Engagement from Afar: How the Role of the Diaspora Makes or Breaks National Secession Campaigns

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How the role of the diaspora makes or breaks national secession campaigns

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by

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List of Abbreviations

AAACL: Albanian-American Civic League
CERD: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
KLA (UÇK): Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës)
KVM: Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK: Democratic League of Kosovo
LPRK: Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo
NAAC: National Albanian American Council
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
UN: United Nations
UNFPA: United Nations Population Fund
UNGA: United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNSC: United Nations Security Council
VTOTs: All-Tatar Public Center (Tatarskii Obshchestvenyi Tsentr)
WCT: World Congress of Tatars
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Defining Terms and Review of Literature

This thesis examines the role of the diaspora, as defined below, in the strength and success of national secessionist movements in Kosovo and Tatarstan. The gaps in the literature provide sufficient space for a qualitative study that intends to further explore the relationship between co-ethnic diaspora communities and national secessionist movements in the homeland. Utilizing four measures of diaspora engagement, this paper hypothesizes that higher diaspora engagement with the independence movement increases the likelihood of the success of the movement. After testing this hypothesis against different kinds of data systematically gathered from multiple sources, this paper finds that the high engagement of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora strengthened the Kosovo independence campaign, while the lack of engagement from the Volga Tatar diaspora weakened the Tatarstan independence campaign.

In the following section, I outline important definitions for this paper and review previous exploration of the relationship between secessionist movements and the diaspora. In the second chapter, I outline the measurements and data for each variable. In the third chapter, I utilize process tracing to discuss the Kosovo independence movement as a case study, followed by the Tatarstan independence movement as a case study in chapter four.

Definition of Diaspora:

Due to the high number of conflicting studies on this question, each with a different definition of diaspora, a general consensus regarding the definition of “diaspora” must be reached for this research project. For the majority of the literature, definitions of diaspora are broken into two camps, the primordial camp, which generally believes that diasporas form naturally from migration, and the constructivist camp, which generally believes that diasporas
form from co-ethnic social mobilization. In other words, there is disagreement whether diasporas form naturally from ethnic migrant communities or form as a result of ethnic activists or political elites who actively construct their identity. Both camps agree that diasporas are highly case-specific and difficult to generalize, resulting in the necessity for a strong working definition. I will provide a brief background on each camp, then explain the choice for the definition of “diaspora” in this thesis and outline the operating definition that will inform the remainder of this project.

Both camps agree on the historical and classical definition of a “diaspora,” which was reserved solely for Jews, Armenians and Greeks driven from their homeland and dispersed around the world. These diasporas are assumed to have had the eventual goal of reinstating and returning to their perceived home (Brubaker 2005, Tololyan 1996, Safran 1991). Also referred to as “victim diasporas,” the dispersed Armenians, Jews and Greeks followed similar patterns of forced or coerced removal from their homeland in repeated instances throughout history. This was followed by general persecution even in their temporary host countries, creating ethnically-distinguished, culturally-resilient and politically-motivated communities focused on creating their own “promised land.” In this context, the “promised land” referred to a reclaiming of their self-identified homeland, as the Jewish diaspora sought to return to Israel and Judea, the Armenian diaspora sought to reclaim the Armenian highlands and the Greek diaspora sought to reclaim Byzantium and Western Anatolia. In these instances, the reclaimed “homeland” does historically coincide with areas that were once occupied by that ethnicity, even if there are no longer any members of that ethnicity in the region. These historical claims often go back millennia and the “right” to a territory based on historical ties is largely self-identified by leaders in the diaspora community. For example, following the Armenian genocide in 1915, the
Armenian population in eastern Anatolia was decimated; however, Eastern Anatolia is still considered to be “historic” Armenia by groups within the Armenian diaspora due to the cultural and historical ties to the region, in spite of the lack of ethnic Armenians living there today (Tololyan 1996). The similar histories of these diasporas contributed to a classical definition of diaspora as “victim diasporas.”

However, with the rise of independence and nationalist movements following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the use of the word diaspora resurfaced and began to take more colloquial definitions in both academic and public speech. The term “diaspora” has expanded in recent years to mean nearly any dispersed population, ranging from other groups that faced coerced dispersion, such as refugee groups; to voluntary dispersion, such as ex-patriates; to shared identities of marginalized peoples, such as the “LGBTQ diaspora.” As a result, the term “diaspora” is under threat of concept stretching, where the definition becomes so vague that the term becomes meaningless (Baser and Swain 2010).

This is where the camps diverge. Despite noting that the definition of diaspora is under threat of meaninglessness, Baser and Swain (2010, 39) follow a constructivist route, arguing that “[a diaspora] is an elite mobilized political project, and diaspora identity is constructed, rather than a natural result of mass migration.” Their argument is fairly simple. A diaspora is not any ethnic community, but rather a group of political activists that seek to affect change in the homeland through co-ethnic transnational mobilization. Through this definition, political goals matter more to a diaspora than ethnic identity, though ethnic identity is a necessary condition for membership to the diaspora. Other definitions focus on this point. Adamson (2012, 28) argues that “‘diasporas’ are best viewed as products or outcomes of transnational mobilization activities by political entrepreneurs engaged in strategic social identity construction.” Demmers (2002) and
Anderson (1983) describe diasporas as “imagined political communities,” where the communities are entirely “de-localized” in favor of transnational social movements without a clear center, but oriented toward achieving political goals in the homeland community. To briefly summarize this dense literature, constructivists state that diasporas are transnational political movements that form as a result of activities initiated by certain political elite that share ethnic identity.

In the other camp, primordialists believe that diasporas form naturally from migration, although not every ethnic migrant community can be considered a diaspora. Some primordialists, such as Walker Connor (1986), define “diaspora” in simple terms, stating that a diaspora is “the segment of people living outside their homeland.” In this definition, the homeland is self-defined by the “segment of people”; however, their connection and relation to their homeland remains undefined. In contrast to this, Safran (1991) notes six defining characteristics of diasporas, four of which define relation to the homeland. Safran’s defining characteristics are as follows: a diaspora population must be dispersed from a specific, original “center” to two or more periphery regions; must retain a collective memory or myth about the original homeland; is not or cannot be fully accepted by the host country; must regard ancestral home as a place to return to or as a true, ideal home; maintains a belief in the necessity to collectively maintain or support the homeland; and finally, the ethno-communal consciousness and solidarity of the diaspora must be defined through their relationship to the homeland. Many (incl. Clifford 1994) posit that Safran’s definition may be too strict, as his characterizations limit the definition to only a few groups, including the Jewish, Armenian and Greek diasporas. Despite the limitations to Safran’s definition, his key point is that the active relationship between homeland and diaspora is definitional to a diaspora community. Tololyan (1996) also notes that diasporas “actively
maintain a collective memory about the homeland,” maintain communal boundaries between themselves and the host country and keep in contact with other co-ethnics and the homeland. Tololyan believes that diasporas form naturally from migration; however, the active retention of a collective memory is reinforced through constructed institutions, such as cultural centers, religious institutions or simply through education at home. As a result, Tololyan’s argument is predominantly primordialist with aspects of institutionalized identity construction in line with a constructivist argument.

Brubaker (2005) summarizes these points shared between Connor, Sheffer (1986), Safran and Tololyan into a cogent working definition for diaspora that contains three components: a “diaspora” must be dispersed through space, maintain social boundaries between itself and the host country and orient itself towards the homeland. This triad of dispersion, social boundary-maintenance and homeland orientation captures the essential differences between a diaspora community and an ethnic migrant community, while still allowing for new communities to become diasporic. In sum, this definition is neither too strict nor too inclusive, allowing for new diasporas to form without allowing general migration patterns to be included in diasporan measurement. Brubaker’s definition will provide the groundwork for this thesis.

Why is a primordialist-dominated definition more suited for this paper? There are four reasons that constructivist definitions of “diaspora” seem misguided. Firstly, most constructivist definitions do not include homeland orientation, a necessity for studying the relationship between diasporas and secession. Without a defined homeland, a collective identity is difficult to construct and social movements would have different goals, though many constructivists continue to posit that the “LGBT transnational community” or “Muslim transnational community” are diasporas, despite a clear lack of a Muslim or LGBT homeland. Secondly,
actions common to maintaining a diasporan identity between co-ethnic communities do not have to be part of a broader social movement, but should be included as diasporan activities because they maintain connection to the homeland. This includes speaking in a native language or contributing to cultural or historical institutions, which allow for boundary maintenance and may orient the speaker to the native homeland, without directly taking a political stance. Thirdly, by framing all diasporas as politically-oriented transnational social movements, any measure of diasporan activity in the homeland will be inherently skewed towards political activity. If all diasporas are defined as inherently political, then the diaspora will affect all political movements within the homeland, obscuring any objective study into the true effect of transnational co-ethnics on the homeland. Finally, co-ethnic diasporas may have different political objectives, such as Zionist Jews and non-Zionist Jews in Europe prior to the establishment of Israel. In the constructivist definition, would the Zionist diaspora be separate from the Jewish diaspora? If the answer is yes, this argument seems like a severe misunderstanding of co-ethnic communities. In sum, to gain a more accurate definition of diaspora and to understand the varying impact of diaspora on secessionist movements, constructivist definitions of diaspora will not be utilized in this paper.

To further extrapolate on the working definition of “diaspora,” as utilized by Brubaker, I have summarized his argument in a few paragraphs, supplemented by other primordialist arguments and Tololyan’s constructivist elements. First, a diaspora must be dispersed through space. This is a broad qualification, but a diaspora includes members from the entire dispersed ethnic population. There is some debate whether the dispersion qualification includes intrastate or solely interstate dispersion, as diasporas historically refer to dispersion outside the homeland, which may not be fully
encapsulated by state lines. For the sake of this paper, intrastate dispersion, such as internally displaced persons, will not be counted as part of the diaspora to preserve the importance of the triangle relationship between host country, diaspora and homeland (Safran 1991). Host countries inherently treat citizens or residents, such as internally displaced persons (IDPs), differently than transnational co-ethnics, adding a further complication in the host-diaspora relationship. Additionally, while an internally displaced individual may be outside their homeland, but still within the same country that their traditional homeland is a part of, they are still subject to the same laws and regulations, constraining their ability to connect to and act along with the rest of the diaspora. For example, an Iranian Kurd who is displaced to Tehran from Iranian Kurdistan is not yet a member of the Iranian Kurdish diaspora, as (s)he is still subject to Iranian policies that limit Kurdish cultural practices and political activity. These limitations and that individual’s removal from the homeland, where the majority of connection between homeland and diaspora occurs, lead to difficulties connecting with the diaspora community. While intrastate dispersed populations often behave as a diaspora and fit Brubaker’s definitions of dispersion, the complicated nature of the relationship between ethnic minority citizens of the host country living outside their homeland and the host country changes the triangle relationship between diasporas, the homeland and the host country too drastically to be included in this paper. In sum, the first definitional characteristic of a diaspora is that a diaspora is dispersed through space outside of the country that includes the homeland.

Secondly, a diaspora must have a homeland orientation. Safran (1991) expands on this definition in his qualifications, stating that a diaspora has a collective memory about perceived homeland, views its homeland as an “ideal” home or a place to eventually return, is committed to the maintenance and restoration of the homeland and relates to the homeland in a way that
shapes the collective diaspora’s identity. While Safran’s definition of diaspora is too limiting for this paper, the key to understanding homeland orientation is the consensus about the general borders of the homeland, which the diaspora largely defines for itself, and an emotional or identifying characteristic of the relationship between diaspora and homeland. In many instances, the identifying characteristic of the connection between diaspora and homeland is emotional, such as a collective memory about genocide, but other identifying characteristics can drive the relationship, such as a unique shared religion with elements rooted in the physical homeland. As Tololyan (1996) notes, these qualifiers separate a diaspora from an “ethnic community” residing in another country, as members of a diaspora actively and intentionally work towards supporting the home country, rather than simply sending home remittances or attending cultural events. Safran notes that this excludes the Roma population from being included in a diaspora, due to the lack of perceived “homeland” amongst the Roma. In sum, the second definitional characteristic of a diaspora is that a diaspora is oriented towards the homeland through a collective emotional or unique identifying characteristic.

Finally, diasporas practice social boundary-maintenance. Through either a collective unwillingness to assimilate or social exclusion in the host country that forces a lack of assimilation, diasporas are not fully included as members of the host country. Despite sometimes being citizens of the host country, members of a diaspora distinguish themselves from the general populace culturally, religiously or socially. This segregation or self-segregation allows for a distinctive transnational community, as Armenians in Poland may readily connect with Armenians in the United States, forming a diaspora. Brubaker additionally notes that this disconnect between the host country and the diaspora must have a time aspect to be considered a diaspora, as most immigrant communities take time to adjust, but a generational disconnect
qualifies a diaspora. As a result of these general qualifications, the term “diaspora” certainly becomes more defined, though more difficult to measure, as ethnic migration measured in most censuses is no longer the sole definition of a diasporic community. Active boundary maintenance and homeland orientation implies a deeper relation to the homeland than solely blood relations or ethnic ties, but rather a mindset that affects certain individuals more than others. Safran (1991) notes the difference between “active” and “passive” individuals in a diaspora, noting that passive members can be activated, but should not be considered members of the diaspora until they are actively involved in boundary maintenance in the host country. This distinction further muddies the water for acquiring quantifiable data on diaspora populations, as passive and active members are largely self-identified. In sum, the third and final definitional characteristic of a diaspora is social boundary maintenance, where the diaspora does not assimilate into the host society either by choice or as a result of social exclusion in the host society.

While Brubaker does not directly include active participation in the homeland as a qualification for a diaspora, Tololyan (1995) and Sheffer (2003) both discuss the importance of active membership to a diaspora. Cultural and social activity are part of maintaining cultural boundaries and potential connection to the homeland. Sending remittances back to family in the homeland, fiscal or social support of political parties or activist groups in the homeland or funding cultural and traditional sites in the host country or homeland are common forms of “active boundary maintenance” amongst diasporas and prevent full assimilation into the host society. Diasporic activity is an important piece to consider when calculating the size or influence of a diaspora, as passive members or assimilated members are not included in size or engagement estimates of a diaspora. The choice to actively maintain boundaries and resist
assimilation as a component of the definition of an engaged diaspora demonstrates some
constructivist elements to the primarily primordialist definition that will be utilized in this paper.

To clearly state the operative definition of diaspora as outlined above, a diaspora must be
dispersed through space outside of the metropole that contains the homeland, oriented towards
the homeland through a collective emotional memory or identifying characteristic and
maintaining social boundaries in the hostland. An engaged diaspora actively maintains social
boundaries and participates in homeland affairs or in cultural or social activities with members of
the diaspora in the hostland.

Definition of Diaspora Engagement:

In order to create an operable framework for diaspora engagement, political, economic
and ideological engagement are all considered parts of diaspora engagement. Engagement in
general speaks to the degree of activity practiced by the diaspora on behalf of the homeland. In
the case of national secessionist campaigns in the homeland, diaspora engagement with the
homeland is likely in conjunction with the secessionist campaign and engagement follows pro-
secessionist sentiments. As a result, a member of the diaspora can be considered engaged by
actively practicing political, economic or ideological engagement or any combination of the
three forms that supports the homeland.

Political engagement is a member of the diaspora’s support of the homeland through
political means. Political engagement requires a member of the diaspora to act within the
political sphere, enacting influence on homeland politics, hostland politics or international
politics. Political activities would include establishing lobby organizations to garner support for
the diaspora or the homeland, voting in the homeland or in the host country for pro-diaspora
candidates or donating to political organizations, campaigns or parties that support the diaspora or the homeland. As an example, the Jewish diaspora in the United States is highly politically engaged, as a number of pro-Israel lobby organizations exist and some members of the Jewish diaspora vote for candidates based on their perceived support of Israel. Lobbying international organizations, such as the European Union, is also considered to be political engagement.

Economic engagement relates to the economic support between a member of the diaspora and the homeland. Sending remittances, investing in infrastructure or businesses in the homeland or intentionally engaging in trade with the homeland as a result of ethnic ties are all forms of economic engagement. With regard to secessionist campaigns, economic engagement can take the form of funding weapon supplies, relief efforts, aid from NGOs or sending remittances to family members in the homeland. Each of these forms of economic engagement encourages the secessionist movement to continue and marginally strengthens the campaign through economic support.

Finally, ideological engagement relates to non-economic or political support of the homeland by a member of the diaspora. Ideological support for the homeland comes in a number of forms, from protesting or demonstrating on behalf of the homeland in the host country to producing pro-secessionist media, such as books, film, articles and newspapers, to encouraging the success of a secessionist campaign on social media. Ideological support can also come from establishing or contributing to co-ethnic cultural or education centers to raise awareness about the homeland. Ideological engagement is key to diaspora engagement, as ideological support of the homeland or co-ethnic secessionist campaign provides necessary support to fighters in the homeland and contributes to the “diasporan mindset,” which will be discussed later.
In addition, not all actions can be perfectly boxed into political, economic or ideological engagement, as there is significant overlap between the categories. Activities without a clear categorization are still considered as part of diaspora engagement, such as joining a secessionist army in the homeland, which is both a political and ideological action. However, the three different forms of engagement for members of a diaspora with the homeland will act as a framework for understanding the relationship between diasporas and secessionist success.

**Definition of Secession and Success:**

In order to study the relationship between diasporas and the success of secessionist movements, the qualifications of a secessionist movement and the definition of a successful secession must be clarified. This paper specifically focuses on national secessionist movements, which will be defined utilizing Roeder’s (2018) definition of a national secession campaign:

“National secessionism is a political program claiming that a population residing inside another sovereign state constitutes a nation that has a right to its own sovereign state within the part of the common-state’s territory that the nation considers its homeland”

The key aspect to this definition is the homeland consideration. A national secessionist campaign claims that the seceding population is not simply a collection of individuals seeking new governance, but a distinct nation with a self-identified homeland. This definition differentiates national secessionist movements from regional secessionist movements, such as movements seeking to establish an independent Republic of Texas. These regional secessionist movements, where the seceding territory does not constitute the national homeland of the campaign, will not be explored in this study. Additionally, while secessionist movements fall into the broader categories of statehood campaigns, which seek to build a state or receive autonomy, and peoplehood campaigns, which seek to construct a national or regional identity, national
secessionist movements will focus solely on the claim of an independent sovereign homeland state by a population residing within a larger sovereign state.

However, Roeder’s definition still needs some clarification. According to Stein (dis. 2016), only four existing states constitute successful secessionist movements, as the creation of independent states through decolonization or through the dissolution of larger states, such as the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, do not qualify as secessionist campaigns. Stein’s reasoning for not including the USSR and Yugoslavia centers around the perceived lack of clarity between a “top-down” collapse of a governmental system through decisions by the central government or a “bottom-up” collapse due to actions by individual secessionist states. According to Coggins (2011), the creation of independent states through decolonization constitute national secessionist movements, such as the secession of Algeria from the French Empire. Roeder (2018) includes the creation of states through the dissolution of states as secessionist campaigns, but does not consider campaigns that support decolonization as a secessionist movement. For the purposes of this study, states that emerge from colonial empires will not be considered national secession campaigns, as the secessionist territory must be from a population residing within the metropole rather than from an external territory (Roeder 2018). As a result, to clarify the definition above, the “common-state’s territory” must be metropole and cannot include colonial territories. Colonial secession campaigns contribute many additional variables that do not apply to metropole national secessionist movements and maintain a different status from metropole territories, preventing an accurate determination of the relationship between diasporas and secessionist campaigns. However, in contrast to Stein, dissolution of states will be included in national secessionist campaigns, as long as the newly independent states are created within the established definition. This maintains Roeder’s definition of national secessionist movements,
where dissolution of states, such as the USSR and Yugoslavia, is included, but decolonization campaigns are not included in the definition.

Success of a secession movement should be clarified as well. While the vast majority of the literature notes that the goal of a national secessionist movement is to create an independent state, the definition of the independent state is unclear. Many (Belanger et al. 2005; Coggins 2011) consider an independent state to achieve success upon a threshold of international recognition. Roeder (2018) does not explicitly state the requirement for international recognition for success, but implies a necessity for international acceptance of a state through the campaigns that he declares successful. Other studies utilize the 1934 Montevideo Convention definitions of a state, which requires a permanent population, defined territory, independent government and capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states. Scott Pegg (1988) first discusses the definition of de facto states as having “an organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time.” He then continues to state that such states seek “full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition.” Dov Lynch (2004) highlights this definition by denoting the differences between judicial and empirical notions of statehood. De facto states usually have not achieved the “capacity to enter into diplomatic relations” outlined in the Montevideo Convention and usually are seeking international recognition, which would prevent most de facto states from achieving judicial statehood. Achieving a recognized legitimate state through international judicial channels would require widespread international recognition, which Coggins (2011), Roeder (2018) and Belanger (2005) require for secessionist success.
However, there is another measure for success of a secessionist movement, utilizing the empirical notion of statehood outlined by Lynch (2004). The empirical notion of statehood would define an independent state through the first three qualifications in the Montevideo Convention: an independent government, a permanent population and a defined territory. A successful state would have internal sovereignty, defined as supreme authority of the governing body over the population of a specified territory. While the de facto state would be lacking judicial independence and external sovereignty, the secessionist movement would be empirically successful, a necessary step to eventually achieving fully recognized independence. For the purposes of this study, I will define the success of a national secessionist movement as achieving an independent government with a defined territory and a permanent population.

To further discuss these three definitions, an independent government would mean an established political system with supreme authority over a defined territory, such as the Republic of China (Taiwan), which has an independent government with supreme authority over the island of Taiwan, despite being unrecognized by the majority of the international community. A successful independent government would have internal sovereignty, as defined above, and established by the de facto state. Additionally, a successful independent government is politically stable and should not struggle to maintain political legitimacy from the majority of the governed populace. While political legitimacy is difficult to measure and collect data on, it is worth mentioning, as historical instances where an independent government collapsed within a few years of independence should not be considered successful, such as the short-lived Crimean Republic in 1917. In sum, an independent government is successfully established when the governed population believes the territory is an independent state and when the government is politically stable and internally sovereign.
Defined territory in the context of an empirically successful state is dependent on two factors: an agreed-upon definition of borders by the *de facto* government and an ability to maintain and protect those borders. A collective, governmental definition of the governed territory is necessary for a successful and stable state. The ability to protect those borders from the larger metropolitan state in case of invasion is necessary for stability as well. In the case of the Republic of Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh), the Artsakh Defense Army protects the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani military with some military and arms assistance from Armenia, allowing the government of Artsakh to maintain its defined borders. The key difference between foreign military assistance and dependency is the ability to hold a standing army that can defend borders without a permanent foreign army. If the only army within Artsakh was the Armenian army or the Armenian army intended on maintaining a permanent force that the Artsakh army relied on for protection, then dependency would be reached and the secessionist movement would not be successful in creating an independent state.

Finally, a permanent population requires a little clarification. A successful state must have a permanent settled population over which to govern without significant, sustained outflow of migrants. If the governed population does not intend to remain in the established state, then the state will inherently fail. A successful state maintains a loyal population that supports the established political system and seeks to maintain independence from the larger metropolitan state. In sum, for this paper, a successful secessionist movement establishes an empirically-independent state with an independent government, defined territory and a permanent population.
Previous Exploration of the Relationship between Diasporas and Secession:

The literature on the relationship between diaspora communities and successful secessionist movements is relatively scant. There are very few quantitative studies that measure this relationship with a wide array of results and the majority of qualitative discussions on this topic center around the same few cases: Palestine, Northern Ireland, Kosovo, Sri Lanka and Kurdistan. However, there seem to be three waves of literature that appeared regarding diasporas and their potential to affect secessionism in the homeland.

The first wave appeared in the early 1980s, when the role of diasporas began to transition from the classical definition of Armenians, Greeks and Jews to a broader, modern definition. Sheffer (1986) explicitly states that the study of modern diasporas is new and motivated by “observation that while these triadic relations [between diaspora, homeland and host country] are becoming an integral and permanent feature of current national and international politics, they have not been adequately studied.” The remainder of the collection of 1986 essays predominantly discuss the role of the homeland on the diaspora, coinciding with Cold War fears that states would utilize their diasporas for espionage or to affect change in other states. However, Horowitz (1986) discusses the ways that diasporas can incite or contribute to communal conflicts, through encouraging irredentist movements, such as the Turkish Cypriots attempting to rejoin Turkey, and through sending remittances and weapons to the homeland to encourage separatist conflict, such as the Irish diaspora monetarily supporting Northern Irish secession from the United Kingdom. Horowitz (1985) also directly states that “whether and when a secessionist movement will emerge is determined mainly by domestic politics… Whether the secessionist movement achieves its aims, however, is determined largely by international politics… occasionally, external relations reinforce separatist proclivities.”
Harik (1986) notes that Palestinian Arab support for Palestinian independence incentivized the duration and intensity of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, as secessionist organizations received remittances and external support that allowed for their continued existence in the face of military defeat. Esman (1986) notes that diasporas “may attempt to directly influence events in a home country” and discusses the Croatian diaspora in central Europe smuggling weapons into Yugoslavia to support Croatian independence and the Irish diaspora funding the Irish Revolutionary Army in Northern Ireland. While no quantitative studies were conducted, there was evidence that diasporas contributed to the intensity and duration of homeland conflicts and supported a number of secessionist movements. In addition, the three conflicts mentioned each had different outcomes, as the Northern Ireland secessionist movement was unsuccessful, the Croatian secessionist movement was successful and the Palestinian secessionist movement has not been resolved. As a result, the literature from this first wave demonstrates that diasporas contribute to the intensity and duration of secessionist movements and homeland conflicts, but does not claim that diasporas improve the likelihood of secessionist success.

The next wave of diaspora conflict literature emerged at the fall of the Soviet Union, where newly opened borders and new emerging states drove the exploration of ethnic conflict, secessionist movements and diasporas. The emergence of the Minorities at Risk dataset in the 1990s drove a few quantitative studies investigating the relationship between secessionist success and diasporas. Gurr (1994) states that maintained social boundaries between diasporas and the hostland leads to increased loyalty to the homeland, potentially highlighting gaps for diaspora members to support conflict in the homeland. Saideman and Ayres (2000) measured “segments of ethnic kin in other states” as a significant variable for inciting secessionist
movements in the 1990s but not in the 1980s, which they find surprising; however, as this study is a comparison between causes of irredentism and secession, Saideman and Ayres merely state that this shows that irredentism and secession are not interchangeable and leave much of the interpretation of their results up to the reader. Sheffer (2003) notes that stateless diaspora leaders utilize more intense tactics to convince diaspora members that independence is important and instill a strong sense of identity and mobilization into their diaspora members. This long-distance nationalism (Anderson 1992) drives an intergenerational desire for the ultimate goal of an independent homeland, causing factions within diasporas, such as the Sikhs, Kurds and Palestinians, to stray towards supporting violent separatism. Shefer (2003) also notes that a range of strategies can be employed by diasporas instead of supporting a secessionist strategy, ranging from full assimilation and integration into the host country to increased autonomy and separatism, and that strategies are chosen by individuals within the diaspora depending on the desired degree of cultural preservation. Sheffer (2003), Gurr (1994) and Saideman and Ayres (2000) each highlight that there are opportunities for diasporas to make an impact on ethnic conflicts and secessionist movements, with Saideman and Ayres even stating that co-ethnics living abroad are a significant factor in starting secessionist movements.

Additionally, the literature regarding diasporas as transnational social movements arises during this time period. Many (Baser and Swain 2010; Adamson 2012; Demmers 2002) note that diaspora activism strengthens secessionist movements and achieves the goal of getting increased international attention. Additionally, Demmers (2002) and Baser and Swain (2010) theorize that the physical removal from the realities of a conflict causes diasporas to encourage a strategy that encourages a refusal to negotiate, increasing the duration of secession movements with mobilized diasporas. Hockenos (2003) also notes similar psychological effects of Balkan
diaspora members contributing to secessionist movements in the homeland, as he notes that a feeling of “exile” produces regret and sharpened vision for political diaspora leaders. This sharpened vision is often radicalizing and encourages an intent to return to an improved homeland and a desire to expedite that return through encouraging political change through any means necessary. Safran (1991) also notes the “myth of return,” that he claims is inherent within a diaspora, is the center of political mobilization for the diaspora.

Through this set of studies, a picture of a “diasporan mindset” emerges, as certain diaspora members become fixated on an idealized historical memory or myth regarding the homeland, driving their intent to return to some form of utopian homeland. This idealized viewpoint has the potential to be exacerbated by social media and ideological engagement, which furthers the logic of a connected ethnic community online. The maintenance of social boundaries outlined in the definition of diaspora has the potential to exaggerate this phenomenon, as the diasporan individual only interacts with co-ethnics and collectively maintains an intention to return to an ethnically-homogenous utopian homeland that likely never existed. This nationalist radicalizing phenomenon is demonstrated in Gourgen Yanikian’s 1973 assassination of two Turkish diplomats. Yanikian, an Armenian septuagenarian living in the United States since 1946 without significant incident, assassinated two Turkish diplomats in California “in retaliation for the Armenian Genocide,” an event that had happened over fifty years prior. Yanikian’s interactions were primarily within the diaspora and his nationalist rhetoric stemmed from his own ideology of revenge for all Armenians. Tololyan (1987) states that Yanikian is understood through a “resonating roll-call that blurs history, context, and nuance,” in reference to the support that Yanikian received from many members of the Armenian community. While the event has no clear significance to seeking secession, it is a primary example of how a “diasporan mindset” can
radicalize members of a diaspora. Once again, although the relationship between diaspora mobilization and secessionist success are not explicitly stated or studied, members of diasporas continue to affect secessionist movements through the ideological support of the “diasporan mindset.”

Finally, a modern wave of quantitative literature regarding ethnic state construction has emerged. Coggins (2011) argues that ethnic “distinctiveness” is not a significant cause for state birth, but does state that external support is the most significant factor for states achieving judicial statehood through independence campaigns. Saideman (2001; 2002) and Carment and James (1997) assert that shared ethnic ties are the central factor to third-state intervention in conflict, which, when coupled with Coggins (2011) would imply that diaspora populations are a central cause for successful statehood. In a similar vein, Arva and Piazza (2016) incorporate diasporas into the civil war and terrorism literature, stating that diasporas are significant in increasing use of terrorism in civil war conflicts.

The key to this paper is that, while a number of studies have been conducted on the relationship between engaged diasporas and secessionist movements, each of them measures a different variable with regard to secessionist movements. The variation of this set of studies is best highlighted in Table 1A.
Table 1A: Previous Explorations of the Effect of the Diaspora on Secession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Example Studies</th>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scheffer (1986, 2003); Horowitz (1985); Saideman and Ayres (2002)</td>
<td>Creation of Secessionist movements</td>
<td>Mixed, only some studies state that diasporas incite secessionist movements or increase likelihood of secessionist strategies to achieve statehood goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coggins (2011); Roeder (2018)</td>
<td>International Recognition of states following secessionist campaigns</td>
<td>No, the existence of diaspora communities do not increase the likelihood of international recognition of a secessionist state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harik (1986)</td>
<td>Duration of secessionist conflict</td>
<td>Yes, the existence of an engaged diaspora has increased the length of secessionist conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arva and Piazza (2015)</td>
<td>Use of Terrorism</td>
<td>Yes, an engaged diaspora increases likelihood of terrorism in civil conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esman (1986); Harik (1986)</td>
<td>Intensity of secessionist conflict</td>
<td>Yes, an engaged diaspora increases the likelihood of violence in resolving secessionist disputes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roeder (2018); Baser and Swain (2010)</td>
<td>Media coverage of secessionist campaign</td>
<td>Mixed, some studies argue that diasporas increase international media attention through protest and lobbying, while Roeder finds that “resourced diasporas” do not increase international media coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As seen above, the literature has not formed a consensus on the role of diasporas in different aspects of secessionist movements. Some studies demonstrate clear impact of diasporas on secessionist movements but others claim that diasporas play no role at all in achieving statehood. While duration, intensity and use of terrorism have all been covered as a form of types of diasporan involvement, the end result of this protracted violence has only been explored with reference to international recognition. However, no studies have explored the relationship between an engaged diaspora and secessionist success as defined as a de facto or empirical state.
As a result, there is a major gap in the literature when success is defined as empirical independence rather than recognized independence, which this study intends to fill.

Therefore, as the literature shows that diasporas have an effect on secessionist movements and the role of the “diasporan mindset” in emphasizing nationalist tendencies, the hypothesis for this paper becomes clear:

\textit{H1: An engaged diaspora increases the likelihood of a successful secessionist movement}

To clarify the causal mechanism of this study, the hypothesis stems from the following logic. Firstly, a diaspora develops in a host country. As previously stated, this begins in a variety of ways through forced or voluntary migration; however, each diaspora that develops actively maintains social boundaries between itself and the host society and remains connected to the homeland. Separately, a national secession movement arises that seeks to reclaim the ethnic homeland of the diaspora. While the diaspora may have played a part in the rise of the secessionist movement, that will not be the focus of this study, as a number of scholars in the literature have focused on the connection between diasporas and secessionist movement creation. A focus of this investigation will be the economic, political and ideological engagement that diaspora communities use to strengthen the secessionist movement in the homeland, leading to an increased likelihood of the success of the secessionist movement, as defined empirically. In sum, higher levels of diaspora engagement should lead to higher likelihood of secessionist campaign strength and success.

To discuss the competing explanations for successful secessionist movements, there are four main competing explanations: the vulnerability approach, the tactical and logistical opportunities approach, the grievance approach, and the programmatic coordination approach. I
will give a brief outline of each approach here, as well as some counterpoints, and then delve into how I seek to control for each variable in the “data and methodology” section.

The vulnerability approach follows the logic that when the metropolitan state is more vulnerable, the likelihood of a successful secessionist campaign increases. Political and economic instability increase the likelihood of secessionist campaigns arising and becoming successful, due to the weakness of the internal structure of the state. Belanger et al. (2005) introduce one of the critiques of the vulnerability approach, stating that the vulnerability approach fails to explain vulnerable state support for other secessionist movements. Other vulnerable states support secessionist movements, such as Italian support for Croatian independence from Yugoslavia, despite Italian economic instability and ongoing secessionist movements, such as South Tyrol. If secessionism is more successful when your state is vulnerable, then supporting another secessionist movement would seem foolish for a vulnerable state. However, as Heraclides (1990) and Belanger et al (2005) point out, multiethnic and vulnerable states are equally as likely as homogenous and stable states to support secessionist movements. This study seeks to control for state vulnerability, allowing investigation of the hypothesis that successful secessionist movements would be strengthened by engaged diasporas regardless of metropole political stability.

The tactical and logistical approach is a group of explanations that identify environmental and strategic conditions that give secessionist movements more success. These explanations include distance of seceding region from the capital, topographical advantages within the seceding region, economic resources within the seceding region and regime type of the metropolitan state (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2001; Arva and Piazza 2016; Belanger et al 2005). For example, Belanger, Duschene and Paquin (2005) contest that
ties drive successful secessionist movements and promote similar “regime type” as a factor for external state support. While each of these reasons may increase the success of a campaign, it is unlikely that any one of them is the primary cause for a campaign’s success. Competing factors play larger roles than any of these variables, as a variable like topographical advantage does not have an altitude threshold that allows for a successful campaign. In sum, these explanations may contribute to explanations of success, but are unlikely to be a competing factor with diaspora support. As a result, I will investigate the more precise role of these competing factors in this study.

The grievance approach is an additional explanation that focuses on the incentive to begin secessionist movements, but is unlikely to contribute to the success of these campaigns. With regard to economic grievances, economic hardship and discrimination towards the seceding region is shown to increase terrorism and violence within the campaign (Piazza 2011; 2012). Fearon and Laitin (2003) additionally claim that poverty is a strong predictor for civil war conflict. However, Roeder (2018) finds that economic discrimination has no significance in his datasets and while economic grievance may drive anger and resentment against the majority population, it is not shown to increase secessionist success. Additionally, Anderson, von der Mehden and Young (1967, 71) criticize the usage of economics to explain secession, stating that “economic arguments may be used by separators to rationalize withdrawal but are rarely accepted as persuasive grounds for renouncing fragmentation by determined secessionist movements.” In general, economic grievances seem to be a symptom of successful secessionist campaigns rather than a cause; however, poverty and economic discrimination will need to be controlled in the case selection. Additionally, political grievances, such as political or cultural discrimination, have been shown to lead to the mobilization and development of secessionist
movements (Anderson 2004). Anderson (2004) argues political grievances in a federalist or democratic framework lead to strong mobilization around secessionist movements, which he believes will lead to success. While his main example is Quebec, which already has a significant amount of autonomy and has failed to pass a referendum regarding independence, political grievances will also need to be controlled by demonstrating political repression does not solely lead to successful secession.

Roeder (2018) finds that resourced expatriates do not significantly increase the international media attention (significance) of a national secessionist campaign. Roeder utilizes a “Programmatic Coordination” explanation for secessionist success, stating that secessionist campaigns are most likely to be successful when each component of the campaign has the same coordinated end goals and maintains the same strategic goals throughout the campaign. As Roeder states, the programmatic coordination explanation is intended to be complementary to other competing explanations, not to replace them. Diaspora support of a campaign seems to be a potential cog in the campaign that Roeder writes off as a competing explanation. However, Roeder defines diaspora support as “resourced diasporas,” which measures wealth and influence of a diaspora in the host country, but does not necessarily measure engagement in the homeland. In addition, if diasporas support the same goals as the rest of the campaign and fund the campaign with military, ideological or economic support, then programmatic coordination could complement the diasporan explanation. In sum, there is no reason why diaspora leaders could not be considered a component of a national secession campaign, so long as they communicate and coordinate their goals with the campaign within the homeland.
Data and Methodology

This study follows a qualitative, case study approach to measuring the relationship between an engaged diaspora and homeland secessionist movements.

Case Selection:

In order to determine this relationship, I selected two case studies, Kosovo and Tatarstan, in order to measure internal validity, varying the key independent variable, the engagement of diasporas, across both cases, while attempting to hold competing independent variables constant. By varying the levels of diaspora engagement and holding competing variables constant, the spectrum of secessionist success will be fully dependent on levels of diaspora engagement.

However, finding cases without any additional variation in competing or complementary factors is nearly impossible in the real world and studies in the field of social science are unable to fully control away competing variables. Utilizing case studies can highlight relationships and causal mechanisms within these cases, but every case will have some exceptions to the rule (Howard 2017). There is no absolute in measuring the limited set of case studies or dataset that can isolate a factor within the complex network of human interactions that contribute to secessionist campaigns. However, if similar cases with differing engaged diaspora levels exist, then a clear relationship between diaspora engagement and secessionist success can be easily determined. By attempting to isolate diasporan engagement, the eventual outcome of secessionism will more clearly demonstrate the relationship between engagement and success, even if the relationship does not exist at all (Howard 2017). However, any qualitative study, due to smaller sample size, is more susceptible to spuriousness and data outliers, as a sample size of two where one of the cases is an outlier could potentially lead to misleading results. Quantitative
studies can easily track outliers and misleading trends in ways that qualitative studies cannot, but quantitative studies also have a difficult time identifying causal mechanisms. However, through thoughtful case selection with existing datasets, I will ideally minimize potential spuriousness of results.

Description of Variables:

In order to determine the success of secessionist campaigns, the operable definition of success must be measurable. While cases were not selected on the basis of secessionist success, a clear framework for how the dependent variable is measured is necessary for identifying the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. As previously stated, a successful secessionist movement establishes an empirically-independent state with an independent government, defined territory and a permanent population. In sum, if the established territory is able to create a de facto state, then the secessionist movement will be declared successful. To measure de facto states, I will utilize Florea’s “De Facto States in International Relations (1945-2011)” dataset, as his criteria for selecting de facto states is similar to the above criterion. To specify, Florea highlights seven criteria for a de facto state:

1. The territory belongs to or is administered by a recognized country, but is not a colonial possession.
2. The territory seeks some degree of separation from the metropole and has declared independence (or has demonstrated aspirations for independence, for example, through a referendum or a “sovereignty declaration”)
3. The governing state exerts military control over a territory inhabited by a permanent population
4. The governing state has not been sanctioned by the metropole government
5. The governing state performs basic functions of governance, such as the provision of social or political order
6. The state lacks international legal sovereignty (external sovereignty)
7. The state exists for a minimum of two years

The first two criteria are inherent to this study, as decolonization campaigns will not be measured and the focus of this paper centers around secessionist campaigns, so both cases have the potential to become a de facto state. The following criteria are similar to the aforementioned criteria of an independent government with a defined territory and a permanent population. The new addition to the previous criteria would be the two year minimum, which seems like an arbitrary yet reasonable timeframe to prove political stability. Florea’s dataset provides clarity to determining de facto states and supports the aforementioned definitions and criteria that I provide. However, the dataset is limited by timeframe and potential, as the dataset ends in 2011 and he does not include any analysis regarding potential new de facto states, perhaps in an attempt to avoid speculation. These limitations should not hinder the selected case studies dramatically, as both of the case study secessionist movements begin prior to 2011. The time periods of each secessionist campaign case will be discussed later in the paper.

A key independent variable to control for in measuring secessionist success is diaspora size. Due to the nature of diasporas, this variable is more difficult to measure than standard immigrant populations, as active boundary maintenance and homeland orientation cannot be directly recorded, but must be recorded through approximate measures. Most countries record immigrant stocks as foreign residents or dual citizens; however, these measures do not successfully record the differences between immigrant communities and diasporas, as many of
these dual citizens or immigrants are attempting to assimilate into the host country society or do not actively orient themselves towards the homeland. Additionally, ethnic minorities are recorded by their nationality in a number of official databases, rather than by ethnicity, meaning that an ethnic Tatar from Russia could be recorded as Russian. Despite these difficulties in utilizing insufficient data, the size of the diaspora relative to the total ethnic population size in the homeland is key to determining that a significant diaspora actually exists outside of the homeland, as a diaspora will be unable to have a significant impact on a secessionist movement if the size of the diaspora is limited to a few individuals living outside the homeland.

To determine diaspora size, I will be utilizing available migrant stocks in reporting countries as an inexact measure of the upper bound of diaspora size. Migrant stocks measure the total number of immigrants entering the country by country of origin. While this data by itself is highly inexact for measuring diaspora communities and usually gives little information regarding the ethnicity of the migrants, migrant stocks allow for a baseline estimate of minorities abroad. If recorded French migrant stocks report 10,000 migrants from Italy, but the Italian census reports that 16% of Italian nationals are ethnically Tyrolean German, a baseline assumption would be that approximately 1,600 Tyrolean Germans entered France. As a stand-alone data point, this extrapolation is fairly weak; however, this data will be coupled with available language data that reports the primary language spoken in each household. Many countries, including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Russia, among others, record the primary language or “mother tongue” spoken by household within the country, giving estimates of the number of native speakers within each country. For example, the United States records a few hundred households that speak Catalan as a primary language, which gives an estimate of the lower bound of a diaspora. With migrant stocks recording an upper bound and language data recording
a lower bound, diaspora size can be roughly estimated in those countries that record these data. Additionally, a few countries record “self-reported” ethnicity, which allows the respondent to identify themselves as a specific ethnicity, providing additional insight to diaspora size. Self-reported ethnicity is the most accurate measure for diaspora size, as ethnic minorities are allowed to identify with their ethnic background, preventing too much assumption on the part of the researcher; however, only a few countries record self-reported ethnicity, including Russia and Lithuania. Migrant stocks, primary language speakers and self-reported ethnicity will act as inexact proxies to measure approximate diaspora size.

The key independent variable in measuring secessionist success is diaspora engagement. Active participation in the homeland can be measured through a number of proxies, including remittances, existence of active lobbying organizations and anecdotal evidence, such as the existence of literature and social media accounts. Diaspora engagement remains the primary independent variable for measuring secessionist success and is measured through three channels: economic engagement, political engagement and ideological engagement. As a proxy for economic engagement, remittances measure the amount of income that a migrant community sends back to the homeland, allowing for insight into economic relationship between the diaspora and the homeland. Remittance data often does not show the exact location of the recipient, hindering knowledge of exact nominal support to the seceding homeland; however, when coupled with the data regarding diaspora size and host country captured above, a broader picture of diaspora support becomes clear. Remittance data is primarily captured on a country-to-country level, such as dollar amount of income from the United States to Russia, which does not highlight specific regional remittances, such as the share of remittances sent to Tatarstan. However, based on size estimates of the diaspora, remittance data can be estimated as a share of
the total remittance amount sent to the homeland. These are clearly rough estimates and largely unavoidable; however, in certain cases, such as in Spain, remittance amounts are broken down to a state-by-state basis, which allows for more accurate measurements of remittances received by specific ethnic households. Once again, remittances are an imperfect measure for economic support of the diaspora to the homeland, but remittance data remains the most reliable proxy for diasporan economic engagement.

As a proxy measurement of political engagement, active lobby organizations are reported in a number of countries. Most developed countries provide public lobby registries, some required by law and others reported voluntarily, but not every country provides lobbyist information, granting only some insight into political advocacy of a diaspora in the host country. If a lobby organization exists on behalf of a specific ethnic group or secessionist movement in any of the publically-available lobby registries, the group will highlight the political engagement of that diaspora in the homeland. By advocating for homeland or diaspora support in the hostland, the diaspora demonstrates political engagement and activism. To record the existence of diasporan public lobby organizations, keyword searches on official government lobby registers and specific bill tracking will successfully highlight existing diaspora lobby groups. The existence of diaspora-specific bills, such as a bill to recognize atrocities committed by Serbia against Kosovo, likely has the support of diaspora interest groups that would be recorded in a lobby registry. As a result, through keyword searches on lobby registries and bill tracking, existing diaspora organizations should sufficiently measure diaspora political engagement.¹

¹ In a previous version of this paper, public demonstrations of support, such as protests, were included as a measure of political engagement. Diaspora communities often seek to gain international attention through public showings of solidarity with the secessionist community. This paper included “public demonstrations of support” as an additional measure of political engagement, utilizing the Mass Mobilization Data Project dataset. However, this dataset only included protests in the metropole. No other collective dataset was located to comprehensively determine anti-government protests around the world.
With regard to non-database evidence, ideological engagement remains difficult to objectively measure. Firstly, to look at a subsection of ideological engagement, the existence of pro-secessionist sentiments over social media is an important measure. As the two case studies began prior to the existence of social media, Twitter and Facebook were selected as two older forms of social media to measure the later end of the measured timeframes. Twitter data goes as far back as 2006, whereas Facebook data reaches back to 2004. No database exists for every post with pro-secessionist positions on social media and a full sentiment analysis is beyond the scope of this study. However, key searches on Twitter and Facebook will uncover the existence of pro-secession pages and groups, where collective sentiments may occur. Search terms for Twitter will follow this format:

\[
\text{Kosovo (diaspora OR secession OR free OR leave OR independence OR independent OR finally OR albanian) until:2009-01-01 since:2006-01-01}
\]

Search terms for Facebook are confined to single-word search terms: “Kosovo,” “Shqipni,” and “Kosova.” While measuring groups with pro-secessionist ideas on Twitter and Facebook is an inexact proxy for the sentiments of a full diaspora, the existence of pro-secessionist or diasporan nationalist pages will add to the ideological narrative. These pages are public, which additionally limits the scope of accuracy for determining ideological support within the diaspora in private profiles or groups; however, the existence of any pro-secessionist groups or pages with a minimum membership of fifty individuals will be considered a sufficient data point for ideological engagement.

Additionally, other proxies for ideological engagement include diaspora-written pro-secessionist books and academic articles. These variables will simply be measured on a yes/no basis, as the existence of a pro-secessionist article in a peer-reviewed journal or a pro-
secessionist published book is a sufficient data point for ideological support. Through keyword searches on WorldCat and Dow Jones Factiva, two separate databases of books and media articles, I will be able to identify and collect data regarding pro-secessionist journal articles and other literature. However, due to the high volume of articles over the measured timeframe, analyzing randomly selected years within the timeframe may need to be implemented in order to control the scope of this measure. The combination of a diaspora-driven social media presence and an academic and literary ideological basis for secession among the diaspora community should act as a sufficient proxy for measuring ideological engagement.

Finally, a catch-all variable is needed for other direct diaspora engagement, such as arms support and joining secessionist forces. These forms of engagement fall into dual categories, such as economic and ideological support for sending weapons to the secessionist campaign. These two measures of engagement are difficult to measure, as armament totals or secessionist army strength are rarely reported and usually roughly estimated. In order to measure arms support and diaspora military support to the homeland secessionist movement, this paper will rely on news sources collected through key searches on Factiva. Similar to the above measures, measurement for this variable relies on media reporting in order to determine if any examples of arms donations or military support occurred within the diaspora. While a significantly inexact proxy, these media articles will provide some insight into the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland secessionist movement.

Once again, similar to measuring diaspora size, each of these measures are inexact, as there is not yet any database that records diaspora literature data. A description of the data used to measure diaspora size and engagement is summarized in Table 2A.
Table 2A: Diaspora Size and Engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV₁A: Diaspora Size</td>
<td>Migrant Stocks</td>
<td>UN Data: “Foreign Population (non-citizens) by country of citizenship, age and sex”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₁A: Diaspora Size</td>
<td>Primary Language Data</td>
<td>Country-dependent census data (United States, Canada, UK, Russia, European Union)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₁A: Diaspora Size</td>
<td>Self-reported Ethnicity</td>
<td>Country-dependent census data (Russia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVᵦ: Diaspora Economic Engagement</td>
<td>Remittances</td>
<td>World Bank: “Bilateral Remittance Matrix”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVᵦ: Diaspora Political Engagement</td>
<td>Lobby Organizations</td>
<td>Public lobby registers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVᵦ: Diaspora Ideological Engagement</td>
<td>Pro-Secessionist Social Media Groups</td>
<td>Keyword searches on Twitter and Facebook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVᵦ: Diaspora Ideological Engagement</td>
<td>Pro-Secessionist Literature and Academia</td>
<td>Worldcat, Factiva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IVᵦ: Diaspora Engagement (Catchall)</td>
<td>Arms Sales and Military Recruits from Diaspora</td>
<td>Factiva</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the quality of data, official country censuses form the basis for the World Bank and UN Data databases, as well as for the measurements of primary language and self-reported ethnicity. While official country-wide censuses are not perfect due to inherent margins of error and potential politically-motivated underreporting, the census is the best and most accessible metric for measuring data on diasporas. Notably, only certain countries measure primary language, which each country measures differently, ranging from “mother tongue/first language” to “additional languages spoken” to “language spoken at home.” Each of these
measures contribute to estimating a diaspora size, with the obvious caveat that diaspora size can only be estimated through proxy measures and cannot be exactly calculated by any current means.

With regard to measures of diaspora engagement, lobby organizations are self-reported by certain countries with transparency laws, including the United States, the European Union, France and the United Kingdom. Germany only has a voluntary public lobbying register, so not every German lobby group will be accessible; however, the German state of Saxony-Anhalt does have a required public lobbying register, which will partially contribute to determining diaspora engagement in Germany. Measuring public self-reported lobby registers has a few setbacks. Firstly, the list is clearly not exhaustive, as only a few countries have publicly accessible lobby registers, limiting the data to only a few, mostly European countries. Secondly, the data is self-reported meaning that governments may attempt to manipulate the lobbying data by hiding certain registered organizations. Thirdly, lobby organizations often do not report their clients, allowing for lobby groups to offer anonymity to potential governments or external actors. However, despite these shortcomings, the existence of lobbying organizations with specific diasporan initiatives will serve as a measure for diaspora engagement. To clarify, evidence of engagement would include the Albanian American Civil League lobbying the U.S. House of Representatives to pass a bill declaring support for Kosovo independence in 2007. While this is not an exact nominal measure, it provides evidence to diaspora engagement in the host country. Anecdotal evidence, such as the existence of a pro-secessionist literature or pro-secessionist social media campaigns or posts, will be included as supplemental evidence to diaspora engagement as measured by remittances and lobbying organizations. In sum, engagement will be partially nominal, based on the amount of remittances sent to the homeland and number of
measured pro-secessionist protests, and partially qualitative and anecdotal, based on the evidence of lobbying campaigns, pro-secessionist literature and social media campaigns.

In addition to the key independent variable, I seek to control for a number of competing approaches. The first competing approach is the vulnerability approach, which states that secessionist success is most likely when the metropole regime is unstable. In order to control for this approach, the theoretical relationship must be outlined:

\[ H2: \text{Secessionist success is more likely when the metropole is more fragile} \]

The logic is that political and economic instability increase the vulnerability of a state to a secessionist movement, which leads to secessionist success, as the vulnerable metropole cannot effectively organize itself or collect the necessary resources to maintain control over the seceding territory. To measure state vulnerability, I will be utilizing the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragility Index, which determines the fragility of 167 countries on the basis of legitimacy and stability in each state’s security, economy, government and society. The State Fragility Index assigns a clear numerical value to each state from 1995 to 2018, allowing for an ability to control for state vulnerability based on average metropole fragility during each secessionist movement.

While the dataset allows for a clear, nominal measure of regime vulnerability, the State Fragility Index is not without faults. Many of the measures of state fragility are generalized in the index; for example, external military aid and foreign military intervention are considered to be independent measures of fragility. While external military aid may be a sign of state fragility, it may also be a sign of intercountry cooperation or technological advancement. These generalities in the measurement of state fragility can lead to a mischaracterization of true state vulnerability. However, with an awareness of these limitations, the State Fragility Index will continue to shed
clear insight into regime stability for this project. Table 2B highlights the variables and data utilized to control for the vulnerability approach.

Table 2B: Metropole Vulnerability to Secessionist Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV$_2$: Metropole Vulnerability</td>
<td>State Fragility</td>
<td>INSCR: “State Fragility Index”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next competing independent variables are tactical and logistical approaches, as outlined previously. There are a number of competing theories within this variable, but each of them is fairly easy to measure and hold constant when selecting cases. The first group of these variables are tactical economic opportunities for secession, which some (incl. Lujala, Rod and Thieme 2007 and Collier and Hoeffler 2006) argue lead to higher likelihood of secessionist success. To measure the tactical economic advantages that some states may have, this study follows Roeder’s logic (2018) and controls for petroleum in the homeland and diamonds in the homeland. Both of these measurements will allow tactical economic advantages in the homeland to be held constant. The theoretical relationship for this competing argument is as follows:

*H3: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland has a tactical economic advantage over the metropole.*

Additionally, geographic advantages must be held constant. Some (Buhaug 2006) argue that further distance between the secessionist homeland and the central metropolitan government leads to higher likelihood of secessionist success. To utilize Buhaug’s logic, “Since residents of peripheral areas are more distant from the capital, where the public goods presumably are produced, they receive fewer benefits for their taxes and therefore have an incentive to secede”
(2006, 697.) Others (incl. Tollefsen, Forø, Strand and Buhaug 2012) argue that a secessionist movement is more likely to achieve success when the seceding homeland touches an international border. Finally, due to the nature of guerilla warfare, some (Lacina 2006) argue that secessionist campaigns are more successful in mountainous terrain. The theoretical relationship is recorded below:

*H4: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland has a tactical geographic advantage over the metropole.*

The data and variables for this section are recorded in Table 2C.

**Table 2C: Tactical Economic and Geographic Advantages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV₃A: Tactical Economic Advantage</td>
<td>Petroleum in Homeland</td>
<td>PRIO: “Petroleum Dataset v1.2”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₃A: Tactical Economic Advantage</td>
<td>Diamonds in Homeland</td>
<td>PRIO: “Diamond Curse Replication Data”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₃B: Tactical Geographic Advantage</td>
<td>Distance between Capitals</td>
<td>PRIO-GRID: “Distance to Capital”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₃B: Tactical Geographic Advantage</td>
<td>Distance to International Border</td>
<td>PRIO-GRID: “Distance to Own Borders”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₃B: Tactical Geographic Advantage</td>
<td>Mountainous terrain</td>
<td>PRIO-GRID: “Area covered by mountains (proportion), average”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To discuss the quality of the data, this study measures tactical and logistical advantages using the “PRIO-GRID” datasets, constructed by the Peace Research Institute Oslo. Following standard spatial disaggregation techniques, PRIO-GRID measures each of these variables through a spatio-temporal grid structure, utilizing quadratic grid cells to cover a world map. In
plain English, PRIO-GRID maps a number of variables, including armed conflicts, socio-economic conditions, ethnic groups, and physical attributes over time, displaying a spectrum of these variables across a world map as a grid. Each cell covers a longitude and latitude point, allowing for sufficient determination of specific locations on the grid. While PRIO-GRID is a well-tested and useful dataset, the limitations of the dataset, like most data collection, are mostly time-based. The grid was last updated in 2015, which is mostly sufficient for the data utilized in this paper, as mountains, oil reserves and distances between capitals rarely change. However, a temporal delay is worth noting for use in this dataset. In addition, exact distances or altitudes are not measured, but kept on a spectrum of near to far, measured by different distance thresholds. For example, the distance between Kosovo’s capital of Pristina and Serbia's capital of Belgrade is on the brink of “somewhat far” and “far” because it is within about ten kilometers of the cutoff point. This threshold approach allows for simplification of data, but does lead to some distinctions that may be misleading, as Pristina is closer to Belgrade than Kazan is to Moscow, but are included within the same threshold grouping. While this limitation is necessary to be aware of, it will not hinder results dramatically.

The next competing independent variable is external state support. As discussed previously, Coggins (2011) finds that external support from other established countries is the best determinant of secessionist success. To measure the effect of external state support on secessionist success, judicial support and physical support must be taken into effect. Judicial support is measured through official recognition. Physical support, such as economic or military support, from a foreign state or state-led actor is recorded in the Center for International Development and Conflict Management’s Minorities at Risk dataset. The inherent problem of recording external support for secessionist movements is that the majority of support is covert or
unofficial; however, the MAR dataset provides the best collected data regarding foreign country support from 1990-2009 (Saideman 2002). As a result, for the purposes of this study, external support will be determined using the MAR dataset for the measured time frame. To restate the theoretical relationship between external state support and successful secession:

*H5: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding homeland receives external support from another state.*

Once again, the data for this section is recorded in Table 2D.

### Table 2D: External Support for Secessionist Movement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV&lt;sub&gt;4A&lt;/sub&gt;: External Judicial Support</td>
<td>Official Recognition</td>
<td>Recognition by one or more United Nations members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV&lt;sub&gt;4B&lt;/sub&gt;: External Physical Support</td>
<td>Economic Support</td>
<td>Minorities at Risk dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV&lt;sub&gt;4B&lt;/sub&gt;: External Physical Support</td>
<td>Military Support</td>
<td>Minorities at Risk dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To discuss the data utilized in this section, the Minorities at Risk database captures a record of foreign economic or military support to secessionist campaigns, which this paper will utilize to measure independent variable 4B. Foreign support of a secessionist movement is often kept classified and is largely reported by the media, which MAR uses on to create the database of external support. Relying on a combination of including journalistic accounts, government reports, group organizations, and scholarly materials, the MAR database constructs a chronology of events for the secessionist movement. While this dataset relies on only publicly available
information, the MAR database will provide sufficient measurement of external state support for secessionist campaigns.

The next set of competing variables deal with the grievances approach outlined above. The basic outline for the grievances argument is that secessionist movements are more likely to be successful when the seceding population feels mistreated or the subjects of unfair policies. This includes economic grievances, which will be measured by the regional per capita GDP level in the seceding territory as compared to the rest of the country. Fearon and Laitin (2001) find that after controlling for per capita income, regions are no more likely to experience civil war or secessionism, arguing that higher poverty rates and lower relative income per capita lead to more successful means of recruitment for insurgency and secession. To measure per capita income, I will be utilizing OECD statistics for reporting countries, which are based on reporting country census reports. The strengths and limitations of census information have been discussed under the primary independent variable section. To control for this economic grievance theory, the theoretical relationship is as follows:

**H6: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding population has lower per capita income than the per capita income in the metropole.**

Economic grievances are not the only form of populations feeling mistreated. Anderson (2004) argues that political grievances, such as repression of civil liberties, lead to higher mobilization of the seceding population, which in turn leads to a higher likelihood of secessionist success. To measure political grievance, I will utilize Freedom House’s database to compare the civil liberties in each of the case countries at the time of secession. Freedom House allows for a largely objective and unique numerical ranking for regimes on the basis of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House focuses largely on the practice of these freedoms rather than the
existence of laws to avoid deception from regimes that act outside of their own Constitutional structure. Similar to the limitations of PRIO-GRID, Freedom House utilizes a spectrum of thresholds from one to five where the distinction between a high three and a low four may be very little in practice, but is distinctly different with regard to their rankings. Once again, this limitation must be noted and the numerical score for each country cannot be taken as objective fact, but the limitation should not hinder results.

Additionally, cultural grievances, such as a majority usage of a different language in the homeland, must be taken into account. According to Gellner (1983), differing religion or spoken language in the seceding region from the majority language or religion in the metropole lead to a feeling of misrepresentation, and cultural grievances develop within the differing population. To determine different languages spoken in the secessionist regions, this paper utilizes Roeder’s Ethno-linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) dataset, which records the likelihood that two individuals speak different languages or are different ethnicities in each country profile entry. To determine the different religions practiced by a majority of the seceding ethnic population, this paper utilizes CIDCM’s A-Religion dataset, which measures ethnic minority group religions. As long as the majority of a specific ethnicity speaks a different language or practices a different religion from the majority of the metropole’s populace, the secessionist movement will be counted as having cultural grievances with the metropole. In some cases, the majority of the population speaks the de facto metropole language in addition to a separate language, such as Tatars in Russia speaking both Tatar and Russian in order to communicate with the majority of the state. In cases such as this, the differing language will still be considered a cultural grievance, as a Tatar-Russian combination of languages is still different from an ethnic Russian speaking Russian outside of Tatarstan. The theoretical relationship for this variable is as follows:
H7: Secessionist success is more likely when the seceding population has political or cultural grievances.

Once again, Table 2E highlights the variables and data utilized to control for the grievance approach.

Table 2E: Economic, Political and Cultural Grievances of Seceding Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV$_{5A}$: Economic Grievance</td>
<td>Relative GDP per capita</td>
<td>OECD Stats: “Regional Economy”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV$_{5B}$: Political Grievance</td>
<td>Civil Liberties within metropole at time of secession</td>
<td>Freedom House: “Civil Liberties”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV$_{5C}$: Cultural Grievance</td>
<td>Different homeland religion from majority religion</td>
<td>A-Religion START dataset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV$_{5C}$: Cultural Grievance</td>
<td>Different homeland language from majority language</td>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) dataset</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, the last competing set of variables fall under Roeder’s Programmatic Coordination (2018) approach. Within the framework of Roeder’s theory that the most successful secessionist campaigns coordinate all major actors within the campaign, Roeder highlights two necessary measures: programmatic authenticity and programmatic realism. Programmatic authenticity is a measure of external legitimacy, where an authentic campaign must be “believed in” by the seceding population. Following Roeder’s model, I measure authenticity through the campaign’s ability to establish an internally agreed-upon distinct territory for secession, the campaign’s center around a “conventionally recognized ethnicity” (Roeder 2018, 105) and the lack of a non-contiguous, alternative homeland. Basically, in
Roeder’s view, a campaign is authentic when the population has a pre-established identity, a clear homeland and no other options for an independent state anywhere else. A secessionist campaign must also be realistic. Programmatic realism measures the population’s belief that the campaign will eventually be successful. If the seceding population believes that the campaign will not succeed, then, following Roeder’s logic, the campaign is unlikely to succeed. Measures of realism include population size within the homeland to be similar to other existing state sizes and the existence of a prior ethnic state, which can rely on ancient historical states, such as Basque rhetorical use of the Kingdom of Navarre as an ethnic precedent, or a previous modern state, such as Ukraine following the fall of the Soviet Union. Utilizing these measures, Roeder establishes our final competing theoretical relationship:

>H8: Secessionist success is more likely when the secessionist campaign has established programmatic authenticity and programmatic realism.

To clarify, Roeder (2018) separates diasporas from the secessionist movement, measuring a resourced diaspora as a separate competing explanation to his approach. However, as previously stated, programmatic authenticity relies heavily on established views of the homeland and ethnic identity, which the diaspora often supports and provides. Additionally, the diaspora is potentially a facet of a secessionist campaign, as secessionist campaigns have historically created an independent government-in-exile that can be considered part of the diaspora, such as in Western Sahara, where the Polisario Front governs from Algeria. In sum, while Roeder’s approach is a competing argument, neither argument is fully exclusive of the other. Table 2F highlights the variables measured and data utilized for this section.
Table 2F: Programmatic Authenticity and Programmatic Realism of Secession Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Measured</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Data Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV₆₆: Programmatic Authenticity</td>
<td>Distinct Territory</td>
<td>Roeder’s Data: “National Secessionism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₆₆: Programmatic Authenticity</td>
<td>Conventionally Recognized Ethnicity</td>
<td>All Minorities at Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₆₆: Programmatic Authenticity</td>
<td>Alternative Homeland</td>
<td>Roeder’s Data: “National Secessionism”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₆₆: Programmatic Realism</td>
<td>Population Size Relative to Other Recognized States</td>
<td>Country census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV₆₆: Programmatic Realism</td>
<td>Prior Statehood</td>
<td>Roeder’s Data: “National Secessionism”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To discuss the data utilized for IV₆, to identify “conventionally recognized ethnicities” that Roeder highlights, I will be utilizing the All Minorities at Risk (AMAR) dataset, a comprehensive dataset of each ethnicity within each state. While limited by the scope of the project, as AMAR only includes ethnic populations of 100,000 or one percent of a country’s total population, the majority of secessionist movements require a larger population that 100,000 individuals. As a result, despite the limitations of scope, AMAR will provide a framework for identifying if a “conventionally recognized ethnicity” is the centerpiece of the secessionist movement. Additionally, Roeder’s datasets provide information regarding distinct territory, alternative homeland and prior statehood.
Description of Cases:

As described above, the key variable in this study is the diaspora, specifically measured through size and engagement. When selecting cases, I sought to control for as many competing variables as possible; however, as previously stated, not every variable can be held constant across all cases. I selected two cases on the basis of diaspora size and engagement, ranging from a large diaspora with high engagement to a large diaspora with intermediate engagement. For this study, a large diaspora means any ethnic group where more than twenty percent of the total ethnic population resides outside of the homeland.

For the large diaspora with high engagement, the first case study is the Kosovo secessionist project from Serbia, ranging from 1991 to 2008. Kosovar Albanians formed a number of diaspora communities across Europe and North America following the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the subsequent Kosovo War in 1998-1999. For this paper, the engagement of these communities towards the Kosovo secessionist movement will be measured from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 until the Kosovo declaration of independence in 2008. Data and records regarding Kosovo pre- and post-independence from Serbia are extensive and information on Kosovo should be fairly complete for the purposes of this project. In order to limit additional variations, the observed time frame for each secessionist movement will be as similar as possible, with emphasis on major events to create the upper and lower limits for the measured length of each campaign. For the Kosovo campaign, the 17-year timeframe from 1991 to 2008 will provide those upper and lower limits.

Initially, this project had three large diaspora cases, varying from high engagement to low engagement, with South Tyrol being the third “low engagement” case. However, due to the lack of data on the South Tyrolean diaspora, unclear beginning and end dates for the campaign, and the continued persistence of South Tyrol as an irredentist state, this case was not included. Excluding colonies, no other diaspora communities larger than 10% of the total global ethnic population size had low engagement profiles. As a result, the comparison will vary between secessionist campaigns with highly engaged large diasporas (Kosovo) and secessionist campaigns with moderately engaged large diasporas (Tatarstan).
For the large diaspora with intermediate engagement, the second case study is the Republic of Tatarstan secessionist campaign from Russia. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, Tatars scattered around Europe and Central Asia, establishing a sizable diaspora community. Despite a number of declarations of independence, the secessionist campaign ended in 2007 following a power-sharing agreement between Russia and Tatarstan that limited Tatarstan’s autonomy, effectively ending any hope of independence. Like Kosovo, data on transnational Tatar communities and Tatarstan statistics is fairly complete, preventing any significant gaps in measuring the relationship between Tatars and the homeland. For the Tatarstan campaign, the 16-year timeframe from 1991 to 2007 will provide the beginning and end of the secessionist movement.

Lastly, to discuss some important measures, the time period for each secessionist campaign must be specified. In order to more accurately compare different secessionist campaigns, the length of time considered for each movement must be similar. To best compare each of the measured nominal variables below, such as relative GDP per capita, which changes annually, each nominal measure will be averaged over the length of the campaign. To determine the length of each campaign, specific important events will be chosen as the beginning and end points of each movement, such as outbreaks of violence or referendum votes, to attempt to compare campaigns that vary in length. For example, despite other attempts to establish an independent Kosovo throughout history, the Kosovo independence movement will refer specifically to movement spanning from the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 to 2008, when Kosovo passed a declaration of independence.

To discuss the attempted controls across these secessionist campaigns, Table 2G highlights the data points for each campaign.
Table 2G: Variation in Competing Variables between Kosovo and Tatarstan Secessionist Campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{3A}): Petroleum in Homeland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{3A}): Diamonds in Homeland</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{3B}): Distance between Capitals</td>
<td>275.39-1480.43km (blue)</td>
<td>275.39-1480.43km (blue)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{3B}): Distance to International Border</td>
<td>Adjacent (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro)</td>
<td>Non-adjacent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{3B}): Mountainous Terrain</td>
<td>Very Mountainous (0.8-1% mountainous terrain)</td>
<td>Few Mountains (0-0.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{4A}): Current Recognition of independence by UN Members</td>
<td>110 members</td>
<td>0 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{4B}): External economic support</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{4B}): External physical support</td>
<td>NATO intervention</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{5A}): Relative GDP per Capita (2010 US$)</td>
<td>$2,004.63 average GDP/capita from 2000-2008 ($1,536.62 less than Serbian average)</td>
<td>$12,325 GDP/capita in 2004 ($2,403 more than Russian GDP/capita in 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{5B}): Civil Liberties of Metropole</td>
<td>Average Civil Liberties from 1991-2008: 4.18/7</td>
<td>Average Civil Liberties from 1990-2007: 4.44/7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{5C}): Different Homeland Religion</td>
<td>Yes (Sunni Islam)</td>
<td>Yes (Sunni Islam)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{5C}): Different Homeland Language</td>
<td>Yes (Albanian)</td>
<td>Yes (Tatar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV(_{6A}): Distinct Territory</td>
<td>Yes (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Yes (Republic of Tatarstan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As previously stated, not every variable was sufficiently held constant. Average metropole vulnerability throughout the length of the secessionist campaign largely remained the same between the two campaigns. However, a number of tactical variables, such as petroleum in the homeland, mountainous terrain and distance to an international border are different between Kosovo and Tatarstan. Average GDP per capita is also different, with Tatarstan exhibiting relative wealth to Russia and Kosovo exhibiting relative poverty to Serbia. External support and recognition will be further measured in the Kosovo and Tatarstan sections; however, based solely on UN-member recognition, Kosovo has high recognition, while Tatarstan does not. Most of the IV$_5$ measures are shared between Kosovo and Tatarstan, with the exception of average GDP per capita, meaning that political and cultural grievances will remain the same for both Kosovar Albanians and Tatars in the homeland during this timeframe. While not every variable remains constant between the two countries, the two cases were selected to demonstrate the spectrum of diaspora engagement in secessionist movements, while holding as many competing variables constant as possible.

In the remaining parts of this paper, I will describe whether the empirical evidence supports or does not support my central hypothesis and alternative arguments, specifically those
my case selection is not able to control for. The first section measures the Kosovo Albanian diaspora’s engagement towards the 1991-2008 Kosovo secessionist movement, followed by the Tatar diaspora’s engagement towards the 1991-2007 Tatarstan secessionist movement. An analysis section will provide more in-depth analysis of the empirical findings, comparing the two campaigns and discussing the significance of the results. The paper will conclude with a summary of major points and recommendations for future diaspora studies analysis.
Kosovo

Size Estimates of the Kosovar Albanian Diaspora:

The modern Kosovar Albanian diaspora in Europe and the United States was formed in waves of migrations from Yugoslavia (Phillips 2012, 32). The first waves of Kosovar Albanians to the United States and Europe began in the 1920s following economic hardships and oppression under Serbianization policies (Williams 2001). Subsequent post-war waves followed the rise of Communism in Yugoslavia in 1944 and Tito’s liberal work abroad policies for citizens of Socialist Yugoslavia in 1970 (Dimova 2013, 27). The final major waves occurred during the independence campaign, following the fall of Communism in 1991 and during the Kosovo war in 1998-1999 (Phillips 2012). These waves are important for understanding the formation of the diaspora, as each wave of Kosovar Albanians fled or left for different reasons, but remained united by language and culture when they arrived in Albanian communities in the host country. This repeated influx of Kosovar Albanians consistently connected older Albanian communities with the homeland and created an inter-generational network of active diaspora members.

The size of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora is difficult to disaggregate from the total Albanian diaspora, as Albanians from Macedonia, Albania and former Yugoslavia also migrated to Albanian communities around the world. However, there are a number of Kosovar Albanian diaspora size estimates to demonstrate a ballpark number. The Kosovo government in 2011 published a migrant stock count that measured Kosovar Albanians departing from Kosovo from 1969-2011. According to the official source, approximately 355,826 Kosovar Albanians lived abroad in 2008; however, this estimate does not include second or third generation Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora, forming a lower-bound estimate.
Diaspora size can also be estimated using immigrant stocks, which are recorded in most country censuses. Utilizing reported host country estimates and excluding other “homeland countries,” such as Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, most immigrant stocks calculate approximately 278,727 Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora around 2003.\(^3\) This calculation is also a lower-bound size estimate, as immigrant stocks have similar shortcomings to emigrant stocks calculated by the Kosovo government.

The final size estimates are based on media reports, which likely overestimate the diaspora size by failing to successfully distinguish between the Albanian diaspora and the Kosovar diaspora. According to a 1999 Wall Street Journal article, there is “a diaspora of more than 600,000 Kosovars living elsewhere in Europe and 300,000 in North America.” In 1998, the Toronto Star estimated “the 600,000-strong Kosovar diaspora - mostly in Germany and Switzerland - is wedded to its roots,” while a different 2005 Toronto Star article estimates a “200,000 Kosovar diaspora (mostly in Germany and Switzerland, and about 30,000 in the United States).” The 600,000 Kosovar estimate is repeated in a number of media reports, ranging from 1997-1999, offering an upper-bound size estimate for the diaspora during the midpoint of the independence campaign. As a result, despite the Wall Street Journal estimating 900,000 Kosovars in Europe and North America in 1999, I believe the estimated size of the diaspora ranges from 278,727 Kosovars to 600,000, which means that the diaspora constitutes between 15-32% of the entire Kosovo world population.

The Kosovo diaspora is clearly large. I will demonstrate below that the engagement of the diaspora in the homeland is the significant factor in measuring the diaspora’s effect on secession. The following section maps out Kosovar diaspora engagement from 1991 to 2008,

\(^{3}\) The year is around 2003 as not every country's census falls on the same year. As a result, 2003 is an average year for the range of census years of available countries, which stretched from 2001-2010.
utilizing aforementioned measures of economic, political, ideological and military support to the homeland from the diaspora.

**Kosovo Process Tracing:**

The Kosovar Albanian diaspora has been an institution of Kosovo since the Ottoman Empire, following the establishment of the League of Prizren in 1878. Known as the Central Committee for Defense of the Rights of the Albanian Nation, the League of Prizren consisted of Kosovar intellectual and military elites and served as a voice for Albanians across Europe and the Mediterranean. The League demanded from the Ottomans a democratically-elected legislature, the right to organize into local Albanian-run councils and a local judicial system based on traditional Albanian codified law. With the power of the diaspora behind them, the League of Prizren grew in power and established a short-lived *de facto* government in Kosovo in 1880 (Phillips 2012, 31). Throughout the Kosovo independence campaign from Socialist Yugoslavia, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora echoed the same sentiments of their forefathers regarding self-determination, mirroring the strong relationship between the diaspora and the homeland, and eventually leading to an independent Kosovo.

In this chapter, the process of Kosovo diaspora engagement and the independence campaign are carefully traced from 1991-2008 using different types of data to measure and triangulate evidence for ideological, economic, political and military diaspora engagement. These data sources include secondary analysis, content analysis of media sources, lobby registers, social media presence and remittance data. The first section covers a discussion of the role of the diaspora from 1991 to 2008 and the events leading up to Kosovo’s successful
independence. The second section summarizes and analyzes the results of the independence of Kosovo from Yugoslavia.

*Diaspora Engagement during the Kosovo Independence Campaign:*

The first signs of Kosovo’s desire for independence from Socialist Yugoslavia began in 1968, when Kosovar Albanians participated in a major post-war demonstration for self-determination. Following Tito’s 1974 rewriting of the Yugoslav Constitution, Kosovo was granted increased autonomy and upgraded to an autonomous province of Serbia. Kosovar Albanians enjoyed a high degree of autonomy within Serbia but slightly less autonomy than republics of Socialist Yugoslavia. The Kosovo Assembly operated with *de facto* veto power, allowing for Kosovar Albanians to prevent the Serbian Republic’s policies from being implemented within Kosovo. The first Kosovar Albanian demonstrations for independence from Yugoslavia began in 1981, following Tito’s death, and continued throughout the 1980s, as university students and grass-roots organizations organized protests across Kosovo (Claybaugh 2013, 25). In 1987, Slobodan Milosevic became leader of the Serbian Socialist Party, running on a platform of Serbian nationalism and intent on reclaiming Kosovo. Milosevic became president in May 1989 and the Serbian National Assembly dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and abolished Kosovo’s autonomy through a police-monitored vote on March 28, 1990 (Williams 2001).

By 1990, the Kosovo diaspora was significantly sized and influential on Kosovo. Two factions of diaspora political organizations had emerged: the Popular League for the Republic of Kosovo (LPRK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), operating out of Switzerland and Germany respectively. The LPRK was born in 1985 from nationalism and violence, as the 1981 university protests spurned hundreds of young Kosovar political exiles fleeing arrest at the hands
of the Serbian regime. Seeking to rekindle a strong sense of Albanian nationalism, the young exiles formally established the LPRK in Switzerland and the “Planners in Exile” began to make contact with militant groups in Kosovo, the “Defenders at Home” (Perritt 2008, 7). Meeting with guerilla warfare experts in Vietnam, Algeria and Northern Ireland, the LPRK learned methods of attaining weaponry and establishing a fundraising network (Perritt 2008, 8). Through their militant connections at home and network of insurgency mentors, the LPRK sought to establish an independent Kosovo through guerilla warfare.

However, the diaspora-backed LDK took an entirely different approach to political engagement that sought to establish an independent state. Following the forced 1989 vote to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy, 215 Kosovar Albanian elites, including Kosovar President-in-exile Ibrahim Rugova and Prime Minister-in-exile Bujar Bukoshi, initially formed the Democratic League of Kosovo in Kosovo to oppose the Serbian measures. Built on Albanian nationalism and non-violent protests, the LDK enjoyed a fierce outpouring of support around the Albanian diaspora. Diaspora supporters established LDK offices across Europe and North America, with fully staffed offices from Toronto to Stuttgart to Melbourne (Hockenos 2003, 185). Back in Kosovo, a shadow Kosovo parliament emerged to prevent the passage of the new Serbian Constitution. Serbian officials locked out Kosovar legislators, shut down Albanian media sources and imposed direct rule over Kosovo by September 1990. As part of the direct rule imposed by Milosevic in Belgrade, the LDK was banned in Kosovo and the majority of the Kosovar elite was exiled to Slovenia (Hockenos 2003, 187).

However, this exile became an opportunity. While Kosovar Albanians in Kosovo worried about the leadership losing touch with the struggle at home, the Albanian diaspora across Europe welcomed the LDK leaders that they had followed from abroad (Hockenos 2003). The vast
network of LDK offices across Europe financed the early government-in-exile’s operating expenses, in response to the LDK’s unifying message of non-violence and hope for a Western-styled independent Kosovo. For the early 1990s, the large, non-violent LDK and the small, radical LPRK coordinated efforts, setting up training camps in Albania and creating a small stockpile of weapons for a Kosovo guerilla army (Perritt 2008). From 1991 to 1993, the political situation of the Kosovar diaspora had coalesced into a powerful alliance between wealthy Kosovar Albanians in Europe, influential non-violent political exiles in Slovenia, and young Kosovar radicals in Switzerland.

Following Belgrade’s reclamation of Kosovo in 1990, the diaspora stepped up its economic engagement in order to address the dire economic situation in the homeland. Kosovar Albanians were actively excluded from public employment, as the Serbs attempted to “Serbianize” Kosovo, forcing Serbian language instruction in schools and removing most Albanians from high income positions. According to The Guardian on August 3, 1992, the Serbian government had removed Albanians from nearly 100,000 public sector jobs in Kosovo since 1990. Entire households lived on remittances sent from the diaspora (The Guardian 1992) and refugees mostly worked as day-laborers to support their families that remained in Kosovo. The economy of Kosovo soon became predominantly financed by the Albanian diaspora with the establishment of the LDK’s voluntary 3% tax in 1992. Three Percent Committees, established by the LDK, supervised the 18 different bank accounts across Europe and the United States that the diaspora could send their voluntary tax (Hockenos 2003, 223). Parallel education and medical institutions were established with generous donations from the diaspora and the 3% monthly income tax, providing both economic and ideological support to the oppressed Albanians in Kosovo.
Diaspora Political Engagement

Despite clear economic support and political activism stemming from the Kosovar diaspora, the major victory of the Kosovar diaspora from 1991-1993 was the success of the Albanian lobby in achieving non-diaspora political support for Kosovo. In the United States, the key group was the Albanian-American Civic League (AACL), established by US Congressman Joseph DioGuardi and Jim Xhema, two influential Albanian-Americans seeking US support for Kosovo (Phillips 2012, 36). Establishing relations with top Congressional officials, including Senator Bob Dole and Congressman Tom Lantos, the Albanian diaspora, through the AACL, organized a 1991 congressional trip to Yugoslavia. The trip proved influential, as Dole condemned the actions of the Yugoslav Army in Kosovo and requested the deployment of a NATO peacekeeping mission to Kosovo in June 1991. Further lobbying led to the creation of the Albanian Issues Caucus in 1994 in the US House of Representatives (Phillips 2012, 39). While the AACL was clearly influential, additional lobby groups arose and coordinated efforts, such as the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), allowing for a powerful, repeated messaging campaign, emphasizing the rights of Albanians in Kosovo.

In total, the United States had five official lobbying organizations oriented towards Kosovar Albanians: the Albanian-American Civil League (AACL), the National Albanian American Council (NAAC), Alliance for a New Kosovo, Albanian Foundation for Democracy and Americans Concerned about Kosovo. While some of these organizations only officially lobbied the government for a few years, the AACL played a major role in garnering US support for Kosovo and developed some of the most staunch supporters of Kosovo liberation in US Congress. Directly as a result of diaspora lobbying, Congressman Elliot Engel created the

Lobby efforts were not confined to the United States either. The German lobby register had at least two Albanian registered lobby organizations active during the independence campaign, including the Deutsch-Albanische Wirtschaftsgesellschaft e.V and the Organisation Albanischer Studenten und Alumni e.V., both of which supported Kosovo independence in Germany (Deutscher Bundestag 2020). Six official Kosovar diaspora lobbying organizations registered with the European Union, predominantly following the war, attempting to gain support for Kosovo’s admission to the EU and for economic assistance to Kosovo. Unofficial lobbying was even more effective. Ibrahim Rugova, President of the Kosovar Government-in-Exile, strongly advocated for foreign support as part of the LDK’s adoption of non-violent tactics, leading to his unofficial title of “Albanian Gandhi” (Krasniqi 2014). Rugova and the LDK lobbied political leaders in Switzerland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Austria for support for Kosovo. Working with other European governments, the Albanian diaspora eventually took the Kosovo issue to the United Nations. As a direct result of Rugova’s meetings with Austrian leaders, the Austrian delegation to the UN directly raised their concerns for human rights in Kosovo in 1992 in the UNGA. On December 1, 1992, the UNHCR passed a resolution demanding that Yugoslav authorities “respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of

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4 These statistics were gathered through keyword searches for relevant terms in the 2020 European Union Transparency Register, which is consistently updated. Organizations with connections to Kosovo that were established before 2008 were counted as lobbying organizations on behalf of Kosovo. The keywords searched for Kosovo were: Kosovo, Kosova, Albania, Albanian, Kosovar, Yugoslav, Yugoslavia, and diaspora.
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo” (Phillips 2012, 55). On August 20, 1993, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) proposed a mission to Kosovo to explore human rights abuses (Phillips 2012, 56). The KLA unofficially lobbied organizations as well, particularly in the United States, where official lobbying had laid the groundwork of support for their cause. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora had achieved international recognition for Kosovo through their successful lobbying efforts.

From 1991 to 1993, the lobbying efforts of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora had reaped significant rewards. International lobbying had increased government awareness of the plight of Kosovo in the United States and Europe, diaspora economic engagement resulted in the establishment of significant international financing networks, and diaspora military engagement led to the creation of training camps for guerilla fighters in Albania. Ideologically, the Kosovo government-in-exile was largely united around non-violent pressure on Serbia. However, this hopeful dynamic within the diaspora changed from 1993-1996. The organized training camps that the LDK and LPRK jointly established were infiltrated by the Yugoslav secret police in 1993 and the guerilla fighters were quickly arrested or fled into exile (Perritt 2008, 8). The hard work of the LPRK since 1985 had fallen apart without a fight.

Divergent Approaches to Ideological Engagement

The young radicals of the LPRK regrouped and attempted to recover from the losses in 1993. The LPRK went fully underground, cutting ties with the LDK and rebranding as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). For three years, radical members of the KLA in Switzerland recruited members from around the diaspora, reestablished fundraising and logistics networks, eliminated Serbian infiltration, and waited for another opportunity to liberate Kosovo. New KLA recruits were not difficult to find within the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. Exiles and refugees
from Kosovo resented the Serbian regime for their personal treatment and the diaspora had absorbed many young people that longed to return to their homeland. Using newspaper articles, meetings and flyers, the KLA disseminated Albanian nationalist rhetoric through its networks and recruiters, stirring the spirits of those in the diaspora that sought to violently resist the Serbian regime and slowly building an army (Perritt 2008, 37). However, for the time being, the majority of the diaspora supported the non-violent LDK, partially due to fear of violent repercussions from the Serbian secret police or the host country (Perritt 2008, 41).

Despite the setbacks that the KLA faced, the LDK continued to grow within the diaspora. DioGuardi and Xhema’s US coalition continued to gain support from American politicians and Rugova’s European campaign also grew. In 1992, the LDK regime had moved from Slovenia to Stuttgart, and tapped into the deep pockets of the Kosovar diaspora in Germany. LDK Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi was tasked with financing the parallel government structure established in the diaspora and raised $125 million from diaspora Kosovars by 1995 (Hockenos 2003, 222). The government-in-exile touted their achievements to the diaspora, adamant that the practices of non-violence and strong relations with the United States and Europe would encourage the international community to intervene in Kosovo on behalf of the Albanian diaspora. In November 1995, the United States hosted the Dayton Accords, a set of peace agreements for ending the Bosnian War and creating a framework for Bosnian independence. The LDK was certain that Kosovo would be tackled at Dayton and that the international community would address the concern over the South Balkans following the Bosnian talks (Hockenos 2003, 237). However, the Kosovo issue never arose in Dayton and the concerns of the Albanians were ignored. The LDK’s plan of non-violence and advocacy leading to international intervention had failed.
The Kosovo diaspora did not take this perceived sleight by the international community well, which undermined the credibility of non-violent ideological engagement. Mass demonstrations in Kosovar Albanian population centers demanded Kosovo independence. Protests in Chicago, New York, Detroit, Switzerland and Germany demonstrated the diaspora’s displeasure. According to Hockenos (2003), Albanian diaspora activists in Dayton broke through the security line and ripped the gates off the hinges at Wright Patterson Air Force Base, where the talks were held. The violence marked the end of Rugova and the LDK’s strategy of pacifism, as the international community delegitimized the dream of independence through diplomacy (Carson 2013). Non-violence failed dramatically and the Kosovar diaspora’s patience wore out.

Roeder (2018) highlights the need for a successful secessionist movement to practice programmatic coordination, where the end goal and intermediary strategic goals are coordinated and shared between all components of the campaign. As the LDK lost support following the Dayton Accords, support for the KLA grew, highlighting two divergent strategic goals for Kosovo, undermining the programmatic coordination argument.

*Diaspora Military Engagement:*

The more radical ideological and military approach of the Kosovo Liberation Army now had an opportunity to capitalize on the vast resources of the Kosovar diaspora that the LDK had dominated for years. Support for the KLA began to grow as an alternative to the LDK and Bukoshi, the Prime Minister of the government-in-exile, began working to raise funds for the KLA. The Albanian diaspora in Europe began channeling money through the “Homeland Calling Fund” to purchase weapons, encourage recruitment and support the KLA (Phillips 2012, 84). Initial support was lacking, the KLA had only a few hundred militants and few weapons.
However, in November 1996, one year after the Dayton Accords, the Kosovo Liberation Army made a public appearance at a funeral for an Albanian killed by the Serbian police in Kosovo. With black masks and machine guns, the KLA was greeted with cheers and applause by the Albanians in Kosovo that kicked off a guerilla military campaign (Phillips 2012, 81).

In an effort to better describe diaspora engagement through military support, I systematically identified 83 English-language articles from 1991 to 2008 that directly mentioned diaspora military support. As an example, the New York Times on June 13, 1999, reported that “In late April, recruits were said to be pouring in at the rate of 1,000 a day, enthusiastic but untrained and unarmed volunteers, most of them from an ethnic-Albanian diaspora numbering close to one million.” This large-scale diaspora military engagement was corroborated in the literature, as the Kosovo Liberation Army had enough diaspora support to establish a separate branch of the KLA, known as the “Atlantic Brigade.” Consisting of mostly second generation Albanian-Americans and Albanian-Canadians, the Atlantic Brigade served alongside Kosovar citizens in defense of the homeland, attacking Serbian soldiers and volunteering to fight in a country that many in the Brigade had never been to before. The failures of the LDK and the international community had sparked a belief in many Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora that they must take matters into their own hands and use whatever means necessary to achieve independence.

5 In order to identify military engagement resources, I utilized the Dow Jones Factiva database, which collects global media reports. The search term algorithm used was: “Kosov* AND (secession OR secede OR free* OR liberat* OR independen*) AND (diaspora) AND (military OR army OR force* OR militia OR recruit* OR fight*) FROM 1/1/1991-1/1/2009” 1,100 articles were identified as a result of this search; however, after disaggregating unrelated or duplicate articles, 206 articles were relevant to this paper. 83 of those articles directly mention different actions of diaspora military engagement.
While the diaspora was initially wary of the KLA, publicized guerilla warfare attacks against Serbian policemen in Kosovo raised morale. As attacks slowly rose in frequency, the Homeland Calling Fund began to raise significant funding from the diaspora. According to Phillips (2012), the KLA received $1.6 million in cash from a single fundraiser held by the Kosovar Albanian diaspora in New York in April 1998. Ibrahim Kelmendi, the German-Albanian director of the KLA’s “Fatherland is Calling” fund reported the Kosovar diaspora in Germany donated $1 million each month of 1998. Recruits continued to arrive in Kosovo, prepared to fight for the name of Albanian nationalism. According to Hockenos (2003), the KLA hand-distributed recruitment flyers amongst the diaspora and recruited in waves. In April 1998, nearly 450 Kosovar Albanians from New York and New Jersey boarded a flight to Kosovo to fight Milosevic’s oppression.

While economic, political, ideological and military diaspora support for the KLA grew from 1996 until 1998, the KLA had difficulty controlling territory within Kosovo. Guerilla attacks were certainly effective in killing Serbian police officers and soldiers; however, the Serbs would retaliate successfully, picking off Kosovar militants and civilians with little discretion. The Yugoslav Army from 1996-1999 was the fourth largest army in Europe and brutally efficient (Perritt 2008). Fortunately for the KLA, the diaspora provided recruits and funding, and the collapse of the Albanian government and pyramid schemes in 1997 meant that a glut of cheap weapons was just across the border. Using diaspora funding, the KLA had a nearly endless supply of cheap weapons seeping over the Albanian border, as hundreds of thousands of stolen government AK-47s were sold to the Kosovo freedom fighters (Perritt 2008). The Kosovo Liberation Army, an organization founded in the diaspora and supported by Kosovar Albanians around the world, was successfully damaging Milosevic’s Serbian army.
One of the competing explanations attributes the success of the Kosovo secessionist movement to the high fragility of the Serbian regime. However, using the State Fragility Index as a measure for metropole vulnerability, the average fragility of Serbia from 1995 to 2008 was 8.93 on a scale from 1 to 25 with 25 being the most fragile. During the height of the war from 1998 to 1999, Serbia was only slightly more fragile than the average, with a vulnerability of 10/25 and less fragile than Russia, where Tatarstan’s secessionist movement failed. Even anecdotally, the Milosevic regime was not particularly weak during this time period, boasting the fourth largest army in Europe and remaining politically stable throughout the war. The KLA’s success against Milosevic was less a factor of the weakness of the Serbian forces, and more due to external diaspora support that enabled successful KLA operations.

While the war between the Serbian military and KLA raged on in Kosovo, diaspora political engagement pressured Western governments and their representatives in the UN to intervene on behalf of Kosovo. Germany, Sweden and Switzerland threatened to freeze Kosovar accounts in their countries that funded the KLA. The AACL continued to lobby the United States to intervene on behalf of Kosovo. Rugova, despite his fall from grace, continued to have a sizable following of Kosovar Albanians, and sent a letter on March 16, 1998, to US Secretary of State Albright requesting peace talks with Milosevic (Phillips 2012). Under the pressure of sanctions, Milosevic reluctantly agreed to meet with Rugova during the summer of his counteroffensive against the KLA. The meeting remained largely procedural, but the opening of dialogue kept Rugova hopeful that Kosovo could become independent through diplomacy. Kosovo lobbying efforts also encouraged the United States and United Kingdom to express human rights concerns for Kosovar Albanians at the United Nations Security Council, leading to the creation of the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in October 1998. The KVM was tasked
with monitoring the October ceasefire between the KLA and the Serbian army and included over 2,000 unarmed international observers from the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE).

Following the resumption of conflict in December 1998, conditions in Kosovo were ripe for disaster. The Serbian Army, tasting victory over a weakened KLA, grew more violent against the Kosovar Albanians and the KLA regrouped and began a string of guerilla attacks. On January 15, 1999, in front of an international audience, Serbian forces launched an offensive against alleged insurgents in Raçak, a small village in central Kosovo, killing 45 Kosovar Albanians, including elderly men, women and a 12 year-old child (Phillips 2012). The Raçak Massacre, as the event became known as, showed the world that the KVM had been unsuccessful in preventing human rights violations. Eight years after US Senator Bob Dole called for NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo, US President Bill Clinton threatened to launch NATO airstrikes against the Milosevic regime. Clinton was very familiar with Kosovo, as he met with Rugova on May 27, 1998 to discuss US support for the Kosovo independence campaign and former Senator Dole in September 1998, who had visited Kosovo on a fact-finding mission for an international refugee group (Sciolino and Bronner 1999). Amongst other factors, this unofficial lobbying contributed to Clinton’s sympathy for Kosovar Albanians and his willingness to act against Milosevic.

After images of the Raçak Massacre covered international media headlines, the United States sought one last effort to resolve the conflict diplomatically with pressure from Rugova. On January 29, 1999, the United States and European powers summoned the Serbian government and the KLA to Rambouillet, France for peace talks. The Kosovar Albanian delegation split along partisan lines between the LDK and the KLA. Rugova and Bukoshi were isolated by the
KLA leaders, such as Hashem Thaci, as the militants firmly believed that the Rambouillet Conference would fail (Phillips 2012). The Kosovar Albanian diaspora watched the proceedings with apprehension. Thaci and the KLA were adamant that the agreement must guarantee independence, which the Rambouillet Proposal did not; however, American advisors to the Albanians convinced the Kosovar delegation to sign the agreement, as Milosevic refused to sign, putting Kosovo in the favor of the international community. On February 23, 1999, Milosevic officially refused to sign the Rambouillet Proposal and moved more Serbian forces into Kosovo.

Following the failure at Rambouillet, President Clinton fulfilled his threat and NATO began launching airstrikes against Serbian forces on March 24, 1999. Milosevic responded violently, lashing out at the Albanian population in Kosovo in a final attempt to “Serbianize” the population through ethnic cleansing. Kosovar Albanians fled across the border into co-ethnic Albanian homes in Albania and Macedonia. The United States began coordinating efforts with the KLA, using the militant group as NATO’s troops on the ground. This major decision was brought about through years of hard work by the Kosovar Albanian lobbyists and the KLA, pushing American political support in Washington and ensuring that the atrocities of Kosovo did not leave the eye of the media (Perritt 2008). In September 1998, KLA commander Florin Krasniqi sent a communiqué to individual commanders in the United States, urging them to systematically disseminate a message that the Serbs were targeting ordinary civilians. According to Perritt (2008, 146), Krasniqi emphasized the need for transparency towards the media, stating that “we can win the war with TV cameras; we cannot win it with battles.” American media interest intensified, the KLA highlighted Serbian atrocities and, when coupled with LDK and AACL lobbying, American officials began coordinating attacks with the KLA in Kosovo. After
months of fighting, Milosevic capitulated. The air campaign lasted 78 days before Milosevic surrendered on June 9, 1999 (Phillips 2012).

Another competing explanation for the success of the Kosovo independence campaign attributes the success of the Kosovo secessionist movement to the intervention of NATO and the United Nations. Some scholars argue that while high diaspora engagement may have contributed to the rise of the KLA, Kosovo would never have become independent without the United States deciding to unilaterally support the NATO air campaign in 1999. To avoid speculation about possible outcomes of the Kosovo War if the United States had not intervened, the role of the diaspora in driving US support for an independent Kosovo should not be overlooked. The formal and informal Albanian lobby in the United States played a significant role in Washington. The AACL, Ibrahim Rugova, Senator Dole, and Representatives Engel, Lantos and DioGuardi all furthered an independent Kosovo, gaining audience with President Clinton, utilizing political engagement to draw media attention to the Raçak massacre, and setting up the foundation for US support in Kosovo. In addition, after the KLA engaged in a media campaign in 1998, NATO actively coordinated with KLA ground forces to plan “Operation Arrow,” a guerilla offensive in May 1999 that successfully drove Serbian forces out of key areas in Kosovo (Perritt 2008).

While external support from NATO and the United Nations played a role in Kosovo independence, the actions of the diaspora largely contributed to the success of the Kosovo secessionist movement and to the involvement of NATO.

On June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which called for “establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered” (UNSC Resolution 1244, Article 9 C, 1999).
The ambiguity of the resolution allowed both parties to claim diplomatic victory, as Kosovo became a self-governing state, while the UNSC “reaffirmed...the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” While the Serbs rejected the UNSC’s resolution, they lacked any authority in practice over Kosovo and nearly 50,000 UN peacekeepers entered Kosovo on June 20, 1999 (Phillips 2012).

*Post-War Diaspora Economic Engagement:*

Following the war, the diaspora’s economic engagement played a major role in laying the foundation for an independent Kosovo. Through the help of the diaspora, the interim Kosovar government reactivated the “Homeland Calling” and the “Fatherland is Calling” funds in early 2000. According to a UNFPA survey from February 2000, 36% of the domestic Kosovo population was supported by an external private individual (UNFPA 2000, 34). Personal financial connections between family members abroad were the predominant share of the Kosovo economy, as over half of the Kosovar population was unemployed. The majority of infrastructure projects in Kosovo were constructed with diaspora financing. According to an International Monetary Fund report from February 2001, “foreign-financed reconstruction inflows for 2000 were estimated to be $360 million, of which about $250 million was for rehabilitation of housing and other buildings.” These donor-based constructions amounted to significant reconstruction within the country. According to a *Wall Street Journal* article from July 3, 2000,

“Most of the wealth comes not from locals producing anything, but from two steady sources of foreign funds: the Kosovar diaspora and the more than 40,000-strong international military and civilian presence, which rents the best houses and buildings, hires drivers and interpreters and purchases what goods are for sale.” (Rafael 2000).
The diaspora maintained and rebuilt the economy of Kosovo in the years following the war.

Diasporan economic support of Kosovo did not stop immediately after the war. Workers remittances to Kosovo averaged 18.97% of the total Kosovar GDP from 2004 to 2008. Remittances alone, not including the significant investment from the diaspora, contributed $771.5 million to the Kosovo economy in 2006, over one-fifth of the Kosovar economy. The diaspora constituted a majority of foreign direct investment in Kosovo from the end of the war until 2005. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora powered the Kosovo economy following the war, but maintained their economic support even up to independence in 2008.

From 2000 to 2008, the diaspora not only powered the economy of Kosovo, but supported the de facto state politically and ideologically. The majority of the new government in Kosovo were members of the diaspora, both as political exiles, such as Ibrahim Rugova, and as voluntary immigrants, such as Hashem Thaci, who left Kosovo to study in Zurich, Switzerland. The major actors of the KLA and the LDK, two organizations founded or operated through the diaspora, were placed in charge of the government and the parallel education, healthcare and political networks founded in Europe transitioned to domestic institutions within Kosovo. The rise of social media contributed to the diaspora connecting with Kosovo as well. At least nineteen Facebook groups of Kosovar diaspora members supporting Kosovo’s independence are still in use from 2005-2008. Three of these groups, “Independent Kosovo,” “Republic of Kosova” and “I Bet I Can Find 3,000,000 People That support Kosovo's Independence,” have over 100 members, with 137 members, 795 members and 433 members respectively. Each of the nineteen groups connect members of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora around the world and post pro-independence rhetoric in the group. For example, on February 25, 2008, one week after
Kosovo declared independence, a flurry of posts on the 137-member Facebook page “Independent Kosova” echoed similar sentiments of support to user Blake Zenuni:

“guys, this group has served its purpose, it shouldn't be "appeal for an independent kosovo" but "support for an Independent Kosovo" thanks to all of you in this group, 8 days of Independence so far! a million more to come!”

The existence of pro-independence Kosovar Albanian diaspora groups offer ideological support for independence from abroad, strengthening the resolve of those calling for independence within Kosovo.

On February 17, 2008, the Kosovo Assembly passed the Kosovo Declaration of Independence from Serbia. Showing continued ideological support for the movement, celebrations were held across Kosovar Albanian communities in Europe and North America. In Toronto, thousands of Kosovar Albanians marched to the Ontario Legislature to encourage recognition of Kosovo. Fireworks and additional celebrations were held in Switzerland, Germany and the United States. After 17 years of fighting for independence, Kosovar Albanians finally achieved the establishment of an independent Kosovo.

*Analysis of Engagement Results and Considerations of Alternative Explanations:*

Following the process of Kosovo secession from 1991 to 2008, the Kosovo diaspora supported the independence effort in many different types of engagement. Diaspora military, economic, political and ideological engagement strengthened the independence movement throughout the whole campaign until independence was achieved in 2008. In light of the overwhelming engagement of the diaspora in strengthening the independence campaign and considering the alternate arguments, the Kosovo case further strengthens the claim that Kosovo achieved independence largely due to the existence of a highly engaged diaspora. This section
will summarize diaspora engagement through this process, some competing approaches and present further analysis of the engagement argument.

With regard to *political engagement*, the key measure of $IV_{1B}$ was the role of diaspora lobbying organizations. The Kosovo diaspora led an incredibly successful lobbying campaign in the United States and Europe during the secession movement. With multiple lobbying organizations and the backing of influential players in Washington DC, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora garnered significant support for the independence movement. Ibrahim Rugova championed an unofficial lobbying movement, personally meeting with heads of state, directly leading to UN actions from Austria, support for the Rambouillet talks and sympathy and support from President Bill Clinton and members of Congress. The KLA unofficially lobbied organizations as well, particularly in the United States, where official lobbying had laid the groundwork of support for their cause. The incessant lobbying by the Kosovar diaspora throughout the entire independence campaign kept Kosovo in the forefront of the key regimes foreign policy agenda. Political engagement of the diaspora contributed to international awareness of the conflict, sympathy for the Kosovar delegation and external funding and condemnations of Serbia’s role in the conflict. Each of these factors contributed to a higher likelihood of success for the Kosovo independence campaign. As a result, diaspora political engagement was highly successful when measured through both official and unofficial lobbying measures.

With regard to economic engagement, the key measure of $IV_{1B}$ was worker remittances. Due to the nature of Kosovo prior to 2002, no official remittances estimates were reported. However, official remittance data was captured from 2004 to 2008 and averaged 18.97% of Kosovo’s total GDP (World Bank 2018). Additional remittance estimates in 2002 and 2003 from
the International Monetary Fund put workers remittances at about 16% of Kosovo GDP. In addition, anecdotal evidence shows significant economic engagement from the diaspora to Kosovo before the war. The LDK’s voluntary 3% income tax financed the operations of parallel government structures from 1991 until 1999. The “Homeland Calling” and “Fatherland is Calling” funds raised millions of dollars for the KLA. According to Andrew Higgins and A. Craig Copetas writing for the Wall Street Journal on May 20, 1999, the KLA claimed to have $250 million to $300 million at their disposal, financed solely by the Albanian diaspora. Additionally, following the war, the majority of foreign direct investment in Kosovo came from the diaspora, including an estimated $360 million in 2001 for infrastructure projects. While official estimates of personal remittances and economic investment from the diaspora are lacking before the war, remittance data and anecdotal evidence shows that the Kosovar Albanian diaspora was highly economically engaged with Kosovo. In the lead-up to the war, from 1991 to 1996, the operating costs of the Democratic League of Kosovo were covered by the diaspora, allowing for the establishment of medical, educational and governmental institutions that eventually formed the foundation for the independent state. During the war, from 1996 to 1999, the financing from the diaspora allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army to purchase weapons. Following the war, the diaspora strengthened the Kosovar economy until the state became independent in 2008. Each of these economic engagements financed each successive milestone for the Kosovo independence campaign, strengthening the resilience of the movement and leading to a higher chance of success.

With regard to ideological engagement, the key measures for IV_{1B} are pro-independence social media groups and literature from the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. As stated above, nineteen pro-independence diaspora Facebook groups are still active from 2005 to 2008. While
these groups highlight only a small fraction of online ideological engagement between the diaspora and the homeland, the encouragement from the diaspora to continue fighting for independence strengthened the homeland’s independence campaign are clear in these posts. This type of connection between Kosovar Albanians around the world encouraged strong nationalist rhetoric, encouraged less engaged members of the diaspora to reconnect with their roots and emphasized a tight-knit culture of resilience against the Serbian regime. In addition, the ideological support for independence encouraged the KLA and LDK to continue fighting, as public diaspora support never dwindled, despite occasionally switching alliances between the KLA and LDK. The high levels of political engagement acted as the driver for ideological engagement, which encouraged further economic and military engagement both in Kosovo and in the diaspora, urging Kosovar Albanians at home and abroad to continue fighting until independence was achieved.

With regard to military engagement, the diaspora also remained highly engaged. The KLA purchased nearly all of their weapons with diaspora financing. In a single night at Bruno’s in 1998, an Albanian restaurant in New York, the KLA raised $1.6 million in cash from the diaspora for weapons. Thousands of second- and third-generation Kosovar Albanian fighters arrived in Kosovo to join the KLA, despite never visiting Kosovo before. The sentiments and drive behind joining the KLA are clearly highlighted in this interaction between Janine di Giovanni, a New York Times journalist, and a KLA medic:

“‘Why are you here?’ I ask a 23-year-old architect, a Kosovar who had been living in Switzerland… ‘Why am I here?’ the medic repeats idly, breaking off a piece of bread. ‘Because my country is important to me. I believe in what I am doing. I believe in the U.C.K. [KLA]’” (di Giovanni 1999)

In this quote, the ideological engagement of the diaspora is clear and has driven a young Kosovar-Swiss architect to join the Kosovo Liberation Army. All the forms of engagement work
together to create a powerful movement; the ideological engagement encouraged economic and political engagement amongst the diaspora, which eventually financed and defended Kosovar Albanian military engagement on the international stage. This widespread diaspora support in all realms strengthened the diaspora movement, leading to eventual Kosovo independence.

Widespread diaspora engagement is further corroborated in a variety of sources that claim diaspora support was vital to the success of Kosovo independence. This hypothesis relies on evidence from official reports from international organizations and Kosovo (see: Moalla-Fetini et al. 2004; Office of Hashim Thaçi 2019), media reports (di Giovanni 1999; Rafael 2000), academic literature (Hockenos 2003; Perritt 2008), and statements from LDK and KLA leadership (see interviews in Phillips 2012).

In addition, competing arguments for the success of Kosovo secession are less compelling. As mentioned in the process tracing, Serbian vulnerability was fairly low during the time of Kosovo’s secession, which undermines arguments that metropole vulnerability is a strong predictor of successful independence. In addition, as mentioned in the process tracing above, the divide between the KLA and the LDK undermines arguments for programmatic coordination as a determinant of success for the Kosovo secessionist movement. While Kosovar Albanians were largely united in their goal of independence, the diaspora was largely split on how to achieve the goal from 1993-1999.

Two additional competing explanations for the success of Kosovo are Kosovo’s tactical and geographic advantage and Kosovar Albanian grievances, which will be discussed in the Tatarstan section below. As a brief overview, Kosovo geographic and tactical advantages played a minor role in the eventual success with the exception of international borders, which Tatarstan did not have. Kosovar Albanian grievances were heavily utilized to garner short-term support
from the diaspora by playing into nationalism and anger towards the Serbian regime, but played a lesser role in maintaining diaspora support for Kosovo over the seventeen-year independence campaign. These two competing explanations are further discussed in the next section.

The argument that Kosovo could not have succeeded without the assistance of NATO and the United States is a strong argument. However, as demonstrated in the process tracing section above, the high levels of Kosovar Albanian diaspora engagement facilitated the eventual US response. As a result, while a secessionist movement may be strengthened by the role of the external actor, the state actor may have acted as a direct result of diaspora engagement. Highly engaged diasporas can help facilitate external state involvement, as evidenced by events in Kosovo. As a result, the external support argument is complementary to diaspora engagement, as external support strengthens secessionist success, but is often elicited by diaspora engagement in the host country.

In Kosovo, the engagement of the Kosovar Albanian diaspora significantly strengthened the independence campaign, providing strong evidence that highly engaged diasporas increase the likelihood of secessionist success. In the next section, I will investigate if the hypothesis remains supported for Tatarstan, which offers a large diaspora with less engagement.
Unlike the Kosovar diaspora, the Volga Tatar diaspora did not have a long-standing tradition of diaspora-homeland relations. While many in the Tatar diaspora viewed Kazan and the Volga Region as their spiritual or cultural homeland, widespread official acknowledgement of the Volga Tatars outside of Tatarstan truly began in 1990, following the fall of the Soviet Union and a surge of nationalist writings from the Tatar intelligentsia in Tatarstan (Graney 2018, 161). Prior to 1990, the Tatar diaspora resided in a number of countries, predominantly in the former Soviet Union, but also remained in tight-knit communities across Asia and the West. These Tatar communities managed to keep their cultural heritage, language and religion, establishing cultural organizations and centers around the world.

Similar to Kosovar Albanians, Volga Tatars are difficult to disaggregate from Crimean or Siberian Tatars, as all three sub-groups of Tatar resided in the Soviet Union. However, immigrant stocks in key countries can help determine a ballpark size estimate for Volga Tatars outside Russia. According to official country censuses, most Volga Tatars live in the former Soviet Union, particularly in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with significant populations in Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Smaller populations exist in the rest of Asia, Europe and North America, particularly in China, Mongolia, the United States, France, Finland and Canada. In total, based on census estimates, 947,547 Volga Tatars lived in the diaspora around 2004.\footnote{Like Kosovar size estimates, not all censuses fall on the same year. Most censuses, particularly in the former Soviet Union, were from 1999. 2004 is an averaged date of all the censuses.}
In addition, media reports had additional estimates of Volga Tatar diaspora size. According to Russian media Business Gazeta (2019), over one million Volga Tatars live abroad, with 50,000 living outside the former Soviet Union. According to Kefeli (2012), 100,000 to 200,000 live outside the former Soviet Union and over four million Tatars live outside Tatarstan. As the official immigrant stocks and media reports largely agree that approximately one million Volga Tatars lived outside Russia from 1990 to 2007, Volga Tatars make up approximately 16.7% of the total Volga Tatar population. For comparison, the Kosovar Albanian diaspora composed 15-32% of the total Kosovar population during the Kosovo independence campaign. As a result, the Tatar diaspora and the Kosovar Albanian diaspora have comparable sizes relative to the total global ethnic population.

From 1990 to 2007, nearly one million Volga Tatars lived outside of Russia. Most of these Tatars spoke Tatar and remained aware of their heritage (Graney 2018). However, despite these tight-knit Tatar hubs in major cities around the world, there was little connection to any specific homeland prior to 1990. The following sections map out the process of Volga Tatar diaspora engagement with the Tatarstan independence and sovereignty campaigns from 1990-2007, utilizing aforementioned measures and multiple sources of data of economic, political, ideological and military support to the homeland from this diaspora of similarly large size as Kosovo’s.

_Tatarstan Process Tracing_

Despite the large diaspora population size and the cultural connection shared by many Tatars around the world, no political infrastructure existed to connect Tatars to the homeland (Graney 2018). The diaspora of Volga Tatars formed differently than in the Kosovo case, where
new waves of Kosovar Albanians arrived in the diaspora every generation and settled in the same communities as past waves of Kosovar immigrants, connecting second- and third-generation Kosovar Albanians to Kosovo. Yugoslav Kosovar Albanian immigrants of the 1970s mingled with Ottoman Kosovar Albanian immigrant communities developed in the 1880s and shared stories of the homeland, uniting a continually growing community through nationalism and a shared connection to Kosovo. This pattern of waves of immigrants continuously refreshed the connection between Kosovo and the diaspora. Until the 1990s, the majority of the Volga Tatar diaspora did not have any close political connections to the homeland. Unlike Yugoslavia, which allowed emigration of citizens to work abroad, the Soviet Union remained closed, not permitting Soviet citizens to leave. As a result, the majority of Volga Tatars abroad in the 1990s were either generations removed from Tatarstan and had left Russia in the 1920s or were recent immigrants seeking to establish their footing in a new country following the opening of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. As a result, no significant political infrastructure for Tatars existed outside of the former Soviet Union to connect them to the homeland (Graney 2018). In the 1990s, the Tatar nationalist movement “rediscovered” the Tatar diaspora and began connecting with Volga Tatars abroad, but the lack of previous connection meant that channels of communication and a united Volga Tatar identity needed to be reinforced quickly to recover from decades of separation.

The Tatar diaspora “rediscovery” coincided with the Tatar nationalist movement of the early 1990s, which sought to establish Tatarstan, a republic of the Russian Federation, as the ethnic kin-state of the Tatars. One third of all Tatars lived in Tatarstan and the ethnic make-up of Tatarstan was 48.5% Tatar, the largest concentration of Tatars in the world (Kefeli 2012). In addition, the capital of Tatarstan was Kazan, the historic cultural homeland of the Tatars. Led
largely by the Tatar intelligentsia, the nationalist movement centered their agenda around three key ideas: Russian imperialism, Tatar exceptionalism and Islamic Jadidism (Hahn 2007).

With regard to Russian imperialism, Tatar nationalists in the 1990s emphasized the Russian assault on the Khanate of Kazan as the early example of Russian colonization. The Khanate of Kazan was an independent Tatar state conquered by Ivan the Terrible in 1552 and forced to convert from Islam to Orthodox Christianity under the Russian rule. Following repeated discriminatory practices and forced conversions under generations of Russian Tsars, Tatars mobilized in both nationalist and socio-economic uprisings, attempting to throw off the yoke of Russian rule (Hahn 2007, 175). The Tatars supported the Bolshevik rise, seeking more rights as one of the largest ethnic minorities in Russia; however, these nationalist hopes were soon dashed under Stalin’s rule (Hahn 2007, 178). Under Soviet rule, the identity of most Tatars reverted to tribal or Soviet affiliations rather than a national Tatar identity, as echoed on July 20, 1973 in a New York Times article:

“There is no difference between us and the Russians, really,” a young Tatar journalist said enthusiastically, but with some exaggeration. “We are like one people (Smith 1973).”

Even following Stalin, despite expanded nationality policies, cultural opportunities for Tatars were limited, leading to some members of the Tatar intelligentsia registering a formal protest with the Soviet Tatarstan government in 1954 regarding the lack of Tatar schools and cultural institutions (Graney 2018, 160). In order to recreate a cultural and national identity, the Tatar intelligentsia in the late 1980s began emphasizing the historical significance of the Khanate

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7 During this time period, Tatars did not refer to themselves as Tatar, but by a variety of ethnonyms, including Kazanis, Bulgars, Mishars or, most commonly in Russia, just Muslims (Rorlich 1986, 5). As a result, the statement that the Khanate of Kazan was a “Tatar” state is misleading, as the majority ethnicity was a proto-Tatar population. However, Tatar nationalists tended to label the Khanate of Kazan as the historical Tatar homeland.
of Kazan and building off past nationalist movements. The Tatar intelligentsia in the late 1980s and early 1990s also drew further connections to the continued economic and political discrimination by the Russian occupiers. Policies of Russification and the migration of Russians into Tatarstan fanned the flames of nationalism (Kondrashov 2000). By the fall of the Soviet Union, there was an education gap between the Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan, largely due to linguistic policies that strongly deterred non-Russian speakers from succeeding on university entry exams (Giuliano 2011). The education gap led to an income gap and the Tatar intelligentsia used this divide to promote a nationalist agenda to overthrow the Russian “colonists.”

In addition to promoting the economic and political grievances at the hands of the Russians, the Tatar intelligentsia-led nationalist movement furthered ideas of Tatar exceptionalism and cultural uniqueness. In 1991, only 1.4% of all Tatar students in Tatarstan attended schools that taught in Tatar language (Graney 2018). The intelligentsia sought to establish Tatar national-cultural institutions and promoted a revival of Tatar writing, art and architecture. Cries for policies of bilingualism, monument restoration and cultural revival dominated the nationalist discussion in Kazan in the late 1980s in conjunction with Gorbachev’s glasnost policies, which opened opportunities for freer expression. In addition, the intelligentsia published studies that showed high rates of inter-marriage between Tatars and Russians and the vast majority of children from these marriages were labelled by the government as ethnically Russian (Gorenberg 2005). Fearing cultural decline, the nationalist movement emphasized economic and political grievances and Tatar exceptionalism, seeking to reverse policies of Russification.

Finally, to a lesser extent, the Tatar nationalist movement emphasized “Islamic Jadidism,” a Tatar Islamic movement that promoted freer religious interpretation, a clear secular
divide between religion and science and broader education systems (Hahn 2007, 176). Jadidism developed in the late nineteenth century in Kazan as a broader political movement amongst the Muslim elite that emphasized some aspects of Tatar nationalism and soon dominated Tatar mosques and madrasas, driving Tatarstan towards a moderate, secular, Islamic majority (Hahn 2007, 177). Due to the political nature of jadidism in supporting education reform and secularism, mullahs and religious leaders began to make an impact on Tatarstan policies in the 1880s, including expanding rights for women and the development of cultural, scientific and scholarly institutions. Religious promotion of literary and artistic endeavors led to a rebirth of Tatar culture in the late nineteenth century and the tradition of jadidism became inherently linked to Tatar identity. Under Soviet rule, jadidism was largely abandoned; however, following the cultural resurgence of the late 1980s, Tatar nationalists readopted the teachings of Islamic jadidism (Hahn 2007, 179). As a result, the Tatar intelligentsia appealed to religious leaders and Muslim Tatars in Tatarstan to promote the national movement in the early 1990s.

The efforts of the nationalist movement were largely successful in mobilizing the domestic population within Tatarstan. Feelings of pride about ethnic heritage, anger over Russian imperialism, and the traditions of jadidism sparked widespread calls for nationalist reform in Tatarstan. According to Hahn (2007), 142 mass demonstrations with nationalist Tatar messages occurred in Russia from 1987 to 1993. In October 1991, over 20,000 demonstrators took to the streets in Kazan to urge the Supreme Soviet to declare independence (Hahn 2007, 180). However, the same fervor for independence was not echoed as virulently abroad. Volga Tatars in the diaspora recognized their cultural connections to Kazan; however, no mass demonstrations or major engagement efforts developed on the scale of the Tatars within Russia or the Kosovars.
In order to determine the explanation for low engagement amongst the majority of the Tatar diaspora with the Tatarstan movement, the internal process for the nationalist movement must be traced. This section measures the ideological and political engagement of the Tatar diaspora through reviewing secondary literature, content analysis of media sources and analyzing primary sources. Economic engagement was a challenge to measure, as there is little evidence Tatars from abroad sent remittances to Tatarstan. The Tatarstan independence movement never became militant, and therefore diaspora military engagement is not measured in this chapter.

_Divergent Approaches to Ideological Engagement_

The Tatar nationalist movement, while seeking a similar goal, conflicted with Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev’s sovereignty movement, another powerful movement in Tatarstan during the same time period. Shaimiev promoted the sovereignty of Tatarstan, and sought to become a “union republic” of Russia, which would operate as a de facto state with full economic and political autonomy. This goal was similar to the nationalist movement, which predominantly sought an independent Tatarstan. However, Shaimiev promoted a “Tatarstani” identity, where Tatarstan could operate as a multi-ethnic republic rather than a Tatar nation-state (Graney 2018). Shaimiev largely avoided ethnic nationalist rhetoric, which he feared would put off the Russians from granting sovereignty, putting him directly in contention with the Tatar nationalist movement.

As a result, much like Kosovo, two approaches towards independence emerged in Tatarstan. Shaimiev promoted political nationalism for Tatarstan, supporting a multi-ethnic sovereign republic that could be achieved through negotiation (Kondrashov 2000, 110). The Tatar nationalist movement, spearheaded by three organizations in Tatarstan, All-Tatar Public
Center (VTOTs), Ittifak and Azatlyk, promoted Tatar ethnic nationalism, seeking to create a Tatar nation-state and promote Tatarstan as the homeland for all Volga Tatars. Shaimiev’s campaign and the nationalists diverged along several dimensions. Unlike the diaspora divide in Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Democratic League of Kosovo, which shared a joint goal of Kosovo independence, the goals of the two Tatar campaigns differed between achieving sovereignty and independence. Shaimiev sought to create a sovereign Tatarstan, which would operate largely as an independent state while respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, while many in the intelligentsia-led nationalist movement sought an independent Tatar nation-state with full territorial split from Russia. In addition, the multi-ethnic nature of Tatarstan caused further divergence, as Shaimiev promoted a nomenklatura Tatarstani identity for all ethnicities of Tatarstan, while most nationalists in Tatarstan promoted a Tatar nation-state for all ethnic Tatars to return. The Kosovo independence campaign never had to reconcile a multi-ethnic argument outside of agreements to respect political rights of Serbs and ethnic minorities, as the Kosovo population was over ninety percent Kosovar Albanian, whereas Tatarstan was only forty-eight percent Tatar. Finally, like the divide between the KLA and LDK, the Shaimiev and nationalist camps disagreed on a means of achieving their goal. Shaimiev, as President of Tatarstan, sought to achieve sovereignty non-violently, through enacting policies, undermining the authority of the Russian regime, and negotiating with Russia and other independent countries. Many Tatar nationalists sought to achieve independence through civil disobedience or force in some cases. This ideological divergence between Shaimiev and the nationalists undermined both movements, as internal struggles for public and diaspora support between the Tatar nationalists and the Tatarstan President prevented a united message.
The three nationalist organizations varied in radicalism. VTOTs remained the most moderate organization. For the early 1990s, VTOTs coordinated efforts with Shaimiev, seeking increased autonomy and eventual sovereignty for Tatarstan. Early VTOTs believed independence could be achieved through negotiations with Moscow and knew Shaimiev maintained influence with Yeltsin. Ittifak and Azatlyk both were more radical. Ittifak promoted the creation of a Tatarstan army under the guise of a “national guard” and was prepared to use violent separatism to achieve independence from Russia. Seeking to prevent another Chechnya, Shaimiev quickly cracked down on radical nationalists, arresting and disarming 623 members of the “national guard” in the fall of 1991 (Hahn 2007, 180). Hundreds of weapons were confiscated in further raids. Azatlyk operates as a nationalist youth organization, primarily promoting Tatar nationalism at universities and schools and organizing mass demonstrations and protests. While all three organizations sought to incorporate the Tatar diaspora into the new Tatar state, the split strategies for achieving an independent Tatar nation-state appeared to undermine the success of nationalism in the eyes of the diaspora.

The nationalist camp recognized the divide, prompting Tufan Mingnullin, a Tatar intellectual writing about nationalism in 1996, to state:

“Today as well, Tatars are not united. This is why their opinion is not taken into account. I do not blame the Russians at all for what we are. Only we are to blame. Those who lack self-respect are not respected. A docile slave is beaten more often.” (Tanrisever 2002)

*Diaspora Political and Ideological Engagement*

As both the nationalist movement and Shaimiev’s project grew in domestic support, the two ideologies eventually reached the diaspora. As president of the Republic of Tatarstan, Shaimiev began signing bilateral agreements with independent countries with large Tatar populations. Through these agreements, Shaimiev signed agreements with Turkey, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on a wide variety of topics, including economic, political and cultural cooperation. These agreements served a dual purpose; by signing bilateral agreements with other countries, Tatarstan was moving closer to gaining recognition of de facto independence and also drawing closer relations to the diasporas in those countries, which bought external support for Shaimiev’s movement (Graney 2018). The Tatarstan government was explicit in their pandering to the diaspora as well. The Tatarstan Prime Minister Sabirov stated during the signing of an 1993 agreement with Uzbekistan, “one in ten Uzbek families contains a Tatar!” (Graney 2018). In addition to the agreements, Tatarstan deployed “authorized representatives” to countries with large diaspora populations, including China, the United States and Germany, to act as ambassadors of Tatarstan. These representatives coordinate political and economic efforts with the host government, but also support cultural and educational endeavors amongst the Tatar diaspora, connecting the diaspora back to Tatarstan (Graney 2018).

However, despite the official efforts to connect with the Tatar diaspora, Shaimiev limited Tatarstan’s engagement with diaspora organizations. The Tatarstan government has been clear that Tatarstan only offers “moral and spiritual” support to the diaspora, stating that Tatarstan cannot offer cultural or educational support abroad (Graney 2018, 164). The Shaimiev administration sought to act as a “coordinator” for the diaspora, connecting organizations abroad with other resources for cultural and educational engagement, but Tatarstan itself could not act as the benefactor for the Tatar people beyond Tatarstan. These limitations stunted diaspora involvement in the sovereignty movement, as Tatarstan failed to act as a Tatar homeland and Tatars did not unite abroad. In the minds of many within the diaspora, a homeland should not act as solely as a morally supportive, bureaucratic coordinating body (Graney 2018).
In contrast to Shaimiev’s diaspora policies, the Tatar nationalists established their own diaspora programs to encourage diaspora political engagement. In February 1992, Ittifak held a Tatar congress or *kurultai* that drew Tatars from all over Russia and the diaspora. In direct opposition to Shaimiev’s government, the *kurultai* elected a 75-member National Assembly or “Milli Mejlis” and issued a declaration of independence (Giuliano 2011). Twenty five members of the Milli Mejlis were elected from outside Tatarstan, including many from the diaspora. While the Milli Mejlis held no political power over the Tatarstan supreme soviet, the show of international unity of Tatars shook Shaimiev. In addition, Ittifak had rallied public support for nationalism in Tatarstan during the fall of 1991. According to public opinion polls conducted in November 1991, 86% of Tatars in Tatarstan supported independence (Giuliano 2011). In October 1991, armed protestors attempted to storm the supreme soviet in Kazan to force a declaration of independence vote (Beissinger 2002). While the attempt was unsuccessful, the nationalist rhetoric continued to dominate the airwaves in favor of independence. A common nationalist slogan chanted outside the supreme soviet highlights the dual economic grievance and exceptionalist bend of the Tatar nationalist movement: “Tatar Oil for Tatarstan” (Datta-Ray 1993). The creation of the Milli Mejlis successfully appealed to public opinion of the Tatars and the attempted declaration of independence with support from elected Tatar diaspora officials highlighted ethno-nationalist Tatar unity. Through the Milli Mejlis, which attempted to grant the diaspora decision-making power within the Tatarstan legislative process, the nationalists had separated the diaspora from the Tatarstan government (Graney 2018, 168).

However, while some members of the diaspora practiced political engagement by joining or supporting the nationalist Milli Mejlis, the measures for lobbying efforts predominantly showed indifference. Only one lobbying organization began operating on behalf of Tatar rights
between 1990 and 2007 in any reporting country or institution. The Underrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) lobbied the European Union to protect the Tatar diaspora in Europe beginning in the early 2000s, which provided no support to the Tatarstan independence campaign. Shaimiev, like Ibrahim Rugova, practiced some unofficial lobbying; however, his efforts remained predominantly in Russia, as he attempted to convince Yeltsin to accept Tatarstan sovereignty.

United public support for the Milli Mejlis did not last for long. In June 1992, Shaimiev, seeking to counter the influence of the Milli Mejlis, established the World Congress of Tatars, which drew thousands of Tatars around the world to Kazan. While the event remained largely a celebration of Tatar culture and heritage, Shaimiev used the opportunity to undermine the Milli Mejlis, describing the WCT as an official government organization that could “turn the emotional energy surrounding national issues into real work with the diaspora, so it does not cause harm” (Graney 2018, 168). However, Shaimiev continued to emphasize that the democracy and multiculturalism of Tatarstan came before the Tatar kin-state.

These two paths split the diaspora. Many diaspora members continued to connect with Tatarstan as a cultural resource and coordinating entity to connect communities of Tatars. Tatars with this cultural connection predominantly practiced ideological engagement, publicly supporting Shaimiev’s vision for a sovereign, multiethnic Tatarstan. This moderate ideological engagement with the sovereignty movement is evidenced by the number of Tatar diaspora social media groups that developed during this time. Similar to Kosovo, Tatar communities gathered in large Facebook groups, supporting Tatarstan sovereignty and cultural exceptionalism. At least ten Tatar diaspora Facebook groups from before 2007 are still in use today, with one group, “KAZAN RUSYA,” holding 1,183 members. However, calls for independence are nearly non-
existent and the rhetoric remains more vague than in Kosovar Facebook groups, with milder posts such as “Long live the Khanate of Kazan!” rather than calls for independence from Russia in the 2007 Facebook group “Tatars Forever.”

On the other hand, the nationalist camp of the diaspora accused Shaimiev of promoting sovereignty for his own self-interest and the interests of the Tatarstan elite, turning his back on the diaspora that seek an ethnic homeland (Graney 2018, 169). The WCT and Shaimiev tended to operate on an inter-governmental level, rather than on a delegation to delegation level, preventing many Tatar diaspora organizations from having any voice in Tatarstan. As a result, many in the diaspora accused Shaimiev of using the diaspora only when it was politically expedient to do so (Graney 2018).

**Initial Success of the Tatarstan Sovereignty Movement**

Despite the divide in diaspora support, both Shaimiev and the nationalists were making progress domestically. On August 30, 1990, Tatarstan declared state sovereignty through an official vote by the Tatarstan supreme soviet. The conditions in Russia were ideal for Tatar independence. Russia was distracted by Chechen separatism in the Caucasus, Russian leadership was in turmoil following the attempted coup in August 1991 and nationalist fervor had reached a fever pitch in Tatarstan in the fall of 1991. Capitalizing on the opportunity, the Tatarstan government held a referendum for Tatarstan sovereignty on March 21, 1992. The referendum question remained vague, allowing both nationalists and Shaimiev supporters to back the referendum, which asked “Do you agree that the republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject of international law, building its relations with the Russian Federation and other republics (states) on an equal basis?” (AP News 1992). The referendum passed with 62% voting in favor.
of a sovereign Tatarstan, which gave Shaimiev significant bargaining power in negotiations with the Russian government. Supporters of a sovereign Tatarstan saw the referendum largely as a ratification of the 1990 declaration of sovereignty.

Russian President Boris Yeltsin became increasingly concerned with the situation in Tatarstan. In July 1991, Yeltsin famously dictated to Russia’s republics “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow” to gain support for his presidential bid (Kondrashov 2000). However, faced with a potentially sovereign Tatarstan in 1992, Yeltsin sought to maintain control over the republic. Acting quickly, Yeltsin created the Federation Treaty, which offered greater autonomy to the Russian republics in return for respecting the territorial integrity of Russia. On March 31, 1992, 18 of the 20 Russian republics agreed to prevent ethnic separatism from Russia. However, Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the Federation Treaty and relations between Yeltsin and Shaimiev soured.

The metropole vulnerability argument raises an important contrast between the leadership of Serbia and Russia. From 1995 until 2000, Russia had an average state fragility score of 10/25, equal to Serbia during the same time period. However, the policies towards minority movements during the lead up to these equal fragility scores led to very different outcomes. Milosevic resisted Kosovar independence, revoking their autonomy and using force to crush any independence campaign. However, Yeltsin granted more autonomy to Tatarstan, co-opting the Tatarstan movement and compelling the Tatars to accept sovereignty in lieu of secession. Part of the failure of the Tatarstan independence movement was the fast success of the sovereignty movement in achieving greater autonomy for Tatarstan, which led to eventual complacency by the Tatar independence campaign. Yeltsin also successfully undermined Tatar intelligentsia
arguments of Russian colonialism by granting increased autonomy, weakening the ideologies of Tatar nationalism.

In November 1992, the Tatarstan supreme soviet adopted a new constitution and offered dual Russian and Tatarstani citizenship for residents of the republic; however, this dual citizenship was not extended to the diaspora (Giuliano 2011, 124). Yeltsin organized nationwide referendums for reform policies in 1993. Tatarstan urged citizens to boycott the vote, drawing less than 15% of the Tatar population to the polls. The same happened for nationwide Russian Duma elections in late 1993 (Giuliano 2011). Tatarstan also refused to ratify the new Russian Constitution in 1993, recessed the supreme soviet of Tatarstan to prevent votes and often publicly contradicted the official stances of the Russian government (Smith 2013). Tatarstan increasingly rejected the authority of Russian leadership and continued to negotiate for sovereignty. In order to gain leverage over Russia, Shaimiev withheld tax revenue and continued to urge the Tatarstan population to boycott federal votes.

In February 1994, Shaimiev’s campaign came to fruition. After nearly two years of negotiation, Yeltsin yielded and a bilateral power-sharing treaty was agreed upon by both leaders. Under the 1994 agreement, Tatarstan’s federal tax rate dropped nearly 70%, their economic and political autonomy greatly expanded and Tatarstan citizens could opt out of the Russian military requirement (Jeffries 2013, 83). Shaimiev did a victory lap in Kazan, proclaiming that his policies led to peaceful and successful sovereignty for Tatarstan. Shaimiev began consolidating political power in Tatarstan, pushing aside opposition and nationalist groups, gerrymandering districts and running negative press campaigns (Giuliano 2011, 125).

Interestingly, Shaimiev publicly contradicted the Russian government on Kosovo secession. Russia supported the Serbian regime and committed peacekeepers to the region. Tatarstan supported the Kosovar rebels and refused to commit any peacekeepers to the Russian force.
The nationalist groups crumbled. VTOTs lost the vast majority of its public support and leadership and moderate widespread nationalism was replaced with fringe radicalism seeking violent Tatar independence. Ittifak and Azatlyk became increasingly factionalized, becoming smaller and smaller organizations (Giuliano 2011). The diaspora no longer could connect with the nationalist movement and the vast majority maintained connections to Tatarstan through domestic cultural organizations and the WCT. Nearly all calls for independence dried up as Shaimiev declared victory for Tatarstan, successfully co-opting key elements of nationalist goals, removing the majority of the secessionist platform.

In addition, while the Tatar diaspora connected with the Shaimiev regime through ideological engagement, the levels of engagement between Kosovar Albanians and Tatars were vastly different. Using similar search terms on Factiva, I found 206 articles regarding separate instances of Kosovar diaspora engagement, in comparison with 11 articles for Tatar diaspora engagement.9 The vast majority of these articles discussed meetings between diaspora groups and the WCT and forms of ideological engagement. There were no articles that discussed economic or military diaspora engagement. In addition, the lack of articles cannot be explained by an increased incentive for the Tatar diaspora to engage with the independence campaign covertly to avoid punishment, as the incentive would be similar to the Kosovar Albanian diaspora. Both the Yugoslav and Russian regimes were capable of and willing to target political dissidents and secessionist enablers abroad, which should decrease the incentive for either

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9 In order to identify media reports on Tatar diaspora engagement, I utilized the Dow Jones Factiva database, which collects global media reports. The search term algorithm used was:
Tatar* AND (secession OR secede OR free* OR liberat* OR independen*) AND (diaspora OR exile*) AND (Kazan OR Volga) NOT (Crimea*) FROM 1/1/1990 to 1/1/2008
The eleven articles were disaggregated from duplicates in the same process as the Kosovo articles.
diaspora to engage with the homeland. As a result, the Tatar diaspora was significantly less connected to Tatarstan than the Kosovar Albanians were to Kosovo.

The Shaimiev administration expanded land reform, economic and education measures in order to prevent Russia from easily reclaiming Tatarstan sovereignty. From 1994 until 1999, Tatarstan successfully operated as a sovereign state within the parameters of Russia. The geography of Tatarstan may have acted as a constraint to Tatarstan’s full independence. The Republic of Tatarstan is completely surrounded by the Russian Federation, which would prevent goods or weapons from entering Tatarstan through a non-Russian border, in case Tatarstan sought violent independence. Kosovo, which borders Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia in addition to Serbia, had a number of other countries to support their independence. However, despite these geographic constraints, Yeltsin still feared Tatarstan secession as a significant threat. The Shaimiev government studied other surrounded countries, such as San Marino, as potential models for their sovereignty model and believed that Tatar sovereignty would remain successful despite their geographic situation (Burke 1993).

The Fall of Tatarstan Sovereignty

The rise of Putin and Russian federalism’s fall from grace soon marked doom for the sovereignty movement. Putin was not Yeltsin. Through a series of unilateral legal actions, the Duma under Putin began withdrawing Tatarstan sovereignty. Shaimiev attempted the same actions as before: withholding tax revenue, supreme soviet recesses and refusals to meet with Russian officials. However, the Putin regime was prepared to engage in constitutional warfare, declaring that all republic constitutions must be harmonized with the Russian Federation’s constitution by June 2000 (Hahn 2007). Tatarstan and Shaimiev continued to delay, making
minor adjustments to the constitution to buy more time. Shaimiev claimed that Tatarstan could not reasonably amend the Tatarstan Constitution until after the March 2002 presidential elections. Putin renewed pressure on Tatarstan immediately following Shaimiev’s reelection and on May 10, 2002, the Tatarstan supreme soviet acquiesced, amending the Tatarstan Constitution to include Tatarstan as a “subject of the Russian Federation” (Hahn 2007, 190).

In addition to engaging in constitutional warfare, the threat of military force under the Putin regime acted as a deterrent for the Shaimiev regime. In 1999, Putin had deployed Russian forces in Chechnya to quash the Chechen independence movement and Tatar leaders feared he would use indiscriminate force against Tatarstan if they did not comply. As a result of this concern, Shaimiev refused to reach out to radical nationalist organizations for assistance and moderate nationalist campaigns led by the intelligentsia had largely died out (Hahn 2007). There were a number of protests in Tatarstan following the 2002 amendments, but the public support for nationalism was gone after the Tatar nationalist movement fragmented following Shaimiev’s co-opting of the secessionist platform (Giuliano 2011). Putin continued to withdraw power from the Russian republics and by March 31, 2004, Tatarstan had lost all special autonomous status. The Tatarstan sovereignty movement had failed.

On July 11, 2007, as a largely symbolic gesture, the Russian and Tatar governments signed another power-sharing agreement. However, unlike the 1994 power-sharing agreement, which granted Tatarstan economic and political sovereignty, Tatarstan was granted some autonomy over only cultural and educational affairs (Arnold 2007). This 2007 agreement marked the true end of the Tatarstan sovereignty campaign that began in 1990, as it represented a complete reversal of the leverage that Shaimiev managed to gain over Yeltsin’s regime.
Analysis of Engagement Results and Considerations of Alternative Explanations:

With the exception of the first few years of the sovereignty movement when the diaspora practiced political engagement through the Milli Mejlis and other nationalist organizations, the Tatar diaspora remained involved largely through shared culture. The lack of historical relations between the diaspora and the homeland, Shaimiev’s emphasis on the “coordination” role of Tatarstan and the lack of diaspora political infrastructure in the host countries made supporting the Tatarstan movement politically, economically or militarily difficult from abroad. The WCT intensified cultural relations between communities greatly and many Tatars supported the sovereignty movement through ideological engagement. However, as Shaimiev lost power, the WCT became a largely Russian governmental institution for Tatar culture and history. The nationalist movement failed to create a strong enough homeland relationship to the diaspora, causing the duration of diaspora support for Tatarstan secession to be very short-lived. Without diaspora encouragement, Shaimiev’s base of support for sovereignty failed under Putin, as Tatars within Tatarstan and Russia likely feared retaliation for defending Tatar sovereignty.

There are a number of competing explanations for Tatarstan’s failure to secede from Russia. Despite higher Russian metropole fragility than in Serbia, Shaimiev and Yeltsin were able to co-opt the platform of the nationalist secessionist movement in Tatarstan by promoting increased autonomy in Tatarstan. The Tatar nationalist movement largely fell apart in 1994, following the signing of the power-sharing agreement, allowing Putin to eventually revoke Tatarstan’s sovereignty without significant challenges. However, according to the state fragility index, Russia was more fragile under Putin’s regime from 1999-2002 (10.5/25 average) than under Yeltsin’s regime from 1995-1999 (9.75/25 average), undermining the importance of state fragility to success of secessionist movements.
In addition, the geography of Tatarstan may have limited the potential for Tatarstan to secede. In Kosovo, multiple international borders allowed for weapons, aid and goods from the diaspora to assist in strengthening the independence movement. However, in Tatarstan, the lack of an international border may have stifled secessionist movements. While initially confident that Tatarstan would not seek independence, Yeltsin became increasingly concerned with the potential for Tatarstan to become independent, as Tatars constitute the second largest ethnic group in Russia and have significant economic resources that could allow them to become independent (Hahn 2007, 174). Yeltsin’s genuine concern for Tatarstan secession partially undermines the argument that geography alone would prevent a successful independence campaign, as Yeltsin could rely on the lack of international borders to stifle the Tatar movement. While both Shaimiev and nationalist leaders were acutely aware of Tatarstan’s geographic situation, nationalist organizations continued to study other landlocked countries or independence campaigns, such as San Marino and Nagorno-Karabakh, in case of the necessity for violent secession. Ultimately, this argument is largely hypothetical. The borders of Tatarstan never closed throughout the campaign and no violent secession occurred, so the geography of Tatarstan played a minimal role in the actual campaign. While this fact does not undermine the possibility that the lack of an international border would have significantly stifled any violent secession, the largely peaceful nature of the movement, Tatarstan nationalist’s preparation for a surrounded secession movement, and Yeltsin’s concern with Tatar secession undermine the argument that international borders alone prevented the success of the Tatarstan campaign.

Unlike Kosovo, Tatarstan did not receive any external support from other independent countries for their independence campaign. However, Tatarstan did not have a highly politically engaged diaspora that may have motivated other countries to assist the Tatarstan independence
movement. The effect of external support on independence remains consistent with the results from Kosovo that external support acts as a complementary explanation to diaspora engagement. External support strengthens independence campaigns; however, diaspora engagement in the host country often triggers the external government support.

With regard to the grievance argument, the Tatar nationalist campaign centered much of their platform on emphasizing Tatar grievances with Russian “colonists.” However, the public support of Tatar nationalism spiked in 1992 and did not successfully endure throughout the independence campaign, highlighting the weaknesses in the grievance argument. Both independence campaigns in Tatarstan and Kosovo heavily emphasized economic and political grievances within their societies; however, the Kosovo campaign was able to endure, while the Tatarstan campaign failed, pointing to other explanations for secessionist success. While emphasizing economic and cultural grievances was a successful motivator in the short term, the failure of the Tatar national movement to garner long-term public support through emphasizing grievances against Russians undermines the argument that domestic grievances increase the likelihood of secessionist success.

Finally, with regard to Roeder’s programmatic coordination approach, Tatarstan supports the argument that internal divisions between key movement actors lessens the likelihood of secessionist success. While the Tatar nationalist movement successfully established programmatic realism and authenticity in Tatarstan, Shaimiev and the nationalists competed for support and failed to coordinate the methods and goals of the independence and sovereignty movements. However, Kosovo, as mentioned above, seems to undermine Roeder’s argument, as the KLA and the LDK failed to coordinate methods and resources, but still achieved independence for Kosovo.
In light of the competing and complementary explanations, as well as the evidence that almost one million Tatars living outside of Russia did not sufficiently engage with the Tatarstan independence movement, Tatarstan demonstrates that a lack of diaspora engagement significantly lessens the likelihood of secessionist success. Tatarstan remains consistent with the results of the Kosovo case. In the next and final section, I will compare and contrast the results of Kosovo and Tatarstan, summarize the competing arguments and offer my recommendations for future diaspora research.
Conclusion

Kosovo and Tatarstan are systematically selected cases that test effectively the diaspora engagement argument. The Kosovar Albanian diaspora engaged with the Kosovo independence campaign politically, militarily, economically and ideologically, strengthening the movement and increasing the likelihood of secessionist success. The Volga Tatar diaspora failed to engage with the Tatarstan independence campaign in any significant capacity, with the exception of some ideological engagement, weakening the movement and decreasing the likelihood of secessionist success. Both diaspora populations were large and culturally aware of their heritage; however, the two independence movements greatly differed on the use of the diaspora.

Mintimer Shaimiev and Ibrahim Rugova promoted nonviolence, unofficial lobbying and negotiation to achieve their respective goals of sovereign Tatarstan and independent Kosovo. However, Shaimiev undermined the role of Tatarstan as an ethnic homeland, promoting a multi-ethnic, sovereign state, which muddied his connection to the diaspora. While Shaimiev established the World Congress of Tatars to connect the Tatar diaspora to Tatarstan, he also deemphasized supporting the diaspora in ways other than “morally and spiritually” and was often accused of using the diaspora as a political tool rather than a means to sovereignty (Graney 2018). In contrast, Rugova emphasized the role of Kosovo as the ethnic homeland for Kosovar Albanians and the LDK utilized strong nationalist rhetoric to engage the diaspora. Shaimiev actively undermined any sense of “return” for the Tatar diaspora to Tatarstan, whereas Rugova encouraged the diaspora to invest in their futures in Kosovo. While Shaimiev and Rugova promoted the same methods, their connection to the diaspora vastly differed, with Rugova using diaspora engagement to strengthen the Kosovo independence movement and Shaimiev failing to strengthen the Tatarstan movement.
In addition, both movements had radical components: the Kosovo Liberation Army for Kosovo and the intelligentsia-led Tatar nationalist movement in Tatarstan, which consisted of a number of organizations, including VTOTs, Ittifak and Azatlyk. All of these organizations actively competed with the non-violence movements led by Shaimiev and Rugova; however, once again, the role of the diaspora led to different outcomes. The KLA initially worked with Rugova and the LDK until the Dayton Accords, when the KLA and many in the diaspora realized that non-violence was not working. The KLA offered new methods of achieving the same goals as the LDK and successfully co-opted a significant chunk of Rugova’s support. While the KLA actively disliked Rugova and the LDK, which became clear at Rambouillet, the non-violent movement laid the groundwork for the KLA movement. When public diaspora support transitioned to violent separatism, the KLA could easily take the reins from Rugova. On the other hand, Shaimiev and the Tatar nationalist movement simultaneously competed for diaspora support throughout the independence campaign. Diaspora engagement was split between the two camps and further split between multiple organizations in the nationalist camp. Ultimately, Shaimiev’s political power as president of Tatarstan won out over the disorganized nationalists, the diaspora lost interest as the independence movement was co-opted by the sovereignty movement and Tatarstan settled for less than five years of increased autonomy. The inability to channel diaspora engagement to strengthen the movement undermined any political power of the Tatar independence campaign.

These two parallel stories of large diasporas in the 1990s raise an important question that deserves future attention: Which actors most effectively create a national identity and motivate an engaged diaspora? In the case of Kosovo, the national identity of Kosovar Albanians had been created over centuries of cultural differences from the ruling class of Ottoman Turks or Serbians.
In the case of Tatarstan, the Volga Tatar identity was not fully formed until the late nineteenth century, where it was subsequently lost under the Soviet Union and rediscovered in the late 1980s. In either instance the question remains for the success of secessionist movements: should the diaspora reach out to the homeland to establish connections or vice versa?

In addition, a discussion of the competing and complementary arguments is necessary in understanding the diaspora engagement argument. With regard to metropole vulnerability, the state fragility of the regime did not seem to matter as much as the policies enacted by the metropole leader. In Serbia, which had lower regime fragility than Russia, Milosevic resisted Kosovar independence efforts with force, attempting to quash the secession efforts. The Milosevic regime was not particularly vulnerable; however, his violent display of force strengthened diaspora engagement, as new waves of refugees spread stories and anger throughout an already active diaspora. However, Yeltsin, fearing Tatarstan secession from a more vulnerable Russia, granted increased autonomy to Shaimiev’s regime, bolstering the sovereignty movement and allowing Shaimiev to co-opt the efforts of the nationalists that sought independence. As a result, the vulnerability of the regime worked in the opposite way than expected, as vulnerability led the metropole to offer compromises that undermined more radical demands for secession.

With regard to geographic or tactical advantages, only international borders seemed to play a role in the outcome of either campaign. Tatarstan had no international borders, which likely played a role in undermining secessionist efforts. However, as stated above, the non-violent nature of the campaign and the genuine concern over Tatar secession from Russian authorities point to additional explanations for secessionist failure outside of lacking international borders. On the other hand, Kosovo had international borders, which the KLA used
at the outset of the independence campaign to build training camps in Albania. In addition, the majority of KLA weaponry was purchased from Albania across the border. However, once again, international borders alone did not lead to Kosovo secessionist success, as neighbors were often unwilling to act with the KLA for fear of retaliation and the ability to more easily import weapons than Tatarstan played a smaller role than other explanations in leading to Kosovo’s independence. As a result, while international borders played a role in the outcome of the secessionist campaign, the role of other explanations likely took precedence in leading to secessionist success.

With regard to grievances, there is significant evidence in both cases that anger at the treatment of the homeland at the hands of the metropole was significant in bolstering temporary support. However, there is little evidence that the temporary support led to eventual secessionist success. In Tatarstan, the nationalist movement heavily emphasized Tatar economic and political grievances with the Russian government and Russians in Tatarstan. However, despite a peak of public support for Tatar nationalism in 1992, these efforts to construct grievances largely failed following Shaimiev’s success with the power-sharing agreement in 1994. In Kosovo, the nationalist movement was largely constructed on grievances with the Milosevic regime, but also based on a culture of resistance within the Kosovar Albanian diaspora (Phillips 2012). As a result, while grievances are a successful short-term nationalist motivator, nationalism constructed around grievances does not appear to successfully endure in the long-term.

External government support acted as a complementary argument to diaspora engagement. In Kosovo, the support from the United States and NATO assisted in increasing the likelihood of independence in Kosovo; however, lobbying efforts from Rugova, the Albanian-American Civic League and other Kosovar Albanians led to the support of the US and NATO.
As stated in the Kosovo section, the diaspora played a significant role in influencing top US officials to intervene on behalf of Kosovar Albanians in Serbia. In addition, the lack of Tatar diaspora engagement and lobbying in host countries, in addition to external governments’ unwillingness to challenge the territorial integrity of a resource-rich and nuclear-armed Russia, may have contributed to the lack of external support for Tatarstan.

Finally, the last competing explanation for the success of Kosovo and the failure of Tatarstan is Roeder’s programmatic coordination argument. Roeder’s argument certainly applies to Tatarstan, as a lack of coordination with regard to goals, methods and messages between Shaimiev and the nationalist movement led to a weakened independence campaign. However, the LDK and the KLA did not successfully coordinate independence efforts during the vast majority of the Kosovo campaign. Roeder (2018) argues that a successful campaign maintains the same end goals and strategic goals throughout the campaign. While the LDK and the KLA maintained the same end goals of successful independence, the intermediary strategic goals were vastly different, as Rugova sought to build a coalition of supportive countries that would pressure Milosevic to grant Kosovo independence and the KLA sought to achieve independence through violent separatism. As a result, Roeder’s programmatic coordination acts as a weaker competing argument in the case of Kosovo.

Suggestions for Further Research

This study provided a fresh and in-depth look at the relationship between the diaspora and secessionist movements and offered strong evidence that diaspora engagement plays a significant role in increasing the likelihood of secessionist success. However, this study was limited in scope. This thesis is not a large and quantitative study of global secessionist
movements, which would provide a wider look at national secessionist movements and diaspora engagement. By conducting a broader quantitative study of all national secessionist movements, the findings on the relationship between diaspora engagement and secessionist success would become more clear and generalizable. In addition, additional measures of engagement should be included in further studies. Political engagement is not limited to lobbying efforts alone and should include data regarding protests and mass demonstrations. Ideological engagement measures should include broader media measures, including radio stations and direct interviews with diaspora members. While the data is largely inaccessible, economic engagement should include complete direct donation amounts to independence campaigns, as well as the number of donors. In addition, further searching should be conducted in the native language, as only some Albanian and Tatar sources were included in this thesis. Expanding the measures of engagement creates a clearer picture of the effect of the diaspora on secessionist campaigns.

This study raises some new areas within diaspora studies that should be further explored. Firstly, it is tantamount to remember that diasporas are non-monolithic entities and factions within diaspora communities may affect choices to engage with the homeland or avoid engagement. Further studies should explore diaspora factionalization and decision-making to understand what prompts members of a diaspora to support or not support secessionist campaigns. In addition, this study does not differentiate between the role of the diaspora during non-violent or violent secessionist movements. Further studies should explore the relationship between diasporas and violent separatism.

This study provides a unique contribution to understanding and explaining secessionist success. The paper offers a foundation for scholars to build on and more rigorously test this new
contribution of the importance of systematically measured diaspora engagement in the success of secessionist movements.
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