The Christian Right and Israel: A Love Story?

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The Christian Right and Israel: A Love Story?

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Government from The College of William and Mary

by

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Accepted for (Honors)

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“I think it is in the best interests of America to support Israel . . . If America does not stand behind Israel we will pay the price for it” – Reverend Jerry Falwell (as quoted in Kreiter, 1981)

The Jews are “spiritually blind and desperately in need of their Messiah and Savior” – Reverend Jerry Falwell (1981, 133)

I. Introduction: Israel and Evangelicals

The United States’ relationship with Israel is one of the country’s most important, strategically and symbolically. The United States was the first country to recognize Israel (Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012), and ever since security and economic ties have bound the two nations closer together. In the twenty-first century United States, it is unusual to find a serious presidential contender from either political party who does not at least pay lip service to this special relationship. Despite his infamously frosty relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (Freedman, 2012; Goldberg, 2015), President Barack Obama has discussed the special importance of supporting Israel’s security (Goldberg, 2012) and visited Israel as both presidential nominee and president (Zeleny, 2008; Greenberg & Wilson, 2012). In the 2016 presidential race, both major party nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump professed their support for continuing a close relationship as well (Kopan & Labott, 2016; Schaefer, 2016). Since taking office, President Trump has affirmed his support for Israel, with an official White House website page reading: “President Trump stands in solidarity with Israel to reaffirm the unbreakable bond between our two nations and to promote security and prosperity for all” (“President Trump,” 2017).

This relationship extends far beyond rhetoric and personal ties between political elites. The U.S. has for several decades annually supplied Israel with billions of dollars in military aid, and while economic aid is now in the millions instead of the billions, loan guarantees and free trade agreements keep the two countries closely linked (Nathanson & Mandelbaum, 2012).
American and Israeli military leaders have developed close ties through the sharing of ideas, strategies, and military hardware (Cohen, 2012). The views of ordinary Americans and Israelis also reflect this special relationship. The American public, recognizing Israel as a strategic partner and as a country that shares similar Western values, has long been sympathetic towards Israel in their disputes with Arab neighbors, and approved of American aid flowing to Israel (Cavari, 2012; “The American Public,” 2015). Among Israelis, an astonishing 96 percent view relations with America as important or very important (Shalev, 2014).

Within the United States, a collection of individuals and interest groups work to sustain and influence this relationship. As will be discussed later, these interest groups engage in a host of activities to win the attention of legislators and policymakers such as providing information, lobbying members of Congress, fundraising and contributing to political campaigns, and even endorsing politicians. While united by a desire to secure the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, the lobby is rife with division (Waxman, 2012). The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is the most well-known of the interest groups, with thousands of members and millions of dollars in its budget, and belongs to the politically centrist part of the lobby (Waxman, 2012). AIPAC and groups similar to it work to build consensus among policymakers while neutralizing criticism of and opposition to the Israeli government’s policies within America (Waxman, 2012). Other interest groups exist that lean more liberal (J Street) or conservative (Zionist Organization of America), leading to an overall fractured movement with different groups favoring different policies and rhetoric. Most of these interest groups draw primarily on the Jewish community within America for membership and resources (Waxman, 2012). However, evangelical Protestants and interest groups associated with the Christian Right and Christian Zionism have also tried to play a significant role in the development of American-Israeli relations.
The Christian Right is an umbrella term for a collection of interest groups and activists whose political conservatism originates in their Christian faith. A significant majority of Christian Right members belong to theologically conservative evangelical Protestant denominations, and these same Protestants are the ones the Christian Right targets for political mobilization. Drawing on their faith, these conservative Christians agitate for conservative social policy on everything from prayer in public schools to prescriptions on sexual behavior. While the Christian Right traces its roots to debates over evolution in schools in the early 20th century and anticommunist efforts in the 1950s and 60s, the movement gained steam and attention in the 1970s (Wilcox, 1992). By this time, evangelicals were becoming more prominent in part simply because of demographics: evangelicals had more children than most other religious groups, and evangelical parents were relatively successful in keeping their children in their churches. Conservative Christians also became more outspoken in response to the turmoil of the 1960s as the counterculture and debates over civil rights and Vietnam challenged traditional views in America. A significant number of Americans concerned by this apparent moral decay and the Supreme Court decisions of the 1960s and early 1970s (which did everything from strike down state-sponsored prayer in public schools to legalize abortion) turned to faith for reassurance, and many found their religious home in theologically conservative congregations (Putnam & Campbell, 2010). Early Christian Right leaders such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson saw the potential to turn theological conservatives into political conservatives, and by the time of Reagan’s administration, groups like the Moral Majority were mobilizing conservative Christians to work on behalf of candidates and turn out voters who demanded social conservatism from their politicians.
While the Christian Right typically finds itself battling over domestic policy, the leaders and interest groups do not neglect national security issues. Some, such as Christians United for Israel (CUFI), are devoted to them. Based on their long-rooted opposition to atheistic communism and the disproportionate number of evangelicals serving in the military, the Christian Right has pushed for and continues to push for a strong national defense (Wilcox, 1992; McAlister, 2005; Wilcox & Robinson, 2011). A key part of this foreign policy vision is an unwavering support for Israel. In 2005, a Pew Research Center study found that white evangelical Protestants, compared to other Americans, were likelier to be sympathetic to Israel, cite their faith as the main reason behind their support, and believe that Israel fulfills part of prophecy concerning Christ’s return (“American Evangelicals,” 2005). In a 2014 Pew Research Center study, evangelical Christians were likelier to believe that America is not doing enough to support Israel and were far more willing to support Israel if Israel were to attack Iran (Lipka, 2014). While conservative Christians do recognize the importance of bolstering a Western-oriented democracy in the unstable Middle East, for a significant number a driving force behind their support is that the establishment and success of Israel as a state resonates with scripture and Biblically-based prophecies concerning the coming of Christ and the end-times.

The evangelical interest in Zionism and support for state of Israel finds much of its origin in the thought of John Nelson Darby, a 19th century evangelist responsible for the popularization of dispensationalism (Rubin, 2012). Dispensationalists believe that, “God created a number of dispensations, or time periods, each of which creates a test for humans, which they inevitably fail” (Rubin, 2012, 237) until the end times ultimately arrive. In order to bring about Armageddon and the triumph of Christ on Earth, the Jews must return to the Holy Land, rebuild the Temple, and begin again the rituals of sacrifice as found in the Old Testament (McAlister,
Darby and his compatriots’ beliefs circulated quickly among theologically conservative Protestant pastors and theologians. The 1878 Niagara Bible Conference included support for the creation of a Jewish state as a key belief, and a few decades late, C. I. Scofield published the Scofield Reference Bible (1909), a crucial text in the development of Christian fundamentalism that drew on dispensationalist thought (McAlister, 2005; Rubin, 2012). Amstutz (2014) adds that non-dispensationalist evangelicals have biblical rationale to support Israel, too, as Jews are God’s chosen people, and those who care for Israel will receive blessings.

Armed with these beliefs and texts, conservative Christians began advocating in the first few decades of the twentieth century for the American government to support the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. This community celebrated the establishment of Israel in 1948 as a successful step towards the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy, but it was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that Israel, as a player in both world affairs and Biblical prophecy, took center stage in the eyes of many evangelical Christians. In 1967, Israel took total control over Jerusalem and several neighboring areas, defeating singlehandedly a coalition of its Arab neighbors in the Six-Day War. Electrified by Israel’s military success and the taking of Jerusalem, prominent evangelicals like Jerry Falwell and Billy Graham became intrigued by Israel (McAlister, 2005), And while evangelical elites took note, the 1970 publishing of Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth provided a text that synthesized Biblical prophecy and current events in a way that emphasized Israel’s centrality to the return of Christ (Lindsey, 1970; McAlister, 2005). Sold by the millions (McAlister, 2005), this book galvanized the evangelical community from the 1970s on to look to Israel as a guarantor of Christ’s return.

However, the evangelical interest in Israel is not without tension, which makes this relationship even more striking. While the return of Christ demands the establishment of a
Jewish state, the Jews’ place in Christ’s return is uncertain. For many conservative Christians, salvation is impossible without accepting Christ as one’s savior, leaving Jews presumably to find themselves as part of the damned (McAlister, 2005). Leaders of evangelical Protestantism and the Christian Right, even if avowedly supportive of Israel, have also made insensitive comments concerning Jews. In 1980, the president of the Southern Baptist Convention, Bailey Smith, told a group of pastors that: “God Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew” (quoted in McAlister, 2005, 176). Christian Coalition founder and presidential candidate Pat Robertson said Jews do not fully understand anti-Semitism: “The poor Jews don’t understand that, it’s too cosmic for most of them to grasp, especially because they don’t believe Jesus is the Messiah” (as quoted in Vamburkar, 2012). Even Christian United For Israel (CUFI) founder John Hagee has made statements implying that Jews are at fault for anti-Semitism because of their disobedience to God, and that the Holocaust was part of God’s plan to drive Jews to Israel (Blumenthal, 2007a; Yglesias, 2008). At best insensitive, these comments showcase how unusual in some sense the support of evangelical Protestants for Israel is. Theology instructs these conservative Christians to support Israel as a way to mirror God’s love for the Jewish people and as a prerequisite to the return of Christ, yet the same theology often promotes an exclusive message concerning who will benefit from the return, and the Jews often seem to be left out.

In this paper, I examine how Christian Right leaders, their interest groups, and the evangelical Protestant faith of decision-makers (whether they be presidents or party leaders) have shaped American support for Israel since the late 1970s when these interest groups blossomed. I proceed by examining the changing treatment of Israel in presidential campaigns and party platforms, and whether or not belonging to an evangelical Protestant denomination makes a member of Congress more likely to support pro-Israeli policy. I find that in these areas the
evangelical and Christian Right footprint to be very small. In GOP primary campaigns, evangelicals are not more likely than non-evangelicals to bring up Israel on their own initiative in debates, and among those who do talk about Israel, their rhetoric is not noticeably more intense. Candidates seeking Christian Right support are more likely to criticize or say nothing about Israel than candidates uninterested in such support. Until the 2016 platform, no evidence exists explicitly linking the Christian Right to changes in Israel-related language, and this language has neither consistently grown nor become more effusive since 1980. Analysis of the 1981 vote to sell AWACS to Saudi Arabia and the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal shows that a member’s evangelicalism does not have a consistent, statistically significant relationship with how the member votes, and the model actually indicates that, if anything, evangelicals are more likely to vote for the anti-Israel position than non-evangelicals.
II. Interest Groups, Religion, and American Foreign Policy: The Literature

This paper’s central question is informed by and contributes to two different academic literatures. The first is how interest groups affect American foreign policy. Scholars and the media have traditionally focused on their effect on domestic-oriented policies such as healthcare reform or banking regulation. Less attention has been paid to how interest groups affect American foreign policy, and whether or not interest groups focusing on foreign policy use similar strategies as those who focus on domestic policy. The second literature considers how religion affects American foreign policy. Religion is a powerful force in American politics, but again much of the focus on religion’s effects has been on domestic policies, especially on social policies such as abortion and gay rights. In examining how the Christian Right has affected American policy towards Israel, and Israel’s treatment as a political issue, I will add to both these literatures.

Interest Groups and Foreign Policy in America

Interest groups are “any non-party organization that engages in political activity” (Nownes, 2013, 4). They operate on all levels of American government, from federal to municipal, on both political and policy fronts. An enduring part of the American political landscape is the presence of interest groups, and in the latter half of the twentieth century the number of interest groups in America has exploded, with such organizations now numbering in the hundreds of thousands (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Nownes, 2013).

Once interest groups form, they may choose to participate in a wide variety of activities to achieve their political and policy goals. Organizational maintenance, monitoring the government, and self-governing are crucial to interest group survival (Berry & Wilcox, 2007;
Nownes, 2013). Secure finances and stable membership are two prerequisites for a viable interest group, and interest groups cannot ignore these necessities, especially when they often compete with other groups (Gray & Lowery, 1997). Once viable, interest groups may then move on to attempt to influence the government. For the purpose of this review, I will focus on interest group activity on the national level because virtually all meaningful American policy concerning Israel occurs on this level.

Scholars commonly divide the activities of interest groups between insider strategies and outsider strategies (also referred to as direct and indirect lobbying). Insider or direct strategies involve interest group activity in which lobbyists develop close working relationships with policymakers through activities like providing information or engaging in drafting processes of bills or bureaucratic regulations. Interest groups employ outsider or indirect strategies when they manipulate media coverage, engender grassroots activity on behalf of their issues, or become active in the electoral process (Bibby, 1994; Ginsberg, 1997; Thomas, 2004; Coleman et al., 2009; Hall & Reynolds, 2012). Groups attempting to defend the status quo tend to be less active than those challenging it, and all are carefully attuned to watching whether or not a policy may change. Overall these strategies cover a wide array of tactics, and interest groups tend to use inside strategies (especially maintaining close contact with legislative allies) more than they do outside, because the former tend to better achieve tangible results (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Baumgartner et al., 2009).

In considering forms of direct lobbying, perhaps the most popular image of interest group activity is that of lobbyists walking the halls of Capitol Hill and persuading members of Congress to vote a certain way on a bill. However, it is far more likely to find interest groups providing information than engaging in arm-twisting. When dealing with lawmakers, lobbyists
hope that by proposing action, or by detailing how already-proposed actions will affect the political, policy, or legal landscape, they can persuade them to engage in various activities ranging from amending legislation to holding hearings to intervening with executive agencies (Coleman et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013). It should be emphasized that in lobbying Capitol Hill, organized interests do not focus only on changing the votes of legislators. For example, Hall and Wayman (1990) find that moneyed interests are more successful in buying “the marginal time, energy, and legislative resources that committee participation requires” (814), and in an environment where legislators’ attentions and resources are divided between many different issues, this itself can be powerful.

Some division exists within the literature on whom lobbyists choose to lobby. Several scholars argue that interest groups concentrate most on mobilizing legislators who already agree with their position, instead of those who are undecided or hostile (Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1999; Hall & Reynolds, 2012). Hall and Deardorff (2006) argue that lobbying can be thought of as a legislative subsidy in which lobbyists provide information or labor to chiefly help “natural allies” (69) that will continue to support their causes. Nevertheless, Hojnacki and Kimball (1999) do find that if an interest group has strong ties to a legislator’s constituency, then they will lobby them no matter the legislator’s initial policy preference. When lobbying Congress, interest groups tend to focus on members of the committees that oversee pertinent legislation, concentrating not only on members of Congress but their staff and the committee staff, too (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013).

The ability of interest groups to provide highly technical information is not to be underestimated. Lawmakers must consider and vote on pieces of legislation that they have very little personal interest in, and that are unlikely to affect their electoral future. The information
that interest groups may provide to lawmakers comes in several forms: they might share the policy ramifications of one’s vote on a piece of legislation such as if the legislation will curb fossil fuel emissions or promote job growth in a certain industry; they might share the political ramifications of supporting or opposing the legislation, and how it could bolster or imperil their party’s electoral success; or they could share the legal ramifications of a bill such as whether or not the legislation would likely hold up in court (Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Coleman et al., 2009; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Nownes, 2013).

Interest group lobbyists may go even farther than trying to sell a bill to a skeptical or indifferent lawmaker. Writing legislation is a time-consuming task, and lobbyists may volunteer to help draft bills or provide certain pieces of language on behalf of lawmakers (Bibby, 1994; Grant, 2004; Nownes, 2013). Lawmakers now have time to focus on presumably more pressing issues for themselves, while interest group agents can help draft the bill to make it as appealing as possible both for their own members and supportive lawmakers. For example, some language in recent finance-related legislation is almost exactly identical to suggestions from Citigroup (Chang, 2013; Eichelberger 2013). As Congress cuts staff, it is increasingly likely that lobbyists will become involved in writing legislation in all issue areas (Madonna & Ostrander, 2015).

In less personal encounters, lobbyists may testify at congressional hearings in order to guarantee some “facetime” with legislators and garner publicity for their issues (Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009). Even if a lobbyist is unable to make it to a congressional hearing in person, he or she may submit a written statement (Nownes, 2013). By engaging in these various activities, with the ultimate goal of shaping the text of legislation and then forming coalitions to break or generate congressional gridlock (depending on an interest group’s position
on a bill), interest groups play an important and highly visible role in shaping the fate of congressional legislation (Bibby, 1994; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Victor, 2012).

Interest groups certainly do not restrict themselves to lobbying the legislative branch. Lobbying the executive branch is an important part of any interest group’s activity, particularly for foreign policy. The executive branch recognizes the importance of these relationships: in 1970, President Nixon established the Office of Public Liaison (now the Office of Public Engagement and Intergovernmental Affairs) to facilitate communication with interest groups. The Office allows interest groups to share their priorities with the president while simultaneously making themselves available to potentially aid the president in activities like outreach or coalition-building (Peterson, 1992; Bibby, 1994; Nownes, 2013). The executive branch budget process is one area of particular concern for interest groups as they look to maintain or increase funding for their priorities (Coleman et al., 2009). In addition to lobbying the White House, interest groups also reach out to the bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementing public policy. Interest groups are able to make their voices heard by meeting with bureaucrats and by submitting comments on the rule-making process (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Baumgartner et al., 2009). Additionally, interest group representatives may have the opportunity to sit on advisory committees where they can provide technical information and help set the agency’s agenda (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Nownes, 2013). Organized interests may also move most aggressively by suing agencies in attempts to gain injunctions, or to try to force them to move more quickly in implementation (Bibby, 1994; Ginsberg et al., 1997).

Organized interests also use outsider or indirect strategies to advance their missions, especially when they lack access to decision makers. While Washington, D.C. may seem to be the heart of interest group activity, involvement of interest groups in grassroots organizing and
elections across the country can drastically shape certain issues. By informing legislators’ constituencies of certain issues and convincing these constituencies to make their voices heard, interest groups can increase the number of voices arguing for their position and more effectively tie a legislator’s decision to her political future (Loomis, 2004; Berry & Wilcox, 2007). Interest groups often begin the process of grassroots lobbying by reaching out to their own members and directing them to flood their elected official’s offices with phones calls and mail, a process derided by some as “Astroturf” lobbying (Ginsberg et al., 1997; Coleman et al., 2009). Organized interests also may create and air media designed to capture the attention of decision makers and their constituents. An oft-cited example is the Harry and Louise ad campaign launched by the Health Insurance Association of America in opposition to President Clinton’s health reform legislation. These ads generated an immense amount of free media, and prompted hundreds of thousands of citizens to contact their representatives. Legislators were then forced to respond to the particular concerns brought up in the ad (Coleman et al., 2009; Hall & Reynolds, 2012). A more recent example comes from the Club for Growth, a conservative interest group that works to cut taxes and government spending, which aired advertisements in certain districts prior to a vote on reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (Min Kim, 2015). The Club let these representatives know that it was monitoring the upcoming vote and drew their constituents’ attention to it. Beyond generating media coverage and constituent contact, interest groups can also train and organize activists. For example, the group Americans for Prosperity, dedicated to reducing the size of American government, has spent money to educate and organize Tea Party activists in order to create and maintain a grassroots presence in states across the country (Mayer, 2010).
Interest groups can go beyond mobilizing constituent contact to getting involved directly in elections. The explosion in the number of interest groups over the past few decades has been accompanied by an increase in interest group spending in the political arena (Nownes, 2013). And some of these resources find their way into electoral politics as interest groups hope to help rising and established allies while defeating officials who oppose them. Contributions through political action committees are a common and relatively transparent form of financial support, but “soft money” spending by interest groups, independent of parties or candidates, is increasingly popular (Hrebrenar, 2004; Coleman et al., 2009; Cigler, 2012; Nownes, 2013). Interest groups may also distribute voter guides, endorse candidates, and host voter registration drives (Shaiko, 2004; Berry & Wilcox, 2007; Nownes, 2013). They may even impact the banner under which these candidates run through influencing the substance of party platforms (Baer & Bositis, 1988; Fine, 1994; Shaiko, 2004). The Club for Growth is not shy about endorsing favored candidates, and in the past few election cycles has spent millions of dollars in districts to elect allies and defeat opponents with varying success (Catanese, 2010; Sugden, 2014). These millions are of course only a drop in the bucket of all the money interest groups spend in giving to candidates and waging their own political fights.

As seen in the above examples of interest group activity, news media and scholarship tend to focus on how interest groups affect domestic politics and policymaking. Interest group influence on foreign policy has been relatively ignored, partially because many scholars doubt whether interest groups even have influence on American foreign policy. A Cold War viewpoint in early studies emphasized that the executive branch dominated foreign policy, and was less accessible to interest group pressure than was Congress (Cohen, 1959). More recently, Spanier and Uslaner argue that the president is relatively isolated from interest group pressure when it
comes to foreign policy decisions. Bureaucrats and advisors are the inner circle, and when international crises demand immediate action there is no time to consult interest groups (Spanier & Uslaner, 1982; Snider, 2004). But to characterize American foreign policy as simply dominated by an executive who bounces from split-second decision to split-second decision in the face of sudden crises would be a mistake. Whether it is dealing with Iran’s nuclear program or working with Russia on armament control, foreign policy forces the executive branch to devise strategy and negotiate with international actors and other branches of the American government. As foreign policy decision making has become more diffused overall (Dietrich, 1999), interest groups have worked with varying success to impact these decisions in multiple ways.

Dietrich (1999) writes that when it comes to foreign policy, interest groups play three primary roles, which are similar to those used when it comes to domestic policy: (1) they frame issues in ways that shape the terms of debate (2) they help Congress monitor international events and the ways in which the executive branch responds to them; and (3) they provide information to government officials and lawmakers. I will consider these roles, and others in which foreign policy-focused interest groups are increasingly involved.

Similar to domestic-oriented interest groups, foreign policy-focused groups often use insider strategies. In the 1980s, the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) was active in engaging Capitol Hill on Cuban and other Latin American issues. CANF helped to repeal the Clark Amendment, which banned American aid from flowing to private Angolan military or paramilitary groups (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999). Unhappy with the Cuban regime sending troops to Angola, CANF leaders began informing U.S. lawmakers about why they should support repealing the Clark Amendment, and the ramifications of doing so. Leaning on
lawmakers who had been sympathetic to their previous causes, CANF helped convince Congress to repeal the amendment in 1985 (Haney & Vanderbush, 1999).

Interest groups have also attempted to influence the executive branch. Early on in the Clinton administration, concerns over Chinese human rights violations led to debate over whether or not China deserved Most Favored Nation (MFN) status for trade. Interest groups that favored America taking a stronger stance against human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch) got involved as did business-minded organizations (the U.S.-China Business Council). Both sides scheduled meetings with key administration officials, and Clinton administration officials even reached out to human rights groups for information (Broder & Mann, 1994; Dietrich, 1999). Interest groups continued to be active on American foreign policy towards China during the Obama administration as well. For example, before one of President Obama’s visits to China, he received a letter signed by groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, pushing him to take stronger stances against China’s technology protectionism (Martina, 2015).

Interest groups dedicated to foreign policy issues have used outside strategies, too. In the lead-up to the American invasion of Iraq, several organized interests arose to oppose the policy. Groups such as Not In Our Name and Americans Against the War With Iraq placed advertisements in major newspapers arguing against the war, and reserved time for television ads, too (Campbell, 2002; Ives, 2003). Interest groups supportive of the war used similar strategies. For example, several years after the invasion, Freedom’s Watch ran television ads throughout the country to engender grassroots support and pressure Congress to continue allocating resources to support the surge (Tapper & Miller, 2007). During the Obama administration, Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, a group that opposed the recent Iran nuclear
deal, raised tens of millions of dollars to spend in television ads to pique the interest of constituents and draw the attention of lawmakers (Ho, 2015).

Christian Right interest groups and their leaders have employed all of these aforementioned techniques in their attempts to influence American politics and policy, although studies of them usually focus on their efforts in domestic policy. In terms of D.C. lobbying, Christian Right leaders and interest groups have long had the ears of the Capitol Hill politicians and White House insiders. In the 1990s, the Christian Coalition’s Ralph Reed advised fellow Christian Right leaders to broaden their conservative message. Instead of focusing solely on social conservatism, he pushed for an embrace of Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with America,” despite the fact that it neglected issues like abortion and gay rights. By supporting such policy platforms and helping almost any leading Republican candidates (even those with questionable social conservative credentials), Reed generated goodwill between the Coalition and Republican leadership in the hopes of winning favor for the Christian Coalition’s “Contract with the American Family” (Brownstein, 1995; Stan, 1995; Waldron, 1995; Green, 2004; Williams, 2010). Focus on the Family’s James Dobson, using a more aggressive strategy in his dealings with Congress, threatened publicly to leave the Republican Party due to socially conservative policies languishing in Congress. Efforts to placate him by congressional leaders like Dick Armey and Tom Delay, and by House social conservatives, led to votes on social conservative issues and the establishment of the Values Action Team to promote dialogue between Christian Right leaders and political leadership (Gilgoff, 2008; Williams, 2010). President George W. Bush also leaned on Christian Right leaders to offer initial support for his Supreme Court nominee Harriet Myers before her nomination fell through (Babington & Fletcher 2005; Williams 2010).
The Christian Right is no stranger to grassroots mobilization and making their voices heard through the electoral process. In past presidential elections, Christian Right leaders and their interest groups have not been shy in making endorsements (Williams, 2010; Eckholm, 2012; S. Smith, 2015a; S. Smith, 2015b; S. Smith 2016). Additionally, these groups regularly engage in voter mobilization, the distribution of voter guides, and other forms of political engagement to bring voters to the polls (Eggen & Somashekhar, 2012; Kroll, 2012; Guth & Bradberry, 2013). While the Christian Right maintains an active presence in the American political landscape, attention paid to the Christian Right usually focuses on how they affect domestic policy. But the Christian Right has always favored a strong national defense policy, rooted in their opposition to atheistic communism (Clendinen, 1980; Wilcox, 1992). Part of this foreign policy outlook includes strong support for Israel.

Academic scholarship and media attention rarely go beyond cursory mentions of the Christian Right interest groups’ interest in Israel (Woolridge, 2008; Waxman, 2010). Some scholars (Wood, 2007; Bach, 2010) have commented on the annual gatherings of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), but more attention is needed. CUFI, founded in 2006 by evangelical pastor John Hagee, is the most visible Christian Zionist group and claims over three million members, making it the nation’s largest pro-Israel advocacy group (“Christians United,” 2016). In their relatively short period of existence, CUFI has become a fundraising powerhouse. Just in their first four years, CUFI raised tens of millions of dollars for charitable purposes as varied as flak jackets for Israeli soldiers to bomb shelters for Israeli communities (Rubin, 2010), and their operational budget is in the millions (Guttman, 2010). In their mission statement, CUFI says that it exists to educate America’s Christians about the “Biblical imperative” of supporting Israel, and to move policy in a pro-Israel direction through communicating with lawmakers and mobilizing
their members to do the same (“Christians United,” 2016). CUFI holds events each month across the country, ranging from events to show support for Israel to sessions for ministry and pastoral leaders to learn about how they can spread the message through their congregations (“Standing with,” 2016; “Pastors’ Briefing,” 2016). Their annual summit in Washington draws thousands of activists and over the years has featured messages delivered from Netanyahu and prominent American politicians such as Joe Lieberman, Lindsay Graham, and Tom Delay (Blumenthal, 2007b; Black, 2014). Additionally, 2015 saw the establishment of the CUFI Action Fund. This organization, headed by prominent CUFI member Gary Bauer, works exclusively on legislative and political issues, with a reported budget of millions of dollars (Rubin, 2015).

While CUFI might be the most visible among Christian Right interest groups, when it comes to Israel, it does not stand alone. Concerned Women for America (CWA), one of the best-organized Christian Right interest groups on the national stage (Wilcox & Robinson, 2011), includes support for Israel as one of its seven core issues (“Support for Israel,” 2016). Citing Bible verses, CWA pledges to work for laws and policies that strengthen the American-Israeli relationship (“Support for Israel,” 2016). CWA can also bring significant resources to bear in influencing policy. Besides its extensive grassroots network, in fiscal year 2014 CWA reported 5 million dollars in revenue, over 800 thousand dollars in assets, and 21 employees (Concerned Women for America). Their associated Concerned Women for America Legislative Action Council reported almost 700 hundred thousand dollars in revenue, and roughly 70 thousand in assets (Concerned Women for America Legislative Action Council). The Family Research Council (FRC), another prominent Christian Right interest group, is headed by Tony Perkins, who has led FRC-sponsored tours of Israel (“Tony Perkins,” 2014) and has said that the
American-Israeli relationship must “always remain unshakable and Bible-believing Christians must do their part” (as quoted in “FRC’s Perkins,” 2015). The Family Research Council (FRC) coordinates extensive national and state lobbying with grassroots efforts, and focuses on influencing policy discussion by providing information to sympathetic politicians and activists (Wilcox & Robinson, 2011). They also have an affiliated organization, Family Research Council Action, that issues voter guides, endorses candidates, and oversees a political action committee (Family Research Council Action). In fiscal year 2014, the FRC reported revenue of 15 million dollars, assets of over 5 million dollars, and almost 100 employees (Family Research Council). Family Research Council Action reported additional revenue of nearly three million dollars and over 200 thousand dollars in assets (Family Research Council Action). While Israel is not one of the FRC’s key issues, it is one more supportive voice in the Christian Right movement that commands significant resources. Led by CUFI, the Christian Right overall has the potential interest and resources to advance pro-Israel policies.

**Religion and American Foreign Policy**

Observers have long noted the distinct religiosity of Americans, with de Tocqueville reporting back to his fellow Europeans how the Christian faith flourished in 19th century America (Graebner, 1976). The importance of faith to Americans has not diminished much, and in comparison to other similarly developed Western countries, Americans are outliers in how much faith matters to them (Wike, 2016). It is no surprise then that politicians regularly discuss their own faith (Killough 2015; Chozick, 2016), and that religious justifications often make their way into arguments over everything from healthcare policies to gay rights to military conflict.

Coleman et al. (2009) write that a set of beliefs, the American Creed, makes up the dominant American political culture through which most Americans evaluate issues and
politicians (see also Huntington, 2004). The importance of religion in America since colonial times has shaped and been a key part of this American political culture. Wald (1992) argues that Puritan beliefs shaped the beliefs of the founders. For example, the belief that God and mortals have a contractual relationship shaped the interest in creating a social contract between state and citizen, and the belief that God influences individuals’ daily lives can easily lead to the belief that God guides a nation (Wald, 1992). Additionally, several scholars note the existence of a civil religion in the United States. Americans use religion to frame and understand the country’s history and purpose, applying religious references and moralistic criteria to political and policy discussions (Bellah, 1967; Wald, 1992; Corbett & Corbett, 1999).

Americans are quite comfortable with politicians discussing their faith and religious leaders discussing their politics. Examples that blur these lines include Jesse Jackson, an ordained minister, who ran for the Democratic nomination for president twice and regularly appealed to religion as the foundation for his political principles (Hatch, 1989). On the other side of the political spectrum, another ordained minister, Pat Robertson, sought the Republican nomination for president in 1988, and ran on a strong socially conservative platform (Wilcox, 1992). Even politicians who are less explicitly connected to religion, such as President Obama, have discussed how their faith has impacted their policy preferences (Tau, 2012; Jaffe, 2015). Religious leaders without pretensions to office make their voices heard, too. For example, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops has made statements on everything from nuclear arms to immigration reform to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate (Hanna, 1989; “Bishops Renew,” 2012; “Catholic Church's,” 2013). Some pastors endorse favored candidates, and some churches work to turn out their parishioners’ vote (Saulny, 2012; “More than,” 2015; C. Smith, 2016; D. Smith, 2016).
Periodically, religion has also affected policy decisions. The Christian Right successfully pushed for a 1985 Education Department regulation that forbade “local school districts from using certain federal funds to support courses in ‘secular humanism’” (Wald, 1992, 263). Early on in the George W. Bush administration, President Bush, drawing on his own Christianity, used executive orders to support faith-based initiatives (typically in the form of the government allocating public money to religiously-affiliated organizations that provide social services) and by prohibiting government agencies from discriminating against religious groups applying for funding (Williams, 2010). Arguments in the name of protecting religious freedom have been used to protest everything from compliance with the Affordable Care Act to passing religious liberty laws that allow businesses to refuse services if doing so conflicts with their faith, and to restrict federal funds being used for abortion and Planned Parenthood (Callahan, 2015; Scott, 2015; Russell-Kraft, 2016)

Religious appeals have often been focused on domestic policy, but their effect on foreign policy deserves further attention. Foreign policy is “the policy of a state towards external actors and especially other states” (Diez et al., 2011, 58; Alden & Aran, 2012). Over the past several decades, scholars have advanced several theories as to how states set their foreign policies.

A few schools of thought leave little room for religion to affect a state’s foreign policy. Rational choice theory posits that within foreign policy decision-making, states act as unitary actors and the domestic characteristics of the state – for example, the religiosity of its citizenry – do not play a large role in setting foreign policy preferences and choices (Alden & Aran, 2012). Another school of thought emphasizes the importance of larger organizational processes and bureaucratic politics in setting foreign policy. Organizations and bureaucracies prioritize their own survival and expansion above all else, no matter the detrimental effects this may have on
policy outcomes. In order to act more efficiently, these large organizations create standard operating procedures that allow them to act quickly, yet also hinder innovation and creative responses to world events that may demand nuance. The idiosyncrasies of individual and groups, including religious motivations, may be partially neutralized, when these larger entities shape the initial contours of discussion (Hudson, 2007; Alden & Aran, 2012). Examples of important scholarly work that take this approach include Allison’s (1971) study on the Cuban missile crisis and Halperin’s (1974) study of mid-twentieth century American defense policymaking.

Psychological and behavioral explanations of foreign policy decision-making arose to counter rational choice theory. It is hard to believe that a state is a unitary actor when it comes to foreign policy decision-making when one sees the number of individuals in the executive and legislative branches of the American government who have some say over foreign policy decision-making and implementation. These explanations argue that individuals are at the heart of decision-making, and in times of high stress and uncertainty, understanding the psychological and behavioral characteristics and perceptions of individuals is an important layer to evaluate in foreign policy analysis (Hill, 2003; Hudson, 2007; Alden & Aran, 2012). Religious beliefs and the way they may shape one’s perceptions of the world, and one’s policy priorities can thus play an important role, according to this school of thought.

Other scholars have emphasized working on the importance of culture and national identity in foreign policy decision-making. It is within this school of thought that investigations of how religion affects foreign policy might also find its home. As mentioned previously, scholars have paid attention to how the characteristics of individuals affect their decision-making, but it is also crucial to understanding how the cultural and national environment has
shaped their political socialization and psychology (Hudson, 2007). However, attributing foreign policy decisions to cultural influences can be problematic. It is hard to falsify the hypothesis that culture affects foreign policy, as everything humans do “becomes both a product of and a component of culture” (Hudson 2007, 107). Scholars have thus taken a different tack in understanding the relationship between culture and foreign policy by examining how culture is used as a political instrument. Actors can manipulate cultural narratives to encourage other actors and the larger populace to make certain decisions (McAlister, 2005; Hudson, 2007). The religious character of a nation can be an important element in a nation’s culture and national identity, and narratives based in or informed by faith can be used to justify certain foreign policy prescriptions. Elites who take to heart their faiths’ moral codes may attempt to project those codes abroad through their foreign policy, and may be particularly attuned to other actors that share their faith or are especially hostile towards it (Hill, 2003; McAlister, 2005). Amstutz (2014) adds that moral principles, often supplied by religion, provide foreign policy goals, standards for judging one’s actions and the actions of other international actors, and inspiration for foreign policy action.

One landmark work that delves into the importance of religion overall in understanding foreign policy and international relations is Huntington’s 1996 book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Huntington (1996) argues that differences between civilizations will be the primary causes of strife in the post-Cold War world. Some of the civilizations he identifies are marked first and foremost by their religious character, such as an Islamic civilization, a Hindu one, and an Orthodox one. “Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations” (Huntington, 1996, 47). Religion thus colors the foreign policy of states, and Huntington (1996) especially focuses on how majority Muslim states have justified
their foreign policy decisions by appealing to Islam. While this particular argument quickly garnered controversy, Huntington does not stand alone in arguing for the importance of religion in foreign policy. Rubin (1994) similarly emphasizes the importance of religion as the basis of political power and unity in many states, and names several examples where a state’s religious character impacts its foreign policy, such as Russian nationalists drawing on Orthodox Christianity to justify more assertive foreign policy, or the leaders of Iran’s Islamic Republic using their fundamentalist Islamic beliefs to justify their antagonism towards much of the West. Religion and religious officials increasingly play large roles in foreign policies across the globe (Luttwak, 1994; Rubin, 1994; Huntington, 1996; Abrams, 2001; Chaplin & Joustra, 2010).

The United States’ foreign policy does not escape the influence of religion, either. Commentators often discuss religion’s role here, ranging from how it frames the American foreign policy perspective to how it helps determine what objectives America actually prioritizes (Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012). However, the influence of particular religious traditions on American foreign policy, in the case of this project conservative Christianity, deserves further attention. As mentioned previously, the application of a religiously-informed narrative to foreign policy decision-making can be especially powerful. One such religiously-infused narrative that Americans have drawn on for centuries (in various ways) to justify foreign policy decisions comes from the beliefs of some of America’s earliest colonists. When the Puritans arrived in America, they brought their Protestant millennialist beliefs that promoted the view that their America would be favored by God and would be the spot to advance their religious mission (Twing, 1998; Judis, 2005). The “City on the Hill” narrative contains a distinct foreign policy aspect to it that continues to reverberate in America today. The Puritans opposed England’s religious persecution and European Catholicism in general, and framed these conflicts in the
language of heaven versus hell (Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012). International relations thus took on spiritual significance as they constructed this simple dichotomy. But not only was their mission to withstand opposing forces, America was to work to “recreate the world in its (and therefore God’s) image” (Twing, 1998, 15). America was to be both a model and an agent of change.

Even as Puritan dominance faded, American decision-makers have drawn on this narrative and other appeals to America’s religious character to justify their foreign policy stances. The Second Great Awakening’s emphasis on a more emotional faith fused with nationalism and expansionism that in the wake of the War of 1812 to push the idea of Manifest Destiny (Ribuffo, 2001; Preston, 2010). This general sense of religiously backed expansion remained as an impetus for late nineteenth century and early twentieth century American imperialism. President McKinley noted that the colonization of the Philippines would be done in part to spread Christianity, and American missionaries brought with them the larger imprint of the American state as they traveled the globe (Ribuffo, 2001; Judis, 2005; Preston, 2010). American Cold War foreign policy also saw the impact of religion, whether it was strident anti-atheistic Communism or relying on Catholicism as a criterion in choosing which South Vietnamese politician earned America’s backing (Wilcox, 1992; Burnett, 1994; Ribuffo, 2001; Preston, 2010). Even in the twenty-first century, the City on the Hill myth showed up in President George W. Bush’s rhetoric in the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks and in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq (Judis, 2005; Preston, 2012). He repeatedly invoked God’s guidance for himself and the nation, and left little nuance in framing American policy towards the Middle East as a battle between good versus evil (Bacevich & Prodromou, 2004). Appeals to religion in American foreign policy are not consistent and are often even conflicting from one era to the
next. However, there should be no doubt that American religious beliefs and narratives have impacted and even fused with American foreign policy.

The Middle East is of course a major focus of American foreign policy. The development of radical Islam and terrorism, the nuclear ambitions of several states in the region, and the supply of oil critical to the world economy mean that the Middle East demands attention. However, America’s interest in the region goes beyond its national security and economic importance. Americans have long been fascinated with the Middle East in its role as the Holy Land. As the origin point of the Abrahamic faiths, significant numbers of American Christians have seen the Middle East as a location to learn about their faith and to learn more about how to view contemporary events in the context of their faiths’ teachings (McAlister, 2005). Beginning in the nineteenth century, American travelers, mostly Protestants, have been visiting the Holy Land in significant numbers. Religious accounts, travel guides, paintings, and photographs all came back to and circulated within the United States as Americans looked to “immerse themselves in Holy Land imagery” (McAlister, 2005, 18). Even American presidents were excited by the Holy Land, with President Franklin Roosevelt enthusiastically commenting on what he saw as he flew over Palestine in route to Iran (Grose, 1983). This religious interest in the Middle East is one more factor adding to American foreign policy interest in the region.

Specifically, in regards to Israel, several scholars have touched on how American religion has shaped foreign policy towards that state. America’s interest in Zionism goes back again to the Puritans, who saw America as a new Israel (Skillen, 2010). This initial interest in creating an Israel helped lay the groundwork for the Zionism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in which Israel would be in Palestine, not America (Skillen, 2010). American Jews, of course, have been the leading proponents of Zionism and numerous scholars (Grose, 1983;
Skillen, 2010) have noted the connections that Jewish Zionists such as Chaim Weizmann, Stephen Wise, and Abba Hillel Silver forged with American leaders. But no American presidents have been Jewish, and most foreign policy decision makers over the course of American history have been Christian. As previously mentioned in the introduction, the Christian faith of American decision-makers, along with Christian Zionist activists, have significantly shaped American foreign policy towards Israel (McAlister, 2005; Skillen, 2010; Rubin, 2012; Amstutz, 2014). Merkley (2004) traces how the faith of every president beginning with Truman has impacted in some sense their policy treatment of Israel. For example, in looking at the very recognition of Israel one can find the influence of Truman’s Baptist faith and consequent interest in biblical history. Despite the warnings of some of his top foreign policy advisors, Truman led the United States to be the first country to recognize Israel, and explicitly referenced the religious aspect of his motivation by referring to himself as Cyrus, the Babylonian king who liberated Jews in the Bible (Grose, 1983; Merkley, 2004).

By investigating how Christian Right leaders and interest groups have shaped American political discussion of and policy treatment towards Israel in presidential campaigns, policy platforms, and congressional votes, I will contribute to both literatures on how interest groups affect foreign policy and how religion in America has helped set American foreign policy.
III. Hypotheses and Data Description

I hypothesize that in Republican primary presidential campaigns, candidates who are evangelical or who enjoy close ties to conservative Christian interest groups will be the most supportive of strengthening the American-Israeli relationship. These candidates will devote more time to Israel and include more effusive rhetoric about the American-Israeli relationship in their debate performances, and these candidates will be unquestioning in their support of Israel throughout their campaign. I will rely primarily on debate transcripts, and journalistic and scholarly coverage of Israel in Republican presidential campaigns to test this hypothesis.

I also hypothesize that the Christian Right, beginning with the 1980 GOP platform, will attempt to influence the language of the document. In addition to their traditional social conservative interests, the Christian Right will also affect how the document treats Israel in regards to the language used, the amount of words devoted to Israel, and the placement of the Israel-related language in the document. Specifically, I hypothesize that: (1) the amount of space as measured by word count devoted to Israel-related language will remain at least constant and probably grow; (2) their efforts will ensure that the documents frame the American-Israeli relationship as one with moral significance in addition to national security significance; and (3) Israel-related language will occupy increasingly prominent positions in the document by receiving its own dedicated section and appearing earlier overall within the document or at least the larger foreign policy section of the platform. In testing this hypothesis, I will refer to the texts of past Republican platforms and examine how they have changed over the past several decades. Additionally, I will refer to journalistic and scholarly coverage of the platform-writing processes and look specifically at the overall influence of the Christian Right on Israel-related policy in the writing of the platform.
Lastly, I hypothesize that evangelical members of Congress will be more likely to take pro-Israeli stances on legislation than non-evangelical members. As discussed in the introduction of my paper, evangelical Christians often prioritize Israel in their foreign policy visions and I want to see if a statistically significant relationship exists between identifying as evangelical and voting for pro-Israel policies. I plan to construct datasets made up of members during congresses that featured votes on relevant legislation. Independent variables that I will include for each member include party affiliation and other measures of ideology, such as the National Journal vote ratings that measure economic, social, and foreign policy standpoints that also may explain why a member votes the way he or she does. The independent variable of interest will be a dummy variable that will code if the member belongs to a Protestant denomination that is considered to be evangelical (Steensland et al., 2000) provide a useful and oft-cited classification of Protestant denominations into categories including evangelical and mainline). The dependent variable will be whether or not the member took the pro-Israeli position on the vote. Most votes in Congress that are explicitly about Israel receive high levels of support so I have instead identified two votes so far that were more divisive and can serve as proxies. The first vote comes in 1981 when Congress voted on approving the sale of military hardware to Saudi Arabia. Pro-Israeli forces, including Christian Right icon Jerry Falwell, mobilized in opposition to the sale, and several members of Congress discussed concern for Israeli security to justify their position on the vote. The second vote is the recent legislation on support for President Obama’s nuclear deal with Iran. Again, concern for how this deal would impact Israeli security was common in arguments over the deal, and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu himself lobbied Congress to oppose it. Using logit and probit regression models, I
will test to see if there is a statistically significant relationship between evangelical faith and congressional support for Israel.
IV. Israel, the Christian Right and Republican Party Presidential Primaries

Presidential candidates are usually a party’s most prominent politicians. Their campaigns generate nationwide press coverage and introduce the candidates to voters across the country through advertisements, debates, and campaign events. Candidates have a unique opportunity to champion their favored policies, bring these approaches to the forefront of American political discourse, and preview what may very well become law. In the 2000 primary season, George W. Bush proposed major tax cuts; in 2008, Barack Obama emphasized his interest in reforming health care; and in 2016, Donald Trump called for building a wall on America’s southern border and for restricting Muslims from entering the United States. These campaign seasons provide excellent opportunities to see how different issues gain or lose prominence in national politics, and if different factions in a party are prioritizing different policies. I hypothesize that Israel will become a more prominent issue in GOP primaries since the rise of the Christian Right (by appearing more frequently as a topic in primary debates, for example), and that presidential candidates who are evangelical or who are trying to court the Christian Right (or both) are going to offer the most supportive, unquestioning stances on Israel compared to candidates who do not meet these criteria. Evangelical candidates have a theological impetus to champion Israel, and candidates wanting to gain the support of conservative Christians may use Israel as a topic to appeal to evangelical voters’ religious sensibilities. I will test these hypotheses by examining debate language and media coverage of candidates’ views on the Christian Right and Israel.

The first primary material I am examining is the language used in primary debates (see appendix 1 for finding transcripts and video for considered debates). I have chosen to only examine GOP primary debates because these debates give me more opportunities than a general election debate between one Republican and one Democrat to see if Republicans from different
religious backgrounds or who have different approaches to the Christian Right also have
different approaches to Israel. Just from the most recent primary season, readers may remember
Texas Senator Ted Cruz’s repeated calls for moving the American embassy from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem, or Carly Fiorina saying that one of her first calls as president would be to Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Debates are a useful measure of what issues candidates
prioritize because candidates must pick and choose what they are going to discuss. In a regular
campaign speech, there is no moderator bearing down and telling the candidate to move on after
two minutes; there is no real opportunity cost to mentioning Israel. But in a debate, a candidate
must be selective in deciding what to talk about in their opening and closing statements. And in
questions about the Middle East, are they going to spend their time talking only about getting
troops out of Iraq or helping resolve the Syrian civil war, or will they also mention their views on
Israel? As I examine this language, I will again be engaging in content analysis: who is talking
about Israel, what are they saying about Israel, and in what context are they saying it. Context is
important because talking about Israel in response to a question asked about Israel is not
indicative of prioritizing Israel. If a candidate talks about Israel in their closing statement or
brings up Israel in response to a broader question about foreign policy, then that is interesting.

Using a master list of GOP primary debates compiled by the University of Virginia’s
Center for Politics (Kondik & Skelley, 2015), I then used C-Span and the University of
California-Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project to locate as many videos and transcripts
of these debates as I could. From 2000 on, I have complete transcripts for all but two debates.
The 1980, 1988, and 1996 records are less complete so I will be more cautious in my treatment
of them as being representative of their primary seasons. Because I do not have access to all the
debates, it is possible that the ones I do have access to could be outliers in terms of Israel’s
frequency as a topic. While I will leave them out of my quantitative analysis, I will return to them later as part of my overall evaluation.

Using these transcripts, I first went through every debate to find who was talking about Israel and under what circumstances. At the most basic level, Israel has become an increasingly common subject of debate since 2000 (2004 is not included because incumbent GOP President George W. Bush ran for re-election and had no primary challenger). In figure IV-1, one can see that the average number of times Israel is mentioned in a debate peaks at roughly eight in the 2012 debates before falling a little in 2016. Both are much higher than the averages in 2000 and 2008.

Figure IV-1
I am most interested in finding instances where a candidate starts discussing Israel when it is not “necessary” for them to bring the issue up. I decided that if the moderator asks “Candidate A” a question about Israel or Palestine, or if another candidate references or comments on Candidate A’s position on Israel, these two circumstances effectively demand that Candidate A discuss Israel. For the purposes of my investigation, all other instances of candidates discussing Israel are unsolicited and therefore more interesting. For the next part of this analysis, I do not include all the mentions of Israel catalogued in figure IV-1, based on the following criteria. I analyzed what was said about Israel and divided responses into two categories, substantive or un-substantive, based on whether or not the comment has any policy implications. An example of an unsolicited mention of Israel that is not substantive, meaning that it indicates nothing about that candidate’s thoughts on Israel or American policy towards Israel, came in a 2008 debate from former Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore. The moderator asked Gilmore about his opinions on George W. Bush’s cabinet shake-up. Gilmore included in his response the following:

We're going to have to engage in the Middle East, and we're going to have to do it for an extended and a long period of time. It isn't just an Iraq issue. This is an issue of the challenges that we're facing between the Palestinians and the Israelis, the challenge between Sunnis and Shiites -- the problem with people on the street not even agreeing with their own regimes – Jim Gilmore, 5/3/07

Gilmore mentioned Israel without having to, but he said nothing remarkable about Israel and lumped it in with problems arising out of Sunni-Shiite tensions. In contrast, there are many ways of bringing up American policy towards Israel that I considered to be substantive in some form. These range from simple statements about America’s continued support for Israel to calls to move the American embassy to Jerusalem to opposing the Iran deal because of its implications for Israel to criticism of political opponents’ policies towards Israel. These examples provide a
hint of the candidate’s views on Israel, and the vast majority of unsolicited mentions of Israel fall under this category.

Once I had determined for each primary season what the substantive comments were and who had said them, I then examined which candidates tend to provide these comments more than others. To do so, I counted the number of unsolicited comments per candidate and then divided that number by the number of debates the candidate participated in to account for differing campaign longevities. For example, in 2016 Florida Senator Marco Rubio discussed Israel on his own initiative seven times over twelve debates, meaning that he provided .53 unsolicited discussions of Israel per debate. This number on its own does not make much sense, as a candidate cannot provide half of a discussion in a debate, but it is useful when comparing it to other candidates’ ratios.

With ratios for forty-three candidacies, I ordered them from largest to smallest. Seventeen candidates, roughly forty percent of this population, are evangelical. Fourteen of the forty-three candidates never discussed Israel on their own initiative (figure IV-2). For the other twenty-nine candidates, I divided them into three groups: a top ten (column 1), a middle ten (column 2), and a bottom nine (column 3). I have bolded all evangelical candidates in Figure IV-2.
The data do not support my hypothesis that evangelical candidates in general are more likely to talk about Israel. If one looks at lists of candidates who never brought up Israel of their own accord one finds six evangelicals and eight non-evangelicals on the list. Based on these numbers, thirty-five percent of evangelical candidates since 2000 never brought up Israel on their own in a debate. Twenty-seven percent of non-evangelical candidates fell in this category. Contrary to my hypothesis, a greater proportion of non-evangelical candidates than evangelical candidates brought up Israel. Even among those who discussed Israel the most, for example, the top six, three were evangelical and three were not.

Evangelicals are also not more particularly intense in their rhetorical support for Israel than non-evangelical candidates, as illustrated by the 2016 debates. Both types of candidates
boasted about their support for Israel, and denounced the Obama administration’s approach. Examples from the evangelical group include Texas Senator Ted Cruz’s call for moving the American embassy in Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (8/6/15), and his referring to Israel as, “One of our strongest allies in the world” (3/10/16). Dr. Ben Carson chastised the Obama administration for turning America’s back on Israel (8/6/15). Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee mentioned in several debates his concern for the dangers Israel faces (8/6/15; 9/16/15). Several non-evangelicals made similar statements of support over the course of the debates. For example, Ohio Governor John Kasich said that, “We have no better ally in the world” than Israel (11/10/15). Florida Senator Marco Rubio criticized the Obama administration for betraying Israel (1/14/16), and said America must be loyal to them (2/13/16). Florida Governor Jeb Bush echoed Cruz in calling for the embassy’s move to Jerusalem, and added that America must strengthen Israeli technological superiority over their enemies (1/14/16). Donald Trump, attacked in one debate (3/10/16) for not being a strong enough supporter of Israel, responded by saying: “There’s nobody on this stage that’s more pro-Israel than I am. . . I have tremendous love for Israel.” Not only do evangelicals fail to outdo non-evangelicals in bringing up Israel, no noticeable difference in intensity of support exists in examining their language.

Whether or not a candidate was trying to attract the Christian Right seems to have no effect on how much he or she discusses Israel. It is difficult to find a Republican candidate who has not attempted to appeal to the Christian Right, and courters are spread from the most talkative on Israel to least talkative. For example, among the most likely to mention Israel, one can find plenty of candidates who courted the Christian Right such as Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum, and Texas Senator Ted Cruz. Among those who never brought up Israel, plenty of candidates courted the Christian Right like Gary Bauer,
Ambassador Alan Keyes, and Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker. One might argue that some candidates simply do not feel comfortable discussing Israel because they have little experience in foreign affairs. However, numerous examples refute this particular explanation. For example, several governors, a position that usually involves few foreign policy choices, appear in the top ten: Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee, New York Governor John Pataki, Virginia Governor Jim Gilmore, and Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty. Neurosurgeon Ben Carson, someone with no public service experience, appears in the top ten. If one extends this consideration to the top fifteen, then one also finds businesspeople Carly Fiorina and Donald Trump, Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal, Texas Governor George W. Bush, and Florida Governor Jeb Bush, again a group without much foreign policy expertise. Among the silent include many individuals who do have such expertise. Alan Keyes, a former ambassador to the United Nations and assistant secretary of state (Merida, 2000), never mentioned Israel of his own accord in a debate in either of his 2000 or 2008 campaigns. California Congressman Duncan Hunter had chaired the House Armed Services Committee before his 2008 bid (“Committee Chairmen”), and in 2000, Senator John McCain was already considered a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Dewar, 2000). Despite their experience, they never brought up Israel on their own initiative.

Lack of foreign policy expertise does not stop a candidate from discussing Israel, and comfortability with foreign policy does not ensure a candidate will bring up Israel.

The three primary seasons that I do not have complete transcripts for, and thus have left out of this analysis, still help to support the conclusion that evangelical status or interest in courting the Christian Right have little influence on talking about Israel in debates. Israel was never a topic of discussion by any candidate in the accessible debates from 1980. In the 1988 debates, only two instances occurred where a candidate discussed Israel substantively on his own
initiative, and that was New York Congressman Jack Kemp, an evangelical who courted the Christian Right (Reid, 1987c; Katz, 1988). In 1996, only three instances occurred, and the candidates responsible were Indiana Senator Dick Lugar, California Congressman Bob Dornan, and publisher Steve Forbes. None of these men was evangelical. Lugar and Dornan both courted the Christian Right (Berke, 1995b; “Conservative Christians,” 1996; Edsall, 1995; Keen, 1995). Forbes did not, and actually found himself the victim of Christian Right attacks (Beltrame, 1996; Berke, 1996). What is most telling about these early primary campaigns is not so much who was talking or what he was saying, but that Israel is largely missing from the discussion. While I cannot be sure that these are a representative sample, the available evidence suggests that Israel has become a much more common debate topic in the twenty-first century than the twentieth.

For the remainder of this chapter, I tried to take a bit broader overview of GOP presidential candidates and Israel by investigating media coverage of the primaries in order to identify candidates who were pro-Israel. Overall, Israel’s role in Republican primaries has become more prominent in media coverage. Beginning with the 1980 primary, I recorded the number of articles appearing in The Washington Post and The New York Times, two national newspapers of record, that contained the words “Israel,” “Republican,” “primary,” and “President” (the articles were aggregated by the LexisNexis Academic database) from January 1st of the year prior to the general election until the day before the GOP convention, when the primary season ended. Figure IV-3 illustrates that while the number of articles including these words has not increased consistently in every primary season, there is an upwards trend (2004 is again not included because incumbent GOP President George W. Bush ran for re-election).
To further examine which candidates were generating news on Israel and what they were saying about Israel, I used other media sources in addition to the two above to have a more complete picture of the primary field. If one returns to the previous discussion of Israel in debates or the discussion of GOP platforms, at first glance, Republicans and the GOP seem to consistently offer Israel uncompromising support. In examining newspaper coverage aggregated by Lexis-Nexis (ranging from national papers like *The Washington Post* to more regional papers such as *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*), I am not trying to compile and compare numbers of articles related to a particular candidate and Israel. Instead, I am searching for *any* instance where a candidate departs from the norm of support for Israel, and that is why I am surveying such a broad range of media. Views that I consider to be unorthodox include calls to cut aid to Israel, chastisement of Israel, or saying nothing about Israel. While not saying anything about Israel does not mean the candidate does not support Israel, this silence should still be treated as a deviation because some candidates in every primary season did find time to make their views on
Israel known. Saying nothing reflects a relatively low prioritization of Israel compared to the candidate’s competitors. In the tables below, I have organized candidates according to their evangelical status and their interest in courting the Christian Right. This organization allows me to compare whether non-evangelicals or candidates who do not court the Christian Right deviate from the norm of unquestioning support for Israel at a higher rate than evangelical or Christian Right-aligned candidates. The candidates have been placed in one of four categories: (1) evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right; (2) evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right; (3) non-evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right; and (4) non-evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right. If my hypotheses are supported, the evangelical candidates and the candidates courting the Christian Right are more likely to offer unquestioning support for Israel than other candidates as reported by the media.

Not every single GOP candidate for president since 1980 is included in my sample for a couple reasons. In the previous section, the candidates I examined were effectively selected for me. They were the candidates who participated in debates. Here I want to be cautious in my selection. For example, let’s say there is a hypothetical candidate who is not evangelical, did not court the Christian Right, and had nothing reported to say on Israel. Let’s also add that this candidate was only in the race for three months and never polled over one percent. If this candidate never had the time to talk about Israel, or the media simply never paid attention to what they had to say, then it is not fair to factor this candidate in as an example of non-evangelical, non-Christian Right candidates being less supportive of Israel. To control for this potential problem, candidates must meet two criteria to be included in this part of the analysis. The candidate must have actively contested one primary contest (a test of viability) and must have participated in at least one nationally televised debate (a test of recognition). I was very
lenient in determining if a candidate courted the Christian Right. I had hypothesized that candidates who were trying to appeal to conservative Christians would be more likely to prioritize Israel. I did not factor into my hypothesis how successful the candidates were at appealing to this demographic’s sensibilities. Thus, I consider pretty much any outreach at all to the Christian Right community as evidence of courting, even if the candidate ended up failing to garner evangelical support. Again I only drew on articles aggregated through Lexis-Nexis to determine if a candidate courted the Christian Right. One cannot with any solid confidence distinguish between attending a Values Voters Summit, speaking at Liberty University, or meeting with religious broadcasters as differing in levels of outreach. These and a host of other similar types of outreach are all acceptable for my purposes, as long as they generate media coverage.

As one looks at the tables, one notices I have italicized numerous candidates. Italicization indicates that the candidate deviates from the norm with their position on Israel by advocating for less American support of Israel, criticizing Israel, or not saying anything at all about Israel. Candidates who are recorded as saying positive things about Israel, and no unorthodox views are simply marked as supporting Israel. Similar to my thoughts on Christian Right outreach, one cannot distinguish with confidence between calling for more aid to Israel, moving the American embassy to Jerusalem, providing Israel with more military hardware, or just generally insisting that America will support them as differing in levels of commitment to Israel.

I will first discuss the evangelical candidates (tables 1 and 2), all of whom, except for Illinois Congressman John Anderson in 1980, courted the Christian Right. There are seventeen of them, and only three candidacies deviate from the norm of support for Israel (eighteen percent
of this demographic): Illinois Congressman Phil Crane’s 1980 campaign, and the 2008 and 2012 campaigns of Texas Congressman Ron Paul. I treat Paul’s two campaigns as different candidacies (and do the same for other candidates who make multiple runs), because some candidates who run multiple times change their position on courting the Christian Right or their messaging on Israel over time, and I want to capture these differences. Thus, only eighteen percent of evangelical candidacies deviate from standard support for Israel. Ron Paul is one of the most idiosyncratic candidates of the past few decades, and his deviation can be easily explained by his staunch commitment to his libertarian ideology. This ideology calls for cutting all foreign aid and being less involved in world affairs; Paul argued in one debate that American intervention is not always helpful and is far too costly for the nation:

We support Israel, and we try to have this balance. But I think it would be much better to have a balance by being out of there. And I think it would be a greater incentive for Israel and the Palestinians and all the Arab nations to come together and talk because I think we get in the way too often of these. And besides, it's costing us a lot of money and it's costing us lives now. And it's time that we come to the point where we believe the world can solve some of their problems without us – Ron Paul, 1/10/08

In that same debate, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee (1/10/08) responded to this point by casting Paul’s isolationism as dangerous for the Middle East, and especially for Israel:

“And for us to give the world the impression that we would stand by if it were under attack and simply say, 'It's not our problem,' would be recklessly irresponsible on our part.”  New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani also criticized Paul in the same debate after Paul said America treats Israel as a step-child, saying:

I think the idea that Israel is a stepchild of the United States is totally absurd . . . The reality is that Israel is a close and strong ally of the United States . . . The defense of Israel is of critical importance to the United States of America, and it goes much deeper than just tactical things – Rudy Giuliani, 1/10/08
Paul was not able to escape attempts to characterize him as anti-Israel in his 2012 campaign, either. For example, the Republican Jewish Coalition excluded him from their forum for presidential candidates, saying that Paul’s congressional record and stances in the campaign were anti-Israel (McGreal, 2011a). Besides the idiosyncratic Paul, Phil Crane, who simply has no recorded views on Israel, is the only other evangelical not to offer full support for Israel.

Table 1

Evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Christian Right connection</th>
<th>Views on Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip Crane</td>
<td>“Outspoken Christian” (Reid, 1980)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Reid, 1980; Rosenfeld, 1980a)</td>
<td>No record of views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Robertson</td>
<td>Southern Baptist (Binyon, 1987; Reid, 1987a)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Binyon, 1987; Reid, 1987b)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (McCartney, 1988; Reid, 1988a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate</td>
<td>Religion/Culture/Politics</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michele Bachmann</td>
<td>Evangelical (Harris, 2011a; MacAskill, 2011)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Eckholm, 2011; MacAskill, 2011)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (Liebler, 2011; McGreal, 2011b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Perry</td>
<td>Methodist, attends evangelical megachurch (Fernandez, 2011; Parker, 2011)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Fernandez, 2011; Parker, 2011)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (McGreal, 2011b; Oppel, 2011a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron Paul</td>
<td>Baptist (Caldwell, 2007)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Fabian, 2011)</td>
<td>Supports ending aid to Israel, ends up barred from the Republican Jewish Coalition for his views on Israel and Iran (McGreal, 2011a; Rutenberg &amp; Kovalevski, 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Cruz</td>
<td>Southern Baptist (Bailey, 2015)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Gabriel &amp; Martin, 2015; Gabriel, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong support for Israel (Phillip &amp; Johnson, 2016; Zezima, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Huckabee</td>
<td>Southern Baptist (Blakely, 2015)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Gabriel &amp; Martin, 2015; Gabriel, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong support for Israel (Mullany, 2015b; Rudoren, 2015b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Carson</td>
<td>Seventh Day Adventist (Rappeport, 2015b)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Zezima, 2015; McCarthy, 2016)</td>
<td>Strong support for Israel (Linde, 2015; Mullany, 2015a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Christian Right connection</th>
<th>Views on Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980 Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Anderson</td>
<td>Born-again evangelical (Balz, 1980)</td>
<td>No record of courting, used faith to justify some liberal positions (Balz, 1980; MacPherson, 1980a)</td>
<td>Support for Israel, criticized Connally’s plan for the Middle East (“Connally Mideast,” 1979; Omang, 1979)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is far more deviation present among the non-evangelical candidates (tables 3 and 4). Out of thirty-six candidates, ten candidates (twenty-eight percent of the group) deviate from unquestioning support of Israel. A few examples spanning my period of inquiry are helpful in illustrating the range of comments that qualify as deviating from unquestioning support.

Some of the most controversial breaks with Israel include Texas Governor John Connally’s proposal in the 1980 campaign to broker peace in the Middle East. The plan included having Israel’s right to exist recognized by Arab countries, the creation of a Palestinian state, and a guarantee of stable oil supply for the West. This plan quickly drew criticism from leaders of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the American Jewish Committee, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations. Competitors for the nomination such as Anderson and Tennessee Senator Howard Baker criticized Connally’s plan for its treatment of Israel, and Jewish members of Connally’s campaign even quit their jobs in protest (“Connally Mideast,” 1979; Goshko, 1979; Lescaze, 1979).
In 1996, Pat Buchanan’s comments likely qualify as the most anti-Israel of any candidate, as he referred to Israel as “a strategic albatross draped around the neck of the United States” (as quoted in Goar, 1996). Additionally, Buchanan derided Capitol Hill as “Israeli-occupied territory,” and denounced what he called Israel’s American “amen corner” (both quoted in Sharn, 1996) in his calls to end foreign aid to Israel. In an article exploring Buchanan’s struggle to win over Christian conservatives, the Christian Coalition’s Ralph Reed and the Traditional Values Coalition’s Lou Sheldon both noted that Buchanan’s views on Israel were at odds with many evangelicals, and Sheldon cited Buchanan’s stance on Israel as the principal reason for him not supporting Buchanan (Sharn, 1996).

Some candidates have offered much more measured critiques of Israel, but such critiques still place them outside the GOP norm. For example, in 1988, Kansas Senator Bob Dole criticized Israel’s treatment of Palestinian protestors, and did not criticize the Reagan administration allowing the United Nations to censure Israel even though every other primary candidate besides Vice-President Bush did (Rosenbaum, 1987; Weinraub, 1988). And in 2016, even as he repeatedly affirmed his support for Israel, candidate Donald Trump displeased many when he said he would act as a neutral party in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, and when he failed to commit to an undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital at the Republican Jewish Coalition forum (Mahler, 2016; Rucker & Costa, 2016).

Overall, my hypothesis regarding evangelical support for Israel does find support here. Non-evangelical candidates have been more likely to say nothing, advocate less American support for Israel, or criticize Israel in some fashion than evangelical candidates. But the data do not support my hypothesis that candidates courting the Christian Right are likely to be more supportive of Israel than non-courting candidates. Only one (the previously discussed John
Connally) of the eight candidates who did not court the Christian Right broke with full support for Israel. Twelve of the forty-five candidates who courted the Christian Right (27%) deviated from full, unquestioning support of Israel in some way. Plenty of them had nothing to say on Israel, advocated less support for Israel, or even criticized Israel: Bob Dole in 1988, Alan Keyes in 1996, Pat Buchanan in 1996, and Rand Paul in 2016 are just a few examples. Israel does appear to be a contributing factor for conservative Christians as they evaluate candidates. As mentioned earlier, Buchanan struggled to gain traction with some evangelicals because of his stance on Israel (Sharn, 1996); in 2012, Iowa Family Leader president Bob Vander Plaats noted that Ron Paul’s stance on Israel was discouraging to him and other Iowa evangelicals in the lead up to the 2012 caucuses (Horowitz, 2011); and at a 2015 Faith and Freedom Coalition summit, Vander Plaats and other evangelical activists noted that candidates’ foreign policy stances, especially regarding Israel, had piqued many attendees’ attentions (Wollner, 2015). Despite evangelicals clearly valuing a candidate’s stance on Israel, this has not translated to unanimous, uncompromising support for Israel among candidates looking to make inroads with the evangelical community.

Even among candidates who always support Israel, they do not always highlight their support for Israel as a way to attract the Christian Right. In 2008, for example, candidates could and did discuss a variety of issues at the Values Voter Summit. Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney emphasized his pro-life position, Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee called for attendees to evaluate a candidate’s social conservative convictions, and Arizona Senator John McCain reflected on his imprisonment in Vietnam. But New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani was the only one reported to talk about his support for Israel (Balz, 2007; Luo, 2007b; Shear, 2007; Sullivan, 2007). At the Family Leadership Summit in 2015, nine contenders appeared
before a crowd of mostly religious conservatives. Some did mention Israel in the course of the discussion, but others, like Pennsylvania Senator Rick Santorum and Dr. Ben Carson, failed to do so despite their strong recorded support for Israel (“2015 Family,” 2015). One can also return to part one of this chapter and find that numerous Christian Right-courting candidates failed to bring up Israel on their own initiative during debates. Israel can be part of an evangelical voter’s calculus in GOP primaries, but among the candidates themselves there are plenty of times where they ignore the issue in their outreach to this community.

It has become far less common for candidates to find fault with some part of American policy towards Israel. For example, concerning non-evangelical candidates, seventy percent of the candidates who departed from the norm ran their campaigns in the 1980, 1988, or 1996 campaign seasons. The three latest were Ambassador Alan Keyes in 2008 (with no record of comments on Israel), Trump’s previously discussed comments on Israel in 2016, and Kentucky Senator Rand Paul’s willingness to consider cutting aid to Israel in 2016 (Haberman, 2015; “Rand Paul,” 2015).

Courting the Christian Right is essentially a requirement of GOP primaries, even if one does not succeed. The last campaign that meets my criteria and did not court the Christian Right was John McCain’s 2000 candidacy. They remain an important constituency in GOP primaries, but apparently their importance does not translate into uniform support for Israel or uniform interest in discussing support for Israel.
### Tables 3

Non-evangelical candidates who courted the Christian Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Christian Right connection</th>
<th>Views on Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1980 Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Dole</td>
<td>Methodist (Weinraub, 1987b)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Rosenfeld, 1980a)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel, took anti-PLO stances (Dole, 1979; Oberdorfer, 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1988 Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George H. W. Bush</td>
<td>Episcopalian (Taylor &amp; Hoffman, 1987)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Taylor &amp; Hoffman, 1987; Katz, 1988)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel but did blame Israel over arms sales to Iran; defended Reagan policies that were seen as chastising Israel (Rosenbaum, 1987; Pincus &amp; Woodward, 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Dole</td>
<td>Methodist (Weinraub, 1987b)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Katz, 1988; Lewington, 1988)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel but did criticize Israeli response to Arab protesters; did not condemn Reagan policies chastising Israel unlike all other candidates except Bush (Rosenbaum, 1987; Weinraub, 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1996 Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Dole</td>
<td>Methodist (Weinraub, 1987b)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Beltrame, 1995; Rhodes, 1995)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (Lippman, 1995; Sciolino, 1996b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pat Robertson</td>
<td>Catholic (Bernstein, 1996)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Debenport, 1995; Edsall, 1996a; Edsall, 1996b)</td>
<td>Wants to end aid to Israel and has criticized Israeli influence in American government (Goar, 1996; Sharn, 1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alan Keyes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Catholic (Kolbert, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Debenport, 1995; Kolbert, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>No record on Israel</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bob Dornan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Catholic (Ayres, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Keen, 1995; “Conservative Christians,” 1996)</strong></td>
<td><strong>No record on Israel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lamar Alexander</strong></td>
<td><strong>Presbyterian (Tollerson, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Debenport, 1995; Walker, 1996)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter of Israel (Fraser, 1995)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phil Gramm</strong></td>
<td><strong>Episcopalian (Niebuhr, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Berke, 1995a; Niebuhr, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter Israel (Haberman, 1995; Lardner, 1995)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dick Lugar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Methodist (Edsall, 1995a)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Berke, 1995b; Edsall, 1995a)</strong></td>
<td><strong>No record of views</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2000 Primary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Alan Keyes</strong></th>
<th><strong>Catholic (Kolbert, 1995)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Courted Christian Right (Nickens, 1999; Henneberger, 2000)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Supporter of Israel (Walsh, 1999)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orrin Hatch</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mormon (McMullen, 1999)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Hauserman, 1999; McMullen, 1999)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter of Israel (Walsh, 1999; Milbank, 2000)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steve Forbes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Episcopalian (“Candidate-by-candidate,” 1999)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Neal, 1999; Neal &amp; Edsall, 1999)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter of Israel (Walsh, 1999)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2008 Primary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>John McCain</strong></th>
<th><strong>Episcopalian (Broder, 1999)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Courted Christian Right (Luo 2007b)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Supporter of Israel (Ben-David, 2008)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mitt Romney</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mormon (Bacon, 2007)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Bacon, 2007; Luo, 2007a)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter of Israel (Krieger, 2007; Lipman, 2007)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alan Keyes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Catholic (Kolbert, 1995)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Gilgoff, 2008)</strong></td>
<td><strong>No record on Israel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rudy Giuliani</strong></td>
<td><strong>Catholic (Santora, 2007)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Courted Christian Right (Luo, 2007c; Santora, 2007)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Supporter of Israel (Cooper &amp; Santora, 2007; Santora, 2007)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2012 Primary**

<p>| <strong>Mitt Romney</strong> | <strong>Mormon (Bacon, 2007)</strong> | <strong>Courted Christian Right (Tumulty, 2011)</strong> | <strong>Supporter of Israel (Oppel, 2011b; Barbaro, 2012b)</strong> |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion/Denomination</th>
<th>Political Affiliations</th>
<th>Support for Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2016 Primary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>Presbyterian (Posner, 2016)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Gabriel, 2015b; Haberman, 2016)</td>
<td>Offered support for Israel, but did make some missteps (Mahler, 2016; Rucker &amp; Costa, 2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marco Rubio</td>
<td>Catholic (Sullivan, 2016)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Gabriel &amp; Martin, 2015; Sullivan, 2016)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (Parker, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rick Santorum</td>
<td>Catholic (Lorber, 2012)</td>
<td>Courted Christian Right (Gabriel, 2015a; Gabriel &amp; Martin, 2015)</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (Corasaniti, 2015a; D. Smith, 2015)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

Non-evangelical candidates who did not court the Christian Right

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Outreach Effort</th>
<th>Supporter of Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Howard Baker</td>
<td>Presbyterian (Schelzig, 2014)</td>
<td>No record of outreach</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (“Connally Mideast,” 1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>John Connally</strong></td>
<td>Methodist (Quinn, 1979)</td>
<td><strong>No record of outreach</strong></td>
<td><strong>Proposed controversial Middle East peace plan, accused of bartering Israeli security for oil (Goshko, 1979; Lescaze, 1979)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander Haig</td>
<td>Catholic (King, 1987)</td>
<td>No record of outreach</td>
<td>Supporter of Israel (Rosenbaum, 1987; Lewis, 1988)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the data present a mixed record, with some support for my hypotheses. In debate performances, Israel has become a more common topic but evangelical or Christian Right-oriented candidates cannot take all the credit. A higher proportion of non-evangelicals bring up Israel on their own initiative, and evangelicals do not even seem to be more intense in their support for Israel based off their language. The broader survey of media coverage also
supports the claim that Israel has become a more common topic in GOP primaries among candidates. For example, in the four primary seasons since 1996, only one candidate who met my criteria never discussed Israel enough for the media to report on his views; the 1996 primary season alone had three such candidates. Additionally, the data indicate that evangelicals tend to be more unquestioning in their support of Israel than non-evangelicals, with a far smaller proportion of the former offering unorthodox views. However, a greater proportion of candidates courting the Christian Right offer unorthodox views as opposed to non-courting candidates. Israel has become increasingly addressed in GOP primary seasons since 1980, but evangelical candidates are not wholly responsible, and a candidate’s interest in pleasing the Christian Right does not entail unquestioning support for Israel.
V. Israel, the Christian Right, and Republican Party Platforms

Since 1980, the Christian Right has been a powerful force in Republican politics, and has attempted to use its clout to influence the GOP’s platform (see appendix 2 for source for all referenced GOP platforms). Its overt presence at past conventions has waxed and waned, yet many of its priorities have become key parts of the platform over the past several decades. For example, thanks in part to their activism, restrictions on abortion and opposition to gay rights feature prominently in recent platforms.

Platforms serve several functions in addition to their most basic one of allowing political parties to state their principles and goals. They provide a signal to voters by publicizing the political and policy paths a party will take if in power. Being able to compare different parties’ stances on certain issues allows voters to make a more informed choice on election day. Platforms are also a tool for accountability. Voters and other watchdogs can compare a politician’s or party’s actions with the platform to determine if they are following through on their promises. A party may also use platforms to reward or placate disgruntled factions within the party. Adding, deleting, or changing language within the platform carries symbolic weight and can demonstrate a party’s commitment to certain priorities. For social scientists, examining changes in platforms can help observers understand the history of parties and how they have changed ideologically (Gerring, 1998; Cooper, 2012; Gearan, 2016).

A platform-writing committee is in charge of drafting the platform, which is then presented at the national convention and voted on by delegates. For the GOP, the committee is usually chaired by a few politicians, and then each state and territory sends one man and one woman to make up the full committee. In 2016, Wyoming Senator John Barrasso was chair, and Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin and North Carolina Congresswoman Virginia Foxx were co-
chairs (Lobianco, 2016). Various state party rules govern the selection of the other members of the committee, who are typically unknown figures on the national stage. For example, the 2016 committee included a Connecticut state legislator, Kansas’s secretary of state, and the president of a Utah-based conservative think tank (“The Platform Committee 2016”). These delegates are divided into subcommittees, such as government reform or natural resources, aided by un-elected committee staff. Once the platform is drafted, a majority of the committee must vote to approve the platform, and then the committee presents the document to the delegates at the convention. These delegates may also propose and vote on changes to the document before finally ratifying it by a majority vote.

But the committee does not work in isolation from other forces. Allies of the nominee try to influence the direction of the platform, and for the past several decades, the Republican National Committee (RNC) or the platform committee itself have invited input from interest groups. In 1988, the platform committee held hearings for groups to offer their opinions; one hearing lasted for twelve hours and featured over one hundred witnesses representing a wide range of special interests (Reid, 1988b; Rosenstein, Rehm & Zboril, 1988). In 2012 and 2016, the RNC reached out to a variety of interest groups for their input on the platform and as a way to soothe tensions over Donald Trump’s controversial campaign, holding meetings with lobbyists representing a wide range of industries, from the American Hospital Association to the American Petroleum Institute, to learn about their priorities (Ackley, 2012; Restuccia & Romm, 2016). While the platform-writing process might not typically receive much attention from the public, interest groups are intensely interested. Having one’s issue mentioned at all is valuable as a way to garner publicity among policymakers and the public. If favorable changes to the platform occur, interest groups can use those changes as examples to their members that their cause is
succeeding and that the interest group is influential. For example, in 2012, the National Rifle Association publicly praised the platform on its website for the platform’s gun rights language (Cooper, 2012).

By forming relationships with the nominee and with key members of the Republican Party apparatus (sometimes even becoming part of said apparatus), Christian Right interest groups have helped enshrine social conservatism in the platforms. In this chapter, I will first discuss how interest groups try to influence party platforms and whether or not they are successful, followed by examining how the Christian Right has affected platform language concerning Israel through content analysis and examination of media coverage. I hypothesize that since 1980, Israel-related language will grow in length, that the language will begin to frame the relationship in moral terms instead of just geostrategic, and that the language will become more prominent in the document (such as by appearing earlier in the platform and by receiving its own section). I conclude that while the Christian Right has been successful in promoting conservative stances on issues like abortion, little evidence exists to show that the Christian Right has influenced or even been interested in affecting Israel-related language in the manner hypothesized above.

**How interest groups try to influence party platforms**

While platform committees may invite input from interest groups, groups may take little deliberate action to influence platforms. Instead, an interest group may know that platform writers will take its wishes into account because it and its base are already influential in the party. The Christian Right is a well-publicized collection of interest groups that, as previously discussed, have the ears of the GOP leaders, and the population that they target most for activism, evangelical Protestants, are a significant proportion of the country (“America’s
Changing,” 2015). One might think that platform writers proactively include planks to assuage the Christian Right without it having to ask for it. Thus, its influence is not recorded as the Christian Right instead chooses to rely on their structural power. Structural power, and its complementary concept instrumental power, are two modes of influence often discussed in the literature related to business and politics. An actor who takes deliberate action to influence the political system uses his instrumental power. Structural power in this literature draws on the phenomenon of government officials adjusting their behavior in anticipation of the needs of business. If policymakers believe a proposed policy will cause businesses to change their strategies in a way that will harm the economy, then they may shelve the policy without business even having to take deliberate action against it (Fuchs & Lederer, 2007; Culpepper & Reinke, 2014; Fairfield, 2015).

However, I do not believe that the supposed structural power of the Christian Right translates to unrecorded success in platforms. The Christian Right has long been wary of being taken for granted by the GOP, and several prominent leaders over the years have groused that the GOP neglects their policies (Goodstein, 1995; Sack, 1998; Yardley, 2000; Healy, 2007). For example, in the 2008 primary season, Christian Right activist Paul Weyrich and the American Family Association’s Donald Wildmon urged social conservatives not to compromise on candidates in the primary on promises of electability, especially in reference to pro-choice New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s candidacy, with Wildmon saying: “We’ve been disappointed and taken for granted by Republicans at times” (as quoted in Healy, 2007). As will be discussed further in this chapter, this wariness leads the Christian Right to not rely on its structural power being rewarded when it comes to platforms. Numerous examples over several decades of the
Christian Right organizing to influence the platform point to the movement’s favoring of deliberate action when it comes to influencing platform writing.

One method of influencing platforms directly goes through the nominee. Although nominees do not have complete control over the platform-writing process, they often have significant input, and the platform committee can take significant cues from the candidate. The 1980 Republican platform is one good example. Several commentators (Kaiser, 1980; “Major News,” 1980) noted that Reagan allies managed the platform writing process to suit Reagan, and the platform ultimately modeled its conservative social policy and hawkish foreign policy in part off his positions. The platform included a Reagan-favored constitutional amendment to ban abortion, despite a majority of delegates opposing such an amendment (MacPherson, 1980b). Similarly, in 2000, the GOP platform took cues from George W. Bush, who wanted to appear as a compassionate conservative while maintaining social conservative positions. He ended up leaving the convention with a platform, shaped largely by committee allies, in which he got much of what he wanted (Gailey, 2000; Rauber, 2000; Toner, 2000). In the ability of the nominee to shape the platform, special interests can add their own voices.

By forming a close relationship with the nominee, an interest group can pique the nominee’s interest in their issue. This interest may then translate into the platform recognizing the issue, too. However, some nominees and interest groups come out of the primary season estranged. And while the nominee and the interest group may never become favorites of each other, they still might need each other. The nominee needs an interest group’s funds, activists, and voters to win election; the interest group, in a polarized two-party system, likely cannot find a candidate who is both more amenable and electable. In this more adversarial relationship, the interest group can negotiate with the nominee, and, for example, be allowed to affect the
platform in exchange for cooperation during the convention or campaign. An example of this sort of appeasement of a disgruntled faction occurred in 2012 where the platform committee included several libertarian-minded planks in the document in an effort to placate supporters of Congressman and presidential candidate Ron Paul (Cooper, 2012).

Recognizing the power of the nominee, the Christian Right has consistently tried to ingratiate itself with GOP standard bearers by joining their campaigns and taking time to meet with the nominee and the nominee’s representatives. Beginning with the 1980 platform, the first opportunity that most Christian Right interest groups had to influence the process, prominent Christian Right leaders already had access to the highest levels of the GOP. For example, in 1980, the Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell had close ties to nominee Ronald Reagan, close enough to counsel Reagan on his vice-presidential pick on the day Reagan chose him (Clendinen, 1980), and to be invited four years later to give the benediction at the Republican National Convention’s opening (Herbers, 1984). At the twenty-first century’s beginning, George W. Bush, an evangelical himself, was close to the Christian Right. Ralph Reed, formerly of the Christian Coalition, went to work for his campaign, and Bush enjoyed ties to Falwell and fellow Christian Right icon Pat Robertson (Dao, 2000; Keen, 2000).

In the cases of GOP nominees who were not its natural allies -- and who it possibly clashed with during the primary campaign-- the Christian Right did not rebuff their advances once it came to the general election. After defeating conservative Christian favorite Pat Robertson in the 1988 primary, George H. W. Bush promised to consult Robertson on several issues, hired Robertson’s campaign manager, and chose conservative darling Dan Quayle as his running mate (Brummer, 1988; Dionne, 1988; McCombs, Williams, & MacPherson, 1988). Bush went on to hold meetings with conservative leaders, and emphasized his social
conservative policies (Dionne, 1988). Twenty years later, nominee John McCain, who had had a rocky relationship with the Christian Right (Glover, 2000), reached out to the Southern Baptist Convention’s Richard Land (Bumiller, 2008), chose Pentecostal Sarah Palin as his running mate, and met with and sent operatives to evangelical gatherings to assure them of his social conservative commitments (Kirkpatrick, 2008). No candidate wants messy convention fights or a crumbling base in the midst of a general election; leveraging such possibilities can give an interest group influence on the platform. The Christian Right especially has leverage as they attempt to organize the roughly quarter of the American population who identify with evangelical Protestantism (“America’s Changing,” 2015), a population that already tends to vote Republican (“Evangelicals Rally,” 2016).

However, interest groups can also assume power in the platform-writing process without relying on the nominee to endorse or acquiesce to their views. They can try to influence leaders in the GOP apparatus. Even in 1980, when the movement was still in its fledgling years, Falwell and other conservative Christian pastors met with the GOP chairman several times during the year in the lead-up to the convention in order to share their priorities (Clendinen, 1980). Becoming part of the apparatus, including part of the platform committee, is another method that has become a favorite of Christian Right activists as they try to influence the platform. Twenty-eight of the 107-member platform drafting committee in 1992 were Christian Coalition activists (Walker, 1992). In 1996, Christian Right elites (including leaders of the Christian Coalition, the FRC, and the Eagle Forum) formed the Coalition to Keep the Republican Party Pro-Life, which claimed a majority of the members on the platform subcommittee overseeing abortion (Edsall & Claiborne, 1996). At the 2000 and 2004 conventions, even as the Bush campaign shut out Christian Right representatives from the primetime coverage they had enjoyed at previous
conventions, social conservatives maintained a significant presence in internal workings (Benedetto, 2000; Toner, 2000; Simpson, 2004; White, 2004). Even more recently, at the 2012 and 2016 conventions, Tony Perkins, the president of a leading Christian Right interest group, the Family Research Council, has represented Louisiana on the platform committee, and in 2016 on the subcommittee responsible for drafting the party’s stance on social issues (Easley, 2016).

**Are interest groups successful in influencing the platform?**

The various methods mentioned above have all been used by Christian Right interest groups to try to influence the GOP platform. And one can find through media reports and content analysis of the platforms themselves that the Christian Right has met with success by using these methods, particularly on social issues. However, as will be further discussed, little evidence exists that points to similar interest or success on language related to Israel.

In 1988, George H. W. Bush made peace with conservatives partly by allowing them to keep intact most of the 1984 platform, a very conservative document (Dionne, 1988). Four years later, he agreed to let platform committee members allied with the Christian Coalition have significant say, especially on social issues, again leading to a very conservative platform. For example, George H. W. Bush’s stated position on abortion allowed for exceptions in the case of rape or incest, but the platform followed Christian Right demands and included no such caveats (Apple, 1992; Berry, 1992; Rosenbaum, 1992; Walker, 1992). In 2008, in an effort to secure conservative support, John McCain allowed Christian Right icon and Eagle Forum founder Phyllis Schlafly to shape the platform and even add specific planks to it. Despite his difficult relationship with the movement, McCain’s platform tended to toe the line on Christian Right priorities and he let them keep an uncompromising stance on abortion (against his past wishes) and add punitive immigration planks, too (also against his past wishes) (Kirkpatrick, 2008;
Simpson, 2008). In both instances, the Christian Right provided the nominee with its cooperation and in exchange got to affect the GOP platform.

As mentioned earlier, in 1996, several leaders of the Christian Right formed the Coalition to Keep the Republican Party Pro-Life. This group was not just for show and ended up voting down proposals to water down anti-abortion language in the platform with strong majorities (Edsall & Claiborne, 1996). They ultimately forced nominee Bob Dole to accept a plank calling for a constitutional amendment to ban all abortion and with no conciliatory words for pro-choice Republicans (Rosenbaum, 1996). In 2000 and 2004, although out of the limelight, conservative activists still were proactive in keeping strong social conservatism in the platforms (Benedetto, 2000; Toner, 2000; Simpson, 2004; White, 2004). The 2004 convention even saw social conservatives adding a plank on gay marriage that went further in opposition than President Bush wanted (Toner & Kirkpatrick, 2004). During the 2016 committee-writing process, Perkins helped lead a successful charge to maintain socially conservative stances, routinely voting down more liberal proposals (Easley, 2016).

While these examples help establish the Christian Right’s record of activism and influence on the platform-writing process, in the next section I plan to be more systematic in tracing the evolution of Israel-related language in the platform and how the Christian Right was involved.

**Platforms and Israel**

Examining the actual text of the platforms and how the text has changed since 1980 also provides evidence of Christian Right success, and corroborates media reports. Content analysis is the process of getting quantitative data out of non-quantitative documents (Krippendorff,
2004; Gray et al., 2007; Johnson & Reynolds, 2012) and has been applied to analyze party platforms (Gerring, 1998). My analysis will consider several characteristics of the Israel-related language: (1) how many words does Israel-related policy receive; (2) what specific words frame the relationship (for example, does the platform treat the American-Israeli relationship purely as a geostrategic one or as one that also has moral import); and (3) how prominent is the Israel language (for example, where is it placed in the document and does it receive its own subsection). Measuring these characteristics are all standard techniques in content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004; Gray et al., 2007).

As a brief example of how content analysis can complement media accounts, I will examine language related to abortion, a previously-discussed policy area where the Christian Right has claimed success (MacPherson, 1980b; Walker, 1992; Edsall & Claiborne, 1996; Kirkpatrick, 2008; Peoples, 2016). The 1980 platform devoted around 100 words to abortion out of roughly 35,000 words. While opposing abortion and advocating for appointing pro-life judges, the platform still struck a conciliatory tone by recognizing opposing views within the party. The next several platforms granted similar space to the issue, but dropped the recognition of opposing views. The 1996 platform devoted 350 words to the issue, calling for support for abortion alternatives, opposing partial-birth abortion, and opposing support for services that may recommend abortion, and the next several platforms did much of the same. The 2016 platform devoted 750 words to abortion, giving full throated endorsements to restrictions on abortion, the defunding of Planned Parenthood, and directly attacking Democratic abortion policies. Just through a brief examination of changes in word count and how abortion policy is framed, we can see growing social conservatism within the GOP.
It is important to note that language on abortion has not grown simply because platforms are longer overall. While Republican platform length has fluctuated over the past three and a half decades, the increasing proportion of the platform dedicated to this issue is undeniable. For example, the 1980, 2000, and 2016 platforms were all within 500 words of a 35,000 word total. Abortion-related language grew from around one hundred words to around three hundred words to finally around seven hundred and fifty words. Here one can clearly see that content analysis is useful in quantifying and illustrating an interest group’s influence on a platform.

It is appropriate to examine changes in Israel-related language not only because of the Christian Right’s already stated interest in the issue, but also because platform language about foreign policy more generally has had religious undertones. The GOP platforms portray America as morally unique and superior in acting on the world stage. For example, the 1984 platform notes “a profound moral difference between the actions and ideals of Marxist-Leninist regimes and those of democratic governments,” and goes on to say that America’s military strength serves a moral purpose. The 1992 platform contrasts morally-blind totalitarians with the “shining city on a hill” that is America. Every Republican platform since 2000 has emphasized the importance of religious liberty to America’s foreign policy, describing the interest as a “cornerstone” (2000), a “cardinal principle” (2004), a “central element” (2008), or that it occupies a “central place” (2012; 2016).

As I turn to test my hypotheses specifically about Israel-related language, I am first going to engage in content analysis. Following this analysis, I will examine media and scholarly reports to try to see if what I observe happening to Israel-related language in the platform can be linked to Christian Right activism. I first hypothesized that the amount of text devoted to Israel would grow in the platform as the Christian Right became more influential within the GOP.
Figures V-1 and V-2 illustrate two different ways of measuring this trend. Figure V-1 shows the number of times the word “Israel” was used in each platform. Figure V-2 shows the percentage of each platform that was devoted to Israel. The text I considered to be “Israel-related” for figure two includes any text concerning Israel in the platform, whether it be their treatment at the United Nations, moving the American embassy to Jerusalem, helping them negotiate with the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or just general affirmations of American support for Israel.

Israel has been mentioned between ten and twenty-five times since 1980. Israel-related text has fluctuated between roughly 225 words (0.64 percent of the 1980 platform) and 750 words (2.63 percent of the 1992 platform). Overall, mentions of “Israel” and text related to Israel have increased since 1980, but not in a clear linear trend. The 1992 platform was the peak for both of these measures, and several platforms of the twenty-first century have no higher proportion of Israel-related language than platforms from the 1980s. Not only has text devoted to Israel not consistently increased from platform to platform, some symbolically important text has even been lost in recent platforms. For example, the 2012 GOP platform deleted longstanding language calling for recognition of an undivided Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, although it was re-instated in 2016, as will be discussed later (McDonald, 2016).

I also hypothesized that beginning with the rise of the Christian Right, the language concerning Israel would not just treat the relationship as a geostrategic one but as one with moral import. I believe that this particular change in framing the relationship is important and can indicate the Christian Right influence for two reasons. The first is that appeals to morals or morality can have religious undertones. Faith is a common source of morality, and inserting such language into a platform can serve as a subtle recognition of the drafters’ religious sensibilities. Second, geostrategically-based relationships are subject to change as geopolitics
Figure V-1

"Israel" in the Platform

Year

Mentions of "Israel"

0 5 10 15 20 25 30


Figure V-2

Percentage of Platform Devoted to Israel

Year

Percentage of Platform

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3

change. Moral relationships are not so fickle, and framing the relationship in this way would appeal to evangelical Christians who want to make sure the American-Israeli bond lasts until the end-times.

Prior to 1980, GOP platforms had consistently mentioned support for Israel. In 1948, the platform welcomed Israel’s establishment, and subsequent platforms re-affirmed support for Israel, but also included lines about maintaining an “impartial friendship” with both Israel and its Arab neighbors (1954) and encouraging Israel to negotiate with its neighbors (1960; 1972). Additionally, these earlier platforms recognized that America’s relationship with Israel was not selfless: the 1968 platform, for example, mentions that Israel is part of America’s Cold War calculus in stopping Soviet influence in the Middle East. This pattern changed in 1980 when the platforms started recognizing an explicit moral interest in Israel. While continuing to recognize Israel’s strategic importance, the 1980 platform was the first to identify American support of Israel as a “moral imperative.” This dimension became a feature of Republican Party platforms for the next twenty years. The 1984 platform reused the phrase “moral imperative,” 1992 recognized a “unique moral dimension,” 1996 included the words “moral bonds,” and 2000 discussed America’s “moral concern” and its “moral obligation” to move the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. However, 2000 is also the last platform to frame the relationship in such a way. The platforms of 2004 and 2008 have no such language, and 2012 and 2016 recognize that American support for Israel comes in part from shared values, but not an explicit moral interest. I have been unable to find any particular reporting on why this shift in terminology occurred, either to explain the introduction of such language in 1980 or to explain the loss of such language in the twenty-first century.
Lastly, I hypothesized that Israel-related language would become more prominent in the platform by receiving its own subsection and by becoming one of the first issues to be addressed within the platform’s foreign policy section. The GOP platform committee has tended to relegate the foreign policy section to the end of the document. Only in the 2004 and 2008 platforms was foreign policy the first substantive section, unsurprising in the wake of 9/11 and the war on terror. In all the other platforms since 1980, foreign policy and defense concerns came last. Within this section, text related to Israel has tended to be a part of a subsection headed along the lines of “The Middle East” (1984) or “The Middle East and Persian Gulf” (2000). The platform committee has not privileged this subsection within the document. It has usually been placed in the middle or near the end of the foreign policy section, and thus at the end of the document. Within the Middle East subsection, Israel-related language has at times come first (i.e. 1988), but has also been near the subsection’s end (i.e. 2004) with no clear trend over time.

The 2008 platform marks the beginning of Israel’s own dedicated subsection. Spaced separately from other Middle East policy and with the simple header of “Israel,” this language does enjoy a bit more prominence than it had in previous platforms. The 2012 and 2016 platforms are similar, although Israel language now has the heading, “Our Unequivocal Support of Israel.” While it does have its own subsection, this text still has been in the middle or near the end of the foreign policy section. Thus, a mixed record exists in regards to Israel-related language receiving increased prominence. The placement of the foreign policy section dictates the general placement of Israel-related language, but even within this section the language does not receive much priority as it tends to be in the middle or end. Recent platforms have given it its own subsection, a small victory, but based on its position within the document, Israel certainly does not seem a priority.
The results of my content analysis do not support some of my hypotheses. The proportion of the platform dedicated to Israel-related language has not consistently grown since 1980, and since 2000 the relationship has not been deemed one of moral import. For the hypotheses that content analysis did not strike down, explicit influence of Christian Right interest groups on this portion of the platform is difficult to find. I began searching for evidence of Christian Right influence by examining newspaper coverage of the platform-writing process beginning a few months prior to the convention and ending in the weeks following the convention, especially focusing on the coverage provided by *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *The Los Angeles Times*, three national newspapers of record. I also examined the websites of leading Christian Right and Christian Zionist interest groups (I focused on Christians United for Israel, the Family Research Council, the Faith and Freedom Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and the Eagle Forum) for blog posts and press releases concerning GOP platforms. These newspapers and these websites had no explicit reporting on these organizations or any other Christian Right group influencing Israel-related language.

While some of these organizations praised the platform and compared aspects of the GOP platform to the Democratic (including sections on Israel), I could find no group claiming responsibility for shaping Israel-related language. It is intriguing that the first platform (1980) to frame support for Israel in moral terms is also the first platform to be written after the formation of the Christian Right (and after Jerry Falwell and other Christian Right leaders emphasized that they cared about more than traditional social issues, and were interested in ensuring that support for Israel remained a core part of GOP policy (Clendinen, 1980)). It is also intriguing that the high point of Israel-related language in GOP platforms was in 1992, the same year that the Christian Right had significant influence and perhaps the most visibility ever on the platform and
during the convention (Mydans, 1992; von Drehle, 1992; Benedetto, 2000; White, 2004). But these are ultimately only coincidences.

The relative silence regarding the Christian Right and Israel language in GOP platforms is meaningful. The Christian Right has not been shy about claiming victory in platform language over the past few decades, as referenced earlier. I see no reason why members of the Christian Right would not crow over their influence on text related to Israel if they had any influence when they have a record of doing so on planks related to abortion, for example. From this I conclude that for much of my period of interest the Christian Right did not prioritize (or perhaps even ignored) shaping platform language on Israel.

However, a sudden assertion of Christian Right and Christian Zionist influence did appear in the 2016 platform. In adopting a conservative platform, the platform committee removed potential language discussing a two-state solution for Israel and reinstated language calling for an undivided Jerusalem (Kopan, 2016; McDonald, 2016). The word count jumped to over 300 words, and in making these changes several commentators noted the importance of evangelical input. Delegates and leaders of groups hoping to influence the platform noted that groups such as the Hispanic Israel Leadership Coalition, CUFI, and the CUFI Action Fund were key players in deciding this language. Unhappy with the 2012 platform’s treatment of Israel, these groups were especially interested in shaping the 2016 document. Gary Bauer, head of the CUFI Action Fund and a long-time influential social conservative, sent a letter to the platform committee asking for specific changes such as the ones mentioned above. Additionally, Bauer and other interested groups reached out to Donald Trump’s staff and successfully drew their attention to helping change the platform language. This combination of piquing the nominee’s interest and approaching the committee directly paid off and Christian Zionists celebrated the
acceptance of their desired changes (Kornbluh, 2016; McDonald, 2016; Mitchell, 2016; Savage, 2016). Israel-language finally became a target of interest groups, and 2016 saw Christian Zionists mount a successful lobbying campaign to ensure that the document reflected their interests. The question is if this will be a one-time phenomenon, or if it will become a trend.

Over the past three decades, Christian Right interest groups have not been explicitly linked to evolving platform language on Israel. While language concerning Israel has received its own subsections in recent years, content analysis proves that the amount of text has not consistently grown, and that the American-Israeli relationship is no longer framed as an explicitly moral one. A dearth of explicit evidence about Christian Right involvement makes drawing any solid conclusion about their influence impossible. However, the silence on this issue from the normally self-promoting Christian Right indicates that it has not been a priority. The relatively recent rise of CUFI and similar groups may be changing this situation as evidenced by 2016 events, but only future platforms will tell.
VI. Evangelicalism and Congressional Votes

In this chapter, I turn from presidential campaigns and platforms to members of Congress. The general question is whether or not being evangelical affects a member of Congress’s voting habits on Israel. My hypothesis is that an evangelical member of Congress is more likely to take a pro-Israel stance on legislation than is a non-evangelical. To test this hypothesis, I have selected two congressional votes: the 1981 congressional referendum on the US selling Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia, and the 2015 congressional referendum on the nuclear deal with Iran (see appendix 3 for finding sources to the full rollcall votes). These are good cases to select because neither of them was explicitly about Israel; votes explicitly about Israel tend to be symbolic and receive nearly unanimous support. For example, the House in 1996 unanimously passed a resolution condemning terrorist attacks in Israel (House Concurrent Resolution 149); in 2010, the House passed legislation to support Israel’s missile defense system on a four hundred and ten to four vote (House Resolution 5327); the Senate has passed several bills about Israel with unanimous consent, meaning there was such general agreement that a rollcall vote was unnecessary (Senate Resolution 923 in 1999, for example); and with unanimous rollcall votes (Senate Concurrent Resolution 4 in 1991, for example). The two votes I selected were much more contentious, and although not explicitly about America’s relationship about Israel, how the legislation would supposedly affect Israel was an important part of debate.

The 1981 vote (House Concurrent Resolution 194 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 37) concerned the proposed arms sale of military hardware, AWACS planes, by the US to Saudi Arabia. While ostensibly about Saudi-American relations, this sale generated a lot of concern for Israel. Examining the text of speeches senators gave on the day of the vote, one finds many
examples of members mentioning Israel’s security as one of their reasons to oppose the sale. Missouri Senator John Danforth (R) argued against the sale, saying in part that the new hardware could embolden Arab states wanting to harm Israel. Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy (D) feared that if Arab states went to war with Israel, Saudi Arabia would be pressured to join the war and use this hardware against Israel. Even senators who supported the sale recognized the need to address concerns that the sale would jeopardize Israeli security. For example, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, and Texas Senator John Tower (all Republicans) emphasized that they believed that the sale of AWACS presented no credible threat to Israel (“Senate,” 1981). The Christian Right, even in its nascent stage, voiced opposition to the sale. The Moral Majority’s Jerry Falwell lobbied members of Congress to oppose the sale and he joined Christians for American Security, a coalition formed to oppose the sale. Falwell argued that America should not do anything that could potentially jeopardize Israel’s security, and the sale of AWACs did just that (Goshko, 1981; Kreiter, 1981). In an appearance on one talk show, Falwell largely disregarded questions on abortion and school prayer, asking the moderator to let him discuss the AWACS (McGrory, 1981). Members of the Reagan administration alleged that Falwell received a list of senators supporting the sale from Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (Shipler, 1981), presumably to help Falwell lobby those senators. Begin did his own lobbying, meeting with President Ronald Reagan and urging him to drop the sale. Begin argued that the sale would decrease Israel’s military superiority over its Arab neighbors, and that the Saudis could only want these planes to use against Israel (Claiborne, 1981; Montgomery, 1981).

The 2015 vote (House Resolution 3461 and Senate Amendment 2640 on House Joint Resolution 61) concerned the agreement the United States and several other countries negotiated
with Iran about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Just like the arms sale to Saudi Arabia, this proposed policy generated a lot of discussion about how it would impact Israel among American and Israeli politicians, and among the Christian Right. The day the Senate voted on the Iran deal, opponents warned of grave implications for Israeli security. Utah Senator Orrin Hatch (R) warned that the deal would not stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon that could be used to kills Israelis and Americans; South Carolina’s Lindsay Graham (R) emphasized that this agreement would jeopardize Israeli security; Indiana’s Dan Coats (R) and Kansas’s Pat Roberts (R) both reminded the audience that Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei had called for Israel’s destruction (“Senate,” 2015). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke before a joint session of Congress and called for members to oppose the agreement, saying if they do not then Israel’s existence would be threatened (Baker, 2015).

Leading Christian Right and Christian Zionist interest groups mobilized months, even years, in advance in an effort to stop the deal. The best example of the breadth of interest among the conservative Christian community is the formation of American Christian Leaders for Israel. This group wrote a petition statement in opposition to the Iran deal that included the signatures of the leaders of Christians United for Israel (CUFI), the Family Research Council (FRC), Concerned Women for America (CWA), Focus on the Family, the Christian Coalition of America (CCA), the Traditional Values Coalition, the Christian Broadcasting Network, and the Moody Bible Institute to name just a few (“Iran Statement,” 2015). In addition to this petition, many of these groups and others engaged in their own extensive lobbying and grassroots mobilization to oppose the deal. CUFI published a list of ten reasons to oppose the deal, calling on its members to urge their members of Congress to oppose the deal (CUFI claims that tens of thousands of members subsequently made such contacts) (Cohen, 2015; Labott et al., 2015). At
its annual summit, CUFI founder John Hagee railed against the deal and organized thousands of summit participants to meet personally with their members of Congress in Washington, D. C. (Parke, 2015). The FRC’s Tony Perkins led several members of Congress to Israel and arranged a meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu to discuss Israel’s opposition to the nuclear agreement years before Congress even voted on it (Stanley, 2013). In the months leading up to the vote, the FRC’s website featured numerous posts opposing the deal with Tony Perkins’ blog celebrating Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to Congress and calling the Iran deal a historic mistake (Perkins, 2015a; Perkins, 2015b). The FRC also provided links and text of articles written by senior FRC fellows who called for passionate opposition to the deal, and claimed the deal was even worse than the Munich appeasement of German leader Adolf Hitler (Blackwell & Morrison, 2015a; Blackwell & Morrison, 2015b). CWA’s website also published pieces opposing the Iran deal. CWA President Penny Nance specifically framed the deal as bad for Israel, arguing, for example, that the lifting of sanctions on Iran would give Iran more money to fund terrorists targeting Israel (Ballew, 2015). Nance also helped organize a rally against the deal that included presidential candidates Donald Trump and Texas Senator Ted Cruz as speakers (“CWA National,” 2015). Focus on the Family President Jim Daly authored a post on his organization’s website after Netanyahu’s speech, calling it Churchillian in its warning of “the grave threat posed by a potentially nuclear-tipped Iran” (Daly, 2015). CCA’s President Roberta Combs, in an action alert directed at members, said that the deal threatened Israeli safety and that they should contact their members of Congress and tell them to oppose it (Combs, 2015). Other posts on the Coalition’s website also mentioned how this deal endangered Israel (“House Majority,” 2015). Eagle Forum sent out an action alert to members and told them to contact their members of Congress to oppose the deal (“Congress’s August,” 2015). Eagle Forum President
Phyllis Schlafly authored a post branding the Iran deal as unconstitutional and a betrayal of America (Schlafly, 2015).

**Constructing the Models**

These contentious votes provide an opportunity to test whether or not a member’s evangelicalism impacts their voting behavior when it comes to Israel. The independent variable of interest is a dummy variable that indicates whether or not a member belongs to a Protestant denomination with evangelical theology (“1” is for evangelicals; “0” for non-evangelicals)(see appendix 4 for sources of members’ religions). Admittedly, scholars disagree over how best to classify someone as evangelical based on their denominational affiliation or on their specific theological beliefs. For example, Wilcox (1992) argues that denominational classifications are not adequate, and that individuals should be considered evangelical based on their interpretation of the Bible and whether or not they consider themselves born-again. However, no comprehensive survey of members of Congress has captured their views on the Bible or their born-again status, but members do report their religious denomination. Therefore, I rely on Steensland et al.’s (2000) oft-cited article in which the authors classify various Protestant denominations as evangelical or mainline based on their theology.

I have made a few additional judgment calls pertaining to my coding that I must note. First, Steensland et al. (2000) distinguish between black Protestantism and evangelical Protestantism based on theological differences, and other articles note that black Protestants and white Protestants tend to behave differently in politics (Lipka, 2016). Second, some members of Congress identify only as “Protestant” or “Christian.” Steensland et al. (2000) classify such non-denominational respondents as evangelical as long as they attend church services at least once a month. For these particular members, I have tried to find more information about their religious
beliefs (see appendix 5 for sources for select members with more available information). For example, Louisiana Senator Bill Cassidy identifies as Christian, and his official website notes that he attends the Chapel on the Campus congregation in Baton Rouge. The Chapel on the Campus’s website promotes beliefs in the inerrancy of the Bible and becoming born-again, both indicative of evangelical theology. Thus I coded Senator Cassidy as evangelical. However, for some members, I could find no further discussion of their religion. Because of these two issues, I created two different variables for a member’s evangelicalism. In the first variable, I code black members of Congress who identify as Baptist, for example, as non-evangelical because of the previously mentioned theological differences, and I code members where I could find no further discussion of their faith as non-evangelical, too, because I do not know about their church attendance. In the second variable measuring evangelicalism, if I had any doubts about a member’s faith -- for example, a black Baptist representative or a senator who identifies only as Protestant -- then I simply dropped them from the analysis altogether instead of presuming their evangelical or non-evangelical status. The difference between these variables did not lead to different outcomes in the statistical analysis so, for brevity, I will only discuss the results generated by the first of these two variables.

Informed by past studies of legislators’ voting decisions (Davis & Porter, 1989; Richardson & Munger, 1990; Snyder, 1992; Berry et al., 2010), I have included several other independent variables to control for other reasons why members may vote the way they do. Such variables include party identification and measures of a member’s economic, social, and foreign policy ideology. For the AWACS vote, I use National Journal’s 1982 measures of legislators’ conservatism in economic, social, and foreign policy ideology (these are three separate measures each drawing on different votes), and the American Security Council’s (a
hawkish think tank) National Security Index’s 1982 ratings of congressional members as controls (see appendix 6 for sources for all interest group ratings). The National Journal ratings draw on a select group of roll call votes (chosen by surveying the rated votes of other interest groups and input from several media organizations covering Congress) over these different issue areas. After compiling members’ voting records, National Journal gave each one a composite score and rank-ordered the members compared to each other. For example, the ultimate foreign policy score for Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee (68) indicates that he is more conservative than 68 percent of the Senate in this area. I used the National Journal’s 1982 measure instead of its 1981 scores because the 1981 score was based partly on a member’s AWACS vote. Using the 1981 measure would therefore have biased the results. The 1982 foreign policy measure factors in a member’s vote on issues such as Cuban expansion; funding and procuring certain missiles; and stopping loans to Poland. The National Security Index also uses rollcall votes to generate its ratings, including developing and procuring missiles and aircraft, a nuclear freeze, and aid to El Salvador and Chile.

For the 2015 vote, neither National Journal nor the American Security Council has continued to rate members of Congress this recently, so I chose new control variables. The interest group ratings that I used as controls came from Family Research Council Action (FRC’s political action committee that tracks a member’s behavior on social policy), the Club for Growth (CFG, a conservative interest group that promotes fiscal conservatism and free market capitalism), Peace Action (a dovish think tank that promotes less defense spending and nuclear non-proliferation) and the Center for Security Policy (CSP, a hawkish think tank that promotes a philosophy of “peace through strength”). All of these think tanks generate their scores based off rollcall votes. I found that the two foreign policy ideology control variables, generated from
2016 calendar year votes, while not including the vote on the Iranian nuclear deal itself, did include related votes designed to make the terms of the deal impossible to carry out. For example, Peace Action’s Senate ratings considered a vote preventing the buying of heavy water from Iran. CSP’s House ratings considered votes preventing buying heavy water, and a vote imposing sanctions on Iran. Including these particular votes would bias the model. I therefore edited the two groups’ scores and removed the Iran-related votes from calculation as I re-scored members. I found that using the original score and the edited score caused no substantive change in my independent variable of interest, but to avoid bias, I will only discuss the results of models that used the edited ratings. I also no longer include a party identification variable. The unanimity among Republican members of Congress in opposing the deal caused the probit and logit models to drop this variable from the analysis. I cannot fix this lack of variation among GOP members of Congress, so I proceeded without this variable.

**AWACS for Saudi Arabia**

When conducting statistical analysis of each vote, I created logit and probit models because they are designed to work with binary dependent variables such as Yes/No votes in Congress. Because logit models and probit models using the same variables will report almost identical levels of statistical significance between independent and dependent variables, and will indicate the same directions for relationships between independent and dependent variables, I will just discuss my probit models. The AWACS legislation was written as a measure of disapproval of the sale. If a member voted “aye,” they were voting against the sale and thus taking the “pro-Israel” stance. According to my hypothesis and based on my coding of the variables, I expect evangelicalism to have a direct relationship with this vote (i.e., evangelicals should vote “aye”). I ran three separate regressions, one for the House vote, one for the Senate
vote, and one where I combined the two chambers’ votes (figures 1-3; all figures can be found at the end of this chapter). Not every member of Congress is included in these regressions, because some failed to report any religious status at all, and thus I left them out of the analysis altogether.

Out of the members of the 1981 House whose religion I could code, thirty-three, ten percent of the sample, qualified as evangelical. Fifteen of these evangelicals, or forty-five percent, opposed the sale. Evangelicals were less likely to oppose the sale than non-evangelicals, seventy-six percent of whom opposed the sale. One finds this same phenomenon in the Senate. Twelve senators were evangelical (thirteen percent of all senators I could code), and only two of them (seventeen percent of evangelical senators) opposed the deal. In contrast, fifty-one percent of non-evangelical senators opposed the deal. These initial comparisons greatly increase my skepticism regarding my hypothesis that evangelicals will be more likely than non-evangelicals to oppose the sale.

In the probit model, no independent variables had a statistically significant relationship with the House vote (measured at the standard α level of .05). If one is a little more generous than .05, then three variables approach statistical significance. The measure of a member’s cultural conservatism has a coefficient of -.013 and an α level of .057, indicating that the more culturally conservative a member was, the more likely a member was to support the sale. The National Security Index had a coefficient of -.012 and an α level of .062, indicating that more hawkish members were more likely to support the sale. Lastly, the relationship between the vote and evangelicalism nears statistical significance (α=.064). However, the direction of this relationship runs counter to the original hypothesis. With a coefficient of -.467, the inverse relationship indicates that evangelicals were more likely than non-evangelicals to support the sale. It is not easy to think of a credible causal mechanism that explains why evangelicalism
would push a member towards selling arms to Saudi Arabia is. It appears that, consistent with my findings in previous chapters, Christian Right ties and evangelicalism do not always lead to pro-Israel activity.

In the probit model for the Senate vote, three variables were statistically significant at the .05 level: National Journal’s economic measure ($\alpha=.049$), cultural measure ($\alpha=.003$), and foreign policy measure ($\alpha=.027$). The first two of these variables had negative coefficients, indicating that as members became more conservative, they were more likely to support the sale. The foreign policy variable had a positive coefficient, indicating that more hawkish senators were more likely to oppose the sale. In short, ideology mattered. Evangelicalism did not have a statistically significant relationship ($\alpha=.167$) with support for the sale, but its coefficient (-.981) again indicated that evangelicals were more likely to support the sale.

In the probit model of the entire Congress, three variables achieved statistical significance: evangelicalism ($\alpha=.010$), party identification ($\alpha=.010$), and National Journal’s cultural measure ($\alpha=.000$). The National Security Index almost reached statistical significance ($\alpha=.068$). All these relationships were inverse. Evangelicals, Republicans, cultural conservatives, and hawkish members were all more likely to support the sale than their counterparts. None of my models for the AWACS vote supported my hypothesis. In fact, evangelicals seem more likely, if anything, to support selling the hardware than non-evangelicals.

Why might evangelical members of Congress not have responded to the calls of their religious brethren? One reason might be that evangelical activists, despite their public opposition to the sale, did little actual arm-twisting. Despite Jerry Falwell’s public statements against the deal, several senators who had enjoyed the support of the Moral Majority supported
the sale: North Carolina’s John East, Colorado’s William Armstrong, and Iowa’s David Jepsen are all examples (McGrory, 1981). Members of the Israeli government privately complained that Falwell did nothing substantive to oppose the deal (Shipler, 1981). Several senators even went from being prominent opponents of the sale to supporting it. Jepsen is perhaps the most disheartening defector from the standpoint of a Christian Zionist. Previously declaring his opposition to the sale because he thought it was anti-Israel, Jepsen ended up voting for it, citing constituent pressure and classified information (McGrory, 1981; Mohr, 1981a). Other defectors included Maine Senator William Cohen, who said he did not want to handicap Reagan in international affairs and that the failure of the sale would be blamed on Israel (Mohr, 1981b). Washington’s Slade Gorton, an evangelical, told the press a letter from Reagan caused him ultimately to support the sale (Mohr, 1981b). It appears that the Reagan administration lobbied far harder and more successfully than the Christian Right by revising language in the deal to fit the demands of senators and promising to hold off on delivering the equipment for several years. Senator John Glenn implied in the wake of the vote that the administration’s lobbying methods were not all made up of such carrots, remarking that Reagan was “ill-served by a staff that uses methods like these” (as quoted in Mohr, 1981b). However, party identification was only statistically significant in the model of the entire Congress; the other two models do not indicate that Republicans felt particular loyalty to Republican President Reagan’s vision on this vote as one might expect. The AWACS vote remains puzzling, but if anything, these models indicate that evangelicals were more likely to support the sale than non-evangelicals.

**The Iran Nuclear Deal**

I again worked with probit models in my examination of the Iran nuclear deal. I coded my data similarly to how I coded the AWACS data in that I expect evangelicalism to have a
direct relationship with opposition to the Iran deal. I ran three separate regressions, one for the House vote, one for the Senate vote, and one where I combined the two chambers’ votes (figures 4-6). Not every member of Congress is included in these regressions, because some failed to report any religious status at all or because they did not participate in enough congressional votes to receive interest groups ratings, and thus I left them out of the analysis altogether.

At first glance, the 2015 vote seems to offer better support for the main hypothesis in this chapter than the 1981 vote. Sixty-four House members (fifteen percent) qualified as evangelical, and fifty-nine (or 92%) of evangelical representatives took the pro-Israel position and opposed the deal. Only 57 percent of non-evangelical representatives opposed the deal. There were thirteen evangelicals in the Senate (thirteen percent), and of these twelve of them (92%) opposed the deal. Fifty-three percent of non-evangelical senators opposed the deal.

In the probit model, only one variable had a statistically significant relationship with the House vote (measured at the standard α level of .05). Peace Action’s rating had a coefficient of -.011 and an α level of .025, indicating that the more dovish a member is the more likely he or she is to support the sale. If one is a little more generous than .05, then CSP’s variable also approaches statistical significance (α=.054), and with a coefficient of .012 indicates that the more hawkish a member is, the more likely he or she is to oppose the deal. The relationship between the vote and evangelicalism is not close to statistical significance (α=.341). Additionally and oddly, the direction of this relationship runs counter to the original hypothesis. With a coefficient of -.829, the inverse relationship indicates that, if anything, evangelicals were more likely than non-evangelicals to support the deal. This contrasts with my expectations from theory and from the proportions mentioned above, and it is not easy to think of a credible causal
mechanism that explains why evangelicalism would push a member towards supporting the Iranian nuclear deal.

In the probit model for the Senate vote, the statistical software had difficulty constructing a model when using both foreign policy ideology controls. The Senate vote in particular might be troublesome for the statistical software because evangelical senators were almost unanimous in their opposition to the deal (only one of thirteen supported it). This variable’s lack of variation in relation to the dependent variable could have created a problem similar to the one caused by the party identification variable. I was still able to generate a model using Peace Action’s rating as my only foreign policy control variable, and while I would like to have avoided this inconsistency, it does not affect my conclusion. No variables are close to approaching statistical significance. Evangelicalism had an \( \alpha \) value of .937, and its coefficient (-2.335) again indicates that evangelicals were more likely to support the deal.

In the probit model of the entire Congress, one variable achieved statistical significance: FRC’s rating \( (\alpha=.031) \). With a coefficient of .026, the more socially conservative a member is, the more likely they are to oppose the deal. The ratings from Peace Action \( (\alpha=.094) \) and CSP \( (\alpha=.079) \) approach statistical significance. Their coefficients (-.007 and .010, respectively) indicate the same relationships they did in the House probit model. The evangelical variable is statistically insignificant \( (\alpha=.387) \), and its coefficient (-.747) again indicates an inverse relationship. Examining these three regressions, it appears that, if anything, ideology mattered. None of my models for the Iran vote supported my hypothesis. In fact, evangelicals seem more likely, if anything, to support the deal than non-evangelicals based off these models.

Despite all the recorded work of Christian Right interest groups to mobilize evangelical opposition to the Iran deal, using these regressions, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
relationship between evangelicalism and the vote is due to chance. I am surprised by this, and
the indicated direction of this relationship, especially because Christian Right and Christian
Zionist groups inserted themselves into the Iran deal debate, even years prior to the actual vote,
to make their opposition to it known. In selecting these two votes, I chose “easy” cases, in that I
expected to find support for my hypothesis given how clearly the “pro-Israel” choice was
distinguished, and the amount of conservative Christian activism in relation to the votes. The
failure of these cases to support my hypothesis indicates that it is likely wrong for a wider array
of cases (Gerring, 2007). It appears that, consistent with my findings in previous chapters,
Christian Right ties and evangelicalism do not always lead to pro-Israel activity, no matter if the
year is 1981 or 2015.
Note: probit models are maximum likelihood estimators, which use observations to generate the parameters of a statistical model. The statistical program begins this process by generating iterations. The first iteration (Iteration 0) includes none of the independent variables to create a “null” model. Subsequent iterations include the independent variables, and the model attempts to find the best fit, represented by maximizing the log likelihood. Maximizing this likelihood is the process of estimating the best values for the independent variables’ coefficients. When the difference between successive iterations becomes almost zero, the model is said to have converged, and stops further iterations.

Model 1: 1981 House Vote on AWACS Probit Model

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -194.660
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -144.793
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -141.880
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -141.854
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -141.854

Probit regression

Number of observations = 331
LR chi2(4) = 105.61
Log likelihood = -141.854
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.271

| AWACS Vote                     | Coefficient | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | 95% Confidence Interval |
|-------------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|-------|------------------------|
| Evangelical                  | -0.475      | 0.257      | -1.85 | 0.064 | -0.978                 | 0.028 |
| Party                        | -0.356      | 0.219      | -1.63 | 0.103 | -0.785                 | 0.073 |
| NJ Economic Conservatism     | -0.004      | 0.006      | -0.70 | 0.484 | -0.016                 | 0.008 |
| NJ Foreign Policy Conservatism | 0.005      | 0.007      | 0.08  | 0.937 | -0.013                 | 0.014 |
| NJ Cultural Conservatism     | -0.013      | 0.007      | -1.90 | 0.057 | -0.026                 | 0.000 |
| NSI Rating                   | -0.012      | 0.006      | -1.86 | 0.062 | -0.024                 | 0.001 |
| Constant                     | 3.025       | 0.376      | 8.04  | 0.000 | 2.288                  | 3.763 |
Model 2: 1981 Senate Vote on AWACS Probit Model

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -66.354  
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -29.536  
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -29.343  
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -29.342  
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -29.342

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<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>= 0.558</td>
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</table>

| AWACS Vote                              | Coefficient | Std. Error | z    | P>|z|  | 95% Confidence Interval |
|-----------------------------------------|-------------|------------|------|------|--------------------------|
| Evangelical                             | -0.981      | 0.709      | -1.38| 0.167| -2.371 - 0.409           |
| Party                                   | -0.162      | 0.713      | -0.23| 0.820| -1.559 - 1.234           |
| NJ Economic Conservatism                | -0.036      | 0.018      | -1.97| 0.049| -0.071 - 0.000           |
| NJ Foreign Policy Conservatism          | 0.032       | 0.015      | 2.21 | 0.027| -0.004 - 0.061           |
| NJ Cultural Conservatism                | -0.035      | 0.012      | -2.94| 0.003| -0.058 - 0.012           |
| NSI Rating                              | -0.015      | 0.012      | -1.32| 0.187| -0.038 - 0.007           |
| Constant                                | 3.156       | 0.857      | 3.68 | 0.000| 1.476 - 4.836            |
Model 3: 1981 Congressional Vote on AWACS Probit Model

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -271.560  
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -194.486  
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -191.973  
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -191.968  
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -191.968

Probit regression  
Number of observations = 427  
LR chi2(4) = 159.18  
Log likelihood = -191.968  
Prob > chi2 = 0.000  
Pseudo R2 = 0.293

| AWACS Vote                        | Coefficient | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | 95% Confidence Interval |
|-----------------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|------|--------------------------|
| Evangelical                       | -0.576      | 0.224      | -2.58 | 0.010| -1.015                   | -0.138                   |
| Party                             | -0.512      | 0.198      | -2.59 | 0.010| -0.899                   | -0.125                   |
| NJ Economic Conservatism          | -0.006      | 0.005      | -1.19 | 0.235| -0.016                   | 0.004                    |
| NJ Foreign Policy Conservatism    | 0.008       | 0.006      | 1.40  | 0.163| -0.003                   | 0.019                    |
| NJ Cultural Conservatism          | -0.019      | 0.005      | -3.67 | 0.000| -0.029                   | 0.009                    |
| NSI Rating                        | -0.009      | 0.005      | -1.82 | 0.068| -0.018                   | 0.001                    |
| Constant                          | 2.880       | 0.299      | 9.64  | 0.000| 2.294                    | 3.466                    |
Model 4: 2015 House Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model

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<td>7</td>
<td>-64.229</td>
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</table>

**Probit regression**

- Number of observations = 427
- LR chi2(4) = 436.39
- Log likelihood = -64.229
- Prob > chi2 = 0.000
- Pseudo R2 = 0.773

| Iran Nuclear Deal Vote          | Coefficient | Std. Error | z    | P>|z| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|---------------------------------|-------------|------------|------|------|--------------------------|
| Evangelical                     | -0.829      | 0.870      | -0.95| 0.341| -2.534                   | 0.877                        |
| FRC 2015 rating                 | 0.016       | 0.014      | 1.15 | 0.252| -0.012                   | 0.044                        |
| CFG 2015 rating                 | 0.028       | 0.027      | 1.05 | 0.294| -0.120                   | 0.081                        |
| Peace Action 2016 rating        | -0.011      | 0.005      | -2.24| 0.025| -0.120                   | -0.001                       |
| CSP 2016 rating                 | 0.012       | 0.006      | 1.93 | 0.054| -0.120                   | 0.025                        |
| Constant                        | -0.664      | 0.371      | -1.79| 0.074| -0.456                   | 0.063                        |
Model 5: 2015 Senate Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -68.029
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -17.109
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -13.771
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -12.593
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -12.347
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -12.340
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -12.340
Iteration 7: log likelihood = -12.340
Iteration 8: log likelihood = -12.340

Probit regression

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Log likelihood = -12.340

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<th>Prob &gt; chi2 = 0.000</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2 = 0.819</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Iran Nuclear Deal Vote | Coefficient | Std. Error | z  | P>|z| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|------------------------|-------------|------------|----|------|-------------------------|
| Evangelical            | -2.335      | 29.636     | -0.08 | 0.937 | -60.420 | 55.749 |
| FRC 2015 rating        | 0.063       | 0.049      | 1.27 | 0.202 | -0.034 | 0.159 |
| CFG 2015 rating        | 0.038       | 0.048      | 0.79 | 0.431 | -0.056 | 0.131 |
| Peace Action 2016 rating | -0.004     | 0.009      | -0.49 | 0.624 | -0.023 | 0.014 |
| Constant               | -1.503      | 0.502      | -2.99 | 0.003 | -2.488 | -0.518 |
Model 6: 2015 Congressional Vote on Iran Nuclear Deal Probit Model

Iteration 0: log likelihood = -350.801
Iteration 1: log likelihood = -95.262
Iteration 2: log likelihood = -81.857
Iteration 3: log likelihood = -80.366
Iteration 4: log likelihood = -80.22
Iteration 5: log likelihood = -80.227
Iteration 6: log likelihood = -80.227

Probit regression

Number of observations = 527
LR chi2(4) = 541.15
Log likelihood = -80.227
Prob > chi2 = 0.000
Pseudo R2 = 0.771

| Iran Nuclear Deal Vote              | Coefficient | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|   | 95% Confidence Interval |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|------------|-------|-------|-------------------------|
| Evangelical                         | -0.747      | 0.864      | -0.87 | 0.387 | -2.440 - 0.946          |
| FRC 2015 rating                     | 0.026       | 0.012      | 2.16  | 0.031 | 0.002 - 0.050           |
| CFG 2015 rating                     | 0.021       | 0.020      | 1.07  | 0.283 | -0.018 - 0.061          |
| Peace Action 2016 rating            | -0.007      | 0.004      | -1.67 | 0.094 | -0.015 - 0.001          |
| CSP 2016 rating                     | 0.010       | 0.006      | 1.76  | 0.079 | -0.001 - 0.022          |
| Constant                            | -0.999      | 0.301      | -3.32 | 0.001 | -1.589 - 0.409          |
VII. Conclusion

The evangelical relationship with Israel is a puzzling one, as American evangelicals have become some of Israel’s fiercest supporters, at least superficially. Even since the Christian Right’s early years, its leaders, such as Jerry Falwell, have emphasized that their policy interests extend beyond social conservative priorities, and include Israel (Clendinen, 1980; Falwell, 1981). Today, Christian Right leaders like the Family Research Council’s Tony Perkins and Concerned Women for America’s Penny Nance continue Israel-related activism, and the Christian Zionist movement has sparked the creation of interest groups dedicated solely to promoting Israel, such as CUFI, which claims millions of members. Evangelical presidential candidates like Texas Senator Ted Cruz and Arkansas Governor Mike Huckabee made their unquestioning commitment to Israel’s security clear during their time on the national stage. On the grassroots level, evangelicals have long factored GOP presidential candidates’ stances on Israel into their voting calculus (Sharn, 1996; Horowitz, 2011; Wollner, 2015).

Religion and American foreign policy have been intertwined since the nation’s founding, exhibited in Manifest Destiny, rationales for American imperialism, and Cold War dogma. Evangelicals and the Christian Right have a particularly strong theological impetus to support Israel. Scripture teaches that God promised the land of Canaan to the Jewish people, and that God will reward those who care for Israel (Amstutz, 2014). The existence of Israel also provides the best chance for the realization of the end-times, and for evangelical Christians to receive their celestial reward (McAlister, 2005; Amstutz, 2014). But this investigation indicates that theological impetus does not translate into prioritization of shaping Israel-related language in platforms, bringing up Israel in debates, or siding with Israel in in congressional votes. Amstutz (2014) offers other reasons why evangelicals feel a particularly strong bond with Israel,
including shared beliefs in democracy and human rights, and shared security concerns. But the
results of this investigation call into question the commitment and the effectiveness of
evangelical presidential candidates and the Christian Right organizations that attempt to mobilize
evangelicals when Israel-related policy is on the table.

The Republican Party’s platforms have changed significantly since 1980, especially as
the party has increasingly looked to please social conservatives. In a mixture of candidates
acquiescing to more strident views to keep to the peace, or social conservatives taking matters
into their own hands and writing their views into the platform, Christian Right activists have
celebrated the adoption of their measures on topics as diverse as abortion and immigration
reform. Apparently, these activists’ fervor on issues like abortion has not extended to fighting
for changes in Israel-related language. The proportion of the platform dedicated to Israel has not
consistently increased over the past several decades, and language designating the American-
 Israeli relationship as one of moral import, instead of solely strategic value, has fallen by the
wayside. The Christian Right, like any collection of interest groups, has shown its eagerness to
claim credit for its work. The silence on Israel-related language indicates the Christian Right has
failed to influence this part of the platform.

The men and women who want to run on these platforms also have the opportunity to
prioritize Israel in the national discourse, and push the country towards new policies. However,
presidential candidates who are evangelical or who are seeking the support of conservative
Christians have not uniformly prioritized the issue of Israel in their campaigns. In debates, non-
evangelicals are more likely to bring up Israel of their own accord. Evangelical candidates do
not even appear to be more intense in their rhetorical support for Israel, as one finds examples of
non-evangelicals wanting to move the American embassy to Jerusalem or championing Israel as
one of America’s best allies, too. Granted, non-evangelicals are more likely than evangelicals to criticize Israel, advocate for less American support for Israel, or say nothing about Israel. But candidates looking to curry favor with the Christian Right are also more likely to do these same things than those not seeking the Christian Right’s help. Evangelical activists are interested in hearing about Israel, but even candidates who never deviate from unquestioning support for Israel do not always address this issue in their outreach to such activists. This oversight likely signals that the candidates themselves are unaware of the potency of Israel among this community, or they believe that other issues are more important to evangelical listeners.

In actual policy-making, this research does not indicate that evangelicals are more likely to support pro-Israel legislation. Using two contentious congressional votes, each of which drew significant attention for how the policies would allegedly impact Israel, probit regression models do not indicate that evangelical members of Congress are more likely to vote for the pro-Israel position. In the 1981 vote on selling AWACS to Saudi Arabia, the independent variable measuring a member’s evangelical status was not consistently statistically significant, and even when it was, it indicated that evangelical members of Congress were actually more likely to take the anti-Israel position on the issue. Despite the interest of the budding Christian Right in opposing the sale, members of Congress with close ties to the Moral Majority still felt safe supporting the sale; the Reagan administration received far more credit than Jerry Falwell in winning votes. In the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal, the variable measuring evangelicalism was never statistically significant, and its coefficient indicated that if anything, evangelical members of Congress were again more likely to take the anti-Israel position. Ideology appears to trump religious or theological motives when it comes time to vote.
Among political scientists, the literature on interest group attempts to affect American foreign policy remains smaller than the literature on attempts to affect domestic policy. Past studies indicate that when interest groups do try to affect foreign policy decisions that they use much of the same strategies as interest groups focused on domestic policy. Direct and indirect lobbying are both tools used by the Christian Right in their attempts to affect policy related to Israel. In 1981, Jerry Falwell reportedly had a list of senators provided to him for him to call; in 2013, Tony Perkins was already leading members of Congress on trips to Israel as part of his interest in opposing the Iran deal. Grassroots mobilization occurred as well, with the 2015 Iran deal sparking the Christian Right to host rallies and urge their members to contact members of Congress. But perhaps the literature is also smaller because groups like the Christian Right that have interests in domestic and foreign policy choose to focus more on the former. Even if an interest group’s base is interested in different policy areas, this does not mean the interest group has the resources or the desire to influence every area. The Christian Right has largely left Israel-related language in GOP platforms to others, earning attention instead for language detailing strident opposition to abortion and gay rights. Despite demonstrated interest in courting conservative Christians, plenty of GOP presidential candidates do not consistently bring up Israel in their outreach to this community, and desire for Christian Right support does not always keep candidates from criticizing Israel or American policy towards it. And evangelicals are not statistically significantly more likely to take pro-Israel positions in congressional votes than non-evangelicals. Unless the movement re-prioritizes (which is possible as will be noted later), Christian Right activism may not provide much new material on how interest groups affect American foreign policy.
My approach in this project did not investigate all possible paths through which evangelicalism or Christian Right activism could impact Israel’s position in America’s politics. I examined only GOP presidential primary contests. One could potentially find a wealth of new information in a study of electoral races for the House and Senate, and examine candidates’ stances on Israel and how that reflected their evangelicalism or interest in the Christian Right. Interviews with Christian Right and evangelical activists could help determine whether or not interest in Israel is really just lip-service among many of these individuals, and help explain why affecting Israel-related language and policy seems to take a backseat to issues like abortion. Additionally, more in-depth interviews with evangelical members of Congress (and evangelical staffers) and with evangelical civil servants handling Israel-related policy (such as State or Defense Department employees) could also provide new information on how faith and Christian Right activism affects policymakers’ decisions on Israel. Future studies might also further and better elucidate the complexity of evangelical support for Israel by differentiating among evangelicals (in regards to both their theology and their political ideology) and exploring differing approaches to Israel within these subgroups.

Evangelical interest in Israel will not disappear, and with the growing influence of groups like Christians United for Israel (for example, the 2016 GOP platform’s Israel language was influenced by Christian Zionists), potential does exist for evangelical and Christian Right activism on Israel-related policy to shed more understanding of how interest groups and religion affect American foreign policy, especially in regards to a country that remains one of America’s most significant strategic and symbolic allies.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Republican Primary Debates

Transcripts of all evaluated debates from the 2000 campaign season on can be found through the University of California, Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/debates.php

Referenced transcripts or video for debates from earlier campaign seasons can be found at the following individual locations.

January 5, 1980 debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygGL9DGeSGM&t=3157s
April 23, 1980 debate: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YfHN5QKq9hQ

Appendix 2: Party Platforms

Full text of all discussed Republican Party platforms can be found through the University of California, Santa Barbara’s American Presidency Project: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/platforms.php

Appendix 3: Congressional Votes


Record of 2015 Iran Deal Senate vote (Senate Amendment 2640 on House Joint Resolution 61): https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=114&session=1&vote=00264

**Appendix 4**: sources of religious beliefs of members of Congress


**Appendix 5**: additional sources for religious beliefs of members of Congress identifying as only Protestant or Christian for the 2015 vote on the Iran nuclear deal


Senator Bill Cassidy: https://www.cassidy.senate.gov/about/about-bill

http://thechapelbr.com/beliefs/

Congressman Bob Dold:

Congressman Richard Hudson https://hudson.house.gov/biography/#.WGQZWlzy8w


Congressman Jim Jordan:


Congresswoman Martha McSally:

Congressman Mark Meadows: http://meadowsforcongress.com/mark/

http://www.cbchurch.org/about-cbc/affiliation--beliefs/

Congressman Robert Pittenger: http://www.patriotclassic.com/about2-c1jg7

Congressman Adrian Smith: http://www.omaha.com/news/rep-adrian-smith-quietly-looks-out-for-his-district/article_2d1bda5e-76f4-574b-ad3e-69e2a60a4bc7.html


Congresswoman Jackie Walorski: http://media.cq.com/members/31142?rc=1

Congressman Roger Williams: https://books.google.com/books?id=haUIULhY0EoC&pg=PA260&lpg=PA260&dq=roger+williams+university+christian+church&source=bl&ots=g2OwHZEZAg&sig=rl_Gjh74zeAJNGZt9gTSrvLsTJQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwidstrKgJjRAhVFYyYKHWYeCdoQ6AEINTAE#v=onepage&q=roger%20williams%20university%20christian%20church&f=false

Appendix 6: interest group rating sources

1982 National Journal ratings:

1982 American Security Council National Security Index rating:

2015 Club for Growth ratings
House Scorecard:

Senate Scorecard:

2015 Family Research Council Action ratings:

2016 Peace Action ratings:
2016 Center for Security Policy ratings:

Works Cited


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