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The Powhatan Uprising of 1622: a historical study of ethnocentrism and cultural conflict

John Frederick Fausz

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THE POWHATAN UPRISING OF 1622:
A HISTORICAL STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRISM AND CULTURAL CONFLICT

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
J. Frederick Fausz
1977
APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

J. Frederick Fausz

Approved, August 1977

Richard Maxwell Brown
Thad W. Tate
John E. Selby
M. Boyd Coyner
James Axtell, Northwestern University
DEDICATION

As a totally inadequate compensation for endless years of emotional, intellectual, and financial support, I dedicate this dissertation to my parents, John and Edna Fausz of Lakeside Park, Kentucky.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF MAPS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. PROLEGOMENA: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. TSENA-COMMACAH, THE Powhatans' VIRGINIA.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. BATTLE AGAINST &quot;TYRANNY&quot;: THE ELIZABETHAN IDEOLOGY OF COLONIZATION</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1607-1622</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER V. IN BRITISH BLOOD IMBRUED: THE POWHATAN UPRISING OF MARCH 22</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VI. SCORCH THE EARTH AND SCOURGE THE ENEMY:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SECOND ANGLO-POWHATAN WAR, 1622-32</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER VII. THE DEATH OF IDEOLOGY AND THE BIRTH OF A COMMONWEALTH</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPILOGUE</td>
<td>577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

iv
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As the days became months and the months, years, I despaired of ever finishing this research project. The completion of my task would not have been possible without a commitment from faculty, friends, and family members that was equal to my own. Contrary to Hermann Hesse's assertion, I did not have to destroy my old world in constructing a new one, and I am pleased to say that bitterness and alienation have not resulted from this dissertation.

Intellectual debts, unlike financial ones, are a pleasure to accumulate. No one has directed or followed my scholarly progress more closely than Prof. Richard Maxwell Brown, who chaired my first oral examination at William and Mary as he is chairing the last. His helpful guidance, imparted in hallways as well as in seminars, and concerning my M.A. thesis as well as this dissertation, has earned him my sincere appreciation and respect. Another who has had a great impact on my studies is Prof. Thad W. Tate, whom I have known as a scholar, employer, and friend. His advice is valued by every student of the Colonial Chesapeake. I am also grateful to Prof. John E. Selby, Dean of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and Prof. M. Boyd Coyner for their scholarly
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J. Frederick Fausz
August 1977

Williamsburg


LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Following Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.1</td>
<td>Hypothetical Representation of the Origins of Tsenacommacah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2</td>
<td>Tsenacommacah, 1607-1612: Principal Tribes and Werowances and Estimated Populations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3</td>
<td>Tsenacommacah—Internal Unity at Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4</td>
<td>Political Organization of Tsenacommacah at Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.5</td>
<td>Subsistence Cycle of the Powhatans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.6</td>
<td>Tsenacommacah—External Threats (Non-European)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1</td>
<td>Classification of Ethnic Stereotypes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.1</td>
<td>Review of English Settlements, 1622-1625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.1</td>
<td>Mortality of Berkeley Hundred Settlers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.1</td>
<td>Distribution of Virginia Population, 1625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Following Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.1 Tribal Areas of the South Atlantic Slope</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.2 Core Tribes of Powhatan's Domain, circa 1607</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.3 Aquatic Resource Zones of the James and York River Basins</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.4 Tsenacommacah and Environs, circa 1607</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.1 Wingandacoa: Ralegh's &quot;Virginia,&quot; 1584-1590</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.1 Engagements of the First Anglo-Powhatan War, 1609-1613</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.1 The Powhatan Uprising, March 22, 1621/22 (Hypothetical Plan of Attack)</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.2 Corporation of Henrico, March 22, 1622: English Settlements</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.3 Corporation of Charles City, March 22, 1622: English Settlements</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.4 Corporation of James City, March 22, 1622: English Settlements</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.1 Second Anglo-Powhatan War: English Offensives, Summer-Autumn, 1622</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.2 Tribes of the Potomac River Basin, 1600</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.3 Second Anglo-Powhatan War: English Offensives, May-November, 1623</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.1 The Marrow of English Colonization in Virginia, circa 1625</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration Following Page

IV.1 English Musketeer, circa 1607 . . . . . . . . . . 221
IV.2 Southeastern Bird-Man Deity or Bird Costume . . 348
ABSTRACT

This interdisciplinary study analyzes historically the society and culture of Elizabethan/Jacobean England and Powhatan Virginia ("Tsenacommacah") beginning in the sixteenth century and investigates how and when each was changed through intercultural contact between 1607 and 1625. Focusing upon the Powhatan Uprising of March 22, 1621/22, and using the unifying concepts of ideology and ethnocentrism, conclusions are made regarding the preconditions and the precipitant cause of the uprising, the resulting alteration in English stereotypes of Indians, and the ramifications for the post-uprising development of English Virginia.

Beginning with the battle against the "tyranny" of Catholic Europe, Elizabethans developed concepts that evolved into the Hakluytian ideology of colonization. These preconceptions and misconceptions established the goals of overseas expansion, enshrined ethnic prejudices against non-English cultures, and legitimized aggression against hostile or non-receptive native populations. The rhetoric and the realities of colonization in Ireland and at Roanoke are analyzed for the light they shed on later experiences in Virginia.

The colony at Jamestown was founded on the Elizabethan model, and the decade-and-a-half of Anglo-Indian relations prior to 1622 was influenced by old stereotypes, prejudices, and guidelines. Religion, the buttress of both the English and Powhatan cultures, spatial distance of the two peoples, and English attempts at forced acculturation were key elements in determining the nature of Anglo-Indian relations between 1607 and 1622. The English in these years escalated their demands of the Indians, as intercultural relations became increasingly strained. The invaders of Virginia commandeered corn in 1607, sought the death of Powhatan priests in 1609, dispossessed Indian lands from 1618 on, and, finally, attempted the forced acculturation of all Powhats in 1622.

The once-strong and fervently ethnocentric Virginia Algonquians saw their political organization eroded and their culture directly threatened by 1622. Revitalized through the leadership of Mangopeesomom/Opechancanough and Nemattanew, the tidewater tribes attempted to annihilate the hated aliens in the famous uprising. However, only partial success spelled doom for Tsenacommacah. The crisis period of 1622-1625 severely crippled Powhatan culture, killed the Virginia Company and Elizabethan ideology, and accelerated the growth of Virginia's unique tobacco society. A mature and thriving Virginia emerged from a bitter Indian war, validating Hakluyt's claim that Englishmen could be successful colonizers but repudiating the idealism and the growth model of Elizabethan ideology.
THE Powhatan Uprising OF 1622:

A HISTORICAL STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRISM AND CULTURAL CONFLICT
I am an adventurer: if not
to Virginia, yet for Virginia;
for every man that prints,
adventures.

John Donne, Sermon (1622)

CHAPTER I
PROLEGOMENA: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY

Part I: Historiography

The Powhatan Uprising of March 22, 1621/22, was the single most significant event of Anglo-Indian relations in Virginia. An early example of a native culture's rebellion against intruding European civilization, the uprising climaxed a mere decade-and-a-half of intercultural contact. Its impact upon transatlantic ideology and policy was impressive: it brought to an end the first, forty-year, phase of British imperialism, accelerated Virginia's unique course of development, and hastened the doom of an Amerindian empire with vast potential.

The Powhatan Uprising is an authentic historical watershed, but its very familiarity has hampered detailed analysis. No sizeable scholarly account of this event has ever been published. Because of this historiographical neglect, and due to the mushrooming interest in both Native American studies and the Colonial Chesapeake, a monograph focusing
upon the events of 1622 and set within the context of British imperialism fills an interpretative void.

This study, in its present form, could not have been written just a few short years ago. The 1960s and 1970s produced the relevant interpretations and the reawakened consciousness necessary to rewrite Virginia's early history from an intercultural perspective. In the past decade-and-a-half, respected historians of colonial America have retold the English story,¹ while ethnohistorians and anthropologists continue to research and analyze various aspects of the Powhatan past.²

However, no one has specifically addressed the 1622 uprising, itself, and after three-and-a-half centuries

¹Especially relevant and important have been the contributions of Philip L. Barbour and Edmund S. Morgan. See Barbour, The Three Worlds of Captain John Smith (Boston, 1964); idem, ed., The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609, Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., CXXXVI-CXXXVII, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1968); idem, Pocahontas and Her World (Boston, 1969). See Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975).

of myopic and mythopoeic Anglo-American historical interpretation, the important details of the uprising--its causes, timing, rationale, and ramifications--still languish in the shadows of factual obscurity. Even though there are no books, essays, or even dissertations devoted to the topic, the abundance of error-ridden, prejudicial, short, and superficial treatments necessitates a revisionist perspective. Even recent appraisals of the uprising, although disburdened of passion and anti-Indian bias, have done a less than adequate job of analysis. The uprising of 1622 is still too often "explained" in terms of simplistic monocausality or vague multicausality.

In interpreting the Powhatan Uprising, the historian should answer at least two basic questions:

1. What were the preconditions (the results of long-range causes) that set the stage for the reaction of precipitants?

2. What were the precipitants (immediate causes) that indicate why something happened when it did?³

As fundamentally obvious as these two questions may seem, no historian has ever linked the preconditions growing out of fifteen years of Anglo-Powhatan relations with the timing of the uprising in March 1622. Nor has anyone differentiated between the factors that assured periods of

peaceful relations and those that triggered fullscale warfare prior to 1622.

Before discussing the historiography of the Powhatan Uprising, an important "revisionist" point should be made regarding terminology. The word, "massacre," as in the "Great Massacre of March 22, 1621/22," will not be used in this study, contrary to its traditional, almost universal, acceptance. Derived from the Old French word, "macaïer" ("to butcher"), "massacre" refers to the indiscriminate slaughter of persons on a large scale for reasons of revenge or plunder. Although this definition accurately describes what the Powhatans did in 1622, the word "massacre" should be replaced for two reasons.

First, due to the prejudicial misuse of the term in the past, volatile connotations remain that cannot be permitted in this era of white sensibility and Indian sensitivity to the Native Americans' heritage. As one historian explained, "a fight became a battle when the white man won, a massacre when the Indians prevailed."4

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4Wesley Frank Craven, White, Red, and Black: The Seventeenth Century Virginian (Charlottesville, Va., 1971), 51; my italics. White historians have to be extremely sensitive to the Native American's search for his past. In a recent book review, it was mentioned how the Nez Perce tribe was indignant about whites referring to 19th-century cavalry "skirmishes" with their ancestors--engagements that they considered full-fledged "battles." Wilcomb E. Washburn's review of Noon Ne-Ne-Poo (We, the Nez Perces): Culture and History of the Nez Perces (Lapwei, Idaho, 1973), in Idaho Yesterdays, XVIII (1974), 30-31.
The "symbolic substance" of terminology is today being scrutinized for long-perpetuated ethnic and racial distortions, and as Francis Jennings noted recently, historians must strive "to employ semantic instruments designed for measurement rather than attack."  

Second, there is a better, more accurate term for describing the events of 1622--"uprising." Denoting rebellion against oppression and revolt on a large scale, "uprising" is a valid and functional substitute for "massacre." The Powhatans in 1622 were technically considered subjects of King James I, and the massive, surprise attack they launched on March 22, 1621/22, was actually the first blow in a decade-long revolutionary war designed to rid their land of the hated English. Engaged in a desperate patriotic struggle for cultural survival, the Powhatans were described as "rebels of the South Colony" by English contemporaries. Thus, "uprising" has validity in historical context, a fact recognized by scholars of Native American History, who pioneered the use of the term in their writings.  

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7 William T. Hagan, American Indians, Chicago
All interpretations of the Powhatan Uprising can be traced back to two contemporary English sources: Edward Waterhouse's polemical Declaration of the State of the Colony and . . . a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre (London, 1622)--the "official view" of the Virginia Company of London\(^8\)--and Capt. John Smith's Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles (London, 1624), Book IV.\(^9\) Waterhouse provided most of the "factual details" of the uprising--some of which cannot be proved or disproved--and printed the only list of those who were killed during the March 22 attack.\(^{10}\) Judging by the historiographical dependence upon Waterhouse, his account is the single most important source for the uprising, biased though it is.

The Relation of the Massacre, published barely two months after news of the uprising reached London, identified

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\(^8\)Published in Aug. 1622, Waterhouse's account, as a company-sponsored tract, presented the best side of things to the public. See Chap. VI, below. A usable reprint of Waterhouse is most conveniently found in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 4 vols., III (Washington, D.C., 1933), 541-571.

\(^9\)Available in many facsimile editions, the standard modern reprint is still Edward Arber and A. G. Bradley, eds., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1910).

\(^{10}\)See Appendix B, below.
the "true" cause of the uprising as the "instigation of the Divell (enemy to theire [the Indians'] salvation) and the dayly feare that possest them, that in time we by our growing continually upon them, would dispossesse them of this Country." With this assessment, Waterhouse established the interpretative parameters to which all subsequent commentators have adhered. Ever since 1622, historians have divided and separated causation, some stressing territorial issues of conflict, and others the more innately cultural sources of conflict between Englishmen and Powhatans. But equally as important, Waterhouse enshrined the anti-Indian biases that have been perpetuated over the years.

Waterhouse made no attempt to consider preconditions or to explain the timing of the attack, and he actually suppressed information in his possession in order to remove any hint of English culpability in provoking Indian revenge. By emphasizing the treachery and ferocity of the "perfidious and inhumane" Powhatans, by interpreting the 1622 attack as inexplicable and without reasonable provocation, and by making strident pleas for genocidal revenge, Waterhouse created in the "Barbarous Massacre" a focus of ethnic prejudice that endured for

11 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 22.


13 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 18-22.
three-and-a-half centuries. His countrymen had lost a battle in 1622, but Waterhouse, through his passionate and persuasive rhetoric, made certain that the English would win the war in the history books.

Capt. John Smith drew extensively from Waterhouse's account, but he added new details that gave his interpretation originality, plausibility, and a sense of balance. Although hatred of Indians and desire for revenge were ever present in Smith's account, he nevertheless realized that a precipitant—an act of English provocation—brought on the March attack. Smith linked the timing of the uprising to the murder by the English of a mysterious and respected Powhatan leader—Nemattanew—only two weeks before.\(^{14}\) Smith's interpretation of Nemattanew's death as the "Prologue to this Tragedy" was a significant corrective to Waterhouse's distorted perspective. Smith accepted Waterhouse's conspiracy theory concerning pre-1622 Powhatan plots against the English, but he disagreed with the interpretative importance assigned to the "Divell" or to territorial issues.\(^{15}\) For the pragmatic captain, the Powhatans "did not kill the English because they were Christians, but for their weapons and commodities, that were rare

\(^{14}\) Smith, Generall Historie, 144. Smith spelled the name "Nemattanow," but most versions of it indicated a "-ew" end sound. See Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 108-109n.

\(^{15}\) Ibid., 165.
novelties."\textsuperscript{16}

Only one year after the \textit{Generall Historie} was published, the Rev. Samuel Purchas brought out his \textit{Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes}, in which he presented his own views of the recent Indian uprising.\textsuperscript{17} The leading ideologue of English imperialism after Hakluyt, Purchas presented a patchwork synthesis based upon both Waterhouse and Smith. Plagiarizing much of Waterhouse's account, Purchas inserted Smith's details about Nemattanew's death and realized its importance for explaining the Powhatans' precisely timed revenge.\textsuperscript{18} In fact, Purchas went beyond the \textit{Generall Historie} and described Nemattanew's murder as the "Cause of the Massacre," although in another location he also mentioned the "instigation of the Divell" and land dispossession as important factors.\textsuperscript{19}

Since Waterhouse, Smith, and Purchas were writing about current events, they can be excused for their lack of objectivity, distorted perspective, and ill-defined and ambiguous view of preconditions and precipitant causes. For the modern historian, this triumvirate remains vitally important for the factual details they provide. However,


\textsuperscript{17}4 vols. (London, 1625). The best modern reprint is in 20 vols. (Glasgow, 1905-1907). The uprising is discussed in Vol. XIX.

\textsuperscript{18}Purchas, \textit{Pilgrimes}, XIX, 168-169.

\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 164.
later commentators on the uprising, seeking to improve on these early accounts, succeeded only in adding new prejudices to old. Historians of the past three centuries, with their original and unsupported insights, helped create a unique, mythopoeic American interpretation of the 1622 uprising.  

Early in the eighteenth century, Robert Beverley, belonging to the planter class that had profited in a Virginia freed of an Indian menace, wrote "the earliest work which attempt[ed] a comprehensive description of the colony's past history." Beverley's History and Present State of Virginia (London, 1705) viewed Indians in a less passionate and more paternalistic light than had the earlier authors, but his narrative revealed a chauvinistic, colonial Virginia bias. According to Beverley, immediately prior to 1622 Englishmen treated the Powhatans with kindness—indeed, with "Freedom and Friendship"—unknown in Jamestown's early days. But this congeniality exposed

20Over the centuries, Virginia's native-son historians have embellished the story with such "facts" as: the uprising occurred on Good Friday, 1622; John Rolfe was killed in the attack; and that up to 400 or more Englishmen were slain. These gratuitous details are never attributed to a source, but rather have attained their own validity by repeated telling.


23Beverley, History, ed. Wright, 51.
the defenselessness of the colonists and gave the natives the "Occasion to think more contemptibly of them." 24 Nemattanew's death "was reckon'd all the Provocation given . . . to act this bloody Tragedy, and to . . . engage in so horrid Villainy all the Kings and Nations bordering upon the English Settlements." 25 The Powhatans had plotted a "Hellish Contrivance"--the annihilation of all the English--"according to their cruel Way of leaving none behind to bear Resentment." 26 Beverley stressed the precipitant cause of the uprising and ignored the important preconditions, but at least he, unlike many later writers, provided a rational explanation for why the Powhatans had attacked when they did. 27

Four decades after the publication of Beverley's History, another son of the Old Dominion, the Rev. William Stith, published his History of the First Discovery and Settlement of Virginia (Williamsburg, Va., 1747). Stith was vehemently prejudiced in his account of the "cruel and bloody Massacre," an event "most memorable in

24 Ibid., 50.
25 Ibid., 53-54.
26 Ibid., 51.
27 Ibid., 54-56. Almost alone among twentieth-century scholars, Philip Barbour interpreted Nemattanew's death as precipitating the uprising. However well he understood the timing of the event, Barbour made no attempt to investigate the important preconditions. Pocahontas, 205-206.
our Annals." The connection between Nemattanew's death and the timing of the uprising was implied, but never directly stated, by Stith, and the Powhatan overlord, Opechancanough, had allegedly formulated his conspiracy for annihilation long in advance. The period of peace immediately preceding the uprising, Stith explained, was intended for the Powhatans' benefit, allowing them a "Taste of Civil Life" and protecting them from an "English War" that could have easily exterminated them. Thus it was that unsuspecting, trusting, and kindly Englishmen fell "by the Hands of a perfidious, naked, and dastardly People, . . . Bloodhounds" all. The myth of English innocence and Indian treachery was still thriving 125 years after Waterhouse.

In the next century, another noteworthy Virginia historian, Charles Campbell, interpreted the 1622 uprising for the "sophisticated" readers of 1860. Campbell's History of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia (Philadelphia, 1860) mentioned Nemattanew ("wild, untutored savage!"), but his death was only vaguely related to the timing of the March attack. In almost all other respects, Campbell merely paraphrased Waterhouse's version of events, retaining of course the flavor of post-1622 English

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28Stith, History, 208.
29Ibid., 209.
hatreds.  

Campbell's perspective on the Powhatans could have benefitted from the more enlightened views of Henry R. Schoolcraft, who completed his classic six volumes of *Historical and Statistical Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian Tribes of the United States* in 1857. Schoolcraft was sympathetic to the Powhatans and portrayed Opechancanough as a wise and courageous leader with a "head whose anatomy would have honored Solon." Always the "unflinching enemy of the colony," Opechancanough became "inflexibly bent on preventing the progress of the Saxon race" as early as 1618. His plot to root out the English was, according to Schoolcraft, more hindered than advanced by the "striking incident" of Nemattanew's murder in early March 1622. Even though the timing of the uprising and the various

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32 Campbell wrote that "the red men of Virginia were driven back, like hunted wolves, from their ancient haunts. While their fate cannot fail to excite commiseration, . . . the perpetual possession of this country by the aborigines would have been incompatible with the designs of Providence in promoting the welfare of mankind. . . . The unrelenting hostility of the savages, their perfidy and vindictive implacability, made sanguinary measures necessary." *Ibid.*, 167; my italics.


34 Schoolcraft, *Archives of Aboriginal Knowledge*, 98.
preconditions went unanalyzed by Schoolcraft, the Powhatans were viewed more as efficient strategists than as treacherous murderers. Stripped of much of the inflammatory rhetoric that Waterhouse had employed, Schoolcraft's account conveyed a sense of Indian pride and cultural aspiration, and the rebels of 1622 were treated as protagonists acting to better their condition.35

However, Schoolcraft's sensitivity to the Powhatan perspective was not adopted by writers later in the nineteenth century. In 1877, the famous historian of colonial Virginia, Edward D. Neill, mentioned the uprising of 1622 in a short essay devoted mainly to the development of the iron industry in the seventeenth century.36 Writing only a year after Custer's defeat, Neill noted how the Powhatans had tricked the trusting Englishmen with pledges of peace and how, "as often since, these professions and confessions were a prelude to treachery and massacre."37

The equally famous antiquarian, Alexander Brown, as late as 1898 relied upon block quotations from Waterhouse to tell the story of the uprising. In his First Republic in America,38 Brown interpreted Nemattanew's death as only

37 Ibid., 224.
38 (Boston, 1898).
incidental to the timing of the attack, an attack that was allegedly in the planning stages at least a year before March 1621/22. If Brown saw the "massacre" as the work of a "master mind," it was a mind he believed too brilliant for an Indian, for he toyed with the idea that the Spanish may have actually instigated the uprising.

In general, nineteenth-century writers progressed little beyond Waterhouse and Smith in interpreting the events of 1622. There was almost no attempt to understand the motivation of the Powhatans or to analyze precipitants within the context of preconditions. The death of Nemattanew was linked to the timing of the uprising by most writers, but even that dramatic event was presented in a vacuum, with no emphasis on why it was a significant provocation or on how it related to a possible anti-English conspiracy in existence long before.

Twentieth-century accounts of the 1522 uprising have, in many respects, been as brief, sketchy, and unsystematic as earlier versions, but there has been an evolution in tone from the inflammatory and biased to more

39 Brown, First Republic, 465-466.

40 Ibid., 467n. A year before the appearance of Brown's book, Bostonian John Fiske had cautiously analyzed the situation: "Opekankano and his people watched with grave concern the sudden and rapid increase of the white strangers. That they were ready to seize upon an occasion for war is by no means unlikely, and the nature of the event indicates careful preparation." Old Virginia and Her Neighbors, 2 vols., I (Cambridge, Mass., 1902 [orig. publ. Boston, 1897]), 223-224.
dispassionate interpretations. Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker in 1914 presented an error-ridden and Anglophilic view of the Powhatan Uprising, and his book was reissued in 1959 with errors and biases intact. In *Virginia Under the Stuarts*, Wertenbaker contended that territorial dispossession and a growing English population brought on the "general butchery" in 1622, but he failed to discuss precipitants or provocations for explaining the timing of the attack. Apparently, he believed it was sufficient to state that a conspiracy was hatched in the "cunning brain" of Opechancanough, "always hostile to the white men." Generally, the details and the tone of Wertenbaker's interpretation adhered to Waterhouse's account, except where Wertenbaker committed gratuitous errors of fact.

41 In the following historiographical summary of 20th-century interpretations, I have omitted consideration of two works that provide many insights into the Jamestown experience but which add little to a discussion of the uprising per se. These works are: Richard Beale Davis, *George Sandys, Poet-Adventurer* (New York and London, 1955), an excellent biography, and Perry Miller, "Religion and Society in the Early Literature of Virginia," in *Errand Into the Wilderness* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 99-140, a brilliant and provocative essay. Davis included a lengthy section on the uprising, but it consisted almost exclusively of reprinted primary sources and lacked perspective. *George Sandys*, 119-162.

42 (Princeton, N.J., 1914; repr. 1959). Quotations are from the reprint.


44 *Ibid.*, 48-51. Wertenbaker's carelessness with details was evident when he gave "Race" for "Pace" (the colonist who warned Jamestown), 48, and "357" for "347" (Waterhouse's tally of the English dead), 50.
Charles M. Andrews, the "dean" of American colonial history in his day, twenty years later referred to Wertenbaker's "good account" of the uprising, but he, himself, had little to say concerning the "hideous tragedy." Andrews substituted phraseology for analysis, and "explained" the complex events as follows:

"... Indian enmity smoldered, bursting into flame in 1622..." He did imply, however, that the whole ugly affair could have been prevented had not Powhatan died and Opechancanough succeeded him in 1618.

Another eminent colonial historian, Wesley Frank Craven, has had the good fortune and the good sense to revise his opinions and to reevaluate his language over the course of three decades. In a 1943 article, "Indian Policy in Early Virginia," Craven condemned the Powhatans for resorting to "barbarism in its most savage forms"—an especially misplaced moral judgment considering that World War II was then giving a terrible new dimension to those words. Craven provided no explanation of preconditions or precipitants to the uprising, and the Indian attack happened as suddenly on the printed page as it had in life. However, five years later, in his influential

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46 Ibid., 142.
47 In WMQ, 3d Ser., I (1944), 65-82.
48 Ibid., 73.
book, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, Craven cited the colony's rapid growth as the factor that prompted the uprising. But once again, the "natives fell upon the unsuspecting colonists with savage brutality," with no explanation as to why March 22, 1621/22, provided the occasion or the opportunity.

It was only in 1971, with the publication of his *White, Red, and Black*, that Craven developed a less ethnocentric and more balanced interpretation in keeping with the times. In this work, Craven called attention to the Powhatan economy and culture and portrayed the Indians' sense of powerlessness as the English crowded them culturally as well as territorially. In this context, the uprising "signalled above all ... the Indian's refusal to adapt." Craven's problems with biased language and insufficient explanations were only representative of the many pitfalls that befell otherwise fine historians when writing about the Powhatan Uprising. For instance, Richard Lee Morton's generally excellent *Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960) did a poor job of interpreting the events.

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50 Ibid., 146.

51 James W. Richard Lectures at the Univ. of Virginia (Charlottesville, Va., 1971).

52 Ibid., 52. Also see chap. 2, passim.
of 1622 and actually helped perpetuate errors of Virginia's mythological past. Morton made no effort to explain causation beyond a discussion of Opechancanough's conspiracy. But even here, the "savages" (always "savages") were "not . . . as bold as they were clever in carrying out their designs. In many cases the mere show of a gun caused them to flee." Treacherous if he succeeded and cowardly if he failed, the Indian of America's past was losing ground to the prejudicial pens of historians. And if scholars could not control their biases, then the popularizers could not have been expected to present balanced appraisals. In 1952, for example, George F. Willison wrote that the Powhatans took a "terrible revenge" in 1622 for "injuries and indignities suffered," but "the Indians had committed numerous outrages, [which] they excused or conveniently forgot." With florid prose but little analysis, Willison

53Morton said the uprising occurred on Good Friday, that Rolfe was among the "six Councilors" killed, and that "more than 350 colonists" died, but he did not cite a single source that revealed these details. Colonial Virginia, I, 74-75. See the recent work by Warren M. Billings, ed., The Old Dominion in the Seventeenth Century: A Documentary History of Virginia, 1606-1689 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975). Billings made the "Good Friday mistake" and declared that the Powhatans did not take prisoners on the day of the attack (208)--a statement refuted by no less than five contemporary, accessible, documents.

54Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 74, 76.

gave credit to Opechancanough for a "diabolically brilliant coup" that had caused "the blood of the English . . . to flow under the flash of knives and the roar of guns."  

As this brief survey demonstrates, the unstated and the overstated have dominated past interpretations of the 1622 uprising. Until recently, the historiography of the subject was rather undeveloped, reflecting the superficial treatments by scholars who thought the topic unworthy of serious inquiry or those who were unwilling to investigate the complex issues they recognized.

However, the 1970s have so far produced several thesis-oriented interpretations that seek to explain the causation of the 1622 uprising. While none of these accounts is large or completely developed, they are more systematic in arrangement and argument and more enlightened in approach and tone than earlier works. And not surprisingly, the two "camps" that developed in the early 1970s--the one emphasizing cultural factors, the other territorial issues--evolved from Waterhouse's original conception of dual causality. Also similar to Waterhouse's approach is the tendency among current scholars to analyze and debate the preconditions of the uprising with little or no emphasis placed upon the precipitant cause(s) or on the timing of the attack.

56Tbid., 234, 236.
Three modern scholars, Nancy O. Lurie, Gary B. Nash, and Francis Jennings, have determined that land disposssession and territorial pressures in general caused the uprising of 1622. Lurie's path-breaking essay, "Indian Cultural Adjustment to European Civilization," claimed that the Powhatans revolted because their natural resources were increasingly threatened by encroaching tobacco plantations. The "real danger" to the Indians, she said, "arose from the inexorable growth of European society in Virginia." Lurie credited the Powhatans with able planning in the uprising, and she called attention to the unified and efficient fighting organization developed by 1622. However, the death of Nemattanew was not mentioned; no effort was made to explain the crucial question of timing; and even the assumptions about the circumscribed Powhatan environment were not substantiated with evidence.

Gary Nash, in his 1974 book, Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America, attempted to answer both the questions of causation and timing. As sensitive to what preceded as well as to what followed the uprising, Nash

58 Ibid., 49.
59 Ibid., 48-51.
viewed the growing English population as bringing about a deterioration in Anglo-Indian relations. This "highly combustible atmosphere generated by a half-dozen years of white expansion and pressure on Indian hunting lands was the . . . fundamental cause" of the uprising. Nash believed that a plot for a coordinated Indian attack was already in existence when the murder of a "greatly respected Indian [Nemattanew] ignited the assault." Thus, in a succinct survey, Nash addressed himself to preconditions and the precipitant cause, although, like Lurie, his statements about territorial pressures remained unproven.

In 1975, the land thesis was argued by Jennings in his provocative book, *Invasion of America*. The English, according to Jennings, sought peace with the Powhatans only when it coincided with their economic best interests, and the Indians became a liability and an obstacle to progress when tobacco production superseded earlier trade relations. The English population doubled between 1618 and 1622, and "Indian hostility grew" accordingly. "Finally the alarmed Indians rose in a desperate effort to drive away or exterminate the intruders." Thus, Jennings argued,

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62 Ibid.
63 Jennings, *Invasion of America*, 77-78.
as had Lurie and Nash, that "the contention over the land was exactly what had precipitated the war."64

Those scholars with a land thesis can be criticized for failing to prove the validity of assumptions about territorial and population pressures--assumptions that must remain only seemingly obvious until the necessary research into the Powhatan ecosystem and English settlement patterns is completed. In addition, Lurie, Nash, and Jennings were only interested in discussing preconditions from 1618 to 1622, and they paid little attention to a direct and discernible precipitant that would have explained the precise timing of the uprising. A true cause of an event should be intimately connected with its timing, and there has never been a convincing account based on the land thesis that could explain why the Powhatans attacked in 1622 and not in 1619, 1620, or 1621; why they struck in the month of March (O.S.), and not in October, for instance; or why the uprising occurred in a period of declared peace and overtly amicable relations and not in a time of pronounced hostility and violence.

However, an alternative to the land thesis emerged in three works published in 1975. This approach was represented by Wilcomb Washburn, Edmund S. Morgan, and Alden T. Vaughan--respected scholars who interpreted the uprising in a multicausal context of vaguely defined cultural, as well as territorial, factors.

64Ibid., 78.
Vaughan, in *American Genesis: Captain John Smith and the Founding of Virginia* (Boston, 1975), stressed the English attempts after 1619 to supplant Powhatan culture with Anglican religion and European civility ("ethnic arrogance and pious hopes"), but he also noted that land dispossession and the increasing colonial population strained Anglo-Indian relations. It was clear to Vaughan that after fifteen years of enduring English "contempt," the Powhatans' fears and frustrations "burst to the surface in a sudden, brutal massacre."65 The uprising was the "inevitable result of white aggression" according to Vaughan,66 and for that reason, he was little interested in linking the specific timing of the "frenzied assault" with the long-smouldering Powhatan resentments.67

Wilcomb E. Washburn believed that the uprising was not inevitable, but could have been "forestalled" if the English had been less aggressive and demanding in their relations with the Powhatans. In his *Indian in America* (New York, 1975), Washburn flatly declared that conflict over land was not the underlying cause of hostilities (there being land enough for all), "as long as appropriate


procedures were followed in its acquisition." Rather, it was the Englishmen's basic arrogance and contempt for Indian sovereignty that engendered the Powhatans' "smoldering resentments" and eventually made continued acquiescence to colonial presence "unbearable." For Washburn, there was little doubt that Opechancanough's "exasperation at the course of the colonists' unending demands precipitated the violent reaction of 1622." However, without an understanding of why March 22, 1621/22, seemed such an ideal time for staging a "violent reaction," the "exasperation" must remain a nebulous precondition for rebellion and not a direct provocation to it.

In a most important study, American Slavery, American Freedom, Morgan more fully discussed the broad and basic conflict of cultures than did either Vaughan or Washburn. Morgan interpreted the 1622 uprising in terms of two rather equally weighted factors. He blamed the Virginia Company's efforts after 1618 to construct an "integrated community" predicated upon the Powhatans' adoption of English religion and lifestyle, and he also cited the simultaneous growth in English population and tobacco plantations. Conflict resulted because the Powhatans "were notoriously proud, their empty lands were not 'unused'," and the "arrogance of the English" became

68126-127.

69Washburn, Indian in America, 128.
insufferable. However, like Vaughan and Washburn, Morgan offered no indication that a precipitant cause was present (or necessary) for bringing about the "dramatic catastrophe" of 1622.

As competent and respected as these scholars are, any discussion of the uprising that fails to answer, or even consider, the question of what precipitated a concerted and bellicose Powhatan rebellion is not very enlightening in a historiographical sense. And to omit even the mention of Nemattanew's critically timed death—an event deemed so overwhelmingly relevant and significant by seventeenth-century commentators—places otherwise attractive hypotheses into doubt and compounds the mystery that has always shrouded the 1622 uprising. Sound analysis cannot deal with either preconditions or precipitant causes; the total picture must be viewed in focus.

It is precisely this long tradition of the half-developed, or poorly presented, interpretation that has prevented the uprising of 1622 from receiving serious, detailed examination in either published or unpublished historical works. Unless historians can comprehend what specifically preconditioned the Powhatans' hatred for the English and what specific actions motivated the Indians to attack when, where, and in the manner they did, historical

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71 Ibid., 98.
interpretation will not have progressed much beyond Waterhouse's perspective of an inexplicable and peridious Indian betrayal of peaceful and innocent Englishmen.
Part II: Methodology

For a revisionist study to interpret successfully the Powhatan Uprising in its entirety, it is essential to learn as much as possible about Powhatan culture, tribal politics, and the aspirations of the Indian people. It is a difficult task fraught with risks for the traditionally trained historian, but even an imperfect attempt is preferable to the sheer guesswork of the past or the empty expressions of futility that have prevented others from trying.72

Although some would argue that white historians can never produce good or fair Indian history, all research conscientiously undertaken must advance our scanty knowledge.73 So much of the Indian's "usable past" has already been lost or hidden that the revisionist historian must proceed like the salvage archaeologist in recovering

72E.g., Vaughan wrote that "the native of New England had no written language, nor even a partial substitute for one. The materials, therefore, do not exist for a detailed account of acculturation in seventeenth century New England; by necessity, as well as by inclination, I . . . have not, for the most part, attempted to account for the actions and reactions of the natives." New England Frontier: Puritans and Indians, 1620-1675 (Boston, 1965), vii.

and uncovering the remnants of Native American societies and cultures.

One of the greatest benefits that can result from excavating previously unknown details and in reconstructing formerly misunderstood events, is the discovery of "bad" Indians along with the "good." When a forgotten career is unearthed by new research, Native American History, in particular, and United States History, in general, is enhanced by the recognition of noteworthy individual contributions heretofore unappreciated. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., in his Patriot Chiefs: A Chronicle of American Indian Resistance, stated that "some of the Indians' greatest patriots died unsung by white men, and because their peoples also were obliterated, or almost so, their very names are forgotten."74 Pocahontas and her father, Powhatan, are legendary and romantic figures;75 their fame is owing to the fact that the one actively helped the first Englishmen in Virginia and the other tolerated the alien intruders who were later enshrined as our country's earliest forebearers. But one of my goals in this study is to understand the "other," more hostile, Powhatan leaders, especially Opechancanough and Nemattanew. It is important to recognize that these largely forgotten

74 (New York, 1958), xiii; see also, xiv.

75 The engraved bookplates that adorn books in the Edward Ayer Indian Collection at the Newberry Library, Chicago, list Powhatan and Pocahontas among other famous Indian "Chiefs and Wise Men."
individuals "faced the gravest threats that men face: challenges to freedom, right of conscience, personal security, the means of existence, and life itself."76

To overcome his ethnocentric biases and to study intelligently the history and culture of Indian tribes, the historian must appreciate and utilize other disciplines, perspectives, and concepts. In this study, the most rewarding methodology is ethnohistory—the marriage of anthropology and history that employs historical sources in conjunction with ethnology to derive a comprehensive understanding of aboriginal life and culture.77 As the common ground where the disciplines of ethnology and history converge in Indian-white relations, ethnohistory is the logical approach for analyzing two cultures in contact.78

76Josephy, Patriot Chiefs, xiii.

77Culture can be succinctly defined as the "integrated sum total of learned behavior traits which are manifest and shared by the members of a society." E. Adamson Hoebel, "The Nature of Culture," in Harry L. Shapiro, ed., Man, Culture, and Society (New York, 1971), 208. See also, R. A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (New York, 1970), 80; Ward H. Goodenough, Description and Comparison in Cultural Anthropology (Chicago, 1970), 101. Berkofer wrote that an appreciation of culture theory "enables the historian to understand more readily past group ideation in such a way that he can estimate the behavior it should and did produce with greater probability." Behavioral Approach to Historical Analysis, 145. See also chap. 7: "Implications of the Culture Concept for Historical Analysis," 146-168.

78In conversations with me, James Axtell pointed out that to differentiate historical ethnology from ethnohistory, the latter should designate only the historical study of two cultures in contact, as opposed to the anthropological study of a single culture over time.
Ethnohistory has never been rigorously defined (one scholar called it "the study of the history of . . . peoples normally studied by anthropologists"), and its application "summons no little artistry." The "practice of ethnohistory," according to William Fenton, "is difficult to outline and make explicit"; however, Jennings noted that, "as the ethnohistorian holds the anthropologist's respect for theory, he analyzes events for their demonstration of known cultural processes; as he holds the historian's methodological respect for fact, he tests the theory of abstract processes by their fit on unique and unalterable events."

In the past, anthropologists, especially historical ethnographers and archaeologists, made much better use of written sources than historians made use of either ethno­logical concepts or ethnographic data in their researches.


81Ibid., 11.

However, in the last decade, disciples of the "New Indian History" have begun to reinterpret Indian-white relations in the colonial era from the perspective of the ethnohistorian. Committed to an interdisciplinary methodology and a cultural approach, these revisionist scholars have become catalysts in destroying anti-Indian myths and in prompting investigation of important, but previously neglected, topics.

As many of these studies have demonstrated, the ethnohistorical approach, above all, conveys a new sense of perspective and a heightened sensitivity in dealing with Native American cultures. While it is indeed impossible, and undesirable, to understand a native culture entirely in terms of the native's own conceptual categories (the emic approach), an appreciation for the emic, when analyzed in the context of anthropological theory and categorization (the etic approach), can yield significant


84Kaplan and Manners, Culture Theory, 22-23, 184-188; Goodenough, Description and Comparison, 112. Cf. Branislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific
insights for the ethnohistorian. At the very least, a knowledge of ethnological principles can show the ethnohistorian "how discrete items relate to other wholes," thus broadening the implications of his research.  

The second contribution of the ethnohistorical approach is the interpretative framework that is established for studying European and Indian cultures in contact. An illustration of this is the new work being done to revise the Turnerian frontier concept of "civilized" Anglo-Americans waging a battle for progress against "savage" Indians on the edge of settlement. The old civilization vs. savagery and good vs. evil dualities are being replaced by the ethnohistorian's view of a frontier as an "inter-group contact situation," where "dynamic interaction" between "boundaries of people" results in acculturation, assimilation, miscegenation, race hatred, conquest, or other processes. The ethnohistorian considers Europeans and Indians as "morally neutral and

(New York, 1961). Malinowski believed that the ideal for the ethnographer was to "grasp the native's point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world." Ibid., 25.


87Ibid., 207. Also see 209 and passim.
relatively comparable as 'societies' and 'cultures.'"\textsuperscript{88}

In the words of Jennings:

Instead of assuming an impassable chasm, the ethnohistorian postulates the capacity of societies to exchange cultural traits in processes of cooperation as well as conflict, and he sets himself the task of describing those processes, to which he gives the inclusive neutral name of acculturation.\textsuperscript{89}

For this study the ethnohistorical methodology is especially useful. Not only were the Powhatans, like other Indian groups, "inarticulate" in the sense that they lacked a written language and documentary "archives," but the extant English sources for the early period of Virginia history are small in number. However, given the proper perspective and ethnohistorical orientation, it is possible to extract important ethnographical data on the Powhatans from the familiar and biased primary accounts of Englishmen. It is encouraging to note how much information about Powhatan material culture, tribal folkways, and socio-political structure was, and is, derivable from the writings of early "ethnographers" like Thomas Harriot, John Smith, and William Strachey.\textsuperscript{90}

In addition to the methodological framework that ethnohistory provides, the social science concepts of

\textsuperscript{88}Jennings, Invasion of America, 13.

\textsuperscript{89}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{90}See Karen O. Kupperman, "The Ethnographic Quality of the Early English Response to the American Indian" (paper delivered at the American Society for Ethnohistory annual meeting, Albuquerque, N.M., Oct. 1976).
ethnocentrism and ideology have proven to be profoundly important. The concept of ethnocentrism, as defined by William Graham Sumner in 1906, is a "view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it." In this context, each group "nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, and exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders." Sumner's general ethnocentric rating scale, in which a hypothetical cultural ingroup considers itself in relation to a culturally dissimilar outgroup, would contain some or all of the following propositions:

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<th>Ingroup Attitudes Re Outgroup</th>
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<tr>
<td>See selves as virtuous and superior;</td>
<td>See outgroup as contemptible, immoral, and inferior;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See own standards of value as universal, intrinsically true;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>See selves as strong;</td>
<td>See outgroup as weak;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ingroup theft and murder illegal;</td>
<td>Theft and murder permissible against outgroup;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative relations with ingroup members;</td>
<td>Absence of cooperation with outgroup members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obedience to ingroup authorities;</td>
<td>Absence of obedience to outgroup authorities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to remain an ingroup member;</td>
<td>Absence of conversion to outgroup membership;</td>
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Ethnocentrism is easily defined and easily recognized. Because of enculturation at a young age, almost everyone strongly identifies with his own culture and ingroup. This is implicit acceptance and is not at issue here. What makes the concept of ethnocentrism important for the social scientist, though, is the manner in which ethnocentric values are manifested in actions and applied to (and used against) outgroups. According to anthropologist Melville Herskovits, "it was when, as in Euro-American culture, ethnocentrism is rationalized and made.

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<th>Descriptions of</th>
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<td>Group B</td>
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Ibid., 171, Fig. 10.2.

LeVine and Campbell defined ethnocentrism as "an attitude or outlook in which values derived from one's own cultural background are applied to other cultural contexts where different values are operative." Ibid., 1. The real value of their book lay in its presentation and discussion of the various anthropological, sociological, and psychological propositions relating to the ethnocentrism syndrome. Among the relevant positions discussed are transfer and reinforcement theory, frustration-aggression-displacement theory, and realistic-group-conflict theory.
the basis of programs of action detrimental to the well-being of other peoples that it gives rise to serious problems."93 It is this aspect of ethnocentrism that has greatest relevance for my study.

Members of an aggressive ingroup assume that they hold the key to "universal moral rightness" and hate culturally different outgroups with other beliefs, or they assume that outgroups actually believe as they do but behave differently out of perversity or incompetence.94 Ethnocentrism also manifests itself in "ethical dualism," where actions considered sinful or illegal within the ingroup are legitimized when committed against an outgroup.95 Sumner portrayed the ingroup as a "peace group" and the outgroup "as one against which plunder is sanctioned."96

Because of its ability to summon blind loyalty in times of cultural stress and conflict and to maintain discipline and morale within the ingroup, ethnocentrism is heightened during periods of warfare and manipulated by purposeful propaganda.97 Sigmund Freud, who defined


94 LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 14.


96 LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 16.

97 Murdock, "Ethnocentrism," Encyclopedia of the
ethnocentrism as "group narcissism," believed that it was always possible "to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there . . . [were] other people left over to receive the manifestation of their aggressiveness."98

Because of its complex implications and ramifications, ethnocentrism is an important social science concept used in the analysis of ethnic, racial, and cultural relations. It is an especially useful concept for the historian studying Europeans and Indians in contact, where power, aggression, prejudice, and discrimination influence the interaction of superordinate and subordinate societies and cultures.

Intimately associated with ethnocentrism because it connects and reinforces attitudes and actions, is the concept of ideology.99 Although subject to different definitions to fit the context of historical research, ideology, as used in this study, is the "unconscious . . . tendency at a given time to make facts amenable to ideas, and ideas to facts, in order to create a world image convincing enough to support the collective and the individual sense of identity."100

Social Sciences, V, 614.


99LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 2.

100Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in
Ideology is alienative, doctrinaire, totalistic, intense, dogmatic, and distorting.\textsuperscript{101} Whereas ideas are "particular insights," ideologies "are ideas crystallized into universal systems. Ideas are relative, ideologies absolute."\textsuperscript{102} Ideology renders otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful and enlists private emotions into a united public policy.\textsuperscript{103}

Ideology, like ethnocentrism, is partisan and aggressive when used by one culture against another. A particular ideology supports or combats causes and policies, serving to "rationalize, exhort, excuse, assail, or account for certain beliefs, actions, or cultural arrangements."\textsuperscript{104}

Specifically, ideology is useful in "morale explanation"

\textsuperscript{101}Clifford Geertz, \textit{The Interpretation of Cultures} (New York, 1973), chap. 8, passim.

\textsuperscript{102}Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., \textit{The Crisis of Confidence} (New York, 1969), 47.

\textsuperscript{103}Geertz, \textit{Interpretations of Cultures}, 220, passim. See also, Hoebel, "Nature of Culture," in Shapiro, ed., \textit{Man, Culture and Society}, 218, 219-220. Anthropologist Melford Spiro has identified no less than five "levels" of ideological learning or conviction. An individual: (1) learns about his culture's ideologies; (2) understands ideologies; (3) believes them to be valid; (4) is guided by them ("cognitive salience"); and (5) finally internalizes the ideologies to the extent that they actually serve to initiate behavior. See Kaplan and Manners, \textit{Culture Theory}, 118.

\textsuperscript{104}Kaplan and Manners, \textit{Culture Theory}, 113.
(sustaining ingroups under chronic strain); "imaginal thinking" (using metaphors and symbols for group purpose); and "stereotype formation." Above all, ideology in historical context is a self-fulfilling prophecy with a normative force of its own.105

Historians have made appropriate use of the concept of ideology in several different contexts. In a nationalistic context, ideology helps shape individual ideas and values and promote a sense of social cohesion. When focused in, and manipulated by, the state, ideology supports the "ultimate framework of social obligation, social order, and coercive power."106 In a religious context, ideology fuses the world as lived with the world as imagined into a single set of symbols.107 It is through religion that the intellectual, emotional, and moral experiences of the individual or the group are expressed within a meaningful framework.108 Religion sanctifies ingroup loyalty and sacrifice and the ingroup's hatred and contempt for outgroups; in so doing, religion becomes

105 Geertz, *Interpretation of Cultures*, 222, passim.

106 Yehoshua Arieli, *Individualism and Nationalism in American Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 4; also see *ibid.*, 1-3.


intimately connected with ethnocentrism and ideology.\textsuperscript{109}

Since this dissertation is primarily a cultural study, the concepts of ideology and ethnocentrism provide the necessary unity and continuity for analyzing two cultures separately and in contact between 1580 and 1625. Such concepts become important for understanding the complex inter-relationships among three distinct groups—the homeland-English, the Virginia-English, and the Virginia Indians—and four "policy-making" bodies—the English government, Powhatan's empire, the colony's government, and the Virginia Company of London, each of which possessed different values and aspirations. In this context, traditional methodology and traditional periodization, which interpret 1607 as the dividing point between "British History" and "American History," have little validity.

This study is fundamentally an investigation of how ideology related to events and events to ideology within a transatlantic, Anglo-Powhatan, synchronic and diachronic framework. In this context, colonial Virginia becomes a cultural laboratory in which imperialist ideology and native culture interacted and were mutually transformed in the process. In the period between 1580 and 1625, English colonial policy and ideology were fundamentally changed; the cultural baggage (or "mental furniture")\textsuperscript{110} of


\textsuperscript{110}Edward Eggleston, \textit{The Transit of Civilization}
transplanted Englishmen was altered by contact with a "new world" and a native people; and the Powhatans, possessing their own ideology and blueprint for empire, saw their culture completely disrupted in the process. In only fifteen years of cultural contact, a previously unforeseen new future was charted for both peoples. The Powhatan Uprising of 1622 was crucially important in the transformation.

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The gap in interpreting the interaction between the ideas, ideals, and actions of the Old World and the New is slowly being remedied. See Fredi Chiappelli, ed., First Images of America: The Impact of the New World on the Old, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1976). Chiappelli et al. provide a general European perspective rather than a specifically English one.
The mildnesse of the aire, the fertilitie of the soile, and the situation of the rivers are so propitious to the nature and use of man as no place is more convenient for pleasure, profit, and mans sustenance.

Capt. John Smith, Map of Virginia (1612)

CHAPTER II

TSENACOMMACAH, THE POWHATANS' VIRGINIA

In the sixteenth century, the Powhatans were only one of many large, complex, and culturally diverse Native American groups along the southern Atlantic coast. In the region encompassed today by the states of Virginia and North Carolina—referred to as the South Atlantic Slope Culture Area by anthropologists—lived the Powhatans, Chickahominies, Chesapeaks, and Nansamunds of tidewater Virginia; the Conoys of tidewater Maryland; the Accomacs, Accohannocs, Tockwoghs, and Nanticokes of the Delmarva Peninsula; the Weapemeocs, Chawanoacs, Secotans, Roanokes, Pamlicos, Croatoans and

1A. L. Kroeber, Cultural and Natural Areas of Native North America (Berkeley, Calif., 1939), 141; Lewis Roberts Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of Cultural Diversity and Progressive Development Among Aboriginal Cultures of Coastal Virginia and North Carolina" (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1964), 68.
Neuses of tidewater North Carolina; the Manahoacs, Monacans, Tutelos, and Saponies, Siouan-speaking tribes of the piedmont; and the Meherrins, Nottoways, and Tuscaroras, Iroquoian-speaking tribes along the Virginia-North Carolina border and piedmont areas. (See Map II.1.)

The cultural boundaries of the Virginia Algonquians at contact extended from just south of the present Virginia-North Carolina border to a point west of the fall line, north to the southern bank of the Potomac River, and east to include the modern Virginia Eastern Shore.2 Tsenacommacah, the political domain of the Powhatans, occupied only a portion of the total culture area of the Virginia Algonquians.

Physically, the inhabitants of tidewater Virginia were of Algonquian stock. Burial ossuaries unearthed by archaeologists contained remains of the Iswanid skeletal type, characterized by a long, narrow cranium and rather smallish skulls and bones.3 Stature of six feet was not uncommon.4 The Iswanid type, although generally found in Virginia and North Carolina burial sites, is less common to the south and west, where skeletons of the Walcolid

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MAP II.1 TRIBAL AREAS OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC SLOPE, 1600

1. Powhatans (Alg.)
2. Chickahominies (Alg.)
3. Accomacs/Accohannocs (Alg.)
4. Conoys (Alg.)
5. Nanticokes (Alg.)
6. Chesapeaks*
7. Nansamunds (Alg.)
8. Chawanoacs (Alg.)
9. Weapemeeocs (Alg.)
10. Secotans (Alg.)
11. Nottoways (Iro.)
12. Meherrins (Iro.)
13. Tuscaroras (Iro.)
14. Neuses (Alg.)
15. Pamlicos (Alg.)
16. Manahoacs (Siouan)
17. Monacans (Siouan)

*May have been extinct by 1600.
variety (skulls with rounder, broader crania) predominate.\textsuperscript{5}

Based upon demographic data compiled from skeletal remains, the tidewater Algonquians' life expectancy ranged between 20.9 and 22.9 years in the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{6} Ossuaries from the area of Nanjemoy Creek in the Potomac River basin revealed that infant mortality (ages 0-5 years) was about 30 per cent. Another 35 per cent of the sample at one site, and 28 per cent at another, died while in their 30s, and only 6 to 13 per cent of the population analyzed by skeletal remains lived beyond the age of 50.\textsuperscript{7}

Linguistically, the Virginia Algonquians were members of the Algonkian language family, which included Atlantic coast tribes like the Abnakis, Narragansetts, Massachusets, Pequots, Wampanoags, and Delawares; the "Old Northwest" tribes like the Shawnees, Sauks, Fox, Chippewas, Ottawas, and Crees; and western plains tribes

\textsuperscript{5}Hudson, \textit{Southeastern Indians}, 29.

\textsuperscript{6}Douglas H. Ubelaker, \textit{Reconstruction of Demographic Profiles from Ossuary Skeletal Samples: A Case Study from the Tidewater Potomac}, Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology, no. 18 (Washington, D.C., 1974), 64, Table 40. Cf. other life expectancies: Ancient Greeks (670 B.C.-600 A.D.), 23.0 years; Texas Indians (850 A.D.-1700 A.D.), 30.5 years; and European ruling families (1480-1579), 33.7 years. \textit{Ibid}.

like the Blackfoot and Arapahoes. Several distinct dialects were spoken by the various Algonquian tribes of tidewater Virginia, but the most pervasive, Powhatan, has been classified as "conservative" and "archaic" Proto-Eastern Algonquian, akin to the language of southern New England tribes.

Culturally, the Virginia Algonquians were a baffling composite of Great Lakes, New England, mid-Atlantic coast, and southeastern traits. In 1924, anthropologist Frank Speck argued that the Virginia Algonquians, having migrated from the Great Lakes region, developed a distinct culture based largely upon a southeastern, Gulf Coast trait inventory. The more important of these cultural traits were an agriculture based upon maize, beans, squash, and tobacco; pottery and basketry arts associated with a sedentary village life; "religious and political


autocracy; a priesthood; and ritualized temple burial for chiefs. Thus, according to Speck, the tribes of tidewater Virginia were "less Algonkian in culture than they were in speech." They "cultivated the superior economic and social properties of the south and . . . served in the northern spread of the resulting culture-complex."12

In 1939, anthropologist Regina Flannery further demonstrated the influence of the southeastern culture complex in Virginia. She made a comprehensive, comparative study of over three hundred coastal Algonquian traits and concluded that there were three distinct Algonquian subareas that paralleled geographic patterns. Northern New England tribes shared the highest percentage of "Northern Algonquian traits," while the southern subarea of tidewater Virginia and Maryland demonstrated the lowest percentage—only fourteen of some sixty-nine traits in the case of Virginia.13 But of forty-nine traits described as southeastern in origin, the Virginia tribes possessed forty-eight.14 Flannery concluded that "much of the characteristic culture [in Virginia] has been overlaid

11 Ibid., 190-192, 194, 197-199.
12 Ibid., 198.
13 Regina Flannery, An Analysis of Coastal Algonquian Culture (Washington, D.C., 1939), 191-196. The third Algonquian group analyzed was the cultural and geographical "center" subarea, encompassing tribes in Delaware, New York, and southern New England. Ibid.
14 Ibid., 182-183.
and swamped out by elements coming from the Southeast, particularly those which are connected with agriculture and which stop short of Northern New England.  

A'few years later, anthropologist Maurice Mook noted that the Virginia Algonquians were a cultural composite. He argued that, although the northern Algonquian trait inventory represented the "basic substratum" of tidewater Virginia culture, southeastern characteristics formed "an easily recognizable over-deposit."

Most recently, Viennese anthropologist Christian Feest wrote that the Algonquian tribes of tidewater Virginia lacked as many important southeastern traits as they adopted. His major contribution has been to demonstrate the unique position of the Powhatans among other Algonquian groups and to discuss the special indigenous factors that gave rise to their development.

The roots of Tsenacommacah must be traced back to a period between 3500 B.C. and 1000 B.C., when Virginia Algonquian groups began to exploit efficiently the aquatic resources of the area. By 200 B.C. they had made agricultural adaptations that helped determine the fundamental

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15 Ibid., 190.


linguistic and ethnic boundaries later known in the historic era.\footnote{Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of ... Coastal Virginia," 481.} Permanent settlements and population growth accompanied an increased dependence upon agriculture, but in the thirteenth century, the tidewater tribes engaged in warfare and serious competition for resources, as population declined and expansion ceased.\footnote{Ibid., 482, 484, 489-490.} At about the same time, certain Algonquian groups, ancestors of the contact era Powhatans, migrated to the area of tidewater Virginia.\footnote{Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 40; Speck, "Ethnic Position of Southeastern Algonkian," Amer. Anthro., N.S., XXVI (1924), 194; Mook, "Indian Tribes of Tidewater Virginia," WMQ, 2d Ser., XXIII (1943), 39.} These people probably settled in the western, upstream portions of the major tidal rivers. Here the proto-Powhatans could consistently and efficiently exploit both fresh and salt water resources.\footnote{Capt. John Smith, A Map of Virginia. With a Description of the Countrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion (Oxford, 1612), 15, 23-24; Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of ... Coastal Virginia," 42-56.}

Those Virginia Algonquian tribes collectively known as Powhatans in the contact era were probably not united in the polity known as Tsenacommacah until the last quarter of the sixteenth century.\footnote{Feest, "Powhatan," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 79.} The eventual architect of this
domain was Wahunsonacock, or Powhatan (Po'uh·tan), who was born in the late 1540s at the village of Powhatan near the falls of the James River. The factors that enabled this leader to exert his authority over a large portion of tidewater Virginia cannot be known with precision, but the motivation for consolidation probably lay in external dangers, Indian or European in origin, which threatened the survival of the local Algonquian tribes.

Sixteenth-century Spanish incursions into the southeast, their conquests in Meso-America and the West Indies, and their explorations along the Atlantic seaboard were well known to the Virginia tribes. News of the death and destruction wrought by the Spanish invaders spread from Meso-America through the southeast and up the coast, as demonstrated by the pervasive influence of the disaster-related Southeastern Ceremonial Complex, also known as the Southern Death Cult.

\[23\text{Smith, Map of Virginia, 34-35.}\]
\[24\text{Francis Magnel, "Relation of the First Voyage and the Beginnings of the Jamestown Colony" (1610), in Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Jamestown Voyages Under the First Charter, 1606-1609, 2 vols., Hakluyt Society, 2d Ser., CXXXVI-CXXXVII (Cambridge, 1969), I, 154; James Mooney, "The Powhatan Confederacy, Past and Present," Amer. Anthro., O.S., IX (1907), 129. Known penetrations by the Spanish included the expeditions of Ponce de León (1513), Estéban Gómez (1525), Nunez Cabeca de Vaca (1526), Luis Vasquez de Ayllón (1526), Pánfilo de Narváez (1528), Hernando de Soto (1539-1541), Tristán de Luna (1559-1561), Pedro Menéndez de Avilés (1565), and Juan Pardo (1566-1567).}\]
\[25\text{Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 86-88, 206; Paul S. Martin, George I. Quimby, and Donald Collier,}\]
The Virginia Algonquians' direct contact with the conquistadores came in the early 1560s, when Spanish soldiers abducted an Indian boy from the area of Bahia de Santa Maria (Chesapeake Bay). Renamed Don Luis de Velasco, he became the protege and godson of Luis de Velasco, viceroy of New Spain, converted to Catholicism, and visited Spain, Florida, and Havanna. Don Luis, apparently well assimilated by the late 1560s, became the object of Spanish hopes for converting the Indians of Ajacán (Virginia).

In September 1570, he, along with Juan Baptista de Segura, S.J., vice-provincial of Florida, and eight other Jesuit fathers, brothers, and lay catechists landed in the James River near Archers Hope Creek; crossed the peninsula; and established a mission post on the south bank of the York River.

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Soon after landing, Don Luis left the Jesuits and went among his own people, deeply concerned that "the land . . . [was] in quite another condition than expected, . . . because Our Lord has chastised it with six years of famine and death," as the priests observed.\textsuperscript{29} During Don Luis's years in Spain, a drought had ruined the Indians' agriculture and caused a severe decline in population.

"Since many have died and many also have moved to other regions to ease their hunger," wrote Quiró and Baptista, "there remain but few of the tribe, whose leaders say that they wish to die where their fathers have died, although they have no maize, and have not found wild fruit."\textsuperscript{30} Despite their dire condition, the Indians showed "good will" to the Jesuits in a "kindly manner" and allegedly announced that "they want[ed] to be like Don Luis [i.e., converted], begging us to remain in the land with them."\textsuperscript{31}

The return to Virginia of Don Luis, who had probably been presumed dead by his people, may have reawakened their hopes in this time of crisis. There was little doubt that he was a respected leader with influential kin. His "uncle" was a powerful chieftain, and Don Luis, himself, was described by the Jesuits as a "cacique" and a

\textsuperscript{29}Luis de Quiros and Juan Baptista de Segura to Juan de Hinistrosa, Ajacán, Sept. 12, 1570, in Lewis and Loomie, \textit{Spanish Jesuit Mission}, 89.

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{31}Ibid.
"captain and leader." The Spanish priests fully realized that "it was in the control of this Indian and his kinsmen to take away their lives, when and in what way they wanted without meeting any resistance." The end was not long in coming.

In February 1571, two or three of the priests were slain when they went looking for Don Luis among his tribe, and he personally shot an arrow through the heart of Father Quirós. Don Luis then went to the other, unsuspecting priests and requested hatchets so that he and his followers could cut wood for the construction of a church. The next day, as the Jesuits were celebrating the feast of Candlemas, Don Luis, dressed in a cassock, led his men in an attack on the priests. The fathers were killed with hatchets and machetes, their bodies were mutilated, and the mission was defaced and looted. One boy, Alonso de Olmos, was allowed to live, since the Indians wanted to kill "only the Fathers."

The Spanish soon took their revenge for the

32Luis Gerónimo de Oré, "Relation" (ca. 1617), ibid., 181; Juan de la Carrera, "Relation" (1600), ibid., 135.
33Carrera, "Relation," ibid., 134.
34Juan Rogel to Francis Borgia, Ajacán, Aug. 28, 1572, ibid., 110, 135.
35Oré, "Relation," ibid., 181.
annihilation of the Jesuits. In August 1572, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, founder of Spanish Florida, arrived in Ajacán with four ships and 150 soldiers. They skirmished with Indians near College Creek along the James River, killed some twenty of them, and captured another fourteen as hostages for the surrender of Don Luis. 37 Among these hostages was "a principal chief"--the uncle of Don Luis. 38 In mid-August, the Spanish recovered Alonso near Chesapeake Bay, but since the Indians refused to hand over Don Luis, the hostages were baptized and then hanged. The Spaniards departed on August 24. 39 "The Country remains very frightened from the chastisement the Governor inflicted," reported a Spanish eyewitness, "for previously they were free to kill any Spaniard who made no resistance. After seeing the opposite of what the Fathers were, they tremble. This chastisement has become famous throughout the land." 40

Menendez's harsh "chastisement" of the tidewater Algonquians followed years of drought, poor harvests, and despair. In addition, there is a high probability that the tribes were being, or would soon be, stricken with epidemic

37 Oré, "Relation," ibid., 183-184. Also see ibid., 62.


40 Rogel to Borgia, Aug. 28, 1572, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 111; also see, 108-109.
diseases contracted from the Spanish.\textsuperscript{41} The crises faced by the Algonquians were real enough, and just as the threat of Spain would intensify Elizabethan ethnocentrism and promote a united front of opposition, so too may have the New World conquistadores served as catalysts for tribal consolidation.\textsuperscript{42} Anthropologist Elman Service noted that "without foreign-political problems, overall tribal integration would not take place; it is always such problems that stimulate the formation of larger political bodies."\textsuperscript{43}

The key to tracing the evolution of the Powhatan polity, Tsenacommacah, is the relationship, personal and political, between Don Luis of the 1570s and Powhatan of the early 1600s. Unfortunately, very little is known about the Virginia Algonquian kinship system—a crucial ingredient for interpreting both general and specific information. The postcontact Powhatans, at least, observed virilocal marital residence (patrilocality)\textsuperscript{44} and may have practiced matrilateral cross-cousin marriage, as did some Algonquian

\textsuperscript{41}See p. 61, below.

\textsuperscript{42}Feest, "Powhatan," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 77, 79.

\textsuperscript{43}Elman R. Service, Primitive Social Organization: An Evolutionary Perspective, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed. (New York, 1971), 102-103.

To complicate descent-reckoning, Indian leaders practiced polygyny as befitted their rank and the needs of a well-developed, warrior-oriented society. Powhatan, himself, had over one hundred wives, including a dozen favorites, by whom he fathered at least thirty children, with never more than one child per wife. In addition, it is questionable whether the Powhatans observed matrilineal or patrilineal descent exclusively or whether both types functioned at different levels in society. Some offices descended patrilineally from father to son, while the "Crowne" of Powhatan's later domain descended "not to his sonnes nor children but first to his brethren, ... namely Opitchapan [Opitchapam], Opechancanough, and Catataugh [Kekataugh] and after their decease to his sisters." In this matrilineal arrangement, the supreme office within Tsenacommacah would "never [descend] to the heires of the males."
Given this confused and incomplete picture of kinship patterns, in which terms like "brother" and "sister" could refer to cross-cousins and in which "father" could refer to a maternal uncle, it is virtually impossible to judge with certainty Powhatan's blood relationship to Don Luis. However, tribal legends held that "Powhatan's father was driven by them [the Spanish] from the west-Indies into these parts" \(^{49}\) and that Opechancanough was "call'd Brother to Powhatan, but ... he was Prince of a Foreign Nation [and son of a ruling chief?], and came to them a great Way from the South-West." \(^{50}\) More recently, scholars from various disciplines have theorized that Don Luis was Powhatan's brother or father (or maternal uncle), that Opechancanough was Don Luis's son and thus only Powhatan's classificatory brother, or that Opechancanough was, in fact, Don Luis. \(^{51}\)

\(^{49}\)Raphe Hamor, *A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia... till... 1614* (London, 1615), 13.


\(^{51}\)Siebert, "Virginia Algonquian," in Crawford, ed., *Southeastern Indian Languages*, 287; Feest, "Powhatan," *Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen*, XIII (1966), 77; William R. Swagerty, *Comparative Patterns of European-Indian Relations in the Sixteenth Century* (Ph.D. diss. in progress, Univ. of California, Santa Barbara); conversations with Mr. Swagerty.
With or without kinship ties between Don Luis and Powhatan, it is quite likely that a marriage alliance between two families of local chieftains--a York/Pamunkey river "dynasty" (Don Luis's family?) and a James River "dynasty" (Powhatan's family?)--formed a strong, new polity in the 1560s or 1570s.52 The timing of such an alliance probably had much to do with: the prolonged absence of Don Luis; threats from the Spanish or Indian enemies; or a combination of factors. Evidence supporting such an alliance between chieftains of different territories is found in the dual, James and York river focus of the contact-era Powhatan domain. Powhatan was reported to have "inherited" the James River tribes of Powhatans, Appomattoocs, and Arrohattocs, plus the village of Orapaks, and the York/Pamunkey river tribes of Mattaponies, Pamunkeys, and Youghtanunds, plus the village/capital of Werowocomoco.53 Later, Powhatan maintained a treasury and a capital at Orapaks near his natal village, while the traditional capital, treasury, and holy burial place of kings were located in the territory of the Pamunkeys.54 (See Table II.1 and Map II.2).

52 For a more complete discussion of this hypothesis, see Feest, "Powhatan," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 77.


### TABLE II.1: HYPOTHETICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE ORIGINS OF TSENACOMMACAH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chieftain of James River Tribes</th>
<th>Chieftain of York River Tribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Powhatans</td>
<td>Pamunkeys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appomattocks</td>
<td>Mattaponies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrohattocs</td>
<td>Youghatanunds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village of Orapaks &lt;br&gt;(Capital)</td>
<td>Village of Werowocomoco &lt;br&gt;(Capital)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Marriage/Alliance? 

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NUCLEUS OF TSENACOMMACAH 

Inheritance 

WAHUNSONACOCK <br>(POWHATAN)
MAP II.2  CORE TRIBES OF POWHATAN's DOMAIN, circa 1607
Underlined Names Indicate
Six Original Tribes
Controlled by Powhatan
The six tribes that Powhatan "inherited" provided him with a strong nucleus of several thousand persons, the overwhelming majority of whom lived within a twenty-five mile radius of the falls near Powhatan village.\textsuperscript{55} Possessed "of a daring spirit, vigilant, [and] ambitious," Powhatan was anxious to "enlarge his dominions." Allegedly "cruel" and "quarrellous" in the pursuit of his goals, Powhatan, in some three decades, forced tribes along the James, Rappahannock, and Potomac rivers to submit to his sovereign authority. When the English arrived in 1607, Powhatan's domain was larger, in terms of territory, than "any of his Predicessors in former tymes."\textsuperscript{56} (See Table II.2.)

Powhatan's empire of Tsenacommacah ("densely inhabited land")\textsuperscript{57} probably had a population in the neighborhood of twelve thousand by 1607, out of an estimated population of twenty thousand Algonquians in all of tidewater Virginia.\textsuperscript{58} But even these upwardly-revised population

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{55}See Table II.2, below.
\item \textsuperscript{56}Strachey, \textit{Virginia Britania}, ed. Wright and Freund, 56-57.
\item \textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 37; Feest, "Powhatan," \textit{Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen}, XIII (1966), 70.
\item \textsuperscript{58}See Appendix A, below. Christian F. Feest, "Seventeenth Century Virginia Algonquian Population Estimates," \textit{Arch. Soc. of Va., Qtly. Bull.}, XXVIII (1973), 74, has suggested a population of between 14,000 and 22,000 for all the Virginia Algonquian tribes, but unfortunately figures are not always given for each tribe. Both Feest and Ubelaker, \textit{Reconstruction of Demographic Profiles From Ossuary Skeletal Samples}, 69, have argued for a warrior-to-total population ratio of 1:4, based on the observations of
\end{itemize}
TABLE II.2: TSENACOMMACAH, 1607-1612

Principal Tribes and Werowances and Estimated Populations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe</th>
<th>Estimated Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powhatan's &quot;Inheritance&quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamunkeys</td>
<td>Opechancanough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opitchapam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kekataugh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powhatans</td>
<td>Parahunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattaponies</td>
<td>Werowough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youghtanunds</td>
<td>Pomiscutuck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appomattos</td>
<td>Coquonasum &amp; Opuskeno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrohattos</td>
<td>Ashuaquid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Loyal Tribes</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paspaheghs</td>
<td>Wowinchopunk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiskiacks</td>
<td>Ottahotin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weanocs</td>
<td>Kaguothocum &amp; Ohorouquoh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kecoughtan (colony)</td>
<td>Pochins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piankatank (colony)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warraskoyacks</td>
<td>Tackonekintaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quiyoughcohannocks</td>
<td>Oholasc (regent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patowomekes</td>
<td>Matchqueon &amp; Japassus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Potomac River Tribes</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rappahannock River Tribes</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: capital guards, etc.</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

figures were probably only a fraction of the aboriginal Virginia population. A dramatic population decline in the last half of the sixteenth century, from which the Powhatans had not recovered by 1607, may be inferred from available evidence. In 1570, the Spanish Jesuits reported on "six years of famine and death" that had drastically reduced the tidewater tribes, and yet Father Rogel observed "more people than in any part I have seen on the known [Atlantic] coast." However, William Strachey, writing forty years later, noted that Virginia "hath not appeared so populous here to us, as elleswhere in the West-Indies" and attributed depopulation to the perennial warfare between the tribes.


It is impossible to know to what extent depopulation affected the tidewater Algonquians or if Powhatan's core tribes were affected to a greater or lesser degree than groups outside his control. Whatever the circumstances, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century Powhatan enlarged his domain and exerted his authority by forcing tribes to pay tribute or by outright conquest. Sometimes in the late 1590s, Powhatan's priests prophesied that "from the Chesapeake Bay a Nation should arise, which should dissolve and give end to his Empire." Reacting to this fearful oracle, Powhatan allegedly "destroyed and put to sword, all such who might lye under any doubtfull construction of the said prophesie." Among these were the Kecoughtans, a large tribe living near Old Point Comfort, considered "too powerful . . . to syde with the great Powhatan." However, when the death of the Kecoughtan chieftain provided an opportunity, Powhatan attacked the tribe, killed "most of them," and removed the survivors to live among his loyal tribes. Somewhat later, Powhatan attacked the Chesapeaks, a tribe living near modern Virginia Beach, and exterminated "all the Inhabitants."
A few years later, Powhatan continued his consolidation by assaulting the Piankatank tribe, also near Chesapeake Bay. Employing a tactic that later became all too familiar to the English, Powhatan's warriors lodged amicably among the Piankatanks before they "fell to the spoile." Twenty-four of the Piankatanks were allegedly slain and scalped, and the tribe's women, children, and chieftain were taken captive and presented to Powhatan to "doe him service." At his capital of Werowocomoco, Powhatan proudly displayed the Piankatank scalps and "made ostentation of ... [a] great ... triumph."64 To complete his plans, Powhatan later "colonized" the Piankatank village with the by then-assimilated survivors of the Kecoughtan conquest.65

Although the western, upstream portions of Tsenacommacah were well-consolidated, and selected areas bordering Chesapeake Bay had been conquered, a few strong tribes remained independent of Powhatan's control by the time the English arrived in 1607. One tribe, the Chickahominies, were cultural isolates and maintained their independence in the midst of Powhatan's core tribes.66

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64Smith, Map of Virginia, 37.
65Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 68.
66On the characteristics of such "ethnic enclaves," see Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism:
(See Map II.4.) According to anthropologist Lewis Binford, "the presence of this completely capsulated group suggests that the territory under the control of the Powhatan chieftain at the time of contact was only recently extended to its recorded bounds." Described as a "warlick and free" people, the Chickahominies probably maintained a population in excess of two thousand persons, and as late as 1614, it was claimed that they could muster five hundred warriors. The Chickahominies spoke a language different from Powhatan (Pamunkey) Algonquian and had a political system based upon priests and a council of elders (cawcawwassoughs)—factors that determined a variant culture. Perhaps one reason for the Chickahominies' success in maintaining their sovereignty and territorial integrity was their ambivalence toward Powhatan: they were strong enough to be his professed enemies, and yet Chickahominy


Hamor, True Discourse, C3r. See Appendix A, below.

warriors sometimes served him as mercenaries in exchange for copper.70

Another populous, independent tribe—the Nansamunds—lived along the Nansemond River thirteen miles from its confluence with the James River. This "proud warlike Nation" had a population of some eight hundred persons, which included two hundred "sturdy and bold" warriors.71 In 1612, they were ruled by Weyhohomo and three lesser chieftains, Annapetough, Weywingopo, and Tirchtough.72 As Binford noted, the "recognition of a 'great' as well as 'lesser' chiefs . . . [and] the frequent mention of 'kings' . . . [are] evidence of the existence of a chiefdom among the Nansemond quite similar to the internally ranked system of the Powhatan."73 Like the Chickahominies, the Nansamunds spoke a language that was virtually unintelligible to the Powhatans.74

On the Eastern Shore, the Accomacs and the Accohannocs displayed significant cultural differences and

70 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 68.
71 Smith, True Relation, D45; Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of . . . Coastal Virginia," 103; Appendix A, below.
72 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 66.
73 Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of . . . Coastal Virginia," 106; see also 102-105.
74 Siebert, "Virginia Algonquian," in Crawford, ed.
political independence from Powhatan's domain. With a population that totaled close to two thousand persons, these tribes were ruled by two brothers—the "laughing King" of Accomac (a "proper civill Salvage") and his "Lieutenant," Kiptopeke of Accohannoc.75 These leaders and their people—considered by the English the "most civill and tractable" of all the Algonquians—maintained consistently good relations with Jamestown and repulsed all attempts by the Powhatans to dominate them.76 Significantly, the Accomacs and Accohannocs did not conduct the important huskenaw rite, a fundamental religious ceremony of the Powhatan culture. The Eastern Shore tribes succeeded in their defiant, independent ways largely because the Powhatans lacked boats of sufficient size and quantity to launch an invasion across Chesapeake Bay.77

All of the independent tribes—the Chickahominies, Nansamunds, Accomacs, and Accohannocs—preserved their sovereignty because of capable leadership, large warrior populations, and viable economic systems. The last factor was especially noteworthy. According to the statements of

Southeastern Indian Languages, 446.


76Pory, "Observations," in Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 142-143, 147.

77Ibid., 143.
Englishmen, all of these tribes were capable horticulturalists and had flourishing subsistence economies. One Chickahominy village, Moysonicke, was described by Capt. John Smith as a densely populated town with "plaine fertile planted ground, in . . . great proportions."78 Likewise, Smith noted that the Nansamonds had "1000. Acres of most excellent fertill ground, so sweete, so pleasant, so beautifull, and so strong a prospect, for an invincible strong Citty, with so many commodities, that I know as yet I have not seene."79 Similarly, the Eastern Shore tribes were described as contented peoples blessed with the bounties of fish, fowl, and field.80

Although it is open to question whether Powhatan could have conquered the independent tribes of the tidewater area had the English not arrived, there is little doubt that the establishment of Jamestown disrupted intertribal relationships and upset a delicate precontact balance of power.

By 1607, Powhatan ruled the largest, most politically complex and culturally unified chiefdom in Virginia.81 Forged by conquest, based upon efficient

78 Smith, True Relation, B3r.
79 Ibid., D4v.
80 Pory, "Observations," in Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 142-143.
management and common defense, and maintained by the force of arms, tribute, religious ideology, and the fierce personality of a determined ruler, Powhatan's domain of Tsenacommacah was a sovereign and extensive political empire.

Although "emperor" and "empire" are Eurocentric terms first applied by Englishmen in the early seventeenth century, they accurately describe Powhatan and his impressive tidewater domain.\textsuperscript{82} John Smith talked about Powhatan's "monarchicall government, [where] one as Emperour ruleth over many kings or governours,"\textsuperscript{83} but what the earliest Englishmen observed, later commentators were slow to believe.\textsuperscript{84} Thomas Jefferson and hosts of more recent analysts interpreted Powhatan's domain as a confederacy of

\textsuperscript{82}The word "emperorship" was first used only in 1606. \textit{Oxford English Dictionary} (Oxford, 1933). The first modern scholar to accept the concept of Powhatan's "empire" was Samuel Rivers Hendren in his dissertation, "Government and Religion of the Virginia Indians," \textit{Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science}, 13th Ser., XI-XII, ed. Herbert B. Adams (Baltimore, 1895), 546-547, 561-562. Hendren noted that "the word 'empire' is preferable and indeed more accurate as characterizing Powhatan's power, though such a use of the term is certainly a travesty upon imperialism generally." \textit{Ibid.}, 16. Philip L. Barbour went further and called Powhatan the "Despot of Virginia" and his domain an "autocratically ruled despotate." \textit{The Three Worlds of Captain John Smith} (Boston, 1964), 140.

\textsuperscript{83}Smith, Map of Virginia, 34.

\textsuperscript{84}See the perceptive comments by Francis Jennings, \textit{The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1975), 114-115.
willing tribes.  

But a confederacy is a voluntary union by league or contract, and there was nothing voluntary about Powhatan's conquest empire, the modus operandi of which was allegiance based upon force and intimidation. In the words of one historian, "no such governmental institution as a 'confederacy' . . . existed among the Virginia tribes; for in every instance we find the principle of cohesion . . . to have been fear."  

Typologically, Powhatan's empire can be interpreted as a "centralized monarchy," a "traditional state," or a "chiefdom," according to the often ambiguous terminology


88 Georges Balandier, Political Anthropology (New York, 1970), 149-150; see also, 125-131.  

of political anthropologists.\textsuperscript{90} Powhatan's domain met all the criteria of a chiefdom: it was a densely populated, integrated kinship society; it had defined borders; it was governed by a centralized, hierarchical authority that dominated social relationships, religious beliefs, and military activities; and it functioned effectively because of a productive, redistributional economy.\textsuperscript{91} The Powhatans' socio-political organization was of the "Circum-Caribbean" type found at contact in South America, Meso-America, and in the southeastern United States (e.g., the Natchez culture).\textsuperscript{92} The most striking common characteristic of all these varied chiefdoms was the exercise of absolute power by a central authority.\textsuperscript{93}

Powhatan was called the "Mamanatowick" (great lord, supreme chieftain)\textsuperscript{94} by his people, and he headed an elaborate and authoritarian political organization. In

\textsuperscript{90}See Balandier, Political Anthropology, chaps. 1, 2, 6, passim on the problems of definitions and methodology. E.g., some scholars' criteria for a "traditional state" and a "chiefdom" are the same. See David G. Mandelbaum, "Social Groupings," in Harry L. Shapiro, ed., Man, Culture, and Society, rev. ed. (New York, 1971), 372 and passim.

\textsuperscript{91}See Service, Primitive Social Organization, 133-134, 145, 148, 159, 162-165.

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., 143. See W. H. Sears, "The State in Certain Areas and Periods of the Prehistoric Southeastern United States," Ethnohistory, IX (1962), 109-125.

\textsuperscript{93}Driver, Indians of North America, 302.

\textsuperscript{94}Strachey, Virginia Britannia, ed. Wright and Freund, 56.
Tsenacommacah, there were three classes of leaders: the
kinship elite, composed of Powhatan and both blood and
classificatory kin; werowances, subordinate chiefs or
governors in command of individual tribes and villages; and
a priesthood that combined secular power with religious
authority at both the local and superordinate levels of
organization.

Werowances were Powhatan's governors, the highest
secular administrators and war leaders at the local level.
Their relationship to the Mamanatowick can best be described
as feudalistic and personal. As English contemporaries
observed, Powhatan "devided his Country into many
provinces, or Shiers ... and over every one placed a
several absolute Commandeer, or Weroance to him contribu-
tory."95 Each werowance was "potent as a prince in his
owne territory ... [and] have their Subjectes at so quick
Comaund, as a beck bringses obedience, even to the
resticucion [sic] of stolne goodes."96 Powhatan depended
upon his werowances to muster and lead war and hunting
parties; to maintain discipline by exercising the powers
of life or death over individual tribes and villages; and
to collect from each village and to pay to him a tribute
amounting to eighty per cent of all agricultural products,

95Ibid., 63.

96[Anon.], "Description of the People" (1607), in
the bounty of the hunt, and other commodities.  

The werowances constituted a ruling aristocracy that was founded upon inheritance through the male line, although Powhatan had the ultimate authority of appointment over his subordinates. For example, sometime before 1612 Powhatan arbitrarily installed Oholasc as werowansqua (a female werowance) over the Quiyoughcohannock tribe as a replacement for the werowance Pipsco, who was "by birth and possession descended the true and lawfull Weroance of the same." Pipsco, it seems, had committed a terrible offence that led to his dispossession; he had "stollen away" a "Chief woman" (probably a concubine) of Opechancanough.

Powhatan's kin, his most loyal followers, were installed as werowances in highly sensitive areas of Tsenacommacah. His "brethren"--the triumvirate of Opitchapam, Opechancanough, and Kekataugh--ruled over the strong Pamunkey tribe from the clustered villages of Menapucunt, Uttamussak, and Kupkipcock. These three


100Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 69; Barbour, John Smith, 162-163.
villages, situated at the confluence of the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers near modern West Point, formed a strategic and important wedge in the center of Powhatan's empire. Two of Powhatan's grown sons--Parahunt, "Tanx (little) Powhatan," and Pochins--were werowances at the villages of Powhatan and conquered Kecoughtan, respectively. These sites represented the western line of defense and the eastern gateway of the James River portion of Powhatan's domain. At Quiyoughcohannock, on the south bank of the James River opposite the mouth of the Chickahominy River, the werowansqua Oholasc was regent for the infant son of Powhatan, Tatahcoope.101

The Mamanatowick had the power of life and death over his werowances, and both he and his subordinates levied the death penalty upon individual tribesmen. Murder, accessory to murder, robbery, theft, and adultery were the most common capital crimes, and the manner of execution was designed to bring greatest agony to those accused of the most serious offences.102 Formal executions were evidence.


102 Spelman, "Relation," in Arber and Bradley, eds., *Works of Smith*, I, cxi. Tribal enemies or notorious malefactors had their skin scraped off and their joints severed before being burned alive; common murderers had all their bones broken before being burned alive; and lesser offenders were knocked unconscious before being thrown into a fire. *Ibid.*, cxi; Smith, *Map of Virginia*, 36-37. For examples of swift and summary justice, see Spelman, "Relation," in Arber and Bradley, eds., *Works of Smith*, I, cxi; [Capt. Gabriel Archer], "A relatyon of the the Discovery of our River, from James Porte into the
of a high degree of political and social sophistication among the Powhatans. Smith noted that "I thought that Infidels wear lawless yet . . . I saw sum put to death," and Smith observed "that their Magistrates for good commanding, and their people for du subjection, and obeying, excell many places that would be counted very civill."

Smith described the "great feare and adoration" with which Powhatan's tribesmen obeyed him. "For at his feet they present whatsoever hee commandeth, and at the least frowne of his browe, . . . [they] tremble with feare: and no marvell, for he is very terrible and tyrannous in punishing such as offend him." Powhatan generally ruled according to tribal customs, "yet when he listeth his will is a law and must bee obeyed," noted Smith.

In asserting his will over werowances, tribes, and tribesmen, Powhatan relied upon the Pamunkeys, the most loyal and disciplined tribe within his domain.

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105Smith, Map of Virginia, 34.

106Ibid., 36.

107Smith commented upon discipline in 1607: "[The Indian] custome is to take anything they can ceaze off, onely the people of Pamaunke, wee have not found stealing." True Relation, D4.
TABLE II.3: TSENACOMMACAH--INTERNAL UNITY AT CONTACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of strength and allegiance</th>
<th>Areas of least control</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pamunkey-Mattaponi-York-James river basins</td>
<td>James River (central)</td>
<td>Rappahannock and Potomac River Tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powhatans</td>
<td>York River (downstream)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pamunkeys</td>
<td>Quiyoughcohannocks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mattaponies</td>
<td>Warraskoyacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrohattocs</td>
<td>Paspaheghs</td>
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<td>Youghtanundts</td>
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<td>Appomattoocs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weanocs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Opechancanough (Opuh-cañ-can-ō), although second to Opitchapam in line of succession to the title of Mamanatowick, was nevertheless the dominant leader of the Pamunkeys. The tribe's territory, "a Rych land of Copper and pearle,"108 was called "Opechancheno,"109 and there can be little doubt of who was in control. Opechancanough was one of the wealthiest men in Tsenacommacah, for the pearls prized by the Powhatans came from freshwater mussels found primarily along the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers.110 But his greatest source of power undoubtedly lay in his capacity to mobilize an estimated one thousand warriors within two days.111 After the arrival of the English, Opechancanough's aggressive and belligerent behavior revealed a commander of great power and confidence. Although there is no reason to doubt his precontact service to Powhatan, later events demonstrated his consistent attempts to wrest control from an aging Powhatan and his older brother, Opitchapam.112

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110Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 164 n. 21. The Chesapeake Bay oyster does not produce pearls of value, but the freshwater Naiades mussel does.


112See Chap. IV, below.
Coercive command and wealth were the twin pillars of the Powhatan socio-political organization, as Opechancanough so well illustrated.\textsuperscript{113} The Powhatans had an economy based upon tribute and redistribution of goods, and the Mamanatowick and his werowances controlled the supply and circulation of valuable commodities. Rewards to favorites ensured loyalty, and loyalty produced enthusiastic warriors. War brought more booty (especially women) to be distributed as favors and gifts. Thus control over both war and wealth guaranteed the status of werowances and made possible the allegiance of their tribesmen.\textsuperscript{114} The word "werowance," in fact, meant "he who is rich."\textsuperscript{115}

In a hierarchical society based on status, wealth, and power, high office had to be constantly affirmed by grand display. The first Englishmen in Virginia were rather astonished to find all the embellishments and trappings of monarchy and aristocracy among the Powhatans. On two separate occasions, Smith described the \textit{majestas spectabilis} and \textit{grandeur emperiere} of Powhatan. At his

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113}See Feest, "Powhatan," \textit{Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen}, XIII (1966), 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{114}Ibid., 78.
\end{itemize}
capital of Werowocomoco, the Mamanatowick held court while proudly lying upon a Bedstead a foote high upon tenne or twelve Mattes, richly hung with manie Chaynes of great Pearles about his necke, and covered with a great Covering of Rahaughcums [raccoon skins]: At his head sat a woman, at his feete another, on each side . . . were raunged his cheife men on each side the fire, tenne in a ranke, and behinde them as many yong women, each a great Chaine of white Beades over their shoulders: their heads painted in redde and with such a grave and Majesticall countenance, as drave me into admiration to see such state in a naked Salvage. . . .

Smith, the world traveler, said he had not beheld "such a Majesie . . . either in Pagan or Christian," and in a second meeting with the emperor, he marveled at Powhatan's fifty-man corps du guard composed of the tallest warriors; his sixty-yard long treasure house containing furs, copper, pearls, roanoke (shell beads), puccone (a valuable red pigment), and weapons; and Powhatan's many comely concubines who waited upon him constantly.

William Strachey also noted how the "ostentacion of such Majestie as he [Powhatan] expresseth . . . strykes awe and sufficient wonder into our people." Even this English-man who had been at the sultan's court in Constantinople was "perswaded [that] there [was] . . . an infused kynd of divingness" and a princely demeanor surrounding Powhatan that rivaled European monarchs.

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116 Smith, True Relation, Clv.
117 Smith, Map of Virginia, 35. Also see, True Relation, C4v.
118 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 60.
After Powhatan's official coronation by the English in 1608, he became even more status conscious. In 1609-1610, Powhatan visited the Patawomekes and ceremoniously placed the English crown upon his head before throwing beads to the assembled tribesmen. 119

In imitation of Powhatan, werowances demonstrated their status and authority by means of special attire and ceremony. Copper chains, called tapantaminais, 120 copper headpieces, pearl necklaces, and headdresses of dyed deer fur were the most common symbols of office for werowances, and individual leaders competed with each other in ostentatious display. 121 The werowance of the Weanocs "had a Chaine of pearle about his neck thrice Double," worth an estimated £300-400, and lived in a "pallace" of riches. 122 The werowansqua of the Appomattoocs carried herself majestically in a "fashion of state" and had an "usher" conduct her to her seat, which, by the way, was well separated from the "commoners." Her attire confirmed her office: she wore a copper necklace and a "Crownet of Copper" upon her head. 123

121 [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 84, 85, 92-93; [anon.], "Description of the People," ibid., 103.
122 [Archer], "Relatyon," ibid., 93.
123 Ibid., 92.
Pipsco, before being deposed as werowance of Quiyoughcohannock, was vividly described by George Percy:

The Werowance [came] ... playing on a Flute made of a Reed, with a Crown of Deares hair coloured red, in fashion of a Rose fastened about his knot of hair, and a great Plate of Copper on the other side of his head, with two long Feathers in fashion of a pair of Hornes placed in the midst of his Crowne. His body was painted all with Crimson, with a Chaine of Beads about his necke, his face painted blew, ... his eares all behung with Braslets of Pearle, and in either eare a Birds Claw through it beset with fine Copper or Gold, [and] he entertained us in so modest a proud fashion, as though he had beene a Prince of civil government, holding his countenance without laughter or any such ill behaviour.¹²⁴

Pipsco's wife was described as "debonayre, quaynt, and well pleased, as ... a daughter of the house of Austria behoung with all her Jewells." She was possessed of "a kynd of pride" and "so much presentment of Civility" that she required "servants" to lift her out of canoes and to satisfy her every whim.¹²⁵

As important as the aristocracy of werowances was to the secular functioning of Tsenacommacah, the Powhatan priests, in their roles as holy men, prophets, advisers, conjurers, and healers, were actually the most crucial buttresses of the Powhatan culture. The priest was the "bridge builder" linking the spiritual and temporal realms. Like priests in other cultures, Powhatan holy men controlled the "channels by which divine blessings are conferred on the community," sharing themselves "in the

¹²⁴Percy, "Discourse," ibid., 137.
power and prestige of the gods." Significantly, Powhatan priests themselves were considered Quioughcosoughs (minor deities), and their status was enhanced by their intimate association with the rituals and beliefs of Okee, the most important god in the Powhatan polytheistic pantheon.

According to tribal ideology, Okee gave the sedentary, maize-growing Powhatans their skills in agriculture and, by doing so, determined their cultural development. This deity also directed affairs in less constructive ways. Okee was primarily regarded as a ruthless god—an evil force of misery and destructiveness. The Powhatans were Manicheans,

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The Powhatans worshipped the sun, the sky, and other forces of nature, but some have theorized that the sun was their major deity or that Okee in fact represented the sun. See Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., *Jamestown Voyages*, I, 143; Feest, "Powhatan," *Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen*, XIII (1966), 72; David Beers Quinn, ed., *The Roanoke Voyages, 1584-1590*, 2 vols., Hakluyt Society, CIII-CIV (London, 1955), II, 888.


129 Strachey, *Virginia Britania*, ed. Wright and
believing in Ahone, "the good and peaceable god"--a creator--and in Okee--the vengeful destroyer god. Since Ahone never harmed anyone and dispensed blessings whether he was worshipped or not, the Powhatans saw no necessity to appease him.\textsuperscript{130} The worship of Okee, however, was considered essential, for according to a "severe Scale of Justice," Okee "punisheth them with sicknesses, beates them, and strikes their ripe Corne with blastings, stormes, and thunderclappes, stirres up warre and makes their women falce to them."\textsuperscript{131}

Okee, the embodiment of power, punishment, terror, and death, was thus worshipped "more of feare than love."\textsuperscript{132} Such a ritualized, internalized ideology of fear was quite supportive of the authoritarianism of Powhatan's domain. Émile Durkheim argued that the god worshipped in a culture is a good representation and personification of societal values,\textsuperscript{133} and numerous other writers have demonstrated the ways in which belief systems and priesthods promoted social integration and upheld chieftainship.\textsuperscript{134}

Freund, 89.

\textsuperscript{130}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{131}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{132}Smith, \textit{Map of Virginia}, 29.
\textsuperscript{133}\textit{In Formes Elémentaires de la Vie Religieuse (1912), as discussed in Lucy Mair, An Introduction to Social Anthropology, 2d ed. (New York, 1972), 27.}
\textsuperscript{134}George Henry Lane-Fox Pitt-Rivers, \textit{The Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races} (London, 1927), 197, 201,
James I and his bishops, the priesthood of Okee formed a unit with Powhatan.

The rituals and beliefs associated with Okee may have had a symbolic affinity with the Southeastern Ceremonial Complex as represented by the so-called Southern Death Cult, mentioned above. Linked with Meso-American and Mississippian cultural traits, the Southern Death Cult grew out of a sense of fear, chaos, and despair in the Indian societies contacted by the Spanish in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Feathered vestments, eagle feathers, bird symbols, bird claws, flying serpents, weeping eyes, and various representations of snakes were among the symbolic motifs associated with this cult, some of which were found in tidewater Virginia.\(^{135}\)

Birds and feathers had special significance. In the southeast, birds represented, by their flight, the "upper world" (order), while snakes symbolized the realm of the "under world" (disorder).\(^{136}\)

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\(^{135}\) Martin, Quimby, and Collier, Indians before Columbus, 363-366.

\(^{136}\) Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 127-129, 163. The Spanish Jesuits noted that the "devil" often appeared to the tidewater tribesmen "in the shape of a bird."
1590 edition of Thomas Harriot's *Brief and true report of the new found land of Virginia* portrayed a Secotan conjurer with a small black bird fastened behind one ear (a badge of office), and the Secotan priests were known to be pre-occupied with hunting ducks, swans, and other fowl.\(^\text{137}\) In Virginia, the Powhatan chief priest wore a dozen stuffed snake skins tied together at the tails and draped over his head. Encircling the snake skins was a crown of feathers.\(^\text{138}\) The Powhatans also worshipped the *pawcorance*, a sacred bird of twilight that was believed to contain the soul of a legendary tribal "prince."\(^\text{139}\) In addition, part of the Powhatans' mortuary ritual for werowances included decorating the corpse with feathers.\(^\text{140}\)

The care taken in the burial ritual of werowances was indicative of the close relationship that Powhatan and the aristocracy maintained with Okee in death as well as in


\(^\text{137A2v-B3v.}\) The same attire was also found in Virginia. Beverley, *History of Virginia*, ed. Wright, 212.

\(^\text{138Smith, Map of Virginia, 30-31.}\) See also, Charles Edgar Gilliam, "The Quyoughcohannock," Pt. I, Arch. Soc. of Va., Qtly. Bull., VIII (1953), unpaged. Gilliam theorized that Okee/Kiwasa was intimately related to bird symbolism. Also see Chap. IV, below.

\(^\text{139Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 127, 214.}\)

\(^\text{140Smith, Map of Virginia, 33.}\)
life. Powhatan, himself, was the titular, if not the actual, head of the Okee cult, and his name was derived from the Algonquian word, powwaw, meaning "priest." In death, the bones of the emperor would be preserved, joining those of his ancestors in the temple (quioccsan) of kings at the village of Uttamussak. Here, a black and pearl-studded wooden idol of Okee in human form watched over the physical remains and the burial treasure of past leaders. Ethnologists Maurice Mook and Frank Speck noted that the special treatment of the emperor's remains and their preservation in a charnel house were cultural traits directly related to southeastern practices.

Seven priests maintained a constant watch at the Uttamussak shrine and kept the sacred fire burning. The sepulchre of kings was considered so holy and forbidding that only werowances and priests were allowed to enter it.


144 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 94-95.

145 Apparently on at least two occasions, Englishmen, namely Harriot and Beverley, violated the sanctity of the temple to describe the contents therein. See Quinn, ed., Roanoke Voyages, I, 424-427; Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 195-196.
Whenever common tribesmen passed by, they made offerings of copper or beads to ward off evil. Only werowances and priests were accorded ritualized burials; other Powhatans were merely deposited in the earth. Likewise, only the aristocracy could experience life after death, and they went to a sensual heaven in the western sunset before being reincarnated in human form. Thus, authority and status were concepts enshrined (literally) by the Powhatans, and the wealth of life was housed in temples alongside the bones of dead leaders.

In addition to their duties associated with burials, Powhatan priests officiated at the Okee-related and culturally significant huskenaw ceremony. Unique to the Powhatans, the huskenaw was a puberty ritual in which adolescent males from aristocratic families were indoctrinated and selected for the priesthood. The initiates were beaten, drugged, deprived of food, and kept segregated

146Smith, Map of Virginia, 30.
147Ibid., 33-34; Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 95, 100.
148Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 100.
149On the importance of symbolically linking the eminent living and the eminent dead, see Balandier, Political Anthropology, 118.
for up to nine months. Poisonous roots served as hallucinogens in making the boys temporarily "stark staring Mad," a process by which they were made to forget past experiences and to realize a spiritual rebirth and a new level of consciousness. Although some of the initiates doubtless did not survive this ordeal, the huskenaw was not, as the English believed, a ceremony of child sacrifice to Okee. However, since the ritual was dedicated to that deity, dire consequences would result if the huskenaw were neglected. "This sacrifice," wrote Smith, "they held to bee so necessarie, that if they should omit it, their Oke . . . would let them have no Deare, Turkies, Corne, nor fish, and . . . would make a great slaughter amongst them." As interpreters of Okee's will, Powhatan priests assumed significant roles as conjurers and prophets. They appeased Okee by offering blood, deer suet, and tobacco

151 Smith, Map of Virginia, 33.

152 Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 207-208; Feest, "Powhatan," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 73. On the value of suffering and hallucinations for experiencing rebirth and achieving new insights, see Paul Radin, Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin (New York, 1937), 106-113 and chap. 6, passim. A wighcasan ("bitter") root was used by the Powhatans as a purgative in spring regenerative rites and at other times as cure for various ailments. Smith, Map of Virginia, 13, 28. See also Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 226-228.

153 Smith, Map of Virginia, 33; Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 98.

154 See Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 98-100; Smith, True Relation, C3r. On conjury in general, see Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 351-365.
as sacrifices. When rivers became choppy, conjurers cast tobacco or copper over the water in an attempt to pacify angry spirits. Native tobacco (Nicotiana rustica) was considered to have sacred properties and was consistently used in religious rites, even though the Powhatans preferred to smoke the milder English variety (Nicotiana tabacum).

The prophecies of the Powhatan holy men often directly influenced political decisions. When priests foretold that a "Nation" would arise in the area of Chesapeake Bay to overthrow Tsenacommacah, Powhatan began a campaign of conquest. On other occasions priests were catalysts to werowances, telling them "how much their Okeus wilbe offended with them... yf they permitt a Nation despising the aunckyent Religion of their forfathers to inhabite among them, synce their own godes have hitherto preserved them, and given them victory over their enemies from age to age."

Traditionally, priests not only aroused support for

155Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 98.


157Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 104-106. For a similar prophecy among the North Carolina Algonquians, see Harriot, Briefe and true report, orig. quarto ed. (London, 1588), F2f.

158Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 90.
defense or war--they decided when and against whom war should be waged. Although the Mamanatowick, his werowances, and trusted advisers met in a council of war, the priests made the final decision.\textsuperscript{159} The use of "supernatural sanctions" to justify aggression was a significant indicator of a high degree of ethnocentrism among the Powhatans.\textsuperscript{160} But the priests' involvement did not stop with the declaration of war. For when Powhatan warriors finally went into battle, priests were in the vanguard, carrying an idol of Okee before the tribesmen. In one particularly bloody battle with the English in 1607, the priests actually stopped the fighting and sued for peace in order to recover their idol, which had been dropped during the melee.\textsuperscript{161}

For the English or any alien intruders interpreted as dangerous in Powhatan prophecies, the priests were real and powerful forces to be reckoned with.\textsuperscript{162} Feared and respected in life and among a small elite accorded special privileges after death, the Powhatan priests were rightly recognized by their enemies as having an enormous impact upon the cultural stability and the political viability of Tsenacommacah. As Strachey noted, "their Priests . . . doe at all tymes . . . absolute governe and direct the

\textsuperscript{159}Ibid., 104.

\textsuperscript{160}LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 134.

\textsuperscript{161}Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 45.

\textsuperscript{162}See Chap. IV, below.
Weroances . . . in all their actions."163 Not even Powhatan would have dared ignore the will of Okee or the warnings of priests.

Indeed, priests and their Okee-related rituals and prophecies exerted such an influence over affairs in Tsenacommacah that Powhatan's domain may be interpreted as a theocracy. Among all the Powhatans, leaders and followers alike, "the service of their God . . . [was] answerable to their life," and there can be little doubt that tribal religion was the most pervasive and enduring element of the tidewater culture.164 According to Nancy O. Lurie, "one of the most striking retentions of native patterns was the cultural aspect of religion."165 Even into the eighteenth century, the principal components of the Powhatan belief system were little changed from the early contact era. In 1689, the Rev. John Clayton wrote that the Powhatans "dare not own, nor worship our God, for fear their own God should destroy them."166 Likewise, Robert Beverley in 1705 observed that the Indians still conducted the huskenaw

163Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 89.


ceremony, and he quoted a Powhatan informant who told him that "the Priests--they make the people believe."167

Priests and werowances were the important cement of Powhatan's empire. They ensured conformity and obedience on the local level and acted as communication links between the Mamanatowick's capital and individual villages and tribes. Priests and werowances were restricted elites who ensured Tsenaccommacah's political viability and cultural vitality.168 They alone wielded authority under Powhatan, and as individual strong men, their power was not diffused by bureaucratic institutions like a "Great" or "Grand Council." Despite the superficial conclusions of many historians and anthropologists, the Powhatans had no de jure council of the empire in the early contact period. Smith and Strachey wrote only of de facto counsellors (cronockoes; cawcawwassoughs; caucorouses)--werowances and priests--but never of a constituted great council.169 It was only in 1705 that Beverley interpreted cawcawwassough and cockarouse to mean an official member of the "[Powhatan] King or Queens Council," but Tsenacommacah was extinct by

167Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 201, 205-208.


169Smith, True Relation, C3v, C4v; Smith, Map of Virginia, 5, 25; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 38; Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 58, 67, 69.
that date. Nevertheless, scholars continue to speak of a great council, without sound basis. The political organization of Powhatan's empire, sans council, is represented by Chart II.4.

The Powhatan chiefdom survived and flourished by adapting to or reordering the natural environment (the ecosystem) and by controlling the superorganic environment (competitive, proximate societies and cultures). In terms of the natural habitat of tidewater Virginia, the Powhatans developed a productive and diversified economy based upon an adaptive use of their particular ecosystem. A combination of agriculture, hunting, fishing, and foraging permitted a varied and rather stable diet for a large and dispersed population. The Powhatans were a sedentary people who "commuted" to hunting grounds for only short periods in specific seasons. They lived in villages

170 Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 226; also see 149.

171 E.g., Binford inferred from scanty evidence that "the paramount's council was composed of lineage heads and district chiefs." "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of . . . Coastal Virginia," 92

172 For a general discussion of these terms, see Service, Primitive Social Organization, 102-103.

173 Roy A. Rappaport defined an ecosystem "as the total of living organisms and non-living substances bound together in material exchanges within some demarcated portion of the biosphere." "Nature, Culture, and Ecological Anthropology," in Shapiro, ed., Man, Culture, and Society, 238; also see 249 and passim.

174 See Jennings, Invasion of America, 67-71.
TABLE II.4: POLITICAL ORGANIZATION OF TSENACOMMACAH AT CONTACT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
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<td>Defense, War, Trade, Diplomacy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warriors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cult of Kings</td>
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<td>Punishment, Religious Rituals</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Partial Redistribution of Tribute</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Appointment to Office</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Tribal Level**
- Werowances

**Superordinate Level**
- The Mamanatowick

**Priests; Conjurers**

**Tribesmen**

**Feedback**

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composed of multi-family, loaf-shaped bark lodges situated along the major tidal rivers. Their inhabited sites varied greatly according to size and function, but they can generally be classified either as hamlets (containing from two to ten lodges), or as nucleated villages (containing from twelve to forty lodges, plus ceremonial and supporting structures). There was one example of a "consolidated village-hamlet complex"—the three clustered Pamunkey towns of Menapucunt, Kupkipcock, and Uttamussak located at the confluence of the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers. The largest single village site at contact, although probably not Powhatan in origin, was at Kecoughtan near Old Point Comfort. Here, at one time, a thousand people were supported by two or three thousand cleared acres.

The Powhatan agricultural staple was maize (*Zea mays*). Planted in April, May, and June, maize was classified as "early corn" and "late corn." The early corn produced small ears and was harvested green after some ten to twelve


weeks, while late corn grew larger and took some fourteen weeks to ripen. The stalks of the late corn yielded one to three ears, each of which contained between two and five hundred kernels, according to English observers.

The Powhatans practiced multiple cropping (planting more than one crop per season in the same field) and intercropping (mixing two or more vegetables in the same field) in an attempt to obtain maximum yield from a minimum of acreage. The famous Amerindian "Sacred Triad" of maize, beans, and squash were grown together in the same fields and made Powhatan agriculture very productive. Historical geographer Carl O. Sauer estimated that a single mixed acre of corn, beans, and squash, with the addition of sunflowers (which the Powhatans also grew), would sustain a person for a year.

Maize and beans complemented each other both as crops and as food. Like maize, beans (Phaseolus vulgaris) and squash (Cucurbita pepo) thrive in a moist, warm, and acidic soil. Where corn removes nitrogen from the soil,

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179 See Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 293 and passim.

180 Smith, Map of Virginia, 16.


183 Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 293.
beans replace it. In addition, climbing beans, when planted in the same hillocks with corn, will conveniently grow right up the stalks. Englishmen commented that the Powhatan corn/bean fields resembled a hopyard, with vines growing up the pole-like stalks.\(^{184}\) As food, corn supplies protein but lacks lysine, an important amino acid. Beans, however, are rich in lysine.\(^{185}\) Thus, one of the Powhatans' favorite dishes—pausarowmena (succotash: corn and beans boiled together)—was an excellent dietary staple.\(^{186}\)

In setting their crops, the Powhatan men girdled trees, removed the bark to hasten their death, and set fire to the roots and surrounding ground cover. Only the largest trees were left standing.\(^{187}\) Large areas of

\(^{184}\)Spelman, "Relation," in Arber and Bradley, eds., Works of Smith, I, cxii; Smith, Map of Virginia, 16.

\(^{185}\)Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 294.

\(^{186}\)Smith, Map of Virginia, 17.

tidewater Virginia were put to the torch, removing trees and undergrowth, with the result that dense forests were the exception and not the rule in the early contact era.\textsuperscript{188}

In between the surviving trees, women would dig holes with a stick and place four kernels of corn and two beans in each hole, which were some four feet apart. Women and children continued to tend the fields throughout the summer months. After a few weeks of growth, hills of soil were fashioned around the corn stalks to prevent their destruction by high winds; to avoid soil erosion and loss of fertility; and to keep the corn well-watered and well-drained.\textsuperscript{189}

Late corn was harvested in September and October—the Taquitock season. From September until November, the Powhatans celebrated their "chief Feasts and sacrifice"—a joyous time of abundant fruits, corn, fish, fowl, and "wilde beasts exceeding fat."\textsuperscript{190} The harvest festival was a time of "jolly divotion." The Powhatans built a large bonfire in the fields, and for four or five hours

\textsuperscript{188}Smith, True Relation, Elv; 54-55; Hu Maxwell, "The Use and Abuse of Forests by the Virginia Indians," WMQ, 1st Ser., XIX (1910), 73-103. Maxwell's biased article noted that, at contact, "the tribes were burning everything that would burn, and . . . if the discovery of American had been postponed five hundred years, Virginia would have been pasture land or desert." Ibid., 103.

\textsuperscript{189}Smith, Map of Virginia, 16; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 297-298.

\textsuperscript{190}Smith, Map of Virginia, 16.
at a time, tribesmen would sing, shout, and dance around "like so many Fayries," according to Strachey. On this occasion," wrote Beverley, "they have their greatest variety of Pastimes, and more especially of their War-Dances, and Heroick Songs; in which they boast, that . . . [they] have nothing to do, but to go to War, Travel, and to seek out for New Adventures." The Powhatan harvest festival--"the greatest Annual Feast they have"--was akin to the Green Corn Ceremony, a significant seasonal event among all southeastern tribes. It represented a new year and a fresh beginning. In its social and cultural impact, noted one anthropologist, the Green Corn Ceremony encompassed, but exceeded, elements of our Thanksgiving Day, New Year's festivities, Yom Kippur, Lent, and Mardi Gras.

The Powhatans enjoyed their bounty of harvested corn in a variety of ways. They sucked the sweet juices from the green corn stalks, roasted corn on the cob, used kernels in soups and stews, prepared cracked corn or hominy, and made bread or cakes (apone: "corn pone") from corn meal. Like tribes farther south, the Powhatans

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193 Ibid.
195 Smith, *Map of Virginia*, 16-17; Hudson,
prepared hominy with wood-ash lye, which imparted lysine and niacin to the maize.\textsuperscript{196}

The Powhatans would gorge themselves in these flush times, eating whenever they liked and as much as they pleased until supplies ran out.\textsuperscript{197} But their prodigality was not generally indicative of what anthropologist Marshall Sahlins referred to as "pristine affluence"\textsuperscript{198}—a confidence in an abundant supply of nature's products. Rather, the Powhatans' gluttony reflected the largely seasonal nature of agricultural bounty.

"For neere 3 parts of the yeare," observed John Smith, "they . . . live of what the Country naturally affordeth from hand to mouth." Smith also noted how "their bodies alter with their diet," going from "fat" to "lean" and from "strong" to "weak."\textsuperscript{199} Smith's description of the physical changes in the Powhatans' bodies makes his account seem more authentic, and less ethnocentric.

In fact, the harvested maize did not begin to satisfy the subsistence requirements of the general population, and for much of the year, there was precious little

\begin{footnotes}
\item[197][Anon.], "Description of the People," in Barbour, ed., \textit{Jamestown Voyages}, I, 103.
\item[199]Smith, \textit{Map of Virginia}, 18, 22.
\end{footnotes}
corn for the average tribesman. The scarcity of corn is revealed by the value placed upon it by the Powhatans. Maize was considered as valuable as copper, hatchets, beads, and pearls, and individual Powhatans took great pains to bury small caches in the forest. But how can the apparent productivity of the Powhatans' agriculture be reconciled with Smith's assessment of extreme want?

Although agriculture probably accounted for no more than fifty per cent of the Powhatans' subsistence requirements even under the most favorable conditions, the dietary shortfall was less a matter of productivity than of accessibility and distribution of resources. Elitism and inequality pervaded the economic system, and a favored few enjoyed a surplus while the vast majority went without.

Enforced deprivation made food the Powhatans' "chiefest riches"— riches fit for a king and riches demanded and received by the Mamanatowick. The single


202 Smith, *Map of Virginia*, 28. Powhatan, according to Smith, valued "a basket of corne more pretious then a basket of copper, saying he could eate his corne, but not his copper." [Symonds, ed.], *Proceedings*, 59.
most significant factor accounting for shortages in available food was Powhatan's enormous tribute totaling eighty per cent of every harvest. Werowances were held accountable for the collection of tribute from every village, and there were also special days set aside for the sowing and harvesting of the "Kings corne." When Powhatan visited villages, he was always presented with gifts of copper and food, "to shew much reverence."

Although Edmund S. Morgan recently dismissed claims about Powhatan's exorbitant tribute, the emperor's monopoly on food was a significant fact of life among the tidewater tribes. One tribesman named Amarice "had his braynes knock't out for selling but a baskett of Corne ... without Powhatans leave," and the Mamanatowick and his kin often had abundant supplies of corn, which they traded to the English even in times of general seasonal shortages. In late winter 1607/08, between four and six hundred bushels of corn were personally traded to the English by Powhatan and Opechancanough; another three hundred bushels and three to four hogsheads changed hands at Werowocomoco in late autumn 1608; and an additional three hundred

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bushels were traded in January 1608/09. Clearly, certain high-placed individuals had access to victuals during some of the worst seasons of the year, and they did not need to ask anyone's permission to trade them away.

Powhatan and his werowances controlled the distribution of commodities through the tribute system; centralized the storage of harvest products; made agriculture a socio-communal, not an individual, concern; and, by so doing, may have actually encouraged as great a productivity as there was. Above all, the Powhatan economy was one in which the Mamanatowick had a "right to things realized through a hold on persons."

But built into the Powhatan economy was a redistributitional element. The status of Powhatan and his werowances demanded that they reciprocate, reimburse, and reward through gifts and services. Examples of this redistribution of commodities may be seen in the elaborate feasts given and in the gifts dispensed on special occasions.

207 [Symonds, ed.], Proceedings, 20, 51, 76. It must be emphasized that these particular transactions were voluntary and that Powhatan and Opechancanough asked exorbitant prices.


209 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 93; also see, 130-140.

210 See Smith, True Relation, D1v, D2r; [Symonds,
Generally, tribes that were independent of Powhatan may have had more equitable economies, since they seem to have exercised greater restraint in trading away their food reserves. In 1608, the Chickahominies, even though they had just harvested their corn crop, refused to trade with the English and finally relinquished two hundred bushels only under duress.\textsuperscript{211} The independent Nansamunds reportedly had over one thousand bushels of stored corn in May 1609 (before the new planting!), which the English had to take by force.\textsuperscript{212} The Eastern Shore tribes, too, had abundant supplies of corn in almost all seasons. The Accomacs, wrote John Pory in 1624, "are the best husbands of any Salvages we know: for they provide Corne to serve them all the yeare, yet spare; and the other [i.e., the Powhatans] not for halfe the yeare, yet want."\textsuperscript{213}

Although the individual Powhatan's supply of harvest corn was quickly exhausted, the communal pursuits of hunting and fishing supplemented agriculture. During the Popanow season, primarily in January and February, the Powhatans left their villages and divided themselves into

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{211} Symonds, comp., Proceedings, 13. The Powhatans would often feast the English (gift-giving) but then refuse to trade their food (barter). [Symmonds, comp.], Proceedings, 58-59.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid., 96.

\textsuperscript{213} Pory, "Observations," in Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 143.
\end{flushright}
bands to begin the all-important deer hunts. Women accompanied their husbands and had the task of constructing temporary lodges after each day's trek. As many as three hundred Powhatan warriors would surround deer herds and drive them into a constricted space by setting fire to forest cover. When the deer had little maneuverability left, the men would kill the animals with arrows, "taking their skinnes which is the greatest thinge they desier, and sume flesh for ther provision." A variation on the fire-surround method saw the deer chased into a creek or river at which time men would shoot them from canoes.

A mass hunt was a cultural adaptation—an efficient method of obtaining sufficient quantities of meat for a large and sedentary population. Already by 1612, deer herds were rarely found near the inhabited areas along the principal rivers but lived in the "deserts" upstream toward the fall line. The deer population may have been

214 Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of... Coastal Virginia," 63-64.
215 Woven mats (ananseco) were taken along to drape over saplings to form temporary shelters. Spelman, "Relation," in Arber and Bradley, eds., Works of Smith, I, cvi.
216 Ibid., cvii. This was a Eurocentric misconcep- tion, for the Powhatans, like other Amerindians, made use of every part of the deer. In addition to the life-sustaining venison and fur, the Powhatans fashioned a kind of axe from the antlers and rendered deer suet and bone into a waterproof adhesive for attaching arrowheads onto the shafts. Smith, Map of Virginia, 23.
217 Smith, Map of Virginia, 24-25.
218 Ibid., 13.
inordinately depleted by the Powhatans' mass hunts. An admittedly biased English account noted that "foure or five hundred Deere were usually slaine" in the "generall huntings of the King [Powhatan]," during which time does and fawns, as well as bucks, were indiscriminately killed.219 The communal deer hunts would end in late February or early March, and each werowance would lead his people back to the villages to prepare for spring planting.220

There was a misconception among Englishmen in the seventeenth century, since perpetuated by historians, that hunting was regarded as sport and recreation by the Powhatans. Smith referred to the hunting ground as a "place of exercise," and Professor Morgan recently wrote that "Indians, like well-to-do Englishmen, apparently regarded hunting as sport."221 Morgan wrongly portrayed the

219 Edward Waterhouse, A Declaration of the State of the Colony . . . and a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre (London, 1622), 23. Also see Hamor, True Discourse, 20. The quantities referred to are refuted by John Smith, who reported that a single day's hunt would net only 6 to 15 deer, but perhaps Waterhouse was referring to the entire season's catch. Smith, Map of Virginia, 24. Other European observers, however, noted that many Indians, engaged in the (commercial) exploitation of beaver, would kill off "whole Stocks, both Male and Female." Baron Lahontan (1684), quoted in Calvin Martin, "The European Impact on the Culture of a Northeastern Algonquian Tribe: An Ecological Interpretation," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXI (1974), 3.

220 Quirós and Segura to Hinistrosa, 1570, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 90.

221 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 51-52; Smith, Map of Virginia, 24; also see, 22. See the ethnocentric misconceptions of Sir William Alexander, An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1624), 7.
Powhatans as idle farmers and avid sportsmen, for the communal hunts of tidewater Virginia had little in common with the pastimes of the Elizabethan gentry. The Powhatans took "extreame paines" in their hunts, and the long treks during winter, the organized method of the kill, and the participation of women indicate that this was a matter of survival in a time of want.222 If Powhatan males hunted avidly and well it was because much was at stake, including the serious duty of demonstrating ability as a good provider in order to increase their marriage prospects.223

As Francis Jennings explained:

we need not and should not give way to romantic sentimentality in order to recognize the very plain fact that hunters and warriors loafed in the villages--where Europeans saw and described them--in order to rest and recuperate from the exhaustion of the hunt--where the writing kind of European does not seem to have followed.224

Equally as significant as hunting and agriculture to seasonal subsistence patterns was the Powhatans' reliance upon fishing. The Powhatans were able to exploit both salt water and fresh water fishing because their settlements were concentrated in the upstream and transitional zones of both the James and York rivers.225 (See Map II.3.)

Fishing was vitally important to the Powhatans,

222Smith, Map of Virginia, 24.
223Ibid.
224Jennings, Invasion of America, 92.
MAP II.3  AQUATIC RESOURCE ZONES
OF THE JAMES AND YORK RIVER BASINS
especially the runs of anadromous fish—the sturgeon, shad, and alewife—that were taken in the months of April through June, precisely when hunting and agriculture provided little sustenance. Because of their crucial seasonal availability, anadromous fish became the most "critical limiting factor to population growth." In addition to the spring spawning fish, the Powhatans exploited herring, salmon, trout, rock fish, eels, catfish, garfish, fresh water mussels, oysters, Chesapeake Bay blue crabs, and a variety of turtles. The Powhatans relied upon high volume fishing and made effective use of woven reed weirs strategically placed in rivers. Fishing was so productive that even the incompetent English, after adopting the Powhatan weir methods, reported catching "more Sturgeon then could be devoured by dogge and man."

Fishing, when joined with hunting and agriculture, gave the Powhatans the "greatest diversity of resources within a relatively restricted area." In terms of derivable resources, the Powhatans "enjoyed the greatest subsistence security" of all the tribes in the Chesapeake Bay-Carolina Sound area, and as a consequence, they had a

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226 Ibid., 42-56, 455.
227 Ibid., 460.
228 Ibid., 46-51; Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 127-128.
229 [Symonds, ed.], Proceedings, 86-87.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Seasons</th>
<th>POPANOW</th>
<th>CATTAPEUK</th>
<th>COHATTAYOUGH</th>
<th>NEPINOUGH</th>
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<td>(pocuttawes)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deer</td>
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<td>(uttapantain)</td>
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<td>(assentamens)</td>
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<td>Bear</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Strawberries, Mulberries</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(muskimims)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(tuckahoe)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anadromous fish: shad sturgeon, alewife

Ground nuts--------
(chickinguamins)

Kidney beans

Green maize----

Parched maize

Deer

Stored beans

Bear

Rabbits

Crabs

Oysters

Terrapins

Fruit----

Maize planted

Squash--------
(pamyauk)

Kidney beans

Green maize----

Parched maize

Deer

Stored beans

Bear

Rabbits

Crabs

Oysters

Terrapins

Fruit----

Maize planted

Squash--------
(pamyauk)
more complex socio-political organization and a greater population density than their Indian neighbors.231

Having adapted to their natural environment, the Powhatans' other major concern was the superorganic environment, which consisted of aggressive enemies on their borders. The consolidation and growth of Powhatan's domain were prerequisites for survival, because the western, northern, and southern boundaries of Tsenacommacah were ringed with strong and hostile Indian tribes and confederations.

The most immediate, serious threat lay west of the fall line where the Siouan-speaking Monacans and Manahoacs lived.232 (See Map II.4.) The Monacans were a confederacy of five villages or tribes located in the Virginia piedmont from a point directly west of modern Richmond and extending to the foothills of the Blue Ridge ("Quirank") Mountains. The Monacan capital, Rassawek, was located at the confluence of the Rivanna and James rivers, but one Monacan town, Mowhemcho, lay less than twenty miles by

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water from the village of Powhatan. The Monacans, together with their allies, the Manahoacs, probably had a population of three to six thousand persons in 1607, although it may have been several times higher in the pre-contact era.

The Manahoacs were a piedmont confederacy of some eight to twelve tribes or villages concentrated near the headwaters of the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers in northern Virginia. The Manahoacs, along with the Monacans, were described as "barbarous" tribes "living for the most part of wild beasts and fruits." Indeed, these Siouans were more dependent upon hunting and foraging than the Powhatans, and they lacked the rich aquatic resources—


236 Smith, Map of Virginia, 26.
especially the anadromous fish—of tidewater Virginia.\textsuperscript{237}

The less advanced state of the piedmont economy produced significant consequences in cultural development. The Monacans and Manahoacs, with less dependence upon fishing, situated their villages north to south across drainage areas, unlike the Powhatans who lived lineally along major rivers from east to west. With greater emphases upon dispersal and with hunting and foraging being more important than agriculture or fishing, the Monacans and Manahoacs probably had a less complex socio-political organization and a lower population density than the tidewater tribes.\textsuperscript{238}

The border between the Siouans and the Algonquians, according to Nancy Lurie, "was characterized by greater cultural and linguistic differences than those observed to the north and south . . . [and] represented a definite danger area" for Powhatan.\textsuperscript{239} The Monacans and Manahoacs were warlike and aggressive and launched annual autumn raids against the Powhatans.\textsuperscript{240} The English could attest


\textsuperscript{239}Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," in Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America, 42-43.

\textsuperscript{240}Ibid., 43; [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 88; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 64.
to their hostility. Some four to five hundred Manahoac warriors attacked Englishmen in 1608, and at one point, they ran along the bank of the Rappahannock River for twelve miles while shooting at an English vessel. The Monacans and Manahoacs may have been seriously encroaching upon Powhatan's empire by 1607. The fact that there were no Algonquian villages west of the fall line along the James and Rappahannock rivers reveals to what an extent the Powhatans were restricted to a circumscribed coastal/tide-water area. As equally significant as territorial encroachment or containment was the interference of the Monacans and Manahoacs with the Powhatans' supply of copper from beyond the mountains.

One potential source for that supply came from the Bocootawanaukes (or Pocoughtaonacks), copper artisans and traders who lived on a "Sea" in the general vicinity of the Great Lakes. This tribe reputedly took "sollide Mettell from . . . stone without fier, bellowes or additament, and beat it into plates." The Bocootawanaukes have been

241Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 62-63.
242Mook, "Indian Tribes of Tidewater Virginia," WMQ, 2d Ser., XXIII (1943), 30.
244William Wallace Tooker, The Bocootawanaukes, or the Fire Nation (New York, 1901), 72, 75. See the anonymous sketch map of Virginia (1608) in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 238, 240.
245Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 132; also see 35.
tentatively identified as the Ottawas, and in the Powhatan dialect, bocottaw meant "fire," while otawaiaac bocataw meant "the fire is out" or "without fire."\footnote{246} In physical appearance, the Bocootawanaukes had shaven crowns, with long hair in the back tied with a knot, and carried "Swords like Pollaxes."\footnote{247} Although the precise trading relationship between the Powhatans and these Great Lakes people cannot be determined, the Bocootawanaukes actually posed a threat to the northern reaches of Tsenacommacah, especially the Patawomekes and the Rappahannocks.\footnote{248} The Bocootawanaukes were described as a "mighty" and "fierce Nation that did eate men" and as a tribe that "infecteth him [Powhatan] with a terrible warr."\footnote{249} In 1606, they allegedly raided the Patawomekes and killed about one hundred of those northernmost Powhatans.\footnote{250}

Yet another danger to Powhatan's empire came from the "continuall incursions" of the Massawomekes, a mysterious tribe that lived "beyond the mountaines . . . upon a great salt water, which by all likelyhood is either some part of Commada [Canada] some great lake, or some inlet

of . . . the South sea." The Massawomekes were a large and warlike tribe—the "most mortall enimes" of the Powhatans (especially the Patawomekes), the Susquehannahs, Conoys, Nanticokees, and western Siouans. As a Manahoac informant told Smith in 1608, the Massawomekes "had many boats, and so many men that they made warre with all the world." The Massawomekes have been tentatively identified as one of the New York Iroquois tribes (perhaps the Seneca), because they used birch bark canoes, "French" hatchets, and shields of interlaced sticks—items not found in the South Atlantic Slope Area. The Massawomekes, like the Manahoacs and other aggressive tribes, probably made annual raids into Powhatan territory.

South of the James River lay other tribes that were at least potential enemies to Powhatan, although little is known about intertribal relations in the early contact era. The Nottoways and the Meherrins, Iroquian peoples, were at an economic and organizational disadvantage to the


252Smith, Map of Virginia, 26; Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 48.

253Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 63.

### TABLE II.6: TSENACOMMACAH--EXTERNAL THREATS (NON-EUROPEAN)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Greatest, most immediate threats</th>
<th>Less important threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Border</td>
<td>Northern/Northwestern Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monacans</td>
<td>Bocootawanaukes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manahoacs</td>
<td>Massawomekes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conoys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Susquehannahs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern/Northwestern Border</td>
<td>Southern Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massawomekes</td>
<td>Chawanoacs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conoys</td>
<td>Nottoways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Susquehannahs</td>
<td>Meherrins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Border</td>
<td>Eastern Border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chawanoacs</td>
<td>Nanticokes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nottoways</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meherrins</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Powhatans and perhaps did not present much of a threat to Tsenacommah. However, the Chawanoacs of Wingandacoa were governed by an all powerful chief like Powhatan and were the strongest Algonquian tribe encountered by Ralegh's Englishmen in the 1580s. At some point between 1620 and 1644, Opechancanough waged war against the Chawanoacs to recover a stolen woman, and, reputedly, the "King of a Towne called Pawhatan" (Parahunt?) strangled the Chawanoac chieftain with a bow string.

The presence of strong and hostile Indians on their borders encouraged the Powhatans to develop ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility. The Powhatans were forced "to imitate their more warlike neighbors or be conquered and absorbed by them," and authoritarianism and militarism proved to be the best guarantees of security.

In 1625, Sir Francis Bacon wrote that "no nation which doth not directly profess arms may look to have greatness fall into their mouths," and there is little doubt that the militaristic values of the Powhatans were very

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256 Ibid., 461.


258 LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 73; also see, 17, 72-77.

important to their development. Selective conquest of tidewater Algonquian tribes was the foundation of Tsenacommacah, but the Powhatans did not overextend their men and resources to launch costly offensives against Iroquian or Siouan enemies. The Powhatans' main strategy in war was defense of their lands and culture, and raids into alien territory were only conducted for revenge and retaliation in an effort to keep the enemy at bay.

Warfare was on a small scale, frequent but sporadic, and few casualties were suffered in any single engagement between evenly matched Indian forces.²⁶⁰ Fighting commonly took the form of raids on enemy villages, and "Stratagems, treacheries, or surprisals" were the preferred methods.²⁶¹ Raids yielded rich booty—the enemy's women and children. When the Powhatans anticipated an attack on their own villages, they either engaged the enemy in open field battles, employing massed bowmen and organized maneuvers, or in guerrilla combat.²⁶² Using guerrilla tactics, the Powhatans surprised approaching warriors by crawling through high grass with bows in their mouths until they were within point blank range.²⁶³ At other times, warriors crept up

²⁶⁰Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 116. Also see, Jennings, Invasion of America, 155-156, 166-168; Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 247-249.

²⁶¹Smith, Map of Virginia, 26.

²⁶²Ibid., 27.

²⁶³Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 134. The Manahoacs were known to have swum
on their victims behind portable bushes and thickets as at Birnam Wood.264

The Powhatans were fierce fighters. They fired their arrows with deadly accuracy,265 and "having shott an Enemy that he fall, they mauled him with a short wooden sword."266 Smith reported that when a Patawomeke warrior discovered a wounded Manahoac still alive on the field of battle, "never was Dog more furious against a Beare, then . . . [he] was to have beat out his braines."267

The foundation of Powhatan warfare was the militia structure rooted in each village and tribe. Werowances and war captains mobilized their men for battle just as they did for hunts, and during the fighting, these respected and powerful leaders were "alwayes in front."268


264Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 63.

265A good Powhatan Bowman could hit a small target 40 yards away, and the range-at-random of their arrows was some 120 yards. Smith, Map of Virginia, 24.

266[Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 91. The Powhatan "sword" could be a heavy club of wood, but often it was more like a tomahawk, with part of a deer's antler, stone, or piece of iron affixed to wood. Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 109; Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 138.

267Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 63.

Battles were often local affairs, and werowances and tribes usually fought their closest enemies with little outside assistance. Thus, Patawomekes defended themselves against Massawomekes, Rappahannocks against Manahoacs, and Pamunkeys against Monacans. Only in unprecedented emergency situations—like the English intrusion in 1607—would two or more werowances join their forces in common action. Although localism was strong and werowances zealously defended their tribal boundaries, Powhatan's empire was basically united and well organized. The local disputes and factionalism that occasionally developed out of the paranoia and jealousy of individual werowances did not seriously affect the larger polity.\(^{269}\)

The high status and great visibility of local werowances and their importance in tribal defense helped perpetuate a well-developed warrior cult among the Powhatans. The ablest fighters were rewarded with the greatest prizes of the Powhatan empire—women, wealth, and status.\(^{270}\) If a warrior were ferocious against an enemy and performed bravely "for the publique or common State," Powhatan or one

\(^{269}\)E.g., see Strachey, *Virginia Britania*, ed. Wright and Freund, 64-65; [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., *Jamestown Voyages*, I, 82; Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., *Jamestown Voyages*, I, 136. Two general theories support this point. According to LeVine and Campbell, "the higher the level of political complexity the less frequent is internal feuding"; and "societies that frequently engage in war with their neighbors are less likely to have feuding than societies that have peaceful external relations." *Ethnocentrism*, 55; also see, 56-57, 117.

of his werowances would publicly reward him with copper, pearls, or beads and bestow upon him a new and distinguished name, which constituted "the most emynent and supreme favour."271

Warriors called attention to their status with special attire, and the "most gallant" were, according to Smith, "the most monstrous to behould." A typical warrior would paint his face and shoulders red (the color of war) and wear trophies—like the dried hand of a slain enemy—around his neck.272

The importance of warriors to the Powhatan culture was illustrated by the socialization procedures that began when males were young children. Mothers made their sons practice with bows every morning and required them to hit specific and difficult targets before allowing them to eat breakfast.273 The value placed on expert marksmanship, which represented survival in the hunt as well as in battle, was thus personalized and reinforced at an early age.

The emphasis upon skills of the kill, the high status of warriors, the positive benefits derived from warfare, Powhatan's conquest of area tribes, and the value

272 Smith, Map of Virginia, 21.
of the militia for each village reveal a society that was militaristic and highly ethnocentric. The militia structure and frequent fighting unified villages and tribes, channelling hatreds and frustrations to outgroups. Powhatan men formed special relationships in a brotherhood of arms and joined together to hunt enemies in the same ways that they hunted animals. In another perspective, the emperor's rewards to military heroes ensured that all males would loyally serve the larger polity. The bestowal of such rewards, as a confirmation of ethnic group membership, can be interpreted as further evidence of the Powhatans' strong sense of ethnocentrism.

Ethnographers who have studied cultures around the world note a high degree of ethnocentrism and militancy in societies that exploit a variety of natural resources; that have a developed political organization; that have a dense population; and that have a large amount of transportable wealth, such as stored food products and precious metals. According to these criteria, the Powhatans may be said to have been intensely ethnocentric. Their actions bear out this conclusion. The Powhatans' ruling hierarchy based on overlordship and designated local control, their

274 LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 74, 124-125.


276 See LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 70.

277 Ibid., 75; see also 36-37, 55-57.
tribute structure that supported authoritarianism, the worship of a fierce and vengeful deity, the power of the priesthood of Okee, and the high status accorded to werowances and warriors preserved order, ensured unity, and differentiated the tribes of Tsenacommacah from neighboring, and culturally alien, outgroups.278

It was no coincidence that the tribes loyal to Powhatan recognized his authority, paid him tribute, observed the huskenaw ceremony, worshipped Okee, and exploited the natural environment in similar ways, or that tribes outside the sphere of Powhatan's influence had different concepts of government, alien belief systems, varying languages and dialects, and dissimilar economies. Incorporation within Powhatan's empire assumed cultural unity and conformity. The tribes of Tsenacommacah represented a strong and solidified domain because they had a sense of cultural similarity, territorial proximity, and common defensibility.279

Powhatan's tidewater empire was a rigid, authoritarian, and culturally unified polity. The strong ethnocentrism, hierarchical leadership based on ascription, and strictly enforced customs and traditions were, in anthropological terms, "boundary-maintaining mechanisms" that made Powhatan's domain a prime example of a "hard-shelled,

278 Ibid., 112, 189.
279 Ibid., 104-106.
vertebrate" cultural system—a culture uncompromising, self-assured, and resistant to change.280

The Powhatan chiefdom, as of 1607, showed a great deal of "geopolitical sophistication,"281 was expanding territorially, and had the capacity for evolving to the higher, socio-political level of a "state."282 However, the Powhatans were arrested in their political development and were prevented from achieving their fullest cultural potential when militant aliens invaded Tsenacommacah from the eastern gateway of Chesapeake Bay.


282Feest, "Powhatan," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 77 and passim. A state is differentiated from a chiefdom by the following criteria:

1. Monopoly of legitimate and legal force;
2. Clearly defined economic and political classes;
3. An aristocracy of bureaucrats, military leaders, and priests.

Service, Primitive Social Organization, 163-165. Another anthropologist defined a state simply as "a set of local communities which are so organized that certain men of the group have the power to act for all in making the people of the several communities do certain things and seeing to it that they refrain from doing other things." Mandelbaum, "Social Groupings," in Shapiro, ed., Man, Culture, and Society, 372.
It is a great advantage to know our enemies, but a greater encouragement to know that our enemies are God's enemies.

Alexander L'Eighton, *Speculum Belli Sacri* (Amsterdam, 1624)

CHAPTER III

BATTLE AGAINST "TYRANNY": THE ELIZABETHAN IDEOLOGY OF COLONIZATION

"God is English." With this simple and direct statement, the Rev. John Aylmer expressed the patriotism, religious dogmatism, and self-assured ethnocentrism that gripped Englishmen only a year after the coronation of Elizabeth I. Aylmer's assertion reveals why the sixteenth century was an era of "Armes, Harmes, Fights, Frights, Flights, [and] Depopulations," in which religious issues brought Europe to the "brink of atrocious carnage."

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It was an age of intense faith, and Christianity permeated every facet of life. Religion was the central fact of existence, the force that guided European statecraft and the context that provided meaning for dynasties as well as individuals. As with religions of other cultures, sixteenth-century European Christianity was the "focus of prejudice," the "pivot of cultural tradition," and the dynamic means for regulating, maintaining, and redirecting society.\(^4\) Supported by dogma and myth, reason and emotion, religion legitimized authority, justified real politik intensified ethnocentrism, aroused patriotism, and consoled and controlled the masses.\(^5\) Politicized Christianity, as a vehicle of social engineering, had little sympathy for dissenting consciences and eccentric paths to personal salvation. According to the principle of cujus regio ejus religio, rulers decided which religious doctrines their subjects would follow, but civil wars, court intrigues, and political assassinations--crude, popular "vetoes"--often altered the decisions. God's

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See also, Lacey Baldwin Smith, The Elizabethan World (Boston, 1972), chaps. 1-2, passim.


support was routinely claimed by rebels and monarchs, Protestants and Catholics for projects both pious and perfidious, and widespread martyrdom and militancy demonstrated how universally misdirected was religious zeal.\(^6\)

It was in such a milieu that Elizabeth I came to the throne of England in 1558.\(^7\) Following the unpopular and flawed reign of the Catholic Mary Tudor, Elizabeth soon became the symbol of hope to a realm burdened with crises at home and abroad. In 1559 the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis ended war with France, and in the following year, the French withdrew from Scotland. On the domestic front, Parliament in 1559 repealed the heresy acts of Mary and passed the acts of Uniformity and Supremacy, abolishing allegiance to the Pope.\(^8\) These first decisive steps to dispel doubt and disorder produced a swift and gratifying popular reaction. "By means of this Alteration of Religion," wrote the chronicler, William Camden in 1559, "England . . . became

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\(^7\)See Wallace MacCaffrey, The Shaping of the Elizabethan Regime (Princeton, N.J., 1968), chaps. 1-3, passim. MacCaffrey wrote that the years surrounding Elizabeth's coronation were fraught with "frightening and incalculable incertitudes." Ibid., 5.

\(^8\)These acts were the first of Elizabeth's reign--1 Eliz. I c. 1 and 1 Eliz. I c. 2.
of all Kingdoms of Christendom the most free." It was significant that the new queen was a Protestant, for this fact "at once revived deeply-rooted notions of the Church as a great public corporation, one with the Commonwealth."10

Probably the greatest influence in establishing Elizabeth's grand reputation as a Protestant monarch was John Foxe's immensely popular book, The Actes and Monuments . . . touching matters of the Church (London, 1563), commonly known as the "Book of Martyrs." Dramatic and apocalyptic, the "Book of Martyrs" interpreted the papacy as the seat of the Antichrist and portrayed Elizabeth as a "second Constantine," the Protestant hope for a new and peaceful era in Christendom.11 Foxe traced the historical martyrdom of Protestants in grisly detail and popularized the myth that England was an elect nation chosen to receive God's special favor.12 Englishmen were reminded of


12Haller, Elect Nation, chap. 3, passim; Peter Gay, A Loss of Mastery: Puritan Historians in Colonial America (Berkeley, Calif., 1966), 6-9, 13-16. See also, V. Norskov
how England had become the first Christian country outside
the Holy Land long before the "Romish" St. Augustine
arrived and of how religion had experienced a unique
development within the realm." The Israelites, God's
chosen flock in their time, became the "spiritual ancestors"
of sixteenth-century Englishmen. In Fox's rhetoric,
England was the first among Protestant nations, a realm of
blessed people with a blessed queen. "Regnum Angliae,
regnum Dei est--the kingdom of England was palpably the
kingdom of God." Published at an unusually propitious
moment, the "Book of Martyrs" soon became accepted as
"Anglo-Saxon folklore" and competed with the vernacular
Bible as the most-read book among Englishmen over the
next two centuries.

The ideology of English Protestantism was passion­
ately nationalistic, even xenophobic. The "Book of
Martyrs" helped unite, "in a full-blown mythology," the
English sense of history and religious experience. The
ideology of election gave relevancy to current events and

Olsen, John Foxe and the Elizabethan Church (Berkeley,
Calif., 1973), 1-50, passim.

13Gay, Loss of Mastery, 6-7.

14Ibid., 7-8.

15Tuveson, Millenium and Utopia, 47. Haller wrote
that the "Book of Martyrs" was "received at once as the
one authoritative account of the whole chain of events in
the history of the Church and the nation." Elect Nation,
220-221.

16MacCaffrey, Elizabethan Regime, 14.
public issues and focused and ordered the Protestant Englishman's response to them. "Such an ideology, religious in terminology and concept, but political in application and goals, proved extraordinarily serviceable to the needs of the age."17

Serviceable it was, but also dangerous. Although the Elizabethan Age was an impatient and self-confident milieu of virile literature, vibrant intellects, and vast promise, fear and defensiveness gripped Englishmen throughout the queen's reign. Favored by Providence and blessed with a proud heritage, England was nevertheless a realm beset by real and threatening enemies in the second half of the sixteenth century. As the strongest Protestant nation in a strife-torn Europe, England was forced to fight a constant battle against militant Catholicism, which to Englishmen represented tyranny, idolatry, and treachery. For Englishmen, a series of unsettling and dangerous events gave potent reality to vehement anti-Catholic rhetoric.18

The Duke of Alva, at the command of Philip II, invaded the Low Countries in 1567; Spanish forces attacked John Hawkins and Francis Drake at San Juan de Ulúa in 1568; the English northern earls rose in a Catholic rebellion in 1569; Pope Pius V excommunicated Elizabeth in 1570;

17Ibid., 14-15.
the Ridolfi Plot tried to put Mary, Queen of Scots, on the English throne in 1571; six to eight thousand French Huguenots were slaughtered in the St. Bartholemew's Massacre in 1572; Douai seminarians began proselytizing in England in 1574; Jesuits infiltrated England in 1580; papal troops landed in Ireland in 1579 and 1580; William of Orange, the Dutch Protestant leader, was assassinated in 1584; and two additional Catholic plots related to Mary, Queen of Scots--Throckmorton's in 1583 and Babington's in 1586--led to domestic paranoia. In the context of these disturbing events, Philip II's Armada invasion of 1588 was only the boldest and most ambitious stroke in an ongoing "holy war" against Protestant England.  

Pope Pius V's bull of excommunication, Regnans in Excelsis set the tone of Catholic ideology and established the rationale behind the "Enterprise of England." Elizabeth was described as a "heretic and favourer of heretics," the "servant of wickedness" who "monstrously usurped the place of supreme head of the church in all England . . . and reduced the said kingdom into a miserable and ruinous condition. . ." The Pope absolved all Englishmen of their allegiance to Elizabeth and

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20 Ibid., 235.

21 Text from Camden, History, quoted in Cross, Royal Supremacy, 152-154.
denounced loyalists with the "sentence of anathema."22 William Allen, "Cardinal of England" and founder of the Douai "Serninary of Martyrs,"23 wrote that "there is no war in the world so just or honorable . . . as that is waged for . . . the true, ancient, Catholic Roman religion,"24 and a papal secretary noted that "whosoever sends her [Elizabeth] out of the world with the pious intention of doing God service, not only does not sin but gains merit."25

English prejudices hardened in response to Catholic threats against their beloved queen. There was an escalation in anti-Catholic statutes, and between 1577 and 1603, 189 Catholics, most of them priests, were executed in England.26 The pope was denounced as a "wolfish blood-sucker"27 and a tyrannical "ravening Wolfe" and "raging Panther," who

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22Ibid. See also, G. R. Elton, England under the Tudors, 2d ed. (London, 1974), 303-305. Elton wrote that Regnans in Excelsis "shocked a nationalist and king-worshipping generation; from it dates the instinctive English reaction which equates papery with subtle and poisonous treason." Ibid., 305.

23Neale, Elizabeth, 257, 310.

24William Allen, The True, Sincere and Modest Defence of English Catholics (1584), quoted in Cross, Royal Supremacy, 44.

25Quoted in Neale, Elizabeth, 258.

26Cross, Royal Supremacy, 40-41.

27Sir Christopher Hatton, quoted in Neale, Elizabeth, 313-314.
doth both forsake his charge (the cure of soules)
And practiseth how to destroy both soules
And bodies of Christs deare and sacred flocke.28

"The Pope of Rome is antichrist," wrote Robert Browne in 1582, "whose kingdom ought utterly to be taken away."29

Two decades later, a royal proclamation continued to denounce Catholicism's "violent malice, peril, and poison both against us and our state."30

If the Pope was considered "the chief and principal root of . . . horrible and wicked treacheries,"31 the secular champion of the Church Militant was Philip II of Spain, who proved to be the most dangerous adversary in fact. Englishmen had only to look at the Netherlands to envision the fate that awaited them. Philip had "enthralled" the Low Countries by the Inquisition and "Turke-like . . . [had] tread under his feet all their Nationall and fundamental Lawes, Priviledges, and ancient Rights." He obtained a papal dispensation ("the true cause of the warre and bloudshed") and


29Robert Browne, A Treatise of Reformation without tarrying for any (1582), quoted in Cross, Royal Supremacy, 165-166.

30Dated Nov. 5, 1602, in Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, III (New Haven, Conn., 1966), 252.

employed that most merciless Spaniard, [the] Duke of Alva, . . . [who] slaughtered . . . eighteene thousand and sixe hundred, by the hands of the Hangman, besides al his other barbarous murders and massacres. 32

Philip's "bloody Edicts" against Dutch religion, his "Cruelty over mens Consciences," and the Spanish "Yoke upon a most free Nation" were precedents too real and terrifying to be ignored by Englishmen. 33

The Elizabethan English, by necessity, became obsessed with tyranny. Sir Walter Ralegh defined tyranny as "a violent form of government, not respecting the good of the subject, but onely the pleasure of the Commander. . . . It is the unjust rule of one over many." 34

But tyranny, especially "Catholic tyranny," connoted more than that. It was aggression—oppression on the move. A tyrant would as surely invade a country as he would control men's consciences, and it was a righteous nation that maintained a defensive posture ever ready to repulse treacherous invasions. Queen Elizabeth herself noted that a just cause—"the quarrel of the righteous"—required "but to defend." 35 And Ralegh spoke of "just defensive wars


33 Camden, History, ed. MacCaffrey, 102; see also, 206-207.

34 Ralegh, History, 319 (2d enumeration).

35 Quoted in Neale, Elizabeth and Her Parliaments, II, 322.
against the violence of usurpers."³⁶

There was a definite distinction between tyrannous aggression and just, honorable warfare, and the Spanish were accused of being the "only nurses of unjust warres in Christendom."³⁷ Unjust wars violated the codes of European nations and were characterized by the initiation of violence without a declaration of war, the use of treachery, and the perpetration of brutal atrocities.³⁸ The English, in theory, adhered to the guidelines of "honorable" warfare, which consisted of battles conducted in open field with evenly matched forces and limited by Natural Law and the laws of "civilized" Christian states.³⁹ England consistently maintained a righteous, legal posture by always letting others (the "tyrants") attack first, and, in this sense, was usually the innocent victim under the laws of God, nature, and nations.

It was, however, England's policy to fight tyranny and aggression wherever they found it. Elizabeth committed six thousand troops under the earl of Leicester to


³⁸Ralegh, History, 470 (2d enumeration).

³⁹Ibid., 468 (2d enumeration).
aid the Dutch in 1586, and between 1585 and 1603, the queen spent over £1,400,000 to beat back the Spanish invasion forces in the Low Countries.\textsuperscript{40} As the major source of aid to Protestant causes, Elizabeth became the prime target of Catholic fanatics. After the assassination of William the Silent in 1584, Elizabeth was isolated as the leading Protestant monarch in Europe.

Four Catholic plots in seventeen years involved attempts to replace Elizabeth with Mary, Queen of Scots, called by Englishmen a "Confederate in the Holy League for the Extirpation of the Protestant Religion."\textsuperscript{41} Mary, that "daughter of sedition, the mother of rebellion, the nurse of impiety, the handmade of iniquity, . . . Papist of profession, a Guisan of blood, a Spaniard in practice, [and] a libertine in life," was finally executed for her complicity in the "Enterprise of England" in February 1586/87.\textsuperscript{42} The death of "that Jezebel" was a direct catalyst to the papal-Spanish plans to invade England--to turn that realm into an "Aceldama, a field of blood."\textsuperscript{43} Englishmen expected the worst.


\textsuperscript{41}Camden, History, ed. MacCaffrey, 260.

\textsuperscript{42}Job Throckmorton, quoted in Neale, Elizabeth and Her Parliaments, II, 110.

The year 1588 found much of Christian Europe obsessed with an apocalyptic prophecy. According to Philip Melancthon and the mathematician Regiomontanus, 1588 was to be a miraculous year of strange astronomical phenomena and earthly tumults that would usher in the Last Judgment and bring defeat to the Antichrist. But for Protestants generally and Englishmen particularly, a showdown in the holy war with Spain was awaited with "grim comfort." As the impressive, "invincible" Armada sailed into the English channel in July, one Englishman expressed his emotions in a diary: "We are now in peril of goodes, liberty, life, by our enemies the Span[iards], and at home papists in multitudes [are] ready to come uppon us unawares."

Fifteen-eighty-eight was the "Great-wonderful and Fatal Yeare of our Age," as ambivalently proclaimed by an English pamphleteer. Although the English fleet performed courageously and well in repulsing the Armada, it

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45Camden, History, ed. MacCaffrey, 308-311; Mattingly, Armada, 175-185. One of the books published in 1588 was Thomas Tymme's Preparation against the prophestical dangers of 1588 (STC 24420).

46Richard Rogers, quoted in William Haller, The Rise of Puritanism, paperback ed. (New York, 1957), 44. For evidence of the intertwined confidence and defensiveness of the English at this time, see the proclamations in Hughes and Larkin, ed., Tudor Royal Proclamations, III, 15, 83, 256.

47Quoted in Mattingly, Armada, 185.
was God's weather that did the greatest damage to the Spanish invaders—a significant fact not lost on Englishmen. The Rev. Richard Hakluyt expressed the attitudes of his countrymen in the aftermath of victory:

I thinke that never was any nation blessed of Jehovah, with a more glorious and wonderfull victory upon the Seas, then our vanquishing of the dreadful Spanish Armada, 1588. But why should I presume to call it our vanquishing; when as the greatest part of them escaped us, and were onely by Gods out-stretched armes overwhelmed by the Seas, dashed in pieces against the rockes, and made fearefull spectacles and examples of his judgements unto all Christendome?48

Philip II's aborted invasion was the climax to decades of religious warfare—"a judicial duel in which, as was expected in such duels, God would defend the right."49 Rarely had divine intervention been as decisive or apparent as in the Armada's defeat. "For how can the Spanishman say," wrote an English contemporary, "God is with us and againe, If God be with us who can be against us. We have seene the last sommer by experience the true effects of this."50


49Mattingly, Armada, 400.

50[Francis Mar, trans.], A Politike Discourse
1588], James Aske proclaimed that it was for the queen's sake that "Jehovah wrought the fame," and in the halls of Parliament, Puritan Job Throckmorton was beside himself with enthusiasm over the Armada's defeat:

I think God be sworn English, there is nothing will prosper against the Queen of England! . . . We that lived to see her Majesty's life, so dear unto us, pulled out . . . of the lion's jaws in despite of Hell and Satan, may truly . . . confess that indeed the Lord hath vowed himself to be English.\(^52\)

The defeat of the Spanish Armada also had a great psychological impact upon the other armed camps of Protestant Europe. The Huguenot leader La Noue wrote to Sir Francis Walsingham that the "prince of Parma . . . has seen beneath his very nose the chariots of Egypt submerged beneath the waves. . . . In saving yourselves you will save all the rest."\(^53\)

England's post-Armada hubris and self-assurance, when compared with the realm's pre-Armada fears, demonstrated the growing intensity of English ethnocentrism and the evolution of a mature nationalism. In the thirty years from Elizabeth's coronation to the Armada defeat, Englishmen had experienced real and perceived threats

\(^{51}\) Aske, Elizabetha Triumphants, A4V

\(^{52}\) Quoted in Neale, Elizabeth and Her Parliaments, II, 170. See also, Neale, Elizabeth, 311-312; Mattingly, Armada, chap. 33, passim; [Mar, trans.], Politike Discourse, A2V.

\(^{53}\) Letter dated Aug. 17, 1588, quoted in J. H.
from Spain. In meeting the challenges of plots, suspicions, and finally invasion, England's belligerence and prejudices intensified.\textsuperscript{54} In potentially dire, life or death struggles, it is universally true that the cultural distinctiveness and the superiority of an attacked group will be accentuated among its members, while the attacking group's vices and cultural inferiority will be exaggerated in the ideology of the ingroup.\textsuperscript{55}

Englishmen formulated and perpetuated various stereotypes of the enemy to strengthen their own ethnocentrism and sense of resolve in the face of crisis. The English perceptions of the Spanish as egotistical, aggressive, tyrannical, hostile, militant, immoral, and dishonest fit the classic patterning of "universal," negative ethnocentric stereotypes.\textsuperscript{56}


\textsuperscript{54}For an explanation of the ramifications of realistic-group-conflict as defined by social scientists, see Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior (New York, 1972), 30-31 and passim.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., 32-33; 30-35, passim.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 173. Social scientists studying frustration and aggression of cultural groups have found:

"The outgroup perceived as most frustrating to the ingroup will be most hated."

"The stronger outgroups, insofar as they have more capability to frustrate, will be more hated."

"The outgroup with which warfare has been carried on most recently and severely will be most hated."

"The outgroup with the most disparaging images of this particular ingroup will be most hated."
England's pre-1588 attitudes were ambivalent to be sure, and feelings of fear and foreboding, confidence and superiority were often intertwined. But the ambivalence of crisis tensions was dispelled by the hubris of victory and the belief in God's favor, which had been confirmed by combat in 1588. In the heady aftermath of their triumph, the English denigrated everything about their once-threatening Spanish enemies. In the eyes of Elizabethans, Spaniards came from inferior forebearers: "The Gothes and Vandales, are counted cruell, the Moores perfidious, and revengefull, the Saracens proud, and villanous in their manner of living." 57 Spain was like a cypress tree--tall and great but weak, slender, and unfruitful--while England was more like the olive tree in its strength and fruitfulness. 58 Spaniards were known for their pride, "covetousness and crueltie," and the "Dom Diegos and Spanish Cavalieros, whose doughtiest deedes are bragges and boastinges, ... [were considered] shadowes without substance." 59

"The most ethnocentric outgroup in terms of unwarranted self-esteem will be most hated." 57 [Robert Ashley], A Comparison of the English and Spanish Nation (London, 1589), 19.

58 [Mar, trans.], Politike Discourse, A2r.

59 [Ashley], English and Spanish Nation, A3r. See also, [George Abbot], Briefe Description of the Whole World (London, 1600), H1v. A 1611 English dictionary gave the following definition for "Castillaniser": "To imitate or affect Spanish fashions, or humors; to play the Spaniard; [hence] also, to speake big; stand on proud
As fighters, the Spaniards were regarded as "peevishe weedes," and it was believed to be an easy task for Englishmen "to snub the greedie desire of the ambitious Spaniards, and to make them fight like sheepe."  

After their psychological revitalization in 1588, the English considered themselves superior to the Spanish in courage and military skills. "The English comes with a conquering bravery," wrote the Frenchman John de Sevres, and Ralegh believed that "the militarie vertue of the English . . . [could prevail] against all manner of difficulties." After 1588, Englishmen increasingly realized that "for empire and greatness, it importeth most, that a nation do profess arms as their principal honor, study, and occupation." In the course of the Anglo-Spanish War (1588-1604), the English were increasingly aggressive and successful in arms. Displaying the ethnocentric tendency to sanction deeds against the enemy that would be prohibited as immoral or illegal within the ingroup, Englishmen turned the piracy of ships and the sack of towns into effective

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60 Humfrey Barwick, A Breefe Discourse Concerning the force and effect of all manual weapons of fire . . . (London, 1594?), G2v, 28.

61 Ralegh, History, 265 (2d enumeration); also see, 262, 263 (2d enumeration).

62 Bacon, "Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates" (1625), Essays of Bacon, intro. Morley, 65.
tactics in the 1590s.  

This growing militarism was a significant development. Strength in warfare and reliance on force reveal the intensity of ethnocentrism within a culture. Conflict with alien outgroups often ensures that peace and unity will prevail within the cultural ingroup, and patriotism ("national narcissism") encourages that relationship. Wars test this "narcissistic energy" by making group or national survival a more important concern than individual lives, as soldiers willingly die for their beliefs in the righteousness and superiority of the state.

Religion was very important in nurturing this post-Armada militarism and ethnocentrism. Religion was, of course, "the bond both of Peace and War," and "sermons were used . . . to point out that war in the Protestant cause was a religious as well as a patriotic duty." John R. Hale noted how books, pamphlets, and sermons resolved "irksome points of conscience . . . , such as


64LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 13-15.

65Ibid., 137-139.

66J. Frederick Fausz and Jon Kukla, "A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 114.

'May we pray against the enemy?'--yes, for in a just war our enemies are God's enemies."

According to A. L. Rowse, in the course of Anglo-Spanish warfare "England achieved maturity, [and] became a modern state." The events of 1588 represented a decisive turning point for England, and the defeat of the Armada was a catalyst to nationalism. As Patrick Collinson noted, 1588 brought "the climax of that movement of national self-assertion which was one facet of the English Reformation." Encompassing zealous Protestantism, the elect nation concept, and the cult of Elizabeth--but transcending the mere sum of its parts--English nationalism was very much in evidence after 1588.

According to social scientists, nationalism represents "ethnocentrism in its most involved, or perhaps only pure, form." Aside from the obvious components of political administration and state control, nationalism entails "an ideology of historical unity and group distinctiveness" strong enough to build emotional attachment


69Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 322.

70Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement, 385. Also see, Mattingly, Armada, 401.

71LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 112.
and to arouse loyalty and commitment from the populace. "Thus nationalism represents an advance over earlier forms of ethnocentrism, in the sense that it obtains the more intense and broad responsiveness of a large population to the state leadership." 72

The Armada had produced a sense of "collective emotion" 73 and Schicksalsgemeinschaft (community of fate) 74 that enshrined patriotism in a people who had faced danger together. After 1588, patriotism, ethnocentrism, and "collective emotion" were illustrated in a variety of ways. In 1591, Queen Elizabeth solicited her subjects' "hands, purses, and advices" to stem the infiltration of Jesuits and to defend English "wives, families, children, lands, goods, liberties, and their posterities against ravening strangers, [and] willful destroyers of their native country." 75 Ralegh, too, felt the mood of common identity and wrote that the "strength of England" lay in "the people and yeomanry"--the "freest of all the world." 76 In

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72 Ibid.
73 Lewis, Spanish Armada, 212; Mattingly, Armada, 401-402.
75 Proclamation, Oct. 18, 1591, in Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, III, 90.
the "heroic age" of Elizabethan England (1584-1604), collective emotion and patriotism also expressed themselves in the flowering of literature and the arts, the outpouring of English histories, in the firm establishment of the vernacular, and in the pride of native craftsmen and merchants.77

In this same period, too, English ethnocentrism, as reflected in the harsh criticisms of other cultures, reached unprecedented proportions of breadth and depth, indicative of a proud and maturing national spirit. Englishmen more than ever after 1588 believed that theirs was "the most renowned Iland in the world"78 and that their realm was a "Sanctuarie of all civilitie, kindnesse and courtesie."79 England enjoyed the special favor of God; its "reformed religion" was free of the tyranny and the "wodden gods" of Rome; it possessed a wise and courageous sovereign; and its people had an enviable heritage of political freedoms and relatively good government. These were the blessings of the English nation and these were the standards by which all other nations, cultures, and peoples were judged tyrannical, uncivilized, or idolatrous.


78[Abbot], Description of World, F4r.

79[Ashley], English and Spanish Nation, 34.
by comparison.\textsuperscript{80} As a homesick English diplomat observed in the late 1580s, "all the known nations and kingdoms of the world are not comparable for happiness to this thrice blessed nation [i.e., by religion, common law, and monarch] and angelical kingdom of Canaan, our England."\textsuperscript{81}

Englishmen denounced the Tartars for "their unmerciful lawes, their fond superstitions, their bestiall lives, their vicious manes, their slavish subjection to their owne superiours, and their disdainfull and brutish inhumanitie unto strangers."\textsuperscript{82} The Russians fared little better. They were described by English observers as a people oppressed by cruel emperors and brutal laws, "much after the Turkish fashion."\textsuperscript{83} Although the Russians were "a kinde of

\textsuperscript{80}This was clearly indicative of "group narcissism," a term coined by Sigmund Freud, and of "ethnocentrism," coined by William Graham Sumner. Sumner defined ethnocentrism as "a view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it." Folkways (New York, 1906), 12-13; Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (London, 1961), 114.

\textsuperscript{81}Sir Jerome Horsey, "The Travels of Sir Jerome Horsey" (ca. 1589-1590), in Lloyd E. Berry and Robert O. Crummey, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth-Century English Voyagers (Madison, Wis., 1968), 369.

\textsuperscript{82}Hakluyt, Principal Navigations (1598), Preface to the Reader, in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluyt, II, 445.

\textsuperscript{83}Giles Fletcher, Of the Russe Commonwealth (1591), in Berry and Crummey, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, 132-133. See also, Horsey, "Travels," ibid., 270, 273.
Christians," their elaborate iconography made them idolaters "after the grossest and profanest manner," and much of their religion was touched with "popish superstition." The Russian populace was considered servile, brutish, treacherous, and cowardly due to oppression, and one lesson was made very clear to the English: "Superstition and false religion best . . . agree with a tyrannical state and [are] . . . a special means to uphold and maintain the same." George Turberville summarized the harshest criticisms in verse:

Wild Irish are as civil as the Russies in their kind; Hard choice which is the best of both, each bloody, rude, and blind.
If thou be wise, as wise thou art, and wil't be ruled by me,
Live still at home and covet not those barbarous coasts to see.
No good befalls a man that seeks and finds no better place,
No civil customs to be learn'd where God bestowes no grace.

84[Abbot], Description of World. B2r.

85Fletcher, Russe Commonwealth, in Berry and Crumme, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, 134, 227. See also, "To Dancie," Tragicall Tales (1587), ibid., 76, 83; [Abbot], Description of World, B2r.

86Fletcher, Russe Commonwealth, in Berry and Crumme, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, 134. The English obsession with "superstition" was explained by Francis Bacon: "It is better to have no opinion of God at all than [to have] such an opinion as is unworthy of him; for the one is unbelief, the other is contumely: and certainly superstition is the reproach of the Deity." "Of Superstition," Essays of Bacon, intro. Morley, 36.

87Turberville, "To Parker," Tragicall Tales, in Berry and Crumme, eds., Rude and Barbarous Kingdom, 84.
Turberville called the Irish "bloody, rude, and blind," and other Elizabethans portrayed them as beastlike, uncivilized, cruel, vengeful, and slaves to the tyranny of their clan and religious leaders. Being an "uncivil People," the Irish were "more superstitious" and were more likely to "be excited to Rebellion under pretext of Religion." The Irish, like other "barbarous people," were the "best observers of ceremonies." After years of warring with the English, the wild Irish were referred to as "wood-born savages," "dunghill gnats," and "ravening beasts" that fed on "grass and shamrocks." And in 1600 George Abbot made an appraisal of Irish people and Irish land that later became the typical English attitude regarding Indians and their habitat: "The people are naturally rude and superstitious, the countrie good and fruitefull."

The decade-and-a-half of Elizabeth's reign that followed the defeat of the Spanish Armada--referred to as the "heroic age" by A. L. Rowse--naturally merged into

88 Camden, History, ed. MacCaffrey, 43.
90 Quoted in Quinn, Elizabethans and the Irish, 136. See also, Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Philadelphia, 1964), 364-365 and passim.
91 [Abbot], Description of World, F4r.
the "go-getting age" described by Wallace Notestein. Historians have always demonstrated great enthusiasm in describing the "marvellous summertime of the imagination" that this era produced. Elizabthans reputedly enjoyed "a swoop of the national spirit" and a "soaring, dizzy ascent" filled with "promise and expectancy." And as a fitting climax, the era produced "the greatest living monument to the Elizabethan Age"—the planting of the "English-speaking stock" and its culture in North America.

Historical chauvinism aside, the man most responsible for this colonial "monument" was the Rev. Richard Hakluyt, regarded by most as the "Apostle of Empire."

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93 Sir Walter Ralegh, "English Voyages," in Principal Navigations, modern ed., XII (Glasgow, 1904), Preface, 93.

94 Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 158; Ralegh, "English Voyages," Principal Navigations, XII, 93.

95 Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 30.

Hakluyt's influential writings and ideas drew on England's post-Armada nationalism, patriotism, militarism, ethnocentrism—and religiosity—and constituted a pervasive and persuasive ideology of imperialism. It was no mere coincidence that Hakluyt rushed into print his monumental prose epic, *The Principal Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries of the English Nation*, within a year after the defeat of the Spanish Armada. His timing was perfect for focusing the nation's attention on the historical greatness of the English people and for demonstrating the intimate relationship that they had always maintained with the sea. The *Principal Navigations* gave tangible and authoritative support to the growing intensity of English national pride.

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The passionately English and staunchly Protestant Hakluyt belonged to a small but increasingly influential group of talented preachers, promoters, and public men who were possessed of an "overweening and often unreflecting confidence in themselves and the rectitude of their own intentions." Represented in the 1580s by men like Raleigh, Walsingham, Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir George Peckham, and later by men like Sir Thomas Smythe, Sir Edwin Sandys, and the Rev. Samuel Purchas, this "forward-looking party" saw the need for nationally sponsored overseas colonies that could draw strength from the patriotic and financial resources of the state.

Protestantism and nationalism, piety and policy went hand in hand, and the desire for overseas empire was as backward-glancing as it was forward-looking. The establishment of a "counter-empire" to thwart Spain's designs in the New World was seen as a "competitive necessity," since success in cutting off the bullion supply and in making claims to strategic American territories

History of English Overseas Interests to 1620 (Amsterdam, 1965).

Haller, Elect Nation, 243.

would ensure the survival of the Protestant cause in Europe. The New World would be another battlefield where old wars would be waged. As the Huguenot La Noue noted: "The Spaniard wanted to take Flanders by way of England, but it is now for you [the English] to take Spain by way of the Indies."

In a more progressive sense, though, Hakluyt envisioned colonies in terms of England's "manifest destiny" to transmit a "superior" culture and "right" religion to native populations. Aside from the strategic concerns of the ongoing war with Spain, colonies would provide gratification for English nationalism and glorification of the "English God." In this context, it was not surprising that Hakluyt, the preacher, would be a most effective propagandist, because England's clergymen, as God's spokesmen, were ideal mediums for imparting pious overtones to public policy and for making pious policy a public concern. Hakluyt's vocational and national biases led him to propagate the idea that the goals of Christianity and England were inseparable and that colonies were divinely ordained for this chosen people.

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102Letter to Walsingham, Aug. 17, 1588, quoted in Elliott, Europe Divided, 332n. See also, Elliott, Old World and New, 94.
The sixteenth century had placed both Luther and Columbus on the stage of history, and Hakluyt, with one eye fixed on Reformation struggles and the other fixed on overseas empire, saw expansionism as a religious and a patriotic crusade with both sacred and secular rewards.\footnote{Wright, Religion and Empire, 6, 8-9, 26-28, 53, 56, 86, 153; Louis B. Wright, Gold, Glory and the Gospel: The Adventurous Lives and Times of the Renaissance Explorers (New York, 1970), 332, 335.}

Foxe's Englishmen were suffering martyrs on the defensive, but Hakluyt's Englishmen were taking the offensive and confidently expected success.\footnote{See Hill, Intellectual Origins, 193-194. In the 1580s and 1590s, a younger generation of Elizabethans sought personal honor and national glory in a "Marlovian mood of high aspiration." These "extremists" created a hubristic "secular religion" out of the desire to adventure and succeed in a variety of patriotic enterprises. Anthony Esler, The Aspiring Mind of the Elizabethan Younger Generation (Durham, N.C., 1966), xxiv, 84, 165; also see, 146, 200, 242-243. John Parker noted that a personal and patriotic emotional appeal transformed nationalism into imperialism after 1580. Books to Build an Empire: A Bibliographical History of English Overseas Interests to 1620 (Amsterdam, 1965), chaps. 6-7, passim.}

Hakluyt's influence was greatly enhanced because he was an accomplished cosmographer as well as a dedicated clergyman, and he was able to argue from both "scientific" and theological perspectives.\footnote{Cosmography in the sixteenth century was a combination of geography, ethnography, political, and natural history. See Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 114, 143, 186-187. To Hakluyt, geography and "Chronologie" were the "Sunne and Moone, the right eye and the left of all history."} He established the standards and the ideological parameters for other theorists of colonization, and his successors emulated both his

training and his tireless commitment to a religious mission in the New World.\textsuperscript{106}

The \textit{Principall Navigations} was Hakluyt's magnum opus, but his concept of English imperialism was most succinctly stated and persuasively argued in the manuscript, "Discourse of Western Planting," written in 1584.\textsuperscript{107} Hakluyt promoted colonization for both pragmatic and idealistic reasons, and his arguments were designed to bolster England's military position, economic well being, and sense of cultural superiority in one or all respects. Hakluyt left few stones unturned as he advocated New World colonization in order to:

1. Spread Christ's gospel to the heathen;
2. "Plant sincere religion," to provide a safe haven for Protestant refugees fleeing from Catholic tyranny in Europe;


\textsuperscript{106}Colonial theorists who were cosmographers as well as clergymen included Samuel Purchas; George Abbot, later Archbishop of Canterbury (1611-1633); Richard Eburne, who wrote \textit{A Plain Pathway to Plantations} in 1624; and William Castell, author of \textit{A Short Discoverie of the Coasts and Continent of America} (London, 1644). See Fulmer Mood, \textit{The English Geographers and the Anglo-American Frontier of the Seventeenth Century} (Berkeley, Calif., 1944), 365-370, 384-385; Wright, \textit{Religion and Empire}, 133; Evelyn Page, \textit{American Genesis: Pre-Colonial Writing in the North} (Boston, 1973), 234-235; Richard Eburne, \textit{A Plain Pathway to Plantations} (1624), ed. Louis B. Wright, Folger Shakespeare Library (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), editor's introduction, xxvi-xxxiv.

\textsuperscript{107}The full title is: "A particular discourse concerninge the greate necessitie and manifolde comodyties that are like to growe to this Realme of Englande by the Westerne discoveries lately attempted, Written in the yere
3. Challenge Spain's position in the Americas and to rebuke Pope Alexander VI's bull of donation;

4. Gain access to valuable commodities and exotic agricultural staples;

5. Find profitable employment for England's "redundant" population and idle masses;

6. Establish strategic outposts from which to raid Spanish bullion fleets;

7. End the Spanish cruelties in the New World;

8. Help "civilize" Ireland through trade and contact with American outposts;

9. Increase the revenues of the crown;

10. Enlarge the English navy and increase the merchant marine;

11. Discover passages to the orient; and


The great potential of colonies offered tremendous challenges and allurements to the self-confident English. But the arguments that proved most enduring and pervasive over the decades were those that nurtured and gratified Elizabethan religiosity and sense of mission. For at the heart of Hakluyt's conception of colonization--his first and greatest commandment, so to speak--was his fervent belief that

1584. by Richard Hakluyt of Oxford at the requeste and direction of the righte worshipfull Mr. Walter Raghly nowe Knight."

Godliness is great riches, and that if we first seeke the kingdome of God, al other things will be given unto us, and that as the light accompanieth the Sunne and the heate the fire, so lasting riches do wait upon them that are jealous for the advancement of the Kingdome of Christ, and the enlargement of his glorious Gospell: as it is sayd, I will honour them that honour mee.  

Above all, English colonization in the New World would involve the "gayninge of the soules of millions of those wretched [native] people, the reducinge of them from darkness to lighte, from falshoode to truthe, from dombe Idols to the lyvinge god, from the depe pitt of hell to the highest heavens."  

Hakluyt criticized colonization undertaken solely for "filthie lucre," "vaine ostentation," and "worldly and transitorie gaine," and in 1587 he admonished his friend Ralegh for his delay in dispatching Anglican missionaries to the Roanoke Colony. Once conversion of Indian

109Richard Hakluyt, Divers voyages touching the discoverie of America (1582), Preface, in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluys, I, 178.

110Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," ibid., II, 216. Wright noted that "from the first voyage of Martin Frobisher, in 1576, onward, the conversion of the heathen became an increasingly prominent motive in the discussions of westward expansion." Religion and Empire, 11.

populations was begun, Hakluyt wrote Ralegh, "God will be with you, you have no reason to doubt, for his glory, the salvation of countless souls, and the increase of the Kingdom of Christ is at stake."  

Of course, Hakluyt, the priest, had a special commitment to spreading the Christian message throughout the world, but Elizabethans, generally, believed that Christ's second coming would occur only when the gospel was "preached through the whole world . . . unto all nations." Pious Englishmen felt compelled to proselytize and convert populations "in all coasts and quarters of the world" before "the day of judgement." 

For Hakluyt, conversion could only accompany large-scale colonization and stable English settlement in the New World. The process of converting and "civilizing" indigenous populations had to be accomplished gradually, in stages. Englishmen should first establish beachheads and outposts in America, enlarge their numbers, make contact with natives, learn their language, "and by little and little acquainte themselves with their manner and so with discretion and myldness distill into their purged myndes

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112 Hakluyt, Epistle Dedicatory to Ralegh, translation of Peter Martyr (1587), in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluyts, II, 368.


114 [Abbot], Description of Worlde, G4r.
the swete and lively liquor of the gospell." In time, 
colleges might even be established "to traine upp the 
youthe of the Infidells." Hakluyt's inherent faith in 
God's plan made him optimistic that successful conversion 
and peaceful cohabitation were desirable and possible with-
out conquest of arms, but his gradual, step-by-step formula 
was considered an essential ingredient.

Elizabethans were all too aware of Spanish failures 
in conversion attempts due to their impatience, which 
invariably led either to a bloody conquest of Indians or to 
a bloody slaughter of "Fryers." In this and other 
respects, Spanish colonization served as a negative model 
and a positive catalyst for Hakluyt's theories. On the one 
hand, Spanish colonization demonstrated how a small and 
determined band of Europeans could achieve "greate things"

115 Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," in 
Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluys, II, 215. Also see, 

116 Cf. the less optimistic projections of Hakluyt's 
kinsman, Richard Hakluyt, the lawyer:

"The ends of this 
voyage are: 1. To plant Christian religion 
2. To trafficke 
3. To conquer

To plant Christian religion without conquest, will 
bee hard. Trafficke easily followeth conquest:
conquest is not easie. Trafficke without conquest 
seemeth possible, and not uneasie. What is to be done 
is the question.

"Inducements to the Liking of the Voyage intended towards 
Virginia" (1585), in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluys, II, 
332.

117 Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," ibid., 
215.
in a "shorte space," establishing settlements in the New World and finding enormous wealth in the process. On the other hand, the record of the Spanish conquistadores illustrated the despicable cruelties and infamous moral failures that Englishmen hoped to avoid. At the heart of this negative aspect of Spanish colonization was the well-publicized "Black Legend."

According to contemporary English views, Spaniards had allowed the New World's treasure trove of mineral wealth ("mynes to blowe up mindes and rockes to ruine faithe") to "intoxicate the braines, and impoysen the minde with transitory pleasures." Their holy intentions and pious pronouncements were a mockery, for, "charmed by the cup of Circe," the Spanish had been "transformed into . . . savage beasts" and "divels incarnate."

Englishmen had more than enough information about Spanish misadventures in America upon which to base their negative conclusions. In the 1580s, Bartolome de Las Casas's Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies and Girolamo Benzoni's History of the New World spread "the most lurid information about Spanish conduct" throughout Europe.

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118 Ibid., 216.

119 Sir William Alexander, An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1624), 7, 44.

120 Ibid., 6; [Ashley], English and Spanish Nations, 23.
and created "an indelible image of Spanish atrocities." In 1584, Hakluyt wrote of the "mightie masse and huge heape of massacres" that the conquistadores had "ungodly perpetrated" in Spanish America. They had allegedly "despeoped and made desolate more than tenne Realmes greater then all Spaine," slaughtering, according to Hakluyt's count, between twelve and fifteen million men, women, and children from the indigenous populations.

In its genocidal deeds, Spain reputedly surpassed the bloodlust of Turks, Scythians, and Tartars in inflicting "new and enormous cruelties" upon the "poore barbarous and simple" Indians of America. Ralegh estimated the toll in lives to have been in excess of twenty million persons, "reasonable creatures made to the Image of God and lesse harmefull then the Spaniards themselves."

The great judge of the world [wrote Ralegh], hath heard the sighes, grones, lamentations, teares, and bloud of so many millions of innocent men, women, and children afflicted, robbed, reviled, . . . roasted, dismembred, mangled, stabbed, . . . ripped alive, beheaded in sport, drowned, dashed against the rocks, famished, . . . and by infinite crueltyes consumed. . . .

Another source claimed that in Mexico alone, Spaniards had killed thirteen million Indians in seventeen years,

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121 Elliott, Old World and New, 93.
123 [Ashley], English and Spanish Nation, 23.
124 Ralegh, Guiana, ed. Schomburgk, 138. See also, [Abbot], Description of World, H1V, H3V; Ralegh, History, 419.
"roasting some, plucking out the eyes, . . . and casting them living to be devoured of wild beasts."\textsuperscript{125}

These tales of "barbarous and exquisite massacres" and the "distruction of whole nations of people" prompted justifiable--and politically opportune--denunciation from Englishmen in the 1590s, a decade of escalating warfare with Spain.\textsuperscript{126} As much as anything else, Spanish behavior in the New World focused English attention on that region and served as a real catalyst for colonization among morally outraged Elizabethans. It was considered vitally important for Englishmen to reestablish the good image of Christian Europeans, an image that had been so horribly tarnished by the "Black Legend." Reports from the New World told of how America's natives detested the very "name of Christians."\textsuperscript{127} And in another sense, Englishmen believed it was their duty to expose indigenous populations to "right" religion--Anglicanism--as compensation for those "perverted" by conversion to the "Romish superstitious

\textsuperscript{125}[Anon.], "Of America and Its Ilands" [n.d.], (Harleian MS 2334, f. 89), Virginia Colonial Records Project, Survey Report 302, microfilm reel M-277, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation. This source noted that "the Pope hath rysed up in this parte of the world a new Empire, (instead of that which Lately fell from his Jurisdiction in Europe)." As late as 1709 Englishmen, like John Lawson, were still discussing the "Spanish Yoke." Lawson, A New Voyage to Carolina, ed. Hugh Talmage Lefler (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1967), 10.

\textsuperscript{126}Ralegh, Guiana, ed. Schomburgk, 138. See Elliott, Old World and New, 95 and passim.

\textsuperscript{127}[Abbot], Description of World, H\textsuperscript{1}v.
Religion" of the Spaniards. As Hakluyt phrased it, converted Indians had only rejected simple idolatry for a more elaborate form and had been drawn from "Sylla into Charibdis, that is to say from one error into another." The New World Indian was seen as a victim of Spanish tyranny, and Englishmen fully intended to remove the yoke of oppression from the native populations. Sir Francis Drake in the late 1570s adopted a similar policy in encouraging black Cimarrons to rebel against their Spanish masters, and Hakluyt foresaw the day when enslaved Indians would, with English aid, rise up, slay their Spanish oppressors, and make Philip II "a laughing stocke for all the worlde." In 1596, Ralegh actually made elaborate plans for inciting the Guianans against the Spaniards. To secure the Guianans' trust and confidence, Ralegh proposed to inform them that Queen Elizabeth was the champion of "distressed nations both in her owne and forrayn countries"; that England was "populous, rich, [and] warlike"; and that the Protestant religion was "farr differing from the Spanish, mayntaining truth, justice, and faythfulnes, [and] prohibiting all murders, treasons, adulteries, thefts, and whatsoever correspondeth not with equity and reason." In


130Ibid., 248-249; also see, 252-257. On Drake's mission, see Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American
addition, Ralegh proposed showing the potential Indian rebels several maps of England, including one of the city of London, supposedly as a cultural, awe-inspiring incentive.\textsuperscript{131}

From all of this anti-Spanish propaganda and ethnocentric wishful thinking came an Elizabethan image of the New World Indian as a poor, innocent, and pathetic victim, helpless in the face of brutal European aggression. Of course, the image served the issues, but the fact remains that the Indian was pitied—even admired—before he came to be hated.

The Indian of the New World was a "naturall," or native inhabitant, of a land considered wild and primitive.\textsuperscript{132} He was therefore a product of an uncivilized environment, and this explained both his positive and negative characteristics—the image and the "anti-image."\textsuperscript{133} Environment Freedom (New York, 1976), 10-20, 24.

\textsuperscript{131}Ralegh, Guiana, ed. Schomburgk, 145.

\textsuperscript{132}The term "natural" did not necessarily have a negative connotation. It was often a synonym for "native," as in "natural" commodities or "natural" Englishmen. See draft document of Nicholas Ferrar (May 1624), in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1935), IV, 479; Hakluyt, Principall Navigations (1589), Preface to the Reader, in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluyts, II, 402.

\textsuperscript{133}See Henri Baudet, Paradise on Earth: Some Thoughts on European Images of Non-European Man, trans. Elizabeth Wentholt (New Haven, Conn., 1965), 35-36 and passim; Howard Mumford Jones, O Strange New World (New York, 1964), chaps. 1-2, passim; Page, American Genesis, 236-239 and passim. Page wrote that, in the minds of Europeans, America represented both "an earthly paradise"
determined that the Indian would be, in a positive sense, naive, uncomplicated, candid, guileless, and kind, and, in a negative sense, that he would be naked, bestial, primitive, and pagan. Environmentalism cut two ways, and Englishmen could portray the Indian as a peaceful inhabitant of an idyllic Arcadia or as a brutish cannibal from a violent, savage jungle.\(^{134}\) The images remained mutable and transferable, and portrayals varied by author, era, perspective, and purpose. The ambivalent images and anti-images of Indians were "closely linked to intentions and desires" and were "molded by the nature of colonization and the inner requirements of adventuring Englishmen."\(^{135}\)

Given Hakluyt's era, perspective, and purpose, Indians became "peaceable, lowly, milde, and gentle people"—"lambes . . . qualified and endowed of their maker and creator."\(^{136}\) As one vitally interested in a religious and "an earthly hell." It was a paradise that nurtured "devils" and a "Satan's kingdom" that offered "utopia." American Genesis, 239; also see, 222-223.

\(^{134}\) "Geography, with its large ingredient of ethnology, . . . and its oft-repeated claim that human beings in their behavior were the creatures of environment made a profound impression upon the minds of . . . the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries." Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 288.


mission to the New World, Hakluyt portrayed Indians as not only tractable and cooperative, but as anxious for, and receptive to, Christian conversion. "They are very easie to be perswaded," he wrote, "and doo all that they see . . . Christians doo in their devine service with like imitation and devotion, and were very desirous to become Christians." \(^{137}\) The Indians of Virginia, noted Hakluyt, had "better wittes then those of Mexico and Peru" (a convenient geographical distinction), and "they will easilie embrace the Gospell, forsaking their idolatrie." \(^{138}\)

Hakluyt's optimistic appraisals of the "better" Indians claimed by the English were echoed by contemporary writers and superficially confirmed by various adventurers. In 1583, Sir George Peckham envisioned Indians "thirsting after christianitie" and Englishmen treating them with "courtesie and myldnes." \(^{139}\) In Peckham's view, the English pledge of "benefite, commoditie, peace, tranquillity and safetie" would "induce theyr Barbarous natures to a likeing and a mutuall society with us." \(^{140}\) From Drake's expedition along the California coast in 1579 came reports of local

\[\text{\textsuperscript{137}}\text{Ibid.}, 214.\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{138}}\text{Hakluyt, Epistle Dedicatory to Ralegh, trans. of Laudonniere, \textit{ibid.}, 375.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{139}}\text{Sir George Peckham, \textit{A True Reporte of the late discoveries, and possession, taken in the right of the Crowne of Englands, of the Newfound Landes: By that valiaunt and worthy Gentleman, Sir Humfrey Gilbert Knight (1583)}, in Quinn, ed., \textit{Voyages of Gilbert}, II, 448, 451.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{140}}\text{Ibid.}, 452; also see, 440.}\]
Indians "of a tractable, free, and loving nature, without guile or treachery." They treated the English with kindness and worshipped them as gods. Their potential for conversion was "proven" by the fact that, when the English prayed, sang hymns, and read from the Bible, the Indians "sate very attentively . . . , greatly rejoicing in our exercises. Yea they tooke . . . pleasure in our singing of Psalms."141

Likewise, in 1585, Arthur Barlowe found the Indians along the North Carolina coast to be "gentle, loving, and faithful."142 Thomas Harriot, like Barlowe an employee of Ralegh, described these coastal Algonquians as anxious for conversion. They believed the English Bible to be imbued with magical powers and sought "to touch it, to embrace it, to kisse it, to hold it to their breasts and heades"--in essence, "to shewe their hungrie desire of that knowledge which was spoken of."143 John Brereton, chronicler of Capt. Bartholemew Gosnold's 1602 expedition to the Massachusetts coast, wrote of the hospitality of the Indians there.

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143 Thomas Harriot, A breife and true report of the
"These people . . . are exceeding courteous, gentle of disposition, and well conditioned. . . . I thinke they excell all the people of America." Ralegh, in 1596 and again in 1617, commented on the vast potential for proselytizing among native populations. He summed up most of the arguments when he wrote: "There are none in the World so wickedly inclined, but that a religious instruction and bringing up may fashion anew and reforme them."\textsuperscript{145}

The fact that Englishmen of Hakluyt's generation refracted reality through idealistic lenses is partially explained by the tendency of European contemporaries to be beguiled by the Indian's fine features, quick mind, pristine innocence, and exotic "nobility." Continental art and literature created rich and impressive images of virtuous New World natives. René de Laudonniere's descriptions of heroic and generous southern Indian chiefs, Jacques Le Moyne de Morgue's paintings of Indians as "Michelangelesque Roman[s]," and the writings of Peter Martyr and others served as the accepted "footnotes" to

\textsuperscript{144}John Brereton, \textit{A Briefe and true Relation of the Discoverie of the North part of Virginia} (London, 1602), 8-10.

\textsuperscript{145}Ralegh, \textit{History}, 14.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 274 (2d enumeration); Baudet, \textit{Paradise on Earth}, trans. Wentholt, 10, 27, 35-36; Robert Cawley, \textit{The Voyagers and Elizabethan Drama} (New York, 1938), 344-395, passim.
England's ideological convictions. Observation and interpretation alike were clouded by imagination, myths, and wishful thinking on the part of Europeans. The strong psychological urge to see America as a regenerative challenge and a utopia of unrivalled opportunity conjoined myth and reality in the minds of Englishmen.

The New World Indian did possess an anti-image, but even traits considered negative in the English mind had their place within the Elizabethan ideology of colonization. Two overall characteristics made Indians "inferior" to Englishmen: they were savages (without 'civilization') and pagans (without knowledge of Christ). Indians were "ethnicks"—infidels and cultural aliens. Considered "utterly unlearned" in a European sense, Indians were "uncivilized" because they were "naked, . . . ignorant of

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148 Baudet, Paradise on Earth, trans. Wentholt, 5-6, 27, 75; Elliott, Old World and New, 52, 103-104; Wright, Religion and Empire, 141, 149. Elliott wrote that "the image of the innocent Indian was most easily maintained by those Europeans who had never actually seen one." Old World and New, 42.

shipping, without . . . historie or writing . . . [and]
ignorant of Scripture, or Christ, or Moyses, or any
God." In particular, Englishmen noted that Indians
violated treaties and pledges of peace; took revenge for
any and all injuries; misused their lands in a "salvage"
manner; and lacked discipline and ability in warfare.151
Actually these last two stereotypes, by which Indians were
judged inferior to Englishmen, were important to the
ideological arguments for colonization.

Although the Indians along the Atlantic coast of
North Carolina lived in the "goodliest and most pleasing
territorie of the world," they had little use for the
exotic commodities desired by Europeans, a sure sign of
their inferiority. Englishmen were very condescending
about the "uncivilized" nature of Indian agriculture and
village life, and they considered their land as wasted
and empty until they could impose European methods of farm­
ing upon it.152

In another negative stereotype with positive over-
tones, the English regarded Indian wars as "no more warres
then the playenge of children," and they often referred to

150 [Abbot], Description of World, G4r, H3r.

151 Ralegh, History, 578 (2d enumeration); Hakluyt,
"Discourse of Western Planting," in Taylor, ed., Writings
of Hakluys, II, 260.

152 See Ralph Lane to Richard Hakluyt, lawyer,
Indians as "unarmed people."\textsuperscript{153} This dangerous misconcep-
tion allowed Englishmen to justify their defense of out-
manned natives against the Spaniards while guaranteeing
their own security and inevitable success in New World
ventures.\textsuperscript{154}

The English belief in environmentalism created
Indians who resembled Plato's barbarians--"naked, unshod,
unbedded, and unarmed"--and who lived Hobbesian lives--
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."\textsuperscript{155} But the
environmentalist perspective excused the Indian for some of
his shortcomings. The natives of the New World often
behaved the way they did because they were oppressed and
abused by their own chieftains, "in the same manner that
mens bodies . . . [were afflicted] with an agew."\textsuperscript{156} In
this context, Brereton observed that Indians were fre-
quently "given to filching, which the very name of Salvages
(not weighing their ignorance in good or evil) may easily
excuse."\textsuperscript{157} For believers in environmentalism, then, the Indian, as simply the product of circumstance, could easily be reformed and "civilized." This optimistic assumption nurtured the Elizabethan sense of mission and kept alive the English dreams of liberation and conversion in the New World.

The Elizabethans' very confidence in the mutable nature of Indian culture and in the English ability to reform it precluded a racist ideology in the sixteenth century. Indians were considered culturally, not racially, inferior, and "modern racism," based upon the "invariable connection between cultural behavior and physical type," would have proven self-defeating to an idealistic ideology of colonization.\textsuperscript{158} Indians were not considered "beasts" or sub-humans as some historians have asserted, but were known to be the descendents of Adam, Noah, and later Asiatic peoples that had migrated to America.\textsuperscript{159} Englishmen

\textsuperscript{157}Brereton, 	extit{Briefe and true Relation}, 11.

\textsuperscript{158}Schermerhorn, 	extit{Comparative Ethnic Relations}, 73-74. See also, Hodgen, 	extit{Early Anthropology}, 213; Jennings, 	extit{Invasion of America}, viii. According to psychologist Gordon Allport, "most human characteristics ascribed to race are undoubtedly due to cultural diversity and should, therefore, be regarded as ethnic, not racial." \textit{The Nature of Prejudice}, paperback ed. (New York, 1958), 111. Also see, Graham C. Kinloch, \textit{The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis} (New York, 1974), 50-57; Paul Bohannan and Philip Curtin, \textit{African and Africans}, rev. ed. (Garden City, N.Y., 1971), 9, 35-36, 47.

\textsuperscript{159}Hodgen, 	extit{Early Anthropology}, 313, 379, 405, passim; Winthrop D. Jordan, \textit{White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812} (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968), 240. In 1537, a papal bull officially declared
wrote that Indians bore the "Image of our Heavenly Creator, and wee and they come from the same moule;"\textsuperscript{160} and the issue of pigmentation, when it arose at all, was resolved in the Indian's favor. Although parts of America shared the same latitude with regions in Africa, it was observed, Indians were "of a reasonable faire complexion and very Little (if at all) inclining to blacknesse."\textsuperscript{161}

Although they were not racists in the modern sense, sixteenth-century Englishmen were so deeply rooted in ethnocentrism that cultural prejudice became as severe in its impact upon Indian societies. This strong prejudice evolved from a centuries-old "crusading mentality"\textsuperscript{162} that legitimiz-ed the domination of culturally dissimilar and "inferior" native groups by culturally "superior" European invaders and conquerors.\textsuperscript{163} The beginnings of a later mature racism lay

\begin{footnotes}
\item[160] John Rolfe, A True Relation of the State of Virginia Left by Sir Thomas Dale Knight in May Last 1616, Jamestown Documents (Charlottesville, Va., 1971), 12.
\item[162] Jennings, \textit{Invasion of America}, 5-6.
\item[163] For a discussion of "migrant superordination"--the process by which alien invaders dominate native subordinates--see Schermerhorn, \textit{Comparative Ethnic Relations}, 52, 68, 97-98.
\end{footnotes}
in the Eurocentric attitudes of medieval and Renaissance religiosity, when the crusader was both Caucasian and Christian and the "enemy" was the dark-skinned heretic. "In the gradual transition from religious conceptions to racial conceptions," wrote Francis Jennings, "the gulf between persons calling themselves Christian and the other persons, whom they called heathen, translated smoothly into a chasm between whites and coloreds."  

In the prejudicial stereotypes formulated and perpetuated by Hakluyt's Elizabethan generation, the Indian served as an intellectual reference group onto which over-idealized traits could be projected or from which equally erroneous negative characteristics could be derived. The mythopoetic and myopic prejudices of Elizabethans—fundamentally negative, culturally predetermined, emotional, rigid, value-laden, often irrational, and high resistant to modification by new and more accurate information—were ethnic stereotypes that fit the "classic"

164Jennings, Invasion of America, 6; also see, 59. And see, Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 358-359. Etienne Grisel wrote that

Europeans had a mixed inheritance which encouraged a dual classification of mankind. According to the Judeo-Christian tradition, "the fundamental division along religious lines was between Christian and heathen." But the Renaissance also revived the thought of ancient philosophers, who had distinguished between Greeks and barbarians. As to the former distinction, the criterion used was religion, or receptivity to grace; as to the latter, it was civilization, or rationality.

"The Beginnings of International Law and General Public Law

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patterning as defined by social psychologists. 165 (See Table III.1, below.)

The New World Indian became a permanent fixture and an essential ingredient in the English ideology of colonization. The Englishmen's strong, self-deluding desire for the success of American ventures overshadowed doubts about the willingness of native peoples to accept the presence of Europeans and to adopt "civilized" behavior. Sooner or later, though, the "savage" Indian, the uncooperative Indian, and the unwaveringly pagan Indian would have to be dealt with. 166 As David Beers Quinn noted, America's


165 See the "classic" characteristics of prejudice summarized in Howard J. Ehrlich, The Social Psychology of Prejudice: A Systematic Theoretical Review and Propositional Inventory of the American Social Psychological Study of Prejudice (New York, 1973), 3-4, chap. 1, passim. Also see, Allport, Nature of Prejudice, chaps. 1-3, passim; LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 69. According to social psychologists, "societal mechanisms," "cognitive mechanisms," and "organizational mechanisms" confirm and convey attitudes of prejudice. Of especial relevance is the principle of stability ("the greater the distinctiveness, diffusion, and consensus in ethnic attitudes, the greater their stability") and the principle of intensity and centrality ("the more important are stereotypes, intentions, or affects, the more intensely they will be accepted or rejected"). Ehrlich, Social Psychology of Prejudice, 161-165.

166 Baudet wrote that, while the "glorification of the red Indian and of the noble savage in general, deeply influenced European expansion, . . . it failed to prevent the wholesale massacres that accompanied this expansion." Paradise on Earth, trans. Wentholt, 54. Also see, Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 3-4.
**TABLE III.1: CLASSIFICATION OF ETHNIC STEREOTYPES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modern Classifications</th>
<th>Typical Elizabethan Prejudices</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive Relational Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are courteous;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Intellectual Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are alert, witty;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Moral Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are candid;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Relational Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are arrogant;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Intellectual Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are childlike;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Moral Qualities</td>
<td>Indians are cowardly;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-Hostility</td>
<td>Indians are sadistic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsubstantial</td>
<td>Indians are lazy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotionality</td>
<td>Indians are pleasure-loving;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Characteristics</td>
<td>Indians are oppressed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Characteristics</td>
<td>Indians are poor;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Characteristics</td>
<td>Indians love music and dancing;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Characteristics</td>
<td>Indians are dark-skinned;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three Levels</td>
<td>Indians are athletic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indians are dirty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"natives were not the simple, obedient savages whom some theorists hoped for, but they were not wholly intractable barbarians either: a sophisticated native policy was called for."\textsuperscript{167}

Although they had nothing resembling a "sophisticated native policy," the Elizabethans did and would depend upon a basic but effective behavior pattern, which, to them, seemed logical, consistent, and just. The first premise of this formula was that the English had a legal, moral, and natural right to inhabit native lands in America. The laws of European states established the "clear and immutable" right of Christians to travel "into those Countries and abide there," and the Indian could "not justly impugne and forbidde, . . . mutuall society and fellowship betweene man and man."\textsuperscript{168} It was God's will for men to explore the earth and to seek out strange lands following the deluge, argued the Europeans. Contact and trade between peoples, safe passage, and free intercourse were deemed essential to counteract the divisive effects of Babel and to bring all men into communion under God.\textsuperscript{169} The European laws of nations and nature by long tradition decreed that "no

\textsuperscript{167}Quinn, "Renaissance Influences," Royal Hist. Soc., Transactions, 5th Ser., XXVI (1976), 91.

\textsuperscript{168}Peckham, True Reporte, in Quinn, ed., Voyages of Gilbert, II, 450.

\textsuperscript{169}Purchas, "Virginias Verger, or a Discourse shewing the benefits which may grow to this Kingdome from American English Plantations, and specially those of Virginia and Summer Ilands" (1625), Purchas His Pilgrimes,
violence should be offered to Ambassadours"; that "the Sea . . . should bee common"; and that "Strangers [i.e., colonizers] sholde not be dryven away from the place or Countrey whereunto they doo come." As Hakluyt expressed it, "they therefore that take away this, take away that most laudable society of mankind, . . . the mutuall occasions of doing good, and . . . vyolate Nature herself." A corollary belief of Englishmen held that all men had a natural and immutable right to the soil in all lands. Indians, they argued, had no right to prevent "strangers" from free access to their fertile land, especially since the natives misused and abused it. So believed Thomas More, when in 1516, he wrote:

They [the Utopians] think it the justest reason for war when any nation refuses to others the use and possession of that land which it does not use itself, but owns in idle emptiness, when the others by the law of nature ought to be nourished from it.

Almost seven decades later, Peckham argued that colonizers should enjoy by right "such competent quantity of Lande, . . . considering the great abundance that they [America's Indians] have of Lande, and howe small account they make


170 Peckham, True Reporte, in Quinn, ed., Voyages of Gilbert, II, 450.

171 Hakluyt, trans. of Mare Liberum, in Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluyts, II, 499.

thereof. The belief that Indians held lands only by right of natural possession—legally unrecognized tenure—and that America was technically vacuum domicilium, ripe for European exploitation, were elements of the Elizabethan colonization ideology with long-range ramifications.\textsuperscript{174}

The manner in which the English arrayed and pressed their justifications for colonization prepared them consciously and unconsciously, psychologically and intellectually, for the Indians' potential rejection of their physical presence and cultural "presents." Ideologically, the most serious, irreconcilable issue for which Englishmen would be compelled to take up arms against Indians would be their rejection of Christianity. England's intense national Protestantism, transported abroad as Anglican imperialism, was the most pervasive and ethnocentric component of Elizabethan culture. The decades-long battles against the "tyranny" of Catholic Europe had stamped an indelible impression upon the English consciousness: religious orthodoxy and the shared values of patriotic Protestantism were the most significant criteria for assessing loyalty and trustworthiness. The religious conversion of Indian populations was considered the "onely course" that could prevent

\textsuperscript{173}Peckham, True Reporte, in Quinn, ed., Voyages of Gilbert, II, 452-453. Also see, Ralegh, Guiana, ed. Schomburgk, 141-142.

\textsuperscript{174}See Jennings, Invasion of America, 82-84, 134-138; Pearce, Savagism and Civilization, 20-21; Purchas, "Virginius Verger," Purchas His Pilgrimes, XIX, passim; Chap. VI, below.
intercultural conflict and "first make strangers confide in a new friendship."175

Given their biases against the allegedly idolatrous and impure forms of Catholic worship, Elizabethans saw "clear and unmistakable similarities ... between Popish and pagan religions."176 Although "all [ancient and heathen forms of idolatry] were regarded as the degenerate expressions of some earlier and purer faith,"177 the native religions of the New World were especially detested, because the "devil worship" and the practice of human sacrifice often attributed to Amerindians represented blind superstition and idolatry at its worst.178 Satanism, real or suspected, could not be tolerated, for, as a "counterfeit religion," it was a direct challenge to the Christian God.179

Although Anglicans were compelled by doctrine to show "mercy upon all Jews, Turks, infidels, heretics, and [to] take from them all ignorance, hardness of heart, and contempt," the pagan's continued resistance to conversion would be considered an intolerable affront to Elizabethans.180

175Alexander, Encouragement to Colonies, 28.
176Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 325.
177Ibid., 303.
178Ralegh, History, 370.
179Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 303.
Non-believers already accounted for five-sixths of the world's population—a shocking statistic—and there was no room whatever for anything like "cultural pluralism."

Elizabethans believed that "the true Religion can be but one, and that which God himselfe teacheth . . . all other religions being but strayings from him, whereby men wander in the darke, and in labyrinthine errour." Hakluyt decried heretical beliefs and reaffirmed his faith in God as the "Creator and Governor of the world, . . . the father of the nature of man, . . . [who] would have them of one kind, and to be conteyned under one name." Ralegh, likewise, noted that "the Law of God bindeth all men, and is without errour." For men committed to an unyielding, all-inclusive Christianity, and who were unwilling to accept the validity of alien belief systems, the issue of religious conversion "presented the sharpest incompatibility

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181 Robert Brerewood, Enquiries touching the diversity of languages and religions in thechiefe parts of the world (London, 1614), noted that Christians (Protestants and Catholics) accounted for 1/6 of the population in the known world, Muslims for 1/5, and "pagans" for the rest. Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 218, 219. Hodgen wrote that "the sum of religions, sects, rituals, gods, and idols known to any well-informed Christian during this period was disconcerting and overwhelming." Ibid., 215.

182 Samuel Purchas, Purchas his Pilgrimage (London, 1613), C4v, D4r. Also see, Pilgrimage, 2d ed., 656; Hodgen, Early Anthropology, 266-267, 301, passim.

183 Hakluyt, trans. of Mare Liberum, in Taylor, Writings of Hakluyts, II, 498.

184 Ralegh, History, 232.
between Indian and European.\textsuperscript{185}

Once Englishmen justified colonization by convincing themselves that settlement on Indian land was not, in and of itself, an act of provocation, and once they determined that religious conversion of Indians was an uncompromisable goal, intercultural conflict was largely predetermined. In 1596, Ralegh summarized Elizabethan thinking on these issues. "Christians may not warrantably conquer Infidells upon pretence only of their infidelity," he wrote, "\textit{unless upon just cause of wrongs} from the Idolaters received."\textsuperscript{186} Of course, "just cause of wrongs" could be interpreted in a variety of ways. If the Indians rejected Christ's gospel and gave "hard measure" to English missionaries or if they denied free use of their soil, colonizers had a perfect right to "overrun their countryes."\textsuperscript{187} The English were determined to have colonies one of two ways: by "quiet possession," freely accepted and welcomed by Indians, or by military conquest of hostile natives "to attaine and maintaine the right for which they

\textsuperscript{185}Page, \textit{American Genesis}, 217; also chap. 19, \textit{passe­sim}. Also see, Jennings, \textit{Invasion of America}, 43-45; LeVine and Campbell, \textit{Ethnocentrism}, 138. This self-assured belief in One Truth and One Way is typical of an intense ethnocentrism. Such a view is often coupled with "phenom­enal absolutism"--the belief that alien cultures consciously ignore and resist the "right way" because of perversity or wickedness. Levine and Campbell, \textit{Ethnocentrism}, 14.

\textsuperscript{186}Ralegh, \textit{Guiana}, ed. Schomburgk, 140, 142-143; my italics.

\textsuperscript{187}Ibid., 143; also see 146. And see, Peckham,
doo come."\textsuperscript{188}

Against unregenerate and militant \textit{mauvais sauvages}--the "stubborne Savages as shall refuse obedience"\textsuperscript{189}--it was considered "no breache of equitye for the Christians to defend themselves, to pursue revenge with force, and to doo whatsoever is necessary for attayning of theyr safety," in essence, "to resist violence with violence."\textsuperscript{190} "The Law of Nature, . . . and the Lawes of all Christian Kings and States," wrote Ralegh, "do favour him that is assailed in the slaughter of the Assailant."\textsuperscript{191}

Retributive justice against aggressors, be they Spaniards or Indians, was further legitimized by reference to Biblical and classical precedents. Joshua and Juda had "utterlie vanquished many Gentiles, Idolaters, and adversaries to the children of Israel," and the Old Testament provided many other examples of how "God shewed his justice to revenge tyranny."\textsuperscript{192} Under the Roman emperor, 


\textsuperscript{190}Peckham, \textit{True Reporthe}, in Quinn, ed., \textit{Voyages of Gilbert}, II, 453.

\textsuperscript{191}Ralegh, \textit{History}, 468 (2d enumeration).

\textsuperscript{192}Peckham, \textit{True Reporthe}, in Quinn, ed., \textit{Voyages of Gilbert}, II, 455; also, 454. See Judges 1, 6, 11; Joshua, 4,5,6,7. Trevelyan wrote that through the tremendous popularity of the Bible in the 16th century, "the deeds and
Constantine, Christianity was advanced by "the Lawe of Armes" when he conquered "remote Barbarous and Heathen nations" (among them Britain) and "utterlie subdued the rude and cruell . . . Scithians."\textsuperscript{193} These were compelling precedents, indeed, for "conquering the Gentiles" and "extinguishing of such tirants as . . . withstoode the planting of the christian religion."\textsuperscript{194}

But as ready as they were to use force against "stubborne Savages" (considered a small minority of coastal Indians), Elizabethan Englishmen hoped that military conquest would not be necessary.\textsuperscript{195} Once again, they were prepared for bloodshed but desirous of avoiding it. As confident as they were that "God hath reserved [areas north of Florida] . . . to be reduced unto Christian civility by the English nation," the men of Hakluyt's generation were optimistic of contacting the "right" kind of Indians--those yearning for trade goods, Elizabethan thoughts of men who had lived thousands of years before in the eastern Mediterranean . . . coloured the daily thought and speech of Britons." \textit{History of England,} II, 135.


\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., 458.

\textsuperscript{195}Englishmen in the 1580s and 1590s were careful to distinguish between unregenerate, hostile Indians and converted, hospitable ones, just as they differentiated between genocide and limited retribution. See ibid., 451-453, 458; Hakluyt, "Discourse of Western Planting," in Taylor, ed., \textit{Writings of Hakluyts}, II, 257-261, 282, 318; Ralegh, \textit{Guiana}, ed. Schomburgk, 140-149, 152.
folkways, and Anglicanism.  

The English were secure in the validity and the ultimate success of their grand plans for colonization, and the idealists welcomed the challenge of intercultural relations and a religious mission to the New World. The success of such a mission, in light of Spanish failures, would confirm the superiority of English values and institutions. The Elizabethans were ever conscious that "the eyes of all Europe are looking upon our endeavours to spread the Gospell among the Heathen people," and disgrace would follow a moral disaster as great as Spain's. After decades of bitter warfare with intransigent foes in the dismal bogs of Ireland--compared by some contemporaries to Spain's wasteful and ill-fated forays into the Low Countries--England wanted New World colonization to work.

Englishmen like Hakluyt never lost sight of the fact that America's Indians held the key to colonial success or failure. They were the human bounty to be claimed for England and their reaction to colonization would be the crucial, determining factor in the realization of


198 Alexander, Encouragement to Colonies, 4-5.
English plans. Despite the fact that contact with Indians was unavoidable, Elizabethans did not want to avoid them. America was a territorial laboratory where contact with Indians and reform of their culture were required procedures for testing the values and the ideology of the elect nation.

English colonization in Ireland and "Old" Virginia (Roanoke Island) in the last quarter of the sixteenth century illustrated Elizabethan treatment of alien out-groups, and these experiences give perspective to later Anglo-Indian relations at Jamestown.

A great body of historical literature has been devoted to a comparison of Irish and Virginia colonization, including analyses of propagandistic and promotional tracts, the attitudes toward indigenous populations, and the activities of leading colonizers. However, the Elizabethan colonization of Ireland cannot be directly equated with Hakluytian New World ventures, because of the confused sequence of conquest-colonization-conquest that characterized Tudor Ireland over several decades. The English did not regard Ireland in terms of an idealistic mission like that which motivated them in American colonization; rather,

Ireland represented a long-standing threat to England itself and was viewed in terms of strategic and military considerations.

In essence, anti-Irish prejudices were founded in real conflicts long before Elizabethan colonization was attempted on a large scale, and idealistic missions were aborted in favor of brutal conquests. In 1573, the suppression of Shane O'Neill's rebellion cost the English crown over £230,000; Desmond's rebellion in 1579, some £255,000; and Tyrone's rebellion of 1594-1603 almost £2,000,000. During those decades, the Pope dispatched two expeditions to Ireland in an attempt to attack Protestant England from the "back door," and tens of thousands of Welsh and English troops were levied to fight the Irish rebels. Thus, as G. M. Trevelyan concluded,

Ireland was the danger point in Elizabeth's dominions, and when her enemies attacked her there she was compelled most reluctantly to undertake its conquest. Because her military and financial resources were inadequate to the task, her lieutenants used great cruelty in destroying the people by sword and famine, and in making a desert of districts which they had not the power to hold.

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200 Trevelyan, History of England, II, 122. In comparison, the Armada-connected mobilization cost only £333,000. Ibid.

201 Between 1590 and 1602, over 32,000 Welsh and English troops were levied for Irish service, while an undetermined portion of another 30,000 men levied for combined service in Ireland, Cadiz, the Azores, and the Low Countries also saw action. C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 2d ed. (London and New York, 1968), Appendices, 290, 293.

Although the native Irish and the Indians of America were both regarded as culturally inferior pagans and savages, the major difference was that the English knew the Irish as hostile and aggressive rebels before they had a chance to idealize them as perspective converts to "civility." As far back as the reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII, the Irish countryside beyond the English "Pale" was regarded as the wild and barbaric domain of tyrannical clan leaders, where feuds and wars raged continually. Although the Irish were denounced by the same ethnocentric "cultural nationalism" that caused Elizabethans to denigrate all alien cultures, they were especially hated for their "treasons" and belligerence. The Irish were described as warlike, "lurking rebel[s]," a people "desperate in revenge" and "implacable in their hatred," whose "disobedience [was] loathsome" to the English. Elizabethans envisioned the Irish as

Fraught with all vice, replete with villainy,
They still rebel and that most treacherously
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Cruel and bloody, barbarous and rude,
Dire vengeance at their heels hath them pursued
They are the savagest of all the nation; . . . .


207 Ibid., 136.
These were the angry stereotypes confirmed by direct and bloody contact, and "English verses . . . became ever more bitter as the war went on."\(^{208}\) In 1600, the Irish were called "blind reprobates, Megora's brats" who "practice rapes, and true men's wracks."\(^{209}\)

Elizabethan Englishmen had only too many occasions to observe and read about the hated, rebellious, and intransigent "wild" Irish. Out of strategic necessity vis a vis the threats of Catholic Europe and, in particular to put down the rebellion of Shane O'Neill (1559-1566), England moved to subdue and conquer Ulster in the mid-1560s.\(^{210}\) Soon after, other rebellions—Fitzmaurice's in 1569-1572 and Desmond's in 1579-1583—flared up in the southern province of Munster. Humphrey Gilbert (later knighted) was one of the commanders dispatched to quell the uprisings, and he demonstrated the less-than-idealistic goals necessitated by combat. In suppressing rebellion, Gilbert ordered that

the heddes of all those . . . which were killed in the daie, should be cutte of[f] from their bodies and . . . should . . . bee laied on the ground by eche side of the waie leading into his owne tente so that . . . [everyone] muste passe through a lane of heddes which he used ad terrorem . . .: And yet did it bring greate terrour to the [Irish] people when thei sawe the heddes of their dedde fathers, brothers, children, kinsfolke and freinds, lye on the grounde before therr

\(^{208}\)ibid.

\(^{209}\)ibid.

\(^{210}\)Elton, England under the Tudors, 387-389. See also, Nicholas Canny, The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-1576 (Hassocks, 1976), passim.
faces, as thei came to speake with the said collonell. 211

Gilbert, the sadistic commander, was also an articulate spokesman for the English position, and in 1572, he argued for the necessity of ad terrorem tactics. Ireland had to be conquered in any way possible, he wrote, because the constant state of turmoil and rebellion were "causes of Confusion" and left that country "open to th'entrye of enemyes"—"Spanyards or scottes" or others with "desire of Conquest." "The assured subjection of Ireland," wrote Gilbert, would bring "quitness without rebellions and thereby a savinge of great expence to . . . England." 212

Private plantations were an integral part of Elizabethan plans for subjugation. When the Anglo-Spanish war prevented American colonization from proceeding in the late 1580s, Ralegh established his 12,000-acre Munster plantation on lands confiscated from Desmond and the house of Fitzgerald. Ralegh and other entrepreneurs were encouraged to settle English yeoman tenants on their lands in an effort

211 Thomas Churchyard, A Generall rehearsal of warres and joyned to the same some tragedies and epitaphes (1579), quoted in Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 582. See also, Quinn, Elizabethans and the Irish, 126-129.

212 Humphrey Gilbert, "The Discourse of Ireland" (1572), in Quinn, ed., Voyages of Gilbert, I, 125. The "preservation of the Irish empire" was deemed more crucial, since England no longer held Calais. "If Ireland shuld also be wonne from England," theorized Gilbert, "then England shuld be bordered on eche side as occasion might sone fall owt, with unsure and dangerous neighbours whereof let Scotland be a president for us." Ibid., 126.
to bring stability to Ireland.213 Thus, Elizabethan
colonization in Ireland had a different *raison d'etre* than
English colonization in America. Its precedents were
Roman and Machiavellian, and colonies functioned as mili-
tary components of pacification and conquest. English
colonization in Ireland was neither trade-oriented nor land-
oriented to the degree that it was a guarantee of order and
control.214 "In Ireland," observed Quinn, "colonization
was primarily one means of solving the problem of govern-
ment; colonies were associated with power rather than with
the expansion of peoples into new areas."215

But Ralegh's plantation and the other private
"colonies" in Ireland were soon "washed away in blood"--
the blood and "sudden horror" of Tyrone's rebellion and the
"Nine Years' War," 1594-1603.216 This was the largest Irish
uprising and the single greatest challenge to English
pacification efforts in Ireland.217 In 1598, the talented

213Ibid., 128; Rowse, *Expansion of Elizabethan
England*, 141-144; Elton, *England under the Tudors*, 390-
391; Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," *WMQ*,
3d Ser., XXX (1973), 577.

214Quinn, "Renaissance Influences," *Royal Hist.

215Ibid; also see, 79. Canny noted the influence
of Roman and Machiavellian precedents, but he did not
differentiate between a colony of "control" and a colony
of economic exploitation. "Ideology of English Coloniza-

216Rowse, *Expansion of Elizabethan England*, 144;
Elton, *England under the Tudors*, 390; Quinn, *England and
the Discovery of America*, 386.

Hugh O'Neill, earl of Tyrone, inflicted a devastating defeat upon English forces at Yellow Ford on Ulster's Blackwater River, killing 1500 of the enemy.\textsuperscript{218} In Munster, native tenants rebelled against their absentee English manor lords, and "in one month's space almost all the Irish were in rebellious arms, and the English were murdered, or stripped or banished."\textsuperscript{219} One English commentator noted that Tyrone was "incouraged by the Pope, and ayded by the King of Spaine. . . . In these troubles and treasons, [we] see the Machinations of Satans seed against the seed of the Woman, that is, the Church."\textsuperscript{220}

Elizabeth responded to this real threat by dispatching notable, and sometimes capable, commanders to quell the rebellion. This was not to be a war waged by colonists against native inhabitants, as the struggle became yet another front in the ongoing Anglo-Spanish conflict. England sent thousands of troops and spent over two million pounds, while Philip III dispatched over five thousand Spanish soldiers to fuel the fires of revolt on England's frontier.\textsuperscript{221}

The final, decisive blow to Gaelic independence came at the Battle of Kinsale in 1603, where the Spanish

\textsuperscript{218}Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 144, 422.
\textsuperscript{219}Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{220}Richard Carleton, Bishop of Chichester, A Thankefull Remembrance of Gods mercy (London, 1624), B2\textsuperscript{v}–B3\textsuperscript{r}.
\textsuperscript{221}Rowse, Expansion of Elizabethan England, 431.
garrison surrendered and Tyrone's forces disintegrated.\textsuperscript{222} The English victory belonged to Charles Blount, Lord Mountjoy, but the war had been won by attrition and atrocity, as whole provinces were reduced to burned over districts.\textsuperscript{223} The destruction of crops and food supplies and the slaughter of noncombatants brought the suffering of total war to the civilian population.\textsuperscript{224} These tactics were deemed necessary for winning a long and frustrating guerrilla war, and atrocities were self-justifying for the cathartic release they brought to the harried troops. Ireland had, over the years, done "to the English as the Lowe-Countries did to Spaine, [becoming] a meanes whereby to waste their men, and their money."\textsuperscript{225} But, as Thomas Churchyard observed in 1579, "terrour . . . made short warres."\textsuperscript{226}

In 1599, Elizabeth and her Privy Council defended the English military response to the "violent and bloody outrages" of the Irish rebels. Many native Irish, it was

\textsuperscript{222}Ibid., 434-437; Cruickshank, \textit{Elizabeth's Army}, 206.

\textsuperscript{223}Rowse, \textit{Expansion of Elizabethan England}, chap. 11, passim.


\textsuperscript{225}Alexander, \textit{Encouragement to Colonies}, 4. Also see, [Abbot], \textit{Description of World}, C3\textsuperscript{v}; Quinn, \textit{Elizabethans and the Irish}, 131-132.

asserted, were "forced into disloyalty by 'the Wicked and barbarous rebels,' who have alleged, falsely, 'that we intended an utter extirpation . . . of that nation and Conquest of the country.'" But "'the very name of Conquest in this case seemeth absurd to us,' since the object of military action was only 'to reduce a number of unnatural and barbarous rebels and to root out the capital heads of the most notorious traitors.'" 227

Historian Nicholas Canny has argued that the English treatment of the Irish was "innovative" and "extralegal," and that because the Irish were judged culturally inferior, conquest was made ideologically justifiable to the Elizabethans. 228 The English were uncompromising, prejudiced, and cruel conquerors to be sure, but Canny is wrong in several respects. According to the Elizabethan imperialist ideology, cultural superiority entitled Englishmen to invade and settle regions where paganism,

227 Quinn, Elizabetes and the Irish, 137. The English assumed that rebels formed only a militant minority in an otherwise complacent and obedient population. Sir William Herbert wrote in his "Croftus, sine De Hibernia liber" that English plantations in Ireland were designed to defend the "powerless against the harshness and oppression of the rulers." Quoted in Quinn, "Renaissance Influences," Royal Hist. Soc., Transactions, 5th Ser., XXVI (1976), 85 and n. See also Quinn, Elizbeans and the Irish, 137 and passim.

228 Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 579, 581, 583, 594-595. Quinn argued that Elizabethan attitudes remained ambivalent and divided with regard to Ireland and the Irish. Englishmen were "curious, surprised, hostile, censorious, nationalis­tic, reforming, and, paradoxically, at times sympathetic and brutal almost in the same breath." Elizbeans and the Irish, 33.
tyranny, and chaos—as they defined them—reigned. All Christian states recognized this right. But conquest could only be legitimized as a response to aggression, such as a rebellion of native inhabitants against the English invaders/settlers. Of course, the English allowed little choice to indigenous populations: either submit peacefully and accept the English presence or rebel against it and face military conquest. But ideologically, in the Elizabethan Englishman's mind, there was a difference. The conquest/colonization of Ireland occurred because the people were rebelling against legitimate authority and legal possession according to sixteenth century standards, not because the Irish were cultural "inferiors."

Since the English defined tyranny as aggression, especially aggression against them, they found it and provoked it everywhere. But even though they might provoke it, if aggression and rebellion erupted, then the English needed no defense to employ retributive justice or wars of conquest against the "traitors" to imposed authority. That was the ultimate rationalization of Elizabethan ideology: military conquest was the legal and defensive response to tyrannical aggression against prior, morally justifiable colonization. Given such a rational sequence of propositions, all proper, moral, and "legal," the English had neither reason nor inclination to emulate the wanton horrors
of the "black Legend," as Canny implied. Sir Robert Cecil wrote that Elizabeth "might have rooted out the whole Nation [of Ireland] by this time [1599]. So hath the Spaniard done in the Indies, but her Majesty is more merciful for they must have some place to live in." While atrocities multiplied, and English cruelties often rivaled those of Spain, Cecil's statement and similar ones throughout the latter sixteenth century reveal that Elizabethans never wanted to copy the illegal and brutal tactics of the Spanish.

If the last two decades of Elizabeths' reign demonstrated anything, it was that the English considered themselves morally superior to the Spanish "tyrants." Spain committed aggression against unoffending, innocent native populations that posed no direct threat to Philip's throne, whereas the English in Ireland were combating aggression that posed a real danger to the security of England itself. Although, objectively speaking, Englishmen demonstrated a capacity for cruelty and tyranny equal to that of the Spanish, the crucial fact was that their ideology of

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229 Canny, "Ideology of English Colonization," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 594-596. Canny made much of the fact that Richard Eden's Decades of the Newe Worlde or West India (London, 1555) had recommended Spain's colonial example to Englishmen, but Eden's advice must be seen as a less-than-sincere attempt to impress Mary Tudor and Philip II, the Catholic monarchs then on the throne. Ibid., 594; Parker, Books to Build an Empire, 44, 48, chap. 4, passim.

230 Quoted in Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, 387.
colonization, which made them particularly self-conscious about tyranny, blinded them to their own misdeeds.

The second example of Elizabethan colonization occurred at Roanoke Island, off the present North Carolina coast, between 1584 and 1590. Unlike the Irish experiences, the Roanoke Colony followed some of Hakluyt's formulations and offered Englishmen their first opportunity to live among New World native populations. However, the always tentative nature of the Roanoke venture, its exclusive reliance upon private versus national sponsorship and funding, the small scale of the attempt, and its failure to exploit agriculture, native commodities, and trade relationships characterize Ralegh's colony as a less-than-mature example of Elizabethan colonization.

The Roanoke Colony was at least partially designed as a privateering base and a military outpost from which raids on Spanish plate fleets could be launched.231 Ralegh's original patent from Queen Elizabeth, dated March 25, 1584, made no mention of a civilizing or Christianizing mission among the Indian population, although a subsequent bill of confirmation in the House of Commons (dated December 1584) referred to the Roanoke venture as an opportunity for "the knowledge of god and trewe religion . . . [to] be propagated amongeste foreign Nacions."232

231Quinn, ed., Roanoke Voyages, I, 6-7; Morgan American Slavery, American Freedom, 28-29.
232Quinn, ed., Roanoke Voyages, I, 82-89, 126-127.
Under his patent, Ralegh dispatched Philip Amadas and Arthur Barlow on an exploratory expedition in the summer of 1584. The following summer, Sir Richard Grenville led a large military force to secure an outpost in the country, now known as "Virginia." Grenville left 108 men, including scientist Thomas Harriot and artist John White, on the ten-mile long Roanoke Island under the command of Ralph Lane, a veteran of Irish combat. Lane's contingent constituted the "first colony." Lane constructed a fort and explored the region up to Chesapeake Bay, but having fallen on hard times, his men took passage with Sir Francis Drake's fleet and returned to England in June 1586. In July, three relief ships under Grenville finally arrived at Roanoke and found the outpost deserted, but Grenville left fifteen men to hold Fort Ralegh while he returned to England. This handful of men was the "second colony."

Such tentative beginnings prevented the realization of any idealistic mission that Ralegh may have entertained. It was only with the "third colony" at Roanoke that Hakluytian colonization—in the sense of a stable agricultural settlement with women as well as men—was attempted.233 In January 1586/87, a corporation known as "the Governor and Assistants of the Citie of Ralegh in Virginia," was created. And consistent with Hakluyt's belief that colonies were the vehicles by which native populations

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233Ibid., II, 498.
would be converted, the college of arms referred to the new corporation as the means for "The increase of Christian Faith and Religion" in America.234

In February 1586/87, Hakluyt counselled his friend Ralegh that the "salvation of countless souls, and the increase of the Kingdom of Christ... [was] at stake." "For to posterity," observed Hakluyt, "no greater glory can be handed down to conquer the barbarian, to recall the savage and the pagan to civility, to draw the ignorant within the orbit of reason, and to fill with reverence for divinity the godless and the ungodly."235

It was Hakluyt who, in 1586, urged Ralegh to colonize in the area of Chesapeake Bay, a region of greater promise than Roanoke Island,236 and, indeed, Gov. John White's expedition of 1587 was headed for the Bay, "according to the charge given us... under the hande of Sir Walter Ralegh."237 Those plans were aborted, however, and White and the 117 colonists (89 men, 17 women, 11 children) were unceremoniously deposited on Roanoke Island in July 1587. This group became by accident and not design the "fourth colony" at Roanoke. White and the ships soon

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234"Grant of Arms to the City of Ralegh," Jan. 1586/87, ibid., 508.

235Hakluyt, Epistle Dedicatory to Ralegh, trans. of Peter Martyr's De orbe novo... (1587), ibid., 515.

236Hakluyt to Ralegh, Dec. 30, 1586, ibid., I, 494.

237[John White], "The fourth voyage made to Virginia, with three shippes, in the yeere, 1587," ibid., II, 523; also see, 502-503.
returned to England, and a relief expedition did not reach Roanoke Island again until August 1590, by which time the colony had vanished. Thus the "fourth colony" became the "Lost Colony" of history and legend.\(^{238}\) Roanoke was a failure.

In six years, Ralegh had spent some £40,000 in private funds with no appreciable return on his investment.\(^ {239}\) The colonists had failed at subsistence agriculture and made Governor White's land grants dubious inducements to settlement.\(^ {240}\) With scanty and erratic logistical support from England and the discontinuous nature of the various settlements, the Roanoke Colony was never assured of long-term survival. Because of this disadvantage, it was illogical to expect conversion of Indians or the development of Mediterranean-type commodities so promoted by Hakluyt and Harriot.\(^ {241}\) According to Quinn, the "highly specialized and carefully organized type of farming" necessary to fulfill Hakluyt's ideal projections, "was not easily practicable." "There was no conception in Hakluyt's

\(^{238}\)See ibid., 515-538; Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, chap. 17, passim.


\(^{240}\)Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, 302-304; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 39-43.

\(^{241}\)Alexander wrote that the Roanoke colonists, "not being supplied in time, or out of ignorance, or laziness, not using the ordinary means (the usual fault of all beginners) were brought by famine to a great extremity."
mind of the long struggle for a bare subsistence, under primitive conditions, . . . which made the rapid construction of . . . [a successful] settlement as he envisaged quite unrealistic."

The Roanoke Colony also showed Hakluyt to have been overly idealistic and naive regarding Anglo-Indian relations. The complexities of intercultural contact were revealed in the New World realities of the 1580s, but, even so, the blunders committed by Ralegh's men were destined to be repeated some twenty years later at Jamestown.

At Roanoke, the English made contact with coastal Algonquians who had a sedentary, agricultural economy based upon maize and supplementary, seasonal hunting; a tradition of intertribal warfare; an intratribal political hierarchy; and a system of intervillage overlordship and alliance. These Carolina Algonquians, called "Renapoaks," the "true men," numbered between five and ten

Encouragement to Colonies, 28.


thousand persons at time of contact and lived in
"Wingandacoa," the region encompassing the mainland between
the Chowan and Pamlico rivers and the outer banks of modern
North Carolina. 244 (See Map III.1.)

Wingadacoa was subdivided into three main tribal
enclaves with separate overlords, or werowances. At con-
tact, the Secotans occupied villages from south of the
Pamlico River to Albemarle Sound, including Roanoke Island
and a mainland village opposite the island, called
Dasemunkepeuc. The Roanokes/Secotans were the first Indian
group encountered by the English. The Secotan werowance
was Wingina, and his brother, Granganimeo, seemed to be a
subordinate ruling over Roanoke Island. While Granganimeo
lived, Secotan-English relations were peaceful enough. 245

The Weapemeoc tribe controlled a second major ter-
ritory, and their villages were situated on the north
shore of Albemarle Sound. Okisco, the Weapemeoc werowance,
displayed both passive and hostile behavior toward the
English invaders.

The third subdivision of Wingandacoa was ruled by
the Chawanoacs, reputedly the strongest of the Carolina
Algonquians in this era. They were led by the lame
werowance, Menatonon, who lived at the inland village of

244 Lane, "Account," in Quinn, ed., Roanoke
Voyages, I, 277 and n. On Wingandacoa, see ibid., II,
853-854. On population, see ibid., I, 265n.

245 Barlowe, "First voyage," ibid., I, 99-100, 103,
106-107, 110-111, 113.
MAP III.1 WINGANDACOA:
RALEGH'S "VIRGINIA," 1584-1590
Chawanoac on the Chowan River. Menatonon did not take up arms against the English because both he and his son, Skiko, were frequently hostages of the invaders. Yet another, seemingly independent tribe, the Croatoans, lived on Croatoan Island in Pamlico Sound. Although he was probably not the werowance there, Manteo was the Croatoan best known to the English and served as a loyal interpreter and informer.

As Englishmen preconditioned to recognize paganism and idolatry, the Roanoke adventurers were immediately prejudiced against the belief systems of the Indian population. Although Barlowe in 1584 described the Secotans as kind and gentle people, he also called attention to the worship of "their Idoll" (Kiwasa), "a meere illusion of the Devill." Harriot, in his Briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia (London, 1588), described Indian religion at length, especially the satanic practices of the Secotan conjurers and priests. In Theodor DeBry's 1590 illustrated edition of Harriot's work, the deity Kiwasa, protector of dead werowances, was illustrated in engravings.


247 For an overview of the tribes of Wingandacoa, somewhat different from the one presented here, see ibid., II, 852-872.


249 Harriot, Briefe and true report, E2v-F14.
DeBry's elaborate title page portrayed Kiwasa seated upon the skull of a ram and being worshipped by a conjurer and a priest. The implication of satanism and idolatry was unmistakable.

The English attitude toward real or perceived enemies was a militant one, and their quick resort to force of arms often preconditioned the alienation of indigenous populations. The Roanoke ventures were military in organization and conception, and strong-armed tactics were considered the most reliable, if least imaginative, course of action. When Grenville's 1585 expedition stopped in the Spanish West Indies for provisions, the English troops demanded food by "faire, and friendly means" but were determined, if necessary, "to practise force, and to relieue our selves by the sworde." When the Spaniards failed to deliver provisions as promised, "our General fired the woods thereabout." Later, at Hispaniola, the English had their way with other Spaniards not out of any "curtesie," but because of "the force that we were of ...: for doubtlesse if they had bene stronger than wee, we might have looked for no better curtesie at their handes, then Master John Hawkins received at Saint John de Ullua [in

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In their relations with the Secotans, the English wanted them to "honour, obey, feare, and love us" all at once and promised "discreet dealing and governement" with the Indians. However, the emphasis was always more on fear than on love. In Grenville's first expedition to the mainland opposite Roanoke Island, the village of Aquascogoc was torched because the Secotans had failed to return a stolen goblet. In 1586, Ralph Lane captured Menatonon, the crippled Chawanoac werowance and held his son as a hostage for good behavior; raided Weapemeoc villages; and generally intimidated local werowances in an attempt to prevent a real or imaginary conspiracy against the English. Lane attacked and murdered the werowance Wingina (who had changed his name to Pemisapan), because the Secotans and their allies, "grew not onely into contempt of us, but ... began to blaspheme, and flatly to say, that our Lord God was not God, since hee suffered us to sustaine much hunger and also to be killed." The English commander proudly described how Pemisapan was assassinated:

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252 Ibid., 187.
253 Harriot, Briefe and true report, F2v.
256 Lane, "Account," ibid., 277.
Finding myself amidst 7. or 8. of his principal Weroances, and followers [wrote Lane], I gave the watchword agreed upon, (which was Christ our victory,) and immediately those his chiefe men, and himselfe, had by the mercie of God for our deliverance, that which they had purposed for us [i.e., death].

Lane's bloody and expedient attack brought only temporary security, for when Governor White's "Citie of Ralegh" expedition arrived in July 1587, Lane's fort had been destroyed and none of the fifteen soldiers left by Grenville were alive. Friendly Croatoan tribesmen reported that the Secotans had killed the small garrison, and soon after White's arrival, one of the leading colonists was slain on Roanoke Island by Pemisapan's followers seeking revenge. In an attempt to salvage a diplomatic triumph in an otherwise dismal record of Indian relations, the English in 1587 baptized Manteo, a trusted Croatoan who had been to England, and titled him "Lord of Roanoke and Daseqmunkepeuc." In only three years, the English at Roanoke had alienated the vast majority of the local Indian population and had driven traditional tribal enemies to band together in an attempted uprising against the hated invaders. Already in 1585, Harriot noted how "some of our companie

257 Ibid., 287-288; my italics.
258 [White], "Fourth voyage," ibid., II, 524-528.
259 Ibid., 530-531; White, "Narrative of the 1590 Voyage to Virginia," ibid., 598 and n.
260 Ibid., I, 246-248, 265n, 270n, 276n-277n, 280n.
shewed themselves too fierce, in slaying some of the [Indian] people . . . upon causes that on our part, might easily enough have been borne withall."261 Hakluyt, too, believed that "the hand of God came upon them [the English] for the crueltie, and outrages committed by some of them against the native inhabitants of the Countrie."262

English criticisms of Roanoke activities were well founded, and even Lane himself feared that unruly troops would brutalize the Indians more than even he believed necessary. Lane's job as commander was made extremely difficult by, as he phrased it, the "wynde menn of myne owene naccione."263 English officers feared that their own troops would turn "their Peeces and Pikes against their commanders."264 As Ralegh expressed the problem, "all discourse of magnanimitie, of Nationall Vertue, of Religion, of Libertie, and whatsoever else hath beene wont to move and incourage vertuous men, hath no force at all with the common Souldier."265

But in addition to deliberate attack and the brutalities of English troops on the rampage, the Indians

261Harriot, Briefe and true report, F2v.
263Lane to Sir Philip Sidney, Aug. 12, 1585, ibid., 204.
264Ralegh, History, 148 (2d enumeration).
265Ibid.
of Wingandacoa suffered a more devastating and terrifying form of abuse--disease. Even in villages "not revenged" by Lane's troops, death by epidemic took a horrible toll of the native population. "The people began to die very fast," observed Harriot in 1585, "and many in short space; in some towns about twenty, in some forty, . . . and in one six score [died], which in truth was very many in respect of their numbers."266 Because disease and death struck only the Indians and only at those villages that the English visited, the unprecedented epidemics had a disastrous psychological impact upon the Secotans. According to Harriot, after "the Wiroans Wingina had observed such effects in four or five towns to follow their [the Indians'] wicked practises, they were persuaded that it was the worke of our God through our meanes, and that wee by him might kill and slaye whoe wee would without weapons and not come neere them."267 Harriot further reported that high mortality among the Secotans--"this marvelous accident"--caused them to regard the English as gods. "Some [of the Indians] woulde likewise seeme to prophesie that there were more of our generation yet to come, to kill theirs and take their places, as some thought the purpose was by that which was already done."268

266Harriot, Briefe and true report, F1r.
267 Ibid.; my italics.
Kidnappings, murder, theft, arson, epidemic disease, and fear, not love, of the Christian God were the offerings of English "civility" brought to the Indians of Wingandacoa. If the native inhabitants by their hostility had ceased to fit Hakluyt's conception of friendly and guileless innocents, so, too, had the English failed to live up to the Hakluytian standards of idealistic, Anglican liberators. In fact, the most serious concern by 1587 should have been whether the tactics of the English would leave any Indians alive for "liberation" and conversion.

Ironically, Hakluyt's goal of tranquil intercultural cohabitation in the New World probably came closest to fulfillment as a result of the Roanoke venture. There is reason to believe that some of the English men and women of White's "Lost Colony" went to live among, and actually intermarried with, the Croatoan Indians to form the Hatteras/Lumbee tribe of a later date. But the homeland-English could never or would never accept such a shocking example of genetic assimilation and cultural betrayal. Instead, tales of the "Lost Colony" came to epitomize Indian treachery and served as the mythopoeic "bloody shirt" for justifying aggression against the Powhatans years later.


By the time of Elizabeth's death in 1603, Englishmen had acquired a considerable amount of firsthand experience in scorching the earth and scourging the enemy on their expansionist frontiers. English actions in Ireland and at Roanoke were not what Hakluyt ideally had in mind, but the basic tenets of the ideology of colonization had proven quite serviceable, nonetheless. Predictably, Englishmen had found "tyrants" wherever they looked and created rebels wherever they ventured. When Lane spoke of the "treason of our owne Savages," he revealed an elaborate English belief system that equally accommodated and legitimized invasion, conversion, and conquest.271

Harsh retribution and force of arms had proven to be useful, short-term tactics of military pacification in Ireland and at Roanoke, but Elizabethan colonies still had to demonstrate their viability and value. However, rather than engaging in self-chastisement for these colonial failures, Englishmen were convinced that a more concerted effort along the same ideological lines would assure success. The formation of the Virginia Company of London in 1606 was interpreted as a hopeful new attempt to prove the validity of English ideals and Elizabethan preconceptions.

Ideologically, the Elizabethan Age did not come to an end with the queen's death in 1603. The ideology of

58, 91. And see Chap. IV, Below.

271 Lane, "Account," in Quinn, ed., Roanoke Voyages, I, 266.
colonization that had encompassed English ethnocentrism and sense of Protestant mission for two decades prior to Elizabeth's death remained a dominant intellectual force for two decades after her passing. A religious mission in the New World had become so much a part of England's cultural baggage that to deny its validity or to disparage its chances of success would have undermined a major rationale for colonization and irreparably damaged the ideological pillars of Elizabethan imperialism.

Following the colonial failures in Ireland and at Roanoke, the formation of the Virginia Company of London in 1606 provided the first, best, and last opportunity to test the Elizabethans' post-Armada assumptions in America. The colony of Virginia--founded close enough in time to Elizabeth's reign to capitalize upon her dizzying era of patriotic glory and national enthusiasm--was sanctioned by James I, supported by a large cross-section of the English populace, and directed by a diverse contingent of merchants, clergy, gentry, and nobility. Judged in terms of the ethnocentrism that spawned it and the ideology that nurtured it, the Jamestown colony was a fitting climax to the Elizabethan Age.272

272 Elizabethan colonial theories were applied in Virginia as in no other 17th-century English colony. The founding of Jamestown, a vindication of patriotic imperialism, appealed to an England united in its goals through the centripetal forces of the pulpit and the crown. In contrast, the later colonies at Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay were founded as refuges for sectarians and dissenters and appealed only to special interests. See Chap. IV, below.
Elizabeth, the "Virgin Queen of eternal memory" was considered to be the "first Godmother" of Virginia, and the Rev. Richard Hakluyt deserves the designation as the "first Godfather." His personal crusade of the pen unrelentingly supported both practical colonial projects and the overall intellectual arguments of English imperialism. Hakluyt's enthusiasm was shared, and his writings were encouraged, by high-placed officials like Sir Francis Walsingham, Lord Burghley, and Sir Robert Cecil, and he was closely involved in the founding of both the East India and Virginia companies between 1600 and 1606.

"Hakluyt," wrote A. L. Rowse, "formed the true link between the strenuous fragmented efforts [at colonization] under Elizabeth . . . and their final fulfilment in Virginia." When the decade of the 1590s saw Englishmen preoccupied with the war with Spain, privateering, and mercantile interests in other parts of the world, Hakluyt attempted to reawaken interest in American colonization with the publication of a three-volume, second edition of his *Principall Navigations* (1598-1600), twice the size of

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the 1589 original. Although activity in the area of Virginia was suspended until the Anglo-Spanish War ended in 1604, Hakluyt "never lost faith in it, and took part in its revival under James I." 277

The relevance of Hakluyt's ideas was attested to by the serious attention given the Principal Navigations. The East India Company after 1600 supplied all its ships with copies, making it required reading along with the Bible, Foxe's "Book of Martyrs," and the Rev. William Perkins's Works. 278 Likewise, the Virginia Company of London purchased the enlarged edition of the Principal Navigations, as well as Hakluyt's 1609 translation of Fidalgo do Elvas's Virginia Richly Valued, by the description of the maine land of Florida. 279

Whether or not Hakluyt's consistent zeal in colonial promotion was the effective catalyst, as the Anglo-Spanish War de-escalated around 1600, "public interest was aroused, as never before, by the Virginia enterprise." 280

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278 Hill, Intellectual Origins, 159.


Voyages by Bartholomew Gosnold and Bartholomew Gilbert to New England in 1602, by Samuel Mace to Roanoke in 1602, by Gilbert to Chesapeake Bay in 1603, and by George Weymouth to New England in 1605 illustrated the unextinguished interest in the old patents of Ralegh and Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Peace in 1604 freed English ships and energies for New World enterprises, while the Elizabethans' "competitive necessity" to counter European Catholicism had been in no way diminished.

The accession of James I perpetuated Elizabethan goals—and prejudices. The new monarch was seen as the "peaceable Salomon," a "most tender and loving nursing Father" to the English Church and a king firmly committed to the battle against heresy and tyranny. As the young scholar-king of Scotland, James had written that "God hath promised not only in the world to come but also in this world, to give us victory over them [the forces of Anti-christ]."

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281 Rowse, Elizabethans and America, 62; Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, chaps. 8, 16, passim.
283 Translators' Dedication, King James Bible (London, 1611).
The enemies of the elect nation gave a mighty boost to James's early popularity with the alarming Gunpowder Plot of 1605. Arousing anti-Catholic prejudices and Protestant determination, the aborted plot only confirmed "the Popish Church [as] . . . the malignant Church" and England's enemies as "bloudy and barbarous." Militant anti-Catholicism was rekindled in 1605-1606, and new oaths of allegiance were required of English Catholics, since "their love and zeal to the Roman religion . . . can no ways agree with English loyalty." Once again, as with the papal bull of 1570 and the Armada invasion of 1588, threatening reality validated Protestant rhetoric. The old ideological themes were renewed, as England was placed on the defensive but miraculously saved by the hand of Providence.


287Hoby to Edmondes, Feb. 10, 1605/06, in Birch, Court and Times of James I, ed. Williams, I, 50. Also see, Earl of Salisbury to Sir Henry Wotton, June 16, 1606, ibid., 65; Sir Thomas Smith to Edmondes, Feb. 12, 1605/06, ibid., 53; Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant, 77-78; Hearnshaw, Social and Political Ideas, 122-123.

It was in such an atmosphere that King James was
"offered the most stately rich kingdom in the world"—
Virginia, a land that would make "England more rich and
renowned than any kingdom in all Europe."\(^289\) The monarch
needed little urging.\(^290\) His chief justice, Sir John Popham,
summoned together several groups of colonizers—old and new,
West Country and London men, intellectuals, adventurers,
and public officials—to organize and coordinate the long-
delayed establishment of American colonies.\(^291\) Out of this
planning came the first Virginia charter of April 1606,
generated by King James to Hakluyt, Sir Thomas Gates, Sir
George Somers, Edward Maria Wingfield, and "divers others."
James granted the charter for

> the furtherance of soe noble a worke which may, by the
> providence of Almighty God, hereafter tende to the
> glorie of His Divine Majestie in propagating of
> Christian religion to suche people as yet live in
darkenesse and miserable ignorance of the true
> knowledge and worshippe of God and may in tyme bring
> the infidels and salvages living in those parts

\(^{289}\)William Brewster to [Dudley Carleton?], bef. Aug. 1607, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Salisbury
(Cecil) MSS., XIX (London, 1965), 202. George Popham wrote
that the "glory of God will be made manifest fully in these
regions" and the "empire of your Majesty will be extended."
Popham to King James Dec. 13, 1607, Virginia Colonial
Records Project, microfilm reel M-271, Colonial Williamsburg.

\(^{290}\)See Merrill Jensen, ed., American Colonial Docu-
ments to 1776, Vol. IX of English Historical Documents,

\(^{291}\)Philip L. Barbour, ed., The Jamestown Voyages
Under the First Charter, 1606-1609, Hakluyt Society,
2d Ser., CXXXVI-CXXXVII, 2 vols., I (Cambridge, 1969),
14; also see, 13-20, passim.
to humane civilitie and to a settled and quiet gouvermente. . . . 292

In the king's "Articles, Instructions, and Orders" for the government of Virginia (dated November 1606), James further entreated his subjects to promote a religious mission to the New World. It was his desire to "provide that the true word and service of God and Christian faith be preached, planted and used not only within every of the said several Colonies and plantations but alsoe as much as they may amongst the Salvage people . . . according to the doctrine, rights and religion now professed and established in our realme of England." 293 The articles called upon prospective colonists to "use all good meanes to draw the salvages and heathen people . . . to the true service and


293 Ibid., 15. One belief remained consistent and inviolable: deviants in religion were untrustworthy and potentially dangerous to the state. James and his Privy Council in 1607 required an oath of supremacy that bound all voyagers to Virginia to "abhor, Detest and adjure as impious and heretical!, this damnable doctrine . . . That Princes which be excommunicated or deprived by the pope, may be deposed or murthered of their subjects." In Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 5. Even into the 1620s, the colonists in Virginia were mindful of the connection between religious heresy and disloyalty. In 1620, one Master Chanterton was considered a spy because, as a commentator noted, he "smells too much of Roome, . . . mayntaining hi.s sensles religion" with "much Zeale." John Pory to Sir Edwin Sandys, June 12, 1620, ibid., 304. And in 1624/25, another individual was banished as "a persone Dangerous to this Colony" because he was "stronglie affected to Popery." Governor and council to the earl of Southampton, Jan. 10, 1624/25, ibid., IV, 509.
knowledge of God" and to use "all just, kind and charitable courses" in encouraging Indians to "conforme themselves to ... sociable traffique and ... the obedience of us."

The influence of Hakluyt and other Elizabethan theorists of the 1580s was unmistakable in these instructions. An even closer connection was established in the specific advice given by James's Council for Virginia in December 1606. These London advisers told the Virginia adventurers to establish and fortify a settlement upon a large navigable river some one hundred miles from its mouth--precisely Hakluyt's advice in his 1584 "Discourse of Western Planting." The establishment of a secure outpost was given top priority, for although "Great Care" would be taken "not to Offend the naturals," fortifications would prepare the English for any eventuality. Such fortifications, noted Hakluyt in 1584, would "kepe the natural people of the Countrey in obedience and good order."

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295 Taylor, ed., Writings of Hakluyts, I, 61, passim; Quinn, England and the Discovery of America, chap. 8, passim.


Indian trade was also discussed in the council's advice. Whereas Hakluyt believed that the English should initially concentrate on accumulating lumber, soap ashes, and other easily exploited commodities "aboundinge in no accompte with them [the Indians] and with us of greate price," the instructions of 1606 focused on obtaining a local source of food. In the light of the Roanoke colony's subsistence problems, it was considered essential to accumulate Indian corn "before . . . they perceive you mean to plant among them." Basic, early contact precautions aside, Hakluyt and the London council agreed that the ultimate success of any venture lay in its commitment to Christian principles, "for every Plantation which our heavenly father hath not planted shall be rooted out."

Hakluyt's sincere commitment to the Virginia enterprise was demonstrated by his apparent willingness to accompany the first voyage as a missionary. In November 1606, James I granted a dispensation so that Hakluyt, then 54 years old, and his fellow clergyman, Robert Hunt, could go to the colony to convert Indians, who would "remain and end their days in such ignorance unless such a great evil

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299 Ibid., 281.


is cared for as soon as possible."302

The Virginia Company, as organized in 1606, was a "public joint-stock company" of diverse interests and goals—a national corporation for Christian imperialism and mercantile benefits.303 The company's history, in the opinion of Wesley Frank Craven, can be fully understood "only as an instrument for the accomplishment of national purposes."304 "Worthy Marchants" and men of "much belief and creditt" were expected to serve company and nation as God's "Stewardes" and to erect a "Sanctum Sanctorum, a holy house . . . among Infidells."305 Seeking to fulfill the religious and patriotic dreams of Hakluyt and his

302 Dispensation for Richard Hakluyt and Robert Hunt, Nov. 14, 1606, in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 63. Hakluyt at this time held the following livings: clerk prebendary of the collegiate church of St. Peter, Westminster, and in the cathedral church of the Holy and Undivided Trinity, Bristol; rector of a parish church in Suffolk; and the "perpetual chaplain" of the hospital of St. Mary le Savoy, Middlesex. Hunt was a vicar of a parish church in Sussex. Ibid., 62. Hunt went to Virginia, Hakluyt did not, probably because of his age.


304 Gray, Good Speed to Virginia, ed. Wesley Frank Craven, Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints (Boston, 1937), Editor's Introduction, i-ii.

305 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 22.
generation, the Virginia enterprise was considered a "most lawfull, . . . honorable, and . . . holy action."306 Virginia was called the "first Plantacion of the reformed Religion," and its intimate connection with the Protestant mission was neither narrow nor insincere.307 The profit motive was certainly strong within the Virginia Company,307 but in the seventeenth century, Mammon and God could be served simultaneously without qualms of incompatibility.308 "All the rich endowments of Virginia," wrote Samuel Purchas, "are wages for all this worke: God in wisdome having enriched the savage Countries, that those riches might be attractives for Christian suters, which there may sowe spirituals and reape temporals."309

By 1606, the Hakluytian ideology of colonization had become a powerful belief system of unquestioned


307 Quoted in Leo Francis Stock, ed., Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting North America, I (Washington, D.C., 1924), 64. Perry Miller wrote that "religion . . . was the really energizing propulsion in this settlement [i.e., Jamestown], as in others." "Religion and Society in the Early Literature of Virginia," in Errand Into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass., 1956), 101; also see, 106-107, 109, 111.

308 "Sharp practices, schemes for quick returns, unethical business methods could flourish despite Christian morality." Miller, "Religion and Society," Errand Into the Wilderness, 125; also see, 118, 120-121.

309 Purchas, "Virginias Verger," Pilgrimes, XIX, 232; my italics.
validity. The leaders of the Virginia colony who matured after 1588 actually internalized the doctrines and concepts of the older Elizabethans and transported their preconceptions and misconceptions to the New World. The stimulating motivation and the stifling myopia derived from this ideological legacy had a significant impact upon Virginia affairs until the mid-1620s.
God is on our side, and doth favourably accept the enterprise of ours of carrying the Gospell to this people.

William Crashaw, *Sermon* (1610)

All culture wars have been conducted in religious clothing, and no conquering or proselytizing people have neglected the simple precautions of enlisting a sympathetic and omnipotent God on their own side.

George Henry Pitt-Rivers, *Clash of Culture and the Contact of Races* (1927)

CHAPTER IV
THE INVASION OF VIRGINIA:
ANGLO-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1607-1622

Considering the fact that both the English and Powhatan cultures were ethnocentric, militant, aggressive, authoritarian, and religion-directed, violent clashes resulting from contact could almost have been predicted. The English invaders were strongly predisposed by their cultural assumptions to alienate, subjugate, or eradicate non-Christian native peoples, while the Powhatans were equally predisposed to choose alienation or risk destruction by a staunch defense of their culture.

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Anglo-Powhatan relations can be understood in terms of mutual suspicions and fears and reciprocal aggression and cruelty. However, the English did not come with a grand strategy of genocide, and the Powhatans quickly abandoned the idea of annihilation. Both sides reacted in kind to actions by the other. Although land dispossession, capricious violence, and random murder resulted from contact, no single factor was more crucial in turning cultural prejudice into warfare than the English campaigns against Powhatan religion and their attempts at directed culture change.

Twice in the first decade-and-a-half of Anglo-Powhatan relations—in 1609 and again in 1621/22—cultural conflict erupted into fullscale warfare. On both occasions these ideological wars stemmed from religious issues, and the fighting was unparalleled in its intensity and destructiveness. From 1607 to 1609, the English used violence and intimidation against the Powhatans but did not attack their religion or culture. There were random killings but no bloodbath. From 1614 to 1621, the English dispossessed a large portion of the Indians' territory and committed brutal acts of violence. However, Powhatan religion and culture were not seriously or directly threatened, and warfare was averted. But between 1609 and 1613, and again beginning late in 1621, the English consciously assaulted Indian religious beliefs and cultural integrity—once by military means and once by peaceful
means. The Powhatans' response on each occasion was to launch a bitter war in defense of their culture.

The "Invasion of America"\(^1\) began with a general infiltration of Englishmen into Virginia. The fact that it was slow and gradual—that the colony of Virginia began as a small and struggling garrison at Jamestown—was an important factor in the ultimate success of the European "invasion."

Between 1607 and 1609 Jamestown was a mere outpost of empire, the embryonic first stage of a mature colony in the Hakluytian sense.\(^2\) With limited objectives and meager resources, the outpost era in English Virginia was best represented by Capt. John Smith's non-ideological, pragmatic approach to survival. More concerned with feeding his men than dispossessing the Powhatans of their lands or with seeking converts to Anglicanism, Smith asked the tidewater tribes to trade their corn, not their culture.

The Smith era, or the outpost era, 1607-1609, was a probationary period when the two peoples scrutinized each other regarding motivations, strengths, and weaknesses. In any such period of first contact, "conjunctive relations" are established that determine if or how intercultural relations are established that determine if or how intercultural


communication and accommodation are to be achieved.\textsuperscript{3} In
the case of Virginia, "conjunctive relations" did not
include massive slaughter, because there was a rough parity
in military capabilities recognized by both sides. The
English had a technological superiority with their firearms,
while the Powhatans had an overwhelming numerical and tacti-
cal superiority.\textsuperscript{4} Essentially, the offensive potential of
the Indians was offset by the defensive strength of the
English. Warfare was averted in favor of diplomatic rela-
tions based upon mutual wants and needs.

Although historians have correctly argued that much
of European technology was of little importance in assuring
survival in the New World,\textsuperscript{5} the fact that the English had
firearms and the Powhatans did not was profoundly signifi-
cant in the early contact era. Europeans considered guns,
or "fiery weapons,"\textsuperscript{6} to be one of the "miracles of

\textsuperscript{3}Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar,
"Acculturation: An Exploratory Formulation," American
Anthropologist, LVI (1954), 980-984.

\textsuperscript{4}In 1607, Smith estimated that there were at least
1500 warriors within 60 miles of Jamestown. Capt. John
Smith, A Map of Virginia. With a Description of the
Countrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion
(Oxford, 1612), 19.

\textsuperscript{5}Nancy O. Lurie, "Indian Cu-tural Adjustment to
European Civilization," in James Morton Smith, ed.,
Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History
(Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), 39; Edmund S. Morgan,
American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of
Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975), 39, 75, 90.

\textsuperscript{6}Humfrey Barwick, A Breefe Discourse Concerning the
force and effect of all manual weapons of fire . .
(London, 1594?), 17.
Christendome, and possession of firearms was an ethnocentric yardstick of both practical and symbolic superiority. The English came armed with an arsenal of firearms ranging from pistols to ships' cannon. Shoulder arms of two varieties—the twenty-pound musket that required a forked rest for support and the lighter caliver—soon became lords of the forest, especially after 1610, when the cumbersome matchlock firing mechanism was replaced by the snap-haunce, a primitive but effective early flintlock. (See Illus. IV.1.)

7 George Abbot, A Briefe Description of the Whole World (London, 1600), C2v.

8 Barwick wrote that "the Irish have their Darts, the Dansker . . . their Hatchets, and . . . the Scotch men . . . their Speares: all of which are more meeter for Savadge people or poore Potentates . . . then for puissant Princes." Breefe Discourse, C1r.


There were 17 to 28 separate steps needed for firing calivers and muskets, and their expert use required a minimum of 5 days' training per month. Barwick, Breefe Discourse, H2v, 24; Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 92. In addition, the field equipment needed by musketeers was impressively burdensome. Barwick, Breefe Discourse, D3v; Webb, Elizabethan Military Science, 94; C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army, 2d ed. (London and New York, 1966), 106. Here and throughout, the term "musket" will refer to all shoulder arms, whether of the caliver size or the musket.
ILLUS. IV.1:

ENGLISH MUSKETEER, circa 1607

A soldier equipped for Indian fighting in Virginia:

A. Caliver, approx. .60 caliber (matchlock)
B. Morion
C. Bandolier
D. Burning Match
E. Matchlock Cock
F. Charges of Powder (pre-measured); a bandolier held 12
G. Powder Horn (redundant when bandolier was used)
H. "Purse" holding shot
I. Dagger, usually 12-inch blade
J. Doublet; sometimes of quilted leather.
The musket was justly regarded as a superior weapon of war, and its effects were terrible and terrifying. Of course, the explosion of black powder in and of itself could intimidate an enemy accustomed only to the silent flight of arrows, while the lead shot of the musket—capable of splintering or debarking trees—was psychologically unnerving and physically devastating. The range of English muskets was several hundred yards at random, and they could easily kill a fully armored European soldier at two hundred paces or an unarmed man at six hundred. Splintered limbs and horrible body wounds were the result of being hit with musket shot. William Strachey observed that the Powhatans could easily mend wounds made by sword, ax, or arrows, but "a compound wound, . . . where byside the opening, and Cutting of the Flesh, any rupture is, or bone broke, such as our smale shott make amongst them, they know not easily how to cure,


and therefore languish in the misery of the payne thereof.\textsuperscript{13}

The English were well aware of the tactical edge that firearms gave them, a fact demonstrated by the Spanish \textit{conquistadores} and by Ralph Lane's troops at Roanoke. In the London Council's 1606 instructions for the first Virginia voyage, Englishmen were cautioned not to let muskets fall into Indian hands or to let any but the best marksmen fire their weapons in front of Indian witnesses. Without "Shott which they only fear," it was believed, the Indians would "be bould . . . to Assailt" the Jamestown garrison.\textsuperscript{14}

Firearms were the equalizers that placed a handful of Englishmen on a military par with vastly superior Powhatan forces, a fact recognized by the Indians themselves. The Powhatans, who worshipped Okee out of fear, naturally enough had great respect for "all things that were able to do them hurt beyond their prevention," and they "adore[d] with their kinds of divine worship" lightning, thunder, and the English cannon and muskets ("pocosacks").\textsuperscript{15} The werowance of Quiyoughcackannauck, for example, allegedly

\begin{itemize}
    \item \textsuperscript{13}Strachey, \textit{Virginia Britania}, ed. Wright and Freund, 110; my italics.
    \item \textsuperscript{14}London Council, "Instructions given by way of advice . . . for the intended Voyage to Virginia . . ." (1606), in Barbour, ed., \textit{Jamestown Voyages}, I, 52.
    \item \textsuperscript{15}Smith, \textit{Map of Virginia}, 29; On pocosacks, see Strachey, \textit{Virginia Britania}, ed. Wright and Freund, 197.
\end{itemize}
stated that the Christian God "much exceeded" Okee's powers to the same degree that English "Gunnes did their Bowes and Arrows."\textsuperscript{16}

The distribution and use of firearms explains a great deal about the tenuous nature of Anglo-Powhatan relations between 1607 and 1609. Historians have always been perplexed at why Powhatan did not annihilate the English at the outset, and one scholar even claimed that the invaders were consistently "feted, fed, and flattered" by the Powhatans.\textsuperscript{17} The fact is, Englishmen were promptly attacked by a significant intertribal force only a dozen days after disembarking at Jamestown Island on May 14, 1607. On May 26, before the completion of James Fort, and while Capt. Christopher Newport, Capt. John Smith, and twenty others were being conveniently entertained upstream by Opechancanough, Parahunt, and the werowances of Arrohattoc and Appomattoc, a force of between two and four hundred warriors attacked the main body of Englishmen at Jamestown.\textsuperscript{18}

In this attack, Paspaheghs, Quiyoughcohannocks, Appomattocs, Weanocs, and Kiskiacks made a "very furious Assault," proving themselves to be "very valiant people."\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16}Smith, Map of Virginia, 34.

\textsuperscript{17}Lurie, "Indian Cultural Adjustment," in Smith, ed., Seventeenth-Century America, 37.

\textsuperscript{18}John Smith, A True Relation of such occurrences and accidents of noate as hath hapned in Virginia . . . (London, 1608), A4r; [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 95.

\textsuperscript{19}[Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown
Personally led by Wowinchopunk, warowance of the Paspaheghs, the attackers advanced to the palisades of James Fort, "shott through the tentes," and killed two of the English while wounding about a dozen others. The Indians were only repulsed by repeated firing of muskets and ships' ordnance, and they retreated when a cannon ball toppled a tree bough into their m'dst. Reportedly "Dyvers" of the warriors were slain and many wounded by musket fire.

Firearms had saved the embryonic English outpost, for it was generally acknowledged that without them, "our men had all beene slaine." The warriors under Wowinchopunk had tasted the deadly and frightening effects of English fire power, and when a second attack was launched three days later, the Indians were considerably more cautious, showing "feare, [and] not daring approche scarce

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20 [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 95; Barbour, Pocahontas, 13. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 42, wrote that 17 Englishmen were wounded, and in his True Relation, A4V, that 13 or 14 were wounded. Four members of the council suffered wounds, and the president, Edward Marria Wingfield, had an arrow shot through his beard. [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 95.

21 Smith, True Relation, A4V; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 42.

22 [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 95; Smith, True Relation, A4V

23 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 42. Also see, [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 95.
within muskett shott."24 After May 26, the Paspahegghs and their comrades in arms did not challenge the English guns but stayed out of range and contented themselves with shooting stragglers "going out [of the fort] to doe naturall necessity."25 Undoubtedly frustrated by the defensive strength of the English invaders, the Indians even shot forty arrows into an English dog that wandered out of the stockade.26

Powhatan almost certainly planned and ordered the May 26 attack on Jamestown Island in an attempt to wipe out or at least seriously challenge the English, called tassantasses, or "strangers"27 by the Powhatans. The pre-attack entertainments upriver had served to delay the Newport/Smith reconnaissance party, while Powhatan dispatched his downstream werowances to assault the fort. Wowinchopunk had been placed in charge of the attack because Jamestown Island was in the tribal territory of the Paspahegghs, but he, himself, was incapable of planning the operation. Of his allies on May 26, the Weanocs had long feuded with the Paspahegghs, the Quiyoughcohannock werowance was jealous of Wowinchopunk, and the Kiskiacks

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25Ibid., 96-97.  
26Ibid.  
from the York River were not immediately threatened by the English. 28

Through Wowinchopunk, the Mamanatowick himself had tested the aliens, and after seeing that annihilation would not be easily accomplished, he adopted a different strategy. By claiming non-involvement with the events of May 26, Powhatan was free to make closer, unaggressive contacts with the English in order to test their intentions: Would these aliens be vengeful and mount retaliatory raids? Would they be as formidable without their ships and deadly firearms? Did they plan to stay in Tsenacommacah? Were they potential conquerors? Could they be useful against Indian enemies to the west and north?

Clearly, the choice of peace or war lay with Powhatan, and the ethnocentrism of his people probably blinded them to any real offensive threat from the English. The garrison on Jamestown Island in 1607 hardly seemed like the fearsome conquerors mentioned in Powhatan prophecies. Indeed, the pitifully small and woefully ill-prepared band of 105 men and boys--individuals who would unthinkingly walk into a hail of Indian arrows--were incapable of toppling powerful Tsenacommacah. Any perceived threat from them was reduced by the fact that they had established their outpost on a deserted and

desolate peninsula a great distance away from the Powhatans' densely populated and important military and cultural centers to the west and north. With their superior numbers, greater mobility, and capable military intelligence, the Powhatans must have been confident that they could anticipate and defend against any aggression from the English. Powhatan soon made a conscious decision to use these aliens, not to kill them.

While Wowinchopunk remained violently opposed to the English presence so near his villages, and other Indians "murmured" about the aliens, the policy of Powhatan and his kinsmen became one of overt and obvious friendship. Parahunt, Tanx ("Little") Powhatan, reportedly defended the English right to settle on the "little waste ground" that was Jamestown Island, while messengers from Powhatan spread the word that Opechancanough and his Pamunkeys, along with the Mattaponies, Arrohattocs, and Youghtanunds were wingapohs ("friends") of the English and would assist them against their marrapoughs ("enemies")--the Paspaheghs,

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31 Ibid., 141; [Archer], "Relatyon," ibid., 86-87.
Quiyoughcohanocks, Weanocs, Appomattocs, and Kiskiacks.\textsuperscript{32} On June 21, Opechancanough sent a message of peace to Jamestown, and on June 25, Powhatan sent pledges of friendship to the English.\textsuperscript{33} The Mamanatowick reputedly desired the aliens to "sowe and reape in peace" with the Paspaheghs and Quiyoughcohanocks, whom he promised to keep under control. "This message fell out true," wrote Edward Maria Wingfield, president of the resident council, "for both those wyroaunces have ever since remayned in peace, and trade with us."\textsuperscript{34} In early July, both Opechancanough and Powhatan sent deer to Wingfield, and, significantly, Opechancanough was anxious to know where the large ships had gone.\textsuperscript{35} (Newport had returned to England on June 22.)

In this post-attack period of hospitality and close contact, the Powhatans learned that the English were interested in finding the "South Sea" and mineral wealth to the west; that they were anxious to procure food; that they had copper and other desirable goods for trade; and that they would be willing to serve as allies against the Monacans and Mannahoacs.\textsuperscript{36} The knowledge that the English

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{32}[Archer], "Relatyon," \textit{ibid.}, 86, 97-98; Appendix I, \textit{ibid.}, II, 470.
  \item \textsuperscript{33}Smith, True Relation, A4\textsuperscript{v}; Edward Maria Wingfield, "Discourse" (1608), in Barbour, ed., \textit{Jamestown Voyages}, I, 214.
  \item \textsuperscript{34}Wingfield, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., \textit{Jamestown Voyages}, I, 214.
  \item \textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}
  \item \textsuperscript{36}[Archer], "Relatyon," \textit{ibid.}, 82, 86, 97-98;
\end{itemize}
were food-poor and that they were willing to trade valuable copper for corn gave Powhatan great leverage in his dealing with the Jamestown garrison. As Powhatan later told the English, "we can plant any where, . . . and we know you cannot live if you want our harvest . . . ; if you promise peace we will believe you, if you proceed in revenge, we will abandon the Countrie." 37 Actually, the Powhatans mistakenly believed that they had greater leverage than they did, for they thought the English had come to Tsenacommacah because England was barren of agriculture and forests. 38 How else could one explain the ineptitude of these aliens in procuring their own food and at the same time explain the high value they placed on corn?

The Powhatans' edge in the balance of power was grounded in a favorable trade balance. The English offered pen knives, scissors, bells, beads, glass "toyes," and copper for corn, much to the delight of the Indians. 39 For a long time after contact, Anglo-Indian relations


37 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 83. Also see, Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 44-45.

38 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols., XIX (Glasgow, 1906 [orig. publ. 4 vols., London, 1625]), 119. The Powhatan informant was Tomocomo, a respected elder who accompanied Pocahontas to London in 1616.

39 [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 84. In Sept. 1607, the Virginia Company had purchased assorted beads and 5 yards of blue, "motheaten" cloth from the East India Company for use in the Indian trade. Court Minutes of the East India Company, Sept. 4,
turned on a brisk trade in corn. Given enough pressure, would the English one day be forced to trade away their powerful weapons of war?

For the present, copper was the commodity most desired by the Powhatans. Copper had inherent value as an indicator of werowance wealth and status, but the English metal was specifically preferred over the native variety because it was redder and harder. English copper had "primary estimacion" with Powhatan, and he tried "by all means" to "monopolize all the Copper brought into Virginia by the English." Powhatan and his kinsmen controlled the market, and the Mamanatowick reportedly resold copper "to his neighbour Nations for 100. tymes the value." He, of course, retained enough to increase his power among his own people. Allegedly, the werowances who attacked James Fort on May 26 were each promised a large copper plate as a partial inducement. In their dependence upon

1607, ibid., 114.


41 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 145.


44 Ibid.
Indian corn and by their contributions to Powhatan's power, the English in 1607 were little more than subordinate, tributary tribesmen under the Mamanatowick's control.

Powhatan's superior position over the English was conclusively demonstrated in the summer of 1607. About half of the one hundred or so Englishmen who first landed died in that brutal season, due largely to an outbreak of beri-beri and typhoid fever. A debilitating disease that incapacitates its victims for six weeks or more even if they survive, typhoid wreaked havoc among the inhabitants of the marshy, insect-infested Jamestown peninsula. For weeks there were no more than five men healthy enough to stand watch. "If it had not pleased God to have put a terror in the Savages hearts," wrote George Percy, "we had all perished by those wild and cruel Pagans, being in that weak estate as we were." Not only did the Powhatans refrain from attacking, but, as Percy phrased it, "our mortal enemies ... did relieve us with victuals, as Bread, Corne, Fish, and Flesh in great plentie," and "divers


Kings in the Countrie" contributed "to our great comfort."49

The English garrison had been forsaken by London and the Christian God; they had been saved by the grace of Powhatan. Jamestown's "comadies never endured long without a Tragedie," and disease, disorganization, and poor adaptation to the Virginia environment were the real enemies in the summer of 1607.50

After the English had been saved by Indian provisions, Powhatan made a conscious effort to establish direct communications between his capital, Werowocomoco, and Jamestown. In December 1607, Opechancanough and several hundred Pamunkey warriors captured Captain Smith, who was conspicuous as the colony's cape-merchant and a leader among the English.51 Smith spent almost a month as a

Voyages, I, 144-145.

49Ibid., 145. Also see, Smith, True Relation, Blr.

50[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 13. The frustration and factionalism of the summer of 1607 was destined to be repeated in later years. In general, see Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, chaps. 3-4, passim; Barbour, Smith, chap. 10, passim; Richard Lee Morton, Colonial Virginia, 2 vols., I (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), chaps. 1-2, passim.

51[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 13; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 46-47. Three Englishmen and two Pamunkeys were slain in taking Smith captive. Smith, True Relation, B3V-B4r. One of the Englishmen, George Cassen, had earlier been captured and interrogated by the Pamunkeys concerning Smith's whereabouts. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 46. Cassen was then "sacrificed . . . to the Divell:" he was stripped naked, bound to a stake before a large fire, and was mutilated, much in the manner of English drawing and quartering. Account of William White (1608?), in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 150.
prisoner of "those Barbarians" and was treated with respect and hospitality as he was escorted throughout Tsenacommacah.\(^5^2\) (He was fed so well, in fact, that he believed he was being fattened for the cannibal's pot.)\(^5^3\)

In his captivity, Smith discoursed at length with Opechancanough, who took "great delight" in using an English compass and in learning about sailing ships, navigation, astronomy, and the Christian God.\(^5^4\) For his part, Smith learned that the Powhatans viewed the world as round and flat, like a plate, in which they occupied the centermost part.\(^5^5\) He also learned that the Indians were fascinated by his captured gunpowder and intended to plant "that seede" in the spring.\(^5^6\) Smith had occasion to observe Powhatan priests ("ugly as the divell") and their frightening conjuration rituals ("they intended to have sacrificed mee to the Quiyoughquosicke, which is a superi­ous power they worship, a more uglier thing cannot be described").\(^5^7\) The captain's prejudices were not


\(^5^3\) Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 47.

\(^5^4\) Smith, True Relation, B4r-B4v.

\(^5^5\) Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 47.

\(^5^6\) Ibid., 48.

\(^5^7\) Smith, True Relation, C3r. Also see, Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 48.
contradicted by contact; they were confirmed. Englishmen saw tyranny and idolatry everywhere in this land ruled by the "Divel," and their suspicion and fear were mingled with contempt for the Powhatans' way of life.58

In late December, Smith was finally taken to Werowocomoco. At the court of the Mamanatowick, "more than two hundred of those grim Courtiers stood wondering at him [Smith] as he had beene a monster."59 In discussions with Powhatan, the captain "demeaned himselfe"60 by showing deference, but in so doing, he managed to say the "right" things. Smith lied about English intentions and told Powhatan that the Jamestown men had sought refuge in Virginia because the Spaniards, their enemies, were chasing them and because their ships were leaking. The English, said Smith, would stay only long enough to take revenge on the Monacans for killing a son of Captain Newport, and then they would depart in ships Newport would bring back from

58 Englishmen had "chanced in a lande" filled with "idle, improvident, scattered people," whose seeming devotion to satanism struck all the wrong chords of Elizabethan prejudices. [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 77. Also see, [Archer], "Relatyon," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 85. When the Indians attacked, they did so "like Beares"; when they lit fires, the English thought they were signals to "bring their forces together and so to give us battel"; when they sang and danced in hospitality, the English described it as "noise like so many Wolves or Devils" and theorized that they had "beene at their Idolatry." Percy, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., Jamestown Voyages, I, 134-136.

59 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 48.

60 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 14.
When the discussion inevitably turned to a comparison of empires, Powhatan showed "what pride hee had in his great and spacious Dominions, seeing that all hee knewe were under his Territories," while Smith described James I's domain, the "innumerable multitude of his ships," the greatness of Captain Newport, and the "terrible manner of [European] fighting."62

Suddenly, the discussions ceased, and Smith was assaulted by several warriors who stood ready "to beate out his braines." At that moment, Pocahontas, the Kings dearest daughter when no intreaty would prevale, got his head in her armes, and laid her owne upon his to save him from death: whereat the Emperour was contented that he should live...63

Pocahontas's legendary and dramatic act was almost assuredly part of a ritualized, symbolic ceremony whereby Smith was adopted into the fellowship of the Powhatans.64
Because he was a captain—an English werowance—who had showed valor when captured, Indian custom decreed that Smith should live. Opechancanough and his men, by laying aside their arms when they had Smith surrounded in the forest, demonstrated this fact. After Smith's capture, Opechancanough prevented an enraged father of one of the Pamunkey warriors that Smith had slain from taking revenge on the captain.65

Every action pointed to the fact that Smith was to be kept alive, and that Powhatan considered this Englishman a valuable part of his overall strategy. Smith underwent an elaborate conjuration ritual to purify him for having shed Pamunkey blood, and Pocahontas's intervention gave official sanction to the adoption of this alien into the tribe.66 Powhatan invested Smith as werowance of Capahowasic, a village opposite Kiskiack on the north bank of the York River downstream from Werowocomoco, and decreed that he should provide hatchets and copper for him and bells and beads for Pocahontas.67 Powhatan esteemed Smith as "his sonne,"68 and in the days ahead, other tribesmen treated the captain as a "demi-god" and took presents to

65Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 48.

66Ibid. On "death-contamination" and ritual cleansing, see Turney-High, Primitive War, 222-226.

67Smith, True Relation, C2v; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 49.

68Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 49.
him at Jamestown.69 The favoritism shown to Smith became so blatant that other Englishmen "much envied his estimation amongst the Salvages."70

Powhatan made a werowance of the first Englishman he had personally encountered, and as an adopted kinsman, Smith was assured of a close, face-to-face relationship with the Mamanatowick. A great deal of mutual understanding developed between these two leaders in the outpost era, and the conflict of contact was eased somewhat by the fact that two individuals above all others were personally responsible for the conduct of their respective peoples. To Powhatan, perhaps, the process by which the English were made subordinate was completed when Smith was adopted and unwittingly gave his fealty to Mamanatowick. The tassantasses could now be efficiently exploited, and Powhatan did not wait long before making his first demands. As Smith prepared to leave for Jamestown with a twelve-man Indian escort, Powhatan asked for presents--a grindstone and two cannon.71 The arms race was on in earnest.

For much of the winter and spring of 1607/08, peaceful Anglo-Powhatan relations prevailed, and in February, Smith and Newport, known to the Indians as Smith's "father,"

69 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 14; Smith, True Relation, C3v.

70 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 17.

71 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 49. Only later did Powhatan realize that the cannon weighed 3000–4000 pounds apiece.
made a series of triumphal visits up the York and Pamunkey rivers. Powhatan "strained himselfe to the uttermost of his greatness to entertain" the visitors, and the English gave him a red suit, a white greyhound, and a hat.72 A friendly exchange of interpreters further sealed the peace.73 Smith was reaffirmed as a werowance of "Powhaton," and the Mamanatowick proclaimed that "all his subjects should so esteeme us, and no man account us strangers nor Paspaheghans, but Powhatans, and that the Corne, weomen and Country should be to us as to his owne people."74 Opitchapam and Kekataugh also showed their hospitality, and Opechancanough, "his wife, weomen, and children came to meete me," reported Smith, "with a naturall kind affection[.] [H]ee seemed to rejoynce to see me."75 Feasting was frequent and trading was brisk, but certain cultural incongruities demonstrated how fragile the peace was.

In trading, Powhatan wanted Smith and Newport to give him all their hatchets and copper, for which he would make a suitable gift of corn.76 That was the Powhatan

72[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 18; Smith, True Relation, C4v.

73Thomas Savage was left with Powhatan, and Narnontack, Powhatan's "trustye servant, and one of a shrewd subtill capacity," was to serve as an interpreter among the English. [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 19.

74Smith, True Relation, D1r.

75Ibid., D3v.

76Ibid., D2r; [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 19.
manner of reciprocal exchange, and, as the Mamanatowick observed, it was "not agreeable with my greatness in this pedling manner to trade for trifles."§7 Newport aimed "to please the humor of the unsatiable Salvage" and granted his every request, but Smith strongly objected, because, as he noted, Powhatan "valued his corne at such a rate, as I thinke it better cheape in Spain."§8 Doing it Newport's way netted the English a mere four bushels of corn for twenty hogsheads' worth of trade goods.79 But Smith eventually got his way when Powhatan and Opechancanough fancied some "blew beads," which Smith cunningly esteemed so precious--fit "to be worn but by the greatest kings in the world"§0--that some four pounds of the beads brought up to six hundred bushels of corn.§1

Another issue of controversy, involved English firearms. In Smith's audiences with Powhatan, the Mamanatowick ordered the English to drop their weapons in deference, as did his other subjects. No true friends, he claimed, would come into his lodge with cocked muskets

77[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 19; my italics.
78Ibid.
79Ibid.
80Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 52.
81Ibid.; [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 20. The estimates of the quantity of corn vary. In another location, Smith wrote that only 250 bushels were taken back to Jamestown. True Relation, D4R.
as did the tassantasses. Smith replied that only an enemy intent on treachery would require visitors to disarm themselves.82

Ethnocentrism and personal pride were very evident in these negotiations. Both Smith and Powhatan embraced their respective cultures as superior, and believed that, as individuals, they deserved a great amount of deference. Powhatan perceived himself as the overlord of Virginia and the English as intruders in his land, but Smith knew he was a "civilized" European who could blast the Mamanatowick off his throne of raccoon skins at any time. Such ethnocentric attitudes were irreconcilable among two cultures so imbued with hubris.

Overlooking such fundamental points of disagreement, the visit of Smith and Newport to Werowocomoco in February 1607/08 was the high point in early Anglo-Powhatan relations. Effective channels of communication had been opened; trading remained mutually beneficial; the Powhatans were confident of their position vis-à-vis the Jamestown settlers; and the English were still too weak militarily to upset the peace with capricious acts of brutality. The optimism of the moment was symbolized by Newport, who traded twenty swords to Powhatan for twenty turkeys--to Smith's utter horror!83

82Smith, True Relation, C4ν-D1r.

83[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 23. The discrepancy in the actions and attitudes of Smith and Newport can be seen as "a clash between the initiative
Smith and Newport returned to Werowocomoco several months later for Powhatan's "coronation," an elaborate ceremony that unwittingly made the Mamanatowick subordinate to King James. However, the short-term effect of "this stately kind of soliciting" made Powhatan "much overvalue himselfe." He was not the only one. Smith became president of the resident Virginia council in September 1608 and set about to put the Powhatans on the defensive and to make them deferential.

Smith embarked upon a policy of intimidation, a bullying campaign based in feigned strength but actual weakness that was designed to preserve Jamestown by convincing the Powhatans that the English could not be trifled with. Superficially, aggression worked for Smith. After a group of dancing Nansamunds were fired upon by the English for no apparent reason, an intimidated werowance of that tribe feasted Smith and promised future trade. There was a similar response after Smith brawled with some warriors caught stealing at Jamestown.

Within one hour . . . [local Indians] came presently of themselves, and fell to working upon our wears [fish weirs] . . . and seeing their pride so incontred, were so submissive, and willing to doe any thing as


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84[Symonds, comp.], *Proceedings*, 42; see also, 46-47.

85Smith, *True Relation*, D47-D4V.
might be, and with trembling fear, desired to be friends within three days after.  

Word of Smith's get-tough policy spread among the tidewater tribes, and the werowance of Nansamund voluntarily returned a stolen English hatchet that had not even been missed. When Smith became convinced that the Pasapaheghs' "faining love is towards me, not without a deadly hatred," he brazenly "detained certaine Salvages" as prisoners in James Fort. This situation was considered so serious and potentially explosive that Powhatan sent Pocahontas to negotiate the captives' release, and Opechancanough sent his own shooting glove and vambrace as gifts to mollify the angry captain. The prisoners were finally released, but only one day later, Smith severely whipped a Paspahegh warrior with a rope for "scoffing and abusing us."

Smith continued his reign of terror. Given provocation by the Nansamunds, Smith in 1608 threatened to destroy all of their canoes, lodges, and corn. Intimidated, the Nansamunds bought their security with four hundred bushels of corn, and the adversaries parted "good friends."  

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86 Ibid., Elr.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., E2r, E3v.
89 Ibid., E3v-E4r.
90 Ibid., E4r.
91 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 65.
Again, it seemed, aggression produced positive results for the English. Later, in mid-winter 1608/09 Smith even used reckless force against Opechancanough. On this occasion, Smith grabbed the werowance and aimed a cocked pistol at his chest, whereupon the assembled Pamunkeys, "little dreaming anie durst in that manner have used their king," dropped their weapons out of fear and disbelief. Smith also allegedly beat and "spurned like a dogge" Wecuttanow, Opechancanough's son.

Smith's aggression produced relatively little bloodshed, but intimidation and violence worked as purposeful tactics because the Powhatans were placed on the psychological defensive. This policy uniquely suited the early contact situation, for the Powhatans understood severity and respected force. As Powhatan told Smith, rumors quickly spread that the captain had come "to destroy my Cuntrie," which "much affrighteth all my people." Smith explained that those who were truly friends had little to fear, for "by the advantage we have by our

According to Smith, whenever he "curbed" the "insolencies" of the Powhatans, even to the point of bloodshed, they always gave him "presents to purchase peace." 

93 Ibid., 74.
94 See Barbour, Smith, 257.
95 Symonds, comp., Proceedings, 61.
armes . . . [if] wee intended you anie hurt, long ere this wees could have effected it," adding, however, that "warres" were Englishmen's "chiefest pleasure."96

Smith's short-term successes were nonetheless detrimental to long-term stability and trust in Anglo-Powhatan relations. In this campaign of force and intimidation were revealed all the worst ethnocentric prejudices of Englishmen--prejudices that led to incompatibility between cultures in close contact. Given the English biases against less "civilized" peoples, Smith was self-assured that his restrained, but nevertheless frequent, use of violence would guarantee "a continual peace with the Indians."97 When angered by the Powhatans' lack of deference, Smith and his companions sought to "spoile" villages or to exert their authority in other violent ways.98 When they were "constrained to endure overmuch wrong [abuse]" at the hands of the Powhatans, the Englishmen's first reaction was to "directly fall to revenge."99

As the proud Sir Walter Ralegh once noted, "no wrongs are

96 Ibid., 62. Smith's policy of intimidation had to be backed up by actions, and in Apr. 1608, he spent a week training 60 Englishmen "to march, fight, and scirmish in the woods." These novice guerrilla fighters gained confidence and soon considered themselves "better able to fight with Powhatans whole force . . . amongst the Trees, . . . then the Fort . . . [had been on May 26, 1607] to repulse 400." Smith, True Relation, Elv.

97 Ibid., E4v.

98 Ibid., B1v-B2r.

99 Ibid., B2r.
so grievous and hatefull, as those that are insolent."\textsuperscript{100}

But coupled with the English sense of cultural superiority was a deeply rooted paranoia, reminiscent of the foreboding associated with 1588. As Smith wrote, "experience had well taught me to beleive his [Powhatan's] friendship, [only] till convenient opportunity suffered him to betray us."\textsuperscript{101} Others, like Wingfield and Percy, took only the smallest comfort in Indian hospitality and looked with suspicion upon their every action.\textsuperscript{102} This paranoia fuelled the flames of ethnocentrism and prompted the English to take revenge on tribes like the nearby Paspaheghs when their real fears centered on the much stronger and more dangerous Pamunkeys. As often happens in intercultural relations, "the most overtly hated outgroups will be ones that are strong enough to be threatening but weak enough to be successfully aggressed against." Actually, the "relative power" of an outgroup often determines its

\textsuperscript{100}Sir Walter Ralegh, \textit{The History of the World: In Five Bookes}, 2d ed. (London, 1617), 320 (2d enumeration).

\textsuperscript{101}Smith, \textit{True Relation}, D1\textsuperscript{V}-D2\textsuperscript{X}.

\textsuperscript{102}On one occasion the Paspaheghs showed genuine friendship by returning an English boy who had run away to their village. Instead of using this act as the foundation for future good relations, President Wingfield noted only that at least by returning the boy, the Paspaheghs demonstrated that they were not cannibals. Wingfield, "Discourse," in Barbour, ed., \textit{Jamestown Voyages}, I, 216 and passim. Percy, too, always "mistrust[ed] some villanie" from the Powhatans. "Discourse," \textit{ibid.}, 139, 140, 143, 145.
selection as a "target of hostility." 103

Thus, it was no accident that the English quickly established a pattern of aggression against the most accessible, closest, and relatively weaker tribes. The so-called "churlish and treacherous nation" of Paspahegh 104 was a convenient scapegoat for devastation, because it was perceived as a threat, while stronger but less proximate tribes like the Patawomekes and the Accomacs and Accohannocs on the Eastern Shore triggered neither English paranoia nor aggression. 105 Proximity bred fear, and closeness spawned contempt for, not tolerance of, the Powhatan culture. 106

The English at Jamestown in the early contact era found the symbolic weapon of ethnocentrism to be as useful as the physical weapon of the musket. Together, these weapons provided a large margin for error in Indian

103 Robert A. LeVine and Donald T. Campbell, Ethnocentrism: Theories of Conflict, Ethnic Attitudes, and Group Behavior (New York, 1972), 217; also see, 39.

104 Smith, True Relation, B2r.

105 "The nearer outgroups should be targets of the most ethnocentric hostility." LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 37. Lack of precise information about an enemy will usually make potential aggressors err on the side of caution. Ibid., 213. On specific relations between the English and the Patawomekes and the Eastern Shore tribes, see below.

106 Social scientists have noted that the "less contact with outgroup members, the greater the opportunity for over-idealizing . . . the outgroup's performance and values and the more likely its adoption as a positive . . . reference group." Ibid., 69. Groups protected by natural barriers, as were the Eastern Shore tribes, are under less threat from outsiders and are thus usually less ethnocentric.
relations and allowed the English to win military victories while justifying their own moral failures. But contact had produced tension between the English actors in Virginia and the English observers in London. Virginia Company officials decried the alienation of the Powhatans that Smith's policy was likely to produce, and the "command from England was so straight not to offend them [the Indians], as our authority bearers . . . would rather be anything then peace breakers." 107 The company wrote that Englishmen should "absolutely . . . be good agaynst the Naturall people . . . to abstayne from this unnessisary way of provication, and reserve ourselves to the defensive part." 108 Although London officials "wrangled with captaine Smith for his cruelty," most of the men at Jamestown approved of the "feare and obedience" that his policies had produced in the Powhatans. 109

However, a combination of local factors--not London policymakers--undermined Smith's strategy between 1608 and 1609. The Powhatans were less content to endure English aggressions because trade relations were deteriorating. The Indians were surfeited with copper, which had been devalued and more approachable by strangers. See ibid., 37.


109 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 24-25; also see, 76.
by a "dannable and private trade" beyond the control of Smith and the Jamestown government. Another factor was Powhatan's determination to acquire English muskets and other weapons, which was, of course, a consequence of Smith's policy itself.

By the winter of 1608, Powhatan refused to trade for the old commodities, telling Smith that "he could eate his corne, but not his [the Englishman's] coper." He was willing, however, to exchange forty bushels of corn for forty swords whenever the captain liked. There were some men at Jamestown, like rebellious German laborers and mariners from relief expeditions, who were quite willing to sell arms to the Indians. Between late 1608 and early 1609, several German renegades provided the Powhatans with three hundred English hatchets, fifty swords, eight muskets, eight pikes, plus assorted tools, shot, and powder that had been stolen from James Fort. Although Powhatan later killed these defectors and traitors, their actions had a

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110Ibid., 50. The Spanish Jesuits in Virginia four decades earlier experienced similar problems when unauthorized private traders devalued trade items among the tidewater tribes. One of them advised to "take care that whoever comes here in no wise barters with the Indians." Luis De Quiros to Juan De Ministrosa, Sept. 12, 1570, in Clifford M. Lewis and Albert J. Loomie, The Spanish Jesuit Mission in Virginia, 1570-1572 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1953), 92.

111[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 17, 42, 49, 74.

112Ibid., 58-59.

113Ibid., 66; also see, 50, 67-74, 79-81, on the actions of the renegade Germans.
detrimental impact on Anglo-Indian relations. Armed with English weapons and dismayed at recent events, Powhatan in January 1608/09 moved his capital from Werowocomoco to a less accessible forest enclosure nearer his natal village.\footnote{114}{See Barbour, Pocahontas, 57. Powhatan's move away from the English was dysfunctional from the standpoint of intercultural communication.}

By the summer and fall of 1609, Smith was less able to control the growing numbers of Englishmen, and rash acts, coupled with a breakdown in intercultural communication, created a volatile situation.\footnote{115}{On the growing factionalism, see [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 93-95; Barbour, Smith, 278-279.} In September 1609, Capt. John Martin wantonly slaughtered—not intimidated—several Nansamunds and lost some of his own men when the Indians counterattacked.\footnote{116}{[Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 95.} About the same time, unruly Englishmen stationed near the falls "tormented" Powhatan villagers "by stealing their corne, robbing their gardens, beating them, ... and keeping some prisoners." The tribesmen "dailie complained to captaine Smith," and although he did his best to ensure stable relations, he was unable to prevent acts of violence by both sides.\footnote{117}{Ibid., 97. It was at this time that Smith purchased the tract of land called "Nonsuch," near modern Richmond, in an attempt to keep the unruly Englishmen away from local Indian villagers. Smith gave Parahunt ("Tanx-Powhatan") copper and pledges of defense against the Monacans for the land. Ibid., 98.}
The decline in Smith's ability to command respect from the Indians, who had once considered him a "demi-god," and to govern his own countrymen, signalled an end to the outpost period. Already by May 1609, company officials in London were completing plans for a new mode of government for Virginia that would forever change the nature of Anglo-Powhatan relations. But while Smith controlled affairs at Jamestown, his tough-minded pragmatism, his military experience, his innate bravado, and his past familiarity with alien cultures made him a "contact specialist" and contributed to his success in ad hoc diplomacy with Powhatan. Although Smith's ethnocentric biases never allowed him to let the "insolencie of those proud Salvages" go unpunished, he was too much the practical administrator to permit senseless acts of slaughter to impede his trading for Indian corn—the lifeblood of Jamestown. Smith's ability to deal with the Powhatans in the context of their own culture and to curb the violent tendencies of his troops stand in stark contrast to the later English policy extremes of ruthless aggression or myopic defenselessness.


120 Jeremy Belknap wrote the following appraisal of Smith in 1794:

He had a disorderly, factious, discontented, disappointed set of men, to control, ... in the face
Smith left Virginia on October 4, 1609, and, almost immediately, the Powhatans "revolted" and began to "murder and spoile all they could encounter." Instead of "corne, provision, and contribution from the Salvages," wrote one Englishman, "wee had nothing but mortall wounds," as the "bloody fingers" of the Powhatans became "imbrued in our bloods."121 The passing of the Smith era was marked by unprecedented violence.

The Powhatan offensive against the English coincided with the infamous "Starving Time" at Jamestown (October-March), when famine, poor leadership, disease, and Indian incursions contributed to a mortality of 88 percent of the native lords of the soil, formidable in their numbers and knowledge of the country, versed in stratagem, tenacious of resentment, and jealous of strangers. To court them by presents was to acknowledge their superiority, and inflate their pride and insolence. Though savages, they were men and not children. Though destitute of science, they were possessed of reason, and a sufficient degree of art. To know how to manage them, it was necessary to be personally acquainted with them; and . . . a person who had resided several years among them . . . was a much better judge of the proper methods of treating them, than a company of gentlemen at several thousand miles distance, and who could know them only by report.

American Biography: Or, An Historical Account of Those Persons Who Have Been Distinguished in America, I (Boston, 1794), 299-300. For other analyses of Smith's Virginia policies, see William Randel, "Captain John Smith's Attitudes Toward the Indians," VMHB, XLVII (1939), 218-229; Keith Glenn, "Captain John Smith and the Indians," ibid., LII (1944), 228-248; Edwin C. Rozwenc, "Captain John Smith's Image of America," WMQ, 3d Ser., XVI (1959), 27-36; Barbour, John Smith, chaps. 16-19; Alden T. Vaughan, American Genesis: Captain John Smith and the Founding of Virginia (Boston, 1975), chap. 3.

121 [Symonds, comp., Proceedings, 104-105.]
among the English. Cannibalism and the consumption of snakes and rodents were noted at the distressed garrison, and the men "Looked Lyke Anotamies [skeletons] Cryeinge owtt we are starved We are starved." The Indians, perceiving the weakness of the Jamestown garrison, "dyvers Tymes assaulted" Englishmen as they left the fort. One report stated that "some adventuringe to seeks reliefe in the woods, dyed as they sought it, and weare eaten by others who found them dead. Many putt themselves into the Indians handes, . . . and were by them slaine."

That "subtell owlde foxe" Powhatan once again had the English at his mercy because of their insatiable need for food, but in 1609, he used his advantage with a vengeance. Powhatan now wanted to exterminate, not profit from, the English, and corn was used not for trade, but as

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122 Of some 500 living in October, only 60 survived until the following March. George Percy, "A Trewe Relacyon . . . of Virginia from . . . 1609 untill . . . 1612," in Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine, III (1922), 269; [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 105.

123 Percy, "Trewe Relacyon," Tyler's Qtly. Hist. and Genealogical Mag., III (1922), 267, 269; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 105-106.


125 "A Briefe Declaration of the Plantation of Virginia duringe the first Twelve Yeares, . . . downe to this present tyme. By the Ancient Planters nowe remaining alive in Virginia" (1623), in H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1619-1658/59 (Richmond, 1915), 29.

126 Percy, "Trewe Relacyon," Tyler's Qtly. Hist. and
bait to lure the hated aliens to their deaths. The probationary period in Anglo-Powhatan relations was over; the Indians' revenge against the English had begun in earnest.

The Powhatans killed seventeen Englishmen searching for food near Kecoughtan, and another contingent was found slain with their mouths stuffed full of bread in "Contempte and skorne."\textsuperscript{127} In autumn 1609 the Indians assaulted Capt. Francis West at Arrohattoc and killed eleven men under his command.\textsuperscript{128} Soon after, Pamunkey bowmen cut down thirty-three of fifty men under Capt. John Ratcliffe as they were greedily loading corn into a boat. Ratcliffe, himself, was captured and died a horrible death by torture.\textsuperscript{129} In the winter of 1609 Captain West procured abundant provisions at Patawomeke, but instead of returning to Jamestown, he and his thirty-six man force mutinied and set sail for England. Before departing, though, West was "harshe and crewell" with the Patawomekes and cut off two heads "and other extremetyes."\textsuperscript{130}

Everything was going Powhatan's way until the summer of 1610. Sir Thomas Gates, Sir George Somers, William

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{127}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{128}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{129}Ibid., 266. Also see Henry Spelman, "Relation of Virginia" (ca. 1613), in Edward Arber and A. G. Bradley, eds., \textit{Travels and Works of Captain John Smith}, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1910), I, ciii.
\item \textsuperscript{130}Percy, "Trewe Relacyon," \textit{Tyler's Qtly. Hist. and
Strachey, and the 150 people who had been stranded on Bermuda since the previous July arrived in Virginia on May 23, and on June 9, Thomas West, Lord De La Warr, and another 300 people arrived with a year's provisions.\textsuperscript{131} The almost simultaneous arrival of Gates, temporary governor of Virginia, and De La Warr, lord governor and captain-general of the colony, signalled the beginning of the end of Powhatan's empire.

On May 23, 1609—a full year before Gates's actual arrival in Virginia—the Virginia Company of London had obtained a new charter that gave it direct control of the colony. With the procurement of this charter, the company directors committed themselves to the erection of a strong, permanent colony in the ideological tradition of Hakluyt. Neither Jamestown nor Tsenacommacah would ever be the same again.

In granting the 1609 charter, King James noted that the "principall effect which wee cann desier or expect" of Virginia was "the conversion and reduccion of the [native] people in those partes unto the true worshipp of God and Christian religion."\textsuperscript{132} The Virginia Company was conscious of its holy mission, and it launched an unprecedented

\textsuperscript{131}Strachey, Generall Historie of Virginia, 89-90, 106-107.

ideological crusade to gain financial and moral support for its new charter. The company enlisted Dr. George Abbot, the future Archbishop of Canterbury, the Rev. Richard Crackanthorpe, chaplain to the king, and scores of lesser clerics motivated by a sense of Christian immediacy and national purpose to deliver sermons and to write pamphlets in support of the Virginia enterprise.\footnote{133}

In the early seventeenth century, Anglican clergymen were the "most influential instruments for the direction of public opinion,"\footnote{134} and their advocacy of religious and patriotic goals "carried tremendous weight."\footnote{135} Many Jacobean clergymen were well-informed "sociologists" and "good mercantilists,"\footnote{136} who, like Hakluyt before them, actively concerned themselves with colonial affairs and made "warm contact with living issues."\footnote{137} This militant dedication, characteristic of a later Puritanism, was an important

\footnote{133}{Louis B. Wright, Religion and Empire: The Alliance Between Piety and Commerce in English Expansion, 1558-1625 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1943), 87-89.}

\footnote{134}{William Haller, The Elect Nation: The Meaning and Relevance of Foxe's Book of Martyrs (New York, 1963), 226.}

\footnote{135}{Wright, Religion and Empire, 154.}

\footnote{136}{Ibid., 150-152.}

component of the early Jacobean and "thoroughly Protestant" Anglican Church.138

Drawing upon clerical talent and inclination, the Virginia Company "tuned the pulpits"139 in 1609 in a publicity campaign that utilized churches in and around London for special convocations. Often these promotional sermons--one of which was twenty thousand words long--were printed as pamphlets under company sponsorship.140 In March 1608/09, Richard Crackanthrope (D.D., Oxon.) delivered an open-air sermon in which he ecstatically promoted a "New Britain in another world" and the teaching of "heathen barbarians and brutish people . . . the speech and language of Canaan."141 In April, 1609, the Rev. William Symonds, pastor of St. Saviours Church in Southwarke, delivered a company-sponsored sermon on the need for English clergymen to emulate the "Zeale" of "Jesuits and Friers" in New World conversion efforts.142 Only three

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141Ibid., 256.

142William Symonds, Virginia. A Sermon Preached
days later, the Rev. Robert Gray spoke to the assembled
directors and investors of the Virginia company. Gray
referred to King James as the "Joshua" of England's empire
and called the Virginia adventurers the "children of
Joseph." He stated that England's glory would soon exceed
that of Rome and denounced anti-colonization forces as
enemies "against God, the King, the Church, and the Com-
monwealth." Gray, like Hakluyt, was vitally concerned
that the "holy name of God . . . [would] be dishonored
among the Infidels" or that the colony in Virginia would
seek the "wealth of that countrie above or before the glorie
of God and the propagation of his kingdome."143

The promotional sermons continued into 1610. In
February 1609/10, the Rev. William Crashaw delivered an
eloquent message to Lord De La Warr and the assembled
members of the Virginia Company before La Warr sailed to
the colony. Crashaw told his audience, as Hakluyt would
have, to make private profit subordinate to the Christian
mission, for "he that is zealous of Gods glorie, God will
be mindful of his profit: and he that seekes only or

at White-Chapel in the Presence of . . . the Adventurers
and Planters for Virginia (London, 1609), quoted in Brown,
Genesis of the United States, I, 291. Symonds compiled
the various accounts from Virginia published as the
Proceedings (1612). See n. 9, above.

143 Robert Gray, A Good Speed to Virginia (London,
1609), ed. Wesley Frank Craven, Scholars' Facsimiles and
Reprints (New York, 1937), 9, 23, 27.

144 Ibid., 16.
principally spirituall things, God will reward him both with those spirituall and temporal things."\textsuperscript{145} Crashaw declared that Englishmen should give the Indians "Civilitie for their bodies, [and] Christianitie for their soules: The first is to make them men; the second happy men; the first to cover their bodies from the shame of the world; the second, to cover their soules from the wrath of God."\textsuperscript{146}

Crashaw called La Warr's expedition a "noble" one, for its purpose was "the destruction of the divels kingdome, and propagation of the Gospell."\textsuperscript{147} Referring to the new governor of Virginia, Crashaw remarked:

Remember thou art a Generall of English men, nay a Generall of Christian men: therefore principally looke to religion . . . and let the name of the Pope or Poperie be never heard of in Virginia.\textsuperscript{148}

Underlying the message of Crashaw and of men like the Rev. Daniel Price (\textit{Saules Prohibition Staide} [London, 1609]), was the sincere belief in the seriousness of domestic crises. Price wrote that whereas London "should be Jerusalem, the City of God," it, instead, had become "Murder's slaughterhouse, Thefts refuge, Oppressor's

\textsuperscript{145}William Crashaw, \textit{A Sermon Preached in London Before the Right Honorable the Lord Lawarre, . . . ["A New-yeeres Gift to Virginea"]) (London, 1610), 55.

\textsuperscript{146}Ibid., 33.

\textsuperscript{147}Ibid., 17.

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid., 82-83.
safety, Whoredom's stewes, Usury's bank, Vanity's stage, abounding in all kind of filthiness and profaneness."149 Crashaw viewed Virginia colonization as the ideal vehicle to "rectifie and reforme many disorders which in this mightie and populous state are scarce possibly to be reformed without evacuation."150

In addition to sermons, the Virginia Company sponsored other tracts that piously and patriotically connected a Christian mission with the colonization of Virginia. In 1610, Richard Rich's *Newes From Virginia: The Lost Flocke Triumphant* declared:

Let England knowe our willingnesse for that our worke is good
Wee hope to plant a Nation, where none before hath stood.
To glorifie the Lord tis done, and to no other end:
He that would crosse so good a worke, to God can be no friend.151

Another, more famous, promotional publication was Robert Johnson's *Nova Britannia. Offering most excellent fruitez by Planting in Virginia* (London, 1609). Johnson, a London alderman and an influential member of the Virginia Company, recited many of Hakluyt's mercantilistic arguments for colonies; repeated the horrors of the Black Legend;

149 Price, Sawles Prohibition Staide, in Brown, Genesis of the United States, I, 315.

150 Crashaw, Sermon, 78-79.

restated the prejudices against the Pope and Spain; and extolled the virtues of the elect Protestant nation.  

But Virginia and Virginia's Indians were Johnson's major topics. He regarded the Powhatans as "very loving and gentle," who "entertain and relieve our people with great kindnesse; they are easy to be brought to good, and would fayne embrace a better condition." However, the company's optimism was balanced with prejudices from the first two years of contact, for the Powhatans were described as "wild and savage people that live up and downe in troupes like heards of Deare in a Forrest."  

Johnson's statements revealed the ambivalent gloved hand and mailed fist of Elizabethan ideology and ethnocentrism. Conversion was the first concern, not "supplanting the savages." "Our intrusion into their possessions shall tend to their great good," wrote Johnson, "and no way to their hurt, unlesse as unbridled beasts, they procure it to themselves." The English, according to Nova Britannia, did not want to cast Indians "out of the frying panne into the fire," but by "mutuall interchange and commerce" to impart "divine riches" and to cover "their  

152 [Robert Johnson], Nova Britannia (London, 1609), in Peter Force, comp., Tracts and Other Papers Relating . . . to the . . . Settlement . . . in North America, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1836), I, no. 6, 6-8, 10, 16-17, 18, 20.  

153 Ibid., 11.  

154 Ibid.
naked miserie with civill use of foode, and clothing."\textsuperscript{155} The people who had saved Jamestown with their provisions would still have to be taught husbandry!

\textit{A True Declaration of the estate of the Colonie in Virginia}, published by the Virginia Company in 1610, complemented Johnson's tract with its patriotic, pious, optimistic, ethnocentric, and Hakluytian emphases. Even after the English failures during the outpost era, the company still advocated contact and reform as its most cherished objectives of Indian policy. Before the English could purchase "the pearles of earth" and sell "the pearles of heaven," Virginia had to be made a mature and populous colony. That was what the new charter was all about. "There is no other, moderate, and mixt course, to bring them to conversion, but by dailie conversation where they may see the life, and learne the language each of other."\textsuperscript{156}

This barrage of company propaganda concerning its Christian and altruistic intentions brought an enthusiastic response from the English populace in 1609 and 1610, as evidenced by cash subscriptions to support the Virginia venture. Although the "evangelical argument" had been

\textsuperscript{155}Ibid., 18.

\textsuperscript{156}A True Declaration of the estate of the Colonie in Virginia (London, 1610), in Force, comp., \textit{Tracts}, III, no. 1, 6. Other portions of this tract reflect an embittered, anti-Indian attitude brought on by the warfare in Virginia. See \textit{ibid.}, 7, 16-18.
worked "for all it was worth, the important fact is that for Englishmen at the beginning of the seventeenth century it was worth a great deal."\(^{157}\) The Virginia Company's 1609 charter was supported by fifty-six London companies, in addition to peers, knights, gentry, merchants, and 282 "citizens . . . of divers qualities."\(^{158}\) Between 1606 and 1610, the city companies pledged £2,500 from their treasuries, while 190 members of the dozen livery companies made individual investments exceeding £10,000.\(^ {159}\) The Virginia Company's mission seemed so rational and proper that the Grocers Company kept a record of its members who "denied and refused" to contribute to "soe honorable a service."\(^ {160}\) Broad public support was illustrated by the multitude of tiny individual contributions, some as small as two shillings.\(^ {161}\)

In 1609, and again in 1612, influential clergymen also invested in the Virginia Company, among them Hakluyt, Crashaw, James Montague, the Lord Bishop of Bath and Wells,


\(^{160}\) Brown, \textit{Genesis of the United States}, I, 256-258.

\(^{161}\) Rabb, \textit{Enterprise and Empire}, 98, n. 132.
Archbishop Abbot, the bishops of Oxford and Worcester, the
Dean of Westminster, and Richard Buck and Alexander
Whitaker, clergymen who actually went to the colony.\textsuperscript{162}
Between 1609 and 1612, almost twelve hundred separate
investors supported the company's efforts at colonization—
68 percent of the total membership the company would attain
in its eighteen-year history. Even after 1609, when the
prospects for quick profits faded, the gentry invested in
large numbers.\textsuperscript{163} By 1611, over £40,000 had been pledged
to the Virginia Company by all types of investors.\textsuperscript{164}
"Perhaps at no time in the history of British imperialism,"
wrote Wesley Frank Craven, "has there been any colonizing
venture so representative of all walks of English life, so
truly a national effort, as was the attempt in 1609-1610
to plant in Virginia."\textsuperscript{165} As William Strachey wrote at the
time:


\textsuperscript{163}Rabb, \textit{Enterprise and Empire}, 38-39, 90, Table 9.
For lists of investors, see Hecht, "Virginia, 1607-1640,"
Appendix I, \textit{passim}; Virginia Company, \textit{A Declaration of the
State Of the Colonie and Affaires in Virginia} (London,
1620), 1-30 (2d enumeration), 1-4 (3d enumeration).

\textsuperscript{164}Hecht, "Virginia, 1607-1640," 71; also see 72.
(1960), 148.

\textsuperscript{165}Gray, \textit{Good Speed to Virginia}, ed. Craven,
Introduction, i; \textit{my} italics. Also see Hecht, "Virginia,
1607-1640," 71-72; Miller, "Religion and Society,
\textit{Errand Into the Wilderness}, 111-112.
Virginia was a thing once so full of expectaunce... as not a Pilgrimage to a romain yeare of Jubile, could have bene followed with more heat or zeale: the discourse and Visitation of it tooke up all meetings, tymes, termes, all degrees, all purses, and such thronges and concourse of personall Undertakers, as the aire seemed not to have more lightes, then that holie Cause inflamed Spiritts to partake with it: it was a wonder to see how manie brought their Free-will-offfringes and professed then to throwe their bread upon those waters.166

Flushed with its financial bonanza and conscious of its popular mandate, the Virginia Company of London initiated an aggressive policy of forced acculturation, a policy designed to ensure the ultimate success of its venture by first making the Powhatans tractable and reliable. In the Virginia Council's 1609 instructions to Governor Gates, the company's militant goals were clearly reflected:

You shall, with all propensenes and diligence, endeavour the conversion of the natives... as the most pious and noble end of this plantacion, which the better to effect you must procure from them some convenient number of their children to be brought up in your language and manners, and... we thinke it reasonable you first remove from them their Priestes by a surprise of them all and detaininge them prisoners, for they are so wrapped up in the fogge and miserie of their iniquity and so tirrified with their continuall tirrany, chained under the bond of deathe unto the divell that while they live amounge them to poison and infecte them their mindes, you shall never make any great progres into this glorious worke, nor have any civill peace or concurre with them.167

166 Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, dedicatory, 3.

167 Virginia Council, "Instruccions to Gates" (1609), in Bemiss, Three Charters of the Virginia Company, 57-58. Indian children, especially those of werowances, were to be treated kindly and educated, so that "their people will easily obey you [Gates et al.] and become in
Once again, there was the specter of tyranny and idolatry to haunt Englishmen, and the instructions to Gates "pronounce[d] it not crueltie nor breache of charity to deale . . . sharply" with the Powhatan priests and werowances—even to the point of killing them.\textsuperscript{168}

The two years of contact between 1607 and 1609 had provided a revealing look into the worst features (for Englishmen) of the Powhatan culture, and London officials used every prejudicial account at their disposal in planning for a new and enlarged Virginia colony. Allegedly, sometime before 1609, Powhatan had "confessed" to Captain Smith that he had been present at the slaughter of Roanoke's "Lost Colony,"\textsuperscript{169} and that information was used in a major indictment of the "tirrany of Powhaton."\textsuperscript{170} But the English proposed only the substitution of one form of tyranny for another. Gates was told, in effect, to assume the role of the Mamanatowick and to make all other werowances pay tribute to the English.\textsuperscript{171} By this time even the London council knew that the copper/corn trade

\textsuperscript{168}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, 58.

\textsuperscript{169}Purchas, "Virginias Verger: Or a Discourse shewing the benefits which may grow to this Kingdome from American English Plantations . . .," chap. 20 of Pilgrimes, XIX, 228.


\textsuperscript{171}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}
was dead, and they advised seizing village corn fields and holding werowances as hostages to prevent the Powhatans from fleeing and thus ruining the English food supply.\textsuperscript{172} In addition, Gates was given a final piece of advice: "If you make friendship with any of these nations, as you must doe, choose to doe it with those that are \textit{farthest from} you and enemies unto those amonse whom you dwell, for you shall have \textit{least occasion to have differences with} them."\textsuperscript{173} Already the practical experience with cultural conflict was undermining the idealistic theories that called for close intercultural contact. The strength of English ethnocentrism was eroding the fine pronouncements of colonization ideology.

Coinciding with the Virginia Company's new charter and the arrival of Governor Gates in the colony was the beginning of the First Anglo-Powhatan War (1609-1613). Both sides viewed this bitter conflict as a cultural war--a holy war--where, according to one perspective, Christian crusaders were rooting out the unregenerate heathen, and where, from the other perspective, hated \textit{tassantasses}, "despising the auncyent Religion" of Okee, were trying to destroy Tsenacommacah.\textsuperscript{174}

\textsuperscript{172}Ibid., 63.

\textsuperscript{173}Ibid.; my italics.

\textsuperscript{174}Strachey, \textit{Virginia Britania}, ed. Wright and Freund, 90.
As announced in Gates's instructions, the Powhatan religion was the epitome of an evil culture that had to be reformed. A combination of hatred and fear caused Englishmen to see Okee as the "Devil." He was a deity of evil and vengeance, and the "sanctions he undertook in punishing offences looked quite 'devilish' and the cults performed by the priests in his honor had similarities to European witchcraft."\textsuperscript{175} The Powhatans, it was believed, were suffused with satanism, and Englishmen even referred to the Indians' scalplocks as "Devill-lock[s]."\textsuperscript{176} Powhatan priests were described as "English witches" and "popish Hermits" who lived "naked in bodie, as if their shame of their sinne deserved no covering: ... they esteeme it a vertue to lie, deceive and steale as their master the divell teacheth them."\textsuperscript{177}

As powerful policymakers within the Powhatan culture and committed satanists, "these priests of Baal or

\textsuperscript{175}Christian F. Feest, "Powhatan: A Study in Political Organization," Wiener Völkerkundliche Mitteilungen, XIII (1966), 72. Also see, Richard Beale Davis, "The Devil in Virginia in the Seventeenth Century," in Literature and Society in Early Virginia, 1608-1840 (Baton Rouge, La., 1973), 14-22. The Powhatan huskenaw ceremony appeared to be a "divellish custome" of child sacrifice to Okee and was considered a benchmark of heathenism by the English. See Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 143.

\textsuperscript{176}Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols. XIX (Glasgow, 1906 [orig. publ. 4 vols., London, 1625]), 118.

\textsuperscript{177}Alexander Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia (London, 1613), Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints (New York, n.d.), 24, 26.
Belzebub were [considered] greatly offensive to the Majestie of god, as most perillous for the English.178 Hated as a "generation of vipers," Powhatan priests were condemned as the "bloody and furious" conspirators who had goaded Powhatan into annihilating Englishmen at Roanoke.179 "The men, women, and Children of the first plantation at Roanoak," wrote Strachey, "were by practize and Comaundement of Powhatan (he himselfe perswaded thereunto by his priests) miserably slaughtered without any offence given him."180 Strachey was convinced that Powhatan was only awaiting a "fitt opportunity (inflamed by his bloody and furious priests) to offer us a tast of the same Cuppe which he made our poore Countrymen drinck of at Roanoak."181

178Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 90; also see, 104-106.

179Ibid., 58, 91; Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, 26.


181Ibid., 58; also see, 105-106. Although Powhatan may, in fact, have killed the survivors of Ralegh's colony, it was the use made of this inflammatory allegation that is important here. See David Beers Quinn, "The Lost Colony in Myth and Reality, 1586-1625," in England and the Discovery of America, 1481-1620 (New York, 1973), 432-481, passim, especially 455, 457-458. The rhetoric of the 1609-1612 period regarding the fate of the Roanoke colonists was either short-lived or unconvincing, for in 1625, Sir William Alexander, later earl of Stirling, wrote of the "Lost Colony:" "What did become of them, if they did remove to some other part, perish, disperse, or incorporate with the Salvages (no monument of them remayning) is altogether unknowne." An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1625), 28.
Thus, the extermination of the Powhatan priests was justified by Englishmen in London and Virginia as a preventive necessity—"an acceptable service to God . . . [as] Jehu king of Israell did when he assembled all the priests of Baal, and slue them to the last man."\textsuperscript{182} It was only "to prevent our owne throats from the cutting," noted Strachey, that Englishmen would "drawe our swordes, \textit{et vim vi repellere}."\textsuperscript{183} Above all, "noe Spanish Intention shalbe entertayned by us . . . to roote out the Naturallls as the Spaniards have done in Hispaniola and other parts, but only to take from them [the Powhatans] these Seducers."\textsuperscript{184}

Rhetoric and reality merged in the First Anglo-Powhatan War. The policy formulated in London and the deeds performed in Virginia dovetailed to a remarkable extent between 1609 and 1613. As company tracts were advocating revenge on the Powhatan priests, the colony was preparing to carry that plan into effect. Lord De La Warr, Gates, and Sir Thomas Dale, who, with Gates, had been specifically recruited in the Low Countries, were making Virginia a disciplined military colony through the \textit{ad terrorem},


\textsuperscript{183}\textit{Ibid.}, 26.

\textsuperscript{184}\textit{Ibid.}, 91.
"drumhead justice" of the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall. Accompanying this able leadership and authoritarian rule was the better preparedness of the Jamestown garrison for war. Between June 1610 and August 1611, over 950 immigrants, the vast majority of them men, arrived in Virginia to bolster the strength of the colony. Supplies from London, plus a vast quantity of body armor for use in battle, gave the English an overwhelming military advantage over the Powhatans. As the company's True Declaration asserted in 1610, "our forces are now such as are able to tame the fury and treachery of the Savages."187

In June 1610, Gates commenced a series of offensives designed to take revenge on specific tribes for actions against the English during the "Starving Time." Gates first led a force against the Kecoughtans. He lured them into complacency by entertaining them with a drummer, and in the sudden and brutal attack that followed, many of the Kecoughtans died of "extraordinary Lardge and mortall wounds." Pochins lost his village and Powhatan his easternmost outpost; the English gained many fertile fields and a

185Rutman, "Militant New World," 146, 182; also see, 53-54, 124, 137. William Strachey, secretary in the colony, was the compiler of the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall (London, 1612). See the modern reprint, ed. David H. Flaherty, Jamestown Documents (Charlottesville, Va., 1969). On the commanders, see Barbour, Pocahontas, 75-76.

186Hecht, "Virginia, 1607-1640," 329-331.

187Virginia Company, True Declaration (1610), 20.
strategic location for the construction of future fortifications.188

On August 9, 1610, Percy led seventy men against the Paspaheghs, the perennial scapegoats. Percy's musketeers surrounded the unsuspecting villagers, and in a brief assault, they killed some sixteen warriors and captured the wife and children of the werowance, Wowinchopunk. The Paspahegh lodges were burned, their corn was cut down, and on the voyage back to Jamestown, the English soldiers voted to kill the werowance's children. They were thrown into the river, and the troopers took sport in "shoteinge owtt their Braynes."189 This done, Percy dispatched most of his force to raid the Chickahominies some fourteen miles from the mouth of the Chickahominy River. Again, the warriors were put to flight and corn was cut down, but on this occasion, "Temples and Idolles" were destroyed along with Indian lodges.190

On one earlier occasion, in the autumn of 1609, English troops had committed sacrilege on Indian holy places, "Ransacked their Temples Tooke downe the Corpses


190Ibid., 272.
of their deade kings from of their Toambes And caried away their pearles Copper and braceletts, wherewith they doe decore their kings funeralles."\textsuperscript{191} Such behavior confirmed the Anglo-Powhatan War as a holy war in which English soldiers fought "under the banner of Jesus Christ."\textsuperscript{192} As the war of retaliation progressed, Biblical precedents bolstered the Christian crusaders. If King David could "warre against the Ammonites," proclaimed a company pamphlet in 1610, "it is lawfull, in us, to secure our selves, against the infidels."\textsuperscript{193}

"Dei facta, sunt nostra praecepta, Gods actions, are our instructions"\textsuperscript{194} became the rallying cry in Virginia, as Marshall Dale, who never doubted that he was involved in "Religious Warfare,"\textsuperscript{195} bolstered his troops' morale with the armor of Anglicanism. A prayer contained in the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall asked God to "defend us from the delusions of the devell, the malice of the heathen, [and] the invasion of our enemies"; to "confound the practises of Satan and his ministers"; and to...

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\textsuperscript{191}Ibid., 263. Also see, Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 91.

\textsuperscript{192}Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, 44.

\textsuperscript{193}Virginia Company, True Declaration, 6. "Fortitude without justice," declared this anonymous pamphleteer, "is but the firebrand of iniquitie." \textit{Ibid.}, 7.

\textsuperscript{194}Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{195}Quoted in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 102.
"let wickedness, superstition, ignorance and idolatry perish." There was sincerity in the English belief that "we have the divel and all the gates of hel against us," and comfort was taken in the militarism of the Old Testament:

O then let Dagon [God of Canaan] fall before thy Arke, let Satan be confounded at thy presence, and let the heathen see it and be ashamed, ... for their God is not as our God.

The perceived threat from the Powhatans, the seriousness of the English mission, and the authoritarianism of the De La Warr-Gates-Dale regime intensified the ethnocentrism of the English soldiers—as revealed by their increasing tendency to commit atrocities. Frustrated by the

196[Strachey, comp.], Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall, ed. Flaherty, 97, 99, 100. The military theorist Thomas Digges observed in 1590 that "if the verie Paynims by due observation of their fayned Religion did keepe their Armies in marvellous obedience and order, how much more shall true Religion delivered from the Almightie Lord of Hostes avayle a Generall and Armie that loveth him, to the atchieving of myraculous Victories." An Arithmetical Militarie Treatise, Named Stratioticos, rev. ed. (London, 1590), 306.

197[Strachey, comp.], Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall, ed. Flaherty, 98. Also see, Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, 22, 44.


199The very severity of the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall, which Dale applied to the fullest extent, supports various propositions of social scientists. External threat "increases ethnocentrism"; creates increased awareness of one's own ingroup identity; reduces defection from the ingroup; and increases punishment for defecters and deviants. LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 32-33; quote on 33. On Dale's treatment of "deviant"
impotence of the colony during the "Starving Time," repressed by the harsh Lawes Divine, Morall and Martill, and aroused by the company's inflammatory publications, English troops sought catharsis in the murder of children and in the desecration of Indian holy places. The Powhatans were blamed for English suffering and for hampering the colony's development. Every blow struck against the Indians was a personal, emotional revenge for past wrongs, and was, at the same time, a commitment to the future of English Virginia. Modern theories of frustration,

Englishmen, see Percy, "Trewe Relacyon," in Tyler's Qtly. Hist. and Genealogical Mag., III (1922), 280.

Social scientists who have studied a variety of cultures have found that "the more frustrating the environment, the more ethnocentric the group," taking into account that "frustration is a product of expectations" and that a "lowering of conditions is frustrating no matter what the terminal level." LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 124. "Restraint on impulse, frustration, pain, and the like" often produces "hostile, retaliatory, [and] aggressive tendencies directed at the perceived source of restraint." Ibid., 118-119. And if "the expression of hostility toward a displacement target has a catharsis value," then ingroup tensions and factionalism are reduced. Ibid., 121; also see, 133 and passim.

Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 90, noted the frustrations that the English experienced, but he was rather insensitive to the ways in which intercultural bitterness was intensified by the First Anglo-Powhatan War. His preoccupation with racism obscured the fact that similar frustrations bred similar atrocities in interethnic—not interracial—relations throughout Europe, namely in 16th-century Ireland and in 17th-century Germany. Ibid., 80-81, 98-130. See S. H. Steinberg, The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660 (New York, 1966), 102 and passim; R. A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations (New York, 1970), 73-74 and passim; Graham C. Kinloch, The Dynamics of Race Relations: A Sociological Analysis (New York, 1974), 50-57.
aggression, and displacement acknowledge that the greater the discipline of group life, its repressions, privations, and exactions [moral, religious, or economic sanctions] . . . , the greater we can expect its aggressiveness to become at the expense of some other group or groups.201

According to sociologist Gordon Allport, there is a "stepwise progression from verbal aggression to violence, from rumor to riot, from gossip to genocide,"202 and the preliminary forces that precipitate warfare—and especially atrocities—were all present in Virginia before or during the Anglo-Powhatan War. Long periods of "categorical prejudgment" and suspicion and hatred of the Powhatans preceded actual warfare, and an "outside strain upon members of the in-group"203—such as the hostility and suffering of the "Starving Time"—was enough to trigger an aggressive reaction against the Indians. Provocation existed, and large-scale warfare erupted when English military capabilities were increased and when violence was officially sanctioned in London.

Once actual fighting broke out, moral justifications and peer pressure would have tended to perpetuate and escalate "destructive activity." Allport wrote that "to see other equally excited persons in a condition of mob frenzy augments one's own level of excitement and behavior." 201LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 117.
203Ibid., 58.
Such factors "remove the normal brakes that exist between verbal aggression and overt violence. They are likely to be fulfilled in regions where the two opposing groups are thrown into close contact."204

Once the war in Virginia had gained momentum, the English came to relish atrocities beyond their efficacy as ad terrorem military tactics. The "Quene" of Paspahegh, who had witnessed the brutal and senseless murder of her children, was needlessly put to the sword at Jamestown. Percy insisted on this relatively humane form of execution over Lord De La Warr's objections; the governor had wanted her burned alive.205 De La Warr's sense of revenge was personal as well as official, for after his nephew, Capt. William West, was slain by the Powhatans, the governor rarely missed a chance to inflict cruelty.206 He considered all Indians as spies, and on one occasion, had a warrior's hand cut off to serve as a warning to any Powhatan who ventured near Jamestown.207 Many of De La Warr's commanders, like Gates, Dale, George Yeardley, and Samuel Argall, were veterans of bitter fighting in the Low Countries, and their experiences

204Ibid., 58-59.
206Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 85; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 108.
and frustrations with those futile wars made them efficient masters of devastation and vengeance. In September 1610, Captain Argall attacked the Warraskoyacks in retaliation for having mocked the governor. He burned everything in sight and cut down their corn, but to his disappointment, the villagers had fled, and there was no one around to kill.208

In late 1610, the Powhatans launched a series of counter-offensives against the English. De La Warr's own force was assaulted near the falls, while the Appomattocs killed fourteen Englishmen near their villages.209 Gates's drummer, who had so cunningly entertained the Kecoughtans before their fatal hour, was the only survivor of the Appomattoc attack. As Percy noted, "the Salvages be nott Soe Simple as many Imagin . . . for they had nott forgotten how their neighbours att Kekowhatan wer alurred And defeated by Sir Thomas Gates when he had the same Taborer [drummer] with him."210 In retaliation, the English burned an Appomattoc village and narrowly missed killing the wero-wansqua Opossunoquonucke with a volley of musket shot.211


209Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 64.


211Strachey, Virginia Britania, ed. Wright and Freund, 64.
In February 1610/11, the English achieved their final and long-festering revenge on the Paspaheghs. After repeated attacks on their nearest Indian neighbors, after burning and pillaging, and after killing Wowinchopunk's wife and children, the English killed the werowance himself, "one of the mightiest and strongest Salvadges that Powhattan had under him, and . . . one of his Champions."\textsuperscript{212}

Lord De La Warr left Virginia on March 28, 1611, and soon after, a force of five or six hundred Indians attacked and wiped out a small English garrison stationed at the blockhouse on Jamestown Island. Percy called this assault a "disaster," but colony officials did not have to despair long.\textsuperscript{213} On May 12, 1611, Dale arrived in Virginia with three hundred soldiers and a "greatt store of Armour," which he soon put to use.\textsuperscript{214}

In the summer of 1611, Dale—"our Religious and valiant Governour"\textsuperscript{215}—led one hundred men, in complete armor for the first time, against the Nansamunds. The Indian warriors suffered many casualties in furious fighting, but the armored English did not lose a man. Shocked at the ineffectiveness of their arrows, the Nansamunds

\textsuperscript{212}Ibid., 67.

\textsuperscript{213}Percy, "Trewe Relacyon," in Tyler's Qtly. Hist. and Genealogical Mag., III (1922), 276.

\textsuperscript{214}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{215}Alexander Whitaker, quoted in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 109.
resorted to "exorcismes conjuracyons and charmes . . . diabolicall gestures . . . Spelles and incantacionus" in a futile attempt to bring rain to extinguish the burning wicks on the English muskets. These "charmes" of Indian sorcery did not bring rain, but they were blamed for bewitching Dale and his men soon after the battle.

The Nansamunds' desperate reliance upon supernatural sanctions revealed growing psychological stress and a sense of powerlessness among the tidewater tribes. As the English successes multiplied, the Powhatans called upon "their Okeus, and to all the host of their Idolls, to plague the Tassantasses . . . and their posterityes." As Strachey reported, the Powhatan priests

feare and tremble, lest the knowledge of god and of our Saviour Jesus Christ should be taught in those parts, [and] doe now with the more vehement perswade the people to hold on their wonted Ceremonyes, and . . . to sacrifice still their owne Children to the auncyent god of their fathers.

The worst was to come for the Powhatans. In September 1611, after Gates returned to Virginia with an
additional three hundred people, Dale established the upriver settlement of Henrico (Farrars' Island). In this campaign, Dale invaded the region near Powhatan's natal village—the western door of his empire—and received furious assaults from Indian forces. Leading the main body of warriors, as the commander appointed by Powhatan himself, was Nemattanew, "comonly called . . . Jacke of the feathers . . . by reason thatt he used to come into the felde all covered over with feathers and Swans wings fastened unto his showlders as thought he meante to flye."²²¹ This was the first recorded appearance of Nemattanew, a famous Indian leader who later had a profound impact on Anglo-Powhatan relations. In 1611, he was unable to turn back Dale's expedition.

The English conquest of the upper James River broke the backs of the Powhatans. Henrico was soon established as a thriving population center surpassing Jamestown, and from 1611 to 1616, this area became the functioning capital of Virginia.²²² Dale's victory gave the English effective


²²²Raphe Hamor, A True Discourse of the Present Estate of Virginia (London, 1615), 30-32; John Rolfe, A True Relation of the State of Virginia Lefte by Sir Thomas Dale Knight in May Last 1616 (1616), Jamestown Documents (Charlottesville, Va., 1971), 7, 9-10; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 111; Charles E. Hatch, Jr., The First Seventeen Years: Virginia, 1607-1624, Jamestown 350th Anniversary Historical Booklet, no. 6 (Williamsburg, Va., 1957), 50-52, 62-64; J. Frederick Fausz, "Patterns of
control of the north bank of the James River from Hampton Roads to the fall line. In two years of war, the English had attacked and, in varying degrees, devastated villages of the Nansamunds, Kecoughtans, Paspaheghs, Chickahominies, Warraskoyacks, Powhatans, and Appomattocks, and Powhatan himself had retreated to the secure Pamunkey stronghold at Matchcot, far from the English.223 (See Map IV.1.)

In addition to subduing the hostile tidewater tribes, the English had established good relations with the Patawomekes, Accohannocs, and Accomacs, effectively alienating them from Powhatan's influence. In 1612, Captain Argall received in trade eleven hundred bushels of Patawomeke corn and sealed a defensive military alliance with that tribe against Powhatan.224 On the Eastern Shore, the English found "great store of Inhabitants, who seemed very desirous of our love, . . . because they had received good reports from the [Patawomekes] of our courteous usage of them."225

Settlement in the James River Basin, 1607-1642" (M.A. thesis, College of William and Mary, 1971), chap. 3. On the relative importance of Henrico, see the exaggerated 1613 German map by Jakob Franck, in John W. Reps, Tidewater Towns: City Planning in Colonial Virginia and Maryland (Charlottesville, Va., 1972), 41.

223Hamor, True Discourse, 38; Barbour, Pocahontas, 139; Lord De La Warre, "Relation," June 1611, in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 89.

224"A letter of Sir Samuel Argoll touching his voyage to Virginia, and Actions there: Written to Master Nicholas Hawes, June 1613," in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 29-93.

225Ibid., 94.
MAP IV.1 ENGAGEMENTS OF THE FIRST ANGLO-POWHATAN WAR,
1609–1613
After Dale's campaigns in 1611, the English noted that Powhatan was "not able to doe us hurt," and the First Anglo-Powhatan War was slowly coming to an end. Although the fighting de-escalated after 1611, Powhatan refused to submit to the English. The Mamanatowick defiantly continued to hold English prisoners and weapons, which were considered "Monuments and Trophies" of English defeats and "shames." Captain Argall's chance capture of Pocahontas among the Patawomekes in March 1612/13 was designed to end the hostilities, for Powhatan's submission to English authority was the ransom for Pocahontas's freedom. But the proud and stubborn Powhatan refused English demands for almost a full year after Pocahontas's capture. Finally, in February 1613/14, an English ultimatum--delivered in the form of a large raid upon the Pamunkeys--convinced Powhatan to accept the terms of his hated adversaries. In the spring of 1614, the Mamanatowick submitted to a degrading

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226 De La Warre, "Relation," June 1611, ibid., 89.

227 Letter of Sir Thomas Dale to "M. D. M.," June 1614, ibid., 105; Hamor, True Discourse, 55. It was reported that even though the English muskets and swords were "of no use" to Powhatan, "it delighted him to ... looke upon" them. Hamor, True Discourse, 6


229 Dale to "M. D. M.," in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 103-104. "Being justly provoked" in their Pamunkey expedition, the English burned some 40 dwellings, killed five to six Indians, and "made freeboote and pillage"--a "satisfying" revenge for the Indians' "preumption" in shooting at them. Hamor, True Discourse, 8. The English presented an ultimatum to Powhatan, demanding "either a firme league of
peace that made him a tributary of the English and forced him to recognize his subordinate position under English authority.  

Even though Powhatan's James River domain had been devastated, his daughter held captive by the enemy, and the Pamunkeys attacked by the increasingly aggressive English, the fact that the Mamanatowick submitted at all indicates how militarily and psychologically beaten down were the Powhatans. Dale, himself, was amazed at how meekly Powhatan 

friendship or a present warre." "Briefe Declaration of the . . . first Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 33.

Although the specific terms that Powhatan agreed to are not extant, the provisions of a peace made soon after with the Chickahominies were probably similar.

1. The Chickahominies would retain their local government of 8 elders but had to recognize Dale as their "weroance" and King James as their sovereign;
2. They would be known as tassantasses or Englishmen;
3. They would refrain from killing English livestock or people;
4. They would supply 300-400 warriors to the English if needed;
5. They would visit English settlements only if invited;
6. Each of 500 bowmen would annually pay 2 bushels of corn to the English as tribute, for which they were to receive iron hatchets;
7. The eight ruling elders would enforce these provisions in exchange for English red coats, copper chains of office, and engraved medals of James I.

Hamor, True Discourse, 13-14.
"tendred us peace" after all the killing, burning, and pillaging that had gone before, and he characteristically attributed English success to "the God of Battailes." 231

The English won the First Anglo-Powhatan War because committed Virginia Company officials had so fervently desired success and feared failure. Anything short of a complete victory would have meant a "detriment of Christian Religion and a greate prejudice unto this Kingdome," and would have condemned the surviving colonists to "famishing and . . . the Cruell rages of barbarous Infidells[]." 232

As Dale wrote to company officials in 1613: "If you give over this Country and loose it, you ... will leape such a gugion as our state hath not done the like, since they lost the Kingdome of Fraunce." 233

When hostilities finally ceased, Englishmen in London and Virginia rejoiced in their victory. In 1614, the Virginia Company, in particular, saw the dawning of a new era of prosperity and accomplishment, in which its long-stressed goals could be realized. In looking to the future, the company felt compelled to protect its reputation by

231Ibid., 54-55. It was frankly admitted that Powhatan agreed to the peace "more for feare then love." "Briefe Declaration of the . . . first Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 33. Also see, Dale to "M. D. M.," in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 105-107.


233Sir Thomas Dale to Sir Thomas Smythe, June 1613, read in Company Minutes, May 7, 1623, Ibid., II, 399.
justifying wartime measures to the English populace.

Already in 1610, the company's *True Declaration* had stated that the war in Virginia was merely an action against traitors to legitimate authority, since Powhatan in 1608 had "voluntarilie" accepted "a crown and scepter" from King James, with "full acknowledgment of dutie and submission." The pamphlet noted that "if just offences shall arise, it can be no more injustice to warre against infidells, than it is when upon just occasions wee warre against Christians." 234

Strachey wrote in 1612 that "in the Old Testament we shall read, when straunge and great Nations, would not submit to the yoak of . . . the everlasting god, by faire entreaty, they were ferro, et flammis, compel's thereunto." 235 In 1613, as the war was winding down, William Crashaw wrote that

though Satan visibly and palpably raignes there [in Virginia], more then in any other knowne place of the world: yet be of courage (blessed brethren) [for] God will tредe Satan under your feet shortly, and the ages to come will eternize your names, as the Apostles of Virginia. 236

However, the fullest expression of the company's position was found in Alderman Johnson's sequel to his

234 Virginia Company, True Declaration, 6-7. Also see the denunciation of Powhatan, *ibid.*, 17-19.


236 William Crashaw, "Epistle Dedicatory," in Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, C2r.
Nova Britannia, entitled The New Life of Virginia (London, 1612). In this tract, the company, through Johnson, observed that "the worke that we first intended and have publisht to the world [conversion of Indians]" is still "chiefe in our thoughts." But native "worship of Divels" was the major impediment--the "knot" that had to be untied or "cut asunder." Military victory was a necessary first step in the conversion process, but as soon as the Powhatans submitted, "patience and humanitie" would replace "Iron and steele." As Johnson wrote, "weapons of warre are needfull, I grant but for defence only, and not in this case." Rather, the company idealistically announced that once the war was over Indian children would be acculturated and converted with "gentlenesse" and their elders by "wisedome and discretion," assuring them equal status with Englishmen regarding protection, wealth, and habitation.

The year 1614--the midpoint between first contact and later uprising--was one of promise and fulfillment for the Virginia Company. Following closely Powhatan's acceptance of terms, came the April marriage of Pocahontas, the

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237[Robert Johnson], The New Life of Virginea: Declaring the former successe and present estate of that plantation (London, 1612), in Force, comp., Tracts, I, no. 18-19. The Rev. Alexander Whitaker in 1613 wrote that "God and the Divell will not dwell together," but that once the English "were masters of their [the Powhatans'] Countrey, and they stoode in feare of us ... it were an easie matter to make them willingly to forsake the divell, [and] to embrace the faith of Jesus Christ." Good Newes from Virginia, 36, 40.

238[Johnson], New Life of Virginia, in Force, Tracts, I, no. 7, 18.
newly christened "Lady Rebecca," to colonist John Rolfe.239

Out of the carnage of war had come the first fruits of Hakluyt's dream--an acculturated, Anglicanized Indian, Pocahontas. As "the first Christian ever of that [Powhatan] Nation, the first Virginian ever spake English, or had a childe in marriage by an Englishman," Pocahontas was living proof that the idealistic projections of London could be realized.240

The Virginia Company directors were more self-assured than ever that the colony could become a "Sanctum

239Hamor, True Discourse, 11; Barbour, Pocahontas, chap. 10; Mossiker, Pocahontas, chap. 9.

240Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 122. Also see Hamor, True Discourse, 55, 59-61; letter of Whitaker to "M. G.," 1614, in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 109. Whitaker, who lived at Rock Hall near Henrico, was given the responsibility of converting Pocahontas. Harry Culverwell Porter, "Alexander Whitaker: Cambridge Apostle to Virginia," WMQ, 3d Ser., XIV (1957), 338-339; Mossiker, Pocahontas, 164-170. Her baptismal name, Rebecca, was both Biblical and prophetic:

And they called Rebekah, and said unto her, Wilt thou go with this man? And she answered, I wil go.

So they let Rebekah their sister go, and her nourse, with Abrahams servant and his men.

And thei blessed Rebekah, and said unto her, Thou art our sister, growe into thousand thousandes, and thy sede possesse the gate of his ennemies.

And the Lord said to her, two nations are in thy wombe, and two maner of people shalbe devided out of thy bowels, and the one people shalbe mightier then the other, and the elder shal serve the younger.

Sanctorum, an holy house" for religious triumphs. Believing that God was "sufficiently revenged for . . . [the Powhatan] forefathers Ingratitude and treasons," company officials boasted that "these poore Heathens . . . [when converted] would cry blessed for ever be the most high God . . . that sent these English as Angels to bring such glad tidings amongst us." In 1613, Crashaw appealed for Anglican missionaries--"Champions of Christ"--to give up "their soules to God, and their flesh to nature, honoring, and . . . consecrating those Heathenish Earths with their happy bodies."  

An outpouring of optimism was understandable in 1614, for the Elizabethan imperialistic blueprint was still operative. Hakluyt, himself, as late as 1609 wrote that

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241 Hamor, True Discourse, A4r. On John Rolfe's own optimism, see his letter to Dale, 1613, in Barbour, Pocahontas, 247-252; Rolfe, True Relation, Jamestown Documents, 12.

The Rolfe-Pocahontas marriage to a large extent proved that maximal racism--an invariable connection between cultural behavior and physical type--was not a factor in early Anglo-Powhatan relations. See Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, 73-74 and passim; Kinloch, Dynamics of Race Relations, 50-57. Also see, Winthrop Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1968), 89-91. The Rolfe-Pocahontas match need not have been the only such marriage, if other factors had been equal. See Judith Reynolds, "Marriage Between the English and the Indians in Seventeenth Century Virginia," Archaeological Society of Virginia, Quarterly Bulletin, XVII (1962), 19-25.

242 Hamor, True Discourse, A4r.

243 Crashaw, "Epistle Dedicatory," in Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, C3r.
conversion—the ultimate colonial mission—would only be accomplished gradually and that paganism would be eradicated "by little and little."²⁴⁴ The First Anglo-Powhatan War had begun that process, and Pocahontas's conversion had confirmed the legitimacy of violent means to achieve peaceful ends.

Encouraged by peace, a growing colony, and their first convert, the Virginia Company directors were oblivious to the irony of 1614. The war that had been designed to make the Powhatans accept the English presence succeeded only in earning their hatred and in pushing them out of the James River basin. Because of the war, close contact with, and reform of, the Indians—the essential components of a Christian mission—became almost impossible to achieve. After 1614, the company and the colony, the ideology of the homeland-English and the ethnocentrism of the Virginia-English, worked at cross purposes. Removal and reform were contradictory objectives, just as tobacco and theology were soon to become. The Rolfe-Pocahontas marriage, itself, represented the irony: Pocahontas's accomplishments gratified London idealists; Rolfe's accomplishments with tobacco gratified Virginia pragmatists. As Dale in 1614 wrote with regard to future colonists: "howsoever they

stand affected, here is enough to content them, let their ends be either for God, or Mammon."\textsuperscript{245}

Between 1614 and 1620, London and Jamestown followed the beat of different drummers, and it became increasingly obvious that Virginia colonists were not embracing or advancing the goals of the Virginia Company. After 1614, the colony would grow and change; the company would not.

With ideological self-righteousness, the Virginia Company directors never abandoned their religion-oriented goals for the colony. Between 1612, the date of the third royal charter, and 1621, the company sought financial support by repeating its commitment to the pious mission of New World conversion. Once again, the English populace responded to Elizabethan idealism. Six London companies and 325 individuals subscribed to the company in 1612,\textsuperscript{246} and thereafter the "reall and substantiall food by which Virginia . . . [was] nourished" came from public lotteries.\textsuperscript{247} At least £29,000 was raised in this way over several years.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{245}Dale to "M. D. M.," June 1614, in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 108.

\textsuperscript{246}Brown, Genesis of the United States, II, 542n.


In the "First Great Standing Lottery" of 1612, Sir Edwin Sandys urged the mayor of Sandwich to support the company's efforts toward "the enlargement of the Christian truth." The Vintners' Company of London pledged £40 in the company's lottery for "winning soules to God by plantation of Religion amongst infidels," and other city companies also bought chances. The "Second Great Standing Lottery," 1612-1615, made a large public appeal. A 1612 broadside ballad urged potential investors to "performe a Christian part" in the company's "high praysed enter­prise," and a 1615 broadside, adorned with engravings of Europeanized Indians, proclaimed:

Once, in one State, as of one Stem,
Meere Strangers from Jerusalem,
As Wee were Yee; till Others Pittie
Sought, and brought You to That Cittie.

Deere Britaines, now, be You as kinde:
Bring Light, and sight, to Us yet blinde;
Leade Us, by Doctrine and Behaviour,
Into one Sion, to one Saviour.

That these religion-hungry Indians portrayed on the 1615 broadside brought to mind the conversion of Pocahontas of the Virginia Company, VMHB, LXVIII (1960), 156-165.


250 Ibid., 263.

251 Ibid., 264-265.

252 Ibid., 274.

253 "A Declaration for the certaine time of drawing the great standing Lottery," broadside (London, 1615), ibid., 258.
was no accident, for her example was an essential ingredient in the company's planning and fund-raising after 1614. The "effectively managed visit" of the Powhatan princess to England in 1616 was a triumph of public relations. She created great excitement, being entertained by the likes of King James and the Lord Bishop of London "with festivall state and pomp." Even Captain Smith was given to write an enthusiastic letter of introduction for Pocahontas to Queen Anne, declaring that "this Kingdome may rightly have a Kingdome by her meanes."

Coinciding with the news of Pocahontas's conversion, King James in February 1615/16 directed the archbishops of Canterbury and York to solicit funds from all bishops and parishes under them for the purpose of "erecting ... some Churches and Schooles, for the education of the Children of those Barbarians [in Virginia]." James noted the "good progress made" in conversion of Indians and saw the "hope of further increase." Semi-annual collections were

254Wesley Frank Craven, "Indian Policy in Early Virginia," WMQ, 3d Ser., I (1944), 71.

255Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 118. Purchas followed Pocahontas's activities with great interest until her tragic death in 1617 (at Gravesend she came to her "end and grave.") Ibid. On her visit to London, see Barbour, Pocahontas, chap. 13; Mossiker, Pocahontas, chap. 12.

256Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 122.

257Quoted in Peter Walne, "The Collections for Henrico College, 1616-1618," VMHB, LXXX (1972), 258.

258Ibid. Also see, Virginia Company, letter of solicitation to the mayor of Norwich, Dec. 4, 1617, quoted
made and paid by the archbishops to the treasurer of the Virginia Company. More than £2,000 was raised by 1620, and London parishes alone contributed £1,000. This campaign became the basis for the proposed Indian college of the "University of Henrico." The company, in its 1618 instructions to Gov. George Yeardley (the "Great Charter" of reforms), advocated the "building and planting of a college for the training up of the children of those Infidels in true Religion, morall virtue and Civility and for other godly uses." An additional, related project, the East India collegiate school for English youths, brought in additional funds for the Virginia Company.

Private donations for Indian conversion and education and for the establishment of Anglican churches flowed in Johnson, "'Running Lotteries,'" VMHB, LXVIII (1960), 161.

259Craven, "Indian Policy," WMQ, 3d Ser., I (1944), 71.


261Virginia Company, Instructions to Sir George Yeardley (the "Great Charter"), Nov. 18, 1618, in Bemiss, ed., Three Charters of the Virginia Company, 100.

into company coffers between 1619 and 1621. Mistress Mary Robinson of London, cousin to Sir John Wolstenholme of the Virginia Company, bequeathed £200 in 1619 for the construction of a church in the colony. That same year unknown donors contributed £50 worth of silver communion services, damask table cloths, and carpets of silk damask and crimson velvet for use in the proposed St. Mary's Church and in the college at Henrico. 263 In 1619/20 a pseudonymous source—one "Dush and Ashes"—donated £550 in gold for the "Convertinge of Infideles to the fayth of Christe," and called for the education of young Indians from ages seven to twelve and their subsequent apprenticeship in a trade until age twenty-one. 264 Similarly, the will of Nicholas Ferrar, the elder, provided £300 for the education of ten Indians at the proposed Virginia college and allocated £24 annually for colonists who would supervise the preparatory instruction of Indian children. 265 The Lord Bishop of Rochester donated


264 Virginia Company general court, Feb. 2, 1619/20, ibid., 307. "Dust and Ashes" is believed to have been Gabriel Barbor of the company. Charles Campbell, History of the Colony and Ancient Dominion of Virginia (Philadelphia, 1860), 148.

265 Virginia Company court, Apr. 8, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 335. Money from the Ferrar grant was given as late as 1640 to George Menefie, who for 10 years had instructed a Rappahannock boy in religion, reading, and writing. Philip Alexander Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols. (New York, 1910), I, 364-365nn.
£20 of his own money over and above the funds he had collected for the college from his diocese.266

This religiously-motivated fund-raising increased in intensity by 1621. The Rev. Patrick Copland, chaplain on the England-bound East India Company ship Royal James, so convinced his shipmates of the need for missionary activity in Virginia that the crew and passengers donated £70. 8s. 6d. to found a collegiate school. The following year mariners on the East India Company ships Hart and Roe-Buck gave £66. 13s. 4d. for the same purpose.267 Copland planned future solicitations of East India factories. His efforts were so tireless in founding a Virginia academy at a proposed site in Charles City that he was named first rector of the Henrico college and awarded three shares in the Virginia Company "by waye of Gratification."268 In 1621, the Virginia company received


267 Brown, Genesis of the United States, II, 973; Virginia Company quarter court, Nov. 21, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 559; company court, Oct. 31, 1621, ibid., 538-539; company preparative court, Nov. 19, 1621, ibid., 550; company quarter court, July 3, 1622, ibid., II, 73.

268 Virginia Company quarter court, Nov. 21, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 550; committee meeting, Oct. 30, 1621, ibid., 539; Land, "Henrico and Its College," WMO, 2d Ser., XVIII (1938), 483, 487.
a large church Bible, a richly-bound smaller Bible, the Book of Common Prayer, a catechism, St. Augustine's *De Civitate Dei*, the complete works of William Perkins, and a map of Guiana drawn by Sir Walter Ralegh to be used in the "East India School."  

In early 1622, an unusual donation was made by the same "Dust and Ashes" who had given £550 for Indian projects two years before. Although not directly related to Henrico college or the collegiate school in the colony, this second gift promised an additional £450 if the company would send eight to ten Indian children to England, there "'to be educated . . . and to weare a habbit as the children of Christes Hospitall do.'"  

By May 1620, the company had received £2,043 in contributions specifically for the Indian college and had disbursed almost £1,477.  

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270 *Virginia Company quarter court, Jan. 30, 1621/22, ibid., I, 586.

271 *Virginia Company quarter court, May 17, 1620, ibid., 355.

272 In 1619 the college committee consisted of Sir Dudley Digges, Sir John Danvers, Sir Nathaniel Rich, Sir John Wolstenholme, Mr. John Ferrar, Dr. Theodore Gulstone, and Dr. Francis Anthony. Land, "Henrico and Its College," *WMQ*, 2d Ser., XVIII (1938), 477. In 1622, a new committee was appointed, which consisted of Mr. Thomas Gibbes, Mr. Robert Smith, Mr. Samuel Wrote, Mr. Gabriel Barbor, and Sir Edwin Sandys, and Danvers and Ferrar from the original group. *Virginia Company quarter court, July 3, 1622,*
for the college and ten thousand acres for the University near Henrico, and sent one hundred tenants at company expense to work the land. From the profits of these tenants, the company expected to finance the college. The £550 "Dust and Ashes" grant was invested in an iron-works (with eighty laborers), the profits from which would become the continuing source of operational funds for the college.

The sincerity and the motives of the Virginia Company regarding the Indian college were recently challenged by Francis Jennings, who referred to the "missionary racket" and the "Indian college mission device" designed


Virginia Company general court, Nov. 17, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 268.

Virginia Company quarter court, May 17, 1620, ibid., 352.

In 1619, the company decided not to build the college immediately, but to "forbeare a while and begin first with the meanes they have to provide and settle an Annuall revenue, and out of that to begin the erection of the said College." Virginia Company court, May 26, 1619, ibid., 220. Also see, Virginia Company, Declaration of the State of the Colonie (London, 1620), 8. A year later, the company sought two "worthy and sufficient men" to oversee the working tenants on the college lands. Company court, May 11, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 340.

to squeeze money out of the "gullible English faithful." 277

While it is true that the company was prone to mismanage-
ment and incompetence 278 and that Indian-related projects
did appeal to idealistic philanthropists, 279 many steps
were taken to put collections to good and appropriate
uses. The Indian college project was the most optimistic
and premature of the company's plans, being proposed as the
company was entering its darker hours. Setbacks included
the death of the master of the ironworks and of many of the
company's tenants, as well as the half-hearted support
given the project by the colonists themselves. But if one
single factor prevented the fulfillment of the company's
goals, it was that Indian children could not, and would
never, be found to make use of such an institution. The
Powhatans refused to let the colonists educate their
children because they were in "feare of hard usage by the


278 Wesley Frank Craven, Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment (New York, 1932), chaps. 6-7, passim; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 101, chap. 4, passim; Hecht, "Virginia, 1607-1640," chap. 4, passim.

279 One such philanthropist was George Ruggles, a fellow of Clare Hall, Cambridge. "Of singular honestie and integritie of life, sincere and zealous in Religion, and of verie great wisdome and understanding," this scholar in 1622 bequeathed £100 to the Virginia Company "for the education of Infidelles Children." Virginia Company quarter court, No*. 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 136.
English.  

External factors killed the Indian college project, not the insincerity or larceny of the Virginia Company.

The company directors in this period may have been myopic and naive, but they were neither hypocrites nor thieves. They repeatedly demonstrated the sincerity of their idealism by individual, unheralded, and well-intentioned actions. In May 1620, a Virginia Company court voted to pay twenty shillings a week toward the medication required by a tubercular Powhatan maiden who had lived in Cheapside since Pocahontas's visit in London.  

In this case, as in Pocahontas's tragic death, the English environment was not deemed conducive to Indian health, and in January 1621/22, the Virginia Company vetoed a proposal to educate Powhatan children in London, because "upon experience of those brought by Sir Thomas Dale [it] might be farr from the Christian worke intended." The company directors likewise turned down requests of some in Virginia

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281Virginia Company court, May 11, 1620, ibid., 330. Five years after Pocahontas's 1616 visit to London, the company was still supporting two other Indian women. In 1621, it was decided to furnish the women with one servant apiece and to send them (voluntarily) to Bermuda for marriage. Virginia Company preparative court, June 11, 1621, ibid., 494; company general court, June 13, 1621, ibid., 496.

282Virginia Company quarter court, Jan. 30, 1621/22, ibid., 589.
who wanted to have Powhatan children live at their plantations, because the "Indians are not acquainted with them."
The company was careful to select locations, like Southampton Hundred and Berkeley Hundred, where Powhatan children were "sure to be well nurtured." 283

The directors of the Virginia Company were similarly cautious about the men they dispatched to the colony as ministers. They often demanded proof of competency by having a candidate give a trial sermon. 284 The company was a consistent recruiter of clergymen, paid them £20 for passage to Virginia, and decreed that livings in the colony total £200 per annum. 285

Jennings has charged that the "Virginia Company never transported a single missionary to America," 286 a statement refuted by the work of the Rev. Alexander Whitaker, the scholarly and dedicated clergyman who converted Pocahontas to Anglicanism and who was a tireless

283 Virginia Company court, Feb. 16, 1619/20, ibid., 311; company court, Mar. 2, 1619/20, ibid., 318.


285 Virginia Company, Instructions to Yeardley, 1618 in Bemiss, ed., Three Charters of the Virginia Company, 100; Virginia Company, Declaration of the State of the Colonie, 6-7; Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia, 1, 199n. The company was also generous in its rewards and favors to clergymen like Purchas and Donne, who had supported its projects. See Virginia Company quarter court, May 22, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 24; company quarter court, July 22, 1622, ibid., 74.

286 Jennings, Invasion of America, 55.
crusader for missionary activity between 1611 and 1617.\footnote{See Crashaw, "Epistle Dedicatory," in Whitaker, Good Newes from Virginia, passim; Porter, "Alexander Whitaker," WMQ, 3d Ser., XIV (1959), 332-343.} The company actively sought ministers, who, by their "good example," would "allure the Heathen people to submit themselves to the Scepter of Gods most righteous and blessed Kingdome, and so finally to joyn with them in the true Christian profession."\footnote{virginia company, broadside, May 17, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 276. In July 1622, the company gave the freedom of the company to a Mr. Pemberton, "a Minister of Gods word, intendinge forthwith to goe to Virginia and there toimploye himselfe for the convertinge of the Infidelles." Virginia Company quarter court, July 3, 1622, \textit{ibid}., II, 74.} Although missionaries are made and not born, most ministers sent to Virginia had the potential, given the right circumstances, to be active proselytizers among the Powhatans. However, circumstances were rarely right for conversion attempts, since Virginia clergymen were overburdened with ministering to Englishmen,\footnote{See governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 1621/22, \textit{ibid}., III, 583; Virginia Company court, July 7, 1620, \textit{ibid}., I, 394.} who, in turn, were frequently engaged in warfare with the Indians. In addition, Anglican priests, in general, died soon after arriving in Virginia. Among notable clergymen who had the potential to be active missionaries were: Robert Hunt (arrived 1607; died 1608); Richard Buck (arrived 1609; died ca. 1621), who married Rolfe and Pocahontas; Nicholas Glover (arrived 1611; died 1612); Samuel Macocke (arrived
1618; died 1622); Henry Jacob (arrived 1622; left 1623); and Thomas Bargrave (arrived 1619; died 1621).  

Although the Virginia Company leadership at the highest levels between 1614 and 1622 consistently supported a religious mission in Virginia, the men in control after 1619--Sir Edwin Sandys, John Ferrar, and Nicholas Ferrar--were especially committed to Christian goals. Sandys, a son of the Archbishop of York and descended from a Marian exile, had taken Anglican orders at Oxford and had written *A Relation of the State of Religion* in 1605. Suspected of Puritan sympathies, Sandys had allegedly affirmed "that if God from heaven did constitute and direct a forme of Government it was that of Geneva." The Ferrar brothers, as deputy treasurers of the Virginia Company, worked closely with Sandys in formulating plans for Indian education and conversion. In 1621, John Ferrar reaffirmed his commitment to Virginia--an enterprise "most Christian honorable and glorious"--and "exorted the Companie not to be discouraged for . . . he hoped God still had a hand in

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the protection of Virginia." Sandys and the Ferrars promoted the Indian college project from 1619 until 1622. The company was debating the duties of the college rector even as the startling news of the Powhatan Uprising reached London in July 1622. 

Ironically, 1622 was an active year for college planning, and it represented the most mature phase in the company's sponsorship of idealistic projects. The company published Copland's *Virginia's God Be Thanked, or A Sermon of Thanksgiving for the Happie successe of the affayres in Virginia this last yeare*, which he had delivered in Bow Church, Cheapside, on April 18, 1622. The "Happie successe" that Copland referred to was "external, internall, and eternall," affecting the company, colony, and their mutual mission.

Copland's optimism reflected the company's state of mind in early 1622:

293Quoted in Virginia Company court, Oct. 31, 1621, ibid., I, 537.
Let us therefore consider and weigh well the Wonderful workes of the Lord: for, is it not a work of wonder to . . . stay . . . the hungry Lyons that they doe not devour? to mollifie the hearts of Salvages, and to make some of them voluntarily to remoove from their owne warme and well seated and peopled habitations, to give place to Strangers, whom they had never before seene: as Powhatan at the first plantation of the English . . . ? Yet all these hath the Lord done, and are they not wonderful works indeed?298

Also in 1622, Sandys and the company sponsored the publication of the Rev. John Brinsley's Consolation for Our Grammar Schooles, a famous textbook on pedagogy by a consultant on the Indian college.299 Designed as a model for schools in "all ruder countries and places; namely, for Ireland, Wales, and Virginia," Brinsley's book stressed the interrelationship between education and conversion, "civilitie" and Christianity.300

The enthusiasm and dedication of the Virginia Company directors regarding Indian policy was not shared by the colonists, whose cooperation was considered essential. It was the company's fate to have won the Anglo-Powhatan War only to lose the peace; from 1614 to 1622, the company's influence in, and control over, Virginia were on an irreversible decline. The colony after 1614 was not a "Sanctum Sanctorum" for conversion, but a profitable


300Brinsley, Consolation for Our Grammar Schooles, title page, "Epistle Dedicatore," passim.
marketplace where the production of tobacco soon became an obsession.

Especially after 1618, when the price of Virginia tobacco reached three shillings per pound, and a planter working alone could earn £200 per annum, the Virginia English became "good honest Tobaccoe mongers" in a boom-time atmosphere of profitable exploitation. When the Lawes Divine, Morall and Martiall were finally suspended in 1619, Virginia experienced "the fleeting ugliness of private enterprise operating temporarily without check." Many saw Virginia "not as a place of Habitation but onely of a short sojourninge [and] . . . applyed . . . their labors wholly to the raisinge of present proffitt and utterly neglected not only staple Commodities but even the verie necessities of mans life."

From January's seedbed to November's hogshead, tobacco was king. Tobacco rooted the plantation system in Virginia's soil by promoting massive immigration, bringing about sudden territorial expansion, dispersing settlements,


303 Virginia Company quarter court, Nov. 21, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 566.
exhausting the soil, and necessitating an increasingly larger labor force to meet economic demands.304 Between 1617 and 1622, some seventy ships carried up to 4,600 persons to the colony, and in the same period, thirty-one private plantations were chartered in Virginia.305 In 1616, 2,300 pounds of tobacco were exported for sale in England, but by 1618, that figure had increased almost twenty-fold.306 Both banks of the James River from Hampton Roads to Henrico supported tobacco plantations large and small; settlements were established with little regard for defense; and the land barons and tenant monopolists grabbed up new settlers as soon as they disembarked.

With it all, Virginia began to demonstrate real growth and maturity, as illustrated by the first General Assembly of 1619, in which eleven separate boroughs and plantations were represented. Although the colony's viability and prosperity was an improvement over earlier periods of crisis, Virginia's development was not applauded in London, precisely because the way in which the colony was maturing directly challenged the goals of the company.


305Hecht, "Virginia, 1607-1640," 169, 171.

306Ibid., 173.
The specter of Mammon—in the form of planter profits—was running and ruining Virginia, according to the Virginia Company. The London directors lashed out at profiteers who sold commodities at "excessive rates," contributing to "oppression and grindinge of the poore." The company called for "the exemplarie punishment of such Monsters as devour theire brethen by this wiked and barbarous course, especially if such wickednesse should be exercised by men in . . . authority." The company’s own officials could not be trusted when the lures of lucre were so powerful.

Rolfe, too, decried the changed atmosphere in the colony. As early as 1616, he wrote that it was "much to be mourned and lamented, how lightly the workes of God are now-adayes generally regarded, and less sought after: but the workes of the World . . . hungered for and thirsted after with unsatiable greediness." The Hakluytian ideology of piety and purpose was being perverted, as a Virginia planter's statement of early 1622 revealed:

Yea I say that any laborious honest men may in a shorte time become ritche in this Country. Lett them every one, zealous to increase the Churche of God, by propagating the Gospell, and to augmente the greatenes and glorie of his King and Country lay his helping handes to this Christian, and ever famous action.

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309 Rolfe, True Relation, Jamestown Documents, 12.

310 Peter Arundelle to John Smyth of Nibley, Jan.
The company regarded the trends in Virginia as "matters of lowe esteeme," seeing "contemptible" characteristics in the "solitary uncouthness" of the "Infant COMMONwealth." The company considered tobacco to be a useless, "deceivable weede," the profits from which "might soone vanish into smoake." The indignation from London was rightly placed, for Virginia's tobacco economy proved the undoing of company projects. Since the colony's "principall wealth" was labor, company tenants were diverted from official projects like the Indian college and were put to work in the fields of private planters. Construction of the East India School at Charles City was indefinitely postponed "by reason that as yet through their dotinge so much upon Tobacco no such workmen could be had but at intollerable rates, [which] might . . . tend to the exhausting of this sacred Treasure."


312Virginia Company general court, June 5, 1622, ibid., II, 36.


All too often, the company sent tenants to Virginia with inadequate supplies and provisions, and upon arrival, they had to be apportioned to planters in order to survive. Consequently, public lands and projects were little advanced, while planters reaped the benefits from tenant labor. Even on their own, tenants were forced to plant tobacco just to make ends meet, and economic diversification was made impossible. When, in 1619, the college tenants were constrained not to plant tobacco, they "bitterly" protested "that they have noe other meanes to furnish themselves with apparell for the insuinge yere but are likely . . . to be starved if they be debarred of it."316

If the atmosphere of boom-time Virginia was not conducive to the company's idealistic projects, large scale tobacco production had an even more detrimental impact upon the tidewater tribes. By the early 1620s, Elizabeth City overran the Kecoughtans' once-fair fields of corn; Smythe's (Southampton) Hundred and the "Governor's Land" occupied traditional Paspahegh territory; the plantations of Flowerdieu and Weyanoke stood on land of the Weanocs; the Falling Creek ironworks and the college/university lands intruded upon the village sites of the Powhatans and Arrohattocs; Abraham Piersey's plantation was situated on Appomattox lands; and several English settlements bordered

316 Weldon to Sandys, Mar. 6, 1619/20, ibid., III, 263.
the territory of the Quiyoughcohannocks and the Warraskoyacks. 317 This encroachment was not so much a quantitative issue as it was a qualitative one: there was plenty of land *per se*, but the English and the Powhatans were competing for the same riverine lands along the banks of the James.

Although definite conclusions are rendered difficult by the dearth of evidence on Virginia's early geography, post-uprising sources indicated that few of the tidewater tribes were *totally* dispossessed before 1622. 318 The James River tribes, with the exceptions of the Kecoughtans and the Paspaheghs, probably retained much of their territorial integrity even in the face of English expansion. Although Englishmen claimed vast stretches of alluvial lands, plantations were not densely populated, and habitations were widely separated. The adverse effects on the Powhatans' "adaptive efficiency vis-à-vis the natural habitat" 319 more than likely involved fishing and hunting to a greater degree than corn production, since the James River basin was the critical source of supply for fresh water and marine products. 320 Corn could be had, at a

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317 See Hatch, *First Seventeen Years*, 32-33 and *passim.*

318 See Chap. V, below.


320 Lewis R. Binford, "Archaeological and
price, from regions less affected by English settlement, namely the Pamunkey and Mattaponi river basins, the Potomac River basin, and the Eastern Shore.\(^{321}\) An additional factor that must be taken into account is the decline of the Powhatan population, which almost certainly occurred between 1609 and 1614. A bitter conflict like the First Anglo-Powhatan War often creates its own crude solutions to territorial pressures "by giving the predators more land for their population and by simultaneously reducing the population of the defeated so that they can subsist adequately on less land."\(^{322}\)

Because vast areas of Powhatan's domain, like the Pamunkey, Mattaponi, York, and Chickahominy river basins, remained secure, and because English encroachment did not trigger a violent Indian reaction in 1618, 1619, 1620, or 1621, the simple fact of land dispossession cannot alone explain the Powhatan uprising of 1622. While the cultural implications of land loss were undeniably important and serious, territorial dispossession was a precondition, not

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\(^{321}\)While all of these regions produced corn surpluses, the Pamunkey tribe, in particular, became the "bread basket" of the uprising alliance after 1622. See Chap. VI, below.

\(^{322}\)LeVine and Campbell, *Ethnocentrism*, 79.
a precipitant cause, of Powhatan rebellion.\footnote{323} The motive forces of revolution lay in other, complex cultural issues that evolved in Anglo-Powhatan relations between 1616 and 1621.

In the early contact period, there had been two major problems for the English colony: "enmity with the Naturalls, and the bruit of famine: one of these . . . was some cause of the other."\footnote{324} Or phrased another way, English difficulties could be traced to "injuries to and from the savaldges and yet A necessity of their use and helpe."\footnote{325} However, by 1616, the Virginia planters felt confident in a situation of reversed subsistence shortages:

\begin{quote}
the English yerely plant and reape quyetly; and travaile in the woodes a fowling and a hunting as freely and securely from feare of danger or treachery as in England. The greate Blessinges of God have
\end{quote}

\footnote{323}Social scientists have found that "groups exploiting natural resources in short supply will be more ethnocentric than groups economically dependent upon abundant resources." \textit{Ibid.}, 36. Similarly, groups in regions where resources are overtaxed are "more likely to engage in lethal warfare involving large-scale killing," as opposed to more restrained and less lethal warfare. \textit{Ibid.}, 80. Ralegh wrote in 1617 that "the miseries of warre are never so bitter and many" as when invaders crowd out and dispossess the native inhabitants of a country. "The mercilesse tearme of this controversie arme both sides with desperate resolution seeing the one part must either winne, or perish by famine; the other defend their goods, or lose their lives without redemption." \textit{History of the World}, 545.

\footnote{324}Hamor, \textit{True Discourse}, 16.

followed this Peace; and it next under him hath bredd our plenty: ...

And whereas heretofore we were costrayned yerely to seeke after the Indians, and intreate them to sell us Corne, . . . now the case is altered, they sue after us, come to our Townes, sell the skins from their shouldiers which are their best garmente to buy corne: yea som of their petty Kinges have borrowed this last yere [1615-1616], 4. or 500, bushelles of wheate [corn], for payment whereof this harvest, they have mortagged their wholl Countries, som of them not much less in quantytie then a Shier in England.326

Being a complete reversal of earlier patterns, Indian dependence upon the hated English for their food must have had a negative cultural impact, especially since the Powhatan god, Okee, was considered to be the controlling factor in their husbandry. Meanwhile, the English were reaping the benefits from the cleared fields they had stolen from the Indians. In 1619, the colonists reputedly har vested two crops, one of European grains and the other of maize.327

In addition to poor harvests, disease--that great killer of the Secotans and Roanokes--hit the Powhatans hard after 1616. In the summer of 1617, the English were stricken

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327 Pory to "Singular Good Lorde," Sept. 30, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 220. The harvest was bad in 1618, however, due to a great drought and a "fearfull tempest" of massive hailstones that destroyed corn and tobacco crops. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 124, 125.
with a "great mortality," which was, however, "far greater among the Indians." 328 That same season, an epidemic devastated the local deer herds, a situation far more serious for the Powhatans than for the English. 329 Again, in the "Torride sommer" of 1619, a fearsome epidemic struck both Englishmen and Powhatans. 330 This unknown but "very contagious" disease killed off some three hundred of the English and came close to depopulating entire plantations. 331 This epidemic allegedly "proceeded from a disease in it selfe not mortall," but despite the high toll of Englishmen, death from it was "chiefly amongst the Indians." 332

The high Indian mortality mentioned in contemporary accounts may indicate the presence of "virgin-soil" epidemics in this period. 333 Particularly lethal among immunologically defenseless native populations, epidemics of this type often have devastating psychological effects.

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329 Ibid.
330 Pory to "Singular Good Lorde," Sept. 30, 1619, ibid., 220. Also see, Rolfe to Sandys, Jan. 1619/20, ibid., 246.
331 Rolfe to Sandys, Jan. 1619/20, ibid., 244; Virginia Company court, Mar. 15, 1619/20, ibid., I, 320; company broadside, May 17, 1620, ibid., III, 275.
332 Virginia Company broadside, May 17, 1620, ibid., III, 275; company court, Mar. 1619/20, ibid., I, 310.
333 See Alfred W. Crosby, "Virgin Soil Epidemics as a Factor in the Aboriginal Depopulation in America," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIII (1976), 289-299.
upon tribal culture. As occurred among New England and Plains tribes in different centuries, epidemics shattered belief systems because the respected priests were impotent in the face of inexplicable mortality.

With all their problems, the Powhatans were pitiful but not pitied. Debilitated, depopulated, and seemingly unthreatening, the Indians were viewed as defeated and downtrodden pawns rather than as proud and fierce warriors. Complacent in the cessation of warfare and temporarily less dependent upon the Powhatans for food, the Virginia English regarded Indians as troublesome obstacles to the fullest exploitation of lands and resources. Englishmen considered them as scapegoats, blaming them for "all the wrongs and injuries that the malice of the Divell or man cann afford" and wanted, above all, to avoid close contact with the Powhatans.

A Virginia proclamation of 1618 forbade trade and

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334 Ibid., 289, 296-298. On demographic ramifications of New World epidemics, see Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492 (Westport, Conn., 1972), chap. 2, passim; Jennings, Invasion of America, 22-30.


336 Pory and George Thorpe to Sir Edwin Sandys, May 21, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 446.
"familiarity" with the Indians and prohibited the dismantling of defensive palisades.⁴³³ English stockades, found among many plantation sites, symbolized a fortress mentality of exclusion and were designed to keep the Indians "out there" with the beasts.³³⁸ The first Virginia assembly in 1619, in considering the company's instructions to maintain close relations with the Powhatans, advised the colonists "neither utterly to rejecte them, nor yet to drawe them to close in [amongst the English habitations]."³³⁹

The colonists' negative attitudes toward both the Virginia Company and the Indians were reflected in the two governors who directed Virginia affairs between 1617 and 1621. George Yeardley, who served as governor from April 1616 to May 1617, and again from April 1619 to November 1621, and Samuel Argall, governor from May 1617 to April 1619, were both veterans of the Dutch wars and of the First Anglo-Powhatan War. Judged either incompetent or corrupt by many of their peers, Yeardley and Argall sought their

³³⁷Gov. Argall, proclamation, May 18, 1618, ibid., 93.

³³⁸See Governor and council in Virginia to Virginia Company, Nov. 11, 1619, ibid., 227; Dale had impaled areas around Kiskiack and Warraskoyack in 1615/16 and the Henrico environs before beginning his settlement there in 1611. "Declaration of the first Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59, 33; Hamor, True Discourse, 30.

"owne excessive gaine and lucre . . . to the great detri-
ment of the Companie and almost distruction of the
Plantation."\textsuperscript{340} In London, they came to represent the
"hinderance and scandall" of boom-time Virginia.\textsuperscript{341}

In 1622, the company directors blamed Argall for their
great losses . . . by his misimploying their Tenants,
Corne, Cattle and other yearly proffittes in the
time of his Government to his owne private endes and
gayne (to the great prejudice and almost overthowe
of the publique Stocke and State of the Colony). . . .\textsuperscript{342}

Similarly, Governor Yeardley asked the company to release
him from office so that he could oversee his tobacco
profits; taught Indians how to shoot muskets; permitted
fortifications to fall into disrepair; and allowed English
corn production to dwindle.\textsuperscript{343} An English interpreter,
cognizant of Yeardley's faults, allegedly told Opechancanough
in 1619 "that within a yeare there would come a governour
greatter then this."\textsuperscript{344}

\textsuperscript{340}\textit{Virginia Company court, June 19, 1622, Kings­
bury, ed., VCR, II, 55.}

\textsuperscript{341}\textit{Virginia Company court, Apr. 12, 1621, ibid.,
I, 451. See the following company investigations of cor­
ruption in the colony: company court, July 13, 1619, ibid.,
244; company preparative court, June 11, 1621, ibid., 481.}

\textsuperscript{342}\textit{Virginia Company quarter court, May 22, 1622,
ibid., II, 27. Also see Pory to "Singular Good Lorde,"
Sept. 30, 1619, ibid., III, 219.}

\textsuperscript{343}\textit{Gov. Yeardley to Sir Edwin Sandys, 1619, ibid.,
III, 124; Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 120-121, 123.}

\textsuperscript{344}Pory, \textit{Proceedings of General Assembly}, 1619, ed.
Van Schreeven and Reese, 65. This information allegedly
put Yeardley "in much disesteem both with Opechancano and
the Indians." \textit{Ibid.}
Yeardley generally ignored the company's instructions "to encrease and maintayne . . . a Christian Comerce . . . with the Savages" and instead engaged in violent clashes with the Indians in an attempt to gain corn.\textsuperscript{345} In the beginning of Yeardley's first term as governor, the English tried to coerce the Chickahominies into paying the tribute of two bushels of corn per man as specified in the 1614 treaty. The Chickahominies refused to pay, and with "much scorne and contempt," they told Yeardley "he was but Sir Thomas Dales man."\textsuperscript{346} To revenge "their insolencies," Yeardley led one hundred armed men against the Chickahominies, who were gathered for a pre-arranged parley near the village of Ozinies.\textsuperscript{347} The parley never took place—a slaughter did. Some forty Chickahominies, out of three hundred at Ozinies, were slain in a brutal attack later called "perfidiouse" by royal officials.\textsuperscript{348} At gunpoint, the Chickahomy survivors agreed to a "more firme league"

\textsuperscript{345}Virginia Company quarter court, Nov. 15, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, I, 423.

\textsuperscript{346}Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 120. Also see "Declaration of the first Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, ed., \textit{Journals of Burgesses}, 1619-1658/59, 33.

\textsuperscript{347}Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 120.

\textsuperscript{348}Sir Nathaniel Rich, "Draft of Instructions to Commissioners Investigating Virginia Affairs," Apr. 14, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, IV, 118. Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 120, said that 12 Chickahominies were killed and 12 were taken prisoner. The English reputedly also confiscated 100 bushels of corn at this time.
with the English--a peace so "firme" that "it continued unviolated almost the space of two yeares[!]"349

The peace was broken in 1618, albeit without dire consequences, at a time when the English were reputedly short of gunpowder. The Indians "perceivinge our forbearance to shoothe (as formerly) concluded . . . that our peeces were, as they said, sicke and not to be used; upon this, . . . they were boulde . . . to assault some of our people."350 In November, a band of Indians, allegedly Chickahominies, slew five Englishmen to break the peace. One of the victims, Richard Killingbeck, was slain by an Indian using an English musket.351 Less than a week later, these "fugitive Salvages" murdered three children of William Fairfax and two neighbor boys at the Fairfax home on Jamestown Island.352 Englishmen both in London and Virginia demanded a "sharp revenge" on the Chickahominies for these acts.353 However, Opechancanough intervened and promised to bring the "fugitives" to justice.354

The events of 1618 come into focus only in the

350 Ibid., 34.
351 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 125.
352 Ibid.
354 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 125.
context of Powhatan internal politics after 1614. Within two years of the English landing at Jamestown, Powhatan, the once-awesome conqueror of tidewater Virginia, was beginning to show his age. In 1608, Powhatan, then in his sixties, explained his current outlook on life:

I having seen the death of all my people thrice, and not one living of those 3 generations, but my selfe, ... knowe the difference of peace and warre. ... But now I am old, and ere long must die, ... I ... knowe it is better to eate good meate, lie well, and sleep quietly with my women and children, laugh and be merrie with you, ... then [to] bee forced to flie from al, ... and be hunted by you. ... 355

Four years later, Strachey noted that, although Powhatan had been "cruell" and aggressive in his younger days, as he got older he "delighted in security, and pleasure, and ... reasonable condicions of peace, ... quietly settled amongst his owne."356 During the Anglo-Powhatan War, the Mamanatowick was in seclusion, and after he had agreed to the humiliating peace of 1614 and witnessed his favorite daughter renounce her culture, Powhatan was a broken man. The fierce leader who had had the capacity to crush the English in 1607, by 1614 was entreating the tassantasses to give him a shaving knife, bone combs, fish hooks, a dog, and a cat. 357

After the Anglo-Powhatan War, the Mamanatowick

355 [Symonds, comp.], Proceedings, 60-61.
357 Hamor, True Discourse, 44-45.
spent most of his time making ceremonial tours throughout his domain, much in the manner of Elizabethan progresses.358 In 1617, Powhatan was much grieved at the news of Pocahontas's death in England,359 and in the summer of that year, he "left the Government of his Kingdom to Opachanko and his other brother [Opitchapam/Itoyatin]" and sought refuge among the Patawomekes.360

Powhatan's abdication in 1617 implied an internal power struggle, because the year before, he had "gone Southwards, for feare (as some thought) least Opechancanough his brother should joyne with the English against him."361 This information, from a reliable and high-placed Powhatan, rings true, for between 1614 and 1616, Opechancanough was taking definite steps to assume the leadership of Tsenacommacah. Long overshadowed by Powhatan, Opechancanough, probably as a result of defeat in war, asserted himself and showed no small amount of princely ambition.

Opechancanough was proud of the fact that he "was a great Captaine" who "did alwayes fight," and the most enduring mental image of him is at the head of Pamunkey warriors

358 Argall to Virginia Company, Mar. 10, 1617/18, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 92. See Appendix C, below.

359 Ibid.

360 Argall to Council for Virginia, June 9, 1617, ibid., 73-74. Also see, Barbour, Pocahontas, 259 n.3.

361 Tomocomo quoted in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 118.
engaged in the capture of John Smith in 1608. In 1614, Dale reported an incident in which some Pamunkeys intercepted English messengers on their way to Powhatan and directed them to deliver their message to Opechancanough, "saying that what hee agreed upon and did, the great King would confirme." Added Dale: "This Opocankano is brother to Powhatan, and is his and their chiefe Captaine: and one that can as soone (if not sooner) as Powhatan commandethe men." In 1615, Ralph Hamor reported that Opechancanough, Powhatan's "successor, ... hath already the commaund of all the people." 

In 1616, Opechancanough displayed his ambition by actually manipulating Yeardley's slaughter of the Chickahominies. Pledging his peaceful intentions, Opechancanough informed the governor, as a friendly confidante, that the Chickahominies had been killing English livestock. This information allegedly set up the fatal parley. Opechancanough probably counted on the quick-tempered English to initiate violence, for after the Chickahominies had been fired upon, the frightened tribesmen beseeched Opechancanough to protect them, declaring him "King of

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362 Dale quoted in Hamor, True Discourse, 54.
363 ibid., 53.
364 ibid., 10.
Ozinies" and paying him tribute.366 As Smith later reported, Opechancanough had a plan "for subjecting of those people, that neither hee nor Powhatan could ever bring to their obedience."367

Powhatan died in April 1618, and Opitchapam reputedly became the Mamanatowick.368 But Opechancanough was far more visible and active than his older brother, and at least among the English, both men were referred to as the "great Kinge."369 By the early 1620s, if not before, Opechancanough was said to have the effective power of government, while Opitchapam only the dignity of office.370 In such an arrangement there was occasion for jealousy, and an English document of 1623 indicated that Opitchapam feared and hated Opechancanough.371 The 1618 murders that were blamed on the Chickahominies, who by then were under

366Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 120.
367Ibid.
368John Rolfe, letter of June 1618, quoted in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 121.
370John Pory, "Discourse," in Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 142-143.
371This information is derived from an incident in May 1623, reported in Virginia Company court, Nov. 17, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 483. See Chap. VI, below.
Opechancanough's control, may be seen as an attempt by Opitchapam to discredit his brother. The assailants, in fact, were Pamunkeys, not Chickahominies, because after killing the five Englishmen, they had looted a Chickahominy temple and enraged local villagers.\(^{372}\) The marauders of 1618 may have been part of the same band of renegades who, in 1621, raided English and Indian alike. They were commanded by Opitchapam and, at that later date, were living in an area southeast of the Nansamunds.\(^{373}\)

In any event, neither Opechancanough nor the Chickahominies had anything to gain by arousing the wrath of the English in 1618. Senseless acts of violence had little meaning for Opechancanough, who, between 1616 and 1622, was consciously seeking to consolidate his position both among his own people and in relation to the English. Opechancanough sought to bolster his control over the former through the services of Nemattanew, the "Jack of the Feathers" of Henrico fame, and to increase his power vis-à-vis the latter by acquiring firearms.

The balance of power continued to revolve around muskets. They were considered such an important key to Anglo-Powhatan relations that the General Court of Virginia

\(^{372}\text{Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 125. The Chickahominies who had their temple looted were declared "innocent" of killing the English by Opechancanough himself. Ibid.}\)

\(^{373}\text{Ibid., 143.}\)
in 1624 tried to determine who had taught the Powhatans how to shoot in the first place. Seven different Englishmen, including Smith and Dale, were retroactively accused of allowing the Indians to use muskets.374

In 1618, Governor Argall issued a proclamation that prohibited any Englishman from teaching an Indian to fire a musket, the penalty being death for both "learner and teacher."375 However, the Powhatans had always managed to procure muskets since the days of the German laborers, and they continued to do so.376 In October 1619, Nemattanew asked Governor Yeardley to supply the Pamunkeys with eight to ten armed and armored Englishmen for a joint expedition against Indian enemies beyond the falls. Yeardley's council seemed favorably disposed to the project as one way of earning the trust of Opechancanough, who had "stood aloofe upon termes of dout and Jealousy," refusing to "be drawne to any treaty" since April 1619.377 Although it is

374General Court of Virginia, Nov. 1624, H. R. McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632, 1670-1676 (Richmond, Va., 1924), 28. Nemattanew, himself, was well experienced with muskets. Ibid.

375Gov. Argall, proclamation, May 18, 1618, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 93.

376General Court of Virginia, Nov. 1624, McIlwaine, ed., Minutes of Council and General Court, 28; Gov. Argall, pardon to George White, Oct. 20, 1617, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 80.

377Governor and council in Virginia to Virginia Company, Nov. 12, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 228.
uncertain whether this campaign ever took place, a later
document specifically implicated Nemattanew in the deaths
of several Englishmen at approximately the same time.378

Whether or not on this occasion the Indians killed
Englishmen for their arms, Opechancanough's purposeful
manipulation of his adversaries was clear. He refused to
allow his people to live at English settlements when he
learned that Indians would not be permitted to use muskets.
Opechancanough's position placed colony leaders in a
quandary. With unceasing pressure from London to maintain
close ties with the Indians and to take their children into
their homes for purposes of conversion, it became almost "a
matter of State" in Virginia: "whether such as would live
amongst them should use them [muskets] or not, as a bait
to allure them," or whether only Christianized Indians
should be allowed to use firearms.379 Opechancanough was
given leverage through the Virginia Company's intense
desire to convert and educate Indian youths, for he was
approached many times by officials who wanted to borrow or
even to buy Powhatan children for that purpose.380

378Gov. Wyatt and council in Virginia to Virginia
Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., IV, 11. In 1624, George
Wyatt, esq., father of the governor, wrote about
Nemattanew having taken Englishmen "by Strategem" on an
earlier occasion. J. Frederick Fausz and Jon Kukla, "A
Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624,"
WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 117.

379Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 143.

380The company in 1619 ordered the colonists to
"mainteyne amity with the natives" in order to "procure
For reasons of mutual advantage, Opechancanough and Yeardley agreed to a "confirmation of a Peace and ... League" in the spring of 1621. Opechancanough's decision to end his aloofness became clear only later, but in 1621, the English welcomed the agreement for two reasons, both related to tobacco. As tobacco assumed ever greater importance for the colony, the English desired a new peace that would remove the danger of Indian "trechery" and permit a colonist to "planteth himselfe where he pleaseth, and followeth his businesse securely." In addition, amicable relations with the Indians would renew the trade in corn, now sorely needed by a colony with increased immigration and a disproportionate emphasis on tobacco cultivation. By 1620, the English commodities were "reduced to two"--tobacco and sassafras--and the "plantinge and providinge

their Children in good multitude to be brought upp and to worke amongst us." Virginia Company to Gov. Yeardley, June 21, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 147. Also see, company court, Mar. 2, 1619/20, ibid., I, 319. However, Yeardley wrote that the "Spiritual vine . . . will not so sodaynly be planted as it may be desired, the Indians being very loath upon any tearmes to part with their children." If all else failed, Yeardley would "purchase some Children" for conversion purposes. Gov. Yeardley to Sandys, 1619, ibid., III, 128, 129.

381 Virginia Company court, July 10, 1621, ibid., I, 504. Also see "Declaration of the first Twelve Years," McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59, 35.

382 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 138.

of Corne [was] soe utterly neglected that the dearth grew excessive."384 By this misgovernment," wrote the company directors, the colonists "reduced themselves into an extremity of being ready to starve."385 The desperation caused by the shortage was revealed when the English raided the friendly Patawomekes and stole eight hundred bushels of corn from them in late 1619.386

The English became complacent in this peace, and they relaxed their mental and physical defenses and put aside their muskets for plows.387 This myopic complacency also bred greater familiarity with, and increased contacts between, the Powhatans and the English. Much reliance was placed in Opechancanough's pledges of peace, and when in 1621 the Virginia Company was debating the appointment of a marshall for the colony, it was declared that there was "no present necessity or use of such an officer."388

At this juncture, a new governor, Sir Francis Wyatt, arrived in Virginia in November 1621. Well-born, talented, naive, and inexperienced, Wyatt was expected to implement reforms and to support company projects with a zeal

385 Virginia Company general court, Nov. 17, 1619, 16, *ibid.*, 266.
386 Rolfe to Sandys, Jan. 1619/20, *ibid.*, III, 244.
387 Smith, *Generall Historie of Virginia*, 139.
uncompromised by the kind of self-interest that had marred
the administrations of his predecessors.\textsuperscript{389} The Virginia
Company hoped to remove "all matter of scandall and
reproach"\textsuperscript{390} that had been caused by the "great neglect
and remissenes in the Governors of Virginia, from tyme to
tyme (to the infinite prejudice of that Plantation)."\textsuperscript{391}
In particular, the London directors wanted Wyatt to pro-
mote the co-habitation of Indian and English families "as
beinge a great meanes to reduce that Nation to Civility and
to the imbracing of our Christian religeon."\textsuperscript{392} Although
Wyatt was the first Virginia governor without practical
military experience, the optimism that prevailed in 1621
made that issue one of little serious concern.

The new governor, along with another, relatively
recent arrival--George Thorpe, esquire--initiated a brief
renaissance of Hakluytian idealism with their commitment to
the company's religious mission. Their deeds over the
course of only a few months between late 1621 and early

\textsuperscript{389}Ibid., 449; Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice,"

\textsuperscript{390}Virginia Company general court, Nov. 17, 1619,

\textsuperscript{391}Virginia Company court, Apr. 12, 1621, \textit{ibid.},
449.

\textsuperscript{392}Virginia Company to governor and Council in
Virginia, July 25, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, III, 487. The company
also wanted to ensure stability in the colony by dispatch-
ing more women to become wives. Company quarter court,
Nov. 21, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, I, 566.
1622 had a profound impact on the future of the company, the colony, and Anglo-Powhatan relations.

Thorpe, popularly known as the first distiller of American corn whiskey, had been a former member of Parliament, a former gentleman of the king's privy chamber, and an investor in various colonial projects when he came to Virginia in the spring of 1620. He was one of five major Gloucestershire investors in Berkeley Hundred, a private James River plantation of eight thousand acres, and when he left his wife and children to go to Virginia, he did so "the better by his presence to order and direct the affaires . . . of the . . . plantation," which had fallen on hard times.


Well known to many in Virginia and London, Thorpe was regarded by contemporaries as a pious and worthy individual. John Pory called him a "vertuous Gentleman," who "was to us in many respects as of an Angell from heaven, neyther did I ever see any mans face out of my natyve countrey, that did more joy me. . . . I pray god send more like unto him." Similarly, Governor Yeardley found Thorpe to be a "most sufficient gent vertuous and wyse, and one upon whose shoulders the Frame of this godly building the government of this whole Collony would most fittly sitt."

In April 1620, no sooner had Thorpe arrived in Virginia, than the Virginia Company appointed him deputy

(1899), 293; also see, 276, 277.


397John Pory to Sandys, June 12, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 305.

398Yeardley to Sir Edwin Sandys, 1619, ibid., 213. Craven, Dissoluton of the Virginia Company, 185, noted that the portion of this letter concerning Thorpe was probably written near the end of Yeardley's term, ca. 1621.
and overseer of the Indian college.\footnote{Virginia Company extraordinary court, Apr. 3, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, I, 332.} In addition to supervising the college tenant laborers, Thorpe planted ten thousand grape vines to generate revenue for the school and provided a mason out of his own pocket to construct a furnace for the college-related ironworks.\footnote{Thorpe and Pory to Sandys, May 16, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, III, 446.} His dedication and industry was gratifying to the company directors, and he was highly praised in official correspondence.\footnote{Virginia Company to governor in Virginia, July 25, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, 487.}

In July 1621, the Virginia Company appointed Thorpe to Governor Wyatt's Council of State.\footnote{Virginia Company, "Ordinance and Constitution for the Council and Assembly in Virginia," July 24, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, 483.}

Thorpe had a sincere desire to improve Anglo-Indian relations, and his activities far exceeded, in breadth and zeal, his official duties. Considered a friend of the Powhatans and a \textit{de facto} mediator between the two cultures, he found the Indians to be "of a peaceable and vertuous disposition" and treated them with kindness.\footnote{Thorpe and Pory to Sandys, May 16, 1621, \textit{ibid.}, 446.} He punished those under his command for mistreating the Powhatans, and as a gesture of sincerity, Thorpe had some English mastiffs killed because they frightened the Indians.\footnote{Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 145.} Thorpe criticized
the colonists for their "maledictions and bitter execrations" directed at the Powhatans, and in May 1621, he wrote to Sandys:

I thinke that the company shall doe well to make somme publicke declaration of theire intente and desier of the conversion of this people and . . . a testification of theire love and hartie affection towards them . . . thereby to molifie the mindes of our people. . . . 405

Precisely such a declaration appeared in the company's July 1621 instructions to Governor Wyatt, then still in England. It was one of the stronger statements made in the Virginia Company's fifteen-year history regarding the religious mission. The London directors advised the governor "to have espetiall care that no injurie or oppression bee wrought by the English against any of the natives of that countrie wherby the present peace may be disturbed and ancient quarrells (now buried) might be revived." 406 The colonists were told to procure Powhatan children "by just meanes" for education and conversion, the most capable of whom were to be groomed for the Indian college. In addition, the "better disposed" of the Powhatan adults were to be given suitable rewards "to converse with our people

405Thorpe and Pory to Sandys, May 16, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 446.

406Virginia Company, "Instructions to the Governor and Council of State in Virginia," July 24, 1621, Bemiss, ed., Three Charters of the Virginia Company, 110. The company added the provision that the "honor of our nation and safety of our people were to be "still preserved" and that "all maner of insolence committed by the natives" should be "severely and sharpelie punished." Ibid.
and labor amongst them . . . that thereby they may growe to
a likeing and love of civillity and finallie bee brought to
the knowledge and love of God and true religion."\textsuperscript{407}

The official position of the Virginia Company, the
views of "new" colonists and company men like Wyatt and
Thorpe, and the traditional idealism of men like Rolfe,\textsuperscript{408}
however, continued to be resented and criticized by planter
interests in Virginia. One particularly outspoken
individual, the Rev. Jonas Stockton (or Stockam) of
Elizabeth City, expressed his opposing views in a letter to
the company in May 1621. Stockton saw conversion-by-
kindness as an impossible goal and observed that "if Mars
and Minerva goe hand in hand, they will effect more good in
an houre, then those verball Mercurians in their lives;
and till their [the Indians'] Priests and Ancients have
their throats cut, there is no hope to bring them to
conversion."\textsuperscript{409}

\textsuperscript{407}Ibid., 111.

\textsuperscript{408}Rolfe was a consistent idealist from the time he
married Pocahontas in 1614 to his death in 1622. In 1616
he wrote that "there is no smale hope by piety, clemency,
courtsie and civill demeanor (by which meanes som are wonn
to us already) to convert and bring to the knowledge and
true worshipp of Jesus Christ 1000:s of poore, wretched and
mybelieving people." True Relation, Jamestown Documents,
12. In 1617, he rather naively informed Sandys that the
Indians were "very loving, and willing to parte with their
children" for conversion purposes. Rolfe to Sandys,
June 8, 1617, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 72.

\textsuperscript{409}Quoted in Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia,
140. Stockton (b. 1589) received a B.A. from Brasenose
Stockton's hard-line views, reminiscent of the 1609 instructions to Governor Gates, reflected the tremendous obstacles facing Thorpe in his attempts to build a bridge of understanding between the cultures. Although he was an optimistic reformer who hoped to bring drunkenness, Indian-baiting, and other sins "out of Fation," Thorpe might well have despaired of the success of his mission. Already in May 1620, the company's treasury was "utterly exhaust[ed]," and the Powhatans refused to allow their children to live with the English, regarding any Indians who did so as either hostages or slaves. If Thorpe ever hoped to have Indian youths for the company's college—if he ever hoped to convert a single Powhatan ("that great

410 Thorpe to Sandys, May 15, 1621, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 447. Thorpe wrote that he had "the testimony of a good conscience that I have done noe man wronge." He never lost his commitment for reform: "If I live I doute not but I shall doe it." Ibid. In the face of discouragements and setbacks, Thorpe wrote from Virginia that "more doe die here of the disease of theire minde then of theire body." Thorpe to Smyth of Nibley, Dec. 19, 1620, "John Smyth of Nibley Papers," N.Y. Pub. Lib., Bulletin, III (1899), 293.

Thorpe and his co-investors in Berkeley Hundred made a commitment "to place preachers, build churches, school houses and such like works of charity," and already by 1619, they had agreed to raise and educate Indian children at the plantation. "Smyth of Nibley Papers," N.Y. Pub. Lib., Bulletin, III (1899), 162; Virginia Company court, Feb. 16, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, I, 311.


412 Gov. and council to Virginia Company, Nov. 11, 1619, ibid., III, 228.
master-piece of worke")—he would first have to win the confidence and respect of tribal leaders, especially Opechancanough.

"Insinuating himselfe . . . for his religious purpose," Thorpe "made a good entrance into their [the Indians'] affections" by giving gifts to Opechancanough. The great werowance allegedly "doted on a house which the English had built for him" and delighted in "locking and unlocking the doores, sometimes a hundred times in a day, admiring the strangenesse of that Engine, a Locke and Key." Thorpe promised the Powhatans that all the English comforts and material goods could be theirs if they would accept the Christian God, and he boasted to Sandys that once the Powhatans were won over by the "book of the worlde," they would more readily embrace the spiritual book of the Word. Thorpe's ethnocentric bias saw as good the fact that the "cravinge" Powhatans "begin more and more to affect English Fassions and wilbe much alured to affect us by gifts if the company would . . . send apparell and

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413 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144.

414 Ibid., 145.


416 Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 153.

417 Thorpe and Pory to Sandys, May 16, 1620, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 446.
Thorpe well appreciated the leverage that certain gifts would give him. As early as 1619, he had purchased six thousand glass beads of assorted sizes—worth £2. 5s., almost twice the price of a musket—to be used in the Indian trade. But beads traded for Indian commodities, as a function of the marketplace, was quite different from giving lavish presents, like a house, for the purpose of eroding cultural values and revolutionizing lifestyles.

Thorpe was waging a silent and subtle war of acculturation, and his method of directing culture change among the Powhatans was a new approach in Anglo-Indian relations. His attempt to win over the Powhatans "by kinde usage" was the prototype of imperial Christianity in its most modern, ethnocentric, and morally self-assured form. As in innumerable cases of European contact with

418 Ibid.


420 Meaning forced acculturation—the consciously directed culture change of an outgroup by an ingroup. This was other-directed and implied no reciprocity in cultural exchange. See A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology: Culture Patterns and Processes, abridged paperback ed. (New York, 1963), 233-236; Ralph Linton, ed., Acculturation in Seven American Indian Tribes (New York, 1940), 503, 510; Melville J. Herskovits, Acculturation: The Study of Culture Contact (New York, 1938), 6-10 and passim; Jennings, Invasion of America, 13.

421 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 146.
native peoples, Thorpe's missionary fervor attempted to impose a new, incompatible culture on the Indians while destroying or circumventing traditional folkways. Christian missions are, and always have been, revolutionary enterprises, demanding that the non-believer commit cultural suicide.\textsuperscript{422}

Forced acculturation poses a real danger to native peoples, for "no vaguely understood universal religion can restore unity to a shattered tribal system."\textsuperscript{423} As one anthropologist described the disastrous results: "a three-


\textsuperscript{423}Pitt-Rivers, \textit{Clash of Culture}, 197. Also see R. Godfrey Lienhardt, "Religion," in Harry L. Shapiro, ed., \textit{Man, Culture and Society}, rev. ed. (New York, 1971), 399 and passim. Religion and culture were indivisible, and Christianity and "civilization" were an "inextricable combination" to be accepted or rejected as a totality. Berkhofer, \textit{Salvation and the Savage}, 107.
legged stool with one leg taken off is not a two-legged stool—it is no stool at all." In this context, Thorpe, the pious promoter of Indian education and conversion, was a dangerous man; his approach was a greater threat to Powhatan tribal life and cultural values than had been any military strategy since 1607. Thorpe represented the most advanced level in the ever more increasing demands of the English. In 1607, they wanted the Powhatans' corn; in 1609, they sought to destroy their priests; in 1618, they took their lands; and in 1621, they were trying to extinguish the Indian culture with kind words and English "Fassions."425

The winter of 1621 brought an apparent triumph for Thorpe. When he met with Opechancanough to present greetings from the newly arrived Governor Wyatt, Thorpe was given an unexpected reward for his work among the Powhatans. First of all, Opechancanough "gave the English leave to seate themselves any where on his Rivers where the Natives

424 Howells, Heathens, 259.

425 Thorpe's activities represented a mature stage in intercultural conflict corresponding to the evolution of English settlement in Virginia. English expansion from 1616 to 1621 can be described as a stage of "substantial settlement," which stops short of "demographic or ecological ascendancy." This is a precondition leading to polarization, estrangement, and antagonism. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, 21, 101. However, the English attempts at forced acculturation represented advanced "colonization," where the intruding superordinates "have the power to decide and carry out their decision[s] with conviction of its right and warrant. . . . The very nature of the situation often makes the uppers prone to make unilateral decisions, thus transforming the lowers into instruments or tools." Ibid., 21.
... [were] not actually seated" and promised to conclude agreements with Wyatt on matters of mutual defense, transpor
tation, and exploration.\textsuperscript{426} But even more startling, the once-intransigent werowance "willinglye Acknowledged that ... [the Powhatan religion] was nott the right waye, desiringe to be instructed in ours and confessed that god loved us better then them."\textsuperscript{427} Opechancanough told Thorpe that he would permit Indian families to live among the colonists,\textsuperscript{428} and he requested English families to live with the Pamunkeys. As if these revelations were not surprising enough, Opechancanough also repudiated the sacred huskenaw ceremony, the most culturally significant rite associated with the worship of Okee.\textsuperscript{429}

Such professions would have amounted to cultural heresy had they been sincere, but Opechancanough, in late 1621, was not at all truthful in his pronouncements. His actions were no accidents, for by lulling Thorpe, Wyatt, and other Englishmen into complacency, he was shrewdly setting in motion a strategy as subtle in its execution,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{426}Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{427}Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 1621/22, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 584.
\item \textsuperscript{428}This was a sought after goal in 1619. See Gov. Yeardley to Sandys, 1619, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 128.
\item \textsuperscript{429}Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 1621/22, \textit{ibid.}, 584. Thorpe's work was commented upon in Copland's sermon, \textit{Virginia's God Be Thanked}, 28-29.
\end{itemize}
ethnocentric in its foundations, and revolutionary in its impact as was Thorpe's. Opechancanough's seemingly resigned and defeatist attitude was feigned, for even after demoralizing defeat and debilitating disease, the Powhatan commitment to Okee was stronger than ever.

Opechancanough acted the way he did because there was no future in Anglo-Powhatan relations based on peace, despite the lies told to Thorpe. Everything that could have been done to the Indians had already been done and could easily be done again, in peacetime as well as in war. The Powhatans had suffered enough. An authentic peace could only bring more Englishmen to monopolize more acres and to spread more disease. Peace would only bring repeated seizures of Indian corn and continued attempts to take away Powhatan children, their belief system, their folkways, indeed their entire culture. What did the Powhatans have to gain by keeping the peace? What could they lose by breaking it?430

From Opechancanough's personal standpoint, everything the English had done prior to 1621 increased his power and status; anything they could do after 1621 would only weaken his position. Whatever Opechancanough told Thorpe was done out of expediency and revealed a confidence in, not despair of, the future. Opechancanough would not sacrifice the

430 On the resistance of subordinate groups to forced acculturation/assimilation by superordinates, see Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations, 83 and passim; LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 127.
younger generation to the Christian God, for a victorious and free Tsenacommacah would need them.431 Opechancanough's statements and his plans reflected strength, not weakness.

From a military standpoint, the Powhatans were probably stronger than at any time since the arrival of the English. The land dispossession and hostile encroachments by the English had consolidated Indian power in the traditionally strong villages in the Pamunkey and York river basins north of Jamestown. In addition, tribes gathered from the defeated and abused remnants of Powhatan's empire included the strong and once-independent Chickahominies and Nansamunds, both the long-oppressed victims of English cruelties.432 In early 1623, the English estimated that merely to attack Opechancanough's enclave on the Pamunkey River would require at least three hundred armed men—a single expedition considerably larger than any previously assembled in Virginia.433 Opechancanough allegedly built up his forces with the help of the English. As a 1622 source declared:

431In 1618, Opechancanough allegedly pledged the Powhatans' country to Thomas Rolfe, the "lyving ashes" of his mother, Pocahontas, and promised to "reserve it from all others till he comes of yeares." Virginia Company court, June 19, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 52; Rolfe to Sandys, June 8, 1617, ibid., III, 72.

432On the tribes under Opechancanough, see Chap. V.

433Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 12.
the infinite trade they [the Pamunkeys] have had in this 4 yeares of securitie enabled Opichankanoe to hyer many auxiliaries which in former times I knowe for want thereof Pohatan was never able to act the like.434

What had prompted this military renaissance? What was responsible for the renewed sense of self-assurance among a people who had witnessed the disintegration of Tsenacommacah in less than a decade and had seen their great leader die in the same period?

Something had definitely happened to change Opechancanough's attitude between 1616 and 1621. His confident conduct with Thorpe was far different from the "aloofness" he had displayed during Yeardley's governorship. In 1619, Yeardley had found Opechancanough and the Pamunkeys uppon doubtfull termes, neither did we ever perceve that at any time they voluntarilie yealded themselves subjects or servants to our Gracious Soveraigne, neither that ever they tooke any pride in that title, nor . . . [were they] mutuallie helpful or profittable, . . . but to the contrary, whatsoever at any time was done uppon them proceeded from fear without love, for such helpe as we had from them have been procured by sword or trade.435

The Indians' attitude reflected a common condition of defeated groups in that they remain desperately hostile to acculturation but are "without hope of successful revolt."436

This hostility, wrote anthropologist Ralph Linton,


expresses itself in terms of passive resistance and uncooperativeness. The old culture of the conquered becomes, for them, a symbol of their lost independence. . . . This condition results in a sort of blanket opposition to the acceptance of any new elements of culture beyond those necessary to continued existence.\textsuperscript{437}

The Powhatans' renewed cultural vitality displayed in 1621/22 may well have resulted from a revitalization movement. Traditionally precipitated by military defeat, political subordination, floral and faunal changes, economic distress, epidemics, and external pressures for cultural change,\textsuperscript{438} revitalization movements are ethnocentric, nativistic, and usually religion-connected cults designed to alleviate deprivation, frustration, and anxiety.\textsuperscript{439} Such cults emphasize the elimination of aliens and a return to the glory days of former times. They are deliberate and organized movements designed to restore cultural values and tribal strengths and to do so quickly.\textsuperscript{440} As anthropologist A. L. Kroeber explained these phenomena:

\begin{quote}
After two societies have come into sufficiently close contact for one to feel the other as definitely more
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{437}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{438}Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," \textit{Amer. Anthro.}, LVIII (1956), 269.


\textsuperscript{440}Vogel, "American Indian in Transition," \textit{Amer. Anthro.}, LVIII (1956), 249; Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," \textit{ibid.}, 265.
populous, stronger, or better equipped, so that its own culture is in process of being supplanted by the other, a conscious preservation effort or defense is often produced.441

Despondency and "universal hopelessness"442 often accompany military defeat, and in this vacuum of despair, a "charismatic leader" or prophet, possessing "fascinating personal 'power,'" often appears to lead revitalization movements.443 The motivations of a prophet may include sincere spiritual belief or a craving for power, but in any case, the charismatic leader offers his people "wish fulfillment"--"release from the human impasse by supernatural mechanisms."444 The ancestral dead, it is often believed, will aid their earthly kin by returning to slay alien intruders, and other optimistic projections include the idea that bulletproof shirts will neutralize the enemy's firearms.445

If, indeed, the Powhatans had a cult of revitalization, its charismatic leader would quite likely have been Nemattanew. A shadowy, mysterious figure in English accounts, Nemattanew is not associated with any events

441Kroeber, Cultural Patterns and Processes, 245.
442Ibid., 246.
444Kroeber, Cultural Patterns and Processes, 246.
445Ibid.
before 1611, the year he led Powhatan's troops at Henrico.446 However, after 1618, his name is more frequently encountered in English records, most notably in association with the uprising of 1622.

A trusted lieutenant of both Powhatan and Opechancanough, Nemattanew seems to have been a war captain rather than a werowance with specific administrative duties. The talented and loyal Nemattanew was "accounted amongst the Salvages their chiefe Captaine," because of his "courage and policie."447 Nemattanew had a powerful impact on his countrymen. He was described as a "very cunning fellow" who "took great Pride in preserving and increasing . . . [the Powhatans'] Superstition concerning him, affecting every thing that was odd and prodigious to work upon their Admiration. For which purpose he wou'd often dress himself up with Feathers after a fantastick Manner."448

Nemattanew's attire was certainly unique and an important part of his mystique. The Powhatans sometimes wore mantles made of turkey feathers, which they draped over their shoulders like shawls,449 but Nemattanew was


447Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144; Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 168.

448Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 52-53.

449Smith, Map of Virginia, 20. A Mattaponi feather mantle, made in the 1940s, is illustrated in Hudson, South-eastern Indians, 268, Fig. 68.
said to have been "covered over with feathers... as thowghe he meant to flye." He definitely succeeded in calling attention to himself, for although many Powhatans wore feather mantles, only one was accorded the title "Jack of the Feathers." Nemattanew's attire was first noted in 1611, soon after the English had worn body armor into battle for the first time, and perhaps his feathers were the symbolic equivalents of armor. Feathers in themselves were religiously significant, for the Powhatans believed that "the devil" (Okee?) communicated to his followers in the guise of a bird. (See Illus. IV.2.)

The significant "Superstition" concerning Nemattanew was his claim that he was immortal and invulnerable to the colonists' bullets. According to one English account of 1624, Nemattanew may have instilled in his tribesmen a "strong perswation of an Ointment that could secuere them from our Shot." Such a belief parallels the Sioux Ghost Dance revival of the 1890s, a cult in which "ghost shirts,"

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451 Ibid.

452 Relation of Bartolome Martinez, 1610, in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 161. Also see Chap. II, above, on the relevance of the Southern Death Cult for the Powhatans. On the importance of feathers, see Hudson, Southeastern Indians, 28-29, 125.

453 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144, 151; Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 168.

ILLUS. IV.2:

SOUTHEASTERN BIRD-MAN DEITY OR BIRD COSTUME

An example of one of the Southeastern Ceremonial Complex Motifs. Cherokee. From Spiro, Oklahoma. See Charles Hudson, The Southeastern Indians (Knoxville, Tenn., 1976), 125, Fig. 35b.
adorned with religious symbols, feathers, and drawings of birds, were thought to be bullet-proof.⁴⁵⁵ Other revitalistic movements, too, have featured infallible dogmas, a belief in super-human powers, and the leader's claim to invulnerability to steel or bullet.⁴⁵⁶

Later events indicated how important Nemattanew, the man of "policie" and "Superstition," was to Opechancanough in the early 1620s. Opechancanough's sudden change of policy and his decision to treat with Yeardley in the spring of 1621 are revealing. Sometime in 1621, Opechancanough changed his name to Mangopeesomon, and Opitchapam/Itoyatin changed his to Sasawpen,⁴⁵⁷ precisely as Wingina (Pemisapan), the Secotan werowance, had done before carrying out his reputed plot against the Roanoke Colony.⁴⁵⁸ In the


⁴⁵⁶Raymond Firth, Elements of Social Organization, paperback ed. (Boston, 1963), 240-241.

⁴⁵⁷Governor and council in Virginia to Virginia Company, Jan. 1621/22, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 584.

summer of 1621, Mangopeesomon allegedly "practised with a King of the Eastern shore (no well-willer of his) to furnish him with store of poison (naturally growing in his country)" with which he intended to kill the English.\footnote{459}{Edward Waterhouse}, A Declaration of the State of the Colony and ... a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre (London, 1622), 21.

The Eastern Shore werowance, friendly to the English, turned him down. Probably not too long after this incident, reliable Indian informants from the Eastern Shore reported to Governor Yeardley that Mangopeesomon was planning to assemble a large (intertribal?) force at a ceremony for "the takinge upp of Powhatans bones" and to use these warriors to "sett upon every Plantatione of the Colonie."\footnote{460}{Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 10. George Wyatt in 1624 retroactively implicated Nemattanew in an uprising conspiracy. Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 117.}

Thus alerted, the English became vigilant, and apparently nothing came of the plan at that time.

But vigilance soon subsided, as Governor Wyatt, upon arrival, found the colony "in very greate amytie and con- fidence with the natives," which he intended "by all good meanes to contynue and enlarge."\footnote{461}{Governor and council in Virginia in Virginia Company of London, Jan. 1621/22, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 583-584.} As Copland proudly announced in his 1622 sermon:

Wingina/Pemisapan may have been "taking a new 'war-name' in anticipation of his victory over the English." Ibid., 265n.
There is no Danger . . . either through warres, or famine, or want of convenient lodging . . . , for, blessed be God, there hath been a long time, and still is a happle league of Peace and Amitie soundly concluded, and faithfully kept, betweene the English and the Natives, that the fear of killing each other is now vanished away.\footnote{Copland, Virginia's God Be Thanked, 9-10. Thorpe, of course, concurred in the optimistic appraisal. \textit{Ibid.}, 28.}

The twelve to fifteen hundred colonists then in Virginia\footnote{The company estimated that there were some 1500 persons in the colony in Sept. 1621 and some 1240 "about the tyme of the Massacre." However, the latter figure is suspect, because a marginal comment implied that 1240 referred to the population in "the latter end of the yeare 1622." Master Wroth, Notes from lists showing total number of emigrants to Virginia, 1622, in Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 537.} were, indeed, quite complacent, and as was later reported, the "collonie [was] at a most unseasonable time divided into so manie small bodyes that it did even invite the Savages to execute the . . . horrid Massacre."\footnote{[Robert Johnson], "Draft of a Statement Touching the Miserable Condition of Virginia," after May 9, 1623, \textit{Ibid.}, IV, 178.}

Considering the sequence of events between late 1621 and early 1622 there is little doubt that Mangopeesomon had already decided to annihilate the English. His seemingly well intentioned remarks to Thorpe in early 1622 succeeded in gaining the further confidence of the English and in providing readier access to their homesteads. Although Mangopeesomon could not gauge the attitudes of all Englishmen, the impressions created by a few official spokesmen like Thorpe probably convinced him that any people who were so anxious to have Indians around that they were willing to
buy children would be ripe for slaughter.

A volatile situation existed in Virginia as the Powhatans returned from their winter hunts in early 1622. Mangopeesomon may then have been looking eight months into the future, envisioning a newly gathered maize harvest and the sweet taste of total revenge.
May it therefore please your Majesty . . . not to suffer the heathen to triumph over us and say where is now their God.

"Humble Petition of the Distressed Collony in Virginia" (March 5, 1621/22)

CHAPTER V

IN BRITISH BLOOD IMBRUED: ¹

THE POWHATAN UPRISING OF MARCH 22

In the first week of March 1621/22,² Nemattanew visited an English plantation a few miles from Jamestown and persuaded a colonist named Morgan to accompany him on a trading expedition to the Pamunkey enclave. Two or three days later, Nemattanew was spotted wearing Morgan's cap, and, when confronted, he told a couple of Morgan's servants that their master was dead. The English laborers seized

¹ Adapted from a complimentary verse by David Wiffin, dedicated to Capt. John Smith on the publication of The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles (London, 1624), A2v. In the original, the line reads: "In Brittish blood they deeply did imbrue/They Heathen hands."

² Ibid., 144. Philip L. Barbour, Pocahontas and Her World (Boston, 1970), 205, noted that the date was on or about Mar. 6, Ash Wednesday. Legend has it that the 1622 uprising occurred on Good Friday, an unsubstantiated claim that is refuted by Barbour's thorough research. Smith's account is based on a "Master Wimp," who remains unidentified.
the Indian leader and intended to take him before George Thorpe, the de facto mediator in such matters. But Nemattanew struggled and "so moved their patience," that the two Englishmen shot him. As he lay dying, Nemattanew requested his assailants to bury him among the English, so that his tribesmen would not discover that he had been killed with a bullet.  

According to one English account, Nemattanew was like "a Jesuit [in] that he desired to be buried in Christian burial, and his request suited with [his claims of immortality] . . . not to have his men know that he was kild with a Shot." 

The mysterious and charismatic Powhatan leader was dead. There was tragic irony in the fact that Nemattanew, the symbol of a new era of hope for his people and the "immortal" survivor of many battles, was killed by a lowly

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3 After the servants shot Nemattanew, they placed him in a boat and intended to take him before Gov. Wyatt, "then seven or eight miles from them." Ibid. If Wyatt was then at Jamestown, and if the killing took place downstream from the capital, then Nemattanew was shot in the vicinity of Martin's Hundred, which was especially hard hit in the subsequent March 22 uprising. To quote Smith on Nemattanew's final requests: "... finding the pangs of death upon him, [he] desired of the Boyes two things: the one was, that they would not make it knowne hee was slaine with a bullet; the other, to bury him amongst the English." Ibid.

servant in such an unheroic manner. The odd sequence of events surrounding Nemattanew's end--his complicity with Morgan's disappearance, the disdain he displayed by openly wearing Morgan's cap, his foolhardy return to Morgan's household, and his obstinate refusal to face Thorpe--all point to *hubris*, a supreme self-assurance, even death-contempt.

These factors indicate that Nemattanew indeed believed in his reputed powers of immortality to the point of self-delusion. It is highly unlikely that this proud Pamunkey would have deliberately chosen such an undramatic end, forced into the ultimate humiliation of admitting that his claims were false and requesting of his very murderer that the manner of his death be kept secret. In one sense, Nemattanew had probably long before subconsciously committed himself to an "altruistic willingness for self-sacrificial death," a psychological commitment embodied in any soldier's decision to die for principles. But from all indications, he made no conscious decision to provoke his own death. Nemattanew alive, not dead, was the key to Mangopeesomon's ultimate designs. It could not be known at the time, however, that Nemattanew, influential in life, would become even more important in death.

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With the murder of the charismatic Powhatan leader, desperation gripped the Indians. In the light of Mangopeesomon's confidence in eventual victory over the English, news of Nemattanew's death brought shock and sorrow. When Mangopeesomon learned of the murder, he reputedly "much grieved and repined, [and made] . . . great threats of revenge." Only a couple of years before, Mangopeesomon had cunningly told the English that he would not care if Nemattanew had his throat cut, vowing that the death of any "one man should be noe occasion of the breach of the peace," and in mid-March 1621/22, the Powhatan overlord once again told Englishmen what they wanted to hear. When confronted by messengers from a concerned Governor Wyatt, who recognized

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7Gov. Wyatt and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, in Susan Myra Kingsbury, ed., The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 4 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1906-1935), IV, 11. Hereafter cited as VCR. Darrett B. Rutman cited this document as evidence that Gov. Wyatt lied to the company, telling the directors that "nenemachanew" (Nemattanew) had been killed when Yeardley was governor (i.e., ca. 1619-1620). "A Militant New World, 1607-1640: America's First Generation, Its Martial Spirit, Its Tradition of Arms, Its Militia Organization, Its Wars" (Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1959), 26ln. However, Rutman misread the council's letter to the company, a letter which Yeardley cosigned with Wyatt and other councillors. Surely Yeardley would not have openly contradicted information that was already accepted as fact by the company by Aug. 1622. (See n. 9, below.) Mangopeesomon made similar professions of peace to Gov. Samuel Argall in 1618. See Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 125.
the possible ramifications that Nemattanew's death might have, Mangopeesomon assured them that "he held the peace . . . so firme, as the Skie should sooner fall then it dissolve." But Mangopeesomon was buying time. He did not have the luxury of waiting for an autumn attack. As events would demonstrate, the Powhatans had only about two weeks from the date of Nemattanew's death until the morning of March 22 to prepare their massive assault. Mangopeesomon had to allay English fears and to ensure the colonists' complacency in order to provide him with the opportunity to marshal his forces and to formulate his strategy. The English only too late came to appreciate the careful planning that almost brought their downfall:

8Wyatt's messengers, upon hearing of Mangopeesomon's grief and threats, "returned him such terrible answers that he cunningly dissembled his intent, with the greatest signes he could of love and peace." Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144. Wyatt was sufficiently concerned by Nemattanew's death that he wrote a detailed account to his father, as evidenced by George Wyatt's grasp of the facts in 1624. Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 108-109, 117.

9[Edward Waterhouse], A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia With a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre in the Time of peace and League, treacherous executed by the Native Infidels upon the English, the 22 of March last . . . (London, 1922), 13; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144. Waterhouse wrote that Mangopeesomon made this statement "about the middle of March last" when "an occasion was ministred of sending" messengers to him. But Waterhouse never said that the "occasion" was necessitated by Nemattanew's murder. Because Waterhouse's account was sponsored by the company, it represented the "official" view of the uprising for public consumption.
... [the] Natives live not in great numbers together, but dispersed, and in small companies; and where most together, not above two hundred. ... These small and scattered Companies ... had warning given from one another in all their habitations to meete at the day and houre appointed for our destruction, at all our several Townes and places seated upon the River; some [of the Powhatans] were directed to goe to one place, some to another, all to be done at the same day and time, which they did accordingly ... 10

There seems to have been a frantic immediacy to Mangopeesomon's preparations, for with the death of Nemattanew, tribal solidarity and self-confidence may have been eroding. An aggressive and daring stroke was called for if the Pamunkeys' status as the fiercest and ablest tribe in Tsenacommacah was to be preserved. 11 Judging the Nemattanew's murder was not publicized, for it would have made the colony, and indirectly the company, culpable in provoking the Indian attack. It suited company plans to make Powhatan actions appear as inexplicable, treacherous, and unwarranted as possible, even though the London directors, themselves, fully recognized the importance of Nemattanew's death. In official correspondence the company noted the "occasion of so great suspicion and jealousie as was Nenemathanewes [Nemattanew's] death" as relevant in explaining the timing of the attack on March 22. Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 666.

10 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 19-20; attributed to George Sandys, resident treasurer in Virginia. According to social scientists, "for war in its more organized forms to be conducted by a society, it must be able to divert men from subsistence activity, to coordinate their military activities, and to make use of the fruits of predatory warfare." LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 75.

11 Traditionally the strongest tribe in Tsenacommacah, the Pamunkeys often fought to preserve their "reputation," as post-uprising documents related. See Wyatt and council to Virginia Company, Dec. 2, 1624, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 507-508; Chap. VI, below.
plan in light of actual events, Mangopeesomon's strategy called for the total annihilation of the colonists (women and children as well as men), the slaughter of their livestock, and the complete destruction of all things English. What was probably proposed—and definitely attempted—was to return Virginia to its pre-contact state.

That Nemattanew's death was the crucial catalyst—the precipitant—for the Powhatan Uprising is borne out not so much by the fact that the two incidents were only two weeks apart, but by the very boldness that the timing of the attack represented. Mangopeesomon must have been desperate, indeed, to avenge his trusted lieutenant's death when he did, for by launching an offensive in March (O.S.)—April (N.S.), he ignored Powhatan custom and precedent in warfare.

From a cultural-environmental perspective, Powhatan warfare was intimately related to the tidewater subsistence cycle. The waging of war, dependent upon the food supply, was almost always conducted in late summer (the season of Cohattayough), after the first of the year's three corn plantings had been harvested, or in winter (Popanow), when the warriors congregated for communal hunts.\(^\text{12}\) In March, which fell within the Cattapeuk season, the Powhatan economy afforded little or no corn surplus from the previous autumn's

harvests, and planting for the next season would not begin until late April. In fact, the word "Cattapeuk" may have meant "be hungry," or "to famish" in the Powhatan language.

In this context, Mangopeesomon formulated either a reckless or a brilliant plan, depending upon one's perspective. If the Powhatans' bold and sudden stroke managed to annihilate the English, the tribesmen could triumphantly return to their recaptured lands in time for the spring planting; however, if the uprising were not totally successful, there would be no food surplus with which to feed the warriors over a long campaign and little opportunity to plant a new corn crop in the face of English reprisals.


14 Smith, Map of Virginia, 18; Lewis R. Binford, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of Cultural Diversity and Progressive Development Among Aboriginal Cultures of Coastal Virginia and North Carolina" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1964), Chap. 1, passim. In 1600 it was reported that the tidewater tribes' food supply generally began to give out around Jan. and Feb. "Relation of Juan de la Carrera," in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 134.

15 Philip L. Barbour, The Three Worlds of Captain John Smith (Boston, 1964), 146, 436, n. 3. Barbour was less certain of this meaning in his article, "The Earliest Reconnaissance of the Chesapeake Bay Area: Captain John Smith's Map and Indian Vocabulary," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, LXXX (1972), 34, s.v. "Cattapeuk." Hereafter cited as VMHB.
Whether Mangopeesomon was too confident of an easy victory or desperate enough not to care, his actions compare with those of underprivileged and alienated subordinate culture groups that have decided to strike out against oppression. According to sociologist R. A. Schermerhorn, the often hasty decision to revolt is likely to be nonrational so that their challenge [to the superordinates] encompasses a mélange of motives: masculine assertions, desires for revenge, escapes from deprivation, status longings, enthusiasm for a leader. . . . Impulses like these . . . rise to such intensity that they blot out any sense of danger in the venture, or make it puerile to count the cost.16

Mangopeesomon made good use of the two weeks between Nemattanew's murder and March 22, just as he had employed the four previous years to refashion a united tribal organization from the dislocated, discontented remnants of Powhatan's empire.17 Mangopeesomon was a more aggressive and able commander than Powhatan had been; the Indians by 1622 had had years of contact with, and had grown proficient in the use of, firearms; and two strong tribes—the Chicka-

16Schmerhorn, Comparative Ethnic Relations: A Framework for Theory and Research (New York, 1970), 21-22. Alfred Kroeber wrote that a revolt or uprising "usually . . . comes after the invaded culture has had its really mortal wound, when the natives as a mass begin to despair of its survival." Anthropology (New York, 1948), 439.

hominies and the Nansamunds—that had refused allegiance to the old empire, were now loyal to Mangopeesomon.18 And, while the English were dispersing into small settlements between 1618 and 1622,19 the Powhatans had been consolidating their strength in the traditional tribal enclaves in the York and Pamunkey river basins.

Mangopeesomon's 1622 uprising alliance included his own Pamunkeys; the "Tanx ('Little') Powhatans," by 1622 probably a composite of tribal groups living between Henrico and the fall line; the Weanocs (Weyanokes) of upstream James River; the Quiyoughcohannocks ("Tappahannocks"), from the south bank of the James; the Kiskiacks, from the south bank of the York River; the Chickahominies; and the Warraskoyacks and Nansamunds from the downstream, south bank of the James River.20 In addition to this principal strike force, the

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18 The Nansamunds had been ravaged in the First Anglo-Powhatan War, and the Chickahominies suffered attack in the era of "peace," 1614-1621. See George Percy, "A Trewe Relacyon . . . of Virginia from . . . 1609 until . . . 1612," Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine, III (1922), 262-263; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 120.

19 The English "did disperse themselves to live apart, . . . which . . . embodied the Savages to . . . give them an easie way for executing the mischiefe that they intended, by killing two or three hundred persons before they could advertize [warn] one another." Sir William Alexander, An Encouragement to Colonies (London, 1624), 29.

20 This paragraph is based on English documents and work with geographical placement of tribes in 1622. Although the colonists after the uprising sometimes indiscriminately attacked any Indian, specific tribes were singled out for planned revenge. The tribes mentioned here were the objects of English expeditions on more than one occasion. See Gov. Wyatt and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 9; Alexander Brown, The First Republic in America (Boston, 1898), 472-473.
Rappahannocks probably gave support to the uprising as well.\textsuperscript{21} The Patawomekes and the Eastern Shore Accohannocs and Accomacs did not join the alliance.\textsuperscript{22}

With most of the tidewater Algonquians at his command, Mangopeesomon planned for his warriors to infiltrate virtually every English settlement and household openly and without weapons on Thursday evening, March 21, and on Friday morning, March 22. Individual tribesmen were probably dispatched to English settlements nearest to their own villages. If the attack were to succeed, the Indians who arrived at the various plantations had to be trusted and recognized as friendly, or at least recognizable as local natives. At an appointed time, the warriors were to strike down their hosts without warning, using whatever tool or weapon lay at hand. Englishmen would be killed with the implements of their own, "superior" culture. No prisoners were to be taken. This tactic—the unarmed infiltration of an enemy's defenses (both physical and psychological), with almost certain success assured by a face-to-face assault using

\textsuperscript{21}In Jan. 1622/23, an English expedition was launched against the Rappahannocks "to take revenge uppon them, as Confederates with Apochankeno [Mangopeesomon]." Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 9.

\textsuperscript{22}However, the once-friendly Patawomekes were temporarily hostile after enduring English treachery soon after the uprising. See Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 153-154, 156-158, 161; Chap. VI, below.
MAP V.1 THE PowhatAN UPRISSING, March 22, 1621/22

(HYPOTHETICAL PLAN OF ATTACK)
"shock weapons"—has been effectively used for millenia by native peoples.23

"Weapons of shock" (hammers, tomahawks, swords, axes, etc.) are "crushers and piercers . . . held in the hand of the assailant" and are considered "military instruments par excellence."24 In the context of seventeenth-century Virginia, the use of such weapons, when coupled with the element of surprise, could effectively neutralize the English firearms. Muskets were only efficient weapons of defense if an attack were anticipated. Once an assailant made contact with weapons of shock, firearms would offer little hope.25

Mangopeesomon planned to launch a two-pronged attack. Besides the infiltrating tribesmen who would catch the English defenseless and unawares at various locations, running bands of armed warriors would spearhead a massive assault throughout the colony. It was intended that these warriors should swoop down "from divers places to finish the Execution."26 The success of the Indian strategy depended


24 Turney-High, Primitive War, 12.

25 Ibid.

26 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 20.
upon keeping the elaborate plans secret until the moment of "Execution." Any leaks along the channels of communication would be dangerous, and anything less than total annihilation would be disastrous.

From March 15 to March 21, relations between the Powhatans and the English were peaceful and, in most respects, more normal than usual. On Wednesday, March 20, Indians guided a group of Englishmen through some woodlands without incident, and the Warraskoyacks returned an English interpreter, then living with them, to his master. Some Powhatans even borrowed English boats to go back and forth across the James River, "to consult of the divellish murder," as was later theorized.27

This atmosphere of amity and complacency was only shattered on the evening of Thursday, March 21, when a Christianized Indian boy became the important communication "leak." This Indian, probably the Chanco (Chauco) of legend,28 informed planter Richard Pace, with whom he was staying, that

27 Ibid., 13.

28 Kingsbury transcribed the name as "Chauco," but since traditional usage has overwhelmingly favored "Chanco," I have adopted that spelling. See governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 98. For Chanco's heroic role in saving hundreds of English lives ("the good fruit of an Infidell converted to Christianity"), the Virginia Company recommended a suitable reward—a "good and carefull education" so that he could be "made capable of further benefittes and favors." Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, ibid., III, 673. In 1624 the company agreed to support an Indian boy "lately brought over from Virginia by one William Perry." This was probably Chanco, for the Rev. Patrick Copland, rector-designate of
the Powhatans planned a general uprising to murder all the colonists. Chanco told how his brother had come to him and given him explicit instructions. On the morning of the next day (Friday), according to Chanco, he was to kill Pace, while at the same time, his brother would murder planter William Perry, Chanco's master, who lived nearby. According to the Indian messenger, similar incidents would occur throughout the colony, perpetrated by tribesmen living with, or visiting, the English.

But the converted Chanco had other ideas. Later on Thursday evening, he divulged his secret to Pace, a man who had reputedly always treated him with kindness. Pace reacted with dispatch in the pre-dawn hours of Friday, March 22. He secured the defenses at his two hundred-acre

the East India School and highly influential in company circles, was charged with educating the boy. Virginia Company Court, Apr. 28, 1624, ibid., II, 538.

29 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 20.

30 Ibid., 20. The Rev. Joseph Mead related another version. The Indians, he wrote, invited the English to a great feast and "it chanced in the place neare which the Governour himselfe lived, than an Indian youth asked another Indian youth (who was baptised ...) If he knew, what they must do at this feast? What saith the other? Why, quoth he, we must cutt all the English men throats, and I hope, thou wilt cutt thy Masters. The Christian Indian presently informed his master, and he the Governour. ..." Joseph Mead to Sir Martin Stuteville, Christ College, July 13, 1622 (Harleian MS. 389, f. 216v), in "The Indian Massacre of 1622: Some Correspondence of the Reverend Joseph Mead," ed. Robert C. Johnson, VMHB, LXXI (1963), 408-409.

31 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 20.
plantation, "Pace's Paines,"
located upriver from Jamestown on the south bank of the James, and may have alerted neighboring plantations. He then rowed across the river to warn Governor Wyatt, who was able to prepare the defenses of an alerted Jamestown. There was probably not time enough to do much more, for "suburbs" only a couple of miles from the capital do not seem to have been warned.

At eight o'clock on Friday morning, just as Chanco had predicted, Mangopeesomon's warriors came unarmed to unsuspecting English households on both sides of the James River for a distance of 100 miles, bringing with them deer meat, turkeys, fish, and other provisions for trade.

This did not arouse the colonists' fears, for they were used to seeing "idle" Powhatan men walking about the dis-

32 Gov. Wyatt's list of land titles, May 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 555; Charles E. Hatch, Jr., The First Seventeen Years: Virginia, 1607-1624, Jamestown 350th Anniversary Historical Booklet, no. 6 (Williamsburg, Va., 1957), 32, 77.

33 Waterhouse noted that warnings went out to "such other Plantations as was possible for a timely intelligence to be given." Relation of the Massacre, 21. However, one location only 2½ miles from Jamestown was apparently not alerted (see below).

34 Waterhouse said that the Powhatans entered English settlements on "Friday morning" and the evening before, but an unknown informant of the Rev. Joseph Mead specified "8 in the morning." This accords with other information regarding the Powhatans' plans. Relation of the Massacre, 13-14; [?] to Mead, July 12, 1622 (Harleian MS 389, f. 214v), in "Correspondence of Mead," ed. Johnson, VMHB, LXXI (1963), 408.

35 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 13.
persed settlements during "working hours." In the Wyatt era, English homes were often opened to the Indians for entertainment and trading, and Powhatans, it was reported, "commonly lodged in . . . [the colonists'] bed-chambers."36 Mangopeesomon's warriors were thus familiar with the daily routine of the English and knew when women would be at the hearth and the men in the fields.

At each separate homestead and plantation, the visiting Powhatans chose their best opportunity to attack their hosts. Suddenly, when many of the English were still seated at the breakfast table, the assailants grabbed axes, hammers, or other implements and fell upon the colonists, "not sparing eyther age or sexe, man, woman, or childe."37 The attack erupted "like violent lightening," and was so unexpected, that "few or none discerned the weapon or blow that brought them to destruction."38 After killing their enemies, the Powhatans selectively defaced and dismembered

36 Ibid.; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 144.
37 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 14. Mead wrote that 300-400 Indians came to Jamestown to conduct the English to the "feast," but that the alerted colonists "fell upon them and beat out their braines scarce any escaping and so expiated in some sort the blood of their brethren which they [the Indians] slew in other places." Mead to Stuteville, July 13, 1622, in "Correspondence of Mead," ed. Johnson, VMHB, LXXI (1963), 409. Mead is the only English source to mention this seemingly preposterous episode.
38 George Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, James City, Mar. 30, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 73; Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 14.
some of the corpses, cutting them "into many pieces" and "carrying some parts away in derision." 39

The attack was devastating. Not only were the English surprised and murdered in their own homes, where they felt most secure, but the infiltration tactic and the one-on-one nature of the assaults probably left few survivors at unalerted plantations. The tidewater tribes had employed a similar tactic in wiping out the Spanish Jesuits on the York River in 1570/71. At that time, warriors were each assigned to a different priest, "so that all were killed at the same time, without being able to help one another." 40

However, there was only one other occasion after 1570 and before 1622 when the Powhatans attempted total annihilation of their enemies. 41 Traditionally, the tidewater tribes spared the lives of rival werowances and all women and children. 42 But 1622 represented "total war" and was motivated by an implacable, cultural hatred. The uprising was revolutionary in its intent and effect; win or

39 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 14. Smith wrote that the Powhatans, "not being content with their lives, . . . fell againe upon the dead bodies, making as well as they could a fresh murder, defacing, dragging, and mangling their dead carcasses into many pieces." Generall Historie of Virginia, 145.

40 "Relation of Juan de la Carrera" (1600), in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 135-136.


42 Ibid., 109-110; Smith, Map of Virginia, 26.
lose, the Powhatans would not return to conditions as they had been. The uprising was also unprecedented in its destructiveness. Never before had Powhatan warfare wrought such massive damage to human life, industries, livestock, homes—and hopes.43 The full impact of the uprising can only be comprehended by a review of the destruction at each English settlement.

Corporation of Henrico

English Fatalities on March 22:
4 sites: 51 men, 3 women, 5 children, 2 undetermined44

The English settlements immediately northwest of Henrico, located more than sixty riverine miles from Jamestown, were especially vulnerable to attack. The college lands, the ironworks at Falling Creek, Thomas Sheffield's plantation, and Henrico Island, itself, were in close proximity to three of the six tribal groups that had formed the basis of Powhatan's empire in the sixteenth century. The Powhatans, Arrohattocs, and Appomattocs were not mentioned in connection with the uprising per se, but it is quite likely that the English designation, "Tanx Powhatans,"

43 The ruthless manner in which Englishmen fought their wars was a valuable, if unfortunate, precedent. Social scientists note that "an ingroup surrounded by successfully aggressive outgroups will imitate the outgroup patterns of aggression." LeVine and Campbell, Ethnocentrism, 202.

44 The "undetermined" were adults, sex unknown. See Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 35-36, for the Henrico figures.
represented a consolidation of villages and tribes from the Henrico area. This region had been the scene of brutal confrontations between 1609 and 1613, and due to their proximity and their past hatreds, the "Tanx Powhatans" were almost assuredly responsible for the devastation in the Henrico area. (See Map V.2)

At Falling Creek, a total of twenty-seven Englishmen died on March 22, most of them laborers at the colony's ironworks and likely the craftsmen that had been sent from Warwickshire, Staffordshire, and Sussex in 1620. Master John Berkeley, the hereditary heir to Beverstone Castle, Gloucestershire, a member of the Council of State and director of the ironworks, and one Joseph Fitch, apothecary to Dr. John Pott, were killed at this one hundred-acre site. It appears that the entire English population at Falling Creek was wiped out, with the possible exception of two children, who, according to legend, managed to hide from the attacking warriors.

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45 The Paspaheghs, formerly resident on the north bank of the James River flanking both sides of the Chickahominy River, and other "refugee" tribes may have been living among the "Tanx Powhatans" by 1622.

46 Virginia Company, Declaration of the State of the Colony (London, 1620), 5, 10, 16.

47 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 10.


49 Beverley, History of Virginia, ed. Wright, 54-55.
But almost as demoralizing as the human loss was the complete destruction of the ironworks, an embryonic but promising industry for which both company and colony had held high expectations. Before the March attack, the Falling Creek site had been described as "very Commodious and advantagious" and the furnace as being in a state of "some good forwardnes." Even though the Indians destroyed machinery and tossed tools into the river, the English wanted to believe that the ironworks was capable of restoration. Some £5000 had been spent on the project prior to 1622, and a large portion of the college money had been invested in the ironworks. But in light of the Powhatan Uprising, neither the company nor the colony were capable of large investments in men or money. By November 1623, the prospects of an iron industry were officially dead.

A second major company project, the Indian college, was also dealt a death blow on March 22. Situated across the James River just southeast of Falling Creek was the one thousand-acre college site, where tenants worked under


52 Virginia Company court, Nov. 19, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 497; [Alderman Johnson], "Answer to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, ibid., IV, 141.
the direction of George Thorpe. Although Thorpe was not on
hand the day of the attack, sixteen others were slain here.\footnote{53}
The Virginia Company had long considered the college project
a "publique . . . [as well as] a sacred bussiness," and the
London directors declared the post-uprising abandonment of
the college lands a matter of "discontent . . . [and] evill
fame."\footnote{54} The repossesson of both the college site and
Falling Creek was "of absolute necessitie, lest the best
fire that maintains the action here [in England] be putt
out."\footnote{55} However, the company's encouragement could not com-
ensate for the poor planning, lack of funds, and hatred for
the Powhatans that doomed efforts at reestablishment. Thus
Mangopeesomon killed an industry that would have promoted
economic diversity and an institution that would have pro-
moted Indian acculturation. Both were projects of high
priority and vast potential—for the English, not the Pow-
hatans.

Among other sites attacked on March 22 was Thomas
Sheffield's 150-acre plantation, located three miles from
Falling Creek. Here Powhatan warriors killed the master,

\footnote{53} See Map V.2. Waterhouse listed 17 killed, but
Thomas Hobson was alive in Feb. 1623/24. Relation of the
Massacre, 36; "List of the Living in Virginia, Feb. 16,
1623/24," in John Camden Hotten, comp., The Original Lists
of Persons of Quality, . . . and Others Who Went From Great
Britain to the American Plantations, 1600-1700, 2d ed.
(New York, 1880), 169, s.v., "College land."

\footnote{54} Virginia Company to governor and council in

\footnote{55} Ibid., 671.
his wife, and eleven men and boys, probably the entire popu-
lation. On Henrico Island, five people were killed, and
the settlement was "utterlie demolished" by the Indians.
The attackers burned buildings once considered the pride of
the colony and slaughtered large numbers of chickens,
hogs, cattle, goats, and horses.

There were other sites lying within the boundaries
of the Corporation of Henrico that suffered attack, but no
other casualties were reported. At John Proctor's planta-
tion, located on the south bank of the James River between
Sheffield's and Henrico, Proctor's wife, "a proper, civill,
modest Gentlewoman," according to John Smith, gathered
together some laborers and defended her homestead against
the Indian warriors.

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56 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 36; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 60. This plantation was probably not resettled after the uprising.


60 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 150.

61 Some three or four weeks after the attack, however, Mistress Procter and the others were ordered by the governor to move to locations of better defense, after which the Powhatans came and set fire to the plantation buildings. Ibid.;
Corporation of Charles City

English Fatalities on March 22: 19 sites: 109 men, 21 women, 10 children, 2 undetermined

The general devastation in the Corporation of Charles City was on a par with that in Henrico, but the actual toll in lives was far greater. An extensive area, stretching along both banks of the James River from the mouth of the Chickahominy River up to the "Curls" near Bermuda (Charles) City, was affected. Although the English settlements in this region were in reasonably close proximity, most had insufficient populations for repulsing a coordinated and determined Indian attack. (See Map V.3)

There were several tribes living in the area that together probably represented a sizeable warrior population. These included the Appomattocks, the Weanocs, the populous Chickahominies, and the Quiyoughcohannocks. Three of these tribes—the Weanocs, the Quiyoughcohannocks, and the Appomattocks—had joined with the Paspeheghs and the Kiskiacks in the May 1607 assault on James Fort.

On March 22, 1621/22, the English settlements in the Corporation of Charles City were, for the most part, small,

Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 60. One other plantation of note, that of Capt. Samuel Mathews, was located near the Indian village of Arrohattoc. There are no details of what transpired here on Mar. 22. See ibid., 52-53.

62 See Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37-41. The "unde termined" here were adults, sex unknown. Ibid., 40.

63 See Barbour, Pocahontas, 13-14.
dispersed, undefended, and unsuspecting of Indian attack. The plantation of Abraham Piersey (Piercey, Pierce), located on the Appomattox River near its mouth, suffered four deaths in the assault, enough to warrant its abandonment.\footnote{Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 67.}

North of Piersey's lay Bermuda (Charles) City, a region of growth and promise from 1611 to 1616 and the site selected for the proposed East India School.\footnote{See Fausz, "Patterns of Settlement," 42-43; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 63-65; and John Rolfe, A True Relation of the State of Virginia Lefte by Sir Thomas Dale, Knight, in May Last 1616, Jamestown Documents (Charlottesville, Va., 1971), 9-10.}

Charles City in 1622 was certainly less influential than it had once been, but it is impossible to estimate the English population that may have been living here at the time of the uprising.\footnote{Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37, is particularly vague on the location of individual plantations.}

Somewhere near Charles City and "about the Precincts," five men of Capt. Roger Smith's company were killed, and at a nearby plantation, the Henry Milward family—the master, his wife, child, and sister—died, along with "Goodwife Redhead" and three others.\footnote{Ibid.}

At William Ferrar's house (location not determined), the Indians killed ten persons.\footnote{This site may have been on the Appomattox River near Piersey's plantation. Gov. Wyatt's list of land titles, May 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 555.}

The Powhatans struck the also unspecified sites of Richard

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{64}}Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 67.}

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{65}}See Fausz, "Patterns of Settlement," 42-43; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 63-65; and John Rolfe, A True Relation of the State of Virginia Lefte by Sir Thomas Dale, Knight, in May Last 1616, Jamestown Documents (Charlottesville, Va., 1971), 9-10.}

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{66}}Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37, is particularly vague on the location of individual plantations.}

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{67}}Ibid.}

\footnotesize{\textit{\textsuperscript{68}}This site may have been on the Appomattox River near Piersey's plantation. Gov. Wyatt's list of land titles, May 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 555.}
Owen's house (six dead); Owen Macar's (four dead); and William Bikar's (five dead), all in the general vicinity.\textsuperscript{69}

Because of the paucity of information on settlement locations and pre-uprising population for the Charles City area, it is hard to determine how devastating the attack was here. Charles E. Hatch, historian of early Virginia settlement, believed that the devastation was great, but noted that the published death toll for Charles City seemed "rather light in comparison with [some other] settlements. . . . It leads one to doubt that a full list of names was submitted."\textsuperscript{70} An alternative explanation is that stout defenses repulsed the Indians. In 1616, Charles City had been judged one of the two best-fortified settlements in the colony, being situated upon high ground with palisades, trenches, and blockhouses.\textsuperscript{71} If locations were as defensible six years later, and if a large enough population maintained them, the Powhatans could well have been discouraged from launching an assault (assuming that infiltration miscarried), as they were at Jamestown and Elizabeth City. In any case, there is no compelling reason to assume that a complete

\textsuperscript{69}Waterhouse usually listed contiguous plantations together within each corporation. Relation of the Massacre, 39-40.

\textsuperscript{70}Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 66. Alexander Brown had earlier concluded the same point. First Republic, 467n.

\textsuperscript{71}Rolfe, True Relation, Jamestown Documents, 9-10.
accounting of the English dead was not made following the attack.\textsuperscript{72}

Charles City, like Henrico, suffered a great loss of buildings and livestock.\textsuperscript{73} If, realistically, the Powhatans could not kill every last Englishman, at least they could force the abandonment of settlements and destroy everything of value worth returning to.

However, downstream along the corporation's north bank settlements, the Indians were very successful in their primary objective--killing Englishmen. At Berkeley Town and Hundred, the eight thousand-acre plantation in which Thorpe was a shareholder, a total of eleven persons died, including Thorpe.\textsuperscript{74} Waterhouse's account, as biased and inflammatory as it is, is nonetheless the only primary source that reveals how Thorpe met his end. Apparently Thorpe was warned to run for his life just as Mangopeesomon's warriors arrived at Berkeley Hundred, but he chose neither to flee nor to defend himself, being, reputedly, "so void of all suspicion, and so full of confidence that ... [the Indians] meant ... [no] ill against him."\textsuperscript{75} Although much

\textsuperscript{72}As with the case of West and Shirley Hundred (a strong settlement), low mortality often indicated a well-defended site, as opposed to a faulty tally of the English dead. See Hatch, \textit{First Seventeen Years}, 48.


\textsuperscript{74}Waterhouse, \textit{Relation of the Massacre}, 38.

\textsuperscript{75}\textit{Ibid.}, 17.
that was later written about Thorpe inflated his status as a hero and a martyr, the fact that he refused to run or to believe that the Powhatans hated him coincides with accounts of his pre-uprising self-assurance, piety, and naïvete.\textsuperscript{76} Thorpe, the "kind" Englishman stood his ground and was "wilfully murdered" by warriors who surely recognized this highly influential and visible colonial leader.\textsuperscript{77} After killing him, as all contemporary accounts related, the Powhatans mutilated and defaced the corpse with great glee.\textsuperscript{78}

Thorpe's murder was no accident. In Mangopeesomon's revolutionary and cultural war, Thorpe—the pious proselytizer, the agent of forced acculturation, the man who wanted to take Powhatan children away from their parents and to corrupt them with alien doctrines—was a prime target. The Indians' treatment of his corpse seems to confirm this. Although other English bodies were reputedly mutilated, the Indians' treatment of Thorpe was particularly shocking.\textsuperscript{79} The outrage that Thorpe's murder and mutilation precipitated

\textsuperscript{76}See \textit{ibid.}, 15-17; Barbour, \textit{Pocahontas}, 200-203

\textsuperscript{77}Waterhouse, \textit{Relation of the Massacre}, 16-17.

\textsuperscript{78}To quote Waterhouse's emotionally charged account: "... they ... cruelly and felly, out of devillish malice, did so many barbarous despights and foule scornes after to his dead corps, as are unbefitting to be heard by any civill eare." \textit{Ibid.} Smith and Purchas used similar, inflammatory language to describe this incident. Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 145; Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols., XIX (Glasgow, 1905-1907 [orig. publ. 4 vols., London, 1625], 161.

among English commentators, who portrayed him as a religious martyr engaged in a Christian mission, provides valuable insights into the situation. For English contemporaries, the Powhatan Uprising was viewed as a holy war instigated by the "devil" and perpetrated by the worshippers of Okee. In this context, the mutilation of Thorpe may indeed have been an act of catharsis and religious symbolism for the Powhatans.

Mutilation, decapitation, and blood-licking have been and are spiritually and socially significant practices for many past and present cultures, and the tidewater tribes seem to have taken particular satisfaction in the ritual desecration of Christian religious leaders and symbols. A striking parallel to the way in which Thorpe's corpse was treated was the ritualistic mutilation of the Spanish Jesuit priests on the York River in 1570/71. The bodies of the fathers, who had been active in conversion attempts, were hacked to pieces after their murders. It was reported that the Indians cut off their heads and used the skulls as

80 Waterhouse called Thorpe a "glorious Martyr" who "hath gayned a Crowne of endlesse blisse," and clergyman Purchas also played up this theme. Both men used Thorpe's death as a primary issue in exhorting their countrymen to exact a terrible revenge. Relation of the Massacre, 17 and passim; Pilgrimes, XIX, 159 and passim; Chap. VI, below.

81 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 22; Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 164; Mead to Stuteville, July 13, 1622, in "Correspondence of Mead," ed. Johnson, VMHB, LXXI (1963), 408-410.

82 Turney-High, Primitive War, 193, 222-223.
drinking vessels. In addition to the treatment accorded the bodies, the attackers looted the outpost, "profaned the holy vessels, . . . hung the patens around their necks and dressed themselves in the sacred vestments." Whether or not the Powhatans believed they were robbing Thorpe of his spiritual powers as well as his life, the devastation of Berkeley Hundred plantation was far more than "spiritual." This promising settlement, which had been founded for the "honor of the allmighty god, [and] the inlargeinge of Christian religion," and which in 1619 had taken the lead in housing and educating Powhatan children, was ruined by the uprising. Surviving tenants were relocated, and the site had not been reoccupied as late as 1625.

Near Berkeley Hundred, the Wests--Captain Francis, Nathaniel, and John, brothers of the Lord De La Warr--lost a total of six men from their three contiguous plantations,

83 "Relation of Bartolomé Martínez" (1610), in Lewis and Loomie, Spanish Jesuit Mission, 159-160.
84 "Relation of Juan de la Carrera" (1600), ibid., 136-137. Also see, "Relation of Luis Gerónimo de Óbregón" (ca. 1617), ibid., 181-182; letter of Juan Rogel, Aug. 28, 1572, ibid., 110; Carl Ortwin Sauer, Sixteenth Century North America (Berkeley, Calif., 1971), 224.
known collectively as "Westover." An adjoining settlement owned by Thomas Swinhow suffered proportionately more damage. Swinhow's wife, two sons, and four others were killed in the attack, according to Waterhouse, and Smith listed Thomas Swinhow, himself, among the dead. However, Swinhow survived, but perhaps as an indication of his deep personal loss, he never returned to his plantation. In the census of 1624/25, he was listed as living alone in a suburb of Jamestown.

Lying on a jutting point of land downriver from Swinhow's plantation was Sir George Yeardley's property, "Tanks Weyanoke" (Weynoack, Weanock), across the river from his other plantation, Flowerdieu Hundred. Twenty-one people died at Tanks Weyanoke, presumably all tenants. The plantation was abandoned after the attack, and by 1624, it was the property of Abraham Piersey, the capemerchant. It is highly probable that the Chickahominies had a major role in

Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 38; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 43-44.

Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 40; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 149.


Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 40. Nearby, at an undisclosed location, a Master Hobson, his wife, and five others were slain. These probably constituted the seven persons whom Smith listed as dead "at another place." Generall Historie of Virginia, 149.

Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 42.
the destruction at Yeardley's Tanks Weyanoke, in revenge for the 1616 slaughter at Ozinies.

Yet another Yeardley interest, and a plantation of great size, prestige, and potential, was Southampton (earlier, Smythe's) Hundred. Located at "Dancing Point" near the confluence of the Chickahominy and James rivers, Southampton Hundred was a plantation of eighty thousand acres that at different times bore the names of two Virginia Company directors. In 1619, this settlement had assumed an important role in experimenting with iron manufacture and in furthering Anglicanism and Indian education in Virginia. St. Mary's Church, founded by donations from London, was erected on the plantation, and it was agreed that the settlement would raise and educate Powhatan children as at Berkeley Hundred. However, the March 22 attack "appears to have been the blow that ended the promising hopes of Smith's Hundred." Although only five people were killed, probably a small percentage of the total population, subsequent harassment by the Powhatans and the plantation's poor defenses soon forced the abandonment of the site.

93 Rogers Dey Whichard, History of Lower Tidewater Virginia (New York, 1959), 71.
95 Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 41.
96 Ibid.
Among the north bank plantations in the Corporation of Charles City, fifty-seven persons lost their lives, including six women and four children. However, many more were probably saved by quick decisions or last-ditch defenses. At "Causey's Care," for instance, Nathaniel Causey, an "ancient planter" who had come with Newport's first supply expedition in 1608, successfully fended off the Indian attackers with an axe. At another location, it was reported that two Englishmen held off some sixty warriors, "for they [the Indians] hurt not any that did either fight or stand upon their guard." Such statements ring true, but not in the sense of English assumptions about Indian cowardice and military inferiority. Rather, the Powhatans were probably reluctant to tarry too long at any one location during the attack, since their chances for success lay in doing the greatest amount of damage to the largest number of plantations before the English could mobilize their forces.

The Powhatan tactics of infiltration and hit-and-run proved lethal to English residents along the south bank of the James River, just as they did to the north bank settlers.


98 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 145.

99 Ibid.
At least seven separate sites were assaulted, and at six of them, a total of forty-three persons died.

At "Powell Brook" (later "Merchant's Hope"), a six hundred acre plantation situated on the old Weanoc village lands across the river from Westover, Capt. Nathaniel Powell, his wife, daughter, and nine others were slain. The body of Powell, a colony resident since 1609, a former acting governor, and in 1622, a member of the Council of State, was decapitated by the Powhatans. Downstream from Powell Brook, Samuel Maycock (M.A., Caius), a councillor under governors Yeardley and Wyatt and an unordained minister, was killed along with Edward Lister, a signer of the Mayflower Compact. Maycock's plantation was not reestablished after the uprising.

At Yeardley's Flowerdieu Hundred plantation, downstream from Maycock's, five men and one woman died in the attack. The light mortality at this, one of the larger private plantations, was probably owing to decisive defen-

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100 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 40.
101 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 145.
102 Edward L. Goodwin, The Colonial Church in Virginia (Milwaukee, Wis., 1927), 293.
103 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 39; Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 71.
104 Muster of 1624/25, in Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers, 5-69.
105 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 39.
sive action. Flowerdieu was one of the few upriver sites ordered to be held and defended for the colony's future security. 106

At the plantation of Capt. Henry Spelman (Spilman) east of Flowerdieu, two men were killed, and the settlement was subsequently abandoned. 107 Spelman, himself, an "ancient planter" and a valued interpreter living among the Powhatans, was killed in 1623 by the Patawomekes. 108 Close to the Spelman property was Capt. John Ward's plantation of twelve hundred acres. Here, Lt. John Gibbs and eleven other men, presumably all tenants, lost their lives. 109 This settlement was typical of many others; they had been founded only three or four years before the uprising, and they did not survive that event. 110


107 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 149. Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 41, had merely "Captaine Spilman," and Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 73, claimed that the land belonged to Thomas Spilman, who came to Virginia in 1617. Whether the land belonged to Henry, who died in 1623, or to Thomas, who moved to Elizabeth City in 1624, the plantation was not reestablished. See Nell Marion Nugent, comp., Cavaliers and Pioneers: Abstracts of Virginia Land Patents and Grants, 1623-1800, I (Richmond, 1934), 6.

108 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 161; Chap. VI, below.

109 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 38.

110 See Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 32-33.
Close to the boundary of the Corporation of Charles City, on the south bank of the James River, was "Martin's Brandon" plantation, owned by Capt. John Martin. Martin was a contentious fellow, and his settlement was known as a "Receptacle of Vagabonds and bankrupts." Six died here. Near dusk on March 22, a ship stopped at Martin's Brandon to search for wounded survivors, but none were found. Mangopeesomon's warriors apparently looted this plantation as they had others, for, it was reported, "the Indians . . . carried away all other things as it should seeme by there strowinge of old Chestes and barrelles about the field." The Powhatans also apparently remained in the area, because the houses left standing on March 22 were found burned to the ground on the following day. Re-settlement at Martin's Brandon did not occur for several years.


Virginia Company court, June 19, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 42.

Including a lieutenant, an ensign, two boys, and Mathew, "a Polander." Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 41.

Testimony before the Virginia Company, Feb. 4, 1624/25, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 516.

Ibid.

Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 75-76.
Within the Corporation of Charles City, downriver from Charles City itself, the north bank plantations suffered fifty-seven fatalities and the southside plantations, forty-three. In different ways, the settlements in each location were vulnerable to attack. The north bank plantations were generally larger and, at least potentially, better defended; however they probably faced a larger and stronger Indian force, quite possibly the Pamunkeys themselves. The south bank settlements were smaller and probably less defensible, but they faced tribes not as strong as the Chickahominies or the Pamunkeys. Common defense and alertness were the key factors to survival among residents of both the north and the south bank. Escape, assuming it was even a possibility, would have been extremely difficult. Without large numbers of boats and ideal circumstances, the Chickahominy and James rivers presented formidable obstacles to seeking safe refuge downstream.

Corporation of James City

English Fatalities on March 22:
5 sites: 98 men, 24 women, 11 children, 6 undetermined

As was demonstrated by the high mortality in the Corporation of Charles City, numbers alone were incapable

117These are revised figures based on Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 41-43: 100 men, 28 women, 11 children, 6 undetermined (6 adults, sex unknown). I have subtracted 6 names, including Walters, Dickenson, Boise, and Jefferies, who later turned up alive, and two persons who were listed as dead at two separate locations and thus were counted twice. See Appendix B for specifics.
MAP V.4 CORPORATION OF JAMES CITY, MARCH 22, 1622
ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS

- Archer's Hope
- Paces Paines
- Hogg Island
- Jamestown
- Bennett's Welcome
- Martin's Hundred
- Mulberry Island
of thwarting the Powhatan assault. Large but disorganized concentrations of Englishmen were easily slaughtered, while much smaller groups, alert and organized for aggressive defense, fared better. Nowhere were these two conclusions more convincingly illustrated than in the Corporation of James City.

At and near Edward Bennett's south bank plantation, located downstream from Jamestown opposite Mulberry Island, there was a considerable amount of fighting between Englishmen and Mangopeesomon's attacking warriors. Although the settlements in the vicinity were dangerously close to the villages of the Warraskoyacks and the Nansamunds, the main attack force in this region, Englishmen living here were relatively successful in saving lives through aggressive reaction. A Master Baldwin defended his house and his wife, who lay wounded, by repeatedly firing his musket at the attacking Warraskoyacks.118 Half a mile from Baldwin's, Ensign Harrison and his wife were slain, but a servant boy continued to shoot at the Indians until they departed.119

In addition to individual acts of courage (or desperation), there were notable instances of group effort and cooperation among the settlers living near Bennett's

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118Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 146.

plantation. When Harrison's house was set on fire, Thomas Hamor led eighteen women and children to Baldwin's homestead and defended it until help arrived.120 Thomas Hamor's brother, Ralph, the author, soldier, and colony official from the Dale era, arrived on the scene and, seeing the attack in progress, retired to his still-unfinished house on Hogg Island. "There onely with spades, axes, and brickbats, he defended himselfe and his Company till the Salvages departed."121 Soon thereafter, a ship dispatched six musketeers to aid the defenders, and both armed and unarmed Englishmen finally drove the Warraskoyacks away. Two of the musketeers, under the command of John Pountis, vice-admiral of Virginia, were killed in the foray.122

At another area plantation, the small household of Edward Waters (or Walters) was attacked by Nansamunds.123 Two servants were slain, along with the Waters's child, but

120 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 146.
121 Ibid.
122 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 43. All of the dead from the several skirmishes in this vicinity were listed together under the heading of "Mr. Edward Bennets Plantation." Ibid.
123 Waters had accompanied Sir George Somers to Bermuda in 1611 and spent many years there. He was one of the three men who found the extremely valuable supply of ambergris on the island. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 153; Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 346-347.
surprisingly, Waters and his wife were taken prisoner. Mistress Waters was erroneously listed among the dead in Waterhouse's *Relation of the Massacre*, as was the general practice with missing persons.\textsuperscript{124} However, several weeks after the March 22 attack, Waters and his wife escaped from the Nansamunds, taking a canoe and safely rowing across the James River to Elizabeth City.\textsuperscript{125} This amazing incident caused Smith to write: "Thus you may see how many desperate dangers some men escape, when others die that have all things at their pleasure."\textsuperscript{126}

Despite all the courage and luck in evidence near Bennett's plantation on March 22, fifty-three colonists were killed by the Indians. It was the Warraskoyacks who had, only two days before, peacefully entered Ralph Hamor's plantation and returned unharmed an interpreter who had long lived among them.\textsuperscript{127}

Casualties should have been much lighter on the north bank of the James River, considering the advance notice that Governor Wyatt had of the impending attack. But in the dozen or so miles between the capital city and Mulberry Island, some eighty-five people were killed, although it

\textsuperscript{124}Waterhouse, *Relation of the Massacre*, 43.
\textsuperscript{125}Smith, *Generall Historie of Virginia*, 153-154.
\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 154.
\textsuperscript{127}Waterhouse, *Relation of the Massacre*, 13, 42-43.
cannot be determined with certainty which Indian tribe or tribes participated in the attacks against Archer's Hope, Martin's Hundred, and Mulberry Island--the only sites that reported casualties.

The Kiskiacks, situated on the south bank of the York River near present day Yorktown; were only twelve to fifteen land miles distant from the Jamestown area. They were almost certainly involved in the March 22 attack.\textsuperscript{128} It is also conceivable that Warraskoyacks and Nansamunds from the southside rowed across the James, although it is more probable that Chickahominies and Pamunkeys attacked settlements from the west and northwest. In accordance with Mangopeesomon's ultimate objectives, a massive thrust against Jamestown was surely intended,\textsuperscript{129} and for the supreme danger and honor involved in this, the overlord's own Pamunkey tribe would have likely been the best choice as an assault force. (See Map V.1.)

The English records are surprisingly silent on what defenses Jamestown possessed, how formidable an obstacle an alerted capital would have represented to the Indians, and whether the Powhatans even attempted an assault here. The

\textsuperscript{128}Maurice A. Mook, "The Ethnological Significance of Tindall's Map of Virginia, 1608," \textit{WMQ}, 2d Ser., XXIII (1943), 387.

\textsuperscript{129}Rutman, "Militant New World," 265.
implication from Waterhouse is that the Indians immediately perceived a strong and alerted armed force on the naturally defensible island (peninsula) and departed without a serious fight.\textsuperscript{130} If that were the case, neighboring plantations, less well defended, took the brunt of the Powhatans' frustrations.

The closest that the attack came to Jamestown was at Archer's Hope (later College Creek), a suburb located only two-and-a-half miles from the capital. Here, on Ensign William Spence's property lying between the glebe land and Fowler's Neck, five men were killed.\textsuperscript{131} Although Spence himself survived, William Fairfax, whose children had been murdered by Indian renegades in 1618, "The Tinker," and three other residents, were not so fortunate.\textsuperscript{132} At Mulberry Island, more than a dozen miles from Jamestown, Thomas Peirce, his wife and child, two men, and a "French boy" fell to Indian warriors.\textsuperscript{133} John Rolfe lived close by on a patent of seventeen hundred acres, but contrary to the traditional belief that he died in the attack, he was already dead by March 22.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{130}Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 21.
\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{132}See Charles E. Hatch, Jr., "Archer's Hope and the Glebe," VMHB, LXV (1957), 479, 483; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 125.
\textsuperscript{133}Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 42.
\textsuperscript{134}Rolfe had dictated his last will and testament on Mar. 10, 1621/22. Barbour, Pocahontas, 213.
At Martin's Hundred, a plantation lying between Archer's Hope and Mulberry Island some seven miles from Jamestown, seventy-four colonists were killed--more than at any other single location. Martin's Hundred contained eighty-thousand acres and was described by Charles M. Andrews as the "most important of all the private plantations and the first to take form."\(^{135}\) Like Berkeley Hundred and Southampton Hundred, "the Society of Martin's Hundred" had agreed to support, house, educate, and convert Indian children; however, the offer was soon withdrawn.\(^{136}\) For by late January 1621/22, Martin's Hundred was described as "sorely weakened and . . . in much confusion."\(^{137}\) It was probably this disorganization, coupled with the fact that the English here were dispersed along the plantation's huge boundaries (with river frontage ten miles long), that accounted for the terrible mortality suffered on March 22.

Waterhouse placed the death toll at seventy-seven for Martin's Hundred, but his list contained several names of persons who were missing and only presumed dead. Mistress Boyse (Boise),\(^{138}\) wife of John Boise, burgess from Martin's


\(^{137}\) Virginia Company quarter court, Jan. 30, 1621/22, ibid., 587.

\(^{138}\) Perhaps the "Sara" mentioned as one of the English prisoners at Pamunkey. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 158.
Hundred in the first assembly in 1619; Jane Dickenson (or Digginson), wife of Ralph Dickenson, an indentured servant; and Mistress Nathaniel Jefferies were listed as dead, but they were actually captured by the Indians on March 22 and were later returned to the colony. In addition to these three verifiable cases, there were probably another fifteen or so English women from Martin's Hundred and elsewhere who were taken prisoner but later returned alive.

Smith reported that in late June or early July 1622 an English expedition discovered that Mistress Boyse was a "prisoner with nineteene more at Pamaunke," Mangopeesomon's chief town. In March 1622/23, another source noted that the Pamunkeys still had "19 English persons retayned . . . in great slavery," and that "there are none but women in Captivitie with th' Indians for the men that they tooke they putt . . . to death." It is not known whether all of the remaining captives were returned, although Samuel Purchas mentioned the release of seven prisoners sometime before the end of 1623. That date coincided with Jane

139 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 42.
140 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 154. See Chap. VI, below.
142 Letter to John Woodall, 1623, ibid., 238.
143 Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 170.
Dickenson's return to the colony. On March 30, 1624, only a few days after the start of the English new year, Mistress Dickenson presented a petition to Governor Wyatt and his council. In it she mentioned how her husband had been killed at Martin's Hundred during the 1622 attack and how she had been "Caried away with the Cruel salvages, [and remained] amongst them Enduring much misery." She noted that Dr. John Pott had ransomed her and "divers others" for two pounds of beads.\(^{144}\) As for Mistress Jefferies, she was residing in the Corporation of James City by February 1623/24, according to the "List of the Living in Virginia" of that date.\(^{145}\)

It is significant that the only three verifiable cases of captured persons listed as dead, but who were later returned alive, were all women and that they came from Martin's Hundred, and it is likely that the fifteen to seventeen other women captives also came from that plantation.

The disorganization that had characterized Martin's Hundred before the March 22 attack was more in evidence

\(^{144}\)In Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 473. The purpose of Mistress Dickenson's petition was to obtain release from an unjust and oppressive servitude to Pott, "Considering that it much differeth not from her slavery with the Indians."

\(^{145}\)Hotten, comp., Original Lists, 175.
after it. For no other plantation listing casualties in Waterhouse's compilation were the individual entries so vague and confusing. Usually specific as to either given name, surname, or both, Waterhouse's list for Martin's Hundred included twenty unidentified "Men and Boyses" or "Men-servants," four unnamed "Maids," two unidentified children, and three persons unspecified by either age or sex.146 Because Martin's Hundred had been hardest hit in the 1622 attack, a great deal of confusion probably surrounded the body count. Then, too, the vague and anonymous listings may have reflected the fact that many bodies were mutilated and/or burned beyond recognition. To compound the problems of compiling a detailed and accurate list under such adverse conditions, there were the beliefs that missing persons had almost assuredly been killed in inaccessible areas or that they had been captured and would certainly be killed soon after.

Indeed, those contemporary assumptions should have been accurate. In terms of his original strategy of annihilation, why did Mangopeesomon take prisoners at Martin's Hundred and keep them alive? It is conceivable that, after realizing that Jamestown could not be taken without the essential element of surprise, the Indians believed it was

146 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 41-42.
impossible to wipe out all, or even a majority of, the English. Considering the disproportionate abundance of leaders, ships, provisions, muskets, and ordnance at the capital, the Powhatans could have expected a harsh retaliation from the English. Therefore, as they continued their attack against plantations downstream from Jamestown, the Indians may have taken some prisoners expressly for the purpose of later bargaining or ransom. The fact that the English women were kept alive for many months and that on two occasions Mangopeesomon was willing to exchange them as terms of a truce—a truce scorned by colony officials—confirms this hypothesis.147 The taking of the Martin's Hundred women was the Pocahontas kidnapping in reverse, and Mangopeesomon was probably prepared to purchase peace with hostages, just as the English had done in 1613-1614. However, unfortunately for the Powhatans, the English thirst for revenge was not to be so easily sated.

Mangopeesomon's grand and desperate design had failed to annihilate the aliens. Large numbers of the English remained alive, and many settlements were untouched by the attack.148 In the Corporation of Elizabeth City,

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147 See Chap. VI, below.

148 Near Martin's Hundred, for instance, lived a family that did not even know of the uprising until Mar. 24. Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 146.
the population concentrations at Newport News and Kecoughtan-
Elizabeth City reported no casualties. Both sites were
defensible and secure, with organization and manpower super-
intended by military veterans Daniel Gookin (at Newport News)
and Capt. William Nuse, Marshall of Virginia (at Elizabeth
City). These most eastern of the colony's mainland set-
tlements were situated in the traditionally weakest portion
of both Powhatan's and Mangopeesomon's domains. In retro-
spect, Mangopeesomon's only hope of success on March 22
would have been to destroy or cripple every other English
settlement so that his consolidated forces could have as-
saulted Newport News and Elizabeth City en masse.

As it was, Mangopeesomon's partial success on
March 22 was great indeed. Some 325 to 330 of the English
were killed in a few short hours, including four important
and respected members of the Council of State: Thorpe,

149 William Nuce (or Newce) died in Apr. 1622, but
his brother, Capt. Thomas Nuce, took over his duties if not
his office. Richard Beale Davis, George Sandys, Post-
Adventurer (London and New York, 1955), 115n, 133n, 151n;
Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 154; Hatch, First
Seventeen Years, 97-100.

150 My revised estimates. Waterhouse, Relation of the
Massacre, 43, gave a total of 347, but the individual names
in his list add up to 349. Likewise Smith, Generall Historie
of Virginia, 149-150, printed 347, but his list, too, added
up to 349. In the first printed estimate of fatalities,
Gov. Wyatt stated that "above three hundred" had perished,
and I believe a figure closer to 300 than to 350-400 is
more accurate. Governor and council in Virginia to Virginia
See Appendix B. George Donne as late as 1638, in fact, men-
tioned a figure of 300 dead. T. H. Breen, "George Donne's
'Virginia Reviewed': A 1638 Plan to Reform Colonial Society,"
WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 466.
Berkeley, Maycock, and Powell. The Powhatans had forced the abandonment and/or extinction of once-thriving plantations and had destroyed the industries and projects vital to the future of the Virginia Company. By their devastating attack, the Powhatans altered English settlement patterns and created a severe refugee problem that would kill hundreds more of the English in the year following the March uprising.

Mangopeesomon's sudden and crippling "Pawne mate" against the English was a classic "surround and dawn attack" that featured many of the timeless, fundamental principles of warfare. The Powhatans had taken the offensive and used it well; they employed their forces in a concerted effort; they used both fire and mobility to their advantage; and their recognition of the value of military intelligence enabled them to surprise the enemy. Above all, Mangopeesomon's plan was brilliant because it combined the classic military properties of complexity and simplicity. As an

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151 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 20. Davis believed that two other councillors were killed: Michael Lapworth and John Rolfe, although no evidence was cited. George Sandys, 127n.


153 Turney-High, Primitive War, 128.

TABLE V.1: REVIEW OF ENGLISH SETTLEMENTS, 1622-1625

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantations/settlements abandoned after March 22, 1621/22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maycock's Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powell Brooke/Merchant's Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spelman's Plantation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swinhow's Plantation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanks Weyanoke Plantation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plantations ordered defended after March 22, 1621/22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamestown and Suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kecoughtan/Elizabeth City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southampton Hundred (abandoned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flowerdieu Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West and Shirley Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan's Journey</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations damaged/crippled in 1622 but active by 1625</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College Land (tenants on land; project dead)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles City and environs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piersey's Plantation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archer's Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamor's Plantation/Hogg Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulberry Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warraskoyack/Bennett's Welcome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations unaffected on March 22, 1621/22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jamestown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Shore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

English contemporary wrote of the attack: "I doe not ... recon them as cowards. ... Neither did this their enterprise or execution, either want politie or corage."\textsuperscript{155}

For the present, in the wake of unburied bodies and smoldering ruins, Mangopeesomon had everything his way. Few, if any, of his warriors had fallen in the uprising, and great must have been the exhilaration, pride, and sense of accomplishment generated around Powhatan campfires on the night of March 22, 1621/22. If not the final stroke, then at least the devastating first stroke, had been delivered in a bloody revolutionary war of cultures. After only the first day of what was to be a ten-year struggle with the English, the Powhatans had regained a crucial, long-dormant element of their warrior culture—the capacity to project gripping terror into the consciousness of their enemies.

For the English, the events of March 22 created a "labyrinth of melancholy."\textsuperscript{156} All over the colony, Englishmen were shocked and stunned by the intensity and destructiveness of the attack. Governor Wyatt despaired at how the Powhatans, "under the Coulor of unsuspected amytie, ... [attempted] to have cutt us of[f] ... and to have Swept us away at once through owte the whole land."\textsuperscript{157}


\textsuperscript{156}Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 151.

\textsuperscript{157}Governor and council in Virginia to Virginia Company, after Apr. 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 612.
However, an even greater amount of despair and a considerable amount of fear was reserved for thoughts about the uncertain future of English Virginia. The uprising "was alarming not so much for the destruction wrought, . . . but for the fact that the [Powhatan] Confederacy could now operate as a unified fighting organization." Mangopeesomon had achieved "a solidarity which Powhatan either had been unable or was disinclined to achieve." 158

For most colonists, fearful of the future, it must have truly seemed that Virginia was like a "Childe . . . exposed as in the Wilderness to extreame daunger[,] . . . fayntinge and labouringe for life." 159 Feelings of regret, sorrow, fear, hatred, and utter despair, brought on by events of March 22 but destined to intensify, were expressed in poetic but pathetic ways. The scholarly colonial administrator, George Sandys, spoke of his fellow survivors as "we, whom the hand of heaven hath humbled," and he professed the inability of mortals to provide solace. 160 Planter William Capps, a burgess in 1619, believed that "the last massacre killed all our Countrie, besides them . . .


159 Virginia Company petition to House of Commons, Apr. 21, 1624, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 258.

160 Sandys to John Ferrar, Jamestown, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., IV, 22.
[the Powhatans] killed, they burst the heart of all the rest.\textsuperscript{161} Governor Wyatt, too, with great emotion described how terrible it had been to "witness those vexed Soules and troubled Spirites of ours, when in this last outrage of these Infidelles we were forced to stand and gaze at our distressed brethren, fryinge in the furie of our enimies, and could not relieve them."\textsuperscript{162}

The English survivors, the inarticulate and articulate alike, shared a common tragedy on March 22, 1621/22. On that one day, feelings of fear and hatred were aroused that would last a lifetime.

\begin{flushright}

\textsuperscript{162}Gov. Wyatt, commission to Sir George Yeardley, June 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 656.
\end{flushright}
I will make mine arrowes dronke with blood, (and my sworde shal eat flesh) for the blood of the slaine, and of the captives, when I beginne to take vengeance of the enemie.

Deuteronomy 32:42, Geneva Bible (1560)

CHAPTER VI

SCORCH THE EARTH AND SCOURGE THE ENEMY:

THE SECOND ANGLO-POWHATAN WAR, 1622-1632

Part I: The English Revenge Literature

Governor Wyatt and his decimated Council of State composed the first official announcement of the Powhatan Uprising in late April 1622. Prior to this, Wyatt had not communicated with the Virginia Company since January 1621/22, and now he had grim news, indeed:

It hath pleased God for our manyfo[ld] sinns to laye a most lamentable Afflictione uppon his Plantacon, by the treacherie of the Indyans, who one the 22th of march laste, attempted . . . to have Swept us away at once throughowe the whole land, had it nott plesed god of his abundant mercy to prevent them in many places. . . .

It had taken a full month for Wyatt and his council to write a brief statement on a monumental disaster, and it took almost another month to dispatch the letter to England. The Seaflower, "the ship that brought...this unwelcome news," left Jamestown only after Sunday, May 12 (O.S.), and did not arrive in England until early July. On July 3, Sir Edward Sackville, of the Virginia Company, informed James I and his Privy Council of the dire events in the colony. However, London-at-large was not generally aware of Virginia's tragedy until mid-July, when the news began to circulate through the gossip-filled correspondence of men like John Chamberlain and the Rev. Dr. Joseph Mead (Mede), the great Cambridge classicist and theologian.

The earliest non-official reference to the Powhatan Uprising appeared in a letter dated Friday, July 12, from Thomas Locke to Dr. Mead. In the midst of reporting on four newly created earls, Locke wrote: "I had almost forgott, that all our people in Virginia in all places should on

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2 Edward Waterhouse, Declaration of the State of the Colony and...a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre (London, 1622), 19; Alexander Brown, The First Republic in America (Boston, 1898), 481; Richard Beale Davis, George Sandys, Poet-Adventurer (London and New York, 1955), 127. The Seaflower had only arrived in Virginia in Feb. 1621/22, carrying 120 colonists. Brown, First Republic, 463, 467. In this chapter, especially, it is important to remind the reader that all dates are old style. Brown, and some other secondary sources, made conversions to new style dating, but I have tried to eliminate all discrepancies.

3 Virginia Company court, July 17, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 96. The "former Court" referred to in these minutes was held on July 3. Philip L. Barbour, The Three Worlds of Captain John Smith (Boston, 1964), 352, 479, n.1.
March 22 at 8 in the morning, under pretence of freindship have bin murthered by the Natives; and had bin, had not an Indian boy the night before discovered it to his Master."4 Locke's information was probably already known to Mead, for the very next day, July 13, he dispatched a letter from Cambridge to Sir Martin Stuteville, a kinsman from Suffolk. Mead summarized the week's "ill newes come from Virginia (which every man reports that comes from London)."5 "About 300 some say 329 of our colonie," wrote Mead, "[were] there massacred by the Indians at the instigation ... of their wicked God Ochee; and had all perished in like manner, had not our God, who is the Best God, had more care of them, then they had of themselves."6

On the same day that Mead wrote, Chamberlain sent a letter from London to his friend, Sir Dudley Carleton, the English ambassador at The Hague. Chamberlain angrily blamed the uprising on the colonists' "supine negligence that lived as careles and securely there as if they had ben in England." For Chamberlain, an intensely patriotic and interested chronicler of Britain's imperialist ventures,


5(Harleian MS. 389f, 216v), in "Correspondence of Mead," ed. Johnson, VMHB, LXXI (1963), 408.

6Ibid., my italics.
"the disgrace and shame [was] . . . as much as the losse, for no other nation wold have be[n] so grossely overtaken." 7

The reactions of Mead and Chamberlain to the uprising represented the secular and religious components of England's ethnocentric, imperialist ideology in 1622. Chamberlain, the London-based man of affairs, was dismayed by the "shame" of Mangopeesomons's victory, and he abhorred the blemish done to the reputation of the realm. Mead, on the other hand, expressed his outrage in religious terms, seeing in the Powhatan rebellion the makings of a holy war, pagans versus Christians. Both perspectives—the patriotism and the religious idealism—had long nurtured and buttressed English colonization ideology. What Mead and Chamberlain expressed so well in their private correspondence were the sincere and serious concerns of Jacobean Englishmen facing unfathomable threats to their cultural integrity and national identity.

The astonishment and dismay of Mead and Chamberlain in July 1622 symbolized what some scholars have called

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"Jacobean melancholy," which reached dramatic proportions between 1622 and 1625. Doubt, disillusionment, and a preoccupation with death infected the realm in the last three years of James I's reign, as a series of shock waves produced by sudden and startling "Pearl Harbors" racked England. The crises escalated in the immediate post-uprising years, and the Indian attack in Virginia became just one more foreboding event to play on the old paranoia and prejudices of Englishmen.

Contemporary attitudes in the early 1620's were still very Elizabethan. In 1621, the Rev. Robert Jenison wrote a tract entitled, The height of Israells heathenish Idolatry in sacrificing their Children to the devill, and in the same year appeared True Copyes of the insolent, cruell, barbarous, and Blasphemous letter, written by the Great Turke. Considering this intellectual climate, it is not surprising that the Rev. John Donne, Dean of St. Paul's, in November 1622 referred to the Powhatan Uprising as "a flood, a flood of blood" that signalled a time for

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reflection and renewed determination on the part of harried Englishmen.  

An event similar to the uprising in its shock value was the 1623 "Massacre" at Amboyna in the Moluccas. In that incident, the Dutch East India Company tortured and murdered ten English factors "in a criminal bid for commercial supremacy." The True Relation of the Unjust, Cruel, and Barbarous Proceedings Against the English at Amboyna in the East-Indies (London, 1624) contained explicit woodcuts of gory tortures, and many outraged Englishmen demanded just revenge. Chamberlain wrote of the "tyranny and injustice of the Hollanders," and he wanted to capture "the first Indian ship that comes in our way, and [to] hang up upon Dover Cliffs as many as we should find faulty, . . . and thus dispute the matter afterwards." Whether the offenders were Powhatans or


12 See Arber, comp., Registers of Stationers, IV, 87.


14 Chamberlain to Carleton, July 24, ibid., 465.
Dutchmen, Chamberlain believed that "there . . . [was] no other course to be held with such manner of men, as neither regard law, nor justice, nor any other respect of equity or humanity."\(^{15}\)

The Powhatan Uprising in 1622, the Amboyna outrage in 1623, and the ignominious failure of Count Ernest of Mansfield's expedition to liberate the Palatinate in 1624\(^{16}\) all served to tarnish England's reputation and to raise the specter of imperial decline. "The time hath been," wrote Chamberlain,

when so many English [as the 12,000 men with Mansfield] . . . would have . . . made the world talk of them. But I know not how, we that have been esteemed in that kind more than other nations, do begin to grow by degrees less then the least, when the basest of people in matter of courage dare brave and trample upon us. I have known the time, when they durst not have offered the least of those indignities we have lately swallowed and endured.\(^{17}\)

Thus, news of the Powhatan Uprising reached England when fear and despair were rampant among the literate population. Negotiations were continuing for the Spanish "match"--the proposed marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, and Maria, the Infanta--and rumor had it that the king of Spain was making unreasonable demands: James I

\(^{15}\)Ibid.

\(^{16}\)James I's misconceived plan to oust Spain's allies from his son-in-law's territories "ended in utter disaster." The English lost some 8,000 men to disease while preparing for the invasion of the Palatinate. Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant, 391; also, 387-388, 390.

and Charles would have to convert to Catholicism, and, worse still, England would have to "surrender" Virginia and Bermuda to Spain.\textsuperscript{18} To add to the general turmoil came other disturbing reports in the next several months: a "great fleet of Spaniards" was sailing along the English coast; developments in the East Indies brought "dishonor of the king, the decay of trade, and the ruining of many private men"; and the Irish began to "show themselves with much more boldness, and speak more bravely than they should."\textsuperscript{19} War with Spain loomed on the horizon, and it seemed certain that England would be dragged into the European conflict that became the Thirty Years War.\textsuperscript{20}

Simultaneously, England experienced a "catastrophic depression," with riots, bankruptcies, escalating prices, falling wages, and a series of bad harvests between 1621 and 1624.\textsuperscript{21} To compound the other crises, the city of London suffered a murderous plague in Charles I's coronation year that claimed some forty-one thousand


\textsuperscript{19}Chamberlain to Carleton, Aug. 10, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, 325; Chamberlain to Carleton, Oct. 5, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, 338; Thomas Locke to Carleton, Oct. 12, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, 341.

\textsuperscript{20}Akrigg, \textit{Jacobean Pageant}, chap. 27.

lives, often at the rate of four hundred per week. This plague was considered so serious that a period broadside listed "the heavy time of God's Visitation in 1625" along with the Armada of 1588 and the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 as three notable "Deliverances unto eternal Memory." The broadside thanked God for past mercies but appended a "zealous Prayer to turne from us the fourth Judgement, that is likely to fall upon us by the Sword."23

In the early 1620's, the chaotic state of religion was perhaps the most serious crisis of all. As James courted Spain, Jesuits and other priests were released from London jails, and good Anglican ministers were punished for being too zealous in their anti-Catholicism.24 Papists were free to say Mass and to ignore the oaths of allegiance and supremacy even while Anglican preachers in lower orders were forbidden to "meddle with any matter of controversy in the pulpit."25 Mead recounted two inci-
dents that illustrated the topsy-turvy state of religion in this period:

I was told yesterday [September 27, 1622] . . . that some Papists . . . on the borders of Lancashire, brought a great bear into the church while the minister was preaching; but a neighbor knight was so bold as to lay them all by the heels for it.

My Lord Peters, a Catholic, is said to be confined to his house . . . for affirming confidently that his majesty and the prince were both Papists: which God forbid! 26

The October 1623 tragedy of the "Fatal Vespers," in which over one hundred English Catholics were killed when a building collapsed during a Mass, demonstrated how hotly religious issues still burned. The disaster at Blackfriars was cited by Protestants as evidence of God's just revenge upon Catholics for the aborted Gunpowder Plot eighteen years before:

The day of this accident is remarkable . . . , because it . . . being their 5th of November [N.S.], according to the Romish calendar, . . . as on our 5th of November, they would have blown up and overwhelmed our whole state, so now, on their 5th of November, some of themselves are overwhelmed in exprobation. 27

In the crises of the early 1620's, as in those of 1588 and 1605, English fears, anxiety, and a foreboding sense of danger were coupled with optimism and a strong reliance on God's favor. The Protestant Englishman's

26 Mead to Stuteville, Sept. 28, 1622, ibid., 335.

27 [?] to Mead, Oct. 29, 1623, ibid., 427; also see, ibid., 428-431, 433.
providential view of history and his fervent ethnocentrism, as indicated by the undiminished vitality of anti-Catholic prejudices, were little changed from the days of John Foxe. The English ideology of election, according to historian Keith Thomas, "taught that England's lucky escapes, from the Armada or the Gunpowder Plot, were direct manifestations of the hand of God."\textsuperscript{28} Virtue and vice, good and evil would be judged and rewarded in due course, and the orthodox and patriotic English "showed little hesitation about recognising God's judgments on their neighbours or in identifying the particular sin which had provoked them."\textsuperscript{29}

Illustrative of this position was the book written in 1624 by the Rev. George Carleton, D.D., Bishop of Chichester. Entitled the \textit{Thankful Remembrance of Gods Mercy}, in a historical collection of the great and merciful deliverances of the Church and State of England, Carleton's book detailed the "contentious, seditious, cruel, malicious, [and] unclean adulterers, idolaters, [and] murtherers"—all of them Catholics—who had threatened reformed religion and the "perfect" commonwealth from 1558

\textsuperscript{28}Thomas, \textit{Decline of Magic}, 91-92.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, 92-93.
The bishop's thesis was that "more conspicuous . . ., more illustrative examples of God's mercy will hardly be found anywhere: God hath for many years delivered . . . [the English] people of his own, his true Church." 31

The post-uprising revenge literature in England, therefore, must be interpreted in the context of the elect nation's dualistic sense of optimism and paranoia, success and tragedy. The shocking events in Virginia, while not the greatest threat to the homeland-English, nevertheless released intense anger, revealing the overwhelming sense of frustration in Jacobean London. Calls for bloody revenge and holy war against the Powhatans represented an emotional catharsis, and perhaps the crisis in Virginia, compared to others facing Englishmen, seemed the one most easily solved by the most expedient methods.

The Virginia Company directors and investors were the homeland-English most directly affected by the 1622 uprising. Even though their response to the Indian rebellion was colored by self-interest and the unhealthy state of the corporation, the company's reaction was consistent with Elizabethan ideology and ethnocentrism. The Virginia

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30(London, 1624), 259; see also B2v-B3r, B3v, 210. On Bishop Carleton, see Thomas, Decline of Magic, 92.

31Carleton, Thankfull Remembrance of Gods Mercy, 260; also see 1.
Company's first official response to the July announcement of the Powhatan attack came in a harsh, recriminating letter to Governor Wyatt, dated August 1, 1622. The tragedy was seen as the "heavie hand of Allmightie God for the punishment of ours and your transgressions," most notably "excesses of apparell and drinkeing" and "the neglect of the Devine worshipp" in the colony.32 The company also chastised the colonists for not heeding the threat inherent in Nemattanew's death ("surprized by treacherie in a time of known danger") and for ignoring earlier indications of Indian revolt ("being deafe to so plaine a warning").33

The London directors were noticeably disheartened, embittered, and impotent in the face of adversity. The sudden Powhatan Uprising left them dumbfounded. As late as June 5, a general court of the Virginia Company had declared that "there was nowe greater hopes then ever of a flourishinge State and Common Wealth in Virginia."34 But scarcely two months later news was that the "Natives

32 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 666.
33 Ibid.
34 Virginia Company quarter court, June 5, 1622, ibid., II, 34.
... doe now insult over" the colonists,\textsuperscript{35} to the "disgrace [of] the Plantation."\textsuperscript{36}

The company directors desperately urged reforms on the colonists--including a revision in settlement patterns and a dedication to Anglican worship--in an effort to save the situation.\textsuperscript{37} However, it was increasingly evident that the company could offer little else but advice. On August 1, the London directors informed Wyatt and his council that they would be unable to supply the colony with food, "the publique stock being utterly ... exhausted [with] ... no hope of raising any valuable Magazine."\textsuperscript{38} As far back as May, old debts had been paid "to the great exhaustinge of the common Treasurie," and current expenses had placed the company some £1400 in the red.\textsuperscript{39}

The Powhatans were condemned in company correspondence and in company-sponsored publications in general because of their "treason" against England and specifically

\begin{footnotes}

\textsuperscript{35}[Alderman Johnson], "An Answere to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, \textit{ibid.}, IV, 151.

\textsuperscript{36}"An Answere to a Petition delivered to his Majestie by Alderman Johnson," company court, May 7, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, II, 395.

\textsuperscript{37}Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, III, 669.

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Ibid.}, 668.

\textsuperscript{39}Virginia Company preparative court, May 22, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, II, 13, 19, 24.
\end{footnotes}
because they had ruined programs and goals of the London directors. The vehemency of company-generated revenge literature represented the shock of dashed hopes at precisely the moment when Hakluyt's dreams had seemed so close to fulfillment.

Considering the shame of military defeat at the "handes of men so contemptible" and the bleak prospects for the company's future, the London directors, "with much griefe," prescribed a bloody revenge on the Powhatans, "the saving of whose Soules, we have so zealously affected." However, the company displayed a real ambivalence in its post-uprising policy. In August 1622, the Virginia Company directed the college tenants to continue making bricks, "to the intent that when opportunitie shalbe for the erecting of the . . . Colledge, the materialles be not wanting." But in May 1623 the directors noted that the "convertinge of the Infidells . . . was an attempt impossible[,] they being descended of the cursed race of Cham." On the one hand, the London directors advised the colonists "to roote out from being any longer a people, so

40 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, ibid., 666, 671-672.
41 Ibid., 671.
42 "An Answere to a Petition delivered to his Majestie by Alderman Johnson," company court, May 7, 1623, ibid., II, 397.
cursed a nation, ungrateful full to all benefittes, and uncapable of all goodnesse"—in essence, to wage "a perpetuall warre without peace or truce"—and yet left open the removal of the tribes as an alternative to genocide. 43 "Remembering who we are," wrote the company directors, "we cannot but advise, not only the sparing, but the preservation, of the younger people of both Sexes, whose bodies may, by labor and service become profitable, and their mindes . . . be reduced to civilitie, and afterwardes to Christianitie." 44

If flickering, idealistic hopes lingered for the conversion of Powhatan youngsters, little mercy was to be accorded the Indian adults, perpetrators of the March 22 attack. If not enough Powhatan warriors could be killed in open battle, then the entire tidewater Indian population must be starved into submission. A speedy and total war was deemed necessary by the dire conditions in Virginia and by the English thirst for revenge. Powhatans were to be pursued, hunted down, and surprised in their villages; holy places were to be demolished; houses burned; canoes destroyed; and corn stolen, "deprivin them of whatsoever may yeeld them succor or relief." 45

43 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, ibid., 672.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
More specifically, the company advised the colonists "to provoke theire [the Powhatans'] neighbouring enemies . . . to the fierce pursueing of them" and to reward the Indian allies with beads and copper "uppon the bringeing in of theire heads." A large bounty was placed on Mangopeesomon's head and on those of other principal Indian leaders. In addition, the company authorized the colony's troops to divide the spoils of war and told Virginia's officials to use captured Powhatans as slaves to work on public projects, such as fortifications.

Fast on the heels of the Virginia Company's August 1 letter to Governor Wyatt, the London directors rushed into print the official interpretation of the Powhatan Uprising. This now-famous tract, *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and . . . a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre*, by Edward Waterhouse, a secretary

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46 Ibid.

47 Ibid., 673.

48 Ibid., 672-673. The company had already made plans for obtaining 400 young men from England and Wales to send as tenants and troops. Ibid., 667. And see Chap. VII, below.

49 The full title is: *A Declaration of the State of the Colony and Affaires in Virginia. With a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre in the time of peace and League, treacherously executed by the Native Infidels upon the English, the 22 of March last* (London, 1622). The Declaration was entered for publication on Aug. 21. Arber, *Registers of Stationers*, IV, 40.
to the company,⁵⁰ was a last-ditch attempt to rally public support for the company in its darkest hours. Recognizing that "reputation . . . [was] a principal pillar of all great Actions,"⁵¹ the Virginia Company hoped that the August publication of Waterhouse's account would salvage its programs and actually encourage new investment.

Believing that "ill luck is good for something," Waterhouse explained away the embarrassment of the uprising by arguing that the English were not defeated in honorable combat but "by the perfidious treachery of a false-hearted people."⁵² The discovery of Indian hatred for the English in 1622 was fortuitous, since this "forewarning" could become a "forearming . . . to prevent a greater mischief" later on.⁵³ Arguing that "this Massacre must rather be beneficial to the Plantation then impaire it,"⁵⁴ Waterhouse detailed the reasons for optimism concerning the future of Virginia:

⁵⁰Very little is known of Waterhouse. In the preface to the Relation of the Massacre, he thanked the Virginia Company for making him a member of that body and referred to this tract as "the first fruits of my poore service." Ibid., A3v. In May 1622, one "Waterhouse" was praised by the company for his efforts in collecting past due stock subscriptions. Virginia Company preparative court, May 20, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 14.

⁵¹"Discourse of the Old Company," Apr. (?) 1625, ibid., IV, 530.

⁵²Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, A3v, 26.

⁵³Ibid., A3v.

⁵⁴Ibid., 33. Waterhouse wrote that "the losse of this blood . . . [will] make the body more healthfull." Ibid., 22.
1. The Powhatans have betrayed "innocency," and God will protect and defend the blameless English.55

2. The Indians' treachery has freed the hands of the English, "before . . . tied with gentlenesse and faire usage." The colonists "may now by right of Warre, and law of Nations, invade the Country [i.e., the Powhatan tribal lands], and destroy them who sought to destroy us."56

3. Conquest of the Powhatans "by force, by surprize, by famine" will be easier and surer of success than had been attempts to "civilize" them "by faire meanes."57

4. The defeat of the Indians will offer a better choice of more fertile and cleared land for planting, and thus rapidly increase the productivity of the colony.58

5. The Powhatans, "who before were used as friends, may now [as spoils of war,] most justly be compelled to servitude and drudgery."59

55Ibid., 22.
56Ibid., 22-23.
57Ibid., 24. Waterhouse suggested the use of "blood-Hounds to draw after them, and Mastives to seaze them." Ibid. Historians have often misread this as "Mastives to teare them," because they ignored the list of errata. Ibid., A4v.
58Ibid., 33.
59Ibid., 25.
6. And, finally, the colony (and indirectly the company) could expect aid and encouragement from the king and from concerned citizens throughout England. "We have this benefit more to our comfort," noted Waterhouse, "because all good men doe now take much care of us then before." 60

The Virginia Company was not insincere in the optimism expressed through Waterhouse's Relation of the Massacre, but the positive outlook was zealously over-emphasized in a bid to attract new financial support and to assure continued confidence in the colony. In October 1622, the company went so far as to claim that "this Massacre will prove much to the speedie advancement of the Colony." The "sheeding of this blood wilbe the Seed of the Plantation, for the addition of price, hath much endeared the purchase." 61 Many, however, criticized the company for trying too hard to find the silver lining in the bleakness of the 1622 tragedy. As the company's enemies were quick to point out, in derision, the "Massacre . . . was the

60 Ibid., 26. The company had already received assurance that the king would supply them with arms from the Tower of London (July 1622) and would help recruit men for service in Virginia. Also, the city of London made a commitment to send 100 people to the colony. Ibid., 27.

fayrest excuse for all [past] errors." The "Massacre saves all" was a telling denunciation of the Sandys administra-
tion that disarmed Waterhouse's projections as the futile hopes of a sinking organization.62

The more enduring significance of the Relation of the Massacre lay not in its propagandistic declarations, or in the recital of Virginia's rich endowments and vast potential as lures to renewed commitment. Rather, its significance lay in the plans for a calculated revenge on the Powhatans and in the vehement hate-language Waterhouse used to describe the Indians. An intellectual barrier had been crossed, and a unanimity of harsh English opinions condemned the Powhatans to extirpation. For Waterhouse and his readers, Virginia "was not so good, as the Natives are bad, whose barbarous Savagenesse needs more cultivation then the ground it selfe."63 The Indians, as described, were more cruel than "Lyons and Dragons," for even wild animals knew better than to devour their human "Benefactors." "But these miscreants . . . put not off onely all humanity, but put on a worse and more than unnaturall brutishnesse."64

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62 [Alderman Johnson], "An Answer to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, ibid., IV, 141, 142.

63 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 11.

64 Ibid., 15.
After March 1621/22, not only were the Powhatans regarded as "rude, barbarous and naked people," but as "tanned, deformed Savages." Paraphrasing the Spanish historian, Oviedo, Waterhouse judged Indians "the most lying and inconstant [people] in the world, sottish and sodaine . . ., leese capable then children of sise or seven yeares old," and only ingenious when it came to treachery and murder.65 Never again would well-intentioned Englishmen be so complacent and naive in their relations with Indians. "Trust is the mother of Deceipt," wrote Waterhouse,

and . . . Hee that trusts not is not deceived:
. . . kindnesses are misspent upon rude natures, so long as they continue rude . . . Thus upon this Anvile shall wee now beate out to our selves an armour of proofe, which shall for ever after defend us from barbarous Incursions.66

Waterhouse's Relation of the Massacre, as the first published account of the uprising, succeeded in publicizing the tragedy and in hardening public opinion against the Powhatans. Dr. Mead, although he knew the bare facts of the uprising before Waterhouse's account appeared, never-

65 Ibid., 30-31.

66 Ibid., 26. Cf. Spanish reaction (Villagrá, Historia de la Nueva Mexico [1610] to the Acoma Indian Uprising under Zutacapán: "Without prerogative or right or any sort of wealth . . . this mad barbarian . . . seeks like Lucifer, to rebel and assume to himself the government of all." Quoted in Evelyn Page, American Genesis: Pre-Colonial Writing in the North (Boston, 1974), 63.
theless thought it important to mention to Stuteville that "there is a Declaration, by the counsell of Virginia . . . of the late massacre, which was most barbarous, and in the very midst of kindnes on our part." As the prime promoter of English revenge against the Indians, Waterhouse called upon "every good Patriot . . . [to] consider how deeply the prosecution of this noble Enterprise concerneth the honor of his Majestie and the whole Nation, the propagation of Christian Religion, [and] the enlargement, strength, and safety of his Majesties Dominions." He exhorted his countrymen to turn plowshares into "victorious Swords" for vanquishing the "heathen" in Virginia.

Thanks to the Relation of the Massacre, the homeland-English took an interest in the colonists' progress against the hated enemy in the months ahead. Revenge for national honor in the forests of Virginia continued to be a news-worthy item for correspondents. As an unidentified Londoner wrote in February 1622/23: "Yesterday came good newes from Virginia, that the Colonie . . . hath driven Opochankanogh farre of[f], [and] slaine many of his men (in


68Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 34.

69Ibid., 23.
revenge of his last yeares treacherous murdering of 340 of ours)."70 Thus, in its cathartic impact, Waterhouse's account succeeded in making revenge a legitimate and lasting concern. As Sir Francis Bacon wrote in 1625, the "most tolerable sort of revenge is for those wrongs which there is no law to remedy . . . Public revenges are for the most part fortunate."71

As effective as Waterhouse proved for mobilizing English opinion, his account was only the tip of the rhetorical iceberg in the aftermath of the Powhatan Uprising. Equally as impassioned anti-Indian hate literature soon proliferated in London. Most of these accounts based their arguments on religious issues, which gave them the greatest credibility and the widest possible popular appeal. In some or all respects, the post-Waterhouse accounts interpreted the uprising as symbolic of God's temporary wrath, but long-term love, for his chosen flock; viewed the uprising in the context of England's Christian mission; and mobilized sentiment for a "holy war"--the ultimate solution to the "Indian problem." These often elaborate and tortured arguments, when taken together,

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represented England's ideology of Christian imperialism at its most developed and ethnocentric stage.

God's wrath was understood as the first cause of Virginia's tragedy; it was His "heavie hand" that levied punishment for excesses and transgressions. For Jacobean Englishmen, God was the "Author of all our tragedies, . . . [and He] appointed us all the parts we are to play." The true Christian was expected to accept chastisements and crises resolvedly, "as the tributes of offending." So it was that the Virginia Company, in August 1622, advised the colonists

to make a humble reconciliation . . . with the devine Majestie by future conformities unto his most just and holie lawes: which doinge we doubt not but that you shall be safe from the handes of all your enemies, and them that hate you; from whom if Gods protection be not with you no strength of scitation can save you.73

God had harshly chastised the English out of love for them, because he cared so much for them. As Sir Walter Ralegh paraphrased St. Augustine's message, "the Divine goodnesse is especially therefore angry in this world, that

72Sir Walter Ralegh The History of the World: In Five Books, 2d. ed. (London 1617), B2f. The Jacobean historian saw situations as mutable according to divine whim. "There is no man so assured of his honor, of his riches, health, or life; but that hee may be deprived of either or all, the very next houre or day to come." A man could be "Grand Signior of the Turks" in the morning and the "Footstoole of Tamerlane" by evening. Ibid., B4v, B5v. Such were great men often brought to ruin, as Ralegh knew first-hand.

it may not be angry in the world to come, and doth mercifully use temporable severity, that it may not justly bring upon us eternal vengeance." The situation in 1622 was often compared to God's dealings with His other chosen flock, the Israelites. Heathens, whether the Powhatans or the ancient Canaanites, were God's instruments to "correct and scourge" the elect when they went astray:

... God hath ever bin
A righteous punisher of sinne, with sinne.

So long as Israel bow'd not unto Baal,
Canaan was free to them, and they not thrall
God threw the Heathen out, nor did they want
Means to increase their store, nor room to plant,
But when they [the Jews] once began t'Idolatrize,
And in excess to glut, and wantonize,

Mercy was gon, and Justice came in place:
Those [the Canaanites] got of them againe, whom late they chased,
Possest their Seats, their Mansions all defaced.

Similarly, "God in his secrett judgement" permitted the Powhatans to use "many powerfull and most wicked meanes, to bring ... [Virginia] downe."

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74 Ralegh History, 278.
75 Ibid.
76 [Christopher Brooke], A Poem on the Late Massacre in Virginia (London, 1622), BlV.
But the significant fact was that the chastised elect had the sanction of holy writ to retaliate against the heathen instruments of God's judgments. The chosen people were expected to turn around and "destroy the rejected Ethnikes" of Canaan,\(^78\) for God allowed vengeance for the blood of His people, even though that blood had been "shed for their sinnes, or trial of their faith."\(^79\) This reasoning was expressed in a broadside ballad written in Virginia in 1623:

No English heart, but heard with griefe, the massacre here done: And how by savage trecheries, fell many a mothers sonne: But God that gave them power and leave, their cruelties to use, Hath given them up into our hands, who English did abuse.\(^80\)

Because God would always support Christians against pagans, it is important to note the rhetorical emphasis of the post-uprising revenge literature. It was the "inocent blood of so many Christians," wrote the Virginia Company, that "doth in justice cry out for reveng."\(^81\)

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\(^79\)Deuteronomy 32:43, marginal commentary, Geneva Bible (1560), 95.

\(^80\)"Good Newes from Virginia" ("Sent from James his Towne this present Moneth of March, 1623 by a Gentleman in that Country"), broadside ballad (London, 1623), in William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., V (1948), 353 (11. 1-8).

\(^81\)Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 671-672; my italics.
Brooke, company member, attorney, and poet, the Powhatans had not killed mere Englishmen; they had slain Christian Englishmen. Because in 1622, the Indians were "quaffing the life-blood of deare Christian Soules" even as he wrote, Brooke called on his countrymen to

Inflame thy heart, take spleene, the cause is given,
All men of knowledge, and auspicious Heaven,
Now prompt thee to revenge the blood late shed,
An expiable warre unto the dead.82

It was the idea of pagans triumphing over Christians—and the ideological heresy that represented—which produced the outpouring of hatred and calls for revenge. It mattered little how many Christians had been slain in Virginia.83 As proof of this, the homeland—English expressed as much or more horror and anger over the death of one man—George Thorpe—than they did over the other three hundred or so dead Englishmen put together.

There was no better symbol for illustrating the Powhatans' cruelty or for generating English reprisals than


83Waterhouse's Relation of the Massacre listed the names of all those killed in the Mar. 22 attack not for sensationalism, but "to the end that their lawfull heyres may take speedy order for the inheriting of their lands and estates there." Ibid., 35. Bereaved relatives in England were neither slow nor shy in claiming Virginia lands. See Virginia Company extraordinary court, Oct. 7, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 105-107.
the so-called martyrdom of Thorpe. He was a perfect late-Jacobean martyr in the Foxe tradition. A conscientious Protestant and a tireless laborer for Indian conversion, Thorpe was the "kind" Englishman who was killed by the very pagans he had tried to "civilize." Thorpe's work among the Powhatans, the manner of his death, and the mutilation of his corpse were seized upon and converted into volatile issues in the aftermath of the uprising. Waterhouse, again, was the first to address the situation. He described Thorpe as a "worthy religious Gentleman" who did "earnestly affect their [the Powhatans'] conversion, and was so tender over them." Although killed by the "Viperous brood" of Indians he had befriended, Thorpe "hath gayned a Crowne of endlisse blisse, and is assuredly become a glorious Martyr." At the same time, "the sinnes of these wicked Infidels" made them "unworthy of enjoying . . . the eternall good that he most zealously alwayes intended to them."84

Adopting the martyr theme, Brooke's 1622 Poem on the Late Massacre in Virginia eulogized Thorpe, who was a close personal friend of the poet-attorney.85 The news of Thorpe's violent death left Brooke "tearelesse as Tonguesse," and he published an idealized portrait:

84 WATERHOUSE, RELATION OF THE MASSACRE, 16-17.

85 Another of Thorpe's friends was Chamberlain, who noted that fact in a letter to Carleton, July 13, 1622. McClure, ed., LETTERS OF CHAMBERLAIN, II, 446; Birch, comp., COURT AND TIMES OF JAMES I, ed. Williams, II, 322.
Brave Thorpe, thou true deserver of thy Style,
Whose minde with things exorbitant, or vile
Had no affinity: . . .

Thou that wert used to negotiate
In matters of Religion, as of State;
Who did attempt to make those Indians know
Th’Eternall God; their sinewie necks to bow
To his obedience; . . .

They could not loose the hold the Divell hath,
Or bring them to the knowledge of our Faith
Yet noble Thorpe, be thy attempt renown’d,
Thy vertue memorized, thy valor crown’d;

Heroicke Thorpe sleepe in thy Urne,
Whilst making Hearts in Incense burne
Of Love to thee, and to thy Fame,
Thy Valor, Vertue, and thy Name.86

Even three years after Thorpe’s death, the Rev. Samuel
Purchas considered him a noble "Abel" who had been "Kain-deceived" by the Indian "Beasts."87

Thorpe’s death had a great impact on contemporary
Englishmen. Much like the Powhatan leader, Nemattanew,
Thorpe’s influence from the grave was more significant than
his deeds in life. Because he had friends in high places,
because he symbolized the mission of colonization, and
because, in death, he seemed most like a martyr, Thorpe
captured the imagination of literate Englishmen. Those
individuals who believed most in Thorpe’s idealistic
mission and who were touched most deeply by his death were

86[Brooke], Poem on the Massacre, B4F–V.
87Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes,
20 vols., XIX (Glasgow, 1905-1907 [orig. publ. 4 vols.,
London, 1625]), 159.
the very ones whose hatred for the Powhatans knew no bounds after 1622.

Coinciding with Brooke's personal sorrow and anger over Thorpe's passing was his anti-Indian rhetoric of revenge, almost without parallel in its vehemence. Brooke referred to the Powhatans as "Creatures . . . (I cannot call them men)"; "Hell-hounds in their ugly formes"; "a Heard of Beasts"; "Wolves, Tygars, Tyrants"; and "off-spring of Hells damned brood." The Virginia Indians, wrote Brooke, were

\[\ldots\text{Soules drown}'d in flesh and blood;}
\[\text{Rooted in Evill, and oppos'd in Good;}
\[\text{Errors of Nature, of inhumane Birth;}
\[\text{The very dregs, garbage, and spawne of Earth;}
\[\text{Who ne're (I think) were mention'd with those creatures}
\[\text{Adam gave names to in their severall natures}
\[\text{But such as comming of a later Brood,}
\[\text{(Not sav'd in th'Arke) but since the generall Flood}
\[\text{Sprung up like vermine of an earthly slime.}
\[\ldots\text{Father'd by Sathan, and the sonnes of hell, . . .}\]

Recognizing the irreconcilable cultural differences between the Powhatans and the English ("they worship Devils; we, the Dietie"), Brooke concluded that the Indians must be slaughtered, "leaving not a Creature/That may restore such shame of Men, and Nature."90

[Englishmen] take heart, and fill your veynes; the next that bleed Shall be those Fiends: and for each drop of ours, I strongly hope we shall shed theirs in showers.91

88 [Brooke], Poem on the Massacre, A4r-v, B3r. Clr.
89 Ibid., Clr.
90 Ibid., Clr, C4r.
91 Ibid., C4r.
Although Mangopeesomon and the Powhatans would not have committed cultural suicide by allowing Thorpe to succeed in his mission of acculturation, by killing this particular Englishman considered so altruistic and noble by his London contemporaries they unknowingly opened the way for genocide. A mere two months after news of the uprising reached England, Waterhouse, Brooke, and others were discussing how the Indians would be "corrected by . . . [God's] justice." For refusing to accept the Christian God in life, the Indians would be dispatched to face Him in death.92

In the writings of Mead, the unregenerate paganism of the Powhatans and the uprising they perpetrated represented satanic forces that had to be overcome in holy war. Mead alleged that many Powhatans regretted the 1622 attack, but that "their God will not lett them alone . . . [and] terrifies them and incites them against their wills to this wrong."93 He thus blamed the uprising on the work of the Powhatan deity, Okee, and described him as "something of kind to him that manages the massacres now in France, and other parts of Christendome." However, Mead was quick to

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92Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 12, 17. After the Anglo-Powhatan War was underway, it was noted that "the indignation of God is now at last appeased." Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 646.

add, in terms reminiscent of John Aylmer and Elizabethan rhetoric, that "our God, the God of Gods, [will] confound them quickly."\textsuperscript{94}

As a millenialist and an optimist, Mead viewed the "weapons of the Protestant cause" not as the patient endurance of "severe persecutions" but as "aggressive, overt action against the powers of evil."\textsuperscript{95} Given Mead's confidence that Protestantism would eventually triumph over world-wide paganism and the powers of the Antichrist, the Powhatans may not have seemed much of a threat to him.\textsuperscript{96} However, even if the 1622 uprising represented only a temporary setback to Englishmen, every enemy who possessed a different culture and an offending religion posed a danger that had to be eliminated.

The most cogent and coherent theorist of such views was Purchas, successor to Hakluyt as the leading

\textsuperscript{94}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{95}Ernest Lee Tuveson, Millenium and Utopia: A Study in the Background of the Idea of Progress, paperback ed. (New York, 1964), 77; also see 76-81, 85.

\textsuperscript{96}Mead believed that Protestants would triumph in 7 stages, none of which included the overthrow of native "heathens" in the New World:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Albigensian/Waldensian risings</td>
<td>4. [Thirty Years War], 1618-1648</td>
<td>7. Final judgment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Luther's revolt</td>
<td>5. Destruction of Rome, &quot;Throne of the Beast&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Elizabeth I's anti-Catholic laws</td>
<td>6. Destruction of the Turks and conversions of Jews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, 77-78.
ideologue of English colonization. In his 1625 treatise "Virginias Verger," Purchas produced elaborate arguments for dispossessing and destroying the Powhatans, because they represented "Satans tyranny in foolish pieties, mad impieties, wicked idlenesse, busie and bloudy wickednesse." The Powhatans were doubly damned by Purchas, who indicted them for the murder of Raleigh's "Lost Colony," as well as for the slaughter of Jamestown's colonists. Because Virginia's tidewater tribes were guilty of "disloyal treason" by having violated their pledges of fealty and peace and by having betrayed the trust and "goodwill" of the English, Purchas called for their destruction. The "Temperance and Justice" that had once characterized the "cohabitation of English and Indians in Virginia" ended when the Powhatans attacked in 1622. Considering the uprising, "temperance could not temper her selfe, yea the stupid Earth . . . cries out that shee is ready to spue out


98 "Virginias Verger: Or a Discourse shewing the benefits which may grow to this Kindgome from American English Plantations, and specially those of Virginia and Summer Ilands," Pilgrimes, XIX, 218-267.

99 Ibid., 246.

100 Ibid., 228-229.
her Inhabitants: Justice cryeth to God for vengeance, and in his name adjureth Prudence and Fortitude to the execution."\(\text{101}\) To Purchas, there was little doubt that God would bless the "just vengeance of rooting out the authors and actors of so prodigious injustice" and provide Englishmen with a "totall subjection at le[a]st, if not a fatall revenge."\(\text{102}\) "Extirpation of the more dangerous" Powhatans, with slavery ("servilenesse and serviceableness") prescribed for the rest, was Purchas's "solution" to Virginia's "Indian problem."\(\text{103}\)

Purchas made the only attempt to justify thoroughly the English post-uprising policy of revenge, and his moralistic treatise of 1625 reiterated the Elizabethan rationale for colonization.\(\text{104}\) As long as Purchas wrote, Hakluyt's ideas remained alive.

Purchas argued that the English had a "natural right," as defined by scripture, to replenish the whole

\(\text{101}\)Ibid., 229.
\(\text{102}\)Ibid., 225, 230, 231.
\(\text{103}\)Ibid., 246.
\(\text{104}\)Purchas went to great lengths to present multiple reasons why colonization in Virginia was "honorable:"

1. For religion (to seek the kingdom of God first)
2. For "Humanitie" (to be a "good Samaritan" to unbelievers)
3. For honor of the English nation
4. For honor of the king
5. For honor of the realm
6. For profit
7. For necessity to relieve population pressures
8. For the development of commodities and raw materials.

Ibid., 237-260, passim.
earth and to settle the uninhabited portions, or "vacant places," in the world, most notably in Virginia.\(^{105}\) According to the old Elizabethan theories, the Indians' natural title to their country was abrogated by their misuse of the land. Since the Powhatans were allegedly nomadic and unsettled ("more brutish than the beasts they hunt, more wild and unmanly then that unmanned wild Countrey"), and since they had prohibited the English from using the land to its full potential, dispossession was therefore justified.\(^{106}\) Purchas's distorted perspective, which held that

\(^{105}\) Ibid., 246.

\(^{106}\) Ibid., 222-223, 246. In his great facility in the use of double meanings, Purchas wrote that Virginia was "like a modest Virgin . . . expecting rather ravishment then Marriage from her Native Svages." But "she is worth the wooing and loves of the best husband." Ibid., 242. In denying the English full use of Virginia's land, the Powhatans were like the legendary "Manger-dogges," which would neither eat hay nor allow hungry oxen to have any. Ibid., 223.

Jennings, Invasion of America, 80, wrote that Purchas invented the mythical arguments for the "nonperson-land qualities of savages" by misrepresenting them as nomadic, without rights to the soil. But Jennings overlooked several important antecedents to Purchas's views. However significant was Purchas's impact, he was certainly not the first to "depersonalize" the Powhatans. In addition to Elizabethan theorists, John Bonoeil published a company-sponsored treatise in 1622, in which he wrote:

[The Indian] knows no industry, no Arts, no culture, nor no good use of this blessed Country [Virginia] . . ., but are meere ignorance, sloth, and brutishnesse, and an unprofitable burthen onely of the earth: Such as these (I say) . . . are naturally borne slaves . . . and there is a naturall kind of right in you, that are bred noble, learned, wise, and vertuous, to direct them aright, to governe and to command them.
only the "progressive," Protestant English could profitably and intelligently cultivate the soil, consciously ignored the fact that the colonists had long depended upon Powhatan food supplies for their sustenance and overlooked the colonists' depletion of the soil by the greedy production of an addictive weed.  

The Powhatans' act of rebellion in 1622, of course, was the single most damning charge against them. For, by killing Englishmen, by committing treason—the "worst of sinnes," the sin of Judas—the tidewater tribes incurred the "chastisement of the common Law of Mankind," as well as

in the law of nature and nations, a land never inhabited by any, or utterly derelicted and immemorially abandoned by the former inhabitants, becomes theirs that will possess it. So also is it, if the inhabitants do not in some measure fill the land, so as the land may bring forth her increase for the use of them: for . . . a man does not . . . become lord of a main continent, because he hath two or three cottages in the skirts thereof.


108 Purchas, "Virginias Verger," Pilgrimes, XIX, 257.
the "severitie of the Law of Nations."\textsuperscript{109} The shedding of English blood transformed the Powhatans from mere heathen "Vagabonds" into unregenerate satanic "Murtherers." They were, according to Purchas, "slaves, ... rebells, excommunicates, ... Barbarians, ... and Out-lawes of Humanity."

"If Armes be just," wrote Purchas, "invasion and conquest" would avenge those "unnaturall, inhumane wrongs [done] to a loving and profitable Nation, entertained voluntarily, in time of greatest pretended amity."\textsuperscript{110} It was the Powhatan Uprising, then, which gave England a final, "mortall immortall possession" of Virginia--an inviolable title based upon the graves of "so many murthered English."\textsuperscript{111} As Purchas chauvinistically proclaimed: "This our earth is truly English, and therefore this Land is justly yours O English."\textsuperscript{112}

That Purchas, the champion of Christian imperialism, saw the need to defend and justify revenge and dispossession reveals the degree to which both the gloved hand and mailed fist of colonization ideology had been internalized and

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., 224. Actually, according to Hugo Grotius, \textit{De Jure Belli et Pacis} (1625), honorable conduct in war was imposed upon "civilized" Europeans only. There was not a universal standard for all men or all "nations." Sir George Clark, \textit{The Seventeenth Century}, 2d. ed. (New York, 1947), xiiiin.

\textsuperscript{110}Purchas, "Virginias Verger," \textit{Pilgrimes}, XIX, 224 and passim.

\textsuperscript{111}Ibid., 266.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 228.
accepted by Jacobean Englishmen. Underlying the very elaborateness of Purchas's legalistic treatise was a moral reluctance to destroy the Powhatans and at the same time a compulsive necessity to exact revenge. Purchas's ambivalence may have derived from his realization that Hakluyt's most idealistic dreams were truly dead and that Virginia represented the first, best, and last opportunity to validate the belief that England's culture could and should be transported to the New World.

Purchas's "Virginias Verger" has been called a "seminal rationalization for colonization by conquest." But that statement is in many respects redundant, for successful, large scale colonization was conquest. In the context of England's ideological "gospel" of Christian imperialism, the options had, from the 1580's on, been either religious conquest and the peaceful acculturation of heathen souls or military conquest and the bloody murder of heathen bodies. When Purchas expressed the deeply felt sentiments of a "heart truely English, sincerely Christian," he merely perpetuated the idea that Indian minds, as well as Indian lands, were ripe for colonization/conquest. Because the peaceful, religious conquest-of-souls had failed so miserably in Virginia, the dispossession of Indian lands, and

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113 Jennings, Invasion of America, 78.
the destruction of Indian bodies must logically be the result. To have conquered the Powhatans militarily without first trying to Christianize them would have been very non-Protestant and Iberian of the English. However, to have permitted the Powhatans to murder Christians with impunity would have necessitated the renunciation of entirely too much Biblical, medieval, and Reformation ideology. Pagans must not be allowed to triumph, and tyrants--whether Spanish or Powhatan--had to be rooted out, in 1622 as in 1588.

Purchas's views on just conquest were the logical extension of Hakluyt's earlier views on legitimate colonization. That Purchas, in 1625, could still write--and believe--that the "Glorie of God in his Word and Workes [was] advanced by this Plantation [of Virginia],"\textsuperscript{114} demonstrated the relevance of Elizabethan colonization ideology for the vehement arguments for dispossession and genocide forty years later. "Religion . . . [remained] the bond bothe of Peace and War,"\textsuperscript{115} and in terms of ideas and ideology, the Christian God would always be the "Alpha and Omega . . . of the Virginia Plantation."\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{114}Purchas, "Virginias Verger," \textit{Pilgrimes}, XIX, 230 margin; also see 265-267.

\textsuperscript{115}George Wyatt to Sir Francis Wyatt, [1624], \textit{I}, in J. Frederick Fausz and Jon Kukla, "A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624," \textit{WMO}, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 114.

Part II: The War Against the Indians

The die was cast in 1622, and the cause was given to shed Powhatan blood "in showers." The once-promising "wares of peace" now had to be put aside in favor of the "peace of warres."117 And there was no sizeable or influential body of English opinion, either in Virginia or in England, that opposed brutal retaliatory measures against the Powhatans. In England, the self-interested Virginia Company, the Anglican clergy, and imperialist ideologues were all aligned against the Powhatans, and King James I, for his part, authorized and supported "a just revenge of those treacherous Indians," because of the "losse of so many . . . Subjectes."118

In Virginia, of course, a unanimity of anti-Indian opinion was quickly attained in the aftermath of the uprising.119 There were no defenders of the Powhatans who stepped forth to prevent their slaughter. Dead were idealists and mediators like Thorpe and John Rolfe; gone from the colony were talented, if militant, negotiators like Capt. John Smith; and radicalized were the once well-

117 Ibid., 257.
118 Virginia Company court, July 17, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 96.
intentioned officials like Gov. Francis Wyatt and colony treasurer, George Sandys. The pendulum of mass opinion had swung to the pre-uprising position of plantation barons and Indian haters like the Rev. Jonas Stockton and former governor, Sir George Yeardley. Significantly, Stockton and Yeardley had survived the Powhatan attack; Thorpe and Rolfe had not. After March 1621/22, it was commonly thought that not only Powhatan priests, but all Powhatans, should have their throats cut.

It cannot be conclusively determined whether the colonists were influenced by the English revenge literature in the months immediately following the 1622 attack. The Virginia-English were certainly aware of the anti-Indian sentiment and the calls for revenge in London, although the colonists needed neither justification nor authorization for the retaliation they planned. In the end, the question of influences on the Virginia-English is less important than the manner in which their actions became divorced from the ideas circulating in England.

In September 1622, Governor Wyatt, very Purchas-like, spoke of the "savadge and bloody crueltie of the heathen Natives" and resolved, "cheifly for the glory of God, and love towards our brethren (whose blood, no doubt, crieth to heaven for vengeance), . . . fully to reveng theire cruell deedes." And, "with all humblenes of mind," Wyatt

120 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Sir George Yeardley, Sept. 10, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 678.
acknowledged the "just hand of God" in punishing the colonists' sins. Indeed, many of Wyatt's countrymen in Virginia were truly awed by the chastisement of God, the force of whose judgment they appreciated more than any Londoner could realize.

However, the same colonists who had been chastised for their "greedy desires of present gaine and profit," were ultimately too pragmatic to accept the idea of a holy crusade against the Powhatans. Even with an overwhelming mandate from England to exterminate the Indians, and even with more compelling personal reasons for revenge, the colonists formulated an Indian policy, which, in its expediency and purposeful goals, stopped far short of genocide. The Virginia-English would make war on the tidewater tribes in their own way and for their own reasons. Ultimately, the colonists turned out to be neither the pious crusaders nor the loyal and righteous Englishmen portrayed in the London revenge literature. In the colony, theories and symbols counted for less than actions and results. Revenge was less the product of ideological consistency than it was of prac-

121 Ibid.
122 A Briefe Declaration of the Plantation of Virginia duirng the first Twelve Yeares . . . downe to this present tyme. By the Ancient Planters nowe remaining alive in Virginia," 1623/24, Henry R. McIlwaine, comp., Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59 (Richmond, 1915), 36.
tical concerns. Whereas England embraced Thorpe as a holy martyr, Virginia saw him in a far different light: he was the very man, wrote a colonist, who had "brought such a misery upon us by letting th'Indians have their head."¹²³

The Virginia-English refused to take up "Mahomet's sword" and to "propagate religion by wars, or by sanguinary persecutions to force consciences."¹²⁴ Rather, the colonists chose to kill Powhatans for immediate and expedient reasons—for land, food, and security—but rarely capriciously or for the sake of ideology alone. "In time" and at their own pace, the colonists would "clean drive . . . [the Indians] from these partes," but for no more meaningful reason than to "have the free libertie and range for . . . cattle."¹²⁵

While London buzzed with the shocking news of the uprising in the summer of 1622, the colonists were grappling with serious problems. Governor Wyatt, young, inexperienced, and the colony's top administrator for a mere five months prior to the uprising, was faced with the most severe combination of crises in Virginia's short history. After the

¹²³ William Capps to John Ferrar, Mar. 31, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 76.

¹²⁴ Bacon, "Of Unity in Religion" (1625), Essays of Bacon, Intro. Morley, 9.

¹²⁵ "Declaration of First Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, comp., Journals of Burgesses, 1619, 37.
devastating attack in March, Wyatt was forced to become a skillful and mature leader almost overnight: he had to marshal an unruly, diseased, and dispossessed population into a competent fighting organization; find provisions and lodging for refugees and new immigrants; and deal with critics and self-interested men both in Virginia and in England. Wyatt's development as an effective administrator and military leader between 1622 and 1626 was an important factor in the colony's survival.

The prompt and efficient exercise of authority and planning was crucial to the preservation of the surviving English. Before the Powhatans could "take courage to pursue what they had begunne," the governor first had to "recollect the straglinge and woefull Inhabitants, soe dismembered, into stronger bodies and more secure places." Immediately after the March 22 attack, the colonists were forced by circumstances "to quitt many of . . . [their] Plantacons, and to unite more neerely together in fewer places the better for to Strengthen and Defende." Scores of refugees swarmed into Jamestown and Elizabeth


127 "Declaration of First Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, comp., Journals of Burgesses, 1619, 37.

128 Governor and council to Virginia Company, after Apr. 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 612.
City, the two most defensible locations that had escaped devastation in the uprising. This sudden influx of population soon brought epidemics and depleted food supplies.129

The impromptu flight from outlying plantations was not succeeded by rational planning until late April 1622. At that time, Governor Wyatt ordered Jamestown, Elizabeth City, Newport News, Southampton Hundred, Flowerdieu Hundred, West and Shirley Hundred, and Samuel Jordan's plantation to be held and defended.130 Between April 13 and April 20, Wyatt granted commissions to Capt. Roger Smith and Capt. Ralph Hamor for commanding the regions of Charles City and Henrico and Martin's Hundred and Warraskoyack, respectively.131

129 On shifts in population and settlement, see Chap. VII, below.

130 Governor and council to Virginia Company, after Apr. 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 612; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 150.

131 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Roger Smith, Apr. 13, for Charles City, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 609; for Henrico and Coxendale areas, Apr. 20, ibid., 611; to Ralph Hamor, Apr. 15, for Martin's Hundred, ibid., 610; for Warraskoyack, Apr. 19, ibid., 610. Hamor was given specific instructions to remove all goods and people from the Warraskoyack-"Bennett's Welcome" area and to transport them to Jamestown. Ibid., 610. However, by Oct. 1622, there was pressure from the company to "repossess" the plantation of Edward Bennett, "the largest Adventurer that they [company officials] knowe of." Virginia Company extraordinary court, Oct. 7, 1622, ibid., II, 105.

In 1592, Roger Smith had been a commander of an infantry company in Sir Francis Vere's English regiment in the Low Countries. He had come to Virginia in 1616. Annie Lash Jester and Martha Woodroof Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person: Virginia, 1607-1625, 2d ed. (Princeton, N.J., 1964), 308. Hamor, former company secretary in the colony, was a veteran of the First Anglo-Powhatan War.
Both men were given "absolute power and command in all matters of war over all the people" in these regions, who, "uppon paine of Death" had to obey the commanders "uppon all occasions." These commissions were the beginnings of an embryonic military structure in Virginia that was to become all encompassing in its control over post-uprising affairs.

The vaguely defined, pre-1622 status of commanders at private plantations, where military rank was "more honorific than real," changed in the aftermath of the uprising. Smith and Hamor became the first "borough commanders" with major responsibility for all English inhabitants and property in certain designated areas. Other men, responsible only for individual plantations, became subordinate officers under them. The entire command structure under Wyatt functioned according to the English "militia tradition." Actually, Yeardley probably served as the supreme military commander in the immediate post-uprising period, for, as a veteran of fighting in the Low Countries and the First Anglo-Powhatan

134 Ibid., 292-293, 292n.
135 Ibid., 290 and passim.
War and a colony official of long standing, he exercised considerable influence over the inexperienced governor. According to a Virginia contemporary Bould worthy Sir George Yardly Commander cheife was made Cause foureteene yeares, and more he hath, within this Country staid.\textsuperscript{136}

By 1623, borough commanders had been appointed over all the English settlements. Capt. William Tucker and Capt. Jabez Whitaker were in charge of the Corporation of Elizabeth City and all the plantations on the lower James River, both north and south banks. Capt. William Peirce was made commandant of Jamestown Island and the mid-river plantations, and he also served as commander of Wyatt's thirty-man corps du guard. Capt. Roger Smith remained in control of the Charles City/Henrico area and was later builder of, and commander at, Fort Warraskoyack. Capt. Isaac Maddison was commander of all plantations west of Flowerdieu (later Piersey's) Hundred, and Capt. William Epps was placed in charge of the Eastern Shore.\textsuperscript{137}

Coupled with the problems of refugees, resettlement, and defense was the dire need for provisions. The English

\textsuperscript{136}"Good Newes from Virginia," in WMQ, 3d Ser., V (1948), 353 (11. 17-20). Rutman believed that for a year after the uprising, Wyatt delegated most authority to Yeardley because of his military experience. Wyatt was also ill for much of this period. "Militant New World," 296 and n.

\textsuperscript{137}Rutman, "Militant New World," 294, 294n-295n.
had not been able to plant spring corn in 1622, and the specter of starvation became increasingly real. Wyatt perceived the food shortage as so serious that he commissioned Yeardley and John Pountis, vice-admiral of Virginia, to seek out a suitable location on the Eastern Shore for resettling some three to four hundred colonists there.\footnote{138} Although removal to the Eastern Shore did not occur, this proposed evacuation was seen at the time as the only way to relieve pressures on the scant James River resources.

In granting this commission to Yeardley and Pountis, Wyatt gave instructions for dealing with Indians that soon became standardized.

Because through the late revolt . . . of our Neighbouring Salvages, we are uncertaine of frendshipp with any of these Natives, . . . [I] give you leave, and \textit{absolute power, either to make peace or warr with any of them}, as it shall seeme most hoofull and necessarie for the present estate of this our Common-Wealth, as also \textit{peaceably to trade} for Furs, Corne, or other Comodities, \textit{with} . . . frendes, and \textit{forceably to take such} . . . from \textit{those that dare be our enemies}.\footnote{139}

In the early stages of the war with the Powhatans, Wyatt, due to his inexperience with military command and his

\footnote{138}\textit{Commission from Gov. Wyatt to George Yeardley and John Pountis, June 20, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 656-657.}
\footnote{139}\textit{Ibid.; my italics.}
unfamiliarity with Indian affairs, allowed his subordinates great latitude in deciding policy in the field. They could choose either to fight or to parley, depending upon the particular situation. Given the varying intelligence, experience, and inclination of each individual commander, the governor's trust and confidence was often misplaced.

But Wyatt's carte blanche to his field captains reflected a frantic need to secure provisions from anyone, anywhere, and by any means necessary. Luckily for the colonists, considering their limited manpower, obtaining food and waging war were actually two edges on the same sword. By taking the offensive against the Indians, the English could keep them at bay until the colony's late corn crop was harvested, and in raids of retaliation, Powhatan food supplies could be captured, casualties inflicted, and the tribesmen themselves brought to the brink of starvation. The colonists were to "make warr, kill, spoile, and take by force . . . boote of Corne . . . from any Salvadges our enemies."140 Because the Powhatans were "growne more bold . . . and still will be worse and worse till they be tormented with a continuall pursuit," it was essential for the colonists to launch an offensive as soon as possible.141

Actually the first post-uprising contact with the Indians involved negotiation instead of bloodshed. In June

140 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to George Yeardley, Sept. 23, 1622, ibid., 678-679.

141 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155.
1622, Capt. Isaac Maddison was sent among the Patawomekes to discuss terms for the release of the captured Martin's Hundred women held by the Pamunkeys.\footnote{Ibid., 157.} Mangopeesomon, however, delivered an "insolent Answer" to Governor Wyatt's entreaties and committed some undescribed "dishonor . . . to the Kings Picture."\footnote{Letter of Ralph Hamor, read in Virginia Company court, Oct. 23, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, II, 115; Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 154.}

Later in the summer, as soon as the English could leave their fields, Wyatt finally marshalled his commanders and dispatched raiding parties against the Pamunkeys and their allies.\footnote{On the problem of planning military action around the seasonal demands of tobacco, See Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, IV, 37-38; Edmund S. Morgan, "The First American Boom: Virginia 1618 to 1630," \textit{WMQ}, 3d Ser., XXVII (1971), 181; Governor and council to company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, \textit{VCR}, IV, 451.} Between summer and fall 1622, Sandys, the treasurer-poet, twice raided the Quiyoughcohannocks; Yeardley attacked the Weanocs and later went against the Nansamunds, Warraskoyacks, and the Pamunkeys; Capt. John West invaded the Tanx Powhatans; and Capt. William Powell attacked the Chickahominies.\footnote{Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, IV, 9. Capt. Nathaniel Butler, former governor of Bermuda, joined Powell's forces for the attack on the Chickahominies. It was in this visit to the colony that Butler gained the negative impressions contained in his "Unmasked Face of the Colony of Virginia." Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 159-160. And see Chap. VII, below. (See Map VI.1) A jingo-
MAP VI.1  SECOND ANGLO-POWHATAN WAR:
ENGLISH OFFENSIVES, Summer-Autumn, 1622
istic ballad (sung to the tune, "All Those that be Good Fellows"), written by a colonist at the time, described one of these raids:

Stout Master George Sandys upon a night
   did bravely venture forth
And mong'st the Savage murtherers
   did forme a deede of worth
For finding many by a fire
   to death their lives did pay
Set fire of a town of theirs
   and bravely came away
From James his Towne wel shipt and stord
   with men and victualle store
Up Nan-somond river did they saile
   long ere they came to shore
Who landing slew those enemies
   that massacred our men
Took prisoners corn & burnt their townes
   and came aboard agen. 146

Because the English sailed up rivers in shallops and pinnaces and lumbered ashore fully armored, it was rare that the Indians were surprised "by a fire." The Powhatans had usually already fled their villages and fields, and pitched

battles were infrequent. It was a fluke when Captain Powell captured three Chickahominies he had "met by chance," although his subsequent actions were less unique: he cut off their heads and put their village to the torch.\textsuperscript{147} The colonists were the first to admit that the Powhatans were "nott suddenlie to be destroyde with the sworde by reasone of theire swyftnes of foote, and advantages of the woodes, to which uppon all our assaultes they retyre."\textsuperscript{148}

While not militarily spectacular events, these initial raids of retaliation in the summer and autumn of 1622 brought death, starvation, and fear to the Powhatans. The anonymous balladeer wrote that "Munsaymons King in danger lies/and perill every day,"\textsuperscript{149} and English troops slew "divers" Indians, "burnte theire Townes, [and] destroyde their [fishing] Wears and Corne."\textsuperscript{150} Then, too, these first organized raids established a pattern of combat and operations that were followed in all later fighting.

The Second Anglo-Powhatan War was a seasonal, hit-and-run war of attrition—a "total" war with respect to the indiscriminate suffering inflicted on the noncombatant,

\textsuperscript{147}Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155.

\textsuperscript{148}Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 10.

\textsuperscript{149}"Good Newes from Virginia," in WMO, 3d Ser., V (1948), 352 (11. 45-46).

\textsuperscript{150}Ibid., 9.
"civilian" population. The major English tactic was the "feedfight"—the "fieringe and wastinge" of the enemy's food supply, field crops, and habitations to promote dislocation, confusion, and starvation. The "feedfight" required only a handful of armored soldiers armed with muskets, resembling the mobile, "running army" advocated at various times by English theorists. In annual raids conducted on several fronts—Governor Wyatt called them "harshe visitts"—the English succeeded in their short-term objective: to keep the Powhatans on the defensive by means of "blud and crueltie," teaching them that "kindnesse harmd are armed."

By seasonal use of the "feedfight," the colonists attempted to sever the "Sinnewes" of Mangopeesomon's uprising alliance, simultaneously keeping all the tribes hungry and in search of food. The English would plant


their crops in the spring, raid the Indians in mid- to late summer to destroy their corn, and return in time for harvest. In backup raids just before the onset of winter, large caches of Powhatan corn were stolen for use by the colony. Supporting these operations, and giving mobility to the English forces, were ships, which ravaged Indian canoes and prevented the Pamunkeys and their allies from obtaining food on the neutral Eastern Shore or in the Potomac River basin. Thus, as it developed, the strategy of the colonists was pragmatic and expedient, employing purposeful, if brutal, violence for specific objectives. Rarely did military planning vary or extend beyond the short-term.

That did not mean, however, that the Virginia-English were myopic in their Indian relations. Even while they were warring with most of the tidewater tribes, the colonists saw the efficacy of maintaining other Indians as allies and friendly neutrals. While pursuing the raids upon Mangopeesomon and his confederates, Governor Wyatt established trade contacts with the Patawomekes on

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157 Martin came closest of any colonist to formulating long-term objectives. His purpose was to "frustrate and disable the Indians our enymes ever to subsist of them selves, but force them to have their dependancie upon us, for foode and Clothinge," thus preventing future rebellion. "How Virginia May be Made a Royal Plantation," Dec., 1622, ibid., 709; "Manner to Bringe the Indians into Subjection," ibid., 706-707.
the Potomac River, nonparticipants in the uprising and reliable suppliers of food in years past.  

Capt. Raleigh Crashaw, a former colleague of John Smith and friendly with the Patawomeke werowance, soon after the uprising sailed to the Potomac River in search of food. While he was at the Patawomeke village, Mangopeesomon sent emissaries to the Patawomekes and asked them to join his alliance against the English. The Pamunkey messengers boasted that "before the end of two Moones there should not be an Englishman in all their Countries." However, the Patawomekes refused the "offer" and pledged their protection to Crashaw. In May, Captain Hamor arrived in the Potomac River seeking provisions on a general trading commission and was surprised to find the Englishman, "all men thinking Captaine Croshaw dead." To obtain needed corn that the Patawomekes could not then supply, Hamor joined with the tribesmen in a raid against the Nacotchtanks, "mortall enemies" of the Patawomekes.

158Martin called the Patawomekes actual "enemyes" of the Pamunkeys. "Royal Plantation," ibid., 705. See "A Letter of Sir Samuel Argoll touching his Voyage to Virginia, and Actions there: Written to Master Nicholas Hawes, June 1613," in Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 91-93.

159Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 153.

160Ibid., 154.

161Ibid. Other enemies of the Patawomekes included the "Pazaticans" (Anacostans/Picataways) and the Moyaones. Ibid., 151. Also see commission from Gov. Wyatt, May 7, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 622.
On this raid, some eighteen of the Nacotchtakks were slain, and the English soldiers and the Indian warriors shared a large booty of corn. 162  (See Map VI. 2)

Upon learning of this friendly reception and mutual cooperation, Governor Wyatt on June 17 granted "full power and absolute authority" to Capt. Isaac Maddison to "asist the king of Patomack, against his and our enemies, and to defend them and theire Corne to his utmost power." Maddison was cautioned to behave appropriately "towards the Patomacks our confederates, as also against the other Salvages theires and our enemies." 163  This was a remarkable Anglo-Indian alliance against another Indian tribe--a fact made even more remarkable because it occurred after the 1622 uprising. The colonists were indeed capable of differentiating Indian friends from Indian foes, and their foresighted pragmatism did not at all resemble the hysterical hatred of all Indians that has been assumed.

However, the policy formulated at Jamestown was often contradicted by actions in the field. Captain Maddison, in particular, displayed inordinate amounts of paranoia and stupidity. Arriving at the Patawomeke village,

162 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 154.

163 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Maddison, June 17, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 654-655; my italics. Also see Virginia Company court, Dec. 1620, ibid., I, 434.
MAP VI.2 TRIBES OF THE POTOMAC RIVER BASIN, 1600

Conoys

Anacostans
Piscataways
Moyomps?
Nacotchtanks
Moyaones
Patuxent River

Patawomekes

Potomac River

Powhatan affiliates are underlined; others were enemies.

Site of Washington, D.C. (Anacostia)
Maddison was less confident of the allies' loyalty than either Wyatt or Crashaw. He constructed a strong blockhouse near the main village and kept his troops on alert. Maddison's paranoia was fed by Robert Poole, an untrustworthy English interpreter; the intervention of a renegade Nazatica werowance with a grudge against the Patawomeke werowance; and the threatening possibility that Mangopeesomon might succeed in turning the Patawomekes against the English.\textsuperscript{164} The Nazatica renegade informed Poole that the Patawomeke werowance and the great conjurer of the tribe had laid a plot against Maddison and his men. Upon hearing this, Maddison rashly took the Patawomeke werowance prisoner, along with his son and four other tribesmen, and then he brutally murdered thirty or forty Patawomeke men, women, and children. Maddison took the werowance and three other hostages of Jamestown, where, in October, they were ransomed with Patawomeke corn transported to the capital in Captain Hamor's ship, \textit{Tiger}.\textsuperscript{165}

The contemporary "Good Newes" ballad glorified Maddison's "achievement":

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{164}Smith, \textit{Generall Historie of Virginia}, 156.
\textsuperscript{165}Ibid., 157; commission from Gov. Wyatt to Hamor, Oct. 23, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 696. See also Richard L. Morton, \textit{Colonial Virginia}, 2 vols., I (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1960), 78. In Nov. 1622, Maddison was given a general commission to obtain corn anywhere he could find it, by trade, by force, or by "any other meanes they can devise." Commission from Gov. Wyatt, Nov. 12, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, III, 700.
\end{quote}
And Captaine [Maddison] likewise
with honor did proceed
Who comming tooke not [only] their corne,
but likewise tooke their King:
And unto James his Citty he,
did these rich trophies bring. 166

However, Smith made a different, far more accurate appraisal. The "contact specialist" of an earlier era angrily denounced Maddison's stupidity in his harsh dealings with friendly Indians, while praising Crashaw's enlightened attitudes. "Neither all the Counsels of Spaine, nor Papists," wrote Smith, "could have devised a better course to bring them all to ruine, then thus to abuse their friends." Such perfidy made Virginia a stage "where nothing but murder and indiscretion contends for victory." 167

Thinking little about the ramifications of Maddison's deeds, the colonists resumed their retaliatory raids after their scanty corn crop was harvested in the fall. Yeardley led an attack against the Nansamunds, but the Indians set fire to their own village and corn rather than see them plundered by the English. 168 On September 10, Yeardley received a commission "to make warr, kill, spoile and take by force" Mangopeesomon's own villages along the Pamunkey River, "with Gods mercifull assistance, fully to revenge

166 "Good Newes from Virginia," in WMQ, 3d Ser., V (1948), 355 (ll. 95-100).
167 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 157.
168 Ibid.
theire cruell deedes." And "so to Opachankenowes house,/ they marched with all speed:/ Great generall of the Savages." However, the Pamunkeys escaped into the woods with much of their corn harvest intact. Frustrated, Yeardley's men destroyed "tempell, Botes, houses, and wers" [weirs] and even pursued the Indians into the woods. Displaying their "spirit," Mangopeesomon's warriors "lay[d] in ambuscado, and as . . . [the colonists] marched, discharged some shot out of English peeces, and hurt some of them." Others "shot with Arrows manfully/ till bullets answered them." A previously unappreciated element of the Anglo-Powhatan War--the Indians' use of muskets--thus made its appearance. In the last English raid before the onset of winter, Captain Tucker attacked the Rappahannocks, "Confederates" of the Pamunkeys in the uprising.


170 "Good Newes from Virginia," in WMQ, 3d Ser., V (1948), 354 (ll. 65-67).

171 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 158; my italics.

172 "Good Newes from Virginia," in WMQ, 3d Ser., V (1948), 354 (ll. 55-56).

After the raiding season had passed, the winter of 1622/23 proved devastating for the English. "Extreame hath beene the mortalities of this yeare," wrote George Sandys, "which I am afraid hath добled the Nomber of those which were massacred. There is few of us that have not knockt this yeare at the gates of death." Sandys estimated that at least five hundred persons died in a "generall sicknes" in the year following the uprising, including nineteen of his own tenants. It was clear to the colonists that "the Lordes hand hath ben more heavie by sicknes and death then by the sword of our Enemyes." Many of the deaths were blamed on a "pestilent fever . . . never knowne before in Virginia," supposedly the result of an epidemic that began aboard the Abigail, which arrived in the colony in December 1622. Others attributed the mortality to the more familiar scurvy and the "bloody

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174 George Sandys to Sir Miles Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 71, 72. See also Edward Hill to Jo. Hill, Apr. 14, 1623, ibid., 234.

175 Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 74; Sandys to "Master Ferrar," Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 25; [Sir Nathaniel Rich], Notes of letters from Virginia, May-June 1623, ibid., 158.

176 Samuel Sharp to [?], Mar. 24, 1622/23, ibid., 233.

177 Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 25. The shipboard epidemic was reputedly caused by a London merchant's supply of "stinking beer." Lady Wyatt, wife of the governor, came over on the Abigail and reported that the ship was so crowded with infected people that "after a while we saw little but throwing folkes over board." To make "amendes" for the intolerable situation, the ship's captain, himself, died. Lady Wyatt to "Sister Sandys," Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 232-233. Also see Richard Norwood to his father, Apr. 8, 1623, ibid., 233.
"fluxe" (typhoid fever), but whatever the cause, disease coupled with Indian warfare, exacted a horrible toll in lives.178

Even seasoned planters died in large numbers, and "many departe[d] the World in their owne dung for want of help in their sickness."179 One witness to Virginia's winter of 1622/1623 noted that new arrivals died especially quickly and that "unregarded and unburied" bodies were to be found lying under hedge rows.180 Objecting to this unfavorable publicity, some colonists insisted that no one died "under hedges [for] theris noe hedge in all Virginia." However, it was admitted, many did fall dead "in the midst of" Jamestown's streets.181 Some "defense."

To view these facts in the perspective of pre-uprising events, death from disease had plagued Virginia from its earliest days, and shockingly high mortality was evident even before the winter of 1622/23. (See Table VI.1) Between 1619 and 1621, alone, some three thousand


179Thomas Nicolls to Sir John Wolstenholme, Apr. 2, 1623, ibid., 231.

180Virginia Company court, Apr. 30, 1623, ibid., II, 382. The charge was made by Capt. Butler, a pro-Smythe critic of Sandys and Southampton. This document contains both Butler's negative findings on the colony and the colonists' rebuttals.

181Ibid.
TABLE VI.1: MORTALITY OF BERKELEY HUNDRED SETTLERS
February 1620/21 to August 1622

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Fate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Tracy, Esq.</td>
<td>died 4/1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mary Tracy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Tracy</td>
<td>ret'd to England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Tracy [Mrs. Nath. Powell]</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arnold Oldisworth</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Robert Pawlett</td>
<td>departed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Kemis, gent.</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Kemis, gent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Longe, gent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Holmeden, gent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Pereby, gent.</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Shepy, gent.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Keene, gent.</td>
<td>ret'd to England 6/1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Came, gent.</td>
<td>ret'd to England 6/1621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frances Grevill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Webbe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabell Gifford [Mrs. Adam Rayner]</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Hale, drummer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Bayley</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Baughe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriell Holland</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Holland</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giles Bradway</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Dutton</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Milton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Finch</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Finch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frances Finch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gibbes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Baker</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howlett, Sr.</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Howlett, Jr.</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Prosser</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Howlett</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Jelfe</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Rowles</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Rowles</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benedict Rowles</td>
<td>killed 3/22/1622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Brodway</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Coopy</td>
<td>died</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Coopy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Coopy [mortality: 52%]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

persons perished in Virginia, the result of overzealous immigration and poor planning both in London and Jamestown.182

The acute problems of disease, food shortages, and inadequate housing were exacerbated by the influx of ill-provisioned and unseasoned immigrants from England. Between the uprising and the end of 1623, over one thousand persons arrived in Virginia, adding to the crowded conditions and the general confusion of the crisis era.183 Letters written in the winter of 1622 reported that "above a third part of the passengers in the last ships are sick since their landing; many having scarce a hole to hide their heads in."184 Governor Wyatt and his council correctly blamed the Virginia Company for being the "Chief

182Master Wroth, Notes from Lists Showing Total Number of Emigrants to Virginia, 1622, ibid., III, 537; Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia (New York, 1975), 101 and passim.

Of 38 people sent to Berkeley Hundred in Sept. 1619, 29 (2 slain in the uprising; 27 "dead") were not living by summer 1622. Of 4 persons who accompanied Thorpe to Virginia in May 1620, all had died by 1622. John Smythe of Nibley Papers, New York Public Library, Bulletin, III (1899), 210, 212.


cause of our scarcytie," because "multitudes of people [were sent] scantie or utterlie unprovided."\(^{185}\)

With food and other necessities in short supply, inflated prices became yet another vexing problem. Live-
stock, tools, nails, and clothes were all considered luxury items. In late winter 1622/23, cows cost £18, hogs, £10, and hens, 10s.-15s., when they were available. Nails were priced at 20s. per thousand.\(^{186}\) Of greater necessity was English meal, which sold for 30s. a bushel (£12-£15 sterling per hogshead), and Indian maize, which cost 10-12s. a bushel, or £12 per hogshead, equal to 80 pounds of tobacco.\(^{187}\) It was estimated that a year's supply of bread would have cost a lowly tenant/laborer two years' wages.\(^{188}\)

Virginia, in the aftermath of the Powhatan Uprising, was a "plantation of sorrowes and [a] Cropp of trobles, . . . plentifull in nothing but want and wanting nothing.

\(^{185}\)Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, IV, 13.

\(^{186}\)William RowJsley to his brother, Apr. 3, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 235; Peter Arundell to William Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 89.


\(^{188}\)[Alderman Johnson?], "Drafts of a Statement Touching the Miserable Condition of Virginia," May or June 1623, \textit{ibid.}, IV, 175, 177.
but plenty." 189 Perhaps the greatest misery occurred at plantations like Martin's Hundred, which had been devastated by Mangopeesomon's warriors in 1622. Although it had been "ruinated and spoyled" on March 22, 1621/22, Martin's Hundred was nonetheless reoccupied late in the same year. 190 The 140 or so persons who had lived at the plantation before the uprising were, by early 1623, reduced to a pitiful 32 living on the edge of oblivion. 191 Of some thirty new tenants who had arrived around Christmas 1622, twenty were already dead by the following March, including the plantation's master, his father and brother. 192 The sickly survivors worked hard, "bothe earlie and late," for a "messe of water gruel" (called "loblollie") and a "mouth-full of bread." 193 A pint of meal was supposed to feed a laborer for three days. 194

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189 Petition of Richard Quaile to governor and council, Mar. 11, 1623/24, ibid., 468.

190 Frethorne to Bateman, Mar. 5, 1622/23, ibid., 41; Gov. Wyatt and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 16-17.

191 Frethorne to Bateman, Mar. 5, 1622/23, ibid., 41.

192 Frethorne to his mother and father, Mar. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 58, 60.

193 Ibid., 58.

194 Frethorne to Bateman, Mar. 5, 1622/23, ibid., 41. Cf. these rations with the provisions prescribed for the colonists by the company in 1622. For one year each adult male was to have:
A young tenant at Martin's Hundred, Richard Frethorne, eloquently described the awful conditions there in late winter 1622/23. "Wee are as like to perish first as anie Plantation," Frethorne wrote his parents, "for wee have but two Hogsheads of meale left to serve us this two Monethes."\footnote{Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 62. Even when rationed, corn was quickly consumed.}

Reminiscent of the colony's "Starving Time" in 1609/10 was Frethorne's report of people desperate enough to eat the "barkes of trees, or mouldes of the Ground."\footnote{Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, 1623, ibid., 62. When some Martin's Hundred settlers were presented with a large supply of food, some of them, in a frenzy, reputedly ate themselves to death. Frethorne to Bateman, Mar. 5, 1622/23, ibid., 41.} Frethorne also detailed the omnipresent fears of Indian attack, especially horrifying to men so individually and collectively weak. "We are but 32 to fight against 3000 [warriors] if they should Come, and . . . wee lye even in their teeth."\footnote{Frethorne to his mother and father, Mar. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 58.}

These travails made young Frethorne "rue and Curse the time of my birth with holy Job," and he pleaded

\begin{tabular}{ll}
8 bushels of meal & costing £20.00.00 \\
2 bushels of peas & 0.06.00 \\
2 bushels of oatmeal & 0.09.00 \\
1 gallon of aquavite & 0.02.06 \\
1 gallon of "oyle" & 0.03.06 \\
2 gallons of vinegar & 0.02.00 \\
\end{tabular}

The Inconveniences That Have Happened to Some Persons Which Have Transported Themselves from England to Virginia (London, 1622), STC 25104, broadside attached to some copies of Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre.

\footnote{Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, 1623, ibid., 62.}
with his parents to help him "be redeemed out of Egipt." In one respect Frethorne was "redeemed"—he died within the year.

Frethorne's woes were not untypical. For the vast majority of colonists, Mangopeesomon's rebellion had thoroughly disrupted the once-promising boom times and transformed Virginia into a nightmare of suffering, death, and unfulfilled hopes. Tenant Henry Brigg, representative of many others, soon found that pre-uprising rhetoric did not apply to post-uprising realities. "If you remember," Brigg wrote to his brother, "he [Master Atkins] told me that for my Diett the worst day in the weeke should be better than the Sunday, and also he swore unto you that I should never serve any man but himselfe." However, as Brigg continued, "Atkins hath sold me and the rest of my Fellowes," and instead of fencing in livestock, "we pale out our Enemyes and yet . . . we goe continually in danger of our lives."

198 Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 2, 3, 1623, ibid., 61, 62.


200 See, e.g., Nicolls to Wolstenholme, Apr. 2, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 231; Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 22; Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, ibid., 106-107; Capps to Ferrar, Apr. 1623, ibid., 78.

201 Henry Brigg to Thomas Brigg, bef. June 1623, ibid., 236. Atkins also sold tenant Thomas Best for £150,
Many colonists who were considerably better off than tenants planned to stay in Virginia only long enough "to gett what . . . [they] have lost and then . . . leave the Contrey." According to one Edward Hill, 1622 was "the worst yeare here that ever I saw." William Rowlsley, a well-to-do surgeon, concurred. Rowlsley arrived in Virginia in the summer of 1622 with ten servants, but by April 1623, with all his servants dead, he had misgivings about seeking his fortune in the colony. "My wife and I have the best Company and the best fare . . . [and] we fare as well as any people in the land but my wife doth nothing but talke of going home." However, Master and Mistress Rowlsley waited too long; they died before they could leave. For Frethorne, Rowlsley, and hundreds of others, the immediate post-uprising era was "the fearestfullest age that ever christians lyved in." "like a damned slave." Best to his brother, Apr. 12, 1623, ibid., 235. Morgan cited the example of Best as indicative of how tenants were generally treated. "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVII (1971), 197-198. While I would agree that many tenants received inhuman treatment, Atkins seems to have been an untypical—though busy—white slaver.

203Ibid.
204Rowlsley to his brother, Apr. 3, 1623, ibid., 235; Christopher Best to Master Jo. Woodall, Apr. 1, 1623, ibid., 238.
It was only as the year 1622 drew to a close that the full impact of Mangopeesomon's successful attack was appreciated. The terrible uprising year had seen upwards of one thousand Englishmen die from "contagion and sword": 330 in the March 22 attack, 500-600 from related epidemics and starvation, and another 20 to 30 in subsequent Indian raids on settlements.\(^{207}\) By early 1623, Virginia's English population was reported to be "very small and weake: And in great danger to be utterlie ruyned either by th'Enemy or by Famine or both."\(^ {208}\) For the 1200 to 1700 English people in the colony between late 1622 and early 1623,\(^ {209}\) food supplies remained scanty and/or poorly distributed; tenants were ill-provisioned and dislocated; and debilitating diseases continued to afflict the population.

For the Virginia-English, the one source of relief—of satisfaction and catharsis—was their success in military expeditions. In Wyatt's year-end report to the company, he proudly wrote that "by Computatione and Confessione of the Indyans themselves, we have slayne more of them this yeere, then hath been slayne before since the begininge of the Colonie."\(^ {210}\)


\(^{208}\)[Rich], Notes of Letters from Virginia, May-June 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 159.

\(^{209}\)Wroth, Notes of Emigrants to Virginia, 1622, \textit{ibid.}, 536.

\(^{210}\)Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 10.
Wyatt and his captains of war were proud of their bloody raids, but given the wisdom of hindsight, they should have been more appreciative of the Indians who survived their attacks. For the colony's most grievous, though less "heroic," problem was not the threat of Indians; it was, and was to remain, the shortage of food. And just as in the colony's early days, the English were dependent upon the Powhatans, now their implacable enemies, for the most basic, most crucial human need.

There were, of course, multiple and complex reasons for the food shortage following the Powhatan Uprising:

1. The 1622 attack upset an already unstable system of supply and distribution of provisions. The abandonment of cleared lands and the high mortality among laborers exacerbated the problem.211

2. Among survivors of the uprising, steady nutritional deterioration and the outbreak of epidemics hampered productivity. Many workers were too undernourished to go to the fields, and whereas Smith's edict in 1608 had been "no worke, no meat," by late 1622 it was fast becoming "no meat, no worke."212


212Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155.
Labor continued to be used inefficiently. 213

3. Without supplies from London, the majority of tenants and poorer freemen were faced with the hard choice of planting corn, exclusively, for food (while sacrificing all other necessities), or of planting tobacco in the hopes of purchasing food as well as other needed commodities. 214

4. Alternative food products from hunting and fishing were not easily obtained. The woods were dangerous because of the Indians, and boats and other supplies were available only at exorbitant prices. 215

While the overall dilemma facing the colonists was real, the specific shortage of food between 1622 and 1624 may have only been a relative one. As Edmund S. Morgan has argued, supplies were obtainable, but it was "a question of who had them and of who could pay for them." 216

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213 One planter complained that the "multitude of women doe . . . nothing but . . . devour the food . . . without doing any dayes deed." His discontent was probably heightened by the fact that women charged him £3 sterling per annum for doing his laundry! Nicolls to Wolstenholme, Apr. 2, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 231.

214 Most of the letters written from the colony in Mar. and Apr. 1622/23 state that the arrival of the Seaflower would bring an end to all miseries. However, in Mar. the supply ship blew up in Bermuda (ironically, a careless smoker was to blame), and all provisions were lost. Capt. Miles Kendall to Sir Edwin Sandys, Apr. 15, 1623, ibid., 120.


216 Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 105.
Although there is not enough evidence for a general indictment of all the colonists, there are notable examples of food profiteers who contributed to the misery and high mortality of their countrymen.

Not surprisingly, Governor Wyatt's councillors and military commanders had the greatest opportunities for monopolizing food. Wyatt's inner circle "knew how to turn public distress to private profit," and some did just that.217 As leaders of raiding expeditions and "truck masters" of the same voyages, the captains of war often shared the booty from Indian villages with the merchants and mariners on whose ships they sailed.218 The political and military leaders of Virginia--with status, power, and access to ships--made the best of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. Corn, the most needed commodity in post-uprising Virginia, became a medium of exchange second only to tobacco in its value. It was "not a small portion of Corne that . . . [would] feed a man, when that is his onelie sustenance," and those individuals with access to supplies found the 1622-1624 "corn boom" as lucrative as the earlier tobacco boom.219

217Ibid., 106.

218Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Isaac Maddison and Robert Bennett, Nov. 12, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, III, 700.

219Sandys to Samuel Wrote, Mar. 28, 1623, ibid., IV, 65.
The most notorious and successful corn profiteer in this period was Yeardley. In his position as a trusted councillor and military commander, Yeardley collected corn on his raids among the Powhatans and sold it to the starving colonists. In his 1622 expedition against the Pamunkeys, alone, Yeardley confiscated over one thousand bushels of corn—representing one-fourth of all the corn so collected that year—and charged his countrymen 10 shillings per bushel for "freight charges."  

Yeardley reputedly put much thought into his attacks on the Indians. It was charged that he took "paynes to burne a few of their houses, everie yeare like a Surgion, that wanteth meanes, to keep . . . [a patient] in hand 3 yeares, that maybee Cured in 3 quarters, or 3 monethes." By allowing the Pamunkeys to return to their fields year after year, Yeardley maintained an almost endless source of "income," while still doing his military duty for the colony. In 1623, Yeardley reportedly had so much corn of his own that he established a commodities exchange and did a brisk business trading his corn for others' tobacco, "which passes there as current Silver." Relative to

220 Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 10; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 158.

221 Capps to Ferrar, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 37.

222 [Rich], Notes of Letters from Virginia, May-June 1623, ibid., 186; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 157.
market values in 1622/23, one thousand bushels of corn, converted into tobacco, was worth up to £1000.223

Yeardley, however, did more than collect and trade corn. He also grew it. Recognizing the colony's great need for that commodity, he set tenants to work planting maize on his secure Eastern Shore lands. He, himself, spent a full six weeks at Accomac during the summer of 1622 supervising the work. "Some Corne he brought home," it was reported, "butt as he adventured for himselfe, he accordingly enjoyed the benefit."224 Indeed, Yeardley was never known to be generous or altruistic when it came to corn; in 1622 he callously told starving tenants at Elizabeth City not to beg for his corn but to eat their own green and growing corn, for it would make them "fat."225

Yeardley's behavior was an open scandal in a colony and an era not notably sensitive to greed. Contemporaries called him a "right worthie Statesman, for his owne profit."226 Yeardley represented the extreme in oppor-


224Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155. Yeardley's corn farms on the Eastern Shore were the beginnings of his and his son's "empire" there. Sir George patented 3700 acres in Accomac in 1626, and his son, Argoll, was an official of the county in the 1640's. Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 378.

225Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155.

226Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 37.
tunistic, near-criminal practices, and even Wyatt's "Councell Careth not for him by reason of some foule matters."\textsuperscript{227} Early in the war, many believed that Yeardley "had throwne a mist before . . . [the governor's] eyes," although Wyatt, himself, seems never to have questioned his subordinate's "vigilance and integritie."\textsuperscript{228}

As for the governor, there is no evidence to indicate that he condoned or shared in Yeardley's profiteering. While more than one of Wyatt's councillors straddled the fence of legality in this era, contemporaries never questioned the governor's basic honesty and virtuous motives. He was sometimes portrayed as an inexperienced "Cypher" who had allowed the uprising to happen, but often these same critics praised him as a "carefull, mild, Religious, just, [and] honest" leader and as "a Moyses, accepting no person, nor profit."\textsuperscript{229}

Wyatt's kinsman and colleague in Virginia affairs, George Sandys, represented the ill-defined middle way between the extremes of Yeardley and Wyatt. His office of colony treasurer, which authorized him to commandeer and relocate company tenants and to collect debts owed

\textsuperscript{227} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{228} Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Yeardley, undated, \textit{ibid.}, 18; Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 38.

\textsuperscript{229} Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr., 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 38; Capps to Ferrar, Mar. 31, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 76.
the company, brought to Sandys equal measures of profit, responsibility, and hatred. Sandys was given a "badd report for his hard dealings with the planters," probably as a legitimate result of official duties, but he also had a questionable involvement in the corn trade. As overseer of the glassworks tenants, Sandys had access to the glass trade beads that were invaluable for obtaining Indian corn by peaceful means. Interpreter Poole was the treasurer's agent among the Patawomekes, and on one occasion he paid "thirteene armes le[ngths]" of the "Thresurers beads" for a "Tubb" of corn and, on another occasion, twenty thousand blue beads for woven mats needed to seal Sandys's ship, Elizabeth. What use Sandys made of the corn and other supplies obtained in the Indian trade is not known.

Wyatt's councillors and commanders, collectively and individually, exercised considerable authority over all aspects of life in post-uprising Virginia. When supplies sporadically arrived from England, the monopoly of office and ships "caused but few but the Chieftaines to be little better by them." There were frequent com-

230Statements of Seamen as to conditions in Virginia, Apr.-June 1623, ibid., 94.


232Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 155.
plaints of the colony leaders "extortinge upon the people," and one resident feared that "Robbery and extorcion" would become permanent fixtures of Virginia government.233 One planter, even though he had friends in London, was prevented from taking delivery of supplies sent directly to him. He wrote that the "great men are payd, but poore men must bide the loss: yet I dare not complaine for feare of worse, seeing Virginia is governed whollie by Sir Edwyn Sandys his faction."234

The most serious indictment against the colony leaders was the monopolization and the misappropriation of the labor force, a charge intimately connected with the relative shortage of food. Even before the uprising, servants, tenants, and apprentices had been "easy prey" and valued acquisitions in the labor-intensive, single-staple economy of Virginia.235 The colony after 1618 was a "charnel house" where officials assigned the ablest laborers of their own, not the company's, lands.236 But the Powhatan Uprising intensified and accelerated this process. In the aftermath of the 1622 attack, "every man

233 Statements of seamen, Apr.-June 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 94; petition of John Penreis to Gov. Wyatt and council, Sept. 4, 8, 1623, ibid., 277.
234 Arundell to Caninge, Apr. 14, 1623, ibid., 230.
236 Ibid., 183-194.
now of meaner sort, who before lived well . . . upon
their owne land [were forced] . . . to forsake their houses
. . . and to joyne themselves to some great mans planta-
tion."237 The abandonment of plantations and the enforced
consolidation of population meant that for scores of
colonists "all their labours now for the most part must
redound to the Lords of those Lands."238

Although self-interest, greed, and predatory prac-
tices surfaced in the post-uprising era of chaos and
crisis, it is hard to separate them from the legitimate
and serious factors of high mortality, internal colony
instability, and external Indian threat in determining the
motivations behind labor policy. Alleged injustice and
inhumane actions against the less fortunate colonists is
one side of the story; expedient and well-intentioned
behavior in times of death and deprivation is the other.
Given the scanty, ambivalent, and often biased evidence,
an irrefutable case against the colony's "great men" can-
not be established.239

237[?] to Joseph Mead, Apr. 4, 1623, in "Corres-

238Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 150.

239E.g., Natnacil Butler and William Capps were
pro-Smythe men who were unceasing in their criticism of
both company leadership and colony government. See But-
tler's "Unmasked Face of our Colony of Virginia," 1622, and
planters' rebuttals, Virginia Company court, Apr. 30,
1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 381-386; Capps to Ferrar,
Mar. 31, 1623, ibid., 76-79; Capt. Kendall to Edwin Sandys,
Apr. 15, 1623, from Bermuda, ibid., 119-122. Cf. George
To their credit, Virginia officials at times acted to ease the suffering of their countrymen. When it was determined that the company's tenants-at-halves "were never able to feede themselves by theire labours three moneths in the Yeere," the governor saw to their resettlement, and in January 1622/23, the Council of State pledged food to the college tenants until the next harvest.240 Small, unstable plantations that could neither support nor defend their populations also required assistance. A case in point was the settlement of Sir William Nuse, the colony's marshal, and his brother, Capt. Thomas Nuse. Both leaders died in 1622, leaving sick and "ragged" tenants and "great Depts" behind them at an Elizabeth City site.241 The surviving tenants harvested neither corn nor tobacco in 1622. Such an ill-provisioned settlement was susceptible to all manner of hazards, and in September 1622, the "first [Indian] assault since the Massacre" occurred at Nuse's plantation, leaving burned supplies and

Sandys's frank appraisal of his fellow councillors. Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 22.

240 Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 13, 15-16.

241 Ibid., 16; Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 22. Nuse lost 77 tenants to disease. Niccols to Wolstenholme, Apr. 2, 1623, ibid., 231; Capps to Ferrar, Apr. 1623, ibid., 78. The situation with Nuse's people was not atypical in post-uprising Virginia. At Lady Dale's land, there were only 14 men and 8 boys--most of them new arrivals--unable to defend themselves adequately. Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 16.
two English dead in its wake. In March 1622/23, Sandys finally had to dispose of Nuse's company tenants (a legitimate function of his office), "for want of provision." Three of these laborers were sold to one planter for six hundred pounds of tobacco, but two died before they even arrived at their new master's plantation; six others were sold to individuals at the rate of one hundred pounds of tobacco per man. Four of Nuse's men Sandys was "fayne to send to my owne plantation," and of these, two fell sick and two ran away. Sandys, by authorization of the company, was to have received five tenants from Nuse's supply, but in the end, he was only left with Nuse's page ("dead before delivered") and a young boy hardly worth his food ration.

The case of Nuse's tenants was not an isolated one. Many of the company's projects--the Indian college, silk-works, lumberworks, and the glassworks--suffered from the deaths of managers and overseers, disease among the workers, and inadequate provision for housing and food.

242 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 156; also see, 155-157.

243 Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 11, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 107; Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 22.

244 Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, ibid., 22-25; Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, ibid., 108-109; Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., 11-15.
Sandys, as treasurer, had the responsibility for turning these disasters into profitable projects for the company, while keeping laborers fed and preventing independent planters from using them in their own tobacco fields. Clearly, Sandys had a tough job at a critical time. In April 1623, Sandys had to place several planters "under arrest" and distrain the goods of others who were arrears in debt payments to the Virginia Company.\textsuperscript{245} And in the course of superintending the Italian glassmakers ("a more damned crew hell never vomited"), the treasurer, as he reported it, was "called rascall to my face for reprovinge them of theire ryot, negligence and dissension."\textsuperscript{246}

In addition to the labor-related practices based on greed and those based on duty of office, were the actions which, if they have been accurately reported, represented altruism in a period of crisis. Planter Robert Bennett, for instance, took responsibility for a young boy, "for vittiles being scarce in the contrye[,] noe mane will tacle servantes."\textsuperscript{247} Company tenants were sometimes fed and clothed by private individuals even though "there was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{245}Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 106.
  \item \textsuperscript{246}Sandys to Ferrar, Mar. 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 23-24.
  \item \textsuperscript{247}Robert Bennett to Edward Bennett, June 9, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 222; Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 16.
\end{itemize}
neither ground for these to plant, nor provision."\textsuperscript{248}
Governor Wyatt reported in April 1623 that he had "no more ground to spare" for the support of tenant labor. "indeed I was streightened for roume," he wrote, "as I had not above a 1000 wt of Sixteene Tenants of mine, That Planted at Pasbehaighes [governor's allotment]. Truth is I was faine lend many of them (having wives and children) more corne, then all their Croppe of Tobacco was worth."\textsuperscript{249}

In the final analysis, any judgment on the Vir­ginia leaders with regard to labor practices must take account of many factors. Crisis situations allow greedy men to take unfair advantage of the less fortunate, but war and high mortality by their very nature bring disaster to some and provide legitimate opportunities for others. Considering the unprecedented problems and the revolu­tionary events of the crisis period, 1622-1625, there were probably equal amounts of altruistic and predatory behavior, of good intentions and dastardly deeds. Whatever conclu­sions are reached, the important point is that there were no guidelines or ready solutions for dealing with the first massive Indian uprising ever faced by Englishmen.

\textsuperscript{248}Gov. Wyatt to John Ferrar, Apr. 7, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 104.

\textsuperscript{249}\textit{Ibid.}, 105.
The spring of 1623 signaled the end of a hard winter and brought closer yet another summer season of retaliatory raids. The colonists determined "to sett mannyly upon th'Indians"--the natural scapegoats for all their suffering--and saw the promise of catharsis as well as corn in renewed military action. On March 4, 1622/23, Governor Wyatt issued an executive order making March 22 an annual day of holy observance, "in consideration of Gods most mercifull deliverance of . . . Virginia from the treachery of the Indians." Wyatt's decree focused the attention of the colonists on past tragedies, present miseries, and future hopes; it also opened the 1623 "hunting season" on the Powhatans. The time had come, noted a determined governor, when "either wee must drive them, or they us out of the countrey."

Mangopesomon was equally determined. His warriors had not been idle since the uprising, and they killed some twenty Englishmen in small raids between the uprising and spring 1623. A large offensive was not undertaken; instead, local tribes had responsibility for attacking English settlements closest to their villages. Throughout

250 Ibid., 104.
251 Order of Gov. Wyatt, Mar. 4, 1622/23, VCR, IV, 40.
252 Wyatt to Ferrar, Apr. 7, 1623, Ibid., 104.
253 Edward Hill to Jo. Hill, Apr. 14, 1623, Ibid., 234.
the winter of 1622/23, the colonists were ever fearful, as "if the enymie weare at all tymes present."\textsuperscript{254} A group of Indians attacked Martin's Hundred on the Sunday before Shrovetide,\textsuperscript{255} and a planter living near Elizabeth City lamented the proximity of the Kiskiacks: "The Indians are drawne of[f] as farre, as a man can hurle a stone at twice[.] I make no question, but when the leaves are Greene, they wilbe somewhat nearer."\textsuperscript{256}

The Patawomekes did not wait for the greening of the leaves, however. In March 1622/23, this once friendly tribe gained a stunning victory over the English, avenging Maddison's slaughter of their women and children the summer before. Capt. Henry Spelman, "the best linguist of the Indian Tongue" and a most capable Indian agent since 1607, and an English force of some twenty-one soldiers, were killed by the Patawomekes.\textsuperscript{257} Spelman, like Captain Crashaw, was on friendly terms with the tribe, but according to Smith, he "presumed too much upon his acquain-

\textsuperscript{254}Assembly minutes, Mar. 2, 1623/24, McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59, 38.

\textsuperscript{255}Frethorne to his mother and father, Mar. 20, 1622/23, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 58. Frethorne explained apologetically that 2 of the attackers were made slaves and not killed because of "pollicie." Ibid.

\textsuperscript{256}Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, ibid., 37.

\textsuperscript{257}Arundell to Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, ibid., 89; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 161. Others said that 26 were killed, but surely 5 survived to carry the news back to Jamestown. See Edward Hill to Jo. Hill, Apr. 14, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 234; Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, ibid., 108.
Apparantly, Spelman and his armored troops had gone to trade with the Patawomekes, but as soon as they entered the Potomac River, they were warned of a plot to assassinate them. Spelman confronted the Patawomeke werowance with the allegation, whereupon the Indian informant was beheaded by the chief as a sign of friendship. With their fears dispelled, Spelman and his men returned unarmed to the Patawomeke village the next day. They were attacked and killed. The five sailors left aboard the pinnace, Tiger, saw Spelman's head roll down an embankment. The Patawomekes seized muskets, armor, and trade goods along with an English shallop and then attacked the Tiger itself. Sixty canoes (later reports said two hundred) and "above 1000" warriors rowed out to assault the pinnace—the first time an English ship had ever been so attacked in Virginia. The sailors barely managed to escape by discharging the ship's ordnance and hoisting the sails. Never again would English ships be "a continuall

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258 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 161.
259 Arundell to Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 89.
260 Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 161.
261 Arundell to Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 89, and Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, ibid., 108, both said 60 canoes attacked the ship; Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, 1623, ibid., 61, claimed there were 200 canoes and 1000 Indians. See also Rutman, "Militant New World," 285.
terror to the Natives," as was the common belief in London.\textsuperscript{262}

The news of Spelman's disaster was shocking to the colonists. One commentator was quite philosophic about the incident:

Wee our selves have taught them [the Patawomekes] how to bee treacherous by our false dealinge with the poore kinge of Patomecke that had alwayes beene faythful to the English, whose people was killed[,] hee and his sonne taken prisoners[,] brought to Jeames towne, brought home agayne, ransomed, as if [he] had beene the greatest enemy they [the English] had: Spilmans death is a just revenge... .\textsuperscript{263}

But the more common English reaction was one of anger and dismay, for in addition to the loss of the men, the defeat at Patawomeke meant that needed food supplies would not be forthcoming. "The Salvadges ... from whome we hoped to have helpes by trade," it was reported, "proved our most treacherous enemies, cunninglye circumventinge and cruellie murderinge such as were employed abroade to gett reliefe from them."\textsuperscript{264}

The loss of muskets and others arms, however, was considered even more threatening. With the captured

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{262} "Discourse of the Old Company," Apr. ? 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 529; Arundell to Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, ibid., 89; Smith, Generall Historie of Virginia, 161.
\item \textsuperscript{263} Arundell to Caninge, Apr. ? 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 89. Also see petition of Penreis to Gov. Wyatt and council, Sept. 4, 8, 1623, ibid., 277.
\item \textsuperscript{264} "Declaration of the first Twelve Years," in McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59, 37; Sandys to Ferrar, Apr. 8, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 108-109.
\end{itemize}
"peeces, swordes, armour Coates of male, Powder, [and] Shot," the Indians could "now steale upon us and wee Cannot know them from English, till it is too late." There was real cause for alarm. The Pamunkeys' use of firearms against Yeardley's men in December 1622 and the capture of English weapons in March 1621/22 and again in March 1622/23 revealed the continuing determination of the tidewater tribes to beat the colonists at their own game. Adopting the enemy's technology and using it against him was psychologically uplifting as well as militarily advantageous.

After the Patawomekes wiped out Spelman's force, a colonist noted that "now the Rogues growe verie bold, and can use peeces [muskets] . . . as well or better then an Englishman." The Indians, it was reported, "dare mayntayne an open Warre . . . [and] beinge armed with our Weapons . . . can brave our countrymen at their verie doors." In April 1623, tenant Frethorne wrote of how an Indian warrior had beaten a colonist in a contest of markmanship, and even Sandys admitted that the Powhatans knew only too well how to fire muskets.

265 Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 2, 3, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 61.
266 Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, ibid., 61.
267 Report on conditions in Virginia, May 1623, ibid., 147.
268 Frethorne to his mother and father, Apr. 3, 1623, ibid., 61; Sandys to Wrote, Mar. 28, 1623, ibid., 67.
The Powhatans' possession and expert use of firearms went as far back as the governorship of Sir Thomas Dale, and it was a myopic and ethnocentric Londoner, who, in 1622, claimed that the Indians did not know how to fire muskets. The grudging respect shown the Powhatans by the colonists was in striking contrast to the old misconceptions still held by most of the homeland-English. Considering themselves experts in all things, the Virginia Company directors in August 1622 had forbidden the shipment of English bows and arrows to Virginia, because the "use and scatteringe of them amongst the Indians might prove . . . dangerous . . . and withall make them acquainted with the manner of fashioninge the Arrow heads." But bows and arrows would not suffice for either side in the Second Anglo-Powhatan War. In weaponry as well as tactics, this war was the prototype of subsequent Anglo-American-Indian conflicts. The Second Anglo-Powhatan War enshrined the firearm as the premier weapon of the American frontier. George Wyatt, esq., an expert on

269 General Court minutes, Nov. 1624, McIlwaine, ed., Council Minutes, 1622-1632, 28; Chamberlain to Carleton, July 13, 1622, McClure, ed., Letters of Chamberlain, II, 446. However, there were other Londoners who were well aware of the threat from the Indians' possession of firearms. Already by Nov. 1622 there appeared a royal proclamation, which forbade the trade of "warlike weapons" to the Indians, "to the hazard of the lives of Our good subjects." Broadside proclamation "Prohibiting interloping and disorderly trading to New England in America," Nov. 6, 1622, Virginia Colonial Records Project, microfilm M-176-1, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation.

270 Virginia Company court, Aug. 14, 1622, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 100. The bows and arrows were sent to Bermuda, instead. Ibid.
military matters and father of the governor, in 1624 wrote that, in Virginia, muskets must be "first in order of fight, . . . principal, and . . . necessary for . . . present wars." Virginia's terrain was ideal for random attack with firearms, and the elder Wyatt advised that at least 100 of every 120 Englishmen in the field should be armed with muskets.271 In combat, Wyatt wrote, "Shot beds the base."272

The high percentage of firearms per total combatants suggested by the elder Wyatt was a notable departure from standard European methods of warfare. The use of bills and pikes—the primary infantry weapons in Europe since the fifteenth century273—had "worne quite out of use" in Virginia by 1621.274 Muskets were considered the essential


272 I.e., "shot is the basis of the attack." Ibid., 122; also see 107.


weapons for fighting the Powhatans, although for expected Spanish invaders, pikes "shall have to doe . . . [to] fight with him in his treanches." 275 

As the tactics of warfare in Virginia were modernized before they were in Europe, so, too, did the weapons themselves reflect modernization. The **snaphaunce**, a prototype of the flintlock musket that was more efficient and reliable than the matchlock, came into general use in Virginia well before its widespread adoption in Europe. Ten of twenty muskets sent to Virginia in May 1618 had been equipped with "snaphammers," and of nine muskets sent over on the **Supply** in 1620, six were of the new snaphaunce design. 276 In February 1622/23, Capt. John Martin "altered . . . [the] Lockes" on all twelve of his muskets before shipping them to Virginia. 277 By 1624/25, it has been estimated that only 57 of the more than 1000 muskets in the colony were of the old matchlock type. 278 But despite the obvious superiority of the snaphaunce for the colonists, the matchlock remained the principal firearm of European armies until the late seventeenth century. 279

275 Ibid. 
278 *Rutman, "Militant New World,"* 310.
Unappreciative of the colonists' sophistication in weaponry, the Virginia Company, clinging to old ethnocentric biases, dispatched arms to Virginia, which, "though they were altogether unfitt, and of no use for moderne [i.e. European] Service, might nevertheless be serviceable against that naked people."280 These arms from the Tower of London and the Minories included 2000 helmets, 280 brigantines (plate coats), 400 mail shirts, 40 "jacks of plate," 700 calivers, 300 muskets, 1000 halberds, assorted swords and pistols, and some 20 barrels of gunpowder. The supplies arrived in Virginia in January 1622/23.281

In March 1622/23, almost simultaneous with the news of Spelman's defeat, Chanco (Chauco), the converted


Indian apparently trusted by both sides, made a sudden appearance at Jamestown, bearing a message from Mangopeesomon.\textsuperscript{282} The Powhatan overlord desired a truce—a conditional peace—that would allow all the tribes of the uprising alliance to plant spring corn at their villages.\textsuperscript{283} Chanco, speaking for Mangopeesomon, informed Wyatt that "blud inough had already been shedd on both sides, that many of his People were starved, by our takinge Away theire Corne and burninge theire howses."\textsuperscript{284} In exchange for granting the truce, the Indians promised to return English "People (beinge aboute twenty) whom they saved alive since the massacre."\textsuperscript{285} A week later the Pamunkeys sent back "Mrs [B]oyse (the Chiefe of the prisoners) . . . appareled like one of theire Queens,

\begin{flushright}
In Nov. 1622, Lord St. John of Basinge donated an additional 60 coats of mail to the colony. Company court, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, II, 135. Also see the invoice of arms sent with subsequent expeditions, June and Sept. 1623, \textit{ibid.}, IV, 227, 278-281.
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{282}Governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 98. Chanco (Chauco) was accompanied by Comahum, "agreat man" responsible for the 1622 attack on Martin's Hundred. Because the latter was considered a war criminal and not an official emissary, he was held in chains for possible ransom. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{283}Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 37.

\textsuperscript{284}Governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 98.

\textsuperscript{285}\textit{Ibid.} Also see Frethorne to Bateman, Mar. 5, 1622/23, \textit{ibid.}, 41, who said there were 15 prisoners held by the Pamunkeys.
which they desired . . . [the English] should take notice of."286 Because Mistress Boyse was the only prisoner returned, Wyatt and his council decided to let the tribes plant their corn in the hopes of getting the others back. From the onset of negotiations, however, the colonists had an ulterior motive in allowing the truce. Sandys wrote that the English would "trie if wee can [to] make them as secure as wee were that wee may follow their Example in destroying them."287 If the colonists knew where the Indians planted their corn, it would be much easier to deliver a swift and devastating attack; otherwise, the Powhatans would "plant in such Corners, as it will nott be possible . . . to finde owte."288

With the Powhatans and the English engaged in spring planting, Governor Wyatt received a second surprise communication in May. Sasawpen (Itoyatin/Opitchapam), "the great Kinge," informed the governor that he would betray his brother, Mangopeesomon, delivering him to the English "either alive or dead." To aid him in this plot,

286Governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 98.
287Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 75.
288Governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 99.
Sasawpen requested ten or twelve soldiers from Wyatt and promised to return the women captives he held. On May 12, Captain Tucker was dispatched with an expedition "into Pamunkey Ryver, neere to the seate of Appochankano." At this point, the details become confused, for on May 22 Tucker was in the Potomac River negotiating for the release of English prisoners held (or recently transported) there.

Tucker's mission was to assemble the leaders of the uprising alliance on the pretext of a peace parley and then to murder them with poison. Just how this English plot was connected with Sasawpen's alleged conspiracy against his brother cannot be determined. But according to surviving documents, Tucker did hold a "peace" parley at Patawomeke with Mangopeesomon and the other respected leaders of the tidewater tribes. (Whether the English regarded the Patawomekes as enemies, intermediaries, or co-conspirators with them is not known.) "After . . . manye fayned speches," Tucker presented some specially

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289 Virginia Company court, Nov. 17, 1623, ibid., II, 483. This information was reported to the company by one "Master Raymond," who had been at Jamestown when Wyatt received the message. Raymond also reported that Capt. Tucker was sent with 12 men to carry out the plan. Ibid.

290 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Tucker, May 12, 1623, ibid., IV, 190.

291 Bennett to Bennett, June 9, 1623, in "Lord Sackville's Papers," AHR, XXVII (1922), 507.
prepared sack with which to poison the Indians. An English interpreter, perhaps Poole, tasted the sack to demonstrate that no treachery was intended, but he drank from an untainted container. "The kinge" (supposedly Mangopeesomon), the werowance of Kiskiack, sons of chiefs, and "all the great men" to the number of two hundred drank from the poisoned batch and reputedly died or fell sick. The English then fired "a volie of shoote . . . [that] killed the tooe kinges [of Pamunkey and Kiskiack?]" and "som 50 more." After picking through the dead bodies, Tucker's men "brought hom parte of ther heades."

292 Ibid. By all contemporary accounts, Tucker was the poisoner of the Indians, but tradition also implicates Dr. John Pott in the plot. Although Pott was probably not present at Patawomeke, as a physician he may have prepared the tainted sack. Only one (dubious) document implicated Pott—a letter from the earl of Warwick to Edward Conway in Aug. 1624 (C.O. 1/3; C.O.1/5, pt. 2, fol. 206, Public Record Office). Whether or not Warwick was out to damage Pott's reputation unfairly, the true blame for this plot "has not been conclusively assigned." William S. Powell, "Aftermath of the Massacre: The First Indian War, 1622-1632," VMHB, LXVI (1958), 62. However, historians have always had their favorite villain. Jennings, Invasion of America, 164, blamed Pott, but did not mention Tucker; Morgan, American Slavery, American Freedom, 121, blamed Tucker, but not Pott; Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 82, mentioned both Tucker and Pott in the poison plot.

293 Bennett to Bennett, June 9, 1623, in "Lord Sackville's Papers," AHR, XXVII (1922), 507.

294 Ibid.
It was widely reported throughout the colony and in England that Mangopeesomon and many of the "Indian Kinges and great Comaunders" had been slain at Patawomeke. The colonists believed it was "impossible for him [Mangopeesomon] to escape, beinge the designe was chiefly on his person and that exposed to the principall danger."\textsuperscript{295} Wyatt wrote to the company that by this "successful stratagem" the English prisoners were retrieved and many Indian leaders slain, "amongst whom wee are assured, that Apochancono is one."\textsuperscript{296} Governor Wyatt's dictum, originally applied to the Powhatans, served well to describe Tucker's "accomplishment:" "perfideous craft is much more dangerous than open violence."\textsuperscript{297}

Confident that the treachery at Patawomeke was a "great dismayinge to the blodye infidelles," the English captains of revenge happily reported in early summer that the Indians' growing corn was well enough along to burn down.\textsuperscript{298} The colonists planned to "geve them shortly a

\textsuperscript{295}Governor and council to Virginia Company, June 1623, read in company court, Nov. 17, 19, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, II, 482, 486. Company court minutes of Nov. 12 mentioned that 150 Indians had been killed. \textit{Ibid.}, 478.

\textsuperscript{296}Governor and council to Virginia Company, after June 1623, \textit{ibid.}, IV, 102.

\textsuperscript{297}Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, bef. May 7, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 167. William Alexander noted that the Virginians had taken revenge at Patawomeke "not after a commendable manner." \textit{An Encouragement to Colonies} (London, 1624), 29.

\textsuperscript{298}Bennett to Bennett, June 9, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., \textit{VCR}, IV, 222.
blow, That shall neere or altogether Ruinate them."\textsuperscript{299} It was a question, though, of which side would strike first, for as a Virginia planter wrote, "the Heathen Kennell of dogges" at Kiskiack and Pamunkey were "just at our backes, and when their Corne is readie, have at your bucklers you brave . . . Englishmen."\textsuperscript{300}

In fact, the English drew first blood. On July 23, 1623, Wyatt's commanders simultaneously attacked along several fronts in the largest single offensive of the war. Capt. William Peirce raided the Chickahominies; Capt. Nathaniel West went against the Appomattocs and Weanocs; Capt. Samuel Mathews struck the Tanx Powhatans; and Capt. Tucker attacked the Nansamunds and Warraskoyacks.\textsuperscript{301} One week later, Captain Maddison attacked the Weanocs again, while Tucker struck a second time at the Nansamund villages.\textsuperscript{302} (See Map VI.3) Because the Indians remained "as swift as Roebucks" and could only be hurt by "surprise and famine," the tried and true tactic of the feedfight was once again employed by the English forces.\textsuperscript{303} The

\textsuperscript{299} Governor and council to Virginia Company, after June 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 102; Virginia Company quarter court, Nov. 19, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, II, 486.

\textsuperscript{300} Capps to Wynston, Mar. or Apr. 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 37, 39.

\textsuperscript{301} Commissions from Gov. Wyatt to Mathews, Peirce, West, Tucker, and Maddison, July 17, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 250-251.

\textsuperscript{302} Commissions from Gov. Wyatt to Maddison and Tucker, July 23, \textit{ibid.}, 251.

\textsuperscript{303} Sandys to Sir Miles Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 71.
MAP VI.3  SECOND ANGLO-POWHATAN WAR:

ENGLISH OFFENSIVES, May-November, 1623
POWHATANS, Samuel Mathews (July 23)

WEANOCES, Nathaniel West, Isaac Maddison (July 23)

APPOMATTOCS, Nathaniel West, Isaac Maddison (July 23)

CHICKAHOMINIES, William Peirce (July 23)

QUIYOUGHCOHANNOCKS, William Tucker (twice) (July 23)

INSET: POTOMAC RIVER BASIN

ANACOSTANS, Francis Wyatt, Isaac Maddison, William Tucker, Jabez Whitaker (Nov. 1623)

PATAWOMEKES, William Tucker (May 1623, Poison Plot)

NANSAMUNDS, William Tucker (twice) (July 23)

KISKIACKS, James River

Jamestown
colonists attacked the tidewater tribes "with fire and Sword" and apparently did grievous damage to their ripening corn. Wyatt reported to the company that the Powhatans, as expected, had planted corn "in great abundance uppon hope of a fraudulent peace," and that the July raids had ravished tribal lands and populations.

The multi-pronged and well-organized English attacks of 1623 were indicative of maturing and increasingly efficient colony leadership. All functions of government were placed on a military footing in an attempt to dissipate the chaos of post-uprising Virginia. In late April 1623, Wyatt ordered every twentieth man between the ages of 20 and 45 to help construct a fort at Warraskoyack, a project thought necessary to provide defense against Spanish invasion. The following month, the governor ordered all the colonists to plan enough corn for their own families' use, recognizing the disastrous effects of

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304 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Peirce, July 17, 1623, ibid., 250.
305 Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, ibid., 450.
306 Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, Apr. 29, 1623, ibid., 129. The workers were to be supplied with arms, tools, and provisions collected from levies on plantations. For every man assigned to work on the fort, 300 lbs. of tobacco and 3 barrels of corn were levied for support. Gov. Wyatt, warrant to Capt. Jabez Whitaker, May 13, 1623, ibid., 191; warrant to Peirce, Nov. 20, 1623, ibid., 401; order in council (Wyatt absent) to Tucker, Dec. 8, 1623, ibid., 441.
relying upon a professed enemy for food.\textsuperscript{307} In May, also, Wyatt commissioned Captain Peirce as lieutenant governor and commander of James City, the island, and the blockhouses.\textsuperscript{308} On May 7, the governor prohibited other than colony officials from negotiating with Indian emissaries and ordered plantation commanders to maintain watch and ward at all times.\textsuperscript{309}

In August, Wyatt took steps to halt the rampant inflation that had driven the prices of commodities "to a most excessive and unconscionable height."\textsuperscript{310} On September 4, 1623, the governor issued a proclamation forbidding unauthorized individuals from trading for Indian corn anywhere in Chesapeake Bay or on the Eastern Shore, because certain mariners had devalued the trade goods and were thought to have hindered the colony's own production of corn.\textsuperscript{311} A few weeks later, Wyatt announced severe

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\textsuperscript{307}Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, May 9, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 172-173. At the same time, licenses for trade with the Indians were being granted to fewer and fewer individuals in an attempt to gain control over the situation. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{308}Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Peirce, May 29, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 209. At the same time, Peirce was given command of the newly created 30-man \textit{corps du guard}. Previously, councillors themselves took turns guarding Gov. Wyatt. \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{309}Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, bef. May 7, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 167.

\textsuperscript{310}Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, Aug. 31, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 271.

\textsuperscript{311}Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, Sept. 4, 1623, \textit{ibid.}, 275, 267. This proclamation was a clear attempt to give
\end{flushright}
penalties for stealing valuable and scarce livestock. The theft of any domestic animal worth twelve pence or more would be considered a felony punishable by death.312 In the following months, Governor Wyatt issued a series of warrants and orders requiring his regional commanders to collect levies on tobacco and corn from planters in order to pay the colony's "public debt."313 And on December 31, 1623, Wyatt named Captain Tucker harbor commander for the lower James River. The duties of this powerful and potentially rewarding post included the search and seizure of ships, the confiscation of goods, and the detention of persons trying to leave the colony illegally.314

the governor more control and to reform the abuses afflicting the colony. Wyatt's proclamation directly refuted the instructions of private plantation investors in England, who had told their agents in the colony to trade for corn. Southampton Hundred, for instance, outfitted private trading expeditions and even hired Thomas Savage as an interpreter. Ibid., 276.

312 Gov. Wyatt, proclamation, Sept. 21, 1623, ibid., 283-284.

313 Warrants and orders from Gov. Wyatt to Maddison, Tucker, Peirce, Epps, and Greville Pooley, Oct., Nov. 20, Nov. 27, 1623, ibid., 284, 400, 401-402, 407. The levies amounted to 10 lbs. of tobacco per 1000 plants harvested; 1 gallon of corn per barrel harvested; and 4 lbs. of tobacco from every "laboring man" who had failed to collect 66 lbs. of sassafras as the company had demanded. In the Corporation of James City, 1500 lbs. of tobacco and 16 barrels of corn was allocated for the minister's salary, the remainder of the levies going to pay the public debt.

314 Council of State, Commission to Tucker, Dec. 31, 1623, ibid., 446.
The stability and sense of direction that Wyatt's proclamations and orders represented signalled the beginning of a hopeful and more promising future for the colony. Confidence was also bolstered by the arrival of much-needed supplies from England in autumn 1623. In a massive relief effort—the first since the uprising—over £7000 worth of foodstuffs and other provisions were collected by private individuals in England and dispatched to Virginia. Hogsheads of flour, butter, cheese, and oatmeal, in addition to apparel, "fishing nets," and other necessities were sent to various individuals and particular plantations.  

Buoyed by the arrival of supplies and a more efficiently functioning government, the colonists made plans to launch a second major offensive against the Indians in 1623. On October 20, Governor Wyatt ordered captains Maddison, Tucker, and Whitaker to levy a total of ninety men and two weeks' provisions from the plantations under their control. These troops assembled at Jamestown in early November, and Wyatt, himself, led the expedition into the Chesapeake Bay sometime around November 18.  

315 Virginia Company, list of subscribers for relief of the colony, July 4, 1623, ibid., 245-246; subscribers to magazine, July 4, 1623, ibid., 247-248; an account of sums subscribed and supplies sent since April, July 23, 1623, ibid., 252-253; note of provisions to be sent to Virginia, July 31, 1623, ibid., 257-258.  

316 Warrants from Gov. Wyatt to Maddison, Tucker, Whitaker, Oct. 20, 1623, ibid., 292; commission from Gov. Wyatt to council, Nov. 18, 1623, granting authority to a quorum of 3 councillors in the governor's absence, ibid., 399.
The stated purpose of the mission was the "settling of trade with some of the neighboring Savadges in the Bay," but the large complement of troops and the fact that provisions at this time were in sufficient supply indicate that the expedition was not trade oriented. 317 In fact, Wyatt, his three subordinate commanders, and their men sailed up the Potomac River and boldly attacked the "Fascoticons and their associates, being the greatest people in those partes of Virginia." 318 The English "put many to the swoorde," set fire to the village, and burned "a marvelous quantitie of Corne," because "it was nott possible to bringe it to our boates." 319 Their aggressiveness and over-confidence notwithstanding, Wyatt's forces had been lucky to gain such a victory. As if they did not have their hands full with Mangopeesomon and the tribes of the uprising alliance, the colonists now took on the Piscataways/Anacostans, associated with the powerful Conoy Confederacy of some seven thousand Indians. 320

317 Wyatt's commission to Council of State, Nov. 18, 1623, ibid., 399.

318 Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, ibid., 450.

319 Ibid.

Wyatt defended this expedition months later by claiming that it had been the Anacostans ("Pascoticoms") who had killed Spelman's men in March 1622/23. Although this assertion was contradicted by more reliable contemporary accounts, the Anacostans were the scapegoats in Wyatt's renewal of an amicable alliance with the Patawomekes. By blaming the Anacostans for murders actually committed by the Patawomekes and by raiding the Anacostans, the hated enemies of the Patawomekes, Wyatt achieved English acceptance for an Indian alliance and demonstrated his sincerity to the Patawomekes. The renewed Anglo-Patawomeke alliance was concluded in autumn 1623. The Indians agreed to assist the English in the war against the Pamunkeys and to trade corn to them; the colonists promised to raid the Anacostans, Nacotchtanks, and Moyaones--tribes which inflicted terrible casualties on the Patawomekes.

321 Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 450-451. There is one obscure reference to an "agreement" made in 1622 between Sandys and the Patawomekes, but it is not substantiated by other documents. Ibid., 450.

The rapprochement with the Patawomekes, whom the English had treated as friends, enemies, and friends again, reflected the mature development of a pragmatic Indian policy. The colonists had finally come to a realization that there could be some "good" Indians who were not dead Indians after all. Indicative of this changed attitude was Wyatt's commission to Captain Hamor in January 1623/24. In an attempt to preserve the Patawomeke alliance, the governor's warrant was quite explicit, leaving little room for the commander's exercise of judgment (or paranoia). Hamor was to sail to the Potomac River and to trade "uppon pledg, if the Savadges shall require it." He was forbidden "to compell by any waies or meanes any Indians whatsoever to trade more than they shalbe willing to trade for; or to offer any violence to any except in his owne defence." 323

Governor Wyatt, both in his Indian policy and in his administration of internal colony affairs, had developed into a capable leader within two years of the uprising. One enduring symbol of this maturation was the general

323 Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Ralph Hamor, Jan. 19, 1623/24, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 448. See similar wording in commission to Raleigh Crashaw, Mar. 16, 1623/24, ibid., 470. Cf. the wording of a pre-alliance trading commission of May 1623: If the Indians refused to trade, it was deemed "lawfull . . ., either by force or by any other meanes . . ., to take from them [any tribe] theire Corne, or any other goodes of theires, he [the commander] can possesse himselfe of." Commission from Gov. Wyatt to Gilbert Peppet, May 12, 1623, ibid., 189.
assembly convened on March 5, 1623/24. In an effort to bring more stability to Virginia, Wyatt, his seven councillors (Francis West, Yeardley, Sandys, Pott, Hamor, Smith, and Pountis), and twenty-eight burgesses from fourteen settlements met to enact several laws of reform.\footnote{William Waller Hening, comp., Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, 13 vols., I (Richmond, 1809), 119-129.}

Only the second legislature in Virginia's history, this assembly established its sole authority to levy taxes and imposts; forbade the arbitrary levy of labor by the governor; and set up monthly courts in the corporations of Charles City and Elizabeth City.\footnote{Ibid., 124-125.} The burgesses prohibited the public and private corn trade after June 1624; ordered homesteads pallisaded for defense; required all men to carry arms when at work or away from their plantations; and regulated the use of gunpowder.\footnote{Ibid., 126-127.} March 22 was made a legal holiday for annual observance, and the colonists were ordered to "fall upon their adjoyning salvages" in early July. A maturing militia organization was strengthened by an act that authorized medical care at public expense for troops wounded on these expeditions; the permanently disabled were "to be maintained by the country according to his person and quality."\footnote{Ibid., 123, 128.}

\[\text{\footnote{\textit{Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia from the First Session of the Legislature in the Year 1619, 13 vols., I (Richmond, 1809), 119-129.}}}\]
also gave its approval to strict martial and civil discipline by the governor:

No person within this colony upon the rumur of supposed change and alteration, [shall] presume to be disobedient to the present government, nor servants to their private officers, masters or overseers at their uttermost perills.328

The general assembly of 1623/24 was representative of the colony's emergence from two years of pure hell into an era of confidence and determination. From the beginning of the Anglo-Powhatan War, the colonists were most encouraged by their military accomplishments; even though all else seemed bleak and foreboding, there was comfort and catharsis to be found in the annual, later twice-annual, raids on the Powhatans. Militarily, Wyatt's raid on the Anacostans represented a new peak of confidence and daring, but the greatest English victory came in 1624, the year of turning points for Virginia.

In autumn 1624, Wyatt enjoyed his finest hour as a field commander when he led a force of sixty Englishmen against a combined Indian force of some eight hundred Pamunkey warriors and "divers nationes that cam to asiste them."329 The Pamunkeys, led by Sasawpen330 and defending

328Ibid., 128.


330Where was Mangopeesomon? He had literally dropped out of the records following the poisoning plot in May 1623, and if it were not for accounts of the 1644 uprising, one could almost be persuaded that the Pamunkey werowance had
their home ground, fought a fierce two-day battle in open field, of the type not seen in Virginia since Nemattanew's valiant defense of Powhatan lands near Henrico in 1611. The Pamunkeys fought to preserve their renowned "reputatione with the rest of the Salvages," and they even earned the respect of Wyatt. This battle, the governor said, "shewed what the Indyans could doe. The Indyans were never knowne to shew soe greate resolu­tione."\textsuperscript{331}

While their courage and resolve were demonstrated, the Pamunkeys were nevertheless dealt a serious setback. In addition to suffering many casualties (the English, themselves, suffered sixteen) and losing a corn crop that could have fed four thousand men for a year,\textsuperscript{332} the Pamunkeys probably lost essential support from potential allies. Observing the battle were representatives of the Patuxents, a strong Maryland tribe, and Wyatt noted that the Pamunkeys had probably lost face, considering actually been killed by Tucker. Perhaps Mangopeesomon was indeed made ill by the poison and required a long period of recovery.

\textsuperscript{331}ibid., 507-508.

\textsuperscript{332}ibid., 507. Such a large amount of corn was not inconceivable, since the Pamunkeys, besides being the mightiest warriors, were also the major corn suppliers for the uprising alliance. See governor and council to earl of Southampton and Virginia Company, Dec. 2, 1624, ibid., 508.
they had "made greate braggs, of what they would doe [to the English], Amonge the Northerne nationes."333

By the end of 1624, the colonists were so confident of their military superiority that they boasted that only the lack of gunpowder prevented a more extensive slaughter of the Indians.334 Despite these feelings of superiority, however, the English appreciated the manner in which the Pamunkeys had bravely challenged them in open field and realized that, when on the offensive, the Indians could still inflict considerable damage. Mangopeesomon's uprising alliance remained basically intact after all the bloody combat, and the Pamunkeys, Tanx Powhatans, Chickahominies, Weanocs, Appomattocs, Quiyoughcohannocks, Warroskoyacks, Nansamunds, and Kiskiacks still planted corn on their tribal lands. The Indians were still militarily strong, and if they learned how depleted were the colonists' supplies of gunpowder, the English believed "they might easily in one day destroy all our people."335

After two-and-a-half years of bitter warfare, the colonists came to regard the Powhatans more as capable

333 Ibid., 508.

334 Ibid., 507. Also see governor and council to earl of Southampton and Council for Virginia, Apr. 17, 1624, ibid., 475.

warriors and less as either helpless scapegoats or as cowardly murderers of women and children. The Virginia-English, through war, had come to know the Indians better. Certainly, cultural differences and specific grievances made for irreconcilable hatred between colonists and Powhatans, and even though the memories of 1622 could never be erased, the views of Indians could be modified by present circumstances. Knowing well their own capabilities and their enemy's strengths and weaknesses, the colonists saw little reason to pursue the total destruction of the Powhatans. War, it was thought, should aid the colony's development and not become an annoying distraction from the real business at hand. Frequent military obligations, if not held in check, could hinder tobacco production and impede Virginia's progress as much or more than raiding Indians. This changed attitude was the clearest evidence that the colony was emerging from the crisis period of 1622-1625.

Although the Second Anglo-Powhatan War did not officially end until 1632, there was a noticeable de-escalation of combat after 1625. For three years, Wyatt and his commanders had allegedly "used their uttermost and Christian endeavours in prosecutinge revenge against the bloody Salvadges," but in 1625 it was evident that "the Colony
hath worn the Skarrs of the massacre."\textsuperscript{336} Needed
gunpowder did not reach Virginia until late summer 1625,
and raids against the Powhatans were suspended. By
January 1625/26, the colonists seemed as preoccupied with
the "great Charge" of continuing the war as they once had
been with the need for revenge.\textsuperscript{337} There were no recorded
military activities in 1626—the year Governor Wyatt left
office and returned to England—and subsequent combat was
infrequent and highly selective.\textsuperscript{338}

Emphasis shifted from costly and time-consuming
offensive raids to a defensive posture that would permit
the English population to prosper, while still offering

\textsuperscript{336}"Declaration of the first Twelve Years," 1623/24,
in McIlwaine, ed., Journals of Burgesses, 1619-1658/59, 37;
report to Privy Council, Mar. 2, 1623/24, ibid., 38;
governor and council to earl of Southampton and Virginia

\textsuperscript{337}Governor and council to commissioners investig­
gating Virginia, Jan. 4, 1625/26, Kingsbury, ed., VCR,
IV, 568-569.

\textsuperscript{338}Powell, "Aftermath of Massacre," VMHB, LXVI
(1958), 70; Fausz and Kukla, "Letter of Advice," WMQ, 3d
Ser., XXXIV (1977), 111n. Rumor of an impending surprise
Indian attack in spring 1627 forced the colonists to raid
the Powhatans in Aug. and Oct. Quarter court, Apr. 3,
1627; general court, July 4, 1627, McIlwaine, ed., Council
Minutes, 1622-1632, 147, 151. A tenuous truce was estab­
lished in Aug. 1628, but after Feb. 20, 1628/29, the
English once again declared war on the Powhatans, in order
"to prevent a second Massacre." General court, Jan. 31,
1628/29, ibid., 184-185. Finally, a peace was made with
the Pamunkeys and the Chickahominies on Sept. 30, 1632,
ending the Anglo-Powhatan War. \textit{Ibid.}, 480.
security from Indian attack. In the mid- to late-1620's, many pre-uprising English settlements were re-occupied and palisaded against the Powhatans, and the colony of Virginia became an armed camp of awesome military potential.339

In 1630, Kiskiack fell, and soon after, Englishmen began patenting adjacent lands, "bordering upon the chiefe residence of the Pamunkyy King the most dangerous head of the Indian Enemie."340 In the mid-1630's, a four mile long palisade was constructed across the peninsula, connecting Archer's Hope (now College) Creek, which flows into the James River, and Queen's Creek, which flows into the York River. This ambitious project gave the English secure access to some three hundred thousand acres between James-town and Elizabeth City--an area "near as big as Kent."341

339 In 1625, the colony's inventory of arms included 803 muskets, 384 breastplates, 404 swords, 9,331 pounds of lead for shot, 1,032 pounds of powder, and 276 coats of mail. Elizabeth City claimed 208 muskets among its population, and among private plantations, Jordan's had 37 muskets and 704 pounds of lead, Matthew's had 18 muskets, and West and Shirley Hundred had 45. Philip Alexander Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, 2 vols., II (New York, 1910), 33. Also see, Muster of 1624-25, in Juster and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 5-69; Rutman, "Militant New World," 310.

340 Governor's proclamation, Oct. 8, 1630, in Nell Marion Nugent, comp., Cavaliers and Pioneers: Abstracts of Virginia Land Patents and Grants, 1623-1800, I (Richmond, Va., 1934), 44. Also see, Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 122-124; Hening, comp., Statutes at Large, I, 139-140.

That massive palisade, a physical barrier between two enemies and two cultures, was symbolic of the colonists' past, present, and future goal—to avoid close contact with the Indians. War, which represented contact of the closest and most brutal variety, was deemed a temporary necessity for pushing back the Powhatans, nemeses to English progress. Making "the Indians flie" was the colonists' only assurance that Englishmen "shall nere more want indure."342

The English success in attaining their goal was measured in the degree to which they came to "regard not the Salvages" for either food or fighting after 1625. In the end, physical distance proved to be the best guarantee of mutual survival for both the English and the Powhatans. "Our first worke is the expulsion of the Salvages to gaine the free range of the countrey," wrote Governor Wyatt in 1624, "for it is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were as thornes in our sides, then to be at peace and league with them."343

see, Wesley Frank Craven, "Indian Policy in Early Virginia," WMQ, 3d Ser., I (1944), 74; Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 124. Middle Plantation, later Williamsburg, was the mid-point along the palisade.

342"Good Newes from Virginia," in WMQ, 3d Ser., V (1948), 355 (ll. 113-114).

343Gov. Wyatt to earl of Southampton, summer? 1624, Wyatt Documents, WMQ, 2d Ser., VI (1926), 118.
Wyatt's pragmatic Indian policy was uniquely Virginian. Born in the crucible of war, it had a relevance to reality that Hakluyt's idealism and Purchas's rantings for revenge did not. English ethnocentrism, tempered by experience, ultimately killed the London theorists' great dreams. The writings of Hakluyt and the labors of Thorpe had been dedicated to the idea that Virginia's Indians could be acculturated and that the English could live with them in a peaceful and integrated society. But the colonists were the first to realize what their countrymen were slow to admit: alien peoples do not readily abandon their culture, and close contact with defiant and strongly ethnocentric groups breeds hatred and contempt--on both sides.  

The Powhatan Uprising and the Second Anglo-Powhatan War

There is an interesting parallel illustrating how closeness/contact with other cultures bred contempt in Englishmen. In 1623, after English courtiers had returned from visits to Spain, it was noted that

this journey hath wrought one unexpected effect, that whereas it was thought the Spaniards and we should piece and grow together, it seems we are generally more disjointed and further asunder in affections than ever.

The Spanish experience thus confirmed English biases toward the "gross ignorance and superstition" of the Spaniards. Chamberlain to Carleton, Oct. 25, 1623, in Birch, comp., Court and Times of James I, ed. Williams, II, 426.
were the results of close contact between two different cultures; for much of American History, similar situations produced similar reactions. The maintenance of social distance and the establishment of spatial buffers, measures neither idealistic nor utopian, were, nevertheless, the only post-invasion alternatives to assimilation or genocide.
If the glory of god have noe power with them . . . yet lett the rich Mammons desires egge them on to inhabite these Countries.

Sir Thomas Dale, 1613.

For, I am not so simple to thinke, that ever any other motive then wealth, wil ever erect there a Commonweale.

Capt. John Smith, 1616.

CHAPTER VII
THE DEATH OF IDEOLOGY
AND THE BIRTH OF A COMMONWEALTH

The Powhatan Uprising of 1622 and the subsequent Second Anglo-Powhatan War legitimized revenge against the tidewater tribes. While London theorists swiftly shifted from an advocacy of Powhatan assimilation to an advocacy of genocide, the colonists retaliated against the Indians with a cruel vengeance. But there was little of England's rhetoric in Virginia's reality. Although they might fight like crusaders in pursuit of corn or in defense of their tobacco fields, the Virginia-English had little sympathy with moral crusades and holy wars. Opportunistic and pragmatic, the colonists were determined to kill Indians wherever, whenever, and in whatever manner they chose, but they were as equally
committed to a cessation of hostilities if it suited their own self-interest. Such were not the attitudes of committed idealists.

Adversity encountered and adaptability acquired between 1622 and 1625 created an Atlantic of the intellect that alienated the colonists from their countrymen as no mere ocean could. The Virginia-English formed attitudes out of experiences that were unfathomable to the homeland-English. A classic process of two-way acculturation had occurred in Virginia between the colonists and the Powhatans. The English owed their sustenance to Indian maize and their livelihoods to Indian tobacco. While they lived in English cottages and wore English clothes, the colonists' agriculture was Powhatan, their language was filled with Powhatan expressions, and their palisaded homesteads and corn fields were Powhatan in design.

Through war—a regrettably violent form of culture contact—there had developed a sharing of effective means and methods by the Anglo-Indian adversaries. The Powhatans captured and used English muskets and armor, challenged the colonists in open-field battles, and even attacked an armed ship in mid-channel. The colonists adopted the Powhatan "stratagems" of death-by-parley and death-by-hospitality and followed the Indian practice of taking scalps in battle, although Englishmen were not unfamiliar with head-collecting from the Irish wars.

Although Anglo-Powhatan contact would continue to
breed contempt and fuel hatreds, the colonists became purposeful in their violence and accurately gauged the levels of limited force necessary to achieve objectives short of genocide. Appreciating both the strengths and weaknesses of their Indian enemies, the colonists soon realized the impracticality of extermination, as they had earlier done with conversion. Concerned less with extremist, theoretical, and long-term "solutions" to the "Indian problem," Virginia's planters after 1622 sought practical and achievable goals—like the quick but brutal raid against the nearest Indian village—that would not keep them away from their fields for long but would keep the Powhatans away forever.

Even in war, the colonists were committed to avoiding the Indians as much as possible, and they always had to weigh the relative threats to their security with the relative harm that would be done to their tobacco crop by long campaigning. In 1623, Governor Wyatt noted how the planter militiamen "Crye out of the loss of Tyme against their Comanders, in a warr where nothinge is to be gained, and the Chief tyme of doeinge the enymie most spoyle falinge owt to their greatest hindrance."¹


The death of the crusader ideology may be dated in 1625, when the Virginia-English pragmatically concluded an
alliance with the Patawomekes and de-escalated the conflict with the Pamunkeys. Having learned from their recent experiences, the English in Virginia realized that friendship with some Indians was not necessarily a vice or that destruction of all Indians was not necessarily a virtue. Not many Londoners would have understood the attitudes of Virginians like Captain Tucker, who had cruelly poisoned to death his Indian enemies but who simultaneously had an Indian boy living with him. 2

The "death of ideology," as revealed by the colonists' pragmatism and desire to avoid idealistic missions, gained momentum in 1624-1625 with the publications of Francis Bacon, Sir William Alexander, and the Rev. Richard Eburne. 3 Imposing a "new" Indian policy with their ideas, these writers saw the pitfalls in miscarried conversion efforts. Alexander believed that colonists should "possesse themselves" of New World lands "without dispossessing . . . others." The "ruine" of indigenous populations, wrote Alexander, "could give us neither glory nor benefit, since . . . it would breed


infamie." Bacon, too, reflected upon the mistakes of London and Jamestown when he advocated "plantation in a pure soil; that is, where people are not displaced, . . . for else it is rather an extirpation than a plantation." Eburne joined Bacon in committing heresy against Hakluytian idealism when he promoted future colonization in areas, like Newfoundland, which had no indigenous native populations.

As much as they differed on details and in orientation, these imperialist theorists and the Virginia colonists had a similar point to make in 1625. Henceforth, the idealistic policy of converting New World Indians would be replaced by a pragmatic policy of avoiding contact with Indians altogether. As was the case with Virginia's example by 1625, the success of an English colony was deemed more important than the success of a Christian mission.

This perspective was only one manifestation of the many changes that took place in Virginia's "crisis period" between 1622 and 1625. This compressed but revolutionary "era" had such a profound impact upon Mangopeesomon's Virginia, Wyatt's Virginia, Sandys's company, and James I's

4 Alexander, Encouragement to Colonies, 37-38.


6 Eburne, Pathway to Plantations, ed. Louis B. Wright, Folger Shakespeare Library Documents of Tudor and Stuart Civilization (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), xxiv, xxx-xxxii, 125-128. Alexander, later earl of Stirling and Canada, actively promoted colonization in the areas of "New Scotland" (Nova Scotia) and Canada.
England that it should be interpreted as an authentic historical watershed. An analysis of the Virginia Company, as it approached its less-than-graceful death, and of the Virginia colony, as it achieved new life, will reveal the revolutionary aspects of these years.

The Virginia Company of London, for over a decade-and-a-half the primary promulgator of colonization ideology, was the most obvious casualty of the Powhatan Uprising. Dissolved in May 1624 as a direct result of events in 1622, the company, in essence, was a victim of suicide. The most damning aspects of its history were illuminated by its own members, as factions exposed the fallacies and the failures of others to the destruction of each and all. The company died not because it was evil or inherently corrupt, but because it had become irrelevant to England's post-uprising colonization efforts. The company failed because its goals no longer received popular support, the primary power base it had always

7 The downfall of the company was charted as follows:
1. The Harvey Commission (Oct. 24, 1623) investigated the dire conditions in Virginia;
2. The Sir William Jones Commission (May 9, 1623) investigated abuses within the company and the receiver;
3. The Virginia Company was dissolved, May 24, 1624;
4. The Mandeville Commission (June 24, 1624) was set up to reform government in Virginia.

needed and depended upon. In desperation, when near death, the company tried to rally public opinion once more, still believing that the old tenets of the Hakluytian ideology would enlist both popular and crown support. It was in this last, futile attempt to arouse interest in an outmoded formula that revealed the disease that killed the company: the symptoms were those not of chronic hypocrisy but of terminal myopia.

The Virginia Company had always believed in its mission. Idealism and ideology had always plagued it. Indeed, how else does one explain why powerful and successful peers, gentlemen, and merchants pursued a difficult and masochistic policy of Indian conversion when the Spaniards had long before demonstrated the efficacy of rape, war, and pillage? Or how does one explain why such generally capable bureaucrats advocated the production of impractical staples like wine, silk, and even licorice, to the exclusion of tobacco, Virginia's real "gold"? Unshaken to the end were the company's commitments to its national and religious mission.

Given this orientation of idealism and conviction, the company directors sincerely perceived the Powhatan Uprising in terms of "shame and reproach"—an event bringing "detriment" to the colony and "dishonor" to England. 8 In 1622,

8Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, May 2, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 163; [Robert Johnson], "An Answeare to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, ibid., 134.
the directors drew upon all of the optimism and idealism of past days in writing that "the late calamities that have befallen do much grieve but no whit daunt us, for we see no danger but rather advantage to be made thereby." In the aftermath of the tragic uprising, the company felt compelled to urge its colonists to "really demonstrate that your intentions are all one the advancement of Gods glorie, and the service of his Royall Majestie." However, the company had lost its capacity to comfort or encourage the colonists. In the wake of the Powhatan Uprising, the Virginia Company's naive idealism struck the colonists as insincere, irrational, or irrelevant.

The bodies of the English dead had barely been buried in 1622, and in many parts of Virginia the Powhatans were still "ripping open our gutts," as one colonist phrased it, when the company directors urged the colony to continue work on the Indian college, because "it was the best fire that maintaines the action here [i.e., in England]." Such a position, although infuriating to the Virginians, was quite consistent with company policy. As the enthusiastic response

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10 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, May 2, 1623, ibid., IV, 163.

11 William Capps to John Ferrar, Elizabeth City, Mar. 31, 1623, ibid., 76.

12 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 1, 1622, ibid., III, 670.
from the English populace had demonstrated over the years, the religion-connected college project and the Christian mission to the Indians were, in fact, the salvation of the corporation, ideologically and financially.

Since 1607, the Virginia Company had been the primary source of information on the Powhatans' "needs" for the English citizenry, but in 1622, the Indians had severely undercut the company's position. There could be no "mission" without willing Indians, and it was obvious to most Englishmen after 1622 that the company's single greatest raison d'etre—the goal to convert and civilize the Powhatans—had vanished. In their frustration and impotency, the company directors advanced a variety of often contradictory positions, reflecting both the hard-line extermination views of Waterhouse's *Relation of the Massacre* and a more traditionally idealistic perspective.

In 1623, the company strongly restated its view that honor to God, through Indian conversion, should be Virginia's first priority, followed by "the good of our subjects" (investors and colonists, in that order). In the same year, the company directors petitioned King James, emphasizing again their commitment to the "Glorious worke" of conversion. They declared that the colony's future development on the company model would be a "Constant Monument" to the king's

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"Glorious name forever." And in a 1624 petition to the House of Commons, the company stated how Virginia, "the first Plantation of the reformed Religion," was a thoroughly Christian endeavor—"not simply a matter of Trade, but of a higher Nature." Noting how "distempered" the corporation was at that time, company leaders sought Parliament's help, because "unable to be . . . our owne Phisitians . . . [we] doe thinke our selvs tyed in Conscience, Duty and reputation [to make this plea] . . . for the deliverance of our owne soules, and for discharg of the trust reposed in us."15

When the company finally died, ignored and unmourned, the ideology it had propagated so well for so long became a dead letter. Of course, ideology, per se, did not pass from the scene, but as an effective, purposeful vehicle for promoting and advancing colonization, the old Elizabethan concepts were finished. Ironically, before the collapse of the Virginia Company, the corporate directors saw their own ideas used as a weapon against them by the one group in England more ideologically rigid and purist than they—the London clergy.

14 "Declaration of the Present State of Virginia . . . presented to the King . . . ," recorded in Virginia Company court minutes, Apr. 12, 1623, ibid., II, 351.

In November 1622, the Rev. John Donne, Dean of St. Paul's, preached his famous "suburbs of the old world" sermon to assembled members of the Virginia Company. \(^{16}\) Donne, who had almost certainly read Waterhouse's account, condemned company directors for their decision to abandon their praiseworthy religious mission for quick revenge and less idealistic goals. \(^{17}\) "Be you not discouraged," he wrote,

if the promises which you have made to yourselves, or to others, be not so soon discharged; . . . . Only let your principal end be the propagation of the glorious Gospel.

. . .

God says to you, No kingdom, not ease, not abundance; nay nothing at all yet; the plantation shall not discharge the charges, not defray itself yet; . . . . \(^{18}\)

According to Donne, temporal desires should never be allowed to overshadow spiritual goals, and in that context, the post-uprising mood in England reflected corruption. With the persistence of Hakluyt, Donne admonished the company for their declining idealism: "Let not the riches and commodities of this world, be in your contemplation in your adventures." \(^{19}\)

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\(^{16}\) John Donne, *A Sermon upon the viii Verse of the I Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles* (London, 1622). The text of Acts 1:8 reads: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth."


\(^{19}\) *Ibid.*, 226.
The Holy Ghost enables your conscience to say, [Donne observed], that your principal end is not gain, nor glory, but to gain souls to the glory of God; this seals the great seal, this justifies justice itself, this authorises authority, and gives power to strength itself. 20

Finally, to punctuate his criticisms, Donne sternly reminded the company members of a crucial fact of their existence: "In this city [London], you have taken away a great part of the revenue of the preacher, to yourselves." 21

Invaluable disciples for promoting company projects over the years, the London clergy were thoroughly disgruntled by 1624. It was a combination of dire reports from the colony after the uprising and the ensuing factionalism and unsavory conduct of the Virginia Company—not its ideology—that lost it support. The reputation of colony and company, alike, were at their nadir, the once-glorious enterprise having been "crossed by the Incursion of the Savages abroad, and by the division of their Owners at home." 22 In July 1623, John Chamberlain reported how the factions in those two companies [Bermuda and Virginia] are growne so violent as Guelfs and Gebelines were not more animated one against the other, and they seldom meet upon the Exchaunge or in the streets but they brabble and quarrell, so that yf that societie be not dissolved the sooner, or cast in a new mould, worse effects may follow then the whole business is worth. 23

20 Ibid., 235.
21 Ibid., 236.
22 Alexander, Encouragement to Colonies, 29.
23 Chamberlain to Sir Dudley Carleton, July 26, 1623,
Company critics of the Sandys regime and external critics of the company stood in line to chastise the sinking corporation after 1622. Robert Johnson, of Sir Thomas Smythe's faction, condemned Sir Edwin Sandys for wasting £90,000 and killing some three thousand colonists in his rash projects since 1619. He noted that under Smythe, Virginia had enjoyed a "moste hopefull and comfortable Course for many years togeather with unity and love amongst ourselves, and quyett entertainment of those Savadg Indians by which . . . some . . . were converted to Christian religion." This was in marked contrast to the present situation under Sandys, where "Civill discord and dissention amongst ourselves and . . . Massacre and Hostility between the Natives and our Colony" were the dominant trends.

Outside criticism of both Smythe and Sandys came from that long-suffering hero, Capt. John Smith, who wrote that


24 [Robert Johnson], "Answeare to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 150. In their defense, the Sandys faction contended that Smythe had spent £80,000 to place 600 people in Virginia in 11 years, while Sandys had spent only £30,000 and transported 2,500 colonists in 3 years. "A Declaration of the Present State of Virginia humbly presented to the Kings most excellent Majestie by the Company for Virginia," compiled Dec. 1622, read in company court, Apr. 12, 1623, ibid., II, 348.

the purses and lives [of the colonists] were subject to some few here in London who... consumed all in Arguments Projects, and their own conceits: every year trying new conclusions... ...

We [in Virginia] did admire [wonder] how it was possible such wise men could so torment themselves and us with such strange absurdities and impossibilities,... [such as] obtaining Charters for Universities [and] Free-scholes... before there was either people, students, or schollers to build or use them... [A]ll the world could not have devised better courses to bring us to ruine than they did. 26

All the criticism took its toll. Soon, the "disgrace of the Plantation spread amongst the Common sort of people" and the company's actions became "opprobriously calumniated." 27 In 1624, the inevitable, crushing blow descended: "Preachers of note in this Cittie [London] that had begunne... to pray continually for Virginia, lefte quite the remembrance of it; finding the Action to grove either odious or contemptible in mens minds." 28

Bankrupt in clerical backing, popular support, internal unity, and funds, the Virginia Company of London died in 1624. Not surprisingly, the colonists in Virginia were among the first to recognize the "odious" aspects of the company.

26 Capt. John Smith, Advertisements For the unexperienced Planters of New-England, or any where... (London, 1631), 3-5.

27 Virginia Company petition to Privy Council, Apr. (?) 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 526. The company believed that Nathaniel Butler's "Unmasked Face... of Virginia" had done much to ruin its public reputation. Company quarter court, May 14, 1623, ibid., II, 430.

28 Virginia Company petition to Privy Council, Apr. (?) 1625, ibid., IV, 526.
that contributed to its downfall. In the crisis period of 1622-1625, the colony and the company clashed over a variety of issues, as the colonists pushed for self-determination and the London directors increased their irritating intrusions into Virginia's affairs. The company in that era was less the "carefull Nurse and tender Mother" of Virginia\(^\text{29}\) than it was a meddling, senile old hag who neither loved nor understood her offspring.

The Virginia Company, which many claimed had gone bankrupt because of the "vaynglory" and the "vast and wilde projects" of Sandys,\(^\text{30}\) proved totally incapable of reacting to crisis pragmatically or effectively. When in 1623, the colonists begged for food in the midst of famine and plague, the company directors complained that they only made a 25 per cent profit on meal and asked to be "freed from those unjust and most undeserved taxations of oppression."\(^\text{31}\) It was private individuals and plantation investors who dispatched food to save the Virginians;\(^\text{32}\) the company sent three Bibles, two

\(^{29}\)\text{Ibid.}, 527.

\(^{30}\)\text{Sir Nathaniel Rich, "Draft of Instructions to the Commissioners Investigating Affairs in Virginia," Apr. 14, 1623, ibid., 117.}

\(^{31}\)\text{Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 6, 1623, ibid., 264.}

\(^{32}\)\text{See "List of Subscribers and Subscriptions for Relief of the Colony," July 4, 1623, ibid., 245-248, 257-258. Between Apr. and July 1623, over £700 worth of food and goods were pledged to the colony. Individually, the company leaders did show compassion for the colonists. Sandys and the Ferrars pledged £140 of their own funds for Virginia. ibid., 247.}
copies of the Book of Common Prayer, and a copy of Ursinus his Catechisme (Oxford, 1591). As for the high mortality and horrid living conditions in Virginia, the company wrote: "We can give no other helpe then our humblest prayers . . . , nor other Counsell, then that . . . you labor to apeare the wrath of God, that burneth so fiercely."34

When the company directors did take action, they often exercised dubious judgment. After the king had granted a supply of arms desperately needed in Virginia, the company held back one hundred muskets and fifty pikes for the relatively secure planters in Bermuda.35 The company's plan to send four hundred young men to the colony was never carried out,36 and a later group of one hundred tenants gathered together by the City of London for relief of Virginia was diverted by the company to Bermuda.37 Although the company was not directly responsible for the explosion of a Virginia-bound provisions ship, in which £500 worth of supplies were lost, the accident symbolized its incompetence in dealing with

33 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 6, 1623, ibid., 271.
34 Ibid., 263.
crises. 38

The company directors, in various stages of post-uprising relations with the colony, could be capriciously callous, casual, and critical. In 1623, it was reported that the company's "Nobillytie and gentry are most of them absent in the Vacation when yet divers weighty and urgent businesses happen." 39 At the other extreme was the erratic and insufferable meddling of the company "experts" on colonial affairs. Without consulting with colony officers, the company in May 1622 appointed Capt. Samuel Each, master of the "plague ship" Abigail, to build a blockhouse/fort near Blunt Point as protection against Spanish invasion. 40 For this seemingly ill-timed project, the company assessed the colony sixty-four thousand pounds of tobacco (at 3d./lb.)—more than existed in all of Virginia at that date. 41 Predictably, the project soon miscarried. The incompetent Captain Each attempted to build the fort on a shoal of oyster banks—"a fort in the Sea . . . a Castle in the aire," chided George Sandys—

38 Capt. Miles Kendall to Sir Edwin Sandys, Bermuda, Apr. 15, 1623, ibid., IV, 120.
39 Virginia Company court, June 23, 1623, ibid., II, 447.
40 Virginia Company preparative court, May 20, 1622, ibid., II; company to governor and council in Virginia, Oct. 7, 1622, ibid., III, 685.
41 Gov. Wyatt to George Wyatt, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., IV, 236; governor and council to company, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 100-101. Gov. Wyatt found a "generall unwillingness (not to say an opposition)" among the colonists to pay for Each's fort. Governor and council to company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, ibid., IV, 454.
and, facing disgrace, "the Captaine dyed, to save his credit, soone after." 42

On another occasion, in March 1622/23, the company coerced George Sandys to relocate the poorly provided college tenants on the university lands, which remained vulnerable to Indian attack. "I like not this strageling," wrote Sandys of the order. "If all had beene of my minde, I would rather have disobayed your commaunds, then subjected the Collony to such disorder and hazards." 43 An experienced colonist was proven correct: six of the relocated tenants were killed within the year, almost half of the total number lost to the Indians in 1623 within the bounds of the colony. 44

The Virginia Company's 1623 orders to Governor Wyatt to organize a militia of five hundred trained and equipped troops and to levy every fifth man in the colony to work on Each's fort also displayed insensitivity to Virginia's

42 George Sandys to Sir Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., IV, 74; governor and council to Virginia Company, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 100. Capt. Roger Smith was assigned to build a later fort on solid ground not far from this location.


44 List of the Dead in Virginia, Feb. 1623/24, in John Camden Hotten, comp., Original Lists of Persons of Quality . . . and Others Who Went to the American Plantations, 1600-1700, 2d ed. (New York, 1880), 189. George Sandys was com­mitted to compact settlements as the way to prosperity and se­curity, and he was dismayed when the company ordered re-occu­pation of dispersed plantations so soon after the uprising. To Sandys, dispersing the population was like throwing "quick­silver . . . into the fire." Sandys to Samuel Wrote, Mar. 28, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 66.
problems. If company recommendations were carried through Wyatt wrote sarcastically, that "would leave some xx men to guard 40 Plantations, halfe a man to each counting any that were tolerable shott."\(^{45}\) Even more disturbing to the colonists was the company's haughty criticism of their military tactics against the Powhatans. Referring to Captain Tucker's poisoning of the parleying Indians in May 1623, the London directors emphasized that only honorable means should be employed in Virginia. Although they considered the colonists' "resolutions" admirable, the directors noted that Englishmen were "to[o] worthie to use any false dealinge" and stated that the colonists' conduct should reflect "justice and truth."\(^{46}\) To this criticism, Wyatt responded that he and his troops "hold nothinge injuste, that may tend to theire [the Powhatans'] ruine, (except breach of faith)[.] Strata-gems were ever allowed against all enemies, but with these neither fayre Warr nor good quarter is ever to be held."\(^{47}\)

It was natural that the colonists were angered and angered by the company's attitude in 1623, considering the fervent cries for holy war and "fatall revenge" that had proliferated in London only the year before. Officials in the

\(^{45}\) Wyatt to George Wyatt, Apr. 4, 1623, ibid., 237. In Mar. 1622/23, there were only an estimated 180 men available for war, 80 of whom were fit only to be porters on a march. Sandys to Wrote, Mar. 28, 1623, ibid., 67.

\(^{46}\) Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Aug. 6, 1623, ibid., 269-270.

\(^{47}\) Governor and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 30, 1623/24, ibid., 451.
colony were especially sensitive to unfavorable comparisons of Wyatt's troops with those of former governor Sir Thomas Dale. The company wrote in October 1622 that

since the Savadges enmitie could not hinder [Virginia] in the Collonies weakest infan­cie, we cannot thinke it can now do, when the strength thereof is almost ten times doubled, except we should thinke you lesse then they were. 48

In defense of their accomplishments under adverse conditions, the Virginians responded: "What could not wee doe if wee . . . [as Dale] had 500 men at our owne disposure, both fed and appareled out of England?" 49

The many criticisms and insults from the Virginia Com­pany, considering how little it had contributed to the colo­ny's relief, revealed an insensitivity to the colonists' problems. Transatlantic tensions intensified between 1622 and 1625, and company and colony grew increasingly belliger­ent in their attitudes toward the other.

The most serious issue involved the irreconcilable debate over tobacco. The controversy over tobacco production was not restricted to the company courts, as many Englishmen after 1622 saw evil in the cultivation of that staple. But it was the Virginia Company that turned the debate into an irreconcilable issue, interpreting the colonists' attachment to tobacco as a source of rebelliousness and profit-madness.

49 Sandys to Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., IV, 74.
The planters of the "weed" as well as the weed itself gave Virginia the reputation of a Mammon-dominated, evil stewhouse, where chaos reigned and where idealism was sacrificed to crude self-interest. 50 "Tobacco and Sassafras," wrote the company, were "matters of present proffitt, but [are] no wayses fitt foundations of a future State." 51

The production of tobacco was blamed for preventing the necessary diversification of Virginia's economy and for inhibiting the export of other staples desperately needed in England. It was a real dilemma, because the "excessive plantinge of Tobaccoe" had already trapped many Virginians in the cyclical web of overproduction and total dependence. That "the poore planter must either starve or be forced to plant it in greater quantities for his necessarie mayntenance" 52 was an obvious fact. Even so, the company directors were determined not to see their efforts become "vanished into smoke (that is to say into Tobaccoe)," 53 and they continued to hammer away at this economic and moral vice.

50 [Robert Johnson?], "Parts of drafts of a statement touching the miserable condition of Virginia," after May 9, 1623, ibid., 179. Also see, "Draft for the Commissioners of a Preliminary Report on the Conditions of the Colony," June or July 1623, ibid., 215-217.

51 Virginia Company to Privy Council, Apr. (?) 1625, ibid., 521.

52 [Johnson], "Answere to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, ibid., 145.

In 1622, the company advanced ethnocentric arguments against tobacco, which in that year, especially, should have been persuasive:

Surely there is some such sorcery in this weed; it was first sown (it seems) by some Indian Enchanters hand, with spels and Magicke verses, or otherwise you could never so much dote on it. For all the fruit of this, it is but smoke, which vanishes, and likely will not always last . . . . Doe not then still Ixion like, imbrace a cloud, for Iuno, and smoake, for substance. 54

Certainly by 1625, if not well before, the homeland-English were overwhelmingly opposed to the "smoakie Witch"—tobacco. Three influential writers with different orientations—the Rev. Samuel Purchas, Capt. John Smith, and Bacon—all denounced tobacco to varying degrees. Purchas concentrated on the immoral influences that tobacco ("fume-some-froth-spirits") had on smokers as well as growers, 55 while Bacon's essay, "Of Plantations," saw in Virginia's devotion to tobacco a prime example of an "untimely prejudice of the main business" of colonization. He, like Purchas, advocated a diversified economy in which tobacco, representing the gain of the few and the pain of many, would have no place. 56

54 Ibid., 62.
55 Samuel Purchas, "Virginias Verger, Or a Discourse shewing the benefits which may grow to this Kingdome from . . . Virginia . . . ," in Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes, 20 vols., XIX (Glasgow, 1906 [orig. publ. 4 vols., London, 1625]), 251.
56 Bacon, "Of Plantations," in Essays of Bacon, intro. Morley, 73. Also see, Purchas, Pilgrimes, XIX, 266-267 and passim.
Smith was divided in his loyalties to Virginia, his love of practicality, and his personal dislike of tobacco as a staple. Like the others, Smith saw little future in a "furnish foundation" of "small stability," yet he could not ignore the fact that the colonists put tobacco profits to good use and "have builded many pretty Villages, faire houses, and Chapels, which are growne good Benefices of 120. pounds a yeare." In 1630, Smith advised the colonists to diversify their economy out of self interest, recognizing that market fluctuations would increasingly make tobacco cultivation a risky proposition.

But Smith's rather balanced appraisal was the exception. Most contemporary Englishmen, like the Virginia Company directors, were vehemently opposed to tobacco and critical of those who grew it. This continuing criticism was symptomatic of the many issues growing in intensity by 1625. It also demonstrated the persistent tendency to find fault with the colony rather than trying to understand its unique problems and needs.

57 Smith, Advertisement For unexperienced Planters, 33.
58 Capt. John Smith, The True Travels, Adventures, and Observations of Captaine John Smith (London, 1630), 45. Smith realized that as long as tobacco maintained a high market value, the planters would continue to believe it would "furnish them with all things." Until corn or other commodities attained competitive value, "there will be little or nothing to any purpose." Smith, The Generall Historie of Virginia, New-England, and the Summer Isles (London, 1624), 165.
The Virginia Company's directors represented the prevailing opinion in England when they minimized the day-to-day travails and tragedies endured by their countrymen across the sea. Choosing to ignore and discount the dire reports issuing from the colony, the company, it was said, believed "all the world was Oatmeale there." 

Committed as they were to old policies and misconceptions, company officials were convinced that Virginia's problems, and thus their own, were caused by unruly tobacco mongers and governmental chaos.

In October 1622, the company accused certain unnamed planters of having subverted Virginia's noble mission—"a horrible Cryme, and treason even against God himself." An incensed Governor Wyatt and his Council of State, in reply to these charges, demanded that the company

poynt owte the man guiltie of that horrible treasone against god himself, since by naminge none you Charge us all, nether know wee any, that we had nott freely adventured them selves, and parted with their particular proffites to advance your designes, and nott their owne gaine.

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59 Smith, Advertisements for unexperienced Planters, 3.
61 Gov. Wyatt and council to Virginia Company, Jan. 20, 1622/23, ibid., IV, 11.
"These and divers other Circumstances Considered," wrote the planters, "wee were in good hope that you woulde not have added sorrow to afflictione, woundinge our reputations with such disgracefull reprooffes, unworthie of our sufferinge yf not of our industrie."  

Dissension mounted. The colonists particularly objected to the company's "censure uppon us as yf we alone were guiltie" of allowing the uprising to happen. After all, they argued, it had been the company's goal to convert the Powhatans and the company's plan to entertain Indians in the colonists' homes. How was it possible, asked Wyatt, to defend the colony against attack when those "secrett Enemies . . . live[d] promiscouslie amongst us and . . . [were] harbored in our bosomes"? In general, Wyatt and other colony leaders were upset with the totality of the company's misinformed and shallow proposals. They stated emphatically that "wee [would] more willinglie suffer a reprooff in preservinge your people, then Comendatione in their hazarde." As for the Virginia Company's inability or unwillingness to provide supplies, the colonists wrote sarcastically:

62 Ibid., 13.
63 Ibid., 10.
64 Ibid., 12.
"If we had knowne yt would have cost you soe much trouble, wee would never have writt for yt."65 Concerning a discrepancy in company revenues from the colony, Wyatt suggested that corporate graft was to blame ("we suppose you have fownd by your officers where the error is").66

The growing antagonism of the Virginia-English, in general, was caused by the company's incompetence, lack of support, bad advice, and misinformed criticisms and, in particular, by the direct and personal attacks on prominent colonists. One member of the company observed that only

utter shippwracke can be expected when at the helme of this Wetherbeaten vessell [Virginia] there sittes scarce one able and experienced Councellor to guide her but all of them generallie either newe Commers or men of Contemplation and discourse and not of action or experience in government.67

In an alleged atmosphere of reform, the company in October 1622 decided to investigate charges that planters "did allure and beguile divers younge persons . . . to serve them upon intollerable and unchristianlike conditions."68

Sir George Yeardley was assessed £224 4s. 6d. for allegedly

65Ibid., 14.

66Ibid., 16.

67[Johnson], "Answeare to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, ibid., 147.

68Virginia Company court, Oct. 23, 1622, ibid., II, 113. On alleged abuses to tenants, see company preparative court, Nov. 18, 1622, ibid., 129-130.
commandeering some fifty company tenants for his own use. And when Christopher Davison, secretary of the Council of State, complained that he was short of tenants due him by right of office, the company denied his request for more men, because he "had not performed his service above halfe the time."69 The directors even berated Governor Wyatt, the most honest and honorable official in the colony:

To speake plainly, we shall never believe nor dare to attempt any thing of great engagement and hazard, till by reall example of some extraordinarie worke by you effected, we may have proofe of the sinceritie of your intentions and assurance not to be deluded and frustrated.70

Although the company may have been correct in its condemnations of men like Yeardley and Davison, the London directors were very unfair and shortsighted in their criticisms of Governor Wyatt. That such a competent, learned, and well-connected individual could be basely charged with subverting the company's ill-conceived programs revealed the depth of suspicion and misunderstanding dividing the two groups of Englishmen. The Powhatan uprising exacerbated a basic discrepancy between the

69 Virginia Company extraordinary court, Oct. 7, 1622, ibid., 108, 109. Yeardley had already sent 3333 lbs. of tobacco to cover his debt, but its market value (£275) was far short of the tenants' worth (£500). Ibid., 108.

70 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Oct. 7, 1622, VCR, III, 686. Although they claimed to have approved of his administration of the colony, the London company directors in 1624 continued Wyatt as governor "of necessity," because they had no funds for equipping and transporting a new man. Virginia Company court, Apr. 1624, ibid., II, 537.
perceptions and goals of the Virginia-English and the homeland-English, but it also brought revolutionary changes that created an unprecedented chasm in perspective. Wyatt and his kinsman, George Sandys, had been regarded as intelligent and loyal company officials beyond repute in 1621, and yet after only two years in Virginia, both men were siding with the colonists and were being forced to defend their decisions to their employers. The company's agents were now the colony's spokesmen.

In 1624, Wyatt noted that "many things are Principles with us here that are disputed there [in England] as Problemes,"71 and observed the growing "Antipathy . . . betweene theyr vast Commands and our grumbling Obedience."72 In 1623 he had written to his father: "I often wish little Mr. Farrar here, that to his zeale he would add knowledge of this Contrey."73 George Sandys agreed with Wyatt that the company's endless and erroneous advice reflected the "disposition of those who glory in their wise-domes, . . . [who] will rather Justifie and proceed in their Errors then to suffer a supposed disgrace by reformeing them."74

71Wyatt to [earl of Southampton?], summer 1624, in William and Mary Quarterly, 2d Ser., VI (1926), 120.
72Wyatt to George Wyatt (father), Apr. 4, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 237.
73Ibid.
74George Sandys to Sir Miles Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 71.
The London directors, Sandys observed, "impute the fault to the execution, when it is indeed in the project." 75 The instructions from the company were considered "infeasible and . . . most inconvenient," for the directors knew "nothing of Virginia nor will [they] believe anie thing from us that is not answerable to their former Conceptions." 76

What Wyatt and Sandys represented was the ability to adapt to new experiences and to make the best of crisis situations. Although they were relative newcomers to Virginia, they soon became the articulate torchbearers of the colony's "pragmatic revolution." The pre-1622 growth of private enterprise and personal fulfillment in Virginia assumed unprecedented proportions because of the unsettling events of 1622-1625. There was nothing in the old Elizabethan ideology of colonization that could have prepared the homeland-English for the "shocking," disconcerting changes of this era. Mangopeesomon's rebellion and Virginia's subsequent, internal "revolution" proved too much for the undeviating and outdated "former Conceptions" of the company directors. When the Virginia Company

75Sandys to Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 73.

76Sandys to Miles Sandys, ibid., 71. George Sandys believed that Virginia's problems were caused by "too much vaine glorie and presumption at home." Sandys to Samuel Sandys, Mar. 30, 1623, ibid., 74; also see Sandys to Samuel Wrote, Mar. 28, 1623, ibid., 65.
finally died in 1624, it fell victim to manifold changes, disruptive events, and ideas whose time had come.

It was in this sense that the "dissolution of the Virginia Company was a momentous event in the intellectual history of modern Europe." According to Perry Miller's eloquent analysis of this era, the demise of the company "was a turning point, . . . because it shattered the immense conception of the colonial impulse which the Virginia writers had constructed in terms of a medieval, hierarchical, providential universe." But the company's dissolution, for all its "epochal significance," was only a result, not the cause, of Virginia's independent development after 1622. It was the Powhatan Uprising that both unleashed the company's self-destructive urges and accelerated Virginia's evolution from a "holy experiment to a commercial plantation."78

The Powhatan Uprising had produced a "sodayne alteration of the State of all things" in Virginia, but it was believed at the time that the "sheeding of this blood wilbe the Seed of the Plantation, for the addition


78Ibid., 139.

of price, hath much endeared the purchase." 80 In 1624, commissioner John Harvey noted that "were the Indians driven of[f] from infesting our people and Cattle, . . . in two or 3 yeares, . . . then the Plantation with good government would undoutedly flourish." 81 But by the very next year, English Virginia was already becoming a secure and prosperous homeland for many colonists. After enduring and mastering the individual and collective tragedies of famine, plague, and war that had racked the colony since 1622, the Virginians were, as Governor Wyatt wrote, anxious to "quicken our new springinge hopes." 82 Counting their blessings and looking optimistically to a brighter future, many in Virginia could personally vouch for the fact that "warre [was] . . . the universall Chirurgeon of . . . di-tempered times." 83 As anthropologist Robert Redfield observed:

True warfare is . . . recognized in those military activities in which . . . the rivalries of two culturally different groups are put to the test of armed conflict... . It both destroys and constructs societies. 84

80 Virginia Company to governor and council in Virginia, Oct. 7, 1622, ibid., III, 683.

81 John Harvey to Sir Nathaniel Rich, Apr. 24, 1624, ibid., IV, 476.

82 Governor and council to Privy Council, Apr. 6, 1626, ibid., 572-573.

83 Alexander, Encouragement to Colonies, 5.

The colonists emerged from three years of fighting to discover a colony much changed by events of the crisis period. Instead of the many dispersed plantations that had formed a tenuous ribbon of settlement up and down both banks of the James before the uprising, several "clustered" communities were thriving in its aftermath. The major pre-1622 settlements at Jamestown and Elizabeth City had attracted the uprising refugees, exploited the linear resources of riverine communication and transportation, and developed into stable, populous, and affluent zonal resource centers.

Jamestown, with a 1625 population of 122 men, 53 women, 33 houses, and 183 cattle, was a populous capital; in its suburbs of Pasbehegh, the Main, Neck-of-Land, and Hogg Island lived an additional 183 persons, making the area a self-sufficient community. The Corporation of Elizabeth City in 1625 supported 235 free adult inhabitants, 157 servants, 43 children, 2 Indians, and 6 Blacks. It had 99 dwellings of all sorts, 21 storehouses, and a variety of livestock; 12,000 acres were patented here.

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and most were under cultivation. 88 Elizabeth City, proper, as early as 1623, was said to have been "soe well disposed that . . . well governed men may enjoy their healths and live as plentifully as in any parte of England." 89 This glowing appraisal was apparently accurate, for within the secure confines of Elizabeth City in 1625 lived twenty-four individuals who had come to Virginia before 1610. 90 When settlements west of the Southampton River were included, the "metropolitan area" of Elizabeth City consisted of 375 persons, a sizeable percentage of Virginia's total population in 1625. 91 (See Table VII.1)

The development of Jamestown and Elizabeth City reflected the downstream, eastern focus of English settlement after the uprising. 92 The value of defensible positions and security-in-numbers became apparent after

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88 Quisenberry, "Virginia Census," VMHB, VII (1899-1900), 266-367; Alexander Brown, First Republic in America (Boston, 1898), 623-624; Muster of 1624/25, in Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 48-66.


91 Hecht, "Virginia Muster of 1624/25," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 73.

92 Wesley Frank Craven, Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689 (Baton Rouge, 1949), 173; Fausz, "Patterns of Settlement," chap. 4.
**TABLE VII.1: DISTRIBUTION OF VIRGINIA POPULATION, 1625**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporation</th>
<th>Settlement</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henrico</td>
<td>College Land</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles City</td>
<td>Neck-of-Land</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>West &amp; Shirley</td>
<td>61</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan's Journey</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaplain's Choice</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Piersey's Hundred</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James City</td>
<td>James City</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jamestown Island</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paspaheghs</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor's Land</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Main</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. Pott's</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neck-of-Land</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Archer's Hope</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burrow's Mount</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pace's Paines</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Smith's Plantation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edward Blaney's</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mathew's Plantation</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crowder's Plantation</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasurer's Land</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treasurer's, James City</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hogg Island</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mulberry Island</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Warraskoyack</td>
<td>31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth City</td>
<td>Elizabeth City</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Company Land</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Newport News</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Shore</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Totals       | 1216                         | 100.0      |

Based on Irene W. D. Hecht, "The Virginia Muster of 1624/25 As a Source for Demographic History," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 73.
the 1622 attack, since both Jamestown and Elizabeth City had emerged from that tragedy virtually unscathed. The only settlements of note in the western, upstream portions of the James River by 1625 were in the vicinity of Charles City. Four settlements here represented the third major population/resource cluster, although they were not communities in the traditional sense. Neck-of-Land near Charles City, favorably located at the confluence of the Appomattox and James rivers, had sixteen dwellings, much livestock and poultry, and a population of forty-four in 1625. Nearby were the thriving plantations of West and Shirley Hundred, Jordan's Journey, and Flowerdieu Hundred, which together accounted for 235 individuals in the census of 1624/25.93

By 1625, then, the three regional clusters of James City, Elizabeth City, and Charles City were the marrow of English colonization in Virginia. (See Map VII.1) Until the mid- to late-1630's, virtually all patentees of land limited their acquisitions to these regions. Except for the occasional grants of land on the Eastern Shore and along the York, Rappahannock, and Potomac Rivers, new patents in the decade after 1625 were all located within a dozen miles of Jamestown Island, in the Appomattox

93Hecht, "Virginia Muster of 1624/25," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 73. Also see Quisenberry, "Virginia Census," VMHB, VII (1899-1900), 366-367.
MAP VII.1 THE MARROW OF ENGLISH COLONIZATION IN VIRGINIA, circa 1625

- Piersey's Hundred
- West and Shirley Hundred
- Truelove's Neck-of-Land
- Jordan's Journey

- Paspaheghs
- Neck-of-Land
- The Main
- Jamestown

- Corporation of Charles City
- Corporation of James City
- Hogg Island
- Newport News
- Settlements west of Southampton River

- Elizabeth City

F. Fausz
River basin within the Corporation of Charles City, or in the vicinity of Nansamund on the south bank of the James River.\textsuperscript{94}

The colony's settlement patterns had been "revolutionized" by the Powhatan Uprising. But even more dramatic changes occurred with regard to Virginia's population between 1622 and 1625. Although some scholars have overlooked the uprising's significant effect on Virginia's population trends,\textsuperscript{95} the ramifications of warfare, plague, and famine were not lost on contemporaries.

The colony suffered some one thousand deaths in 1622 alone, and in 1623, an additional four to five hundred people died, including thirty-seven killed by Indians.\textsuperscript{96} Few colonists in 1622 could appreciate Waterhouse's prediction that the "losse of this blood . . . [will] make the body more healthfull," but two years later they were beginning to.\textsuperscript{97} In 1624, the situation

\textsuperscript{94}Fausz, "Patterns of Settlement," 58-62.

\textsuperscript{95}Most notably Hecht, "Virginia Muster of 1624/25,"\textit{ WMQ}, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 65-92, who did not appreciate the devastating effects of the uprising for the population she was analyzing. To generalize about Virginia's pre-uprising demographic trends from post-uprising evidence is as inaccurate as generalizing about Hiroshima's 1941 population using data from 1946.

\textsuperscript{96}List of the Dean in Virginia, 1623/24, in Hotten, comp.,\textit{ Original Lists}, 189-195. Sixteen were slain in the colony, 21 were slain on Spelman's ill-fated expedition to Patawomeke.

\textsuperscript{97}Edward Waterhouse,\textit{ Declaration of the Present State of the Colony and . . . a Relation of the Barbarous Massacre} (London, 1622), 23.
improved, as mortality declined substantially. In the year covered by the first census, there were only 121 reported deaths, a mere handful of which (13) were attributed to Indian attack.98

At the end of 1622, Virginia's population may have been as high as eighteen hundred, which, although "farre short" of company "Conjectures" (twenty-five hundred), may still have been inflated. George Sandys, in mentioning that at least five hundred had died of disease, noted that there were probably not another five hundred "able men" left in the colony by early 1623.99 At the end of that year, Virginia's population was approximately fifteen hundred, and at the end of 1624, it had dropped to the level of between twelve and thirteen hundred.100 But by the beginning of 1625, the population of the colony had truly stabilized. Capt. John Harvey estimated that there were now some seven hundred "able men" in Virginia.101


101 Quoted in Greene and Harrington, American Population, 136.
That was a significant and revealing fact. For the uprising and related crises had allowed to survive precisely those individuals who could make the most of survival. By early 1625, Virginia's English population was decidedly young and male. Some 49 per cent of the male population was between the ages of 20 and 29, and 47 per cent of the total population was in the same age group. Close to 77 per cent of the colony's population consisted of men and boys. Sextist stereotypes notwithstanding, this was an aggressive aggregate in a land that rewarded aggressiveness.

Although the "Lushious smell/of that delicious Land" had proven all too fleeting for hundreds of Virginians, an improvement in the mortality rate and a simultaneous end to the crisis period rewarded the fortunate survivors with unprecedented opportunities for advancement. Given the survival of large numbers of men anxious to make their fortune, and a corresponding end to crisis and high mortality, it followed that Virginia's economy would take off after the Powhatans had been beaten back. All the factors were right for an unprecedented "boom."

Virginia's most important, mushrooming growth was a post-uprising phenomenon. Although Edmund S. Morgan dated an

102 Hecht, "Virginia Muster of 1624/25," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXX (1973), 71, Table 1.
103 Ibid., 70.
earlier "boom" in 1618, the trends prior to 1622 were relatively insignificant compared to what followed in the wake of the Powhatan Uprising. The earlier boom was little more than a whisper; the post-uprising boom was a thunderous roar.

Of course, tobacco had been enshrined as the prime staple of Virginia--the source of wealth, the foundation of security, and the medium of exchange--before the uprising. In 1618, the colony produced some forty thousand pounds of tobacco (priced at 3s./lb.); in 1620, forty thousand pounds (at prices ranging from 1s.-4s./lb.); and in 1621, fifty-five thousand pounds (at 2s. 2d./lb.). These early trends set the stage for the later boom.

There is no doubt that, while the Virginia Company gave birth to the colony, tobacco gave it mature life in the fullest senses of energy and growth. "Tobacco," according to Darrett Rutman,

was to prove the "sovereign remedy" for Virginia's ills. Its promise of profit was to be the "great cause" so necessary to successful colonization, the dream to prompt the Virginia settler into coming to the New World, building, looking upon what he built as home, and, when danger lurked, militantly and voluntarily defending that home. 106


Tobacco saved the colony in 1622 by providing the needed incentive—the pregnant dreams of quick riches—that sent the colonists to their muskets and not to England-bound ships.

With their thoughts on tobacco, the Virginia-English fought the Powhatans with a special zeal, not because they considered the Indians savage heathens but because they were interfering with profits and hampering progress. Colonists killed Powhatans because they were, by 1622, considered invaders of English Virginia, a Virginia uniquely catering to planter interests. Later, as the Second Anglo-Powhatan War was reaching the stage of a military standoff, tobacco supported the colony's defiance of the company and opened the way for future growth and vitality.

Virginians thus had recognized their avenue of success before 1622, and they refused to stray from the sacred path of quick wealth. The colony's pre- and post-uprising attitudes toward tobacco were the same, and neither company pleas for reform nor Indian rebellion could do much to change them. As George Donne, marshal of Virginia in 1637, observed:

That Slaughter [1622] much abated Adventurers for a while, but afterwards coveting quick retornes for proffitt, they proceeded to new Expedicion without any regard of Meane: [or] any Redresse of auld defaults. 107

"From the standpoint of internal strength and militancy," noted Rutman, "tobacco was to prove almost the coalescing

factor in Virginia that religious fanaticism was to prove in New England. Even in the uprising year of 1622, Virginians produced some sixty thousand pounds of tobacco.

But Virginia's mature and important tobacco "boom" came after the Powhatan Uprising. The pre-1622 tobacco production levels of forty to sixty thousand pounds per annum were paltry compared to later annual rates. In 1623, 134,607 pounds of tobacco were grown and brought between 12d. and 1s. 10d./lb. on the market. The following year, production was up to 203,000 pounds, and the crop was priced at 2s./lb. In 1625, "only" 132,000 pounds were harvested, but the price was again at the 1618 level of 3s./lb. From 1626 to 1628, Virginians produced tobacco at a consistently high annual rate of between three hundred and fifty and five hundred thousand pounds. By 1629, the colony's annual output may have exceeded one million pounds.

The post-uprising rush for profits produced an economic bonanza in every sense. Population increased dramatically,

109 Hecht, "Virginia Colony, 1607-1640," 356-357.
110 Ibid.
112 Hecht, "Virginia Colony, 1607-1640," 199, 357. Also see, Morgan, "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVIII (1971), 177. Of course, as production increased, the price per lb. of tobacco fell, but that decline had only a relative effect on profits. While the 1618 price offered extraordinary profits, the price had to drop precipitously before tobacco would become a liability to growers. Virginians made a
and by 1628-1629, there were probably three to four thousand people in Virginia.\textsuperscript{113} There was an accompanying scramble for land considerable territorial expansion. Close to a million acres had been patented before 1622, but only 12,500 acres had actually been planted during the company years.\textsuperscript{114} However, for the two hundred patentees holding eighty thousand acres by 1625, land represented new profit potential and was more frequently planted.\textsuperscript{115} During Wyatt's term as governor (1621-1626), at least 6,200 acres were granted in 52 separate patents, including 4,000 acres in Elizabeth City alone.\textsuperscript{116}

As reflected by population growth, increasing tobacco production, and land expansion, Virginia was experiencing flush times in the mid-1620s. But the surest indicator of the boom was the unprecedented social mobility that characterized the era. Ignoring the significance of the uprising for launching Virginia's takeoff, Morgan did not investigate all of the factors of social mobility, and, thus, he was unable to pinpoint with any precision the date of the colony's real boom.\textsuperscript{117}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[113] Greene and Harrington, American Population, 136.
\item[114] Wyatt's list of patents, 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 551-558, as computed by Hecht, "Virginia Colony, 1607-1640," 197.
\item[115] Brown, First Republic, 627.
\item[116] Fausz, "Patterns of Settlement," Appendix A, 66.
\item[117] Morgan, "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVIII
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Taking Morgan's own list of "winners in the servant sweepstakes" as evidence of the post-1622 boom, one finds surprising trends. Morgan listed Abraham Piersey, merchant and planter, as having 39 servants in 1625, but he failed to indicate that Piersey acquired 26 of these men only after 1622. Piersey's personal boom, as with many other planters, occurred after the uprising, not before. He had owned a mere two hundred acres in 1619 and lost four servants in the 1622 Indian attack, presumably a large proportion of everyone at his plantation considering its proximity to the decimated college lands. Piersey, as cape-merchant, gained his wealth and tenants from the turmoil of the post-uprising crisis period, when prices were inflationary and hungry laborers were easy prey. It was not until 1625 that Piersey was admitted to Wyatt's Council of State--already the private preserve of the wealthy and powerful--and only after that date did his acreage increase substantially. He patented 1,150 acres in 1626 and also purchased Flowerdieu Hundred from George Yeardley. Considered the "wealthiest resident of


118 Ibid., 188.


120 Waterhouse, Relation of the Massacre, 37.

121 Charles E. Hatch, Jr., The First Seventeen Years: Virginia, 1607-1624, Jamestown 350th Anniversary Booklet,
the Colony at the time,‖122 Piersey died in 1633 and left an estate of £5,000.123

Yeardley, who also held 39 servants in 1625, similarly acquired no fewer than 20 of them between 1620 and 1623.124 He had been governor in 1619 and a successful profiteer, but as his wartime corn expeditions demonstrated, the uprising era offered unlimited opportunities for marketing scarce commodities. Although Yeardley had wealth, power, and status before 1622 (he was only the second man from the 1619 governor's council still in Virginia by 1623), he further increased his position between 1622 and 1625. When he died, his estate was worth £10,000.125

George Sandys (with 17 servants in 1625), Governor Wyatt (with 17), Daniel Gookin (with 20), and Dr. John Pott (with 12 servants) did not arrive in Virginia until 1621, so they did not share in any boom that began as early as 1618. Their personal booms came after, and as a result of, the uprising. Their later wealth and position was based upon

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122 Henry Chandlee Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's: Buried Cities of Romance (Baltimore, 1938), 78.

123 Grant and Munro, eds., Acts of the Privy Council, Col. Ser., I, 189 (entry for June 30, 1633).


the important offices they held and the services they performed in the crisis period. There is little doubt that Sandys, as colony treasurer and the official responsible for allocating and relocating hungry tenants, made his fortune and inflated his status between 1622 and 1626, the date of his departure.  

Upon his return to England, Sandys was appointed a gentleman of the king's privy chamber and lived out his days as a pampered poet and country squire. Pott, who was a councillor in 1621, must have been in frequent demand as one of the colony's only physicians. By 1628, he was acting governor.

Even more conclusive evidence of the post-uprising growth of wealth and status is found in the careers of Wyatt's wartime commanders. According to Morgan's servant list, Capt. Samuel Mathews held 23 servants in 1625; Capt. William Tucker, 17; Capt. Roger Smith, 14; Capt. William Peirce, 13; Capt. William Epps, 13; and Capt. Ralph Hamor, 10. Most of these men were of poor to middling status prior to 1622; all became powerful and influential men between 1622 and 1625.

126 Ibid., 190-191; Richard Beale Davis, George Sandys, Poet-Adventurer (London and New York, 1955), chaps. 6-7.

127 Davis, George Sandys, 227, chaps. 9, 10, passim.

128 Morgan, "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVIII (1971), 191; Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 75.

129 Morgan, "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVIII (1971), 188.
Mathews, Hamor, Peirce, and Tucker all led one or more retaliatory raids against the Indians between 1622 and 1624, and because corn was the sole booty of war, these commanders probably received a handsome personal proportion of that commodity for themselves. These four men, plus Smith, builder of the fort at Warraskoyack, and Epps, in charge of the Eastern Shore settlements, were borough commanders with an intimate knowledge of which planters could or could not support servants in the crisis period.

It is no secret how servants who survived war, plague, and famine came to acquire new masters in this era. In 1623, Hamor had been "miserablie poore," but he evidently prospered as a councillor between 1623 and 1626, the year of his death.130 He left his widow a plot in an exclusive section of James City and two hundred acres on Hogg Island.131 Tucker, as captain of a forty-ton pinnace, had received a governor's commission to trade for Indian corn in December 1621.132 Named to the lucrative post of harbor commander at Elizabeth City after the uprising, Tucker served as a burgess in 1623 and 1625 and became a councillor in 1631/32. He died in London in 1644.133 Peirce was a burgess in 1623 and 1625

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130 Ibid., 191.
131 Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 76.
133 Nell Marion Nugent, comp., Cavaliers and Pioneers: Abstracts of Virginia Land Patents and Grants, 1623-1800, I (Richmond, 1934), xxxi. Twelve of Tucker's servants in 1625
and a councillor in the assemblies of February 1631/32 and February 1632/33. Smith received twelve hundred pounds of tobacco and twelve barrels of maize for constructing the War-raskoyack fort, and he was appointed to Wyatt's Council of State in 1621, where he remained through 1629. Epps, accused of manslaughter in 1619, patented 450 acres on the Eastern Shore in 1626 and became a burgess in 1625.

Of all of Wyatt's officers, Samuel Mathews most clearly made his fortune in the crisis era. In 1620, he had patented land near the Indian village of Arrohattoc and the Henrico College tract. Because of the uprising, Mathews was commissioned to raid his closest Indian neighbors, as well as to relocate the college tenants on his own lands. (Eleven of Mathews's 1625 servants did not arrive in Virginia until after 1621.) Mathews served as a burgess in the assembly of 1623, but as befitting someone of his growing wealth, status, and talents, he was appointed to the governor's council in

arrived in Virginia only after 1621. Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 49.

134 William Waller Hening, comp., The Statutes at Large; being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia ..., I (Richmond, 1809), 153-154, 202-203.

135 Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 79.

136 Hening, comp., Statutes at Large, I, 137.


139 Hatch, First Seventeen Years, 53.

140 Jester and Hiden, Adventurers of Purse and Person, 38.
1624. He remained a councillor and an influential colonist into the 1640s.

The times were right both for men who came to Virginia with a stake and for those who merely survived their colleagues. John Chew, for instance, arrived in Virginia in 1622 with a certain amount of capital, and being a merchant at a propitious time, soon established a warehouse where he traded in meal, corn, wine, and tobacco. Chew was a burgess in 1623, 1625, 1629, and as late as 1642/43. He owned property on Hogg Island and was one of the earliest patentees on the York River. By 1649, he was living on a five hundred-acre estate in Maryland.

Other, more obscure men became socially mobile in the crisis period of high mortality. John Utie was first made a burgess in 1623 and continued in that position until being named to the council in 1631/32. Capt. Nicholas Martiau achieved burgess status in 1623 and served many times after, as did John Southerne, Nathaniel Basse, and others. Lt. Thomas Osborne, master of the college tenants, was elected to the assembly for the first time in 1625 and served in every

141 Morton, Colonial Virginia, I, 107.

142 Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 76-77, 77n. Edward Bennett, another Virginia merchant-planter, held 12 servants in 1624/25; of these, he had acquired 11 between 1621 and 1623. Muster of 1624/25, Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 46.
session through February 1632/33.  

Lt. Thomas Flint, who came to the colony only in 1618, patented one thousand acres in 1628, the largest land grant of that year. He became a burgess in 1629 and served in the General Assembly as late as 1642/43. Robert Poole, the interpreter who had lived many years among the Patawomekes, patented three hundred acres in 1627, the largest grant of that year. Social mobility was a fact of life in post-uprising Virginia. Of forty-one burgesses in the assembly of 1629, seven had been servants only five years earlier.

These men, and many others, represented the wealth and status that the survivors of unprecedented hard times sought and accepted as their right. The period between 1622 and 1625 was so disruptive, socially, politically, and econom-

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144 Muster of 1624/25, Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 64.


146 Hening, comp., Statutes at Large, I, 139, 238-239.

147 Nugent, comp., Cavaliers and Pioneers, I, 8.

cally, that the simple fact of survival gave many individuals a step up into new statuses. Several generous souls after 1622 began the time-honored Virginia tradition of comforting wealthy widows, for in the aftermath of Mangopeesomon's attack, there were widows and second husbands aplenty. Captain Mathews helped his fortunes by marrying Frances Hinton, the twice-widowed former wife of both Nathaniel West of Westover and Abraham Piersey of Piersey's Hundred and Flowerdieu Hundred. 149 Roger Smith married Jane Rolfe, third wife of John Rolfe and the daughter of Capt. William Peirce, commandant of Jamestown; and merchant Edward Blaney wed William Powell's widow. 150 Likewise, William Perry, Chanco's master and Richard Pace's neighbor in March 1621/22, made the best of hard times. Although Perry had been in the colony since 1611, it was only after he married Izabella Pace, widow of Richard, that he achieved real status. Mistress Perry patented a prime tract of land on Jamestown Island in 1627, and William, her new husband, was named commander of "Paces Paines" in 1628. He served as a burgess in October 1629, March 1629/30, and February 1631/32 and was appointed to the Council of

149 Lyon G. Tyler, Cradle of the Republic (Richmond, 1906), 239.

150 Philip L. Barbour, Pocahontas and Her World (Boston, 1970), 214. Mistress Elizabeth Stephens received 1,000 acres when her father died in 1636 and another 500 acres upon the death of her husband in 1637. By 1638, she was Lady Harvey, wife of Sir John Harvey, the governor of Virginia. Jester and Hiden, comps., Adventurers of Purse and Person, 265.
State after 1632. Although his career reflected no boom before 1622, Perry prospered greatly in the aftermath of the uprising. He died a successful planter and colony leader—the epitome of a socially mobile "survivor"—in 1637.

Men like Perry prospered after 1622 because they helped fill a void of leadership and office. Of twenty-two burgesses who had served in the first General Assembly of 1619, only three—Samuel Sharpe, John Polentine, and Tucker—were around to serve in the second assembly in 1623. Similarly, of six councillors in 1619, only Francis West was alive and in Virginia by 1623. However, of the twenty-eight burgesses who served in the first post-uprising assembly, seventeen served again either as burgesses or councillors. This trend represented not only greater political stability, but the jealous preservation of power in fewer and fewer hands. In the census of 1624/25, 48 families carried titles of distinction, and they controlled 266 of some 487 white servants and 20 of the 23 Black servants listed.

151 Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 78n.; Nugent, comp., Cavaliers and Pioneers, I, xxxi.


Virginia's growing power and wealth elite lost no time in erecting monuments to their accomplishments. As early as 1623/24, "New Towne," a compact area on Jamestown Island situated between the ruins of the brick church and Orchard Run, was developed as a prestigious residential section of James City. Here, living side by side, were the holders of authority, the leaders of trade, and the captains of war. Between 1623 and 1628, Yeardley, Councillor Richard Stephens, Hamor, Peirce, Smith, Izabella Perry, and merchants Chew, Blaney, and George Menefie were all neighbors along Backe Street. Two of the most famous residents in 1624 were John Harvey, governor from 1630 to 1635 and again from 1637 to 1639, and his nemesis, Dr. Pott, who lived across the street and who was the man responsible for deposing him in 1635. Wyatt lived near "New Towne" in the "Governor's House," complete with a garden and other amenities. However, the governor did not live in the most famous structure on the island; the military commandant did. The William Peirces reputedly had a house with a dining hall and a garden that yielded one hundred bushels of figs annually. One commentator estimated that to have kept a house as lavishly in

155 See Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 23, 59, 74-77.
157 Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 74.
158 Ibid., 53.
England as the Peirces did in Virginia would have required £300–400.\(^{159}\)

When, in June 1625, Governor Wyatt wrote that "the Colonie was in a hopefull waye and in as good a Conditione as ever,"\(^{160}\) he was as guilty of self-effacement as of understatement. The colony had emerged from the crisis period in a far better condition than ever before, thanks largely to Wyatt's able leadership. According to a variety of eyewitnesses, whose accounts were compiled and interpreted by John Smith, Virginia in the mid- to late-1620s was a model of a successful colony, as measured by individual accomplishment:

Being thus in a manner left to themselves, since then within these foure yeeres [1625–1629], . . . they have increased beyond expectation.

. . .

Their numbers then [in 1627] were about 1500. some say rather 2000. divided into seventeene or eighteene severall Plantations; . . . they have now found meanes to take plentie of fish . . . ; having meanes, they need not want. Upon this River [the James] they sel­dome see any Salvages; . . . [and] no other attempt hath beene made upon them this two or three yeares [1624–1627]. Their Cattle, namely Oxen, Kine, Buls, they imagine to be about 2000. Goats great store and great increase . . . and no fami­ly is so poore, that hath not tame Swine sufficient; and for Poultrie, he is a verie

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\(^{159}\) Smith, True Travels, 44; "Documents, Wyatt," WMQ, 2d Ser., VII (1927), 127; Forman, Jamestown and St. Mary's, 53.

\(^{160}\) Council of State to Commissioners for Affairs in Virginia, June 15, 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 562.
bad husband [that] breedeth not an hundred in a yeere . . .

For bread they have plentie, and so good . . .: divers have much English corne, especially Master Abraham Perce, which prepared this yeere [1627] to sow two hundred acres of English wheat, and as much barley; feeding daily about the number of sixtie persons at his owne charges.

James Towne is yet [1629] their chiefe seat, most of the wood destroyed, little corne there planted, but all converted into pasture and gardens; wherein doth grow all manner of herbs and roots we have in England in abundance, and as good grasse as can be . . .

Master Hutchins saith, they have 2000 Cattle, and about 5000. people; . . . they are able to feed three or foure hundred men more than they have; and . . . this last yeere [1628] was there at least two or three and twenty saile.

No discoveries of any thing more than the curing of Tobacco, by which hitherto, being so present a commodity of gaine, it hath brought them to this abundance; but . . . every one [is] commander of himselfe, to plant what he will. 161

"Every one commander of himselfe," wrote Smith. Even in the late 1620s it was difficult to find pragmatic individualists like the famous captain, men who would praise "those faire plantations of our English Nation," in which "rich and gallant people came . . . who went thither as poore as any Souldier or Sailer, . . . [getting] more in one yeare, than [was possible] . . . by Piracie in seven." 162 For the vast majority of Englishmen, such profit-oriented individualism

161Smith, "Continuation of the Generall Historie of Virginia," True Travels, 42-44.
162Ibid., 60.
was still frowned upon in the decade of the 1620s.

In 1622, Donne had written that

\[
\text{if those that adventure thither [to Virginia], propose to themselves present benefit, and profit, a sudden way to be rich, and an abundance of all desirable commodities from thence, this is to be sufficient of themselves, and to need no man: and to be under no man and to need no man, are the two acceptations of being kings. Whom liberty draws to go, or present profit draws to adventure, are not yet in the right way.} \tag{163}
\]

It had been considered a reproach when, in 1623, the Virginia Company wrote that "the Planter loves his libertye," and it was a harsh rebuke when John Bargrave observed that, in the colony, "extreme libertie . . . [was] worse than extreme Tirranie." Bargrave had even gone so far as to recommend a dictatorship for Virginia, "because desperate diseases must have desperate remidies, poysons expeling poysons when the body of the state and councell is rent and torne . . . into factions."\tag{166}

While Bargrave exaggerated Virginia's internal

\begin{enumerate}
\item[164] [Johnson], "Answeare to a Declaration of the Present State of Virginia," May 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 146.
\item[165] John Bargrave to Lord Treasurer Middlesex, June 10, 1624, ibid., 223-224.
\item[166] Bargrave, "Form of Policy for Virginia," bef. Dec. 7, 1623, ibid., 422-423. Bargrave recommended that "the sworde . . . [must be] put into the handes of some one brave and austere commaunder, whoe . . . executes at an instant." Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
factionalism, there was doubtless much about the colony's post-uprising boom that was cruel and unsavory, although unbiased evidence is scanty. But with all the rhetoric generated against the colony in this era, the fact remains that Governor Wyatt, in 1625, was appointed to continue in office by the king, himself. As the last company governor and the first royal one, as one who was praised by royal commissions, the colonists, and the crown, Wyatt must have done something right during his turbulent administration. 167

Hundreds of Englishmen had died since 1622, but thousands more had died before 1622. Hundreds of colonists had to suffer to enable a minority to prosper after 1622, but thousands suffered before 1622, and almost no one prospered. The important fact was that, between 1622 and 1625, a self-conscious group of successful men demonstrated the efficacy of combining mind and muscle, proving beyond a doubt that Englishmen could prosper in a strange land if they would adapt and accept the land on its own terms. Many armchair theorists in London would denounce the planters' profit-mindedness and their naked pragmatism, but if Virginians were becoming acculturated to the "jungle," at least they were vigorously proud of the results.

The men controlling Virginia's affairs between 1622 and 1626 were a unique transition group. They were neither

167 See J. Frederick Fausz and Jon Kukla, "A Letter of Advice to the Governor of Virginia, 1624," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 104-111.
a wholly cultured, well-connected group of colonial officials, like the Wyatt-Sandys-Thorpe-Pory-Davison ruling elite sent over in 1621, nor a wholly debased collection of profiteers like the Yeardley-Piersey-Mathews plantation elite.168 Rather, the leaders of the 1620s—"Wyatt's men"—represented a combination of the talents and interests of both groups. Wyatt and Sandys—Virginia's literati—survived the pre-uprising Council of State, which was in a shambles after 1622, while Mathews, Menefie, and others enjoyed profitable, if somewhat disreputable, careers well into the 1630s and 1640s.169 But for a brief time in the crisis era and after, the diverse backgrounds, talents, goals, and personal morality of the leaders of Virginia society did not interfere with their compatibility born of crisis.

Wyatt's men constituted a "mixed government" in a real and personal sense; their relative lack of factionalism would

168 Sandys appraised his fellow councillors and other leaders in 1623: Yeardley and Mathews were self-interested profiteers; Pott and Davison were mere "Ciphers"; Hamor, Pountis, and Smith were honest and well-intentioned; and Tucker, Blaney, and Peirce were talented and trustworthy. Sandys to John Ferrar, Apr. 11, 1623, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 110-111. Notwithstanding the recognition of personal differences and unsavory conduct, these criticisms did not blossom into disruptive factionalism.

have been the envy of traditional rivals like John Smith and Edward Wingfield of an earlier era, and of John Harvey and Dr. Pott of a later one. The leaders of Wyatt's Virginia stood together against "traitors" like Edward Sharpless and constant critics like John Martin—"a man of a prostituted conscience, a sower of disentione and seditione, . . . and a persone exceedinge daun"erous to the state and Colonia." For a fleeting moment in Virginia's early history, local interests were colony concerns, and personal aspirations and governmental policies merged.

Above all, Wyatt's Virginia demonstrated the value of

170 Sharpless, acting secretary of the Council of State, in 1624 betrayed that body by reporting confidential information to the commissioners investigating Virginia. For this "perfidiousnes and perjurie," he was sentenced to the pillory and "lost a peece of one of his eares." Governor and council to Privy Council, June 15, 1625, Kingsbury, ed., VCR, IV, 561.

171 Governor and council to commissioners for affairs in Virginia, June 15, 1625, ibid., 565. Also see, governor and council to Virginia Company, Feb. 4, 1624/25, ibid., 517-518. Martin had been a disruptive influence since the 1619 assembly when his patent was disputed.

Wyatt's council was very jealous of its influence and power. In 1623/24, the General Assembly passed a law that stated "that no person within this colony upon the rumur of supposed change and alteration, presume to be disobedient to the present government, nor servants to their private officers, masters or overseers at their uttermost perills." Hening, comp., Statutes at Large, I, 128. See Morgan, "First American Boom," WMQ, 3d Ser., XXVIII (1971), 193-195, for a discussion of the harsh punishments meted out by the council in this period.
pragmatic adaptation. Bernard Bailyn was mistaken when he wrote that "riches in a new country like America signified nothing more than the accident of prior settlement."172 Rather, survival, adaptability, intelligence, and energy were the essential factors of success. The individuals who founded the first gentry dynasties later in the seventeenth century came with wealth to a settled country.173 Their examples were no examples at all. What Virginia and the 1620s demanded were men who could make something out of nothing. Because they had done precisely that, in the worst of times and with little help from England, "Wyatt's men" served as worthy examples for others to emulate.

After 1625, ideology was challenged by the post-uprising Virginia growth model as the surest foundation on which to establish colonies. Wyatt's Virginia, because it was fully committed to a "new world, a world of reason and commerce,"174 was a useful precedent for motivating other Englishmen in the quest to establish viable colonies.

The Powhatan Uprising produced many changes; its ramifications were evident in the intellectual crisis in England,

174 Miller, "Religion and Society in Early Virginia," in Errand Into the Wilderness, 140.
the death of the Virginia Company, and the "revolution" in
the colony. The forces and energies that were unleashed in
Virginia transformed the colonists into indefatigable and
perennial foes. By 1625, the Virginia-English had discarded
ideology and discovered more enduring and gratifying goals—
personal reasons for coming to, and staying in, the New World.

Such goals would later be rediscovered in colony after
colony, and the net effect in every case would be uniformly
negative and tragic for America's Indians. Perry Miller un-
knowingly told as much about the future of the Powhatans as
he did about the future of the colonists when he stated that,
by 1625, Virginia "was started on the road which led from
teleology to competition and expedience, where the decisive
factor would be, not the example of the Apostles, but the
price per pound of tobacco." 175

175 Ibid.; also see, 138-139. Such secularization and
changed emphases came to Europe, gradually, throughout the
17th century. Sir George Clark, The Seventeenth Century,
2d ed. (Oxford, 1947), 324 and passim. In the France of
Richelieu and Mazarin, "religious beliefs, orthodox or
heretical, were increasingly confined to the sphere of per-
sonal conviction and individual choice, whereas the public
affairs were directed by a raison d'etat which no longer
needed and used supernatural arguments for the pursuit of
worldly ends." S. H. Steinberg, The Thirty Years War and
the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660 (New York,
1966), 99.
And the Lord said to her, two nations are in thy wombe, and two maner of people shalbe devided out of thy bowels, and the one people shalbe mightier then the other, and the elder shal serve the younger.

Genesis 25:23, Geneva Bible

EPILOGUE

The Powhatan Uprising of 1622 was a stunning example of a native culture's rebellion against European invasion. With this aggressive and bold act, Mangopeesomon temporarily revitalized the tidewater tribes and served notice that the Powhatans rejected both the culture and the presence of the English "tyrants."

Despite the fact that the English had halted the Powhatans' cultural and territorial expansion in 1607, and despite the colonists' capricious, callous, and confusingly contradictory relations with the Indians, the ethnocentrism of the old Powhatan Empire had not been extinguished by fifteen years of disruptive, often brutal, contact with Englishmen. Death by warfare and loss of territory were familiar experiences understood in the context of the Powhatan culture. Cultural suicide and voluntary slavery were not. Even genocide, which loomed in the future unforeseen, was preferable to the willful abandonment of a culture sancti-
fied by priests and glorified by the deeds of ancestors.

The fundamental question in 1622—whether the Powhatans would or could become converted Englishmen—was answered in the negative. Religion, the most conspicuous element of both cultures, was, and would remain, an irreconcilable issue; few Powhatans and no Englishmen had converted or would convert to the doctrinal precepts of the other. In 1622, the Powhatans chose to die rather than to change their ways.

With the uprising, Mangopeesomon made war on the optimistic ideas of men in England who wanted to civilize the Indian; however, his deeds were avenged by pragmatic colonists who wanted to displace and remove the Indian from Virginia. In the course of the Second Anglo-Powhatan War, both sides recognized that total conquest or annihilation of the other was out of the question. The adversaries in that conflict were really more closely matched than surviving records indicate, for each side remained vulnerable to, and wary of, the other.

In terms of the important issues that precipitated the uprising and the war, neither side had sacrificed the crucial aspects of their culture. In that sense, both sides won. On the one hand, the English were not annihilated, but at least the Powhatans had headed off the potentially strong and dangerous thrust of conversion. Their culture had been preserved. On the other hand, the Powhatans were not eradicated, but at least the English had pushed them
back, giving the colonists room to expand and prosper. Their profits had been preserved.

The Powhatan Uprising ended an era for Englishmen. In its ramifications, the Indian rebellion revealed a crack between ideology and secular realism that soon became a chasm. In the aftermath of 1622, it was evident that ideology was an important instrument for giving birth to colonies, but that it was of little utility in bringing them to maturity or in plotting their futures. In the case of Virginia, tobacco worked better.

Mangopeesomon's uprising was the major factor in determining whether English Virginia would survive and prosper. Maturing under fire, the colony decided the issue in the crisis period between 1622 and 1625. The corn profiteers, the tenant monopolists, and the land barons developed their predatory, capitalistic skills to the fullest extent in this era. Many pre-uprising trends were accelerated and new energies unleashed until, by 1625, Virginia had an aggressive and self-confident elite of power and wealth.

Events of the crisis era severed the colony from the company, giving mature life to the former and bringing merciful death to the latter. The colonists had long had one perception of reality--pragmatic and realistic--while the company clung to a distorted and refracted perception confused by theories and preconceptions held over from Elizabeth's reign. The ideology of colonization, as perceived by the company, was much more than a set of convenient and
hypocritical rationalizations; it was a system, an encasing suit of intellectual armor that could not be tailored to fit new realities without destroying its rigid design.

For one fleeting moment under George Thorpe, the Virginia Company's ideological mission came close to fulfilling Hakluyt's idealistic dreams of Indian conversion. But it was precisely that optimistic and religious mission that so conflicted with Mangopeesomon's ethnocentric goals and sense of cultural allegiance. The uprising of 1622 proved devastating to the English mind because the company's hopeful plans were killed at their apex; while, simultaneously, the Powhatans' strength was asserted as never before. Bereft of its mission, the company collapsed.

The death of the Virginia Company signaled the end of the first, forty-year, phase of British imperialism. Between 1585 and 1625, English New World colonization had been Hakluytian, idealistic, and national in appeal and response. Never again would a colony, like Virginia, have such intellectual, financial, and moral support from crown and commonalty, peers and merchants, clerics and soldiers, alike. Newfoundland fisheries and New England outposts of schismatics could capture neither the imagination nor the support that Virginia had. The glorious imperialistic era ended when the dizzying Elizabethan prospects were replaced by a less idealistic, but more personally fulfilling, set of goals--tobacco, tenants, and territory. For better or worse, Virginia belonged to the Virginians after 1625.
Between 1622 and 1625, the Virginia-English refused to be lured into a crusade of conversion or holy extermination; their strategy and policy regarding the Powhatans were at once less ambitious and more successful. But if ideology came to be viewed as a useless anachronism, ethnocentrism could not be. Whether it was a traditional loyalty to English culture or to Virginia's new lifestyle, the colonists needed neither tracts nor sermons to tell them what they innately knew: as "civilized" Europeans, their children would inevitably inherit the forest. Ironically, by their unorthodox means and naked pragmatism, Virginians fulfilled the major goal of Elizabethan imperialism—"to plant another England in America."

The forty years between the birth of Hakluyt's dreams and the realization of Virginia's promise saw England's most idealistic endeavors dashed or cruelly twisted by irrepres-sible forces. Beginning in the sixteenth century as an essential weapon in the national struggle against the tyranny of Spain and Catholic Europe, England's imperialist ideology was, by 1625, a perverted entity. Whereas the cruelties of the Spanish conquistadores had seemed the very epitome of tyranny in 1588, by 1625, Cortes and his fellows were deemed worthy of emulation for their aggressively successful Indian policies. Whereas Hakluyt had called for a noble mission to the New World's natives in 1588, by 1625, Purchas was demanding their extermination.

In terms of idealistic motivations, the Elizabethan
battle against tyranny was not the same as the later push for profits. But in their brutal effects, they proved equally devastating for the American Indian. The Elizabethans, with their great energy and fervent ethnocentrism, ensured that their future countrymen in Virginia would eventually come out on top in the battle against tyranny. In 1632, after having vanquished the Powhatan "tyrants," after fighting tyranny with tyranny, the Virginians did, indeed, stand alone as successful colonizers--the greatest tyrants of all.

Ironically, Mangopeesomon's actions in 1622 accelerated the growth of English Virginia, aided its prosperity, made it alluring for hundreds of new immigrants, and sowed the seeds of territorial expansion that precipitated a second uprising in 1644. The land issue became the greatest threat to Powhatan culture after 1630, and Mangopeesomon's people had to endure death, defeat, and dispossession for a dozen years after the Second Anglo-Powhatan War before they perceived the unmistakable signs of cultural decay. Without space to expand, with a smaller and smaller land base on which to preserve even the status quo, the Powhatans were forced into a second uprising.

The Indian rebellion of 1644 cannot truly be equated with that of 1622. The 1644 attack was a desperate, futile effort against only a few English settlements; it was an outburst of frustration, not a potentially successful cultural war of annihilation. The Powhatans had silently and
gradually become a remnant culture even before they attacked in 1644. The strength of the tribes, the confidence of victory, and the startling fear instilled in the English—all had made Mangopeesomon's 1622 uprising unique and different in intent and effect. In 1622, the Powhatans had launched a revolution for cultural sovereignty; in 1644, they carried out raids for cultural survival. The earlier uprising had attempted to give the Indians back their Virginia; the later attack tried to give a little of Virginia back to the Indians.

As if to symbolize the fate of his people, Mangopeesomon, the aged "great king," died in the second uprising. Leader of the old days and the old ways, inveterate rebel and patriot, Mangopeesomon/Opechancanough was, in 1644, probably one of a very few men who had known Powhatan's vitality and Tsenacommacah's glory. Ironically, this beleagured werowance had outlived all of his ideological and military adversaries—Hakluyt, James I, Smith, De La Warre, Dale, Purchas, Yeardley, Sandys, Thorpe, and Wyatt. The Virginia governor he attacked in 1644 had not even been born when Jamestown was founded.

Both Mangopeesomon, successor to Virginia's emperor, and Charles I, successor to Virginia's king, died for lost causes in the turbulent decade of the 1640s. In their lifetimes, they had witnessed ideological conflict, revolutionary upheaval, and incomprehensible changes. Years before, when both were only heirs apparent, Virginia and England had been vastly different places.
APPENDIX A

POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE VIRGINIA ALGONQUIANS
(CA. 1607-1612)

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| Totals for Powhatans   | 1675  | 1970     | 6405   | 5400    | 6670   | 3211    | 7485   | 8230-10230 |

*From different sources. **New number estimated.
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* Estimates based on Feest's 1:4 ratio of warriors to total population but not specifically recorded in his published work.

**Feest lumped many tribes/villages under the designation Rapphannock, including the Cuttatowomens, Moraughtacunds, and Nantaughtacunds.
SOURCES FOR APPENDIX A

Binford, Lewis Roberts, "Archaeological and Ethnohistorical Investigation of Cultural Diversity and Progressive Development Among Aboriginal Cultures of Coastal Virginia and North Carolina" (Ph.D. diss., Dept. of Anthropology, University of Michigan, 1964), 76 (Table 15), 104 (Table 18).

Denver Art Museum (Department of Indian Art), The Virginia Indian Tribes: Seventeenth-Century Names, Locations, and Populations (Denver, Colo., 1933).


Smith, Capt. John, A Map of Virginia. With A Description of the Countrey, the Commodities, People, Government and Religion (Oxford, 1612), 5-8, based on observations in 1607-1608.


# APPENDIX B

AN ALPHABETICAL LIST OF THE ENGLISH KILLED ON MARCH 22, 1621/22

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<td>Flowerdieu Hundred</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>Location</td>
<td>Page</td>
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<td>Waters's</td>
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<td>Henrico</td>
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<td>Bennett's</td>
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<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man-servant to H. Bromage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man-servant to T. Moise</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 men-servants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 men-servants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 men and boys</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>servant to J. England</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ferrar's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 servants to T. Brewood</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bennett's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 servants</td>
<td></td>
<td>Martin's Hundred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DISCREPANCIES IN WATERHOUSE**

- Boise, Mrs. John  
- Cooke, Thomas  
- Diggininson, Mrs. Ralph (Jane)  
- Holland, Thomas  
- Hobson, Thomas  
- Jefferies, Mrs. Nathaniel  
- Waters, Mrs. Edward  

- Martin's Hundred  
- College Land  
- Ferrar's  
- Martin's Hundred  
- Falling Creek  
- College Land  
- Martin's Hundred  
- Waters's  

**Survived**
APPENDIX C

POWHATAN: A HUMAN PERSPECTIVE

"The greate Werowance Powhawtan in his annuall progress through his pettye provinces comming to Patowamack, was there as in other places intertained with the greatest honnor that Nation could, amoung'st other shewes of solemnitie, and much mirthe, itt was ordered that theire Younge men, such as were fitt for warr, should in a souldyerlike manner present themselves before his Majestye, each of theis in his turne declaringe what worthie exploites by theire undaunted valours theye had achieved against theire Ennimyes the Massoamackes and the wilde Beastes of theire Forest, every one strivinge to strayne his actions highest therebye expecting the greater reward and commendations. Amoung'st these he whose lott was last though not of least account haveinge noted his Fellowes in theire extraordinarye boastinges, to devoure even more than all that might be sayd to any purpose in that kinde, comminge forth and with a stoute and decent behaivour making his obeseyance thus related [']And I my Lorde went this morninge into a great Marshe and there valientlye killed six Muske Rattes, which though itt be no more then the boyes do dailye yett this my Leige is true and most of 601
the rest but fables. ['] This moved the whole assemblye to laughter, nor was the truth of his meane action either blaymed or shamed, for the Jest so tooke the Kinge that this fellowes poore indeavours was most regarded and best rewarded fabula narratur . . . ."

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VITA

J. Frederick Fausz