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The People of Seljuq Baghdad, 1069-1089

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement
for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the Medieval and Renaissance Studies Program from
The College of William and Mary

by

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction 3-14

Chapter 2: *Al-aewam* in the sources, 1069-1089 15-71

Chapter 3: Conclusion 72-77

Bibliography 78-79

Glossary of Arabic Terms 80

Chapter 1: Introduction

The Islamic Middle East underwent profound political changes in the tenth century. The Abbasid caliphate disintegrated and lost control of Egypt, Syria, Arabia, the Caucasus, and Iran. Their political losses were often delivered at the hands of Shi'a factions: the Shi'a Fatimid dynasty conquered most of North Africa while the Shi'a Buyid dynasty conquered much of western Persia. Although it retained nominal control over the capital of Baghdad and the surrounding regions, the caliphate itself became subjugated to the Shi'a Buyids. This meant that the Abbasid administrative apparatus continued to operate in many respects, at least enough to guarantee the caliph some of his traditional honors and privileges, while in practice Baghdad was ruled by a foreign Buyid garrison.

Within a century of the year 1000, however, Sunni factions led by the Seljuq Turks retook most of Iran, destroyed the Buyid dynasty, regained control over much of Arabia and the Caucasus, and pushed the Fatimids out of Syria and back into Egypt. They even managed to open Anatolia to Islamic conquest for the first time in centuries. This Sunni political resurgence was complemented by a thorough consolidation of Sunni theology along traditionalist lines, especially after the removal of the Buyids from Baghdad in 1055. The proceeding decades witnessed the proliferation of new scholastic institutions and the early crystallization of the four canonical Islamic legal schools, namely the Hanbalis, Shafi'is, Hanafis, and Malikis. Baghdad was at the center of this Sunni consolidation, which culminated in the works of the Persian theologian al-Ghazali, whose philosophy has virtually dominated Sunni Islamic theology since the late Middle Ages down to the present day.

Conventional scholarship viewed these events as constituting a single 'Sunni Revival', characterized by collaboration between the Abbasid and Seljuq regimes in a political and ideological struggle against the Shi'ites and later against the Crusades. However, this view has come under close scrutiny since the 1960s, with some scholars arguing that the relationship between the two regimes was in fact fraught with political and cultural tensions. In some cases, this scholarship has led to the more extreme position that the Seljuqs were essentially Machiavellian despots who prioritized their own political fortunes over any religious or ideological concerns and, therefore, cared little about the revival of Sunni Islam.[1] The initial reassessment was pioneered by George Makdisi, who demonstrated that a 'Sunni Revival' could only have begun before the Seljuq period during the Buyid captivity with the reforms of the caliph al-Qadir.[2] Following this line of thought, Richard Bulliet has introduced the term 'Sunni Recentering' as a possible alternative to the term 'Sunni Revival'.[3] The purpose of this project is not to assess the validity of these terms, but is rather to study the phenomena to which they usually refer. In this work, I will retain the term 'Sunni Revival' for convenience without making any assumptions about its timeline or underlying causes.

Despite the significant volume of literature on the Sunni Revival, scholars have been unable to neatly stitch the various political and intellectual trends identified with the Sunni Revival into a single coherent narrative. As it stands, the scholarly community vacillates between the traditional view of the Sunni Revival, which portrays the Seljuq sultans as pious orthodox Muslims deeply devoted to the struggle against Shi'ism,[4] and the revisionist view of the Sunni Recentering, which views the Seljuq sultans as faraway tyrants who had little to do with the intellectual consolidation in Baghdad and cared mostly about their own political fortunes. This vacillation appears to stem from the fact that scholars tend to focus almost exclusively on the political and cultural elites of the Seljuq state. This is especially true of Baghdad, the center of the Sunni Revival, with the result that scholars lack a robust structural understanding of Islamic society in the city during this period. Lacking this understanding, scholars have interpreted and reinterpreted the importance of the *madrasa* (pl. *madaris*),[5] the crystallization of the legal schools, and al-Ghazali's philosophy for the broader Sunni Revival many times over without finding conclusive results.[6] Conversely, very little work has been done to study the vast majority of the city's population, the unorganized mass of common people referred to in the sources as *al-aewam* (the masses, sing. *al-eama* usually has the same meaning). Perhaps this explains why the existing scholarship has yet to achieve a clear understanding of social life in Baghdad, and thus a clear understanding of the local dynamics of the Sunni religious consolidation.[7] [8]

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[1] For example, see Safi, *The Politics of Knowledge in Premodern Islam*.
[2] Peacock, *Early Seljuq History*, 111-112.
[3] Berkey, *The Formation of Islam*, 189.
[4] For example, see Tor, *Sovereign and Pious*.

With this consideration in mind, I will study the treatment of *al-aewam* in the sources over a crucial period in the history of Baghdad, the two decades before al-Ghazali arrived in the city in 1091. In doing so, my goal is to demonstrate that *al-aewam* were not the docile political tools of local elites, but rather played a significant active role in framing and shaping local dialogues related to contemporary social dilemmas, especially between themselves and various ‘elite’ groups. These issues include the occupation of Baghdad by the Seljuqs, the proliferation of vices such as prostitution and excessive drinking, and clerical debates between the major emerging legal schools. The *aewam* of Baghdad commented substantively, forcefully, and effectively on these social issues and played a crucial role in the direction of related dialogues over this period in the city. It is therefore impossible to imagine a clear understanding of any Baghdad-oriented Sunni Revival without a robust understanding of the city’s *aewam*.

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[5] For example, see El-Hibri's review of *A Learned Society in a Period of Transition*.

[6] For example, see Griffel, *Al-Ghazali's Philosophical Theology*.

[7] The scholarly vacillation is owed to a lack of a robust structural understanding of Islamic society in Baghdad during this period. Being able to locate specific events, such as al-Ghazali's tenure in the city, within the continuum of broad historical phenomena, such as the Sunni Revival, requires a strong understanding of the broad social structures within which these events were temporally situated, which connect the specific events to the general phenomena. For example, it is not possible to assess the importance of the *madrasa* without understanding how it impacted existing pedagogical structures and traditions in Baghdad. That is, a connection cannot be drawn between the *madrasa* and long-term phenomena of reform without understanding why the changes that it represented were chronologically significant.

[8] As a result of this vacillation, scholarly interpretation of the relationship between the Seljuqs and the city of Baghdad as a center of reform has undergone many changes, shifting between the view that the Seljuqs were primarily concerned with controlling Baghdad as a source of political legitimacy, and the view that the Seljuqs were genuinely invested in reform as an expression of their personal piety. Regardless of the stance taken by the Seljuq sultans, there is no doubt that reform movements local to Baghdad played a significant role in the development of Sunni Islam during the Seljuq era. It seems that a closer examination of *al-aewam* will reflect a more accurate image of the city's social structure, and therefore lead to a stronger understanding of reform movements in the city. This follows from the given importance of understanding the city's broad social structure for connecting specific local reforms with the proposed long-term reform movement. The phrase 'social structure' is used here to mean the nexus of discursive and social patterns and traditions that characterized daily life in the city, particularly from a dialectical angle. The city's social structure does not need to be understood in an exhaustive sense, but one does require an accurate image of life in the city in order to understand the broad historical importance of local events. This accurate image does not come from cataloging every social group that ever existed in the city, or examining on an empirical basis every social group that is ever mentioned by the sources. It comes from understanding how people thought, lived, and interacted with each other: this is 'social structure' in a veritably humanistic sense. Understanding the *aewam* is necessary for this, and is thus a necessary component of understanding the broad historical significance (i.e. for the Sunni Revival) of specific local events in Baghdad. So, the theory is that without understanding how the *aewam* participated in dialogues surrounding the Seljuq occupation, the *madrasa*, the Hanbali movement, etc., it will be impossible to accurately place those reforms and innovations in the context of a broader 'Sunni Revival', because all of those reforms were at some point debated by the *aewam* in a substantive way: they were placed before them for their consideration (the building of a *madrasa*, for example), and that consideration was a natural and integral part of the process of long-term change.

The Rise of the Seljuqs

The Seljuq Turks began their conquests in the Middle East during the 1040s, by which time the region had politically stabilized after the upheavals of the tenth century. The Byzantine Empire and the Fatimids had become locked in a political stalemate during which the two states vied for control over numerous satellite territories, particularly Syria, Cyprus, and Sicily. East of Aleppo stretched a patchwork of smaller Kurdish and Arab states from Mosul to the southern Caucasus, where the populations vaguely transformed from Kurdish-majority into Armenian-majority and eventually into Georgian and Turkic along the Black Sea and Caspian Sea coasts respectively. Many of these smaller states offered nominal loyalty to the Byzantines. Further south, the Abbasids maintained titular control of Baghdad and several nearby cities, but they were politically dominated by the Buyid dynasty. The Buyids were themselves fractured into several familial branches stretching across western Iran, each holding a major city, where they skirmished with each other, neighboring Iranian dynasties, and local Kurds. Further east, the Turkic Ghaznavid dynasty had wrested control over vast swaths of eastern Persia and Afghanistan, including the province of Khurasan, home of several historically important cities such as Merv, Nishapur, Sarakhs, Tirmidh, and Tus.

It was from this region that the Seljuqs first emerged: in the early 1040s, they began to enter Khurasan from the north in greater numbers than the Ghaznavids were prepared to handle. They slowly conquered the province while the Ghaznavids were mired in internal difficulties. Their new domains were split into two parcels, the western one given to Tughril, and the eastern one given to Chaghri. Perhaps not satisfied with his portion, Tughril continued his incursions further west and found ample opportunity for expansion. Within a decade, he had subjugated most of the feuding factions of central and western Iran, and in 1055 he made his triumphant entry into Baghdad, 'freeing' the Sunni caliph from his Shi'a Buyid suzerain. It took several more years for the situation there to stabilize, but by Tughril's death in 1063 the Seljuqs had become undisputed masters of central Iraq.

Chaghri's son Alp Arslan, who seized control of Tughril's domains after his death, proved to be just as active a ruler as his uncle. He personally commanded two very successful campaigns into Syria and the Caucasus, the latter of which produced the famous battle of Mantzikert in 1071. This resulted in the disintegration of the Byzantine army and the opening of Anatolia to the incursions of Turkic nomads, who by that point were migrating into Iraq, Syria, and the Caucasus in large numbers. These groups also began to displace the ruling powers in Syria and along the Levantine coast, with expeditions reaching as far as Palestine and even into Fatimid Egypt itself. Many of these parties offered nominal allegiance to the main Seljuq branch in Persia while others were entirely rogue.

When Alp Arslan's son Melik-Shah inherited his domains in 1072, the state had become by far the most powerful polity in the Middle East. While Melik-Shah may not have been quite as active as his two predecessors, his reign was still marked by further expansion and consolidation over a much broader geographic expanse. His court was particularly interested in three frontiers: Anatolia (including the Caucasus), Syria, and Transoxiana. The former two territories were gradually reduced in the first decade of his reign, and he received a major boon in 1085 when a series of fortuitous deaths handed fairly direct control of Anatolia and Syria to the sultanate in Persia. With consolidation continuing after that point, by 1092 Melik-Shah had become more powerful than any Sunni ruler in at least the preceding two centuries.

This work studies local life in Baghdad from around 1070-1090, which roughly corresponds to the reign of Melik-Shah. The political and bureaucratic consolidation of the Seljuq state during this period was largely directed not by Melik-Shah himself, but rather by his father's talented vizier Nizam al-Mulk. Nizam patronized significant cultural achievements such as the first official *madrasa* (1066) and Umar Khayyam's observatory (ca. 1075) in addition to directing significant political achievements: he was responsible for organizing Melik-Shah's campaigns and diplomacy. Naturally, Baghdad featured prominently in Nizam's vision for the Seljuq state from both of these angles, and the city became the object both of his religious patronage and of his political ambition. Thus, the 1070s and 1080s represent the absolute height of Seljuq control and stability across the Middle East, particularly in the territories closest to the court residences in Iran (Nishapur, Rayy, Hamadan, and Isfahan), including Baghdad.

The Landscape of Seljuq Baghdad

Baghdad undoubtedly benefited in some respects from the relative security afforded by the height of Seljuq domination; however, life in the city was nonetheless complex and not particularly peaceful. While not threatened by foreign attacks after 1058, the city was frequently disrupted by violent internal conflicts throughout this period. These conflicts, referred to in the sources as *fitan* (riots, sing. *fitna*) in serious cases, could range from strictly sectarian to broadly inter-communal riots, and could involve every local social group, including the *aewam* (the masses, sing. *al-eama*).

These riots represent the most obvious instances of *al-aewam* participating in issues pertinent to the Sunni Revival: in several cases, for example, the *aewam* reacted violently against clerical opinions and innovations, the political policies of the Seljuq state, and local social dilemmas. In general, the *fitan* of this period represent the reactions of *al-aewam* to a wide range of contemporary social issues.

The proceeding analysis will revolve around the participation of *al-aewam* in *fitan*. In order to understand these riots, however, one must have a solid understanding of the various other social groups that participated in them, and so it is necessary to first introduce the city's social environment here.

In terms of the city's layout, any public place where people gathered could play an important role in social life. The city was divided into several populous districts, the most important ones being the *bab al-Basra*, *bab al-Azaj*, *bab al-Nubi*, *al-Rusafa* and *al-Karkh*; all of these districts were Sunni except for *al-Karkh*, which was Shi'a. The recurring term *bab* in these place names means 'gate', and refers to the gate about which many of these communities were oriented (*bab al-Nubi* = 'the Nubian Gate [district]', for example). As we will see, open public spaces as generic as the city's streets and gates could play an important role in local social life. More specifically, examples of important locales include the *jami al-Qasr*, which is the mosque most frequently mentioned in the sources, the *suq al-thulatha* (the 'Tuesday market'), and the *suq al-madrasa* (the market of the *madrasa*, here referring to the *madrasa Nizamiyya* founded by Nizam al-Mulk in 1066). In general, life in the city seems to have revolved primarily around the mosques and the markets.

As mentioned, one important phenomenon of the Sunni Revival was the crystallization of the four canonical Islamic legal schools, which were composed of the broad social group known as the *ulama* (scholars). Three of these were active in Baghdad: the Hanafis, the Shafi'is, and the Hanbalis. The Hanafis and the Shafi'is benefited significantly from official state patronage during this period: the *Nizamiyya*, for example, was a Shafi'i institution. The Hanbalis, who were the most conservative group of the four, eschewed state patronage and were not associated with a *madrasa* in Baghdad until the twelfth century.[9] So, they sometimes convened in public places besides the scholarly institutions, such as the markets. The *suq al-thulatha* in particular seems to have represented a locus of Hanbali activities at the time, while the *suq al-madrasa* represented the same for the Shafi'is (this is not surprising given its close proximity to the Nizamiyya).

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[9] Ephrat, *A Learned Society in a Period of Transition*, 47.

The communal organization of the legal schools is probably in some ways a reflection of their demographic composition. The Hanbalis enjoyed significant local support during this period, often from the *aewam*. Their ranks were largely drawn from local theological circles and thus sometimes mingled freely with local laymen, especially with the merchants of the *aswaq*. The Shafi'is, on the other hand, were mostly foreigners from the east. Many of their leaders knew Nizam al-Mulk personally (some were even from the same region in Persia, and Nizam al-Mulk was a Shafi'i himself) and thus enjoyed significant state support and prestigious positions at the *Nizamiyya*. They did not, however, benefit from the sympathies of the local people, although they seem to have enjoyed relatively more support from the merchants (the group referred to in the sources as *ahl al-suq*, lit. 'people of the market') than from the *aewam*, depending on the market. It seems that their close affiliation with the Seljuq court became a political liability during times of tension between the people and the foreign garrison.[10]

The Seljuq garrison, it appears, was made up entirely of foreign soldiers from the east. Despite being foreigners, these soldiers participated in the city's daily life by buying from the local markets and praying in the local mosques, among other things. The garrison was commanded by the *shihna*, a military governor appointed directly by the Seljuq government.[11] While it is not always clear where they were housed, they sometimes took up residence in the *dar al-Mamlaka*, which was a palace complex on the eastern bank of the city, within the outer walls. Aside from the *shihna*, there was also a group of Seljuq civil officials present in the city, the *eumada* (sing. *amid*), again appointed directly by the Seljuq court, who sometimes played an important role in military affairs.[12] These two groups acted as the actuators of Seljuq policy in the city: they helped maintain order and commanded the troops, relayed demands from the court, collected taxes, assured that the sultan was mentioned in the local *khutba* (sermon), and organized visits by the court to the city.

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[10] Ephrat, "The Seljuqs and the Public Sphere in the Period of Sunni Revivalism: The View from Baghdad," 146-148.
[11] Van Renterghen, "Controlling and Developing Baghdad," 125-126.

Aside from the centrally-appointed Seljuq government, the Abbasid caliphate also played a significant role in governing Baghdad. Although the caliphs were banned from raising an army by the Seljuqs, they still retained several significant administrative and symbolic functions. They maintained a large retinue of servants, an inner circle of local notables, and a corps of personal guards and made appointments to several important administrative offices, including the head of the local police (*sahib al-shurta*).[13] What remained of the Abbasid government was managed by the caliph's personal vizier, although this important office was not immune to Seljuq meddling. There is a significant body of literature dedicated to the elite social groups that composed the caliph's retinue, for example the group known as *al-aeyan* (notables), who were drawn from old, local families. Unfortunately, there is little corresponding research dedicated to the *ahl al-suq*, who played a significant role in local social life and for whom a separate lengthy research project could likely be dedicated, and even less so for *al-aewam*, the focus of this project.

The State of the Field and New Questions

Most of the existing scholarship in this field focuses exclusively on the elites. Thus, even basic questions surrounding *al-aewam* such as who they were, where they lived, and what they did for work, have not been approached, let alone answered. A rare attempt to define *al-aewam* in the existing literature is found in Vanessa van Renterghem's work *Les élites bagdadiennes au temps des*

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[12] Cahen, "'Amid," 434.
[13] Van Renterghen, "Controlling and Developing Baghdad," 126-127.

Seldjoukides (2015). There, she offers a brief overview of *al-aewam* in one chapter of a much longer work dedicated primarily to the city’s elites. She states that the *aewam* were not necessarily composed only of the city’s poorest citizens and that the term may have referred to social groups as disparate as middle class merchants and certain clerical figures. Thus, according to Renterghem, it is impossible to identify the term systematically with a single economic class, and so *al-aewam* should retain in translation the apparently vague meaning that it holds in the primary sources.[14]

It seems, as mentioned earlier, that a clearer picture of Seljuq Baghdad’s social structure requires a better understanding of *al-aewam*. So, if it is inevitable that the term *al-aewam* will retain its proposed ‘vague character’ in translation, then it may be almost impossible to obtain an accurate and convincing picture of social life in Seljuq Baghdad. It may be possible, however, to uncover a more precise meaning of the term in its particular contexts. Renterghem herself offers a focused philological assessment of the term *al-khasa* (the elites) in the sources. She concludes that while the term does take a general and ‘vague’ meaning in some contexts, in many others it has a very specific and narrow meaning. In particular, the chroniclers almost always use the term *al-khasa* to refer specifically to members of a retinue (usually of the caliph or sultan), and so translates it instead as ‘intimates’ or ‘confidants’.[15] This project essentially attempts to expand this convincing analysis and extend it to *al-aewam*. Renterghem seems to conclude simply on the basis of the *aewam* not being ‘systematically’ identifiable with the poor that the Arabic term presents an inescapable vagueness. Even if the term itself is vague in some respects, a close reading of the sources (namely the chronicles) shows that it is almost always used in the same context to reference the same specific, albeit diverse, group of people.

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[14] Renterghem: ‘Mais rien ne prouve que la *ʿāmma* ait été uniquement composée de nécessiteux ou de Bagdadiens de condition économique modeste, et il est probable qu’elle comprenait une partie de ce que l’on désignerait aujourd’hui comme étant des classes moyennes, artisans, boutiquiers, petits commerçants ainsi que, selon les circonstances, lettrés et hommes de religion, qui ne rechignaient pas toujours à descendre dans la rue pour combattre physiquement leurs ennemis idéologiques. Il est donc délicat de systématiquement identifier la *ʿāmma* aux couches les plus pauvres de la population, comme c’est souvent le cas sous la plume des historiens du xx^{e} siècle. On parlera plutôt, prudemment, du peuple bagdadien, dans sa potentielle hétérogénéité sociale, pour garder le caractère flou du terme arabe correspondant’. Van Renterghem, *Les Élites Bagdadiennes au Temps des Seldjoukides*, 14.11.

[15] Van Renterghem, *Les Élites*, Introduction: 47-51.

The only other work to discuss *al-aewam* in this field, Simha Sabari's Sabari's *Mouvements populaires à Bagdad à l'époque "Abbasside," IXe-XIe siècles* (1981), does not offer any significant advancements in answering the question of who the *aewam* were. He writes that the term *al-eama* designates 'the people' in a broad sense, is closely related to the term *al-suqa*, and is directly opposed to terms, such as *al-sultan*, that reference the authorities.[16] This understanding is mostly negative and relative: we understand who they were not, who they were close to, but not quite who they were.

As for the role played by *al-aewam* in local social life, both Sabari and Renterghem tend to view *al-aewam* through the lens of the elites: they are more interested with how the *aewam* disrupted elite life than with why they did it. For Sabari, the *aewam*, 'sans organisation ou direction religieuse', sporadically manifested their perpetual discontent through random acts of violence against the authorities, stemming from the 'inescapably tyrannical nature' of the state regimes.[17] Renterghem, whose primary focus is the elites, does not make any particular effort to investigate the nature of *al-aewam*'s participation in riots.[18] She spends much more time cataloging the riots, placing them into different categories, and attempting to connect them to phenomena of urban control by the elites than she does in considering their nature.

Aside from the works in French by Renterghem and Sabari, most English publications related to Seljuq Baghdad also deal with the city's elites. For example¸ *A Learned Society in a Period of Transition* (Ephrat, 2000) deals with the *ulama*, *Controlling and Developing Baghdad* (Renterghem,

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[16] Sabari: 'le terme al-'âmma désignait le peuple au sens le plus large; il était presque identique au terme désignant la population (ahl) et très proche des termes al-ra'iyya – les sujets, les ouailles – et al-sùqa – les gens des marchés ou ceux qui sont dirigés, gouvernés – en opposition au terme al-sultân – les autorités'. Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires*, 18.

[17] Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires*, 124.

[18] Renterghem: 'malgré (ou peut-être même en raison de) la force du pouvoir seldjoukide à cette époque, ces décennies apparaissent parmi les plus troublées de l'histoire bagdadienne, avec plus d'une trentaine d'émeutes entre 447/1055 et 487/1094'. Van Renterghem, *Les Élites*, Introduction: 14.9.

2012) deals with the Abbasid and Seljuq regimes, and *The Politics of Premodern Islam* (Safi, 2006) deals with Seljuq political practices. Even a recent collection of articles dedicated exclusively to Baghdad (*Baghdad, From Its Beginnings to the 14th Century*) mentions *al-aewam* less than 10 times in over 800 pages. Thus, even the meager assessments of the *aewam* in the French literature dwarf the topic's coverage in the English literature.

Given the lack of deep scholarship on the subject, the following analysis will be driven forward by several fundamental questions: Who were *al-aewam*? What role did *al-aewam* play in fomenting the riots? What methods did they use? What were they trying to communicate? Who were the messages targeting? What was the impact of their agitation? Approaching the source material through a critical and comparative lens with these questions in mind should lead to a better understand of the Baghdad *aewam* during the height of Seljuq power, and therefore of the city's broader social structure and the role of *al-aewam* in phenomena of the Sunni Revival.

Chapter 2: *Al-aewam* in the sources, 1069-1089

Preface

This chapter will consist of several close, comparative readings of *al-aewam* in the sources, mostly with respect to significant riots. They will be organized according to the topic that each event elucidates. First, the Nizamiyya riots of 1077-1078, which deal with *al-aewam*'s participation in intra-Sunni conflicts. Second the Sunni-Shia riots of 1089, which represent the organization of *al-aewam* against an external religious community. Third, a series of riots across the period (1088, 1072, and 1069) that demonstrate the wide range of *al-aewam*'s criticisms.

The narrative sections of this chapter draw on three main sources: *al-Kamil fii al-Tarikh* by Ali ibn al-Athir (c. 1160-1233),[19] *al-Muntazam* by ibn al-Jawzi (c. 1116-1201),[20] and *Mir'at al-Zaman* by Sibt ibn al-Jawzi (c. 1186-1257).[21] Additionally, selections are drawn from *Zubdat al-Nusra* by al-Bundari,[22] *al-Bidaya wa al-Nihaya* by ibn Kathir (c. 1300-1373),[23] and Abu Ali ibn al-Banna's eleventh-century diary.[24] All of these authors belonged to Sunni clerical circles, although only ibn al-Jawzi, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, and ibn al-Banna lived in Baghdad long-term. Al-Bundari was a Persian, ibn Kathir was from Syria, and ibn al-Athir spent most of his life in Mosul. While I have drawn on each chronicle for the narrative sections of this chapter, ibn al-Athir's text has been used as a skeleton.[25]

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[19] Dar al-Kutub al-Alimiyya (Beirut): 1987.

[20] Dar al-Kutub al-Alimiyya (Beirut): 1992.

[21] Dar al-Risala al-Alimiyya (Damascus): 2013.

[22] 1900 edition.

[23] Al-Helawy: 1997.

[24] The 2014 translations of *al-Kamil fii al-Tarikh* by D. S. Richards and the 1956 translations of ibn al-Banna by George Makdisi have also been referenced.

[25] The scope of this project requires that I refrain from expanding to other useful genres, such as the biographical dictionaries. It should also be mentioned that the contemporary dictionaries might lend some aid in clarifying the meaning of terms such as *al-aewam*. Further studies on the topic would likely benefit from close readings of the dictionaries, for example the *Lisan al-Arab*. The overview of some relevant roots provided by Renterghem certainly points to the potential usefulness of such an approach. However, this seems to fall outside of the scope of this project, primarily because the dictionaries are structurally quite different from the chronicles. In general, this study will focus on closely analyzing relevant passages from the chronicles through a comparative lens.

The Nizamiyya riots of 1077-1078

In the early summer of 1077, an Iranian cleric named Abu Nasr ibn Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri arrived in Baghdad. He was a Shafi'i, like Nizam al-Mulk, and had received permission from Nizam to preach in the Nizamiyya madrasa in the city. He held several sermons in which he attacked the Hanbalis by accusing them of *tajsim* (anthropomorphism) and was later accused of bribing several Jews to convert publicly at his hand. While al-Qushayri had the support of local Shafi'is, led by the professor of the Nizamiyya Abu Is'haq al-Shirazi, the Hanbalis were the stronger party by far; they were led by a man called Abu Ja'far ibn Abu Musa al-Hashimi. Events continued to escalate after al-Qushayri's initial sermons, and while the Shafi'is managed to recruit the local military governor (*shihna*) to support them, the Hanbalis were unsuccessful in convincing the caliph to take a position. Tensions boiled over when al-Qushayri moved to hold a sermon in the mosque of al-Rusafa, and the two sides fought a violent battle in which a man was killed and the Shafi'is were defeated.

At this point, the Shafi'is began publicly accusing the caliph of siding with the Hanbalis even though he had refused to aid them materially before the battle. Al-Shirazi was incensed by the caliph's stance, and under his leadership the Shafi'i clerics threatened to leave the city, at which point the caliph panicked and asked everyone to assemble in the *diwan*. He struck a deal with the Shafi'is to prevent them from leaving the city, but he was still extremely nervous about how Nizam al-Mulk would react to the situation, with whom al-Qushayri had been in direct communication since before the conflict broke out. After the conflict, al-Shirazi sent several long, formal letters complaining about the situation to the caliph's vizier Fakhr al-Din ibn Jahir and his son Amid al-Dawla ibn Jahir.

Nizam al-Mulk sent a response to these letters, which arrived the next year, along with his son Mu'ayyad al-Mulk, who took up residence near the Nizamiyya in the *suq al-madrasa* district. In his response, Nizam told al-Shirazi that he did not consider it a political responsibility of the state to take sides in conflicts between the *madhahib* and ordered him to respect the Hanbali majority. Additionally, Nizam had already recalled al-Qushayri from his position at the Nizamiyya, so his response to al-Shirazi served to underscore Nizam's surprising rebuke of his fellow Shafi'is. News of this response spread among the Hanbalis and they became 'arrogant and unbearable'.[26] One day in the early summer of 1078, in a reaction to this irritating behavior, a Shafi'i student from the Nizamiyya went into the *suq al-thulatha* and publicly accused the Hanbalis of heresy (*takfir*). This started another riot, which was much more violent than the first. The student was pelted with bricks by the Hanbalis, so he got the help of the *ahl suq al-madrasa*, and the two market communities engaged in a full-scale battle. It continued to escalate, and when *al-eama* broke in favor of the *suq al-thulatha* and began looting the *suq al-madrasa*, Mu'ayyad al-Mulk called in the foreign armies to intervene. They broke camp and violently dispersed the rioters, resulting in many deaths.

When news of these events reached Nizam al-Mulk, he was furious. The caliph seems to have taken no active role in the events of 1078, and Nizam reacted by blaming his viziers, who belonged to the Banu Jahir family. He ordered the caliph to dismiss Fakhr al-Din and sent a subordinate to round up the Banu Jahir. He also dispatched more letters chastising those who had participated in the riot on both sides, and the political recriminations continued for some time.

Who participated in the 1077 riots?

There were three broad social groups involved in these riots: the *ulama*, the *ahl al-suq*, and the *aewam*. Despite the somewhat clear social lines that separate these groups in the sources, the question of who participated in the riot is not nearly as straightforward as an outline of the events would imply. For example, al-Athir only says that '*fitan* occurred between al-Qushayri and the Hanbalis' because he spoke about Asharism, and ‘his enemies from the Hanbalis and their followers reached the *suq al-madrasa al-nizamiyya* and killed a group of people’.[27] Are the ‘Hanbalis’ here exclusively professional clerics, or could they include members from the other groups (particularly the *ahl al-suq*)? He uses the word *tabaehum* (‘their followers’), but the meaning here is generic. In fact, he does not describe the Hanbalis at all other than as al-Qushayri’s ‘opponents’. He does write that ‘al-Qushayri preached to the people (*al-nas*) in the Nizamiyya madrasa’, but he uses the term *mutaesibun* to describe al-Qushayri’s allies; D. S. Richards translates this as ‘partisans’.[28] Al-Athir states that among al-Qushayri’s *mutaesibun* were several high-level emirs and *wa ghayruha min al-aeyan*, meaning ‘and others like them from the *aeyan*’ (notables). Al-Athir does not give a clear picture of what side ‘the people’ were on, or whether ‘the people’ were involved in the actual conflict at all. This account could be contrasted with the direct statement of affairs given by al-Bundari:

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[26] *Inbasatu wa istatalu*. Sibt, *Mir'at*, 335.

فثارت الفتنة من العامة

This means ‘a *fitna* was unleashed from *al-eama*’, which al-Bundari follows by writing that ‘the Hanbalis reached the *suq al-madrasa* and killed a group of people, and they demonstrated *al-shanaea*’ (repulsiveness).[29] In al-Bundari’s narrative, al-Qushayri performs his sermons, and the people rise up violently against the *suq al-madrasa*. He does not reference any Hanbali notables as intermediaries in the conflict, let alone as the sole anti-Shafi’i agitators. The critical role that al-Bundari reserves for *al-eama* on the Hanbali side is confirmed by ibn al-Jawzi and Sibt ibn al-Jawzi.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzi narrates a somewhat muddled timeline of the events leading up to the main battle. Interestingly, he writes the following:

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[27] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 413.

[28] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 413; Richards, *The Annals*, 171.

[29] Al-Bundari, 50.

فأنكرت الحنابلة ذلك, وعنّ لابي اسحاق الشيرازي امام الشافعية و اصحابه معونته على الحنابلة, وتتبع بعضهم بعضا في الطرقات ضربا وسبا

That is, ‘so the Hanbalis rejected [al-Qushayri’s preaching], and Abu Is’haq al-Shirazi and his allies lent their support against the Hanbalis, and the [two groups] were beating and insulting each other in the streets’.[30] It appears in this narrative that there was brawling in the streets before al-Qushayri’s public conversion of the Jews, which is what precipitated the major battle. Indeed, there does not appear to be any logical leap in the author’s narrative from a dispute in the Nizamiyya madrasa to beatings in the streets. Unfortunately, it is unclear who exactly these beatings involved, but it seems that violence was woven into the fabric of this dialogue from the beginning.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzi then mentions that the Shafi’is requested the help of Nizam al-Mulk *li-qilla eadadihim* (because of the smallness of their number), and that the Hanbalis were strengthened *bi-suwad al-balad* (with people of the land). He then mentions the conversion of the Jews, and that:

فتقول العوام: هذا اسلام المغايظة و الرشا, لا اسلام الدين التقى

That is, ‘so *al-aewam* said: this is an Islam of corruption and bribery, not the Islam of pious religion’.[31] What could he possibly mean by *fataqul al-aewam*? Of course, *al-aewam* was not a single person, it was a social group, and not one for which a single appointed person spoke, as far as we know. They had no single representative, and yet they communicated with the clerics in such an unambiguous way that the historians felt confident in writing that ‘they spoke’, almost as a single voice.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzi’s account of the initial developments mirrors, very narrowly, the narrative given by his grandfather ibn al-Jawzi, and the preceding line is found there almost verbatim:

فكان العوام يقولون: هذا اسلام الرشاء لا اسلام التقى

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[30] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 326-330.

[31] Ibid.

Meaning, ‘so *al-aewam* said: this is the Islam of bribery, not the Islam of piety’.[32] Certainly, this legitimates al-Bundari’s relatively straightforward statement that the *fitna* ‘rose up’ from *al-aeama*. Taken together, these three sources seem to imply that *al-aeama* was somehow expressing its own opinion on a clerical activity.

Sibt ibn al-Jawzi follows this statement by saying that ‘things were getting worse between the two groups’, so Abu Is’haq wrote to Nizam al-Mulk complaining about the Hanbalis and asking for help.[33] He then gives a somewhat disjointed account of the political chain of reactions that resulted in al-Qushayri reaching the *bab al-Nubi* with his followers, converting a Jew there, and deciding to attack Abu Ja’far, which started the battle.

Ibn al-Jawzi, whose narrative is more clear, immediately moves from *al-aewam yaqulun* to the decisive moment: al-Qushayri converts a Jew, places him on horseback, and goes to attack Abu Ja’far in his mosque. According to both sources, Abu Ja’far heard about the attack and organized his forces in waiting so that when the Shafi’is arrived at his mosque, they started pelting them with bricks. The Shafi’is were defeated, and they shouted from the roof of the *bab al-Nubi* ‘al-Mustansir ya Mansur’, accusing the Abbasid caliph of working against the *sunna* like the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir.[34]

As for the participants in the battle, both sides seem to have involved members of the *ulama*. However, these two sources also mention the death of *ahad min al-Shafaeiyya khayat min suq al-thulatha* (Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, ‘one of the Shafi’is who was a tailor from the *suq al-thulatha*’).[35] This demonstrates that the *ahl al-suq* participated directly in such violent episodes. It confirms the underlying assumption that the city’s clerics could not have constituted a community with the demographic significance implied by the multiple direct responses from the Seljuq government if they

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[32] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 181-182.
[33] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 326-330.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

were the only ones involved in such disputes. And, likewise, that the inter-party fighting among the clerics alone could probably not have been so widespread or severe that it would have disrupted day-to-day life in the city even if it did spill out into the markets; it seems much more likely that these conflicts would have involved members of the *ahl al-suq* at least. Thus, this episode demonstrates that even the most sectarian riots could have involved broader segments of the urban society.

Importantly, we know that all three major social groups participated in the formation of dialogue in the 1077 riot: members of the *ulama* and the *ahl al-suq* were fighting in the streets. Whether *al-aewam* participated in the violence is unclear. However, it is clear that they contributed in some meaningful way to the dialogue, because their apparently unambiguous rejection of al-Qushayri's preaching meant that the Shafi'is were significantly outnumbered in the general dispute. Something like the term 'unpopular' is wanted to describe their activities. The Hanbalis were *mae kuthra aedaduhum taqawwu bi-suwad al-balad*: with the greatness of their number they were strengthened by the people of the land.[36] Even here, there seems to be a distinction being made between a tight-knit group of partisan Hanbalis and the *suwad al-balad* who supported them. Perhaps this tight-knit group of Hanbalis included members of the *ahl al-suq* who participated in the fighting, as al-Athir mentions 'the Hanbalis and their followers', drawing a clear distinction between the core Hanbali group and those from outside of their rank and file who supported them.[37] Likewise, the Shafi'is suffered from *qilla aedaduhum*, the smallness of their number. This does not imply necessarily that *al-aewam* joined the fighting itself on the Hanbali side, but it certainly does not exclude it, and we know that the *ahl al-suq* did participate (some on the side of the Shafi'is, in fact).

In either case, all three groups participated in the formation of a debate over the rightness of al-Qushayri's religious campaign. There was a substantive dialogue over whether his conversion of the

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[36] Ibid.

[37] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 413.

Jews constituted an authentic expression of Islamic devotion: *al-aewam* participated by expressing their opinion (somehow) and the *ahl al-suq* participated through violence, and both actions had a meaningful impact on the communal consequences of the dialogue (the riot and the withdrawal of al-Qushayri).

What do the sources say about the 1078 riots?

While al-Athir and al-Bundari mention little or nothing (respectively) about these events, ibn al-Jawzi and Sibt ibn al-Jawzi provide detailed narratives. Here is the brief account in al-Athir that provides a concise overview of the situation:

‘And in Baghdad there was a *fitna* in this year between the people (*ahl*) of the *suq al-madrasa* and the *suq al-thulatha* because of religious matters (*al-aetiqad*), and they were looting each other, and Mu’ayyad al-Mulk ibn Nizam al-Mulk was in Baghdad in a house that was near the *madrasa*, so he sent for the *amid* and the *shihna* and they both showed up with the army, and they beat the people (*al-nas*) and a group of them was killed, and they dispersed.’[38]

It is interesting that al-Athir describes this conflict, which was apparently anchored in religious disputes over correct belief (*al-aetiqad*), as a fight primarily between two market districts. It is clear from ibn al-Jawzi and Sibt ibn al-Jawzi that each district represented a locus of religious support for one of the two *madhahib*. Unfortunately, al-Athir is not very clear about which group actually fomented the riot: the *ahl al-suq* or the *ulama*. More importantly, what was the place of *al-aewam* in this conflict? Since al-Athir does not mention the common people, we must turn to another source. With respect to this riot, ibn al-Jawzi is the only author to use the term *al-aewam*. Thus, his account deserves special attention:

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[38] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 415.

خرج من المدرسة متفقه يعرف بالاسكندراني, ومعه بعض من يؤثر الفتنة الى سوق الثلاثاء, فتكلم بتكفير الحنابلة, فرمي باجرّة, فدخل الى سوق المدرسة واستغاث باهلها, فخرجوا معه الى سوق الثلاثاء, ونهبوا بعض ما كان فيه, ووقع الشر, وغلب اهل سوق الثلاثاء بالعوام, ودخلوا سوق المدرسة فنهبوا القطعة التي تليهم منه

This means: ‘a student came out from the *madrasa* known as ‘al-Iskandarani’, and with him some people who started the *fitna*, to the *suq al-thulatha*; so he talked about the *takfir* of the Hanbalis, and they threw bricks at him, so he [went back to] the *suq al-madrasa* and got help from its people (*ahliha*), so they went with him to the *suq al-thulatha*, and they looted some of what was there, and evil things occurred, and the people of the *suq al-thulatha* were victorious with [the help of] *al-aewam*, and they entered the *suq al-madrasa* and looted the part that they had taken from there’.[39]

Perhaps the most interesting thing here is that ibn al-Jawzi places *al-aewam* on the side of the Hanbalis for a second year in a row, this time taking an active role in the violence and looting with the *ahl al-suq*. But before assessing the significance of the place of *al-aewam*, it is necessary to address the robust information provided by the sources for the instigation and outcomes of the riot.

It does not appear that *al-aewam* began to participate in the conflict before the return of al-Iskandarani with his allies from the *suq al-madrasa*. This detail is present more in ibn al-Jawzi than in Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, who only says that al-Iskandarani ‘talked about the *takfir* of the Hanbalis, so they rose up against him and beat him, and they looted the *suq*, and a Shafi’i man was killed, and the *fitna* intensified’.[40] In fact, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi does not mention *al-aewam* or ‘the people’ at all. Despite this, it is clear in both narratives that the participation of the *ahl al-suq* of both districts lead to a disruption of daily life. Is it possible that the *ahl al-suq*’s preoccupation with the conflict was enough to disrupt life for *al-aewam* to the point where they felt pushed to join the conflict themselves? There was a point at which *al-aewam* seems to have made an active decision about whether to join the conflict, according to ibn al-Jawzi’s account. However, it is not entirely clear what was at stake for *al-aewam* with respect to this decision. The most potent evidence for the degree to which daily life in the city was disrupted is actually the Seljuq response.

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[39] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 191.
[40] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 335.

The Seljuq response to the 1078 riots

At some point after the riot began to escalate, a request was sent to the ‘*amid* of Iraq’ and the *shihna* for military support. The sender was Mu’ayyad al-Mulk, who had an estate near the Nizamiyya *madrasa* that he feared would be looted during the riot. What exactly was he reacting to?

Al-Athir does not mention *al-aewam* at all, and instead portrays the riot as a sectarian conflict between the market districts. But he still mentions the detail about Mu’ayyad’s house and the looting. Thus, it does not seem to be clear, from his account, whether Mu’ayyad was afraid more of his house being looted specifically than he was of the sectarian conflict creating disorder in general. And, since al-Athir does not mention *al-aewam*, it is not necessarily obvious who he thought would loot his property. Likewise, it is not clear why he would have been targeted, especially if we are not sure whether the scope of the conflict had expanded significantly beyond the sectarian issue.

Thankfully, the other sources provide much more information. It seems that *al-aewam* would have been one of the groups feared by Mu’ayyad al-Mulk, given that ibn al-Jawzi places them on the side of the Hanbalis. This is obviously because it was the Hanbalis who invaded the *suq al-madrasa* district and were therefore participating in the looting near Mu’ayyad’s house.

Makdisi seems to lean towards the interpretation that *al-aewam* was the primary target of the response force: ‘Mu’aiyad al-Mulk, fils de Nizam, ayant eu peur qu’on ne pillât son palais, demanda aide au amid, qui envoya contre les émeutiers les troupes sultaniennes. Ceux-ci repoussèrent les gens du peuple … [et] le diwan envoya aussi les troupes pour mettre fin à l'émeute'.[41] He seems to be following directly from ibn al-Jawzi, who says that '[the Amid] sent the Daylamis and the Khurasanis to [Mu'ayyad al-Mulk] and they pushed back *al-aewam*, and they killed around ten of them with arrows'.[42] As if *al-aewam* was their first priority, ibn al-Jawzi writes that only then did the troops carry out their orders to extinguish the riot, seemingly in reference to the sectarian conflict as opposed to the general looting.[43]

The two other authors are less specific about who the Seljuqs were targeting. Ibn al-Athir uses the vague term *al-nas* when referring to the people beaten by the Seljuq army in Baghdad. Presumably, he is using this generic term to reference everyone participating in the riot. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi provides similar information: he mentions that the Seljuq troops shot the people involved in the *fitna* (using a generic object pronoun) with arrows and brought the bodies of the dead back to the *diwan*.[44]

Given that these sources are more inclined to use generic terms for the rioters, it seems fair to lean towards ibn al-Jawzi's narrative, as does Makdisi, which implies that *al-aewam* were playing a central role in the riot. Why exactly they got involved in the first place, or what was at stake for them, is still not clear. Their daily lives were certainly disrupted, but was this before they actually started participating? If we follow Makdisi's interpretation, then it seems that Mu'ayyad was most afraid of *al-aewam* itself, which seems to imply that he thought of *al-aewam* as the greatest potential threat to public order. So why did they join the Hanbalis *en masse*, apparently, and invade the *suq al-madrasa*, if the riot only reached a critical point of disruption after they started participating? The implication running through these sources is that *al-aewam* was doing two things at once: participating in an inter-communal conflict on the side of the Hanbalis and engaging in general looting that was unrelated to the initial conflict. There is an unexpected third source for this riot that supports this interpretation.

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[41] Makdisi, *Ibn Aqil*, 1.183.

[42] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 191.

[43] In fact, Makdisi only cites ibn al-Jawzi, al-Athir, and ibn Kathir for his description of the riot; he does not, apparently, draw from Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, whose narrative is substantially different from every other source in different ways.

[44] Sibt, *Mir'at*, 335.

How did *al-aewam* participate in the 1078 riots (ibn Kathir)?

Some help is found in a much more recent source: ibn Kathir. He provides nothing more than a summary of ibn al-Jawzi's account in his chronicle *al-bidaya wa al-nihaya*, but he distills it to the point of clarification. Apparently breaking from the edition of ibn al-Jawzi that I am reading here (Beirut, 1992), he writes that 'a party from *al-aewam* became enraged' at both the Hanbalis and the Shafi'is.[45]

First, it seems clear that *al-aewam* was not a unified force with one mind, one opinion, or one leader. Ibn Kathir has provided an unintentional description of *al-aewam* that is not found in the other sources: that *al-aewam* could split into factions and did not necessarily make decisions as a single body. Second, ibn Kathir's text deserves a closer examination because it departs significantly from what the main authors wrote:

وفي شوال منها وقعت فتنة بين الحنابلة و بين بعض فقهاء النظامية, و حمى لكل من الفريقين طائفة من العوام,
وقتل بينهم نحو من عشرين قتيلا

This means: 'and in Shawwal from [the news of Nizam's letter] there occurred a *fitna* between the Hanbalis and a party of Nizamian jurists, and a group from *al-aewam* became enraged towards both of them, and there was killing between them that came to about twenty deaths'.[46]

It is clear that this account does not comport with what ibn al-Jawzi writes in the version that I am reading. Ibn Kathir presents the sectarian conflict as being between 'the Hanbalis' and 'Nizamian jurists': this is the fourth different characterization we have read of the conflict in as many sources. Al-Athir describes it as a fight between two market districts (although he cites religious belief as the main factor). Sibt ibn al-Jawzi describes it as a fight between two *madhahib* that happened to also involve the *ahl al-suq*. Ibn al-Jawzi describes it as a fight between two more holistic communities: on the one side, Shafi'i jurists from the Nizamiyya and their allies in the *ahl suq al-madrasa*; on the other side, Hanbali clerics, the *ahl suq al-thulatha*, and *al-aewam*.

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[45] Ibn Kathir, *Al-bidaya wa al-Niyaha*, 65.

[46] Ibid.

It is worth noting the uniqueness of ibn Kathir's description of the original conflict. He refers to one party as 'Hanbalis', which might include *ulama*, *ahl al-suq*, or other groups (recalling al-Athir's earlier description of one faction as 'the Hanbalis and their followers'), and the other as 'Nizamian jurists', which is referring to a very narrow community. We know from the other sources that the broad Shafi'i-aligned faction included members of both major market districts, but ibn Kathir's statement underscores the fact that members of the *ulama* also participated directly.

With that being said, it is difficult to reconcile ibn Kathir's description with ibn al-Jawzi's, since one puts *al-aewam* clearly on the Hanbali side, and another reserves for them a third position. The most likely interpretation seems to be the one outlined above: that one group of *al-aewam* was engaged in partisan activities on the side of the Hanbalis, while another – the one mentioned by ibn Kathir – became embroiled in general looting after the conflict had already escalated. It is likely that Mu'ayyad was most afraid of this second group, but we should not make the mistake of reducing *al-aewam* only to the actions of general looting. This would not account for ibn al-Jawzi's narrative, which suggests that *al-aewam* made a conscious decision at some point to lend aid to the Hanbalis against the Shafi'is. Thus, at least one group of *al-aewam* began participating in a sectarian conflict before another began looting. In this context, it is difficult to identify the exact issue that *al-aewam* was originally responding to when they joined the sectarian conflict on the side of the Hanbalis.

Ibn Kathir's account suggests that *al-aewam* was reacting to a widespread disruption of their daily lives created by the conflict between the partisan *ahl al-suq*. It is otherwise difficult to understand why a *ta'ifa min al-aewam* would turn against 'both parties' at any point.[47] It is also possible that the degree to which *al-aetiqad*, as al-Athir mentions, was at stake for *al-aewam* as well as for the *ulama* and the *ahl al-suq* should not be underestimated, particularly given ibn al-Jawzi's account involving the activities of al-Iskandarani as instigating factors.

It is difficult, though, to see how *al-aetiqad* could motivate such an apparently significant level of commitment on the part of *al-aewam* (they seem to have killed a man in the *suq al-madrasa*, for example). Whereas in 1077, there was an unequivocal statement by *al-aewam* of their attitude towards al-Qushayri's public conversions, for 1078 there is no such obvious statement of motivation. In this case, it may be possible that underlying factors played a significant role. Why did *al-aewam* only join the 1078 riot after the Shafi'is returned to the *suq al-thulatha* in greater numbers, as ibn al-Jawzi says? A partial explanation might be that the widening of the conflict's scale presented a disruption to their daily activities at the *suq*, while a full explanation would ideally elucidate the underlying ideological factors at play as well. There is no reason at this point to think that doctrinal factors played a significant role for *al-aewam*. Separately, we should take seriously the potential that *al-aewam* was participating in a broader dialogue surrounding the expression of religious identity in public.

What was *al-aewam*'s role in these riots?

There has not been an obvious impact of *al-aewam*'s participation in these two riots on the Sunni clerical outlook in Baghdad. Neither riot appears to have targeted a long-term social dilemma beyond the immediate communal conflicts. The accusations of Hanbali *tajsim* in 1077 are deceptively unhelpful, because the ideological substance of that accusation was not, it seems, a major factor in the fomenting of violence. More important was *al-aewam* accusing the Shafi'is of inauthentic practices, and yet this is a fairly general accusation: it could involve fiscal corruption, or the superficiality of public conversion, or something else. Likewise, in 1078 the Shafi'i student publicly accused the Hanbalis of *takfir*, which is another vague and general charge. Thus, deep social or ideological criticisms did not play an obvious role the instigation of these two riots. This is another reason for thinking that underlying factors – economic (the disruption of their daily lives at the *suq*), ethnic, communal – might have been at play. This also makes it quite difficult to gauge the level of impact that the participation of *al-aewam* in these riots might have had on clerical outlooks, if it had any at all.

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[47] Although, one should recall that ibn Kathir does not mention the *ahl al-suq* at all in his narrative, so it does not seem possible to conclude that there was a widespread disruption using only the information contained in his account.

On the other hand, the importance of *al-aewam*'s participation for the Seljuq outlook is clear. Makdisi's narrative reflects the impression given by ibn al-Jawzi that *al-aewam*'s participation in the 1078 riot is what signaled the general breakdown of public order to Mu'ayyad al-Mulk, which is what motivated him to call in the armies. The sources also identify, very clearly, potential targets for *al-aewam*'s violent protests: Mu'ayyad's house in the *suq al-madrasa* is one example. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi presents another important example in his narrative of the 1077 events. The deal struck by the caliph with the Shafi'is to prevent them from leaving the city, according to Sibt ibn al-Jawzi, involved al-Qushayri preaching his sermon in the *jamiea al-Qasr*. When the day came:

جلس بالجامع, و بعث الخليفة جماعة من الرجالة بالسلاح يحفظونه من العوام

That is, when the day came, al-Qushayri 'preached in the mosque, and the caliph sent a group of armed men to protect him from *al-aewam*'.[48] Clearly, another potential target for *al-aewam*'s violent protests was the clerical class itself. This passage is helpful because it confirms the suspicion that *al-aewam* could be involved in a wide range of violent actions. The sources mention the killing of a sick man in the *suq al-madrasa* in the 1078 riots, but they do not mention the perpetrators specifically. It is quite possible that they were *al-aewam*, given that they were involved in the invasion of the market, that Mu’ayyad al-Mulk was afraid that they would loot his estate, and that, in the previous year, the caliph was worried about them attacking or ambushing al-Qushayri in public.

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[48] Sibt, *Mir'at*, 335.

At this point, an investigation into the role of *al-aewam* in the formation of dialogues related to phenomena of the Sunni Revival (such as Seljuq clerical policies or the spread of the Hanbalis) seems viable. The problem with studying intra-Sunni conflicts exclusively is that there were several inter-*madhhab* riots that do not appear to have involved *al-aewam* in an obvious way. For example, there was a riot in spring 1083 that followed a similar course as the 1077-1078 riots: a controversial Ashari preacher was given permission by Nizam al-Mulk to preach at the Nizamiyya madrasa. He arrived there one day with an armed escort of Turks and Seljuq officials (ibn al-Jawzi: ‘with the *shihna, al-atrak*, and the *eajam*[49] with weapons’) and gave a controversial Ashari sermon.[50] He had an argument with the Hanbalis that lead to a *fitna*; apparently the Asharis broke into a man’s house and seized his books.[51] While the sources do reference large groups in connection to these events, the *aewam* are not mentioned by name, and it is often unclear why or how they participated. Thus, such an event does not offer significant obvious evidence for the participation of *al-aewam* in public dialogue.

So far, we have found that *al-aewam* was a flexible but potentially cohesive social group: in some instances, it could split into different parties, and in others it seems to have spoken with a single voice. We have also found that they had the potential to join violent sectarian conflicts and participate meaningfully in public dialogue, but at this point we have no evidence that they played a major role in shaping that dialogue. Similarly, we have at this point only an opaque understanding of what was at stake for *al-aewam* and why they would have participated in such violent riots: perhaps there was some intersection of practical and ideological factors.

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[49] The term *eajam* is used in this literature to refer to non-Arabs, traditionally Persians. Makdisi, however, sometimes translates it as ‘the Turks’ for example in Makdisi, *History and Politics*, 39.

[50] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 222.

[51] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 428; Richards, *The Annals*, 189.

Now, the aim is to further investigate *al-aewam*'s discursive power. In order to do this, we should probably look for riots that both involved *al-aewam* and surrounded an issue related closely to phenomena of the Sunni Revival. The next several examples are intended to elucidate the importance of *al-aewam*'s participation in public dialogue with respect to critiques of broader social phenomena.

Sunni-Shi'a riots involving *al-aewam* and the politics after 1078

If we are looking for civil disturbances with a more obviously ideological bent and less of an immediately communal focus, then one place to start might be a Sunni-Shi'a riot involving *al-aewam*. There were several Sunni-Shi'a riots in the period between 1078 and the upper bound of this project's chronological range: a few brief episodes from late 1085 to early 1087 and one in 1089. The sources give the impression that tensions were building over time, because by far the most serious of these riots were the ones in 1089; coincidentally (or perhaps not) it is also the only one to mention *al-aewam*. A quantitative overview of the parties involved in each event will help contextualize the 1089 riots:

Date (AH)	Date (AD)	Sunni party	Shi'a party
Al-Athir: 478[52] IJ: Shaban, Dhu'l-Hija 478[53]	IJ: late 1085 and mid-1086	Al-Athir: *sa'ir al-mahal min Baghdad* IJ: *mahal al-sunna, al-sunna, bab al-Basra*	Al-Athir: *ahl al-Karkh* IJ: *ahl al-Karkh*
Al-Athir: Muharram, Shawwal 479[54] IJ: Muharram, Safara 479[55]	Both: mid-1086 Al-Athir: early 1087	Al-Athir: *ahl bab al-Basra, al-ahdath min al-sunna, al-hijaj* (the pilgrims) IJ: *al-sunna*	Al-Athir: *ahl al-Karkh* IJ: *al-Karkh, al-shiea*
All sources: throughout 482 beginning in Safara[56]	All: throughout summer, 1089	*Al-aewam, ahl bab al-Basra, ahl bab al-Azaj*	All: *Ahl al-Karkh*

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[52] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 441.
[53] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 241-242.
[54] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 449.
[55] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 255-256. In the section on Shawwal, the Sunni party said that *hadha mal al-ruwafid halal*.
[56] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 457, 460-61; al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 282-283; Sibt, *Mir'at*, 422.

In each of these riots, the Shi'ites are only identified as *ahl al-Karkh*. Conversely, the Sunni parties are said to have come from almost every quarter of Baghdad (*sa'ir al-mahal min Baghdad*) and are the only party ever referred to as *al-aewam*. The impression is usually that 'commoners' were at the center of these riots on the Sunni side, as none of the sources mention *ulama*, *fuqaha*, or *ahl al-suq* participating, although it is possible that some of them did. One key difference between these riots and the intra-Sunni riots is that the sources are typically vague about their instigation and do not associate any clerical figures by name with either party. This is in stark contrast to the 1078 riots, for which the sources mention the Shafi'i student who instigated them by name. Although a deeper quantitative analysis would likely yield further information about the character of these riots and also about *al-aewam*, this project's scope requires the focus to remain on passages that use the term specifically. So, I will focus here exclusively on the 1089 riots.

Naturally, the local political situation in the city changed in some important ways in the decade after the 1077-1078 riots. A brief overview of those changes will provide a useful window into the political circumstances that contextualized contemporary protests.

The Banu Jahir managed to regain the caliph's vizierate late in 1079 with the approval of Nizam al-Mulk, who seems to have cooled down in the aftermath of the riots. During that period, he had *aeada Kuhara'in illa shihnakiyya al-eiraq* (he returned an officer called Gohara'in to a military office in Iraq called the *shihnakiyya*).[57] This office seems to have vested Gohara'in with a wide range of powers in Iraq and in particular over Baghdad. Furthermore, by mid-1083 the relationship between the Banu Jahir viziers and the caliph had broken down to the point that they were dismissed from the vizierate and left Baghdad. Why exactly their relationship with the caliph deteriorated is unclear, but they shortly entered into the service of the Seljuq court itself, which gives the impression that they were in better standing with the Seljuqs than with the Abbasids. In their place, the caliph appointed (or was allowed by Nizam to appoint) a trusted ally named Abu Shuja to the position. This was after a complex series of political maneuvers in which Mu'ayyad al-Mulk attempted to assume the office himself. He was known publicly as a wine-drinker, however, while the caliph preferred Abu Shuja for his refusal to associate with the easterners. The caliph was so opposed to further Seljuq appointments that he sent Abu Shuja to make his case for the vizierate to Nizam al-Mulk in person. This worked, and Abu Shuja assumed the office around early 1084. Later, the caliph accepted a visit of Melik-Shah and Nizam al-Mulk to the city in the summer of 1087, during which he married the sultan's daughter (the wedding had been negotiated several years earlier by Nizam and the Banu Jahir viziers). Thus, by the late 1080s Nizam had achieved a significant level of control over internal affairs in Baghdad. The caliph had also lost two competent viziers, who by that point were working for the Seljuqs on their campaigns in upper Mesopotamia.

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[57] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 417.

On a more local level, Abu Is'haq al-Shirazi died in November 1083 and was succeeded as professor of the Nizamiyya by a man called Abu Saed Abd al-Rahman ibn al-Ma'mun al-Mutawalli. Apparently, Mu'ayyad al-Mulk made this appointment shortly after al-Shirazi's death. Nizam later expressed his disapproval at the speed of the nomination, saying that the madrasa should have been closed for a year after the passing of al-Shirazi. So, when al-Mutawalli died early in 1086, Mu'ayyad seems to have learned from his mistake, or else was disciplined, because that year the replacement was sent several months later by Nizam himself. The replacement was a man called Abu al-Qasim Ali ibn Abu Yaela al-Hasani al-Dabbusi, who is referred to by the sources as *al-sharif* and *al-ealawi*; the sources describe him as a good scholar.[58]

With respect both to the professorship of the Nizamiyya and the caliph's vizierate, it is important to appreciate the level of control held by the Seljuqs, and in particular by Nizam al-Mulk. The Seljuq state that Nizam had built was reaching its political zenith around the mid-1080s, and the

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[58] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 257; al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 449; Sibt, *Mir'at*, 409.

Abbasid caliphate was reaching its political nadir at the same time, with the earlier loss of the caliph’s right to raise armies being compounded by the loss of his personal political sovereignty.[59] The caliphate had been weakened by the death of the caliph al-Qa’im in 1075 after a very long reign, and his successor was probably not prepared to handle the events of 1077-1078. So it is important but not surprising that Nizam was essentially making appointments to the caliph’s vizierate by the late 1070s (when he ordered the dismissal of the Banu Jahir). The sources also give the impression that the Banu Jahir more so defected to the Seljuqs in the mid-1080s than were pushed out by the caliph, a turn of events for which we are lacking contextual information. In any case, by the late 1080s the caliph seems to have lost control over his own political life outside of a small sphere of formal activities. That situation is reflected in the Sunni-Shia riots of 1089.

The events of the 1089 riots

All of the three main sources describe the 1089 riots as a serious disaster. Al-Athir splits the events into two sections, one titled *dhikr al-fitna bi-Baghdad bayna al-eama* and another titled *dhikr al-fitna bayn ahl Baghdad thaniyya*. That is, ‘the *fitna* in Baghdad between/among *al-eama*’ and ‘the second *fitna* between the people of Baghdad’; this is the only section I have seen in al-Athir that mentions *al-eama* in the title.[60]

While al-Athir’s sections are separated by several unrelated topics, the other two authors describe the riots in single, unbroken narratives. I will study the riot in the two phases given by al-Athir’s division, since the other two sources also split the riot into an initial phase and a secondary phase along the same lines. Ibn al-Jawzi follows his own narrative with a long text by ibn Aqil, who was an eyewitness of the events. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi offers a shorter version, but its relative compactness makes it a convenient place to start. To preface the events, I will present his entire account here:

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[59] Damascus was captured from a rogue lieutenant by Melik-Shah’s brother Tutush shortly afterwards. The deaths of Muslim b. Quraysh in mid-1085 and Sulayman ibn Qutalmish in mid-1086 brought Tutush to the height of his own power in Syria and Anatolia.

[60] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 457, 460-61.

‘And in Safara there was a great *fitna* in Baghdad between the *sunna* and the *shiea*, and the reason was that people (*anasa*) from the *ahl al-Basra* attacked Karkh, and they killed a man and wounded another, so they closed the markets of Karkh, and its people (*ahliha*) raised up Qur’ans, and a lot of people (*khalq kathir*) were killed between them, and Khumartash the *na’ib al-shihna* came, and he descended close to the Tigris to stop the two groups [from what they were doing], …, and the caliph sent to them[61] *al-khadam, al-khawas, al-hashimiyin, al-quda, al-aeyan*, and *al-mashayikh*, and they [still] did not stop, and *al-eama* raised up crosses on reeds; and they (the Shi’ites) called out *al-mustansir ya mansur*, and the other group called out *al-masih ya mansur*, and the *fitna* got worse, and about two hundred people were killed from the two groups, and the people (*ahl*) of Karkh cursed the Companions of the Prophet, …, and they transgressed to the point of cursing the Prophet himself, and the caliph wrote to Sadaqa ibn Mazyad requesting an army, so he sent the Arabs to him, and they worked with the *shihna*, …, and the *fitna* ended.’[62]

Unlike the 1077-1078 riots, the sources provide a clear picture of which social group was at the center of the 1089 riots – *al-aewam* – although we do not yet have a clear picture of exactly who they were or what motivated them. In this case, the actions, criticisms, and targets of *al-aewam* will reveal a good deal both about their discursive capabilities and about what was at stake for them.

1089: How did the riot start? (al-Athir’s first phase)

All three sources give essentially the same description of how the riot started: the *ahl bab al-Basra* attacked the Shi’a Karkh district. All three sources use the exact same verb – *kabasa* – to describe this action. All three sources agree that the *ahl al-Karkh* then closed their markets, and then the sources diverge.[63] Sibt ibn al-Jawzi is the most vague because he only says that they ‘raised Qur’ans’ (*rafaea ahluha al-masahif*) and that many people were killed.[64] Ibn al-Jawzi says something similar: *rufieat al-masahif eala al-qasb* (‘the Qur’ans were raised onto reeds’), and ‘the *fitan* continued to increase and decrease until Jumada I’, when it got much worse (this is where al-Athir’s second section begins).[65] Al-Athir fills in the gap for the first phase:

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[61] Other sources mention the caliph sending most of these groups to the Shi’ites with an order to adhere to the *sunna*, but Sibt is the only one to mention the Hashimites.

[62] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 422.

> و رفعوا المصاحف و حملوا ثياب الرجلين بالدم و مضوا الى دار العميد كمال الملك ابي الفتح الدهستاني مستغيثين ... فسكن العميد كمال الملك الفتنة و كف الناس بعضهم عن بعض, ثم سار الى السلطان فعاد الناس الى ما كانوا فيه من الفتنة

That is, ‘and they raised Qur’ans and carried the bloody clothes of the two men, and they marched to the house of the *amid* Kamal al-Din Abu al-Fath al-Dihistani asking for help … so he quieted down the *fitna* and the people (*al-nas*) stopped what they were doing, then he went to the sultan, so the people (*al-nas*) returned to what they were doing before with respect to the *fitna*’.[66]

So, according to al-Athir, the Shi’ites of al-Karkh raised up their Qur’ans and the clothes of the men who had been killed/injured and marched to the house of a civil official (*amid*) called Kamal al-Din, who they asked for help.[67] Then, in the portion that I have omitted, Kamal al-Din tried to pass off the job to another official, who tried to pass it off to another official. Those two officials then got into a fight that the caliph broke up, and responsibility fell back on Kamal. He managed, apparently, to alleviate the situation, but then left the city. It is clear from another section of al-Athir that he had been dismissed from his post.[68] Then, according to al-Athir, things started to get worse.

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[63] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 457, 460-61; al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283; Sibt, *Mir’at*, 422.
[64] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 422.
[65] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283.
[66] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 457.
[67] Kamal al-Din seems to have been sympathetic to the *ahl al-Karkh*, although exactly why is unclear.
[68] It is unclear by whom.

Perhaps the most significant feature of this section is al-Athir's use of the term *al-nas*. He does not use the term *al-aewam* anywhere in the body of the text; he only uses *al-nas*. However, the section is titled 'the *fitna* in Baghdad between/among (*bayna*) *al-eama*'. Furthermore, all three sources use the term *al-eama* or *al-aewam* when discussing the second phase of the conflict. It is clear in this context that we are talking about *al-aewam* with respect to the rioters, not *al-ulama* or *ahl al-suq*. This is not surprising: *al-nas* is a generic term that can be used in many contexts, and sometimes, as in this section, it is used in place of *al-aewam*.[69]

Unfortunately, the authors are very vague about how the riots actually started, so little information can be gleaned from the first phase. Al-Athir's section does not tell us anything other than that *ahl bab al-Basra kabasu al-Karkh*. No reason is given for why such a violent episode occurred seemingly out of nowhere. Thus, the instigation in this case does not offer a viable method of assessing what was at stake for *al-aewam* or why they were participating. Nonetheless, it is clear that *al-aewam* had an enormous capacity to disrupt public order: they invaded the Karkh district, killed or injured two men, forced the closure of the district's markets, and compelled the Shi'ites to seek aid from an official. Also, the opaqueness of the riot's instigation gives the impression that *al-aewam* were not under the direction of any local clerical leader even at the beginning. With respect to identity, the sources do not distinguish *al-aewam* by creed; they are only called *ahl al-sunna*. And, whenever the term is used, the sources refer to *al-eama* as saying a particular thing or performing a particular action as a single body, which makes the question of exactly who they were very difficult to approach. Fortunately, some of these dilemmas are clarified by the events of the second phase.

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[69] These sections beg the question of whether al-Athir is including Shi'ites under the header of *bayna al-aeama*. In my experience, I have never encountered an *al-aewam* that included Shi'ites. In the main sources, the Shi'a are *rafidun, ahl al-Karkh*, or *al-shiea*: they are always described as a cohesive group that is external to the *ahl al-sunna*. Likewise, it is clear with respect to the 1089 riots that when the authors mention *al-aewam* or *al-eama*, they are talking about a group of *ahl al-sunna*. In the example above, for instance, Sibt ibn al-Jawzi refers to the two groups as the *ahl al-Karkh* and the *aewam*. The only evidence I have found to suggest that *al-eama* might be a broad enough term to sometimes include Shi'ites is the title of al-Athir's first section. On the basis of these impressions, it does not seem possible to investigate the place or role of the Shi'a with respect to *al-aewam* within the scope of this project.

1089: A new revolt (al-Athir's second phase)

Al-Athir picks up the second section of his narrative in the month Jumada I, which agrees with the other two sources (ibn al-Jawzi: *wa ma zaalat al-fitan tazid wa tunqus illa jumada al-ula* = 'the *fitan* continued to increase and decrease until Jumada I', when they got worse again).[70] The Shi'ites were vastly outnumbered in a fight against several other quarters (al-Athir: *ghayruha min al-mahal*) and were getting the worse of the violence.[71] The *shihna* of Baghdad, at this point a man called Khumartegin who is also called the *na'ib* of Gohara'in, tried to alleviate the situation (al-Athir: *yakif al-nas ean al-fitna*), but did not succeed despite being aided materially by the Shi'ites.[72] There was a massive amount of looting, particularly of Karkh. One day, the caliph sent a large party of notables (including ibn Aqil) with letters commanding the Shi'ites to join the *ahl al-sunna*; they initially agreed, but fighting resumed shortly thereafter.

How did the situation become so bad that the caliph was brought so quickly to demand the capitulation of the entire community? The sources never give a clear explanation of why the Shi'ites suddenly came under such an intense attack by *al-aewam*, who are the only social group distinctly identified with the Sunni rioters (unlike in previous riots where either the *ahl al-suq* or the *ulama* participated). Clearly there were factors at work here that the sources are not discussing, for example the instigation of the conflict. In any case, the rioting continued for a long time, with each side exchanging blows, until Sadaqa ibn Mazyad arrived with an army and stability was violently restored. (Sadaqa belonged to a local Arab family, the Mazyadids, who were generally Shi'a leaning and who controlled several small territories to the west of Baghdad.)

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[70] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283.

[71] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 460-461.

[72] Ibid.

The sources do not give a very strong sense of chronological context for the events of the second phase. In some places, they read more like a list of events than a cohesive narrative. Thus, it should be possible to isolate several important events in the sources and examine their particular significance without needing a strong understanding of chronological order. Of course, this will make it difficult to know what provoked these events, but this is a natural and unavoidable problem when dealing with sources of this nature. I am going to focus on two events that should illuminate the broader social role being played by *al-aewam*: first, an instance in which they carried crosses in protest; second, an instance in which they lynched an Alid citizen.

(1) *rafaea al-eama al-saliban* = '*al-eama* raised up crosses'

The narratives agree that at one point, the Shi'ites appeared to have renounced their ways when they wrote on their mosques 'the best of men after the Prophet were Abu Bakr, then Umar, then Uthman, then Ali'.[73] But on the next day, they attacked and sacked Ibn Abu Euwf Street and killed the *mueaddil* Abu al-Fadl ibn Khayrun. With this latest violent turn, the people went to the *diwan* with him appealing for help.[74] Here are the lines in each text:

ورفع العامة الصلبان و هجموا على الوزير في حجرته و اكثروا من الكلام الشنيع

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[73] Van Renterghem interprets this event differently, framing it in both *Les Élites* and 'Baghdad under the Saljuqs' as the result of 'l'inscription que les autorités avaient fait graver, sur leurs oratoires, glorifiant les califes 'bien guidés''. That is, that the inscriptions were, in fact, written over the mosques of Karkh by Sunni authorities. This interpretation is not cited or explained in 'Baghdad under the Saljuqs', and in *Les Élites* only the traditional sources of al-Athir, ibn al-Jawzi, and Sibt ibn al-Jawzi are referenced. This is strange, because al-Athir states that *kataba ahl al-Karkh eala abwab masajiduhum khayr al-nas baed rasul Allah Abu Bakr thuma Umar thuma Uthman thuma Ali*, which Richards translates as 'the Karkh populace wrote over the gates of their mosques "The best of men after the Prophet of God (God bless him and give him peace) is Abu Bakr, then Umar, then Uthman, and then Ali"'. Al-Athir seems to present the inscriptions as a rouse intended to trick the neighboring Sunnis into thinking that they had recanted; ibn al-Jawzi presents a similar narrative (*katabu eala masajiduhum…*, referring to *ahl al-Karkh*) and Sibt does not mention the inscriptions. So, I am not sure why Van Renterghem adopts this interpretation. Van Renterghem, *Les Élites*, 14.8; Van Renterghem, "Baghdad under the Seljuqs," 240; Richards, *Annals*, 224; al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 461; al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 282.

[74] Richards has a different reading of the text. It says *faqasada al-diwan mustanf[i]ran wa maehu al-nas wa rafaea al-eama al-saliban* (al-Athir, 461). Richards 'takes *al-nas* in a restricted sense, as opposed to the following *al-amma*, the common people generally'. Thus, he translates *al-nas* as 'community leaders' and *al-eama* as 'the [Sunni] mob'. I am not entirely convinced by this, because al-Athir is usually less ambiguous with his referential pronouns than some of the other sources, and there is not an obvious restricted group to which *al-nas* would refer in this context. It seems more natural, here, to read *al-nas* as referring generally to the same group *al-eama*, which mobilizes in the very next phrase.

ورفع العامة الصلبان على القصب, و نادوا: المستنصر يا منصور, ونادت الطائفة الاخرى: المسيح يا منصور

ورفع العامة الصلبان على القصب, وتهجموا على الوزير ابي شجاع في حجرته وكثروا من الكلام الشنيع

‘And *al-eama* raised up crosses, and they attacked the vizier in his room, and they said a lot of hideous words’ (al-Athir).[75]

‘And *al-eama* raised up crosses on reeds, and [the Shi’ites] called out: *al-Mustansir ya mansur*, and the other group called out: *al-masih ya mansur*’ (Sibt ibn al-Jawzi).[76]

‘And *al-eama* raised up crosses on reeds, and they attacked the vizier Abu Shuja in his room, and they said a lot of hideous words’ (ibn al-Jawzi).[77]

We know that *al-eama* could potentially break up into groups, but here the sources describe them as doing a single thing: *al-eama* is expressing an unambiguous attitude towards the state of the *madhhab ahl al-sunna* in the city. Their statement must have been both collective and unambiguous since *al-aewam* was not a single body *per se* and, in particular, was not represented by a single leader or body of leaders that spoke for them. The question of identity is again almost impossible to approach in a meaningful way. The sources only identify them as *al-eama* and *ahl al-sunna*. Were they leaning Hanbali or Shafi’i? The sources do not say anything to the effect, for example, that some of them were from the Shafi’i-leaning *suq al-madrasa*. In fact, none of the *aewam* being discussed in this riot are said to have come from the *madhhab*-affiliated market districts; the most frequently mentioned districts are the *bab al-Basra* and the *bab al-Azaj*. Thus, here it remains difficult to study their identity beyond the broad categories of *ahl al-sunna* and *ahl bab al-Basra*, etc.

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[75] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 461.
[76] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 422.
[77] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283.

It seems more efficient to move towards the topic of dialogue. What message was *al-eama* trying to communicate by raising crosses? Were they levying a criticism or actually threatening to convert? There is a strong answer found in ibn al-Jawzi's quotation of ibn Aqil, the eyewitness:

قال العوام: هلك الدين مات السنة, ونصبت البدعة, ونرى ان الله ما ينصر الا الرافضة فنرتد عن الاسلام

That is, '*al-aewam* said: the religion is finished, the *sunna* has died, and *al-bidae* is triumphant, and we see that God only gives aid to the Shi'ites (*al-rafida*), so we will renounce Islam'.[78] The theme here is that God's will is revealed through the victories of those that he favors. Clearly, 'says *al-aewam*', God does not favor the *ahl al-sunna*, so we will abandon Islam. The object of their criticism is also stated by ibn Aqil: *kathara al-kalam eala al-sultan* – in this case, *al-sultan* is referring to the caliph (the term is often used in a general way to reference 'the power').[79] The main sources also state that *al-aewam* attacked the caliph's hand-picked vizier Abu Shuja in his own quarters, so the immediate target was the administration of the caliphate. If it is clear that *al-eama* was attacking the caliphate both through symbols and actions, then what was the message that they were trying to send?

The carrying of crosses can be interpreted in two ways: either as a method of communicating their belief that the *ahl al-sunna* had lost God's favor, or as a subtle threat.[80] Sibt ibn al-Jawzi mentions that they chanted, in emulation of the Shi'ites, *al-masih ya mansur,* meaning 'Christ the Victorious'. Similarly, this chant could be interpreted either as an accusation that God had abandoned the *ahl al-sunna*, or as a subtle threat. Now, there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that *al-aewam* meaningfully identified as the *umma ahl al-sunna,* so there is no reason to think that they actually considered abandoning it.

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[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Sabari seems to lean towards the subtle threat interpretation – 'en 482/1089, cette situation avait entraîné parmi les masses populaires le désespoir et la menace de conversions au christianisme ou au rafidisme' - but he does not study the incident exhaustively; he mentions it twice in passing. Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires*, 120.

So, the ‘subtle threat’ is that *al-aewam* is inviting the caliph and his allies to consider such a scenario. They would like the caliph, the *ulama*, the *aeyan*, and others to consider what they would do if one day *al-aewam* suddenly did abandon the *sunna*. They are tacitly pointing out that the ability of these groups to preserve Islam, or even to effectively govern Islamic society, is dependent on *al-aewam*’s support, in general, of their agenda. ‘What would you do’, *al-aewam* is ‘saying’, ‘if we decided one day that you had no authority over us?’ By raising crosses in public, they are urging the governing groups to consider an answer, take their complaints seriously, and perform their obligations.

So through this method, *al-aewam* is making an open, unambiguous statement assessing the caliphate’s performance with respect to God’s favor. They have two methods: first, they can communicate a message by occupying a public space and raising subversive visual symbols or chanting subversive slogans. Second, they can deploy violence, in this case by attacking the vizier in his own chambers and insulting him using ‘hideous language’ (al-Athir: *al-kalam al-shanie*). This second method – violence – leads directly into the second well-described event during this stage of the riots.

(2) *thara al-eama hunak bi-ealawi* = ‘*al-aeama* attacked an Alid’

Both al-Athir and ibn al-Jawzi agree that after the attack on Abu Shuja, the following occurred:

و قتل ذلك اليوم رجل هاشمي من اهل باب الازج بسهم اصابه, فثار العامة هناك بعلوي كان مقيما بينهم فقتلوه و حرقوه

وكان قد مات يومئذ هاشمي من اهل باب الازج بنشابة وقعت فيه, فقتل العامة علويا ورموه في خربة الحمام

‘That day a Hashimite man of the *ahl bab al-Azaj* was killed when he was hit by an arrow, so *al-eama* attacked an *ealawi* who was living among them, and they killed him and burned him’ (al-Athir).[81]

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[81] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 461.

‘And there died on that day a Hashimite from the *ahl bab al-Azaj* by an arrow that hit him, so *al-eama* killed an *ealawi* and threw him in the ruins of a *hamam*’ (ibn al-Jawzi).[82]

On the basis of an event such as this, it is impossible to imagine that *al-aewam* did not seriously identify with the Sunni *umma*. We know from previous episodes that they participated in dialogues surrounding authentic (Sunni) Islam, and in this case it is clear that they strongly identified with the Hashimite community; whether there was an equally strong ethnic component to this identity is an open question. In any case, they clearly identified their community with the Hashimites and the *ahl al-Karkh* with the Alids.[83] Thus, their dedication to the *sunna*, in addition to their religious devotion, must be taken seriously as a motivating factor.

This event also underscored the ability of *al-aewam* to engage in violence. Their attack on an Alid can be interpreted in two ways: first, it can be viewed as a practical way of defending their community from the Shi’ites. (The political defense of the *ahl al-sunna* required them to take an eye for an eye.) Second, it can be viewed as a method of communicating their hatred of the *ahl al-Karkh* both to the Shi’ites and to the Abbasid state. They chose to single out an Alid for the purpose of making a statement against the Shi’ites specifically, so it is reasonable to assume a discursive undercurrent.

The *aewam* therefore had an extremely wide-ranging set of resources at their disposal: they could assemble in public, occupy public places, raise subversive symbols, chant slogans, loot government buildings, attack government officials, and kill prominent members of rival communities. The *aewam* was also capable of deploying these methods in a discursive context: they communicated messages through occupation and violence. With that said, was it the case that these methods actually had an impact? If so, on what? On clerical dialogues? Ideological developments? Seljuq politics? We are interested not only in an attempt to contribute to the dialogue, but also in a substantive contribution. It remains to prove whether their actions had demonstrable impacts; we will return to this later.

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[82] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283.

[83] Another important factor that this event underscores is the difficulty in assigning an affiliation by creed to a particular quarter of the city. In the 1077 riot, a Shafi’i was killed who was from the *suq al-thulatha*, usually described as a Hanbali district. In these riots, an Alid was found living among the Sunni *eama*.

What was *al-aewam* reacting to?

It seems that at some point in the riots there was a wider breakdown of public order that *al-aeama* itself reacted against. Without further context, it is difficult to read an invective such as ‘the *sunna* has died’ as only referencing whatever unknown Shi’a actions initiated or perpetuated the conflict, nor does it seem that the Shi’ites were overwhelmingly successful in their attacks. While it is true that *al-aewam*, according to ibn Aqil, specifically mentioned the triumph of heresy (*bidae*), their discontent seems to be revolving around the impression that the *ahl al-sunna* had lost God’s favor more generally, i.e. not only with respect to this particular conflict. So, it seems that the abandonment by God of the *ahl al-sunna* should be taken to include the general collapse of Sunni society in Baghdad that accompanied this particular Sunni-Shi’a conflict. After all, the instigation appears to have been an inter-communal dispute, not a desire for looting. The more general breakdown, which the sources clarify in detail as discussed below, only occurred over time. Thus, the most likely explanation is that inter-communal disputes were at the center from the beginning and remained at the center of the riots even as they evolved and got out of control. Then, the *aewam* who remained primarily motivated by the communal dispute lamented the general breakdown, which produced the charge that the *sunna* had died, etc. In fact, this chronological interpretation is very similar to the one that characterized the 1078 riots: *al-aewam* became involved at first in a communal dispute, and then, over time, their involvement grew in scale to the point where a certain group began to engage in general looting. So, there seems to be a suitable precedent for this interpretation. It would probably also help to interpret the riots in temporal context as an explosion of building tensions over time that likely involved several factors and many objects of popular complaint, however the scope of this project does not permit this.

As mentioned, there were several very violent Sunni-Shi’a riots preceding this one throughout the eleventh century in Baghdad, although none of them reached the rhetorical heights of the one in 1089, which significantly exceed our expectations for such a riot. Similarly, none of the sources implicate *al-aewam* as narrowly in the preceding riots as they do for the 1089 riots. So it seems that on this basis also, we have a strong reason for thinking that *al-aewam* was reacting not only to the Sunni-Shi’a conflict, of which there had been many with similar levels of violence and Shi’ite rhetoric, but also to a broader problem. The distinguishing factor here is the extensive participation of *al-aewam*, the general collapse of public order, and the (apparently) resulting extremes of *al-eama*’s criticism.

The scope of this general collapse left a strong impression on the sources. According to al-Athir, Sadaqa ibn Mazyad’s forces encountered urban gangs (*eayyarun*) roaming the city when they arrived. The most vivid descriptions, though, come from ibn al-Jawzi’s quotation of ibn Aqil. He states:

صار العوام يتبع بعضهم بعضا في الطرقات والسفن

That is, ‘*al-aewam* started going after each other in the streets and in the boats’, and

الشباب قد احدثوا الشعور والجمم, وحملوا السلاح, وعملوا الدروع, ورموا عن القسي بالنشاب والنبل

Meaning, ‘*al-shabab* started wearing their hair long and carrying weapons and making plate armor and shooting arrows’.[84] The caliph became so angry that he started arresting (*qabada*) members of *al-aewam*.[85] This account, from ibn Aqil, closely recalls the actions of *al-aewam* in 1078 because here they seem to be playing two very different roles at once, albeit on more well-defined levels (or at least more detailed by the sources). On the one hand, they are appealing to the caliphate for order and weighing substantially into a broad, public dialogue by carrying crosses in the streets and murdering

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[84] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 281-283. This translation is adapted from Richards, *The Annals*, 224 (note 40).

[85] The fact that these arrests are notable to the sources may be notable to us.

Alids: they are adding their interpretations of the problem to the pool of discursive possibilities with respect to the role of the caliphate. On the other hand, they also seem to be directly participating in the breakdown of public order that they themselves are lamenting: they were attacking each other in the streets and some were being arrested by the caliph. Of course, there were other social groups involved in the breakdown of order, for example the *eayyarun* (which I have not encountered at all up to this point) and the *ahl al-Karkh*. But ibn Aqil seems to attribute the breakdown as much to *al-aewam* as he does to any other group. Likewise, there is a sense in the three main sources that the clerics and other notables (*al-khawas, al-aeyan,* etc.) were attempting to appeal directly to *al-aewam* for order. This implies that they were at the center of the wider breakdown, as they appear to have been in 1078.[86]

It seems necessary to return to the previous conclusion that *al-aewam* was a fractious group. Perhaps some of them could have attacked the Shi'ites at the same time as others turned on each other and to general looting. It is also possible that many of *al-aewam* never became involved at all. Indeed, al-Athir makes a distinction between the *ahl al-Karkh* who 'did not normally fight' and those who sprung to action more quickly, so it seems reasonable to identify such a distinction in *al-aewam* as well. We also know that even the *aewam* who did participate in inter-communal violence were not under the direction of a visible clerical figure from beginning to end, so there is no reason to think that they were under any kind of organized direction.

It seems likely that some members of *al-aewam* took advantage of the inter-communal violence to loot and participate in the general breakdown of order. As that occurred, the *aewam* who had been motivated by the inter-communal conflict began to lament the misfortune of the *ahl al-sunna* in general, so it makes sense to include the widespread breakdown of order as a subject of their despair. There is no other way, given the information that we have, to explain statements such as 'the religion is finished', or actions such as the attack on Abu Shuja, other than to assume that *al-aewam* is reacting to a perceived issue much broader than a specific inciting incident or the recent history of inter-communal conflicts with the *ahl al-Karkh*. Likewise, the fact that *al-aewam*'s level of discontent seemed to grow rapidly over time, rather than explode at a particular moment, supports this interpretation.

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[86] The caliph's appeal to the Shi'ites also supports this interpretation because it seems to imply that the Sunni *aewam* was putting intense direct pressure on the caliphate to solve whatever the problem was.

The Response and the Impact: how/why *al-aewam* was important

Given *al-eama*'s aggressive verbal critiques of the caliphate, not to mention their violent attacks on government officials, it is natural that the caliph made a direct effort to respond to their demands. It is reported that he sent a delegation to the *ahl al-Karkh* commanding them to adhere to the *madhhab ahl al-sunna*,[87] but this message is difficult to interpret without better knowledge of what the Shi'ites might have done to incite the attacks in the first place.[88] In the context of this severe, generic command, it is almost as if the mere existence of the Shi'ite community had suddenly become intolerable to *al-eama*. We do have good information about the delegates sent to them, however, because ibn al-Jawzi recorded the names of those who were sent. He writes that 'the caliph's chamberlains (*hajib*) and his slaves (*khadam*) got together, and the judges (*quda*) Abu al-Farj ibn al-Nisbi, Yaqub al-Zaynabi, and Abu Mansur ibn al-Siyagh; and the sheikhs Abu al-Wafa' ibn Aqil, Abu al-Khuttab, Abu Ja'far ibn al-Kharqi the *muhtasib*, and they went to the *shihna* and read a publication from the *diwan* to *al-Karkh*'.[89]

The fact that the caliph would send such a broad delegation to such an apparently intractable community suggests the severity of the problem and the potential extent of *al-aewam*'s influence. Our immediate knowledge of the clerical reaction to the explosion of violence and disorder is opaque; there was probably some line beyond which the *ulama* and the *fuqaha* were unwilling to cross when it came to criticism of the caliphate and of the social groups to which many of them belonged either obviously or discretely. In the case of these riots, *al-aewam* had no lines, and that distinction is made clear by the fact that the caliph had members of the *aewam* arrested and resorted to calling in a foreign army to subdue them. It is thus somewhat surprising that the jurists were willing to work closely with the caliph and negotiate with the *aewam* by addressing their complaints directly. The perceived threat must have been severe.

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[87] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 282.

[88] They certainly escalated the situation by insulting the Prophet, but this is only a partial explanation because it says nothing about why the events were escalated or how they began. Also, the sources do not agree on whether this occurred before or after the delegation was sent (Sibt ibn al-Jawzi vs. ibn al-Jawzi), and they do not offer a clear precipitating incident for the delegation, other than perhaps a fight over the Ghalib market.

[89] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 282.

Al-aewam appears to have expected[90] the ruling elites to fulfill certain obligations to the *umma*: one of those was public order; possibly another was to enjoin the good. While there is overwhelming evidence to suggest that the Baghdad *aewam* continued to view the caliph as the only viable leader of the *umma*, Nizam and the Seljuqs also represented the ruling elites. In that sense, it is clear that Nizam understood what was expected of him: he took public order very seriously, especially in Baghdad. Erosion of public order meant an erosion of state legitimacy, and so while *al-aewam* did not target the Seljuqs directly in their critiques, Nizam would eventually become targeted, or at least feel targeted, if their critiques were directed at the ruling groups in general. One contemporary poet wrote an ode accusing Nizam directly of ‘undoing order’ in connection to the 1077 riots,[91] so the potential for such an accusation was there, and it is impossible to imagine that Nizam was unaware of it. Thus, Nizam’s reactionary political machinations can also fall under the umbrella of dialogue that *al-aewam* could influence through their protests.

The fact that the caliph avoided calling the Seljuqs for help further indicates this avenue of *al-aewam*’s potential discursive influence. Clearly, the caliph did not want to involve Seljuq armies in the situation any more than they needed to be. By then, he had good reason to be ‘afraid’ (as the sources say in connection to the 1077 riots) of Nizam’s reaction to widespread disorder. Nizam had dismissed several of his viziers in succession and had increased Seljuq political presence across Iraq in the years after 1078. Thus, it is reasonable that he searched rather desperately for an alternative solution to the problem, and the Shi’a Mazyadids were never his first choice.

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[90] It is only possible to make statements such as this because we know, at this point, that *al-aewam* was not under organized direction. When ‘they say something’, their opinions were their own. If they were sometimes pro-Hanbali, such as in 1077, then that is a reflection of the obvious but not inevitable popularity that the Hanbalis enjoyed.

[91] The ode begins *Ya Nizam al-Mulk, qad hulla bi-Baghdad al-nizam*, or ‘Ah Nizam al-Mulk, order has been undone in Baghdad’. The author, cited as ibn Abu al-Saqr, is toying with Nizam’s honorific, which means ‘order of the state’. Sibt, *Mir’at al-Zaman*, 330.

The caliph called for Sadaqa’s aid nonetheless, clearly fearing Nizam’s reaction, but he could not undo what had already been done. The year after the riots, Gohara’in traveled to the sultan’s camp to complain about Abu Shuja. Nizam, who was apparently partial to laying blame on the viziers, immediately ordered his dismissal. The caliph is said to have requested Nizam appoint Amid al-Dawla to the position, and Nizam agreed: this was an official with whom he was familiar by that point, since he had spent the previous several years in the sultan’s administration with his father Fakhr al-Din. It seems that Nizam was intent on keeping a closer eye on the city from that point on, since he appointed his close ally al-Ghazali to the chair of the Nizamiyya in July 1091, and in November of the same year he and Melik-Shah visited Baghdad in person. They only stayed for a few months before returning to Isfahan, but they planned on making another visit the next year.

These high-level political maneuvers were the end result of *al-aewam*’s violent discursive agitation. Their immediate target might have been the administration of the caliphate, but, as we have seen, they were also lamenting a broader problem among the *ahl al-sunna*: probably a general decline of public order in Baghdad in addition to the dominance of the Shi’ites that signaled a shift in the will of God. Thus, one of Abu Shuja’s last acts before his dismissal was to pressure the caliph into releasing a warrant ‘that the Dhimmis should be compelled to wear their distinctive dress, to wear what the Commander of the Faithful Umar ibn al-Khattab had stipulated for them’.[92]

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[92] This warrant was only released after an incident in which a Jewish Seljuq official was attacked in public by ‘a man selling carpets’, who reported to the *diwan* that the Jew ‘treated me as inferior to himself’. According to al-Athir, the

If this was the caliphate’s response, then clearly *al-aewam* was not reacting to some momentary irritant. They charged that ‘religion is finished, the *sunna* has died, and *al-bidae* is triumphant’. They marched to the vizier’s home carrying crosses. They sought out Alids to kill and mutilate in public. What was at stake for this group? It seems to have been something much bigger than Karkh. Who were *al-aewam*? We have scarcely come closer to answering that question, but I believe that we are now beginning to realize their centrality to local developments in Baghdad and the immediate implications for their broader influence.

Further evidence for the breadth of *al-aewam*’s discontent

I argued in the previous section that the object of *al-aewam*’s criticism could not be reduced to the precipitating events of a conflict with *al-Karkh*. This argument was based on an interpretation of the timeline: there was a group of *al-aewam* that was directly involved in an inter-communal conflict from beginning to end, and there was another group that, at some point, became involved in general looting, as likely occurred in 1078. As the riot began to grow in scale, the criticisms of *al-aewam* began to increase in severity. By the second phase of the riot, they were carrying crosses, attacking the caliph’s vizier, and saying that the *sunna* had died. I argued that these criticisms were so far over the line that they could not be explained by escalating incidents with the *ahl al-Karkh* or by a recent history of

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Jewish official, whose name was Abu Sa’d ibn Samha, traveled to the sultan’s camp with Gohara’in to request Abu Shuja’s dismissal. It might be worth noting that a decade earlier, Gohara’in had worked with his lieutenant Khumartegin to conspire against the wealthy tax farmer of Basra, who was a Jewish man called ibn Allan. This ibn Allan was protected by Nizam al-Mulk, so Gohara’in and Khumartegin went over his head to Melik-Shah (who was in another city). The sultan joined their conspiracy and had ibn Allan executed; and when he died, Melik-Shah confiscated 100,000 dinars worth of his property, while Basra was given to Khumartegin. According to the sources, Gohara’in and Khumartegin were trying to cause a rift between Nizam al-Mulk and Melik-Shah over the position of ibn Allan; apparently they were not on good terms with Nizam al-Mulk. Nonetheless, it is interesting that Nizam seems to have had a history of patronizing Jewish administrators. Thus, when Gohara’in arrived at the sultan’s camp with ibn Samha in 1091 asking for Abu Shuja’s dismissal, their requests aligned perfectly with Nizam’s political tendencies. It seems that Gohara’in realigned himself politically during the decade between his conspiracy with Melik-Shah against ibn Allan and his conspiracy with Nizam al-Mulk against Abu Shuja. Richards, *The Annals*, 185-186, 227.

Sunni-Shia conflicts: at some point, the domain of their grievances must have expanded beyond the local heresies, however radical they had become (cursing the Prophet, etc.).

The caliphate's reaction supported this interpretation: the caliph issued a warrant ordering the dhimmis to observe the rules of Umar ibn al-Khattab. This reaction suggests a broader discontent among the people with the direction of contemporary Islamic society. Here, I will present several incidents involving *al-aewam* that further support this interpretation of their grievances. These examples will also support the argument that *al-aewam* was able to meaningfully shape dialogue in the city by expressing their grievances through the methods detailed above.

There were two disturbances in the year 1088 that involved *al-aewam*; both of these emerged from unusual circumstances and are given uneven treatment by the sources. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi says very little about both events, and his account of the first one does not align with those of al-Athir and ibn al-Jawzi. Only al-Athir mentions *al-aewam* in connection with the first event. The three sources agree on the second event, and all of them mention *al-aewam* in connection.

(1) the first event: *jadhabu suyufuhum*

All three sources agree that in 1088 (al-Athir and ibn al-Jawzi give the month of Safara), the *ahl bab al-Basra* started building a new bridge.[93] All the other information comes exclusively from al-Athir and ibn al-Jawzi.

According to them, there was an ostentatious display involving the transportation of bricks on plates of gold and silver, and it attracted a massive crowd from the other quarters, especially the *bab al-Azaj*. While this was going on, the *ahl bab al-Azaj* spotted a woman selling water to 'the people' (al-Athir: *al-nas*) on the banks of the Tigris. They attacked her, 'as was their custom' (al-Athir: *eala eada lahum*), just as the *shihna* Gohara'in was traveling down the river.[94] (The sources say that they cried something like *al-ma' li'l-sabil*, meaning 'water for free' or 'water for the people'.) She went to him for help, and he sent 'the Turks' (both: *al-atrak*) against her attackers. According to both sources, the Turks started beating the attackers, who then 'drew their swords' (ibn al-Jawzi: *jadhabu suyufuhum*) and started hitting the sides of Gohara'in's horse while he was still in his barge.[95] A small battle then ensued in which several people were killed. Al-Athir is even more specific than ibn al-Jawzi about the decisive moment, when, according to him, *salla al-eama suyufuhum*: *al-eama* drew their swords, began beating Gohara'in's horse, etc.[96] Thus, it seems from al-Athir's account that *al-eama* were among the *ahl bab al-Azaj* who were crowding around the new bridge, attacking the woman for selling water, and fighting with Gohara'in. Indeed, al-Athir later adds that *hamala as'habuhu eala al-eama*: Gohara'in's followers began attacking *al-eama*.

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[93] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 454-455; al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 277-278; Sibt, *Mir'at*, 420.

[94] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 455.

It is quite striking that a source would mention *al-eama* carrying swords, or really any weapons. This factor seems to have implications for the social group that *al-aewam* belonged to: how many of them carried swords? How often did they use them? Are there implications for their fiscal situations? I have not discovered any other instance of *al-aewam* carrying weapons. If it is true, then it certainly underscores our previous understanding of *al-aewam* as a group that could inflict serious violence on the ruling parties and make viable attempts at communicating their opinions through force.

Perhaps equally striking, though, is their attack on the woman selling water and al-Athir's comment that it was 'their custom'. This detail points to the potential importance of economic factors for their discontent. However, it also implies a broader dissatisfaction with contemporary social life. *Al-aewam*, on the basis of this event, expected water to be free, implying that it should be provided by the traditional caretakers of society. This naturally suggests a general disapproval of contemporary social norms, at least with respect to this very narrow issue.

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[95] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 277.
[96] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 455.

We have little idea of how widespread this problem was or of how often the people performed this ‘custom’ of attacking water vendors. Were public water fountains not being maintained? Were people becoming dependent on vendors for their water supply? These are questions that, of course, cannot be approached on the basis of a single event such as this, even if al-Athir does state that it was ‘their custom’ to attack water vendors. Nonetheless, their aggressive reaction implies a frustration with the issue of water that seemed to run deep. Likewise, it seems to represent an instance of *al-aewam* participating in a more long-term topic of dialogue rather than reacting against a momentary issue. The issue of free water is mentioned by al-Athir at least as early as 1051, when Shi’ites used the same slogan (‘Water for free!’) when protesting a Sunni blockade of al-Karkh during a series of riots.[97]

(2) the second event: *ijtimaeat al-eama*

The second event of this year involving *al-aewam* also points to a widespread frustration that appears to have weighed constantly on the people. While all three sources agree on these events, the narratives are much shorter. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi gives the shortest narrative:

‘In this year, the caliph removed the protectors (*as’hab*) of his wife Khatun from the harem, and they went to the Dar al-Mamlaka, and the reason was them becoming overbearing towards the people (*al-eama*), so they made noise and requested the caliph’s help, and he became scared of a *fitna*.’[98]

If not for the other sources, we might spend some time asking what is meant here by Khatun’s foreign soldiers becoming ‘overbearing’ (Sibt: *istatala*). Thankfully, ibn al-Jawzi and al-Athir supply the details. One day, one of the Turks (both: *turki*) was bartering with an ‘itinerant fruit seller’ (al-Athir: *tawwaf fakiha*) when they got into a dispute.[99] According to al-Athir, the vendor cursed the Turk, who then grabbed a pan from the balance and used it to split his head open. After that, *al-eama* began to gather and a crowd was formed. The caliph, who was ‘afraid of a *fitna*’, quickly ordered the total expulsion of the Turks from his harem. It was completed within a single hour (al-Athir: *fi saaea wahida*) and things quieted down.[100]

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[97] Richards, *The Annals*, 75.

[98] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 420.

[99] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 454-455; al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 277-278. I am using the translation of *tawwaf fakiha* given by Richards, *The Annals*, 219.

Perhaps this event gives a window into the lives of *al-aewam*: they sprung very quickly to the defense of an itinerant vendor. In fact, they began protesting and calling for help *after* he had been killed, so clearly there was something at stake for them depending on whether such treatment would be tolerated. Of course, this ‘merchant’ was of a much different class than the *ahl al-suq* who managed storefronts in the big market districts and ran workshops full-time. Thus, it is not strange that *al-aewam* identified with this man’s struggle. The event may also point towards ethnic tensions in the city that, like the economic tensions, likely ran deep and contributed to the day-to-day frustrations of *al-aewam*.

There is an unrelated passage in which al-Athir incidentally lends support to this view. When discussing the ‘Qadiri House’ (*al-bayt al-qadiri*), he mentions that there was fear about the extinction of the line during al-Qa’im’s reign. This was partly due to the Qadiri House having *kanu yukhalatun al-eama fii al-balad yajrun majra al-suqa*, meaning that they ‘were mixing with *al-eama* in the city and entering the lifestyle of *al-suqa*’, which would mean that the people (*al-nas*) would not respect them as caliphs.[101] *Al-suqa* is a term that Richards translates as ‘petty tradesmen’: it has a similar meaning as *al-aewam*, but implies vending.[102] This passage seems to reinforce the association between *al-aewam* and a less institutionalized, perhaps, iteration of the culturally ubiquitous mercantile profession.

Returning to the incident with the fruit seller, it is also noteworthy that the caliph took such quick and decisive action. Given that *al-aewam* were sometimes armed, and obviously capable of disrupting normal life in the city, it is understandable that he feared a major conflict. The caliph, though, rarely took decisive action when tensions flared up, for example in the 1078 riots when he appears to have been inactive.

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[100] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 455.
[101] Ibid., 407.
[102] Richards, *The Annals*, 168.

Thus, what I would highlight here is the sense that the people were constantly under intense pressure from foreign forces. It seems that there were also ethnic and economic components that could be further studied. With that being said, it is clear the *aewam* considered the Turks' position with respect to the caliph to be a constant threat to their daily lives. Otherwise, they would not have assembled in public and called for help from the caliph (Sibt ibn al-Jawzi: *istaghathu illa al-khalifa*) even after the peddler had been killed.[103] Their complaint regarded, as Sibt ibn al-Jawzi says in his account, the behavior of *al-atrak* in general. If the caliph was willing to tolerate this event, then what else would he tolerate? What did this mean for *al-aewam*? The privileges held by the foreign soldiers must have felt like a constant weight that threatened to interrupt or even end their lives at any moment. Thus, they called for 'help' from the caliph, and, without knowing exactly what they asked for, we know that the caliph responded by making a clear statement that such behavior would not be tolerated.

Both the 'water for free' riot and the incident with the fruit vendor give the impression that *al-aewam* in Baghdad was under constant, increasing pressure from forces beyond their control. Thus, it is not surprising that their critiques could sometimes escalate to target not only specific circumstances, but also the state of Islamic society on the whole, at least in Baghdad. In one case, they are said to lament the selling of water, a complaint that stretched back at least 30 years in the city. In the other case, they are said to complain about the privileges held by foreign soldiers who lived in the most private parts of the city. In both, their complaints were not *per se* about singular incidents that needed to be worked out. Rather, they were about general social phenomena: water should not be sold, and foreign soldiers should not enjoy unchecked privileges over the locals. For *al-aewam*, there needed to be lines to observe and rules to follow. They clearly expected the caliph to fight for these standards, but they could also direct their energy against any representative of the local or foreign government, for example against Gohara'in, who was a Seljuq appointee.

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[103] Sibt, *Mir'at*, 420.

And the governing groups often took their complaints very seriously. After all, *al-aewam* clearly had a significant capacity to leverage force against the ruling elites. So, when it looked as if two armed parties might come to blows in the city, the caliph made haste to find a solution. In fact, Gohara'in had wanted to punish the *ahl bab al-Azaj* after they attacked his barge, but nothing seems to have come of it.[104] He later petitioned successfully for Abu Shuja's dismissal, but that was only after the 1089 riots, and that meant nothing directly for *al-aewam*.[105] Punishing a large group of people was fairly difficult. Disciplining *al-aewam* must have been especially difficult because they had no visible leaders. Thus, *al-aewam* was capable of leveraging significant force against the ruling elites, both foreign and local.[106] They often complained about fairly broad social dilemmas rather than particular events, and they clearly expected their leaders, especially the caliph, to uphold certain standards of conduct in the city. The last several examples will strengthen and expand this characterization of their social place in Baghdad and further elucidate their contributions to public dialogue.

The *oud* riots: *al-aewam* and the Sunni *ulama*

By this point, we have studied most of the major events involving *al-aewam* between 1077 and 1091. The death of the caliph al-Qa'im in 1075 after reigning for over 40 years should probably be identified as a turning point in the local history of Baghdad. His successor was not prepared to handle the riots caused by al-Qushayri only two years later at the Nizamiyya. Nizam took advantage of the new caliph's weakness by meddling with his vizierate, as we have discussed, and by attempting to increase the powers held by his subordinates over Iraq. The Nizamiyya riots (1077-1078) were the last major intra-Sunni riots of this period to involve *al-aewam*, at least according to the sources. There was one significant inter-*madhhab* riot in 1083, but the sources do not implicate *al-aewam* explicitly. So if we are looking for a substantive contribution by *al-aewam* to dialogues related directly to phenomena of the Sunni Revival, besides what has already been gleaned from the events of 1077-1078, then we must look to affairs before the Nizamiyya riots. Such an event occurred in the spring of 1072, three years before the death of al-Qa'im. Naturally, Baghdad was politically a very different place at that time, even with respect to the riots that occurred only five years later. This fact is reflected in the narrative, which will be given here by al-Athir because he is the only author to mention *al-aewam*:

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[104] Richards, *The Annals*, 219.

[105] Although, there is evidence that he was very popular with *al-aewam*, so it might not be that simple.

[106] The paradox here is that they were able to organize so effectively, and in particular to communicate messages with such a high level of clarity, without having any formal organization. The explanation is that their opinions must have been held by an overwhelming number of those that turned out for protests and riots. The implication is that their disaffection with the direction of Islamic society must have been widely-held.

'And one of the amazing things that is narrated with respect to this flood is that the people (*al-nas*) in the preceding year had denounced the large number of singers and wine, and some of them cut the strings of the *oud* of a singer who was with a soldier (*jundi*), so the soldier that she was with rose up [against him] and beat him, and the people (*al-eama*) gathered together with a lot of the imams, among them Abu Is'haq al-Shirazi, and they called for help from the caliph and demanded that the brothels and taverns be destroyed or shut down, so he promised them that he would write to the sultan about it, so they quieted down and dispersed, and many of the pious men continued to call for him to investigate it, so then Baghdad was flooded, and this great event caused damage to the caliph and the army, and its misfortune spread through the whole people (*al-nas*), and the sharif Abu Ja'far ibn Abu Musa saw some of the chamberlains (*hajib*) that were saying "we will message the sultan and try to disperse the people (*al-nas*)", and one of them said "stay quiet until the response comes" and Abu Ja'far said to him: "we wrote and you wrote, and our response came before your response", meaning that they complained about the situation with them to God Almighty and he responded with the flood before the arrival of a response from the sultan.'[107]

Naturally, the most striking feature of this narrative is the role being played by *al-eama*, who apparently assembled with clerical leaders from both the Hanbali and Shafi'i parties in looking for a solution to the problem. It is somewhat surprising that they would turn to the clerical community in general for help, rather than the Hanbalis alone, since only a few years later the *aewam* were in open conflict with the Shafi'i community. First, however, the overall political situation should be discussed.

As mentioned, this passage appears to describe a community of leaders very different from the one that oversaw the 1089 riots or even the 1077-1078 riots. First, it is notable that the Hanbalis made an active effort to work with the Shafi'is on this issue by inviting their leader to the assembly in the mosque. It is worth noting that this was al-Shirazi, the professor of the Nizamiyya who had worked very closely with Nizam al-Mulk in the past and, of course, would become closely involved in the Shafi'i policies that led to the riots of 1077. Five years before those riots, he was apparently willing to work with the Hanbalis on an issue that *al-aewam* presented to them. Second, the 'imams' appear to be in relative control of the situation compared to, say, the 1089 riots: they assemble (*ijtimaeat*) with *al-aewam*, they issue a formal complaint to the caliph, and the caliph forwards it to the sultan. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi tells us more about this process:

'Ibn Abu Musa listened and gathered the Hanbalis, and he brought out with him Abu Is'haq al-Shirazi and his fellows, and they entered the *jamiea al-Qasr*, and they asked for help and demanded the removal of the evils and the destruction of the brothels, so the caliph began to take notice of the evildoers and the spilling of wine and such as that, and they demanded the dismissal of Sa'ad al-Najmi from the *hisba*, and he was dismissed, and they demanded the striking of a *dirahim* that the people (*al-*

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[107] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 403-404.

nas) could use, and the caliph [responded]: “return to your homes, and we will write to Adud al-Dawla (Alp Arslan) about what you asked”.’[108]

So they seem to have drafted a complaint with very specific demands. And not only did the caliph receive their complaint, but he actually fulfilled a request that he thought was within his power to fulfill. The congregation of imams presented the caliph with three demands: do something about the brothels and taverns, fire the *muhtasib*, and strike a new *dirham*. What these second two demands had to do with the first one is not entirely obvious: all three sources make it clear that the incident with the *oud* is what provoked the assembly. Perhaps they considered the *muhtasib* partially responsible for preventing the proliferation of illicit establishments.

In any case, al-Athir provides a very different explanation for the assembly of the imams than the other two sources. According to Sibt ibn al-Jawzi and ibn al-Jawzi, a cleric began the conflict by cutting the strings of the *oud* and by complaining about it to the Hanbalis, who then organized a gathering in the *jamiea al-Qasr* with the Shafi’is and drafted a complaint.[109] Al-Athir, on the other hand does not identify any clerical figure as the principal organizer of the protest at the beginning, although Abu Ja’far quickly took control of the situation. He writes that *al-aewam* gathered, along with the imams, and demanded action from the caliph. Al-Athir does not even suggest that the strings were cut by a cleric, let alone that the protest was primarily motivated by Hanbali (i.e clerical) frustration. Al-Athir states that *ijtima’at al-eama wa maehum kathir min al-a’ima*, meaning ‘*al-eama* gathered together with a lot of the imams’.[110] This passage appears to assign centrality or even precedence to the role played by *al-aewam* with respect to the gathering, since they are the subject of the verb *ijtima’at*, as if it were a gathering of the *aewam* that also happened to be attended by clerics.

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[108] Sibt, *Mir’at*, 252-253.
[109] Al-Jawzi, *al-Muntazam*, 138-139.
[110] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 403-404.

The central place that al-Athir assigns to *al-aewam* with respect to the organization of an assembly and the drafting of complaints to the caliph should be taken seriously given our understanding of the role that they played in proceeding riots. In particular, we know that *al-aewam* often formed a discursive position without the direction of a particular leader, especially in the 1089 riots, but also in the episodes of 1088 and 1077. What this means, for this case, is that *al-aewam* contributed substantially to the formation of a dialogue between the imams and the caliph in which the imams looked to the caliph for ‘the brothels and taverns to be destroyed or shut down’ by taking an active role in the organization of a general assembly. We would not be able to draw such an inference without a prior understanding of *al-aewam*’s ability to participate actively in public dialogue and congregate in public (1088, 1089) without the direction of a particular (named) leader. Thus, in this instance, we may take al-Athir’s narrative seriously: *al-aewam* assembled publicly to complain about an ongoing social phenomenon that violated their moral expectations for Islamic society in Baghdad. As in previous cases, they expected the caliph to take their complaints seriously and provide help.

It is likewise unsurprising that all three sources record a strongly negative reaction among the *ulama* towards al-Qa’im’s forwarding of the assembly’s complaints to the Seljuq administration. The response narrated by al-Athir repeats a theme that we have encountered before with respect to the 1089 riots: that God’s will is revealed through the victories of those that he favors. In 1089, *al-aewam* charged that God no longer favored the *ahl al-sunna* as the only explanation for the defeat and collapse of the Sunni community in Baghdad. In 1072, Abu Ja’far charged that God had responded to the calls of the pious Hanbalis by sending a massive flood against the city and in particular against the ruling officials who had tolerated the proliferation of vices by deferring to the Seljuq government.

Was this reaction only held by the Hanbali clerics, or was it more widespread? The answer seems to lie in Sibt ibn al-Jawzi’s narration of the fallout, which I have found difficult to follow. Thankfully, it is parsed by Simha Sabari.

According to him (following Sibt ibn al-Jawzi and ibn al-Jawzi), Abu Ja’far ‘se prit la tête entre les mains en criant: “Lamentez-vous sur l’Islam, notre obéissance à cet imam a pris fin”’.[111] Then, the jurist ibn Abu Ifafa, addressing ‘au peuple’, said ‘“ô musulmans, violà que le sharif s’inflige ses coups et se lamente sur l’Islam”’, at which point ‘les gens du peuple se rassemblèrent rapidement’. The phrase ‘gens du peuple’ is used by Sabari for *al-aewam*, so he must be reading the third person plural pronouns in this section as referring to them. Accordingly, Sabari writes of them that ‘on les entendit crier: “Cet imam n’est pas meilleur que ‘Uthman b. ‘Affan … l’argent qu’il détient nous appartient … notre serment de bay’a à son égard est nul et non avenu”’.[112] Here, ‘imam’ is referring to the caliph. After these complaints, there were some violent protests that were violently suppressed.

When Abu Ja’far cried that ‘notre obéissance à cet imam a pris fin’, he seems to be referencing the perception that the caliph’s deference to the Seljuqs on the suppression of moral vices signaled an effective end of the old caliphate. This message was communicated to *al-aewam* through the address of ibn Abu Ifafa, and it apparently led *al-aewam* to declare that their oath to the caliph (*bay’a*) was no longer valid. Again, it seems that *al-aewam* participated in an active dialogue over the changing place of the caliph in Islamic society. As in the case of the 1077 riots, their opinions clearly fell on the side of the Hanbali clerics, who were the most visible clerical party to protest the caliph’s inaction.

With that being said, this interpretation must be informed by our understanding that *al-aewam* was not under meaningful direction by the Hanbalis. The events of 1077-1078 may give the impression that the Hanbalis were somehow directing their participation in dialogue, but every riot that we have studied in the 1080s points towards the opposite conclusion, namely that none of the clerical groups had the ability to regulate *al-aewam*’s participation in dialogue. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the opinion apparently held by *al-aewam* with respect to the 1072 troubles (that their oath to the caliph was invalidated by his unwillingness or inability to subdue moral vices in the city) was indeed their own. The fact that it was also held by the Hanbalis, and also perhaps by many of the Shafi'is, should not be read as evidence that *al-aewam* was being directed by clerical opinion. There is much stronger evidence to suggest that they were aware of the stakes and formed their own opinions. How they expressed these opinions has already been studied here; how exactly they formed them is unclear.

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[111] Sabari, *Mouvements Populaires*, 112-113.
[112] Ibid.

Al-Athir's explicit mention of *al-aewam* is obviously critical in identifying the role that they played, and it is likely used by Sabari in his interpretation of the other two narratives. Sabari, however, seems to miss the apparently critical role played by *al-aewam* in the initial convocation of the assembly: studying his narrative seems like a worthwhile exercise in evaluating the importance of reading the sources comparatively. He writes that:

'The same year, during the month of Jumada al-Akhira, the preacher ibn Abi Imama saw a singer carrying her musical instrument leaving the residence of a Turkish commander. The preacher cut the strings of the instrument (an *oud*) and the commander's soldiers launched into pursuit, assaulting and beating him all the way to his home. The sharif Abu Ja'far gathered the Hanbalis in the *jamiea al-Qasr*, where they were joined by the Shafi'is led by Abu Is'haq al-Shirazi…'[113]

This account seems to totally erase the role assigned by al-Athir to *al-aewam* in the event's instigation. The fact that *al-aewam* participated in the protest from the beginning lends further support to the idea that they were not under the direction of clerics and were, in fact, singularly disturbed by the preponderance of brothels and taverns in the city. Likewise, it seems to erase our knowledge that *al-aewam* was at the center of a large-scale meeting with the imams of both *madhahib*. Thus, as in the case of the 1088 and 1089 disturbances, *al-aewam* was commenting meaningfully on a social dilemma: they made a clear statement of the consequences of the caliph not fulfilling the role expected of him, in this case that their oaths to him were invalidated. The *oud* incident of 1072 especially represents *al-*

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[113] Ibid.

aewam commenting on phenomena directly related to the Sunni Revival, namely the political and religious role of the caliph in a rapidly changing city.

Thus, while it does not seem that *al-aewam*'s agitation produced a response from the caliph or the sultan on the proliferation of illicit establishments, it is fair to say that it helped shape a clerical response to the problem, even if the Hanbalis might have reacted similarly on their own. Given the response of the caliph to the assembly of *al-aewam* in 1088 over the fruit seller incident, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the caliph took the problem much more seriously given the popular mobilization. Likewise, *al-aewam* played a role in forming the public assembly and offered a substantive response to (or perhaps even an escalation of) the critique levied by the Hanbalis towards the caliph. Maybe they took that critique too far in their eyes: as with their criticisms in 1089, it is difficult to imagine entrenched Hanbali clerics such as Abu Ja'far endorsing statements such as 'our oaths to the caliph are nullified by his inaction'. Nonetheless, they played a critical role in shaping broader public dialogue in the city, and it seems to have had a demonstrable impact on the clerical outlook, and perhaps also the response of the caliphate, through the formation of a public assembly.

Ibn al-Banna's perspective from within the walls of the city

Ibn al-Banna was a Hanbali jurist who wrote a diary covering the years being studied here. Unfortunately, only the portion for parts of 1068-1069 survives, but these sections still provide an invaluable eyewitness account of daily life within the city. Ibn al-Banna mentions *al-aewam* several times, and as the events he describes occurred only three years before the *oud* riots, they offer one more unique account of the role being played by *al-aewam*; in this case, it is a true glimpse into the daily social life of the city.

During this time, there was intense infighting between the *madhhabs*, between the Hanbalis, and between the *ahl al-sunna* and the *ahl al-Karkh*. The first notable incident occurred when a group of Hanbalis gathered in a mosque, including ibn al-Banna, heard that there was trouble in the *bab al-Maratib* quarter. Ibn al-Banna ordered a '*khayat* from among us, who was neither a jurist nor any other class of learned men' to investigate the incident.[114] Since *khayat* means 'tailor', it seems that this individual was a member of the *ahl al-suq* as opposed to one of the 'itinerant vendors'. This account essentially confirms an assumption about the relationship between the *ulama* and the *ahl al-suq*: that the *ahl al-suq* were sometimes closely associated with members of the clerical class. Indeed, it seems to imply that the *ahl al-suq* might sometimes be included in generic references to 'Hanbali' parties when further specifics are not provided, given the fact that ibn al-Banna included an uneducated member of the *ahl al-suq* as 'among [our Hanbali group]'. While this passage does not mention *al-aewam* directly, it underscores the potential fluidity of relationships between the clerics and the other classes.

This first incident was on 17 January 1069. The second notable incident occurred shortly afterward on 30 January 1069 during the Friday prayers at the al-Mansur mosque. According to ibn al-Banna, a large-scale *fitna* occurred after one of the *eajam* (translated by Makdisi as 'one of the Turks') seized a woman outside of the mosque.[115] 'The people' (referred to in this section only as *al-nas*) tried to assist her, at which point a brawl ensued between the Turks and the people. One man was killed by the Turks and many more were injured. A local *amid* confronted the foreign soldiers about their behavior, charging that 'if the Byzantines had reigned over the Muslims, they would not have done what you have done, had they seen them in their mosques, engaged in their prayers'.[116] Apparently, the foreign soldiers feared another *fitna* and had assembled in arms. The women of the deceased grieved publicly, and on 31 January the people (*al-nas*) formally demanded that the caliphate punish the killers.

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[114] Makdisi, *History and Politics*, 38.
[115] Ibid., 39.
[116] Ibid., 40.

Several groups were gathered in the *diwan*, including *al-fuqaha*, *al-sharaf*, *al-tijar*, and *al-amathil*, to be told that the caliph had sent messages to the sultan informing him of the issue.[117]

This event recalls several incidents that we have already studied. First, both the foreign soldiers and the caliphate appeared to have been particularly unnerved by the possibility of a *fitna* between the foreign soldiers and 'the people', as in the 1088 incident with the fruit vendor. Second, the caliph responded by convening a large *diwan*, this time including even the *tijar*, here probably referring to the wealthy merchants. This recalls the caliph's formation of broad assemblies in response to public agitation by 'the people' in 1077 and 1089. Third, the caliph seems to have felt that an immediate response in this instance was beyond his authority and instead deferred the issue to the Seljuq government, as had occurred when presented with demands from 'the people' and others in 1072.

All of these characteristics point towards the conclusion that this incident likely involved *al-aewam*, and that here *al-nas* is probably being used in place of *al-aewam*, as al-Athir had used it in his first section on the 1089 riots. Thus, the incident seems to resemble the conflict between *al-aewam* and the foreign soldiers in 1088, only in this case we have a much clearer understanding of what *al-nas*/*al-aewam* expected from the caliphate: they demanded 'that the criminals be punished'.[118] This confirms two conclusions that were drawn with respect to the 1088 event: first, that the presence of foreign soldiers in the city did represent a constant threat to the daily security of *al-aewam*; second, that the people expected the caliph to represent their interests with respect to the privileges of the foreigners. For them, there were rules that needed to be observed by the foreign soldiers – for example, they could not kill indiscriminately – and they expected the caliph to uphold them.

The third notable incident began on 6 March 1069 when the cleric ibn Sukkara publicly condemned the 'drinking of intoxicants in the precincts of the Caliphal palace and the gathering of condemnable entertainments at their places'.[119] He destroyed the lutes and drums that he found and poured out their wine. A couple days later, someone complained about the incident to the caliph, so ibn Sukkara was summoned before a council. There, he was condemned by a Shafi'i cleric called ibn al-Sabbagh, who argued that he had no right to smash the instruments. In response, ibn Sukkara said that 'God and His Apostle ordered that they be broken. The Prophet – peace be on him! – has said "I was given a mission to obliterate musical instruments and idols"'.[120] His rhetoric escalated and he was sent to jail. The next day (10 March), ibn al-Sabbagh issued a *fatwa* arguing that ibn Sukkara was wrong to smash the instruments. When ibn al-Banna heard this (on the same day), he immediately published a *fatwa* against ibn al-Sabbagh, arguing that the charges against ibn Sukkara should be dropped, and it was cosigned by several of his Hanbali companions and delivered to Abu Ja'far. The day after that (March 11), news reached the *diwan* that ibn al-Sabbagh and his companions had been robbed and beaten, and the news began to spread rapidly around the city. At about the same time, the Hanbalis began falling behind ibn al-Banna's *fatwa*, and then al-Shirazi, the leader of the Shafi'is and professor of the Nizamiyya, issued his own *fatwa* in which he concurred with ibn al-Banna. News of this reached the caliph, and he reversed ibn Sukkara's sentence. Ibn Sukkara then threatened to leave the city but was dissuaded by his companions on the basis that there would be a *fitna* if he left.[121]

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[117] Makdisi translates these terms as 'jurisconsults', 'Sharifs', 'merchants', and 'notables' respectively. Ibid.
[118] Ibid.

According to ibn al-Banna, when the news of al-Sabbagh's misfortune began to spread, *akhadha al-nas yaqulun* ('the people began to say') that God had punished al-Sabbagh for issuing *fatwas* against ibn Sukkara and for 'exceeding the proper limits in this regard'.[122]

It seems highly possible, as in the previous case, that the term *al-nas* here is referring to *al-aewam*, as in the several other cases when *al-aewam* is said to have said something with respect to a widely held opinion. It is unclear whether or not the attitudes of *al-nas*/*al-aewam* might have influenced the opinions of the clerics. It is possible that al-Sabbagh had gone rogue at ibn Sukkara's council in disregard of official Shafi'i policy and that al-Shirazi would have repudiated his position even if it had not been widely condemned by the people. Ibn al-Banna, however, mentions the news of al-Sabbagh's misfortune and its rapid dissemination among *al-nas* before he mentions the outpouring of clerical opinions in favor of ibn Sukkara. Likewise, it is not clear whether ibn al-Banna is implying that al-Shirazi, for example, issued his *fatwa* on March 10, March 11, or later; it seems unlikely that his *fatwa* would have come on the same day as ibn al-Banna's, and news began to spread of al-Sabbagh's beating on the very next day. While it should be clearly stated that ibn al-Banna says nothing of the sort, his narrative of events gives the impression that the attitude of *al-nas* towards the situation had formed at least independently of the *fatwas* being issued, even if they did not influence them directly.

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[119] Ibid., 292.
[120] Ibid., 293.
[121] Ibid., 293-294.
[122] Ibid., 283.

In either case, this event presents another instance of *al-nas*/*al-aewam* forming an unambiguous opinion on a substantive social issue related to dilemmas of the Sunni Revival. As in 1072, they had very clear expectations for the roles being played by the ruling groups. This episode, however, demonstrates that those expectations extended not only to the caliph, but also to the *ulama* themselves. *Al-nas* seems to have thought that al-Sabbagh had crossed some sort of limit when he issued a *fatwa* stating that one who smashes instruments holds accountability. Likewise, they considered it within the bounds of clerical prerogatives to attack these vices where they existed; why *al-aewam* did not appear to expect as much from the clerics in 1072 is not entirely clear, although the clerics did work with *al-aewam* to deliver a petition to the caliph in that case.[123] Thus, ibn al-Banna's passage seems to further reveal the breadth of dialogues on which *al-aewam* was prepared to comment. As in previous instances, their attitudes seem to have been their own, and they seem to have been capable of expressing them unambiguously. Whether their attitudes might have influenced the *fatwas* being published is a more opaque question, but it is clear in other instances that they could inform clerical responses (1072, 1088). The fact that such a question is even on the table demonstrates the broad range of *al-aewam*'s potential influence related to these debates.

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[123] It is interesting that the Hanbalis and Shafi'is published concurring opinions; it recalls the joint Hanbali-Shafi'i assembly that formed during the 1072 riots, and reflects a different climate than the one of the 1077-1078 riots.

The fourth and final incident I will highlight here relates only to a terminological phenomenon in ibn al-Banna. At the beginning of this section, I mentioned that ibn al-Banna uses the term *al-eama* several times in his surviving diary sections. One day, on 11 February 1069, ibn al-Banna convened with some of his Hanbali companions to discuss an issue between ibn Aqil and Abu Ja'far. One of the clerics was frustrated with Abu Ja'far, and it was reported that he said in exasperation that he would not follow his advice, but 'responded favorably to the opinion of the common people'.[124] The phrase used by ibn al-Banna is *ra'iy al-eama*, literally 'the opinion of *al-eama*'.[125]

In this case, a private dialogue between members of an elite clerical circle, the term *al-eama* is being used in a derogatory sense, to refer to a group of people whose opinions are not worth taking. However, this passage provides unambiguous empirical evidence for the conclusion that *al-aewam* played a tangible role in the city's primary channels of dialogue. Even if the term is being used to rhetorical effect, it is clear that ibn al-Banna and his contemporaries, writing in Baghdad in February 1069, saw no contradiction in the phrase *ra'iy al-eama*: the idea of 'the *aewam*'s opinion' made sense to them. It seems reasonable to infer, on the basis of this account and on all of the case studies that have presented here, that such a *ra'iy al-eama* existed in Baghdad's discursive domain at this time, that it was continuously contemplated by the elites, and that it commented substantively on social issues related directly to phenomena of the proposed Sunni Revival.

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[124] Makdisi, *History and Politics*, 43.
[125] Ibid., 24.

Conclusion: *ra'iy al-aeama*

At the end of the previous chapter, we posited several questions about *al-aewam* with respect to their place in the local social structure of Seljuq Baghdad the role that they might have played in local events of the broader Sunni Revival. At this point, it seems that there was a nontrivial role played by *al-aewam* in the formation of dialogues in Baghdad. Let us review some of the previous questions:

What role did *al-aewam* play in fomenting the riots? We have studied several cases in which *al-aewam* seems to have been the primary or sole party participating, for example in 1088 and 1089. In several cases, such as in 1069, 1072, 1078, and 1088, they played visible, formative roles in riots that seem to have had long-term social issues at their center. Perhaps most importantly, *al-aewam* does not appear to have been under visible direction by a member of an external group in any of these cases. One of the minor Sunni-Shia riots might have involved a leader (al-Athir: *muqadim al-ahdath min al-sunna*),[126] but this individual does not appear to have been external to his own social group, and we are not sure whether that group was *al-aewam* anyways.[127] With this, we can conclude that *al-aewam* was playing an autonomous role in the fomenting of riots across the period being studied. They were not pawns or observers: the *aewam* was an active participant with unique perspectives and opinions.

What methods did *al-aewam* use? The most common 'method' seems to have been simple public assembly and the delivery of a set of demands to the caliphate. Sometimes (1069, 1072) the *ulama* and the *tajir* might have acted as intermediaries, but other times (1069, 1088, 1089) it seems that *al-aewam* acted on their own. With that being said, they also had a wide range of discursive tools at their disposal. First, their public assemblies could involve the display of subversive symbols or slogans (1089). Second, they could resort to violent actions against government officials, either of the caliphate (1089), or of the sultanate (1069, 1078, 1088). In total, they could assemble in public, occupy public places, raise subversive symbols, chant slogans, loot government buildings, attack government officials, and kill prominent members of rival communities.

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[126] Al-Athir, *Tarikh*, 449.

[127] Richards translates the phrase as 'the commander of the Sunni militia', which seems to suggest that he thinks the group was the *eayyarun* even though the text does not mention them directly. Richards, *The Annals*, 203.

What was *al-aewam* trying to communicate? Who were the messages targeting? There is a sense that they expected the governing officials to maintain a basic standard of public order: this is fairly clear in their dealings with the foreign soldiers (1069, 1088), but it is also implied by their conduct during the 1078 and 1089 riots. *Al-aewam* also seems to have tied the local ruling groups to a broad range of moral prerogatives. In several cases (1069, 1072, 1077, 1088), it seems that they expected both the caliphate and the *ulama* to limit the spread of vices in the city. In 1072, it seems that *al-aewam* went so far as to suggest that their oaths to the caliph were bound by the caliph's ability to fulfill a traditional role, and that their oaths were invalidated by his political (relating to the exercise of power) deference to a foreign government. It seems that *al-aewam* expected the ruling classes to perform a broad range of traditional functions; or, that the inability of these groups to perform those functions was a sign of divine displeasure, a theme that recurs multiple times (1069, 1089). Thus, it seems that *al-aewam* was trying to communicate these expectations to the ruling groups, or at least to communicate their dissatisfaction with contemporary realities of social and political conduct. These messages almost exclusively targeted the administration of the caliphate, but we have seen that they had the potential to address the foreign government as well.

What was the impact of their agitation? The evidence has suggested that the ruling groups, both local and foreign, were closely aware of *al-aewam*'s expectations and criticisms. The sources frequently mention contemporary clerics as hearing things that 'they said' or even mediating on 'their opinion', and often the potential of *al-aewam* to riot seems to have provoked a quicker response than an actual riot (i.e. there was an acute awareness of their temperament). It seems that *al-aewam* could motivate the assembly of several social groups for the purpose of problem solving (1069, 1072). Severe agitation could push the caliph himself towards involvement in social issues, sometimes in conjunction with the *ulama* and other elite groups (1069, 1088, 1089). We know that their aid in a communal battle could tilt the scales in the favor of their chosen allies (1078), and that overwhelming opinion could influence the practices of clerical agitators (1077). In all, it seems that whatever direction the general dialogue in Baghdad began to take during this period, it needed to involve *al-aewam* in some meaningful way. There is never a sense in these texts that they could easily be made to conform, either to opinions that they overwhelmingly rejected (1069, 1077, 1078), or to the domination of communities that offended their social practices (the foreign soldiers, the *ahl al-Karkh*).

Who were *al-aewam*? Unfortunately, we have not made nearly as much headway in answering this question. We have had glimpses into what their lives might have looked like here and there: they identified with ‘a Hashemite that lived among them in the *bab al-Azaj*’ and with a murdered ‘itinerant fruit seller’; there was a close relationship between the terms *eama* and *suqa*. But we have still not extracted a substantive understanding of their daily lives. Nonetheless, the information gathered here seems to suggest the existence of an ongoing, long-term dialogue in the city that meaningfully involved *al-aewam* in a number of ways.

It seems to me that if the people’s reaction to an *oud* being played is to re-evaluate their oaths to the caliph, then the people are not reacting to an *oud* being played. They are reacting to the long-term social phenomena that test their expectations for Islamic society in the city. To that end, the conclusions of this chapter have implied an intense and substantive participation by *al-aewam* in dialogues related to phenomena of the Sunni Revival such as the Seljuq occupation of Baghdad and the crystallization of the legal schools. In the next chapter, I will tie these conclusions directly to those phenomena and demonstrate that *al-aewam* played an instrumental role in their discursive progress.

Chapter 3: Conclusion

In this final chapter, I will connect the conclusions of the preceding case studies to the broader Sunni Revival. This will demonstrate that *al-aewam* played a critical role in the construction and development of relevant dialogues in Baghdad during the height of the Seljuq period. Thus, *al-aewam* must be considered when assessing the nature of any potential Sunni Revival during the Seljuq period.

First, understanding the relationship between the *aewam* and the Hanbali *ulama* is critical in understanding the *aewam*'s connection to the Sunni Revival. This is because the Hanbali movement significantly realigned Islamic thought along much more traditionalist lines and thus played a major role in shaping modern Islamic thought over the late medieval period. The Hanbali movement was fundamentally traditionalist, as Hanbali scholars advocated a return to traditional Islamic practices as a solution to contemporary difficulties. As discussed, the Hanbali movement enjoyed significant levels of popularity in Seljuq Baghdad. This popularity is vividly contrasted by the sources with the local political difficulties experienced by the withdrawn, rarefied Shafi'is, who were mostly foreigners. The Shafi'is significantly benefited from Seljuq patronage, especially during the tenure of Nizam al-Mulk, who endowed the *madrasa Nizamiyya*, granted permissions to preach at the *madrasa*, and appointed foreign Shafi'i scholars to the professorship of the *madrasa*, culminating in the appointment of al-Ghazali to the position in 1091. Many of these Shafi'i scholars knew Nizam al-Mulk personally. Thus, the Shafi'is are often portrayed as a closed group of unpopular foreigners who benefited from the political patronage of a faraway despot, while the Hanbalis are portrayed as the principled defenders of the city's traditional sovereignty who used popularity among the masses as a political weapon.

In reality, the relationships that existed between these groups were more complicated. In one case, a merchant from the *suq al-thulatha* participated on the Shafi'i side of a riot, despite the *suq al-*

thulatha being a locus of Hanbali activities. Thanks to the diary of ibn al-Banna, we know that members of the *ahl al-suq* mingled directly with both Hanbali and Shafi'i clerics. Thus, both clerical groups were somewhat entrenched in local communities. This should not be surprising given that both Hanbalis and Shafi'is used local markets and local mosques and lived within the walls of the city. Likewise, there seems to have been a relatively pro-Shafi'i district in the city surrounding the *madrasa Nizamiyya* and the *suq al-madrasa*. This is the district in which Mu'ayyad al-Mulk took up residence and could perhaps be called a Seljuq compound. This Shafi'i state of affairs naturally contrasts with the high levels of popularity enjoyed by the Hanbalis among the *aewam*. Nonetheless, Shafi'i and Hanbali clerics alike participated in the normal activities of local day-to-day life.

This is important for *al-aewam* because it implies that while the Hanbalis were substantially more popular during this period, they were not the only clerical group embedded in local communities to which one could theoretically belong. The Hanbali and Shafi'i clerical communities, despite their different political orientations, shared several similarities: they were both exclusive, meaning that affiliation with one legal school typically excluded affiliation with another, they were both socially distinct from the *aewam*, they were both politically active, and they both associated with members of the *ahl al-suq* directly. These similarities explain a significant insight from the previous chapter: the *aewam* seems to have had similar expectations for both groups as carriers of clerical obligation (i.e. not only for the Hanbalis).

Likewise, the sources often place the *aewam* in dialogue with the clerics in general. That is, the *aewam* are never presented as expressing their attitudes within the confines of a Hanbali discursive frame; instead, they participated in dialogue directly with all available clerical groups. For example, the *aewam* was never under the visible direction of any clerical leader. They seem to have taken spontaneous, independent action on several occasions and with respect to a wide range of problems. Many of these issues would not have affected any clerical group: for example, the murder in 1088 of an itinerant vendor by one of the foreign soldiers. The individual was not a member of the *ahl al-suq* and thus likely did not inhabit any of the clerical circles. So, it is not surprising that in this instance the *aewam* took independent action and are portrayed by the sources as having petitioned the clerical groups in general directly. In 1089, the *aewam* completely crossed the lines beyond which even the most traditional clerics were prepared to test by threatening public apostasy, thus pushing the caliph to work with all clerical groups to restore order. In 1072 the *aewam* petitioned the clerics to take action regarding the proliferation of illicit establishments. While that protest had apparently been triggered by the actions of a Hanbali cleric, it is significant that the resulting assembly, motivated by *al-aewam*, consisted of both Hanbali and Shafi'i clerical leaders. Finally, in 1069 the Hanbali and Shafi'i legal schools released concurring *fatwas* condemning an extremely unpopular decision by the caliph to imprison a Hanbali activist for destroying musical instruments. These decisions were released at the same time as 'the people began to say' that God had punished one of the activist's Shafi'i litigants. Thus, the Hanbali and Shafi'i clerics both fell in line with the *ra'iy al-eama*, the opinion of the people, which the sources portray as having been formed without the direction of clerics. So, the clerics and the *aewam* occupied two ends of a very broad discursive channel.

To that end, the Hanbalis depended on the *aewam* for their local political strength. The Hanbalis did not control the people as a resource; they vied head-to-head with the Shafi'is for control of clerical influence during this period and, in this respect, for the approval of *al-aewam*, evidenced by the events of 1069, 1072, and 1077. There is no reason to think that the Hanbalis could not have lost the people's support by taking positions that were offensive to them. The people formed opinions and mobilized as a fully autonomous political force, evidenced by the events of 1078, 1088, and 1089. In some cases, the Hanbali and even the Shafi'i clerics worked directly with the *aewam* in formulating responses and finding solutions to particular problems. In many other cases, even the opinion of the *aewam*, let alone their mobilization, played a significant role in clerical debates. In total, the *aewam* were not Hanbali by nature. The Hanbalis struggled significantly to win their favor and could have lost it at any moment.

That being said, there is a noticeable traditionalist angle to many of the *aewam*'s criticisms. Abu Shuja's last act in response to the events of 1089, for example, was to enforce the rules of Umar ibn al-Khattab for the dhimmis, a measure that appears intended to have pleased *al-aewam* given the nature of that year's events. (Indeed, *al-aewam* had attacked Abu Shuja in person during the riots by invading his home and condemned him with 'hideous language', so it seems highly likely that the measure was intended to allay their concerns, especially given his apparent popularity following his dismissal by Nizam al-Mulk.) In 1069 and 1072, the people took positions in favor of the destruction of musical instruments, and during the latter events the *aewam* lamented the political decline of the caliphate with respect to the Seljuqs, allegedly going so far as to declare their oaths nullified by the caliph's inability to subdue vices on his own initiative. These attitudes put them naturally on the side of the Hanbalis in some disputes. There was also a political dimension to inter-*madhab* debates because the Shafi'is benefited significantly from Seljuq patronage. It is, in this context, unsurprising that the *aewam* swung towards the Hanbalis in disputes over Islamic authenticity (1077). At the same time, the *aewam* represented a significant political force in their own right: the caliph feared that they would publicly assault or murder a cleric appointed by Nizam al-Mulk himself in 1077, they pressured the caliph into expelling foreign soldiers from his *harem* in 1088, and they were responsible for the total undoing of local order in 1078 and 1089. Thus, even if popular opinion was the Hanbalis' to lose given their traditionalist legal opinions and lack of Seljuq state support, it was still the *aewam*'s to dispense. And their support in a local political or legal dispute represented a significant asset, as we have seen; it was so potent that the entire local ruling structure – Hanbalis, Shafi'is, and the caliph – was sometimes compelled to negotiate with them directly. These negotiations (1072, 1089) represent the clearest indications of a two-way dialogue directly between the clerics as a group and the *aewam*. That is not to say that other dialogues did not exist, nor that the Hanbalis were not significantly more popular than the Shafi'is among the people, which the sources state clearly. It is, however, important to recognize that the broadest level of dialogue in the city during the Seljuq period was not between the Hanbalis and the Shafi'is or between the caliphate and the sultanate, but was rather between the clerics and the people.

This understanding of the relationship that existed between the *aewam* and the clerical elites of Baghdad represents a significant advancement in our understanding of Baghdad's broader social structure during the Seljuq period. It is far removed from Andrew Peacock's dismissive reference to the people of Baghdad as 'the Hanbali masses'.[128] It directly implies that while the *aewam* did not actively participate in advanced political dialogues, high level religious patronage, or significant intellectual innovations, they were not passive players in local phenomena of the Sunni Revival. They observed everything that occurred publicly in the city: the Seljuq conquest and occupation, the construction of the *madrasa*, the debates between Shafi'is and Hanbalis, the decline of the caliphate, et. al., and they lashed out substantively and forcefully against phenomena that appeared to threaten their way of life (1069, 1072, 1078, 1088). Thus, the emergence of a significant traditionalist movement in Baghdad during this period was not a necessary phenomenon, nor was it engineered by a cadre of rarefied elites behind the closed doors of a *madrasa*. Rather, the people participated substantively in the dialogue surrounding traditionalist phenomena of the Sunni Revival, and the relevant innovations would not have moved forward in the city without the tacit approval of the always-observant *aewam*.

This conclusion that a durable traditionalist movement in Baghdad could only have emerged with the dialectical assent of the *aewam* aligns with the bare historical facts of the period. Nizam al-Mulk continually attempted to tighten his fist around Baghdad over his nearly 30-year tenure as the chief vizier of the Seljuq state, first for Alp Arslan and then for Melik-Shah. This project culminated in his strong-handed response to the *aewam* riots of 1089: Nizam dismissed the caliph's vizier Abu Shuja, appointed his ally al-Ghazali to the professorship of the *Nizamiyya*, and visited Baghdad in person with the Seljuq court. He planned to visit Baghdad again in 1092, but he was assassinated in his camp on the return trip from Isfahan. Melik-Shah made it to Baghdad, but himself died before the end of the year under suspicious circumstances after ordering the caliph to vacate the city. After their deaths, the Seljuq state rapidly declined; and amidst the political chaos that engulfed the east, in 1095 al-Ghazali abandoned Baghdad, only four years after his triumphant arrival. Thus, by the time the crusaders arrived in Syria two years later, the state that had ended a thousand years of Roman rule in Anatolia was itself in pieces. In this sense, the trouble made by the *aewam* of Baghdad had the broadest imaginable consequences for the Middle East.

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[128] Peacock, *The Great Seljuk Empire*, 246-247.

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Glossary of Arabic Terms

aetiqad	Correct belief
aewam	The broadest social group referenced by medieval Islamic sources, usually translated as 'the masses' or 'the common people', and in French usually as 'les gens du peuple'
aeyan	Usually translated as 'an elite' or 'a notable'[129]
ahl	A generic term meaning 'people', usually used in an *idafa* structure (and thus rarely seen with a definite article) such as in *ahl al-bayt* ('people of the house [of Muhammad]') or *ahl al-kitab* ('people of the book')
al-nas	A generic term meaning 'the people', used in many contexts.
amid	A high-level civil official appointed by the Seljuq government[130]
bidae	A needless innovation without Quranic precedent[131]
diwan	In this context, a state bureaucratic office
eajam	A generic term for a non-Arab, usually referring to Persians or Turks
ealawi	A descendant of Ali
eama	The single form of *aewam*; it has the same meaning
eayyarun	Urban gangs
fitna/fitan	Civil strife or a riot, usually within the Muslim community
fuqaha	Scholars of Islamic law
hisba	In this context, usually refers to the office held by an individual entrusted with supervising moral behavior in public, especially in the markets, where he had the prerogative to test weights and coins for authenticity and to promote honest practices[132]
madhab/madhahib	An Islamic legal school
madrasa	An endowed institute of scholarly learning
muhtasib	The holder of the *hisba* office
na'ib	A generic term for the deputy of a state official, sometimes 'governor'[133]
nizamiyya	The *madrasa* endowed in Baghdad by Nizam al-Mulk (1066)
shihna	A military official appointed by the Seljuqs[134]
sunna	'Generally approved standard or practice introduced by the Prophet'[135]
sunni	A follower of the *sunna*
suq al-madrasa	A market district in Seljuq Baghdad attached to *madrasa Nizamiyya*.
suq al-thulatha	A large market district in Seljuq Baghdad ('the Tuesday market')
tajsim	Anthropomorphism of God's attributes, widely considered heretical
ulama	Religious scholars

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129 Bowen, "A'yan," 778.
130 Cahen, "'Amid," 434.
131 Robson, "Bid'a," 1199.
132 Cahen and Talbi, "Hisba," 485-489.
133 Ayalon, "Na'ib," 915.
134 Van Renterghen, "Controlling and Developing Baghdad," 125-126.
135 Brown, "Sunna," 878.