

5-2023

Under the Blue Berets: Race and Ethnicity as Factors for Peacekeeping Success

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Under the Blue Berets: Race and Ethnicity as Factors for Peacekeeping Success


A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in Government from
William & Mary


by

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May 1st, 2023

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Acknowledgements and Dedication

This paper would not have been possible without the work of the many scholars, policymakers, peacekeepers, and host country populations who were involved in peace operations long before I studied them. I would like to provide a special thanks to Dr. Sue Peterson for volunteering to be my thesis advisor and Dr. Etienne Poliquin and Dr. Rui Pereira for volunteering on my committee. I am very grateful for the advice they gave me and how they provided me with the opportunity to produce my first piece of empirical research.

I also thank the following people for their help and encouragement throughout this project:

- Dr. Rani Mullen
- Dr. Larry Evans
- Dr. Philip Roessler
- Dr. Paula Pickering
- Rick Mikulski
- Mary Oberlies
- Dr. Randal R. Ketchem
- Dr. Josh Smith
- The staff of the Roy R. Charles Center
- The staff of Earl Gregg Swem Library
- All my family and friends

Finally, I am dedicating this research to my Uncle Fred, who has always inspired me to look beyond borders and build a better world.

Abstract

Do race and ethnicity impact peacekeeping success? Scholars provide many arguments for why peacekeeping missions succeed or fail, but there has been little systematic study of how identity similarities or differences between peacekeepers and populations affect mission outcomes. I propose that racial and ethnic similarities or differences between the two groups are causal mechanisms that help determine whether a mission is on the road to operational success or failure. I use a mixed-method design to test these claims. First, I use a linear regression analysis to measure the impact of racial similarity between peacekeepers and populations on violence against civilians in twelve African civil wars. The analysis shows that higher proportions of racial similarity somewhat reduces violence. I then use process tracing in my case study of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) to test my theories qualitatively. I find additional evidence in this case suggesting that racial and ethnic differences reduce peacekeepers' ability to protect civilians.

Introduction

Peacekeeping missions have been an important part of international relations (IR) since the end of World War II, with over a hundred missions on six continents touching the lives of millions of people. Much of the United Nations' bandwidth has been spent on peace operations since its inception over 70 years ago.¹ Peacekeepers and other peace operators from across the globe have

¹ United Nations Peacekeeping 2018

aimed to provide vital humanitarian assistance, help displaced peoples, build state capacities, prevent war, calm conflict, and protect civilians caught up in violence.

Many peacekeeping missions are deployed into tense situations where failure is not an option. Mission goals can be lofty, and peacekeeper success may be the only thing standing between stable peace and brutal conflict. This is particularly clear in the infamous case of UNAMIR, the UN's peace mission in Rwanda from 1993-1996. Peacekeepers were supposed to create a buffer between Hutus and Tutsis to limit tensions, monitor human rights violations, and create demilitarized zones to protect civilians. But the mission failed to produce peace talks and failed to protect Tutsi civilians from Hutu violence in 1994 and 1995, leading to the Rwandan Genocide, one of the most horrific events of the late 20th century and one that claimed nearly half a million lives.²

At the same time, some peacekeeping missions have been extremely successful. UNTAC was the UN's Transitional Authority in Cambodia and is widely regarded as one of the most beneficial peace operations ever.³ The UN's civilian employees, observers, police units, and military task forces were able to stabilize the country after decades of civil conflict, war with Vietnam, and the brutal Cambodian genocide at the hands of the Khmer Rouge. UNTAC helped to disarm rebel groups, clear mines, repatriate and resettle displaced people, foster economic growth, and push towards democratic elections with a multi-party parliamentary system and a constitution with human rights provisions.

² Stanton 2009, 6-25

³ Bratt 1996, 3-5

The difference between UNAMIR and UNTAC's outcomes could not be starker; one allowed a genocide to occur while the other ushered in a new era of relative stability. A peacekeeping mission's success or failure can determine whether a country falls into violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide or emerges socially, economically, and politically stronger than it ever was before. The major consequences of peace operations have led many scholars and policymakers to investigate the factors that produce a mission's success or failure.

The peacekeeping literature historically focuses on more tangible explanations for mission outcomes like the international community's financial and rhetorical commitment to peace, the social, economic, and political context of the mission host country, or mission's unit size or weapons strength. Developments in psychology research began to bleed into the peacekeeping literature in the mid-2000s, leading students of peacekeeping to explore how identity factors like gender, and more recently culture, language, and religion can affect mission outcomes.⁴

I expand on the peacekeeping and identity scholarship by bringing race and ethnicity into the fold. While ethnicity has been widely studied in IR, race has only recently been broadly included in IR analyses; neither of these identity factors has been explicitly used to analyze peace operation success. The lack of empirical insight into the connection among race, ethnicity, and peacekeeping outcomes invites the question: How does racial and ethnic similarity or difference between peacekeepers and populations affect mission outcomes?

I merge IR literature with social psychology research to create new hypotheses about the relationship between race, ethnicity, and peacekeeping. I propose that racial and ethnic similarity between peacekeepers and populations will lead to better mission outcomes while racial and ethnic

⁴ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021; Whitworth 2004

difference creates new challenges to mission success. More specifically, I posit that race and ethnicity can help or hurt peacekeepers' attempts to build trust and obtain information, causal mechanisms that impact operational and wider mission success or failure.⁵

My mixed-method empirical analysis finds support for my arguments that racial and ethnic identity impacts peacekeeping success by acting as causal mechanisms. My quantitative analysis finds statistically significant evidence that increasing racial similarity is correlated with decreasing violence against civilians. Additionally, process tracing in my case study of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Congo (MONUC) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo uncovers evidence that racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and locals hurt mission operations and the UN's ability to safeguard civilians. I do not find substantial evidence for or against the idea that racial and ethnic similarity helps the mission succeed. My case reveals that the literature's other explanations impact mission success, but race and ethnicity matter too. Indeed, other explanations may be necessary, but without identity factors like race and ethnicity, they are not sufficient. Identity factors are likely sufficient variables for determining outcomes, although further research is needed to determine if they are necessary.

These results are important for both scholars and policymakers. They provide a strong foundation for others to continue exploring identity as a factor for peacekeeping success while providing peace operations practitioners with possible evidence to reorient and improve mission outcomes.

⁵ I draw these causal mechanisms from Vincenzo Bove, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri's 2021 study of the impact of cultural, linguistic, and religious differences between peacekeepers and populations.

The remainder of this thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part, I review the peacekeeping literature to define what peacekeeping is, operationalize what success or failure looks like, and compare three historically important explanations for mission success: international arguments, contextual arguments, and operational strength arguments. I then draw upon social psychology research to define race and ethnicity and argue why and how they should be considered as factors for peacekeeping success. In the second section, I employ a mixed-method design, starting with a large-N regression analysis of the relationship between racial similarity and civilian casualties among ten UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa. I then move into a comparative analysis between two parts of the MONUC mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In the concluding section, finally, I synthesize my results in context with the literature before offering new avenues for research.

Literature Review and Theory

What factors determine whether a peacekeeping operation succeeds or fails? Specifically, do racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and populations impact a mission's outcome? There is literature that can provide insight into these important questions, although it requires a bridging of different political science fields. The relevant scholarship is split into two main categories: research on peacekeeping from an international relations perspective and research on the impacts of race from a political psychology lens. I review these two bodies of thought, demonstrating how combining elements of both literatures provides a strong foundation for new empirical claims about race and peacekeeping.

International Peacekeeping

There is a wealth of research on international *peacekeeping* spanning from the very end of World War II to the present day.⁶ Students of international peacekeeping seek to define what it is and how to operationalize whether a peacekeeping mission is successful. They also explore the factors that determine mission outcomes. Scholars developed three main explanations for the success or failure of a deployment: *international*, *operational*, and *contextual*. A review of this scholarship builds an argument that ethnic and racial dynamics research from a political psychology perspective is needed to fully understand peacekeeping. Before turning to these literatures, however, I briefly review some of the definitional literature on what constitutes a peacekeeping operation as well as the success or failure of such an operation. This peacekeeping literature occurred across three distinct waves: one that built theories on peacekeeping and interstate conflict during the Cold War, another that expressed disillusionment with and clarification of peacekeeping missions in the 1990s, and the most recent 2000s wave that uses quantitative methods to reexamine claims about peacekeeping.⁷ This review focuses largely on the second and third waves of research created in the 1990s and 2000s, although the first wave's theoretical foundations are briefly examined.

What is Peacekeeping?

⁶ Fortna and Howard 2008, 283-301

⁷ Ibid.

Some policymakers and the public use peacekeeping as a misnomer for various activities placed under the modern umbrella term *peace operations*.⁸ Peacekeeping entered the lexicon after Cold War scholars used case studies to explore international organizations efforts at conflict resolution, specifically after interstate conflict.⁹ These scholars attempted to establish what peacekeeping meant because of a lack of clarity in the United Nation's charter and other regional organization's founding documents.¹⁰ The end of Cold War brought a renewed interest in refining and splicing the definitions of peacekeeping, resulting in the development of *peace operations*, a term that includes *peacemaking*, *preventive diplomacy*, *peacebuilding*, *peace enforcement*, and peacekeeping. These ideas are all complementary and overlapping, complicating the study of peacekeeping.

Researchers have tried to characterize peacekeeping's many counterparts to define peacekeeping by contrast. Peacemaking is one of the easiest terms to separate from peacekeeping. Many scholars agree that peacemaking is defined by bringing hostile parties to resolve conflict through peaceful means such as judicial proceedings, mediation, and other avenues outlined in Chapter VI of the United Nation's Charter.¹¹ There is also agreement that peacemaking can include efforts by the United Nations, regional bodies, independent states, and non-governmental

⁸ Diehl and Balas 2014

⁹ Bloomfield 1964, xi-296; Burns and Heathcote 1963; Fabian 1971, viii-315; Rikhye 1984

¹⁰ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 13-21

¹¹ Fisher 1993, 247-266; Greig and Diehl 2005, 621-645

organizations if the efforts are not enforceable through sanctions or military force.¹² This form of international activity is probably most known among the public, although its efficacy and exact definition has been questioned by scholars like Christopher Clapham.¹³

Peacemaking is somewhat related to preventative diplomacy, the act of preventing a dispute's creation, escalation, or spread.¹⁴ Preventive diplomacy tends to focus on situation monitoring, confidence building, and violence mitigation through diplomacy, although preemptive troop deployment and peacebuilding operations can occur.¹⁵

Peacebuilding's amorphous nature makes it harder to contrast with peacekeeping. Peacebuilding is best defined by Boutros-Ghali as an "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace" to avoid future conflict.¹⁶ These actions, which can be taken by state and non-state actors, include humanitarian assistance, the growth of civil society, the expansion of human rights, the strengthening of the economy, and a wide array of other societal progressions have. Charles Call and Susan Cook have expanded on this interpretation of peacebuilding to include the prevention of conflict in and development of all states, not just post-conflict societies.¹⁷ Many national departments and international organizations

¹² Neuhold 2001, 59-72; Schweigman 2001, 1-373; Zartman 2007, 3

¹³ Clapham 1998, 193-210

¹⁴ Bercovitch 2007, 241-258; Botrous-Ghali 1992

¹⁵ Sokalski 2003

¹⁶ Boutros-Ghali 1992

¹⁷ Call and Cook 2003, 233-246

apply various attributes to peacebuilding, some of which include troop deployment, making it challenging to operationalize and fully separate from peacekeeping.¹⁸

Peace enforcement has potentially the greatest overlap with peacekeeping, although it is also the easiest to concretely define. Most scholars agree that peace enforcement is a coercive act that generally entails a large, heavily armed force deploying to pacify a belligerent party at the behest of an international organization, usually the United Nations Security Council using its Chapter VII powers.¹⁹ These missions generally occur in instances of intrastate post-Cold War conflict like strikes against Serbian forces in Bosnia.²⁰ But some researchers like Shashi Tharoor and Lars Muller argue that peace enforcement is increasingly merging with peacekeeping.²¹ They believe many modern peace operations include elements of both coercive, non-consensual deployments found in peace enforcement and the consent of the host state as required in traditional definitions of peacekeeping; this is mainly due to an increase of non-state actors becoming involved in conflicts.

Broad definitions of peacekeeping, like Paul F. Diehl's "any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes," make it hard to contrast it with other aspects of peace operations.²² Other

¹⁸ Barnett et al. 2007, 35-58

¹⁹ Beardsley 2013, 369-386; Diehl and Balas 2014

²⁰ Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 1-23

²¹ Muller 2015, 359-380; Tharoor 1995, 408-426

²² Diehl 1994, 4

scholarship splices this expansive identification into two different definitions which I call *traditional peacekeeping* and *contemporary peacekeeping*. Brad Daniel and Donald Hayes define traditional peacekeeping as a small, unarmed or lightly armed contingent of military personnel who are deployed to implement a ceasefire between consenting parties, typically administered by the United Nations.²³ These missions are bound by the three “foundational” principles of peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and use of force only in defense of the mission and mandate.²⁴ Additionally, many traditional peacekeeping mandates did not include broad orders to protect civilians and instead instructed forces to act as buffers or mediators in a conflict. The traditional definition was developed among early theorists discussing Cold War interstate conflict; it does not include the coercion found in peace enforcement, the non-violence institutional avenues in peacemaking, or the broad array of non-military goals found in peacebuilding.

Contemporary peacekeeping includes a variety of terms like Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin’s *wider peacekeeping*, William Durch’s *multidimensional peacekeeping*, Trevor Findlay’s *expanded peacekeeping*, and Charlotte Ku and Harold Jacobson’s “peacekeeping plus state-building,” all of which capture a post-Cold War idea of peacekeeping that incorporates intra-state conflicts, varying degrees of coercion and state-building, and more recently expansive directions to protect civilians and disarm belligerent parties.²⁵ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin’s term adds humanitarian aid as a mission goal during an ongoing conflict, while Durch, Findlay,

²³ Daniel and Hayes 1995, xx

²⁴ Durch and Berkman 2006

²⁵ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 13-21; Durch 1997, 1-34; Findlay 2002, 4-8; Ku and Jacobson 2002, 3-36

and Ku and Jacobson's different conceptions depart from traditional peacekeeping by expanding the use of force to compel compliance with international disarmament mandates, protect civilians, and engage in peacebuilding operations. All these contemporary terms generally depart from the core aspects of traditional peacekeeping by including state-building activities and stronger use of force mandates, blurring the lines between peacekeeping and other peace operations.

I use my own definition of peacekeeping which draws heavily from the peace operations literature. Peacekeeping refers to the "prevention, containment, [and] moderation" of "hostilities between or within states" through the third-party intervention of an organized force of military and/or civilian units who build, maintain, or restore peace.²⁶ Peacekeeping will include both traditional and contemporary components. Forces can be unarmed, lightly armed, or heavily armed and may be deployed by a single nation outside the host nation, a regional body, or the United Nations. Missions with elements of other peace operations like peacebuilding will be included if development is not the primary goal, a key distinction when identifying thresholds for mission success.

Defining Mission Success

The best definition of a "successful" peacekeeping is just as debated in the literature as the definition of peacekeeping itself. It is necessary to operationalize peace and conflict to understand success. Many scholars agree a successful mission should increase levels of peace, specifically via a *negative peace* or *positive peace*. Negative peace, or the absence of violence, is the most applied

²⁶ International Peace Academy 1984

concept of peace, although peace theorists like Johan Galtung posit that positive peace, or changing structures to prevent violence, is also valuable.²⁷

The operationalization of conflict is also up for debate.²⁸ Some datasets apply differing levels of per year casualties to classify levels of conflict while others split organized violence into different forms of state and non-state conflict.²⁹ Additionally, Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon's more recent exploration of casualties as a measure of conflict argues that "one-sided violence," commonly known as violence against civilians by state or non-state actors, should be considered along with violence between belligerent parties as a measure for mission success.³⁰

The peacekeeping literature takes definitions of peace and conflict to establish thresholds for a peacekeeping mission's success. Scholarship on ideas of success can be parsed into two categories following ideas of negative peace, which includes *peace maintenance* and *peace survival*, and positive peace, which includes the state-building and civil development operations found in peacebuilding.

Duane Bratt and Paul Diehl propose criterion stemming from negative peace and peace maintenance, saying a successful mission will limit armed conflict and prevent its renewal to facilitate the peacemaking process.³¹ But some scholars contest these standards because

²⁷ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Galtung 1969, 167-190

²⁸ Jeong 2008, 5-6

²⁹ Gleditsch et al. 2002, 615-637; Sundberg and Melander 2013, 523-532

³⁰ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014, 737-753

³¹ Bratt 1996, 3-5; Diehl, Paul F. 1988, 485-507; Diehl, Paul F. 1993

peacekeeping forces have a debated impact on violence reignition and peacemaking.³² Others explore the limitation of violence's geographic reach to conceptualize success, although a few researchers argue geography must be paired with causality data throughout the conflict's timeframe to carry any weight.³³

Another approach to success metrics includes peace survival, an idea characterized by the weakening of conflict and the strengthening of peace in the short or long term.³⁴ Virginia Fortna's widely adopted framework focuses on each mission's short-term ability to hold peace agreements without an increase in casualties for a few months to a few years.³⁵

More peace survival literature investigates the operationalization of success in the long term. A variety of research looks at peacekeeping's ability to reduce conflict, specifically in ten-year periods.³⁶ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis' highly referenced framework proposes a three-pronged test which explores a mission's ability to stop the renewal of conflict, keep violence below "low levels," and stop the contestation of territory within two-, five-, and ten-year increments.³⁷

³² Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Johansen 1994, 307-310)

³³ Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015, 67-89; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2018, 1005-1025

³⁴ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Sambanis 2008, 9-32

³⁵ Fortna 2003, 97-114; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 183-208

³⁶ Beardsley 2013, 369-386; Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel 1996, 683-700

³⁷ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 1-23

The increasing importance of peacebuilding leads some scholars to consider peacekeeping's ability to establish positive peace, especially in the long-term. This research branch evaluates peacekeeping success through democratization, economic development, and other aspects of state building.³⁸ Positive peace is growing as a standard for mission success, although peacekeeping's effect on state-building is harder to empirically test due to many confounding variables.

I define mission success using peace maintenance and peace survival, specifically evaluating peacekeeping operations on their ability to reduce violence against civilians throughout a conflict's length.³⁹

Does Peacekeeping Work?

Peacekeeping's effectiveness depends on what definition is used and what success criterion are employed, but the third wave of peacekeeping literature has produced a consensus that peacekeeping is successful.⁴⁰ While a few older qualitative papers by authors like Jerzy Ciechanski and a quantitative study by Amithab Dubey argue that peacekeepers are ineffective at reducing violence and promoting peace, Virginia Fortna and Lise Howard find wide modern agreement that peacekeeping is "quite successful."⁴¹

³⁸ Di Salvatore and Ruggeri 2017; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779-801

³⁹ Diehl and Druckman 2010, 93-108

⁴⁰ Walter, Howard, and Fortna 2021, 1705-1722

⁴¹ Ciechanski 1996, 82-104; Coleman and Williams 2021, 241-255; Dubey 2002; Fortna and Howard 2008, 283-301; Wright and Greig 2012, 127-147

The literature's broadening consensus on peacekeeping's success has led many scholars to debate why and when it is successful. Research on reasons for success can be broken into three complementary categories: *international* arguments about the global community's commitment to a mission, contextual arguments about a conflict's social, economic, and political environment, and *operational* arguments about units' capacities to execute and interface with populations.

Making Peacekeeping Successful: The International Argument

One school of thought focuses on global factors outside of the host state—such as the mandate of the UN or other regional body, the commitment of the international community, or the involvement of a great power—as explanations for the success of peacekeeping missions.⁴² Many proponents of this theory argue that missions with creeping, unrealistic mandates that included broad peacebuilding goals were more likely to fail.⁴³ Other researchers like Paul Diehl, Daniel Druckman, and James Wall slightly disagree with this analysis, positing that peacebuilding can make the mission more successful if applied in the correct situation.⁴⁴

Some students of peacekeeping focus on a second international factor, the commitment of the United Nations and the broader international community, as essential to success no matter the mandate.⁴⁵ Such approaches examine the financial, military, and rhetorical commitments to a mission; there is strong agreement in the literature that the international community's level of buy-

⁴² Bratt 1997, 45-70

⁴³ Fearon and Laitin 2004, 5-43

⁴⁴ Diehl, Druckman, and Wall 1998, 33-55; Stedman 1995, 40-63

⁴⁵ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779-801

in for an operation is positively correlated with the goal achievement.⁴⁶ James Morrow's foundational work on signaling and negotiation is also relevant here. His argument that signaling commitment through action more effectively displays intentions is also true in the peacekeeping context; the more states contribute to a mission, the more likely belligerents are to recognize that international organizations may impose costs for further violence.⁴⁷ Other scholars have correctly pointed out the perennial free rider problem around issues of collective action on peacekeeping missions, which tend to be unpopular and require great incentives for participation.⁴⁸

Theoretically, participation of great powers can help remedy collective action problems and increase chances of peacekeeping success by providing strong moral and operational support.⁴⁹ Yet researchers disagree on the impact of great power involvement. Some scholars like James Fearon, David Laitin, and Katja Favretto posit that great power involvement, whether through an international organization or unilaterally, is important for mission success, especially if the great power violates the neutrality principle and choose a side in the conflict. Others like Darya Pushkina find, however, that great power involvement is not correlated with success.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ Kathman and Benson 2019, 1601-1629; Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 2001, 183-208; Maekawa, Ari, and Gizelis 2019, 397-416; Wright and Greig 2012, 127-147

⁴⁷ Morrow 1999, 77-114

⁴⁸ Dorn and Matloff 2000; Passmore, Shannon, and Hart 2018, 366-379

⁴⁹ Bratt 1997, 45-70

⁵⁰ Favretto 2009, 248-263; Fearon and Laitin 2004, 5-43; Pushkina 2006, 133-149

This broaches the question of non-UN, and more specifically completely unilateral, involvement from great powers and its effectiveness in reducing conflict. Some believe that unilateral great power action makes missions more successful because it bypasses bureaucracy, although many argue that the UN's power as a consensus builder leads international cooperation to be a more effective course of action.⁵¹ Diehl also finds multilateral missions to be successful, although not as successful as those coordinate by international organizations.⁵² Interestingly, little research has been done on the involvement of "middle powers" in peacekeeping, although a few articles argue that their effects work in parallel with those of great powers.⁵³

International explanations comprise a substantial portion of the literature on the success or failure of international peacekeeping missions. Such explanations, however, must be paired with contextual arguments to draw a clearer picture of mission success.

The *Contextual* Argument

A second school, the *contextual* argument, offers logic that can pair with *international* arguments to build a more complete understanding of mission outcomes. *Contextual* research suggests that pre-existing factors like a country's level of economic development, measures of civil rights like gender equality, and the type of conflict creating the need for deployment have the greatest impact on peacekeeping outcomes.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Diehl 1993, 209-230; Pushkina 2006, 133-149; Sandler 2018, 1875-1897

⁵² Diehl 1993, 209-230

⁵³ David and Roussel 1998, 131-156

⁵⁴ Pushkina 2006, 133-149

Many scholars are researching how a country's economic and social development impacts the potential for peacekeeping effectiveness. For example, higher levels of female participation in civil society is positively correlated with mission success.⁵⁵ Additionally, some literature reviews find that peacekeepers are more likely to see success in countries with more developed economies because of better infrastructure and potentially more stable social conditions.⁵⁶ Democratization is also seen as a valuable indicator of mission success in literature reviews because countries with more stable and inclusive political systems are more likely to employ peaceful resolutions to conflict, easing the mission's workload.⁵⁷

While social, economic, and political development are important background factors for peacekeeping deployment, more insight can be gained from investigations into how conflict type impacts outcomes.⁵⁸ Peacekeepers have increasingly been deployed into regions where identity factors like ethnicity drive conflict. A review of ethnic conflict literature provides evidence that ethnic conflict is not only one of the most challenging types of conflict to resolve, but also one of the most likely causes of civil war, presenting numerous hurdles for international peacekeepers to overcome.⁵⁹ While Di Salvatore posits that some international peacekeeping action has failed to

⁵⁵ Gizelis 2009, 505-523

⁵⁶ Bove and Elia 2018, 712-728

⁵⁷ Blair, Di Salvatore, and Smidt 2022, 1-19

⁵⁸ Ernst et al. 2014, 100-117

⁵⁹ Carment and James 1998, 61-82; Denny and Walter 2014, 199-212; Schnabel 1997

quell, contain, or mitigate violence from ethnic conflict, particularly in Rwanda, there have been a surprising number of successes, specifically in Eastern Europe.⁶⁰

This poses interesting questions into how the identities of peacekeepers could have an impact on a mission's capacities to execute its mandate.

The Operational Argument

A third set of explanations for peacekeeping success or failure, operational approaches, is in some ways the most universally agreed upon among scholars. Proponents of operational explanations believe that a mission's state-building activities, unit size, weapons capacity, logistical support, and ability to interface with local populations have a strong effect on a mission's outcome.⁶¹

The increase in peacekeeping as peacebuilding has led to research on the effects of state-building, or the creation, development, and stabilization of state institutions and services, on mission success.⁶² The effects of peacebuilding can be challenging to study because of the many confounding variables involved in development, although many scholars believe it can provide higher levels of peacekeeping mission success.⁶³ Peacekeepers can plant the political, economic, and social development seeds needed to promote long-term stability and successful peacebuilding,

⁶⁰ Brattberg 2012, 156-162; Di Salvatore 2020, 1089-1109; Kaufman 1996, 229-246

⁶¹ Heldt and Wallenstein 2007

⁶² Wesley 2008, 369-385

⁶³ Howard 2007, 1-20; Sandler 2018, 1875-1897; Whitman and Bartholomew 1995, 169-188

reducing the need for further peacekeeping involvement.⁶⁴ But, some scholars like Fortna find democracy and peacebuilding efforts moot in some cases and unproductive in others, while other scholars argue the economic impacts of peacekeeping forces are wholly counter-productive.⁶⁵

Conversely, nearly all the military literature argues that strong logistical support, weapons proficiency, and unit size are extremely important for any mission success, including peacekeeping missions.⁶⁶ Military monitoring and early warning systems can be particularly helpful in mitigating violence and preventing spillover, especially if rapid response units are in place.⁶⁷ Bellamy and Williams argue that operational strength and detection is highly inter-twined with great powers who can provide overwhelming force and different types of peacekeepers.⁶⁸

The peacekeeping literature identifies three primary categories of peacekeeper: observers, police, and military.⁶⁹ Observers generally do not have any type of weaponry and are mainly tasked with observing ceasefire compliance, assisting in mine removal and disarmament, or monitoring elections or human rights violations. Police tend to be lightly armed and tasked with criminal investigations, observer protection, or seizure operations. Finally, military units tend to be the most

⁶⁴ Caruso et al. 2017, 250-270; Dorussen and Gizelis 2013, 691-706; Joshi 2013, 362-382; Maley 2013, 1-10

⁶⁵ Beber et al. 2019, 364-379; Bove and Elia 2018, 712-728; Fortna 2008, 174-175

⁶⁶ Krepps 2010; Pawelczyk 2018, 85-98

⁶⁷ Dorn and Matloff 2000

⁶⁸ Bellamy and Williams 2009, 39-57

⁶⁹ Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2010, 42-68

heavily armed and are deployed into regions with heavy fighting. Soldiers usually protect observers in dangerous areas, engage in policing activities, protect civilians and displaced people camps, facilitate logistics, and more recently even engage in peace enforcement.⁷⁰

Much of the scholarship relates the type of unit to its capacities. Studies have found that missions comprised of more heavily armed military and police personnel are more effective because they are more equipped to achieve objectives through force.⁷¹ Additionally, Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon's 2014 study also found that missions with a higher observer makeup are correlated with increases in violence. The interplay between these three main types of peacekeepers all affects how a mission works together to accomplish goals.

Inquiries into unit cohesion and the workings of the mission on the ground provide some of the most intriguing results. Researchers and policymakers have long identified several unit related detriments to peacekeeper success, mainly sexual violence and corruption, but recent inquiry into identity factors has produced interesting remedies for these issues.⁷² Donna Bridges and Debbie Horsfall propose that increasing gender diversity in missions can help reduce incidences of sexual violence while allowing better integration with communities, although Sandra Biskupski-Mujanovic says gender related successes within operations still requires more empirical evidence.⁷³

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 779-801; Holt, Kelly, and Glyn 2009, 166; Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014, 737-753

⁷² Moncrief 2017, 516-528; Transparency International 2019

⁷³ Biskupski-Mujanovic 2019, 405-421; Bridges and Horsfall 2009, 120-130

Interestingly, some studies show that ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity among peacekeepers can help reduce corruption, increase organization, and create more successful peacekeeping missions. Vincenzo Bove and Andrea Ruggeri's quantitative analysis of linguistic difference in peacekeeping units shows that moderate levels of diversity can increase mission success by delivering more strategy perspectives, breaking from classical ideas of the benefits of homogeneity found within the co-ethnicity literature.⁷⁴ Edward Goldring and Michael Hendrick's findings contradict Bove and Ruggeri's, but other studies agree with the analysis that unit diversity can have a positive impact on mission outcomes.⁷⁵

A few studies have expanded on intra-mission diversity research to see how identity similarity or difference between peacekeepers and populations affects outcomes. Vincenzo Bove, Chiara Ruffa, and Andrea Ruggeri's recent article and subsequent book chapter uses a mixed-method approach to explore how geographic, religious, and linguistic distance between peacekeepers and populations can reduce violence.⁷⁶ They propose four new mechanisms that are affected by identity:

- Informative trust: are peacekeepers “able to gain information due to trust building?” The authors expect soldiers from similar cultures will be more effective at this.
- Informative communicability: can peacekeepers understand “the very context they are embedded in?” Cultural, ethnic, and linguistic similarity are also supposed to aid peacekeepers in understanding the conflict environment.

⁷⁴ Bove and Ruggeri 2016, 681-700; Goldring and Hendricks 2018

⁷⁵ Beardsley and Gleditsch 2015, 67-89; Mironova and Whitt 2017, 2074-2104

⁷⁶ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021

- Resolve deterrence: higher demographic distance between peacekeepers and populations signal to the population that the international community is committed to ending the conflict.
- Skilled persuasion: the ability of peacekeepers to affect local opinions of the mission and improve anti-conflict persuasion.

The authors found quantitative evidence that diversity between mission operators and locals can help reduce violence, conflicting with Bove and Ruggeri's previous study, which showed that heterogeneity between the two groups increased violence against civilians.⁷⁷ But their 2020 qualitative findings showed that cultural similarity between Ghanaian peacekeepers and residents in the Central African Republic helped the peacekeepers display empathy.

Interestingly, Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri only nod at their operationalization of identity and do not touch on other identity factors, specifically race. Sandra Whitworth 1998's book chapter briefly questions whether racial difference between peacekeepers in Somalia and country residents could have had an impact on mission success.⁷⁸ This prompts questions about how race and ethnicity may affect mission outcomes given Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri's findings and other explanations in the literature.

A review of the scholarship defining peacekeeping, operationalizing success and failure, and advancing explanations for mission effectiveness shows the extent of debate among scholars and policymakers. International, contextual, and operational arguments outline many factors that contribute to mission success or failure. But given how important the few existing studies show identity is for peacekeeping unit effectiveness, racial and ethnic difference between peacekeepers

⁷⁷ Bove and Ruggeri 2019, 1630-1655

⁷⁸ Whitworth 1998, 176-191

and societies should be further investigated as another factor for success using research from the social psychology sphere.

Race, Ethnicity, and Social Psychology

Race, and to a much greater extent ethnicity, have been explored in international relations research, but more work is needed to fully understand how both factors affect intergroup relations, specifically at the substate level.⁷⁹ I do not wholly address all the complexities of the psychology scholarship concerned with the impacts of social identities on group dynamics, but I do make a case that they are important variables for understanding conflict. First, working definitions of race and ethnicity as social constructs are introduced, followed by strong existing evidence that these factors are necessary to fully understand the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions.

What are Race and Ethnicity?

Race has long been debated and critiqued within the international relations and social psychology fields. The first contentious definitions of race developed via the pseudoscientific concept of *racial essentialism* which argues that there are fundamental genetic differences between racial groups.⁸⁰ Ali Rattansi argues that this problematic conceptualization of race as difference supported by hard biological facts has fallen out of favor with nearly all reputable biologists and social scientists, and Zoltan Buzas believes it has been replaced by debates that fall within two

⁷⁹ Bell 2013, 1-4; Gruffydd Jones 2008, 907-927

⁸⁰ Vincent 1982, 658-670

new spheres.⁸¹ The first discussion sphere revolves around whether race is real, important, and socially or biologically defined, while the second debate sphere centers on whether race should still be included in analyses or dropped to prevent the perpetuation of racism. Beliefs about how race falls on these lines can be broken into three schools: *racial naturalism*, *racial skepticism*, and *racial constructivism*.⁸²

Buzas identifies racial naturalists mainly as geneticists and biologists who see race as biologically constructed as “subspecies of *Homo Sapiens* whose members share some combination of common ancestry, genotype, and phenotype,” who reject racial hierarchy and race as a static concept, and who argue for its continued inclusion in analyses. On the other hand, *racial skeptics* believe that race is totally socially constructed and not an important analytical variable because of its problematic history, therefore calling for its elimination. Finally, *racial constructivists* agree that race is socially constructed but real because of social perceptions about physical difference, arguing that it must be brought to the forefront of political science analyses to correct the field’s racist history.

I utilize a racial constructivist view of race and identity. It conceptualizes *racial identity* as a “collective category based on perceptions of a common ancestry through phenotypical (physical) traits,” drawing on reviews from recent literature.⁸³ This definition provides a more comprehensive and applicable idea of race. It aligns with many other scholars who argue that race is an important factor in group relations while showcasing that race is built on *perceptions* of

⁸¹ Buzas 2012, 38; Rattansi 2007

⁸² Buzas 2012, 38

⁸³ Desmond and Emirbayer 2009, 335-355

physical commonality or difference, not real biological considerations, wholly rejecting racial essentialist claims. The *perceptions* portion of the definition also implies that race's conceptualization can change between regions, countries, populations, and individuals, revealing the need to study race through multiple lenses and highlighting the inherent limitation of any operationalization.

Like race, ethnicity is understood as a social construct, although scholars have an easier time concretely defining the term.⁸⁴ Joseph Rothschild's pioneering work defines ethnicity as "collective groups whose membership is largely defined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society."⁸⁵ Other scholars agree with this definition, although they also relate the formation of ethnic identity to various factors like language, culture, and religion.⁸⁶

I employ Rothschild's highly cited conceptualization of ethnicity, although it adds *perceptions* to views on "real or putative ties." Ethnicity and race are related in their social construction and inherent limitations, although contrasts can be drawn. I emphasize a difference between ethnicity, a perception of common ancestry shaped by related factors like culture and language, and race, a perception of common ancestry built through physical characteristics. These working definitions are then applied in the social psychology sphere to explore their effects on group peace and conflict.

⁸⁴ Cottam 2010, 99

⁸⁵ Rothschild 1981, 9

⁸⁶ Smith 1981

Race and Ethnicity as Factors for Peace and Conflict

Race and ethnicity may be challenging to operationalize, but many scholars agree that both factors have at least some effect on conflict. *Social identity theory* is the hallmark political psychology theory about group identity that guides conversations around racial and ethnic peace and fighting. Social identity theory states that parts of an individual's self-conceptualization is derived from their perceived membership in a certain group, leading people to view others in their perceived group as an "us" *in-group* and those outside of their perceived group as the "them" *out-group*.⁸⁷ This differential view of the world can be very powerful, especially when group membership can be more easily gleaned from visible characteristics, making race one of the most noticeable indicators of group difference.⁸⁸ *Social dominance theory* goes a step beyond social identity theory and argues that this in and out group thinking comes in to play when groups are competing for resources in society, leading to a dominant group structuring a hierarchy in society.⁸⁹ This idea of groups competing for and maintaining dominance is especially prevalent when discussing race and ethnicity as many countries develop cleavages along these lines.

The creation of groups, and interactions between these groups in the world, leads to the formation of different relationships. *Emotion* is a powerful relational mechanism in political psychology literature, specifically when it comes to feelings of *revenge*. Many international relations scholars have theorized that feelings of animosity and revenge affect how states interact

⁸⁷ Hogg 2016, 3-17

⁸⁸ Phillips DeZalia and Moeschberger 2016, 121-134

⁸⁹ Pratto and Stewart 2011

with each other, but these same dynamics may play out at the sub-international level.⁹⁰ If a group feels uneasy, slighted, attacked, or inherently endangered by another group, especially if there is a history of misunderstanding or animosity, the endangered group is much less likely to cooperate and more likely to spark conflict.⁹¹ Additionally, long-standing bonds between groups can build feelings of trust, an important mechanism that at high levels can help groups work together and avoid conflict.⁹² Social identity theory works well with causal mechanisms like emotion to explain how difference or similarities between groups can breed conflict or peace.

Some of the literature agrees that racial difference and similarity has an impact on group conflict and peace. Christopher Federico and Samantha Luks' review of the race and interpersonal social psychology literature agrees with other non-race related findings by foundational scholars like Stephen Walt. Walt identifies racial perceptions surrounding inferiority, competition, alliances, and threat as sources of animosity between different groups and cohesion between similar ones.⁹³ This also makes sense within the context of the ethnicity literature because of the interrelated concepts. Although some researchers dispute the study of racial perceptions and conflict because race is such an arbitrary idea, much of the scholarship argues that it has an impact worth exploring.⁹⁴ The ethnicity and conflict literature draws upon similar social psychology theories, with many scholars reaching a consensus that ethnic difference is prone to create

⁹⁰ Löwenheim and Heimann 2008, 685-724

⁹¹ Souleimanov and Aliyev 2015, 158-180

⁹² Igarashi et al. 2008, 88-101

⁹³ Federico and Luks 2005, 661-666; Walt 1987, 5-38

⁹⁴ Cole and Stewart 2001, 293-308

resentment and potentially violence, especially when competition for resources and survival is involved.⁹⁵ Ethnocentrism, the belief that one's group is at the center of existence, can lead some ethnic groups to see spark conflict without major cause and cause individuals in the competing groups to see their entire lives as an "us vs. them" challenge.⁹⁶ Conversely, landmark research within political psychology has produced the idea of co-ethnicity, stating that ethnically similar groups are more likely to work together.⁹⁷ While some research differs in the degree that ethnicity impacts intergroup dynamics, and some scholars dispute aspects of causal mechanisms like social identity theory, many agree that ethnic difference or similarity is an important variable for explaining conflict.⁹⁸

Definitions of ethnicity and race can be amorphous to different extents, but many political psychology and IR publications argue that these identity factors have an impact on conflict and peace on both the interpersonal and systemic levels. This begs the question: how can race and ethnicity be incorporated as variables for peacekeeper success?

Psychology and Peacekeeping

Some social psychologists have tried to understand the psychology of the peacekeeper, even suggesting that identity factors may affect intergroup dynamics between peacekeepers and populations. Research points out the tension between many peacekeepers' identities as soldiers

⁹⁵ Cottam 2010, 199-200

⁹⁶ Davis 1999, 25-47; Duckitt and Mphuthing 1998, 809-832; Sidanius et al. 2004, 845-880

⁹⁷ Habyarimana et al. 2009, 1-256

⁹⁸ Gartzke and Gleditsch 2006, 53-87; Habyarimana et al. 2008; Huddy 2001, 127-156

and peacekeepers, creating an internal conflict about whether to take on a role as a warrior or a peacemaker.⁹⁹

This tension can result in conflict and violence, especially when paired with the many preexisting identity biases that almost all humans hold. Kurt Boniecki and Thomas Britt identify four common threat perception biases that exist between peacekeepers and populations:¹⁰⁰

- Realistic threats are the “perception that the outgroup threatens the power or well-being of the in-group.”¹⁰¹ These threats are common in many peacekeeping missions where peacekeepers face great personal danger.
- Symbolic threats are threats where the outgroup does not support the belief of the ingroup. Boniecki and Britt argue white American peacekeepers’ mistrust of Somalis stems from racist views of Black Americans not honoring white American values of “hard work.”¹⁰²
- Intergroup anxiety addresses the idea that interactions with an outgroup may lead to rejection or ridicule largely due to a lack of cultural understanding.
- Negative stereotypes occur when members of an ingroup hold negative expectations towards members of an outgroup. This can occur when western peacekeepers see members of an economically developing country as “backwards” or when populations relate European peacekeepers to former colonizers.

⁹⁹ Boniecki and Britt 2003, 53-70

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Boniecki and Britt 2003, 54

¹⁰² Boniecki and Britt 2003, 56

Other scholars agree with this research on how identity differences and similarities can impact threat perceptions and weaken intergroup bonds. The literature also pinpoints how threat perceptions can damage an important hinge point of peacekeeper success: trust. Perceptions of similarity between peacekeepers local populations can increase cooperation because of higher levels of trust, while perceptions of difference can challenge intergroup cooperation because of real or biased threats.¹⁰³

Much of the social psychology scholarship argues that identity similarities or differences between groups affects how those groups work together; the creation of ingroups and outgroups paired with emotional responses can greatly impact intergroup relationships. Additionally, the peacekeeper-specific psychology literature agrees with these claims in a mission context, building a theoretical and empirical foundation that suggests an exploration of how identity similarity and difference impacts mission outcomes.

Bridging the Gap: Combining Peacekeeping, Ethnicity, and Race to Better Understand Mission Outcomes

A review of the peacekeeping literature anchored in the international relations field provides a definition for peacekeeping, differing metrics for success, and related *international, contextual, and operational* reasons as to why missions succeed or fail (Figure 1). But it also shows a lack of major consideration for how peacekeeper and population identities could affect the mission's outcome, calling for the incorporation of political psychology literature; this research provides strong psychological arguments as to why differences and similarities between groups can promote or mitigate conflict. Both the peacekeeping and social psychological literatures build

¹⁰³ Borris and Diehl 2003, 207-222; Kimmel 1998, 57-71

a basis for Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri's mixed conclusions about how identity plays into mission success. While the authors find that cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities can be useful in some situations but harmful in others, they do not test a major identity factor highlighted in the psychology literature: race.

I build a more complete understanding of peacekeeping's effectiveness by analyzing race and ethnicity as independent variables for mission success or failure while testing alternative explanations in the literature. I also explicitly posit that Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri's ideas of informative trust and informative communicability are not new as explanations but as underlying mechanisms that determine whether operational explanations succeed or fail.

I utilize social identity theory and co-ethnicity to theorize that similarity between peacekeepers and populations improves mission effectiveness. I argue that the social psychological research shows that people of similar backgrounds work better together, and I engage in one of the first quantitative studies explicitly exploring how racial and ethnic similarity and difference make peacekeepers more operationally successful.

Figure 1: Factors of Peacekeeping Success and/or Failure

Name	Definition	Examples	Limitations
International	Concerned with the international community's response to a conflict.	Great power involvement, UN mandate, international resolve	Collective action can be hard to undertake, especially with slow moving bodies like the UN.
Contextual	Concerned with the environment the peacekeeping mission is deploying into.	Economic development, social progression, political stability, presence of ethnic conflict	It can be hard to measure the exact impact of economic, social, and political factors because many countries that require peacekeeping operations are still developing.
Operational	Concerned with the mission's capabilities and make up.	Unit size and type, weapons capacity, peacebuilding operations, unit diversity	Few limitations on the unit strength and operations front, although the impact of peacebuilding can be challenging to quantify.
Race and Ethnicity of Peacekeepers and Populations	Concerned with racial and ethnic difference between unit soldiers and populations.	Peacekeepers deploying into a conflict where the population is of the same racial group.	Race and ethnicity are social constructs, meaning they are hard to universally operationalize.

Hypotheses

This thesis draws upon the existing peacekeeping and political psychology literature to posit new testable working hypotheses about racial and ethnic difference between peacekeepers as variables that determine if the operation succeeds or fails (Figure 2). I also explore alternative hypotheses about mission success.

Figure 2: Hypotheses
Alternative Explanation: International Arguments
H _{1a} : Missions with greater international involvement are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{1b} : Missions with weaker international involvement are less effective at reducing conflict.
Alternative Explanation: Contextual Arguments
H _{2a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{2b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of socio-economic development are less effective at reducing conflict.
H _{3a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of political stability are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{3b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of political stability are less effective at reducing conflict.
Alternative Explanation: Operational Strength Arguments
H _{4a} : Missions with stronger operational capacities are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{4b} : Missions with weaker operational capacities are less effective at reducing conflict.
My Hypotheses: Race and Ethnicity as Mechanisms within the Operational Argument
H _{5a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are a part of the same racial group as the population are more likely to reduce conflict.
H _{5b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different racial group as the population will be less effective in reducing conflict.
H _{6a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a similar ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{6b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.

Empirical Evidence

A review of the political science literature shows that there has been little widespread inquiry into whether racial or ethnic difference between peacekeepers and populations affects mission success. This section of the thesis executes a mixed-method research design to explore claims about race, ethnicity, and peacekeeping outcomes. I first operationalize my independent, dependent, and control variables before discussing the quantitative regression analysis of whether race specifically is a significant factor in determining the success or failure of peacekeeping. Finally, I use a comparative case study to qualitatively trace the process by which identity and operations contribute to mission success.

I find interesting empirical evidence that suggests that race and ethnicity are important variables for determining whether a peacekeeping mission succeeds or fails. My quantitative analysis finds that racial similarity between peacekeepers and populations is correlated with a reduction in violence against civilians, although the relationship is statistically significant but weak. I also find evidence that the alternative international and operational explanations are impactful on mission outcomes.

I use MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as my case study. I find evidence that supports many of the alternative explanations and support for my hypotheses about racial and ethnic difference as mechanisms for operational success. But I do not find evidence for or against claims about racial and ethnic similarity, suggesting further study is needed.

Quantitative Analysis

This thesis combines original data on the racial makeup of peacekeeping missions with data from existing analyses to test race's specific impact on peacekeeping. It mainly draws on Lisa

Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon's study of UN peacekeeping in African civil wars, which explores how different types of peacekeeping missions affect violence against civilians.¹⁰⁴ Their dataset includes 36 intrastate conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa between 1991 and 2008 with monthly observations. Twelve of the 36 conflicts contain peacekeepers at some point in time, although I justify the removal of the Somalia and Rwanda cases (Figure 3).

¹⁰⁴ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 875-891

Figure 3: List of UN Missions in the Dataset		
MONUC (Democratic Republic of the Congo, September 1999-December 2008)	ONUB (Burundi, June 2006-December 2008)	MINURCAT (Chad, August 2007-December 2008)
UNMIS (Sudan, March 2005-December 2008)	MONUA (Angola, 1997-January 2000)	UNOA (Angola, February 2000-July 2000)
ONUMOZ (Mozambique, January 1993-December 1994)	UNMIL (Liberia, January 2004-December 2005)	UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone, July 1998-September 1999)
UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone, October 1999-December 2002)	MINURCA (Central African Republic, April 1998-December 1999)	MINURCAT (Central African Republic, August 2007-December 2008)
MINUCI (Côte d'Ivoire, June 2003-February 2004)	MINUCI (Côte d'Ivoire, March 2004-December 2006)	
Removed Cases		
UNOMSOM I/II (Somalia, August 1992-January 1995)	UNOMUR/UNAMIR (Rwanda, June 1993-March 1996)	

My linear regression analysis utilizes Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's dependent variable, one-sided violence, to measure the effect of a newly created independent variable, the proportion of a peacekeeping mission which comes from another African country.¹⁰⁵ I use this operationalization to quantify how similar a peacekeeping mission may be to the host country. I

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

also employ several of Kathman, Hultman and Shannon's control variables to test other explanations of peacekeeping success.

I make several major changes to the original dataset beyond the addition of racial data. First, all cases without UN peacekeepers and contribution data are removed as I want to focus my measurement on the effect of racial similarity within a mission host country. Second, all months before a peacekeeping mission arrives are removed because I want to compare the independent variables impact across missions, not before or after a mission arrives. I only analyze months in which at least one civilian death has occurred. Next, I exclude several control variables and breakdowns of the one-sided violence caused by each side in the conflict to expand my number of cases; keeping many of Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's controls while adding my own could remove too many cases ranging across the continent. Finally, the Somalia case is dropped due to lack of data for some variables, and the Rwanda case is dropped because it is a massive outlier; the genocide produced an immense number of civilian casualties (nearly 140,000 in one month) compared to other cases which generally contain under 400 monthly deaths.

Variables and Data

Independent Variable: Racial Similarity

The independent variable in my analysis is *racial similarity* (*racesimilarity_PROP*). I draw from the International Peace Institute's comprehensive dataset for each country's per month, per mission troop contributions to identify the proportion of a peacekeeping mission that comes from an African country.¹⁰⁶ This number is then matched with the corresponding month and year in one of the ten included African conflicts. The proportion is displayed as a percent rounded to the nearest

¹⁰⁶ Perry and Smith 2013

second decimal. I aim to capture racial similarity by conceptualizing all members of an African country, whether a peacekeeper or host nation resident, as African, creating the proportion of a peacekeeping mission that seemingly shares racial similarity with the host nation population.

This conceptualization of race as the independent variable contains several limitations. Race is previously defined as “collective category based on perceptions of a common ancestry through phenotypical (physical) traits.” The complexity and fluidity of race across borders makes it challenging to operationalize and study; my idea of race may not ring true for everyone from Africa. Although some research suggests that the “African” identity forms below the Sahara, other reviews of the literature argue it stretches across the entire continent.¹⁰⁷ Results are blurred by the inclusion of all African countries, not just those in sub-Saharan Africa, in the proportion of similarity. Much of North Africa and the country of South Africa have complicated racial makeups but are denoted as fully African in this study, complicating the regression’s findings. Finally, the simplified variable used here does not factor in ethnicity, thereby moderating the scope of the results. I acknowledge these limitations, but I believe that this framework uses the best data currently available and creates a base for other scholars to further explore race.

Dependent Variable: One-Sided Violence

I measure the dependent variable, mission success, by the amount of one-sided violence *One-Sided Violence (osvAll)*. One-sided violence is operationalized as civilian deaths at the hands of one or more of the conflict’s warring parties. Civilian casualties are lagged one month behind the mission’s deployment (*osvAllLagDum*) and recorded at monthly intervals. I also take the log of

¹⁰⁷ MacEachern 2007, 393-412

the monthly data to account for any outliers. Death counts are drawn from Kathman, Hultman, and Shannon's dataset, which uses data from Uppsala University's Georeferenced Event Dataset.¹⁰⁸

One-sided violence is commonly used throughout conflict scholarship, making it an accepted and the best available measure of success, but there are limitations to its usefulness. First, it can be challenging to obtain accurate counts of civilian casualties. Second, the data used here does not include civilians who may have been accidentally killed in battles between belligerents. Finally, it does not look at battle-related deaths between warring parties, meaning that peacekeepers' effect on reducing conflict may not be fully measured.

Control Variables

I include five control variables in my analyses:

Unit Capacities (troopLag, policeLag, militaryobserversLag): Missions with more expansive abilities tend to have a larger personnel footprint, making unit size an effective measure for operational strength. Additionally, it is important to compare the effectiveness of troops, police, and observers, given their very different powers.

A unit's operational capacities are operationalized as the type and size of unit. Peacekeepers are split into three constitutive groups: troops, police, and military observers. The per month, per unit type deployment is then logged and set to per capita per host country, accounting for population size differences. Data is gathered by Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon using the International Peace Institutes database.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 875-891; Sundberg, Lindgren, and Padskocimaite 2010; Sundberg and Melander 2013, 523-532

¹⁰⁹ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 875-891; Perry and Smith 2013

Population (Intpop): I use the logarithm of a country's population to control for the likelihood of conflict and its intensity. Larger population sizes are positively correlated with conflict probability and fierceness.¹¹⁰ Data is collected using the World Bank's national population database.¹¹¹

Conflict Duration (epduration): This analysis also controls for each conflict's length. This variable is measured using data from Uppsala University's previously referenced dataset, which covers the entire time a conflict has occurred, not just the time peacekeepers spend in the country. Research shows that extended periods of conflict can have detrimental impacts on civilians and lead to death, requiring that I control for the length of the conflict.¹¹²

Protection of Civilian Mandate (pocmandate): Not all UN peacekeeping mandates include a mandate to protect civilians. Any analysis of the relationship between peacekeepers and violence against civilians must control for a mission's authorization to protect those targeted. The existence and strength of a civilian protection mandate can also be used to measure the international community's commitment, allowing me to test one of the other explanations in the literature. Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon analyze UN Security Council resolutions to identify which missions are allowed to use force against warring parties attacking civilians.¹¹³ Missions with such a mandate are coded with "1", while missions without a civilian protection mandate are assigned

¹¹⁰ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014, 737-753

¹¹¹ World Bank 2022

¹¹² Gates et al. 2012, 1713-1722; Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2003, 189-202

¹¹³ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 875-891

“0”. Newer missions tend to include more expansive protection of civilian mandates, however, which may complicate the findings as I include both missions from before and after the inclusion of these stronger mandates.¹¹⁴

Ceasefire Presence: Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon identify the presence or absence of a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities between warring parties as an important control in conflict research.¹¹⁵ Cases where at least two primary warring parties have not agreed to a ceasefire or significant cessation of hostilities are coded as “0,” while a “1” means a ceasefire is in place before the arrival of the mission. The authors use UCPD’s Peace Agreement Dataset to gather this information.¹¹⁶

I use all these variables to execute a linear regression to test the correlation between racial similarity and one-sided violence. Linear regressions are one of the most common statistical methods to measure the impact of an independent variable on a dependent variable and determine whether the two are positively or negatively correlated. The validity of the regression can limit the findings of my study, however, given the low R-squared value.

¹¹⁴ Williams 2013, 1

¹¹⁵ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2014, 737-753

¹¹⁶ Davies, Pettersson, and Öberg 2022, 593-610

Results**Figure 4: Regression Results on the Impact of Racial Similarity (racesimilarity_prop) on****One-Sided Violence (osvAll)**

VARIABLES	(1) osvAll
racesimilarity_prop	-0.02* (0.01)
troopl原因	-0.17*** (0.06)
policelag	-0.56 (0.47)
militaryobserverslag	4.40*** (1.14)
Intpop	-0.11** (0.05)
epduration	-0.00 (0.00)
pocmandate	0.26 (0.47)
ceasefire	-1.14* (0.63)
Constant	4.51*** (0.67)
Observations	157
R-squared	0.18

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 5: Hypotheses Testing from the Quantitative Analysis

Alternative Explanation: International Arguments	Supported	Not Supported	Not Tested
H _{1a} : Missions with greater international involvement are more effective at reducing conflict.	X		
H _{1b} : Missions with weaker international involvement are less effective at reducing conflict.	X		
Alternative Explanation: Contextual Arguments			
H _{2a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more effective at reducing conflict.			X
H _{2b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of socio-economic development are less effective at reducing conflict.			X
H _{3a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of political stability are more effective at reducing conflict.			X
H _{3b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of political stability are less effective at reducing conflict.			X
Alternative Explanation: Operational Strength Arguments			
H _{4a} : Missions with stronger operational capacities are more effective at reducing conflict.	X		
H _{4b} : Missions with weaker operational capacities are less effective at reducing conflict.	X		

My Hypotheses: Race and Ethnicity as Mechanisms within the Operational Argument			
H _{5a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are a part of the same racial group as the population are more likely to reduce conflict.	X		
H _{5b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different racial group as the population will be less effective in reducing conflict.	X		
H _{6a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a similar ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.			X
H _{6b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.			X

The linear regression results reported in Figure 4 illustrate the factors that lead to peacekeeping success. Racial similarity is negatively correlated with one-sided violence, meaning that missions are more successful at reducing one-sided violence when peacekeeper and population racial identities are similar. Additionally, racial similarity is statistically significant at the $p < 0.1$ level. However, the absolute value of the impact is -0.02, meaning that it has less impact than other explanations but still reduces deaths. Still, this finding supports H_{5a} and H_{5b} summarized in Figure 5. My results are consistent with the political psychology literature, which argues that individuals who are more alike are more likely to work together and are similar to findings in Bove and Ruggeri's 2019 study.¹¹⁷ But the results suggest disagreement with Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri's quantitative study which explore linguistic and cultural differences between peacekeepers and populations; my regression shows that higher levels of homogeneity decrease one-sided violence,

¹¹⁷ Bove and Ruggeri 2019, 1630-1655

while they find that more linguistic and cultural heterogeneity improves outcomes.¹¹⁸ These two studies measure different types of diversity, but the divergence suggests a need for more analysis.

My analysis also yields other interesting results relating to the alternative explanations. It contradicts Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon's original findings, for instance, that police units have a statistically significant impact, although I confirm their findings that the troop and observer forces have a statistically significant impact on the success of peacekeeping operations.¹¹⁹ Troops are effective at reducing violence, while observers are correlated with increases in violence, aligning with the original article's findings and much of the peacekeeping scholarship.¹²⁰ This provides mixed evidence for operational arguments presented in H_{2a} and H_{2b}. Finally, the population and ceasefire findings also confirm those reported in the literature, but interestingly I find that a protection of civilians mandate is statistically insignificant, making it hard to support the international involvement arguments presented in H_{1a}.

But this quantitative study has limits. First, a linear regression may not fully capture each variable's impact on one-sided violence given a low R-squared value of 0.18. Second, the analysis focuses only on UN peacekeeping missions during intrastate civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa, complicating a generalization to missions run by regional organizations like the African Union or OAS, conflicts beyond intrastate civil wars, and conflicts located outside of Africa. This limitation is especially important given how the makeup of regional organizations may relate to my arguments about race and ethnicity. Finally, I was unable to test important contextual arguments

¹¹⁸ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021

¹¹⁹ Hultman, Kathman, and Shannon 2013, 875-891

¹²⁰ Fortna and Howard 2008, 283-301

around socio-economic development and political stability because of gaps in available per month data.

Despite these limitations, my findings make a unique contribution to the peacekeeping literature. This is the first study to explicitly explore race as a factor in peacekeeping and find it to be a statistically significant variable. This analysis also provides a foundation for other scholars to study the relationship between peacekeepers and populations through other lenses. Next, I use a qualitative comparative case study to address some of the limitations found in the quantitative portion and provide greater insight into what makes peacekeeping successful.

Qualitative Analysis

Case Selection

The explosion of peacekeeping post-Cold War provides numerous potential cases to study. Corinne Bara and Lisa Hultman identify over 120 UN, regional, and international peacekeeping missions on six continents between 1993 and 2016.¹²¹ Nevertheless, I study a UN mission to be consistent with the quantitative analysis. I also select an African case because of the many peacekeeping missions operating there and the relative racial homogeneity and ethnic heterogeneity among many African populations.

Additionally, I choose a case in which there was variation in the racial composition of peacekeepers, allowing me to control for economic, social, cultural, and political factors in the conflict while helping to isolate my independent and dependent variables. I employ the International Peace Institute's monthly contribution data used in the regression analysis to

¹²¹ Bara and Hultman 2020, 341-368

determine levels of racial similarity and help me identify a strong case.¹²² Monthly insights into peacekeeping missions yield a few strong contenders: MINUCI/UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire, UNOSOM I/II in Somalia, and MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The Côte d'Ivoire case, specifically UNOCI, sees the greatest scale up in the proportion of peacekeepers from Africa, going from the low 30%'s at the start of the mission in 2003 to the high of 60%'s during the height of UNOCI in 2005. But there is a gap in peacekeeping contributions between April 2005 and July 2006 and there are fewer than 400 peacekeepers in the country for most of the mission, limiting scholars' ability to study the impact of race on peacekeeping success.

UNOSOM I/II in Somalia is heavily examined in the literature due to the specific nature of the case. UN involvement in Somalia was the international community's first major foray into peacekeeping following the end of the Cold War and included heavy US involvement. But the infamous Mogadishu/"Black Hawk Down" incident quickly ended global involvement. The US withdrawal from the mission brought African involvement in UNOSOM from the low 20%'s to the high in the low 60%'s by the end, but the special circumstances of the case require it's exclusion.

This leaves the MONUC/MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) as my two-part case. The UN's involvement in the DRC is one of its longest missions ever, beginning with MONUC in fall of 1999 and continuing to the present as MONUSCO.¹²³ The mission has seen over 10,000 observers, police, and troops deployed by 30 countries on all continents. MONUC received military powers from the UN Security Council in February 2000 to oversee the

¹²² Perry and Smith 2013

¹²³ United Nations Peacekeeping 2010

peace process of the Second Congo War and later deal with intrastate conflict, specifically in the Ituri and Kivus regions.

This case is a prime selection target for many reasons. Data shows that African peacekeepers made up about 40% of the mission after the February 2000 mandate extension, and their representation peaked at 71% in August 2005, before dropping to about 50% of the mission after a surge of troops from South Asia in 2006. This allows for an easy splicing of the case into two parts, one in which Africans made up less than 50% of the mission and one in which they made up more than 50% of the mission.

The UNSC's 2000 mandate also gives the mission a robust mandate with protection of civilians requirements, allowing me to control for those important factors. Additionally, troops, police, and observers are all present throughout the mission. Finally, there is a large body of primary literature, such as mission reports, as well as secondary scholarly literature to draw from. All these factors make MONUC a strong case for a qualitative exploration into how racial and ethnic similarity between peacekeepers and populations affects mission outcomes.

Case Study: MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002-2005

MONUC's unique scale-up in troop contribution from African nations makes it an interesting case to splice and explore the effect of this study's independent variables, the proportion of a peacekeeping mission's racial and ethnic similarity to the host country's population. The mission began in September 1999 but significantly ramped up in January 2002 upon the UN Security Council's November 2001 approval of Resolution 1376, initiating a new stage of the

mission with an expanded mandate.¹²⁴ Part 1 of the case investigates the effect of a low proportion of racial similarity between peacekeepers and populations. Part 1 begins in January 2002 when African peacekeepers made up 39% of the mission and ends in December 2003 when 53% of peacekeepers came from Africa.¹²⁵ Part 2 of the case begins in January 2004 with 53% of African peacekeepers and ends in October 2005 with a mission high of 71% African peacekeepers.¹²⁶ This allows me to explore how a high proportion of similarity effects violence against civilians, the study's dependent variable. I expect to see a drop in one-sided violence as the proportion of African peacekeepers increases, supporting my theory that racial and ethnic similarity leads to more successful missions by increasing operational efficacy.

The peacekeeping literature suggests that violence against civilians should decrease as the mission goes on and success factors strengthen. International mission support, operational capacities, and the DRC's politico-economic situation all improve 2002-2005, allowing me to use process tracing test the alternative hypotheses to the new psychological ones I propose about identity similarity.¹²⁷

I find substantial evidence for many of my hypotheses. I find little support for the socio-economic contextual argument, but I argue there is strong support for the international, political contextual, and operational strength explanations for MONUC's reduction in recorded one-sided

¹²⁴ ONU/UN: CONSEIL DE SECURITE/SECURITY COUNCIL 2001

¹²⁵ Perry and Smith 2013

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Dagne 2010; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002a; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2003a; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004a; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005a

violence. Additionally, there is evidence that the peacekeepers could not build informative trust and communication with locals because of the racial and ethnic differences, hurting operational capacities and overall success. I do not find support for or against claims about racial and ethnic similarities improving the mission's operational abilities. All this research suggests that while the literature's other explanations of peacekeeping matter identity factors matter too.

History: 1995-2005

The Congolese Wars and the DRC Before MONUC, 1995-1999:

The DRC, formerly known as Zaire, is one of Africa's largest countries by land mass and population.¹²⁸ The country was ruled by dictator Mobutu Sese Seko from 1965 until Hutu fears of Tutsi vengeance for the 1994 Rwandan genocide triggered mass Hutu immigration to the eastern DRC. The instability gave rise to an anti-Mobutu coalition, led by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) supported by Rwanda and Uganda, who overthrew Mobutu in May of 1997 during the nearly two year First Congolese War.

Tensions quickly grew between Laurent Kabila, the new DRC President and AFDL leader, and his Rwandan and Ugandan allies, triggering the Second Congolese War in August 1998.¹²⁹ The Rwandan, Ugandan, and to some extent Burundi-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) pushed towards the capital Kinshasa until Kabila received support from Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola. This stalled progress and led to thousands of combatant and civilian

¹²⁸ Tarus 2010

¹²⁹ Koko 2012, 27-62

casualties and millions of displaced people.¹³⁰ Talks began in Zambia between the warring parties, leading the Congolese government, Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia to sign the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on July 10, 1999; the RCD and other factions endorsed the plan which called for “direct UN involvement” in ceasefire management.¹³¹ The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1258 three weeks later, creating a small, three-month liaison force in the DRC to interface with Lusaka agreement signatories and prepare for observer deployment.¹³²

Early MONUC, 1999-2001:

UN officials quickly realized that they needed to provide more long-term support for the Lusaka agreement, leading the UNSC to officially create MONUC in November 1999.¹³³ The Secretary-General was granted permission to deploy military observers to the Joint Military Commission created by the Lusaka agreement and to capitals of signatory countries. Ceasefire and disarmament non-compliance was rampant, so the UNSC allowed MONUC to deploy military personnel and protect civilians who were in imminent danger.¹³⁴ But major conflict continued throughout 2000 and mission leaders ruled out the deployment of the nearly 5,500 authorized military personnel due to President Kabila’s opposition and increased fighting in eastern

¹³⁰ Dagne 2005

¹³¹ Koko 2012, 39

¹³² United Nations Security Council 1999a

¹³³ United Nations Security Council 1999b

¹³⁴ United Nations Security Council 2000

provinces.¹³⁵ Observers were also constrained by their mandate, limited to monitoring fighting in the eastern Tshompo, Katanga, and Équateur regions as well as noting the presence of foreign troops who were supposed to be repatriated to their home countries.

2001 brought a changing conflict environment. The January assassination of President Laurent Kabila brought his son Joseph Kabila to power; the younger Kabila was much more friendly to MONUC, allowing for an expansion of the mission's footprint.¹³⁶ Multiple guard units were able to deploy and expand observer operations in key cities like Goma, Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Mbandaka, although MONUC lacked the mandate and resources to move into the riskiest situations or engage in civilian protection.¹³⁷ UNSC Resolution 1355 authorized MONUC's expansion in June of 2001, instructing peacekeepers to assist in the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, or reintegration (DDRRR) of combatants, signaling the mission's pivot towards multidimensional operations beyond observation and light protection.¹³⁸ Finally, MONUC's capabilities were expanded again as Secretary-General Kofi Annan pushed for the mission to enter its third and most powerful stage.¹³⁹

MONUC, Part I, January 2002-December 2003:

¹³⁵ Koko 2012, 40-46

¹³⁶ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2001a; Spijkers 2015, 88-117

¹³⁷ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2001b

¹³⁸ United Nations Security Council 2001c

¹³⁹ Mueller, Diehl, and Druckman 2021, 493-516; ONU/UN: Conseil De Securite/Security Council 2001

MONUC's entrance into phase III deployment was a challenging one. The mission saw very mild success in the first half of 2002 by opening an "Inter-Congolese Dialogue" between belligerents in the ongoing conflict, facilitating the removal of some Namibian, Rwandan, and Ugandan forces. They also launched a "very positive" public information campaign through Radio Okapi.¹⁴⁰ Additionally, the first major influx of military personnel arrived in the form of a Uruguayan military unit to secure the key eastern city of Kisangani where fighting had been particularly intense. But the Secretary-General's June 2002 report acknowledged "considerable difficulties" with the mission securing the hundreds of thousands of displaced people in the eastern provinces without more military and humanitarian assistance.¹⁴¹

UN officials and national policymakers were excited about the second half of 2002 following the signing of the Pretoria Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda. Rwanda agreed to remove all its forces from the eastern DRC if the DRC cleared out members of the Rwandan former army (ex-FAR) and Rwandan Hutu militias; MONUC would provide verification mechanisms, disarmament services, and security forces.¹⁴² Additionally, the DRC and Uganda reached the Luanda peace agreement, coordinating the prompt withdrawal of Ugandan forces and implementing the end of the Second Congolese War that was supposed to occur with the 1999 ceasefire.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002a, 1-6

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 2002

¹⁴³ Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Government of Uganda, and Government of Angola 2002

Uganda's withdrawal inflamed tensions between the Lendu and Hemu ethnic groups, posing significant security and humanitarian problems in Bunia and the resource rich border province of Ituri. The Lendu and Hemu communities in Ituri fought a brutal conflict in 1999, and the occupying Ugandan forces played "the role of both arsonist and fire-fighter" between the ethnic groups.¹⁴⁴ The Secretary-General warned of conflict after Uganda left Ituri, calling for large increases in troops and capabilities to help implement the Luanda and Pretoria agreements and secure the crisis in the eastern DRC.¹⁴⁵ The UNSC unanimously passed Resolution 1445 at the end of 2002, doubling the number of allowed military personnel to 8,700 spread across two task forces to deal with nearly 5,000 civilian casualties recorded by the end of the year .¹⁴⁶

2003 again witnessed some progress met by major security and humanitarian crises. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue ended in April 2003, with President Joseph Kabila's central government, a major RCD splinter group centered in Goma (RCD-Goma), and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) reaching an agreement on a transitional government, security reforms, and plans for an election in 2005.¹⁴⁷ MONUC planned a surge into the east to secure provinces and bring citizens into the new political process.

But several simultaneous emergencies occurred as the dialogue ended. The Ituri conflict intensified as Ugandan forces left in April 2003, with confirmed reports of identity-based violence committed by Lendu and Hemu militias. Fighting also continued in North and South Kivu as RCD-

¹⁴⁴ Marks 2007, 67-80

¹⁴⁵ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002b

¹⁴⁶ United Nations Security Council 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

¹⁴⁷ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2003b

Goma battled RCD-Kisangani (RCD-K/ML), Hutu militias, and ex-Rwandan army members.¹⁴⁸ Both situations created hundreds of thousands of displaced people, thousands of civilian victims of violence, and disrupted DDRRR efforts.

The Security Council recognized the dire nature of the situation and acted with significant force on May 30, 2003. The international organization approved a European Union-led “Interim Emergency Multinational Force” in Bunia to work with the overwhelmed MONUC contingent to protect displaced peoples.¹⁴⁹ Operation Artemis “produced quick results,” using advanced technology and an extensive Chapter VII peacemaking “enforcement” mandate that allowed soldiers to use force to restrain belligerents and prioritize the protection of civilians.¹⁵⁰ Violence in the region declined significantly, and aid was provided to many refugees.¹⁵¹

MONUC was set to take over the mission when the interim force left on September 1st. The UNSC approved a much larger budget, more troops, and better weapons; it also gave MONUC an expanded mandate along the lines of Operation Artemis.¹⁵² Recorded civilian casualties dropped to under 3,500 with the intervention.¹⁵³ The mission was also reoriented towards preparing the DRC to host democratic elections in 2005, representing a change in the UN mission’s trajectory.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ United Nations Security Council 2003a

¹⁵⁰ Marks 2007, 73

¹⁵¹ Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

¹⁵² United Nations Security Council 2003b

¹⁵³ Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

MONUC, Part 2, January 2004-October 2005:

Peacekeepers appeared to gain ground on the security front in early 2004. The Ituri region still had “increased” volatility due to the national government’s inability to administer the area, but the influx of troops in late 2003 allowed some displaced people to return home.¹⁵⁴ The Kivu provinces also saw an end to “large-scale fighting,” except for in the town of Bukavu.¹⁵⁵ A February dispute about a weapons cache seizure between the Military Commander of South Kivu, Brigadier-General Prosper Nabyolwa, and former RCD-G Colonel Jules Mutebutsi erupted into violence in May, threatening the entire transitional government. Nabyolwa was recalled, but fighting began between troops loyal to the new acting Commander of South Kivu and Mutebutsi’s forces. Violence escalated when ex-RCD-G general Laurent Nkunda threatened members of the Banyamulenge ethnic group in Bukavu. MONUC had attack helicopters and other heavy equipment but had only 1,000 soldiers for a city over 500,000, resulting in Bukavu being ransacked and DRC security forces blaming the peacekeepers for abandoning their posts.¹⁵⁶ The Bukavu incident nearly toppled the transitional government again with further infighting, disunity, and threats of civil war.

Additionally, a variety of heinous sexual assault claims against peacekeepers emerged in the middle of 2004. The Secretary-General’s report counted “72 allegations,” eight of which investigators determined to be “credible.”¹⁵⁷ Other research shows, however, that peacekeeper-

¹⁵⁴ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004a, 6-10

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004b, 15-16

perpetrated sexual violence, especially against children, was probably vastly undercounted, and the violence most likely began at the start of the mission, complicating an accurate study of how the exploitation impacted different eras of the mission.¹⁵⁸

The news about peacekeeper criminality led militia to target many MONUC units, especially towards the end of 2004 in the Ituri province. Some fighting occurred between militias and DRC state security forces in Katanga and Mayi-Mayi and ex-RCD-Goma groups in the Kivus, although recorded civilian casualties fell to 748 in this period.¹⁵⁹ The transitional government attempted to forge ahead to elections as the UNSC reaffirmed the mission's commitment to ensuring the completion of the election in 2005, the security of the east DRC with the creation of two separate soldier task forces, and the continuation of humanitarian programs like DDRRR.¹⁶⁰

Outright recorded killings of civilians remained lower in 2005 than in previous years, but violence was targeted towards civilians in Ituri and some Banyamulenge people returning from displaced persons camps in Burundi.¹⁶¹ Additionally, attacks on soldiers continued to increase as the mission became more aggressive with weapons seizures. The Union of Congolese Patriots faction led by Thomas Lubanga (UCP-L) and the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) targeted peacekeeping convoys and aircraft, killing nine Bangladeshi soldiers in February 2005.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁸ Kovatch 2016, 157-174; Neudorfer 2015, 97-123

¹⁵⁹ Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

¹⁶⁰ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004b

¹⁶¹ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005b

¹⁶² Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005a

But peacekeepers were able to make some progress in preparing for the election, disarming rebels, and returning displaced people.¹⁶³ The constitutional referendum was rescheduled from January 2005 to December 2005 due to a lack of infrastructure needed to run the election smoothly. Millions of people across the country registered to vote, even in historically turbulent eastern cities like Beni and Kisangani. The Secretary-General acknowledged the “many” financial, logistical, and security challenges the peacekeeping mission would face in administering free and fair elections while mitigating violence, but said the UN was “encouraged” by the progress made; progress towards total peace was meager, but 280 civilian deaths were recorded.¹⁶⁴

MONUC saw a gradual decline in one-sided violence in part one of the case but a steep decline in part two. This prompts questions about why recorded deaths declined and builds a space for me to test my hypotheses about factors for mission success and failure.

Explaining the Decrease in One-Sided Violence

In this section, I explore explanations for the decrease in one-sided violence between 2002 and 2005, specifically the large drop in recorded violence witnessed between parts one and two of the case. I test international, contextual, and operational strength theories before investigating my own theories about how identity similarity and difference between peacekeepers and populations affects the mission’s operational abilities and overall outcome.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Secretary-General 2005b; Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

I find evidence for many of the alternative hypotheses as well as support for my arguments about race and ethnicity acting as mechanisms for operational success. The international theories contain some of the strongest traditional arguments for why MONUC struggled and then made progress towards reducing violence against civilians. The mission struggled to protect civilians in part one of the case between 2002 and 2003 because of a constrained mandate and a lack of resources, but the international community's involvement in the DRC through the EU's interim force and the UNSC's expanded mandate helped bring some stability in the most problematic regions.

International Explanation:

Hypotheses:
H _{1a} : Missions with greater international involvement are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{1b} : Missions with weaker international involvement are less effective at reducing conflict.

The peacekeeping literature suggests that heavy international support for a mission makes it more successful in achieving its goals. The UNSC granting of expansive mission mandates, the involvement of a great power, and the contribution of well-trained, well-equipped troops have all been suggested as reasons for a mission's success. Strong evidence is presented for these claims when comparing the international community's support for MONUC in part one and part two of the case.

Mission leaders and the Secretary-General frequently cited a lack of commitment as reasons for the deteriorating situation in 2002 and 2003. The Secretary-General's February 2002

report acknowledged that the mission “would not be able to undertake” demilitarization, humanitarian, and protection tasks outlined in previous mandates without further UNSC assistance and “higher levels of cooperation” between involved parties.¹⁶⁵ The October 2002 report stated that the “full support of the international community” and “necessary decisions” by the Security Council were required to “achieve these aims” of stabilization.

Mission officials called for extra-mission involvement as “brutal” violence in the Ituri region escalated in the spring of 2003.¹⁶⁶ The May 2003 report found that MONUC’s restrictive mandate made the situation unmanageable by the mission, requiring help from a member state with a “highly trained and well equipped” capacities. This led to the deployment of the pivotal EU-led interim force, starting a new era of the mission in part two of the case from 2004-2005.

Reports in 2004 and 2005 show that increased international commitment to MONUC gave the mission the potential to reduce conflict. The Secretary-General acknowledged that the interim mission, an arms embargo, and the Security Council’s mandate expansion which provided MONUC with Chapter VII enforcement powers helped reduce conflict in Bunia and greater Ituri.¹⁶⁷ Additionally, officials applauded South African President Thabo Mbeki’s continued support of the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, hoping that regional involvement peace verification would help state parties remain committed to conflict reduction.

But the Secretary-General firmly stated that MONUC could not effectively achieve its’ goals without more international support. Donor countries were encouraged to “transform their

¹⁶⁵ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002a, 15

¹⁶⁶ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2003a, 20-26

¹⁶⁷ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004c

commitments” by bolstering budgets, deploying more troops, and exerting “pressure on neighboring countries” to refrain from arming more militias.¹⁶⁸

Primary sources strongly support the argument that increased international support from 2002-2005 helped the mission reduce violence against civilians, supporting H_{1a} and H_{1b}. The commitment may not have been as strong as mission officials would have liked, limiting MONUC’s ability to stabilize the security situation and engage in other humanitarian activities, but it did allow peacekeepers more success in part two of the mission compared to part one.

The literature also argues, however, that missions don’t just succeed because of the international community. A strong UNSC mandate may not be enough for a mission to overcome preexisting regional challenges. Scholarship shows that the conflict environment affects peacekeepers’ ability to fulfill their international mandates, requiring a test of how the DRC’s socio-economic and political contexts impacted the mission’s success.

Contextual Explanation:

Hypotheses:
H _{2a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of socio-economic development are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{2b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of socio-economic development are less effective at reducing conflict.
H _{3a} : Missions deployed into countries with higher levels of political stability are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{3b} : Missions deployed into countries with lower levels of political stability are less effective at reducing conflict.

¹⁶⁸ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005a; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005c

Marginal increases in the DRC's socio-economic development and political stability may have also contributed to a reduction in violence. The DRC was one of the poorest and least democratic and politically stable countries in the world in 2002-2005, although it saw gradual economic growth and political consolidation between mission parts one and two.¹⁶⁹

The DRC experienced economic stagnation between 2002-2003, with the GDP per capita in current US dollars decreasing from \$168.90 to \$168 due to occupying forces and conflict in Ituri and the Kivus.¹⁷⁰ But GDP growth began to increase as portions of the country stabilized, ending with a GDP per capita of \$211.66 in 2005.

MONUC identified the lack of economic development as a major humanitarian concern with security implications.¹⁷¹ The UN attempted to reopen the Congo River for commercial activity while providing job training as incentives for disarmament from 2002-2003, but it soon became clear that the larger conflict would need to be settled first.¹⁷²

The DRC's economy began marginal growth after Rwandan and Ugandan forces left the country and the interim force and stronger MONUC mission brought more stability to Ituri. But the humanitarian situation remained dire, even as UNICEF and UNDP provided aid to millions of displaced people.¹⁷³ The displaced people who were able to return home were left with few

¹⁶⁹ Marshall and Gurr 2020; World Bank 2023

¹⁷⁰ World Bank 2023

¹⁷¹ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002a

¹⁷² Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004a, 13-14; Wanki 2011, 101-128

¹⁷³ Ibid.

economic opportunities and sometimes forced to work with or for armed groups. Militias and rebel groups were able to take advantage of the DRC's little economic development and exploit its many natural resources, funding their purchase of new weapons and supplies.¹⁷⁴ This provides little evidence for H_{2a} and H_{2b}, although the marginal nature of the economic growth makes it challenging to test the hypotheses in this case.

While the DRC did experience meager economic growth between 2002 and 2005, the situation was still challenging. The growth was very small, and potentially captured by rebel groups who used their new wealth to fund conflict, providing little evidence for H_{3a} in this case.

But the country's political developments may tell another story. The Polity5 dataset shows an increase in democratization from "0" to "1" on their scale in part one of the case and from "5" to "6" 2004-2005 in part two.¹⁷⁵ The DRC was governed by a factionalized and weak government under Joseph Kabila, leading to major conflict and civilian death between government militias and rebel groups well into 2003. The formation of the transitional government with Kabila as President and members of eight different rebel groups serving as ministers and vice ministers "directly related" to "improved prospects of the reduction of conflict."¹⁷⁶ The government still struggled, however, to work together to control and administer much of the east DRC, especially in the conflict-ridden Ituri region and Kivu provinces.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ Dam-de Jong 2017; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004b, 3-7

¹⁷⁵ Marshall and Gurr 2020

¹⁷⁶ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2003, 8

¹⁷⁷ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004, 3

The transitional government almost collapsed multiple times in 2004 and 2005 due to the Bukavu incident and corruption charges brought by Kabila against members of the MLC, potentially allowing for a resurgence of conflict and one-sided violence.¹⁷⁸ But the transitional government was able to re-form, with establishment of a representative national assembly, senate, and draft constitution before the 2005 elections. The tense relationship between Kabila, the RCD-G, the MLC, and those largely outside the transitional government like the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) still allowed for dialogue. The government's limited show of commitment to fair elections by increasing voter registration in Kinshasa helped ensure UDPS mass action "did not materialize," preventing violence by security forces.¹⁷⁹

Increased democratization and stability were far from perfect between 2002 and 2005, but there is evidence that the improving political situation helped reduce violence against civilians, supporting H_{3a} and H_{3b}. International and contextual arguments helped determine MONUC's ability to protect civilians, but missions can only be successful if they also have the capacity and will to execute tasks and interface with the local populace. For this reason, I turn now to an exploration of the operational strength arguments.

Operational Explanation:

Hypotheses:
H _{4a} : Missions with stronger operational capacities are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{4b} : Missions with weaker operational capacities are less effective at reducing conflict.

¹⁷⁸ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004b; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005a

¹⁷⁹ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005b, 2

International and contextual factors set the stage for the success or failure, but the operational capacity of the mission allows peacekeepers to act successfully within the international and domestic environments. There is evidence that missions with greater capacities are more effective at reducing conflict, a theory that rings true in the MONUC case. UN Member States began to greatly increase troop and equipment contributions after 2003, partially explaining why violence against civilians decreased between parts one and two of the case.

Reports throughout 2002 and 2003 affirmed that MONUC would be “unable to complete” all its assigned tasks or even operate in many parts of the DRC without significant increases in military deployment.¹⁸⁰ The mission would require forward operating bases concentrated in cities like Kisangani with riverine units, military engineers, and significant logistics capacities to support observers and ensure a reduction in conflict; the lack of resources made the Ituri situation even more dire in 2003.¹⁸¹

Increased operational capacities in 2004 and 2005 generally helped to reduce violence against civilians. The restructuring of troop deployments, the deployment of an Ituri specific brigade, as well as increased troop contributions from Morocco, Uruguay, and Ghana helped MONUC “secure” displaced peoples and ensure their safe return home.¹⁸² 2005 saw an even greater increase in troops and an expansion of capacities, although it was not nearly what the Secretary-General requested. India donated attack helicopters to prevent militia attacks by seizing

¹⁸⁰ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002b

¹⁸¹ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2002b; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2003a

¹⁸² Secretary-General of the United Nations 2004a

weapons, and other nations trained DRC security forces to guard important administrative sites and protect noncombatants.¹⁸³

The increased presence also may have contributed the targeting of UN forces, especially by the splinter group UCP-L.¹⁸⁴ But the uptick in attacks against MONUC could also be better handled by peacekeeping forces because of stronger weapons and greater abilities to enter remote regions.

There is substantial evidence that increased operational capacities helped MONUC secure civilian populations, especially those targeted in the aftermath of the Bunia conflict. Like the international explanation, UN documents show that the mission did not receive all the materials and soldiers it requested, but those it did receive most likely helped it reduce one-sided violence, supporting H_{4a} and H_{4b}.

This brief case study shows that many of the international, contextual, and operational factors influenced the success of the MONUC mission. These explanations, like one that focuses on race and ethnicity, all point in the same direction: greater success in the second part of the mission than in the first. As we have seen, however, the international and domestic contexts provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for mission success. For a peacekeeping mission to succeed, it also needs adequate operational capacity. Those operational capacities, in turn, rest on a racial and ethnic identification between the peacekeepers and the population. In short, I offer new identity arguments that underly the operational argument. Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri examine the role of trust and communication in their qualitative case study of cultural, ethnic, and linguistic

¹⁸³IRIN 2004; Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005b

¹⁸⁴ Secretary-General of the United Nations 2005a

homogeneity between peacekeepers and populations, finding that informative trust and communication are increased when similarity increases.¹⁸⁵ That trust and communication is what allows peacekeeping missions to operate effectively.

Race and Ethnicity as Factors for Operational Success

Hypotheses
H _{5a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are a part of the same racial group as the population are more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{5b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different racial group as the population will be less effective in reducing conflict.
H _{6a} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a similar ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.
H _{6b} : Missions where peacekeeping forces are part of a different ethnic group as the population will be more effective at reducing conflict.

Social psychology scholarship shows that groups with commonalities are more likely to work together than groups with differences, especially when the differences are more easily perceived. Additionally, peacekeeper psychology literature posits that racial and ethnic similarity between groups can build trust and communication while racial and ethnic differences can decrease trust, foster powerful emotional responses like vengeance, and lead to harmful stereotypes that harm intergroup dynamics. Race and ethnic identity dynamics between peacekeepers and populations are crucial to fully understand why peacekeeping missions succeed or fail; they are the mechanisms that build or destroy informative trust and communication. Informative trust and communication, in turn, determine the cohesion between peacekeepers and those they seek to

¹⁸⁵ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021

protect, affecting mission operations and the peacekeeper's ability to safeguard civilians. Indeed, there is some evidence to suggest that racial and ethnic differences between the peacekeepers and the people of the DRC limited the mission's effectiveness, although there is little evidence available to determine how the high proportion of African peacekeepers in the second half of the mission affected mission outcomes.

Anti-UN protests were active throughout MONUC's history, although an increase in tensions began in 2002 as the mission failed to protect civilians.¹⁸⁶ The population's discontent ratcheted up in 2003, however, as the majority non-African peacekeepers attempted to move into Ituri province during the EU-led interim mission. French troops faced off against protestors in Bunia who called for the mission to "face the consequences" and "go home."¹⁸⁷ The "go home" reference specifically suggests animosity and a feeling of difference between the French troops and Congolese protestors. Congolese people seemed to have felt that the French troops were not there to protect them because they were from a distant place with no real connection to the eastern DRC. This prompts considerations about how racial and ethnic differences between interim mission troops and Congolese people complicated the mission's ability to build informative trust and communication and interface with the population to reach security goals.¹⁸⁸

An NGO report also found that peacekeepers in the eastern DRC, many of whom were Uruguayan, faced "difficulty in distinguishing between Rwandese and Congolese Hutu and Tutsi

¹⁸⁶ Kambale 2002, 1

¹⁸⁷ Agence France Presse 2003

¹⁸⁸ Williams 2013, 1

fighters,” groups of people who have clear linguistic differences to those from the region.¹⁸⁹ Additionally, a 2003 interview with Usman Dabo, the coordinator of the Ituri mission, identified a potential linguistic barrier between local peoples and the majority Bangladeshi, Indian, Nepalese, Pakistani, and Uruguayan force who could not speak French, Swahili, or Lingala.¹⁹⁰

Linguistics are often highly correlated with ethnicity, suggesting that the high proportion of peacekeepers from ethnic groups that are highly dissimilar from those in the eastern DRC made the mission more challenging.¹⁹¹ Many MONUC members struggled to build informative trust and effective communication with local populations because of the language barrier. Peacekeepers also may have lacked an understanding of region-specific ethnic contexts, possibly harming the mission’s ability to protect civilians and carry out other mandated duties.¹⁹²

The strongest evidence for racial and ethnic tensions between UN forces and populations affecting security outcomes emerges in a retroactive field survey conducted in four cities in South Kivu among Hutu and Tutsi residences in the early 2000s. A Rwandan Hutu in Uvira pinpointed MONUC soldiers, mainly those from “Pakistan and Bangladesh,” as the second greatest barrier to peace due to the perception that they want the war to continue so they can make money.¹⁹³ This demonstrates a possible lack of understanding and connection between the racially dissimilar

¹⁸⁹ GREAT LAKES ADVOCACY NETWORK and RESEAU EUROPEEN CONGO 2003

¹⁹⁰ Africa News Service 2003

¹⁹¹ Fearon 2003, 195-222

¹⁹² Reyneart 2011, 27-28

¹⁹³ Jacob Udo-Udo 2016, 127-128

groups, creating stereotypes that hurt the mission's ability to gain informative trust among the population.

Others in the survey believed the mission could not achieve much because they were doing the bidding of the US, UK, France, and the Rwandan government. It is interesting to see respondents pinpoint three majority white western powers, two of which had extensively colonized Africa, as reasons for MONUC's failure. It suggests that MONUC was caught up in the pre-existing tensions between the Congolese people and dissimilar powers that, with other Europeans, had previously colonized the region. This suggests that the perceived racial and ethnic differences negatively impacted the mission's ability to build intergroup cohesion and carry out its mandate.

The Rwandan Hutu survey group identified the Tutsi Rwandan government as pulling MONUC's strings and encouraging inaction. The mission's apparent entanglement in the tensions seen between Rwandan Hutus and Rwandan Tutsis could show that too much similarity, specifically ethnic similarity in this case, could hamper a mission's success. This survey could provide evidence against the race and ethnicity hypotheses, but it is important to note that the Rwandan government was an active participant in the conflict and was not involved in the peacekeeping mission.

Congolese people also said that foreigners in MONUC were a barrier to peace, specifically Rwandans in general. But one group in Fizi said that "Chinese, Europeans, and Americans" were also in the DRC to "kill and plunder," extending the colonial horrors brought on by notorious racist King Leopold the Second of Belgium.¹⁹⁴ This again suggests that local populations were less trustful of the peacekeepers because of the racial and ethnic difference. China, the US, and many

¹⁹⁴ Jacob Udo-Udo 2016, 146-147

European countries were not involved in the Congo during Belgium's colonial rule, but they may have been seen as continuing the legacy of colonialism because of the vast differences between them and the Congolese. This may have reduced trust and communication between all the peacekeepers and the population, hurting the mission's effort to safeguard civilians.

Next, the Uvira group expressed a "myth" that "MONUC's Muslim fighters" were there to steal UN weapons and sell them to armed groups.¹⁹⁵ This again suggests that a lack of commonality and understanding encouraged the creation of stereotypes, falsehoods, and a general feeling of "us vs. them," hurting MONUC's ability to interface with locals and achieve their security goals.

Finally, an analysis of sexual violence by peacekeepers posits that racism and increasing "geographic distance" between soldiers and local people could have created an environment for abuse.¹⁹⁶ Bonnie Kovatch suggests that the racial difference made the peacekeepers feel less attached or inclined to protect women and girls, prompting sexual exploitation and violence, which in turn led to protests that harmed the mission's operational abilities.

There is limited evidence, however, supporting or refuting the fact that an increase in racial or ethnic similarity contributed to a decrease in one-sided violence from 2004-2005. Kovatch finds that many African peacekeepers from Tunisia, South Africa, and Morocco were identified in sexual exploitation scandals.¹⁹⁷ This could help refute my identity hypotheses as I would expect peacekeepers from Africa to be less likely to commit violence against other Africans. But Africa is a very diverse place; Tunisia and Morocco are ethnically, culturally, and racially different from

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ Kovatch 2016, 170-171

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

the sub-Saharan African country of the DRC and South Africa has a large contingent of white people of European ancestry in their armed forces.¹⁹⁸

I could only find one mention of Africans, specifically South Africans, explicitly helping the mission's operational success. MONUC's Chief Security Officer was quoted in 2003 saying that he was "convinced" that their successes in the eastern DRC came "down to our South African contingent."¹⁹⁹ The racial and ethnic makeup of the contingent is unclear given the presence of white South Africans in the military, but it could suggest that the South Africans were more willing and able to execute because of their greater proximity to and trust of the local population than other Asian, European, or South American peacekeepers.

MONUC provides only mixed support for my newly developed identity explanations that underlay arguments about operational success. There is evidence for the claim that racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and populations made the mission less effective at reducing conflict by disrupting the creation of informative trust and communication. Various statements about foreign involvement of western and Asian peacekeepers, which in one case was linked back to the DRC's colonial history, support the idea that racial differences can negatively affect peacekeepers' abilities to interact with the population and bring security. Additionally, references to linguistic and religious differences breeding distrust supports the hypothesis that ethnic difference can hamper communication, operations, and overall mission success.

There is evidence to support hypotheses H_{5b} and H_{6b}, but I have not found any substantial evidence either for or against H_{5a} and H_{6a}'s claims about how racial and ethnic similarity can lead

¹⁹⁸ MacEachern 2007, 393-412

¹⁹⁹ Africa News Service 2003

to mission success. This is interesting given how civilian casualties in the DRC decreased as the proportion of African MONUC peacekeepers increased (Figure 6). The seemingly inverse relationship between similarity and one-sided violence does not necessarily mean that the two variables are correlated, but the thesis' quantitative portion agrees with other studies that racial similarity is negatively correlated with one-sided violence.²⁰⁰ More qualitative work is needed to identify sufficient evidence to support or reject claims about identity similarity's impact on operations and peacekeeping success.

Figure 6: MONUC Racial Similarity and One-Sided Violence in the DRC		
Year	Proportion of African Peacekeepers (IV) ²⁰¹	One-Sided Violence (DV) ²⁰²
2002	39%-43%	4,851
2003	42%-53%	3,365
2004	53%-60%	748
January 2005-October 2005	60%-73%	280

²⁰⁰ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021

²⁰¹ Perry and Smith 2013

²⁰² Pettersson et al. 2021, 809-825

This qualitative analysis of the impact of racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and populations is strong, but it also reveals several limitations. First, one-sided violence can be a challenging way to measure MONUC's success. Conflict in the DRC tends to be centered around the eastern border where infrastructure is weak to non-existent, complicating the reporting of violence against civilians to UN officials and other watchdogs. Additionally, one-sided violence is not the only way to operationalize a mission's performance. The metric does not capture other aspects of violence against civilians like looting, sexual violence, and the destruction of property, all events that frequently occurred throughout the case. In fact, MONUC is considered a failed mission by some scholars because it did not prevent displacement or civilian distress during conflict, although the nature of the mission's effectiveness is debated.²⁰³

The correlation between the tested variables and one-sided violence does not mean there is a causal link. While I find evidence that many of these hypotheses are influential, more study is needed to determine internal validity and generalizability to other African and non-African cases. Missions operating in unique and complex environments like the DRC are extremely hard to study, and racial and ethnic similarity and difference are hard to operationalize, leading me to control for as many variables as I can while carefully splicing the case into empirically sound parts.

I acknowledge these limitations and hope that others will employ methods to combat them in future investigations. This case study provides a strong jumping off point for further analysis into how identity can impact peacekeeping success.

²⁰³ Manahl 2011, 117-128

MONUC Conclusions

An exploration into MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo provides mixed evidence for how racial and ethnic similarity between peacekeepers and populations affects operational efforts and a reduction in violence against civilians. I splice one of the UN's longest running peacekeeping operations into two parts, January 2002-December 2003 and January 2004-October 2005. The mission sees an increase in the independent variable, the proportion of racial similarity between peacekeepers and the DRC's population over time, while observing a decrease in one-sided violence, my dependent variable. This allows me to test my racial and ethnic explanations while controlling for country specific variables. Additionally, a gradual increase in other potentially important factors for peacekeeping success allows me to test these other arguments.

The case's history provides strong evidence for the impact of the international and operational arguments on MONUC's reduction in one-sided violence. The international community's increasing resolve to end the conflict through mediation and UNSC action helped troops protect civilians. The mission also received more peacekeepers and better equipment as time progressed, expanding operational capacities, and further protecting civilians.

The contextual hypotheses received mixed support. While the DRC experienced a marginal increase in socio-economic development, it's unlikely that the growth contributed to a significant reduction in conflict, challenging the idea that socio-economic development increases mission success in this case. But the contentious yet occasionally productive work of the transitional government helped the country democratize and become slightly more consolidated, evidencing the theory that missions are more successful in countries with higher political stability.

The operational capacity hypotheses also had merit. MONUC was able to receive more police and soldiers with better equipment than it had at the start of the mission, allowing peacekeepers to better work within their mandate to secure civilians.

Many of the existing literature's common international, contextual, and operational strength explanations for mission success ring true in MONUC, but I argue that social psychological and identity factors are little explored causal mechanisms for operational outcomes and reductions in one-sided violence. Racial and ethnic similarities and differences between groups have been shown to significantly impact how people work together, calling an exploration of how identity dynamics between peacekeepers and populations may impact the efficacy of other operational factors.

I find mixed support for my theories about the impact of identity difference on peacekeeping. Field surveys and newspaper interviews reveal some evidence that racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and populations may have hurt MONUC conflict reduction efforts by decreasing informative trust and communication between the two groups. But there is little evidence for or against the hypotheses that racial and ethnic similarities make a mission more successful by building trust and communication as Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri propose. Putting this case study in context with the existing literature and my quantitative analysis adds a substantive base from which other scholars can further study the impact of identity on peacekeeping success.

CONCLUSION

This thesis is guided by a previously unexplored question in the peacekeeping scholarship: How do racial and ethnic similarities or differences between peacekeepers and populations affect mission outcomes? I find some evidence for my hypotheses that racial and ethnic similarity helps a mission build success while racial and ethnic difference can challenge peacekeepers' ability to safeguard civilians. I specifically present strong empirical findings that race and ethnicity help determine a mission's ability to build informative trust and communication, potentially helping to explain why some missions' operations are more successful than others.

My regression analysis of ten UN peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan African between 1992 and 2008 shows a statistically significant relationship between peacekeeper-population racial similarity and violence against civilians. One-sided violence appears to drop as the proportion of racial similarity increases in a mission, although the impact is weak. Additionally, I find support for the international and operational strength arguments proposed in the literature. But the quantitative portion was unable to test contextual arguments and explain how race and ethnicity could impact a mission, leading me to my case study.

The thesis' qualitative analysis of race, ethnicity, peacekeeping, and alternative explanations for success also found some evidence for my hypotheses about the impact of identity on one-sided violence. One-sided violence declined as the proportion of racial similarity increased, prompting an exploration of causal mechanisms.

I split the MONUC mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo into two parts, the first occurring January of 2002 to December of 2003 and the second occurring between January of 2004 and October of 2005. Splicing the case in this way allowed me to test the impact of low

racial similarity between peacekeepers and populations in part one against the higher proportion of similarity in part two. I conducted process tracing to test my identity theories with the competing arguments in the literature.

The case suggested that racial and ethnic differences between peacekeepers and local populations created challenges for the mission. Reports, newspapers, and surveys may argue that identity differences impeded the creation of informative trust and communication between the groups, making it harder for the mission to interface with residents, accomplish operational tasks, and reduce one-sided violence. This also further evidences my theory that identity differences act as causal mechanisms which help explain operational arguments. But I was unable to find substantial evidence for or against the hypotheses that racial and ethnic similarities helped improve peacekeeper-population relations and reduce one-sided violence. All this research suggests that alternative explanations to why missions succeed are valuable, but race and ethnicity also have an impact on outcomes. Identity factors are sufficient variables, but more research is needed to determine if they are necessary.

These are interesting results given the existing peacekeeping and psychology literature. My findings somewhat align with Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri's previous arguments about how identity similarity increases mission success through informative trust and communication, although I present new claims about race.²⁰⁴ The social and peacekeeper psychology research suggests that there should be more evidence about how race, ethnicity, and other identity factors impact peacekeeping outcomes, encouraging further study of these questions through quantitative and qualitative analyses.

²⁰⁴ Bove, Ruffa, and Ruggeri 2021

My results build an important foundation for other scholars and policymakers to explore identity and peacekeeping. As the MONUC case shows, peacekeepers can be the only thing standing between civilians and violence, demonstrating the importance of a complete understanding of the factors that make a mission succeed or fail. More research is required to gain a better grasp of the dynamics between identity and peace operations.

First, I urge scholars to study the relationship between race, ethnicity, and peacekeeping through other avenues. There are very few empirical studies of any connections between identity and peacekeeping, requiring more quantitative and qualitative work to thoroughly test hypotheses and causal mechanisms. Future researchers should consider conducting interviews with key participants or gaining access to private papers to truly examine these arguments. Additionally, researchers with other conceptualizations of race and ethnicity should also study these identity questions. The fluidity of race and ethnicity requires a broad study of these ideas through numerous lenses.

I also suggest that others explore how race and ethnicity could impact other aspects of peace operations. Could identity similarity or difference between hosts of a peace summit and those coming to the bargaining table affect results? Are peacebuilders more effective at increasing state capacities when they are more like people in the host country?

Political science literature is just beginning to connect race, ethnicity, and other identity factors to peace operations, creating the space for other scholars to explore previously untouched explanations of peace operation outcomes. Peace operations may come to define the 21st century and beyond, necessitating a full understanding of what makes these important activities succeed or fail.

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Appendix A

I would like to give a special thanks to Jacob Kathman, Lisa Hultman, and Megan Shannon of their dataset and analyses found in their 2013 article “United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War” off which I based my quantitative section. The original dataset is published with the article and can be found in the references, but I am including my dataset [here](#).