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Steadfast in their ways: New England colonists, Indian wars, and the persistence of culture, 1675-1715

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STEADFAST IN THEIR WAYS: NEW ENGLAND COLONISTS, INDIAN WARS, AND THE PERSISTENCE OF CULTURE, 1675-1715

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This Dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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The Indian wars of early New England were traumatic events. During King Philip's, King William's, and Queen Anne's Wars (1675 to 1715) dozens of towns sustained attacks, and English communities and their inhabitants were buffeted and challenged by the experience. The scholarship on colonial warfare and New England as a whole has focused on change and development that occurred as a result of these wars. War places great stress on individuals and societies, forcing them to act in new ways and often to reevaluate and abandon old habits. New Englanders and their communities did change dramatically as a result of repeated wars with the region's natives and their French allies. Yet New Englanders were also resistant to change, and this persistence of core culture ideals is often as historians analyze the transformation of New England from colonies to provinces.

Beyond the extensive physical damage, the conflicts challenged the identities and values of English colonists in myriad ways. In the midst of battle, many men failed to live up to the expectations of their gender, while some women stepped beyond theirs to act in a manly fashion. Despite the troubling behavior of cowardly men and manly women, gender norms and roles in New England did not change under the pressures of Indian wars, in part due to the uncoordinated management by ecclesiastical and political leaders of the narratives of the conflicts. Alternately chastising and praising their constituents, leaders offered examples of “proper” behavior, reasserted control over “amazons” and “viragos,” and created larger-than-life heroes.

Indian raids forced hundreds of English settlers from their homes, putting great stress on towns and colonies and creating the dilemma of either aiding refugees (and abandoning the traditional insular nature of towns) or excluding and expelling them (failing John Winthrop's exhortation to bind together). Historians argue that traditional aid through family and towns was incapable of meeting the demand. Instead, New England's governments responded by relieving towns of this responsibility. However, this aid was actually limited and narrowly directed. Towns remained exclusive, gathering in those they were obliged to aid through familial or proprietary connections and allowing outsiders to remain only conditionally. Following the natural hierarchy of their community, refugees sought to support themselves before turning to family and friends, and sought town and colony aid only when traditional sources were exhausted.

Finally, in the midst of Indian wars, New Englanders often had to “dispose of” captured Indians. Having suffered grievously in the wars, New Englanders might have abandoned the law (albeit English law for Englishmen) and exacted revenge. Many prisoners suffered vigilant justice, and others faced servitude or public execution after a formal trial. New Englanders are rightly criticized for their actions, but while the colonists' treatment of prisoners was "uncivil" by modern standards, when viewed through the context of the time, New England's leaders tempered the "rage of the people," and the colonies remained within bounds of tradition and law.

New Englanders resisted changes to the core cultural ideas and institutions of patriarchy, localized community, and morality based in English law. Though these notions of gender, community, and morality were battered by war, they survived and remained central to New England identity.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dedication</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction: The Seat of War is With Us</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1: Cowards and Viragoes: The Troubling Behavior of Men and Women</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2: Sojourners for a Time: New England Refugees of Early Indian Wars</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3: To Still the Clamors of the People: Justice, Revenge, and the Fate of Indian Prisoners</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epilogue: Steadfast in their Ways</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>List of Abbreviations</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vita</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To Vicky, Collin, and Catherine
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It takes a village to write a dissertation, and it is unfortunate that only one name will adorn the spine of this work because it is truly the product of many people. I owe each of them a debt of gratitude.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>John Foster’s Map of New England, 1677, prepared for William Hubbard’s A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Map of Southern New England</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Map of Northern New England, 1675-1692</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STEADFAST IN THEIR WAYS
INTRODUCTION
THE SEAT OF WAR IS WITH US

As the winter of 1694 eased into spring along the New England frontier, the sense of security that accompanied a season normally devoid of Indian attacks evaporated. The arrival of warmer weather meant the renewal of war and risk of ambush and raids by Native war parties. To bolster the colony's defenses, the Massachusetts Assembly wrote to the governor of Connecticut for assistance. After all, wrote the magistrates, "it is a common Enemy we are engaged ag[ain]st and tho ye seat of War does providentially lye nearer to our doors, yet it is ye overrunning & Extirpation of ye whole [tha]t is sought." ¹ Massachusetts and its holdings in Maine had indeed borne the brunt of violence and destruction in New England's numerous conflicts with its Native inhabitants. But the magistrates, writing safely from Boston, were wrong to consider the war to be at "their" doors in anything but a figurative sense. The people inhabiting the string of communities arcing from the upper Connecticut River Valley to the coast of Maine held that dubious distinction. As the

selectmen of Kittery, Maine lamented in 1704, "the Seat of warr is with us and the Burden Exceeding heavie upon us."2

Thousands of English inhabitants of the outer tier of New England settlements would feel the hard hand of Indian wars over the course of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Indian-white relations in New England had simmered for the first fifty years of white occupation, occasionally flaring up into short-lived conflicts such as the Pequot War of 1636. The continuous pressures on the Indians to cede their land and autonomy to the English, coupled with the effects of altered subsistence patterns and the ravages of European diseases, brought tensions to a critical point by the early 1670s.

The spark for all-out war came in June 1675 after Plymouth executed three Wampanoags for the murder of John Sassamon, a Christian Indian suspected of betraying plans of an uprising to the English. In immediate reaction to this affront and for a lengthy list of other grievances, the Wampanoags rose under the leadership of their sachem Metacom, known to the English as "King" Philip. Whether under Philip's guidance, in concert, or merely coincidentally, many of the Nipmucks, Narragansetts, and Abenakis arose against the New England colonies as well, and the war spread from Plymouth colony to engulf the entire

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2 Petition of the Selectmen of Kittery, 29 Nov. 1704, in DHSM 9: 207-8 (my emphasis); Mass. Acts & Resolves, 8: 131, 507; similar phrase were used in other petitions; see Petition of the Inhabitants of Scarborough, Oct. 1675, in George Madison Badge, Soldiers in King Philip's War: being a Critical Account of that War, with a Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677 ... (Leominster, MA: Rockwell and Churchill, 1896), 333-34; Petition of William Screven on behalf of Kittery, 18 June 1694; Petition of York and Kittery, Sept. 1695, DHSM 5: 397-98, 427-28; Petition of John Wheelwright on behalf of Wells, Dec. 1703, DHSM 9: 172-73.
region. Convinced the conflict was a conspiracy engineered by Metacom, New Englanders labeled this conflict "King Philip's War." Throughout 1675, the Indians consistently bested their English opponents or avoided open battle. The colonists gradually gained the upper hand as they became attuned to the American way of war and employed Indian allies, but other factors led to English victory. Disease and hunger continued to weaken Philip and his allies, and as the final straw that broke the "separatist" Indians' collective back, the Mohawks of eastern New York entered the fray as nominal allies of the English. Until fighting died down in late 1676 (1677 in Maine), Indian warriors and English soldiers continued to destroy one another's towns and fields and slaughter opponents of all ages and conditions. From June 1675 to the summer of 1677, New England colonists suffered through at least 130 recorded raids and ambushes, excluding English offensive actions. As a result of the war, nearly 1,000 colonists died, and thousands more were uprooted by the destruction of 13 towns and partial burning of 6 more. As historian Douglas Leach so aptly declared, "A number of communities which had once been thriving centers of human activity now existed only as jumbles of blackened ruins and weed-choked gardens."4

New Englanders enjoyed an eleven-year interlude of peace, during which many refugees chose to return to their frontier abodes and rebuild. However, in

3 See Figure 1.
1688 New England once again went to war as Europe entered the War of the League of Augsburg, known to colonists as King William’s War (1688-1698 in North America). The imperial aspect of this war would lead New Englanders to participate in several large campaigns against French Canada, but most colonists experienced the conflict much as they had in the 1670s. Though military leaders such as Benjamin Church led a number of “scouts” and expeditions against native settlements, the war was largely defensive, with colonists, militiamen, and provincial soldiers defending reinforced houses (garrison houses) and forts against raiding parties of Abenakis and Frenchmen. Provoked by continued expansion of English settlement and encouraged by the governor of New France, Count Louis de Buade de Frontenac, Abenaki bands in upper New England struck frontier communities at least 82 times over the course of ten years for revenge, loot, and prisoners. Although New Englanders endured fewer attacks than during King Philip’s War, these assaults focused on exposed border settlements, with Rhode Island, Connecticut, and most of Massachusetts safe behind their frontier buffers. As a result, the New England frontier contracted once again as thousands of people fled to safety. The ongoing pressures of war likely contributed to the hysteria that resulted in the Salem witch trials of 1692. The war in New England did not end with military victory for the English or due

5 See Figure 1.
to the Treaty of Ryswick. Instead, the Abenakis' dependence on and desire for English trade goods led them to negotiate a settlement.\(^7\)

This interlude was short-lived as imperial overtones once again brought war to America in 1702. The death of Charles II, the Habsburg king of Spain, resulted in war to secure the Spanish succession. Its North American extension, Queen Anne's War (1702-1713), was "a slow-motion rerun of King William's War," according to historian Ian Steele. As before, large Anglo-American expeditions would strike at strategic French positions in Canada, but the grinding conflict occurred on the frontier. The governor of New France encouraged his Abenaki allies to strike at English settlements, and unresolved issues between Natives and their white neighbors resulted in a repetition of previous frontier wars—rumors of impending attack, devastating raids, and reprisals. Between August 1703 and September 1712, Indian and French raiders struck English settlements over 120 times.\(^8\) The most infamous raid came with the attack on Deerfield, Massachusetts in February 1704, which resulted in the deaths of 38 English inhabitants and the capture of 111 others.\(^9\)

Historian Francis Parkman aptly labeled this period in colonial history as the "Half-Century of Conflict." But as the inhabitants of Kittery, Maine suggested in 1704, the "seat of war," the heart of the conflict, was not with the

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\(^8\) See Figure 1.

\(^9\) Steele, *Warpaths*, 151-59; Peckham, *Colonial Wars*, 57-76.
grand expeditions against Canada but in the small towns, such as Brookfield, Massachusetts, along New England’s exposed frontier. The inhabitants of this remote village on the wagon road connecting eastern Massachusetts to the settlements of the Connecticut Valley would experience intimately the violence of Indian attacks, the accompanying fear and questions of cowardice, dislocation and resettlement, and even a measure of revenge. The town experienced one of the first attacks in Massachusetts during King Philip’s War and suffered one of the last of Queen Anne’s War in 1712.10

The first day of August 1675, though, began pleasantly for the town’s residents. Not only had they celebrated the Sabbath with their lay preacher, but Mary Trumble had given birth to a son, Ebenezer. Mary’s husband, Judah, must have been anticipating this event for he was over thirty miles away in Springfield at the time of the birth, purchasing two quarts of rum.11

Given the news from the rest of New England, the townspeople must have felt relief on this happy occasion. Hostilities had erupted in late June between English settlers of Plymouth Colony and their Wampanoag neighbors, and the violence had come perilously close to Brookfield with the July 16 attack on nearly Mendon, resulting in the death of five inhabitants and abandonment of

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the town.\textsuperscript{12} Despite the warning signs and apparent threat to Massachusetts Bay, the residents of Brookfield remained calm. For the brief existence of the town, its people had maintained cordial relations with the nearby Nipmuck Indians. In fact, one of the Nipmucks’ principal sachems, David, claimed himself as a great friend of the English. Events would soon test the townspeople’s optimism.\textsuperscript{13}

Around noon, a short column of mounted soldiers led by Capts. Edward Hutchinson and Thomas Wheeler wound its way into town to be greeted by the inhabitants. The officers and their twenty troopers were undoubtedly tired, having ridden scores of miles in the previous three days in search of the Nipmucks. Lacking the confidence of the Brookfielders, the Governor and Council of Massachusetts Bay were working to shore up relations with their own native neighbors, though in a heavy-handed and presumptuous manner, to forestall the spread of violence. Several Nipmuck sachems had agreed to visit Boston in late July, summoned by English magistrates who demanded assurances of fidelity; but wary of English intentions, the Nipmucks had instead abandoned their villages and eluded any white emissaries. Hutchinson’s mission was to find, not fight, the Nipmucks, “get a right understanding of [their] motions,” and secure “the publick peace.” Four of Hutchinson’s soldiers


\textsuperscript{13} Thomas Wheeler, A Thankfull Remembrance of Gods Mercy to Several Persons at Quabaug or Brookfield (1676) in Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, 1676-1677 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 239-44.
finally managed to "aquaint the Indians that we were not come to harm them," and the sachems agreed to a rendezvous on August 2, three miles outside of Brookfield.\footnote{Wheeler, *Thankfull Remembrance of Gods Mercy*, 243-44; Temple, *History of North Brookfield*, 79.}

The following morning, Hutchinson's soldiers rode toward the "plain appointed" with some misgivings. The Nipmucks' repeated failures to appear for previous parleys gave little hope for success this time. Furthermore, the scouts who had arranged the talks had reported the natives to be "stout in their Speeches, and surly in their Carriage." In contrast to the glum soldiers, three of Brookfield's leading men—selectmen John Ayres and William Prichard, and constable Richard Coy—rode easy with the column, "strongly persuadew of their Freedome from any ill intentions towards us." Unfortunately for them, David was not such a friend of the English as they had supposed. As the soldiers rode single file between a swamp and a rocky hill, the Nipmucks rose from hiding and "sent out their shot upon us as a showre of haile." The three Brookfield men, along with five of Hutchinson's troopers, tumbled dead from their saddles within moments, while the surviving soldiers beat a hasty retreat to Brookfield. The eight English dead were "left as meat to the Fowls of heaven and their flesh unto the Beasts of the earth, [for] there was none to bury them."\footnote{Wheeler, *Thankfull Remembrance of Gods Mercy*, 244; Increase Mather, *A Brief History of the War with the Indians in New-England* (Boston, 1676) in ibid; Temple, *History of North Brookfield*, 89.}

Having escaped unhurt, Capt. Thomas Wheeler turned to aid the men left behind, only to be shot and unhorsed himself. With "divers of the Indians being
then but a *few Rods distant* from me,” Wheeler struggled to escape. Fortunately, his son had missed him in the retreat and returned to rescue the captain. Though himself wounded in the lower back, Thomas Wheeler the younger helped his father mount his horse, and both men managed to cheat death. Wheeler later praised his son's actions, proclaiming he had “shew[n] himself therein a *loving and dutiful Son*...[and] adventur[ed] himself into great peril of his Life to help me in that distress.”

The return of the negotiating party, minus eight members, with the news of the Nipmucks' "Treacherous dealing...did so amaze the Inhabitants of the Town" that the Brookfielders quickly abandoned their homes and possessions. Over 75 men, women, and children of the town, in addition to Wheeler's troopers, crowded into the sturdy tavern of the recently deceased John Ayres and barricaded it against attack. (The number of people in the building would rise to over 160 when reinforcements arrived on August 4th.) Fearing an immediate assault, the inhabitants brought nothing with them, “and so came to the house...very meanly provided of Cloathing, or furnished with Provisions.”

Over the next two days and nights, the Nipmucks repeatedly assaulted the Ayres Tavern and its inmates with musket fire, burning brands, and insults, destroying the majority of the town in the process. Wheeler's account of the attack, like so many others describing Indian assaults, is an example of sensory

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17 Ibid., 246; Roy, *Quabaug*, 160.
overload. The defenders watched as Indians ransacked and burned their homes, tracking the destruction with each new plume of smoke. The raiders then made sport of Samuel Prichards, whose head they cut off, “kick[ed]...about like a Football,” and then stuck on a pole within sight of the tavern. Dead horses and cattle lay around the town, casualties of the first encounter of the day and later pot-shots from the Indians. In the August heat, the odor must have been overpowering as the carcasses decomposed over several days, particularly when mingled with the sulfur of black powder, smoke from burning buildings, and likely smells as frightened inhabitants lost control of their bodily functions. The sounds of the attack were equally overwhelming. “The Barbarous Heathen pressed upon us in the house with great violence,” recounted Wheeler, “sending in their Shot amongst us like haile through the walls, and shouting as if they would have swallowed us up alive.” Simon Davis, appointed by Wheeler to lead the defense, was “of a lively Spirit,” and repeated shouted encouragement to the soldiers to stand fast, “fire upon the Indians,” and wait for God to deliver them. Hearing such platitudes, the attackers “did roar against us like so many wild Bulls,” and scoffed at their prayers. Breaking into the nearby meeting house, the Indians held a mock service, “saying, Come and pray, sing Psalms, & in Contempt made an hideous noise somewhat resembling singing.” Thomas Wilson, shot in the jaw and neck as he fetched water, cried in anguish as did other wounded men,
and many of the fifty women and children crowded in the tavern, including two sets of twins born during the siege, added their cries to the cacophony.18

Though the inhabitants had panicked at the first notice of attack, they later rallied and contributed greatly to the defense of the tavern. Wheeler later wrote that they “did well and Commendably perform[ed] the duties of the Trust committed to them with much Courage and Resolution.” Not until the early morning hours of August 5, after the overnight arrival of English reinforcements, did the Nipmucks abandon the siege and slip away into the countryside. Bereft of homes, possessions, and most of their livestock, the people of Brookfield abandoned the ruins of their town in the next few weeks and sought shelter with friends and relatives throughout Massachusetts.19 Newly widowed Suzanna Ayres was more fortunate than most refugees. Her home and estate largely survived the assault, and she carted off beds, linens, and kitchenware valued at nearly £200.20 The rest of Brookfield’s displaced citizens survived with little or no aid outside of their family circles.

The assault on Brookfield returned to public notice briefly in 1676. Thomas Wheeler had called on God to “avenge the Blood that hath been shed by these Heathen who hate us without a Cause,” and when several of the attackers were captured, he had his wish fulfilled. “Sam Sachem,” “Sagamore John,” and

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20 The Probate Records of Essex County, Massachusetts, vol. 3 (Salem, MA: Essex Institute, 1920), 50; Alison I. Vannah, “‘Crotchets of Division’: Ipswich in New England, 1633-1679,” (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of History, Brandeis University, 1999), 715, 842-43.
Netaump, three Nipmuck sachems, faced trial and execution for their role in the "rebellion" against English authority.\textsuperscript{21} The town itself remained little more than a charred remnant and rendezvous point of military forces for the rest of King Philip's War, and indeed, well into the 1680s. Not until 1686 did settlers petition the Massachusetts General Court for permission to reestablish the township. Even then, only one original family and the remnants of another returned to reclaim their lands.\textsuperscript{22} Indian wars would intrude upon Brookfield in King William's and Queen Anne's Wars as well. Several settlers died in the raids, while others fled to safer towns. But many chose to remain in place despite the dangers, planting and harvesting crops, building homes and mills, attending divine services, and raising their children.\textsuperscript{23}

The wartime experiences of communities like Brookfield and the conflicts that engulfed them have not gone unnoticed by historians. Accounts of the battles and tactics, stories of the great raids, privations of captives, and the great political aspects of colonial and imperial warfare have all found their places in most histories, but it was with the advent of the new social history and its focus on "everyday people" that that shaping power of war on the individual came to the fore. In recognition of the powerful tools provided by social history, historian Richard Kohn called for an analysis of "the life and the environment of

\textsuperscript{22} MA 107: 96.
the enlisted man in much greater detail and depth than has ever before been
tried in order to recover the fullness of the military experience."24 His
push for investigation into the lives of soldiers blossomed into a fresh look at
early America’s military experience through the lens of social history, and,
indeed, the full integration of military history into the broader study of colonial
America.

It made perfect sense. As historian Richard Melvoin reasoned, “Indians,
and wars, were a basic part of New England’s development. To study the path
from Puritan to Yankee or from village to town without examining the staccato
of wars and conflicts is to excise a critical element of New England’s story. The
time has come to integrate colonial social history more fully with the study of
Indians, wars, and the frontier.”25 Scholars have accomplished this to a great
degree, producing a plethora of literature on various aspects of Indian wars
during the colonial period—how intercultural misunderstandings have shaped
the course of wars, how wars have wrought changes on communities and
individuals, how warfare and militaries are reflective of culture and community,
and how conflict is often the root of changing or developing identities.26

Norton, 1989), 12.
JAH, 74: 4 (March 1988): 1187-1209; Melvoin, New England Outpost; Harold E. Selesky, War and
Society in Colonial Connecticut (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); John Shy, A People
Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976); Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society
in the Seven Years’ War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Richard Slotkin,
This body of scholarship on colonial warfare, like that on New England as a whole, has focused on change and development. True, war places great stress on individuals and societies, forcing them to act in new ways and often to reevaluate and abandon old patterns of existence. New Englanders and their communities did change dramatically as a result of repeated wars with the region’s natives and their French allies. Beyond the extensive physical damage, the conflicts challenged the identities and values of English colonists in myriad ways. In the midst of battle, many men failed to live up to the expectations of their gender, while some women stepped beyond theirs to act in a “manly” fashion. Indian raids pushed hundreds of English settlers from their homes, putting great stress on communities and colonies and creating the dilemma of either aiding refugees (and thus abandoning the traditional insular nature of towns) or excluding and expelling them (and failing John Winthrop’s exhortation to bind together). Finally, in the midst of this turmoil, New Englanders often had to “dispose of” captured Indians, particularly during King Philip’s War.

Having suffered grievously in the wars, New Englanders had the opportunity to abandon their dedication to law (albeit English law for Englishmen) and exact revenge rather than achieve justice. But like the persistent Brookfielders, who repeatedly rebuilt and maintained their community in the midst of war, New Englanders resisted changes to core cultural ideas and institutions. Though notions of gender, community, and morality were battered and nearly broken by the pressures of war, they survived and remained central to New England identity.
CHAPTER ONE

COWARDS AND VIRAGOES: THE TROUBLING BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN

In April 1676, King Philip's War dragged on with no apparent end in sight. Though the United Colonies had dealt the Narragansetts a heavy blow with the assault on their village in the Great Swamp in December 1675, hostile natives continued to strike at exposed New England towns. Lancaster, Marlborough, Sudbury, and a dozen other communities suffered attacks and lost inhabitants to death or captivity. The English military response seemed inept. Colonial forces were unable to bring their adversaries to open and decisive battle, instead suffering a string of defeats and fruitless pursuits. On the night of April 20, several hundred Indians gathered near Sudbury, one of Massachusetts's most exposed communities. "The Enemy well knowing our Grounds, passes, avenues, and Scituations had neare surrounded Our towne in ye Morning early," recalled the inhabitants, who remained unaware of their enemies' presence until the Indians fired several empty buildings. Though surprised, the town's inhabitants put up a spirited defense from their garrison houses, and by early afternoon, "forced ye Enemy with Considerable slaughter to draw-off."¹

¹ Petition of the Inhabitants of Sudbury to the General Court, Boston, 11 Oct. 1676, George Madison Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War: Being a Critical Account of that War, with a Concise
Noise and news of the assault reached neighboring communities, and at least four separate groups of soldiers hurried to Sudbury’s relief. In Marlborough, Capt. Samuel Wadsworth gathered fifty men and marched to the sound of the guns. About a mile from the beleaguered town, the relief force sighted a small group of Indians, who immediately fled into the woods. Whether through overconfidence in their own abilities or simply an irrational desire to come to grips with the enemy, Wadsworth’s men pursued and suddenly found themselves surrounded by scores of hostiles. For four hours, the English militiamen defended a nearby hilltop, repelling several assaults. As Cotton Mather later wrote of the incident, “our men fought like men, and more than so.” Suddenly this manly resolve crumbled when the Indians set fire to the tinder-dry woods, and a heavy wind blew smoke and flame toward the English position. Nathaniel Saltonstall recorded that the English were “forced to quit that advantageous Post in Disorder.” More likely this “Disorder” became a rout as individuals and then small groups panicked and fled, thus compromising the entire defensive effort. In the resulting panic and chaos, the Indians “came on upon them like so many Tigers, and dulling their active Swords with excessive Numbers” slew over thirty men, including Wadsworth. In the afterglow of victory, the Indians further shamed the English, sending notice that the colonists

“provide Store of good Chear, for they intended to dine with us upon the Election Day” in a fortnight’s time.2

This particular fight epitomizes another “war” occurring as King Philip’s War and subsequent Indian conflicts tested the mettle of New Englanders. English men not only struggled with Native Americans for cultural and geographical superiority in North America, but competed with their own culture’s ideal of manhood. In a society that expected men to obtain the means to support a family and then “manfully” defend his charges and livelihood, there was little room for shirkers and cowards. Wadsworth’s men may have initially “fought like men,” as Mather put it, but these same soldiers also ran in fear and suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of “savages,” who felt superior enough to order Englishmen to prepare for a native victory feast. The recurring contraction of the frontier that accompanied the destruction and desertion of exposed townships such as Sudbury endangered New England’s prosperity, and the region’s colonies expected their male inhabitants to drive back the “savage” invaders. But many men shared the fears and fate of Wadsworth’s men. New England’s histories abound with accounts of men who fled from their enemies, surrendered strong military posts, suffered through captivity, or abandoned their homes and even their families. Troubled by this apparent lack of fortitude,

New England's Puritan ministers exposed the failings of men, perhaps to shame them into action as well as remind them of their duties and responsibilities. To further complicate these challenges to New England manhood, women often stepped into the void, defending their homes as men should, thus transcending and challenging long-established gender expectations. Though this behavior might be explained by the model of "Deputy Husband," some women went beyond defending their homes with domestic implements, instead taking up firearms, an item closely linked to manhood, and even scalping their kills. Despite the troubling behavior of cowardly men and manly women, gender norms and roles in New England did not change under the pressures of Indian wars, in part due to the uncoordinated management by ecclesiastical and political leaders of the narratives of the conflicts. Alternately chastising and praising their constituents, leaders offered examples of "proper" behavior to wavering men and women, reasserted control over "amazons" and "viragos," and created larger-than-life heroes, both men and women, who came to dominate the chronicles of New England's early Indian wars.

As in any culture, New England society expected men and women to perform and conform to accepted gender roles. In the case of New England, gender identity was largely defined by the relationship between husband and wife within the patriarchal family. As historian Ann Little observed, New England lacked many of Europe's traditional institutions of power and authority,
most notably "the manor house, schools, and guilds." Furthermore, the
decentralized nature of New England's political and religious organizations
created a need for stronger local institutions. Thus, the patriarchal family with
its established gender roles and inequalities was critical to New England,
becoming, as Little puts it, "a legally defined and empowered 'second estate'
charged with ensuring the proper ordering of society." 3

Within the patriarchal family, men and women shared the tasks of
running and maintaining the household – planting crops, raising children, and
conducting business with the outside world. Puritan ministers frequently
preached and wrote on the function of the family and defined the relationship
between husband and wife as a partnership. Anglican clergyman William Secker
summed this up in a wedding sermon with a number of metaphors, most
notably that of a pair of instruments. A husband and wife, he proposed, were
like "two well tuned instruments, which sounding together, makes the more
melodious musick." 4 Samuel Willard, minister to churches in Groton and
Boston, wrote that "in several respects [spouses] stand upon even ground," and
"are in the Word of God called Yoke-Fellows, and so are to draw together in the
Yoke." While recognizing the interdependency and equality of man and wife in

3 Cotton Mather, A Family Well-Ordered. Or An Essay to Render Parents and Children Happy in One
Another (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, 1699), 4; Ann M. Little, Abraham in Arms: War and Gender in
Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 4; Mary Beth
Norton, "The Evolution of White Women's Experience in Early America," AHR, 89:3 (June 1984):
593-619.
4 William Secker, A Wedding Ring, Fit for the Finger [1690] (Portsmouth, NH: Samuel Whidden,
1806), 14.
the eyes of God, ministers also recognized the inherent inequality created by God and set down within this relationship. “Nevertheless,” continued Willard, “God hath also made an imparity between them, in the Order prescribed in His Word, and for that reason there is a Subordination, and they are ranked among unequals.”

This divinely ordained hierarchy was replicated in relationships between parents and children, ministers and congregants, and magistrates and citizens, and the order thus created was the very root of Puritan society.

A woman’s place in New England’s patriarchal families was defined by her relationship to her husband, by the physical bounds of her home, and by her submission to male authority. As historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich discovered, the terms “wife” and “woman” were virtually synonymous in colonial New England, indicating that a girl became both an adult and a woman upon marriage. While achieving this benchmark of maturity, the woman lost her legal identity to her husband under coverture. Thereafter, as Cotton Mather and Samuel Willard put it, “The Wife shines with the Husband’s Rays,” and she should “take delight in his Honour, as her own, & use means to uphold it.”

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Constrained by law, a woman was also constrained by the bounds of her husband’s house and property. Of course families did not live in isolation, but women were “ordinarily more within the House,” attending to “all your Domestick Businesse.” In a rather condescending sermon clearly intended to remind women of their place in society, Cotton Mather declared that women had “little more worldly Business, than to spend (I should rather say, to save) what others get, and to dress and feed...the little Birds, which you are Dams unto.” At the same time, women stood as “Deputy Husband” when their men were absent. As English clergyman and historian Thomas Fuller wrote, “In her husbands absence she is wife and deputy husband, which makes her double the files of her diligence.” In this line of reasoning, Mather allowed that women might temporarily step out of their bounds “for the maintaining of all good Orders.” Thus, in addition to practicing “the Affairs of Housewifry,” argued Mather, a wife must know “Arithmetick and Accomptanship [perhaps also Chirurgery] and such other Arts relating to Business as may enable her to do the Man.” Once the husband returned home, the wife reverted to domestic concerns. As Ulrich notes, the fluidity of gender roles within the household “allowed for varied behavior without really challenging the patriarchal order of society.”

8 Mather, Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion, 49-51.
While this is true to an extent, and the goodwife might act as Deputy Husband when necessary, Puritan society still expected her to submit to her husband’s authority and that of all men in positions of power. Women enjoyed a degree of influence in family decisions, but the final word (in the Puritans’ ideal world at least) was the husband’s, and the wife must “hearken to him, in his lawful Counsels and Demands.”

Cotton Mather and other ministers summed up a woman’s place with words and phrases such as “modest,” “discrete,” “obedient,” and “seen rather than heard.” In short, the Puritan woman was anonymous.

Like a goodwife, a New England man truly came into manhood when he left behind his adolescence, acquired property and a livelihood, and became a husband and patriarch in his own right. Borrowing from a Hebrew folk saying, William Secker wrote “He is not a man that hath not a woman.” As master of his own home, a man became a “free burgess” and a full participant in local government, and as a husband, he commanded the labor and property of his wife and family. As Ann Little summarizes, “By effecting this transformation from son to husband and father, from governed to governor, by setting a young

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10 Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity, 612.
11 Mather, Ornaments for the Daughters of Zion, 54, 83-84, 90; Ulrich, Good Wives, 3; see also John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 83-84; Morgan, Puritan Family, 42-44.
12 Secker, Wedding Ring, 7.
man atop a domestic hierarchy, marriage created manhood in early New England.”

The act of marriage might “make” a man, but unlike a submissive goodwife, a man had to maintain this precarious status by demonstrating continuously his mastery of himself, his surroundings, and his family. As a mature man with a proper sense of responsibility and duty, he mastered the land or a trade in order to provide for his flock and to remain economically independent. Samuel Willard wrote that a husband and father must “approve himself worthy to be [their] Head,” capable and willing to exert his entire being for their maintenance. As historian Lisa Wilson phrased it, “White men in colonial New England were expected to keep the wolf from the door.” Similarly, a proper man had to maintain order over every soul in his charge. Cotton Mather went so far as to describe the patriarch as the “Owner of a Family,” whose responsibility was to “faithfully Command and manage those that belong unto him” and ensure they “Keep His Way, and His Law.” A man who failed to control the tongue of a shrewish wife or required the assistance of neighbors to feed his family risked public shaming, a return to the dependence of adolescence, and virtual social emasculation.

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14 Willard, Compleat Body of Divinity, 611; Lisa Wilson, Ye Heart of a Man, 7-9, 114; Mather, Family Well-Ordered, 6; see also Morgan, Puritan Family, 8, 19-21; Anne S. Lombard, Making Manhood: Growing Up Male in Colonial New England (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 98-
Perhaps the greatest test of manhood came when trespassers threatened a man’s family and property. In peacetime, this might involve asserting oneself in a lawsuit or a fist fight, but in New England’s Indian wars, men had to keep a different sort of “wolf” at bay. For New England’s men, this was merely a matter of course. Ann Little and other historians have demonstrated how English culture had become militarized due to ongoing religious wars between Protestants and Catholics. Seventeenth-century English writers frequently published tracts relating the glorious victories of manly Protestants over their feminized foes, thus linking English manhood with successful military performance. With the rise of Puritans to prominence in England, Little argues, this association took on a more fervent manifestation, particularly when King Charles I dissolved Parliament. In his tract *The Christian Souldier, His Combat, Conquest, and Crown*, Edward Turges called on every Englishman to rise to the defense of his family and true religion and “not digresse from the proper end for which thou wast made.” The purpose of a man, he argued, the very purpose for which God made him, was “‘to bee a Christian Souldier.’” John Davenport, later a minister in New England, went so far as to call for a citizens’ militia.

“[A]s in Rome, none were excused from service, when Hannibal was at the gate,”

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he declared, thus "the use of the Bow must be practiced by all," and heads of household must train children and servants in its use.\textsuperscript{17} While New England men did not hang bows over their mantles as John Davenport would have them, Little argues that they maintained this tradition with widespread possession of firearms. As Cotton Mather noted, the use of such weapons was "neither Decent nor Lawful" for women (as well as Africans, Catholics, and Indians), thus specifically connecting gun ownership with English manhood.\textsuperscript{18}

The Puritans carried this militant outlook to New England, and ministers continued to preach of their warrior god and his faithful patriarchs of biblical times. In 1678, the Rev. Samuel Nowell devoted an entire sermon to the topic, capturing the prevailing understanding of manhood and the centrality of violence to its definition. "The Lord is a Man of War," he declared, and as his faithful followers, New England men would do well to emulate Him. War was a tool of reformation and should be expected, he argued, because "The Lord Jesus is not coming to send peace on the Earth but the Sword; Reformation never went on yet without it." Furthermore, like the ancient Israelites in Canaan, New England's Puritans had carved out a home in a hostile wilderness and continued to defend their lands and possessions against interlopers. Thus, a confluence of "our civil Rights and Libertyes as Men and our religious Liberties and Rights as Christians," as Nowell put it, demanded that Puritan men "defend with the

\textsuperscript{17} Davenport, \textit{Royall Edict}, 3, 6, 15.
sword, as far as we are able” their homes and faith. Therefore, New Englanders must be prepared to defend their homes and carry on God’s struggle against any foe who “shall oppose the advancement of the Kingdome of Christ.”

Abraham was the favorite biblical example for male behavior, and Nowell built his interpretation of manhood around this paragon of patriarchs. Not only had Abraham provided for his family and controlled his women, he prepared his household for war. According to Genesis 14:14, when his brother Lot was taken captive by King Chedorlaomer, Abraham “armed his trained Servants, born in his own house, three hundred and eighteen” and pursued the king’s army. As a patriarch should, Abraham defended his family and faith, and God blessed him with victory and captives. While Nowell was partially chastising New Englanders for their sometimes lackluster performance in King Philip’s War, the message to his audience was clear: the duty of men was to train and prepare for war, “a Duty which God expecteth of all Gods Abrahams in their respective places.”

Unlike a number of prominent ministers of the period, Nowell spoke of battle from personal experience. He served as army chaplain during the United Colonies’ December 1675 campaign against the Narragansetts, and Cotton Mather later memorialized his courage under fire, claiming “at this fight there

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19 S[amuel] N[owell], Abraham in Arms; or The First Religious General with his Army Engaging in a War For Which He Had Wisely Prepared and by Which, Not only an Eminent Victory was Obtained, but a Blessing Gained also. (Boston: John Foster, 1678), 1, 3, 10, 13; depictions of God as a warrior appeared in numerous sermons of the period; see also Fuller, who wrote “God himself may seem to be one free of the company of Souldiers, in that he styleth himself, A man of warre.” Fuller, Holy and the Profane, 119.
20 Nowell, Abraham in Arms, 1-2, 4.
was no person more like a true son of ‘Abraham in arms,’ or that with more courage and hazardly fought in the midst of a shower of bullets from the surrounding salvages.”

In Nowell’s eyes, as well as those of the ministers who wrote the histories of New England’s Indian wars, English men were expected to stand bravely against the “savage” enemy, and “provide for his own & his family’s safety.” Ministers were full of advice for their soldiers, calling on them to emulate a fictional ideal. When faced with danger in battle, this model soldier and man “neither stands still, starts aside, nor steps backward, but either goes over it with valour, or under it with patience.” In fact, no real man would imagine fleeing in battle, claimed Thomas Fuller. Rather, English soldiers fled “from nothing so much as from the mention of flying.”

Edward Turges warned his listeners that contemplating flight in battle, indeed even the mere act of looking back, “argues a Cowardize, or carelesnesse.” Like Lot’s wife, who lacked the faith and discipline to follow God’s instructions as she fled Sodom, soldiers who turned in battle might find God abandoning them as well.

Nowell built on each of these themes and called on the Christian men of New England, secure in their faith in God, to act “bold as a lion.” Perhaps most importantly, New England men were expected to succeed in battle. To win was to “punish [the

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21 Mather, Magnalia, 568.
22 Fuller, Holy and the Profane, 122-23.
enemy] for injuries done” and maintain dominance. To lose or surrender was to put one’s fate in the hands of other men, thus reverting to the dependent status of a woman or child. As Little argues, New England men “knew very well that it was not only their sovereignty or their livelihoods that were at stake in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century warfare; what was at stake was their very manhood.”

Magistrates clearly understood the connection of manhood and battle as well. The Massachusetts General Court explicitly connected male identity to defense when it required that all men along the frontier, capable of carrying arms, “bee well provided for their defence.” Increase Mather, his son Cotton, and William Hubbard expanded this interpretation, envisioning military leaders in particular as men of “Courage or warlike Spirit,” prepared to fight to the death if necessary. Thomas Fuller would have agreed, particularly in regards to fighting Indians. Writing thirty years before King Philip’s War, he predicted that a soldier about to “fall into the hand of a barbarous enemy, whose giving him quarter is but reprieving him for a more ignominious death...had rather disburse his life at the present, then...fall into the hands of such remorseless creditours.”

Thus, an honorable death in battle was preferable to capture and emasculation.

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24 Nowell, Abraham in Arms, 4, 15; see also William Hubbard, The Happiness of a People in the Wisdome of their Rulers Directing and in the Obedience of their Brethren Attending Unto what Israel ought to Do (Boston: John Foster, 1676), 23.
25 Little, Abraham in Arms, 7, 28.
26 Fuller, Holy and the Profane, 124.
It was far easier for these Puritan divines, safely ensconced at home and only confronting the Indian enemy in spiritual battle, to pen such rhetorical expectations of honorable death than for real men to perform the deeds. New England’s natives proved a troublesome and sometimes unfathomable enemy that did not match the colonists’ pre-war notions of an easily cowed enemy. From first settlement in New England, Puritans had viewed the Indians’ military capabilities with contempt and considered Catholic France, Anglican England, and especially the Dutch as greater military threats. The colonists’ relatively easy victory over the Pequots in 1636-37 confirmed English impressions, and this proved costly in the first months of King Philip’s War. Only weeks into the conflict, the Rev. John Eliot recognized the colonists’ mistake. In a letter to John Winthrop, Jr., he noted that “We w[ere] too ready to think [tha]t we could easily suppress [tha]t flea; but now we find [tha]t all the craft is in catching of them, &[tha]t in the meane while [they] give us many a soare nip.” In the closing months of the war, Massachusetts magistrate Daniel Gookin and William Hubbard both wrote of this collision of the myth of Indian military capabilities with reality. After “serious thoughts,” Hubbard believed that “the sad losses


and slaughter that have befalln this poor Countrey, in the present warre, can be imputed to nothing more then to the contempt of our enemies, or overweening thoughts of our owne skill and courage. It is never good,” he concluded, “to despise a small enemy.”

Indeed the Indians gave the colonists many “soare nips” and seemed to suffer little in return. New England men fought an enemy who would seldom, if ever, stand in the open and fight in the European manner. Instead, Indians and their later French allies struck without warning, killed the unwary, burned what buildings they could, and withdrew with captives before neighboring militia units could effectively respond. The devastating raid on Oyster River, New Hampshire on July 18, 1694 is a case in point. Spread over both banks of the river, the community depended upon its train-band and twelve garrison houses for survival. However these feeble defenses were quickly overwhelmed by nearly 250 Abenaki warriors and associated Frenchmen. Resident Ann Jenkins testified to the swiftness and ferocity of the dawn assault. Moments after Jenkins’s husband left their home for morning chores, he burst through the door and “Cried to me & o[u]r Children to run for o[u]r Lives For the Indians had beset the Town.” Fleeing for the shelter of a cornfield, Jenkins recounted that the family encountered a group of Indians, who “shot at my husband & stroke him down, Ran to him & struck him three blowes on the head with a hatchet[,

scalloped him and run him three times in the breast with a baganet [bayonet]."

The Indians mortally wounded and scalped one of Jenkins’s daughters, placed
the child in her dying father’s arms, and left them both “gasp[ing] together.” After
plundering and firing most of Oyster River’s homes, the raiders carried Jenkins,
her three surviving children, “together with the Rest of my Neighbors whose
Lives were spared,” into captivity.31 By the time militiamen under Capt. Thomas
Packer arrived from nearby Strawberry Banks, the enemy had dispersed into the
woods with 49 captives, leaving behind 45 dead New Englanders, 20 of whom
were members of the town’s train-band, and Oyster River “in a manner
Ruined.”32 With no enemy to fight, Packer’s men buried the dead, reinforced the
surviving garrisons, and marched home.33

Though Englishmen had fought such elusive enemies in Ireland and in the
Americas within living memory, New Englanders found the Indians’ “skulking”
way of war frustrating and confusing. William Hubbard claimed that natives
would not “kill any Man with their Guns, unless when they could lie in wait for
him in an Ambush, or behind some Shelter, taking Aim undiscovered.”34 After
singular ambushes or larger strikes like that on Oyster River, the native raiders

32 “Journal of the Reverend John Pike,” *MHSP*, vol. 14 (1876), 128; Mather, *Decennium Luctuosum*,
July 1694, in *NHPP*, 2: 128; “Diary of Lawrence Hammond,” *MHSP*, 2nd ser. 7 (1892), 166; John
Clarence Webster, *Acadia at the End of the Seventeenth Century: Letters, Journals and Memoirs of*
33 Thomas Packer to the Governor and Council, 18 July 1694, *NHPP*, 2: 128; “Reports as to the
34 Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, 1: 114; see also Samuel Gorton to John Winthrop Jr.,

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“melted” into forests and swamps that Europeans found as threatening as the Indians themselves. Describing the Pocasset Swamp in which Philip’s Wampanoags took shelter, Nathaniel Saltonstall claimed the area was “so full of Bushes and Trees, that a Parcel of Indians may be within the Length of a Pike of a Man, and he cannot discover them.” In his 1676 poem “New England’s Crisis,” schoolteacher Benjamin Tompson affirmed the colonists’ fear that “every bush hid a hostile Indian. “Hence came our wounds and deaths from every side / While skulking enemies squat undescribed, / That every stump shot like a musketeer, / And bows with arrows every tree did bear.” Cotton Mather later admitted that New Englanders tended to do more harm to themselves than the Indians, “sacrifice[ing] one another to our own mistakes by firing into every bush that we saw to stir.” With English military forces largely limited to reacting to native raids and unable to come to grips with Indians in European-style battles, it was Indians, rather than English patriarchs, who dictated the tempo of the wars and, in many cases, the pattern of daily life in frontier communities.


36 [Benjamin Tompson], New England’s Crisis, or a Brief Narrative, of New-Englands Lamentable Estate at Present, Compard’d with the Former (but few) Years of Prosperity, [Boston: John Foster 1676], in Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, 1676-1677 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 220.

During the Narragansett crisis of the 1640s, the sachem Ninigret had threatened New Englanders with just such a situation, "that an English man should not stir out of his Doors to Piss, but they would kill him." 38 Thus, New England men found themselves in an untenable position, incapable of protecting their families and communities as men should, leaving them effectively, if only figuratively, unmanned by Indians and their tactics. 39

Native Americans were not insensitive to the New Englanders' struggle for manhood in the midst of war. As Ann Little argues, Indian cultures venerated the brave and successful warrior as much as the English, firmly associating military prowess with manhood. 40 Indian warriors were quick to taunt their foes for running in battle, for foolishly fighting in dense formations that made easy targets, or for holing up in garrisons, as the people of William Phillip's garrison did in September 1675. When Maine's Abenakis struck coastal settlements, including Phillips's fortified house, militiamen and families fled for shelter. To draw the soldiers back into the open, the Indians set fire to nearby buildings, including critical corn crops and saw mills. When this failed to arouse the New Englanders, the Indians jeered their opponents' unwillingness to come to grips, calling, "You English cowardly Dogs, come out and quench the Fire." In this instance, verbal assaults on manhood failed to draw out the militiamen, but as

Edward Warton reported, this tactic often worked, "so that in a little time [the
Indians] have much surprized, and made great slaughters upon the English."
Such verbal jousting contained a second attack on English manhood. As both
Little and historian Jane Kamensky conclude, free speech was a "gendered
prerogative in early New England," and only adult men enjoyed the privilege.
When women or children spoke out of turn, they faced censure and punishment,
yet here were savages daring to address Englishmen as inferiors.41

Even when they managed to come to grips with their enemies,
Englishmen did not always behave as demanded by their standard of manhood.
In fact, the official histories and correspondence of these wars are rife with
examples of men who failed to defend their families, some while preserving their
own lives. William Larrabee of Wells, Maine, hid and watched as Abenakis
killed his wife and three children in August 1703. Though later an Indian fighter
of some renown, in this critical incidence he failed in his role as shepherd to his
family.42 Similarly, during the February 1676 assault on Lancaster, Mary
Rowlandson witnessed one of her neighbors begging for his life rather than
taking up arms to defend his home. "He begged of them his life, promising them

*New-England's Present Sufferings, Under Their Cruel Neighbouring Indians* (London: 1675), 1-4;
Kamensky, "Talk Like a Man," in McCall and Yacovone, eds., *Shared Experience*, 20, 23, 26, 28.
42 Samuel Adams Drake, *The Border Wars of New England, Commonly Called King William's and
Queen Anne's Wars* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 156-58.
money," she recalled, "but they would not hearken to him but knocked him in the head, and stripped him naked, and split open his bowels." 43

On other occasions, men simply failed to perform and instead meekly accepted their fate. On August 29, 1707, a large Indian and French force struck Haverhill, Massachusetts. Awakened by the first shots, the Rev. Benjamin Rolfe quickly rose from bed and held the door closed against the attackers. Rolfe called for help from the three soldiers residing in his house, "but these craven-hearted men refused to give it, for they were palsied with fear, and walked to and fro through the chambers, crying and swinging their arms." When a musket ball penetrated the door and struck Rolfe's elbow, he fled through the back door, only to be struck down next to his well. The panicked soldiers tried to reason with their attackers, begging for mercy, but the Indian raiders quickly dispatched them. 44

Other men "basely ran away" in the heat of battle," such as happened near Mendon on the night of November 9, 1675. Leading twenty-three horsemen, Capt. Daniel Henchman planned to attack and burn the nearby Indian village of Hassanameset. After dismounting some distance from their target, the troopers marched to surround the village. But when time came for the assault, Henchman discovered that only his lieutenant and five soldiers had followed him. When the Indians repulsed the reduced assault force and mortally wounded two soldiers,

44 B. L. Mirick, History of Haverhill, Massachusetts (Haverhill, MA: A.W. Thayer, 1832), 120-21.
the remainder of the men "cowardly ran away," as Increase Mather described it. "I cryed to them, for the Lord's sake to stay," Henchman recounted, "for in retreating as wee did I gave up myself and them with me for lost." When the Indians pursued the fleeing soldiers, Henchman called on his men to make a stand and help bring off the wounded, "but all were upon flight though I threatened to run them through." After recovering their casualties, the troopers "with Grief and Shame" returned to Mendon. Henchman summed up the incident as "a sad frown," a lost opportunity to kill fifty or more hostile Indians.45

At other times, these failures of English manhood could have a domino effect or even shift the flow of the war itself. The troubled garrison soldiers and inhabitants of Black Point, Maine caused one such incident in October 1676. The settlements of Maine had suffered Indian raids early in King Philip's War, and many of the locals had fled to safer towns in Massachusetts. Those who remained fell under the military jurisdiction of Massachusetts, and the presiding officers frequently quarreled with the inhabitants. Accusations of using soldiers for personal gain (such as harvesting timber) and even refusal to help embattled

militiamen dogged the commander, Joshua Scottow. On bad terms with their protectors, the people of Black Point were ripe for exodus.46

Their chance came in the summer and fall of 1676 as Abenaki Indians renewed their attacks on Maine's settlements. When Scottow was absent in Boston to answer the charges laid against him, a large party of Indians under Mogg Heigon chose to approach Black Point. Acting commander Henry Jocelyn gathered the inhabitants and soldiers “into one fortified Place” and left the fort to parley with the Indian leader. Apparently apprised of Black Point’s readiness to fall by Walter Gendall, a captured local, Mogg Heigon sought a bloodless capitulation.47 According to Mary Oakam, whose husband was in the garrison, Heigon “gave them till next day to get away with their goods.”48 Unaware of the outcome of the parley, the people of Black Point chose to act on their own under cover of the lengthy negotiations. Upon return to the fort, Jocelyn found “that all the People were fled away out of the Garison, having carried away their Goods by water before his Return.”49 With only his family, servants, and two or three elderly folks “hoe would not goe away but stay[ed] theare,” Jocelyn surrendered.50 During the night, he led this small group to safety by canoe.51

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48 GDMNH, 23-24; Suffolk Court Records, 1111.
William Hubbard attributed the double failure—Jocelyn’s refusal to stand and his community’s abandonment of its leader—to fear and the readiness of the people to run. One inhabitant, he reported, claimed over 150 Indians had surrounded the post, “which was more by an hundred than any Body else every saw near the Fort.” However, once the besieged inhabitants learned of their imagined predicament and perceived the supposed danger, they were “ready to fly away like a Hart before the Hunter or his Hounds,” and to abandon their homes, their fort, and their commander.52

The panic did not end with Jocelyn’s nocturnal escape. At nearby Winter Harbor, Brian Pendleton and his garrison heard a few shots, but they remained ignorant of the danger. The same afternoon, Pendleton noted several boats leaving the Black Point area, firing numerous guns in an apparent salute and farewell to their comrades left behind. Some young men of Winter Harbor paddled a canoe out to the last boat, where the passengers described the abandonment of Capt. Jocelyn and Black Point. Reporting a combined enemy force of over eight hundred, they advised the Winter Harbor residents to flee before nightfall. “If you love y[ou]r lives,” they cried, “bee gon as soone as you can.” Panic immediately gripped the Winter Harbor soldiers and settlers, who were “as mad to make away as ever I saw any men,” claimed Pendleton. Though he offered to remain behind to defend the garrison, he had few takers,

51 Rev. Thomas Thacher to Peter Thacher, Boston, 16 Oct. 1676, NEHGR 8 (1854): 177-78.
52 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 173.
and the garrison soldiers flatly refused. The fourteen local fishermen, armed with only eight serviceable weapons, packed up and left straight away, and the inhabitants followed suit. 53

Although Massachusetts soldiers, and a few settlers, reoccupied Black Point in November 1676, the uncontested surrender of the post and shameful flight of soldiers and settlers further damaged the colonists’ flagging morale. “Such a spirit of fear and cowardice is poured out on the inhabitants of those parts, that it is exceeding ominous,” wrote the Rev. Thomas Thacher. He blamed the fleeing inhabitants and militiamen of Maine for spreading the contagion of fear by exaggerating the numbers of their foes and claiming imminent French involvement. “Foolish jealousies may feign that fear makes scarecrows to affright the fearful; and a sluggard may say a lion is in the way. So, many of those fearful persons may think to bide their shame by such suggestions.” 54

Of greater import, and perhaps the nadir of New England manhood, came with the surrender of Fort William Henry at Pemaquid in 1696. Only three years earlier, Gov. William Phipps had pressured the Massachusetts Bay government to fund and build the fort in an attempt to reassert control over this stretch of the Maine coastline as well as intimidate the Abenakis. Although poorly constructed, the fort was a rather impressive stone quadrangle 737 feet in circumference. Its 6-foot-thick walls of 12-22 in height were capped by a 29-foot

tall stone bastion. With a planned garrison of 60 men serving 14 or more cannon, this post was a statement of New England power and authority. Unfortunately, most of the guns were placed to repel a seaborne assault. In addition, with the closest surviving settlements seventy-five miles away, Fort William Henry could not count on any timely military support. Still, with sufficient manpower and fortitude, the garrison could make a credible stand. If Cotton Mather’s later exaggerations were true, the fort’s defenders could surely repel “Nine Times as many Assailants” as it had defenders. “Yea, we were almost Ready to flatter our selves,” he later wrote, “that we might have writ on the Gates of this Fort...Reddi, non Vinci potest” – it may be given up but it cannot be conquered.55

In August 1696, Mather’s post mortem declaration was put to the test as several hundred Indians (estimates ranged from 400 to 600), accompanied by 110 Frenchmen under Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville, invested Fort William Henry. Standing against them were 95 well-provisioned, “double-Armed” New Englanders under Capt. Pascoe Chubb. After landing their field artillery and mortars from two ships, the Frenchmen established a battery and lobbed several explosive bombs into the fort. Summoned to surrender, Chubb boldly replied, “I shall not give up the fort, though the sea be covered with French vessels, and the

land with wild Indians,” which of course had already happened.56 Pausing in
their bombardment, the French invited Chubb to view the forces arrayed against
the fort and to reconsider his hasty rejection of capitulation. Several experienced
sergeants, including one who had seen mortars at work in Flanders, toured the
French and Indian lines and apparently gave Chubb a frank estimate of their
situation, for he quickly changed his mind. Outnumbered, cut off from his water
supply, and defending what some later claimed were crumbling ramparts,
Chubb declared “it vain to stand out.” Beyond this simple math of war was fear
of the Indians. The previous winter, Chubb’s men had killed and captured
several Abenakis in the midst of a parley, and as Thomas Hutchinson wrote in
his history of New England, “they were conscious of their own cruelty and
barbarity, and feared revenge.” Iberville exploited this incident and the resulting
Indian anger, declaring that if the garrison refused to give in, “it would get no
quarter, as they could not prevent the heathen from entering and destroying
them all.” With promises of quarter and transportation, Chubb surrendered his
command. After giving the garrison safe passage to Boston, the French pilfered
the cannons and supplies before razing Fort William Henry to its foundations.
Once again, the frontiers of New England contracted.57

56 Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, in Lincoln, ed., Narratives of the Indian Wars, 262; Extract of a
letter from Boston, 15 Aug. 15, 1696, Lt. Gov. Stoughton to Lords of Trade and Plantations, 24
Sep. 1696, Boston, CSP 15: 146, 257; Williamson, History of Maine, 642-44.
57 Extract of a Letter from Boston, 15 Aug. 1696, Lt. Gov. Stoughton to Lords of Trade and
Plantations, 24 Sept. 1696, Boston, Lt. Roger Write to the Duke of Bolton, Plymouth, 24 Nov. 1696,
CPS 15: 146, 257, 422; “The Diary of Samuel Sewell,” MHSC, 5th ser. 5: 431; Kenneth M. Morrison,
The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations (Berkeley:
News of the surrender of "so fair a Citadel" did not sit well with other New Englanders. Not only had Chubb given up one of the strongest forts in the region, he had openly surrendered his manhood (and that of his soldiers) without a fight. Despite his declaration to stand against all odds, the "courdly and trechuras villan," as Lt. Roger Write called him twice in a short letter, had "fired only three guns from the fort" during the entire siege. Bartholomew Gedney blamed the winter incident, supposing that Chubb's guilt from his dishonorable actions at the parley "made him uncapable of doing ye part of a good Comander & we have felt Heavens Rebuke for it." Cotton Mather was far more direct and damning in his commentary of Chubb's "unaccountable Baseness" and that of his men. "If they were Men, [they] might easily have maintained it against more than Twice Six Hundred Assailants," he lamented. "I cannot help crying out, O meroe Novangloe, neque enim Novangli!" — Oh mere New England women, not New England men! The Massachusetts Bay government apparently agreed, imprisoning Chubb on charge of treason for several months before releasing him. Never cleared of the accusations or the stigma of

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surrendering Fort William Henry, Chubb died in an Indian raid on Andover in 1698.\textsuperscript{61}

These varied incidents of fear in battle tell only part of the story. New Englanders likely exhibited trepidation in other ways besides fleeing in battle. Modern studies of behavior in combat indicate that "the overwhelming majority of soldiers experience fear during or before battle." In a survey of recent studies, historian Richard Holmes found that nearly 70 percent of soldiers experienced "a violent pounding of the heart," with a lesser number suffering "a sinking feeling in the stomach, uncontrollable trembling, a cold sweat, a feeling of weakness or stiffness and vomiting." The unfortunate soldiers in Rolfe's Haverhill house endured at least some of these. Holmes also states that between 6 and 21 percent of combatants lost control of their bladders, while another 5 to 10 percent involuntarily voided their bowels.\textsuperscript{62} No period historians recorded these sorts of visible and highly shameful signs of fear, but there is little doubt they occurred. These varied examples of "cowardice" were widespread but singular and usually had few implications beyond the unfortunates involved. However, such obvious failures of manhood made a forceful impression on a people who so strongly coupled successful military performance, or at least physical bravery, with male identity.

\textsuperscript{61} Mass. Acts & Resolves 7: 185, 563, 590-91; "Diary of Samuel Sewell," 471; Petition of Pasco Chubb, 18 Nov. 1696; Vote in Relation to Col. Saltonstall and Capt. Chubb, Mar. 1697, DHSM 5: 469-70, 481-82.

Captured—and even turn-coat—men posed another challenge to New England manhood. As historian William Foster notes, the typical image of the frontier captive is that of a young woman. But as he discovered, reality was different. The archetype of frontier captives should be a man rather than Mary Rowlandson. Of the approximately 2,600 New Englanders captured and brought to Canada between King Philip's War and the Peace of Paris in 1763, Foster found that over 80 percent were men or boys.\(^6\) Rather than fight to the death like the ideal man of Puritan philosophy and teachings, these men (and boys) opted for captivity and subordination. Daniel Belding of Deerfield, Massachusetts made this choice in 1696. A small party of Indians struck several outlying houses of the frontier community as the inhabitants were coming in from the fields to attend lecture. Rushing into Belding's house, the raiders quickly killed his wife and three children while subduing Belding, his twenty-two-year-old son Nathaniel and a younger daughter, Thankful. Another son, Samuel, "kicked, and scratched, and bit" at his attackers until they "struck the edge of [a] hatchet into the pate of his head...and left him for dead." Likely shocked by the swift death of their family members, the other Beldings surrendered without a fight. Along with John Gillett, captured while hunting bees in the woods, these captives began the long march to Canada.\(^6\)


More concerned with daily survival on this trek, captives rarely had opportunity to escape or exact revenge. However, Quentin Stockwell, captured in a 1677 raid on Deerfield, twice failed to capitalize on such opportunities and, surprisingly, later admitted this in his narrative. Taken along with twenty-four other inhabitants of the upper Connecticut Valley, Stockwell was destined to be tortured and burned. The night before his intended immolation, he was sent to gather wood for his own pyre. When no Indians stirred at his noise, he supposed “if any of the English would wake we might kill them all sleeping.” Stockwell carefully confiscated the raiders’ weapons, “but my heart failing me, I put all things where they were [a]gain.” Fortunately, his master prevented his fiery death. On a second occasion, Stockwell’s master left him with an Indian too ill to carry his own weapons. “I...had opportunity and had thought to have dispatched him and run away,” he recalled, but chose not to endanger any captives left behind. Clearly Stockwell, Belding and the others believed, as William Hubbard said, “Better [to be] a live dog than a dead lion,” even if this meant a blow to their manhood.65

And dogs they were, reduced from their superior positions as fathers and men of their communities to dependents and servants of “savages” and “papists.” Native women frequently participated in the “welcome” that captives received, thus immediately indicating the reversal of roles and “unmanning” of

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captives. John Gyles, captured in August 1689, recalled several receptions in Indian villages, where women “seized me by the hair of my head and by my hands and feet like so many furies,” signifying their dominance over the white man.66 Daniel Belding and his daughter likely encountered the same when they became the property of their captors. William Foster discovered that as slaves of the Indians, male prisoners such as Belding and Gyles found their daily existence and labors in domestic and agricultural service managed by Indian women, who used these opportunities to humiliate as much as work their captives. Although Anglo men often performed farming work similar to what they did at home, they were segregated from any activities identified by Indians as “male,” and instead “employed throughout the season as gatsennen or akozone — meaning domestic animals.” Likened to livestock, these men served as beasts of burden, hauling meat from the kill, clearing farmland, or fetching wood and water. They were further shamed by their subordination to and supervision by women.67 Gyles recalled an elderly woman “who ever endeavored to outdo all others in cruelty to captives.” When encountering captives, she reinforced their lowly status by

66 John Gyles, *Memoirs of Odd Adventures, Strange Deliverances, Etc.*, in Vaughan and Clark, eds., *Puritans among the Indians*, 100-102: this was separate from the gauntlet but might have been part of the symbolic washing away of the captive’s race and past as part of the adoption process. Women also played an important role in deciding which captives would be offered up for communal torture, kept as slaves, or adopted into families. See James Axtell, “The White Indians of Colonial America,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 32:1 (Jan. 1975): 55-88.

67 Stephen Williams, son of the Rev. John Williams of Deerfield, remained a captive among Indians for some time. Employed and supervised by women, he apparently “did not work enough for them,” leading the women to complain to a Jesuit priest, who whipped the young man for his impudence and laziness. John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive Returned to Zion*, in Vaughan and Clark, eds., *Puritans among the Indians*, 199.
tossing hot coals onto their chest or dragging younger captives through the fire itself.68

Similar to Daniel Belding and John Gyles, prisoners sold to the French often became bondservants, particularly those who resisted conversion to Catholicism. As the French indentured-servant trade dwindled due to continued war with England, the influx of potential male labor was a godsend. "Nuneryes and Religious Houses" required laborers for domestic work as well as labor in their supporting fields. Belding's son Nathaniel was purchased by the Hospital Sisters of Saint Joseph, while John Gillett served on the farm of the sisters of the Congregation Notre-Dame. As Foster reveals, "once conveyed from the marketplace to his new custodians at the farm...[Gillett] would be newly clothed as well as fed, cared for, instructed—and controlled" by the nuns on site. His transformation from independent Englishman to dependent slave/child was complete.69

French merchants also redeemed captives for their services, particularly those with trade skills. Warham Williams, the youngest son of John Williams captured during the 1704 raid on Deerfield, was purchased by Agathe Saint-Père, an influential force in early Canadian textile manufacture. In addition to Warham, Saint-Père purchased nine other New Englanders, many of them with weaving experience, and employed them in "the manufacture of cloth, wool

69 "Stephen Williams' Journal," 115-16; Foster, Captors' Narrative, 32-38; Joseph Dudley to the Board of Trade, 2 Dec. 1712, DHSM 9: 335-38.
fabric, and serge.” Only four years old, Warham would contribute little or nothing to her production. His apparent “uselessness” and the work to which Saint-Père put her captives did not escape the Indians who sold her the child. Later the natives returned and tried to negotiate a trade, exchanging an adult captive for Warham. They reasoned that “the child could not be profitable to her, but the man would, for he was a weaver and his service would much advance the design she had of making cloth.” For undisclosed reasons, Saint-Père chose to keep the boy instead. Foster further argues that Saint-Père, long used to controlling servants and male employees, completely dominated the lives of her captive laborers. In one instance, she even superseded the right of a father to baptize and name his own infant child. Saint-Père also used her sixteen-year-old daughter to supervise production in her textile workshop, thus placing mature adult men under the authority of one of the least powerful categories of people in New England, adolescent girls.70

Though New Englanders viewed the subordination of English men to French and especially Indian women as an abomination, the behavior of treasonous captives, those who assisted Indians against the same homes and families they were bound to protect, was a complete betrayal of English manhood. Joshua Tift became the image of such treachery in January 1676. A one-time resident of Pettaquamscut, Tift had left home under clouded

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70 Williams, Redeemed Captive, in Vaughan and Clark, eds., Puritans among the Indians, 188; Foster, Captors’ Narrative, 131-40.
circumstances at some undetermined point, though his father wrote him out of his will except for a single shilling in November 1674 indicated possible family squabbles.\textsuperscript{71} He may have “turned Indian, married one of the Indian Squaws, renounced his Religion, Nation and natural Parents all at once,” as William Hubbard claimed.\textsuperscript{72} Other unsubstantiated claims brand him a criminal, who either fled English society in 1662 to avoid punishment or deserted the English army in 1675.\textsuperscript{73} Regardless, in the weeks following the English assault on the Narragansett fort in December 1675, he was captured—dressed in Indian garb, with a musket “deep charged, and laden with Slugs”—along with several hostile Indians stealing cattle near Providence, Rhode Island. Under questioning, Tift claimed he had lived apart from Indians and raised cattle before his capture a month before. After watching the slaughter of five of his cattle and threatened with death by the raiders, he offered to “be servant to the Sachim while he lived.” Tift admitted to being in the Narragansett fort during the English assault, waiting on his master until he was wounded.\textsuperscript{74} Maj. Robert Treat alleged that

\textsuperscript{71} Leach, \textit{Flintlock and Tomahawk}, 139.
\textsuperscript{72} Hubbard, \textit{History of the Indian Wars}, 1: 162.
Tift wounded Capt. Robert Sealy during the battle, while Capt. Peter Oliver claimed, “He shot 20 times at us in the swamp.” A third English participant alleged that Tefft “did [the Narragansetts] good service & kild & wounded 5 or 6 English, in that fight.” Despite conflicting evidence, his questioners deemed him guilty of treason, and on January 18th he was hanged, drawn, and quartered. Few people lamented his death, wrote William Hubbard, “Standers by being unwilling to lavish Pity upon him that had divested himself of Nature itself, as well as Religion, in a Time when so much Pity was needed elsewhere.” Whether Tift was truly guilty of treason remains unclear, but as historian Jill Lepore concludes on the unfortunate incident, “For standing by idly while his ‘master’ shot at English soldiers, Joshua Tift was either a traitor or a slave; either way, he was no Englishman.” Perhaps the greater crime was that he was no man.

William Gendall, who had provided information to Mogg Heigon before his attack on Black Point in October 1676, behaved in an equally shocking manner. Gendall was a respected member of the Spurwink and Black Point communities, commander of a garrison, and one of three members of the local committee of militia. With the help of James Fryer and eight men, he took a ketch to nearby Richmond Island to recover property and provisions left behind.

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76 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 162.
by fleeing settlers. While loading the vessel, they were surprised by Mogg Heigon’s raiders. Unable to make sail due to contrary winds, the Englishmen had to anchor and fight. However, the Indians put up such a volume of fire that Gendall’s men dared not “look above Deck.” When the Indians cut the ketch’s cable, the boat slowly drifted toward shore, accompanied by the Indians’ threats to burn the vessel and its passengers. “They were brought to the sad Choice,” wrote William Hubbard, “of falling into the Hands of one of these three bad Masters, the Fire, the Water, or the barbarous Heathen.” Preferring captivity with the “Hope of Liberty afterwards,” Gendall’s crew yielded. Mogg Heigon sent two captives to Piscataqua to obtain goods and currency to ransom their friends.78

To this point Gendall had acted, if not honorably by fighting to the death, in the interest of his men. However, instead of playing the proper role of silent prisoner, he acted as an interpreter and messenger for the Indians. Apparently overhearing Mogg Heigon’s plan to attack Black Point, Gendall volunteered “to lead [the Indians] on to this design, in such manner as they should not lose one man: & further added that he was as willing other men should be taken as himself.” Historian Jenny Pulsipher speculates that Gendall may have participated in the parley with Capt. Jocelyn, under cover of which the inhabitants fled. Whether he personally urged Jocelyn to surrender or not, Gendall’s fellow Black Pointers knew he had played a role in their downfall,

testifying “that the said Gendall was of Counsel to the Indians for the taking of this garrison; he knowing the weakness of those to desert.” 79

Gendall’s duplicity did not stop there. Four days later, October 16th, Mogg Heigon’s party struck at Wells, killing two inhabitants and wounding three others in the initial flurry. Henry Horwood and Thomas Richardson, both in the Littlefield garrison house, testified that the Indians sent Gendall forward to negotiate their surrender. Claiming to be a “poor Captive,” and with tears in his eyes, Gendall “begged that we wold surrender our Garison for Gods sake and the poor Women and Children Sake.” Desiring to prevent the inhabitants’ death, he warned that the Indians had “many Inventions with burch Rinds and Brimstone, and other Combustables” that they would use to burn any garrison that resisted. Having seen very few Indians in the vicinity, the men refused the offer, and Mogg Heigon’s forces withdrew. Horwood and Richardson’s accounts of this interaction hint at Gendall’s motives and state of mind. Openly distraught over his predicament, Gendall informed them that if he (or presumably the two released prisoners) failed to pay a £20 ransom, he would be killed. Comparing his situation to that of the Wells inhabitants, he admitted “if itt was his Case as itt was ours, if he had a 100 Houses he wold give them all.”

Clearly Gendall had offered up Black Point and Wells (or at least his information on the towns) to preserve his own life.80

Whether Gendall’s life was truly at risk is questionable. He may have been forced into his role of negotiator and messenger, but Mogg Heigon was noted for his kind treatment of prisoners. Even William Hubbard conceded this point.81 Furthermore, Gendall freely offered information on the state of Black Point’s garrison, acting more a collaborator than prisoner. Finally, soldiers caught Gendall looting abandoned properties while in the company of Indians. When two boat-loads of soldiers under Sgt. Bartholomew Tipping arrived at the recently abandoned Black Point, they spotted Mogg Heigon and other natives in canoes, while several others were “skulking from rock to rock” on shore. The skulkers were actually the “prisoners” Walter Gendall and William Lucas. Lucas confessed that he and Gendall had “acted so like Indians the better to impede [the soldiers’] landing.” In return for scaring off Tipping’s men and helping Gendall carry away his loot, Lucas would receive provisions to feed his family for a year.82

Needless to say, reports of Gendall’s activities caused a stir in Boston, and in March 1677 the Massachusetts magistrates formally accused him of acting “in a perfidious & treacherous way against the Inhabitants [having] sought to betray them into the ennemyes hands by his Indeavor & Counsell.” With Gendall’s

80 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 196.
81 Ibid.
82 Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 220-21; Daniel Dennison to the Governor and Council of Massachusetts, 14 Dec. 1676, DSHM 6: 145-46.
accusers scattered over the region, the court threw him in the Boston jail until they could be gathered. After six months in confinement, Gendall finally faced his accusers and failed to convince them of his innocence. In addition to forfeiture of all property and banishment, he was “to Runn the Gantelop thro the millitary Companyes in Boston...wth a Roape about his necke.”

Two nights before facing the gauntlet, Gendall fled the colony. Through the intercession of a friend, the court eventually commuted his punishment to a £40 fine. Somehow, by 1680 Gendall had reestablished his credentials in Maine, serving as commissioner of Falmouth, regulator of resettlement of North Yarmouth, and even as deputy to the general assembly in 1684. Jenny Pulsipher speculates that unlike Tift, Gendall survived his treachery due to his Maine residency. The Massachusetts claim to Maine was tenuous at best, and the colony’s leadership might have feared royal intervention or even annulment of their charter “if the king learned that they had executed a Maine resident for breaking his oath of fidelity to Massachusetts.”

Even so, the courts recognized Gendall’s crimes as well as the collapse of his courage. Rather than defend his flock, Walter Gendall had offered it to the wolves for his own preservation.

While few Englishmen went as far as Gendall or Tift, New England faced a broader epidemic of fear and emasculation. As real and imagined Indian

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83 Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 90, 102.
85 Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 221.
parties "skulked" through frontier areas and struck isolated homes and towns, New Englanders began suffering from invasion neurosis, "the extreme tension of anticipating an attack which does not materialize." 86 This phenomenon was particularly virulent in exposed frontier communities that bore the brunt of Indian assaults. Settlers in more exposed homes often congregated in garrison houses for defense. However, as William Pynchon discovered in August 1675, people also crowded into homes for psychological reasons. In a letter to John Winthrop Jr., Pynchon reported that the people of Springfield were so afraid "of a sudden surprisal at home" that they "remove[d] from their own houses to any next that they judge more strong." In their desire for close contact (and presumed security), Springfieldsers even abandoned homes in the very heart of the community for the companionship of neighbors. 87

Other settlers took to their heels and fled their embattled communities, sometimes after losing their homes but often in anticipation of doing so. 88 Military leaders decried the loss of defenders, magistrates complained of the contraction of the frontier, and ministers spoke of dishonoring God and their monarch. In June 1675, mere days after the outbreak of King Philip's War, a small company of Bridgewater militiamen were marching to reinforce a garrison a few miles from Swansea, Plymouth Colony. En route they encountered some

88 See Chapter 2.
Swansea residents who had abandoned their homes. As they tried to convince the Bridgewater soldiers to turn back, the Swansea refugees "made doleful Lamentations, wringing of their Hands; and bewailing of their losses." William Hubbard had little sympathy for their plight because they, the men in particular, had failed at the most basic of male responsibilities: defense of the home. As he declared, they had absconded "having not as yet resisted unto Blood." While praising the Bridgewater men for marching on to do their duty, Hubbard implicitly condemned the Swansea refugees as cowards who deserted "the Cause of God and his People" and endangered the lives of others.\textsuperscript{89}

Fearing for their lives, frontier settlers used any excuse to leave. In October 1675, after fighting had temporarily died down along the Maine coast, a large group of settlers from Falmouth abandoned the town for the safety of Essex County. Among the group was George Ingersoll, a prominent member of the community and its lieutenant of militia. On the pretext of addressing the Massachusetts Council, he had abandoned his town and his military post. This was no temporary absence. Three months after leaving Falmouth, Ingersoll applied for and was granted the right to reside in Salem. Such privilege was dependent upon his demonstrated ability to feed his family for a year, indicating that Ingersoll had brought the bulk of his property and provisions from Falmouth and had no intention of resuming his post. Major Richard Waldron complained that Ingersoll's actions were "discouraging of those who are better

\textsuperscript{89} Hubbard, \textit{History of the Indian Wars}, 1: 186.
minded: and [encouraged] the Comon Enemye to distroye and burne whatsoever and whosoever they can take advantage against.” Four months later, the remaining inhabitants of Falmouth wrote the governor, warning him not to believe Ingersoll’s excuses for leaving, “which we all know to be the Least moving Cause of his departure.” Clearly feeling betrayed, they requested the governor strip him of his commission. “He is not a man of Courage or warlike Spirit,” they declared, and “his timorousness and cowardize” had caused many people to flee the town. “These things are not fit for nor become a man that hath the Charge of a band of souldiers; & Especiallye in these times....” Instead, they requested the governor appoint “a man of Courage that we may not be Led along as sheepe to the slaughter.”

The nearby garrison of North Yarmouth behaved in a similar way during King William’s War. When the soldiers and inhabitants abandoned the town, Sylvanus Davis questioned their motives. “Thay to make a Cloke for thaire Removing Doe say thay did wante Amonition,” this despite numerous offers of resupply from other garrisons. In fact, the North Yarmouth inhabitants had ample powder stores, which they divided among themselves under cover of darkness before departing for Boston. Such flights of refugees and soldiers

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91 Sylvanus Davis and Others of Falmouth to the Massachusetts Governor, Falmouth, 28 Aug. 1689, *DHSM* 9: 40-43.
became such an epidemic in every Indian war that colonial governments repeatedly passed acts to prevent the abandonment of the frontier.92

New Englanders in far safer areas were not immune to this paranoia and fear. Judge Samuel Sewell recorded that the dread of attack even invaded his dreams. "Last night I dream'd I saw a vast number of French coming towards us, for multitude and Huddle like a great Flock of Sheep," he wrote in his diary. "It put me into a great Consternation, and made me think of Hiding in some Thicket." If Sewell, safe in his Boston bed, slept fitfully in expectation of invading hordes, New Englanders who stood watch during long nights had it far worse. Invasion neurosis had primed them to anticipate attack at any time, and sentinels started at each sound or glimpsed Indians and Frenchmen lurking in every shadow. In an all-too-common incident, the townspeople of Charlestown, secure in the heart of Massachusetts, were startled awake by gunfire and drums on the night of September 14, 1690. Claiming to see Indians "in their back fields," sentinels had sounded the alarm with gunfire and drums. In actuality, the intruders were runaway servants. Fortunately no one was hurt, though the combination of fear and hasty trigger fingers led to friendly casualties on several occasions.93

In summer 1692, Gloucester was repeatedly alerted by sightings as well, but the foes could not be dismissed as absconding servants. Puritan clergyman John Emerson recorded a number of "Wonderful and Surprising Things" that occurred near his Gloucester home, which Cotton Mather later published in *Decennium Luctuosum*. Persistent night noises, as if people "were going and running about his House," caused Ebenezer Bapson's family to relocate to a nearby garrison house. For the next two weeks, Gloucester endured recurring alarms as Bapson and other residents spied unidentified persons lurking near the garrisons and in nearby fields and woods. These figures, who "spoke in an unknown Tongue," resembled Indians on some occasions, Frenchmen at other times, and sometimes both simultaneously, thus resembling a typical raiding party in King William's or Queen Anne's wars. Numerous men claimed to have engaged these foes but with little result. On July 14, while pursuing these elusive enemies, Bapson fired on three figures thirty or forty feet distant, "and as soon as his Gun was off, they all fell down." Thinking he had killed them all, Bapson approached, "But coming almost unto them, they all rose up," fired a shot, and fled. Despite pursuit by other soldiers, and claims of shooting another mysterious raider off a fence, the New Englanders could find no physical evidence of the raiders.94

Several such encounters occurred, none of which resulted in visible casualties on either side. Emerson admitted that the town "was not

Alarumed...by real French and Indians.” Cotton Mather agreed, arguing that a town in Gloucester’s protected position was in no real danger, particularly with the extensive military forces currently garrisoned in its vicinity. “[N]o man in his Wits will imagine,” he wrote, “that a Dozen Frenchmen and Indians would come and alarm the Inhabitants for Three weeks together, and Engage ‘em in several Skirmishes, while there were two Regiments Raised, and a Detachment of Threescore men sent unto their Succour....” Moreover, “not one man [was] Hurt in all the Actions, and All End[ed] unaccountably.” Instead, Mather and Emerson attributed these bizarre occurrences to the Devil, the ongoing turmoil of the Salem witch trials, and the “Prodigious War, made by the Spirits of the Invisible World upon the People of New-England.”95 Given the general climate of fear and trepidation, it is possible that Gloucester was beset by a few raiders assisted (and magnified) by misinterpreted sights and sounds as well as overwrought minds.

Although Mather dismissed the behavior of Gloucester’s skittish inhabitants, the behavior of many New England men during the Indian wars, both on and off the battlefield, could not be so readily ignored. New England did not need live dogs, to borrow from Hubbard, but veritable Sampsons, men who were willing to spend their lives in defense of their homes and families. In other words, New England needed men to act as men. In private

correspondence, public sermons, and rapidly produced histories of the wars, ministers railed against "cowardly" behavior in hopes of shaming men to greater efforts. Even the Quaker Edward Warton, no friend of Puritan ministers, wrote of their efforts and call to arms in the dark winter days of 1676. Where magistrates and military officers seemed "as men in a maze, not knowing what to do," the "Priests," as he derisively called them, "spur them on...bidding them go forth to Warr."96 In his history of King Philip’s War, William Hubbard chastised the men of Maine, and by extension the entire male population of New England, for their lack of fortitude. He openly declared that the fishermen and mariners of coastal Maine "Had not either Skill or Courage to kill any thing but Fish" and would rather tamely submit to captivity than risk their lives. Thus, they acted as the men of Babylon in the book of Jeremiah, who, having "forborn to fight: they have remained in their holds: their might hath failed, they became as women."

Additionally, he claimed, other Down-Easters boasted of their intentions to fight Indians, yet in the moment of truth, they fled, "running away like a Flock of Sheep, at the Barking of any little Dog." If they, and all other Englishmen, had demonstrated the same bravery as a few select individuals, Hubbard declared, the Indians "would not have done half the Mischief that since hath been done by them."97 Similarly, Increase Mather called attention to the subject through his history of the war as well as many a public "day of humiliation" during King

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96 [Warton], New-England’s Present Sufferings, 4.
97 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 122, 236; the reference to Babylon and Jeremiah comes from a sermon by John Williams, God in the Camp: or, The Only Way for a People to Engage the Presence of God with their Armies (Boston: B. Green, 1707), 7.
Philip's War. Though he and other ministers often read military reverses as God's response to the sins of the colonies, clerics also declared the root of defeat to be the questionable bravery of Englishmen. At Black Point in June 1677, a "strangely bold & courageous" Indian force inflicted heavy casualties on a larger body of militiamen. The many sins of New England were not the cause of this loss, according to Increase Mather. Instead, "Our soldiers, some of [the]m basely ran away wh[ich] occasioned the slaughter." The colonists had suffered many serious setbacks during King Philip's War and subsequent fighting in Maine, most attributed to collective sin, yet in this case Mather declared "there never was a more solemn rebuke since the War begun."

The failure of superior numbers was a frequent theme, and ministers were quick to point out similar humiliating instances of a few Indians defeating a greater number of Englishmen. In addition to the Black Point debacle, Mather made particular note of an episode near Springfield in March 1676. As eighteen Englishmen and several women and children rode into town for Sunday services, seven or eight Indians ambushed the party, killing a man and woman riding together. Rather than confront their attackers, the remaining seventeen men, "surprised with fear, rode away to save their lives." The Indians easily

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99 Hubbard, Happiness of a People, 50, 60; Cotton Mather, Frontiers Well-Defended. An Essay, to Direct the Frontiers of a Country Exposed unto the Incursions of a Barbarous Enemy, How to Behave Themselves in their Uneasy Station (Boston: T. Green, 1707), 22-23.
100 "Diary of Increase Mather," 405; William Hubbard agreed with Mather's assessment, declaring the loss due to the "young and undisciplined Company," many of which "were ready to run and shift for themselves." Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 235.
captured several women and children left behind. "What shall be said when eighteen English-men well arm’d, fly before seven Indians?" Mather lamented.101

A quarter century later, Increase’s son Cotton asked the same question. Attributing King William’s War to the machinations of the native survivors of King Philip’s War, he wondered how a relative handful of Indians, “an hundred” as he put it, could “set the whole country on fire.” Yet “an army of a thousand English raised must not kill one of them all.” Mather reminded New Englanders that such failures (rooted in shameful behavior) led to military defeat and subjugation—a position no “man” could accept. To drive home his point, he drew parallels between New England’s troubled condition and the Roman conquest of Israel. To commemorate their victory, the Romans issued a coin portraying Israel as a silent woman in a submissive, seated position. Thus, one of the earliest representations of military defeat portrayed the vanquished warriors as emasculated and feminized. Mather warned that New England’s men faced the same destiny if they failed in battle. “Alas, If poor New-England, were to be shown upon her old Coin, we might show her Leaning against her Thunderstruck Pine tree, Desolate, sitting upon the Ground.”102

The ministers’ disdain was reflected further in the terminology they employed to describe their people. Of course, Christian tradition had long portrayed Jesus and his ministers as shepherds of their docile flocks. However,

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102 Cotton Mather, Humiliations Follow’d with Deliverences (Boston: B. Green & J. Allen, 1697), 31; Mather, Magnalia, 673.
such an analogy was out of place in the midst of war. Describing men as sheep was more a commentary on their meek behavior in the face of relentless attacks than a commendation of their faith. Ministers repeatedly described New Englanders as a variety of domesticated animals—chickens and sheep in particular—useful for food or service but lacking any true capacity for self-preservation. Furthermore, domestic animals typically depended upon humans for sustenance and defense, just as families depended upon their men for the same. Thus, likening men to barnyard animals was no compliment. In contrast, ministers described Indians as predatory animals—wolves, tigers and even dragons out to ravage the New England’s “hen roosts” and “petite flocks,” vultures come to pluck chickens, loup-garous (werewolves) to despoil the people. Though such terms were useful for dehumanizing Indians, condemning their behavior, and justifying reprisals against them, these epithets were indirect compliments as well. Wolves and vulture might be beasts, but at least they were animals of vigor and power, far more manly than their prey. 103

For clergymen, the solution was quite straightforward. Beyond addressing the sins that angered God, Cotton Mather declared that men “must Quit your selves like men.” 104 In their sermons to soldiers as well as publications for the general population, ministers expanded upon that simple but laden

phrase, frequently reiterating the proper attributes and expected behaviors of men. As dictated by their society and their faith, soldiers and patriarchs must protect their families and property, stand fast in battle, and serve God's cause. Increase Mather made this point when describing the February 1676 assault on Lancaster, Massachusetts. Though Joseph Rowlandson was absent during the attack, and thus could not defend his home and family, other men of the community endeavored to protect his wife Mary. "Eight men lost their lives, and were stripped naked by the Indians," recounted Mather, "because they ventured their lives to save Mrs. Rowlandson." Clearly this was a costly decision, but to Mather, it was the correct, and only, choice for a man.105 A quarter century later, the Rev. Benjamin Wadsworth would have agreed. In an election sermon before Boston's Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, Wadsworth warned his audience of the consequences of unchecked frontier raids while simultaneously reminding the men of their responsibilities. "Would you have your Country spoiled, your Houses rifled and burnt, your Goods and Riches taken away, your Children dasht against the stones, your Wives and Daughters ravish'd before your faces, your Women with Child ript open, your Aged Fathers and Mothers barbarously dragg'd about the Streets, your Churches overthrown, your selves Captived, Inslaved, or contemptuously slain?" With each phrase, Wadsworth called attention to the pillars of New England manhood—acquisition of a

competency, creation and protection of a family of dependents, duty to one’s faith, and continued demonstration of independence—and explained how each was imperiled by Indian raids. The answer, of course, was to stand fast and fight back. "We should not be cowardly Neuters, or idle Spectators," declared Wadsworth. Rather, with proper training and armored in faith, men should throw themselves into battle, secure in the knowledge that they fought against God’s enemies. “We should love him above our lives, and therefore be willing to indanger and expose our lives, when his and his peoples Interest calls for it. We ought to lay down our lives for the Brethren."  

If the public embarrassment by ministers and their own poor performance were not enough, New England’s men had the examples of prominent viragoes—women of manly courage—to further spur them into action. Historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich puts the actions of such viragoes squarely within the bounds of expected female behavior. As Deputy Husbands, women “not only could double as a husband, she had the responsibility to do so.” 107 In the case of Elizabeth Stover, she stood in for her husband after his death early in King William’s War. The Stovers had maintained an enclosed stockade at Cape Neddick, Maine, valuable for neighborhood protection and as a supply point for

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106 Benjamin Wadsworth, Good Souldiers a Great Blessing (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, 1700), 8-14, 22, 25; Cotton Mather went so far as to label those who died in these wars as martyrs. For other examples, see Samuel Gorton to John Winthrop, Jr., Warwick, 11 Sept. 1675, MHSC 4th ser. 7: 627-31; Nowell, Abraham in Arms, 5-11, 18-19; Hubbard, Happiness of a People, 23; Mather, Frontiers Well-Defended, 24, 36; Cotton Mather, Souldiers Counselled and Comforted: A Discourse Delivered unto some Part of the Forces Engaged in the Just War of New-England Against the Northern & Eastern Indians (Boston: Samuel Green, 1689), 5, 32-3; Williams, God in the Camp.

107 Ulrich, Good Wives, 37-38.
militia forces. When her husband was killed, Elizabeth "manned" the post for another two years, even after her neighbors fled and her adult sons abandoned her. Finally, with no support, she abandoned the "best fort in the Eastern parts." ¹⁰⁸

Women all along the New England frontier likely fulfilled a similar role or participated in the defense of their homes. Notably these women of action fought with tools generally associated with women's work—boiling soap or water, hot coals from the cook fire, a pot, even a roasting spit—and often did so in defense of their children. Hannah Bradley of Haverhill, Massachusetts, was singled out by Cotton Mather for her domestic defense in 1704. Captured by Indians in 1696 and redeemed three years later, Bradley understood the price of submission. ¹⁰⁹ When six native raiders struck her husband's garrison house on a cold February afternoon, she fought back with the tools at hand. Jonathan Johnson, the sole sentinel, pulled one attacker through the door, and Hannah "took the opportunity to pour a Good Quantity of scalding Sope, (which was then boiling over the Fire) upon him, whereby he was kill'd immediately." After a second attacker stabbed Johnson, Bradley scalded the Indian with boiling soap as well and fled to another room with her children. Only after the attackers fired

¹⁰⁹ List of Captives, Some Brought Home and Some Still in Enemy Hands, Casco, 17 Jan. 1699, DHSM 5: 516-17; Deposition of Hannah Bradley, in George Wingate Chase, History of Haverhill, Massachusetts, From its First Settlement, in 1640, to the Year 1860 (Haverhill, MA: 1861), 308-09; Drake, Border Wars, 169.
the house did she surrender. By associating the war-like actions of Hannah Bradley and others with female domestic tools and roles, the Puritan historians demonstrated that these women assumed the male role of defender while remaining connected to their female persona. Once the fight was over, they would “shrink back into submissiveness,” thus not challenging the gender bounds of New England society.

The mob murder of two captured Indians at Marblehead in July 1677 illustrates how women might temporarily assume the role of male protectors, particularly if the men themselves were unable fulfill their duties. The New England coastal communities had suffered that summer as Abenakis captured over twenty fishing vessels and crews off the coast of Maine and New Hampshire. Rumor had reached Marblehead that the mariners were all dead. However, aboard one ketch, Robert Roules and his companions managed to overpower and bind two of their captors, and return to Marblehead, intending to collect the bounty on prisoners. After entering the harbor, the mariners were confronted by the locals, particularly the women, just as they were emerging


from church. "When they saw the Indians, they demanded why we kept them alive and why we had not killed them." Roules's answer of the bounty "did not satisfy the people, who were angry at the sight of the Indians." When the fishermen attempted to bring the prisoners ashore, "the women surrounded them, drove us by force from them...and laid violent hands upon the captives."

With many of Marblehead's sailors still in captivity and unable to confront their enemies, their womenfolk assumed the role in their stead. In the midst of the tumult, several stones were directed at Roules and his companions "because we would protect [the Indians]," and the women prevented him and local lawmakers from interfering "until they had finished their bloody purpose."

Apparently the women felt Roules was more concerned with personal financial restitution than acting as a man. Finding him lacking, the "vengeful women of Marblehead" served as defenders and avengers for their community, and melted back into anonymity, never to be identified.112

Despite the notion of Deputy Husband, such behavior of women in or out of battle was not the norm. As Ulrich writes, "This does not mean that fighting was a typical female response...The heroism of women like Hannah Bradley...represented possibility, not probability."113 The paucity of stories regaling female violence indicates the exceptional nature of these episodes.

While in theory Deputy Husbands should stand in and assist with defense, New

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113 Ibid., 179.
Englanders did not expect this, nor did they consider women in any defensive equations. When counting able bodies to secure garrison houses, authorities completely ignored women as well as boys and old men. William Hubbard’s description of the September 1675 attack on Maj. William Philips’s garrison house in Maine is a case in point. Approximately fifty people were crowded into the building at the time, of which Hubbard labeled only ten as able hands.

“They had five more that could do something, but through Age or Minority not able to make any notable Resistance,” he admitted. Here, he discounted boys and old men as defenders due to their dependent status, and he completely ignored thirty-five women. Persons in these demographic categories qualified as dependents, not as men, and they were not expected to fight. Although contemporaries noted a few occasions when women loaded weapons or passed powder, the English still believed that war and weapons were the province of men.

Native American warriors may have felt the same. When eighteen raiders attacked an isolated farm near Lamprey River Landing in New Hampshire in August 1723, Aaron Rawlins and his twelve-year-old daughter barricaded the door and defended the house until they were overwhelmed. After scalping Rawlins, the Indians cut off the girl’s head. Contemporary chronicler Jeremy Belknap supposed the beheading might have been due to haste, but he thought it

more likely that the raiders were “enraged against her, on account of the
assistance she afforded her father in their defence, which evidently appeared by
her hands being soiled with powder.” Thus, the exceptional nature of boys or women taking on the role of men warranted recording. By underscoring the proper, non-threatening examples of Deputy Husbands in their sermons and histories, ministers purposely chose to draw attention to acceptable female bravery and shame men in return.

The actions of some women, however, went beyond “proper” female bounds, and it seems that men had to explain these aberrations and reinforce the proper place of women. A June 1692 raid on Wells, Maine by a combined party of Indians and Frenchmen presents one example. Half of Capt. James Converse’s thirty-man command was trapped aboard open sloops in the harbor, leaving him with only fifteen men to defend his garrison. Cotton Mather later claimed that the garrison’s women “took up the Amazonian Stroke,” carried ammunition to the male defenders, and even “with a Manly Resolution fired several Times upon the Enemy.” It is unclear if the attackers were aware of the women’s actions. But Mather reported a verbal exchange during a lull in the battle that may indicate otherwise. When Converse rejected a demand for surrender, an Indian replied, “Being you are so Stout, why don’t you come and Fight in the open Field, like a Man, and not Fight in a Garrison, like a Squaw?” Fourteen years later, another

117 Cotton Mather, Decennium Luctuosum, 233-38.
small party of women “assumed an Amazonian courage” when their near-empty garrison was struck. The women sounded the alarm, donned male garb, “put on hats, with their hair hanging down,” and “fired so briskly” that they convinced their attackers that the “unmanned” garrisons was, in fact, “manned.” The women likely doffed their male hats and coats once the skirmish ended, thus fitting within the framework of women assuming and putting off the male role. Furthermore, in each case, the women remain unnamed and unheralded.

The exigencies of war might require such transgressions, but this double broaching of gender boundaries (clothing as well as function) must have resonated with gender-conscious New Englanders, particularly in the context of the Salem witch trials, where women who stood outside the bounds of society or seemed to challenge established authority found themselves on trial for their lives. English clergymen of all denominations had long railed against violations of proper dress, rooting their attacks in the ancient laws set forth in the book of Deuteronomy. In a 1582 diatribe against the theater, Anglican clergyman Stephen Gosson argued that “the law of God very straightly forbids men to put on women’s garments.” Clothing served as “signes distinctive between sexe and sexe, [and] to take unto us those garments that are manifest signes of another

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119 Penhallow, History of the Wars, 41-42; see also Jabez Fitch, “A Brief Narrative of Several Things Respecting the Province of New Hampshire in New-England” (Boston, 1728-29).  
sexe, is to falsify, forge and adulterate, contrarie to the expresse rule of the words of God.\textsuperscript{121} Puritan ministers shared this deep-seated antipathy to the theater, particularly the unmanning of men who played female parts. To them, clothing was more than a functional accessory or marker of class—it gendered the body it encased, making one (along with behavior) a man or woman. As historian Laura Levine argues, clothing "could actually alter the gender of the male body beneath the costume," and conversely make a woman a man.\textsuperscript{122} Kathleen Brown demonstrates the power of clothing in her examination of Thomas/Thomasine Hall, a transgendered settler in colonial Virginia. Hall dressed, acted, and was accepted as both a man and a woman in different social situations, even serving as a soldier in military campaigns in the Low Countries. This transformation from man to woman was possible in large part due to clothing.\textsuperscript{123}

As with men in England, New England ministers and magistrates enforced proper gender behavior through passage of laws as well as fiery sermons denouncing dressing beyond one's station (one of several identified "sins" responsible for King Philip's War, according to ministers) or wearing


\textsuperscript{122} Levine, \textit{Men in Women's Clothing}, 3.

apparel or hair in a style appropriate for the opposite sex.\textsuperscript{124} This became doubly important as Native Americans took on and later looted the trappings of Europeans, stripping dead European men of their male markers and allowing the Indians to appear, from a distance, as white colonists.\textsuperscript{125} In 1696 Massachusetts Bay formalized this long tradition by passing a law explicitly aimed at preventing men and women from cross dressing, and court cases enforcing this law cropped up on occasion in the late seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{126}

Perhaps the most prominent example of gender bending is Hannah Duston, who outdid all women, and many men, for the “manliness” of her actions. During an assault on Haverhill, Massachusetts on March 15, 1697, native raiders captured Duston, recently delivered of a child, her midwife, Mary Neff, and nearly forty other people. When the raiders split their party, Duston and Neff marched off in the custody of two native families, who also held Samuel

\textsuperscript{124} Mass. Records, 5: 59-63; Mather Humiliations, 9; Dorothy Hoyt was sentenced to a severe whipping “for putting on man’s apparel” in October 1677; Essex Court Records, 6: 172; In July 1679, Sarah Phillips of Boston was sentenced to fifteen lashes and a severe fine for theft, bearing a bastard child, and “rideing away in mans Apparrell.” Suffolk Court Records, 30: 1063; See also Kamensky, “Talk Like a Man,” 23.


Leonardson, a young man seized over a year before. Threatened with the gauntlet upon their impending arrival in an Indian village, the three captives plotted their escape.\textsuperscript{127} Possibly swayed by Leonardson's lengthy stay among the Indians, one of the men showed the boy "how he used to knock Englishmen on the head and take off their Scallops."\textsuperscript{128} Late that night, the captives put that knowledge to use, killing and scalping ten sleeping Indians, including women and children, afterward returning to white society to claim their due.\textsuperscript{129}

Rather than fade into anonymous obscurity like the women of Marblehead, Duston became something of a folk hero and celebrity, featured in sermons by the likes of Cotton Mather. Laurel Ulrich rightly argues that historians have often interpreted Duston's actions through a more sentimental image of women that appeared in the nineteenth century. By doing so, Duston appears as an oddity, a challenge to the patriarchal order of New England. Instead, Ulrich argues that such war heroines, self-reliant viragoes, as she calls them, had become familiar and thus not threatening to proper New England society.\textsuperscript{130}

Not all of Hannah's contemporaries would have agreed. Nathaniel Saltonstall, magistrate of Haverhill, identified what he thought to be the proper qualities of women, and Hannah had stepped well beyond these. Her behavior

\textsuperscript{127} Mather, \textit{Humiliations}, 41-46.
\textsuperscript{128} "Diary of Samuel Sewell," 5: 453.
\textsuperscript{129} Mather, \textit{Humiliations} 41-46; Mather, \textit{Magnalia}, 634-36.
more resembled the forceful and frightening actions of a party of Indian women in spring 1676. “Armed with Clubs, Pieces of Swords, and the like” the native women fell on two unarmed Englishmen traveling from Marlborough to Sudbury, “beat out their Brains, and cut off their privy Members, which they carried away with them in Triumph.” Disgusted that “the most milde and gentle Sex” could do such a thing, Saltonstall believed these native women had “utterly abandoned at once the two proper Virtues of Womankinde, Pity and Modesty.”

His ideal woman was the submissive Mary Rowlandson. Though Saltonstall was not equating English women with their Indian counterparts, clearly he saw it as abnormal for women to press beyond their “gentle” nature and take life in such a violent, “manly” way. In addition, for Mather and Hubbard to label Duston a “virago” or “Amazon” was not necessarily meant as praise. Hannah was not transformed by donning male clothing, nor did she fight with the tools of or in defense of her domestic realm. Ulrich argues that Hannah’s use of a knife was no different from butchering farm animals for consumption. However, killing a human in a premeditated act of revenge is a far cry from barnyard butchery. Therefore, Hannah’s actions warranted explanation, and the labels of virago and Amazon served as such. According to Joyce Chaplin, the term “virago” referred to women “whose temper was hotter

\[131\] [Saltonstall], *Present State of New-England*, in Lincoln, ed., *Narratives of the Indian Wars*, 82; in a similar incident, William Harris of Rhode Island described the role of Indian women in the torture and execution of two Englishmen captured after Pierce’s fight in March 1676. After tying the two men to trees, “the Indean women whipped them allmoste to death, and then cut of Some of theyr flesh & put therein hot embers, after a most cruell barbarous maner.” Leach, ed., *A Rhode Islander Reports*, 42.
and more masculine than normal,” while Amazons were “unnatural,” females who had removed a breast to better use their weapons and practice the male art of war. “The idea of the Amazon, like the idea of a virago, stressed that her body was contrary to nature.”132 Such women, to include Hannah Duston, were like the biblical Jael who drove a tent peg through her enemy’s head—women to be feared and controlled.

After her return from captivity, Cotton Mather “canonized” Duston, claims Ulrich, and she became “an American amazon, a defender of Israel, and an archetypal heroine of the New World frontier.”133 This is largely true. Within weeks of her return, Mather incorporated her story into a fast-day sermon, *Humiliations Follow’d With Deliverences*. Although Hannah was not the centerpiece of the sermon, the story of her captivity and spectacular self-rescue spread rapidly across New England. Regardless of Hannah’s apparent fame, the “celebratory” actions of New England men seemed to reveal unease as evident in their efforts to reassert male control over this formidable but wayward woman. As Joyce Chaplin argues, “even in moments of military extremity, Englishmen were unwilling to admit that women could or should fight.” If and when they participated, the description of their actions and “celebration” must be “carefully coded.”134 In their journals, Samuel Sewell and the Rev. John Pike of Dover both recorded the exploits of Duston, Neff, and Leonardson, but with no more fanfare

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than other events. In fact, Sewell dwelt not on Duston but on her native captor, who had once lived and prayed with the Rowlandsons of Lancaster, and on Leonardson's fortuitous scalping lessons. Like Increase Mather and his terse description of the women of Marblehead in 1677, Sewell may not have known what to make of Duston. Though he presented her with some Connecticut flax as a gift, this item seems more a reminder of her proper place in family and society than a tangible reward for her notable but manly actions.135

The Massachusetts General Court, and indeed her husband, took a similar stand in regards to the bounty for the ten scalps taken. In a petition to the Court, Thomas Duston attributed his wife's "extraordinary Action" to God, both in its prompting and execution, and not to Hannah herself. In fact, the appeal said very little about Hannah. Popular sentiment demanded compensation for the "just Slaughter of soe many of the Barbarians," as Thomas himself admitted. However, he asked for reward not for the scalps (for which compensatory legislation had expired) but for the destruction of his estate suffered in the attack on Haverhill. Having lost his home, and more importantly as head of household and husband of Hannah, Thomas saw himself as "the fitter object for what consideracon the publick Bounty shall judge proper for what hath been herein done." The Court concurred, awarding £25 to Thomas and another £12.10 each to the widow Mary Neffe and Samuel Leonardson.136 Beyond this, Thomas was

given command of a garrison house in recognition for saving the rest of his family, actions less trumpeted throughout New England because they were expected.137

The published accounts of Hannah's actions required proper "coding" and interpretation as well. In his study of male captivity, historian William Foster argues that Anglo-American captivity narratives written by or about men were gendered documents that "contain[ed] gaping holes or erasures concerning female authority." By excluding or reducing the role of women in their captivity experience, English men reasserted the superiority of their culture and gender. As Foster states, "the act of writing [a narrative] was nothing less than an urgent act of restoring masculinity."138 The telling of Duston's story, and those of other women, was much the same. Cotton Mather first molded and published Hannah's story in his fast-day sermon, *Humiliations Follow'd With Deliverances*, and subsequently in his religious histories of the Indian Wars, *Decennium Luctuosum* and *Magnalia Christi Americana*. The sermon was not a call for women to emulate Hannah and take up arms. In fact, the actions of Hannah and her companions were not the focal points of the long sermon but simply examples of God's intervention in New England's affairs. Instead, Mather focused on the sins of New England, the need for collective repentance, and reminded men of their duties and responsibilities. When he recounted the story of the attack on

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137 See also Whitford, "Hannah Dustin: The Judgment of History," 308.
138 Foster, Captors' Narrative, 3-4.
Haverhill, Mather highlighted the bravery of Thomas Duston, who “manfully kept in the Reer of his Little Army of unarmed Children” as they retreated to the safety of a garrison house. In contrast, he portrayed Hannah as timid, “sitting down in the chimney with a heart full of most fearful expectation.” As the women trudged into captivity, their master observed their dejected faces, and, according to Mather, offered words of comfort. “What need you trouble your self? If your God will have you delivered, you shall be so!” And Mather concluded, “it seems our God would have it so to be.” Thus, according to Mather, Hannah’s courage to act came not from some internal ability or unwomanly urge, but from God, who used the women to chastise the heathen and illustrate His benevolence.139 In both the public and religious acknowledgements of Hannah’s unwomanly deeds, she was placed (or replaced) in the proper relationship of wife to husband and supplicant to God.

The narratives of far less threatening women than Hannah Duston were framed in a similar fashion, with frequent reminders of the proper places of men and women as well as acceptable means of resistance. Mary Rowlandson’s famous captivity narrative appeared in print in 1682, bookended between an introduction likely written by Increase Mather and a sermon penned by her husband, thus containing and protecting her with the male mantles of husband and editor. As Neil Salisbury and others have argued, this format allowed Mary to enter “the all-male realm of public discourse” without violating “the

conventional boundaries of theology and gender as established in the United
Colonies of New England.” In his introduction, Mather frequently reiterated
Mary’s proper place in society with phrases such as “precious yokefellow,” “dear
Consort,” and “Hand maid.” She was no virago like Hannah Duston, as Mary
herself confirmed when describing the assault on Lancaster. Mary had once
vowed that she would prefer death to captivity among the Indians, “but when it
came to the trial my mind changed.” As Mary’s children were carried off, the
raiders pledged to protect her “If I were willing to go along with them.”
140 Wounded and dispirited, Mary chose to submit rather than pick up a weapon
and fight.

Mary may have surrendered, but she resisted her captivity in a more
feminine way than Hannah Duston—she continued to act as mother to her
children and made use of “womanly” talents to survive. Mary nursed her dying
infant, inquired after the welfare of nearby children, visited them on occasion,
and even combed her son for lice. And while she did not murder her captors and
escape, she survived in part by utilizing female domestic skills, knitting
stockings and other clothing in exchange for food, and even sewing a shirt for
Metacom’s son.141 While Mary’s narrative was written in part to prove that she
had retained her religious, cultural, and sexual purity during her captivity, it also
provided a model for the proper conduct of an Englishwoman—dedicated

140 Rowlandson, Sovereignty and Goodness of God, ed. Salisbury, 45-47, 64-65, 70.
141 Ibid., 75-76, 78, 81, 83-84, 89-91, 95, 102.
mother, skilled domestic worker, and servant of God. As Nathaniel Saltonstall said of her in his wartime narrative, "[F]or being a very pious Woman and of great Faith, the Lord wonderfully supported her under this Affliction, so that she appeared and behaved her self amongst them with so much Courage and majestic Gravity, that none durst offer any Violence to her, but on the contrary (in their rude Manner) seemed to show her great Respect."  

Rev. John Williams confirmed proper feminine submissiveness and passive resistance in his own narrative, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion*. Having given birth to a child only weeks before, his wife, Eunice, quickly weakened on the difficult trek into captivity after the 1704 raid on Deerfield. Although she realized that her death was imminent, and despite having witnessed the killing of her infant, Jerusha, and six-year-old son, John Jr., Eunice was not bitter. "She never spake any discontented word as to what had befallen us," wrote Williams, "but with suitable expressions justified God in what had befallen us." In this instance, Williams portrayed a woman who willingly submitted to rather than fought the will of God, and he glorified her submissiveness to proper authority. Williams did write of feminine resistance, but in his narrative women became spiritual rather than temporal warriors, squaring off against the persuasive powers of French priests and nuns. He related several instances of English girls and women refusing to cross

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themselves, wear crucifixes, or convert to Catholicism. "A maid of our town" who lived amongst nuns proved rather recalcitrant, Williams reported. When she refused to cross herself, the nuns beat her on the ears, struck her face, "pinched her arms till they were black and blue," and then thrashed her hands with "six branches full of knots." Offers of money to convert and threats to turn her over to Indians did nothing to weaken her resolve.144

Cotton Mather related a similar story in the narrative of Hannah Swarton, captured and taken to Canada in 1690. Like the captives of Deerfield, she resisted French attempts to convert her to Catholicism. In the mold of Mary Rowlandson, Swarton deployed her knowledge of scripture to refute Catholic teachings. Apparently her defense of her faith, as well as open contempt for "the idolatrous worship" of her captors, was successful, and she never attended mass again. Despite her brave resistance, Swarton remained humble in her narrative and chose not to provide great detail of her arguments. Remaining the submissive woman, she declared, "It's bootless [pointless] for me, a poor woman, to acquaint the world with what arguments I used, if I could now remember them; and many of them are slipt out of my memory." It is more likely that Cotton Mather added this dialogue for his own purposes.145

As the narratives of Hannah Duston, Mary Rowlandson, and Hannah Swarton demonstrated, the danger of celebrating or even discussing female

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144 Ibid., 203-4.
145 Mather, Magnalia, 359; other narratives of women in action used domestic imagery to describe their actions. See [Thompson], "New England's Crisis," in Slotkin, So Dreadfull a Judgment, 231.
assertiveness required a counter-balance with the celebration of successful male warriors. The same male-packaged and male-edited stories of women, along with accounts of male captives and famous Indian fighters, reminded New Englanders that not all men had failed in their duties. Though ridiculing the effete behavior of some, ministers also commemorated the deeds of the deserving, often in the same breath or written phrase. John Williams's captivity narrative, which celebrated female resistance while implicitly describing the emasculation of New Englanders as they lost control of their lives to French and Indian women, demonstrated that captive men could maintain a veneer of respect, even after losing the foundation of their manhood with the destruction of their homes and scattering of their families. Though stripped of his pulpit by the 1704 Deerfield raid, Williams continued to minister to his flock in captivity, seeing to the needs of fellow captives and working toward their physical and spiritual redemption. News of conversions among his people frustrated Williams, particularly when his son Samuel "turned to popery." Rather than wallow in self-pity for failing as father to his congregation and family, Williams continued to combat "false" religion as he had in Deerfield, writing his fallen son a stinging letter of rebuke. "I pity your weakness," he wrote, followed by a pointed dissection and refutation of Catholic dogma. His own measured resistance to conversion served as a model for other captives and a rebuke for those who failed to keep the faith.146

146 Williams, Redeemed Captive, in Vaughan and Clark, eds., *Puritans among the Indians*, 167, 184-
Though not circulated like published narratives, the correspondence of military commanders and soldiers related many examples of male bravery, ranging from individual actions to the efforts of entire communities. In August 1692, John Keezar of Haverhill was cutting grass in Pond Meadow outside of the town. Having laid aside his musket to handle his scythe, he was unarmed when surprised by an Indian. Instead of running or surrendering in hope of surviving, Keezar turned his hand-tool into a weapon, charged his attacker, and stabbed him in the stomach.147 Where dispatches named Keezar, other descriptions were impersonal, ascribing bravery to unnamed individuals. Such was the case with the April 1676 Sudbury raid. The same battle that led to the panic and destruction of Capt. Wadsworth’s company also witnessed the collective bravery of the town’s defenders. The selectmen of Sudbury praised the actions of all inhabitants, none of whom “seemed to be possessed with feare.” Rather than shelter in garrison houses and await death or rescue, the nameless defenders “issued forth to fight ye Enemy in theire sculking approaches,” and succeeded in driving off the attackers.148

The redoubtable Indian fighter, Benjamin Church, had similar praise for the inhabitants of Falmouth, Maine in September 1689. The morning after he landed soldiers for an expedition against the Abenakis and their French allies, a large native force struck the town. Church described this fight as one of the
toughest he had experienced, yet the townspeople responded "with an undaunted Co[u]rrage," joining his soldiers in battle. After exchanging heavy fire for six or seven hours, the attackers retreated with their casualties, hounded by English "shott & Shouts." Church praised his soldiers, but he gave great credit to the untrained townsmen. "[T]hay marched ought valenterely with the first[,] maintained the fight with the best & marched of with the Last[,] behaving them selves Like men willing to defend thaire Country."149

The public acknowledgement of such events came from ministers, who sprinkled their sermons and publications with explanations for noted failures and accounts of plucky battlefield commanders. In English eyes, natives could never best an Englishman in a fair fight, and ministers buttressed this belief by repeating the frequent complaints that Indians "durst not look an Englishman in the Face in the open Field," and fought in a manner "contrary to the practice of all Civil Nations." According to Cotton Mather, Indians attacking the Wells garrison in June 1692 refused a challenge to fight in the open field, replying

“English Fashion is all one Fool; you kill mee, mee kill you! No, better ly somewhere, and Shoot a man, and hee no see! That the best Soldier!”

Therefore the cause of defeat was rooted more in the wily, unmanly ways of the Indians than in the military incompetence of colonists. More importantly, ministers argued that the all-powerful Christian God had a hand in every English defeat, He having used Indians as tools to chastise the Saints for their collective sins. When He felt the New Englanders had suffered enough, He would surely return them to his favor and grant them military success. In addition to God and native culture as explanations for defeat, ministers charged certain military leaders with an excess of courage that resulted in disaster.

“Want[ing] neither Courage nor Skill,” Capt. William Lathrop led his company of soldiers and many Deerfielders to their deaths at “Bloody Brook” in September 1675. According to William Hubbard, he enthusiastically but unadvisedly adopted the individualized fighting tactics of the Indians, resulting in “The Ruine of a choice Company of young Men, the very Flower of the County of Essex.” Even the heavy losses suffered at the Great Swamp Fight in December 1675 were the product of overzealousness, as Samuel Nowell argued in *Abraham in Arms*. In this instance, he believed, “there hath rather been an


151 Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, 1: 113-14, 118, 211-12; Hubbard argued that Capt. Wadsworth and his company were drawn into the ambush at Sudbury due to their desire to grapple with the enemy. “Too much Courage and Eagerness in Pursuit of the Enemy, hath added another fatal Blow to this poor Country.” Hubbard, *History of the Indian Wars*, 1: 211-12, 2: 259.
excess of Courage then defect or want of it; most of our losses have been occasioned meerly by it."\textsuperscript{152}

If zeal could be moderated by judgment and combined with courage and skill, the result was the successful Indian fighter. New England produced several such Sampsons, including Captains Thomas Wheeler and Samuel Moseley.\textsuperscript{153} None cast a shadow as long as Benjamin Church of Plymouth Colony, the most celebrated New England warrior, who fought Indians in three successive wars between 1675 and 1713. Though Church was a shameless self-promoter, his deeds were recorded and trumpeted by ministers who sought an antidote to male tepidness and a counter to female overzealousness. William Hubbard and Cotton Mather featured Church in their narratives of the Indian wars, and both ministers held him up as the paragon of New England manhood. Church fought in the initial engagements against Metacom’s Wampanoags in the summer of 1675, and while scouting Pocasset Neck with fifteen men, he stumbled upon a large force of Indians, “just ready to devour them.”

\textsuperscript{152} Nowell, Abraham in Arms, 17.

\textsuperscript{153} In his 1676 Thanksgiving sermon, the Rev. Edward Bulkley of Concord included a lengthy narrative of the fight at Brookfield in August 1676. Written by Capt. Thomas Wheeler, the account celebrated the steadfastness of Brookfield’s men, “who did well and Commendably performed the duties of the Trust committed to them with much Courage and Resolution through the Assistance of our gracious God,” as well as the bravery of Capt. Thomas Hutchinson, Wheeler, and their soldiers. See Thomas Wheeler, A Thankfull Remembrance of Gods Mercy to Several Persons at Quabang or Brookfield (Cambridge, MA: Samuel Green, 1676) in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 246. A less successful but equally vaunted leader was Capt. Michael Pierce. Deacon Philip Walker of Rehoboth, penning a poem about Pierce’s 1676 fight outside the town, went so far as to equate the “martyred” English soldiers with ancient Hector for their demonstrated bravery in their fatal stand against overwhelming odds. See Philip Walker, “Captan Perse and his Coragios Company” in Early Rehoboth, 35-36.
Outnumbered ten to one and trapped against the shore, the English soldiers began to lose heart. In too many similar instances, the story concluded with a rout of the English or a valiant but fruitless final stand. In contrast, Hubbard wrote, Church possessed “enough [courage] for himself, and some to spare for his Friends.” Rousing his faltering men, he exhibited great personal bravery and took steps to protect them from enemy fire. By the time a boat arrived to withdraw Church’s men, they had nearly exhausted their ammunition and most weapons were overheated and fouled from overuse. Rather than a “cowardly Flight,” the scouting force inflicted casualties on their enemies, suffered none in return, and conducted “a fair Retreat” due to the level head of Church. Hubbard credited the captain with a last gesture of defiance before he drew off. “Such was the bold and undaunted Courage of this Champion...that he was not willing to leave any Token behind of their flying for want of Courage, that in the Face of his Enemies he went back to fetch his Hat.”154 Two wars later, Cotton Mather would recount the same incident in his *Magnalia Christi Americana*, and liken Church to Shamgar, the ancient Israelite judge, who slew six hundred Philistines with an ox goad. To Mather and other New Englanders, Church was more than a successful leader. He was “our Lebbaeus,” a man of heart and courage.155

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As historian John Demos surmised, the 1690s—and several decades on either side—were a "time of extreme and pervasive anxiety" in New England. Beset by nearly continuous Indian wars, legal challenges to various colonial charters and rights, and the secularizing influence of commerce on society, New England's colonies stood on the brink of great change. However, the region's men sought to maintain a degree of stability by preserving traditional roles and authority within the patriarchal family, the root of civil society. Despite the frequent occasions when women assumed a male role and conversely when men assumed a more submissive character through actions in battle, New England gender roles remained intact, if somewhat bent, at the end of these wars. Mary Beth Norton argues that men "persisted in seeing their wives and daughters in traditional patriarchal terms. In men's eyes, women were properly viewed as dependents of a specific marital household."\(^{156}\) The historical narratives of the wars reinforced this belief, labeling Hannah Duston as an "Amazon," a historical oddity, passing judgment on the cowardly Pasco Chubb, who lost his life in an Indian raid, and enshrining soldiers such as Benjamin Church in the pantheon of New England folklore.

CHAPTER TWO

SOJOURNERS FOR A TIME: NEW ENGLAND REFUGEES OF EARLY INDIAN WARS

Destructive raids on frontier communities like Deerfield in 1704 and accounts of "redeemed" captives are ubiquitous in early New England history. Less well known are the experiences of hundreds of frontier families driven from their homes by fear or Indian attacks. As wars came and went between 1675 and 1715, dozens of towns along the New England frontier, stretching from the Connecticut Valley to the coast of Maine, suffered devastating attacks by Indian and, later, French raiders. "[L]ike the flotsam and jetsam left floating at sea in the wake of a hurricane," as historian Douglas Leach put it, hundreds and then thousands of people fled their destroyed or embattled homes, drifting toward calmer climes.¹

Not surprisingly, refugees often arrived with little more than the clothes on their back and a few hastily gathered possessions. As they came to rest in safe havens, the issue of who would shelter and sustain these people cropped up in town and provincial-level correspondence. Ministers and magistrates had railed against the spread of settlement for years, accusing frontier settlers of greed and godless behavior. War and the repeated roll-back of the frontier seemed to


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confirm their suspicions that God was punishing these transgressors.
Understandably, towns receiving refugees feared that these people would become a great financial burden due to the apparent attitude of colonial officials as well as the tradition of local charity.

Historians argue that the tradition of aid through family and town governments was simply incapable of meeting the demand. Instead, New England’s colonial governments responded by relieving towns of this responsibility, providing indirect aid to refugees, and sharing the cost through colony rates. According to Douglas Leach, the Massachusetts colony treasury bore the major financial responsibility for its colony’s refugees during King Philip’s War. As Michael Puglisi claims, this “represents a shift in relief measures from a system of direct aid granted to specific persons who were well acquainted with the donors to a more general system in which strangers contributed to the maintenance of persons in need throughout the colony.”

As Puglisi and Leach show, colonial governments responded to the frontier exodus with a barrage of proclamations, and congregations and private individuals gathered funds and supplies to help the indigent. However, this aid was actually quite limited and narrowly directed, and records do not support their conclusions of wide-spread colonial relief. Furthermore, towns remained exclusive, gathering in those they were obliged to aid through familial or

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proprietary connections and allowing outsiders to remain only conditionally. Following the natural hierarchy of their community, refugees sought to support themselves before turning to family and friends, and only grudgingly sought town and colony aid when familial and fraternal sources were exhausted.

The debate over war refugees and their relative absence from official records runs counter to traditional New England town studies that emphasize change and breakdown of community. As historian Christine Heyrman points out, the traditional model claims that “townspeople forgot their responsibility to the public good, defied customary restraints, and violated the old religious ideals of brotherliness and asceticism.”3 The experience of war refugees stands in contrast to this. The reactions of provincial and town governments, and indeed the refugees themselves, demonstrate continuity of the communal ideal in New England. This sense of community did not reside in provinces and general courts, but in the towns and in the “little commonwealths” of New England’s families. From their inception, many towns had been tight-knit communities, restrictive of residency and demanding a degree of conformity.4 Although the character of New England towns was changing by the 1670s, this tradition of exclusivity was alive and well in the years preceding King Philip’s War and


would continue after as well. Restrictions may have become somewhat elastic in war time, but towns quickly and continuously pushed refugees from their midst once the fighting subsided. By seeking to exclude "outsiders" from official town aid, New England towns clung to traditional notions of personal, familial, and communal responsibility, and provincial governments actually aided the process. War reinforced rather than destroyed New England's sense of community.

Family and town were the central elements of New England's political and communal life. Many Puritans had turned to the faith to achieve a degree of order in a world that seemed to be dissolving into chaos and sin. Thus, New England's Puritan settlers sought to create stability through the institutions of the patriarchal family, congregation, and what Kenneth Lockridge labeled "Closed, Corporate Communities." In many ways, this "persistent localism," as historian T.H. Breen termed it, was a reaction to King Charles I's extension of royal authority at the expense of traditional local institutions. Those Puritans who resisted the king's power grab and came as part of the Great Migration were determined to re-create a society in Massachusetts that returned control of most church, government, and defense issues to towns. Furthermore, the Puritan

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6 Lockridge, A New England Town, 16.

doctrine of personal relationships with God and predestined salvation
"eliminated the mediating powers that sustained the church and state of a dying
feudalism."8 Thus, according to John Cotton, the hierarchy of society would
return to what God had ordained—family, town/congregation, and only then
province.9 Of course, not all New England settlers were Puritans, but the
independent-minded settlements of fishermen and mariners along the coast as
well as other New England colonies reflected a similar ethos of localism and
noninterference.10 New England, then, was “not a single unit, but a body of
loosely joined fragments.”11

The essential element of these “fragments” consisted of families. Puritan
clergyman William Gouge referred to the family as the bedrock of human
existence—”out of it kingdoms and nations [were] raised.” Families produced,
reproduced, educated, worshipped, and governed based on the natural hierarchy
established by God of man over woman, parent over child, and master over
servant. Each was “a little Church, and a little commonwealth.” More than a half
century after the Great Migration of the 1630s, ministers such as Cotton Mather
continued to laud the family as the primary form of order in society. “Well-

ordered Families,” he reasoned in a 1699 sermon, “naturally produce a Good Order

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11 Breen, Puritans and Adventurers, 4-24.
in other Societies. When Families are under an ill Discipline, all other Societies being therefore ill Disciplined, will feel that Error in the First Concoction.” 12

Indeed, the strength of New England families “from the very beginning gave [its] societies a much greater internal strength and stability than that of early Virginia.” 13 When trouble arose in the form of single persons, transients, criminals, the sick or indigent, families served as hospitals, charities, jails, and moral supervisors. Various provincial laws throughout New England tended to relieve colonies of responsibility for “troublesome” individuals and to pass the burden to the family, thus reinforcing its primacy. The typical domestic unit may have been nuclear, but wide-spread kinship networks including cousins, in-laws, and relatives of deceased spouses shared family responsibilities. As historian Edmund Morgan noted, “Puritans felt the obligations of minor relationships only slightly less than those of their immediate families.” New England was indeed a family business. 14

While families were inclusive in their connections, New England towns were not. En route to New England in 1630, John Winthrop had proclaimed his notion of a “cittie upon a hill,” that ideal polity where godliness would flourish and sin shrivel. Inhabitants would share labor, resources, and a collective

13 Johnson, Adjustment to Empire, 4.
responsibility to enforce God's laws, much as the primitive Christians had done. This could only be accomplished through closely knit and closely settled communities, not vast provinces. Although Winthrop's focus on towns was based in religion, towns served as the most important political body to all New Englanders, regardless of faith.\textsuperscript{15}

To achieve Winthrop's goal, towns by nature were exclusive and resistant to outside interference.\textsuperscript{16} Aided by the relative homogenous and family nature of the Great Migration, as well as laws granting towns the authority to expel "undesirables," the first generation created mostly "orderly, harmonious societies." Not alone in their goal, the inhabitants of Dedham, Massachusetts declared their intention to "keepe off[\ldots] from us such, as ar[e] contrary minded. And receave onely such unto us...as may be probably of one harte with us."\textsuperscript{17} Even the more liberal-minded communities of Rhode Island refused uninvited residents, as William Newman discovered on June 7, 1671. After repeated warnings to depart from Portsmouth and Newport, where he owned no land and "never had permission to abide," the Portsmouth selectmen ordered Newman and his wife to leave immediately or suffer "15 stripes and be sent out of town."\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{16} Greven, \textit{Four Generations}; Lockridge, \textit{A New England Town}, passim.
\textsuperscript{17} Heyrman, \textit{Commerce and Culture}, 30; for an example of laws regarding strangers, see the General Court's May 29, 1655 proclamation that "all the tounes in this jurisdicon, shall have liberty to prevent the coming in of such as come from other parts or places of these jurisdiccons" in \textit{Mass. Records}, vol. 4 pt. 1, 230; Johnson, \textit{Adjustment to Empire}, 8; Virginia DeJohn Anderson, \textit{New England's Generation: The Great Migration and the Formation of Society and Culture in the Seventeenth Century} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
\textsuperscript{18} RICR, 2: 394-95.
Towns made exceptions if newcomers had skills or knowledge to contribute, such as schoolmasters, ministers, or artisans, or if a resident in good standing stood in surety for the stranger’s behavior and livelihood. Thus, excluding and “warning out” undesirables as single men, widows, people of questionable morals, wandering laborers, and those who disagreed on land distribution or finer points of religion allowed “inhabitants to develop a strong sense of corporate identity as well as a consensus about how best to order local institutions.”

This exclusiveness was in part rooted in poor relief. New England’s settlers labored to live up to John Winthrop’s exhortation to “knitt together in this worke as one man,” and “be willing to abridge our selves of superfluities, for the supply of others necessities.” Those outside the Puritan pale realized that communalism contributed to material as well as spiritual success. Thus, as historian Laurel Thatcher Ulrich noted, “Prosperity meant charity, and in early New England charity meant personal responsibility for nearby neighbors.” The survival of a town or family, much less the Puritan venture, required a mutual spirit at times.

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Responsibility for one’s neighbor did not equate to “a feeling of collective caring,” nor did it indicate open-handedness. According to English tradition, “each individual was held in equal measure to be ultimately responsible for personal maintenance,” and the able-bodied poor were responsible for their own relief. This meant finding odd jobs, temporarily farming small plots of land to feed one’s family, or moving in search of work. If this proved insufficient, New Englanders in need turned to their extensive family networks and close friends. Courts made every effort to enforce traditional family charity and keep responsibility at the lowest level. Jonathan and David Littlefield of Maine illustrated this in 1709 when they appealed to the York County Court for assistance with their intransigent relations. Their mother, Merubee Littlefield, “was under the Infirmity of old age and not able to help herself whereby she [became] burdensome to the petitioners.” The court required Merubee’s “other Children and Relations” to appear in court “to shew Cause if any they have why they do not assist in her Support and maintainence as aforesd.” Only when the indigent had exhausted personal ability and kin connections, “when there is no other means whereby our Christian brother may be relieved in this distress,” as John Winthrop put it, did town support come into play.

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24 Winthrop, “Model of Christian Charity,” 143.
While New Englanders recognized their Christian duty toward those in need, caring for the poor was a drain on a town's limited finances in the best of times. Thus, poor relief was "conditional and discriminatory," a right accorded only those with an indisputable legal stake in the community "because of birth, marriage, contract, or permission to settle." Transients need not apply.\textsuperscript{25} Settlement laws throughout New England protected towns from unwanted charges, declaring if anyone "stand in need of releefe they shalbe relieved and maintained by the Towneships whence they came." However, these same laws allowed for transients to acquire inhabitant status and rights after several months of residency "without notice given" or complaint by town officials.\textsuperscript{26} Not surprisingly, newcomers had to demonstrate their means of livelihood or obtain sponsorship from a resident before being allowed to settle. Those unable to satisfy the town selectmen were "warned out," meaning either eviction or notification of ineligibility for relief, before they could become an official burden. Often transients chose to remain in place, with selectmen renewing their "under warning" status.\textsuperscript{27}

Some New England towns struggled with poor relief more than others, particularly the larger or port communities. As the center of commercial cod

\textsuperscript{25} Herndon, \textit{Unwelcome Americans}, 21; Nellis, \textit{Records of the Boston Overseers of the Poor}, 53.  
\textsuperscript{26} NPCR, 11: 40-41; Mass. Records, Vol. 4, pt 1: 365, note this says to get aid "with his family, or in case he hath no family;" the period necessary to acquire residency varied from three months to a year, depending on colony and year.  
fishing, Marblehead suffered a “floating population of nonhouseholders and seasonal laborers” that could number two-thirds of its residents. Eager to maximize the profits and development of the fishing industry, the Massachusetts General Court did not extend the power of exclusion to Marblehead. In the 1660s this led the port town’s stable residents to complain of “many...persons undesirable, and of noe estates” settling in the town, acquiring by default inhabitant status and rights, and becoming “burthensum to the place.”\textsuperscript{28} Boston and Charlestown suffered from transient populations as well, though these towns retained the right to expel unwanted and burdensome squatters. Recent arrivals to New England tended to congregate in these “haven-towns,” as the Rev. John Elliot called them in 1650, to recover from the transatlantic voyage and to make final preparations before settlement elsewhere. In addition, the port towns had their “hordes of sailors, dockworkers, and ‘floaters’ of every kind attracted to New England’s major seaports.”\textsuperscript{29} Transient indigents sometimes took advantage of their relative anonymity in these port towns, and played cat-and-mouse with town officials until they achieved their three months required for official inhabitant status. The reality and potential of this burden spurred Boston and Charlestown officials to scrupulously enforce the laws of residency.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} Heyrman, \textit{Commerce and Culture}, 207, 213-14; Essex Court Records, 5: 373.  
\textsuperscript{29} Crandall, “Second Great Migration,” 348.  
John Winthrop’s model of New England did not last long. Families and towns would remain the center of New England society, but they would soon stretch well beyond the pale of Boston and the “benevolent” oversight of the Puritan fathers and statesmen. Out-migrations occurred with the expulsion of dissidents such as Samuel Wheelwright and Roger Williams. These were small-scale and could be considered a purging of the Puritan body. But the draw of “available” land proved too strong for people conditioned by English society, where status lay in land ownership. This became more evident with the rapid growth of the English population and diminishing divisions of land for subsequent generations. By the 1670s, settlers in the Connecticut Valley worried that they lacked sufficient land for their “hordes of children.”

The thirty men of Northampton who petitioned the Massachusetts General Court to create Northfield in 1671 claimed that they were “in a greate measure straightened” for land and “could not fully attend God’s work and expand His kingdom” without the new grant. Hannah Swarton, captured by Indians in the 1690s, admitted that her family moved to Maine from Beverly “for large accommodations in the world.”

Colonial governments sought to control this expansion and maintain oversight with stringent settlement requirements, including minimum numbers

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31 Evan Haefeli and Kevin Sweeney, Captors and Captives: The 1704 French and Indian Raid on Deerfield (University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 19, 32.
of families and disposition of homes. While frontier communities varied in their commitment to the Puritan experiment, most towns in northern and western Massachusetts were extensions of older, well-established communities. As historian David Jaffee discovered, this “serial town settlement tended to retard social change by promoting the replication of a conservative, largely consensual, agrarian order.” While the creation of congregations and settling of ministers tended to lag in frontier communities, the people were no less devoted to replicating what they had left behind. In Deerfield, on the tip of English settlement in the Connecticut River Valley, “the street on which they lived, the common field that they farmed, and the meetinghouse they had erected by 1675 attested to their desire to recreate a typical New England town.”

Nevertheless, new towns, many nothing like the compact communities of Winthrop’s vision, sprang up across the region, some perilously close to the “insidious” wilderness. Other “common coasters,” as Winthrop called them, drifted between settlements, seeking employment or opportunity. He condemned these practices, lamenting that “if one may go, another may, and so the greater part, and so church and common wealth may be left destitute in a wilderness, exposed to misery and reproach, and all for thy ease and pleasure.”

Winthrop and subsequent Puritan leaders feared that such unchecked expansion

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35 Haefeli and Sweeney, Captors and Captives, 16-20.
threatened to lose the bonds and controls of society. The frontier represented more than the Devil and his native minions. It harbored religious dissidents, “religious guerrillas” as Richard Slotkin calls them, who “undermined the Puritan attempt to keep the means of government and manner of education in conformity” with their goals. In addition, secular-minded businessmen like the Pynchons of Springfield found traction and threatened the economic and political dominance of more established areas.37

Not surprisingly, ministers and magistrates roundly condemned frontier settlers, particularly those in the non-Puritan areas of Maine and New Hampshire (and even Massachusetts towns such as Marblehead) as lawless, godless, and even lacking a degree of humanity. To some extent, these criticisms were just. Puritan influence was tenuous at best along the Maine coast, where different faiths, political bodies, and land claimants competed for control.38 The difficulty of settling ministers led the more pious settlers to lament their move. On her relocation to Casco Bay, Hannah Swarton regretted leaving “the public worship and ordinances of God where I formerly lived (viz. Beverly) to

remove...where there was no church or minister of the Gospel...thereby
exposing our children to be bred ignorantly like Indians and ourselves to forget
what we had been formerly instructed in." Puritan ministers such as William
Hubbard and Increase and Cotton Mather would latch onto these reports and
exaggerate the godless state of the frontier. Hubbard compared frontier
settlements to Sodom and their people to Lot (at best) or termed them "a dull
and heavy-moulded sort of People, that had not either Skill or Courage to kill
any thing but Fish." Cotton Mather later wrote of the impossibility of
preaching to such people, "whose gods were fish and pine." The morals of
many settlers, particularly those in fishing communities, were often suspect as
well. Likely delighting many Puritan critics of the frontier, royal commissioners
visiting Maine in the 1660s claimed that "as many Men may share in a Woman,
as they doe in a Boate, and some have done so." Unfortunately, purveyors of
such rumors tended to tar all frontier settlers with the same brush.

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39 Mather, Narrative of Hannah Swarton" 150; see also John Winter to Robert Trelawny, Richmond
Island, 2 Aug. 1641, in DHSM, 3: 287; John Bishop to Increase Mather, Stamford, 2 Oct. 1677, in
MHSC, 4th ser. 8 (Boston: Wiggin and Lunt, 1868), 303.
40 William Hubbard, The Happiness of a People in the Wisdome of their Rulers Directing and in the
Obedience of their Brethren Attending Unto what Israel ought to do (Boston: John Foster, 1676);
Hubbard, The History of the Indian Wars in New England from the First Settlement to the Termination
of the War with King Philip, in 1677, ed. Samuel G. Drake (New York: Burt Franklin, 1865; reprint
1971), 2: 236; Increase Mather, A Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New-England, (Boston,
1676) in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment; Cotton Mather, Terribilia Dei:
Remarkable Judgments of God, on Several Sorts of Offenders, in Several Scores of Instances; among the
41 Clark, Eastern Frontier, 13; Cotton Mather, Magnalia Christi Americana: Or, The Ecclesiastical
42 Report of His Majesties Commissioners Concerning Maine, DHSM, 4: 298.
When fighting broke out throughout New England in 1675, the debate over frontier settlements and settlers’ morals changed from an abstract issue to a real crisis as thousands of settlers fled to safer areas. Frontier towns in a two-hundred-mile arc, from Northfield, Massachusetts to the coast of Maine, as well as interior settlements in Rhode Island and Plymouth, suffered raids, destruction, and abandonment. In an October 1675 letter to a London associate, Quaker Nathaniel Wharton described the implications of the Indians’ strategy of "compass[ing] the out-sides, and weakest Towns in the Country." The Indians "gather the People," he wrote, "and drive of[f] them in heaps, like Fishes before a Net and make them fly before them to the strongest Towns for Refuge...where they, for want, shall starve, and famish one another." Indians quickly recognized the value of destroying intrusive towns and driving their inhabitants back amongst their countrymen to spread fear and strain resources. In later wars, this was a well-founded strategy, which natives described as "Driv[ing] the pigs to the great sows Boston and New York, [where] they will suck her to death."

44 CSP, 13: 1282; William Hubbard wrote of Metacom’s hope “of driving all the Country before them to the Towns upon the Sea-coast” and of Mugg’s desire to “drive all the country before them” and burn Boston. Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 210, 213; for more on the rapid collapse of the frontier in King Philip’s, King William’s, and Queen Anne’s Wars see Leach, Flintlock and Tomahawk, 188-89; Edward Randolph: Including His Letters and Official Papers from the New England, Middle, and Southern Colonies in America, with Other Documents Relating Chiefly to the Vacating of the Royal Charter of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 1676-1703, ed. Robert Noxon Toppan (New York: Burt Franklin, 1967 [1898]), 292-99; CSP 13: 1393; CSP 26: 357; DHSM 3: 402-3.
The family of James Giles was among these “pigs” fleeing to the great sowBoston. In the spring of 1672, Giles settled his family along Muddy River, nearMerrymeeting Bay in Maine and not far from the home of his brother. WhenKing Philip’s War erupted in southern New England three years later, Giles andhis relations were forced to “forsake [their] house” and seek refuge in thefortified home of their neighbor, Samuel York. After a month in crowdedconditions, while Wabanaki Indians raided the settlers’ unprotected homes, Gilesand the other colonists removed for a time to the Clark and Lake tradingcompound on Arrowsic Island, and then to the home of the trader/merchantSylvanus Davis, where they remained for the winter and made springtime plansto return home. However, Giles’s intended homecoming never happened asMaine was engulfed in violence again in August 1676. When a party of“Eastward Indians” attacked Arrowsic Island, the Giles family and a dozensurvivors were “forced to fly for our lives in a canoe” to a nearby fishing island,“leav[ing] all ever we had, and glad that we could save our lives.” After apetition to the Massachusetts government for military assistance or removalwent unanswered, Giles and nearly three hundred neighbors from the Kennebecregion fled by fishing boats to Piscataqua, Salem, and Boston, “according as theyhad friends and relations.” 45

Most of these refugees, whether from coastal Maine or the Connecticut Valley, had little opportunity to gather their mobile estate for the remove. Samuel Gorton of Warwick, Rhode Island wrote of the confusion as settlers fled real or imagined attacks "like soules distracted, running hither and thither for shelter, and no where at ease." In their haste to leave, refugees left their homes, "goods and livelihood also." In the case of Northfield, Massachusetts in 1675, soldiers sent to escort the inhabitants to safety were unwilling to follow the slow pace of oxen-drawn wagons, piled with household goods, or driven livestock. Shaken by the site of the mutilated bodies of fallen soldiers on their march to Northfield, the soldiers forced the inhabitants to abandon everything but their horses. The people of Deerfield fared little better, though they carried some household goods with them. Surviving probate records for these refugees value their evacuated property at thirteen pounds one shilling, "and this was in a world where a horse and cow alone were worth five pounds, and a feather bed with pillows, blankets, and pillow case the same." Those like James Giles who fled as their homes burned carried even less and were "beginning the world again & att present are pore & low."  

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47 George Sheldon, A History of Deerfield, Massachusetts: The Times when the People By Whom It was Settled, Unsettled and Resettled, 2 vols. (Deerfield, MA: E.A. Hall, 1895), 1: 95-96.  
48 Richard Melvoin, New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 103-4, 313n.34; James Hovey, who died in the attack on Brookfield, Massachusetts in August 1675, had a similarly small estate left after the attack. His widow, Priscilla, returned an inventory of the estate to the Northampton Court in September 1675 valued at £15-10. The inventory included two steers, two small yearling steers, half share of a horse, one bed with furniture, a gun, a sword, and one pot. Louis E. Roy, Quabog Plantation alias Brookfield: A Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts Town (West Brookfield, MA: 1965), 173. See also Hubbard,
With the arrival of droves of destitute refugees like the Gileses, the rhetoric regarding frontier settlers took on a more virulent tone. In a very short time, the transient population of New England, always feared as idle, dangerous, and disorderly, increased beyond measure, and refugees became a symbol of chaos, failure, and proximity of the war. Many New Englanders never witnessed the violence of Indian attacks, experiencing the wars vicariously through higher taxes, stories of neighbors who served on military expeditions, and paper and pulpit. Refugees were ever-present and “living reminders of the destruction that could fall without warning.” Having fled under duress, refugees often reported stories that evolved and escalated in each retelling. Samuel Gorton claimed that people believed every “flying and false report; and not only so, but they will report it again...and by that means they become deceivers and tormenters one of another, by feares and jealousies.” Furthermore, they represented communities that had failed to defend themselves. Although many towns were laid out in a dispersed manner “for their convenyency of tillage” and therefore difficult to defend, by law they had a basic militia for protection. Therefore, the loss of towns and flight of inhabitants represented “unpardonable negligence” on the part of the refugees themselves. “The English can be blamed

49 Jenny Hale Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 142; see Morgan, Puritan Family, 146, regarding New England’s general fear of a mobile population, and the tradition of government “drives” to insure all singles or unconnected people resided in families.
for nothing but their Negligence and Security,” William Hubbard said of Casco Bay settlers, “in that having alarmed their Enemies, they stood not better upon their Guard.”52 As these towns disintegrated, other communities by necessity extended their militiamen to fill the void, and this rankled. Though writing of the citizens of Salmon Falls in 1690, Fitz-John Winthrop might have been voicing the opinion of many New Enganders when he said “such a people are miserable and cannot be saved.”53

For Puritan divines, it seemed that John Winthrop’s fears and predictions had come true. Interpreting the causes of King Philip’s War in a religious light, ministers and magistrates tended to place much of the blame on colonists from the outer tier of towns and settlements. Cotton Mather and other leaders would resurrect these same arguments to blame frontier settlers for subsequent wars.54 Referring to settlers “living in a single and scattering way, remote from townships and neighbourhood,” the Connecticut General Court declared that “the Providence of God seems to testify against such a way of living.” Not only did this manner of settlement leave people open to Indian assault, but it was “contrary to religion,” with frontier settlers liable “to degenerate to heathenish

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52 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2:103.
ignorance and barbarism." 55 God was quite aware of this, Cotton Mather claimed in 1707, evident in the number of "Unchurched Villages" that had been "utterly broken up, in the War that has been upon us, [while] those that have had Churches regularly formed in them, have generally been under a more sensible Protection of Heaven." 56 Minister and historian William Hubbard echoed this sentiment, declaring that those "scattering Plantations on our Border" in southern New England (Rhode Island) and especially to the Eastward, where many "were contented to live without, yea, desirous to shake off all Yoakes of Government, both sacred and civil." Having lived in the manner of Indians, they were "most deservedly ...left to be put under the Yoke and Power of the Indians themselves." 57 Similarly, Increase Mather saw outlying dwellers as driven by material greed, concerned with acquiring vast amounts of land, where their fathers had been "satisfied with one Acre for each person, as his propriety, and after that with twenty Acres for a Family." Even the holiest of frontier settlers did not escape this condemnation. Mather singled out Thomas Wakely of Maine as a case in point. After migrating to New England "for the Gospels sake" and becoming an esteemed member of a congregation, "old Wakely" moved his

55 CCR, 2: 328; the Massachusetts Council had said much the same in letter to the Secretary of State in April 1676, DHSM 6: 109. See also Mass. Records, 5: 59; see NPCR 5: 177 regarding Dartmouth's destruction due to "theire scattered way of living."
56 Mather, Frontier Well Defended, 9; Mather, Magnalia, 2: 660; Cotton borrowed liberally from his father, Increase Mather. See Mather, A Brief History of the Warr, in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 104.
57 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 2: 256-57; Mather echoed a favored refrain that there have been whole Plantations that have lived from year to year without any publick Invocation of the Name of God, and without his Word." Increase Mather An Earnest Exhortation to the Inhabitants of New-England (Boston, 1676) in Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 175.
family to Casco Bay, "where [there] was no Church, nor Instituted Worship." The extended Wakely clan numbered among the first casualties when Abenaki Indians swept the region in September 1675. William Hubbard claimed that Wakely had meant to move back, but "he was arrested by the Sons of Violence." Investigating the remains of the Wakely homestead on September 10, 1675, Lt. George Ingersol of Casco reported six dead and three missing. Wakey and his wife "were halfe in, and halfe out of the house neer halfe burnt. Their owne Son was shot thorugh the body, and also his head dashed in pieces. This young mans Wife was dead, her head skinned, she was big with Child, two Children having their heads dashed in pieces, and laid by one another with their bellys to the ground." Having abandoned the first planters' vision of compact Christian communities, delayed the establishment of congregations, and lived "like profane Indians without any Family prayer," all for the sake of "land and elbow-room," these settlers had, according to Mather, violated the Fifth Commandment, committed filial impiety, and were therefore justly liable to God's judgment.59

With a majority of refugees coming from the very communities condemned by ministers, governments, and citizens alike for having "broken filial ties of congregant to patriarch-minister, citizen to magistrate," second


generation to first generation, their reception by the rest of New England seemed questionable. However, it was impossible to ignore the economic and military services that frontier dwellers provided the region. For Massachusetts Bay to fulfill its charter and survive, it required great quantities of lumber from the coast of Maine as well as the products of its fisheries. Without the loathsome frontiersmen, this would be impossible. On a smaller scale, expansion was necessary for the economic well-being of growing families. Additionally, until their towns were overwhelmed, these same refugees also protected more established areas. Cotton Mather spoke of religion as a figurative hedge protecting Christians from heathen Indians, but settlers and their communities were a literal, if porous, bulwark to invasion. As King Philip’s War spread north and west in summer 1675, John Pynchon reminded John Winthrop, Jr., of the sacrifices made by his neighbors in the exposed town of Springfield. “We being as it were your frontiers and a security to you being now next [to] the enemy,” he wrote to Winthrop, and “you may safely do what we cannot.” Various colonies publicly recognized the defensive value of frontier communities.

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60 Ibid., 64.
by offering land grants in unsettled areas to veterans and their descendants, but only after the shock of King Philip’s War. 64

Even discounting the military and economic value of frontier settlers, luckier colonists recognized that refugees had not packed up and left their homes on a whim to enjoy the hospitality of their more “civilized” brethren or to see the wondrous sights of Marblehead and Boston. Instead, they left only when remaining behind would be a fruitless waste of lives. As the residents of Lancaster wrote to the General Court of their abandonment of the town in February 1676, it was “better [to] save our Lives then lost Life & Estat both.” 65

More importantly, these colonists from the outer tiers were not the half-heathens of Mather’s descriptions. They were “parts & members of the whole” and belonged to the Little Commonwealth of family and friends. 66 New England’s interior or frontier towns were often extensions of older established towns, where children had settled on unoccupied and undivided town grants further inland, or entire segments of towns picked up and moved. In these removes, they necessarily left family and friends behind, and very few people could not claim a relative on the frontier. Even arch-critic Increase Mather had family in the borderlands—he his nephew Samuel was minister for Deerfield, and

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John Williams, a subsequent preacher in the same town, was an in-law of the Mather clan.67 Thus, when towns suffered attack and subsequent abandonment during King Philip’s War, most displaced settlers tended to seek refuge, as Capt. Thomas Wheeler noted of the Brookfield refugees, “where they had lived before their planting or settling down there, or where they had relations to receive and entertain them.” Retracing the steps of their migration to outlying areas, refugees retreated to previous abodes or, in some cases, to the large haven towns and commercial centers of Boston, Charlestown, and Salem.68 Often their movements were in response to letters from relations and friends, who offered to shelter their families or take in their children.69

The shade of John Winthrop must have approved as a general spirit of Christianity seemed to prompt New England’s governments and people to sympathize with fleeing settlers. During a 1690 wave of refugees, Cotton Mather argued that “when a Time of Distress and Danger calleth for it,” colonists must

67 “Diary of Increase Mather,” in MHSP, 2nd ser. 13 (Boston, 1900), 400; Haefeli and Sweeney, Captors and Captives, 31.
be prepared to help those in need, "tho' we have no more than Two Mites to give, we should part with more than One of them."70 Massachusetts judge Samuel Sewall commented, "We are sensibly to remember those who suffer adversity, as being our selves also in the body, liable to the same pains and sufferings."71 Thus, even colonists of the most disreputable character found refuge. The Massachusetts Bay General Court extended an invitation of shelter to the exile Roger Williams, as long as he refrained from "visiting any of his different opinions in matters of religion."72 Even the "outlaw" John Bonython of Maine, the epitome of Mather's image of frontier dwellers, found shelter and aid in the Bay. Over the course of his "life of debauchery and outlawry," Bonython had fathered an illegitimate child, threatened "to slay any person that should lay hands on him," tore down his brother-in-law's house, refused to submit to the Massachusetts government when the Bay acquired Maine in 1652, labeled the local minister "a base priest, a base knave and a base fellow," and had finally had a bounty placed on his head. Yet he was not denied shelter, though granted it was in unorthodox Marblehead.73

70 Hubbard, Happiness of a People, 61; Cotton Mather, The Present State of New-England (Boston: Samuel Green, 1690), 8-9, 12.
72 MA 10:233.
73 "John Bonython," NEHGR vol. 38 (1884): 54-55 and NEHGR vol. 34 (1880): 99; a surviving epitaph describing John Bonython sums up his character. "Here lies Bonython the Sagamore of Saco; He lived a rogue and died a knave and went to Hobbowocko," Hobbowocko being a native spirit that Puritans equated with the devil.
Thousands of less infamous refugees found temporary refuge among their extended kin network and with friends. After their escape from Damariscove Island, John Giles and his family arrived in Boston on August 18, 1676 and began a peripatetic life that would last for six years. Giles repeatedly called on the passing hospitality of family and friends, all while attempting to settle and provide for his family. In Boston and possibly Braintree, where the family had lived for a year, the Gileses enjoyed the shelter of “good friends” for seven weeks. But with winter coming and the city “being very full of people...and [with] no hope of returning again to our former habitation,” Giles “thought it time to look out for some other place of settlement.” A friend suggested they migrate to the Long Island community of Southold, settled by New Englanders. Indeed, Giles’s brother Thomas may have settled there in 1676. Armed with a letter of introduction, Giles bargained for passage on a vessel and the family

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departed Boston. James’s friend, Richard Brown, welcomed the refugee family into his home, where for the next year he and his neighbors “provided for us,” wrote Giles, “like a father, until we were able to shift for ourselves.” Taking leave of Brown’s hospitality in October 1677, the Giles family moved into an abandoned house near a small plot of land purchased by James. He planned to farm the plot, but “after some improvements made upon it, I found the land very poor and barren, and no meadow to be got for my cattle.” After scrimping for nearly a year and a half, James “began to dislike the place.” Again the family would move in hopes of restoring their lives. They resided with a succession of friends and acquaintances, who provided shelter, sustenance, and employment before the Gileses finally settled on the Raritan River in New Jersey in 1682.75

The frequent movement of the Giles family demonstrates that offers of refuge did not equate to open-armed and open-ended relief, nor did towns or colonial governments assume the greater share of supporting those in need. While Puritan ministers called on their flocks to aid the destitute, their rhetoric reminded listeners that they owed this help to select people. Cotton Mather may have asked each Christian to “Venture his All,” but this effort was intended to help the “People of God,” or “Member[s] in the Church-Mystical,” phrases he and other ministers repeated continuously.76 The Connecticut Council echoed this in official policy in May 1676, calling for Connecticut residents to “extend our

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75 Giles, True Account, 113-17.
compassion” to “very many of our dear friends the Lord’s people in that Colony of New Plimouth and elsewhere.” Charity remained a duty among family and friends and a responsibility to “rightful” members of communities, temporal or spiritual. Furthermore, ministers claimed that traditional charity would “pay all our debts, and defray all our publick charges.” William Hubbard argued that individual responsibility, family assistance, and church donations would “relieve all our distressed friends, [and] it would answer all the necessities of Church and State. This would feed all our poor, and clothe all our naked Brethren, and support all our Widows and Fatherless ones.” Hubbard reminded his listeners that the primitive Christians had experienced the worst of adversity, yet “their Treasury [was] never wasted.” Clearly, Hubbard exaggerated the power of charity, but the tradition of low-level, exclusive, and targeted aid would remain the dominant means of aiding refugees.

Church congregations played an important role in relieving refugees. This is not surprising since New Englanders viewed the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century wars with Indians as spiritual as well as physical conflicts, and refugees suffered both because of and on the behalf of the One True God. Puritan ministers frequently referred to the conflicts as “Wars of the Lord,” with the Saints struggling against the devil’s heathen minions and their papist allies. Furthermore, the basic tenets of Christianity demanded charity

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77 CCR, 2: 446-47.
78 Hubbard, Happiness of a People, 61-62.
79 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1:12.
and compassion, sympathy being, as Samuel Sewell noted, "the lowest payment Christians can make to their afflicted friends."\textsuperscript{80}

Congregations backed sympathetic prayers with direct assistance to some refugees, such as the people of Brookfield, who were "plentifully relieved out of the Church Stock" after fleeing on foot to Boston.\textsuperscript{81} Noteworthy refugees enjoyed warm welcomes, particularly redeemed captives, whose stories provided verbal ammunition for ministers. Mary Rowlandson, whose Lancaster home had been destroyed in February 1676, enjoyed near-celebrity status as the first captive redeemed during King Philip's War. Upon Mary's release, she and her husband, Joseph, were "kindly entertained" in several homes, and for nearly three months, the Rev. Thomas Shepard and his wife of Charlestown were as "Father and Mother" to the couple. Other congregations sheltered them as they traveled in attempts to reunite their scattered family, and on several occasions Joseph Rowlandson filled empty pulpits as they passed through, "for which [congregations] rewarded him many fold." Boston's South Church even rented the house of James Whitcomb for the Rowlandson family for nearly a year, and Mary spoke of furnishing her home through the love and benevolence of "Christian-friends."\textsuperscript{82} John Williams, minister of Deerfield during the devastating 1704 raid, had a similar experience when he returned from captivity.

\textsuperscript{80} Samuel Sewall to Dorothy Rider, 6 April 1688 in "Letter Book of Samuel Sewall" \textit{MHSC} \textit{6th} ser. 1: 79-80; see also Thomas Noyes to Governor of Massachusetts, 19 June 1691, \textit{DHSM} \textit{5}: 257-58.


In his captivity narrative, he praised God for “opening the hearts of many...to
give for our supplies in our needy state.”

More commonly church assistance came through collections taken during
services or donations gathered from the broader community. On subsequent
Sundays in August 1675, the First and Second Churches of Boston and a
congregation in Charlestown collected £69, £68, and £78 respectively “for the
distressed Families relief.” Cotton Mather’s congregation did the same for “the
poor Inhabitants in our Frontier Towns in the East” in 1691. As custodians of
these funds, ministers converted the cash into bushels of wheat or Indian corn.
Sympathetic churches in England and Ireland occasionally responded as well,
with small donations of “old Cloathes” and a few pounds in currency, though
these contributions were mixed in with a steady stream of charity during
peacetime. Frequently, ministers wrote letters of appeal to provincial
governments, which tended to delegate such “charity drives” to the
congregations in their jurisdiction. In response to a plea from John Kingsley,
resident of devastated Rehoboth, as well as the pressure of Boston ministers, the
Connecticut Council called on its churches to solicit donations of food, collect the

83 John Williams, *The Redeemed Captive Returning to Zion*, in Vaughan, ed, *Puritans Among the
84 [Saltonstall], *Present State of New England*, 38, 42.
85 “Diary of Cotton Mather 1681-1708,” *MHSC*, 7th ser. 7 (Boston, 1911), 137; “Diary of Samuel
Sewall, 1674-1729,” *MHSC* 5th ser. 5 (Boston: 1878), 352.
86 Jane Hooke to Increase Mather, 8 Aug. 1677; Hooke to Mather 27 June 1678; Hooke to Mather, 5
March 1679; Hooke to Mather, 7 April 1679 in *MHSC* 4th ser. 8: 261-25 and passim; Cotton Mather,
*Memoirs of the Life of the Late Reverend Increase Mather, D.D.* (London: John Clark and Richard Hett,
1725), 30; Benjamin Woodbridge to the Bishop of London, 2 April 1690, *CSP* 13: 810.
produce, and ship it to those in need.\textsuperscript{87} Because Connecticut suffered little in the way of material damage in the Indian wars, its congregations would contribute grain on a recurring basis in later wars. Cotton Mather and Samuel Sewell both commended their Connecticut cousins for their “very \textit{liberal Collection} of many hundreds of Bushels of corn, for the \textit{Relief} of the Poor, in the \textit{Northern Towns}” of Massachusetts. \textsuperscript{88}

While any aid was beneficial to refugees, the relief provided by church congregations was limited in scope. The collection of £215 pounds by three churches in August 1675 represented a generous donation on the part of the congregants. But such funds, and the food they represented, would not go far to feed the eventual thousands of people who fled their homes. A 1714 court dispute between Josiah Littlefield and Josiah Winn, both of Wells, Maine, illustrates the annual cost to feed New Englanders. When Littlefield was captured in a 1708 Indian raid, he wrote (through French intermediaries) and appointed Winn the guardian of his four parentless children. Upon Littlefield’s return from captivity two years later, Winn demand eight pounds per year for each child for “diet washing mending & attendance.” His itemized bill of

\textsuperscript{87} John Kingsley to Joseph Haynes, 4 May 1676 and Meeting of Council, Hartford, 26 May 1676 in CCR, 2: 445-47, 456-57.
\textsuperscript{88} “\textit{Diary of Cotton Mather},” 223; “\textit{Letter Book of Samuel Sewall},” 5-8, 181-87; Mather repeated this in \textit{Magnalia Christi Americana}, 676; for church collections in Plymouth in the 1690s, see Church, \textit{History of Philip’s War}, 198-200.
expenditures, later presented in court, indicates rather frugal spending.\textsuperscript{89} Thus, the August 1675 donations by the Boston and Charlestown churches represent the yearly cost of sustenance for only twenty-seven people. One New Englander admitted that needy refugees “are not likely to receive much except a few provisions bought with the money collected in the churches.”\textsuperscript{90} In addition, a considerable portion of these food donations fed garrison soldiers and inhabitants of the same towns sheltering refugees. This became such an issue that during King William’s War, Samuel Sewall insisted to the commander of Kittery, Maine, that his latest shipment of corn “must not be bestowed on the Garrison soldiers.”\textsuperscript{91}

Refugees also had to compete indirectly with captives for these limited church funds, which were frequently used to redeem white prisoners among the Indians. This was not a cheap proposition—the redemption of Mary Rowlandson and one of her children were redeemed for £27.\textsuperscript{92} Churches were more likely to take collections to redeem captives than to feed refugees, and often these collections secured more funds than those targeting the needy. In November 1691, Cotton Mather’s Boston congregation collected £44 to relieve refugees as well as “the poor Inhabitants in our Frontier Towns.” Three months

\textsuperscript{90} David Jeffreys to John Usher, Boston, 19 Nov. 1691, in CSP 13: 1611.
\textsuperscript{91} “Letter Book of Sewell,” 184.
\textsuperscript{92} Rowlandson, Sovereignty and Goodness of God, 162-64.
later, the same church collected more than £62 in a single service “for the Redemption of our Captives in the hands of the Indians.”

Ministers further restricted the dispensation of this already limited church relief. While ministers preached the necessity of charity for all, it seems they may have directed this aid toward more “deserving” people—the Saints. In the midst of the fighting, religious leaders continued to condemn “troublemakers” that might need such aid. Increase Mather, William Hubbard, Samuel Sewall, and others blamed the wars on sinful frontier dwellers, the idle poor (whose ranks many refugees joined unwillingly), and religious dissidents such as Quakers and Anabaptists. Cotton Mather would later write that God might be pleased by the charity of Boston’s congregations, but their “daily bounties to the needy, all your subscriptions to send the bread of life” went to “places that are perishing in wickedness.” Public and private correspondence pointed to selective distribution of church donations. In 1676, the Rev. Samuel Wakeman of Fairfield, Connecticut wrote of his congregation’s willingness to “contribute...to the releife of the distressed saints (ministers & their children in speciall).” Increase Mather’s aunt, Jane Hooke, send frequent aid from England, which she indicated was also for “those poor ministers.” She seemed pleased with his account of the distribution, not “dar[ing] suspect your care to whom to do

93 “Diary of Cotton Mather,” 137.  
95 Mather, Magnalia, 1: 102.
besto[w] what the benefactors... send." 

John Williams wrote of Boston’s “unfeigned love and charity to them that are of the same family and household of faith.” 

Connecticut’s Council expressed a similar focus for that colony’s church assistance, intending it for their “dear friends the Lord’s people...of New Plimouth” and “the poore saints in their afflictive bereavemts.” 

Indeed, ministers and governments demanded strict accountability for church donations. Samuel Sewall requested that the military commanders of Dover “favour me with a few lines describing the Persons to whom the Corn is given.” 

This does not necessarily prove that Sewell and others denied church aid to the “non-Elect,” and it may have been strictly a matter of bookkeeping. However, a 1676 donation from overseas arrived with stipulations that it be distributed to “the poor distressed by the late war” regardless of differences in religious ordinances, jurisdiction, and, surprisingly, race. The donors had heard that Baptists “have been severely dealth withal in New England” and seemed to suspect that they would receive little aid unless directed.

The widespread devastation of three successive wars also forced New England’s colonial governments to take an interest in refugees. While the degree of provincial participation in public relief certainly grew as a result of these

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96 Samuel Wakeman to Increase Mather, 27 Sept. 1677; Jane Hooke to Increase Mather 27 June 1678; Hooke to Mather, 14 April 1681, in MHSC 4th ser. 8: 262, 264-65, 585-86. 
97 Williams, Redeemed Captive, 225-26. 
99 Samuel Sewell to William Vaughan, 6 April 1697, “Letter Book of Samuel Sewall,” 181-82; Plymouth required “a particular account from each person, with orders of advice how it may be disposed of.” Church, History of Philip’s War, 198-200. 
conflicts, it never supplanted the tradition of family and friends as the primary means of assisting those in need. The responsibilities of coordinating New England’s defenses took priority, and government funds went, understandably, toward soldiers and fortifications in far greater sums than to displaced inhabitants. Thus, most provincial aid for refugees tended to come in the form of declarations and threats that bolstered defenses and protected town interests rather than succored the needy.

The rapid spread of violence during the summer of 1675 forced New England governments to act quickly to prevent the complete collapse of the frontier. The first flood of refugees came as inhabitants of Middleborough, Brookfield, Squakeag (Northfield), and Deerfield abandoned their towns as did a large number of prominent families of Falmouth, Maine. Military commanders such as Samuel Appleton in the Connecticut Valley and Richard Waldron of Maine attempted to stem the outflow of potential soldiers with local restrictions on movement, begging the governor to act. Recognizing the importance of this outer tier of towns as a buffer for the heart of the colonies, the Massachusetts General Court ordered frontier residents to stand their ground unless licensed to depart. Settlers who fled and failed to return to their homes,

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101 Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 262; Order of Richard Waldron to inhabitants of Falmouth, 6 Oct. 1675, DHSM 4: 348-49.
102 Samuel Appleton to Inhabitants of Springfield, Wethersfield, Northampton, Hadley, and Hatfield, 12 Nov. 1675, in MA 68: 54a; in Dec. 1675, the General Court made a specific point to restrict occupants of Wells to the town, which included a large number of refugees from the Eastward, Order of Council, 9 Dec. 1675, DHSM 6: 103-04; the General Court reiterated the order, specifically for residents of the eastern parts, in May 1676. See Mass. Records, 5: 81; DHSM 4: 348-49; military commanders also ordered the abandonment of a few untenable towns.
and those who would flee in the future without official sanction, faced forfeiture
of "theire interest in that place for the defraying the charge of the garrison
souldiers." The Court later tacked on a £20 fine to this already stiff penalty.103

Bearing the brunt of fighting in King William's and Queen Anne's Wars,
Massachusetts would renew a version of this law over thirty times between 1676
and 1715.104 Plymouth's Council of War imposed a similar law, ordering
inhabitants to "abide in each towne of this collonie to which hee belongs" or
forfeit "the whole p[er]sonall estate of each one that shall soe doe to the colonies
use." The government further empowered magistrates to seize anyone
contemplating flight and to confiscate their estates and any boats or carts used in
the attempt.105 Connecticut also required its citizens to remain in place, except
for a few outliers.106 With land virtually worthless once overrun by Indians or
within their striking range—it could not be improved or sold—threats of estate
confiscation might seem to lack teeth. But the loss of "interest" in a township
meant forfeiting the community rights of an inhabitant, leaving refugees
landless, homeless, and lacking a critical part of their assistance network.107

Only Rhode Island absolved its inhabitants of any fault for fleeing to safety.108

103 Mass. Records, 5: 51, 65; the General Court attempted to enforce this decree, in part, in Nov.
1675, when it ordered any residents of Mendon who had fled after an Indian attack to return to
their town.
104 Mass. Acts & Resolves, 1: 194-95, 236, 293, 311, 402-3, 474, 491, 520, 552, 566, 585-86, 605, 612,
639, 657, 674, 696.
105 Meeting of the Council of War, 29 Feb. 1676, NPCR, 5: 185.
107 DHSM 3:392, 402-03.
108 RICR, 2: 533-34.
Clearly, governments wanted stout frontier outposts (with some dependents withdrawn, if necessary), and refugees would not find a warm welcome.

If threats to their estates could not keep colonists in their beleaguered towns, colonies hoped to incorporate refugees into their defenses. Offering a job to "young men & single persons...that are out of employment, & not capeable to provide for themselves" could be considered a form of state aid to the needy. The Massachusetts General Court sought men to fill garrisons and "issue forth to the damnifying of the enmy," and the largest pool of potential soldiers "fitt for such imploy" were "those persons who have lately deserted their habitations."

Magistrates ordered military leaders to identify and press into service any men who had abandoned their towns and use them in expeditions into their home territory or reinforce garrisons as close as was feasible. John Stebbins of Deerfield was one such refugee pressed for service. Stebbins had already served for over a year as a volunteer in "the wars of the Lord, & my country," and was likely the only Englishman to escape unwounded from the debacle at Bloody Brook in 1675. John was working as a carpenter in Cambridge and Muddy River when the constable "came & pressed me for a garrison souldier for Hadley." Having left town a week before the summons, Stebbins faced a £4 fine, though he managed to win an appeal and secure his discharge.

Pressed men like Stebbins also harvested grain, herded livestock, and cleared

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110 MA 69:208; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, 1: 109; see also Petition of John Liby Sr. to Governor and Council, March 1677, DHSM 6: 160-61.
brush along roadways to prevent ambush, all vital military tasks, and all
garnering a daily wage of eighteen pence. As with the act to prevent the
desertion of the frontier, the Massachusetts government renewed legislation to

Money for unemployed refugees certainly helped, but this was second-
hand aid at best, an unintended consequence as colonial governments directed
their war efforts. Furthermore, this was not an offer that men could refuse, on
penalty of hefty fines. Since refugees usually lacked estates to penalize,
magistrates instead ordered the seizure of "such delinquents."\footnote{Mass. Records, 5: 81, 144-45.} Matthias Puffer
of Mendon faced impressment in late 1675. After his wife and eldest son died in
the July 1675 attack on the town, Puffer and numerous inhabitants fled to
Braintree and Weymouth. The General Court ordered "all such persons that
have already quitted their habitations at Mendon" to return and garrison the
town. Though he briefly returned with ammunition and supplies, he ignored the
order to stay. The Court accused Puffer of absenting himself "to the
discouragement of those that remaine." Threatened with seizure of his meager
estate as well as his person, he argued that he could better support his surviving
children by laboring in Braintree, not with the military. This became a moot
point when Mendon was finally abandoned in November of that year. In other instances, the Massachusetts General Court ordered the entire surviving male population of abandoned towns to assume military duties. Only two days after the destruction of Groton in March 1676, the Council ordered the men of that town, Lancaster, and Marlborough to settle in other Middlesex County towns “for their strengthening.”

Drafting refugees served the governments’ political needs as well. Towns in more protected areas of the colonies frequently complained of sending their sons to defend territory abandoned by its inhabitants, particularly in Maine. William Hathorn, commanding the Essex county militiamen garrisoning Wells, Maine in 1676, complained that the local inhabitants and those driven there by Indians had little to do. In a letter to the governor of Massachusetts, he argued that the locals “might better be employed there then many of ours, who have families at home & a Considerable Charge.” Even exposed frontier towns provided soldiers for Maine based on county levees, and they felt their men should remain at home to defend their own interests. Richard Waldron, commanding in Portsmouth, asked that “all the Men that are come to us...from the deserted & conquered Eastern Country should be ordered to the Places that are left on their own side of the River, that so o[u]rs may be recalled to their

113 MA 68: 110; NEHGR 22(1866): 462.
114 Samuel A. Green, Groton During the Indian Wars (Groton, MA: John Wilson and Son, University Press, 1883), 39-41.
115 William Hathorn to Governor and General Court, Wells, 2 Oct. 1676, in DHSM 6: 128-30.
severall Townes." Impressing refugees for "the publicque safety" had the added windfall of removing unwanted people from towns where they sheltered. Waves of refugees had heightened New England's long uneasiness with idleness, "a sin of Sodom." Early in King Philip's War, the Massachusetts General Court identified the sins that had brought God's wrath upon the colonies, and the "loose and sinful" behavior of young, single, and idle people ranked high on the list. The magistrates went so far as to order the constable of Boston to inspect families and to "present a lyst of the names of all idle persons to the selectmen, who are hereby strictly required to proceed with them as already the law directs." It seems that in its quest for security, the General Court was determined that refugees would pay, either with their lives or their estates.

Colonists who wisely chose the latter were further hampered in their quest for aid by colonial proclamations designed to protect town interests. Under the 1639 Act for Regulating Townships, an individual could acquire inhabitant status and rights (to include charity) in any town after living there for three months without official notice and warning out by selectmen. Noticing the overwhelming burden that refugees might become based on this law, the Massachusetts General Court dashed any hopes refugees had of obtaining new resident status in their chosen haven. In November 1675, the Court declared that persons "forced from theire habitations & repaire to other plantations for releife,

shall not, by virtue of their residence in said plantations they repair unto, be accounted or reputed inhabitants thereof, or imposed on them, according to law, title Poore,” thus denying them potential town assistance. In effect, Massachusetts issued a blanket “warning out” for every refugee.118 At the same time, the government expected refugees to continue to contribute through taxes and service. Rather than provide relief to refugees, the government demanded that they “stand, in respect of charges and duty to the publicke, in the same capacitie with the propper inhabitants amongst whom they make their aboade or residence.”119 Thus, the government expected refugees to fulfill the duties of inhabitants while denying them the accompanying rights.

On the surface, the same Massachusetts General Court act in 1675 that denied refugees the legal status of “poor” also seemed to declare the colony's willingness to help bear the cost of supporting displaced persons. Historians Douglas Leach, William Black, and Carl Bridenbaugh have used this to argue that, in Massachusetts at least, “the major responsibility for providing financial aid for needy refugees was assumed by the colony treasury.” Black argues that this represents the beginning of large-scale public relief. Bridenbaugh even claims that refugees boarded with relatives at the expense of towns and

118 Ibid., 5: 64.
119 Ibid., 5: 78, my emphasis; John and Robert Blood were forced to pay ten colony rates for both their abandoned residence at Billerica and their haven town, Concord. They eventually recovered the excess payment through court action. Mass. Records, 5:188.
indirectly the colony. However, these interpretations ignore or dismiss a vital clause in the act. "[I]n such case, and where necessity requires, (by reason of inability of relations, &c,) they shall be supplied out of the publicke treasury."

Furthermore, the town selectmen were ordered to "inspect this matter; and doe likewise carefully provide, that such men or weomen may be so imployed, and children disposed of, that, as much as may be, publick charge may be avoy[led]." This short and apparently overlooked clause demonstrates that the General Court recognized the traditional hierarchy of relief—personal responsibility through work, extended family networks, followed by towns of legal residency—and sought to reinforce, not supplant, it. Only when people were completely destitute, had exhausted the resources (and patience) of their network of kin, friends, and neighbors, and could find absolutely no work would the colony extend a hand. Thus, the government ensured that the burden of support remained at the lowest level possible.

The Massachusetts declaration cracked the door to possible aid for refugees, but the burden of fighting repeated Indian wars emptied provincial

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121 Mass. Records, 5: 64, my emphasis.

122 In later years, provincial governments provided towns with additional tools that proved useful when refugees became an issue again. These laws extended the period of untroubled residency before becoming an inhabitant to one year, gave selectmen and overseers of the poor the right to inspect and regulate idle persons (forcing them to work, farming out children), and authorized selectmen to suppress vagabonds and "Other Lewd, Idle and Disorderly Persons." Though these laws did not specifically target refugees, town leaders could apply them if necessary. Mass. Acts & Resolves, 1: 67, 378-81, 451-53, 536, 538; see also Nellis, Records of the Boston Overseers of the Poor, 19-53.
treasuries at an alarming rate. Six months into King Philip's War, the Massachusetts General Court met in special session and declared the colony's inability to prosecute the war properly due to a shortage of funds. Offering public and common lands as security, the magistrates pledged to repay "all & every sume or summes disbursed & lent for the use of the publicque." Three months later, with Philip's resistance waning and violence in Maine escalating, the Court still found it difficult to raise money, provisions, and clothing to keep its forces in the field. Again, the magistrates called on inhabitants "to give, or lead, or both, the country such a summe of mony & provisions as may helpe to discharge the publick necessary debts contracted & contracting in the management of this warre." With the General Court struggling to maintain an army to fight Indians, any provincial aid to refugees would be conditionally granted, narrowly targeted, and limited in amount.

Provincial aid to refugees often came by the indirect means of tax abatements to frontier towns or because of services rendered, not by virtue of their indigent status. Particularly during the longer wars of the 1690s and early 1700s, frontier towns struggled to support their own inhabitants, garrison soldiers, and any refugees among them, all while trying to maintain a "normal" life under a near-constant state of siege. James Emery of Kittery might have been

123 Mass. Records, 5:71, 96; Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island all declared their inability to fund the war effort during King William's War, claiming the cost to guard frontiers and seaports "very insupportable." In each case, governments called for general, voluntary contributions by the citizenry. The overthrow of royal governments in New England contributed to this, with caretaker administrations lacking the authority or force to collect taxes. See DHSM 5: 300-1, 303, 304, 309.
describing any frontier community when he petitioned the Massachusetts
governor and Council in August 1695 for a remission of taxes. Emery and his
neighbors had been driven from their homes to the safety of garrisons and
watched as Indians destroyed much of their stock. Due to “Watching, Warding,
[and] Frequent Alarms,” they accomplished little work, and the people “daily
grow more & more feeble and deplorable...Walking and working with fear,
Trembling & [in] Jeopardy of life.” In addition, the inhabitants fed the garrison
soldiers out of their own stocks, relieved the “Several Poor in Our Own Towns,”
and assisted a growing number of refugees from outlying areas. “Needing rather
to have something given to Support Us, than to have anything taken from Us,”
Emery pleaded for a reduction in rates. However, he did not ask for
reimbursement or credit for supporting refugees, but for assistance in
maintaining a minister “so they may not turn heathen but that the Poor may
have the Gospel preached among them.” The governor and Council remitted ten
pounds from that year’s taxes “if they can be supplied with a minister.”124

While this may appear as an accounting slight-of-hand — funds (or credit)
were still going to towns that supported refugees — the Massachusetts
government considered preventing “a famine of hearing the word of God” a
critical part of the war effort. After all, the lack of the gospel on the frontier was
a significant complaint of Puritan leaders before King Philip’s War as well as a

124 Cpt. John Floyd to Governor and Council, 27 Jan. 1691; Petition of James Emery to Governor
supposed source of God's anger. In their petition, Brookfield's inhabitants claimed, "It is an Intollerable burden, to continue as we have done without the preaching of the word." God commanded and the people desired to hear the "Instructions, rebukes and encouragements of the word" to avoid "the darkness & deadness of our own hearts, together with the many Snares that are in the world," particularly so near the frontier. Reverend Ebenezer Pemberton would later remark to the Massachusetts Assembly that such "aid" to frontier dwellers was "not Charity but Justice."126

During every war, successful petitions from frontier communities highlighted the maintenance of ministers, not reimbursement for refugee costs, as the primary reason for tax relief.127 Massachusetts granted many of these petitions, as well as others, for the cost of supplying soldiers, repairing fortifications, or making snowshoes for winter scouting parties.128 But the government refused others, such as Kittery's petition two years after their successful 1695 attempt. The selectmen of Kittery pled their weakened state, inability to produce enough food to survive, and "the maintainance of others who are not capable of getting th[ei]r necessary susten[an]ce, as some aged some

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126 Ebenezer Pemberton, A Sermon Preached in the Audience of the General Assembly at the Publick Lecture in Boston November 1st, 1705 (Boston: R. Green, 1706), 30.
maimed and severall whose living (further toward the East) the Enemy has
ruined wch makes or own Town taxes not a little burthensome." Clearly, they
were sheltering refugees, but in this case the Council refused "in the
Circumstances of the province and the Helps afforded to sd Town." Kittery
would pay its entire rate. Six months later, Kittery appealed again. While
difficult conditions featured in the petition, this time the selectmen returned to
maintenance of the ministry as the central argument for aid.129

While refugees were liable for rates within their haven towns, they did not
always benefit from the indirect aid of tax abatement as did legal residents. In
October 1676, the General Court offered tax relief to eight frontier towns "for the
enterteyning of garrison soldiers." Springfield, which continued to shelter
many refugees from the Connecticut Valley, featured prominently, receiving one
hundred fifty pounds in abatements. This appears a boon to needy refugees who
fled from and to Springfield. But the Court declared that "They who have
deserted the toune, & not runn the hazard wth their neighbors, not being to be
allowed any share in the abovesaid abatement."130

While Massachusetts pushed responsibility for refugees to the lowest
level, the government honored its pledge to help once assured that all possible
alternatives were exhausted. The Court turned down several petitions for aid
when the resources of relatives or towns remained untapped. Benjamin Janes of

129 Petition of the Selectmen of Kittery; 13 April 1697; Petition of the Selectmen of Kittery, Sept.
1697, DHSM 5: 482-84, 490-92.
Northfield, Massachusetts had been driven from his home at age three, only to have it happen again in 1704. In the raid on his home, Janes lost three children and most of his possessions, while his wife suffered a head wound and scalping. Hannah survived her injuries, but in 1707 she still lay under a doctor’s care. “So impoverisht that he is unable to satisfie the surgeons,” Benjamin appealed to the governor and Council. Though they considered Janes “an object of charitie,” the magistrates referred him to “the charitie of the good people in the towns of Branford, Guilford, Kilinsworth, and Saybrook.” Onna Thomas, “a poor Widow Woman driven in from the Eastern Parts in the late War,” had more luck than Janes. During Queen Anne’s War, she had sought shelter in Lynn. In February 1718, after four or more years on her own, she stood in need of aid. “Not appearing that she belongs to any Town, from whom she can have Support,” Thomas appealed to the General Court and received forty shillings in aid in February and another five pounds in October. Two years later, Lynn attempted to collect another three pounds for Onna’s expenses. Apparently, the Court’s charity had its limits, and the petition “Pass’d in the Negative.”

Usually the General Court reimbursed towns for expenses related to refugees rather than address direct petitions. As the destination for displaced people lacking any other opportunities, Boston and the Essex County seaports received the bulk of these refunds. Various historians have commented on the

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growth of the urban poor in New England in the early eighteenth century and
the corresponding cost of charity, some of which was connected to colonial wars
and population displacement. However, the bulk of "new" resident poor who
clamored for aid were not frontier refugees but widows and orphans of men who
died in expeditions against French Canada. Furthermore, historian Gary Nash
demonstrates that poor relief did not unduly burden any New England
community, even at the height of King Philip's and King William's Wars.
Although there was "widespread deprivation in the seaports," town
expenditures for poor relief remained manageable, and requests for
reimbursement under the 1676 Massachusetts declaration were few in number.
Even during the 1690s, "Boston needed less than one hundred pounds per year
for poor relief."133 This is not to say that refugees were not a burden on towns
and the colonies, but the portion of relief provided by the state was minimal—
responsibility remained with individuals, families, and legal residence.

Other historians have cited the general cost of charity as evidence of the
burden of refugees on towns and colonies, and this often due to a misreading of
the sources. For example, the Boston town records frequently mention
assessments for the broad and inclusive purposes of "reliefe of the poor and the
defraying other necessaries arising in and for Sd Town." In 1707, Boston
assessed £1,300 using this same justification. Ellis Ames and the nineteenth-

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century editors of the Massachusetts Acts and Resolves argue that this huge expense (intended to represent overall expenses for Boston) gives “some idea of the burden to which Boston was subjected in supporting refugees from the frontiers.” However, when granting minimal assistance to refugees, town and colonial governments were careful to differentiate between expenditures for their own people and refugees. Of the £1,300 for 1707, Boston spent only £31-3-8 to support “sundry aged and infirm persons of the eastern parts...driven upon them through the calamity of the war.” Although the Boston overseers of the poor managed the distribution of this assistance, the money was carefully accounted for outside of normal poor relief funds. Furthermore, the Council associated the funds with particular individuals. Boston received reimbursement on numerous occasions for the support of Priscilla Smart, described as both “an imbecile” and an “impotent gerle” from Black Point, Maine. In March 1704, Massachusetts paid Boston £4-8 for Priscilla’s food, a pair of shoes, a jacket, and two shifts. A year later, the Court paid £25-10 to Boston for the care of Priscilla as well as Abraham Stevens, another refugee from Maine. Boston received small reimbursements in 1707, 1709, 1710, 1712, and 1713 for Priscilla’s care and the support of four or five other persons. Salem also kept detailed records regarding refugees, noting layouts ranging from ten shillings to fourteen pounds. Between February 1676 and August 1678, Salem claimed £67-10-19 expended

135 Ibid.
"upon ye poore Estwrd people payable by ye Country." In each case, as in Boston, the expense is associated with a specific individual for a specific purpose, and it is made quite clear that these costs were for war refugees, not "standard" poor. The specificity and the extreme paucity of such claims in the official records are quite striking. Other than petitions for tax abatement from frontier towns and these few requests for charity, it seems Massachusetts was successful in passing responsibility for refugee upkeep.

The limited nature of province-level aid to refugees is most apparent in the so-called Irish Donation of 1676. As New England suffered repeated setbacks in King Philip's War, Increase Mather had written to his brother, Nathaniel, pastor of a congregational church in Dublin, imploring him to aid his fellow Puritans in their darkest hour. "It pleased God," wrote Mather in his autobiography, that his letters to Ireland "tooke such effect, as that a ship laden with provisions was by some well affected to New England . . . sent from thence for the poor here." Accompanying these generous donations was a letter from Nathaniel Mather and his associate contributors, outlining their "suggestions" for the proper distribution of the goods. Concerned with equity (particularly considering that many of the Irish donors were Baptists and Quakers), the

137 "Salem Town Records: Town Meetings 1659-1680," in Essex Institute Historical Collections vol. 48 (Salem, MA: 1912), 34-36, 153-55, 229, 243; and 49 (1913), 70-71. These few records represent the totality of charity reimbursement requests by towns for refugee support. While other refugees would petition the General Court for funds, these requests were for payments due for goods or services rather than appeals for charity. See pg. 157 below.


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donors demanded that the relief supplies be shared among “the poor distressed by the late warr with the Indians; wherein wee desire that an equall respect bee had to all godly psions agreeing in fundamentals of faith & order though differing about the subject of some ordinances.” As a result, while Rhode Island was excluded as a recipient colony, Englishmen living outside the jurisdictions of the three Puritan colonies, Baptists, and even loyal Christian Indians were not to be excluded from the benefits.139

To comply with these instructions and to quickly distribute the relief, the Massachusetts General Court required the selectmen of each town to “forthwith take a list of the names of all such persons, Inhabitants, or strangers, resyding therein members or non members wth what losse they have suffered in their persons or estates and are in Distresse.”140 Like other provincial-level assistance, this was limited to those with absolutely no other recourse for survival.

The result of the selectmen’s work was a nearly complete register of surviving towns in Massachusetts (including Maine and New Hampshire, but missing the Connecticut River towns), compiled by the General Court in January 1677. This document listed 510 families containing 1,921 persons “Distressed by the War” and destitute of support. Magistrates allowed another 400 persons to account for the nine towns not yet reporting, bringing the total to 2,321.141 Since

140 Order of the Council, December 1676, DHSM, 6:144.
141 “Irish Donation,” 249. Figures for Plymouth are available through extrapolation based on the per person “handout” for Massachusetts Bay. Connecticut donated its portion of the funds and supplies to Plymouth and Massachusetts. CCK, 2:496-97.
historians have estimated New England’s entire pre-war white population as approximately 30,000 people, 2,300 individuals labeled as “Distressed” is a significant number. Not all of these people were refugees, but, as indicated in the instructions from Ireland and the General Court, a combination of strangers and residents of each town. Boston would distribute its portion to “several poore Families, out of this towne, & such as came hither from the Easterne ptes & other places.” Furthermore, this number cannot possibly represent all of those people displaced by the war. Maine’s prewar white population, estimated at between 4,200 and 6,000, spread in small settlements along the bays and islands of the coast, was devastated over the course of 1675 and 1676. Only the towns of Wells, York, and Kittery remained inhabited. By themselves these three towns account for only 1,700 of the pre-war inhabitants of Maine. Even with an influx of refugees, York and Kittery (suffering in their own right) reported only 31 families containing 107 individuals as destitute on the Irish Donation report. If all 107 of these destitute individuals are considered refugees (which likely they were not), when added to the existing population of York, Kittery, and Wells, this leaves at a minimum 2,400 displaced inhabitants of Maine unaccounted for – more than the total number of destitute persons listed in all of Massachusetts.

This still excludes the hundreds of southern and western Massachusetts

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142 Ibid; NPCR, 5: 222.
143 Report of the Record Commissioners of the City of Boston, 7: 106-07.
144 For Massachusetts Bay population, see Slotkin and Folsom, eds., So Dreadfull a Judgment, 3; for the varied estimates of Maine’s population, see Moody, “The Maine Frontier,” 260, and Williamson, History of the State of Maine, 1: 447.
145 “Irish Donation,” 249.
inhabitants displaced by the war. The cases of Ipswich, Massachusetts and Scituate, Plymouth further illustrate the discrepancy between the list of destitute persons eligible for colonial aid and actual refugees. In an exhaustive study of Ipswich, historian Alison Vannah identified at least sixty-five refugees sheltering in the town during the war, yet on the Irish Donation list, the town’s selectmen listed as destitute only one family containing six individuals. Of Scituate’s 32 families and 132 recipients, there were only “four families of the eastern people.”

In addition to assisting only a portion of refugees, the Irish Donation provided little in the way of actual aid. Prices for food had risen as crops burned or lay moldering in the fields, and some individuals throughout the colonies attempted to profit by charging even more than the going rate. With various grains commanding 18 shillings a bushel, butter and cheese 6 pence and 4 pence per pound respectively, the Irish Donation funds did not stretch very far. In the end, each distressed individual would receive only 3 shillings worth of food. A soldier earned that in two days, while the colony expended another 5 shillings 4 pence per week to feed each man. This colony effort fed the distressed for less than four days. When compared to material losses, 3 shillings is even more

ridiculous. In answering the General Court’s call, Sudbury’s inhabitants claimed loss of property valued at over £2,700. The town received a mere £7-4 from the Irish Donation pool.\textsuperscript{149}

Although Sudbury suffered terrible damage during King Philip’s War, this town along with more fortunate communities played an important role in aiding the destitute. Of course, towns did not always welcome refugees with open arms. The inhabitants of Northampton, Massachusetts must have wondered how they could possibly cope with the flood of refugees in 1675-76 as thirty-six families from Northfield and Deerfield fled the violence in the Connecticut Valley. One-third of Deerfield’s householders were former residents of Northampton, as were nearly all of the original proprietors of Northfield, and many of them sought shelter in their former haunts.\textsuperscript{150} As a waypoint to and from Maine’s settlements, Portsmouth, New Hampshire attracted even more refugees throughout the Indian wars. During a single week in May 1690, between 300 and 400 people, mostly women and children, fled to Portsmouth.\textsuperscript{151} Clearly, these refugees represented a burden beyond any town’s meager charity capabilities, particularly these two frontier communities. While towns would aid refugees, they did so in a manner that protected their inhabitants’ rights, limited

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Boston received 38 barrels of oatmeal, 25 of wheat meal, 2 of wheat, 5 of malt, and 1 cask of butter. Report of the Record Commissioners, 7: 106-07.
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\textsuperscript{149} Petition of Inhabitants of Sudbury to the General Court, 11 Oct. 1676; An Accompt of Losse Sustained by Several Inhabitants of ye Towne of Sudbury by ye Indian Enemy, 21 April 1676, in Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, 223-25.

\textsuperscript{150} Trumbull, History of Northampton, 1: 255, 262, 267, 286-87; Melvoin, New England Outpost, 101, 104-5; Temple and Sheldon, History of Northfield, 60-61, 64, 67-68, 82; Sheldon, History of Deerfield, 43-48, 92.

\textsuperscript{151} Charles Frost to Governor and Council, 22 May 1690, in DHSM 5: 104-5.
the strain on the public purse, and obeyed the General Court’s declaration regarding the burden of refugees—relief was for members only.

By tradition as well necessity, town poor relief for refugees was limited and exclusionary. Legal inhabitants, “which wee are Oblidged in duty to take care of,” wrote William Screven of Kittery, could reasonably expect charity. However, town selectmen ensured that these individuals lacked other means of support first, a process that often dragged on. William Smead of Northampton lost his house, barn, and crops to Indians in 1675. Only in 1677 did the town come to his aid, providing a half acre of land. Finding this insufficient to provide for his family and improve his lot in life, Smead took his family to Deerfield.152 Refugees who formerly lived in the town but maintained a legal claim could expect help as well. When John Ayres died in the siege of Brookfield in 1675, his widow Suzannah gathered her large family and fled to Ipswich, their previous residence. John had been “among the godly in Ipwsich” before settling in Brookfield, and Suzannah still had family there as well. With her Brookfield home abandoned, she could have claimed relief from Ipswich based on her husband’s holdings there. However, the value of the family’s remaining estate was sufficient to support Suzannah and her children. She is listed as owning a

house there in 1678, though this may be the property retained after the move to Brookfield.\textsuperscript{153}

Beyond this, towns remained as exclusive as ever. Refugees might apply for admission to a town, but these newcomers, with little in the way of money or goods, could quickly become a burden on their new community. Much as during peacetime, the success of their plea depended on their character, if they possessed a skill of use to the community, or if they were self-supporting. When Thomas Wilson fled Brookfield along with the Ayres family, he sought shelter in the home of his youth. Although the son of the respected town constable, Thomas had a history of troublesome behavior, including releasing of a number of prisoners under his father's keeping. The Ipswich selectmen certainly remembered this and denied him admission as a member of the town.\textsuperscript{154}

Educated or skilled refugees fared better than Wilson. George Burroughs, driven from Falmouth in 1676, acted as an assistant to Salisbury's minister, John Wheelwright, for over three years, while Joseph Rowlandson of Lancaster preached in several churches after his wife's redemption.\textsuperscript{155} Musceta Cove on

Long Island, settled by New Englanders, welcomed at least seventy-five men and their families in 1676 and either assigned them land or employed them. This group of refugees boasted many skilled artisans, including shipbuilders, blacksmiths, spinners, caulkers, and tailors. Historian Daniel Carpenter claims that this infusion of trades boosted Musceta Cove’s development so much “that by 1680 it seemed as if a suitable ‘Yankee town’ had been bodily moved from New England and set down here.”156

While the celebrity status of the Rowlandsons, or in the case of artisans their sought-after skills, likely improved the welcome and acceptance of some displaced New Englanders, the most important qualification for admittance was self-support. For example, on January 11, 1676, the Salem selectmen admitted twenty-one Maine refugees as inhabitants of the town for the duration of the Indian wars because they possessed “pvetion [provisions] for thm selves & famelys for one yeer.”157 In contrast, George Davis of Sagadahock found Portsmouth (future New Hampshire) unwilling to assume any responsibility for the cost of his care. Davis had been severely wounded at Arrowsic Island in October 1676, the same attack that forced James Giles to flee to Boston. While a town doctor treated his wounds and temporarily housed Davis, the town refused

to pay the doctor, claiming Davis's wounds were suffered "farr from us." 

Ironically, the only refugees eligible for traditional town relief were those who did not need it.

In keeping with the local nature of New England, towns limited charity to insiders, excluded undesirable individuals, and refused official residence status to many others. Communities continued to "warn out" undesirables during all Indian wars. In Boston, the selectmen labeled sixty-two people for possible warning out between 1676 and 1679, while Marblehead renewed its determination to bar "such persons as are probable to be a chardg to the Towne." However, this was tempered with mercy and understanding, exempting "such as are forced from their habitations by the wars according to the late Law of the Country." In Massachusetts, the General Court had already declared that refugees would become neither residents of nor burdens on their haven towns. Therefore, while towns were unwilling to grant the rights of inhabitants to refugees, they allowed these exiles to "sojourn here during ye time of ye Indn Warr according to Law." Ever-restrictive Ipswich allowed 65 people to remain during King Philip's War, but selectmen "drew up lists barring them from the privileges in town." Boston may have warned out 62 people, but these

161 Vannah, "Crotchets of Division," 843-46, 863-64.
unlucky souls were only a fraction of the minimum of 430 destitute people identified in the city in January 1677.162 Frontier communities did the same as far as possible. James Pynchon, commander of military forces in western Massachusetts and resident of destitute Springfield, packed several refugee families from abandoned Connecticut River towns into his home.163

Selectmen worked diligently to fulfill the General Court's wishes that refuges "be improoved for the best advantage and least charge."164 This first involved finding relations or towns of record to assume responsibility for the refugee. The odd case of Abraham Collins demonstrates the lengths to which town authorities went to avoid charges. In late 1689 or early 1690, Collins and his eighteen-month-old son Benjamin fled Casco Bay for shelter in Milton. Collins put the child "to Nu[r]ss" while he worked for John Kinsley. The Milton selectmen promptly warned the nurse to return the child to Collins, who was to make a proper settlement without involving the town. Collins apparently agreed to take the child to its grandmother in Ipswich, but instead left Benjamin with his employer. Two days later, Kinsley delivered the child to his father. This time, Collins "seemed to take little Notice of it," ran off, and abandoned the child on the roadway. When no one "took...notice or care of [Benjamin] and...no person could be found to Releive it & that it must perish if we did not take care of it,"

162 Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness, 79; "Irish Donation," 245-250.
163 Pynchon Papers, 1: 140-42; Trumbull, Northampton, 260-61; Northampton, with a pre-war population of around 500, along with smaller Hadley, sheltered 36 families from Northfield and Deerfield.
Kinsley carried the child to a nurse. Kinsley appealed to the courts for an answer, pointedly stating that he was not “obleiged any more then anie other perticuler p[er]s[on].” The Milton selectmen would not pay either, given that Collins was “an Easterne man.” Eventually the courts passed the child into Kinsley's care.165

Though Benjamin was too young to work at the time, his future labor, as well as that of mothers and older children, essentially relieved the town and colony of any costs and brought a valuable commodity to a labor-short economy. Refugees recognized this as well. In August 1676, a group of colonists, driven from their Casco homes to temporary shelter on an island in the bay, begged for a vessel to rescue the dozen men and “many” women and children. As incentive, the petitioners stated that “the men and women can work, the orphaned children, offspring of Christians, ought to be rescued and put out to service.”166 In the case of John Kinsley, he likely apprenticed Benjamin Collins and “owned” his labor until he was twenty-one years of age. Selectmen put to work young girls and single women, including Mercy Lewis of later witch-trial fame, as house servants. Their masters received labor as compensation for housing and feeding these refugees.167 Young men found themselves enrolled in

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166 GDMNH, 21.

the local trained band (according to colony law) and at risk for service back on the frontier.\textsuperscript{168} In other cases, towns took advantage of the unexpected wealth of manual labor. Newport, Rhode Island may have used refugee muscle to build its stone tower, first mentioned in records a mere eighteen months after King Philip's War.\textsuperscript{169} Other refugees found work as laborers, wet nurses, gravediggers, or in one case as the bell ringer for Salem—degrading work, to be sure, but work that protected towns and colony from unnecessary expenses.\textsuperscript{170}

Some towns also devised ways by which refugees could support themselves, and benefit the community at the same time. In 1701, Boston went so far as to purchase £500 worth of tools and other materials “To Sett and Keep the poor people and Ill persons, at work, as the Law Directs.” This effort was directed toward the growing problem of Boston's urban poor, not refugees, who were ineligible for official town relief such as this. However, the materials gave the city an option to employ idle hands if needed. Perhaps more appropriate to the skills of refugees were actions by Newport and Portsmouth in Rhode Island. As historian Douglas Leach noted, “most displaced people were farmers of sorts,” so town leaders offered available land for planting as well as rights to

\textsuperscript{168} Mass. Records, 5: 71.
\textsuperscript{169} Leach, “Away to Rhode Island,” 50.
keep a cow on the commons. In March 1676, Portsmouth allowed refugees the free use of one hundred acres in various areas of the town commons for farming. In order that this “may not be prejudiciall to any free Inhabitant” who might use the commons for pasturage or haying, the offer expired in two years, after which any improvements made to the land, including fencing, would revert to the town. In fact, Portsmouth had the land back sooner than planned, renting the land for profit only eighteen months later. Thus, refugees earned their keep, prevented a burden on their haven community, and increased the value of the land in the bargain.

New England’s churches, towns, and provincial governments were flexible in their response to the refugee crisis, particularly considering that there was no existing system for large-scale support of displaced people. Increased church offerings and “food drives,” temporary rights to sojourn in safety, and nominal admissions of responsibility each helped refugees to some degree. However, these forms of assistance were limited, and as Douglas Leach argues, “for the most part these unfortunate people probably had to fend for themselves.”

171 Leach, “Away to Rhode Island,” 49.
172 Mass. Acts & Resolves, 8: 750; Clarence S. Brigham, ed, The Early Records of the Town of Portsmouth (Providence: E.L. Freeman and Sons, 1901), 188-89, 193-94; RICR, 2: 533-34; Leach “Away to Rhode Island,” 49; a group of petitioners suggested the same strategy to the Massachusetts General Court in February 1676, arguing “That unimproved Lands in particular proprieties that Lye freer from the danger of the Enimy be planted and sowne by those that are driven from their habitations for the supplye of them selves and Comon Benefitt.” MA 68:140; between 1677 and 1679, Hadley temporarily granted small parcels of land to refugees for planting. See Ifkovic and Kaufman, eds., Early Settlement in the Connecticut Valley, 322. 173 Leach “Away to Rhode Island,” 48.
Self-support may have been as much a choice for refugees as an enforced condition. There had always been a stigma associated with charity, whether one deserved assistance due to involuntary circumstances or warranted “correction” due to personal failure. Poverty-stricken individuals who threw themselves upon the town’s charity came under the authority of selectmen or overseers of the poor and lost control over their lives. Selectmen inspected such families for idleness, co-opted the labor of adults in any fashion they saw fit, and bound out children as apprentices or indentured servant. As historian Ruth Herndon argues, overseers of the poor and selectmen sought “to minimize the public cost of poor relief.” Rather than subject themselves to such mercy, many poor people preferred to migrate and find temporary work.174

While Massachusetts declared that refugees did not qualify for relief based on poor laws and residency requirements, the General Court certainly made it appear that they were subject to the same restrictions as those who did. In its November 1675 proclamation, the government required selectmen to interrogate refugee families in as to their living relations and homes of record, put men and women to work, and “dispose[d] of” children—all in the name of avoiding public charges and maintaining control over a mobile population.175 Connecticut followed a similar line in May 1676. In an election-day address, the Court recommended that town selectmen remain vigilant of “boarders or

174 Herndon, Unwelcome Americans, 5, 31, 42-43, 85; Nellis, Records of the Boston Overseers of the Poor, 18-25.
sojourners.” Any such people who sheltered with families were required to attend church services “and be subject to the domestickall government of the sd family, and shall be ready to give an acco[un]t of their actions upon all demands.”176 Not surprisingly, the Connecticut Council of War reported to the Massachusetts General Court that of the refugees who had sought shelter within Connecticut’s towns, “many were faine to be sustayned by the charaty of the good people of the Colony,” preferring to work for themselves. Undoubtedly familiar with the obligations associated with traditional charity, many refugees balked at accepting any official aid and preferred to remain their own masters.177

Instead of appearing in a multitude of appeals for charity from provincial and town governments, refugees demonstrated a desire to “not be troublesome and burdensome to other townes.”178 Many colonists from beleaguered communities attempted to remain in their homes as long as possible, requesting provincial assistance to do so in the form of weapons, reinforcement, and provisions. In the aftermath of an attack on Falmouth in August 1676, Thaddeus Clark and other survivors fled to Andrews Island. Although Clark reported 11

176 CCR, 2: 280-81; Cotton Mather would later remind New Englanders of one’s duties within the family, particularly focusing on the obedience that servants (inmates, indwellers) owed to the master of the house. See Cotton Mather, A Good Master Well Served. A Brief Discourse on the Necessary Properties & Practices of a Good Servant (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, 1696), and A Family Well-Ordered.
178 Nourse, Early Records of Lancaster, 120-21.
men dead and 23 women and children killed or taken, he appealed to Boston authorities for help to “fight the Enemie out of our Borders, that our English Corn may be inned in, whereby we may comfortably live.” If military assistance was not forthcoming, Clark asked for the means to evacuate “that we may provide for ourselves elsewhere.” In some cases, frontier dwellers even rejected official suggestions to withdraw as being dishonorable and certainly unprofitable.

Refugees created several other temporary communities like Clark’s on Andrews Island and attempted to “shift for ourselves,” as James Giles put it. Their hope was to escape to “some surer Place, there waiting for better Times, when they may with Peace and Quietness return to their former Habitations.” To support themselves in this temporary exile as well as to deny those supplies to their native opponents, refugees frequently sent small parties to harvest whatever crops they could find, plant for next season if possible, and recover gunpowder for defense. A small party of Clark’s fellow exiles returned home under cover of dark to remove “a considerable Quantity” of powder from a storehouse that Indians had overlooked. Further east from his temporary

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refuge on Arrowsic Island, Giles returned home on occasion in the fall of 1675 to harvest his crops, and anticipating his return home in the fall, he planted “some Indian corn and other things.” Refugees occasionally asked for government assistance for larger salvage expeditions. In October 1676, Joshua Scottow was finding his exile “exceeding pinching,” and requested a Massachusetts government vessel to investigate abandoned Black Point. He hoped to “bring off w[ha]t may be left of the ruines of the fort & habita[tions] if burnt, & also wt Corne & Cattell is left.” Scottow claimed he and other inhabitants had left over 1,000 bushels of grain, 300 head each of “great Cattell” and sheep, in addition to “beif & pvisions,” all of which would relieve Scottow and the remainder of “the poor Inhabitants” of Black Point. Massachusetts allowed the use of the vessel, but Scottow had to bear the charges. These expeditions into hostile territory did not always end well. In September 1676, seven refugee men pressed into service by Capt. William Hathorne “were over desirous to save some of their Provision.” Claiming “they must and would go, else their Families must starve at Home,” the men sailed to Munjoy’s Island to fetch some sheep. No sooner had they landed than Indians attacked, killing the entire party.

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184 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 169, 173-74; Rowe, Ancient North Yarmouth, 13-14, 35-36.
That the provincial government became the last resort for aid is evident in the very wording of numerous petitions of individuals. Ambrose Berry, a wounded and rehabilitating veteran of the war in Maine, asked the Council for help only because he had "noe Friends [in Boston] to support me in this time of my necessity." Fearing that his doctor would cease treating him if he remained unpaid, Berry requested help so "that I may not p[er]ish in this my Condition, For my Wound is now at the mending hand, and if it bee neglected my Life is gon." Similarly, John Liby and his extended family, sheltering in Boston after being burned out of their Scarborough home, petitioned the governor and Council in March 1677. Liby, his wife, and nine other relatives were dependent on the labor of his four adult sons. One had been killed at Black Point, Maine, a second had died in Boston, and the surviving two had been absent for nine months, pressed for military service down east. "In a very Low Condition, beeing about the age of 75 years," and having no way of procuring "a Livlihood," Liby asked the governor not for charity, but for the discharge of his two remaining sons so that they could return and support their refugee family. It is noteworthy that John Liby was not asking for charity, but only for the means by which to help himself. In other cases, individuals actually wanted to have nothing to do with provincial aid. Liby seemed proud that before desperation drove him to petition the Court, he had not been on the colony dole, and if he

185 Petition of Ambrose Berry to Council, Boston, March 1677, DHSM 6: 159-60.
had his way would remain so. In petition after petition, refugees asked for the means to survive on their own (labor of a son or husband) or funds owed them for services rendered and goods provided. New Englanders knew there was no such thing as a free lunch, and they preferred to subsist on their own merits rather than ask for handouts.¹⁸⁷

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Despite the clamor of ministers bewailing the declension of the city on a hill, the region’s people had not forgotten their responsibility to the public good. In the midst of war, high taxes, and general upheaval, New Englanders had sheltered family and friends, allowed strangers to sojourn in their towns, and answered the calls of clergymen to donate. However, charity was tempered with the tradition of personal responsibility and localism. Although New England’s traditional system of charity was not intended to service thousands of needy people, it remained the model that families, towns, and provinces followed. Charity was a duty, but one owed to particular individuals and practiced at the lowest levels. Thus, New Englanders helped those who they were responsible for—family, friends, and fellow town residents—and expected these same people to help themselves first. At war’s end, haven towns rescinded their offer of shelter and expected refugees to depart and trouble them no longer. This “tough love” does not represent a decline of New England communalism. Rather, the

treatment and actions of refugees represent continuity of the local communal ideal and the primacy of the family. James Giles and Mary Rowlandson likely never received 3 shillings worth of goods from the Irish Donation nor any other aid outside of friends, family, and congregants. Instead, like thousands of other New Englanders cut adrift by war, they worked where they could, found their way into the homes of friends and family, and waited for peace and a return home.
CHAPTER THREE

TO STILL THE CLAMORS OF THE PEOPLE: JUSTICE, REVENGE, AND THE FATE OF INDIAN PRISONERS

On the morning of January 29, 1676, a post rider from Norwich arrived in New London, Connecticut with grisly news. A party of New Englanders had discovered the bodies of Joshua Rockwell and John Renolds of Norwich, “dead & thrown down the [Shetucket] River banke, theire scalps cutt off.” Rockwell’s teenage son remained missing and was “supposed to bee caryed away alive” by the hostile Indians arrayed against the New England colonies. Betting against such an encounter, the three men had left the relative safety of Norwich, intending to sow a new crop on the far side of the Shetucket River. Clearly, Lady Luck deserted them, and the men paid with their lives.1

Upon hearing the news, two soldiers, recovering from wounds suffered in the December campaign against the Narragansetts, decided to take matters into their own hands. The day before, one of New England’s native allies, a Pequot sachem named Daniel, had deposited two Narragansett prisoners in New London’s jail to await trial, likely for murder or treason. These unfortunate men, unarmed and locked in prison, were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Their dander up after hearing the news from Norwich, the convalescing soldiers

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appointed themselves judge, jury, and executioners, broke into the prison, and “shott dead” the cornered natives. After eyewitnesses refused to identify the culprits and town authorities chose not to “exercise theire power” to uncover the truth, the two murderers went free and likely received a hero’s welcome for their deed. “It [is a] pitty soe rude and barbarous act should bee passed by without due witnesse against it,” lamented Edward Palmes, but there was nothing he could do.²

Many such incidents occurred during the short duration of King Philip’s War as New England’s Algonquian Indians and English colonists battled with and against each other between 1675 and 1676. Like most armed conflicts, King Philip’s War had its share of prisoners taken in battle and raids, or those who voluntarily surrendered to avoid further bloodshed. The Indians carried dozens of New Englanders into captivity, such as Joshua Rockwell’s luckless son and Mary Rowlandson, the wife of a Puritan minister and later author of a captivity narrative. These and other white captives frequently faced ritual torture and execution. However, they were just as likely to receive fair and even remarkably kind treatment from their captors. Rowlandson admitted that as her captors slowly starved, she frequently “fared better than many of them,” and a warrior even presented her with a Bible in an effort to comfort her. Some captives may

² Palmes to the Governor and Council, CCR, 2: 403; Drake, “Restraining Atrocity,” 33-56.
have been adopted into Indian families to replace lost loved ones, while many others were ransomed by their English brethren.3

Indian prisoners faced far different and less predictable fates. Several prisoners suffered vigilante justice in the streets of New England towns, while others faced public execution after a formal trial. Native prisoners who avoided mobs or halters often faced slavery instead. At least 1,400 prisoners were sold into temporary slavery within New England, while another 900 to 1,000 prisoners found themselves shackled aboard deep-sea vessels bound for plantation colonies—a policy that the Rev. John Eliot opposed as contrary to the colony’s mission to Christianize the natives.4

Indeed, it seems that New Englanders fell prey to magistrate Daniel Gookin’s prediction, letting their reason “be darkened, if not almost lost” in their desire for revenge and satisfaction. Some captured Indians were tickled by the torturer’s knife into revealing information. Many more prisoners enjoyed their “protected” status only briefly, the victims of vigilante justice in the field or on the streets of New England towns. Those brought to trial for supposed rebellion

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against King Charles II faced almost certain conviction and execution by rope or bullet or even a short ride on Charon’s ferryboat. The larger anonymous mass, mere numbers in a ledger, became the bondservants of New Englanders and toiled for years before regaining their freedom. Most odious of all, hundreds of Indian prisoners, “unworthy” of the mercy of temporary servitude and not quite deserving public death, faced consignment to the hell of Caribbean sugar plantations. The redoubtable and self-promoting Benjamin Church later admitted his own misgivings regarding the treatment of prisoners in an apocryphal anecdote about capturing and questioning a grizzled old native named, of all things, Conscience. Upon discovering “Conscience,” Church smiled and said “then the war is over, for that was what they were searching for, it being much wanted.” As an ironic twist, New Plymouth sold Conscience into servitude.5 Contrary to Church’s sentimental note, however, not all New Englanders lost their conscience or concept of right or wrong. While New England’s treatment of prisoners was gruesome and “uncivil” by twenty-first-century standards, when viewed through the broader context of the time, it seems that New England’s leaders, at least, tempered the “rage of the people,” and the colonies remained within bounds of tradition and law.6

5 Thomas Church, The History of Philip’s War, Commonly Called the Great Indian War, of 1675 and 1676. Also, of the French and Indian Wars at the Eastward, in 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and 1704, ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2nd ed. (Exeter, NH: J. & B. Williams, 1829), 147-49.
The European culture of war, which influenced how New Englanders responded to their enemies on and off the field of battle, had gradually evolved over the course of several centuries into the “law of arms” (jus in bello) and the doctrine of “just war” (jus ad bellum). The law of arms grew from the medieval code of chivalry that governed combat between elite warriors, thus ignoring the needs and rights of “lesser” combatants as well as civilians. Intending to prevent some of the worst excesses of warfare, the Church gradually intruded upon the chivalric code. Christian doctrine, particularly the centuries-old concept of the Peace of God, forbade unwarranted cruelty, blood lust, and warring on holy persons, the weak and sick, and women and children. Furthermore, armies developed their own disciplinary regulations to govern the behavior of their troops, from the proper way to stand guard to the prohibition of rape. These various strains of thought slowly coalesced into the law of arms, which “dealt mostly with the practical aspects of war—prisoners, standards and banners, ransom, booty, parleys, truces, and the like.” In addition, the simultaneously evolving doctrine of jus ad bellum sought to make it acceptable for Christians to war in self-defense and to avenge wrongs. Puritan minister Richard Bernard summarized the basis of just war, arguing, “a warre just, by reason, by the instinct of nature, and by custome of all Nations, and by religion it selfe, is that which is undertaken in defence of our Country, religion, libertie and state.” Although not codified until the Dutch jurist and theologian Hugo Grotius published De Jure Belli ac Pacis in 1625 (1645 for the English version), these ideas
were recognized and observed throughout Europe and New England. As historian Barbara Donagan argues, home-grown Grotii such as Richard Bernard and his fellow Puritan William Gouge wrote their own brands of military law and theory that differed little from Grotius, though framed in the Protestant experience and written in the vernacular. Englishmen, whether “citizen-soldiers at home...potential soldiers or curious civilians,” devoured the military literature of the period.

Widespread discussion of the laws of war did not translate into practice, however, as the violence of the Thirty Years’ War demonstrated. In fact, historians allege a general failure on the part of Europeans to instill restraint in warfare before the middle of the seventeenth century. While restraint depended upon the willingness of both warring factions to participate, the laws of war themselves allowed for extreme violence against combatants and civilians alike.

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For every rule protecting civilians or limiting bloodshed, there existed an exception legitimizing or excusing excessive behavior or outright crime. For example, besieging armies generally offered their target cities one chance to surrender. Once "the battering ram had shaken the walls" or troops stormed the city, the defenders—civilian or military—were fair targets for death, abuse, and robbery. Additionally, pillage from sacked cities or the surrounding countryside served to supplement the meager wages of soldiers in what historian John Lynn called "a tax of violence." Furthermore, an army could excuse its excesses against civilians as proper reprisals. According to Barbara Donagan, "reprisal offered a particularly useful justification for appalling actions, matching atrocity for atrocity. And it was characteristic to blame the victims for the cruelties their enemies were forced to commit against them." 10

The applicability of the laws of war also depended upon the manner of war being fought. In the case of sovereign Christian nations in conflict, the laws of war applied, particularly regarding prisoners, noncombatants, and the concept of quarter, though of course violations occurred as often as not. In civil wars, as William Fulbecke argued, "a Rebell may not properlie be called an enemie," and the conflict was "an exercise of princible jurisdiction" rather than a war. Thus, civil law took precedence over the laws of war, and rebels were treated as traitors, murderers, and common criminals. The laws of war declared any

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response to rebellion “just” and granted carte blanche to the government and its armies. In theory, “the Law of Armes is not to be observed and kept” when suppressing “Pyrates, Rebels, Robbers, Traytors, and Revoltes,” wrote Fulbecke. Instead, they should be “burnt alive, or els hanged upon a gibbet” in accordance with civil law. Civilians in areas of rebellion lacked immunity as well, and harsh actions directed toward them were intended as punishment for their complicity and to deter future rebels. However, opposing sides generally took a more pragmatic approach and observed the rules of war in fear of reprisals. As Barbara Donagan confirms, the English Civil War had its fair share of atrocities to include massacres of surrendered soldiers, murder of civilians, and ill-treatment of prisoners. However, “War crimes did not become policy, atrocities were individual and sporadic, and reprisal was precariously contained.”

The laws of war all but disappeared in colonial wars, such as England’s long conquest and subjugation of Ireland. In such irregular wars, “especially one with strong racist, religious, and retributive elements,” argues Donagan, the laws of war did not apply, “since barbarian or heretic ‘others’ or outsiders did not merit the protections due to the civilized and Christian.” The Irish wars, as with Indian in North America, involved all of these elements. Faced with “savages” who lived “like beastes, voide of lawe and all good order...more uncivill, more uncleanly, more barbarous, and more brutish in their customs and

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demeanours, than in any other part of the world that is known,” the English dropped all pretense of “civility” in war, particularly when the Irish resorted to guerrilla warfare to counter England’s overwhelming military superiority. In 1598, such tactics on the part of rebel leader Hugh O’Neill so incensed and frustrated Viceroy Thomas Burgh that he labeled O’Neill “the dishonestest rebel of the world.” A coward, “he never making good any fight, but bogring13 with his shot and flying from bush to bush.” At night “he lodgeth dispersed in the thicks and holds no firm guards, but throws himself and all his into sundry goves, lurking scattered like wolves or foxes, fitter to hunt with dogs than to find with men.”14 In response, English leaders such as Charles Blount, eighth Lord Mountjoy, waged total war on the rebels, devastating the countryside and people. His lieutenant, Sir Arthur Chichester, described the devastation of one English raid along Lough Neagh. “We have killed above one hundred people of all sorts, besides such as were burnt, how many I know not,” he reported. “We spare none of what quality or sex soever, and it hath bred much terror in the people who heard not a drum nor saw not a fire there of a long time.”15 English military leaders fought the Irish without restraint and without regard for the laws of war, and they would carry these attitudes with them to North America.

13 Given the context of its use, “bogring” may refer to either a boggart (a sprite or specter that haunts gloomy areas such as the bogs of Ireland) or bog trotting (moving about or living in the bogs).
Samuel Gorton later remarked that the Indian wars of North America reminded him of his youthful experiences in Ireland. "Much English blood was spilt by a people much like unto these" and "many valiant soildiers lost their lives...by means of woods, bushes, booggs, and quagmires." The English had responded to "treacherous and bloody massacres" of the Irish with extreme force, and Gorton envisioned the same in New England.\textsuperscript{16}

When King Philip's War broke out in 1675, the New England colonists were faced with a volatile combination of two forms of war—a colonial war (crusade to some) against "savages" and "heathens" and a rebellion of native subjects—neither of which, by tradition and emerging rules, required the application of the laws of war. Human emotions are unpredictable in the best of times, and "common sense" and self-restraint often goes by the wayside when unusual circumstances bring emotions to a boiling point. King Philip's War was a case in point. With its sudden violence and devastating losses, the war lent itself quite easily to interpretation by colonists as an unconventional conflict where rules did not matter, at least in the subjugation of the "illegitimate and immoral foe."\textsuperscript{17} The horrors witnessed (and committed by) New Englanders and the personal losses suffered were enough to torment the most rock-solid among them. In one estimate, "Every person, almost, in the two colonies [Plymouth and Massachusetts], had lost a relation or near friend, and the people in general were

\textsuperscript{16} Nicholas P. Canny, "The Ideology of English Colonization: From Ireland to America," WMQ, 3\textsuperscript{rd} ser. 30: 4 (Oct. 1973): 575-598; Samuel Gorton to John Winthrop, Jr., MHSC 4\textsuperscript{th} ser. 7: 629-30; Karr, "Why Should You Be So Furious," 887.
\textsuperscript{17} Kerr, "Why Should You Be So Furious," 883.
exasperated.” Nearly the same proportion could claim significant loss of property. Unsurprisingly, then, revenging dead, missing, and mutilated loved ones as well as destroyed homesteads and towns was at the forefront of many New Englanders’ minds when hostile Indians fell into their hands.\textsuperscript{18}

Psychological and spiritual wounds festering in Puritan minds contributed to this mood as well. While some Puritans viewed the stunning ferocity and destructiveness of Indian attacks as an indication of God’s anger toward his wayward people, others wondered if He was withdrawing his divine approval from the “Puritan enterprise.” As historian Richard Slotkin argues, “For a community that had conceived of itself as the new chosen people of the Lord, as the bearers of Christian light to heathen darkness, the fulfillers of a divinely inspired ‘Errand into the Wilderness,’ the catastrophe of the Indian war threatened their most basic assumptions about their new world.” Whether of the Puritan faith or not, New Englanders deeply felt the injuries to their sinews and society, and the hangman’s noose as punishment for their apparent (or proxy) tormenters was hardly cathartic enough to ease their pain. Many, such as Capt. Samuel Moseley, wanted personal revenge. “Seeing what mischief had been done by the Indians which I have beene eyewitness to,” he wrote, “would make a wiser person than I am, willing to have revenge of aney of them. . . .”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{19} Richard Slotkin and James K. Folsom, So Dreadfull a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, 1676-1677 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1978), 4; George Madison Bodge,
century later, the Rev. Benjamin Wadsworth would indirectly absolve Moseley of his basest desires by invoking Hugo Grotius’s theory of just war. “[I]t would...be our duty,” he argued, “to revenge [Indian attacks] in the death of all the Actors in, and Abettors of, such Murder.”20

Compounding the New Englanders’ collective desire for revenge was the frustration of fighting an elusive enemy, who failed to “manage their war fairly after the manner of other nations.” This lack of “proper violence,” as historian Peter Silver labels it, was particularly frightening and unsettling to European colonists. Plymouth governor Josiah Winslow complained that Philip’s warriors “very suddaynely and violently fell upon our neighbouring people, first robing and burning their houses, and after in a sculking, unmanly way, destroying many of our people.”21 In the eyes of the Rev. Solomon Stoddard, such behavior earned Philip and his cohorts the odious label of “thieves and murderers” and the fate normally reserved for predatory animals. “They doe acts of hostility without proclaiming war,” he complained, and “They don’t appear openly in the field to bid us battle. They act like wolves and are to be dealt withall as wolves.” Unable to come to grips with Indians in European-style combat, frequently bested in lightning-quick raids and ambushes, and mocked by unseen enemies, English soldiers undoubtedly felt their honor slighted (code for embarrassment)

20 Benjamin Wadsworth, Good Souldiers A Great Blessing (Boston: B. Green and J. Allen, 1700), 7.
and hankered for revenge upon any Indians unfortunate enough to fall into their hands.\textsuperscript{22}

Stoddard's equating the Indians with wild beasts was not uncommon, and his condemnation was relatively benign in comparison to others'. European combatants characteristically portrayed their enemy in disparaging terms or as beasts when fighting "pagans," "heathens," and "savages."\textsuperscript{23} New England ministers, however, ominously labeled their opponents as "perfect children of the Devil" (which bode ill for native prisoners) and portrayed their war as a struggle against a satanic union to dispossess them of their God-given lands. While many Puritans believed God to be using the Indians to chastise sinful New England, the colonists held (whether in truth or for convenience) that the Almighty intended to use the Puritans to even the mark with Satan's tawny tools. So believed the eminent Puritan divine, William Hubbard. "It appears thus by the Sequal of things," he theorized "that after the Lord hath accomplished his Work upon his People, that he is beginning to call his Enemies to an Account, and punish them for the Pride of their Hearts, and for all their Treachery and Cruelty against his Servants." The commissioners of the United Colonies agreed with Hubbard's interpretation, and called on New Englanders


\textsuperscript{23} Gov. John Leverett to Sir Joseph Williamson, 1675, in CSP, 9: 317, hereafter cited as CSP.
“with the more cherfullness [to] attend our duty not only in defending our selves from [the Indians’] insolenceys, but...to seeke reparation for the many injureys they have done us.”24 With quick wit and creative interpretation of Scripture, the New Englanders attributed their actions and cruelties to God and relieved themselves of any moral inhibitions or obligations toward their enemies.25 New Englanders never lost an opportunity to label the Indians’ attacks as anything but “savage,” unwarranted, and unjust. Historian Jill Lepore argues that such writing constituted the victors’ attempts to win the war again, this time in public discourse and histories. Shocked by their near descent into savagery, Englishmen sought to justify their actions (to themselves as well as their English “audience”) by denigrating their opponents.26 William Hubbard’s narrative of the conflict, and the accompanying “Map of New England,” illustrate this. Hubbard refused to use the word “war” to even describe the conflict. “The

25 James Drake argues that European colonists and Indians created a “covalent” society before King Philip’s War, one that “had been built by the conscious interweaving of English and Indian polities by individuals hoping to preserve their identities in a rapidly changing world. This entailed creating strong links between peoples of diverse backgrounds.” This intermingled society and the familiarity it bred, he argues, caused combatants to restrain the worst of atrocities. While the links between native and English societies are not in doubt, most colonists were unable to see Indians as anything like themselves. Their inability to attribute full humanity to Indians allowed for quick demonization when war broke out. See James D. Drake, King Philip’s War: Civil War in New England 1675-1676 (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), 14. See also Lepore, The Name of War, 112.
20 Lepore, The Name of War, 11-12, 106-08; Puglisi, Puritans Besieged, 19-21; see [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 439.
Matter of Fact therein related (being rather Massacres, barbarous inhumane Outrages, than Acts of Hostility, or valiant Achievements) no more deserve the Name of a War than the Report of them the Title of an History,” he proclaimed. “[T]herefore, I contented myself with a Narrative.”27 The accompanying “Map of New England” was equally dismissive of Indians and their strategies. The map features a table listing the fights and confrontations that Hubbard described in great detail within the book.28 With few exceptions, “Almost all of the fifty-five numbered places [on the map] were sites of Indian atrocities perpetrated against English settlements.” By doing so, argue historians Matthew Edney and Susan Cimburek, Hubbard largely ignored English attacks, “emphasized Indian atrocities as the defining feature of the war [and] placed the burden of the war’s barbarity squarely on the shoulders of the Indians.” This agrees with Jill Lepore’s broader argument of winning the public relations war after the end of hostilities. To avoid behaving as the Spanish had in their colonial possessions, and thus lose their English identity, New Englanders had to play down their own foibles while emphasizing the barbarity of their enemies.29

While the histories produced by ministers such as Hubbard and Increase Mather were certainly works of self-justification, New Englanders also wrote of the “mindless savagery” of their opponents as it occurred, not in post facto

27 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 15.
28 See Figure 2.
official histories intended for broad consumption. Instead, these descriptions of Indian attacks and graphic accounts of torture appeared in personal correspondence. Roger Williams, a noted friend of the Indians, lamented in December 1675 that “it is not possible to keepe peace with these barbarous men of blood, who are as justly to be repelld & subdued as wolves that assault the sheepe.”

Four months later, Williams stood in front of his burning home and chastised the party of Narragansetts and other natives who were destroying Providence. “This Hous of mine now burning before mine Eyes hath Lodged kindly Some Thousands of You these Ten Years,” he cried to one Indian. They “had Forgot they were Mankind,” he proclaimed, instead behaving “like Wolves tearing, and Devouring the Innocent, and peaceable.” Furthermore, while most New Englanders failed to acknowledge any responsibility for provoking the war, they did not conveniently “forget” or ignore their own actions. Instead, New Englanders justified their brand of “savagery” as acceptable responses to an unprovoked, unconventional war, just as English soldiers had done in Ireland.

In one of many such incidents, Major John Talcott led a command of “Stoute vallyant men” in mop-up operations in August 1676. Apparently “provoked by the barbarous inhumanety they have heard of & Seen hath bin done to the English whose dead bodyes they founde in the woods,” Talcott’s men captured

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30 Roger Williams to John Winthrop, Jr., 10 Dec. 1675, in Robert C. Winthrop and Thomas Franklin Waters, A Sketch of the Life of John Winthrop the Younger, Founder of Ipswich, Massachusetts in 1633, 2nd ed. (Ipswich, MA: J. Wilson and Son],1900), 63.
"very many & kill[ed] all save some boyes & girls." Edney and Cimburek are correct to point out that Hubbard listed few battles instigated by the English on his map. However, the two English-initiated fights that Hubbard chose to feature, the Great Swamp Fight and the Falls Fight, were perhaps the greatest representations of English "barbarism" that he could pick. For New Englanders, there was no need to shy away from their own barbarities. Instead, they justified them as their European contemporaries would under similar circumstances—proper responses to unconventional wars.

Images of an inhuman enemy, then, combined with apparent divine sanction, personal pain, and desire for revenge, produced a volatile situation in which Indian prisoners could hardly hope to predict their fate or hope for mercy, much like their own native wars. The commissioners of the United Colonies confirmed this with a proclamation on August 30, 1675, declaring the "Heathen...in Hostility." The Indians (never labeled with any specificity) had declined all attempts at diplomacy, "contrary to the Practice of all Civil Nations." Instead, they declined open and honorable combat and resorted to "bloody Insolencies by Stealth, and Skulking in small Parities." Having disposed of the

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"hostiles" as legitimate foes, the commissioners authorized “any person . . . that shall find any Indian travelling or Sculking in any of our towns or woods . . . to command them under their guard and examination, or to kill and destroy them as they best may or can,” effectively declaring “open season” on Indians, hostile or friendly.34

Believing themselves to be fighting a war that required no rules, New Englanders dealt with native prisoners in myriad ways. With proclamations like that of the Commissioners, or the later edict demanding death for those “as shall appear to have imbrued their hands in English blood,” soldiers and civilians had wide discretion in dealing with prisoners, particularly when out of reach of constables and magistrates. Marked for death by New Englanders, particularly infamous “malefactors” and influential Indian leaders would likely never see the inside of a courtroom and could expect on-the-spot execution.35 When Capt. Benjamin Church captured Sam Barrow, “as noted a rogue as any among the enemy,” the officer informed Barrow of his imminent death “because of his inhuman murders and barbarities.” Church, however, revealed a softer side seldom seen in this bloody war and allowed the condemned man a few puffs of tobacco before a soldier “sunk his hatchet into [Barrow’s] brains.” New Englanders were equally quick to judgment if they considered the prisoner a “special” traitor, such as the Narragansett Indian known as “Stone-Layer John.”

34 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 450-51.
35 MHSC, 4th ser. 8: 689; RIHSC, 5: 173.
Having learned the mason's trade among the English, John turned his "white" talents against his former teachers when he constructed fortifications for hostile Indians in the Narragansett swamps, earning him the label of "arch Villain" and a swift execution upon his capture in June 1676.36

In numerous other instances, soldiers chose individuals from among their captives and executed them in what can only be termed acts of retribution. As the war wound down in June 1676, Cpt. Daniel Henchman's company captured eleven Indians. Determined to exact retribution for undisclosed wrongs against them, his men randomly chose "two of the oldest by Counsel" to die for the "sins" of other Indians.37 Neither youth nor infirmity guaranteed immunity from such random executions. On the Saco River in southern Maine, several English sailors thought to verify the truth of an old wife's tale using Indian prisoners. Hearing that "Children of the Indians...could swim as naturally as any other Creatures," the mariners capsized a canoe containing a woman and infant, "plunging mother and child into the river. The baby sank like lead," refuting the fable and killing the babe. Unfortunately, the child's father was the influential sachem Squando, who responded to this murder with "all the Mischief he [could] to the English in those Parts."38 Elderly prisoners fell victim as well.

During Massachusetts' initial foray against the Narragansetts in December 1675,
an old Indian, "so decriped [he] Could not go," fell into English hands. Quickly
tiring of carting him around on soldiers' backs and unwilling to tarry at his
expense, members of the expedition proposed tossing his ancient bones to the
hungry hounds. "But the tendernes of sum of them prevailed." They spared the
old man this grisly end, only to "Cut ofe his head." Samuel Moseley was not as
squeamish as these "tender-hearted" Bay soldiers. On October 16, 1675, after
capturing an Indian woman near Hatfield, the captain ordered that she "be torn
to peices by Doggs and she was soe dealt with"39

Those fortunate prisoners who avoided canine jaws but unlucky enough
to miss the merciful blow of a sword or hatchet often faced severe interrogation
and torture at the hands of New Englanders and their Indian allies. At times,
soldiers tortured prisoners to exact military information, but often such
"examinations" degraded into pure psychological and physical torment to slake
English thirst for revenge. The ever-present Capt. Moseley excelled at examining
captives. In August 1675, English-allied Indian scouts captured Andrew, a
Christian Indian who had accompanied hostile Nipmucks in their attack on
Brookfield, and his son David loitering "without cause" near Marlborough. A
master of mental gambits, the zealous captain bound the father to a tree and
bundled the Indian youth out of sight, intending to use each as pawns against
the other. Demanding that Andrew confess to the recent wounding of a

39 [John] Easton, A Relacion of the Indyan Warre, (1675) in Lincoln, ed, Narratives of the Indian Wars, 13, 16; Easton described another old man, "very decreped" whom soldiers tormented due to his association with hostiles; Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 69.
Massachusetts militiaman, Moseley and his minions “pumped him as hard as they could” until the tormented Indian confirmed that his “sone was one of those men that wounded Capt. Hutchinson” at the Brookfield ambush earlier that summer. After firing a round into the air to simulate execution and hiding Andrew out of sight, Moseley turned on the boy. Bragging that he had just slain Andrew, the captain promised the lad the same end if he would not confess. The youth revealed that he and his father, praying Indians, had unwillingly accompanied hostile Nipmucks to Brookfield, where they “shot three or four Times a Piece.” Moseley brought father and son together, and “at Length they confest they were both among the Nipmoogs, and that the Son did wound Captain Hutchinson.” Having achieved his purpose, Moseley shot Andrew “without acquainting the [Massachusetts] Council before it was done.” David remained “fastened to a tree, and guns bent at him,” when Moseley offered him a reprieve if he accused other Christian Indians of crimes against the English. David willingly perjured himself to save his life, but within a few weeks he found himself sold into slavery and transported out of the colony.40

Torture was not a uniquely “English” practice, nor, as New Englanders would like to have believed, solely in the province of their “savage” neighbors. Both sides practiced torture of some form throughout the war, but the symbolism inherent in their actions differed. Its practice among New England’s Indians was

“both an expression of dominance and a release of mourners’ emotions,” a collective catharsis for those who performed and witnessed it. While the English colonists likely considered the torture of Indian prisoners as serving up just deserts for similar treatment of captured whites and justified it as a means of obtaining intelligence, tormenting a “savage” could not help but provide a similar sense of closure and release, though few would admit it. Following an assault on the Narragansetts in July 1676, Connecticut forces under Major John Talcott witnessed the torture of a “young sprightly fellow” by their Mohegan allies. Though Indians were the primary actors in this bloody and painful drama, Englishmen gathered to watch as the Mohegans forced their sacrificial lamb into a “great Circle” so that “all their Eyes might at the same Time, be pleased with the utmost Revenge upon him.” Digit by digit, the Mohegans dismembered the young Narragansett’s hands and feet “as they used to do with a slaughtered Beast, before they uncase him,” all while he danced and sang his death song. After breaking both of his legs, the Mohegan tormenters forced the victim to sit silently “till they had Knocked out his Brains.” Though William Hubbard, who described the scene in his history of the war, maintained that “the English were not able to bear [watching] it, it forcing Tears from their Eyes,” apparently the blood sport captivated and satisfied at least one Englishman enough to record the incident for posterity.41

Not all New Englanders adopted torture with the same fervor of Moseley, Talcott, and their Mohegan allies. Benjamin Church, the colonies' most successful soldier, was as quick as any to execute prisoners for known murders. However, he refused to torture prisoners, claiming, "It was not English-mans fashion to seek revenge." When his rangers captured a wanted Indian, "some were for torturing of him to bring him to a more ample confession, of what he knew concerning his Country-men." Though Church quickly quashed this notion, when the prisoner's wounds proved a hindrance to quick and stealthy movement, "it was concluded [that] he should be knocked on the head." The Plymouth captain was as likely to fill his prisoners' bellies with food as with lead. On one occasion, Church was downright hospitable to his prisoners, ensuring that they were "well treated with victuals and drink." Guards and captives passed a "merry night, and the prisoners laughed as loud as the soldiers." Church's actions were self-serving, though, as he sought to bring former foes under his control for use against other natives.\(^42\)

While few Englishmen could bring themselves to socialize with Indians, even the rabid Indian-hater Moseley transported the bulk of his prisoners to authorities in English towns in relatively whole condition. However, civilians who felt the pains of war and lacked the means to strike back in battle did not always honor the temporary reprieves granted by soldiers in the field, and

several vented their frustration on helpless prisoners. One Windsor, Connecticut resident suggested that a captive "be baited by our fiercest dogs," both for punishment and as "a terror" to other natives.43 Fortunately, this incident did not come to pass, but an even more gruesome event transpired in Marblehead in 1677. As fighting dwindled in southern New England that summer, hostilities continued to blaze in Maine. With the ultimate goal of forming a navy of sorts and burning Boston, numerous Abenakis shanghaied more than twenty English fishing and trading vessels in July. Aboard the captured William and Sarah, a ketch out of Salem, Robert Roules, Joseph Bovey, Richard Downs, and William Buswell regained control of their vessel from the Indian buccaneers, pitched several of them into the sea, and trussed up two more for transportation to the authorities. On the evening of July 15, the ketch sailed into Marblehead harbor, home port of many of the hijacked vessels. The town was teeming with refugees from Maine as well as angry and desperate families, who had just heard rumors that all of the fishermen were dead. After hauling the prisoners ashore to "deliver them into the hands of the constable," Roules and his fellow mariners nearly lost their own skins as an angry mob of women "laid violent hands upon the captives [and] with stones, billets of wood, and what else they might," the "vengeful women of Marblehead" decapitated the would-be pirates and "pulled [the flesh] from their bones." Loudly declaring their unwillingness to leave

43 Sylvester Judd, History of Hadley, including the Early History of Hatfield, South Hadley, Amherst and Granby (Springfield, MA: H.R. Hunting, 1905), 146-47.
justice to the courts and demanding personal retribution, Marblehead’s mothers and daughters demonstrated ferocity that would outstrip the most artful Indian torturer.44

The bars of a prison cell were no deterrent to vigilantes, as the two unfortunate Narragansetts discovered in New London. Boston had its share of crowd action as well, and not always against “hostile” Indians. When the Court of Assistants exonerated several Christian Indians of murder and planned to release them in August 1675, an angry mob gathered to exact their own brand of justice and sought Capt. James Oliver to lead them. While Oliver (who earlier in the summer had randomly beheaded several captured Indians) had no warm feelings for Indians, he apparently despised vigilantism just as much and disbursed the crowd with warm words and the head of his cane.45 Just across the river in Charlestown, Sergeant John Shattock, a survivor of Cpt. Beers’s defeat near Northfield a few days before, complained loudly of the release of the accused Indians. With his recent brush with death very much in mind, he vowed that the authorities “shall hang me up by the neck before I ever serve them

again.” A quarter hour later, Shattock drowned when the ferry sank while crossing to Boston.46

A month later, Boston experienced another brief demonstration of mob mentality. Canonchet of the Narragansetts and his aged advisor, Corman, arrived in Boston to reconfirm a treaty with the English. The movement of the Indians through the city caught the attention of many colonists. Sarah Pickering looked up from her work long enough to note Corman just as he was confronted by William Smith. Whether he was affronted by “savages” moving easily through his city or seeking personal satisfaction is unknown. Whatever Smith’s motives, he grabbed hold of the old man and “threw him with violence to the ground, so [that] his back & head came first to the ground, his heels flying up.” A jury sentenced Smith to pay a fine, and the Narragansetts confirmed the treaty a month later, only to have the peace fall apart two months later.47

As King Philip’s War ground on into late 1675 and 1676, New Englanders grew more despondent as the fighting went against them. Hostile Indians seemed to be everywhere yet nowhere, burning towns, destroying property, and melting back into the wilderness before English forces could respond. Indians realized exactly what they were doing, as sagamores Sam and Kutquen Quanohit demonstrated in a reply to a missive from the Massachusetts governor. “You know, and we know, you have great sorrowful with crying,” they wrote, “for

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46 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 466-67; “Diary of Increase Mather,” 400.  
you lost man, many hundred men, and all your house, all your land, and woman, child, and cattle, and all your things that you have lost." To Englishmen, though, such attacks were “expressions of mindless savagery or as divine retribution[,] not]... calculated assaults on the English way of life.” Daniel Gookin repeatedly noted the “animosity and rage” of the colonists toward all Indians. “Because much mischief being done and English blood shed by the brutish enemy,” he later wrote, “and because some neighbour Indians...had proved perfidious and were become enemies, hence it was that all the Indians are reckoned to be false and perfidious.”

William Clarke of Plymouth may have captured the true essence of the “popular” view of Indians best in an encounter with Increase Mather. Mather had admonished Clarke for wishing all Indians dead, arguing that “their innocent blood would cry.” Clarke cared little for Mather’s desire for justice, declaring that “he would say as the Jews did, their blood be upon me & my Children.”

Despite the rage of the people, New England’s magistrates largely interpreted the war as a civil conflict and viewed hostile Indians as rebellious subjects in need of severe chastisement rather than just as savages in need of extermination. Though civil leaders were as vulnerable as anyone to desires for revenge and frequently gave in to popular clamor, for the most part they evaluated, judged, and punished Indians according to English law.

48 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 449, 508; Lepore, The Name of War, 96. 49 “Diary of Increase Mather,” 402.
Of course, any English claims of "civil conflict" and therefore legitimization of vicious suppression and punishment of hostile Indians depended upon European claims to territory and, more importantly, claims of Native American submission to English authority. Historian Yasuhide Kawashima has traced the gradual extension of Puritan law and English dominion over the region's native population. The first compacts between colonists and Indians were nominally based on friendship and mutual support due to the relative weakness of the new settlements. However, after the Pequot War in 1636-37, colonists became increasingly assertive in their legal dealings with natives, first claiming the right of extraterritoriality for Englishmen, followed by declarations of the supremacy of English law in all intercultural, then intracultural, dealings. The degree of English interference often depended upon proximity to European settlements, with natives living outside colony boundaries or on its margins maintaining greater political independence, and those living in "praying towns" or individually within white settlements submitting completely. As Kawashima demonstrates, over the course of the seventeenth century, "colonists' relations with the southern New England Indians had passed from foreign to domestic." Puritans viewed this extension of English law over Indians in pragmatic terms. By authority of charters and patents, any Indians living within the bounds granted by the king were, in English eyes, subjects by default. Furthermore, "superior" law would benefit the natives and assist in their conversion to Christianity, all while "demonstrat[ing]
God's approval of the Puritan exodus. It was God's will that the Puritans be in New England and extend His blessings to those dwelling in darkness.

While Englishmen took for granted their moral superiority, and thus their right to exercise religious and political authority over Indians, New Englanders rooted their extension of power in the law itself. Based on the covenants with and supposed submissions of various sachems, New Englanders firmly believed that many of the region's natives fell under the jurisdiction of one of the four New England colonies and therefore the rule of King Charles II as well. With King Philip as the prime mover in 1675, proving his legal submission was most important. Puritans traced the subordination of Philip's Wampanoags to the summer of 1620, when Philip's father, Massasoit, established a treaty of mutual protection with the settlers of New Plymouth. Colonists conveniently interpreted this as Massasoit swearing fealty to the king of England. Nathaniel Saltonstall, a Boston merchant, later reflected colonial sentiment when he claimed that the Wampanoag sachem "was content to become the Subject of our Soveraign Lord King James, his Heirs and Successors, and gave to the English all the Lands adjacent, and to their Heirs for ever." Massasoit's eldest son, Alexander, reaffirmed this league on September 26, 1630, but more germane to the New Englander's present situation was Philip's own affirmation of the

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covenant with New Plymouth in August 1662. Expressing a desire to continue “that amitiie and frindship that hath formerly bine between this govment and his deceased father and brother,” Philip pledged his loyalty to the king. Following aborted hostilities in 1671, Philip again swore allegiance, this time adding a “rider” to his oath (which he must have delivered with pursed lips), vowing that “this may testifie to the world against me, if ever I shall again fail in my faithfulness towards them (that I have now and at all times found so kind to me), or any other of the English Colonies....” The same year, sachems from other tribes and villages also pledged themselves to the English “to the shedding of our blood, or the lose of our lives.”

Other native groups had gradually sworn some sort of loyalty to a colony or the king over the course of forty years. The overwhelming English victory in the Pequot War and the subsequent formation of the United Colonies encouraged numerous sachems to seek the protection of, and thus submit to, English authorities. The Hartford Treaty of 1638 nominally bound the Mohegans and Narragansetts to Connecticut in a tributary relationship, while in the 1640s another seven sachems submitted their people to colonial authorities in “friendship, Amity & subjection.” Ten more Nipmuck sachems from western Massachusetts submitted in 1668. In addition, historian Jenny Pulsipher

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52 NPCR, 4:25-26, 5:79; [Saltonstall], Continuation of the State of New England, 70; Mather, Brief History of the War with the Indians, 150-1; Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 11.
estimates that over 2,500 natives, representing 20 percent of New England’s native population, had “yield[ed] obedience to the gospel” by 1675.54 James Drake extends this, arguing that by 1675 “most, if not all, of the Indian groups [within New England] had ... sworn loyalty—at least formally—to a colony.”55 What the New Englanders failed to realize (or willfully ignored) was that these various headmen, Philip included, were hardly paramount chiefs with absolute power and authority. Instead, they “ruled” by persuasion and consensus. Yet, the English considered the word of one chief sufficient to establish legal contracts, alliances, and agreements for all members of that “tribe.” Further convinced that Philip was the mastermind of a pan-Indian uprising, New Englanders considered his word as binding—and damning—for every “rebel” Indian.

However dubious English jurisdiction may have been, the colonies’ laws seemed to point to a clear fate for Indian prisoners. In the course of the war, Philip’s kith, kin, and allies committed numerous crimes considered capital in English legal circles. In the summer of 1676 the New Plymouth council drafted a document that reads like a modern “rap sheet,” neatly laying out the charges against the by-then-dead Philip and his allies. “Whereas Philip . . . [and] his accomplices, having bin in confederation and plighted covenant with his

55 Drake, King Philip’s War, 112-13.
maj[jes]ties] collonie of New Plymouth, have lately broken covenant with the English, and they are theire people likewise broken out in open rebellion against our sovr[eig]n lord Kinge Charles, . . . expressed by raising a crewell and unlawfull warr, murdering his liech [liege] people, destroying and burning theire houses and estates, expressing great hostillitie, outrage, and crewellty against . . . [the king's] subjects, werby many of them were p[er]sonally slaine, and some bereaved of theire deare children and relations.” Each of these crimes—“manstealing,” destruction of property, blasphemy, and murder—demanded that the malefactor “suffer the pains of Death.” Added to these crimes were charges of burglary, heresy (by those praying Indians who turned to preying), piracy, and, if the paternalistic Puritans considered the Indians as their hypothetical children or charges, willful failure to submit to the authority of their white “parents.” Perhaps the most odious of these offenses was “publique rebellion” with the intent to “treacherously and perfidiouslie attempt the alteration and subversion of our frame or politie or Government fundamentallie.” As rebellious subjects, Indians forfeited the nominal protection afforded prisoners of sovereign nations, and therefore were subject to a traitor’s death—hanging, beheading, and quartering.56

Clearly, any “simple” solution provided by the law would be colored by passion and prejudice. But, that New England’s leaders truly attempted to

follow the law when considering the fate of prisoners is evident in the legal
language they used to describe hostile Indians—"murderers," "revolters,
"traitors" in "open rebellion,"—and the legal processes by which they abided—
capture, custody, trial by jury, and punishment. As Yasuhide Kawashima
argues, Puritans had long sought "just treatment" of any non-whites within their
jurisdiction. "Their concept of justice," he argues, "consisted of universal
application of their laws; it included ideas of fairness, equality, nonarbitrariness,
and humaneness," though Quakers, witches, and Catholics might disagree.
Based on the Body of Liberties of 1641 and the Laws and Liberties of 1648,
Indians theoretically enjoyed the same legal rights as white inhabitants,
including a proper complaint process, trial by jury, the right to question
witnesses, the option to speak in court, the right to appeal, and suffer similar
punishments. Kawashima found that overall, "legal treatment of natives in
colonial Massachusetts was...not harsh, although it was strict." But Kawashima
also argues that European racial and cultural intolerance influenced the law in
practice. Prejudice led New Englanders to ignore or dismiss native testimony,
particularly if given against a colonist, and to award harsher punishments (debt
slavery or transportation) than for whites. Furthermore, natives "could not make
use of their rights to the fullest extent," often confessing their crimes freely or

57 Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 159-60; King Philip's War Narratives (Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms, 1966), 5; Samuel Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern
Indians, or a Narrative of their Continued Perfidy and Cruelty, From the 10th of August, 1703, To the
Peace Renewed 13th of July, 1713. And from the 25th of July, 1722, To their Submission 15th December,
1725, Which was ratified August 5th, 1726, [Boston: J. Harpel, 1726] Reprint Edition (Cincinnati: J.
Harpel, 1859), 13; CSP 14: 1306; NPCR, 5: 173, 203; RIHSC 5: 164, 175; DHSM, 5: 185.
waiving jury trials (in which their native peers rarely served as “full” jurors) in favor of summary proceedings. As a whole, Kawashima found the Puritan legal system “Just but not equal.”

To complicate matters more, Indian defendants were caught in a power struggle between English commoners serving on juries and their social superiors who dominated the bench. Historian Jenny Pulsipher argues that this was part of a broader power struggle in New England as colonial leaders sought to maintain their supreme authority, rooted in charters granted by the king, while “disgruntled citizens, unhappy neighboring colonies, and Indians” chipped away at their prerogative. Traditionally, judges “had the sole right to decide the law and a jury the right to determine the facts and to receive the law from the court.” However, the popular feeling among New Englanders was that juries should do both. When Indians found themselves on trial for murder and treason, they faced empowered juries and judges who risked public rebuke (and worse) if they dared challenge popular opinion.

Although English law sought equal treatment for all, Indian prisoners still faced a harsh and biased legal system, further enflamed by war. Indeed, they had little hope of mercy. Furthermore, the European culture of war put a combined colonial and civil war such as King Philip’s War outside the bounds of

the laws of war. Yet colonial tribunals were not kangaroo courts, and magistrates and field commanders sought a modicum of justice. Colonial governments granted their military leaders great discretion when encountering “hostile” Indians. As the war expanded in August 1675, the Massachusetts Council granted any Englishman or friendly Indian the right to detain, question “or to kill and destroy” any Indian outside the narrow bounds declared by the government. The magistrates tempered this blanket warrant, “declaring, that it will be most acceptable to them, that none be killed or wounded, that are willing to surrender themselves into custody.” The degree of willingness, of course, was based on the individual’s interpretation and left room for abuse. However, to avoid prosecution for assault or murder, the detainer had to follow legal procedure of interrogation and evaluation. Furthermore, once hostilities commenced, most Englishmen were unwilling to leave the safe confines of town without military escorts. Thus, the enforcement of this regulation fell to military leaders.  

Governments were equally broad in the powers they granted to military leaders regarding treatment of prisoners. In cases of suspected spies or saboteurs, commanders could act with impunity. Benjamin Church warned Josiah Winslow of an Indian woman in Plymouth “who seems to be sent with lies and flam[e]s to affright and corrupt your Indians.” Winslow advised his military

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60 CCR 2: 359-60; [Gookin], *Historical Account...of the Christian Indians*, 450-51.
commanders to execute her, but he left it to their discretion.\textsuperscript{61} Though her fate is unknown, an earlier native spy in Plymouth wound up decorating the governor’s door with his severed head.\textsuperscript{62}

Unlike the quick fate of spies, prisoners who submitted to or were captured by colonial forces required proper legal procedure. The Connecticut Council’s orders to Major Robert Treat, appointed to command that colony’s forces in August 1675, are illustrative of this point. The Council authorized Treat to “use any stratagems of war for advantage against the enemie,” including offering terms of surrender or quarter. He was to determine any prisoner’s culpability for crimes committed against the colonists and to deny pardon to “grand contrivers and murtherers.” Before Treat could dispose of such suspected criminals, however, such charges must be “proved against them.”\textsuperscript{63} Governments did not widely distribute summary powers; instead they concentrated this authority in the hands of relatively few commanders. In October 1675, Boston merchant Jon Paine complained to the Commissioners of the United Colonies that military forces had unjustly removed “Jack Indian,” his family, and another man from their wigwam near Paine’s house. Captains Matthew Fuller and John Gorham replied “they had good grounds for wt they did & to suspect them.” Rather than determine the fate of these Indians

\textsuperscript{61}Josiah Winslow to Thomas Hinckley and John Freeman, 23 May 1676, in MHSC 4th ser. 5: 8-10.
\textsuperscript{62}Benjamin Batten to Sir Thomas Allyn, 29 June-6 July 1675, CSP 9: 253; the Connecticut Council granted powers to its Council of War and other leaders “to condemn such Indian murtherers as shall be brought in.” CCR 2: 413.
\textsuperscript{63}Orders to Major Robert Treat, 30 Aug. 1675, CCR 2: 356; see also CCR 2: 367.
themselves, Fuller and Gorham declared they must "take [the Indians] & examin them before ther Genll." 64

Other commanders possessed summary powers and could carry out punishment if warranted by law. While no colony maintained an official proscription list, the notoriety of certain Indians or their clear association with arch-traitor Philip was sufficient cause for execution. In summer 1676, the Plymouth council ordered Cpt. Benjamin Church "to receive to mercy, give quarter, or not; excepting some particular and noted murderers." Church caught one of those "noted murderers," Sam Barrow. "The Court had allowed him no quarter," Church informed him, "because of his inhuman murders and barbarities." Apparently, Plymouth authorities condemned Barrow in absentia, and one of Church's Indians carried out the execution.65 In several other incidents, commanders such as Maj. John Pynchon and Capt. Thomas Prentice summarily executed prisoners who were known Wampanoags or "one of Philip's Company," enough to label them as traitors by association. Pynchon was not indiscriminate with his powers. Soon after the August 1675 raid on Brookfield, a young Indian man sought shelter in Springfield. Local residents suspected him of supplying the enemy and labeled him "a man of death," while a scout fingered him as participating in the Brookfield attack. Knowing the Indian in question had an extended family sheltering in Northampton, Pynchon doubted

64 Jon Paine to the Commissioners of the United Colonies, Oct. 1675, in Further Letters on King Philip's War (Providence, RI: E.L. Freeman, 1923), 14-16.
65 Church, History of Philip's War, 96, 119.
his guilt. Instead of dispatching the Indian with a hatchet, Pynchon sent him under guard to Major Simon Willard at Brookfield for further examination.

Springfield’s residents “cry out that he is not dispatched,” wrote Pynchon, and “think I have done ill to discharge the lad.”

In most cases, once military leaders had prisoners in custody, they “separated the Vile and Wicked from the Rest, and sent them down to the Governour at Boston” or other centers of power for trial. New Englanders may have seen all natives as “Serpents of the same Brood,” but they relied on the law to determine their degree of guilt. At trial, the prosecution presented both evidence and witnesses to prove their case, and defendants were afforded the opportunity “to present [their] plea before the Councill why [they] should not be proceeded against accordingly.” Despite popular pressure to “drive the judges and jurors upon the rock of bringing blood upon the land,” magistrates conducted fair trials and juries had the courage to occasionally acquit Indians of murder, rebellion, or other crimes.

The first trial of significance came relatively early in the war and was occasioned by the confessions that Capt. Moseley had tortured out of Andrew and David in August 1675. In exchange for his life, David accused fourteen Indians from the praying town of Okonokhamesitt, near Marlborough, of

67 Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, 320-21.
68 Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 244.
murder. Although these men had served as scouts and guides for English forces in the early weeks of the war, Moseley "pinioned and fastened [them] with lines from neck to neck" and sent them to Boston like a coffle of slaves. Eleven of the group stood accused of "a notorious murder upon seven English persons at Lancaster upon a Lord's day." However, David proved an unreliable witness. Defendant James Akompanet quickly pointed out that he and the other accused had originally captured David and turned him over to the English. Clearly, he fingered the Okonokhamesitt Indians "to revenge himself of them," and David admitted as much when examined by the court. The prosecution also produced circumstantial evidence, including a pair of bandoleers, known to belong to one of the dead Englishmen, and a bloody shirt worn by one of the accused. "By good evidence [they] cleared matters, all those pleas [being] figments," wrote Daniel Gookin. Calling numerous witnesses, including colonists, the defendants established an unshakable alibi, having been "at worship of God in their fort...ten miles distant" at the time of the murder. Another white man testified that James Rumny Marsh, one of the Indians, had "honestly" acquired the bandoleer. Finally the bloody shirt came not from murder but from a successful deer hunt—the man had still been carrying portions of the deer on his back when apprehended by English forces.70

70 Gookin, Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 455-8; Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 52-54; Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 95.
Gookin hinted that the anti-Indian "popular party," as well as Marlborough inhabitants who had long eyed the Indian land near their town, had tried to fabricate a case against the Indians. "Every stone was turned by their enemies to bring them to destruction. But some, that were more considerate, serious, and pious, had their hearts exercised with tremblings in prayer all this time." With such overwhelming evidence, the jury had no choice but to acquit the men, though two other defendants were sentenced to transportation or death for other crimes. Realizing the unpopularity of the decision, the court chose to release the Indians under cover of darkness and escort them to the praying town of Natick. Public anger over this wildly unpopular verdict and the "underhanded" means of spiriting the Indians out of the city resulted in the mob converging on Cpt. Oliver's house in hopes of creating a lynch mob. Though the bulk of the Okonokhamesitt Indians escaped unharmed, the mob had the satisfaction of a public execution soon after.71

As the near-lynching of the Okonokhamesitt Indians demonstrated, the public was out for blood, and releasing Indian prisoners into the general public was as intelligent as leaving sheep in the care of wolves. After their acquittal for allegedly burning haystacks (a capital crime) in Charlestown in October 1675, twenty Indians from Wamesit passed through Woburn en route home and encountered Woburn's train-band in the midst of drill. Realizing a potential

71 Gookin, Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 455-58, 460-62, 466-67; Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 52-54; [Saltonstall], Present State of New-England, 40-1.
debacle when they saw it—armed and angry Englishmen encountering accused
(though acquitted) natives—the Indians' escort consulted with the Woburn
captain. Despite the commander's strict orders to hold fire until the Indians were
passed "nor yet to give any opprobrious words," a soldier named Knight (clearly
lacking the chivalry associated with his name) discharged his musket, killing a
young Indian in the party. Like the New London soldiers the following year,
Knight "beat the rap" by smugly claiming an accidental discharge. Despite an
abundance of witnesses, none would speak against Knight. "Indeed witnesses
were mealy-mouthed in giving evidence," complained Daniel Gookin. "Much
contrary to the mind of the bench," the jury found Knight not guilty, and despite
lectures from the court and repeated orders to reconsider their decision, "the jury
did not see cause to alter their mind."72

This duel between juries and the bench was representative of a broader
split among New Englanders as to the proper fate of native prisoners. Historian
James Drake argues that social position was the determining factor in how New
Englanders treated prisoners. Individuals who lacked formal military training—
civilians and volunteer soldiers—tended toward indiscriminant acts of
retribution against all Indians and demonstrated a general disregard for
authority. To Drake, Samuel Moseley was the personification of this "popular
party" attitude.73 Lacking any formal training and unable to obtain a military

73 Drake, "Restraining Atrocity," 44-5; [Gookin], Historical Account . . . of the Christian Indians, 496.
commission despite marriage connections to the Massachusetts governor, Moseley led a volunteer company composed of the sweepings of the colony. As a former privateer in the Caribbean, Moseley called on some of his past shipmates and recruited servants, apprentices, and even a condemned pirate. Over the course of the war, Moseley and his company tortured confessions from friendly Christian Indians, seized Indians who were under the protection of the General Court and shipped them to Boston for trial, responded to the groundless suspicions of white communities against Indian neighbors, set dogs on helpless prisoners, and repeatedly ignored commands from the government. As one magistrate wrote of Moseley, his actions were "very offensive to the Council, that a private captain should (without commission or some express order) do an act so contradictory to their former orders." 74

Contrasting with Moseley and the amateur lower sorts, Drake argues, were government officials and trained military leaders (social elites), who demonstrated restraint when judging prisoners. Daniel Gookin represented this element of Massachusetts society. As commissioner for the Christian Indians, Gookin defended his native charges against manufactured crimes and chastised those, such as Moseley, who acted without thought. Gookin's retrospective narrative of the Christian Indians seems to support Drake's class conclusion,

74 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 496; [Saltonstall], Present State of New-England, 28, 30, 39; Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 68-9, 76; Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 70; Mass. Records, 5: 94-5.
criticizing "the common people" several times and hinting that a Boston lynch mob was composed of servants and apprentices.75

By contrast, historian Jenny Pulsipher discounts class as a determinant, noting that animosity toward Indians could be found across the social spectrum. Moseley’s men may have been “vulgar,” but people from the middle and upper ranks of society held equally vicious attitudes. In August 1676, four English soldiers returning to Concord from military service encountered six Christian Indians picking berries on Hurleberry Hill. The mounted men chased the three women and their children, killed them with muskets and hatchets, and left their bodies to rot.76 According to Pulsipher’s examination of probate records, these men were of the middling sort. Furthermore, magistrates and ministers agitated against Indians as well. Mary Rowlandson returned from captivity embittered against Christian Indians. She later reported that the Okonokhamesitt Indians near Marlborough were responsible for the killings at Lancaster in August 1675, even though the court had cleared them and another Indian had confessed.

Rather than class, Pulsipher argues that generation influenced attitudes toward Indians. To obtain land, many of the second generation had to settle farther from the core towns, which exposed them to Indian attacks. Furthermore, the first generation increasingly blamed the younger generation for the apparent decline in religious fervor and social cohesion in New England. “It is not surprising,”

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75 Drake, “Restraining Atrocity,” 44-47; [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 449, 466.
76 Ibid., 513-14.
concludes Pulsipher, "that under these conditions some rejected the constraints placed on them by their elders and lashed out against any Indians they could find, including those under government protection."77

Pulsipher only hints at what was likely the source of aggression toward Indians, in the field or the court room—proximity to danger and loss. Soldiers, refugees, and frontier dwellers tended to have the harshest attitude toward prisoners, having witnessed battle, destruction, and the trauma of close-quarter combat.78 Daniel Gookin, though a trained soldier and captain of a militia company, never directly confronted Indians in battle. In contrast, Capt. James Oliver, a fellow member of the bench, led forces in combat and was an outspoken critic of Gookin’s defense of Christian Indians. Although Oliver condemned the attempted lynching of Indian prisoners, he had ordered summary executions himself. Veterans from the middle and lower strataums of society were equally willing to give in to violence, as the Hurtleberry Hill killers demonstrated. In Springfield, John Pynchon’s decision to execute a suspected enemy was influenced by the scores of refugees who were sheltering in his town after they had abandoned settlements further up the Connecticut River Valley.79 Even civilians who remained in safety could turn violent after losing loved ones to

77 Pulsipher Subjects unto the Same King, 135-36, 142, 144, 148-50; Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 71-73; Rowlandson, Sovereignty and Goodness of God; see also [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 444, 492 for white captives making accusations against Christian Indians.
78 [Harris], Rhode Islander Reports, 76.
Indian attack, as the goodwives-turned-executioners of Marblehead proved. Clearly, animosity and atrocities committed in war were not limited to "brutal, hardened soldiers" or the "lowest orders of society."80

On occasion, provincial magistrates punished and even condemned New Englanders who acted beyond their authority.81 The four Hurtleberry Hill killers faced trial before the Court of Assistants in Boston on September 4, 1676. Daniel Hoar, Daniel Goble, Stephen Goble, and Nathaniel Wilder all admitted to the murders, but they claimed their actions were justified based on the General Court's previous declarations regarding Indians "wandering" too far from their village. In fact, Daniel Hoar's father, a lawyer, argued "I humbly conceive he had not broken any law."82 A jury of Englishmen convicted all four men and sentenced them to death, though Wilder and Hoar would receive pardons upon appeal. Not surprisingly, the jury's verdict on the Hurtleberry Hill Four was extremely unpopular. William Marsh intimated that "three or four hundred men...would guard them from the gallows." Despite the threats of mob action, Stephen Goble was executed on September 14, 1676 along with three Indians convicted of killing whites, followed by his uncle a week later. Increase Mather recorded both executions in his diary, and his conflicted statements on the crime

80 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, passim; Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 174; Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 149; Axtell, "Vengeful Women of Marblehead;"Corvisier, Armies and Societies in Europe, 5.
81 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 460, 474-75; Bodge, Soldiers of King Philip's War, 76, 159-60, 225, 461; Mass. Records, 5: 68, 94-95; Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 52-54, 56-57, 71-73, 76, 86-88.
82 Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 136; [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 513-14.
and sentence are reflective of New Englanders as a whole. When Mather first heard of the murders, he feared “if Justice be not done upon the Murderers, God will take Vengeance,” as would the Indians. Yet when Stephen Goble hung on the gibbet, Mather’s greatest concern was not the need for justice, but that an Englishman should die alongside an Indian.\textsuperscript{83}

Magistrates attempted to try Englishmen for similar crimes on other occasions but had little success with convictions. The results of a trial in November 1675 illustrate why jurors rarely convicted whites for crimes committed against Indians during war. The same Wamesit Indians assaulted by Knight were once again accused by their white Chelmsford neighbors, this time for burning a barn. Rather than resort to authorities, fourteen men from Chelmsford marched on the Indian village and confronted the few Indians gathered around their wigwams. With no warning, John Largin and George Robbins indiscriminately fired their weapons into group of Indians, killing a twelve-year-old boy and wounding five women and children. Although Daniel Gookin claimed that “all wise and prudent men, especially...the magistracy and ministry” deplored the act, a jury of Englishmen found Largin and Robbins innocent. Gookin claimed “a mist of temptation and prejudice against these poor Indians [had] darkened their way.” Rather than simple prejudice, it may well have been fear of their fellow citizens that influenced the jurors. Gookin

\textsuperscript{83} Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 71-73; “The Diary of Samuel Sewall,” MHSC, 5\textsuperscript{th} ser. 5: 21-22; “Diary of Increase Mather,” 403; Mass. Records, 5: 117; MA, 30:221a.
recorded how New Englanders “could hardly extend charity to the jurors and magistrates” who acquitted Indians. 84 Hard feelings would be even worse for convicting an Englishman of doing what most whites would applaud them for. The soldiers who murdered the prisoners in New London, Connecticut were never convicted for their murders, nor was Knight for his “accidental discharge.” One can imagine how Robert Roules must have felt in Marblehead as he watched the mob of women tear his prisoners limb from limb. He later claimed that “such was the tumultation these women made, that for my life I could not tell who these women were, or the names of any of them.” In the midst of such passion and fury, his life quite literally depended upon his silence.85

Magistrates who sought justice for prisoners, or at least publicly supported the Christian Indians, faced genuine danger for their actions. They had clearly struck a chord with the public, who recognized the court’s unwillingness to rubber stamp convictions. After killing the Indian prisoners brought in by Roules, the Marblehead matrons claimed “if the Indians had been carried to Boston, that would have been the end of it, and they would have been set at liberty.”86 As a result, Daniel Gookin faced taunts from fellow magistrates, such as Capt. James Oliver, who, fed up with Gookin’s “Impertinences and multitudinous Speeches,” told Gookin he should be “confined with his Indians [Christian Indians on Deer Island] than to sit on the Bench.” Nathaniel

84 [Gookin], Historical Account...of the Christian Indians, 459, 482-83; Mass. Court of Assistants 1: 56-57; Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, 300, 400; Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 153-54.
86 Ibid.
Saltonstall claimed that Gookin’s efforts on behalf of Christian Indians had “made him a Byword both among Men and Boys.”87 Gookin, Thomas Danforth, and John Eliot faced worse on the streets of Boston. Elizabeth Belcher overheard Richard Scott call Gookin an “Irish Dog, [that] was never faithful to his country, the son of a whore, a Bitch, a Rogue, god confound him, & god rot his soul.”

Scott intended more than words, Belcher claimed. “If I could meet him alone, I would Pistol him, I wish my knife...were in his heart.”88 Given the mood of the people, this was not an idle threat. In February 1676, an anonymous group of New Englanders, calling themselves “the Society A.B.C.D.,” published a letter threatening Gookin and Danforth with imminent death. Asking fellow Bostonians to help circulate the letter, the Society warned “those traitors to their King and Country...Guggins and Danford, that some generous spirits have vowed their destruction.” Not wishing to seem uncharitable or unchristian, the Society “warne[d] them to prepare for death, for though they will deservedly die; yet we wish the health of their souls.” The Society or other opponents may have attempted to kill Gookin and Danforth a few weeks later. In April, with John Eliot, they sailed to Long Island in Boston Harbor to inspect the Christian Indians sequestered there. En route, a large vessel “whether willfully or by negligence, God he knoweth,” struck their small boat. “I drank in salt water twice, & could

87 [Saltonstall], Present State of New-England, 40.
88 Deposition of Elizabeth Belcher and others, 4 March 1676, MA 30: 192; The Court of Assistants fined Scott £100 to be paid to Gookin. See Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 61. Some opponents also circulated the rumor that Gookin was indirectly supplying gun powder to Philip through the Christian Indians. See Mary Pray to James Oliver, 20 Oct. 1675, MHSC 5th ser. 1: 105.
not help it,” recollected Eliot. Fortunately, no one died, though some New Englanders wished that were not the case. “Some thanked God,” for their deliverance, Eliot recorded, while “some wished we had bene drowned.”

Andrew Newcomb, accused of sinking Eliot’s boat, claimed “it was like two persons walking or meetinge one an other in a broad street & by indeveringe to shune one another runn against each other as is very usuall.” The court fined him £15 for damages, and Eliot and Gookin continued their efforts. Opponents took a safer—and legal—action against Gookin later that spring, voting him out of office and off the bench.89

Despite unfriendly juries and a hostile public, court officials at least sought proper proceedings for Indian defendants. Fair trials were not limited to Christian Indian allies taken under questionable circumstances.90 In the closing weeks of the war, as hundreds of Indians surrendered en mass to colonial forces, the Rhode Island Council invoked its charter power “to Exercise the Law

89 [Harris], Rhode Islander Reports, 66; MA 30:193a; William B. Trask, ed, “Rev. John Eliot’s Records of the First Church in Roxbury, Mass,” in A Report of the Record Commissioners Containing the Roxbury Land and Church Records, 2nd ed. (Boston: Rockwell and Churchill, 1884), 193-94; Records of the Suffolk County Court 1671-1680, Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, vols. 29-30 (Boston, 1933), 30: 695; other Indian advocates faced harassment as well. John Hoar, who oversaw the fifty-eight Nashobah Indians in Concord, claimed he was “being daily threatened to be shot, and one snapped at thrice at my own door by a Lankastsheir soldier.” Pulsipher, Subjects unto the Same King, 143.

Martiall in such Cases as Occasions shall necessarily require." The basis of each case lay in the original actions of Philip, "who trayterously, rebellioues, royetously and routously arm[ed], weapon[ed], and array[ed] themselves with Swords, Guns and Staves, &c., and have killed and bloodely murthered many of his said Majestys good Subjects, who lived peaceably under the sundry Governments to which they did belong." For adhering to Philip, the Rhode Island attorney general declared, "I doe on the Behalfe of his said Majesty, impeacht thee as a Rebell in the Face of this Court." Over the course of five days, the court examined numerous accused rebels. With each defendant, the attorney general questioned the individual, presented evidence, called many witnesses (both against and in favor of the defendants), allowed the defendant to speak, and weighed the facts of the case. The court did not rush these cases, truly seeking to determine "if any of them have been in open hostility against the English and have imbrued their hands in English blood or otherwayes damnifyed them." In the examination of Manasses Molasses, the court questioned nine witnesses, four white men and five native men and women, before rendering judgment. The results were not uniform—the court condemned some to "be shott to death," others had judgment suspended, and a few like Molasses were sent to Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay for further questioning.  

91 Record of a Court Martial held at Newport, R.I. in August, 1676 for the Trial of Indians Charged with being Engaged in Philip's Designs," 1-17; RIPP, 2:586; Orders of Joshua Indian, 24 Aug. 1675 in CCR 2: 352; Plymouth was equally thorough when examining prisoners. When three Indians
As a whole, colonial courts treated native defendants “justly” but harshly. For each Indian acquitted of “war crimes,” many more were convicted on inadequate evidence. The criteria for guilt or innocence lay in the accused Indians’ behavior, whether proven or merely suspected, and to colonists the mere hint of suspicion was often enough to acquaint the accused with the hangman. In the March 1677 murder trial of Canjuncke, Nassamaquat, and Pompacanshee, the Plymouth jury exonerated Pompacanshee and failed to return a guilty verdict against his companions. However, the jurors found Canjuncke and Nassamaquat “very suspicious of the murder charged on them,” and “there not appeering further evidence against them to cleare up the case,” the court ordered all three sold into foreign slavery.92

As might be expected in time of war and upheaval, the colonists’ sense of fairness was off kilter, and the evidence and witnesses accepted by the courts reflected this. Judges privileged the testimony of whites over that of Indians and accepted native testimony only when favorable to public interest, particularly when supportive of a guilty verdict against other Indians.93 In normal capital murder cases, the law mandated at least two witnesses to condemn the defendant, a requirement often overlooked with Indian prisoners. In July 1676,

petitioned on behalf of thirty Saconett men and their families to “renew theire peace with the English,” the court asked a detailed series of questions regarding their motivations; reason for coming into Plymouth; why their request should be granted; why they did not join the English at the outset of the war; why they feared the English; had they burned any English homes; had the English done them any wrong or threaten them. Even after answering these questions, the court denied the petition and demanded proof of fidelity, including fighting alongside Plymouth forces against Philip. NPCR 5: 201-3; see also CCR 2: 471-72, 479-80.

the Plymouth court condemned and executed Woodcocke, Quanapawhan, and John Num for the murder of Sarah Clark based on the testimony of an Indian woman, who bargained her testimony in exchange for mercy. Her accusation of one led to a series of examinations, each producing another confession and accusation. In the end, only her confession was voluntary, and it was sufficient to convict and execute three men.94

In the case of Captain Tom, a Christian Indian from Natick and leader of that praying town’s train-band, the “ear-witness” testimony of two white men outweighed the evidence presented by six Indian allies. Tom admitted to accompanying hostile Nipmuck Indians into New England’s nether regions, but only when threatened with death. Jon Partridge of Medfield presented damning but questionable evidence against Tom, testifying that during an assault on his home, “I did heare the very reall voice of captaine Tome.” Edward Cowell claimed that in a skirmish with Indians near Sudbury, he recognized Captain Tom among the hostiles “by a grumbling signe or Noyse that hee Mayde.” In Tom’s defense, James Quanapaug, a Praying Indian who served the English as a spy, swore that Tom “told me that hee . . . greatly desired to bee among the praying Indians & englishe againe. . . hee never had or would fight against the English.” Five other Christian Indians, officers of Massachusetts’ Indian companies, submitted a collective petition on Tom’s behalf. The Council rejected their plea, as well as Quanapaug’s testimony, stating that “it doth appeare by

94 NPCR, 5:204-6; Mather, Brief History of the War, 131-32, 204-6.
sufficient evidence that he was not only . . . an instigator to others over whom he was by this government made a Captain, but also was actually present and an actor in the devastation of some of our plantations.” Tom made one last plea when led to the gallows on June 22. “I did never lift up a hand against the English,” he claimed, “only I was willing to goe away with the enemies that surprised us.” Even if innocent of insurrection, Tom’s self-admitted failure as militia captain to offer armed resistance would certainly have earned him a date with death, and no number of petitions or eyewitnesses (especially of native origin) could change his fate.95

With jurors most likely predisposed against natives, hostile ear- and eye-witnesses, and likely disregard of any favorable testimony, Indian defendants found the judicial deck stacked against them. The chance for acquittal dimmed even further because New Englanders’ classification of the war rejected the application of the rules of war. Viewing the conflict, in part, as a civil war, the courts voided the Indians’ best defensive gambit—the cloak of immunity afforded soldiers at war. William and Joseph Wannuckkow and John Appamatogoon argued this defense at their trial in September 1676. “It was a time of ware when this Mischiefe was done; and though It was our unhappy Portion [to] be with the Enimies, yet we conceive that depredations and

95 Deposition of Jon Partridge before the Massachusetts Council, 19 June 1676, MA, 30: 205b; Deposition of Edward Cowell, 19 June 1676, in Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip’s War, 225; Deposition of Edmund Rice and Abraham Gale before the Massachusetts Council, 19 June 1676, MA, 30: 204b; [Gookin], Historical Account . . . of the Christian Indians, 476-77, 528-29; Lepore, The Name of War, 143-44.
Slaughters in warre are not Chargable upon Particular persons.” They further cited their successful efforts “to save Goodman Eames and his children” from their burning home during a raid. To their detriment, the court remained unmoved by their claims of mercy and heroism or the logic of their argument and convicted them as rebels against the king.96

Guilty verdicts handed down against their native foes pleased New Englanders. But the executions that followed were the defining moment of justice and satisfaction for most Englishmen, providing the average resident with the opportunity to witness or exact officially sanctioned revenge by leering at tawny bodies kicking at the end of a rope or occasionally heaving on the halter itself. The punishments exacted were no different than what other rebels received in English and European societies—summary justice, deportation into servitude, or “judicial slaughter.”97 In August 1675, several enthusiastic citizens of Boston led a condemned Indian to the gallows pole, flung the rope over the top, and “so hoisted him up like a Dog, three or four Times, he being yet half alive and half dead.” As he vainly struggled against the tightening noose, another Indian stepped out from the crowd of onlookers, stuck a knife into the dying man’s chest, “and sucked out his Heart-Blood.” With this “Dog-like

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96 William and Joseph Wannuckkow and John Appamatogoon to the Massachusetts Council, 5 Sept. 1676, MA, 30: 216-17; Joseph Indian and others to the Massachusetts Council, 14 Aug. 1676, MA, 30: 211.
Death," wrote Nathaniel Saltonstall, "was the Peoples Rage laid in some Measure." 

Native prisoners in more pacific Rhode Island could occasionally expect similar treatment. Nearly crippled by "putrid and infected wounds" that would likely have been the end of him soon enough, an Indian named Chuff faced swift justice. Labeling Chuff as "a Ring leader all ye War to most of ye Mischiefs to our Howses & Cattell, & what English he could," the inhabitants of Providence "cried out for Justice agnst him threaning themselves to kill him if ye Authoritie did not. Roger Williams assembled the Rhode Island Council, formed a court martial, tried and condemned Chuff, and quickly felled him with a ball to the breast, "to the great satisfaction of the Towne." 

Executions were not always as grisly as that in Boston or as satisfying as Chuff's, and New Englanders tended to note executions of more infamous Indians or exceptional occurrences. In late July 1676, Sagamore John of the Pakachoag praying Indians brought in a notorious "rebel," Matoonas, as a peace offering. Massachusetts had executed Matoonas's son in 1671, for which the aging sachem declared his intent to avenge his son's death. Matoonas stood accused of killing two Englishmen at Mendon, the first to die in Massachusetts during the war, as well as being "the principal Ringleader" in the assault on Brookfield in August 1675. After the council condemned Matoonas, Sagamore

98 [Saltonstall], Present State of New-England, 41.
John (still seeking forgiveness for turning away from the English) asked that he and his men serve as executioners. John’s men tied Matoonas to a tree on Boston Common, shot him, and decapitated him. “His head [was] cut off and placed upon a Pole on the Gallows opposite to his Sons that was there formerly hanged,” recorded one witness.¹⁰⁰

The growing frequency of executions, with thirty Indians shot in one day on the common, reduced them to mundane events, garnering little more than passing references in Bostonian judge Samuel Sewell’s diary. On September 13, 1676, Sewell described the unusual method of execution, firing squad, and the precise location on Boston Common, “upon Wind-mill hill,” where the executions took place. On the 21st, he noted the weather at execution times as well as the condemned Indians’ actions and demeanor. The following morning, he participated in the dissection of one of the executed Indians, noting one doctor’s attempt at humor when he declared the Indian’s heart “to be the stomach.” Five days later, he listed by name the natives sent to the gallows along with their crimes. By mid-October, he merely tacked the event onto other daily dealings. “Note, went not to Lecture Two Indians executed.” Perhaps his thirst for revenge had been slaked. “Most Ring leaders in the late Massacre have themselves had blood to drink,” he wrote, “ending their lives by Bullets and Halter.” Increase Mather’s interest and powers of description waned in a

¹⁰⁰ A True Account of the Most Considerable Occurrences that have Hapned in the Warre between the English and the Indians in New-England (London: B. Billingsley, 1676), 8; Mather, Brief History of the Indian War, 135; Metcalf, Annals of the Town of Mendon, 78.
similar way as the spectacle (and satisfaction) of public executions became commonplace. On September 22, 1676, he noted a bit of excitement when “a mad woman got away with the rope” intended to hang a condemned Englishman, forcing the executioners to cut down the just-executed Sagamore Sam and reuse the same noose. Mather no longer bothered to record executions in his diary after this entry.\textsuperscript{101}

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Most prisoners did not face the hangman, nor did many of them receive formal trials for their “crimes.” Toward the end of the war, as English soldiers brought in greater numbers of prisoners and other Indians voluntarily submitted, New England towns quickly filled with droves of captive and surrendered Indians (eventually numbering over two thousand), whose fate had yet to be determined.\textsuperscript{102} Massachusetts and Connecticut both appointed committees to disburse Indians throughout the region to await trial, but as prisoner numbers grew and court dockets lengthened, individual trials became impractical, as did execution.\textsuperscript{103} Besides an increased court load, these crowds of

\textsuperscript{101} “The Diary of Samuel Sewell,” MHSC, 5th ser. 5: 13-14, 16-17, 21-25; “Diary of Increase Mather,” 403-5; Lincoln, History of Worcester, 31; Segal and Stineback, Puritans, Indians, and Manifest Destiny, 196-97; for other accounts of executions see Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1: 107-8, 182; [Gookin], Historical Account . . . of the Christian Indians, 471, 473; Mather, Brief History of the War, 138; Mass. Court of Assistants, 1: 76.


\textsuperscript{103} Hubbard, History of the Indian Wars, 1:96; William Jones to William Leete, 19 May 1676, CCR, 2:470; MA, 30: 209.
formerly hostile Indians also caused great consternation among the people.\textsuperscript{104} Responding to the people’s fear of prisoners rising against them, colonial leaders passed a series of measures intended to secure “those Indians already come in, or that may be brought into their hands” so that “they may be hindered from doeinge damage to the inhabitants.” Rhode Island, for example, required any inhabitant who held an Indian twelve years or older to provide “a sufficient keeper” during the day and to keep them under lock and key at night.\textsuperscript{105} Partly as a consequence of this, New Englanders considered other means of punishing and disposing of Indian prisoners of war. While the most prominent and “vile” Indians continued to die by halter and hackbut, killing every prisoner was hardly possible or desirable. Traditional means of ridding society of unsavory characters through “warning out” and banishment were impractical as well. Native pariahs would simply blend in with other Indians, continue to live in the region, and, many Englishmen believed, likely “prove prejuditiall to our comon peace and safety.”\textsuperscript{106} Finally, imprisoning over two thousand people was not cost effective. At approximately two shillings per week for each prisoner’s upkeep (the going rate in Salem), the colonies would be doling out over £200 each week from already empty coffers.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{104} MA, 30: 209; MHSC 4\textsuperscript{th} ser. 8: 689; Clarence S. Brigham, ed, \textit{The Early Records of the Town of Portsmouth} (Providence, RI: E.L. Freeman and Sons, 1901), 187-88.
\textsuperscript{105} Mass. Records, 5: 72; RICR 2: 534; CCR 477; \textit{Early Records of Providence}, 8: 14.
While faced with these moral and economic dilemmas, the New England colonies had other immediate and critical needs to consider. The increased military and civil expenses of the war had quickly emptied their coffers, yet fiscal obligations remained, particularly to soldiers. At war’s end, the colonies also faced the task of rebuilding towns, farms, and businesses with a depleted labor pool. Historian Lawrence Towner argued that New England had suffered a chronic labor shortage from its beginning. The colonies lacked a ready pool of skilled and unskilled workers, and many who might have filled these roles were drawn away by available land. In particular, there was a shortage of female labor, leaving English women to perform all the normal domestic duties with “considerably fewer female servants to assist them than was customary in England.” The losses in King Philip’s War and displacement of thousands of people made the situation worse.108

Above all, New England required physical and psychological security, and accords of the past had clearly failed to address this need. Wary of relying on treaties again, the New Englanders demanded “more than words to binde [the natives] to fidelity” and instead sought to put the Indians “in a situation not to again engage in burning the towns and murdering the inhabitants.”109 Many

New Englanders likely harkened back the fate of the Pequots in 1637. As Edward Johnson wrote in his providential history of New England, *Johnson's Wonder-Working Providence*, Massachusetts and Connecticut leaders attempted to erase the Pequots as a people, thus removing them as a future threat to white settlement. As he recorded, “the Squawes and some young youths [the English army] brought home with them, and finding the men to be deeply guilty of the crimes they undertook the warre for, they brought away onely their heads as a token of their victory.” Whether dead, enslaved, or under the English thumb, the Pequots had posed no threat since 1637.

Practical as ever, colonial leaders used one dilemma to resolve others: selling Indian prisoners into bondage from the war’s beginning. As Johnson’s history revealed, New Englanders had established precedent during the Pequot War by marketing captives as servants and slaves. In June and July 1637, Connecticut and Massachusetts sold seventeen Pequot women and children to sugar planters on Providence Island in the Caribbean, while purchasing or claiming as rightful plunder of war another 250-300 captives. Historian Michael Fickes explains that this surge of laborers boosted New England’s servant population by 18 percent and helped alleviate the shortage of female servants. Based on early English notions of Indian cultures, where subservient

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women worked while men apparently lounged, New Englanders believed that Pequot women would make excellent domestic servants. However, Puritans would discover that their new servants were not the ideal workers they had envisioned. The combination of a foreign work environment, frequent abuse by their masters, and ill-feelings toward the people that had destroyed their families led many Pequot servants to perform poorly, possibly on purpose. Hugh Peter, who acquired several Pequot servants after the war, went to the trouble of requesting an English maid to replace his native servant. Demonstrating the widespread frustration with Indian servants, he lamented, "Truly wee are so destitute (having none but an Indian) that wee know not what to doe." Even more ran from their masters "before they could be made serviceable to God and man." Forty years later, as New Englanders once again considered selling captives as domestic servants, William Harris of Rhode Island warned of the likely outcome. "They will run all away againe," he concluded, "as ye captives formerly did after ye Pequot war forty years since." 

Even with the unsatisfactory results of Pequot servitude, some eminent colonists had long eyed the potential profits from peddling prisoners. Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts and Emanuel Downing, his brother-in-law, had plotted for such an opportunity in 1645, planning to profit from any future Indian unpleasantness. "If upon a Just warr the Lord should deliver [Indians]
into our hands, wee might easily have men woemen and children enough to exchange for Moors,” penned Downing. He must have experienced first-hand the problems of Pequot servitude or else heard Hugh Peter’s lament about their unsuitability. However, Downing argued that New England’s insufficient labor pool had to be addressed for the region to expand. English servants demanded such high wages to resist the temptation of available land to the west, Downing claimed, that he could support twenty African slaves on the wages of one Englishman. “I doe not see how wee can thrive,” he continued, “until wee gett into a stock of slaves sufficient to doe all our business.” His solution was to trade New England Indians to Caribbean planters for African slaves, who earned no pay and could not blend into surrounding native communities.114

New Englanders built upon the precedent of selling and enslaving prisoners through law and practice. When some New Englanders questioned the existence of slavery in their midst, the colonies developed laws to allow for “bond slavery, villenage or captivity amongst us,” so long as the victims “be Lawfull captives, taken in just warrs.”115 New Englanders put this into practice during the English Civil War as Cromwell’s Parliamentarian forces captured large groups of royalist Scots and sold them overseas. Unwilling to maintain them in England or send them all home, fearing they would return to the king’s forces, Cromwell opted for exile. He shipped over four hundred men to New

114 Emanuel Downing to John Winthrop, [Summer, 1645], MHSC 4th ser. 6: 65; Fickes, “They Could Not Endure the Yoke,” 79-80.
England, where they were sold into servitude throughout New England. Some labored in the iron works in Lynn, others worked the sawmills of Berwick, Maine, and a few toiled for John Pynchon in frontier Springfield. They adjusted to their servitude easier than the Pequots, partly due to a somewhat familiar culture, but also because of New English attitudes. While Englishmen looked down on the Scots as a rule, John Cotton claimed that New England sought “to make their yoke easy. They have not been sold for slaves to perpetual servitude, but for 6 or 7 or 8 years.” These Scots prisoners eventually gained their freedom, though their exile was permanent.116

Liberal Rhode Island did not acquire Scots servants, but the colony’s laws seemed to fit hand-in-glove with the spirit of the times. Rhode Island leaders constructed their laws to gain pecuniary restitution for damaged or lost property, authorizing the courts to condemn and sell such offenders that “shall spoyle or damnify cattell, fence or fruite trees, corne house or other goods of any of the English . . . into slavery.” The aggrieved party would then receive compensation from the sale price of the individual.117

Plymouth was the first colony to act on these laws during the war itself. Following Capt. Moseley’s capture of eighty hostile Indians near Plymouth in the summer of 1675, the council ordered that “he should kill none that he took alive,


117 Colonial Laws of Mass, 1: 125; RICR, 1: 412-13; see also CCR 2: 297-98.
but secure them in Order to a Transportation.” Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts were not far behind, soon capitalizing on their newly acquired human commodities as well, often to pay their soldiers and to encourage enlistment. All colonial governments at some point in the war allowed their soldiers to keep a portion of the plunder and prisoners reaped while on military operations “for encouragement of the sayd Captaine and his company.” Plymouth even used proceeds of such sales to reimburse its governor for his expenses.\footnote{Easton, \textit{A Relacion of the Indyan Warre}, in Lincoln, ed, \textit{Narratives of the Indian Wars}, 30; CCR, 2: 474; Francis Baylies, \textit{An Historical Memoir of the Colony of New Plymouth}, ed. Samuel G. Drake, (Boston: Wiggin and Lunt, 1866), 75; Church, \textit{History of Philip’s War}, 95; RICR, 2: 548-51.} \footnote{Newell, “Changing Nature of Indian Slavery,” 107-10, 125; Towner, “A Good Master Well Served,” 131-35; Almon Wheeler Lauber, \textit{Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States} (Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1979), 136; for examples of perpetual servitude within the colonies, see \textit{Early Records of Portsmouth}, 433-34.}

Selling Indian prisoners within the colonies had the double benefit of filling labor needs as well as colonial coffers. While some fell into perpetual slavery, most Indians sold into bondage in New England were essentially indentured servants, though most, if not all, served longer terms than whites and enjoyed few rights assured to such contracted workers.\footnote{Newell, “Changing Nature of Indian Slavery,” 107-10, 125; Towner, “A Good Master Well Served,” 131-35; Almon Wheeler Lauber, \textit{Indian Slavery in Colonial Times within the Present Limits of the United States} (Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1979), 136; for examples of perpetual servitude within the colonies, see \textit{Early Records of Portsmouth}, 433-34.} Colonial laws attempted to regulate Indian slavery in New England with varying degrees of success and humaneness. Rhode Island law was the most liberal among the colonies in its regulation of these new bondsmen, declaring “that noe Indian in this Collony be a slave, but only to pay their debts or for their bringing up, or custody they have received, or to performe covenant as if they had been country
men[,] not in warr.” Officially categorized, then, as bonded debtors of sorts, captives in Rhode Island faced only limited periods of servitude. Initially, the law bound captives for nine years, but magistrates later imposed a sliding scale that bound children for longer periods, no doubt “for their bringing up” and Anglicization. On average, Indian children served three years more than their white counterparts in Rhode Island.\textsuperscript{120} Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Plymouth imposed similar, if harsher, terms of service.\textsuperscript{121}

While the actual numbers of Indians sold into servitude in the colonies is vaguely known at best, nearly 1,400 natives remained in some form of captivity after all overseas “exports” were completed. Colonial councils appointed committees to parcel out a large number of these to English masters, and some private organizations (one including Roger Williams) formed and profited from the trade.\textsuperscript{122} These groups held public auctions in every New England colony, sometimes selling scores of Indians at a time.\textsuperscript{123} For a very reasonable fee, ranging from a few shillings to several English pounds apiece, New Englanders could purchase much-needed labor for household and field at prices well below the market value of African slaves. Thomas Smith made off like a bandit when he purchased “10 Squaws, 8 paposses, 1 man” for £25, while Samuel Moseley

\textsuperscript{122} Early Records of Providence, 8: 11-16; Cook, “Interracial Warfare,” 20.
\textsuperscript{123} Early Records of Providence, 8: 16-18; RICR 2: 549-51.
apparently received a discount for "damaged goods" when one of the thirteen women and children he purchased was sickly. Lack of hard currency did not keep less affluent New Englanders from benefiting from these slave emporia. Elisha Smith of Providence bought the services of one Indian captive, ironically, for twenty-two bushels of Indian corn, while Elisha Smith of Providence paid with "3 fat sheep."^{124}

Theoretically, the reciprocal relationship between this "three-sheep" Indian and his master was similar to that of white servitude. In return for laboring "according to the best of his skill power and ability," a native bondservant would receive "Sufficient food and Rayment and other nessesaries meet for such an apprentice." Ever conscious of their religious mission as well as the pacifying powers of civility, colonial authorities further ordered that children "bee religiously educated and taught to read the English tounge."^{125} Compared to white indentured children, Indian youths came out of their indentures with little training or education. In a detailed study of Indian children in servitude in Rhode Island, historians Ruth Herndon and Ellis Sekatau found that few became literate or learned basic ciphering, while less than 9 percent of boys and 6 percent of girls received any skilled training whatsoever. According to oral tradition, keeping children unskilled and illiterate made them dependent upon their

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^{125} *Early Records of Portsmouth*, 430-31; Daniel Gookin, "Indian Children put to Service," *NEHGR*, 8 (1854): 270-73; Hubbard, 1: 207
masters to interpret their terms of service, thus becoming accomplices in their own servitude.\textsuperscript{126}

When not engrossed in acquiring the gifts of gab and God (likely most of the time), these former prisoners of war worked in a variety of settings, mostly in general farming or housework tasks. According to native oral tradition, young children assisted older servants with their work in the kitchen, house, and yard. Increase Mather intended to use his newly purchased boy to cut wood and "goe to mill." By age ten or twelve, child servants were working in the same capacity as adults. Former warriors and hunters became farmers, husbandmen, stonemasons, common laborers, and occasionally sailors. Women and girls labored within the home, performing traditional English domestic chores such as cooking, washing, and sewing.\textsuperscript{127}

Many Indians, especially men and boys, found the transition to servitude difficult and most likely degrading. Like their Pequot predecessors, they demonstrated their attitudes in their work ethic, degree of cooperation, or frequent flight. Lacking recourse to the courts (although this existed in theory), Indian servants protested their position, as Lawrence Towner found, "most often as unruly servants or runaways." Native servants were frequently chastised for "sauciness" and a host of other terms for stubborn behavior and outspokenness. More than one goodwife claimed that she "found it impossible to teach [the girls]

\textsuperscript{126} Early Records of Providence, 8: 16; Herndon and Sekatau, "Colonizing the Children," 139, 142-51.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 156; MHSC 4th ser. 8: 232; Sainsbury, "Indian Labor," 340-41; Towner, Good Master, 103-23; Lauber, Indian Slavery, 243.
these lowly domestic arts,” while others complained that males “only become efficient workmen, under a stern and vigorous discipline.” These negative opinions influenced the market value of Indian servants (who were valued at roughly one-tenth that of an African slave) as well as their future. Most colonies stipulated that Indian servants’ freedom was contingent upon their performance as evaluated by their masters. If satisfied, masters granted their charges “certificates of good behavior,” which served as virtual passports to freedom. However, a bondsperson’s continued recalcitrance or a poor work ethic, or even a master’s pettiness, could lead to perpetual servitude or, worse, sale out of the country.  

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While bondservants in New England faced years of toil, freedom remained within their grasp through manumission or flight. Hundreds of their compatriots were not so lucky. In a stroke both ingenious and diabolical, the Massachusetts and Plymouth courts resorted to selling into foreign slavery those captives who had not “imbrued their hands in English blood” but were too dangerous to keep in New England, even as slaves. Through this ultimate form of “warning out,” the colonies reaped a profit and achieved a modicum of security. Between 1675 and 1676, Plymouth alone sold and transported at least

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129 MHSC 4th ser. 8: 689-90; Drake, “Restraining Atrocity,” 53-54.
511 prisoners, grossing £397-13 for a single batch of 188 prisoners. Massachusetts Bay was a close second, accounting for over 400 deported prisoners. In official counts, 900-1,000 Wampanoags, Narragansetts, Pocumtucks, and Massachusetts found themselves shackled aboard deep-sea vessels bound for Virginia, the West Indies, and even as far away as the Azores and the Iberian peninsula. Eleven group of Christian Indians, condemned and transported in 1676, was unceremoniously dumped in Tangier. Six years later, the Rev. John Eliot, “father” of the praying towns and staunch advocate of Christian Indians, was still working to recover these prodigal children of New England.

Eliot’s request of the Massachusetts General Court was not without merit. The predicament of his castaway flock was of the colonists’ own doing. Rather than market their prisoners as prime field hands, “they literally advertised the odiousness of their cargo.” In their desire to prove the righteousness of their actions, Plymouth and Massachusetts officials armed slave carriers with certificates proclaiming the “many notorious barbarous and execrable murthers, villanies and outrages” perpetrated by each hold-full of “heathen Malefactors” — hardly words to entice potential buyers. Virginians, faced with Nathaniel Bacon’s rebellion and war with the Susquehannocks in 1676, had enough

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132 Lepore, The Name of War, 163, 168.
troubles of their own and had little need to import more. Barbados was in similar straits. Following the triple blows of a hurricane, an aborted slave rebellion, and ongoing conflict with the region’s Carib Indians, Gov. Jonathan Atkins firmly believed that the island’s fragile state could hardly benefit by purchasing New England’s human refuse. Thus in June 1676, the Barbados assembly passed a bill prohibiting the import of Indian slaves from New England, considering them “a people of too subtle, bloody, and dangerous nature and inclination to remain here.” Jamaica followed suit, effectively shutting the Caribbean door to New England slavers. The sullen and dangerous reputation of this newest New England export rapidly spread, poisoning the market before the products ever arrived for sale. The shipmaster of Eliot’s forlorn band found that “the nations, wither they went, would not buy them,” leading him to maroon the Indians in North Africa. Other masters, speculates historian Jill Lepore, “may have simply dumped their now valueless cargo somewhere in the Caribbean Sea, or abandoned groups of New England Indians on uninhabited islands.”

The Massachusetts and Plymouth policies of exporting Indian prisoners of war were not without critics, though precious few. A small minority of New Englanders opposed the practice on strategic and religious grounds. Soldiers

like Benjamin Church were quick to point out that such blatant cruelty and profiteering was likely to rouse the Indians further and prolong the war. William Leete, the deputy governor of Connecticut, concurred, arguing for confinement of captives in a remote location, "least the countrie should be more enflamed, with more enemyes in armes in severall parts, when so little can be done to subdue those that are embodied in one part." Besides, such a policy would hardly encourage voluntary submission when "to surrender for slaughter or forraigne captivity, doth run hard against the graine of nature." These fears were partially born out, and New England's harsh actions compelled some Christian Indians (possibly Captain Tom) to join the enemy.135

A handful of magistrates and clerics opposed selling captives into foreign slavery on moral grounds. Governor Walter Clarke of Rhode Island, a Quaker, refused to take his place on a council disposing of prisoners, and Daniel Gookin, member of the Massachusetts General Court and friend of the Christian Indians, protested loudly against the harsh treatment afforded Indian prisoners.136 John Eliot garnered the laurels and absorbed the ridicule of being the Indians' most impassioned and well-spoken advocate. In a slightly apocalyptic petition to the Massachusetts General Court in 1676, he argued that the court was acting contrary to the colony's divinely and royally sanctioned mission to the natives of

135 Church, History of Philip's War, 50-52; William Leete to John Winthrop, Jr., Hartford, 23 Sept. 1675, MHSC 4th ser. 7: 578-80; John Lake to the Massachusetts Council, Boston, 15 Sept. 1676, MA 30: 221b; NPCR 9: 242.
136 Charles J. Hoadly, ed, Records of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, from May 1653, to the Union (Hartford: Case, Lockwood and Company, 1858), 177; RICR 2: 548-51; Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War, 63.
New England. "[W]hen we came, we declared to the world & it is recorded, yea we are ingaged by our letters Patent to the Kings Majesty," he observed, "that the indeavour of the Indians conversion, not their extirpation, was one great end of our enterprise, in coming to these ends of the earth." Furthermore, instead of obeying Christ’s missive to extend mercy and compassion to one’s enemies, the magistrates were “active in the destroying [of Indian] soules” by sending them “away from the light of the gospel . . . unto a place, a state, a way of p[er]petual darkness.” Drawing a parallel between the profiting from the sale of prisoners and Judas’s thirty pieces of silver, Eliot darkly declared that “to sell soules for money seemeth to me a dangerouse merchandize.” To this Puritan divine, removing heathen Indians from the hands of enlightened New Englanders and depositing them with papists and profiteers guaranteed their spiritual and thus eternal death and was more than even the most devilish Indian deserved.137

While the fate of most prisoners did not disturb them, ministers John Cotton, Increase Mather, and James Keith all discussed the justness of selling Philip’s son into foreign slavery. Each acknowledged that the sins of the father should not be visited upon the son, but all three justified the sale in the end. Cotton noted that “children of notorious traitors, rebels, and murtherers, especially of such as have bin principal leaders and actors” may be considered party to their parents’ actions and “salva republica, be adjudged to death.” Mather simply said King David of biblical fame would have nipped in the bud a

137 NPCR, 10:451-53;
treacherous sprout to prevent it from "prov[ing] a scourge to the next
generation." Finally, although Keith desired Massachusetts to be "the habitation
of justice and the mountain of holiness," in the end he desired "a quiet
habitation, a tabernacle that shall not be taken down." If the sale of Philip's boy
required this, so be it.138

Despite his denunciations, warnings, and pleas for mercy, Eliot never
questioned the Court's right to condemn and execute Indian prisoners, nor did
any opponents of deportation advocate total amnesty. They simply questioned
the strategic and moral cost of this policy to their physical and spiritual struggle
with the minions of darkness. On the surface and with few exceptions, New
Englanders did not question their treatment of prisoners or their actions during
the war. To many, like the Mather dynasty, "King Philip's War was a holy war, a
war against barbarism, and a war that never really ended."139

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The colonists waged many more wars against their native neighbors (or, if
the Mathers were right, simply fought another round). But in King William's
and Queen Anne's Wars, New Englanders never had to confront the glut of
prisoners they had in the 1670s. The natives of northern New England were not
as intertwined with English society and had the option, however detested, to
retreat toward Canada, where they received support (and certainly

138 John Cotton and Samuel Arnold, 7 Sept. 1676; Increase Mather to John Cotton, 30 Oct. 1676;
John Davis (Boston: Crocker and Brewster, 1826), Davis's Appendix, 454-55.
139 Lepore, The Name of War, 175.
encouragement) from French colonial and religious officials.\textsuperscript{140} As a result, New Englanders took very few prisoners after King Philip’s War.

Treatment of prisoners continued as before, with New Englanders justifying their jurisdiction over and subsequent punishment of Indians on supposed submission to English authority as well as “savage” behavior in combat.\textsuperscript{141} Although the submissions of the Abenakis of Maine were even more questionable than those of southern New England, any hostile Indians remained “bloody Salvage perfidious Indian Rebels,” who sought “to carry on their design of an insurrection upon the English.”\textsuperscript{142} When Massachusetts sought to negotiate with the Abenakis for the return of captives in February 1692, the Council required Captains Alden and Converse, the negotiators, to first “Represent unto [the Indians] their baseness, treachery and barbarities practiced in carrying on of this war, and that contrary to the methods of Christian or Civilized Nations, having always declined a fair pitch’t battle acting like bears and wolves.” Firmly remind them, the Council concluded, of “their falsehood and breach of promises made in their former Capitulations.”\textsuperscript{143} Twenty years later, Gov. Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts continued to use the language of treason and to speak of Indian actions as crimes rather than acts of war. Writing to the Council of Trade and Plantations in 1712, Dudley spoke of exchanging French prisoners but was at a


\textsuperscript{141} Church, \textit{History of Philip’s War}, 244.

\textsuperscript{142} Massachusetts General Court Address to the King, 5 Dec. 1696, \textit{DHSM} 5: 474-77; Testimony of John Sabin, Boston, 27 March 1700, \textit{CSP} 18: 345 vii.

\textsuperscript{143} Instructions for Captain Alden and Captain Converse, 5 Feb. 1692, \textit{DHSM} 5: 321-23.
loss as to his native prisoners. “For these sixty years [the Indians] have acknowledged their Dependance upon the Crown of Great Britayn, and Twice since I have come heither have Acknowledged their Dependence upon the Crown of Great Britayn & their Submission to it.” Regardless of their pretended submission, he claimed, “after the Warr broke out [they] Committed barbarous murders and Burnt many Houses in Company with the French and their Dependant Indians.”144 He was simply continuing an old pattern.145

Many of the prisoners taken by New Englanders were often grabbed by underhanded means before hostilities broke out or at peace conferences. In 1688 with Indian-white tensions rising, Capt. Blackman, justice of the peace for the Saco River area of Maine, seized 16-20 Abenakis, whom he labeled as “Bloodey, murderous Roges in the first Indian war, Being the Chefe Ringe Leadors & most fit & Capeble to doe mischief.” Blackman shipped the prisoners from his preemptive arrests, including some women and children, to Boston, where authorities held the prisoners as hostages to assure their relatives’ good

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145 [Gov. Bradstreet] to Gov. Slaughter, Boston, 30 March 1691, DHSM 5 185; Gov. Bellomont to the Council of Trade and Plantations, Boston, 28 Aug. 1699, CSP 17: 746; Governor and Council of New Hampshire to the King, Spring 1700, DHSM 10: 54-56; Minutes of the Council of Massachusetts Bay, 12 March 1700, CSP 18: 216; Proclamation of Gov. Fitz-John Winthrop against the Eastern Indians, August 1703, MHSC 6th ser. 3: 146-7; Massachusetts Council and Assembly to the Queen, 12 July 1704, CSP 22: 451. With an ironic turn of events, some colonists captured by the French and Indians found themselves termed and treated as traitors rather than prisoners. Following the Glorious Revolution in England, King James took shelter in France. When a combined French and Indian force captured the fort at Falmouth, Maine in May 1690, the attackers violated the terms of surrender and allowed Indians to take all but a few of the defenders. Because Boston supported the “usurpers” William and Mary and the French James, the French attackers labeled the New Englanders traitors and rebels, and thus treated them as such. See Gov. Bradstreet to Agents for the Massachusetts Colony, Boston, 29 Nov. 1690, DHSM 5: 144-46.
behavior. Historian Kenneth Morrison argues that rather than calm a tense frontier as hoped, this sparked the "second Abenaki-English" war (King William's War) on the Eastern frontier.

Though their capture sparked a war, these captives were treated relatively well, particularly when compared to their predecessors in the 1670s. According to Cotton Mather, Indian prisoners were transported "with great care, and not one of them hurt," and once in Boston, "care [was] taken daily for [their] provision." He was not off the mark, though how much "care" they received is questionable. Although New Englanders labeled these Indians "prisoners" as opposed to French "prisoners of war" kept in the same prison, Massachusetts reimbursed Caleb Ray, the keeper of the Boston prison, for their upkeep for months at a time. At two shillings, six pence per week for food, each prisoner was afforded half the allotment of a soldiers—not a feast, for sure, but enough for basic subsistence. Caleb Ray even tried to increase the prisoners' weekly allowance to four shillings for food as well as funds for firewood "to render their Lives comfortable amidst the hardships of prison Entertainments."

Despite feeding and warming the prisoners, colonists were not going soft on Indian prisoners, and magistrates continued to vigorously apply the law to

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their "rebel" captives. But lacking the crowds of prisoners requiring rapid disposal, magistrates had time for cool consideration. In 1694, eight prominent ministers of the Boston area (including Increase and Cotton Mather) joined the debate "in relation to the subject of showing mercy to the savages then in prison at Boston." The question at issue was the legality of sparing the lives of "Certain Salvages now in Hold." Quoting from 1 Kings 2:5, the ministers reaffirmed the colony's right to condemn the prisoners as traitors. "Great is the difference between the blood shed by declared enemies, tho' very perfidious ones, in a state of war," they claimed, "and the blood shed by professed subjects, under circumstances of the law and not so engaged in arms." However, the ministers also reminded the magistrates that a legal condemnation required "two sufficient testimonies," something they lacked. Thus in the same breath, the worthy ministers prevented illegal executions but bolstered the colony's right to condemn Indians as traitors and murderers. Colonial courts tried a number of Indians for murder and treason, though in minuscule numbers compared to before, and officials generally conducted the trials according to proper procedure. Magistrates also recognized the value of prisoners for prompting Indians to the negotiating table or as encouragement to exchange their white captives, thus creating a need to care for prisoners as they had not before. 150

As before, English forces in the field drew little criticism for the tactics used to subdue “rebel” Indians, and field commanders continued to exercise summary justice. Benjamin Church demonstrated such powers as he led several expeditions against the Eastern Indians during King William’s and Queen Anne’s Wars. On several occasions, he threatened prisoners with torture at the hands of his own native soldiers or executed prisoners found with English scalps. Another instance in May 1704 resembled the results of a European siege on a small scale. Approaching a camp of Indian and French forces, Church’s soldiers came upon a hut and demanded the surrender of the occupants. “They should have good quarter” he declared, “but if not, they should be all knocked on the head and die.” In this case, three men, a woman, and a boy surrendered and were granted quarter. At a second hut, the occupants refused to come out. “I hastily bid them pull it down,” recalled Church, and knock them on the head, never asking whether they were French or Indians; they being all enemies alike to me.” Although Church was criticized for his action, he felt justified both by taken in war, it demonstrates the efforts of magistrates to follow proper procedure, even in the midst of war and increased interracial tensions. The narrative of the proceedings show the use of interpreters to ensure understanding, full presentation of evidence, questioning of multiple witnesses (white and Indian), visits to the scene of the crime, and confessions extracted “without force, stroke, or violence.” Two of the four defendants were executed for murder, with the others found guilty of lesser crimes. Their subsequent escape, recapture, and death at the hands of a mob were a reminder that popular sentiment against Indians remained, though restrained by magistrates and ministers. See Gregory H. Nobles and Herbert L. Zarov, eds., Selected Papers from the Sylvester Judd Manuscript (Northampton, MA: Forbes Library, 1976),144-50, and James Spady, “As if in a Great Darkness: Native American Refugees of the Middle Connecticut River Valley in the Aftermath of King Philip’s War,” Historical Journal of Massachusetts, 23:2 (Summer 1995): 183-97.
European military conventions as well as rights of retribution for “their bloody cruelties, perpetrated on my dear and loving friends and countrymen.”

With natives withdrawing toward Canada for lengthy periods before resuming raids, colonial forces had greater difficulty finding and fighting their enemies. Combating this more elusive and distant enemy was a daunting and expensive prospect, so colonial governments resorted to scalp bounties to fight the war on the cheap. Passing and repeatedly renewing the “Act for Encouraging the Prosecution of the Indian Enemy & Rebels,” the Massachusetts Council sought unpaid volunteers to seek out and engage hostile Indians, offering head money “for every Indian, great or small, which they shall kill, or take and bring in prisoner.” Soldiers receiving wages or supplies and militiamen defending garrisons could expect bonuses for their kills and captures, but the real money lay in self-sufficient volunteer companies. Completely funding their own venture, volunteer companies cost the government nothing unless they successfully engaged hostile Indians. With their only compensation coming from scalps and prisoners, their bounties could be as high as £100 per scalp or prisoner, with the higher offerings coming in the aftermath of major assaults on the frontier or to encourage enlistment for English offensives against Canada. For example, following the devastating attack on Deerfield in 1704, the bounty for males capable of bearing arms (twelve and over according to Massachusetts) soared from £20 to £100. This dropped to half that by 1706 and jumped to £100...

again, coinciding with the 1707 English assaults on Port Royale and Acadia. Leaders wavered on the categories and values assigned to scalps, gradually differentiating between men of fighting age (which varied from twelve to fourteen) and women and children. Bonuses offered for noncombatants, dead or alive, were usually half that for men, reflecting either the magistrates' distaste at the killing of "helpless sorts" or (more likely) the reduced effort required to take their scalps.152

On the surface, these offers of head money were a continuation of a war without rules—a colonial war—that allowed the dominant power to target its enemies without distinction. In theory it encouraged revenge and "savagery" on the part of Englishmen. Peter Silver argues that European settlers closely associated mutilation, particularly the obvious results of scalping, with Indian warfare and European defeat. Therefore, "when it was inverted—by Europeans scalping Indians who came into their power—it could release an absolute exhilaration."153 While the thought of scalp bounties may have offered solace to colonists, the reality of frontier warfare offered few opportunities for New Englanders and their Indian allies to cash in. Numerous military expeditions toward Canada and Down East in 1689-90, 1696, 1704, and later in Dummer's


153 Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 78-80, 161-62.
War captured or killed relatively few hostile Indians. In fact, Massachusetts paid out only modest sums for scalp bounties, so little that historian Gavin Taylor found that "scalp" expeditions "failed to win enough plunder and bounties to cover the cost of expenditures." Thus, while scalp bounties were a successful cost-cutting measure, as a military tool they failed.

* * *

Throughout the early Indian wars, and King Philip's War in particular, the people of New England struggled to harmonize an overwhelming desire for revenge with an equally powerful urge to maintain order and follow the law. Whether killing out of revenge or following a proper trial, summarily executing prisoners in the field or selling them into servitude, New Englanders managed to justify their actions through emerging laws of war and their inapplicability to colonial wars or civil conflicts. This is not to say that New Englanders did not take their revenge on their native enemies or that their actions were moral. Indeed, as William Hubbard said, "Justice Vindictive hath Iron Hands." But while such actions were vindictive, they were legal—vindictive justice—within the bounds of law and tradition as colonists and Europeans saw it. No matter how reprehensible their actions, New England’s leaders somehow managed to

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channel the rage of the people into legal channels, thus preventing New England from completely abandoning its moral compass. As Daniel Gookin declared, “If the conscientious and pious rulers of the country had not acted contrary to the minds of sundry men,” the colonists’ war record might be far darker than it was.155

EPILOGUE

STEADFAST IN THEIR WAYS

In spring 1676, the Massachusetts Council attempted to negotiate the release of several English women and children held by the Nipmucks in western Massachusetts. Two sachems, Sam and Kutquen Quanohit, declined to ransom their captives, and their short letter of response to the magistrates neatly summed up the damage suffered by the English settlers. "You know, and we know, you have great sorrowful with crying; for you lost many, many hundred men, and all your house, all your land, and woman, child, and cattle, and all your things that you have lost."1 This description could apply to the aftermath of any war fought between New England’s white and Native populations in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. But despite the widespread destruction, repeated collapse of the frontier, and continued hazard of living in exposed regions, many settlers chose to reestablish their abandoned homes and communities soon after the cessation of hostilities. In 1677 Richard Hutchinson commented that many colonists were already working "their Old Habitations, and Mow down their Ground, and make Hay, and do other Occasions necessary

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for their resettling: All which gives us comfortable Hope that God will graciously repair our Breaches, and cause this Bloody War to End in a lasting Peace.” Fifty years later, the Rev. Thomas Smith recorded in his journal that even in the oft-attacked and abandoned Casco Bay, Maine, area, “There is a considerable number of people down here, to look out for farms, designing to settle here.”²

The process of rebuilding was slow and arduous, and often years passed before towns could function on their own. The conflicts left their mark on frontier communities as many settlers chose not to return, and those who did struggled with severe poverty. War-time turmoil and heavy taxes also resulted in a changing of the guard in local leadership as traditional “political brokers,” as historian T.H. Breen has labeled them, lost the confidence of their constituents.³ Despite these changes, New Englanders remained committed to their local communities more so than to their colony. Though provincial power had grown by necessity during the Indian wars, towns remained the preeminent political and social bodies in New England society. Indeed, provincial governments worked to help towns reestablish themselves by authorizing local leaders to collect rates from absentee landowners to support the town ministers and even confiscate land to allow for more compact and defensible resettlements.


The dedication to local community, the law, and traditional roles was readily apparent even years later. In 1726, as Dummer’s War drew to a close northern New England, refugees from inland towns sought to settle in Falmouth. Rev. Smith recorded that the selectmen acted quickly, warning out “one Savage, and also one Stimson and his family...as they did several others, just about the making of the peace.” As before, troublesome and burdensome refugees were not welcomed, or at least were denied the assistance of a town not theirs by right. In contrast, several men and their families, “who were sober and forehanded men” and willing to construct a grist mill, were quickly incorporated into the community. Another group of eight men and their families were also allowed to settle “with an obligation...to stand by one another in peace or war.” Eight years later, the townspeople fulfilled that pledge by building a garrison house for Smith, thereby providing for their minister as well as their own spiritual and temporal defense. Thus, towns remained exclusive, gathering in those they were obliged to aid through familial or proprietary connections and allowing outsiders to remain only conditionally. This was not the abandonment of John Winthrop’s call for community or a sign of declension of the New England spirit, as so many Puritan divines had feared, but a continuation of traditional localism.

When war threatened Falmouth between 1720 and 1740, the townspeople grappled with fear as had their predecessors. “The mischiefs done by the Indians make it a dark time indeed,” wrote Smith. Rumors of impending attacks

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4 Willis, ed., Journals of Smith and Deane, 50-52.
and lurking raiding parties “somewhere on the back of us” caused the inhabitants to congregate near garrison houses for safety. “We live very quiet on account of the Indians,” remarked Smith as attendance at his services declined. Despite the apparent wariness and fear of the people, he noted that the men lived up to their pledge to “stand by one another,” standing watch at night, and pursuing raiders who threatened theirs or nearby communities. Unlike Cotton Mather, Smith never criticized the manliness of his fellow townspeople. Instead, he praised “a great number of our men” who rapidly responded to a lurking Indian on the outskirts of town and later hurried to the assistance of nearby North Yarmouth. The shades of Hannah Duston and Pasco Chubb made no appearance in Falmouth.5

The Indian wars of early New England were dramatic and traumatic events, and Falmouth and dozens of other frontier communities were buffeted and challenged by the experience. Yet New Englanders were also resistant to change, and this persistence of core culture ideals is often lost in the shuffle as historians analyze the transformation of New England from a huddle of struggling colonies to mature provinces. Though tested by the ordeal of war, New Englanders’ notions of gender, community, and morality maintained their form and centrality to the people’s identity. New Englanders were indeed steadfast in their ways.

5 Ibid., 41-62, 80-81, 85, 113-14, 119-20, 124-28, 133.
Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712  
(excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Swansea, Plymouth</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 26, 1675</td>
<td>Taunton, MB</td>
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<td>Providence, RI</td>
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<td>June 28, 1675</td>
<td>Rehoboth, Plymouth</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1675</td>
<td>Dartmouth, PI</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 9, 1675</td>
<td>Middleborough, Plymouth</td>
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<td>July 14, 1675</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Aug. 11, 1675</td>
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<td>Sept. 3-4, 1675</td>
<td>Deerfield/Northfield, MB</td>
<td>13-21</td>
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<td>Sept. 5, 1675</td>
<td>Casco, ME</td>
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<td>Sept. 6, 1675</td>
<td>Deerfield/Northfield, MB &quot;at burial ground&quot;</td>
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<td>Saco, ME</td>
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<td>Sept. 18, 1675</td>
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<td>Blue Point, Casco Area, ME</td>
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<td>Sept. 20-25, 1675</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
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<td>Sept. 26, 1675</td>
<td>present-day Suffield, CT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Berwick, ME</td>
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<td>Oct. 4, 1675</td>
<td>Springfield, MB</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712 (excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
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<td>Saco Sands area (Casco), ME</td>
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<td>Spurwink, ME</td>
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<td>Oct. 13, 1675</td>
<td>Black Point, ME</td>
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<td>Oct. 14, 1675</td>
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<td>Oct. 16, 1675</td>
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<td>Oct. 25-28, 1675</td>
<td>Northampton, MB &quot;stragglers&quot;</td>
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<td>Westfield, MB (on road to Springfield)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 27-28, 1675</td>
<td>Westfield, MB (on road to Springfield)</td>
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<td>March 1676 (early)</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 9, 1676</td>
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<td>March 26, 1676</td>
<td>Below Springfield, MB</td>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1676</td>
<td>Marlborough, MB</td>
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Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712 (excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 26, 1676</td>
<td>Simsbury, CT</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Rehoboth, Plymouth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Scituate, Plymouth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 29, 1676</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Wickford, RI</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 30, 1676</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Billerica, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Braintree, MB</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Andover, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Wrentham, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Bradford</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Worcester, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1676</td>
<td>Mendon, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 1676</td>
<td>Hadley, MB</td>
<td>1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1676</td>
<td>Bridgewater, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 1676</td>
<td>Woburn, MB</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1676</td>
<td>Chelmsford, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 17, 1676</td>
<td>Marlborough, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 18, 1676</td>
<td>Sudbury, MB</td>
<td>13-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Hingham, MB</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 1676</td>
<td>Weymouth, MB</td>
<td>1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 1676</td>
<td>Springfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1676</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 8, 1676</td>
<td>Bridgewater, Plymouth</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 1676</td>
<td>Bridgewater, Plymouth</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 12-13, 1676</td>
<td>Hadfield, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 20, 1676</td>
<td>Scituate, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 25-26, 1676</td>
<td>Hadley, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 30, 1676</td>
<td>Hadfield, MB</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 1676</td>
<td>Hadley, MB</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 1676</td>
<td>Rehoboth, Plymouth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 11, 1676</td>
<td>Taunton, Plymouth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 11, 1676</td>
<td>Falmouth, ME</td>
<td>34 killed and captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13, 1676</td>
<td>Hammond's Post (Woolwich)</td>
<td>&quot;several&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 12, 1676</td>
<td>Westfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 14, 1676</td>
<td>Arrowsic Island, ME</td>
<td>37-50 killed and captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3, 1676</td>
<td>Munjoy's Island, ME</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 18, 1676</td>
<td>Saco, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 25, 1676</td>
<td>York, Cape Neddick, ME</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 12, 1676</td>
<td>Black Point, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 18, 1676</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
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251
Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712 (excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1677</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1677</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 16, 1677</td>
<td>Black Point, ME</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1677</td>
<td>York/Wells, ME</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 1677</td>
<td>Black Point, ME</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summer 1677</td>
<td>Fishing vessels off Maine</td>
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**King William's War**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 27, 1688</td>
<td>Springfield, MB (friendly Indians attacked)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 16, 1688</td>
<td>Northfield, MB</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1689</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 1689</td>
<td>Sagadahoc, ME</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1689</td>
<td>Oyster River, NH (Durham), NH</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1689</td>
<td>Andover, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 2, 1689</td>
<td>Pemaquid, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26, 1689</td>
<td>North Yarmouth, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 20, 1689</td>
<td>Falmouth, ME (Church's fight)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 18, 1690</td>
<td>Salmon Falls, NH</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25, 1690</td>
<td>Casco, ME</td>
<td>30?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22, 1690</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 22, 1690</td>
<td>Fox Point (Newington)</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1690</td>
<td>Lamprey River, NH</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 5, 1690</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 1690</td>
<td>Wheelwright's Pond (Lee)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 1690</td>
<td>Amesbury, MB</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July or Aug. 1690</td>
<td>MBquoit, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 21, 1690</td>
<td>near Casco, ME</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 25, 1692</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1692</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 18, 1692</td>
<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1, 1692</td>
<td>Billerica, MB</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 28, 1692</td>
<td>South Berwick (Newichwannock)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 29, 1692</td>
<td>Sandy Beach (Rye)</td>
<td>21 killed and wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 10, 1693</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 6, 1693</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27, 1693</td>
<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
<td>5-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 13, 1693</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
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### Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712 (excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Dead</td>
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<td>Oyster River, NH</td>
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<td>Portsmouth, NH</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 27, 1694</td>
<td>Groton, MB</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 20, 1694</td>
<td>Spruce Creek and York, ME</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 24, 1694</td>
<td>Long Reach (Kittery), ME</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4, 1694</td>
<td>between Amesbury and Haverhill, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 15, 1694</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 1695</td>
<td>Saco Fort, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6, 1695</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 1695</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1695</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1695</td>
<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1695</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1695</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 5, 1695</td>
<td>Billerica, MB</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1695</td>
<td>Saco Fort, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 10, 1695</td>
<td>Northfield, MB (friendly Indians attacked)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Pemaquid, ME</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 7, 1695</td>
<td>Newbury, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 1695</td>
<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 7, 1696</td>
<td>Dover, NH (nearby)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 24, 1696</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 26, 1696</td>
<td>Sagamore's Creek (Portsmouth, NH)</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 26, 1696</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 13, 1696</td>
<td>Andover, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 14, 1696</td>
<td>Pemaquid, ME Fort William Henry</td>
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<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
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<td>Aug. 25, 1696</td>
<td>Oxford, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 25, 1696</td>
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<td>Lubberland, NH</td>
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<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
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<td>Hadley, MB</td>
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<td>Saco Fort, ME</td>
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<td>Dec. 11, 1696</td>
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<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
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<td>York, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 20, 1697</td>
<td>Groton, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712
(excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 10, 1697</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
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<td>Salisbury, MB</td>
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<td>June 24, 1697</td>
<td>Hatfield, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1697</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 4, 1697</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 1697</td>
<td>Dover, NH-Eliot, ME</td>
<td>3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 7, 1697</td>
<td>Saco Fort, ME</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9, 1697</td>
<td>Damariscotta, ME</td>
<td>12 12</td>
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<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 15, 1697</td>
<td>Johnson's Creek</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Feb. 22, 1698</td>
<td>Andover, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1698</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1698</td>
<td>Spruce Creek, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 9, 1698</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 14-15, 1698</td>
<td>Hatfield, MB</td>
<td>3 2</td>
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Queen Anne's War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 10, 1703</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td>39 killed and captured</td>
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<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Cape Porpoise, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Winter Harbor, ME (near Saco)</td>
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<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Saco Fort, ME</td>
<td>11 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Spurwink, ME</td>
<td>22 killed and captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Purpooduck, ME</td>
<td>25 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1703</td>
<td>Falmouth, ME</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 17, 1703</td>
<td>Hampton, NH</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 6-7, 1703</td>
<td>Black Point, ME</td>
<td>18 killed and captured</td>
</tr>
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<td>Oct. 1703</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>6 2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Oct. 8, 1703</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 20, 1703</td>
<td>Saco, ME</td>
<td>3 2?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 20-30, 1703</td>
<td>Casco Bay, ME</td>
<td>4 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 28, 1704</td>
<td>Berwick, ME</td>
<td>1 1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Feb. 8, 1704</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
<td>1 1-4</td>
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<td>41 5 112</td>
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<td>Berwick, ME</td>
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<td>Apr 26, 1704</td>
<td>Lamprey River, NH</td>
<td>1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late Apr 1704</td>
<td>Dover, NH (Cochecho)</td>
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<tr>
<td>late Apr 1704</td>
<td>road to Wells, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>May, 1704</td>
<td>between Hadley, MB and Springfield, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1704</td>
<td>between Northampton and Westfield, MB</td>
<td>1 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 11, 1704</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
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Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712
(excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
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<td>Wells, ME</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 1704</td>
<td>between Deerfield and Hatfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 13, 1704</td>
<td>Northampton, MB</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0-8</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Deerfield, MB area</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10, 1704</td>
<td>Hatfield, MB mill</td>
<td>1 (friendly Indian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13/31, 1704</td>
<td>between Hadley and Springfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 1704</td>
<td>above Deerfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 1704</td>
<td>East of Hadley, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 30, 1704 (c.)</td>
<td>between Deerfield and Hatfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>July 31, 1704</td>
<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1, 1704 (c.)</td>
<td>between Northampton and Westfield, MB</td>
<td>1-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1704 (early)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1704 (early)</td>
<td>York, ME to Oyster River, NH</td>
<td>1-3</td>
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<td>Aug. 1704</td>
<td>Amesbury, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 1704</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 8, 1704</td>
<td>Groton, MB</td>
<td>3+</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 11, 1704</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 25, 1704</td>
<td>Lancaster, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May? 1705</td>
<td>Kittery, ME (Spruce Creek)</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>May/June 1705</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Oct. 15, 1705</td>
<td>Cape Neddick</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>April 26, 1706</td>
<td>Oyster River, NH</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>July, 1706</td>
<td>Kingston, NH</td>
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<td>July, 1706</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>July, 1706</td>
<td>Chelmsford, MB</td>
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<td>July 1706</td>
<td>Sudbury</td>
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<td>July 1706</td>
<td>Groton, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 3, 1706</td>
<td>Dunstable</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>July 3, 1706</td>
<td>Salmon Brook (near Dunstable)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>July 3, 1706</td>
<td>Blanchard's Garrison (near)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>July 8, 1706</td>
<td>Wilmington, MB</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 8, 1706</td>
<td>Reading</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9?, 1706</td>
<td>between Dunstable and Chelmsford, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1706</td>
<td>Amesbury, MB</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 31, 1706</td>
<td>Springfield, MB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 10, 1706</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 22, 1707</td>
<td>Oyster River, NH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712 (excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>White Losses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 12, 1707</td>
<td>Groton, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>late June, 1707</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>2+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1707</td>
<td>Westfield, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1707</td>
<td>Casco, ME area (fishing boats)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 8, 1707</td>
<td>between Dover and Oyster River, NH</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 10, 1707</td>
<td>York to Wells, ME</td>
<td>4 killed and captured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 18, 1707</td>
<td>Marlborough, MB</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1707</td>
<td>Oyster River, NH</td>
<td>8-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>Kingston, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. ? 1707</td>
<td>Casco, ME</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 21, 1707</td>
<td>Winter Harbor, ME (near Saco)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 21-30, 1707</td>
<td>Berwick, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 22, 1708</td>
<td>near York, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1708</td>
<td>Northampton, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 26, 1708</td>
<td>Springfield, MB</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29, 1708</td>
<td>Haverhill, MB</td>
<td>16+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1708</td>
<td>Amesbury, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1708</td>
<td>Kittery, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 13/30, 1708</td>
<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 26, 1708</td>
<td>Bloody Brook/Deerfield, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 11, 1709</td>
<td>below Deerfield, MB</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 6, 1709</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22/23, 1709</td>
<td>Deerfield, MB</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 25, 1709</td>
<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
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<td>Aug. 8/9, 1709</td>
<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 1709</td>
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<td>Spring 1710</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 23, 1710</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 23, 1710</td>
<td>Kingston, NH</td>
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<td>June-July, 1710</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
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<td>June-July, 1710</td>
<td>Waterbury, CT</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>June-July, 1710</td>
<td>Simsbury, CT</td>
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<td>July, 1710</td>
<td>Marlborough, MB</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1710</td>
<td>between Concord and Groton, MB</td>
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</table>
Figure 1. Raids and Attacks by Native Americans against New Englanders, 1675-1712
(excluding English offensive actions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Attack</th>
<th>Dead</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 20, 1710</td>
<td>Brookfield, MB</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Aug. 2, 1710</td>
<td>Winter Harbor, ME (near Saco)</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 9, 1710 (c.)</td>
<td>Winter Harbor, ME (near Saco)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring? 1711</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring? 1711</td>
<td>York, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 29, 1711</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April/May 1711</td>
<td>Dover, NH</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 10, 1711</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 16, 1712</td>
<td>Exeter, NH</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 16 /May 13, 1712</td>
<td>between York and Cape Neddock, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 16 /May 13, 1712</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16 /May 13, 1712</td>
<td>Spruce Creek/Kittery, ME</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 16 /May 13, 1712</td>
<td>Oyster River, NH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>April 16 /May 13, 1712</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 14, 1712</td>
<td>between Wells and Cape Neddick, ME</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>June 1, 1712</td>
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<td>June 3-4, 1712</td>
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<tr>
<td>June-July, 1712</td>
<td>Berwick, ME</td>
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<td>July 18, 1712</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
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<tr>
<td>late July, 1712</td>
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<td>Sept. 1, 1712</td>
<td>Wells, ME</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 1712</td>
<td>between Wells, ME and Portsmouth, NH</td>
<td>3-4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2. John Foster’s Map of New England, 1677 prepared for William Hubbard’s *A Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians in New-England, from the first planting thereof in the year 1607 to this Present Year 1677* (Boston, 1677).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviations Used in Citations</th>
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<td><strong>AHR</strong></td>
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<td><strong>JAH</strong></td>
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</table>
NEHGR  New England Historical and Genealogical Register


RIHSC  Collections of the Rhode Island Historical Society

WMQ  William and Mary Quarterly
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Volume 11 Ecclesiastical, 1679-1739
Volume 30 Indians, 1603-1705
Volume 31 Indians, 1705-1750
Volume 32 Indians, 1750-1757
Volume 67 Military, 1643-1675
Volume 68 Military, 1675-1676
Volume 69 Military, 1676-1680
Volume 70 Military, 1680-1703
Volume 71 Military, 1704-1711

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263


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IV. Unpublished Dissertations and Theses


David M. Corlett was born in Vancouver, Washington on June 6, 1972 to D. Robert and Melba Corlett. He graduated from Fort Vancouver High School in June 1990. He received his B.A. in History from Gonzaga University in May 1994. He was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army and served on active duty with the Second Armored Cavalry Regiment until 1998.

In August 1998, the author entered the College of William and Mary as a graduate student and as a historical editing apprentice with the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. He received his M.A. in American History from William and Mary in May 2000. David Corlett defended his dissertation in November 2010. He is currently working as an adjunct professor in the Bachelor of Interdisciplinary Studies program, School of Continuing and Professional Education, at the University of Virginia. He resides in Williamsburg, Virginia with his wife, Victoria Corlett, and their children, Collin and Catherine.