Trade Talks and Populist Thoughts: The Rise in Populist Rhetoric Following China's Accession to the World Trade Organization

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Trade Talks and Populist Thoughts:
The Rise in Populist Rhetoric Following China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from
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by

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1. Introduction

In 2002, China became a full member the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in the process gained access to the ability to trade with the United States at slightly lower but significantly more consistent tariff rates. As a result, U.S.-China trade expanded dramatically and created significant import competition for U.S. manufacturers.¹ Over the following two decades, a significant literature emerged on how that shift in trade impacted the global economy, domestic economic patterns, and importantly, domestic politics. This paper will look at the last of those three things, focusing on how American trade rhetoric has shifted over the last twenty years, and how that shift lines up with causal theories on rising partisanship and populism in U.S. politics.

Trade politics are useful in understanding how domestic issues trickle down to impact local politics. Further, because trade is international, domestic rhetoric on trade can be a moderator of nationalism, racism, and populism.² Trade rhetoric can thus be a useful tool in studying the pathways through which racialized and populist language enter the public lexicon. These shifts in the public and political lexicon of the country have consequences of their own as well. Recent theories have suggested that trade-based economic pain is creating a rise in populism that is mediated by out-group targeting, and that this rise is triggering increasing partisanship in U.S. politics.³ These theories have meaningful impacts on American political life if true, meriting close testing.

This paper finds some support for increasing populism, primarily through class-based identification. This finding contrasts with suggestions that populism is primarily rising through right-wing, out-group targeting, which this paper finds no support for. The findings presented here

¹ Ianchovichina and Martin, “Impacts of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization.”
² Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo, Racialized Politics; Hays, Lim, and Spoon, “The Path from Trade to Right-Wing Populism in Europe”; Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization?”
³ Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization?”
suggest increasingly divergent language between Democrats and Republicans on trade, especially about their employment of populist rhetoric. This data supports claims that increasing populism is driving increasing partisanship in Congress. The paper uses two methods to support these findings: the creation of dictionaries of populist language and topic modeling.

To provide necessary background, this paper begins with a summary of relevant literature concerning trade politics, particularly following Chinese accession to the WTO, and the shortcomings of that research so far. Following the summary of literature is a description of the methods and the initial findings, including all raw data and information necessary for recreation. After the presentation of findings and methods is a discussion which presents in more depth the results and illustrates both the pitfalls of this research and areas for expansion. Finally, a brief conclusion underlines the key findings and shortfalls.

2. Understanding the Relevant Literature

This paper will utilize natural language processing (NLP) methods to understand how rising import exposure from Chinese imports has shaped rhetoric on the floor of Congress regarding trade. Trade has long been a testing ground for theories of how economics impacts domestic politics, and China’s accession provided a clear test case. Recent papers have used the impact of Chinese trade on Congressional politics to look at how cultural alienation and populist nationalism may be fueled by trade-based economic stress. The papers have viewed this issue through the lens of partisanship and used roll call voting to see how partisanship changes in relation to economic difficulty.\(^4\) However, these papers are limited due to their focus on voting, both by an inability to handle nuances that do not present in up-down voting and by their inherently deductive

approach. NLP can address both issues, allowing for complication and inductive testing. This paper will use NLP techniques, specifically topic modeling and dictionary analysis, to provide a novel angle on partisanship, populism, and trade.

*The Ties Between Trade and Congressional Debate*

The idea of fair trade in the United States originally emerged to protect small businesses from dumping and price dropping by larger stores. However, the term became more common in international trade during the passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which ushered in an era of rapid expansion in international trade. The term still described the prevention of dumping and price dropping but focused on developing countries with low labor costs rather than large stores. Fair trade reemerged in political rhetoric the early 1990s. As the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was being negotiated and ratified, fair trade became a vehicle for discussing concerns about how trade liberalization could be undertaken while protecting labor and environmental standards in developed and developing countries. However, the meaning of the term “fair trade” has evolved in contemporary politics, especially after the 2016 election. Fair trade is now less tied to environmental standards and working standards, and more connected to how trade liberalization has caused outsourcing and joblessness in U.S. regions with a historically strong manufacturing presence. Though this usage was most obvious in the presidential campaign, Republicans in Congress also began shifting their talking points from free trade to fair trade.

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5 Dobson, “TNCs and the Corruption of GATT.”
6 Meyer, “Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement.”
7 Kuk, Seligsohn, and Zhang, “The Partisan Divide in U.S. Congressional Communications After the China Shock.”
8 Kuk, Seligsohn, and Zhang.
In order to study this shift in rhetoric in relation to trade, scholars looked for clear examples of dramatic shifts in trade levels and began using the accession of China to the World Trade Organization. China’s near meteoric rise in manufacturing exporting provides a good case study for trade and politics, marking a drastic change over a period in which American political rhetoric was also shifting. China’s share of American imports rose from three percent to more than seventeen percent over the course of fifteen years.\(^9\) These studies then used voting in the House of Representatives as a dependent variable. Due to short terms in small districts being contrasted with national platforms and issues, House members must carefully balance the local and national. These aspects make the House an appropriate testing ground for issues with both local and national concerns.\(^10\) As a result, the impact of rising Chinese import competition on House politics became a common and effective vehicle for studying how the localized impacts of trade shocks can shift national politics. These papers found very mixed and often contested results on issues regarding populism, so this paper will focus on the same, useful linkage between Chinese import rises and House politics to address some of the theories that have emerged.

*Understanding the Impact of Economic Pressure on Legislators*

To see how balancing local and national concerns play out, one must understand the way economic pressure can shape legislators. Economic pressure primarily affects legislators through direct impacts on the conditions in their districts. For example, a legislator whose district has been hit by a natural disaster may vote to increase funding to Federal Emergency Management Agency as a demonstration of solidarity or proactivity. Legislators do must act in order to avoid what

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\(^9\) Che et al., “Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?”

Achen and Bartels refer to as the “angry retrospective,” in which voters punish legislators for events that the legislator had little or no control over. \(^{11}\) Voter understandings of trade politics have an atypically strong ability to both reward and punish incumbents in electoral politics, even though legislators have little power over the distributional consequences of trade. For example, job loss from trade has twice the electoral effect of non-trade job loss. During the 2004 presidential election, a one percentage point loss in employment due to trade resulted in a 0.15 percentage point drop in support for President Bush, the Republican incumbent. A one percentage point loss in employment due to other factors, however, resulted in only a 0.070 percent drop in support for President Bush. \(^{12}\)

This power of economic change forces responses from legislators in predictable ways. Legislators from trade-exposed districts are more likely to vote against free trade measures, whereas legislators from districts threatened by offshoring of manufacturing jobs are more likely to discuss labor concerns once elected. \(^{13}\) Failing to respond to trade can be decisive in reelection campaigns, especially in tightly fought districts. \(^{14}\) These results support the hypothesis that trade can shape political rhetoric and voting, as legislators face significant cost if they do not respond to trade. The need to respond is in line with previous research confirming that diffuse interests, or those without a specific lobby, are some of if not the most important factors in trade debates. \(^{15}\) The importance of trade impacts and local response is reinforced by the fact that contemporary trade legislation is often bundled with domestic legislation. This bundling, particularly for export-dependent districts and their representatives, amplifies the impact that trade exposure has on

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\(^{11}\) Achen and Bartels, “Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks.”
\(^{12}\) Margalit, “Costly Jobs.”
\(^{13}\) Owen, “Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization.”
\(^{14}\) Margalit, “Costly Jobs.”
\(^{15}\) Bailey, “Quiet Influence.”
National shifts in trade, according to this research, should shift national politics. The impact of increasing offshoring and resulting shifts in electoral politics have been closely tied to a rightward shift in politics and increasing populism.

This paper will define populism as a political ideation that assumes an antagonism between the people and an established elite, in which true legitimacy comes from “the people”, who are virtuous, and not from a denigrated elite. The more right-leaning expression of populism is often seen in nationalist and racially exclusive understandings of who constitutes “the people.” This form of right-wing populism is the type most often described as emerging in response to trade-related economic damage. The trend is neither new nor specific to the United States. In Germany, trade exposure was correlated with a significant increase in vote share for far-right parties while having no impact on other parties. Roughly two-thirds of this increase is tied to shifts in the labor market that resulted from trade, indicating local economics as a key mediator in the process. In the United States, ties between economic pressure, trade, and right-wing populism can be traced back nearly a century. Throughout the Great Depression, economic pressure was tightly tied to rightwards electoral movement. This history all undergirds how strongly trade concerns can shape electoral politics and provides a basis for the contemporary focus on Chinese imports and the House of Representatives.

Contemporary Disagreements on Rising Populism and Partisanship

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17 Spruyt, Keppens, and Van Droogenbroeck, “Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It?”
18 de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke, “Right-Wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression.”
19 Hays, Lim, and Spoon, “The Path from Trade to Right-Wing Populism in Europe.”
20 Dippel, Gold, and Heblich, “Globalization and Its (Dis-)Content.”
21 de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke, “Right-Wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression.”
Much of this focus on trade with China has looked at how older white men, who perceive themselves as socially and culturally alienated, feel victimized by trade-based economic pain, resulting in cultural backlash and right-wing populism.\textsuperscript{22} Trade complaints then both mediate and exacerbate racism and out-group targeting.\textsuperscript{23} However, the literature so far has struggled to consistently support the cultural backlash hypothesis. One paper found not only that trade exposure increased vote share for Republicans and a decline in moderates in the House, but that impacts were differentiated by demographics. Majority-white districts experience further pulls to the right, while majority-minority districts move to the left.\textsuperscript{24} This finding seems consistent with expectations, but another paper found, in opposition, that vote share for Democrats increased in more trade-exposed districts.\textsuperscript{25} A third paper contradicted both, suggesting that there were no shifts in broad political ideology, but rather that some politicians are adopting more trade-averse positions while remaining static on non-trade issues.\textsuperscript{26} Finally, one paper suggested that none of this is indicative of the impact of trade, but rather of in-group preference mediated through claims of economic harm. In other words: trade is just a smoke screen for racism.\textsuperscript{27}

One possible explanation is methodological. All these papers work through roll call votes or DW Nominate scores. The DW Nominate scores use voting patterns to plot the partisan lean of members of Congress. By analyzing voting scores, each member is assigned a score between negative one and one. The closer a member is to a negative one, the more liberal; the closer to a positive one, the more conservative; the closer to zero, the more moderate. The DW Nominate

\textsuperscript{22} Inglehart and Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism.”
\textsuperscript{23} Cerrato, Ferrara, and Ruggieri, “Why Does Import Competition Favor Republicans?”
\textsuperscript{24} Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization?”
\textsuperscript{25} Che et al., “Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?”
\textsuperscript{26} Feigenbaum and Hall, “How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks.”
\textsuperscript{27} Cerrato, Ferrara, and Ruggieri, “Why Does Import Competition Favor Republicans?”
scores can then be used for quantitatively testing partisanship.\textsuperscript{28} However, basing a measurement of partisanship or legislative behavior on purely voting is problematic as it suffers from selection bias, party discipline, and an inherently deductive approach. Thus, even in the best circumstances, an analysis of voting behavior cannot provide a complete picture of partisanship.

To begin with, though roll call voting can often indicate a member’s party affiliation, it isn’t always effective at identifying relative partisanship within parties.\textsuperscript{29} The first issue that becomes apparent is the selection bias. In many countries, roll call votes are not automatically recorded. The ruling party can then choose which votes are made public, so public records of roll call votes are not an unbiased source. Nonrecorded votes become less of an issue in the United States Congress, where all roll call votes that occur on the floor are automatically recorded.\textsuperscript{30} Automatic recording does not, however, prevent any selection bias. Potential legislation in the House must pass through committee, which exists under the sway of majority party leadership. If a party leader expects significant resistance from within their party, they may simply kill the legislation in committee. If they are unable to do that, the Speaker of the House can simply remove it from the docket or table the legislation, effectively killing it.\textsuperscript{31} As a result, the process by which bills even make it to the floor for voting is a contentious and political process, creating a selection bias for vote-based metrics of partisanship.

In addition to selection bias, votes are subject to party discipline, in which party leaders use a variety of methods to enforce unity. These methods can range from threats and promises of committee assignments, internal pressure, and endorsements for reelection campaigns, among


\textsuperscript{29} Schwarz, Traber, and Benoit, “Estimating Intra-Party Preferences.”

\textsuperscript{30} Hug, “Selection Effects in Roll Call Votes.”

\textsuperscript{31} Vandoren, “Can We Learn the Causes of Congressional Decisions from Roll-Call Data?”
other things.\textsuperscript{32} Party discipline within the United States is carried out largely by the whip. Each party selects a whip whose job is to tally support and attempt to secure or flip individual members before key votes. A “whipped system” refers to a legislative system with this or a similar structure, and a “highly-whipped system” gives the whip significant power and authority to carry out their job.\textsuperscript{33} The power of party leadership to discipline is tested when party members choose to vote against their party. However, members of legislatures are much more likely to rebel when their party holds a comfortable majority, which means their vote is less key and therefore less likely to be fought for. When parties are in the minority and depend on internal unity along with defectors from other parties, the normal rebels are much more likely to fall in line.\textsuperscript{34} This ability to discipline emphasizes the shortcomings of roll call votes as a tool for differentiating within parties.

\textit{The Benefits of Speech and Language Processing as Tools}

Speeches are less subject to party discipline and may avoid the selection effects created by only looking at votes. A study of the Swiss parliament found that even in a system where parties exercise significant power (highly whipped systems), speech is consistently more varied and more likely to break with party lines.\textsuperscript{35} Members can also speak with more ambiguity or nuance than an up-down vote may allow. The ambiguity can allow them to speak to their district’s issues, including localized trade problems, in ways unlikely to catch the attention of party officials.\textsuperscript{36} While these speeches are unlikely to change voting behavior, they can be used to capture partisan differentiation. Word-level scoring of political texts has been used to accurately match human

\textsuperscript{32} Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, “Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen.”
\textsuperscript{33} “U.S. Senate: Party Whips.”
\textsuperscript{34} Slapin et al., “Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament.”
\textsuperscript{35} Schwarz, Traber, and Benoit, “Estimating Intra-Party Preferences.”
\textsuperscript{36} Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, “Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen.”
hand-coding in predicting partisanship.\textsuperscript{37} Thus, computational language analysis can provide a means for capturing partisan differences while avoiding issues inherent to roll call voting. Legislators who do vote against party interest are also likely to call attention to it with a speech on the floor, since they are already engaging in rebellion against their party.\textsuperscript{38} Measuring debate, then, should closely capture breaks from the party that a roll call metric would not.

Speech measurements also allow for multidimensional analysis. DW Nominate scores focus on partisanship, which is also the standard axis of analysis for most roll call-based papers.\textsuperscript{39} Any other axes introduced are also, like partisanship, assumed to be worthwhile metrics \textit{a priori}. This type of deductive testing is not necessarily a problem, but it is limited in what it can say. Deductive testing cannot generate new hypotheses effectively, nor can it identify trends it is not already looking for. Tools provided by NLP allow for the dimensions of analysis to be created inductively through the application of topic models. As a result, inductive testing can find shifts in speech or behavior that are not expected. Methods based on language have already shown promising results in differentiating some manners of speaking by Representatives from districts with various levels of trade exposure.\textsuperscript{40} These differentiations are much more subtle than what is often picked up by voting, specifically on the intermediary step of the manner in which rhetoric moderates between economic pain and partisanship.

\textit{Hypotheses for Textual Analysis}

The causal chain found in many of the papers discussed is roughly as follows: trade imports create economic pain, which feeds into in/out-group populist rhetoric, which triggers rising

\textsuperscript{37} Laver, Benoit, and Garry, “Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data.”
\textsuperscript{38} Slapin et al., “Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament.”
\textsuperscript{39} McElroy and Benoit, “Policy Positioning in the European Parliament.”
\textsuperscript{40} Kuk, Seligsohn, and Zhang, “The Partisan Divide in U.S. Congressional Communications After the China Shock.”
partisanship. As discussed above, the use of DW Nominate scores limits testing to the beginning and end of this chain, measuring whether rising economic pain triggers partisanship. This paper will use NLP tools to focus on the intermediate step of rhetoric. If the theories suggesting that rising trade has contributed to populism are correct, there should be noticeable changes in Congressional rhetoric on trade. Populist rhetoric is marked by people-centrism, anti-elitism, and exclusionism.41 Theories on rising trade also suggest that rising populist rhetoric is a driver of partisanship. For these theories to be true, the rhetoric of trade must itself be increasingly partisan. Thus, there should be a party-based divergence in rhetoric, detectable in tone, topic, or both. These two steps provide two hypotheses, as follows:

1. **Following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization, there is a measurable increase in the frequency of populist rhetoric in Congressional debate.**

2. **Congressional rhetoric on trade should be differentiable across party lines following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.**

Further, as discussed earlier, there is differing opinion on which party is more likely to capitalize on this increase in populism. For a party to use populism, it must discuss it as a political issue, so this paper will look at the rhetorical prevalence of populist language. As discussed above, populism is also likely to take on different representations based on language, so it is worthwhile to see if this is true within the Congressional record. These theories will be tested through the following hypotheses:

3. **Republican members of the House are more likely to use populist language than their Democratic counterparts.**

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4. The populist rhetoric used will be differentiated by party, specifically:

   a. Republican members of the House will be more likely to use out-group targeting and nationalist language, and usage will grow over time; and

   b. Democratic members of Congress will be more likely to use economic and class-based language, and usage will grow over time. 42

3. Methodology

Scraping the Congressional Record

The corpus was created by downloading and scraping the Congressional Record. The Record is comprehensive, beginning with the 104th Congress which lasted from 1995 to 1996. Maintained by the Library of Congress, the online Record is generally posted the morning after a Congressional session adjourns. It is accessible online at www.congress.gov. The scraping program utilizes the Congressional website’s search function, gathering results for a search with a specified time period but no other restrictions. Each year of data for Congress contains about 30,000 documents. These documents can include a debate transcript, a motion, testimony, or submitted written remarks, and comprise everything that is contained within the officially maintained Congressional Record. For consistency with other papers looking at trade and Chinese imports, this paper will use only the House and exclude documents from the Senate. These documents contain all relevant information, including speaker names, dates, titles, and location in the Congressional Record. However, none of this information is tagged within the document, but instead is stored as plain text. 43

42 de Bromhead, Eichengreen, and O’Rourke, “Right-Wing Political Extremism in the Great Depression.”
43 “Congress.Gov | Library of Congress.”
The plain-text formatting presents two challenges. The first is extracting the unmarked information from the downloaded data, and the second is matching speakers to biographical information. To address these issues, several steps are necessary. Texts must first be split into component parts, such as the date and title. To do this, we wrote a program that took the general format of the files and hard-coded to address special cases. The program can then process through each text and pull apart separate speeches, with speaker names and dates. In addition, the program cleans the texts of the speeches through a series of steps. The first is stripping any special characters, as these are generally a result of converting between written text and HTML files. Punctuation is also removed, as all methods used here are word-based. Finally, a number of words are filtered out and removed. The list of words includes articles, procedural terms, and other commonly used but not relevant terms.

The cleaned text is fed into a matching program. The matching program uses all information available to attempt to look up the speaker in a database of all current and past members of Congress. The database is provided through GitHub and listed as part of the public domain. It is a subset of the @unitedstates project, which is maintained and updated by individuals from several nonprofits and news organizations, but not formally affiliated with any of these organizations. The database includes in-depth information including party affiliation, committee assignments, religious affiliation, and district number.44

The program matches information it finds in the text to the database. As an example, consider a speech from the Senate in 2006, with a speaker listed as Mr. Obama, who is a Democrat from Illinois. The program would filter down to only Senators from Illinois who held office in 2006, and then use Mr. to restrict the search to males. After this, it would search the name, which

44 Unitedstates/Congress-Legislators.
would leave only one person remaining, Senator Barack Obama. The matching program is
effective. It attempts to match between 62% and 64% of documents and has a success rate of 98%
with the documents that it attempts. While the attempt numbers may seem low, this is a function
of the extensive number of motions, procedural matters, bills, and votes included in the record.
None of these items, which comprise upwards of 30% of the record, have definite speakers.
Further, most have no relevant text, so their inclusion or exclusion has little bearing on the
analytical findings. The primary source of unmatched Congressional members is name changes
while in office (Representative Stephanie Sandlin née Herseth is often unmatched due to her
marital name change), compound names (e.g. Representative Díaz-Balart is often unmatched), and
typos (Senator Tom McInnis’ surname is sometimes misspelled as McGinnis).

After the texts have been cleaned and matched to members of Congress, they are sorted
and filtered to maintain only texts that are specific to trade, using a set list of terms:

| Table 1. Identifier words for retrieval of trade-related speeches |
|---------------------------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Followed by trade: | Free | Fair | International | Bilateral | Multilateral |
| Trade followed by: | Talk | Agreement | Discussion | War | Dispute |
| Other | Import | Export | NAFTA | TPP | DR-CAFTA |
|       | WTO | FTA | USMCA | USTR | CAFTA |

These search strings were selected to provide the most exhaustive corpus possible while limiting
nontrade documents. However, it is impossible to perfectly capture trade documents without any
overlap. “Fair trade,” for example, is an important term in capturing debates on trade. However, it
is likely also used in unrelated discussions on the political, social, or economic trade-offs of a
policy. I would have preferred to also capture closely debates on how trade impacts domestic
workers but could not find terms to capture this without pulling in an extensive number of
documents on labor movements at large.
The filtered corpus contained 19,254 items, of which 13,964 were speeches matched to members of the House. Those were split into roughly 7,244 Democratic speeches and 6,728 Republican speeches. However, because this paper looks specifically at Chinese accession to the WTO, many of these speeches were used only for training topic models and calibrating baseline word frequency lists. The set from China’s accession onward consists of 8,981 speeches, comprised of 4,734 by Democrats and 4,247 speeches by Republicans.

*Topic Modeling*

Topic modeling is a method of finding common themes and patterns in a corpus of texts. Topic modeling works by detecting patterns in word usage, frequency, and distance to create groups, or “topics”, of similar words. The topics represent a distribution of words that are related to each other more tightly than to words that comprise the other topics. The topic-modeling algorithm generates topics through an unsupervised process, so topic models cannot be used to test for specific ideas within a corpora unless the ideas are generated independently by the model. However, because the topics are independent and unsupervised, they are effective for generating hypotheses and looking for non-obvious trends. There are several common topic-modeling algorithms that provide different trade-offs in speed, consistency, and effectiveness. Each algorithm also varies in effectiveness relative to the size of the corpus used. To allow for a balance between speed and performance, this paper implements two different topic-modeling algorithms: latent semantic analysis with non-negative matrix factorization (NMF) and latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA).

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46 Blei; Lee and Seung, “Learning the Parts of Objects by Non-Negative Matrix Factorization.”
A consistent set of word embeddings is necessary to evaluate topic models. Word embeddings are vector representations of words, which can be mapped onto a space such that the vectors show the similarities and relationships between a given set of words. I created a set of word embeddings specific to the corpus through the word2vec algorithm.47 These vectors are used to measure the trends in word distance and frequency that topic models interpret. Further, these vectors can be used to measure how effective a topic model is by testing the similarity between words. A good topic model should have internally coherent topics, measured by the closeness of the words within the topic, and low similarity with other topics, measured by the difference in words across topic.

Topic modeling began with the creation of a word2vec model implemented through GenSim. The word2vec model used one hundred dimensions over 40 epochs and was trained on the full corpus of trade-related documents.48 A document-term matric was created independently to be fed into the topic modeling algorithm. I then generated topic models for each subset of data, running first an NMF model that tested from fifteen topics to forty-five topics, and then selected the best model. I ran an LDA model across a six-topic range on either side of the NMF peak and compared the best of these LDA models to the best NMF model. This process generated a single model that created high-coherence, low-similarity topics across the given corpus.

Dictionary Creation

I created three word lists to analyze the usage of populist language in the text. The first focused on elite-centric and populist language in a general sense. The second and third focused on left- and right-leaning forms of populist language, respectively. I began each with a predefined list

47 Mikolov et al., “Distributed Representations of Words and Phrases and Their Compositionality.”
48 “Gensim.”
of words, and then used concept representations available from ConceptNet to find comparable words. The starting lists were based on existing literature that discusses general conceptions of populism and how populism is expressed within different partisan frameworks. I used Rooduijn and Pauwel’s paper on populism in Western Europe as the basis for the generalized word lists, since it is designed to be context-independent and has been used in a variety of papers on populism. I based the rightist and leftist dictionaries on a number of papers that discussed U.S. policy and rhetoric to capture the ways the U.S. parties are split. The rightist list focused on out-group targeting and nationalism. The leftists list focused on class-based language. The language is also specific in application to trade discussions. Classifying words such as “immigration” and “terrorist” would not serve as an accurate proxy for right-wing populism in a broad sense, as both are points of discussion across the political aisle. However, within a trade context, these terms are generally used to suggest connections between economic exposure and external threats, in service of framing trade as a contest with a constructed other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Elite Language</th>
<th>Leftist Populism</th>
<th>Rightist Populism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elite Politician Bureaucrat Government Establishment</td>
<td>Interest Wealthy Superwealthy Class Workers</td>
<td>Immigration Immigrants Radicals AmericaForeigner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elitist Politician Arrogant Detached Undemocratic</td>
<td>Rich Financial Undeserving Wealthy Greedy</td>
<td>Terrors Unamerican Foreign American Globalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these lists allow for testing specific ideas of populism, there are some problems in implementation. For example, the dictionary analysis does not account for context, so if an often-

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49 Speer, Chin, and Havasi, “ConceptNet 5.5: An Open Multilingual Graph of General Knowledge.”
50 Rooduijn and Pauwels, “Measuring Populism.”
populist term such as foreign is used in a non-populist context, it will still be marked. Some of the words included are also extrapolated from the literature, so they may not be as effective as theorized when used as markers of populism. Right-wing populism is particularly difficult in this light. Leftist language is fairly constricted to class, but rightist language uses a broad swathe of themes such as immigration and terrorism. As a result, those terms are included, but may negatively impact the effectiveness of the dictionary due to the looseness of the ties and the internally broad nature of the dictionary.

I used these starting lists to create concept vectors though ConceptNet. I retrieved all words with a vector similarity to the starting list’s concept vector above a cutoff of 0.7 and then filtered those down through several methods, including testing compound words and manually deleting redundant or inaccurate words. I checked the word lists for the three categories to make sure they had no overlap. The final lists included 421 words for the elite language dictionary, 182 words for the leftist dictionary, and 164 words for the rightist dictionary. These dictionaries formed the basis for testing various sub-corpora split along both partisan and temporal lines, in order to identify how language usage broke down.52

The testing was straightforward: I tallied each occurrence of one of the words in the dictionaries by text and scaled by the length of the text. The scaled totals provided a category salience by text, which could then be used to compare two given sub corpora, for example, Democrats against Republicans from 2002 until 2019. The tables in the findings section provide both the mean percentage and the weighted average. Mean percentage assumes that all hits against the dictionary are equally valuable. Weighted average adjusts each hit by how tightly correlated the word is to the dictionary. For the purposes of statistical testing, this paper looks at the weighted

52 For full dictionaries, see the appendix
average, so that highly correlated words are given more bearing on results, especially since the word lists are long. Because these tests involved tabulating occurrences of individual words, the lists generated can be used to provide a clearer picture of shifts in language usage and nuances that may be missed by statistical testing.

4. Findings

*Focus Points of Debates on Trade*

The first test performed was a topic modeling of all trade-related speeches from 2002 through 2019, with the best performing model generating fifteen topics. The results are interesting, but not particularly surprising. Three of the topics were procedural (containing words such as “section,” “federal,” “minutes,” “yield,” and “chairman”). Other topics matched with the expected focal points of U.S. debate on trade: oil and energy, trade agreements (along with a specific topic on NAFTA and the Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)), environmental and labor standards, agriculture, pharmaceuticals, finance, and economic and trade relations with Iran.

China emerged as a discrete topic and includes specific references to the WTO. A number of the other topics include language that maps on to populism. The topic on labor, for example, includes terminology on workers’ rights, fairness, and neglect, speaking to a populist conception of class protection. While the language in the topics cannot speak to increases or decreases over time, it is indicative of an undercurrent of populism within the U.S. debate on trade. Further, the
presence of a discrete topic on China that references the WTO affirms the validity of using Chinese accession to the WTO as a launch point. Both of these claims are reinforced by the fact that these topic models are generated using seventeen years of debate within the House.

*Understanding Partisan Breakdowns of Trade Debate*

Following a generic topic model, individual models were created for each of the two parties over the seventeen-year window. Both models had thirteen topics, and the majority of those could be closely matched to topics from the general model. Outside of the procedural topics, the Republican model retained sections on trade agreements, NAFTA and CAFTA, finance and business, Iran, China, agriculture, and energy. The Republican model’s only unique topic was the USMCA (United States-Mexico-Canada Free Trade Agreement), which is the Trump administration’s retooled version of NAFTA. The topic matched that of CAFTA and NAFTA largely, but included specific references to President Trump, Speaker of the House Pelosi, and impeachment. Democrats also lacked many topics unique from the general model. The exceptions are a topic on the Bush tax cuts, and the separation of a topic on NAFTA and CAFTA into two distinct topics. The matching nature is largely unsurprising, given that members of the House are presumably speaking towards each other on related topics. The similarity allows for the analysis of populist language to be more meaningful because differences that arise in speech will be in the ways speakers address a particular topic rather than in the topic they are choosing to address. A

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53 Swanson and Tankersley, “Trump Just Signed the U.S.M.C.A. Here’s What’s in the New NAFTA.”
good example of this differentiation is the distinction between how Republicans and Democrats address trade related to energy. Key words across the topic are consistent, including “energy”, “fuel,” “oil,” and “gas.” However, the secondary terms include differentiation that implies the distinct lenses with which each party approaches the issue. The heavy economic focus of the Republican party is evident through the extensive use of “import,” “supply,” “drilling,” “prices,” and “production.” Meanwhile, the Democratic party sees more mileage out of terms like “renewable,” “independence,” “dependence,” and “clean.” These differences are demonstrative of how topical consistency can still contain underlying currents that are hard to capture without fine-grained language analysis, and how populism can present itself without being the explicit topic of debate.

*Dictionary Analysis on Partisan Divides*

Topic modeling is useful in identifying the extent to which Congressional debate on trade is topically unified and what the points of focus are. However, it cannot specifically address populism. This limitation emerges because topic models generate their focus endogenously, so they cannot be assigned to track populism specifically within a text. To do so, analysis with the
predefined dictionaries discussed above is necessary. Dictionary analyses are necessary to look at shifts both over time and across party lines. Topic models are useful in order to provide an insight into how the parties are differentiated in usage of populist language, as shown above, but the dictionary analysis gives a more fine-grained understanding of where the parties differ.

Divisions in Language by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Usage of populist language by party, from 2002 until 2019.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Populism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rightist Populism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a temporal analysis, the period from 2002 until 2007 was compared to the period from 2011 until 2019. These periods are significant for two reasons. The first is that they share relatively similar numbers of speeches, allowing for relatively equal comparisons. The second is that many view the 2008 presidential election and the 2010 midterms as a turning point in the usage of populist rhetoric in the United States.54 To allow for clear comparison, then, the two periods provide an insight before and after this transition.

Democrats are far more likely than Republicans to use traditionally leftist and class-centered populist language. Looking at individual words, Democrats consistently use the terms associated with this strain of populism more: “workers,” “class,” “inequality,” “unemployment,” and “greed.” All these words underline a form of left-wing populism that focuses on wealth and income inequality as primary issues. This result is largely unsurprising and matches most

54 Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization?”, Formisano, “Populist Currents in the 2008 Presidential Campaign.”
theoretical understandings of partisan differences in populist language. What is surprising is that Democrats are also more likely to use rightist populist language, which is generally defined by out-group targeting and nationalist rhetoric. It is noteworthy that the usage is much less frequent here than with leftist language, but is significant nonetheless. As a result, it is worthwhile to look at which specific words each party is using within the more rightist understanding of populism.

Democrats are more likely to use words such as “multination,” “international,” “globalizing,” and “emigrate.” These words can help to explain why Democrats may be tagged as more right-wing populist by a dictionary analysis, as they can be wielded in multiple ways. Rightist populism would identify these as negatively charged words, presenting a national-identity focused understanding that would view internationalization and global immigration as challenges to the nation’s homogeneity and a threat to the people. Democratic party policy, meanwhile, is largely in support of immigration and internationalization, as evidenced by growing support for pathways to legalization for undocumented immigrants and increased international support for human rights and humanitarian efforts. As a result, the absence of context may be interfering with the dictionary analysis approach and therefore misidentifying Democrats.

The Republican side, meanwhile, seems to match theories on a rise in right-wing populism. Some of the words exclusive to or vastly more common with Republican speakers include “terror,” “criminals,” “aliens,” “extremists,” and “terrorism.” All of these words seem to line up with out-group targeting and nationalism, which are both identified as part of the right-wing populism theorized in response to trade-related economic pain. In contrast with Democrats, there is no apparent reason to assume that these results are misleading. Words like “alien,” “terrorist,” and

55 Rhodes and Johnson, “Welcoming Their Hatred.”
56 von Beyme, “Populism, Right-Wing Extremism and Neo-Nationalism.”
57 NW, Suite 800Washington, and Inquiries, “Americans’ Immigration Policy Priorities.”
58 Autor et al., “Importing Political Polarization?”
“criminal” have clearly negative sentiment and coding that words like “multiculturalism” lack. Thus, it is reasonable to doubt that Democrats are markedly more likely to use right-wing populist language.

Overall, a partisan breakdown finds some support for common theories of how each party looks to implement populist rhetoric but does support a clear differentiation between the two. The findings largely support hypothesis 4b, which posits that Democrats are more likely to use class-based and traditionally left-leaning populist language. Meanwhile, the data presented finds mixed results for hypothesis 4a, positing that Republicans are more likely to use out-group targeting and nationalist language in support of right-leaning populist ideations. While there is some qualitative and observational support hypothesis 4a, there is no consistent qualitative support from dictionary analysis to support this. The data here also supports hypothesis 2, as there is significant differentiation in the type of populist rhetoric each party uses. However, the data largely disproves hypothesis 3, as there is no evidence to suggest that Republicans are more likely to speak in populist language.

Changes Over Time

In addition to requiring partisan difference, theories that China has driven rising populism also presuppose that populism is, in fact, on the rise. Thus, a series of tests that look at the shifts in the usage of populist rhetoric over time are also necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Percentage</th>
<th>Weighted Average</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Before 2007</td>
<td>After 2010</td>
<td>Before 2007</td>
<td>After 2010</td>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Language</td>
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<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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<td>1.37</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Populism</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If trade exposure is driving increasing populism in the United States Congress, then populism must itself be increasing. The dictionaries described in the methodology section which address right-leaning populism, left-leaning populism, and general anti-elitist sentiment, were applied to the House of Representatives. Interestingly, leftist populist language increased while both elite-centric language and rightist language decreased. In other words, the consistent increase in populist language was limited to largely class-based and economic discussions, whereas there was a net decrease in language that relied on outgroup targeting and generalized anti-elitism. However, the decrease in elite and rightist language was considerably smaller than the increase in leftist language. As a result, there is limited support for hypothesis 1, which states that populist rhetoric should increase following China’s accession to the WTO.

It is helpful to look at what words in specific become more common after 2011. Most of the increasingly used language is focused on economic class, with “bank,” “asset,” “inequality,” “investments,” and “superwealthy” becoming more common. The word “class” itself is used far more commonly after 2011. This word usage is in line with the dictionary analysis, which points to an increasing use of traditionally leftist populism, with its bent towards class. Words such as “poverty,” “poor,” “wages,” and “unemployment” all become less common in discussion on trade. These results underscore an increasingly leftist populism in trade. Left-leaning populism reframes the discussion from how the people can help the poor to how the people can combat exploitation by the rich. 59 Thus, everything described above points towards this leftward populist increase. However, the shifts are not particularly large. In order to provide a clearer picture of how the shift

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59 Rhodes and Johnson, “Welcoming Their Hatred.”
occurs, the two parties were separated and run against the same dictionaries over the same two time period: 2002-2007 and 2011-2019.

**Democratic Usage of Populist Language**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite Language</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Populism</td>
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<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Populism</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dictionary analysis of Democratic speech over time tells a conflicting story. In line with predictions of rising populism, leftist populist language rises dramatically between the two time periods. This rise is supported by the language used: “billionaire,” “superwealthy,” and “superrich” are used exclusively in the second period. “Poor,” “poverty,” and “wages” are all used less while “inequality,” “greedy,” “banks,” and “class” all become more regular. Much as in general debates, this indicates a leftist populist reframing of wealth and trade as a class conflict that identifies the wealthy as benefitting at the cost of the people. These changes provide qualitative and quantitative supports for hypothesis 4b. However, there is still a contrast between this rise in leftist populist language and a decrease in elite language writ large.

One possible explanation is that the words that comprise the category on elitism are highly context-dependent, much like those for internationalism. For an individual who broadly trusts the government, “bureaucrat” could reference a competent federal worker with a positive connotation or be a sentiment-neutral technical term. However, for someone who is distrustful of government, “bureaucrat” is likely to be a derisive or negative term. Looking at some of the specific word lists seems to suggest that there may be increasing anti-elitist sentiment, as “bigoted,” “cynical,”
“partisan,” and “authoritarianism” all became more common over time, while “policies,” “leadership,” and “authority” became less common. This conclusion contrasts with the quantitative finding, though, and is not well supported. At best, the evidence is inconclusive regarding whether Democrats have become more or less likely to use elitist language.

The way Democrats use rightist language tells a similar tale, but an even murkier one. The quantitative difference is small, and the word changes have no coherent theme, so there is no evidence to suggest a meaningful increase or decrease. This means that the data here suggests that on aggregate, Democrats have increasingly used populist language since China’s accession to the WTO, supporting the claims of hypothesis 2.

**Republican Usage of Populist Language**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean Percentage</th>
<th>Weighted Average</th>
<th>Before 2007</th>
<th>After 2010</th>
<th>Before 2007</th>
<th>After 2010</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite Language</td>
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<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.59</td>
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<td>0.507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leftist Populism</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Populism</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.013*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dictionary results for Republican language over time provide little support for any of the hypotheses. There is no measurable trend in leftist populist language, which is relatively unsurprising. More surprising are the lack of trend in elite-based populist language and the measured decrease in rightist populist language. While the latter is a small shift, it is in direct opposition to theories on cultural alienation as a driver of populism for the Republican party. To begin with elite language, there is some qualitative evidence to suggest an increase in populist
rhetoric. Some of the words that become more prominent over time, such as “cronyism,” “prejudiced,” “partisan,” “biased,” “elites,” and “establishment,” seem charged independent of context. Meanwhile, much of the language that becomes less common, such as “representatives,” “leadership,” “agencies,” and “authorities,” could likely be uncharged and technical. However, this is not universal: “demagogue” and “despotism” become less common, for example, over time. Additionally, the lack of quantitative support means that increasing populism in elite language is at best anecdotal.

Looking at word lists for rightist language provides little clarity, especially given the already minimal shift detected by the quantitative dictionary analysis. “Extremists” becomes less common over time, while “radicalized” becomes more common. “Native” becomes more common, as “natives” becomes less common. “Globalized” becomes more common as “globalization” becomes less common. Even anecdotally, there is little by way of trends or consistent changes in the data. At best, it indicates that the minimal drop detected is not representative. This data fails to support hypothesis 4b, which suggests that Republicans should increasingly use rightist populist language.

5. Discussion

The analyses undertaken find mixed support for the hypotheses. There is significant support for hypothesis 2, which states that there should be differentiation in rhetoric on trade between parties following China’s accession to the WTO. This party divide held up empirically, as Democrats are far more likely to use leftist populist language and employ vastly different forms of rightist populist and out-group language. Topic modeling also supported this theory, suggesting that while both parties are discussing the same topics, they are doing so with different vocabularies
and different frames. The clearest example is varying approaches to trade in energy, where Democrats consistently mention renewability while Republicans focus on gas and crude oil imports, but the differences hold across topics within trade.

Democratic usage of class-based terms matches the expectations of most partisan analyses of populism and the predictions of this paper laid out in hypothesis 4b. This finding is supported both by the quantitative and qualitative findings of this paper. Democrats are not only more likely to use class-based, leftist language than Republicans, but usage has grown significantly over time. Democrats did see drops in elite language and out-group targeting. However, both categories saw small decreases. Further, looking at individual word lists indicates that the words that saw change in usage are highly context-dependent, undermining these relatively minor movements. As a result, it is likely that on aggregate, Democrats became increasingly populist over the time period measured.

There is no quantitative evidence to suggest that Republicans are more likely to use out-group targeting, rightist populist language than Democrats. However, there is some qualitative evidence, as the words Republicans are more likely to use in this category are generally more context-independent and negatively charged. This result provides at best mixed evidence for hypothesis 4a and no evidence for hypothesis 3. Further, time-based analyses provide no evidence that Republicans are becoming more populist over time. The quantitative change in rightist populism is minute, and qualitative analysis of the word lists does not provide any clarity. This data further fails to support hypothesis 3.

This paper sought to provide an alternative perspective on debates about how trade with China and resulting import competition may be shaping U.S. political rhetoric on trade. These claims require that populism be on the rise at large, which is supported to limited extent, and that
parties be differentiated in their employment of partisan rhetoric, which is well supported here. However, there is no clear evidence from these analyses to support that the rise in populism is concentrated among Republicans, or that out-group targeting and racism are moderators for economic pain from import competition. If this type of out-group targeting process were occurring, there should be a clear increase in rightist populist language among Republicans, which is notably absent. There are several possible explanations for why there is no measurable increase.

*Explanations for Failure to Detect Rightist Language*

The first is largely methodological. The analyses here are context-independent by word. For some angles of populism, this style of analysis may be effective, as with testing for specifically classist language. However, because out-group language is often coded to avoid accusations of racism or nationalism, it may be much more context-dependent and thus not appear in a dictionary-based analysis. Further, the inclusion of terms on immigration and terrorism may have prevented the rightist dictionary from effectively testing for right-wing populism. Both concepts are often included in discussion of nationalism and populism, but also widely used outside of the populist lexicon. As a result, those words may create enough noise within the data to prevent identifying trends effectively.

If either of these are the case, then there are several opportunities for further study that could be more effective. The first would be sentiment analysis, which measures the emotional charge of words based on the contexts they appear in and could thus identify whether a coded word like “multinationalism” is being used in a positive or negative light. Another alternative would be manual scoring, in which human coders identify the existence of nationalism or out-group

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60 Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo, *Racialized Politics.*
targeting in a text. This method would have drawbacks, as it could allow coder bias to easily impact the results and would limit the amount of texts that could be analyzed. Finally, a more restrictive dictionary for right-wing populism may avoid unnecessary noise and identify tighter and more informative trends.

The second possible reason for the inability to support the theory of out-group targeting as a moderator for economic problems is more theoretical than methodological. It is possible that economic pain is not being moderated at all and is instead presenting directly in economic terms throughout speeches. This theory would explain why leftist language, which is already couched in economic terminology, is the only category with a significant increase over the time period. This idea would also explain some of the drops in rightist ideology among Republicans, if the party is moving towards class-based and economic rhetoric in lieu of out-group based ideations. This theory could be tested by creating a dictionary that looks specifically at economic pain, grounded in terminology of job loss and manufacturing, and running that against the available data. This type of test could measure economic pain language but would not necessarily rule out out-group targeting. The two could be coexistent, or even codependent, if the economic pain is explicitly linked to instead of merely moderated by out-group targeting and nationalism.

General Areas of Further Research

One clear area of research would be experimenting with various versions of populism and populist language. The three areas addressed in this paper could be broken down further as a starting point, as each is broad and has a low threshold for how connected the dictionary words are. Rightist populism, for example, could be broken down into separate categories of nationalism, coded identity and racial politics, and anti-globalism. The restricted focus could also help to
eliminate some issues of context-dependency, as the categories could be more specifically filtered and tuned to what they are testing for. On the flip side of this, using a single generalized populism dictionary could be an effective tool. While each strain of populism has distinct threads and messages, all are grounded in the creation of a generic people and a threat to that people. Developing a way to test for that type of category creation could be effective, such as looking at whether the usage of the plural first-person instead of the individual first-person plays a role.

This paper used speeches from the House of Representatives, because the bi-annual reelection and smaller electorate requires they be more attentive to district concerns than Senators. As a result, it would be worthwhile to test usage of populist language against trade exposure at the district level. Unfortunately, a consistent and publicly available set of data on trade exposure changes from Chinese accession to the WTO does not exist. A number of authors have managed to create these data sets, but the procedure to do so is relatively complex and outside of the scope of this project. Once created though, it would be interesting to look further into how the parties break down internally in regards to populist language.

Finally, comparing populist rhetoric to DW Nominate scores on a representative-by-representative basis could provide a bridge between natural language analysis, such as the research presented here, and the work done by others that looks at shifts in partisanship in response to perceived rises in populism. This type of comparative analysis could also allow for a measurement of the extent to which speech does, or does not, represent voting patterns and match expressed voter preference.

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6. Conclusion

Much of the recent work on trade connects rising economic pain from Chinese imports to increase in partisanship. Populism on both sides of the aisle, particularly Republicans, serves as the link between economic pain and partisanship. This paper sought to test whether that populism was measurable, so as to see if it could be playing this theorized middle step in the causal process between economics and partisanship. There seems to be at least some increase on aggregate in the amount of populism, which supports claims that populism may be a part of the process. However, no evidence was found of an increase in rightist, out-group targeting populism. This result casts some doubt on whether this form of populism is in fact mediating economic pain that has heavily fallen upon predominantly white, working-class communities. However, more research is needed, as the findings were inconclusive due to methodological limitations and the complexity and context-dependency of populist rhetoric.
Works Cited


Competition Favor Republicans?,” September, 42.


https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659.


The appendix provides the full list of terms that comprises each dictionary.

Elitist Dictionary:
natives, multinationals, enigre, emigrate, passports, nationals, nativism, transnationality, u.s, radicalization, culturism, expatriating, country, transglobal, transnationalism, americans, warped, warmongers, fascists, multiculturalist, americanized, nations, american, fascism, globalizing, citizens, imperialistically, refugee, passport, multinational, americanization, culture, multiculture, warmongerer, expatriation, naturalisation, stranger, terrors, xenophilia, jihadi, globalising, counterterror, multicultural, global, radicalized, native, cultures, jihadism, america, internationals, foreignness, warmonger, citizen, radicalisation, multiculti, naturalize, counterterrorist, jihadist, americanisation, neoconservatives, nationalistic, invader, emigrated, outlanders, crookedness, nation, nativist, outland, transnationally, naturalised, nationalists, cultureless, neoconservatism, citizenry, americas, internationalizing, nativistic, cultural