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Peace Discourse in Postwar Japan: Emergence, Continuity, and Transformation

Xiuyu Li
William & Mary

Peace Discourse in Postwar Japan: Emergence, Continuity, and Transformation

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Xiuyu Li

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Professor Eric C. Han, Director

Professor Sasaki Tomoyuki

Professor Kitamura Hiroshi

Professor Fabrício Prado

Williamsburg, VA
May 9, 2023

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Introduction: Pacifism as a National Rationale

Postwar Japan has often been described as "pacifist." This is because Japan has not engaged in a single major conflict since the end of WWII and because of the kind of peace thinking developed by its war-weary populations. While it was considered natural for humans to desire peace, this momentum was generated from the memory of Japanese people as both perpetrators and victims of war over the course of the country's modernization. The Japanese intellectuals not only cherished the peaceful condition in the wake of WWII as a generous gift from the Allied powers but also dedicated themselves into rebuilding Japan in a manner of utmost peacefulness. "Peace (*heiwa*)" was thus one of the most important themes of Japanese history after WWII because it reflected the popular will of the Japanese people and because its discourse was the driving force of political, social, and intellectual movements in postwar Japan. This thesis argues that the majority of Japanese people perceived "peace" as the national rationale or the identity of postwar Japan. This pacifist rationale in Japan, however, was contested and shaped by different, specific historical circumstances. That being said, some of the major events and themes of postwar Japanese history must be addressed in order to make sense of the debate and transformation of peace discourse from the late 1940s to the present.

The origin of the pacifist rationale in postwar Japan, however, was the experience of war, the antithesis of peace. On its first appearance, the history of modern Japan was the history of killing. Between the second half of the nineteenth century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Japanese people underwent numerous civil and international wars: the Boshin War, Samurai Rebellions led by Etō Shimpei and Saigō Takamori, the First Sino-Japanese War, and Russo-Japanese War during the Meiji period and WWI during the reign of the Taishō emperor. Over the course of the country's modernization and centralization of its

government, Japan became a regional and even a world power, but it did not cease its step toward colonialism and imperialism. Despite the fact that Japan, along with Germany, France, the United States, and 27 other nation-states signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and nominally established "peace" as the guiding principle of international affairs, the rationale of Social Darwinism continued to dominate Japanese politics and society, resulting in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of Peking in 1937, and the surprise attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941. Japan once again engaged in a worldwide total war.

The entire nation was fully mobilized for that war. Millions of male citizens were conscripted and sent to battlefields, while women and seniors also fought, spontaneously or passively, on the "home front," manufacturing ammunition and supplies and sacrificing their own welfare for the country. All political parties were dissolved and replaced by a political cheerleading squad, and the film industry was required to make "national policy films" to propagandize war efforts. According to national propaganda, the war in China, Southeast Asia, the Soviet-China border, and the Pacific Ocean was a "holy war" for the emperor. Moreover, it was beautified as a war of emancipating the rest of Asia from Euro-American hegemony and of establishing the "Greater Eastern Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere." It was undeniable that Japan fought WWII with a society and culture structured for it, but this national commitment received only destruction and defeat.

Japan entering the Postwar under Occupation

Witnessing the devastating damage of the two nuclear bombs and the Soviet army invading Manchuria, the leadership of the Japanese Empire finally decided to give in. On August 15, 1945, Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on the radio. Shortly after his announcement was broadcasted around the nation, Washington D.C.,

Moscow, Chongqing, Yan'an, the Japanese army in all theaters, and the rest of the world received the same message: Japan surrendered unconditionally, and the war had ended. While the formal surrender took place at *USS Missouri* on September 2, August 15 is memorized by the Japanese people as the "Memorial Day of the end of war (*shūsen kinenbi*)" or the "day of mourning the war dead and praying for peace (*senbotsusha wo tsuitōshi heiwa wo kinen suru hi*)." The U.S. troops then landed in the archipelago and took over the control of government and military institutions from the Japanese. Japan entered the postwar era under a state of occupation.

Many Japanese had a mixed feeling of relief, exhaustion, and uncertainty about the Allied Occupation. The relief was from the liberation of onerous duties for the war, which had become more and more desperate by the end of the war. In this way, it was the American forces who set them free. The sense of relief, however, was quickly overshadowed by unbearable exhaustion and despair, which was often described as the "*kyodatsu* condition," a state of psychic collapse.[1] *Kyodatsu* was generated by the nightmarish memory of war and the loss of faith in the nation. During the war, most of the wooden structures in major Japanese cities were burnt to the ground by incendiary bombs; males were conscripted, sent overseas, and never returned; those who were fortunate enough to be repatriated, however, brought both physical and psychological trauma back to their homeland; industry and economy completely collapsed; food and other supplies for living were scarce in the cities; many urban residents started to pawn their personal items for food at black markets or rural villages. On the other hand, the fate of both Japan and its people, who had vowed their loyalty to the emperor and supported the imperial army, remained obscure in the incoming state of peace. Would they be punished in the same way as Germany after WWI, which paid a great sum of indemnity and bore the humiliating identity of warmongers? In this

[1]John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 88-89.

state of fatigue and precariousness, the Japanese people were subjected to the new policies of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP).

Peace and Democracy

SCAP policies were, basically, democratization and demilitarization. SCAP introduced general election and women's suffrage and conducted land reform in the rural area. They disarmed and dismissed the Japanese army, navy, and air force and abolished conscription. The demilitarization also involved removing war elements from the Japanese government and society. The regime started purging ultranationalists and war collaborators from public service and putting those responsible for the war, including national leaders, on trial. Former Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, Hiroda Kōki, General Matsui Iwane, and other prominent figures of imperial Japan were detained at Sugamo Prison in Tokyo and later executed for waging war. One of the wartime Japanese Prime Ministers Konoe Fumimaro did not anticipate this unprecedented enforcement of international law on national leaders; Konoe, who was actively cooperating with the SCAP once the armed conflict had ended, committed suicide after learning that he was about to be arrested as a class-A war crimes suspect.

Wartime slogans were also converted into languages of peace, which marked Japan's identity under the Occupation. As prominent historian John Dower noted, the collapse of the totalitarian regime provided room for freedom of speech. English, satire on the emperor, criticism of the war, as well as other frivolous languages that were prohibited during the war re-emerged in the Japanese society due to the encouragement of SCAP and people's expression of war-weary emotion. Not surprisingly, the peace discourse infiltrated this half-directed and half-spontaneous social movement, despite some of its languages were still entrenched in wartime

propaganda.[2] The most popular catchphrase at the time, "Construct a Nation of Peace (*heiwa kokka kensetsu*)," was derived from wartime slogans such as "Construct a Greater Eastern Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere," but the regime turned that discourse into a momentum of peaceful reconstruction. The slogan was written and rewritten by school kids throughout the nation. Even Prince Akihito, the future Heisei Emperor, participated in the same practice.

Peace was associated with the revised constitution of Japan, arguably the most significant accomplishment of SCAP's democratization and demilitarization schemes. The new constitution is not only a legal document that defines postwar Japanese democracy but also a symbol of Japanese commitment to peace after WWII. A brief comparison between the constitution of the Empire of Japan and the postwar constitution helps to prove the point. The first obvious difference between the two documents lies in the preamble; the former heavily emphasizes the sacred imperial lineage to ancient ancestors and the duty of imperial subjects to be loyal to the emperor, while the latter expresses the Japanese people's desire for peace. The role of the emperor was made different as well. Chapter 1 of the imperial constitution claimed the emperor the paramount leader of the nation, while article 1 of the postwar constitution states that the emperor is merely a symbol. Subsequently, the emperor of postwar Japan could no longer convoke, prorogue, or dissolve the diet (the congress of Japan) as it was stipulated in article 7 of the imperial constitution. Finally, and most importantly, the postwar constitution prohibited Japan from possessing armed forces and waging war and was thus known as the "peace constitution (*heiwa kenpō*)." The article 9 of the postwar constitution reads:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

[2]Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 172-177.

> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.[3]

The "peace constitution" defined the most fundamental characteristics of postwar Japan, a democratic and pacifist country. As Dower put it, postwar Japan was restructured in accordance with the "idealistic agenda of 'Demilitarization and Democratization,'" and once the former demilitarization was completed, the long-term objective became to create and maintain the "paired ideals of peace and democracy."[4] Peace and democracy were thus intimately connected to and became the sole condition for each other. Meaning that real state of peace could only be achieved in a democratic state, while real democracy can only be maintained in peace.

The constitution with article 9 thus guaranteed both democracy and peace in this understanding, but this "peace and democracy under the protection of article 9" rationale became precarious when it faced the Cold War reality. Was it possible to survive the Cold War without any military force to protect the country? Intellectuals and politicians in postwar Japan had diverging opinions on whether to keep or revise article 9, or in other words, on whether to reshape the Japanese identity of peace.

Contesting Peace

When article 9 was first presented at the end of the war, even the most conservative Japanese politicians believed that they had no choice but to follow the standardized narrative shaped by SCAP. In 1946, Prime Minister Shidehara Kijūrō read the draft of article 9 and said that Japan would renounce war because it had learned from experiences of war and nuclear

[3]"The Constitution of Japan," Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet, accessed April 10, 2023. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html. The content of "The Constitution of the Emperor of Japan," trans. Ito Miyoji, accessed April 15, 2023, can be found at https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html.

[4]Dower, "Peace and Democracy in Two Systems: External Policy and Internal Conflict," in *Postwar Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), 3.

bombing.[5] In 1949, three years after the constitution came into effect, Prime minister Yoshida Shigeru also praised article 9 as the foremost guarantee to maintain peace when he answered a question on the right to "self-defense" in the diet. Yoshida said that "Since the term war of self-defense has frequently been used in past experience as an excuse for aggressive war, I believe it better to renounce all wars, including wars of self-defense."[6] However, SCAP's democratization and demilitarization scheme soon yielded to the "reversed course."

The "reverse course" began due to the increasing tension of the Cold War in the late 1940s. In 1946, Winston Churchill made the famous speech about the "Iron Curtain" that divided the Europe into two separate blocs. In 1949, the Chinese Communist party seized control of mainland China and continued to threaten the U.S.-endorsed Nationalist regime, which had retreated to Taiwan. The Soviet-endorsed North Korea and the U.S.-endorsed South Korea divided the Korean Peninsula on the 38th Parallel. Troops of the Soviet Union also increased their presence in East Asia, and the activities of labor Unions and the Communist party in Japan became more frequent and larger in scale. SCAP responded to these threats by cracking down strikes and student movements and calling off the "Demilitarization and Democratization" process. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 impelled SCAP to take action against the communists. The target of the purge was "reversed" this time. Leftists and communists were removed from public service, while some of the ultranationalists, including Former Minister of Commerce and Vice Minister of Munitions Kishi Nobusuke, were freed from imprisonment because of their anti-communist stance.

[5]Aoki Tokuzō, "Shidehara Kijūrō's Efforts for Peace," *Heiwa Shisō-shi*, 1954.

[6]Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behavior In Modern Japanese Politics* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 308. https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb02408.0001.001.

SCAP's stance towards demilitarization was also "reversed" in order to assist the strategic interests of the U.S., who was now urging Japan to become a more capable military ally. SCAP pressured the government of Japan to repeal article 9, written and imposed on Japan by the Americans themselves, and remilitarize immediately. When this move was blocked both the Yoshida Cabinet in conjunction with the opposition, General Douglas MacArthur authorized Japan to have the right of self-defense in his annual New Year statement in 1950, leading to the establishment of the National Police Reserve, later the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JDSF). The idealistic "Peace and Democracy" of postwar Japan was now under challenge from realistic concerns for national security in the Cold War.

The San Francisco Treaty and Anpo

The 180-degree change of the occupation policy provoked Japanese intellectuals who fell into a dilemma as to whether they should continue following the United States or not. They formed the "Peace Issue Symposium (*heiwa mondai danwakai*)" to exchange and express their views on the postwar reconstruction. On the one hand, they found SCAP laudable for reshaping Japan's national institutions in ways that matched their weariness of war and demand for freedom and peace. On the other hand, they realized that Japan could never achieve real democracy and peace as long as SCAP continued to occupy Japan militarily and manipulate the Japanese government. The majority of academia felt inclined to stick to the idea of peace and democracy. Therefore, when the negotiation of a peace treaty that was going to conclude the occupation started in San Francisco, the intellectuals demanded a treaty that fulfilled their imagination of a "peace-loving country," an honorable member of the United Nations committing to international peace on the basis of the peace constitution.

The Treaty of San Francisco signed by Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951, however, failed to meet the demand of the intellectuals. The biggest problem of the treaty *per se* was that Japan only concluded the war with the United States and its allies, while the Soviet Union, China, the rest of the eastern bloc, and Taiwan did not recognize this treaty and were technically still at war with Japan. In addition, the San Francisco peace treaty was signed along with the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, which was known in Japanese as *Anpo*.[7] The *Anpo* nominally ended the Occupation and restored Japan's national sovereignty; however, it granted the United States the right to continue deploying military forces and establishing military installations to defend Japan when it is attacked. Moreover, the *Anpo*, in conjunction with the peace treaty, recognized Japan's sovereignty to exercise "self-defense," which allowed Japan to possess armed forces despite the existence of article 9. The JSDF was a product of this treaty. Moreover, the *Anpo* stipulates no exact date of expiration and has to be renewed every ten years; thus, the protests against it were held every ten years. The signing of two treaties signified the strengthening of the military alliance between the U.S. and Japan against external threats.

Curiously, this move to put Japan in a subordinate position to the United States was also justified by a version of the peace discourse. In his memoirs, Yoshida claimed that the signing of the peace treaty marked the establishment of a "peaceful inclined and responsible government" in Japan and that its achievement of postwar reconstruction had impressed the Allied Powers, who generously returned sovereignty to Japan.[8] He would further claim that the two treaties were inseparable because entrusting national security to the United States was the most "realistic"

[7]The full name of the treaty in Japanese is *Nipponkoku to amerika Gasshūkoku to no aida no anzen hoshō jōyaku* (The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan). *Anpo* is the abbreviation of that name in Japanese.

[8]Yoshida Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*, trans. Yoshida Kenichi (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 243-244.

option for Japan to maintain peace in the cold war. According to his famous "Yoshida doctrine," Yoshida presented an alternative way to peace regardless of article 9: focusing on the domestic economy while relying on the alliance with the United States, the most powerful economy in the world. The "Yoshida doctrine" would inspire more LDP politicians to pursue peace despite the contradiction between article 9 and *Anpo.* At the end of the day, the key to the debate over "peace issues" at the time was whether to have the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the picture or not.

Conservatives versus Progressives

The two most important groups that debated about article 9 and *Anpo* were the right-wing conservatives and the left-wing progressives. This is not surprising in the least, because the confrontation between them has been the central dynamic of Japan's postwar politics until 1995. By the word "conservatives," I am referring to Yoshida Shigeru, Kishi Nobusuke, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku, and other prime ministers as well as diet members from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which continuously dominated Japanese politics from its formation in 1955 until 1993.[9] A conservative politician is usually traditionalist, nationalist, and pro-American because the LDP heavily relied on the support of the United States. On the other hand, the "progressives" is a more obscure category of politicians and intellectuals because its members held a wide range of opinions, despite the fact that they shared the same goal in principle. Liberals like Maruyama Masao believed that it was more "realistic" for Japan to join neither bloc and entrust the national security to the United Nations, and that article 9 and the whole constitution were the best tools to maintain peace and democracy. Marxists like Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hani Gorō were critical of the development of Japanese capitalism and modernization, which heavily depended on the U.S. economy. Eto Jun, Tsurumi Shunsuke, and others generally distrusted the integrity of the U.S.

[9]Also in 1994-2009 and 2012-present.

occupation. The voices of progressives in the diet were primarily represented by two political parties: The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and The Japan Communist Party (JCP). The JSP was the biggest "progressive" party in postwar Japanese politics, and it opposed the U.S.-Japan alliance and defended article 9 because it wanted Japan to maintain unarmed neutrality in the Cold War. The JCP, however, was more militant than the JSP in its support of mass movements and maintained a close connection with the Soviet Union in the early 50s.

There was no doubt that the conservatives confronted the progressives on political issues like article 9 and *Anpo*, but the use of peace discourse transcended that simple dichotomy. While it was in the wake of WWII when progressive scholars like Maruyama and the JSP first used "peace" to attack the government's incapability to enforce the "peace constitution," conservatives retorted with their discourse of peace. In the late 50s, hawkish nationalists, such as Kishi, argued that revising article 9 would create better conditions for peace in alliance with the United States. Liberals like Yoshida and his disciples said that they signed the treaty of San Francisco and *Anpo* for "peace and prosperity" and that they accepted both the article 9 and the JSDF in the 60s. More recent LDP prime ministers like Hashimoto Ryūtarō and Abe Shinzō endorsed sending JSDF to UN "peacekeeping operations" to demonstrate Japan's commitment to international peace, which seemed to follow the preamble but violate article 9. While the "progressives" disagreed with the conservatives in principle, there were many overlaps among the respective ideas of peace they put forward in reality. Therefore, while it is important to understand the debate over peace in the context of the conservative-progressive dichotomy, it is equally important to recognize the fact that peace discourse was central in defining Japan's political and cultural self-identity in postwar war decades.

Structure of the Thesis

This thesis has three body chapters, addressing different time periods in a mostly chronological order. The first chapter examines the origin and development of a rationale for perpetual peace in postwar-Japan intellectual community. Although pacifist thoughts have a deeper root and a longer history in Japan, they could never prevail in Japan without the U.S. Occupation. During this transitional period between WWII and the Cold War, Maruyama Masao and his peers at *heidankai* initiated a mass movement and developed the most popular progressive peace discourse that ties peace with democracy. When their demand of unarmed neutrality was frustrated by the signing of San Francisco Peace Treaty and *Anpo*, Maruyama shifted his attention to defending article 9 from the conservatives no matter what.

Chapter 2 investigates peace as a political controversy in the context of progressive-conservative dichotomy. It demonstrates that while the left-wing parties, like the JCP and the JSP, shared the same peace idea with the intellectuals in principle, they never fully aligned with each other to materialize the idea of unarmed neutrality. The conservatives, though facing strong opposition to the renewal of *Anpo* during the Kishi administration, managed to regain public confidence by significantly uplifting the national economy and making major diplomatic breakthroughs. Between the 60s and 70s, conservative politicians accepted article 9 and incorporated progressive demands into the LDP policy as long as the U.S.-Japan Alliance remained intact. Thus, I argue that the progressive mass movement has lost most of its momentum at this period because the progressive had fallen apart, and the conservatives had fit the LDP into the peace movement.

Chapter 3 discusses the Yasukuni Shrine and Abe Shinzō's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" discourse. These are more recent controversies in which the idea of peace was brought up

again and reshaped. I argue that while the LDP justified prime-ministerial visits to the shrine with the same peace discourse of the 60s and 70s, Abe was promoting a nationalist rationale very different from his predecessors. Abe's discourse highlighted new security issues and the importance of strengthening the alliance with the U.S., and he might have *de facto* repealed the article 9 in 2016. This leaves us with the question about the future of Japan's peace discourse. In what ways will it be transformed, or does Japan still need to speak about peace?

In the three chapters, I have tried to elucidate the kaleidoscopic discourses of peace and emphasize that the idea of peace has characterized Japanese politics in the postwar era until recently. Since 1950, article 9 was repeatedly brought up by both the conservatives and the progressives as an arena where different pacifist rationales were presented and vied with one another. Article 9 has been associated with not only constitutional revision, but with every single issue related to peace in postwar Japan as well. It was repeatedly brought up by both sides when dealing with the peace treaty, the *Anpo*, the anti-nuclear movement, and even the Yasukuni Shrine. In the meantime, we have also witnessed several transformations of peace discourse from both sides at particular historical moments, which could be grasped through an analysis of their changing attitudes toward article 9. At the end of the day, we may be seeing the culmination of postwar circumstances where assumptions of peace generated from wartime defeat are no longer valid or relevant. If so, our understanding of Japanese history after WWII might also have to change because peace really defined the Japanese self-consciousness of this era.

Chapter 1: The Rise of a Japanese Peace Discourse

In the wake of WWII, Japan was in urgent need to re-establish its self-identity and found its position in a bipolar international order. The war officially ended on September 2, 1945, but Japan had not concluded a peace treaty with the rest of the world and was under Occupation. In the years that followed, concerns about punishment and Japan's future standing were rife among Japanese intellectuals. For them, the only passage to a complete and peaceful postwar reconstruction was about finding out what "peace" really meant for Japan. In his reflection on postwar intellectual movement, historian Hagihara Nobutoshi wrote in 1965 that "the new national rationale (*kokka risei*) of Japan is to play a pioneering role in alleviating the conflict between the 'two worlds' and cultivating conditions for global peace." If Japan fulfilled that role, according to Hagihara, the "Great Japanese Empire" would collapse, and Japan would reemerge as a "meaningful presence in the international community."[10] Hagihara's writing retrospectively echoed the statements of the "*heiwamondaidanwakai* (hereafter *heidankai*) or Peace Issue Symposium" published between 1949 and 1950, which shaped the predominant peace discourse in postwar academia.

The *heidankai* discourse not only engaged with political issues such as the negotiation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and article 9 but also aimed to reinforce that "national rationale" in Japanese society. This chapter examines the genealogy of Japanese peace discourse and focuses on Maruyama Masao's intellectual trajectory, which made him an active *heidankai* member and a protester against *Anpo*. I argue that the Japanese peace discourse was a product of intellectual responses to the transitional period between Japan's defeat and the escalation of the

[10]Hagihara Nobutoshi, "*nihonjin no shikōwokeihatsu heiwamondai danwa reisanka ni risōwokakagete*," *Asahi Shinbun*, August 12, 1965.

Cold War; and the intellectual debate over peace discourse was germane to the idea of "realism (*genjitsu shugi*)," which both Maruyama and his opponent used to underpin their arguments.

Early Peace Discourse in Japan

While this essay focuses on the contested peace narratives in the postwar, peace discourses in Japan certainly had deeper roots and was under the influence of foreign source of ideas other than SCAP. **"**Peace" made its debut as a negative attitude towards war in ancient Japanese literature. The *Manyōshū* (collection of ten thousand leaves), the oldest extant anthology of Japanese *waka*, recorded several traditional Japanese poems expressing anti-war sentiments. Confucianism, which was a pillar of Japanese social hierarchy and morality, emphasizes benevolence or "*ren*" and discourages using violence as the means to resolve conflicts. War was also denounced in Mahayana Buddhism prevalent in the Nara period (710-794) and Heian period (794-1185). Buddhist sutras emphasize a similar notion of "*wa*" (peace), which connotes avoiding conflicts between states, families, and individuals and settling with Japanese inherent wariness of war.[11] Although this sentiment of longing for peace existed in Confucian and Buddhist teachings, modern Japanese pacifism grew as an ideology under the influence of foreign ideas, namely Christianity and Western philosophy.

Christianity was first introduced to Japan in the sixteenth century but started to play an increasingly important role in Japanese political thought once the prohibition against Christianity was repealed in the Meiji period (1868-1912). As Peter Brock argues, early Christian writers made several different arguments to condemn war and highlight its incompatibility with the teachings of the Holy Bible, and some of their ideas included "love of enemies" and "disapproval

[11]Nishikawa Yukiko, *Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism* (London: Routledge, 2018), 99.

at the military profession" endorsed by the state.[12] These arguments were more or less reused by Christians (particularly Quakers) in modern Japan, especially those who played a pivotal role in prewar Japanese pacifist thought.[13] Poet and essayist Kitamura Tōkoku (1868-1894) established the first Japanese peace society (*Nihon Heiwa-kai*) in 1890, while others including Uchimura Kanzō (1861-1930), Kinoshita Naoe (1869-1937), Abe Isoo (1876-1949), and Kōtoku Shūsui (1871-1911), and Yanaihara Tadao (1893-1961) were involved in various anti-war activities during the Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905); in the meantime, Yosano Akiko produced a controversial piece of poetry "Thou Shalt not Die (*Kimi Shinitamou koto nakare*)," in which the narrator laments her younger brother beleaguered at the city of Port Arthur by the Russian forces. These authors projected their voices both in the Diet (the legislature of Japan) and the intellectual community, but their advocacy was limited to the level of literary critique of government policy; in other words, they never managed to become the mainstream nor instigated a mass movement.[14]

Another source of prewar Japanese pacifism was Western philosophy, which was studied enthusiastically at Tokyo Imperial University and began to be translated into Japanese since the Meiji Restoration. Liberal historian and journalist Tokutomi Sohō who was contemporary with the Christian pacifists expressed the idea that democracy and independence could only be secured under the condition of peace. In his book published in 1886, Tokutomi claimed that the evolution of a nation-state to a peaceful society was an inevitable, universal historical process

[12]Peter Brock, *Pacifism in Europe to 1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 8.

[13]Yuan Cai, "The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism," *New Voices 2* (December 2008): 181. https://newvoices.org.au/volume-2/the-rise-and-decline-of-japanese-pacifism/.

[14]"Introduction: The Setting for Japan's Pacifism," in *Pacifism in Japan: The Christian and Socialist Tradition*, ed. Bamba Nobuya and John F. Howes (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1978), 2-3.

because "when a force reaches its extreme, it must change" (*ikioikimareba kanarazu henzu*).[15] Thus, Tokutomi predicted that Japan would be destroyed if it does not abandon the way of colonialism and militarism and switch to commercialism. Tokutomi's stance would inspire Nakae Chōmin (1847-1901) to promote Jean-Jacques Rousseau's liberalism in Japan.[16]

Aside from liberal and equalitarian ideals, a school of Japanese scholars was equally obsessed with Kantian philosophy, which promotes peace beyond the will of individuals. In 1795, Kant published the article "Towards Perpetual Peace" in which he defines six articles to ensure perpetual peace among states: 1) peace settlement that leads to war in the future should not be considered; 2) no state can take over another independent state by any means; 3) standing armies will be abolished slowly and eventually; 4) government shall not be in debt for foreign affairs; 5) No state shall interfere in the affairs of another state; 6) no state should commit to hostile actions that damage the relations between states and make future peace impossible.[17] What's more, Kant writes about three definitive articles (or settle points) for peace. First, each state should establish a republican system; second is that international law shall be based on federation of each state; and third is that universal civil law should be limited to conditions for international friendship.[18] In other words, Kant seemed to believe that peace should be perpetuated nationally and internationally via the means of legal institution that protects human rights and the independence of the nation. Kant also believed that there is a "hidden plan of

[15]John D. Pierson, "The Early Liberal Thought of Tokutomi Soho. Some Problems of Western Social Theory in Meiji Japan," *Monumenta Nipponica* 29, no. 2 (Summer, 1974): 207. The quote comes from Soho, *shōrai no nihon*, in *Tokutomi Sohō Shū*, 1886.

[16]Nishikawa, *Political Sociology of Japanese Pacifism*, 104.

[17]Immanuel Kant, *Towards Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History*, edited by Pauline Kleingeld (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 67-70. ProQuest Ebook Central.

[18]Kant, *Towards Perpetual Peace*, 74-82.

nature" which administered the egoistic human beings satiating their antagonist desire with "the spirit of trade" in the progress towards perpetual peace.

Kant's philosophy of peace was critically accessed around the world, and international institutions like the United Nations or the European Union, are materializing a part of the world order in Kant's imagination. Another German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) to an extent endorsed Kant, although he was not convinced that self-interests and "the spirit of trade" contributed to either republican rule or international peace.[19] The peace discourse of Kant and Fichte was studied by scholars in Japan's imperial universities, who were eager to absorb any knowledge that could benefit the nation.

Nambara Shigeru (1889-1974) was one of the leading Japanese scholars of Kant and Fichte, who embraced a pacifist rationale under the influence of Christianity and western philosophy. Nambara was born in a village in Kagawa Prefecture on Shikoku Island. In the 1900s, he successively attended First High School of Tokyo and Tokyo Imperial University and studied under the mentorship of Uchimura Kanzō and Nitobe Inazo, who was famous for his writings on *Bushido* in which he analogizes the code of samurai to European chivalry. Nambara, however, was critical of Christian pacifism as he believed that possession of army is a natural right for the nation; perhaps this was why his professorship at Tokyo Imperial University was left intact in the rise of militarism and became the President of the university—now the University of Tokyo (*Tōdai*)—after the war.[20]

[19]Emiliano Acosta, "Nature and perpetual peace in Kant and Fichte's cosmopolitanism," *Anuario filosófico* 52, no. 1 (2019): 101, with reference to *Fichte's review of Kant's Perpetual Peace*. DOI: 10.15581/009.52.1.87-11.

[20]Inoguchi Takeshi, "Nambara Shigeru (1889–1974): how a Japanese liberal conceptualized eternal peace, 1918–1951," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 19 (2018): 617-618. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1468109918000373.

Kantian pacifism left a tremendous legacy in Japanese academia as Nambara mentored and promoted quite a few young scholars at *Tōdai*, the best of them was his research assistant Maruyama Masao. Under Nambara's advisory, Maruyama, still a graduate student, wrote a paper criticizing fascist/Nazi theories of state utilizing the Neo-Kantian dichotomy between the reality and ideal. As he himself put it, in this premature, cheeky paper, he incorporated Nambara's philosophical argument to differentiate the "conservative ruling class emphasizing the ideal nature of reality" from "the proletarian class, whose reasoning relied on the reality of the ideal."[21] It may be argued that this reality versus ideal dichotomy infiltrated almost the entire postwar Japanese intellectual discourse. Notably, Yanaihara Tadao would be appointed as Nambara's successor as the President of *Todai* in 1951,[22] marking the presence of Christian pacifism along with Kantian philosophical traditions at the top of Japanese higher education.

While they had considered the topic of peace much earlier, neither Nambara nor Maruyama was able to express them publicly in the oppressive milieu of wartime Japan. Even though Maruyama was not famous enough to attract attacks from right-wing groups and was advised by Nambara to use subtle but discreet wordings for his paper to avoid censorship, he nonetheless got into trouble.[23] When he was still in high school, Maruyama participated in the study group of materialism hosted by Hasegawa Nyozekan (1875-1969). Although the group was not necessarily revolutionary, Maruyama was arrested and interrogated by the Special Police (*tokkō*) because Marxism was classified as "dangerous thoughts" and because it was illegal at the time for high school students to study Marxism.[24] They continued to oversee Maruyama until he

[21]Maruyama Masao, "*Nambara sensei wo shitoshite*," in *Maruyama Masao Shū*, vol. 10, ed. Matsuzawa Hiroki, Uete Michiari, and Iida Taizō (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 176.

[22]"List of University Presidents," The University of Tokyo, accessed April 10, 2023. https://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/en/about/presidents.html.

[23]Maruyama, "*Nambara sensei wo shitoshite*," in *Maruyama Shū*, vol. 10, 176.

[24]Rikki Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan: Maruyama Masao and the search for autonomy* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 9.

was drafted in 1944 and restarted their surveillance when Maruyama returned to college and waited for his second conscription in 1945. This experience of repression in a totalitarian nation-state significantly affected Maruyama, who said that it felt as if "the state had entered one's inner soul with boots on."[25] Maruyama was one of the more fortunate scholars who were able to stay in college and conduct research for a long span of time during the war; he avoided being persecuted again because of the protection from his tutor Nambara as well as keeping himself in a low profile.

Wartime censorship, at the height of the Pacific War in particular, was gruesome enough to silence all intellectuals regardless of whether they were liberalists, socialists, communists, or pacifists and force them to switch their support (*tenkō*) to the imperial cause. Prior to Maruyama, many intellectuals had committed *tenkō* or recantation, seeing the promising prospect of militarization and centralization of power. Tokutomi, for example, became a Diet member and served as a consultant for the Home Ministry; becoming a member of the civil service in charge of the police seemed to be in complete contradiction to his liberal thoughts.[26] At the end of the war, Tokutomi was identified as a class A war criminal and was detained at his own house.[27] Maruyama and Tokutomi represented two of the common career trajectories among Japanese intellectuals in imperial Japan: Maruyama made a tacit approval of imperialist ideology and was

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[25]Maruyama Masao, "*nihon shisōshi ni okeru* '*kosō*' *no mondai: Maruyama Masao sensei o maneki shite*," *Uchiyama Hideo kenkyūkai*, 1979, 35 cited in Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 9.

[26]Pierson provided a detailed analysis of why Tokutomi gave up his liberal ideals. He argues that there are five reasons: 1) the rising nationalism and Soho himself is nationalistic. 2) He found the social transformation he predicted was not about to come rapidly and realized the growth of imperialism in western countries, which are models of modernization for Japan. 3) the classical liberalism was outdated at the time, and theories of extreme personal freedom and laissez faire in domestic affairs were overshadowed by expansionism and imperialism. 4) the Tripartite intervention of Japan s annexation of Liaodong peninsula urged Soho the insecurity of Japan s International status and the need to build a strong nation. 5) the imperial house was the only institution commanding the loyalty of all people and standing above all class interests and in which he could promote unity and moderate class conflicts. Pierson, "Tokutomi Soho," (1974): 220-224.

[27]"*Tokutomi Sohō ryakureki/shōzō*," Tokutomi Sohō Museum, accessed April 10, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20070312210341/http://www2.ocn.ne.jp/~tsoho/index.html.

conscripted into the army, while Tokutomi joined the government directly; to be frank, none of them would have survived the war if they refused to commit *tenkō.* Many could not bear the conscience of betraying their original ideal and endorsing, tacitly or explicitly, war atrocities. With this huge psychological burden, the Japanese intellectuals had to address the period of war and reaffirm pacifistic ideals in order to proceed to the postwar.

Contested Consensus: "The Peace Issue Symposium"

During this transitional moment between Japan's defeat and the escalation of the Cold War, intellectuals across the world seized the opportunity to express their thoughts on preserving peace. In July 1948, a statement titled "Causes of Tensions which make for War" was published by The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Eight dominant social scientists signed the statement, including Gordon Allport, Max Horkheimer, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Alexander Szalai, who was the president of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs.[28] The gist of the UNESCO statement includes the following points: First, they adopted a pluralist position which recognized every individual opinion, which they believed to be the precondition for any collective intellectual effort. Second, they declared that longing for peace was human nature and thus, establishing and maintaining peace was an indispensable need for all human beings. In order to reach this common goal for all human beings, however, there

[28]The full list of signatories and their titles includes: Gordon Allport, Harvard professor of psychology; Gilberto Freyre, Professor of Sociology at University of Baha, Brazil; French sociologist George Gurvitch, the director of Sociological Studies in Paris; Max Horkheimer, Director of the Institute of Social Research in New York City; Arne Næss, Professor of Philosophy at University of Oslo; British psychoanalyst John Rickman, Editor of *the British Journal of Medical Psychology*; Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan, Chairman of the Council of Fellows, Washington School of Psychiatry and Editor of *'Psychiatry,' Journal for the Operation Statement of Interpersonal Relations*; and Alexander Szalai, Professor of Sociology at University of Budapest, President of the Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs and a Marxist Sociologist.

must be "fundamental changes in social organization and in our ways of thinking," and all social scientists must unite and take a role of identifying (the origin of) conflicts and determining a solution to war once for all.[29] The statement is concluded by the following paragraph:

> (L) In this task of acquiring self-knowledge and social insight, the social sciences—the sciences of Man—have a vital part to play. One hopeful sign today is the degree to which the boundaries between these sciences are breaking down in the face of the common challenge confronting them. The social scientists can help make clear to people of all nations that the freedom and welfare of one are ultimately bound up with the freedom and welfare of all, that the world need not continue to be a place where men must either kill or be killed. Effort in behalf of one's own group can become compatible with effort in behalf of humanity.[30]

When SCAP passed the UNESCO statement to the editor of *sekai* ("the world") magazine Yoshino Genzaburō, they did not foresee that it would trigger a massive intellectual movement. But, Yoshino soon contacted prominent scholar Shimizu Ikutarō, who was teaching sociology at Gakushūin University, and the two worked together to assemble more than 50 of the most respected intellectuals from the Kantō (Tokyo) and Kansai region (namely, Osaka, Kobe, and Kyoto) to respond to the UNESCO statement. Yoshino and Shimizu's effort received such a warm welcome in the Japanese intellectual community because they saw the particular moment as the right time to gather not only to endorse the principles of the UNESCO statement but also to make their own claims to pacifist leadership.

While postwar Japanese pacifist intellectuals owed a huge intellectual debt to Christians and Kantian philosophers, it was the Allied Occupation or, practically speaking, the U.S. occupation of Japan right after the war that provided the breeding ground for pacifism in Japan.

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[29]Allport, Freyre, Gurvitch, Horkheimer, Næss, Rickman, Sullivan, & Szalai. "Causes of Tensions which make for War." The entire statement is cited in Hadley Cantril, "Psychology Working for Peace," *The American psychologist* 4, no.3 (March 1949): 72-73.

[30]Ibid., 73.

In 1948, Japan was on its way to democracy and independence under the supervision of SCAP. The imperial system was discredited, and Emperor Hirohito was briefly in danger of being put on trial along with other suspects of war crimes. The new constitution also came into effect in the previous year, which convinced Japanese scholars that the "fundamental changes in social organization and people's way of thinking" in the UNESCO statement was taking place in Japan. Yoshino, in particular, was motivated by the presence of Hungarian scientist Szalai's signature in the statement, which he believed to be symbol of cross-cultural pacifism that transcended ideological confrontation. It was not until 1950 that a paper edited by Hadley Cantril showed Szalai's discontent with other UNESCO members' "prejudice" against socialism. The escalation of Cold War between 1947-1950 would also frustrate this ephemeral enjoyment of freedom and fulfillment of ideology.[31]

This first national gathering of Japanese intellectuals in postwar Japan led to the establishment of the "Peace Issue Symposium." The *heidankai* officially announced its establishment in 1949 at the proposal of three eminent scholars, Abe Yoshishige, Ōuchi Hyōe, and Nishina Yoshio, and had branches at universities around Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. From 1949 to 1950, the *heidankai* published three statements on peace, and all of them more or less echoed the principles highlighted in the UNESCO statement. Some of the respected *heidankai* members who signed the statements included Maruyama Masao, Tanaka Michitarō, Shimizu Ikutaro, Yanaihara Tadao, Ryū Shintarō, and Hani Gorō.[32] In the eyes of a contemporary Japanese graduate student, the list of names would be absolutely formidable as it included the most well-known scholars from the best universities in the nation and that it by and

[31]Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 177-178.

[32]For full list of *Keidankai* members who signed the first collective statement, see Ōtake Hideo, *sengonihon bōeimondaishiryōshu* vol.1 (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1991), 360-361.

large represented the mainstream view of academia.[33] Maruyama Masao, who had been investigated by the police during the war due to his critique against Japanese fascism, was very active in the symposium. Maruyama was responsible for the Tokyo branch of *heidankai*'s original response to the UNESCO statement and contributed to the writing of the first and second chapter of *heidankai*'s third statement "*mitabi heiwa ni tsuite* (third times about peace)," despite his tuberculosis.[34] To a certain degree, the *heidankai* statement was Maruyama's voice.

In the proceedings of *heidankai*, Maruyama and his peers sought to settle peace with realistic measures on the one hand and foregrounded the "ideological transcendence of peace" or the idea of "peaceful coexistence" on the other.[35] Firstly, the group had to address the issue of war responsibility to determine whether they had the right to discuss peace. How could they explain their recantation during the war, which could signify their tacit agreement to Japan's war commitment? As Hani, who was a *Kōzaha* Marxist in the prewar era, suggested, "[Do] we have the qualifications to respond (to the UNESCO statement)? I don't think so."[36] While Ōuchi said that the war was a "special circumstance" and it was difficult for them to resist, Maruyama chimed in and pointed out that nobody could leave the war behind with his hands clean, but at least they could take *heidankai* as an opportunity to show intellectual solidarity and use their knowledge to achieve peace.

Maruyama wrote this view in the first *heidankai* statement, which read:

> It is the most regrettable that we Japanese social scientists, though we have possessed the views of peace in this statement, only made little resistance when our country started the war of aggression and lacked the courage and efforts to proactively prevent war. Perhaps

[33]It is almost equivalent to W&M faculties' open letter to President Rowe.
[34]Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 177.
[35]Ibid.
[36]Hani Gorō in *Heiwa Mondai tōgikai gijiroku*, *Sekai*, July 1985, 78, cited in Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 179.

> the reason behind this is that we were deprived of our freedom of speech, and we could not spread our views among the people or have the power to protect peace.[37]

Maruyama believed that the peace discourse was muzzled during the war because intellectuals were deprived of the freedom of speech. To not repeat that tragic episode, the Japanese intellectuals must unite and work with the people. Maruyama and his peers claimed that despite the schism between capitalism and socialism in Japan and the world, it was still possible to seek "consensus among the majority (*tasuo iken*)" and "common understanding (*kyutsuo no kenkai*)" of peace issues.[38] In *The third time on Peace*, Maruyama argued that even though the globe was divided by the "two worlds," global peace was not a fantasy. The "two worlds" were made of two blocs led by two superpowers, but Maruyama was trying to say that this divide was not "monolithic, but multi-dimensional and thus manageable." Therefore, depicting the Cold War as the confrontation of two groups of nations who shared exactly the same interests and ideology was a "misrepresentation of reality."[39] The future of Japanese democracy and autonomy thus lay in Maruyama's "realistic" theory of peaceful coexistence with both worlds.

More importantly, the statement made the case that Japan must take a proactive but neutral role in making world peace. Maruyama believed that neither American democracy nor Soviet communism could offer the state of peace he wanted. To him, the former provides "freedom without equality," while the latter provides "equality without freedom."[40] Maruyama also drew the connection between the "peace constitution," which expressed Japanese people's desire for peace, and Japan's very existence, which depended upon the goodwill of the nations

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[37]Abe Yoshishige et al. "*Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru nihon no kagakusha no seimei*," in Ōtake Hideo, *sengonihon bōeimondaishiryōshu*, vol.1 (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobō, 1991), 357-358.

[38]Hagihara, *Asahi Shinbun*, August 12, 1965.

[39]Kersten, *Democracy in Postwar Japan*, 191.

[40]"*Mitabi no heiwa ni tsuite*," cited in Ibid., 192.

who judged Japan's war crimes. Therefore, Japan must look for a "complete peace (*zenmen kōwa*)," which includes the Soviet Union and China, instead of a "separate peace (*tandoku kōwa*)" with the United States and its allies. The U.S. military presence in Japan was meant to be terminated; the article 9 should be honored and defended; and Japan would instead entrust its security to the United Nations and thus fulfill the national mission written on the preamble; Thereupon, the Japanese people could bear the "great responsibility to rebuild Japan in a peaceful manner."[41] Furthermore, Maruyama suggested that the peaceful reconstruction of Japan entailed the three following aspects: first, launching social and institutional reforms to achieve maximum social welfare and justice and mend the rift between races, ideologies, nations, religions, and classes; second, scholars should work and share their knowledge of peace with the people and the politicians; third, they projected Japan as a proactive agent of human progress and an honorable member of the international community, which bears a resemblance to the Kantian theory of "perpetual peace." He described this scheme as "enlightenment (*keimō*)."

There is no doubt that *heidankai* failed to "enlighten" the entirety of Japan. The symposium overestimated the breakdown of the established power structure after WWII and people's enthusiasm for their vision of world peace. Japan, in the early postwar era, did not have the economic means or power to realize any of these objectives. The confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet blocs in Eastern Europe and break out of the Korean War severely undermined the public confidence on the project, which gave the conservative politicians the ground to argue against *heidankai* scholars that the U.S-Japan alliance was the "cornerstone" of peace and security in Japan. Numbers of conservative *heidankai* members actually left Maruyama to support the security treaty. Unarmed neutrality vs. peace with the right of self-

[41]Abe et al. "*Sensō to heiwa ni kansuru no seimei*," in Ōtake *shiryōshu*, vol.1, 357.

defense thus became the most difficult paradox for Japanese pacifists to deal with. The intellectual community would continue their peace activism in the next two decades or so, and Maruyama would be leading the protests against U.S-Japan security treaty in 1960; however, people's enthusiasm towards the enlightenment project was gradually exhausted because they were tired of hearing about revolutionary ideologies without making any real-life benefits.

Nevertheless, *heidankai* was the first collective intellectual effort in postwar Japan to engage seriously with international and social realities within the framework of peace, and its formation was based on a contested consensus among scholars of different backgrounds and fields. Maruyama and his peers at *heidankai* established the theoretical foundations for the Japanese conceptions of peace and published three sensational statements on that subject. They also conducted extensive research on peace and democracy, peace treaties, and the constitution, making them the most influential intellectual group in postwar Japan. In the 1950s, the symposium gained nationwide popularity and represented the mainstream view of the academia. It failed because SCAP, the architect of Japan's democratic and pacifist systems, turned against them in conjunction with the conservatives in Japan. Despite the fact that the symposium's advocacy was frustrated by the successive events of the signing of San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, and Japan's remilitarization in response to the rising tension of the Cold War, this intellectual practice survived in various forms through the anti-Vietnam War citizens movement (*Beheiren*) as well as protests against *Anpo* in the 1960s and 70s. The fact that the peace discourse was incorporated into all these social and student movements seeking was salient. In the final analysis, participants of the *heidankai* inaugurated a new era of Japanese intellectual history.

The Problem of the "Peace Constitution"

The U.S. occupation of Japan was technically terminated in 1952, but American forces were still deployed throughout Japan according to *Anpo*. The concern about Japan entering a war fought by the U.S. prevailed among Japanese intellectuals. Some of them were critical of the occupation policies as well as the peace constitution, and they presented an ambivalent discourse as they were reluctant to challenge pacifist and democratic principles in the constitution but were aware of the lack of integrity in the enforcement of them in reality.

Literary critic Eto Jun, who studied at Princeton University in the 1960s, found out that the Occupation forces censored and suppressed any "anti-democracy" or "militaristic" publications, including those related to the atomic bombings. This discovery completely changed Eto's opinion about the Christian civilization of the United States, even though he was almost converted to its democratic or Enlightenment ideas. Eto distrusted the integrity of the Occupation because he worried that if Japan became stronger and less dependent, the United States would no longer tolerate her. He believed that the only way out for Japan was to revise the American-written constitution while maintaining Japan's role in the American-centered international order of peace. Nationalism mixed with pacifism in his ambivalent feelings, and his writing challenged the constitution's denunciation of the right of belligerency, which he believed essential to restore national independence:

> Japan must continue to develop peacefully, without becoming embroiled in any war arising in any part of the world, at least for the next twenty years…The recovery of the right of belligerency does not mean walking the road to war. It would not mean nuclear armament. It would only mean the regaining of sovereignty.[42]

[42]Eto Jun, *1946 Kenpō: Sono Kōsoku* (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū, 1980), 99.

Eto would find Takeuchi Yoshimi agreeing with his critique of the American-written "peace constitution." Similarly, Takeuchi looked at the constitution with disbelief and disillusion, which seemed to be cold (*yosoyososhii*) to him: "It [the constitution] stresses universal human rights, and that is wonderful, but I have the feeling that it is too dazzling (*mabushii*) and I am embarrassed to call it my own…Are we such fine people?"[43] Disappointed by "fascist" and "authoritative" policies of the regime, Takeuchi quit his teaching positions and started writing to make the constitution "warmer" to the Japanese people. Takeuchi was one of the most prominent cultural critics in the Showa era and famous for his adaptation of the Chinese revolution model to Japan's path to overcome issues of modernity, and his view would attract Tsurumi Shunsuke, a historian, sociologist, and philosopher who studied at Harvard before the Pearl Harbor. Sharing his academic experience in an elite American university with Eto, Tsurumi equally felt his vision of America was "tainted" as its occupation policy rapidly moved to an anti-communist stance and restored Japanese conservatives to power.[44] Ueyama Shumpei, a philosopher, chimed in on the discussion of article 9 by reflecting on the development of pacifist doctrine during the war and expressing his uneasiness about the pacifist identity that was imposed on Japan. For Ueyama, article 9 is based on unfounded, "self-righteous" premises framed by the Americans, and the Japanese people should always keep a vigilant eye on it. He writes:

> The stipulation of article 8 of the Atlantic Charter and article 9 of the Japanese constitution rests on the self-righteous premise of the American government, which took the initiative in framing them both, that 'we are a peace-loving people.' To take what

[43]Takeuchi Yoshimi, *Fufukujū no Isan* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1961), 142.

[44]Lawrence Olson, *Ambivalent Moderns: Portraits of Japanese cultural identity* (Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 126.

> they propose at face value without a fundamental reconsideration of their shared premise is unacceptable.[45]

While other intellectuals found it difficult to reconcile the difference between the idea in the constitution and the Cold War reality, Maruyama scrutinized the constitution and developed a clear and coherent position to endorse article 9. First, Maruyama believed that the preamble should not be taken frivolously as it states Japan's national mission. The preamble stipulates that the Japanese people shall not only secure themselves and their posterity "the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations" but promote peace as a "universal principle" that "controls human relationships." This requires Japan to promote regional and international peace proactive by presenting itself as a "honorable" member of the international community. This national mission was stated in the last sentence: "We the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources."[46] The preamble and article 9 are thus intimately connected and central to this national mission as well as Maruyama's vision of peace. This raises two questions. Why should people consider the preamble and article 9 seriously when they seemed to depart very much from Cold War reality? What should Japan do to deal with that difference between theory and reality? Maruyama, who was active in researching and participating in discussion of *Kenpō Mondai Danwakai* (Constitutional Issue Symposium) since 1958, came up with a two-fold interpretation of the constitution from his realistic pacifism developed during his participation in *heidankai* activities.

On the one hand, Maruyama believed that people should stop posing ambivalent and unclear critiques of the *status quo* but take action to achieve what was stipulated in the

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[45]Ueyama Shunpei, *Dai Tō-A sensō no imi* (Chūō Kōronsha, 1964), I, 29.

[46]This position was later adapted in the 1960s by residents lived near SDF bases at Hokkaido, who argued that preamble of the constitution entitled them to the "right to live in peace" and therefore the military installations were unconstitutional and supposed to be removed. For more details, see Sasaki Tomoyuki, *Japan's Postwar Military and Civil Society* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), chapter 3.

constitution: complete demilitarization and democracy. This, however, required people to embrace the rationale of *doing* (*suru koto*), meaning to assert their rights to live in a free, democratic society without the threat of war and protect them.[47] In Maruyama's view, this reasoning of *doing* was in contrast to that of *being* (*dearu koto*), which meant sitting comfortably on the *status quo* and "falling asleep on one's rights." He believes that if the Japanese people continued to act upon one's *being* as they did in the feudal era when samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants only practice duties assigned by the caste system, they would eventually be dispossessed of all the rights granted to them.[48] In this sense, the *doing* rationale was very modern because it encouraged people to challenge the government and discuss the "peace constitution," which, according to Maruyama, maintained the vitality of democracy in postwar Japan. The "peace constitution" would be meaningless if people merely treated it as a political manifesto that could never be realized. Therefore, defending the peace constitution was extremely important because it signified the switchover from *being* to *doing*----in other words, from a stagnated old feudal society to a vibrant new democratic society. His essay "Some Reflections on Article 9 of the Constitution" reads:

> When we regard article 9 as a direction indicator, it becomes a dynamic force, not just a static outer limit…. The Self-Defense Forces actually exist, and of course nobody can deny the reality of their existence. But that reality is very different when we ask if we should increase the Self-Defense Forces or if we should turn toward decreasing them as much as possible and converting them to peaceful uses. In making such a decision, article 9 is of great usefulness as the actual stipulation which determines our course of action. It is our political compass. Otherwise, if we refuse to discard article 9 merely because it is a lofty ideal and persist in thinking of it as an outer limit for policy, we must conclude that

[47]Maruyama Masao, "Being and Doing" (1958), trans. Dennis Washburn, *Review of Japanese Culture and Society* 25 (2013): 152. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43945391.

[48]Ibid., 153, 155.

> it makes no difference whether defense forces are decreased or increased as long as they stay within certain limits.[49]

In such a way, Maruyama argued that enforcing the peace constitution could grant the intellectuals and the rest of Japan a real opportunity to commit to *doing*—to achieve "enlightenment" and reconstruct Japan with peace and democracy.

On the other hand, Maruyama also argued that dissolving the JSDF and defending article 9 was realistic because it was the Japanese people's will. Maruyama rejected the rationale that Japan's best way to enter the postwar era was to strengthen its tie with the U.S. because it was occupied by the United States—which happened to be the strongest economic entity in the globe—even at the expense of the "peace constitution." The view that Japan should rely on the U.S. to reconstruct peacefully was very popular among intellectuals and had been a consistent LDP policy. Most of the LDP politicians endorsed the U.S.-Japan Alliance because they considered it to be "realistic" and "pragmatic." In Maruyama's view, however, they were wrong because they failed to grasp the changeability of the situation, meaning that the Cold War would not last forever. Maruyama blamed the conservative government for only showing people the view that Japan "must" be on the U.S. side for geopolitical and economic reasons and underplayed other views against them.[50] At the end of the day, it was not the people's choice but the LDP's choice, and the conservatives misjudged the situation because they undermined the power of the mass, as the only reality in Maruyama's conventional liberalism. Maruyama thus argued vociferously not only that Japan's passive foreign policy under which the national

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[49]Maruyama Masao, "Some Reflections on Article IX of the Constitution," trans. Frank Baldwin in *Thought and Behavior In Modern Japanese Politics: Expanded Edition*, ed. Ivan Morris (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 298-299.

[50]Sasaki Fumio, *Nationalism, Political Realism and Democracy in Japan: The Thought of Maruyama Masao* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 99. ProQuest.

security was "entrusted to another country," was unconstitutional,[51] but also that the conservative government was not showing every possible option to the Japanese people.[52]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have delineated the connection between Japanese peace discourse in the postwar and earlier pacifist thoughts in Christian and Kantian philosophy. Although they had possessed thoughts on peace much earlier, Japanese intellectuals could only express them publicly in the wake of WWII. That was when the "peace constitution" granted them the freedom of speech to respond to the UNESCO statement and articulate a pacifist, "national rationale." That rationale was the predominant view of *heidankai*/academia in the early 1950s, but it was criticized for being overly "idealistic" to its commitment to unarmed neutrality during the Occupation and the Cold War. However, intellectuals such as Maruyama would not easily succumb to that criticism, and he argued that the constitution must be defended because it was the key to successful postwar reconstruction and because it represented the will of Japanese people. Maruyama's theory and discussion of article 9 influenced many of his colleagues and students, but he never spoke in the Diet. The following chapter will discuss various competing rationales for peace proposed by the political parties. While the discourse of the progressive parties more or less resembled that of *heidankai*, the gist of the conservative peace discourse, however, was about preserving more "realistic" peace under the U.S. military umbrella.

[51]Maruyama, *Thought and Behavior*, 305.
[52]Sasaki Fumio, *Thought of Maruyama Masao*, 99.

Chapter 2: Peace Politics

There is no other word more prevalent than peace in postwar Japanese politics. Even for right-wing politicians such as Kishi Nobusuke, addressing Japan's image of a "peace-loving nation" (*heiwa kokka*) was no less imperative than pushing for constitutional revision. After he signed the revised *Anpo* in January 1960, Kishi mentioned the term "peace" 19 times in his administrative speech delivered between February 1 and 2, arguing that he was taking action for peace instead of saying it in vain. He even claimed that the new treaty did not mean to antagonize the communist countries.[53] It seems wild to imagine a man like Kishi, former cabinet member of Tōjō Hideki's cabinet during the war, being so eager to justify his actions with the word "peace," but in fact, every single Japanese prime minister since the end of World War Two mentioned peace in speeches regardless of his political standing.[54] The Japanese peace discourse, which emerged in the particular historical circumstances of defeat and the Cold War, had become the dominant narrative of Japan's political self-identity by 1960.

The peace discourse, however, was contested by both progressives and conservatives in this period. On the one hand, Japanese socialists and communists in the opposition, or the progressives, used peace as a central term in an anti-government, anti-US social movement. On the other hand, the conservatives in the government attempted to contain that movement by utilizing peace as a guiding ideology. The debate over peace was more complicated than this dichotomy as the progressives and the conservatives both suffered from factionalism and personal strife, making the peace discourse in postwar politics diverse and versatile. This chapter examines the political debate over peace discourse between the 1950s and 70s within the context

[53]Akimoto Daisuke, *Japanese Prime Ministers and Their Peace Philosophy: 1945 to the Present* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 141.

[54]For more details, see Akimoto, *Japanese Prime Ministers and Their Peace Philosophy*.

of progressive and conservative confrontation. I will primarily focus on presenting the peace discourse of the left and right factions of the JSP as well as that of the mainstream conservatives and how they, effectively or ineffectively, modified their discourse in accordance with historical change. I argue that the outcome of this divisive debate favored the mainstream conservatives of the LDP, whose economic and diplomatic successes gradually fit them into pacifist vision of the progressives at the beginning of the 70s.

Peace Politics and Postwar Settlement, 1947-1950

The peace issue did not emerge as a major source of political division in Japan until 1950 when the negotiation of a peace treaty that defined its national character and international role became the subject of public discussion. The controversy was around whether or not the government should accept a "separate peace." This "separate peace" meant a peace settlement without the Soviet Union and China, which would formally align Japan with the United States and extend the U.S. military presence in Japanese territory. The conservative regime was in favor of this plan. On May 7, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru stated in an interview that he hoped American forces would be deployed in Japan after the peace treaty is signed.[55] In the meantime, Minister of Finance Ikeda Hayato exchanged Yoshida's request for a peace treaty that prolonged American military presence in Japan to secure regional peace in a secret meeting at Washington. The Japanese request for American military protection, Ikeda guaranteed, did not violate the constitution.[56] On November 11, Yoshida then stated in the upper house that a "separate peace" was acceptable.[57]

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[55]*Asahi Shimbun*, May 11, 1949, in Ōtake Hideo, *sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: sanichi shobō, 1991), 331.

[56]Miyazawa Kiichi, "*washinton he no misshi*," in Ōtake *shiryōshū*, vol. 1, 336.

[57]*Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 1949.

Yoshida's move to negotiate a "separate peace" received firm domestic opposition. In his secret meeting with Joseph Dodge, Ikeda expressed his concern about the theory of "overall peace," which was promoted by the newly formed alliance between the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the Communist Party (JCP), and the intellectual community.[58] These parties criticized the "separate peace" for violating the peace constitution and national independence. The first chapter has covered the *heidankai* statements on defending the constitution, maintaining neutrality, seeking membership in the United Nations, and resisting foreign armies deployed in Japan. The JSP's demands on peace issues resembled those of the intellectuals.

Since its founding in 1945, the JSP declared "peace discourse in diplomacy" as one of the three pillars of its political philosophy.[59] The JSP's brief party program, which was passed unanimously, offered an abstract idea of international pacifism. Its third element reads: "Our party opposes all militaristic thought and action and resolves to permanent peace through cooperation with the peoples of the world."[60] The JSP became the biggest party in the diet in the 1947 general election and formed a centralist-left coalition government (also the first government) under the new constitution. At the time, the party leader and prime minister Katayama Tetsu was a Christian pacifist and an antimilitarist, who devoted himself to making a peaceful Japanese state. In his policy speech delivered in the diet on July 1, 1947, Katayama mentioned the term 'peace (*heiwa*),' 'pacifism (*heiwashugi*),' and 'peace-loving nation' 12 times, stressing that Japan should become a democratic, pacifist state in order to make perpetual

[58]Miyazawa, "*washinton he no misshi*." Ōtake, *shiryōshū*, vol. 1, 335.

[59]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Their Peace Philosophy*, 76 with reference to *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*. Morning Edition. 2014. October 27. *Nihon Shakaito ga Ketto*, p. 14. The other two pillars are democracy in politics and socialism in economy.

[60]Douglas C. Durham, "The Origin of Divided Politics in Postwar Japan" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2004), 145. Full text was found in Nihon Shakaito, *Nihon shakaito nijunen no kiroku*, 24.

peace in the world.[61] Katayama's peace state project was encouraged by General Douglas MacArthur, who famously talked about Japan being the "Switzerland of the Far East." However, the centralist-left coalitions (in both Katayama and his successor Ashida Hitoshi's government) were unstable and ineffective, and scandals facilitated their final collapse in the next general election of 1949.

The JSP decided to fully grapple with peace negotiations after they lost the election. As Edwin O. Reischauer noted, the Katayama and Ashida government were regarded as "collaborators" with SCAP, while the communists succeeded in the election because of their radical resistance to imperialism and military bases.[62] Katayama's opponent in the party took this opportunity to discredit the right-wing faction to which Katayama belonged. Suzuki Mosaburō, one of the leading left socialists, openly called for a neutralist Japanese state in October 1949.[63] By the end of the year, it was clear the left Suzuki-faction had become the main advocate of pacifism and neutralism in the JSP. Learning from the failure of Katayama's government and facing the threat of communists from the far left, the JSP leadership decided to readjust their position and challenge the ruling Liberal Party by standing up against the U.S. occupation. As a result, the "unarmed neutralism" introduced by the Suzuki-faction became serious party policy. At the 1950 convention of the JSP, the party's "three peace principles" were established: "1)

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[61]Akimoto Daisuke, *Japanese Prime Ministers and Their Peace Philosophy*, 78.

[62]Igarashi Takeshi, "Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 11, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 326 with reference to Max W. Bishop to W. Walton Butterworth, February 8, 1949, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1949, VII, part 2, p. 663.

[63]Suzuki's argument basically sounds like this: 1) Japan's strategic importance has changed because of the successful communist revolution in China. 2) The United States is thus trying to build Japan as an anti-communist stronghold. 3) But Japan should not become the Americans' ally, like what Nehru was doing in India; instead, Japan should strengthen the economic relation with China. 4) Japan need not fear China, who need to trade with Japan. J. A. A. Stockwin, *the Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968), 34 with reference to *Shakai Shimbun*, October 30, 1949.

conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty with the countries which were legally still in a state of war with Japan; 2) neutrality in accordance with the constitution; and 3) opposition to the use of Japanese military bases by any foreign powers. In the following year a fourth principle of the opposition to rearmament was added."[64]

The JSP embraced peace policies at around the same time as the Yoshida government was pursuing "separate peace." On May 3, Yoshida said publicly that the "overall peace" was "an empty talk of inferior scholars who twisted their knowledge and pandered to the public" and argued for American troops in Japan for security and foreign investment for economic recovery.[65] Nambara Shigeru, the President of Tōdai who was thus scolded by the Prime Minister, replied that dismissing scholars as prostitutes of knowledge (*kyokugakuasei*) is an old practice in imperial Japan and that the "overall peace" and neutralism was not only demanded by the Japanese people but popular among the commonwealth nations as well.[66] The JSP also wrote a formal statement to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who was negotiating terms of remilitarization with the Yoshida cabinet. The third section of the statement reads: "Japan has declared its demilitarization and commitment to peace in its constitution, which means to denounce war and to take neutral position in international conflicts. Today the world is unfortunately divided into two camps. At this time, Japan demands an overall peace because it worries that a separate peace will make the relationship between Japan and the other camp

[64]Yuan Cai, "The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism," 193, with reference to Allan B. Cole, George O. Totten, and Cecil H. Uyehara. *Socialist Parties in Postwar Japan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 200.

[65]*Asahi Shimbun*, May 4, 1950. Ōtake Hideo, *sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: sanichi shobō, 1991), 337.

[66]Nambara Shigeru, "*Yoshida shushō no 'kyokugakuasei' hatsugen he no hihan*," May 6, 1950. Ōtake Hideo, *sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: sanichi shobō, 1991), 365.

sensitive."[67] On July 8, only ten days after the start of the Korean War, the party made a symbolic step to launch a peace movement by issuing an "outline undertaking the peace movement" and formed a Special Committee Concerning the Peace Movement.[68] However, within that year, SCAP ordered Yoshida's cabinet to launch the Red Purge, which almost wiped out the JCP from the political map, thus making the JSP the most powerful "peace party" in the opposition.

Peace Politics in Schism and Merger: 1951-1955

The period between 1951-1954 was the period of overcoming internal power struggles for both the conservatives and progressives. On the one hand, Yoshida's doctrine of prioritizing economic development on the premise of accepting American hegemony over Japan was highly controversial. Yoshida not only authorized the establishment of the National Police Reserve, which was the precursor to the Self-Defense Forces, but also signed the San-Francisco Peace Treaty in conjunction with *Anpo* on September 8, 1951, which was an overt intrusion on Japan's national independence and a violation of the peace constitution. Liberals who were unsatisfied with Yoshida's policies left the party and formed the Democratic Party. In December 1954, Yoshida was eventually forced to resign for a shipbuilding scandal and was replaced by Hatoyama Ichirō.

On the other hand, the JSP, troubled by the UN endorsement of military operations in Korea, was divided by the left Suzuki-faction and the right faction led by Nishio Suehiro, and the two factions differed fundamentally on issues of peace settlement, remilitarization, and the *Anpo*.

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[67]Nihon Shakaito, "*Duresu ate seishikibunsho*," June 24, 1956. Ōtake Hideo, *sengo nihon bōei mondai shiryōshū*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: sanichi shobō, 1991), 367.

[68]Douglas C. Durham, "The Origin of Divided Politics in Postwar Japan" (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2004), 145 with reference to "*Heiwa undo tenkai ni kansuru yoryo*," in Nihon Shakaito Seimu Chosakai, *heiwa e no riron to jissen*, p.27.

The Nishio-faction was willing to accept the "separate peace" and join the alliance with the "free world." Moreover, the Nishio-faction was vigilant against communism and willing to follow Gen. MacArthur's call for remilitarization for self-defense. On the contrary, the Suzuki-faction endorsed the "four principles of peace," which confronted the Nishio-faction in every direction. This confrontation favored the Suzuki faction as its affinity to quasi-Marxist ideology enabled it to work closely with the increasingly anti-American trade unions and gradually isolated the right socialists from the pacifist dialogue.[69]

This division was eventually ended in October 1955, when both factions merged with each other to form a left leaning JSP. Its new position, however, was compromised and more obscure. In the agreed platform, "neutralism" was replaced by "self-reliant independence," a Nishio-faction term; the security treaty "should be dissolved," but the stage of its dissolution was nowhere mentioned; the existence of police was admitted, while less strong words were used against remilitarization. Nevertheless, the left socialists could still use the terms "non-aggression" and "international disarmament" as foundations of the peace movement.[70] The reunion of left and right socialists was soon followed by a merger of their conservative counterparts, who formed the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP and the JSP would remain as the two largest political parties in Japan through 1993. This one-and-a-half party

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[69]J. A. A. Stockwin, *the Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1968), 48.

[70]The reunification of socialists was a tedious process because both factions had very strong ideological position. There are several reasons why this was made possible: First, both the Left Socialist Party and the Right Socialist Party became more successful in the election due to the division of the conservatives. Second, the change of international situation, such as the fade of Sino-Soviet threat to Japan after the end of the Korean War and Churchill's speech on Locarno model (upon which the international peace is guaranteed by a treaty of non-aggression between the East and West blocs) to secure the Eastern Europe, forced LSP and RSP leaderships to adjust their positions and provided room for negotiation. Third, the effort of reunification groups in both LSP and RSP played a central role in reconciling this division. *Yakushin suru Nihon Shakaito*, 70-72. Stockwin, *Socialist Party and Neutralism* (1968), 71-72, 77-78.

system with the conservative LDP as the governing party and the progressive JSP in the opposition since 1955 is thus called the "1955 system."

4Stagnation of the Socialists in the 1955 system

The reunited JSP, however, was never a plausible alternative to the LDP under such a system. Scholars generally agreed that JSP could possibly gain popularity by adopting a more moderate posture.[71] This kind of attempt did happen in the early 1960s. The party secretary Eda Saburō proposed a structural reform so that the party could move towards a social democratic direction, but this proposal was blocked by his rivals, who then ratified a document called "The Road to Socialism" only to consolidate the party's leftist position. The stagnation of the JSP, however, was also an opportunity for the LDP to adjust its policy and take over the cause of peace.

Aside from internal power struggles and personal strife, there are several scholarly explanations for socialists' stagnation during this period. First, the presence of the JCP, which made its comeback in the 1955 general election during the socialists' split, contributed to the JSP's loss of momentum. Although both the communists and socialists were committed to constitutional pacifism in principle, the former took a more radical "peace force thesis," which glorified the Comintern as a "force of peace." This ideological difference hindered interparty efforts and caused the ultimate schism of the peace movement.[72] A notorious episode happened in the Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (*Gensuikyō*), a national anti-nuclear organization to which the JSP, General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sōhyō*), and JCP were

[71]This is a premise held by almost every scholar who wrote about this subject. This view is shared at least by Mark J. Ramseyer, Frances M. Rosenbluth, Masaru Kohno, Ko Maeda, Stockwin, Igarashi, and Can, whose article was written more recently.

[72]Yuan Cai, "The Rise and Decline of Japanese Pacifism," 194-195.

affiliated. The socialists insisted that *Gensuikyō* should object to nuclear armament and testing by any nation on the one hand, and the communists were adamant that testing by "forces of peace" should be allowed because it was for defense purposes only.[73] The two parties continuously clashed with each other at the *Gensuikyō* Congress and openly criticized each other in newspapers. The antagonism was so intense that all efforts of reconciliation became futile, resulting in the JSP and *Sōhyō*'s last-minute withdrawal before *Gensuikyō*'s 1963 Ninth World Conference in Hiroshima. The JSP's withdrawal severely disappointed the public, who started to believe that the so-called "progressive" parties were playing with their emotion. Literary figure Ōe Kenzaburō cried: "…but were the conference representatives ever given a chance to take any rational and specific action other than the catcalling of 'peace, peace?' The leaders held secret meetings to balance things among the political parties and the various foreign delegations; the followers merely called out 'peace, peace,' however energetically."[74] It then turned out that the Socialists and the Communists were criticized for merely speaking about peace instead of doing anything.

Moreover, members of the JSP were worried that if the party moved to the right, some of its staunchest leftist constituents would vote for the JCP instead. This was due to the particular nature of Japan's single, nontransferable vote (SNTV) system, under which each voter could cast one nontransferable vote to an individual candidate, and a district could send up to five most popular candidates to the diet. This allowed parties to nominate multiple candidates in a district

[73]George O. Totten & Tamio Kawakami, "Gensuikyo and the Peace Movement in Japan," *Asian Survey* 4, no. 5 (May 1964): 836-837.

[74]Ōe Kenzaburō, *Hiroshima Notes*, trans. David L. Swain & Toshi Yonezawa (New York: Marion Boyars, 1981), 56.

and arrange them across the ideological spectrum.[75] Once the spectrum was clearly laid out, it became more difficult for the Socialists to maneuver since they were not only facing the challenge of the JCP from the far left, but also the threat of central-left factions like the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and Clean Government Party (CGP). Thus, under the SNTV, the JCP-DSP threat situated the socialists into a political dilemma between other parties.[76]

Decisions of incumbent JSP diet members also played an important role in this political phenomenon. Ko Maeda argued that a campaign to nominate more candidates in electoral districts would backfire on the incumbent candidates because if such thing happened, vote to incumbent JSP members would be split by their party fellows, and their JCP and DSP rivals would take advantage of it.[77] JSP incumbents in larger districts where they were in competition with the DSP, were more likely to resist the change of party policy because they were afraid of losing their seats in the diet.[78] In this way, incumbents became an obstacle for the party to gain popularity.

Another factor was the various LDP strategies to undermine the opposition. For example, the LDP outlawed "obvious campaign activities" on TV or radio to impede candidates of the opposition parties from publicizing their new political ideas. Ordinary voters, who had very few information on regional and party politics, were thus more likely to vote for the incumbents, who

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[75]Mark J. Ramseyer & Frances M. Rosenbluth, *Japan's political marketplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 42. Ramseyer and Rosenbluth called the JSP's policy to situate itself between the central-left and far left a "niche strategy."

[76]Masaru Kohno, "Electoral Origins of Japanese Socialists' Stagnation," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 1 (February 1997): 71.

[77]Ko Maeda, "An Irrational Party of Rational Members the Collision of Legislators Reelection Quest with Party Success in the Japan Socialist Party," *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 3 (March 2012): 344.

[78]See the empirical analysis in Maeda, "An Irrational Party of Rational Members," 355-357.

were mostly from the LDP.[79] Moreover, LDP politicians were usually patronized by large corporations and enjoyed various conveniences to raise funds and avoid punishment as the governing party.[80] This imbalance of power and resource not only helps explain the JSP's disadvantage in the election but also paved the way for the LDP to take credit for the peace movement in the 1960s.

Peace Politics and a Divided LDP

While the progressives were divided on their views of peace and faced headwinds in the voting system, there were multiple factions as well as versions of the peace discourse within the LDP, the party of the conservatives. James Babb argues that there were at least "two currents of conservatism," one favored heavy industry and state involvement in the economy, and the other defended the interests of landlords in rural area; it was the cooperation between the former and right socialists that formed the coalition government in 1947.[81] In the period between 1945-1955, seventeen separate conservative parties, big and small, appeared on stage until the establishment of the LDP, and some of them continued to exist as factions in the party.[82] Recent scholarship has divided the LDP into five major factions: two mainstream factions, a faction consisting of former Democratic Party members, the *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo*, and *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūkai*.[83] Most of Japanese prime ministers between 1955 and 1993 came from these five factions. Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku, who were considered Yoshida's biggest successors,

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[79]Rosenbluth & Micheal F. Thies, *Japan Transformed: Political Change and Economic Restructuring* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 67.

[80]Rosenbluth & Thies, *Japan Transformed*, 67-68.

[81]James Babb, "Two Currents of Conservatism in Modern Japan," *Social Science Japan Journal* 5, no. 2 (October 2002): 216.

[82]Haruhiro Fukui, "The Association Basis of Decision-Making in the Liberal Democratic Party," in *Papers on Modern Japan 1965* (Canberra: Australian National University, Department of International Relations, 1965), 26.

[83]Christian G. Winkler, "The evolution of the conservative mainstream in Japan," *Japan Forum* 24, no. 1 (2012): 52.

established the two conservative mainstream factions. Ōhira Msayaoshi, Suzuki Zenkō, and Miyazawa Kiichi belonged to the Ikeda faction, while Tanaka Kakuei, Takeshita Noboru, Obuchi Keizō, and Hashimoto Ryutarō followed Satō. Hatoyama and Kishi Nobusuke, who mentored Fukuda Takeo, were former Democratic dietmen; Miki Takeo was the founder of *Banchō Seisaku Kenkyūjo*; and Nakasone Yasuhiro was affiliated with *Seisaku Kagaku Kenkyūkai*. Although these prime ministers all came from the LDP, they and the faction they represented had their own agenda to grapple with peace issues.

While the LDP has conventionally been considered the antithesis of the JSP and JCP-backed peace movements, the peace discourse of the conservative mainstream evolved over time. Yoshida was a staunch anti-communist and monarchist who devoted himself to economic reconstruction at the expense of defense policy.[84] It was during Yoshida's second administration (1948-1954) that the issues of the constitution, peace treaty, the Allied occupation, and the police reforms were settled (though in controversial ways), but it was precisely Yoshida's firm decisions that incurred vehement opposition from the left, which contributed to his resignation. His successors thus shifted towards a more pragmatic direction and adapted themselves to historical change.[85] The conservatives' success in the 1960s in comparison with the JSP could be attributed to the swift change of their peace discourse. But before we reach that story, it is necessary to address Hatoyama-Kishi's takeover of the premiership, when the tensions between the government and the people were unprecedentedly high.

Hatoyama and Kishi: Peace with the U.S., 1954-1960

[84]Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs*, 223-226, 231.

[85]Winkler, "The evolution of the conservative mainstream," 52.

Hatoyama, known as Yoshida's biggest rival in the conservative camp, became the prime minister in December 1954 and started to pursue his "relative pacifism that acknowledges Japan's right to self-defense."[86] In his policy speech delivered on January 30, Hatoyama said that this cabinet would firmly promote peace diplomacy and prepare for constitutional revision.[87] On the one hand, Japan normalized relations with the Soviet Union, joined the United Nations, and concluded a compensation agreement between Japan and the Philippines under his administration. On the other hand, Hatoyama's advocacy of constitutional revision in hope of materializing Japan's rearmament and full independence situated him in alignment with the United States but in opposition to the conservative mainstream and the JSP. Suzuki Mosaburō, Chair of the JSP, attacked Hatoyama for being "reactionary."[88] Nevertheless, Hatoyama's nationalist stance was generally inherited by his successor Kishi, who became the prime minister in 1957 after the short-lived Ishibashi cabinet.

Kishi was probably the most infamous prime minister in postwar Japanese history. Progressives criticized him as a remanent wartime fascist and imperialist,[89] but he was very enthusiastic about strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance to maintain peace. His most controversial episode came in 1960, when the Kishi cabinet decided to renew *Anpo* signed between Japan and the United States eight years earlier. On January 16, Kishi managed to elude protestors on his way to the airport and secretly flew to Washington, where he signed the treaty

[86]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Peace Philosophy*, 110.

[87]Asahi Shimbun, January 30, 1954.

[88]Asahi Shimbun, February 24, 1956.

[89]Reto Hofmann, "The conservative imaginary: moral re-armament and the internationalism of the Japanese right, 1945-1962," *Japan Forum* 33, no.1 (2021): 78. Also in Dagfinn Gatu, *Japan in Upheaval: The Origins, Dynamics and Political Outcome of the 1960 Anti-US Treaty Protests* (New York: Routledge, 2022), 48, Hatayama and Kishi are marked as "hawkish premierships" by Gatu.

three days later.[90] Moreover, Kishi took despotic measures in the diet to ratify the treaty. On May 19, Kishi ordered police into the National Diet Building to expel JSP dietmen, who were conducting a sit-in to delay the proceedings. The diet then passed the treaty with only LDP MPs present, which ignited a public outcry. People were infuriated not only because signing the treaty implied Japan's further entrance to the Cold War and dependence on the U.S. but also because Kishi's move in the diet was flagrantly undemocratic and unconstitutional.[91] The JSP, the JCP, *Sōhyō*, teachers' union, students' union, and hundreds and thousands of citizens blocked the street, beleaguered the Diet Building, and protested against the regime. The situation continued to intensify in June. On the tenth, the car that carried James C. Hagerty (the Press Secretary of the White House) was surrounded by about 6,000 protesters outside the Haneda Airport until he was rescued by a helicopter; President Eisenhower was forced to cancel his state visit to Japan because of the escalating protests.[92] Five days later, right-wing extremists drove two trucks to the crowd (and injured 80 people), and a female university student named Kanba Michiko was killed in a clash between students and riot police.[93] While the renewed treaty was nonetheless passed automatically on the nineteenth without the approval of the House of Councilors, Kishi finally announced his resignation on the 23rd.

Mainstream Conservatives: Becoming an Agent of Peace, 1960-1964

Mainstream conservatives, who took control of the LDP leadership again, had to appease popular demands regarding peace and regain public confidence in the party without further

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[90]Robert Trumbull, "Japanese Mobs Failed to Delay Kishi's Trip to the US for Treaty," *New York Times*, January 16.

[91]Gatu, *Japan in Upheaval*, 8.

[92]"Chapter Three: Period of President Kishi's Leadership," A History of the Liberal Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic Party of Japan website, accessed February 8, 2023, https://www.jimin.jp/english/about-ldp/history/104276.html.

[93]Gatu, *Japan in Upheaval*, 94.

damaging the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Their solution was a two-fold strategy: diverting people's attention from *Anpo* and article 9 to a soaring national economy under peace and making real contributions to international peace. This strategy turned out to be successful both domestically and internationally.

Pushing back against Kishi's hardening chauvinism, Ikeda Hayato took a more flexible "low posture" (*teishisei*) towards the opposition. He not only promised to tolerate different opinions and hold face-to-face meetings with the opposition but also postponed the LDP agenda of constitutional revision. In 1963, he surprisingly included "no constitutional revision on our watch" into the LDP slogan for the general election.[94] This could be interpreted as a manifesto to prevent another *Anpo*, but it contributed to the Socialists' decline in this period.[95]

Moreover, Ikeda associated "peace" with economic "prosperity" (*han'ei*), a phrase he used four times in his administrative policy speech on January 30, 1961.[96] Then, his "Income Doubling Plan," was a massive scheme concerned about upgrading infrastructure, improving social security and welfare, and expanding private industry through targeted investment, calling for doubling the national economy in ten years. In contrast, the JSP campaign slogan that promised "Three cups of milk a day" became "laughably unambitious."[97] The opposition, troubled by internal split and ideological stagnation on the one hand and frustrated by Ikeda's miraculous success in income doubling on the other, generally failed to pose any challenge to his administration. As Nick Kapur put it, Ikeda's "Income Doubling Plan" remedied Japanese politics from ideological strife by playing an identity game that intertwined nationalism with

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[94]Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 81.

[95]Ibid., 81-82.

[96]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Peace Philosophy*, 151.

[97]Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 102.

economic growth and mobilized the nation for "a new kind of 'total war' in the economic sphere."[98]

Internationally, Ikeda made several neutralist postures in Cold War politics. With regard to the relation with communist China, he defended the "purely commercial" relation between the two countries.[99] He also said that Japan should trade simultaneously with mainland China and Taiwan on January 21, 1964.[100] The Ikeda cabinet was also credited with negotiating the treaty with Park Chung-Hee's administration of South Korea, normalizing the Japan-Korea relations and attempting to settle all historical issues of WWII between the two countries.

The biggest celebration of international peace under Ikeda's administration was the 1964 Tokyo Olympics Games, the first time ever such an event held in Asia. Delegations of 41 countries, including the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, participated in the event along with their rivals in the West bloc and delegations from "Third World" countries. Members of the Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) carried the Olympic flag into the national stadium, and jet formations appeared in the sky when emperor Hirohito, who was invited as the guest of honor to declare the opening of the Games, left the royal box.[101] Sakai Yoshinori, who was born in Hiroshima on the day that the atomic bomb was dropped into the city, appeared on the stage as the carrier of the flame.[102] After Takeshi Ono made the oath on

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[98]Ibid., 107.

[99]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Peace Philosophy*, 150, with reference to "Ikeda Defends Red-Trade Plans," *Washington Post*, *Times herald*, 1963.

[100]Emerson Chapin, "Ikeda Backs Ties with Taipei and Peking Trade," *New York Times*, January 22, 1964.

[101]Jilly Traganou, *Designing the Olympics: Representation, Participation, Contestation* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 66.

[102]"Olympic Games Tokyo 1964," International Olympics Committee, accessed February 8, https://olympics.com/en/olympic-games/tokyo-1964.

behalf of all athletes, 8,000 pigeons were unfettered.[103] A-bomb victims, the emperor, the JSDF, sportsmanship, and pigeon were integrated to symbolize Japan overcoming the traumatic past and envisioning a new era of peaceful development.

Satō Eisaku, the next prime minister, built upon Ikeda's political legacy and discussed diplomatic issues under the framework of peace. In his administrative policy speech delivered at the Diet on March 14, 1967, Satō stated that Japan's fundamental position is to "seek its own security and development in an environment of world peace and stability," with the "intent to contribute to world peace and prosperity in Asia."[104] In the same diet session, Miki Takeo, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Satō's cabinet, reminded the audience of Japan's "moral responsibility" to assist less developed nations in the region.[105] The Satō cabinet thus endorsed disarmament, reconciliation between confronting parties at Vietnam, disarmament, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), all of which were similar to the progressive claims of the early 50s. The *Anpo*, which had inflicted serious pain on the nation five years ago, was justified as a contributing factor to peace in Satō and Miki's statements. Satō stated: "The Government has been able to maintain our country's security and peace under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. I have decided to maintain this Treaty relationship in the future…."[106] Miki followed Satō's reasoning and stated that he was determined to maintain *Anpo* as "the pillar of

[103]"Tokyo 1964 welcomes the world to the Olympic Stadium," International Olympics Committee, accessed February 11, https://olympics.com/en/news/tokyo-1964-welcomes-the-world-to-the-olympic-stadium.

[104]Satō Eisaku, "Road to Human Development: Administrative Policy Speech by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the 55th Extraordinary Session of the Diet March 14, 1967," *Japan reference series* 1-67 (public information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1967): 1.

[105]Miki Takeo, "For World Peace and Prosperity: Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister at the 55th Extraordinary Session of the Diet March 14, 1967," *Japan reference series* 3-67 (public information Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1967): 8.

[106]Satō, "Road to Human Development," (1967): 4.

our country's security policy."[107] Self-contradictory as it is, the logic behind the pragmatic "peace diplomacy" of the Satō administration lies precisely in Miki's concluding remark:

> Today, the trend of world history is such that nations are drawing away from insistence on ideology and moving toward the pursuit of stability in a practical and concrete manner.
> I am determined to promote a flexible diplomacy by seeing every possibility for peace and prosperity under the widely fluctuating international situation, thus responding to the expectations of other countries. I ask you to extend your understanding and support of the views that I have just presented.[108]

Satō did not break his promises. In 1965, the normalization treaty was finally signed by Japan and South Korea (even though it left many controversial issues unresolved). In regard to Japan's territorial integrity, the Satō cabinet successfully pushed through the reversion of Okinawa. The returned Okinawa, he declared, would be "nuclear free."[109] His biggest success in peace diplomacy lay in his contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. On December 11, 1967, he proposed the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" (non-procession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons), under which he would acquire and maintain national security in line with the constitution and established them as "national policy" (*kokuze*).[110] He went on to announce the four pillars of his anti-nuclear policy: 1) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, 2) nuclear disarmament, (3) extended nuclear deterrence, and 4) peaceful use of atomic energy.[111] Satō's pacifist public image reached a climax when he signed the NPT in 1970, for which he

[107]Miki, "For World Peace and Prosperity," (1967): 4.

[108]Ibid., 9.

[109]Satō, "Administrative Policy Speech at the 68th Diet Session," January 29, 1972. Cited in Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Peace Philosophy*, 164.

[110]"Three Non-Nuclear Principles," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed February 8, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/.

[111]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers & Peace Philosophy*, 158.

won the 1974 Nobel Peace Prize. According to the Nobel Committee, Satō was described as the "symbol of Japan's will for peace."[112]

Satō's vision of peace was not entirely unchallenged as peace issues were brought again before the 1970 renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This time Okinawa, which had been occupied by the US military forces since the end of the Pacific War, became a major issue in the "1970 *Anpo* Protest." On January, 1969, leaders of JSP, DSP, CGP, and JCP all expressed their aspiration to invalidate the *Anpo* and reclaim Okinawa.[113] Later, the JCP and JSP formed an alliance against the LDP, initiating the "unified action for abandonment of *Anpo* and immediate, unconditional return of Okinawa;" the JSP claimed that this time, it would not only cooperate with other democratic parties but also ensure its central status in the movement.[114] Between 1969 and 1970, several nationwide demonstrations were organized and conducted by opposing parties, unions, and college students, and riot police arrested thousands of protesters to quell the chaos. In raw numbers, the 1970 *Anpo* was a bigger event than the 1960 protests because it took place in the climax of other peace movements (Anti-Vietnam War Movement, anti-nuclear movement, student protests for social welfare, etc.) that happened around the same time. However, it was also a less effective protest against the LDP because the revolutionary theories were too often used by various opposition groups in the past few decades, while the real problems, neocolonialism, corruption, increased government regulation over universities, and stratification of the working population, were "obscured in the mania for 'struggle.'"[115] In the meantime, the

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[112]"Eisaku Sato: Facts," The Nobel Prize, accessed February 8, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/1974/sato/facts/.

[113]*Asahi Shimbun*, January 1, 1969.

[114]*Asahi Shimbun*, September 17, 1969.

[115]Andrew E. Barshay, "Postwar Social and Political Thought," in *Modern Japanese Thought*, ed. Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 346-347.

conservative mainstream tried its best to fit into the picture of peace by accomplishing decisive economic growth and major diplomatic breakthroughs.

At the start of the 1970s, the 1950s JSP claims on seeking UN membership, "self-reliant independence," neutrality between the two "worlds," anti-nuclear weapons, avoiding war and rising living standard within the constitutional framework, became the ongoing or achieved agenda of the LDP.[116] Upon reflection, Hatoyama and Kishi's reactionary regimes also contributed to this historical development. Japan joined the UN during the Hatoyama administration and was on its way to diplomatic normalization in the late 1950s; Kishi, notorious as he was, secured Japan in the framework of *Anpo* at the expense of his political career, which paved the way for Ikeda's income doubling scheme and Satō's success in the Okinawa reversion. After Hatoyama and Kishi, prime ministers from the conservative mainstream were fonder of referring to the article 9 as a justification of their economic and diplomatic policy. Satō's successor Tanaka Kakuei further consolidated the image of LDP as an agent of peace movement when he and his cabinet hosted the reversion of Okinawa and normalized the Sino-Japanese Relation in 1972. The joint communiqué reaffirmed pacifist ideals and seemed to settle down all the "historical issues" with China. After that, pandas and table tennis became the most popular symbol of international friendship and world peace in the Japanese public imagination. Japan was never so close to becoming a "peace-loving nation."

Conclusion

Every political party in postwar Japan proposed different agendas of peace. The Suzuki-faction of the JSP, whose ideology resembled the scholars' ideas, first incorporated peace discourse into the party policy in the 1950s. Throughout the 50s and 60s, "progressive" parties

[116]This view is also mentioned in Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroad*, 123.

such as JSP and JCP advocated the "four peace principles" to attack the regime, while the LDP and centralists took a more pragmatic stance on preserving peace with the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The peace discourse of both sides dramatically transformed in the crucial period of the 1960s, started by Kishi's despotic move to dismiss the diet and renew *Anpo*. However, the progressive peace discourse lost its influence in the following years because 1) the JSP was stagnated in the face of rivalry with the JCP, the SNTV system, factionalism, and incumbent party dietmen and 2) the momentum of peace movement was exhausted by incessant protests and strife. In the meantime, the mainstream conservatives managed to fit the conservative agenda into the peace movement by campaigning in the slogan of "peace and prosperity" and making breakthroughs in national economy and "peace diplomacy." Thus, while the debate over peace discourse took place in the context of progressive-conservative dichotomy in the 1955 system, article 9 was no longer an issue for the LDP politicians in the 60s and 70s as they backed their peace discourse with geopolitical "reality."

The "reality," however, changed in 1994. In the previous year, the LDP lost its first election in the last 38 years, but the resulting government was controlled not by the JSP alone but by a coalition of all opposition parties. The party leadership decided to form a JSP-LDP joint government with a Socialist prime minister, which signified its betrayal of" unarmed neutralism" and the end of the 1955 system. The JSP had accepted the national anthem and the *hi no maru* as the flag of the nation and dropped its opposition to the Security Treaty and the JSDF. Yet Abe Shintarō, Mori Yoshirō, and other politicians from Kishi's sidestream continued to serve as central figures of the LDP in the following years. Abe Shinzō would become the most important prime minister of Japan in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Although the conservative mainstream had successfully overcome the progressives and achieved peace-related

goals, the LDP did not necessarily seek to perpetuate a pacifist identity in the post-Cold War period. Chapter 3 will continue examining the continuity and change of peace discourses in the following decades.

Chapter 3: Peace Discourse at a Crossroad: Yasukuni Shrine and Abe Shinzō

In the 2010s, "peace" was still political catchphrase of the Abe Shinzō administration. On December 26, 2013, the one-year anniversary of his second prime ministership, Abe delivered a speech titled "pledge for everlasting peace" to justify his "official visit" to Yasukuni Shrine. Abe said the following in that speech:

> …The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their loving wives and children, and thinking about their fathers and mothers who had raised them…. Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today…is to report before the souls of the war dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never wage war again.[117]

While he used the same LDP slogan of "peace and prosperity" as Ikeda Hayato did back in the 1960s, Abe also invented his own peace discourse, known as the "Proactive Contribution to Peace (*sekkyokuteki heiwashugi*)." This notion appeared in Abe's statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, published on August 14, 2015. In the statement, Abe apologized for the enormous and profound damage caused by Japan's war of aggression during WWII and repeated several times that Japan has become a "peace-loving nation" committing to international peace and prosperity; however, Abe also said in the same statement that the country's current peace and prosperity came from the sacrifice of those who died in the war and stressed that it was his will not to let the younger and future generations of Japan, "who had nothing to do with that war to be predestined to apologize."[118] In Abe's peace discourse, Japan

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[117]"Speeches and Statements by the Prime Minister: Statement by Prime Minister Abe--Pledge for everlasting peace," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, accessed February 23, 2023, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201312/1202986_7801.html.

[118]Abe Shinzō, Statement of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, August 14, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html.

must find a way to honor its past and moved on from the humiliating identity as the perpetrator of war crimes in order to reach the ideal state of peace.

Abe's peace discourse was criticized around the world for endorsing ultranationalism, the right-wing cause, and historical revisionism. Many onlookers could not believe that Abe visited the shrine on August 15 not to appreciate the imperial past but to pray for peace. The Chinese government immediately expressed its "strong protests and severe reprimand" against Abe's move and condemned it as "absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese people." Qin Gang, the spokesman of the foreign ministry, said that "the essence of Japanese leaders' visits to the Yasukuni shrine is to beautify Japan's history of military aggression and colonial role." Seoul expressed a similar disappointment over Abe's "anachronistic" visit, while the White House was profoundly worried that this incident would damage Japan's relations with its neighbors in East Asia.[119] In Japan, JCP politician Shii Kazuo claimed that he would never tolerate this action, which "declared Japan's glorification of the war of aggression to the world."[120] Waseda University Professor Yamamoto Takehiko called Abe's 2013 pilgrimage to Yasukuni Shrine "an act of folly" that would cause Sino-Japanese relations to deteriorate.[121]

The problem was not only that Abe's visit to the shrine damaged Japan's diplomatic relations with China and Korea but also that the logic behind his two statements——that Japan's current peace and prosperity was made by the sacrifice of war dead——was historically untrue. In the eyes of the beholder, that generation contributed to everything about Japan's war effort but

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[119]"Japanese PM visits controversial Yasukuni war Shrine," FRANCE 24 (with AFP, AP, and REUTER), December 26, 2013, https://www.france24.com/en/20131226-japan-china-pm-yasukuni-war-shrine-diplomacy.

[120]"*Abe shushō no yasukunisanpai ni kokunaigai kara hinan no koe*" J. People.cn, December 27, 2013, http://j.people.com.cn/94474/8497328.html.

[121]FRANCE 24, "PM visits Yasukuni."

the "peace and prosperity" in the postwar. The reasoning was very simple: those died in the war could never make contributions to postwar reconstruction and rapid economic growth. Moreover, China, Korea, and other anti-war groups all believed that Yasukuni Shrine symbolized Japan's historical revisionism as it denied the judgment of Tokyo Trial by worshipping class-A war criminals such as "heroic spirits (*eirei*)" and showcased an alternative narrative of WWII, in which the "Great East Asia War" (*dai toa sensō*) was defended as a war of self-defense at the Yūshūkan war museum, an integrated part of the Yasukuni precinct. Both institutions were criticized for symbolically affirming the Japanese as victims of the war, rather than the instigators of it. Therefore, Abe, who was talking about exonerating the Japanese people from war responsibilities, was lambasted as a historical revisionist.

The debate over Abe's peace discourse in the 2010s presented a very different picture from Chapter 2, in which I examined how the LDP fitted itself into the peace movement and defeated its biggest rival, the JSP. The peace discourse that had helped the LDP to recover its public image and popularity in the 1960s did not seem to work as effectively in the Yasukuni controversy. In the meantime, however, public interest in peace issues declined significantly due to generational change. Many criticized Abe not for historical issues but because they thought it hurt Sino-Japanese relations, which were already bad in 2013 due to the territorial dispute of the Diaoyu/Senkoku Island. As Fukuoka Kazuya's research shows, while the public preferred a more cautious approach from the PM, the majority of the respondents in the opinion poll supported "official Yasukuni visits."[122] This change of milieu coincided with Abe working with the right-wing group *Nippon Kaigi* (Japan Conference) to push forward his project of "normalizing the

[122]Fukuoka Kazuya, "Commemorating and Othering: A Study of Japanese Public Opinion on Prime Minister Abe's 2013 Yasukuni Pilgrimage," *East Asia* 36 (2019): 366, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12140-019-09322-w#citeas.

nation." This project encompassed revising the constitution, education laws, JSDF laws, and history textbooks. The peace discourse, which has defined the Japanese cultural and political self-identity, was now challenged by the victims of Japan's past aggression as well as its prime minister.

This chapter examines the continuity and transformation of Japanese peace discourse since the 1970s. I will divide the chapter into two parts, which respectively focus on Yasukuni Shrine and Abe Shinzo's "Proactive Contribution to Peace" discourse. I argue that while Yasukuni Shrine has been associated with peace for an extensive span of time, the postwar peace discourse about it was flawed once the shrine was connected to Japan's imperial past; Abe, on the other hand, was looking for an alternative narrative for a "normalized nation" instead of a "peace-loving" one. Thus, the Japanese peace discourse was at crossroads.

Part 1: Yasukuni and Peace

In certain aspects, Abe's claim that he visited Yasukuni Shrine for peace matched the "function" and the historical narrative of the shrine. The term "Yasukuni" was derived from the Confucian classic Zuo Commentary on the Annals of Spring and Autumn (*Zuo zhuan*), meaning "to protect the peace of the nation." Built in 1869 in accordance with Emperor Meiji's imperial rescript, the shrine commemorates about two-and-half million men, women, children, and various kinds of animals, who died in wars for the cause of the emperor. During the wartime, the shrine was an institution of state shinto patronized by the Japanese military, but as the war ended, the shrine was transformed into a religious corporation (*shukyōhōjin*) under the Allied Occupation and has hitherto performed various shinto rituals to pacify "angry spirits" from destroying the country. The Great Autumn Rite, for example, is meant to present offerings (from

the imperial family, the shrine, and beyond) to propitiate the dead, who would cease to be resentful to the living and protect the nation in peace and prosperity; Yasukuni's *Chinreisha*, or the "Spirit pacifying shrine" venerates rebels and enemies of the imperial institution, including Etō Shimpei, Saigō Takamori, and Allied soldiers who died in the war against Japan;[123] the Yūshūkan war museum, which is an integrated part of the shrine, presents pictures, personal items, and stories of the dead, honoring them as *kami* (god) or *eirei* (heroic spirits). All of such worshipping and commemoration was conducted in the name of honoring the war dead without whom, according to the shrine officials and right-wingers, Japan could no longer earn the current state of peace and prosperity. As Takenaka Akkiko pointed out, Yasukuni was a national memorial built to promote the idea of "a peaceful society built upon past sacrifices" and to "define the war's meaning on a national level;" thus, "people across the political spectrum could embrace the idea of peace and prosperity."[124]

Peace Discourse in "Official Visits"

While prime-ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine were an established practice in postwar Japanese politics, LDP politicians eventually embraced the same peace discourse to justify their visits to criticisms. Since Yoshida Shigeru became the first postwar prime minister visiting the shrine in 1951,[125] his disciples from the conservative mainstream, Ikeda Hayato, Satō Eisaku,

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[123]John Breen has done extensive research on the rituals performed in Yasukuni Shrine and problems on the shrine's playing of historical memory. For example, see his article Yasukuni Shrine: Ritual and Memory," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 6 (June 2005): Article ID 2060, https://apjjf.org/-John-Breen/2060/article.html and his chapter "Yasukuni and the Loss of Historical Memory" in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

[124]Takenaka Akkiko, *Yasukuni Shrine: History, Memory, and Japan's Unending Postwar* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2015), 17.

[125]*Asahi Shimbun*, October 18, 1951.

Tanaka Kakuei, Ōhira Masayoshi, and Suzuki Zenkō, continued that practice and visited the shrine 5, 11, 5, 3, and 7 times respectively.[126] More right-wing prime ministers such as Kishi Nobusuke and Fukuda Takeo also paid homage to the shrine during their administration. Between 1951 and 1985, ten prime ministers from the LDP made 58 trips to Yasukuni, regardless of their factional affiliations or political stance.[127]

While these earlier visits to the shrine received rather limited media coverage, peace discourse about Yasukuni was problematized as a national problem during Nakasone Yasuhiro's visit in 1985. Nakasone was the first Japanese prime minister who declared that he visited the shrine in his "official capacity." He also declared that his motive was very simple and even naive: "to put an end to the war."[128] Nakasone certainly had some personal motivation to visit the shrine, as his late younger brother Ryosuke was enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine as an "*eirei*."[129] On the other hand, Nakasone decided to defy the shinto rituals: he declined to bow and clap twice as Shinto custom required and only bowed his head, demonstrating his personal conviction for peace (not for state shinto) to the public.

Since the "official visit" of Nakasone ignited a public outcry, his successors in the late 1980s and the 1990s have been downplaying the significance of the shrine and only visited the shrine occasionally.[130] However, LDP Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's frequent visits to the shrine between 2001 and 2006 once again brought the "Yasukuni Issue" to public attention.

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[126]Phil Deans, "Diminishing Returns? Prime Minister Koizumi's Visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms," *East Asia* 24 (2007): 273, Table 1.

[127]Fukuoka, "Commemorating and Othering," 351.

[128]John Breen, "Introduction: A Yasukuni Genealogy," in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 10.

[129]Akimoto, *Prime Ministers and Peace Philosophy*, 220.

[130]Miyazawa Kiichi made a secret" visit in 1992, and Hashimoto Ryūtarō visited the shrine on his birthday in 1996.

Before his 2002 visit, Koizumi made the following statement, which best characterized the party's endorsement of the peace-sacrifice narrative:

> I believe that the present *peace* and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the resolution *to embrace peace* and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic war. I consider it to be natural for me to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which has become over the course of many years, a central institution for many people of Japan to mourn those who sacrificed their lives for the country.[131]

Koizumi's statement was not only similar to Abe's later statement of 2013 but also repeated the claims of Nakasone, who justified his visit by worshipping the war dead (in his case, the younger brother of him) and praying for peace. Koizumi, Nakasone, and Abe utilized Yasukuni Shrine as a platform to present their version of peace discourse. The discourse of LDP prime ministers, to an extent, matched the historical function of the shrine, but these politicians did not treat it as a matter of preserving orthodox shinto practice. The fundamental commonality between all these statements from Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe lies in the fact that they associated "peace and prosperity" in the present with the sacrifice made by those who died in the war, which signified an evolution of LDP peace discourse since the 1970s. This association, however, as I said earlier in the chapter, did not make a lot of sense historically and became very controversial because Yasukuni Shrine was entangled in the Gordian knot of memory, experience, emotion, and historical narrative. Criticism against prime-ministerial visits and the shrine, on the other hand, also evolved over time.

Yasukuni Controversy: The Dead End of Peace Discourse

[131]Koizumi Junichiro, "Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the visit of Yasukuni Shrine," Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, last modified April 21, 2002. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000357.html. I italicized "peace" and "to embrace peace."

Criticism in the 1970s

Criticism against prime-ministerial visits emerged in Japan in the 1970s, but it was not so much about article 9 at its nascent stage. In 1975, prime minister Miki Takeo decided to visit the shrine "as the leader of the LDP" on August 15, the 30th anniversary of the end of the war, and attempted to push through the "Yasukuni Shrine Act" (*yasukuni jinja hōan*), which would enable direct government support of the shrine. Miki was backed by the Japan War-Bereaved Association (*Nippon Izokukai*), a right-wing group looking for preserving the honor of the dead as well as elevating them as national heroes. Itagaki Tadashi, the secretary-general of *Izokukai* and a diet member affiliated with LDP, contended that "expressing our gratitude to *eirei* and renewing our commitment to peace is a course that is natural and must be done."[132] In response to this, the Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party, Clean Government Party, and other opposing parties protested against Miki's visit because they believed the bill violated article 20 of the peace constitution, which stipulates the separation of religion and state.[133] Curiously, the oppositions did not attack Tadashi (and the LDP)'s position with reference to article 9, which had been incorporated into their agenda since the occupation era. The reason was that article 9 was no longer an effective counterargument against the conservative mainstream, since the LDP had successfully fit into the peace movement by making major economic and diplomatic breakthroughs in the 1960s and 70s. Miki Takeo advocated "peaceful coexistence" and inherited Sato Eisaku's anti-nuclear stance by ratifying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty during his

[132]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 13, 1975.

[133]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 12, 1975; The Constitution of Japan," Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, accessed February 25, 2023, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

administration, all of which put him on the same side as anti-war activists.[134] Therefore, the opposition could only criticize Miki's visit for violating article 20 because they could not attack Miki's visit to Yasukuni on the grounds of reintroducing Japanese militarism as the language of "peace" was widely used to justify the conservatives' stance in the 1970s. Miki's visit would have appeared no different from previous visits if he did not propose the "Yasukuni Shrine Act," which was blocked by the progressives in the diet.

The "Yasukuni issue" became more complicated in 1978 when the Yasukuni head priest Matsudaira Nagayoshi, a former lieutenant of the Imperial Navy, decided to enshrine 14 class-A war criminals as "Showa martyrs" (*showa junnansha*) in 1978.[135] The so-called "Showa martyrs" included the former PM Tōjō Hideki, Hiroda Kōki, and General Matsui Iwane, who were held responsible for "crimes against peace" (namely waging war against China, against the United States, and the Nanjing Massacre) and were executed in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. This matter did not transpire until the next year when a senior shrine official apprised the public of the shrine's decision. "The shrine judged that it was appropriate to enshrine them at Yasukuni because it has been 33 years since the end of the war and it is a tradition since the Meiji era," deputy chief priest Fujita declared provocatively, "even though they were class-A war criminals, they nonetheless served the country. We cannot leave them alone considering the emotion of the bereaved families."[136] Although there was no clear evidence suggesting LDP intervention in the shrine's decision from the government, Itagaki Tadashi of the *Izokukai*, who happened to be the second son of a class-A war criminal Itagaki Seishirō, a major

[134]Akimoto Daisuke, *Japanese Prime Ministers and Their Peace Philosophy*, 180.
[135]*Asahi Shimbun*, April 19, 1978.
[136]Ibid.

vote pool of LDP, most likely endorsed the enshrinement. Moreover, shrine officials also stated that they got the approval from Azuma Ryōtarō, the former governor of Tokyo and head of the Japanese Olympic committee, and other representatives of the laity (*sōkeisha*).[137] Thus, it could be inferred that some LDP-affiliated rightists were behind the scheme.

The enshrinement of class-A war criminals posed a great challenge to the peace narrative of the shrine. To many, this logic simply failed to stand because worshipping those who committed "crimes against peace" could by no means do anything good to peace. Emperor Hirohito was "dismayed" by the enshrinement and stopped visiting the shrine since then.[138] LDP prime ministers also found it difficult to mediate between their "desire for peace" and support for the right groups such as the *Izokukai* in Yasukuni issue, and thus had to be careful about articulating their motivations to visit the shrine. Fukuda Takeo, who has often been described as a nationalist and hawkish PM, kept his four visits to the shrine "unofficial." Fukuda balanced the right-wing nationalists within the party and external critics by simultaneously visiting the shrine and doing "all-directional peace diplomacy" (*zenhōi heiwa gaikō*), which strengthened Japan's connections to China, the U.S., the Soviet Union, and member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).[139] Nevertheless, the LDP peace discourse about Yasukuni was falling into a deadlock. On the one hand, the LDP prime ministers visited the shrine and used peace discourse as ways to support *Izokukai*'s claims. On the other hand, the peace discourse did not work at a shrine that enshrined war criminals, and the prime ministers were criticized for harming Japan's diplomatic relations with China and Korea and violating the

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[137]*Asahi Shimbun*, April 19, 1978.

[138]Hirohito's response was recorded in the memoir of Tomita Tomohiko, a former Grand Steward at the Imperial Household Agency; the news on the emperor stopped visiting the shrine since 1978 was reported by *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, July 20, 2006.

[139]Deans, "Diminishing Returns," 282.

constitution. Although they did not respond harshly to Yasukuni in the late 1970s, the energy was eventually unleashed in 1985, when Nakasone abruptly visited the shrine "in his official capacity" and brought the issue to international attention.

Criticism against Nakasone, 1985

Nakasone was criticized for visiting the shrine because the date he chose to visit the shrine implied historical revisionism. This was because August 15 was not only the anniversary of the end of the war in Japan but also the National Liberation Day of Korea. Paying homage to class-A war criminals on August 15 thus evoked the memory of war atrocities among the victims of Japanese colonialism and was considered an intrusion on Korean national identity. The *Kyunghyang Shinmum* newspaper commented that Nakasone's action aimed to "legitimize Japan's aggression against Asian countries," and a female critic said that "If this suggests Japan's course for the 21st century, it is a dangerous retrogression. It can also be seen as making the groundwork for the revival of militarism."[140]

Though not on August 15, the Chinese people celebrated the victory over Japan and the anniversary of the victory of anti-fascist war on September 3. For Chinese people, the Memorial Day for the end of war was a national and emotional moment, and events that commemorated the war was a very sensitive subject in Chinese society. After Nakasone's pilgrimage was widely covered by the media, the Chinese government expressed "serious concern and attention" to this issue, claiming that "it hurts the people of Asian countries, including those of China and Japan."[141] On the same day as Nakasone visited Yasukuni shrine, the Memorial Hall of the

[140]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 1985.
[141]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 15, 1985.

Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders (*Qinhuarijun Nanjing Datusha Jinianguan*) started hosting visitors in Nanjing, which could be understood as China's retaliation against Nakasone's move. The Soviet Union and Southeast Asian countries protested against the enshrinement of class A war criminals at Yasukuni and Japan's "shift to militarism." The BBC also reported that Nakasone's visit indicated that "Japan is no longer ashamed of WWII."[142]

While his decision to pay homage to the shrine triggered an international uproar, Nakasone continued to be criticized for government interference with religious matters (article 20), an argument that has been used by the progressives since the 1970s. Critics also linked Nakasone's visit to his endorsement of the Kishi line of constitutional revision and the abolition of the 1% defense budget ceiling. In response to that opposition, Nakasone and the LDP claimed that there was a "government consensus" on 'official visits" that any form of pilgrimage was "constitutional."[143] Issues of war criminals and the "emotions of Asian people," however, were either neglected or deliberately underplayed in the LDP report. In short, international concerns about Japanese militarism were brought into the Yasukuni controversy along with the opposition's concern for article 20 in 1985; still, article 9 remained a separate issue from Yasukuni.

Although Nakasone did not persuade audiences from China, Korea, and progressive parties to regard his visit as a gesture of peace, his peace discourse helped him to retain premiership until 1989, making him the second-longest serving prime minister of Japan. His administration led the "honeymoon period" of Sino-Japanese relations in the 80s, contributed to regional stability and global nuclear disarmament. Nakasone also spoke against Koizumi in 2001

[142]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 1985.
[143]*Asahi Shimbun*, April 14, 1985.

because he believed that visiting the shrine would cause serious diplomatic implications.[144] While it was unclear whether he visited the shrine for his brother, for votes from *Izokukai*, or for constitutional revision, Nakasone at least demonstrated some regret in his later years.

Criticism against Koizumi, 2001-2005

International and Japanese opponents of Koizumi, or prime ministerial visits to the shrine in general, used the same argument about historical revisionism and article 20 in the early 2000s; this time, however, article 9 was included in the picture. From 2001 to 2005, Koizumi officially visited Yasukuni Shrine each year, which caused Sino-Japanese relations to deteriorate. China raised several objections to the Koizumi's visit. First, Koizumi's actions seriously injured the feelings of Chinese people because class-A war criminals, including general Matsui who was executed for his responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre, were enshrined there. Paying homage to those war criminals thus equaled to honoring imperialism and denying the suffering of Chinese people during the war. Jiang Zemin, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), said that "This [Koizumi's visit to the shrine] is an issue of two nations and two histories;…I can never condone Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine."[145] Second, visiting Yasukuni was not a question of "personal freedom" and of Japan's domestic affairs because Koizumi, as the prime minister, was a national and political figure whose gesture would encourage the right-wing extremists to reintroduce fascism in Japan. Koizumi thus must understand that everything he did was politicized action. Third, the Chinese government related Koizumi's visit to the history textbook issues. Back in the 1990s, Japanese conservative, right-

[144]Nakasone Yasuhiro, *Nihon no Sorigaku* (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 2004), 144-147. Cited in Akimoto, *Prime Ministers and Peace Philosophy*, 220.

[145]Wang Zhixin, "China, Japan and the Spell of Yasukuni," in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 78.

wing groups attempted to revise high-school history textbooks, which they believed were propagandizing the "masochist historiography" of the war. According to the Chinese government, Koizumi's act to visit the shrine was no different from changing how history was taught in Japan.[146] In this way, Koizumi's reference to peace was pure sophistry, and his real intention was to buy cheap popularity by "going down in history as a Prime Minister who stood up for Japan's political interests."[147] After all, it is impossible for one to justify enshrining criminals against peace to pray for peace.

Domestic opposition parties attacked Koizumi's visits by relating them to a number of issues, including the constitution (both article 9 and article 20), the history textbook, class-A war criminals, and the peace politics in general. The political opposition, in conjunction with local civilian groups, hosted grassroots activities to criticize Koizumi. One of these actions took place in 2001 at Tokushima, Shikoku, where members of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the New Socialist Party of Japan made speeches and distributed brochures on Yasukuni and peace issues. DPJ dietman Sengoku Yoshito first claimed that "We have paid the price for visiting Yasukuni Shrine on a shallow idea. If Japan does not reflect on what it did in Asia in our parents' generation, relations will not improve."[148] On top of Sengoku's statement, representatives from the SDP and New Socialist Party also criticized Koizumi on the grounds of article 20 and the enshrinement of class A war criminals. The gathering also featured with other emphasis on article 9 and the anti-nuclear movement, both of which were agenda of progressive parties since the 1950s. A local citizen group called "the Tokushima Prefectural Citizen Roundtable against Constitutional Revision" organized a

[146]Wang, "China, Japan and the Spell of Yasukuni," 73-77.
[147]Ibid., 77.
[148]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 2001.

signature drive in front of the JR station, seeking support for article 9. A member of the group (most likely a labor unionist or a lawyer) made the connection between Yasukuni and war of aggression/constitution. He said: "Yasukuni Shrine is still a symbol of the war of aggression, and visiting the shrine overturns the principles of the Constitution."[149] At the same time, "The Tokushima Anti-Nuclear/constitution forum," which was formed by New Socialist Party members, advocated defending article 9.

It was interesting that Koizumi continued to declaim about peace despite these challenges. For Koizumi, his position to "make peace" was perhaps coherent and consistent since he had made numerous gestures of peace throughout his premiership. Koizumi arranged the first visit on August 13, 2001, deliberately avoiding August 15 due to international pressure. In October, Koizumi made a state visit to China and toured the Marco Polo Bridge as well as the Memorial Hall of Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japan. Furthermore, Koizumi apologized for Japanese Empire's aggression against China and Korea, and six months before he made the aforementioned statement to "pledge for peace." In August 2005, the 60th anniversary of the war's end, Koizumi reiterated that Japan should never again "take the path for war" and expressed "keen remorse and heartfelt apologies" in recognition of "historical facts."[150] If Koizumi's real interest was to create an image of an assertive Japanese PM unyielding to Chinese and Korean pressure, these public acknowledgements of Japan's historical problem and apologies to China and Korea would certainly go against it.

Moreover, Koizumi was facing a similar situation as Nakasone did in 1985. On the one hand, Koizumi promised the *Izokukai* and his voters that he would visit Yasukuni Shrine on

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[149]*Asahi Shimbun*, August 16, 2001.

[150]"Koizumi Apologizes for War Wounds." CNN, December 18, 2005. https://web.archive.org/web/20051218183732/http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/08/15/pacific.victoryday/.

August 15 once he was elected as prime minister in his campaign for the LDP presidency. Therefore, he willingly paid visits to the shrine to fulfill his political manifesto. On the other hand, Koizumi did not want to endorse state shinto: he refused to perform the right shinto etiquette in the same way as Nakasone did in 1985;[151] he wanted to sustain his and Japan's identity of peace and use peace as a common language to bridge the gap between the *Izokukai* and the opposition such as the Chinese government. In other words, Koizumi wanted to hit two birds with one stone, to fulfill his promise to right-wing voters and personal conviction at the same time by visiting the shrine speaking about peace. Koizumi, claiming that his real intention was to embrace peace, thus addressed the visit not only to the international audience, but also spoke to the *Izokukai* and the bereaved families, many of whom demanded the government to justify and endorse the death of their relatives, for which Koizumi awkwardly and ahistorically attributed the "present peace and prosperity" to the war dead. This move, however, only undermined his peace discourse because it put him under domestic and international criticism about historical revisionism and litigations against his violation of article 9 and 20. Frankly speaking, Koizumi's logic did not make sense to China, Korea, and other victims of war. The *Izokukai*, shrine officials, and the rightists would not be unsatisfied with "peace" as an appeasement to the opposition or an obscure endorsement of each of their position. Koizumi and Nakasone's pacifistic intention could be genuine, although the LDP peace discourse sometimes simply could not persuade certain groups, both in Japan and beyond.

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[151]This aspect of the "deliberately private" nature of Koizumi's visit was highlighted by Japanese mass media. For example, according to the television broadcasting of his visit on August 17, 2005, Koizumi wore a suit instead of ceremonial clothes, walked up to the public worship hall rather than the main sanctuary, and was not accompanied by any priest from the shrine. For more details, see Phillip Seaton, "Pledge Fulfilled: Prime Minister Koizumi, Yasukuni and the Japanese media," in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 179.

Part 2: Abe Changing the Peace Discourse

One of the major transformations in Japanese politics between the 1970s and the 2000s was the gradual dissolution of the conservative-progressive dichotomy. Progressive parties, which sought to gain public support in their anti-war and anti-LDP discourse, were never fully aligned. Left-wing parties like the JCP expounded on Koizumi s violation of the constitution, but the DPJ and other centralist parties were more concerned about foreign relations. Furthermore, the "progressives" might have lost the debate over the JSDF already. In 1994, the JSP, known as the largest "peace party" in the 1950s and 60s, abandoned its socialist ideology as the present party leader and Prime Minister Murayama accepted the *Anpo* and constitutionality of SDF; the party dissolved in 1996 and was transformed into the SDP, a minor party in Japanese politics since then. The JCP still insisted on dissolving the SDF but only had a few seats in the Diet. As a result, Koizumi and his Kōmeitō partner won a landslide victory in the 2001 general election, and the "progressives" in our understanding were no longer a major political force. In contemporary Japanese politics, the difference between the LDP and its rivals in terms of their attitudes towards the constitutionality of JSDF became less and less clear as most parties took the compatibility between the SDF and article 9 "for granted."[152]

The weakened progressives also confronted the generational change and LDP's alternative peace discourse. While Sengoku Yoshito was arguing for a reflection of our parents generation," how many ordinary voters younger than him would find that statement attractive or

[152]Sasaki Tomoyuki, *Japan's Postwar Military and Civil Society: Contesting a Better Life* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2017), 5.

relevant? Moreover, although attacking Koizumi on the ground of article 20 and article 89 (which forbids government patronizing religious activities) was a legally tenable argument that has been used since 1975, the opposition found their argument on the constitution challenged by an ascending rationale of constitutional revision that emerged in Hashimoto Ryūtarōs administration (1996-1998). Hashimoto restored the LDP leadership in the government after the fall of Murayama's Socialist-led cabinet. In his book *Vision of Japan*, Hashimoto argued that constitutional revision was necessary for Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) to participate in UN peace operations.[153] Koizumi, who believed that U.S.-Japan Alliance was essential for national security, by and large endorsed Hashimoto's reasoning; he did endorse deploying JSDF overseas and argued that Japan should "prepare for war in peace."[154]

In this political context, philosopher Takahashi Tetsuya posed serious concerns about constitutional revision and Japan's capablility of waging war again. His reasoning was that Yasukuni shrine continued to advocate Japan's imperial legacy even after the U.S. occupation, which created a dangerous and false historical awareness that could put Japan into war again.[155] Takahashi was particularly worried that Koizumi's successor Abe Shinzō, who set a clear agenda to "breakaway from the postwar regime," would go ahead to revise article 9 and make the JSDF a real army.[156] In Takahashi's mind, Abe pushed his agenda in both legal and cultural dimensions. Legally, the LDP defended the status of prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine

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[153]Hashimoto Ryūtarō, *Vision of Japan* (Tokyo: KK Best Sellers, 1993), 106, cited in Akimoto, *Prime Ministers and Peace Philosophy*, 314.

[154]The quote comes from Koizumi's general policy speech at the 151st Diet Session on May 7th, 2001, cited in Akimoto, *Prime Ministers and Peace Philosophy*, 345.

[155]For more details, see Takahashi Tetsuya's book *Yasukuni Mondai* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005).

[156]Takahashi, "Legacy of Empire: The Yasukuni Shrine Controversy," in *Yasukuni, the War Dead and the Struggle for Japan's Past*, ed. John Breen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 106.

on the ground of article 20 on the one hand, and sought constitutional revision to justify JSDF, rewrite history textbooks, and nationalize the shrine on the other. Culturally speaking, endorsing the Yasukuni ideology was about glorifying Japan's imperial past and creating affection for a "normalized nation" in Abe's terms. Notably, Takahashi also highlighted the fact that constitutional revision was aligned with U.S. strategic interests,[157] and he believed that this would eventually lead to the remilitarization of Japan.

Nippon Kaigi

Prime Minister Abe, when he took office in 2006-2007 and 2012-2020, did pursue his agenda in accordance with Takahashi's prediction and achieved many of his objectives. Abe worked closely with *Nippon Kaigi*, a massive right-wing organization of which Abe was a member, to repeal article 9. The constitutional revision was clearly a major goal of this group. The second issue of *Nihon no Ibuki* (Japan's Breath of Energy), now the official organ of *Nippon Kaigi*, declared that the constitution is the "main obstacle" to the protection Japan, which could only be achieved through "the establishment of a clear national polity linked to the Emperor."[158] At the new year of 2016, *Nippon Kaigi* launched a movement of collecting 10 million signatures for constitutional revision at shinto shrines across the nation. On their pamphlet wrote the catchphrase "for a beautiful Japan, for our children," which expressed the organization's aim to reshape Japan's nationhood. As a result, *Nippon Kaigi*'s "committee to make a beautiful Japanese constitution" (*utsukushi nihon no kenpō wo tsukuru kokumin no kai*) successfully

[157]Ibid., 107.

[158]Cited in Tawara Yoshifumi, "What is the aim of Nippon Kaigi, the Ultra-Right Organization that Supports Japan's Abe Administration?" trans. William Brooks & Lu Pengqiao, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 21, no. 1 (November 2017): Article ID 5081, https://apjjf.org/2017/21/Tawara.html.

collected 7.54 million signatures by the end of October.[159] *Nippon Kaigi*'s political power became daunting in 2017 when 16 out of 20 cabinet ministers were members and constitutional revision seemed imminent.[160]

Nippon Kaigi also attempted to utilize Yasukuni Shrine as a platform to present their argument on defense issues. The Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja honchō*), the *Izokukai*, and laity representatives affiliated with the shrine were either a part of or contributing to the right-wing cause of *Nippon Kaigi* since its foundation in 1997. Although revising article 9 was their primary goal, these groups also found that the "separation of state and religion that has gone too far."[161] Thus, *Nippon Kaigi* was eager to defend the shrine from the opposing parties and urged the government to renationalize the Yasukuni Shrine by revising article 20 and 89 along with article 9. On August 15, 2017, *Nippon Kaigi* set up a booth in front of the Yasukuni Shrine, distributing the aforementioned pamphlets and selling picture books titled "what is the Self-defense forces (SDF)?"[162] This could be interpreted as an endorsement of Abe's constitutional revision claim in the same year in which the LDP would revise article 9 and thereby "normalize" the national sovereignty.

Abe was committed to grapple with the issue of constitutional revision. In 2012, the LDP published a "draft for the revision of the Constitution of Japan" (*nihonkoku kenpō kaisei sōan*), which disclosed a detailed LDP agenda to materialize the vision of a "beautiful Japan"

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[159]Tawara, "Nippon Kaigi," pp. 19 in the downloaded pdf.

[160]Tawara, "Nippon Kaigi," pp. 20 in the downloaded pdf.

[161]Nippon Kaigi, "*Nippon Kaigi ga mezasu mono*," accessed August 24, 2016, cited in Ernils Larsson, "Jinja Honchō and the Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan," *Japan Review* 30, Special Issue (2017): 247.

[162]Pictures of the *Nippon Kaigi* booth, the pamphlets, and the picture book are shown in the Tawara article, pp. 4 in the downloaded pdf.

(*utsukushii nihon*) to the public. I will highlight two important modifications in the draft. First, the draft sought to restore the emperor as the symbolic head of the state and acknowledge *hi no maru* and *kimi ga yo* as the national flag and anthem. Second, the draft removed the limit to the cases of "self-defense" from the jurisdiction of article 9 and legalized the national defense force (*kokubōgun*) as well as the prime minister's right to command that force.[163] The Abe government did not succeed in ratifying this draft; however, the LDP has *de facto* revised article 9 through the ratification of the 2015 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Corporation (*shinnichibei bōeikyoryoku no tame no shishin*), which allowed the JSDF to defend U.S. forces and assets in Japan, during operations in defense of Japan and during peacekeeping operations abroad.[164] In other words, the JSDF, with its consolidated legal status, can now flexibly engage in a wide range of military activities in conjunction with the American forces in Japan and outside Japan. While the new defense guidelines were obviously in the U.S. interests of strengthening the military alliance with Japan, it was also a significant shift on the Japanese side. As James Schoff put it, nowadays Japan "can contribute to another country's defense, even if Japan has not been directly attacked, and to loosen the rules by which Japan can join broader multilateral peace enforcement activities."[165] Japan was transformed under the Abe administration from a "peace-loving nation" into a "normalized nation" capable of dealing with regional threats.

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[163]*Jiyūminshutō*, "*nihonkoku kenpō kaisei sōan*," accessed March 19, 2023, available at https://www.jimin.jp/news/policy/130250.html.

[164]Robin "Sak" Sakoda, "The 2015 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines: End of A New Beginning," Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, accessed March 14, 2023. https://amti.csis.org/the-2015-u-s-japan-defense-guidelines-end-of-a-new-beginning/.

[165]James L. Schoff, "New U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines 'Unlikely to Alter' Power Balance in Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, accessed March 14, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/28/new-u.s.-japan-defense-guidelines-unlikely-to-alter-power-balance-in-asia-pub-59926.

"Proactive Contribution to Peace"

Still, Abe articulated this transformation with the notion of Japan's "proactive contribution to peace". For Abe, "proactive contribution to peace" connoted a clear-cut break with the traumatic history of the Asia-Pacific War and signaled a considerable change of Japan's international role. Then in 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a pamphlet titled "Japan's national security policy: Proactive Contribution to Peace," and its preface read:

> For more than 70 years since the end of the war, Japan has been a peaceful country. It has advocated freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law and contributed to both regional and global peace and prosperity. Japan's security policy is an extension of this course and its essence as a peaceful nation never changes….The international community also expects Japan to play a more active role in promoting peace and stability. 'Proactive contribution to peace' based on the ideology of international cooperation is the basic principle of the Japanese government against these realities. Japan will ensure the peace and security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific region while contributing more actively to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the international community.[166]

On the one hand, the pamphlet suggests that the second Abe government was following the practice of his LDP predecessors, who articulated Japan as an active agent of regional and international peace and prosperity since the 1960s, and that Japan would continue making contributions to third-world development, protecting the environment, demilitarization and nuclear disarmament, and various peacekeeping operations. More notably, the Abe administration also committed to sustaining (and strengthening) the U.S.-Japan Alliance, which has been part of the LDP agenda since the end of the war. Early in 20065, Abe acknowledged

[166]The full pamphlet can be downloaded at "*panfuretto/ri—furetto*: *nihon no anzenhoshōseisaku sekkyokuteki heiwashugi*" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, accessed March 18, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/p_pd/dpr/page1w_000072.html.

that such alliance was the foundation of and central to Japan's diplomacy and national security policy, which more or less resembled the position of his grandfather Kishi Nobusuke.[167] On the other hand, the pamphlet highlights that Japan and the international community were facing some new threats against peace and stability, such as the nuclear missile testing of North Korea, territorial disputes with Russia, China, and South Korea, and cyber-attack, and had to come up with a new policy concerning the national security. In other words, Abe first suggested that security and the national interest was concerned in order to reach peace.

Thus, the second Abe administration launched a series of reforms and movements to achieve "proactive contributions to peace." It established the National Security council to discuss security and diplomatic issues under the PM's leadership; it came up with the 2013 National Security Strategy (NSS), which aimed to strengthen its defense forces, alliance with the U.S., and relations to China, Korea, ASEAN, G7, APEC, and various international organizations; the government adopted the "three principles of defense equipment transfer," which authorized the JSDF to transfer arms to a third country. In 2015, the government launched "peace and security legislation," including the revision of the Peace Keeping Operation law, Self-Defense Forces law, and other 8 existing laws. This massive move in the diet allowed Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defense," which paved the way for the 2016 defense guidelines. This more or less signified Abe's success in reinterpreting article 9 and thus not only legitimized the legal status of JSDF but also further "normalized" it as a *de facto* military force.

[167]For full footage of the speech, see "*2006nen Abeshinzōshi jimintōsōsaisen ni shoshutsuba 'utsukushikuni' shokenhappyōenzetsu wo no—katto de (2006nen kugatsu kokonoka) 'seisō Kiroku* news archive,'" ANNnewsCH, accessed March 18, 2023, 15:32-15:52, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EEsb70bkQlQ.

Abe stepped down in September 2020 due to a relapse of his colitis but continued to act as a public figure. Just a few days later, he posted a picture of him at Yasukuni Shrine, reporting to "*eirei*" about his resignation on his twitter account, and visited the shrine four more times until he was killed in July 2022.[168] Abe was assassinated, but his plans and policies were still being enforced by his successor. Current Prime Minister of Japan Kishida Fumio just announced the new NSS of 2022, which inherited Abe's position of "proactive contribution to peace." The document said that the Kishida government would maintain the U.S.-Japan Alliance as the "cornerstone" of Japan's national security policy and sought to "reinforce Japan's defense capabilities as the last guarantee of national security."[169] At the same time, Japan unveiled its unprecedented $320 billion plan of military buildup, which, as former Maritime SDF admiral Koda Yoji put it, would make the JSDF a "real, world-class effective force." Kishida, who believed that Japan and the Japanese people are at "turning point of history," described this staggering investment as "my answer to various security challenge that we face."[170] At this period when the global peace and stability are under severe challenge, Japan chooses to proceed to remilitarization nonetheless, with or without article 9. Japan's remilitarization in the twenty-first century is by no means a retrograde step to imperialism or militarism, but the practice of the right to "collective self-defense" and the new defense guidelines has increased Japan's chance to engage against potential enemies of the United States. As we have to admit that Japan is more

[168]These postings can be seen on Abe's twitter account, accessed March 19, 2023, https://twitter.com/abeshinzo.

[169]"National Security Strategy (NSS)," MOFA, accessed March 18, 2023. The document can be downloaded at https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.

[170]Tim Kelly and Murakami Sakura, "Pacifist Japan unveils biggest military build-up since World War Two," *Reuters*, last modified December 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pacifist-japan-unveils-unprecedented-320-bln-military-build-up-2022-12-16/.

likely to get into war, "proactive contribution to peace" seems to be a genuine peace discourse no longer.

Conclusion

Since the 1970s, prime ministers from the LDP have been using the established peace discourse to engage with various cultural topics and to credit the imperial past with Japan's current "peace prosperity." This strategy, however, was ineffective over the course of the evolution of Yasukuni issue because it was impossible to justify the enshrinement of class A war criminals with the "peace discourse." Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe were thus lambasted internationally by China and Korea and domestically by the progressive parties in opposition. Nonetheless, the LDP was slowly winning the debate due to the decline of progressive parties and generational change. What emerged from the "peace and prosperity" discourse was a rationale for revising article 9. Abe Shinzō, who worked with *Nippon Kaigi* to pursue a cultural project of dissociating Japan from its traumatic past and position in the Cold War, articulated that new rationale as "proactive contribution to peace," which was about dealing with security issues, strengthening the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and, most importantly, revising article 9 to build a "normalized, beautiful" Japan. As Abe's project is still on its way, the flawed and contested Japanese peace discourse is now at a crossroads.

Conclusion: The End of Japan's Postwar?

In this thesis, I have analyzed the complexity and transformations of Japanese peace discourse, which heavily shaped Japan's political and cultural self-identity since the end of WWII. I have traced the origin and dissemination of the peace discourse in *heidankai* intellectual activities under the Occupation and examined Maruyama's rationale of defending the constitution to perpetuate Kantian-style peace and democracy. This rationale was promptly appropriated by progressive political parties to lambaste the government. Meanwhile, the conservative regime, whose legitimacy and authority were underpinned by the U.S.-Japan Alliance, strived to contain that criticism by associating the idea of peace with economic prosperity and proactive diplomacy on the one hand and tacitly endorsing the coexistence between article 9 and *Anpo* on the other. Peace continued to exist in Japan as a political discourse to bridge the gap between parties, associations, and nations; more recently, however, the LDP version of peace discourse underwent a significant shift to the direction of not only restoring national pride but outspoken remilitarization.

I paid particular attention to the controversy over article 9 because it was both central to any version of peace discourse and useful in grasping its transformation *vis-à-vis* specific historical circumstances. In other words, the change in the attitudes toward article 9 reflected the change of the group's wider interpretation of peace. The conservatives took article 9 in absolute terms in the wake of WWII, but a few years later, they claimed that the right of "self-defense" was legal under article 9 upon the request of SCAP. Moreover, while nationalists such as Kishi Nobusuke attempted to repeal article 9 in 1960, conservative mainstream politicians accepted article 9 as well as *Anpo* in the following decades. On the other hand, the progressives' stance on article 9 also changed dramatically in 1994 when Murayama Tomiichi, PM of the JSP-LDP coalition government, declared the party's recognition of the constitutionality of the JSDF,

meaning that they accepted the existence of military forces under article 9. Yet recent LDP prime minister Abe Shinzō, Kishi's grandson, more or less followed a separate right-wing cause. In the draft of the revised constitution published by the LDP in 2012, Abe and his followers not only proposed the establishment of an "army for national defense" but also the restoration of a political and religious role for the emperor. Furthermore, the LDP has *de facto* repealed article 9 once the 2016 defense guideline entitled the JSDF to fight alongside American forces. Japan, which has maintained a "peace-loving" identity over the course of the postwar era, is now at a crossroads.

The idea of the postwar has prevailed in Japan for more than seven decades, and it is rare and curious in the present day that a country claims itself still in "the postwar or *sengo*." One way to understand the "postwar" is to identify it as the period after WWII—that is, from September 2, 1945, to the present, but this way of periodization is an oversimplification. First, the exact date that marked the end of the war is contested: the Americans and Europeans celebrated their victory against Japan on September 2, when the armistice was signed at *USS Missouri*, while the Japanese commemorated the end of war on August 15, the day emperor Hirohito announced Japan's defeat. Andrew Gordon argues that the political and economic structuring of Japan in the wake of WWII more resembled the same historical trends as those around the Great Depression, which he conceptualized as the "transwar system."[171] In this way, Japan's "postwar" started in the aftermath of reshaping the "transwar" pattern when it entered into "high-speed economic growth" between the 1960s and 70s. I, however, argue that *sengō*

[171]Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, 4th edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 259.

started in 1947, when the "peace constitution" that defined Japan's contested identity came into effect.

While the starting point of *sengo* is contested, there are also different views about the end of *sengo* as well, and each of them has a unique scope. Yoshida Shigeru would argue that Japan had entered a new era in 1952 because it completed the postwar reconstruction and regained its "independence," and this could be the end of *sengō*. The 1956 economic white paper published by the Japanese government declared that "it's no longer the postwar (*mōhaya sengō dewanai*)" because the Japanese economy had fully recovered from the postwar reconstruction. In political science, 1993 and 1994 is a plausible time to declare the end of *sengo* because the organization of the voting system as well as the political spectrum (the JSP disbanded and the LDP lost the first election since 1955) that had lasted since the 50s were completely changed between the two years. According to Carol Gluck, some economists believed that *sengo* ended when Japan's economy leveled off in the 1970s, but she argues that *sengo* is not only about politics or economy but individual experience.[172] To a degree, Gluck echoes Harry Harootunian, who has pointed out that "*sengo* has not ended because the past that gave its birth has not ended" in 2000.[173] For both Gluck and Harootunian, the idea of *sengo* went beyond the 1970s and 90s because both the gratification and anxiety that had shaped people's experience and memory of "the postwar" continued to exist until the twenty-first century. In my humble opinion, *sengo* is the period when the Japanese self-identity was specifically shaped by various peace discourses emerging from wartime experience and when intellectuals, politicians, and political parties vied for a leading role in defining "peace" and its relation to "reality." On the one hand, people enjoyed their experience of *sengo* because

[172]For reference to Carol Gluck, see Karisa Yuasa, "Postwar Japan: Past or present?" PSU Vanguard, February 11, 2020. https://psuvanguard.com/postwar-japan-past-or-present/.

[173]Harry Harootunian, "Japan's Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse of History" *The South Atlantic Quarterly 99*, no.4 (2000): 720. Project Muse Premium Collection.

they were living in peace and prosperity shaped by the "peace constitution." On the other hand, they felt unsatisfied with *sengo* because the "ideas" in the constitution never fully matched the "reality" and because the image of a "peace-loving nation" was ceaselessly contested.

In today's Japan, politicians, intellectuals, and people are still dealing with issues of American military bases, territorial disputes, the Yasukuni Shrine, article 9, and the JSDF, which in aggregate evoke the memory of *sengo*. However, over the course of Japan's remilitarization, the LDP has found the voice of opposition less and less ardent since the *Anpo* protest in 1960, and part of the reason is that the younger generations born after the years of mass movement no longer have the memory and experience that has maintained the vitality of *sengo*. The late Nobel laureate Ōe Kenzaburō used to believe that he belonged to probably the last postwar generation. During an interview in 2013, Ōe narrated his experience in a telling manner:

> The constitution was created when I was 12 years old, when article 9 was explained to me at school and I heard there would be no more war and no more armaments. As a boy whose country was at war until two years ago, I thought that I had been taught the most important thing. Naturally, I started my literary career and have made the observance of article 9 and hope for peace fundamental to my way of life. We have been doing so for nearly 70 years since the end of World War II. I want to pass it on to the next generation. I will soon be 80 years old. My legs hurt for two days after I participated in demonstrations, but I still speak at rallies because I feel that the government is insulting citizens like myself. I want to live as an old man who keeps the 'postwar spirit (*sengo no seishin*).'[174]

Ōe cherished his "postwar" identity for he had struggled to earn what he learned at school—to follow article 9 and contribute to "real peace" without the U.S.-Japan Alliance. He was, however, pessimistic about the inheritance of this "postwar spirit" that had to be kept by this man in his late 70s. The situation has turned against Ōe's wish after his death when Abe's discourse—which Ōe described as "passive contribution to war' (*shōkyokuteki sensōshugi*)" in

[174]"*Ōe Kenzaburōsan 'kyujyō wo mamoru koto, heiwa wo negau koto ga ikikata no kipon tsugi no sedai ni tsunagitai' Honshi ni seisen uttae*," Tokyo Shimbun, last modified March 13, 2013, https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/237745.

the same interview—was promulgated and adapted to a national policy, and the LDP received very few critiques of the integrity of that discourse from the younger generation. Ōe died in March 2023 with the kind of "postwar spirit" that he possessed as people became less sensitive to the meanings of peace discourse and were thus losing their consciousness of article 9 and the issues of peace behind it.

Peace discourse is also disappearing in contemporary Japanese Politics. On the website of the Office of the Prime Minister of Japan, the newest catchphrases of the second reshuffled Kishida cabinet includes "COVID-19," "NewFormCapitalism," "DiplomacySecurity," "DisasterResponses," "Ukraine," and so on but no "Peace."[175] "Peace" seems to be less important in Japanese politics and might be completely discarded in the near future. If peace were to be disassociated from the Japanese political and cultural identity, this might signify the final ending of Japan's *sengō*, which was defined by the lasting repercussions of a disastrous war.

[175]"Tag List" Prime Minister's Office of Japan, accessed April 20, 2023. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/tag/index.html.

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