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Anglo-Spanish rivalry and the development of the colonial Southeast, 1670–1720

Timothy Paul Grady

*College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences*

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ANGLO-SPANISH RIVALRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL SOUTHEAST, 1670-1720

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Timothy Paul Grady

2006
APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Timothy Paul Grady

Approved by the Committee, May 2006

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DEDICATION

I would like to dedicate this dissertation first to my wife, Claudia. Without her support, encouragement, and patience, there would have been no way that completing the long, hard process of research and writing would have been possible. Secondly, I would like to dedicate it to my parents, Pat and Spence Farley. From the very beginning they believed in me, and supported me in my decision to embark upon this long and difficult journey. To all three, I would simply like to say “Thank you!”
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Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for the efforts of my crack editorial staff, Claudia, Spence, and Mom.
ABSTRACT

This study investigates the role played by the rivalry between English Carolina and Spanish Florida in the history of the colonial Southeast from the mid-seventeenth century through the 1720s. It contends that, from standpoint of the local inhabitants, Native American and European, both the perceived and the actual threat that Spanish Florida and Carolina posed to one another was the dominant concern and motivation of the actions of both during the roughly fifty-year period from the founding of Charleston to the final events of the Yamassee War. At the local level, government officials, Indian traders, Franciscan missionaries, the various Indian tribes, runaway slaves, and all others living in this borderland region contended daily with the rivalry between Carolina and Spanish Florida. Only with the resolution of this threat could Carolina and thus the British emerge as the dominant colonial power in the Southeast. The dissertation seeks to reanalyze the events of this period within the framework of this rivalry and to do so by blending comprehensive research in the available documentary evidence available for both South Carolina and Spanish Florida.
ANGLO-SPANISH RIVALRY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COLONIAL SOUTHEAST, 1670-1720
Map of the Southeast, 1715

Map reprinted from
Map of Florida Indians

Map reprinted courtesy of
- Introduction -

The Anglo-Spanish Rivalry and the Emergence of the Colonial Southeast

In 1565 the Spanish established a colony in Florida at St. Augustine to protect their more valuable colonies in the Caribbean and South America from any potential European rivals. Florida served primarily as a military buffer between the Spanish Americas and other European colonies to the north. In addition, it acted as an important defensive bastion protecting the treasure fleets bearing the riches of the Americas to Spain. Because the Spanish population in La Florida remained small, the extension of Spanish influence in the region was accomplished primarily through a chain of Franciscan missions. These missions encompassed tens of thousands of Indian converts and extended from the coastal islands of modern Georgia to the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. Through its heyday in the mid-seventeenth century, the Spanish presence in the Southeast went unchallenged by other Europeans and the missionaries, soldiers, and traders ranging across Florida from St. Augustine exercised enormous influence among the natives.

During the seventeenth century, however, England repeatedly defied Spain’s claim to the region. Spanish officials in St. Augustine took careful note of the English efforts at Roanoke in the 1580s and the 1607 establishment of the colony at Jamestown. With the founding of Charleston in 1670 in retrospect, Spanish dominance in the region was doomed, though for a period of almost fifty years the issue remained in doubt as
effort, Spain was never able to bring the necessary force to bear against Carolina in repeated efforts to destroy the colony. The Carolinians, on the other hand, never successfully conquered St. Augustine, despite a persistent and slowly successful campaign of raids and invasions aimed at countering Spanish influence among the natives. For both colonies, the central factor guiding their actions was the presence of a local European rival for the good will and alliances of the powerful native tribes in the region. Given the extreme efforts, the expenditures, and the political and military maneuverings of the rival colonies, it is clear that the contest between Spanish Florida and English Carolina represents the single most important factor in the development of the Southeast until the mid-1720s. All other concerns, whether trade relationships, geopolitical imperial considerations, or the interplay of cultural and religious themes, became subsumed into the larger struggle between the two sides. What emerged through the seventeenth and early eighteenth century was a frontier region that incorporated the interests of two, and eventually three, European powers with a large and varied Indian population whose numbers dwarfed the combined colonial populations of both Carolina and Florida.

Considering the variety of cultures, the economic and political motivations of each, and the changing diplomatic and imperial concerns in Europe, this work contends that, from standpoint of the colonial Southeast, both the perceived and actual threat that Spanish Florida and Carolina posed to each other was the dominant concern and motivation of the actions of both during the fifty-year period from the founding of Charleston to the final events of the Yamassee War. At the local level, government officials, Indian traders, Franciscan missionaries, the various Indian tribes, runaway
slaves, and all others living in this borderland region contended daily with the rivalry between Carolina and Spanish Florida. Only with the resolution of this threat could Carolina and thus the British emerge as the dominant colonial power in the Southeast.

The historiography of this region has been typically one-sided, considering the subject from the viewpoint of Carolina. The seminal work on the subject of English power in the Southeast through the establishment of Georgia is Verner W. Crane’s *The Southern Frontier*, published in 1929. Crane’s book remains the best general work on the subject, despite a flurry of more recent publications on the history of Carolina. Crane’s study, however, also sets the trend for most works on the early years of Carolina’s history. In Crane’s interpretation, the rivalry between the English and Spanish serves as a mere prologue to the main imperial contest between France and England. The last three decades of the seventeenth century, the years before the French settlement of Mobile and the extension of French influence down the Mississippi through Louisiana, are discussed only briefly and then passed over to give the Anglo-French rivalry of the early eighteenth century the primary role in the development of the Southeast.

This historiographical trend can be seen in the most recent work on the English in the Southeast, Alan Gallay’s 2002 work, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717*. Gallay gives short attention to the experience of the mission Indians of La Florida and gives only brief accounts of the Anglo-Spanish conflicts of the 1680s and early 1700s. These issues are mere stepping stones to the rivalry between the English and French in the contest for Indian alliances in the eighteenth century. The rival efforts to win Indian loyalties are seen by Gallay, partially correctly, as motivated almost entirely by the desire for Indian slaves. Yet,
when considering these efforts, the Spanish side of the equation is diminished, giving preference to the Anglo-French contest. Additionally, both Crane’s early work and Gallay’s recent monograph show the same interpretational characteristics that exemplify most work on the history of Carolina. Sources for the discussions of the Spanish presence and activities in the Southeast are limited to a few translated collections of Spanish documents, combined with and dominated by limited accounts of the events described by English participants. Foreign language primary-source materials are usually from French rather than Spanish archives, tending to emphasize the French influence in the region despite their relatively late arrival on the scene. Crane and Gallay’s works both fall into an Anglocentric, imperialist interpretation of the events. In their version, because France was the primary rival to England in the European competition of the period, France was necessarily the primary threat perceived by the English in Carolina. Little consideration is given to the local viewpoints of the Carolinians, the Spanish Floridians, or the Indian participants in the regional conflicts is given. When the Carolinians’ perspective is considered, the perceived potential of a French threat in the Southeast is stressed, bypassing the very real threat Carolinians perceived in the Spanish presence in Florida.

From the viewpoint of historians of Spanish Florida, the presence of the Carolinians is, of necessity, given much greater consideration. Even here, however, little attention is given to the importance of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry and how it affected the development of the region as a whole. For the last several decades, the history of Spanish Florida has been considered from very limited points of view. Representative studies in their subjects such as Jane Lander’s *Black Society in Spanish Florida* (1999), Jerald
Milanich's *Laboring in the Fields of the Lord: Spanish Missions and Southeastern Indians* (1999), and Amy Turner Bushnell’s *Situado and Sabana: Spain's Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida* (1994) each excel in their consideration of a limited aspect of Spanish Florida society. Whether it is a study of black society, mission Indians, or Spanish officials, the larger regional implications are given only cursory mention. Each gives short generalizations when describing the interaction of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry with social development in the colony, though admittedly to a greater extent than that of historians of Carolina. This trend is also evident in the first true synthesis in the historiography of Spanish Florida, Paul Hoffman’s *Florida's Frontiers* (2002). These histories deal with the influence of English Carolina on the development of Spanish Florida from the standpoint of the destruction caused by Indian raids, attacks by English privateers, and outright invasions of Florida by Carolinian forces. Yet, once again, the story is one-sided, in keeping with the focus of the studies, and fails to contemplate the importance of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in this fifty-year period and the ways it shaped the development of the region.

The one-sided nature of studies of these colonies is slowly being changed as historians begin to break down the false imperial boundaries that separated English Carolina and Spanish Florida and begin to recognize the important interaction between the two. The need to do so has long been recognized by historians, though few have attempted it. J. Leitch Wright, in his 1971 *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America*, was the first to do a comprehensive study of the interaction between Spain and England in the colonial era, though the expansive nature of the work hindered his ability to go beyond the broadest consideration and failed to see the detailed consequences and motivations
behind the rivalry for individual colonies. Two more recent works on colonial South Carolina are good examples of the effort to provide more detailed examinations of this region. Walter Edgar's *South Carolina: A History* (1998) and Stephen J. Oatis' *A Colonial Complex: South Carolina's Frontiers in the Era of the Yamasee War, 1680-1730* (2004) each make a serious effort to study the importance of Spanish Florida to events in Carolina, though, in each, their efforts are limited by the failure to comprehensively survey available historical resources from a Spanish perspective.

Borderlands studies and the importance of the North American Spanish frontier have also increased in scale and importance among Latin American historians. David J. Weber provided the best overview of the Spanish in North America with his seminal 1992 work, *The Spanish Frontier in North America*. For the most part, however, more resources have been directed at the North American Southwest, in works such as Cynthia Radding's *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850* (1997) and Susan M. Deeds *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (2004). Each of these impressively researched and written works give great insight into the borderlands of New Spain in the colonial area, taking advantage of the rich documentary resources available for the subject. This growing historiography on the colonial Southwest also partakes of the growing interest in Spanish Borderlands history both north and south, as seen in Barbara Ganson's *The Guarani Under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata* (2003).

The Carolina-Florida frontier is the last of the borderlands region, whether from the English or the Spanish side, to finally find its own identity in historical analysis and has enormous potential for study. The greatest opportunity is possibly the unique nature
of each colony within its larger imperial context. Spanish Florida, unlike both northern New Spain and the Río de la Plata, served solely as a military outpost and contended with a strong regional European rival from its very inception. Its role within the empire as a defensive bastion defined its society, providing its mission much greater importance than it would enjoy elsewhere. Carolina, unlike any other English colony, chose a course of Indian engagement in competition with the Spanish that resulted in a unique Indian trade in both furs and slaves, which, in turn, shaped events for all participants. In addition, its proprietary government set the stage for severe internal divisions that had great consequences for the course of events during this period. These two colonies, the varied and influential native tribes, and their interaction provides the chance to contribute a novel and hopefully interesting story of how the colonial Southeast emerged in the fashion that it did. Telling that story is the goal of this work.

This, then, is the opportunity provided by the historiographical trends of both colonies. From the standpoint of Carolina, this work considers the importance of the real, rather than the perceived, threat posed by the proximity of Spanish Florida. From Florida’s perspective, this study shows the ever-present influence and destruction directed by Carolinian officials and traders intent on removing the potential threat to the south. Finally, from the perspective of the largest group in the region, the dissertation provides an analysis of how the competition between the two European colonies affected the lives and cultures of the Indian population, and how they navigated the changing economic and military situation throughout this period. This dissertation reanalyzes the events and developments of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in the Southeast in an effort to demonstrate the overriding influence of this opposition on the course of Carolinian,
Floridian, and Indian history, from the founding of Charleston through the Yamasee War. It is, at once, a work of synthesis and as well as a new approach to the available primary sources relating to both Carolina and Spanish Florida, as each have been used to provide insight into the actions of all of the historical actors.

The primary sources relating to the history of South Carolina exist in numerous transcriptions and collections ranging from those done by Alexander S. Salley in the early twentieth century to the documents held by the State Archives of South Carolina in Columbia and the collections of the South Carolina Historical Society. The primary sources of Spanish Florida were derived first from a few transcribed works such as those of Manuel Serrano y Sanz and Irene Wright. The largest and best source of documents from Spanish archives, however, were those found in the John Batterson Stetson Collection of microfilm. This massive collection is of imaged documents found in the Archivos General de las Indias in Seville. The noted historian, Irene Wright, spent years locating most of the documents relating to Spanish Florida and creating this collection with the financial support of the Stetson family through the first decades of the twentieth century. It represents the most valuable source of information regarding the actions and events described in this work from the Spanish perspective.

In the attempt to tell the story through an overarching narrative of the period, each chapter is organized chronologically. The first chapter seeks to set the stage for the introduction of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry to the Southeast. It describes the development of the rivalry in its European beginnings, then traces the role played by that enmity in the beginnings of Spanish Florida as well as the founding of Virginia and the early exploration of Carolina. This chapter argues that, despite the fading of the Anglo-
Spanish rivalry in terms of European diplomacy, the rivalry was critical to the events of the early Southeast and sets the stage for a closer confrontation between the two sides as the English pushed their colonies southward.

The second chapter begins to look at the early interaction between Florida and Carolina, beginning with the founding of Charleston in 1670 and continuing through the destruction of the Spanish missions of Guale in the mid-1680s. This chapter demonstrates the fundamental nature of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in each colony and how that competition, played out largely in the dual quests for Indian alliances, shaped both internal and external developments in St. Augustine and Charleston. It depicts the critical nature of the Spanish missions to the colony of Florida, and how the English sought to weaken Spanish power by striking at those missions. The chapter also describes the early efforts of individuals in Charleston to solidify Indian alliances with tribes, such as the Westoës, and turn those tribes against their rival.

The third chapter describes the decade of the 1690s, when diplomatic pressures in Europe forced a period of relative peace between Carolina and Florida. This period is shown to be the “calm before the storm.” As officials in both St. Augustine and Charleston sought to establish links with the other to foster amity, the pressure of competition for Indian alliances, the growing weakness of the Spanish Empire, and the corresponding inability to adequately provide for the defense of its outpost in Florida were setting the stage for the cataclysmic events of the early 1700s. The chapter seeks not only to illustrate the larger developments in both colonies, but to provide a more personal picture of the interaction between the Spanish and English during this period through the stories of individuals caught up in the interplay between the two rivals.
The fourth chapter provides an overview of attacks by the English against the Spanish colony in Florida in the early 1700s. With the restraints of the previous three decades removed by the War of Spanish Succession in 1701, the colonists in Charleston led by James Moore were able to launch several large-scale attacks against St. Augustine and the mission province of Apalachee. Using both militia and large numbers of Yamassee and Creek warriors, the English devastated the town of St. Augustine and virtually destroyed the Indian missions of Apalachee. Thousands of mission Indians were either killed, captured and sold into slavery, or forced to resettle to regions controlled by the English. This chapter details the end of Spanish power in the Southeast.

The last chapter describes the events just after the destruction of Apalachee, as the Creeks and the Yamasseees, acting with the encouragement and support of the English, succeeded in destroying all but a handful of the Spanish missions. By the end of the 1710s, Spanish Florida could boast only a few hundred remaining allied Indians. The success of the English, however, led to the increasing abuse of the Indians by English traders and, subsequently, the revolt of the Yamassee Indians and several other tribes against Carolina in 1715. This chapter argues that this revolt and the resulting waves of refugee Yamasseees, Savannahs, and other Indians into Florida as they fled English retaliation provided the Spanish a last chance to reclaim their position in the Southeast. It shows that the Spanish made serious efforts to win back Indian allies, but that these efforts were largely unsuccessful due to the weakness of the Spanish empire as a whole. Far from being inconsequential, though, this chapter demonstrates that the Yamassee War had larger implications for the colonial Southeast. This war set back English efforts to control the region exclusively, and set the stage for Indians throughout the region to play
off the English, the Spanish, and the new European arrivals, the French, against one another for the next several decades resisting all efforts to be dominated by one power exclusively.

Throughout the work, I have used the Anglo-Spanish rivalry as the central organizing factor for all of the various events described. I have sought to provide all sides of the story — English, Spanish, and Indian — wherever possible. While other factors obviously played a role, the fact that this rivalry is key to the course of events as they transpire in the colonial Southeast has led me to exclude or generalize about some of the dynamics playing into events in order to concentrate most of the analysis and descriptions on the key point. The details of the trade in Indian slaves, the slow emergence of plantation agriculture, the political machinations occurring within each colony, and larger imperial concerns of both the English and Spanish have all been given less attention than the larger competition between these two colonies because it is the conclusion of this work that all of these dynamics were merely aspects of that same contest. The rivalry between Carolina and Florida affected every inhabitant of the colonial Southeast. The simple purpose of this work is to better understand their tale.
When European eyes turned to the southeast coast of North America, it was the Spanish who were the first to establish a presence in the region. They were not, however, the only Europeans to cast a covetous glance at the thick forests along the coast and the imagined riches of the interior. The French attempted two settlements during the 1560s but were forcibly displaced by the Spanish who established a garrison town at St. Augustine. While the outpost was small and undermanned, the Spanish effectively spread their influence from St. Augustine over the next decades using a growing chain of Franciscan missions created among the Indians through much of northern Florida and coastal Georgia.

It was not long, though, before others sought to challenge Spain's claims on the region. England, in particular, sought to challenge the growing power of Spain in Europe by attacking their possessions in America. Indeed, early English promoters formed almost all of their early plans for colonization in response to the success of the Spanish in the Americas. These plans were designed to both imitate and contest Spanish power and the first English colonies proceeded with due attention to possible Spanish objections to their presence. Finally, as Spain's ability to displace the growing English presence on the

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1 For sake of simplicity, place names that have been modernized or anglicized from the Spanish usage will be used in their more familiar, modern form. For example, San Augustin will be referred to by the modern St. Augustine, Charles Town will be modernized to Charleston.
North American coast waned, English explorers pushed southward towards Florida. Along the way they encountered signs of Spanish Florida's hold on the southeast and challenged it ultimately with the establishment of Charleston in 1670. At each step in this overall process, Spain sought to impede the English through every available means, in Europe and without. As the rivalry evolved, however, it grew beyond European events. In America, it took on a regional nature as, in the end, the Spanish and English interacted across a hostile frontier seeking to emerge supreme in the struggle for the Southeast.

England's notorious rivalry with Spain during the reign of Elizabeth I was not traditional. It developed over the course of decades during the sixteenth century as matters of religion intruded themselves in the once congenial relationship between the states. Both England and Spain emerged in the sixteenth century as newly unified nations. In England, the three decades-long struggle for the throne between the rival claimants of the House of York and the House of Lancaster was put to rest with the victory of Henry Tudor over Richard III. Henry assumed the throne in 1485 as Henry VII, establishing the Tudor dynasty that would rule England until 1603. In Spain, Ferdinand II of Aragon married Isabella I of Castile in 1469 in support of her claim to the throne of Castile during a dispute that led both Castile and Portugal to back opposing sides. With Ferdinand's help, the two wedded monarchs secured Isabella's claim and, as a result, ruled a unified Spain, though institutionally the kingdoms remained separate for centuries. With their defeat of Granada in 1492, the last Moorish kingdom on the Iberian
Peninsula was brought under Spanish control. Columbus’ voyage of discovery in the same year opened up a new path for expansion for the Spanish people.  

Emerging from civil war, the primary objective of Henry VII during his reign was the stability of his claim to the throne of England and passing it on to his son. Seeking strength in allies he turned his sights on the growing power of Spain to accomplish this. In 1489 Henry arranged the betrothal of his two-year-old son Arthur with three-year-old Catherine of Aragon, the youngest child of Ferdinand and Isabella. The two were married in 1501, but Arthur died only six months into the marriage. Less than a year later Henry VII, still eager to solidify the good relations between the two nations as well as to keep the dowry of Catherine, betrothed his remaining son, the future Henry VIII, to Catherine, though he was too young to marry at the time. Although his father forced the young Henry to repudiate the betrothal in 1505, he rejected his father’s wishes and he married Catherine just months after Henry VII’s death in 1509. While personal feelings played their role, the somewhat older Catherine still brought a link to Spain which emerged as the dominant power in Europe in the early sixteenth century.  

While Henry VIII was a dutiful husband, his devotion to Catherine waned as a series of miscarriages and children who lived only a few months frustrated his search for a male heir. The sole child produced by the couple who lived was Mary, a daughter, to whom Henry was loath to pass his throne. By 1526 Henry’s frustration with Catherine’s inability to produce a male heir led him to turn his affections to Anne Boleyn. He determined to put Catherine aside and seek an annulment of his marriage from Pope

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Clement VII with the intention of marrying Anne. Thus, Henry's search for a male heir and his desire for the younger Anne led him to risk the displeasure of Spain and the Pope after failing to receive the needed annulment. Breaking with the Catholic Church, Henry declared the Church of England a separate entity from Rome and he proclaimed himself the head of the newly independent church. In one bold stroke, Henry separated from Rome and reinforced his own power by disbanding the Catholic Church throughout England. He ultimately put his own supporters in positions of power in a bureaucracy that established the supremacy of the throne. His actions also alienated Charles V, the King of Spain and the Holy Roman Emperor, the most powerful monarch in Europe, and the nephew of Catherine, though this did not prevent other efforts on the part of Spain to maintain good relations with England. Religion would get in the way of these efforts.3

Henry's many wives and his almost frantic efforts to produce a healthy male heir are legendary, but at his death in 1547, he left only three children, Mary, Elizabeth, and Edward, each by three different wives. He also left a kingdom rife with religious and political tensions. Both Protestant and Catholic factions strove to attain primacy while trying to further their visions of the future kingdom. Other nations saw the tensions as a chance to assert their influence in the British Isles. France supported the Scots, causing unrest on England's border, and Spain looked to assist any potential restoration of Catholicism in England while giving support to Irish rebels. Edward VI ascended the throne in 1547 at the age of nine and his short six-year-reign saw continued Protestant entrenchment and disputes over the succession. When Edward passed away in 1553, his sister Mary seized the disputed throne. She immediately reinstated Catholicism as the

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religion of the land, supported by her new husband, Philip of Spain, the son of Charles V. Marriage to a staunch Catholic and a Spaniard alienated the Protestant nobility.

Religious violence exploded and some three hundred persons, including the former Archbishop of Canterbury, were burned at the stake as heretics, earning Mary the nickname ‘Bloody Mary.’ The nobles were further incensed when Philip convinced Mary to support Spain in a war with France that resulted in a disastrous defeat. Mary’s reign lost its main pillar of support when Philip’s desire to restore Catholicism in England was put aside on the death of his father. He left England to assume the throne of Spain as Philip II, and Mary died a short ten months later with the kingdom in disarray. England was a kingdom in tatters when Elizabeth I assumed the throne in 1558. During her reign the tensions with Spain exploded into warfare and the Americas took their place as a principle battleground.\(^4\)

Under Elizabeth, England became a bastion of Protestantism in Europe. Elizabeth gave assistance to various Protestant groups in Scotland and on the continent that assistance ultimately led to confrontations with both France and, more significantly, Spain. But through much of the first few decades of her reign, Elizabeth sought to maintain peaceful relations, especially with Spain. She even entertained propositions of marriage from Philip II of Spain, who saw an opportunity early in Elizabeth’s reign to add England to his empire and to continue the restoration of Catholicism begun under Mary. He proposed marriage to Elizabeth only two months after Mary’s death and Elizabeth teased the Spanish monarch for a few years hoping that Philip’s interest would protect her from French attack and papal denunciation during the period she was

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entrenching her own power in England. She deftly played various factions against each other to maintain her own power throughout. Even English Catholics retained some hope through the 1570s before Elizabeth felt secure enough in her reign to begin clamping down and imposing restrictions on religious observance. Spain continued to see England as a balance to French ambitions for many years, but the spreading wars of religion doomed any possibility of Anglo-Spanish friendship.5

The roots of Anglo-Spanish rivalry lay in religion, but the physical confrontations that would embroil the Americas began in Europe. Philip II was zealous in his desire to root out heresy against Catholicism, and his possessions in the Low Countries were a center of Protestantism. Aided by the Catholic Church, when he assumed the throne of Spain in 1556 he set about putting down the rising Protestant fervor in the region by repressing any form of worship other than Catholicism. While he did grant some forms of religious freedom to the region in 1558 in return for money, he quickly realized that the leading nobles, primarily William of Orange, were using the religious turmoil to gain too much power at his expense. When Philip decided to install three new archbishops and fourteen new bishops in the region in the early 1560s, the tensions quickly broke into open rebellion against Spain. Violence and warfare swept much of the Spanish Netherlands through the 1570s, and Philip II poured enormous resources in men and material into quelling the rebellion. In the early 1570s, the rebels against Spain appealed to England as a co-religionist for assistance. At this time, Elizabeth began the slow movement of England from uneasy ally to outright enemy in the eyes of Spain.6

5 Brigden, New Worlds, Lost Worlds, 219-227, 267.
Elizabeth II had spent many of the early years of her reign solidifying her hold on the throne through deft political maneuvers. She also encouraged a growing cult worship of her image as the virgin queen, symbolically married only to her realm. By the 1570s she felt secure enough to move against suspected disloyalties among the English Catholic population and to take a more assertive role in European affairs. Her decision to spurn the early proposals of Philip and her reinstatement of Protestantism in England alienated Spain. By 1571 Philip had given up on maintaining the English alliance, and Elizabeth’s court discovered a plan that year for a Spanish invasion of England to forcibly reconvert the population to Catholicism. When the appeals for aid came from the Spanish Netherlands, Elizabeth hesitated, despite Philip’s animosity, to openly challenge Spain’s power. Concerns about the threat that Spain posed to England led her in 1572 to expel a group of Dutch rebels in exile, named the ‘Sea Beggars,’ that had used southern English ports as a haven in their fight for independence from Spain. This overt move to appease Spain did not stop Elizabeth from providing discreet aid to the rebels the same year in the form of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, a favorite of Elizabeth, who ‘volunteered’ to assist the rebels. Open defiance of Spain, however, was still a move that Elizabeth would not make.\(^\text{7}\)

Against Spain’s vast American empire, the English echoed the slow move from tentative ally to open enemy that was occurring in Europe. English traders had frequented Iberian ports in both Spain and Portugal for decades by the time the relationship between Elizabeth and Philip began to sour. Despite amicable trade relations, there were sources of tensions, namely the claims by Portugal to a monopoly over the trade along the Guinea coast of Africa and the similar claim of Spain to a

monopolistic claim on colonization and trade in the Americas. England typically refused to recognize the legal basis that both of the other countries used to justify these claims.\(^8\) In 1530 English traders began regular voyages to Africa to trade cloth and other goods for various items such as ivory, pepper, and slaves. These vessels then made the voyage to the West Indies to engage in an illicit trade with Spanish colonies which, despite royal edicts against trade with any ships other than Spanish vessels, were willing to overlook the technical violation of the law. English privateers such as John Hawkins found the slave trade a lucrative venture despite the protests of Philip II. Hawkins maintained the fiction of English neutrality at one point in 1571 by offering his service to Spain in an effort to spy out Spanish plans against England. On one voyage he was accompanied by his kinsman, Francis Drake, with whom he would later become prominent when the rivalry between the two nations became violent.\(^9\)

The transition from ally to enemy in the Americas took a complex course as Elizabeth and Philip spent most of the 1570s and the early 1580s playing diplomatic games. Each refused to openly admit that the two countries were moving inexorably to war, even as their actions spoke louder than words. Individuals in the Americas were not as scrupulous in maintaining the fiction though they took pains to act as if it were so. As more English ships made the illicit trip to the Indies, greater portion of the riches of the Spanish Empire found their way into the holds of English corsairs, who took any

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8 The legal claims made by Portugal and Spain to their relative spheres of influence were based on a series of Papal Bulls, most significantly the Bull *Inter caetera* issued by 1493 that resulted in the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 that split the Atlantic along a meridian 100 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands with all lands east to fall to Portugal and everything west to Spain, though it would leave all lands under Christian Kings undisturbed. Other powers, such as England and France, obviously, never recognized the legality of this treaty.

opportunity for profit. Trade, however, was being abandoned in favor of piracy, despite an effort to maintain a pretence of peace. An English ship running along the mainland coast of New Spain in 1571 justified an attack on a Spanish ship, sending the unfortunate captain the message:

"Captain and crew of this frigate: We are surprised that you ran from us in that fashion and later refused to come talk with us under our flag of truce, knowing us, and having seen evidence of the few days past that we do ill to none under our flag of truce, but only wished to speak with you. And since you will not come courteously to talk with us without evil or damage, you will find your frigate spoiled by your own fault. And to any who courteously may come to talk with us, we will do no harm, under our flag. And who does not come, his be the blame."10

The increasing frequency and scope of English attacks brought loud and frequent complaints from Spanish officials to the crown, such as one from the Spanish port of Nombre de Dios on the Atlantic coast of what today is Panamá. In 1573, a year after Francis Drake sacked and pillaged the town, Pedro de Ortega Valencia wrote of the danger of English activity along the coast inspiring rebellion against the Spanish, claiming that "[this] place is so alarmed and in such need (once the fleet shall have departed) of people to garrison it against the numerous cimarrones, and other Negroes who run away to join them daily." He claimed that the inhabitants of the city were "unable to strengthen or hold it," especially since "this coast is so beset by such bold English corsairs, little afraid of any offense that can be done them from here." Spanish officials looked at English provocations with increasing anger, but, again, the turmoil in the Low Countries and European diplomacy kept Philip from taking overt action. Encouraged by the response, English ships became more aggressive. Francis Drake followed up on his earlier sacking of Nombre de Dios by leading an expedition in 1578 to

10 "English Corsairs to certain Spaniards, the Mainland coast, February (?), 1571," in Wright, Documents, 1569-1580, 11.
circumnavigate the globe. During the voyage Drake and his fleet rounded the tip of South America, sailed up the Pacific coast of South and North America where they sacked Valparaiso, attacked Spanish shipping, and returned to England across the Pacific laden with Spanish gold and spices from the Indies in 1580. Spanish complaints to Elizabeth were met with counter-complaints of Spanish activities in Ireland and support for Catholics in England against her rule.11

Spain's policy of inaction changed in the 1580s when Elizabeth took several steps that brought open strikes against Spanish interests in Europe as well as in the Americas. Her actions bespoke an audacious decision to confront Philip. Spain in the early 1580s was at the zenith of its power. While Spain appeared formidable before, it appeared invincible now. Philip II claimed sovereignty over the entire Iberian Peninsula, having seized Portugal in 1580 in the name of his wife, the daughter of King Henry of Portugal. In addition, he ruled Sicily, Naples, Sardinia and the Duchy of Milan. He controlled the Spanish Netherlands, though he faced rebellion there. Through Portugal he held the Portuguese settlements in Africa and the whole of the East Indies; through Spain he held all of the Americas including Portuguese Brazil. Philip served Europe as the pre-eminent Catholic monarch of the time and, through the 1570s, Elizabeth slowly assumed the role of the most powerful Protestant monarch. Religion served as both reason and excuse for England to take action against Spain. Desire to match the economic and military might of Spain was a secondary motivation. Seeking to match, openly, the power of Spain showed Elizabeth at her most daring and she moved on several fronts at once. The

closest to home of these was to begin openly supporting the rebellious provinces of the Spanish Netherlands across the English Channel.\textsuperscript{12}

The situation for the rebel Protestants in the Low Countries after 1577 deteriorated as the Spanish ‘Army of Flanders’ under Philip’s nephew, Allesandro Farnese, later the Duke of Parma, pushed the rebels northward, capturing city after city. Parma soon subdued the southern provinces, modern Belgium, as the largely Catholic nobility in this region had been uneasy allies of the Protestant rebels. By 1585 the key port city of Antwerp was under Spanish control and Parma had pushed the rebel army back into their northern provinces. Unwilling to see the Protestant rebels defeated utterly, Elizabeth asserted the common cause of Protestantism. She reached an open agreement with the rebel leaders and sent an army of some four thousand men under one of her favorite courtiers, Robert Dudley, the earl of Leicester. The English army’s effectiveness in the field was less important than the blatant challenge to Spain’s rule over the provinces, and this explicit dare issued by Elizabeth was echoed in the Americas. Philip responded with an embargo of English shipping and began planning for a large-scale invasion of England to put an end to Elizabeth’s provocations.\textsuperscript{13}

As a second avenue of attack, Elizabeth aggressively assaulted the source of much of Spain’s wealth, the colonies in the Americas. In the Spanish West Indies, what had been a cold war of individual attacks on Spanish shipping became a hot war of widespread destruction when Sir Francis Drake, freshly knighted by the queen for voyage around the world, staged a large-scale raid of the Spanish West Indies in 1586. Drake’s

\textsuperscript{13} Brigden, \textit{New Worlds, Lost Worlds}, 244-53; Parker, \textit{Grand Strategy of Philip II}, 147-77; Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, 222-30.
fleets of twenty-five ships sailed in late 1585 as a response to Philip’s embargo of English shipping and set course for the West Indies. For the rest of 1585, and through the first half of 1586, Drake attacked a series of Spanish cities. In 1585 his fleet sacked Vigo in Spain and sailed to the Cape Verde Islands and took the city of São Tiago. Proceeding to the Caribbean, Drake attacked and sacked Santo Domingo and Cartagena.14

Reports from Spanish officials of Drake’s actions catalog the extreme destructiveness and cost of Drake’s raid to Philip’s American possessions, showing both the religious animosity and the desire for Spanish treasure that motivated the attacks.

The dean of the Cathedral of Santo Domingo reported Drake’s actions to the king, stressing the religious nature of the attack. He informed the king that:

“God, Our Lord, permitted an English fleet which the people of this city of Santo Domingo sighted on Friday, the 10th of January of this present year, to land men immediately, on the following Saturday. That day they entered into the city and sacked and destroyed it. We understand that it was Heaven’s punishment on this people’s manifold sins... The English remained here 36 days, during which they treated this city as an enemy of their religion, of their queen and of themselves...”15

Other reports emphasized the incredible destruction and pillage that Drake wrought. One from an unidentified agent in the royal court in England summarized Drake’s leisurely progress through Philip’s holdings: “In some of the places he [Drake] captured he stayed for a fortnight, but in others he remained a whole month.” In each, Drake, not satisfied with the plunder found in each city, also “arranged that the inhabitants should ransom themselves out at a high price.” To add insult to injury, Drake boasted on his return to England that Philip “could not repair and reconstruct, in twenty years of continuous peace

14 Parker, Grand Strategy of Philip II, 171-81.
and with the expense of tens of thousands or millions of gold pieces, what he personally had destroyed, burned and ravaged in such a very little time.16

After taking Cartagena, Drake’s next target was unknown but the subject of serious speculation on the part of the Spanish who endured his stay. Tristan de Oribe Salazar, a resident held for ransom, reported after his release that a boat escaping the English attack sailed “from the unhappy city of Cartagena for Nombre de Dios” carrying word that “Captain Francis says openly that he intends to take that city of Panama…”17 Others were not so sure of his specific destination. Pedro Fernández de Busto, the governor of Cartagena, wrote to the king in May 1586 of his actions after receiving word from Havana of the loss of Santo Domingo. He wrote that in warnings dispatched to several cities, “I sent word of the loss of Santo Domingo and warning that the enemy intended to visit all this coast.”18 For all the speculation about new targets in the Spanish Main, Drake surprised many by turning north, towards La Florida, and struck St. Augustine. For the first time, the Anglo-Spanish rivalry that formed in Europe and spread to the Americas played a primary role in events that directly affected the development of the North American Southeast.

At the time of Drake’s approach in 1586, St. Augustine was a small military outpost on the northeast coast of the Florida peninsula. Its short history traced back to 1565 and was a result of another European threat to Spanish claims to the Americas, in this case a small group of French Huguenots under the command of Jean Ribault that

17 “Tristan de Oribe Salazar to a correspondent in Panama, Turbaco, March 5-11, 1586,” in Wright, Further English Voyages, 1583-1594, 41-45.
planned to establish a colony along the southeastern coast of North America. In 1562, Ribault, with 150 soldiers and crew, established a small fort and erected a stone marker at Santa Elena near Port Royal Sound in modern South Carolina. Leaving thirty men to complete the fort, Ribault returned to France for supplies and more men. The remaining French soldiers soon gave up for lack of food and used a small boat to return to France. When a Spanish ship arrived in the summer of 1564 they found the site abandoned. The Spanish destroyed the fort and removed the marker.\footnote{Paul E. Hoffman, \textit{A New Andalucia and a Way to the Orient: The American Southeast during the Sixteenth Century} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 169-215; Jerald T. Milanich, \textit{Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe} (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1995), 143-44.}

The French were undaunted by the setback. New plans for settlement were already in the works and in April 1564 another expedition under René de Laudonnière, the second-in-command to Ribault on the first voyage, left France bound for North America. Three ships and three hundred persons, including women and children, reached the Atlantic coast of Florida in July 1564. The expedition sailed up the mouth of the St. Johns River and established a settlement and fort, named Fort Caroline, on a bluff overlooking the river. Laudonnière described the fort as “built in a triangular shape” and claimed impressive fortifications, including one side “bounded by a little ditch and built with turf making a parapet nine feet high.” The river side, from which a naval attack would come, boasted a “timber palisade” and a guardhouse within.\footnote{René de Laudonnière cited in Milanich, \textit{Florida Indians}, 146.} But impressive defenses did not help the settlement feed the colonists and soon hunger and other hardships caused unrest among the settlers. Only the assistance of the local Timucua Indian population allowed the colony to survive. Even the arrival of an English fleet under John Hawkins failed to save the struggling settlement. After the French traded
arms and artillery for a ship and supplies from the English, Laudonnière and the other colonists determined to return to France. They were dissuaded by the arrival of a small fleet under the command of Jean Ribault, who had orders to assume command of the colony.\textsuperscript{21}

The Spanish, however, learned of Fort Caroline soon after its founding and, again, determined to expel the French from La Florida and this time to establish a settlement of their own to prevent future threats. In 1565, Philip II of Spain charged Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, the commander of Spain’s Caribbean fleet, with driving the French from Fort Caroline and establishing a Spanish colony in Florida. Menéndez’ expedition of eleven ships and five hundred colonists sailed from Spain and on August 28, 1565 entered the harbor he named for St. Augustine. Sailing on, Menéndez arrived at the mouth of the St. Johns River on September 4, just a week after the arrival at Fort Caroline of Ribault’s relief fleet. Menéndez encountered the French fleet but was unable to bring it to combat and soon returned to St. Augustine where he began construction of a small fort. Hoping to take the Spanish by surprise, Ribault sailed to attack them, but his fleet was wrecked in a storm. With Fort Caroline virtually defenseless, Menéndez marched overland and on September 21 killed or captured most of the French there. Ribault and his men, driven ashore south of St. Augustine, were captured as they tried to reach Fort Caroline by land. Laudonnière, Ribault’s son, and forty-four of his men escaped to the French ships and sailed for France. Menéndez and the Spanish viewed the two hundred or so French

\textsuperscript{21} Hoffman, \textit{A New Andalucia}, 216-23; Milanich, \textit{Florida Indians}, 146-47.
captives as both heretics and pirates and executed all but a dozen or so Catholics. Those French who escaped capture or refused to surrender fled south or inland.\textsuperscript{22}

After the destruction of the French settlement, Menéndez set about fulfilling his obligation to settle towns along the coast to protect Spanish interests. On September 8, 1565, Menéndez took formal possession of Florida at St. Augustine. But after he finished his business with the French, he decided to settle his main town farther north at Santa Elena while maintaining a smaller garrison at St. Augustine. After exploring the coast south of St. Augustine, he set affairs in the town in order and sailed north along the coast where, during the week of Easter in 1566, he settled a second Spanish settlement at Santa Elena, which he intended to be his capital. He hoped one day to add settlements around the east, west, and southern coast of the Florida peninsula and, ultimately, to accomplish the long hoped for linkage of Florida to New Spain overland. These grand plans failed to materialize, and with his death in 1574 the plans that had already been scaled back were even further reduced to mere maintenance of the two existing settlements. Though the colony at Santa Elena grew to include some two hundred settlers by 1569, the settlement suffered from disease, starvation, and the hostility of the local Indians brought on by abuse and mistreatment. The Santa Elena settlement was abandoned in 1576 and burned by the Indians, though the Spanish reoccupied the site and rebuilt the fort in 1577. Thus, in the mid-1580s both Santa Elena and St. Augustine held a few hundred colonists, small garrisons of soldiers, and wooden fortifications. The weak defenses of St. Augustine

proved no match for the large English fleet that Francis Drake led against it in June 1586.\footnote{Milanich, \textit{Florida Indians}, 159-63; Hoffman, \textit{A New Andalucia}, 249-66.}

The Spanish at St. Augustine were not unaware of the threat posed by Drake’s fleet. As word spread throughout the Caribbean of the depredations wrought by the English against Santo Domingo, then at Cartagena, most Spanish towns sought to improve its defenses in case they were the next target. Under the leadership of the governor, Pedro Menéndez Márques, the nephew of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, the Spanish took the best possible actions to prepare. Spanish officials testified after the attack that Menéndez Márques “built a new fort at harbour mouth, at the bar, at the end of the channel, to protect the entrance.” With this new series of fortifications, Menéndez Márques withdrew all the available artillery and the garrison behind the walls and stored the valuables of the town in this secure location. Despite the losses suffered in the attack, officials believed that considering “how quickly it was done and by how few people, and with what scanty materials, the fort was very effective and well situated.”\footnote{“The royal officials of Florida to the Crown, San Agustin, June 17, 1586,” in Wright, \textit{Further English Voyages}, 164-65.}

The governor’s actions were in vain. With a garrison of less than a hundred men and small wooden fortifications, the Spanish were unable to resist the English for long. Menéndez Márques gave a full report to the king. He described Drake’s arrival with a fleet of “42 sail” on the 6\textsuperscript{th} of June and the next day, he reported, Drake “landed 500 men and with seven large pinnaces sought me forthwith in the fort. With 80 I had in the fort I resisted him until nearly midday.” Faced with stubborn defiance, Drake then “landed some 2000 men and planted four pieces of artillery among certain sand dunes near the
fort, with which he began to batter it.” Unable to resist such overwhelming force, Menéndez Márides made the decision to withdraw his garrison into the interior along with the women and children, over two hundred persons in total. With the retreat of the Spanish, “the enemy took and sacked the town and burned the church with its images and crosses, and cut down the fruit trees, which were numerous and good. He burned the fort and carried off the artillery and munitions and food supplies.”

After the complete destruction of St. Augustine, Drake sailed northward in search of Santa Elena with the intention of repeating the destruction he had wrought on its sister city. Word of an impending English attack, however, reached Menéndez Márides’ lieutenant. As Drake’s fleet passed by, firing its cannon along the coast hoping for a response to reveal its location, the residents of Santa Elena extinguished all the lights and remained silent thus saving their town from certain destruction. The destruction left in its wake at St. Augustine, however, had profound consequences on the future of Florida. The attack forced the Spanish to the realization that they lacked the men and supplies to maintain two far-flung settlements in La Florida. They made the decision to consolidate the resources dedicated to Florida by the Spanish crown in one location and royal officials decided that the greater proximity of St. Augustine to Cuba would make it easier to protect and supply. The Spanish abandoned Santa Elena in the summer of 1587 and the garrison and settlers relocated to St. Augustine, where the fortress and town were rebuilt and reinforced.

From that point on, St. Augustine served as the center of Spanish influence and power in the Southeast. The small city became the focus of an intense interaction


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between the Spanish and Indians spreading out in a series of missions that ultimately extended Spanish influence inland through Timucua and Apalachee and northward along the coast through the regions of Mocama and into Guale along the Georgia coast. In some ways, though, Spanish influence had suffered its first check as, although missionaries routinely visited the Santa Elena region over the next few decades, the town of Santa Elena was never rebuilt. In the context of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry, the reason for Drake’s attack on La Florida introduces the third, and most lasting, avenue of the English assault on Spanish power during this period. Drake’s fleet sailed to Florida to secure the colony that the English had established on Roanoke Island the year before in an explicit challenge to Spanish hegemony in the Americas.²⁶

* * * *

England, like France, had been a participant in the early explorations of the Atlantic before Columbus’ 1492 voyage. Merchants in Bristol, England, sponsored explorations and, later, Henry VII commissioned voyages of exploration in the North Atlantic. An Italian mariner, Giovanni Caboto, offered his services to the Spanish and Portuguese at the same time as Columbus but was rejected. After Columbus’ voyages, Caboto turned to Henry VII of England who sponsored two voyages in 1497 and 1498 that explored the Canadian coast in search of a passage to Asia. Caboto’s son, Sebastian, continued exploring the North American coast around Hudson Bay in search of this Northwest Passage in 1508 and 1509. But Henry VII ultimately withdrew his support of

the voyages with an eye to more productive efforts aimed at solidifying his hold on the
throne. England was an observer for much of the sixteenth century of the growth of the
Spanish empire in the Americas and gave little thought to establishing an English
presence there with so much to do closer to home. Early efforts to establish English
colonies during the reign of Henry VII and afterwards concentrated on Ireland. Many of
the familiar names involved in early English colonization in the Americas learned their

Perhaps the most prominent name that emerged at the forefront of proposals to
plant a colony in North America that had been associated with the English efforts in
Ireland was Sir Humphrey Gilbert. During the 1560s and early 1570s, Gilbert served in
the English army in expeditions to help Protestants both in France and in the Netherlands.
Also during this period he served in Ireland as both soldier and, after 1569, governor of
Munster, earning a knighthood the following year. This service made him very familiar
with the benefits that colonies could bring England, and his service against Spain gave
him further motivation to challenge Spain's preeminence in the Americas. Beginning in
the early 1560s, Gilbert began to toy with the idea of continuing the search for a
Northwest Passage. In 1566 Gilbert drafted a proposal to Elizabeth to draw support for a
voyage of discovery in search of this passage that represented what others, such as
Richard Hakluyt the Elder, were also suggesting. When published a decade later as \textit{A}
Discourse of a Discoverie for a New Passage to Cataia, it was at the forefront of thought on the benefits of colonization.28

In the 1560s and through much of the 1570s, Elizabeth's policy was public appeasement of Spain while supporting measures against it surreptitiously. During this time, most English proposals for exploration of North America focused on the search for a Northwest passage in hopes of finding a route to Asia (or Cataia) that would bypass the Portuguese and Spanish middlemen in the trade for silk, spices, and other valuable goods much sought after in Europe. Gilbert echoed this when he claimed, based on accounts from Spanish explorers of North America like Coronado and the chronicler, Gómara, that "America [was] an Iland, and likewise Grondland: and that Grondland is distant from Lappia. 40. leagues, and from Terra de Labrador, 50." If America was an island it could be circumnavigated to the north and "[these] things considered, we may (in my opinion) not only assure our selves of this passage, by ye Northwest, but also yt it is navigable, both to come and goe, as hath beene proved in part and in al."29 To aid in the discovery of this passage, Gilbert proposed planting a colony on the coast of North America, which in his mind would be of great benefit to England in many ways. His treatise summarized these benefits:

"Nowe admit that we might not be suffered by the savages to enjoy any whole countrey or any more then the scope o f a Citie, yet if wee might enjoy trafficke and be assured of the same, wee might bee inriched, our Navie might be increased, & a place of safetie might there be found, if change of religion or civill warres should happen in this realme, which are thinges of great benefite. But if we may injoy any large Territorie of apt soyle, we might so use the matter, as we should not depende upon Spaine for oyles, sacks, resinges, oranges, lemons, Spanish skinnes, &c. Nor upon Fraunce for woad, baysalt, and gascoyne wines, nor on Estlande for flaxe, pitch, tarre, mastes, &c."30

29 Ibid, 14, 18.
Thus a new colony provided a base for exploration, a refuge in a potential crisis, and, if the territory was expanded, the production of numerous resources for which England found herself beholden to her enemies. As the European situation changed, however, Gilbert’s proposals changed with them.

While finding the Northwest Passage remained a goal for England in each effort at colonization, other motivations emerged as Anglo-Spanish relations deteriorated. Gilbert’s efforts to receive support from Elizabeth grew to echo this diplomatic evolution. In a letter to Elizabeth in 1577, Gilbert laid out an ambitious plan to catch the queen’s attention. In Gilbert’s expanded plan, a colony that could serve as a launching point for exploration could also serve as a base for naval expeditions of a different, more profitable, type. His letter laid out “a discourse how Her Majesty may annoy the Kinge of Spaine by fitting out a fleet of shippes of war under pretense of Letters Patent, to discover and inhabit strange places.” Once North America was secure, the colony could be used as a staging ground with the grand scheme of taking the whole of the Spanish empire. Gilbert proclaimed that if “you will let us do this, we will next take the West Indies from Spain. You will have the gold and silver mines and the profit of the soil. You will be monarch of the seas.”

Gilbert’s ambitious plans progressed in 1578 when Elizabeth commissioned him to plant a colony in North America. His first expedition in that same year was forced back by storms. Though it ended in failure, it was significant because it drew his half-brother Walter Ralegh into active participation in the colonization of North America.

Gilbert assembled another fleet in 1583 and successfully reached Newfoundland in August. After claiming the land in the name of the queen and exploring the area in anticipation of planting a colony, Gilbert and the ship he traveled on disappeared during a storm on the return voyage to England. His ideas were not lost. Others took up the quest and the numbers of people proposing plans for colonization grew. Most importantly, Ralegh himself took up the challenge and convinced Elizabeth to reissue the patent granting license to plant an English colony in North America to him in 1584.32

Sir George Peckham was one of those who, along with his son, George, desired to continue the mission. He and his son were prominent members of a group of Catholic gentlemen who purchased rights to land in America from Humphrey Gilbert. After losing many supporters over time, they published the result of several interviews with one of the survivors of Gilbert’s final expedition, Captain Edward Hayes. The pamphlet purported to report on Gilbert’s discoveries while promoting a new effort to plant a colony. Once again, the success of the Spanish colonies was prominent in the suggested motivations of the plan:

“Withall, how mightely hath it inlarged the domions of the Crown of Spayne, and greatly enriching the subjectes of the same, let all men consider. Besides, it is well knowne, that sithence the time of Columbus his first discoverie, through theyr planting, possessing, and inhabiting those partes, there hath beene transported and brought home into Europe, greater store of Golde, Silver, Pearle, and Pretious stones, then hath beene in all ages, since the creation of the worlde.”

Peckham continued, arguing that Gilbert’s expedition represented a turning point and that now “it hath pleased almighty God, of hys infinite mercie at the length, to awake some of our worthy Countrey men, out of that drowsie dreame, wherein we all have so long

slumbered.” To Peckham, it was natural to continue Gilbert’s efforts because England’s right to the lands were unquestioned.\textsuperscript{33}

Richard Hakluyt the Younger, probably the leading proponent of planting English colonies in North America, echoed Peckham’s arguments. In his \textit{A Discourse of Western Planting}, written at the behest of Ralegh and published in 1584, Hakluyt extolled the virtues of the lands in America and the benefits a colony would provide to England. He repeated the resources and possible agricultural production that an American colony would provide, then stressed the possibility to strike a blow at Spain. He pointed out that “the mischefe that the Indian Threasure wrought in time of Charles the late Emperour father to the Spanishe kinge, is to be had in consideracion of the Queenes moste excellent Majestie.” That treasure had been used by Philip against England to “worke the unrecoverable annoye of this Realme, whereof wee have had very dangerous experience.” Hakluyt believed that to engage Philip in America by establishing English colonies would “bringe kinge Phillippe from his high Throne, and make him equal to the Princes his neighbours, wherewithal is shewed his weakenes in the west Indies.” He continued that thought, saying that “the lymites of the kinge of Spaines dominions in the west Indies be nothinge so large as ys generally ymagined and surmised, neither of those partes which he holdeth be of any such forces as ys falsly geven oute by the popishe Clergye.” As such, England’s efforts in America would be a step in the larger struggle against Spain.\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33} Sir George Peckham, “True reporte of the late discoveries... by... Sir Humphrey Gilbert,” in Quinn, ed., \textit{New American World}, 3: 42.

Hakluyt also delineated the specific means by which England could shake Philip's empire to its core. The first was to strike at the great treasure fleets that sailed annually from the West Indies to Spain following the currents past the coast of Florida. He pointed out that "it is also a thinge withoute controversie that all southerne and southeasterne windes inforce the Spanish flete returninge home nere or upon the aforesaide coaste [Florida] and consequently will bringe them into our daunger after wee shalbe there strongly setteld and fortified." He believed that from a fortified port on the North American coast, England could "arrest at our pleasure for the space of teene weekes or three monethes every yere, one or twoo hundred saile of his subjectes" striking at the West Indies as well as blocking "[Spanish] shippes at the fysshinge in Newfounde lande."\textsuperscript{35}

The second avenue of attack would be "to understande that the Savages of Florida are the Spaniards mortall enemyes and wilbe ready to joyne with us againste them." Not only would the Indians serve as allies against the Spanish in La Florida, but "in lande on the northe side of Nova Hispania [New Spain] there is a people called Chichimici which are bigg and stronge men and valiaunte archers which have contynuall warres with the Spaniardes and doo greatly annoye them." Hakluyt, therefore, proposed to use a base in North America both to supply fleets to stage raids against the Spanish but to imitate Philip's activities in Ireland and supply weapons and support to native rebels against Spanish colonies in the Americas. It was a grand scheme to be sure and one that found an enthusiast in Sir Walter Ralegh.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid, 83, 85.
Ralegh agreed with Peckham’s and Hakluyt’s notions and actively set about to continue his brother’s plans with the active encouragement of Elizabeth. To support his efforts, Ralegh enlisted the support of some of the greatest proponents of colonization of the day such as Hakluyt, Thomas Harriot, and John Dee. He arranged a voyage of discovery and commissioned Arthur Barlow and Philip Amadas to explore the coast north of the territory claimed by Spain. In July 1584, Barlow and Amadas’ expedition landed on the Outer Banks of modern North Carolina on an island called ‘Raonoak’ by the natives encountered by the expedition and adopted as Roanoke by the English. Barlow’s report extolled the virtues of the land, exaggerating the potential for colonization and described the first meetings with the Indians. The native chief, Barlow reported, was “named Wingina, the countrey Winhandacoa, (and now by her Majestie, Virginia,.)” The small group of natives approached the English tentatively: “hee left his boates altogether, as the first man did a little from the shippes by the shoare... he never moved from his place, nor any of the other foure, nor never mistrusted any harme to be offered from us, but sitting still, he beckoned us to come, and sitte by him.” Once the English approached, Wingina made “all signes of joy, and welcome, striking on his hed, and his breast, and afterwards on ours, to shew we were all one, smiling, and making shewe the best hee could, of all love, and familiaritie.” Impressed with the friendly reception and the environment, the expedition returned to England and reported to Ralegh on their success. He wasted no time in organizing another expedition to plant a colony on the island.37

The expedition left Plymouth in April 1585 and consisted of seven ships with over a hundred soldiers commanded by Ralegh’s cousin, Sir Richard Grenville. Included in the expedition were a number of Ralegh loyalists, two Indians taken in the previous

voyage, Manteo and Wanchese, as well as the artist, John White, and Thomas Harriot, a prominent scientist. It sailed through the Spanish West Indies, even landing at the small Spanish port of Isabella on the island of Hispaniola, where the governor, intimidated by the large number of English, politely entertained and traded with the English with whom Spain was still technically at peace. The fleet reached the Outer Banks in late June and spent a month exploring the surrounding region before establishing a colony on the northern end of Roanoke Island in July. Ralph Lane, a veteran of the wars in Ireland, was named governor and put in charge of the soldier-colonists. The English constructed a small fort and set about exploring inland and establishing relations with the surrounding Indians. Manteo and Wanchese served as interpreters, though Wanchese soon ran away from the English and encouraged the Indians to strike the English.

Grenville soon left the colony in order to return to England for supplies. The pressing need for supplies did not prevent his engaging in the activity for which the colony was intended to assist. On his return voyage, Grenville “descried a tall ship of foure hundred tuns or thereabouts, making the same course that he did, unto whome he gave chase, and in few houres by goodnesse of saile overtooke.” Having encountered a Spanish ship, Grenville “by violence won” the ship, discovering that she was “richlie laden with sugar, hides, spices, and some quantitie of gold, silver, and pearle.” The prize was the *Santa Maria de San Vicente*, part of the Spanish treasure fleet that had separated from the others in a storm. Enrique López Fayal, a passenger, described Grenville’s attack: “the ship opened fire and bore down on them, firing her guns with the intention of disabling them, and so cut up their rigging that they were disabled.” Once the Spanish ship was disabled, the “corsair then lowered a boat with 30 armed soldiers and a captain
whom they called their general, named Richard Greenville.” López Fayal concluded his account stating that the “passengers gave up the key to their boxes and he unlocked some and broke open others and removed many lots of gold and silver and pearls... The total was over 40,000 ducats.” Grenville, therefore, made the voyage profitable from the outset.38

The soldiers at the fledgling colony, however, were not as successful. Lane’s outpost at Roanoke suffered from the dual problems of inadequate supplies and an increasingly hostile Indian population surrounding it. In the beginning, the Indian population was generally supportive of the English, making fishing weirs for them and assisting in planting crops for the newcomers. Lane explored as far north as the Chesapeake and as far south as Secotan. Thomas Harriot used the time to observe the native peoples and to investigate the local plant life, while John White made remarkable watercolors and drawings of the Indians and their societies. This promising start did not last.

Both Grenville before his departure and Lane treated the Indians harshly, severely punishing any perceived slight by the Indians. The imperious attitude of the English wore thin with the Indians during the period when the English relied almost exclusively on the Indians for food. Finally, the Indians would not or could not provide further supplies. The neighboring tribes turned hostile and began raiding the English. For the colonists, food became scarce, forcing Lane to split his soldiers into small groups. He sent each group to different parts of the barrier islands in hopes of their foraging enough

food to survive while looking for passing ships. By June 1586, open warfare erupted
between the colonists and the Indians. When Sir Francis Drake, fresh from his attack on
St. Augustine, arrived at Roanoke, Lane reluctantly made the decision to return to
England. Lane, hoping to return with more men and supplies, left fifteen men at the fort
with supplies for two years to hold the land in the name of the queen until a new
expedition could be organized.

Lane and the failed colonists returned to England with Drake’s fleet and reported
to Ralegh on the events leading to the failure of the first colony. Ralegh was undeterred
in his ambition to found a colony in “Virginia,” as the region had been named in honor of
the “virgin queen.” Ralegh’s design for the next expedition was altered from his first
plan by the input of Harriot, White, and others. They argued that establishing an
agricultural colony would be more effective in ensuring a permanent presence in America
than relying exclusively on soldiers. To accomplish this, the second expedition included
some 150 colonists and consisted of men, women, and children. Rather than a military
governor, John White was appointed governor of the new colony and he brought his
pregnant daughter and son-in-law with him on the voyage. The intention was to stop off
at Roanoke to gather the soldiers left by Lane and then to proceed to the Chesapeake to
establish the colony there. When the fleet arrived at Roanoke in July 1587, however, the
decision was made by the captain of the lead vessel that the season was too far advanced
to continue the trip to the Chesapeake. He determined, against White’s protests, to leave
the colonists at Roanoke. Facing a lack of supplies, the colonists convinced John White
to return to England with the ships in August to arrange for new supplies to be sent to the
colonists. White’s efforts in England, interrupted by the outbreak of open war between
Spain and England and the attack by the Spanish Armada in 1588, were delayed. By August 1590, when White finally succeeded in returning to Roanoke, the colony was gone, with only the word 'Croatoan' (the name of a neighboring island) carved in a tree to provide a clue of their possible fate. The 'Lost Colony' remains one of history's great mysteries.39

The English efforts to challenge Spain in America were not a secret in Spain. While Philip remained unwilling until the late 1580s to declare war on England, his officials did not take the English activities lightly and kept close watch through diplomats and spies in England as well as through orders to Spanish officials in the West Indies. As England's relationship with Spain deteriorated, Philip II found it increasingly useful to keep track of the ships leaving ports throughout England, especially those bound for the Americas. He did so through an effective system of people willing to sell information regarding the destination of ships or from highly placed individuals in the royal court whose sympathies still lay with Catholic Spain. For much of the 1570s and early 1580s, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Philip's ambassador to England, managed this system and regularly sent back reports on English activities that might interest his king. An example of this was their interest in the efforts of Gilbert to win approval of his expeditions to found a colony in North America. Mendoza was well aware of Gilbert's endeavors as well as the motivations behind them. In June 1578, he reported to Philip a meeting between Gilbert and others, claiming that "it was arranged with the Earl of Leicester in his own room – the Queen being present – that the way to insure themselves against your Majesty and put a stop to your good fortune was to make a course to the Indies and rob

the fleets, unless they could establish footing on the coast.” Mendoza knew the queen would support the effort, “for thus they would prevent so much money coming to your Majesty, a matter which is likewise continually urged by Orange, who is of the same way of thinking.”

Mendoza’s spies kept an effective watch on Gilbert’s expeditions as well. He knew the number and strength of each fleet and reported on the successes and failures of both. Mendoza’s efforts were so thorough that on the first expedition he reported that in “the ships of Onofre Gilberto [Humphrey Gilbert] I have sent a special man to give a complete account of the voyage if he returns. It has been a good piece of luck finding a skilled man and trustworthy (since he is English).” Mendoza took nothing for granted and sent a note to the Council to “[m]ake this known to His Majesty. I have given him [the spy] orders, that if on the return, they touch at Spain he is to go straight to Madrid and see you in order to inform you as to what may have happened.”

Even when Mendoza’s system of informers and spies worked as planned, he did not always receive accurate information. With tensions so high between the two countries and with Elizabeth taking a progressively more aggressive tack towards Spain, Mendoza could be forgiven for exaggerating the dangers. In a report sent to Philip regarding Gilbert’s second expedition, for example, Mendoza claimed that:

“[Humphrey Gilbert] is fitting out three more [ships] with which to go to Florida and settle there in the place where Estucle [Stukeley] was and Juan Robero [Jean Ribault], (the man who Pedro Melendez beheaded), with the French. When he asked for the Queen’s assistance he was answered in council that he might go, and, that when he had landed and fortified, the Queen would send 10,000 men to conquer the territory and safeguard the port.”

While his information on Gilbert’s preparations was fairly accurate and Gilbert had received the support of Elizabeth in his efforts, the rumor of 10,000 men being prepared for deployment in America was obviously inflated.42

By 1584, Elizabeth’s patience with Mendoza’s activities and his growing outward hostility towards England and Elizabeth resulted in his expulsion from England. This setback did not prevent the continued activities of his paid informers. When Mendoza was established as the Spanish ambassador to France, he continued to forward the reports of his spies on to Philip. Through 1584 and 1585, Mendoza conveyed information on the activities of Ralegh’s first exploratory expedition and then his preparations of another fleet to sail to the Americas, though the destination was unclear. He also reported on the preparation of a large fleet to sail under Francis Drake though, once again, the exact target was unknown. Even without full details, however, it was clear to Mendoza and to royal officials in Spain and the Americas that England’s ships would target Spanish interests. When, in fact, this proved to be the case, the result was open warfare by 1585. After that, Mendoza and other diplomats found it increasingly difficult to get information out of England. This forced Spain to turn to governors and officials in the colonies to receive information on English activities there.43

No officials in the Spanish empire were more concerned with the exploration of the English in North America than those in St. Augustine. Pedro Menéndez Marqués kept abreast of English voyages as best he could. As early as 1580 he commented on the voyage of Francis Drake around the southern tip of South America, reporting that “I hear

42 “Don Bernardino de Mendoza reports to Philip II, April 26, 1582,” in Quinn, ed., New American World, 3:245
that five English vessels had entered the South Sea by the Strait of Magellan. Many
years ago, the adelantado, Pedro Menendez [de Avilés], and I suspected this, and I even
understand that he discussed it with your Majesty in the royal council of the Indies.” He
knew of English interests to find a passage around the Americas but remained convinced
that their efforts would take another path. He claimed that “I hold it as my opinion that
they aimed at a mark in that direction, and are about to hit another, which is at the back of
Florida.” Menéndez Marqués did not doubt the existence of a Northwest Passage.
Indeed, many at that time thought that the Chesapeake Bay might contain a route to the
Pacific and he believed the English voyage around the Straights of Magellan would find
that passage and that it would bring them back to the Atlantic close to La Florida. He
believed, therefore, that Spain must act quickly to stop the English from continuing their
efforts: “if this is not remedied in time by cutting them off from the passages, it will be a
difficult thing to do later on.”

After Mendoza warned of Walter Raleigh’s preparations for the 1585 expedition
the actual passage of Grenville’s fleet through the West Indies brought reports from
Spanish governors in Hispaniola and Puerto Rico of the landings made by the English at
poorly protected or uninhabited spots on these islands. Other rumors abounded of
Drake’s fleet and the potential threat posed by such a large and imposing force. With
incomplete information on the two disparate threats, officials such as Menéndez Marqués
viewed the possibilities with concern. After a trip to Havana to gather information on the
issued, he decided to postpone a long-planned trip to Spain and return to St. Augustine to
prepare defenses against an attack. He reached the city in July 1585 and found that his

44 “May 5, 1580. Pedro Menéndez Marqués discusses the administrative problems of Florida,” in Quinn,
lieutenant, Gutierre de Miranda, had caused numerous problems among the garrison and population. To quell the situation in Florida and worries about the rumored English settlement, Menéndez Marqués decided to remain in Florida at the behest of almost the entire Spanish population and proceeded to send men to explore the coast north of Santa Elena in search of the English.45

His efforts to reinforce the garrisons of St. Augustine and Santa Elena were supported by the Council of the Indies as well as by the king, who authorized fifty additional soldiers for Florida in December 1585. The wheels of bureaucracy turned slowly, though, and by the time Drake arrived at St. Augustine all of Menéndez Marqués’ efforts proved futile against the overwhelming size of the English fleet. St. Augustine was entirely destroyed. After Drake’s departure, the answer to where Ralegh’s fleet had planted the English colony became even more important. The common belief was that Drake planned to reinforce the new English colony, perhaps wintering there, then using it as a base from which to continue his devastating attacks in the Caribbean. The problem for the Spanish was finding the new colony. Most accounts of Grenville’s fleet could only surmise that it was somewhere north of Florida, towards the great cod-fishing grounds around Newfoundland. Other reports put the English at the Bahia de Santa Maria, the Spanish name for the Chesapeake Bay. No one was able to definitively name a location for the colony, though Philip ordered Menéndez Marqués to make every effort to discover it.46

Although events in Europe between England and Spain led the Council of the Indies and Philip to turn their attention to matters closer to home, namely the proposed

45 Hoffman, Spain and the Roanoke Voyages, 24-25.
46 Ibid, 30-35.
invasion of England that resulted in the Spanish Armada, officials in Florida sought to find the English colony. The first small expeditions that attempted to locate the English late in 1585 proceeded no further than the southern tip of the Outer Banks. After Drake’s visit to St. Augustine, Menéndez Marqués’ immediate efforts centered on rebuilding St. Augustine. But by late July he was secure enough to send his lieutenant, Vicente González, to take word of Drake’s attack to Spain and ordered him to proceed along the coast northward in hope of finding the English. González reported to Philip that “he went investigating the whole coast and going into all the bays: and among the many others he went into, he came across one that is two leagues wide at the mouth and extends thirty leagues inland.” González continued, claiming that upon entering this bay, “he talked with an Indian chief… and among other pieces of information concerning the fertility and richness of the land, he gathered that to the North of that place there was a river that went through to the other ocean, and that near to it there were some English settlers.” Given this report, Philip ordered the Florida governor “with great diligence and care to try and find out if it is true.” If he could locate this reported river he was to ascertain “if by any chance it could be found out whether these pirates have tried to sail along it, and where they have settled, and what their plans are.”

Philip’s orders to Menéndez Marqués reached St. Augustine in May 1587 and the governor immediately set out to obey, using the dispatch boat that had brought the king’s order to sail north along the coast. He reached as far as the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, which was still the suspected location of the English colony, but was driven off by a series of storms. Admitting defeat, Menéndez Marqués sailed from there to Havana and

wrote the king of his plan to return to St. Augustine and to attempt a new search the following year when he could assemble an larger expedition and set out at a better time of year to avoid storms. He spent the winter of 1587-1588 rebuilding St. Augustine and consolidating the garrison from Santa Elena. There was even a possibility that he learned during that time that he might receive orders from the Duke of Medina Sidonia, the Spanish commander of the Armada being assembled in Lisbon to strike England, to sail north to Newfoundland to strike any English ships at the supposed colony or in the fishing grounds there.48

When the time came in mid-1588 for the expedition to search for the English to sail, Menéndez Marqués found himself too busy with the administration of the colony and waiting for possible orders from Spain to lead the hunt himself. He therefore appointed his trusted lieutenant, Vicente González, to once again search for the English colony in the Chesapeake Bay. The reports of this expedition, printed later from journals of one participant, Juan Menéndez Marqués, the governor’s nephew, give one of the earliest accounts of the bay. But the expedition failed to find the English colony. The search did find evidence on the Outer Banks of a previous English presence. The account reported that “on the inside of the little bay they had entered there were signs of a slipway for small vessels, and on land a number of wells made with English casks and other debris indicating that a considerable number of people had been here.” The expedition found no other signs of an English presence and it is not clear where the location

48 Hoffman, Spain and the Roanoke Voyages, 43-46.
mentioned was in relation to the Roanoke colony, nor did the Spanish make an intensive search having found nothing that suggested a current presence.⁴⁹

González returned to St. Augustine with nothing that solved the mystery of the English colony. The investigation and rumors continued to circulate among officials in Havana. The royal accountant in Havana, Pedro de Arana, reported in 1587 his interview with an English captain, William Irish. Irish reported visiting what he thought was Chesapeake Bay in 1586 and seeing livestock and a branded mule that could be evidence of an English presence there. The next year Arana forwarded a deposition by Pedro Díaz, a Spanish sailor captured by Grenville on a Spanish ship, who reported visiting the second Roanoke colony before having finally escaped from the English in 1588 and then returned to Havana. Díaz gave a more precise location for the English colony than any had before. Even with this information, Spanish officials, both in St. Augustine and elsewhere, were led by circumstances in Europe to turn their attention away from the English colony. The defeat of the Spanish Armada and ongoing warfare between the two countries made solidifying the defenses of the Spanish colonies a much greater priority. The Spanish in Florida expended little effort to new searches to the north and Menéndez Marqués was recalled to Spain in 1589 to consult with the Council of the Indies on future Spanish plans for Florida. For the next fifteen years, the Spanish bandied various proposals to establish a colony in the Chesapeake to dislodge the rumored English colony, but nothing ever came of them. A colony, if any existed, became a matter of

minor concern compared to the ongoing war and the debate over the future of Florida itself.\textsuperscript{50}

The effects of the English attacks on St. Augustine and the perceived threat posed by an English colony to the north were driving events in the course of development of La Florida in terms not only of the consolidation of the defenses of the colony at St. Augustine but of its very existence. Soon after Drake's raid on the Florida colony, an internal debate among the Spanish erupted over continuing to maintain a colony so far from the main centers of population in the Spanish empire. A month after Drake's attack, only days after learning of the attack, a prominent merchant in Toledo wrote to Philip arguing that to "maintain Florida is merely to incur expense because it is and has been entirely unprofitable nor can it sustain its own population. Everything must be brought from outside." If the English wanted to colonize La Florida, he concluded, let them. He supposed that if, "although Your Majesty possess Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Yucatan and New Spain, the garrison of Florida has nevertheless suffered actual hunger, what would happen to foreigners there who must bring their subsistence from a great distance to an inhospitable coast? The land itself would wage war on them!"\textsuperscript{51}

The immediate proposals to abandon Florida entirely in 1586 were rejected in favor of Menéndez Marqués' and other proposals to merge the two garrisons into one in order to facilitate supply and defense. The debate itself continued through the first few years of the seventeenth century, accelerated by a major uprising along the coast of modern Georgia of the Guale Indians, who were angered by the activities of Franciscan missionaries among their people. Without the incentive of native souls to justify the

\textsuperscript{50} Hoffman, \textit{Florida's Frontiers}, 50-53.

expense of maintaining the colony, the governor of Cuba, Pedro de Valdés, proposed abandoning Florida as a lost cause and using the funds to strengthen Havana. Other officials in Cuba and elsewhere supported abandoning the east coast of Florida in favor of developing the Gulf coast from Florida to New Spain.52

These ideas failed to end the Spanish presence in St. Augustine for three primary reasons. First, Church officials discouraged an outright abandonment of the thousands of Christianized Indians who inhabited the missions in Florida. Second, all officials recognized the usefulness of a port along the east coast of Florida to assist the ships of the treasure fleet that necessarily passed through the Florida Straits on their trip to Spain. Finally, and most critically, the continued rumors of English activities along the coast north of St. Augustine led many in Spain to see the need for a frontier garrison to serve as a bastion for the more valuable colonies in the Caribbean. As a justification for its recommendation to keep St. Augustine, the Council of the Indies in January 1607 wrote:

“last year it gave a report to Your Majesty that it had gathered from certain information that a merchant from Plymouth [Plemon] had said that as some ships were going to look for a passage to the north-west to the East Indies and Japan in 1605 they hit the coast of Florida in an area of very good land peopled by Indians... and the talk was that a great fleet was going to be fitted out [for the spring] to take everything that would be needed for Englishmen to go and live in that land with their wives and children...”

The rumored report of an English fleet setting out in 1607 was, of course, true. Significantly, the English plans to settle the Chesapeake, as they would do in May of that year, proved a final justification for the need to maintain La Florida. From this point on, the Anglo-Spanish rivalry took on a life beyond that of a merely European context. The state of war or peace between the two countries did not alter the fact that the two sides faced each other across a shifting frontier. While events in Europe affected events in

52 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 97-99.
America, the local colonists in their various efforts to establish English colonies or to protect Spanish interests were forced increasingly to contend with the presence of the other in their daily existence.\(^53\)

\* * * *

Spain and England's war came to a fairly quick end after the death of Elizabeth I in 1603 and the ascension to the throne of James I. The war that had taken on an almost personal nature in the animosity between Philip and Elizabeth was over. Yet the distrust between the nations did not end instantly and the Spanish policy of protecting their claim on the Americas was still in force. This combination ensured that the rivalry continued to influence the course of events in the Southeast as the English successfully planted a colony in the Chesapeake at Jamestown. While refusing to recognize the exclusive right of Spain, England moved cautiously in advancing efforts in the first few years to organize a joint-stock company to lead the colonization of Virginia. James actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to improve relations with Spain and did not desire to antagonize Philip III, who succeeded his father to the throne of Spain in 1598. The Americas, however, continued to be a flashpoint for tensions in the relationship between the two countries.

The Spanish, of course, had reason for concern that England was moving forward in their efforts even before the actual Jamestown colony was founded. In March 1605, Spanish officials in St. Augustine sent three ships to investigate reports from Guale Indians of a ship taking soundings and heading north. Coming upon the English ship, the

Castor and Pollux, with its mixed English and French crew, the Spanish ships captured the intruding vessel and discovered its orders from Henry IV of France to explore and trade with the Indians along the coast in search of the English colony still believed by some to be located in the area. Despite protests from the English ambassador to the Spanish court, the ship was impounded and the crew distributed around the West Indies as slaves.

Another incident in 1606 occurred as the Virginia Company sought to further explore the region. They commissioned the ship Richard under the command of Henry Challons to make the passage to Virginia via the West Indies to explore and trade in the area around the Chesapeake and provided Challons a pass that it could use to justify its voyage if challenged. This pass did nothing when the Richard found itself in the middle of a Spanish fleet in the Florida Straits. After capturing the vessel the Spanish dispersed the captives among the fleet and confiscated the ship. Over the next eighteen months the fate of the Richard and her crew became a diplomatic crisis as the English ambassador protested the harsh treatment of many of the English captives. The Spanish responded with increasingly hostile threats they hoped would force the English to renounce any efforts to plant a colony in America. An English official in Spain wrote home expressing his thoughts that the “Spaniardes here seme nothinge pleased with this attempt, and I doe thincke they will endeavor to prevent us from goeing into those partes, if by anie meaines they can.” He correctly identified the motives of the Spanish but the Spanish misjudged King James’ resolve to continue the Virginia enterprise. If anything, the Richard affair and Spain’s attempts to intimidate the English backfired and led to a hardening of

attitudes on the part of the English. By the time the Spanish released the last captives in 1608, the English had planted their first foothold in North America.\(^5^5\)

Despite Spanish protests and demands of European diplomacy, the English continued to believe that occupying Virginia was necessary. A debate in Parliament in 1606 summarized the current opinion in favor of a Virginia colony, stating that it was insufficient to merely claim an area, as the Spanish did in lands north of Florida. Most believed that “neither is it sufficient to set foot in a Countrie but to possess and howld it, in defence of an invading force (for wante whereof) the King of Denmarke intendeth into northwest passage (as it is reported) and it is also reported that the French intendeth to inhabit Virgenia.” The only method to hold the territory claimed by England since Roanoke was to head off the intentions of others and to establish a permanent settlement in that land. In 1606, the Virginia Company dispatched the ships *Susan Constant*, *Godspeed*, and *Discovery* with orders to explore the Chesapeake, to find a suitable location, and to establish a colony there.\(^5^6\)

The Virginia Company did not seek a confrontation with Spain, given the king’s current policy of improving the relationship. The plans and orders issued to the ships traveling to Virginia sought to protect the colony while minimizing the chances of antagonizing the Spanish. Even the course taken by the ships was adjusted to take this desire into account. Orders to a supply fleet in 1609 stipulated that “in your passage thither you shall not land nor touch any of the Kinge of Spaines his Dominions quietly possessed, without the leave or license of the governor of such place as you shal by

\(^{55}\) “Jan. 25/ February 4, 1607. Nevill Davis to Sir John Popham.” in Quinn, ed., *New American World*, 3:403, 409; The point regarding this incident hardening the resolve of the English in regards to Jamestown is proposed by Quinn in the Editor’s note preceding the referenced document.

\(^{56}\) “1606. ‘Reasons to move the High Court of Parliament to raise a stocke for the maintaining of a Collonie in Virgenia,’” in Quinn, ed., *New American World*, 5: 168-70.
accident or contrary windes be forced into.” Not only were the ships not to stop at any Spanish islands, the fleet was instructed to “hold counsel with the masters and pilots and men of the best experience what way is safest and fittest for you to take, because we hold it dangerous that you should keepe the old course of Dominico and Meuis [Nevis] lest you fall into the hand of the Spaniard, who may attend in that roade ready to intercept you.” The “old course” of boldly sailing through the Spanish West Indies was set aside in favor of lessening the risk of a confrontation that the English did not want.57

Despite their best efforts, the leaders of the Virginia Company knew that the risk of a violent Spanish response to the new presence of an English colony in the Chesapeake was a distinct possibility. It was also an ever-present concern to the early settlers. Instructions given to the expedition included the warning to remember the lessons of history when it came to the Spanish. They recommended that once the colony was established, the council, “to the end That You be not Surprised as the French were in Florida by Melindus [Menéndez] and the Spaniard... shall Do Well to make this Double provision first Erect a Little Sconce at the Mouth of the River that may Lodge Some ten men With Whom you Shall Leave a Light boat that when any fleet shall be in sight they may come with Speed to Give you Warning.”58

The Spanish threat remained in the settlers’ minds after they landed on an island several miles up the renamed James River. They chose the location in hopes of making the settlement harder to locate, and the settlers immediately set about constructing a fortress to repeal attack from any direction, with special attention to the waterside. Built


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in the form of a triangle with a bulwark at each corner, the longest wall faced the river
with two of the towers able to bring their cannon to bear on any seaborne attacker.

William Strachey, an early colonist, described the fort this way:

"...A low levell of ground about halfe an Acre... on the North side of the River,
is cast almost into the forme of a Triangle, and to Pallizadoed. The South side
next the River (howbeit extended in a line, or curtaine six score foote more in
length, then the other two, by reason the advantage of the ground doth so require)
contains one hundred and forty yards: the West and East sides a hundred onely.
At every angle or corner, where the lines meete, a Bulwarke or watchtower is
raised, and in each Bulwarke a pееce of Ordnance or two well mounted."59

Even with these defenses, the Virginia Company still believed that any attack
capable of destroying the colony would come from the sea and most likely, given past
experience, from the Spanish. In 1609, they instructed the new governor, Sir Thomas
Gates, to take care to "chose for your principall residence and seate to have your catle,
provisions of corne, foode, and magazine of other municiion in, as your greatest strength,
trust and retraite, must be removed some good distance from any navigable river, except
with small boates" so that no enemy force could "seeke your habitacion; and if in this
place some good fortificacion be made to which no ordinace can be brought by water, if
you be provided of victual, you may dispute possession till a straunger be wearied and
starved."60

Although the Spanish never seriously threatened the colony, the English spent the
first several years aware of the threat and with at least one watchful eye on the sea. They
also were wary of attempts from within by Spanish sympathizers to sow dissent in order
to open the colony up to attack. Around 1609, the governing council condemned an
unnamed blacksmith for some unidentified crime and sentenced him to be hanged. In

60 "[May, 1609]. Instructions for Sir Thomas Gates for the government of Virginia," in Quinn, ed, New
hopes of saving himself by distracting attention to someone else, the blacksmith accused Captain George Kendall, one of the councilors, of being a Spanish conspirator. John Smith recalled in his memoirs an incident around the same time in which several colonists, a “Dutchman, and one Bentley another fugitive, [and] William Volda (a Switzer by birth)” were found to have incited the local Indians to attack the English. Smith was certain that the conspirators’ loyalties lay with “the Spanyard to whom they intended to have done good service.” While clear evidence of Spanish efforts within the colony is lacking, the English themselves remained wary of potential sabotage.61

Although the Spanish never interceded to prevent the continued English presence at Jamestown, this did not signify inaction on the part of the Spanish. In fact, the Spanish were well aware of the English efforts in Virginia and sought to stop them, first through diplomatic means, then, when that failed, through an expedition from Florida. In England, the preparations for the first voyage to Virginia in 1607 were observed and reported on by Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Spain’s first ledger-ambassador to London in twenty years. Zúñiga sent detailed reports to Philip III urging him to pressure the English to give up their plans for Virginia. He wrote of the plans to plant a colony in the region of Virginia and English intentions to “obtain from the country above the Cape of Santa Elena the same commodities as from Spain, in the same latitudes, so as to have no need [of Spain].” He worried additionally that from his

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observations it was "thoroughly evident that it is not their desire to people [the land],
but rather to practice piracy, for they take no women – only men."  
Zúñiga also conveyed his observations of the general mood of the English and
James I regarding Spanish intentions towards the colony. He informed his king that the
members of the Virginia Company were "very much afraid that Your Majesty is going to
order an attack, for their whole move is only to test how Your majesty takes." The
overall mood was to push forward, though, because while they were "frightened to death
that Your Majesty will throw them out... [their] idea is that if they do not carry out [their
plan] they will put the King in the position of taking it in his own hands." King James,
however, was adamant about upholding England’s right to explore and colonize North
America. In meetings with Zúñiga, James informed the ambassador that, while he was
not specifically aware of the Virginia plans, he defended England’s right to carry them
out. The king insisted that "he had never known that Your Majesty [Philip III] had a
right to it [Virginia], for it was a region very far from where the Spaniards had settled;
furthermore, it was not stated in the peace treaties... that his subjects could not go [where
they pleased] except to the Indies." England would pursue the Virginia project over the
objections of Spain, despite the diplomatic pressures brought to bear.  

Whether it was lack of desire or a preference for diplomatic maneuvering, the first
orders to send an expedition from Florida to the Chesapeake in search of the new colony
did not come until 1609. Before this, the Spanish believed that James I could be
intimidated to rescind his grant to the Virginia Company. Efforts on the part of Zúñiga

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62 “[14/] 24 Jan. 1607, Pedro de Zúñiga to Philip III,” in Barbour, ed. The Jamestown Voyages, 1: 71;
63 “[12/] 22 September 1607, Pedro de Zúñiga to Philip III,” in Barbour, ed. The Jamestown Voyages, 1:
  115; “[25 September] 5 October 1607, Pedro de Zúñiga to Philip III,” in Ibid, 1: 117; “[28 September] 8
  October 1607, Pedro de Zúñiga to Philip III,” in Ibid, 1: 118.
and the diplomatic flap over the capture of the ship, Richard, were an indication of this plan. These attempts, to the contrary, served more to stiffen the James’ resolve than they did to force the abandonment of the plans for a Virginia colony.\textsuperscript{64}

When diplomacy failed, Spain resolved to discover the location and the strength of the English colony. The Florida governor, Pedro de Ibarra, responding to the orders from Spain, sent a reconnaissance vessel under the command of Francisco Fernández de Écija to search out the colony and to report on its strength. Fernández sailed northward towards the Chesapeake, stopping at points along the coast to speak with Indian leaders to gather news on English activities. During one encounter, Fernández and the ship’s captain “began to ask the said Indian if he knew where the settlement of the English, or French, was, and what he knew about it.” The Indian chieftain informed the Spaniards that “four days’ journey [from there]… in the said village of Daxe he had had word that near there, in a village called Guandape on a river that runs to the sea, the English had settled on an island surrounded by water but for a strip which unites it to the mainland.”\textsuperscript{65}

With word on where the English were located, Fernández set sail for the location, hoping to spy out the strength and layout of the colony. The Spanish ship reached the bay on July 24, but was immediately confronted by a larger English ship owned by Samual Argall, one of the English council members. Fernández recognized that “we had to admit that it was a ship incomparably greater in burden than ourselves, because we saw that it carried two topsails and a great flag at the masthead.” Confronted by the larger ship, the Spanish “could neither go ahead nor land, anchored in the middle of the bay, rather toward the south side.” The Spanish were forced to flee when, “after warning had


been given there in the interior to their settlers, the wind changed suddenly to north-west, and it [the ship] bore down on us again, and while we were observing it, the wind which brought the said ship came upon us.\textsuperscript{66}

The Fernández expedition failed to gain information on the strength of the English colony, but the report was forwarded to the Junta de Guerra, the war subcommittee of the Council of the Indies, for consideration. Their deliberations took time but, by 1611, the decision was made to attack the English at Jamestown. The Junta de Guerra recommended an attack to prevent allowing the English "to fortify themselves in the said bay of Jacán [Chesapeake]... and to make an expedition into the land, taking for that purpose sufficient people, until they shall come to Nuevo Mexico, Nueva Galicia, and Vizcaya, and Çacatecas, which are in the same latitude." To carry out the plan, the Spanish organized another expedition to search out the colony, this one by a caravel out of Lisbon, still a Spanish possession at this point. The ship was commanded by Diego de Molina and included Francis Lymbry, an Englishmen, who had already done some spying for Spain in Virginia, as pilot. In addition, the Junta recommended sending "two religious of the English Seminary [Catholic priests], that more satisfaction may be obtained, by their going to England and embarking on the first occasion that any ships are going from there to Virginia." From there, after they had "informed themselves of the inhabitants, settlement, and fortifications, and the character and force of the harbor or harbors where they are fortifying themselves they should return to England in the same

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid, 147.
trading ships and from there to Spain.” The intention was clear; the English posed a threat and should be removed.67

The hopes and recommendations of the Junta de Guerra, echoed by the vociferous appeals of the Florida governor, never materialized into action. The Spanish crown, distracted by European affairs and unwilling to risk an outright war over the Virginia affair, did nothing but incrementally increase the size of the Florida garrison. With finances strained, the Spaniards made a conscious decision to do nothing more than protest England’s intrusion diplomatically. Thus, while plans continued to be proposed and considered, the acceptance of an English presence in the Chesapeake became a de-facto reality, despite the recognized threat they posed to Spanish power in the Southeast. Over the next few decades Virginia boomed with the advent of the tobacco economy and the English population expanded in both numbers and territory. While the Spanish in Florida watched nervously, the English also expanded their presence in the Caribbean during the early decades of the seventeenth century, especially on the island of Barbados, where a thriving sugar crop pushed more and more colonists to look to the Americas for opportunity. In search of new lands, the territory south of Virginia began to be a target for speculation and further exploration. The Spanish in Florida played a role in this process as well.68

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68 For Spain’s reaction to Jamestown, see Irene A. Wright, “Spanish Policy Towards Virginia, 1606-1612: Jamestown, Ecija, and John Clark of the Mayflower,” American Historical Review, 25: 3 (April 1920), 448-79.
The activity in the territory that would later be named Carolina originated soon after the founding of Jamestown. In 1629, Charles I acted on his presumed claim to the territory to the south by granting the land between the 31st and 36th degrees of north latitude to his attorney-general, Sir Robert Heath, for the founding of a colony to the south of Virginia. Heath did almost nothing with it and very few explorations were made of the area for the next thirty years. Little was written about the territory with only a few exceptions. One of these was a pamphlet written by Edward Bland, Abraham Woode, Sackford Brewster, and Elias Pennant giving an account of an expedition made by them in late 1650 into Carolina. Bland, a merchant in Virginia, felt that Christianizing the Indians and settling the land south of Virginia would open up great opportunities for merchants such as himself. He made note of his initial contact with an Indian chieftain of the “Tuskarood” (Tuscarora), who welcomed the contacts with the English and encouraged further trade.69

The growing wealth of the Virginia colony and the escalating population also gave some English a reason to look southward. Some were concerned that the colony remained vulnerable to any European power that sought to strike a blow at an English enemy in a relatively unprotected spot. As the vagaries of European politics changed, Spain remained a prime candidate to challenge the English hold on the Chesapeake. E. W. Gent, a proponent of the idea of founding a colony to the south of Virginia, published a treatise arguing the need of a defensive bulwark to the south. He pointed out the “apparent danger all the Colonies may be in if this [Carolina] be not possessed by the English” to convince others of the necessity of a new, southern colony. Like the Spanish

who had been concerned with the danger posed by Virginia, Gent believed the distance between Virginia and the northern provinces of New Spain was much smaller than it actually was. With this in mind, Gent suspected that “the Spaniard, who already hath seated himself on the North of Florida, and [now is] on the back of Virginia in [latitude] 34, where he is already possessed of rich silver Mines.” Given this supposed proximity, he thought the Spanish would “no doubt vomit his fury and malice upon the neighbour Plantations, if a prehabitation anticipate not his intentions...”

Given the friendly initial reception by the Tuscarora and the perceived need for expansion southward, many in Virginia began to slowly expand their knowledge of the Carolina territory, beginning first with the northern areas of the territory, most of which is in modern North Carolina. One of these was Francis Yeardley of Virginia, the son of Sir George Yeardley, one of the early governors of Virginia, who wrote a letter in 1654 describing the land to John Ferrar, Esq. formerly a prominent member and deputy treasurer of the Virginia Company. Yeardley described the worth of the territory and encouraged further explorations southward. He also noted the presence and influence of the Spanish in Florida among the Indian tribes in the area. In one encounter, Yeardley recounted that “the Tuskarorawes emperor, with 250 of his men, met our company, and received them courteously; and after some days spent, desired them to go to his chief town.” The Tuscarora chief informed the English that at his main village “was one Spaniard residing, who had been seven years with them, a man very rich, having about thirty in his family, seven whereof are negroes; and he had one more negro, leiger

[resident] with a great nation called the Newxes. He is sometimes, they say, gone from thence a pretty while.” Though it is unclear from the description the business of the Spaniard mentioned it is likely that the man was a trader who would have traveled from village to village and perhaps maintained his entourage in the main village. Regardless of the exact nature of the man, the fact of a Spanish presence in the area was clear.\(^71\)

Though Yeardley noted the presence of the Spanish in Carolina, a fact that must have been of some concern, he also pointed out that not all Indians were happy with their influence. He recounted in his letter to Ferrar that besides the Tuscaroras, who had welcomed a trading relationship with the English, there was another large tribe who could be of value. He remarked on “another great nation by these [the Tuscarora], called the Haynokes, who valiantly resist the Spaniards further northern attempts.” He gave the location of these Indians as three days inland from the coast and to the south of the Tuscaroras near another larger Indian tribe he called the Cacores. With the large number of native inhabitants in the region and their mixed relationships with the Spanish, the possibility of the English supplanting the Spanish intrigued many. Thus the territory’s seemingly willing native population, welcoming climate, and a supposed role as a bastion against the Spanish gave others the motivation to pursue the possibility of a colony south of Virginia.\(^72\)

On March 20, 1663, King Charles granted to eight Proprietors a province to be called Carolina which included all of the lands formerly granted to Heath and extending from the Atlantic to Pacific. These original proprietors included such prominent individuals as Lord Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl of Shaftesbury, Edward Hyde, earl

\(^72\) Ibid, 29.
of Clarendon and George Monck, duke of Albemarle. Other proprietors had experience in the colonies such as Lord John Berkeley and his younger brother, Sir William Berkeley, the governor of Virginia as well as Sir John Colleton, whose oldest son, Peter would become active in the Carolina venture. Most of them had been ardent supporters of the Stuarts during the restoration of Charles II to the English throne, and the Carolina grant represented, in part, a reward for their backing. Of the proprietors, none were more enthusiastic supporters of the endeavor than Shaftesbury and most played only minor roles. For the majority of the period of the Proprietor’s rule in Carolina, appointed agents such as Thomas Modyford and Peter Colleton, the son of the proprietor, acted in the interests of the Proprietors and reported to one individual, such as Shaftesbury, on their activities.73

During the 1660s several different groups sought to obtain licenses from the Proprietors to settle at various points along the Carolina coast. The territory was split into three sections. The northernmost, Albemarle, already had a small population of planters that had migrated from Virginia in search of new land. Another centered on the Cape Fear region and the last one on the Port Royal area. Several groups of Barbadian planters, frustrated by the lack of available land in the West Indies, organized an early expedition to the southern regions under Captain William Hilton. Another group from New England landed a small colony near Cape Fear in 1663, although, due to hunger and Indian hostility, it was abandoned within a few years. Hilton’s expedition gave a glowing report of the land’s potential while the New Englander’s accounts gave the opposite impression. To clarify the matter of conflicting accounts two groups of Barbadians sent

out two expeditions in the mid-1660s to further explore the region and to locate possible sites for settlement. The first of these was organized under the leadership of Hilton, Captain Anthony Long, and Peter Fabian. The Barbadians ordered Hilton to explore from Cape Fear south, and the mission left in the ship, *Adventure*, on August 10, 1663.

Confident in the results, a few days later the group wrote to the Lords Proprietor for permission to purchase land from the Indians and to hold it under the authority of the Proprietors.74

Hilton’s explorations gave evidence not only of the potential profit to be had by holding land in Carolina, but also the potential risks of being so close to Spanish Florida. Hilton relates that on “Wednesday the 26 instant, four of the clock in the Afternoon, God be thanked, we espied Land on the Coast of Florida, in the lat. of 32 deg. 30 min. being four Leagues or thereabouts to the Northwards of Saint Ellens.” The party immediately found strong evidence of the continued influence of the Spanish in the area. In one encounter, Hilton recalled that “several Indians came on Board us, and said they were of St. Ellens; being very bold and familiar; speaking many Spanish words, as *Cappitan, Commarado, and Adeus*.” Rather than being awed, the Indians showed easy familiarity with the English ship and armaments. Hilton reported:

“They know of the use of Guns, and are as little startled at the firing of a Peece of Ordnance, as he that hath been used to them many years: they told us the nearest Spanyards were at St. Augustins, and several of them had been there, which as they said was but ten days journey; and that the Spanyards used to come to them at Saint Ellens, sometimes in Canoa’s within Land, at other times in small Vessels by Sea, which the Indians describe to have but two Masts.”

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It was evident to the English that the Spanish influence over the Indians in the area remained strong and that caution was necessary.75

Events proved the reality of this attitude when the “Edistow,” an Indian tribe living just north of Santa Elena, captured five Englishmen from a long-boat scouting the area. Hilton and the other leaders of the expedition, responding to the Indian chieftain who informed the English of the captives, “shewed him store of all Trade, as Beads, Hoes, Hatchets and Bills, etc., and said, he should have all those things if he would bring the English on board us; w[hi]ch he promised should be done the next day. Hereupon we wrote a few lines to the said English, fearing it to be a Spanish delusion to entrap us.” The captives proved to be the remnants of a larger crew that had been attacked by the Indians when their small boat overturned along the coast. When one of the captives, a young boy, was brought to the ship he “informed us that there were four more of their company at St. Ellens.” Relating the plight of the captives, the youth “could not tell us whether the Indians would let them come to us: For saith he, Our Men told me, that they had lately seen a Frier and two Spanyards more at St. Ellens, who told them that they would send Soldiers suddenly to fetch them away.”76

The standoff between Indians and English was resolved without further bloodshed through the intervention of the Spanish. When the Spanish soldiers arrived to rescue the English, an exchange between the English and Spanish camps included a gift from the Spanish of “a quarter of Venison, and a quarter of Pork, with a Complement, That he was sorry he had no more for us at that time.” The Spanish used their relationship with the Indians to arrange the release, sending a message to Hilton that “I advise you, that if these

76 Ibid, 39-40, 41.
Indians (although Infidels and Barbarians) have not killed any of the Christians, do require as a gift or courtesie for those four men, four Spades, and four Axes, some Knives, and some Beads, and the Four Indians which you have there.” Hilton and his expedition continued their explorations and returned to Barbados with another glowing report of Carolina. The Proprietors’ agents promptly used the report to reach an accord with the group known as the ‘Adventurers’ and other potential settlers in Barbados. Hilton’s account, while positive on the potential promise of a Carolina colony, also showed that no English presence in the area would be free from the Spanish threat posed by Florida.77

The second expedition organized by the Barbadians was arranged by Sir John Yeamans, the leader of another of the groups. Yeamans led the negotiations with the Proprietors and obtained a formal agreement with the Proprietors in 1665 over the terms of government for the new territory. The Proprietors named Yeamans governor of the territory of Carolina and he made a short visit to the soon-to-be abandoned colony at Cape Fear that same year. Yeamans intended two settlements, one at Cape Fear and another in the Port Royal region. To find a suitable site for the later colony, he organized another expedition under Captain Robert Sandford to follow up on Hilton’s trip. Sandford set out from the Cape Fear settlement in June 1666 to explore the coast to the south.78

Sandford spent a month exploring the Port Royal region and encountered several groups of natives in the area. In the area around the North Edisto River, Sandford

77 Ibid, 53-54.
reported going “a shoare on the East point of the Entrance, where I found Shadoo (the Capt. of Edistow, that had been with Hilton att Barbados), and severall other Indians come from the Towne by Land to see for our comeing forth.” Meeting several friendly tribes, Sandford was impressed with the reception he received at each point, but one encounter stood out. At one point just north of Port Royal, he described meeting an Indian “who used to come with the Southern Indians to trade with us att [the colony at Cape Fear]... and is knowne by the name of Cassique [chief]. Hee belongeth to the County of Kiwaha[Kiawah], and was very earnest with mee to goe with my Vessell thither, assuring me a broad deep entrance, and promising a large welcome and plentiful entertainment and trade.” Sandford realized that the various Indian chieftains each wanted an alliance with the English to give them an advantage over their rivals. With this in mind, he explored the area around the “County of Kiwaha” located around the Ashley River where the town of Charleston would eventually be founded. The reception he received and the strategic position of the area, located at the mouths of two converging rivers, led to his recommendation that this be the site of the new colony.\(^7\)^9

Sandford’s expedition also came across signs of a Spanish presence. He mentioned a visit to one Indian village in which he came across one building “att th’end of which stood a faire wooden Crosse of the Spaniards ereccon.” In another village he watched an Indian having his hair “shoaren on the Crowne, after the manner of the Port Royall Indians, a fashion which I guesse they have taken from the Spanish Fryers thereby to ingratiate themselves with that Nacon.” Overall though, Sandford’s journey was free of Spanish interference and he felt the area safe enough to leave a volunteer with the

Indians in the Port Royal area for the purpose of learning their language and culture. For this purpose, he left “Mr. Henry Woodward, Chirurgeon, [who] had before I sett out assured mee his resolucon to stay with the Indians if I should thinke convenient.” Woodward remained in the region for several months after Sandford’s departure. His presence was reported by other Indians to the Spanish and he was soon captured by Spanish soldiers and taken to St. Augustine. He remained a prisoner for over a year before being released by an English buccaneer during an attack on St. Augustine in 1668.80

The Proprietors, led by Lord Ashley Cooper, followed up on the Hilton and Sandford expeditions by financing a fleet of three ships with over one hundred colonists that set out from Ireland late in 1669 bound for Barbados, where additional supplies and colonists would be furnished by a group led by Yeamans. After leaving Barbados, storms hindered the mission and forced two of the ships back to port. The remaining ship, the *Carolina*, under William Sayle, reached the Port Royal area in March 1670. After exploring the region, the colonists decided that Port Royal was too near Spanish Florida for comfort and, relying on Sandford’s recommendation, traveled north to the Ashley River where they landed. In April they established a settlement on the west bank of the Ashley River, though the settlement was later moved to the peninsula formed by the convergence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers. The settlers immediately set about fortifying the settlement, named Charles Town (Charleston), building a high palisade around their houses knowing that the Spanish would react harshly to their presence. This precaution proved fortuitous when three small Spanish ships, aided by Indian allies, attacked the small village in August. The Spanish forces launched only a small assault

80 Ibid, 100, 104-106.
before being forced to withdraw to St. Augustine by storms. The English were there to stay.\textsuperscript{81}

The Spanish reaction to the founding of Charleston was merely the culmination of a growing realization of the threat posed by the expanding English presence in the region. The Spanish in St. Augustine spent the decades of the 1650s and 1660s worrying about their exposed position and begging the crown for increased assistance against the inevitable attack. Their concerns were well-founded. England’s relationship with Spain remained rocky through much of the seventeenth century. This was never so evident as in the 1650s, when the newly declared Commonwealth under the leadership of Oliver Cromwell set about implementing a grand “Western Design” that intended to capture Hispaniola and Cuba from the Spanish. Organized in 1654 and executed in 1655, the attack on the well-fortified island of Hispaniola was a disaster and the English invasion fleet was repelled with heavy losses. To salvage something from the effort, the English turned their sights on the relatively unprotected island of Jamaica. Even this effort had mixed results. Though the English succeeded in capturing and keeping the island, the Spanish freed all the slaves in the colony before fleeing to Cuba. Those slaves maintained a guerrilla resistance to the English for several years afterwards.\textsuperscript{82}

The invasion of Jamaica and the ensuing war sent shockwaves through the Spanish empire. In Florida, the royal governor, Diego de Rebolledo, spent the mid-1650s dealing with Indian unrest and the threat of English invasions, but, preoccupied with internal reforms of the colony’s missions, he could not accomplish anything substantive

\textsuperscript{81} Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 53-59.
against the English. A revolt by the Timucuan Indians in 1656 was a response to the efforts by the governor to consolidate the Indian missions in reaction to the precipitous population decline among the mission Indians. After putting down the rebellion, Rebolledo spent much of 1656 and 1657 visiting the various districts negotiating with the Indian caciques at missions such as Santa Maria de Bacucua, San Pedro de Lepatale, San Juan de Aspalaga, and San Martin de Tomole. Throughout Apalachee, Timucua, and Guale, he sought to address some of the Indian complaints regarding abuses of the Indians by Franciscan friars and soldiers to win their approval of his intentions to move their villages into a set of more centralized mission towns in Guale and Timucua. Many of Rebolledo's reforms aimed at limiting the authority of the friars in interfering with native life. He also regulated the number of Indian laborers that could be required from each cacique and set the level of tribute paid in the form of food by the Indians at a more acceptable level. But the reforms were more cosmetic than substantive and Indian resentments continued to fester. Nevertheless, Rebolledo did gain a level of acceptance among the Indians and, at a minimum, successfully reduced the scattered missions into a more organized and defensible set of settlements along the northern frontier of Spanish Florida.  

With efforts to subordinate the Indians fully to Spanish authority ongoing, Rebolledo and his successor continued to complain of the inadequacy of Spanish defenses in St. Augustine against English encroachment. In addition to the possibility of an outright invasion by English forces, the Spanish reported an increasing number of Indian raids on the missions of Guale, the first occurring in 1661. These "Chichimecs,"

83 Testimonio de Visita of Gov. Diego de Rebolledo and outcome, St. Augustine. 1657, AGI Es leg 155 N. 18 bnd 1467 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 133-37.
Nahuatl a term used generically by the Spanish to denote heathen Indians or raiders, were thought to have been sent and supplied by the English in Virginia though their exact origin is unclear. After attacks on San Joseph de Sapala, the Chichimecos retreated north and into the interior. Another attack in 1662 destroyed a small mission along the lower Savannah River. After this series of raids, the Chichimecos reportedly moved northward and settled around the Port Royal area (termed by the Spanish as “Yamassee”) and into La Tama, the area in the interior of Georgia in the foothills of the Appalachian Mountains. As a result of this movement groups of refugee “Yamassee” Indians and other natives from the interior migrated into Spanish Florida from 1667 on, displaced by these Chichimecos. Accelerating this migration were the beginnings of other raids by “Westo” Indians who had settled around the middle Savannah River area above modern Augusta during the same period. These refugees moved to Guale as well as to Spanish missions in Apalachee in search of refuge. These Indians, along with the newly settled “Westos” and “Yamassees,” would play a key role in the future struggle between the English and Spanish for control of the Southeast after the founding of Charleston.⁸⁴

The almost constant requests for reinforcements and additional supplies sent to the Council of the Indies met with little success for most of the 1660s. The Spanish empire was hard-pressed to meet the needs of its far-flung empire as revenues from the silver mines of the Americas declined. Given the number of demands on the empire as a whole, the hardships of a minor outpost on the frontier fell far down the list of priorities. This changed in the early morning hours of May 29, 1668, when a group of English

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pirates led by Robert Searles attacked St. Augustine. Searles had captured the colony’s supply convoy and used it to enter the bay unchallenged before launching his attack. The English failed to capture the fortress protecting the town, but managed to raid the churches, the storehouses, and the houses before retreating with the spoils. In addition to the loot gained in the attack, Searles also rescued the intrepid Dr. Henry Woodward from his yearlong captivity in St. Augustine. Woodward would go on to play a pivotal role in the early years of the Charleston settlement. The subsequent investigation of the attack blamed the ineptitude of the governor and the sergeant major of the garrison, who had fled with the troops into the forest rather than mounting a counterattack.85

The attack on St. Augustine exposed the extreme vulnerability of Florida and led the Spanish to take a two-pronged approach to secure the position of their outpost in North America. First, the English and Spanish officials in London and Madrid undertook a series of diplomatic negotiations that would resolve the disputes over territory and trade that had bedeviled the relationship between the countries. These negotiations resulted in the Treaty of Madrid, signed in 1670, which formally recognized all of the English possessions in the West Indies, including Jamaica. The treaty also allowed the English free passage through the waters of the Caribbean though it limited trade by each side to their own territories. Significantly, for the Spanish in St. Augustine, it recognized the English title to the territory of Virginia, setting the limits of English settlement to just below the new settlement at Charleston. Ironically, the treaty was signed only three

85 Letter from Francisco de Sotolongo to the King, St. Augustine, July 4 1668, AGI 54-5-20 89 bnd 1660 (Stetson); Letter from Gov. de la Guerra y de la Vega to the King, St. Augustine, Aug. 8 1668, AGI 54-5-10 bnd 1662 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 143-44.
months after the arrival of the Carolina at the Ashley River and, though the Spanish were not aware of it, the treaty technically legitimated the new English colony.\textsuperscript{86}

The second response to the English attack in 1668 was a reinforcement of the garrison and fortress of St. Augustine. As soon as word reached the Viceroy of New Spain of the attack, supplies, money, and some seventy-five additional soldiers were dispatched to strengthen the town. In January 1669, the Junta de Guerra made a formal recommendation to approve the longstanding request of the Florida governors to rebuild the fort in stone. By 1672 a royal engineer was in St. Augustine, and immediately broke ground for the Castillo de San Marcos. Although it took some fifteen years to complete, the improved defenses immediately strengthened the position of the Spanish. The new defenses required additional support and the Junta accordingly proposed, and the crown agreed, to increase the number of the garrison and provided a corresponding increase in the situado, the annual stipend granted by the crown and paid by various citizens in New Spain for the support of the colony.\textsuperscript{87}

Thus, the Spanish in St. Augustine enjoyed reorganized and reinforced defense when they learned of the new English settlement on the Ashley River after Indians on St. Catherine's Island captured a foraging party from Charleston. The Indians sent the prisoners to St. Augustine, where interrogations revealed the presence of the English at Charleston. The Spanish reacted quickly, organizing a three ship fleet, under Juan Menéndez Marqués, to attack the settlement, though poor weather forced it back to port without accomplishing its mission. Over the winter months, the Spanish sent a garrison

\textsuperscript{86} Hoffman, \textit{Florida's Frontiers}, 144.
\textsuperscript{87} Memorandum from the Junta de Guerra to the King. Madrid, Jan. 22 1669, AGI 58-2-2/11 bnd 1668 (Stetson); Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, March 7 1669, AGI 58-2-3/1 bnd 1669 (Stetson); Hoffman, \textit{Florida's Frontiers}, 144.
of twenty-five men to the mission at St. Catherine's Island to protect it against English attacks. Since diplomatic maneuvers were underway, in response to the news of the English colony the crown sent orders to Florida to take no action against the English as there appeared, at the moment, to be no immediate threat to the missions. The situation, therefore, remained tense but unresolved. ⁸⁸

At the end of 1670, the state of affairs in the Southeast was a standoff. The Spanish in Florida held a fortified position in St. Augustine, but the key to their power in Florida, the Indian missions, remained vulnerable to raids along the frontier. In the new colony at Charleston, the English slowly increased their presence and soon began negotiating with the Indians in the region to establish their influence in the region to counter the Spanish. Two sides stared across a wide frontier and looked to solidify their strength through the Indian tribes that occupied the region. From this point and for the next fifty years, the struggle for the Southeast would play out as a three-sided game of intrigue and violence that would leave only one participant supreme.

When English colonists led by William Sayle in the aptly named, Carolina, landed on the banks of the Ashley River in April 1670, they set into motion the complex interaction of English and Spanish interests that would largely guide the development of the Southeast for the next fifty years. However, while this rivalry had its roots in Europe, the English struggle to establish their presence and the Spanish effort to prevent a loss of influence in the area played out in such a way as to make European geo-political concerns secondary. Of greater interest to both sides at the local level was the critical interplay between English and Spanish with the Indian populations that occupied the areas between St. Augustine and the fledgling colony at Charleston. It was soon clear to both colonizers that winning the loyalties of the numerous Indian tribes was the key to expanding each side’s influence in the region.

The Spanish had a significant head start in this respect. Spanish missionaries were critical to Spanish influence in the region; by the time the English established Charleston, a chain of Franciscan missions extended from Guale on the Atlantic Coast to Apalachee on the Gulf of Mexico. The mission Indians served as reliable allies but could not prevent English efforts to win other Indian tribes around the Charleston and Port Royal areas to their cause. What began as a trading relationship soon turned to more
destructive purposes as the English used their new Indian allies as surrogate invaders and slave raiders against their Spanish rivals. Finally, by the middle of the 1680s, Guale, the region of Spanish influence closest to the English in Charleston, became the focus of both Indian and English attacks leading to the first retreat of Spanish power in Florida. With this retreat, the English emerged over the space of fifteen years from the weakness of Charleston’s early years to a position equal to the Spanish in the contest for supremacy in the Southeast.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, Spanish power in the Southeast was at its zenith. Most of St. Augustine’s influence was based on the string of Indian missions that stretched across northern Florida and in Guale in modern-day coastal Georgia. The establishment of these Catholic missions under the Franciscan Order began soon after the establishment of the Spanish presence in La Florida. Shortly after the founding of St. Augustine in 1565, and at the request of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, the Jesuits began efforts to Christianize the native population. They sent several missions to the Indians, including one to Chesapeake Bay, in hopes of converting them and to enlist their support for the Spanish presence in Florida. Unfortunately for the missionaries, the Indians greeted most of these early expeditions with hostility and several Jesuit missionaries were killed. This led the Jesuits to abandon their efforts in 1572.¹

Despite these setbacks, both Menéndez and the Spanish crown realized from previous colonizing experiences the importance of missionaries in bringing a native population under Spanish control. In February 1573, the crown issued orders to the

Franciscan Commissary General of the Indies, an office in the order recently established to serve as an intermediary between the religious order and the crown, to send eighteen Franciscan missionaries to Florida to convert the Indians to Christianity. The first Franciscans arrived at the end of 1573, and three of them, led by Father Diego Moreno, were soon among the Guale and the Orista Indians near the settlement of Santa Elena. Initial resistance to the Spanish efforts in the form of attacks on the Spanish settlement at Santa Elena in 1576 led to the temporary withdrawal of missionaries. But efforts restarted in 1584, and the Franciscans continued their activities uninterrupted over the next few decades. From 1595 to 1695 more than 270 Franciscan friars traveled to La Florida and eventually spread Spanish influence through a string of missions that stretched from St. Augustine north to the coast of Georgia and west through Timucua to the Gulf Coast near Apalachee. At the height of the mission system, some forty missions, manned by almost seventy friars, served roughly 26,000 Indians. Apalachee, with its dense Indian population and rich agricultural resources, proved to be the most important success. Most of the supplies produced in Florida that the Spanish at St. Augustine were able to procure came from there. In all, the missions provided the military and economic underpinning of Spanish Florida; most of the locally produced food and labor used by the Spanish in St. Augustine came from these missions.2

The Franciscan success in bringing so many Indians under the sway of the Spanish through these missions ultimately proved devastating to their neophytes.

Although St. Augustine remained chronically undermanned and underfunded throughout its history, it nevertheless was the only center of European military power in the region until 1670. Therefore, the prime method used by the Franciscan missions to gain Indian allegiance to Spanish rule and acceptance of the mission system was the implied threat of the Spanish garrison. Missionaries won the allegiance of a village’s chief with promises of alliance and military support for his rule against his adversaries. In return for allegiance, the chief gained personal prestige in being associated with the Spanish, the equivalent of a strong paramount chieftain. The Spanish also provided gifts of tools, cloth, and other goods that the chief could then use to distribute to sub-chiefs to win their support. The arrangement provided palpable benefits for both sides, and as long as the benefits outweighed the drawbacks the Indians accepted the guidance of the Spanish.  

This system of reciprocity, Spanish power and goods in exchange for allegiance and acceptance of the missions, spread St. Augustine’s influence throughout the region. After a series of failures, the Franciscans sent Father Juan de Silva and twelve new friars to Florida in 1595 and a slow, cautious effort to establish missions began. This effort built upon the thirty years of experience Spanish officials and missionaries now had with the Indians of La Florida. The Spanish used their hard-won knowledge of ethnic and linguistic variations, political divisions, and power relationships between each group to accomplish their ends, pitting one group against another to win the allegiance of key chiefs. In elaborate ceremonies held in St. Augustine, Indian leaders were baptized, given a formal Christian name, and awarded lavish gifts to cement his loyalty. 

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4 Ibid.
The technique slowly increased the number of Indian missions throughout the region. By the mid-1580s, Christian Indians in Florida were limited to one of the two towns located at the northern and southern ends of the St. Augustine settlement. Through the late 1580s and early 1590s, however, the Franciscans visited the Timucuan Indian towns on the Atlantic coast north of St. Augustine to Cumberland Island in southern Georgia. After the arrival of Father de Silva in 1595, the Franciscans took even greater pains to coordinate their efforts to establish centralized missions with the Spanish governors. Two missions in the Mocama region, the northernmost being San Pedro de Mocama on Cumberland Island, were established to continue the ongoing process of converting the Indians in that region. Soon after 1595, new expeditions combining friars and military detachments traveled farther north into Guale in an effort to reestablish the alliances that had been abandoned earlier. They created new missions, such as the one at Santa Catalina de Guale on modern-day St. Catherine’s island, on the barrier islands and mainland of the Georgia coast.

Finally, in 1597, Spanish governor Gonzalo Méndez de Cançó set out on an ambitious plan of expansion building upon the successes of the 1580s and 1590s. New expeditions headed inland across northern Florida and southeastern Georgia, inviting Indian chiefs to visit St. Augustine to proclaim their allegiance to the Spanish crown. Despite sporadic resistance to the Spanish among the Guale Indians, by the early 1600s, the Spanish claimed the allegiance of Indian tribes from Guale through Mocama and inland from St. Augustine through the Timucuan Indian chiefdoms to the St. Johns River in the region known as Agua Dulce. The Spanish attempted unsuccessfully to extend their influence inland to the Georgia and Carolina piedmont, led by expeditions chasing
the rumors of wealth that dated from the Soto expeditions. While the Spanish failed to
establish missions in these areas, their efforts did bring the dense populations and rich
agricultural resources of the backcountry to the attention of the Spanish.  

The Franciscans built upon their successes of the late sixteenth century,
overcoming the occasional Indian defiance through gifts and persistent waves of new
friars. When necessary, the Spanish turned to military force to put down outright
rebellions. Acceptance of Spanish leadership was not something that could be reneged
upon at a later date and uprisings met with violent reprisals from the St. Augustine
garrison. For example, a 1597 expedition of one hundred Spanish soldiers and some two
hundred Timucuan Indian allies marched through Guale, burning villages and crops to
put down an incipient revolt of those Indians who refused to reaffirm their earlier
commitment. Slowly, reinforced by several similar examples of Spanish power, the area
of Guale, Mocama, Timucua, and finally Apalachee fell under the sway of St. Augustine
and the Spanish.  

Beginning in 1597, the Franciscans set about extending their reach farther
westward from the nearby Timucuan settlements of Agua Dulce. Responding to the lure
of Spanish goods and the apparent might of Spanish arms demonstrated among the Guale,
numerous Timucuan chiefs from the interior of northern Florida and southern Georgia
traveled to St. Augustine to render fealty to the Spanish governor and to request that

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5 Milanich, *Laboring in the Fields*, 106-12; For the most notable expeditions into the interior, see Charles
Institution Press, 1990) and John E. Worth, “Late Spanish Military Expeditions in the Interior Southeast, 1597-1628,”
in Hudson and Tesser, eds., *Forgotten Centuries*, 104-22. For notable examples of Indian rebellions during this period,
see Mary Ross, “The Restoration of the Spanish Missions in Georgia, 1598-1606,” *Georgia Historical Quarterly (GHQ)*
*GHQ* 7 (1923): 44-53.

6 For the Indian rebellion in Guale, see Ross, “The Restoration of the Spanish Missions,” 171-99 and
missionaries be sent to their territories. In 1606, the first *doctrina* (major mission) in the interior was founded in central northern Florida in the Timucuan region of Potano. By 1616, there were twenty-three missions in the provinces of Guale, Mocama, St. Augustine, Timucua, Agua Dulce, and west of the St. Johns in Potano. By the early 1620s, another ten missions extended the range of Spanish influence. Periodic shipments of goods arrived in St. Augustine, intended for use by the missionaries to reinforce existing loyalties and to extend their reach west across the Florida peninsula. These goods included vestments, bells, wine, candles, and other goods for use by the priests in masses intended to impress their Indian hosts. In the late 1620s, the final push through the far western Timucuan Indians in the region called Yustaga was accomplished with the establishment of the mission of San Pedro y San Pablo de Potohiriba in 1628.7

The westward expansion of Spanish power continued past the Timucuas and, beginning in 1633, the Franciscan friars began to establish a presence in Apalachee. Many chiefs in the area had been requesting missionaries from the Spanish as early as 1612, apparently in response to the perceived benefits of Spanish alliance evident among the Guale and Timucuan Indians. The first mission to be established in Apalachee was San Lorenzo de Ivitacuco, with at least seven others being founded across the region by the early 1640s. By the 1650s, ten missions served an Indian population of some thirty thousand. By the mid-1640s, Apalachee was the most populous and most important of the Indian provinces, providing most of the locally produced provisions for St. Augustine. In 1638, Spanish soldiers were sent to garrison the province to quell some

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unrest among reticent chiefs, and, by 1639, a small port on the St. Marks River began operations to facilitate the transport of goods. A deputy governor, Claudio Luís de Florencia, was appointed to provide better governance of the increasingly important province.8

By the mid-seventeenth century, to many Indians it seemed that to be a Christian chief was to be a more powerful leader. Yet that decision came with a price. Spanish missionaries insisted on changing the traditional lifestyle of the Indians under their control. The Indians were settled into missions or into smaller villages within easy reach of a central mission village, thereby losing the ability to move in response to seasonal changes. A central church served as the focus of religious life for mission Indians, and the importance of native religious structures and burial sites such as charnel houses gave way to Christianized forms of worship and burial. Iron tools replaced those made by Indians. Catholic priests insisted on the cessation of Indian practices of polygamy and forbade traditional forms of dance, celebrations, and games as "heathen" practices. Spanish crops were accepted and cultivated by Indians in addition to the more traditional ones, and Spanish methods of agriculture replaced native practices. Missionaries even took to interfering in the succession of new chiefs in attempts to ensure more pliable leadership. Most devastating of all were the unintended consequences of epidemics that swept through the Guales, the Timucuas, and the Apalachees, causing a dramatic decline in native populations by the mid-seventeenth century. This forced the Spanish to resort to periodic relocation of villages to combine faltering populations into more easily

8 For the Apalachee Indians and the Spanish, see John H. Hann, Apalachee: The Land Between the Rivers (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1988); Milanich, Laboring in the Fields, 123-29; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 100-16.
controlled and utilized villages nearer the Camino Real, the road that connected St. Augustine to Apalachee from the mid-century on.  

Constant Spanish demands for Indian laborers and the meddling of Spanish priests in the leadership choice of villages caused complaints and resistance among the Indians. The natives resisted the changes brought about by the Spanish in their lives both through rebellion and, as the Indians learned more about the legal systems used by the Spanish, through frequent complaints to the royal governor at St. Augustine. Major Indian revolts against Spanish control in Guale in 1597 and in Apalachee in 1647 failed to expel the Spanish from these areas, although they did prompt royal officials to circumscribe the interference of priests and soldiers in some aspects of Indian’s lives.

The complaints of Indian caciques (the term used by the Spanish for Indian chieftains derived from a native term among Caribbean Indians) caused almost constant friction between the royal governor and the Franciscan priests, both of whom desired to protect their interests in maintaining Spanish control over the Indians. Overall, the power of the Spanish garrison, severe Spanish reprisals against rebellious Indians, and the continued use of gifts to key native leaders served to maintain control through most of the seventeenth century. Their power in La Florida remained unchallenged through much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and, despite a decrease in population, the numbers of Indian allies to the Spanish remained impressive. By mid-century, there were some forty missions, serving some 15,000 Indians, most of whom were in Apalachee.

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9 For cultural interaction and change among the Indians along the mission frontier, see Milanich, Laboring in the Fields, 105-174; For a concise description of the effects of cultural change in the South among the Indians, see James Axtell, The Indians’ New South: Cultural Change in the Colonial Southeast (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997), 1-36. For archeological evidence of these changes, see L. Jill Loucks, “Spanish-Indian Interaction on the Florida Missions: The Archaeology of Baptizing Spring,” in McEwan, ed., The Spanish Missions of La Florida, 193-216.
Only with the arrival of the English did Spanish power waver and the Spanish in St. Augustine took careful note of English activities first at Roanoke, later at Jamestown, and ultimately, and of greatest concern, the successful establishment of Charleston in 1670.¹⁰

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The ship Carolina, under William Sayle, reached the Port Royal region in March 1670. After exploring the area, the colonists decided against Port Royal due to the proximity of Spanish Florida and traveled north to the Ashley River where they landed and in April established a settlement on the west bank of the Ashley River. The settlers immediately set about fortifying the settlement, which they named Charles Town. A Spanish assault against the town in an attempt to dislodge the English failed when storms forced the Spanish to withdraw to St. Augustine and the Spanish crown chose to accept the presence of the English rather than try further military measures. The proprietors hoped to make the colony financially self-sufficient and perhaps to generate a profit. Local colonists also sought to turn the new colony to their own interests. What soon developed was a situation in which the interests of the proprietors, often reflecting the geo-political interests of the growing English empire, diverged from the interests and the concerns of many of the colonists. In many instances, this divergence caused conflict and confusion within the colony and led to almost constant tensions between the English and

Spanish. Frequently, these internal divisions entangled the Indians as well, as they attempted to negotiate their own way in the region.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite having a grand plan, outlined in the “Fundamental Constitutions,” which sought to create a landed aristocracy of “landgraves” and “caciques” to rule the new colony, the proprietors held that in reserve until the colony could be populated. To govern the fledgling colony, they created a council consisting of a governor and five deputies, appointed by the proprietors, and five individuals elected by the freemen of the colony to serve collectively as a grand council. By the middle of 1671 a colonial assembly of twenty freemen was added to allow the colonists a voice. The exact relationship between the various offices and the lines of authority during the first decade were unclear to all involved. Conflict invariably erupted due to the confusion. The proprietors settled early disputes that developed between the elected Speaker of the assembly, Sir John Yeamans, and Joseph West, the head of the Council, over competing claims to the governorship. Yeamans had the better claim as a landgrave and the deputy of the palatine, the senior Proprietor, and was appointed governor in late 1671. The deviation between individual and proprietary interests ensued.\textsuperscript{12}

The majority of Yeamans’ efforts in his three years as governor centered on turning a private profit and impeded his ability to govern as other colonists, headed by Joseph West, slowly began to resent his activities. A split occurred between the Barbadian transplants such as Yeamans and those who came from England, Ireland, and elsewhere occurred. The Barbadians represented roughly half of the new arrivals, and

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid, 59-61.
many were already wealthy planters who sought to turn the Carolina colony into an extension of their holdings in Barbados. Actions such as Yeamans' practice of selling the produce from his personal holdings to Barbados while the Carolina colony remained short of food alienated them from the majority of the local population. The proprietors became increasingly aware of the problems created by the Barbadians as the Carolina colony failed to meet financial expectations. Subsequently, Yeamans was dismissed by the proprietors as governor in the spring of 1674 and replaced with West.13

Yet Yeamans was hardly alone in his devotion to his own interests and the appointment of West did little to rein in the disorder of the colony in its first decades. Factionalism, between supporters of the proprietors and those whose focus was on local interests or personal aggrandizement, remained typical of Carolina through the 1690s. The proprietors spent much of the 1670s and 1680s attempting to curb the colonists' freedom of actions with little success while the colonists reacted to developments in the region in terms of their Indian and Spanish neighbors. Among the Proprietors' endeavors were attempts to monopolize the Indian trade for reasons of profit and to maintain peace using a series of regulations prohibiting private individuals from entering the business. Secondly, they tried to prohibit the use of Charleston as a pirate haven. Both met with limited success through the rest of the seventeenth century and the proprietors' hopes for order and financial benefit from the colony went largely unmet. In fact, the only success in their efforts was their 1680 order to relocate the Charleston settlement from its original location on the west-bank of the Ashley River across the river to the point formed at the convergence of the Ashley and Cooper Rivers. Their order to "take care to lay out the

streets broad and in straight lines, and that in your grant of the town-lots you do bound everyone's land towards the streets in even line, and suffer no one to encroach with his buildings upon the streets" led to an orderly and elegant town that soon grew into a center of commerce and trade.¹⁴

From Charleston, however, the English looked beyond their settlement at a land in which their very existence through much of the 1670s and 1680s was insecure. They were new player in what had been primarily a two-sided negotiation between the Spanish and the Indians. Virginia was too remote to be a true rival among the Indians of the region, and the occasional French or English trader who landed along the coast was more of an irritant than a true threat to St. Augustine. Charleston was different and the English immediately saw the importance of winning Indian allies to secure their position. An added benefit of convincing the Indians to maintain peaceful relations with the English was the lucrative returns that could be had for both sides. For the English, the Indian trade represented access to furs and slaves, though the proprietors made a concerted, though largely ineffective, effort to curtail trade in slaves as too disruptive. For the Indians, the English trade signified access to weapons and the protection of a strong ally in the ongoing and ever-changing rivalry between groups. In many respects, the Indians who turned to the English as allies did so for the same reason most had initially welcomed the Spanish. In some cases, the newly won English allies were former allies of the Spanish, and many made the switch from one to the other several times depending on the situation.

The English in their explorations found many Indians who expressed resentment of the Spanish before the actual founding of Charleston. Both William Hilton and Robert Sandford reported encounters with Indian leaders who welcomed the English as potential allies. The serious efforts to prepare the way for the English establishment of the Carolina colony began with the efforts of Henry Woodward. Woodward remained with the Indians in the Port Royal area after the departure of the Sandford expedition in 1666 and was captured by a Spanish patrol responding to Indian rumors of his presence. He remained a captive until released during the attack on St. Augustine by Robert Searles in 1668. Woodward encountered the expedition heading for Carolina and volunteered to join and to put his Indian experience to the service of the proprietors. With that, Henry Woodward became the single most important figure in English-Indian relations in the early years of the Carolina colony.

Taking advantage of his familiarity with the native population, Woodward was quickly pressed into exploring and surveying the surrounding territory. He was recruited in 1671, by Sir John Yeamans, to explore the area north of Charleston towards Virginia to establish contact with the Indians there. Anthony Ashley Cooper, later the Earl of Shaftesbury, noted Woodward’s expertise and through Andrew Percival, enlisted him as his Indian agent at St. Giles, Cooper’s personal plantation in South Carolina. Finally, Woodward was chosen to lead another expedition into the interior in 1674 to establish a

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15 See Chapter 1, pp. 46-54.  
17 Anthony Ashley Cooper was created the first Earl of Shaftesbury in 1672 as a reward for his support for Charles II during the interregnum and after the restoration of the English monarchy in 1660. He was arrested and tried for treason for conspiring against the assumption of the throne of James II though the charges were later dropped. He fled to Holland in fear of further charges and died there in 1683. Of all of the Lords Proprietor, Ashley was the most involved in the Carolina venture and took the lead in many issues relating to it during its first decade before his fall from favor in the English court. He will be referred to as Lord Ashley throughout this study. For his biography, see Kenneth H. Haley, *The First Earl of Shaftesbury* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
formal relationship with the Westo Indians, reputedly the most powerful tribe in the area who had sent representatives to the English desiring commerce. So important was Woodward to the establishment of relations with the Indians, that the proprietors rejected several of his requests in the early 1670s to return to England to attend to personal affairs. Cooper's secretary noted agreement among the proprietors in England that Woodward could not “be spared being interpreter and familiarly acquainted with the Indians” and that he should be “forced now to stay at home [in Carolina] to interpret the Indians intelligence.”

The Westo alliance that Woodward successfully established was critical to the development of the lucrative Indian trade that would dominate the South Carolina economy through the first decades of the eighteenth century. The origins of the Westoes is unclear though many ethno-historians believe them to be a group of northern Indians of imprecise origins forced south by Iroquoian expansion and armed by Virginia traders in the mid-1600s. Through the 1650s and 1660s, the Westoes (called Chichimecos by the Spanish) began raiding the Spanish Indian mission settlements for slaves to sell to the English in Virginia. Unfortunately for other Indians in the area, the Westoes did not confine their activities to the Spanish Indians and were regarded with fear by many. The Sayle expedition, in its search for an appropriate location to settle, reported Indians describing the Westoes as “a rangeing sort of people reputed to be Man eaters.” In the initial meetings, Indians greeted the English arrival “crying Hiddy doddy Comorado Angles Westoe Skorrye (which is as much as to say) English very good friends Westoes

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are nought they hoped by our arrival to be protected from ye Westoes." According to the local Indians in the area where Charleston would be founded, the Westoes "had ruinated [that] place killed sev’all of those Indians destroyed & burnt their Habitations & that they had come as far as Kayawah doing the like there.” To many Indians, the English were as much an ally against the Westoes as they were against the Spanish.19

Before 1674, the Grand Council at Charleston believed that military force would be necessary to curb the Westo’s power in the area, both to keep the peace with other Indians as well as to stop the Westo from raiding outlying settlements. Colonists complained frequently of Indian raids that had “practiced the killing & stealing of hoggs in this settlem[en]t to the great damage of the Inhabitants thereof.” Increasing the anger of the English locals, in late summer 1673, several colonists were killed during an Westo Indian raid, leading to calls for a military reprisal. The Council passed a resolution condemning “the murther committed by a certaine nation of Indians called Westoes, their continuall Alarums & publick declaration of an intended invasion in & upon this settlem[en]t.” The Council ordered “that a party of men be raised under command of Lt Col Jno Godfrey & capt. Mau[ric]e Mathews jointly & be expedited to marche against the sd Indians to kill & destroe them or otherwise subject them in peace.” To most effectively accomplish their task, the Council decided to enlist friendly Indians who would be happy to strike a blow against the Westo. Godfrey and Mathews were “advised that the present Warr of the Westoes will be most effectually accomplished by the assistans of the Esaugh Indians who are well acquainted w[i]th the Westoes habitacons

& have promised all the help they can afford." Quick action was required to avert the Indian war so desired by many of the colonists.  

The proprietors overruled the Council and chose to allow Woodward an opportunity to establish a peaceful relationship with the Westoes if possible. One of them, Lord Ashley, in particular, sought to bypass the colonists and to use Woodward as both proprietary agent and his personal representative to the Indians. After receiving word of a party of Westoes who approached the English with offers to trade, Lord Ashley sent word to Woodward with specific instructions on how to proceed. Woodward’s instructions gave him great latitude in proceeding and ordered him to “consider whether it be best to make a peace with the Westoes or Cussitaws which are a more powerful Nation said to have pearle and silver and by whose Assistance the Westoes may be rooted out.” Mindful of the difficulty of convincing the Indians around Charleston to accept a peace with the Westoes, Lord Ashley warned Woodward that “noe peace is to be made with either of them without Including our Neighbour Indians who are at amity with us.” In addition to negotiating with the Westoes and other Indians, he gave Woodward a secondary task of bargaining with the Indians around Edisto for the purchase of the island and surrounding area. He intended to create a personal estate, separate from the Carolina venture and outside the control of the Grand Council.

Woodward agreed to accompany the Westoes back to their main village. Along the way, he commented on the eagerness of the Indians to enter into a commercial alliance. Despite being unable to speak each other’s language, the Indians communicated their intent by drawing “uppon trees (the barke being hewed away) the effigies of a bever,

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21 “Instructions for Mr Henry Woddard [Woodward], [23rd May, 1674],” in CSCHS, 5: 445-46
a man, on horseback and guns, Intimating thereby as I suppose, their desire for friendship, and commerce with us.” The Westo’s familiarity with Europeans and ongoing trading relationships was apparent. Woodward encountered Indians with “fowling pieces” or firearms and his entrance to their village was greeted with a “a volley of fifty or sixty small arms,” demonstrating a ready supply of powder and shot. He soon discerned that the Westo were in contact with other English traders from Virginia. He noted that they were “well provided with arms, ammunition, trading cloath and other trade from the northward for which at set times of the year they truck drest skins furrs and young Indian Slaves.” Given their eagerness and the ongoing trade with Virginia, Woodward, with the later enthusiastic approval of Lord Ashley and the other proprietors, agreed to an alliance with the Westoes.22

A Westo alliance, rather than attempting to find other Indians to assist in a war against them, made sense in several ways for the English in addition to the fact that the Carolinians would be supplanting the Virginians in an ongoing relationship. The Westoes had migrated south and settled along the upper reaches of the Savannah, Altamaha, and Ocmulgee Rivers in the upper piedmont regions of South Carolina and Georgia. From this region they had easy access via the large rivers and coastal plains to the other Indian tribes located along the Atlantic Coast and in southern Georgia and northern Florida. They were non-selective and raided along the Spanish mission frontier from Guale to Apalachee, as well as among the non-Christian Indians from Charleston south along the coast. Their location also situated them strategically between the areas of

influence of the English and Spanish and as a buffer for the powerful Indian nations further to the west.

This strategic location proved decisive in Woodward’s decision to forgo the option of proceeding westward and seeking allies against the Westoes. During his stay at the Westo village, two “Savana” Indians appeared, representing Indians located south and west from the Westoes. The Savannahs were a tribe of Shawnees who had migrated eastward from the Ohio Valley into northern Florida and Georgia, probably as a result of the Iroquois wars of the 1640s. The two newcomers sought to enter an alliance with the Westoes against the “Cussetaws, Checsaws and Chiokees” who, they warned, “planned to come downe and fight the Westoes” and others in the area. These other Indians were the major Indian tribes west of Carolina and northwest of Florida. The Cussitas were a branch of the Creek Indians located in Alabama and northwestern Georgia, the Chickasaws were to the north and west of the Creeks, and the Cherokees inhabited the Appalachian Mountains and foothills from northern Georgia and the upper Carolinas. Each were numerous and powerful and the threat of raids towards the coasts against the Westoes and others served as a powerful impetus to the Carolina-Westo alliance and other Indians’ willingness to put aside their enmity towards the Westoes.

The visit of the Savannahs also reminded Woodward of the pervasive influence of the Spanish in the region, as well as the ever-shifting nature of Indian alliances in

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response to both European and Indian rivalries. The position of the Savannahs north of the Spanish missions in Apalachee and Timucua led to contact between them and the mission Indians. The Savannahs resisted Spanish influence but needed allies against the stronger tribes and desired better access to European trade goods than possible through the Spanish. Carolina provided the latter and the Westoes, located between the Savannah Indian settlements and Charleston, afforded both an ally and a conduit to the English. The warning to the Westoes was probably an attempt to win influence with the larger tribe. The Westoes responded to the warning seriously, looking to their defenses and preparing for a possible attack. Afterwards, the Savannah representatives explained to Woodward their desire to trade with the English. They presented him with “Spanish beeds and other trade as presents, makeing signes that they had commerce w[i]th white people like unto mee, whom were not good.” This suggested their contact with the Spanish and gave evidence of a trading relationship. Nevertheless, it showed Woodward that the Savannahs preferred to enter an alliance with the English rather than the Spanish. Woodward’s visit, therefore, accomplished several things desirable to the English. First and foremost, it made peace with the Westoes, however transitory. Secondly, it allowed him to bring the Savannah’s desire for trade to the attention of the colonists and proprietors. Finally, it moved a potential ally of the Spanish closer to the English and provided an advantage to the Carolinians that would prove useful in the future.

The Carolina-Westo alliance forged by Woodward at the proprietors’ behest was tenuous at best but did provide a more organized and lucrative entry into the Indian trade. This trade provided Charleston with much needed income, and represented a central item

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of contention between the colonists and proprietors. The need for the colonists to begin to become more self-sufficient was paramount to many of the proprietors. After agreeing to invest an additional 100£ to support the colony in 1674, the proprietors sought Lord Ashley’s “advice [on] what course is now to be taken to avoid those inconvenientvys we have formerly ran into, to set as narrow bounds as may be to our future expenses.”27 The desire to move the colonists to self-sufficiency and perhaps to generate a profit was passed along to the Grand Council by Lord Ashley and possibly played a role in the proprietors’ desire to forestall continued hostilities with the Westoes. The Indian trade contributed greatly to the hopes for a sustainable income to be derived from the Carolina venture.28

Nevertheless, the contention between the colonists and the larger concerns of proprietors and English foreign policy entered into more critical matters than the income available from the Indian trade. This tension between proprietors and colonists demonstrates how, in many respects, the presence of the Spanish in St. Augustine and the potential threat they represented, remained central to the colonists’ concerns in Charleston. The proprietors and English policy-makers had other priorities. The colonists were well aware of their isolated and exposed position, despite the defenses erected around the settlement from its first founding. The first governor, William Sayle, beseeched the proprietors to “be mindfull in sending us supplies and more people which is our greatest want [that] thereby wee may bee strengthened ag[ains]t our enemies, for the Spanyard watcheth onley for an opportunity to destroy us.”29

27 Lords Proprietors to Lords Shaftesbury, Whitehall Nov. 20, 1674, in CSCHS, 5: 454-55.
29 Governor Sayle to Lord Ashley, 1670, in CSCHS, 5: 185.
Sayle’s warning was accurate and within a few months of the settlement’s founding, the Spanish attacked Charleston with a combined force of three ships under Juan Menéndez Marqués and a land force of Guale and Timucuan Indians. The attack fell apart on the outskirts of the English settlement as the Spanish ships were forced by bad weather to return to St. Augustine and the Indians, without the support of the ships, were unwilling to storm the settlement’s palisades. Henry Woodward reported the aborted Spanish attack to Sir John Yeamans, who was still in Barbados organizing additional supplies at the time. Woodward noted that “[the Spanish] Indians being terrifyd at ye Scaleing of some of our Great Guns... [and] ye Spaniard as wee suppose being frustrated of his expectation of starving us, cowardly retreated to St. Augustines never attempting anythinge against us.” Woodward and others, however, did not believe the Spanish at St. Augustine would give up easily, despite efforts in Europe to maintain peace between the countries. He finished his report to Yeamans remarking that “at pr[ese]nt wee have noe other news” but warning of rumors that the Spanish “hath threatened to destroy ye Indians of St Helens, of Cumbohee & of Edistowe [that] are our friends.”

The Spanish desire to remove the English from Carolina and the need for Indian alliances to prevent it was apparent to Yeamans. He viewed the response of Governor Sayle to the attack as weak and decided that firmer action was needed. He wrote the proprietors in early 1671, to warn them that the Spaniards “endeavoured to stir up the Indians to prevent your settlement threatening distraction to those Indians that continue friendship to the English.” Despite the threat, Yeamans did not see an adequate concern

on the part of the governor and other proprietary agents, claiming that “your people do not apprehend any danger from those designes.” He informed the proprietors of his decision that “the poorenes of Spiritt shewne by Governor Sayle in this occasion and the fears he hath betrayed in this smale commotion... hath lost them some esteeme with the Indians and may draw on them great Inconvenience in the future.” To prevent further mistakes, Yeamans declared that “if God permit I intend to sayle thither myselfe towards the latter end of the Somer comeing.” Upon his arrival, he claimed a greater right to the governorship than Joseph West, Sayle’s personally appointed successor after his death in early 1671.31

Concerns over Spanish intrigue against the colony were rampant and, just as was the case in the Jamestown colony, accusations of individuals aiding the Spanish surfaced.32 A particular concern of colonists was the possibility of disgruntled servants and slaves taking the opportunity of St. Augustine’s relative proximity to flee their servitude and take refuge with Carolina’s enemies. In January 1672, John Foster accused one of his servants, John Radcliffe, of “running away from his said Masters service and relinquishing his allegiance to our Soveraigne Lord the King and his fidelity and submission to the Lords Proprietors.” Foster additionally accused Radcliffe of “endeavouring to persuade and lead William Davys and Richard Bardiner two of his fellow servants along with him to the Spanish habitations with the Spaniards conspire and procure the ruine of this hopefull settlement.” The Council punished Radcliffe by adding a year to the length of his service, in addition to the time of confinement and other punishments already imposed.33

31 Sir John Yeamans to Lords Proprietors, 1671, in CSCHS, 5: 218.
The Carolinians' concern regarding potentially disloyal white servants was not without merit. Many of the servants were Irish and Catholic who, in search of opportunity, signed on as indentured servants either to Barbadian planters who immigrated to the new colony or directly to colonists in Carolina. There was a long-standing enmity between the Irish and the English monarchy that laid claim to Ireland and had imposed a largely English nobility in Ireland. Through the sixteenth and seventeenth century, Catholic Spain supported Irish resistance to England as a part of the diplomatic and military maneuvering between the two countries. None of this prevented the Lords Proprietor from turning to Ireland, just as they did with French Huguenots and others, as a potential source of colonists and servants and granting special incentives at the end of their term of servitude if they would travel to Carolina through the first decade.

Once in Carolina, it was natural for Irish servants to see St. Augustine as a potential safe haven if they tired of the rough conditions and poor treatment of indentured servitude. One of those that took this route was Brian Fitzpatrick who, in the summer of 1672, successfully fled southward, to the great consternation of the Council. Worried that he could provide information on the defenses and situation in Carolina to the Spanish, the Council gave instructions to Henry Woodward to lead an expedition in pursuit "in order to the taking sd Bryan Fitzpatrick & bringing him back." In this case, the Council was determined to prevent Fitzpatrick’s defection and directed Woodward, "in case of opposition soe as they cannot take & securely bring him alive then to maim, destroy or kill him as they shall find best to agree with their owne safety.” The possibility of a direct Spanish attack or an attack by Spanish-allied Indians was too great to allow someone with knowledge of the colony to make it to St. Augustine. Despite the
efforts of the governor and council, however, several Carolinian servants did make it to the Spanish.\textsuperscript{34}

Before the Westo alliance provided a valuable and powerful Indian buffer against the Spanish, the colonists remained fearful of attack. For the first few years of Charleston's existence, the colonists admonished Lord Ashley and the other proprietors that "[w]ee cannot reasonably believe that the world is now asleep in that the Spaniard has forgot his sullenness."\textsuperscript{35} For the colonists, the immediate threat of St. Augustine and the Indians allied with them was of primary concern. The proprietors and Lord Ashley in particular were in agreement with English diplomatic policy during the time and saw Spain as a potential ally, or at least a neutral party, in the larger struggle against Louis XIV and France. Local and imperial perspectives diverged and the colonists saw their concerns pushed aside for larger issues.

From the English geo-political perspective in the 1670s, France and the Netherlands were of much greater interest than Spain. Louis XIV of France ruled over the most populous and richest nation on the continent, and the French colonies in Canada, Haiti, and other smaller West Indian islands made them a growing threat to the English colonies as well. The Dutch were perhaps the most dominant maritime trading power; a position challenged successfully by England during a series of three Anglo-Dutch Wars in 1652-1654, 1664-1667, and 1672-1674. In an effort to placate the French, Charles II actually allowed England to be drawn into the final conflict with the Dutch in a supporting naval role to the French invasion of the Netherlands. When that failed, he quickly signed a treaty in 1674 with the Dutch to end the conflict. In addition to the

\textsuperscript{34} Council Journals, Aug. 24, 1672, in CSCHS, 5: 411.
\textsuperscript{35} Joseph Dalton to Lord Ashley [Jan. 20, 1672], in CSCHS, 5: 378-379.
turmoil of European politics, Charles II of England, restored to the throne in 1660, spent much of his reign well aware of his fragile hold on the throne and attempting to maintain an uneasy peace among the various factions of Protestants and Catholics in England. In comparison to these concerns, Spain by the 1670s was a second-rate power whose importance was declining.

Given these various concerns, Charles II and his Privy Council spent most of their efforts trying to preserve an uneasy peace with France, while attempting to curb growing French interest in the Americas. Colonial matters between the two powers reflected this duality, and Carolinian concerns were not the only local matters that were ignored. Many of the Council's deliberations concerning the American colonies in the early 1670s sought to placate concerns among New Englanders over the establishment of a French trading post in Newfoundland. In addition, French fishing boats were intruding in increasing numbers in the cod fisheries claimed by the colonies and the growing population of French Canada and the influence of French traders among the Indians in the northeast caused alarm among the colonies of New England. Yet, their protests fell on unsympathetic ears and the Privy Council dismissed their petitions with orders to take no aggressive action.36

The proceedings of the Privy Council regarding Spain's possessions in the West Indies, including Florida became entwined with the cautious attitude of the ing and Council regarding France. The English viewed Spain as a possible hedge against French power in the Americas as well as a potential trading partner. Reflecting this attitude, the Council issued orders to the governor of Jamaica in 1675 informing him of negotiations

with the Spanish crown that allowed Spanish traders to obtain African slaves from both Jamaica and Barbados at a set rate and in pre-arranged numbers. The Spaniards were taking advantage of cheaper prices provided by the increasing English slave trade, while the English saw the advantage in making a small profit and, in a longer term view, gaining influence with the Spanish in the Americas. The Council noted in its order that:

It is for the interest of England and Jamaica that the Spaniards be preserved in possession of the countries they have in the West Indies, and that the Franch [sic] grow not too strong on Hispaniola... Such a contract would make the the subjects of both Crowns have good correspondence, and make the world see it is not for the advantage of the English to have any other colony but Jamaica.37

With the interaction of French, Spanish, English, and Dutch in the West Indies, the English crown sought a delicate balance to preserve peace while allowing for trade. Anything that might antagonize Spain or cause conflict was minimized. Thus, during the 1670s and into the 1680s, Carolina was but a small part of a much larger picture.

The decisions of the proprietors during this period focused on avoiding conflict with the Spanish and maximizing opportunities for profit. From the outset, the proprietors knew that the temptation for the colonists to antagonize or raid the Spanish would be great. Lord Ashley warned governor Sayle that “we [the proprietors] doe absolutely prohibit you and you are to take care not only that you suffer not the people out of greedinesse to molest either the Spaniards on that side or any of our neighbour Indians in their quiet possessions.” Aware that explorations of the surrounding land could also present opportunities for mischief if the explorations progressed too far towards St. Augustine, Lord Ashley further instructed Sayle to “avoid all searches too far that way least the Spaniards by that means discovering how neare you border on them should joyne all their forces there and elsewhere to cutt you off.” Lord Ashley gave

insight into the long range plans of the Proprietors by reminding Sayle that “[p]lanting and Trade is both our designe and your interest and if you will but therein follow our directions we shall lay a way open to you to get all the Spaniards riches in that Country with their consent.”

Echoing the larger effort of the Privy Council to encourage trading relations with Spain and her possessions, the proprietors sought to get the colonists to put aside their concerns and to establish a trade with St. Augustine. In 1674 they sent instructions to one of the members of the Carolina Grand Council, Andrew Percival, who also served as the personal agent of Lord Ashley, to “endeavour to begin a Trade with the Spaniards for Negroes, Clothes or other Commodities they want.” In deference to some of the concerns of the colonists, the instructions included the caveat that Percival was to “take special care that it be soe managed that they [the Spanish] get noe Intelligence of our strength, condition or place of settlement.” Acknowledging the special place of the local Indians in the three-way relationship with the two colonies, the proprietors sought to “get some Trusty Indian” and use him to carry a letter to the Spanish settlement. In the communication, the proprietors sought to communicate to the officials there that they were “as of all the English Nobility the most affectionate of the Spaniards” and desired “to have a Commerce with them.” To accomplish this, it was hoped, both sides could settle on “some convenient place about or beyond Porte Royall soe as to give Jealousy to neither side and with as much secrecy and by as few persons as [the Spanish governor] pleases and that soe managed it might be very advantageous [to] both.” Despite the worries and warnings of the colonists, therefore, the proprietors put diplomacy and profit

38 “[Lord Ashley to Governor] Wm. Saile 13th May. [1671],” in CSCHS, 5: 327.
39 “Instructions [from the Proprietors] for Mr. Andrew Percivall. 23 May, 1674,” in CSCHS, 5: 443.
first and tried to limit the colonists' actions in line with English colonial policy.

Ironically, in Florida, a somewhat similar conflict between local concerns and diplomatic necessity paralleled that ongoing in Carolina.

From the moment word of the settlement at Charleston reached St. Augustine, officials from Florida to Spain knew that the arrival of the English posed a potentially devastating threat to the Spanish colony and to the Indian missions along the frontier. It is true that the aborted attack by the Spanish some months after Charleston's founding was the only overt Spanish attack on the English in the 1670s. The failure of the Spanish to gather the resources necessary to dislodge the English, however, did not reflect a lack of desire among Spanish officials in St. Augustine or among the royal advisors in Madrid. The rivalry between Carolina and La Florida was caught between the larger diplomatic necessities and the local concerns of colonists on the Spanish side just as much as it was on the English side.

The reaction of the Spanish in St. Augustine to the founding of Charleston was immediately hostile. The three-ship fleet and land force of Indian allies that was sent to attack the new settlement in late 1670 was organized hastily by a local junta de guerra, or council of war. When it failed, the royal governor of Florida, Manuel de Cendoya, took further action to protect the colony from the feared attack. He sent Captain Matheo Pacheco and twenty-five soldiers to the mission on St. Catherines Island to serve as a garrison in the largest Guale mission and to gather information from the Indians to the north regarding the English settlement. The garrison in Apalachee was increased in anticipation of increased raids along the mission frontier. Finally, word of the English
settlement was sent by fast dispatch to Spain and the governors of Havana and New Spain.\(^4^0\)

The new English settlement at Charleston created a difficult situation for the Spanish. None of the Spanish officials desired to allow the English to remain. The threat to St. Augustine and the mission Indians was obvious to all. However, the need for local security was technically at odds with Spanish interests in Europe. The governor of Florida was the one caught most between the local situation and the demands of Spanish diplomacy. Official policy was driven by the Treaty of Madrid signed in July 1670. The treaty resolved long-standing issues between Spain and England, such as the occupation of Jamaica by England in 1655, illegal trading by English ships in Spanish colonies, and English colonies in the Americas that technically encroached on Spanish claims to the region. Much to the consternation of officials in St. Augustine, the treaty also legitimized the settlement at Charleston. Hoping to preserve the peace, the king issued a royal cedula on January 24, 1671 ordering the governor to publicly announce the peace treaty with England and to curtail aggressive action.\(^4^1\)

Despite the orders, Governor Cendoya chose to interpret the king’s instructions loosely and took steps over the next few years to improve the defensive situation among the missions. While the small number of English settlers led the Spanish to the conclusion that an outright assault against St. Augustine was unlikely, the outlying missions, especially in Guale were vulnerable to raids by the Westoes and others. The Spanish had long known that the arms and ammunition being used by the Indian raiders

\(^4^0\) Letter from Viceroy Marques de Mancera to the King, December 26, 1670, AGI 58-2-2/19 bnd 1712 (Stetson); Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry*, 52-53; Hoffman, *Florida’s Frontiers*, 144-45.

\(^4^1\) Governor Manuel de Cendoya to the King, March 24, 1672, AGI 58-2-3/3 bnd 1761 (Stetson); Wright, *Anglo-Spanish Rivalry*, 52-53.
was being supplied by the English and that with the establishment of Charleston, the
situation would only worsen. Accordingly, the Guale Indians in two mainland missions
along the coast of Georgia, San Felipe de Alave and Santa Clara de Tupiqui, moved their
villages to Cumberland and Sapelo Islands, respectively, to take them out of easy reach of
the attackers.42

Governor Cendoya went so far as to refuse to carry out the order to publicly
announce the peace treaty with England without first insuring that the crown was fully
aware of English provocations during 1670 and 1671. He wrote to the king in March
1672 to inform him of his decision not to comply with the cedula concerning the peace
treaty issued in January of the previous year. Cendoya acknowledged receiving the
cedula ordering him to announce “the new treaties of peace with England,” but
complained that “the English observe them very poorly, actually not at all.” Cendoya
pointed out that the English continued to condone attacks “at sea just as on land” against
Spanish peoples, including the mission Indians. He noted that English colonists had been
captured on St. Catherine’s Island, nominally within the agreed territory of Spanish
Florida. Without further instruction or convincing the English to halt their activities in
Carolina, Governor Cendoya thought that telling the Indian and Spanish inhabitants of
Florida that they were at peace with England would be premature.43

Through the next few years, the hostility of the English settlers at Charleston and
their Indian allies towards the Spanish and the missions became more and more apparent.
Raid by the “Chichimecos” continued unabated and reports of individuals going missing

42 Hoffinan, Florida’s Frontiers, 145.
43 Governor Manuel de Cendoya to the King, St. Augustine, March 24, 1672, AGI 58-2-3/3 bnd 1761
(Stetson).
or being killed outside the missions through all of Guale, Timucua, and Apalachee were common. The formation of the Westo alliance negotiated by Henry Woodward at the behest of the proprietors merely formalized what had been an ongoing problem for the Spanish since the 1650s. The Spanish received confirmation of their suspicions in May 1675 when a Chisca Indian woman, taken during a Westo raid and transported to Charleston as a slave, escaped and reached the Spanish. She told them that Englishmen frequented the Westo villages to repair their firearms and supply them with ammunition. She also reported that the English and Westoes were planning joint raids on Apalachee and Timucua with the long range goal of destroying the missions in those areas. This warning, along with pirate attacks on the Apalachee port of San Marcos, led to the decision to begin construction on a small fortification at the port and an increase in the local garrison.44

The governor's warnings and the ongoing reports of Indian raids were not lost on the Council of the Indies or the crown. An order was issued in February 1673 to the governor of Havana to provide assistance to Florida in the form of additional soldiers for the garrison at St. Augustine. In addition, the Council sent orders to the governor of Florida to begin communication with both Havana and New Spain to discuss possible methods of dislodging the English in Carolina without breaching the peace treaty. The royal junta de guerra in Madrid even issued a formal report to the king in February 1674 that addressed various justifications for an attack on Charleston that would fall within

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provisions of the Treaty of Madrid using the Westo raids and pirate attacks as validation.\textsuperscript{45}

The situation in the Spanish Florida provinces of Guale, Timucua, and Apalachee by the 1670s was tense and the situation along the frontier deteriorating. A visit in 1675 by Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, the Bishop of Cuba, provides some insight into the conditions at the time of the growing English threat and the effects of the Indian raids. Calderón noted that he had organized an escort of “a company of Spanish infantry of the Post [of St. Augustine], and two of Indians, arquebusiers and archers because I had to traverse the frontier of the country of the chiscas and chichimecos, barbarous and warlike heathens” during his travels among the missions. In Guale, in particular, the migration of Westo Indians into the South Carolina and Georgia piedmont region had put great pressure on the missions, both through the ongoing raiding and the subsequent migration of other Indians into the area. Here, groups of Yamassee and Tama Indians moved into the coastal regions and formed villages on the barrier islands and along the coast. These “pagan” Indians were welcomed by the Spanish who hoped over time to add to the dwindling numbers of Guale and Mocama Indians in the missions. Even with the new arrivals, Guale was the weak link in the mission chain with only fifteen Christian and pagan villages, none of which had more than Santa Catalina with 120 persons and was

\textsuperscript{45} Cedula to Governor Manuel de Cendoya of Florida, Madrid, June 20, 1671, AGI 58-2-2/22 bnd 1735 (Stetson); Governor Francisco de Ledema to the Queen, Havana, February 25, 1673, AGI 58-2-2/29 (Stetson); Report from Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, February 12, 1674, AGI 58-2-14/6-12 bnd 1876 (Stetson).
the seat of the Spanish garrison and lieutenant-governor. At the time of Calderón’s visit, the entire province contained an estimated population slightly over 750.⁴⁶

The Indian missions in Timucua and Apalachee were in somewhat better shape. Indeed, Apalachee was the crown jewel of the mission system, where the vast majority of the Christianized Indian lived and from which most of the locally produced supplies, such as corn and cattle, were supplied. Calderón noted more than 1,600 Indian inhabitants in Timucua and almost nine thousand Indians in Apalachee. In all, the Spanish missions of Florida had thirty-three missions with a population, including those in and around St. Augustine itself, of 13,152 Christianized Indians, a number so specific that it seems reasonable that Calderón had made a fairly specific count to report to the king. This count represented a dramatic decline in the numbers of Indian allies in Florida claimed by Spain from the closest earlier enumeration of the mission system. A similar count in 1655 had claimed thirty-eight missions and some 26,000 Indian inhabitants in Florida. The losses over twenty years were due to disease, warfare, the ongoing slave raids by the Westoes and others and the losses of allies as some chose to move or switch allegiance to the English. The exact proportions are unknowable but the loss of half of the Indian allies represented a drastic loss of power and prestige by Spanish Florida during these years.⁴⁷

The losses, while dramatic, did not represent a total failure of Spanish influence in the region. Calderón’s report also gave evidence of the ongoing weight of the Spanish presence in the region and the fact that many Indians outside of their direct control still

⁴⁷ Letter of Calderón, 5-11; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 147.
sought Spanish missionaries and through them an alliance with St. Augustine. The major area of growth was in Apalachee and the areas north of that province. Calderón reported on efforts underway to extend the number of missions north of Apalachee, saying that

"[n]ine leagues from Encarnación, on the northern frontier, is another [village] named San Nicolás, of about 30 inhabitants, and 3 leagues further on is another, San Carlos, of something like 100 inhabitants. Both these are of the Chacatos nation, which 14 years ago requested baptism and had not their desire fulfilled until the 21st of June of last year, 1674." He also informed the king of migrations among the Lower Creek Indians in southeastern Alabama claiming that the Hitchitis and Okmulgees, among others, had seemingly moved over from the Ocmulgee River southward to be near the Spaniards.

The gains in Apalachee, however, could not make up for the dramatic decline in Spanish power along the Atlantic coast north of St. Augustine, especially in Guale which represented a vital buffer zone needed to prevent the rise of English power after the founding of Charleston.

The tense standoff between Charleston and St. Augustine of the 1670s, where barely concealed hostility between the local inhabitants and allied Indians was restrained by the needs of international relations, deteriorated in the 1680s as the first outright clashes between the two sides occurred. As a result, Guale and the Spanish missions that had existed for almost a century were destroyed and English Carolina took its first step towards hegemony over the Southeast. From the perspective of the colonists in Charleston, the attacks on Guale were not a result of an organized campaign against the Spanish in the region. Rather, they were the outgrowth of the inability of the proprietors

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to establish a strong government to control the lawless nature of Carolina in its first decades and the long-standing encouragement of the Westo Indians in their raiding.

The Westo raids on the missions in Guale reached their peak in 1680, seriously weakening the settlements there and allowing for their destruction a few years later in buccaneer attacks. By that time, the Westo alliance had ended in warfare as a result of the English inability to control the incessant and indiscriminate raiding of their allies. The Westoes continued to raid the Spanish missions, which did not bother the English. Unfortunately, they also continued to raid other Indians, including those near Charleston. To the colonists in Charleston, the turmoil caused by the Westoes among the other Indian allies far outweighed the benefit gained through the continuation of trade with the unruly tribe. The proprietors and their agents attempted to remove the colonists from direct contact with the Westoes. In 1677, hoping to forestall problems, the proprietors issued a seven-year prohibition on private trading with Indians outside of a one-hundred mile radius around Charleston in order to prevent unregulated trading ventures among the Indians. This left the proprietors with an effective monopoly on the Indian trade, an action that outraged the Charleston colonists. The proprietors defended their action, claiming that their monopoly of the Indian trade was "not merely out of design for gain." Rather, they declared that by furnishing the Westoes with arms and controlling the trade, the Indians would be tied to Carolina through dependence on an ongoing supply of ammunition. The mutual benefit to colonists and Indians, in the view of the proprietors,
was having such a “bold and warlike people” as allies that “we should so terrify those Indians with whom the Spaniards have power.”

The designs of the proprietors to use the Westoes against the Spanish culminated in May 1680 when a group of 300 Westoes struck the small Guale missions of San Buenaventura de Gaudalquini on St. Simons Island and Santiago de Ocone on the mainland. The raiders also struck the “pagan” Yamassee Indian town of San Simón on St. Simons Island. The Westoes devastated the towns, looting the villages and killing several inhabitants before being driven inland by a Spanish counterattack by the garrison from Santa Catalina. Rather than retreating fully, the raiders reappeared a few days later at sunrise, this time boldly attacking Santa Catalina itself. The Spanish commander, Lt. Governor Francisco Fuentes, held off the attackers with six Spanish soldiers and sixteen armed Indians. Governor Hita Salazar commended Fuentes’ leadership in a letter to the king, noting that after his sentries had been “murdered by a force of over three hundred men” he had “occupied the mission” and with his small force defended the chapel “with aptitude and valor defended [the mission] from morning until four in the afternoon.” Despite Fuentes’ brave resistance, the pinned-down Spanish defenders could not prevent the Westoes from ransacking and burning the village.

After the raiders withdrew, the dispirited and frightened residents of Santa Catalina, along with the survivors of the earlier attacks, moved to Sapelo Island for greater safety, abandoning the largest mission in Guale. The Spanish governor, Pablo de Hita Salazar, hurriedly obtained reinforcements from Havana and strengthened the

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garrison slightly but failed to convince the Indians to return to their original villages. The Spanish mission frontier retreated slightly southward as the garrison and Indians set about building a stockade to defend the new community. Further orders from the Council of the Indies to the governor of Cuba and the viceroy of New Spain ordered them to send regular reinforcements to the Florida garrison. All of the renewed interest in strengthening the Florida outpost was commendable, but it represented only a minor increase in the effective strength of the St. Augustine garrison. Most of the new soldiers who were sent merely replaced invalid soldiers and did little to increase the actual size of the garrison. While St. Augustine heightened its vigilance, the actual strength of its mission outposts was inadequate to effectively defend the inhabitants. While the Spanish in St. Augustine did what they could to improve their defenses, the Guale missions were still left exposed to the concerted attacks that would come.51

Surprisingly, renewed attacks on Guale did not come from Indian raids. After the 1680 attacks, the Spanish missions were given a respite of a few years as the fragile alliance between Carolina and the Westoes collapsed into warfare. Despite the efforts of the proprietors to control the situation in Carolina, the havoc created by the Westo raids through 1680 was not contained to the Spanish Indians. By the end of 1679, the coastal Indians and the colonists had decided to take action. The colonists enlisted the aid of several local tribes and convinced the Savannah Indians to assist them in attacking the Westoes. By the end of 1681, the Westoes were destroyed as a distinct people, though small numbers of them moved to Apalachicola, just north of Apalachee, where they continued efforts to make peace with the English and regain some of their lost influence.

51 Cedula to Viceroy of New Spain, Madrid, Nov. 8, 1681, AGI 58-1-21/302 bnd 2222 (Stetson); Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, Nov. 10, 1681, AGI 58-1-21/306 bnd 226 (Stetson).
through the mid-1680s. By 1683, little more than fifty Westoes remained and the Savannahs had been invited by the colonists to move into the regions vacated by the Westoes and to assume much of their former role.\footnote{Crane, \textit{Southern Frontier}, 16-18; Gallay, \textit{Indian Slave Trade}, 55-62; Barker, “Much Blood and Treasure,” 194-95.}

Through 1680 the war between the Westoes and the colonists, along with their Indian allies, continued despite the efforts of the proprietors to stop the attacks. The proprietors became almost frantic in their efforts to make peace between the two sides. In February 1680, they accused the governor and Council in Charleston of instigating the war against the wishes of the proprietors. The Carolinians were ordered immediately to make peace with the Westoes. Further, the proprietors instructed Lord Ashley’s agent, Andrew Percival, to push the colonial Assembly to pass legislation legitimizing the proprietors’ claim to a monopoly on the Indian trade. In the negotiations, the Westoes were to be provided any trade goods they desired as long as they promised to cease attacking the coastal Indians. Further, the Westoes were to be instructed that their trade delegations would be confined to traveling to two plantations, to prevent further violence between them and the colonists. To maximize the proprietors’ control, the two delegated plantations belonged to Lord Ashley, a proprietor, and Sir Peter Colleton, the brother of another proprietor. Finally, as a gesture to the leaders of the colonist faction, they established a commission of six members of the colonial assembly, headed by Joseph West, a supporter of the proprietors. The commission was ordered “to determine differences or causes of complaint, between the Indians and English in Carolina.” This last, almost empty, gesture did little to convince the colonists to halt their actions. In the time it took the proprietors to make their wishes known, the Westoes were gone with the
Savannahs were in their place. In the interim, through the late 1680s, Indian raids on the Spanish missions became uncommon. Unfortunately for the Spanish, other raiders turned their sights on Guale.53

From its inception, Charleston and the coast of Carolina, both north and south, proved a popular and easy haven for privateers who preyed largely on the Spanish shipping of the West Indies. This situation was exacerbated by the bickering between local factions and the proprietors. These tensions weakened the ability of the governor and the Grand Council to truly control the colony, and privateers or pirates, depending on one’s point of view, of all nationalities plied the waters between Carolina and Florida. St. Augustine’s weakness and the regular route taken by the rich Spanish treasure fleets through the Florida Straits on their way to Seville made Charleston and other nearby English colonies in the Bahamas convenient starting points for those interested in raiding. While the heyday of the Carolina pirates would come in the first decades of the eighteenth century, the effect of privateer raids in Florida during the 1670s and 1680s was devastating.54

Spanish Florida’s experience with pirate raids had a long history before the raids of the 1680s destroyed Guale. It was often the raids of English privateers that served as the impetus to action and reorganization in Florida as the crown and Council of the Indies sought to better protect the isolated colony. Sir Francis Drake’s destruction of St. Augustine caused the consolidation of the Santa Elena and St. Augustine garrisons into

54 For history of piracy in Atlantic, see David F. Marley, Pirates and Privateers in the Americas (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Publishers, 1994). For piracy and the effects on Spanish Empire, see Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998).
one more easily defended capital. Robert Searles’ attack in 1668 led to the final decision to begin construction of the stone fortress of the Castillo de San Marcos at St. Augustine. Similarly, the buccaneer attacks in 1683 and 1684 had significant ramifications for the future of Spanish Florida and resulted in a complete retreat from Guale and a retrenchment of Spanish forces and mission Indians in Timucua and Apalachee.55

The size and scope of the devastating attacks in Guale may have come as a surprise to the new Spanish governor, Marquez Cabrera, but the danger of pirate attacks did not. From 1680 on, the number of privateer raids on various coastal settlements in Florida increased substantially. Some were small and intent on raiding outlying ranches and missions for food. A series of small raids by English privateers struck the La Chua ranch in Apalachee in 1681, 1682, and again in 1684, though they met with little success. Other raids by English ships were intent on capturing Indian slaves to be sold in Jamaica and elsewhere, such as an attack at Mosquito Inlet that captured fifteen Indians and killed ten others. In March 1682, an English privateer captured the supply ship bound for St. Augustine carrying the yearly situado, the royal grant of funds and supplies that helped maintain the garrison. That same month another English pirate attacked and destroyed the newly constructed fort at San Marcos in Apalachee.56

St. Augustine’s danger soon became apparent as prisoners captured during the attacks on La Chua revealed that a combined group of English, French, and Dutch buccaneers, commanding several ships and led by the notorious French pirate Michel, Sieur de Grammont, were planning to assault St. Augustine using Charleston as a final

56 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 150-51.
stop. The increased number of attacks in La Florida led Cabrera to send warning to the king of the threat and to plead for increased assistance. The king responded in 1683 by informing Cabrera that he had issued a repeated order to the governor of the Canary Islands for one hundred additional soldiers to be sent to Florida, yet issued a firm order that the English settlement at Charleston was not to be attacked, for doing so would violate the peace treaty between England and Spain. The order, however, did instruct the governor of both Cuba and Florida to take any necessary measure to prevent further English settlement outside of Charleston. Final warning came from a Dutch trader out of New York, who gave word to the governor of an upcoming attack during a trading stop in February 1683. The governor responded by increasing the number of sentries, but was unable to do much to buttress the exposed garrisons outside St. Augustine.  

The forewarning of attack allowed the garrison in St. Augustine to be ready when several small boats filled with pirates were spotted on the morning of April 5, 1683. Seeing the garrison prepared, the pirates withdrew to their ships and sailed north, attacking mission after mission in the Mocama region just north of the capital. The missions at San Juan del Puerto, San Felipe, and other ‘pagan’ Indian villages in the area were sacked. A small troop sent from St. Augustine arrived too late to prevent the losses; witnesses claimed that the buccaneer force had left Mocama intending to resupply and return with sufficient forces to attack and capture Guale. The attacks in Mocama convinced the governor of the need to reorganize and consolidate the missions in both Mocama and Guale. He planned to move the eight missions of Mocama and Guale into

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57 Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, Sept. 22, 1683, AGI 58-1-20/22 bnd 2343 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, May 5, 1682, AGI 54-5-12/5 bnd 2258 (Stetson); Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, Oct. 2, 1682, AGI 54-5-12/7 bnd 2285 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Oct. 8, 1683, AGI 54-5-11/111 bnd 2346 (Stetson).
three larger missions that would be within fourteen leagues of St. Augustine and no more
than five from each other, allowing quicker defensive action. Furthermore, upon
receiving word of the attack and in response to the multiple attacks on Spanish shipping
by English privateers, the governor of Cuba issued patents authorizing Spanish ship
owners to raid English shipping out of Jamaica, and pilloried the Charleston settlement as
a haven for English pirates.58

While the Mocama Indians agreed to the move quickly, convincing the Guale
Indians to relocate and merge their villages into larger, more centralized towns proved
harder. Most refused to move to the desired locations, while others wanted to wait until
the fall in order to harvest the crops that had just been planted. By the summer of 1684,
the frustrated governor appealed to the king for orders to assist in the planned move and
complained of the Franciscan missionaries who were supporting the resistant Indians. In
August 1684, Marquez Cabrera successfully put pressure on the leaders of the largest
Guale settlements, threatening to leave them defenseless against further Indian or pirate
raids. The Indian leaders agreed reluctantly and slowly made plans to move their people
into the town at San Pablo on the south side of the St. Johns River.59

A new raid by English pirates in October 1684 put fresh pressure on the Guale
Indians to comply with the governor’s wishes. The raids destroyed the villages at San
Jaun del Puerto, Sapelo, and Asao. The Spanish garrison did not engage the larger
buccaneer force, and the Spanish and Indian population of the villages retreated to the

58 Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, April 16, 1683, AGI 54-5-14/154 bnd 2313 (Stetson);
Governor of Cuba to the King, Havana, May 11, 1683, AGI 54-1-23/4 bnd 2314 (Stetson); Hoffman,
Florida’s Frontiers, 151-52; Milanich, Laboring in the Fields, 172-74.
59 Plans for Relocation of Guale Indians, Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, August 26, 1684,
AGI 54-5-11/118 bnd 2390 (Stetson); Milanich, Laboring in the Fields, 173-74; Hoffman, Florida’s
Frontiers, 152-53.
mainland, leaving their towns at the mercy of the English. Of the English force only one small sloop with a crew of eleven bound for Charleston was captured by a small scouting party of Indians from Guadalquini. Once again, reinforcements from St. Augustine arrived too late to stop the raids and the pirates left the area before the Spanish could counterattack. The destruction and inability of the Spanish to provide a sufficient defense of the area convinced the Indians to move south rapidly. The raid proved the death blow to the Spanish presence in Guale. By the spring of 1685 the move to the new missions in Mocama close to St. Augustine was complete. The Spanish had abandoned their northernmost province in Florida, and the first battle for primacy in the Southeast had gone to the English.  

The Spanish did not accept the loss without some attempt to revenge themselves on the English in Carolina. The governors of St. Augustine and Cuba organized a retaliatory raid on Carolina. The governor of Havana recruited a Spanish privateer, Alejandro Thomás de León, and his two ships to carry out the attack, giving the Spanish some deniability since the attack would be carried out in the same manner as had the English raids. The two governors justified the attack by using the directive of 1683 that allowed them to “confine” the English to Charleston and noted that the pirate Grammont had resupplied in Charleston. In early 1684, a group of Scots led by Henry Erskine, the third baron Cardross, and William Dunlop arrived in Carolina seeking to found a new town to the south of Charleston near what is today Beaufort in the Port Royal area. In November of the same year, 51 Scot settlers founded a small settlement that they called

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60 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, March 20, 1686, AGI 2-4-1/19/13 bnd 2463 (Stetson); Report on Guale Raids by Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, Sept. 30, 1686, AGI 58-2-2/66 bnd 2510 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 153.
Stuart Town (Stuartstown). As a further incentive to the Spanish, during the year since Stuartstown's founding, Cardross and Dunlop encouraged groups of Yamassee and other Indians who opted to flee north from the destruction in Guale to settle around the Savannah River. Further, in mid-1685, the Scots armed the new arrivals and encouraged them in a raid into Timucua that “burnt several Towns and in particular the Said Chapell and the Fryers house and killed fifty of the Timechoes and brought away Two and twenty Prisoners which they delivered to the Scotts as slaves.” By 1686, the combined provocations of the Guale raids and the new Scot settlement and their actions provided a ready excuse for a Spanish retaliation.61

The small fleet under de León sailed to St. Augustine in May 1686 and delivered a supply of munitions to assist the garrison. After collecting volunteers for the attack, including a group of Guale warriors and a contingent of Mulatto militia, de León sailed north to Stuartstown with over a hundred Spanish soldiers and a like number of supporting Indians and militia.62 The Scottish inhabitants, receiving word of an impending attack, fled to Charleston; when the Spanish arrived, they found the settlement abandoned and burned it to the ground. Eager to increase their plunder, the Spanish privateers turned northward to Charleston in violation of their orders and raided the

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61 Report of English Activity and New Settlement at Santa Elena [Stuartstown], Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, Oct. 6, 1685, AGI 54-5-15/94 bnd 2446 (Stetson); Andres de Munibe to the King, Havana, Feb. 12, 1687, AGI 61-6-20/43 bnd 2549 (Stetson); Antonio de Arredondo, Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia; A Contribution to the History of one of the Spanish Borderlands, trans. Herbert E. Bolton. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1925) 15; Crane, Southern Frontier, 31; Lesser, South Carolina Begins, 145-46; Wright, Anglo-Spanish Rivalry, 57; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 157-58.

62 In June, 1683, Governor Marques Cabrera complied with a royal cedula ordering him to remove Creole soldiers, including mulattos, who he had recruited to bolster the garrison’s strength. He reported his compliance to the king and, in the same account, informed the King and Council of his formation of two militia companies, one made up entirely of “pardos and mulattos” to assist in the defense of the colony. See Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 28, 1683, AGI 54-5-11/103 bnd 2324 (Stetson). For the experience of slaves and free blacks in Spanish Florida, see Jane Landers, Black Society in Spanish Florida (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999).
plantations around Charleston as the English defenders huddled behind the Charleston defenses. Included in the destroyed plantations were those owned by the English governor, Joseph Morton, and the secretary of the Grand Council, Paul Grimball. The raids produced a rich assortment of plunder, including religious artifacts that had been captured by the English and several African slaves. The raiders found and freed a group of enslaved Christian Indians, who were taken back to St. Augustine and resettled in a nearby mission. Captain de León turned his sights on Charleston itself and only a sudden storm prevented his attack. During the fierce weather, one of the Spanish ships ran aground and de León and several others drowned. With their forces depleted and the English forewarned, the Spanish retreated with their booty and slaves to St. Augustine.63

Further Spanish retaliatory raids continued through the end of 1686. On their return overland to their new settlements, the Guale warriors from the de León expedition encountered a group of four English traders and their Indian guides returning from an expedition to Apalachicola. The Guale attacked and killed the group and took their pack animals, loads of beaver and deer skins, and their arms and ammunition. The Spanish sought and received permission from the king for the Indians to retain possession of the valuable cargo to reward them for their allegiance and support in the raids. In another raid that same year, Captain Francisco de Fuentes led a large group of more than 350 Apalachee and Timucuan Indians in raids north from Timucua along the coast and inland areas of Georgia. His group attacked and drove away the "Yamassee" Indians who remained or had returned to the area, this time in an alliance with the English.64 By the

63 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, November 8, 1686, AGI 54-5-12/39 bind 2526 (Stetson); Crane, Southern Frontier, 31-32; Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 157-58.
64 The word "Yamassee" originally referred to a small tribe that moved into Guale in response to the Westo attacks and were welcomed by the Spanish, though they refused to accept Christian ways. After the
end of the year, the Spanish had repaid the English attacks with equal destruction, and the
governors of both Florida and Cuba petitioned the king to consider a second attack on
Charleston to finally remove the English threat. The evolving diplomatic situation in
Europe deterred Spain from that course of action. But the Spanish had struck back and,
in Charleston, the English determined to strike back directly at St. Augustine before they,
too, were forced to back down by wider diplomatic concerns.65

The Spanish attacks destroyed the Scottish settlement, forcing William Dunlop
and the others to resettle in Charleston. Many of the plantations that the Spanish
devastated belonged not only to the governor and members of the Council, but also to
several members of the colonial assembly. Stuartstown was of little concern to many
Carolinians because the proprietors had granted Dunlop and Cardross independence from
the Charleston government. But the subsequent attack on Charleston was a different
matter. Thus, while many of the leaders of Charleston viewed the loss of Stuartstown
with ill-concealed glee, the inhabitants of Charleston were outraged at what was, in their
biased view, an unprovoked attack on their town at a time of peace. The colonists in
Charleston desired nothing less than revenge on “all the bloodly insolencys the Spaniards
had committed.” The Assembly gathered quickly and passed an act that authorized the
outfitting of two French privateers that were in Charleston and the gathering of a large
force of English militia and sailors to man them, with the stated intent to “persue,
attacque and (by God’s grace) to vanquishe” the Spanish. Early in the summer of 1687,

65 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Nov. 8, 1686, AGI 54-5-12/39 bnd 2526 (Stetson); King
to the Marquis de los Velez, Madrid, Feb. 15, 1687, AGI 61-6-20/44 bnd 2550 (Stetson); Hoffman,
Florida’s Frontiers, 158.
the Council and Assembly organized a scouting party under the command of Dunlop with orders to scout along the coast south to Sapelo Island to ensure that the Spanish had indeed abandoned the area. The entire colony prepared for an attack on Florida.\textsuperscript{66}

The desires of the colonists gave way to the desires of the proprietors when, in July 1687, James Colleton arrived as the new governor of South Carolina, replacing Joseph Moreton. Moreton had been one of the leading dissenters in Carolina, opposing most of the proprietors' reforms in the mid-1680s. The proprietors appointed him initially in an effort to win over many of the leaders of the colony to their point of view. Their attempt failed and Moreton refused to rein in the excesses of the colonists who, in the views of many of the proprietors, had been largely responsible for the violence that erupted between Charleston and St. Augustine. Colleton arrived in Charleston with instructions to gain control of the colony and immediately threatened to arrest and hang anyone who continued hostilities with the Spanish. To allay the fears of the majority of landowners he reinforced the militia, obtained new stores of weapons and ammunition, and established warning beacons along the coast to the south. Finally, he had laws passed instituting large penalties on anyone found to encourage or support privateer ventures.

While his efforts met with mixed results, he received the strong endorsement of the proprietors, who commended him on his actions and instructed him to enter negotiations with the Spanish in St. Augustine to prevent a recurrence of the violence and to gain the return of the captured slaves. The proprietors promised to demand reparations

from the Spanish for the destruction and personally reimbursed Lord Cardross for his losses suffered in the destruction of Stuartstown. The intended attack on St. Augustine was stopped, and for the next fifteen years, English Carolina and Spanish Florida entered an uneasy truce where both sides negotiated and sought to win over new Indian allies in an effort to gain an advantage over their rival.67

By 1688, relations between St. Augustine and Charleston returned to a nervous standoff at the instigation of their respective governments. By this point, the imperialism of Louis XIV of France forced several European nations, including Spain and England, to band together in the League of Augsburg as a defensive alliance against French aggression. The hostility between the two small colonies were set aside, reluctantly, and both sides sent emissaries to the other to negotiate and communicate over issues and complaints ranging from reparations to renewed complaints. Over the next fifteen years, the rivalry between two did not abate but, just as it had been before the outbreak of outright warfare, it was subsumed into efforts to best the other in their attempts to win allies among the numerous Indian tribes that dwelled in the region between the two.

But the events and efforts of both Carolinians and Spanish Floridians during the 1670s and 1680s had significantly altered the balance of power in the region. Indian tribes such as the Creek, Cherokee, and the new Yamassee confederation still dominated the landscape and the power relationships in the region. The destruction of Guale, however, forced the Spanish into retreat, and the subsequent loss of prestige among the Indians forced weakened attempts by officials in St. Augustine to win influence among natives outside their immediate control. This trend would accelerate during the fifteen-

year “alliance” between the English and Spanish empires. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, it would lead to the emergence of English hegemony over the region and the sudden and rapid decimation of Spanish power.
In the years following the destruction of the Guale Indian missions, the necessities of imperial politics forced an uneasy peace on the citizens of St. Augustine and Charleston. During the hostilities of the 1680s, both the English and the Spanish had suffered losses. Following the attacks on their Indian allies, for the first time Spanish influence retreated southward in the face of English hostility. The English, too, suffered losses as the fledgling settlement of Stuartstown in the Port Royal area was completely destroyed and the plantations directly south of Charlestown were pillaged in Spanish reprisals.

Local concerns, however, gave way to European politics. While colonists on both sides demanded new attacks on their rivals, cooler heads prevailed as Spain and England entered into an alliance against France in 1689. At the instigation of their governments during the next decade, the leaders of Carolina and Spanish Florida sought to maintain peace in the regions between the two colonies. Each side sent delegations to the other at various points in an effort to overcome different points of contention. Within the colonies, the ruling elite sought to address the issues that gave their rivals reasons for hostility, though in both cases internal divisions hindered the efforts of the governments to effectively control the colony.
All of these efforts, of course, did not preclude attempts to improve the relative strength of their respective colonies in the region at the expense of their rival. Both the English and Spanish sought to increase their influence among the Indians of the region. Local citizens, especially among the English, continued to participate and encourage the trade in Indian slaves that resulted in raids throughout the region. As the situation in Europe changed by the end of the 1690s, the rivalry between Carolina and Florida reemerged. The decade of peace, imposed as it was from above, fell apart and hostilities again emerged to forever change the political, economic, and cultural development of the Southeast.

The abandonment of Guale by the Spanish and their Indian allies left the region largely bereft of settlements, though Indian raiding and hunting parties from settlements both to the south and the north continued to frequent the area. The nominally Christianized Guale and Mocama Indians, although initially reluctant to move from their homes along the barrier islands of coastal Georgia and northeastern Florida, changed their minds when faced with Westo raids and privateer attacks. After 1684, the mission Indians largely chose to accept the resettlement plan of Governor Marquez Cabrera, which merged the smaller missions into three centralized missions to be built south of the St. Johns River. The governor’s plan placed the surviving Guales and Mocamas within fourteen leagues of St. Augustine and within five leagues of each other to make quick defensive responses to raids possible. Given the continued threat of Indian raids or attacks by English ships along the coast, the mission Indians had little choice if they were to continue their association with the Spanish.1

1 For the causes and details of the resettlement, see Chapter Two, 40-41.
The Indians from the Franciscan missions of Guale were not the only Indian inhabitants of the contested region to feel the effects of the warfare of the 1680s. Beginning in the 1660s and 1670s, groups of ‘heathen’ Indians began migrating to the Spanish controlled areas surrounding the missions throughout Spanish Florida in response to pressure from the Westoes. Westo raids pushed them out of the Carolina piedmont and the interior of Georgia, known to the Spanish as La Tama. While these Indians represented an assortment of tribes from the interior, the Spanish labeled them collectively ‘Yamassee.’ The largest number of these migratory Indians settled in the province of Guale. The Spanish welcomed these newcomers and encouraged their settlement along the coast and on the barrier islands, despite the newcomers’ refusal to accept Christianity. The influx of new Indians helped allay the dwindling numbers of mission Indians and represented an opportunity for the Spanish to improve the defenses of the province. This influx of new allies coincided with Spanish efforts in the 1670s to create a new post, a “Defensor de Indios,” to address Indian complaints of mistreatment. This Defender of Indians would serve as a legal representative empowered to investigate and recommend punishments for alleged abuses of the mission Indians. Each of these moves sought to prepare the colony for a combined English-Indian attack that the officials in St. Augustine had feared for years.

2 The term ‘Yamasees’ was first used by Antonio Matheos, the Spanish commander of the Spanish garrison in Apalachee in 1675, to describe the arrival of new Indians that he claimed were “all of one nation with the people of La Tama.” See Mark F. Boyd, ed. “Enumeration of Florida’s Spanish Missions in 1675,” Florida Historical Quarterly [FHQ] 27 (Oct. 1948), 181-88.
3 Consulado de Indias to Comissario General de Indias, Madrid, Nov. 24, 1676 AGI 58-1-21/166 bnd 1991 (Stetson); Father Juan de Luengo to Antonio de Rozas, Madrid, Nov. 30, 1676, AGI 54-5-20/106 bnd 1992 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the Queen, St. Augustine, June 15, 1675, AGI 58-1-26/32 bnd 1929 (Stetson).
When their fear of attack on the outlying province were realized, the Spanish defenses failed utterly to defend their allies, new or old. The combined pressure of Indian raids and pirate attacks struck equally at the mission Indians and their Yamassee neighbors. When the plan to abandon Guale and relocate the missions to the south came to fruition, the Yamassee chose to reconsider their alliance with the Spanish. This decision was largely the result of the weakness of the Spanish response to the attacks on their allies. From the perspective of the Yamassee, the English represented a more secure source of valuable trade goods as well as a more powerful ally than the Spanish. The Carolinians' war against the Westoes also removed the most powerful of the Indian enemies of the Yamassee. As the Guale and Mocama Indians moved southward in 1683 and 1684, the various peoples who formed the confederated Yamassee contacted the leaders of the newly founded Scottish settlement at Stuartstown, Lord Cardross and William Dunlop.4

These two leaders saw a great opportunity in the Yamassee migration to lands along the Savannah River formerly occupied by the Westoes. The Scots had settled in the Port Royal region despite the “great report of the Spainards invading” and threatening Carolina. Just as in the founding of Charleston, the Scots believed that from their locale “ther may be passage opened from this place to New Mexico, which with all the mines there... wold be a matter of vast importance.” The arrival of the Yamassee into the region provided the Scots, and through them Carolina, the prospect of another powerful ally against the Spanish. Cardross and Dunlop wrote to the Proprietors of their plans to use the Yamassee as a buffer against possible Spanish incursions. Cardross reported that

the Yamasses, “which wer laitlie under the Spainzard at St. Augustine and admitted to setle heire within our bounds.” Indeed, Cardross and Dunlop were thrilled that the Yamasses were “verie effectionit to us [and] are Inveterat enemies to the Spainzard, and continues still in ware with the most considerable Spanish Indians.” The Scots granted the Yamassee permission to settle along the Savannah River though, as they told newly arrived Governor James Colleton, “the truth is they are so considerable and warlike that we would not doe otherwise.”

Both Carolina and the Yamasses saw great advantage in their new relationship. The English found a powerful replacement for the Westoes, and the Yamasses found a ready source of trade goods.

The enthusiasm for the new alliance with the Yamasses led Cardross and Dunlop to quickly overstep their bounds. Through the end of 1684 and 1685, the Scots at Stuartstown began to arm the Yamasses and encouraged them to raid into the Spanish regions of Timucua and Apalachee. These actions were in direct contradiction of the wishes of the Lords Proprietor to maintain peace with the Spanish and infuriated officials in St. Augustine, many of whom were jealous of the Scotish settlement and feared the encroachment on the valuable Indian trade. Many of the English colonists were also leery of the Scots’ actions with the Yamasses. Henry Woodward, the most experienced Indian trader and negotiator in the colony, wrote to the proprietors advising them of Cardross and Dunlop’s efforts against the Spanish. He reported that “armes & other things [had been] delivered to the Yamases and that they are gone ag[ainst] the

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5 Lord Cardross and William Dunlop to Sir Peter Colleton, March 27, 1685, in “Arrival of the Cardross Settlers,” George Pratt Insh, ed., South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine [SCHGM] 30 (April, 1929), 75-76.
Trinechoes [Timucuas].” Woodward feared the repercussions of these raids and labeled them “an unadvised project.”

Woodward’s fears were well founded. Motivated by the English attacks on Guale, the founding of a new English settlement even closer to St. Augustine, and the provocation of the Yamasissee raids, the Spanish attacked Stuartstown and Charleston, destroying the former and causing great damage to the plantations surrounding the latter. Immediately after these attacks, the colonists in both Charleston and in St. Augustine made plans to attack their rivals. Each side had significant numbers of Indian allies; the English with the Yamassesee and other coastal Indians around Charleston and the Spanish with several thousand mission Indians remaining in the provinces of Timucua and Apalachee. Furthermore, both Spanish and English continued to try to win over the Indians in Apalachiocola, a large region north and west of Apalachee in western Georgia and Alabama. In this area, a variety of tribes, interrelated by culture and language drawn together into a loose alliance, would emerge as the Creek confederation in the early decades of the eighteenth century. The situation after the Spanish attacks on Carolina in 1686 was tense. The local hostility became a secondary concern, however, when the political situation in Europe exploded into war and both England and Spain, along with a ‘Grand Alliance’ of other European powers, banded together to halt the spread of French power. This caused the local rivalry to take a backseat to imperial concerns for a decade.

In Europe, Louis XIV of France made no secret of his desire to expand French power and territory. Through the late 1660s and in the 1670s, Spain and France fought

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two wars over territory in the Spanish Netherlands, both of which saw Spanish concessions as part of the peace treaties ending each conflict. The English had become involved in the first war as they increasingly viewed French ambitions on the continent with concern. By the late 1680s, Louis XIV coveted territories along the Rhine River. Emperor Leopold I and various German princes formed the League of Augsburg in 1686 to prevent French aggression. Over the next few years other European powers such as Spain, Sweden, and the United Provinces joined the League to oppose further French gains. After the 1688 French invasion of the Palatinate, the League expanded once again in 1689 with England’s declaration of war. In England, William and Mary, the new monarchs put on the throne during the Glorious Revolution, feared French support of the cause of the deposed James II, and eagerly joined in the effort against Louis XIV. This new Grand Alliance united much of Europe against France and the fighting continued on land and at sea as the allies sought to contain French power through much of the 1690s. After successes and failures on both sides, the war came to an inconclusive end in 1697 with the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick, which returned the combatants to the status quo ante, with each side largely returning to their previous borders, though France did gain control over Saint-Domingue, later known as Haiti.7

In St. Augustine, there were additional reasons for concern besides the English. Worries over French activities in the 1670s and 1680s were almost as serious as the ever-present anxiety over the English in Charleston. The Spanish were well aware of the explorations of René-Robert Cavalier, the Sieur de La Salle, along the Mississippi River. La Salle is best remembered for his explorations of the Great Lakes region from French

Canada in the late 1670s as well as his journey down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico in 1682. At the end of this journey on April 9th, at the mouth of the Mississippi River, La Salle buried an engraved plate and a cross, claiming the territory for France and named the region Louisiana in honor of the French king. In 1684, La Salle organized a second expedition of four ships and some three hundred settlers with the intention of establishing a colony at the mouth of the Mississippi River and challenging the Spanish hold on the Gulf of Mexico. The expedition suffered from disease, pirate raids, and shipwrecks but successfully put ashore somewhere along the Texas coastline late in 1684. The settlers met with Indian hostility and starvation while La Salle led several expeditions eastward by land in an effort to locate the Mississippi. On the last expedition, the remaining colonists mutinied and murdered La Salle in anger over their poor conditions. The colony hung on until 1688 when most of the surviving adults were killed during an Indian raid and several children were taken captive. A French expedition in 1689 found no survivors of the expedition and the attempt was abandoned.  

Echoing the hostility between Spain and France in Europe, officials in St. Augustine and in Mexico reacted immediately to try to locate and remove the French threat at the instigation of the king. A report in late 1685 by the Junta de Guerra in Madrid warned the king of the implications of a French colony to Spanish control of the shipping lanes through the Gulf of Mexico. In response to the report, an expedition of two ships set out from New Spain in 1686 in search of the new French settlement, while fifty soldiers set out overland under Alonso de León to search along the coast. De León

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subsequently led four expeditions in search of the new colony, but found only one starved
and confused survivor and the burned-out remains of a settlement, though not where the
Spanish believed the La Salle colony to be located. In the end, the Spanish failed to
discover the true fate of the French colony and over the next decade worried greatly over
the possibility of a rival colony located on the Gulf Coast.9

Efforts outside New Spain centered on removing the threat of English and French
cooperaion against Florida. In St. Augustine, royal officials supported new calls for
increases in the garrison by pointing to a commercial agreement signed between England
and France in 1686, before the anti-French William III replaced the pro-French James II
on the throne of England. The officials also reminded the council that the earlier attacks
on St. Augustine and Guale were carried out by English pirates cooperating with the
French and operating out of Charleston. When the prisoners captured during those earlier
raids gave information purportedly identifying the exact location of the new French
colony, officials sent soldiers from the Apalachee garrison westward seeking to locate
and destroy it. In conjunction with the move to attack the supposed French colony, the
king approved and encouraged continued patrols aimed at preventing the English or the
Yamassees from establishing a permanent presence in Guale to take advantage of the
Spanish withdrawal. Finally, in Europe, diplomatic activity increased as the Spanish
ambassador in London petitioned the English court to curtail their support of the French.
England eventually did halt their cooperation with France due to the fall of James II from
power in England and his replacement in 1688 with his Protestant daughter, Mary, and

9 Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, April 8, 1686, AGI 61-6-20/20 bnd 2479 (Stetson); Conde de
Paredes to the King, Mexico, July 20, 1686 AGI 61-6-20/25 bnd 2489 (Stetson); William E. Dunn,
Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States, 1678-1702: The Beginnings of Texas
her husband, William of Orange, a long-standing adversary of Louis XIV. England
joined Spain in the Grand Alliance against France the following year.\textsuperscript{10}

Division and infighting plagued St. Augustine during the immediate aftermath of
the hostilities with Carolina. For the Spanish in Florida, the late 1680s was a period of
turmoil. The political and economic situation following the withdrawal from Guale was
one of acrimony and confusion, mostly aimed at the governor, Juan Marquez Cabrera.
Accusations of wrong-doing on the part of Cabrera came from local officials, military
officers, and the Franciscans. During the height of the crisis in relocating the Guales and
faced with possible retaliatory attacks from Charleston, Marquez Cabrera left St.
Augustine for Havana, where he arrived in May 1687 on a quest to obtain further
provisions and aid for the beleaguered colony. He failed, though, to inform the other
royal officials of his purpose and his absence during a period of potential continued
conflict with the English infuriated most of the residents of St. Augustine. The officers
and bureaucrats of the garrison and colony appointed Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda, the
sergeant-major of the garrison, interim-governor and sent word to the governor of Cuba
and the king of the situation. They accused Marquez Cabrera of malfeasance and
mismanagement as well as leaving the colony without permission. Upon the governor’s
return to St. Augustine, he was arrested for abandoning his post and jailed in the Castillo
until instructions could be received from Madrid.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, July 22, 1686, AGI 61-6-20/26 bnd 2490 (Stetson); The
King to Marquis de los Velez, Madrid, July 22, 1686, AGI 61-6-20/27 bnd 2491 (Stetson); Cedula to the
Governor of Florida, Madrid, August 14, 1688, AGI 58-1-22/86 bnd 2738 (Stetson). For the Glorious
\textsuperscript{11} Manuel de Murguia to the King, Havana, May 12, 1687, AGI 54-1-25 bnd 2593 (Stetson); Royal
Officials to the King, St. Augustine, June 20, 1687, AGI 54-5-15/47 bnd 2617 (Stetson); Royal Officials
to the King, St. Augustine, August 15, 1687, AGI 53-6-4/1 bnd 2632 (Stetson).
Marquez Cabrera's efforts to rearrange the defenses and address perceived problems among the mission Indians also led to a flare-up of between the governor and the Franciscans that plagued Spanish Florida through most of the mission period. While disputes over royal prerogatives relating to the *Patronato Real* between royal officials and missionaries were common, Marquez Cabrera pushed the disputes further than the majority of his predecessors. The governor began to complain to the king and the Council of the Indies of Franciscan abuses of the mission Indians, such as the whipping of Indians regardless of their civil status, exploitation of Indian labor without recompense, and the missionaries' tendency to ignore the governor's prerogatives like notification of the movement of friars into and out of the colony. These complaints echoed many of the disputes of the past, but Marquez Cabrera added a more strident tone in his complaints, accusing the friars of causing such discontent among the Indians that it served as the primary cause of the flight of many former allies to the English. He also toured many missions in Apalachee and Timucua to reassert royal authority and to inform the caciques that they answered to him rather than to the local friar.12

The friars reacted strongly to the governor's complaints with their own objections to what they perceived as actions on his part that overstepped his authority. In 1687 the local leaders of the Franciscans in Florida excommunicated Marquez Cabrera for his

12 The *Patronato Real* was the title accorded to a series of rights granted to the King of Spain from 1493-1510 by the popes Alexander VI and Julius II which gave the Spanish throne authority over the Church in the new lands of the Americas. As it evolved over time, this gave the King the right to nominate and, therefore, practically to appoint bishops and other high ecclesiastical officers that would serve in the Americas. It also allowed the crown to administer tithes and other offerings and made it responsible for all the expenses of the Church. In the case of Florida, this nominally gave the governor the right to monitor the movement and activities of missionaries and to address grievances of colonists and Indians against them. The Franciscans, however, disputed the extent of the governors' rights and regularly ignored instructions from and the prerogatives of the governors. Paul E. Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 166-67.
ostensible undermining of priestly authority among the Indians. They supported the arrest of the governor and applauded his replacement with Diego de Quiroga y Losada, who assumed the post of governor late in 1687. Marquez Cabrera returned to Spain where an investigation cleared him of the majority of charges against him, largely through the support of Governor Quiroga, who continued to accuse the Franciscans of Indian abuse and attempt to curtail their authority. In 1688 Quiroga requested and received an emissary from the Bishop of Cuba whose orders from his superiors were to investigate and take testimony on the Franciscans’ activities. Quiroga went further in alienating the Franciscan hierarchy when he refused to allow a designated inspector from the order to visit the missions. The turmoil between the governor and the friars grew to the extent that it gained the attention of the Council of the Indies. After hearing both sides of the issues, the Council agreed that steps should be taken to prevent continued abuse of the mission Indians in order to maintain their allegiance. However, the Council also found that the governors had overstepped their authority in several instances. In the end, little was done to change the status quo, and internecine squabbling between the governors and the missionaries continued to be the norm through the end of the mission period in the first decade of the 1700s.13

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Entering 1688, the political situations in both Charleston and St. Augustine were in disorder, with various factions advocating continued conflict against their regional rival while diplomatic concerns necessitated an end to the hostilities. The governors of

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13 Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 166-67; Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, Oct. 4, 1686, AGI 54-5-15/33 bnd 2512 (Stetson); Cedula to the Governor of Florida [Quiroga], Madrid, Sept. 30, 1687, AGI 58-1-22/56 bnd 2643 (Stetson).
both colonies sought peace in order to solidify their alliances among the Indians and to reorganize the defenses of their territories. Out of these motivations, the first consistent efforts to establish and maintain ongoing contact between the colonies emerged and for the next fifteen years assorted delegations traveled between the two towns seeking redress for various grievances even as, during the later third of that period, tensions began to rise once again. Seeking a quick end to the fighting, Governor James Colleton, in 1687, put a stop to the plan approved by the Carolina Assembly to attack St. Augustine early the next year. Responding to orders from the Lords Proprietor, Colleton appointed William Dunlop, late of the settlement at Stuartstown, to head an expedition carrying a letter to the Spanish governor at St. Augustine seeking a correspondence with him in order to prevent further destruction.

The orders from the proprietors to smooth over relations with Florida reflected their views on the recent fighting between the colonies and underlined their efforts to reestablish control over unruly colonial elites, eager to further their own interests despite orders to the contrary. For another part, the proprietors merely echoed the crown’s efforts to reestablish calm in the colonies to coincide with the ongoing diplomatic maneuvering in Europe. In 1686, James II signed a treaty with Spain intended “for the quieting and determining [of] all controversies and disputes that have arisen or may hereafter arise between the subjects of both Crowns in America.” The orders sent to Carolina from the court informing the colony of the treaty ordered that any official countenancing continued hostility against the Spanish would pay a penalty by “making satisfaction with their goods for the damage arising.”14

The Lords Proprietor had little, if any, sympathy for the colonists after the losses inflicted by the Spanish and their Indian allies came to their attention. They wrote James Colleton in March 1687 regarding the warfare on both sides, laying most of the blame directly at the feet of the colonists themselves. Lord Craven, Peter Colleton (the governor’s brother), and the other proprietors noted that they had been “informed that one hundred fifty three Spainyards, Indians and Mulattos [had] fallen upon the outskirts of our settlement and burnt and plundered.” The cause of the warfare was clear in the eyes of the proprietors. The message to Governor Colleton noted that the violence occurred, in their opinion, “because those of Carolina notwithstanding the Kings Commands and our own Repeated orders to the contrary have received the Pyrates and Privateers that have unjustly burnt and robbed the houses of the Spainyards.” Further justifying the Spanish in their actions, the proprietors claimed that “if it be true that such have been received at Carolina could any rational man believe the Spainyards would not seek Revenge... [or] be justified in doing so.”

The proprietors further defended the need for calm in the face of the Spanish incursion by quibbling with the colonists’ justifications for a retaliatory attack on St. Augustine in the immediate aftermath of the Spanish attacks. The proprietors pointed out that the claim made by the colonists that the “Spainyards that Invaded you were thereunto Commissioned by the King of Spaine” could only be validated “upon the Informacon of a Mulatto.” They argued that “without your having seen any such Commission or having sent to the Governor of St. Augustins” to verify the truth of the statement, no action could

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be made. Without such proof, they warned, drawing England into a dispute with Spain ran directly against the wishes of the king; a risky proposition for anyone.16

In order to forestall further violence, the proprietors made clear in their orders that no further local efforts to organize overt attacks against the Spanish would be tolerated. While promising the colonists to petition the King for compensation for their losses, the proprietors took steps to remove the local officials that had led the colony into the perceived mischief that had caused the bloodshed.17 They ordered several prominent individuals removed from their positions of authority within the colonial government. One John Boon was found guilty of not only holding “correspondence with the Pyrates Chapman and Holloway,” two ship captains convicted of attacking Spanish shipping and settlements, but also with providing the pirates with “victuals” and arranging to “convey away and conceale part of their stolen goods.” The Proprietors and Governor Colleton removed Boon from the Grand Council and prohibited him from holding office in the colony in the future. In addition, the Proprietors included instructions to the Carolina Assembly warning them to “be more prudent and Loyall and know their Duty better then to choose persons who have soe notoriously acted in Contempt of his Majesties Lawes.” Their warning noted that unless the colonists were more circumspect in their actions, they could not justifiably complain of things that “tend to ye Ruine of the Settlement” because their own acts had drawn “on you the Indignation and Revenge of all those Princes” whose colonies the colonists had provoked. While the colonists’ anger over the Spanish attacks was not abated, their ability to act upon that anger was forcibly curtailed.18

16 Ibid, 186.
17 For promises of recompense, see Chapter 2, 44-45.
With the attacks over, the Carolinians’ plans for a retaliatory attack on Florida stopped, and the proprietors’ orders clear, Governor Colleton put into effect his plan to send Dunlop’s expedition to begin the effort to maintain an open line of communication with St. Augustine. Through the late 1680s and during most of the 1690s, both Spanish and English governors sent a number of delegations to the other to complain and seek redress for various sources of conflict. In the first expedition, Colleton ironically chose a man who had little love of the Spanish but who had an intimate knowledge of the voyage to the south, William Dunlop. Dunlop had been an investor and a leader of the Scottish colony at Stuartstown destroyed by the Floridians. He thus held little love for the Spanish in St. Augustine or their Indian allies. In 1687, during the immediate aftermath of the attack on Charleston, the Carolina Assembly sent William Dunlop along with some thirty Englishmen and a small group of Indian allies to scout the region of Guale to ascertain the Spanish defenses of the region in preparation of the anticipated invasion of Florida. The Yamasseses provided the bulk of the Indian allies accompanying Dunlop on this scouting voyage, reflecting the shifting alliances of the local Indians in the territory to Charleston from St. Augustine. Dunlop’s plan entailed a small force of “in all 100 men: whereof 37 English 60 Yamsies [sic] [and] 3 Wimbee [Cusabo] Indians” that would travel to the region of the former missions in order “to goe to the frontiers to see if the Spaniards were still lying w[ith]in the province.”

Dunlop’s scouting party found numerous signs of the former Spanish presence, including ruined houses, orchards, and the vestiges of a small fort on the island of Santa

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19 The ‘Wimbee’ was a coastal Indian tribe of southern South Carolina that were part of the larger Cusabo Indians that had earlier been allied with the Spanish. “Journal of Capt. Dunlop’s Voyage to the Southward, 1687,” _SCHGM_, 30: 3 (July 1929), 129.
Catalina. Orchards had been burnt, houses looted, and among the few remains found, Dunlop noted livestock, some clothes, and other articles taken from the raids on Charleston. Despite the signs, he noted that both Spanish and Indians seemed to have abandoned the province in the face of the English threat and his party continued southward. His voyage was not without problem as the loyalties of his Yamassee and Cusabo allies were tested by his desire to confront the Spanish. With many of the Indians so recently friendly with the Spanish, they saw little if any gain in raiding the Spanish with such a small force. Some Indians in the party balked at Dunlop’s order to attack, a small lookout post he encountered at the northern edge of Spanish territory. One chieftain named Matamaha refused his order to participate in the attack giving proof that the Indians in the region would continue to act as free agents rather than submissive vassals. The Indian responded to Dunlop’s exhortations by stating bluntly that “he wold not goe kill Spaniards for they had never killed any of his people.” Without something to offer in return, Dunlop had no way to force the Indians’ cooperation. Facing uncertain allies and the possibility of Spanish attack, Dunlop decided to return to Charleston with news of his findings. On his return, he discovered that the situation had changed and that Governor Colleton had effectively gained control of the colony in the name of the proprietors. A Spanish priest, Simon de Salas, arrived in Charleston under a flag of truce early in 1688 bearing an offer to entertain an English delegation in St. Augustine to discuss the points of contention between both sides. Dunlop, reluctantly perhaps, agreed to Colleton’s request that he turn his knowledge of the Spanish to a more peaceful use.
and lead the expedition to St. Augustine to begin communicating with the Spanish governor.  

Governor Colleton’s instructions to Dunlop were thorough. His orders required Dunlop “to repair to the most Noble Governor of fflorida” and convey the good wishes of the proprietors and the English king. To overcome Dunlop’s possible continued ill-will towards the Spanish, the orders made clear where the authority lay in the need for establishing communication between the parties. Colleton reminded him that “the King my Master hath most strictly injoynd me and his other subjects to maintain the peace and Amity betwixt the Crowns.” Further, Colleton desired that both Dunlop and the Spanish be aware that he, as governor, would “not only as the duty [owed] to [his] Princes command but by Inclination too at all times use [his] utmost endeavours to maintain a constant peace and good Correspondence with the subject of his most Cathlick majesty and most especially with the... Governor of fflorida.” Dunlop’s mission was the first of several similar missions that Colleton and his successors would use through the 1690s to maintain a fragile peace. While the particulars changed from time to time, Dunlop’s mission and Colleton’s communication with the Spanish governor provide a good example of the themes that would recur throughout the decade regarding the concerns of the English.

In the letter to the governor of Florida he sent by Dunlop, Colleton sought to allay both the concerns of the Spanish as well as the residents of Charleston still bitter at the destruction wrought by the Spanish raids. The main issue for the Spanish was the support and tolerance for vessels engaged in the piratical raids that had destroyed the missions in

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Guale and continued to attack Spanish shipping. Just as the Proprietors acknowledged the culpability of some of the leading colonists in Carolina in this type of activity, Colleton sought to assure the Spanish governor that efforts to remedy this situation were well underway. Colleton instructed Dunlop to “let the Governor of Florida know that since I came to the Government [of Charleston] there have been no pirats nor other Sea Robbers admitted nor had any reception in this province without being brought to condigne punishment.” To demonstrate his sincerity, Colleton pointed to the fact that he had “severall at this time in prison who are speedily to be brought to their tryalls” for piracy. He sought to assure his counterpart in St. Augustine that he would “at all times vigorously endeavour in my station and Government to extirpate abolish and destroy that sort of people who are so much enemies...to all mankind.”

From the Carolina standpoint, much more important were Colleton’s efforts to push for some type of reparations for the destruction done to the plantations and the loss of slaves both during and after the raids. His instructions sought “chiefly to lay open and make evident the great damages his Majestie’s subjects in this province here sustained by the two Invasions of this Country by persons who came from the City of St. Augustine.” Since Dunlop, himself, had lost his house and possessions in Stuartstown, he was in a unique position to press for this cause and to give a personal report of the losses. With this in mind, Colleton instructed Dunlop to “demand satisfaction for the same and to give a particular Account of the sume of the said damages.” The demand for compensation for the losses would ultimately fail to produce any tangible result, but it did, along with

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21 “William Dunlop’s Mission to St. Augustine,” 2.
the Proprietors’ promises to bring the issue up through diplomatic channels, help to dispel some of the resistance to the efforts to maintain peace between Carolina and Florida.\footnote{Ibid.}

Of more importance than reparations was the issue of slaves taken by the Spanish during the raids as well as the ongoing problem of runaway slaves finding refuge in St. Augustine. Colleton instructed Dunlop specifically to “demand and receive those eleven Negroes which were taken from Landgrave Mortoun who are there still.” Joseph Morton was the governor of Carolina who had preceded James Colleton. His plantation house on Edisto Island, along with others, had been ransacked by the Spanish during the raids and his brother-in-law Edward Bowell had been killed. Although Morton himself died before Dunlop’s expedition, Colleton’s instructions were accompanied by a personal letter from Morton’s widow and the executors of his will to Dunlop requesting that he personally “demand the said negroes” using the names provided, Peter, Scipio, Caesar, Sambo, Mammy, and others, as proof of their ownership. In lieu of the slaves being returned, the letter allowed that if the Spanish were “willing to buy them wee leave you to dispose of them at your Discretion.” Colleton’s cooperation with this request was yet another attempt to win support for the proprietors from prominent colonists such as Morton who had been a key leader in the faction of colonists who opposed many of the proprietors’ efforts to exert their authority of colonial affairs and the Indian trade.\footnote{“William Dunlop’s Mission to St. Augustine,” 2-4; Weir, \textit{Colonial South Carolina}, 64-66.}

A further effort to win support for the peace with the Spanish was Colleton’s order to deal with the issue of fugitive slaves in the future. From the beginning of Carolina, chattel slavery had been important to the economy. Many of the early colonists brought with them experience with plantation agriculture in Barbados and elsewhere in

the English West Indies when they immigrated to the new colony. A major irritant on the part of the English colonists was the potential and actual refuge found in Spanish Florida by runaway slaves. The possibility of freedom spurred many slaves to run away and was a problem for English planters in Carolina through most of its history. On the other hand, the slaves who reached Florida provided the Spanish with a source, albeit small, of new settlers and a way to tweak their English rivals. In addition to these factors, slaves represented one more reason for the importance of the English-Indian alliances because the Indians cooperated with the English in watching for and returning runaways. In all, the slave experience represented both a military and a diplomatic challenge to both sides.

Militarily, black inhabitants in both colonies were used to augment the forces available to their respective governors. In 1683, after the English attack on St. Augustine, the Spanish governor organized roughly fifty black and mulatto inhabitants, both slave and free, into a militia company in conjunction with another company of similar size of white creoles. The incorporation of slaves continued through the rest of the seventeenth century and culminated in 1738 when the Spanish governor, Manuel de Montiano, established a free black town, Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, north of St. Augustine to act as a buffer fortress against English encroachment. The English, likewise, used their most trustworthy slaves as a complement to the colonial militia. So important were these adjunct militiamen that a 1708 law passed by the Carolina Assembly required each militia captain to “enlist traine up and bring into the field for each white, one able Slave armed with gun or lance” to increase the number of soldiers available during emergencies. Both during the Westo War and at other times of strife, small numbers of black militia served Carolina until the 1720s and 30s when the
Yamassee War and the 1739 Stono Rebellion convinced white Carolinians of the dangers of arming slaves.\textsuperscript{24}

Diplomatically, the fugitive slaves represented a sticky point of contention that required the Spanish governor to improvise a solution and to request further clarification from the king on the course of action to be taken in the future. In William Dunlop’s instructions, Governor Colleton pushed beyond the immediate issue of Morton’s stolen slaves and instructed that his emissary should “likewise demand the delivery up to you of those fugitive Negroes and others who have fled from this province.” This had become an issue because, in 1687, the first recorded instance of runaway slaves successfully reaching St. Augustine occurred when a group of eight men, two women, and a nursing child arrived in a stolen boat seeking refuge and claiming to be Catholic. The Spanish governor, Diego de Quiroga y Losada, gave them asylum, putting the men to work on the construction of the Castillo de San Marcos and the women in his own household while paying all wages for their work from the royal coffers. Governor Colleton demanded all of the slaves’ return and claimed that two of the escapees had murdered someone during their escape. Unwilling to show weakness, Quiroga refused to release the slaves into English custody; but in an attempt to demonstrate some good will in the peace process he agreed to pay restitution for the slaves to their owners. Since the royal coffers in St. Augustine were chronically short of funds, Dunlop had to accept a promise for payment “within the period of a year and a half... of one thousand and six hundred pieces in coin”

and Governor Quiroga immediately applied to the king for the money to do so. He put a few of the slaves up for auction in an attempt to offset some of the expense, but reported that no one in St. Augustine could afford to buy them. He, himself, offered to buy the two females. Ultimately, in 1693, the slaves were freed by order of the king and became part of the small but important community of free blacks in Spanish Florida.\(^2\)\(^5\)

Diplomatically, the issue of slave loyalties also led the English over time to reevaluate their relationship with their Indian allies. The fact that slaves and servants alike might seek to leave their servitude in Carolina was not lost on Carolinians from the very beginning of the colony. Governor Joseph West in 1671 commented on the travels of Henry Woodward both north and south, stating that “if he arrives safe... there is way laid for o[u]r Serv[an]ts to range in, wee have lost two already.” His fears were justified when in 1674 the interim-governor of St. Augustine, Pablo de Hita Salazar, noted the arrival of four white English servants from Charleston claiming ill-usage from their masters. To prevent slaves from attempting the same, a system of tickets and passes was required for slaves to travel around the colony; violators faced severe punishments such as branding, slitting the nose, and emasculation. Though these laws were later disallowed by the Lords Proprietor, the concerns of the colonists were apparent in their passage.\(^2\)\(^6\)

To help with the problem of runaway slaves, the colonists and the proprietors recruited their Indian allies to help keep watch for and help return fugitives passing through their territories. In 1683 the proprietors noted that many in the colony believed that Indians were the best way to keep slaves from escaping. They noted that “the

\(^2\)\(^5\) Governor of Florida to the King, March 8, 1689, AGI 54-5-11/74 bnd 2785 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, August 16, 1689, AGI 54-5-12/86 bnd 2825 (Stetson); Landers, “Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose,” 13-15; “William Dunlop’s Mission to St. Augustine,” 27.

Indians will be of great Use to ye Inhabitants of our Province for the fetching in againe of such Negro Slaves as shall Runn away from their masters.” Later warnings from the proprietors to the colonists against alienating the Indians surrounding them pointed out to the offending colonists that without the Indians “you can never get in yo[u]r Negroes that run away.” As the numbers of slaves increased, some colonists sought a way to further organize the Indians to assist with the problem. In the 1690s, Governor Thomas Smith, his Council, and the Assembly issued orders and subsequently “sumond all ye neighouring Indians to Receive Some Comands from ye Councill relateing to Runaway slaves.” While the Indians acted from their own motivations and were not willing or able to keep all slaves from escaping to St. Augustine, the relationship between English and Indians changed not only due to the desire for trade, but also from the desire of the English to prevent the loss of their increasingly valuable slaves to their rivals to the south.27

William Dunlop’s mission to St. Augustine thus represented, in part or in whole, most of the major issues and themes that entered into the complex relationship between Spanish Florida and English Carolina during this period. The need to maintain an open line of communication to attempt to resolve disputes between the regional rivals was taken seriously by both sides, at least through the first years of the 1690s. The Spanish, especially, saw it as way to safeguard their weak colony. From the time of Dunlop’s original mission, Spanish accounts mention corresponding in some form or fashion with the English in “San Jorge” (the Spanish term for Charleston) eight times over the next decade. While not numerous, in terms of the previous hostility and the mutual mistrust

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between the two sides, the attempts represent a temporary respite from the outright enmity that existed before this period and a brief, if imperfect, period of peace for both colonies. The issues continued to center on Indian relations and slaves. Over time, however, the peace between the colonies deteriorated over these same concerns as slowly but surely both sides failed to meet the others' expectations.28

The diplomatic need for peace from the European perspective continued through at least the end of 1697 with the end of the War of the Grand Alliance. With the Spanish engaged in war with France from 1688 and the beginning of the Glorious Revolution in England that same year, the turmoil demanded that Carolina cease its antagonism of the Spanish. The same held true of Spanish colonies after William III of England formally allied with the League of Augsburg against France early in 1689, events that roughly corresponded to the time during which William Dunlop was endeavoring to establish a peaceful relationship with St. Augustine. From the diplomatic perspective in Europe, both the Spanish crown and the Lords Proprietor, acting on orders from the English crown, sought to do their part in maintaining peace between Carolina and Florida. In addition to agreeing to pay the required sum for the slaves demanded by Dunlop, the Spanish king, Charles II, issued orders to resolve the legal status of and free several English prisoners held in Seville who had been captured during the attacks on Guale and St. Augustine. Several royal cedulas over the next several years also repeatedly

28 Gov of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/112 bnd 2914 (Stetson); Gov of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 22, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/120 bnd 2930 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, August 12, 1693, AGI 58-1-22/275 bnd 3176 (Stetson); Gov of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, March 11, 1695, AGI 58-1-26/130 bnd 3283 (Stetson); Memo from Junta de Guerra for Fiscal, Madrid, June 27, 1697, AGI 58-1-26/135 bnd 3440 (Stetson); Gov of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, August 9, 1697, AGI 54-5-13/126 bnd 3449 (Stetson); Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, Feb., 1698, AGI 58-1-26/137 bnd 3494 (Stetson); Gov of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, May 15, 1699, AGI 61-6-22/15 bnd 3617 (Stetson).
reinforced the need to keep up the correspondence with the English in Charleston. For their part, the Lords Proprietor also repeatedly warned their governors during the first half of the 1690s of the need to keep the Spanish happy. A large measure of this effort centered on their orders to the Carolinians that “if any pyrats come to Carolina you doe yor best endeavor to seize them and their plunder.” The proprietors wanted to ensure that privateers who made their living raiding the Spanish were punished and made examples of so that “men may no longer have reason to say that Carolina is a safe retreat for pyrats.”

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The cause of peace, in Carolina as in Spanish Florida, during the late 1680s and through the first half of the 1690s, also had the added impetus on both sides of serious confusion and infighting among the colonists that would have prevented effective efforts to attack their regional rivals in any case. In both colonies, the royal governors during the immediate aftermath of the conflict in 1680s faced legal troubles. In both, disparate local interests among the colonists, clergy, or other royal officials served to cause discord in the organization and administration of the colony. In Carolina, continued disputes over control of the lucrative Indian trade erupted between the representatives of the proprietors and the colonists. In Florida, the long-standing friction between governor and clergy hindered efforts to improve the defenses of the colony at the same time that the course of

29 King of Spain to the Marquis de los Velez, Madrid, April 12, 1688, AGI 58-2-6/11 bnd 2711 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, Nov. 7, 1693, AGI 58-1-26/127 bnd 3192 (Stetson); “Lords Proprietor to Thomas Smith, Governor of Carolina,” in Recs. Rel. to SC, 3: 112.
the war with France caused worries and losses for the Spaniards in St. Augustine. On top of the internal divisions in Florida, continued worries over the actions of English Indian allies along the remaining mission frontier and the threat of French or English encroachment on western Florida provided challenges that the bureaucracy of the Spanish Empire recognized but never effectively met. By the beginning of the 1700s, these challenges would combine to begin the eventual decimation of Spanish power in the Southeast.

The legal wrangling common in St. Augustine between clergy, officials, and governor during 1687 and 1688 did not end completely with the arrival of his replacement, Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada. Though most locals were initially happy with the replacement, Quiroga passed little time before being drawn into the petty squabbling and complaints that typified the administration of this backwater outpost. Some of the issues tended to be so minor as to be laughable in some respects. In one instance, Governor Quiroga ordered the other royally appointed officials in St. Augustine to “begin wearing cloaks on Sundays,” because he felt it would be not only more appropriate but “more dignified” and becoming of their station in the community.30

When not otherwise occupied with minor disputes, other conflicts often arose between the governor and the clergy over the prerogatives of each group in the implementation of justice within the colony. One such dispute arose over an English prisoner, Andres Ranson, captured during one of the English raids in 1684 and accused of piracy.31 He remained in St. Augustine as a prisoner for the duration of the conflict and

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30 Governor Quiroga y Losada to the King, St. Augustine, August 16, 1689 AGI 54-5-12/80 bnd 2819 (Stetson).
31 This prisoner is referred to as both Andres Ranson and Andres Ransom in various Spanish documents. I will refer to him as Ranson for sake of consistency since this is the most common spelling.
continued his captivity there even after several other English prisoners had been transferred and released. Ranson’s status as a prisoner, his guilt, and finally his religious status became a matter for debate between civil and religious authorities across the Caribbean for over a decade. The facts of the case were, in the beginning, quite ordinary. Ranson was an experienced English seaman. Before his capture in the early 1680s, he and his wife lived in the New Providence colony in the Bahamas. In 1683, he was hired by a New England privateer, Captain Thomas Jingle, to serve as steward aboard one of ten vessels outfitted and granted letters of marque to raid Spanish shipping. Ranson led a small group of ten English sailors in a raid to the north of St. Augustine in search of needed provisions for the fleet. A force of fifty Spanish soldiers dispatched from the capital when word reached St. Augustine of the presence of English raiders found and captured Ranson’s group. A trial was soon held for the prisoners by the Spanish governor, Juan Marques Cabrera. During the trial, a Spanish mariner with years of experience in the Caribbean who had been captured and held prisoner aboard an English ship engaged in attacks on Spanish shipping, positively identified Ranson as the pilot of that ship. The Spanish interrogated the other English sailors who admitted that the Jingle fleet’s purpose was to raid the Spanish and pointed to Ranson as their leader. The governor convicted all of the individuals of piracy, sentencing the sailors to hard labor and Ranson to death by hanging. The English sailors were ultimately released during the negotiations between England and Spain in the late 1680s, but Ranson’s case became a matter of controversy and split the Florida colony along religious lines for more than a decade.32

32 Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, July 10, 1685, AGI 58-2-6/1 bnd 2434 (Stetson); Testimonio.
From this point the details of Ranson’s story begin to border on the remarkable.

After sentencing the prisoners, Governor Marquez Cabrera set out to implement his decision. The other ten Englishmen were put to work on the continuing construction of the Castillo de San Marcos. Until late 1684, the governor kept Ranson imprisoned awaiting execution. While awaiting his sentence, Ranson began to seek the ministrations of a Franciscan priest, Perez de la Mota, from the local church, professing his devout Catholicism. This mattered little except to the religious community in the colony, and ultimately a small squad of soldiers led Ranson to the gallows in St. Augustine to be hanged. Soldiers, the governor, various local officials, and a small contingent of priests, led by Father la Mota, attended as witnesses as a rope was wrapped around Ranson’s neck and the executioner proceeded to suspend the convicted pirate and twist to tighten the rope until Ranson’s body became limp. At some point during the twisting the rope snapped. As the priests checked the body, to the astonishment of all, they found that Ranson was still alive. La Mota immediately declared it a miracle and had Ranson carried to the sanctuary of the convent in St. Augustine. From there, Father La Mota and the other priests proclaimed Ranson’s ecclesiastic immunity from the death sentence and defied the efforts of the governor and other officials to claim Ranson and carry out the sentence. From the remarkable events of that day, the acrimony between governor and clerics devolved into petty accusations and threats. All the while Ranson, for three years,

dev auto sobre si debe o no gozar de la inmunidad eclesiastica Andres Ranson, St. Augustine, June 1, 1696, Jeannette Thurber Connor Collection, Library of Congress, Hereafter referred to as (Connor); J. Leitch Wright, Jr., “Andrew Ranson: Seventeenth Century Pirate?” FHZ 39: 2 (Oct., 1960), 135-40.
remained safely within the walls of the convent as both priests and governor wrote heated letters to their superiors demanding a resolution to the controversy.\textsuperscript{33}

By 1687, when Governor Quiroga y Losada took office in St. Augustine, the resolution of the controversy still eluded officials and priests in Florida, despite the intervention of the Bishop of Cuba and the orders to investigate the episode from the king. Quiroga convinced both sides to step back and offered Ranson safe conduct to live in the Castillo in return for his assistance as a carpenter in the continuing construction of the fort. The other English prisoners had long since left Florida, but Ranson readily agreed. For almost two years he worked, as events proceeded in his case. In 1690, orders from the king to the Bishop of Cuba demanded Ranson’s release to civil authorities, which Quiroga had already accomplished. The king also ordered the banishment of at least two priests for their parts in defying civil authorities. The royal orders instructed Florida officials to arrange transport for Father la Mota to testify in person of the events and to present his case. Civil authorities did not escape the notice of the king’s councilors; they later reprimanded Governor Quiroga for allowing Ranson free run of the Castillo and ordered him confined in the convent until his status was determined.\textsuperscript{34}

Father la Mota reached Spain in 1692 and submitted his testimony to the Royal Council. In lengthy, laboriously detailed, testimony, La Mota described his version of

\textsuperscript{33} "Documents relating to Andres Ranson", St. Augustine, 1685-1686, AGI 58-2-6 bnd 2462-A (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, March 18, 1686, AGI 58-2-6/5 bnd 2462 (Stetson); Wright, "Andrew Ranson" 140-43.

\textsuperscript{34} Bishop Compostela to the King, Havana, August 12, 1691, AGI 58-2-6/22 bnd 3003 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to Governor Quiroga y Losada, Madrid, 1690, AGI 58-1-25/222 bnd 2872 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 8, 1690, AGI 58-2-6/21 bnd 2921 (Stetson); Fr. Julian Chumillas to Antonio Ortiz de Otalora, San Francisco, Florida, December 2, 1688, AGI 58-2-6/16 bnd 2772 (Stetson).
the events in a written memorial and used the broken rope, itself, as evidence of a miracle. From there, the case entered the halls of bureaucracy, and the Council’s determination in the case is unknown. The case of a minor pirate in a backwater outpost, despite the stir it created, may never have received the true attention of anyone in Madrid. Certainly, the fact that all of the immediate participants, outside of Ranson himself, had long since left or been banished from St. Augustine did not contribute to the immediacy of the case. The efforts of la Mota and his fellow Franciscans, however, did accomplish their main aim because Ranson was never executed. His status still undetermined, he alternately lived either in the Castillo or in the convent through the rest of the 1690s and into the early 1700s. During the English invasion of Florida in 1702 and the two-month siege of St. Augustine, Ranson, along with other more recent English captives held in the fortress, were offered freedom in return for service as interpreters or medics helping the outnumbered Spaniards. The then-Governor, Jose de Zúñiga y Cerda, noted Ranson’s and the others’ conduct and recommended that his offer of freedom be honored.

Ranson’s case, while unique, merely points out the divisions within Spanish Florida society, especially between the Church and royal government. Whether the disputes over grain withheld by priests from soldiers, as Governor Quiroga complained in 1692, or a dispute over legal jurisdiction over a prisoner, Spanish Florida clearly did not face the regional threats with a unified face.\(^{35}\)

More divisive than the internecine squabbles among the leadership of the colony was the almost constant lack of adequate staffing, supplies, and funding that St.

\(^{35}\) Memorial of Joseph Perez de la Mota, Madrid, August 25, 1692, AGI 58-2-6/24 bnd 3103 (Stetson); Auto de Governor Governor Zúñiga y Cerda, St. Augustine, Nov. 10, 1702, AGI 58-2-8 bnd 3940 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, April 16, 1692, AGI 54-5-13/33 bnd 3069 (Stetson); Wright, “Andres Ranson,” 140-144.
Augustine suffered throughout most of its history. The constant worries regarding this problem escalated and plagued Spanish Florida even more greatly during the decade of the 1690s, causing complaints and even threats of insurrection from the garrison and population of St. Augustine. One of the major factors in the intensification of the colony's dire situation was the disruption caused by the war with France. In Europe, and to a lesser degree the Americas, Spain's power had faded from its heyday of the sixteenth century and Spain's ability to stop the French fleet was limited. Numerous reports of French ships threatening Florida kept the governor moving his few troops from spot to spot in hopes of heading off a feared attack. In one instance, in 1690, reports had French ships both to the north and south of St. Augustine, a report verified by English dispatches from Carolina. Governor Quiroga rushed small contingents to both spots but the attacks failed to materialize. On another occasion, in 1692, the governor hastily recalled troops sent to Apalachicola back to St. Augustine to head off another rumored attack. He begged the king for more troops, though to little avail.\textsuperscript{36}

Even more troubling were the constant depredations against Spanish shipping throughout the Caribbean during the war. French ships were a perpetual threat to the long lines of supply and communication that linked the outpost in Florida to the more populous and well-defended areas of the Spanish empire. The exposed nature of the colony worked against it. Several times officials in Florida reported to Madrid the loss of dispatches or the supplies and money of the annual situado and begged for relief. In 1691, the French captured a courier ship carrying documents to New Spain that described the lack of supplies and the poor defenses of St. Augustine to the viceroy. This caused

\textsuperscript{36} Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 22, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/120 bnd 2930 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, April 10, 1692, 54-5-13/32 bnd 3067 (Stetson).
even further fear of attack among the population in Spanish Florida. The stresses of war also disrupted the payment of the situado from New Spain; for much of the decade of the nineties, St. Augustine failed to receive its stipend of money and supplies for years at a time. Even orders sent by the king early in 1691 to the viceroy of New Spain, instructing him to send additional supplies each year to be stockpiled against emergencies to remedy the situation, went unanswered in the turmoil of the times. In 1693, the governor reported the failure of the situado to arrive for the years from 1689 to 1692. In February 1697, a similar complaint from Florida reported that the situado from 1691 to 1696 had not been received as well. By this time, the situation in La Florida was dire and soldiers, citizens, and Indians alike began to rebel against an authority that could not provide for their needs.\textsuperscript{37}

The last half of the 1690s saw the disorder in Florida reach extremes. Lack of payment caused unrest and a lack of discipline among the Spanish troops stationed in Florida, especially those posted among the mission Indians who had the least amount of oversight. Abuses of the Indian population became common, and in 1694 the governor responded to an increase in the complaints voiced by the Indian caciques in Timucua and Apalachee by ordering a visita, or inspection, of all of the provinces by Captain Juan de Pueyo as the governor's official representative. Among the officials charged with misconduct were the lieutenant-general, Diego de Jaen, who was recalled to St. Augustine to answer charges of administrative misconduct, scandalous behavior with the Indian women, and forcing Indians to provide tribute and labor without compensation.

\textsuperscript{37} Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, Oct. 15, 1691, AGI 54-5-13/26 bnd 3022 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to [governor] of Florida, Nov. 17, 1691, AGI 58-1-22/208 bnd 3035 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, April 23, 1693, AGI 54-5-13/53 bnd 3154 (Stetson); Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, Feb. 8, 1697, AGI 54-5-13/101 bnd 3398 (Stetson).
Another officer in Timucua, Lieutenant Andres Garcia y Santiago, was charged with the murder of an Indian man. Even the Indian population was not free of sins against the state. Two Apalachee Indians were accused and later convicted of counterfeiting coins.\textsuperscript{38}

Poor discipline grew into threatened rebellion in St. Augustine as the lack of supplies and irregular pay continued and grew worse. While some two-thirds of food supplies needed by the town continued to come from Apalachee, the failure of supplies to reach Florida from Cuba or New Spain caused widespread hunger among the population. Shortages of supplies forced harsh measures from the governor, and the soldiers of the garrison suffered the worst through the 1690s. In December 1692 the garrisons’ rations were cut in half to conserve food. By December of the next year, the governor cut the rations to one third. The occasional ship did reach the colony over the next couple of years, but by 1696 the soldiers were again on one third rations. Efforts to obtain supplies from outside the Spanish empire were forbidden by royal decree in 1696 causing great anger among the vecinos, or townspeople, of St. Augustine. By 1697, the critical lack of supplies had soldiers foraging for food in the forests and the population of St. Augustine, barely two thousand souls, at the point of rebellion. The situation worsened in February of that year when a ship sent to Havana sank off the islands of the Bahamas. Soon thereafter an unsigned note addressed to the governor and left on the church pulpit after a service threatened to turn the colony over to the French unless immediate steps were taken to obtain supplies from Charleston. To add insult to injury, an English ship captain, John Phillips, who had sworn loyalty to the Spanish king in return for a letter of marque against the French, renounced his loyalty and accepted a commission from the French.

\textsuperscript{38} Autos de Visita, St. Augustine, Feb. 8, 1695, AGI Es de Cam leg 157 cua I bnd 3280 (Stetson).
The situation in St. Augustine was at the breaking point, and only the fortuitous arrival of a relief ship from Havana in April 1697 prevented a rebellion among the Spanish and Creole populations. Unrest among the Indian population was not as easily allayed.39

Late in 1696, several missions to the immediate south and southeast of St. Augustine in the interior of Florida in a relatively new region known collectively as Mayaca, established during the early 1680s, rebelled against the Spanish during their period of greatest weakness. Soldiers sent to quell the unrest accomplished little as the Indians from the missions in the area such as San Salvador de Mayaca, Atissime, and Atoyquime fled at their approach. Some of the missions involved were populated by the refugee Yamassees who had resettled south of St. Augustine after the destruction of the Guale missions. Several Spaniards, including a Franciscan priest, Father Luis Sánchez, and a soldier, were killed during the violence and the mission church desecrated. The unrest spread to other areas, and over the next year royal orders forced the governor to personally quell the unrest among the mission Indians and restore order. Eventually, the Indians returned to Mayaca, except for the ringleaders of the rebellion, and order was restored. Yet the situation in St. Augustine and in the missions remained tense. Spanish influence among the Indians rested on their perceived ability to protect their allies and to project power throughout the mission provinces. As supplies ran short, the garrison starved and dwindled in numbers, and even the Spanish and Creole population stirred

39 Royal Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, Feb. 27, 1696, AGI 58-1-22/370 bnd 3348 (Stetson); Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, April 20, 1697, AGI 54-5-13/119 bnd 3419 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to Governor of Florida, Madrid, Aug. 17, 1697, AGI 58-1-22/401 bnd 3452 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 170.
with unrest; Spanish influence decreased and exposed the weakness of La Florida to all. It was a perception that the Spanish struggled to rectify as outside threats multiplied.40

The perceived threats posed to the Spanish from France did not center wholly on the menace of an attack on the capital of St. Augustine. The worries over French interest and attempts to settle a colony on the Gulf of Mexico did not fade after the initial furor over La Salle’s expedition in the 1680s. As late as June 1689, reports continued to remark on sightings of a supposed French settlement around the Mississippi River or somewhere further east towards Apalachee. Even more troubling to the Spanish officials in St. Augustine were efforts on the part of English traders from Charleston to use the period of relative calm between Carolina and La Florida to extend their trading relationships into Apalachicola, just north of Apalachee, where the beginnings of the loose alliance among the various tribes that would become the Creek Confederacy began to emerge. As early as 1685, officials at Charleston began to send small groups of traders into the area under the leadership of the experienced Indian trader/negotiator Dr. Henry Woodward. The caciques of Altamaha, of the large town of Coweta, and other villages on or near the Chattahoochee River saw the English as a way to balance Spanish influence and efforts to force Apalachicholas into an alliance. After the weakening of Spanish power with the destruction of Guale, some isolated raiding of Apalachee missions by the Apalachicholas occurred, causing the Spanish to send small military expeditions to the region to try negotiate peace with offers of gifts and trade, an effort that the Spanish were forced to repeat almost yearly through the early 1690s. The

40 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Feb. 3, 1697, AGI 54-5-13/101 bnd 3394 (Stetson); Letter to Comissario-General de Las Indias, St. Augustine, April 18, 1698, AGI 58-1-22/453 bnd 3518 (Stetson); Royal Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, June 5, 1698, AGI 58-1-22/458 bnd 3533 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 163-65.
caciques of Apalachicola and throughout the area north of Apalachee effectively used both the Spanish and English overtures against the other, balancing their response to maximize the benefit and to fiercely maintain their independence of action.41

Despite the efforts of the Spanish to forestall the spread of English trade into a region so close to Apalachee, the Carolinians increased their trade with the Creeks during the 1690s. First word of the troubling developments came in September 1689 in a warning from Governor Quiroga to the king of the appearance of even more English traders in the region. The danger to Apalachee from the north and from the sea was untenable to officials in St. Augustine. Fortunately, the Spanish were not wholly without resources to counter the threat to their most valuable province, despite their weakened condition. Small military expeditions were sent into Apalachicola to expel the English traders, and in June 1690 Governor Quiroga decided to construct a blockhouse to house a garrison in Apalachee. The poor situation of the garrison in St. Augustine caused the regular military excursions into Apalachicola to end in 1692, but the governor maintained his efforts to fund the new stronghold at the mission of San Luis de Apalachee. From 1694 to 1696, despite problems elsewhere, the Spanish successfully completed a two-story blockhouse with placements along the upper works for small pieces of artillery situated on a high hill. A palisade eventually completed the fortress that in 1695 gave a small garrison of thirty-four soldiers an unobstructed view of the province from which to respond to continuing raids from the increasingly hostile Apalachicola.42

41 Conde de Galve to the King, New Spain, June 14, 1689, AGI 61-6-20/64 bnd 2803 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 160-63.
42 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Sept. 29, 1689, AGI 54-5-12/97 bnd 2852 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 8, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/116 bnd 2918 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, April 10, 1692, AGI 54-5-13/32 bnd 3067 (Stetson); Royal
Growing concerns over the continued French threats to shipping in the Gulf of Mexico, combined with the troubling activities of the English among the Creeks, led the Council of the Indies to decide in the later half of the 1690s to establish a larger port and town than they currently had in western Florida. In 1689, following up on the rumored interest of France in Pensacola Bay, a Spanish expedition from New Spain, under the command of Captain Andres de Pez, did a thorough exploration of the area and recommended a site for a new settlement that would become Pensacola. Through the 1690s both the French and the English threatened to lay claim to the bay and, soon after the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697 ending the War of the Grand Alliance, confident reports out of France described the outfitting of four French ships, with orders to settle along the Gulf Coast. From the English, a similar warning came in the summer of 1698 in the form of a report from a Spanish officer, Francisco Romo de Uriza, sent as an ambassador from the Spanish governor to Charleston, who told of finding Indians from Pensacola trading in the town. When confronted with the Spanish claim to the area, the governor of Carolina, Joseph Blake, adamantly proclaimed Pensacola Bay property of the English and refused to halt trade with the Indians. He further informed Uriza that the French and English had informally agreed that whichever power was the first to settle the area was to have undisputed title, despite Spanish claims to the contrary.43

The rumors and apparent activity of the French and English forced the hand of the Council that had approved a plan of settlement in the early 1690s but failed to provide the

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Cedula to Governor of Florida, Madrid, June 5, 1698, AGI 58-1-22/439 bnd 3549; Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 163.

43 Governor Torres of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Oct. 23, 1698, AGI 61-6-22/5 bnd 3583 (Stetson); Crane, Southern Frontier, 64-65; Lawrence Carroll Ford, M.A., The Triangular Struggle For Spanish Pensacola, 1689-1739 (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1939), 1-32.
funds necessary to accomplish it. Pensacola Bay, at the western extreme of the
panhandle of modern Florida, was far removed by land and sea from St. Augustine and
the efforts fell outside of the immediate purview of the governor of Florida. In 1698, a
royal cedula ordered the Conde de Moctezuma, the Viceroy of New Spain, to collect
whatever funds necessary from whatever sources available and send an immediate
expedition to Pensacola Bay to take possession. A similar parallel effort in Spain under
Martín de Zavala organized two ships with soldiers and supplies for the new settlement.
Finally, a small fleet of three ships under the command of Andrés de Arriola, with just
over three hundred men, landed in Pensacola Bay on November 21, 1698 and constructed
a small fort named San Carlos de Austria. Zavala’s force reinforced the small settlement
in 1699 but not before the threat to Pensacola became readily apparent. In late January
1699, the force of French ships rumored to be destined for the Gulf Coast appeared off
the new settlement, only to be refused entry. This fleet under the leadership of Pierre Le
Moyne, Sieur d’Iberville, an experienced French explorer in French Canada, would
proceed to explore the region around the mouth of the Mississippi. D’Iberville would
return several times to the area around the Mississippi and would later be the first French
governor of Louisiana. Other rumors of an English trading station among the Creeks as
well as sightings of English ships off the coast also brought the timeliness of the
Pensacola settlement to light. Another threat had been averted but not stopped and by the
beginning of the eighteenth century the situation of Florida would enter its most difficult
stage. 44

44 Conde de Galve, Viceroy of New Spain, to the Marquis de los Velez, Mexico, June 29, 1689, AGI 61-6-
20/66 bnd 2805 (Stetson); Jaime Franck to Sec Sierralta, Santa María de Galve, Feb. 18, 1699, AGI 61-6-
22/9  bnd 3600 (Stetson); Francisco Martinez to Viceroy Moctezuma, Santa Maria de Galve, Aug. 28,
1699, AGI 61-6-22/22  bnd 3632 (Stetson); Ford, Triangular Struggle, 32-55.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in Florida, both growing threats from outside the colony and the inability of Spain to effectively supply and reinforce the garrison there, the Spanish officials of La Florida took great pains to maintain their side of the peace between England and Spain. More likely it was the difficulties themselves that account for the efforts on their parts. Throughout the 1690s and especially towards the later part of the decade, Spanish Florida faced increasing numbers of Indian raids among the missions along the border in Apalachee, Mocama, and Timucua. Though faced with evidence of English traders instigating these raids, the Spanish limited their response to sending formal letters of protest to Charleston and pleading with Madrid to put diplomatic pressure on England to control the actions of its colonists in Carolina. During the first few years of the peace, these efforts were fairly successful. Communications between the two colonies remained cordial and the Spanish even welcomed ships from Charleston bearing news of French movements in the Caribbean.45

The desire to minimize the potential sources of conflict with the English in Carolina extended even to prompt and sincere efforts to help the occasional English ship in distress along the treacherous Florida straits. One notable example is the harrowing adventure of Jonathon Dickinson. Dickinson was a devout Quaker whose father had moved his family to Jamaica after participating in the English conquest of that former Spanish colony. Dickinson’s father received two sizable plantations there for his efforts. Jonathon became a moderately successful merchant in Port Royal and ultimately decided to move his wife, his infant son, and ten slaves to Philadelphia in search of even greater opportunity. On August 23, 1696, Dickinson and his party set sail from Port Royal

45 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 22, 1690, AGI 54-5-12/120 bnd 2930 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, March 11, 1695, AGI 58-1-26/130 bnd 3283 (Stetson).
aboard the *Reformation*, bound for Pennsylvania. The ship was becalmed for some weeks, becoming separated from the other ships in the small convoy, and in late September, it encountered a fierce storm that cast the small ship onto the Florida shore a few miles north of the modern Loxahatchee River near an inlet Dickinson called Hoe-Bay, a bit over two hundred miles south of St. Augustine.46

After saving themselves from the shipwreck, Dickinson and his fellow survivors were soon found by a local Indian tribe, which set about looting the wreckage and confiscating the possessions of the English. The Indians were armed with what Dickinson described as “large Spanish knives” and the surviving English could do little to stop them. Recognizing them as Europeans but not sure of their identity, the cacique of the tribe began to question them. Dickinson recalled that “they rushed upon us and cried *Nickaleer Nickaleer*. We understood them not at first: they repeating it over unto us often. At last they cried Epainia or Spaniard, by which we understood them that at first they meant English.” Perceiving the hostility, the party first claimed to be Spanish then, when the Indians failed to believe them merely answered “Pennsylvania” to continued questioning which meant nothing to their Indian captors. The survivors realized that to be discovered as English would be dangerous because the Indians seemed antagonistic to anything English. A few of their captors spoke Spanish and, fortunately for the survivors, so did one of the slaves named Solomon. Dickinson and others tried to question the Indians on the location of St. Augustine, but the Indians refused to give

accurate directions to the Spanish capital, pointing south rather than north in an attempt to keep the English survivors and their goods under their control.47

Over time, the cacique relented in his efforts to mislead or to keep captive Dickinson's party because the native leaders were unable to decide on whether the group was English, Spanish, or other. The Spanish were, according to Dickinson, “a terror unto the Indians” and obviously the ability of the Spanish to project power in this region had not diminished to an extent that would allow the Indians to act without regard to consequences. Dickinson discovered that among the Indians “was a man... who, some years past, had been taken off by some of our English sloops” as a slave before escaping off Cuba, where he made his way to Havana and from there to St. Augustine and to his native people. Dickinson commented that the “greatest charge this man had against the English was for taking him and their people away.” Only the chance that the survivors might actually be Spanish kept them safe. This did not stop the Indians from trying to discover the truth. The cacique and others were familiar with different European goods and brought items of clothing, knives, or chests to the survivors proclaiming them “Nickaleer” or English. Using Solomon to speak for them, the shipwrecked travelers pointed to the large amount of Spanish coin in their possessions and claimed to have merely bought the goods from the English. In another instance, the man who had been captured and held by the English long enough to learn some of the language tried to trick the survivors into calling items or food, such as plums, by their English names. Fortunately, Solomon was able to teach the others enough simple words in Spanish to avoid being tricked. Dickinson and his groups spent over two weeks convincing the

cacique to lead them to St. Augustine; when the cacique finally relented, they headed north. They sent Solomon, the Spanish speaker, ahead of them to attempt to contact the Spanish for help.\(^{48}\)

Just days into the trek north, well before the return of Solomon, Dickinson and his company were ecstatic to learn of the approach of a squad of Spanish soldiers, who had set out over two weeks earlier in search of a Spanish vessel lost in the same storm. The next day the group “heard four muskets discharged, and immediately we looked out, and the Spaniards in their piragua [a large canoe with a sail] were in sight.” Captain Sebastian Lopez commanded the group of ten soldiers and an Indian interpreter. Dickinson found the Spanish greeting remarkable, saying that the “Spaniards embraced us very cheerfully and expressed their being glad to find us alive.” Limitations of communication hampered the exchange of information, but the Spanish assisted the English in regaining most of their goods, much to the distress of the Indians. The cacique who had guided the English to the north and his band were infuriated to find out the true identity of the survivors and only grudgingly obeyed the orders of Lopez.\(^{49}\)

Having rescued the English party from a tense situation that had switched from hostile to accommodating from day to day, the soldiers guided the group on the voyage north. Their reception in St. Augustine was warm. The governor allowed Dickinson’s wife to lodge and recover in the rooms of the governor’s wife. The group spent a few days recuperating under the hospitality of the Spanish, with the governor granting full freedom of movement to the English. After their recuperation, the Spanish governor assigned a small group of six soldiers to accompany and guide the English north by land

\(^{48}\) *Dickinson’s Journal*, 52-64.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.
to Charleston. There they were greeted warmly by Governor Blake, who rewarded the soldiers and arranged transport for them south to St. Augustine. The episode demonstrates that, despite the tensions that were growing by this time between the two rival colonies, the Spanish continued their efforts to maintain an amicable, or at minimum, a peaceful relationship with the English. They aided Dickinson's party rather than abandoning them or even suspecting their intentions enough to hold them for trial. It is true that Spanish Florida did not have power to overtly threaten Charleston nor was there motivation in Madrid to antagonize the English. Yet dark clouds were gathering for the Spanish in La Florida as the English in Charleston were unable to control the innate desire by many of the colonists to remove their main regional rival. As the 1690s proceeded, events in Charleston moved increasingly towards open warfare on St. Augustine.50

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With the arrival of James Colleton in Charleston, the new era of peace with Spanish Florida ensued. It lasted, however, for only the space of a few years, and early in the 1690s English traders once again began to encourage Indian raids into the Spanish mission provinces. This did not indicate a policy of intentional antagonism produced by rivalry with the Spanish. Indeed, as late as 1697, the proprietors were complimenting then Governor Joseph Blake on his efforts to maintain good relations with St. Augustine. The proprietors wrote warmly to Blake saying "[we] are glad to heare of ye good

understanding between you & ye Governor of St. Augustine” and promised to make efforts to communicate with the Spanish ambassador in London to assist in this endeavor. However, from the perspective of most Carolinians, St. Augustine was of secondary importance during this period. Through most of the late 1680s, beginning with the arrival of Colleton, and through the first half of the 1690s, Carolina was too split with factionalism and political infighting to pay much attention to its regional rival and too fearful of a French attack by sea on Carolina to purposefully defy the orders coming from the Lords Proprietor regarding the peace with Spain. Indeed, for their part the proprietors during this period consistently made efforts to quell the problem they thought of as the biggest source of irritation to the Spanish in St. Augustine - piracy - and to try to keep a rein on the activities of English traders among the Indians to minimize that issue.51

By the time Colleton dispatched William Dunlop on his expedition to St. Augustine in search of a treaty of peace, the Proprietors had convinced the king, James II, of the need to make an effort to curb the excesses of pirates around the Caribbean who preyed upon Spanish, French, and even other English ships in the region. Early in 1688, the English government offered a general amnesty to pirates in the region and threatened harsh punishment for those who chose not to accept. Communicated to Governor Colleton by the proprietors, the order threatened “all Pirats [sic] and Privateers... in Contempt our Princely mercy” that they would be “pursued with the utmost severities, and the greatest Rigour... untill they and every [one] of them be utterly suppressed & destroyed.” The royal policy to keep up the pressure against pirates who might endanger the peace between England and Spain continued and even accelerated after the Glorious

Revolution of 1688 when William of Orange replaced James II and brought the country into a formal alliance with Spain against France. As late as 1698, the proprietors communicated the concerns of "His Majesty" over "pirats and Sea Robbers." The king, according to the proprietors, took into "consideration... the consequences of such like pernicious practices which by the Resentment of princes and States concerned and otherwise will infallibly more and more tend to the prejudice of trade and bring great scandal upon the English name and nation." The order to the then-governor in Carolina, Joseph Blake, ordered renewed efforts to suppress the use of Charleston as an open haven for some of the more notorious pirates of the period. These efforts met with mixed results and the golden age of piracy in the Carolina did not really end until the late 1710s but the attempt to allay the concerns of allies such as the Spanish helped maintain the fragile peace through the end of the 1690s.52

In the early 1690s, the governor of South Carolina, Seth Sothell, one of the proprietors after having purchased the interests of Lord Clarendon, also sought to exercise some control over the activities of the Indian traders. Using his initially friendly relationship with most of the local elites who held power in the Assembly, Sothell forced the passage of the first act to regulate the Indian trade against the more outrageous abuses that alienated the Indian tribes, especially the Yamassees and even early contacts among the Creeks and Cherokees. He even pursued a policy of strictly investigating and punishing any action of the traders against the Indians that might threaten to push them

into a closer relationship with the Spanish. In one instance, Sothell received permission to investigate rumors that reached the ears of the proprietors of certain Carolinians who, while trading, had murdered several Indians. The proprietors ordered him to find "the truth of this Information" in order that "a timely remedy [could be] applied to prevent the ill consequences that is to be feared will attend such presumptuous and Irregular proceedings." The proprietors warned Sothell and the rest of the Carolinians that continued abuses could only have "very dangerous consequence[s] not onely to ye peace of our province but alsoe to Virginia and other their Maj[es]ties Colonys in America."

But, the effort to regulate the Indian trade failed to control the abuses of the traders, and well into the 1710s the problem of placating Indian hostility toward the worst of the traders continued to be an issue for Carolina. Still, early in the 1690s, some efforts were made to control the dilemma. The good intentions, though, were not able to overcome the ongoing and increasing problem of conflicting desires between local and proprietary interests. Factionalism ran rampant in Carolina from the 1680s and through most of the 1690s.53

The most influential group of local elites in Carolina was labeled the "Goose Creek men" after the residence of many of the members along a small tributary of the Cooper River in modern-day Berkeley County. The leader of this powerful faction was Maurice Mathews, a shrewd politician who assembled a large faction of supporters in the Assembly. In the 1680s, Mathews led local efforts to frustrate attempts by the proprietors to assert their influence in the colony. This contest resulted in over three decades of strife.

53 Salley, Records in the British Public Records Office for South Carolina, 3: 15; Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 67-68.
and discord in the administration of the colony and did not truly end until the last days of proprietary rule in 1719.

A sign of the discord that affected the colony during much of this period was the eight separate administrations that ruled the colony during the 1680s and the five in the 1690s. James Colleton, the brother of proprietor Sir Peter Colleton, was no more successful than any other governor in quelling the dissent. In some ways he was less so, due to his role in establishing the peace with St. Augustine. Mathews and his fellow Goose Creek men moved quickly to alienate Colleton from the colonists by promising their support in private to Colleton in introducing a bill that would raise an excise tax to pay for his salary. When the gullible Colleton put the tax issue forward in the Assembly, the Goose Creek men publicly opposed the measure and portrayed Colleton as greedy and grasping. Mathews likewise characterized Colleton as weak and corrupt for his actions in accepting reparations from the Spanish for the slaves taken during the raids on Stuartstown and elsewhere. The Goose Creek men castigated Colleton for preventing the Carolinians' attack on St. Augustine, claiming that he had failed to avenge the honor of the colony in exchange for money. Colleton's relationship with the Assembly deteriorated to the point that he avoided calling it for two years. By 1689, Colleton had fallen from favor with both colonists and proprietors and when Seth Sothell, himself a proprietor, arrived in Charleston he assumed the governorship with the initial support of the Goose Creek men, who arranged to have Colleton banished from the colony.54

Sothell was barely more successful than Colleton in overcoming the resistance of the Goose Creek men to reform the colony or in his efforts to control the Indian trade.

After two years he was replaced by Philip Ludwell, who had been serving as the administrator of the colony in North Carolina. Ludwell was unable to govern effectively in the face of opposition and recommended that the task of governorship should fall on one of the proprietors who would be granted extraordinary powers of authority by the consent of the others. Ludwell served only a year before being replaced by Thomas Smith, who after a year was replaced by the royal council in Charleston. Joseph Blake served as a temporary replacement until another candidate could be found. Ultimately, John Archdale took the position in 1695, though he died a year later and his position was filled once again by Joseph Blake. Blake served until his death in 1700, when he was replaced by James Moore, a prominent Carolinian. Through the 1690s the governors were forced to deal with increasingly powerful groups of local elites and various factions such as the Goose Creek men. The proprietors warned Thomas Smith, for example, that “the Goose-creek men have been enabled to draw many evil minded persons to side with them in keeping things unsettled” and preventing effective government in the colony. By the mid-to-late 1690s, the unrest forced governors such as Archdale and Blake to grant more and more rights to the Assembly in passing legislation and raising money for the colony. After the most intense period of bitter division between proprietors and colonists had passed, James Moore’s assumption of the governorship represented a shift in power from the proprietors to the colonists and their assembly. Once able to more fully address their own local concerns and with the

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55 In 1691, Philip Ludwell was granted the authority by the Proprietors to appoint a deputy governor to administer the colony in North Carolina. The proprietors still hoped eventually to have representatives from both colonies meet in Charleston to serve as a unified government but this proved unfeasible. The separation of the colony into North and South Carolina is typically dated to this time. See Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 68.
diplomatic need to placate Spain removed, Moore would lead the colony back into overt conflict with Spanish Florida and its Indian allies.\textsuperscript{56}

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Throughout the 1690s, the central issues in the disputes between the supporters of the proprietors and the Goose Creek men revolved around the implementation of a system of rents due the proprietors, the defense of the colony, and the regulation and control of Indian trade. Archdale worked out a compromise with the Assembly that eventually implemented the quit-rents and provided funds for the construction of a fort at Charleston, policies that continued under his successor. This last agreement finally addressed the need for better defenses needed for fear of a French attack on the colony. The one issue that resisted an easy resolution was the control and regulation of the Indian trade, which both proprietors and colonists wanted to manage. This led to a great deal of turmoil in the region as individual traders acted without restraint to gain as much from the trade as possible. Typically, the Spanish missions and the Indians in those regions suffered from the raids prompted by these traders. Legislation passed through the early 1690s with the encouragement of a series of successive governor that attempted to limit the regions in which the traders could operate. Traders were to be licensed by the proprietary government and were prohibited from trading south or west of the Savannah River. This policy aimed at preventing provocation of the Spanish, but failed to keep the Yamassees and other Indians trading with the English from traveling freely past this

\textsuperscript{56} Salley, Records in the British Public Records Office for South Carolina, 3: 111.
boundary to raid the missions in search of Indian slaves. The governor and a member of
the council were to act as an impromptu commission to address the traders’ abuses,
publicly allowing the Indians to witness the trials of those accused of crimes against them
in hopes of placating aggrieved tribes. Unfortunately, these and other measures aimed at
preventing the Indian trade from being a source of conflict between Florida and Carolina
failed.\textsuperscript{57}

The years between the mid-1680s and the last years of the 1690s represented a
brief and uneasy lull in the rivalry between English Carolina and Spanish Florida. The
war in Europe and the diplomatic imperative to maintain peace between England and
Spain in the face of French aggression forced both colonies to begin a policy of
communication and negotiation. In addition, through much of the period, both colonies
were divided by factionalism and infighting that precluded each from acting overtly
against the interests of the other. The weakness of Spanish Florida led to efforts to
maintain the good relationship with Carolina throughout the period. In Charleston,
division between colonists and proprietors kept the English from extending their
influence too much at the expense of their regional rivals. This division within Carolina
changed, however, by the late 1690s as local colonial elites emerged in a more powerful
position relative to the governance of the colony. The winds of war gathered momentum
beginning in the last years of the seventeenth century and the first decade of the
eighteenth century would encompass the destruction of Spanish power in the region.

\textsuperscript{57} Weir, Colonial South Carolina, 67-73; Roper, Conceiving Carolina, 97-131; Alan Gallay, \textit{The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 91-98.
In the early years of the eighteenth century, the rivalry between Spanish Florida and English South Carolina reached its most violent and destructive stage. At the beginning of the century the Spanish area of control still ranged from St. Augustine to the new settlement at Pensacola across the Indian mission provinces of Mocama, Timucua, and Apalachee. Spanish influence among the Indians still remained relatively strong and, at least at the beginning of the 1700s, thousands of Indian allies remained loyal to St. Augustine. Nevertheless, English power was ascendant. By the end of the first decade, Spanish power would be decimated and the remaining Spanish colonists and Christianized Indians confined to the immediate areas around the two fortified settlements remaining in Florida.

The violent events and quick and utter destruction of the mission system in Spanish Florida were remarkable because one decade earlier, St. Augustine and Charleston both held to a convenient if shaky alliance dictated by events in Europe. The events of the early 1700s, however, reflect the interaction between local desires and imperial politics that so typified the first decades of the English presence in Carolina but, for the first time, led to a final resolution of the rivalry. Beginning in 1700, the colonists in Charleston began to achieve enough power to act on their desires to remove their main rivals to the south despite proprietary interference. Events in Europe served also to
accelerate a final confrontation as France and Spain became official allies against England, thereby removing the imperial obstacles previously preventing the Carolinians from openly attacking Florida. The rivalry between Florida and Carolina over control of the Southeast took on its most complex and destructive aspect as France entered the contest for control of the political and economic development of the region. Yet, the longstanding competition between the Spanish and English continued to be the determining influence on events and it would not be until the 1720s that this would change forever.

Despite the uneasy truce between English and Spanish colonists in the 1690s, their rivalry never truly disappeared. It continued to play out among the shifting and varied alliances and trading relationships that both sides sought to establish with the Indian tribes in the region. Throughout the decade the English began to extend their commercial influence westward, first through the Yamassees and other local tribes along the Savannah River, then further west among the emerging Creek confederacy. Both of these areas lay directly north of one of the two major remaining mission provinces, Timucua and Apalachee, on which Spanish power relied to counter the English. As early as 1687, as the political environment in Europe was moving England and Spain towards an alliance, royal officials were complaining loudly to the Junta de Guerra (Council of War) of English activities in Apalachicola among the Creek Indians just north of Apalachee. The following years saw repeated warnings of English encroachment and incitement of the Indians in the Apalachicola region. By the late 1680s and 1690s, the Spanish were sending regular military patrols to try to dispel the growing threat. By the late 1690s, due specifically to growing English influence among the Indians in the area,
the Spanish constructed and garrisoned the small fortress of San Luis de Apalachee to
better protect their mission frontier.1

In Timucua, as in Apalachee, Spanish officials in St. Augustine knew that, despite
the truce with the English, their missions and the Indian inhabitants were tempting targets
to Indian tribes inspired by trade with the English to raid the exposed settlements.
Indeed, the vulnerability of Timucua was apparent as early as 1685. It was the Yamassee
raids organized and provoked by Lord Cardross and William Dunlop of the Scottish
settlement of Stuartstown on the Spanish mission in Timucua, Santa Catalina de Ajohica,
that provoked the Spanish attack on Stuartstown and on the outlying plantations around
Port Royal. In the 1680s and throughout the 1690s, the Spanish increased the small
number of soldiers in the main garrison of the region at Santa Fé de Teleco. Their
defensive presence there was also reinforced by the small settlement of La Chua ranch, a
Spanish-owned plantation raising livestock for St. Augustine. Started in the 1630s by
Francisco Menéndez Márquez, a relative of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, the farm
occupied eighty-seven square miles of land and raised corn, livestock, and other foodstuff
for sale to the St. Augustine government using a combination of slave and Indian labor,
the later gained from the local mission of San Martín de Ayacuto fifty miles to the
northwest of the ranch. La Chua, by the late 1680s, was the largest of several
commercial ranchos owned and operated by prominent Spanish-Floridian families in both
Timucua and Apalachee. The two provinces were the breadbasket of the colony and,

1 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Jan. 18, 1687, AGI 54-5-15/44 bnd 2546 (Stetson). For
summary of the construction of San Luis de Apalachee, see Chapter 3, 33-35.
while unable to supply all of the food needs of St. Augustine, were vital to a continued exercise of Spanish influence in the region.\(^2\)

Although increased Spanish defenses and the garrisoning of strong points among the mission Indians helped reduce at least some of the threat posed by Indian raids from the north, through the 1690s and into the early 1700s, Spanish defenses still relied on the power of the mission Indians themselves as the foundation of their continued influence in the region. In the 1690s that power was still formidable. By 1695, there were few small settlements along the coast north of St. Augustine in the extreme southern end of the Guale province and into Mocama, the region directly north of the capital. A 1695 visita conducted by Captain Juan de Pueyo listed the several hundred survivors of the fifteen Guale missions destroyed in the English raids of the mid-1680s and reported that they had been successfully reorganized into the missions of Santa Clara de Tupique, San Phelipe, and Santa María. This represented at least a minimal guard against possible attacks on St. Augustine from the north. The provinces of Timucua and Apalachee, with their still-substantial population of mission Indians, represented a more substantial defensive force for the Spanish. In the aftermath of the destruction to come in the early 1700s, Governor Córcoles y Martínez claimed the loss of some ten to twelve thousand Indian allies in the warfare that would mark the years from 1702 through 1708. Even if he exaggerated, it is clear that the Spanish, in addition to the newly established and

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reinforced garrisons and fortifications, had several thousand Indian allies to supplement their strength.\(^3\)

As strong as the Spanish-Indian alliances were historically, by the end of the 1690s Indian tempers were beginning to fray due to the raiding of Creek and Yamasee Indians along the border. The complaints regarding Spanish inability to protect their Indian allies, the implicit basis of the relationship between mission Indians and the Spanish, combined with the almost constant complaints of abuses committed by soldiers and friars throughout the mission provinces to threaten the stability of the Spanish-Indian relationship. By the end of the seventeenth century complaints such as the one forwarded to the governor at St. Augustine in April 1699 were common. In that month, Don Patricio Hinachuba, a local Indian cacique of the town of Ivitachuco in the Apalachee province wrote to Don Antonio Ponce de León, a chaplain and organist in the church at St. Augustine. He reported that many of the local Indians were “most unhappy and the natives are fleeing from these [parts] in disorder.” He went on to claim that some had “fled to the woods, others to Saint George [Charleston] with the English, prompted by the heavy labor exacted” by local Spaniards. The potential and actual loss of allies, not to mention the possible strengthening of their English rivals, was met with dismay by the Spanish governor, who immediately set out to correct the situation.\(^4\)

Knowing that the Indians were critical to any hopes of defending the colony, Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda took several steps to ameliorate Indian relations


within the missions. He ordered his officials to investigate and rectify Indian complaints of abuses by soldiers, citizens, and friars alike. In one case, Governor Zúñiga appointed Captain Jacinto Roque Pérez as deputy governor in Apalachee in 1700 with instructions to “be attentive in the first place to the protection of the Indians... because of the deteriorated condition in which the province is found.” As part of this effort, the new deputy governor was “on every occasion when [an abuse] occurs, to make investigation, punishing those who transgress” against the Indians in order to solidify their alliance. Efforts to add non-missionized Indians proceeded in conjunction with this effort, with an order to Captain Roque Pérez to make sure that the Apalachee “comport themselves in a friendly manner, with all civility and good will” to the “pagans with whom [the Spanish] are trying to re-establish friendship.” In a final effort to prepare the colony for the eventuality of war, Governor Zúñiga ordered existing munitions, such as they were, to be stored throughout the missions. He instructed his lieutenants that “all the villages [of] the natives [should be] provided with all supplies necessary for operations of war, which they can and must arrange..., in such a manner that no misfortune might arise from lack of preparations.” By 1701, the Spanish were as prepared as they could be and, with the assistance of the mission Indians, their strength was ready for the anticipated English storm. This strength was still formidable despite the setbacks of the 1680s. The influence and power of the Spanish in Florida still caused concern for the English in Carolina, who were determined to dominate the Southeast economically and militarily in order to achieve a monopoly on the still-lucrative Indian fur and slave trade.5

The fact that the English in Carolina were in a position to act on their longstanding desire to remove their regional rivals in Spanish Florida was, once again, a direct result of the vagaries of European politics in the last years of the 1690s and the early years of the 1700s. For the first time in the history of the Carolina colony, the demands of international diplomacy in royal courts in Europe finally corresponded to the concerns and desires of the local population. With this development the final major obstacle to a large-scale, organized attack directly on St. Augustine and its mission allies disappeared. With the freedom to act, Carolinians were quick to take advantage.

The political situation in Europe was in flux in the last years of the 1690s. During the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-1697), Louis XIV managed to fight to a standstill an alliance of several powerful European countries, including England and Spain. Warfare on several fronts occupied William and Mary, the new monarchs on the English throne. These included a French-sponsored rebellion in support of the usurped monarch, James II, in Ireland, as well as campaigns against William’s territorial holdings in the Netherlands and in Spanish territories in modern Belgium and Luxembourg. The serious threat posed by France to both countries forced a cessation of hostilities in the southeast of North America. With the signing of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697, the war came to an inconclusive end. In terms of the situation between England and Spain, the end of the war and developments within Spain quickly led to a breakdown of the former alliance as Louis XIV sought to extend the power of the French throne southward, this time through the manipulation of the Spanish monarchy itself.
In 1700, Charles II of Spain died without an heir. Throughout his life Charles, the last of the Spanish Hapsburg kings, suffered from a variety of physical and mental ailments. He was mentally retarded and disfigured by hereditary attributes, such as an excessively large jaw and lip common among the Hapsburg line and exaggerated by several generations of marriages to close relatives. During most of his reign others, first his mother and then his illegitimate brother, exercised the true power of the throne as acting-regents. Two marriages failed to produce an heir but did provide fodder for the confusing and subsequently devastating events ahead. In 1679, Charles married Marie Louise of Orleans, the daughter of Philippe I of Orléans, the only brother of Louis XIV. After her death ten years after their marriage, a 28-year-old Charles, still in desperate need of a male heir, married Maria Anna of Pfalz-Neuburg, a daughter of Philipp Wilhelm, Elector Palatine and sister-in-law of Charles’ uncle, Leopold I, the king of Hungary and Bohemia and the Holy Roman Emperor. Both the complex relationships between the thrones of Spain, France, and the Holy Roman Empire and the conflicting relations of each of his wives would plunge Europe, once again, into war.

In the final years of the 1690s it was obvious that Charles II would die without an heir and the issue of the succession to the Spanish throne became a point of tension between the nations exhausted by the previous conflict. Three principal individuals had competing claims to the throne of Spain. First was Louis XIV, on behalf of his eldest son who was a grandson of King Philip IV of Spain through Philip’s daughter, Marie Thérèse, to whom Louis XIV had been married. The second claimant was Joseph Ferdinand, the electoral prince of Bavaria and a great-grandson of Philip IV. Finally, the Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, a Hapsburg who had married a younger daughter of
Philip IV, who claimed the succession on behalf of his son by a second marriage, the Archduke Charles. Diplomats in 1698 and into 1699 raced to come up with a mutually agreeable solution to the problem. Efforts and agreements to resolve the issue were complicated by the death of Joseph Ferdinand thus leaving only two primary claimants, both of whom created undesirable consequences to their successful assumption of the Spanish throne. As a last resort in an attempt to lessen the tension, Louis XIV agreed to bypass the claim of his son in favor of his grandson, Philip de Bourbon, duc d'Anjou, though he refused to rule out the possibility of him eventually succeeding to the throne of France as well. Other nations, such as England and the Netherlands, had issues with both candidates because either would unite the Spanish empire with an already powerful nation, thus tipping the uneasy balance of power in Europe. To further increase tensions as diplomats raced to prevent the outbreak of war, the Spanish nobility convinced an ailing Charles II in 1699 to name Philip de Bourbon as his primary successor.

When the Spanish king, Charles II, finally succumbed to his physical ailments and died in 1700 neither Louis XIV nor Leopold I would agree to a splitting of the Spanish territories. England and the Netherlands, while preferring Philip to the Archduke Charles, could not risk the possibility of a united Spain and France. By September 1701, the diplomatic standoff devolved into open warfare as Louis XIV moved his armies into fortresses in Spanish territories on the border of France, and refused to accept the notion of forcing Philip de Bourbon to renounce his claim on the French throne. England, the Netherlands, and Leopold I joined forces against France and Europe, just four years after ending one devastating and expensive war, was once again torn apart by a long and bloody conflict. While the powers of Europe entered the war reluctantly, the clash was
just what the colonists in the tiny corner of the English empire in Carolina had been waiting for. Most colonists in Carolina feared that Spanish possessions might be put to use by France in their war against English interests. From the point of view of Carolinians, Spanish Florida, now under the control of a French monarch, posed just such a threat.6

Just as the situation in Europe was changing towards renewed Anglo-Spanish hostility, the political situation in Charleston was emerging in the late 1690s from one of internecine squabbling between factions to relative unanimity in the face of a combined Spanish-French threat. By 1700, the fighting between supporters of the proprietors and a powerful coalition of prominent colonists seeking to gain political power in the colony was waning. A first step towards this reconciliation was a blanket pardon issued by the proprietors in 1693 for acts committed by members of a group of influential colonists that had illegally deposed Governor James Colleton and fought the efforts of his successor to more fully control the colony. The departure of several of the ringleaders of this colonial faction, known as the ‘Goose Creek Men,’ such as Maurice Mathews and Andrew Percival, allowed more moderate leaders of the faction to emerge. Finally, Joseph Blake, the governor of South Carolina in the late 1690s and himself a proprietor, managed to quell most of the remaining unrest between the two sides by acceding to some efforts to expand the rights of the colonial Assembly, and to open the Indian trade to more people by relaxing some of the stricter regulations. When Blake died in 1700, James Moore, the new leader of the Goose Creek men, had enough clout with both the proprietors’

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supporters in the Assembly and his own faction to maneuver himself into the office of governor and to begin to organize the colony and its Indian allies around his own grand design. His design centered on controlling the Indian trade locally through his own supporters and removing Spanish Florida, the main regional impediment to that control.7

By the time he became governor in September 1700, James Moore had lived in South Carolina for some twenty-five years. Through his long years of residency and experience, Moore had become adept at manipulating events and individuals to his and his allies' advantage. Often during the late 1670s and through the 1680s, Moore cooperated to a certain extent with both sides of the factional strife in an attempt to better his own position. Moore served on a special investigatory and regulatory commission set up by the proprietors in 1677 in the aftermath of the Westo War. His position as a supporter of and later a faithful lieutenant to Maurice Mathews, the later leader of the Goose Creek men, put Moore in a key position to learn much of the Indian trade and gain a thorough knowledge of the geography of the interior. Moore supported efforts by Mathews to discredit the foremost Indian negotiator of Carolina in the early 1670s, Dr. Henry Woodward, in an effort to gain a monopoly on the Indian trade after the Westo War. Indeed, it was the appointment of local colonists like Mathews and Moore to the Indian commission, intended by the proprietors to keep control of the Indian trade for their own benefit, that allowed the beginnings of the Goose Creek faction. The proprietors soon realized that the colonists, especially Mathews and to a lesser extent the moderate and low-key Moore, sought to control the course of the Indian trade, acting, as

they noted, with “greater regard to their Private Profits [than] benefit to the Publik.”

With the emergence of Mathews in local politics, and with Moore quietly emerging as an influential follower, the factionalization of Charleston politics worsened.8

By the late 1690s, with the departure from the colony of Mathews and other prominent leaders of the Goose Creek men, James Moore assumed leadership of the colonial faction. In addition, having acted as a more moderate member of the Goose Creek faction, he still maintained the respect of the proprietors for his knowledge of Indian relations and for the exploratory missions he had personally commissioned and occasionally led. By 1699, Edward Randolph, surveyor general for the English Board of Trade, reporting on the condition of South Carolina, described Moore as “a gentleman of good estate in this country.” Not only did Moore enjoy a good reputation among locals but he also served as “Secretary of the province and a deputy to Sir John Colleton one of the Lords Proprietors.” Moore, therefore, enjoyed the support of both locals and the Proprietors and was thus in a strong position to advance his own agenda when the opportunity presented itself. So great was his reputation with the proprietors at this point that Thomas Amy, a proprietor himself and the Secretary of Carolina for the Proprietors, wrote to James Moore in 1698 requesting his opinion on the current state of the Indian trade and for advice on any thoughts Moore might have on how to better regulate the traders.9

His role as one of the most knowledgeable and experienced Indian traders in the colony in the late 1690s was indisputable, but his loyalty to the proprietors was weak at best. It could, and would, be claimed that his devotion to the concerns of the colony and its colonists as a whole was weak as well. His critics in the aftermath of his time as governor claimed, with some justification, that all of his actions in office aimed to serve only his own interests without regard to the consequences. There is no doubt that Moore sought to avail himself of every opportunity to further his own fortunes. For example, during the visit in 1699 of the Board of Trade representative, Edward Randolph, Moore sent a letter to Randolph regarding an expedition into the interior on which Moore claimed to have found signs and reports among the Indians of silver mines in territory claimed and inhabited by Indians allied to the Spanish. Moore, however, was adamant that Randolph not pass along information of the findings to the proprietors desiring, as Randolph recorded, “that they might not seize upon the produce of his own cost and labour.” Moore slyly asked “what profit had arisen to his majesty by the 4th part of the gold and silver mines in [Carolina].” By passing along vague tales of mineral wealth, Moore obviously hoped to pique royal interest and sponsorship of Moore’s expeditions as well as to interest the king in taking an active hand in Carolina affairs.10

Moore’s reports of silver mines in Indian territory certainly aimed at piquing the king’s interest in Carolina for several reasons, including Moore’s own self-aggrandizement. Another reason behind the letter was that it might serve to advance Moore’s own desire to finally remove the major regional rival to English dominance in the Southeast, Spanish Florida. Moore’s fears of Florida only increased as the political situation in Europe shifted Spain from ally to enemy of England in the last years of the

10 Edward Randolph to the Board of Trade, March 22nd, 1698/99, in Recs. Rel. to SC, 4: 79-81.
1690s, even though the peace signed after the War of the Grand Alliance removed any immediate threat of invasion. In Moore’s efforts to interest the king in Carolina he noted that on his expedition in search of these mines he had spoken with Indians, probably of the Creek Confederacy because of the location of the supposed mines as claimed by Moore. These Indians told him that “the Spaniards had been actually at work upon mines within twenty miles of me.” The Indians, according to Moore, “killed the Spaniards lest when they grew numerous they should make slaves of them to work in these mines as they had millions of other Indians as [the Indians] said they had been informed.” Since the Spaniards would no doubt not give news of this sort to the Indians, it is at least plausible and likely probable that it was English traders who spread stories of Spanish atrocities among the Indians in an effort to shift alliances in their favor. Whatever the truth of Moore’s account might be, the fact that he immediately involved the Spanish in La Florida and the threat that they posed is an indication of his and most of his fellow Carolinians’ larger concern over a combination of Spanish and French threatened to overwhelm the English and remove them entirely from the region.11

Moore’s alarm over the Spanish in Florida being subsumed into a larger French effort against the English reflected very recent events in the geopolitical situation in the region. The developments in Europe coincided with the arrival of the third, and last, European player in the contest for the Southeast. Eventually, the French would supplant the Spanish as the main English rival for control of the region and of the ever-important Indian trade. But at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the French actually represented merely a bit player in terms of actual numbers and influence in the region. In 1699, Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, a Frenchman of Canadian birth who had led several

11 Ibid, 82.
naval missions against the English in the Hudson Bay region during the early 1690s, led a French expedition to explore the area around the mouth of the Mississippi and to establish a colony. In May 1699 d'Iberville landed at the Bay of Biloxi and constructed a small settlement and a fort at Biloxi, the first French colony in the region known as Louisiana. In 1702, the French established another small settlement at Mobile Bay in an effort to extend their presence in the area. Finally, in 1718, the city of New Orleans was established and became the capital of the province of Louisiana in 1720. From this point on, New Orleans would play a large role in the economic development of the region and grow into a large port on the Mississippi, from which the French could effectively extend their reach into the Ohio Valley from French Canada and Louisiana. By that time, France would become the primary regional rival to the English in Carolina in the common effort to control the Indian trade and gain Indian alliances. In the first years of the 1700s, however, the French presence in Biloxi was a minor issue. The English had a large lead in influencing the Indians north of La Florida. Moreover, in the settlements of Biloxi and Mobile, only a handful of soldiers and Indian traders, acting under the guidance of the Henri Tonty, an experienced Indian trader from New France, were just beginning initial efforts at the behest of d'Iberville to establish diplomatic relationships with the Creek, Choctaw, and other native tribes.¹²

The English and Spanish, therefore, remained the chief regional rivals for economic and military hegemony over the Southeast in 1700, when James Moore assumed the office of governor in South Carolina. The fact that the French had a foothold in the Gulf of Mexico was much less important than the potential joining of the

Spanish and the French under one common purpose: the purpose of removing or at least reducing the growing power of the English in Carolina. In this concern, Moore merely represented the common sentiment. In June 1699 Edward Randolph reported that "I find the Inhabitants [of Charleston] greatly alarmed upon the news that the French continue their resolutions to make a settlement a[ t the] Meschasipi River." The inhabitants, and Moore among them, begged for arms and ammunition or even better a royal garrison to be sent to Charleston, warning that if "the French are settled at Messasipi or if upon the death of the King of Spain these countries [Florida] fall into the hands of the French as inevitably they will," the inhabitants would have no choice but to return to England or some other place "where they may find safety and protection." Moore, himself, realized the danger posed by a Spanish Florida in the hands of a French monarch. After the invasions of Spanish Florida that he led in the following few years after Randolph's warning, he noted to the proprietors in a report on his actions against the Spanish that "we were more afraid of the Spaniards of Apalatchee and their Indians in conjunction [with] the French of Mississippi" than any other forces the enemies of the English could produce. Since the number of Frenchmen in their new Mississippi trading posts was minute and their efforts to convince large groups of Indians in the region to their side just beginning, the obvious threat to Carolina continued to be Spanish Florida. This was a threat that Moore determined, early into his governorship, to remove once and for all from any credible position to challenge the growing English power in the region.13

Events in Europe conspired to provide Moore the opportunity to do just that. The death in 1700 of Charles II, the last of the Hapsburg kings of Spain, led to a general war

13 Edward Randolph to the Board of Trade, June 28th, 1699, in Recs. Rel. to SC, 4: 90; Extract of Colonel Moore's letter to the Lords Proprietors, 16 April, 1704, in Boyd, Here They Once Stood, 95.
in Europe by September 1701, the War of the Spanish Succession. England, under William III, the Dutch Republic, and the Holy Roman Emperor, Leopold II, in September 1701 formed an alliance against Louis XIV and France and declared war. Spain and its newly proclaimed king, Philip V, joined France as did the German electors of Bavaria and Cologne and other small states like Mantua. Later Prussia, Portugal, and Savoy would enter the war on the side of England. Even the death of William III in 1702 would not shake the determination of England as his successor, Queen Anne, continued to vigorously pursue the war in Europe, allowing John Churchill, duke of Marlborough, to lead the English military effort. The war would wax and wan in Europe for eleven years. The ripples of the conflict would inexorably alter balance of power in the Southeast of North America as James Moore and the Carolinians finally got the war they had wanted for decades.

Among James Moore’s first actions as governor of Carolina, as early as 1700, was to begin to investigate and improve the defenses of the colony and to ensure himself and his supporters of the potential forces available to take the offensive against their Spanish rivals to the south. In November 1700, almost a year before the outbreak of hostilities, the House of Assembly in Charleston, at Moore’s instigation, voted to organize a commission to “consult and advice about... Building a Look-out upon Sullivan’s Island” just south of Charleston. The Assembly sought to provide a better warning of invasion from the south, such as the one in which Stuartstown and the plantations to the south of Charleston had been ransacked and burned by the Spanish in the 1680s. The fort was to be built of stone and brick and to consist of a tower of “twenty five foot diameter at Bottome and Twelve feet, Diameter at Topp, with Two flores and that the foundation to
be built [and] secured with Pyles.” Not content to merely provide for a tower lookout, the Assembly later added a provision requiring the commission to “Cause a great Gunn to be mounted on Sullivan’s Island... [and] That they ordr so much Powder as by them shall be Thought fitt out of the Public Power... for the firing of the said Gunn.” The tower would thus be able to both signal ships rounding the point of potential navigation hazards, as well as to provide a minimal defense in case of attack.¹⁴

Less than a year later, but still before the official outbreak of war between England and France, in August 1701 Moore requested and received the House of Assembly’s consideration on a long list of particulars related to the better defense of Charleston and Carolina as a whole. Moore’s request sought to have the Assembly “Consider how many Looke out and places of Defence [sic] & What Guards are needful to be put on ye Sea Coast to ye North & South ward of Charles Town.” Instructions and requests included money to “build the Warfe Wall which done, will be A great defense.” Moore desired to have “hand Granado’s and Shott for the Great Gunn’s” stockpiled and powder stores increased. The Assembly ultimately agreed to most of the requests, including extending the lookouts southward, though not without an intense debate that required Moore to take a personal hand in influencing the vote of both the upper and lower houses. Their orders, passed at Moore’s request, established “three Lookouts between South Edistoe and Ashly River... and also... a Look out on ye North side of [Charleston] to give advice by water if any Danger” should appear. The three lookouts to

the south and one to the north are an obvious reflection of the direction from which the Assembly perceived danger more likely to approach.\(^{15}\)

Moore’s gaining of approval from the Carolina House of Assembly to improve the defenses of Carolina reflected the common sense of impending menace growing in Charleston. Moore included in his formal message to the Assembly a dire warning. He cautioned the gathered colonists, both the Assemblymen and the general population, that he had “One thing more… to recommend to your Serious Considerations which is ye French Settlement which is on ye Sea Coast on ye Missishipee River.” French activities among the Indians around the new settlements at Mobile and Biloxi were of such obvious concern to all as to have Moore remind the Assembly of the danger of “the French of Canada’s neighbour hood to the Inhabitants of New England.” But that was not the deeper concern of Moore or his supporters. His message, while using the French to raise a general level of anxiety, pointed out specifically that “St. Augustin I am informed… have made two Settlements not above 120 miles to ye Southward of St. Augustine.” The spread of Spanish territory was not as critical to Moore as that they “already begin to Incite our Indians to trade with them.” The conjunction of French plans and Spanish influence among the Indians between Carolina and Florida led to the final warning that no matter what an individual’s beliefs about the possibility of a war in Europe spilling over to the Southeast, he hoped that the Assembly would remember that “Warr or peace We are sure to be always in danger” so long as English influence among the Indians could be challenged.\(^{16}\)

\(^{15}\) *JCHASC*, 12: 3-4.

\(^{16}\) *JCHASC*, 12: 4.
Moore's warnings of a dire threat were echoed by others. His supporters, especially in the smaller and more exclusive upper house of the Assembly, sent a message to the dissidents who resisted Moore's emphasis on military preparedness, or at least providing sufficient money for the proposals. Robert Gibbs, a prominent supporter of Moore, sent a message to the lower house questioning first how the dissenters could "conceive how they [the defensive improvements] Can be done without Money." Gibbs accused those who objected to raising the money for the military preparations of being blind to the real danger to Carolina. He wrote that he supposed "you are not Sensible of the Designes ye Spanyards have against us," adding that the king himself was aware of the possible danger "as by his Royal Comand To the Commander in Cheife to Take care of this His province is Evident." Gibbs finished his warning with the advice that "We doubt not but [if] you Reflect, [tha]t ye french and Spanyards mayhave notice of ye warr betweene ye Crown of England and the Crowne of ffance and Spaine five or Six Months before we may, and that it will be too Late to raise money" in that event. The fact that a combined French and Spanish threat potentially hung over the colony was clear to Gibbs. He and other supporters of Moore convinced the Assembly that it should stand united against that threat. The warnings effectively silenced the opposition, though many still had their doubts as to the wisdom of Moore's plans.17

The combination of admonitions from both Moore and his supporters in the upper house served to convince even the most recalcitrant of Moore's opponents that something should be done to prepare the colony for a possible attack from the south. The debate over Gibb's letter repeating Moore's warning was debated over the course of an entire day, and that afternoon the lower house formally adopted a resolution to address the

17 JCHASC, 12: 13.
issue. In a letter announcing their intentions to both Moore and the upper house, the Assemblymen wrote that:

"[this] House being Credibly Informed that the Spanyards if a warr breaks out Designes to attack this Settlement, Wee Therefore request yo[u]r Honors to Joyne w[i]th us in an address to ye R[igh]t Hon[r]ble Lords Proprietors & Informe them ye Danger we are in [tha]t they may Give us such Assistance as they shall thinke necessary for ye Defense & Security of this their Collony."

In addition to agreeing to act in concert, the lower house agreed that "an Equall Tax of five Hundred Pounds [shall] be Raised, for ye present defense of this Province upon Reale and personall Estates." For the first time in decades, the colony of South Carolina stood together, relatively speaking, in their desire to prepare the colony for a war. The defenses were to be improved, the colony protected. Moore's first desire had been realized. Almost immediately, he and his supporters began setting the stage for turning their attentions from defense to offense if the opportunity presented itself, as they hoped it would.18

As the power relationship in the Southeast between the dual European camps rested almost entirely upon the tenuous alliances each could count on among the Indians, Moore's hopes of taking the fight to the Spanish obviously rested on the strength of his Indian allies and their continued loyalty. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the next step the leaders of South Carolina sought to make was to ensure the continued good graces of their Indian friends. This issue lay at the heart of the ever-increasing influence that the English had been able to establish throughout the region, always at the expense of the Spanish. The Indian trade, while providing in large part the economic basis for survival of the Carolina colony in its first few decades, also provided the English colonists a clandestine tool to reduce the power of their Spanish rivals. It was a tool that the English

18 *JCHASC*, 12: 14.
put to good use during the decade of nominal peace between Charleston and St. Augustine.

The importance of Indian alliances and the use of such alliances as a basis of power in Carolina and in the region were fundamental to Charleston politics and the designs of the local colonists from the beginning. The Lords Proprietors and their principle agent, Henry Woodward, used the Westo Indians to attempt to maintain a monopoly on the Indian trade to the exclusion of other local colonists. When the emerging Goose Creek men, and their leader, Maurice Mathews, engineered the Westo War in the mid-1670s, the decades-long struggle between local and proprietary interests in the Indian trade and in local politics began. When the Westoes were replaced by the Yamassees as the primary Indian allies of the English, the struggles between the competing groups over who would influence the actions of the Indians and thus reap the benefits of the trade emerged once again as critical to the colonists' success. The actions of a new competitor in the mid-1680s, this time the Scottish settlement under Lord Cardross at Stuartstown, provoked the fears of the proprietors and the locals alike, both of whom made only token efforts to assist the colonists at Stuartstown in response to the Spanish attacks that destroyed the settlement. After that destruction, the proprietors set about to more fully regulate the activities of Indian traders by granting the governors of South Carolina from the late 1680s through the 1690s more authority to negotiate with the Assembly to pass legislation to investigate and punish abuses. That renewed attempt at control gave the Goose Creek men and their new emerging leader, James Moore, increased influence among the locals and with the proprietors who appointed him as a member of the new commission appointed to regulate the Indian trade. That influence
helped Moore organize his supporters and add to them enough to assume power in 1700.\(^{19}\)

Moore and, before him, Mathews, as leaders of the Goose Creek men saw the Indian trade as serving a double purpose. The first purpose was, of course, economic. The Indian trade represented one of the most lucrative ventures in the first few decades after the establishment of Carolina and before a true staple crop emerged to provide an impetus toward moving to plantation agriculture on a large scale. Thus, control of that trade was central to the struggle for political dominance in the colony and thereby served a second purpose: those that could most effectively influence the actions of the Indians could build a more secure political base by controlling the economic benefit it represented. One aspect of the Indian trade, however, served an even more important purpose in the larger purposes of James Moore: to inflict harm on the power of the Spanish in the region through the trade in Indian slaves. The trade in slaves taken in raids had been an important secondary source of income among most of the colonists engaged in the Indian trade from the 1670s on, serving to supplement the vastly larger trade in animal skins that represented its mainstay. The trade in Indian slaves, therefore, was a prime source of conflict between locals like the Goose Creek men, who were its primary participants, and the proprietors, who sought almost from the beginnings to limit the practice as much as possible since they were unable to outlaw it entirely.\(^{20}\)

Individuals such as James Moore, Maurice Mathews, Arthur Middleton, and other prominent members of the Goose Creek faction justified the enslavement of Indians taken in raids by English allies on the basis that the captives were taken in "just wars." Indians

\(^{19}\) For the Westo War and the use of Indians by the Goose Creek Men, see Chapter 2, 15-20; see also Roper, Conceiving Carolina, 65-66, 88-91.

\(^{20}\) Gallay, Indian Slave Trade, 45-50.
captured in a legal conflict with Carolina could thus be transported and sold in the West Indies as slaves as long as the participants in the trade could claim a justified cause for the conflict. The justification of the fighting and raiding committed, first by the Westoes and then by the Yamassees and others, constituted the basis of most of the conflict between locals and proprietors. For their part, the proprietors sought to limit conflict within the region to minimize the disruption to the colony and to prevent the possibility of alienating unallied Indians sufficiently to motivate them to attack Carolina. For various reasons, economic and political, the Goose Creek men and others let no opportunity pass to encourage continuing raiding by the Indians allied with the colony to further both their own power and that of the colony. That both of these purposes typically came at the expense of the Spanish was a consequence of this activity, and Moore and others like him were all too aware of this fact.21

Efforts on the part of the proprietors to curb the abuses of the trade in Indian slaves centered on laws requiring the licensing of Indian traders within the colony, passed first in the 1670s, and on efforts to outlaw the trade except for those taken in wars in which the colony as a whole was involved. Both of these endeavors met with little success as prominent colonists such as Mathews and Moore easily evaded the prohibitions and used their various positions of authority to circumvent the laws. Traders like Moore continued to encourage raiding on the Spanish missions and on Indians friendly to the Spanish by providing a ready market for Indian captives in defiance of the law. The proprietors accused both Mathews and Moore in 1683 of having “most contemptuously disobeyed our orders about sending away of Indians and have contrived most unjust wars upon the Indians in order to the getting of Slaves.” The proprietors

removed both individuals from their government positions. Both, however, regained the trust of the proprietors within a year as differences among the proprietors and the confusion caused in the mid-1680s by the Spanish attacks and the uneasy Indian situation in the aftermath of the Westo War allowed individuals with Indian experience to continue to exercise influence in local affairs.  

The Goose Creek men began to solidify their defiance of the proprietors in the last half of the 1680s, emerging as such a powerful faction that some complained that these “dealers in Indians boast they can with a bowl of punch get who they would Chosen of parliament and afterwards who they would chosen of the Grand Council.” Orders from the proprietors to the governors in the late 1680s and through the 1690s to reign in the abuses of the Indian trade typically went unenforced or, worse, were put in the hands of committees where individuals like Moore himself stood like the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse. By the end of the 1690s the Goose Creek men emerged triumphant in the political struggle over the Indian trade. When Moore became governor in 1700 and began to set in place his plans for regional dominance, the second step in preparing the colony militarily for the anticipated struggle with the Spanish in St. Augustine was to ensure the loyalty and organization of the most important part of the offensive military force available to the Carolinians: the Indians. Immediately after gaining approval for the needed improvements to the defensive plans of the colony, Governor Moore and his supporters within the Assembly put forward legislation to gather the needed Indian allies for the upcoming offensive.  

23 Governor of South Carolina to the Lords Proprietors,” in Recs. Rel. to S., 2: 33-34.
The first step for the Carolinians was to ensure the loyalty of their truest allies. With this in mind, the Assembly put forward and passed a bill in August 1701 ordering “James Stanyarne be sent to the Yamassee Indjans with a present and to Give them an Assurance of our ffrrnd Ship, the more to Engage them to our Enterest.” Other matters before the Assembly sought to “Prevent dealeing with Indjans on Trust and to Regulate other abuses in ye indjan Trade.” The gathered notables realized that trying to solidify Indian alliances depended on keeping good relations with the Indians engaged in trade with the English. Therefore allowing traders to use debt as a method of manipulating the Indians or by acting in a manner that could be interpreted by the Indians as abusive would be untoward to say the least. The Assembly finished the year’s business with the admonition to Governor Moore that he should “Use his Utmost Indever to oblige ourfrndly Indians to our Interest” in order to fully prepare the colony for the anticipated strife to come.24

With Moore’s designs in Carolina progressing apace in August 1701, the situation in Europe around the same time cooperated with the events in Charleston. Diplomacy in Europe continued through the first part of 1701 to seek a solution and to prevent a war. Louis XIV’s declaration of Philip V as undisputed ruler of Spain was not enough to set off the conflict, though both sides disputed whether Austria would be given title to Spain’s possessions in Italy. In England, William III did not have the support of the elites nor did his provinces in the United Provinces of the Netherlands support a new war against France. Reluctantly perhaps, but faced with diplomatic necessity, England recognized Philip V as king of Spain in April 1701. Louis XIV pushed too hard, however, when in September 1701, just days after a treaty was negotiated to gain Philip

24 JCHASC, 12: 15, 21-22.
V general recognition, France publicly recognized James Stuart, the son of the deposed James II of England, as King James III of England in defiance of King William. This action swung public opinion in England and allowed William to declare war against France. When confronted with the refusal of the Spanish nobility to part with any portion of the Spanish empire, Austria and the Netherlands followed suit. Soon Europe was torn apart by war. A few months later, James Moore and the Carolinians were informed of the outbreak of hostilities between England and the feared alliance between Spain and France.25

Soon after the war began in Europe, in Charleston the debate over other matters was laid aside and Moore’s supporters in the Assembly passed another series of measures to solidify the Yamassee alliance and to make a new effort to gain support among the other Indians of the region. The perception that the situation in the Southeast was growing more threatening for the English was widespread in Charleston and most colonists wanted Moore to take steps to head off a disaster. The first order of business was to ascertain the threat among the Indians and to continue efforts to bring the closest Indian allies even closer. With this in mind, the Assembly passed a request in January of 1702 that asked Governor Moore to appear before the gathered members to “lay before this house w[ith] Informacon he has received from ye Tallabosees & Couatau [Indian tribes to the west of the Yamassee] traders in refferance to the dangers & Mischeiffs we ly[e] under by ye Neighbourhood of the ffrench & Spaniards, & w[ith] Attempts they have made to draw s[ai]d Indians to their Intrest.” The measure added a request for Thomas Nairne to present

himself before the Assembly to report on efforts to prevent trader abuses among the Yamasses.\textsuperscript{26}

Mindful of the need to placate the Yamasses, the Assembly formed a committee to sit as judges of traders accused of malfeasance in order to “remove the abuses done to the Yamasee Indians by them that live among and trade with them and of making them Easie in Our Neighbourhood and friendship, So as that they may not have reason to return to ye Spaniards.” The committee ordered Joshua Binan, an English trader, to be arrested and brought to Charleston to “Answer ye Complaynts of Severall Yamamasee Indjans” that he had “Comitted Several Abuses to our neighbour and friendly” allies. Binan was not alone. Other traders were investigated in the first months of 1702 with several being ordered to return seized goods or to pay the Yamassee for their actions. The Assembly, sitting as a court, ordered William Page to “make full Satisfaction to the old Ewhaw of ye Hoos Pau Towne for a Gunn he forceably tooke from him.” John Roe was ordered to pay restitution to a Yamassee for several deerskins he had seized to satisfy a debt. Binan was ultimately found guilty and forced to pay an Indian named “Po:ka” for “Killing his hoggs and also, for Burning a House” in the Indian Town after having seized the Indian’s belongings from it. The Assembly intended to deal seriously and quickly with Yamassee complaints. The proprietors encouraged their efforts, seeing the need to shore up the defenses of Carolina through a solid Yamassee alliance. They wrote to Moore and to the Assembly requesting that they take every step to ensure that “Friendly means be used with the Indians, so as to bring them over to his side as a protection and defense against the neighboring enemy, the French and Spaniards.” The Yamassee represented the cornerstone of English influence and aspirations and, as such, both

\textsuperscript{26} “House of Assembly to Governor James Moore, Jan. 21\textsuperscript{st}, 1702,” in \textit{JCHASC}, 13: 10.
colonists and proprietors recognized the need to protect them from French or, even more likely given the historical association, Spanish meddling.27

Once the alliance with the Yamasseees and their associated neighbors could be assured, Moore and his supporters sought to add to the military strength of the Carolinians. To do this, the Assembly organized efforts to send envoys to several Indian tribes further south and west of the Yamassee that had been engaged in trading relationships with the English from the 1680s on. Orders were issued to send emissaries and to “think of Some way to prevent ye Tallabooses & other Indians now our friends their trade & acquaintance with ye ffrench till some way may be found to secure us from the dangers & Mischeifs which that Trade & acquaintance will bring us.” The Tallapooses were a prominent tribe among the early Creek confederacy and their proximity to the fledgling French settlements on the Gulf of Mexico led the Carolinians, unaware of the actual size and strength of the French in the region at this point, to worry over the incipient efforts of the French to win influence.28 Similar orders were issued to send delegations to the region inland from the former mission province of Guale directly south of lands controlled by the Yamassee along the Savannah River. The instructions to these individuals sought “some way to Confirm ye Cussatoes w[hi]ch live on Ocha-Sa Creek & ye Savannos in the Place they now live in, and to Our friendship they being the Only People by whom Wee may expect advice of an Inland Invasion.” The delegations succeeded in solidifying the firm alliances with tribes such as the Yamassee, and drew others, like the Creeks and Savannahs, to the English side. The Carolinians, for once


28 For the emergence of the Creek Indians, see Steven C. Hahn, The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004) and Robbie F. Etheridge, Creek Country: The Creek Indians and their World (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
almost solidly though not completely unified behind their new governor, James Moore, were well prepared for the coming hostilities.29

Little effort was being spared in Charleston during the first three years of the 1700s to ensure that Carolina would be well defended in the eventuality of a conflict with their rivals in Spanish Florida. The possibility that their longtime rival might be assisted by the arrival of a new French colony on the Gulf Coast only added to the impetus. Spanish officials in St. Augustine knew of English activities and through the 1690s matched the English with efforts to solidify the defenses of the remaining mission provinces and of St. Augustine itself. The efforts on both sides were well-timed, and the perceptions of the English in Charleston and the Spanish in St. Augustine regarding a growing threat of war were well-founded. Tensions between the two rivals deteriorated in the late 1690s as nervousness in Europe increased. The English Board of Trade’s representative, Edward Randolph, reported in May 1700 an increase in the number of English ships attacked by pirates in the Caribbean on routes between Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Charleston. He wrote the board of his concerns and forwarded information he had obtained claiming that the “Governor of the Havanah entertains and protects the Pyratts which very lately robbed and tooke severall laden vessels in the Gulff of Florida and appears by the Copy of the Depositions of Thomas Smith [an English ship captain] who came into Providence [in the Bahamas] the times I was there.” In addition to Spanish provocations, Randolph included his sense of public morale, claiming that inhabitants were in “an dissatifyed and unsetled condition... fearing the Spaniards their

neighbours... will once more ruine them and drive them off from their Settlement as they
not long since did."\textsuperscript{30}

Tensions in Charleston rose to such a fevered pitch in the late 1690s and the first
years of the 1700s that they began to echo not only the regional concerns of the
Carolinians but also the diplomatic turmoil within England and Europe. In 1698, George
Harris, a ship-owner and captain of the \textit{Swallow}, had his vessel seized and his goods
impounded in Charleston over concerns that he was a foreign agent in the employ of
France via a Scottish company supposedly sympathetic to the cause of the deposed
monarch, James II, who then resided in France with the support of Louis XIV. Affidavits
sent to Charleston by the proprietors and their agents testified that George Harris had
been naturalized as an English citizen in 1694. Harris, himself, in testimony before the
court of Admiralty in Charleston, acknowledged to having been “born in St. Martins in
the Kingdom of France.” The case struggled on through 1699 before Harris’ goods and
ship were returned and restitution made. The proprietors rebuked Charleston officials for
improperly seizing the vessel and accused them of overzealousness in implementing anti­
piracy laws. With anxiety over the situation between England, France, and Spain,
however, the fear motivating the officials in Charleston to do so seems understandable.\textsuperscript{31}

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Tensions in St. Augustine at the end of the 1690s and the first years of the 1700s
were equally on the rise. The Spanish governor, Joseph de la Zúñiga y Cerda, and other

\textsuperscript{30} “Edward Randolph to the Board of Trade, May 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1700,” in \textit{Rees. Rel. to SC}, 4: 164-65.
\textsuperscript{31} “Various Documents related to the case of George Harris, a.k.a, George Heremelos,” in \textit{Rees. Rel. to SC},
officials, both in Florida and in Spain, warned of the growing hostility of the English repeatedly in the years before the outbreak of war in the Southeast. Delegations to Charleston to complain of Indian raids on the missions, like that of 1699, fulfilled a dual roll as various reports on the conditions, defenses, and armaments of Charleston and along the coast were dutifully forwarded to the Council of the Indies in Madrid. The difference in the two settlements was that the Spanish in St. Augustine knew of their exposed situation compared to the much better supplied and fortified Charleston. All of the money, supplies, and arms obtained in the previous few years before the onset of war went to improving the defenses of St. Augustine itself and to increase, if only incrementally, the defensive garrisons among the missions. St. Augustine did not possess the extra weapons to provide armaments to the Apalachee and Timucua Indians in any great numbers. At no point did the governor of Florida have any hope of carrying the fight to Carolina, at least not without direct orders from the king and forces from the large regional and provincial capitals of Havana and New Spain. Thoughts of overtly antagonizing the English were never entertained even with the threat of war looming over the region. The Spanish even continued the policy of treating the English with compassion, at one point assisting a wrecked English slave vessel lost off the coast of Florida in March 1701. The survivors were treated well and the slaves were returned without incident to Charleston. Despite their efforts to placate the Carolinians, many in St. Augustine knew that their hopes for peace in the region were futile. In the early months of 1702, word reached both capitals of the outbreak of war in Europe. War in the Southeast would begin soon afterwards.32

32 Andres de Arrioles to the King, Vera Cruz, Nov. 15, 1699, AGI 61-6-22/29 bnd 3669 (Stetson); Antonio de Ubilla y Medina to Marq del Carpio, Palazio, June 17, 1701, AGI 61-6-22/41 bnd 3825
Word of the outbreak of war in Europe reached Charleston in May 1702. It found Governor Moore prepared to carry out his longstanding desire of destroying Florida and removing the threat posed to English hegemony in the region. Yet, a vocal group of Moore’s opponents were not willing to go along with such a radical course of action. The members of the House of Assembly reported that “wee have reason to believe that... Warr is Begunn in Europe” but also noted that “it is well Knowne to you [Moore] in what Bad Condition this Country is to Defend it Selfe against an Enemie.” A fierce debate over whether to launch an invasion of St. Augustine ensued and gripped the colony for over three months. Prominent individuals presented testimony before the Assembly on “wayes and methods for the Attacking & Takeing of St. Augustine or any of our Enemies of ye Crowne of France and Spaine.” The deliberation over the need to go on the offensive took on patriotic overtones as Moore used the war fervor among Carolinians, who welcomed the news that Queen Anne, William III’s successor, continued the fight against the hated French and Spanish, to tar his opponents. One prominent opponent, John Oldmixon, recorded a few years after the events of 1702 that “any member of the assembly [who] undertook to speak against it... he was presently look’d upon by him [Moore] and his adherents, as an enemy and traitor to his country.” Over the course of the summer of 1702, emotions in Charleston reached a fevered pitch and the Assembly voted overwhelmingly to take all needed measures to ensure the “speedy” fall of St. Augustine before the French could reinforce the position.33

By September 1702, Moore had received the go-ahead to organize the invasion of Spanish Florida and hastily proceeded to organize his militia and Indian allies into an invasion force. Before his attack could be readied, English efforts to recruit new Indian tribes to the endeavor of striking at the Spanish paid an early dividend in May 1702. In that month, a party of Creek Indians, at the instigation of the English, sent a raiding party into Apalachee and attacked the Mission Santa Fe, a northern outpost situated in Timucua between Apalachee and St. Augustine along the Camino Real, the road that connected the two provinces. The Creek raid on Santa Fe came as a result of a small delegation of four Apalachee dispatched to the "Apalachicolos," as the Spanish styled the Creeks, several months before the attack. The Apalachees organized the delegation in response to false peace overtures from certain Creek caciques early in 1701. Its mission was to obtain the release of horses captured by Creek raids on the Apalachee missions, to perhaps set up a legitimate trade with the Creeks, and to end the pillaging of the Creeks along the frontier. The Creek Indians met the Apalachees with scorn and bloodshed. An offer by the Apalachees to accept weapons for horses in the future was rejected and the Creeks seized three of the four Apalachee Indians and killed them outright. The surviving delegate escaped and made his way back with his story, causing a great deal of consternation among the Spanish and Apalachees alike.34

The incident caused the Spanish governor to issue orders regarding a reevaluation of the relationship between Spanish Florida, her Indian allies, and the increasingly hostile Creeks. Governor Zúñiga appointed Captain Don Juan de Ayala Escobar as visitador general (inspector general) of Apalachee with orders to "carefully investigate the peace

34 "Auto of the Inspector Relating to Apalachee. San Luis, Feb. 22, 1701" and "Governor Zúñiga to the King. Upon the raid into Santa Fé and the expedition upon which Captain Romo was sent. San Aug. in, Sept. 30, 1702,", in Boyd, Here They Once Stood, 33, 36-37.
[treaties] which the natives of these provinces [of Apalachee] have covenanted with those of Apalachicolo and other pagans of that territory.” Other instructions prohibited “the deputy and the remaining infantry, and existing settlers and inhabitants, as well as all the natives of the province, caciques and chiefs” to no longer travel or trade with any Indians from the Apalachicola area to prevent, it was hoped, any further cause of conflict between the two sides.35

The May raid on Santa Fe proved that the hopes of the Spanish officials, so desperately seeking to avoid a war, were futile. Governor Zúñiga reported a few months later to the king the particulars of the attack, tying it to the English as a way of warning of the expected attack to come. Zúñiga testified that after the deaths of the “three Christian prisoners” that the Creeks, “not being satisfied with the wickedness done… entered in the dawn watch and burned and devastated the village of Santa Fé… making the attack on the convent with many firearms and arrows and burning the church.” The Indians and the small garrison in Santa Fe retreated into a small stockade near the church and after three hours managed to fight off the attackers, both taking and inflicting casualties. The loss of life on the part of the Spanish, according to Zúñiga, would have been light if not for the precipitous action of the local deputy governor, Juan Ruiz de Canicares. As the Creek raiders began their retreat, Ruiz, “with small prudence” gathered a handful of Spanish soldiers and just over a dozen Timucua Indians and pursued the attackers to take revenge. The pursuers, however, were outnumbered by the Creeks, who spread into a crescent formation and turned and attacked the Spanish. Zúñiga reported that “one and another up to ten of our Indians died in the skirmish... [with] only a few Indians escaping.” In the

battle, Ruiz was killed and the Spanish garrison at the key strongpoint between the colonial capital and its most important province, Apalachee, weakened. The aftermath of the destruction of Santa Fe found the “Apalachee Indians... fearful of the hostilities and injuries which their villages will have to suffer from the raids the Apalachicolos will make unless they are curbed and punished.”

Understanding that the mission Indians looked to the Spanish for defense and aid as part of their implicit role as the paramount chieftains of Florida, Zúñiga organized a retaliatory force under the command of Captain Don Francisco Romo de Uriza with orders to secure Apalachee and to proceed with a cautious foray into Apalachicola to punish the tribes responsible for the raid on Santa Fe. Romo’s force marched to Apalachee in October to placate the mission Indians and to reassure them of the Spanish ability to protect them. While taking steps to deal with the aftereffects of the Creek raid, Zúñiga made it clear in his report to the king where he believed the blame lay for the actions of the Creek. He claimed that the “English... encourage them [the Creeks] with arms and ammunition, and who even accompany them, for the opinion exists that an Englishman led the band that entered Santa Fé.” The governor dutifully reported the dispatch of Romo’s force and his hopes that the strengthened garrison would suffice to allay the Apalachee concerns. He promised to do everything in his power to accomplish this goal “in order that the Indians may not be dismayed and take to the woods.”

The fact that the English threatened the Spanish position in Florida was well known to the Spanish officials in St. Augustine and Madrid alike. The improvements to the defensive garrisons in Timucua and Apalachee and the reinforced fortifications in St.

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36 "Governor Zúñiga to the King: Upon the raid into Santa Fé and the expedition upon which Captain Romo was sent. San Aug.in, Sept. 30, 1702,", in Boyd, Here They Once Stood, 36-37.
37 Ibid, 38.
Augustine were the only actions the locals could accomplish by 1701 as the rumors of war swirled in European and American capitals. Recognizing the growing possibility of a French-Spanish alliance, the king and Council of the Indies issued orders to Governor Zúñiga to give him another source of succor in the case of war. A royal cedula reached St. Augustine in the early months of 1701 informing the governor that the Council had received “very reliable news that the English and Dutch [were] planning an invasion and conquest of the Indies.” Should St. Augustine be threatened, the governor was instructed to “make all preparations that may be necessary for defense” and in case additional help was needed, the Council advised the governor to “avail yourself of French auxiliary arms, not only of those found in the island of Santo Domingo... but also of those which recently have been sent to those coasts by the Most Christian Majesty and my Grandfather.” The second reference was to the new colonies at Biloxi and Mobile, and officials in St. Augustine dutifully began an ongoing communication with the French regarding the English activities in the region. The English fears of a French force reinforcing St. Augustine proved accurate.

That alliance, however, would do little to stop the overwhelming force that James Moore was gathering at the same time. When Captain Romo de Uriza left St. Augustine in October 1702, Moore’s efforts to win the backing of the Assembly and of the Yamassee and Creek Indians had proven effective and he was already moving to invade Florida in an attempt to take St. Augustine and finally remove the Spanish threat, once and for all.38

38 “Royal Cedula to the Governor of Florida. Madrid. Jan. 11, 1701,” in Boyd, Here They Once Stood, 32-33; Antonio de Ubilla y Medina to Marquis de Carpio, Buen Retiro, April 24, 1701. AGI 61-6-22/35 bnd 3813 (Stetson).
The last three months of 1702 proved pivotal in the three decades old rivalry between Charleston and St. Augustine. The events of this short period began the process of English ascendancy in Southeast and the rapid decline of St. Augustine from regional power to a diplomatic and economic afterthought. That progression began with Captain Romo de Uriza’s departure and journey from the Apalachee garrison town of San Luis. Romo determined very quickly in early October 1702 to organize an expedition to punish the Creek for the destruction of Santa Fe. He gathered a large force of roughly eight hundred Apalachee, Timucua, and Chacato Indians at San Luis to supplement the assembled Spanish soldiers and proceeded north into Apalachicola. His movement and plans were noted early by the Creeks, who moved to counter his force. A large force of Creek warriors armed with English firearms ambushed the Spanish force on its march to the Chattahoochee River. In the battle, over half of the Indian forces accompanying the Spanish were either killed or captured, later to be sold to English slave traders in Charleston. The survivors threw down their weapons and ran. Captain Romo survived the debacle, retreating to San Luis to try to salvage the situation as best he could. His attempts were overtaken by events occurring by the end of October in St. Augustine.39

By the middle of the month of October, James Moore had successfully assembled a force of some 800-1000 soldiers, mostly militiamen, with a smaller number of Yamassee allies to serve as scouts and foragers. Moore sent delegates to the Creeks in early October in an effort, albeit unsuccessful, to recruit a large force to join in the assault

on St. Augustine. During the delegate's visit to the Creeks, a Chacato Indian woman, a resident of one of the Spanish missions, learned of the purpose for the visit and hastily left the Creek village to warn the Spanish of the upcoming attack. She arrived in San Luis on October 21 and officials there immediately sent word to St. Augustine, where warning of the English invasion reached the Governor on October 27. That forewarning most likely saved the town of St. Augustine from complete defeat. Governor Zúñiga began to prepare the town for war, moving supplies into the fortress of San Marcos and sending pleas for help to New Spain and Havana. The governor dispatched orders to Apalachee and the small fortress of Pensacola to prepare for a possible attack and to send whatever aid they could provide. Finally, following the standing orders of the king and Council, he sent Diego de Florencia westward to Mobile in an effort to gain the assistance of the French in relief of St. Augustine.40

The warning of the impending attack did not provide the Spanish with enough information regarding Moore's specific plans to prevent the English from surprising and overwhelming a small garrison and blockhouse on San Pedro's Bar at midnight on November 3, 1702, then following up with an attack on Mission San Pedro de Tupiqui. Soon panic ensued among the missions immediately surrounding St. Augustine as Franciscan friars and Christianized Indians alike fled their homes and retreated into the woods as the English overran the missions just to the north of St. Augustine. A small group of twenty Spanish soldiers dispatched from St. Augustine arrived to find the missions of San Juan del Puerto and Piritiriba destroyed. When word reached Zúñiga of

the size of the English forces, he quickly made the decision to avoid a battle in the open, opting instead to retreat behind the strong stone walls of the Castillo de San Marcos and to hope for a relief force from Havana or elsewhere. By the time the English arrived at St. Augustine from their attacks on the remaining missions to the north on November 8, 1702, some 1,500 persons crowded into the fortress at St. Augustine to await the attack.41

Though dramatically outnumbered, the Spanish garrison of some 174 soldiers and a couple of hundred men and boys who looked out on Moore’s army of almost one thousand did not realize the good fortune that had befallen them. In Moore’s haste to attack the Spanish at St. Augustine, little thought had been given to the needs of an extended siege should his effort to take the town by surprise fail. Once Moore arrived at St. Augustine, he settled in to besiege the fortress in hopes of starving them out or in convincing the Spanish governor to surrender. Moore’s preparations, however, were not complete when he launched his assault on Florida. He succeeded in bottling up the Spanish within the fort using a fleet of small ships gathered in Charleston to blockade the port and landing his army at the St. John’s River then marching overland to attack the city by land. While he outnumbered the forces available to the Spanish by over two to one, he had not succeeded in obtaining the entire complement of artillery, especially the mortars he had requested but never received from Jamaica. The siege, therefore, settled into a waiting game that lasted through November and December. Each side delayed a direct assault, instead determining to see which occurred first, the Spanish running out of food or the arrival of Spanish reinforcements from Cuba. As fate would have it, it was the latter. On December 29, 1702, a Spanish fleet from Havana arrived off St. Augustine and landed a relief force on Anastasia Island. Governor Moore, his army low on supplies

and faced with a Spanish fleet that outgunned the eight vessels he had used to blockade the port, decided to retreat. He burned the eight ships in the bay and marched overland to the remainder of his fleet waiting in the St. John’s River. From there he led his army back to Charleston to face the consequences of his failure to take St. Augustine.  

The political aftermath of the St. Augustine expedition threw the government into an uproar as immediate questions by the members of the Assembly were bandied about to explain the fiasco. In January 1703, Moore’s opponents lost no time in denouncing his leadership during the expedition. While the English had taken few casualties and caused a great deal of damage to the Spanish around St. Augustine, the failure to completely remove the Spanish threat led to an investigation into the conduct of the attack. Those who had previously sought to speak out against the expedition now complained that they had been abused and intimidated into silence. Moore further exacerbated the dispute by refusing to allow those complaining of illegal tactics during the debate preceding the expedition access to the court. The loss of eight ships and a total debt of some £8,000 related to the attack on St. Augustine led Moore to lose much of his support among the Goose Creek men.

Sir Nathaniel Johnson was appointed to replace Moore as governor. A favorite of the Goose Creek faction, Johnson attempted to placate some of Moore’s opponents with promises that no further abuses would be tolerated, but he refused to take action against the still influential Moore. The Goose Creek men, still in control of the Assembly and with the help of Johnson, sought to hobble their opposition by passing legislation regulating religious matters in the colony in an effort to isolate their largely non-Anglican opponents. The failure to take Moore to task for his actions, both before the attack and

after, and the attack on their religious freedom led the most prominent of the dissenters, such as Robert Quarry and John Ash, to organize a delegation led by Ash to present a case for royal intercession in South Carolina to put a stop to the perceived tyranny of Moore and the Goose Creek faction.\textsuperscript{43}

In St. Augustine, the English siege left a swath of destruction around St. Augustine that would set the colony back for years. The Indian missions around St. Augustine were largely destroyed and the damage to the town itself was devastating. The houses, shops, and church of St. Augustine were looted and burned. Subsequent petitions for assistance listed 141 separate owners who complained of the loss of a house or other building. A royal cedula to the viceroy of New Spain instructed the provision of 20,000 pesos for immediate relief and ordered the governor of Havana to provide a garrison of two hundred additional soldiers to defend St. Augustine from further assaults. The amount of destruction to St. Augustine itself was later valued at 62,750 pesos, not including the destruction of the Franciscan convent and the parish church. When the English withdrew, roughly twenty buildings remained standing in all of St. Augustine and the Indian population in the immediate area was scattered.\textsuperscript{44}

Well aware of the possibility of more English assaults on St. Augustine or on the other mission provinces, the Spanish attempted to strengthen the province quickly. A line of defensive outposts was built from the Mission at Nombre de Dios north of St. Augustine to the San Sebastian River in the interior to provide a warning of future assaults. The surviving Indians of the Mocama missions assembled into new villages


\textsuperscript{44} Consejo de las Indias to the King, Madrid, April 30, 1703. AGI 58-1-28/2 bnd 4005 (Stetson); Hoffman, \textit{Florida's Frontiers}, 177.
south of the St. John’s River and rebuilt the mission at Pirtiribi with a new stockade and fort to house a small garrison. In Timucua the Spanish reinforced the central mission of the province at San Francisco de Potano by enclosing the village with a stockade and consolidating there the survivors of the mission at Santa Fe. The defenses would do little to stop the next wave of English attackers through 1703 and 1704.45

James Moore’s loss of the governorship did not stop his crusade to achieve Carolina supremacy in the Southeast. In the debate regarding his action against St. Augustine, Moore made clear his intent, stating his new strategy of ultimately adding “the conquest of a small Spanish town called Pancicola and a new French colony [Mobile].” Shifting his sights from St. Augustine, on which he still hoped to ultimately “make a second Attempt,” Moore finally set himself and the colony the goal of making the new English monarch, Queen Anne, the “Absolute and Soveraigne Lady of all the Maine as far as the River Mischiciipi.” The accomplishment of this ambitious objective would confirm that “the Colony of Carolina [would] be of the Greatest Value to the Crown of England of any of her Majesties Plantations on the Maine except Virginia by adding a Great Revenue to the Crown.” Once he stepped down as governor, Moore used his influence among the Goose Creek men to stifle dissenters, and in September 1703, he convinced the Assembly to approve legislation to commission him “to Raise a Party of men to go to ye Assistance of ye Cowetaw [the Creek], And other our frindly Indjans, And to Attacque ye Appelaches.” Moore’s grand design to sweep aside the Spanish and the French continued, and the Indians of Spanish Florida were the prime targets.46

45 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 177.
46 JCHASC, 13: 28, 103-104.
Throughout 1703 the Creeks continued to raid the Apalachees and Timucuas with the active assistance of the English. In the first months of that year, a small party of English militia and Creek warriors attacked the reinforced missions of San José de Ocuia and Piritiriba on the St. Johns River as well as San Francisco de Potano in Timucua. Some five hundred mission Indians were captured during these raids and many were sold into slavery to English traders. In November 1703, Moore left Charleston with some fifty Englishmen and a few hundred Yamassee Indian allies. Along his march toward Apalachee, Moore recruited Creek warriors so that by the time he arrived at the fortified mission at Ayubale in late January 1704, he led some one thousand Indians along with his militia troops in attack on Apalachee.47

The Indians of Ayubale, led by the Franciscan friar, Angel de Miranda, numbered just under two hundred persons but held the attackers off for nine hours. Moore’s troops finally “thought fit to attempt the burning of the church, which we did, three or four Indians assisting us.” The Apalachees sought to prevent this, “obstinately defending themselves” before Moore finally reported that “a friar, the only white in it, came forth and begged mercy.” In the attack on Ayubale, Moore recorded taking “about twenty-six men alive, and fifty-eight women and children.” These Indian captives would be sold into slavery for resisting the English in order to pay for the expedition. Moore and the Assembly had determined early on that the second attack on Spanish Florida should attempt to pay for itself to avoid incurring debt as had the first.48

47 “Extract from a letter of Governor Zúñiga to the King, San Augutln, March 30, 1704,” in Boyd, Here They Once Stood, 48-49; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 178.
Having destroyed Ayubale, Moore marched towards San Luis de Apalachee in an effort to defeat the main Spanish garrison. When word of the English invasion reached the lieutenant governor of the province, Juan Ruíz de Mexía, he organized a force of thirty soldiers and some four hundred Indians to counter Moore’s army and marched to the relief of Ayubale. Governor Zúñiga later reported the battle to the king, including a somewhat positive spin on what was certainly a disastrous defeat. He detailed how Captain Ruíz “surrounded the enemy and killed six or seven of the English and about one hundred of the pagan Indians.” The losses to the English, while serious, did not stop Moore’s army and the Spanish force “for lack of munitions” was defeated decisively by the English-led force of Indians. Moore reported “one hundred and sixty-eight [Apalachee] Indian men killed and taken in the fight; but the Apalatchia Indians say they lost two hundred, which we have reason to believe the least.” Captain Ruíz and eight of his men were captured and were “stripped and secured in stocks.”

The defeat of the Spanish garrison left the province of Apalachee open to Moore’s army and he immediately set about destroying the missions and reducing Spanish influence among their former allies to nothing. He later reported his success in the effort in a letter sent to Charleston:

I sent to the cassique of the Ibitachka, who, with one hundred and thirty men, was in his strong and well made fort, to come and make his peace with me, the which he did, and compounded it with his church’s plate, and ten horses laden with provisions. After this I marched through five towns, which had all strong forts, and defenses against small arms. They all submitted and surrendered their forts to me without condition. I have now in my company all the whole people of three towns, and the greatest part of four more. We have totally destroyed all the people of four towns: so that we have left the Apalatchia but that one town which compounded with one part of St. Lewis.

The mission Indians at San Luis were the last to surrender; with their action the Spanish province of Apalachee was no more. Moore offered the Indians he encountered a simple choice: they could surrender and move voluntarily to the lands controlled by the Yamassee and others nearby Carolina, thus forsaking their alliance with the Spanish, or they could choose capture and slavery. By the end of his expedition, Moore informed the governor of Carolina that the "number of free Apalatchia Indians that are now under my protection, and bound with me to Carolina, are 1300, and 100 slaves." His Indian allies had captured another two hundred or so Apalachees bringing the total number of mission Indians to be sold into slavery to over three hundred.50

From the perspective of the Spanish, the defeat and destruction of Apalachee, their largest and most productive province in Florida, was a disaster in every sense of the word. Governor Zúñiga, in January and February of 1703, sat helpless in St. Augustine as the missions of Apalachee burned. He wrote frantic appeals to Havana and New Spain requesting assistance but could do little else. He explained to the king that it "was my desire to send assistance to the infantry and settlers found there, as well as to some natives who have joined them." His desire could not be implemented, he claimed, because "I find myself with so few people, and I am disconsolate that I dare not leave this place without some defense." Without hope of relief from the Spanish, Apalachee was left to the English. By the middle of 1704, Governor Zúñiga reported to the King the sad news that "in the said Province of Apalachee there are no people remaining, in comparison to the number when there were fourteen villages, in which were a total of eight thousand persons." In 1704, the governor finally noted that of their former

Apalachee allies, "not two hundred remain; and these are prone to leave, some to the woods and others to the enemy."  

The Apalachees themselves took various routes away from their traditional homes in response to Moore's expedition. Some moved southeast towards St. Augustine; many sought shelter in Timucua as a temporary sanctuary. At least eight hundred fled the English attacks westward and moved closer to the French at Mobile in hopes that the French would prove more effective allies than had the Spanish. The majority responded to the failure of the Spanish to protect them by renouncing their former allies and accepting the English offer of alliance. Thousands moved northeast into areas around the Savannah River and were absorbed into the confederation of Indian tribes in the area led by the Yamasses, thus strengthening the English in Carolina. The influence and power of Spanish Florida took a huge blow in the loss of the Apalachees and proved just as ineffectual in their attempts to stop the slide into powerlessness.

The raids on Spanish missions did not end in 1704 with the successful conclusion of James Moore's attempt to destroy Apalachee. Creek and Yamassee raids continued for a decade deep into Florida, attacking and destroying the remaining missions in Timucua and near St. Augustine. In August 1704, a Creek raiding party attacked the missions of San Pedro and San Mateo, capturing and burning alive the caciques of those villages and sending the survivors fleeing deeper into Timucua. In 1705, other raiding parties laid siege to the town of Abosoya, built the previous year by refugee Apalachees. Raiders attacked San Francisco de Potano and the blockhouse at the La Chua ranch towards the end of the year. In the spring of 1706, the remaining missions in Timucua

52 Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 181.
came under such strong and constant attacks by both Creek and Yamassee war parties, assisted by the English, that the new governor, Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, ordered the withdrawal of Spanish forces and mission Indians from that province. By the end of 1706, Timucua was practically deserted, though a few small bands of mission Indians and their Franciscan friars, continued to attempt to live in the area through 1707. By 1708, Governor Córcoles y Martínez reported the complete devastation of the mission provinces and the loss of some ten thousand Indian allies. Spanish power in the southeast was gone and the English of Carolina seemed ascendant.\[53\]

The first years of the eighteenth century witnessed the shift in power from the Spanish to the English and the introduction of a brand new player in contest for regional influence, the French. Indian alliances, whether with the Creeks, Apalachees, Yamassees, or Timucuas, continued to represent the key to power in the area. In the events that changed the region so completely during these few short years, the Spanish failure to protect their allies and the weakness of the French and, thus, their inability to assist the Spanish in the contest proved decisive. By the end of the first decade of the new century, the Spanish had gone from a regional power to a mere afterthought, and the importance of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in the development of the Southeast began to fade. While it would once again, albeit briefly, become central to events, it would never again be the primary driving factor on the course of the region's history.

Fading Power and One Last Gasp: The Waning of Spanish Influence and the Beginnings of English Ascendancy in the Colonial Southeast

The approximately two decade period before the establishment of the colony of Georgia in 1733 represents the closing chapter of a roughly fifty-year period in which the rivalry between Spanish Florida and English Carolina was the most important factor in the political, economic, and cultural transformation of the colonial Southeast. This rivalry spurred shifting alliances between Indians and Europeans which, in turn, led to lucrative trade, Indian slavery, and almost unremitting warfare that had profound consequences on all participants. The devastation wrought by Anglo-Indian raids into Florida during this time led to the final decline of Spanish power in the region and paved the way for a brief period of English dominance by the mid-1710s. That dominance was short-lived because, by the 1720s, Spanish Florida was replaced in the competition with the English for the Southeast by French Louisiana.

In the overall story of whether Charleston or St. Augustine would serve as the key European settlement in the southeast, the Yamassee War was the catalyst for its final chapter. For Carolina, it ultimately removed the last real Indian threat to the growth of the colony, but was also a setback to its influence as the causes of the conflict led many Indian tribes to pull back from a full alliance with the English. Yet, the war’s effects on Spanish Florida were equally significant. The southward flight of large numbers of Yamasseees and their allies gained the immediate notice of Spanish officials who sought
to win back and maintain the Indians' allegiance, regain lost territory, and use their newfound allies to reduce the threat posed by Carolina. Despite these grand ambitions, their efforts proved futile. Carolina emerged triumphant in their fifty-year contest with Spanish Florida for power and influence in the colonial Southeast and would begin to echo the larger imperial English sentiment that saw France as the true threat to English hegemony in North America.

The violence between Carolina and Spanish Florida, which reached its crescendo in 1702 and 1703 with James Moore's destruction of the mission province of Apalachee, did not cease after these events; it merely changed direction. While the English turned their sights westward, their Creek and Yamassee allies continued raiding the survivors of the missions as the Floridians sought to rebuild settlements closer to St. Augustine. In late 1704, the Creeks destroyed the small missions of San Pedro and San Mateo in the province of Timucua. During the raids on these outlying settlements, the caciques of both villages were captured and burned to death by the marauding Creeks. At the same time, other Creek raiders attacked the outskirts of the La Chua ranch in Timucua. The next year, in August 1705, a sizable Creek war party laid siege for twenty days to the town of Abosaya. Only a Spanish military force sent from St. Augustine saved the besieged Indians. Abosaya was a new settlement, built by the survivors of the Apalachee town of Ivitachuco, which had attracted a sizable number of surviving mission Indians. The siege, combined with continued raids that targeted that town afterwards, convinced
the refugees to abandon the new town by the end of 1705 and to retreat to St. Augustine itself.¹

Throughout 1705 and through the spring of 1706, Creek Indians continued to attack across Timucua in an effort to remove their ancient enemies and to gain reward from their English allies. The Creeks organized direct attacks on the blockhouse fortifications at the La Chua ranch and the remaining villages throughout the region, laying siege to the main Timucuan mission and garrison at San Francisco de Potano. The strength of the attacks and the violent and tortuous treatment of captives by the Creek attackers caused the Timucuans and Spanish alike to begin fleeing their traditional lands in search of the relative safety provided by the guns of the Castillo de San Marcos. The small garrison of seven soldiers posted at La Chua Ranch abandoned their exposed position and sought refuge in San Francisco de Potano just in time to be put under siege.

By April 1706, the lieutenant governor of Timucua, along with the caciques of Santa Fe and San Francisco, the two remaining settlements in the province, asked the new governor, Francisco de Córrcoles y Martínez, to be allowed to move all of the surviving Indians and settlers to St. Augustine. He reluctantly agreed. The evacuation of Timucua continued through early 1707 and paralleled the withdrawal of the last of the mission Indians from the Mocama region just north of St. Augustine. By the end of the decade, with the destruction of Apalachee and the abandonment of Timucua, the former mission provinces of La Florida had, for all intents and purposes, became a no-man’s land of Creek and Yamassee raiding parties that traversed the entire region, even harassing the

outskirts of St. Augustine itself. Spanish power in the region had been broken, though it would be almost a decade and experience one last gasp of hope before the process would be complete.²

The efforts of the English themselves turned from St. Augustine and focused on the remaining Spanish and French enclaves in western Florida. After dealing with the base of Spanish power by destroying the missions, the English realized that the largest threat remaining came from the French settlements at Biloxi and Mobile. From here the French could potentially help reestablish Spanish influence among the Indians around Pensacola but, this time, closely allied with the French in Mobile. A combined force of English militia and Creek warriors attacked the Spanish outpost at Pensacola early in 1707, plundering and burning the town before being driven back by a Spanish counterattack. A second effort later that year to destroy Pensacola once and for all failed as the English and the Creeks quarreled and some three-fourths of the attackers deserted. A timely French relief force led by Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne, the sieur de Bienville and the governor of Louisiana was able to scatter the remaining English-led force.³ Indians allied with the French had, in each case, provided the Spanish with warning of the attacks, and the cooperation between French, Spanish, and their remaining Indian allies


³ Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne, the sieur de Bienville, was the younger brother of Pierre Le Moyne, the Sieur d'Iberville and founder of the French settlements in Louisiana. Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne served as the governor of Louisiana from 1701 to 1713. See Nellis M. Crouse, Le Moyne d'Iberville: Soldier of New France (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954) and Edwin Adams Davis. Louisiana: The Pelican State. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1961).
led the English to determine that their best course of action was to now attempt to destroy the main French settlement at Mobile.\(^4\)

To accomplish this objective, the English turned to another experienced Indian trader and negotiator, Thomas Nairne. Nairne was a recognized expert who became prominent during the governorship of James Moore when he was appointed to a committee seeking a method to regulate the Indian trade to prevent abuses. While the committee’s work failed to produce a workable solution, Nairne continued to be prominent in organizing Indian allies to best serve English aims. In late 1707, Nairne appeared before the Assembly and proposed a visionary plan by which South Carolina could totally remove the French from competition for the Southeast. He planned to recruit a volunteer force from the experienced Indian traders in Charleston, led by himself and two lieutenants. He would then use trade goods supplied by the Assembly to win “over to our friendship & alliance the Chactaw & Yaushau Indians.” The Choctaws, the Yazoos, and other Indians in the area that comprises modern Louisiana and Mississippi had tentatively welcomed received Thomas Welch, one of Nairne’s agents, and Nairne firmly believed they could be won over to the English side. The combination of Choctaws and Creeks with English leadership would provide, by Nairne’s estimation, a force that would consist of “a fleet of Eighty Canoes man’d with 500 Indians and 1000 by land, 15 English on the one part and 36 with the other.” The force could then “fall on the said front by way of Surprize or otherwise to Cutt [off] those Indians that shall then be allied with the French.” Once that was accomplished, Nairne was sure that the French would “be Reduced to that extremity as either to oblige the French to Surrender or

\(^4\) The King to Marquis del Carpio, Buen Retiro, April 19, 1705, AGI 61-6-22/60 bnd 4252 (Stetson); Verner Crane, *The Southern Frontier: 1670-1732* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1928, 1981), 87-88.
Desert the place.” Encouraged by the grand scheme and seeing a way to follow up the reduction of the Spanish in Florida, the House of Assembly appointed Thomas Nairne as the leader of a proposed assault on Mobile as well as the Indians allied to the French. 

Although ambitious and with the potential to seal English control of the Southeast, Nairne’s plan never got off the ground. Through the beginning of 1708, the governor, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, and the House of Assembly haggled over how to pay for “that weighty affair of removing the French from Mobile.” The expedition got bogged down in the increasing factionalism between proprietary supporters, labeled “dissenters” by their opponents, and the colonists who sought to protect local interests, the “Goose Creek Men” and others. Religion, politics, and economic interests came into play during the last decades of proprietary rule in South Carolina as factionalism ruled the day. During the time the political leaders of Charleston were unable to reach agreement, the Nairne expedition and plan for attacking Mobile fell apart and the ensuing bickering paralyzed large-scale English military action for the rest of the war.

Nairne, himself, did not help the situation. While the deliberations went on among the politicians, Nairne traveled to the lands of the Choctaws at his own expense and successfully achieved peace with the Choctaws. He continued his efforts among the western Indians until June 1708, when he returned to Charleston in hopes that his proposal had been approved. His return, however, saw his arrest on charges of treason. The turmoil in England between the Stuart heir of the deposed James II of England and

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Queen Anne I spilled over to the internal politics of South Carolina. Nairne was indicted on accusations of “Endeavoring to disinherit and Dethrone our Rightfull and Lawfull Sovereigne Lady Queen Ann and to place in her Room the pretended Prince of Wales.” The allegation was a result of Nairne’s involvement with the “Goose Creek Men” as well as Nairne’s previous choice to accuse Governor Johnson’s trader son-in-law with abusing Indians. The charges against Nairne were eventually dropped as his supporters and others complained loudly to the Lords Proprietor of Johnson’s imperious actions. Ultimately, the proprietors removed Johnson from office based on the numerous complaints. In 1710, Nairne traveled to England to meet with the proprietors, who immediately saw his worth as an Indian negotiator, and by the time of his return to Carolina a new governor was in place and he resumed office as the Indian commissioner. The delay in his plan to achieve regional dominance, however, cost the colony a realistic chance to take complete control of the Indian trade and alliances of the Southeast. His efforts, and those of his supporters, to achieve a peaceful trade with the Creeks and Choctaws put them into a strong position of power in the region relative to their European rivals for the next several years. Indian matters would replace fears of European rivals for the rest of the decade.7

In Spanish Florida, equally momentous decisions were being made. Despite the setbacks in 1702 and 1703, the ongoing attacks and raids among the dwindling numbers of mission Indians, as well as the weakness of the garrison, the Spanish sought to strike back. The immediate years after the attacks on St. Augustine and the destruction of Apalachee caused frantic calls for Carolina’s destruction by Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y

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7 Mittimus signed by Governor Nathaniel Johnson, June 24, 1708, cited in Crane, Southern Frontier, 90-93, at 92.
Cerda and other royal officials to their immediate superiors in Havana, New Spain, and Spain. But, the wheels of bureaucracy of the Spanish empire turned slowly and at first the Junta de Guerra and the Council of the Indies did not realize how serious the situation in La Florida actually was. Full reports of the attack and siege of St. Augustine began to reach Spain in April 1703. After initial thoughts of retaliation, the Junta and Council successfully convinced the king to approve a policy of repair and reinforcement rather than attacking Charleston, which was deemed impractical at the time.8

Through the spring and summer of 1704, rumors and reports of the English attacks on Apalachee and the “atrocities” of the English, Creeks, and Yamassees who comprised the assaulting forces began to trickle back to Spain. Governor Zúñiga wrote to the king of “two soldiers and several Indians who were burned with much barbarity and cruelty by the abhorrent pagans, who bound them to some stakes by the feet and hands and set them on fire until their lives were extinguished.” The deaths of so many converts and of several clergy even evoked an order from the king to his ambassador in Rome to bring the situation to the personal attention of the pope so that the martyrs could be properly remembered and to solicit whatever political support against England it could evoke. By the end of June 1704, the Junta de Guerra reversed its earlier decision and recommended to the king and Council that plans begin to organize a punitive expedition aimed at destroying Carolina once and for all. Orders went out quickly from the king to begin assembling the needed personnel and supplies.9

8 Viceroy Albuquerque to the King, Mexico City, April 1, 1703, AGI 58-1-27/63 bnd 3991 (Stetson); Secretary Aperregui to Marquis de Ribas, Madrid, April 18, 1703, AGI 58-1-27/A-28 bnd 4994 (Stetson); Council of the Indies to the King, Madrid, July 21, 1703, AGI 58-1-20/83 bnd 4041 (Stetson).
9 Governor Zúñiga to the King, St. Augustine, March 30, 1704 AGI 58-1-20/92 bnd 4101 (Stetson) [Also translated in Mark F. Boyd, et al., eds, Here They Once Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1951, 1999), 49]; Cedula to Spanish Ambassador in Rome,
While the decision to attack had been made, the Spanish empire was long past its prime in 1704 and the effort required to assemble the resources needed to attack Charleston took time, especially given the bureaucracy that slowed the actions of the regional officials involved. Shortages of money, difficulty in recruiting troops, organizational confusion, and overall hesitation to commit such a large number of resources to the defense of an exposed and expensive outpost kept the planning and coordination at a snail’s pace for over a year. The initial plan was rather simple. The Junta de Guerra and the king first issued orders in 1703 and again in early 1704 to the viceroy of New Spain to send immediate aid in the form of troops and money to Florida to assist in quelling the ongoing English-inspired Indian raids in Timucua. Once the decision to attack Charleston had been made, other orders soon followed. To provide the main naval force required, the Junta de Guerra recommended that the king assign the Barlovento (Windward) Fleet, a Spanish fleet based in the Caribbean since about 1635 to combat piracy and protect Spanish ports, to the task.\(^{10}\) For financial support, the king issued orders to the viceroy to supply 50,000 pesos to fund the expedition. For the invasion army, two hundred men were to be supplied by the viceroy and a smaller force from the Governor of Havana from which port the attack would sail. For Florida’s part, Juan de Ayala y Escovar, the garrison commander who had traveled to Spain after the 1702 siege to collect relief funds and push for the attack, was ordered to collect as many recruits as he could both for the attack, as well as to reinforce the decimated garrison at

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\(^{10}\) For information on the Barlovento Fleet, see Bibiano Torres Ramírez, *La Armada de Barlovento* (Seville: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1981).
St. Augustine. The plans were set, the orders sent, the expectations of victory secure, and from there the attack began to fall apart.\(^1\)

The first problems faced by the organizers dealt with the serious financial situation of the Spanish in the early 1700s. Simply put, the empire could not afford the huge expense of a large-scale invasion on its own. First, the Barlovento Fleet at the beginning of the War of Spanish Succession was in poor repair and had dwindled to just a few small ships incapable of doing what it was asked. To make matters worse, the viceroy of New Spain was unable to provide the requested sum to pay for the effort. Rather than refuse the order, he simply delayed in responding. Finally, in the middle of 1704, the Junta de Guerra and the king issued a formal reprimand to the viceroy for his earlier delay in providing help to St. Augustine and for ignoring the order to coordinate the proposed attack. A year passed with little action on the part of the viceroy, necessitating another order; this one in May 1705, repeated the order to the viceroy to provide the money and fleet for the attack. This order, too, was beyond the ability, and probably the desire, of the government of New Spain to provide, though the viceroy made what little effort he could.\(^2\)

An equally troubling problem for the would-be attackers was the extraordinary difficulty of finding troops for the campaign. Most of the problem arose from the rumor of the horrid conditions faced by those still in La Florida. Word of the destruction of much of the town of St. Augustine and the miserable conditions there in the aftermath of

\(^{11}\) Cedula to Viceroy Albuquerque of New Spain, Madrid, August 20, 1703, AGI 58-2-3/23 bnd 4048 (Stetson); Cedula to Governor of Florida, Madrid, August 22, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/305 bnd 4159 (Stetson); Cedula to Viceroy of New Spain, Madrid, August 22, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/306 bnd 4160 (Stetson).

\(^{12}\) Handbook of Texas Online, s.v. "Armada de Barlavento," found in http://www.tsha.utexas.edu/handbook/online/articles/A/AA/eta4.html (March 3, 2006); Cedula to Viceroy Albuquerque of New Spain, Buen Retiro, August 22, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/304 bnd 4161 (Stetson); Cedula to Viceroy Albuquerque of New Spain, Buen Retiro, May 2, 1705, AGI 58-1-23/346 bnd 4254 (Stetson).
the English attacks reached Spain throughout 1703 and 1704. A letter from Governor Zúñiga reached Madrid in March 1704 describing the “miserable conditions” in St. Augustine, as well as the failure of the situado ships or any relief ships from New Spain to arrive with supplies for the colonists and garrison. The next year saw no improvement. A little over a year later, the new governor, Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, echoed his predecessor describing the hunger, sickness, and poor morale, emphasizing the fact that St. Augustine could not withstand another attack by the English and any such action would result in a “disaster.”

As news of the horrid conditions in the frontier colony spread, few soldiers volunteered to join those intending to reinforce it. Captain Juan de Ayala y Escovar, the Florida representative charged initially with obtaining troops to send directly to St. Augustine, first reported the problem in August 1704. Replying to an official reprimand issued by the Council of the Indies for his delay, Ayala claimed that the difficulty lay in finding willing troops, not in obtaining supplies. After over a year in Spain, Ayala still had not found the hoped-for one hundred soldiers to reinforce the garrison and told the Conde de Miraflores that “troops would be difficult to recruit if they know of the destination.” Ayala made the decision to leave with the supplies and troops that he had, leaving his son-in-law in Spain to continue the effort.

Others were no more successful. The viceroy of New Spain, required to send two hundred soldiers to St. Augustine to prepare for the attack, was finally able to provide only forty-seven by the end of 1704. In Spain, after Juan de Ayala’s son-in-law, Joseph

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13 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, March 30, 1704, AGI 58-1-20/92 bnd 4101 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, June 16, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/106 bnd 4271 (Stetson).
14 Conde de Miraflores to Secretary Aperregui, Cadiz, August 24, 1704, AGI 58-2-2/78 bnd 4164 (Stetson).
Ligio de la Puente, reported in July 1705 that he was ready to depart but had also been unable to obtain soldiers for the attack, the Council of the Indies encouraged the search to be extended to malcontents or criminals. The search extended from Seville to Cadiz to Madrid as officials in a number of locales were requested to search for willing troops, no matter the source. The governor of Cadiz turned over every soldier currently in his city’s prison to the Council for the attack. By the time Ligio de la Puente set sail in late 1705, the few soldiers who could be found sailed on two small ships for Havana, then on to St. Augustine. Rather than with crack troops, the Spanish assault would be carried out by convicts and malcontents, and not nearly as many of those as hoped for.\textsuperscript{15}

The last matter that caused confusion and the ultimate failure of the assault on Charleston also related to lack of desire of many to become part of a colony that so obviously was a dismal post in which to serve. The extensive and often awkward bureaucracy that characterized the Spanish empire throughout its existence contributed to the delay. After his heroic defense of St. Augustine in the face of James Moore’s siege in 1702, Governor Zúñiga received almost universal praise from within Florida and the rest of the empire. A formal commendation for his leadership was issued early in 1703. Amid the general acclaim, Zúñiga received the best reward for service a governor in the backwaters of the empire could hope for: a promotion to the governorship of the large and rich city of Cartagena. Without a doubt, such a promotion was received with joy by Zúñiga. The problem for the bureaucracy, especially at a time when plans for a major

\textsuperscript{15} Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, September 15, 1704, AGI 58-2-2/84½ bnd 4176 (Stetson); Joseph Ligio de la Puente to Secretary Aperregui, Seville, July 7, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/110 bnd 4280 (Stetson); Conde de Miraflores to Secretary Aperregui, Madrid, July 14, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/111 bnd 4281 (Stetson); Secretary Aperregui to Jose Grimaldo, Madrid, July 14, 1705, AGI 58-2-14/53-54 bnd 4283 (Stetson); Conde de Miraflores to Secretary Aperregui, Madrid, AGI 58-2-2/120 bnd 4296 (Stetson); Casa de Contratcion to the King, September 8, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/121 bnd 4297 (Stetson); Francisco de Sanmillan to Secretary Aperregui, Cadiz, November 30, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/144 bnd 4349 (Stetson).
assault on Carolina were underway, was to provide a timely replacement to allow Zúñiga to assume his new post.\textsuperscript{16}

The true difficulty in achieving this seemingly simple task lay in convincing someone to take the post. Just as ordinary soldiers were reluctant to go to Florida, the nobility and officeholders who were candidates for the post were equally reticent. It took three offers and a year and a half to convince someone to accept and, meanwhile, the plans for an attack, requiring the coordination and resources of three colonies (Florida, Cuba, and New Spain) suffered from the lack of a governor dedicated to the endeavor. Even before the January 1704 promotion of Zúñiga, the position was offered to Domingo de la Canal y Soldevilla. Canal took so much time to consider his options that the Council of the Indies asked King Philip V to reconsider the offer in light of the need to have a governor in place in Florida, as well as the need to free Zúñiga from his unwilling position and get him to Cartagena. After Canal formally turned down the job, the king and Council offered the position to Andres de Arriola, who pleaded age and infirmity in declining the role, though he did send a few orders initially from Cadiz to have Apalachee reconnoitered for a continued English presence late in 1704. This, at least, indicates that he considered, for a time, the possibility of assuming the position before reconsidering his options based on Florida’s condition. Arriola finally informed the secretary of the Council of his decision in February 1705. Finally, the position was offered to and accepted by Francisco de Córcoles y Martinez. It had taken over a year to find someone to fill the position, and the new governor finally left Spain in September 1705 with the few soldiers that officials had been able to scrounge up. By this time,

\textsuperscript{16} Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, June 6, 1703, AGI 58-1-20/79 bnd 4019 (Stetson); Secretary Aperregui to Marquis del Carpio, Madrid, January 29, 1704, AGI 58-1-20/86 bnd 4084 (Stetson).
though, it was more than apparent to all involved that Spain was not up to the challenge, in the midst of a larger war, of single-handedly attacking Charleston. For help, the new Bourbon king of Spain turned to his former homeland and current ally, France.\footnote{Consejo de Las Indias to the King, Madrid, February 1, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/264 bnd 4086 (Stetson); Adres de Arriola to Secretary Aperregui, Cadiz, February 17, 1705; Viceroy Albuquerque to the King, Mexico City, October 2, 1704, AGI 58-2-2/93 bnd 4197 (Stetson); Titulo to Andres de Arriola from the King, Madrid, July 4, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/291 bnd 4126 (Stetson); Casa de la Contratación to the King, Seville, September 8, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/121 bnd 4297 (Stetson).}

Learning of the Spanish difficulties in assembling a strike force with which to attack Charleston, the French ambassador to Spain early in 1706 contacted the Council of the Indies and proposed a new plan. Several French corsairs bound for the Caribbean with orders to harass English shipping were in Seville at the time Joseph Ligio de la Puente was preparing to depart. It was suggested that the French “Sea General,” Monsieur Ferbe, be appointed to lead the French ships to Havana and then to St. Augustine, where they would be combined with whatever ships those two colonies could provide. In each port, Spain would provide whatever additional assistance it could. The hope was that freebooters, soldiers, and adventurers could be convinced to join the expedition and the combined French and Spanish force could attack Charleston as a joint effort. Given the inability of Spain to provide the force necessary, the proposal was accepted, though not without some reservations among Spanish officials over having the French lead the effort and embarrassment that they, the Spanish, had not succeeded in launching their own attack. The French fleet set sail for Havana and arrived in mid-1706, gathering what reinforcements it could. On August 29, Ferbe’s fleet of five ships arrived at the port of St. Augustine to prepare for the assault.\footnote{Joseph de Grimaldo to Duque de Atrisco, Palacio, October 28, 1705, AGI 58-1-28/8 bnd 4339 (Stetson); Junta de Guerra to the King, Madrid, November 3, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/138 bnd 4341 (Stetson); Affidavit and Testimonio by the Notary Juan Solana relative to the English of Carolina, St. Augustine, October 26, 1705, AGI 58-2-2/121 bnd 4297 (Stetson).}
The fleet of five French ships, led by the large flagship *Brillante*, sailed on August 31, accompanied by a Spanish ship provided by Governor Córcoles, commanded by Ensign Luis Rodrigo. The governor later reported to the king that he had provided what assistance he could, given the poor state of the Florida colony. The Spanish reinforcements consisted of “the galiot [small flat-bottomed merchant vessel] of this fort and up to thirty infantrymen, and some Spanish adventurers who offered themselves.” Accompanying the Spanish soldiers were “in two piraguas, some Indians who voluntarily [asked] that I let them go.” The total land force consisted, at least by the claim of Monsieur Ferbe, of some “eight hundred filibusteros [freebooters, adventurers] and four hundred veteran soldiers.” While most likely exaggerated, the total force of soldiers, freebooters, and Indians was substantial enough to do significant damage to South Carolina.  

The expedition, however, failed to meet expectations. Its first mishap came as soon as the combined fleet of ships left St. Augustine. As the ships rounded the point and entered the open waters of the Atlantic, the ships spotted an English sloop spying on the Spanish preparations and immediately gave pursuit. During the day-long chase, the fleet split up and, after unsuccessfully attempting to capture the English ship to prevent forewarning of the attack, turned towards their target. The fleet reassembled the next day off Charleston harbor but, unfortunately for the French and Spanish effort, the flagship *Brillante* failed to appear. This loss was devastating because the ship carried “the best
troops, the ordinance, shovels, spades, shells, and the land commander.” The total number of soldiers missing totaled 250, representing the large majority of the professional military force. Monsieur Ferbe determined that “it was imperative that he wait for it” and, being cautious, sent the small Spanish galliot to take soundings of the harbor waters to see if it would accommodate the French fleet. The delay was a critical mistake because, as Ensign Rodrigo later testified, “they would have succeeded if they had entered immediately.”

Monsieur Ferbe did not abandon the attack and proceeded as best he could. After sailing into the harbor and anchoring outside the range of English guns, he sent representatives to the Charlestonians to demand their surrender and threatening to “devastate the land” should they resist. The bravado must have been forced since he knew that he lacked most of his military force without the Brillante. The English response was firm. Governor Johnson replied to the threats with scorn. He answered the ultimatum saying; “they had been colonizing in Carolina for thirty-seven years, and that it had cost them all many drops of blood, and that if they [the attackers] wished to win and enter they, it would have to be by force of arms, and that, conquering it, he [Ferbe] did not have ships to carry the spoils.” The governor sent the representative back to the French fleet after “much drinking of the health of the king of France and the Queen of England, between the governor and the envoy.” Charleston would not surrender.

The forceful reply of the English governor did not dissuade the French from the attack. The report of the Spanish representative regarding the forces arrayed in Charleston, however, convinced them of the futility of a direct assault against the walls of

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20 Affidavit and Testimonio by the Notary Juan Solana relative to the English of Carolina, St. Augustine, October 26, 1706, AGI 58-2-3/32 (Coe).
21 Ibid.
the English town, from which artillery had fired through the night as a warning to the French ships. The envoy reported that he had seen “thirty-two cannon at the shore of the sea, three large ships, three sloops, two brigantines, and seemingly two hundred soldiers” manning the defenses. Some 1,500 citizens gathered within the town defenses and it was apparent to all that the English in Charleston were well-prepared for the attack.22

With Charleston beyond the capabilities of the attackers, Monsieur Ferbe determined to strike a symbolic and potentially lucrative blow against the colony by raiding the plantations in the surrounding area. Many of the members of the force were, after all, privateers in search of loot, and the countryside around Charleston was dotted with rich plantations and houses. One hundred eighty soldiers were deployed during the night with orders to “rob the plantations and capture the negroes, and other things,” though the Spanish ensign, Luis Rodrigo, protested that raiding was not the mission, destroying Charleston was. The raiding parties soon split apart and all military order was lost among the looting and pillaging of the nearby farms. The lack of discipline and order allowed the English militia numbering well over two hundred, by then aided by an influx of Indian warriors responding to the calls for help, to counterattack the French and Spanish soldiers. The raiders were soundly defeated and most of the attackers were taken prisoner. A later investigation into the fiasco at Charleston reported that “at the first attack the Frenchmen fled, although their leaders urged them [to go] forward.” As the defeated raiders fled to their ships the English vessels within the harbor began a

concerted attack on the French fleet. Faced with certain defeat, the French and Spanish vessels, lacking their largest ship, chose to abandon the attack rather than face battle with the English. The effort to destroy Carolina had failed. No further attempt, by either the Spanish or their French ally, would ever again threaten Charleston. For the Spaniards in St. Augustine, the contest for control of the Southeast had turned irrevocably against them.23

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The years after the attack, and certainly by the early years of the 1710s, saw both St. Augustine and Charleston turn to other issues largely removed from the rivalry that had, for so long, dominated their thinking. That rivalry, tinged now by the presence of the French, would emerge again in 1715 as an important consideration for each but for the preceding years both had other pressing concerns. For the Spanish, it was survival and recuperation. For the English, their attentions turned to the consolidation of their gains and consideration of a new regional threat, the French.

In St. Augustine, the last years of the War of Spanish Succession, which lasted formally until 1714, were ones of hardship and misery for the surviving Spanish settlers and the few hundred remaining mission Indian allies who had not been killed or incorporated into the Creeks or the Yamasees. Despite the strained finances of the Spanish empire, taxed as it was with war and economic and bureaucratic inefficiency in

the early eighteenth century, a serious effort to repair the damage done by the English attacks and to provide for a more effective defense of the colony was made. Upon receiving word of the destruction, the Council of the Indies asked King Philip V to provide 20,000 pesos for repairs to the town. The requests of Governor Zuñiga for another attack on Charleston were put aside by both the Council and King in order to focus efforts on increasing the defenses of St. Augustine. They ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to provide an additional 6,000 pesos for distribution among the soldiers and townspeople to cover some of their losses. Following further attacks in 1704, surviving mission Indians loyal to the Spanish relocated to new settlements close to St. Augustine. Furthermore, the Council ordered the viceroy of New Spain to add an additional 50,000 pesos to that year’s situado, the royal collection of funds from New Spain intended to support Florida. For further reinforcement of the town, an additional two hundred soldiers were to be sent to reinforce the garrison, though only the forty-seven found by Joseph Ligio de la Puente actually were added.24

While money was provided for rebuilding, it took longer to provide a more effective defense, given the ongoing fighting throughout the region. In 1708, the new Spanish governor, Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez, reported continued English-Indian raids and begged the king to order another assault on Charleston. Limited progress in providing a more coordinated defense occurred in 1709 with the formation of a cavalry company to serve as a mobile force capable of patrolling the outlying areas and responding quickly to raids on neighboring settlements. Under the command of Joseph

24 Consejo de Indias to Philip V, Madrid, April 30, 1703, AGI 58-1-28/2 bnd 4005, (Stetson); Consejo de Indias to the Philip V, Madrid, July 21 1703, AGI 58-1-20/83 bnd 404, (Stetson); Cedula to Governor Zuñiga, Madrid, September 1, 1703, AGI 58-2-3/24 bnd 4049, (Stetson); Cedula to Governor Zuñiga, Madrid, Feb. 13, 1703, AGI 58-1-23/260 bnd 4088, (Stetson); Cedula to Viceroy of New Spain, Madrid, Aug. 22, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/306 bnd 4160, (Stetson).
Primo de Rivera, the fifty mounted soldiers served an important function for Spanish defenses over the next decade, leading the Council of the Indies to approve an increase in the situado to pay for the additional troops. Some eight years after its formation, the governor of Florida requested to increase the cavalry unit’s size, commenting favorably on its effectiveness. Yet slightly improved defenses and a rebuilt town did not dramatically improve the situation of the Spanish. They remained isolated and alone with few Indian allies, a true sign of their powerlessness. In 1708, Governor Córcoles claimed the loss of some ten to twelve thousand Indian allies over the previous five years, and a census of the nine Indian villages allied to the Spanish in 1711 listed only 401 names, men, women, and children.²⁵

The efforts to rebuild the colony and improve the defenses in the face of an ongoing English threat were hampered greatly by the inefficiency of the Spanish supply system, the exposed nature of the colony, and by the encroaching enemies that continuously harassed the remaining colonists. By 1707, the colony at St. Augustine faced extreme hunger and a serious lack of supplies for the garrison. The situado supply system, relying as it did on a small yearly trip to New Spain to obtain money with which the appointed situado supply officer could buy food and supplies, was notoriously unreliable even under the best of circumstances. With the continuing fighting between Spanish, French, English, and Dutch colonies throughout the Caribbean, the

²⁵ Cedula to Viceroy of New Spain, Madrid, Aug. 22, 1704, AGI 58-1-23/306 bnd 4160, (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Jan. 14, 1708, AGI 58-1-28/32 bnd 4435, (Stetson); Manuel de la Cruz Ajedo to Felix de la Cruz Ajedo, Madrid, Nov. 3, 1709, AGI 58-1-28/69 bnd 4527, (Stetson); Royal Officials to Philip V, St. Augustine, Nov. 28, 1711, AGI 58-1-28/99 bnd 4625, (Stetson); Junta de Guerra to Philip V, Nov. 10, 1713, AGI 58-1-20/135 bnd 4691, (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to the King, St. Augustine, February 4, 1718, AGI 58-1-30/72 bnd 4903, (Stetson); Governor Córcoles to the King, St. Augustine, April 9th, 1711, AGI 58-1-23/435 bnd 4589-A, (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 181.
circumstances were even less reliable. Storms sank a much-needed situado ship in 1707, leading Governor Córcoles to send Juan de Ayala y Escovar to Havana to beg for emergency aid for the garrison. In 1709, English privateers operating out of Jamaica captured the supply ship out of Havana intended for St. Augustine. The attempts to supply St. Augustine, mired in bureaucracy and often subject to storm or attack, was so rife with problems that it was not until 1709 that a ship bearing goods representing the situado funds from 1702 and 1703 arrived in St. Augustine. Similarly, the 20,000 pesos approved in 1702 to help in the rebuilding efforts following Moore’s attack did not arrive until 1708.26

Amid complaints that the original orders requiring the viceroy of New Spain to attack Charleston had been ignored and that the efforts to supply the colony from abroad were inadequate, Governor Córcoles found himself, by necessity, concentrating merely on keeping the colony intact. The situation was exacerbated by the inability of the colonists to gather any provisions from the surrounding countryside. By 1707, with the retreat of the Spanish from Apalachee and Timucua, the colonists in St. Augustine lived under a state of veritable siege, despite the fact that the English themselves no longer used their influence to send waves of Yamassee and Creeks into La Florida. The Creek Indians, however, continued to roam freely throughout the region. Spanish settlers and the few remaining Indians in St. Augustine could not cultivate lands beyond the immediate area around the walls of the town. Governor Córcoles reported in 1708 that woodcutters could not provide the needed fuel for Spanish fires without extreme danger

26 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, November 16, 1707, AGI 58-1-28/23 bnd 4422 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, January 12, 1708, AGI 58-1-28/30 bnd 4431 (Stetson); Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, July 20, 1709, AGI 58-1-30/7 bnd 4509 (Stetson).
of being killed or captured. Other reports early the same year informed the king and Council that almost all the cattle that had prospered among the missions and the few Spanish-run ranches had fallen prey to the English and their Indian allies. The agricultural production of the colony, while never capable of sustaining the entire colony, had fallen to next to nothing. Spanish Florida hung by the slender thread of the situado, without which it would have been utterly destroyed. The Spanish in Florida were now confined to St. Augustine and a very small outpost at Pensacola, the two separated by hostile territory with no effective means of communication. For all intents and purposes, Spanish Florida by 1710 was no more than a handful of settlers, soldiers, and Indians, barely surviving with many seeking a way out.27

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With the Spanish removed as an effective participant in the European contest for influence in the Southeast, the English turned their attention to the French in Louisiana. Attacking in sufficient strength to destroy the French in Louisiana was beyond the capabilities of the English, riven as they were with factionalism. When that became apparent, especially after the temporary fall from grace of Thomas Naime, the English in Charleston turned instead to a consolidation of their gains taken at the expense of the Spanish. Through the end of the first decade and into the second, the English in Carolina spent most of their time and energy in the backcountry solidifying their trade

27 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, January 14, 1708, AGI 58-1-28/32 bnd 4435 (Stetson); Royal Officials to the King, St. Augustine, March 5, 1708, AGI 58-1-34/12 bnd 4441 (Stetson); For the experience in Pensacola, see Lawrence Carroll Ford, The Triangular Struggle For Spanish Pensacola, 1689-1739 (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of American Press, 1939).
relationships with the Yamasses and the Creeks. They sent new and increasing numbers of traders throughout the Southeast, extending, for the first time, their influence as far as the Choctaws and Chickasaws to balance the French efforts to gain control over those important tribes. A large part of the English effort to extend power, however, was not the external negotiations with the various tribes. It was to try to regulate and control the activities of the traders themselves so as not to alienate any of their hard-won allies.

The first significant step in trying to regulate the Indian trade came in July 1707 when, after months of argument and strife between the governor and the Assembly, an act was passed creating a board of commissioners charged with the regulation of Indian trade. This new system replaced earlier experiments in licensing traders and dealing with charges of abuse on an ad hoc basis. The Assembly’s choice to head the new agency was Thomas Nairne. The hope of all involved was to better negotiate with the various Indian tribes in hope of countering the French efforts to extend their influence. The next five years saw the board make several attempts to rein in the excesses of the traders, though most of them proved ineffective as the quarrels between Governor Nathaniel Johnson and the Assembly caught Nairne and others in the crossfire. In large part, the dispute centered on whose interests, the proprietors or the locals, would control the profits of the Indian trade. This trade still, despite the destruction of the Spanish missions, did a brisk business in Indian slaves in addition to the thousands of deerskins annually that represented the large majority of the trade. When the infighting resulted in Nairne’s arrest and removal as the prime Indian agent in 1708, the new commission continued but was effectively weakened to the point of uselessness for several years. The English Indian traders continued to act independently of any controlling authority. Invariably,
abuses occurred and increased as English influence and power continued to increase through the end of the war in 1713. It would take a true crisis to prompt the Carolinians to take serious steps to regulate the activities of its traders, but the realization of the importance of the issue was slowly entering the awareness of the colony’s leaders.\textsuperscript{28}

While the efforts to control the activities of Indian traders were beginning to inch forward, the concurrent attempts to maintain the friendship of the Creeks and Yamasssees and to win over the Cherokees, the Choctaws, and the Chickasaws from their early alliance with the French met with more success. The early efforts of individuals like Thomas Nairne to win the friendship of these powerful tribes and to counter similar French efforts were continued by others such as Price Hughes. Hughes served admirably as an Indian negotiator throughout the Southeast from 1713 until his death in Louisiana in 1715. While unable to agree on regulating the Indian trade, both the governor and the Assembly in Charleston agreed on the need to support with money and goods the activities of Hughes and Nairne again after he was cleared of wrongdoing and reappointed as the colony’s chief Indian agent. The two negotiators traveled extensively before 1715, bribing, cajoling, and even threatening various tribes to gain their agreement to cease their support of the French. Hughes was even captured by the French during one journey among the Natchez. Under direct questioning by Governor Bienville in Mobile, Hughes admitted freely the coordinated efforts of the Carolinians to establish control of the Indians throughout the Southeast. It was after his release by the French, arranged by Governor Charles Craven of South Carolina, that Hughes journeyed first to Pensacola,

then began a trip to visit the Alabama Indians, only to fall victim to a party of Tohome Indians who attacked and killed the intrepid trader. The Tohomes were long-standing victims of the traffic in Indian slaves still common among English traders. Their resentment and the subsequent murder of Hughes was merely one of the first Indian reactions to the growing hegemony and arrogance of English traders.²⁹

The failure to regulate the activities of the individuals engaged in the Indian trade throughout the Southeast directly led to the biggest setback to English power in the Southeast, the Yamassees revolt of 1715. As infighting and factional squabbling hindered efforts to address the growing complaints of the Yamassees, the Creeks, and other smaller tribes in the upcountry of Carolina, the problem of abuses became greater as the English began to expand their trade among the entire region, now without the limitation of an effective rival. The trade consisted largely of deerskins, an estimated 54,000 hides per year, but also continued a brisk trade in Indian slaves to the Caribbean. As the Spanish missions, once the easiest target for slave raids, were destroyed by 1707, the traders in Indian slaves became increasingly more indiscriminate in their targets and took every opportunity to gather slaves whether legitimate or not. John Musgrove, for example, appeared before the Assembly at the end of 1706 and into 1707 on multiple charges of abuse of the Indians with whom he treated. Among the numerous charges were accusations that “he arbitrarily and of his own accord tooke and Receiv’d Sixteen Illcombee and Wacoca free people and made them his Slaves.” In another instance, Musgrove was charged by the Indians with having “arbitrarily threatened the Tuckesaw

²⁹ Crane, Southern Frontier, 105-107.
Indian King and another unless they would give him four Slavs upon pretence that they
had taken away his the said Musgroves and one William Steads Indian Wives. 30

The abuses of individual traders were almost impossible to prevent. Since there
were approximately two-to-three hundred traders engaged in the Indian trade, for every
abusive trader, such as Musgrove, who was charged and lightly punished, numerous other
abusers, great and small went unchecked. Many in Charleston were aware of the
potential disaster of not fixing the problem as the debate over how best to regulate the
traders’ activities played out. Thomas Carey, the speaker of the Assembly, warned in one
address during the debate over the Indian Regulation Act of 1707 that South Carolina as a
whole had “great reason to Dread our Utter Ruin and Destruction from a Continuance of
ye varied Abuses and grievous mismanagement of ye Traders Among the Indians.”
Carey’s warnings were prophetic, though little effective action was taken. Others were
blinded to the natives’ potential to strike back at the English. The victories over the
Spanish in Florida and the effective blocking of French power in the region had led some
to believe that English hegemony over the region and its Indians was inevitable. In his
book A New Voyage to Carolina in 1709, John Lawson bragged that Carolinians were
“such troublesome Neighbors to the Spaniards, that they have once laid their Town of St.
Augustine in Ashes, and drove away their Cattle; besides many Encounters and
Engagements, in which they have defeated them, too tedious to relate here.” He
dismissed the presence of the French as a mere nuisance. As to the Indians, Lawson
gleefully claimed that the English in South Carolina were “absolute Masters over the
Indians, and carry so strict a Hand over such as are within the Circle of their Trade, that

30 JCHASC, 16: 22-23.
none does the least Injury to any of the English, but he is presently sent for, and punish'd with Death, or otherwise, according to the Nature of the Fault.” The idea that the Indians might resent English control did not enter some persons’ considerations and regulation of the Indian traders stalled, progressing only incrementally. The abuses continued, and over time the Indians’ resentment of the high-handed and abusive treatment reached the boiling point and spilled over into general warfare. That war erupted on April 15, 1715.31

By the beginning of 1715, the fidelity of many of the Indians allied to the English was beginning to crumble. Traders increasingly returned to Charleston with complaints and ill-feelings of formerly friendly tribes such as the Yamassees and other tribes along the Savannah River. Gov. Charles Craven knew that such unrest could only lead to dangerous problems for the colony and took immediate action. A later account of the outbreak of fighting recorded his efforts and their unfortunate conclusion:

Gov. Craven hearing of this rupture, immediately dispatched Captain Nairn and Mr. John Cockran, gentlemen well acquainted with the Indians, to know the cause of their discontent, who accordingly on the 15th of April, met the principal part of them at the Yamassee Town, about 130 miles from Charlestown, and after several debates, pro and con. the Indians seemed very ready to come to a good agreement and reconciliation, and having prepared a good supper for our Messengers, all went quietly to rest; but early next morning their lodging was beset with a great number of Indians who barbarously murdered Captain Nairn and Messieurs John Wright, and Thomas Ruffly, Mr. Cockran and his wife they kept prisoners, whom they afterwards slew. One Seaman Burroughs, a strong robust man, seeing the Indians’ cruel barbarity on the other gentlemen, made his way good through the middle of the enemy, they pursuing and firing many shot at him. One took him through the cheek (which is since cured) and coming to a river, he swam through, and alarmed the plantations; so that by his escape, and a merchant man that lay in Port Royal River, that fired some great guns on the Enemy, several Hundreds of English lives were saved.32

The death of Thomas Nairne set off a chain-reaction of violence, and Indian traders throughout the frontier were either killed or barely escaped Indian hands with their lives. Many of the Indians along the Savannah joined in the revolt, as did the Santees and Congarees, who lived north of Charleston. Indians along the Carolina frontier began a series of coordinated attacks that struck at isolated English settlements and plantations throughout South Carolina. At least four hundred English men and women died in the attacks, and white settlers abandoned the Port Royal area entirely. The widespread raid forced most Carolinians to retreat to the Charleston area, abandoning the outlying areas to the Indians. Governor Craven immediately assembled the few hundred militia troops available to him and marched to Yamassee Town, the main Yamassee settlement, with the intention of quelling the unrest quickly. He “marched within Sixteen miles of said town, and encamped at night in a large Savanna or Plain, by a Wood-side, and was early next morning by break of day saluted with a volley of shot from about Five Hundred of the enemy; that lay ambuscaded in the woods.” The very weapons that the English had for so long provided their erstwhile allies were turned against them. After a few hours of hard fighting, with heavy losses on both sides, the Yamasseees withdrew. Craven realized quickly that his position was exposed and decided to retreat rather than face the more numerous enemy again.33

With the colony under siege, Craven immediately dispatched word of the revolt to the other colonies, pleading for aid. A few brave Indian traders risked their lives by traveling to several tribes farther inland and to the north that had not joined in the revolt. The combined effort met with success and saved South Carolina from a situation that,

arguably, could have resulted in the destruction of the colony. Despite the destruction and death of the early months, many of the other Indians believed it in their best interest to maintain their friendship with the English. The Carolinians received the assistance of many Indian groups, such as the Tuscaroras, the Corees, and most importantly the Cherokees who immediately began to send large raiding parties into Carolina attacking the confederated Yamasseses and their supporters along the Savannah River. Assistance also came from the other English colonies such as North Carolina. The combined efforts of the English and the Cherokees proved decisive. Over the space of the next year, fighting raged along the frontier until Governor Craven successfully reestablished a control of most of the South Carolina backcountry. The governor placed “garrisons in all convenient [places] that may be, in order to defend the country from depredations and incursions of the enemy, till better [could] be made.” Even after the fighting died down after March 1716, the losses to Carolina were still being tallied. Most of the the Indian traders had been victims of the violence. At one point it was claimed that the Carolinians had, at the time of the first attacks, about a “hundred traders among the Indians, whereof we apprehend they have murdered and destroyed about Ninety Men.” Many militia had been lost to the fighting and the numbers of colonists lost to the raids was unknown. The losses to the Indians were even more devastating. Most of the villages of the five Indian peoples along the Savannah and the Ogeechee Creeks on the Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers were destroyed, their people scattered. By the middle of 1706, almost all of the combatant Indians had been forced to retreat south and west. It would take the next several years for the English in South Carolina to recover, and the Indian trade would be the first thing to be reorganized to prevent a recurrence of conflict. For the Spanish, the
revolt was equally significant. As the Yamassees and their allies fled, a substantial number of them chose to move to Spanish Florida, giving officials there renewed hope in their struggle against the English.34

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With a sudden influx of Indian refugees into Florida, the Yamassee Revolt offered the Spanish a unique opportunity to reclaim some of their lost influence. Less than three months into the fighting, four caciques approached the Spanish in St. Augustine requesting asylum. One was named by the Spanish Antonio Perez Campaña and was likely once a resident of the Apalachee region. Complaining of English enslavement of their women and children, these caciques declared their allegiance to the Spanish crown. The governor of Florida hurriedly sent word to the king in early July 1715 claiming that 161 Indian towns followed these four leaders. By October, the Council of the Indies commented in its reports to the king on the possibility of reclaiming lost territory in northern Florida and Apalachee with the aid of Indian allies and the proposed relocation of Spanish families to Florida, though this last idea was frequently proposed and rarely carried out.35


35 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, July 5, 1715, AGI 58-1-30/42 bnd 4776 (Stetson); Consejo de Indias to the King, Madrid, Oct. 14, 1715, AGI 58-1-20/153 bnd 4790 (Stetson); Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 183.
The initial shift in allegiance of Indians early in the fighting in Carolina accelerated as the initial successes turned into a disastrous defeat for the Yamasses and their allies. In January 1716 the governor of Florida reported the successful resettlement of the 161 initial Indian settlements into new villages nearer St. Augustine as well as in Apalachee, and added that another powerful cacique from Coweta had sworn allegiance to the crown. A year later, in January 1717, another group of Indians in Savacola, near Apalachee, changed their allegiance to Spain. In April a reported 157 “infidel Indians” arrived in St. Augustine to proclaim allegiance to the king in return for refuge from the English. However, Spanish experience with maintaining Indian alliances quickly led to the realization that special attention would be needed to keep the new allies happy. The governor requested shipments of tools, supplies, and gifts to distribute among the Indians, and the Council of the Indies hastily issued a royal order to demand no tribute, to inflict no harsh punishments, and to distribute whatever money and goods would be sent immediately upon their arrival. A directive to the viceroy of New Spain ordered an increase in the Florida situado of 6,000 pesos to be used to provide gifts to the recently pacified Indians. The interim-governor, Juan de Ayala y Escovar, proudly reported using money from his own pocket to see to the well-being of some of the Indians. Finally, of crucial interest in all Spanish colonial endeavors, officials requested that renewed religious missions be sent to the Indians in consideration of the spiritual well-being of these new arrivals.36

36 Governor of Florida to the King, St. Augustine, Jan. 25, 1716, AGI 58-1-30/50 bnd 4815 (Stetson); Cedula to the Governor of Florida, Madrid, Feb. 17, 1716 AGI 58-1-24/44 bnd 4836-A (Stetson); Interim-Governor Juan de Ayala y Escovar to the King, St. Augustine, Jan. 28, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/70 bnd 4878 (Stetson); Fr. Antonio de Florenzia to Philip V, (Madrid), July 13, 1716, AGI 58-2-14/71 bnd 4866 (Stetson); Int-gov Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, April 18, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/64-65 bnd 4883 (Stetson).
Spanish officials in Florida did take the opportunity provided them by the acquisition of new Indian allies to regain some lost territory. Indian settlements in northern Florida and around St. Augustine increased in number and population. The Spanish also claimed the nominal allegiance of Indians in inland Georgia south of the Savannah River and westward in areas controlled by the Creeks such as Coweta. The Yamassee revolt in Carolina had a ripple effect among the Creeks to the west. Resentment towards the English caused the Creeks to kill a few English traders, expel others, and to make offers of allegiance and trade to both the Spanish and the French, whose presence on the Gulf Coast at Mobile was slowly expanding. The French were given permission to build a trading station and a small fort at the junction of the Coosa and Tallapoosa Rivers. The Creeks’ former experience with the Spanish promised even greater gains for officials in Florida. Large delegations of Creeks visited Pensacola in 1715, and one delegation agreed to travel to Mexico City in 1717 at the invitation of the viceroy of New Spain. Finally, in Apalachee, the most prosperous of the former mission provinces, the Spanish formulated plans to reclaim and hold their former possession with grand plans of resettling Yamassee refugees in former missions and to re-garrison the province.37

As soon as the news of the allegiance of Indians in and near Apalachee reached St. Augustine, a squad of soldiers and delegates traveled to the province to negotiate with the new allies. Acting-Governor Ayala made plans in April 1717 to send a detachment of troops to Apalachee to renew the garrison there, though their departure was delayed until the arrival of funds to cover the costs. During the winter of 1717 and the spring of 1718,

37 Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 183-85.
the Spanish in St. Augustine received the good news of the withdrawal of English traders from the Coweta region in the face of hostility from the new Spanish allies, the successful rebuilding of the fort at San Marcos de Apalachee, and the arrival in the region of some of the groups of Yamasseses sent to Apalachee by the Spanish.

While the rebuilding of Apalachee met with limited success, the grander hopes of extending Spanish influence among the Creeks were in vain. By September 1717 a Spanish delegation of officials led by Lt. Deigo Pena reported splits among the Creeks over loyalties to the Spanish. He also reported French and English hostility towards the spread of Spanish influence. The unity of the Creeks lasted only until the middle of 1717, when bands of upper Creeks opted to renew trade with the English whose goods were both cheaper and more plentiful than those of the Spanish. When Pena's delegation reached Coweta, a party of English traders was already there negotiating a renewed alliance. Pena failed to end the English efforts and retreated to Apalachee with little to show for his visit. Further delegations sent by the Spanish failed to prevent the Creeks from pursuing a policy of trading with all three European powers, frustrating Spanish hopes of extending their influence in the area. While the Spanish succeeded in reestablishing a presence in Apalachee at San Marcos and with a few allied settlements nearby, it remained weak and precarious, dependent on the small Spanish outpost at Pensacola for its exposed existence.38

38 Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, Jan. 28, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/70 bnd 4878 (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, April 18, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/64-65 bnd 4883 (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, Nov. 22, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/66 bnd 4894 (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to the King, St. Augustine, Dec. 22, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/68 bnd 4896 (Stetson); Capt. Joseph Primo de Rivera to Interim-Governor Ayala, San Marcos de Apalachee, April 28, 1718, AGI-1-30/77-78 bnd 4909 (Stetson); Governor Benevides to Philip V, St. Augustine, Sept. 28, 1718 AGI 58-1-30/82 bnd 4916 (Stetson); Hoffman, *Florida's Frontiers*, 183-85.
The efforts of the Spanish to reestablish even a portion of their former power in the Southeast worried the other European powers in South Carolina and Louisiana, and neither the English in Charleston nor the French in Mobile acquiesced to Spanish efforts to expand their influence and territory. A visit to Mobile during the expedition of Diego Peña in late 1717 elicited only hostility from the French over the activities of the Spanish in Apalachee. The English response to the movement of large numbers of Yamasses into Spanish Florida was equally harsh. As soon as the Yamasssee revolt began, rumors and accusations about Spanish instigation of the attacks ran rampant through Charleston, and calls for renewed attacks on Florida soon followed. It was no surprise that as soon as Indian refugees began arriving in Florida, the Spanish governor and royal officials prepared for possible English reprisals and renewed Indian raids on the new villages around St. Augustine. In April 1716, the governor informed the king of his plan to use some royal funds to bolster the defenses of St. Augustine in expectation of English attack. That June, English raids in the area and reports of English privateers out of Jamaica delayed dispatches to Spain requesting more aid. The next year seven Irishmen escaped servitude in Carolina, arriving in St. Augustine to warn of English plans to attack Florida.39

The dynastic struggle in Europe over the throne of France after the death of Louis XIV in 1715 exacerbated the local hostility towards the Spanish in Florida. Philip V of Spain’s desire for his grandfather’s throne led to the War of Quadruple Alliance in 1718. This minor war pitted an overmatched Spain against an alliance of Great Britain, Austria,

39 Governor Benevides to Philip V, St. Augustine, September 28, 1718, AGI 58-1-30/82, (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala of Florida to Philip V, St. Augustine, April 16, 1716, AGI 58-1-30/57, (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, Dec. 4, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/67 bnd 4895, (Stetson); Crane, Southern Frontier, 170-72; Hoffman, Florida’s Frontiers, 186-87.
France, and the Netherlands who sought to block the ambitious Philip. While most of the serious fighting occurred in Italy, the European war once again spilled over to the shores of the Southeast and led to both French and English attacks on Florida in 1719. French forces invaded and captured Pensacola and recaptured it after a Spanish relief fleet from Havana had been diverted to its aid. Pensacola was almost totally destroyed. An English report of the French activities sent back to Charleston reported that “the French at the taking it from the Spaniards the last time which was the 5th of September last demolished the fortificacons [and] only one [guardhouse] they kept for a lookout of 25.” With the destruction of their outpost, the Spanish abandoned San Marcos and Apalachee leaving their erstwhile Indian allies to their own devices. The Havana fleet defeated at Pensacola had been intended to take part in an attack on Charleston, but its defeat by the French put an end to any hope the Spanish had of attacking Carolina successfully. The English, however, received warning of the Spanish intention to attack and raided St. Augustine in response. In early October, a fifty-man party of English and Creek soldiers raided Yamassee villages around St. Augustine, leading some Indian inhabitants to abandon their new homes. At least three Spanish soldiers were killed in the attacks. After losing the western outpost on the Gulf and facing abandonment by many of their Indian allies, the Spanish concentrated on defending St. Augustine for the remainder of the war, abandoning efforts to reestablish their power.40

Spanish hopes for the restoration of lost influence in the Southeast proved ultimately futile not only because of the changing nature of Indian allegiance and English
and French resistance. Ultimately it proved fruitless because of the inability of Spain to provide the necessary funds for gifts and additional defensive forces that together would have proved to the Indians the ability of Spain to be an effective regional ally. The payment of the situado was notoriously unreliable, frequently failing to take into account increased expenses and often years late in arriving. Provisions for the garrison were in chronic short supply. This led to many instances, such as one in 1712, when the governor in Florida decided to trade with the English enemy for provisions rather than face starvation. Despite the good intentions of repairing damage to St. Augustine and to provide relief to the refugee Indians after the English attacks in 1702 and 1704, the actual payment of most of these funds was not realized until 1709, and enough damage remained in 1714 for additional funds to be ordered from New Spain. With the situado and damage relief so unreliable, the funds ordered to provide gifts and provisions to secure the Indians’ allegiance did not arrive in time to accomplish their goal. What little that did arrive, combined with local sources of funding, proved too little, too late.41

Promised defensive reinforcements proved equally unreliable. While the earlier formation of the local cavalry company proved effective, most reinforcements sent from Spain to Florida went astray on the journey, diverted from their intended purposes by other needy colonies. In early 1716, a shipment of one thousand guns and supplies of ammunition left Spain intended to reinforce and re-equip the Florida garrison and to replace much of what had been lost over more than a decade of warfare. On its arrival a year later, two hundred guns and the accompanying supplies had been diverted to Havana

41. Bushnell, *Situado y Sabana*, 43-48; Governor of Florida to Philip V, St. Augustine, July 17, 1712, AGI 58-1-28/105 bnd 4644, (Stetson); Cedula to Governor of Florida, Madrid, April 24, 1714, AGI 58-1-23/482 bnd 4711, (Stetson); Viceroy Linares to Philip V, Mexico, April 6, 1716, AGI 58-1-30/56 bnd 4853, (Stetson).
by the governor of Cuba. Acting-governor Ayala of Florida pleaded for more to be sent, declaring the shipment inadequate in the beginning and worse with twenty percent missing. A similar experience occurred in the attempts to reinforce the garrison in expectation of English attacks. In February 1718, only thirty-seven soldiers of an original one hundred sent from Spain under the command of Joseph de Burgos, arrived in St. Augustine, the balance remaining in New Spain on the orders of the viceroy. At the same time, the governor of Havana recalled eighteen garrison troops sent previously to reinforce the undermanned garrison. These incidents exposed the inability of Spain, despite the best intentions and plans, to supply and reinforce Florida when the opportunity to extend and reclaim much of its lost influence presented itself.42

In Charleston, the aftermath of the Yamassee War was one of reorganization, regulation, and a massive political shift as the colony moved from proprietarial control to become a royal colony. After the heavy fighting of the Yamassee War faded, recriminations ensued, with loud and vocal protests by the colonists over the perceived neglect and inefficiency of the Proprietors in the face of such a potentially devastating threat to the colony as a whole. Through 1716, the House of Assembly passed and forced the governor to agree to a bill changing the method of voting to one in which each local parish church became the voting station rather than requiring a centralized election in Charleston, the center of the Proprietors' support. The next election resulted in the loss of sixteen of the twenty representatives in the Assembly the Proprietors' supporters could

42 Cedula to Governor of Florida, Madrid, February 17, 1716, AGI 58-1-24/43 bnd 4836, (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, April 18, 1717, AGI 58-1-30/64-65 bnd 4883, (Stetson); Interim-Governor Ayala to Philip V, St. Augustine, February 28, 1718, AGI 58-1-30/74 bnd 4906, (Stetson).
count on and solidified the control of local leaders over the government. They were not long in changing the entire basis of the colony to suit their own interests.\(^4\)

With their new-found control, the Assembly moved quickly to address the uncontrolled system of Indian trade that had been the cause of the devastation of the colony. The initial difficulty lay in the fact that hundreds of individuals, both English and Indian, had been killed during the hostilities, including most of the experienced traders from both sides who formed the core of the trade. Almost immediately after the Yamasses and their allies had moved southward, abandoning their lands, traders from Charleston began to tentatively attempt to reestablish trader relationships with their former friends, especially the Creeks and Choctaws. Individual efforts gave way to a more concerted effort by the government to seize control of the trade to prevent a repeat of the former abuses. The Assembly moved in 1716 to pass a comprehensive act to standardize the trade and make it serve the needs of the general public, who, of course, would trust their elected representatives to act in their best interests. Cut out of the new system, for the most part, were the Proprietors and private Charleston merchants who had built their lives and fortunes on the Indian trade. This new system, obviously, met with resistance and protest and, along with another complementary act passed later the same year, was repealed by the Proprietors in 1718. Reacting to the complaints and demands of the increasingly powerful Assembly, another law to regulate the Indian trade passed in 1719 that met both public and private demands for inclusion. The act blamed the "profligate and wicked actions" of the traders under the old system for having brought a "dreadful and bloody Indian war upon this Province." The new act created an Indian

trade commissioner who would oversee a system of official, government-appointed factors who would represent the commissioner among individual tribes and would license and police all of the legal traders allowed to travel and do business with the various Indian tribes, under the watchful eyes of both the governor and the Assembly. This mix of public and private interests, modified slightly over the next few years, operated relatively smoothly until 1756 when, faced with the outbreak of the Seven Years' War with France, the crown assumed control of all Indian relations throughout the colonies.44

Further action on the part of the legislature also served to alienate the Proprietors from their colonial subjects. To encourage settlement on the frontier, the Assembly unilaterally proclaimed former Yamassee lands forfeit and began a policy of granting small of tracts of land to any white settlers willing to inhabit and strengthen the southern borderlands of Carolina. Realizing that the lack of white inhabitants and the growing numbers of black slaves might create future problems, the Assembly passed a high tariff on future slaves brought into the colony. Last, the large debt incurred by the colony led the Assembly to consolidate the debt, issue new paper currency, and hike taxes on private merchants importing goods into the colony to pay for it. These last actions, penalizing the increasingly important slave trade and passing a fiscal policy that punished merchants but assisted local planters, led the Proprietors to instruct their agents and the Governor, Robert Johnson, to dissolve the Assembly and call new elections. The Proprietors began to take the dramatic step of disallowing acts of the Assembly frequently, causing the tension between the two sides to increase exponentially. While Johnson did his best to

mediate, the situation became untenable and the governance of the colony ground to a halt.\textsuperscript{45}

As the turmoil within the colony increased following the Yamassee War, by 1719 the in-fighting had reached a fevered pitch. In 1717, almost half of the free white men in the colony signed a petition to the king asking him to place the province under his protection and to relieve the Proprietors of their control. The Proprietors in 1717 and 1718 continued to act in a seemingly arbitrary manner, alienating an increasing number of their supporters within Carolina. The Proprietors revoked various legislation passed by the Assembly such as those acts for reorganizing the system of holding elections, regulating the Indian trade, attempting to reconcile the debt of the colony, and various other measures seeking to improve the defenses of the colony. By 1719, almost the entire colony was united in its anger and frustration at the actions of the Proprietors and it took only a small match to light the flames of revolt within Carolina. Once again, Spanish Florida would affect the course of Carolinian history.\textsuperscript{46}

With the heightened animosity between colonists and Proprietors, it took only a rumor to begin the move towards royal government. The outbreak of war between Great Britain and Spain in 1718 caused concerns over a repeat of the 1706 attack on Charleston and, in 1719 rumors began circulating that a large Spanish fleet was assembling in Havana with the intent of attacking Carolina. The fleet would subsequently be used to respond to the French attack and capture of Pensacola and the war had little effect on Charleston, but the rumors were enough to cause local leaders to begin circulating petitions calling for a separation of the colony from the Proprietors. The efforts met with

\textsuperscript{46} Weir, \textit{Colonial South Carolina}, 100-102.
widespread support in Carolina and in December 1719, when the Assembly met, it passed resolutions refusing to recognize the Proprietors' new council and their earlier efforts to reorganize the colonial government to quell dissension. The Assembly called upon Governor Johnson to renounce the Proprietors and claim power in the name of the king until word of the dispute could be sent to London for resolution. When Johnson refused, the Assembly turned to James Moore, Jr., the son of the former governor and general, to be provisional governor.\(^\text{47}\)

Governor Johnson made a concerted effort to stop the Assembly from continuing its rebellion, even going so far as to use his available ships to block the harbor and threaten the capital. James Moore, however, had quickly raised five hundred militia troops and seized the colony's artillery. The superior force of colonists forced Johnson to back down. As soon as word of the events reached London, the king appointed a provisional governor to end the conflict. Over the next ten years Carolina existed in a state of legal limbo as various Proprietors sought to either reclaim their rights to the province or to rid themselves of their shares at the best price they could find. Finally, in 1729, the crown bought out the shares of seven of the eight proprietors and officially declared South Carolina a royal colony.\(^\text{48}\)

The final factor linked to the aftermath of the Yamassee War that affected English Carolina was the ending of any aspirations of hegemony over the whole of the Southeast in terms of controlling the powerful Indian tribes. Just as the Spanish had learned in their efforts to win back the friendship of the Creeks in 1717 and 1718, the English began to realize that the landscape had changed in terms of the Indians in the region. As they

\(^{47}\) Ibid.

\(^{48}\) Ibid.
began to reestablish trading relationships with the various sub-tribes that made up the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws, the Indian factors and agents of Charleston met with increased resistance when they sought to establish a monopoly on the trade. The Indian chieftains who had, before the Yamassee War, seen the English as the dominant power in the region now saw a greater opportunity to balance their relationships with the English, the French, and to a lesser extent the Spanish. The Indians could not have been unaware that as the supremacy of the English began to grow after the destruction of their main regional rival, the Spanish, the abuses of the traders grew as well. Not having a competitor to balance and moderate their activities had resulted in the devastation of the Yamassee War for the English colony. By the time they recovered from the setback, the French had replaced the Spanish as an effective challenger to Carolina, and the Spanish presence in St. Augustine at least represented a potential, if not actual, alternative to the traders from Carolina. For the Indians of the region, no European power would be truly dominant in the region until the end of the Seven Years’ War.49

The Yamassee War represented both an end and a beginning for the history of the colonial Southeast. From the standpoint of the Spanish of La Florida, it was the end of an era. For a brief moment of opportunity the flood of new Indian allies provided St. Augustine a chance to regain at least part of their lost influence. It was a chance that was, in large part, squandered due to their inability to provide the support, protection, and gifts that were required to keep their new friends. For the English, the war also represented an opportunity lost. After the final destruction of their long-standing rival, the Carolina traders and negotiators had a chance to establish a lasting control of the region through

their growing influence among the Indian tribes in the Southeast. However, the lack of an effective means of control over the traders, coupled with the bitter infighting that characterized Charleston politics during these years, meant that the abuses inherent in the unregulated Indian trade would lead to the revolt of their former allies, the Yamasses.

In the years following the war, the English would once again face off against a bitter European rival across a wide borderland controlled by powerful Indian tribes who carefully balanced each offer to better their own situation. That rival, though, would no longer be the Spanish. The era of the prime importance of the Anglo-Spanish rivalry in the course of events in the colonial Southeast was over. From this point on, the story of the region would become one in which the English, the French, and, of course, the ever-important Indians would control the shape of things to come. The Spanish, while not gone, would play only a minor supporting role.
On February 12, 1733, James Oglethorpe led a small band of 114 men, women, and children to Yamacraw Bluff, a point overlooking the south bank of the Savannah River. There Oglethorpe organized a small settlement he and the others named Savannah. The new town served as the capital of a new colony, Georgia, which had been granted a royal charter the year before and was intended to serve as a buffer zone between the prosperous colony of South Carolina and the Spanish colony of Florida. By 1733, the threat to the rapidly growing colony of South Carolina from Spanish St. Augustine was slight. Yet many in Britain and Charleston felt that Georgia could serve an important purpose. First, it would make the journey to St. Augustine and freedom much more difficult for runaway Carolina slaves, a problem that had escalated over the previous decades. Second, Georgia would serve as a base from which to launch military attacks on St. Augustine should the need arise. This later design, indeed, was realized as the region between Georgia and Florida witnessed Oglethorpe’s unsuccessful siege of St. Augustine in 1740 and the disastrous Spanish defeat at Bloody Marsh in 1742. Both of these battles occurred during the War of Jenkins’ Ear from 1739 to 1742, after which the war was subsumed into the larger War of Austrian Succession.

These European wars and the founding of Georgia, however, mark a transition point in the history of the colonial Southeast. From the moment Savannah became the cornerstone of the Anglo-Spanish frontier between British North America and Spanish
Florida, South Carolina assumed a secondary role as supporter rather than prime player in the rivalry that had played such a critical role in the shaping of the colonial Southeast to that point. Not only did Carolina cease to be the central player in this competition, but the rivalry itself, despite the conflicts between the British and the Spanish, would become a mere afterthought in the larger imperial context of the struggle between Great Britain and France for North America. Spanish Florida’s influence and threat had been destroyed by the 1720s and Spain itself was unable afterwards to do more than provide a bare defense of its exposed outpost. Florida would remain in Spanish hands for only three decades after the founding of Georgia because it passed to British control in 1763 after the end of the Seven Years’ War.

The relative insignificance played by Florida in events after the 1720s should not diminish the importance of its role in the history of the region before then. The Spanish in Florida were the first Europeans to establish a significant presence in the area. Their missionary efforts led to enormous changes among native peoples. The introduction of new ideas, new technologies, and the epidemic diseases that devastated the Indian population are, perhaps, the most lasting of the effects of the Spanish presence in La Florida.

Yet the introduction of a new European rival, the English, at Charleston in 1670 led to even more changes in the region. The Indians and Spanish inhabitants of the Southeast were forced to deal with an ever-changing situation as both European powers sought to protect and expand their influence. English traders ranged throughout the countryside, bringing some Indians to their side and forcing others to respond to the threats posed by the English allies. First the Westoes, then the Yamassees, and later the
Cherokees and Creeks would become intertwined in the English efforts to supplant the Spanish as the major European power in the region. By the first decade of the eighteenth century, Charleston had succeeded in this effort.

But throughout the rise and fall of the Spanish, the emergence and ascendancy of the English, and the eventual advent and slow growth of the French as a regional rival to the others, it was the Indians who represented true power. The Anglo-Spanish rivalry that dominated events for some fifty years was largely played out on the strength of native alliances. When the English temporarily emerged triumphant over their Spanish rivals, it was the Yamassees, Creeks, and other tribes who would revolt against English power in 1715 and deliver a setback to the hegemony so long sought by the leaders of South Carolina. After the English survived the violence of the Yamassee War, it was the Indians who continued to play European powers off against one another, merging the French into the longstanding game of rivalry that had so recently featured the Spanish. Georgia’s arrival just altered the playing field. The course of history in the Southeast continued with the Spanish set aside in favor of the French. The story continued, but the time of the rivalry between English Carolina and Spanish Florida had passed.
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Timothy Paul Grady was born in Ducktown, Tennessee on October 17, 1965. He graduated from Woodward Academy in 1983. After spending several years working in the private sector, he received a B.S. degree in History from Tennessee Technological University in Cookeville, Tennessee, in 1997. He received a M.A. degree in history from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia, in 2000.

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