Memory, Narrative, and Identity Shifts in Modern Ireland

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Memory, Narrative, and Identity Shifts in Modern Ireland

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Science in Interdisciplinary Studies from The College of William and Mary

by

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ABSTRACT

Collective memory is defined as any shared memory held by two or more members of a given social group. This type of memory has been studied intensely since Maurice Halbwachs’ introduction of the idea at the beginning of the 20th century. Until recently, cognitive scientists have not participated in the conversation on collective memory; however, one group of researchers recently introduced a model that compares individual and collective memory consolidation as analogous processes on different levels (Anastasio et al, 2012). This paper uses Anastasio’s model to explore the process of collective memory consolidation in contemporary Ireland (especially 1950-present), a nation that has experienced an enormous amount of cultural change in the past several decades. Over a period of two months (May-July 2015), 46 interviews were collected in various locations throughout Ireland. Focusing on important elements such as The Troubles, Catholic sexual abuse scandals, and the Celtic Tiger period of the Irish economy, qualitative data analysis shows strong evidence for the capacity of consolidated collective memory to be updated, fractured, and changed based on significant events, much like long-term individual memory. Due to the small scale of this study, the results should not be seen as exhaustive, but the beginning of a conversation on collective memory change in Ireland.
PART ONE: Defining and Contextualizing Collective Memory Consolidation

Introduction to Individual Memory Consolidation

Humans’ fascination with the capacity to retain information is by no means a recent development; even the existence of language and art display our desire to record our experiences in a concrete fashion. Further, 17th and 18th century philosophers such John Locke mused about factors that affected “degree or strength of associations” between events (Tulving & Bower, 2000, p. 3). Psychologists were also intrigued by memory and learning, along with how to measure these processes. Hermann Ebbinghaus performed an early study on forgetting. Ebbinghaus taught himself lists of nonsense words and attempted to recite them after varying delays. He then graphed his retentions with respect to time in an effort to quantitatively model forgetting, finding that retention falls sharply within the first few hours following rehearsal, but then levels off afterwards (Ebbinghaus, 1885). Of course, this study includes various limitations; for instance, Ebbinghaus himself was the only subject in the study, meaning that the results probably were not statistically significant. However, Ebbinghaus’ research did set the stage for later study into human memory.

Since these early forays, research methods have become far more sophisticated due to vast technological progress as well as the proliferation of empirical studies on learning and memory. These factors have led to a more robust understanding of the complex processes underlying memory consolidation—also called “encoding”—and storage.

Several researchers have proposed models attempting to explain the mechanisms of memory in a more concrete manner. One of the first, most popular, and most
influential models is the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of memory. Sometimes referred to as the modal model of memory or the dual-store model of memory processing, this model became one of the first to propose a comprehensive system describing encoding and storage of stimuli into long-term memories (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). The figure below depicts the model.

![Diagram of the Atkinson-Shiffrin model of memory consolidation](Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968)

As can be seen, the model postulates that stimuli from the environment are held briefly in sensory registers before proceeding through to more permanent memory stores; notably, it indicates that sensory inputs must first progress through a short-term memory store for rehearsal and manipulation before being permanently encoded in long-term memory. Consolidated memories can then be retrieved and temporarily moved back into the short-term store for normal usage and interpretation.

Though its significance cannot be denied, some have expressed skepticism regarding the model’s simplistic approach to modeling short-term memory. Baddeley and Hitch constructed a model of memory that attempted to remedy this flaw by proposing a
more complex, integrative configuration of short-term memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).

![Diagram of the Baddeley-Hitch model of working memory](image)

Figure 2: A visual representation of the Baddeley-Hitch model of working memory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).

In this model, short-term memory is broken down into several different theoretical systems. The “visuospatial sketchpad” is used to represent and process new visual/spatial data; in essence, this system allows humans to hold information “in their mind’s eye” for a short period of time before this information is allowed to enter into the long-term memory store. The phonological loop performs the same function for incoming verbal information. An intriguing aspect of the model is Baddeley’s idea of a “central executive,” which organizes the input of information and modulates the entire working memory system. Neuroimaging studies involving active maintenance of visual processing indicate that the areas of the prefrontal cortex are likely implicated in the process of working memory (Braver et. al, 1997). This makes sense when considering Baddeley’s
theory, as the prefrontal cortex, specifically the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, seems to be primarily implicated in neural processes involving higher-order functions such as goal setting, motivation, planning, and attentional control (Miller et al., 2001; Johnson et al., 2007; Amemori et al., 2015). Thus, this structure is integral in the operation of the central executive.

Baddeley’s model includes features that differentiate it from the Atkinson-Shiffrin model, namely the presence of a controlling entity that mediates short-term memory. Further, it incorporates specific sensory buffers, allowing for a more complex, integrative understanding of the processes. Interestingly enough, Baddeley’s initial model did not include an episodic buffer; this aspect was added much later as a space for organizing incoming information from the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad into sequential events (Baddeley, 2002). These factors will aid in understanding collective memory consolidation later in this paper.

Recent research has also revealed trends in the process of encoding, one of the most compelling being that memory seems to be a state-dependent process. For example, in a study examining the effects of alcohol on remembering, researchers found that “greater retention was found for those subjects whose drug states were the same in memory consolidation and retrieval” (Lowe, 1982). Additionally, another study asked participants to learn two lists of words, one on land and one underwater. The results showed that lists learned underwater were better retrieved underwater, just as lists learned on land were better retrieved on land (Godden & Baddeley, 1975).

However, research also indicates that human memory is not perfect—far from it, in fact. Perhaps the most obvious example of this is the limited capacity of our short-term
memory, shown to be either four plus/minus one or seven plus/minus two items (Cowan, 1993). Additionally, information that enters working memory requires attention prior to entering long-term memory. Indeed, one study demonstrated that splitting attention due to multitasking causes decreased retention of items in long-term memory (Craik et. al, 1996). These data imply that we do not have the capacity to encode all environmental stimuli, meaning we must selectively attend to those stimuli we consider most pressing. In this sense, memory is not a perfect representation of events; instead, it serves as an incomplete, selective, personal store of attended information.

Errors in memory also occur after consolidation. For instance, after memorizing a list of words, people often claim to remember seeing non-present words that are similar to the words actually included in the list, a phenomenon known as misattribution (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). Even more, people can often be swayed into recalling false memories when presented with misleading information regarding an event (Loftus et. al, 1978). Such studies indicate that our memories can actually be manipulated by outside sources, a phenomenon that will be explored further during discussions of collective memory.

Memory circuitry also seems to be inherently connected to neural structures implicated in emotional response. For instance, Elliott Wimmer and Daphna Shohamy demonstrated that due to connections to the striatum, the rewards center of the brain, the hippocampus can link our episodic memories to more pleasurable experiences, causing preference for these experiences later (Wimmer and Shohamy 2012). The amygdala, a major fear and emotion center in the brain, has major, direct connections to the hippocampus. This makes sense considering lesions to the amygdala cause impaired
explicit memory for emotionally charged events (Adolphs et. al, 1997). In this sense, memory might develop as an inherently biased personal narrative due to emotional influence.

Lesions to other neural substrates implicated in memory consolidation also cause profound deficits in memory. Since the hippocampus is considered the major center for memory encoding, it would make sense that damage would cause massive issues in processing. In one famous study, a man named H.M. had his hippocampus removed to remedy debilitating seizures. Though the seizures subsided, H.M. could not form new declarative memories or recall memories that were consolidated temporally close to the surgery (Scoville & Milner, 1957). However, he could remember disparately consolidated memories, such as those of childhood events. Thus, the hippocampus must be heavily implicated in memory consolidation— but not memory storage, which seems to be distributed throughout the cortex. Additionally, this study demonstrates that both anterograde amnesia— inability to form new memories— and retrograde amnesia— inability to recall previously consolidated information— are possible after neural damage.

**Introduction to Collective Memory**

The term “collective memory” is notorious within academia due to the difficulty in defining it. Social scientists generally point to Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945), a 20th century French philosopher, as the progenitor of the term. Halbwachs wrote quite a bit on the topic, with his books *On Collective Memory* (1950) and *The Social Frameworks of Memory* (1925). Halbwachs developed then-revolutionary ideas regarding the manner in which societies and other “collectives” of people engage and integrate their own present
experience with their past. He argues that “memory…is the basis for social cohesion” and that “individual and collective memory are [thus] inextricably intertwined” (Halbwachs & Coser, 1925/1992; Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 46). Further, he believed that we construct our own memories based on the predilections, prejudices, and attitudes of the social groups to which we belong, along with our interactions with others in these groups, a view supported by several psychological studies, some of which will be expounded upon later in this section (Coman et al, 2009; Loftus et al, 1978; Loftus, 1993; Loftus et al 2005; Wright et al, 2000). Finally, Halbwachs writes, “it follows that there are as many collective memories as there are groups and institutions in a society” (Halbwachs & Coser, 1925/1992, p.22). Thus, for Halbwachs, collective memory is a recursive process that affects the way individuals develop memories and any defined social group—be it a nation, an ethnic group, or a family—has its own collective memory.

Since Halbwachs’ pioneering work, numerous scholars, primarily in the fields of history, sociology, and anthropology, have assumed the mantle of research on collective memory. Research has propagated at such a level that those interested in cognitive psychology have grown wary of, as Alin Coman et al (2009) put it, “the imperialistic march of memory studies across the social sciences” (p. 125). David Berliner (2005) imparts his skepticism of the proliferation of collective memory research in his paper “The Abuses of Memory: Reflections on the Memory Boom in Anthropology”. Berliner comments on how the meaning of the term has recently become “muddled” in the social sciences due to overextension of meaning to comprise elements of culture and history; as a result, it has, in his words, “gradually become a vague, fuzzy label.” He also paraphrases Richard Terdiman (1993) by writing that he [Terdiman] “[argues]…that
memory is everything and everything is memory” (p. 206). John R. Gillis (1994) comments that the tangled meanings surrounding memory could be a result of the fact that memory and identity inherently depend on one another (p. 3). This essentially means that the study of collective memory should be done with a critical eye.

In light of these reservations, it makes sense to begin with a discussion of what collective memory is not. Firstly, it must be cautioned that collective memory should not be used as a catchall phrase comprising anything related to the history of a certain cultural group; in other words, collective memory is not synonymous with history, nor is it synonymous with cultural identity. Indeed, these processes are intrinsically related in that all three influence and connect with each other in many disparate ways, so it is thus very important to delineate their differences. While collective memory can be defined as any narrative or memory shared by a given social group, history aims to produce an objective and complex account of the past. Further, according to Wertsch & Roediger (2008), the process of collective memory “ignores counter-evidence in order to preserve established narratives” and “is impatient with ambiguity,” while history “recognizes complexity and ambiguity” and “aspires to arrive at an objective account of the past, regardless of consequences for identity” (p. 321).

Additionally, a collective memory develops as an inherently biased narrative due to its close association with its social group’s identity; however, collective memory is not cultural identity. Collective memory is essentially a process by which cultural identity is continuously updated and involves “the concretion of identity” (Assmann, 1995, 130). Identity also comprises a set of characteristics beyond memory; for instance, language is a part of a culture’s identity, but not its collective memory. However, memory of
language acquisition and perceptions of language’s importance in culture are collective memory.

It is also important to note here that collective memory may not be a simple summation of the memories of individuals, though this view is still largely up for debate. Some researchers, such as James Wertsch, agree with a view of collective memory that accounts for the influence of social frameworks on memory, but believe collective memory to be no more than the sum of its individuals’ memories (Wertsch, 2002; Anastasio, 2012, 52). Others, such as Anastasio, Halbwachs, and Paul Connerton (1989), and Jeffrey Olick (1999) think of collective memory as more than a depository of shared memories—perhaps, in accordance with Anastasio, more suitably compared to complex, interconnected networks, such as the human brain. Consider his point of view regarding the issue:

Whereas the brain is the medium for individual memory, society is the medium for collective memory. Just as neurons in the brain, interacting through their synaptic connections, can store and recall patterns, so people in society, interacting directly and through cultural tools, can form memories and remember the past in ways they could not do as separated, isolated individuals. On both the individual and collective levels, we can distinguish between memory structures (e.g. synapses, neurons, books, museums, etc.), which are objects, and memory consolidation (memory structure formation) and remembering (via memory structures), which are processes (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 55).

Though no empirical research has unequivocally proved the existence of a collective memory existing as more than the sum of its parts, I am inclined to agree with
Anastasio on the matter. Further, as the individuals making up a collective are interconnected and the resulting network forms defined, fixed representations of memory, the process of collective memory seems to follow a similar motif to artificial neural networks created by computational neuroscientists to simulate memory formation in individuals (Anastasio et al, 2012, 30-35; McClelland et al, 1995). In this sense, individual and collective memory formation are related in regards to manner of processing, which suggests the possibility of forming collective memory representations greater than the sum of individuals’ memories of a given event.

Anastasio’s studies also indicate that collective and individual memories seem to be analogous processes: “Collective memory exists as a phenomenon unto itself that is similar to individual memory but occurring on different levels and taking different forms” (Anastasio et al, 2012). He also presents a model for memory that can be used to describe both individual and collective memory consolidation, which will be expounded upon in later sections.

Since these and other studies indicate the similarities between collective memory consolidation and individual memory, I will use a memory model proposed by Anastasio (2012) to look at these processes as analogous. Thus, since individual memory is inherently flawed due to various errors in encoding and retrieval and these memories feed collective remembering, these individual narratives consolidate to create a skewed, biased collective memory, which can then be fractured, shifted, and hijacked by literature, political ideologies or major social, political, and economic events—thus constantly changing cultural identity. I argue further that this cycle of collective memory also affects the way people develop individual memories, thus continuing the cycle and creating a
“patchwork” of collective memories and cultural identities. To illustrate my ideas, I use my own primary research, consisting of 46 interviews taken in Ireland. These interviews were performed in multiple locations throughout Ireland, including Dublin, Galway, Belfast, Derry, and various small towns throughout the island so as to incorporate the identities of all areas. Review of the interviews indicates a nuanced spatial patchwork of identities and collective narratives throughout Ireland, along with a palpable, strong generational divide, especially when discussing politically and socially charged events. This generational shift serves as an interesting focus due to cultural upheaval in recent decades as a result of the Troubles, massive economic growth and decline due to the Celtic Tiger, Catholic abuse scandals, net immigration, and regional differences in modernization. I argue that these aspects, among others, created a perfect environment for collective memory to fracture, particularly across generational lines.

The following sections will delve into further detail on the complexities of collective memory: the first will consider the importance of the individual in collective memory, while the second will describe the process of collective memory consolidation from a social psychological perspective along with its similarities to individual memory consolidation. These points of contact will prove useful when examining the nuanced manner in which a national collective memory developed in Ireland through a combination of social, political, and economic influences, and was subsequently damaged, fractured, and drastically altered during the latter half of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Such influences will be briefly noted here and expanded in Part Two and Part Three.
Importance of the Individual

If collective memory is, then, understood to be a collective process, potentially more than the “sum of its parts,” how and where does the individual factor into the equation? Historian Susan Crane asserts that social science should “writ[e] the individual back into collective memory,” as it is in the individual’s capacity to interact with history that collective memory becomes possible (Crane 1997; Anastasio, 2012, p. 54). Individuals are not only the basic root of collective memory but also a profound influence on its formation, able to manipulate the memories of other individuals as well as the group memory as a whole. This influence occurs during both the encoding and retrieval of memories.

Elizabeth Loftus revolutionized cognitive memory research with her pioneering study on misinformation effect in memory. During the study, approximately half of the participants were shown a sequence of slides depicting a car stopped at a stop sign while the other half were shown slides depicting the same car stopped at a yield sign. Afterwards, both groups were given a questionnaire about the video. For half of the subjects, the type of sign displayed in the initial slides was consistent with the type of sign mentioned in the questionnaire. The other half received a questionnaire in which the sign type was inconsistent with the sign displayed in the slides. The participants were given an irrelevant filler task and then given a forced choice recognition test in which two different series of 15 slides, one depicting each of the original conditions, were displayed at once. The subject was asked to select which slides he or she saw earlier in the experiment. Results showed that misleading information produced a greater proportion of incorrect memories than did true information, suggesting that either the original
information was not fully encoded before testing or that the misleading information is introduced into the correct consolidated representation after the fact, altering it (Loftus et al, 1978). Regardless, the key idea here is that individuals can recall incorrect details about an event in the presence of misleading information.

Other scholars have since explored misinformation effect in the context of social interaction. According to Coman et al (2009), “social contagion refers to the spread of memory—either true or false—from one person to another via social interaction” (p. 131). This could, obviously, serve as a powerful tool for the spread of collective memories between individuals within a group. A group of researchers altered Loftus’ original misinformation experiment to examine the effects of social interaction between pairs of people on memory of information to which both were exposed. In a priming phase, participants were shown a series of 40 pictures, 30 of which corresponded with a series shown to the second member of each pair. Each pair was then shown all 80 photos and asked each time to, one by one, state whether or not they had seen the photo during the priming phase; thus, subjects were occasionally presented with misleading information prior to responding to a stimulus. Results indicated a “small but reliable effect of memory continuity” as prior presentation of accurate information bolstered accurate recall whereas misinformation increased the likelihood of incorrect response (Wright et al, 2000, p. 189).

Further, a second experiment involved separately presenting a group of photos of a crime to a pair of people. The photos showed generally the same information save for a few subtle differences. The pairs reconvened after a sequence of questions regarding the photos and were again asked questions about the crimes they were shown. Though initial
recall was accurate, most people ended up conforming after conversing with the other member; confidence notably predicted which person persuaded the other (Wright et al, 2000, p. 195-99). These studies display the powerful role of social experience in regards to the formation of memory, along with the ability of people to influence memories of other individuals and the memory of a group as a whole.

Alin Coman and colleagues (2009) point out three aspects regarding the role of the individual in collective memory formation. First, they emphasize the importance of conversation on memory encoding—perhaps as an even more potent tool than physical collective memory structures, such as monuments and museums in that conversation is thoroughly implicated in the formation of “what has variously been called informal, vernacular, or counter-memories” (p. 130). Second, they discuss roles in conversation, specifically the role of the “narrator” and its connection to collective memory formation. Narrators are essentially those individuals prone to direction of a conversation as well as attention to certain details in the conversation, thereby making their version of a narrative more likely to enter collective memory (p. 133). Dominant narrators—narrators who “were particularly successful in transmitting their contributions to the conversation into the group’s subsequent collective memory”—influence both the likelihood of memory formation and the content of the memory (p. 134). This dominance tends to take shape quite often; in one study regarding familial conversation dynamics and collective memory, researchers observed the presence of a dominant narrator in 17 of 24 cases (Cuc et al, 2006; Coman et al, 2009, p. 133). Third, they indicate the role of expertise in social contagion, stating that people identified previously as “experts” seem to more reliably convince other individuals that their version of a narrative or memory is true (p. 134-35).
These aspects spread light on the nuances of memory consolidation in a group setting, especially the elements of social interaction that affect an individual’s ability to influence a group’s collective memory. One example of this phenomenon with regards to Ireland is the social power of Catholic priests through the 1950s. Since these people can be seen as experts with regards to theology and spiritual matters, it makes sense that people would be likely to conform to a somewhat repressive narrative with regards to accepted social interaction. This will be discussed further in Part Two.

Perhaps these dynamics could help explain the influence of certain politicians in 20th century Irish politics, specifically Eamon de Valera, who served in various executive positions in the government of Ireland during the first half of the 20th century, including President of the Irish Republic from 1921-1922, Taoiseach (essentially Irish prime minister) from 1937-48, 1951-54, and 1957-59, and President of Ireland from 1959-1973. Though opinions on De Valera have vacillated more since the 1960s, he was incredibly well respected during his tenure in politics. Combining this respect with his vast experience in politics, De Valera certainly qualified as an expert, as defined by Coman, in the eyes of much of the Irish population at the time—which was still clinging to a romantic narrative of Irish Nationalism “built” by politicians and artists during the end of the 19th century through the beginning of the 20th century and the creation of the Irish Free State (Hutchinson, 1987). De Valera also had a propensity for grand rhetoric, exemplified by his famous speech, “On Language and the Irish Nation” (1943), also known as “The Ireland that we dreamed of”, given on the 50th anniversary of the founding of Douglas Hyde’s Gaelic League. Consider the excerpt below, alongside
Wertsch’s argument that the state possesses a particularly strong ability to influence the collective memory of a nation (Wertsch, 2002):

…The Ireland that we dreamed of, would be the home of a people who valued material wealth only as a basis for right living, of a people who, satisfied with frugal comfort, devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit – a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, the contest of athletic youths and the laughter of happy maidens, whose firesides would be forums for the wisdom of serene old age. The home, in short, of a people living the life that God desires that men should live. With the tidings that make such an Ireland possible, St. Patrick came to our ancestors fifteen hundred years ago promising happiness here no less than happiness hereafter. It was the pursuit of such an Ireland that later made our country worthy to be called the island of saints and scholars. It was the idea of such an Ireland - happy, vigorous, spiritual - that fired the imagination of our poets; that made successive generations of patriotic men give their lives to win religious and political liberty; and that will urge men in our own and future generations to die, if need be, so that these liberties may be preserved…(De Valera, 1943).

Notice De Valera’s repeated emphasis on romantic notions of Irishness, such as “athletic youths” (which could be intended to invoke memories of Cuchulainn, the mythic Irish hero and nationalist icon) and “happy maidens,” both of which tend to figure strongly in Irish mythology¹. Additionally, De Valera makes sure to reference the coming of St.

¹ Lady Augusta Gregory’s Gods and Fighting Men (1904) is a good companion to Irish folklore, should the reader wish to read more.
Patrick, an event that strongly influenced both Irish history and folklore—which can serve as a vehicle for collective memory. St. Patrick also appeals to religion, thereby invoking a strong emotional response. As was stated before, the speech was also given to commemorate the Gaelic League, an organization that works to conserve the Irish language, an issue of pride and, thus, major emotion for many Irish people. No doubt these references were made intentionally to inspire emotion; indeed, several historians and sociologists have pointed out the unique emotional connection of the Irish to their folklore and Celtic past (Hutchinson, 1987; O’Kelly, 2004; Myers, 2011). Thus, in skillfully utilizing his position as an “expert” along with strong emotional cues throughout the speech, De Valera managed to create an incredibly strong collective memory of his “ideal Ireland” while continuing to feed an ongoing narrative of Irish nationalism during a time of national crisis—World War II. Interestingly enough, parts of Ireland began the process of modernization far before this point. For instance, Ireland embarked upon a major project, the Shannon Hydroelectric Scheme, from 1925-1929. It was “a far-sighted and innovative move” and would serve as an international model for similar electricity projects for years to come (Ferriter, 2005, p. 316). Additionally, it took place in County Clare, an often romanticized rural county—one de Valera would have been thinking of while making this speech. With this in mind, de Valera’s narrative of his “ideal Ireland” was actually quite far removed from reality.

Collective Memory Consolidation
Collective memory scholars have, until recently, been unsuccessful in producing a model for consolidation of collective memory. Anastasio et al (2012) present a distinctive and convincing view of collective memory and individual memory as analogous processes by using a model intended to compare the two processes. The model is reproduced below for convenience:

![Three-in-one model of consolidation](image)

Figure 3: “Three-in-one” model of consolidation, as detailed in Anastasio et al’s book, *Collective and Individual Memory Consolidation*. This model will be referenced often for the remainder of this paper (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 72).

Note that this is not a suggestion that collective and individual memories are one in the same, an inaccurate point of view (Anastasio, 2012, p. 44). Instead, I argue in concurrence with Anastasio and others that collective memory and individual memory are analogous systems at different levels of processing; additionally, due to the individual’s ability to influence collective memory and the importance of social context
on the formation of individual memory, the processes are interconnected in many disparate ways.

The first element of the model is the buffer, which essentially serves as a temporary storage space for unconsolidated memory. This element is strongly related to the visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop described by the Baddeley-Hitch model of working memory. Indeed, for individual memory consolidation, this component is working memory, where stimuli and their meanings are held briefly prior to encoding into long-term storage via Hebbian learning, otherwise known as long term potentiation (Hebb, 1949). This process is heavily mediated by attention, as items must be attended for memory consolidation to occur. For collective memory, this process involves any sort of information distributed to a collective that has yet to be consolidated into collective memory. This can take the form of posters, propaganda, mass media, data, or cultural artifacts. It is only through interaction with the relationality element of the model that these labile memories become stable long-term memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 91).

Several aspects of the buffer should be clarified here before continuing. Firstly, Anastasio points out that “contingency, catastrophe, and ‘the spirit of the secret society’” affect which private sources of information become available for public consumption in the form of archives—and, thus, for the process of memory consolidation (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 94). The importance of discursive space—that is, a physical or virtual place where people can gather and discuss ideas through written word and conversation—in regards to the buffer element is also stressed with a comparison to Jürgen Habermas’ notion of the public sphere as a separate space from the political sphere (Anastasio et al, 2012, p. 97; Habermas, 1989). Alin Coman and associates (2009) also stress the
importance of discursive space (p. 133). These discursive spaces act as a buffer in that new information is constantly brought to the attention of members of the collective, thereby making ideas available for consolidation.

Two different discursive spaces are important when considering the collective memory/memories of Irish people. The first of these is the pub, which has traditionally served as a community center. Here, the general public is able to gather and discuss ideas, beliefs, and memories without fear for safety or vilification. Additionally, the pub functions as a venue for folk music performance, which often helps to build upon the collective nationalist narrative due to common themes of republicanism, reverence for martyrs, and the English as an enemy (Parfitt, 2015). Thus, nationalism is continuously kept in the attention of the collective.

The second pertinent discursive space is the church. As will be explained in greater detail in the following section of this paper, Irish Catholicism was the dominant force in Irish social politics until the 1950s (Fuller, 2005; Walsham, 2012). Here, the parish priest, a position occupying massive social power in the traditional Irish community, could continuously update the collective memory of the community, utilizing his position as a spiritual expert to push Catholic ideology, such as sexual repression, into the community’s attention. Additionally, the church can easily connect with people’s emotions, further influencing memory.

The second aspect of Anastasio’s model is the relater, which can be compared to the hippocampus in individual memory. The relater is responsible for gathering items in the buffer for storage in long-term memory while establishing recursive, meaningful relationships with previously consolidated memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, 105-107).
For collective memory, this can be any form of conversation or dialogue, be it direct or indirect, between members of a collective that influences the consolidation of previously held or new narratives. Nationalism is an interesting example of the relater at work; it develops as a national narrative related to many common themes such as overcoming an enemy and the sacredness of the dead. Interestingly enough, nationalism develops best when the collective is historically homogeneous—which fits well for traditionally white, Catholic, conservative Ireland (Anastasio et al, 2012, 120-23). Another key factor of the collective relater is that collective memory is influenced by interactions between groups as well as within a group; thus, the entity is able to modify its own narrative as long as it is presented with a convincing counter-narrative.

Finally, the third aspect of the model is the generalizer, which essentially operates as a store of consolidated memories (Anastasio et al, 2012, 128). For individual consolidation, this is mediated by the medial temporal lobes and the hippocampus, which aid in the production and storage of episodic memories from working memory. In collective memory consolidation, the generalizer acts on a group by strengthening or modifying of existing narratives through interaction with the relater element (Anastasio et. al, 2012).

Using this model as a guide, the following part will detail the gradual construction of a national Irish memory in the 19th and 20th centuries and the beginnings of its subsequent disintegration from social, political, and economic perspectives by examining the influence of the Catholic Church, the Celtic Revival and nationalism, and the Celtic Tiger respectively. Afterwards, Part Three will use a combination of primary research
and other data to examine the systematic fracture of this narrative due to a “perfect storm” of events during the latter half of the 20th century.

**PART TWO: Historical Background of Irish Collective Memory Consolidation**

**Catholicism, Social Dominance, and Sexuality**

In terms of cultural adherence, Irish Catholicism has been remarkably resilient and influential. Throughout history, the people of Ireland blended traditional Celtic culture with the burgeoning religion; perhaps this complex integration of Celticism and Catholicism provides rationale for its stalwart support among the Irish peasantry throughout occupation of Ireland. English conquest of Ireland brought along with it a host of tribulations associated with attempts at religious control. However, despite disenfranchisement, landownership restrictions, anti-Catholic legislation, and tense sectarianism, the Catholic Church gradually established itself as a powerful economic, political, and social force, setting the stage for its near-complete authority during the twentieth century (Scanlan, 2006, p.14; Aughey and Oakland, 2013, p. 85). Emmet Larkin argues that by the 19th century the Church had enough economic pull to divert considerable capital away from the Irish economy, possibly contributing to economic instability. Additionally, brought on by a nationwide “identity crisis caused by the gradual loss of the Irish language, culture, and way of life during the preceding century” along with a collapse of the credibility in the traditional “peasant belief system” due to the Potato Famine, Ireland’s Devotional Revolution from 1850-1875 continued to bolster the might of the Catholic Church as people converted en masse (Larkin, 1976, p. 4-6). The ratio of priests to laypeople increased from 1 in 3500 to 1 in 400 from 1840 to 1960,
reflecting the expanding visibility of the church; by the early twentieth century, “Catholic influence permeated both the law and the individual psyche” (Scanlan, 2006, p. 68).

As Catholicism garnered more and more social power, it also gained control over Irish sexuality—with profound consequences. With the passing of referenda on everything from marriage to contraception to homosexuality, the Church effectively regulated the sexual culture and behavior of the country as a whole. Chastity became “both a religious and patriotic ideal,” and a sense of Victorian prudishness, in which everything carnal was taboo, became normality (Scanlan, 2006, p. 65). “While sexual desire and pleasure are obviously rooted in the body and soul of the individual, they are also central to social order and social control,” stipulates Inglis; in this sense, the Church sought to use its power to control sex, thereby maintaining order and containing the so-called sins of the body (Inglis, 2005, p. 11).

Marriage, then, became the foremost method by which the Church managed to restrain the sexuality of Irish society and to decrease population growth. For women, expected to remain pure and modest for family’s sake, Catholic marriage control resulted in a strange duality in which some were prevented from access to their only source of sexual expression while others were expected to reproduce steadily (Inglis, 2005, p. 16-17). The Irish people also upheld the sacrosanctity of established marriages. Divorce was not granted in Ireland until 1995, and contraception, while legalized in 1980, did not become readily available until 1993 (Scanlan, 2006, p. 66; Fuller, 2005, 51-52) Going further, the Church sought to curtail any sort of extramarital sexual expression, attempting to regulate all “occasions of sin,” or situations in which men and women would mingle socially, assuming that such gatherings would bring “temptations” (Inglis,
Thus, stepping outside of one’s marriage was grounds for public shaming; for instance, Charles Stewart Parnell, revered as an “uncrowned king” in 19th century Ireland, saw an infidelity scandal bring his political career to its bitter end (Larkin, 1961, p. 316). “What made Ireland unique,” says Inglis, “was how deeply Victorian practices and attitudes penetrated into the Irish body and soul” in terms of sexuality (Inglis, 2005, p. 23). Ireland, then, became a sort of social theocracy, a country in which the church maintained an iron grip on social norms with a striking authoritarian manner. Tim Pat Coogan (2003) even promotes the idea that “the only native Irish institution which might have fuelled fascist leanings was the Catholic Church, whose authoritarianism could in some ways be compared to the underlying basis of fascism,” with regards to the right-wing, extreme nationalist Young Ireland organization of the 1930s (p. 204). Thus, through a steady era of power acquisition, the Irish Catholic Church essentially set the stage for an era of modern social dominance.

This paradigm of church-society relations largely continued without challenge throughout the first half of the 20th century. Much of the Catholic hierarchy were Pro-Treaty in the 1920s, in part due to a desire to continue its control in the new Irish Free State (Ferriter, 2005, p. 331). As the 20s came to an end, the church incited a moral “panic”, especially regarding contraception and the growing movement of modernism, which the clergy saw as detrimental to social mores or “obscene”. This came to a climax in 1929—after an inquiry from Kevin O’Higgins’ Committee on Evil Literature—with the establishment of the Censorship of Publications Act (Ferriter, 2005, p. 340-41). With its passage, the act allowed for the restriction of any book or publication due to “indecency or obscenity” and included a ban on literature advocating for contraception
and birth control; Mary Clancy also notes that this detracted from women’s ability to add to the birth control conversation as well (Coogan, 2003, p. 170). This could be the basis of Inglis’ (2005) assertion that Ireland experienced a “dearth of sexually transgressive literature” (p. 19). As such, the Church continued in its crusade to limit public access to increasingly modern ideas, which were being available in the collective buffer of other European nations.

By restricting public access to alternative narratives, Irish Catholic leaders assured their dominance over Irish collective memory consolidation, regulating access to generalized, long-term storage using censorship while also controlling the attentional capacity of the crucial relater element (Anastasio, 2012). This made sure that the dominant narrative in Irish culture was largely homogenous and Catholic-centric. Later political developments continued to aid this narrative, including Eamon De Valera’s recognition of the Church’s “special position” in Irish society in the Constitution of Ireland, enacted in 1937\(^2\) (Ireland, 1937; Fuller, 2005, p. 41). Additionally, via correspondence with Pope Pius XII, Taoiseach John Costello’s Inter-Party Government assured their “filial loyalty” to the Catholic Church and their “firm resolve to be guided in all…work by the teaching of Christ (Fuller, 2005, p. 41-42) The Constitution’s wording and similar legislation not only aided with the Church’s legitimization of its power but also allowed for the intermingling of Catholic influence in state business, which certainly gave the clergy a large amount of political and social power.

Despite its meticulous construction of social authority during the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) centuries, the Irish Church’s power began to erode during the 1950s, seen by some as the

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\(^2\) Article 44.1.2 includes the following clause: “The State recognises the special position of the Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Church as the guardian of the Faith professed by the great majority of the citizens
last decade of complete Catholic dominance in the social sphere. One major event that highlighted this was the Mother and Child Scheme of 1951, championed by Minister for Health, Noel Browne. The point of Browne’s idea was to provide free medical care for mothers and their children until the age of 16. Unfortunately for him, both the Catholic Church and medical professionals argued against the proposal, claiming it was “a threat to private medicine” (Ferriter, 2005, p.502) while others believed the country simply could not afford the reform (Fanning, 2008, p. 153). Further, “Catholic social theory” convinced many to argue “that it was unacceptable for the state, through the local authorities, to interfere with the private welfare of families and their children” (Ferriter, 2005, p. 501). Rising tensions between Church and State eventually led the Irish government to demand Browne’s resignation at the behest of church officials; however, with an “unprecedented” decision, Browne complicated the situation on his resignation day by releasing “the full documentation of the correspondence which had passed between him, the bishops and the Taoiseach to all the newspapers” (Fuller, 2005, p. 47).

According to Diarmaid Ferriter (2005), the Catholic Church remained “the effective government of Ireland,” but the public was finally aware of the extent to which the Church penetrated the public sphere (p. 504). This certainly caused the public to begin questioning the place of Catholicism in the Irish government, a trend that would define the remaining years of the 20th century.

The Second Vatican Council of the 1960s continued the process of changing the role of the Irish Catholic Church. Fuller (2005) writes that “it was a blueprint for a more open questioning model of church—which was in stark contrast to the legalistic model which had characterized Ireland till then” (p. 49). This change, though not accepted by all
of the Irish clergy, began to quicken the population’s move away from adherence to the Church. The Sixties also brought the explosion of radio and television, which “pushed back the frontiers of what was acceptable overnight” and “[demanded] accountability of bishops, politicians, public servants, and private persons alike” (Fuller, 2005, p. 49).

Since the Church could not regulate these forms of media—this fell to the government, of course—this development allowed for the exposure of the Irish populace to alternative narratives conflicting with Church control, accelerating the move towards secularization. Feminism added to the mix in the 1970s, promoting the legalization of contraception; many “saw the social values of Catholicism as a major obstacle inhibiting equal opportunities for women in Ireland, however personally devout they might be” (Foster, 2008, p. 48).

All of these factors certainly aided in chipping away at the prominent Catholic consolidated memory, but the various scandals that plagued the Church throughout the 90s and early 2000s were far and away the greatest and most sudden trauma. Firstly, the Church utilized asylums known as Magdalen Laundries to incarcerate women who became pregnant out of wedlock until as late as 1996 (Ferriter, 2005, p. 538). In 1993, 155 bodies of women and children who had lived and died in the High Park Asylum were found in an unmarked mass grave in Dublin. The information was not leaked to the public until 2003, but the information caused a massive amount of uproar (Smith, 2007, p. 432). Additionally, the 90s brought the beginning of the highly publicized priest abuse scandals, during which allegations of systematic sexual abuse were brought to public attention. These scandals alienated many Catholics, who felt that the Church had betrayed them—especially given its propensity to preach against sexual immorality (Patterson,
2002, p. 293; Ferriter, 2005, p. 733). The sweeping effects of these traumatic incidents, especially the abuse scandals, will be detailed further in Part Three.

The Celtic Revival, Irish Nationalism, and The Troubles

Taking root in the late decades of the 19th century, the Celtic Revival was a period of renewed interest in Celtic culture. Inspiration for the movement, which comprised both the literary Celtic Twilight and the revival of the Irish language, came from a worry among artists, historians, and other intellectuals that Ireland had lost connection with its unique Gaelic history and heritage, due in part to English rule. This initiative came on the heels of the Potato Famine, which decimated the population of native Irish speakers as a result of malnourishment, emigration, and death. The leaders of the movement, such as W.B. Yeats, Lady Augusta Gregory, J. M. Synge, and Douglas Hyde wished “to revive an authentic, indigenous Irish folk culture” (Castle, 2001, p.1). In his 1892 speech before the Irish National Literary society, “The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland,” Hyde complained:

We have at last broken the continuity of Irish life, and just at the moment when the Celtic race is presumably about to largely recover possession of its own country, it finds itself deprived and stript of its Celtic characteristics, cut off from the past, yet scarcely in touch with the present. It has lost since the beginning of this century almost all that connected it with the era of Cuchullain and of Ossian…

As Phillip O’Leary (1990) writes, this demonstrates Hyde’s notion of “nineteenth century Ireland’s simultaneous betrayal of her language and her history” (p. 88). In this context, these people endeavored to rediscover a Gaelic culture in Ireland, creating an
“aesthetic of cultural redemption,” from its English oppressors (Castle, 2001, p. 3). Yeats, too, contributed to this ideology. As a poet intensely interested in folklore, he was certainly inspired by ancient Gaelic literature and wished to reintroduce it into modern Irish culture. Much of his work contains allusions to Irish mythology and romantic notions of a Gaelic Ireland. Consider the following extract from his poem, “To Ireland in the Coming Times,” in which he muses about his connection to the Irish past and his hopes that his verses will continue into a modern future he believed to be dark:

Yet he who treads in measured ways

May surely barter gaze for gaze.

Man ever journeys on with them

After the red-rose-bordered hem.

Ah, faeries, dancing under the moon,

A Druid land, a Druid tune! (Yeats, 1892)

Yeats’ imagery in this poem is certainly mystical, reflecting his desire to redirect public attention to folklore. Ciaran O’Kelly (2004) argues that Yeats believed that “the true Irish were the remnants of an unbroken line that provided a direct link to the ancient and pagan Ireland that was, most importantly, prior to England’s political influence” (p. 510), and Gregory Castle (2001) remarks on Yeats’ “desire to preserve and thereby redeem an authentic Irish folk culture” along with a “belief in the innate spiritualism and mysticism of the Irish peasantry,” especially in the west of Ireland (p. 41). Furthermore, John Fanning (2011) comments on how “deliberate the construction of this identity was” and how it continues into Irish culture today (p. 24). Yeats, then, was able to construct and
disseminate a particularly strong narrative that has since become consolidated in Irish collective memory.

Synge, a poet, writer, and playwright whose work benefitted greatly from the establishment of an Irish national theatre at the turn of the 20th century, also contributed to this line of thinking. Much of his work concerns somewhat romantic notions of the Irish West, which he, like Yeats, considered to be something of a haven of true, pagan Irishness. This includes his book, *The Aran Islands*, which details his journeys through the eponymous isles off Ireland’s western coast and his belief that they represent a culture separate from the Anglicized Catholic culture of the rest of Ireland (Greene & Stephens, 1959, p. 98-99). Synge’s plays, notably *Riders to the Sea*—set on Inishmaan, one of the Aran Islands—and *The Playboy of the Western World*, set in County Mayo on the west coast, also factor into his depiction of the myth of the Irish west, which Luke Gibbons (1996) refers to as a “rural myth” and “soft primitivism,” a somewhat manufactured, idealized vision (p. 29). Gibbons also notes parallels between Synge’s depiction and the American West portrayed in Hollywood films (p. 25-35). In reality, Yeats’ and Synge’s views of the West is interesting in that they idealized a region of Ireland that was fraught with poverty and unemployment at the time.

Several of my interview subjects, notably Professors Mary Clancy and Lionel Pilkington of NUI Galway, discussed the impact of the romanticization of the west, even going so far as to deem it “dangerous.” Mary Clancy also noted the continued construction of this quixotic character in Albert Kahn’s 1913 collection of color photographs from the Irish west coast, taken by Marguerite Mespoulet and Madeleine Mignon-Alba, two French women. Clancy believes these photographs to be heavily
manufactured, specifically noting the image included in the appendix, saying, “I think she dressed up.” Her rationale relies upon the fact that the cloak worn by the girl would have been ceremonial dress and would not have even been worn by such a young woman. This type of doctoring certainly falls in line with the romantic ideas of the literary revivalists.

The mystical narrative created by the Celtic Revival certainly influenced the way Irish people think of their heritage, as will be discussed in Part Three, but it also had a major effect on the nationalist independence movement of the early 20th century. According to O’Kelly (2004), “The idea of being Irish that was articulated by the nationalists was rooted in the Celtic Revival” and “The Revival provided the basis for the nationalists’ political movement… It was also a move from largely justice-based to culturally-based demands for independence” (p. 510-511). Additionally, “though impossible to quantify exactly, the cultural renaissance of the previous decade… undoubtedly influenced many nationalists” (Ferriter, 2005, p. 112). Consider, for instance, the following excerpt from Padraig Pearse’s speech at the grave of O’Donovan Rossa, a former rebel in the 1867 Fenian Rising:

O'Donovan Rossa was splendid in the proud manhood of him, splendid in the heroic grace of him, splendid in the Gaelic strength and clarity and truth of him. And all that splendour and pride and strength was compatible with a humility and a simplicity of devotion to Ireland, to all that was olden and beautiful and Gaelic in Ireland…The clear true eyes of this man almost alone in his day visioned Ireland as we of to-day would surely have her: not free merely, but Gaelic as well; not Gaelic merely, but free as well (McLoughlin 1996).
Pearse’s idea of an “olden” Gaelic Ireland here bears similarity to Yeats’ vision, and he also includes romantic, hero-like notions of the man. Further, the writers of the 1916 Proclamation of the Republic of Ireland, distributed during the Easter Rising, likely included the clause “supported by her exiled children in America and by gallant allies in Europe” to ensure they would be charged with treason, thereby guaranteeing their executions (Mitchell & O’Snodaigh, 1985).

Martyrdom and blood-sacrifice were themes of early Celtic mythology—seen especially in the Ulster Cycle and the popular myth of Cuchulainn. These themes were also utilized in the Celtic Revival, as seen in Yeats and Lady Gregory’s play Cathleen ni Houlihan. Roisin Higgins (2012) writes in her book Transforming 1916 that for young Irish men, as a result of the renewed attention towards the Cuchulainn myth and Pearse’s own writing, “true heroism therefore was cast retrospectively onto life only once it had ended in martyrdom” (p.116). In this context, it would seem that the signees wished to have their deaths serve as the fuel behind the nationalist movement, inciting others to follow in their footsteps to fight the British. The ploy ended up working, too:

The notion that the leaders, and the rebels who had died during Easter week, had willingly sacrificed themselves for the nation set in train a process of codifying the story of the Rising itself as a mythic and symbolic event, rather than as a military undertaking (Wills, 2009, p. 14).

Feasibly, the combination of artistic leaders and political leaders espousing this narrative of a Gaelic Ireland accounts for its adherence in Irish culture, as will be expounded upon later. Consider once again Alin Coman’s idea of the expert. In this context, the major players of the literary Celtic Revival can be seen in the role of
“experts” by the Irish collective insofar as they were able to produce high quality literature; thus, writers such as Yeats, Synge, and Gregory were able to utilize the relational element to direct attention towards and consolidate a Gaelic Ireland memory seen as “true” by the Irish population. Going further, political leaders, also in the expert role, were able to use this generalized narrative to construct a strong, parallel, all-encompassing cultural nationalist narrative.

With this in mind, partition and The Troubles present an interesting problem for the republican, nationalist narrative. Clearly, the leaders of the nationalist movement attempted to create an us-vs-them ideology with regards to the British, so the voluntary departure of Northern Ireland from the Irish Free State definitely complicated the issue. While some, such as Yeats, considered the partition necessary—in fact, he was quoted as saying “when surly disagreeable neighbors shut the door, it is better to turn the key in it before they change their mind”—much of the population in the Republic of Ireland and most of the minority Catholic population in Northern Ireland favored reunification (Elliott, 2009, p. 118). Tensions between Northern and Southern republicans and Northern unionists slowly rose throughout the 20th century and into the Sixties. Sean Lemass attempted to normalize relations and soothe the impending conflict by meeting in Belfast with Northern Ireland Prime Minister Terence O’Neill in 1965—just before the 50th anniversary of the Easter Rising—over border matters and industrialization (Foster, 2008, p. 115). Though some saw this as a major step, the hostility between unionists and republicans boiled over into violence in the late 60s and raged until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
Conflict still occurs in certain areas of Northern Ireland, especially urban centers, and the wounds of the Troubles remain fresh. Violence seems to have made quite an impact on the collective consciousness of both regions. For instance, in one interview, Professor Richard McMahon of Trinity College pointed out:

The violence in NI created a sense of separateness in the southern counties. The South remains a remarkably low violence society, while the North went from being one of the most non-violent societies in the 50s to being the most violent society in Europe in the 70s.

Interestingly, some consider the concept of “myth” to be a major cause of The Troubles. Graham Dawson (2007) defines the word as “understood to mean damaging misconceptions and falsehoods about the past, embedded in popular consciousness, which fuel the atavistic political identities of Ulster Unionism and Irish nationalism, and stir up political violence” (p. 35). In this sense, consolidated collective memory helped cause the conflict and the conflict helped to create an altered narrative of greater separation. These notions will be explored further in The Troubles section of Part Three.

**Economic Change: Globalization and the Celtic Tiger**

The foundation of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy of the 90s and early 2000s actually began much earlier—in fact, it can be traced back to Sean Lemass’ administration in the 1960s. Inheriting the position of Taoiseach in 1959 from its longstanding holder, Eamon de Valera, Lemass was faced with a daunting problem—the economy. Until his inauguration, Ireland largely had protectionist economic policies in place and was still feeling the effects of the Anglo-Irish Trade War. Lemass sought to
liberalize and diversify the Irish economy, which was in a state of stagnancy (Patterson, 2002, 148). Though it would take a great amount of time, Lemass’ policies and legacy would eventually lead to massive economic success and modernization.

The first step was T.K. Whitaker’s “Economic Development” paper, written in 1956 and adopted in 1959, which proved to be the catalyst for economic liberalization. Many see the ideas included in this document to be the “prelude to growth in the 1960s” (Kirby, Gibbons, and Cronin, 2002, p.6; Fanning, 2008, p. 8-9). The paper advocated a move away from agriculture and de Valera’s isolationist policies, a relic from the trade war of the 1930s. Additionally, it allowed for major tax breaks for foreign businesses in an attempt to attract foreign direct investment. Coupled with progressive education reform, Lemass’ policies quickly began to stimulate the economy.

Once Ireland joined the EEC—which would become the EU—in 1973, this growth began to reach new heights due to lenient EEC tax policies and continued foreign investment; indeed, “by 1973, new foreign-owned firms employed some 40,000 workers, or one-fifth of the manufacturing workforce of the Republic” (Patterson, 2002, p. 152). Although inflation, uncontrolled public spending, and emigration did detract from this benefit, the economy was on a path to success. Charlie Haughey’s government established Dublin’s International Financial Services Center in 1987, continuing Ireland’s shift towards a more export and service-based economy (Finance Act, 1987; Hardiman, 2003, p. 7). That year (1987) also saw the beginning of the “Social Partnership” economic period (O’Malley, 2012, p. 14). This policy involved a partnership between the government, employers, and trade unions in an attempt to agree on various economic
issues in order to curb inflation, set fair wages, and promote further growth in the economy.

Other factors undoubtedly influenced the growth of the Irish economy. For instance, public health research indicates “the legalisation of contraception in 1980 resulted in a sharp decline in fertility and a sizeable increase in the relative share of the working-age population,” which helps to explain the birth of the Celtic Tiger (Bloom & Canning, 2003, p. 229). However, the major causes, as outlined earlier, are usually seen as the end of protectionism, progressive educational reform, net immigration, foreign direct investment, and joining the EU. These factors helped to produce massive growth in the Irish economy from 1987-2001:

Output in the decade from 1995 increased by 350 per cent, outpacing the per capita averages in the UK and the USA, personal disposable income doubled, exports increased fivefold, trade surpluses accumulated into billions, employment boomed, immigrants poured into the country…Between 1987 and 2001, the annual growth rates of the Gross National Product exceeded 7 per cent and sometimes touched double figures (Foster, 2008, p. 7).

Though the economy would experience a major crash in 2008, likely due to the banks’ irresponsible lending practices and the bursting of a major property bubble, the Celtic Tiger moment in Irish history ran directly counter to the traditional collective memory of poverty and economic stagnancy that had been consolidated for years. Though poverty remained a major issue in certain areas and not all regions of the country experienced economic development at the same rate, the sudden explosion of Ireland’s economy had enormous, lasting effects on the collective memory of its people (Kirby, 2004). In fact,
the economy was a major issue discussed in many interviews, with wide-reaching effects branching into many other areas of interest.

**PART THREE: Irish Collective Memory Today**

**Methods and General Notes**

To assess the changes in Irish collective memory, 46 interviews were collected over the course of two months (27 May-14 July 2015). 19 of those interviewed were female and 27 were male. The following age groups were formed to aid in analysis: 18-29, 30-49, and 50+. Interviews were structured in that the same questions were asked to each person, but also fluid in that subjects were permitted to take the conversation down different paths depending on their answers to the standard questions. Questions are available in the appendix. This free-form direction was taken to allow people to freely recall memories and to eliminate observer bias due to directed questions. Additionally, interviews were geographically dispersed so as to eliminate substantial geographical bias in data.

One of the major questions asked was “What do you see as the most prominent cultural change or changes in the past five decades?” Of the youngest age group, seven reported a sense of “openness,” three reported economic change, three reported political change, and one reported no change. Of the middle age group, four reported economic change, four for demographic change, three for “openness,” three reported religion, one for political change, and one each for political change, liberalization, and technological change. Of the oldest group, five reported economic change, seven said religion, two discussed technological change, and “openness,” language change, and demographics
each had one claimant. Obviously, there is quite a bit of overlap regarding these opinions, but also several differences, namely a drop in perceptions of openness amongst older subjects. The following sections will endeavor to elucidate the nuances of the interview data.

**Catholicism**

Not all recent damages to Irish collective memory are splintering. Some have even seemed to incite a unifying response, which may seem counterintuitive at first glance. Consider, though, Anastasio’s model, in particular the relationality element: due to the recursive nature of memory, the influence of other social group members on individual and group memories, and the modifying capacity of the collective relater, people are able to adjust their own memories in the presence of a convincing counter-narrative (Anastasio et al, 2012). Thus, it is plausible that an exceptionally comprehensive counter-narrative in direct opposition to a collective representation concerning a given aspect of a culture could indeed cause people’s memories to shift en masse. In the context of Ireland, this seems to be what has happened with regards to the Irish Catholic Church.

The previous sections briefly detailed the history of Catholic social dominance along with how Catholicism has become engrained into Irish collective memory. This paradigm began to change during the latter half of the 20th century (Ganiel, 2016). The shift was not a result of decreased visibility, considering the ratio of Catholic priests to laypeople increased from approximately 1:3500 to 1:400 from 1840-1960, but a change in culture (Scanlan, 2006). Louise Fuller attributes this to the Church’s inability to adapt to rapidly changing times, technology, and attitudes in Ireland starting in the 1950s
However, the most powerful influence on public opinion was undoubtedly the priest sexual abuse scandals beginning in the 1990s and continuing into the 21st century.

Bearing in mind the doctrine of sexual asceticism and “sins of the body” preached actively in the Irish Catholic Church for over a century, it makes sense that people would have a strong reaction to allegations of systemic sexual transgressions. Much of the population felt that the scandals exposed hypocrisy within the clergy; for instance, Ciaran, a 22 year old bartender working in Dublin, said that, “There’s not a lot of love for the church in my generation. I hate the church—bunch of arseholes. They’re sexually repressive, yeah, except amongst themselves.” The same man claimed to “love the gay marriage referendum.” Additionally, Abi, 29, from Waterford, believes that, “People have been questioning the exact meaning of traditional values…people have been realizing mistakes so far as family values and our culture. You can hold your own belief.”

This notion was shared by many of those who were interviewed; people indicate that bucking the Church’s influence had a liberating effect on society’s perceptions of social mores, pushing social ideology in a more progressive direction. When asked about the most prevalent cultural changes in the country, Niall, 40, living in Galway claims that it’s “the decline of the Catholic Church,” which “opened up new opportunities…released the two main parties and sort of unfroze the country.” This quote is especially interesting considering James Joyce’s repetition of the word “paralysis” in his seminal work, *Dubliners*, which details Joyce’s observations of stagnancy in early modern Ireland.

Indeed, people seem to associate Catholicism with a stifling of growth within the country and agree that its waning influence allows for more social freedom, which is
interesting considering approximately 85% of the country identified as Catholic in 2011 according to the Central Statistics Office of Ireland. However, it should also be noted that this is the lowest reported Catholic percentage in history, a massive decrease from 94.9% in 1961, the highest ever reported. Furthermore, the number of people reporting atheism, agnosticism, or no religious preference increased from 67,413 in 1991 to 277,237 in 2011. In terms of population proportion, this is nearly a threefold increase—from 1.9% to 5.8% (Ireland, 2011; Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015, p. 53). Additionally 25-34 year olds make up a disproportionate 26% of the nonreligious population, palpable evidence of a generational shift in progress (Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015, p. 54).

Taking this a step further, consider the following, taken from an interview with Dr. Emilie Pine, 38, in Dun Laoghaire:

The ritual act of memory is hugely in conflict with Catholic memory…

The Catholic Church didn’t adapt with social change, so now we see a rejection of the exercising of power in the church… If the church had been less repressive, things may have gone differently. Even if they had said ‘we’re not going to marry gay people, but if they go and get civil unions what’s that got to do with us?’ Who knows what might have happened?

She also called the “Yes” movement leading up to the gay marriage referendum “an active dissociation between past and present.” These quotes expose several interesting aspects of this collective memory shift away from Catholic social control. Firstly, as was previously stated, people seem to display an acknowledgement of Catholicism’s difficulty with adapting to modernity as well as feelings of betrayal due to sexual infidelity within the church. Furthermore, she draws connections between waning support
for the Catholic Church and the success of the Marriage Equality Act in May 2015, which, in a resounding 62-38 victory, made Ireland the first country to legalize gay marriage by popular vote (McDonald, 2015). 60.5% of eligible voters participated in the polls, which places the referendum in the top 5 in history in terms of voter turnout.

Young people especially mobilized around the “Yes” movement, with over 80% of voters aged 18-24 voting in favor of marriage equality at a much higher turnout than the previous general election (Elkink et al, 2015). When asked about the most prominent cultural changes in the past 5 decades, Ella, 29, said, “Definitely the referendum. It’s the first time Ireland has progressed in equal rights and the first time the youth has engaged in voting and democracy.” Others also echoed this sentiment. Asked the same question, Niamh, 27, said, “There’s also the referendum. I voted yes, but I was so surprised. That wasn’t supposed to happen.” Saoirse, 21, commented: “I think it’s great. I wasn’t even sure it would pass. There was a silent majority that wasn’t speaking out. It’s time for equality…there’s an obvious homosexual minority.” These statements indicate a notion that the referendum represents a positive move away from the Church and towards a secular society; this was often accompanied by a genuine sense of shock regarding the weakened influence of Catholicism on social opinion.

The referendum was also approved in every constituency except South Leitrim-Roscommon, a sparsely populated rural area (Ireland, 2015). Other rural counties, usually strongholds of social conservatism—Professor Michael King at Trinity College Dublin, 35, noted an “obstructionist element in rural Irish farmers [who]…will vote no just to vote no”—still passed the bill. John, a 23-year-old male student from rural Clare claimed:
“I voted yes. I didn’t really think much of it, really. It was just the right thing to do. I didn’t really do much research on it or anything. Just live and let live.”

This adage—“live and let live”—and general enthusiasm towards secularism was echoed several other times in discussions of the referendum—and not only among young people. Brian, 57, from Dublin claimed, “I voted yes. Of course I voted yes. It could be my son. People just need to live and let live.” He also said, “The Catholic church has done major damage to this country. The priest that married me is locked up now—you can look him up. The only reason people go to mass is if they don’t, the neighbors will be talking.” Another man from Galway, Martin, said:

When I grew up, even up to the 1980s, the church dominated social mores. The referendum shows we are shaking the shackles of church domination. We’ve done that, I think. I’ve been there, having been born in the 40s, coming from a Catholic background. It’s fantastic, it’s great [the referendum]. Change has been enormous for the good, I think back to you can’t eat meat Friday. Hell and damnation, pulpit pumping is long gone.

One woman, Judy, 72, said about the referendum: “It’s terrific. The first time Catholicism has no stranglehold on what we say and believe. Grannies have grandkids who are gay. It just made sense.” This actually reflects the wide, cross-generational support base for marriage equality. One study looked at voting statistics and determined that even though people aged 18-24 voted in much larger numbers than normal, the referendum still would have passed with ease. Save the 65+ age group, all groups voted “yes” at well over 50% and over 75% voters under the age of 45 voted in favor (Elkink et al, 2015). Professor Tony Varley at NUI Galway described this phenomenon, saying,
“You couldn’t predict this 30 years ago. We were steadfastly Catholic then…But this is the politics of the future, the basis of mobilization in our country.” Indeed, it does seem that people, regardless of age, are beginning to rally around support for a more secular society, reflecting a shift in memory of the Catholic Church from a positive, obedient manner towards a more Western, individualistic, freethinking ideology. People also seem to show an acknowledgement that shared representations of the Church are indeed changing; for instance, Martin’s discussion of his memories of the Catholic Church in the 1980s reveals an interesting tendency to memorialize the more negative, unpleasant aspects of the institution, which might not have been the case before the scandals in the 1990s, and Tony’s assertion that “you couldn’t have predicted this 30 years ago” indicates that memories of adherence to the Church have faded quite a bit.

Both Brian and Emilie also touched on another very important point: collective memory of the Catholic Church as an institution versus memory of Catholicism as a religion. As Emilie points out, Irish people as a whole seem to retain positive memories of their religious beliefs alongside major disenchantment with the Church insofar as it exists as an establishment. In fact, one study, performed in October 2011 by Amarach Research for the Iona Institute, found that less than half—approximately 35%—of Irish Catholics attend mass on a weekly basis, a major drop from over 90% in 1961. People were grouped into age groups of 18-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55+. The only age group above 50% was 55+ at 52%, and all other age groups polled below 35% (Attitudes towards the Catholic Church, 2011). This certainly supports Brian’s expressed ideas of indifferent attitudes towards mass and the Church as a whole.
More interesting is people’s opinions towards the Church itself. Though 70% of people in the poll identified as Catholic, only 24% of all adults indicate favorable opinion of the Church. Again, people over the age of 55 are the most sympathetic, with 55% claiming a favorable position, but 44% indicate an unfavorable opinion; what’s more, less than 20% of people surveyed from all other age groups were positive towards the Church. People also estimate, on average, that 28% of priests are guilty of abuse despite the fact that only 4% have been accused. These data strongly imply a shift in opinion away from Catholicism as an institution, but not necessarily the religion itself. In support of this, almost half of all those surveyed (46%) believe Catholic teachings are still of value to Irish society (Attitudes towards the Catholic Church, 2011).

Data collected in interviews corroborate this implication as well. One woman in her 50s, Mary, lodged a complaint: “Negative reactions against the Catholic Church are justified but the young generation is going too far in the other direction. Their attitudes towards casual sex, drink, are really quite extraordinary. The pre drinking culture is getting way out of hand.” Three other surveyed adults, including two religious officials, agreed with this sentiment; one of them, a 51-year-old priest in Dublin, said: “There is a sense of revolution against every inherited value. This was exposed in the referendum. It’s change, no more, no less.” Though the religious bias must be recognized here, these attitudes towards social change demonstrate that Catholic teachings—particularly concerning public morality—do seem to remain intact, especially in older individuals.

How did this cross-generational shift, excluding the very oldest members of society, occur in Ireland? How did this damage to collective memory—specifically to the collective relater’s ability to make positive emotional connections to Catholic memory—
result in such a broad decrease in support? As was stated earlier, individual memory seems to be heavily influenced by emotion (Adolphs et al. 1997; Wimmer & Shohamy, 2012). Applying Anastasio’s analogy of individual to collective memory, it could be that the sensational, emotional nature of the priest abuse scandals provided a deeper damage to collective memory than a less emotionally charged event—such as economic growth (Anastasio et al., 2012). The comprehensive media coverage of the scandals certainly kept the events constantly in the collective buffer, allowing the recursive process of memory formation to continuously update memory over a long period of time. Additionally, it could be that slowly waning opinions of the Church in older people before the referendum due to other causes (television and radio access, technological advancements, better education, etc.) “primed” society for the traumatic memory damage provided by the scandals, allowing the event to more thoroughly change collective memory of Catholicism (Fuller, 2005; Cochran & Waldmeir, 2015; Ganiel, 2016).

Finally, why do older generations hold on to Catholic ideas of social morality? Using the individual-collective analogy once more, damage to the relater element in individuals—the hippocampus—can cause retrograde amnesia of memories in close temporal proximity to the traumatic event; however, memories much earlier than the event often remain intact (Scoville & Milner, 1957). Due to the analogous model, it could be feasible that Catholic teachings still remain in sufficiently old individuals as remote unconsolidated collective memory, which would explain the widespread decline in opinion towards the church along with the simultaneous retention of Catholic morality.

Effects of the Celtic Tiger
Though not quite as “clean” and straightforward to describe as damages to Irish Catholic memory, the changes to the Irish economy brought about by the Celtic Tiger moment of the ‘90s and early 2000s certainly had observable effects on Irish collective memory. However, compared to Catholic priest abuse scandals, this damage to collective memory of the economy is far less emotionally connected and somewhat more complicated. Data from interviews point to palpable age and urban/rural divides along with a questioning of the place of perceptions of Irishness, insofar as they pertain to the change from a traditional to modernized economic landscape.

First off, views towards the Celtic Tiger itself seem to be quite polarized. Some of those interviewed had an almost entirely positive view, such as Orla, a Dublin economics professor:

It gave us hope. We were confident. It felt like we had come into our own at long last… I cannot even explain to you… we switched on the TV every day, saw the amount of people killed. I cannot explain the effect this had on the psyche of the Irish People.

For Orla, then, the Tiger serves as a sort of coming of age moment for Ireland, a positive foil to the violence caused by The Troubles. It seems that for many people, the boom provided a glimmer of hope when other aspects of society were falling apart, such as connections to the Catholic Church. This provides some explanation as to positive collective memory of the event. Ella, 29, from Dublin, believes, “People were very proud of being from a wealthy country.” However, others see the Tiger in a far different light. For instance, when asked about the greatest change in society, Micheal, 32, from Ennis gave a scathing commentary:
The economy. With the Tiger, you find these people, they’ve got a big house, two cars, and no personality. To be honest, I think the recession was the best thing that could’ve happened to the Irish. It brought us back down to earth and helped us remember our old values and traditions.

Abi, 29, from Waterford would likely agree with Micheal. She recounted an interesting story illustrating her beliefs:

I think it was too far ahead of its time. One day, my father and I trespassed on an abandoned property in the Midlands. It’s a family estate, a double-courtyarded family estate. It used to be a shooting lodge, so basically a rich person’s hobby boat…three generations of derelict structures. At the back of that, a proposed golf cart garage...We also found the bones of a half built hotel, no roof. Each room had a box of a bedroom, unfinished. Business cards were strewn all over the floor. It’s absolute devastation without inhabitation. That’s the Tiger for you. People got greedy, and Ireland hasn’t really caught up with how much money was spent.

Despite the massive success of the economy during the Tiger period, people like Micheal and Abi take the stance that it actually had a net negative effect on Ireland. These people seem to believe that the modernizing effects of the economic boom caused people to move away from traditional Irish culture. For instance, one man from Galway noted, “There’s this moral panic about the rise of egotistic culture, fed by the Celtic Tiger.” Niamh, 27, a Dublin woman, would also agree with this sentiment. Consider the following quote from her:

For a long time, it was shameful to enjoy yourself. It was shameful to spend, and that’s why we left. I think we went from a country that loved being rich to an
incredibly austere society, and I think people left because of it. People have started to loosen their purse-strings again and so Irish people are returning—from America, from Europe, and Australia—Australia was huge for a while. And though I left for a reason, while I was away I thought of home often. I missed it quite a bit, which led me to return.

Niamh’s commentary not only highlights a transition away from loose spending practices—often seen as a cause of the 2008 crash—but also a belief that people looked down upon others and pushed blame one another, along with institutions like the banks. Research done by O’Flynn, Monaghan, and Power (2014) confirms this idea (p. 925-27). Niamh’s point also suggests one potential cause for massive youth emigration during the years after the crash (Mac Einri & White, 2008). It seems, in light of these data, that the Irish collective was in the process of consolidating a new economic narrative of prosperity, but this consolidation was interrupted by the crash. Thus, people’s opinions on the Tiger and the economy in general were fractured, resulting in several different narratives regarding the Tiger moment.

Additionally, there seems to be an interesting age divide in terms of hope for the economy’s recovery that might highlight different consolidated narratives among different age groups. People below the age of 35 seem to have hope that the economy will recover its former level of growth and success. Neil, 24, who works in the technology sector in Dublin, claimed, “We’re going to be ok as long as multinational companies invest and we’re given opportunities to invest abroad.” He also said, “Ireland’s future…is directly tied to the EU.” Ciaran, 22, also from Dublin, confirmed this view as well. When asked about whether he was pessimistic or optimistic about the
future of Ireland’s economy, he said, “I think so. I hope jobs will get back to where they once were. Everyone has a very strong work rate. I have two young siblings in college, working with me, now working. Education’s so good…that it’ll definitely recover.” However, older interviewees seem to be far less convinced. One unemployed woman from Cork, age 60, said, “I hope our children will be in a better situation than us…I’m not convinced, though.” Further, another woman, Judy, 72, originally from Athlone but living in Galway, said, “Anything outside of the Pale\(^3\) suffered, got poorer. Not a huge change here [from the Tiger], but very much Ireland as an island… I hope the economy recovers. Not to go back to silliness. Not looking good, though. It’s only getting worse.”

The disparity between these comments highlights an interesting phenomenon where two different narratives exist based on the economy’s ability to improve. It could be that older people had far more experience with a poor, protectionist economy from the days of Eamon de Valera, and thus have a remote consolidated collective memory of poverty. Because of this, these people are more likely to see the Celtic Tiger as an anomaly, a diversion from a more strongly consolidated memory of austerity. However, people under the age of 35 have far more experience with a powerful, global economy and thus could have consolidated a different economic narrative from their elder counterparts, making them more likely to be optimistic about the future. This actually makes sense considering research shows that in European societies, “happiness starts off relatively high in early adulthood, then falls” (Pittau et al, 2009, p. 350).

Judy’s comments also bring out another important point: there seem to be differences in memory consolidation of the economy in urban and rural areas. Though

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\(^3\) “The Pale” is a term used by Irish people to refer to the area of Ireland directly controlled by the British in the Middle Ages (Ferriter, 2005). In the present day, this term is often used to refer to Dublin and its surrounding area.
Judy now lives in Galway, her experience living in Athlone—not necessarily rural, but certainly much smaller than major urban areas such as Cork and Dublin—gives her insight into the views of a different subgroup of the Irish collective. Rural areas did not experience quite as much of the modernizing effects of the Tiger as other, more urban areas; indeed, one study done in 1998—the middle of the Celtic Tiger moment—by the Irish Central Statistics Office showed far more unemployment in rural areas in the southeast and midlands and along the border than in more urban areas such as Dublin (Ireland, 1999). One farmer from Doolin, age 67, when asked about economic change, said, “Oh, Dublin, they get all the money and all the grants and what do we get? I guess we’ll suffer on, I suppose. That’s just Ireland.” Thus, it seems that people living in rural areas that gained less benefit from the industrialization process during the 90s have a less positive memory of the Celtic Tiger, and perhaps still have a generalized narrative of a more agrarian Ireland.

Elements of Nationalism

Unlike recent damages to traditional Catholic memory, nationalist collective memory change in Ireland has not been quite so clean or easy to understand. Much of this can be attributed to the variety of factors at play with regards to Irish national identity, including immigration and growing multiculturalism, political corruption, The Troubles in Northern Ireland, music, sport, and modernization. This section will move to examine these and other issues along with their effects on people’s perceptions of Irishness and the ways people engage with their past through collective memory of major historical events, such as the Easter Rising of 1916.
Here, I aim to elucidate the complicated dynamics of nationalist memory consolidation at many levels, including different political and cultural elements and the influence of the Troubles on collective memory in the Republic and Northern Ireland, among others. These factors allowed for the both development of regional identities and differential collective memory consolidation, not only when comparing the North and South but also among different counties within the Republic.

**Easter Rising Commemorations**

Marches, protests, and other public demonstrations serve as an interesting phenomenon with regards to collective memory consolidation. They externalize a certain narrative in a powerful manner, albeit temporarily, while creating a sense of unity among the members of the demonstration. Often, through shared experiences between participants and intergroup interactions between the active subgroup and the larger collective, these demonstrations can promote a sense of unity, both within the demonstration itself and in the larger community as a whole.

For example, regarding a 1987 political march in Yerevan, Armenia, Nora Dudwick (1994) writes that such political mass-mobilization can “become the basis for new memories and identities which can be invoked during later stages of political activism” (p. 145). Later, she comments that the marches created a “sense of sacredness” and a “sense of unity” among participants; apparently, many participants noted experiencing “a wonderful feeling of being present everywhere, in every place occupied by that huge body of people” (p. 178) and that “meeting in public in defiance of a
government ban, speaking back to the authorities, and experiencing themselves as part of collectivity created a feeling of communitas” (p. 180).

In a similar vein, one of the most useful tools for studying the process of Irish collective memory consolidation, especially pertaining to Irish nationalist memory, is the occurrence of Easter Rising commemorations. Beiner (2007) notes “Ireland is deeply troubled by evocative memories of its past, not least of 1916, which inhabits a mythic time and space reverberating with resonances that range far beyond the events of that year” (p. 366). These events occur annually and major anniversaries, such as the fiftieth in 1966, the ninetieth in 2006, and the hundredth in 2016, call for tremendous celebration and memorial. For this study, Rising commemorations are convenient because memorialization is usually accompanied by a reexamination of the original event in the context of current national attitudes, analogous to context-dependence in individual memory consolidation and retrieval (Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Loftus 1993; Lowe, 1982). In this sense, these demonstrations serve as a benchmark for nationalist memory, allowing researchers to chart memory and identity shifts insofar as they relate to a changing perceptions of the Easter Rising.

Take, for instance, the differences between the jubilee year Rising celebrations of 1966 and the ninetieth anniversary commemoration in 2006. Since tensions with the North and Britain were starting to grow, Sean Lemass wished to focus on the developing modernization of Ireland and twenty-six county nationalism—excluding the six Northern counties— in order to preserve relations; he “constantly brought to the fore images and references to ‘modern’ Ireland so that the fiftieth anniversary commemoration was as much about the act of looking forwards as backwards, requiring a delicate negotiation
between tradition and change” (Higgins et al, 2006). However, President Eamon de Valera altered this aim by declaring in his speech that “the divided island remained the great unfinished business of the state and called for the restitution of the province of the great Gaelic clans,” thereby ensuring “the triumphalism of 1966 helped mask the halting steps toward realism the year before” (Foster, 2008, p. 102).

Celebration in Northern Ireland was quite different, with the Rising being recognized solely in an unofficial fashion—though still vehement, with demonstrators such as Kevin Agnew fighting for republicanism, and arguing “that Pearse and the other 1916 veterans had not died for two Irelands” (Higgins et al, 2006). The state only officially recognized the Battle of the Somme, which also took place in 1916. The year 1966 was also the year the UVF (Ulster Volunteer Force) declared war on the IRA, marking the beginning of the Troubles; in this context, the jubilee demonstrations are often thought of as taking on the strong feelings of nationalism already present in the country at the time while simultaneously igniting the ripe whisperings of revolution within the national consciousness. Sir Kenneth Bloomfield remarked that one could “identify the first stirrings of the current conflict in the clash of conflicting ideologies in 1966, at the time of commemoration of the Easter Rising and the Battle of the Somme respectively,” and that “the events of 1966 are, perhaps, a timely reminder that in our society commemoration itself can too easily take on a confrontational quality” (Beiner, 2007). The anniversary of 1998 took on a similar, but modified feeling as “Fianna Fail politicians attempted to legitimate the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement by drawing on a particular vision of history that referred to... the unfinished business of 1916” (Grayson, 2016).
Evidence of collective memory change can be seen when comparing the enthusiastic 1966 commemoration with more recent celebrations, particularly those in 2006 and 2016. Beiner (2007) comments, “Following the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, commemoration of the insurrection was tainted with allegations that it inspired republican paramilitary violence” (366). In this sense, through the function of the collective relater, people connected memory of the rebellion with more recent, visceral memories of violence in the North, attenuating the fervency that accompanied earlier moments of remembrance.

The hundredth anniversary has also taken on a much different air than earlier demonstrations, partially due to increasing modernization. Though nationalist pride around the event still remains, with the government distributing tricolors and copies of the Proclamation to primary schools, it seems to have eroded quite a bit (Ferriter, 2016; Hjelmgård, 2016). One recent news article quoted historian Charles Townshend, who said that “Over the last century, [the differences between Britain and Ireland] have, beyond doubt, significantly declined” and that “it may be harder than ever now to fully grasp the depth and intensity of nationalist hostility to England and Anglicization.” The same article included a statement from Irish political scientist Gail McElroy, who said, “It's not some kind of 'us against them,' anti-British event. It's seen as a reflection of modern Ireland, not the Ireland of 1916. To be Irish now is to be very cosmopolitan and inclusive” (Hjelmgård, 2016). Thus, the “us vs. them” nationalist moment in Ireland seems to be declining sharply as the country continues to engage with a global economy and culture, thereby altering the manner in which Irish people participate in remembering their past.
Even the figures honored by the demonstrations seem to be changing. Banners have been hung this year on the College Green depicting not the signers of the Proclamation, but Henry Grattan, Daniel O’Connell, Charles Stewart Parnell, and John Redmond, demonstrative of a move away from memorialization of violent nationalism towards constitutional nationalists who some argue “made more of a contribution to the achievement of a sovereign Irish State than 1916 or the War of Independence” (Linehan, 2016). Thus, Easter Rising demonstrations can be seen as a way to visualize the continuous updating of the generalized nationalist narrative. The commemorations bring generalized memory back into the collective buffer to be attended to by the relater, therefore changing the collective memory of the event as the context of remembrance gradually changes over time.

**Immigration and Multiculturalism**

One area of Irish society that has certainly experienced rapid change over the past three decades is the ethnic makeup of the population. Traditionally, historians associate Ireland with a massive diaspora; due mainly to the Famine and a lagging economy, “the average annual net emigration from Ireland [between 1871 and 1961] consistently exceeded the natural increase in the Irish population, which shrank from about 4.4 million in 1861 to 2.8 million in 1961” (Ruhs, 2009, p. 1-2). Additionally, immigration to Ireland was “virtually nonexistent” during this period (Mac Einri & White, 2008, p. 153). Thus, the act of leaving Ireland essentially became a major consolidated narrative in Irish collective memory, a narrative that was further implanted by much of the literature of the 20th century.
However, due to a more robust economy during the Celtic Tiger moment, an increase in employment, and immense foreign direct investment, the 90s in Ireland were characterized by a historically uncharacteristic influx of immigrants, with 1996 being the first year of net immigration, which would continue into the 21st century (Kline, 2004, p. 187). According to Mac Einri & White (2008), “The 1996 Census can be taken as marking the beginning of a modern period of net immigration. It showed a country which was still largely ethnically homogenous,” an aspect that would change dramatically in subsequent years (p. 153). Early on, returning Irish people comprised the majority of the migrants, but their proportion declined continuously; from 2006-2008 “Irish immigrants made up only 18 percent of the inflow.” During the early 2000s, the number of non-Irish EU and non-EU migrants rose dramatically and between 2001-2004, non-EU immigrants represented over one half of all non-Irish migrants (Ruhs, 2009, p. 2-3). The 2011 Census, performed by the Central Statistics Office, found that 12% of Irish residents were non-nationals, an increase from 5.8% in 2002; further, 199 different nationalities were represented in Ireland and 12 different nations accounted for at least 10,000 residents (Ireland, 2012, p. 7-8).

This surge of multiculturalism conflicts strongly with Ireland’s tradition of cultural nationalism, which is heavily reliant upon a homogenous population to fit the “us vs. them” or “Irish vs. British” narrative. One study, which used surveys to analyze seventeen countries and assign scores based on factors that influence nationalism, ranked Ireland second in both the ethnic nationalism and religious nationalism categories; factors that impacted these categories included pride in nationality, country of birth, religion, and duration of life spent in a country (Koos, 2007). This attests to the high level of ethno-
cultural nationalism in Ireland. Considering this context, how did such major changes in the ethnic structure alter Irish collective memory?

In discussions of the greatest changes in Irish culture and society since 1960, approximately one third (4/13) of those interviewed between the ages of 30 and 50 included demographics or immigration and 2/14 of those above the age of 50 agreed. None of those below the age of 30 listed demographics; however, far more subjects discussed demographic change in some regard. This demonstrates that issues of multiculturalism must be present in the buffer and relater, as people do tend to recall ethnic changes quite easily. Additionally, a narrative of Irish multiculturalism could be in the process of consolidation into stable storage, considering none of those in the youngest age bracket cited multiculturalism as a major change. This could be attributed to large-scale immigration beginning during the childhood of the younger subjects, thereby exposing that subset of the population to ethnic diversity for the majority of their lives; in this sense, the young generation never truly developed a collective memory of Irish homogeneity—at least, not from their own experiences—but instead began the consolidation process of the narrative of multiculturalism Ireland from their early years.

One salient feature of Irish collective memory of multiculturalism is the narrative of change itself. Several people made comments concerning the major influx of immigration and the impact it had on their lives; shock seemed to be incorporated into these narratives. One Dublin man, 48, remarked: “I started school in the seventies…at that time, Ireland was the whitest, most Catholic place on the planet…This Pakistani man arrived and we couldn’t figure out what was happening. We’d touch his skin and
hair…You’d never seen a black person before, living there.” Consider, too, the following quote from a man, 38, also from Dublin:

“Definitely the change in demographics. I mean, my brother and I lived near a seminary that would train these African men and my brother and I had never seen men like these before. We used to go and wait by the gate. We’d stand there and just wave. And they’d come with these big smiles—these dark, dark Africans…with big white smiles—and they’d wave back because they’d know exactly why we were doing it.”

These quotes highlight the level of astonishment regarding the beginning of net immigration and the presence of other ethnicities. Furthermore, both stories, especially the first, demonstrate the physicality of race in Ireland along with the notions of “otherness” ascribed to people of non-Irish ethnicities. It seems that immigration had a jarring effect on people’s perceptions of Ireland and, potentially, their Irish identity.

Evidence from other interviews seems to point to a cognizance of racism and a movement towards acceptance of other cultures. A man from Dublin, 39, said, “I’d like to see people get on with each other. You see a lot of tension between the classes, the foreigners and the Irish. I don’t think there’s any need for that oppression.” One woman, 29, claimed:

“I think the fear of foreigners is ridiculous. If anything, that influx of people willing to work, that mass influx, they’re circulating more money than it would be if they were just Irish people…The Brazilian thing is really interesting. You have rich people who have come over and people who have worked their asses off in their own country who are willing to start a new life. They work to live and live to
work. They come here, but until they’ve learned English, they can’t return. They haven’t said no to staying in the country.”

The ideas presented in the above quote demonstrate the willingness of some people to welcome non-Irish ethnic groups into Irish culture. Adding to this idea, one Dublin woman said, when asked about her hopes for the future, “More diversity, more tolerance, less xenophobia, less racism. I think it’s something that needs to be talked about, more awareness is needed, social media.” It seems that a counter-narrative to the old ethno-cultural nationalism is consolidating, especially among younger Irish people—one geared towards a celebration of a multicultural, non-homogenous Ireland.

**Regional Identities and the Myth of the West**

Despite the nationalist vision of many prominent 20th century Irish politicians, as discussed in Part Two, a striking amount of regionalism seems to have developed within the Republic of Ireland. In his book, *In Search of Ireland: A Cultural Geography* (1996), B.J. Graham confirms the existence of multiple distinct identities within Ireland, claiming that the island “created—and continues to sustain—a complex diversity of regions and localities, each with their own orientations, experiences, and mentalities” (p. 19). Graham refers to this phenomenon as a “regional mosaic,” caused—somewhat paradoxically—by Ireland’s connections to bordering European regions (Ulster to Scotland, Leinster to England, Munster/Connacht to Iberia), its insularity, and its geographic variation (p. 20-21). Tom Inglis (2010) maintains that this idea of a mosaic of local identities holds true even within the context of globalization, attributing it to the prevalence of “local networks of social support” along with an extraordinary sense of local and county
belonging in Ireland, with only Spain showing higher levels; indeed, in one survey, 85% of Irish respondents indicated feeling close to their town/city/locality (p. 5-6). These studies indicate a general acceptance of a “split” Ireland with regards to identity.

This study is less concerned with the history of regional identities, however; instead, I will focus on people’s perceptions of regional identities, especially in comparison to other localities, and the persistence of the regional mosaic of Irish identity into the twenty-first century. Unlike changes discussed in other sections of this paper, views on regional identities have remained relatively intact over the course of history due to a variety of factors, including differential levels of modernization, Celtic Revival literature, and the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA).

Take, for instance, perceptions of County Cork. Due to major involvement with the anti-Treaty side of the Irish Civil War, the Irish War of Independence, and several earlier revolts against the British, Cork’s traditional nickname is “The Rebel County.” Two out of three interviewees from Cork noted this with a sense of pride during the interviews, and another young man from Mayo, 23, said, “[Clare, Kerry, and Cork] are the rebel counties. They consider themselves the real Irish because the British forces never conquered that far.” Interestingly, as illustrated by these responses, traditional, consolidated collective memory of regional identity markers seems to be quite well conserved.

Dubliners’ insights regarding their own regional identity were also noteworthy. Firstly, two different Dublin men made comments about how Dublin “basically

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4 This refers to the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which established the Irish Free State. The establishment of the Republic of Ireland would come later, in 1948. Many of the rebels were against the Treaty, as it meant that Ireland would remain under the control of Britain, which many saw as counter to their initial goal of independence.
dominates” Ireland; though this sentiment certainly has a foundation, the agreement connotes a sense of pride among Dublin residents. Indeed, one woman, 29, stated, “Dublin is more open-minded and multicultural. You’d find more traditional values in the West and more alternative communities like Galway.” With regards to the cultural aspect, her comment is interesting, considering Galway is actually the most multicultural city in Ireland in terms of population percentage; this indicates a slightly skewed perception of Dublin, possibly due to pride in the city as the economic and cultural hub of the country, a view other interviewees tended to convey.

Perhaps more interesting, though, are the inconsistencies between perceptions of regional differences of Dubliners and other Irish citizens. Most of the interview subjects noted an urban-rural divide in Ireland; however, while six out of the 22 surveyed Dublin residents did not believe in any cultural variance from region to region, 100% of those living outside of Dublin stated that there are cultural differences between regions, especially between East and West Ireland. This implies that Dubliners consider Ireland to be a much more culturally homogenous place than Irish people living in other areas would declare, which could be a result of Dublin’s historically globalized character and higher level of modernization when compared with the rest of Ireland (Kirby, 2004; Dolan, 2010).

One explanation of this disparity could be that Dublin has a greater exposure to a wider range of media than other, more rural areas; thus, more alternate viewpoints and a larger variety of information are made available in the buffer, thereby interfering with the relater’s capacity to consolidate a collective representation of identity differences. Professor Eoin O’Malley of Dublin City University corroborates this view: “Urban areas
are more exposed to different thought. Historically, the east coast could have access to BBC radio before other regions, which must have had some impact.” On the other hand, Ciaran, originally from Tipperary but residing in Dublin—giving him insight into the nuances of both rural and urban areas—said that the “only difference between the country and the city, I guess, is that people from Dublin don’t really know what’s happening around Ireland.” In this sense, Dubliners could simply be less interested in the goings-on of other areas of the country, exhibiting a more intentional focus on international and Dublin-centric matters.

When asked about identity variance across regions, Abi, originally from Waterford but now living in Dublin, said, “No. You can’t even say that [there’s a difference between regions]. That being said, the divide in Ireland is very, very noticeable…Sense of community is greater in rural spaces like the West…anonymity is impossible.” Along the same vein, Peter, 38, from Dublin, claimed, “Ireland is dominated by Dublin. There’s definitely an urban versus rural divide, as much as you’d see in any other country.” These opinions, along with Ciaran’s quote about the differences between urban and rural areas in the previous paragraph, bring out an interesting point—that people tended to instinctively associate the term “urban” with Dublin at a much greater frequency than other areas. This makes sense, considering Dublin is by far the largest metropolitan area in Ireland; however, people often consider Dublin as the only “real” urban area, which is not entirely accurate. Additionally, as is demonstrated in Abi’s quote, Dubliners may indicate a belief in the lack of difference between regions but, by exclusively applying the identifier “urban” to Dublin (albeit unintentionally) these people may actually imply a regional divide.
Furthermore, outsider perceptions of Dublin tend to be quite unsympathetic, as there
seems to be a sense of separation from the city. For instance, one man, 23, from Clare
gave the following statement:

I was doing a work visa program in New York with a bunch of guys from the
Midlands, a couple from the South, no one from Dublin though. We all got to
talking and I think we realized, I realized I’ve never really met a sound lad from
Dub. They’re stuck up and they think they’re all that, but they’re not all that.

This not only demonstrates animosity and anti-Dublin sentiment, but also the
powerful effects of a social group on memory retrieval and consolidation. Also, it
illustrates a sense of “rural vs. Dublin” or “Dublin vs. the rest of Ireland,” an
interpretation given by Eoin O’Malley in his interview. Additionally, a middle-aged
man from Galway gave an interesting testimony regarding regional identities in Ireland:

There’s a sense of alienation between Dublin and the rest of Ireland. My
son…Dublin for him is a really important other. There’s a definite sense of
difference from Dublin, sort of an opposition… For me, the south of Ireland is
important to describe Clare, Cork, and Kerry. It really grates on me when people
use the term ‘South’ to refer to the whole Republic. I heard it when I was 20 years
old and thought ‘What!’ A visitor once said to my son that, ‘In the South,’ and my
son stopped him…he said, “You’re not in the South, you’re in the West!’ He
didn’t even realize that might have offended the man. He just wanted to correct
him, I think.

Finally, several people remarked on linguistic differences. The only subjects who
considered the Irish language an important part of their lives, unsurprisingly, lived
outside of Dublin, with most living on the west coast. Additionally, Mary, 57, commented on language differences between Dublin and Galway:

There’s a dramatic difference in language spoken. The version of English is totally different in Dublin and Galway. Dublin English is quite Americanized, but Galway people often use Irish syntax…would probably embarrass people.”

These narratives confirm feelings of isolation from Dublin in other areas of Ireland. Many Dublin residents indicate awareness of these feelings; for example, David, 34, believes, “There’s a bit of a target on Dublin’s back. With the GAA, the rest of the country would want anyone but Dublin winning.” However, others are not quite as attuned, with multiple people agreeing on a lack of anti-Dublin sentiment elsewhere in Ireland; such discrepancy adds another layer to the previous postulation that Dubliners are not familiar with the views of other areas of Ireland, with David’s quote complicating the impression.

Additionally, opinions regarding characteristics of the West also provide an interesting look at the persistence of consolidated collective memory. When asked about regional differences, Michael, 50, from Galway noted, “We’re friendlier. There’s more education about Irishness to students. There’s a lot more multiculturalism. All the strangers make us [as Irish people, in the strangers’ perspectives] a bit more Irish.” Others, including people residing outside of the west, corroborated this belief; however, some disagreed with this point of view. David, the Dublin man mentioned earlier, claimed, “The west is more stuck in the 70s…In the west, they stick to their own…If you walked into the pub, they’d look at you if they didn’t know you, if you know what I mean.” The stark contrast between these two viewpoints indicates the complexity of
regional identities, along with the difficulty in studying them due to the fact that local pride creates a great amount of bias, possibly skewing people’s perceptions and responses.

Perhaps the most interesting finding, though, is the robust endurance of romantic ideas of the west. As was described earlier, Celtic Revivalist artists and nationalist politicians largely constructed a myth of a Celtic, “true” Irish west (O’Kelly, 2004, p. 510). Some people—especially academics—are conscious of this. One professor, Mary, literally said, “romantic notions were manufactured” and that these notions are “kind of a barrier…it’s dangerous to romanticize.” Elaine, a 21-year-old Dublin bartender, supported this claim: “Yes they do. Absolutely. The romantic idea of the West persists. Everyone leaves and doesn’t return. We’re still that generation, though.” Professor Lillis O’Laoire confidently argued in favor of this view:

It’s still expressed strongly through sport and song. It’s still tied to capitalism. You have to rethink the whole concept of folklore. Connemara, Aran Islands—you see it there. Kildare is steeped in Fenian culture. There are still people there who tell Finn MacCool stories, and they were told popularly until the 1930s. But it goes deeper than that and below that. I think it’s harder to see on an everyday basis without staying in a place for long and seeing how things work.

However, many, including westerners, express remarkably idealistic perceptions. Interviewed in a pub in Doolin, a Limerick man said, “You’ve come to the right place. This is the real Ireland.” A young man from Clare, 23, discussed how he recommends tourists experience Ireland by saying, “I always tell people—if you want to see the real Ireland, start up in Donegal and work your way down the coast through Galway—go to
Dublin, definitely see the capital, but that’s not all there is.” Paradoxically, even people who indicated doubt regarding this romanticism conveyed romantic impressions of the west. As was mentioned earlier, Peter, 38, from Dublin denied the existence of regional differences but said, “No, more of an acknowledgement of the magnificent space in the West. It’s just magnificent.” Though not explicitly romantic in nature, Peter’s comments do show awe, a sort of idealism surrounding the natural environment. This continued romanticizing of Connacht shows how a sufficiently consolidated, fully generalized narrative can persist, even if the basis behind it was, in fact, largely fabricated. Once a collective memory is passed from the relater into generalized, stable storage, this narrative is incredibly difficult to extract and/or modify without a significantly damaging traumatic event (Anastasio, 2012). Since the Celtic Revival popularized the myth of the west, thereby creating a robust narrative of a Celtic west, the recursive nature of collective memory assured that this myth did not fade.

The Troubles

Obviously, The Troubles stand out as the most shocking series of events in recent Irish history—and, thus, they certainly had a jarring effect on Irish collective memory. Much of the changes involve an increased schism between Northern Irish and Irish identities and amplified the importance of religious identification in Northern Ireland relative to Ireland. A major age divide was also observed between the oldest members of the population and everyone else. These findings indicate an interesting identity dynamic with major geographic, community (urban vs. rural), and age components.
Firstly, the Troubles drove a palpable wedge between Northern and Southern identities. Niall, a Galway man, claimed, “Our view of the North is shaped by the violence…For the longest time, the North was a place to be helped…Or [alternatively] ferocious violence could contaminate Ireland.” Later in the interview, he also commented, “There’s an underlying sense of difference from the rest of Ireland. The Troubles intensified this…Irish nationalism didn’t really come through during their time of hardship.” Professor Richard McMahon of Trinity College agreed with this view:

Northern Ireland becomes a part of a fracture in the UK, which Southern Ireland sees itself as separate from. There’s a divergence, a stronger sense of separateness. Differences are now far more apparent. What degree is the separation between Northern and Southern nationalists? I think Southern nationalists have no real understanding of Northern nationalism.

Another man from Dublin, Michael, 35, said the following of the symbol of the Irish tricolor and Irish republicanism:

Sinn Fein is not my generation’s version of Ireland…To me, the tricolor is not a symbol of my generation’s Ireland either. I think it was hijacked by extreme republicanism. I think the tricolor was hijacked by extreme republicanism. Now, I’d walk away from a republican street performance making use of the tricolor. To me, it’s not a symbol of my generation’s Ireland. I think IRA culture terrifies the young generation, too.”

There seems to be a retreat from identifying with Northern Ireland as well as the IRA, which conflicts with the prominent nationalist narrative of desire for a united Ireland. However, despite this want to dissociate from the violence of Northern Ireland Irish
nationalist/republican ideas do continue to have an impact on the process of collective memory consolidation. When asked about her hopes for the future, Saoirse, 21, from Galway, said, “In the long term, I’d hope Northern Ireland would possibly come to be seen as a part of Ireland as a whole. That the controversy ends. Since the queen came and shook hands with the Sinn Fein leader—I think it was a big step.” Saoirse’s hope indicates the continued presence of an Irish nationalist narrative that escaped the traumatic events of the Troubles, implying that this narrative is remotely consolidated and ingrained in Irish national identity.

Another important result is the presence of an age divide in Northern Ireland with respect to collective memory of The Troubles. Everyone interviewed in Belfast and Derry considered violence to be the greatest present issue and the most marked change in the past several decades. However, older people (above the age of 65) tend to have a different perception of the way the violence affected society. Take the testimony of Pat, 72, from Belfast, for example: “I saw 57 people blown up right here. Look down, look down. There were holes in this concrete. You can’t see them now, but I saw them. But that’s only Belfast.” His musing of “that’s only Belfast” after discussing a vivid memory of destruction might imply a belief that endemic to Belfast due to the strong consolidated narrative of violence in Northern Ireland. Another man named Paddy, age 67, gave the following interesting, albeit somewhat shocking, statement:

In 20 years, I hope it’s the same as it is today. You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make him drink. We want to live separately. Why fix what’s not broken? Just because we’re not friends doesn’t mean we have to hurt each other.
Sometimes it’s better if the wrong is what’s right. We’re separate, and everything is fine.

Paddy also claimed that Shankill, a predominantly Protestant, working class neighborhood is “the heart of Ku Klux Klan territory.” For the older population of Northern Irish citizens, The Troubles have become an important part of their identity. In their eyes, it seems to be the case that violence is an ongoing narrative in the region and that separation of Protestants and Catholics is necessary to keep peace.

Younger inhabitants, however, stray from this identity. Many seem to have a tendency to look at the violence as a relic of the past and not an identity marker. When asked about major differences, Angela, 25, of Belfast said:

It’s a lot less turbulent now. My generation doesn’t really understand that. We celebrate culture a lot more because of that. The city center used to shut down at night, and it’s beginning to come alive again. So is the Catholic quarter. In the Troubles, people would socialize in their own areas—more safe.”

Another Belfast woman, Jenny, 23, noted the continuation of a divide between Protestants and Catholics. However, unlike Paddy, this was a point of conflict for her. “I don’t care what religion you are, if it would just disappear it’d be easier. If everyone could just think about if the person’s right instead of what they actually are.” Ciaran, 22, a sport shop worker in Derry-Londonderry seems to concur with this view.

“Londonderry—Derry divide is a big problem. I wouldn’t call it Londonderry. There’s a divide between Catholics and Protestants still. There are some people who are bitter, they hold grudges. We’re just reliving the past, it’s pointless.” Ciaran’s mother, Marilyn, 61, agreed with him, saying, “My hopes would be be happy, live and let live…All
nationalities and religions be happy with each other…friends and peace.” Thus, it seems that younger generations of Northern Irish wish to leave the violent past behind rather than continue to consolidate a narrative of separation. It could be that older people—those above the age of 65—were teenagers or adults during the beginning of the Troubles, allowing this age group ample time to consolidate memory of the violence while younger members of society were either too young to experience the strife for themselves or hadn’t been born yet.

**Conclusions and Directions of Further Research**

First, my primary research confirms Anastasio’s idea of the existence of remote consolidated collective memory. It seems that older generations of Irish people have a consolidated narrative of both the moral aspects of Catholicism and Ireland’s economy pre-Celtic Tiger, as evidenced by judgement towards the drinking and sexual behavior of young people and lack of hope for the economy’s recovery, respectively.

Further, and most prominently, the data presented gives strong evidence for capacity of consolidated collective memory to be updated, fractured, and changed based on significant events, much like long-term individual memory. This can be most readily seen in the major changes to collective memory of Catholicism due to the priest abuse scandals and Magdalen laundries, but can also be seen in other aspects of Irish collective memory. Other examples include the widening of the identity gap between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland due to The Troubles, changes in people’s memory of the Celtic Tiger as a result of the economic downturn, and memory of Ireland as a multicultural place.
Finally, though memory can indeed be changed and damaged due to significant economic, social, and political events, generalized collective memory can also stand the test of these damages to collective memory if it has been sufficiently consolidated in the past. Evidence for this includes continued belief in the myth of the West and vestiges of the constructed Irish cultural nationalist narrative from the beginning of the 20th century.

One caveat to this research is its small scale, which is indicative of the limited resources available to an undergraduate student. This is not a criticism, simply an observation that one in my position would not have the capacity or means to perform research on a greater scale. It must be noted that this research is by no means exhaustive and is likely not perfectly representative of the entirety of Ireland, considering much of the claims were based off of a small sample size of 46 people. However, it does point to evidence that the current period of Irish culture is one of great flux and Irish collective memory does seem to be changing quite a bit. The research expounded upon here should be seen as the beginning of a conversation on Irish collective memory change, but certainly not the end of it. Further research should be devoted to larger surveys and more focused looks at the various nuances behind Irish identity in order to further understand the complex web of economic, social, and political factors that influence the way Irish collective memory changes and updates over time.
APPENDIX

List of generic questions asked to all subjects:

1. What do you see as the greatest or most evident difference in your culture in the past fifty years?

2. Do you see any differences between regions in Ireland?

3. (if subject didn’t discuss economy during question 1) How did the Celtic Tiger change your country? How would you describe the effects of economic changes?

4. Do you see any major differences between generations?

5. What are your hopes for the future?

6. What are your opinions of the Catholic Church?

7. What are the differences between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland?

Additional questions for Northern Irish subjects:

1. How would you describe your identity--Irish or Northern Irish? What does this identity mean to you?

2. Are you religious? If so, what is your religion? What does your religion mean to you?

3. Do you still see effects of The Troubles in your culture? If yes, what are they?

Interviews were fluid; I allowed subjects to take the conversation in whatever direction they chose and would ask questions based on this direction. Each subject was asked the same questions, but some discussed different things at a greater length than others.

Photo from Albert Kahn collection of photographs, 1913
This photograph is interesting, as discussed in my interview with Professor Mary Clancy, because this woman would not have been wearing the cloak based on her age and the traditional nature of the garment. (Image taken from RTE Ireland’s webpage. URL: http://www.rte.ie/archives/2016/0201/764484-photography-ireland-in-colour/)


https://ia800502.us.archive.org/17/items/therevivalofiris32746gut/32746-0.txt


