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Who Does The Dying?

‘Martial Races’ and War Time Unit Deployment in the Indian Army

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the Government Department from The College of William and Mary

by

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Who Does The Dying?

‘Martial Races’ and War Time Unit Deployment in the Indian Army

Ammon Frederick Harteis
Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori
Abstract

During the Second World War, the Indian Army held back units and soldiers that were not from the so-called “martial races” from frontline combat service. The British “martial races” theory held that only a small number of communities in India were fit for military service and people from all “non-martial” communities should be excluded from the Army. Has the Indian Army, after gaining independence from British leadership, contended the Second World War practice of deploying “martial” units in combat while assigning “non-martial” units to non-combat roles? It has been conclusively demonstrated that “martial race” groups have contended to be overrepresented in the post-colonial Indian Army. However, there has been little study into how the “martial races” theory has continued to affect the Indian Army outside the matter of the recruitment of soldiers. The Indian Army, while being forced by political leadership to open up recruitment to “non-martial” communities, contended the Second World War practice of tending to select units composed of “martial” soldier to see action while tending to held back units composed of “non-martial” soldiers. Using a new data set I build, this study measures the effect of martial identity on the likelihood an infantry company in the Indian Army will be deployed into combat during a war. During each war sampled, the Kashmir War 1947-8, the Sino-Indian War 1962, the India-Pakistan War 1965, and the India-Pakistan War 1971, “martial” infantry companies were more likely to see combat action then “non-martial” units. However, this effect is heterogeneous across the wars, with greater effect seen in the Sino-Indian War 1962 and India-Pakistan War 1971. This thesis contributes to the literature by advancing a new theoretical understanding of the political consequences of social representation in combat fatalities. Groups that fight for the country can demonstrate a “blood sacrifice” for the nation. A group’s political leadership can use the memory of that “blood sacrifice” to make demands from the political system. However, there are barriers to a group’s ability to make demands from the political system that may not be overcome by the memory of “blood sacrifice”.
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

In 1857, a near revolution would rock British India. Indian soldiers of the 11th and 20th Bengal Native Infantry regiments and 3rd Light Cavalry mutinied and took control of Delhi. 1 The rebels proclaimed from the city that the Bahadur Shah Zafar, the Mughal emperor, to be the leader of the revolt. 2 The uprising spread out of Delhi through all of the northern Gangetic plain of India and into central India and included armed uprisings of civilians as well as soldiers. 3 It took the British 18 months to put down the rebellion. 4 By the end of the rebellion, 6,000 of the 40,000 European in India were killed and approximately 800,000 Indians died either from combat or the resulting famines and epidemics in the wake of the uprising. 5 The uprising transformed British rule in South Asia. Control of India was taken over by the British Crown, marking the end of the British East Indian Company’s century long sovereignty. It also prompted a major reorganization of the British Indian Army.

The Army leadership decided to shift recruitment away from upper-caste communities in Bengal and the Gangetic plain toward Punjab and northern India. The British emphasized that they were rebuilding the army to increase its capacity and to do so they recruited from “martial races” –those conceived as having members who exuded bravery and military aptitude. Field Marshal Frederick Roberts expressed his view about how the British needed to respond to the uprising, “We must recognize the necessity for only employ on service, across the North-West frontier, troops of the hardest and most warlike races…” 6 But this social engineering was as

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
much about revolution-proofing. Deeply scarred by the 1857 uprising, the British sought to build a loyal army and took signals on loyalty based on the social background of mutineers during the uprising. The British labelled groups were loyal during the uprising and lived closed to the Afghan-Russian frontier as the ‘martial races’. The British were concerned that Russian forces would invade India through Afghanistan. It was more cost effective to recruit soldiers to guard the border from areas near the Afghan border than further east or south in India because of shorter lines of communication. Groups that provided stiff resistance against British colonization where likely excluded from the ‘martial races’. British officials believed that people that live in the cooler hills of northern India were healthier than those that lived in the plains.

This reorganization of the Indian military would prove a critical juncture. Wilkinson shows that, while subsequently the post-colonial Indian Army recruits from all parts of India, traditional ‘martial races’ groups are still overrepresented in the uniformed personnel. I argue that it also shaped military deployment for the next 125 years. Companies from the “martial races” were more likely to be deployed on the frontline during the post-independence wars.

Despite an official post-Independence policy of recruitment open to all, many ‘die-hard’ senior officers remained believers in the ‘tribal’ izzat of the martial races and the Indian Army continued to enlist men from the north and northwest in numbers disproportionate to their respective communities’ share of the

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7 Rand and Wagner, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’,” 237-238.
Barua, “Inventing Race.,” 111.
Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 7.
9 Barua, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’,” 108.
10 Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 166.
national population. The immediate post-Independence conflict in [Jammu and Kashmir] followed by years of Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian tension further inhibited successive administrations from enforcing ‘radical changes in the organizations of the fighting arms’. Thus, while most ‘tail’ units and all post-independence raising such as the Parachute Regiment have been constituted on an all-India bases, the majority of the army’s ‘teeth’ arms remain the preserve of the martial races.\textsuperscript{11}

This pattern is due to Indian Army officers internalizing the British colonial mythology of the “martial races” and their importance to the effectiveness of India’s military readiness. This is best articulated by Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, the Indian Chief of the Army Staff during the 1971 India-Pakistan war, who wrote in the forward of a study of the 1965 India-Pakistan War:

\begin{quote}
…I have heard rumours for the proposed re-organization of the Indian Army into mixed units on the basis of State population, under the garb of recruitment imbalances. Should this happen, God forbid, it would transform the battlefield scene completely…If this imprudent proposed political decision is accepted by sycophantic generals, I forecast doom and calamity…In the name of God, desist from such folly. Neither God nor future generations will forgive the perpetrators of such misplaced nationalism which will
\end{quote}

lead to the destabilization of the famous Indian Army. May perdition fall on the heads of perpetrators of such a crime—A CRIME it will be – A CRIME to the traditions of these famous Regiments, a CRIME to the nation.\textsuperscript{12}

Field Marshal Manekshaw’s attitude towards the idea of changing the composition of the Indian Army shows that Indian officers during the first few decades after Independence had internalized the need for continuing to give the “martial races” special treatment. It could be that Indian officers think that the “martial races” are better soldiers than “non-martial” groups in India; or that Indian officers believe that remaking the Indian Army would be disruptive and would dangerously weaken the force. Either way, an informal survey conducted by the Indian think tank The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in 2010 showed that 22 of the 38 active or retired Indian Army officers interviewed expressed the belief that the Indian Army should not work to change the compositional imbalance in the Indian Army.\textsuperscript{13}

To test this argument, I have collected the combat records of each infantry company in the Indian Army. The Indian Army is made up of regiments. Each regiment is responsible for recruiting and training its own non-officer personnel. Each regiment has its own history, dress uniform, and esprit de corps. Each regiment is composed of a number of battalions, ranging between two and over twenty. Battalions are composed of companies, usually four companies in a battalion. Companies are either ‘All-India’ companies or are composed of specific groups. Some battalions are composed of specific ‘martial races’ group. Some battalions are composed of specific non-‘martial races’ group. Equipped with this information and matching it with a

\textsuperscript{12} Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 58-59.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid, 63.
company’s service record, I am able to measure if some groups in Indian society have seen more combat deployments since independence than others.

I find that infantry companies that were composed of “martial” groups saw higher levels of combat deployments and were more likely to see a combat deployment between 1947 and 1971 than companies that did not have a “martial” composition. In other word, the reorganization of the Indian Army after 1857 would shape the deployment of Indian Army units for more than a century later. I also find interesting inter-war heterogeneity. It is most noticeable in the Sino-Indian 1962 War and the India-Pakistan War 1971. Martialness does not seem to be an important factor in the unit deployments in the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965. This pattern may be because of different geographic directions of the fronts. The Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965 were both fought on only the north and western borders of India, while the Sino-Indian War 1962 and the India-Pakistan War 1971 had significant theaters of action along the eastern borders of India.

This is the first thesis to test the impact of martialness on “blood sacrifice” in post-independence. To date, no one has tested this because we lack compiled data on the service records of Army companies in post-Independence India. By carefully coding the sources listed in Appendix D, I built from scratch a data set of the combat history of every infantry company, approximately 1,800 companies, in the Indian Army between 1947 and 1971. Every infantry company was coded for being composed of either “martial” groups or “non-marital” groups. Then, every infantry company was coded for either seeing combat or not seeing combat during the Kashmir War 1947-48, the Sino-Indian War 1962, the 1965 India-Pakistan War, and the 1971 India-Pakistan War.
The continuation of a martial informed pattern of unit deployment in the Indian Army after Independence brings in the question the effect of regime change on state institutions run by the government. This thesis demonstrates that the change in the political leadership of India from British appointed Viceroys to elected Indian politicians and the change in Indian Army leadership from British officers to Indian officers did not lead to the total cession of British policies and practices in the Indian Army. The wider implication here is that regime change is overrated. Changes in the political leadership of a government and the military leadership of an army do not in fact guarantee changes in policy. Resilient institutional memory and continued cultural norms preserve the ghost of the previous regime. Further study should be undertaken to see if this continuity in military policy is seen across other countries that has witnessed regime changes. The organization, practice, and traditions of national military are places to study regime change resilience as militaries have strong internal identities and senses of history, tend to be large powerful political actors, and oftentimes are not replaced by a regime change.14 Was the slice of French society that fought, and froze, and died in Russia in 1812 the same or different slice of French society that fought, and baked, and died in Mali in 2012? How was the Imperial German Army that marched to war in 1914 similar to the Bundeswehr deployed in Afghanistan in 2014? How has the composition of the Red Army in 1917 effected composition of the Russian “volunteers” in eastern Ukraine in 2017? This thesis casts doubt on the ability of political actors to change the institutions they inherit from the previous regime, questioning the value of revolution itself.

14 The exception to the last point is regime change by civil war where the old military is destroyed and replaced by the rebel military, like during the Russian Revolution/Civil War 1917-1923 and the China Revolutions 1911-1949, or in cases where a regime change involves bring in former rebel forces into the national military like the merger of the South African Defense Force, the national military of the Apartheid government of South Africa, and uMkhonto we Sizwe, the armed wing of the African National Congress, into the South African National Defense Force in 1994.
Service in a national military is important because it allows members of a group to demonstrate their loyalty to the government and the country. The opportunity to demonstrate loyalty is particularly important for groups that are marginalized in society. If members of a group fight and die, make a blood sacrifice for the country, they can make a case to the political process that they deserve to have their grievances rectified. However, if a government or military leadership can control who serves in the military, political and military leaders can control which groups are able to make blood sacrifice claims to the political process. If marginalized groups are excluded from military service they do not get the material benefits often associated with military service of a reliable paycheck, medical and educational services, housing allowances, retirement schemes, and widow’s pensions. If marginalized groups are excluded from combat deployments by the military leadership, then the political leaders of that group cannot use memory of their sacrifices as a political tool demonstrating their rights as citizens of the country.

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: This thesis begins with a summary of the factors other scholars have identified as important to determining which individuals are more likely to die in combat operations in modern militaries. Next, is a brief history of the Indian Army during the British colonial rule. Then is a review of various theories that seek to explain the creation of the “martial races” in India. Next is a section that demonstrates the continued relevance of the “martial races” in post-colonial Indian military thinking. Then, this study’s data collection and methods are discussed followed by the findings of the study indicating that infantry units composed by the “martial races” were more likely in some cases to see combat then units composed of “non-martial races” between 1947 and 1971. Finally, the thesis is concluded with a section looking at the role of military service in citizenship formation and how the memory of combat deaths can be used in domestic politics.
Who Usually Does the Dying: Theories of Combat Deployment

This section reviews existing scholarship on combat service in the modern age. A number of factors may make some segments of the population more likely to join the military and more likely to serve on the frontlines. Social factors, like class and race and ethnicity, individual factors, like family background, education, and biochemical composition, and the institutional role of the draft all affect the likelihood of someone joining the military and ending up in combat. One prevailing hypothesis is that social class structures select who serves. People from lower socio-economic background have less access to the social capital that would allow them to avoid military service and combat deployments. But there is some evidence that the class effect is not significant in all cases. Another important factor in determining the likelihood that someone will die in a combat role in the military is their ethnic or racial identity.

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People from marginalized racial or ethnic groups may have less access to the wealth and power needed to protect themselves from being drafted or be more likely to join the military for economic reasons. They may be more vulnerable to be forced into military service. However, governments may not want to provide people from marginalized groups with weapons and military training and would choose to exclude these groups from the military. Much like social class, there is evidence to suggest that race and the ethnic identity is not a significantly determining factor in all classes.\(^{19}\)

Individual factors may also shape the likelihood one sees combat and serves on the frontlines. For example, there is evidence to suggest that individuals who grow up in an area with a greater military presence and closer proximity to a military base are more likely to join the military.\(^{20}\) Similarly, social ties may influence enlistment. Individuals with family and community connections to the military are more likely to join the military.\(^{21}\) Education and cognitive abilities also seem to matter. Young people and those with low cognitive capabilities (e.g. as measured by lower IQs) are more likely to be assigned combat roles.\(^{22}\) Young people may be perceived as immature and not capable of handling more complex jobs in the military. Individuals with low cognitive capabilities are screened out of more complex non-combat assignment (such as military lawyers, surgeons, intelligence analysts, and aircraft mechanics) and assigned to infantry service. Similarly, in some cases, higher education reduces the likelihood of an individual joining the military as they are more likely to find civilian


\(^{20}\) Kleykamp, “College, jobs, or the military? Enlistment during a time of war”.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Gimbel and Booth, “Who fought in Vietnam?”. 
employment. Additionally, individuals with higher levels of testosterone and/or lower levels of cortisol in their bodies were more likely to end up in combat arms of the military. Finally, individuals with a history of misbehaving and receiving punishment from authorities in school and during basic training in the military are more likely into be assigned to the combat arms of the military.

The final important variable in determining the likelihood that someone will serve in the military and die in combat is whether or not the country has a draft. Draftees are in many cases more likely to end up in combat roles than individuals who enlisted in the military. Militaries do not want to bear the costs of training someone to perform a difficult task, such as conducting maintenance on a jet fighter, if that individual is going to leave the military when their one or two year tour of duty ends. The higher turnover rate of the draftees makes it more costly to train them and thus militaries are more likely to assign draftees to roles, like the infantry, that require less training. Additionally, militaries want to encourage people to enlist in the military, not be drafted in. Individuals who enlist in the military are making a much longer commitment to the armed services as a career and lifestyle, not just an act of forced labor. Therefore, militaries encourage people to enlist in the military by implicitly promising individuals that enlist that they will not be assigned to more risky roles in the military. During the American War in Vietnam (1964-1973), men with riskier draft lottery numbers volunteered more for military service than

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23 Teachman, Call, Segal, “Family, Work, and School Influences on the Decision to Enter the Military”.
24 Gimbel and Booth, “Who fought in Vietnam?”.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
men with safer lottery numbers.\textsuperscript{27} During that war, draftees died at disproportionately higher rates when compared to individuals that enlisted in the military.\textsuperscript{28}

In contrast to these existing theories that emphasize the importance of social class, individual factors and traits (such as cognitive capabilities, social ties, heritable testosterone levels) and institutional factors (such as the draft), I emphasize the importance of colonial legacies and how they shape military recruitment and deployment. As I describe in the next section, there is a robust historical scholarship on this subject but most stop at explaining how colonial legacies shape recruitment but don’t explore its legacy for deployment.

Another critical difference between “martial race” identity and the above identities and factors is that the “martial race theory” was created by the military to affect who enlists. In contrast, other social structures, such as race, social class, and ethnic divisions, were not created for the purpose of military recruitment. They may have important implications for patterns of enlistment but these structure were created by other forces and imposed on militaries. By looking at the role “martial races” play in the recruitment and deployment policies of the Indian Army, we can learn how militaries create social constructs and how in turn they shape military decision-making.

In exploring this striking phenomenon, I focus on the case of India and not Pakistan, even though the Pakistani Army has its own history of “martial races”, because in Pakistan martial identity covaries with ethnic identity (especially among Punjabis and therefore functions as a describer on an ethnic identity. In India the “martial races” is a cross-cutting cleavage—it cuts

\begin{itemize}
\item 27 Angrist, “The draft lottery and voluntary enlistment in the Vietnam era”.
\end{itemize}
across a number of different ethnic groups. In the next section, I describe the origins of the social construction but first give a brief history of the formation of the Indian Army.

**Historical Development of the Indian Army**

**Brief History of the Indian Army: 1600-1971**

The British colonial project began in India in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth granted a charter to the “Governor and Company of the Merchants of London trading into the East Indies”.\(^{29}\) The East India Company’s territorial claim in India were in three parts, or Presidencies: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. Each Presidency was responsible for its own defense and had its own armed force.\(^{30}\) In 1615, King James I sent Sir Thomas Roe as an ambassador to meet with Emperor Jahangir in Agra where Roe received a legal document acknowledging the English presence in Surat, in the Bombay Presidency, and allowing English merchants the right to bear arms.\(^{31}\) In 1661, a royal charter allowed the East India Company to recruit local soldiers at Fort William in Calcutta, Bengal. Also during that year, 400 English soldiers were sent to Bombay to protect the city. Later, in 1668, these soldiers were organized into first European regiment in India, the Bombay Fusiliers.\(^{32}\) The following year, the East India Company started recruiting local soldiers at Fort Saint George in Madras.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{31}\) Barua, *The State at War in South Asia*, 67, 70.

\(^{32}\) Ibid, 70.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
In the 1740s and 1750s, The British East India Company fought to remove other European countries from India. In 1748, after a conflict with France, the British East India Company undertook a major reform effort, including establishing a European regiment in

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Madras and recruited an additional 2,000 local soldiers. As part of this reform process, the British adopted the French practice recruiting locals as sepoys and training them training them in the European line infantry tactics.\textsuperscript{35} In Surat, the Company raised an additional 2,000 soldiers, mostly Arabs and Turks. The Bengal Presidency raised five to seven companies. Each Presidency also raised an artillery company. In 1756, the Seven Years’ War broke out, pitting Britain against France again. The French defeat in India left Britain the sole European military power in India. After the end of the conflict, Gen. Robert Clive reorganized the Bengal Army.\textsuperscript{36} Clive established a regiment of Bengal locals commanded by European officers. This policy, local soldiers with European officers, remained the rule in the Indian Army until after the First World War.\textsuperscript{37} By the end of 1761, the Bengal Army had 1,200 European soldiers and 8,500 local sepoy soldiers.\textsuperscript{38} The Madras Army had two European battalions, six sepoy battalions, and two artillery companies supported by a regiment of British regulars.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{35} Sepoy is a widely used term to refer to Indian foot soldiers that served in the armies of the British East India Company and the British Indian Army.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 70.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 71.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 70.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
In 1763, Clive’s reforms paid off when Mir Kasim, the nawab of Bengal, led a campaign against the British.\textsuperscript{41} At the end of the conflict, the British East India Company abolished the

\textsuperscript{40} Charles Colbeck, \textit{The Public Schools Historical Atlas} (New York: Longman Green and Co., 1905).

\textsuperscript{41} Barua, \textit{The State at War in South Asia}, 71.
position of nawab of Bengal and took direct control of the territory, which became a base from which British influence grew through northern India. During this conflict, British commanders deployed their forces so that European units were in the center of the line of battle with sepoy units on both flanks. British commanders learned to trust the battle worthiness of sepoy forces. Maj. Hector Munro declared in the House of Commons that, “Sepoys properly disciplined and led on with the Europeans are good soldiers and will do anything”.

In the 1760s, the recruitment practices of the three Presidencies began to diverge. Madras and Bombay tended to recruit local soldiers from geographic and communally diverse backgrounds. The army of the Bengal Presidency was different. The Bengal Presidency recruited soldiers almost exclusively from high-caste groups in the Awadh (or Oudh) region. At the same time, the Bengal army became the dominant force of the three Presidency’s armies. By 1800, this recruit pattern was causing problems. High-caste soldiers would refuse to take orders from a comparably lower-caste non-commissioned officer, insisted on food being prepared to meet their religious taboos, and critically during 1838 war in Afghanistan refused to cross the Indus River and leave “Hindustan”. Therefore, after the First and Second Anglo-Sikh Wars of the 1840s, the Bengal army began recruiting from the Punjab region. Soldiers from the defeated Punjabi forces were recruited into the Punjab Irregular Force and the Punjab Frontier Force, with some recruitment allowed within the Bengal regiments stationed in Punjab. The Bengal army resisted the creation of Sikh and Punjabi regiments because the belief of some British officers

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42 Ibid, 72-73.
43 Ibid. 75.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid, 7, 8.
48 Ibid.
that the Punjab needed to be demilitarized, dislike by sepoys of Punjabis, and professional jealousy.\textsuperscript{49}

Then in 1857, there was an uprising in the ranks of the Bengal army. During the 1857, uprising many of the communities, in particular upper-caste Brahmins, from Bengal and United

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig3.png}
\caption{Map of Indian in 1907\textsuperscript{50}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
Province rose up against the British. Eastern India in the 1850s was no longer a center of conflict and the Bengal soldiers were living in geographic regions that were closer to the physical center of power in Calcutta. Because of their lack of threats to deal with and their proximity to political power, the soldiers in the Bengal Army were more politically aware than other groups farther from Calcutta. Therefore, they organized and rose up while other groups that lived far away from Bengal did not. Other groups, mostly from northern India, stayed loyal to the British and helped put down the uprising. These loyal groups become classified as the “martial races”. Soldiers from Punjab, some 50,000 men, remained loyal to the British and were critical in putting down the uprising. In response to the uprising, the British crown and government took over the colonial project in India from the British East India Company. The British government began reorganizing the Bengal army. The army reduced the recruitment of Hindustani Brahmans and integrated the Punjabi irregular forces into the regular army.

In the 1870s, the British became increasingly concerned about the potential threat from Russia to their Indian holdings. During the 1860s and 1870s, Russia had taken control of much of central Asia and was now bordering Afghanistan. To respond to this new threat, the British shifted military operation to the northern and north-western parts of India. The 1879 Eden Commission recommended that the three separate Presidency armies be brought under a single Commander-in-Chief, further recruitment of troops from the Punjab region, and the scaling down

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52 Cohen, The Indian Army, 33-35.
53 Barua, “Inventing Race: The British and India’s Martial Races,” 111.
54 Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 7.
55 This narrative of the causes of the creation of the “Martial races theory” was supported by the Peel Commission’s investigation into the causes of the 1857 uprising.
56 Marston, The Indian Army and the End of the Raj, 9.
57 Ibid, 9-10.
of the Madras Army. While some British officers resisted the change, Field Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar, appointed as Commander-in-Chief in 1885, quickly moved to put these plans in action. Roberts was firm believer in the need to recruit soldiers from northern India. It is under Roberts’s tenor of Commander-in-Chief that the “martial races” theory became the firm policy of British officers in India. Roberts stated that, “I have no hesitation myself in stating that except Gurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, the pick of Punjabi Muhammadsans [Muslims], Hindustanis of the Jat and Ranghur castes… [and] certain classes of Pathans [Pashtuns], there are no Native soldiers in our service whom we could venture with safety to place in the field against the Russians.” Many groups, such as Bengalis and groups from south India, were deemed ‘non-martial’ and were excluded from service in the army. Additionally, the British did not want to recruit soldiers from urban areas because of the belief that educated, cosmopolitan, city-dwellers were more politically active than rural peasants and were too soft to be soldiers. By 1893, 44 percent of the Indian Army were drawing recruits from the “martial races”. Regiments that were organically recruiting from the “non-martial” communities were increasingly shifting their recruitment efforts to the recruited from “martial” communities in Punjab, the North-West Frontier region, and Rajputana. By 1914, there were 552 infantry companies in the Indian Army of which 211 were composed of men from the Punjab, 121 were composed of men from the North-West Frontier region, 80 companies were composed of Nepalese Gurkhas, and the

56 Ibid, 10.
57 Ibid.

Class in the context of the Indian military is often used to mean community. To quote from the Report of the Willcox committee (1945), “The term ‘class’ as used technically in Indian Army since the third quarter of the [19th] century, means a type of Indian recognized as distinct from others by the Army authorities for purposes of recruitment and organization. The basis of the distinction may be difference of race, language, religion, caste, domicile or any two or more of these.” This definition of class not the same as the Marxist definition of class being a social-economic group.
58 Ibid, 12.
59 Ibid.
remaining 140 coming from other regions.\textsuperscript{60} That year, 75 percent of the Indian Army was recruited from the martial races.\textsuperscript{61}

In 1903, the Indian Army underwent major structural reforms. Up into this this point the British government had preserved the British East India Company basic structure of three Presidency armies in India, with the Punjab essentially being treated as a separate entity. However, in 1903 the Command-in-Chief of the Indian Army Lord Kitchener abolished the old, tripartite structure and created a single, unified, centralized Indian Army. All of the infantry battalions and cavalry regiment were renumbered in sequential order and the remaining Punjabi irregular forces were integrated into the regular army.\textsuperscript{62}

The outbreak of the First World War brought India, along with the rest of the British Empire, into armed conflict with the Central Powers. During 1914 the old system of recruitment continued. In 1915, the system broke down under the manpower requirements of the war and twenty-two hitherto “non-martial” classes were added to the recruitment pool.\textsuperscript{63} In 1917, a new system of territorial recruitment was instated with recruitment centers opening in regions of India where no recruitment had ever happened before. Despite these efforts to expand the recruitment pool of the India Army by the end of the First World War, still 40 percent of the soldiers in the combat arms of the Indian Army were from Punjab.\textsuperscript{64} Combined Punjab and the United Province provided three fourths of the all Indian Army recruits during the First World War.\textsuperscript{65}

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, 13.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, 14.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid, 15.
The Indian Army in the 1920s and 1930s had three tasks: internal security, external defense, and imperial garrisoning. The Indian Army was used to put down rebellions in Burma, responded to unrest in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province, control mass nationalist activist, and reign in communal violence. It was believed by British leaders that the Soviet Union was a grave threat to India. The Indian Army during this time period trained to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan and Iran if a war was to break out between the two powers. The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 made possibility of a war between Britain and the Soviet Union seem increasingly likely. Finally, Indian soldiers were garrisoned throughout the British Empire in far flung locales like Egypt, the British Mandates of Iraq and Palestine, the Persian Gulf, Aden, Cyprus, Malaya, and China.

The outbreak of the Second World War led to the Indian Army growing from a force of 120,000 soldiers to a force of 2,000,000 soldiers by the end of the war. Wartime manpower requirement forced changes to the communal composition of the Indian Army. There were nearly no Bengalis in the Indian Army before the war, but Bengalis were 4 percent of the wartime Army. Before the outbreak of hostilities, only 3 percent of the Army was from southern India. During the war, southern India provided 18 percent of the soldiers in Indian Army. The share of Indian soldiers from the overrepresented Muslim community fell from 35 percent to 25 percent.

66 Srinath Raghavan, *India’s War: The Making of Modern South Asia 1939-1945* (Gurgaon: Penguin Books India, 2016), 33. This paragraph and the following two were adopted from a paper I wrote in the Spring of 2018. The two versions are similar in that they share central ideas, statistics, and sources. These two paragraphs are not copied from the earlier paper.
67 Raghavan, *India’s War*, 33.
68 Raghavan, *India’s War*, 34.
69 Ibid.
percent and Sikh representation fell from 18 percent to 4.6 percent. However, the “martial race” communities were still overrepresented in the Indian Army. In the Second World War, 32 percent of the total recruitable male population of Punjab served and 53 percent of the recruitable male population of North West Frontier Province while only 12 percent of the recruitable male population of southern India served. Hindus mobilized 12 percent of the total recruitable Hindu male population into the Army, while Muslims mobilized 21 percent of the total recruitable Muslim male population into the Army. Army units composed of soldiers from “martial” groups were more likely to be deployed in combat than units composed of soldiers from “non-martial” groups. “Non-martial” units were often assigned to support, logistics, and administrative roles. Only 5 percent of the infantry of the Indian Army came from “non-martial” groups.

Independence brought a more representative Indian Army. The territorially and regimental rearrangements of Partition decrease the overrepresentation of Muslim Punjabis and the underrepresentation of Bengalis in the Indian Army. Members of Parliament, seeking to provide jobs for their voting base, from “non-martial” regions and communities, pushed the Army to open up to the whole country. But the Army has worked to protect its British inherited recruitment patterns. The Army’s leadership felt, as seen in Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw’s

72 Ibid.
73 Raghavan, India’s War, 74.
Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 44 and 70-71.
74 Raghavan, India’s War, 75.
Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 70-71.
Cohen, The Indian Army, 49.
Cohen argues that occupation and class of communities are more important determinants of their perceived “martial” qualities than religion. He notes that “yeoman peasants” and moderately wealthy farmers were favorite socio-economic groups for the British to recruit soldiers from.
75 Raghavan, India’s War, 76.
Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 76.
76 This paragraph was adopted from a paper I wrote in the Spring of 2018. The two version are similar in that they share central ideas, statistics, and sources. These two paragraphs are not copied from the earlier paper.
77 Wilkinson, Army And Nation, 89-92.
78 Ibid, 96.
colorful quotation earlier in this thesis, civilian political interference in the operation of the Army would leave India dangerously open to attack.\textsuperscript{79} Then India underperformed in its war with China in 1962. To respond the Indian government increased the size of the Army from 458,000 soldiers to 825,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{80} Most of the growth came from raising new “martial” units.\textsuperscript{81} It was this newly reinforced Indian Army that fought against Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.

\textit{Creation of the Martial Classes}

Rand and Wagner argue that the groups included in the “martial races” were not just loyal to the British during the 1857 uprising, but living in areas that are geographically closer to the new threats to British rule in India, namely the North Western frontier with Afghanistan and Russia.\textsuperscript{82} The inclusion of groups in the “martial race” category was more geographical than racial.\textsuperscript{83} They also maintain that “martial races” has been ascribed a too central role in analysis of colonial recruitment.\textsuperscript{84} Ray argues that martial races constructed as a product of colonial discourse.\textsuperscript{85} Ray challenges two arguments that rival his constructivist narrative of the creation of the “martial races”. The first argument restates the view of colonial historiographers that the “martial races” composed of the pre-colonial military power and not a product of colonial discourse. The second argument is that colonial recruitment practices were idiosyncratic. The “martial race” was a constructed identity in some cases, but not others.\textsuperscript{86} Ray finds that ethnic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[79] Ibid, 112.
\item[80] Ibid, 129.
\item[81] Ibid, 133.
\item[82] Rand and Wagner, “Recruiting the ‘martial races’,” 233-4.
\item[83] Cohen, \textit{The Indian Army}, 46.
\item[85] Ibid, 561.
\end{footnotes}
groups that had developed state-like structures in the precolonial period were significantly underrepresented in colonial security forces compared to ethnic groups that were stateless in the precolonial period. Additionally, ethnic groups that provided stiff resistance against attempts by the colonial state to extend its power were significantly underrepresented compared to ethnic groups that offered weak resistance or simply acquiesced to colonial domination.

Barua argues that climate and biological science were key factors in creating “martial races”. The British viewed the tropical climate of Indian plains and lowlands as unhealthy. Consequently, the British believed that groups that live in hills and mountains were healthier and better fit to be soldiers.87 The British used physical measurements or anthropometry to determine whether an individual belonged to a “healthy”, “martial race”. Biological sciences, in particular Darwinian eugenics, were key to Victorian racism. Caste, and other groups, were thought to be biological rather than social phenomenon.88 Herbert Hope Risley wrote in his 1915 book *The People of India*, that the caste of an individual could be identified by measuring the nose: the finer noses belonged to higher caste groups while the coarser noses belonged to the lower caste groups.89 Barua also notes that, unlike the arguments put forward by India’s nationalist historians, there are no period documents to indicate that British developed the “martial race theory” as policy of “divide and rule”.90 Although the policy may have that effect.

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88 Cohen, *The Indian Army*, 47.
90 Ibid, 114.
Data and Methodology

The Universe of Cases

The universe of cases for this study is the infantry wing of the Indian Army. The infantry wing of the Indian Army is divided into 31 regiments. Each regiment has its own history, tradition, esprit de corps, and is responsible for recruiting and training its own soldiers. Infantry regiments are divided into battalions. The number of battalions in a regiment range from 2 to 28 depending on the regiment. There are a total of 450 infantry battalions in the Indian Army. Most of the infantry battalions are divided in four companies and there are approximately 1800 infantry companies in the Indian Army.

I focused on the infantry wing of the Indian Army in this study for two reasons. First, there is a large and detailed body of works on the history of the infantry wing of the Indian Army. This allowed me to build a detailed data set of individual infantry companies of the Indian Army. There was no clear source of data on the operational history of the other wings of the Indian Army. Second, fortunately the infantry is the core of the Indian Army. All of the other branches of the Indian Army, including amour and artillery, are merely support functions. Therefore the core manifestation of the Indian Army is the characteristics of the infantry branch.

Independent Variable

The independent variable is the degree of martial identity a class is assigned to an infantry company. Each infantry company of the Indian Army is either an “All-India” unit, fixed, or single class composition unit. Was the class composing a company defined as a “martial race” group by the British? In particular, I am interested in whether or not a group was defined as martial group in the late 1930s, before the British Empire joined World War Two. The late
1930s was the last period of time in which the Indian Army was run by the British in a time of relative peacetime operations. It is important to draw measurement on the “martialness” of particular groups as close to the end of the British colonial period because martial identity, like other social constructs, was constantly shifting. Therefore, older sources that contain data on martial identity from the 1880s and 1890s cannot be relied on to give an accurate account of martial identity when India becomes an independent country in 1947. Part of the problem of measuring martial identity is that the English spelling of names of groups in various non-English languages change over time and between authors. The lack of standard English names for the various groups in the India means that there is some uncertainty about whether two authors are discussing the same group or different groups. Measuring the independent variable presents the fundamental problem of trying to statically define a social construct that in each case is defined differently (See Appendix A). This is the greatest source of error in measuring the independent variable. The degree of “martialness” of a class changes. Class identity changes over time. The names of classes, and spellings of these names, change over time. This study is an imperfect attempt to statistically measure some that is not measured but felt and known.

This study drawing on two sources to measure the independent variable. First is a book written by Lieut-General Sir George MacMunn titled *The Martial Races of India*. MacMunn was the Colonel Commandant of the Royal Artillery and served in India. He was a prolific writer of titles such as *The Armies of India, The Official History of the World War—Egypt and Palestine 1914-17*, and *Gustavus Adolphus: The Northern Hurricane*. *The Martial Races of India* was written in 1933 and gives a detailed history of the different “Martial Races”. The book is cited in
a number of academic studies of the “Martial Race” theory.\textsuperscript{91} On pages 236-237, MacMunn provides a list of the groups in India that are considered to be “Martial Races” (Appendix B).

This study checks MacMunn’s list of “Martial Races” groups in India in 1933 against data on the composition of the Indian Army right before the outbreak of World War Two, and before the large group of the Indian Army during the war that led to a temporary end of the “Martial Races” theory of recruitment. This data can be found in Wilkinson’s book \textit{Army and Nation: The Military and Indian Democracy since Independence}.\textsuperscript{92} The composition data serves as a measure of the practical effect of the “Martial Races” theory of recruitment. Appendix C is a chart showing the percentage of different population groups serving in the Indian Army before World War Two and the total size of each population group. The chart demonstrates that before World War Two some small groups, like Dogras, Gujars, and Kumaonis, had disproportionally high service percentages while some large groups, like Other Hindus and Madras Classes, had disproportionately low service percentages. Groups that are denoted with asterisks (i.e. *Ahirs*) are considered for the point of this study to be “Martial”. Groups denoted with asterisks are both listed by MacMunn and by the Wilkinson service data as being a “Martial Class”. This study needs to address some inconsistencies about this list of “Martial” classes. Gurkhas are left off the list of “Martial” classes because they are mostly from Nepal. Pathans and Baluchis, despite being listed as “Martial” classes by MacMunn and having a high pre-war service percentage are excluded from this study because they are from areas that are now in Pakistan. I have been, as of


\textsuperscript{92} Wilkinson, \textit{Army And Nation}, 70-71.
yet, unable to determine is the Meos group in Wilkinson and the Mers group in MacMunn are the same groups and authors misspelled or the names changed over time, or are they different groups. Muslim Punjabis are a less significant part of the post-independence Indian Army than the colonial Indian Army because many of the Muslim Punjabi units were transfer to the Pakistani Army.

A list of which groups are considered to be “Martial” classes provides us with the ability to code units, down to the Battalion and even Company level, as either being composed of “Martial” classes or not being composed of “Martial” classes. P.K. Gautam’s book Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army: Continuity and Change provides a chart with the class composition of all the Regiments in the Army.93 Next, regimental histories provide accounts of which units in each regiment see action during the four major wars this study is considering.94 From these two sets of data we can measure whether or not Indian Army units that are composed of “Martial” classes see combat more than units that are composed of other classes.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the binary value of whether or not an infantry company made contact, saw combat attack, with the enemy during a particular war. This data was collected by reading secondary historical sources that record the service history of each infantry company, (see Appendix D for list of sources cited in collecting company service history). As source of error in the collection process is that I could not consult every possible source ever written as some could not be retrieved by the interlibrary loans system at Earl Greeg Swem Library at The

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93 Gautam, Composition And Regimental System Of The Indian Army, 46-50.
94 See Appendix D for list of sources cited.
College of William and Mary. It is possible that some companies that made contact with the enemy were not recorded in my data set as having done so as I could not find a source that recorded this action. Another source of error is the sometimes ambiguous wording some of the sources used that made it unclear the exact nature a units wartime activities. I tended to err on the side of caution and if a text description did not use phrases like “shoot at” or “attacked the enemy’s position” the unit was not coded as having made contact with the enemy. It is possible that this practice led to some errors of admission. Finally, some infantry regiments had more written about them which made data collection easier as more sources available.

Control Variable: Distance between Regimental Headquarters to frontline.

Controlling for the variable of distance between Regimental Headquarters to the frontline is important because it eliminates the geographic proximity as causal mechanism for unit deployment. The locations of each infantry regiment’s headquarters are in listed in Indian Army (A Reference Manual) by Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma (Retd.). Locate each Regimental Headquarters with the decimal GDP coordinates of the city the each Regimental Headquarters is located in. Next, create a map with state level administrative boundaries for India and national administrative borders for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Create new layers for Jammu and Kashmir and for Arunachal Pradesh (formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency). Project whole map into the Asia Equaldistance Conic North projection. Insert Regimental Headquarters by adding points on the GPS coordinates for the cities in which each Regimental Headquarters are located in. Use the Near tool to measure the distance between each Regimental Headquarters and the four areas of combat. For the 1947-8 Kashmir War, distance from each Regimental

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96 GeoHack database
Headquarters to Jammu and Kashmir. For the 1962 India-China War, distance from each Regimental Headquarters to Jammu and Kashmir and to what was then called the North-East Frontier Agency (renamed Arunachal Pradesh in 1972). For the 1965 India-Pakistan War, distance from each Regimental headquarters to Pakistan which stands in as a proxy for West Pakistan in 1965. For the 1971 India-Pakistan War, distance from each Regimental headquarters to Pakistan which stands in as a proxy for West Pakistan in 1971 and to Bangladesh which stands in as a proxy for East Pakistan in 1971. For each company, take the distance from where their Regimental Headquarters was at the time of the war, found in Indian Army (A Reference Manual), and the front they saw combat action on.\(^9^7\)

\(^9^7\) Website
Findings

General Findings

Indian Army infantry companies that were composed of a “martial” class group are more likely to have seen combat in the Kashmir 1947-8, Sino-India 1962, India-Pakistan 1965, India-Pakistan 1971 Wars than infantry units that were composed of a “non-martial” class group. The unit of analysis in this section is unit,war. Each infantry company appears four times in the data set. Each time the unit is linked to either the Kashmir 1947-8 War, the Sino-India 1962 War, the India-Pakistan 1965 War, or the India-Pakistan 1971 War. Across all wars there were 5,236 unit,war cases, or 5,236 individual companies being deployed in individual wars. Of those 5,236 unit,war cases, 2,019 or 38.56 percent were “non-martial” cases. The other 3,217 or 61.44 percent were “martial” cases. In other words, across the all four wars 38.56 percent of potential infantry company deployments were of “non-martial” units and 61.44 percent of potential infantry company deployments were of “martial” units. Across all four wars, 63.92 percent, 2.48 percentage points above the proportion, of the potential infantry companies deployed in combat were “martial” class companies. The share of infantry companies in the Indian Army with a “martial” class composition fell between the 1947-8 and the 1962 wars from 62.5 percent to 60.68 percent. After the 1962 war, as the Indian Army was rapidly expanded, the percentage of “martial” infantry companies grew from 60.68 percent to 61.99 percent in 1965. By 1971, the percentage of “martial” infantry fell from 61.99 percent to 60.79 percent.

Across all four wars, 36.08 percent, 2.48 percentage points below the proportion, of the potential infantry companies deployed in combat were “non-martial” class companies. Of

“martial” class infantry companies 36.08 percent of potential deployments resulted in actual deployments, while 69.60 percent of potential deployments did not result in actual deployments. Of “non-martial” class infantry companies 27.34 percent of potential deployments resulted in actual deployments, while 72.44 percent of potential deployments did not result in actual deployments. Infantry companies with martial composition are more likely to have seen combat deployment during the four wars observed than infantry companies without martial composition. Martialness have a 3 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat across all wars. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 41.18 percent of the army, the 3 percentage point effect is 7.28 percent increase in the likelihood of a company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 7.28 percent of an Army with 5,236 posable company combat deployment across 4 wars is 381 companies.

In all regressions, distance, the measure of the distance from a Regimental Headquarters to frontlines, had no effective on the likelihood of a company being deployed in combat. Distance is measured in meters and is not inverted so the higher the value, the greater the distance from a Regimental Headquarters to the frontlines. Martialness does not seem to be affected by distance to the frontline. When distance is control for the effect of martialness increase during the Sino-India War 1962 and the India-Pakistan War 1971, with the inverse being true for the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965. This may have to do with the geographic direction of the war. Both the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965 were only fought along India north-western and western border in Jammu and Kashmir and along the border with West Pakistan. However, the Sino-India War 1962 and India-Pakistan War 1971 had Eastern Theaters of action. In the Sino-India War 1962 there was fighting in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north and in the North East Frontier Agency. In the
India-Pakistan War 1971 there was fighting in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in the north, along the border between India and West Pakistan, and an invasion of East Pakistan.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Martial %</th>
<th>Non-Martial %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>60.68</td>
<td>39.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>61.99</td>
<td>38.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>60.79</td>
<td>39.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Engaged in Combat</th>
<th>Did not engage in combat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>81.51</td>
<td>18.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>92.09</td>
<td>7.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>62.27</td>
<td>37.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>52.6</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3:

Difference in the composition of Indian Army Infantry Companies and the Martialness effect in combat deployments

![Graph showing the difference in composition of Indian Army Infantry Companies and the Martialness effect in combat deployments.](image)

Table 4: Battlefield Contact Across All Wars

![Bar chart showing the mean of battlefield contact for Non-Martial and Martial Infantry Companies.](image)
Table 5: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat Across All Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martialness</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
<td>0.03**</td>
<td>0.098***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.27***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.17***</td>
<td>0.05**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>5,236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). Significant at ***99% level, ***95% level, and * 90% level.

Kashmir War 1947-48

In the aftermath of the Partition of India into India and Pakistan in August 1947, India and Pakistan fought a war over control of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Kashmir, was a Hindu Dogra but 75 percent of his subjects were Muslim. Both governments of the newly created countries of India and Pakistan wanted Singh to annex his princely state to their country. Singh wanted to maintain the independence of his polity. However, an internal revolt backed by Pakistani tribesmen threatened the summer capital of Srinagar, and in October, Singh was forced to annex his state to India and ask for Indian military intervention to push back the rebels and interlopers. Pakistani forces mobilized to support the tribesmen and the two armies squared off against each other over course the 1948. By the end the
year, the conflict ended in a stalemate with two countries drawing a de facto border along the Line Of Control through Jammu and Kashmir.  

Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 63.85 percent were “martial”, 1.35 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” composition. Conversely, 36.15 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 18.89 percent of them saw combat during the Kashmir War 1947-8. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 17.82 percent of them saw combat during the Kashmir War 1947-8. Martialness have a 1.1 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the Kashmir War 1947-8. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 37.5 percent of the army, the 1.1 percentage point effect is 2.93 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 2.93 percent of an Army with 1,152 company is 34 companies. The effect of martialness is that 34 infantry companies of the Indian Army saw combat in the Kashmir War 1947-8 because they were martial.

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Table 6: Battlefield Contact during Kashmir War 1947-8

Table 7: Effect of Martialness on Battlefield Combat in Kashmir War, 1947-1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martialness</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
<td>-0.085**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Distance</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.178***</td>
<td>0.300***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,152</td>
<td>1,136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Sino-India War 1962

In 1962, Indian Army patrols along the border with China in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) (renamed Arunachal Pradesh in 1972) and the Ladakh region of Jammu and Kashmir can across Chinese outputs in disputed territory. The Chinese forces attack Indian patrols in the NEFA in an effort to distract from a road building project in Ladakh linking Tibet with Xinjiang, China. As the border clashes escalated, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was unwilling to deploy more military forces to the frontier as he believed he could negotiate a solution to the conflict with the Chinese government. The lack of deployment of additional Indian Army forces to the border allowed for the Chinese military to defeat the Indian forces that were in the area. The Chinese military, after demonstrating its ability to launch a successful attack into Indian territory, withdraw its forces.100

Due to the surprise nature of the Chinese attack on Indian forces and the unwillingness of Indian political leaders to deploy more military forces to the border, less than 8 percent of the infantry companies of the Indian Army saw combat action during the Sino-Indian War. “…only 24,000 of the Indian Army’s approximately 550,000 personnel took part in the war…”101 Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 74.22 percent were “martial”, 13.45 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” composition. Conversely, 25.77 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 9.68 percent of them saw combat during the Sino-Indian War 1962. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 5.19 percent of them saw combat during the Sino-Indian War 1962. Martialness have a 4.5 percentage point effect on

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101 Kundu, *Militarism in India*, 150.
whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the Sino-Indian War 1962. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 39.31 percent of the army, the 4.5 percentage point effect is 11.45 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 11.45 percent of an Army with 1,226 company is 140 companies.

Table 8: Battlefield Contact during Sino-Indian War, 1962
Table 9: Effect of Martialness on Battlefiled Combat in Sino-Indian War, 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sino-Indian War 1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martialness</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact in Previous war</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.052***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

India-Pakistan War 1965

On 7 August 1965, the Pakistani Army sent about 7,000 lightly armed guerrillas into Indian controlled Kashmir with the goal of fermenting revolt. The Indian Army moved quickly against the Pakistani backed Kashmiri rebels and seized some of the Pakistani outposts. The Pakistani Army responded on 31 August by launching a full-scale assault on Indian territory. The Indian Army responded with attack directed at Lahore, the capital of Pakistani Punjab. By the end of September both militaries were running low on foreign military supplies, artillery shells in particular, leading to a cease-fire and in February 1966 the Soviet Union mediated the conflict to an official end.102

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The Indian Army was much more prepared for fighting a war with Pakistan than it was for a conflict with China and as such 37.73 percent of the infantry companies were deployed in combat. Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 65.21 percent were “martial”, 3.22 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” composition. Conversely, 34.79 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 34.46 percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1965. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 39.75 percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1965. Martialness has a 5.3 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1965. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 38.04 percent of the army, the 5.3 percentage point effect is 13.9 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 13.9 percent of an Army with 1,394 company is 194 companies.
Table 10: Battlefield Contact during Indian-Pakistan War 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martialness</td>
<td>0.053**</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>-0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact in Previous war</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.036)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.344***</td>
<td>0.369***</td>
<td>0.357***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>1,394</td>
<td>1,226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
In 1970, Pakistan held national elections to legitimize the previous year’s military coup. The Awami League, an East-Pakistan based political party, won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. All of the Awami League’s seats were in ethnically Bengal East-Pakistan. The mostly ethnically Punjabi West Pakistani military leadership did want to have a government led by the Awami League. Talks between West Pakistani and East Pakistani politicians broke down and on 24 March 1971 the Army declared martial law in East Pakistan. The Army moved quickly to deconstruct the Awami League and arrest its leadership, disband East Pakistani police and paramilitary units, and control the flow of information in and out of East Pakistan. Much of the leadership of the Awami League and the now disbanded East Pakistani security forces fled to India. A large number of refugees followed the Awami League into India. Among the refugees and former East Pakistani security forces armed rebel forces began to form and cross back into East Pakistan to wage an insurgency against the Pakistani Army. By mid-July, 7 million East Pakistani refugees were in India. The Indian government did not allow for any political settlement of the crisis that did not include the repatriation of these East Pakistani refugees. The Pakistani government did not want these refugees to be repatriated as the government viewed them as traitors. The Indian government did not want the conflict between the Bengali rebels and the Pakistani Army to continue, leading to more refugees crossing into India and the potential for a radical, battle-hardened, government coming to power in an Independent Bangladesh. On 3 December 1971, the Indian military launched an attack on Pakistani forces in both East and West
Pakistan. On 16 December 1971, all Pakistani forces in East Pakistan surrendered to the Indian Army, ending the conflict and leading to the creation of an independent Bangladesh.  

As the Indian government was able to choose the time and place at which it started the full-scale war with Pakistan, it was able to fully mobilize its forces, consequently 47.4 percent of available infantry companies saw combat. Of the infantry companies that did see combat during the war, 61.53 percent were “martial”, 0.74 percentage points above the proportion of infantry companies that had a “martial” composition. Conversely, 38.47 percent of infantry companies deployed had a “non-martial” composition. Among the “martial” infantry companies, 47.98 percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1971. Among the “non-martial” infantry companies, 46.52 percent of them saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1971. Martialness has a 1.5 percentage point effect on whether or not an infantry company saw combat during the India-Pakistan War 1971. Since the control is “non-martial” infantry company, which was 39.21 percent of the army, the 1.5 percentage point effect is 3.83 percent increase in the likelihood of company seeing combat if they are a “martial” company. 3.83 percent of an Army with 1,464 company is 56 companies.

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Table 12: Battlefield Contact during Indian-Pakistan War 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martialness</td>
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<td>0.152***</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
<td>(0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact in Previous war</td>
<td>0.278***</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.465***</td>
<td>0.114***</td>
<td>0.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from OLS regression. The dependent variable is whether a given Indian Army infantry unit served on the frontlines (i.e., experienced contact with the enemy). * p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Implications

Military Service and Citizenship

Military service is one of, if not the, hallmarks of citizenship in a modern country, particularly in a political democracy. In the late 18th Century – early 19th Century, states had to deploy increasing large militaries to fight wars. This pattern of mass mobilization required states to make compromises with the masses. No longer were the masses just mere feudal subjects. Through conscription the masses became citizens with political and civil rights previously reserved for the nobility. Through the same process, the idea of the citizen-soldier was created. The military, composted by citizen-soldiers, demonstrates the legitimacy of the government from the point of view of the citizens. Citizens demonstrate their loyalty to country through military service and in exchange they receive the benefits of citizenship from the state. Without citizenship, a national military is essentially a mercenary force.

However, citizenship is not just a legal definition but a standing within society. Within societies, different constructed groups have different positions in the hierarchy. Some groups, those with access to political, economic, and social power, are dominant groups. Other groups, those denied access to political, economic, and social power, are subordinate groups. Militaries can reflect civilian inequalities within their organizations, but groups that gain power in the military can convert that power into social positions in civilian life. Subordinate groups can try

105 Ibid, 186.
106 Ibid, 190.
109 Ibid, 504.
to gain access to a societal position through service in the military. Military service leads to the development of social capital which can advance individual and group status in society.\textsuperscript{111}

However, inequality is built into the military.\textsuperscript{112} The military ranks their members with ranks and unit assignments. Different units have different statuses, often with front-line combat units privileged over rear support units.\textsuperscript{113} Societies, in particular militarized societies, and militaries tend to prize the combat units in a military over non-combat units. Combat units are glorified through heroic imagery of the combat soldier that marginalizes the non-combat units and the non-militarized identities.\textsuperscript{114} The dominant groups in society had greater ability to access the higher statuses positions in the military.\textsuperscript{115} The dominant groups in the military will try to maintain it privilege by erecting barriers to advancement to subordinate groups in the military.\textsuperscript{116} However, subordinate groups may find themselves able to advance through the military if there is a military need for rapid growth, if the subordinate groups are able to put pressure on the military to allow their members to advance through the ranks, or if there is a declining recruitment levels from the dominant groups.\textsuperscript{117} The status subordinate groups attain in the military matter socially to the degree to which military service grants access to social networks outside the military and the dominant groups do not have civilian avenues through which they

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid, 880.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid, 877.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid, 354-355.
\textsuperscript{117} Yagil Levy, “The War of the Peripheries: A Social Mapping of IDF Casualties in the Al-Aqsa Intifada.” \textit{Social Identities} 12, no. 3 (May 2006), 312.

Often the dominant groups in a military are from the upper-middle class. Often the members of the upper-middle class seek non-military careers. The decline in interest of the upper-middle class in military service opens up the military to previously marginalized groups in the military for advancement. Levy demonstrates this effect by examining the difference between the ethnic composition of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) during The Lebanon War (1983-2000) and the First Intifada (1987-1993) against the ethnic composition of the IDF during the Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000).
can maintain their dominance. The military accomplishments, and associated heroic myths and symbols, become a “currency” that the subordinate groups can use to socially advance.\textsuperscript{118} Subordinate groups can cite their military activities, deploying the norm of the citizen-soldier, in order to demand civilian quid pro quos.\textsuperscript{119} Janowitz and Burk demonstrate that African Americans have used service in the US military as a means to gain greater political, civil, economic rights in the United States.\textsuperscript{120}

Blood Sacrifice

A mechanism I would like to propose for how political actors turn military service into political power is the blood sacrifice. Blood sacrifice is the practice of a group’s political leaders using the death of members of the group in the military make demands of the political system. Political leaders use memory of the death of service members as a point to rally the group together and demonstrates the loyalty of the group to country. As the military and the civilian government can determine who is deployed in combat operations, they can determine who has access to blood sacrifice and who does not. In this way the government and the military can choose which groups have access to the material benefits being able to deploy blood sacrifice in political contests.

\textsuperscript{118} I want to stress that I do not mean to say that the subordinate groups are inventing stories about their military actions. I am using the myths anthropologically, in the same way Peer Fiss uses the word myth in “Modern Company Myths: The Influence of Organizational Stories on Creating Commitment”. Fiss describes myths as part of the collective mental structures that, along with artifacts and collective actions, manifests organizational culture (page 4). Fiss finds organizations with strong myth systems, especially “creation” and “overcoming a challenge” myths, are more effective in generating commitment from its members that organizations without “creation” and “overcoming a challenge” myths (page 2).


Three examples of blood sacrifice are the memorialization of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment and Col. Robert Gould Shaw after the American Civil War, the remembrance of the 36th Division of British Army during the Battle of Somme by Ulster Unionists in Northern Ireland, and the political rhetoric of Azam Khan during the 2014 Indian General Elections. A fourth example, the breakdown in relations between the Sikh community and Indian government in the 1980s, shows the limitation of blood sacrifice in advancing a community’s interests in the political system.

The 54th Massachusetts, The Battle of Fort Wagner, and memory in the Jim Crow Era

In 1863, Governor of Massachusetts, John A. Andrew announced that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts would raise a regiment of African Americans to fight in the US Army against the Confederacy in the American Civil War. The 54th Massachusetts Regiment was the first African American regiment raised for the US Army since the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation and the first African American regiment raised in the North.121 The initial efforts to raise 1,000 African American soldiers from Massachusetts failed with only 133 men volunteering.122 The rest of the soldiers came from other states of the Union, occupied Confederate territory, Canada, and the West Indies. More soldiers in the 54th Massachusetts were from Pennsylvania (294 soldiers), New York (183 soldiers), and Ohio (155 soldiers) than from Massachusetts.123 These soldiers, after being trained in Massachusetts under the leadership of Col. Robert Gould Shaw on 28 May 1863 paraded through Boston, along Beacon Street between

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122 Burchard, “WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”, 63.

123 Redkey, “Brave Black Volunteers”, 22.
the State House and the Boston Common on their way to the transport ship in the Harbor. This moment was seen by many observers a great step for African American as they could prove that they were worthy of being citizens by taking action to end slavery. Along the paraded route people were selling souvenirs reading “Those who would be free, themselves must strike the blow.” However the Boston Irish community resented the African American soldiers because the Irish competed with African Americans for employment. The Irish were concerned that military service would give African Americans more status and thus crowd the Irish out of jobs.

The 54th Massachusetts left Boston and were deployed in the coastal Sea Islands of South Carolina. The US military was working to take back control of the City of Charleston and to do that they needed to take Fort Wagner, which guarded the seaward entrance to the harbor. Col. Shaw requested that the 54th Massachusetts be assigned the task of being the first regiment in a direct assault on Fort Wagner. On 18 July 1863, the 54th Massachusetts was waiting for evening to fall to begin their assault on the fort. As they stood there, they knew about the pivotal battles that had finished fifteen days earlier at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania and Vicksburg, Mississippi. However, they had also heard about the outbreak of violence in New York City five days earlier. Laborers had engaged in a violent riot after the announcement of a new law that allowed for someone to avoid being conscripted into the US Army by paying a substitute to take his place. The rioters, instead of targeting the wealthy plutocrats and powerful government

124 Burchard, “WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”, 72, 75.
126 Burchard, “WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”, 72.
Duncan, Where Death and Glory Meet, 86.
officials responsible for the measure, beat and shot African Americans and known abolitionists, dragging their bodies through the streets of the city and then strung the bodies up in place spaces.\textsuperscript{128} The soldiers of the 54\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts, some of whom had families living in New York City, knew about these riots that showed that they were not full citizens of the country for which they were about to die to preserve. When the signal came, Col. Shaw led the 600 (well under the strength of a typical regiment of 1,000 soldiers) tired, hungry soldiers, who had just seen their first combat two days earlier, down the beach towards Fort Wagner.\textsuperscript{129}

Fort Wagner was massive structure. Its garrison of 1,700 had spent the day holed up in the bomb proof shelter as US Naval vessels shelled the fort. Due to a protective barricade, none of the fort’s artillery had been damaged during the shelling. As the 54\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts advanced, the few thousand yards down narrow beach between the Atlantic Ocean and a tidal swamp the “monstrous mound of sand and earth” loomed up in front of them.\textsuperscript{130} At eighty yards, the Confederate defenders unleashed grape-shot and canisters on to the advancing US soldiers.\textsuperscript{131} One of the 54\textsuperscript{th} Massachusetts’ officers later recalled that he saw “A sheet of flame, followed by a running fire, like electric sparks, swept along the parapet.”\textsuperscript{132} The Regiment reached the fort, crossed the moat, and scrambled up the rampart. Col. Shaw was quickly killed. His remaining soldiers charged up the slope of the fort under heavy fire. The wounded and the dead tumbled headlong down the slope of the rampart, coming to rest in the moat. Some who were still alive drowned in the salty water.\textsuperscript{133} The next wave of support did not come fast enough and the 54\textsuperscript{th}

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{129} Ibid, 3.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 4-5.
\textsuperscript{131} Duncan, \textit{Where Death and Glory Meet}, 112.
\textsuperscript{132} Burchard, “\textit{WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION}”, 9.
\textsuperscript{133} Ibid, 88.
Massachusetts had to withdraw without taking the fort. Of the 600 soldiers of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment that took part in the battle, 272 were killed, wounded, or captured, a 45 percent casualty rate. Over the course of the American Civil War, 1,345 men served in the 54th Massachusetts, with 270 dying in some fashion, a 20 percent casualty rate.

After the Battle of Fort Wagner there was a desired to memorialize the memory of Col. Shaw and the 54th Massachusetts. Gov. Andrew appointed a committee to erect a fitting monument in Boston. The committee took until 1897 to finish the project. The committee hired Augustus Saint-Gaudens to sculpt a bronze monument. While Saint-Gaudens wanted to just make a statue of Shaw, Shaw’s parents demanded that the monument also depict the African American soldiers who served under him parading along Beacon Street through Boston. When the monument was unveiled to the public on 31 May 1897, it was the only monument in the country to show African American soldiers in full military uniforms. The ceremony on that day featured a gathering of 60 veterans from the 54th Massachusetts marching “proudly up the hill to do honor to their fallen comrade.” At the ceremony, Booker T. Washington gave meaning to the loss of life.

What these heroic souls of the 54th Regiment began, we must complete…If through me, a humble representative, nearly ten millions of my people might be permitted to send a message to

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134 Ibid, 90.
135 Duncan, Where Death and Glory Meet, 113.
136 Ibid, 124.
137 Burchard, “WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”, 110.
138 Ibid, 111.
140 Burchard, “WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”, 112.
141 Redkey, “Brave Black Volunteers”, 33.
Massachusetts, to the survivors of the 54th Regiment…to the
family who their only boy that we might have life more
abundantly, that message would be: Tell them that the sacrifice
was not in vain, that up from the depths of ignorance and poverty
we are coming…by way of the school, the well-cultivated field, the
skilled hand…we are coming up…\textsuperscript{141}

The monument gave meaning to the loss of life at Fort Wagner. But by 1897, the gains for
African Americans won in the blood of the Civil War had been eroded by the entrenchment of
Jim Crow era white supremacy. In an effort to resist Jim Crow, African American used the
memory of the blood sacrifice of 54th Massachusetts to remind the government of what it owed
them. The 54th Massachusetts Monument is prominently displayed on Beacon Street, Boston
facing the Massachusetts Statehouse, the residence of the political institutions the bore the moral
weight of 270 dead soldiers. A constant reminder of what African Americans are owed.

\textsuperscript{141} Burchard, \textit{“WE’LL STAND BY THE UNION”}, 114.
Figure 5: Memorial to Robert Gould Shaw and the Massachusetts Fifty-Fourth Regiment

The 36th Ulster Division, The Battle of the Somme, and remembrance in Troubled Northern Ireland143

On the first day of The Battle of the Somme, 1 July 1916, the 36th Division of the British Army went over the top of their trenches and charged towards the German lines. In the course of that day 5,000 soldiers, of a total strength of 15,000, died.144 The 36th Division of the British Army was composed of Protestants from Ulster in Ireland. The first of July was a day heavy with meaning for Ireland’s Protestant community for it was the anniversary of one of the defeats of the Irish Catholics to William of Orange at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.145 Now in 1916 Irish Protestants were once again fighting for King and Country. To quote the 36th Division’s commanding officer, “We could hardly have a date better calculated to inspire national traditions among our men of the North.”146 The heavy losses on the first day of the Somme, 5,000 sons, fathers, brothers, husbands, was a heavy total for the Ulster Protestant community. The losses on the first day of the Somme was a shared moment of sacrifice for the community as everyone knew someone who lost someone in service to their country. “The Battle of the Somme became the archetype of Ulster’s loyalty and defense of the crown.”147

The Ulster Protestant community was quick to offer remembrance to the death of 1 July. The response to the first day of The Battle of the Somme was at the same time deeply personal and

Reynolds uses the term “blood sacrifice” to decrible the political ramifications of the Battle of the Somme and the Easter Rising of 1916 on the formation of Irish nationalism and Ulster Protestant identity over the 20th century. I use his idea, which he does not develop into a theorically framework, to explain the political power of question “who does the dying”?
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid.
147 Ibid.
extremely political. Unionism, the idea the now partitioned Northern Ireland should remain in the United Kingdom, made it worthwhile for Ulstermen to die for their country, allowing families to make sense of their grief.\textsuperscript{148} Sarah Mailey marked the death of her husband, Lance-Corporal John Mailey, with short newspaper notice:

\begin{quote}
For King and Country well he stood

Unknown to coward's fears

In battles strife he shed his blood

With the Ulster Volunteers.\textsuperscript{149}
\end{quote}

By 1918, 1 July was cemented as an annual day of remembrance for the Orange Order, a Masonic-style fraternity sworn to maintain the Protestant Ascendancy in Ireland.\textsuperscript{150} During the interwar years, Unionists contrasted their service to King and Country at the Somme with the Easter Uprising that same year.\textsuperscript{151} One Sinn Fein leader commented that, “Unionists used the Somme sacrifice as a badge of loyalty to their new state and still do.”\textsuperscript{152} They were making the argument to British officials that they, and not the Catholics, were loyal and could be partners with the British officials in running Northern Ireland. Riding on that partnership was Protestant access to the levers of state and material benefits of controlling the government.

During The Troubles, a period of violence in Northern Ireland between the 1960s and 1998, the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), one of the Protestant paramilitary forces that was

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, 167.
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, 168.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, 171.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., That is a quotation from Jim Gibney.
responsible for some of the earliest killing, claimed the memory of the 36th Division for themselves. They painted a number of murals along Shankill Road in Belfast depicting the soldiers of either the First World War or the 36th Division in particular alongside UVF gunmen. In this way the UVF is calling on this shared narrative of sacrifice and Protestant Ulster identity to justify their violent political actives in furtherance of their goal of maintain the British presence in Northern Ireland.
Figure 6: Mural depicting the soldiers of the 36th Division charging in no-man’s at the Somme with an Ulster Orange sky.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{153} Keith Ruffles, \textit{36th Ulster Division mural}, 2013, web, 2,592 x 1,936, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:36th_Ulster_Division_mural_-_panoramio_(1).jpg
Figure 7: Mural depicting four recipients of the Victoria Cross from the 36th Division with the UVF emblem in the center.\textsuperscript{154}

\textsuperscript{154} Keresaspa, Mural depicting four recipients of the Victoria Cross from the 36\textsuperscript{th} (Ulster) Division, Cregagh estate, Belfast, web, 926 x 1,151, Wikimedia Commons, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:UVF_Victoria_Crosses.png
The Kargil War, Azam Khan, and the Indian General Election of 2014

On 7 April 2014 the Samajwadi Party (SP) had a political rally in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, India. At this rally Azam Khan, the leader of the SP, stood up and delivered some remarks to the assembled group.\textsuperscript{155} Translated from Hindi, his remarks read as following:

People who intended to disturb harmony claimed that I called somebody dog. In this pathetic era of politics, mediapersons understand and admit your mistake. Who said that it pains if a puppy comes under the wheel of a car? Who calls us puppy? Narendra Modi called us puppy. Hindu soldiers did not conquer Kargil, however it was Muslim soldiers, who by chanting Allah-uh-Akbar conquered Kargil.\textsuperscript{156}

Khan then went on to say, “Recruit us [Muslims] in to the Indian Army. No one can guard the borders of our nation better than us [Muslims].”\textsuperscript{157} Former Army Chief Gen. V K Singh, who was at the time a candidate for the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), responded by saying that the Kargil War was “won by Indian”. “Anybody who talks of caste, creed and religion in the army needs to be condemned. He may be anybody. The war was won by Indians and not by any casts, creed, society, religion.”\textsuperscript{158} In 2014, Azam Khan was campaigning against the BJP lead by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{156} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{157} “Azam Khan kicks up another row, say soldiers who won Kargil were Muslims not Hindu,” \textit{India Today}, from PTI, April 9, 2014. https://www.indiatoday.in/elections/highlights/story/azam-khan-samajwadi-party-muslims-ghaziabad-rally-lok-sabha-polls-188197-2014-04-09
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
then Gujarati Chief Minister and Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi. The BJP has gained a reputation for being “a party with a narrow communal agenda that aims to destroy the Indian secular state. Its objective is to establish its version of a Hindu state. The Muslim minority suspects that it will be violently suppressed and Hinduized in such a state.” In 2013, Modi was asked how he felt about the 2002 anti-Muslim riot that killed over 1,000 people in Gujarat. He responded, “If someone else is driving a car and we’re sitting behind, even then if a puppy comes under the wheel, will it be painful or not? Of course it is. If I’m a chief minister or not, I’m a human being. If something bad happens anywhere, it is natural to be sad.”

This quotation caused controversy in India. First, it seemed to dismiss the terrible events of 2002. Second, it called Muslims, one fifth of the population of India, dogs. Third, once again Modi did not take responsibility for the violence that happened during his term as Chief Minister of Gujarat.

Khan, defending his party’s control of the state of Uttar Pradesh, used Modi inflammatory remarks to turn out Muslim voters against the BJP. The SP was at the time a communal collation of Muslims and Yadav, an Other Backward Class (OBC) group in Uttar Pradesh. Khan cites Modi’s previous statements about Muslims and then takes a hard right

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hand turn and discusses the religion of the Indian soldiers who fought in the Kargil War. The Kargil War was a brief border conflict in 1999 between India and Pakistan along the Line Of Control in Kashmir. Pakistani forces infiltrated on to the Indian side of the Line Of Control and took up positions on the Kargil heights. Indian forces then pushed out the Pakistani forces. Khan was claiming that the Indian soldiers deployed in the Kargil War were Muslim not Hindu. This was such a controversial remark that the Election Commission banned him from public speaking afterwards. Khan defended himself claiming that using Muslim soldiers was a tactic deployed by the Indian Army to confuse the Pakistani Army. Furthermore, “Expressing oneself is within the framework of law and it is my right to speak the right thing. I have only talked about sacrifices [emphasis added]. Whatever injustice happened, I have only spoken about that. I have not said anything other than facts. I have not threatened anyone. It is not my nature to threaten anybody.”

In this incident we see a politician deploy a story of blood sacrifice in effort to win an election. Khan was claiming that Muslims were “doing the dying” for India and as such the Muslim party should be in power. This claim is false. A number of non-Muslim units were deployed in the Kargil War. Regardless of the validity of the claim, Khan was making a claim from the political process of India that his group should have special rights because of it service to the Indian state. Incidentally, Khan’s SP did not perform will in the 2014, winning only 5 of the

violence to protect the Babri Masjid from the kar sevaks won him the support of Uttar Pradesh’s Muslim communities, but lost him the 1991 election.


80 Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, seats in Uttar Pradesh down from the 23 they had won in the previous General Election.\textsuperscript{165}

Operation Blue Star, Khalistan, and The Limits of Loyalty

At 7 p.m. on 5 June 1984, the Indian Army executed Operation Blue Star by opening fire with heavy artillery on the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar, Punjab, India, the center of the Sikh religion.\textsuperscript{166} At 10:30 pm, commandos entered the complex and engaged the occupants in combat. After the commandos were repealed, infantry units and tanks stormed the complex.\textsuperscript{167} After between 500 and 1200 deaths, the Golden Temple complex was back in the hands of the Indian government.\textsuperscript{168} How had relations between the Indian government and a segment of the Punjabi Sikh community, a community whose loyalty to the Indian state had been a bedrock assumption for Indian security policy for decades, deteriorate to the point that the Indian Army was being used to storm the center of the religion of “One of the most numerous and successful of the Indian Army’s recruited communities…”?\textsuperscript{169} It wasn’t like Punjab’s Sikhs hadn’t been able to gain political benefits from their military service. After the India-Pakistan War 1965, Sikhs got their own state drawn along linguistic lines that neatly cut between the Hindu majority, Hindi speaking Haryana state and the Sikh majority, Punjabi speaking Punjab state.\textsuperscript{170} Due to the Green Revolution and government price supports, Punjab’s grain output trebled between 1964

\textsuperscript{167} Nayar and Singh, \textit{Tragedy Of Punjab}, 98.
\textsuperscript{169} Kundu, \textit{Militaryism in India}, 169.
\textsuperscript{170} Jeffrey, \textit{What’s Happening to India?}, 91.
and 1972 with farmers making a 27 percent return on wheat in 1972. Through this period Sikhs remained an important class in the Indian Army. “…in 1962 almost 40 per cent of the army’s brigadiers and over 45 per cent of its major-generals were Sikhs. Punjab which was just 2.45 percent of India’s population in 1981 still accounted for over a tenth of all cadets attending the [Indian Military Academy] ten regular courses from 1978-82. A 1991 report estimated that Sikhs continued to constitute a fifth of all Indian Army officers.” Well into the 1980s India’s military security was dangerously dependent for a large part of good functioning relations between the Indian government and the Sikhs of Punjab. The collapse of that relationship in 1984 was a grave challenge to the state’s ability to maintain security.

The partition of India in the summer of 1947 divided the Province of Punjab between India and West Pakistan. For Punjab’s Sikhs, partition meant that they were no longer a somewhat political irrelevant minority. Before Partition, Punjab’s Sikhs were 15 percent of the population of Punjab in 1941, a faction in region with many religious groups. After Partition, Punjab’s Sikhs were the second largest religious group, 33 percent of the population of Punjab in 1951, in a state with only two religious groups: Hindus and Sikhs. Before, they were a small group that did not have a real chance at being the sole dominant political group. Now, they had a chance of coming into sole political power in a state. But the Indian government decided that there were to be no more religious states created in India because the creation of Pakistan was so costly. The propaganda organs of the Indian Federal state and the Congress Party’s political organism drummed out a steady beat of secularism, non-aligned socialism, and national unity.

171 Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India?, 29.
172 Kundu, Militarism In India, 170.
173 Jeffrey, What’s Happening to India?, 42.
175 Ibid.
‘Secularism’ did not have a positive connotation for Punjab’s Sikh community. ‘Secularism’ for the Sikhs meant that the special relationship between the Indian government and the Sikhs that the British fostered over the past decades was void. The deal was the Sikhs, as a “martial race”, would give the lives of their sons, husbands, fathers, and brothers to protect the interests of the state, but in exchange the Sikhs would be given a special status in the colonial hierarchy. The colonial leadership would be particularly concerned with their needs. The British would always make sure the Sikhs got their family military allowance, their pension payments, and access to land on which to retire. The new Congress government seemed to be threatening the Sikhs’ special relationship with the Indian government.\(^\text{176}\) Even as the Sikh community continued to, as a “martial race”, join the Army and die in India’s wars, it became increasingly unclear how dedicated the civilian political leadership was to the needs of the Sikh community as a special group. The rhetoric coming out of the Parliament seemed to suggest that the Congress party wanted to end the pattern of “martial races” recruitment all together, totally striping the Sikhs of their special status. Furthermore, the national broadcasting about a religiously neutral Indian state seem to some in Punjab’s Sikh community as a signal that the national government would not act to protect them from Hindu majority Punjabi state government. “Militant Hindu groups, confident of their own numerical edge in the new Punjab, referred to the Sikh religion as an offshoot of Hinduism and declared that ‘the Sikhs should come back to the Hindu society and be absorbed by it.’”\(^\text{177}\) Punjab’s Sikhs has just witnessed and suffered through the creation of a new country to protect the rights of one religious minority in South Asia. Couldn’t they have just a


\(^{177}\) Jeffrey, *What’s Happening to India?*, 101.
state of their own where they didn’t have to worry about “being absorbed” by a Hindu majority? This initial mistrust would dog the relationship until it broke in 1984.

Then three things happened. First, Jawahar Lal Nehru died in 1964. Second, India and Pakistan fought a war in 1965. Third, the Sikh dominated state of Punjab was created. Jawahar Lal Nehru was the Prime Minister of India between 1947 and 1964. His brand of non-aligned socialism and national unity was based in a deep fear about what would happen if more divisions were created in India. After seeing the costs and damages done by the Partition of India and Pakistan along religious lines, it is understandable that Nehru did not want to allow any more religious partitions. As such he prevented the formation of any new states in India based on religious or ethnic lines. However, in 1964 Nehru died and there was new leadership in the Congress Party. The next year, war broke out between India and Pakistan. The Sikh areas of Punjab, being along the border between Indian and West Pakistan, were a center of the fighting and sustained major damages from the war. Additionally, Sikhs, as a “martial race”, were seen as one of the heroes of the 1965 War. These two factors, the change in national leadership and a spot light being put on the Sikhs for their actions during the 1965 War, led to the creation of an independent Punjab state. The key was to divide the old Punjab state by linguistic groups. The Hindi speaking, conincidentally majority Hindu areas, became Haryana. The Punjabi speaking, conquedently majority Sikh areas, became Punjab. Punjabi, while spoken by many groups in daily usage was closely associated with Sikhism because the sacred text, the Guru Granth Sahib, was written in Punjabi using the Gurmukhi script.178 While many groups could speak Punjabi,

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178 Ibid, 102.
few non-Sikhs could write and read Punjabi in the Gurmukhi script. Therefore, Sikhs seeking to make their own state framed it as a Punjabi linguistic state, not a Sikh religious state.

Fig. 8: Linguistic Division of Punjab between 1956 and 1966

After the creation of the Sikh rump state of Punjab in 1966, relations between the Center and the Sikh community settled down. The Green Revolution and government price support brought wealth to Sikh farmers. However the mechanization of agriculture did lead to rising rural unemployment in the region. Then the outbreak the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and resulting OPEC

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oil in bargo created a problem for the Indian government. The cut back in oil production lead to a spike in global oil price. India was a major oil importer with little domestic reserves, so the increase in price hit the state hard. As a result the Indian government had to scale back the price supports on agricultural production.\textsuperscript{180} This decision led to economic uncertainty about the future of Punjab farming economy. The other problem in relations between the central government and the Sikh community was purely political. In the 1977 election, the ruling Congress Party dramatically underperformed in Punjab and lost power.\textsuperscript{181} During the 1977 election the Akali Dal, the majority Sikh ruling party in Punjab, broke with the Congress Party and joined the opposition Janata Party government.\textsuperscript{182} When the Congress Party came back into power in January 1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used the powers of President’s Rule to dissolve nine state legislatures, including Punjab, and call for new elections.\textsuperscript{183} The Congress Party won a narrow victory (63 out of 117 seats).\textsuperscript{184}

In response a group of supporters of Jagjit Singh Chauhan, a Sikh political leaders who had been operating in exile, proclaimed from with the Gold Temple an independent “Khalistan”, Sikh national homeland, within the borders of Punjab.\textsuperscript{185} Chauhan was named the President of what was to be a ‘purely Sikh State’.\textsuperscript{186} Simultaneously, the same proclamation was made in the United States, West Germany, Britain, Canada, and France.\textsuperscript{187} Within Punjab, factions of the Akali Dal party began a process of ethnic outbiding and the 20 September 1980 arrest of Jamail Singh Bhindranwale, the militant leader of the Sikh educational organization Damdami Taksal,
in connection to the murder of Lala Jagat Narain, the editor of the Hindi language newspaper Punjab Kesari.\textsuperscript{188} Nehru’s nightmare of a second religious partition of India was now a potential reality.

The arrests of Bhindranwale and the process of ethnic outbiding in the Punjab lead to a wave of violence. The market in Jullundur was attack by gunmen on 22 September 1981. On the 29\textsuperscript{th} an Indian Airlines plane was hijacked in Lahore, Pakistan. The next two months there was a shoot at the Secretariat in Chandigarh, the murder of a number of Hindu politicians, two policemen were killed and their weapons stolen, and then a bomb went off at headquarters of Bhindranwale’s, who had just been released from police custody with all charges dropped.\textsuperscript{189} By the end of the year Bhindranwale was the most powerful political actor in Punjab. Over the next two years no faction in Punjab would act without considering his response.\textsuperscript{190} Over the next two year the Akali Dal leaders entered into negotiations with the Indian government to see if there was someway to end the conflict.\textsuperscript{191} The talks fell apart over a failure to reach agreement on water rights.\textsuperscript{192} In August 1982, Bhindranwale moved his headquarters into the Golden Temple of Amritsar, the center of the Sikh religion to avoid being arrested again.\textsuperscript{193} The next 18 months saw another wave of violence and the Central government trying the imposition of President’s Rule, the deployment of thousands of paramilitary police officers, and the banning of the All India Sikh Student Federation in an effort to end the crisis.\textsuperscript{194} On 23 May 1984, Harchand Singh Longowal, the President of the Akali Dal, announced an attempt to stop the sale of grain from

\textsuperscript{188} Ibid, 145.  
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, 146.  
\textsuperscript{190} Ibid, 147.  
\textsuperscript{191} Ibid, 154-155.  
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, 160.  
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid, 163.  
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid, 164, 180.
Punjab to the Food Corporation of India. Since Punjab at the time provided half the grain for central reserve system, used to redistribute grain around the country and keep the price down, the blocking of sale of Punjabi grain would have affected food prices in the whole country.\textsuperscript{195} In response, on 2 June, PM Gandhi announced that the Army was now authorized to take the lead in Punjab.\textsuperscript{196} On 5 June, the Indian Army launched Operation Blue Star, its assault on the Golden Temple of Amritsar.\textsuperscript{197} It took two days for the Army to take control of the whole Temple complex, killing between 500 and 1200 people, including Bhindranwale, in the complex while losing 90 soldiers.\textsuperscript{198} Over the next year, Army operations to stamp out the rebellion would kill up to 5000 people in over 40 raids of Sikh religious sites all around Punjab and would expose many more to extreme forms of integration and confession extraction.\textsuperscript{199}

There was a powerful sense of outrage from many non-rebellious Sikhs that had not been mobilized by the previous years’ conflict.\textsuperscript{200} Indian President, and Sikh, Zail Singh let it be known how displeased he was with the storming of the Temple.\textsuperscript{201} One 7 June there was a mutiny by the 9\textsuperscript{th} Battalion of the Sikh Regiment. Six hundred soldiers broke into the regimental armoury outside the town of Ganganagar and then drove through the streets shouting “Long live Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale” and shooting indiscriminately.\textsuperscript{202} Units from the Rajputana Rifles were sent to arrest the Sikh mutineers.\textsuperscript{203} A larger mutiny took place in the Sikh Regimenatal Centre at Ramgarh in Bihar. Mutineers turn their guns on their commanding

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid, 179-180.  
\textsuperscript{196} Ibid, 180.  
\textsuperscript{197} Nayar and Singh, \textit{Tradey Of Punjab}, 98.  
\textsuperscript{198} Jeffrey, \textit{What’s Happening to India?}, 181.  
\textsuperscript{199} Nayar and Singh, \textit{Tradey Of Punjab}, 124.  
\textsuperscript{200} Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, \textit{Amritsar: Mrs Gandhi’s Last Battle} (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985): 192.  
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid, 193.  
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid, 194.  
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
officers and then left to try and make it to Amritsar. They were stopped by units from the Punjab Regiment and local police at the Shakteshgarh railway station.\textsuperscript{204} The total number of soldier that joined the mutiny was 1,461, of which 1,050 were raw recruits, many of who had been forced to desert at gunpoint.\textsuperscript{205} There were other smaller mutinies around India in Jammu and Poona.\textsuperscript{206} These mutinies raised questions about the ongoing loyalty of the Indian Army during times of communal unrest. The decision to send soldiers into the Golden Temple tested loyalty of the soldiers and lead the most serious crisis of discipline in the ranks that the Army had faces since independence.\textsuperscript{207} The events of 1984 demonstrated the grave danger for the Indian government on relying on a handful of “martial races” for the bulk of the Army’s man power.

One a cool October morning, 31 October 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by by two Sikh police officers.\textsuperscript{208} In response there were a series of pogroms against Sikhs throughout the country, with the complicity of the Congress government.\textsuperscript{209} Independent sources believe that between 8,000 and 17,000 people were killed. Government sources estimated that 2,800 Sikhs were killed in Delhi.\textsuperscript{210} The Indian government has yet to prosecute those responsible for the mass killing.\textsuperscript{211} Mass graves have contended to be discovered as recently as 2011.\textsuperscript{212} Later in 1984, in the wake of the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh riots, the Congress Party won a landslide victory and Indira Gandhi’s son Rajiv Gandhi

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid, 196.  
\textsuperscript{205} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{206} Ibid, 197.  
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{208} Jeffrey, \textit{What’s Happening to India?}, 182.  
\textsuperscript{210} Akhilesh Pillalamarri, “India’s Anti-Sikh Riots, 30 Years On,” \textit{The Diplomat}, October 31, 2014. \url{https://thediplomat.com/2014/10/indias-anti-sikh-riots-30-years-on/}  
secured his position as Prime Minister. On 24 July 1985, Longowal and Gandhi announced an agreement that affected ended the conflict between the members of the Sikh community and the Indian government.\footnote{Jeffrey, \textit{What’s Happening to India?}, 206.}

While it may be true that a group’s political leadership can use blood sacrifice as political tactic, it doesn’t mean that it is an effective tactic. In the three above examples none of the factions deploying blood sacrifice narratives succeeded in achieving their goals. Remembering the role of the 54th Massachusetts in the Battle of Fort Wagner did not prevent the collapse of African American political power after the end of Reconstruction, the rise of Jim Crow segregation, or massive wave of lynching in the 1890s. While Northern Ireland has remained part of the United Kingdom, the end The Troubles have rendered the Ulster Volunteer Force politically irrelevant. The Ulster Volunteer Force has spent the past twenty years since the Good Friday Agreement operating as a minor street gang. It has no political purchase with even the Protestant population of Northern Ireland.\footnote{Mitchell Resse, “Northern Ireland and Brexit.” Public Lecture, Reves Center at The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA, March 27, 2019.} Despite Azam Khan’s invocation of blood sacrifice, the Samajwadi Party performed poorly in the 2014 Indian General election. Using the memory of a group’s blood sacrifice may not be that effective. The “martial” status of Punjabi Sikhs did not prevent the brake down in relations between the Sikh community and the Indian government leading a wave of violence both state and non-state in Punjab and targeting Sikhs. Wartime service in segregated units marks off each group as different from each other. In a political
situations where those group identities are inflamed, like racial identity in late 19th-early 20th century America or religious identity in contemporary, marking out your group as not just different but special and worthy of praise may not be a viable strategy for a marginalized group. Potentially, a more effective strategy for marginalized group to gain political power through military service is to serve during war time in integrated units with the dominant group. For example American Jews and Catholics became white for a large part by serving with white Protestants in the military during the Second World War. However, military and political leaders maybe unwilling to integrate combat units, limiting the ability of marginalized groups to access full citizenship through combat service.

Conclusion

The British military tradition of the “Martial Races Theory” of recruitment affected the operation of the Indian Army after independence of India. Infantry companies that were composed of “martial” groups saw higher levels of combat deployments and were more likely to see a combat deployment between 1947 and 1971 than companies that did not have a “martial” composition. However, this is not a perfect effect. While overall we see this effect, it is most noticeable in the Sino-Indian 1962 War and the India-Pakistan War 1971. Martialness does not seem to be an important factor in the unit deployments in the Kashmir War 1947-8 and the India-Pakistan War 1965. The implication is that, since military service is a sign of citizenship for the modern state, the colonial practice of the “Martial Races Theory” continues to effect who is and isn’t a citizen in India and how those citizens engage in politics.

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Appendix A

“Martial” class groups as defined by the author for the point of this study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Martial” class</th>
<th>Defining Variable</th>
<th>“Martial” class</th>
<th>Defining Variable</th>
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<td>Kumaonis</td>
<td>Ethno-linguistic</td>
</tr>
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<td>Brahmans</td>
<td>Caste, Region</td>
<td>Maharattas</td>
<td>Caste, Region</td>
</tr>
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<td>Dogras</td>
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<td>Rajputs</td>
<td>Caste, Clan, Region</td>
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<td>Garhwalis</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Linguistic, Region, Religion</td>
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<td>Caste, Religion, Religion</td>
<td>Ranghars (Muslim Rajputs)</td>
<td>Linguistic, Region, Religion</td>
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<td>Jats Sikhs</td>
<td>Caste, Religion</td>
<td>Muslim Rajputana and Central India</td>
<td>Region, Religion</td>
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<td>Mazhabi and Ramdasia Sikhs</td>
<td>Caste, Religion</td>
<td>Other Sikhs</td>
<td>Religion</td>
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</table>

216 World Culture Encyclopedia, “Ahir”.
217 Ethnologue, “Kumaoni”.
218 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Maratha”.
219 Ethnologue, “Dogri”.
220 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Rajput”.
221 Ethnologue, “Garwali”.
222 Ethnologue, “Gujari”.
223 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Hindustani language”.
224 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Jat”.
225 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Rajput”.
226 Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Jat”.
Appendix B²²⁸

From the Frontier.
Pathans of many clans (both from the cis-and trans-frontier hills) (Moslems).
Baluchis and Brahuis (Moslems).

From the Punjab.
Sikhs (principally of the Jât race).
Hindus (a few Jâts and Brahmins).

THE MARTIAL RACES TO-DAY ²³⁷
Dogras, chiefly Hindu and mainly Rajput (from the hills between the Punjab plains and the Himalaya massif, of the Pir Panjâl Range).
Moslems of many tribes (principally of Rajput origin).

From Delhi and Hindustan.
Garhwalis (Hindus from the hills between the United Province and the Himalaya).
Kumaonis (Hindus from the hills between the United Province and the Himalaya).
Jâts, Gujars, Ahirs (Hindu).
Rajputs (Hindu for the most part).
Brahmins (cultivators).
Moslems (descendants of Turk and Afghan settlers and converted Rajputs).

From Rajputana and Central India.
Rajputs (Hindu).
Jâts (Hindu).
Mers (Hindu and Moslem).
Kaimkanis (Moslem Rajputs).

From Western India.
Mahrattas (Hindu).
Moslems who are chiefly descendants of Afghan, Pathan, Turk and Arab.

From Southern India.
Indian Christians
Pariahs and other depressed classes (Chiefly for special technical corps.
Tamils (cultivators).
Moslems descendants of foreigners as in Western India (a very few).

Patterns of Class Recruitment in the Indian Army on the eve of the Second World War

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<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th>Fit Males of Recruitable Age</th>
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<th>Percentage of Recruitable males serving in Indian Army</th>
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229 Wilkinson, *Army And Nation*, 70.
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<td>129466</td>
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Appendix D

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