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Defining Greekness: The Effect of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

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Defining Greekness: The Effect of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

A thesis presented in Candidacy for Departmental Honors in
International Relations

from

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

By

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Defining Greekness

The Effect of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

Iliana D. Tzafolias

ABSTRACT

Many scholars agree: identity plays a significant role in shaping political opinion. What about foreign policy opinions, though? The literature on ethnic identity focuses on how ethnic identity affects domestic political opinion and political activism, paying little attention to its effect on foreign policy opinions. However, in a nation like the United States, where ethnic interest groups hold much power to influence U.S. foreign policy, it is important to understand how people's ethnic identity affects their foreign policy opinions about homeland politics. The Greek diaspora is widely considered one of the most politically involved diasporas in the US. By conducting a nationally representative survey, oversampling members of the Greek diaspora, this project investigates whether and to what extent one's Greek ethnic identity affects one's opinions about EU-Greece relations. Developing an ethnic identity index to define respondents' "Greekness," this project seeks to illuminate how strength of ethnic identity differentially affects foreign policy opinions about homeland politics. The results suggest that the higher one's strength of Greek ethnic identity, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

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INTRODUCTION

What really happened in the Greek debt crisis of the late 2000s and early 2010s? Was Greece simply a nation struggling to recover under the weight of austerity measures? Did the EU impose a financial straitjacket on Greece, preventing the country from recovering more quickly? The answer depends on who you ask. Several scholars have found that identity affects political opinion—but how does one’s strength of ethnic identity affect one’s foreign policy opinions? This project seeks to answer this question and, more specifically, to understand whether and to what extent one’s Greek ethnic identity affects one’s foreign policy opinions about EU-Greece relations.

Identities are “among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics” (Smith 2004: 302). Much literature on ethnic identity suggests that there is a strong link between identity and politics (Lee 2008); however, few scholars have explored how ethnic identity affects political opinions about foreign policy. Most studies on ethnic identity and political opinion focus on racialized diasporas and their domestic political opinions and political behavior. This research project adds to this literature by discussing the role that ethnic identity plays in shaping the foreign policy opinions of a non-racialized European diaspora. Given that the Greek diaspora has proved to be one of the most influential ethnic interest groups in the United States, an analysis of how the ethnic identity of Greek diaspora members affects their foreign policy opinions has important implications.

Based on the results of a nationally representative survey and also administering the same survey to additional Greek Americans in the United States, this project finds that the stronger one’s ethnic identification as Greek, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greece’s national interests. Though this may seem like an obvious finding, this study

offers relevant additions to our current understanding of ethnic identity on political opinion. By studying the Greek diaspora and focusing on foreign policy, this study examines an ethnic group not previously studied in this context, extends the analysis to foreign policy, and begins to identify a causal explanation for the relationship between strength of ethnic identity and foreign policy opinions.

In the following analysis, I use seven measures of Greek ethnic identity and outline the specific process by which each measure of identity affects foreign policy opinions. The measures include: 1) generational status, 2) language knowledge, 3) religious affiliation, 4) country of citizenship, 5) self-identification of ethnic identification, 6) frequency of visits to Greece, and 7) attachment to the Greek people and/or state. This last measure, attachment to the Greek people versus attachment to the Greek state, is a new measure I created to capture the type of attachment to the ethnic homeland. This measure pragmatizes personal and emotional affiliation to the homeland, and in this way, offers insight into foreign policy opinions.

Before delving into the research, it is important to address my potential bias in this project. I am a Greek American. My father immigrated from Greece; my mother is a first-generation Greek American; I speak, read, and write Greek fluently; I actively participate in the Greek Orthodox Church; and I have grown up traveling for a month and a half every summer to Greece where I stay with my family. In other words, in terms of defining my “Greekness,” it is fair to say I am very Greek.

This research arose from self-reflection about how my own Greekness affects my opinions about EU-Greece relations. I noticed that, like several of my family members, I have a relatively critical perspective on Greece’s place in the EU, and I believe that this opinion is at least partly informed by my Greek ethnic identity. I realize that my Greek ethnic identity inclines

me to align with perspectives that portray Greece as a victim and makes me wary of perspectives that directly blame Greece. Moreover, as somebody who studies the rise of Euroscepticism—criticism of European integration generally and the European Union in particular—I must note that I have done considerable research on how the EU has disadvantaged certain member states (including and in addition to Greece). I am fascinated by the power dynamics that allegedly exist in the EU, and my background in this topic most definitely affects my research. For all these reasons, I discuss how my positionality influenced this project in hopes of maintaining transparency and objectivity in my work.

This thesis is split into five main sections. First, in the literature review, I offer an overview of the literature on diaspora and ethnic identity studies, specifically focusing on diasporic relations with the ethnic homeland and how ethnic identity is understood to affect political opinion. Next, I discuss the main argument of this study, including a causal mechanism, and I outline hypotheses about how my independent variable, strength of ethnic identity, relates to my dependent variable, foreign policy opinions. I then explain this project's methodology, describing the survey design and dissemination. In this section, I also expound on how I constructed a composite index for ethnic identity and how I coded the dependent variables in the linear model regressions. Subsequently, I present the results from the regression models, highlighting where the data supports my argument and where it does not. Lastly, in the conclusion section, I offer reflections about how this research could be improved and identify avenues for further study on this topic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This project seeks to determine the effect that the strength of one's ethnic identity has on one's foreign policy perceptions. Specifically, analyzing the American Greek diaspora, this project tests how the strength of one's Greek ethnic identity affects foreign policy opinions about EU-Greece relations. Answering this research question requires knowledge of many literatures across multiple fields of political science, including diaspora, ethnicity, and political behavior studies. For this reason, to contextualize this research question properly, this literature review offers a compilation of the relevant research on diasporas, ethnic interest groups, ethnic identity, and the role that ethnic identity plays in political opinion. In this section, I review the applicable research findings and critiques where the current literature falls short in its ability to answer this project's research question.

Diaspora Studies

Diaspora studies seeks to understand the role one's connection to an ethnic homeland plays in the construction of one's identity (Cohen & Yefet 2021). Because this project centers around the Greek diaspora's political opinions about its ethnic homeland, it is important to understand the related literature on diaspora studies to understand how group diasporic membership translates to personal ethnic identity.

Diasporas are "ethnic minority groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their countries of origin—their homelands" (Sheffer 1986: 3). Historically, diasporas had been perceived as posing security risks through the ability to organize, affecting economic development due to economic remittances being sent by foreign workers to home countries, and producing the brain drain

phenomenon of out-migration (Brinkerhoff 2006). More recent literature, in relation to diasporas in the United States, has offered a more positive outlook, unanimously highlighting the ability of diasporic interest groups to contribute constructively to American society. A product of strategic social identity construction, diasporas operate under the concept of a shared homeland. They often lead to the creation of a new, hybrid identity with a “diasporic culture” especially if a diaspora is divided along ethnic, religious, and political lines (Cohen & Yefet 2021). Though strong diasporic identities are not a direct springboard for diaspora mobilization (Mavroudi 2018), this feeling of belonging to a national homeland is powerful, and it can often lead to diasporic mobilization due to feelings of alienation resulting from limited social and political opportunities in the hostland (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Mavroudi 2018). Depending on the conditions of the host society and the homeland, diasporas can be dynamic political actors, actively creating change in favor of their shared homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Mavroudi 2018).

Extensive work has been done on the causes of diasporic mobilization. To begin, the structure of opportunity of the hostland and its relations with the homeland critically determine the breadth of influence a diaspora group can have. The more positive the economic, political, and social linkage between the host and home countries, the greater the likelihood that diasporas will be able to successfully influence foreign policy (Cohen & Yefet 2021). Based on the understanding that migrant mobilization creates a construction of loyalty to the nation that serves as a source of collective identity (Quinsaat 2013; Brinkerhoff 2006), scholars proffer that diasporas often mobilize for political causes in their country of origin because diasporas view themselves as the “representatives of their old country abroad” (Quinsaat 2013; Shain 1994). For this reason, the size and diversity of the diaspora community abroad and the ability of the

diaspora institutions to sustain a collective identity in the new country have been found to greatly affect diaspora mobilization (Quinsaat 2013). Specifically, experiences with democratic governance and conflict in the country of origin produce a higher likelihood of diaspora mobilization (Prasad & Savatic 2023).

Throughout the literature, scholars note that diaspora attitudes are not static; changes that the homeland or the hostland undergoes politically, economically, and socially can cause a shift in diaspora attitudes (Cohen & Yefet 2021). Moreover, the nature and causes of certain migration patterns also have an impact on the attitudes of the diasporas toward their homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Alfaraz 2018). Whether migration was voluntary or involuntary will affect diaspora perceptions of the homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Alfaraz 2018). This knowledge adds critical perspective to the research goals of this project: homogenous diasporic political opinions are not to be expected. Rather, “since large diasporas are often products of different migration vintages and of different political circumstances at home, the diaspora pool will rarely consist of a homogeneous population holding similar views, or retaining the same militancy toward the home government” (Shain 1994: 826). Diaspora studies can, therefore, help us understand diasporic attitudes, but they cannot offer perspective on how attitudes differ among later generations of a diaspora.

Ethnic Interest Groups in American Diplomacy

Diasporas have significant potential to influence attitudes and policies in the United States, as certain diasporas form ethnic interest groups that lobby the U.S. government to take action in favor of their ethnic homeland. Painting homeland-oriented political matters in such a way that convinces the U.S. government to take certain actions, ethnic interest groups hold

decisive power in affecting political attitudes. This ability that diaspora groups possess to influence not only U.S. foreign policy, but also opinions about their homeland make the study of ethnic interest groups relevant to this research.

Diasporic lobbies are interest groups that try to influence U.S. policymaking in favor of a shared ethnic homeland (King & Melvin 1999). Specifically, they are “institutionalized, nongovernmental actors whose members share a collective cultural identity, to which belonging to the same immigrant community is central” (Rytz 2013: 15). Thus, lobbyists work as surrogates of the home country (Newhouse 2009). Though skepticism exists about the influence ethnic groups have on U.S. foreign policy (Moore 2002; Rogers 1993; Garrett 1978), the majority of recent ethnic interest group literature maintains that ethnic groups have great power to affect foreign policy (McCormick 2012; Newhouse 2009; Rubenzer 2008; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007).

Before offering a summary of the literature on this topic, it is important to note, that while diasporas and ethnic interest groups share a similar connotation in the literature, they are analytically distinct: diaspora membership implies a connection to a shared ethnic homeland, while membership in an ethnic interest group does not technically require such association (Rubenzer 2008). Nevertheless, ethnic groups, ethnic interest groups, diasporic groups, and lobbyist groups are relatively interchangeable terms throughout the literature (Rubenzer 2008; McCormick 2012; Newhouse 2009; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007).

Rubenzer (2008) simply explains, “Ethnic identity groups that are successful at influencing U.S. foreign policy are successful because they operate well as interest groups” (Rubenzer 2008: 183). Ascribing to a top-down elite mobilization (where the initial economic resources are provided by political entrepreneurs) as the mechanism that leads to the

establishment of an ethnic group (Prasad & Savatic 2023), scholars offer two main reasons for the success of ethnic groups: the structure of the American political system and the characteristics of the ethnic groups themselves (McCormick 2012; Rubenzer 2008; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). The congressional branch of the U.S. government offers ethnic groups direct access to influencing policy makers' opinion about certain political issues affecting an ethnic homeland. By providing votes in key areas, making campaign contributions to politicians in favor of their political agenda, and lobbying on key issues, ethnic groups can make a real difference in U.S. politics (McCormick 2012; Mearsheimer & Walt 2007). Moreover, because ethnic groups are concerned about specific foreign policy issues that are largely unimportant to a great portion of the nation, they are able to have more success lobbying, especially if they are trying to defend the status quo rather than seeking change (Rubenzer 2008; Saideman 2002).

Conversely, Saideman (2002) discusses three main obstacles that stand in the way of a diaspora affecting foreign policy: (1) difficulties in mobilizing politically, (2) competing ethnic groups, and (3) limited ability to work in broader coalitions due to a group's narrow focus on a specific set of issues. Regardless, the majority of scholars agree that ethnic interest groups can strongly influence attitudes towards the homeland and can promote great political change in favor of the homeland.

The Greek Diaspora and Lobby

Having discussed the literature on diasporas and their potential to influence U.S. foreign policy and political attitudes towards the homeland, it is important to discuss the role of the Greek diaspora, specifically, in affecting U.S. foreign policy, as it has proved to be one of the most influential ethnic interest groups in the United States. The Greek diaspora's ability to

mobilize in defense of its ethnic homeland showcases this ethnic group's concern for and engagement with homeland politics. Therefore, analysis of the Greek ethnic interest group and its successful attempts to influence policy and opinion regarding Greece is vital to understanding how attachment to one's Greek ethnic identity may affect one's perception of one's ethnic homeland.

Founded in 1974 after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) is the largest Greek lobby group in the United States. Upon creation, its goal was to aid the strengthening of U.S. ties with Greece, stop the Turkish occupation of Cyprus, support Greece in its efforts to maintain sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and oppose the use of the word "Macedonia" in the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Its most notable success was its ability to persuade Congress to impose an arms embargo against Turkey in 1975 in response to Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. Not only was this embargo imposed, but it also was sustained for around three years until June 1978. This instance is highly acclaimed throughout diaspora literature as one of the strongest examples of the potential an ethnic interest group has to influence opinion and a nation's foreign policy (McCormick 2012). Accordingly, the Greek diaspora has been and continues to be regarded as one of the most influential lobby groups in the United States (McCormick 2012). However, to understand whether identification within such a politically active, powerful diaspora favorably affects Greek Americans' foreign policy opinions about their homeland, a further understanding of ethnic identity and its effects on political opinion is necessary.

Ethnic Identity

To understand whether and to what extent affiliation with one's ethnic identity affects foreign policy perceptions, it is essential to understand ethnic identity, how it is measured, and how it is understood to influence political opinion. Though the review of diasporic studies offered the necessary background to understand the role that diasporas play in affecting homeland-oriented politics, potentially favorably affecting diaspora members' political perceptions of the homeland, it is important to understand the literature on ethnicity and how group ethnic identity affects personal identity and opinion. There is a vast literature on this topic, as ethnic identity has been perceived as a meaningful determinant of both national phenomena and individual identity and opinion.

Ethnicity Studies

Identity has come to be understood as the missing link for a diverse range of outcomes like class conflict, ethno-nationalist violence, democratic peace, party identification, social movements, economic development, corporate culture, and the behavior of firms (Lee 2008; Fearon & Laitin 2003). While it is important to mention this vast literature on the role of ethnicity as a determinant of violence and civil war in a society (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Chandra 2006), this research project focuses on the literature that approaches ethnic identity as a determinant of individual opinion—specifically, political opinion.

Within these literatures, ethnic identity is defined differently depending on the differing theoretical traditions discussing it (Yoon 2011; Brady & Kaplan 2009; Fischer & Moradi 2001). There exist three main theories: (1) social identity theory emphasizes a sense of belonging to a certain social category rather than a personal identity; (2) identity formation theory suggests a

process of discovering identity over time as people understand the role that their ethnic identity plays in their lives; and (3) the acculturation framework focuses on an individual's assimilation to a culture by embracing and maintaining certain cultural characteristics (Fischer & Moradi 2001).

Chandra (2006) conceptualizes ethnic identities as “a subset of identity categories in which membership is determined by attributes associated with, or believed to be associated with, descent” (Chandra 2006: 397). Similarly, Phinney defines ethnic identity as “an aspect of acculturation, in which the concern is with individuals and the focus is on how they relate to their own group as a subgroup of the larger society” (Phinney 1990: 501). Though there is no agreement on a comprehensive definition due to the complex objective and subject nature of ethnic identity, these definitions offer the most applicable understandings of ethnic identity for the present research question (Yoon 2011; Brady & Kaplan 2009; Chandra 2006; Fischer & Moradi 2001; Davis 1999).

Measurement of Ethnic Identity

Though defining ethnic identity has proven difficult, work on measuring ethnic identity is more coherent. In 1992, Phinney developed the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) that has since become one of the most widely used ethnic identity measures due to its applicability to all ethnic groups. MEIM is a questionnaire that represents measures based on shared elements of ethnic identity, common across groups (Phinney 1992). Though originally developed to measure ethnic identity affirmation, achievement, and behaviors (Phinney 2007), Phinney and Ong (2007) revised the MEIM to the MEIM-R, which has been widely assessed as successful at measuring ethnic identity exploration and commitment (Pegg & Plybon 2005).

When discussing measuring ethnic identity and its effect on public opinion, it is important to emphasize that the literature conceptualizes racial and ethnic identity as separate terms. Racial identity refers to racial or ethnic physical characteristics in reaction to societal dynamics of “racial” oppression. Ethnic identity, on the other hand, refers to the possession or embrace of cultural characteristics, such as language and religious expression, as defining principles (Fischer & Moradi 2001). Extensive research has been done on examples of ethnic identity of people of color and European Americans (Alba 1990), acknowledging that the different components of each type of identity require different scholarly approaches because they translate differently into public opinion. For example, in his influential book *Whiteness of a Different Color*, Jacobson (1999) explains how by attempting to assimilate to the American identity, ethnic minorities were re-racialized to become Caucasian. Jacobson’s contribution is reflected in the data collected in a study of African American and Hispanic American ethnic identity in comparison to European American identity. In the study, African American and Hispanic college students indicated higher ethnic identity scores on the MEIM than European Americans, as minority students considered ethnicity to be more central to their self-identity (Phinney 1992). European Americans’ ethnicity did not define their self-identity as much, because their European ethnic identity has been re-racialized to Caucasian, lessening their inherent connection to their ethnic heritage and making it a more inconsequential aspect of their self-identity.

The Greek Identity

Scholars extensively study the Greek ethnic identity, as the Greek diaspora is a rather dynamic and active diaspora group in the United States. Members of the Greek diaspora continue

to pass down their ethnic heritage to later generations, and the existence of several Hellenic-focused organizations keeps the Greek ethnic identity alive. Accordingly, much scholarship exists about the Greek American identity, its main determinants, and the process of assimilation over generations.

Georgakas (2012-2013) divides Greek American ethnic identity into four categories based on Greek Americans' attachment to their ethnic origins: the assimilationists, the American Greeks, the Greek Americans, the Greek and American. First, Georgakas describes the American Greek who prioritizes Greek culture while in the United States, accepting only the aspects of American culture that are deemed necessary. Conversely, there is the Greek American who is more focused on embracing American culture than Greek culture. He describes a less common group called the assimilationists who make ardent efforts at assimilation, completely discarding Greek culture and identity as soon as possible. Lastly, Georgakas characterizes a fourth identity, the most complex identity, of those who simultaneously identify as Greek and American. For these people, their Greek and American identities operate in a dynamic relationship with no fixed cultural ratios, boundaries, or priorities (Georgakas 2012-2013). A similar division of an ethnic group into "types" or "classifications" given their attachment to their ethnic identity is found in other scholarly studies on ethnicity, since the categorization reflects the complex nature of ethnic identity as it evolves from generation to generation (Waters 1994).

Additionally, much work has been done to conceptualize the different measures of the Greek ethnic identity. In a study aimed to determine the main themes of Greekness, Constantinou (1989) identified three principal indicators of Greek ethnicity that were later confirmed in a study by Georgakas (2012-2013): language, sociocultural activities, and politics. Scholars of Greek ethnicity are in complete agreement in accentuating the interconnectedness of Hellenism and

Greek Orthodoxy (Georgakas 2012-2013; Constantinou 1989; Theodoratus 1971; Saloutos 1964), reiterating that “ethnicity for the Greek American represents a synthesis of the Hellenic-Orthodox ideals” (Constantinou 1989: 100). Likewise, there is agreement in the literature that the Greek language is “the most living bond between the ethnic and the old country” (Constantinou 1989: 109). In total, Saloutos (1973: 396) made an explicit, exhaustive statement that best encapsulates all the literature on Greek identity: he associates the Greek national identity with the “perpetuation of the Greek language, Greek faith, and customs and traditions considered Greek.”

This allegiance to both Greece and the United States as sources of one’s identity has been termed a “binational identity.” “Binational identity has arisen spontaneously as a means for individuals to maintain their Greek identity in America” (Georgakas 2004-2005: 12). Scholars warn that this binational consciousness can greatly alter the transatlantic political dialog between the Greek Americans and homeland Greeks. Greeks in the homeland view Greek Americans as a built-in overseas lobby, while Greek Americans perceive homeland Greeks to be citizens of a “quasi-Western nation that suffers from a penchant for conspiracy theories, corrupt bureaucracies, and inept government” (Georgakas 2004-2005: 7). Though this specific quote is taken from an article written before the Greek Debt Crisis, later studies connote a very similar reality (Mavroudi 2020; Georgakas 2012-2013). In this way, the complex relationship between Greek Americans and Greeks must certainly influence foreign policy opinions about the home country. Nevertheless, while there exists much literature on the Greek American diaspora and ethnic identity, these studies have been limited to understanding the process of assimilation over generations and the materialization of a binational identity. No work has been done on the

influence of the strength of one's Greek ethnic identity on one's foreign policy opinions. This project seeks to fill this gap in the literature.

The Influence of Ethnic Identity on Political Opinion and Participation

To do so, I turn to current research on identity and political behavior. Work on the role that ethnic identity plays on domestic political opinion and participation provides a foundation for my research, maintaining as it does that ethnic identity does in fact affect political behavior and offering relevant perspectives with which to approach my research question. Though the current literature on the role of ethnic identity on political opinion is insufficient for answering my research question, this section synthesizes the most relevant research that has been done on this topic.

The Influence of Identity on Political Opinion and Activism

Studies have concluded that there is in fact an identity to politics link (Lee 2008; Smith 2004). Those same studies warn, however, against assuming a connection between ethnic labels and a collective group's politics (Lee 2008). Some scholars have argued that ties to the homeland are only politically relevant to the first generation of immigrants (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Others disagree, however, arguing that loyalty to an ethnic homeland transcends generations, though the frame of reference may change from generation to generation (Cohen & Yefet 2021).

Scholars agree that group identity can play a significant role in influencing individual political behavior (Leighley & Ledlitz 1999). Specifically, "Ethnoracial group membership is also a social identity that can shape political behavior, leading to affinity voting and supporting group causes" (Crowder-Meyer & Ferrin 2021: 757). In their study, Crowder-Meyer and Ferrin

(2021) present important research on how ideological and ethnoracial identities shape people's interpretations of the news. When processing news or other information, people tend to evaluate according to their partisan identity (Crowder-Meyer & Ferrin 2021). Accordingly, Crowder-Meyer and Ferrin theorize that people are incentivized to interpret information in a way that favors their ideological and ethnoracial ingroups. "Ideology and ethnoracial membership are powerful social identities" (Crowder-Meyer & Ferrin 2021: 754). Accordingly, membership in an ethnoracial identity may prompt "in-group favoritism," positive beliefs about groups one identifies with as a means of upholding one's own self-image and ethnocentrism. For this reason, ethnoracial group members often share the same interests, grievances, and threats. This political cohesion of a social group means that group membership can affect political behavior. Group membership possesses a greater ability to affect political behavior the stronger an identity is, the more political implications associated with this identity, and the more group members perceive threats to their group (whether realistic or not) (Huddy 2013).

Research on how ethnic identity affects voter behavior helps us understand why and how ethnic identities affect political opinion, emphasizing that the ethnic identity of later generations of immigrants affects voting behavior as well. In their study of partisan affiliations of Latino voters, Alvarez and Bedolla (2003) draw a connection between ethnic identity and political attitudes and conclude that Latino voter partisanship is shaped by both political and social factors (Alvarez & Bedolla 2003). Other studies conclude that ethnic ties have an effect on voting behavior, and this effect persists even into the second and third generations of immigrants (Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965). Additionally, religious-ethnic identities have been found to play a role in voting behavior, despite social mobility (Parenti 1967; Wolfinger 1965).

The nature and causes of certain migration patterns also have an impact on the attitudes of the diasporas toward their homeland. Whether migration was voluntary or involuntary affects diaspora perceptions of the homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021). A study of the Iranian diaspora conducted by Cohen and Yefet (2021) showed that across generations the clear majority of the diaspora maintained ties with Iran. Only a small group of the respondents—those who had emigrated due to the 1979 Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War—responded that they had no ties to Iran. This knowledge adds critical perspective to the research goals of this project: it is likely for diaspora members to view their ethnic homeland favorably so long as they voluntarily left the country during non-turbulent times. However, this research still only addresses the migrants themselves; it does not address generational perspectives of the homeland.

Contributions to the Literature

As a result, these studies fail to fully address my research question for three reasons. First, they focus on racialized ethnic identities, such as the Latino, Middle Eastern, Caribbean, and African American identities, overlooking how European ethnic identities might affect political opinions. Analyzing the American Greek diaspora, this research greatly adds to the current understanding of diaspora studies to discuss the role that ethnic identity plays in the political opinions of a non-racialized, European diaspora. Second, existing studies focus on effects on domestic political opinion, political behavior, or association with the ethnic homeland; they do not address foreign policy opinions regarding the homeland. Given that most lobby groups work towards affecting some aspect of their host nation's foreign policy (Quinsaat 2013), understanding factors motivating diasporic foreign policy perceptions matters. Therefore, this research focuses on foreign policy opinions rather than domestic political opinion and voter

participation. Third, the studies fail to explore the strength of ethnic identity attachment and its differential impact on political opinions. There are several members of a diaspora, but some members experience the ties to their ethnic homeland more deeply than others. Given this range in affiliation with one's ethnic heritage, it is logical to predict differences in political opinions regarding the ethnic homeland. Regarding the American Greek diaspora, there have neither been studies differentiating strengths of ethnic identification nor studies on Greek diaspora foreign policy opinions; there have only been studies done determining the role of assimilation into American society over generations of Greek Americans (Constantinou 1989). I explore the ways in which the strength of ethnic identity attachment differentially affects political opinion, and I offer a new measure of that strength that captures the type of attachment to the ethnic homeland—to the Greek people or the Greek state. In all these ways, the current project greatly augments existing research on diaspora ethnic identity and its role in the formation of political opinion. The following section explains my argument and causal mechanism, followed by a section on the methodology of this research project.

THEORY

This project seeks to understand whether and to what extent the strength of ethnic identity affects foreign policy opinions. Specifically, this research studies how the strength of one's Greek ethnic identity affects one's views of EU-Greece relations, especially one's propensity to prioritize Greek national interests in European/European Union politics. Consistent with the literature on ethnoracial identity discussed above, I argue that the stronger one's identification as Greek, the more likely one is to perceive Greece more favorably, and thus, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greece's national interests.

It is important to note, however, that some diaspora members may have a strong sense of Greek ethnic identity but have a negative relationship with their ethnic homeland, prompting more negative or critical views of the homeland. Research discussed above suggests that the nature and causes of certain migration patterns have an impact on the attitudes of diasporas toward their ethnic homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Alfaraz 2018). Therefore, one may have a strong feeling of group membership, but its negative nature would not motivate “in-group favoritism.” To identify diaspora members who may have a negative relationship to their ethnic homeland, I control for unfavorable views of the homeland by asking survey respondents why they (or their ancestors) emigrated. Negative reasons for leaving (i.e. political instability, financial reasons, etc.) may foster negative attitudes toward the homeland, whereas positive reasons for leaving (i.e. education, career, family in the other country, etc.) may foster a more positive attitude towards the homeland. Figure 1 below offers a simple diagram of my causal argument.

Figure 1: Causal Argument					
Independent Variable	→		Intervening Variable	→	Dependent Variable
Strength of Ethnic Identity	Increased Feeling of Group Membership in Ethnic Identity	“In-Group Favoritism”	More Favorable Views of the Homeland	Political Opinions that Favor/Flatter the Homeland	Foreign Policy Opinions that Prioritize Homeland National Interests
	↓				
	Negative Relationship with the Homeland	Rejection of “In-Group Favoritism”	More Negative, Critical Views of the Homeland	Political Opinions that Do Not Favor/Flatter the Homeland	Foreign Policy Opinions that Do Not Prioritize Homeland National Interests

My argument draws from the literature on ethnic identity and political behavior, which gives a basis for understanding the extent to which one's ethnic identity affects one's political opinions. The literature on ethnic identity and diaspora studies agree that ethnic identity does in fact affect political behavior, though diasporas do not possess homogenous political opinions (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Lee 2008). This literature provides context for the hypotheses of this project, as I expect there to be differing political views among Greek Americans about Greece's place in the EU, given differing personal political ideologies. My argument remains unaffected by this phenomenon, however, as I maintain that the higher the strength of one's Greek ethnic identity, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interest in comparison to the average American. I am not suggesting that all Greek Americans will hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greece's national interests—just that Greek Americans are *more likely* to than the average American.

Complementing ethnic identity literature, diaspora studies help us understand that diaspora members often view themselves as representatives of their home country (Quinsaas 2013; Shain 1994). A product of strategic social identity construction, diasporas operate under the concept of belonging to a shared homeland (Cohen & Yefet 2021), and diaspora scholars maintain that this sentiment is powerful in affecting one's identity. Nonetheless, these literatures still cannot offer much insight into diaspora members' foreign policy opinions. I build a more complete understanding regarding the role of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions, as I offer a generalizable argument for understanding what type of foreign policy opinions people of an ethnic group may have and why.

Hypotheses

I derive a number of specific hypotheses from my general argument.

Generation Status

The literature on ethnic identity and politics shows that loyalty to an ethnic homeland transcends many generations, although the frame of reference may change from generation to generation (Cohen & Yefet 2021; Alvarez & Bedolla 2003). This research informs my understanding that generation status proximity will yield more favorable perspectives of the homeland, generating the following hypothesis:

(H1) The closer (farther) one's generational proximity to Greece, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Language Knowledge

Considered “the most living bond between the ethnic and the old country” (Constantinou 1989: 109), the Greek language is widely considered among scholars of the Greek diaspora as a main determinant of Greek ethnicity (Georgakas 2012-2013; Constantinou 1989; Saloutos 1973). Therefore, I use increased language knowledge as an indicator of increased strength of Greek ethnic identity and propose the following hypothesis:

(H2) The higher (lower) one's knowledge of the Greek language, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Religious Affiliation

Similarly, scholars of Greek ethnicity are in complete agreement that Hellenism and Greek Orthodoxy are greatly intertwined (Georgakas 2012-2013; Constantinou 1989; Theodoratus 1971; Saloutos 1964). Accordingly, I use higher affiliation with the Greek Orthodox Church as an indication of stronger Greek ethnic identity. My hypothesis regarding the measure of religious affiliation is as follows:

(H3) The more (less) affiliated one is with the Greek Orthodox Church, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Citizenship

Possessing citizenship in a nation infers not only a strong level of attachment to that nation, but also a direct sense of belonging to that national ethnic group. For this reason, I include whether one possesses Greek citizenship as a measure of strength of ethnic identity. While possessing Greek citizenship translates to an increased strength of Greek ethnic identity, not possessing Greek citizenship does not necessarily translate to a decreased sense of ethnic identity. For this reason, I propose the following hypothesis about how citizenship affects one's foreign policy opinions:

(H4) Individuals who hold Greek citizenship are more likely than those who do not hold Greek citizenship to have foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Self-Identification of Ethnic Identity

I include self-identification of ethnic identity as a measure of strength of ethnic identity because many people may possess an ethnic heritage but do not claim it. Claiming one's ethnic

background indicates the strength of one's personal identification with it. A person may be a first generation Greek American but not identify with any part of his/her/their Greek ethnic identity, whereas a person with less generational proximity to Greece may identify strongly with the Greek part of his/her/their heritage. The self-identification measure directly accounts for how closely one affiliates oneself with one's Greek ethnic heritage, leading to the following hypothesis:

(H5) Individuals who self-identify as Greek American or Greek are more likely than those who do not to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Frequency of Visits

Frequency of visits to the homeland also measures strength of ethnic identity because it potentially reflects how closely one identifies with one's ethnic heritage. Visiting an ethnic homeland frequently builds increased ties with the language, culture, and people of that nation. This connection translates to an increased sense of ethnic identity, prompting the following hypothesis:

(H6) The more (less) often one travels to Greece, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Attachment to the People vs. the State

Finally, I develop a novel measure of ethnic identification: attachment to the people versus attachment to the state. This measure not only communicates attachment to one's ethnic homeland, but more importantly communicates the *type* of attachment to the homeland. While identifying with both the people and the state imply identification with Greece as a nation and an

ethnic homeland, I define attachment to the people to mean having personal relationships with the people in Greece as well. Attachment to the state, on the other hand, I define to mean identification with Greece only as a nation and an ethnic homeland. In other words, those that identify with the people also have relationships with people in Greece, while those that identify with the state do not. In this manner, identification with the people of Greece suggests a deeper type of attachment to the ethnic homeland. It indicates a higher strength of Greek ethnic identity, as having relationships with people in Greece infers closer ties to the homeland. Based on this reasoning, I suggest the following hypotheses regarding this measurement of attachment to the people/state:

(H4a) The more (less) attachment one feels to the Greek people, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests;

(H4b) The more (less) attachment one feels to the Greek state, the less (more) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Drawing on the existing diaspora and ethnic identity literature, I propose hypotheses about the effects of the strength of ethnic identity on the foreign policy views of members of the Greek diaspora, specifically on Greek-EU politics. Figure 2 summarizes these hypotheses.

Figure 2: Hypotheses
Measurement 1: Generational Status
<i>H₁</i> : The closer (farther) one's generational proximity to Greece, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
Measurement 2: Language Knowledge
<i>H₂</i> : The higher (lesser) one's Greek language knowledge, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Measurement 3: Religious Affiliation
<i>H₃</i> : The more (less) affiliated one is with the Greek Orthodox Church, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
Measurement 4: Citizenship
<i>H₄</i> : Individuals who hold Greek citizenship are more likely than those who do not hold Greek citizenship to have foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
Measurement 5: Self-Identification of Ethnic Identity
<i>H₅</i> : Individuals who self-identify as Greek American or Greek are more likely than those who do not to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
Measurement 6: Frequency of Travel
<i>H₆</i> : The more (less) often one travels to Greece, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
Measurement 7: Attachment to the People vs. the State
<i>H_{7a}</i> : The more (less) attachment one feels to the Greek people, the more (less) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.
<i>H_{7b}</i> : The more (less) attachment one feels to the Greek state, the less (more) likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

METHODS

Research Design

To understand whether and to what extent one’s Greek ethnic identity affects one’s opinions about EU-Greece relations, I conducted a nationally representative survey, and I administered the same survey to a group of Greek Americans in order to oversample members of that ethnic group. I collected a total of 1,631 responses, 578 of which were from Greek Americans and 1,053 of which were not. The national representative survey was administered by Qualtrics Survey Company and provided 195 of the responses from Greek Americans. I collected the other 383 Greek American responses by administering the survey to Greek diaspora members

directly, without the use of a survey company, by reaching out to several local and national Greek American organizations. Figure 3 below provides information about the survey dissemination, including the dates that each organization fielded the survey, the size of the samples, and the number of responses.

Figure 3: Survey Respondents

Non-Greek American Respondents			
Company Name	Date Fielded	Number of People Contacted	Number of Responses
Qualtrics Survey Company	02/29/2024	1,053	1,053 responses
Greek American Respondents			
Organization Name	Date Fielded	Number of People Contacted	Number of Responses
Qualtrics Survey Company	02/29/2024	195	195
St. Katherine Philoptochos ¹	02/24/2024	240	
AHEPA Foundation ²	02/26/2024	1,000	
Greek Women of NOVA ³	02/27/2024	154	
Greek Orthodox Moms ⁴	02/27/2024	about 39,000	
American Hellenic Institute (AHI) ⁵	03/15/2024	70	
TOTAL:		about 40,659	578 responses

¹ Saint Katherine Philoptochos is a regional organization consisting of Greek American women over the age of 18 in the Virginia, Maryland, and Washington D.C. districts.

² The AHEPA Foundation is a national organization consisting of Greek American men over the age of 18. The survey was only fielded to 1,000 of its members in the Virginia, Maryland, and Washington D.C. districts.

³ Greek Women of NOVA is an organization based in Northern Virginia consisting of women ages 18 and older.

⁴ Greek Orthodox Moms is a national organization consisting of Greek American mothers. The survey link was posted in one of the organization’s bulletins.

⁵ AHI is a national organization consisting of thousands of Greek Americans. It is the largest Greek lobby group in the US; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a great majority of its members are attentive to Greek politics. The survey was disseminated to a group of 70 members randomly selected by AHI staff.

Why were there so many Greek American responses in the nationally representative sample? With only 0.6% of the US population identifying as Greek American, the Qualtrics nationally representative survey producing 195 Greek American responses clearly deviates from national demographics. One can hypothesize that this disproportionate representation is due to Greek Americans' heightened interest in participating in this survey compared to average Americans. Qualtrics pays survey respondents based on the number of surveys they complete. Therefore, one can speculate that while several non-Greek Americans were quick to skip this survey once they understood how Greece-centered it was, Greek Americans made all the greater effort to fill it out. This phenomenon exhibits Greek Americans' increased attentiveness to issues concerning their ethnic heritage and homeland.

Created to shed light on how Greek Americans perceive EU-Greek politics in comparison to non-Greek Americans, the survey asked all respondents the same questions about their opinions about the US, EU, Greece, and EU-Greece relations. Respondents were also asked the same basic demographic questions, including gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, income, household size, voter participation, and political ideology.

Every survey respondent was asked "Which of the following best describes your ethnic identity?" The respondents who selected "Greek" or "Greek American" were prompted to a series of questions about their affiliation with Greece, measuring the strength of their Greek ethnic identity. Respondents who described themselves as "American" or "Other" were prompted to the question, "Do you identify with one or more countries or regions from which

your ancestors emigrated?” If they responded “Yes”, they were then asked a series of parallel questions about their ethnic identity.⁶

Below I discuss my independent variable, intervening variable, dependent variable, and controls, including what questions were asked to measure these variables. I also include information about how I coded each variable in the linear model regressions. I discuss the results of the regressions in the results portion of this paper.

Independent Variable: Ethnic Identity

My independent variable is strength of ethnic identity, and I include seven measures of this variable in my analysis. Though my hypotheses were about the individual measures of Greek ethnic identity, I found that analyzing the strength of Greek ethnic identity as a composite variable offers deeper insights than studying the different measures individually. Below I outline the seven measures of ethnic identity and then discuss how I construct the composite variable:

1. Generational Status:

- a. Respondents were asked “Which of the following best describes your immigrant status in the United States?” based on the assumption that the closer the generational proximity, the stronger one’s ethnic identity. In other words, selecting “Immigrant” indicated the highest level of ethnic identity affiliation, while selecting “More than third generation through at least one parent/guardian” was the lowest level of ethnic identity affiliation.

⁶ Although data was collected about non-Greek American respondents’ affiliation with their ethnic identities, it was not included in the analysis. Only data from Greek American respondents was used, as I focused my analysis on Greek ethnic identity specifically.

2. Language Knowledge:

- a. Respondents were asked to identify their language knowledge on a scale from “0 - No knowledge” to “5 - Native/bilingual proficiency”, with 5 indicating the highest level of ethnic identity affiliation.

3. Religious Affiliation:

- a. Respondents were asked about their ethnic religious affiliation in the question, “On a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being not at all and 5 being very or extremely, how deeply involved in or affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church/a religion of your ethnic homeland are you?”

4. Citizenship:

- a. All respondents were asked about their citizenship status and were given the following options to choose from: “(a) I am a citizen of the United States only; (b) I am a citizen of Greece only; (c) I am a citizen of both the United States and Greece; (d) I am a citizen of the United States and at least one other country, excluding Greece; (e) I am neither a citizen of the United States nor Greece; and (f) I prefer not to answer.”

5. Self-Identification of Ethnic Identity:

- a. All respondents were asked, “Which of the following best describes your ethnic identity?” In a randomized order, respondents selected from the following responses: (a) American, (b) Greek American, (c) Greek, (d) Other.

6. Frequency of Travel:

- a. Respondents were asked, on average, how often they visit the country from which their ancestors emigrated based on the assumption that the more often one visits,

the stronger one's ethnic identity affiliation. The response options were: (a) More than once a year, (b) Every year, (c) Once every two years, (d) Once every five years, (e) Once every ten years or less often.

7. Attachment to the State vs. People:

Respondents were asked whether they identify with their ethnic homeland's people and/or state. Respondents were prompted with the following response options: (a) I identify with the Greek people, but not with the Greek state, (b) I identify with both, but more with the Greek people, (c) I identify with both about equally, (d) I identify with both, but more with the Greek state, (e) I identify with the Greek state, but not with the Greek people, and (f) I identify with neither the Greek state nor with the Greek people. Respondents were asked not to select "identification with the people" unless they had personal relationships with people living in Greece. This measure of ethnic identity differs from the other measures listed above in that it is not a linear, hierarchical measure of strength of ethnic identity. Rather, this variable measures type—rather than strength—of ethnic identity, and it has implications for the dependent variable, foreign policy opinions. An individual who identifies with the people and has personal relationships with Greeks in Greece is more likely to have sympathy towards the Greek people and, thus, hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests over European interests. A respondent who identifies only with the state does not have the same personal, emotional attachment to Greece and its people.

Defining Greekness: Constructing the Composite Index

I developed a composite index for Greek ethnic identity and found that analyzing Greek ethnic identity as a composite variable offers far more meaningful results than studying the

different measures individually. I also ran linear model regressions measuring the effect of each individual measure of ethnic identity on foreign policy questions, but I found few statistically significant results. I developed the composite index of ethnic identity based on the respondents' generational proximity, language knowledge, religious affiliation, frequency of visits, and attachment to the people/state. Though I discuss a total of seven measures of ethnic identity throughout this paper, I only include five of them in the composite variable.

While holding Greek citizenship implies great connection with Greece, lack of Greek citizenship does not necessarily imply any less of a connection with Greece as an ethnic homeland. Thus, because all respondents were a part of the Greek diaspora in the US and very few possessed Greek citizenship, I chose not to include citizenship in the index. I also chose not to include the measure of self-identification in the composite variable because the composite measure of Greek ethnic identity inherently reflects this variable of self-identification. Respondents were only prompted with questions about their Greek ethnic identity if they selected that they self-identified as "Greek" or "Greek American". If they did not self-identify as "Greek" or "Greek American" they automatically received an index score of zero because they were not asked any questions about their Greek ethnic identity. Moreover, citizenship and self-identification of ethnic identity are nominal variables, while all other measures included in the index are ordinal or were coded as ordinal variables. In this way, all the measures in the index were on the same scale.

When considering how to construct the index I first ran the necessary regressions to ensure that all the measures I wanted to include in the index had positive relationships with each other. The composite index was on a 25-point scale, as each measure of ethnic identity was on a five-point scale. I programmed the code to award five points for the answer with the highest

“Greekness,” four points to the next highest answer, and so on. In this way, for generational proximity, respondents were awarded five points if they selected “Immigrant” and one point if they selected “More than third generation.” For language knowledge, they were awarded five points for selecting “5 - Native/Bilingual Proficiency,” one point for “1 - Elementary Proficiency,” and zero points for “0 - No knowledge.” For religious affiliation, they were awarded five points for selecting “5” and one point for selecting “1.” For frequency of visits, they were awarded five points for selecting “More than once a year” and one point for selecting “Once every ten years or less.” Lastly, for attachment to the state versus people, respondents were awarded five points for selecting “I identify with the Greek people, but not with the Greek state;” four points for “I identify with both, but more with the Greek people;” three for “I identify with both about equally;” two for “I identify with both, but more with the Greek state;” one for “I identify with the Greek state, but not with the Greek people;” and zero for “I identify with neither the Greek state nor with the Greek people.”

Self-Identification of Ethnic Identity: An Important Measure

Before differentiating the data between responses from Greek Americans and responses from non-Greek Americans, I separated the data between responses collected by Qualtrics versus responses collected through Greek American organizations. After doing this, I found that some respondents from Greek American organizations indicated “American” or “Other” as their ethnic identity. Of the 578 responses collected via Greek American organizations, 25 selected “American” and 7 selected “Other”. This phenomenon highlights the significance of self-identification as a measure, showcasing that ethnic identity transcends factors like generational

proximity and language knowledge; it requires a deliberate personal connection with the ethnic homeland. Identification with an ethnic homeland, in other words, is a matter of personal choice.

Intervening Variable: Favorable View of the Homeland

In my causal argument, the intervening variable is favorable views of the homeland. Strength of ethnic identity leads to an increased feeling of group membership, leading to “in-group favoritism.” This ingroup favoritism leads to more favorable views of the homeland that influence someone to maintain foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greece. I measure my intervening variable using data collected from the following question:

1. View of the Homeland:
 - a. All respondents were explicitly asked how favorably they view their ethnic homeland on a scale of 0-10, with 0 being very unfavorably and 10 being very favorably.

Dependent Variable: Foreign Policy Opinions

My dependent variable is foreign policy opinions. Given that I do not have a single measure of foreign policy opinions, I ran linear model regressions to understand how ethnic identity might impact respondents’ answers to six different questions measuring respondents’ foreign policy opinions about EU-Greece relations.⁷ Accordingly, I standardized all the codes, aligning the coefficients in my regression models on a uniform scale. Each response option was assigned a numerical value on a scale from 1 to 5, with 5 reflecting the answer choice that most prioritized Greek national interests. The following questions were asked:

⁷ If respondents selected “Prefer not to say” or “Do not know” for a question, their answers were removed from the analysis for that question. Given this, I lost many observations in some of my regressions.

(For questions 1-5, respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement. For question 6, respondents were asked to select from the options “Victim,” “Burden,” “Both,” “Neither,” and “Don’t Know.”)

1. Greece currently hosts more than 50,000 international refugees. I favor a policy that would limit the number of future refugees allowed into Greece.
2. I am in favor of Greece making tradeoffs in order to maintain peace with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.
3. I favor Europe's decision to create the European common currency, the euro.
4. I believe the EU has an obligation to assist other member states that are financially struggling.
5. I believe that Greece should leave the EU [Grexit].
6. Do you consider Greece to be more of a victim of or a burden to the EU?

The following section explains my reasoning for asking each of these questions, as well as how I coded the responses:

1. The Syrian refugee crisis:

There is much debate in the European community about whether Greece should continue to incur a large portion of the burden from this crisis or whether the rest of the EU member states should help more. The answer choice “Strongly Agree” was coded as the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

2. The Turkish conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean:

Turkey and Greece have engaged in ongoing conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean for a long time. There is much debate in the EU about whether Greece should make concessions to

maintain peace for the whole EU. Accordingly, how a respondent answered this question showcases whether they prioritize Greece's national interests over those of the whole EU. The answer choice "Strongly Disagree" was coded to represent the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests, and "Strongly Agree" was coded to represent the response that least significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

3. The establishment of the euro as a common European currency:

The establishment of the euro as a common European currency is a debated topic, as some scholars, politicians, and people believe that conversion to the euro disadvantaged certain member states. Given that Greece is frequently referenced as one of these disadvantaged member states, I asked respondents whether they favor the decision to convert to the euro common currency. The answer choice "Strongly Disagree" was coded as the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

4. The EU's financial obligation to its members:

The EU, International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank offered Greece significant bailout funds in response to the major debt crisis Greece faced following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. For this reason, I asked respondents whether they believe that the EU has a financial obligation to its members, given that the Greek debt crisis marked a period during which the EU provided significant financial assistance to its struggling member state. The answer choice "Strongly Agree" was coded as the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

5. Grexit:

Respondents were asked whether they are in favor of Grexit (i.e. Greece leaving the EU). After the Greek debt crisis, the term Grexit began to emerge in response to how the EU handled

Greece's debt crisis. This movement represents the idea that Greece's national interests are not prioritized enough within the EU⁸. The answer choice "Strongly Agree" was coded as the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

6. Greece as a victim of or burden to the EU:

Respondents were asked whether they view Greece as a victim of or burden to the EU. This question illuminates much about respondents' foreign policy opinions about the power relationship between Greece and the EU. This question also addresses whether and to what extent they prioritize Greece's national interests when determining their foreign policy opinions. Viewing Greece as a victim to the EU implies that one believes that the EU does not adequately address Greece's national interests, exemplifying the respondent's desire to see Greece's national interests prioritized more. Conversely, viewing Greece as a burden to the EU implies that one perceives Greece's national interests to encumber the EU's best interests, exemplifying the respondent's desire to see the EU's interests prioritized more. The answer choice "Victim" was coded as the response that most significantly prioritized Greek national interests.

Controls: Alternate Explanations for Dependent Variable

I offer alternate explanations for the dependent variable.⁹¹⁰ I asked respondents to identify the following information about themselves, as these variables are widely accepted

⁸ It is important to note that respondents could logically see both staying in the EU and leaving the EU as favoring Greek national interests. If this is the case, the regression may not indicate a statistically significant relationship between strength of ethnic identity and being in favor of Grexit.

⁹ I originally intended to include other variables that may explain why people do not travel to the ethnic homeland. While some may have little desire to go back to Greece, others simply cannot afford to travel back. For this reason, I asked respondents who selected that they traveled to Greece 'Once every ten years or less often' to identify the reason for not traveling to Greece to better understand their relationship with their ethnic homeland. I was not able to collect enough data, though, to include this variable in the regression models.

¹⁰ I also offer alternate explanations for the intervening variable. Given that these variables only applied to immigrants from Greece, though, I did not collect enough data to produce any reliable findings. First, I asked respondents their reasons for leaving their ethnic homeland because the nature and causes of certain migration patterns have been found to have an impact on the attitudes of the diasporas toward their homeland (Cohen & Yefet

factors that may affect one's political opinions. I measure each according to self-recorded survey responses:

1. Gender:

- a. Because gender has been found to influence how individuals interpret politics, respondents were asked to identify their gender based on the following options:
(a) Female, (b) Male, (c) Non-binary, and (d) Prefer not to answer.¹¹

2. Age:

- a. Age is widely accepted as a factor that greatly influences political opinion. Younger people tend to be more liberal or progressive, while older people tend to be more conservative. Moreover, given that different generations have experienced different geopolitical events and realities, respondents were asked to denote their ages to understand how their ages might have influenced their political opinions.

3. Race/Ethnicity:

- a. Given that the economic and social effects of a person's race and/or ethnorracial background can influence political opinions in several ways, respondents were asked to identify their race or ethnicity.

2021; Alfaraz 2018). Second, I asked respondents whether they were better off or worse off financially since emigrating to the United States. This question was asked because whether they have economically benefited from emigrating to the US may impact their overall opinion about the US and their homeland. Nonetheless, both of these alternate explanations were not considered in the results because I did not collect enough data to produce reliable results.

¹¹ This variable for gender was coded to indicate the effect on the dependent variable when respondents were not female. Accordingly, the variable is labeled "non-female" in the regression models. Only six respondents identified as "non-binary."

4. Education:

- a. Given that much research suggests that higher levels of education are associated with greater political awareness and more liberal political views, respondents were asked to describe their highest level of education.

5. Income:

- a. It is widely accepted that income influences individuals' economic interests, often motivating certain political ideology and political perceptions. Accordingly, respondents were asked to identify the income bracket to which they belonged.

6. Number of People in Household:

- a. Respondents were asked to identify the number of people in their household to account for variations in household size when assessing the standard of living indicated by respondents' income.

7. Voter Participation:

- a. Given that voter participation often reflects the respondent's political engagement and awareness, respondents were asked to indicate how often they vote in U.S. national, state, and local elections. They selected from the following responses: (a) I vote in every election, (b) I vote at least once every two years, (c) I vote at least once every four years, (d) I vote less than once every four years, (e) I am not eligible to vote, (f) I choose not to vote, and (g) I prefer not to answer.

8. Political Ideology:

- a. Given that political ideology significantly influences beliefs, values, and priorities, it is important to recognize its impact on how respondents interpret and respond to political information. Therefore, respondents were asked to identify the

description that best fits their political ideology: (a) Very liberal, (b) Liberal, (c) Slightly liberal, (d) Moderate, middle of the road, (e) Slightly conservative, (f) Conservative, (g) Very conservative, and (h) Prefer not to say.

RESULTS

This section presents key findings from the survey data. In general, I find that a stronger Greek ethnic identity leads individuals to prioritize Greek national interests in their foreign policy opinions. In this section, I first discuss the direct effects of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions. I then look at the indirect effects in two parts: 1) the effect of the strength of ethnic identity on favorable perceptions of the homeland, and 2) the effect of favorable perceptions of the homeland on foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

The results of this study yield two primary conclusions:

1. Stronger ethnic identification corresponds to more favorable perceptions of the ethnic homeland; however, more favorable perceptions of the homeland do not influence foreign policy opinions to prioritize Greek national interests.
2. The stronger one's Greek ethnic identity, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests.

Direct Effects of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

While the hypotheses presented in the previous section initially focused on individual measures of ethnic identity, analysis of the survey data revealed that treating ethnic identity as a composite variable showed a more statistically significant relationship regarding its impact on

foreign policy opinions. I, therefore, report the results for the regression models that look at the effect of the composite variable of ethnic identity on each of the foreign policy questions.¹²

For four of the six questions, the regression models show a statistically significant and positive relationship between strength of ethnic identity and foreign policy opinions that prioritize homeland national interests. For the question about the conflict with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean, the regression model shows a positive and statistically significant relationship ($\beta = 0.185^{***}$, $p < 0.001$)¹³ between strength of ethnic identity and resistance against a policy that would make Greece compromise with Turkey. This relationship is significant at the 0.1% level, indicating that there is a 0.1% chance that this relationship occurred as a result of chance. For the question about the refugee crisis, the regression model shows a statistically significant relationship in the predicted direction ($\beta = 0.113^{**}$, $p < 0.01$) between strength of ethnic identity and the inclination to support a policy limiting the number of refugees allowed into Greece. This relationship is significant at the 1% level, meaning that there is a 1% chance that the observed relationship occurred by chance. For the question about Greece being a victim/burden to the EU, the regression model also reveals a meaningful positive relationship ($\beta = 0.127^*$, $p < 0.05$) between the strength of ethnic identity and the inclination to perceive Greece as a victim of the EU. This finding is significant at the 5% level, indicating that there is a 5% chance that the observed relationship occurred by chance. For the question about the EU's obligation to assist financially struggling member states, the regression model reveals a positive and statistically significant relationship ($\beta = 0.070^+$, $p < 0.1$) between the strength of ethnic identity and the inclination to believe that the EU has an obligation to financially support its

¹² See Appendix B for a table with the regression models for each of the individual variables.

¹³ Note that the asterisks following the beta (β) coefficient represent the p-value, denoting the statistical significance of the coefficient. In decimal form, the p-value indicates the likelihood that the observed relationship occurred by chance. The lower the p-value, the more statistically significant the coefficient is and vice versa.

struggling member states. This relationship is significant at the 10% level, indicating a 10% chance that the observed relationship occurred by chance. Note that the p-values of first three relationships indicate more statistical significance than the last relationship. This difference in statistical significance suggests that the first three relationships are less likely to be due to random chance than the last one. Still, though, the p-value of the last question indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, denoting a statistically significant relationship, nonetheless.

In two cases, however, the results did not support my argument. For the question about Grexit, I found a statistically significant relationship between strength of ethnic identity and support of Grexit, but not in the predicted direction ($\beta = -0.063+$, $p < 0.1$). This relationship is significant at the 10% level, meaning that there is a 10% chance that the observed relationship occurred by chance. A possible explanation for this negative relationship might be that respondents could logically see staying in the EU as favoring Greek national interests. For the question about conversion to the euro common currency, though the regression model showed a positive relationship, it did not show a statistically significant relationship between strength of ethnic identity and disapproval of converting to the euro currency ($\beta = 0.041$, $p > 0.1$). An explanation for this statistically insignificant relationship might be that some respondents could logically believe that the conversion to the euro favored Greek national interests, while others could logically believe the opposite, that adoption of the euro was bad for Greek national interests.

The findings from the six regression models directly measuring the effect of strength of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions are summarized in Figure 4. The full six regression models are included as Appendix C.

Figure 4: Regression Model Results

Direct Effects of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

Question Topic	Coefficient
Conflict with Turkey	0.185***
Refugee Crisis	0.113**
Victim/Burden	0.127*
EU Financial Obligation	0.070+
Grexit	-0.063+
Conversion to the Euro	0.041
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Indirect Effects of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

Initially, I argued that a stronger Greek ethnic identity fosters more favorable views of the homeland, influencing foreign policy perspectives that prioritize Greek national interests. I ran linear model regressions measuring the effect of the composite independent variable, strength of ethnic identity, on the intervening variable, views of the homeland, and the effect of this intervening variable on the dependent variables, respondents' views on the six foreign policy questions just discussed. The results of these models show that there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and the intervening variable, but not between the intervening and dependent variable. That is, the predicted indirect effect of the strength of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions is not present.

The regression model reveals a positive and statistically significant relationship between the strength of ethnic identity and favorable perceptions of the homeland ($\beta = 0.625^{***}$, $p < .001$), supporting the first part of my causal argument. However, the regression models testing the relationship between perceptions of the homeland and foreign policy opinions did not

produce statistically significant results. Though the regression model for the question about the EU’s financial obligation to struggling member states showed a positive and statistically significant relationship ($\beta = 0.297^{***}$, $p < .001$), the rest of the regression models did not. Figure 5 below outlines the results from the regression models measuring the indirect effects of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions. It shows that my causal argument does not work as originally hypothesized; only the first part of the argument is supported by the data. The full regression models are included as Appendix D.

Figure 5: Regression Model Results

Indirect Effects of Ethnic Identity on Foreign Policy Opinions

Independent Variable→Intervening Variable	Coefficient
Ethnic Identity→Favorable Perceptions of the Homeland	0.625***
Intervening Variable→Dependent Variable	Coefficient
Favorable Perceptions→Conflict with Turkey	-0.153
Favorable Perceptions→Refugee Crisis	0.147
Favorable Perceptions→Victim/Burden	0.177
Favorable Perceptions→EU Financial Obligation	0.297***
Favorable Perceptions→Grexit	-0.143
Favorable Perceptions→Conversion to the Euro	-0.019
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001	

Perhaps, these statistically insignificant results are due to how I measure the intervening variable. Asking respondents to identify how favorably they view Greece on a scale of 1-10 might not have been a good measure of perceptions of the homeland. It also might have been beneficial to differentiate between overall favorable perceptions and favorable political perceptions of the homeland. Moreover, reflecting on the results and my causal argument, I

suggest an alternate intervening variable to be analyzed in future research. Perhaps, group membership in the Greek ethnic identity also leads to feeling threatened whenever the Greek people are threatened. Huddy (2013) argues that group membership possesses more ability to affect political behavior the stronger an identity is because the stronger this identity, the more group members perceive threats to their group (Huddy 2013). Therefore, I suggest that this inclination to feel threatened when the Greek people are threatened may then translate to holding foreign policy views that prioritize Greek national interests, as these views would be the least threatening to the Greek people.

In total, these results show that strength of ethnic identity does in fact affect foreign policy opinions. The results from several of the regression models show that the strength of ethnic identity has a positive and statistically significant relationship with foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests. That said, the results also show that the intervening variable does not relate to my dependent variable as hypothesized. While there is a very strong statistically significant relationship between my independent variable and intervening variable, the results show that the same is not true of the relationship between the intervening variable and the dependent variable.

CONCLUSION

In a nation like the United States where so many people identify with an ethnic background, ethnic identity studies have become increasingly relevant. While scholars agree that there is a strong connection between identity and political opinion, the field still has much room to grow. This study, focusing on how strength of ethnic identity affects foreign policy opinions of the Greek diaspora in the US, greatly adds to our understanding of ethnic identity. It examines

an ethnic group not previously studied in this context; it furthers the discussion to analyze the effect of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions; and it begins the conversation in identifying a causal explanation for the relationship between the two.

This research proposed the overarching argument that the higher one's strength of Greek ethnic identity, the more likely one is to hold foreign policy opinions that prioritize Greek national interests. The data collected from a nationally representative survey oversampling Greek Americans supported this argument. Though the data did not support the causal argument as originally hypothesized, the linear model regressions revealed positive and statistically significant relationships between the strength of ethnic identity and foreign policy opinions that prioritize homeland national interests. Additionally, this argument is applicable across descriptive, prescriptive, and normative opinions about foreign policy, making it more generalizable and relevant.

With hindsight, I offer the following reflections on my work. First, given that the data did not support my causal argument as originally hypothesized, I reflected on reasons for why this may be. Though I discuss this more deeply in the results section, I think it is important to highlight that I suggest an alternate intervening variable to be considered in future research. Perhaps, group membership in the Greek ethnic identity leads to feeling threatened whenever the Greek people are threatened. This feeling may then translate to holding foreign policy views that prioritize Greek national interests, as these views would threaten Greeks the least.

Second, reflecting back on my measure of attachment to the people/state, I suggest a simpler, more effective way to approach this measure in the future. Instead of asking about attachment to the people versus the state, it may be more effective to reconceptualize this measure as simply whether someone has personal relationships with people in the ethnic

homeland. Perhaps, it would be better to ask a question like, “On a scale of 0-5, how closely do you identify with people in Greece?”, with “0” indicating not having any relationships with people in Greece. This simpler way of phrasing the question and conceptualizing the measure may precipitate more accurate results, as it could mitigate any confusion about what the question is asking. Therefore, while I maintain that this measure of attachment to the people/state is important and should be considered in future research, I suggest rephrasing it to be “relationships with people in the homeland.” This reframing of the variable still measures the exact same thing but does so in a much clearer way.

Before concluding, I would also like to note that this study prompted a series of new research questions related to this topic. I collected a significant amount of data from the survey, much of which was not analyzed in this thesis. Specifically, I gathered data on respondents’ foreign policy opinions regarding the US. This data could provide insights into how individuals with stronger ethnic identities might perceive the foreign policy of their current homeland differently. Moreover, it could be used to investigate whether individuals who identify with an ethnic background tend to hold different foreign policy opinions about the US compared to those who solely identify with their American identity. Does a sole American identity lead to foreign policy opinions that prioritize American national interests? Would that be the same for an American with an ethnic background? These several questions have emerged as a result of this research, and much of the data from this study could be used to begin to answer them. This study only scratched the surface, leaving much room for further development in research to come.

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APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTIONS

[Below includes the full survey disseminated; not all questions were used in project analysis.]

Defining Greekness: The Effect of Ethnic Identity Affiliation on Foreign Policy Perceptions

[Start of Block: Splash Page]

Thank you for participating in this study on the influence of ethnic identity on foreign policy opinions. The survey should take no longer than 10 minutes to complete. There are no perceived risks or benefits associated with taking this survey. Your participation is fully anonymous. Anonymity means that no one, including the researchers, will be able to connect the responses to the identity of the respondent. You may discontinue participation at any time without penalty by simply exiting the survey. You must be 18 years of age or older in order to participate. By starting the survey, you give your consent to the statements above and your participation in this survey. Thank you again for your contribution to this important research.

The participant may receive the top-line results of this survey by emailing the lead researcher Iliana Tzafolias (idtzafolias@wm.edu). The faculty advisor for this project is Dr. Susan Peterson (smpete@wm.edu), whom you may contact for questions about the survey, research, and respondents' rights. This survey is funded by William & Mary.

This research has been reviewed by William & Mary Student IRB on (11/09/23) and is determined to be "Exempt," and will expire on (11/09/24). Respondents may report dissatisfaction with any aspect of this study to Dr. Jennifer Stevens, Chair of the Protection of Human Subject Committee, by telephone (757-221-3862) or email (jastev@wm.edu). Please see this page for more information:
<https://www.wm.edu/offices/sponsoredprograms/researchcompliance/guidanceandprocedures/studentirb/>.

[End of Block: Splash Page]

[Start of Block: Block 1]

Q1 Which of the following best describes your opinion of each of the following:

	Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	Don't know
United States	<input type="radio"/>				
Greece	<input type="radio"/>				
European Union	<input type="radio"/>				

[Page Break]

Q2 How well informed do you consider yourself to be about Greek/EU politics?

- Very knowledgeable
- Fairly knowledgeable
- Somewhat knowledgeable
- Not very knowledgeable
- Not at all knowledgeable

[Page Break]

Q3 Do you support or oppose continuing efforts at European integration?

- Strongly oppose
- Oppose
- Support
- Strongly support
- Don't know

[Page Break]

Q4 Do you believe that European integration efforts to date have been successful or unsuccessful?

- Very successful
- Somewhat successful
- Slightly successful
- Unsuccessful
- Do not know

[Page Break]

Gender - Are you:

- Male
- Female
- Non-binary
- Prefer not to answer

[Page Break]

Age - Please indicate your age:

{fill in the blank }

[Page Break]

Race - What would you consider yourself as?

- White
- Black or African American
- American Indian or Alaska Native
- Asian
- Hispanic or Latino
- Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander

- Other _____
- Prefer not to say

[Page Break]

Q5 Greece faced a major debt crisis following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and the European Central Bank offered Greece significant bailout funds in response.

Which of the following entities do you believe bear significant responsibility for the beginning/severity of the 2009 Greek debt crisis? (Choose all that apply.)

	The Greek people	The Greek government	The European Union	Individual European Union officials	European Union banks	Other	Do not know
Beginning of the Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Severity of the Crisis	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

[Display This Question:

If Greece faced a major debt crisis following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The European Un... = Beginning of the Crisis [Other]

Or Greece faced a major debt crisis following the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The European Un... = Severity of the Crisis [Other]]

Q5TEXT – Other You have selected “Other”. Please specify your response.

[Page Break]

Q5a If you were to choose one entity, which entity do you believe bears the largest responsibility?

Beginning of the Crisis

▼ The Greek people ... Do not know

Severity of the Crisis

▼ The Greek people ... Do not know

[Display This Question:

If you were to choose one entity, which entity do you believe bears the largest responsibility? = Beginning of the Crisis [Other]

Or If you were to choose one entity, which entity do you believe bears the largest responsibility? = Severity of the Crisis [Other]]

Q5aTEXT – Other You have selected “Other”. Please specify your response.

[Page Break]

Q6 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1) I would agree if I heard someone say, “Greek people are lazy. I mean, look at how much debt they got themselves into!”	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would agree if I heard people say, “Greek people are hardworking.”	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
2) Greece currently hosts more than 50,000 international refugees. I favor a policy that would limit the number of future refugees allowed into Greece.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
3) I am in favor of Greece making tradeoffs in order to maintain peace with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
4) I favor Europe’s decision to create the European common currency, the euro.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
5) I believe the EU has an obligation to assist other member states that are	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

financially
struggling.

6) I believe that
Greece should
leave the EU
[Grexit].

[Page Break]

Q7 Do you consider Greece to be *more of* a victim of or a burden to the EU?

- Victim
- Burden
- Both
- Neither
- Do not know

[Display This Question: If Do you consider Greece to be more of a victim of or a burden to the EU? = Victim]

Q8a – Victim Which of the following best describes your reasoning for saying that Greece is more of a victim than a burden to the EU? (Choose all that apply.)

- The EU did not do enough to help Greece overcome the 2009 debt crisis.
- The EU made it more difficult for Greece to overcome the 2009 debt crisis.
- The EU does not give proper credit to Greece for its contributions to the European community (whether economic or otherwise).
- The EU leaves Greece to disproportionately carry the burden of the Syrian refugee crisis.
- The conversion to the euro currency disadvantaged Greece while it advantaged other, richer EU nations.
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Display This Question: If Do you consider Greece to be more of a victim of or a burden to the EU? = Burden]

Q8b – Burden Which of the following best describes your reasoning for saying that Greece is more of a burden than a victim of the EU? (Choose all that apply.)

- Greece got itself into a large debt crisis, and the EU had to bail it out.
- Regardless of the debt crisis, the Greek economy is a burden to the European community because Greece does not carry its own weight.
- Greece does not contribute enough to the European community (economically or otherwise).
- Greece cannot handle the Syrian refugee crisis and needs help from other EU member states.
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Display This Question: If Do you consider Greece to be more of a victim of or a burden to the EU? = Both]

Q8c – Both If you have to choose between the two, do you consider Greece to be more of a victim or more of a burden to the EU?

- Victim
- Burden
- Do not know

[Display This Question: If you have to choose between the two, do you consider Greece to be more of a victim or more of a... = Victim]

Q8c-1 More Victim Which of the following best describes your reasoning for saying that Greece is more of a victim of than a burden to the EU? (Choose all that apply.)

- The EU did not do enough to help Greece overcome the 2009 debt crisis.
- The EU made it more difficult for Greece to overcome the 2009 debt crisis.
- The EU does not give proper credit to Greece for its contributions to the European community (whether economic or otherwise).
- The EU leaves Greece to disproportionately carry the burden of the Syrian refugee crisis.

- The conversion to the euro currency disadvantaged Greece while it advantaged other, richer EU nations.
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Display This Question: If you have to choose between the two, do you consider Greece to be more of a victim or more of a... = Burden]

Q8c-2 More Burden Which of the following best describes your reasoning for saying that Greece is more of a burden to than a victim of the EU? (Choose all that apply.)

- Greece got itself into a large debt crisis, and the EU had to bail it out.
- Regardless of the debt crisis, the Greek economy is a burden to the European community because Greece does not carry its own weight.
- Greece does contribute enough to the European community (economically or otherwise).
- Greece cannot handle the Syrian refugee crisis and needs help from other EU member states.
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Page Break]

Q9 Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neither Agree nor Disagree	Somewhat Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1) I would agree if I heard people say, "Americans are arrogant."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I would agree if I heard people say, "Americans are lazy. I mean, look at the size of their national debt."	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

2) I would agree if I heard people say, “Americans are hardworking.”

3) I support the North American Free Trade Agreement, which created a free trade zone and eliminated or reduced barriers to trade and investment among the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

4) I favor extending cooperation among the United States, Canada, and Mexico beyond trade to include a common currency.

5) The U.S. admitted 60,000 new refugees in 2023. I favor a policy that would reduce the number of refugees admitted to the United States each year.

6) I believe the U.S. has an obligation to assist other countries that are financially struggling.

[Page Break]

Q10 Are you a citizen of the United States, Greece, both, or neither?

- I am a citizen of the United States only
- I am a citizen of Greece only
- I am a citizen of both the United States and Greece
- I am a citizen of the United States and at least one other country, excluding Greece
- I am neither a citizen of the United States nor Greece
- I prefer not to answer

[Display This Question: If Are you a citizen of the United States, Greece, both, or neither? = I am a citizen of the United States and at least one other country, excluding Greece]

Q10a Are you ethnically tied to the country (or one of the countries) of which you have citizenship (excluding the United States and Greece)?

- Yes
- No
- I do not know
- I prefer not to answer

[Page Break]

Q11 Which of the following best describes your ethnic identity?


- American
- Greek
- Greek American
- Other

[Page Break]

[Display This Question: If Which of the following best describes your ethnic identity? = Greek]

Q11a On a scale of 0-10, to what extent do you identify with the following statement: I am a citizen of Europe.

Please answer by moving the knob to the right or left to indicate your level of identification as a citizen of Europe.



[Display This Question: If Which of the following best describes your ethnic identity? = Greek American]

Q11b You have described yourself as Greek American. If you had to choose, would you consider yourself more Greek or more American?

- Greek
- American

[End of Block: Block 1]

[Start of Block: Block 2 – American/Other]

US1 Do you identify with one or more countries or regions from which your ancestors emigrated?


- Yes
- No
- Do not know

[End of Block: Block 2 – American/Other]

[Start of Block: Block 2a – American/Other]

US2 On a scale of 0 to 10 with 0 meaning no affiliation and 10 meaning extreme affiliation, how strongly do you identify with one or more countries or regions from which your ancestors emigrated?

Please answer by moving the knob to the right or left to indicate your level of identification.



[Page Break]

US3 Do you identify with that country's people, state, neither, or both?

Identification with the country's people means that you have relationships with people in that country; identification with that country's state means you identify with that country as a nation and an ethnic homeland. Please do not select identification with the people unless you have personal relationships with people living in that country.

- I identify with the people, but not with the state
- I identify with both, but more with the people
- I identify with both about equally
- I identify with both, but more with the state
- I identify with the state, but not with the people
- I identify with neither the state nor with the people

[Page Break]

US4 Do you speak any languages relating to your ethnic heritage, not including English?

- Yes
- No

[Display This Question: If Do you speak any languages relating to your ethnic heritage, not including English? = Yes]

US5 On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being elementary proficiency and 5 being native/bilingual proficiency, please indicate your level of proficiency in the language you know. If you know multiple languages relating to your ethnic heritage, please answer based on the language you know best.

- 1 – Elementary proficiency
- 2 – Limited working proficiency
- 3 – Professional working proficiency
- 4 – Full professional proficiency
- 5 – Native/bilingual proficiency

[Page Break]

US6 On average, how often do you visit a country from which your ancestors emigrated to the United States?

- More than once a year
- Every year
- Once every two years
- Once every five years
- Once every ten years or less often

[Display This Question: If On average, how often do you visit a country from which your ancestors emigrated to the United St... = Once every ten years or less often]

US6a Which of the following best captures your reason for not traveling to that country more often or not traveling to the country at all?

- I do not want to
- It is too expensive
- Other _____

[Page Break]

US7 Which of the following best describes your immigrant status in the United States? “First-generation” refers to the first generation to be born in a country to which one’s parents had immigrated. “Second-generation” refers to someone whose parents were born in the United States, etc. (Please choose based on the ancestor who immigrated most recently–i.e., if one parent is born in the U.S. and another parent immigrated to the U.S., select first-generation.)

- Immigrant
- First-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Second-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Third-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- More than third-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Do not know

[Page Break]

US8 Which of the following best describes your reasons (or your most recent ancestors' reasons) for emigrating to the United States?

- Political instability
- Financial reasons
- Family members in the United States
- Education
- Career
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Page Break]

US9 Is your family better or worse off financially, or is there no difference in the financial health of your family compared to before you (or your ancestors) emigrated to the United States?

- Much better off
- Somewhat better off
- Neither better nor worse off
- Somewhat worse off
- Much worse off
- Do not know

[Page Break]

US10 On a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being not at all and 5 being very or extremely, how deeply involved in or affiliated with a religion of your ethnic homeland are you?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3


4

5

[Page Break]

US11 On a scale of 0-10, with 0 being very unfavorably and 10 being very favorably, how favorably do you view the homeland of your ancestors?

Please answer by moving the knob to the right or left to indicate your view.



[End of Block: Block 2a – American/Other]

[Start of Block: Block 3 – Greek]

GR1 On a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being no knowledge, 1 being elementary proficiency, and 5 being native/bilingual proficiency, please indicate your level of proficiency in the Greek language.

0 – No knowledge

1 – Elementary proficiency

2 – Limited working proficiency

3 – Professional working proficiency

4 – Full professional proficiency

5 – Native/bilingual proficiency

[Page Break]

GR2 On a scale of 0 to 5, with 0 being not at all and 5 being very or extremely, how deeply involved in or affiliated with the Greek Orthodox Church are you?

- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5

[Page Break]

GR3 Do you identify with the Greek people, the Greek state, neither, or both?

Identification with the Greek people means that you have personal relationships with people in Greece; identification with the Greek state means that you identify with Greece as a country and an ethnic homeland. Please do not select identification with the people unless you have personal relationships with people living in Greece.

- I identify with the Greek people, but not with the Greek state
- I identify with both, but more with the Greek people
- I identify with both about equally
- I identify with both, but more with the Greek state
- I identify with the Greek state, but not with the Greek people
- I identify with neither the Greek state nor with the Greek people

[Page Break]

GR4 On average, about how often do you visit Greece?

- More than once a year
- Every year
- Once every two years
- Once every five years
- Once every ten years or less often

[Display This Question: If On average, about how often do you visit Greece? = Once every ten years or less often]

GR4a Which of the following best captures your reason for not traveling to Greece more often or not traveling to Greece at all?

- I do not want to
- It is too expensive
- Other _____

[Page Break]

GR5 Which of the following best describes your immigrant status in the United States? “First-generation” refers to the first generation to be born in a country to which one’s parents had immigrated. “Second-generation” refers to someone whose parents were born in the United States, etc. Please choose based on the ancestor who immigrated most recently–i.e., if one parent is born in the US and another parent immigrated to the US, select first-generation.)

- Immigrant
- First-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Second-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Third-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- More than third-generation through at least one parent/guardian
- Do not know

[Page Break]

GR6 Which of the following best describes your reasons (or your most recent ancestors' reasons) for emigrating from Greece?

- Political instability
- Financial reasons
- Family members in the United States
- Education
- Career
- Other _____
- Do not know

[Page Break]


GR7 Is your family better or worse off financially, or is there no difference in the financial health of your family compared to before you (or your ancestors) emigrated to the United States?

- Much better off
- Somewhat better off
- Neither better nor worse off
- Somewhat worse off
- Much worse off
- Do not know

[Page Break]

GR8 On a scale of 0-10, with 0 being very unfavorably and 10 being very favorably, how favorably do you view Greece?

Please answer by moving the knob to the right or left to indicate your view.



End of Block: Block 3 – Greek

Start of Block: Block 4 – All

Q12 Which option best describes your highest level of education?

- Some high school
- High school diploma
- Bachelor's degree
- Master's degree
- Ph.D. or higher
- None of the above
- Prefer not to say

[Page Break]

Q15 What is your total annual household income?

- \$0 to \$30,000
- \$31,000-\$60,000
- \$61,000-\$90,000
- \$91,000-\$120,000
- \$121,000-\$150,000
- \$151,000-\$200,000
- \$201,000-\$250,000
- \$251,000-\$500,000
- \$501,000-\$750,000
- \$751,000-\$1,000,000
- More than \$1,000,000
- Do not know
- I prefer not to answer

[Page Break]

Q16 How many people are in your household?

- 1 person
- 2 people
- 3 people
- 4 people
- 5 people
- 6 people
- More than 6 people
- I prefer not to answer

[Page Break]

Q17 Which of the following best describes how often you vote in U.S. national, state, and local elections?

- I vote in every election
- I vote at least once every two years
- I vote at least once every four years
- I vote less than once every four years
- I am not eligible to vote
- I choose not to vote
- I prefer not to answer

[Page Break]

Q18 Which of the following best describes your political ideology? In general, do you think of yourself as

- Very liberal
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate, middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Very conservative
- Prefer not to say

End of Block: Block 4 – All

**APPENDIX B: REGRESSION TABLES FOR INDIVIDUAL MEASURES
OF ETHNIC IDENTITY¹⁴¹⁵**

	Conflict with Turkey	Refugee Crisis	Victim/Burden	EU Financial Obligation	Grexit	Conversion to the Euro
Generational Proximity	0.137	0.048	0.187*	0.039	-0.061	-0.010
Language Knowledge	0.028	0.090	0.135**	0.12*	-0.033	0.058
Religious Affiliation	0.143	0.101	0.110*	0.239***	0.028	-0.047
Attachment to the People	-0.034	0.20*	0.122	0.10	0.058	0.1
Frequency of Visits	0.010	0.145	-0.066	0.098	-0.136	-0.033
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001						

¹⁴ This table only presents the coefficient and statistical significance from each regression model. Only these results are offered about this data because the study did not focus its analysis on the effect of the individual measures of ethnic identity; rather, it focused on the effect of strength of ethnic identity as a composite variable. The full regression tables measuring the effect of ethnic identity as a composite variable are included in Appendix C.

¹⁵ Note that the asterisks following the beta (β) coefficient represent the p-value, denoting the statistical significance of the coefficient. In decimal form, the p-value indicates the likelihood that the observed relationship occurred by chance. The lower the p-value, the more statistically significant the coefficient is and vice versa.

APPENDIX C: REGRESSION TABLES FOR DIRECT EFFECTS OF STRENGTH OF ETHNIC IDENTITY ON FOREIGN POLICY OPINIONS

1) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Conflict with Turkey

(Intercept)	-0.082
	(0.165)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.185***
	(0.034)
Education	-0.066+
	(0.039)
Income	0.009
	(0.018)
Household	-0.009
	(0.022)
Voter Participation	-0.074***
	(0.021)
Political Ideology	0.015
	(0.016)
Non-female	0.168**
	(0.058)
Age	0.006**
	(0.002)
Black or African American	-0.169+
	(0.097)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.683*

1) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Conflict with Turkey

	(0.343)
Asian	0.005
	(0.150)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.232**
	(0.085)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	0.287
	(0.902)
Other	0.241
	(0.244)
Num.Obs.	1051
R2	0.085
R2 Adj.	0.072
AIC	2777.2
BIC	2856.6
Log.Lik.	-1372.623
RMSE	0.89

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Refugee Crisis

(Intercept)	-0.617***
	(0.174)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.113**
	(0.036)
Education	0.018
	(0.041)
Income	0.012
	(0.019)
Household	0.024
	(0.023)
Voter Participation	0.069**
	(0.022)
Political Ideology	0.103***
	(0.017)
Non-female	-0.148*
	(0.062)
Age	-0.001
	(0.002)
Black or African American	0.114
	(0.102)
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.175
	(0.362)

2) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Refugee Crisis

Asian	-0.155
	(0.158)
Hispanic or Latino	0.032
	(0.089)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	-0.337
	(0.953)
Other	-0.496+
	(0.258)
Num.Obs.	1051
R2	0.068
R2 Adj.	0.056
AIC	2891.5
BIC	2970.8
Log.Lik.	-1429.729
RMSE	0.94

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

3) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Victim/Burden

(Intercept)	-0.155
	(0.277)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.127*
	(0.051)
Education	-0.031
	(0.062)
Income	-0.018
	(0.028)
Household	0.034
	(0.038)
Voter Participation	0.022
	(0.037)
Political Ideology	0.023
	(0.027)
Age	-0.003
	(0.003)
Black or African American	0.045
	(0.152)
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.544
	(0.393)
Asian	-0.085
	(0.240)
Hispanic or Latino	0.083

3) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Victim/Burden

	(0.129)
Other	-0.171
	(0.465)
Non-female	0.157
	(0.097)
Num.Obs.	502
R2	0.032
R2 Adj.	0.006
AIC	1458.8
BIC	1522.1
Log.Lik.	-714.405
RMSE	1.00

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4) Strength of Ethnic Identity → EU Financial Obligation

(Intercept)	0.094
	(0.179)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.070+
	(0.037)
Education	0.025
	(0.042)
Income	0.028
	(0.019)
Household	-0.010
	(0.024)
Voter Participation	0.050*
	(0.023)
Political Ideology	-0.045*
	(0.018)
Age	-0.002
	(0.002)
Black or African American	-0.054
	(0.105)
American Indian or Alaska Native	0.335
	(0.373)
Asian	0.048
	(0.163)
Hispanic or Latino	0.002

4) Strength of Ethnic Identity→EU Financial Obligation

	(0.092)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	-0.514
	(0.981)
Other	0.046
	(0.266)
Non-female	-0.138*
	(0.064)
Num.Obs.	1051
R2	0.037
R2 Adj.	0.024
AIC	2952.6
BIC	3032.0
Log.Lik.	-1460.319
RMSE	0.97

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

5) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Grexit

(Intercept)	0.315+
	(0.173)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	-0.063+
	(0.036)
Education	-0.021
	(0.041)
Income	-0.039*
	(0.019)
Household	0.024
	(0.023)
Voter Participation	0.018
	(0.022)
Political Ideology	0.100***
	(0.017)
Age	-0.012***
	(0.002)
Black or African American	0.179+
	(0.102)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.062
	(0.361)
Asian	-0.123
	(0.158)
Hispanic or Latino	0.121

5) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Grexit

	(0.089)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	0.418
	(0.949)
Other	-0.222
	(0.257)
Non-female	-0.165**
	(0.061)
Num.Obs.	1051
R2	0.096
R2 Adj.	0.084
AIC	2883.0
BIC	2962.3
Log.Lik.	-1425.509
RMSE	0.94

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

6) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Conversion to the Euro

(Intercept)	-0.629***
	(0.171)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.041
	(0.035)
Education	-0.001
	(0.040)
Income	-0.015
	(0.019)
Household	0.033
	(0.023)
Voter Participation	-0.058**
	(0.022)
Political Ideology	0.111***
	(0.017)
Age	0.004*
	(0.002)
Black or African American	0.009
	(0.100)
American Indian or Alaska Native	-0.065
	(0.355)
Asian	-0.022
	(0.155)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.166+

6) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Conversion to the Euro

	(0.088)
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander	0.412
	(0.934)
Other	0.740**
	(0.253)
Non-female	0.137*
	(0.060)
Num.Obs.	1051
R2	0.084
R2 Adj.	0.072
AIC	2849.2
BIC	2928.5
Log.Lik.	-1408.594
RMSE	0.92

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

APPENDIX D: REGRESSION TABLES FOR INDIRECT EFFECTS OF STRENGTH OF ETHNIC IDENTITY ON FOREIGN POLICY OPINIONS

1) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Favorable Perceptions of the Homeland

(Intercept)	-2.185***
	(0.485)
Strength of Ethnic Identity	0.625***
	(0.123)
Education	0.028
	(0.098)
Income	0.003
	(0.041)
Household	0.038
	(0.066)
Voter Participation	-0.024
	(0.071)
Political Ideology	0.121*
	(0.051)
Age	0.001
	(0.006)
Black or African American	-0.284
	(0.329)
Asian	-1.573*
	(0.711)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.192

1) Strength of Ethnic Identity → Favorable Perceptions of the Homeland

	(0.255)
Other	0.088
	(0.404)
Non-female	0.188
	(0.178)
Num.Obs.	136
R2	0.329
R2 Adj.	0.264
AIC	382.9
BIC	423.7
Log.Lik.	-177.441
RMSE	0.89

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

2) Favorable Perceptions → Conflict with Turkey

(Intercept)	-0.611
	(0.642)
Favorable Perceptions	-0.153
	(0.109)
Education	-0.127
	(0.133)
Income	0.113*
	(0.055)
Household	-0.047
	(0.088)
Voter Participation	-0.031
	(0.093)
Political Ideology	0.039
	(0.069)
Age	0.021*
	(0.008)
Black or African American	-0.182
	(0.455)
Asian	-0.169
	(0.964)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.683*
	(0.335)
Other	-0.150

2) Favorable Perceptions → Conflict with Turkey

	(0.538)
Non-female	0.224
	(0.236)
Num.Obs.	135
R2	0.187
R2 Adj.	0.107
AIC	457.0
BIC	497.7
Log.Lik.	-214.521
RMSE	1.19

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

3) Favorable Perceptions → Refugee Crisis

(Intercept)	-1.182*
	(0.561)
Favorable Perceptions	0.147
	(0.095)
Education	-0.066
	(0.114)
Income	0.012
	(0.047)
Household	0.048
	(0.077)
Voter Participation	0.166*
	(0.081)
Political Ideology	0.192**
	(0.060)
Age	0.004
	(0.007)
Black or African American	0.486
	(0.382)
Asian	0.407
	(0.844)
Hispanic or Latino	0.521+
	(0.293)
Other	-0.092

3) Favorable Perceptions → Refugee Crisis

	(0.471)
Non-female	-0.110
	(0.207)
Num.Obs.	136
R2	0.167
R2 Adj.	0.086
AIC	424.2
BIC	465.0
Log.Lik.	-198.118
RMSE	1.04

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

4) Favorable Perceptions → Victim/Burden

(Intercept)	-0.715
	(0.650)
Favorable Perceptions	0.177
	(0.120)
Education	0.075
	(0.137)
Income	0.035
	(0.058)
Household	0.069
	(0.085)
Voter Participation	0.001
	(0.085)
Political Ideology	-0.001
	(0.062)
Age	0.008
	(0.008)
Black or African American	-0.055
	(0.407)
Asian	-0.978
	(1.022)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.293
	(0.314)
Other	-0.306

4) Favorable Perceptions → Victim/Burden

	(0.587)
Non-female	0.086
	(0.244)
Num.Obs.	78
R2	0.174
R2 Adj.	0.022
AIC	225.6
BIC	258.6
Log.Lik.	-98.794
RMSE	0.86

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

5) Favorable Perceptions→EU Financial Obligation

(Intercept)	0.428
	(0.487)
Favorable Perceptions	0.297***
	(0.083)
Education	0.046
	(0.099)
Income	0.015
	(0.041)
Household	-0.023
	(0.067)
Voter Participation	0.013
	(0.071)
Political Ideology	-0.051
	(0.052)
Age	-0.006
	(0.006)
Black or African American	-0.049
	(0.332)
Asian	-0.811
	(0.733)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.377
	(0.255)
Other	0.047

5) Favorable Perceptions→EU Financial Obligation

	(0.409)
Non-female	0.229
	(0.180)
Num.Obs.	136
R2	0.171
R2 Adj.	0.090
AIC	385.9
BIC	426.7
Log.Lik.	-178.951
RMSE	0.90

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

6) Favorable Perceptions → Grexit

(Intercept)	-0.196
	(0.551)
Favorable Perceptions	-0.143
	(0.094)
Education	-0.020
	(0.112)
Income	-0.107*
	(0.047)
Household	0.138+
	(0.075)
Voter Participation	-0.028
	(0.080)
Political Ideology	0.124*
	(0.059)
Age	-0.007
	(0.007)
Black or African American	0.776*
	(0.375)
Asian	-0.431
	(0.828)
Hispanic or Latino	1.107***
	(0.288)
Other	0.476

6) Favorable Perceptions → Grexit

	(0.462)
Non-female	-0.196
	(0.203)
Num.Obs.	136
R2	0.281
R2 Adj.	0.211
AIC	419.0
BIC	459.8
Log.Lik.	-195.518
RMSE	1.02

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

7) Favorable Perceptions → Conversion to the Euro

(Intercept)	-1.100+
	(0.626)
Favorable Perceptions	-0.019
	(0.106)
Education	0.189
	(0.127)
Income	-0.057
	(0.053)
Household	-0.005
	(0.085)
Voter Participation	-0.016
	(0.091)
Political Ideology	0.129+
	(0.067)
Age	0.007
	(0.008)
Black or African American	0.129
	(0.426)
Asian	-0.936
	(0.941)
Hispanic or Latino	-0.180
	(0.327)
Other	1.148*

7) Favorable Perceptions → Conversion to the Euro

	(0.525)
Non-female	0.102
	(0.231)
Num.Obs.	136
R2	0.133
R2 Adj.	0.048
AIC	453.8
BIC	494.6
Log.Lik.	-212.916
RMSE	1.16

+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001