Liberal education and moral development: an integrated model of moral education

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LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL EDUCATION

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Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Education

by
Roderic Lewis Owen
May 1985
LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL EDUCATION

by

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Chairman of Doctoral Committee
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my father, The Rev. John Richard Owen, originally of Plas Hen, Chwilog, North Wales. John Owen was an active and caring Presbyterian clergyman, an ardent contributor to Welsh culture and language, and a wise and loving father. He died December 18, 1984, at the age of sixty.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Without the sustained guidance, patience and insights of Dr. William Losito, this thesis would not have been written. To the extent this dissertation is jargon free, clearly argued, and logically structured, much of the credit is due to him.

Although not directly involved in this project, two other faculty deserve special thanks: Dr. James Haden, Professor of Philosophy at the College of Wooster, for initially stimulating my interest in morality, ethics and education, and Dr. Clifton Conrad, former Professor of Higher Education at the College of William and Mary, for encouraging and then guiding me in my decision to study the history and philosophy of higher education.

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... every form of possible human perfection proves upon reflection to be defective and unachievable in reality. Therefore, ideals serve well as guides. They are like beacons on a journey, but they do not permit us to tarry, as though our goals and rest were already contained in them.

Karl Jaspers in
Philosophy of Existence
Chapter 1: Introduction

Purpose and Rationale of the Study

Purpose In many college and university mission statements one will discover a statement or paragraph dwelling upon the moral mission of the institution and emphasizing its aim to imbue students with a moral conscience, a strong sense of values, or perhaps, with sound ethical character. On occasion, the promotion of a more specific moral code or set of values is explicitly identified; in such cases, the institution's religious or ideological foundations usually set the tone for the mission statement. In this thesis, the general question is raised: At a college or university level, what should be our educational goals and methods in the realm of moral development? It is assumed that one can rationally formulate and defend curricular aims focused on morality and that such goals need not be tightly linked to any specific political ideology or religious faith. A second, closely related question follows: What curricular or instructional model is most logically consistent and ethically acceptable with the mission and philosophy of liberal education? The major purpose of this study is to answer these two questions and develop one reasonable, clearly-defined model of moral education, a possible approach to offering "instruction in morality" at a college level.
In order to work toward these goals, several critical steps are taken. First, in a philosophical study of this nature the identification and clarification of several important concepts and the setting of boundaries are necessary tasks; "moral education" and its related terms are particularly ambiguous, easily misunderstood terms. Therefore, the provision of a framework of clear definitions and carefully delineated conceptual boundaries are primary and ongoing concerns. Second, the language and goals of the liberal education tradition are used to critically evaluate existing models of moral education and help develop a new approach. "Liberal education," an expression rooted in both educational philosophy and practice, serves as a viable conceptual tool in the determination of the goals and methods of moral education; also, the use of the relatively broad liberal arts tradition provides a means to transcend all but the most rigid or dogmatic ideological frameworks of educational goals, and it serves as an antidote to an antiseptic, technique-oriented skills approach to "valuing." Third, in the process of evaluating current collegiate models of moral education a number of closely related issues are examined. These include addressing such perplexing questions as "What exactly is a liberal education?"; "Does moral education necessarily result in indoctrination?"; "What is the meaning of and what are the differences between process-oriented goals and substantive, educational goals?"; and "Is there a connection linking teaching about morality with teaching morality?"

It is important to add touches of both tentativeness and humor to this study: tentativeness because the entire realm of morality yields few definitive answers and guidelines--humor because it is all too easy
to become overly sanctimonious and unrealistically invested in the role colleges can play in moral development. In complete earnestness, a recent report on "The Integrity of Higher Education" reads, "all university and college personnel, by their practices and their conduct, may so profoundly affect the intellectual and moral development of the young that even seemingly minor departures from integrity cannot be tolerated" (Bonham, 1980). Over a hundred years ago, however, President Philip Lindsley of the University of Nashville had this to say: "This is certain: that parents need never look to a college for any miraculous moral regeneration or transformation of character" (in Rudolph, 1962, p. 90). In short, society's expectations on the realistic role that colleges and universities can and should play in the moral development of students have varied considerably. At this point, perhaps only this can be stated with some certainty: Few educational issues generate more heat, contradiction, and confusion than morality and its instruction.

**Contemporary Overview**

A review of events in higher education over the past decade does reveal renewed, strong concern for questions of ethical or moral behavior and principle. Numerous proposals for core curricula and other educational schemes call for "skills in moral reasoning," "awareness of values" or even, "ethical growth or transformation." One commentator writes, "liberal education should aim to make values issues central to the intellectual life and to make it clear that a college, like other organizations, is a community of moral agents" (Murchland, 1979, p. 43). In a chapter entitled "Values and
the American Tradition" in Missions of the College Curriculum (1978), the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching cites several of its surveys indicating a significantly sizeable concern for moral growth and instruction through college education among the populace at large, as well as among faculty and students. Also, in a comprehensive survey of the intended outcomes of higher education, "a valid and internalized but not dogmatic set of values and moral principles," "moral sensitivity and courage," and "a sense of social consciousness and social responsibility" are listed as prominent goals (Bowen, 1977, p. 56).

There also have been many specific curricular proposals designed to implement such espoused objectives as "an examined set of values" and "greater moral sensitivity." Area number three, "Social Analysis and Moral Reasoning," of the recently implemented core curriculum at Harvard is, among other things, intended to introduce students to important traditions of thought, to make them aware of the intricacies of ethical argument, and to bring them to grips with particular questions of choice and value. They are to learn that it is possible to think systematically about such issues as justice, obligation, personal responsibility, citizenship, and friendship. (Harvard, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, 1979)

In another core curriculum proposal, Educating for Survival (1977), Ernest Boyer and Abraham Kaplan propose a "capstone" experience that provides a very strong and forward look at the moral and
ethical considerations that guide the lives of each person, a kind of forum in which personal beliefs could be discussed. Everyone 'believes,' everyone continually makes value-laden choices, and no one holds values wholly unrelated in origin and impact to the values held by others. (1977, p. 76)

Several years ago, the Hastings Center published a volume entitled *Ethics Teaching in Higher Education* (1980) which attempts a comprehensive overview of instruction in ethics at the college level.

Researchers and commentators on moral education typically develop one or more of three explanations to account for this recent, rapid expansion of interest in moral education. Many affirm a vague social theory linking contemporary events with resultant educational measures for reform. Few of the recent articles or books dealing with the problems of moral education fail to mention the effect of moral scandals on our society. Military force and the continuing threat of nuclear disaster, the C.I.A. and the practice of covert intelligence gathering, corporate business practices and the abused rights of consumers, the sexual philandering and questionable personal finances of political representatives, and the heightened awareness of discriminatory practices against various groups is but a sampling of the contemporary issues which some have chosen to view as signs of individual and societal ethical deterioration. These same commentators occasionally point to sociological data revealing the decreasing role of church and family in child rearing and the increasing role of mass media and...
institutional education at all levels for socialization of the individual. Others have looked upon the re-birth of moral education as an affirmation of a cyclical view of college curriculum history. By this account, the pendulum has swung back again to a concern for the humanities, liberal arts, and human values—in reaction to the continued growth of the sciences, professional specialization and narrowly vocational studies. At the turn of the century the reaction took the form of "Character Education" (Wagoner, 1980), in the 1940s the Harvard Red Book report emphasized citizenship, and in the 1970s and 1980s liberal education has been examined increasingly as an ethical enterprise (Botstein, 1979a, 1979b; Conrad & Weyer, 1980; Murchland, 1976, 1979).

A third "explanation" is more complex, steeped in an understanding of intellectual history which itself is open to a wide range of interpretations. From this perspective the entrenched scientific/analysis paradigm, indeed, our faith in reason and scientific method, has come under fire.¹ Our increasing willingness to seriously question the continuous use of the scientific method has been accompanied by a serious re-evaluation of the meaning and role of human reason and rationality—a re-examination which has resulted in providing a level

¹For a particularly lucid account of this viewpoint, the reader is referred to the works of William Barrett: Irrational Man: A Study in Existential Philosophy (1962) and The Illusion of Technique: A Search for Meaning in a Technological Civilization (1979). Such works as Reason Awake (Dubos, 1970), The Function of Reason (Whitehead, 1958), Where the Wasteland Ends (Razak, 1973), Art and Technics (Mumford, 1952), and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn, 1970) provide a representative sampling of this genre.
and degree of intellectual credence to moral language and reasoning lacking in the first sixty years of this century. More specifically, the philosophical views of the logical positivists and other analytic thinkers who either rejected moral statements as meaningless or labeled them as merely emotive in nature have now been challenged (and according to many, undermined) in a series of new attempts to establish a reasonable, intellectual grounding for morality and for value statements and beliefs in general (Bailer, 1968; Rawls, 1971; Taylor, 1961; Toulmin, 1950). This earlier analytic challenge had the initial effect of limiting most academic work in ethics (in scholarly publications and journals and in college courses) to a narrow focus on the metaethical issues arising from the attempt to justify the very existence and utility of ethical inquiry and language. More often than not, this metaethical approach held small appeal for the typical undergraduate and the non-professional philosopher; hence "ethics"--as a component of philosophy departments if not as general subject of concern--became increasingly isolated from the college curricular mainstream (Sloan, 1980, pp. 38-40). Today, the sustained, critical reactions against notions of moral values and language as either meaningless or merely emotional have helped lay the groundwork for the most recent proliferation of courses, research, and seminars dealing with substantive, contemporary ethical problems.

This increase of activity is easily documented. There are a significant number of individuals and groups now examining such contemporary concerns as public policy-making, profit margins, abortion, news reporting, genetic engineering, and racial inequity using the
language and disciplinary methods of ethics. No longer must ethicists be primarily or solely concerned with validating the intellectual legitimacy of their endeavors. (If nothing else, they can point to the works of such contemporary philosophers as Stephen Toulmin, Kurt Baier, and R. M. Hare as providing a metaethical base for this more concrete, applied endeavor.) The rapid expansion and influence of the Hastings Center (Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences), the flourishing of academic centers and departments focused on value concerns and utilizing forms of ethical inquiry,\(^2\) and, more generally, the numerous professional societies and organizations encouraging the examination of ethical issues in their respective domains—in combination, provides overwhelming evidence of a dramatic shift away from metaethical inquiry on the philosopher's part and toward normative ethical inquiry on the part of many social scientists and professional educators.

**Rationale**

The popular demand for moral education in reaction to national scandals, the re-examination of liberal education as an ethical enterprise, the resurgence of ethics as a legitimate applied discipline, and the current proliferation of varied courses and programs of values and moral education are among the major social and intellectual trends which shape and direct this discussion on moral education and instruction in morality. This description (and brief explanation) of the current surge of interest in ethics and moral education points

\(^2\)These include the Center for the Study of Values at the University of Delaware; the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy at the University of Maryland; the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, and the National Center for Business Ethics at Bentley College, Massachusetts, to name a representative selection.
to a number of compelling reasons in favor of sustained philosophical analysis of alternative goals and methods of moral education: reducing semantic confusion, understanding how to use the growing body of social scientific research in moral development, recognizing a new focus on measuring educational quality through examining student outcomes, identifying the dangers inherent in moral education without clear goals and guidelines, undermining the belief that education can be value-free, and finally, reasserting the important role that the philosophy of liberal education can play.

First, the clarification of semantic confusion provides a major impetus for this study. Although there most certainly is room for substantial disagreement about the need for and the nature of moral education at any educational level, much discord and confusion has resulted from ambiguous, poorly defined concepts. For example, there are sponsors of core courses and programs in "humanities and human values" who conscientiously avoid the label "moral education" and clearly distinguish themselves either from coursework in ethics or the objective of "altering moral behavior;" while there are others who readily use the expressions "moral education," "values education," and "ethics" interchangeably. In this study, it is maintained that these terms are not entirely synonymous but rather have had and should continue to have appreciable, substantive differences.

Second, the growing body of psychological and sociological research attempting to define and measure moral development and thought processes could have increasingly important implications for programs and theories of education at all levels. Indeed, much work has been done on the
effects of college education on the individual—including effects on
doctoral behavior and thought (Astin, 1971, 1977; Feldman & Newcomb, 1969;
Hyman, Reed & Wright, 1975; Jacob, 1975; Wilson & Gaff, 1975; Winter,
McClelland & Stewart, 1981). Thus far, the findings of such studies
are ambiguous and heavily dependent on the researchers' means of mea­
surement. For example, in his classic study, Changing Values in College
(1957), Philip Jacob focuses on substantive changes in students' value
positions on such specific matters as extramarital sex, belief in a
supernatural creator, freedom of the press, and drug usage as recrea­
tion, and he identifies changes in political party affiliation and
church membership that may have occurred as a result of attending
college. Jacob's study is significantly different from William Perry's
Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years
(1970) in which stages of cognitive growth are identified and described
in detail. For Perry and his team of psychological researchers, the
particular value stands and changes in themselves were unimportant;
rather, they provided access to the underlying cognitive process through
which the student structures and evaluates knowledge of self and the
world. Despite significant differences among themselves, many develop­
mental psychologists agree that at least some forms of moral growth can
be both defined and measured (Lickona, 1980, pp. 103-32). Also, if one
adds to this surge of psychological research a growing sense among
those paying for a college education that college outcomes should be
analyzed and publicly reported, then new and more exacting forms of
educational measurement will in all likelihood develop out of this body
of research. This, then provides a second reason for philosophical
analysis of moral education: without such analysis, there is the
danger that unexamined goals and objectives would be illegitimately
introduced as the natural consequence of descriptive, social scientific
theory and research. In other words, it might be possible for educa-
tors to become so enamored with a particular hierarchical theory of
moral development that they would begin to uncritically accept the
moral stages as actual curricular goals and forget the fundamentally
descriptive (and tentative) nature of social scientific theory.

This desire to avoid uncritically translating the findings of
descriptive educational research into curricular goals and objectives
leads to another yet broader reason for this type of study: the under-
mining of the idea or ideal of education as value neutral. Curricular
objectives, the ends of instruction, almost always depend on value
judgments about what should be taught, about what is important for the
student, and ultimately, for society. Rather than retreat behind the
misleading mask of pure objectivity, each educational institution, each
curriculum, must be clear and forthright about the moral character of
its goals and objectives. These goals may, indeed, include intellectual
objectivity, tolerance, and respect for diversity, yet these too are
value positions and their pre-eminence in a given educational system
will stand in marked contrast to one which primarily emphasizes common

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3 In brief, this is a modern restatement of G.E. Moore's "natural-
istic fallacy" in which he clearly exposes and logically derides argu-
ments which move from "is" to "ought"--from a description of what is
to the contention that "what is" is "what should be."

4 In The Ideal of the University (1969) R. P. Wolff provides an
especially effective argument in his section entitled "The Myth of
Value Neutrality."
heritage, self-discipline and character, and competence in basic communication skills. The examination of curricular objectives directly focused on moral development serves to bring this point regarding the impossibility of value neutrality to the forefront. For example, the institution which sets no goals whatsoever regarding moral development may transmit the message that morality is meaningless or entirely individualistic. Another college which affirms respect for cultural pluralism and diversity, critical development of a set of ideals and values, and moral sensitivity and consciousness as curricular goals will differ markedly from one which emphasizes personal salvation, good citizenship, and acceptance of and adherence to moral rules. Value neutrality in determining educational and curricular goals and objectives is clearly a myth.

Fourth, there is the need to re-examine the critical and continuing role that the philosophy of liberal education can play in determining educational goals and objectives, coupled with the need to define and clarify the exact nature of liberal education. A clear notion of the historical links between liberal education and moral development as an educational goal is crucial in this attempt to reassert the connections between undergraduate education, the liberal arts ideal, and individual morality. The moral growth and development of the undergraduate student has been a predominant aim of liberal education (Brubacher, 1978; Conrad & Wyer, 1980; McGrath, 1975, 1976; Wegener, 1978). As the earliest practitioners of higher education in the West, the ancient Greeks conceived of education as a moral activity creating both knowledgeable and virtuous men (Jaeger, 1939; Murchland, 1976,
1979). If anything, it has been this fundamental concern for growth in character and integrity that has distinguished liberal education from other forms of advanced instruction. However, the 19th century sectarian entrenchment of liberal arts education coupled with the 20th century failure to discover a new model of liberal education have worked to erode the once well-established concern for moral growth (Conrad & Wyer, 1980). Moreover, the rise of the graduate and professional schools with their emphasis on research, specialization, and scientific objectivity has been paralleled by a decreasing emphasis on personal instruction and encounter, general studies, and value awareness and development (McGrath, 1975, 1976). Today, there are those who regard any form of instruction dealing directly with values and morals either as indoctrination and, hence, unacceptable or simply as inappropriate in an educational setting where the primary goals revolve around the advancement of truth and the development of rational-analytic capacities and technical skills (Codero, 1976; Gluck, 1977; Gordon, 1975; Hook, 1970; Schleifer, 1976). This study does, then, seek to contribute to the reestablishment of connections between higher education, the liberal education ideal, and

5 In the 19th century liberal education became so closely associated with the small sectarian colleges of numerous denominations that for some it continues to bear connotations of narrow-minded pietism, overly protective paternalism, and antiquated classical instruction. In the 20th century, it took many liberal arts colleges sixty or seventy years to eliminate such mandatory practices as daily chapel, studies in classical languages, and the senior course in moral philosophy (see McGrath, 1976; Rudolph, 1976; Sloan, 1980). The objectives that these practices attempted to meet—community building, development of discipline and moral character, and the nurturing of a comprehensive view rooted in common heritage—are still often regarded as important; yet, until recently, there has been little discussion regarding the contemporary curricular means to help bring about those goals.
the goals of moral development.

Finally, without firm philosophical grounding, educational objectives and goals regarding morality and its instruction will be particularly susceptible to manipulation and distortion with potentially devastating results. For example, an objective such as "clarification of personal values" could conceivably be translated into one-sided individualism (e.g. "All I need do is clarify my own existing values and not at all concern myself with anyone else's values."). Or the objective, "development of moral reasoning ability" might in practice become "identify and develop debate techniques which will allow the student to win moral arguments" or "discover a method which will allow one to solve all moral dilemmas." Although such examples may seem extreme when stated in this manner, there clearly are all too many historical examples of moral education or training having gone awry. Furthermore, a well-developed philosophical basis to college-level instruction in morality will grant such programs and courses increased leverage in the curricular competition with existing, better defined, traditional areas of study. In the words of Daniel Callahan, without a theoretical framework, there will result a "general swamp of competing purposes, confused pedagogies, and muddled students" (1978, p. 141). One could safely assume that the current popular interest in moral or values education would rapidly fade in the face of such confusion and ambiguity of purpose. In summation, this preliminary statement of purpose and overview provides both a sense of context for this study as well as a developed set of reasons for in-depth analysis of alternative goals and models of moral education.
Method and Scope

**The Question Restated**

Answers to the questions, "What should be our educational goals and methods in the realm of moral development?" and "What curricular or instructional model is most logically consistent and ethically acceptable with the philosophy and aims of liberal education?" are neither easily nor definitively formulated. The former question is logically prior and broader in scope, while the latter question provides a specific context: an instructional model and liberal education. As stated earlier, the existing diversity of vaguely synonymous expressions—"ethical development," "moral reasoning," "values clarification," "applied or normative ethics"—is an indication of the semantic confusion that often hinders the development of a reasonable response from the onset. For some, the value orientation of the questions automatically renders them meaningless and thus any attempt to develop a reasoned response is futile since such "answers" would be unsubstantiated or unverifiable. For others the task is, perhaps, not so much illogical as it is ethically suspect; in this view, although very broad, generic goals regarding moral character may be appropriate, their formulation into more specific curricular objectives seriously risks indoctrination. These foundational concerns are raised and the basis of this thesis is defended as at least reasonable, and, in a preliminary sense, it is maintained that it does make sense to ask such questions. Educators can reasonably choose between and assign levels of priority to such goal statements as "the creation of good men and women," "awareness of values and moral issues," and "movement to a higher level of
moral reasoning"; that it is sensible and not necessarily unethical, to develop specific curricular objectives that can, at least in part, help fulfill broad mission statements; and that unless clear, adequately defended aims are developed, the instructional means or methods can make little sense. As philosopher of education, Broudy has contended:

Because it is believed that choice among ends in education is possible, it is felt that such choice is also necessary, for otherwise means, presumably, could not be selected for relevance and fitness, and failure in this respect would render the whole enterprise irrational, i.e. aimless or vacillating.

(1970, p. 2)

Without the more explicit, tangible connections between broad mission statements, specific curricular objectives, and instructional methods and structures, moral development may as well be abolished or relegated to the extracurriculum, or one might contend that such aims are best met tacitly (perhaps through the entire college experience).

Structure In order to set about answering the two major questions and developing an acceptable model of college-level moral education, this thesis is divided into five major sections or chapters. In this introductory chapter, purpose, rationale, and methodology are

6 One well known argument for this approach has been developed by Polanyi in The Tacit Dimension (1966). Also, the humanities and wholistic approaches to values education are, loosely speaking, educational examples that are examined and critiqued in greater detail in chapter three of this thesis.
identified and explained. Particular care is taken to explain the critical role that the idea of liberal education, and its inherent criteria, can play in deciding what can count as legitimate curricular objectives in this realm of moral growth. In the second chapter a working definition of liberal education is developed with reference to widely accepted historical statements regarding the liberal arts and thorough examination of contemporary practices and principles. A more detailed historical focus on the role of moral education in the liberal arts follows including a special focus on its classical Greek roots. This leads into discussion on both the historical and logical links between liberal education, reason, and moral development as an educational goal. The chapter concludes with a summary of the broad goals and purposes of liberal education, including those aims most directly linked with ethical growth.

Five contemporary models of moral education are identified and described in the third chapter: wholistic, values clarification, humanities, normative-ethics, and cognitive-developmental. With the primary focus on the espoused goals and objectives of each approach, the criteria for liberal education—as developed in the previous section—are then critically applied in the fourth chapter. In this manner, the respective strengths and weaknesses and inadequacies of each of these extant models are developed and argued; out of this discussion two particularly complementary models of moral education are found acceptable. The selection of the cognitive-developmental model and the normative ethics model sets the stage for the final chapter. The attempt is made to integrate both sets of goals and objectives. This task of combining
objectives in moral education that center on careful and rigorous thought on ethical issues with those that focus on personal commitment and ethical perspective is a challenging one. It is contended, however, that just such an integration is most in keeping with the grander purposes and aims of liberal education. In the latter part of chapter five significant curricular structures and pedagogical methods that logically and practically follow from these goals are developed and discussed. The conclusion reiterates the study's limits and summarizes both the strengths and weaknesses of the newly developed set of curricular goals and objectives for moral education within the context of colleges' liberal education.

Methodology This study is a philosophical inquiry into those educational aims and goals focused on the moral development of the individual. There is no attempt to discover or systematize facts, develop empirical generalizations, or formulate explanatory theories about the activity or process of moral education or individual moral development. As a philosophical inquiry, there is analysis and clarification of arguments and concepts—in the same sense as John Wilson "breaks down" moral reasoning into its logical, constituent parts in his work, Moral Thinking (1970) or as R. S. Peters analyzes ideas and evaluates their logical and linguistic adequacy in his book, Ethics and Education (1966). Important educational concepts are analyzed for their logical and ethical adequacy and ideal standards are established for the ends (purposes and goals) and the means (complete curricular model) of moral education in a liberal education context. This
type of conceptual analysis can be essential for descriptive, empirical research. Wilson claims that moral education, in particular, "offers a model case where philosophical guidance is essential for empirical research, if such research is not to be irrelevant or its application dangerous" (p. X, 1972). Peters, however, points out a limitation of conceptual analysis:

- A much clearer grasp of the fundamental issues underlying current controversies is made possible by mapping the area of the concepts and revealing the contours of the criterion built into them. But a detached and clear-sighted view of the shape of issues and institutions is all that conceptual analysis provides. It cannot of itself determine the lines of practical policy. (1970, p. 45)

As a normative philosophical inquiry, this thesis is primarily concerned with the substantive issues that have direct implications for shaping "practical policy." This work is a critical inquiry into the various aims and models of moral education at a collegiate level, an inquiry that develops into a proposal for a specific rationally justifiable model for moral education. Wilson claims that much research on education is normative "in the simple sense that it is not just research on what is the case, but research on how to make what is the case more like what ought to be the case" (1972, p. 7). More specifically, normative theories have been characterized as "consisting of judgements or propositions about the ends or values at which the activity or process of education should aim, the principles they should respect or
implement, the methods they should use, the curriculum to be followed" (Frankena, 1965, p. 3). A normative study, then, presents a systematic view of the principles or goals by which people ought to think or act.

As a normative study, this thesis rests on the philosophical grounds that value statements can be rationally understood; that is, value statements are neither meaningless nor merely emotive in nature. There are a number of metaethical theories supporting the validity of value statements; these range from the belief that values can be verified in the same manner as facts (e.g., Jeremy Bentham's definition of happiness as "the greatest good for the greatest number") to the notion that the truth of value statements is intuitively perceived. For example, Rousseau regarded the laws of nature to be "written in the depths of his (man's) heart by his conscience and reason," while G. E. Moore believed that "value" was a unique, non-natural property of things, intuitively perceived by humans. Others have claimed that values are logically derived from facts (e.g., Jacques Maritain in Education at the Crossroads (1943)) or that moral truths somehow derive from a fact gathering process (e.g. teleological theories, particularly Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics). More recently, Stephen Toulmin (1965), Kurt Baier (1965), and others have developed a "good reasons" approach to the justification of moral assertions. They view morality in terms of function and contend that value statements are rational propositions open to judgments of sensibility and warrantability. R. M. Hare (1964) has a different notion; he argues that the legitimacy and truth content of value assertions lie in their form, not function. Like Kant, he believes that reasons are the basis for moral assertions'
defining property and that this defining form rests in their "univers-ability."

There is no attempt in this thesis to select one metaethical theory over another. By recognizing that the metaethical dialogue on the meaning, intellectual legitimacy, and verifiability of value assertions is continuous, one can perhaps more effectively understand the meaning and nature of normative inquiry. It is not a particular school of philosophical thought, nor an espousal of certain types of moral values or specific methods of moral reasoning. Normative Inquiry is, in a very straightforward sense, ethical analysis on an applied level. It may tend toward broad speculation or a more narrow analysis of specific concepts or ideas, but it is neither purely metaphysical nor analytical. Classic examples of normative studies in higher educational thought and practice are Plato's Republic and Cardinal Newman's The Idea of a University (1948); famous 20th century examples include A. N. Whitehead's Aims of Education (1929), R. M. Hutchin's The Higher Learning in America (1936), and Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University (1972). Though obviously not as sweeping in its scope, this thesis also provides, on rational and logical grounds, a developed set of educational objectives in the realm of moral development and reasoning. Such an approach is forthrightly value-oriented; however, it is not entirely subjective or fanciful. The value orientation of this thesis

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7 More specific pedagogical examples are provided in chapter 3 in the overview of normative ethics as a model for moral education.
is guided by: an awareness of the major findings in the social sciences and educational research about moral development and education; an understanding of the history of liberal education and moral education; and, practical use of conceptual analysis of educational terminology. The normative method is grounded in the belief that clear reasoning can provide not only linguistic analysis of educational aims but also considerable guidance in the formulation and selection of those aims.

Working Assumptions and Other Limitations As noted previously, there have been educators and philosophers who have made rather sweeping, grandiose claims in behalf of a particular educational approach to promoting the development of the student. The limitations of this study are clearly stated at this point in order to: de-emphasize any sense that extraordinary, far-reaching claims are being proposed; clarify the scope of the study and explain why some controversial issues are left unexamined; and, to provide a more complete sense of the intellectual basis upon which this thesis rests. Perhaps one of the most significant limitations is the focus on moral education within the formal academic program; this thesis is centered around those arguments that link the ideals and philosophy of liberal education with the teaching of moral reasoning, or development, in the curriculum. This somewhat exclusionary focus is not intended to demote extracurricular (or non-curricular) methods and goals for moral development to a secondary or less legitimate status. Indeed, not infrequently, proponents of the liberal arts point to such effective sources of
ethical development and character building as student-teacher interaction, institutional milieu, sports activities, and peer interaction (Astin, 1979; Heath, 1968, 1976; Trow, 1976). Recent social scientific studies clearly point out the very substantial role that informal, extra-curricular events do play in shaping moral development--inside or outside of a college community (Lickona, 1976). In this study the emphasis on the curriculum serves as a cynosure for the unique (and, one hopes, clearly defined) role that more formal academic study can play in the overall moral development of the individual.

The concentration on developing legitimate and meaningful goals and objectives for moral education is another boundary. Although there is an examination of the most important curricular structures and instructional methods (that could logically and practically follow from the selected goals), there is no attempt to analyze an array of pedagogical problems or delve in depth into such specific problems as determining the appropriate academic background for teachers of ethics (or instructors in programs of moral education) in a higher education setting. Or, to provide another example, there is only brief discussion on how a proposed model of moral education might "fit" into an existing curricular structure. Also, since this is a philosophical focus on the identification and analysis of goals, there is no attempt to directly address the frequently raised issue of disparity between espoused ideals and actual practice. For example, the apparently worthy ideal, or objective, of "developing a strong moral imagination" may in actual practice become tainted by an incompetent teacher, poorly motivated students, or inadequate learning materials. However, those
failings are not intrinsically related to the goal itself. Only, then, to the extent that such failings are directly related to the nature of the educational objective will there be extended discussion about actual educational practice.

Clearly, the belief (already addressed in the previous section on methodology) that moral propositions and principles can be rationally understood, that they can be intellectually discussed and tested, is a major assumption. If this were not the case, any attempt at moral education would be illogical. For example, if morality is exclusively thought of as verbalized states of emotion, much like "Ouch! That hurts!" or "Please do that again, it feels very good," then there could be no education in moral reasoning, no introduction to moral knowledge, but only, perhaps, training of the emotions or behaviors equated with these moral pronouncements. A more difficult and more controversial assumption than the epistemological claim that the notion of moral education makes logical sense, is the ethical claim that moral education is not necessarily a form of indoctrination. It is doubtful that anyone could successfully contend that moral education would never, in fact or in principle, lead to indoctrination; indoctrination certainly might be a possibility with such educational objectives as "improved moral reasoning" or "development of a moral imagination," but it is not a logical inevitability. The determination of whether indoctrination has occurred in such a course or program would depend upon an examination of the goals (both formal and tacit), the rationality of the knowledge and skills taught, the instructional methods employed, the actual objectives
of the educator, and the resulting effects on the students. With those points outlined, a brief definition follows: indoctrination occurs when an individual or group attempts to pass on or inculcate a belief, view, or idea without the intended learners exercising their own independent judgment or reasoning ability. Does morality have a specific content that can only be passed on in this uncritical manner? Can it only mean inculcation of values and beliefs? Would teaching morality, rather than teaching "about" it, necessarily lead to indoctrination, not education? In this thesis, it is assumed that the answer to these questions is "no"; it is argued, however, (in chapter 2) that a strong, well-defined notion of liberal education can help us develop clear goals and objectives in moral education, goals which in themselves avoid indoctrination and also help us avoid any tendency to slide into indoctrinating methods. Moral education, then, is not necessarily indoctrinating, but just as it is always possible for economics, for example, to be "drilled in" from one ideological point of view, one must acknowledge that indoctrination could occur in a program or course in moral education. Ironically, the acknowledgement of this possibility can indicate, in itself, a vigilant attitude, a healthy wariness of overly optimistic or ambitious claims. As Ruth Macklin points out, education in morality "neither rules in, in principle, nor rules out, 8

8 See I. A. Snook's Indoctrination and Education (1972), for a sound philosophical analysis of the meaning and identification of indoctrination. Also see, R. S. Peter's Ethics and Education (1970), and Hirst & Peter's The Logic of Education (1970).
in principle, espousal of a particular moral viewpoint" (1980, p. 82).

Is the liberal education of the late adolescent or adult student a viable, important goal? There are those, of course, who contend that liberal education (whatever is exactly meant by that notion) is no longer valid or appropriate; such criticisms are wide ranging; from contentions that the liberal arts are elitist (Cross, 1976; Dewey, 1974) or that the liberal education is inefficient in meeting the needs of a modern technological era (Chelt, 1975; Jantsch, 1969) to more radical critiques of American institutional education as indoctrination or mere socialization (Freire, 1972; Illich, 1971) or higher education as oriented toward the past, rather than helping prepare and build for a better future (Toffler, 1971). In this thesis the adequacy of liberal education as providing worthwhile guidelines is, in part, assumed. There is no attempt to write an extended apologia for the liberal arts and systematically respond to criticisms raised by various educational and philosophical schools of thought. However, the developed description of liberal education in the second chapter will provide a clear understanding of what is meant by the term and the educational goals with which it is intimately connected; this description will, at least indirectly, serve as a response to those who would define liberal education differently and as a defense of the liberal education ideal—if not its practice—across all times and places.

Will the collegiate model of moral education that is presented in this thesis be the only plausible model or absolutely the best model? No, of course not—in this thesis alone, five possible models for
moral education are identified, and there have been others in the past and there will be new and different notions in the future. In this thesis one possible model, one especially appropriate for meeting the ideals and goals of liberal education (as it has historically developed and as it exists today) is identified and defined. It is argued that if one accepts that the broader aims of liberal education are important then this new model for moral education is a particularly powerful way to help achieve some of these goals.

Terminology

From Conceptual Confusion to Clarity  Although an extended analysis of the relevant educational terminology is not provided, a set of clear definitions with examples and references is developed. Semantic clarification is necessary to avoid both ambiguity and unnecessary disagreement, especially when attempting to answer such questions as: Are "ethical development," "moral reasoning," and "values clarification" synonymous? Is there any difference between "ethics" and "morals?" Does a "moral" education simply mean a "good" education? Besides being ambiguous, a number of these concepts carry strong, emotional connotations; often these are negative connotations. For example, the pivotal expression, moral education, itself was selected with some hesitancy because of its all-too-frequent associations with Sunday school propriety, turn-of-the-century character education programs, and anti-
intellectualism in general. Clarity of language from the onset may help one avoid jumping to unwarranted conclusions and, perhaps, undermine some stereotypical notions and popular connotations about moral "development" and instruction in morality.

The important major terms are morals, values and ethics; instruction and curriculum; aims, goals, and objectives; as well as growth and development. These concepts are frequently used throughout this thesis, and they are central to most discussions of moral education. Several other concepts, liberal education, normative ethics, and reason, are also critical to this work, but these are defined, and then discussed, in greater detail elsewhere. For example, liberal education is analyzed in depth in the following chapter. A more precise and detailed notion of the concept emerges by raising, and answering, such questions as: What are the significant historical examples of liberal education? What are its defining features? What are its goals and objectives? What connection does liberal education have with moral development and education? Normative, another potentially confusing concept, literally means establishing, or having to do with, norms or standards. For the philosopher-ethicist, normative implies a movement away from theoretical, meta-

9Sidney Hook's essay "The Barbarism of Virtue" in Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy (1970) is an excellent example of rejecting any form of college-level moral education as being anti-intellectual. Perhaps it is this negative, traditionalist connotation of "moral education" that explains (at least in higher education) why so many contemporary programs and research projects label themselves as either "values-education" or as "ethics-in-education." In short, "values" and "ethics" are acceptable words while "morals" and "morality" are unacceptable.
ethical inquiry toward an actual application of moral reasoning to contemporary problems or situations as well as to the actual norms and standards of society and the individual.\textsuperscript{10} Normative ethical inquiry is a means to criticize irrational moral beliefs and develop rationally justifiable moral principles and aims; while, in this thesis, "normative ethics" refers to the specific model of college-level moral education which stems from the renewed emphasis on applied moral reasoning.

Reason and rationality are to a large extent defined within the framework of the ideals of liberal education and the method of normative inquiry. In this study, rationality refers neither to "Reason" as an ideal metaphysical quality (i.e., Platonistic/Hegelean dialectic) nor to the more modern equation of reason with scientific method and inferential logic.\textsuperscript{11} Rationality embodies at least some norms, and broadly conceived, it is the human activity of systematic intellectual inquiry, a process open to public debate and questioning. Moral reasoning, for example, is systematic and clear thinking about the moral dimension of a situation, an idea, or a person; it involves the give and take of open-ended discussion and inquiry—not unquestioning

\textsuperscript{10}See the following for an historical overview and explanation of normative ethics: Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics (1966), Mary Warnock's Ethics Since 1900 (1960), and Paul Taylor's Normative Discourse (1981).

\textsuperscript{11}Recently, several works have appeared in educational literature that are very critical of our overly-narrow conception of reason. These include Murchland (1976,1979), Hearn (1975), Botstein (1979), Mattfeld (1975), and McDaniel (1976).
reliance on tradition and authority nor an exclusive appeal to personal revelation or mystical explanation.

Morals, Values, Ethics In order to discuss the role of reason in moral discourse, a clearly established notion of morality is also necessary. The terms values, ethics, morals are so commonly used in a pejorative sense that they have developed a positive, evaluative connotation. When someone is told that they are "ethical," "of sound moral character," or "a man of values," we are offering praise. In a stricter philosophical sense, however, these are descriptive terms; "ethical" is not an expression of approbation but rather a means of distinguishing between that which is legal, psychological, social... or ethical. Earlier, it was asked if a "moral" education meant a "good" education? Clearly in this descriptive sense it does not mean a "good" or "worthy" education but rather an education in morality (in some sense). Ethics does not refer to either its popular conception as a general pattern or way of life nor to a set of rules for conduct, or a specific moral code. Rather, ethics is synonymous with moral philosophy: sustained, critical inquiry about the nature of moral beliefs, language, and reasoning. For example, asking, and attempting to answer, such fundamental questions as "What makes an act right or wrong?", "What, if anything, is intrinsically good?", or "What

12 The following is a sampling of texts providing basic definitions of ethics and morals: Ethics by William Frankena (1963); Reason in Ethics by Stephen Toulmin (1950); Generalization in Ethics by Marcus Singer (1961); and A Short History of Ethics by Alasdair MacIntyre (1966).
evidence determines whether a moral judgment is correct?" is an ethical enterprise. However, such questions as "Is extramarital sex always wrong?", "Should abortion be legally permitted?", or "Is active euthanasia morally right?" can also lead to ethical inquiry so long as the inquiry is an open-ended, rational one without dogmatic dependence upon a specific code or set of moral values. This, of course, is another example of applied or normative ethics.

The concept of "values," on the other hand, does not imply an intellectual process but rather refers to the broad domain of all human choice or preference. There are many types of human values: matters of taste ("I prefer colonial style over Victorian") and custom ("It is most appropriate that the mother assume primary responsibility for raising children"); aesthetic values ("The sculptured works of Michelangelo are truly elegant and far surpass those of Rodin"); intellectual contentions ("Behavioristic psychology is both inadequate and dehumanizing"); and, moral values ("It is wrong to take another human's life"). Moral values, then, are a specific type of human value. Wellman succinctly delineates the moral dimension: "The moral sphere encompasses acts that are momentous rather than trivial, that affect others as much or more than the agent, that subject the agent to blame or punishment if he chooses incorrectly, and that are a matter of conscience" (1975, p. xvi). Moral values are guides for significant human action and usually develop into a system for judging and evaluating human actions and goals that are of important consequence. Also, moral prescriptions are usually considered to be universal statements, prescriptions that lose their impact and meaning if they are frequently
or radically altered to match circumstances. In this sense moral values become moral principles and are far more similar to laws than to matters of taste or custom.

A final important distinction needs to be made between substantive moral values and the various loose synonyms for the process of moral reasoning. Substantive moral values are the specific values one happens to profess, such as "I believe that abortion is wrong" or "I think that colleges should teach young people to be community minded." That is the "content" to values, but frequent mention is also made of the processes of "ethical inquiry," "moral reasoning," and, at least in one section, of "valuing" and "clarifying values." Just as there are wide variations in what people profess as moral values, there exists diversity in the way individuals choose to go about making moral decisions and judgments. In this thesis, there is a minimal focus on the substantive moral values of the individual or group; rather the analyzed models of college-level moral education are those that are (with a partial demur on the humanities model) primarily concerned with establishing and teaching some process of selecting, analyzing and evaluating moral values, moral character, or both.

A concise review of the preceding paragraphs follows: Ethics has been defined as formal, rational inquiry into the nature and meaning of moral values and language; the moral domain is smaller than, and encompassed by, the broad realm of human values. This thesis is concerned with analyzing various models of moral education that are proposing education in a moral process -- in some sense -- and not an alteration of specific, substantive moral values. Yet, such terms and
phrases as morality, moral reasoning, moralizing, valuing, and ethical
development will in all likelihood never be entirely free from con-
fusion and ambiguity. The complexity, depth and prolongation of phil-
osophical debate over this terminology are indication enough of the
apparent futility of providing absolute definitions. Nevertheless,
the discussion now proceeds into the issues of moral education equipped
with at least reasonable and clear definitions of these three central
concepts.

Instruction and Curriculum  As noted earlier, in this study the
examined models of moral education are those which offer instruction in
morality (or values clarification or ethical development, depending on
the models' emphases and terminology) within the curriculum. But what
is the curriculum? And what is it to offer instruction? Curriculum
is the structured educational experience with articulate goals and
logically connected means to implement those goals. The curriculum
can be crucial to the educational process, yet it is important to
remember that it is not synonymous with education. Even when education
is taking place in a college setting, there remain numerous potential
sources of learning; these are typically referred to as either the
extra-curriculum or the hidden curriculum, or both. Different institu-
tions lay varying degrees of emphasis on the non-curricular aspects of
college education, depending upon their traditions, size, faculty, and
student profiles, and educational philosophy. Yet the one component
that remains common to all is the curriculum. Participation in curricu-
lar activities (typically courses) is required, and even those colleges
or universities which have no specific distribution or course requirements still require that all students "pass through" their curricular structure—whatever form it may take.\(^{13}\)

Paul Hirst defines the curriculum as "a plan of activities aimed at achieving objectives . . . involving two other elements, a content to be used and methods to be employed to bring about learning" (1974, p. 3). R.S. Peters refers to the curriculum as presenting a "range of activities that are thought to be worth passing on" (1966, p. 144) and makes a "case for curriculum activities" as illuminating many areas of life and contributing to the quality of living. In a definition that borders with the notion of an intellectual discipline, Peters writes about curriculum activities as having "a wide-ranging cognitive content"—in contrast to the teaching of games, skills, or techniques (1966, p. 159). The curriculum, then, is the embodiment of the most systematic attempts to translate worthwhile educational objectives and ways of learning into concrete educational programs. This definition leaves open the possibilities for an integrative curriculum or a curriculum that is oriented around problem-solving or student development; in other words, curriculum need not be solely equated with the traditional disciplinary approach. Yet such a definition also raises questions: When the subject of moral education is introduced, should it be a special program taught by specially trained teachers or should it be integrated into the existing curriculum in some creative,

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\(^{13}\)Harvard University at the turn of the century and New College of the University of Alabama in 1985 are examples of educational institutions with no curricular requirements other than completing a prescribed number of credits or hours.
functional manner? Should moral education be part of a problem-solving curriculum or be regarded as another discipline with a body of knowledge all its own? Once again, such discussion quickly leads to areas outside the purview of this thesis; however, some speculation and analysis on the actual curricular structures and placement into an existing curriculum takes place in the final chapter.

Presumably, the major activities within the curriculum are instruction (or teaching) and learning. What are these activities? Effective instruction has been defined as the "ability to bring about desirable modifications in the abilities and perceptions of the learner" (Popham & Baker, 1970, p. 10). A "goal-referenced instructional model" places primary emphasis on the desired learner outcomes; in this context, a teacher does not ask, "What shall I do?" but rather "What do I want my students to learn?" To teach means specifying objectives, designing and implementing activities which will bring about those objectives, and evaluating or measuring students' attainment of the objectives. Effective teaching means that students learn the desired educational objectives.

Hirst and Peters have pointed out that there is neither a logical nor necessary connection between instruction (or teaching) and education: "education might go on without intentional planning with objectives and learning activities" (1970, pp. 76-78). Also, it certainly is possible for teaching to occur but for no learning to occur. Thus, one tends to refer to effective teaching to emphasize that the desired objectives have been learned. The whole point in creating educational institutions and designing curriculums is that there is a teacher
whose function it is to bring about learning in the best possible way" (Hirst & Peters, 1970, p. 78). Of course, once attempts are made to give specific examples of "teaching morality" or "offering instruction in morality," then this enters upon the major theme of this thesis. Each model of moral education develops a different theory of what it is to teach morality. In all of the models, however, there is a clear recognition that teaching is intentional and goal-directed and moves the student well beyond growth shaped only by disparate unorganized environmental factors, "natural" maturation, or both. Also, in each model there is either a tacit or direct belief that teaching "about" morality is an inadequate notion, that there is a stronger sense of teaching. For example, if one were to teach "about" morality, then moral phenomena might be studied from a psychological, sociological, anthropological, or many other disciplinary points of view, but there would be no sense whatsoever of developing a commitment to norms, of bridging the gap between character, facts and values, of recognizing a moral dimension in its own right. In part, the extent to and manner in which each model of moral education attempts to connect these elements and define "teaching morality" serves to differentiate between them.

Aims, Goals, and Objectives What is an educational goal? What purpose does it serve? Does an aim such as "(to) create free-thinking, autonomous individuals" really have any impact or meaning? Is there any difference between aims, goals, and objectives? Since it is primarily educational goals and objectives that are analyzed, evaluated, and de-
developed in this thesis, again conceptual precision and clarity are necessary. Statements of educational goals and aims have at least three central purposes: they can be used as slogans, or inspirational statements, intended to elicit public support and enthusiasm; as guides to the educational process; and as tests to be applied to the actual educational outcomes (Broudy, 1970, pp. 3-21). For example, A. N. Whitehead eloquently claims that wisdom is the ultimate aim of education: "the details of knowledge which are important will be picked up ad hoc in each avocation of life, but the habit of active utilization of well-understood principles is the final possession of wisdom" (1929, p. 93). Whitehead's writings can inspire support and enthusiasm; however, when he defines wisdom as the ability to handle knowledge, to select facts for the determination of relevant issues, and to employ knowledge in such a way as to "add value to our immediate experience," then his aim also becomes a guide for determining educational practices and, with further extrapolation, could be transformed into specific tests of educational outcomes.

There is also a need to clearly distinguish between such sweeping grand aims or purposes of the educational enterprise as "creating people with wisdom," from the more specific goals of a college curriculum, as well as from the very detailed, focused objectives of a particular course or program. Grand aims are broad, long-term, and defy characterization with specific behavioral outcomes or mental tracts. "To create ethical men and women" is a simple example of an educational aim in the moral domain. Educational goals, on the other hand, are less sweeping, more concrete; they may be realistically achieved in the near future
(in a four-year college, for example) and through formal instruction. For example, "the student will develop strong analytic skills in moral reasoning" might be a goal of moral education. Objectives are at the most immediate and specific level. Objectives are often closely correlated with actual outcomes, outcomes that can be tested and measured in some manner: "The student will be able to distinguish factual statements" or "the student will be able to define and logically apply four different styles of moral reasoning." The lines between aims, goals, and objectives are not definitively drawn; rather, it is a gradual progression from the "inspirational" statement of purposes (often found at the beginning of college catalogues in a less-than-inspirational form) to the more precise, and highly pragmatic, objectives of everyday instruction and learning. In general, the discussion on liberal education (in chapter 2) dwells upon aims and concludes with a set of specific goals of liberal education. In the final three chapters, the emphasis is on the goals and objectives of various models of moral education.

Oftentimes, grandiose aims and purposes are seen as non controversial by their very nature (many would not object to the "creation of ethical men and women"). Yet, when such aims are interpreted and as they become translated into goals and specific objectives, the possibilities of conflict and disagreement rise accordingly. This analysis, then, risks leaving the high level of purposes and aims in the effort to construct meaningful, substantive goals in moral education that may serve not only as colorful, inspirational statements but also as guides to the establishment of appropriate pedagogical methods.
and content, and in some instances as tests to be applied to actual human outcomes.

**Development and Growth** Are "development" and "growth" goals or educational aims? Are they synonymous terms indicating a process toward some calculated, or natural, end? These, too, are words that are used in a loose colloquial sense and in a more technical manner. Up to this point, moral development and growth have been loosely used, referring in a broad, inclusive sense to all forms of progressive, forward movement in the moral dimension of the individual: social, intellectual, psychological, spiritual, emotional.

In *Democracy and Education* (1967) John Dewey places a strong emphasis on growth (development is used synonymously) as an end itself—indeed, as the crucial aim of education. Growth, as defined by Dewey, is the "cumulative movement of action toward a later result" and a move away from immaturity, rigidity of habits, and "static adjustment to a fixed environment." For Dewey, "Life is growth" and education is the enterprise which supplies the conditions which insure growth (1967, p. 128). There are many, however, who distinguish between growth and development and are not entirely comfortable with the notion of growth-as-process being the education goal. They contend that individuals must be directed in their growth toward some worthwhile aims. In other words, growth must be toward an ideal. Although there is no direct

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14 For examples, see the works of R. S. Peters, R. Barrow, P. Hirst, I. Scheffler, and H. S. Broudy, to provide a representative sampling.
attempt to deal with this issue, it has already been contended that there is a strong need for educational aims and goals.

Growth and development, strictly speaking, are not synonymous. Growth implies the progressive enlargement of a physical organ or mental function, while development is marked by the appearance of qualitatively new functions or powers (Horne, 1932, p. 49). Also, development is typically associated with internal change, growth with external stimulus and response. Moreover, "development" now is sometimes associated with "developmental psychology," a particular approach to understanding human behavior and thought. For functional purposes, the term "development" is used in this thesis to refer to the overall range of goals that can be achieved through moral education. Human development comes about through at least some planned effort, some overt goals, and it involves internal, more-often-than-not, conscious change. Growth, on the other hand, retains its more gradual and naturalistic connotations. In summary, moral development, but not overall moral growth, is a realistic educational aim; moral development is an all-encompassing phrase for many of the worthwhile aims and goals of moral education.
Chapter 2: Liberal Education

Liberal Education: Its Purposes & Aims

Introduction In this chapter an extended definition of liberal education is developed from a variety of sources (classical roots as well as contemporary statements of practices and aims), and then it is argued that the liberal education tradition offers a powerful, normative vision of higher education. In the search for a post-secondary model of moral education that has clear, meaningful, and ethical goals and objectives, an analysis of the ideals and practices of liberal education should be the first step. Liberal education is an ideal that incorporates moral development as a central feature; moreover, it is an historically rich concept that reveals connections between the humanities, the development of reason, and moral education. Thus, liberal education can lend a direction and content to moral education that emphasizes the role of intellect in morality and yet moves beyond a "valueless," neutral skills approach. More specifically, the philosophy and goals of liberal education are used as the central measure for evaluating various models of moral education. There are, then four objectives in this chapter: first, liberal education is historically reviewed and analyzed, identifying ethical or moral development as a central feature; second, historical links between the aim of ethical development, the ideal of liberal education, and goals centered on reason and rationality are examined; third, liberal education is defended as an important educational concept in its own right; and
fourth, specific goals for liberal education are set forth, thus providing a standard for the selection of an appropriate model of moral education.

Classical Roots

The liberal arts were conceived by that name in the first century B.C. by the Roman scholar, Varro (116 - 27 B.C.) in his *Disciplinarum libri novum*; four hundred years later the liberal arts were divided into the quadrivium (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music) and the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) by an Italian lawyer and rhetorician, Martianus Cappella (c. 424)¹. Cappella's book, *De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii et de Septem Artius Liberalibus Novem*, drew heavily from Varro's encyclopedic work, and it essentially set the tone for higher education in the medieval age (Boyd & King, 1900, p. 94; Schachner, 1962, pp. 13-14). During that harsh age the aims of education were severely restricted: subject to scriptural sanction, confined to the trivium as methods of inquiry, and limited to preserving old knowledge. How could it be otherwise? A far clearer vision of the liberal arts ideal emerges through examination of Greek theory as well as of the educational thought of the Renaissance.

The Greeks closely linked knowledge, reason, and moral behavior (Drew, 1978; Jaeger, 1939; Mumford, 1979; Murchland, 1976). The fundamental aim of education was aretē, to live one's life with excellence.

¹In this historical review the roots of liberal education are identified with the liberal arts. More generally, the term "liberal education" is used in this thesis since it has a broader connotation than "liberal arts"—which sometimes is narrowly defined as a set of specific disciplines.
Moreover, education for areté was a moral activity; it was not moral in a narrow sense but rather in the belief that education was vital, that ideas and principles were crucial, demanding free choice and personal commitment. Intellectual and moral growth went hand-in-hand and could come about only through willingness to bear grave risks. Indeed, it is the ancient Greeks who are most frequently cited as having integrated education with personal growth and with the culture at large as one united ethical enterprise (Drew, 1978; Jaeger, 1939; Mumford, 1979; Murchland, 1976). Such a conception of liberal education is, of course, far removed from those who have criticized the tradition as being elitist by definition (that is, for the "free man" only) or as overly pedantic, concerned only with learning or reason as ends in themselves. Perhaps the current appeal in embracing the broad civic values of ancient Greek education partially lies in the avoidance of promoting any specific religious traditions and mores. The Greeks' secular notions of ethical duty and knowing fit far more comfortably with much of contemporary American higher education—pluralistic in terms of student make-up and social values.

What major goals of Greek education were subsumed under this quest to live one's life well? The goals of education in classical

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2It is surprising how often liberal education has been condemned because at one time its meaning partially lay in the historical practice that it was only for free men, citizens, and not for slaves. As has been illustrated, however, much broader implications exist, and, logically, there is no reason why liberal education should not be accessible to all men and women of all races. Indeed, to some extent this has occurred in post-World War II, United States.
Greece evolved from the ideal of man as a mentally courageous and physically-fit warrior to the responsible citizen immersed in civic affairs and artistic endeavors, to that of the reflective individual engaged in eudaimonia (Jaeger, 1939, p. 6). Eudaimonia, as conceived by Aristotle, was the highest and most uniquely human form of thinking, the most noble use of leisure. This practice of contemplative reasoning did not supplant other goals, but rather illuminated their role and significance in a broader context. Lewis Mumford perhaps expresses this view most effectively for our own times:

In fact, without leisure, our expansion in industry would be almost meaningless, for we need a plentitude of time if we are to select and assimilate all the genuine goods that modern man now commands. Schola means leisure; and leisure makes possible the school. The promise of a life economy is to provide schooling for the fullest kind of human growth—-not the further expansion of the machine. (1979, p. 456)

The classical notion of the rational man is an illuminating one and has been frequently cited in the current re-examination of the undergraduate curriculum and the goals of liberal education. The Greeks thought of reason and intellect in the broadest terms—well beyond the narrow equations of reason with scientific method, pure, abstract theory or value neutrality.

The classical conception of rationality has been stripped and impoverished for rationality included for Aristotle not only the pure and applied
sciences, but the practical sciences of politics, ethics, and education which deal with the principles by which we should order our personal and collective life, and the productive sciences in which rationality is exhibited in the effort to make things which serve our needs or express our sense of the beautiful. (Hearn, 1975, p. 7)

Clearly, to "improve reasoning" was a crucial goal of Greek education, one which included moral growth. In our own times, specific curricular objectives regarding morality do occasionally focus on the development of "better" people, more moral, virtuous, or responsible. Typically, however, if the moral or ethical dimensions of growth are mentioned at all, they are relegated to the emotional sphere, with the implication that they are void of content or rationality (Bowen, 1977; Chickering, 1976). How very different this is from the Greek emphasis on rational morality: empowering individuals to determine and clarify human needs and values. In this sense, the liberal education of antiquity was "a perfective process, a shaping of human sensibility toward desirable and rationally justified patterns of action. It was . . . an ethical enterprise" (Murchland, 1976, p. 22).

During the Renaissance, the rebirth of classical knowledge and education, the tight grip of the Church was loosened and a more equitable balance between Christian precepts and secular learning emerged.

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3Bob Jones University, South Carolina; Oral Roberts University, Oklahoma; and Mahareshi International University, Iowa, are examples.
Pietro Paolo Vergerio's (1344-1420) treatise, "On the Manners of a Gentleman and on Liberal Studies," was an early influential work which helped bring about these changes. Vergerio insisted on the value of an all-round education, the primacy of morality over theoretical learning, and the need to stretch the liberal arts to include literature, history, and "knowledge of nature" (in Boyd & King, 1980, pp. 163-164).

In a similar vein, the scholar and educator, Erasmus, argued that:

the first and most important part of education is that the youthful mind may receive the seeds of piety; next, that it may love and thoroughly learn the liberal studies; third, that it may be prepared for the duties of life; and fourth, that it may from the earliest days be accustomed to the rudiments of good manners. (in Boyd & King, 1980, p. 175)

In the 16th century Montaigne, an equally eminent Renaissance intellectual, de-emphasized scholarly learning as an end in itself or as a means to a higher profession as he sought to stress wisdom over the conduct of our lives as a primary educational mission (in Boyd & King, 1980, p. 225). Because of these and other educators and educational theorists of the time, the liberal arts were transformed from a narrow epistemic construct, allowing merely for survival of knowledge, back into a dynamic cultural ideal. Intellectual and cognitive skills were stressed; however, aims and goals that involved the enhancement of the individual in a larger personal sense took precedence. More recent conceptions of the liberal arts also reflect the values and mores of their times and culture, but they, too, usually assert the broad
classical Greek aims of living one's life well, of knowledge of humanity through self-knowledge.

Modern Conceptions. What are the more modern pronouncements on liberal education that have moved beyond definition to give the concept a unique vitality and existential force? Among the exemplars are Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University (1959), the Yale Report of 1828, and John Stuart Mill's educational theory. They, in turn, have generated such recent descendants as Hutchins' The Higher Learning in America (1936), the Harvard "Redbook," formally entitled General Education in a Free Society (1945), and Whitehead's essays on education. Clearly there are a significant number of other educational philosophers and documents that could be as readily cited, yet those listed here are referred to most frequently in the ongoing attempt to both define and defend the liberal arts ideal. Moreover, they follow closely on those elements of the classical tradition most crucial to liberal education.

Cardinal J. H. Newman (1801-1890) and Robert M. Hutchins (1899-1977) are often linked together in their similar emphasis on the training of rational faculties, the acquisition of universal truths, and the fundamentally-common characteristics of all human beings. Essentially, in this characterization, it is "Reason" itself which serves as the common denominator uniting all humans across time and place. Newman's ideal education primarily emphasizes the training of reason and the "apprehension of the great outlines of knowledge," as acquired through immersion in a "community of scholars." He believes that:
the truly great intellect is one which takes a
connected view of the old and the new, past and
present, far and near, and which has an insight
into the influence of all these on one another
without which there is no whole, no center. The
truly great intellects possess knowledge, not
only of things, but also of their mutual rela-
tions.(1959, p. 143)

Cardinal Newman closely links the rational and moral aims of educa-
tion; the important consequence of a liberal education is to become
a gentleman—to possess "a cultivated intellect, a delicate taste,
a candid, equitable, dispassionate mind, a noble and courteous bear-
ing in the conduct of life" (1959, p. 144). Intellect and knowledge,
in their highest, most abstract form, become almost synonymous with
moral worthiness:

If then intellect is so excellent a portion of us,
and its cultivation so excellent, it is not only
beautiful, perfect, admirable, and noble in itself,
but in a true and high sense it must be useful to
the possessor and to all around him; not useful in
any low, mechanical, mercantile sense, but as dif-
fusing good, or as a blessing, a gift, or power, or
a treasure, first to the owner, then through him
to the world.(1959, p. 145)

In a similar vein, Robert Hutchins claimed that the mission of the
university is "the pursuit of truth for its own sake" (1936, p. 33); in
his lifetime, he vehemently critiqued higher education as being far too utilitarian, professional, and specialized. He proposed a liberal arts curriculum which would utilize the great classic works and emphasize "the arts of reading, writing, thinking and speaking together with mathematics, the best example of the process of human reason" (1967, p. 85). Hutchins was aghast at both the smorgasboard variety of an elective curricular system and the increasing distance between highly specialized instructors and their respective disciplines. His proposals for change center on the development of a required curriculum emphasizing our common human nature, the great thought of the past, and the acquisition of a "common stock of ideas and common methods of dealing with them" (1967, p. 85). St. John's College of Annapolis, Maryland is pointed to as the single example of a contemporary American institution that operates exclusively on such principles.\(^4\) Newman and Hutchins are both cited favorably for their powerful visions of liberal education as providing a common focus for all persons through the training of reason, free from the constraints of such potentially narrow or rigid notions as "societal relevancy," "vocational preparedness," or "academic specialization." On the other hand, these two and those who think similarly are frequently criticized (directly or indirectly) for their authoritarianism, elitism, lack of contemporary relevance, overemphasis on reason, and neglect of individual differences (Cross, 1976; Dewey, 1967, 1975; Freire,

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\(^4\)In 1964 St. John's opened a new college operated on the same curricular basis in Sante Fe, New Mexico.
The Yale Report and the Harvard "Redbook" are somewhat less controversial than the educational philosophy of Newman and Hutchins, but certainly cited no less frequently by both proponents and detractors of liberal education in the United States. Each of these college curriculum reports portrays a basic view of knowledge and learning as static and universal. The emphasis lies on an essential or prescribed body of knowledge usually dealing with our Western civilization heritage. The curriculum is organized by discipline, the pedagogy is centered on the authoritative dissemination of knowledge, and there is an implicit view that learning is difficult work; thus, mental discipline is a key ingredient. To quote the Yale Report:

The two great points to be gained in intellectual culture, are the discipline and the furniture of the mind; expanding its powers, and storing with knowledge. . . . Those branches of study should be prescribed, and those modes of instruction adopted, which are best calculated to teach the art of fixing the attention, directing the train of thought, analyzing a subject proposed for investigation. . . . The habits of thinking are to be formed by long continued and close application. (in Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 278)

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5 See Levine (1978, p. 8) for his characterization of this position which he labels "essentialism."
The report claims that a proper symmetry and balance of character is a fundamental goal of a liberal education:

The great object of a collegiate education, preparatory to the study of a profession, is to give that expansion and balance of the mental powers, those liberal and comprehensive views, and those fine proportions of character, which are not to be found in him whose ideas are always confined to one particular channel. (in Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 282)

Also stressed are the practice of “in loco parentis”\(^6\) and the classroom methods of recitation and lecture; most significantly, Yale faculty maintained that it is classical literature and learning that should form the substantive foundation of the liberal arts curriculum:

[Classical learning] may be defended not only as a necessary branch of education, in the present state of the world, but on the ground of its distinct and independent merits. Familiarity with the Greek and Roman writers is especially adapted to form the taste, and to discipline the mind, both in thought and diction, to the relish of what is elevated, chaste, and simple. (in Hofstadter & Smith, 1961, p. 289)

\(^6\)The college shall serve as an on-location parent as long as the adolescent resides on campus.
If the Yale Report of 1828 is to be considered a vigorous attempt at holding back the encroaching methodologies and disciplines of the natural sciences, academic specialization, elective freedom, and student responsibility, the Harvard report on general education is a systematic attempt to preserve and integrate the ideals of liberal education in an academic setting where all the aforementioned are accomplished fact. In actual practice the curricular proposals of the Harvard "Redbook" of 1945 were successively watered down, and by 1971 the general education curricular structure and requirements resembled the Harvard curriculum of the early 1940's; nevertheless, the report was influential and served as a ready-made rationale for reinvigorating liberal or general education programs across the country. Although the Harvard committee shied away from the elitist label of "liberal education," the report reads: "the task of modern democracy is to preserve the ancient ideal of liberal education and to extend it as far as possible to all the members of the community" (in Levine, 1978, p. 604). In the report the need for some element of unity in education in the face of both curricular and societal fragmentation and diversity is stressed, and a strong appeal is made to our sense of heritage. However, the "Redbook" is written with acknowledgement, and at least some acceptance, of the truths and methods of science, of John Dewey and the progressive tradition, and with a recognition of the need for specialization in modern industrial society. Occasionally, it moves beyond its usual stance (that is, an apologia to study common heritage) and offers an understanding of liberal education as developing the broad critical sense necessary
for dealing with specialization and specialists outside one's chosen area. In this view, liberal education is to be distinguished from special education, not by subject matter, but in terms of method and outlook, no matter what the field. . . . Specialism is interchangeable, not with natural science, but with the method of science, the method which abstracts material from its context and handles it in complete isolation. (in Levine, 1978, p. 606)

The implication, then, is clear: A student engaged in a liberal education does examine context and the general relationships of ideas and circumstances, the concrete as well as the abstract. Yet, in the report it is also argued that there are "truths which none can be free to ignore, if one is to have that wisdom through which life can be useful. These are the truths concerning the structure of the good life and concerning the factual conditions by which it may be achieved, truths comprising the goals of a free society" (in Levine, 1978, p. 607). This tension between emphasizing what essentially amounts to the "process" goals of liberal education with "substantive" or "content" goals is resolved neither in the report nor in our current mission statements and curricular practices. In other words, should our most significant educational aims and goals be identifiable, intellectual skills, or instead understanding or specific principles and areas of knowledge? Whatever the case, the characterization of either the Yale Report or the Harvard "Redbook" as educational
philosophies fixated solely on content—the "furniture" of classical literature and the unifying study of our Western heritage—is a false one. Both visions of liberal education also specify the particularly unique role played in developing skills in reasoning across a wide range of disciplines and life experiences generally.

In the late 19th century, John Stuart Mill, who viewed himself and his utilitarian philosophy as eminently practical, contended that the "whole person" should be educated. He would have been very pleased with the Harvard "Redbook's" emphasis on integration of intellectual skills. Mill writes,

> Universities are not intended to teach knowledge required to fit man for some special mode of making their livelihood. Their object is not to make skillful lawyers, or physicians, or engineers, but capable and cultivated human beings. . . . Men are men before they are lawyers, or physicians. . . . and if you make them capable and sensible men, they will make themselves capable and sensible lawyers or physicians. What professional men should carry with them from a University is not professional knowledge, but that which should direct the use of their professional knowledge, and bring the light of general culture to illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit. (in Bowen, 1977, pp. 40-41)

With such phrases as the "light of general culture," the "apprehending of principles" and "illuminate the technicalities of a special pursuit,"
Mill provides a colorful, imaginative vocabulary for the advocates of a liberal arts education. Although he believes in the importance of educating the whole man, John Stuart Mill places primary emphasis on educating the intellect in the most general types of foundational theories and concepts, an education that would provide intellectual and moral direction.

In a similar vein, Alfred North Whitehead refers to undergraduate studies as "the great period of generalizations" (1957, p. 25); he contends that:

The function of a University is to enable you to shed details in favor of principles . . . A principle which has thoroughly soaked into you is rather a mental habit than a formal statement. It becomes the way the mind reacts to the appropriate stimulus in the form of illustrative circumstances. (1957, p. 26)

Although a mathematician and philosopher by training, Whitehead is one of the first 20th century educators to stress the integration of individual development with educational practice and theory. In his theory of rhythms, he identifies "romance," "precision," and "generalization" as three basic developmental periods. Each stage has

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Contemporary educational and psychological research and literature is replete with developmental schemes—usually elaborated in far greater detail and sometimes incompatible with Whitehead's general proposition. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that these empirically-based schemes were preceded by the astute observations and ethical reasoning of a philosopher-mathematician turned educational theorist.
implcations for design of curriculum and pedagogical methodology; for example, the stage of romance is a time of intellectual exploration and dreaming, when a student initially examines ideas and relationships. Although Whitehead views these stages as cyclical, he contends that from birth to age 13 or 14 life is basically a period of romance; while for the traditional college-aged student, 18 to 22 years of age, it is a period of generalization. This concern for the individual and attempt to connect individual developmental stages of growth with appropriate curricular structures and strategies has been most enthusiastically advocated by those involved in the teaching of liberal education. Whitehead felt that the scientific, technical, and professional curricular areas have been so concerned with mastery of both substantive and procedural material that any focus on the individual actually acquiring and using the information has been near-absent. However, Whitehead does not denigrate factual knowledge; rather, his claim is that "Education is the acquisition of the art of the utilization of knowledge" (1957, p. 4) and that a true and vital education studies "life in all its manifestations" (1957, p. 7). He emphasizes zest for living, the adventure of life, and the development of imaginative and creative powers.

Obviously, Whitehead presents a vision of undergraduate education that is somewhat different from the aforementioned thinkers. He cautions that the training of reason is not the ultimate function of
colleges and universities. He does not claim that there is one particular body of knowledge or disciplinary method with which all should be familiar. Whitehead argues that there should be no serious breach between technical and liberal studies, between general and specialized education:

There is not one course of study which merely gives special knowledge. The subjects pursued for the sake of general education are special subjects specially studied; and, on the other hand, one of the ways of encouraging mental activity is to foster a special devotion. You may not divide the 'seamless coat of learning'. (1957, p. 11)

Also, although he was critical of attempts to maintain a stylized, ancient form of the liberal arts, Whitehead did not favor such approaches as technical training, life-skills development, experiential learning, or scientific studies as alternatives to a liberal education focused on general principles and on imaginative and critical reasoning. Rather, his is a case "to weld together imagination and experience"; for Whitehead, a college must allow for the imaginative consideration of knowledge, investing each particular fact with innumerable possibilities and a broad context. The imagination "enables man to construct an intellectual vision of a new world, and it preserves

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A careful reading of all these educational philosophies would, however, show that although each heavily emphasizes the development of reason, none claims that it is the ultimate aim of education.
the zest of life by the suggestion of satisfying purposes" (1957, p. 93).

With his emphasis on intellectual and ethical vision, the shortcoming of a narrowly technical education, and the need to understand details and facts in the light of principles and theories, Whitehead is well within the liberal studies tradition. In his focus on the rhythms of learning, the crucial role of imagination, and the linking together of theory and practice, the abstract and the concrete, Whitehead brings significant new emphases to liberal education. In a sense, Whitehead's philosophy introduces progressive, Dewey-like concepts to the liberal arts ideal and practice and helps set the tone for the contemporary standards for liberal education.

A Contemporary Overview "The Carnegie Council defined it [general or liberal education] as education rooted in the concerns of civilization and our common heritage, and others define it even more broadly to include any form of education that liberates students in body, mind, or soul" (Levine, 1978, p. 4). Such broad definitions are not unusual; they allow for much overlap between those goals that we have selected--or have historically developed--as appropriate for the higher education in its entirety with those more explicitly linked with the undergraduate curriculum. In Investment in Learning Howard Bowen cautions us that, "The catalogue has a utopian quality about it. It appears to be a compendium of all possible human virtues and hopes" (1977, p. 54). Indeed, as one surveys this comprehensive listing of the espoused goals of higher education, the entire affair assumes a
disturbingly quixotic flavor. Bowen discriminates between societal and individual outcomes, and then divides individual goals into three categories: cognitive learning, emotional and moral development, and practical competence. Unfortunately, little attempt has been made to link these goals with the components of higher education (curriculum, institutional environment, peer interaction, and faculty-student interaction) which may be most likely or responsible for bringing them about.

Undoubtedly the goals encompassed by "cognitive learning" have been most carefully articulated and pedagogically implemented in the liberal arts curriculum. The objectives centered on verbal and quantitative skills, substantive areas of knowledge, reasoning skills, intellectual integrity and freedom have been dealt with far more conscientiously and adeptly than such goals as psychological well-being, personal self-discovery, moral sensitivity and values awareness or humane outlook. Even these latter, so-called "affective" goals, however, have been far more readily embraced by the contemporary proponents and designers of liberal education curricula than such utilitarian, applied aims as good citizenship, economic productivity, consumer awareness, fruitful leisure, or sound family life. The spokesmen of liberal education have disregarded the use of pragmatic ends as specified educational objectives and, instead, tended to view them as possible or even probable outcomes of the primary cognitive and affective aims. Paul Hirst succinctly summarizes this analysis in his rejection of a vocational or an exclusively scientific education, or any specialized form of education. He contends that:
liberal education is concerned with the comprehensive development of the mind in acquiring knowledge, it is aimed at achieving an understanding of experience in many different ways. This means the acquisition by critical training and discipline not only of facts but also of complex conceptual schemes and of the arts and techniques of different types of reasoning and judgment. (Hirst, 1974, p. 47)

Wegener also emphasizes this notion of liberal education as centrally concerned with intellect and intellectual processes:

we seek in a liberal curriculum only the institutionalizations of those intellectual circumstances under which it is maximally probable that the reflective moment of intellectual activity will serve the purpose of permanently transforming the relationship of an individual mind to the intellectual world so that persons may become freely functioning participants in intellectual activity and autonomous members of the intellectual community. A liberal curriculum is at best the initiation in a process, a development, not the achievement of the end to which it is directed. (1978, p. 126)

Despite this focus on intellect at a more removed, philosophical distance, the actual mission statements for contemporary American
undergraduate education have espoused (more often than not) the development of the whole person. In reference to this most ambitious of aims—developing intellectual and practical competence, moral and esthetic dispositions, emotional and social skills and attitudes—in short, the total person—Bowen contends, "No theme runs more consistently through the goal literature" (1977, p. 33). Nevertheless, the primary goals of liberal education as manifested in the curriculum have rarely included physical or affective development. A more specific assessment of curricular goals in today's liberal arts colleges (as presented in college catalogues) is provided in a study by Derek Bok (1974, pp. 159-172). He identifies five very basic goals which keep recurring with varying phraseologies and emphases: acquiring information and knowledge, acquiring skills and mental habits of thought, developing qualities of mind, acquiring understanding and competence in the arts, and developing judgment and values. Obviously, there remains ample room for interpretation (and ambiguity) with each of these goals. For example, what type of knowledge is the most important to acquire: humanities or sciences, specialized or general? What are worthy qualities of mind: open-mindedness, respect for facts, tolerance of ambiguity, capacity for commitment? On the goal of developing judgment and values, Bok writes,

We are all aware that few important decisions in life can be made by logic or reason alone. . . .

There is continuing debate, however, about the need to make a more deliberate attempt to deal with certain areas of value and choice.(1974, pp. 167-168)
The final three goals in particular serve to distinguish liberal education from other forms of education as well as from undergraduate programs that follow from specific political or religious tenets.\(^9\) They fall into the liberal tradition of A. N. Whitehead, the Yale Report, Cardinal Newman, and the Greek emphasis on areté. William Bennett, the recently appointed head of the federal Department of Education, argues that

the descriptions of liberal education have
stressed the intellectual or cognitive skills
to be important. Enhancement of the individual
in some personal sense, larger or at least other
than cognitive, forms the remaining area of family
resemblance prominent in sketches of liberal edu-
cation. At stake here is the exposure of the
individual to the problematics of human existence

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\(^9\) As noted in the first chapter, this is a problematic point in itself. When attempting to indicate in fact those colleges which are immersed in a specific political or religious system of beliefs and social structures—and, thus, undercutting the essential nature of liberal education—conflicts and varied interpretations inevitably arise. In principle, however, most would agree that a truly liberal education could occur only in a setting where academic study and research is subject to neither religious nor political dogma. R. S. Peters mentions this aspect of liberal education: "those who agitate about education being 'liberal' are often protesting against the illiberal tendency to constrain people's beliefs along narrowly conceived or doctrinaire lines, thus emphasizing procedural principles to do with liberty" (1966, p. 411).
and the requirement that he grapple in some fashion with the meaning of the human experience and thereby with the significance of his own life. (1977, p. 69)

It now may seem as though the notion of a liberal education has been stretched to an unrecognizable shape; however, even a brief comparison with alternate philosophies of higher education proves otherwise. For example, the visions of Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929) and Abraham Flexner (1866-1959) project a strict research orientation with increased academic specialization. They, too, wished to eradicate professionalism and narrowly utilitarian elements in higher education; however, they despised the collegial aspects of undergraduate colleges—which each tended to disparagingly view as a continuation of the secondary school system. Their ideal called for pure disinterested research and scholarship, certainly free from vocational and societal concerns, but also free from such diversions as character building, acquaintance with common heritage, and focus on individual development.

John Dewey's (1859-1952) philosophy of education also provides a helpful contradiction. Many of Dewey's principles and methods have been, and continue to be, implemented and integrated into an undergraduate, liberal arts setting. For example, Dewey's quintessentially American belief that education's ultimate purpose is "to set free and develop the capacities of human individuals without respect to race, sex, class or economic status" (1974); his firm commitment to and emphases on problem-solving and experiential learning as pedagogical methods; and his focus on the individual's growth within a democratic community have each found their way into the practices and goals of liberal
education. Yet, to the extent that Dewey's thought is interpreted as primarily experience-based, with relatively little emphasis on theoretical learning and as centered exclusively on the individual's "needs" for the present and future—with minimal focus on intellectual discipline, the moral development of the individual, common knowledge or heritage—then, it does lie outside the liberal education tradition.

Yet another category of college and university mission statements emphasizes many different purposes. For example, in *The Uses of the University* (1972), Clark Kerr presents not so much a vision of what higher education should be as a pragmatic statement on what it is. Nevertheless, in his acceptance of the large multi-purposed institution, Kerr conveys a sense of mission and set of goals. He embraces research, community service, and teaching as equally worthwhile and claims that there is room enough for programs that are theoretical and applied, professional and liberal, specialized and wholistic. Such a view of or vision for higher education tends to overlook the established undergraduate goals and methods of liberal education as they become lost in a plethora of goals and practices. More practically, this eclectic "philosophy" may have contributed to a sense that higher education should have no comprehensive aims. In summation, then, these alternative approaches to the meaning and purposes of undergraduate education help set the liberal studies ideal distinctly apart: Liberal education primarily emphasizes educational goals focused on intellectual and theoretical understanding—integrated with ethical growth, while placing little or no emphasis on the generation of scholarship (or scholars) or on immediate social and vocational outcomes.
Liberal Education: Its Meaning and Utility

"Liberal" vs. "General" Education Because there is general confusion on whether or not the expressions are synonymous, several critical differences between "general" and "liberal" education need to be identified before proceeding with the analysis. Liberal education is sometimes considered to be closely related to the expressions "general education" and "undergraduate education," and the terms are often used interchangeably. Undoubtedly, there is little distinction between the three in their popular usage. Yet liberal education as an idea (or ideal) and as an educational practice has a level of historical depth and tradition lacking in many of its modern day descendants. Typically, undergraduate education and general education are descriptively defined and are, therefore, fairly precise. Undergraduate education simply refers to that segment of one's education that occurs between the completion of high school and the beginning of graduate school. General education is a term given full legitimacy by the Harvard Committee of 1945 with its well-publicized version of curricular analysis and recommendations. As Brubacher contends, the expression undoubtedly came into popular usage in order to "ensure the flexibility needed for rethinking liberal education, and was adopted by 'progressive' elements only too happy to surrender the title 'liberal education' to the 'elitist traditionalists'" (1978, p. 80). The semantic alteration was viewed as necessary in order to "prevent this important channel of social mobility (i.e., higher education) from becoming clogged with upperclass predilections likely to
alienate the greatly enlarged new 'democratic' clientele of higher education" (Brubacher, 1978, p. 80).  

Whatever the impetus for adopting the adjective "general," it has not taken on a strong value connotation, be it democratic, egalitarian, pluralistic, or any other. Rather, it is the simple, factual referent to that part of the undergraduate curriculum that is neither the major nor the elective component, but is some type of curricular mechanism operating in the leftover space meant to ensure breadth of education. For example, "General Education is a disaster area" has become the catch-phrase of contemporary curricular reform.  

The term "liberal education," however, commands both an historical tradition and a body of imaginative, and at times inspiring, aims and objectives to which "general education" can lay no equivalent claim. And, although some proponents of liberal education have emphasized aspects that seemed elitist or unduly rationalistic to critics, the proponents have remained untied in their understanding of liberal education as a broad wholistic enterprise, and they have actively promulgated a concept of education which is proactive and inclusive and not merely a referent

10 Russell Thomas devotes the introduction to his book, The Search for a Common Learning: General Education 1800-1960 (1962), to this problem of general or liberal education. He, too, views the difference as more than merely semantic.

11 See the Carnegie Commission Report, Missions of the College Curriculum (1978), Chapter 8, "General Education: An Idea in Distress."
to that component of the curriculum "left over" through default.12

The identification of a specific, enduring vision of liberal education is, of course, a difficult task; numerous educators have already attempted some form of a comprehensive survey of the meanings and purposes of liberal (and general) education.13 A far smaller number have attempted to critically analyze the concept itself.14 The variety, ambiguity, and sheer quantity of conceptions of liberal education will not, however, be used as an excuse to avoid any definition, but, rather, will serve as fair warning. Liberal education can be, and has been, defined in terms of its curricular offerings, institutional type (i.e., private or public, 2 year or 4 year), the socioeconomic status of faculty and students, its history and traditions, the espoused goals and aims, as well as the actual social and individual outcomes. This philosophical analysis centers upon educational aims and goals, on

12It should be pointed out, however, that there are those who do use the expressions interchangeably and that "general education" does occasionally refer to the more ambitious educational endeavor with all of its historical roots and connotations. Therefore, there is no hesitation in this work to refer to writings on "general education" so long as this connotes something more than a curricular mechanism for breadth or diversity.


14Most recently, J. S. Brubacher, On the Philosophy of Higher Education (1978) and C. Wegener, Liberal Education and the Modern University (1978), have attempted such objective philosophical analyses.
statements of mission and purpose, but not without some regard for those other components that help shape and define our popular notions about liberal education. This extended historical review provides context and serves as a basis for drawing out the specific criteria of liberal education, criteria used to evaluate and select an appropriate model of moral education. Three categories have been examined: first, the classical roots extending back to the zenith of Greek culture; second, well-known historical statements, or apologias, written in the past two hundred years; and third, contemporary proposals and curricular statements on the mission and goals of liberal education. Each serves as a balance supporting the other—with the older documents providing a sense of historical depth and continuity and those more recent providing both contemporary relevance as well as a set of specific goals.

The Value of Liberal Education Why is liberal education a worthy educational ideal? And why should the model of moral education with which it is most consistent be the most acceptable? First, both the ideal and the practice of liberal education have a depth of historical analysis and a breadth of popular appeal unmatched by any other single post-secondary educational norm; also (as indicated) the liberal arts tradition embodies a strong conception of education as fundamentally an ethical enterprise. As an educational ideal largely defined in ethical terms, it provides particularly relevant criteria for examination of the more specific curricular goals and objectives of various models of moral education. Moreover, liberal education is a flexible educational norm, one that is not locked into the notion
that very specific, fixed areas or types of knowledge must be taught, nor is it dogmatically fixated on a skills approach, void of specified content. Thus, liberal education can serve as a basis for a model of moral education that does not teach particular moral values (which could easily lead to indoctrination), as well as for a model that is not totally neutral, naively claiming that no moral values are passed on.

Liberal education is also a concept with logically-connected criteria, criteria which help provide parameters and guidelines for the practice of moral education. For example, R. S. Peters argues that "education" logically imposes the transmission of what is worthwhile to those who become committed to it; it must involve knowledge and understanding and some sort of cognitive perspective which is not inert; and education must rule out at least some methods of transmission on the grounds that they fail to provide for free choice, minimal rational awareness and voluntary cooperation on the part of the learner and the teacher (Peters, 1970, p. 45). The adjective "liberal" introduces another set of logically-connected concepts. At the very least, "liberal" education implies a perspective that either rejects or goes beyond a narrowly utilitarian view of education. Education solely in service of such extrinsic ends as professional or job training, skill development, or social conformity cannot be considered liberal. Also, liberal education differs from many other forms of education in that it is typically thought of as an activity that can fully take place with adolescents and adults—not children. The point is that some minimal level of rational ability and self-
identity serve as prerequisites.

In a preliminary sense, then, the concept of a liberal education provides basic criteria for evaluating models of moral education. For example, moral education involving indoctrination, lacking direction or purpose, or void of some elements of intellectual understanding cannot be considered truly educational. Or, a program of moral instruction which teaches only interpersonal skills or one which has narrowly utilitarian aims or goals (such as good citizenship or enhanced professional identity) cannot be considered an appropriate liberal education enterprise. This chapter concludes with a working definition of liberal education, focused on the major goals, thus providing a sound basis for the selection of a model of moral education for an undergraduate curriculum setting.

The Defining Criteria

Liberal education is, then, at the very least a worthwhile educational ideal. At its very best, its practitioners draw upon the rich cultural heritage of western education to create an educational experience that has a powerful impact on the individual's development. In American higher education today the undergraduate liberal arts curriculum lies between several extremes: "pure" disinterested research; "practical" social relevance; and strict professional specialization. Training for jobs, serving community needs, socialization, professional training, consumer education, and highly specialized scholarship—all play a primary or direct role in
shaping the ideals and goals of liberal education. Instead, the emphasis lies on the individual's acquisition of certain intellectual skills and qualities, familiarity with key areas of knowledge, and to paraphrase John Stuart Mill, on the education of the person qua person—and not in any assumed socially-imposed role. Educational goals in liberal education revolve around learning rational habits and skills that lead to broad patterns of comprehension and an ability to make intellectual connections; acquiring a knowledgeable sense of common humanity and diverse cultural traditions; becoming more aware of the ethical realm; and, in general, learning to grow and develop in many different ways, "educating the whole person."

"Ethical development" has been one of the pervasive themes in the literature of liberal education. Today in the United States many public and private colleges and universities are united in their concern to structure a curriculum that directly addresses itself in some way to ethical issues, moral reasoning, and, in some cases, to the moral development of the individual student. In an even more sweeping sense, J. Brubacher refers to the contemporary university as a secular church serving as society's conscience and operating as an ethical forum for "lay society":

Whereas piety and virtue once defined what the institutions of higher education should teach, today the clergy has lost much of its authority to fill

15 Although one must readily acknowledge that in the actual political turmoil of educational practice and policy making, these goals often have a significant impact.
these words with content. Consequently the university, as a secular church, now fills them with such elastic values as 'social concern,' 'democratic or humanistic values,' or even more flexible, 'socialization'. (1978, p. 123)

This double context—higher education as a fundamentally ethical enterprise and liberal education as ultimately aiming for the moral development of the individual—can be a powerful combination, but the double significance can also cause confusion. In this study, the meaning and goals of liberal education provide a means to select, evaluate, and develop an appropriate model of moral education. There is no analysis of higher education as an ethical enterprise in society nor as a social inculcator of human values.

What, then, are liberal education's defining criteria? Two different but complementary sets of criteria emerge from this chapter: first, the positive, primary goals of contemporary liberal education, and, second, minimal, logical criteria which clearly exclude certain forms of training and education. Although perhaps less inspirational than some mission or goal statements, the 1979 Harvard Core Curriculum report is a clear, concise statement of goals, one that summarizes the major points elaborated upon throughout this chapter by focusing on the characteristics of the liberally educated individual:

1. An educated person must be able to think and write clearly and effectively.

2. An educated person should have achieved depth in some field of knowledge. Cumulative learning is an effective way to
develop a student's powers of reasoning and analysis, and for our undergraduates this is the principal role of concentrations.

3. An educated person should have a critical appreciation of the ways in which we gain and apply knowledge and understanding of the universe, of society, and of ourselves. Specifically, he or she should have an informed acquaintance with the aesthetic and intellectual experience of literature and the arts; with history as a mode of understanding present problems and the processes of human affairs; with the concepts and analytic techniques of modern social science; and with the mathematical and experimental methods of the physical and biological sciences.

4. An educated person is expected to have some understanding of, and experience in thinking about, moral and ethical problems. It may well be that the most significant quality in educated persons is the informed judgment which enables them to make discriminating moral choices.

5. Finally, an educated American, in the last third of this century, cannot be provincial in the sense of being ignorant of other cultures and other times. It is no longer possible to conduct our lives without reference to the wider world within which we live. A crucial difference between the educated and the uneducated is the extent to which one's life experience is viewed in wider contexts (1979, p. 40).
The first goal deals with the widely applicable skills of thinking and writing effectively (presumably at a more advanced level for the college student). The second involves developing in-depth knowledge in some field of knowledge, that is, the traditional major or concentration. The third is yet another restatement of the need for acquaintance with all or most of the major "ways-of-knowing." This goal has typically been implemented with some form of distribution requirement. The fourth and fifth goals are somewhat different from the previous three in that each moves beyond a strictly cognitive base. Certainly, the focus still lies on intellectual development rather than affective or attitudinal change; however, the line is less distinct when one requires that the educated person be able to make "discriminating moral choices with informed judgment" and to "avoid" provincialism through knowledge about other cultures. "Viewing life in a wider context" involves both knowledge and a degree of ethical maturity, as does the ability to make sound moral judgments. An appropriate and effective model of college-level moral education will at least complement most or perhaps all of these goals. An inappropriate model may be entirely experiential with an emphasis on contemporary social interaction and little stress on the exercise of moral judgment, analysis of ethical principles, or examination of

16 It is interesting and relevant to note that the Harvard Report does not specify that the area of in-depth study must be a traditional discipline. Specialization in ethics or moral knowledge may be a possibility.

17 Here, the report remains fairly traditional with an alignment of ways-of-knowing much like those put forth by Daniel Bell in the Reforming of General Education (1968) and unlike those proposed by Philip Phenix in his Realms of Meaning (1964).
cultural diversity of values.

The major logical features of liberal education also set clear conceptual limits for a model of moral education:

--most importantly, there can be no indoctrination. Any objective or pedagogical method which subverts the individual's autonomy and ability to make free, rational decisions must be discarded.

--liberal education does not directly aim to change behavior. Although the long term and indirect results of liberal education may (some claim, usually do) result in behavioral change, the specific goals and objectives in the liberal arts curriculum focus on intellectual change and growth. The individual is left free to make his or her own life decisions.

--liberal education has an intellectual orientation in the broad sense of thinking rationally, giving good reasons, comprehending specific facts and general principles. This does not entirely rule out the affective or emotional realm, but it does exclude therapeutic or educational models that place primary, or significant, emphasis on affective adjustment or growth.

--liberal education is not primarily concerned with vocational or social ends. Moral education in a liberal arts setting, then, must avoid the narrowness of ethical training for good citizenship (alone) or the limited examination of ethical issues and attitudes in selected professions or professional roles. This analysis now turns to the examination of several extant models of moral education, each with its own set of objectives and pedagogical methods. The effectiveness of each model as a potential component of the undergraduate curriculum
is evaluated in light of this developed discussion on liberal education and its specified goals.
Chapter 3: Contemporary Models of Moral Education

Introduction

In the first chapter reasons were presented that indicated the need for continuing analysis of the aims and objectives of moral education in a collegiate setting. In the preceding chapter, the concept of liberal education was examined in some depth; its meaning and characteristics were specified as was its historical emphasis on the individual's moral growth and development. Out of this analysis, the ongoing, significant role of moral education in the undergraduate program was affirmed, and a specific set of criteria, with which to evaluate the incorporation of a program or model of moral education in a liberal arts, undergraduate curriculum was developed. In this third chapter, five extant models of moral education are described primarily in terms of their goals and objectives with some examination of the teaching methods and resources which follow. In keeping with the overall focus of this study, the selected models are those that concentrate on college-aged students, or more generally, those seventeen years of age or older; in addition, the selected models are those that emphasize the undergraduate college curriculum as a potential forum for moral education. Thus, this excludes an examination of models which involve moral development or education which are exclusively psychological or sociological in nature as well as strategies for implementation which fall entirely outside the purview of college curriculum.
Naturally, each of these models of moral education has specified objectives and pedagogical methods to implement those objectives. In none of the models can one discover a proposal for the uncritical transmittal or unconscious inculcation of moral values or behaviors. Proponents of the values clarification approach; the traditional, broad-based humanities model; the wholistic model; cognitive-develop­mental approaches; and the normative ethics model¹ are united in the recognition of two fundamental points: First, whether or not it is a planned or conscious enterprise, the experience of higher education will contribute to, or in some way affect, moral development; and second, the tendency to separate ethical or moral development from the acquisition of critical intellectual skills is educationally ineffective, and perhaps, unethical in itself (since it may lead to indoctrination). In this sense all of the models are viable options and deserving of critical examination. Moreover, these approaches to collegiate moral education are selected because, at least upon immediate examination, none advocates uncritical immersion into a specific set of moral values, and each emphasizes respect for the individual's values while offering instruction in the skills and processes of moral reasoning and development. Again, these are educational models that are generally focused on college-level teaching and learning.

¹See Values Pedagogy in Higher Education (Donellan & Ebben, eds., 1978) and Teaching Values in College (Morrill, 1980) and Values and Moral Development in Higher Education (Collier, Wilson, and Tomlinson, eds. 1974) for alternate categorization schemes.
Nevertheless, as shall become evident, there are significant differences. Some approaches are decidedly more abstract and conceptual than others. One draws heavily from psychological studies on human growth and development. Several seem to fit more easily into existing curriculums; others may place demands on existing curricular structures and require planned integration. Some emphasize structure of knowledge, others the individual student's development. After systematically describing these models, the critical question is raised: Which one, or combination, of these existing models is most suitable for incorporation into the undergraduate liberal education curriculum? In the following chapter the developed set of criteria drawn from the liberal arts tradition is used to evaluate each contemporary approach. In this chapter, each model is systematically described, first providing a basic definition with some historical context (where appropriate); then moving on to identify (in this order) the underlying theoretical base, major goals, and instructional methods. In addition, a specific, continuing case of "applied moral education" will be hypothesized. How would the topic "truth-telling and lying" be handled within the framework of each model?

**Values Clarification**

The values clarification model of moral education is based upon a very broad definition of values and "valuing." Values include everything from personal preference to a set of established ideals to a social system of priorities. In practice, values clarification is
a method of discovery through which the individual first identifies and then "clarifies" his or her own values. This model of moral education is perhaps most widely noted for its large selection of individual and group exercises; these are experiential in nature, requiring personal engagement and emphasizing respect for each individual's values. The basic scheme, its theoretical basis, and the pedagogical methods that follow from it (as well as the psychological research cited to substantiate its effectiveness) are to be found in the works of Merrill Harmin, Sidney Simon, Howard Kirschenbaum, Jack Frankel, and Leland Howe--this model's creators and leading advocates (Frankel, 1977; Raths, Harmon, and Simon, 1966; Simon, Howe, and Kirschenbaum, 1978). Of all the recent educational models focused on morals or value development, values clarification has received the most publicity and controversy--with advocates claiming to be teaching a "valuing process" that is (in a very general sense) humanistic and non dogmatic and detractors criticizing the approach for being everything from superficial and hedonistic to wantonly relativistic and devoid of any cogent theoretical base.

What is the theory behind values clarification, and what are its goals and objectives? First, values clarification proponents eschew contextual or substantive goals as automatically indoctrinating (Stewart in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p. 138). Since no substantive set of values is taught, they (at least initially) claimed to have developed a neutral process for examining personal values. Nevertheless, objectives do exist if in no other sense than that the "valuing process" itself has become an educational objective (Morrill, 1980, p. 16).
The values clarification literature is, however, replete with other values: the values of openness, honesty, creativity, acceptance, and respect for individuality. The specific set of steps describing the "process of valuing" also serves as an outline of the model's educational objectives:

Choosing -
1) choosing freely
2) choosing from among alternatives
3) choosing after thoughtful consideration of each alternative

Prizing -
4) prizing and cherishing your chosen values
5) publicly affirming

Acting -
6) acting upon choices
7) acting with pattern and consistency.

Kirschenbaum later reformulated these objectives into five crucial "dimensions": thinking, feeling, choosing, communicating, and acting (in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, pp. 119-122). For each he (and others) offers very broad descriptions. "Thinking" means reasoning more effectively, being able to analyze advertising, propaganda, and information. "Feeling" is critical to valuing in the sense that individuals who are aware of their feelings are "psychologically more mature and able to achieve goals more rapidly" (Rogers, 1969). Awareness and acceptance of feelings and emotions moves beyond "prizing" or "cherishing" one's

\[ ^2 \text{Later, H. Kirschenbaum freely admitted this himself (in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p. 122).} \]
values to a strengthened self-concept and an ability to understand and use feelings. "Choosing" includes choosing from alternatives, considering consequences and choosing freely, that is, distinguishing between pressures or forces pushing us toward certain choices and one's own individual sense of what choice is best. "Communicating" is the ability to send clear messages; empathy, active listening, and understanding another's frame of reference are all emphasized as important components in the effective communication of values. Finally, "acting" means to act upon our chosen beliefs and values and to act consistently toward one's goals and in accordance with one's values.

The approach does not have a strong philosophical or theoretical foundation with a systematic analysis of values, moral reasoning, or instruction in morality. Kirschenbaum's clearest definition of values clarification emphasizes technique and application: "an approach that utilizes questions and activities designed to teach the valuing process and to help people skillfully apply the valuing process to value-rich areas in their lives" (in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p. 122). The techniques have been especially popular with elementary and secondary school teachers as an occasional alternative to an impersonal structured curriculum; with values clarification they can raise and directly discuss such important social and ethical issues as racism or violence, sexual mores, or life goals. More recently, it has been used at a college level where the numerous pedagogical exercises (including questionnaires, games, group discussions, role playing, simulations, and interviews) are used by both classroom instructors and by student personnel counselors in extracurricular programming (DeLattre &
Bennett, 1979, p. 38). The instructional methods are usually non-didactic, experiential, and dependent on group interaction.

Lying is a universal moral issue with both social and individual dimensions, as well as psychological, religious, legal, and ethical implications. Used as a specific example of moral education, it will lend further shape and substance to this model and serve as a consistent point of comparison with the other models. How might an instructor using values clarification teach about lying? Obviously, the major goal is for the individual student to become aware and clear of his/her own value standpoint(s) on lying. An instructor might begin with a group exercise entitled "Personal Coat of Arms" in which the students share several important aspects of their self-identity with others in the group. The object is to create an atmosphere of sharing and trust as well as to encourage a simple acquaintance with each other. The instructor then announces the specific topic and gives a "mini-presentation" in which several definitions and examples of lying would be introduced. A structured questionnaire follows in which students respond to such questions as "Have you ever lied?"; "Is telling the truth your most important value?"; "Is it all right to tell white lies that help people feel better about themselves?" The results are quickly tabulated (anonymously) and serve as a basis for a general group discussion. The objective is to stimulate thinking about lying. At all times the instructor is cautious not to become a moralist, not to allow him/herself to dominate the discussion with his/her own values about lying. This is especially true when the group moves on to share individual feelings about lying. (Group
exercises involving role playing and simulation might be used to generate emotional responses. At this point students may be asked to preface all their comments with "I feel . . ."). The clear implication is that feelings are entirely individual, subjective, and should not be judged or evaluated. Presumably, students experience some degree of diversity, if not conflict, with their peers; some lay claim to the value of absolute honesty, others believe in truth-telling to a large extent but not in an absolute sense, and still others express a great deal of cynicism about the ability or need to "tell the truth" at any time. Again, throughout it all the teacher/leader remains "neutral"; instead, he/she stresses the objective of clear communication between all participants. Such well-used counseling phrases as "What I hear you saying . . ." or "It sounds like you're feeling . . ." are used to promote effective listening and a nonjudgmental stance. Teaching each student to be able to choose his/her own values is another objective. The exercise "Strongly Agree/Strongly Disagree" is used to encourage students to think about alternatives between total honesty and constant lying. The instructor wishes to ensure that students are "choosing freely," that they are not simply acquiescing to peer pressure or to unexamined family or religious traditions. To conclude, there is an emphasis on action; now that the students have thought about lying and truth telling in more depth, expressed their feelings on the topic, shared ideas with each other, and selected (to some degree) their own stands, are they prepared to actually act in accordance with those "clarified and communicated" values? A contract agreement is written -- in which two or more students pledge to each other that they will
actively carry out their values; for example, one student pledges to stop lying to his parents about his whereabouts during weekends; another may pledge to join or help the college's honor council; yet another may agree to somehow confront a local businessman who is highly exaggerating the powers of his product.

Values clarification is clearly a departure from very traditional notions of curriculum and pedagogical methods in many ways. There is no hesitation to explore human emotions; it is highly experiential; obviously interdisciplinary (or perhaps, nondisciplinary); and to a large degree it is nondidactic and group-oriented.

Wholistic

The values clarification approach to moral education is relatively easily defined, certainly in comparison to wholistic methods of moral education. Those who adhere to a wholistic approach to the teaching of values are usually advocates of a comprehensive education for all dimensions of human development. They believe that planning for education in morality must occur within the wider context of institutional environment including such elements as faculty role-modeling, physical plant design, student body composition and admission policy, peer interaction, and the curriculum in its entirety. In the past decade there have been a number of smaller, private colleges, especially, that have attempted this approach—among them St. Olaf College, Minnesota, Mars Hill College, North Carolina, and Alverno College, Wisconsin (Donnellan & Ebben, eds., 1978). (One can assume that the
size of these colleges allows for a degree of dramatic restructuring as well as coordinated planning between different disciplines and administrative and student affairs offices hardly manageable at larger institutions.) Such colleges (or programs), directly or indirectly, draw much from the research and theory of Douglas Heath and Arthur Chickering (Morrill, 1980, p. 42). Although both college researchers recognize the centrality of ethical growth, each advocates the development of integrity and moral values in combination with many other realms of human growth.

Through his studies on the effects of a liberal arts undergraduate experience Douglas Heath, especially, presents a strong case for a wholistic approach. His findings led him to believe that the total environmental impact of the small residential college has an especially powerful effect on the student's ethical development. Heath writes:

As an example of this coherence, this centralization, both students and alumni reported that a principal effect of their college experience was the development of a more integrative value system. This effect was most succinctly stated by the alumnus who described his education to have been a 'process of intellectual and spiritual integration.' The college's intellectual effects were primarily analytic and critical and its personal and moral (spiritual) effects primarily synthetic and reconstructive. The power of the college was
that it insisted its students integrate both the intellectual and the moral. The integration of the intellectual and moral in the men's experience resulted in a meaningful identity centered in a core of values that synthesized, on the one hand, the values of excellence, integrity, and self-realization with, on the other hand, the development of a genuine concern, respect, and felt responsibility for others and their welfare. These values defined the substance of the enduring effects of their college experience and made clear its fundamentally moral character. (1968, pp. 243-44).

Heath's observations on changing value patterns among college students (using his method of "disciplined case study") are similar to findings from earlier studies: increase in liberalism, less adherence to conventional norms or beliefs, and a move away from formal, traditional religious beliefs and values toward a more immediate, personal morality (which Heath labels "ethical humanism"). Heath concludes that, "If a college wishes to educate liberally the consciences and values of its students, it must have a genuine tradition and atmosphere that prizes the unfettered development of a personally wrought mature value system." His focus is on overarching "tradition" and "atmosphere," the effects

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3See Eddy (1959); Feldman & Newcomb (1969); Jacob (1957); and Sanford, ed. (1964).
of the wholistic college experience.

Arthur Chickering, an especially well-known name in higher education research generally, has conducted numerous studies on the inter-relationships between various forms of college experience and resulting student change and growth (1974; 1976; 1980); and he, too, is convinced that moral development must be integrated with other social, personal, and intellectual forms of development. Chickering has consistently attempted to draw out the educational implications from the findings of developmental psychology. In this vein he writes,

The basic point ... is that motives for learning, learning styles, and orientations toward knowledge are linked to levels of ego development, moral development, and intellectual development. These motives and orientations, backed by the broader reinforcements of developmental levels, in turn define appropriate institutional functions or roles. If learning processes and educational practices consistent with them are developed to carry out those institutional functions, systematic institutional responses can be created that best serve students at particular levels of development. (1976, pp. 89, 92)

In short, Chickering, like Heath, believes that a wholistic approach must mean both a comprehensive approach to education using many tools for change, tools that go well beyond classroom instruction and traditional curriculum, as well as a comprehensive understanding of
human development itself, an understanding encompassing change and growth in areas beyond the strictly "cognitive" or "analytic."

There are, of course, others who have advocated wholistic education and development, most notably Carl Rogers (1969) and John Dewey. In the United Kingdom John Wilson adopts a different approach—an approach that isolates moral reasoning as a specific cognitive and affective skill logically (and practically) composed of such elements as "sensitivity to others," "self-control," "emotional awareness," "factual knowledge," and "prescriptive thinking." Wilson believes that these are all elements of moral reasoning that can, and should, be developed through carefully structured education (Wilson, 1970; Wilson, Williams & Sugarman, 1967). Although philosophical discussion and controversy over Wilson's scheme has occurred on both sides of the Atlantic, relatively little pedagogical application has occurred in the United States. For purposes of this study, however, the goals and methods drawn from Chickering's and Heath's theoretical underpinning will be examined, since this has been the contemporary wholistic approach most focused on the college-aged student as well as the approach most frequently considered (if not fully implemented) at a

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4 In the sense that Dewey insisted that schools be transformed into democratic communities-in-miniature and that otherwise moral education would be too formalistic, if not pathological (see Moral Principles in Education, 1975 and Democracy & Education, 1967).

5 For examples of concrete applications, the reader is referred to The Assessment of Morality (Wilson, 1973). Also, see Values & Moral Development in Higher Education (Collier, Wilson & Tomlinson, eds. 1974).
college or university level. Also, since the primary focus of this thesis rests on college curriculum, this description will focus on the curricular aspects of the wholistic approach.

Again, the wholistic approach rests on the assumption that effective learning occurs when students are challenged to integrate the intellectual and ethical dimensions of growth. In Heath's own words, "moral synthesis and reconstruction" are to be melded with the development of analytic and critical thinking skills. More specifically, this approach often assumes that the teaching of moral values can be integrated with the content and methodology of most academic disciplines. Also, with most wholistic models there is the assumption that learning is a developmental process, that there is a logical and psychological progression in the evolution of increasingly advanced forms of judgment and understanding. Using Alverno College's exemplary wholistic liberal arts curriculum, what are the specific value-oriented goals and instructional methods? The general goal (one of eight critical abilities of a liberally educated person) is "facility for forming value judgments within the decision-making process" (Earley in Donnelly & Ebben, 1978, p. 48). These are broken down into six progressively more advanced objectives: first, understanding one's own values, identifying those beliefs and attitudes by which one personally organizes experience and knowledge; second, understanding the impact of individual and group value choices upon the human community; third, understanding the relationship of values to scientific theory and its technological applications; fourth, learning how to apply one's own values to the process of decision-making; fifth, recognizing and
empathizing with the values of different and diverse human groups; and sixth, articulating and expounding upon one's own value judgments at an advanced level. The means for implementing these objectives are structured at both an institution-wide and traditional curriculum-classroom level. At an institutional level, the college has taken four steps: it has created "competence division in valuing" consisting of faculty from a number of different disciplines. Among other tasks these faculty develop and re-evaluate the theoretical framework for valuing, help design and conduct teaching and evaluation methods, and co-assess in-course evaluation of student performance. There is close coordination with the Student Development office, where counselors and advisors use models of valuing and decision making in their daily interactions with students. Also, the college administers an institutional self-evaluation program, consisting of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies, in order to validate or re-assess their unusual approach. Finally, there are continuing faculty institutes and workshops intended to bring in experts-in-the-field and develop faculty cohesiveness and cooperation (Earley in Donnellan & Ebben, 1978, pp. 53-54). Across the curriculum instructors are encouraged to use "relevant content" as a means for motivating and encouraging students to "incorporate the behavioral and affective components of valuing" (Earley in Donnellan & Ebben, 1978, p. 51). Students are provided many different types of learning opportunities to develop "facility in valuing," including

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6In the Alverno model, levels 1-4 are required outcomes, 5 and 6 are usually selected by Humanities majors.
Courses in different disciplines, interdisciplinary courses, off-campus externships and independent study. Faculty are familiar with various modes of valuing and learn to match teaching strategies with intended learning outcomes. Thus, they ideally use a wide variety of teaching methods, including intensive log writing, simulation and role playing, structured interviews, small group discussions, structured moral-dilemma discussion, and experiential learning.

What could be done within such a structure to teach about the moral issue of lying? Keeping in mind the overall goal of "forming a value judgment in the decision-making process," the first step might well be taken by the faculty serving in the "Competence Division in Valuing." In a manner resembling policy making, they designate "lying" as one particularly relevant, both public and personal, moral issue on which the college places significant emphasis. These committee members work to develop a broadbased approach utilizing faculty workshops and student affairs programming. A faculty workshop (perhaps led by Sissela Bok, author of the recent book *Lying*) focuses on the intellectual and philosophical categories of lying. The student affairs counselors lead role-playing or simulation workshops on lying to one's roommate, the opposite sex, or teachers and may also direct students' energies into a re-examination or recommitment to the college's honor code. The college consciously monitors and evaluates these activities to assess their impact on individual students and the institution in the aggregate. In the academic classes instructors introduce the topic in a variety of disciplines. The psychologist lectures on Rokeach's study, *The Nature of Human Values* (1973), and requires students to keep
a personally-oriented journal with several entries focused on one's own feelings and reasoning about veracity and falsehood. The sociologist and political scientist team together to compare and contrast governmental structures and organizational hierarchies that either promote or discourage impersonality and deception. In a health class, students debate pros and cons of the "protective" lying sometimes done by health professionals. An anthropologist introduces a section on different cultural attitudes and practices on various forms of deception in his/her cultural anthropology courses. Students are asked to survey a variety of ethnic urban groups, suburbanites, and a rural population to develop a sense of varying beliefs and attitudes about lying. And, to conclude this disciplinary barrage, the philosopher teaches an applied ethics course in which students are asked to understand a variety of forms of moral reasoning and relate each to public issues focused on deception and truthtelling as well as to their own personal attitudes and beliefs. Individual students are expected to integrate these learning experiences and share (verbally and in writing) their thinking and development with the faculty competency committee on "valuing." These faculty will then assess the "level" of valuing which the student has attained and offer recommendations and advice if necessary.

Humanities

... I feel little trust in the educational efficacy of any merely rational moral teaching
abstractly detached from its religious environment. Normally, the moral teaching of which I just spoke as contradistinguished from ethical and political philosophy, and which is to be given all through the period of the humanities, should, in my opinion, be embodied in religious training. What, however, is to be done about natural morality? Natural morality and the great ethical ideas conveyed by civilization should be taught during these years. They are the very treasure of classical humanism, they must be communicated to the youth, but not as a subject of special courses. They should be embodied in the humanities and liberal arts, especially as an integral part of the teaching of literature, poetry, fine arts, and history. This teaching should be permeated with the feeling for such values. (1943, p. 68)

This passage from Jacques Maritain's Education at the Crossroads, in which he presents his vision of the ideal liberal arts curriculum, is exemplary. Maritain's faith in the study of the humanities as the means for conveying great ethical ideas and "natural morality" is surpassed only by his belief in a higher morality accessible only in a religious environment and with theological study. In our own generation there are still many who believe that it is the role of the humanities or, even more broadly, of the liberal arts course of study to promote the moral education of the student. Today there are those
who contend that the curricular status quo is adequate for this end as well as those who believe that there is a need for an interdisciplinary curriculum. The former position is, perhaps, most effectively captured in the remark that, "The pursuit of knowledge and truth is itself the parent of moral virtues" (Livingston, n.d., p. 16), a position closely paralleled by Jacob Bronowski, the world famous physicist and science educator (1965). In this vein, Livingston denies that there is any need for explicit moral education, claiming that, "The moral goal of the ideal observer (i.e. disinterestedness) requires an educational program that expressly combats ethnocentrism" (n.d., p. 17). Those who claim that the values implicit in scholarship and the search for Truth are the most potent form of moral education, see no need for the reintroduction of a set of objectives and curricular methods meant to promote moral growth. Indeed, Sydney Hook, well-known Dewey scholar and philosopher, claims that the introduction of explicit moral goals to remake or change society or the individual is potentially devastating and a "barbaric" act. In a more positive sense, Hook claims that

an educational and university system that enshrines the principles of academic freedom can rise higher than its source. It can generate the intellectual power and visions that gradually lift the level of social existence and social consciousness.

(1970, p. 182)

Thus, the principle of academic freedom and the methods of intellectual inquiry become the only legitimate means of morally educating
the student.

Earl McGrath, on the other hand, takes a more active and direct role in promoting the cause of liberal education and its role in moral development. McGrath asks,

What steps have institutions of higher education consciously taken to ameliorate the present social malaise? What have they done to help students to understand its causes or to consider various means for its cure? The large, complex universities with their dozens of specialized schools and departments, with their single minded dedication to the advancement of knowledge, with their wide diversity of goals and services, with their preoccupation with ideas rather than the total lives of individual human beings, have largely abandoned any effort to deal with value problems. (1974, p. 13)

McGrath is acutely aware of what he perceives to be the moral deterioration of society and the intellectual splintering of the university and college. His despair of overspecialization is coupled with his adamant rejection of the value-free teaching and learning promoted by scientism. According to McGrath, the current interest in social scientific models of moral development, including Lawrence Kohlberg and William Perry's schemes as well as numerous other psychological typologies, stems from the decline of the humanities as important, legitimate ways of knowing and learning. Hope, then, lies not in handing the educational areas of values analysis and moral development
over to developmental psychologists and counselors but rather in re-
venalizing the general education program and the humanities, especially.
In a similar vein, John Morris (among many others\(^7\)), stresses the con-
tinuing significance of the humanities as areas of study which can
explicitly deal with value concerns. Morris writes,

*What then is left for the humanities to explain?*

--the life of culture itself, that which forms the
ever fabric of our lives, all that is summed up in
our tradition, and the form of existence which binds
us together, . . . We need to restore the relevance
of reason to the realm of values by recognizing
that the significant features of our tradition can
help us understand our condition. Tradition pro-
vides the context within which we understand the
relevance and importance of the values by which
we judge our decisions. Only insofar as we discern
this content within the literature, the philosophy,
the theologies of the past can we understand our-
selves. (1978, pp. 51-53)

\(^7\)The "revitalization of the humanities," as pointed out in chapter
2, has been a frequent academic theme in the past decade. The concern
for values awareness and moral education are often linked with this
more general concern. The most recent 1984-85 reports on the under-
grade curriculum ("To Reclaim a Legacy" report written by William
J. Bennett, chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities;
"Integrity in the College Curriculum," Association of American Colleges
Committee on Redefining The Meaning and Purpose of Baccalaureate De-
grees; "Involvement in Learning: Realizing The Potential of American
Higher Education," the report of the Study Group on the Conditions of
Excellence in American Higher Education) are a part of this continuing
trend.
McGrath proposes interdisciplinary courses focusing on contemporary problems of our time: social, racial, economic, etc. He emphasizes the ethical foundation to such a course of studies and the pedagogical effectiveness of practice in concrete, problem-solving skills and focus away from an overly abstract, discipline-based approach. The relevance and meaning of such a curriculum "would be found not in the internal logic of each subject but rather in the realities of existence in a complex society" (1975, p. 36). McGrath also believes that the general education curriculum must push students to understand and clarify their personal views and develop the ability to determine the ethical consequences of various actions (1975). The actual pedagogical schemes devised with the intention to revitalize the humanities and thereby bring "value concerns" back into the curriculum have varied. Some have laid more emphasis on the examination of personal moral values and growth; others on the intellectual examination of values in society and literature. Some have remained focused on the traditional humanities disciplines; others have relied more on an interdisciplinary approach and included the sciences and examined ethical implications in scientific research and technological innovation. Typically, curricular reform has meant the development of interdisciplinary courses or programs, the requirement of a core of humanities courses, or occasionally, an externship focused on human conflict and values. Among all, however, there is abiding faith that a sustained encounter with the truly great works and methods of art, literature, philosophy, history, and religion will produce people who are sensitive to and aware of value concerns. Harry Broudy
contends that such individuals know—with a point of view or with a value scheme (1979, p. 643). While Walter Kaufman, a particularly vocal advocate of humanities education, claims that a vigorous encounter with the humanities will give the student "moral vision" (1977, pp. 154-83).

Rather than examine in greater detail the "Sidney Hook-Jacob Bronowski" humanities approach—which is essentially a case for maintaining the status quo—let us turn to the more proactive model presented by Earl McGrath and Walter Kaufmann. Kaufmann conventionally identifies the humanities as "the study of religion and philosophy, art and music, literature and poetry" and then proposes four major goals. The first is "the conservation and cultivation of the greatest works of humanity;" the second is to teach students to focus on "the possible goals of human existence,... on ultimate purposes;" the third, to teach vision; and fourth, to "foster a critical spirit" (1977, pp. xvi-xxi). Kaufmann's strong regard for what are essentially moral aims of education emerges in his discussion on "teaching vision." Vision is defined as seeing alternatives, gaining perspective by obtaining standards of comparison from our past and present. It is also related to the originality of the visionary, and it is brought about through a judicious blending of creativity with discipline and rigorous discrimination (1977, pp. 181-83). Kaufmann believes that the humanities and this primary goal are "vitally important for humanity in both senses of that word--humane attitudes and mankind—that the humanities be taught well" (1977, p. 183).

For Kaufman these goals can be met through a variety of
humanities courses taught by instructors who are themselves liberally educated, skilled at interdisciplinary approaches to learning, and possessed with vision. Among the courses and programs he recommends are comparative religion, an intensive study of the Book of Genesis, studies of three or four great artists, courses focused on several literary figures in both Western and non-Western culture, a course on Plato, and a two-term sequence in the history of philosophy. Kaufmann writes,

The central aim of all those courses would never be to make the student feel that now they know what there is to be known about the subject. It would always be to lead them to examine their own faith and morals and assumptions, as well as the consensus by which they are surrounded. (1977, pp. 199-200)

In addition to this fairly traditional approach, Kaufmann advocates interdisciplinary studies as an especially effective tool for teaching vision. He provides examples for programs on "punishment" and "dying" using religion and literature, as well as perspectives from outside the traditional humanities—psychology, sociology, anthropology, and the applied health sciences. Although Kaufmann and McGrath differ in their interdisciplinary focus—with Kaufmann concentrating on universal, existential aspects of human life and McGrath on contemporary social and individual problems—they are quite similar in their alarm over the disciplinary overspecialization and the resulting lack of discussion and learning about society and life's crucial dimensions.
They both believe that a solid immersion in an integrated program of humanities courses will allow students to grapple with life's fundamental value questions and eventually make individuals more humane.

Returning to the ongoing comparative focus on "lying" as a topic in moral education, what might occur in a humanities program? First, it is understood by the humanities-model advocate that this is a moral dilemma faced by countless people and organizations on a daily basis which is rarely, if ever, directly addressed in a traditional general education program. Perhaps a semester-long program is developed on the broader theme of "Lying, Deception, and Inauthenticity." Such analytic questions as "What exactly 'counts' as lying?", moral questions as "Under what conditions is it morally right to tell a lie?" and philosophical questions as "What does it mean to lead an authentic existence?" blend together in an integrated program of religion, philosophy, literature, art, and perhaps history courses and instructors.

In a literature class students are required to read Richard Wright's Native Son, Dostoevski's Notes from the Underground, and Adrienne Rich's On Lies, Secrets, and Silence. In discussions on Native Son, the class initially focuses on Beggar Thomas's crimes and the lies he tells to cover up his crimes; they then examine the deeper themes in the work: the social lie of racism and the volatile mixture of injustice, fear, and poverty which makes deception and lying a way of life. In a similar manner, students write about and discuss "The Narrator" in Dostoevski's work. They analyze the Narrator's perversity and life-long self-deception and study Dostoevski's philosophical
qualms about Truth and Perfection as worthy human ideals. Adrienne Rich's work, a contemporary collection of feminist prose, would serve to bring out issues revolving around authentic existence for women and the forms of deception that have kept women in subservient and inhumane roles.

A history instructor focuses on Nazi propaganda as a form of mass deception that all too effectively uses modern technology. Students read Mein Kampf, and case studies are used to illustrate the complexities of ethical decision-making and the nature of self-deception and blind obedience. Students attend Shakespeare's "Macbeth" and analyze how a man of integrity and honor is undone by his lust for power and then utterly degraded by his attempts at concealment. An art professor introduces his class to Escher's prints and poses such questions as "What is deception in art?" and "Can art lie?" Students read Koestler's Darkness at Noon and Kafka's The Trial, Orwell's Animal Farm and then attend a civic jury trial. Readings and experiences are structured in a manner to provoke concern about the role of truth and deception in the machinations of our court and judicial systems. Throughout all, the cornerstone to this approach lies in the materials serving as course content: They are, by and large, books, great literary works, and more generally, seminal works in the humanities. Exposure to, and intelligent study and discussion of such works will illuminate and add depth to the moral character of the subject at hand (be it "lying," the integrity of human life, or mass industrialization) and, eventually, contribute to the moral character of the student. That is the fundamental premise of the humanities
model of moral education.

Normative Ethics

The normative ethics model, sometimes referred to as applied ethics, introduces students both to ethical theories and to concrete ethical dilemmas often using case studies. The debates and analyses that follow allow students the opportunity to develop skills in identifying and defining moral issues and in making moral judgments. R. Hancock (1974) and F. Olafson (1973) have developed historical accounts of the birth and development of normative ethics in this century, each outlining the "over-absorption" with meta-ethical questions during the first half of this century and the current increasing willingness to "deal with normative ethics in a traditional philosophic way with the new factor of a recognition of the existence of meta-ethical questions as to a degree separable or at least distinguishable from the normative questions" (Hancock, 1974, p. 165). Olafson, particularly, offers a lucid overview of the interrelationship between ethics and other twentieth century disciplines:

What I have called the 'older' social sciences--political science, economics, and jurisprudence--were widely regarded during the nineteenth century and earlier as forms of applied ethics, proceeding under very general ethical assumptions and responsible to eventual ethical appraisal. They are in fact still so regarded in some quarters, and it may even be that in certain ways there is more
awareness now of the ethical dimension of these disciplines than there was at the beginning of the century.

There prevails at the present time, in place of the old dogmatic assurance, a general receptivity to the idea of resuming a closer relationship with ethics, combined with anxiety about how this would be consistent with the integrity of disciplines that are understandably proud of the advances they have made --advances that many believe were made possible by the adoption of value neutrality as a prime principle of method. (1973, p. 39)

Unlike other models of moral education, the normative ethics approach arises out of a fundamental re-examination of ethics itself, within the discipline of philosophy, and its interrelationship with other branches of knowledge. Its roots, then, remain most firmly implanted in the tradition of critical, reflective thought common to all philosophic inquiry. Advocates of normative ethical inquiry stand apart from that tradition in their unwillingness to restrict critical inquiry solely to highly abstract, metaethical issues. Paul Taylor effectively makes this point and provides a succinct statement of the broader, more "applied" concerns of ethics teaching:

The ultimate purpose of . . . ethics is to enable us to arrive at a critical reflective morality of our own . . . Moral growth occurs, then, as the individual develops his capacity to reason about his moral beliefs. Instead of blindly adopting
his society's moral code or being easily shocked by the moral systems of other cultures, he is able to think clearly, calmly, and coherently about any set of moral norms. He learns how to give good reasons for accepting and rejecting such norms . . . conclusions . . . are arrived at on the basis of his own reflection. He can then decide for himself what standards of evaluation and rules of conduct to commit himself to. It is this sort of person . . . who is the true individualist . . . The process of critical reflection . . . will often lead a man to disagree with his society. In this case it is his critical reflection, not his disagreement, that makes him an individualist.

(1963, p. 280)

In his approach to college teaching in moral values, Michael Scriven claims that morality does have a significant, rational basis and that the best way to achieve effective change (in personal morality) is through the use of the so-called "cognitive curriculum" (1976, p. 323). For him, moral education should include a knowledge about and understanding of relevant facts involved in moral issues; study on the nature, origin, and foundations of ethics (i.e. metaethics); and instruction "in the cognitive skills of moral reasoning, developed to the level of confidence where they can be exercised in social argumentation" (1976, p. 324). Scriven believes that students are almost totally illiterate in this area--that they will enthusiastically accept
some abstract moral truth but then fail to relate that abstract moral truth to a specific decision or situation. In his view, the dangers of naive, unguided moral passion are very real. In similar manner (but with much greater focus on Scriven's final goal), Daniel Callahan has outlined an approach to normative ethics in his essay entitled "Goals in the Teaching of Ethics" (1980). At a very minimum, he contends that courses in ethics should "help students develop a means and a process for achieving their own moral judgments" (1980, p. 71), and that such courses "should make it clear that there are ethical problems in personal and civic life, that how they are understood and responded to can make a difference to that life, and that there are better and worse ways of trying to deal with them" (1980, p. 62).

As with each of the other models, Callahan and other proponents of the normative ethics approach condemn moral education which is a training in specific moral values or specific traits of character. Callahan explicitly rejects goals centered on behavioral change, contending that these . . .

are, however, doubtful goals in the undergraduate or graduate classroom. No teacher of ethics can assume that he or she has such a solid grasp on the nature of morality as to pretend to know what finally counts as good moral conduct. No society can

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8 See The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education (1980) and Ethics in the Undergraduate Curriculum (1980).
assume that it has any better grasp of what so
counts as to empower teachers to propagate it in
colleges and universities. Perhaps most importantly,
the premise of higher education is that students are
at an age where they have to begin coming to their
own conclusions and shaping their own view of the
world. It is the time and place to teach them in-
tellectual independence, and to instill in them
a spirit of critical inquiry. (1980, p. 71)

Callahan outlines five specific objectives in the teaching of
ethics: "Stimulating the moral imagination" involves provoking the
student to see that there is a moral dimension to life, a moral point
of view. "Recognizing ethical issues" requires the examination of
concepts, of prescriptive moral statements, and of ethical principles
and moral rules. These are the tools of rationality and ethics, the
means whereby some order is given to the relatively untutored deliver-
ance of experience and previous conditioning (1980, pp. 65-66). Calla-
han also believes that we must seek to elicit a sense of moral obli-
gation, that students must be encouraged to examine the connections
between their moral perceptions and principles and their resultant
actions. Even more broadly the questions should be raised, "Why ought
I be moral?" A fourth goal is the development of analytical or logi-
cal skills. "Coherence and consistency are minimal goals both in the
analysis of ethical propositions and in their justification" (1980,
p. 67). The toleration--and reduction--of both ambiguity and disagree-
ment in the moral realm is the final specified goal. From the normative
ethics point of view, we must work to reduce disagreement in an area in which conflict and ambiguity are notoriously widespread, while also developing an attitude for tolerance of differing or opposing moral points of view. Intellectual (and personal) toleration are considered especially important in an area that frequently lacks clearly defined concepts and certain intellectual foundations.

Through focus on methods of moral reasoning and applied moral problems, both social and individual, the normative ethics approach is meant to leave students with an understanding that humans are moral agents with responsibility and consequences to their actions. This approach has, more often than not, taken the form of a special philosophy or interdisciplinary course or courses introduced either as requirements or electives into a traditionally discipline-based curriculum. Once again returning to the specific focus on "lying," this topic could be introduced as one predominant moral problem. Besides imparting a basic awareness of an ethical dimension to life and decision making, the instructor's objectives would include developing critical and evaluative skills in moral reasoning and an understanding of alternative modes of moral reasoning, and helping students to select, "fine-tune," or create their own normative theory on moral decision-making. How does one decide whether or not to lie? How does one develop principles or guidelines which will help make that decision? In order to help each student intelligently answer these kinds of questions (not in a definitive sense but rather in the sense of providing directions and concepts), the instructor has students examine the various means of arriving at normative judgments. Students compare
and contrast hedonistic and non-hedonistic forms of justification; they examine both teleological and deontological forms of reasoning.\(^9\) Undoubtedly, students would debate the pros and cons of a strictly "rule-oriented" approach with an "act-orientation" along with all the shades of variation between these two positions; and, they examine "lying" within the framework of such established ethical theories as utilitarianism, egoism, and the "good reasons" method of Stephen Toulmin and Kurt Baier. Such process-oriented works as Wilson's Moral Thinking and Rosen's Strategies of Ethics could play a pivotal role in such a course; although there are now many available texts and anthologies which blend together metaethical theory and normative moral decision-making skills with a selection of contemporary problems.\(^10\) The normative ethics approach focuses both on the skill and process of moral reasoning as well as on specific application (such as lying).

Pedagogical methods include the traditional lecture, readings, and open-ended discussion. Actually, a wide variety of less traditional methods (ranging from intensive journals to role playing) are perfectly compatible with the objectives of the normative ethics model; however, the case-study approach has been a frequently used technique.

\(^9\) In simple terms, is the end goal or consequence the most crucial determinant in moral decision-making (teleological)? Or, is some combination of both principles or rules with the end results the more appropriate method (deontological)?

\(^10\) Among some of these texts are Abelson & Friquegnon's Ethics for Modern Life (1975); Purtill's Thinking About Ethics (1976); Rachel's Moral Problems (1975); Rosen's Strategies of Ethics (1978); and Wellman's Morals and Ethics (1975).
Using the selected example, students read (or view) three examples of lying or deception. Perhaps one involves a doctor not immediately telling a cancer patient that his illness is terminal; another is an individual lying in order to prevent a murder or massacre; and a third is focused on the advertising messages and techniques of a major business firm. Students first read the cases on a factual basis, free from an evaluative commentary, then individually and in groups attempt to come to some sort of reasoned, defensible moral judgment on each situation.

Finally, advocates of the normative model do have more to say about evaluation than others. How does the instructor test the student after the completion of an assignment or section on "lying"? Behavioral measures or psychometric tests of attitudes or judgments are deemed entirely inappropriate (Caplan in Callahan & Bok, 1980, pp. 133-50). More traditional forms of evaluation—such as writing assignments, discussion and participation, interviews, and tests of the intellectual content—should be used in flexible ways, using suitable means of evaluation to match the learning objective and reinforce its attainment. Arthur Caplan, a research fellow at the Hastings Center, lists four major criteria for evaluation: quality of argumentation to support moral views, mastery of theories and principles of ethics, ability to identify moral issues, and ability to argue many different sides to a position (in Callahan & Bok, 1980, p. 147). In short, the students certainly are not tested on their own personal integrity nor on the validity of their personal decision-making process, but rather on their abilities to cogently argue for or against lying in various
circumstances, to identify lying as a moral issue, and to relate ethical theories and concepts to a decision-making process involving lying or deception.

Cognitive-Developmental

There is no dearth of psychological theorists attempting to identify and analyze moral beliefs and actions in order to scientifically understand and predict human behavior and belief. In the past decade at least five major psychological theories examining the moral development of college students, alone, have been proposed (Knefelkamp, 1980, p. 7). One, far more than the others, however, has directly dealt with patterns of moral growth and thought: the cognitive-developmental approach. All of the major cognitive-developmental theorists--Perry, Kohlberg, and Piaget--have devoted a great deal of study to the moral component, rejecting the notion that the moral realm belongs entirely in an affective or emotional domain. It is this very emphasis on linking ethical and intellectual growth that renders this model particularly appropriate for examination as a model for moral education. The other psychological models of college student growth either are too purely descriptive to be of any use in helping formulate goals or they are too broad (for purposes of this study) in their examination of the many interactions both within and out of the formal education process.

11These are ego identity, person-environment, holistic, typological, and cognitive-developmental.
William Perry's scheme describes the qualitatively different ways that students view knowledge and their ethical relationship to themselves and the world around. It is, as is Kohlberg's construct, sequential and hierarchical with each position a necessary "building block" for the subsequent one. Unlike Kohlberg, however, Perry's scheme is far more concerned with the individual's approach to the learning task and how each person makes meaning in the traditional educational setting. Kohlberg is not concerned with the elements of interaction with the college curriculum and learning environment. His theory is at once more general in its broad categorization of moral judgment in any context and more restricted in its primary research-grounding on child development. Perry's model, on the other hand, has provided specific directions and methods for fostering moral development in a college context.

In general, the cognitive-developmental model effectively lends itself to educational approaches for two reasons: a rational and planned dimension to human growth and development is strongly recognized, and the notion of human nature as entirely shaped by either environment or heredity (factors outside human control) is rejected. This perspective is clearly expressed by Graham in his overview on cognitive-developmental theories:

Although one may take a purely empirical view of stages of development, regarding them simply as a

\[12\] Recently, it has also (unlike Perry's scheme) been strongly criticized for embodying a male perspective at the expense of uniquely female approaches to moral reasoning. The philosophical debate on this issue continues today (see Carol Gilligan's *In a Different Voice*, 1982).
convenient way in which to divide up the sequential process of change which takes place in characteristic patterns of moral behavior and orientation with increasing age, there is an underlying implication of developmental theory that the process of development follows the course it does at least in part because of tendencies 'built into' the human being. This is particularly so, perhaps, in the case of the cognitive-developmental theory associated mainly with the names of Piaget and Kohlberg. As compared with psychoanalytic theory, cognitive developmental theory emphasizes cognitive aspects or factors. It is not implied that affective or emotional aspects or purely behavioral aspects are not important, but that in man, to a very large extent, those aspects are mediated by cognitive, organizing factors. In other words, our 'definition of the moral situation' is crucial, although indeed this cognitive definition of the situation may be influenced to a greater or lesser extent by affective and motivational factors, just as our feelings depend in part upon our definition of the situation. (Graham, 1972, p. 277)

In this manner, Perry focuses on how we "define our situation" in both intellectual and ethical terms. His nine stages are revealed through the student's perceptions of the teacher's role and one's own role in
learning. These stages can be collapsed into four basic categories: "dualism" and "multiplicity," which are characterized by cognitive simplicity, absolute and concrete thinking, externally guided behavior, dependence upon authority figures and egocentrism in viewing others and self, and "relativism" and "commitment in relativism," which are characterized by cognitive complexity, relativistic and abstract thought, internally-guided behavior, awareness of context and interdependence in relationship as well as increasingly allocentric and empathetic ways of viewing others. The crucial assumption of all the stage theorists is the necessity of interaction with a stimulus that demands a change in the way of thinking to a "higher," more functional stage of intellectual and ethical reasoning.

In *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years* (1970) William Perry offers an analysis of lengthy, systematic interviews with Harvard students. He provides a description of how students view their world and think about issues and dilemmas as well as how students come to define and conceptualize "knowledge" and "morality" in the college learning process. He has developed a framework for assessing levels of complexity of learning tasks which has allowed practitioners to create deliberate developmental designs of challenge and support (for example see Widick, Knefelkamp & Parker, 1975). The practical possibilities for curricular design and method have been most heralded by Lee Knefelkamp, professor of Counselor Education at the University of Maryland. She claims that:

The design of learning environments around the characteristics of challenge and support illumi-
nated by research with the Perry scheme allows faculty to make the learning accessible to the student, allows faculty members to speak the students' language, to demonstrate that they know and care who the student is, and may well foster increased satisfaction and subject matter mastery. I believe it is the pragmatic possibilities that come from greater insight into how the student approaches learning that has made Perry's model so helpful. (1980, p. 8)

Perry's scheme has been applied in a collegiate setting and continues to be applied at an increasing rate, and its implementation has had effects on curriculum content and course objectives, in addition to pedagogical methods. 13

The question as to whether or not Perry's scheme (or any psychological, developmental model) is purely descriptive, based on empirical research (perhaps, suggestive of an "in-built" biological-based structure of knowing), or is a normative construct, embodying goals and methods of instruction (or development) which can be evaluated with logical and ethical criteria, has been raised (Codd, 1977; Fraenkel in Scharf, ed., 1978; Phillips & Kelly in Harvard Educational Review, 1978; Sullivan, 1977). Perry himself was at first reluctant to bridge

the gap between his scheme and the actual curriculum or classroom. He "felt a deep aversion to 'application' in the sense of transforming a purely descriptive formulation of students' experience into a prescriptive program intended to 'get' students to develop" (Perry, 1977). For purposes of this analysis, Perry's scheme is considered an educational model for moral development and as such is open to philosophical criticism. Its developmental stages are in this sense, then, curricular goals. The educational challenge is to create an environment, to promote classroom learning which will move the student from simplistic dualism to, ultimately, the ability to make personal commitment with full awareness of contextual relativism. Instructors use a judicious mix of challenging situations and materials (pushing the student forward) with a supportive, personal environment (providing an atmosphere in which risk-taking is possible) to bring about these changes (Knefelkamp, 1974). In keeping with the focus of Perry's scheme this progress is evaluated in such terms as "the student's view of knowledge" and "the student's view of evaluation and fairness in the learning/evaluation process." Specific curricular strategies grow from the instructor's assessment of the student's developmental stage; the quantity and type of structure for learning; the diversity of alternatives or perspective encouraged or presented in a course; the degree and amount of concrete experiential learning and abstract, theoretical learning; and the degree of "personalism" (an open classroom setting in which discussion, interaction, and risk-taking-in-learning are encouraged). Each of these pedagogical options is organized and implemented in the manner most likely to promote individual development.
Those who have applied Perry's scheme (see AAHE Monograph #5, 1980; Knefelkamp & Cornfeld, 1978; Touchton, Wertheimer, Cornfeld & Harrison, 1977; Widick, Knefelkamp & Parker, 1975; Widick & Simpson, 1976) typically have not instituted individual courses focused on moral development or reasoning; rather, they have incorporated the stages and methods into existing courses. Thus, there has been little discussion about fundamental alteration of curriculum per se, but rather of restructuring pedagogical methods as well as expanding instructional goals to include the more personal, individual-oriented stages of Perry's scheme. In a sense, the goals and process centered on mastery of subject matter become of secondary importance. Of greater import is the development of the individual student who is attempting to learn the material at hand.

How might the moral issue of "lying and deception" be handled in this model of moral education? Drawing from Lee Knefelkamp's and others' work in this area, the instructor (perhaps in a philosophy, literature, or interdisciplinary course) must first determine whether students were in either a dualistic or relativistic stage of development. Although both groups of students share the same subject matter content, the instructional approaches vary in the attempt to match instruction to developmental status. For all students the course is designed along four major variables: diversity in content, form of learning experience, degree of structure, and type and degree of personalism in the classroom. How might the theme of lying be presented to students at a dualistic stage?
In order to focus on "diversity," the instructor selects a literary work presenting conflicting or paradoxical themes on "lying." For example, The Color Purple is read in this regard. Walker's book is, in turn, compared and contrasted with a nonfiction work such as Vance Packard's The Hidden Persuaders. In terms of instructional approach the prevailing emphasis is on relativism--asking, "Are there any other ways to justify, or describe, or condemn lying and deception?" In-class activities are designed to foster understanding and empathy with a wide variety of positions and personalities. Discussion emphasizes the value of one's own experiences and judgments in situations involving honesty, truth-telling, and deception. An out-of-class experience includes students conducting a series of interviews with selected individuals on their personal views and experiences with "honesty and lying" while assuming different roles: psychologist, journalist, ethicist. Structure is high with the instructor assuming full responsibility for course organization and providing clear-cut expectations for student performance. As for "personalism," instructional methods which help build a high level of trust between all course participants (including the teacher(s)) will be put into effect. For example, the class is frequently divided into small groups and students are encouraged to share personal reactions and experiences.

For students at the relativistic stage the major instructional objective is no longer focused on promoting a sense of diversity, on moving the student beyond an unexamined, simplistic, dualistic view (such as "lying is just always wrong" and "complete honesty is always right"), but rather on commitment-making and the process of choosing.
Course "diversity" emphasizes moving from the seemingly contradictory (such as "Lying is morally wrong; yet some lies are justified"—and, "There is wide variation between religious cultures and time periods on the issue of truth-telling.") to resolution. Rather than examine the diversity of opinions and characters, students are asked to understand their complementarity and the interconnectedness between differing perspectives. Instructional approaches emphasize commitment, and the central question is, "What is the stand or position that \(x\) takes on truth-telling and lying?" Instructors reinforce commitment statements from students. As an in-class experience, students are asked to identify and describe truth-telling dilemmas they are facing in their own lives and to describe how they imagine several of the novel's characters would resolve those dilemmas. An out-of-class activity might involve an independent project on some aspect of the topics at hand. Structure is moderate to low, allowing for far more independence than students at the dualistic stage are capable of; students must assume greater responsibility for class objectives, content, and evaluation. Thus, as the term progresses, students introduce some elements of course content and objectives focused on truth-telling that the instructor had either not considered, was unaware of, or had disregarded. "Personalism," a sense of community and trust, is still a key element in the course design; however, students at this stage possess a stronger sense of their self and values and are personally and publicly challenged in a manner far too threatening to students at earlier stages of development.
Summary

The characteristics of five distinct models of college-level moral education have been identified and described in some detail in this chapter. Although, in some instances, the advocates and practitioners of a particular model may not self-consciously or directly label their approach to moral education as a "model," it is possible in each case to identify an underlying body of theory or assumptions, to specify the major goals and objectives, and to describe the instructional methods. These models draw upon significantly different disciplines and encompass a diverse variety of assumptions about human nature and morality. The cognitive-developmental model is rooted in developmental psychological theory and research—postulating a progressive, hierarchical set of natural, human stages. The humanities model draws upon those traditional liberal arts disciplines that focus upon human culture and values; its practitioners legitimately lay claim to a special status: the approach with greatest historical depth and longest actual practice. The normative ethics model of moral education most clearly falls within the discipline of philosophy, yet moves beyond a concern with ethical meta-theory and history to a twentieth-century application of moral judgment to concrete moral questions and situations. The social scientific research on college student growth and development as well as the liberal arts aim of "education of the whole person" serve as underpinnings for the wholistic model. Advocates of this model either assume or argue that an integrated, autonomous individual most effectively benefits from a
broad, integrated education. The focus lies away from disciplines of knowledge and on patterns of individual student development. The values clarification model neither draws upon nor uses any of the traditional disciplines; it has no definitive theoretical basis. Instead, advocates emphasize its practical teaching techniques. (This model's hidden assumptions are identified in greater detail in the following chapter.)

The goals and objectives of each model do overlap, but when each approach is viewed as a whole and understood in theoretical context, there are, again, substantial variations. Adherents to the values clarification model set forth the individual's identification and selection of his/her values, the "prizing" or emotional and public affirmation of one's chosen values, and the consistent acting upon one's values as major goals. The normative ethics approach is markedly different; its practitioners advocate stimulating the moral imagination, learning to identify ethical issues, developing analytic skills, eliciting a sense of moral obligation and learning to tolerate—and reduce—both moral ambiguity and moral disagreement as the important goals and objectives. Helping individuals develop the ability to make value judgments in the decision-making process is an over-arching goal in the wholistic model. Specific objectives include: understanding one's own values and the impact of both individual and social values upon the community, understanding the relationship between human values and science and technology, knowing how to apply one's own values in decision-making, and recognizing and empathizing with the values of many different societies and peoples. Proponents of the humanities model of moral education set forth (with some minor
variations) these four major goals: teaching moral vision; requiring students to grapple with the major, enduring questions of human existence, purposes and goals; developing a critical, intellectual spirit; and, preserving and illuminating the greatest, classical works of humanity. The cultivated and planned progression through clearly defined developmental stages is the major goal of the cognitive-developmental approach. Moving students from dualistic and multiplicitic forms of knowing into a full recognition of relativism, teaching students to think relatively and contingently and to critically reflect on their own mode of moral reasoning, encouraging the intellectual risk-taking and courage necessary to move on to the next highest stage in the scheme—these are among the major objectives of this model.

In general, the actual instructional methods do not vary widely; instead, there are different emphases between the models. The values clarification approach is easiest to distinguish with its heavy reliance on such nondidactic and experiential teaching techniques as group interaction, sharing-discussion activities, and value "exercises." The wholistic model is, perhaps, most difficult to delineate since it appears to draw upon many different instructional and learning methods, everything from classroom lecture and sustained, critical reading and writing to value-oriented externships and informal debate. Whereas

15 These goals are closest in line with the philosophical premises and assumptions of the 1984 undergraduate curriculum report issued by William Bennet, "To Reclaim a Legacy."
teachers using the values clarification model typically select or create structured, group value exercises, those drawing upon wholistic theory feel free to use many, varied teaching resources: books, teachers from many disciplines, other students, values exercises, and so on. Traditional lecture, structured discussion, and the use of seminal, classical writings and works of art are the mainstay of humanities instruction. Advocates of this approach also emphasize the qualities of the instructor: individuals who themselves are liberally educated, possess moral vision, and are imbued with an appreciation for interdisciplinary learning. The normative ethics model offers instructional methods similar to those used in the humanities approach to moral education: lecture, critical reading and writing and structured discussion. It is distinguished by its creators and advocates through the use of a case-study approach to learning—presenting the specifics of real-life moral dilemmas, discussing, and then moving on to learn the underlying norms, moral principles and reasoning that are pertinent. Teachers drawing upon cognitive-developmental theory use their assessment of the individual student's developmental stage to determine the degree of teacher implemented structure, amount of warmth and personalism, and varying emphases from specific and concrete to general and abstract learning strategies and resources. Again, as with the wholistic model, there are few specific guidelines on actual learning resources or methods used within this developmental context.

As pointed out earlier, although each of these models are clearly distinguishable, they are similar in three important ways: the proponents of these models strongly advocate the important role of moral
all recognize that moral
values are being imparted to students, whether or not there is a
structured, curricular approach to moral education; and, each model
(or some variation thereof) is in actual, current use in American
colleges and universities. In this chapter, descriptions of each
model have been developed drawing upon like-minded groups of educa-
tional theorists and actual contemporary practices in the liberal
education curriculum. In the first three chapters a groundwork
has been laid for the analysis in the following chapters. The concept
of liberal education—its historical aims as well as its contemporary
curricular goals—is used to evaluate these five contemporary models
of college-level moral education. Which one, or what combination of
these models, is most suitable for incorporation into the liberal
studies curriculum?
Chapter 4: Critique of Models

The criteria used to evaluate the five contemporary models of moral education have been explained and developed in the second chapter. In a negative sense, a legitimate college or university model must not involve any form of indoctrination nor any direct emphasis on behavioral goals and objectives. In a positive sense, any acceptable curricular approach to moral education for college-aged youth and adults must emphasize intellectual development and a "critical appreciation of the ways we gain and apply knowledge." There need also be a strong connection with the traditional liberal arts focus on developing an "informed judgment" and an "ability to make discriminating moral choices" as well as on the more elusive curricular goal: teaching individuals to understand life in a wide context, to have "vision."

Which model or models of moral education could contribute most effectively to the overall liberal education of the student? More specifically, which model fits into such historical aims of liberal education as "integrating ethical and intellectual vision," "developing the ability to understand facts and details in light of principles and theories," "creating well-rounded individuals with knowledge and interests in a wide variety of areas," and "introducing students to the foundations of our common cultural heritage"? Clearly there can be no one model which can accomplish all of this, nor is there likely to be a model which is a perfect fit in, say, four out of five categories; rather, the point is to identify those approaches which are particularly well-synchronized with the aims, goals, and logical features of
liberal education, to exclude any that are entirely contradictory or inadequate.

Non-Indoctrinating

In each of the examined models of moral education a concerted effort is made to avoid (in principle and practice) the inculcation or transmittal of substantive values.¹ Whether through a focus on the process of acquiring and internalizing moral values, on the analysis of societal and intellectual values, on the principles of moral reasoning, or on the stages of moral development, each approach attempts to avoid the espousal of any given set of substantive and personal moral values or positions. Obviously, all wish to avoid any semblance of indoctrination; proponents of each model contend that their approach does provide for free choice, voluntary cooperation between teacher and student, and a strong emphasis on rational deliberation. Certainly, it is relatively simple to provide a paradigm case of moral indoctrination: a program of moral education which presented only one set of moral values as worthwhile and refused to reveal its own underlying principles and pedagogical philosophy; that held little or no respect for students' rights and placed no emphasis on the willing cooperation of the student in the learning process; and, that utilized pedagogical techniques that brought about change through manipulation of affective and emotional traits would cease to

¹By "substantive" values is meant values which are concrete and specific as opposed to those which are abstract and procedural—having to do with rules of form. Examples are developed in the text.
be considered educational. It would be indoctrination. For historical examples one might examine Froebel's theories on education in 19th century Germany. Among other major goals, Froebel espouses: obedience to authority, reverence for spiritual accomplishments of the past, and self-renunciation (in Boyd and King, 1980, pp. 349-51). Or, one may refer to Napoleon's reign under which all schools and colleges were required as the basis of instruction "to swear an oath of loyalty to the emperor, to the imperial monarchy as the trustee for the well-being of the people, and to the Napoleonic dynasty as guardian of French unity and of all the ideas proclaimed in the constitution" (in Boyd & King, 1980, p. 360).

Not one of these contemporary models directly involves the uncritical inculcation of substantive moral values; in other words, none teaches an explicit set of moral values drawn from a single religious or ideological base. However, all models of moral education, even those focused on "process," "principles," or "stages" make some assumptions about the nature of humanity, ethics, and current societal values. A solid bulwark against any slippage into indoctrination must be a continuing willingness on the part of the educator (and as an intrinsic component of the educational program) to examine and publicly reveal such underlying assumptions and principles and to make clear goals and pedagogical practices. In this sense, there are variations between

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2 See I.A. Snook's Indoctrination & Education (1972) and R. S. Peters' Ethics and Education (1970) for extended logical analyses of indoctrination.
the models. The normative ethics model and William Perry’s cognitive-developmental model have each set forth a clear range of goals and objectives; in *Intellectual and Ethical Growth During the College Years*, Perry cogently identifies the model’s philosophical and psychological assumptions and limitations. In the normative ethics approach, Rosen, Scriven, and others have carefully pointed out metaethical assumptions and make the critical examination of such philosophical premises an “official” component of the model. The wholistic and humanities models are somewhat more difficult to evaluate, in large part because they are not so clearly self-defined. In principle, there is nothing that mitigates against the ongoing analysis and disclosure of foundational assumptions and pedagogical practice in either model. In practice, however, there are certain aspects of each that could lead to indoctrination. For example, the wholistic approach, with its obvious regard for the development of the “whole” person and concomitant willingness to blur distinctions between the formal curriculum and learning-teaching with the extracurriculum and learning-experience.

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3 He acknowledges his debt to Jean Piaget and the developmental approach to understanding cognitive change and clearly identifies his intellectual base in “contextual pragmatism” and “relativism” (1970, pp. 201-203). Moreover, by the standards of his own scheme Perry himself does not (cannot) claim to have created an absolute standard for understanding and teaching moral development.

4 Indeed, in most normative ethics courses, the two questions initially posed are: “Why be moral?” and “Is there such a thing as morality?” Not only is there no preliminary commitment to a specific moral code, but there is no automatic assumption that morality itself is a viable or meaningful concept. Students are expected to make this judgment individually.
periences in general, runs a higher risk of relegating its emphasis on the rational analysis of moral values to a subordinate status. In a very practical sense, is there time for the teachers and administrators using a wholistic approach to step back and critically review the process of moral education itself? In the example given in chapter 3, the faculty serving in the "competence division of valuing" are meant to serve this function; in other applications, however, it may be all too easy to leave theoretical considerations behind in the over-arching effort to control and shape all, or most, aspects of individual growth and development. The humanities model also may be susceptible to indoctrination to the extent that it slips back into a form of instruction that existed in many sectarian colleges in the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. If the humanities are thought to embrace "first principles" in an absolute sense and to inculcate students in Western cultures' "common heritage," then intolerance and ethnocentrism may follow from this form of instruction. Or, if "vision" were to be defined solely in terms of the male, Judeo-Christian tradition and students were taught neither the knowledge nor abilities to move beyond to a wider definition and vision of "humans" and "humanity," then this may be rightly condemned as an indirect form of indoctrination.

These examples of potential problems are relatively minor, however, in comparison with the values clarification approach—which has

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5First principles, as defined by Robert Hutchins, refers to metaphysical ideals and moral and intellectual guiding principles.
been vehemently criticized by many others for covertly promoting con-
formity (Stewart in Purpel & Ryan, 1976, p. 130; Smith, 1977, p. 8).
The advocates of values clarification often claim to teach an entirely
"neutral" valuing technique; yet they neglect to identify and defend
their own underlying values and principles. One must search the values
clarification literature very carefully, indeed, to identify their
assumptions about human nature or philosophical premises about the
nature of moral values and reasoning. In the failure to effectively
and systematically deal with such theoretical questions, this model
unwittingly inculcates a form of relativism. For example, the student
who consistently and conscientiously clarifies his own personal values
(according to the scheme laid out in chapter 3), observes his or her
fellow students engaged in the same task, and notices the teacher in a
role restricted to nonjudgmental "facilitating" and "coordinating,
may assume that moral decision-making is solipsistic and that individ-
ual values are intrinsically worthwhile, not subject to critical
evaluation by any external standards. If a student clarifies his/her
values on "lying" and assumes an egoist or hedonistic perspective
("I will lie, or tell the truth, when it will help me or give me
pleasure"), there is little in this scheme that moves the student to
either critically evaluate and judge other individuals' value systems
or his/her own system. In short, no one can legitimately tell the
student that he/she is "wrong!". This may result in indoctrination
because the individual is never required nor even encouraged to
critically understand or question the underlying assumptions of the
approach to moral decision-making.
Indoctrination may also occur when teachers use pedagogical techniques that appeal exclusively to behavioral, attitudinal, or affective aspects of human development and learning. In this sense also, the values clarification model (and to a lesser extent the wholistic model) has potential drawbacks. With its strong emphasis on group-oriented, personally-revealing peer activities and on monitored, behavioral implementation, values clarification ironically risks the mutation of a supposedly "neutral" and "rational" clarification process—into a therapeutic counseling technique or, at worst, into a superficial, pedagogical game. Again turning to the example on lying and deception, the teaching strategies largely involved forms of group disclosure, behavioral monitoring, and "feeling" statements. In combination with a strong focus on the rational analysis of moral values and a forthright theoretical foundation, such methods might be useful and help keep collegiate-level moral education from assuming an arid, intellectualized approach; however, for reasons developed throughout this narrative, the values clarification model fails to provide an adequate model of moral judgment and reasoning. Thus, its emphasis on affective elements tends to predominate and lead to possible indoctrination.

The wholistic model may also risk indoctrination by utilizing pedagogical techniques that appeal to the nonrational dimensions of

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6 By "behavioral" is meant actual actions and conduct. "Attitude" refers to a combined manner of acting, feeling and thinking that reveals one's overall mental disposition; and "affective" is the mental dimension of feelings and emotions.
human development. In the sheer effort to cover all aspects of "valuing," in concert with no less than the "development of the whole person," the pedagogical methods, if not the principled intent, edge toward indoctrination. Again, there is no logical component to this model that necessarily promotes an exclusive focus on affective and emotional elements of growth. As pointed out in the description of this model, the attempt is to broaden the college educational enterprise and render it more pedagogically effective through including such affective elements, not by excluding reason and the development of rational abilities and skills. Yet the risk is apparent—as previously illustrated in the example on lying. If a relatively small group of faculty, student counselors, and administrators in a "competency division" rigidly structured all affective, behavioral, out-of-class activities while leaving the in-class, traditional academic course components uncoordinated and unintegrated, a form of indoctrination may occur. Or, at the very least, students may be bewildered by an education that overemphasizes the differences between "affective" and "cognitive" while also presenting a clear, unified approach to "valuing" in the affective sphere and a more haphazard, multi-disciplinary approach in the cognitive or intellectual domain. A student may come to believe that there can be no intellectual guidelines or intellectual process to help make decisions about deception and truth telling. His/her cynicism in this area may very well lead to an uncritical absorption in and acceptance of the implicit values imparted in extra- and noncurricular activities.

In summation, the values clarification model of moral education
runs the greatest risk of indoctrination. Although its explicit claim is for a neutral, unbiased process of valuing, as a matter of fact its goals and pedagogical methods (in themselves) are heavily focused on the affective dimension of learning and experiential learning, and advocates of this approach fail to incorporate a clear and critical understanding of morality and moral reasoning as an important component. The wholistic and humanities models of moral education are more difficult to identify as potentially indoctrinating. The bold attempt to educate and develop all aspects of the individual is so ambitious that it could lead to indoctrination. Also, instruction in the humanities runs this risk if the humanities are defined in a very narrow sense. Moreover, neither approach insists that students possess an in-depth critical understanding of morality and moral decision-making. This stands in marked contrast to the normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models of moral education. Advocates of both approaches require students to analyze metaethical assumptions and various patterns of moral reasoning; their goals are markedly clear and explicit and also focused on intellect and rationality and away from affective and behavioral aspects of human development. The normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models have the clearest and strongest conceptual safeguards against indoctrination.
A major danger in any model of moral education is the tendency to create all too specific objectives and to emphasize the creation of "good," "moral" individuals. This emphasis on specific, behavioral objectives and techniques rather than a reliance on either the more distanced, ultimate aims of liberal education or on the specific objectives focused on intellectual skills is closely linked to the risk of indoctrination. The efficaciousness of behavioral teaching and learning techniques is not in question, nor is their use among younger students or in curricular areas outside of moral education and goals centered upon valuing. However, in college-level programs of moral education, in keeping with the overall aims and methods of a liberal arts education, behavioral goals and systematic teaching methods are inappropriate for two major reasons: First, behavioral goals, almost inevitably, are concrete manifestations of a specific moral value system, thus indoctrination is very likely. Moreover, the likelihood of bypassing respect for students' autonomy and willing cooperation are heightened with behavioral objectives. Second, the primary liberal studies emphasis is on the intellectual development of the student. Behavioral approaches weaken or undermine that emphasis and tend to shift focus away from mastery of knowledge and intellectual skills to the achievement of specific types of behavior. In other words, most liberal education goals are in themselves non-behavioral (or at least not directly measurable through behavior in an immediate and obvious sense).
A paradigm case of a behavioral approach is described in B.F. Skinner's fictional work, *Walden II*. His is a society in which such traditional concepts as "freedom," "dignity" and "morality" are disregarded as empty verbiage and in which it is generally accepted that positive societal and individual goals and values are, in the overall scheme of things, already well known and accepted. Behavioral goals would, obviously, directly focus on shaping, changing, or controlling specific observable behaviors. Social and interpersonal skills that reduce or eliminate such anti-social (and immoral) behaviors as theft, greed, overambition, deception, hatred, and violence would be reinforced, and, in like manner, positive forms of social behavior involving benevolence, courtesy, care, and honesty would be rewarded. In addition, the entire learning environment would be designed in the manner considered most likely to promote correct behavior patterns. This focus on specific behavioral goals and outcomes, from the advocates' perspective, eliminates vagueness, lack of specificity, and inability to adequately evaluate learning outcomes. From the liberal education perspective, however, the exclusive or primary concentration on behavioral change is both intellectually shallow and ethically suspect.

Of the five contemporary models, only two have any type of explicit behavioral goals or teaching methods: The wholistic approach and the values clarification models. It is important to note, however, that in at least two senses all these models seek to change behavior (if behavior is defined in broader terms than actual bodily conduct). At the very least teachers attempt, in their own way, to
alter verbal behavior by imparting language and concepts that allow for an articulate, consistent means of developing and defending one's own moral values. And, as with many forms of education, the creators and practitioners of these models all wish to empower students to initiate and maintain their own behavioral changes. It is not, then, "behavioral change" per se that is the major and direct goal, but rather the potential for the individual student to change him/herself as a result of comprehensive intellectual development (see the Hastings Center study, *The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education*, 1980, pp. 54 & 55). The values clarification model, however, dwells far more specifically than this on direct behavioral change. In such exercises as "Values in Action," "Sensitivity Modules," and "Removing Barriers to Action," the model's final two goals of "acting on one's beliefs" and "acting with a pattern, consistency and repetition" are promoted; moreover, the pedagogical techniques themselves require a significant amount of direct behavioral participation. Thus, although this model's advocates eschew any authoritative stance in any set of moral values (other than the seven-step process-of-valuing scheme), they do encourage each student to affect some immediate behavioral change. Students in a "workshop" or "seminar" on lying and deception will be requested (if not required) to bring their behavior in line with their publicly espoused values (whatever they may be). Students may be asked not only to verbalize their values but also act them out in role plays and share their plans to act in accordance with those values.

In the wholistic model, as defined in the previous chapter, in
none of the objectives are there overt proposals for behavioral transformation. Yet the underlying theory, by definition, requires a systematic institutional response, the use of many different tools for change, and the integration of both cognitive and affective dimensions of growth. Also, there are college-level wholistic models (for two paradigmatic examples: Marshall International University, Iowa, and Bob Jones University, South Carolina) which do place strong emphasis on behavioral change. The line between encouraging each individual student to incorporate the behavioral and affective components of "valuing" and the creation of an institutional ethos which promotes conformity through attempting to shape and educate the "whole person" is neither firm nor fast. Even with a relatively mild, nondoctrinaire wholistic approach (such as that used by Alverno College), the risk of slipping into a behavioral emphasis is apparent. If such an institution chooses to comprehensively measure student outcomes on a four-year scale—an approach that goes well beyond traditional course-by-course grading—the tendency will be to create specific objectives and behavioral teaching methods that promote very direct, overt, measurable skills and competencies. While this may be a laudable approach for certain types of intellectual and physical skills, it falls far short of the liberal arts notion of teaching "discerning moral judgment" and of imbuing persons with "moral vision." Moreover, the tendency to measure behavioral outcomes stands in contradiction to the whole notion of liberal education as teaching "initiation into a process, a development" (Wegener, 1978, p. 126).
In summary, the normative ethics, humanities and cognitive-developmental models of moral education do not include direct behavioral goals or objectives. Although advocates of each recognize the importance of teaching improved skills in verbal "behavior" (as opposed to actual conduct) and also recognize the significance of long-term aims (such as empowering individuals to affect their own changes in conduct and life-style), they do not allow specific learning objectives—focused on altering individual behavior—as part of their model. The proponents of a wholistic approach or the values clarification model, however, are neither definitive nor clear on where the line is drawn between a legitimate focus on verbal or long-term behavioral aims and specific behavioral objectives in the curriculum. The values clarification model is focused on behavioral change in an all-too-immediate sense, risking both indoctrination and intellectual shallowness. The wholistic model's strength is also its weakness—in the sense that its comprehensive focus on all aspects of human development may be admirable at the level of aims and long-term goals, but dangerous when translated into specific curricular objectives (especially when measured in terms of behavioral outcomes).

Liberal Education: The Defining Criteria

Contemporary Goals Before outlining the contemporary goals of liberal education as the primary standard for critiquing models of moral education, two additional logical features of "liberal education" need to be reviewed. These two closely related logical features may
also help evaluate programs of moral education. First, liberal education is neither primarily nor directly focused on vocational or social ends. As pointed out in chapter 2, moral education in an undergraduate setting must, for example, avoid the narrowness of ethical training exclusively for good citizenship or the limited examination of moral issues in selected professions. Second, a program or course focused on morality must be firmly connected with liberal education's intellectual objectives. This does not exclude all forms of affective objectives or applied-learning approaches since "intellectual" is defined quite broadly to mean giving good reasons, thinking rationally, comprehending specific facts and general principles, and exercising sound moral judgment. It does, however, rule out educational models that place a primary or crucial emphasis on affective growth, experiential learning, behavioral change, or therapeutic counseling methods.

Does focusing on "training for specific ends or purposes" help discriminate between the models? Potentially, yes. Do any of these specific approaches to college-level moral education actually emphasize moral training toward specific or narrow goals? In short, the answer is no. Although the normative ethics model has frequently been used as part of the curriculum for professional training ("Ethics in Health and Medicine," "Business Ethics," and "Morality and Law," for example), neither its theoretical foundations nor its pedagogical methods preclude its use as a form of general education in the liberal arts curriculum. Historically, the humanities model has sometimes been promoted as a means of teaching responsible citizenship, but the humanities-as-a-means-of-moral-education has rarely, if ever, had
citizenship as an exclusive, or even primary, goal. As often as not, studies in the humanities have also been oriented toward the counterculture and have encouraged value-laden criticism of existing social mores and norms. In large part, the process-skill orientation of all five models (in combination with at least the intention to educate the individual in the broadest sense possible) has helped to ensure the avoidance of such narrow and limited goals as "training good citizens," "developing sensible consumers," and "producing honest politicians or ethical doctors." The remaining critical logical feature, a strong intellectual orientation, is so closely reflected in the contemporary major goals of liberal education that there is little need to dwell upon it at this point.

The goals of liberal education, as outlined at the conclusion of chapter 2, do provide important criteria. Clearly all programs of moral education need not directly match, one-for-one, all of the major goals. However, the objectives and teaching methods of any potential undergraduate program should indirectly relate to at least three or four of these goals; directly implement two or three; and not fall into direct contradiction with any of the five major goals. These are minimal criteria and appropriately so; it would be unrealistic to expect any single undergraduate program, discipline, or course (no matter what its major function) to accomplish all five goals:

7Counterculture is defined as either a sustained criticism of or a marked alternative to existing culture—people's shared reality as expressed in word, image, myth, philosophy, moral style and education.
to teach clear and effective writing and thinking; develop depth in a specific field of knowledge; instill a critical appreciation of how we learn and apply knowledge; teach skills in thinking about and understanding the moral realm; and develop sensitivity to and tolerance of other cultures and time periods. These five are positive, primary goals of the liberal education curriculum; they are not overarching collegiate aims, nor are they specific curricular objectives intended for some programs and courses and not for others. These goals occupy a central ground between the literature of aims (reviewed in the following section) and the curricular objectives proposed in each of these models. When one asks if they are related or connected, we are asking if the model's objectives are both logically and practically connected to one or several of the five goals. Do the models' objectives, and the teaching strategies that follow, help implement the major goals of liberal education?

Clear Thinking and Writing  An educated person must be able to think and write clearly and effectively. One undergraduate model of moral education places unequivocal, critical emphasis on this goal; the normative ethics model highlights the need to teach clear, concise writing and thinking skills. The recognition and examination of concepts, of prescriptive moral statements, and of principles and moral rules and the development of analytical and logical skills are stated objectives. Pedagogical practice emphasizes structured discussion and frequent written assignments; and criteria for evaluation center upon quality of argumentation, mastery of theory, and ability to accurately
express ideas and concepts in writing and in speaking. The normative ethics model directly implements this major goal. The humanities model is neither as emphatic nor as direct, yet clear writing and thinking are important and obvious elements of this approach as well. In the humanities such objectives as "conserve and cultivate the greatest works of humanity" and "foster a critical spirit" draw immediate attention to clear communication. The required reading of classics and guided pondering on seminal concepts and principles helps teach clear thinking and writing. The development of a critical spirit, one which does not accept matters at face value but rather searches for depth and symbolic meaning, also builds a student's ability to think clearly and communicate ideas effectively. Students who have systematically read, studied, and discussed such works as "Macbeth," Notes from the Underground, Native Son, and Animal Farm (to draw upon the example presented in chapter 3) are then called upon to write critical analyses and interpretations. Such students are being rigorously taught how to write and think for themselves; they are being presented with paradigm cases of clear and insightful thinking and writing. From the simple, forthright prose of Orwell's essays to the deep philosophical characterizations of Dostoevski's novels, students are called upon to read and critique different ways of communicating ideas, facts, and values, and to then attempt their own coherent thinking and writing.

The remaining three models of moral education are not so closely linked with this liberal education goal. In a theoretical sense, at least, not one of these models--wholistic, cognitive-developmental,
values clarification—works against clear thinking on writing. Yet the actual degree of emphasis on writing and communicating skills falls distinctly short of the first two models, and the definitions of what exactly constitutes "clear thinking" are far more divergent. The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education, by definition, stresses intellectual growth and movement through progressively more complex, more sophisticated stages of thinking. Clear thinking and writing are not, however, immediate objectives in themselves; rather, they are seen as probable results from objectives centered on individual development—guided through the stages of growth. In other words, the teaching of clear thinking and effective writing is one set of means toward moving students to "contextual relativism" and "commitment in relativism." The wholistic approach also stresses the student's personal development as paramount; the primary focus lies away from mastery of methods of inquiry or acquisition of knowledge or facts and rests squarely on the wholistic growth of the individual. The general objective for moral growth, "facility for forming value judgments within the decision-making process," again, does not directly stress clear thinking and writing. (The sixth and final outcome, "articulating and expounding upon one's value judgments at an advanced level," is unrequired and only occasionally selected by humanities majors.) Yet, required writing and critical thinking are perceived as means for human growth and are frequently used in practice. Advocates of the values clarification model have not proposed clear thinking and writing as direct objectives, despite this model's stress on "valuing" as a thinking skill. The direct, explicit objectives stress "choosing,"
"prizing," and "acting upon values"; the one specific objective, "public affirmation of values," which one might consider pertinent, is not at all clear in itself. "Public affirmation" may mean a spoken announcement regarding one's beliefs about truth-telling, or taking specific actions in accordance with stated beliefs. Although there is nothing that actually mitigates against this important liberal education goal, it plays a less prominent role in the values clarification approach. To a significantly larger degree, the teaching of clear writing and thinking is, at least, viewed as an effective pedagogical method by the proponents of the wholistic and cognitive-developmental models; and, as noted, the humanities model and most certainly the normative ethics model of moral education directly emphasize clear and effective thinking and communication as important educational objectives in themselves.

Depth in a Field of Knowledge. "An educated person should have achieved depth in some field of knowledge." Of all the liberal education goals, this might be considered one of the least helpful for distinguishing between models of moral education, since it primarily refers to the role of the major or concentration. No contemporary American college or university has chosen to offer an undergraduate academic major in "morality" or "moral discipline." In only one of the five models can one discover a proposal for either a disciplinary,
multi-disciplinary, or non-disciplinary major.\footnote{Although the possibility of an independent, student-created major is particularly evident in the normative ethics or wholistic models, it is only within the Humanities that one can identify an interdisciplinary major focused on moral judgment. See Mortimer Adler's \textit{Paideia Proposal} (1982).} Indeed, questions involving length and depth of study are largely ignored. The emphasis has been a minimal one—on introducing or integrating notions of moral reasoning and development within the curriculum, rather than expanding such ideas into a complete major or discipline. Nevertheless, because this goal encompasses the power of cumulative focused learning as a means of developing students' abilities in reasoning and analysis, it is not irrelevant. Is morality a field of knowledge or a discipline? Or, even more basically, is there such a thing as moral knowledge? Can (or should) one specialize in "moral reasoning" as one unique intellectual skill? These obviously are difficult epistemological questions—well beyond the purview of this thesis. Yet, at least indirectly, each model does assume basic parameters, some implicit answers to these questions (as is the case in this dissertation). For example, it might make sense to achieve "depth" in morality as a field of knowledge in one model (for example, normative ethics)—but not within another (for example, values clarification).

The humanities model typically does not emphasize either depth or cumulative knowledge in morality; in this approach—whether the focus is on moral reasoning as a skill or on moral knowledge as a content area—moral education is subsumed under those traditional disciplines and great works constituting the arts and humanities. From this perspective many lessons can be drawn from a systematic
exposure to the classics, among them lessons in morality and moral decision-making; yet the notion of sustained, in-depth learning in morality itself is largely disregarded if not actively rejected. In a sense the typical humanities' response to a continuing "narrow" examination of moral ways-of-knowing or reasoning is to accuse such programs of sanitized rationality and historical vacuity. In other words, it is the ideas and methods inherent in religion, history, art and literature which give shape and meaning to moral experience and moral knowing. One "concentrates" on art or literature, or religion, while moral ways-of-knowing, judgment, and vision are presumed, natural consequences of such sustained exposure.

Advocates of the wholistic model of moral education are vague about morality as a potential depth-field of study. Although all students are called upon to develop incremental skills in "forming value judgments within the decision-making process," tellingly, it is only humanities majors who (sometimes) proceed to the three more advanced levels of "value decision-making." Once again, the notion of real, cumulative knowledge in morality is largely neglected in the attempt to develop many different aspects of the individual and to introduce the student to many varied areas of knowledge and personal development. The student who has been exposed to cultural anthropology seminars focused on societal values and practices in truth-telling and deception; to student personnel workshops on the college's honor code principles; and to an externship experience in an urban ghetto sponsored by the Religion Department, may not have intellectually concentrated on an aspect of moral reasoning and knowledge so
much as engaged in an eclectic, trans-disciplinary set of learning experiences. If wholistic learning can be regarded as multi- or trans-disciplinary learning, the values clarification model of moral education is essentially non-disciplinary. It has little or no basis in the historically-developed disciplines of knowledge, and even its most devout proponents do not claim its status as an area of knowledge. Although the wide variety of clarification skills and techniques may lead to a form of interpersonal knowledge in the sense that an individual may become more aware of his/her existing values, in general, however, this model fails to provide either the theoretical basis or conceptual depth necessary for sustained, intellectual inquiry.

The normative-ethics model, on the other hand, is rooted in ethics as a long-standing discipline of philosophy. Earlier in this thesis Paul Taylor was quoted, claiming that "moral growth occurs ... as the individual develops his capacity to reason about his moral beliefs." This applied philosophical approach to moral education definitively emphasizes in-depth intellectual skills focused on the moral dimension to life. Intellectual coherence and consistency, justification of moral rules and principles, development of a working vocabulary in moral reasoning, stimulation of the moral imagination are basic programmatic objectives. Although, as with all these models, there seem to be no actual undergraduate concentrations or majors in normative ethics, the flourishing of academic journals and centers for study centered on ethical issues and applied ethical reasoning are, in themselves, indications of the possibilities for sustained, critical inquiry, for an in-depth understanding in this area of
knowing. Moreover, the model intrinsically encourages in-depth moral reasoning and a developed ability at moral judgment whether or not it is relegated to single course status, expanded to a more prolonged series of courses, or developed into an entire program. The cognitive-developmental approach, on the other hand, is more ambiguous in this regard. Although increasing the "cognitive" complexity and sophistication of the individual is one of the key goals, in-depth learning in a single area of knowledge is not a direct component of this model. With its roots implanted in a psychological understanding of human intellectual growth, the cognitive-developmentalists emphasize teaching and learning methods which will move students away from "dualism" and toward "relativism" and, eventually, "commitment-in-relativism." Yet, there is nothing that precludes in-depth disciplinary (or interdisciplinary) learning as one means of attaining those goals. Indeed, the actual models developed by Lee Knekelkamp et al. utilize well-known literary works (some classical works) and demand much verbal and written analysis from the students. Although content knowledge and in-depth skills in critical reasoning may be of secondary importance in this overall scheme of individual development, they are by no means irrelevant. Instead, the role of in-depth knowledge and reasoning skills are recast, placed in the context of teaching toward the intellectual and ethical maturity of the individual student. In summation, the values clarification and wholistic models provide negligible emphasis on intellectual depth, on sustained critical reasoning in one field of knowledge. The cognitive-developmental and humanities approaches occupy a central ground, neither excluding such a form of
moral learning nor directly affirming it. The one contemporary model which very clearly provides a possible structure for intellectual concentration is, then, the normative ethics approach.

**Critical Appreciation of ... Knowledge and Understanding**  
"An educated person should have a critical appreciation of the ways in which we gain and apply knowledge and understanding of the universe, of society, and of ourselves." Essentially, this educational goal emphasizes the need for, at the very least, an "informed acquaintance" with each of the major ways-of-knowing. This is no detailed commitment to a specific set of disciplines or to a specific way of structuring and organizing knowledge. Instead, the focus is, in a very general sense, on becoming aware of and having some experience in a wide variety of ways-of-knowing and, just as important, on developing a critical appreciation of those ways. In other words, for the liberally educated person the categories of knowledge themselves, the ways that we humans "know" things are not fixed, immutable categories; they, too, are subject to analysis and revision. Implicit in this goal, then, is the philosophical belief that critically understanding the methods and structures through which we analyze and understand ourselves and the universe is of fundamental importance.

In terms of introducing students to many different ways of knowing, one commonly thinks of the entire curriculum, not a single course or one course of study, as the means to achieve disciplinary breadth of knowledge. Only with the humanities and wholistic models is there any sustained effort to provide exposure to a variety of disciplines
--all in the attempt to morally educate. The various levels of "value decision making" in the wholistic approach require experience and skills in interpersonal knowing (what Phillip Phenix referred to as "synnoetics," 1964); in psychology and sociology; in the natural sciences and technology; and in cross-cultural and artistic forms of understanding. Using this goal, however, it is more useful to inquire if any of the models utterly fails to contribute to a critical appreciation of the ways we gain and apply knowledge and understanding. Such a charge is very difficult, indeed, to level at either the humanities or normative ethics models. Each model has intellectual understanding as an important objective. The normative ethics model centers on the teaching of critical reflective morality and emphasizes analytic skills and a metaethical understanding of the moral dimension and moral language. The humanities model draws upon the disciplines of history, religion, philosophy, literature, and the arts (and occasionally, the social sciences) to teach skills in moral judgment and to develop moral vision and imagination. Knowledge of and respect for the many, varied ways that human beings come to understand the world, themselves, and human experience is an important aspect of this traditional approach.

As already noted, the wholistic model does expose a student to a wide variety of disciplines, but it also introduces students to many other ways of growing and developing that are not exclusively focused on intellect and reason. In a positive sense, this approach has helped to stretch our notion of human reason and to become far more critical of a "purely" intellectual, rationalized form of education; and,
perhaps, it has also helped teachers and students to become more aware of and sensitive to the emotional and psychological basis of learning. The wholistic approach to education is not, however, as directly and forthrightly committed to a critical appreciation of the ways we gain and apply knowledge as either the normative ethics or humanities models. In practice, one is left with the impression that the wholistic curriculum is designed so very broadly, with the individual student's growth and needs as the primary goal, that there is comparatively less time and effort for critically examining the methods of intellectual understanding and the structures of knowledge. The same risk is apparent with the cognitive-developmental model, in which the moral education of the individual is, first and foremost, defined in the developmental terms of human needs and individual growth patterns. Although a critical familiarity with the traditional categories and disciplines of knowledge is only of secondary importance, this model, nevertheless, does emphasize cognitive patterns of growth and uses forms of critical inquiry to move the student from simpler ways of knowing and understanding to more complex patterns. Neither of these latter two models, then, in any sense "utterly fails" to emphasize a critical appreciation of the ways we gain and apply knowledge.

The values clarification model, however, falls far short of the other four models. With its heavy reliance on such pedagogical techniques as simulation games, role playing, and group sharing, little emphasis is given to serious intellectual debate or to questioning of substantive value positions or to the process of reasoning itself. The focus on values as "the broad realm of human preference" seems to
leave little time for the extended analysis of moral values as distinct and crucial to the human situation. Moreover, this model's objectives, centering as they do on "awareness," "sharing," "clarification," and "implementation," depart widely from the primary liberal education goal of critical examination of knowledge. Indeed, the model's proponents scrupulously avoid mention of a disciplined, structured approach to moral knowledge; rather, it would seem, values are "pre-existent" and the only role of the "values educator" is to prod each student into an awareness and clarification of his/her existing value system. If critically understanding the methods and structures with which we analyze and understand ourselves and the universe is also of fundamental importance, then the values clarification approach to moral "awareness" and development is, again, clearly inadequate. This model's proponents show markedly little sense of the metaphysical and ethical assumptions of their own educational methods as well as those of academic disciplines and other educational structures.

Cannot be Provincial. "A crucial difference between the educated and the uneducated is the extent to which one's life experience is viewed in wider contexts." This combination of intellectual maturity and ethical insight resulting in an attitude of open-mindedness and tolerance is another important, intended outcome of a liberal education. Courses, programs, and educational practices which help implement this goal are contributing to the liberal arts enterprise. "Viewing life in a wider context" and being fully aware of "other cultures and other times" requires factual knowledge and an historical
and cultural understanding of peoples and times different from one's own, but it also calls upon the ability (and willingness) to step outside of one's self, one's personal circumstances, to exercise imagination and an extended sense of sympathy. Again, do these contemporary approaches to moral education contribute to this liberal goal? Or, in a negative sense, do any completely fail to do so? In both the humanities and wholistic models a direct emphasis is placed upon other cultures and other peoples. A critical objective of the humanities model is "to teach vision," and vision is defined as "seeing alternatives, gaining perspective by obtaining standards of comparison from ... past and present." Students read classic works and experience great art from many different cultures—all in the attempt to create more humane, more civilized people. In the wholistic model, two objectives subsumed under the general goal of "ability to form value judgments in the decision-making process" are: "understanding the impact of individual and group value choices upon the human community" and "recognizing and empathizing with the values of different and diverse human groups." In the example developed in chapter 3, students are exposed to an anthropological study of different cultural attitudes and practices on various forms of deception and are also asked to survey a variety of ethnic, urban groups, suburbanites, and rural populations in order to develop a sense of divergent beliefs and attitudes about lying. Through directly examining the values, culture, and history of other peoples, both the wholistic and the humanities models contribute to the development of a broader context for knowing and understanding ourselves, others, and the world-at-large.
The normative ethics and cognitive-developmental approaches to moral education are not as directly focused on the study of other cultures and times, yet in a different sense both do contribute to the educational struggle against provincialism. Advocates of the normative ethics model propose two curricular objectives which are very clearly connected: "stimulating the moral imagination; and "toleration--and reduction--of both ambiguity and disagreement in the moral realm." With its focus on rules and critical reasoning, this approach is more "process-oriented" than either the humanities or wholistic models, and it does not, in itself, dwell upon the historical facts and cultural artifacts of other countries or peoples. Nevertheless, in the attempt to prod the moral imagination, to enable students to see that there is a moral point of view, and with the effort to instill a sense of toleration that must follow from unanswered questions and inevitably conflicting values, the practitioners of this model are indeed contributing to the overall goals of liberal education.

In the same manner, the cognitive-developmental approach does not directly teach about the culture and values of peoples and times other than our own, yet it does emphasize curricular objectives which bring about awareness and toleration of different peoples and ways of life. For example, the student operating with a dualistic intellectual and ethical orientation is--in a very planned sense--exposed to a diversity of opinions and values, challenged to assume more responsibility for his/her learning, and supported by a clear, straightforward learning structure. The immediate objective is to guide the student on into the stages of multiplicity and relativism. Increased cognitive com-
plexity, improved ability to think abstractly, an increased degree of internally-guided behavior, and a much greater sense of context and interdependency in human relationships are among the characteristics embodied in this continuing educational challenge to eventually move the student to the advanced stages of "relativism" and on to "commitment in relativism." As these higher stages, or objectives, are described by Perry, and others who have applied his theory, it is clear that such an individual could not, would not, be provincial or narrow in either his/her intellectual or ethical decision-making.

This, again, leaves for final consideration the values clarification model. Does this approach to moral education encourage students to view their life's experiences in a wider context, to combat narrow-minded provincial attitudes? This model's proponents wish to develop people who choose their values freely from among seriously considered alternatives, who cherish and publicly affirm their chosen values, and who consistently act upon their choices. There is nothing that excludes the introduction of other cultures' values and attitudes into the pool for "free selection." Indeed, at an elementary-level several values clarification educators have developed historical and social scientific curricular materials which teach children about other regions of the world in a bias-free manner. The major potential drawbacks with this model lie in its almost exclusive focus on the indiv-

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9See Kirschenbaum's Advanced Values Clarification (1977) for examples.
idual and in its unwillingness to accept or teach moral judgment. In the example presented in the third chapter the instructor and the students refrain from passing moral judgment on the expressed values of the class participants. Values are freely chosen feelings that are individually held, subjective, and not to be subjected to external or peer testing or evaluation. If a student has freely chosen deception and lying as continuing, viable values for her/himself, then (so long as those values are freely and thoughtfully chosen and cherished and publicly acted upon) others must openly accept this. Taken to its logical extreme, this approach to moral education may create "values solipsism," individuals who remain provincial because they are asked only to choose and clarify their own values. Although there may be room in this model for free selection of values from many different cultural and historical traditions, there does not seem to be a place for any sustained dialogue and debate. This serious question, therefore, can be posed: Without engaging in any serious intellectual and ethical debate between various competing points of view, can an individual evolve or grow into a wider, more mature, and less provincial context for moral knowing and understanding? And, is an individual authentically tolerant and open-minded if he/she willingly accepts any form of values in an intellectual (and ethical) nondiscriminatory manner? At the very least, these are reservations, pointing to fundamental weaknesses in this model's contribution in combating provincial thinking and values.
The contemporary goal, "An educated person is expected to have some understanding of, and experience in thinking about, moral and ethical problems," dwells upon the cognitive elements of moral education, on "informed judgment," and on the ability to make "discriminating moral choices." Again, the normative ethics and the cognitive developmental models appear to be the most clearly and straightforwardly committed to the role of analytic and synthetic reason in moral education and to the general role of reason in moral decision-making. Obviously, however, in a broad sense all five models propose to teach a deeper understanding of moral problems and improved abilities in moral decision making. The very point of this thesis is to distinguish between these models --beyond the sweeping and amorphous statements of aims. This final goal, then, is, in this instance, an unhelpful criterion; unhelpful because it deals so very directly with moral education itself and does not offer any detailed breakdown of objectives. This chapter now concludes with a review of the liberal education tradition as one final means for helping select an effective and ethical model of college-level moral education. This criterion draws upon the general, historical analysis of the overarching aims and purposes of liberal education--as developed in chapter 2.

Liberal Education: The Defining Tradition

Running through the entire liberal arts tradition has been a concern for intellectual and ethical vision; a rejection of a narrow, specialized or technical education; and a firm belief in the need to
develop the ability to understand details and facts in light of principles and theories. In an ideal sense, the liberal studies educator introduces the student to the ongoing concerns of human culture and civilization, engages the student in the intellectual examination of our common heritage, and frees him/her from the fetters of ignorance, prejudice, and societal conformity. Moreover, the search for truth and the creation of an ethical individual have served as ultimate aims for liberal education in a manner unlike that embraced by the large modern university (which has tended to emphasize the advancement of knowledge, professionalism, and service to society) or the community college (which has tended to emphasize social egalitarianism, vocationalism, and direct service to the community).

Besides this continuing concern for the integration of intellect and ethical vision, there has been a strong focus on educating the whole person—as a person—and not solely in one, or more, of our many assumed or imposed roles. These two aims of liberal education, especially, work together to give this form of higher education a distinctly ethical context. The "family resemblance" of liberal education, in large part, lies in this push to have individuals grapple with the ethical problems and meaning(s) of human existence. The liberal educator believes that ultimately this is a personal, individualistic task and that it is, in itself, a moral endeavor which helps create and nurture autonomous, free-thinking individuals. To re-cite Murchland:

Historically, liberal education has addressed itself to the task of determining and clarifying human needs
and values. It was from the beginning a perfective process, a shaping of human sensibility toward desirable and rationally justified patterns of action. It was quite frankly an ethical enterprise. (1976, p. 22)

In the contemporary overview of liberal education, reference was made to the writings of Paul Hirst and Charles Wegener; each of them describes liberal education as an initiation into the process of intellectual activity. Essentially they both contend that liberal education must be concerned with the comprehensive development of the mind. This emphasis moves well beyond the acquisition of factual knowledge to an understanding of experience from many perspectives, the ability to understand complex conceptual schemes, and a familiarity with the "arts and techniques of different types of reasoning and judgment" (Hirst, 1974, p. 47) including moral reasoning. How, then, does each contemporary model of moral education fit into this, the tradition of Cardinal Newman and "The Yale Report," of Alfred North Whitehead, and of contemporary liberal studies educators and philosophers?

The techniques and goals of the values clarification model as well as those of the wholistic model do point to certain aspects of human morality which, undoubtedly, are significant. However, their role in the formal undergraduate curriculum should be negligible when one considers the historical focus and mission of liberal education as briefly outlined above. This level and type of education is grounded in a view of the older student as autonomous and rational. Actual moral
behavior is not taught in such a setting; rather, a capacity for principled thinking and critical moral analysis is developed as free as possible from the influences of unacknowledged or dogmatic moral instruction. Each individual must be free to question and choose his own substantive goals and values. A model for moral education in the liberal arts curriculum should provide the individual with the rationally developed criteria and intellectual heritage necessary to understand and analyze ethical action and principles, to systematize and examine his own selected moral values, and to understand, and to some degree tolerate, the ambiguity and differences that inevitably arise within his own schema as well as others'.

Neither the wholistic nor the values clarification approaches as models of college-level moral education accomplish this. There are very clear dangers of indoctrination with values clarification and far too much emphasis on behavioral change in both models. Utilizing the contemporary goals of liberal education as criteria, the values clarification model falls far short of any acceptable standard. The wholistic model is more ambiguous. Although the struggle against provincialism is an important objective and although the aim of the entire model is, after all, education of the whole person, there is little direct emphasis on clear thinking and writing in moral decision-making, on in-depth learning in morality as a legitimate field of study, or on a more critical, analytic appreciation of knowledge.

At first glance, it may seem that the humanities model of moral education should fit quite well into the liberal education tradition, and, indeed it is a far more acceptable alternative than either of the
two aforementioned models. The humanities model so richly draws upon the humanistic classics of (at least) Western civilization, and it does claim "the teaching of ethical vision" as one important objective. However, although this model does not dwell upon behavioral objectives or techniques, it does, oddly enough, risk indoctrination (at least to a small degree). As indicated earlier, if the humanities or "human" were defined narrowly (perhaps solely in terms of white male, upper class, Judeo-Christian tradition) then this may lead to a narrow, blind form of inculcation. An unlikely occurrence in practice perhaps, yet this essentially is one of the major 20th century criticisms leveled at the entire liberal arts tradition. In short, to the extent that liberal education (and especially the humanities) has embraced "idealism" as its philosophy, Western classics as its primary learning resources, and the didactic lecture as its pedagogical method, it has become intellectually and socially elitist, closed to innovation, and narrowly doctrinaire. As pointed out in chapter 2, the liberal education philosophy has moved well beyond these criticisms, yet the humanities-as-a-model-for moral education remains suspect on this account. An equally serious concern lies with this model's lack of focus on moral reasoning. In using the liberal education objective of "depth in a field of knowledge," it became clear that the humanities form of moral education typically does not emphasize depth or cumulative knowledge in morality. Instead, moral education is subsumed under the traditional disciplines, topically oriented interdisciplinary programs, or the classics of Western culture; students are expected to become aware of the moral dimension and
Implications rather than concentration on ethics itself as a field of knowledge and on morality as a framework for decision-making.

This leaves both the normative ethics and cognitive developmental models for more extensive consideration. With their focus on linking intellectual and ethical growth, developing skills in moral reasoning, and encouraging the making of value commitments and decisions, these two models closely connect with the contemporary goals and the historical tradition of liberal education. This does not exclude consideration of all aspects of other models of moral education. The humanities are "turned down" not in themselves but rather as a specific, concerted means of re-establishing the undergraduate curricular focus on moral development and reasoning. The values clarification approach is soundly rejected as a comprehensive model; yet in another context—with a strong, ethical underpinning—some values clarification techniques may be effective and worthwhile. In this sense, then, an integrated model may draw upon many different aspects of several existing models.

The fifth, final chapter is primarily focused on the normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models of moral education in a liberal studies setting. These two approaches are described in greater detail, reasons for their integration are developed, pedagogical methods and resources which emerge from the synthesis are outlined, and a summary of this approach to selecting and developing an acceptable college-level model of moral education is offered in the conclusion.
Chapter 5: An Integrated Model of Moral Education

Normative Ethics and Cognitive-Developmental

These two models have best met the minimal criteria for inclusion as components of a liberal education. Each has already been described and evaluated; this chapter, then, begins with a more detailed overview of each model's underlying theoretical base and re-explication of the major objectives. The connection with the goals and ideals of liberal education are identified and analyzed and from this analysis the possibility of integrating these two approaches to moral education emerges. It is argued that the cognitive-developmental and normative ethics models are complementary; that, in combination, these two approaches most effectively contribute to the broader aims and goals of contemporary liberal education.

Again, in order to avoid a sense of absolute exclusivity, it is important to explain the context in which the humanities, wholistic, and values clarification approaches to moral education have been excluded from further consideration. Each of these three has some distinctive weaknesses or shortcomings as models that provide connections with liberal education aims and purposes, supplement the curricular goals of liberal studies, and, in general, abide by the basic logical criteria for liberal education. There may be aspects or components of each approach to college-level moral education that are helpful, pedagogically effective, and ethically appropriate within the framework of an integrated model of moral education. For example,
the focus on teaching moral vision and stimulating the moral imagination are important and worthwhile goals of the humanities model; moreover, the immense wealth of literary and artistic works could serve as powerful resources for instruction in morality.

The cognitive-developmental model, as has already been described, consists of numerous positions or hierarchical stages of growth. The particular scheme of William Perry has been selected since, unlike other developmental schemes, it is focused on college education as the context for understanding and encouraging individual growth and change. There are, of course, other developmental theories which do parallel Perry's stage designations. Both Lawrence Kohlberg (1975, 1981) and Jane Loevinger (1976) have created theories and concepts which come close to matching Perry's stages of "dualism," "multiplicity," "relativism," and "commitment in relativism." Dualism serves as a description for students who experience and understand the world in polar terms of "us and them," "right and wrong," "good and bad." Diversity of knowledge and values is barely perceived, but if it is experienced, such students attribute the diversity to confusion or some artificial "test" established by an authority figure. This beginning stage for many college freshmen is paralleled by Kohlberg's "punishment-obedience" and "instrumental-relativist" orientations and by Loevinger's "impulsive" and "self-protective" stages of ego development. Both "multiplicity" and "relativism" have closely connected concepts as well. At the stage of multiplicity a student begins to accept some diversity and uncertainty as legitimate and may even decide that "anyone has a right to his own opinion" and
set this attitude over and against a perceived authority dictating "right and wrong" or "good and bad." Loevinger's "self-aware" and "conscientious" stages and Kohlberg's conventional levels of "interpersonal concordance" and "law and order" at least partially match Perry's multiplicity stage. At the level of relativism students perceive all knowledge and values, including any authority's (be he or she a moral or intellectual "authority") as relativistic and dependent upon circumstance and context. Relativism sometimes results in the existential experience of feeling lost and alone in a meaningless world, seemingly with no standards and no certainty. Loevinger's "individualistic" stage is equivalent, and to a lesser degree, Kohlberg's post-conventional stage of "social contract, legalist orientation" is equivalent (an individual who sees no certainty may need to create order and structure with his/her colleagues). This third basic stage points to a strong personal awareness of the relativity of others' opinions and values, the circumstantial nature of one's own existence and identity, and a movement away from concrete and specific rule-oriented thinking toward a more abstract, "higher principles" form of reasoning. Moving the student toward a relativistic concept of him/herself and of the world of knowledge and values is an essential prerequisite toward the final position. In this sense, the earlier stages, then, are not terminal (or teleological) goals, but rather instrumental goals, pointing the way toward moral and intellectual commitment and maturity. In other words, "dualism," "multiplicity" and "relativism" (or their Loevinger/Kohlbergian equivalents) are not ends in themselves; rather, they serve as useful descriptors
and intermediary objectives, providing the educator with a conceptual framework to both understand students and help move them beyond simplistic and dogmatic ways-of-knowing and valuing.

Perry's final and highest stage, "commitment in relativism," describes an individual who recognizes that despite the circumstantial nature of identity and intellect and the sometimes overwhelming diversity of moral values, he/she must be willing to accept responsibility for developing his/her own personal commitments. In Perry's words, "(an individual) experiences the affirmation of identity among multiple responsibilities and realizes commitment as his ongoing, unfolding activity through which he expresses his life style" (1970, p. 10).

Loevinger's "autonomous and integrated" level and Kohlberg's sixth stage, the "universal-ethical principle orientation," are also characterized by advanced conceptual complexity, a strong ability to tolerate, and even value, diversity and ambiguity, and a breadth of objectivity of understanding grounded in a strong sense of self. This final position does, indeed, serve as a teleological aim, an end-goal. Although all stages in such developmental schemes are more than mere psychologically-descriptive terms, it is especially clear that the highest or final stages are normative; that "commitment in relativism" is a statement of value, of intended educational outcome.

Perry's own discussion on the philosophical context and assumptions of his scheme is instructional; he does not at all deny that the
highest developmental stages embody specific values:¹

We would argue, for example, that the final structures of our scheme express an optimally congruent and responsible address to the present state of man's predicament. These are statements of opinion. Even with the strength of convictions, they remain opinions and their explicit statement may relieve them of suspicion of pretension of the absolute. (1970, p. 45)

Although he does not attempt to develop an extended philosophical justification for these higher stages as educational objectives, Perry is careful to stipulate that, despite these implicit values, on another level the scheme is quite objective and insists on individual choice. The structural generalizations of the scheme do not allow for approval or disapproval of individual actions nor of specific values. Perry points out that

a student at an advanced position of development in our scheme might commit himself to a faith in a religion which includes a faith in an absolute order manifest in human affairs in Natural Law. Even if we ourselves disagreed at concrete levels, we would still be free to honor his values, since, in our context, he

¹This is an honest admission, which helps open the door for philosophical analysis and a comparison with similar psychological schemes which measure many of the same characteristics but utilize a different conceptual framework to do so. In this chapter the comparisons with Kohlberg and Loevinger's schemes helped establish this point.
has elected them in a world which he has learned to consider from another point of view, as relativistic. If he continues to respect the legitimacy of relativistic valuing in others and also others' faiths in other absolutes, his Commitment to an absolute represents, for us, not a failure of logic . . . but a considered and courageous acceptance of an unavoidable stress. (1970, p. 202)

Indeed, the implicit values in Perry's scheme arise out of a specific ethical and epistemological view of the world—of humanity's understanding of knowledge and experience as relativistic. Obviously, Perry is very much aware of and concerned with the individual's understanding of relativism in many forms. It is his contention that for the college student, especially, confrontation with pluralism in values, life styles, and ways-of-knowing is a nearly inescapable experience in the 20th century—present in the classroom and out of it. He points to cultural diversity as a deliberate policy of liberal arts colleges as also contributing to the development of relativistic knowing (1970, p. 6). However, Perry critiques education which then fails to lead the student to grapple with this existent diversity and to make personal choices:

Modern pluralistic education, with all its pros and cons in every subject, is criticized for not teaching commitment, indeed for leading students away from it. What we have been saying from our understanding of our records is that: (1) without a clear view of
pluralism, commitment as we define it is impossible; and (2) commitment can be provided for and given recognition, but it can never be brought about or forced. (1970, p. 37)

The links with the traditional aims and goals of liberal education become more explicit as Perry identifies distinctive features of an educated person, including the ability to think relatively and contingently and the ability to think about thinking itself (1970, p. 37). He contends that in contrast to the anti-intellectual, the "liberally educated man . . . is one who has learned to think about even his own thoughts, to examine the way he orders his data and the assumptions he is making, and to compare these with other thoughts that other men might have" (1970, p. 39).

Dualism and multiplicity are, then, untenable positions for a liberally educated person, and according to Perry, the diffuse relativism of position five is impossible to maintain for a long period of time.\(^2\) An individual truly immersed in this way-of-knowing must move toward either commitment in some form or toward the detached and destructive alienation of "escape."\(^3\) Although Perry claims that the educator cannot and should not explicitly "bring about" or force

\(^2\)The overt implication is that it is psychologically impossible, but the tacit implication is that it is ethically lacking.

\(^3\)Perry defines "escape" as the exploitation of the opportunity for detachment offered by the structures of positions four and five to deny responsibility through passive or opportunistic alienation (1970, p. 9).
commitment, he also contends that this developmental crisis (the move forward toward commitment or retreat into simpler modes of knowing and believing) imposes "a profound responsibility on the educator, a responsibility which is no longer a separable moral task like "building character" which was once somehow 'tacked on' to regular teaching" (1970, p. 212). Thus, the development of personal identity and meaning becomes intertwined with the accumulation of knowledge and practice in intellectual skills. This pedagogical push toward commitment-making calls for "an act of faith, the affirmation of personal choices, after the long and stressful period of detachment, doubt, and awareness of alternatives. Enduring commitments to moral positions, political ideologies, life and career goals, and interpersonal values may be achieved during the college years, but more often than not, crystallization of commitments does not occur until well into one's twenties or thirties" (Goldberger, Marwine, & Paskus, n.d., p. 3). Perry believes that this is also an act of courage:

since each step in the development presents a challenge to a person's previous assumptions and requires that he redefine and extend his responsibilities in the midst of increased complexity and uncertainty, his growth does indeed involve his courage. In short, the development resembles what used to be called an adventure of the spirit.

(1970, p. 44)

Drawing from this more detailed review of the philosophical premises of this cognitive-developmental model, these specific educational
goals emerge:
- moving the student away from dualistic and multiplistic forms of knowing into a full recognition of relativism in a pluralistic universe.
- developing the student's ability to orient him/herself in a relativistic world through personal commitment.
- developing the student's ability to think relatively and contingently and to critically reflect on his/her own modes of reasoning and judgment.
- promoting individual, and personal, meaning-making, free from either simplistic adoption of or automatic rebellion against an authority's power, and grounded in critical awareness of many legitimate ways of making meaning.
- encouraging the intellectual risk-taking and the courage necessary to progress to the highest stage in the scheme.

The educational goals and philosophical premises of the normative ethics model are more direct and in little need of explication beyond that offered in the third chapter. Two of this model's goals—"recognizing ethical issues" and "developing analytical skills"—are straightforward and relatively non-controversial since they dwell upon traditional rational skills. "Eliciting a sense of moral obligation," "stimulating the moral imagination," and "tolerating—and reducing—moral disagreement and ambiguity" are somewhat more problematic since each moves beyond a narrow, analytic definition of reason. "Stimulating the moral imagination" is not unlike a humanities objective for moral education, perhaps an objective subsumed under "developing moral
vision." This goal does, indeed, serve as an antidote to a narrowly analytic focus on moral reasoning; it acknowledges that imagination is also part of human intellect, and serves to reinforce the notion that there can be a "moral point of view" (distinct and different from legal, psychological, or religious points-of-view, for example). Providing case studies and specific examples of moral dilemmas helps stimulate the personal feelings, emotions, and imagination necessary (although not fully sufficient) for moral reasoning and discourse. In the Hastings Center volume, The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education (1980, pp. 80-81), the curricular objectives of "Introducing students to a broad range of contemporary moral problems facing society and the individual" and providing students with "the opportunity to wrestle with the problems of applied ethics, personal or professional," directly contribute to a more vivid sense of moral imagination and a heightened awareness of a moral point of view.

"Eliciting a sense of moral obligation" arises out of the basic question, "Why ought I to be moral?" and follows with each individual's structured attempt to answer that question. Daniel Callahan believes that in an ethics course the relationship between reasoning, human will, and resulting action must be examined. "To elicit a sense of moral obligation," according to Callahan, "is only to highlight with students an internal requirement of ethical thinking: that it calls us to act in the light of what we perceive to be right and good" (1980, p. 66). Since this model assumes intellectual freedom and personal responsibility as the basis for moral action and belief, there is no attempt to impose or enforce an attitude of "moral obligation."
Rather, the focus is on the pedagogical use of reflective reading, group discussion, and case-study analyses as a means for helping each individual student recognize the possible, personal implications of accepting the intellectual notion that there is a moral "domain" and that one can choose to develop and understand one's own moral obligation. Such a task is closely related to another sub-objective, "helping students formulate their own personal and moral ideals" (Hastings Center, 1980, p. 80). The crucial aspect is that the instructor and course materials and participants provide the structure and tools for the individual student to take on this task (if he/she chooses to do so). Of all the normative ethics' goals, this truly is the least analytic, the one goal which plays a tacit role in a course or program and does not serve as a basis for student evaluation. However, although no student is actually evaluated on the nature or degree of their "sense of moral obligation," this goal helps establish a special tone for the normative ethics course. It is in one sense a statement of faith (not uncommon to most disciplines and instructors) that in the long run, beyond the college experience and graduation, individuals will recognize the necessity of a moral point of view and of personal responsibility to bring their life styles and actions in accord with their most deeply felt and examined moral values and beliefs.

The remaining normative ethics goal, "tolerating--and reducing--moral disagreement and ambiguity," arises in part out of the recognition of significant existing differences, both theoretically and practically, in a pluralistic society and in an increasingly inter-
connected and interdependent world. In short, there are many different kinds of people with many different traditions and life histories, and there are also many competing and conflicting moral values and ways of justifying and arriving at those values. Neither moral discourse and reasoning as daily practices nor "ethics" as the intellectual examination of moral values and reasoning rest on the same type of firm intellectual foundation that provides high degrees of exactness, certainty, and predictability, as in the natural sciences or mathematics. Nevertheless, the normative ethics model rests on the fundamental (and philosophically defensible) position that morality is not totally relativistic or subjective, nor is its language empty or meaningless. The various contributors to this approach (Bok, Callahan, Murchland, Rosen) philosophically affirm that there are common denominators, shared experiences and vocabulary, that allow for progress toward greater certainty and systemization in moral reasoning and belief. In this view, we cannot, should not, remain satisfied with existing ambiguity and misunderstanding in moral dialogue and judgment.

Rosen proposes a closely related goal that has to do with the reduction of ambiguity and disagreement: "providing a general means for each person to arrive at justified moral judgments" (in Callahan & Bok, 1980, p. 68). When an instructor offers critical descriptions of competing ethical theories and normative models for moral decision-making, he/she is asking students to recognize that (as a matter of practicality) they are continuously engaged in moral reasoning--whether or not they intellectually adhere to any specific ethical position. Students also come to recognize the critical distinction between "pluralism,"
a social phenomenon that can lead to the toleration of differences, and "ethical relativism," the belief that all moral values have equal legitimacy. Although an individual student may arrive at an intellectually defensible position of ethical relativism, it obviously is not the assumption of the normative ethics model (and, an instructor utilizing this model will push and challenge a student to intellectually justify and defend his/her position). In summary, these goals of the normative ethics model, unlike those delineated in the cognitive-developmental scheme, are more focused on skills in moral reasoning, and they directly flow from the established discipline of ethics. Yet, the cognitive-developmental scheme does espouse "increased cognitive complexity" as an objective, and the similarities between "commitment in the face of relativism" and "eliciting a sense of moral obligation" and "overcoming ambiguity and reducing disagreement" are striking. Also, both the normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models do much to stretch our traditional notions of intellect and the role of reason in human values and moral decision-making. This analysis now turns to an examination of these and other similarities and the ways in which these two models complement each other and in combination meet the broader aims and goals of liberal education.

Connections with Liberal Education: Possibilities for Integration

The cognitive-developmental approach to college-level moral education provides the liberal educator with a set of objectives that personally apply to the individual’s ability to grow intellectually
and ethically, while the normative ethics model provides a somewhat more impersonal set of objectives that revolve around reasoning skills grounded in ethics as a subdiscipline of philosophy. The developmental approach tends to emphasize the ongoing process of moral education, while adherents to the normative ethics model pay more attention to at least some measurable, objective accomplishments (for example, understanding ethical concepts, developed skills in moral reasoning, an intellectual awareness of a moral dimension). Each model complements the other in a powerful manner that conceptually fits into the broad mission of liberal education and very effectively contributes to the goal of individual ethical development. Specifically, in what ways do these models strengthen each other, and why does their integration match the liberal arts ideal so well?

In the previous chapter, connections were drawn between the liberal education goal of developing broadly educated individuals who are not provincial (through their ignorance of other cultures and times). Or, in a more positive sense, such individuals view their identity and life experiences in a wide context. This goal moves well beyond a factual familiarity with times, cultures, and peoples other than one's own to embrace the ethical objective of tolerance and respect. These attitudes follow from an education that teaches an awareness and understanding of social and cultural pluralism and ethical relativism. Indeed, this important goal of the 1979 Harvard core curriculum best illustrates the similarities and possibilities for connecting the cognitive-developmental and normative ethics models.
In one model, the educator insists that the student move from dualistic and multiplistic forms of knowing into a full recognition of relativism in a pluralistic world. Tolerance, respect for differences, and ability to cope with ambiguity and uncertainty are implicit objectives built into the advanced-level ability to make commitments in the face of relativism. The normative ethics model has two explicit objectives which also parallel the acquisition of a broad, tolerant view: the "stimulation of the moral imagination" and the "toleration--and reduction--of disagreement and ambiguity." In combination, these objectives (with the appropriate pedagogical methods) help teach individuals to overcome provincial and dogmatic ways-of-knowing and valuing.

The liberally educated person is also distinguished by the ability to develop and combine ethical and intellectual vision, and the willingness and ability to struggle with the fundamental questions of existence and meaning. Again, both models of moral education, directly and indirectly, propose objectives that center on developing these characteristics. The cognitive-developmental scheme insists that the student make sense and meaning out of his/her personal existence and promotes the intellectual risk taking and courage necessary to do so. The stimulation of a moral point of view and the eliciting of a sense of moral obligation are normative-ethics objectives that point

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4These are the perennial "undergraduate" questions that arise in different ways in different times and cultures, e.g., "Why should I think/question?"; "Who am I?"; "What can I know for sure?"; "What ought I to do?"; "To who or what may I give myself ultimately and completely?"; and "What does human life, and my life, mean?"
toward the individual formulation of moral beliefs and patterns of reasoning.

One of the clearest and least controversial goals of liberal education is the development of rational and analytic thought. Therefore, such moral education objectives as thinking carefully and rigorously about ethical issues, developing an ethical perspective (in the same sense one can develop a legalistic, psychological, or historical perspective) and learning how to rationally evaluate and justify moral positions are frequently cited. The normative ethics objectives of learning how to recognize ethical issues and developing relative and contingent thinking as well as the ability to critically reflect on one's own models of reasoning and judgment are all closely related.

Undoubtedly, the most grandiose and controversial aim of liberal education is the development of an ethical individual. The translation of this long term "mission" into particular curricular objectives has been and continues to be troublesome, not with those objectives centered on acquiring rational skills, but with those focused on "liberal" attitudes and qualities of mind—and certainly with goals that focus on behavioral change in any sense. As outlined earlier, objectives requiring specific behavioral alteration raise the very serious concern of indoctrination, and two contemporary models of moral education have been rejected in large part because

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5 Also see "Doubtful Goals in the Teaching of Ethics" by Daniel Callahan (in Callahan & Bok, 1980, pp. 69-72).
they dwell far too directly on behavioral change (values clarification and wholistic). Yet, without some behavioral dimension the moral educator in a liberal education text runs the risk of teaching abstract skills in the analysis of principles and moral language without ever encouraging students to personally adopt a moral stance or to consistently act upon their values and beliefs. Again, both of these selected models attempt to come to grips with this dilemma. In Perry’s scheme, the student is encouraged to adopt reasoned, tolerant commitments (a lapse into relativism, or lower, is viewed as “retreat” or “escape”). In the normative ethics model the “eliciting of a sense of moral obligation” calls for an intellectual examination of the links between reason, will, and action. Moral obligation does, eventually, require the will power (equivalent to Perry’s “courage”) and the concrete action necessary to fulfill the belief; and, this practical connection can be examined and encouraged through class discussion and reflection. In this way both models introduce objectives that avoid the naive and dangerous tendency to insist on the direct training of moral character and behavior.

Thus far, similarities between the normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models and the aims and goals of liberal education have been discussed. Each model consciously avoids behavioral objectives, yet neither entirely rejects some focus on personal, moral decision-making and an examination of the links between thought and action; both models focus on intellectual skills and processes and scrupulously avoid the inculcation of specific, substantive beliefs; and both
seek to integrate and develop ethical and intellectual growth. What, then, are their differences? Or, more accurately, in what ways are the normative ethics and cognitive developmental models complementary? And how does their integration contribute to a liberal education? The answer to the initial question is direct and simple: The cognitive-developmental approach is grounded in psychological research and as a form of moral education its objectives and pedagogical methods are rooted in a developmental understanding of human change and growth. The normative ethics model, however, has a much more traditional set of educational assumptions, and its objectives tend to center on reasoning skills. The individual personal role in making meaning and assuming responsibility for making commitments is integral to the cognitive-developmental approach, but also recognized is the common "developmental path" which all students follow. The normative ethics model emphasizes the individual role in selecting and analyzing moral values and ways of evaluating various forms of moral reasoning, yet this model, too, emphasizes a common denominator: our acquired, intellectual tools for developing a discerning moral judgment. In other words, one approach focuses on the common developmental progression of combined intellectual and ethical growth, while the other centers upon commonly-held, well-developed and defined philosophical language and methods. An important ideal for the advocates of the normative ethics model is the development of moral principles and values that are widely accepted, publicly verifiable, and rationally defensible. An important ideal for the cognitive developmental moral educator is the development of persons who can move beyond the earlier
stages of knowing and valuing to the advanced stage of moral and intellectual commitment making. Although each model uses a very different vocabulary and draws upon different aspects of our Western intellectual traditions and disciplines, both absolutely insist on the critical, metaphysical assumption that every individual is free to choose his/her own moral values and decision-making style. These two approaches to moral education do provide very different educational frameworks; yet advocates of both models affirm the essential, autonomous role that the individual student plays in his/her personal moral development.

Why and how, then, do the combined objectives of the cognitive developmental and normative ethics models meet the overall aims of liberal education? An answer to this question arises through an examination of the ideal of liberal education as first conceived by the classical Greeks, and then reinvigorated in the writings of A. N. Whitehead and most recently in writings from Botstein (1979a; 1979b), Murchland (1976; 1979), and Thomas Hearn (1975). As outlined in the second chapter, the classical Greeks embraced arete as the ultimate educational aim: excellence, defined as living one's life well. Education, in this context, was found neither in the accumulation of factual knowledge nor in the "mechanics" of class attendance (nor, for modern times, in the awarding of grades and degrees); rather, the authentic educational experience involved a continuing willingness to search for meaning; a search demanding free choice, courage, and commitment (familiar concepts to the proponents of either a cognitive-developmental or normative ethics approach to moral education). More-
over, the Greek conception of reason was a broad one, embracing both theoretical and practical intelligence, abstract knowledge and specific fact, as well as analytic and synthetic reasoning. These emphases on the individual's search for meaning, the process of acquiring and effectively using knowledge, and on human intellect as something far more than impartial logical method or analysis have, once again, come to the forefront of liberal education philosophy. The cognitive-developmental model, especially as presented by William Perry, begins by emphasizing the "individual-as-learner," concrete and experiential aspects of learning, and the development of humane attitudes and qualities of intellect. The normative approach begins by dwelling upon theoretical and abstract learning, knowledge as the critical aspect of education, and the development of broadly rational intellectual abilities. Yet, neither model is so dogmatic as to entirely exclude other important aspects of moral education. Together, they work to meet the challenge to move beyond teaching about ethical theory or moral reasoning to also teaching students why morality and ethical decision-making are a crucial part of life and teaching how an individual can make the intellectual commitment necessary to act ethically.

Pedagogical and Curricular Implications

Teaching Methods The intellectual cement that binds together these two models of moral education consists of, at least, four major, shared epistemological and ethical assumptions: first, neither factual knowledge nor moral values is considered absolute in nature; second,
recognition of human free will and respect for the autonomy of the individual are in themselves primary moral imperatives; third, effective teaching and learning cannot be entirely abstract, theoretical, and impersonal; and, fourth, some learning is (and probably should be) tacit and, at least in the short term, unobservable and unmeasurable. With these common assumptions and their equally effective match with the traditions and contemporary goals of liberal education, the normative ethics and cognitive developmental models are not simply patched together; rather, they are, in a sense, an interlocking pair—different enough to complement and, in combination, to strengthen each other and yet similar enough to effectively integrate. This should become especially clear in even this relatively brief review of the practical curricular implications of a combined integrated model. What, then, are the appropriate effective teaching methods, learning resources, forms of evaluation, and qualifications criteria for instructors using this approach to college-level moral education? And, in what way will, or can, this model fit into existing curricular structures?

The range of appropriate teaching methods is quite large. Beyond the more traditional lecture, readings, structured discussions, and written assignments—case study analysis, group debates, and some limited forms of role playing, and even selected values clarification exercises\(^6\) can be considered effective means of achieving both sets of

\(^6\)When used as one possible teaching component of this synthesis model, these exercises occur in an entirely different context. In the values clarification model, individual "clarification" is an end in and of itself.
objectives. Clearly excluded would be pedagogical exercises exclusively focused on the training of specific behaviors or the manipulation of emotion. The teaching methods of this combined model would not in themselves be radically new or different; yet the sheer range of possibilities is expanded widely. Although didactic lecture in combination with required critical reading and writing may be adequate to meet such objectives as "developing a student's analytic and logical skills" or in "encouraging a student to critically reflect on his own mode of reasoning and judgment," it seems unlikely that such objectives as "eliciting a sense of moral obligation" or "encouraging the intellectual risk-taking and courage necessary to progress to the highest developmental stage" can be successfully met with the more traditional teaching methods. As in many humanities classes (especially in studies of music and art), there is an appeal to the imagination, to elements of human intellect that are not strictly logical. For example, even in a classroom setting, experiencing and understanding art often involves special visual or audio presentations, self-examination of emotional response, participation in the art form (especially with modern art), and, perhaps, creative generation of one's own work of art. In similar manner, an effective course in moral education must be willing to use many different pedagogical techniques in order to stretch beyond a purely analytical understanding of morality and moral decision-making. This stretching, however, does not extend beyond the ethical and epistemological guidelines of liberal education, clearly prohibiting the use of pedagogical techniques that appeal exclusively to behavioral or other nonintellectual dimensions of human development.
In a sense, then, it is a firm, clear grasp of the defined goals of liberal education and the specified objectives of this synthesis model of moral education that allow a program and an instructor greater pedagogical freedom. If the goals are clear (and this, of course, is especially unusual in college-level moral education), then there exists a solid basis for selecting the teaching methods that most effectively bring about, or gradually help implement, those goals and objectives.

The relatively unusual aspect of this model's teaching methods, then, lies not so much in the methods themselves nor even in the wide range of possibilities, as in the basis for selecting and applying them. Drawing upon cognitive-developmental theory, an instructor designs a course of study that takes into account his/her knowledge of students' responses to varying degrees of course structure as well as student sources of intellectual support and challenge, views on authority and sources of knowledge, and need for personalism (a warm, encouraging atmosphere). As pointed out earlier in this chapter (as well as in chapter 3), individual students stand along varying steps in cognitive-ethical development, and an instructor can teach students more effectively if he/she has some understanding of an individual's age, class standing, and developmental stage of growth. The mechanics (and very probably the politics) of implementing such a scheme could be very awkward, indeed. Are students tested and then divided into separate classes or groups on the basis of their "developmental test scores"? Although some form of developmental stage evaluation will be a necessary pedagogical component of this model, it need not translate into a system of "developmental tracking" for moral education. It
could instead, for example, lead to a radically designed class with designated weeks of lecture and structured discussion intended for all those enrolled; while other weeks would consist of individualized learning activities appropriate to a particular individual's developmental stage. Perhaps all students would be required to write a learning contract in conjunction with the course instructor; and, although there would be wide variation in the types of learning activities, the course objectives and actual "quantity" of material to be completed would be equivalent.

For example, students identified as operating on dualistic assumptions about the nature of knowledge and learning (generally freshmen and beginning college students) would need high levels of structure and guidance, frequent personal reassurance, clearly defined means of evaluation, and, in general, intellectual challenges that match their abilities and developmental stage. Therefore, "dualistic" students would have many more structured classes to attend, a greater emphasis on the relatively mechanical aspects of learning and memorizing definitions and theories, and many more concrete learning activities. Naturally, since one major objective is to move such students up this hierarchy of developmental positions, more challenging educational methods and resources will be introduced as the class progresses. Challenge, to these students, is presented in the form of increased diversity of content, an increasing emphasis on the student taking responsibility for his/her own learning, and the use of teacher-led dialogue and discussion. The instructor would begin
to introduce multiple ideas, theories, and perspectives and move beyond the straightforward presentation of facts and vocabulary.

Teaching methods, then, would evolve with students at different developmental levels. Students at a multiplicative position no longer believe that they must accept a teacher's (or authority's) knowledge. Certainty and right/wrong, black/white categories of knowledge and morality still exist, but side-by-side with, as yet, undiscovered knowledge and moral values. Such students will believe that everyone has a right to their own opinion in those areas that are unknown or uncertain. Pedagogical methods that challenge students at this position include continuing withdrawal of the teacher as authority figure and provider of knowledge, an emphasis on providing models of relativistic reasoning, and continuing increase in the diversity of viewpoints presented, in the diversity of in-class instructional methods, and in the level of abstract thinking.

Relativistic students view structure as a springboard, rather than a limit, to inquiry and personal growth. For the relativistic student, development involves recognition of the need for commitment and the ability to make such commitments in the face of uncertainty and multiplicity. Only a very low degree of such teacher-provided structures as lectures, syllabi, and required attendance is necessary. The instructional process should challenge these students with models of individuals who have managed to make informed, reasoned moral commitments. Also, activities which require intellectual decision-making—which ask the student to "choose among competing ethical
theories" (Rosen & Caplan, 1980, p. 68)---need to be promoted. The need for concrete examples, specific applications, and experiential learning as means for inspiring interest and maintaining motivation (necessary at dualistic and multiplicitic stages) is very low for "relativistic" students. In essence, teaching methods are arrived at through an understanding and determination of the individual student's position of functioning, followed by an arousal of genuine cognitive conflict and disagreement through exposure to modes of thought that are a step beyond the individual student's stage of developmental growth.

Learning Resources The college teacher using this approach to moral education has a fairly well-defined and growing set of resources to draw upon. Of the two combined models, it is the normative ethics approach that provides the bulk of college level texts and other materials specifically focused on teaching concepts and theories in ethics as well as on skills in moral decision making, while the cognitive-developmental approach in itself has had little to offer in terms of texts, essays, films, or journals. Its "literature" is oriented for the practitioner, the teacher who wishes to incorporate this theory into his/her teaching.

In part, the challenge for all undergraduate teachers of ethics is discovering a sensible balance of the theoretical and abstract, as exemplified by Western culture's most insightful and critical thinking about morality, with the concrete and specific, as exemplified by the use of the contemporary case studies and individualized moral decision-making readings and exercises. The literature of the former is, of
course, well defined (at least within the Western tradition), including the relevant classical writings of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Epictetus, and St. Augustine; the essays and books by Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers ranging from Montaigne, Descartes, and Spinoza to Hume, Hegel and Kant; and the doctrines of various twentieth century schools of philosophical thought including logical positivism, structuralism, pragmatism, and existentialism. The literature of normative ethics is of current vintage, far more focused on the contemporary and real-life implications of ethical theory and providing numerous texts and anthologies to the teacher of ethics. Such academic journals as *Teaching Philosophy* and *Philosophy in Context* offer a continuing series of reviews of available texts in this area. In addition, publications of the Hastings Center offer comprehensive listings of available resources, primarily readings. Moreover, as mentioned previously, several other major academic research centers focused on value and ethical concerns of society have been formed in the past two decades. Their publications and research and teacher training seminars offer another, at least indirect, resource.

In the search for effective learning resources, the arts and humanities, in general—as well as the humanities model of moral education, specifically—also have obvious potential. The classics of world literature, drama, art, and film often have powerful moral content. *Night*, a semi-fictional literary work on the holocaust by Elie Wiesel, for example, may not be a direct moral analysis of the
Nazi death camps or of German society, nor, in itself, is it intended to promote the ethical and intellectual growth of the individual. Yet, it can have a profound moral influence on the reader, evoking emotions that generate interest in moral reasoning and lending real-life shape to an otherwise abstract set of theories and circumstances. In the examples developed previously on the humanities approach to moral education, such literary works as *1984*, *Native Son*, and *On Lies, Secrets, and Silence* are recommended for their portrayal of deep moral convictions on the part of the author and the fictional protagonists alike. The possibility of moving beyond the written word and incorporating such films with high moral impact as Peter Glenville's "Becket" (1964); Stanley Kramer's "Judgment of Nuremberg" (1961); or more recently John Badham's "Whose Life Is It Anyway?" (1981) may not be quite matched by similar possibilities with classical or modernistic paintings or works of music simply because art and music tend to be less didactic, far less direct in their moral significance for human thought and behavior. Nevertheless, within the structured context of a course designed with a combined normative ethics and a cognitive-developmental basis, an instructor would feel free to transcend disciplinary bounds and use resources from the arts and humanities. In particular, literary and artistic works could help stimulate and broaden the moral imagination, helping students recognize that there is an ethical dimension to life, that value choices are constantly being made. Their use could also provide examples of individual and personal meaning-making, portrayals of individuals who have learned
to function in a pluralistic and relativistic world through making personal commitments.

The teacher is often considered the key "resource." As in many undergraduate curricular areas, the instructor serves as a personal role model as well as a professional educator skilled in his/her discipline or subject. For students at dualistic or multiplistic levels of development especially, this personal aspect of the faculty member as a role model is important. Perry points out that educators must be open and visible in their own thinking, doubts, and styles of commitment and that they must recognize and, in some manner, reward students' efforts to make meaning, take risks, and eventually exhibit courage in commitment (1970, p. 213). Teachers become important as role models in the process of intellectual and ethical development, not in the character-development sense of exhibiting specific correct behaviors. One minimal criterion, then, in the selection of teachers is that they are sensitive to the personal subtleties of teacher-student exchanges and are willing to appropriately and honestly portray their own individual efforts at ethical reasoning, at formulating moral commitments and making value choices. Clearly, the attempt to serve either as an absolute moral authority or as an exemplary "moral" person would stand in contradiction to the ideals of liberal education

7At the very least teachers serve as role models in the sense that they continuously portray the ethics of their own career and discipline through their classroom manner and style.
as well as to those of both the cognitive-developmental and normative ethics models of moral education. On the other hand, absolutely no attempt to become personally engaged with the subject material—no effort to show students that he/she (the instructor) also is involved in the lifelong process of making value decisions, coping with moral ambiguity, and reevaluating self-adopted ethical principles may lead to an arid, removed teaching style and learning environment—the antithesis of an atmosphere designed to encourage personal meaning-making, ethical and intellectual risk-taking, and development of the moral imagination.

Enthusiasm, a high degree of interest for students and the subject matter, effective teaching skills are among the relevant criteria for teachers of most subjects at most levels; there remains, however, the question of academic background and credentials. Must all undergraduate teachers of moral education using the combined normative ethics-cognitive-developmental approach possess a doctorate in philosophy or, perhaps, in theological ethics? Is a master's degree in developmental counseling a necessity? Definitive answers to such questions are well outside the scope of this thesis; rather, several considerations and possible directions follow.

For reasons outlined in greater detail in The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education study (1980), primary emphasis is placed on advanced graduate work in ethics. Familiarity with the language, concepts, and methodology of the discipline is important for both political and pedagogical reasons. Politically, such courses or programs of study may be found unacceptable if they are taught entirely
by individuals without advanced graduate training in philosophy, particularly ethics. Pedagogically, it would be very difficult for the prospective teacher (although certainly not impossible) to immerse him/herself in a thorough and necessary understanding of ethical concepts and analysis and the history of ethical thought without the structured format and support of a university graduate program. The instructor of a combined ethics approach would also need a theoretical background and practical training in the cognitive-developmental approach to understanding students' intellectual and ethical growth. Workshops, summer classes, conferences imparting a theoretical understanding as well as a pedagogical grasp of the particular classroom and student-teacher dynamics are likely means of instruction. Since, after all, the primary role is that of "college teacher," using the theory and skills of developmental counseling—and not "developmental counselor" teaching in the area of ethics—minimal emphasis is placed on sustained graduate training in clinical psychology or counseling.

In short, the qualified teacher of this combination model should be liberally educated, possess extensive graduate-level education in ethics, and have undergone practical training in the cognitive-developmental approach to college teaching and student advising.

**Evaluation**

On what basis are students to be evaluated in a college-level course or program of study jointly focused on moral theory and student development? Again, drawing upon the philosophical criteria for liberal education (as defined in chapter 2), certain evaluation criteria are clearly excluded. Students would obviously
not be evaluated on the basis of either their behavior or on actual content of their personal moral principles and beliefs. This is apparent since the proposed model of moral education so definitively excludes behavioral goals as well as goals centered on the inculcation or manipulation of substantive, personal moral values. There are, however, other objectives which--although they are an important and legitimate part of this integrated model--are not easily evaluated. Such goals as movement from dualism to the higher stages of moral development, willingness to make personal commitments, skills in intellectual and ethical risk-taking, and possessing an attitude of moral obligation are not only difficult to evaluate but are--in an academic sense for individual students--morally inappropriate to evaluate. The objectives themselves are certainly not tacit nor are many of the pedagogical techniques and learning resources intended to bring about such changes (as has been discussed in previous sections). Yet, these are the less traditional objectives that embody some affective and attitudinal elements that no single course of study can realistically hope to change in a relatively brief period of time. These objectives especially can force the instructor to pay heed to the hidden, immeasurable aspects of college education and to the long-term effects of college study as well as push the student to realize the important role of self-evaluation. A student may pose such questions as: "Apart from completing individual courses and receiving certain grades, what does my college-learning experience, in its entirety, mean to me?" "Am I taking the greatest advantage of this course to grow and develop?" "How can I use this knowledge and these skills later in life?" "What
do these new concepts and theories mean to me personally?" "Am I making important connections between this new-found theory, my personal values and principles, and my life experiences?" "Will I, or how will I, act upon this knowledge?" The point is that these are questions that should not be academically evaluated by instructors in an integrated moral education program; rather, a learning environment should be created in which students themselves become capable of posing such questions and dealing with them in a meaningful and sustained manner. Therefore, although no student is evaluated and assigned an academic grade for a "willingness to make a strong personal commitment to certain values," "ability to tolerate moral ambiguity," or for "exhibiting courage and risk-taking in pursuit of moral knowledge," for example, these are legitimate and critical objectives; and the instructor operating within this approach to moral education can actively help individuals understand these goals and work toward them.

The remaining objectives of this model, including "ability to think relatively and contingently," "critically reflecting on one's own mode of reasoning and judgment," "recognizing and identifying ethical issues," and "achieving intellectual depth, coherence, and consistency in the analysis of ethical propositions," fall well within the moral traditional realm of analytic reason. Such commonplace learning activities and resources as critically reading and discussing classic works in ethics, participating in debates and case study analyses, writing short essays and longer research papers, and taking tests—both "objective" tests focused on one's depth, breadth, and
accuracy of factual knowledge and essay examinations which also test integrative and synthetic intellectual skills—may all serve as legitimate and ethical means for evaluating students' progress.

In summation, then, there are three different types of goals and objectives, each with various forms of evaluation. There are behavioral objectives and goals which center on changing the individual's moral values and beliefs. These have been excluded from the start as have the learning resources and the methods of evaluation which would follow. There are legitimate objectives which spring from an expanded notion of reason, a greater sensitivity to the long-term ethical mission of the liberal arts, and a clearer commitment to the curricular goals of liberal education. Success in achieving or working toward such goals may be at least partially measured through using psychological tests of moral reasoning and long-term social scientific surveys of individual moral growth and development. Such instrumentation is used not to evaluate the degree of individual academic progress, but rather to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the course of study and provide information to the instructors and other responsible academic officials on where and how to make revisions to the program or course. In some instances, students may have access to such evaluation information to aid them in self-assessment. Finally, there are the more traditional forms of academic evaluation: tests, papers, debates, and discussion. These serve as the only appropriate means of measuring individual achievement and ability in a college-level program of study in moral education. Those objectives of moral education which are clearly centered on analytic reasoning as well
as the more cognitive aspects of such objectives as "developing an expanded sense of moral imagination" or "ability to make connections between ethical theory and concepts, one's own moral perceptions and principles, and actual actions and lifestyle" can be legitimately evaluated. In short, these are the critical deciding questions: Is this an evaluation of students' intellectual efforts, abilities, and achievements? If so, it is pedagogically appropriate and ethical in a liberal arts context. Is this an evaluation of students' ethical character, will power, moral attitudes, self-identity, or personal development? If so, it is clearly unethical and an inappropriate basis for student evaluation in a liberal arts curricular setting.

Curricular Placement This thesis has been an argument for why goals focused on ethical development should be an important component of a liberal arts, undergraduate curriculum. From that discussion arose a specific model of moral education describing goals, pedagogical methods, learning resources, and evaluation. Although there may be a tendency to assume that this entails developing a new and different type of structured, semester or two-semester long course, this may not necessarily be the most effective method of introducing the goals of ethical development to the curriculum or for reinvigorating the overall ethical mission of the liberal arts college.

Exactly how and where should a "course" or "program of study" emphasizing the goals and methods of this integrated model of moral education be "placed" in a college curriculum? There are numerous and often problematic questions that follow: Should these goals and
pedagogical strategies be formulated into a single course, or series of courses? or, should they be integrated into existing courses in the curriculum? Should this integrated approach to moral education be considered interdisciplinary study? or, come under the rubric and control of either philosophy or psychology, or both departments? Should there be a major or minor in integrated moral education? Should all undergraduate students be required—in some manner—to study moral decision-making and ethics in this proposed context? Should this approach be incorporated into the degree requirements of each available major or should it be considered either a general education elective or requirement? In some instances these are political and contextual questions and the exact "answers" will depend upon the individual personalities and circumstances of the college in which the questions are raised. Nevertheless, there are some general preferences based upon both philosophical and pragmatic considerations.

According to the Hasting's Center study of existing applied ethics courses, many are issue-oriented, interdisciplinary, and team-taught, while most fall under one of the following categories: "Science, Technology, and Ethics," "Pre-professional Ethics" or "Ethics in Non-ethics Humanities and Social Science courses" (1980). In this thesis, however, there has been a broader consideration of the ethical mission of liberal education and the appropriate objectives for moral education within the liberal studies curriculum. The integrated model is obviously not just another normative or applied ethics class; its acceptance would represent an institutional commitment to partially fulfilling the ethical mission of the college through affirming
appropriate curricular goals and teaching methods. It undoubtedly is unrealistic to expect any single semester-length course to meet these broader liberal education goals. Moreover, a case easily could be made that because moral concerns and questions are pervasive—occurring, for example, in science and technology, business, communications, as well as in the methodologies and research practices of all the disciplines themselves—that the ethically-oriented goals of liberal education should be spread throughout the entire curriculum. Despite these considerations, a very strong argument can be made for the development of a concentrated course format. First, it is unlikely that many instructors in many different disciplines would choose to develop competence and expertise in this area. Second, the crucial personal and developmental aspects of this integrated approach could easily be lost in curriculums that are still—by and large—identified and divided on a disciplinary and topical basis. Third—whether an accurate perception or not—many college faculty believe that no serious subject can be taught "pervasively" or "across the curriculum" (Hastings Center, 1980, p. 74). And fourth, to directly cite The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education,

the diffusion of ad hoc ethical analyses among a wide variety of courses deprives students of the opportunity to focus systematically on ethical problems for their own sake, and also of a context for giving them a coherent means of developing broader views on the nature of ethics. (1980, p. 75)
Perhaps it would be possible to essentially do both: create at least one course exclusively focused on ethical and moral judgment goals while also designating certain courses as "ethics intensive," just as some colleges now identify "writing intensive" courses. Such courses would rely upon the faculty member's expertise in his/her own discipline coupled with a commitment to identifying and teaching ethical issues and some degree of familiarity with and application of the cognitive-developmental approach to education.

Although this approach certainly allows for ethical analyses and the identification of moral issues within any major, it seems fairly clear that this integrated model is not a major in itself. (Although it may serve as a component of a student's chosen area of specialization.) This model of moral education is certainly not a new discipline, nor is it founded on a specific subject area (environmental studies or East Asian studies, for example) or a career area (education or business management, for example). If implemented it would help fulfill the undergraduate commitment to a general or liberal education. As for a disciplinary or interdisciplinary designation, this again may largely depend on specific circumstances. A strong philosophy department with a broad-based commitment to humanistic learning (as opposed to the analytic school of philosophy or any particular school of thought) may serve as a secure and invigorating disciplinary home. On the other hand, if a college has a well-defined liberal education program with committed faculty from many disciplines, an interdisciplinary status may be preferable. Again, there has been no attempt in this chapter to design a specific program of study; instead, the
Conclusion

Underlying this proposal for a specific, reasonable model of college-level moral education is the critical assertion that there is a moral dimension to human life and community and that society is replete with many obvious moral quandaries, ethical challenges, and value-based conflicts. Whether they are the almost overwhelming global issues of imminent nuclear destruction, just economic distribution of wealth, or racial and sexual equality or the more personal, individualistic issues of self-identity, religious faith, and truth-telling—all involve a degree of moral choice, of moral risk and commitment. Is the examination of such issues as moral problems in a structured college-learning environment ethically appropriate? Is it pedagogically possible? The advocates of liberal education have, over the centuries, stressed the important role that college education can and should play in preparing individuals to meet such challenges. The overarching mission of creating people who will "live their lives well," who will become free-thinking individuals capable of both ethical commitment and intellectual vision, is certainly as lofty an ideal today as ever. Relatively few American educators (Sidney Hook, aside) seem to reject the ideal, at least as an abstract societal aim. However, it has been institutions committed to liberal education that
have taken these mission statements most seriously and translated them into such contemporary curricular goals as: "an educated person is expected to have some understanding of and experience in thinking about moral and ethical problems" and "(the educated person) cannot be provincial in the sense of being ignorant of other cultures and other times"—with the former goal centering on the development of an informed judgment and the ability to make discriminating moral choices and the latter on the need to develop a tolerant, open-minded attitude or perspective. The translation, in turn, of these curricular goals into specific objectives and learning methods has been even more difficult and more controversial. This "translation" has been the task of this thesis.

Besides the historic commitment of liberal education to the ethical development of the individual and the very existence of a seemingly overwhelming number of moral challenges—whether within society or the self—there is a third, perhaps major, reason to more clearly and explicitly emphasize the goals and objectives of moral education: to undermine the notion that education itself can be value-free, imparting totally objective knowledge and skills. A sustained encounter with moral reasoning—with the proposed integrated model of moral education—would help divest students and faculty alike of the dry, technique-oriented, skill approach to teaching and learning. A stronger commitment to the goals of moral development would help students understand both the strengths and limits of objectivity and analytic reason and help them become sensitive to the underlying value assumptions in learning skills and disciplinary
methodologies, in the selection and arrangement of factual knowledge, in the dynamics of interpersonal and professional relationships, and in the structure of individual courses and the curriculum as a whole.

In chapter 1 a rationale was presented for analyzing the educational goals of moral development and for proposing a specific philosophically-defensible model of moral education. A brief review of these reasons is also in order. There is a desperate need to clarify concepts or at least to use language consistently. As pointed out, "morals," "values," and "ethics" themselves, the central concepts in this study, are often used interchangeably, and each possesses misleading popular connotations. In this thesis integrated model of moral education has a specific and consistent meaning. "Education" implies instruction and learning occurring within a structured, goal-oriented context. "Moral" is used as opposed to "ethics" in that this approach moves well beyond the traditional philosophical examination of ethical theories and patterns of reasoning. Also, "moral" is emphasized rather than "value" to avoid the connotation of a skill-oriented, experiential model and to emphasize the philosophical meaning of moral values as distinguished from aesthetic, customary, or trivial values. "Integrated," in this thesis, refers to the conceptual integration or connection of two existing models of moral education and also implies an integration of fact and value, character and knowledge, and conscience and intellect; while an educational "model" moves beyond an explication of underlying assumptions and goals and objectives to also identify the teaching methods, learning
resources, methods of evaluation, and curricular fit that logically or practically follows. It was also pointed out that the proliferation of social scientific research on individual moral development holds both promise and danger: promise in the sense that the new knowledge could help in creating an effective approach to teaching moral education, danger in the sense that the theories and data collected could be critically and naively accepted as worthwhile educational goals and objectives. The integrated model is an attempt to sensibly draw upon at least some of the psychological research, to recognize the scope and limitations of a curricular approach to moral development, and yet still develop a reasoned, philosophical case for the proposed model's goals and objectives. Finally, an important rationale is that the absence of any firm philosophical grounding for a course or program on college-level moral instruction would inevitably lead either to such a program's early demise or to its manipulation and distortion. The clear connection with the aims and goals of liberal education is intended to insure that neither fate befalls the integrated model of moral education.

To return to one of the central assumptions of this thesis: broad mission statements regarding moral character and development of the student can be translated into legitimate and meaningful curricular goals and objectives. This thesis has been an ethical and historical justification of college-level moral education and a specific illustration of how mission statements and broad curriculum goal statements focused on morality can, indeed, be translated into specific learning objectives in a structured learning setting. If one
accepts such sweeping statements as those identified by Bowen in his 1977 study of more than one-thousand college goal statements, then colleges are ultimately aiming to create individuals with intellectual tolerance and integrity, wisdom, human sympathy and moral sensitivity and courage—and for a society that is moving toward human equality, freedom and autonomy and a general "improvement in the motives, values, aspirations, attitudes and behavior of members of the general population" (1977, p. 55-59). It is recognized that these ultimate ideals serve as "guides," as distant "beacons on a journey" (to again cite Karl Jaspers). The ideals, the long-term aims, find expression at various levels of abstraction and concreteness and in many different structures—other than curriculum and structured learning. In this thesis these ultimate aims take some specific shape, they become instrumental objectives within the college curriculum. Educational aims involving "morality," "ethical character," and "moral development" are restricted neither to a high level of abstraction nor to the extracurricular aspects of college education.

The question "At a college or university, what should be our educational goals in the realm of morality?" was also posed as was the closely related question: "What curricular or instructional model is most logically consistent and ethically acceptable with the mission and philosophy of liberal education?" It was argued that the goals of moral education do not need to be linked to a specific ideology or religious faith, that morality is an overarching concern of the human community. A moral point of view is a broadly humane perspective that
views human value considerations as important. Moreover, the
philosophy and goals of the liberal education tradition--first de-
scribed and analyzed and then actually used to evaluate various
models for college-level moral education--serve as a healthy guard
against either becoming enmeshed in the moral values and princi-
pies of a particular group or becoming over-enamored with a "content-
free" technique or skills approach to valuing.

"What should be the more specific goals and objectives of moral
education?" To answer this question, five existing models of moral
education were identified and described in some detail; these models
were critiqued and evaluated by using the philosophy and goals of
liberal education as the criteria. Thus, this thesis is, in itself,
a form of normative analysis, presenting a case, arguing for a
systematic view of the principles by which colleges ought to con-
struct a program of moral education and then rationally defending
a specific, proposed model of moral education. The integrated model
of moral education, a combination of the objectives of the cognitive-
developmental and normative ethics models and a blending of teaching
methods, learning resources, and evaluation methods, most adequately
meets the logical and ethical criteria for liberal education.

Certainly ethics courses cannot try to teach
particular moral behaviors; that would be in-
doctrination, but if the movement to teach
ethics is serious about developing not only the
capacity to think ethically but also the com-
mmitment to act ethically, then it will have to
find ways to fire the will as well as the intellect, to engage the heart as deeply as the mind, and to put will, intellect, and feeling to the test of behavior. (Lickona in Callahan & Bok, 1980, p. 132)

The unique aspect of the integrated model itself lies in its success in partially bridging the gap described by Lickona and in its explicit assertion that the teaching of ethics and morality (not simply about ethics and morality) is neither an appeal for the affective or emotional education of college students nor a strict limitation to moral reasoning as a form of analysis or moral knowledge as a new discipline, but rather an effort to seek a broader understanding of human reason, of intellectual growth. The analytic goals of the normative ethics model focus on moral reasoning and knowledge; the integrative and synthetic goals of the cognitive-developmental model focus on moral character and development. Together they form an effective approach to college-level moral education that truly meets the aims and standards of liberal education. Indeed, many supposed opposites—affection and cognition, theory and practice, fact and value, curricular specialization and integration, absolutism and relativism, and intellect and conscience—are reunited in this proposed model. In particular, the distinctions between ethical absolutism and relativism as well as between intellect and moral conscience are examined and eventually reconnected by the student instructed in the integrated model.
This proposed approach rests on the arguments that indoctrination is not a logical inevitability in moral education, that moral phenomena and principles are rational and can be intellectually discussed and tested, and that a strong, well-defined concept of liberal education can help develop clear goals and objectives in moral education. However, the scope of the thesis is limited; for a number of reasons, no claim can be made that any one curricular model can entirely achieve the important ethical aims and goals of liberal education—whether in actual practice or in a theoretical sense. First, there are moral learning experiences external to the curriculum as well as outside the entire college environment. Second, at least some of the goals of the integrated model are both instrumental and long term. Such a goal as "developing the student's ability to orient himself in a relativistic world through personal commitment" cannot be definitively achieved within four years—nor, probably, should it be. And, third, this model is one reasonable approach to moral education in keeping with the traditions, aims and curricular goals of liberal education. It is proposed as plausible, ethically acceptable, and logically connected to the ideals of liberal education—but not an absolute guideline in itself.

In closing, college students can be legitimately taught to reflect on moral roles, to use moral reasoning, to be committed to analyzing and selecting moral values and life styles and to act in accordance with their convictions. The connections between passion and intellect and between moral theory, personal conscience, and concrete action can be made legitimate and effective components of a
college-level liberal studies curriculum.
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Abstract

LIBERAL EDUCATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF MORAL EDUCATION

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Two central questions are raised: At a college level, what should be our educational goals and methods in the realm of moral development? and, what curricular or instructional model is most logically consistent and ethically acceptable with the mission and philosophy of liberal education? The major purpose of this study is to answer these questions and develop one reasonable, clearly defined model of college-level moral education. The provision of a framework of clear definitions and carefully delineated conceptual boundaries is a necessary first step.

A number of reasons for sustained philosophical analysis of alternative goals and methods of moral education are developed: reducing semantic confusion, understanding how to use the growing body of social scientific research on moral development, identifying the dangers inherent in moral education without clear guidelines and goals, undermining the belief that education can be value-free, and reasserting the important role that the philosophy of liberal education can play in determining curricular goals and methods.

This study is a philosophical inquiry consisting of analysis and clarification of concepts. More specifically, it is a normative inquiry into the various goals of moral education, leading to a proposal for one justifiable model of college-level education. This normative study rests on the philosophical assumption that value statements can be rationally understood and debated and is guided by an awareness of the major findings in social scientific research on moral development and education, an understanding of the history and philosophy of liberal education, and familiarity with the conceptual analysis of educational terminology.

In order to answer the central questions it is argued that the ideal of liberal education (its inherent logical and ethical criteria as well as a developed set of explicit curricular goals) can help determine legitimate curricular goals and methods that are focused on moral development. An extended definition of liberal education is developed through reference to widely accepted historical statements and examination of contemporary principles and goals.
Five contemporary models of undergraduate moral education are next identified and described in detail: values clarification, wholistic, humanities, normative ethics, and cognitive-developmental. The specific criteria for liberal education are then critically applied, evaluating the respective strengths and weaknesses of each model. It is argued that the normative ethics and cognitive-developmental models are most closely connected with the historical aims and contemporary goals of liberal education.

The study concludes with a detailed analysis of the two selected models. Reasons for their integration are developed, pedagogical methods and resources which emerge from their combination are outlined, and a summary of this approach to selecting and developing an acceptable model of college-level moral education is offered. In closing, it is stated that college students can legitimately be taught to reflect on moral roles and use moral reasoning, to be committed to analyzing and selecting moral values and lifestyles, and to act in accordance with their convictions.