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Development of the National War College and peer institutions: a comparative study of the growth and interrelationship of US military senior service colleges

Vernon Eugene Johnson
College of William & Mary - School of Education

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DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND PEER INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE GROWTH AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF US MILITARY SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

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OF US MILITARY SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

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Presented to
The Faculty of the School of Education
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

by
Vernon Eugene Johnson

February 1982
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Vernon Eugene Johnson

Approved February 1982 by

Armand J. Galfo, Ed.D.
Donald J. Herrmann, Ph.D.
Paul Unger, Ph.D.
Chairman of Doctoral Committee
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Dedication

This report is dedicated to Bobby and the kids without whose support, understanding and encouragement this would not have been possible.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Inspiration for the study leading to this report resulted from some questions raised during seminar discussions conducted by Professor Willard C. Frank and Carl Boyd in their History of Strategy and Policy program at Old Dominion University. Both Dr. Frank and Dr. Boyd imbued the writer with a desire to perform research in the fields of military strategy and policy and in military and naval history. I thank them for planting the seed. Special thanks are due Dr. Boyd for use of materials from his extensive private library of military and naval history.

The writer owes a debt of gratitude to a number of people in Washington, D.C.; Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Newport, Rhode Island; Montgomery, Alabama; Norfolk, Virginia; and Hampton, Virginia for their encouragement and support. Chief among these are: Lieutenant General R. G. Gard, Jr., President of the National Defense University, for sending materials about the University—especially the National War College; Mr. George J. Stansfield, Chief of the Special Collection and Historical Branch of the Library Division at the National Defense University, who personally aided the writer in his research efforts; Colonel Benjamin T. Meadows, Director of Resource Management and Lieutenant Commander A. J. McAloon of the Administrative and Budget Directorate at the National Defense University who saw to it that resources of the University were made available to the writer; and Colonel Robert Zimmer of the National War College who escorted the
writer around the University and introduced him to others who aided the research effort. Additionally, special thanks goes to Dr. E. Brooks Kleber, Historian of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command who encouraged the writer and introduced him to Dr. Benjamin Frank Cooling of the U.S. Army Military History Institute. Dr. Cooling provided very valuable help on the U.S. Army War College. Finally, the person who acted as the focal point for the writer entire research effort and who kept him on the right track was Mr. Edward J. Reece of the Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, The National Archives.

Appreciation is extended to the many librarians whose help made the research for this report possible and pleasant. The ladies at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Technical Library, the Fort Monroe Post Library, the Langley Air Force Base Post Library, and the Armed Forces Staff College Library are due a special "thank you" for their help in obtaining information; particularly through inter-library loans.

The typists who put up with those awful drafts from the writer deserve credit for an excellent product. Thank you Teresa, Frances and Bobby for not only rescuing me on many occasions but for also making me look good on paper. Bobby deserves extra thanks, not only for typing the initial drafts, but for putting up with periods of bad temper, bad eating habits, illness, out of town research, and for letting things go around the house while conducting the research and preparing this report.

Finally, I am deeply grateful for the advice and assistance provided by my committee. Thank you Dr. Galfo and Dr. Herrmann for the guidance you provided throughout this entire project. I am very grateful to Dr. Unger who struggled with me through every word of this report and for serving as chairman of the committee.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The basic hypothesis of this study contended that the National War College, located in Washington, D.C., was planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the capstone of the nation's military educational system. This was a departure from an earlier conclusion made by Masland and Radway which indicated that the National War College had already reached the pinnacle of military higher education. It was the contention of the author of this study, however, that the National War College never reached that position. Rather, the institution has shared the summit of professional military education with both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and with the three services War Colleges which were already in existence when the National War College was founded.

In a second hypothesis of the study it was proposed that despite inter-service rivalry which contributed to the situation, it appeared that the mission of the College and that of its sister institutions required a depth and breadth unique to each, and this prevented any


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institutions from becoming supreme in the military education system.

These senior service colleges appeared to be alike in student clientele, methods of instruction, curricula, organization and functions. This similarity gave rise to perplexing questions about their relationship with one another as well as the justification for all five institutions. Accordingly, it was contended in a third hypothesis that while it appeared that one could describe accurately the interrelationship among the colleges, one could not answer simply whether or not all are required. The concern of the present study, therefore, was to investigate the development of the National War College and its peer institutions, and to examine the interrelationships that exist among these Senior Service Colleges. Accordingly, an investigation into the reasons for the establishment of the National War College and the other Senior Service Schools was made, and an assessment of why the multiple institutions exist was carried out.

The present account is significant because the interrelationships that exist among the National War College and the other senior services schools seem to be both misunderstood by the civilian sector and ignored by the military. An attempt was, therefore, made in this report to clarify for both elements the relationships existing between the National War College and the other Senior Service institutions. Additionally, inasmuch as very little was written concerning the National War College prior to the appearance of the work done by Masland and Radway, and since very little writing of academic significance has been added in the ensuing years, the present research should help to fill the void. Further, by probing factors leading to the development of the National War College, reasons for the existence of a unique military institution for the study of strategy and policy and training of political and military analysts and decision makers should become clearer.
The main focus of this study was the thirty year period 1945-1975. These were the formative years of the National War College and include a period of three great conflicts — part of World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War — when military leaders were called upon not only to conduct military operations but also to participate in the subsequent peace negotiations. The National War College was an important element in the preparation of those leaders for their ultimate roles, thus this period of the development of the National War College closely parallels the period when strategy and policy studies became a key part of the curriculum of advanced military higher education. For background purposes it was necessary to discuss many events outside of the primary period of this study. However, such discussions were limited to those that were necessary to validate the historical purposes.

Since the development of the National War College is a relatively recent historical event, much of what has been written in other documents about the College is based on eyewitness accounts which are naturally subject to bias because of the contemporary nature of the events. While reliance had to be placed on a number of these eyewitness accounts during the conduct of this study, care was taken to eliminate biases as much as possible. The techniques of oral history procedures described by William W. Moss was utilized in order to fill gaps in both eyewitness accounts and in the written materials that were available. However, that in itself is a limitation because as Moss admits, a major limitation of the oral history method is that the resultant study is not an exhaustive presentation of all relevant data, rather it is a recollection of human experiences within the context of a remembered past.²

Journal articles, newspaper accounts, Department of Defense studies, service publications, and unpublished sources were used in the study. There were few, if any, other publications dealing with the College. Most of these sources required extensive analysis and internal criticism to determine their accuracy. Questionnaires, interviews, and some quantitative data were employed to substantiate the evidence gained from primary and secondary sources. Comparative data, especially involving the other Senior Service Colleges, were also extensively utilized.

It is important that the reader understand special terms used in this inquiry. Within the context of the investigation, the term "strategy" refers to the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy. The term, strategy, is concerned not merely with the employment of forces, but also with their effect; particularly at the national and international levels. The term "policy" as used in this paper means the formulation of concepts, principles, and interests of a State based on its national strength, will, resources and goals. Another term that was frequently used is "The National Defense University," that military institution located in Washington, D. C. which at the beginning of the study was composed of the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia was added to the University before the study was completed. The university is a joint service institution under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Another term, "Senior Service Colleges," was used throughout this study. This referred to the National Defense University (less the Armed Forces Staff College) and each of the separate armed services war colleges (i.e., the Army War College, the Naval War College, and the Air War College). Senior
Service Colleges are generally considered to be upper level graduate institutions corresponding to civilian graduate level universities and colleges. They do not include the Armed Forces Staff College or the Command and General Staff Colleges of the separate services since these are generally classified as lower level institutions corresponding to undergraduate civilian colleges and universities. Therefore, these institutions were not included in the study. Nor does the term "Senior Service Colleges" include the separate services officer professional or technical schools which are considered equivalent to vocational or technical colleges. The term "Senior Service Schools" is synonymous with and was often used in the report in lieu of the term "Senior Service Colleges."

Two other terms should be especially noted by the reader -- "training" and "education". Although these terms as used in military parlance usually indicate the same function and are used interchangeably, with no clear distinction between the two, for the purposes of this study "training" referred to instruction that was oriented to a particular military speciality designed to develop a technical skill. It includes technical instruction of military units as well as individuals. "Training" thus is the type of instruction that may be given directly to the individual and organizations, and is job related. "Education," on the other hand, implied instruction or individual study for the purpose of intellectual development and the cultivation of the mind, wisdom, and judgment. Accordingly, as used here, it is the type of learning that prepares one to deal with novel situations and goes beyond job assignment.

The seminal work done by Masland and Radway on military education is the general reference usually found to be available in most libraries
and thus has become a standard reference. Nevertheless, the volume is limited to a general discussion of military education and contains little on the development of the National War College, and the requirement for all the Senior Service Colleges. Masland and Radway's investigation is nonetheless a beginning and forms the basis for the study. A book edited by Lawrence J. Korb supplements Masland and Radway's work and was used throughout the study. Its authors provided some analysis of senior service education. For example, it contains "The War Colleges: Education for What?" in which Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. examines the goals, missions, objectives and curricula of the War Colleges. It also contains Frederick H. Hartmann's "The War College in Perspective" which, while not limited to the National War College, does offer the author's insight into the need for its development by pointing up shortcomings in the offerings of the three service War Colleges. In addition to these secondary sources, George S. Pappas' work Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College: 1901-1967 was used extensively and provided some details on the establishment and organization of the Army War College and the National War College. In Professors of War Ronald Spector examined the establishment

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3 Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy.


6 Ronald Spector, Professor of War (Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1977).
and growth of the National War College and the Naval War College. Another secondary work used was Clarence W. Hannon's *Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces*, in which he discussed congressional attitudes toward graduate level education in the Armed Forces. Further, Hannon provided in his volume a historical perspective of graduate education in the services. He gave environmental forces and trend impacting on graduate service education, and he reviewed graduate degree programs within each service.

As a supplement to this, Joseph S. King reviewed the weaknesses of advanced civilian education programs, discussed officers perception of advanced civilian schooling, and provided a projection of civilian schooling for the future in his "A Study of Army Advanced Civilian Schooling Programs." This account was also used as was one that is more directly related to senior service education by Paul T. Karschina titled *Education, The War Colleges and Professional Military Development* in which he generally assessed the role of military education in the professional development of American military leadership, and discussed supporting educational theory. Karschina also reviewed the history of military education, provided a fundamental thrust for military education, and appraised the Senior Service Colleges in the overall scheme of professional military education. The National War

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7 Clarence W. Hannon, *Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces* (Battle Creek, Mich.: Defense Documentation Center, 1974).


College's pamphlet *Fort Lesley J. McNair: Home of the National War College* and *The Industrial College of the Armed Forces* is an account in which the authors provide a brief history of the post and some events leading to the establishment of the two Senior Service Schools. Typically, Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, a former Commandant of the National War College, provided in a *Sperryscope* article a comprehensive review of the early days of the College, and this was very useful in the study.

Primary sources that were used in the study included The War Department's "Gerow Board Report" in which the board members established the need for the College, The War Department's "Eddy Board Report" wherein the board detailed the Army's position regarding the War College, the U. S. Navy War College's second "Annual Report of the President" in which the College's President depicted navy bias against the National War College, and which contained Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner's

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comments and comparisons of the Navy War College and the National War College. Additionally, The National War College Institutional Report for the Evaluation of the National War College by the Office of the American Council on Education was used extensively. Other reports which played an important role in the investigation are the Report of the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education -- The Senior Services Colleges: Conclusions and Initiatives commonly referred to as the Clements Report. In this work, the Clements Board provided an overview of the Senior Service Schools, discussed their curricula, teaching methodology, their faculties, their cooperative degree programs, their research programs, and recommended future initiatives in these areas. The Board's most salient recommendation was one leading to the establishment of the National Defense University by combining the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Another primary source used was the U. S. Defense Department's Report on Senior Service College Curriculum Study which supplements the Clements Report already mentioned. The authors of this report established a requirement for


a Common Core Curriculum for use at all schools, established a Mission-Specific Curriculum for each separate school which would be supportive of and complement the Common Core Curriculum while stressing its own unique mission orientation, and established an Elective Program which permitted the tailoring of each student's educational experience to his background and service needs. Still another Department of Defense Study was the Plan for Establishment of The National Defense University wherein the study members described plans and procedures for consolidating the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.\footnote{U.S. Department of Defense, Plan for Establishment of the National Defense University (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976).} Included were specific procedures for establishing a single presidency, administrative staff, board of visitors, research program, management systems activity, external program activity, and auxiliary services. Another most useful primary source was the National War College's Statistical Data for Classes of 1947 thru 1959.\footnote{U.S. National War College, Statistical Data for Classes of 1947 Through 1959 (Washington: The National War College, n. d.).} Presented in chart form in this document are certain data that was descriptive of the individual in the various classes. The charts reflected information by branch of service for each year during the period and contained average age of students when entering the college, their length of service and rank on entering, information on academic degrees held, prior attendance at Senior Service Schools, types of assignment on completion of the courses and percentage of those graduating who were promoted to general or flag ratings. It is especially significant that no attempt was made in this document to analyze or to draw conclusions from the data presented; this was left
to the reader. The facts were presented as information only. The final primary sources used were the National War College "Commandant's Annual Reports." These not only provided observations of the College's leader during the academic year, but it also provided an annual report of the Board of Consultants. Additionally, in it the Commandant examined research, seminars, area studies, lecture programs, the budget and operating cost for the college during the year. He also reviewed the curriculum and provided statistical data on the students attending.

Other primary sources used included information found in the National Archives, the Library of Congress, at the National Defense University Archives and Library, and in the Pentagon's Army Library. Additionally, other important secondary sources were found at the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Technical Library (Fort Monroe, Virginia), the Armed Forces Staff College Library and Archives (Norfolk, Virginia), the Military Collection at the Hughes Library at Old Dominion University, and at Swem Library, the College of William and Mary. Sources were also obtained through military inter-library loans involving libraries at the Army Archives (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), the Naval War College (Newport, R.I.), and the Air War College (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama).

Results of the investigation begin in Chapter two with an in depth study devoted to antecedents of the National War College, thus establishing the historical beginnings of war college type of education. Factors influencing the development of Senior Service Colleges in general, and

the National War College specifically, are established in Chapter III. Roles, attitudes, and influences of military and civilian leaders in the development of the National War College are identified in Chapter IV. A comparison of the development of the National War College curriculum and instructional strategies in relation to that of the other Senior Service Colleges is made in Chapter V. Finally, reasons for the existence of the National War College and the other Senior Service Colleges are examined in Chapter VI, and summary and conclusions of the study are presented in Chapter VII.

The National War College is called a college even though it is not an accredited, degree-granting institution. The College has been evaluated a number of times by the Office on Educational Credit of the American Council on Education in order to determine how well it is achieving its objectives as a higher educational institution, and to assist in determining the amount of graduate-level transfer credits which can reasonably be recommended for its programs.21 It is not the type of college one usually thinks of, and its curricula emphasis is placed on things other than war. In fact, one former president of a War College said "It is far from correct to assert that the War College prepares only for war."22 It deals both with technical military subjects as well as conventional civilian academic studies. Therefore, its development was an important aspect of not only military education but


also all of higher education because it exemplified how unique needs resulted in the creation of post secondary educational institutions. It was the intent of the completed investigation to discover through the development of the National War College, the interrelationship that existed among the Senior Service Colleges and reasons the multiple institutions exists. To accomplish this, it was necessary to first understand and appreciate its historical antecedents. Those beginnings are reported in the following chapter.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL ANTECENDENTS

Several attempts were made during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 to authorize a national institution of higher education but all of the proposals were rejected. Even though the Constitution as finally written and passed made no reference to education, there was a continuing interest among its authors and others. The first six Presidents of the United States all agreed on the desirability of a national university, and Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and John Quincy Adams even sent requests to Congress asking for the establishment of such an institution. In addition, George Washington willed fifty shares of his stock in the Potomac Canal Company to be used to establish a national university. James Smithson, an English scientist, bequeathed an

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amount of money for the purpose of founding the Smithsonian Institution
and he left an additional amount for establishing a national university. In spite of all this support for a national university, such an institution was not established. Rudolph contends that the idea became a dream that often recurred in American History but never reached fruition primarily because of hostile interests and beliefs. This dream was partially realized in 1946 when the National War College was established.

Purposes of the College were "To prepare selected personnel of the armed forces and the State Department for the exercise of joint high level policy, command and staff functions, and for performance of strategic planning duties in their respective departments, and to promote the development of understanding [among the armed forces and other agencies of government as well as industry] which are an essential part of a national war effort." This mission appears to coincide with the idea expressed by Benjamin Rush in October, 1788 for a federal university. Rush wanted a university that would prepare graduates for federal service.

4 Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education, p. 5. See also The Smithsonian Booklet, The Castle and Beyond prepared as a service to members of the Smithsonian Associates.


6 Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff "Directives for the National War College (J.C.S. 962/38," 13 October 1947, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42. Section 7, Box 72) The National Archives, Washington, D.C.

7 See notes to "Benjamin Rush on a Federal University, 1788" in Hofstadter and Smith, A Documentary History, vol. 1, p. 153.
This mission further appears to answer the desire of Washington for establishment of a national institution with the "Primary object [of educating] our Youth in the science of Government [and in the art of war]." Establishment of The National War College would also seem to be in agreement with the notions of Jefferson, Washington and Noah Webster that Americans should be provided with an alternative to a European education. The idea of a national war college appears to fit closer than any other institution to the notion of establishing a national university.

Just as the origins of American colleges of the colonial period can be traced to European universities, so can the National War College trace its antecedents to Europe. Henry Barnard, contended that the officers of the armed forces of the colonies were trained abroad; especially the prominent colonial artillery and engineer officers who served during the Revolutionary War. We, therefore, must look for the beginnings of high level American military education to England and Germany.

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\text{8 See "Washington to Congress on a National University, 1790, 1796," Ibid., p. 158.}
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\text{9 Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education, p. 5.}
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\text{10 For discussions of early American colleges see Frederick Rudolph, The American Colleges and Universities, pp. 1-135, and also Hofstadter and Smith, A Documentary History, pp. 1-583.}
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During 1840-1849, Henry W. Halleck became the first person to call for a professionally educated American military person. Halleck was impressed with the training that was carried out by French military educators, particularly Jomini. However, Lieutenant Colonel Emory Upton should be given credit for bringing the European system of military education to the United States; particular the German techniques.

Writing in *Professors of War*, Roland Spector contends that "The Army Schools derived their inspiration from the example of Germany military education. Their model was the great Berlin Kriegsakademie which had been founded by General Gerhardt von Scharnhorst in 1810 to train officers for high command and general staff work." Upton, a protege of General


13 While impressed with Jomini, Halleck did not care much for the Prussian military educator Clausewitz. Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl Maria von Clausewitz were the foremost military thinkers and theorists of the nineteenth century; particularly during the Napoleonic era. Jomini, although a native of Switzerland, became the leading teacher of military tactics and strategy in the French Army and was a great favorite of early twentieth century American military men. Clausewitz was perhaps the most renowned teacher at the Berlin Kriegsakademie (War Academy) and is most remembered for his military philosophy stressing the intangibles of leadership and politics in war. Clausewitz became a favorite of mid-twentieth century American military officers. The theories and philosophies of both are still taught at the National War College and each of the separate services' war colleges. For discussions of Jomini, see Antoine Henri Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. C. H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971) and also Jomini and his *Summary of War*, ed. and intro. J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Pa: Stockpole Books, 1965). For discussions of Clausewitz see Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. *Carl von Clausewitz: On War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); also see Peter Paret, *Clausewitz and The State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).


15 Ibid., p. 15.
William Tecumseh Sherman, in the company of Major George A Forsyth and Captain J. P. Sanger, took a trip around the world in 1876 to study military activities and military schools that were established in Asia and Europe. His visit took him to Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France and England. It was the German military educational system in which he was most interested. Prior to leaving the United States, he received a letter from the War Department in Washington, dated June 23, 1875 and signed by William W. Belknap, Secretary of the Army, which instructed him to visit in Germany "The schools for the instruction of officers in strategy, grand tactics, applied tactics, and the higher duties in the art of war, and the collection and compilation of such other information as might naturally be expected to be of utility to this Government." While Upton was generally impressed by the armies of Asia and Europe that he visited, he was particularly impressed by the German military education system, and on his return to the United States wrote a report in 1878 which set the standard for American military higher education. In his Armies of Asia and Europe, Upton concluded:

The corner-stone of the European staff system is the War Academy, and next in importance is the constant interchange between the staff and the line . . . . The War Academy, and the staff and the line, thus constitute the school of instruction for all of the great commanders of Europe, no less than for the staff officers whose province it is to assist them.17

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17 Ibid., p. 328.
He further stated that:

Abroad, it is the universal theory that the art of war should be studied only after an officer has arrived at full manhood and therefore most governments have established post-graduate institutions for nearly all arms of service where meritorious officers from whatever sphere they may enter the army, may study strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected with modern war. . . . The institutions for the training of the staff are known as War Academies, war schools and staff colleges; for the artillery and engineers and cavalry they are known generally as schools of application, or as advanced artillery and engineer courses.  

America did have some post-graduate training of its artillery officers; however, there were no war academy schools in the German, French and British tradition. The United States first approach to post-graduate military education was made in 1867 with the establishment of the Artillery School of the United States Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia. The institution was designed largely for the instruction of artillerymen in light and heavy artillery tactics, the science of artillery, infantry tactics, history, strategy, engineering, law (including military law, international law, U. S. constitutional law), and mathematics (including algebra, geometry, and plane trigometry). The instruction at this school was so successful that Upton, who later became its commander, suggested that the U. S. Army establish a similar post-graduate school for the infantry and cavalry; one to be located in Atlanta and the other at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He further suggested that the United State pay officers as military professors thereby obtaining a corps of professional instructors. He also recommended establishing a military

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18 Ibid., pp. 362-363.

19 Ibid., pp. 363-364.
educational department within the War Department to inspect army colleges and to which military professors could be attached. Although a special bureau did not result, a post-graduate school for infantry and cavalry was established.

In 1881, General Sherman ordered that: "As soon as the requisite number of troops can be assembled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the commanding general Department of the Missouri will take measures to establish a school of application for infantry and cavalry similar to the one now in operation for the artillery at Fort Monroe, Virginia." Timothy K. Nenninger argues that although Sherman strongly believed in military education and did much to improve the quality of the officer corps, he was not prompted by high ideals in ordering the establishment of the schools at Fort Leavenworth. Rather, he issued the order as a concession to friends and families so their boys could escape company duty in the Indian country. Sherman said: "The school at Leavenworth may do some good, and be a safety-value for those who are resolved to escape from the drudgery of garrison life at small posts." As it turned out, the Fort Leavenworth schools became excellent institutions for the training of infantry and cavalry officers for their roles in modern warfare. However, they still were not war academies in the European sense. According to Nenninger, Sherman wanted the Leavenworth

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20 Ibid., pp. 366-367.


22 Ibid., pp. 23. Also see Sherman to Sheridan, July 31, 1881. Letterbook 95, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.
schools to be like war academies and prepare officers for high command, however, the officers assigned there were junior lieutenants who did not have the stature for high level training. Their greatest need was to develop competence in tactics, not strategy. 23 It was not until decades later that men of higher rank were assigned to Leavenworth. Even then, the curricular emphasis was on administrative, professional and tactical instruction. The first senior level military institution in the United States did not occur until the Naval War College was established.

The Naval War College was established on October 6, 1884, by order of the Secretary of the Navy. The driving force behind the establishment of the new institution was Stephen Bleecher Luce and his concept of professional education. 24 In an address before the Newport Branch of The Naval Institute on April 4, 1883, Commodore Luce proposed establishment of a post-graduate course where officers might have the opportunity of studying the science and art of war as well as the laws of war based on marine international law. 25 While he had previously expressed his ideas in an article titled "War Schools" published in Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute in 1883, Luce attributed the original idea for

23Ibid., p. 23.


such a course to his meeting with General Sherman in 1865. However, it was from the Army's Artillery School at Fort Monroe and the new Infantry and Cavalry Schools at Fort Leavenworth that he really derived his inspiration. He was particularly impressed by the Department of Military Art and Science at Fort Monroe led by Emory Upton with whom he exchanged correspondence. Upton at the time was the leading member of faculty of the Artillery School. Luce said in a letter to his friend W. C. Church "I used to talk with my old lamented friend General Upton about it a great deal. He was enthusiastic and urged me on to make a move in regard to it. But I have never seen my way clear until now." Luce firmly believed that both intensive study and intellectual effort were necessary preparations for conducting successful operations at sea. In his mind those in command at sea needed to comprehend the theory of naval operations in addition to the techniques of the profession. With both a theoretical and technical background, through which their own actions could be seen, the student would possess a perspective of national and international affairs. To this end, the first concern of Luce was


27 Ibid., p. 52.


30 Hayes and Hattendorf, Writings of Luce, p. 37.
to organize a highly qualified faculty. He employed a friend, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan who was at the Naval Academy with him, and assigned him to teach naval history and tactics. One of the most promising officers of the navy at the time, and already distinguished as a writer on naval education and naval warfare, Mahan was to later distinguish himself both as an Admiral and as the second President of the Naval War College. Luce also asked for "an officer learned in military science who could best be supplied by the Army" and obtained Lieutenant Tasker A. Bliss, who was described by the Army's Adjutant General as the most accomplished officer in the profession. Bliss was Adjutant of the school at Fort Monroe. He later served as Chief of Staff of the Army in World War I. For the position as instructor in international law, Luce chose James Russell Soley, prolific writer and distinguished lecturer at The Lowell Institute. Soley had been head of the Department of English Studies, History and Law at the Naval Academy. In addition to Mahan, Bliss and Soley, Commander Henry C. Taylor, the College's third president, lectured on naval tactics. Also, Union Generals John C. Palfrey and George H. Gordon, and historian John C. Ropes lectured on military

operations of the Civil War. These seven men formed the first faculty of the College. A series of lectures by Soley highlighted the first session, and became the foundation for the international law program that gained worldwide recognition for the Naval War College. The army's Lieutenant Bliss's contribution to The Naval War College was no less outstanding. According to Ronald Spector, Bliss contributed the use of a comparative method which ultimately helped to make naval warfare a science. Spector says "He was a link between the new military science as developed in the European staff schools and the naval officers who were to apply it to sea warfare."  

However, Tasker Bliss not only became a distinguished instructor at the Naval War College, he also became one of the founders and the chief architect as well as the first President of The Army War College.

There were some senior military officers who during the last quarter of the nineteenth century called for the creation of an Army War College or for some other type of post-graduate school specifically designed for Army officers. General Emory Upton, like many who followed him, wanted an Academy patterned after that in Germany. George Pappas cautioned that Upton did not maintain any thought of completely copying the Prussian organization nor the policy of its War Academy. In fact, Upton was known to have said: "West Point is, in my judgement, far

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32 Ronald Spector, Professors of War, p. 29.

superior to any academy abroad for preparatory training of officers. But once in service, we have nothing to compare with the war academies of Europe except the Artillery School.\(^{34}\) So, the call went out from Upton and others to create an Army War College.

As a result of the pressure for such an institution, particularly from Major General William H. Carter who made him aware of Upton's report, Secretary of War Elihu Root formally proposed an Army War College. Just as the case with Stephen B. Luce when he proposed the Naval War College, Root met strong resistance from some senior officers of the War Department. Also like Luce, he realized that congressional support was necessary for an official reorganization to accommodate such an institution, but he did not seek the support of key members of the Congress as did Luce. Rather, "He took unilateral and executive action in the name of the President by establishing a War College with general staff functions. . . .by Special Order Number 42, 19 February 1900. . . .and Special Order Number 145, 21 June 1900."\(^{35}\) In the early days of the institution, there were fears among its proponents that it would become merely a general staff organization even though Brigadier General William Ludlow, who served as President of the board charged with bringing the College into existence, and General (then Lieutenant Colonel) William Carter planned it as an institution where emphasis would be placed on education and not general staff functions. It was,

\(^{34}\) George S. Pappas, \textit{The U. S. Army War College 1901-1967}, p. 8.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., pp. 13-14.
however, not until 1903 that the Army War College became a functioning reality. The first class did not report until 1904 and consisted of nine majors and captains; one of whom was to gain lasting recognition as an eminent American military hero—Captain John J. Pershing.  

It should be noted that according to George S. Pappas, The Naval War College and The Army War College were quite similar in character:

Instructional methods were almost identical, although the Naval War College scheduled more lectures. The Naval College placed greater reliance on outside expertise, including civilian academicians, although The Army War College was gradually scheduling more and more visiting lecturers. Each, moreover, emphasized the tactics and strategy of its own service.37

However, unlike The Naval War College, the faculty of The Army War College and The General Staff continue to work so closely together that at times it was difficult to distinguish the two. In fact, until 1916 when The National Defense Act forbade individuals of The General Staff from serving both as general staff officers and as members of the College faculty, it was customary for the military members to serve in the dual capacity. Nonetheless, close cooperation between the two continued to exist until 1917 when The War College closed for the duration of World War I as an academic institution. When the College was reopened in 1919, it was called The General Staff College; and in 1921 in order to reflect mandates of The National Defense Act of June, 1920, 

36Ibid., p. 41. It should be noted that although Pershing was a member of the first class, he did not graduate because of reassignment to the Far East. (See Pappas, p. 47).

37Ibid., p. 78.
the original name - The Army War College was reestablished. As World War I drew to a close, a weakness in the curriculum of The Army War College became evident. There was found to be insufficient instruction in industrial preparedness. As a result, the need for an industrial course for the military became obvious.

Problems of industrial mobilization during World War I were well known to both military and civilian leaders. Public disclosures of wartime failures in the field of supply led to a congressional investigation. Out of this investigation came the requirement to train military men to plan for industrial mobilization. As a result, on February 25, 1924 The Army Industrial College was established. The Army Industrial College continued to function until 1941 when it was closed for the duration of World War II. When the College resumed operation in January, 1946, its name was changed to its present title, The Industrial College of The Armed Forces. It was reconstituted as a joint educational institution operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1948 with The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps serving as equal partners in the staff, faculty, and student body. 38

The Industrial College of The Armed Forces became the only Senior Service College with the primary mission of providing a course of study in resource management for purposes of national security. Its curriculum was designed to address management skills and practices related to human and material resources, analytical techniques, global resource issues

and the national economy. Just as the need for instruction in industrial subjects became evident in World War I, the need for education in greater interservice cooperation became obvious during World War II. This led to the creation of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College during the war.

A War Department memorandum in June 1943 authorized the establishment of The Joint Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) under the jurisdiction of The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The purpose of this College was to provide a special course of instruction for qualified Army, Navy, Air Corps, and Marine Corps officers who were selected to increase their efficiency in the performance of command and staff duties in unified and coordinated operations of Army and Navy forces. The College, intended as a temporary activity during the War, was located in Washington, D.C. in order to maintain close contact with the high command of the services and also in order to take advantage of existing facilities.

The Joint Chiefs established the criteria for the faculty and students. The Commandant had to be a graduate of both The Army War College and The Naval War College. Military faculty members had to be graduates of one of the Senior Service Colleges and also had to possess experience in joint operations. Civilian instructors and lecturers had to be distinguished in fields such as government and military history.


40 War Department Memorandum No. W350-154-3, "Army and Navy Staff College" (Documents Number A45254 and A44766) 4 June 1943 Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352:12-26-42 Section 1, Box 241), The National Archives.
Sixty percent of the students were to be from the Army, forty percent from the Navy and from the Air Force. As a minimum, each had to be the equivalent of a Lieutenant Colonel with the exception of some Majors who had distinguished service records. In this regard, Colonels could not be over 45 years old, Lieutenant Colonels not over 40 and Majors could not be over 35 years old. Based on an agreement between Admiral Leahy and Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinus, three foreign service officers of the State Department were assigned to each class beginning in September, 1944.

Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was selected as the first Commandant of ANSCOL. The curriculum of the College was to be prepared by the Commandants of the Army's Command and General Staff School, the Naval War College and the Air Force's School of Applied Tactics. ANSCOL opened on Jun 1, 1943 at Georgetown University as a mid-level service college. It later evolved into the National War College.

There was, however, one other Senior Service School. The Air War College, the top professional school of the United States Air Force, was established at Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery), Alabama in March

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41Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185, 3 January 1943 Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box 241), The National Archives.

42Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 952/1, 8 August 1944 Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record 218, Records of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 2, Box 241), The National Archives.
1946 with Major General Orvil A. Anderson as the first commandant.\textsuperscript{43} Formed as a constituent part of the Air University, the Air War College became an important part of the family of Senior Service Schools. However, because of the lateness of its founding (only four months prior to the National War College), and partly due to the fact that planning for the National War College had been underway for almost a year when it was established, the Air War College does not serve as a significant antecedent of the National War College.

One can conclude, therefore, that the establishment of the National War College partially fulfilled the desire expressed by George Washington and others for a national university. However, like all its antecedents and like the American universities of the Colonial period, the National War College was greatly influenced by European educational institutions; particularly, military schools. Emory Upton, having studied the military schools of Europe, especially the German techniques for training military officers for service at the highest levels, imported the German system of military training to the United States. Although America had already established post-graduate training for officers at the Artillery School, Fort Monroe, Virginia, it was not like that of the German War Academy. The establishment of the schools at Fort Leavenworth were also not up to par with the German standards. It was not until the Naval War College was established that the United States

had a comparable institution. This college, along with the Army War College which was founded twenty years later, gave the United States the capability to train officers for their traditional technical roles in military operations, and also enabled the armed forces to train their military students to become proficient in strategy and policy thereby making it possible to assign them to the highest levels of government operations as well as permitting them to assume high level military command and staff positions. The late date of establishment of The Air War College made that institution an insignificant factor in the establishment of the National War College. However, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) were not only significant forerunners of the National War College but both added new dimensions to post-graduate training of American military officers; the former in industrial mobilization training and the latter in training for joint and combined operations.

Although ANSCOL was not a Senior Service School as envisaged in this study, its importance in the founding of the National War College should not be underestimated because it was from this temporary school that the National War College emerged as a permanent Senior Service College following World War II. Therefore, in order to determine factors influencing the development of the National War College, it was important that reasons for establishing ANSCOL be investigated along with causes leading to the establishment of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Army War College, and Naval War College. An analysis of the establishment of each of these schools will help to provide insight into the founding of the National War College. Since the Naval War College was the first established, an examination of
reasons leading to its founding will be the first concern of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
FACTORS INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENT OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

Senior Service Schools were established for purposes other than that of command and staff schools, and officer career schools. These latter institutions were lower level schools designed to teach officers fundamental military skills, leadership, tactical operations, logistics operations, and staff responsibilities. The senior institutions dealt less with these day-to-day military concerns and more with concepts like strategy, defense management, and national security policy. On balance, the Senior Service Schools were established to prepare the most promising officers at mid-career for duty at the highest levels. Yet, each had its own reason for being.\(^1\)

In a speech, August 20, 1906 at the U.S. Naval War College, Stephen B. Luce said that institution was established "For an advanced course of professional study where officers could bring to the investigation of the various problems of naval warfare the scientific method adopted in other professions . . . to raise naval warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science."\(^2\) The reasons for establishing the College were apparently clear to Luce in 1906 in contrast


to the first presentation of his draft proposal for a naval war college in November, 1882. John D. Hayes made a strong case of the lack of clarity by Luce when he attempted to draw a distinction between a war college and a line graduate school.³ Even the board of officers appointed by Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler to determine the feasibility of establishing such a college never made a clear distinction between the two.⁴

A review of the curriculum that Luce proposed for the school tend to support the contention by Hayes that Luce was not clear on the type post-graduate training he proposed. While the science of war, military and naval history, military and international law, and modern languages would seem to be the type of studies in a curriculum appropriate for a high level post-graduate naval war academy; the inclusion of naval tactics, astronomy, hydrography, naval architecture, and marine engineering (subjects appropriate for a lower level naval operations and tactics course) would appear to make the school a staff college rather than a war academy. Yet, one must keep in


⁴Luce prepared a draft general order on March 10, 1884 that would officially set up the Naval War College, and on May 3, 1884 Secretary of the Navy Chandler appointed a board consisting of Luce, Commander William T. Sampson and Lieutenant Commander Casper F. Goodrich to report upon the whole subject of a post-graduate course for naval officers including the reason for establishing such a school, the scope and intent of the proposed course of instruction, and an opinion as to the best location for the school. For further details see Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and the Beginnings of The War College," pp. 53-54.
mind that Luce had no model for the kind of institution he was proposing. Surely there were war academies and staff colleges in Europe, but these were essentially army rather than naval schools. Additionally, although the United States had post-graduate schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, these also were army schools. There were no naval war colleges from which a model could be drawn. The United States Naval War College was to be unique. Not only was it to be the first armed services war college in the United States, it was recognized by many to be the first formally organized naval war college anywhere. It should then be no surprise that Luce turned to the most available source he had for a curriculum guide—the U.S. Army Schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. However, while he adopted a curriculum similar to that at the Army's schools, he nonetheless "fostered the assumption of a true war college status by emphasizing the study of national strategy as a combination of sea and land power."  

5 The three principal European staff colleges were the Kriegsakademie founded in Germany in 1810, the British Staff College opened in 1858 and France's Ecole Superieure de Guerre established in 1878. The British Royal Naval College at Greenwich was also in existence; however, this school offered only technical courses which had no relation either to the process of fighting or to the principles of war. For additional information, see W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," Navy 2 (October, 1959)p. 37; also Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States Army 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 11; and see Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977), p. 38.

One reason for the establishment of the Naval War College is found in a letter written by Luce to Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson in August, 1877. As reported by Barnes, Kaufman, and Gannon, Luce advocated in the letter "A school wherein our junior officers would be carried through a post-graduate course consisting of the higher branches of their profession. The leading features of the post-graduate course was to be the carrying of the young officers through a course of instruction in the art of war."\(^7\) This letter was written five years before Luce drafted the proposal for the establishment of a naval war college. Moreover, this letter revealed his real motivation for the establishment of a naval war college. He wanted the navy to have a post-graduate school similar to the Army's Artillery School at Fort Monroe. He was inspired by what the Army was doing for the professional improvement of its officers, and felt the Navy could do the same.\(^8\) Luce was enthusiastic about his proposal and prior to its final acceptance wrote to his son-in-law, Lieutenant Boutelle Noyes in July, 1883:

> My great hobby, now that the training system is fairly established, is to erect a "War School" for officers . . . I have the plan roughly mapped out . . . I have presented my plan to the Secretary but he has not had time to give the matter his attention. . . Whether it will end up in smoke or not I cannot say.\(^9\)

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\(^7\)Captain S. M. Barnes, Commander W. M. Kaufman and Commander H. T. Gannon, The United States Naval War College--A Staff Study of its Historical Background, Mission and Educational Philosophy: Principles and Concepts from which the Second Year of the Course in Naval Warfare was Derived (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College, 1954), p. C-1.


\(^9\)Ibid.
According to Thomas B. Buell, Luce definitely knew the type of school he wanted. This would appear to refute charges made by Hayes that things were not clear in the mind of Luce. More importantly, Luce realized that his proposal would not be popular within the navy, so in order to gain support he delivered a speech, to the Naval Institute on April 4, 1883. This speech on "War Schools" was really a tongue-in-cheek assessment of naval post-graduate education vis-a-vis the Army's training. Buell contends that Luce gave an impressive summary of the Army's advance warfare schooling in the speech and admonished his fellow naval officers that "The Army had been studying war while the Navy had been studying fossils." Therefore, while there is some controversy over whether or not Luce knew exactly what type of naval post-graduate war academy he wanted, there is little doubt as to the major reason for its establishment; the traditional Army-Navy rivalry. The two services had been competitors for a long time. Neither wanted to be out-done by the other. Now that the Army had taken an early lead in the provision of post-graduate professional education, some in the Navy fretted and wanted to catch up. Army officials were just as determined to maintain its pre-eminence since that service was the first in America to establish post-graduate military education although not at the senior level.

According to Timothy K. Nenninger, the need for post-graduate military education was obvious by the close of the nineteenth century. The experience in Europe and the demands of the military profession

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in the United States required it. He argues that the question was no longer academic but bureaucratic—when, how, and in what form would the American Army undertake a systematic education of its regular officers and men? Nenninger explains that it was important for the United States Army at the time to have well-trained, professional officers to cope with the technological, organizational, and tactical changes occurring in warfare during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One should note that by the end of the nineteenth century, the idea that war could be carried on by amateurs became obsolete. Further, the earlier idea that war was in the province of the charismatic leader or the "Great Captain" genius was also rejected. Nenninger contends that even though one's experience and socioeconomic background as well as his place in the social organization of the profession had an effect on his professional development, education was also needed. He says:

Professional education is also important because it affects the development of corporateness, responsibility and expertise. For the military profession schooling is particularly significant because of the limited opportunities officers have to practice their profession—to command and manage troops in combat. Other than war, school is among the principal means by which officers can develop professional expertise.  

12 Ibid., p. 3.
Some senior Army officials had long recognized the need for professional training of their regular officers. They had studied the effects of professional training on their regular officers. They had studied the effects of professional schooling on officers in the armies of Russia and Germany. They saw how this type training improved the effectiveness of the European officers and they wanted to do the same for American Army officers. However, the situation in the United States was further complicated by a number of factors.

While the United States Army was headed by a Commanding General and there was a War Department staff, the commander did not always have the support of the staff officers. These bureau chiefs, according to Pappas, regarded themselves as subject directly and only to the orders of the Secretary of War and not the Commanding General. Consequently, difficulties arose as to how the Army would be administered and would function in the future. Emerging from this complex command and staff structure was the inability to fix the responsibility for the professional education of the regular army personnel. It was true that there were post-graduate schools operating at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, and that in 1866 the Engineer School at Willets Point, New York was established. However, the responsibility for the conduct of these schools and the determination of their curricula, fell to the individual arms and services concerned with the type training conducted at the schools. Pappas says "Little coordination and even less centralized control could be exercised under the exist-
ing staff and command structure.\textsuperscript{16} Another complication was the fact that permanent assignment of officers to the various bureaus of the War Department caused these officers to become entrenched in the Washington scene. Therefore, they made their own contacts among the members of the Congress and the civilians of the executive branch, and as a result felt they had gained sufficient status to justify their providing advice directly to the Secretary of War rather than to The Commanding General.\textsuperscript{17} These complications caused anxiety among many senior officers and pointed up the need for a reorganization of the Army before a system of professional military education at the higher levels could be instituted effectively.

It is therefore little wonder that Secretary of War Elihu Root proposed a reorganization that included the creation of an interim general staff and the establishment of an army war college to house that staff. It was Root's intent that the head of each department of the general staff and his assigned officers be detailed for limited periods to the college not only to direct the instruction but also to acquire the necessary experience in planning to enable them to provide sound advice to the commander.\textsuperscript{18} This creation of an interim general staff became the immediate cause for establishing the Army War College. However there were, according to Pappas, three concomitant purposes in establishing the College. These were "To further higher

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 6.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 13.
instruction of Army personnel, to develop and organize existing means of education into a coherent and unified system, and to serve as a coordinating and authoritative agency through which all kinds of professional military information would be available to the War Department at any time."\textsuperscript{19} Even Pappas admits that functions assigned to The Army War College went far beyond that expected of an educational institution, and that it would appear "The initial concept primarily concerned the function of The War College as a general staff rather than as an education institution."\textsuperscript{20} Although the Congress in making appropriations supported Root in his determination to use The War College as the vehicle for an interim general staff, it was primarily through the efforts of Brigadier William H. Carter that the focus of the War College was turned toward educational functions rather than its use as a general staff training ground.\textsuperscript{21} His constant lobbying with Root convinced him that a real educational institution was needed. As a result, an act authorizing the creation of a true general staff became effective in August, 1903 and Major General Samuel B. M. Young, who as the president of the first War College Board directed both the interim general staff and the College, became the first Chief of Staff of the Army. This enabled the War College to become a separate activity with Brigadier General Tasker Bliss as its first president. To him fell the task of making the Army War College not only the second Senior Service College in the U.S. military but also a true educational institution.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 15.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 28.
The Army's leadership in promoting education as a means of providing a professional military force has already been detailed. Although the establishment of its own War College as one of the premier military training institutions was preceded two decades by the Navy's War College, it nonetheless wasted little time in making the school a comparable institution. Additionally, the Army was quick to recognize inadequacies in its program and to call for corrective measures. Between the two world wars, education for and within the Army received far greater attention than ever before. This was a reflection of both the emphasis placed on preparedness in peacetime and on the increasing complexity of modern war.\(^{22}\) The need for a different type high level institution—one to prepare personnel for advanced national security management assignments became evident. The result was the founding of the Industrial College of The Armed Forces (ICAF).

ICAF did not begin as a Senior Service School. It began as a part of the Army. Known at first as the Army Industrial College, "It was established in recognition of the high importance of logistical training for the conduct of modern war."\(^{23}\) To understand this need, one must understand the status of logistics in the Army through the end of World War I.\(^ {24}\) The matching of the means with the ends—the coordination of logistics with strategy—had been a continuous problem

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) The Army's Chief of Military History defines logistics as "The art of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces... Logistics deals with the deployment of military forces and their equipment to the area of war, and with innumerable services, such as feeding, clothing, supplying, transporting, and housing troops." For additional information see Maurice Matloff (ed.) *American Military History*, p. 12.
for the Army since its beginning. Obtaining and delivering supplies and equipment to troops was often a hit and miss proposition from the colonial period through World War I. In spite of this, logistics continued to be revealed as important factors in determining where and when battles would be held. At times the supply system that was devised failed such as during the War of 1812. At other times prior detailed logistical planning and the judicious use of supplies and equipment insured victory as it did for Generals Grant and Sherman during the Civil War. However, there was no military school solely dedicated to teaching higher level logistical planning.

In this respect, the Army Industrial College became a pioneer institution. Training in marshalling the nation's economic strength and planning industrial mobilization became a reality. Having been closed during World War II by the War Department, pressure was exerted by senior Army officers in 1943 to reopen the College as the Army developed demobilization plans. Although other Army officers suggested sending personnel to the Harvard School of Business for industrial training, advocates for reopening the school prevailed and the Industrial College was reopened; but not as an Army school. According to Hayden J. Price, it was reconstituted as a joint educational institution operating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel serving as equal partners in the staff, faculty, and the student body. It was renamed

the Industrial College of The Armed Forces. The failure of industrial preparedness during World War I had been the primary cause for the establishment of this institution.

Experiences of war helped both military and civilian leaders to realize the importance of educational preparation of armed service personnel for high level responsibilities. Moreover, wartime experiences also tended to point to the need for studies in staff coordination and joint operations among the various military services. It is to such experiences that one can trace the establishment of The National War College.

Early in World War II, American leaders became aware that the growing complexity of planning and conducting military operations at high levels demanded greatly increased training, as well as more emphasis on joint operations and staff coordination. As a result, in the Fall of 1942 General "Hap" Arnold recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that an all service college be created to provide training in joint planning and operations. The idea was to "train officers of the arms in the exercise of command and performance of staff duties in unified and coordinated Army and Navy Commands". The establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) resulted in June, 1943. Reflecting a growing recognition of the inseparability

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26 Ibid.


29 Ibid.
of foreign policy and military policy, and thus the advisability of combined training of both future military and civilian leaders who would influence the planning and conduct of national security affairs, Foreign Service Officers became students at ANSCOL along with individuals from the Army and Navy. The wartime success of this temporary institution helped to cause military and civilian leaders to call for the creation of a permanent post war joint service school. As usual in the military, a board of officers was created to study the suggestions.

In 1946, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow was appointed President of the War Department Military Education Board. Commonly known as the "Gerow Board", it was the final report by this group that contained the first description of what was to become the permanent successor to ANSCOL—The National War College. The recommendations of the Gerow Board contained a proposal that an education system be established for officers of the Army consisting of a National Security University, an Armed Forces Staff College, and schools and colleges operating under the supervision of Army Major Commands. It was the intent of The Board that the National Security University consist of an Administrative College, an Intelligence College, a National War College, an Industrial College, and tentatively a State Department College.

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30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
The purpose of The National Security University as determined by The Board, was to assure the development of officers capable of high command and staff duties in connection with the prevention of war, preparation for and prosecution of war on a global scale, and the execution of responsibilities of the Armed Forces subsequent to hostilities.\textsuperscript{34} It was stated in the Board report:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a.] That there exists a requirement for a National War College to cover part of the instruction formerly included in the scope of the Army War College and the Army and Navy Staff College is indisputable. Instruction dealing with the operational aspects of field forces is included in the proposed Armed Forces Staff College.
  \item[b.] World War I demonstrated the need for an Industrial College and this institution is now accepted as an essential part of our military educational system.
  \item[c.] Experience in World War II established the need for more thorough training of officers in the handling of personnel and intelligence problems, particularly on the national and highest military level. The Administrative College and the Intelligence College are proposed to meet that requirement.\textsuperscript{35}
\end{itemize}

Even though a National Security University was not founded, two of the proposed colleges were established. The National War College and the Industrial College were founded along with the proposed separate Armed Forces Staff College. The Board intended that The National War College be concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of the national resources to implement that strategy. In this connection,

\textsuperscript{34}Idem, "Report of War Department Military Education Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army," p. 27.

\textsuperscript{35}Ibid., p. 28.
the scope of instruction was to include the political, civil, logistical and operational interests and responsibilities of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The War, and Naval Departments. Within this scope, the Board intended that studies include: grand strategy and war planning, foreign and domestic policies of all nations and their effect on world stability, causes and prevention of war, the economic and social resources of nations and their relationship to war potential, joint policies and joint doctrines, mobilization and demobilization, policies for operations with allies, trends of future wars and their implications, and Armed Forces responsibilities after cessation of active hostilities. 36

Looking back over the factors influencing the establishment of the various Senior Service Schools, it was found that experiences stemming from war was the foremost reason for founding the institutions. This was the case regarding the establishment after World War I of The Army Industrial College that later became The Industrial College of The Armed Forces. In like fashion experiences gained in World War II served to cause the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College that later evolved into The National War College. Yet, war experience was not the only cause for establishing Senior Service Schools. The Army's success with its post-graduate training and the need for like type training in the Navy appears to be the real reason for establishing the Naval War College. Secondary reasons for founding the Naval War College were the desire of Luce to provide a place where scientific method could be applied to problems of naval warfare, and a place where

36 Ibid., p. 29.
officers could become professional through post-graduate studies. While it seemed desirable to have a place where Army officers could gain professional training at the post-graduate level, this does not appear to be the main factor in the establishment of The Army War College. Rather, the need to reorganize the Army and to provide for a general staff served as the immediate cause for establishing that College. Other purposes for founding the Army War College included elements such as expansion of higher education for Army personnel, the development and organization of a united Army education system, and the provision of a coordinating and authoritative agency for the dissemination of military information.

Factors influencing the establishment of the Senior Service Schools provide one with ideological and practical reasons for the existences of the schools. Since the reasons for these schools were devised by individuals, it would be necessary to examine attitudes and influences held by the military and civilian leaders involved in order to understand the causes.
CHAPTER IV

ROLES, ATTITUDES AND INFLUENCES OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE FORMATION OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

Senior service education has not always been popular. Most of the senior schools had just as many enemies as friends during their formative years, and the support they did receive from many military and civilian leaders was often lukewarm at best.¹ The military had been particularly affected by a syndrome that Professor Philip A. Crowl and Ronald Spector refer to as "technicism." According to Spector, technicism was the tendency among some officers to emphasize training in technical skills at the expense of general military knowledge.² Crowl contends that Stephen B. Luce was an early leader in the fight against technicism. Arguing that a naval officer should cease to be exclusively a navigator, a seaman, a gunner, or an engineer and become a professional in the art and science of war, Luce was thrust into the forefront of the military educational revolution of the 1880's and 1890's "that was to propel the armed services of the United States out of what has rightly been called the dark ages."³

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In spite of the efforts of men like Luce, Emory Upton, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Tasker Bliss and Elihu Root, this military intellectual revolution did not come easy. Old animosities against post-graduate education of military officers and the desire by many to maintain technicism as a basis for military professional development were strong and not easy to overcome. Infusion of these old prejudices into the early development of the Naval War College is a case in point.

According to Crowl, "During the first two decades the mere existence of a [Naval] War College seemed to provoke only two reactions among most naval officers and Washington politicians: one, indifference; two, outright hostility, and of these, the second was predominant." Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell appears to agree with Crowl. Buell said:

The Navy response [to the proposal for a Naval War College] was indifference and hostile. But Luce prevailed and the Naval War College was established... It had many enemies and few friends.

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes also points out the attitude held by many concerning the Naval War College. Hayes contends that Secretary of the Navy Richard W. Thompson to whom Luce first submitted a proposal for a naval war college never acknowledged receipt of the letters from Luce. He further argues that "It is something of a paradox that William E. Chandler [Thompson's successor] whose ideas on the purpose of a navy left much to be desired and who had no interest in foreign

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5 Ibid., p. 3.
affairs should have initiated the pioneer endeavor in higher military education."\(^7\) At the beginning of the discussions to establish a college, Secretary William C. Whitney, who succeeded Chandler, had a neutral attitude toward the college. At the same time Whitney was aware that the notion of the college was unpopular. The position of neutrality held by Whitney later changed to indifference and finally antagonism because of misunderstandings with Luce.\(^8\) Crowl said Secretary Whitney developed such an intense personal dislike of Luce that he had the Naval War College moved from its original site at Coasters Harbor Island where it had functioned under the Bureau of Navigation to Goat Island to be consolidated with the Torpedo School.\(^9\) The college had been housed from its beginning in a former almshouse on Coasters Harbor Island; and according to Crowl when Luce first saw it he was moved to say "Poor little house, I christen thee the United States Naval War College . . . . In the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."\(^10\) Hayes said this invocation of the Trinity was given while Luce made the sign of the cross and it caused some naval wits in Washington to dub the new institution "Trinity College."\(^11\) When the Naval War College was consolidated with the


\(^8\)Ibid., p. 58.


\(^10\)Ibid., p. 1.

Torpedo School on Goat Island in 1889 Whitney nearly accomplished his aim which was the end of the college. The school did however survive because of efforts by Luce and Mahan to save it and was moved back to Coasters Island in 1892 where it was housed in a new building named Luce Hall.\textsuperscript{12}

Not only was the Naval War College plagued with indifference and hostility by some secretaries of the Navy, it was also attacked by many politicians. One of the few politicians to befriend the Naval War College and to promote its establishment was Senator Nelson W. Aldridge of Providence, Rhode Island. Hayes said of him: "In an attempt to gain congressional recognition [for the College], Aldridge on 4 February introduced a resolution in the Senate requiring the Secretary of the Navy to report the steps that had been taken to establish an advanced course of instruction for naval officers and the reasons which suggested such an action. In his answer Chandler repeated the arguments that Luce had originally presented to him."\textsuperscript{13}

According to Hayes, support in the House of Representatives was not nearly so favorable. Representative Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama, Chairman of The House Naval Committee, was an early opponent of the Naval War College. Luce testified before The House Naval Committee as part of an attempt to gain appropriations for the College. However when the bill for naval appropriations came before the House in June 1886, Herbert left no doubt as to his attitude about the Naval War

\textsuperscript{12}Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War College: 1884-1972, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{13}Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings of The U.S. Naval War College," p. 54.
College when he said: "Now is the proper time to consider carefully whether or not that college is to become a permanent institution. In the opinion of a large majority of your committee, it ought not."¹⁴

Crowl report that further criticism came from Congressman William McAdoo of New Jersey who said:

The idle rich in their sumptuous mansions on Bellevue Avenue [in Newport, R.I.] would surely corrupt the young naval officers sent to Newport for study and professional training. It was "a great misfortune," he said, "that our military schools should be established in connection with watering places characterized in certain seasons of the year as scenes of social display and dissipation."¹⁵

Perhaps the most dramatic attack on the college was that by Hilary A. Herbert after he had left Congress and became Secretary of the Navy (1893-1897) during the second term of President Cleveland. Crowl writes that Herbert had decided to abolish the Naval War College altogether as an economy measure. However, it was saved at the last minute in 1893 when Herbert, on his way to Newport, Rhode Island, was loaned a copy of Alfred Thayer Mahan's book *The Influences of Seapower on the French Revolution and Empire*. After reading it, he was converted into a lifelong friend of the College.¹⁶

Mahan was a devotee of the college from the very beginning when he was appointed the first Professor of Naval History. Crowl, in writing about Mahan, says:

¹⁴Ibid., p. 58.
¹⁶Ibid.
Mahan . . . believed that from the study of naval history would emerge certain principles of maritime strategy, certain permanent truths as equally applicable today as yesterday and tomorrow as today. And in exploring history and demonstrating these truths at the Naval War College, Mahan hoped and expected that the institution would become a true nursery of maritime strategists and naval statesman. 17

The desire of Mahan and Luce for a successful war college was not shared by all naval officers. There were some technicists who could see little value in studying strategy and policy or the campaigns of famous military leaders, or even the maritime strategy of other countries. 18 Early in his quest for support for a war college, Luce wrote to many influential fellow officers who were in a position to influence retention of the Naval War College. One of them, Captain Francis M. Ramsey was the Superintendent of The Naval Academy and a technicist who disapproved of the College and who saw no reason for establishing another Naval Academy. He wrote Luce in 1884: "My view, in regard to this matter differs materially from those expressed by you in your article published in the Proceedings of The Naval Institute." 19 Also, there were some officers assigned to the Naval Training Station at Newport, Rhode Island who disliked the College for no other reason than they coveted the building and grounds for their own purposes. They felt that the College's facilities were more permanent and comfortable than their own headquarters. Fortunately for Luce, the officers with attitudes such as those just described did not prevail. With the help of individuals such as William T. Sampson and Casper F.

17 Ibid., p. 4.
18 Ibid.
Goodrich, Luce was able to get the Naval War College started. Sampson, an educator who succeeded Ramsey as Superintendent of The Naval Academy, shared the views of Luce regarding the need for post-graduate education for Naval officers; and Goodrich, an admirer of Sampson, also believed in the idea. Their support becomes more significant when one considers the fact that it was these two who along with Luce comprised the board which reviewed the merits of such an institution and who recommended its establishment by the Navy.\textsuperscript{20}

Finally, many students were hostile to the Naval War College. Crowl points out: "Most of the first class of eight officers who had been sent from the Torpedo School at Goat Island, felt that they had been shanghaied. To almost all the early students, the curriculum at the War College seemed irrelevant to the point of absurdity."\textsuperscript{21} Crowl continues by saying that "Even as late as 1911 William S. Sims, later to become President of the War College, was most reluctant to be assigned as a student."\textsuperscript{22}

Probably more than anyone else except Luce, Mahan should be given credit for helping to change attitudes held by military personnel and civilian leaders. As the second president of the institution, he went about explaining its reason for existence and showing that the school would neither duplicate nor compete with the post-graduate school at Annapolis. In the final analysis, Mahan won over many technicists. He argued: "The navy had many hardware experts, but none

\textsuperscript{20} Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War College: 1884-1972," p. 3.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.
were authorities on the Art of War." Having seen the roles, attitude and influences of individuals instrumental in the establishment of the Naval War College, attention can now be turned to the Army War College.

Early attitudes in the Army concerning post-graduate education were a little different than that in the Navy when that service's war college was founded. The Army had benefit of the long establishment of its schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, and a number of senior Army officers had traveled to Europe after Emory Upton's trip primarily to inspect German training establishments. Consequently, much literature was published concerning post-graduate education in the Army. The foremost book on the subject was Upton's The Armies of Asia and Europe as previously indicated. However, there were other significant early writings, and according to George S. Pappas: "Almost without exception these writings included a recommendation for establishment of a war academy, a war college, or some other form of post-graduate schooling for officers." Among these writings were: a pamphlet written by Brigadier General Thomas M. Vincent in 1870 entitled "Plea for the Staff of the Army of The United States"; an essay by Lieutenant Arthur L. Wagner on "An American College" which appeared in the 1889 edition of The Journal of The Military Service Institution; Captain E. L. Zalinski's essay "Army Organization, The


Best Adopted to a Republican Form of Government, Which Will Ensure an Effective Peace" appearing in the same journal; Captain T. A. Bingham's essay "The Prussian Great General Staff and What It Contains That Is Practical from an American Standpoint"; and finally Major Theodore Schwan's 1894 book Report on the Organization of the German Army. While these and other writings created a positive attitude for the establishment of some type of post-graduate education, the titles suggest that the calls for such training were tied either to a reorganization of the Army or the creation of a General Staff. It was this "marriage of convenience" that contributed to differing roles, attitudes and influences of individuals in the development of the Army War College.

One of the earliest supporters of military education in the Army was Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding General of the Army during The Civil War period. According to Pappas, Halleck during the period 1840-1849 emphasized that the principles of military art and science constituted the body of a profession and that it made no sense to entrust the professional duties of a military officer to a civilian. Accordingly, Halleck contended that it was necessary to have military officers devoted to the cultivation of military science so as to be able to compete with individuals overseas who were already schooled in military science. Halleck saw the teaching of military science not only as a means of educating the military officer, but also as a means of insuring the preparedness of the military; thus military science becomes a means of insuring peace. While Halleck

25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 7.
did not speak directly of the necessity for post-graduate education, his *Elements of Military Art and Science* served as an inspiration to Emory Upton who after his trip to Europe and Asia argued for such advanced training of Army officers.

The ideas expressed by Upton regarding post-graduate training greatly influenced Major General William H. Carter who as a young officer in the Adjutant General Department became a confidant of Secretary of the War Elihu Root and subsequently persuaded him of the need for an Army War College. Like Chandler of the Navy, Root appointed a board of officers consisting of Carter (who was then a Lieutenant Colonel), Brigadier General William Ludlow, Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck, and Colonel Joseph P. Snager (who accompanied Upton on his around-the-world trip) for the purpose of "considering regulations with a view to establishment of a War College for the Army."27

This board, commonly referred to as the Ludlow Board, was faced with the task of studying the feasibility of a true War College in face of strong pressure from some senior army officers for the organization of a General Staff as the primary need of the Army with a War College secondary. Even the fact that Root was successful in obtaining a congressional appropriation of $20,000 for the establishment of a war college before the Ludlow Board had completed its work did not quiet the strong sentiment for establishment of a General Staff. The members of the Ludlow Board were not able to overcome the opposition for a separate War College, and in its recommendations provided Root

with the means for establishing a War College to function as a General Staff, although the Board indicated there should be a separate war college at the first opportunity. Pappas contends that there is little doubt that Root's own concept and General Ludlow's influence on the Board's deliberations resulted in the final recommendations.\(^{28}\) Carter, however, continued at every opportunity to press for a separate General Staff and a separate War College. Even as a member of the Board appointed by Root to organize and operate the War College, Carter continued to insist that the college should be separated from the General Staff.\(^{29}\) In spite of opposition from many senior Army officers and members of Congress, Carter's efforts were realized in February 1903 when a campaign waged by Root ended in the passage of "An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the Army", which set up a separate General Staff thus freeing the War College to become a true educational institution.

When the War College Board was dissolved, General Tasker Bliss became President of the War College with Colonel Alexander Mackenzie and Major William D. Beach as directors.\(^{30}\) These three began the job

\(^{28}\)Ibid., pp. 19-20.

\(^{29}\)Root appointed a board of officers to convene not later than July, 1902 to organize the War College. Serving on this War College Board were: Major General Samuel B. M. Young, President; Brigadier General Carter; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss; Major Henry A. Green; and Major William D. Beach. Added as ex officio members were The Chief of Engineers, The Chief of Artillery, The Commandant of the General Service and Staff College, and The Superintendent of The Military Academy.

\(^{30}\)Neither General Young or General Carter who were the principals in the establishment of a separate General Staff and a separate War College continued to serve the college after it became separate. As previously indicated, General Young was appointed the first Chief of Staff of the Army and General Carter was sent to duty in the Philippines.
of making the Army War College a part of the Army educational system. Bliss introduced at the College his learn-by-doing method in which lectures were given to the students and then they executed what they had learned as part of a "great war game." Bliss also fostered improved relations with The Naval War Academy. Under his leadership, the College participated in the preparation of operational studies and plans as requested by the Chief of Staff, the planning and conduct of maneuvers and exercises, and supervised the Army's educational system including military instruction conducted at civilian colleges and universities under the Morrill Act of 1862. In 1906, General Bliss was assigned to duty in the Philippines. Because there was no general officer immediately available to replace him Lieutenant Colonel William H. Wotherspoon became the Acting President with the consent of the Chief of Staff. Wotherspoon was ultimately replaced by Brigadier General Thomas H. Berry whereupon he assumed the position of a director along with Lieutenant Colonel Smith S. Leach. Perhaps the most significant undertaking during the period of their service was closer cooperation with the Naval War College in planning amphibious type operations which benefited both services in organizing the expeditionary force sent to Cuba in 1906. This was an early example of Army-Navy coopera-

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31 Ibid., p. 35.

32 The Morrill Act of 1862 provided for military instruction in landgrant colleges. The number of instructors providing courses in military science and tactics at these civilian institutions increased over the years and became the basis for later organizing the Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The ROTC was officially established by the National Defense Act of 1916. For additional information see Maurice Matloff (ed.), American Military History (Washington: Office of The Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 290 and p. 367.

33 Pappas, Prudens Futuri, p. 48.
tion and was a prelude to joint services education.

The Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) was the culmination of efforts by many to establish joint service training. In the forefront was Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold who forwarded a memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggesting the creation of ANSCOL. It is alleged that the memorandum was actually prepared by two of Hap Arnold's assistants; Lieutenant Colonel Cabell and Lieutenant Colonel Smart. Lieutenam General John L. DeWitt was brought back from duty in the Aleutian Island Campaign (during World War II) to become its first commandant. General DeWitt had been Commandant of The Army War College from 1937 to 1939. Commodore Foy became the Deputy Commandant. Foy was a former Navy faculty representative at the Army War College. General DeWitt was not long on duty station before talk began concerning the need for a permanent postwar institution to replace ANSCOL. Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill succeeded General DeWitt as Commandant. It was during Admiral Hill's term that "prominent officials -- including Secretaries of War Henry L. Stimson and James V. Forrestal -- concerned themselves with the creation of permanent postwar joint service schools."

Prominent military personnel who joined in this call for a permanent joint staff college included


37 The Rotunda, p. 10.
Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's personal representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, the Chief of Naval Operations and General George C. Marshall, wartime Army Chief of Staff. However, at the beginning the support by these prominent individuals did not foreshadow the type of permanent joint army-navy staff institution that would finally emerge. That can be clearly seen in a review of the controversy surrounding the selection of a name for the permanent institution.

As early as October, 1945 and prior to his departure as Commandant of ANSCOL, General DeWitt wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it was desirable to settle on an appropriate title for the postwar joint college. General DeWitt said: "The name of the present college has not fully described its mission, which was to increase the efficiency of officers ordered to command as well as staff assignments in unified or coordinated Army and Navy commands. The title Staff College led to the conclusion that its only function was that of training officers for staff duty, and is reported to have resulted in a reluctance on the part of some officers to accept assignment to it as students." DeWitt continued by explaining various titles containing the phrase "War College" had been considered but were not found acceptable because of probable confusion with the Army War College and with

38 Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185/3, 10 April 1943, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box 241). The National Archives. It should be noted that the combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) was a World War II committee consisting of the professional Chiefs of America and England responsible to the President and Prime Minister for planning and directing the grand strategy of the coalition. Its American members were Marshall, King, Lehey, and Hap Arnold. For further information see Maurice Matloff (ed.), American Military History, pp. 427-428.
the Naval War College. He suggested that in order to describe more accurately the functions of the postwar college, to assign a more distinctive designation, to lend more dignity to the title, and to increase its appeal to the public the successor to ANSCOL should be titled "The College of National Defense" and it should become effective upon completion of ANSCOL's final war-time course on December 8, 1945. Admiral King agreed that the name of ANSCOL would not fully describe the mission of a permanent successor; however, he disagreed with General DeWitt's proposal. He indicated that the title "The College of National Defense" appeared to be too inclusive, and with such a name it would be difficult to judge from it anything as to the nature of the school." Accordingly, Admiral King suggested "As the eventual scope and curriculum of the Army-Navy Staff College will depend in some measure on the post war organization of the armed forces, it is considered that, in the interim, the present title is adequately descriptive . . . The title Army and Navy Staff and Command College (ANSCOL) would seem fully descriptive and is suggested, if any change is considered necessary."
General Hap Arnold also became concerned over a proper name for the post-war college and suggested the name of ANSCOL be changed to "College of National Security". He wrote:

Public opinion and the attitude of the services, particularly in so far as education within the services is concerned, are affected by the titles of our military schools and establishments. The United States is committing itself to maintain armed services of sufficient size and strength to maintain national security and fulfill certain international commitments. This goes beyond national defense. It can more appropriately be described under the heading "national security."42

The controversy continued after the departure of General DeWitt and his replacement by Admiral Hill. A record of a telephone conversation between Major General Alfred Grunther of the Army (who later became one of the Deputy Commandants of The National War College along with Admiral Foy and Brigadier General Landon of the Air Force) and Major General McFarland on the staff of The Joint Chiefs of Staff disclosed that Admiral Hill was concerned that the delay regarding the selection of a name might prejudice public opinion; particularly, if the State Department agreed to participate in the post-war college, and if a press release was given to the newspapers with a name omitted. General Grunther indicated that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the Army, had talked with General Carl Spaatz, and Admiral Hill had talked with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and all were ready to select a name from a final list of three which included: National War College, National Defense College, National Security College. It appeared however that Admiral Leahy was the only individual that was

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42 JCS Paper 962/14, Memorandum from CG, Army Air Force, 26 October 1945, Subject: "Proposed Name for Post-War Army and Navy Staff College," Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12026-42, Section 4, Box 72), The National Archives.
not prepared to select a final name. General Grunther also suggested that it may come down to the participants flipping a coin for the name, and finally indicated that if a name wasn't selected soon Drew Pearson or Senator Thomas would hear of it and embarrass everyone.43

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 1, 1946 finally decided on a name and agreed to change ANSCOL to The College of National Security; however, this was rescinded on February 4, 1946 in a memorandum from Captain C.J. Moore, Deputy Secretary of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Admiral Hill. So, the controversy continued. Credit for breaking this long stalemate should go to Admiral Hill who attended a conference with The Secretary of War where the name "National War College" was suggested. Hill obtained the concurrences for this change from General Eisenhower, General Spaatz, Admiral Nimitz, Secretary Forrestal and Mr. Russell (an assistant Secretary of State). James Byrne the Secretary of State later confirmed Mr. Russell's concurrence. Accordingly, on April 4, 1946 the War Department announced to its major subordinate commands the establishment of the National War College for Army, Navy and State Department officers, and that the college would be the highest level education institution of the Armed Forces.44

The individuals whose attitudes, roles and influences were instrumental in the founding of the primary Senior Service Schools were both

43 Record of telephone conversation between General Alfred Grunther and General McFarland, 1 February 1946, JCS Papers, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72), The National Archives.

44 War Department Letter, Office of The Adjutant General, 4 April 1946, Subject: "National War College," JCS Papers, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72), The National Archives.
military and civilian leaders. In the case of The Naval War College which endured twenty-five years of indifference and hostility on the part of Secretaries of The Navy, Congressmen, some senior naval officers and even some students who wanted to continue with technicism as the basis for training naval officers, it took all the persistence that supporters of the College could muster to save it from extinction. Stephen Luce, Senator Nelson W. Aldridge, William T. Sampson and Casper F. Goodrich and even Hilary A. Herbert are but a few of the individuals who labored to save the Naval War College. However, if one person should be given credit for doing most to insure the survival of the College, that individual would be Alfred Thayer Mahan.

Army leaders were no less confronted with animosities against the Army War College than individuals in the Navy had been against its College. The Army leaders fight was not against prejudices and technicism as in the Navy. Rather, their fight was against those who saw the Army War College as an adjunct, and even a subsidiary, of a General Staff. General William H. Carter is to be given credit for convincing Secretary of War Elihu Root to separate the General Staff and the Army War College. Additionally, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Wotherspoon and Brigadier Thomas Berry, all of whom served as Presidents of the College should be credited for making the Army War College a true educational institution.

Lieutenant General Henry "Hap" Arnold was the driving force behind The Army-Navy Staff College while Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt and Vice Admiral Henry W. Hill, as commandants, made ANSCOL a functioning reality. However, DeWitt became a leading figure, along with most of the outstanding and well-known military leaders of the period, in a controversy over the selection of a name for the permanent
successor to ANSCOL because Army-Navy Staff College did not fit the mission or image for the post-war institution. Admiral Hill finally got everyone to agree on the title "National War College" and that Senior Service School was finally established as the highest level military educational institution of The Armed Services.

As things turned out, The National War College did not in fact become the highest level educational institution among the services. Rather, it had to compete with the individual services own war colleges and with the Industrial College of The Armed Forces because of the attitudes and influences of both military and civilian supporters and opponents of all the institutions. This point becomes more clear when one examines curricular development of the Senior Service Schools. Chapter V will attempt to show the similarities and differences among those schools by taking a critical look at the curriculum development and instructional methodologies of each. Special emphasis will be given to the development of curriculum and instructional strategies of the National War College.
CHAPTER V

CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES

The curriculum of an institution tends to distinguish it from other institutions and gives it a clear identity among its peers. More importantly, the curriculum is often a factor in attracting students to the academy. Alan O. Pfnister argues further that curriculum is the critical key to greater retention of students who elect to attend a college or university.\(^1\) It follows that curriculum is important to the growth and development of an institution of higher learning whether its orientation be military or civilian. Military Senior Service Schools, unlike civilian colleges and universities, have not had to compete for students nor to worry about their retention. The military system ensures the ready availability of student clientele whereas civilian institutions have not enjoyed such an advantage. This difference between the two sectors, military and civilian, in attaining and retaining students does not reduce the importance of curriculum development or instructional strategies at the military schools vis-a-vis civilian colleges and universities. In fact, curriculum development at the various War Colleges in the United States became a critical element in the growth of each War College, and tended to give to each its own character thus clearly distinguishing one from the other.\(^2\)

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Masland and Radway looked at the curriculum at the Senior Service military schools and determined that it was the breadth of the curriculum at each that made it different from its peers and unique in higher education. Their findings support the contention that at no other institution of higher learning can an individual receive instruction on the full range of factors, considerations and circumstances that bear upon their studies as one can obtain at the military Senior Service Schools. The question arises as to how and why the curriculum at the various Senior Service Colleges developed as they did. Also what are distinguishing features of each? To answer these question one must begin before the United States military higher educational institutions were founded.

At the time the United States military schools were established, curricula for the proper teaching of military science and tactics had been developed and were in use in European military schools. In fact, when General Emory Upton visited the military schools of the great powers of Europe and Asia, he found a diverse curricula which not only appeared to prepare the young students for a life in the military forces of their countries, but also helped to prepare them for the cultural and social life among their people. Military schools at Modena and Turin in Italy are good examples of training grounds for their culture. Students attending those schools were expected not only to become proficient in military subjects such as military history and geography,
fortifications, military law and administration, and the study of arms, but they were required to become proficient also in engineering during their three year course. Therefore, the students had to master subjects such as arithmetic, plane geometry, elements of physics, chemistry, minerology, mechanical drawing and topography as well as purely military subjects. Additionally, the military trainee had to learn Greek and Roman history, the Italian and French languages, literature of Italy and France, and they had to become proficient in writing. The same type of studies were required at the Russian military schools.³

Upton also observed that before a student could be admitted to the Nicholas Staff Academy at St. Petersburg, he would have had to complete an educational level that is comparable to the secondary school in the United States. More important he would have to pass competitive examinations in mathematics, plane trigonometry, history, geography, fortifications, tactics, the theory of arms, the Russian language, and either the French or German languages. Once admitted, the student would spend three years studying what the Russians referred to as principal and secondary subjects. Principal subjects included tactics and strategy, military history, military administration, military statistics, geodesy, cartography and topographic drawing. The secondary subjects included world history, international law, riding, Russian, French or German, artillery and fortifications.⁴

³Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia, Austria, Germany, France and England (N.Y.: Appleton & Co., 1878) pp. 131-133.

⁴Ibid., pp. 152-153.
The same procedures as practiced in Russia generally held in the war schools of other European countries. Competitive examinations in Austria contained more mathematics and science requirements than in Russia, and its two year course of study included studies of the political economy, the history of civilization, and the natural sciences. The competitive examination requirements at the Staff College at Sandhurst, England were very similar to that in Austria except the British candidate had to pass elementary mechanics, the Hindustani language as well as French and German, and geology. The British two year course was divided into obligatory military subjects and voluntary subjects such as additional languages, experimental sciences and photography. The French Academy of War was in the process of being organized when Upton made his tour; it, therefore, was not open during his visit in France. However, its curriculum was already under development, and was patterned after that of the famous War Academy of Berlin.

Candidates for the Berlin War Academy not only had to pass a competitive examination in various military, scientific, and social studies, but also had to select and write on a theme from a predetermined list in order to show his literary and scientific mastery. Also, he had to submit a written theme, much in the form of a case study, in which he discussed the movement and disposition of troops in certain offensive and defensive operations. When admitted to the War Academic, the German student studied compulsory and voluntary subjects for a two year period.

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5 Ibid., pp. 179-180.

6 Ibid., pp. 264-265.

7 Ibid., p. 249.
Unlike the other European schools which relied mostly on the lecture method of instruction, the Berlin War Academy added the disputation method and used it widely. Instructional strategies at the German academy were different from the rest of the European war schools in that its main emphasis was not only on acquiring positive knowledge, but also on the habit of developing critical thinking among its students so as to ensure action from insight rather than from impulse. It should be noted that another departure from other European War Schools was the teaching of General Staff duties as required study, inclusion of experimental philosophy, ancient history, history of the Middle Ages, and the history of literature as electives. Many of the innovations in the Berlin War Academy mirrored similar new methods in the country’s civilian institutions. These innovations were significant to many Americans who visited Germany and who brought back reports on the German ideas of academic freedom and advanced scholarship in the universities.

Just as American civilian educators brought back innovative ideas for educating civilians, so did the military visitors such as Upton, for furthering military higher education. On the basis of these reports the United States Senior Service Colleges developed their curricula.

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8 Ibid., p. 216-127.

9 George Ticknor, Edward Everette and Joseph Green Cogswell were among the very first Americans to study at the German University. Their visit was during the 1815-1817 time frame and opened the way for more American educators, both from civilian and military institutions, to make the trip overseas to study new German methods in higher education. For additional information see Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, American Higher Education: A Documentary History, 2 vol. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1: 257-263.
The U. S. Naval War College, the first War College to be established, became the first such activity to use the German methods.

From the beginning of the Naval War College, emphasis was placed on fundamentals and principles, on stimulating logical thought processes, and on the study of war as a serious art. W. Royce Powell contends that it was on these solid intellectual bases that the curriculum of the Naval War College was developed and has helped to maintain the continuation of the course offerings. However, it is ironic that while the Naval War College curriculum and methods of instruction reflected that of the Berlin War Academy, it was after observation of the curricula at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth that a course of study was adopted by the Naval War College. Could it be possible that this action reflects the rivalry between the services?

The initial curriculum of the Navy War College was, therefore, adopted by its founder, Admiral Luce, from that of the Army schools previously mentioned. In their programs of study strategy, history and international law were taught along with studies in military tactics. However, Luce departed from the curriculum devised by the Army by placing emphasis on the study of national strategy as an outgrowth of a combination of sea and land power. His premise was that in studying the art of war, one must realize that national strategy is derived from national power, and this power is achieved by strength in both land and sea operations. Thus, from its very beginning, the modern concept of

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11 Ibid.
joint operations became the fundamental basis for the Naval War College curriculum.\textsuperscript{12}

The Naval War College's first curriculum in the winter of 1885 was very limited and consisted of six weeks of lectures and discussions. Unlike the German method, papers were not originally required of the officers in attendance, and such work as done by them was entirely voluntary except perhaps attendance at lectures. As indicated in Chapter II, the works of Alfred Thayer Mahon on sea power formed the core of the naval instruction, and the lectures of Lieutenant Tasker H. Bliss on tactics and Professor James Russell Sorley on international law provided related subjects.\textsuperscript{13} In the summer of 1886, lectures in naval history, coastal defense and tactical exercises with steam launches were added to the course of study.\textsuperscript{14}

War gaming\textsuperscript{15} was introduced in the Naval War College's curriculum in 1892 after a series of lectures by Captain William McCarty Little,

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{13}Alfred Thayer Mahan's works on the influence of sea power upon history were written between 1890 and 1905 and are considered some of the world's most influential military treaties. They contain theories of sea operations that were taught to the early Naval War College students. For an excellent rendering of Mahan's theories see Alfred Thayer Mahan, \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805} (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 7-251. This edition combines an abridgement of \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783} with excerpts from \textit{The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812}. It has approximately 400 illustrations of which 200 are in color.


\textsuperscript{15}Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines war gaming as the act of studying and testing military concepts through simulated battles or campaigns conducted in conferences by officers acting as opposing staffs. See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (1977), s.v. "War Game."
one of the staunchest advocate of this method of instruction. The modern war game had been invented by Lieutenant von Reisswitz of the Prussian Guard Artillery in 1824, and by the time of Bismarck and von Moltke [Chancellor of Germany and Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army respectively who are credited with modernizing the German Armed Forces] it was in general use throughout the Prussian Army. However, the naval war game as instituted by the U. S. Naval War College was not the same as that suggested by von Reisswitz. Rather, the kind of games advocated by Captain Little that finally were established as part of the College curriculum had been developed in 1878 by Captain Philip H. Colomb of The Royal British Navy. The Colomb method consisted of three kinds of games: "The Duel" which simulated battle between two ships; "The Tactical Game" which was a simulated maneuver involving two opposing fleets of battleships and cruisers; and "The Strategic Game" which involved large battle over great ocean distances between opposing fleets. Under the war gaming concept used at the Naval War College, a "main problem" was assigned to the class for resolution. Officers were grouped in committees for studying the problem and arriving at a solution. Reading assignments were given the committee members in order to


18 Ibid.
assist in their deliberations. Finally, the solution of each committee was discussed in class with the instructor serving as a monitor. This method tended to approach German methodology. However, closer to it was the "applicatory" method.

In 1910, the "applicatory" method was introduced at the Naval War College. The system was not new in that it had been previously used at the Army's schools at both Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth. However, while it was originally adopted by the Army from the system used by the German staff colleges and war schools, it gained a new sophistication at the Naval War College. The objective of this method at the Naval College was to cultivate in the minds of the naval officers the habit of systematic reasoning in resolving tactical and strategic problems. The method required an individual rather than a group solution for the problems. The process consisted of estimating the situation involved in a given problem, making a concrete decision on the problems, and formulating orders for carrying out the decision. The applicatory method marked a new phase in the College's curriculum and it is considered to have influenced naval thought in the direction of a more concrete conception of war and the Navy's relation to war. The next instructional method introduced at the Naval War College was the "case study."


W. Royce Powell says the "case study" method of instruction was introduced at The Naval War College from abroad. This, however, could not be confirmed from the literature used in this investigation. Rather, what was confirmed is that the earliest known use of cases was in the diagnostic training of social workers shortly after the Civil War. Later in the nineteenth century, the method was introduced in the Harvard Law School by Christopher Langdell to present judicial decisions in a revolt against the less functional method of legal education. Charles F. Fisher describes the case study method of instruction quite simply as "The use of cases to effect problem-centered learning". He further contends that the case is a factual written record of a situation, condition, and/or experience that may or may not contain a readily identifiable problem, but definitely contains the results and sometimes the implications and analysis of actions. Whether the case study method was introduced to the Naval War College from aboard or from Harvard is irrelevant. Of significance is the fact that by the early twentieth century the case study method had become one of the main instructional strategies used at the Naval War College. Such studies were also popular in the civilian graduate school.


23 Ibid.

The curricular emphasis on tactical studies with the lecture, war gaming, the applicatory method, and case studies as the major instructional strategies continued at the Naval War College throughout much of the early twentieth century. Neither Admiral William Sims nor Admiral Raymond Spruance, who served as Presidents of the College throughout much of the period, substantially changed the curriculum. In fact, Sims believed in the value of the German method and often defended the value of theoretical knowledge applied to the naval profession, but Spruance found work at the college a little more than "an intellectual desert." The situation changed dramatically after the close of World War II. The curriculum was broadened to include many matters not strictly naval or even military. The sights of the students were raised from purely tactical, command and staff concerns to a much higher level of decision making in the areas of strategy and national policy according to Professor Philip A Crowl. "In a broad sense, one can say that in 1947 the War College began a full 180 degree turn back to the original concepts of Luce and Mahan."

The practice of extending invitations to professional historians and social scientists to lecture at the Naval War College began during the administration of Admiral Spruance. Spruance also invited a number

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.

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of representatives from the State Department to speak to the students at the Naval War College. The formal study of logistics was reintroduced into the curriculum as were advanced studies in politics and economics. Professional chairs to be filled by distinguished civilian educators were established. Other studies that were introduced included a core curriculum consisting of the fundamentals of strategy studies with associated sub-courses in International Relations, Evolution of Strategy, Theory, Military Management, Economics, and Comparative Cultures.

In spite of these somewhat radical changes in the curriculum, the Naval War College came under increasing criticism both from within the naval command and from civilian scholars and educators. According to Professor Crowl, after World War II excessive attention was given to the Soviet Union at the expense of the rest of the nations of the world. Further the superficial treatment of its many subjects, its endless and rapid succession of visiting lecturers, along with an over concentration on the contemporary scene, and an corresponding underemphasis on the historical and sociological context in which current events were transpiring were the main criticisms of the curriculum. It was against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, a later President of the College, inaugurated a new course of study which, in his mind, represented "A return to our great traditions—to the strategic and historical contribution of men like Mahan. . . ." 29

29 Ibid., p. 8.

A major component in the establishment of the new curriculum at the Naval War College by Admiral Turner was the Contemporary Civilization Lecture Series. This voluntary program served to promote the College in the dual role of an academic and community cultural center as well as a center for higher professional education. Admiral Turner said of the program:

This series provided a personal enrichment program for student, staff, faculty, and wives of the War College . . . . The subjects covered were intended to be material not [necessarily] related to the college curriculum, but of general interest to the students as citizens and informed persons.31

More directly related to the new curriculum was the Current Strategy Forum. Initially this program was begun in 1948 to allow the students to exchange ideas with a wide cross section of the civilian community. The program was first called "Roundtable Discussions" and later "Global Strategy Discussions." Under Admiral Turner, the Current Strategy Forum brought students face to face with leaders in government, the civilian community and with flag officers. The students discussed with these leaders selected problems affecting the military and the nation at large. The subjects of various discussions were dealt with both by student papers prepared in advance of the forum as seminar stimulators and by distinguished guest speakers.32

As one looks back over the decades of curriculum and instructional development at the Naval War College, three developments appear to have


32 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
changed the demands which the Navy faced, thus requiring a change in
the College's curriculum. They were changes in U.S. foreign policy
and national strategy, difficult choices in the ordering of national
priorities due to the limitation in funds, and the fact that the time
when the U.S. Navy had a clear qualitative and quantitative advantage
at sea had passed. As these changes took place, so did the curri-
culum of the Naval War College to keep up with the demands brought by
the new developments. The primary objective of the curriculum changes
at the Naval War College was to sharpen the critical faculties of the
students rather than teaching operational methodology. The curriculum
was, therefore, structured to a problem-solving approach treating the
areas of strategy, resource management, and naval tactics. The most
significant change in the curriculum in the modern era was a general
deeemphasis of contemporary data and events in favor of providing studies
that would enable the officers to project into the future a number of
years rather than at their next tour of duty. Instruction began to
stress such areas as international law, communications, public affairs
in the total context of the Navy rather than in a series of separate
and discrete fragments.

To accomplish this new direction, students were plunged into a
scholastic discipline that forced them to stretch critical faculties.

33 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
34 Ibid., p. 3.
35 Ibid., p. 5.
For instance, they were forced to probe the multiple meanings of such basic concepts as "limited war," "spheres of influence," "balance of power," and they were pushed to make connections between historical examples and current practices. Less reliance was placed on outside lectures and more of the teaching workload was passed to the resident faculty. Dialogue between the Naval War College and civilian academic institutions was increased through exchange programs and cooperative arrangements with civilian institutions of higher education. An advanced research program was established to permit students to delve into problems affecting the military that had defied solution. Most important is the fact that three trimesters were established to treat the major areas of Strategy and Policy, Defense Decision Making, and Naval Tactics. This program not only divided the student load, but it also meant that each faculty member would now have the opportunity for research and further study during one trimester period while teaching for two trimesters. The Naval War College had indeed returned to the original ideas of Luce and Mahan, and had established for itself a distinctive character emphasized by its preeminence in the studies of national strategy and policy. Further, it had shown that adaptations of the German methods of critical thinking and problem solving to prepare one for future decision making was the most appropriate instructional strategy for military higher education. The Naval War College

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36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 38.
had set the standard which was to be generally followed by most of the other Senior Service Colleges. The second such college to be established picked up that tradition and, using its own peculiar requirements, added to the development of curricula and instructional strategies for military Senior Service education. The Army War College adopted many of the standards of the Berlin War Academy, and followed many of the procedures established by the Naval War College. Yet, it had its own distinctive curriculum.

When General Tasker H. Bliss was given the responsibility for the new Army War College, one of the first things that concerned him was its curriculum. In 1899 he pondered the questions "What shall be taught? How shall it be taught? and "How shall the teaching be extended to the greatest number [of students]?" Bliss determined that it was almost impossible to devise a curriculum for the Army War College which did not repeat at least part of what was taught in one or more of the Army's schools. He, therefore, concluded that the college should deal with the study of the larger problems of military science; devising plans related to the question of military preparation and movement in the time of war. Not to be included were subjects such as military intelligence which was the prerogative of a special bureau of the General Staff; logistics or those subjects designed to teach officers to improve equipment, arms and other materials of war (because these were already


40 Ibid., pp. 33.
taught at other army service schools); and the theory of tactics as well as the practical application of such tactics.41 Like the Naval War College, Bliss decided on teaching Army officers higher level military strategy and tactics; and also like the Naval War College, he proposed to use the war game as the most practical method of instruction. Lectures, however, were to supplement the war games.42

Bliss organized the Army War College faculty into committees which emphasized area studies of other countries or which considered other services' operational missions and tactics. Committee emphasis was later changed under Brigadier General William W. Wótherspoon to concentrate on resources of the United States and other countries of the western hemisphere. European and Far Eastern countries were not considered worthy of study since formidable ocean barriers provided a natural defense to any unfriendly nations from these areas. The lone exceptions were those areas of the Pacific where the United States had island possessions.43

A program of coordinated lectures was introduced at the Army War College in 1906-1907. Seven lectures on military history and "thoughts of war" were held. To this were added latest developments in industry and science affecting military operations. Problems, divided into area studies, were devised following the lectures and became the focus of

41 Ibid., pp. 33-34.
42 Ibid., p. 35.
43 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
tactical and strategic studies. The most significant modification of the curriculum as compared to that developed by the Naval War College was the addition of field trips to Civil War Battlefields where the strategic implications of various Civil War campaigns could be studied on site.

Courses at the Army War College were suspended during World War I and were not reinstated until 1919 when Major General James W. McAndrew was appointed Commandant. Because 19 of the 24 officers selected for the faculty were stationed in France and Germany with the American Expeditionary Forces, McAndrew held the first meeting of the new faculty at Treves, Germany. The faculty tackled the problem of a new curriculum based on lessons learned during combat. Since the new emphasis was to train officers for duties on the General Staff and for preparation for war, the faculty decided on a curriculum that emphasized the study of military, economic, political, sociological and geographical capabilities of Great Power countries; particularly those with whom the U. S. might become engaged in combat in the future (for example Russia and Germany).

The responsibility for the preparation and overall supervision of the curriculum was given to an Academic Board in 1921. The first Board

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44 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
45 Ibid., p. 60.
46 Ibid., p. 90.
47 Ibid., p. 93.
consisted of the Commandant of the College, the Assistant Commandant and the Directors of the various divisions of the faculty. Concomitantly with its development of the curriculum, the board selected continuance of small committees as the primary method for students performance. The board also established a requirement for individual research projects. Even so, the research project reports were submitted through the appropriate committee structure. However, these and other regular committee reports which were normally prepared as staff papers were later presented orally to the entire college.

Following World War II, the major impact on the curriculum of the Army War College was the realization that global conflict involved political, economic and other considerations far beyond conventional military and naval affairs. This suggested changes in national and international studies similar to that instituted by the Naval War College. National strategy and its supporting military programs became the central unifying theme of the curriculum at the Army War College. The fields of study under this concept dealt with National Power and International Relations; Military Concepts, Theater Operations and Readiness; and National Strategy and Military Programs. According to Major General William P. Ennis, Jr., a former Commandant of the Army War College, "These three fields emphasize the role of the Army not

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48 Ibid., p. 107.
49 Ibid., 121.
50 Ibid., p. 139.
only in its purely professional aspect, but in the broad context of the Army as a key element in the defense team. [Further they stressed the Army] as the traditional and dependable source of trained leaders to fill top-level national and international command or staff jobs as required by the nation's need for leadership skills . . . . " It was, however, the introduction of the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) in 1971 that revealed the necessity to institute changes in the curriculum that would enable the graduates of the Army War College to master changes wrought by civilian and military decisions and concepts rather than be driven by them.

Instructional methods following World War II were based primarily on individual student study, research, and the analysis and resolution in committee of assigned problems of current significance. Faculty advisors were assigned to assist student committees. The advisor did not act as an instructor. He was free to join the discussion and, if asked, to voice his opinion, but the committee was at liberty either to accept or reject his opinion. Thus, the final views of the committee members were their own and not that of the advisor. Most students, (except those involved in war gaming) were required to prepare and to present an original thesis on a subject of importance and of either current and/or future value to the Army. This paper enabled the student to demonstrate his ability to analyze a problem objectively and to do original and creative thinking. A National Strategy Seminar provided the

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52 Ibid., p. 57.
53 Ibid., p. 58.
54 Ibid., p. 59.
culmination for the curriculum. This essentially was "a student-developed national strategy and its principal implementing courses of action, with emphasis upon supporting military program [which was] examined and refined in collaboration with distinguished military and civilian guests."  

The Army War College was not particularly known for innovations in its curriculum development. However, it did become a leader in the use of business-oriented computer information systems in order to improve the teaching of management techniques. The thrust of the information systems at the War College was to involve the student in computer-based models and simulations which were integrated with one's learning experience. The aim was to familiarize the student with modern information techniques and retrieval systems to relieve the student of time-consuming statistical research.  

Another innovation was the creation of a department of management and the expansion of management courses in order to keep up with the changing educational environment in both the military and civilian sectors. Like the Navy, the Army sharply curtailed its lectures from outsiders and began concentrating on courses designed to develop the managerial abilities of its students as well as to improve overall professionalism among its attendees. A 43 hour course was developed that included six major sub-courses: "The United States and The International Environment"; "International Strategic Appraisals"; "Management and Executive Development"; "Strategic Military Studies"; "Military  

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55 Ibid.  

Forces Alternative Studies"; and "National Security Issues". In addition, other offerings were added to the curriculum. These included a National Strategic Seminar of one week's duration, a student research program, elective courses, and a 3 day field trip to the United Nations with longer trips to the Canadian capital in Ottawa and to American installations in Panama.

In retrospect, the changing curriculum at the Army War College was designed in anticipation and response to changes on the world scene, changes in academia, and to ensure that the Army's senior graduates could master those changes rather than be driven by them. The primary result was a reduction in the common core phase of the curriculum, the elimination of excessive rigidity as well as the heavy concurrent demands on study. Rather, greater recognition was given in the curriculum to the importance of the student's past experiences and to his educational levels. Both of these factors were considered important in the student's overall professional educational development.\(^{57}\) To assure the accomplishment of appropriate changes in the curriculum, its development was ultimately placed in the hands of a faculty board consisting of The Deputy Commandant of the College, each of the faculty division chairmen, the Chief of the Plans and Policy Group, and the Secretary of The College. The Board reviewed the individual courses proposed by the various divisions of The College or by the Department of the Army, and decided which ones should be retained, modified, or eliminated. Their action, however, was subject to approval of its next higher headquarters, the United States Continental Army Command, and/or the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Personnel at Department of the Army since these headquarters had responsibility for the conduct of the entire Army School System. However, the Board's action was usually approved at the other levels.

While the Army and Navy had set as their goals the teaching of higher level domestic and international strategy and policy subjects to the students at their War Colleges, and to train them in decision making at the higher levels, the newest of the services War College took a different direction in the development of its curriculum. The Air War College's curriculum did not mirror that of the Army War College or the Navy War College. Therefore it established for the youngest of the three service's Senior Schools a distinctive flavor that was to become unique in military higher education.

The foundation of the Air War College's curriculum was "airpower as an instrument of national policy". This base remains today. Of course the direction of the curriculum has changed over the years, but the basic intent has not. Airpower as a national asset still remains the cornerstone of the curriculum. For many years, most of the seminars and guest speakers concentrated heavily on the formulation of national security policy. The students found themselves being prepared mainly for high-level policy making posts with less emphasis on the employment of air power. Individuals at the Air War College who were responsible for development of the curriculum saw this as a drawback to the mission and purpose of the College. They did not want to follow the example of the Army and the Navy in creating a curriculum whose major thrust was on national policy and strategy; rather, they decided to focus on the current airforce missions and the capability to accomplish them, especially in a NATO environment. As a result, studies in courses such as close air support, interdiction, electronic warfare, surveillance and recon-
naissance, airbase defense, airlift, air logistics, command control and communications, and defense surpression were emphasized in great detail.  

The Air War College also turned to more use of in-house faculty than either the Army or Navy War Colleges, and concurrently reduced the number of outside speakers. At its height, the College relied on approximately 250 instructors, most of them military. Further, the College downgraded emphasis on cooperative advance degree arrangements with civilian institutions. Like both its sister service's war colleges, the Air War College initially established programs wherein their students could obtain credit for courses taken either at their own institution or at selected distinguished civilian universities (such as George Washington University). The credits could be applied toward an advanced degree from the civilian university. Many of the Air Force students, like those from the Army and Navy, rushed to obtain the advance degrees. However, authorities at the Air War College began to discourage the students because they felt the Air War College's program came first, and there was little time to attend to the Air War College's requirements and do justice at the same time to advanced graduate studies at civilian universities. Consequently, outside advanced degree programs became strictly off-duty programs and secondary in priority. Work at civilian institutions such as George Washington University, Harvard University, and the University of Alabama was eliminated and whatever off-duty advance degree studies that were accomplished was done at nearby campuses.

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59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.
of colleges such as Troy State and Auburn.

Thus, the Air War College's curriculum was developed to concentrate on four basic areas: Leadership and management; Domestic, Economic, and Social Problems and Crisis Management; Strategy and Capabilities (particularly as they relate to the Soviet Union and Red China); and Military Capabilities and Employment. Additionally, the College had a research requirement for graduation. The culminating experience of the academic years was a large scale computer-assisted Theater Warfare Exercise.

One factor, organization, seems to account for the reason that the Air War College's curriculum was such a departure from that of the Army War College and the Naval War College. Both the Army War College and the Naval War College, as the top professional school of their services, were not an integral part of the rest of their school systems. They were under different administrative and/or supervisory authority. The Air War College, however, is a constituent part of the Air University -- the umbrella organization for Air Force schools located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The Air Force has combined within this one university system institutions comparable to the Command and General Staff Colleges of the other services and to the Senior Service Colleges. This integrated system apparently fosters a closer relationship between the upper and lower level schools in the system whose orientations are different, while at the same time engendering throughout the systems a greater need to know how the Airforce fights rather than how to develop national policy. This departure from traditional military Senior Service School organization and the Airforce's decision to emphasize airpower as an instrument of national policy rather than emphasize education...
in subjects relating to national policy and strategy decision making cer-
tainly made the Air War College's curriculum distinctive. However, the remaining Senior Service Colleges did not follow the Air Force's example. The remaining schools continued the emphasis on decision making at the national and international levels started by the Army and Navy. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), however, went part of the way with the Air War College and tied its curriculum closely to its mission, but with a difference. The ICAF curriculum dealt with the economic, industrial, scientific and technological aspects of security; therefore, ICAF viewed them in the broad context of national and world affairs and the interrelated military, political, and social factors impacting on national security. The emphasis in ICAF's curriculum seems to have been a cross between the Air Force theory of curriculum development on one hand and the Army and Navy on the other.

The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing entirely with resources management. In the early days of the College, the curriculum consisted of six basic courses covering the main facets of national security and the resources management policies of the Department of Defense. Additionally, there were four foundation courses (economic analysis, quantitative analysis in management, executive action, and automatic data processing systems); finally, there were seventeen electives offered the students. Later, core courses were added and these were designed to be presented in a logical order. Sequentially, they

progressed from general background information and environmental studies (such as Environment of National Security, Basic Resources, Management of Industrial Resources) to intensive study of specific areas of national security management (such as National Security Problems and Policies, National Economic Problems and Policies, and Management in the Department of Defense). Emphasis throughout the core program was placed on the integration of problems, current issues, and new developments.  

The curriculum included independent student research whereby the student, either individually or as a team member, prepared a substantial research report which might have taken the form of a thesis, article for publication, staff study, or case study (often the case studies were used in subsequent years in various courses). Or, as an option to preparing the long paper, the student could elect to prepare three shorter papers on subjects related to the core curriculum. Field trips were added to the curriculum and soon became an important part of the learning process at the College. Trips were conducted to industrial plants such as Sperry Rand Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, and Radio Corporation of America where students had an opportunity to investigate first hand some of the management problems they had been studying all year. Additionally, through agreements with certain civilian universities such as George Washington University, certain ICAF courses and their associated research (thesis) projects were credited toward a masters degree in Business Administration.  

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62 Ibid., p. 69.

63 Ibid., p. 70.
ICAF's basic orientation lent itself to certain distinctive innovations which either had not been introduced at the other Senior Service Schools, or if introduced was utilized on a much reduced scale. Student orientation is a case in point. Even before a student selected to attend ICAF registered, his special instructional needs were identified through use of a questionnaire, responses of which were stored in a data retrieval system. This information enabled the faculty to tailor courses for him. Another innovation that proved successful was student critiques which were employed to help determine changes in various courses. Each student turned in a data card evaluating each of the day's sessions. The comments were analyzed by the college's staff and steps were taken to remedy any problems uncovered. Finally, Computer-Assisted Instruction (CAI) became a very important part of the College's methodology. Especially widely used was TUTOR, a series of 36 CAI lessons on basic programming of computers.

The rising sophistication of the ICAF students challenged the designers of the ICAF curriculum as the College entered the post World War II period; especially the 1960's and 1970's. In one year (1971), for example, it was discovered that a total of 103 students had master degrees, and 6 students had doctoral level degrees. Thus, 60% of the class had advanced degrees. In contrast, just 6 years earlier only 66 students had masters degrees and 7 had doctorates totaling 40% of the class. Most of the advanced degrees were in business and public administration. Since graduate-level work in these fields was especially akin both to the broad theme and to several specific parts of the ICAF

64Ibid., p. 68.
program, it was an every-present concern at the College to avoid needless duplication of a student's previous academic work. At the same time, comparable courses had to be presented to those students who had not had them. 65

The college tried to avoid duplication by examining students' background, counseling with them and excusing those who had already had comparable course work from taking one or more of the foundation courses. For each required course previously completed, he had to enroll in an equivalent elective course.

Dr. Fred Brown, a professor of management at ICAF and Adjunct Professor of Public Administration at the American University sums up curriculum development at ICAF this way:

ICAF's problems of course design and presentation are quite similar to those of all educational programs which cater to the needs of adults with highly varied and extensive professional and educational experiences. In the development of the ICAF curriculum, changes have been made in content and methodology to meet the increasing academic sophistication of incoming students. Our recent study of students with previous master's degrees in business or public administration has re-emphasized the importance of intensified attention to tailoring a student's ICAF studies to fit his specific background. 66

Because of its orientation in resources management, ICAF's curriculum was more closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions of higher education than most of the other military Senior Service Schools. This is especially true in the areas of business administration and management. However, one other Senior Service School's curriculum was also closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions. The


66 Ibid., p. 45.
National War College's curriculum paralleled International Studies, Political Science and the History of Strategy and Policy taught at a number of civilian colleges and universities.

No less concerned with its academic offerings, the National War College also made its contribution to development of curricula for the Senior Service Colleges. Although preceded by the Army War College and the Naval War College, the eminence of the National War College in national and international policy and strategy studies are unsurpassed. Covering all disciplines in the field of national security, the National War College became to the Senior Service Colleges what the "Research Universities" had become to civilian institutions of higher education (based on the Carnegie topology of grouping American colleges and universities). As a result of its curriculum, faculty and student body, the National War College became the standard by which the other were judged.

The curriculum of the National War College was a prototype for courses leading to excellence in research and creative thinking. Courses covered in the National War College's curriculum, for example, have included such important national and international studies as The World

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67 In 1970, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education divided American Colleges and Universities into five major categories so that they could be grouped for comparison or discussion purposes based on similarities in curricula, faculty and students. The typology included: (1) Research Universities (those that were the most research oriented, received the most federal financial support for this purpose and awarded at least 50 Ph.Ds' in 1969-1970); (2) Doctorate-Granting Universities (those who awarded from 10 to 40 Ph.D.s in 1969-1970; (3) Comprehensive. Universities and Colleges (those who offered a liberal arts program, and or more professional courses of studies, and a limited doctoral program); (4) Liberal Arts Colleges (those with a strong liberal arts tradition and modest, if any occupational programs); and (5) Two-year Colleges (sometimes called community and junior colleges). For further details see Arthur Levine, Handbook on Undergraduate Curriculum (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), pp. xxiii-xxv and pp. 629-637.
Situation; Factors Influencing National Power; Formulation of National Security Policy; Strategy and Warfare; and The Communists States. Within this background, students took subsources that combined studies in the classroom with field trips to the United Nations Headquarters and to five strategic areas of the world where they met and talked with prominent world leaders. Coincident with these visits, the college had a requirement of individual study and research leading to a thesis in the field of National Security. The research program was designed not only to enable the student to take a fresh look at a subject of national interest, but also to give him a chance to demonstrate his ability to do individual creative work. Encouragement in developing critical faculties through individual study and research have been the greatest strength of the curriculum of the National War College over the years. While there has been refinements in the conduct of the courses at the College, individual study and research have remained its forte. The earliest effort to provide individual study and research was the evening graduate study program started in cooperation with the George Washington University, and followed by the sending of selected individuals research papers of exceptional merit to the head of the author's service or department on a regular basis. To make the results of such student research more widely known, unclassified summaries were published in the annual volume of Abstracts of Individual Research Papers and other publicati-

Another strength of the College has been its visiting guest speaker program.

Since its beginning, the curriculum of the National War College has focused on a broad guest speaker program designed to provide the students expert views and a firm basis for the exchange of ideas in discussion seminars on a wide range of national security related issues and problems. The guest speakers, drawn mostly from groups of responsible governmental officials and distinguished thinkers, were used to cover specific topics of the College's curriculum. Use of these lecturers at the National War College was somewhat different from those at the Army and Navy War Colleges where the guest speakers usually talked on a topic of current interest that was not necessarily a part of the curriculum. It was not unusual for the National War College to utilize over 100 distinguished speakers to supplement its faculty in presenting curriculum courses during an academic year. The College zealously guarded the privacy of its guest speaker program by prohibiting those attending the lectures from attributing any statement to the speakers outside of the College. Consequently, the speakers knew that they could state their views freely and frankly. Further, it provided an atmosphere of free exchange in an uncontrolled environment. This was especially important in creating and

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maintaining academic freedom since the College was a military institution subject to control from outside of the College. Unlike the other schools which cut back outside lecturers, wide use of guest speakers was an asset at the National War College in that it enabled the College to free its residential instructors of much of the classroom details in order that they could devote more time as advisors and monitors of students research efforts, and so they could spend more time in developing creative thinking abilities of the students.

The principal academic techniques the instructors used in guiding student efforts were discussion groups and committee problems. Discussion groups were convened after each lecture, and the topic of the day was discussed in detail. This learning technique was especially useful in helping to break down inter-service prejudices that might have existed among the students. More importantly, it enabled class members to understand and speak on different aspects of the problem being considered. Many of the problems discussed became subjects for further consideration by committees. However, most committee assignments resulted from problems such as those which the National Security Council and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff might face. Following the lead of the Army War College, an innovation in the committee technique at the National War College was the presentation of solutions to the problems to the entire class by the committee, and each class member was given the opportunity to challenge the solutions which the committee had to defend. In the final analysis, the committees had to develop a national strategy based on their findings.

In developing a national strategy, the students had to consider such things as an analysis of factors of national power of the United States and of other nations; the study of the integration of military
and foreign policy; and the role of the United Nations, and other means of avoiding armed conflicts. Further, they had to become proficient in determining the influence of economic, political, psychological and social resources upon national security; and they had to be able to determine the parameters of the national interests and objectives. The course designed to teach the students techniques in developing a national strategy also included a study of military forces necessary to implement national policy, strategy and war planning as well as the impact of science and technology on the armed forces and their employment. ^

An exercise during the last two months of the year served as the culminating experience for the students. Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harrold, a former commandant of the National War College, neatly sums up curriculum development and instructional strategies at the College while speaking of the grand culminating exercise. He said:

In this period the class devotes its entire effort, reinforced by especially selected lectures and reading, to a grand exercise covering top-level U.S. security policy formulation and implementation. From assumed positions of highest government authority, national goals and policy are developed. Based upon these goals and policy, a U.S. national strategy is conceived and prepared, along with supporting world-wide plans and programs. As the climax to the National War College program this final period brings to focus the knowledge and experience gained from all earlier courses of the year.  

In retrospect, one finds that inextricably mixed in the entire program of instruction at the National War College was the development of skill in both research and in decision making. The curriculum and techniques


of learning were, therefore, geared to these ends. Further, they were devoted to a broadening of the knowledge of the student about the United States and the rest of the world. The students were encouraged to think on the problems facing the world and to devise their own solutions to the problems. Finally, they were encouraged to discuss freely and debate the problems and the merits of the solution. Commenting on the curriculum, one member of the Civilian Board of Consultants had this to say after a visit and evaluation of the school in 1949:

With respect to the curriculum, we have noted with satisfaction that flexibility has been maintained and that the course of study has been adapted to changing needs. In general we believe the present program strikes a fair balance between the international and military aspects ... We commend also the effort being made to tie up the political and military aspects of the course during the concluding week of the year.

A review of curriculum development and instructional strategies at the five Senior Service Schools points up one consistent similarity


73 Since early in the history of the National War College, a Civilian Board of Consultants composed of distinguished educators have been appointed to evaluate and guide the college in its curriculum development and administration. One of the first such boards to issue a comprehensive written report was the board of 1949-1950 which consisted of: Dr. J. E. Wallace Sterling (President of Stanford University); Dr. George D. Stoddard (President of the University of Illinois); Dr. James P. Baxter, 3rd (President of Williams College); Dr. Calvin B. Hoover (Dean of the Graduate School of Duke University); Dr. William L. Langer (Department of History, Harvard University); Dr. Arnold O. Wolfers (Director of the Division of Social Sciences and the Social Science Planning Center, Yale University). For additional details, see "Report of the Board of Consultants of the National War College" in Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers 962/92, 7 October 1949, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 7), The National Archives.
among the schools. That is the sameness in general courses and methodologies in spite of apparent differences in missions and objectives of each college. There is a reason for this which can be summed up in one word "uniformity." Uniformity among the curricula of the five schools did not happen by chance. It was planned that way, and the Clements Board was responsible for the results.

The Clements Board was a blue ribbon panel convened for the purpose of making a comprehensive study of the curricula at the five Senior Service Colleges and to recommend guidelines to be followed by each school in refining its curriculum in accordance with the goals of educational excellence shared by the Board and the Colleges. Headed by the Honorable W. P. Clement, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, it included Howard H. Calloway (Secretary of the Army), J. William Middendorff (Secretary of the Navy), John L. McLucas (Secretary of the Air Force), and William K. Brehm (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs). The Board developed three mutually reinforcing components of the curriculum for the Senior Service Colleges. A Common Core outline was developed as suitable for implementation at each college. A Mission-Specific curriculum outline was developed for each separate institution which would be supportive of and would complement the Common Core curriculum while at the same time stressing its unique mission orientation. Finally, the Board developed a Tailored Elective Program outline which permitted the tailoring of each student's educational experience to his background and service needs. Of these three elements of the recommended curriculum, the Clements Board felt that the Mission-Specific phase should be the dominant factor both in intensity and magnitude because it was in this ingredient that the specific focus of the college could best be developed in all of its dimensions.
Further, it would serve as a unifying factor at each school thus main­
taining and giving emphasis to the requirement for separate institutions
within the services.\textsuperscript{74}

In addressing the Common Core element, the Board believed that the Department of Defense (DOD) could not support five Senior Service Colleges at a level of excellence if each school focus was too large. It, therefore, tried to build an outstanding core program addressing only those common needs of each school. This, the Board believed, would re­lieve the faculties of certain basic requirements and would permit them to concentrate on developing and maintaining a program of true intel­lectual substance based on the school's particular mission orientation.\textsuperscript{75} Consequently, the Board determined that the "Common Core should include courses which would develop a sound basic understanding of the following:

---The decision-making process within the Department of Defense and the interrel­ationship of its components.

---National Security Policy formulation and the relation­ship of DOD to the other Executive Departments, the White House, and the Congress.

---Management skills and selected analytical techniques; to include specific attention to the uses and limita­tions of computers in the decision process.

---The National and International environment."\textsuperscript{76}

While the Board did not specify exactly how much of the curriculum


\textsuperscript{75}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{76}Ibid., pp. 3-4
should be Common Core, it did suggest approximately one-third of the total curriculum. For administrative purposes, the Board suggested that the President of the Naval War College be given responsibility for coordinating the Common Core program.

In recommending Mission-Specific Courses, the Board "[did] not mean that the colleges should confine their inquiry to existing practices or narrow single-service concerns; rather that in addressing the full range of issues judged appropriate, each should do so from the conscious perspective of the implications for its special mission field."77 Consequently, the Army War College was to devote itself to courses dealing with land warfare, the Naval War College to those courses dealing with naval warfare, the Air War College to courses dealing with aerospace warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to courses dealing with defense management and material acquisition, and the National War College would deal exclusively with national security policy formulation. The Board foresaw two primary results of the Mission-Specific Curriculum:

First, the environment of the Colleges [would] nurture the development of an executive minded set. Second, it [would] reinforce the effort of each college to strengthen its position as a recognized and respected center of intellectual excellence to which professional officers are attracted for study, and to which scholars are attracted to teach and conduct research.78

Again, the Board suggested that Mission-Specific subjects comprise approximately one-third of the total curriculum at each school. The Board further suggested that the Commandant of the Air War College take the lead in coordinating Mission-Specific subjects.

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77 Ibid., p. 5.

78 Ibid.
The Clements Board concluded that the individual should have the opportunity to tailor his electives based on his career experience. In this connection, the Board pointed out that officers attending the Senior Service Colleges bring with them fifteen to twenty years of differing experience, and that this experience could benefit both the college and the individual officers if it could be nurtured and revealed through formal study. However, the Board felt that certain criteria had to be met in developing the electives. First, they should be confined to topics which fell within the specific mission field of the college. Second, they should require thorough and rigorous examination of the subject matter. The Board further felt that the electives, and accompanying research should be tailored to the individual needs of the student, and should consist of approximately one-third of an individual's curriculum. For administrative purposes, the Commandant of the Army War College was given the lead in coordinating electives.

The Clements Board looked into one other important aspect of the Senior Service instruction: teaching methodology. It found that all of the colleges used a combination of techniques which included guest lecturers, faculty lectures, student-led seminars, and faculty led seminars. The colleges, however, differed as to the emphasis placed on the various techniques. The committee concluded that while there was no rule for optimizing the learning environment, but there should be some general guidelines to be followed by all the Senior Service Colleges. First, peer learning should only be emphasized as a secondary technique and

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79 Ibid., p. 6.
should not be relied on as a primary means of developing the central curriculum themes. Second, guest lecturers should be used to expose students to differing perspectives, and to bring to the student a sense of current real-world situations. However, the role of the guest lecturer should also be secondary. Third, the resident faculty must be the ones who develop the curriculum themes in classroom and seminar settings.

A positive result of the Clements Board efforts was closer cooperation among the Senior Service Schools in curriculum and instructional planning and development. This is most vividly displayed through meetings of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was established in 1962 especially for the purpose of coordinating military education at the Senior Service College level. The MECC was composed of the heads of the senior institutions with the Commandant of the National War College as chairman.

In summarizing curriculum development and the development of instructional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges, certain conclusions can be drawn. First, each school's curriculum tended to distinguish it from the others because, while there was a certain degree of uniformity among all the Colleges, the mission and objectives of each required a curriculum that was unique to the particular institution concerned. Second, the very nature of the Senior Service Schools being military activities made it so the institutions did not have to worry about the recruiting and retention of students. Therefore, the developers of the curriculum were free to concentrate on courses of study that would accomplish the mission of the institutions rather than having to consider courses that would merely attract and retain students. Third, courses at the Senior Service institutions not only contained depth in
subject matter but also were of the type that gave great breadth to the curriculum. Fourth, the curriculum and methodologies of instruction in the American military Senior Service Colleges were originally adapted from European military schools; especially the Berlin War Academy. Fifth, emphasis at all the American Senior institutions was on stimulating logical thought processes although the method of accomplishing this goal varied with each school.

While there was uniformity of goals there seemed to be differences in implementation. Decision making on matters affecting national strategy and policy, and the supporting military programs to carry out the decisions made at the highest levels were emphasized at both the Naval War College and the Army War College. The Air War College's emphasis on airpower as an instrument for national policy and the concurrent emphasis on the study of mission-oriented topics gave this institution a distinctive character that caused it to be different from the other Senior Service Schools. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces concern with resources management at the national level brought to it a great number of students already possessing advanced degrees. This caused a problem in developing a curriculum that would avoid needless duplication of a student's prior educational attainments. Close attention to student questionnaires, critiques and suggestions brought about an excellent program of tailoring subjects to the students needs. More importantly, visits to civilian industrial plants provided the students with an ingredient that was invaluable to rounding out their classroom discussions. Finally, the National War College's emphasis on the development of skills in creative thinking and in research as aids to decision making on matters of national and international importance led to a curriculum that more closely parallel curricula at civilian
institutions than any of the other Senior Service Schools except the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Also important was the emphasis on individual creative work vis-a-vis committee or group endeavors; this gave the National War College a distinctive character when compared to the other Senior military institutions. Curriculum development and the development of instructional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges were distinguished by a desire for excellence. The high level Clements Board attempted to achieve this educational excellence by specifying the types of courses which should concern all the Senior Schools. Core courses, mission-essential courses, and a tailored elective program were thought to be the most logical means of insuring educational excellence while at the same time establishing a need for each of the schools and distinguishing the differences among them. The degree to which this was accomplished is the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER VI

REASONS FOR EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS

Is there really any fundamental difference between the Senior Service Colleges that would substantiate their existence? Or, simply put, are all five of the Senior Schools needed? These questions have plagued both military and civilian leaders since the founding of the War Colleges, yet they have never been fully answered. There have been examinations made of the programs, costs and achievements at each of the Senior Colleges. However, few of the researchers writing about those schools have attempted to investigate why they exist, and almost none have attempted to answer the critical question of their need.

Perhaps Maureen Mylander came closest in an article in which she tried to determine whether or not the War Colleges were a wasted resource. Mylander looked at what the Colleges were all about and why they were founded. She also established many shortcomings of the Senior Service Schools, and what had been done about them. She reviewed the Colleges' operational costs, and examined whether or not the returns on the dollar were worth the costs. Finally she tried to determine whether there will be War Colleges in the future. She concluded: "As matters stand, the schools are not living up to their potential"; and then she says: "Whether they improve, or remain a costly and wasted resource, or even survive at all, will depend largely upon how they surmount [their] obstacles."¹ However,

nowhere does she directly address whether or not any or all of the high
level military institutions are needed. Her article, like many other
writings on these schools, merely accept their existence and assume that
they will continue to exist. John Masland and Laurence Radway's book
Soldiers and Scholars, which is perhaps the most outstanding work on
military education, provides the best example of this omission. The
authors summarily dismiss the question of need by saying:

Fortunately there is no question about the need
for these institutions. Indeed the extraordinary
significance of this need is the underlying theme
of this entire book . . . . Probably their mere exist­
tence in itself constitutes a considerable contri­
bution to the security of the United States. If
they did not exist, they would have to be created. 2

The authors do not provide any rationale for their contentions, nor do
they provide any evidence to support their conclusions. Since the
questions of need remain unanswered, it appears that investigating the
subject as part of the overall development process of the institutions
will provide some insight into their reasons for existing. It also
appears that the best means of discovering the relevant facts and arriv­
ing at a defensible conclusion regarding the need for these schools can
be done by comparing similarities and distinctive differences among the
five military institutions. Before going into the similarities and dif­
ferences, it would seem logical to first establish why military graduate
education is needed for senior officers.

William J. Taylor, Jr. and Donald F. Bletz contend that few would
deny that military officers in particular require extensive graduate

2 John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars:
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957, p. 368.)
education and training to perform the many tasks of their profession. In fact, they report that the requirement for officers with graduate degrees to perform specialized tasks in the military service has grown larger; especially during the decades of the 1960's and the 1970's.3 Clarence Hannon concurs. He says "During the past 20 years, there has been a constantly accelerating emphasis on graduate level education within DOD, but this trend has not been idiosyncratic to the Services; [rather it has reflected a similar trend in society at large].4

To understand this requirement for graduate degrees, one must consider the fact that the Services needs are not limited to military oriented disciplines, such as tactics, logistics, military engineering, operational readiness, and the like. Rather, a significant number of officers are needed with advance education in the pure and social sciences; in relative new fields such as public administration, computer operations, criminal justice, and the behavioral sciences; and in traditional professional fields as education, law, dentistry, medicine, religion, business administration and business management. Paul T. Karschnia explains it very simply. He says "To understand his trade properly, the officer must have some idea of other fields such as natural sciences, law, history, politics, economics, sociology, psychology, etc. and the ways in which these other areas of knowledge may contribute to his own purpose. In addition, he cannot really


4Clarence W. Hannon, Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Army War College, 1974), p. 145.
develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if he is trained simply in vocational duties.\(^5\) Thus, to keep pace with the ever changing technology of war; the social, economic and political changes in society, the military officer must have an advanced education. During the early 1970's for example, the Services validated advanced graduate degree requirements for over 25,000 officers a year.\(^6\) Of this total, the Airforce needed approximately 46 percent, the Army 28 percent, the Navy 24 percent and the Marine Corps required approximately 2 percent of the graduate positions.\(^7\) Peter Dawkins succinctly summarizes the reasons officer graduate education is needed. He says graduate education is needed in the military because of: growing specialization in the many fields military personnel becomes involved, the expanding domestic and foreign roles of the military officer in particular, and the increasing complexity of leadership and management in military units and operations.\(^8\)


\(^6\)Validation of military graduate degree requirements is the act of designating by job title, job description and rank those specialized positions that must be filled by an individual possessing a specific advanced degree. This validation takes place annually by each of the Armed Services reviewing all those positions already in-being and those new ones proposed for inclusion on the required list. The positions selected after this review are reported to the Department of Defense where with the sanction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs, Manpower and Logistics), they are finally approved. For a further discussion on the validation process, see Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," pp. 251-266.

\(^7\)Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," p. 262.

There are other benefits of graduate military education that are less tangible, but just as important in the development of good officers. Raoul Alcala conducted research in the area of attitudes held by the military and concluded that the officers with graduate degrees are less likely to hold absolute attitudes on a subject than other officers. He further said that officers with graduate degrees tend to have a greater range of opinions; and, finally these officers are significantly less likely to believe that a threat to the nation from outside sources (such as communism) would lead to war.  

Josiah Bunting appropriately highlights any discussion on whether or not graduate education is really needed by arguing for a liberally educated military. He says, "The truly liberally educated soldier is the soldier who can reconcile the necessity for training and education and be happy with both." Bunting concludes "The man who is both liberally and professionally educated will be the better soldier." According to Taylor and Bletz, the Services provide for graduate education, whether it be a liberal education or a professional education, in several ways:

First, there are fully-funded and sponsored programs under which an officer is selected to be a full time student for one or two (exceptionally three) years at an accredited civilian institution to complete a masters degree or a doctorate. • • • Second, there are

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fully-funded programs involving a much smaller number of officers selected to attend either the Navy Postgraduate School or The Air Force Institute of Technology. • • • Third, officers can enroll in programs cosponsored by civilian colleges and universities and some of the professional military educational institutions. • • • Fourth, a significant number of officers complete their advance degrees on their off-duty time and at their own expense, although some monetary assistance is available through military and VA sponsorship.11

Regardless of how the degree is obtained, there are those who argue that advanced education for professional military officers is best obtained through civilian colleges and universities. Adam Yarmolinsky is one who believes that education of the military should take place in a civilian environment. He gives three reasons for this. First, he says that education requires a freedom of inquiry that is just not present in a military institution. He contends that "Military institutions are caught in a dilemma... to the extent that they are military, they must support a tradition of acceptance of orders, adherence to prescribed procedures, and deference to established hierarchy. To the extent that they are educational institutions, their allegiance is to [a set of values involving freedom of inquiry]."12 After all, freedom of inquiry is basic to the educational process. Without it, the teacher cannot teach, the student cannot learn, and the scholar cannot explore the frontiers of knowledge. Yarmolinsky points out that freedom of inquiry in the military is necessarily restricted by the

11 Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", p. 262.

requirement to give swift obedience to orders. Elisabeth T. Crawford is another who believes in providing education for the military in a civilian environment. She agrees with Yarmolinsky that the military Senior Service institutions lacks academic freedom. She says it this way:

The locus of these institutions within the military authority structure, however, imposes constraints on the academic model. Among these are the problems of reconciling the academic principle of free intellectual inquiry with military conceptions of propriety and responsibility, especially in the treatment of political matters.

Yarmolinsky's second reason for advocating the education of the military in a civilian college or university is that one is able to gain fresh, new ideas as well as learn to be flexible in his thinking whereas the military remains rigid and inflexible. Alcala says "For the professional officer, civilian graduate level schooling provides an environment that encourages intellectual growth away from the technical and tactical concerns that completely dominate the normal military assignments." (In other words he is really saying that the quality of military education is least compromised when taught in the academic free environment of a civilian college and university rather than in a rigid military institution.)

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13 Ibid.


15 Adam Yarmolinsky, "Where Should the Officer Obtain His Education," p. 151.

In a military environment, there is a tendency to present the subject matter in a framework of military values which are likely to infect the substance of the course. More than likely, it is for this reason that when Joseph King asked over four hundred students at the Command and General Staff College of the Army that if given a choice, would they rather receive their advanced degrees from a civilian or from a military institution. The overwhelming answer was that they would rather receive their graduate degrees from a civilian institution. This response is in sharp contrast to those answers given by approximately 2200 alumni of the National War College who were asked to consider their post-graduate careers and its relationship to the demands of their assignments after graduation, then determine would they have been better off attending the National War College or a program at a civilian college. The National War College graduates by a large margin gave the nod to the Senior Service School over civilian institutions. It is not difficult to assess reasons for this difference in opinions. The Command and General Staff College is a mid-level educational institution attended primarily by Majors and senior (or promotable) Captains, or by Lieutenants and Lieutenant Commanders in the Navy. These individuals usually have a great interest in doing those things that will greatly enhance their careers; or what service people refer to as "ticket punching". If there is one thing

\[18\] Ibid.


about civilian graduate education that many military students on
the subject agree, it is that young officers perceive that a graduate
degree from a civilian college or university is prestigious and will
do more to help them to attain promotion than attending a service
institution. Conversely, older and higher ranking officers (Lieutenant
Colonels, full Colonels, Commanders and Naval Captains) who attend the
Senior Service College usually believe that they will ensure their
selection to flag or general officer status by attending a Senior
Service School. The least rank they anticipate achieving after having
gone to a Senior Service College is Colonel or Navy Captain. Attend­
ing a civilian institution provides them with little value in this
area. The result of all of this is that there is no clear cut position
that the military takes on this question of the value of a civilian
graduate education versus a military higher-level professional educa­
tion.

There is little doubt that weaknesses have existed in the mili­
tary's advanced civilian degree program for a long time. Civilian edu­
cation for military personnel, for example, does not evolve in a
constituency comparable to civilian institutions. Graduates of civil­
ian institutions tend to identify with alumni associations and speci­
fically with "their college" of the university. This provides an
esprit de corps among the group that results in many tangible benefits
for both the institution and the individual.

Military officers are not likely to form a large portion of this
"good old boy network" because they are not likely to attend the uni­
versity of college long enough to become identified with the institu­
tion. In some instances, such as attending off-duty studies or work/
study graduate courses on military installations, the military individuals may never see the college or university from which they graduate. This system evokes little allegiance on the part of the officer. On the other hand, it is believed by some in the military hierarchy that allegiance to a system is an important part in the training of an individual as a good officer. Old friendships established at military schools, especially the senior institutions, leads to a camaraderie, a trust in one another, that carries over to job assignments; particular positions of responsibility in combat. It is difficult to explain to the professional officer that he will gain the same allegiance from, or have the same faith in, an officer whom he met by chance in a civilian graduate institution as opposed to one with whom he was associated at a Senior Service College. William J. Taylor, Jr. puts it quite simply. He says "These constituencies believe deeply that the great military leaders who emerged from the traditional military school system were great leaders, in large measure, because of the traditional system."21 It is for this reason that civilian education of upper level military officers has been given a back seat in the senior military education system by both the military leaders and students. A case in point can be found in the study of National War College graduates and supervisors conducted by The Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey. When asked to consider their post-graduate careers and then determine if they would have been better off attending a military college or a civilian university, only two percent of the over 2200 individuals participating

in the survey thought that they would have done better had they attended a civilian institution. Taylor and Bletz sums up the feeling of the military hierarchy about civilian graduate education for senior officers this way. They said "Beyond exposure to the civilian community, it makes a difference who the officer studies with (sic). The opportunity for exposure to value orientations at odds with military conservatism and authoritarianism is far more likely in the campus classroom than in the classroom shared by military officers alone." Therefore, high level military officials prefer that senior military officers receive the "right" orientation by being trained in a strict military environment.

There are those who argue that advanced civilian education for large numbers of professional military officers is a luxury that the nation can ill afford, particularly since the method of validating the need for positions requiring graduate degrees leaves much to be desired. Leaving the determination of need to both the installation commanders and to the field commanders (e.g., Brigade and Battalion level commanders and lower) often lead to requirements that appear to be unnecessary. For example, instances were found by the General Accounting Office (GAO) where one or more military positions in a command were designated as advanced degree positions when there were similar positions in the same command with similar job descriptions that were not selected. There were no reasons given for the selection of one over the other. Further, it appears that in several instances selection was made only because of

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23Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", p. 258.
the incumbent holding the position. With little or no justification offered, and because of poorly written rationale for the selection of some graduate degree positions as opposed to those not selected, it is only natural that the veracity of the validation system should be held in question by staff personnel at higher headquarters and in the Congress. Therefore, the need of military personnel with advanced degrees is usually a topic of conversation that engenders much interest among those who are opponents of the system. A better system for the validation of the needs of the services is therefore indicated.

Civilian academic degrees have long been viewed by many military officers as highly respected and desirable credentials. Many officers therefore perceive such a degree to be but one of many "tickets" required either for promotion and/or better assignments. Advancement of officers to positions of great responsibilities seems to support this contention. Although the military services have tried to discourage this type of thinking, they have been largely unsuccessful because large number of military officers still enroll in civilian colleges and universities on their own time in quest for an advanced degree. Further, analysis of promotion lists indicate that there is some validity for holding this attitude since it appears that persons with graduate degrees selected for promotion are increasing with each passing year.

One weakness of the system is the indifference held by civilian leaders toward military programs. There are those who argue for the "civilianization" (sic) of certain military positions (usually administrative or service jobs) by replacing the military professional with a civilian. Also, there are those who question the value of offering degrees in military subjects. All one has to do is to take a look at the catalogs of the various colleges and universities to determine the
value placed on military degree programs. Outside of a few schools like Duke University, the University of California at Davis, Ohio University, etc. there are not many civilian colleges and universities where one can obtain a masters degree or doctorate in strictly a military major. Even at most of these institutions the concentration is usually in military or naval history and not phases of military interests that one finds at the Senior Service School. Of course, there are many civilian institutions of higher learning that offer isolated military related courses leading to degrees in other fields, but the academicians in charge of determining degree offerings haven't seen the necessity to expand these courses into military degree programs. Old Dominion University (ODU) is a good case in point.

For a number of years, Dr. Carl Boyd and Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr. of the History Department at ODU, along with a number of their colleagues, have been offering a program of graduate studies in the History of Strategy and Policy. According to the bulletin explaining the offering, "the strategy and policy program at Old Dominion University is designed for members of the armed forces and others interested in examining the problems political and military decision-makers face in situations involving the existence or application of military power." Here is a program that was developed from, and was an extension of, the strategy and policy curriculum created by Admiral Stansfield Turner at The Naval War College. It was therefore like no other program offered in a civilian institution of higher learning. At the same time, it

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24 These three schools are among the foremost producers of Ph.D.'s in Military and Naval History. For further information regarding their programs and offerings in these areas, see: The Bulletin of Duke University Graduate School, 1981-82, p. 153; The University of California/Davis General Catalog (1980-81), p. 227; and Ohio Univ. Bulletin (June, 1980), p. 232.
offered the same instruction that one could expect to obtain in strategy and policy at most, if not all, the Senior Service Schools. Just as at the Naval or Army War Colleges, participants in the ODU program could expect to "sharpen their analytical skills while developing a more informed instinct for making judgments . . . to learn to extend their perspectives beyond direct experience through an intensive study of events, leaders and decisions." This program began as one which led to a certificate. The participants gained recognition for an emphasis in the history of strategy and policy upon completion of the required courses in maritime, naval or military history; and in diplomatic history, international affairs, and in studies in the history of strategy and policy. Later, credits earned in this certificate program were approved for application toward the Masters of Art in History or in International Studies. However, this was the limit that the ODU administration was willing to go toward offering advanced degrees in a military program. Dr. Boyd and Dr. Frank put together a proposal to offer a Doctor of Philosophy degree in Military History and Strategic Studies based on the certificate program. However, they were rebuffed in their efforts even though the History Department at ODU gave them strong support. The State Council of Higher Education in Virginia, and even the administration at ODU, could not see the advantages of offering such a program despite the fact that the program was not duplicative of any offered in the state. Further they could not see that the program was designed to fill an unmet need in the professional development of military officers, nor the


26 Ibid.

27 Old Dominion History Department, "Letter of Intent for Ph.D. in Military History and Strategic Studies", circa 1977-1978.

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fact that ODU's location in Norfolk, Virginia would have assured great interest in the program by military and naval officers in the Hampton Roads, Virginia area. The fact that it would have been the only program of its type at a civilian institution of higher learning apparently did not make any impression on them. This short-sightedness on the part of civilian officials not only denied ODU a potentially prestigious program, and probably cost the university considerable revenue, but it removed any challenges to the programs offered at the five Senior Service Schools. Consequently, there remains no question about the requirement for the Senior Service Colleges from this aspect. Their reason for existence is substantiated since they are the only source of their type of program.

Franklin D. Margiotta aptly summarizes the position taken by civilian leaders toward military higher education. He points out that "In the Air War College and the National War College curriculum, officers are challenged by intellects that are not mustered on one civilian campus." However, this pronouncement opens questions as to whether or not the curriculum at The Senior Service Schools is an advantage or disadvantage. Certainly, the fact that the curriculum at each of the Colleges is so very similar that questions arise regarding the need of the separate schools, and it appears to provide support to those calling for their consolidation.

The Clement's Committee on Excellence in Education, referred to in the preceeding chapter, repeatedly ran into suggestions for consolidating the Senior Service Colleges because "First, ... many of the same

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28 Franklin D. Margiotta, "A Comment on Taylor and Bletz's A Case for Officer Graduate Education: How Much is Enough?" in Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall, 1974) 2: 270.
subjects [were] included in the curricula of all five colleges. . .
Second, . . . the Senior Service Colleges, despite their ties to specific-mission related fields (Air Warfare in the case of the Air War College, Defense Management and Material Acquisition in the case of ICAF, etc.) [did] not represent a level of sophistication, authority, and recognized expertise which substantiates a separate and discrete identity to each college." The committee generally rejected this approach, but could not overlook the subject altogether. The clarion call for consolidation was based on much substance and could not be completely ignored. For many years, The Senior Service Schools had mirrored their own special interests. Their student bodies, faculties and staffs were alike. The curriculum of each was very much alike. Even though there was a constant revision of the curricula almost on a yearly basis most of the Colleges taught the same or closely related subjects despite their differing missions and objectives. Maureen Mylander suggests a reason for this. She contends that the services' war colleges wanted to share the good fortune of The National War College which by the mid 1950's had gained a reputation as being the most prestigious of all the Senior Service Schools. (The fact that many officers of all services considered the National War College superior to the other senior institutions led to a declaration by the Department of Defense that all the schools were equal and officers thereafter were permitted to attend only one of the schools to satisfy senior professional educational requirements.)

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. argues that inasmuch


as the Defense Department had seen the necessity of giving equal recognition to each of the Senior Schools, and since the services had determined that attendance at any one of the schools would be given equal weight in determining promotional potential and future assignments, there should be no concern that the curriculum of each was the same. "But, if an officer gets extra value out of attending the National War College, then the service colleges should use a curriculum distinctive from that used at the National War College." Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner dissents only slightly. In dismissing the apparent claim of competition between the services' war colleges and The National War College, he comments: "I see no reason why the curricula should all be the same, even if they are all producing general/flag officers. We have a need of a multitude of outlooks and backgrounds in the flag communities." Such differences of opinion concerning curricula, coupled with short periods of staff and faculty assignments wherein many of the new people were anxious to put their personal stamp of influence on the institution, led to much churning of the curriculum at relative short intervals (every two or three years). With such constant changes, it stands to reason that sooner or later the Senior Service Schools would wind up teaching the same or like type courses. This resulted in somewhat a standard curriculum, and arguments for such a standard curriculum were widespread.


32 Ibid., p. 127. See note 3.
Some officials of all services have argued that a standard curriculum, which contains required core subjects with some electives, imbues military students with certain basics that will serve them well whatever their future. Those who take this position usually continue their argument by pointing out "There are no textbooks, no identifiable curriculum, and no halls of learning to teach military officers how to be generals, admirals, or senior airmen." As a result, military educators tend to rely on those courses used over the years in the production of great leaders to supplement their practical experience.

As the opportunity to gain practical experiences, the primary training ground for success of military leaders, decreases more reliance is placed on courses like senior leadership, human behavior, military intelligence, communicative skills, military administration and management, logistics, command and control, and military science and tactics to provide each student a thorough grounding in skills that can be called upon by the individual throughout his professional career. Practical results of providing this type standard education to potential military leaders are well known. "Winston Churchill pointed out, in a visit to the United States in 1946, that it was the Senior Service Schools like the Army War College that prepared the Eisenhowers, Bradleys, Clarks, and Gruenthers for their massively responsible roles in World War II at a time when genuine practical experience with large

units and major operations was drastically limited by the miniscule size of the Army in which these officers were serving." What Churchill really tried to convey was that a standard war college curriculum had produced officers who not only had a very high degree of confidence in their ability to deal with complex operational matters inspite of the lack of experience, but in whom others had just as high a confidence. It is hard to argue against this position when one considers that each of the leaders mentioned by Churchill were products of such a curriculum and Army Generals Creighton Abrams, James Polk, and Bruce Palmer; Marine General E.E. Anderson, and Navy Admiral James Mayo, all of whom served heroically during later periods of national crisis pursued the same type curriculum.  

The Clement's Board lends its support to some standardization while at the same time calling for mission-oriented courses, peculiar to each particular college, to be the primary feature of the curriculum. It declared that officers attending the five Senior Service Schools share a number of the same educational needs; therefore, the institutions should put forth a collective effort in building a program relative to the common needs, and these needs should form the basis of the common core subjects taught at each of the institutions. However at the same time, the committee recommended limiting the number of courses in the common core, and advocated that more applied courses

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34 Ibid.
36 Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education--The Senior Service Colleges: Conclusions and Initiatives, p. 3.
relevant to the institution be established. The Committee appeared
to present a dichotomy.

One wonders, just where the board really stood. They straddled
the fence. One can surmise that the reason for this indecisiveness
can be found in the fact that each member of the board was not only
a policy maker with ultimate responsibility for the institutions and
procedures under review, but also that they were obligated to attain
and to maintain the best schools for their various services. It is
only logical that they should do nothing that would tend to discredit
the institution that stood at the apex of their individual services
school system. Yet, at the same time they had been charged with re­
viewing each of the senior programs, and determining how to improve
them. In other words, they had to bring about excellence in higher
military education while maintaining the integrity of their senior
educational institutions. Therefore, the board members took a posi­
tion in the middle and did not solely advocate either a standard cur­
riculum or a mission-oriented curriculum. This vacillation had the
effect of downplaying the importance of curriculum altogether as a
factor related to determining the need of the Senior Service Colleges.

With this out of the way, the board could easily dismiss the
calls for consolidation of some or all of the colleges, and could con­
centrate on devising guidelines in both subject and in administrative
matters that would ensure perpetuation of the Senior Service Colleges
while attempting to bring excellence to military higher education.
Although this argument is plausible, it is nonetheless weak. It
appears that something else is needed before one can completely dis­
miss curriculum as a factor of need. An argument that is most im­
pressive, is the one that removes curricula as a criteria of need. The notion advanced by Frederick H. Hartmann in his treatise, "The War College in Perspective" contends "It is extremely difficult even to determine what subject matter is taught in common from one war college to another because the format and packaging and labeling is all 'hand work' specially done at each institution, and often redone each year." What Hartmann is implying is that it is very difficult to understand curriculum development in the Senior Service Schools because it was done differently there than in civilian institutions. What followed was a course or series of courses combining bits and pieces from many disciplines. Therefore, there were really no standard academic courses at the Senior institutions. Rather, what one found were hybrid composites that were peculiar to military requirements and were put together for military use. As a result, courses in human behavior, management, leadership, for example, as presented in the military environment were not the same courses that were taught in the civilian colleges and universities. More importantly, they were not even the same courses taught from war college to war college because they were put together and revised at each institution. While they may have carried the same or similar title, their content, scope and even objectives were not necessarily the same. If there is anything from a curricular standpoint that provides compelling arguments in supporting the need for each of the Senior Service Schools, it would be this type of arrangement when courses would be subjected to tailoring.

Franklin M. Davis, Jr. served as the Commandant of The Army War College for three years. During this time he became convinced that a tailored curriculum provided the best course offerings for a Senior Service School. He pointed out that because of the wide disparity of experience, professional perceptions, and quality among the students, it was important that their needs be looked at carefully and a curriculum tailored to their needs. He further contended that the courses of study devised must challenge the student, must provide multiple opportunities for the individual to display his initiative, and most important of all the courses must exploit the professional experience of the individual. 38 A curriculum devised in such a manner would provide the individual with the maximum opportunity for study, research and fulfilling professional interests according to Davis. Military institutions are the most likely places to achieve this balance. Civilian institutions just could not afford the time and expense related to such tailoring. It would be difficult to disagree with this position. However, it points up a dilemma even for the military Senior Service Colleges.

Only the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of all the senior schools has done extensive work in tailoring. More important, the mission of ICAF calls for the type of courses that are more easily tailored than those in the other institutions. This tends to support the contention that tailoring courses is a factor in substantiating the need for an institution. However, does this issue of need argue for

keeping only ICAF and the elimination of the rest of the Senior Service Colleges? Rather, what this position seems to affirm is that the other institutions should do more tailoring of their courses not only to meet individual student needs, but also to meet the requirements of the institution itself.

As a result of examining curriculum as a determinant of reasons for the existence of multiple Senior Service Schools, I have concluded that each of the Senior Service Schools is needed to provide a specific type of indoctrination for its own service officers. At best, this conclusion is tenuous in light of other contradictory findings in this study. However, there are some considerations that must be addressed. First, advocates of consolidation of the senior level schools, or even the standardizing of the curriculum at the several colleges, have based their sentiment on administrative changes that would result and not on educational concerns. For example, such advocates have been more concerned with organizational effectiveness, management improvements, and budgetary restraints than the subjects taught at the colleges, the reasons for teaching them, and the achievements of their graduates. Second, advocates of consolidation have never gained the necessary support of either military or government officials to bring about a change in the structure of the senior level educational system. Rather, a combination of practical and parochial interests of the faculties, staffs, students and governing bodies of the several colleges, together with the support of high ranking military leaders and distinguished scholars who have conducted extensive research of the military education system have served to overcome most suggestions of consolidation. Third, where consolidation has occurred, the result has been the consolidation of administrative functions and not of curricular offerings. The best
case in point is the National Defense University composed of the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces with more recently the addition of the Armed Forces Staff College. While the University exerts a certain amount of control over the component colleges, and even though the colleges utilizes various facilities in common and sometimes cooperates jointly on some outside lectures, they nonetheless remain relatively autonomous; particularly in the important areas of mission and of curriculum development. Based on the current missions of the senior level institutions, I can not foresee their consolidation beyond the National Defense University concept unless the defense priorities of the nation change or budgetary considerations forces such a move.

On the other hand, there are two findings that, in my opinion, suggests maintaining the status quo. The literature on senior level education overwhelmingly supports the notion that the major purpose of these colleges is to prepare professionals to successfully carryout the national will. It follows that since the national tasks assigned to the military have been divided according to separate services, the education and training of the officers is best accomplished in accordance with separate service needs. Although the idea of common training needs of officers of various components of an armed force has enjoyed some success in a few other countries (such as Canada and Sweden), the idea has never caught on in the United States except for the education of officers of lower rank. One of the primary reasons is that uniform training of senior military officers is not practical as long as there are separate military services. I therefore can not foresee a need to change the current senior level educational system unless a willingness is expressed first to change the organizational structure of the armed
forces. Uniformity of goals makes it possible to unify the service schools but differences in the implementation leads to rivalry among the branches of service and this establishes a need for the schools. Thus, I have concluded that consolidation is not practical, and each senior college is needed. Amos A. Jordan, a distinguished researcher in the field of officer education says this about the prospects of consolidating senior level education:

The lack of enthusiasm within the services for this approach (or even for centrally directed studies of the question) is rooted in the virtually unanimous view among the professionals that schooling should be keyed directly to service personnel systems, which are themselves based directly upon service tasks. Thus the question is not merely one of service or joint schools, but of the very existence of the services themselves.\(^{39}\)

If, then, each Senior Service School should be retained because of the current structure of the armed forces as I have suggested, curriculum becomes a major determinant of its need. There are of course other determinants of which demographics of students is another major consideration.

One finds that the student body of a Senior Service College is perhaps the most outstanding feature of the institution. Masland and Radway emphatically calls it the most outstanding feature of The National War College.\(^{40}\) The selection of students to attend the National War College remains the prerogative of each participating service or agency, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no command responsibilities in that respect. The military officers selected to


\(^{40}\)Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy, p. 321.
attend. The National War College usually hold the grade either of Colonel or Naval Captain. The civilians who attend the National War College are of comparable rank. Their average ages are usually between 42 and 47. Class size at the National War College generally have been around 200 or less. The same demographics hold true for the remaining Senior Service Schools. We usually find four or five officers from the other services, the State Department and perhaps other governmental agencies attending each of the service war colleges. Although proper military decorum has always been maintained, it has only been recently that even the wearing of the uniform has been required at some of the Senior Service Colleges. Other than these instances, one is struck by the fact that the student body holds very little else in common.

As individuals they come from different branches of the service and have varied backgrounds. They are markedly mixed in terms of experience, qualifications, educational backgrounds, and quality of professional services. What this tells us, then, is that although the students who attend the Senior Service Colleges are alike in many aspects, they are nonetheless very dissimilar in many ways. Accordingly, they do not form a pattern that would permit one to say that they belong in one senior institution in opposition to another. Additionally, their training needs are different and is determined by the tasks they are likely to be assigned in the future. Since these tasks are based on the mission of the particular service to which they belong it is best to train them in institutions that are particularly akin to the service or agency from which they come. Although some common training might be feasible, mission essential training is not, it is the mission with its related tasks that overrides everything else. If, then, there is any argument in support of separate Senior Service Schools which is defensible, it would be one that is
based on demographics and the needs of the services.

In retrospect, one finds arguments both for the consolidation and retention of the Senior Service Schools. However, because of the peculiar nature of military requirements, there appear more persuasive arguments for retaining the schools than arguments against them. Few individuals question that officers of the services should be educated to the extent necessary to carry out their assigned tasks in the interest of the security of the United States. There appears to be a continuing extensive requirement for training officers in the scientific and technological fields as well as in the humanities, and in the professions as well as in military science and tactics. Even though questions continue to center on the extent and nature of the educational requirements and on the number of graduate degrees required as well as on the extent to which the cost of graduate education should be borne by either the government or by the individual officer, there has been little disagreement over the fact that the major controlling factor in determining the educational requirements of the military services is the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its military professionals to perform.\(^4\)

The question of where should the service man be educated, in a civilian or military institution of higher education, has generated far more discussion than conclusive results. Many argue for sending the military officers to civilian colleges and universities because of the free academic climate that prevails there, and because of the fresh, new ideas that one can gain in that atmosphere. However, civil-

\(^4\)Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," p. 257.
ian academicians appear reluctant to offer graduate training in the type of programs that the military needs and desires for its professional officers. Offering studies in strategy and policy, industrial requirements and preparedness during periods of crises, and in the application of air, land and sea power in support of a national strategy appear of little interest in the civilian sector. Rather, these fields are left to the military and the Senior Service Colleges to cover. Further, many military officers, particularly those holding higher ranks, apparently view attending a civilian college or university as of little value to them and would rather attend the Senior Service Schools for the advantages it apparently offers toward selection to flag and general officer rank. Finally, while there appear to be certain similarities in curriculum and student demographics at the Senior Service School, we find that these similarities are only a matter of degree and not substance. Therefore, it seem that no overriding argument could be found to substantiate discontinuance of the programs at any of the Senior Service Colleges. There is, however, still substantial pressure for consolidating some of the courses, and the precedent for this has been set in the establishment of The National Defense University. The issue of consolidation of courses will be considered in the next chapter as it relates to the findings and conclusions of this study.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the study was to examine the development of the National War College and its interrelationship with the remaining four Senior Service Schools. Concomitant to the central purpose a secondary thesis developed which dealt with reasons all the senior institution were necessary.

Evidence in the study supported the central thesis that the National War College was intended to be developed as the highest level institution of all the Senior Service Colleges. However, it was found that the National War College did not attain that position. Rather, it was discovered that the National War College shares the apex of military senior education with the remaining four Senior Service Colleges. Evidence in the study does, however, provide some reasons for the establishment and continued existences of all of the senior institutions; perhaps because of differing missions and rivalry among the various branches of the military.

Research design for the study was devised to include the historical antecedents of military higher education in the United States that served as forerunners to the establishment of the National War College. Further, it was contended that an analysis of factors influencing the development of each of the Senior Service Schools would help to provide insight not only into the founding of the National War College, but also into the reasons for the existence of each of the senior level military
institutions. Further, an examination of the roles, attitudes and influences held by military and civilian leaders closely associated with the establishment of the Senior Service Schools was included in order to understand better how and why they developed as they did, and the causes for their interrelationship. Also, a critical look at curriculum development and the development of instructional strategies at the various senior military institutions was added as part of the design in order to determine development of academic standards of the colleges and to reflect similarities and differences among the course offerings of high level military schools. Finally, a review of the reasons for the existence of the five Senior Service Schools was made a part of the research design in order to determine if any or all of the colleges were needed.

The basic premise in the study was that the National War College was planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the capstone military educational institution of the nation. Instead, the National War College shares the summit of professional military education with the other four Senior Service Colleges. Evidence in the study essentially supports this contention. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946 planned the National War College as the highest level educational institution in the Armed Forces. By the mid-1950's the National War College had achieved an unofficial reputation as being the most prestigious of all the Senior Service Colleges, and many officers of all services considered the National War College superior to the other senior institutions. This fact is supported by the findings made by the Response Analysis Corporation, of Princeton, New Jersey. In the study made by the Response Analysis Corporation it was found that many military officers as late as the 1970's still perceived that the National War College was first in status and prestige when compared with the other
four senior colleges. However, it was this very consideration by military members of all the services which led the Department of Defense to declare officially that the Senior Service Colleges were equal in all respects; therefore, officers needed to attend only one of the four to satisfy senior professional educational requirements. To this end, it can be concluded that the National War College was planned and developed to be at the apex of the military educational system. Further, it was well on its way toward achieving this distinction, but was de-emphasized by the military hierarchy to the point that it officially shares the summit of military higher education with the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the three services war colleges.

Unofficially, however, the National War College still enjoys the reputation as being the most prestigious of all the Senior Service Schools. The research of the Response Analysis Corporation attest to this as does the findings of a Civilian Board of Consultants to the National War College who in 1973 examined the question of its pre-eminence. The Board was concerned that the status and prestige of the college had been eroded over the years because of a decline in the quality of officers sent to the school and because of a drop in the number of its graduates who were promoted to flag or general officer rank. After extensive research, the Board was satisfied that the College had maintained its previous lofty position as the most prestigious of all the educational institutions of the Armed Forces.

A second hypothesis in this study was that the mission of the National War College and that of its sister institutions required a depth and breadth unique to each, and that this prevented either institution from becoming supreme in the military educational system. It was found in the study that curriculum development at each of the Senior
Service Colleges was based primarily on the mission of the particular college, and this was intended to be the dominant factor in the curriculum at all the senior institutions. It was the breadth of the curriculum at the Senior Service Schools that made each different from its peers and made each of them unique.

It should be noted that in this respect, some evidence was found to support the idea that interservice rivalry contributed significantly to the depth and breadth of the Senior Service educational system. There were instances found when interservice rivalry appeared during the development of the National War College such as the controversy over the selection of a name for this institution, and the fact that each of the services insisted on retaining its own war college when consideration was being given to establishing both the forerunner to the National War College, the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL), and the National War College itself. More significantly, interservice rivalry became a direct reason for the establishment of the Naval War College. Other than these instances, evidence of overt interservice rivalry was extremely scarce. Conversely, there was an abundance of evidence extolling interservice cooperation starting with the selection of Tasker Bliss, an Army Officer, to be on the original faculty of the Navy War College and continuing through the founding and development of ANSCOL, ICAF, and the National War College. Perhaps the most outstanding example of interservice cooperation was the establishment and operation of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was an activity established on November 9, 1962 by Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purpose of coordinating military education at the joint and Senior Service College level. The MECC was composed of the Presidents and Commandants of all of the Senior Service Colleges with the Commandant
of the National War College as Chairman.

A third premise was that simple reasons all of the Senior Service Colleges exist seemed to be elusive. As the motives for founding each of the Senior Service Schools were reviewed, varied complex reasons for their existence were found ranging from experiences of war to inter-service rivalry, and also from the desire to provide professional training of military members to establishing a place merely to house a general staff. These, and other ideological interests discussed in the study provided some insight into reasons for founding the Senior Service Schools, but they did not provide, as initially hypothesized, clear cut answers to the requirement for retaining each of the Colleges. However, discussions of the demands of the services for officers with graduate degrees, and of curricula offerings of the Senior Service Schools versus that of civilian colleges and universities, did provide some support for the continued existence of the multiple senior institutions. At best, one can conclude that there is substantial support among the military for separate Senior Service Schools, and there is a noticeable lack of arguments against maintaining the institutions; therefore, in spite of the scarcity of hard evidence, there is sufficient support for continuation of the Colleges. Exploring the development of the National War College and its peer institutions, and examining their interrelationship, was a far less difficult task than determining requirement for the existence of all the colleges.

It was discovered early in this investigation that the antecedents of the war college system in the United States served as important historical forerunners to the founding and development of the National War College and its sister Senior Service Schools. All of these institutions in the United States can trace their heritage to precursors in Europe with the Berlin War Academy serving as the bellwether institution.
The study established conclusively that the first military educational institution comparable to European war academies did not occur in the United States until the Naval War College was established. This was followed by the Army War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and ANSCOL the institution from which the National War College directly emerged. There are two other findings of concern with historical antecedents. First, the Air War College, because of the late date of its founding, does not serve as an important forerunner of the National War College. Second, the founding of the National War College partially fulfills the dreams held by many prominent individuals of the colonial period of American history for a national university. It was, however, the Naval War College that was the leader that brought advanced military education to the United States.

Although established on the general basis of European war schools, it was found that the Naval War College was the first of its kind to be established in the world. It had no model. The military schools of Europe were all army schools. Although the Naval War College founder, Stephen B. Luce, relied on the U.S. Army schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth for much of his inspiration, he did not copy these schools in fostering the idea of a true war college. He emphasized the study of national strategy as a combination of sea and land power. This appeared more in the European tradition. Nonetheless, it was clearly shown that it was the Army that had success with its post-graduate training and the requirement for the same type training in the navy that appear to be the reasons for establishing the Naval War College.

The founding of the Army War College was less educational than bureaucratic according to findings of the study. The interim creation of a general staff and the establishment of a facility to house that
staff became the immediate reasons for founding the Army War College. There were revealed some subsidiary reasons that its founder, Elihu Root, and its chief patron, Tasker Bliss, had for wanting an army war college. These included expansion of higher education for Army personnel, the development and organization of a united army education system, and the provision of a coordinating agency for the dissemination of authoritative military information.

The founding of ICAF and ANSCOL, like the Army War College, did not evolve directly from educational requirements of the services. Rather, the primary reason for their establishment was experiences of actual war; ICAF because of industrial and logistical failures experienced during World War I, and ANSCOL because of the requirement for training in joint operations during World War II. If the reasons for the founding of the Senior Service Colleges were few, the roles, attitudes and influences of individuals involved in their founding and development were many.

One of the interesting findings of this investigation was that the senior military institutions had many enemies as well as friends during their formative years. The "technicists" are a case in point. These individuals were primarily military officers who wanted to emphasize training in technical skills at the expense of general military knowledge. Then there were Congressmen, Senators, and Service Secretaries who opposed the Senior Service Colleges. Even some of the students selected to attend the schools felt that they had been shanghaied and did not support continuation of the Colleges. However, it was found that the supporters of the Colleges were more persistent and intent on prevailing. From Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding General of the Army during the Civil War to Emory Upton who made a trip

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around the world to study the educational systems of other countries, supporters of higher military education in the United States were resolute. Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan were the prime movers in getting the Naval War College started. The primary patrons of the Army War College were Root, Bliss, and William H. Carter. Henry "Hap" Arnold was the driving force behind ANSCOL while John L. DeWitt and Henry W. Hill made that institution a functioning reality. These supporters of higher education in the military faced up to old animosities against post-graduate military education and the desire by many to maintain technicism as a basis for military professional development; and, they overcame the indifference and hostility of the enemies of senior education. They got their schools started. The problem then became what to teach and how it should be presented.

Curricula and instructional strategies were important to the growth and development of military higher education in that they became the factors that tended to distinguish the Senior Service Schools from others in the educational system of both the military and civilian institutions of higher education. The findings revealed that it was the curriculum at each of the service institutions that made it different from its peers and made it unique in higher education. The findings support the contention that at few civilian institution of higher education could a military officer of high rank receive instruction on the full range of factors, considerations and circumstances that bear upon their studies that one can obtain at the military Senior Service Schools. At the beginning of these senior military colleges, work done by students in attendance was voluntary except perhaps attendance at lectures. However, as time passed the work became more academic. The Naval War College is a case in point.
Throughout much of its early development, curricular emphasis at the Naval War College centered around tactical studies. However, the situation changed dramatically, after the close of World War II when the curriculum was broadened to include many matters not strictly naval or even military. Course objectives were raised from purely tactical, command and staff concerns to a much higher level of decision making. Courses were offered in subjects such as Strategy and Policy, Defense Decision Making, Management, Foreign Affairs, Human Relations, and Human Behavior as well as traditional non-tactical subjects as International Law, History, Economics, and Sociology. The new curriculum emphasis marked a return to the original concepts of both Luce and Mahan who believed in the study of national strategy and policy as an essential element in understanding the art of war. To meet this end, the Naval War College pioneered in using the lecture, the "applicatory method" of resolving problems, case studies, and war gaming as the major instructional strategies.

It was found in the evidence that in spite of efforts to modernize the curriculum at the Naval War College, there was increasing criticism of the efforts. For example, excessive attention to the Soviet Union and to the Soviet Bloc countries was deplored. Other main criticisms of the curriculum included the superficial treatment of its many subjects, a rapid succession of visiting lecturers, an over concentration on the contemporary scene, and a corresponding under emphasis on the historical and sociological context in which current events were transpiring. It was against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, in the early 1970's, inaugurated a new course of study which included requiring students to take examinations, the giving of grades to students for the first time, and also requiring more student
research, writing and case studies. In addition, Admiral Turner reduced the number of guest lecturers, eliminated the associated cooperative Masters degree program with George Washington University, established the procedures of studying strategy through historical cases rather than through international relations or political science, shifted emphasis away from broad issues of international relations into areas of more exclusive concern to naval officers, and he included the officer's wives in certain study programs to interest them in their husband's careers. The changes at the Naval War College were no less dramatic than those at the Army War College.

Deficiencies were recognized by the Army War College long before the Navy became cognizant of deficiencies at its College. The Army War College took measures early to revitalize its offerings. The Army War College "70 Study" of 1965 was a continuation of the Haines Board Study of 1964. The U.S. Army War College Mission and Curriculum Study of 1970, and the Norris Report of 1971 were follow-on studies. The results of these in-depth investigations and analyses of the curriculum were an increase in management studies, the application of behavioral science in leadership and management, greater use of automatic data processing, and a greater opportunity for individual research and study. One of the most important changes taking place in the Army War College Curriculum was the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) undertaken when Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr. was Commandant in the spring of 1971. The LRDP was in response to Davis' question concerning "How the school should respond to its responsibilities over the next decade in terms of curriculum content, instructional concepts, faculty development and college organization"? The task of the LRDP, therefore, was to structure a curriculum which would anticipate and respond to
civilian and military changes in the world and ensure that the course would equip graduates to lead and master the changes rather than be driven by them.

It was found that while the Army and Navy had set the standards for the teaching of strategy and policy subjects and for the training of students in decision-making, the other Senior Service Schools continued their distinctive curricular offerings of industrial subjects and courses dealing with air power. The curriculum of the Air War College, for example, used the theme "airpower as an instrument of national policy." In carrying out this theme, the Air War College departed from the example set by both the Army and Navy. The Air Force decided to focus on the current air force missions and the capability to accomplish these tasks especially as they relate to the NATO community. The Air War College was, therefore, less concerned with teaching its students high level strategy, policy and decision making than to ensure that they understood how Air Force operations influenced the national policy, strategy and decisions.

The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing exclusively with resource management. Further, because of its type of curricular offerings, the ICAF students possessed a high percentage of master and doctoral degrees on entering the institution than did their peers at the other high level military schools. It was also found that the ICAF courses were more like those offered in civilian colleges and universities because of their orientation toward business management and practices. However, because of these differences from the other Senior Service Schools and the sophistication of its students, ICAF found that it had a greater problem in designing its courses to fit the needs of every-
one; therefore, this military college did extensive research in both tailoring courses to the background of its students, and determining methods to avoid duplication of previous education of their students.

Further it was found that the curriculum of the National War College was used as a prototype for courses leading to excellence in research and creative thinking. The curriculum was, therefore, devoted to broadening the knowledge and abilities of the students and to creating within the student confidence in the art of decision making. These attributes constituted the peak of excellence in higher education in the military. The emphasis placed on excellence was due in part to efforts made by the Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in Education (commonly referred to as the Clements Board). Members of the Clements Board determined the mission for each of the Senior Service Schools, established instructional strategies, and most important of all specified the kind of core, mission-essential and tailored elective that were considered to be the most logical for insuring educational excellence. Mission-essential courses were determined to be the predominate element of the curriculum.

There is little doubt that the Clements Board contributed to some standardization among the Senior Service Colleges and gave credence to those calling for consolidation of the senior military institutions. In a large measure these institutions were similar. Members of faculties, the student bodies, instructional methods, and even organizations were similar to each other. An attempt to establish reasons for continued existence of all of the military colleges was facilitated by revelation of the separate and distinct missions assigned to each of these schools. Educational requirements of the military are controlled by the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its professionals.
to perform. Since each of the service tasks are likely to be different, the education of the officers of each service should also be different. Civilian institutions of higher education have not felt the teaching of military subjects is their responsibility and, therefore, the military institutions have provided the advanced military training. Finally, military officers realize that they receive status toward promotion to senior rank if they attend a military post-graduate school rather than a civilian institution. In light of the evidence examined in the study it seems reasonable to state that there are substantial reasons for the continued existence of each of the Senior Service Colleges.

In 1975, it was determine by the Clements Board that the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) should continue to be colleges in their own right but should be brought together in the form of a University of National Defense as soon as possible. This was accomplished on January 16, 1976 when the National Defense University (NDU) was established and resulted in an umbrella office of the President, a combined staff, and a new board of visitors to govern the new institution. Further, the libraries of the two constituent colleges were combined, management and system functions of each school became one support activity, external programs and research activities were combined, and the new institution was given budgetary responsibilities. Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, the first president of the National Defense University felt that such consolidation had resulted in a strong reservoir of military educational excellence. However, at the same time the individuality and strength of the two separate component colleges have been retained. It appears to this writer that this consolidation succeeded primarily because the National War College and ICAF were both located at the same physical site.
Further, both were already under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and were not closely associated with the philosophy of either of the three services. Finally, their missions were to teach courses that transcended service tactical and operational requirements. Because of these considerations, it was not only prudent, but also relatively easy, to accomplish the consolidation. This could not happen so easily with the three services war colleges. The differences in their philosophies and missions would prevent establishing a common curriculum. Interservice prejudices and rivalry could be so great that they would prohibit a consolidation. The only way that this writer can foresee a consolidation of the services war colleges with each other or with The National Defense University is after consolidation of all of the country's armed forces into one service. Consequently, the present arrangement appears adequate for military higher education given the current circumstances and conditions. However, there is one thing that is feasible based on the findings of this study. That is inasmuch as the National Defense University has the required stature, prestige and the mission requirement, it should be officially designated the capstone of the nation's military educational system with all the attendant responsibilities and rewards such a designation would entail. In this context it would appear that admission to this capstone institution might naturally follow completion of the senior institution of the services rather than serve as an alternative to them.

In conclusion, the National War College was developed to be the apex of the military education system but it has never gained that official designation. Instead, it officially shares the apex of military higher education along with the four other Senior Service Colleges. It is concluded further that each Senior Service School has
been viewed as requiring a depth and breadth in its offerings unique to each military service and that each institution's mission contributed to this end. Finally, it is concluded that each of the separate institutions should be retained as long as there are separate services and the schools have separate missions. It would seem to follow, however, that in today's world of combined military missions requiring interservice cooperation at the highest levels, an educational capstone for military education could be considered not only beneficial but essential. The National Defense University, if allowed to perform the function for which it was established, should meet such a need.

It would also seem to follow that future military mission requirements and budgetary considerations might eventually override parochial military interests and traditional interservice rivalry thus requiring a reorganization of the armed services. If this should occur, it might be necessary to review these finding and conclusions with a view of conducting a follow-on study on whether or not all the Senior Service Colleges should be retained.
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Vita

Vernon Eugene Johnson

Birthdate: October 25, 1930
Birthplace: Norfolk, Virginia

Education:

1977-1982 The College of William and Mary in Virginia Williamsburg, Virginia
Certificate of Advanced Graduate Study in Education
Doctor of Education

1977-1978 Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia
Certificate of Emphasis in The History of Strategy and Policy

1968 Department of Defense Computer Institute
Washington, D.C.
Diploma

1967-1968 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Diploma

1960-1964 University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Master of Arts

Fort Lee, Virginia
Diplomas

1960 U.S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia
Diploma

1947-1951 Virginia State College
Petersburg, Virginia
Bachelor or Arts
Abstract

DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND PEER INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE GROWTH AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF US MILITARY SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

Vernon Eugene Johnson, Ed.D.

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

Chairman: Professor Paul Unger

The purpose of this study was to investigate reasons for establishment of the National War College, its interrelationship with other Senior Service Schools, and to assess why the multiple institutions continue to exist.

The study contained three hypotheses. First, the National War College was planned and developed to be the capstone of the nation's military educational system. It never achieved that position. Instead it has shared the summit of professional military education with the other four Senior Service Colleges. Second, the National War College and each of the other Senior Service Colleges had unique missions which prevented any institution from becoming supreme in the military education system. Third, although one could establish the interrelationships among the Senior Service Colleges, one could not assess readily the reasons the multiple institutions existed.

The present investigation is significant because the interrelationship that exist among the National War College and the other Senior Service Schools seem to be misunderstood by the civilian sector and ignored by the military. The study attempted to clarify those relationships for both elements.

It was hypothesized that by investigating the historical antecedents of military higher education in the United States one could better understand the development of the National War College and its interrelationships with the other Senior Service Colleges. It was also the contention of the author that an analysis of factors leading to the development of the Senior Service Colleges would provide insight into the reasons all the senior institutions exist today. Additionally, the author believed that one would have to investigate the roles, attitudes, and influences of military and civilian leaders as well as curriculum development and instructional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges before one could fully understand why they developed as they did.

It was concluded that all the Senior Service Colleges are required, and the present arrangement appears to be the best for military higher education given the current state of desires of military officials and indifference to military advanced graduate education by the civilian sector.