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Kaiming Chen

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Psychological Peacebuilding: When the Mind is Ripe for an Election

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Arts / Science in Department from William & Mary

by

Kaiming Chen

Accepted for Honors

Professor Marcus Holmes

Professor Paula Pickering

Professor Harvey Langkoltz

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Introduction

International intervention to support post-conflict reconstruction since the end of the Cold War faces two challenges. First, the sophistication of building a new functioning and sustainable governmental system requires enormous resources and a protracted presence of international support, but international donors often demand immediate and tangible progress so that future support can be delivered, like investors seeking monthly progress in their investment (Sisk, 2009). Secondly, the successful establishment of a stable democracy builds upon institutions involving free and open competition for political and economic power, but such competition inevitably produces winners and losers and thus can jeopardize short-term peace by incentivizing parties to resort to violence and war (Lyons, 2002). In both of these two challenges, a delicate balance must be struck to achieve the most optimal result. Previous post-conflict operations often favor their international donors and hence rely on quick fixes, such as rapid elections and bursts of economic privatization. The results, however, are ambiguous. While war ended in places such as Zimbabwe, El Salvador, and Namibia, fighting resumed in Liberia, Lebanon, and Libya after a purportedly peace-building election (Lyons, 2002, p.215). In the worst case, the Angolan election of 1992 failed miserably and resumed the war for another decade, causing another 100,000 war-related deaths (Leitenberg, 2006). The consequence of failing to deliver peace is far too dire and it calls for a solution. How do we know when the time is ripe for people to compete in peace and not resort to war?

This thesis draws on social psychological theories to propose three factors that may reflect a mental readiness for peace: parity of esteem, integrative complexity, and vocal rejection of violence. Parity of esteem refers to the acknowledgment by all parties in the electoral process
that other competing parties are worthy participants and, consequently, worthy winners and worthy losers (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011). It is an affective appraisal of the opponent’s merits and is positively related to a peaceful outcome of an election – if one thinks their opponent is capable of leading the country, one would be less likely to resort to violence in the case of losing the election. Integrative complexity means one’s capability to differentiate and integrate different perspectives (Suedfeld et al., 1992). A comprehensive and complex cognition of the opponent should deter one from initiating violence – if one is able to better understand how and why the opponent is in the opposition, one would be less likely to invoke conflicts. Assuming that the success of a post-conflict election depends on whether the war resumes as a direct result of the election, this study examines the failed 1992 election of Angola and the successful 1994 election of Mozambique, using content analysis of journalist articles of elite- and mass-level comments of adversaries in a two-year span. The results show that parity of esteem is highly correlated with recurrence of war, while integrative complexity is supported by insufficient data due to limited availability.

This thesis aims to contribute to the literature in two ways. First, it turns to the often-neglected psychological elements that may contribute to conflict relapse. Previous theories on whether an election leads to conflict or peace take a structural approach, emphasizing the role of institution over individual will (Sisk, 2009). This thesis argues that how warring parties – leaders, soldiers, and supporters alike – perceive each other plays no less role than, for example, how the new political system is designed or how many resources the international community bestows. Second, this thesis aims to provide practical suggestions for ongoing peace-building operations by proposing a measurable scale to evaluate the appropriateness of election timing.
This scale hopes to equip practitioners with an objective and indirect tool to understand post-conflict societies, ultimately contributing to a successful transition to sustained peace.

**Literature Review**

Why do elections cement peace in some cases but incite violence in others? This section explores existing literature on this question. It begins by defining what a civil war is and what an election is. It then moves to the role of an election, arguing that an election is a definitive moment where the warring parties and the population upon which they build their support establish a short-term yet significant power dynamic, thus distinguishing an election from any other issues in post-conflict countries because they lack such a pronounced value. Next, theories of why elections may fail to deliver peace are discussed, including the self-conflicting nature of the goal of peace-building operations. Arguments for the role of institutional factors, such as the new political arrangement, the strength of international support, and natural resources, are also mentioned and criticized for ignoring the impact of individual perceptions. It is next argued that the psychological theory of Social Identity Theory can potentially provide an alternative explanation. This section concludes with the concept of parity of esteem and integrative complexity being two factors that may reflect how warring parties in a post-conflict country perceive each other.

**Definitions**

Civil wars are defined as armed conflicts that reach at least 1000 battled-related deaths in total and at least 100 deaths per year, including only military personnel and not civilians. The
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war goal is institutional rather than separatist, which seeks the change of the type of political system of the country, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition, instead of the control of a specific territory (Eck, 2018). Conflicts and wars are used interchangeably in the following discussion. Civil wars initiated by separatist forces are excluded in this thesis because they generally do not solicit international intervention nor are they resolved through negotiations that involve elections.

Elections are formal contests to fill political offices, in which the public is involved in casting the vote (Fjelde et al., 2021). A conflict relapse as a result of an election is defined as the recurrence of civil war prior to, during, or shortly after the election that is substantially linked to an election. Based on empirical evidence, conflict relapse as a result of an election should normally occur within a year or two after the election. Parties to the conflict should invoke the election as a cause of resumed conflict and likely will not resort to violence in the absence of an election.

**The Role of An Election**

In the post-Cold war era, the United Nations has evolved its role in intra-state conflicts from peace-making and peace-keeping to peace-building, aiming to not only stop the armed conflicts but to build sustainable peace through a comprehensive and integrated strategy that includes democratization, usually in the form of fostering a national election (Richmond, 2004). In hindsight, however, this extension of the UN mandate seems to be “overly ambitious” sometimes and the outcomes are at best ambiguous (Griffin, 1999).
Elections are a major component of UN-led peace operations. The purpose of an election is to imbue democratic legitimacy by the affected population to a war-terminating peace agreement (Sisk, 2009). Regardless of the specific electoral systems (proportional representation or majoritarian) or the political institutions for which the election is created (presidential or parliamentarian), elections generate broad legitimacy for the immediate, postwar ruling coalition upon which the success of the state-building enterprise is predicated. The essence of an election is succinctly captured by Sisk (2009) as a rule-bound competition over the governance of the state. He recognizes that elections are inherently conflictual and that although elections are intended to produce a legitimate government to stabilize and better govern the country, the very way in which the population is required to choose often gives rise to or heightens already deep differences along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, for democratic delegates tend to invoke certain sentiments to win the support over some while inflicting hostility over others.

Election is thus differentiated from other measures in a post-conflict peacebuilding process by its decisive nature to signal the official and overall consolidation of a legitimate political structure through the consent of the population. While most other policies are determined by leaderships of the warring parties or international intervenors, election is the first opportunity for the common citizens to voice their opinions and support for the parties, thus conferring legitimacy to the fledgling political institution. It aims to transition the previous struggle for power through violent means to a non-violent, political competition and delegitimizes any other attempts to claim power. Without elections, former warring parties may resort to violence at any time with little fear of a lack of legitimacy.
Moreover, in a post-conflict society where existing political institutions have been mostly destroyed by warfare, election has a profound influence on the political elites as well. Historically, the electoral system and the political institutions that elections legitimize have been more accidental than rationally designed, and the legacy of colonialism is exceptionally salient in former colonies (Reynolds & Reilly, 1999). These former colonies also happen to be where civil wars tend to occur. Once chosen, however, these political arrangements tend to remain constant because political actors will rapidly amalgamate their interests and further consolidate their status in the political system. The cost of altering the political system is usually unfathomable. The weight of an election is thus understood by the political elites, often being the leadership of the former warring parties. Once they consent to the new political game, there is little room for withdrawal or alteration.

From a psychological perspective, an election also serves as a defining point for declaring the relative status of different social groups in a given society. In the post-Cold war era, ethnic and religious differences are replacing ideologies as the demarcation of social groups. The struggle for socialism or liberalism once stifled the differences of tribe, religion, or race. People identified themselves not by how they look or which god they pray for, but by which ideal society they believe in. Now that the iron curtain has fainted, these differences resurfaced, and alone them, historical feuds. In a post-conflict country, although people may be tired of war, they can hardly change their view on other groups. Therefore, in an open, allegedly fair platform to compete for the country’s leadership, the success or failure of any particular candidate inevitably affects the group of which they are representing. Behind one defeated candidate stands a group of exasperated people. It is thus reasonable to expect that an election may intensify the animosity among groups and lead to conflict (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011). Being part of the group defeated
in a procedurally unobjectionable competition can be especially threatening to one’s self-esteem, which will be discussed in detail later.

**How and Why Does an Election Fail?**

Important as it is, elections in practice have often led to outcomes opposite to what foreign actors expect. The 1992 election in Angola was directly linked to conflict relapse as the former rebel group UNITA claimed before the result was announced that the election was rigged (Pycroft, 1994). The consequent two years of fighting were the most devastating in Angola's history, both in human and material terms (Tvedten, 2018). The 2020 presidential and legislative election in the Central African Republic also reignited civil war when six opposition factions formed a coalition prior to the election and started a military march toward the capital, claiming the upcoming election rigged (Losh, 2021).

Why would elections fail to deliver peace? Across different cases, scholars point out that post-conflict elections serve multiple and often contradictory goals, such as war termination, democratization, and an excuse for the end of international involvement (Lyons, 2002). War termination denotes the cessation of violence on a national level. Democratization usually entails a long-term institutionalization of new rules of the political game both in establishing a power-sharing structure accepted by all parties to the conflict and in transforming people’s minds in approaching conflicts of interest from violence to non-violence. Moreover, an election is such an event that can be indicative of the successful consolidation of both elite and mass level consent to the new political structure. For the international community, an election thus becomes a convenient event for an exit strategy, without which foreign countries may refrain from providing any security help at all due to concerns regarding open-ended commitments. As a
result, elections are entrusted with too many expectations that cannot always be altogether fulfilled. Moreover, some even argue that sometimes inaction can be better than unsuccessful action because failure to invest sufficiently either with financial or diplomatic power would likely increase the odds of conflict relapse (Fearon & Laitin, 2004).

The exact power-sharing arrangement or political pacts to which election shall imbue legitimacy also plays a role in whether election leads to peace or war (Lyons, 2002). Militia leaders or local warlords may not have the same level of control over their fighters nor represent their constituencies as traditional political parties do, and their military power may also not correspond to their actual popular support. Thus, a militarily superior group, aided by foreign powers, for example, may intentionally sabotage an election in order to maintain their status. However, the power-sharing pact itself may not serve as an infallible predictor of whether elections can deliver peace, since different factions may desire different outcomes: power over the state, money, self-governance, ideal political system, etc. For example, natural resources have proven luring in many civil wars in Africa, and the right to exploit resources may be more important than a place in the cabinet.

Further discussions on existing theories characterized by institutional factors are presented in the Case Studies section, in which the peace operations in Angola and Mozambique are compared. It is perhaps not too bold to argue that the existing literature on why elections fail to deliver peace adopts an approach that emphasizes the institutional factors, such as the political arrangement or the presence of international peacekeepers or interest groups, or the material factors, such as natural resources. What goes on in people’s minds in terms of how they think of the election and the new political system, however, rarely receives sufficient attention.
Furthermore, these institutional factors are helpful in the process of designing the post-conflict political system, but they can hardly tell us how well the ideas of peaceful competition and respect for the rule of law are implemented, or more urgently, whether or not violence and conflict shall resume in the immediate future.

In addition, the main problem of prioritizing institutional factors over individual and mental factors may conceivably lie in the ineffectiveness of the central government when it loses popular support after war. It is often assumed that a system of reward and punishment can best regulate human behaviors. A properly designed power-sharing arrangement may reward former warring parties with equal opportunities for political participation. Fundings and support from the international community reward warring parties with financial gains and punish with withdrawal should any party resort to violence. These theories may theoretically sound plausible in facilitating peace, but they don’t necessarily consider the possibility that former warring parties may not believe in these offers. As Tyler (2007) contends, “while authorities can exercise power directly through the promise of rewards or the threat of punishment, such approaches to deterrence are expensive, inefficient, and psychologically naive. A reward-punishment governance may be especially problematic during times of instability or crises, when the need of popular support collides with a lack of disposable resources to exert control.” This applies well to post-conflict countries: armed rebellion dismantles the central authority’s control over the entirety of the country; incentives and sanctions from a new authority may not appeal to those people who were in open rebellion, because they may not trust the central government. The psychological approach may thus explain why, in the 1992 election of Angola, UNITA received more from the Angolan settlement than any of the losing parties in El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe received in theirs, but UNITA still defected from the agreement and
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civil war relapsed. UN missions have long been criticized for a lack of awareness of social psychology (see, e.g., Langholtz, 1998). Therefore, examining the efficacy of peacebuilding operations must not exclude the psychological factors deep in the mind of those who are affected by the war.

How does social psychology explain conflict and reconciliation? What are some factors that may contribute to a successful transition from violence to peace? An answer to these questions may be found in research on intergroup conflicts. As will be elaborated in the following sections, the Social Identity Theory and research on Integrative Complexity provide an insight into how individuals in a group perceive and react to an election after years of civil war.

**Social Identity Theory and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding**

Intergroup conflicts and their resolution have been traditionally treated as attributable to disagreements on the division of scarce and coveted resources or power. Relatedly, the ending of intergroup conflicts is predicated on the parties’ ability to agree on a formula for their division (Nadler, 2008). This rational approach that emphasizes the supposedly objective causes of the conflict has been applied to justify elections in the post-conflict peacebuilding process as discussed above. However, relying exclusively on addressing the material needs or power interests is simply not enough, not least because such calculation is inherently impossible to yield a perfect result for warring parties that all have mercurial expectations (Salehyan & Linebarger, 2015). Psychological needs and feelings should also be addressed, as the past of pain and loss has created emotional and perceptual barriers of victimhood, guilt, distrust, and fear that constitute a great challenge for peacebuilding. An election as an inherently competitive event is in a psychological perspective likely to create or intensify existing conflicts and deter future
peace. How to evaluate whether an election will provoke people to the edge of war is the central question in this section.

Social identity theory (SIT) has been widely adopted today in examining intergroup conflict and reconciliation (e.g., Al Ramiah et al., 2011, Ferguson et al, 2016). SIT argues that people tend to define themselves by seeking social groups or social categories (Tajfel, 1974, Tajfel & Turner, 1979, Turner et al., 1987). By identifying with one or multiple social groups, individuals recognize themselves as a member of that group and develop a social identity. Such identity can greatly influence their pride and self-esteem, and a threat to the group is often interpreted as a threat to the individual. This theory also posits that people are inclined to view the world in terms of the in-group (us) and out-group (them), and often unconsciously seek the positive aspects of members of an in-group and the negative aspects of an out-group, thus creating a potentially biased perception (Hogg, 2020). In order to maintain a positive image of the self and the social identity, people tend to engage in social comparison with other groups. When intergroup comparison results in a negative self-appraisal, individuals may resort to intergroup competition and intergroup conflict. Recent studies have adopted SIT in explaining and evaluating civil conflicts in Northern Ireland, Indonesia, and South Africa (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011; Niens & Cairns, 2001; Setiawan, Scheepers, & Sterkens, 2020). The emphasis on subjective experiences and individual’s internal perception of other groups in creating intergroup conflicts of social identity theory thus challenges the prevailing paradigm of a more realist approach to understanding intergroup conflicts. It does so by helping us understand conflicts where there is an absence of objective causes (Al Ramiah et al., 2011).
In a civil war setting, SIT may explain why conflict continues even though there appears to be a lack of objective incentives, or when the peace agreement seems impartial and agreeable to an international observer. Elections, by grouping people according to their supported candidacy, substantiate social identities and breeds seeds for social conflict. A widely accepted method to reconcile intergroup conflicts by social identity theorists is the contact approach, which argues that bringing conflicted groups together under favorable conditions and creating a common purpose or task for them to work together can effectively reduce intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew, 1998; McKeown, 2013; see also Al Ramiah et al., 2011). It is difficult to argue, however, that an election would serve such a common purpose. Instead of serving a noble cause of democratic transition as some may contend, elections generally create more interest conflicts. For the loser of the election and those who vote for them, the loss may be perceived as an attack on their collective in-group identity by the out-groups, thus inciting more grievances and hostilities (Naomi, 2014). In practice, perception of threat is highly dependent on leadership rhetoric during and after campaigns. A loss of election may thus be perceived by the group as a whole either as being stolen by the adversary or as an unfortunate result of legitimate, fair competition.

To further explore the obstacles to peace posed by intergroup conflicts, Pratto et al. (2008) incorporates the needs theory to expand the scope of social identity theory in recognizing how specific psychological needs may be violated as a result of intergroup conflicts that may contribute to further conflict. In particular, previous exposure or involvement in intergroup violence threatens one’s need for self-esteem, the need to see oneself as being morally good, and such threat may be converted into discrimination or outright violence against other groups in order to retain some self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2003). Similarly, the need for consistency in self-
image across time and situation, between the ideal and actual self, denoted as self-integrity, is also distorted by intergroup violence, as people would view the actions made by members of the in-group as actions by themselves, hence rationalizing violence of their in-groups by dehumanizing out-groups (Devine, 1991). Both of these needs are highly imperiled during an election, as the open competition may be perceived as a fight between the right self and the evil other. Accordingly, leaders can take advantage of such needs by making the identity more salient and identity needs more arresting, which has been an effective way to stay in power (Jordan et al., 2003). An election serves not only as a powerful incentive for leaders to incite identity conflicts but also as an open platform for every individual in the country to witness how their in-group members battle with out-groups. Such open competition in itself stiff identification with the in-group while implicitly creating hostilities to out-groups.

**Parity of Esteem and Integrative Complexity**

Having reviewed the literature on institutional building, in particular the electoral system, of post-conflict countries as well as the privation of the application of psychological research in supporting post-conflict peacebuilding, this section will identify two psychological factors that may be predictive of conflict intensification or relapse as a result of election in a post-conflict setting: parity of esteem and integrative complexity.

Esteem has been proposed as a mediating factor between the electoral process and domestic conflict in South Africa (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011). Defined as one’s overall affective evaluation of one’s own worth, value, and importance (Blascovich, 1991), esteem is extended by SIT to incorporate the overall group’s worth, value, and importance into one’s own. Thus, a threat to a group’s value is a threat to a member’s own self-esteem. The study of Bosman & Du
Toit (2011) explored the proportional representation (PR) electoral system in post-apartheid South Africa which, although established procedural equality in universal suffrage and allocation of a proportion of the popular vote into the proportion of the seats in the legislature, is according to the authors actually deepening the ethnic cleavage and creating a potential for conflict. They proposed the model of “parity of esteem” that emphasizes the acknowledgment by all parties in the electoral process that other competing parties are worthy participants and, consequently, worthy winners and worthy losers. These are measured through campaign and leadership speeches before, during, and after the general election of 2009 in South Africa in terms of referring to adversaries in different degrees of derogatory terms and excluding them from South African identity.

Although South Africa in Bosman & Du Toit (2011)’s study was not embroiled in domestic conflicts to the level of civil war and contained much less social fraction, minimal casualties, and a functioning political system, their study has profound implications for post-war electoral system building. To begin with, the South African electoral system of proportional representation was relatively more diverse and fairer to minority parties, as opposed to majoritarian systems that prioritize government effectiveness and accountability (Norris, 1997). Even in such a less fractured society with a more equitable PR system, ethnic tension rises along with elections, the potential for conflict could only increase in more fragile or divided societies. Measures taken during the post-conflict reconstruction process, such as war tribunals and truth-revealing commissions, can arguably also exacerbate the disparity of esteem by bringing more humiliation to the defeated group. As a result, elections that purported to bring trust and security may end up magnifying animosity.
Integrative complexity (IC) refers to one’s capability to differentiate and integrate different perspectives (Suedfeld et al., 1992). Matters such as elections are multidimensional and complex to deal with, with campaigning candidates advocating for different aspects and interests. IC thus captures to what degree people can actually recognize and acknowledge these different perspectives and view them in relation to each other (Brodbeck et al., 2020). Traditionally recognized as a rather stable personality trait, IC has been recently recognized for its potential to change in accordance with the environment, with its measurement scales well-developed and widely adopted (Suedfeld et al., 1992). Recent studies have also revealed IC in shaping collective group behaviors, i.e., the extent to which groups as a whole have adopted or elaborated on the differentiation that exists among members’ perspectives and the way in which the diversity among those perspectives has been reconciled (Gruenfeld & Hollingshead, 1993). IC at a group level describes not only the active presence of multiple perspectives, but the degree to which these different perspectives are acknowledged and integrated by group members. High levels of IC are associated with increased willingness and decisions to cooperate with other groups (Park & DeShon, 2018), more constructive conflict resolution approaches (Kugler et al., 2011) and better social performance in business management teams (Wong et al., 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that violence and conflict relapse as a result of elections in post-conflict countries are associated with lower levels of IC in the competing groups.

The Vocal Rejection of Violence

Do people who perceive each other with low respect and low complexity always turn to violence? More specifically, do they have to resort to civil war? Other than the Social Identity Theory’s idea that people are more inclined to use violence against members of the out-group,
research on esteem has supported that low- and high-esteem groups have an incentive to resort to violence facing status-threatening situations. Low-esteem groups may initiate violence in order to change the status quo (Horowitz, 2000) and high-esteem groups may also use violence when their highly favorable view of self is challenged (Baumeister et al., 1996).

A problem with these theories is that most of them took place in a relatively peaceful environment in comparison to the more turbulent and violent one in post-conflict societies. The conflicts defined in these theories were mostly hostile rhetoric and, in extreme cases, incidental physical confrontations. In a post-war country, however, conflicts refer to the most dangerous form of war, and it may take additional caution to apply these theories in a post-conflict country.

To extend these theories, the third variable in this thesis is proposed as the vocal rejection of violence. It is perhaps not so surprising to conjecture that people who vocally reject violence may be less inclined to use violence. Nonetheless, possibilities remain when leaders use calls for peace as pretenses to stall for their tactical advantages. The vocal embrace of violence may also result from leaders’ desire for more leverage in the negotiation and use violence as a threat while unwilling to actually return to war. For these reasons, the vocal rejection or embrace of violence is considered to examine whether it would play a role in the eventual conflict relapse after an election.
Methods

Hypothesis

This thesis hypothesizes that a negative perception of opponents will lead to conflict relapse. Perception is defined in three dimensions: the affective evaluation of the opponent being a worthy participant (parity of esteem), the cognitive evaluation of the opponent's policy being reasonable (integrative complexity), and the behavioral proclamation of rejection of violence.

Operational Definitions

How may these three dimensions be operationalized? A detailed coding manual with keywords and examples on the three dimensions is attached in the Appendix. A low parity of esteem will manifest in the denial of the opponent being a competent competitor, possibly by referring to cultural symbols devoid of merit and trust, such as being a witch or counter-revolutionary in the case of South Africa (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011). Witch was also used in
Angola. Savimbi attempted to “burn alive people who questioned his leadership” on the grounds that they were “witches (Jolliffe, 1991).” It is noteworthy that such references usually entail a strong cultural idiosyncrasy, hence they may appear less insulting to foreigners who are unfamiliar with local traditions. In South Africa, however, a witch embodies the illicit accumulation of wealth and power by supernatural powers, thus implying the target as a corrupted and evil figure that must be destroyed; labeling someone as counter-revolutionary means accusing them of attempting to block change and retain apartheid privilege. In contrast, a high parity of esteem may be reflected through the acknowledgment of the opponent’s achievements, possibly during the colonial struggle. An overall evaluation of the election outcome by both the winner and the loser as temporary, innocuous, and less consequential rather than perpetual and indicative of presumed inherent qualities of superiority and inferiority can also demonstrate a high parity of esteem.

Integrative complexity evaluates the extent to which one can recognize multiple perspectives (i.e., differentiation) and the ability to evaluate the trade-off or interrelations between different alternatives (i.e., integration). Integration can only take place with certain degrees of differentiation, and they may be captured by a comprehensive score developed by Baker-Brown et al. (1992). Rhetoric that exhibits low IC would contain only one perspective with no or limited discussion of the opponent’s policies. Those with moderate IC may include clear recognition of multiple perspectives but do not offer detailed integration of the opponent’s policies. An active consideration and integration of different perspectives and even inclusion of the opponent’s policies into one’s own political agenda may illustrate high IC.
The rejection of violence is evaluated based on the vocal willingness to use violence as a means to achieve certain goals. A low rejection of violence is demonstrated through, for example, openly threatening war if certain desires are not met. A medium rejection of violence regards violence as a possible option or necessary reaction to certain rule-breaking of the other party. A high rejection of violence is reflected through vocally opposing war, even if the other party is violating certain rules. The difference between low and medium is whether or not to use violence as the first option to resolve conflicts; the difference between medium and high is whether to use violence when there is apparent rule-breaking of the other party.

Data Selection

The 1992 election of Angola and the 1994 election of Mozambique are chosen to examine the impact of the aforementioned psychological factors because they share many important factors as discussed before that could contribute to the success or failure of an election. Angola and Mozambique had similar colonial history and similar ideological reasons for the onset of the civil war; both cases had almost identical foreign influence during the civil war, and both had seen promising peace agreements in 1991 and 1992 that outlined a transition toward peace and democracy. However, the Angola election in 1992 turned into a complete catastrophe that initiated another decade of brutal war, causing millions of deaths, whereas the 1994 Mozambican election successfully established a stable government and maintained peace for the country until today.

Angola and Mozambique shared a similar history of colonization and independence. In the early 16th century, Angola and Mozambique were discovered and colonized by Portuguese explorers. They were later incorporated into the transatlantic slave trade and, by the early 20th
century, largely governed by Portuguese immigrants with the African indigenous majority being excluded from political activities, such as forming political parties or labor unions (Okoth, 2006). Nationalist sentiments built up significantly with the end of WWII and the global trend of decolonization, spearheaded in both countries by Marxist-Leninist parties of *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Liberation Front of Mozambique, FRELIMO) in Mozambique and *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA). Other resistance groups were more fragmented in Angola, including *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA), *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA), who constantly fought among each other. In Mozambique, most anti-colonist forces were united behind FRELIMO. Independence wars focused primarily on the rural area, replicating the People’s Warfare strategy of Maoism (Henriksen, 1976), with the Portuguese Army successfully gripping the more populous urban areas. The Soviet Bloc also supplied military aid and provided personnel training to support the independence movement. With the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1975 that transformed Portugal into a democracy and ended the protracted Portugal Colonial War, Angola and Mozambique gained their independence. Because of the predominant status of FRELIMO and MPLA in their respective countries, both adopted a one-party state under Marxist principles. The exclusion of other political groups in participating in the new political process as well as ideological differences led to civil wars soon after independence in Angola and Mozambique.

The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique were both heavily influenced by foreign actors against the backdrop of the Cold War. Two governmental forces, FRELIMO and MPLA, maintained a close military and economic partnership with the Soviet Union, notably with
FRELIMO receiving aid from the People's Republic of China and MPLA receiving troops and aid from Cuba. Threatened by two neighboring states turning Communism, the apartheid regime of South Africa, in alliance with the United States and other regional apartheid regimes such as Rhodesia, provided aid to the anti-communist factions of UNITA in Angola and Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Mozambiquan National Resistance, RENAMO) in Mozambique. In the case of Mozambique, the anti-communist coalition of RENAMO was initially sponsored by the Rhodesian intelligence in collaboration with anti-communist Mozambiquan exiles (Emerson, 2006). With the end of the Cold War as well as the apartheid regime in South Africa, plus the independence of Namibia from South Africa in the case of Angola, foreign troops and aid were rapidly withdrawn from both countries. FRELIMO drafted a new constitution in 1989 that changed its socialist one-party system to a democratic, multiparty system with periodic elections, while MPLA rejected Marxist-Leninism at its third Congress in 1991 and also transformed Angola into a multi-party system.

Changing international geopolitics had offered initiatives for the warring parties to sue for peace. The Rome General Peace Accords were signed on October 4, 1992, between FRELIMO and RENAMO with the support of the UN. Similarly, with the mediation of the Portuguese government, the Bicesse Accords were signed on May 31, 1991, in Lisbon, Portugal between MPLA and UNITA. Both accords laid out transitional plans for a multiparty democracy with UN supervision, designating national elections for the parliament in Mozambique and the parliament and the president in Angola. Voter turnouts were similar for both elections, with 91.34% in the Angolan 1992 election and 87.87% in the Mozambique 1994 election; MPLA won with a majority of 53% over UNITA of 34%, and FRELIMO of 44% over RENAMO of 37% (World of Parliaments, 2001).
The shared trajectory between Angola and Mozambique, however, ended during their respective first multiparty election. The 1992 election of Angola was alleged to be fraudulent by the former rebel group UNITA. The allegation lasted for a week unsettled, leading to the former rebel troops withdrawing from the new Angola forces to the bushes (AP, 1992). The following resumption of war had become even more brutal and life-consuming than before (Tvedten, 2018). On the other hand, despite similar allegations, the 1994 Mozambique election had seen an overnight resolution of the fraud allegation by the rebel RENAMO and embarked on a successful transition to peace. The distinct fate faced by two similar countries thus offers an opportunity to examine the role of perception in mediating the successful transition to peace after an election.

**Data Collection**

How are the data collected? Traditionally, surveys are used to evaluate psychological factors. In a post-conflict scenario, however, such surveys are not always available. Therefore, drawing on the methodology adopted in Bosman & Du Toit’s (2011) study, this thesis uses content analysis to examine evidence based on leadership speeches, mass-level reports, and interviews.

Most data in this thesis are secondary sources of journalistic articles collected from the Access World News database. Access World News is a comprehensive resource that includes more than 8,000 news publications from nearly 200 countries worldwide. These sources include major national and international newspapers, as well as local and regional titles. Search for the Angola case was conducted using “Angola election,” “Angola vote,” and “Angola campaign” as keywords, setting the time limit from January 1990 to December 1992. The search was conducted for Mozambique using similar keywords, with timing ranging from January 1992 to
December 1994. Additional information, such as speech transcripts in the UN and other settings that are not included in Access World News, is sought based on availability. These are analyzed based on the coding manual attached in the Appendix.

A two-year period around the election is examined for both cases. This period begins with the negotiation and signing of the peace agreement, followed by electoral campaigns as well as demobilization up to the election. During the election, both cases had seen allegations against the government of fraud. After the successful conclusion of the election in Mozambique and several failed attempts to stop violence in Angola, party leaders’ statements are also examined to see if the previous friendly gestures are pretense. Overall, the two-year span included all the significant events from the peace talks up to several months after the election, allowing for the examination of data in case parties were pretending to be nice during the campaign.

Overall, 50 news articles are selected for the case of Angola and 26 for Mozambique. The difference in the number of news feeds is the result of previous western support as well as the Angola leaders’, in particular General Savimbi, own personal charisma. Although both civil wars were fought between ideological enemies who received support from their corresponding foreign power, Angola received much more support from the western bloc, notably the US, as well as the Soviet Union, while the civil war in Mozambique was mostly fought between indigenous revolutionaries against proxies created by neighboring apartheid regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. This distinction may play a role through the factors proposed in this study: a locally based opposition group may possess a stronger negative perception of the opponents than a foreign-supported proxy, and thus with the foreign supports both gone, the former is more likely to continue the war while the latter to concede. Moreover, Savimbi visited several times to
western countries, meeting with heads of government and making speeches. He seemed to be apt
to attract media attention by presenting himself, as well his UNITA organization, as an African
bastion of freedom that fought for the spread of democracy. This personality may arguably
attract him more journalist coverage, even though he later turned out to be the exact opposite: a
dictator who imposed brutal repression even among his own ranks. Ultimately, as shown in later
analysis, the articles available presented a generally consistent pattern for the factors proposed,
and they were mostly from prestigious outlets such as the Associated Press, Christian Science
Monitor, NPR, UPI, etc. The smaller number of Mozambique sources, therefore, should have a
minimal impact on the results.

A notable limitation of the Access World News database is that it only includes English
sources. The cases to be studied, i.e., Angola and Mozambique, are both countries whose
primary language is Portuguese. As a result, the data may not always include a large amount of
primary information, such as the desired entire speech; instead, most data are secondary
accounts, such as excerpts from certain speeches as well as the journalists’ interpretations of
those statements. This limits the extent to which IC can be examined because IC requires a long
enough statement to be properly dissected for differentiation and integration. For parity of
esteem, secondary sources limit its validity through the subjective biases of the journalist as well
as the people being reported. Further research should be conducted using Portuguese first-hand
sources to minimize these limitations.

Another limitation posed by studying Angola and Mozambique with English journalist
sources is that news reports regarding these two countries in the early 1990s were seriously
biased due to ideological reasons. The two government forces used to be Marxist-Leninist
regimes prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, so journalists in the Anglosphere tend not to report positive statements or policies from them. On the contrary, the rebels, being the bulwark against Communism supported by the West and its allies, received more positive coverage in western media. In the case of Angola, the rebel leader Gen. Savimbi, despite notorious humanitarian records of massacring dissidents and civilians, was often hailed as a freedom fighter, whose visit to Washington DC on May 31, 1991, was reported in great details and whose full speech transcript, boasting his personal role in fighting for democracy in Angola, occupied an entire section of the Washington Times. In contrast, the Washington Times’ report of President dos Santos’s meeting with President Bush on September 16, 1991, spent half of the section on how dos Santos has relinquished communism due to lack of international support, and another half on how Bush goaded him to comply with the peace agreement.

The political atmosphere in both Angola and Mozambique was also quite constricted at the time. Due to years of warfare and brutal killings committed by both sides, the people of Angola and Mozambique were uneasy about declaring whose side they were on – unless there were incentives and rewards for going public (Rowan, 1994). It is, therefore, rather difficult to gather data regarding the mass-level perception of the opponents. The use of journalist articles as well as leadership speeches is preferred.

Ultimately, as one of the most prestigious scholars of Portuguese colonial studies pointed out, “there was an absence of a free press and of conditions favoring the development of modern social science in colonial Portugal as well as in its colonies … and what had been publicized about Angola and Mozambique were propagandistic” (Marcum, 1969). It is, nevertheless, acceptable to use certain propagandistic materials in this study, because the psychological factors
at the center of the thesis focus not only on the decision-making process of the leadership, they are also embedded in every single individual who supports their leaders in reigniting the civil war.

Case studies

Existing Theoretical Explanation of the Cases

Power-sharing arrangements have been traditionally proposed as a reliable method to maintain peace in post-ethnic conflict regions, exemplified by the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sisk, 1996). By providing an institutional guarantee of a share of power in political, territorial, military, or economic dimensions to former warring parties, a sense of security is fostered that is conducive to sustained peace (Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). However, despite a lack of a power-sharing pact, Mozambique was able to sustain peace after the 1994 election, whereas Angola continued civil war even though the second Angolan agreement of the Lusaka Protocol in 1994 included a detailed power-sharing arrangement, after the first Bicesse Accord without a power sharing pact failed (Bekoe, 2008).

Another notable difference between the Angola and Mozambique election was the degree of UN supervision. The UN Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) received about 2,500 international monitors as well as UN peacekeeping troops of 5,500 for the transition period between 1992 and 1994, while Angola had 548 monitors and was only supervised by the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) without any ground troops (Malaquias, 1996). It was undeniable that a greater UN presence would contribute to peace, but the level of resources
devoted to Mozambique was so high that it is unlikely we will see similar operations in the future. Firstly, the budget allocated to peacekeeping missions in Mozambique, in total near $1 billion, was so enormous that no other country may be expected to receive the same amount. In June 2021, for instance, the General Assembly approved a budget of $6.37 billion for 12 peacekeeping missions (GA/AB/4368). Despite that some of the missions, including the ones in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Mali, exceeded $1 billion, with inflation taken into account, Mozambique still cost more than twice that of any single peace operation today. Secondly, foreign powers did not just contribute troops and funds, they actively forced diplomatic pressure on Afonso Dhlakama, leader of RENAMO, when he announced withdrawal from the election (Keller, 1994). After Dhlakama denounced the election as fraudulent and announced a national-wide boycott against UN supervisors’ claim that the election was free and fair, intense diplomatic pressure from ambassadors, UN officials, and President Mugabe of Zimbabwe forced him to return to the election (Keller, 1994; Hamlyn 1994). Moreover, later analysis will show that the different level of perception was available even before the creation of the UN Operation to Mozambique in December 1992. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the greater the international effort is, the more likely the peace operation will succeed.

Several scholars have concurred on the similarities between the Angolan and Mozambique civil wars and explored why peace had succeeded in one case but failed in another. Bekoe (2008) points to the perception by warring parties of relative vulnerability as a result of the peace agreement. If the agreement gives too much military leverage, such as disarmament and reintegration, or concedes an unbearable amount of political power, to one side, the implementation process is likely to see severe hindrance from the disadvantaged side. It is
noteworthy that Bekoe’s argument rests on the subjective perception of faction leaders, but whether or not these leaders uphold a reasonable and explicit political agenda is rarely considered. In the case of Angola, for example, the leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, once demanded the absolute elimination of the Communist MPLA while MPLA still possessed military and political dominance in the country (Gleijeses, 2002). Extreme demands would thus deter future peace negotiations and implementation. This focus on faction leaders may unduly devote resources to cater to individual interests rather than the interest of the people. On the other hand, in both Angola and Mozambique, parties were not forced to accept the peace agreement. On the contrary, UNITA, MPLA, FRELIMO, and RENAMO alike accepted the peace agreement with deep confidence. At the signing ceremony of the formal ceasefire on Oct 5, 1992, President Chissano and rebel leader Dhlakama of Mozambique called each other “dear brother” and embraced repeatedly to the applause of the audience (Associated Press, 1992). For Angola, the five rounds of MPLA–UNITA talks in 1990 entailed great concessions from both sides, culminating in the peace agreement that was recognized and hailed by both sides (Christian Science Monitor, 1991).

Chabal (2001) discusses in great detail multiple differences between Angola and Mozambique that concur with the argument of this thesis. Chabal pointed to the internal factors centering around the level of divisions between anti-colonial movements rooted back in the colonial era. For example, Angola had a strong dichotomy between the Creole community that was already highly consolidated over the centuries-long Portuguese rule under the white settlers and the Africans of the interior rural areas. As a result, the elite-based FNLA (whose supporters later turned to UNITA) of the Bakongo African elites of the North had a clash of interest with the more grassroots MPLA which derived support from the Luanda Creole community and its
regional Kimbundu supporters. In contrast, although FRELIMO adopted a similar approach that was based on rural regions like that of the MPLA (Henrikson, 1976), ethnic and interest groups are much more diverse in Mozambique and thus no dominant group can harness enough power against the Portuguese. The lack of any previous contact, hence antagonism, among various groups in Mozambique also allowed them to unite against the colonizers more smoothly.

In addition to the historical rivalry in Angola which was absent in Mozambique, Chabal also marks an inclusive nationalist campaign by FRELIMO versus a policy of exclusion as a result of continuing internal power struggles between and within MPLA and FNLA. Here the psychological perception of the opponent comes into play. As Chabal argues, the FLNA considered the MPLA Creole leadership as a “‘non-African’ mixed-race group disconnected from the ‘real’ African -- even if a substantial number of the MPLA leadership was in fact black African.” The FRELIMO leadership consisted of mesticos, Indians, and even whites, but they were never perceived to be “non-African” (p.226). In the case of MPLA, two grave factional splits, known as the Active Revolt and the Chipenda breakaway, seriously damaged the party’s unity. In comparison, FRELIMO followed the success of Portuguese Guinea which was marked by “unity at all costs, political mobilization of the countryside, and political control of armed action” (p.227). As a result, FRELIMO was endowed with the nationalist legitimacy that the MPLA, despite control over the capital and most of the country on Independence Day, had never seen.

The historical analysis by Chadal provides valuable insights into the level of divisions, or in the psychological terms, group identities, long before the civil wars started. This thesis now turns to the eve of the first election after decades-long civil wars in Angola and Mozambique. In
the course of the two years from ceasefire to months after the election, were the Angolans significantly more divided than the Mozambiquans? Did the Angolans view each other with more hatred (parity of esteem), fewer thoughts (integrative complexity), and more vocally support violence?

**Parity of Esteem**

Parity of Esteem refers to the extent to which parties view each other as worthy participants in the electoral process and hence the willingness to accept the electoral result (Bosman & Du Toit, 2011). In the graph above, the green and round points are occurrences of UNITA’s comments about MPLA, whose points are yellow and triangle-shaped. The blue, diamond-shaped points are comments about UNITA, MPLA, or both, by other smaller parties, such as the FNLA who once merged with UNITA but held its own campaign after the peace agreement. The overlapped points denote the same level of PoE reported in the same article, or articles of the same date, by different parties. The horizontal axis reflects the time. Although the
The horizontal axis is not incremental, meaning that most data are clustered around the election, this pattern is observed in both cases and has little impact on data analysis.

The overall result shows that the case of Angola has lower Parity of Esteem than Mozambique. Both cases had seen an overall, relatively high level of PoE around the signing of the peace agreement in, respectively, May 1991 for Angola and October 1992 for Mozambique. The unsatisfied demobilization and transition period after the peace agreement had led to a decline in PoE, culminating in the allegation of fraud in both countries near the election, where PoE dropped to the lowest level in both cases. In the case of Angola, the situation continued to worsen to the point of no return, whereas in the case of Mozambique, PoE gradually recovered and eventually returned to a high level.

A distinction of how each party behaved should be made especially in the case of Angola. Except for one instance on September 26, 1992, the yellow points portraying the government MPLA are steadily all 2 or above, mostly being 3 or 4. This shows that MPLA has been constantly showing a decent level of respect to UNITA. The green points of UNITA, however, are more volatile and for a prolonged period at 1 and even 0, which shows that UNITA’s respect for MPLA is unstable and more hostile. For Mozambique, there is no significant difference among party behaviors.

What exactly did the former warring parties say in regards to their opponents? How did the change in PoE correlate with the electoral process? The rest of this section will be divided into two parts, detailing how the course changed in Angola and Mozambique, respectively.
Parity of Esteem in Angola

The PoE in Angola was overall more volatile and contained more hostile rhetoric, but its initial situation after the de-facto ceasefire in late 1990 was quite optimistic. On January 3, 1991, the Christian Science Monitor in great detail reviewed the concessions made by each party during the five rounds of MPLA-UNITA talks. Both sides recognized each other’s legal status: UNITA conceded that dos Santos was the head of state and should continue to run the country during the transition and dropped the longstanding demand to be included in the transitional government; MPLA acknowledged the right of UNITA to exist as an opposition party and dropped the demand that Savimbi, the rebel general, should go into exile during the transitional period. MPLA also transformed itself in 1989 from Marxism to liberal democracy, including the separation of party and state, the end of party control over the military, and the opening of multiparty competition for governmental and congressional seats. These recognitions of the opponent’s rights and status are graded 4 in Parity of Esteem. It is not yet 5, however, because such recognition might be supported by the assumption that they would defeat the opponent in an election. Savimbi said during the Seventh Congress of UNITA that “when you are strong, it is time to make concessions … this is our last congress in the bush, our next congress will be in the capital.” Meanwhile, however, Savimbi’s generals also allegedly passed among reporters tales of mass defections by opposition troops and of a bomb attack designed to disrupt the congress (Lyman, 1991). Such an allegation, which was probably fabricated, is rated 2 because it intended to incite hostility and hatred against the opponents.

Following the signing of the peace agreement, however, Angola, in particular UNITA and Savimbi, had embarked on increasingly belligerent rhetoric. During his visit to Washington
D.C. on May 31, 1991, Gen. Savimbi claimed that his struggle was one first against colonial Portugal and then against the Soviet-supported MPLA (Washington Times, 1991), implying that the regime of MPLA was a puppet of the Soviet Union and as undesirable as the suppressive colonial master. He also condescendingly demanded that the MPLA abandon the socialist policies on the market and free press, that they accept the risk that they would lose their monopoly over the power of the state and that they realize that no foreign support can they rely on. This subtle degradation was graded 3 on parity of esteem. Nonetheless, on June 3, 1991, Gen. Savimbi said that “the MPLA had a possibility to win (the election), UNITA too, but a third force no” (AP, 1991). Although this statement may be made with an intention to dismiss other parties vying for power, it nevertheless acknowledged that the opponent may win, thus is graded 5.

Since March 1992, however, Savimbi and UNITA had not made any positive comments regarding the MPLA. On March 26, Savimbi claimed over UNITA radio that the MPLA was planning to launch an attack on UNITA as well as a plot to kill him, and he thus had fled back to his bush headquarters (Kiley, 1992). On May 12, Savimbi bitterly complained that the US wrongly recognized the former-Communist MPLA after it lost support from Moscow and Cuba (Southey, 1992). On June 11, both sides reportedly accused each other of committing unacceptable violations to jeopardize the upcoming election (Finley, 1992): the MPLA’s ambassador to Zimbabwe claimed that UNITA was preparing a secret jungle army and would take power by use of the gun in case they lose (graded 2); UNITA accused the government of exploiting public expenditure for their own campaign, spending public resources on their own voter bases (graded 3).
The September of 1992, in which the election was scheduled on the 29-30th, had seen another drop of parity of esteem, primarily through the alleged (or actual) assassination of senior members of both sides and the increasingly rampant political violence. Although the MPLA and the UNITA reportedly agreed to form a coalition government for national reconciliation and reconstruction on September 9 (Financial Times, 1992), such a move was hardly sincere, given that two assassination attempts were made that month against Kundy Payama, the campaign manager of the MPLA, and another six died in a clash in the capital Luanda on September 23 (Independent, 1992). There had been a steady increase in tension as the election approached, with violent incidents almost every day. UNITA soldiers detained 11 members of the MPLA presidential guard and burnt their three vehicles because, according to Elias Sulpeto Pena, UNITA’s representative on the joint verification committee, they were suspected of trying to assassinate Savimbi; the guards were later released (Kiley, 1992). These actions were all rated 1 in parity of esteem.

UNITA denounced the government right before the voting began on September 29th that it attempted to rig the election. Since then, however, there was a period of silence before the storm until October 3rd, 1992, during which millions of Angolans, more than many international monitors had expected, turned out at voting stations around the country and cast their ballots (AP, 1992). On Oct. 3rd, the National Electoral Council, composed of both UNITA and MPLA personnel, announced that with 23 percent of the ballot counted, President dos Santos took a lead of more than 60 percent of the vote, and Savimbi with less than 30 percent. Soon after, UNITA held two news briefings to complain of irregularities in the counting process; by nightfall, UNITA released its own unofficial tally showing Savimbi in the lead with one-quarter of the votes counted (San Francisco Chronicle, 1992). This action that denies the legitimacy of the
government is rated 1 on parity of esteem. On Oct. 4th, Savimbi said that “It is pity for me to warn you that the MPLA is stealing ballot boxes,” and that there had been “falsification of numbers” and “tampering with computers” (Washington Post, 1992). The Electoral Council conceded on Oct. 7th not to publish the result without sufficient investigation. The “most ominous sign” came on October 8th when Savimbi left the capital of Luanda for his home region, Huambo, making no statements while provoking widespread fear that he may try to relaunch the civil war (NPR, 1992). On October 11th, NPR reported that a street fight erupted in Luanda, a UNITA member shouting that “they (MPLA) have stolen our world … Who are the people supporting the MPLA? They are thieves. They are prostitutes. They are drug addicts. These are the people who are supporting the MPLA.” This comment is rated 0 on parity of esteem.

The standoff continued with sporadic violence and rumors of mobilizing troops around the country for the rest of the year 1992. On October 15th, Savimbi said on Portuguese state television that “I am going to speak to the president (for a second round of voting),” and implicitly accused the MPLA of discrimination, “it was UNITA who said Angola was made up of black people, people of mixed race and white people. The MPLA never said that.” While the act of recognizing the president may be rated 3 or 4, the latter half of the comment contained much more hostility and thus the entire speech is rated 2. The meeting between Savimbi and dos Santos, however, never took place, because Savimbi claimed that the government was planning to assassinate him on his arrival in Luanda (UPI, 1992). On October 20th, Savimbi gathered six other opposition leaders and reaffirmed the belief that the election was rigged (Jolliffe, 1992). UNITA Secretary General Alicerces Nango accused the MPLA of launching attacks with helicopters and tanks on November 1st (UPI, 1992). On December 31, UNITA spokesman Jorge
Valentim said “MPLA wants to expel UNITA from Angola,” and blamed the government for refusing to communicate with UNITA (Collings, 1992). These accusations are rated 2.

Throughout the campaign process and the conflict immediately ensued, UNITA has adopted a rhetoric that characterizes the MPLA as a puppet regime of the Soviet Union, evil communists who attempted to install a one-party monopoly over power (even though MPLA had officially renounced Marxism and changed their name from MPLA-LP to MPLA, removing the “Labor Party”), and election manipulators who sought to undermine democracy and suppress oppositions. In the rare occasions where UNITA recognized MPLA’s status as the governing party, they did so usually in a condescending manner and only under the assumption that UNITA themselves would win the election. After the election result came out against them, UNITA repeatedly accused MPLA of rigging the election, even when the international observers at the time did not support their claim (see, e.g., AP, 1992). These accusations reflected a low level of respect for the MPLA and are rated mostly below 3 and down to 0.

In contrast, the MPLA had been steadily showing a decent level of respect for UNITA. It may not be ruled out that it was because the MPLA was winning the election and thus could be more lenient with their opponent. In the early stage of the campaign, the MPLA attempted to win popular support by appealing that “the Angolan nation survived from the war against Portugal and later UNITA because of the MPLA” during decades of foreign invasion by South Africa and the war against UNITA (Ozanne, 1991). This is rated 3 because it characterized UNITA as culpable for the war. It is 3 because such a claim is a relatively common claim among civil war belligerents and the vice-minister of information who made this claim did not further incriminate UNITA by alluding to any possible acts of brutality. Dos Santos said on September 18, 1991,
that “the two competing parties will not be armed camps, as they were in Nicaragua. We have settled the civil war and have entered a period of peace and, hopefully, prosperity (Constantine, 1991).” Such a statement again recognizes UNITA as a legitimate competitor in the upcoming election and, along with the absence of any derogatory comments, is rated 5.

There was a lack of relevant data on MPLA’s public presence from late 1991 to the beginning of the election in late September 1992, except that in mid-June of 1992, the MPLA’s ambassador to Zimbabwe claimed that UNITA was preparing a secret jungle army and would take power by use of the gun in case they lose, which is rated 2.

When the election approached in September, 1992, as UNITA claimed before the election that MPLA was trying to rig the election, dos Santos responded in an open rally in central Angola that “Angola’s 5 million voters should not be intimidated in their first democratic election,” that “we must be able to decide freely,” and also released white doves (Reuters, 1992). This implied that there were other forces who may intimidate the public and thus potentially blamed UNITA, but still, it stood in sharp contrast to UNITA’s inimical fraud accusation and is rated 3. There were, however, also reports of MPLA using propaganda weapons and spreading rumors against UNITA, such as a top UNITA politician defecting to the government (Ellis, 1992). The worst incident on the MPLA side was on September 28th, 1992, when one man struck a member of UNITA who was suspected of placing a grenade in a public rally by dos Santos in Benguela, screaming that “UNITA must be annihilated (AP, 1992).” Interestingly, this incident was made by the surrounding audience, and the police guarding dos Santos reportedly “fired above the heads of the crowd to rescue the men from a lynching.” Although this incident is
rated 0 in parity of esteem for its obvious hostility, this was the only case of 0 for MPLA and apparently not representative of the entire group because dos Santos had stopped it.

In the month of standoff after the election, the MPLA kept a relatively neutral stance in response to UNITA’s fraud claim and showed more respect than their opponent. On October 5th, it acceded to UNITA’s demand for an independent probe of the allegations of ballot fraud (Christian Science Monitor, 1992). On October 9, dos Santos appealed for peace over a radio broadcast, telling Savimbi followers that they would play “a fundamental role in the development of the nation. (AP, 1992).” These two statements are rated 3 and 4, respectively. On October 17th, the MPLA invited UNITA to join a government of national unity based on the portion of the vote it won, a significant concession considering both sides had not previously committed to any coalition government (Reuters, 1992). This offer is rated 4. The patience of the MPLA, however, abated as UNITA refused to accept the election result and provoke nationwide violence. On November 4th, 1992, dos Santos said “all parties that had gained parliamentary seats in the election should take up their political responsibilities and help resolve the country’s problems,” and that “Angolans wanted peace and the government chosen by the people should begin its work (UPI, 1992).” On November 21th, dos Santos publicly denounced Savimbi in a multi-party congress for resorting to violence and, on 28th, that “UNITA must withdraw its troops, accept the peace accords and ceasefire, and accept the principle of the state administration.” These are rated 3 and 2, respectively.

Overall, parity of esteem is at a relatively low level in Angola, with UNITA showing considerable and consistent hostility towards the MPLA. UNITA accused the MPLA of colluding with the Soviets and sabotaging the election, and made assassination attempts on top
MPLA officials. These statements and actions are rated from 3 to 0 on the level of parity of esteem. The MPLA, in comparison, showed more respect and had rarely made public denouncements against UNITA. Even though many journalist articles mentioned the brutal humanitarian records by UNITA and Savimbi, such as Savimbi’s execution of his own high command, Miguel N’Zau Puna, who defected in February 1992 (Kiley, 1992), such denouncement was never reported in the MPLA’s statements. As discussed in the coding manual, campaign speeches usually require that one side not praise too much of the opponent. The absence of negative comments, therefore, is an important factor in evaluating parity of esteem. As shown, the MPLA had a relatively higher level of parity of esteem than UNITA.

In addition, the claims by UNITA of election fraud were not confirmed by international observers. The UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Angola certified, first in her decision of 19 October 1992 and following decisions of 27 October, 30 October, and 30 November, that with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections can be considered to have been generally free and fair. Along with the predictions by many observers prior to the election that Savimbi would not accept defeat (see, e.g., the Times on March 26, 1992, the Independent on September 10, 1992, the Times on September 26, 1992) and his own statement on October 5 that “there is no international organization which can say whether the elections were free and fair, only the Angolan people can do that (Christian Science Monitor),” it is reasonable to argue that the claims were fabricated to spread a negative perception of the MPLA regardless of the election process. These fabricated statements constituted clearly a low parity of esteem that would contribute to the eventual conflict relapse.
Parity of Esteem in Mozambique

The transition period for Mozambique had seen a propitious start. On Oct. 5th, 1992, the Rome peace agreement was signed, signaling the official ceasefire between FRELIMO and RENAMO. Their leaders, President Chissano and General Dhlakama, were reported to call each other “dear brother” at the peace ceremony, and Dhlakama, the RENAMO rebel leader for 20 years, under the prevailing concern of RENAMO’s defeat in an election, pledged that “if we lose the election, we will go into the opposition. We will respect the agreement (Associated Press, 1992).” Similar rhetoric that perceives the likely defeat as an acceptable prospect is shared by other RENAMO leaderships, including the secretary-general, Vicente Ululu, who said on May 12th, 1993 that “(if RENAMO lost the election) RENAMO will simply become a part of the opposition, no problem (Lyman, 1993).” These declarations showed a high level (5) of parity of esteem by praising the opponent as worthy and the election process as a temporary settlement of power.

A similar level of parity of esteem continued into the second half of 1993. On August 25th, the third day of the peace talks, Chissano summoned all of the provincial governors to Maputo for further talks, a move remarked by observing diplomats as “enabling Chissano to show Dhlakama that the administrators have risen above party politics, and he could show the administrators that there was a relationship of mutual respect with Renamo at the leadership level (Christian Science Monitor, 1993).”

On July 21st, 1994, Dhlakama accused the government of FRELIMO of planning to rig the vote (Shaw, 1994), a similar move made by Savimbi less than two years earlier and is rated 3 on parity of esteem. Following this accusation, however, Mozambique did not plummet into the
downward spiral as Angola did. After making fraud accusations, Dhlakama promised that “if RENAMO wins the election, we would opt for a government of national unity like the one in South Africa … it will invite officials from other parties to serve in government” (Christian Science Monitor, 1994).” This is rated 5. In comparison, Chissano, “despite pressure from the US and other Western nations, has resisted making the same public commitment,” which accordingly is rated 3. On September 29th, RENAMO accused FRELIMO of “holding back forces for a military putsch should it fare badly in the upcoming election” due to its delay of demobilization (Niekerk, 1994), rated 3. In remarking on his party’s campaign strategy in comparison to the opponent, Dhlakama said that “Frelimo have the planes, the lorries, the T-shirts and the bicycles. Of course they can move faster than us, and they can buy votes … But I am not worried because I have a better message. And I am a much better public speaker than Chissano” (Washington Times, 1994).” The claim that “they can buy votes” implied that the opponent may be involved in illegitimate campaign behavior, and holding a better message and personally being a better public speaker combined shows a typical level 3 of parity of esteem – the opponents are characterized as not capable and morally desirable of leading the country. On October 21th, Dhlakama reportedly said that he “would not accept defeat in the election” (Hamlyn, 1994), a rather provocative statement that, without sufficient context, is rated 2.

Similar to Angola, Mozambique’s election was plagued by claims of fraud by the rebels. On October 24th, Dhlakama complained that the government of FRELIMO was “sabotaging” his campaign because the telephone lines around his residence in the northern provinces were cut; he also complained that FRELIMO register thousands of foreigners while failing to register Mozambicans where RENAMO has more popularity (Hamlyn, 1994). This accusation was rated
2 because it did not descend to the level of open hostility and denial of humanness as was the case in Angola. On the eve of the election, October 25th, 1994, FRELIMO president Chissano, while previously rejected any kind of power-sharing, said that he would consider offering Dhlakama a government post in the new government, given the widespread belief that FRELIMO was going to win the election, although he also said that he had “severe doubts about Dhlakama’s willingness to cooperate within a future cabinet” (Matloff, 1994). Given the friendly offer, this thread is rated 4 on PoE. However, a mass-level hostility was observed on that day, as Dhlakama’s motorcade drove through Maputo and was received by FRELIMO supporters with stones and shouting of “killers.” This was rated 1 on PoE. The accusation by Dhlakama culminated on October 27th, when he told Portuguese Radio Nova that “the election is a tasteless joke .. cheating is already in play .. no one wanted to boycott the elections, but they had to because they are obviously fraudulent .. and it was the government who provoked us.” On October 28th, Dhlakama alleged that “we have proof that there will be massive fraud in this election … it is not an election, it is a picnic … we want new elections (Matloff, 1994).” Both of these accusations are rated 2 because they never address anything beyond the election fraud itself. The crisis in the Mozambique election was resolved overnight on October 29th, after Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe as well as other international diplomats put heavy pressure on Dhlakama and guaranteed that an independent international inquiry would investigate the complaints about irregularities. Dhlakama conceded accordingly but still said that “there are elections in this country because I, Dhlakama, personally with the people and my brothers during 16 years struggled so that there could be this celebration. So the celebration is of Dhlakama, the celebration is of the people. President Dhlakama saved the nation (Maier, 1994).” Dhlakama soon agreed to meet with Chissano and abandon his opposition.
In his victory speech, Chissano recognized that "everyone voted so that there would be no more war in Mozambique so that Mozambicans no longer shed the blood of other Mozambicans (AP, 1994)." In his inaugural speech on December 10th, Chissano said "there is no force that can destroy the unity of Mozambicans … the blood that runs in the veins of all our people, of all ethnic groups and all races, has the same national identity (AP, 1994)." Both of these comments called for national unity and collaboration and are rated 5 of parity of esteem for their high respect for the opponents. In the first session of the Parliament, however, RENAMO walked out to protest the lack of a secret ballot to elect the assembly's president, an action showing a moderate level of hostility and is rated 3 for the absence of further accusation or action. On November 30th, 1994, the Christian Science Monitor reported two lively cases of FRELIMO and RENAMO supporters’ comments about each other that both showed a level 4 parity of esteem. A civilian victim of RENAMO, Miguel Cuna said that “RENAMO did bad things and I suffered. It is hard to suspend bitterness but one must. We are all tired of war… We must let the anger go.” Manuel Frank, an attorney and Lisbon representative of RENAMO, said that he had distanced themselves from Dhalakam’s allegation of fraud, that working with his former foes on the electoral commission without renouncing his views was a “pleasant surprise,” that gave him “hope for national reconciliation” and that his family lived in a FRELIMO neighborhood but felt no persecution. These two mass-level cases showed a high level of reconciliation as a result of the electoral process and that people were showing decent levels of respect to each other. It is noteworthy, however, that such respect came out of the fear of violence, and may thus be rated 4 on parity of esteem.

The parity of esteem in Mozambique is relatively stable across partisan lines and, compared to Angola, is relatively higher. The differences between the two cases, however, are
salient but not absolute. Angola entailed more hostile rhetorics, such as UNITA’s accusations of
the MPLA being puppets and suppressive and outliner of MPLA’s mass supporters’ accusations
of UNITA “must be annihilated.” Both cases included accusations of fraud, and accordingly by
the opponent of intentionally interfering with the election. The relatively higher level of PoE in
Mozambique is primarily shown through the lack of more aggressive and derogatory
characterization of opponents. Rarely did either case show highly positive PoE comments, such
as that “even if we lose, they will make a good leader for all of us.” This perhaps has to do with
the cultural idiosyncrasy of the cases. “We try to avoid the word ‘lose,’” said a UN mediator in
Mozambique, “because to be a loser in Mozambican culture is to be hated, to be no good (Hill,
1994).”

**Integrative Complexity**

![Figure 2a: Integrative Complexity in Angola](image)

![Figure 2b: Integrative Complexity in Mozambique](image)

Figure 2a displays the level of Integrative Complexity in Angola, with 5 denoting the highest IC and 0 the lowest. Points indicate segment of journalist articles where one side characterizes the opponent.
19 segments out of 13 articles are analyzed.

Figure 2b displays the level of Integrative Complexity in Mozambique.
16 segments out of 12 articles are analyzed.
Integrative complexity evaluates the cognitive process of how people perceive each other. A high IC manifests in high differentiation, i.e., able to distinguish multiple perspectives of why the opponents behave in certain ways, and high integration, i.e., able to incorporate these perspectives and produce a complex explanation. Essentially, a high IC perception would demonstrate a complicated thought process and usually involve parts of the opponent’s arguments that are supported and parts that are not. Therefore, a high IC is also demonstrated through a certain degree of explicit acknowledgment of the opponent’s achievements. Due to the nature of IC, its evaluation usually requires protracted observation of behaviors and long statements. The limits of the data that this thesis uses, however, restrict the length of materials that can be used to analyze IC properly. Most journalist articles include only short quotes of phrases or sentences on any speeches it reports. Therefore, although the results show that Mozambique has a relatively higher level of IC, the data gathered in this thesis is not sufficient to properly examine the effect of IC on conflict relapse. This section will examine IC with the few cases where long-enough speech transcripts are available.

The IC in Angola based on the available sources shows a highly unstable and overall relatively low pattern. On May 31, 1991, Savimbi claimed during his visit to Washington DC that “the challenge to the MPLA is still more daunting, it must confront the risk of losing power (after the election) … it must permit the mobilization of political parties … it must abandon its monopoly of the print and broadcast media … it must abandon its economic dirigisme and accept the market (Washington Times).” This is a relatively typical example of a level 3 Integrative Complexity, because it highlights a high level of differentiation, i.e., distinguishing multiple perspectives, but it presents almost no integration, i.e., incorporating those perspectives into a rational and comprehensive conclusion. Instead of acknowledging (and potentially criticizing)
the valid reasons that had sustained the opponent for more than half a century of struggle, which would increase the IC level to 4 or 5, Savimbi merely continued his accusation and demanded the MPLA to behave in ways desirable to himself.

On September 9, 1992, dos Santos and Savimbi reportedly expressed their willingness to establish a power-sharing government that would “obviously reflect the dominant political force, but also try to integrate other forces according to their electoral representation in order to guarantee a sufficient base of support for national reconciliation (Financial Times).” This acknowledgment shows a level 5 IC because it reflects a high cognitive recognition of the opponent’s presence in the new political system. It, however, may not be a sufficient demonstration of the actual situation in Angola at that time. This report used international observers’ comments as sources and did not include any actual quotations from either dos Santos or Savimbi. Eventually, the power-sharing proposal did not take form and it is difficult to say if such a concession was made to only show a friendly gesture and to stall and deceive the opponent.

On October 11, 1992, a civilian’s imprecation that the people who support the MPLA were “thieves, prostitutes, drug addicts” who were “stealing votes from UNITA” clearly showed the lowest level of IC: the opponents were undesirable simply because they are bad people.

Overall, it is difficult to identify a clear pattern in Angola due to two reasons. First, neither MPLA nor UNITA had a clear agenda for their campaign, especially in terms of economic or other non-military aspects. Both sides had voiced their support for free market liberalism, but most of their campaign speeches (or the journalist coverage of them) were directed towards the new political system and power struggle. Second, as discussed before, most
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journalist articles include short excerpts from speeches or simply paraphrases, providing little evidence to study IC. Therefore, insufficient data for IC is collected for a more comprehensive analysis.

The Mozambique case is slightly different in terms of the availability of sources as well as a relatively higher level of IC compared to Angola, but such difference is not significant. At the beginning of the Mozambique civil war, RENAMO demonstrated a relatively high degree of IC through its confirmation of FRELIMO’s achievement and policies. During an NPR interview with an anonymous official from RENAMO on May 12, 1993 (Cooper), FRELIMO was perceived as “(having done) some good things, like liberating Mozambique from Portuguese colonial rule…making the same things RENAMO promises to voters, but (FRELIMO) is already delivering them.” This shows a really high IC (rated 5) because even though it aims to present itself as a better alternative, it confirms the good intentions of their opponent’s policies and recognizes their achievements. It is almost impossible to see politicians praising the opponents without trying to conclude with their own success for obvious reasons.

On September 29, 1994, Dhlakama complained that the government of RENAMO has a stronger economic power to outplay his party, “FRELIMO have the planes, the lorries, the T-shirts and the bicycles. Of course they can move faster than us, and they can buy votes” but he still believed he could win because “I have a better message and I am a better public speaker (Washington Times).” This is rated 3. Dhlakama made a similar complaint (also rated 3) on October 24 that “our children don't have food, they don't have schools, but they all have Frelimo T-shirts,” and that “(my supporters) believe in me, not because I fought for democracy, not because I fought for justice, but because I am an alternative (Times).”
Fewer data are available to examine the IC on the side of FRELIMO. In a detailed report of a civilian’s life after the election was concluded on November 30, 1994 (Matloff), a relatively high level of IC was shown. “RENAMO did bad things and I suffered. It is hard to suspend bitterness but one must,” the civilian victim of RENAMO’s kidnapping said, “I hope RENAMO will keep to its pledge to accept defeat … We grew up with FRELIMO, the men fought for it, but that does not mean we believe the government is filled with saints. What has it done for us?” This reflection is rated 4 because it recognizes both their party, the government of FRELIMO, and their former enemy of RENAMO had committed horrible things and that they need to forgo the hatred and move on. It is not yet 5 because it does not elaborate on how the speaker actually perceives the motives and concerns of the two parties.

Integrative Complexity evaluates the cognitive process of how people perceive each other. It is perhaps not surprising to see in the literature that a high IC, meaning that one perceives the other as having multiple incentives to do certain things and that these incentives interact to produce the eventual result, would lead to a lower likelihood of using the ultimate means of violence to resolve conflicts. However, due to the nature of IC which requires the examination of long statements or other means that would reflect the cognitive process, the current database that this thesis studies provides insufficient evidence. Nonetheless, the data available do show a relatively higher and more stable level of IC in Mozambique than in Angola.
Although we have seen a significant difference in the Parity of Esteem between the case of Angola and Mozambique, this difference is much more salient for the rejection of violence, which is directly measured by the vocal embrace or rejection of the use of violence in settling any possible conflicts. Demonstrated in the graph above, Angola had seen various degrees of rejection of violence across the two-year span, ranging from openly promising an absolute rejection of violence in any possible scenario (mostly in the case of losing the election; rated 5) to blatantly threatening war resumption if their needs were not met (rated 0). In comparison, the case of Mozambique had experienced much less hostility throughout the whole time span, with both parties, both on the elite and mass level, openly rejecting violence regardless of the outcome of the election most of the time.
Rejection of Violence in Angola

The rejection of violence in Angola, similar to the parity of esteem, is different for the government of MPLA and the rebel group UNITA. For the MPLA, it was mostly level 3 and 4 until near the end of the two years span in which the rebel’s continuous assaults on towns around the country forced them to abandon the previous rejection of violence. For UNITA, it was relatively high at the beginning but plummeted later with the allegation of the government rigging the upcoming election.

At the beginning of the two-year period studied in Angola, sporadic fighting was still happening, but both sides were changing their attitudes towards war. On March 19, 1991, Savimbi declared that “there is no reason for the war to go on … our fight has fully reached its target … From now on, our troops will only use force in self-defense (Lyman).” This statement is rated 4 because it presents a positive attitude towards rejective violence, but it is not yet 5 because it is based on the assumption that “our fight has fully reached its target,” with the target being (allegedly) the government’s commitment to establishing a democratic system. Similarly, dos Santos declared on May 2 that “a general understanding has been reached … This does not mean the war will end immediately but following steps will be taken so that we may yet achieve a cessation of hostilities (Constantine).”

Savimbi continued his open rejection of violence until September 1992. On June 3, 1991, Savimbi declared that “if I lose I will ask to be replaced by someone younger … I cannot be in opposition, I will step down (AP).” This is rated 4 because he made it even clearer on July 3 that “if I lose the election, this is my country and I am an ordinary citizen … I will not return to armed resistance and no one will push me to go back to the bush anymore (Christian Science
Monitor),” which is rated 5. On October 8, Savimbi met with President Bush and painted a rosy picture for the future, “one thing which is sure is that there will be no return to war at all. The people, they don't want war. The government does not want war. We don't want war. I think that's some assurance we can give you (Murray; also rated 5).” As the time advanced into 1992, however, the delayed progress of demobilization signaled potential acceptance of violence, in particular by UNITA. Two articles on March 22 and 26 reported that although the postponed demobilization should have started by the end of March, the progress was not optimistic. Only around 20 to 25 percent of UNITA troops had arrived at demobilization sites, compared to around 40 to 50 percent of the government troops (NPR). What’s more, Savimbi reportedly strengthened his grip around UNITA by executing high commands and diplomats and showed little enthusiasm for the demobilization program (Kiley).

In May 1992, however, Savimbi regained his lost figure as a fighter for peace, claiming “adamantly” that UNITA would “never go back to guerilla war”; he said that “if we lose the elections, which up to now I don't think will happen, like Mr. Kinnock, we will have to go to party and ask people to make a judgment of me (Southey, 1992).” This is rated 4 because, as discussed above, this promise of peace is made on the assumption that they would win the election. On June 11, UNITA officials reportedly “had vowed to renounce violence and operate as an opposition political party if they lose the election, and to offer some ministry posts to MPLA officials if they win (Finley; also rated 4).”

As is the case throughout the two-year period, MPLA received less coverage for their support (or not) for a peaceful future prior to the election commencing in September 1992. On July 3, 1991, the chief negotiator in the peace talks, Lopo Do Nasiemento, who was also a
political advisor to dos Santos, said to about 10,000 UNITA supporters that “the years of war have left deep wounds in the body of the nation … Now is the time to heal the wounds, not only of the body but also of the soul and heart (Christian Science Monitor),” which is rated 4. On September 18, 1991, dos Santos replied to the concern that Angola shall repeat the fate of the failed election in Nicaragua, that “the two competing political parties will not be armed camps, as they were in Nicaragua. We have settled the civil war and have entered a period of peace and, hopefully, prosperity (Constantine).” Again, this pledge of peace without discussing the risk of losing the election is rated 4. An MPLA campaign report was made on September 23, 1992, including a war memorial displaying an armored vehicle topped with a peace dove and electronic billboards that read “for rights, equality, and a certain peace – vote MPLA (Christian Science Monitor; also rated 4).” At a party in late September to mark the creation of a joint command, UNITA General Chenda Pena said “the process is irreversible, the soldiers will not accept a return to fighting,” and with other UNITA officers embraced their former foes after swearing loyalty to the new army (AP, 1992).

A significant decrease in the level of rejection of violence in Angola, particularly on the side of UNITA, started as the election approached and culminated with the allegation of election fraud. On September 26, 1992, a senior UN official in Luanda commented that “both sides believe they will win … so long as they continue to believe they will win, everything is on track (Kiley).” On September 27, Savimbi boasted in response to an American diplomat’s warning of a potential return to armed struggle that “there will be no need for such action … we will take 75% of the vote … I am so sure of winning. No one is talking about arms (Ellis).” Both were rated 3. On September 29, Savimbi intensified the fear that the losing side will reject the result by saying that “if I am provoked, this will all be very ugly (AP; rated 1).” On October 3, UNITA
complained of electoral fraud, stating that “if MPLA attempts a repeat of the 1975 coup,” in which the newly dependent Angola was about to hold an election but canceled due to civil war, “it will receive an appropriate response from UNITA (San Francisco Chronicle).” On October 4, Savimbi publicly said that “unless the matter (of fraud) is rectified, UNITA will take a position which might deeply disturb the situation in this country (Washington Post).” These two open threats are rated 0. On October 6, UNITA Secretary-General Paulo Aliceres Mango called on the National Electoral Council to stop publishing election results, demanding that “if it does not, the (council) will have to accept fully what will happen in the country (AP; rated 1).” The Council conceded to his demand on October 7. UNITA repeated its demand on October 10 that if the results were made public before proper investigation by the UN, “Angola would be plunged into chaos (UPI; rated 0).” Again on October 12, the chief UNITA representative on the joint peace commission, Elias Pena, said even more bluntly, “if the results are published, it would immediately mean war and catastrophe (NPR; rated 0).” On October 13, however, a UNITA spokesman in Luanda said that “we are not threatening. We have no intention of returning to war. A declaration of war will never come from UNITA, never (UPI; rated 2).” On October 15, Savimbi even expressed acceptance of the election results, promising to meet the MPLA president the next day (UPI; rated 3). The meeting between Savimbi and dos Santos was for a while optimistic, with one UN observer commenting on October 17 that he had been assured by both parties that they would not resume the civil war (Reuters; rated 2), but the planned peace talk eventually failed as Savimbi accused the government of planning to assassinate him. On October 21, Savimbi again proposed a peace meeting with dos Santos to avoid civil war (Reuters; rated 2), but on October 24, UNITA had reportedly surrounded the capital with 7,000 heavily armed men and Savimbi retreated to Huambo and continued to contest the election
(Reuters; rated 0). As the Angola ambassador to Portugal said on October 31, the civil war had already resumed, “it is not declared, but in practice, that’s what it is (AP).”

In response to UNITA’s charges, MPLA was initially inclined to vocally defuse the complaints and maintain peace. On October 5, it agreed to an independent probe of the allegations of ballot fraud (Christian Science Monitor; rated 4). On October 7, it further conceded to UNITA’s demand of postponed disclosure of election results (Reuters; rated 4). MPLA’s patience was wearing thin as the allegations continued. On October 12, the MPLA spokesman said “if he (Savimbi) starts a war, we are ready for him (NPR, rated 2).” On October 13, MPLA information minister Rui de Carvalho denied the fraud accusations, “the MPLA is doing everything it can to safeguard the peace. The elections were overseen by international observers. They took place in full view of everyone. Not one piece of evidence has been found to prove alleged irregularities,” he further declared that “the MPLA is in a calm position, in the position of election winner,” he declared (UPI, rated 4). As armed conflicts occurred around the country, the MPLA demanded on November 28 that “UNITA must withdraw its troops, accept the peace accords and ceasefire, and accept the principle of the state administration (Reuters; rated 1).” On December 5, dos Santos said “thousands of young volunteers were ready to defend their villages and towns against UNITA (CP; rated 0),” and on December 27, MPLA launched its own “defensive action to prevent UNITA troops from seizing unspecified positions (UPI).”

In general, rejection of violence in Angola shows a declining pattern for both MPLA and UNITA since the commencing of the electoral campaign process. It firstly decreased as a result of the slow demobilization process, as well as sporadic violence during the campaign that killed at least 40 people prior to the election (Reuters, 1992). It plummeted for UNITA as it contested
the election results and threatened the government not to disclose the result. The MPLA, after weeks of delay and more agitation, also lost patience and accepted the use of violence. As a result, the Angolan civil war relapsed.

**Rejection of Violence in Mozambique**

Compared to Angola, Mozambique’s former warring parties were exceptionally peaceful in their rhetorics. Throughout the data collected, it was maintained by both parties, especially the rebel group RENAMO who complained about election fraud, that however other things were going on (the factor that distinguishes levels 4 and 5), return to violence was not an option.

On August 4, 1993, RENAMO’s top provincial delegate in Zambezia said that “Dhlakama says he is not like Savimbi. He does not want to go back to war (Christian Science Monitor).” On June 23, 1994, Dhlakama visited Washington D.C., promising “not to return to war regardless of the outcome of the vote (Christian Science Monitor).” On July 17, a soldier at the demobilization camp said that “tell Dhlakama and Chissano that I don't want any more war - that's why I'm going home (AP).” On October 23, Dhlakama said that “if I win or lose, I know that I am the person who brought multiparty democracy to my country, that is enough (the Sun).” On the eve of the election on October 25, Dhlakama told reporters “Go back to war? No! Never (Christian Science Monitor)!” On October 26, Dhlakama promised that “we will use dialogue. No more war… (if the election is not free and fair) we will insist that the elections be held again (Times).” On October 27, as RENAMO threatened to pull out of the election, it still said it was not returning to war (Independent). On October 28, after his comments that the election was a “picnic,” Dhlakama again said, “I am tired of telling people that I am not going back to war. I will be in peaceful civilian opposition (Reuters).” All are rated 5.
There were only a few occasions where either side expressed a level of less than 5 of rejection of violence. On July 21, Dhlakama accused the government of planning to rig the vote, but he also said on July 26 that “I was in the bush for 16 years, that was enough. I will never use the strategy of arms again. I turned to arms to force the government to accept multiparty democracy. Now I have achieved that (Christian Science Monitor; rated 4).” In contrast, however, Chissano “despite pressure from the US and other Western nations, has resisted making the same public commitment (Christian Science Monitor; rated 3).” On October 21, the Times reported, without much detail, that Dhlakama said he would not accept defeat in the election (rated 3), coinciding with similar statements from Savimbi, but was not confirmed by other reports. On October 27, the day when Dhlakama asserted he had proof of massive fraud, he repeated his promise of peace that “if we wanted to return to war, we would already have done so, because (the government) has been provoking us (AP; rated 4).”

What’s better is that they were not only vocally supporting peace, virtually no violence took place during each party’s campaign, and virtually all shooting has stopped since the signing of the peace agreement (Washington Post, 1993). The demobilization went much smoother in the case of Mozambique. By July 29, 1994, two weeks before the deadline for demilitarization, the FRELIMO government demobilized around 55 percent of its troops designated to be discharged, while RENAMO had exceeded its required demobilization levels by an additional 20 percent of its troops – a phenomenon that may reflect the exceptionally strong will for peace (Christian Science Monitor). Even though mutinies occasionally took place in the demobilization camps, they were usually the result of months of confinement without pay and no organized attempts to destabilize the situation. The demobilization was so successful that, by October 23, 1994, there were not enough people willing to serve in the new army – 30,000 soldiers were planned but
only a third of that number was available (the Sun). As the dust settled on December 10, 1994, Chissano made his inaugural speech that “his peace and this democracy are a just reward for the Mozambican people … there is no force that can destroy the unity of Mozambicans (AP).”

The case of rejection of violence in Mozambique was very straightforward: regardless of the outcome of the election, neither party was going to resume the war, and no one was willing to fight anymore.

**Discussions**

This study proposes that a negative perception of opponents, consisting of parity of esteem, integratively complexity, and vocal rejection of violence, will lead to conflict relapse after the first election in post-conflict reconstruction. By comparing journalist coverage of the failed 1992 election of Angola and the successful 1994 election of Mozambique, this study finds that there was a relatively higher level of parity of esteem and vocal rejection of violence in Mozambique, with the latter being more salient. Due to the nature of integrative complexity as well as the limited sources available in English, insufficient evidence was gathered to find a consistent pattern of integrative complexity in either case.

The findings of this study aim to expand the current literature on post-conflict reconstruction in two ways. First, it criticizes the existing emphasis on structural factors to explain the success or failure of peace-building operations and brings up the important role played by mental factors internal to the people who had just suffered war. Although the cases used in this study do show that a higher amount of resources devoted by the international
community can facilitate a successful peace-building operation, it is arguably no less important
that the more positive perception of adversaries in Mozambique, which was in place well before
the UN Mission arrived in Maputo in December 1992, also played a significant role. Moreover,
this study speaks to the broad literature that examines conflicts through a historical and cultural
perspective by channeling the findings of those studies into measurable variables: the extent to
which parties view each other as worthy opponents and subsequently worthy leaders should they
won the election, the capabilities of parties to differentiate the multiple perspectives that the
opponents have rather than simply dismissing them as evil or otherwise inferior, and whether or
not parties would use vocal threats of violence to achieve their goals. These three variables serve
as a scale for us to comprehend how much the historical rivalry and cultural enmity have
continued today. It is vital to learn the history of each conflict, but it is also vital to see how
people integrate history into every moment of their lives and decisions.

Second, this study aims to facilitate ongoing peace-building operations by providing a
measurable scale to evaluate the plausibility of concluding the operation with a democratic
election, or, coinciding with the title, when the mind is ripe for an election. Contemporary peace-
building operations face the challenge of not being able to provide a concrete answer to the
investors on when the transition shall come to fruition, and insufficient preparation with a rush to
the election can cause catastrophic consequences. The three factors proposed in this study can be
adopted into future peace operations to evaluate how former foes perceive each other and
potentially reconcile with one another. Two factors, parity of esteem and integrative complexity,
have been proposed and studied by previous researchers in other settings, and their
measurements have shown high validity and reliability across countries and cultures. Therefore,
it is reasonable to expect that they, along with the vocal rejection of violence, would play a significant role in the outcome of peace-building operations.

For future research, this study has three limitations that can be improved with better resources. First, there is a dearth of existing literature in English pertaining to the Angola and Mozambique civil wars. Only a number of articles and books are available to study, and the journalist coverage of these two wars was, as discussed before, limited in quantity and potentially prone to bias. To better understand the two elections that are opposite in outcomes would require a close examination of the Portuguese literature on related topics. Second, this study uses mostly journalist articles as data to examine the proposed factors, but these articles may not always be first-hand sources and the journalists who wrote them may introduce their own biases and hence impact the result. A better dataset would be composed of entire speech transcripts and even interviews on related issues that, if properly designed, should reveal the implicit perception without agitating the subjects. Third, although this study is conducted with a coding manual with objective evaluations of keywords and context, the undertone of each speech requires a certain degree of subjective interpretation of the researcher, which may see a better result if multiple coders are available.
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UPI. (1992g). UNITA leader savimbi accepts results.


### Appendix

**Coding manual**

**Affective: parity of esteem**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 0-1   | Regard the opponent as less than human, dangerous if taken leadership, may have cultural-specific symbols Possible keywords: traitor, colonist, imperialist, demon, witch, racist, fascist, puppet | “They are not worthy of leading us”  
“(The opposition leader Zille) is a colonialist and an imperialist…we will defeat their fascist, racist tactics.” By ANC leaderships, South Africa, 2009.  
“Sleepy Joe betrayed Pennsylvania. How can you vote for him?... The only thing almost as bad was Kamala with the laugh. … I said, ‘Is there something wrong with her too?’” By Donald Trump, US, 2020. |
| 2-3   | Recognize the opponent as human, but intelligently or morally less desirable than own group Possible keywords: Cheater, thief, clown | “They are not capable of leading us”  
“(Boris Johnson has carried on) months of deceit and deception, (he needs to) do the decent thing and resign… (His excuse was) so ridiculous that it is actually offensive to the British public.” By Keir Starmer, UK, 2022.  
“This is painful, and it will be for a long time.” By Hillary Clinton, US, 2016. |
| 4-5   | Recognize the opponent as equal and competent of leading own group (Politicians rarely admit defeat so this category should be considered more on the absence of negative comments | “They can and (if we lose) should lead us”  
"I had the honor of calling Sen. Barack Obama, to congratulate him on being elected the next president of the country that we both love…This is an historic election. And I recognize the special significance it has for African Americans … Tonight, I remain her (the US) servant. That is blessing enough for anyone.” By John McCain, US, 2008. |
## Cognitive: integrative complexity

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Examples</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>The opponent’s policy has little value, lacks complexity, and have simple (and undesirable) consequences. [Little differentiation and no integration.]</td>
<td>“Their policies are just bad, because they are stupid people.” “The Biden plan will build up China and the Republican party we want to build up America…Biden socialists bill also includes mass amnesty and free college. Not for you, but for illegal aliens.” By Donald Trump, US, 2021.</td>
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<td>2-3</td>
<td>The opponent’s policy is designed because of multiple reasons, some of which may be valuable. [High differentiation and little integration.]</td>
<td>“They considered some good reasons in designing their platform, but not good enough.” “I do love the environment, but what I want the cleanest, crystal clear water, the cleanest air. We have the best, lowest number in carbon emissions, which is a big standard that I noticed Obama goes with all the time.” By Donald Trump, US, 2021.</td>
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<td>4-5</td>
<td>The opponent’s policy is (sometimes) valuable and reasonable. They have in the past developed good policies to tackle real challenges, which we have also taken similar (or better) measures to address. [High differentiation and high integration.]</td>
<td>“Their attempts to tackle our country’s challenges take on some valuable perspectives that are linked together to form a rather reasonable strategy. Our solutions take into account their concerns and plan to be a better alternative.” “I think Senator McCain's absolutely right that we need more responsibility, but we need it not just when there's a crisis… Senator McCain is absolutely right that the earmarks process has been abused, which is why I suspended any requests for my home state, whether it was for senior centers or what have you, until we cleaned it up.” By Barack Obama, US, 2008.</td>
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Behavioral: rejection of violence

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Vocally embrace violence/return to war as a means to achieve certain ends or regard violence as the only means to reach their goals, openly threaten war if desires not met.</td>
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<td>2-3</td>
<td>Regard violence as a possible option or necessary reaction to certain rule-breaking of the other party. May appear as anti-war but always keep war as an option when their requests are not met.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>Vocally oppose war, especially when there is a rule-breaking of the other party. Vow not to return to war even if there is contention over the coalition government or election.</td>
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