level of integrity. In college athletics, these constituents commit or allow actions contrary to the mission of the institution. Regardless of the level of integrity or the perception of resource need revealed by their actions, constituents remain directed by self-preservation as they encounter conflicting interests.

When faced with conflicting interests, constituents--attempting to preserve themselves--reveal through their actions the balance struck between their integrity, or commitment to mission, and their need for resources. For example, the presidents' role in protecting the university mission must be balanced with their role in obtaining new resources for the university.

Balance of Perceived Resource Needs and Integrity

The objective of the constituent is to protect his/her self-interests: self-preservation is the ultimate goal and foundation of decision-making. The tendency for presidents to present a visible public face--for example, leading the call for reform legislation in the NCAA--while conducting, or allowing, private actions on their own campuses contrary to their rhetoric--emphasized by more than 50% of Division I-A universities caught breaking their own NCAA rules in the 1980s--is dictated by their
pursuit of self-preservation. (Knight Commission, 1993, p. II) As conflicting interests require a decision to be made, each constituent bases his/her decisions upon the foundation of self-preservation. For example, the resignation of a university president brought about by an overzealous board who wants to win-at-all-costs suggests that integrity is more critical to that president's own self-preservation than either winning or job security. In contrast, a president caught breaking NCAA rules by offering illegal inducements to athletes has his/her self-preservation closely tied to the acquisition of resource needs. In each case, constituent actions are directed by their perceived needs. Dictated by the need for self-preservation, the balance between integrity—indeed of purpose in commitment to university mission—and perceived resource needs in these cases was asymmetrical.

An imbalance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose results in the creation of breaches in authority into which a subsequent influx of illegitimate power fills the gaps. A dysfunction in the athletic governance process results. These imbalances have been systemic in nature, resulting in the application of illegitimate power in intercollegiate athletics for some time. For example, the unethical recruiting of prospective athletes has been a major concern from 1929 to today. (Savage et al., 1929; Knight Commission, 1993) Constituents with commercial athletic interests have consistently been quick to
fill breaches in authority as they have occurred, thus, perpetuating the systemic imbalances in athletic governance.

Balance between perceived resource needs and integrity can be achieved in intercollegiate athletics. Systemic balance can only be achieved, however, through the many constituencies in the intercollegiate athletic governance process in reform efforts. A balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose is more likely to produce use of legitimate power within the authorized governance structure. Where integrity and perceived resource needs are balanced, athletic governance should function properly if the actors are fulfilling their roles. Some athletic programs do it right. For example, Gilley et al. (1986) identified four university athletic programs--Michigan, Notre Dame, Penn State, Virginia--in which athletic governance structures function through designated channels of authority.

**Systemic Dysfunction Over Time**

Constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics have remained similar over time. In both 1929 and currently, the constituents with legitimate authority in athletics include the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic director, the coach, the conferences, and the NCAA. Undergraduates have consistently had a limited role or none at all. The media, alumni, boosters, and business leaders have consistently had an interest in intercollegiate athletics as well.

While constituents have remained similar, some of their
defined roles have evolved over time. For example, the alumni have seen their legitimate role in the governance of athletics dissipate. In 1929, alumni gained legitimate authority at some institutions through athletic boards, while current alumni are excluded from legitimate roles in athletic governance. Conferences played a larger role in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in 1929 than they do today, but the emergence of new conferences may signal a renewal of conference power. As conference roles have decreased, the legitimate role of the NCAA has expanded. The burgeoning influence of the NCAA make it the supreme inter-institutional authority in athletic policy.

The media influencing intercollegiate athletics in 1929 was the newspaper. The power of the media at the time was clearly presented in the Savage Report (1929), which concluded that reforms could not succeed without media support. The significance of the media today has not waned. In addition to continued newspaper coverage, the current method of coverage has expanded to include countless sports magazines and the powerful media of television. The increased magnitude of media influence is reflected in a $1.75 billion television deal for NCAA basketball. (Blum, 1995) The intensifying scrutiny of college athletics has resulted in several sports broadcasting networks.

While the magnitude and intensity of constituent roles may have changed over time, the incongruence between the structure and process of governance in intercollegiate athletics has remained constant. During both time periods, authority gaps were
generated when prescribed roles were either neglected or exceeded. Consistent breaches in authority were filled by constituents exercising power. For example, the faculty continues to focus on intellectual responsibilities, leaving athletics governance to other constituents. Presidents while tending to academic matters, have consistently permitted athletics to be influenced or controlled by commercially-motivated constituents.

In each time period, the needs that motivated constituents to employ power and authority are consistent. An analysis of constituent practices, policies, and circumstances in 1929 and the present reveals that self-preservation has consistently been the pre-eminent need. For example, in order to preserve their jobs, coaches in 1929 and currently have cheated to obtain players who could enhance the prospect of winning. (Savage et al., 1929; Gilley et al., 1986) The consistent imbalance between resource needs and integrity over time has generated breaches in authority that are filled by illegitimate power. Thus, athletic governance has endured a systemic dysfunction for some time.

Model of Balance in Athletic Governance

Constituents in intercollegiate athletic governance make decisions based upon their need for self-preservation. The pursuit of perceived resource needs or integrity of purpose results in the application of power, either legitimately through the authority hierarchy or illegitimately filling in authority breaches. An analysis of the application of authority and power in intercollegiate athletic governance reveals a systemic
dysfunction that is caused by self-preserving interests impacting the balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose. As decisions in athletic governance are consistently based upon a foundation of self-preservation, and impacted by the balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose, a Model of Balance in Athletic Governance emerges to explain the process.

![Diagram of Model of Balance in Athletic Governance]

Figure 2: Model of Balance in Athletic Governance

Coaches cheating to obtain players, boosters buying influence with huge cash payments, presidents abdicating their authority to get winning teams, and board members ignoring legitimate channels of authority in athletic hiring or financing issues are all examples of an imbalance in which perceived resource needs are high and integrity is low. When, to ensure self-preservation, the perceived need for resources is higher
than integrity of purpose, authority breaches occur and these gaps are filled by the application of illegitimate power in the governance process. Indeed, constituents in authority roles who place perceived resource needs above integrity give up their legitimate power, or have it taken from them by constituents applying illegitimate power in a variety of forms. Constituents who exceed or neglect their role in the athletic governance structure in pursuit of self-preservation allow the development of authority breaches and the application of power in the governance process.

A constituent who places more emphasis on integrity than on resource needs to ensure self-preservation, can generate authority breaches as well, if other constituents' resource needs are high (see figure 2). The resulting gaps are filled by the use of illegitimate power in the governance process. These imbalances appear to be less common, but do occur. For example, reports suggest that the University of Virginia Athletic Director left his post to assume the corresponding position at Southern Methodist University because athletic interests on Virginia's Board of Visitors superseded his authority over the football coach. (Teel, 1995) The board reportedly wielded power contrary to the accepted line of authority in pursuit of maintaining a valued resource--in this case, the services of the football coach--thus revealing an imbalance that results in a dysfunction in the athletic governance process. In recent years, a number of university presidents have resigned, or been released, over
conflicts with the university governing board centering on athletic control. In each case, integrity appears to be an essential part of self-preservation, ranking higher than the perceived need for resources. This was the case for the UNLV President Robert Maxson, whose resources needs did not include job security. (Lederman, 1994)

Athletic governance functions properly when, to ensure self-preservation, a balance between the perceived need for resources and integrity of purpose exists (see figure 2). In this scenario, legitimate power is applied through channels of authority in the governance structure. Authority roles are fulfilled, subject to neither excess or neglect. Constituents make decisions through regular university channels and do not operate independent of the university authority hierarchy; this balance of resource needs and integrity leads to proper functioning of university athletic governance. (Knight Commission, 1993) Universities such as Penn State and Notre Dame are cited as examples of athletic programs that operate within the proper administrative authority of the university, in which a balance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose exist. (Gilley, et al., 1986)

In institutions where constituents can balance perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose, self-preservation is not fully dependent upon either and enhances the balance. Power is applied through regular channels of authority. A coach might not perceive pressure to recruit unethically because his/her self-preservation is not dependent upon resource needs, in this case
athletes, which are either readily accessible and easily obtained, or are not expected to be obtained. The coach meets the perceived resource needs through authorized activities within the regular administrative hierarchy, neither exceeding nor neglecting authority roles and without having to resort to illegitimate sources of power.

In pursuit of self-preservation, the balance of perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose results in proper operation of the governance process through the use of legitimate power in the authority hierarchy of the athletic governance structure. An imbalance between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose results in a dysfunction in the governance process through the actions of constituents, some of whom fail to fulfill their legitimate roles in the governance structure and some of whom use illegitimate power to fill the breaches in authority. Constituents, motivated by self-preservation, reveal through their power and authority relationships, the relative importance of balanced resource needs and integrity.

The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance shows the relationship between perceived resource needs and integrity of purpose, and the impact that their relative balance has on the creation of authority breaches and the subsequent application of illegitimate power. This conclusion provides insights into the governance of intercollegiate athletics that suggest alternatives for change. If systemic change is to occur, individual institutions, and the constituents within those institutions,
must balance perceived resource needs and integrity as they make decisions in the athletic governance process.

**Recommendations for Reform**

Recommendations for reform in the governance of intercollegiate athletics are based upon the systemic dysfunctions revealed by the analysis of the use of power and authority and the resulting Model of Balance in Athletic Governance. Based on the underlying causes of systemic dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, potential avenues for affecting change should determine the participants and methods for reform (see figure 3).

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<tr>
<th>1929</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Reform</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>self-preservation needs prompt</td>
<td>self-preservation needs prompt</td>
<td>systemic dysfunctions in governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>authority breaches filled by power; reveal governance + dysfunctions</td>
<td>authority breaches filled by power; reveal governance = dysfunctions</td>
<td>reveal avenues for reform</td>
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**Figure 3: Cause-Based Reform**

The use of legitimate power in support of clearly established lines of authority will limit authority breaches and the resulting influx of illegitimate power. There are two levels at which the following reforms must ensue: at individual institutions, and inter-institutionally. Specifically, the ensuing recommendations for reform are:
1. Each institution must clearly define its athletic mission.

2. Presidents must take responsibility for the policies and practices related to the athletic mission.

3. The authority within the NCAA must be decentralized to the conference and institutional level so that individual institutions can connect their practices to their self-proclaimed athletic mission.

4. Conference membership must be required of big time athletic programs within the NCAA, thereby placing more authority with the conferences.

5. Full public disclosure of the athletic mission and all practices related to athletics must be required by the NCAA and provided by each institution.

Each institution must individually commit to establish clear lines of authority in the governance of athletics on its own campus. Toward this end, institutions must first clearly define their own mission, and their companion goals for athletics. The roles of each constituent and the channels of authority must be specified within the institution. Institutions and constituents, from the board down, must use whatever legitimate power necessary to support the authority structure in maintaining the congruence between the goals and behaviors of each constituent and the university. If commercial athletics are valuable to an institution, that value should be acknowledged, not ignored. For
example, universities should openly disclose their athletic intentions and practices, even if they are commercially driven.

Aligning perceived resource needs with a clearly defined mission and goals will support the integrity of purpose of constituents and balance in athletic governance. Substantive reforms are essential for the intercollegiate athletic governance system to foster balance between resource needs and integrity. In order to promote balance, institutions could increase resource accessibility. Specifically, if monetary resources are predominant needs for athletic constituents, universities could meet those needs by fully funding athletic programs through duly authorized channels. In that way, institutions should lock out the illegitimate use of power by preventing breaches of authority. If an intangible resource need for coaches is security, institutions could increase coaches' resource accessibility by de-emphasizing winning and increasing job security for coaches, if these are objectives congruent with the mission of the institution and its constituents.

Individual institutions through their governing boards and presidents must accept responsibility for the operation of their own athletic program. Each constituent and individual should be supported by higher authorities in his/her use of legitimate authority and power in the athletic governance process. Boards and presidents must support athletic directors and coaches who fulfill their roles and responsibilities prescribed by the university in accordance with the university mission. In turn,
board members, presidents, athletic directors, and coaches alike should neither exceed nor neglect their prescribed roles in the hierarchy. University constituents must require adherence to the authority hierarchy in athletic governance. As constituents accept the responsibility of their roles in athletic governance through regular university channels, universities will check the influx of illegitimate power, backed by commercial interests.

Contrary to many reform alternatives, these recommendations are in no way an unqualified indictment of commercial athletics. Given the magnitude of the illegitimate power constituents are willing to use to fill any emerging gaps in authority, attempts to eliminate commercial interests in athletics are not only unfeasible but also unwise, unnecessary, and unwanted at the highest levels of competition. The elimination of commercial interests would create an imbalance that would ultimately result in an authority breach that would be filled by illegitimate power. If power is used legitimately through the authority hierarchy, then universities will control their commercial athletic activities. Big time commercial athletics can be compatible with the mission of a major university, if that university chooses to fully incorporate its athletic program as a legitimate component of the university, and if the university's mission includes articulated commercial athletic goals. Full public disclosure of the athletic mission, policies, and practices must become standard procedure. Requiring full disclosure of individual university athletic purposes, policies,
and practices would enhance the clarity of the role of athletics within the mission of the university. Institutions are more likely to match their practices with their respective missions if both elements are made public and addressed through regular self-study and reporting. Universities can profit from athletics—regardless of the level of commercialization—if each university controls athletic governance through regular authority channels by clearly defining athletic purposes, appropriately funding athletic operations, and specifically defining the authority parameters of each constituent.

University leaders can no longer be a spectator, viewing athletics with pride when teams are winning or attracting positive attention, or with shame when teams are losing or left to run out of control. Only when individuals in universities equalize their pursuit of resources with a commitment to integrity at each level of the governance process will a balance be created that will ease the systemic dysfunctioning of college athletics on their own campus. Inter-institutional athletics will be impacted by reform at the campus level, but intercollegiate athletic reform must also occur through the NCAA and at the conference level.

The NCAA is central to athletic reform. However, the Association and its member institutions must recognize the NCAA’s self-preserving interests as the same motivation driving other constituents. As with its individual members, the NCAA should clearly define its mission and openly pursue that mission through
a legitimate hierarchy of authority. If the NCAA, as a result of increased resource needs, has become increasingly commercialized, as reflected in its $1.75 billion television contract, it must come to grips with its own commercial interests, recognize those of its member institutions, and incorporate those interests into its mission. If the NCAA is to be anything more than a self-serving commercial organization, its member institutions must control its commercial endeavors through restructuring its authority hierarchy to more accurately reflect the interests of its membership.

After specifically defining its commercial interests, the NCAA should decentralize its authority by returning more authority roles and responsibilities to individual institutions in order to increase its effectiveness. While requiring public disclosure of athletic mission and practices through the NCAA, more authority reserved for individual universities would result in more effective compliance and enforcement of NCAA rules and regulations because each university would truly be responsible for its own athletic program. The nature of NCAA rules and regulations must necessarily change to better serve the interests of the membership. Since universities are diverse institutions, the NCAA's attempt to standardize them by delineating 512 pages of detailed rules has been ineffective. NCAA rules should reflect the least common denominator among its members institutions. Detailed NCAA rules should be replaced by broader, more easily enforced rules. For example, an NCAA rule requiring each member
institution to disclose all athletic purposes, policies, and practices would place the responsibility for clarifying each athletic program's relation to overall mission upon the university itself. This type of broad-based rule would increase the role and accountability of local campus authority. An increase in local campus authority, and collective authority through conferences, must parallel the decentralization in order to build upon the basic NCAA rules.

Conferences can play a significant role in intercollegiate athletics, as they have in the past, by balancing conference membership to promote competitive parity. Like their similarly-constituted individual members, conferences must clarify their mission. Conferences, like other constituents, must pursue their objectives--regardless of the level of commercialization--within their established channels of authority. A conference, reflecting its member institutions and operating through a legitimate authority hierarchy, might legitimately pursue an agreed upon, commercially-oriented course of action in the governance of conference athletics. Conference realignments appear to be a step toward increasing parity among similar institutions and toward reestablishing conference authority in athletics. If the emerging super-conferences continue to function as legitimately authorized constituents in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, they will become critical in intercollegiate athletic control and reform.
Recommendations for Further Study

This study deals specifically with the uses of power and authority in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, developed to explain the actions of constituents in the governance of athletics, lends itself to application in other areas, both inside and outside of higher education. For example, the model might be employed to examine other institutional components or other constituents in universities. The model could also be applied in political arenas, businesses, or other organizational studies. It might also be adapted to a study of personal decision-making strategies.

The analysis of the application of power and authority in college athletics ultimately led to the Model of Balance in Athletic Governance. A similar analysis of power and authority relationships in other arenas, either inside or outside of higher education, would seem to be a natural next step. For example, an analysis of the application of power and authority in athletics in high schools, or Division II and Division III institutions might follow. Additional studies might analyze other areas of concern within higher education. The analysis of power and authority could be adapted to non-educational organizations, such as business or political organizations. Since this study is based on national data, a follow up could utilize similar techniques to look at individual institutions. Thus, individual universities
could begin to make necessary changes based on their specific circumstances.

An analysis of the application of power and authority, leading to use of the Model of Balance in Athletic Governance, could readily be applied to individual case studies of athletic directors, presidents, board members, coaches, or other constituents. In order to determine cause-based solutions to specific problems, a similar analysis of the use of power and authority, leading to the application of the Model in an institutional case study of an athletic department or other university program might be useful. The Model might also be adapted to a case study of an organization outside of academe.

In conclusion, this study determined how some constituents legitimately use authority within the organizational structure, and how others illegitimately use power to fill gaps in authority. These breaches are generated by the pursuit of self-preservation by constituents who are balancing resource needs and integrity. The result of the use of illegitimate power by constituents to fill in breaches in authority is a systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics that has existed over time. This dysfunction has been allowed to go on for over sixty years and the gaps have widened consistently in that time. Individual universities must align athletic purposes, policies, and practices with their mission. Thus, in looking to the future, duly authorized administrators of individual institutions must assume more responsibility in the governance of
athletics on their own campus as well as through their conference and the NCAA.
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ABSTRACT

The intent of this study was to explore constituent utilization of power and authority over time that led to systemic dysfunctions in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, and to examine the needs motivating the interested constituents, thus suggesting alternatives for reform. A comparison of the policies, practices, and circumstances of constituents in 1929 and the present was based upon an analysis of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching Report (1929); the American Council on Education Report (1986); and the Knight Commission Report (1993), and other books, articles, and reports.

The constituents involved in the governance of intercollegiate athletics were consistent over time and included the governing board, the president, the faculty, the athletic director, the coach, conferences, the NCAA, boosters, business leaders, and the media. These constituents' use of power and authority was examined based upon Burbules' (1986) description of the legitimacy of authority and the reciprocal nature of power and upon Wolf's (1990) modes of power: interpersonal, tactical, and structural.

In both time periods, systemic dysfunction in the governance of intercollegiate athletics resulted from constituents who either neglected or exceeded their prescribed authority roles, thus generating breaches in authority. Other constituents subsequently exercised illegitimate power to fill these gaps in authority. Since constituent exercise of power and authority is based upon the inherent conflict of interest in power relations, an examination of the needs motivating constituents to use power and authority was essential. The examination of needs was based upon Maslow's (1970) deficiency needs that were the foundation of his Hierarchy of Needs. The basic constituent need that motivated constituents to exercise power and authority in both 1929 and the present was founded on self-preservation.

The Model of Balance in Athletic Governance explained the relationship between constituent resource needs and their integrity and was based on self-preservation. When an imbalance occurred, the Model explained why constituents exceeded or neglected their prescribed authority roles and why other constituents used power to fill the gaps in authority.

Reformers must ultimately understand the needs and roles of constituents and their use of power and authority over time in the governance of intercollegiate athletics in order to devise feasible reform alternatives. Only through understanding the participants and process of athletic governance can reformers have a genuine and lasting impact upon changes in the operation of intercollegiate athletics. Recommendations for reform were based upon the needs of constituents that motivate their exercise of power and authority. Reform recommendations at both the individual university and inter-institutional level included: 1. clarify the athletic mission; 2. presidential control; 3. decentralize the NCAA and increase conference influence; and 4. require full public disclosure of policies and practices.