Organization and doctrine in the Continental Army, 1774 to 1784

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ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE IN
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, 1774 TO 1784

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Robert Kenneth Wright, Jr.
1980
APPROVAL SHEET

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PREFACE

The subject of this dissertation is the development of the Continental Army's organizational forms and the evolution of its doctrine on the employment of military force. As such it combines institutional and intellectual history, rather than using the traditional orientation of military history toward battles. I believe that understanding of the nature of opposing forces and their innate capabilities is a requirement for assessing generalship and campaigns.

Military organization takes place on two levels. A superior command structure includes a specialized staff and subordinate groupings of units. The staff functions as a collection of technical advisors to the army's leader and relieves him of much of the burden of detailed planning. The lower echelons of organization permit independent actions by field armies and a responsive internal arrangement of a large force on the battlefield. On a unit level, organization means the formulation of a "flexible organization, permitting full application of the principle of economy of force," reduction of "headquarters and other overhead to speed up command," and devotion of "strength as fully as possible to elements which can be made effective offensively against the enemy."¹

This dissertation concentrates only on the Continental Army, the forerunner of today's Regular Army. Two other military forces existed during the War of American Independence: regular state troops and the militia. The former were directly under the control of their respective state governments and tended to perform garrison duties at important ports or local fortifications, although at times they cooperated with the Continentals for extended periods. The latter were quintessentially local forces. John Shy and a host of other historians have recently paid close attention to the militia, highlighting its local defense mission and the institution's political implications. I hope that my work will complement theirs by explaining the nature of the other major component serving in the Revolution.

The War of American Independence was not a war of national liberation in the Maoist sense. It did involve a struggle for popular support in which the militia played a critical role, but it also included a very conventional eighteenth century military conflict. That contest between a regular British army with assistance from German auxiliaries and a regular American force with French aid relates directly to this dissertation. I have examined the creation of that American force and its evolution into a professional fighting machine which was among the most modern of the era. Many compromises had to be made during this process as a result of various financial, logistical, and manpower crises. Although the army in the field seldom matched the plans made for it, the very existence of that planning reveals a great deal about the nature of the war. Unfortunately, the transformation in 1778 of a local war into a global conflict obscured some of
the changes. British commanders, now concerned with France's actions, could no longer offer battle in the same way that they had in 1776 and 1777.

No military institution exists in a vacuum. Organizations are designed within a context of doctrinal assumptions on the nature of military force and its most effective means of expression. The types of weapons and equipment available, conditions of terrain in which the fighting will take place, and the opponent to be faced are all factors weighing heavily on planners. Less obvious but equally important are political and ideological conditions. Extensive research over the last two decades into the ideological nature of the American Revolution and the development of American political institutions now makes it possible to place the Continental Army in perspective. Militants in the political opposition to Great Britain carried certain fundamental assumptions about military force in their ideological baggage which influenced the organization of the Continentals during the early years of the war. As the conflict went on a more cautious political element, allied with army leaders, altered the nature of the army.

This dissertation traces the emergence of a new American military institution from a combination of European roots and New World influences. It traces the transformation of an extemporized force into a national army. I tell the story from the perspective of George Washington and the Continental Congress because planning took place on that level. As I worked on the subject I became convinced that Washington's role was paramount. He set the tone of the army, guided its development, and coordinated the contributions of many subordinates.
I can only conclude that he deserves credit as the father of the Continental Army.

Too many individuals assisted me during the research and writing of this dissertation to thank individually. I would be remiss if I did not particularly commend the archivists at the New-York Historical Society, the National Archives, and the Library of Congress; Mrs. Penny Crumpler of the U.S. Army Engineer Library; Mr. John Slonaker and Ms. Phyllis Cassler of the U.S. Army Military History Institute; Dr. Robert Coakley and Ms. Janice McKenney of the U.S. Army Center of Military History; and Dr. Russell Weigley of Temple University. Each in his own way made valuable suggestions or eased research problems immeasurably. Very special thanks go to Dr. John E. Selby and the other members of my dissertation committee for their patience and willingness to correspond frequently with me. The most invaluable aid I received, however, came from my family: parents, brother, wife, and children. Without their support and sacrifices I would have abandoned this project many times over. In spite of all the individuals who helped in the completion of this task, the sole responsibility for errors of omission or commission rests with the author.
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This dissertation traces the development of organizational forms and tactical doctrine in the Continental Army, the regular United States armed force in the War of American Independence. It investigates political, ideological, technological, economic, and strategic influences on the decisions made by the Continental Congress, George Washington, and other Army leaders. In the process it places the Continentals in a context of eighteenth century military science.

Individual colonies raised the first troops by drawing on their experiences in earlier wars, especially on the example of short-term provincials supplementing the militia. Congress assumed national responsibility for the war on 14 June 1775 by establishing the Continental Army. During the next year the Army expanded to include units from every state (plus Canada), controlled by a network of territorial departments and subordinate commands. Administrative, logistical, and disciplinary systems and a staff were adapted from British Army usages.

Combat performance in 1776 convinced a majority in Congress that victory required a basic change of philosophy. It created a large army of infantry, artillery, and cavalry regiments raised for the duration of the war. The infantry regimental organization, first used in 1776, was a native development tailored to American conditions. In conjunction with the 1777 adoption of the excellent French military musket it emphasized the American advantage in individual marksmanship and was superior to British and German regiments in strength, efficiency, and flexibility. As a result of the Trenton campaign Washington introduced permanent tactical brigades capable of limited independent action.

The only significant argument over military policy occurred during the winter of 1777-1778. One element, more militant in its ideology, wished to revert to the ideal of a small regular force backed by the militia. Most Army leaders, including an influential contingent of foreign volunteers, proposed to retain the large army and make it more professional and sophisticated. Congress actually followed a course which came closer to Washington's views. New staff officers and specialists, particularly the Inspector General, and the adoption of a uniform drill dramatically improved the Army's fighting ability. In 1781 the Continentals, with important French aid, won a decisive victory at Yorktown. Washington sustained a high level of training to the end of the war and then disbanded the Army without undermining the political ideals of the Revolution.

The Continental Army triumphed in the War of American Independence because it judiciously blended American experience and new military concepts from Europe, particularly those advanced by French theorists, to create a sophisticated military machine tailored for combat in North America.
ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE IN

THE CONTINENTAL ARMY, 1774 TO 1784
CHAPTER I

THE ARMY OF OBSERVATION:
NEW ENGLAND IN ARMS

On 19 April 1775 local militiamen and regular British troops began the War of American Independence at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts. The four New England colonies reacted by raising their own individual armies. Each jurisdiction formed its force according to its particular experience in earlier wars and its individual interpretation of European military developments of the previous century. Their speedy actions resulted from a decade of tensions within the British Empire and tentative preparations for possible armed conflict begun some months earlier. The four forces concentrated at Boston under the loose hegemony of Massachusetts as a de facto regional army, paving the way for the establishment of a national Continental Army.

Warfare in the Eighteenth Century.

The Continental Army which fought in the War of American Independence was the product of European military science. Like all institutions developed by the American colonists, it drew from European roots and was modified by the particular conditions of American experience. Therefore, a proper appreciation of the place of that army in the context of its own times requires an understanding of both the general developments in the military art of western civilization during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the particular martial
traditions and experiences of the English colonists in North America.

In the seventeenth century Europeans developed a new range of
weapons and gradually introduced them into their armies. At the same
time a wave of dynastic wars began in western Europe which led to the
creation of increasingly larger forces. Commanders and the leading
military theoreticians spent the majority of the eighteenth century
attempting to develop organizational structures and tactical doctrines
which would exploit the potential of the new weapons and armies. These
developments culminated in the series of conflicts known collectively
as the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815).

During the seventeenth century armies turned from pole arms,
primarily the pike, to a reliance on firearms as the basic infantry
weapon. The first firearm was a heavy matchlock musket which used a
burning match to ignite the gunpowder charge that propelled a lead ball.
The matchlock suffered from several serious defects as a military
weapon: it was cumbersome; reloading was a long and complicated process;
the chance of misfire was extremely high, particularly in damp weather;
and the lit match betrayed positions in the dark. Its defensive
defects, particularly at close quarters, required a proportion of each
unit to carry pikes to protect itself from cavalry attack or enemy pikes.

1. The basic sources for this section are: David Chandler, The Art of
Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1976);
Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great (New York: Hippo-
crene Books, 1974); Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic
Warfare: The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth Century France
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1957); and Richard Glover,
Peninsular Preparation: The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809
A technological breakthrough occurred in the second half of the century with the introduction of a new firing mechanism. It relied on the spark produced by a piece of flint striking a steel plate to touch off the propellant. The flintlock musket was lighter and handier than its predecessor (although still susceptible to moisture), had a more rapid rate of fire, and was easier to maintain. Late in the century it was complemented by the development of the socket bayonet. The bayonet, a foot-long triangular blade which slipped around the muzzle of the musket without blocking it, transformed the firearm into a pole weapon. The transition to the musket-and-bayonet combination gradually eliminated the need for defensive pikemen, who disappeared from most western European armies by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century.

Standardized flintlocks appeared shortly thereafter. Whether they were produced at government arsenals or by private contractors, the eighteenth century muskets of every country were inaccurate, lacking even a rear sight. Each weighed over ten pounds and had a barrel over a yard long, making it difficult to aim. Flints tended to wear out after only twenty rounds, and even under ideal conditions the effective range for the one-ounce balls (between two-thirds and three-quarters of an inch in diameter) fired by these smooth-bore weapons was about one hundred yards. An average soldier under the stress of combat was capable of firing three rounds a minute for short periods, but required considerable training to accomplish this feat. Since care in reloading was a major factor influencing accuracy, only the first round loaded before combat was fully reliable.
Tactical formations and doctrine were evolved during the period between 1688 and 1745 to take advantage of these new weapons. Infantry gradually became the most important combat arm as firepower came to dominate the battlefield. Beginning with the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14), generals sought literally to blast the enemy off the field with concentrated close-range fire. To this end they moved away from the massed formations characteristic of the era of the pike and adopted what is known technically as linear tactics or deployment in long lines. By mid-century in nearly every army infantrymen stood in three-deep lines to bring a maximum number of muskets into play. The critical firefight took place at ranges of between fifty and one hundred yards.

These weapons and tactics required an adjustment in the organization of an army. Since the sixteenth century the regiment had formed the basic component of an army, providing administrative and tactical control over a group of companies. The need for better fire control in battle led to many complicated experiments. Ultimately, every army turned to a more manageable sub-element, the platoon, the smallest force whose fire could be controlled by a handful of officers and noncommissioned officers. A simple technique of coordinating the actions of a number of these basic elements of fire (normally eight) produced the battalion, the fundamental element of maneuver. Most regiments contained two or more battalions except the British Army's. Great Britain opted to form only eight Platoons in a regiment, making their regiment and battalion normally synonymous. The relationship between the company (an administrative entity) and the platoon varied, although by the end of the
century most armies moved to make them interchangeable. The battalions and platoons, filled with rank and file trained like robots to fire in unison at areas rather than individual targets, formed the heart of the typical European army in the Seven Years' War (1756-63).

A second area of development during the century involved improved handling of armies on the battlefield. At the beginning of the century armies marched overland in massed formations and took hours to deploy into line of battle. This lengthy process often allowed commanders who felt that they were at a disadvantage to march away and decline combat. Several reforms were introduced to overcome this obstacle. The cadenced march step and standardized drill maneuvers were developed to reduce the length of time needed to deploy and minimize the confusion in forming a line of battle. They also allowed a general to adjust his formations to the changing flow of a battle without risking total disruption of his ranks. Successful use of brigades and divisions to control the movements of groups of battalions produced a tendency to make those higher echelons permanent.

Mobile field artillery was also a development of the eighteenth century. While heavy cannon continued to be important in fortresses and sieges, lighter guns were introduced to give direct support to the infantry. As a first step, standardized calibers simplified administrative and logistical problems. Ballistics experts and metallurgists reduced the weight of the tubes, while others improved carriages. The French emerged with the best of the new artillery in the aftermath of the 1764 reforms of General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval, an experienced combat officer and able theoretician. Greater mobility enabled tacticians to consider artillery as a supporting arm whose function was
to fire at enemy personnel instead of opposing artillery. In nearly every European army, however, the artillery was a separate armed service distinct from the infantry and cavalry. This situation complicated battlefield deployment to a certain extent, and more importantly retarded the development of effective combined arms operations.

The army which naturally exercised the greatest influence on the American colonies was the British. Great Britain enjoyed a unique status among the powers during this period because its strong navy protected it from hostile neighbors. With less threat of attack the British lagged behind the rest of Europe in adopting the reforms of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nonetheless, it had adopted the major ones by the time of the Seven Years' War and, in fact, had led in the introduction of many techniques of infantry fire control.

The lag, however, created an incredibly inefficient and complex administrative and logistical superstructure. Authority and responsibility were divided between two major army commands (the British and Irish Establishments), between the army proper and the Ordnance Department (controlling artillery, engineers, and munitions), and between the civilian Secretary at War and the military Commander-in-Chief (when that office was filled). Strategic direction was shared by two or three Secretaries of State. At times the various individuals responsible for the different chains of command cooperated and the system functioned acceptably. Breakdowns made the British Army appear to be leaderless and inept.2

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England's less sophisticated military system caused it to lag behind other European powers particularly in the area of military theory. The art of war changed dramatically during the eighteenth century. By 1800 Napoleon's armies maneuvered in ways that exceeded even the Prussian army of Frederick the Great, the preeminent force of the Seven Years' War. Poor performance in the wars of the mid-century forced the French to seek better ways to handle armies in the field. The British officers, however, learned only through trial and error, contributing little original thought, and by and large did not read the military texts written by Frenchmen and other Europeans.3

British works prior to the Revolution consisted for the most part of drill manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes. The first important manuals depicted the best practices of Marlborough's army: Humphrey Bland's 1727 A Treatise of Military Discipline and Richard Kane's Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne which appeared in 1745. Under the influence of the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal Ligonier the British began moving towards a drill patterned after the Prussians in the late 1750's. This trend began with a series of translations of Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in 1754 and 1757, and in the latter year of Malost de Martemont's The Spirit of the Modern System of War, by a Prussian General Officer. An official drill regulation

issued in 1757 followed a line of Prussian influence which was main-
tained in amendments in 1759 and which culminated with the publication
of Adjutant General Edward Harvey's drill book in 1764. "The '64"
remained the official drill until 1795, although lax enforcement gave
no assurances that all regiments followed it. Two other unofficial
manuals offered alternative drills which appealed to some officers:
Campbell Dalrymple's A Military Essay (1761) and William Windham's and
George Townshend's Norfolk Discipline (1759), a simplified volume
designed for militia use.4

Three other British authors produced works which had a reasonably
wide readership after the Seven Years' War. Major General James Wolfe
became a popular hero for capturing Quebec. In 1768 a collection of
miscellaneous orders and notes that he prepared, mostly while a regi-
mental commander prior to the French and Indian War, appeared under the
title Instructions to Young Officers. It contained no systematic theory.
William Young became a prolific author of volumes dealing with drill,
fortifications, and outpost duty. In 1771 his collected works along with
Wolfe's appeared under the title Manoeuvres, or practical observations
on the art of war. A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes,
The Military guide for young officers, came out the next year. These
pedestrian works represented an effort to furnish junior officers with
reading material on routine military life from a regimental perspective.

4. Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: A Story of the British
Army 1702-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 32n, 34,
57n, 218. Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 79-86. David Chandler,
The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (New York: Hippocrene
The leading European theorists sought to establish a system of warfare which extracted the maximum worth from the weapons and soldiers available to the standing armies of the century. Exponents of linear warfare (l'ordre mince) tended to stress the firepower of infantry volleys. They also admired Frederick the Great and avidly read his Instructions for his Generals after a copy of that secret work fell into Austrian hands in 1760 and was published in various languages. Most imitators of Frederick failed to realize that he achieved results through his personal genius and a capacity for hard work, not because he had developed a well-rounded theory of war.⁵

A series of French authors began to propose a different system in the late 1720's, l'ordre profond. They suggested that infantry formed in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by relying on shock effect and the bayonet. The major authors of this school were Chevalier Jean-Charles de Foulard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80), and François-Jean de Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99). Their theories remained largely paper exercises because they did not fit the realities of contemporary battlefields. In time a practical compromise emerged in l'ordre mixte, a flexible combination of line and column according to the tactical needs of a particular situation. It also stressed training of men to perform both light and line infantry missions. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert (1743-90) was the

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major spokesman for this school. His 1772 *Essai général de tactique* became the seminal text. Although the French Army did not formally adopt Guibert's ideas until 1791, a series of war games in 1778 at Vassieux, Normandy, converted most French officers to the mixed order.  

Colonial Military Experience.

English military institutions formed part of the cultural inheritance brought to America by the first colonists. Immigrants and occasional contact with the British Army kept the colonists informed about newer developments. The most important of these inherited military institutions was the militia, which dated back to Anglo-Saxon times, but the specific conditions of colonial settlement produced important modifications in it. Other variations crept in as the needs of effective defense began to outstrip the capabilities of the militia.

The Tudors had revived the English militia in the sixteenth century as an inexpensive alternative to a large permanent army. They used the traditional universal obligation to serve in the defense of the realm as a basis for sustaining a more manageable body of voluntary "trained bands." Thus the general population acted as a reserve force through the requirement to possess arms, but became primarily a source

of financial support through fines in lieu of active duty for the trained bands. Geographical organization and central direction came through county lords lieutenant. 7

The first settlements in Virginia, Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, and Connecticut all explicitly recruited one or more professional soldiers to act as military advisors. The colonists recognized from the beginning that threats to their security could come from either hostile natives or rival European powers. The Jamestown trading post reacted to danger by organizing itself into a regimental garrison, complete with companies and squads. Plymouth, on the advice of Miles Standish, organized four companies of militia within two years of its founding. The Massachusetts Bay Colony profited from the experiences of the earlier settlements. In 1629 its first expedition, which founded Salem, left England with a militia company already organized and equipped with the latest weapons.

During the course of the seventeenth century the colonists adapted the English militia system to meet their own needs. Because conditions

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varied, several regional patterns emerged. In the Chesapeake Bay area a plantation economy took root, leading to a dispersed type of settlement. Virginia and Maryland formed their militia companies from all the residents of a county or other relatively large area. In New England a different economy led to the use of towns as the basic residential system. Each town formed one or more militia companies, according to its size, as soon as possible after establishing its local government. South Carolina's plantation economy was slightly different and prior experience in Barbados by many of its settlers gave the South Carolina militia a unique cast. Following the Barbadian example, it oriented the institution particularly towards the control of the large slave population. Pennsylvania, initially dominated by Quakers, did not pass a mandatory militia law until 1777. Differences in the individual militia systems in part explain the variety of approaches taken by the colonies when they organized units for the Continental Army in 1775 and 1776.

Growth introduced problems of control in each colony. Massachusetts, by virtue of its size, solved them first. An increase in the proportion of noncommissioned officers over European norms allowed for the formation of subordinate elements, "demi-companies", increasing tactical flexibility and control. In December 1636 the Bay Colony grouped the fifteen existing companies into three regional regiments. That made Massachusetts the first English-speaking government to adopt permanent regiments. Other colonies followed suit: Maryland and Plymouth in 1658; Virginia in 1666; and Connecticut in 1672. In contrast, standing regiments appeared in the English Army only in the 1640's.
American preferences for weapons also reflected modification of the European heritage. Wilderness conditions accentuated the advantages of the flintlock musket. By 1675 nearly every colony required its militiamen to own flintlocks rather than matchlocks, completing this transition a quarter of a century ahead of European armies. Many of the colonists hunted, but few ever fought in a formal line of battle. Their volleys stressed individual marksmanship rather than the concept of firing at an area employed in Europe. A specific byproduct of this attitude led to the refinement of the rifle by Pennsylvania gunsmiths. A hunting weapon with German roots, the Pennsylvania rifle was longer than the standard musket but had a smaller bore (usually .45-caliber). Grooves in the barrel imparted spin to the ball and allowed a trained marksman to hit targets up to 400 yards away. Small units of specialists called jaegers (hunters) in some German armies employed a shorter, heavier rifle. As a military weapon either version proved effective in skirmishing but its slow rate of fire and lack of a bayonet placed the rifleman at a distinct disadvantage in open terrain.

By the eighteenth century the colonial militia, like the English trained bands, armed its men with muskets and based organization on geography. The southern colonies with one regiment per county came closer to the English shire system; the more densely populated northern colonies normally formed several regiments in each county. Most colonies gave each regiment's colonel both administrative and command responsibilities and dispensed with the office of county lieutenant. Local elites in both the mother country and America dominated militia office-holding, whether an elective or appointive system was used, just as they controlled all other aspects of society. Ultimate responsibility for the
militia lay in the Crown. In England it was exercised by the county lords lieutenant, in America by the governor. The financial powers of the lower houses of colonial legislatures did place practical limits on the governor’s prerogatives.

The biggest difference between the English trained bands and the colonial militia was the latter’s more comprehensive membership. Few free adult males were exempted by law from participation: generally only the clergy, some conscientious objectors, and a handful of special groups with vital skills. This inclusiveness resulted from the early need for local defense, absent in England since the days of the Spanish Armada. During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the danger to the more settled regions of the colonies subsided. While a structure based on the total male population of an area was admirable for local defense, it was economically unsuited for extended crises or for offensive operations. Other institutions emerged, leaving the militia, in the words of one historian, "a local training center and replacement pool, a county selective service system and a law enforcing agency, an induction camp and a primitive supply depot." 8

The seventeenth century Indian wars revealed the offensive limits of the militia. As early as the 1620’s in Virginia and during New England’s Pequot War, temporary detachments were drawn from the organized companies for field operations against the Indians. Either volunteers or drafted quotas formed these units. This expedient minimized economic

dislocation and concentrated field leadership in the hands of the most experienced officers. But even that device could create too much disruption to community life, and these provisional militia detachments were employed primarily in garrisons.

A different type of force completely distinct from the militia emerged in the 1670's which was more effective for offense. Hired volunteers ranged the frontiers, patrolling between outposts and giving early warning of Indian attack. Other volunteers combined with friendly Indians to form units for offensive operations in the deep wilderness where European tactics were ineffective. The memoirs of the most successful leader of these mixed forces, Benjamin Church (1639-1718), were published by his son in 1716 and represent the first American military manual.9

The trend away from the militia reached a climax during the imperial wars against Spanish and French colonies between 1689 and 1762. Regiments completely separated from the militia system were raised for specific campaigns. These units, called Provincials, were recruited by the governor and legislature of a colony, with appointed officers, and were patterned after regular British regiments. They relied on bounties for recruiting and conferred greater status on the officers. Although regiments were raised anew each year in most colonies a substantial percentage of the officers accumulated years of service. Provincial field officers tended to come from members of

the legislature who had been long-term militia officers. The company officers, responsible for the majority of the recruiting, were drawn from popular junior militia officers with demonstrated military skills. The most famous Provincial unit was formed by Major Robert Rogers of New Hampshire during the French and Indian War. His separate companies of rangers were recruited throughout the northern colonies and paid directly by the British Army. They performed reconnaissance for the regular forces invading Canada and conducted occasional long-range forays against the French and their Indian allies.

The American phase of the Seven Years' War, the French and Indian War (1754-64), was different from earlier imperial wars in one important way. Formerly Great Britain had been content to leave North American fighting to the colonists and had furnished only naval and logistical aid. Under William Pitt's ministry that policy was reversed and the regular British Army carried out the major combat operations. The provincials were relegated to support and reserve functions. Americans resented this treatment, particularly when they saw British commanders like Edward Braddock and James Abercromby perform poorly in the wilderness. The Britons for their part developed a negative opinion of the fighting qualities of the provincials. British recruitment of servants and impressment of men, food, quarters, and transport created other tensions. Although the Anglo-American forces working together conquered Canada and won important victories in the Caribbean, the close

contact during the war left much residual bitterness. After the Peace of Paris that contributed to a growing breach between the colonies and the mother country.  

The Coming of the Revolution.

During the decade following the Seven Years' War, the government in London adopted a series of policies which altered the traditional relationship between the two portions of the empire. The colonists, whose political institutions were rapidly maturing, resented English interference in what they viewed as internal affairs. Over the years many different issues contributed to an escalation of tension. By 1774 the potential for armed confrontation was real.

One important issue dividing the colonies from England was military in nature. After the 1763 peace London decided to create an "American Establishment" and tax the colonies to pay for it. This army, patterned after a similar Irish garrison nearly a century old, enabled the British to retain a larger peacetime force than British taxpayers would fund. It also secured Canada and Florida from French or Spanish attack and acted as a buffer between colonists and Indians. For Americans it served none of these purposes, particularly after most of the troops moved from the frontier to coastal cities to simplify logistics.  

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Increased political tensions, largely resulting from revenue measures, led the colonists to view the regular regiments as a standing army placed in their midst to enforce unpopular legislation. They responded in two ways. American politicians raised in the ideological traditions of the radical Whigs of seventeenth century England saw the military establishment as an example of the corrupt and unconstitutional practices of the British government, a tool of a ministry out to subvert colonial liberties. They followed the arguments of their intellectual parents and turned to the militia as the institution with which a virtuous citizenry should defend itself. Their calls for a revitalized militia hoped to prove that honest American yeomen were worthy of the rights of Englishment and also to obviate the need for stationing regulars in the colonies. A more militant colonial element moved to counter force with force. The Sons of Liberty appeared in New York in 1765 and 1766 as a paramilitary organization in direct response to British troop movements, and during the early 1770's an increasingly larger segment of American opinion turned to the militia as a possible instrument to oppose the British Army.

With the passage of the Townshend Duties Massachusetts became the focal point of opposition to imperial policies. London responded by

shifting several regiments to Boston in 1768. Although most were withdrawn after the 1770 Boston Massacre, the damage to British credibility in America had been done. The militants in the colonies convinced others that the British were corrupt by arguing that the ministry intended to use military force to crush opposition. More and more leaders accepted the need to create a force capable of opposing the troops if they returned in strength. Individuals who later occupied important positions in the Continental Army, such as Timothy Pickering, who used the pseudonym "A Military Citizen", and William Heath, the "Military Countryman", contributed articles to the Massachusetts press in the early 1770's urging militia reforms. Others organized voluntary military companies whose members agreed to devote extra time to training.15

The 1773 Boston Tea Party created a final phase for these developments. British troops returned to the town in greater numbers than before. Punitive legislation, the Coercive Acts of 1774, furnished final proof to many in New England of Britain's hostility. Military preparations quickened throughout the area, and the First Continental Congress met at Philadelphia in September to concert the colonies' actions to obtain a redress of grievances. New Englanders began serious efforts to strengthen their militia. Officers whose primary loyalty lay with Britain were removed, the tempo of training increased, and by the autumn of 1774 a few individuals were even calling for the formation of a unified colonial army of observation which could take the field if

hostilities erupted. Similar trends, although less pronounced, existed in the middle and southern colonies.

Interest in the militia was matched during 1774 and early 1775 by a concern for war supplies. Adam Stephen, later a major general in the Continental Army, spoke for many in 1774 when he warned Virginia politicians that artillery, arms, ammunition, and other items were in short supply in the colonies. His suggestions to encourage domestic production and importation from Europe were also made by others who agreed with him that if enough arms and ammunition were available, "individuals may suffer, but the gates of hell cannot prevail against America." Imports of arms and powder grew to such volume by October 1774 that the British government began to take steps to prohibit them. Individual colonies also began to remove existing stores beyond the reach of possible British siezure and took the first official steps to encourage domestic manufactures. Massachusetts led in collecting munitions, just as it did in reforming the militia.


The First Continental Congress, meanwhile, rejected a proposal by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia to form a nationwide militia. It did adopt a plan for economic protest, the Continental Association, that had a vital importance in shaping the machinery of revolution. It provided for a boycott of British goods after 1 December 1774 and authorized the formation of enforcement committees. These committees quickly became de facto local governments at both the colony and local levels and secured political control over the countryside, a control which imperial authorities were never able to shake. With this political control went control over the militia, vital to the patriot cause throughout the war. Instead of being cowed by the Coercive Acts, the colonists were now moving towards armed resistance that finally erupted at Lexington and Concord on 19 April 1775.

Thus, in the years immediately prior to 1775 a general trend emerged in Great Britain's mainland American colonies. Tensions built to the point that the leadership in each colony foresaw the possibility of violence. That leadership reacted by gathering war materials and restoring the militia (or volunteer forces) to a level of readiness not seen since the early days of settlement. The British Army's leaders in America were aware of the colonists' actions, but dismissed them as "mere bullying." Given these attitudes, the physical presence of General Thomas Gage's garrison in Boston, and the more advanced state of preparations in Massachusetts, it is not surprising that war began there.

The Massachusetts Provincial Congress, meeting as a shadow government, adopted a comprehensive military program on 26 October 1774 which was based on the militia. It created executive committees of safety and supplies and gave the former the power to order out the militia in an emergency. It also directed officers to reorganize their commands into more efficient units, to conduct new elections, and to drill according to the latest British manual. The program included a plan to form a force of "minutemen" equal to one quarter of the strength of the militia, a concept derived from earlier special detachments of militia. The minutemen agreed to undergo additional training and hold themselves ready to turn out "at a minute's notice." Jedediah Preble, Artemas Ward, and Seth Pomeroy, three politicians who had served in the French and Indian War, were elected as general officers. A month later two younger generals were added: another veteran, John Thomas, and William Heath, a gifted militia administrator. During periods of recess the Committees of Safety and Supplies collected materiel and established depots.

The Provincial Congress reconvened after new elections in February 1775. It clarified the Committee of Safety's powers, reappointed the five generals, and added another politically active veteran, John Whitcomb, as a sixth. More important, the Congress changed its basic policy by augmenting the militia with a more permanent force patterned after

the earlier Provincials. Regulations for this "Constitutional Army" were adopted on 5 April. Three days later a committee report on the "State of the Province" was adopted by 96 of the 103 members present. That report stated that "the present dangerous and alarming situation of our publick affairs, renders it necessary for this Colony to make preparations for their security and defence by raising and establishing an Army." The projected force was to include more than just Massachusetts men, and delegates were sent to the other New England colonies to arrange for their participation. On 14 April the Committee of Safety was instructed to begin selecting field officers for the Massachusetts contingent. Once they were chosen they were to assist the committee in picking captains, who would in turn appoint the subalterns. Preference was expressed for selecting minuteman officers. Following Provincial precedent the new officers were expected to recruit their companies and regiments.21

After initiating this plan for a New England army, the Provincial Congress adjourned on 15 April. When it reassembled on the 22d, it had a war on its hands. The first order of business was accumulating evidence to prove to the English people that Gage's troops had been the aggressors on 19 April. The Congress then turned its attention to forming a volunteer army from the men who had massed around Boston following the battle. The Committee of Safety had already taken tentative steps in this direction by stretching its authority to call out the militia. On 21 April the committee approved an enlistment format. Eight thousand effectives were to serve until 31 December in regiments.

consisting of a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, and nine companies. The committee planned to have each company consist of 3 officers, 4 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 70 rank and file, but it later reduced the rank and file to 50. This decision was preliminary since final authority rested with the Provincial Congress. The pre-lexington plan had been to form the army by apportioning quotas of men among the various towns, a traditional colonial device. The committee decided instead to have the generals survey the men at the siege lines and persuade them to remain. Confusion rapidly turned to chaos, and on 23 April General Ward, the actual commander of the siege, suggested that the Congress use smaller-sized units in order to retain a maximum number of officers. 22

The Provincial Congress incorporated Ward's suggestions in a comprehensive plan adopted that same day. It decided to try to raise a New England army of 30,000 men of which Massachusetts would furnish 13,600. The regimental organization adopted for the infantry called for 596 men: 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant colonel, 1 major, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 chaplain, 1 surgeon, 2 surgeon's mates (assistants), and 10 companies. Each company was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, and 55 enlisted men. On 25 April, following additional discussions with the Committee of Safety, this structure was confirmed with minor changes. 23 The Congress also accepted the committee's suggestion that each regiment headed by a general officer have two majors, and pay scales were approved.

22. Ibid., 2: 369-70, 744-7, 763-830. The collected testimony was published as A Narrative of the Excursions and Ravages of the King's Troops ... (Worcester: Isaiah Thomas, 1775).
23. See Table 1.
TABLE 1

INFANTRY REGIMENTS OF 1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COLONY</th>
<th>FIELD</th>
<th>STAFF</th>
<th>EACH COMPANY</th>
<th>AGGREGATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Lieut. Colonel</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Adjutant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
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<td>Rhode Island</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1a</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Where the colonel was a general officer two majors were authorized.
b. One regiment with only nine companies.
c. Three companies in each regiment were authorized a captain-lieutenant instead of a captain.
d. Three companies without a captain because field officer filled that role as well.
e. The 7th and 8th Connecticut Regiments had only 65 privates per company.
The Massachusetts army was to have artillermen as well as infantry regiments. As early as 23 February the Committee of Safety had planned to train artillery companies and distributed field guns to selected militia regiments. The Provincial Congress directed the committee on 13 April to form six companies for the planned volunteer army. The organization adopted on 6 May for a company called for 4 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a drummer, a fifer, and 32 matrosses (artillery privates). The plan was rescinded four days later, however, and a committee was appointed to confer with Richard Gridley on the propriety of organizing a full artillery regiment. Gridley, hero of the capture of Louisbourg in 1745, was acknowledged as the colony's leading artillery expert. After these talks the Provincial Congress on 12 May authorized a ten-company regiment. Gridley was given command four days later.

The regiment was formed in June, but with only nine companies. Neither Gridley nor his assistant William Burbeck could completely concentrate on raising it since they had been appointed on 26 April as the colony's two engineers. The Committee of Safety added a logistical staff and a company of artificers (skilled workmen) for maintenance duties in June. The important post of ordnance storekeeper went to Ezekiel Cheever. The company officers were drawn heavily from the several Boston militia artillery companies, particularly Adino Paddock's which had received extensive training from British artilleryists in the 1760's and was composed overwhelmingly of skilled artisans and Sons of Liberty. Two of its members, John Crane and Ebenezer Stevens, had moved

24. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 1: 1362, 1368-9; 2: 742-4, 759, 775, 789-90, 797, 801, 807. See Figure 1.
FIGURE 1

MASSACHUSETTS ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF 1775

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
2 Majors

Regimental Staff
1 Ordnance Storekeeper
4 Conductors
2 Clerks

Company
1 Captain
1 Captain-Lieutenant
1 First Lieutenant
2 Second Lieutenants
3 Sergeants
6 Bombardiers
6 Gunners
3 Corporals
32 Matrosses

Artificer Company
1 Overseer (Master Carpenter)
1 Master Blacksmith
1 Master Wheelwright
47 Workmen

Ten companies authorized; nine actually organized.
to Providence, Rhode Island, in 1774 for economic reasons when Boston's port was closed. Their close ties enabled the Rhode Island artillerymen to be merged easily into the regiment in 1776.25

In spite of careful preparations, Massachusetts entered the war in a state of chaos. The Provincial Congress and the Committee of Safety frequently found themselves working at cross purposes. Confusion over the size and configuration of the army created duplication of effort, and prospective officers recruited under a variety of authorities. The militia, especially the minutemen, thanks to their prewar organization, responded as units to the siege of Boston after the battles of Lexington and Concord, but they were not prepared to remain in the field for an extended period of time. Later arrivals were more inclined to serve a full term until 31 December. Order began to emerge in May when formats for commissions and oaths were codified. Mustermasters were appointed to examine enlistment rolls at Cambridge and Roxbury so that the Committee of Safety could certify officers for commissioning. Regiments emerged with a geographical basis and drew their precedence from that of the militia area which furnished the majority of their men. All commissions were dated 19 May 1775, leaving the touchy matter of seniority to be settled later. By June twenty-six infantry regiments had been

certified, in addition to part of a regiment whose status as either a Massachusetts or a New Hampshire unit was unresolved.26

On 13 June the Provincial Congress recognized that the Massachusetts army had achieved relatively final form. It decided to retain in service a force of one artillery and twenty-three infantry regiments. The limit was raised ten days later when troops recruited specifically for coastal defense released Edmund Phinney's Cumberland County regiment from that mission. The status of the generals was also resolved. Ward retained the overall command he had exercised since the outbreak of hostilities, while John Whitcomb, William Heath, and Ebenezer Frye were designated major generals.27

Formation of a New England Army.

Committees of correspondence spread the traumatic news of Lexington and Concord beyond the borders of Massachusetts with remarkable speed. By 24 April New York City had the details and Philadelphia on the next day. In fact, Savannah, the city farthest from the scene of the engagement, received the news on 10 May.28 Massachusetts' call for assistance was answered by the other three New England colonies, its neighbors most concerned with the outbreak of hostilities. Within two months three small armies joined the Massachusetts troops at Boston and a council of war began strategic coordination. This regional force paved

27. Ibid., pp. 1395-6, 1406-9, 1428, 1430, 1433, 1437, 1448-9. The coast defense troops remained in state service instead of becoming Continentals. Joseph Warren, who would have been the senior major general, was killed at Bunker Hill before he received his commission.
the way for the creation of a national institution, the Continental Army.

New Hampshiremen responded as individuals and in small groups to the news of Lexington. On 25 April, anticipating additional, more formal aid from New Hampshire, the Massachusetts Committee of Safety directed Paul Dudley Sergent of Hillsborough County to organize these individuals into a regiment.29 Four days earlier the New Hampshire Provincial Congress convened in emergency session to consider Massachusetts' plan for a New England army and decided to send three members to confer with the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. The New Hampshire congress deferred more comprehensive action until that committee returned and the New Hampshire leadership could mobilize public support and make appropriate financial plans.30

On 18 May the Provincial Congress resolved to raise men "to join in the common cause of defending our just rights and liberties." Initial legislation, loosely drawn, created a Committee of Safety and authorized 2,000 men as the colony's quota for the New England army, counting the individuals already in service at Boston. The plan to use the same regimental organization as Massachusetts was scrapped on 22 May for a more specific proposal. It created three regiments, one of which was

29. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 2: 745, 765. When New Hampshire did not accept responsibility for Sergent's regiment, Massachusetts did, although Sergent raised only four companies.
formed from the volunteers at Boston. The volunteers' election of John Stark, a veteran of Rogers' Rangers, as colonel was confirmed. Enoch Poor of Exeter began recruiting for the second regiment on 24 May. The remaining regiment, headed by James Reed of Fitzwilliam, began organizing a week later in the eastern counties of Strafford and Rockingham. Nathaniel Folsom, a member of the First Continental Congress, received command of the whole force.  

Folsom's original appointment as a brigadier general carried duties similar to the Massachusetts generals', but no regimental command. On 6 June New Hampshire placed him under General Ward's overall command and at the end of the month promoted him to major general. Jealousy on the part of the volunteers at Boston, however, limited his authority for a time. Minor administrative problems hampered the three regiments from achieving full internal cohesion until mid-June, and the last of Poor's companies, detained for local defense, did not reach Boston until early August. Although Folsom wanted an artillery company to support his regiments, there were no officers in New Hampshire qualified to command one. The best that the Provincial Congress could do was to send cannon for the Massachusetts men to use.  

Rhode Island, still able to use its chartered government, convened a brief emergency session of its legislature in response to the news of Lexington and Concord. On 25 April the Assembly resolved to raise 1,500 men.
properly armed and disciplined, to continue in this colony, as an army of observation, to repel any insult or violence that may be offered to the inhabitants. And also, if it be necessary for the safety and preservation of any of the colonies, to march out of this colony, and join and co-operate with the forces of the neighboring colonies.

Substantive action was deferred until the regular May session. In the interim the commander of the Providence County militia brigade offered Massachusetts the services of his three battalions; other individuals went off to Boston as volunteers.33

At the May session, the Rhode Island Assembly created its own Army of Observation and a Committee of Safety. The Rhode Island contingent formed a full brigade under Brigadier General Nathanael Greene, a different approach from that of the other New England colonies. Greene's staff included a brigade adjutant and a brigade commissary responsible for logistics. Three infantry regiments (two with eight companies and one with seven) and an artillery company provided the brigade's strength. Greene, Acting Governor Nicholas Cooke, and the Committee of Safety arranged the officers which the Assembly had appointed. Seniority was determined by drawing lots, since all commissions were dated 8 May 1775. The regiments, which were raised according to county boundaries, rotated posts of honor to avoid establishing a system of precedence. Thomas Church commanded the regiment from Bristol and Newport Counties, Daniel Hitchcock the one from Providence County, and James Mitchell Varnum (an old associate of Greene) the one from King's and Kent. Captain (later major) John Crane, the displaced Bostonian, took charge of the artillery company which contained 4 other

officers, a conductor, 2 sergeants, 2 bombadiers, 4 gunners, 4 corporals, 2 drummers, 2 fifers, and 75 privates.34

Companies marched to Boston as soon as possible. Two of the regiments had assembled there by 4 June when Greene opened his headquarters. Varnum's regiment arrived several weeks later. The artillery company, armed with four field pieces, also arrived in early June. During June and July the Assembly resolved various logistical and disciplinary matters and expanded the brigade's staff by adding a secretary, a baker, and a chaplain. It also raised six new infantry companies, two for each regiment. Greene, who was given limited powers to fill vacancies, was placed under the "command and direction" of the commander-in-chief of the "combined American army" in Massachusetts.35

On 21 April representatives from Massachusetts met with the Connecticut Committee of Correspondence at Lebanon, the home of Governor Jonathan Trumbull. Trumbull sent his son David to inform Massachusetts that a special session of the Assembly would meet as soon as possible and to establish coordination. While some militia units did march to Boston on receipt of news of Lexington and Concord, most were advised to wait until the Assembly could act. The wisdom of this course was confirmed by news that, although Israel Putnam was able to assert a loose hegemony over the volunteers, a formal command structure was needed before they could become effective.36

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The special session convened at Hartford on 26 April, and the next day the Assembly ordered six regiments raised to serve until 10 December, each containing ten 100-man companies. At the time it was believed that these 6,000 men represented 25 percent of the colony's militia strength. The companies were apportioned among the several counties according to population. In its regimental structure Connecticut followed a large, somewhat older model than the other colonies. Like Massachusetts it placed generals in direct command of regiments, and like Rhode Island it also had field officers commanding companies. This left generals directly responsible for both a regiment and a company. Rather than assigning an extra lieutenant to each field officer's company, Connecticut simply designated the senior lieutenant in each colonel's company as a captain-lieutenant. On the other hand, the Connecticut organization called for each company to contain four officers instead of the three provided by all other New England jurisdictions. The Assembly appointed Joseph Spencer and Israel Putnam brigadier generals and David Wooster major general, and assigned supply responsibilities to Joseph Trumbull, the Governor's son, by appointing him Commissary-General.37

During May the Assembly passed legislation that resolved a number of administrative, disciplinary, and logistical problems. The office of regimental adjutant was defined as a separate post, and Samuel Mott was appointed colony engineer, with the rank of lieutenant colonel. The Committee of Safety, also known as the Committee of Defense or

Committee of War, served for the rest of the war as the governor's executive and advisory body. The Assembly considered, but rejected, reorganizing the six regiments into eight to conform in size with those from the other colonies. A special session in July added two more regiments. These were smaller units with a third fewer privates although they retained the same organization and superstructure.

Deployment of the Connecticut regiments also followed a pattern set during earlier wars. The colony had formerly been responsible primarily for reinforcing its neighbors, assisting New York to defend the Albany area and having primary responsibility for protecting western Massachusetts. In 1775 Spencer's 2d and Putnam's 3d Connecticut Regiments, raised in the north-eastern and north-central portions of the colony, naturally marched to Boston. Samuel Parsons' 6th, from the southeast, followed as soon as the vital port of New London was secure. Benjamin Hinman's 4th from Litchfield County in the northwest went to Fort Ticonderoga where the county's men had served in earlier wars. The 1st under Wooster and the 5th under David Waterbury, coming respectively from Fairfield and New Haven Counties in the southwest, were initially reserved to secure New York City. In June Governor Trumbull temporarily placed the men in Massachusetts under the command of General Ward and the regiments in New York under the orders of the Continental and New York Provincial Congresses. The 7th and 8th also went to Boston.

In this manner, the other three New England colonies responded favorably to Massachusetts' plan for a joint army. Although delays were experienced in fielding their regiments, the regiments benefitted from the extra time and organized in a rational manner, avoiding the confusion that had plagued Massachusetts' efforts. Only the 1st New Hampshire Regiment, which had also been organized from the volunteers at Boston, experienced the same organizational troubles as the Massachusetts regiments.

For these New England troops raised in the wake of Lexington and Concord arms and ammunition were in short supply despite recent collection efforts. Weapons available to the New Englanders were mostly English military muskets, known colloquially as "Tower" or "Brown Bess" muskets, left over from earlier wars, and domestically manufactured hunting weapons. Gunpowder, lead for musket balls, and paper for cartridges were critical items. It would take years for the domestic arms industry throughout the colonies to become established despite the best efforts of local governments. In the interim, imports from France, other European nations, and Mexico City were sought, but shortages placed serious limits on the New Englanders' operations. It would take a national effort to overcome them.

Summary.

The New England army assembled around Boston reflected the modifications imposed on European military institutions by nearly two centuries of American colonial experience. Its leaders were drawn largely from the veterans of the French and Indian War and its weaponry and regimental organization strongly revealed the influences of that conflict. The emergence of that army, coordinated by Massachusetts, was a microcosm of the evolution of colonial military institutions. Its first combat revealed the strengths and weaknesses of American experience.

Americans first responded to the possibility of armed confrontation with imperial authorities by strengthening the militia. Each colony took steps to replace aged or unreliable leaders and reorganize units for greater efficiency. Training increased. By 1775 most colonies had restored the militia to a degree of competence in defensive missions not seen for a century. This restoration was influenced by a commitment to an ideological ideal on the part of the militant leadership of the protest movement. That ideal flew in the face of colonial military history which had clearly demonstrated the militia's impracticality on major military operations.

As the crisis deepened a segment of American leadership began to hedge its bets by looking beyond the militia. At first leaders turned to provisional militia units which were designed to take the field on short notice and remain in action for longer periods. Whether these units took the form of volunteer companies or "minutemen", they were derived from the same need to minimize economic disruption that the seventeenth century colonists had faced. The New England army which
came into being at the instigation of Massachusetts moved a step further. Like the Provincials which served as a model, the army's regiments stood apart from the militia system, although drawing heavily on it for recruits and leadership.

Ideologues could accept these new Provincials because they were recruited only for a single campaign. Their enlistments expired by 31 December 1775. Militants also recognized that, like the Provincials, the regiments were directly under the control of local revolutionary governments which represented the people. This qualification restored the subordination to civil authority which the British Army practiced while in Great Britain, but which had been missing from the American Establishment. Because only a modest 30,000-man army was called for, far short of the total military manpower of the New England colonies, the militants could assume that a virtuous citizenry would serve in rotation, obviating the need for a professional force which would be an anathema.

By July a substantial portion of the total projected force had assembled at Boston. Not counting artillery, the New England forces consisted of twenty-six infantry regiments from Massachusetts and three each from New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. On paper they aggregated 99 field officers, 866 company and 144 staff officers, and 18,538 enlisted men. This total was over 2,500 men below authorized levels. More important, it included 1,600 sick and almost 1,500 more who were either on furlough or on detached duty. The regiments were

42. General Return, Main Army, 19 July 1775; Record Group 93, National Archives. Several more regiments had not yet reached Boston.
still only partially organized, for only nine of those from Massachusetts had reached 95 percent of strength even on paper. Five that were below 80 percent of authorized levels were of questionable combat value.

These deficiencies were due in part to the lack of centralized control over the army, or rather armies. Each of the New England colonies raised its own force and dispatched it to Boston in response to Massachusetts' call for assistance. These forces arrived piecemeal and were assigned positions and responsibilities according to the needs of the moment. The only coordination was furnished by a committee form of leadership. A Council of War was established by the Massachusetts commanders on 20 April, and senior officers from the other colonies were added as they became available. Although it worked closely with the Massachusetts civil authorities, it did not really command, but merely developed consensus views. This arrangement prevented effective planning and blocked the individual regiments from making their needs known. Incomplete information on the regiments' status proved to be a major problem in the early months of the Boston siege.43

On 17 June the regional army's first engagement revealed the weaknesses and strengths inherent in its organization. The Council of War decided to apply pressure on the Boston garrison by occupying hills on Charlestown Peninsula that dominated the town. It did not prepare an adequate plan, and committed units piecemeal, with insufficient ammunition and without a clearly delineated chain of command. The British decided not to exploit the positional weakness of the New Englanders,

and instead launched a frontal assault in the hope that this would create a demoralizing show of force. From the security of hasty fieldworks the defenders shattered two attacks with accurate musketry. A third try finally drove them from the peninsula. Sir William Howe, staggered by a casualty rate of 42 percent, realized that the British regulars could not afford to let the New Englanders fight from prepared positions which gave the advantage to New England marksmanship and compensated for their weaknesses. Howe reported to his superiors in London after the battle, "when I look to the consequences of it, in the loss of so many brave Officers, I do it with horror - The Success is too dearly bought."44

The New England army had been defeated, although they had inflicted very heavy losses on the enemy. If they could find solutions to the problems which the battle highlighted, they could profit from the defeat. These solutions required a national army. The search had already turned to Philadelphia where the Continental Congress was in session.

CHAPTER II
THE CONTINENTAL ARMY:
WASHINGTON AND THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Formation of a regional army in the first several months after Lexington was the first phase in the war with England. Even as the New Englanders gathered before Boston a more significant step in the creation of a national force took place in Philadelphia. The Continental Congress convened there on 10 May 1775 to resume coordination of the thirteen colonies' efforts to secure British recognition of American rights. Already four of those colonies were at war. News arrived a week later that Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold had captured Fort Ticonderoga, an event which expanded the dimensions of the conflict and ended hopes of a swift reconciliation with Britain. Congress reluctantly moved to assume direction of the military effort. Up to that point the organization of forces followed established colonial precedents, but as Congress and its agents moved towards an army representing all thirteen colonies they had to break new ground.

Adoption of the Army.

Military attitudes within Congress derived in part from the particular circumstances of the individual constituencies, but also from the political attitudes of the delegates themselves. Conflict began to undermine the hopes of reconciliation among the handful of members who believed that their first loyalty lay with Great Britain. The militants,
concentrated in the New England delegations but with support in other colonies, gained the initiative in deliberations by virtue of superior organization and because British policy played into their hands. During May and June the militants sought support from other delegates for Congress to assume responsibility for the existing troops at Boston. They successfully removed the stigma that the war was a regional issue largely because New Yorkers, concerned for the safety of their own colony, supported the creation of a national force.

The first step in this direction came on 15 May when James Duane of New York introduced a letter from the local New York City Committee of One Hundred. That body, alarmed by a rumor that British troops were on the way to the city, requested Congressional advice. Congress recommended that the British be left alone as long as they committed no overt action, but urged the New Yorkers to defend themselves if attacked and to prevent the troops from erecting any fortifications. Congress also used this occasion to appoint a committee to consider the general defensive needs of that colony. The study group included Thomas Lynch and George Washington, the New York delegation, and militant leader Samuel Adams.

On the next day Congress formed itself into a committee of the whole to "take into consideration the state of America." This was an exceptionally important parliamentary maneuver since Congress was unsure of its objectives but acutely aware of the importance of presenting an appearance of unanimity to the world. As a committee of the whole the delegates could freely exchange opinions and arrive at a consensus with no hint of disagreement in the record. They could also maintain a greater degree of secrecy. This arrangement lasted for the next month and served Congress' purposes admirably, although it created problems for historians attempting to reconstruct the flow of events.

The first business considered by the Committee of the Whole was a motion on 16 May by Richard Henry Lee, a Virginia ally of the Adamses, for Congress to raise an army. Lynch and John Dickinson supported Lee, but opposition came from others, notably Robert R. Livingston and John Rutledge. At this point the delegates knew the Massachusetts plan for a regional army but assumed that the force at Boston amounted only to 9,000 to 10,000 men. Although the delegates did not act on Lee's proposal, it was clear that there was broad support for a defensive military posture in Congress.

Deliberations on 18 May revealed the impact of the news of the capture of Ticonderoga. Congress assumed that the British were planning to use troops stationed in Canada against the colonies, an assumption

5. Ibid., p. 351. Dickinson, Livingston, and Rutledge all were considerably less militant at this point than the New Englanders.
that placed the onus of expanding hostilities on London. Congress instructed the local committees in Albany and New York City to move military supplies to safety and to call on New England for assistance in defending Ticonderoga.\(^7\) The next day the report of the committee studying Duane’s motion passed to the Committee of the Whole for consideration.\(^8\) These events marked a change in sentiment as British actions seemed to confirm the militants’ claims of hostile intent. On 21 May John Adams, a leading militant, reported to colleagues in Massachusetts “I can guess - that an Army will be posted in New York, and another in Massachusetts, at the Continental Expense.”\(^9\) The other delegates, including those who had been reluctant to endorse the use of force, expected formal actions confirming “Continental” or “American” armies for both Boston and New York.\(^10\)

On 25 May the Committee of the Whole delivered its report on three specific measures to be recommended to New York. Two currently undefended strategic points needed fortification: King’s Bridge, which linked Manhattan to the mainland, and the Hudson Highlands, a zone some forty miles above the city where hills narrowed the Hudson River and allowed obstruction of the passage to Albany. The militia of the colony also should be brought to a state of readiness. Finally, the New York

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8. Ibid., p. 57. A similar procedure on 1 June processed the report of a committee composed of militants Samuel Adams, Silas Deane, and Thomas Mifflin and more moderate George Washington, Philip Schuyler, and Lewis Morris appointed on 27 May to suggest ways and means to procure arms; Ibid., pp. 67, 74; Smith, Letters of Delegates, 1: 412, 431.
9. Ibid., p. 364.
10. Ibid., pp. 442-3, 445-6, 464-5.
Provincial Congress should be authorized to raise up to 3,000 men to serve, under conditions similar to those established by New England, until 31 December 1775. They would garrison Ticonderoga and other posts. The Congress unanimously approved these recommendations on the 26th after adding a preamble protesting that, although it hoped for reconciliation, it was forced to defend itself. Congress gave New York's Provincial Congress a free hand in raising and officering the troops. The only recorded debate was over the size of that force. The original recommendation to raise 4,000 was supported by persons of such diverse views as John and Samuel Adams on the one hand and Edmund Rutledge on the other, and then was lowered to 3,000 at the insistence of Thomas McKean and Edmund Pendleton. This action clearly indicates the importance Congress placed on reaching a consensus.

On 31 May Congress received a report from Benedict Arnold that British forces were massing at St. John's at the northern end of Lake Champlain. It requested Connecticut to send troops to help secure Ticonderoga. Actually the 4th Connecticut Regiment of approximately 1,000 men had already moved into the area, and this request granted official approval to the movement. The delegates deliberately left the number vague to allow the Connecticut authorities, who were closer and better informed, freedom of action. This measure, moving New Englanders to assume a function intended for the recently authorized New Yorkers,

12. Ibid., pp. 407, 410. The preamble appears to have been inserted at the insistence of the New Jersey delegates, who represented a variety of views.
resulted from the delegates' perception of the need for swift action. Connecticut's men were already in being; the New York Provincial Congress had not yet had time to raise its troops.  

Decisive action came on 14 June 1775 when Congress adopted "the American continental army." Following its usual procedure it reached a consensus in the Committee of the Whole. A desire for secrecy colored the proceedings. The record indicates only that Congress undertook to raise ten companies of riflemen, approved an enlistment form for them, and appointed a committee to draft rules and regulations for "the government of the army." The delegates' correspondence and diaries and their subsequent actions make it clear that they really did much more. They also accepted responsibility for the existing troops, believed to number 10,000, and the forces allocated for the defense of the various points in New York, assumed to be another 5,000 men.

At least some men in Congress believed from the beginning that this force would grow. Better information soon arrived from Boston regarding the actual numbers of New England troops. Congress responded by a series of increases in the troop ceilings the delegates were willing to support. Within a week delegates began referring to 15,000 men at Boston.

15. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 503-4, 507-8, 515-6, 526-7.
16. Ibid., pp. 488-90, 507.
18. Thomas Cushing, George Washington, and Joseph Hewes constituted the moderate core of this committee, with Philip Schuyler and militant Silas Deane representing the extremes of political opinion.
20. Ibid., pp. 515-6.
and by early July that total began edging towards 20,000. On 19 June the governments of Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire were requested to forward to Boston "such of the forces as are already embodied, towards their quotas of the troops agreed to be raised by the New England Colonies", a clear indication of the intent of Congress to adopt the entire extant regional army. Discussions on the next day indicated that Congress was prepared to support a force at Boston twice the size of the British garrison and was unwilling to order any existing units disbanded. Maximum strengths for both the forces in Massachusetts and New York were finally established on 21 and 22 July, when solid information was at hand. These were set respectively at 22,000 and 5,000 men, a total nearly double that envisioned on 14 June.

The "expert riflemen" authorized on 14 June were the first units raised directly as Continentals. Congress intended to have ten companies serve as a light infantry force at the Boston siege and at the same time symbolically extend military participation beyond the scene of immediate conflict. Six of the companies were allocated to Pennsylvania, two to Maryland, and two to Virginia. Each would have a captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, a drummer (or horn player), and 68 privates. The enlistment period was set at one year, the norm for provincials in earlier wars, a period that would expire officially on 1 July 1776.

23. Ibid., pp. 100-1.
25. Ibid., pp. 313-5. Ford, Journals of Congress, 2: 89-90; 5: 432. On 12 June 1776 the company organization of a rifle company was amended to include both a drummer and a fifer.
Responsibility for recruiting the companies was given to the three colonies' Congressional delegates, who then turned directly to the county committees of areas noted for skilled marksmen. The response in Pennsylvania's western and northern frontier counties was so great that on 22 June the colony's quota was increased from six to eight companies, organized as a regiment. On 25 June the Pennsylvania delegates, on the recommendation of the Pennsylvania Assembly, appointed field officers for the regiment. Since no staff organization was provided, the necessary duties were performed by company officers and volunteers. On 11 July delegate George Read secured the adoption of a ninth company organized in Lancaster County by his wife's nephew. In Virginia Daniel Morgan raised one company in Frederick County and Hugh Stephenson another in Berkeley County; Michael Cresap's and Thomas Price's companies were from Frederick County, Maryland. All thirteen were organized during late June and early July and raced to Boston where their loose frontier attitudes created disciplinary problems.26

Including troops from outside New England gave the desired continental flavor to the Army. This need to broaden the base of support for the war also led John Adams to work for the appointment of a southerner as commander of "all the continental forces, raised, or to be raised, for the defense of American liberty." On 15 June Congress unanimously chose George Washington, a Virginia delegate. Washington had been active in the military planning committees and by late May had taken to

wearing his old uniform. His colleagues believed that his modesty and competence qualified him to adjust to the "Temper & Genius" of the New England troops. Congress gave Washington the rank of General and Commander-in-Chief.  

Congress clearly respected Washington, for it granted him extensive powers combining the functions of a regular British commander with the latent military responsibilities of a colonial governor. Congress' original instructions of 20 June, drafted by Edmund Rutledge and the militants Richard Henry Lee and John Adams, told him to proceed to Massachusetts, "take charge of the army of the united colonies", and capture or destroy all armed enemies. His general instructions were to keep the army obedient, diligent, and disciplined; his only specific obligation was to send Congress the first accurate strength return of the army. The Commander-in-Chief's right to make strategic and tactical decisions on purely military grounds was limited only by a reference to listening to the advice of a council of war. Within a maximum set by Congress, including volunteers, Washington had the right to determine how many men to retain, and Congress empowered him to temporarily fill any vacancies occurring below the rank of colonel. Permanent promotions and appointments could only be made by the colony governments.  

Although sectional politics played a role in Washington's selection, he was in fact the best-qualified native-born American for the job on
strictly military terms. He had begun his military career in the Virginia militia in 1752 as one of four regional adjutants appointed to improve training. During the early phase of the French and Indian War he served with gallantry as Edward Braddock's volunteer aide at the battle of the Monongahela, and later as commander of Virginia's two Provincial regiments defending that colony's frontier. In 1758 he commanded a brigade composed of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania units on John Forbes' expedition against Fort Duquesne, the only American in that war to command so large a force. These years furnished invaluable experience and taught him the importance of discipline, marksmanship, and professional study. Exposure to Forbes' seminal ideas on adapting European tactics to the American wilderness contributed materially to Washington's military education. Above all, he came to recognize that only unyielding commitment to hard work and attention to administrative detail could keep troops in the field.  

On 16 June, the day after Washington's appointment, Congress authorized a variety of other senior officers for its new army. Details were ironed out again in Committee of the Whole. Five major staff officers were established: an Adjutant General, a Commissary of Musters, a Paymaster General, a Commissary General, and a Quartermaster General. They were expected to assist the Commander-in-Chief with the administration

of the "grand army". The forces allocated to New York were already considered a separate department and were authorized their own Deputy Quartermaster General and a Deputy Paymaster General. Three aides and a military secretary for Washington and a secretary for the separate New York department, and six engineers (three for each force) completed the staff. The other ranks created at this time were major general and brigadier general. The number of generals remained uncertain for several days as Congress debated. Between 17 and 22 June Congress finally decided on four major generals, each with two aides, and eight brigadier generals. It fixed these numbers to allow each colony raising troops a share of the patronage. In the succeeding days Congress also took steps to issue paper money to finance the army, and on 30 June adopted Articles of War.

Selection of subordinate generals and senior staff positions led to political maneuvering as delegates sought appointments for favorite sons. On 17 June Artemas Ward and Charles Lee were elected as the first and second major generals and Horatio Gates as the Adjutant General. Ward received seniority because he was in command at Boston and because Massachusetts furnished the largest single contingent of troops. Ward was a Harvard graduate with long years of experience in the Massachusetts legislature and established whiggish political credentials. After two years of active duty as a field officer in the French and Indian War he compiled an excellent record as a militia administrator. Lee and Gates

were professional English officers in their forties who were living in Virginia on the half-pay (inactive) list. Both were associates of radicals in England and America and had served in the French and Indian War. Lee had also seen service in Portugal and in the Polish Army. Gates ended the Seven Years' War as a major in the Caribbean. His appointment as Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier general reflected his staff experience and was intended to provide Washington with a strong administrative assistant.32

Two more major generals were appointed on 19 June to satisfy the colonies contributing the other large contingents. Philip Schuyler, a conservative New York delegate with close ties to Washington, was to command in his native colony. A member of the New York elite, the forty-two year old Schuyler had been a major in the French and Indian War specializing in logistics. His experience, political connections, and extensive business interests in Albany were particularly valuable in his new command. Connecticut's delegation had difficulty agreeing on a nominee for that colony's major general, but Israel Putnam's status as a folk-hero eventually outweighed considerations of strict military seniority, and he received the appointment. Born in 1718, Putnam was a relatively old man who had seen extensive service in the French and

Indian War, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel. He was also an early, vocal leader of the Sons of Liberty.

Selection of eight brigadier generals on 22 June was the product of a compromise. Congress allotted these positions in proportion to the relative numbers of men each colony contributed, and in making appointments followed the recommendations of the colony’s delegates. It created problems, however, by ignoring status and seniority. Massachusetts’ Seth Pomeroy, William Heath, and John Thomas were originally elected as the first, fourth, and sixth brigadier generals. Washington refrained from handing them their commissions until Pomeroy declined because of his age. Congress was then able to eliminate one problem by restoring Thomas to seniority, although it did not fill Pomeroy’s vacancy. Thomas, a surgeon, had been born in 1724 and had served primarily in medical roles. Heath, thirteen years younger, was strictly a product of the militia.

Richard Montgomery of New York became the second ranking brigadier general. Montgomery was born in Ireland in 1738, educated at Dublin’s

Trinity College, and had entered the British Army in 1756. His combat service had been in North America and the Caribbean, but he resigned in 1772 when he failed to receive a promotion to major. He moved to New York, married into the powerful Livingston family, and in 1775 was elected to the New York Provincial Congress. His appointment was intended to complement Schuyler's logistical and administrative skills with combat leadership.

David Wooster and Joseph Spencer of Connecticut became the third and fifth brigadier generals. Wooster was born in 1711 and had served in Connecticut's navy during King George's War. A Yale graduate, he later commanded a regiment in the French and Indian War. Spencer, who was three years younger, had also served in both wars. The two men initially refused to serve under Putnam and had to be cajoled into accepting their commissions. Delegate John Sullivan, a thirty-five year old lawyer, exercised political leverage and became New Hampshire's brigadier general. Folsom who commanded the first troops raised to aid Boston was passed over. Nathanael Greene of Rhode Island became the last of the Continental generals of 1775.

In retrospect the June 1775 decision of the Continental Congress to create a Continental Army seems remarkably free from political strife. Militants as well as delegates of a more moderate persuasion supported each step along the way. The only arguments were of a nonpartisan nature and concerned technical details. That unity of sentiment resulted from British actions which convinced virtually every delegate of the need to take defensive measures and from a compromise program that appealed to every segment of opinion. Militants, deeply committed to the ideal of the citizen-soldier, saw the adoption of the short-term New England
force as the genesis of a yeomanry army. Others, more concerned with
the practical lessons of the colonial wars, felt that they were forming
an army of Provincials. Militants were happy that Congress adopted the
army; more conservative delegates could claim that the door was not yet
closed to reconciliation with the mother country. Adherents of every
view were accommodated in the selection of officers, particularly since
Washington and Schuyler had blank commissions to distribute to the regi-
mental officers. This device confirmed local selections and yet retained
nominal national control of appointments. Senior commanders reflected
the prevailing sentiments of each colony, and ranged from the ultra-
militant Charles Lee to conservative Philip Schuyler. In fact, this
desire for consensus glossed over some profound attitudinal differences
within the Army and Congress that would later create internal turmoil. 35

Washington and Schuyler left Philadelphia on 23 June to take up
their new responsibilities. The Commander-in-Chief reached Cambridge,
Massachusetts, late in the evening on 2 July. He formally opened his
headquarters the next day.

Washington Takes Command.

Washington arrived at Cambridge with the mission of turning the
armed forces assembled there into a unified army. Three major areas
needed improvement: tactical and administrative organization above the

pp. 95-97, 109-10, 112, 119. Lawrence Delbert Cress, "The Standing Army,
The Militia, and the New Republic: Changing Attitudes Toward the Mili-
tary in American Society, 1768 to 1820" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
regimental level; a centralized special staff; and a unified system of discipline. Washington and the other generals appointed by Congress were guided in this work by Congress' general directions and by the model of the British Army. At the end of 1775, although the troops still came primarily from the five northernmost colonies, national control over the Continental Army was well established.

Regiments from the different New England colonies arrived at Boston in a piecemeal fashion and occupied positions according to the dictates of terrain and the road network. Washington brought greater rationality and control by introducing divisions and brigades as echelons between his own headquarters and the regiments. His pattern of organization was adapted to the specific geographic conditions and personalities he encountered at Boston. On 22 July, after some hesitancy because of the problems over rank and precedence and the lack of positive guidance from Congress, Washington assigned his available generals to command three divisions and six brigades, each responsible for a sector of the siege lines. The British occupied two peninsulas in Boston harbor which were connected to the mainland by narrow necks. Ward, with brigades under Thomas and Spencer, guarded the southern or right wing opposite Boston Neck. Lee manned the left wing, shutting off Charlestown Peninsula with Sullivan's and Greene's Brigades. The third division was held in the central area of the lines as a reserve force under Washington's close supervision. Putnam, whose appointment as a major general created the thorniest problem, commanded Heath's Brigade and the sixth brigade.

The latter was under the temporary command of the senior colonel because Pomeroy's vacancy was not filled. This arrangement was retained throughout the siege. Each brigade, normally six regiments, defended its own sector, while the specialized riflemen and artillery remained directly under Washington's headquarters.

Congress began creating a staff structure on 16 June, but had filled only one post immediately, appointing Gates as Adjutant General. Over the succeeding weeks Congress and Washington selected the other staff members. The primacy Congress accorded the Adjutant General is evident in Gates' immediate appointment and his rank as a general officer.

In the British Army the Adjutant General, working closely with the civilian Secretary at War, had responsibility for discipline, compilation of rolls and rosters, and supervision of drills and clothing. By the time of the Revolutionary War the British had also developed a temporary staff adjutant general for each major expeditionary force. This officer handled guards, details, paperwork (including the transmission of orders), and the formation of the infantry into the line of battle. A brigade-level officer, the brigade major, and a detail of sergeants who acted as messengers assisted him. This expeditionary officer served as the model for the Continental Army's Adjutant General. For his part, Washington left Gates to establish the Army's internal administrative

procedures, a task he performed efficiently. In particular, difficulty in compiling the first strength return, a major portion of Gates' job, led to the introduction of printed forms and regularized procedures. 38 On 14 September Congress confirmed, with the rank of colonel, the New York Provincial Congress' selection of Edward Fleming as Deputy Adjutant General for the New York Department. 39

Army administration supervised by the Adjutant General extended to lower echelons. British brigade majors were captains temporarily selected by a brigade commander to serve as his liaison officer between the adjutant general and the regiments. Since a British Army brigade was a transitory formation, the office of brigade major was not permanent. He also supervised the daily working and guard parties of the brigade. 40

The adjutant paralleled the brigade major on the regimental level. A junior company officer customarily was assigned this duty in the British Army in addition to his normal tasks. He assisted the major, who retained nominal responsibility for the regimental staff. In the Continental Army both the brigade major and the adjutant were initially modeled after these British precedents with one important exception. They were normally set apart as distinct offices rather than additional duties.

40. Permanent garrisons contained a town major with functions similar to those of a brigade major.
Massachusetts had appointed William Henshaw as Ward's adjutant general and Samuel Brewer as Thomas' on 27 June to service the two concentrations of Massachusetts troops which had developed. When Washington informed Congress of his army's command organization on 10 July, Congress assumed correctly that he had established three geographical centers. It therefore authorized three brigade majors. Washington accepted the existence of Massachusetts' two adjutants general and Rhode Island's brigade major as de facto brigade majors and requested Congress to authorize one for each of the army's six brigades. In August, when Congress failed to reply, he acted on his own authority and appointed David Henly, John Trumbull, and Richard Cary, and confirmed Brewer, Daniel Box of Rhode Island, and Alexander Scammell. The pattern established in these initial appointments continued throughout the war. Congress normally delegated authority to appoint brigade majors to either the Commander-in-Chief or the territorial department commanders, who in turn deferred selection of specific individuals to the brigade commanders. 41

The remaining administrative staff also followed British precedent. Washington and Congress used the Paymaster General, the disburser of funds, to consolidate Continental control over the Army's finances. Two important militant politicians, James Warren of Massachusetts and Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., of Connecticut, were elected on 27 and 28 July as

the Paymaster General and Deputy Paymaster General for the New York Department respectively. At the end of the siege of Boston Warren declined to move with the Army to New York. Congress replaced him on 27 April 1776 with William Palfrey, a Boston merchant who had been John Hancock's business manager and Charles Lee's aide. This staff department remained relatively small and unimportant in the Continental Army. In the British Army, where regiments were the property of their colonels, the Paymaster General served as the channel through which funds were transmitted to the regiment's civilian commercial agent. Since most supplies were issued directly in the Continental Army, the agent system never developed and the Paymaster General concentrated narrowly on disbursing funds for salaries.

The British Commissary General of Musters (or Mustermaster General) was the official watchdog who insured that regimental commanders actually furnished the men and equipment they claimed payment for. Massachusetts had appointed two mustermasters as early as 6 May. As indicated, Congress included a Mustermaster General in the first set of staff officers, although it delegated selection of an individual to Washington. He chose Stephen Moylan, a wealthy Irish Catholic merchant from Philadelphia, one of the earliest volunteers from outside New England. On 29 July Congress authorized a deputy for the New York Department.

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Commanders' personal staffs, the aides and secretaries authorized on 16 June, completed the Army's 1775 administrative apparatus. Following British precedent, the Commander-in-Chief and the major generals selected these individuals for their political connections as well as their abilities. The aides acted as messengers; the military secretaries performed most of the correspondence duties. During 1775 Washington's "family," as these individuals were collectively known, contained various important young politicians or members of powerful families. This talented group included at different times Thomas Mifflin (a militant member of the Pennsylvania delegation in the First Continental Congress) and Joseph Reed of Pennsylvania, John Trumbull, a son of Connecticut's Governor, and three Virginians, Edmund Randolph, George Baylor, and Robert Hanson Harrison.44

British logistical practices divided supervisory responsibilities between a Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, a civil officer who was concerned with foodstuffs and the procurement and storage of general supplies, and the military Quartermaster General who controlled transportation and forage, as well as the army's marching and camping. A separate branch handled munitions. When Washington arrived at Boston, he reviewed the supply measures undertaken by the several colonies. He was most impressed with the work of Joseph Trumbull of Connecticut, the colony which he expected to furnish a large share of the supplies for the siege. On his recommendation Congress appointed Trumbull Commissary

General on 19 July. Washington appointed Philadelphia merchant Thomas Mifflin as the Quartermaster General on 14 August, and three days later, having persuaded Congress to create the office of Commissary of Artillery to handle that branch's special needs, he continued Ezekiel Cheever as a Continental officer in the role he had been performing for Massachusetts. A similar organization was created for Schuyler's force since Congress realized the practical difficulties of consolidating logistics for such widely separated armies.45

At this stage of the war Congress largely left the development of the logistical apparatus to the judgment of the local commanders, who relied in turn on British precedents. The most important official was the regimental quartermaster, a position that the Continental Army elevated from an additional duty to permanent status. He was responsible for distributing rations, clothing, and ammunition within the regiment. He assigned the men their quarters and supervised pitching camp. A daily duty detail of about six privates, the "camp color men," assisted him. Supplementing the military officers were numerous civilian functionaries in the commissariat. They included such specialists as conductors, clerks, storekeepers, laborers, and skilled craftsmen.46

Medical care formed another area of special support which drew attention very early in the war. The regimental surgeon and his one or two assistants, or mates, provided basic care in the Continental and British Armies. Washington, drawing on his French and Indian War experience, bolstered their efforts by trying to convince the soldiers of the importance of sanitation and diet. Congress followed the lead taken by Massachusetts, and on 27 July created a centralized hospital organization and medical supply system. The New York Department was later given a similar hospital corps under Dr. Samuel Stringer, an Albany politician and Schuyler's personal physician. Dr. Benjamin Church, a member of the Massachusetts political leadership, was appointed as the first Director General and Chief Physician. When he was revealed as a British spy in the autumn, he was replaced by the noted Philadelphian, Dr. John Morgan. Under Morgan a major step towards central control was instituted when regimental medical personnel were required to pass competency examinations.  

New England, a region with strong religious consciousness, naturally provided for spiritual as well as physical welfare. Chaplains had served on all major expeditions since the Pequot War of 1637, and the New England clergy had been politically active in the pre-war period. In 1775 Connecticut and New Hampshire both authorized a chaplain for

each regiment, while Rhode Island allowed one for its brigade. Diffi-
culties arose in Massachusetts. On 20 May it had scrapped a plan to
provide one chaplain for each regiment, deciding instead to accept the
offer of the Congregationalist Church (the colony's officially sup-
ported denomination) to provide clergymen on a rotating basis. Within
two weeks this plan was discarded as unworkable, and the generals and
field officers selected nine official chaplains. This concept of let-
ting the units select chaplains, rather than the authorities assigning
them, became standard procedure in every colony except Georgia and the
Carolinas, and was recognized by Congress as well. 48

Regimental organizations contained another type of specialist
that played an important role, although not technically considered a
staff function. Companies included a drummer and in most cases a fifer
as well. Unlike modern musicians, these individuals were concerned with
signaling rather than morale and were commonly massed behind the regi-
ment in a battle. The eighteenth-century drum produced a sound that
could be heard at distances of several miles and in groups could carry
over the din of combat. Standard beats regulated the routine of camp
life and transmitted orders during battle. Drummers and fifers addi-
tionally administered corporal punishment, maintained the regimental
guard room, and assisted the surgeon and quartermaster in evacuating
casualties. As early as 1777 they began to carry arms, and combat
functions became more important than musical skill as the war progressed.

Eugene Franklin Williams, "Soldiers of God: Chaplains of the Revolu-
tionary War" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1972).
In 1776 drum and fife majors were added to the regimental staff as performing musicians with the responsibility for instructing drummers and fifers. They received higher pay than their British counterparts.49

Later in the war the "field music" provided by the fifers and drummers was supplemented by a few "bands of music." These were true bands normally containing up to eight musicians playing a variety of woodwinds and horns. Unlike European armies, the Continental Army did not hire civilians as bandsmen, but allowed soldiers to perform as an additional duty. The bands, which were maintained by only a handful of regiments, were legally the property of the officers of the regiment who pooled their funds to purchase instruments and pay the musicians. Even Washington had to ask their permission if he wished a band to perform at a formal ceremony or at an unofficial dance.

The final type of staff officer proved to be the most difficult to obtain. While many civilian occupations required skills which could be applied in the Army -- for example, merchants were able to step into various logistical assignments -- military engineering was a highly technical field. Americans knew a great deal about civil construction and could erect simple field works, but they were not on a par with formally trained European military engineers. Congress had authorized Washington and Schuyler each to have one chief engineer and two assistants, but neither commander ever found enough suitable candidates.

Washington had to make do with a handful of men who were at best gifted amateurs: Col. Gridley and Lt. Col. Burbeck of the Artillery Regiment, Jeduthan Baldwin, and Rufus Putnam. They created a ring of earthworks which the British chose not to attack, but could not press a formal siege of Boston. Their lack of skill turned operations into a mere blockade, dictating a strategy of trying to lure the British into costly frontal attacks and strongly influencing Washington's tactical organization.  

The final requirement to turn the force at Boston into an army also involved the creation of special staff officers. Discipline, the military system of obedience and internal control, was an absolute necessity for the linear warfare of the eighteenth century. Washington arrived at Cambridge to find that charges of misconduct in the battle of Bunker Hill had been levelled against a number of officers. He immediately informed the army that cowardice was

A Crime ... the most infamous in a Soldier, the most injurious /sic/ to an Army, and the last to be forgiven; inasmuch as it may, and often does happen, that the Cowardice of a single officer may prove the Destruction /sic/ of the whole Army.  

The Commander-in-Chief's attitudes had been formed during the French and Indian War by his experiences as a commander of Provincials and an observer of the British Army. They were founded on a deep insight into


the nature of American society and the realities of the era. Washington's ideas on discipline dominated the Continental Army.\textsuperscript{52}

New England's military and civil law both grew from English roots. Tradition and the Radical Whig ideology of the region's leaders in 1775 insured that the disciplinary system created for the New England armies was less draconian than Great Britain's. Massachusetts approved Articles of War on 5 April. In May Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted similar codes, while New Hampshire accepted Massachusetts' on 29 June. Derived from British articles in force since 1765, the fifty-three clauses defined crimes, punishments, and legal procedures. Minor offenses were punishable by summary action of the regimental commander, intermediary crimes were subject to a regimental court-martial, and the most serious were tried at a general court-martial. Most offenses were handled with fines or corporal punishment (up to a maximum of thirty-nine lashes); only desertion in combat and betraying the password to the enemy were subject to the death penalty.

The first Continental Articles of War adopted by Congress on 30 June added sixteen clauses to the basic Massachusetts text. The extra articles covered applicability, the preparation of administrative forms, pardons, sutlers, and the disposition of personal effects of deceased

soldiers. This material was contained in the British articles, but had been omitted by the New Englanders. The Continental text was distributed to the troops at Boston on 10 August. Concern for improvement developed throughout the summer. Following a conference between a Congressional committee and the staff, sixteen changes were adopted by Congress on 7 November. They expanded the list of capital crimes. The revision, which had been prompted by the realization that under existing articles treason was not a punishable offense, went into effect on 1 January 1776. At this time Washington began serious efforts to enforce the Continental Articles because lingering doubts over their legal applicability for men enlisted prior to 14 June were finally resolved.

Although Washington relied heavily on British precedents and the unofficial legal advice of William Tudor, he recognized the importance of a permanent staff to assist him. Congress approved his plan to appoint a judge advocate as a legal advisor and a provost marshal to enforce camp discipline. Tudor, a Harvard graduate who had studied law under John Adams, was appointed on 30 July as the "Judge Advocate of the Continental Army." His principal function was supervising trials. The general supervision of discipline, however, remained a function of the Adjutant General. William Marony became the first provost marshal only on 10 January 1776. The provost's functions were identical in both the British and Continental Armies: maintaining the army jail and supervising the daily camp guards furnished by line regiments in rotation. The office suffered from a heavy personnel turnover throughout the war, largely because the provost was required to serve as the Army's
executioner. Washington normally selected a sergeant and conferred on him the temporary rank of captain.

By mid-October 1775 Washington had made great progress in organizing, staffing, and disciplining his army, although his correspondence indicates that he still was not satisfied. The Main Army actually exceeded the 22,000 men Congress had agreed to support. In addition to the artillery, riflemen, and a handful of separate companies, it included 27 infantry regiments from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut, and 3 each from New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Although each colony's units had different authorized strengths, most were at least 90 percent full on paper. Only eight of the Massachusetts regiments were between 80 and 90 percent complete, while three others fell below 80 percent. The individual units averaged 474 rank and file, ranging between 364 and 816. The total infantry rank and file strength of the Main Army was 19,497. There were also 690 drummers and fifers, 1,298 sergeants, 934 company officers, 163 regimental staff officers, and 94 field officers. Of the total rank and file strength, nearly 2,500 were sick, 750 were on furlough, and 2,400 were detached on various duties.

53. General Return, Main Army, 17 Oct 1775; Record Group 93, National Archives. Interpretation of Continental Army strength returns requires special care in understanding the categories used by the staff. Officers and noncommissioned officers were counted if present in camp but not if on detached duties. More complete information was furnished for rank and file (privates and corporals). Sick were classified as either "present" (with their unit) or "absent" (in a hospital or on convalescent leave). "On Command" included all men currently on detached duty, either in the immediate vicinity of camp or at a distance. A true picture of the combat strength of a unit would include the rank and file "present fit for duty" plus a significant percentage of those on command or sick present: the former representing men who could be recalled on short notice, the latter those men capable of bearing arms in a defensive situation. The sergeants and officers in the company grades also represent a combat force.
Four of the six brigades contained approximately 2,400 men in combat strength. Sullivan's Brigade was slightly larger with 2,700 men. The largest brigade was Spencer's (3,200) because it contained two of the large Connecticut regiments and several separate companies. The relative strengths of the divisions reflected their defensive responsibilities. Ward's had the most men (5,600) and Lee's was only 400 smaller. The reserve division under Putnam was the smallest, containing only 4,800 men, while the 700 riflemen remained outside the divisional alignment. This total force was substantial. It was equipped with a staff organization and a disciplinary system, and was grouped into a tactical arrangement which suited its location and mission. On the other hand the British had not tested it in battle. Washington finished 1775 unsure of the army's combat potential and eager to resolve some of the remaining issues relating to its internal organization.

The War Spreads to Canada.

Congressional control over a military establishment was not limited to Washington's Main Army in eastern Massachusetts. The 10 May 1775 seizure of Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain had played an important role in persuading Congress to take military action. It also expanded the horizons of the conflict by resurrecting fears of an invasion from Canada along the Champlain-Hudson River corridor which had been so important during the colonial wars. Unfortunately, the irregulars who had taken the fort under the leadership of Ethan Allen of the "Green Mountain Boys" and Benedict Arnold, a Connecticut volunteer acting under
a Massachusetts commission, quickly melted away. The fort and its valuable cannon required more security than the Committee of Correspondence of Albany County could provide from the handful of local volunteer companies at its disposal. Congress stepped in by assuming responsibility for the 4th Connecticut Regiment which was sent to protect the area from British counterattack, and by directing New York to raise 3,000 troops.

Washington and Schuyler, commander of the New York Department (known for most of the war as the Northern Department), discussed plans on their trip north from Philadelphia. Washington gave his instructions to Schuyler on 25 June when they parted company at New York City. The Commander-in-Chief emphasized organization and the creation of a logistical apparatus, but told his subordinate to follow any instructions that came directly from Congress. On 20 July Congress formalized their arrangements, creating the territorial department as one of the basic command elements of the Continental Army when it instructed Schuyler to dispose of and employ all the troops in the New York department in such manner as he may think best for the protection and defense of these colonies, subject to future orders of the commander in chief.  

Schuyler's little army contained the 4th Connecticut Regiment, the 1st and 5th Connecticut Regiments near New York City, and the 3,000 newly authorized New Yorkers. His subordinate generals, Montgomery and Wooster, reflected the two-colony origin of his force.

The New York Provincial Congress, for a variety of reasons, did not approve a plan for organizing and recruiting its quota until 27 June. The selection of officers took another three days. The four regiments it decided on fell between the extremes of the New England regiments in size. Each contained ten companies; each company was composed of 3 officers and 72 enlisted men. The companies were apportioned to the various counties whose committees of correspondence supervised recruiting. This gave the regiments a geographical basis, and their numerical designations reflected the militia precedence of the counties which furnished the bulk of the men.56

Alexander McDougall, a leader of the Sons of Liberty, commanded the 1st New York Regiment which was raised in New York City. He had no military experience, but his radical political credentials were impeccable. A substantial proportion of his officers had backgrounds in either the French and Indian War or in the city's elite volunteer militia battalion. The 2d regiment was assigned to Albany, the colony's other urban area, and the surrounding regions in the north. Colonel Goose Van Schaick was the son of a former mayor, and many of the officers came from the Dutch element of the population. The 3d and 4th regiments divided the rest of the colony, roughly along the line of the Hudson River. James Clinton, a leader in Ulster County, commanded the 3d. James Holmes and Philip Van Cortlandt, from Westchester and

Dutchess Counties respectively, became colonel and lieutenant colonel of the 4th. In practice, the officers selected for each regiment represented the prevailing political sentiments of their portion of the colony. The colony's newly established Committee of Safety also decided to form an artillery company as part of their contingent, and appointed John Lamb, another New York City Son of Liberty, as its commander on 17 July. The company was raised in the city and organized on the same pattern as the companies of the Artillery Regiment at Boston.57

As a reward for Ethan Allen's role in the seizure of Ticonderoga, the Continental Congress authorized the formation of a special unit for Schuyler's army. The Green Mountain Boys were a quasi-independent group in the area known as the Hampshire Grants (today's Vermont). Congress recognized that they possessed special skills in wilderness fighting, but that they were fiercely independent. Therefore it instructed Schuyler and the New York Provincial Congress, which deferred to Schuyler, to allow them to organize seven companies and elect their own officers. They were formed into a regiment on the New York pattern, with the same terms of enlistment as the New Yorkers, but commanded by a lieutenant colonel rather than a colonel. To Allen's disgust, Seth

Warner, a veteran of Rogers' Rangers of the French and Indian War, received command of the small regiment. 58

Schuyler, following Congressional instructions, launched an invasion of Canada on 31 August. Montgomery was given the primary tactical responsibility for the offensive. Governor Guy Carleton unsuccessfully attempted to halt the Americans at St. John's (St. Jean, Quebec), and then was driven back toward Quebec City before winter weather restricted Montgomery's movements. The regiments of Schuyler's army were supplemented during this offensive by reinforcements from the French-Canadian population and by Major Timothy Bedel's three companies of rangers. New Hampshire had raised the latter men as state troops during the summer to guard the Connecticut River Valley, and on Washington's advice offered them to Schuyler as soon as it became clear that the region was not in immediate danger. 59

Washington launched a second invasion directly from Boston. This maneuver not only had the military purpose of complicating Carleton's defensive problems, but it also enabled Washington to send reinforcements to Montgomery by the most direct route. On 11 September the Commander-in-Chief gave Benedict Arnold, who had returned to Boston, command of a special force of 1,100 men drawn from the Main Army. Three rifle companies (Morgan's from Virginia and Matthew Smith's and

William Hendricks' from the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment) and two provisional five-company infantry battalions of New Englanders reached the banks of the St. Lawrence River on 9 November after an epic trek through the virgin wilderness of Maine. Arnold was too weak to attack the city of Quebec alone and had to wait for Montgomery. The latter had paused at Montreal to regroup his disease-riddled ranks. The two forces linked outside Quebec on 1 December. Although Montgomery was able to persuade some of his troops to extend their enlistments beyond 31 December 1775, many more indicated that they would leave for their homes at the start of the new year. Carleton could not be bluffed into surrendering, and Lamb's field guns were ineffective against the city's walls. Montgomery had to gamble on storming the works, and he made his attempt on the night of 30-31 December under the cover of a snowstorm. He was killed, the attack was repulsed, and a wounded Arnold was left to command the handful of men who continued to blockade the city as 1776 began.

Summary.

By the end of 1775 control over the war effort had passed from the individual northern colonies to the Continental Congress. Acting as a national government that body had appointed general officers, initiated the development of staff and disciplinary systems, accepted the financial responsibility for existing units and authorized the creation of others, and formed two major operational commands. George Washington, a delegate unanimously chosen as Commander-in-Chief, took charge of the Main Army which penned the British into Boston. Philip Schuyler, another
delegate, led the smaller force created to defend New York and later employed in a preemptive invasion of Canada.

Various conditions prevented Washington and Congress from imposing a fully rational arrangement during the first months of the war. They had to accept existing forces and react to the flow of events. More important, they operated within a very special political and ideological context. Any action taken needed the support of the militants who had been most vocal in opposing imperial policy during the previous decade as well as more moderate elements. The rhetoric of the period of protest vigorously rejected the need for a large "standing army" of regular soldiers in America and made an intellectual commitment to a virtuous citizen-soldiery. The outbreak of hostilities in Massachusetts did not change this attitude. In fact Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill seemed to confirm the assumption that properly motivated militiamen were adequate for local defense.

Congress carefully stressed that it acted only out of self-defense in an effort to secure a broad base of support for its measures. The modest size of its army, 27,000 men, and the short period of that army's enlistment were direct products of American opposition to the notion of a standing army. They were also reflections of American experiences in raising forces during the earlier colonial wars. The first Continental Army units thus resembled the Provincials of the French and Indian War who were raised for a specific term to counter a clearly identified enemy. The first units of the Revolutionary War, raised and organized by the governing bodies of the individual colonies, with the assistance of local committees of correspondence or safety, were ideologically
viable because they were responsible to "the people." Indeed, except for the rifle companies, the men were technically enlisted in the service of the various colonial governments which then turned the units over to Congress.

The first officers of the Continental Army, like the officers who had commanded the provincials, came from the leadership of individual communities. They were products of the militia system, chosen for their experience, their ability to recruit, and especially for their political reliability. That these leaders mirrored the socio-political elites of their respective colonies is not surprising. American society in the eighteenth century was deferential. Leadership in every sphere of life was entrusted to men of merit and wealth because they had the greatest stake in society. In return the leaders were obligated to serve society to the best of their abilities. If the leaders failed to live up to their responsibilities they were removed. The senior officers of the Continental Army turned out to have a remarkable amount of practical military experience, largely earned as captains and field officers during the French and Indian War. This experience was comparable to that of their opponents. In 1775 few of the junior officers in the British regiments in America had ever heard a shot fired in combat, and most of the senior officers had little experience beyond the lower field grades. The Continental commanders had an advantage in their more flexible and open approach to the art of war. Aware that they had much to learn, they tended as a group to approach problems with a less rigid attitude, and, in effect, grew into their jobs.
Washington, in cooperation with Congress, worked during 1775 to impose unity and cohesion on the several armies he found at Boston. His task was made easier by the relative homogeneity of the New England colonies and by their long tradition of military cooperation. Progress was made in creating a functional staff. Brigades, divisions, and separate territorial departments formed the pattern of command organization used throughout the war by the Continental Army; all three echelons were introduced in 1775. Washington still had several goals for 1776, particularly standardizing the regimental organization and fostering a sense of common identity, but he had made important progress during his first months of command. He now turned to the task of re-enlisting his soldiers directly under Continental auspices and reorganizing them into a genuinely Continental institution.
CHAPTER III
THE CONTINENTAL REGIMENTS OF 1776:
BOSTON AND QUEBEC

During 1775, the first year of the War of American Independence, British Army regulars fought hastily-formed American units in eastern Massachusetts and in Canada. Each of the New England colonies raised its own army in the aftermath of Lexington and Concord, and New York followed suit with the Continental Congress' encouragement. Lack of centralized direction allowed each colony to base its regimental organization on its own particular experience in the earlier imperial wars. Congress accepted responsibility for them in June when it established the Continental Army. By December Congress, without serious political disagreement, had created a set of generals, a staff, and a disciplinary system. The enlistments of most of the soldiers composing the field armies besieging Boston and Quebec expired on the last day of that month. Congress, George Washington, and the Army's senior leaders used the reenlistment of those troops to transform the Army into a unified national force. In the process they emphasized lessons derived from the French and Indian War. Evaluation of the reorganization raised important ideological issues relating to the military, and led to the first important political debates later in the year.

Washington's Unified Reorganization.

In his first week at Boston George Washington identified several problems relating to the Continental Army's organization. His earliest
letters to Congress reported these defects and suggested solutions. Congress realized that enlistments would probably expire before any changes could produce results, and decided to conduct a thorough investigation rather than taking temporary action. During the summer individual delegates visited the Main Army, and in the fall a special committee held extensive discussions with military and civil leaders in New England. Based on that committee's report and Washington's recommendations a number of major reforms were introduced when the Army was reorganized for 1776.

Washington's first concern was the weakness of so many of the Massachusetts regiments. Because the generals unanimously agreed "that no Dependence can be put on the Militia for a continuance in Camp, or Regularity and Discipline during the short time they may stay," calling out militia units to supplement the Main Army was not a viable alternative. Washington attempted to fill the Massachusetts regiments although he privately doubted that he would succeed, and as early as 10 July 1775 he suggested that Congress recruit in areas outside of New England. In time he also decided that some incompetent officers were undermining the quality of the rest of the Army. Washington blamed this problem on Massachusetts' method of selecting officers and urged Congress to retain sole control over commissions. That policy would have the additional advantage of expanding the geographical base of the officer corps, a contribution towards making the Army a national

institution. Washington also complained that the differences in the New England regimental organizations hampered efficient operations.  

During an August recess several members of Congress traveled to Massachusetts for a personal view of their army. On their return Congress promised to make improvements when the Army was reorganized for 1776 and asked Washington to send particular proposals. On 29 September 1775 the delegates created a special committee to confer with the Commander-in-Chief, his senior advisors, and officials of the New England governments. New England delegates initially interpreted this action as a criticism of their colonies' troops, but quickly dropped their opposition and secured appointments to the committee for delegates they knew would protect New England's interests. Militant Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania and the more moderate Thomas Lynch of North Carolina quickly became members of the committee. A second ballot was needed before Benjamin Harrison of Virginia edged out the militant Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut. All three delegates selected favored a vigorous war effort. The composition of the committee appointed to draft instructions for the investigating committee revealed the broad base of the Army's support in Congress.

Congress' instructions insured that final action would remain firmly in its own hands. The committee, essentially a fact-finding

2. Ibid., pp. 320-31, 390-400, 433, 450-4, 456-7, 505-13. On 10 July, the date he submitted his first report, Washington also began a policy of sending personal letters to members of Congress. These letters transmitted opinions which were impolitic to include in official dispatches; the recipients acted as his agents in securing desired legislation.

commission, arrived at Headquarters on 15 October. Its first responsibility was to persuade the Connecticut troops to remain until 31 December rather than leave on 10 December as their original enlistments specified, and to convey to Washington the hopes of Congress that an attack could be made on Boston before the end of the year. The committee's basic task, however, was to prepare a report for Congress on the specific measures needed to reorganize the Army, including Schuyler's troops, for an additional year's service. They were particularly instructed to discuss a uniform regimental organization, rates of pay and rations, additional regulations, and the projected costs of the Army, and to recommend a specific plan for raising the troops which would retain as many veterans as possible.4

Washington prepared for these meetings by collecting written opinions from his generals and heads of the staff departments, and by holding a Council of War on 8 October. This meeting enabled the Army to develop a unified position, one which reflected the Commander-in-Chief's personal views. The officers wanted a new army of at least 20,000 men organized into 26 infantry regiments, plus riflemen and artillery. Each regiment was to be reduced from ten to eight companies. Each company was to have a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals,

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a drummer, a fifer, and 76 privates, giving the regiment a total strength of 728 officers and men. Eight companies provided better tactical deployment in linear warfare and thus represented a step forward. In comparison to most of the existing regiments, the new regiment would have stronger companies but would save money. The generals begged the question of how to select the officers because of its "delicacy."\(^5\)

These findings and the written staff reports formed the basis for frank discussions with the Congressional committee and the New England civilian representatives from 18 to 24 October. The committee overruled the generals on only one matter, setting the expiration of enlistments at 31 December 1776 instead of 1 December. Both the political and military leaders agreed that enlistments should be limited to a single year, so this was not a serious issue. Washington was promised that his Main Army would be reinforced before it was given additional responsibility for the defense of New York City. The committee, exceeding its authority on the grounds of expediency, allowed him to begin reenlisting his men. Congress began debating the committee's report on 2 November and completed action on the reorganization within a month. It was clearly impressed by the unanimity within the Army and approved the recommendations with little change. The committee thus served as the vehicle for transmitting the Army's ideas to Congress, an important precedent.\(^6\)


On 4 November Congress approved the reorganization of 26 regiments of infantry with the structure recommended by the generals, as well as the plan for implementing the reorganization and various administrative matters. Brown coats with different colored facings (collar, lapels, cuffs, and the inside lining of the coattails) to distinguish the regiments were established as the basic uniform, a system borrowed from the red-coated British Army. Each regiment contained 3 field officers (who could not also be generals or captains), a small staff, and 8 companies. Each company had 4 officers and 2 musicians, plus 8 noncommissioned officers and 76 privates evenly divided into 4 squads. At full strength the regiment deployed 640 privates and corporals. These combat soldiers who stood in the ranks with muskets represented a high 88 percent of its total. Thirty-two officers and thirty-two sergeants furnished a favorable ratio of one supervisor to ten rank and file for company-level control.

Although British and American regiments often operated throughout the war below their nominal levels, a comparison of the official regimental organizations reveals some basic philosophical differences and sheds light on their relative advantages and disadvantages. The basic single-battalion British infantry regiment was a far less formidable organization despite an aggregate strength of 809. It also had three field officers on its rolls, but the colonel was a titular officer, the lieutenant colonel often served as a brigadier, and either he or the

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7. Ibid., pp. 321-5, 399. The regimental organization superseded one established in October for New Jersey and Pennsylvania units by adding a lieutenant, drummer, fifer, and 8 privates to each company; Ibid., pp. 285-6, 291. See Figure 2.
CONTINENTAL INFANTRY REGIMENT OF 1776

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Paymaster
1 Chaplain
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major

Company
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Ensign
4 Sergeants
4 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
76 Privates

a. Initially the additional duty of a subaltern; expanded in July-August 1776 to separate status.
b. Added on 16 July 1776.
c. One per two regiments from 16 January to 28 June 1776; thereafter one per regiment.
d. Added on 8 December 1775.
e. Added on 30 March 1776.
f. Each company divided into four squads. Each squad consisted of a sergeant, a corporal, and 19 privates.
major were frequently detailed to special duties. Staff organization was identical to that originally adopted by the Continentals, but British chaplains and medical personnel were frequently absent. Each regiment had twelve companies. Two were actually recruiting depots (one each in England and Ireland), and two were elite flank companies. The grenadier company, composed of the largest men, was supposed to be the heavy striking force placed on the right or honor flank of the regiment. The light infantry, originally formed during the Seven Years' War and only restored as a permanent formation in 1771, were selected for their agility and were supposed to be either skirmishers or to take post on the left flank. By the Revolution, however, the British normally consolidated the grenadier and light infantry companies into special provisional flank battalions. Commanders tended to use them in normal combat roles, and since they drew replacements from the line companies, they drained the best men from the eight companies remaining at the disposal of the regimental commander. 9

Each British company had the same basic organization: 3 officers, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals, 2 drummers (actually a drummer and a fifer),

FIGURE 3
BRITISH INFANTRY REGIMENT OF 25 AUGUST 1775

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Chaplain
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate

Flank Company
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
2 Drummers
(2 Fifers)
56 Privates

Field Officer's Company
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
2 Drummers
56 Privates

Company
1 Captain
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
2 Drummers
56 Privates

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a. Additional duty of a subaltern.
b. One Grenadier Company and one Light Infantry Company.
c. Normally one drummer and one fifer rather than the official two drummers.
d. Two fifers only in the Grenadier Company. These positions actually were used for the regimental drum major and fife major.
e. Including three fictitious "contingent men."
f. The field officers were considered the captains of these companies.
g. Five "battalion" companies, one replacement company permanently stationed in England, and one replacement company permanently stationed in Ireland.

Only a few regiments containing more than one battalion and certain units raised after 1778 were exceptions to this organization.
and 56 privates. Both of the flank companies had two lieutenants rather than the normal lieutenant and ensign. Three of the line, or battalion, companies lacked a captain since the field officers also held positions as captains. The granadier company had two fifers, but the slots were used for the regimental drum and fife majors. Three privates in every company were "contingent men," fictitious names carried on the regiment's rolls. Their pay was used as a special fund to care for the regiment's widows and orphans. All of these exceptions, plus normal detachments and details, drastically reduced the fighting strength of the regiment. At best, an ideal rarely approximated, a British lieutenant colonel could deploy only 514 men, 63 percent of the theoretical strength. Only 448 (87 percent of the deployable strength) were musketmen. The British also had roughly one supervisor for every ten fighters: 21 company officers and 24 sergeants.

Although a common heritage produced many apparent similarities in the eight-company battle formations of the Continental and British battalions, Washington planned to make his much more powerful. The American battalion contained nearly 50 percent more musketmen (640 rather than 448) without sacrificing control. In fact, Washington normally enjoyed a higher ratio of officers to men than his opponents because so many British officers were absent.10 Shortages in enlisted men plagued both armies, but the additional problems of transatlantic communications made procuring replacements particularly troublesome for the British.11

10. Germain to Howe, 14 Jan 1777; Barrington to Howe, 24 Feb 1777; Howe to Barrington, 1 Jun 1777; British Headquarters Papers, #371, 411, 552.
11. Germain to Howe, 19 Apr, 18 May, and 3 Sep 1777; to Clinton, 21 Mar 1778; Jenkinson to Clinton, 5 Sep 1780 and 5 Dec 1781; Ibid., #496, 530, 660, 1031, 2993, 3181.
The differences in regimental organization reflected deliberate doctrinal choices. Britain, influenced by Frederick the Great and its own experience in the Seven Years' War, produced a regiment tailored to formal European battle. It deployed its battalion companies in three ranks to achieve the density needed for a bayonet charge. The Continentals turned instead to their colonial tradition of aimed fire and the lessons of the French and Indian War for inspiration. They adopted a formation using only two ranks to bring all 640 muskets into effective play. The Continental unit had a frontage twice the size (320 men to 150) of a British battalion and a volley in which all 640 shots counted. The fire of the British third rank was so ineffective that in a volley a battalion could only hope for 300 shots.

The American regimental staff expanded during 1776 as it became more refined and the Continental Army's administration became more sophisticated. In the original planning the staff consisted of a chaplain, a surgeon, and a surgeon's mate, with the functions of adjutant and quartermaster being carried out by subalterns as additional duties. The hospital staff screened all medical candidates since Washington considered it "a matter of too much importance, to intrust the Wounds and

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Lives of officers, and Soldiers, to unskilled Surgeons. At Washington's request five additional specialists were added on 16 July. A paymaster relieved the combat officers of the burden of financial bookkeeping. The drum and fife majors supervised the musicians, the sergeant major assumed administrative responsibilities as the adjutant's enlisted assistant, and the quartermaster sergeant became the quartermaster's helper. The adjutant and quartermaster also became full-time specialists. This staff expansion in fact formalized ad hoc usage.

The only real problem came in establishing the role of the chaplain. Washington wished to attract more capable men by improving the job's status. He recommended that Congress raise their salaries and assign each to minister to two regiments. This was approved, but the events of the coming campaign proved that it was impractical and Congress authorized each regiment to have its own. Implementation was limited by deteriorating battlefield conditions. The chaplain's duties remained the same throughout the war: moral and spiritual guidance; assisting the surgeon; and, like the civilian ministers who were so important in American local life, political indoctrination. One major accomplishment of the Continental Army's chaplain corps was its freedom from denominational friction. A Roman Catholic priest became an Army chaplain, an event unthinkable in 1774.

Even as Congress was acting on the new regimental organization and related matters Washington set the reorganization of the Main Army in train. On the basis of the committee's preliminary instructions he conducted a survey of the officer corps to find out how many planned to remain in service. By 1 November Adjutant General Gates compiled preliminary statistics. The overall response was encouraging: 751 of the authorized 1,465 officers intended to stay. Among combat officers 641 of 1,286 were favorable: 78 field grade and 563 company grade. Twenty-six regiments required 78 field officers and 832 company officers, so only minor adjustments were necessary to account for a full complement of the former. The creation of a second lieutenant position caused some problems since most colonies had not had this rank in 1775, while a surplus of captains existed. Massachusetts had an excess of candidates in the higher grades, the other colonies somewhat of a shortage.

Washington and his generals selected the field officers on 2 November. Because a more detailed evaluation was required, choice of the remaining officers was delegated to groups composed of the brigadier generals and field officers of each brigade. Washington retained the right to review all arrangements. Consideration in the selection of company officers was extended to those who had been absent from camp at the time of the survey or who had changed their minds and decided to continue in service, and to qualified sergeants. Washington reluctantly abandoned his desire to mingle officers from all colonies in each regiment

16. See Table 2. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 36-37, 43-45, 58-59, 145-7. The returns are in Record Group 93, National Archives. The riflemen were not included in the statistics since their service did not expire until 1 July 1776.
TABLE 2
INITIAL RECRUITMENT OF OFFICERS FOR 1776

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Colonels</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonels</th>
<th>Majors</th>
<th>Captains</th>
<th>First Lieutenants</th>
<th>Second Lieutenants</th>
<th>Ensigns</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Willing to Serve</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>135</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Unwilling to Serve</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>112</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Absent</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Vacant</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775 Grand Total of Officers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>373</td>
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This table is compiled from the 1 November 1775 series of four returns entitled "Return of The Commissioned Officers in The Army of The United Colonies ..." in Record Group 93, National Archives.
when it proved to be extremely unpopular. The arrangements were gradually completed, and reenlistment began on 13 November 1775. Recruiting parties, liberal furloughs, and elimination of arrears in pay were all employed in an effort to fill the regiments before 1 January. The new enlistments were expressly in the Continental Army, not in the individual colonies' armed forces as in 1775.

Washington implemented the reorganization of the Main Army on 1 January 1776:

This day giving commencement to the new army, which, in every point of view is entirely Continental, ... His Excellency hopes that the Importance of the great Cause we are engaged in, will be deeply impressed upon every Man's mind, and wishes it to be considered, that an Army without Order, Regularity and Discipline, is no better than a Commission'd Mob.

Each infantry regiment was assigned a numerical designation as a "Continental Regiment" based on its colonel's relative seniority. New Hampshire's three regiments of 1775 under Colonels James Reed, John Stark, and Enoch Poor became the 2d, 5th, and 8th Continental Regiments. The officer ranks were filled through promotions and some new appointments.

Rhode Island retained a quota of 1,500 men, organized into two instead of three regiments. General Greene, working closely with his brother Jacob (a member of the colony's Committee of Safety) and Governor Cooke, used the reduction to purge the officer ranks. Varnum's and

Hitchcock's regiments were retained as the 9th and 11th Continental Regiments. Church's was disbanded because Greene judged its officers to be poor disciplinarians. A handful of its officers, such as Major Henry Sherburne, were used to fill the two regiments or were placed in units from other colonies.  

Connecticut sent five regiments to Boston in 1775 and three to Canada. Since the colony's quota for 1776 consisted of five regiments, the cadres at Boston were used to form the 10th, 17th, 19th, 20th, and 22d Continental Regiments. All modified their geographical bases slightly. Some sergeants were promoted to ensigns, and a few random individuals, particularly veterans of the four companies that had been sent to Boston when their regiments went to Canada, rounded out the officer complement.  

Massachusetts faced different problems in making the transition. Washington assigned it a quota of 11,648 men, about 2,000 fewer than the colony had set for itself in 1775, but only 16 regiments instead of the existing 27. According to their competence, officers were selected in proportion to the number of men the 1775 regiments furnished. The number of companies determined the allocation of field officers. Where a regiment could be reorganized from an existing one, it was held together. In most cases, however, a single regiment could not furnish

eight full companies; therefore companies from several were merged, with the assignment of field officers reflecting the proportions from each.

The reorganization involved New England's artillerymen as well as its infantry, combining Gridley's Massachusetts regiment and John Crane's Rhode Island company into a single regiment. On 17 November Congress named Henry Knox, a Boston bookseller whose volunteer service had impressed Washington, to replace Gridley as the artillery commander. After debate William Burbeck and John Mason were confirmed as lieutenant colonels and Crane and New York's John Lamb as majors. The former were Gridley's field officers in 1775; the latter two had commanded the separate companies with distinction. Congress ruled on 2 December that the regiment should consist of these five officers and twelve companies, but left further organizational details to the Army. The regiment's staff was similar to that of an infantry regiment but included provision for cadets undergoing on-the-job training. Each company contained 5 officers and 58 enlisted men. Eight noncommissioned officers, 8 bombardiers, and 8 gunners were allowed, but Knox followed a policy of actually filling those positions in proportion to the real strength of the company. Bombardiers, gunners, and mates were all privates, but the gunners and bombardiers were specialists who received higher pay.\(^\text{22}\)

In Great Britain the Royal Artillery was technically a separate armed service, a precedent which the Continentals deliberately avoided.

FIGURE 4
CONTINENTAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF 1776

1 Colonel
2 Lieutenant Colonels
2 Majors

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Chaplain
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Drum Major^c
1 Fife Major^c
Cadets^d

Company
1 Captain
1 Captain-Lieutenant
1 First Lieutenant
2 Second Lieutenants^c
4 Sergeants
4 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
8 Bombardiers^d
8 Gunners^d
32 Matrosses^d

a. Added in June 1776.
b. At least two volunteers in training for ultimate assignment as second lieutenants.
c. One performing the duties of firework.
d. Privates. Bombardiers and gunners were specialists receiving higher pay.

Staff and company structures are conjectural. The separate company authorized on 28 October 1775 for the Hudson Highlands was identical except that it had 60 matrosses.
It consisted of a single regiment organized as four eight-company (increased in 1779 to ten) battalions. In peacetime each company contained 5 officers and about 50 men, but expanded in wartime to 6 officers, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 9 bombardiers, 18 gunners, 2 drummers, and 73 matrosses. Both the battalion and the company were administrative units. Tactical flexibility was preserved by organizing provisional artillery "brigades" with crews for eight to ten guns.\(^23\)

Knox's companies were smaller than British ones on a war footing, but were organized more symmetrically. The regiment remained an administrative rather than a tactical entity. Although he did not adopt the "brigade" style, Knox distributed his companies in 1776 to man specific fortifications or batteries and had them camp with nearby infantry units. Later in the year detachments consisting of one or two officers and the crews of several guns were assigned to infantry brigades to furnish direct field artillery support.\(^24\) By the summer of 1776 the shortage of adequately trained artillerists became a serious problem. Knox prepared a plan to form a second regiment which received Congressional approval on 24 July, but events of the campaign prevented action being taken to fill it.\(^25\)

The Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment and the four associated Virginia and Maryland companies were not reorganized because their original terms

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The regiment did not expire until 1 July 1776. The regiment did assume a new designation to conform with the infantry regiments: its continuity and original enlistment as Continentals gave it primacy and the designation 1st Continental Regiment. Washington continued to use it as a special reserve force, although two of its nine companies had been sent to Quebec. The operational attachment of the one remaining Virginia and two Maryland companies allowed it to carry out its unique role. In the spring Washington and Congress planned its reorganization for a two-year term of service. Reenlistment was ordered on 17 June 1776, but the reorganization was hampered by combat requirements.26

The reorganization's planning phase was short and smooth. Congress and the Army both agreed on the general policy and the specifics of the reorganization, and the new arrangement of officers was swiftly drawn up. A real crisis came when Washington implemented the reenlistment phase on 13 November. Indeed, he became so upset by the slow progress that on 4 January 1776 he complained to Congress that:

It is not in the pages of History perhaps to furnish a case like ours. To maintain a post within musket shot of the Enemy ... and at the same time disband one Army and recruit another within that distance of twenty odd British regiments, is more than probably ever was attempted: But if we succeed as well in the latter, as we have hitherto in the former, I shall think it the most fortunate event of my whole life.27

New England civil and military leaders had been very confident during the October planning that the troops would reenlist rapidly. A large

27. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 208. In a private letter to Joseph Reed he mused "How it will end, God in his great goodness will direct. I am thankful for his protection to this time;" Ibid., pp. 211-2.
segment of that group believed fervently in the doctrines of Radical Whig ideology as it related to the military. They believed that the virtue of America's militia-trained citizenry would create widespread willingness to serve in the Army, and felt that the response to Lexington confirmed the validity of this assumption. Despite a wide range of measures adopted to encourage the men, reality was quite different. By 30 December only 9,649 men had signed up, an average of fewer than 1,400 a week. Another 2,808 enlisted by 3 February, dropping the weekly average for the first part of the new year below 600. The Commander-in-Chief began to urge the New England governments to fill their regiments by instituting a form of a draft. Congress recognized the manpower problem and on 16 January removed the restrictions on reenlisting free Negroes. Depending on their personal attitudes, unit commanders opened their ranks to this new source of recruits.

During the transition period Washington filled the gaps in his lines with militiamen called up for limited periods. The first of these were about 4,000 New Hampshire and Massachusetts men furnished during late December when Washington anticipated that Connecticut's Continentals might depart. The recruiting problem led him to issue a new call on 16 January. He asked for provisional regiments on the Continental pattern

to serve for a longer period, until 1 April. New Hampshire had General Sullivan organize its regiment from the companies already at Boston. Connecticut furnished four regiments and Massachusetts six by calling on quotas from the towns closest to Boston.31

A second aspect of the crisis was the December discovery that many of the Army's firearms were not suited for sustained military use. Under the guise of an inspection Washington paraded the Connecticut units on 9 December, a day before their original enlistments expired, so that he could confiscate sound weapons from owners he feared would depart. The New England governments were bombarded with requests for any available arms, particularly British "Brown Besses," and letters were sent to Schuyler and Montgomery begging them for material captured in Canada. This shortage and related ammunition problems persisted during early 1776, but by the summer the crisis had passed.32

In early March the troops at Boston emerged from the period of greatest danger. Excluding artillery, Washington had twenty-seven Continental Regiments. They contained 828 officers, 694 sergeants, 365 drummers and fifers, and 12,510 rank and file. Militia reinforcements added 400 more officers and 6,500 enlisted men. The Main Army was back

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roughly to its 1775 strength in raw numbers. Just under 3,000 of the Continentals were sick at that time, although only 10 percent of them were hospitalized. Thirteen hundred more, including the entire 14th Continental Regiment, were on detached duties. All of the twenty-five reorganized infantry regiments on the siege lines were over half-strength. One had recruited over 90 percent of its rank and file goal, ten others were at least three-quarters full, and only five were below 60 percent. In terms of real combat force half of the regiments were over the 400-man level and only one below 300. The regiments were not yet full, but they had turned the corner. Washington was profoundly shaken by the crisis.

On 9 February he summarized the lessons of the reorganization for Congress:

To go into an enumeration of all the Evils we have experienced in this late great change of the Army ... would greatly exceed the bounds of a letter. ... I shall with all due deference, take the freedom to give it as my opinion, that if the Congress have any reason to believe, there will be occasion for Troops another year ... they would save money, and have infinitely better Troops if they were to enlist men for and during the war. ... The trouble and perplexity of disbanding one Army and raising another at the same Instant, and in such a critical situation as the last was, is ... such as no man, who has experienced it once, will ever undergo again.33

The Canadian Department.

The Congressional committee sent to Cambridge to discuss the reorganization of the Army was instructed to deal with the troops in the Northern Department as well as those in eastern Massachusetts. With

33. General Return, Main Army, 2 Mar 1776; Record Group 93, National Archives.
Washington's approbation they limited their talks to the Main Army, realizing that the two field forces faced unique problems. In fact, Philip Schuyler's reorganization difficulties dwarfed Washington's. His troops were not concentrated in a single small area, and the various parts of his command were in different situations. A special committee went to Schuyler's headquarters to begin the reorganization, but events left the northern area in a state of flux until July.

On 11 October 1775 Congress told Schuyler to encourage the Canadians to join the Revolution. It particularly stressed a guarantee of religious freedom for Roman Catholics, a major concession for American Protestants to make. Congress even authorized Schuyler to organize a Continental regiment from Canadians who were willing to join his army. It also told him to confer with his senior officers and develop a plan for raising the troops needed to defend Canada and the forts on Lake Champlain during the coming winter.35 On 2 November Congress selected delegates to visit Schuyler and aid him in the reorganization. Three New Englanders initially composed this committee's membership: militants Eliphalet Dyer of Connecticut and John Langdon of New Hampshire, and the more conservative Robert Treat Paine of Massachusetts. Dyer fell ill and on 8 November Congress replaced him with New York's Robert R. Livingston, a moderate on the issue of independence who was General Montgomery's brother-in-law.36

Because the need for action was more immediate, this committee's instructions included somewhat broader powers. It was able to take specific steps to encourage the Canadians and to solve logistical problems. Primarily, however, it was formed to collect data about the garrison needed for Canada and the forts in northern New York. It carried information to Schuyler about the newly-approved regimental organization and rates of pay, as well as blank commissions for the Canadian regiment. Schuyler was instructed to reenlist as many of the department's men as possible and to raise any others he needed to complete the conquest of Canada in New England and New York. The committee set out on 12 November and reached Ticonderoga on the 28th after conducting an inspection of the forts in the Hudson Highlands. It discovered to its pleasure that Schuyler and Montgomery (who had been promoted to major general on 9 December) had already begun the reorganization. The committee blessed their actions, gathered the limited information that was available, and on 23 December submitted its report to Congress.

Congress acted on the report on 8 January 1776, before it learned of Montgomery's defeat at Quebec. It displayed the same unanimity in its actions that it had in deciding to send the two committees. The report accepted Schuyler's opinion that 3,000 men were needed for the winter and recommended raising three regiments, including the Canadians.

Congress took note of some of the negative aspects of the report, including the news that Warner's and Bedel's men had gone home and that other units had suffered heavy attrition, and approved a garrison of nine regiments (about 6,500 men). Three were units set in train by the committee: the Canadian regiment being recruited by James Livingston and two regiments formed from the veterans of 1775. These were reinforced by six new organizations. New York, New Hampshire, and Connecticut were each told to raise a regiment for Canadian service. The remainder of the garrison came from regiments currently being formed in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. All nine had the same structure as Washington's reorganized infantry regiments.39

The generals did not form the two veteran regiments until 15 April 1776. In November Montgomery had regrouped his forces for the drive on Montreal by persuading part of his men to extend their enlistments from December until mid-April and releasing the rest to ease his logistical burdens. The New York regiments remained nominally intact, and the 1st Connecticut Regiment gained additional personnel. The men for the latter came from disbanding the 4th and 5th Connecticut Regiments and transferring the men who extended. When the prolonged enlistments expired the two new regiments were formed. Like Washington, Schuyler hoped to mix officers from several colonies in each regiment. He wanted one regiment to consist of five companies from New York and three from Massachusetts, and the other of four companies from New Hampshire, three from Connecticut, and one from New York. Wooster found this scheme

39. Ibid., 4: 39-44.
impractical, just as Washington had. Instead he formed one from New 
York veterans under Major John Nicholson of the old 3d New York Regi­
ment. Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Elmore, who had transferred from the 
4th to the reorganized 1st Connecticut Regiment, commanded the other. 
It used a Connecticut cadre with a leavening of other New Englanders. 
Both regiments finished the 1776 campaign in the Mohawk Valley after 
suffering heavy losses in Canada. 40

The new regiments organized in the north followed a course slightly 
different from what Congress planned. Schuyler had begun reorganizing 
the old Albany-area 2d New York Regiment as soon as he learned of Mont­
gomery's death, and he and Colonel Van Schaick swiftly assembled it as 
the regiment from New York. 41 Washington received Schuyler's report of 
the defeat at Quebec on 18 January, before he learned of Congress' 
actions on 8 January. Washington immediately convened a Council of War 
with delegate John Adams attending as an observer. This Council recom­
mended diverting three of the militia regiments requested for service 
at Boston: one each from Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts. 
Washington wrote to those colonies on the next day, but recommended that 
the regiments be raised as Continentals for a full year's service

Lt. Col. Rudolphus Ritzema to Col. Alexander McDougall, 19 Nov 1775; 
Congress, 10 Apr 1776; Papers of the Continental Congress, Record Group 
360, National Archives. Berthold Fernow, ed., New York in the Revolu­
41. Schuyler to McDougall, 25 Jan 1776; McDougall Papers, New-York 
Historical Society. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 4: 1094; 5: 
instead of as militia for a shorter period. The first two regiments were considered the ones authorized by Congress, and that body subsequently accepted the Massachusetts unit as well.\footnote{42}

All three of the New England regiments were recruited, as Washington recommended, in the areas closest to Canada and were filled fairly rapidly. Connecticut had anticipated the need for additional troops and formed its regiment in Litchfield County which had a tradition from earlier wars of sending men to serve at Lake Champlain. A handful of officers were veterans of the old 4th Connecticut Regiment, but most, including Colonel Charles Burrall, entered Continental service for the first time. Captain Timothy Bigelow's company from Hartford County was equipped as artillery rather than as infantry.\footnote{43}

New Hampshire assembled its regiment at Coos (Haverhill) and marched it overland before the spring thaw opened Lake Champlain for water transport. Timothy Bedel was made its commander in recognition of his ranger service the previous year. In May Major Isaac Butterfield ignominiously surrendered most of the regiment to an inferior force at The Cedars. He and Bedel were courtmartialed for cowardice and banned from ever serving again. Bedel, who was not present at the battle, successfully appealed and later served on the northern frontier.\footnote{44}

Colonel Elisha Porter, a popular western Massachusetts leader, raised that colony's regiment with five companies from Hampshire County and three from Berkshire. Quotas were assigned to each town. The selection of staff and company officers was left to local leaders and the field officers, who were themselves major politicians from the two counties. This expedient hastened organization, but it created administrative headaches.  

Montgomery had received significant Canadian assistance during 1775. On 19 November he directed his wife's kinsman, James Livingston, to begin raising the regiment of Canadians authorized by Congress. Livingston, a New Yorker who had married a woman from Montreal and settled at Chambly, formed his unit at nearby Pointe Olivier and moved it up to Quebec in December. Other Canadians who had been expelled from the city by Governor Carleton also began to recruit men, although only one group ultimately had success.  

46. Montgomery to Schuyler, 19 Nov and 5 Dec 1775; Arnold to Congress, 11 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Invaluable sources for the Canadian regiments' formation are: George Francis Gilman Stanley, Canada invaded, 1775-1776 (Toronto: Hakkert, 1973); Gustave Lac- tot, Canada & the American Revolution 1774-1783, trans. by Margaret M. Cameron (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967); and Allen S. Everest, Moses Hazen and the Canadian Refugees in the American Revolution (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1976).  
47. Arnold to Congress, 12 Jan 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 5: 550. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 223, 238-9. Smith, Letters of Delegates, 3: 459. The Chevalier de St. Aulaire and Quebec barber Jeremy Duggan, who had Arnold's support, were authorized on 21 and 28 Mar 1776 to raise separate Canadian ranger companies (one and three respectively), but neither was successful.
Edward Antil, son of a former Chief Justice of New Jersey, was one of those exiles. He carried the news of Montgomery's death from Quebec to Congress and used the opportunity to recommend Moses Hazen as a popular local leader. Hazen was a native of New Hampshire who had served as a captain in Rogers' Rangers during the French and Indian War. Although he had been allowed to purchase a lieutenancy in the 44th Foot, he had been forced into retirement in 1763 and settled in Canada. After marrying a French-Canadian woman he became an economic and social leader in the Richelieu Valley. Hazen arrived in Philadelphia shortly after Antil, and on 20 January 1776 they secured authorization to raise a second Canadian regiment. Unlike Livingston's, the new unit was patterned after the French regiments of the Seven Years' War. Its 1,000 rank and file were organized in four battalions, each with five fifty-man companies.48

Colonel Hazen and Lieutenant Colonel Antil returned to Canada and on 10 February organized the 2d Canadian Regiment. Only half of the men were recruited, primarily in the Richelieu and St. Lawrence Valleys, before the pro-American sympathies of the Canadian populace subsided. Many French veterans of the French and Indian War who had remained as settlers in Canada in 1763 joined the unit. Hazen's personal financial backing of the regiment during this period gave it a special status for the remainder of the war. Congress allowed him to retain a proprietary interest in the regiment until he was reimbursed, and since he never

was, it remained under his control and retained its unique four-battalion organization. 49

Both regiments drew heavily from the French-Canadian population for their enlisted strength. The majority of the officers, however, came from the English-speaking minority in Canada. Most of this latter group were native-born Americans like the two colonels and were active in the small Canadian Revolutionary movement. The French segment of the population tended to be neutral, although the influential clergy supported the Crown. Bishop Briand of Quebec excommunicated Catholic Canadians who supported the Americans, including François-Louis Chartier de Lotbinière, a Récollet priest who served as Livingston's chaplain. In addition to this spiritual hardship, the summer evacuation of Canada forced the regiments and their families into exile. Both regiments had to be withdrawn from the front lines to reorganize: Livingston's in the Mohawk Valley and Hazen's at Albany. 50

Congress reacted swiftly to the news of the disaster at Quebec. In addition to officially adding the 2d Canadian Regiment and Porter's Regiment to the Canadian garrison, it asked Washington to transfer one of his regiments and a general officer from Boston. On 17 January 1776 Congress finally clarified the command situation by completing the transformation of the invasion force into a separate territorial department.

Since it believed that Schuyler did not desire the Quebec assignment, Congress ordered him to shift his headquarters to New York City and Charles Lee to go to Canada and organize a department staff. Wooster was considered to be "too infirm" to be permanently assigned to the duty that he was exercising on a temporary basis. But before Lee could set out he was reassigned. On 6 March Congress promoted John Thomas, the senior brigadier general, to major general and assigned him as Lee's replacement. Thomas formally assumed command from Wooster at Quebec on 2 May. In the interim Congress reconsidered its previous instructions to Schuyler and ordered him to remain at Albany where he could supervise the logistical support for Canada in addition to performing his other duties.51

During January Congress also considered the needs of the non-Canadian portion of the old New York Department. On the 19th of that month New York was again authorized to raise four Continental regiments for its defense. The colony's Provincial Congress allocated company quotas to the individual counties on 15 February and submitted nominations for field officers to the Continental Congress for commissioning in March. Three of the regiments were assembled from 1775 veterans. McDougall's 1st New York Regiment continued to be principally a New York City unit. Since the 2d had already been reorganized by Van Schaick, the old 3d and 4th were redesignated as the 2d and 3d respectively. James Clinton

continued to command the former, drawn primarily from Ulster County and Long Island. Dutchess and Westchester Counties furnished the bulk of the 3d, while a new 4th was raised in Albany and the other northern areas. Schuyler gradually released the remaining cadres from Canada, a practice which retarded recruiting but which was a compromise with tactical considerations. The 1st assembled at New York, the 4th at Albany, and the 2d and 3d in the Hudson Highlands. Schuyler retained the 4th in northern New York, while the 2d assumed garrison responsibilities in the Highlands and the 1st and 3d served at New York City.52

Canada, however, continued to attract more of Congress' attention. Knowing that the spring thaw that cleared Lake Champlain would also open the St. Lawrence River to the British, Congress and Washington ordered additional reinforcements to the north. Brigadier General William Thompson arrived in mid-May with the 8th, 15th, 24th, and 25th Continental Regiments, but those New Englanders were immediately disabled by an outbreak of smallpox. Brigadier General John Sullivan reached St. John's with a second force on 31 May. It consisted of New Hampshire's 2d and 5th Continental Regiments, the 2d New Jersey Regiment, and the 4th (less many of its companies) and 6th Pennsylvania Battalions. Sullivan found that Thomas had been stricken with smallpox on 21 May and

had turned temporary command over to Thompson. When Thomas died on 2 June, Sullivan by virtue of his seniority inherited command of the de-
partment. 53

The arrival of a British relief force from Europe under Major Gen-
eral John Burgoyne forced the Continentals to abandon the siege of Quebec in early May 1776. The British, Brunswick, and Hesse-Hanau
regulars slowly pushed Sullivan's men back. The Continentals' main
body reached Crown Point on 1 July, ending American hopes of making
Canada the fourteenth colony. The effort had probably been beyond the
Continental Army's logistical capability and ruined many regiments. A
dispirited Sullivan complained that "I am Sufficiently mortified & Sin-
cerely wish I had never seen this fatal country." 54

Congress had reacted to the deteriorating situation in Canada on
17 June before Sullivan's withdrawal. A special diplomatic mission
sent to the Canadians in the spring had held extensive discussions with
the military leaders in Canada. Delegates Benjamin Franklin and Samuel
Chase were accompanied on that inspection by Charles and John Carroll,
two brothers who were leaders in the Maryland Catholic community. Their
June report led to major command changes and revealed for the first time
a partisan split in Congress with respect to the military situation.
Congress appointed Horatio Gates as the new commanding general of "the

53. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 236, 302. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
Washington, 4: 495-7, 500, 519-21, 526, 531; 5: 15, 132-3. Hammond,
Sullivan Papers, 1: 212-4.
54. Ibid., pp. 242-3, 250-4, 271-7. Also see Martin Bush, Revolution-
ary Enigma: A Re-appraisal of General Philip Schuyler of New York (Port
Troops of the United Colonies in Canada" and endowed him with extensive emergency powers to reorganize the department staff and suspend incompetent officers. Gates' selection was based on his reputation as an organizer and administrator. Political considerations also came into play, and became more pronounced after Gates arrived at Crown Point on 5 July and relieved Sullivan.55

The change in command, which nearly precipitated Sullivan's resignation, reflected a growing concern among New England delegates over the lack of success in the north. Since most of those delegates espoused the Radical Whig ideological view of the military, they believed that the failure resulted from a lack of virtue. It was only natural for them to reject the current generals and turn to Gates, who held similar attitudes, to lead a moral regeneration of the northern army. Interwoven with ideological considerations were factors of regionalism and family connection. The shift in preponderance after 1775 from New York units to New Englanders gave the delegates from that region a greater interest and voice in the department's affairs. Friction between key officers within the department who were related to leading politicians magnified these problems.

Gates commanded a territorial department that no longer existed, however, and on 8 July Congress ruled that he came under Schuyler's command. As a practical matter Schuyler allowed Gates a large measure of autonomy at Ticonderoga by staying at Albany and concentrating on logistics and affairs in the Mohawk Valley. Gates' "Northern Army" contained the majority of the department's combat troops and was charged with developing a fortress complex in the Ticonderoga area. Benedict Arnold and David Waterbury, both of whom had commanded ships as civilians, were placed in command of the Lake Champlain naval squadron. On 20 July Gates created a brigade organization for the units at Ticonderoga. Following the advice of his senior officers and his own experience at Boston he assigned units from the same or adjacent colonies to homogeneous brigades to minimize friction. Arnold, the only brigadier general, commanded one of the four brigades. The others were given to three senior colonels.56

Reorganization also involved the formation of two new units from veteran 1775 cadres. On 21 June Congress ordered New York to raise another regiment. Unlike earlier units, this regiment was enlisted for three years. Command was given to Major Lewis Dubois of Nicholson's Regiment as a reward for his excellent service during the winter. Disputes over the appointment of the other officers and their relative seniority prevented it from becoming fully operational. Congress

authorized a second regiment, also for three years, on 5 July. Its cadre, Seth Warner's Green Mountain Boys, had begun reorganizing in February, but a shortage of cash limited recruiting until November.57

Since Knox's Artillery Regiment was designed to support the Main Army, Schuyler relied primarily on separate artillery companies. The remnants of John Lamb's 1775 company voluntarily reenlisted under Lieutenant Isaiah Wool. They were reinforced in the spring by Stevens' and Eustis' companies of Knox's regiment, Bigelow's company in Burrall's Regiment, and a Pennsylvania company. That colony had misinterpreted a Congressional resolution and directed engineer Bernard Romans to recruit an artillery company for service in Canada. Congress accepted it, and it marched north under the actual command of Captain-Lieutenant Gibbs Jones. New York also raised two new artillery companies in New York City, although neither wound up supporting Schuyler as the colony had originally intended. Sebastian Bauman's was a Continental unit created to garrison fortifications in the Hudson Highlands. Alexander Hamilton's company of state troops spent most of 1776 under Knox's operational control and on 17 March 1777 was formally transferred to the Continental Army.58


The Northern Department finally stabilized during the pause in operations caused by the contest for naval control of Lake Champlain. In January Congress planned for a forward Canadian Department of nine regiments (6,500 men) supported by the Northern Department's four regiments defending the area from New York City to Lake George with 2,900 men. By August the Canadian Department no longer existed and the Northern Department's responsibilities stopped just south of Albany. Its troops remained divided into two major groups: Gates' field army garrisoning the Ticonderoga complex and Schuyler's rear echelon sustaining communications and controlling the Mohawk Valley. 59

Gates commanded a force consisting, exclusive of artillery, of fifteen Continental infantry regiments and one separate rifle company, plus six regiments of militia. It contained 386 officers, 333 sergeants, 143 drummers and fifers, and 6,262 rank and file, a total roughly equivalent to the number originally intended for Canada. True combat strength was about 4,000 Continentals, including the detachment manning the fleet, because nearly 2,200 were sick, another 1,000 on detached duties, and 185 on furlough. Only three of the Continental regiments were over three-quarters full, even on paper, and ten were between half and two-thirds complete. This deficiency significantly reduced the units' effectiveness in open battle, but was less of a problem in garrison. The militia added about 200 more officers and over 3,500 enlisted men, most of whom were still fit.

Gates had the six strongest regiments originally assigned to the Canadian garrison or added during January by Congress. He also had the

59. General Return, Northern Department, 24 Aug 1776; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society. The return contains complete data only for the units directly under Gates.
four regiments sent north under Thompson and five of the six that accompanied Sullivan. Schuyler retained direct command of the four regiments which had served the longest in Canada and consequently were in the worst shape. He also had the two regiments raised by New York in the Albany region (Van Schaick's and the 4th New York Regiment), the 3d New Jersey Regiment from Sullivan's force, and the two new regiments just beginning their organization. Three militia regiments supplemented his troops. Schuyler had only three Continental regiments which were even reasonably effective and certainly controlled fewer than the 3,000 effectives he had originally been promised. This force was sufficient, however, for his reduced defensive responsibilities.

Summary.

Congress and the Army's leaders worked closely together during the autumn of 1775 to prepare for the coming year. They intended to eliminate organizational problems revealed during the preceding months and hoped to make the transition smooth. The cornerstone of their work came from Congress' approval of a standard infantry regiment designed by Washington and his generals. Unlike the British Army which was heavily influenced by the European phase of the Seven Years' War, the Continentals took advantage of more pertinent Anglo-American experiences in the imperial wars, particularly the French and Indian War. The new standard regiment represented a very powerful force with a simplified organization. It dispensed with the various special companies of a

60. In May Schuyler had diverted the 3d New Jersey Regiment to the Mohawk Valley when Sullivan passed through Albany.
British regiment, which wasted manpower from an American perspective. The Continental regiment's high ratio of officers to enlisted men recognized the greater need for control under American conditions. Its organization and use of a two-rank battle formation emphasized American faith in musketry rather than shock action.

Adopting a standard regiment solved one problem revealed during 1775. Implementing the reorganization raised new difficulties. Both Washington and Schuyler hoped to emphasize national identification by mingling personnel from several colonies in each regiment. Opposition from the officers and men alike ended that concept, although Washington at least retained the word "Continental" in the designation of his regiments. A greater source of trouble was the recurrence in 1776 of the problem of regiments falling short of their authorized strength. Few of the new units ever reached maximum legal size, and many took excessive time to achieve minimum levels of efficiency. In the future the nation's leaders would have to adjust policies to deal with this condition.

Washington's Main Army at Boston was able to survive the crisis caused by slow enlistments by calling on a sizeable contingent of militia reinforcements. Slow but steady recruiting raised that army by March 1776 to a level where it could begin to apply pressure on General Howe in Boston. British evacuation of the town on 17 March gave the Commander-in-Chief his first victory. On the other hand, defeat marked the American military effort in Canada. Despite several major attempts to reinforce the field army in that theater, it was still driven all the way to Ticonderoga, and many units ended up in shambles from attrition and disease. Schuyler and Gates survived the immediate crisis, but their bickering for hegemony carried ominous overtones for the future.
CHAPTER IV
AN ARMY TRULY CONTINENTAL: EXPANDING PARTICIPATION

Improvisation marked the military situation in 1775; expansion typified 1776. In the first year the five northern colonies each created an army by drawing on their individual experiences. The Continental Congress and the military leaders also improvised when they formed the Continental Army from those forces. The next year the Army expanded to involve more than the forces engaged in Canada, northern New York, and at Boston. Although combat elsewhere was limited, the remaining colonies all raised regiments. The increase in participation necessitated a major change in the Army's command arrangement. That change and the movement of the Main Army from Boston to New York City led in turn to a staff expansion.

The Southern Colonies.

Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia began 1775 free from British occupation. They had defiant royal governors to contend with, however, and Florida's regular garrison posed a continued threat. Like their northern neighbors the southern colonies formed new governments which raised troops whenever the deposed governors gathered military or naval forces. Because these early efforts were undertaken with minimal supervision from the Continental Congress, the southern regiments followed various models of organization. Since the south lacked New England's
homogeneity and similarity of experience in the colonial wars, its units experienced greater structural diversity until Congress provided direction.

The aggressiveness of Governor John Murray, the Earl of Dunmore, pushed Virginia to act first. In March 1775 the extra-legal Virginia Convention decided not to raise regular troops as the militant Patrick Henry proposed, but instead encouraged the formation of local volunteer units. News from Massachusetts produced a change in attitude by July when the Convention reconvened. Although general agreement existed on the need for military action, debates over precise measures lasted until 21 August. The original proposal called for each county to organize a fifty-man company for a total force of 3,000 to 4,000 men. Less militant opinion produced a modification which scaled down the regular force and supplemented it with less expensive minutemen. The compromise adopted by the Convention divided the colony into sixteen military districts, each under a district committee responsible for organizing the troops. The mainland districts raised a total of fifteen companies of regulars and fifteen ten-company minuteman battalions. The Eastern Shore did not form a regular company, but it was authorized a somewhat larger minuteman regiment. The minutemen represented a local defense force within the militia system, and replaced the earlier volunteer companies. The Convention also created a Committee of Safety, adopted Articles of War, and endorsed the current British drill manual.

The fifteen regular companies (about 1,020 men) reported to Williamsburg and on 21 October 1775 formed two regiments. The 1st Virginia Regiment under Patrick Henry, the colony's new commander-in-chief, contained two rifle companies and six musket companies. William Woodford's 2d also had two rifle companies but only five with muskets. The rifle companies came from the frontier and served as light infantry while the musketmen represented the older areas of the colony. Each company contained a captain, 2 lieutenants, an ensign, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 68 rank and file. District committees selected the company officers while the Convention appointed three field officers for each regiment. Staffs consisted of a chaplain, a surgeon with two mates, an adjutant, a paymaster who doubled as mustermaster, a quartermaster, and a sergeant major. The leaders of Virginia's first two regiments carried impressive political credentials although only four field officers had significant combat experience. Most of the captains were too young to have served in the French and Indian War but came from the colony's leading families.

The compromise which created the regiments also included five separate companies to garrison strategic frontier posts. Captain John Neville exercised overall command from Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh). Four were rather large: a captain, 3 lieutenants, an ensign, 4 sergeants, 2 drummers, 2 fifers, and 100 rank and file. The fifth had only a single lieutenant and 25 enlisted men. Two companies manned Fort Pitt while the smallest held the outpost at the mouth of the Wheeling River (Fort Fincastle). All three

came from the West Augusta District, the north-western frontier. Another company from Botetourt County defended Point Pleasant on the Kanawha River. The remaining company secured its home county of Fincastle in the south-west. These companies drew on the precedent of the British Army's use of independent companies for remote colonial garrisons. 3

Skirmishing between the Virginians and Dunmore's forces erupted in Hampton Roads during the fall. The Convention reacted by passing new legislation on 11 January 1776 which essentially bypassed the minutemen as a major combat force. It added seventy-two more companies of regulars, expanding the two existing regiments to ten companies apiece, forming six more of the same size, and establishing the 9th Virginia Regiment as a special seven-company regiment for the Eastern Shore. This legislation added a sergeant to the basic company and created some minor staff positions. It envisioned a large regiment with seven companies armed with muskets and three with rifles. The new companies enlisted their men for a longer period, until 10 April 1778. Individual counties appointed the company officers and raised the men. 4

The Committee of Safety assigned the expanded military force to specific defensive sectors. Pairs of regiments occupied coastal areas divided by the James, York, and Rappahannock Rivers. It also assigned the companies to regiments on a regional basis, although the rifle companies still came from the frontier counties. The Convention made the 8th

<table>
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<tr>
<th>COLONY</th>
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<th>EACH COMPANY</th>
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<tr>
<td>Companies</td>
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</table>

\(a\). In most regiments there were seven musket and three rifle companies.
\(b\). The 6th South Carolina Regiment had no colonel and only five companies.
\(c\). Some companies had an additional private.
\(d\). Two battalions.
\(e\). Clerk.
\(f\). The Light Infantry Company had three lieutenants, no ensign, and four more privates.
Virginia Regiment unique by directing that it be raised by the German-American community in the Shenandoah Valley. Field officers for the new regiments had a great deal of experience, six of the seven colonels having served with Washington in the French and Indian War. Company officers and many of the enlisted men came from the minuteman battalions. 5

All nine regiments, an artillery company, and the frontier companies were raised as state troops for the defense of Virginia and its neighbors. That condition, the ten-company organization, and the short one- or two-year enlistments made them similar to earlier Provincials. The colony could not sustain the financial burden of such a large force, however, and asked Congress to transfer the regiments to the Continental Army. On 28 December 1775 Congress, which wanted to broaden the Army's geographical base, authorized six regiments from Virginia. Prolonged negotiations between the two governments followed and eventually all nine regiments were accepted. Virginia did not alter its regimental organization to conform to Continental standards, nor did it alter the men's terms of enlistment. It did require the officers to exchange colony for Continental commissions, leading to a few resignations. When Virginia also asked Congress to appoint general officers to command these troops, Henry's lack of military experience became a sensitive political issue. Washington blocked Henry's promotion, leading to Henry's resignation and return to politics. In his place Congress elected two men who had served

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5. William P. Palmer, ed., Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts ... (11 vols., Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1875-93), 8: 75-149. The 9th expanded to ten companies on 18 May; see Henning, Statutes at Large, 9: 135-8; and Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 1528, 1556.
under Washington as brigadier generals: Andrew Lewis on 1 March and Hugh Mercer on 5 June. 6

The artillery company authorized on 1 December 1775 consisted of a captain, 3 lieutenants, a sergeant, 4 bombardiers, 8 gunners, and 48 matrosses. On 13 February the Committee of Safety selected James Innis as captain and Charles Harrison, Edward Carrington, and Samuel Denney as lieutenants. Congress adopted the company on 19 March and soon after told Captain Dohicky Arundel, a French volunteer, to raise another in Virginia. Innis transferred to the infantry because he lacked the technical background for artillery service. Arundel then attempted to merge the two companies, but before he could do so, was killed on 12 July while experimenting with a mortar. Although the two companies worked closely together, they remained separate. 7

In May Virginia reorganized the frontier defense companies, retaining them as state troops. Two large companies were filled by re-enlisting men at Fort Pitt and Point Pleasant. A third was organized


in Botetourt to reinforce Point Pleasant. Hampshire and Augusta Counties raised new, smaller companies (3 officers, 3 sergeants, a drummer, a fifer, and 50 rank and file) to garrison Wheeling and a post on the Little Kanawha River. Neville, promoted to major, retained overall command. The same legislation reorganized the 1st and 2d Virginia Regiments for three year enlistments. Virginia's regular forces were more than a match for Lord Dunmore, who by August withdrew to New York.

North Carolina's revolutionary leadership lacked the Virginians' confidence in its base of popular support and turned to outside assistance much sooner. The colony contained a large body of recent Scottish immigrants who were still loyal to the Crown. Old political grievances left Tidewater planters unsure of backcountry cooperation. On 26 June 1775 the North Carolina delegates secured a Congressional promise to fund a force of 1,000 men. This gesture of support gave the colony's leaders the confidence to act.

The North Carolina Provincial Congress also organized military districts similar to Virginia's. To supplement the Continentals, each of the six districts raised a ten-company battalion of minutemen. On 1 September the Provincial Congress arranged the Continentals into two regiments, each consisting of three field officers, an adjutant, and ten companies. The company organization for both the Continentals and the

minutemen was similar to that of the Virginia minutemen: 3 officers, 3 sergeants, and 50 rank and file. To expedite recruiting, North Carolina disbanded its volunteer companies formed earlier. The Continental companies assembled at Salisbury beginning in October. The Provincial Congress developed the plan as a compromise between sectional interests. The east received two regular regiments to defend the coastline from naval attack. Less threatened areas relied on less expensive minutemen.

On 28 November 1775 the Continental Congress ordered both regiments reorganized on the new Continental structure. A third was added on 16 January and two more on 26 March. The Provincial Congress accepted the increased quota and on 9 April ordered the three new regiments raised for a term of two-and-a-half years. It soon added a sixth. Each military district recruited five companies, and the colony at large assumed responsibility for the other two companies needed. North Carolina deviated from the Continental structure by omitting the fife major from the regimental staff and adding a commissary of stores, an armorer, and a wagonmaster. Congress rewarded the colony for its promptness in 1775 by promoting Colonels James Moore and Robert Howe to brigadier general on 1 March 1776.

Members concerned for the security of the coast pressed the Provincial Congress to add another regular regiment with six companies, but General Moore was able to have the plan modified on 29 April. Instead

of a single regiment it created five independent companies of state
troops to defend specific points. Two were the same size as the Con-
tinental companies, but the other three contained only sixty privates.
On 3 May a 24-man company was added to garrison a frontier fort. The
Continental Congress accepted the 6th North Carolina Regiment on 7 May
and subsequently adopted three troops of light horse and an artillery
company raised by the colony during the summer, but not the independent
companies. 12

South Carolina's situation contained factors similar to North Caro-
lina's and Virginia's. It also faced Tidewater-versus-backcountry ten-
sions, but its leadership was more secure politically than North Caro-
lina's. Its Provincial Congress decided to raise regular state troops
rather than turning immediately to the Continental Congress. As a
regional compromise on 4 June 1775 it created two 750-man infantry
regiments for Tidewater defense and a third regiment of 450 mounted
rangers to protect the frontier. Since there was no immediate threat of
invasion the companies were limited to cadre strength. The nine ranger
companies recruited only thirty men apiece. The limit left the two in-
fantry regiments each with ten fifty-man companies, making them similar
in practice to the minutemen in North Carolina and Virginia. Competition
for commissions became intense. Several ranger companies even mutinied
when a Tidewater officer was assigned as their regimental commander. 13

Letters of Congress, 1: 448.
Memoirs of the American Revolution ... (2 vols., New York: David Long-
worth, 1802), 1: 64-65. R. W. Gibbes, ed., Documentary History of the
American Revolution (3 vols., Columbia: Banner Steam-Power Press, 1853-
During the winter the Provincial Congress expanded its forces. An artillery regiment, small but highly specialized, was established to man the fortifications at Charleston, and the 4th South Carolina Regiment was quickly filled by drawing key personnel from the city's elite militia artillerymen. On 22 February 1776 the three original regiments were finally allowed to recruit to full strength and shortly thereafter two new rifle regiments were added. The 5th South Carolina Regiment, recruited in the Tidewater, had seven companies; the 6th only five. It was raised along the northwestern frontier where many of the inhabitants, including its commander, Thomas Sumter, were former Virginians. Each rifle company was unusually large, containing four officers and one hundred men. Artillery companies were allocated for Fort Lyttleton (Fort Royal) and Georgetown with strengths individually tailored to the defensive needs of each locale.  

Congress directed South Carolina to raise three Continental regiments under the standard infantry structure on 4 November 1775. A second act on 25 March 1776 increased the quota to five regiments. The colony did not immediately transfer its units to the Continental Army and tried instead simply to delegate operational control over them. Congress rejected that alternative. On 18 June it finally decreed that all of the regiments except the rangers had been adopted by the earlier acts. As a major concession, however, it promised the colony not to send more than one-third of the troops outside South Carolina without prior notice. The rangers and a similar Georgia unit were adopted on 24 July with a special

FIGURE 5
SOUTH CAROLINA ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF 12 NOVEMBER 1775

1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Company
1 Captain
1 First Lieutenant
1 Second Lieutenant
2 Lieutenants Fireworker
6 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
30 Gunners
86 Privates

Staff
1 Quartermaster
1 Adjutant
1 Paymaster
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon’s Mate
1 Laboratory Sergeant
1 Amorer
1 Assistant Amorer
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant

a. Added on 22 February 1776.
organization and the requirement that the men serve on foot as well as on horseback. Additional legislation was required to restore the six regiments to proper seniority.  

Georgia, like North Carolina, required Congressional support before it risked military action. It had only 3,000 males of military age and was the colony most exposed to outside attack. When Congress authorized South Carolina's three regiments on 4 November 1775 it also directed Georgia to raise a standard infantry regiment. Because communication with the colony took so long, its Provincial Congress was allowed to appoint all officers, not just company-grades. Political factions within the colony fought for control of the regiment until a compromise gave command to Lachlan McIntosh, leader of the Scottish element. Savannah mercantile interests gained the other two field officer positions, while most of the company-level appointments went to sons of planters known as the "Country Party." The latter group controlled the local government and subsequently caused senior Continental officers trouble by asserting a right to meddle in the regiment's affairs.

McIntosh began raising the regiment in February 1776, arming one of the companies with rifles. He correctly anticipated that limited


resources would hamper his efforts. General Lee and the colony's leaders asked Congress to offset Georgia's lack of manpower by raising six regiments elsewhere and assigning them to defend the colony. Before their recommendations reached Congress, it voted to have Georgia raise two additional regiments and two artillery companies. On 24 July it also adopted the colony's four troops of horse and expanded them into a ranger regiment. Recruiting was slow, despite permission to canvass North Carolina and Virginia. Low bounties, long enlistments, and a fear that Georgia's climate was fatal caused problems for the infantry. The ranger regiment did better and was on duty by October 1776.17

In many respects the first year of southern military effort paralleled New England's in 1775. Each colony raised its own force either independently or with Congressional encouragement. Individual differences appeared in regimental structure although a ten-company, 500-man formation had general appeal. The units gradually were adopted as part of the Continental Army. Two key differences set the south apart. The region, with less manpower to spare from a plantation economy, turned quickly to enlistments longer than a single year. Many of the colonies also resisted surrendering full control over their units to a distant government in Philadelphia, and all refused to conform completely to the standard infantry regimental organization.

By July 1776 Georgia had one regiment nearing full strength and a ranger regiment partially organized. North Carolina was held by three regiments, two troops of horse, and an artillery company, while eight regiments and two artillery companies defended Virginia's Tidewater and five companies its frontier. The major troop concentration in the south was at Charleston, threatened by a British force under General Clinton. All six South Carolina regiments were there along with the 8th Virginia, the 1st, 2d, and 3d North Carolina Regiments, and a troop of North Carolina horse. Excluding the artillery the nine Continental regiments aggregated 269 officers and 3,453 enlisted men. About 500 men were sick and nearly 100 others were on furlough, leaving the force well below authorized levels. The three North Carolina regiments were about half strength, the 8th Virginia about three-quarters full. The three senior South Carolina regiments averaged about 350 men apiece, but the newer 5th and 6th were still under 300.18 Recruiting problems clearly posed a greater problem in the south than in Washington's Main Army.

Fortunately for the revolutionaries the southern troops did not face as serious a threat during 1776 as they had feared. Virginia bested Governor Dunmore, and North Carolina crushed a Loyalist uprising at Moore's Creek Bridge. Joint forces of Virginia and the Carolinas, mostly militia, defeated the Cherokee Indians, and the Charleston garrison repulsed Clinton's amphibious force. The ease of these successes actually hurt the Continental Army. Southern leaders, steeped in Whig ideological commitment to militia saw these victories as proof that local forces were

sufficient for their defense and did not give their full support to sustaining their Continental regiments. When Major General Lee, who was in overall command in the south, left in the autumn of 1776 he recognized that "It is not impossible that the late repulse of the Enemy /Clinton/ may be fatal to us. We seem now all sunk into a most secure and comfortable sleep." \(^{19}\)

**The Middle Colonies.**

New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, the central colonies, also joined the Continental Army during 1776 as part of Congress' expansion of the military effort. Like the south, this area had a more diverse ethnic composition than New England. On the other hand, it lay much closer to the seat of national authority in Philadelphia. Proximity simplified communication and enabled the governments of these colonies to cooperate better with Congress. They largely avoided the variety of unit structures which plagued the initial efforts of the other colonies, for example. Easy communication also kept them from raising troops until they received instructions from Congress. While this control saved the colonies unnecessary expense, it raised for the first time an important question of who should make initial appointments of officers.

The first troops requested from the Middle Colonies, other than the riflemen called forth in June of 1775, were two regiments from New Jersey.

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Congress, anticipating a British attack on New York City, on 9 October 1775 asked the New Jersey Provincial Congress for troops to replace the New York regiments which had marched into Canada. New Jersey asserted the right of each colony to name all the officers in a unit because, knowing its own citizens, it could select men who would be most effective. Delegates in Congress who were committed to safeguarding local government supported New Jersey’s position, but the debate was won by those who hoped to strengthen Congress’ role as a national government. In practice Congress followed a compromise. Company officers were selected by the colonial governments who also nominated candidates for the field officers. Congress elected the candidates endorsed by the colonies and issued commissions to all officers.\(^\text{20}\)

Congress subsequently clarified other aspects of the commissioning process. Officers elected on the same day took seniority according to the order in which their names appeared in the minutes of Congress. A promotion made to fill a vacancy carried an effective date retroactive to the time the vacancy occurred. Congress also steadfastly maintained its right to promote officers without regard to seniority in cases of exceptional merit. Delegates from the middle and southern colonies willingly agreed because they knew that strict adherence to seniority would allow New England to dominate Army leadership.\(^\text{21}\)


With policy established, Congress appointed distinguished men as New Jersey's field officers. Lord Stirling, commanding the 1st New Jersey Regiment, and William Maxwell, colonel of the 2d, were veterans of the French and Indian War, militia colonels, and important politicians. The sixteen companies to be raised by the Provincial Congress were apportioned among the counties according to militia strength. Organization of the regiments reflected the longstanding subdivisions of the colony. East Jersey, the northeastern portion, filled the 1st, while West Jersey, the southwest, furnished the 2d.22

William Livingston, a New Jersey delegate soon to be the governor, secured authorization for a third regiment when Congress ordered the 2d to Canada. The new commander, Elias Dayton, had the same military and political credentials as the two earlier colonels. This regiment organized during the early spring on a colony-wide basis. At the same time the Provincial Congress disbanded its minutemen and created two companies of artillery. These companies, one for East Jersey and one for West, were regular state troops designed to support the militia. Congress rejected New Jersey's efforts to have them adopted as Continentals. It also turned down a request for two more infantry regiments. 23

Congress soon promoted Stirling to brigadier general and Lieutenant Colonel William Winds succeeded him as commander of the 1st New Jersey Regiment. In an unusual step, Matthias Ogden (who went to Boston as a

volunteer) was inserted as the new lieutenant colonel. The 1st and 3d went to New York, although two companies of the latter were briefly diverted to protect Cape May. Washington later sent both regiments north, where the 1st joined the 2d in Canada while the 3d served in the Mohawk Valley. 24

Pennsylvania, like New Jersey, had been relatively untouched by operations in 1775. Because it lacked a mandatory militia, the Quaker-dominated colony relied on volunteers, known as Associators. The colonial Assembly, still the legal governing body, assumed responsibility for supervising the Associators on 30 June 1775. Under the leadership of Benjamin Franklin, the colony's Committee of Safety worked vigorously to accumulate supplies and by the end of September published a set of rules and regulations. Since the colony had a large German-speaking minority, the regulations were printed in that language as well as in English. 25

Congress pushed the colony to further activity on 12 October 1775 by authorizing it to raise a regiment. The Assembly appointed company officers who began recruiting almost immediately. Field officers were not selected until November. The companies were enlisted across the colony and assembled in the capital on 11 January 1776. At that time the officers forced the aging Colonel John Bull to resign. John DeHaas,

another veteran of the French and Indian War, replaced him and marched the regiment to Quebec.26

On 9 December 1775 Congress authorized four more regiments. Field officers recommended by the Committee of Safety were appointed in early January. Counties raised the companies which were grouped into regiments on a geographical basis. For unknown reasons, Congress allowed the colony to designate its regiments anachronistically as the 1st through 5th Pennsylvania Battalions. Cumberland County's local committee of safety petitioned the colony's committee to allocate it a full regiment, and Congress rewarded this enthusiasm on 4 January 1776 by directing Pennsylvania to raise another regiment there. Officers for it received commissions according to the county's recommendations.27 One company of each regiment, except the 1st, had rifles instead of muskets. Captain John Nelson's independent rifle company was attached during 1776 to the 1st Pennsylvania Battalion as compensation. That company had been organized by the Berks County committee and accepted by Congress on 30 January.28

Pennsylvania hoped to have a voice in the use of its regiments by having them serve as a unified brigade.29 That course would allow time to train the junior officers, who were inexperienced but considered

"pretty generally men of some Education, capable of becoming good officers, and willing to do their duty."\textsuperscript{30} The Canadian crisis prevented systematic deployment. Congress quickly ordered the 1st, 2d, and 4th (under Franklin's protege Anthony Wayne) to the north. A shortage of arms delayed the movement of the others and led Congress to toy with the idea of arming Robert Magaw's 5th with pikes instead of muskets. The 6th later reached Canada, but the 3d and 5th went only as far as New York City.\textsuperscript{31}

During the summer Congress authorized Pennsylvania to raise two more regiments for special missions. Westmoreland County on its own authority had formed an independent company to protect its frontier. On 16 June 1776 this unit, one hundred men under Captain Van Swearingen, was accepted by the Assembly as state troops and stationed at Kittanning. Congress also became concerned with preserving the neutrality of Indians in the area. On 11 July it ordered Schuyler to raise a regiment to garrison several key points in New York and Pennsylvania, including Kittanning. Seven of the companies were raised in Westmoreland County and the eighth in adjacent Bedford. Swearingen's company became part of the regiment. Aneas Mackay, a former commander of a British independent company living in Westmoreland, was appointed colonel on 20 July. Mackay was successful in recruiting men, but a food shortage prevented concentration of the regiment until mid-December.\textsuperscript{32}

Mackay's regiment was not responsible for the defense of the colony's northern border in Northumberland and Northampton Counties. Congress authorized a second regiment to secure that region on 23 August 1776. It contained only six companies under the command of Lieutenant Colonel William Cook and did not complete organization in time to participate in operations in 1776.\(^3\)

Congress actually provided the equivalent of a full regiment for that stretch of Pennsylvania's frontier by authorizing two separate companies at the same time for the Wyoming Valley. The Valley, today part of Pennsylvania, was claimed by both Connecticut and Pennsylvania, with the former colony exercising effective control. It organized the companies under Captains Robert Durkee and Samuel Ransom of Wyoming.\(^4\)

Delaware also responded promptly when Congress assigned it a single regiment of Continentals on 9 December 1775. Company officers were appointed on 13 January, and six days later Congress approved the field officers. The regiment assembled at Dover in March and began training under the tutelage of Adjutant Thomas Holland, a former British captain. Several companies skirmished with landing parties from the frigate Roe-buck while protecting Delaware's coastline, but the bulk of the regiment lacked weapons until July. It picked up muskets in Philadelphia and in August set out for the Main Army.\(^5\)

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Maryland patterned its defense bill of 14 August 1775 on Virginia's. The colony was not in any immediate danger, however, and merely reorganized its militia and established minutemen. Lord Dunmore's activity in the Chesapeake Bay caused the Maryland Convention to reconsider that decision. On 1 January 1776 the concept of raising regular troops received approval. Two weeks later the Convention replaced the minutemen with state troops. One regiment contained the nine companies from the northern and western parts of the colony. It was organized along lines similar to Continental regiments except for the addition of a second major and a light infantry company. The light company had rifles instead of muskets and a third lieutenant instead of an ensign. It contained 64 privates, somewhat more than the line companies, but the total number in the regiment was the same as in a regiment of eight 68-man companies. Seven of the remaining separate companies were infantry with a larger number of privates; two others were artillery (with the same organization) to defend Annapolis and Baltimore.  

The officers came from the political leadership of the colony. Colonel William Smallwood, Lieutenant Colonel Francis Ware, and four captains sat in the Convention. Both majors had prior service: Thomas Price commanded one of the Continental rifle companies of 1775 and Mordecai Gist organized the colony's first volunteer company in 1774. The regiment and three of the infantry companies reached New York on 9 August and joined Washington. The remaining four companies under Major Price  

did not join them until 19 September when they could be spared from coastal defense. Congress formally assigned Maryland a quota of two Continental regiments on 17 August 1776. The colony decided instead to transfer the regiment and independent infantry companies without providing a second regimental staff. 37

Two other regiments were raised during the summer of 1776, primarily in the middle colonies, as cooperative ventures. The British introduced the use of German auxiliaries in that year. Propagandists denounced the "Hessian mercenaries" and cited them as proof of the corruption of the British political system. They also prompted Congress to begin enlisting troops for longer periods, and to make specific efforts to mobilize the German-American population. 38 On 25 May Congress created the German Battalion. Native-born and immigrant Germans were enlisted in Maryland and Pennsylvania for three year terms. Each colony furnished four companies. The three field officers came from the revolutionary leadership in the German communities in those colonies. Congress added a ninth company from Pennsylvania on 17 July as a direct result of Washington's recommendation of John David Woelper, then a lieutenant in the 3d Pennsylvania Battalion, who had served in the French and Indian War. 39

The other joint unit was authorized on 17 June as the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment. Like the 1st Continental Regiment, on which it

was modelled, its cadre came from the rifle companies of 1775. Daniel Morgan's Virginia company had been captured at Quebec, but the other Virginia company and both Maryland ones were in service at New York and were reenlisted. Four additional companies were raised in Virginia and three in Maryland, all in the northwestern parts of their respective colonies. Captains Hugh Stephenson, Moses Rawlings, and Otho Holland Williams became the regimental field officers, retaining their relative seniority. The regiment was captured in November at Fort Washington, however, before all of the companies had a chance to join it. 40

During late 1775 and 1776 the four central colonies accepted the obligation to raise over 11,000 men for the common military effort. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware formed ten regiments for Congress. Maryland organized the equivalent of two more regiments as state troops, but at Congress' request transferred them to the Continental Army. Four others were added during the summer of 1776, two of which were jointly recruited by adjacent colonies. Like the initial units recruited elsewhere, these regiments attracted men of talent, influence, and experience as officers. Except for Maryland, which behaved more like Virginia than the other middle colonies, each concentrated on improving its militia at first and turned to regular troops only at the request of Congress. That fact eliminated the variation in organizational models that was a problem in the other regions. Once the issue of appointing officers was resolved,

the middle colonies' regiments blended easily into the regular Army. Seven of them went north. The equivalent of six others joined Washington's Main Army at New York City.

The Departments and the Main Army.

Adding new regiments from the southern and middle colonies greatly expanded the size of the Continental Army during 1776. At the same time military operations spread beyond eastern Massachusetts and Canada. Congress and Washington reacted to these new conditions by improving on the basic command and staff organizations created during 1775. The New York and Canadian Departments served as a model for dividing the nation into a system of territorial commands. New departments and the transfer of the Main Army to New York City led in turn to a larger staff. Although the size of the Army was greatly increased during early 1776, additional demands during the summer forced Congress to raise still more men. It chose to tap other resources to meet that need.

The south, particularly Virginia, initiated the expansion of the command structure by requesting general officers for its new regiments. Congress appointed a committee "to consider into what departments the middle and southern colonies ought to be formed, in order that military operations ... may be carried on in a regular and systematic manner." 41 Following the committee's recommendations, Congress created two new territorial departments on 27 February 1776. Virginia, the Carolinas, and

41. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 132-3. The committee represented every shade of opinion in Congress, including the militant John Penn, the more conservative James Wilson, and three members (Thomas Lynch, Benjamin Harrison, and Robert Alexander) who generally followed a middle course on questions of resistance.
Georgia became the Southern Department. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland, added to New York, formed the Middle Department, which remained under Schuyler. Three days later Congress placed Charles Lee in command of the Southern Department and elected six brigadier generals for the new departments. Appropriate staff assistants were subsequently appointed for each.\textsuperscript{42}

Washington remained the Commander-in-Chief with personal command of the "Military District" of New England. Canada represented a fourth department. Congress intended to assign each department a major general and two brigadier generals, but the attempt at symmetry was unsuccessful. Lee's Southern Department immediately received two additional brigadier generals because it covered so large an area, and Washington's Main Army retained three major and six brigadier generals.\textsuperscript{43} Transfers, promotions, and resignations followed. New appointments to fill vacancies included Frederick de Woedtke who claimed to be a Prussian general. His election on 16 March 1776 as brigadier general for the Canadian Department was the first appointment as a general officer of a foreign volunteer.\textsuperscript{44}

When Henry Knox accumulated enough heavy artillery, Washington occupied dominant positions on Dorchester Heights, rendering Boston untenable.


for the British, who evacuated it on 17 March 1776. Washington correctly
guessed that General Howe would attack New York City next, as soon as the
British could regroup their forces. The Main Army moved by brigades to
that city over a period of weeks. The regiments marched overland to Nor­
wich, Connecticut, embarked in coastal shipping, and sailed down Long
Island Sound. Washington opened his headquarters at New York on 14
April, and three days later the last units arrived from Boston.

With this move Washington became commander of the Middle Department.
Schuyler reverted to command of the reorganized Northern Department in
northern New York. Major General Artemas Ward wished to resign, but was
persuaded to accept command of the new Eastern Department encompassing
New England for the time being. His forces consisted of a company of
Knox's artillery regiment and five Massachusetts infantry regiments.
Four, the 8th, 16th, 18th, and 27th Continental Regiments, protected
Boston. The 14th remained at the Marblehead naval base.45

Washington continued the Main Army's organization of three divisions
and six brigades in January 1776. The average size of a brigade remained
the same, although each now contained only four or five of the larger
regiments. When the army moved to New York it gained some regiments from
the middle colonies, but left five behind in Massachusetts. Shortly
thereafter it sent the equivalent of two brigades to the north. In April
Washington regrouped the remaining regiments under the one major and four

45. Ward to Congress, 22 Mar 1776; Record Group 360, National Archives.
450-2, 505-6. C. Harvey Gardiner, ed., A Study in Dissent: The Warren-
Gerry Correspondence 1776-1792 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University
brigadier generals left with the Main Army. Each of the four brigades
contained four or five regiments and defended a specific area or terrain
feature. That arrangement, and the exemption of the artillery from the
brigades, were characteristics of the 1775 brigade system, although
Washington did alter the arrangement employed at Boston in one respect.
At New York he placed the riflemen in the brigade responsible for the
most advanced positions where their special skills had greater value.  

Key personnel changes as well as the expansion to service the new
territorial departments highlighted the history of the Army staff in
1776. Adjutant General Gates and Muster Master General Stephen Moylan,
for example, were promoted to larger assignments during the year. Joseph
Reed accepted the Adjutant General's office with the rank of colonel, and
his former law student, Gunning Bedford, moved up from Deputy Muster
Master General. Their close relationship insured that the two main ad-
ministrative sections continued to cooperate. Washington also worked
to improve the quality of staff work. He instituted a comprehensive re-
porting system that kept headquarters informed about the day-to-day
status of the Army. That data gave the Continentals an edge in accurate
planning over the British, who lacked a cohesive, functioning administra-
tive network.

47. Ford, Journals of Congress, 4: 177, 187, 236, 311, 315; 5: 419, 460;
   6: 933.
   of Congress, 10: 124. Richard K. Showman, et al., eds., The Papers of
   General Nathanael Greene (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
   reports required a ream of paper a month for each regiment.
49. Charles Jenkinson to Henry Clinton, 5 Apr and 23 Nov 1779 and 5 Feb
   1781; British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, #
   1894, 2443, and 3320.
Washington's aides and secretaries served as another element in the Army's administrative chain. During 1776 they also experienced expansion and personnel changes. Increased pay and a Congressional decision to give the Commander-in-Chief's aides the rank of lieutenant colonel (major generals' aides were majors) eased some of the problems caused by career aspirations. The addition of a fourth aide in August compensated for the growth in Washington's correspondence after the move to New York. A new special unit formed on 12 March supplemented the aides. The Commander-in-Chief's Guard, a company-sized element, protected Washington's person and the Army's cash and official papers. Adjutant Caleb Gibbs of the 14th Continental Regiment became its captain and took on the burdens of supervising the headquarters' household. Washington's nephew, Lieutenant George Lewis, became the other officer of the guard.

Comparable expansion took place in the logistical and medical spheres. Two developments in 1776 improved support for the troops. Congress replaced the individual colonies as the procurer of clothing and, under the general supervision of the Quartermaster General, issued it to the troops at cost. The system followed American experience in the colonial wars rather than the British policy of allowing colonels to deal directly with civilian contractors. Designed for the small army of January 1776, the plan suffered a partial collapse when the Army expanded. Eventually Washington had to abandon his hope for standardized uniforms.

52. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 4: 57, 85, 87, 96, 155, 195, 341, 385; 5: 21, 130, 336. The plan included regimental flags keyed to the color of each unit's coat facings.
The second innovation came on 29 June 1776. Washington organized a provisional regiment from the labor troops under the command of Barrack-master Jonathan Brewer, a former colonel, and Deputy Quartermaster General John Parke. The hired or enlisted craftsmen continued to perform maintenance and construction duties, but now were organized into twelve companies for possible emergency combat service. Each fifty-man company had a temporary captain and two lieutenants, mostly either former enlisted men or civilians. The artisans formed companies according to trades: seven of carpenters, three of smiths, one of naval carpenters, and a general maintenance company. The regiment dissolved in November.53

Competent military engineers were too rare to allow each department to have several. Washington brought only Rufus Putnam and Jeduthan Baldwin to New York. Putnam served as the Main Army’s chief engineer with a catch-as-catch-can collection of assistants detailed from the line regiments. Baldwin moved to Ticonderoga to supervise similar arrangements in the Northern Department. Both men received commissions as engineer colonels during the year, although the lack of true training as military engineers created weaknesses in overly ambitious fortifications at New York and Ticonderoga. Fort Washington, the major work on Manhattan, later was stormed in a single day.54

Congress capped the expansion of the Army by creating a special standing committee to assume the burden of routine military supervision.

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Edward Rutledge, echoing Washington's concerns, suggested on 24 January 1776 that Congress establish a War Office similar to Britain's. Congress appointed a committee to study the matter and finally formed a "Board of War and Ordnance" on 12 June. Five delegates, assisted by Richard Peters as a permanent secretary, began functioning on 21 June. In addition to performing various administrative functions, the Board prepared recommendations on matters of military policy which were submitted to the full Congress. The major tasks of the Board included supervision of prisoners of war, the compilation of a master roster of commissioned officers, monitoring returns of men and materiel, and developing reference files of military correspondence. Washington greeted this development with joy, calling it "an Event of great importance ... which will be recorded as such in the Historic Page."  

The military expansion in early 1776 and the improvements in the Continental Army's command and staff organization that it prompted nonetheless fell short of the defensive needs of the nation by the summer. Britain vastly increased the military and naval strength committed to suppressing the Revolution, massing forces at St. John's in Canada and especially at New York. The first pressure to add still more men to the

55. Interest in and support for the Board was widespread in Congress. The original committee to investigate the concept included militants Franklin, Samuel Ward, and Samuel Adams, plus more moderate delegates Thomas Lynch, Benjamin Harrison, Edward Rutledge, and Robert Morris. The resolution was drafted by a committee appointed on 20 March which included James Duane and Thomas Johnson plus militant Richard H. Lee.  
56. Militants John Adams and Roger Sherman; Rutledge and James Wilson who generally adopted more conservative positions; and Harrison.  
58. Ibid., p. 159.
Continental Army’s rolls came from New England. A Congressional study in May indicated that the Eastern Department needed a garrison of 6,000 men. On 11 May Congress ordered Ward’s five regiments to recruit to full strength, adopted two regiments of Rhode Island state troops, and three days later directed the other three New England governments to raise one regiment apiece.

Washington’s basic policy throughout the war called for keeping the Continentals concentrated and leaving local defense to "the Militia, or other Internal Strength of each Province." The New England governments initially used short-term independent companies to protect key harbors, but on 31 October 1775 Rhode Island took a different course by raising a 500-man regiment of state troops as its source of "Internal Strength." In January the force expanded to two 750-man, 12-company regiments, which freed Ward from responsibility for defending Newport and Providence. New Hampshire’s new Continental regiment was intended to garrison Portsmouth, but chaos resulted from attempting to use state troops as a cadre, and Colonel Nicholas Long made no recruiting progress until August. Connecticut raised its regiment under Colonel Andrew Ward in the Hartford area and northeastern portions of the state, and then added two regiments of state troops to take over the burden of local defense when it marched out of the state. Massachusetts did not raise its regiment, but instead placed three regiments of recently formed state troops (two of infantry

60. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 3: 379-80. Also see pp. 486-7.
and one of artillery) under General Ward's command with the restriction that they could not be sent outside Massachusetts.  

Congress' plans for a 6,000-man Eastern Department became a dead letter by summer as operations elsewhere became more important. Three of the new regiments and all five regiments of the original New England garrison soon shifted to either Ticonderoga or New York. During conferences in May Washington and Congress concluded that the Army needed a two-to-one numerical advantage to defend both places successfully. Between 1 and 3 June Congress called for the additional men needed to achieve that ratio. Ticonderoga received an allocation of 6,000 militia and New York another 13,800. A third force, the 10,000-man Flying Camp, was set aside as a mobile reserve stationed in New Jersey. In deciding on militia rather than still more Continental regiments, Congress acted on practical and ideological reasons. Militia could take to the field quicker, and many delegates also believed that America faced a crisis which demanded full participation by the society. To individuals of this point of view the militia, not the regular army, was the military institution of the people.

All of the colonies from Maryland northward responded to this call, although few furnished their full quotas of militia. Pennsylvania's contribution to the Flying Camp included two special units of state troops, totalling 1,500 men. They had been created in March to replace departing Continentals. The colony planned to use the two-battalion Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment either on the frontier or in defense of eastern Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania State Musketry Battalion to defend Philadelphia from British regulars. The state troops also included an artillery contingent which was not sent to the Flying Camp, but retained near Philadelphia to guard the fortifications on the Delaware River. A small company under Thomas Proctor established in October 1775 expanded in May to one hundred men. As a result of its men's distinguished service as volunteers on the Continental Navy's Hornet in an engagement with the frigate Roebuck, Pennsylvania further expanded its artillery force to two large companies. In October those men were ordered to be reenlisted for the duration of the war.

The reinforcements of militia, and of several new Continental regiments which arrived in New York during the summer, increased the size of the Main Army. Although the militia had their own "Provincial" brigadier generals, Washington had a pressing need for extra senior officers to which Congress responded on 9 August by promoting Heath, Spencer, Sullivan, and Greene to major general, and adding six new brigadier generals. Of the original 1775 brigadier generals only Wooster was not promoted; Congress

punished him for quarrelsome conduct in Canada. The new brigadier generals replaced men promoted, killed, or captured. In almost every case the senior colonel from the same state was promoted. Other brigadier generals were added in September. The additional generals enabled Washington to reorganized his brigades. In August the eight brigades of militia and four of Continentals were formed into three "Grand Divisions," each tailored to a specific defensive mission and containing both militiamen and Continentals. Although other brigades were added, that basic pattern prevailed for the remainder of the campaign.

In mid-September the Main Army's fourteen infantry brigades contained 31,000 officers and men. Over 7,000 were sick, although most of those were not so ill as to be hospitalized. Another 3,500 were on detached duties. Of the total strength, 57 percent came from 36 regiments of militia and 4 of state troops. The remainder, 25 Continental regiments, accounted for 674 officers, 103 regimental staff officers, 602 sergeants, 314 drummers and fifers, and 11,590 rank and file. Only slightly more than half of the Continental rank and file were carried as present and fit for duty: 3,153 were sick and 2,356 "on command." Of those on special duties nearly two-thirds were Continentals rather than militia because they had better training. All regiments were reasonably complete. Half were over three-quarters full, including the sick and detailed

68. General Return, Main Army, 14 Sep 1776; Record Group 93, National Archives. This return does not include the Flying Camp or various regiments, such as the Delaware Regiment, not physically with their brigades on that day.
personnel. The eight which fell below two-thirds had special reasons for their status. The 1st Continental Regiment was in the process of reorganizing, and the others all had suffered heavy casualties in the battle of Long Island a few weeks earlier. Overall these figures indicate that Washington had a large army under his command, although only a fraction of it could be considered trained, reliable troops. On the other hand, his regular regiments were reasonably close to their designed strength and had an organizational potential for efficient battlefield duty.

Summary.

The original plans worked out by Congress, Washington, and Schuyler projected a small Continental Army for 1776. Twenty-six infantry, one rifle, and one artillery regiment were allocated to the Main Army and another nine infantry regiments to the army in Canada and northern New York. Standard tables of organization insured that the regiments would have a uniformity lacking in 1775. Events during 1776 and Congress' willingness to include every colony in the military effort soon outran the original modest plan. Great Britain committed major forces from Europe which expanded the scope and intensity of the conflict. Congress and the individual colonies reacted by adding additional units to the Army.

The haphazard growth in the number of regiments, conditioned by a changing military situation and political questions, eventually produced a national military institution in a geographical sense. Congress established a network of territorial departments and added general officers
and staff personnel to provide a national command organization. Although many of the newer regiments also adopted the standard regimental structure, differences prevailed in some units due to special circumstances involved in their creation. Bringing them into conformity was the major remaining task required to make the Army a national institution in every sense.

Units concentrated in the north, at Charleston, and especially at New York City during 1776 represented more colonies than those assembled at Boston and in Canada in 1775. Despite the loss of homogeneity, the major field armies worked well together. The troops in the far north suffered a humiliating repulse in Canada, but stabilized after withdrawing to Ticonderoga. The Southern Department easily defeated tentative efforts to restore royal authority in that region. Washington's Main Army drove the enemy from Boston, but was less successful in its defense of New York. The latter campaign included a series of battlefield defeats and the loss of the vital port city. Howe outgeneralled Washington, and his British and German regulars for the most part performed more efficiently in combat than the mixed force of militia and Continentals. Howe's 15 September landing at Kip's Bay, scattering two militia brigades in a rout, marked the low point of the campaign for the Americans.

On the next day, however, a relatively minor skirmish at Harlem Heights began the restoration of Continental morale. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Knowlton's recently formed provisional ranger unit, supported by the rifle companies of the 3d Virginia Regiment, and later by other units, defeated a British force which included the elite 42d Foot (Black Watch). Other skirmishes at Pelham and Mamaroneck, and individual performances by
units even in battles which ended in defeat, contributed to a restoration of confidence. Washington planned to incorporate the lessons he learned in this campaign when the Army was reorganized for the coming year. Changes in arms and the development of better teamwork in larger units, rather than major change in the regimental structure, figured prominently in his plans. The other key concept which emerged from the campaign was a realization that militiamen were not prepared for extensive service with the field armies. As Washington told Congress,

I am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our Liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defence is left to any but a permanent standing Army, I mean one to exist during the War. 69

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CHAPTER V

AN ARMY FOR THE WAR: 1777

Enlistments for most of the Continentals expired on 31 December 1776. Congress and Washington, remembering the problems of the previous winter's reorganization, began preparations during the early fall. They profited from experience by starting sooner and by retaining the idea of planning through military-Congressional conferences. The new reorganization applied to troops from every state, producing comprehensive legislation to rationalize the ad hoc growth of the previous year. The nearly unanimous decision to recruit men for the duration of the war, rather than the single-year term typical earlier, formed the central premise of the new plan. It was approved in September and modified somewhat during the winter to adjust to changes necessitated by the final phase of the 1776 campaign. Other modifications came in 1777 as the Main Army gained its first experience with mobile rather than static operations. In 1777 the Continental Army reached its maximum size in terms of units. Other than a handful of special-type organizations, problems thereafter related to sustaining strength rather than growth.

The Eighty-Eight Battalion Resolve.

Congress made the basic decisions about the size and nature of the Continental Army of 1777 during September and early October of 1776. Delegates of different political backgrounds agreed on the general
outlines of a new policy. Extensive discussions in committee took place before consensus on precise details appeared. The original proposal adopted by Congress settled on the size of the Army and apportioned it among the several states, establishing conditions of enlistment and compensation for the officers and men. Congress also approved amendments to the Articles of War to improve discipline.

Americans had adamantly opposed long enlistments during the first year and a half of the Revolution. In addition to the precedent of short enlistments for the Provincial's, most politicians believed in the ideal of a militia of citizen-soldiers rather than a "standing army." That attitude began to change during the summer of 1776, and even Whiggish John Adams conceded that the newly independent nation needed "A regular Army, and the most masterly Discipline, because ... without these We cannot reasonably hope to be a powerful, a prosperous, or a free People."¹

The 1776 campaign proved that the Revolutionary militia system, like its colonial predecessor, could not furnish large bodies of men for extended periods. The change in Congress' attitude began during the summer when the newly authorized units were recruited for three years' service. By the fall delegates universally agreed to rely on a large body of trained and disciplined Continentals to compete with the British and German regulars on the battlefield.²

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Once Congress decided in favor of a long-term army it directed the Board of War to draft a comprehensive plan. The Board submitted that document on 9 September 1776. Congress devoted the next week to debating and amending it in committee of the whole. Discussion of specific details relating to enlistments, bounties, and the allocation of quotas consumed the time. The final legislation, known as the "eighty-eight battalion resolve," called for eighty-eight regiments of infantry under the structure approved for use in 1776. Congress' estimates of the military population of each state governed the quotas of regiments. The delegates intended to have most existing regiments reenlist their men. They approved cash bonuses and liberal post-war land grants as incentives in the face of the much longer terms of service. As in the past, Congress retained commissioning powers but allowed the states to select all regimental officers. The states also had to arm, clothe, and equip the regiments, and could withhold part of the men's pay to cover the cost of uniforms.

Longer enlistments allowed the Army to improve training and discipline. Modification of the Articles of War also contributed to better discipline. Washington decided during the summer that the existing Articles lacked deterrent effect, and he sent Judge Advocate William Tudor to Philadelphia to present his case. Tudor and a Congressional committee which included some of the finest legal minds in America produced the revision

3. See Table 4.
5. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson carried out the majority of the work of this committee.
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b. Scammell's.
c. Cornell's; Sherburne's.
d. Webb's; Sherburne's.
e. Lamb's.
f. Malcolm's.
g. Malcolm's; Hartley's; Patton's.
h. Half of the German Battalion.
i. State Regiment included.
j. Half of the German Battalion and half of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment.
k. 4th South Carolina Regiment.
l. Georgia's Ranger Regiment.
m. Warner's; 1st and 2d Canadian Regiments.
adopted on 20 September. It expanded the number of articles by more closely copying the British articles and restoring material deleted in former versions. The central changes added to the list of capital crimes and increased the maximum corporal punishment from thirty-nine lashes to one hundred. This version remained in effect for the rest of the war. Accompanying legislation commissioned Tudor as a lieutenant colonel and authorized deputy judge advocates to assist with mounting casework.  

Washington wrote a letter to Congress on 24 September, before he learned of these resolutions, requesting immediate action to reorganize the Army for the new year and to improve discipline. It was an eloquent appeal which overcame the last lingering objections in Congress, but it also raised some new issues. In particular Washington asked the delegates to increase the pay scales of officers and to furnish free uniforms to the men. Congress increased officers' salaries on 7 October and approved an annual uniform allowance on the next day.  

The Commander-in-Chief's concern was to complete the reorganization before winter fragmented the Army. He wanted Congress to have the states send legislative committees to headquarters and to Ticonderoga to insure that the most qualified officers were retained. Congress agreed, and when some committees did not appear promptly, allowed Washington and Schuyler to act in place of them. When November brought news that Massachusetts

had promised to supplement the pay of its enlisted men and that other states were considering similar action, Washington warned that such a course was unwise over the long term, and Congress agreed. On 12 November the practice was forbidden, but the option of shorter three-year enlistments received approval as another incentive to recruiting.\footnote{Ibid., 5: 854-6; 6: 920-1, 944-5. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 115-6, 139-41, 143-4, 154-9. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 6: 152-6, 186-90, 200-1, 271-3, 289-90.}

Operations around New York did not halt after the battle of White Plains. Instead, they interrupted the reorganization and eventually caused major changes in the master plan. On 12 November Washington divided the Main Army to guard against several possible courses of British action. General Lee, recently returned from the south, remained east of the Hudson River to protect approaches to New England. Washington crossed over to New Jersey to reinforce the Flying Camp. General Heath’s division marched into the Hudson Highlands, a mountainous zone some forty miles above New York City, to preserve communications between the two larger forces. As early as 8 November 1775 Congress recognized that the Highlands deserved to be fortified because it was the only place along the river between Albany and the sea where warships could be stopped. A commandant of the fortifications, at first a colonel but later a brigadier general, had been the senior Continental officer in the region during most of 1776. Heath’s assignment transformed the region into a de-facto territorial department, a status which its strategic importance preserved for the rest of the war.\footnote{Ibid., 5: 10-11, 123, 138-9, 317-9, 340-1, 435-6; 6: 242-5, 257-8, 284-7; 16: 150-4. Ford, Journals of Congress, 3: 337-8. Robert K. Wright, Jr., “Too Little, Too Late: The Campaign of 1777 in the Hudson Highlands” (Master’s Thesis, College of William and Mary, 1971), pp. 30-40.}
Howe captured Fort Washington on 16 November, depriving Washington of its large garrison and upsetting the balance of forces. He continued with an invasion of New Jersey which chased Washington across the Delaware River on 8 December. A second British force from New York captured Newport, Rhode Island, the same day. As soon as Howe decided that Washington was safe on the Pennsylvania side of the river, he halted the campaign and ordered his troops into winter quarters.

Trenton, one of the most advanced outposts, was garrisoned by a reinforced Hessian Brigade under Colonel Johann Rall. Rall's regiments were among the best in the German auxiliary forces serving the British, but they were worn out, seriously short of officers, and handicapped by a cumbersome structure. Hesse-Cassel modeled its army on Prussia's, giving each infantry regiment two five-company battalions plus a grenadier company. The British had altered that formation before the regiments left Europe, detaching the grenadier companies to form four four-company grenadier battalions and dividing each regiment into two single-battalion regiments. In comparison with British and American units, the revised Hessian regiment lacked enough officers for its large enlisted strength. It contained five companies for administrative purposes, but fought in eight platoons. Before it could engage, it needed time to regroup into platoons. At Trenton the Hessians were billeted by company. 10

FIGURE 6
HESSE-CASSEL INFANTRY REGIMENT OF 1776

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Judge Advocate
1 Chaplain
1 Senior Surgeon
1 Wagon Master
1 Drum Major
6 Musicians
1 Armorer
1 Provost
1 Assistant Provost
2 Drivers

Company
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Provost Sergeant
7 Corporals
1 Junior Surgeon
3 Drummers
1 Clerk
105 Privates
4 Officers' Servants

a. Each field officer was also the commander of a company, so each regiment actually had only two companies with all four officers.
The invasion of New Jersey threatened Philadelphia and the existence of the Main Army. Washington ordered Lee to come to his aid, but the latter followed an independent strategy until he was captured. Major General John Sullivan assumed command of Lee's three brigades and marched them to headquarters without further incident.\(^\text{11}\) Schuyler and Gates in the Northern Department responded much more quickly. On 18 November most of the regiments in that department had already started south to reorganize, leaving Colonel Anthony Wayne in command of a winter garrison at Ticonderoga. On 26 November Schuyler diverted them to Washington. Four arrived at headquarters on 20 December, the same day as Sullivan, while three others established a camp at Morristown, New Jersey, to threaten British rear areas.\(^\text{12}\)

Washington, reinforced by these Continentals and by Pennsylvania and New Jersey militia, moved quickly to restore morale and public confidence. He sent Generals Spencer and Arnold, but no troops, to rally New England militia near Newport. Patrols probing the banks of the Delaware uncovered weakness at Trenton. On the night of 25-26 December a partially regrouped and resupplied Main Army crossed back into New Jersey. Part of the counterattack had to be cancelled because of bad weather, but the main body virtually destroyed Rall's brigade. On 3 January a second enemy brigade was mauled near Princeton. Washington then proceeded to Morristown,
having completely outmaneuvered his opponents and forced them to withdraw into a small bridgehead around New Brunswick.

In a period of little more than a week Washington's small, veteran cadre shattered two British brigades, restored morale, and recovered most of New Jersey. The Germans lost their aura of invincibility and for the rest of the war were underused by the British. Individual officers who performed well during the crisis became Washington's trusted subordinates. This brief campaign introduced the Continental Army to mobile warfare after nearly two years of static operations at Boston and New York. Washington spent the next several months digesting its lessons. The most important of those lessons was the value of a brigade composed of several infantry regiments supported by an artillery company. Hereafter it became the basic element of the Main Army.

**Rounding Out the Army.**

The retreat through New Jersey made Washington acutely aware of Howe's numerical strength and his advantage in artillery and cavalry. In a series of letters to Congress during December the Commander-in-Chief pressed for more men. Additional infantry regiments, more artillery, and a force of cavalry headed the list of needs which he outlined. Congress, shaken by the crisis and near defeat, acted on these requests by the end of the month. As a result, the Continental Army became a more balanced force which Washington could organize into elements capable of competing in open battle.

The requests which Washington sent to Congress represented the views of his generals as well as his own opinions. Increasing the number of infantry regiments from the 88 authorized on 16 September to a minimum of
110 lay at the heart of Washington's proposals. Because the invasion of New Jersey probably would prevent that state from recruiting its quota, he accepted New York's offer to raise a fifth regiment and instructed all recruiting parties to enlist as many men as possible without regard for quotas. Henry Knox, whom Washington recommended for promotion to brigadier general, submitted a plan to expand the artillery to five regiments to support the larger number of infantry regiments. Washington thought five excessive, but when he asked Congress for more infantry he included a request for three regiments of artillery. He also desired a force of cavalry, several new staff officers, and enough generals to make one brigadier general available for every three regiments and one major general for every three brigades.\(^\text{13}\)

Congress did not act immediately because it was moving to Baltimore for greater security. On 27 December, however, it complied exactly with Washington's suggestions. Knox was promoted and Washington empowered to add the necessary staff officers. Congress ordered the Commander-in-Chief to develop a comprehensive system for promotions, specifying that officers should rise by seniority: regimentally to the rank of captain and within a state's "line" through the field grades. A state's line consisted of its quota of infantry regiments established in September. Most important,

Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis; and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness of General Washington, do, hereby, \textit{Resolve}, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, 16 battalions of infantry, in addition to those already

voted by Congress; to appoint officers for the said bat-
talions; to raise, officer, and equip three thousand
light horse; three regiments of artillery, and a corps
of engineers, and to establish their pay ... 14

The "Sixteen Additional Regiments," artillery, and light horse
represented a new type of force different from the September regiments.
Unlike previous Continental units, these were not organized by the indi-
vidual state governments but were directly under the Commander-in-Chief's
control. The sixteen infantry regiments, added to the eighty-eight of
the September resolve and six approved the previous summer without re-
spect to a single state, produced a total of one hundred and ten. The
six regiments became known as "extra" regiments to distinguish them from
the state lines and the sixteen "additionals." Warner's (largely from
the Vermont area) and the 1st and 2d Canadian Regiments remained as extras
for the remainder of their existence. The other three were basically
absorbed into state lines. Dubois' Regiment, primarily recruited in New
York, became part of the expanded line of that state. The German Battalion
and the remnants of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment contained the
equivalent of a regiment of men from Maryland, which never raised an eighth
regiment, contending that those two units should count towards its Sep-
tember quota. 15

Washington had expected favorable Congressional action and began
recruiting even before he learned of the new resolve. On 21 December he

legislation authorized establishment of a magazine and ammunition labora-
tory at Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
15. Harry Alonzo Cushing, ed., The Writings of Samuel Adams (4 vols., New
York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907), 3: 342-6. Fitzpatrick, Writings of
told General William Maxwell to offer competent officers omitted from New Jersey's reorganization commissions as company commanders if they would recruit at least fifty men apiece. The same offer was made on 24 December to Samuel Griffin, a staff officer from the Flying Camp. When Congress eventually authorized the additional regiments and Washington began to organize them after settling into quarters at Morristown, he followed a pattern outlined in these December experiments. In particular, he used the regiments to provide for officers who he felt had been passed over by state legislatures for reasons other than military merit. Top positions were given to officers who performed distinguished staff duty during 1776. Washington also believed that Congress intended to have the regiments apportioned according to geography and acted accordingly.16

Because New England had a lower line quota in 1777 than in 1776, potentially forcing out many good officers, Washington assigned it seven of the additional regiments, the largest group given to any region. Since Boston did not furnish a regiment in 1775 or 1776, Washington selected Henry Jackson, a citizen with a strong military reputation, to command a regiment allocated to the town. Jackson's key officers came from Boston's Independent Company of Cadets. A second Massachusetts regiment went to Lieutenant Colonel William Lee of the 14th Continental Regiment. The 14th declined to reenlist as a regiment in the 1777 reorganization, but enough officers and men remained to justify using it as a cadre. The third regiment for Massachusetts went to Deputy Adjutant General David Henley, whose broad base of contacts promised recruiting success. All

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three regiments remained at Boston during 1777 because they received a low priority in the competition for recruits with the line and artillery regiments. 17

Two other Deputy Adjutants General, Ezekiel Cornell of Rhode Island and Alexander Scammell of New Hampshire, turned down offers of New England additional regiments. Cornell chose to command his state's brigade of state troops, Scammell the 3d New Hampshire Regiment. Greater success came with the Connecticut portion of the program. Samuel Blatchley Webb, one of Washington's aides, raised a regiment there with support from the state government. Connecticut also combined with Rhode Island to raise the last of the New England regiments. Henry Sherburne of Rhode Island received that command as a reward for gallantry at The Cedars. Although the regiment took the field in 1777, it never organized all its companies. 18

State affiliation was less clear in the case of the five regiments Washington allocated to the middle states. In contrast to New England, where there was a large body of former Continentals to draw on, Washington selected officers in the middle states from among veterans of the summer's militia forces. Colonel William Malcolm of New York City received one regiment. General George Clinton and his brigade major Albert Pawling (who became the new regiment's major) raised four of its companies in the city. General Armstrong organized the other four in Pennsylvania. The regiment did not assemble as a unit until October. Two veteran New Jersey militia leaders, David Forman and Oliver Spencer, raised regiments

17. Ibid., 6: 433, 499-500; 7: 86-87, 136-40, 165-6. John Hancock was a former commander of the elite militia Cadets.
with New Jersey cadres. Forman's built on the preliminary work of Griffin, who declined command; Spencer's on Maxwell's efforts.¹⁹

The other two regiments recruited primarily in Pennsylvania, but drew from neighboring areas as well. On the recommendation of Richard Henry Lee, Washington gave command of one to Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Hartley of the 6th Pennsylvania Battalion. Acting Adjutant General Morgan Connor (the major of the 1st Continental Regiment) became lieutenant colonel when James Wilkinson, a Northern Department staff officer, declined. Like most of the commanders of the additional regiments, Hartley was allowed wide latitude in selecting his junior officers. Lieutenant Colonel John Patton of the Pennsylvania State Rifle Regiment, who had served with distinction at New York in 1776, was rewarded with the other regiment. Assistant Quartermaster General John Parke and Brigade Major Peter Scull became his field officers. ²⁰

Washington avoided criticism that he favored his native south by commissioning few officers in the additional regiments from that region. Since Georgia and the Carolinas were outside the sphere of his immediate command, he omitted them altogether, and Maryland's contribution to the extra regiments exempted it from the additions. Initially Washington allotted only two regiments to Virginia, both to close associates: his aide William Grayson and the noted frontiersman Nathaniel Gist. Grayson recruited in northern Virginia and nearby Maryland. Washington planned to use Gist's unit as a special light infantry regiment with four

companies of rangers from the southern frontier and up to 500 attached southern Indian scouts. The Indians also would serve as hostages for their tribes' good behavior. The Commander-in-Chief reluctantly added a third Virginia additional regiment two months later. Lord Stirling had grouped three volunteer Virginia companies into a provisional battalion under Captain Charles Mynn Thruston, a powerful political leader from the Shenandoah Valley. When they performed well in northern New Jersey, Washington told Thruston to recruit a regiment in north-western Virginia.\(^1\)

Washington never attempted to raise all sixteen additional regiments. He stopped short of the maximum Congress allowed because of serious recruiting problems. Although some of the additional regiments enjoyed more success than others, none could compete on an equal footing with regiments of the state lines.\(^2\) Congress itself secured the final additional regiment on 17 June 1777 when it approved North Carolina's offer to raise another regiment under Colonel Abraham Sheppard. Because at least 300 men had to report to Washington within a reasonable period under the terms of the authorization, the regiment soon disappeared through absorption.\(^3\)

The three artillery regiments authorized on 27 December, like the additionals, represented an expansion rather than the addition of a completely new element to the Army. Since the September quotas made no mention of artillery, Washington presumably was free to use one or two of the eighty-eight regiments for that purpose. During December, however,

\(^{22}\) Scammell to Frederick Steuben, 25 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Colonel Knox prepared a plan for as many as five artillery regiments to support every geographical region, not just the Main Army. On his own authority Washington ordered Knox to begin recruiting three regiments while he submitted a request for the additional number to Congress.24

The 1777 artillery regiment, like the infantry, followed the same general organization that prevailed in 1776. Congress did not change the allocation of staff or company officers and left the regiment divided into a dozen companies. It did make two changes. The number of field officers in a regiment dropped from five to three because the net increase allowed for flexibility to handle major detachments from the Main Army. The second change regrouped the enlisted men. A company now contained 6 sergeants, 6 corporals, 6 bombardiers, 6 gunners, and 28 matrosses. This arrangement provided balanced crews for up to six guns, plus a company ammunition section.

Knox began recruiting after the Trenton campaign. He left Major Thomas Proctor to support the Main Army with the Pennsylvania and New York state artillery companies plus Captain Sebastian Bauman's Continental company. This plan freed the officers of the 1776 regiment to begin recruiting two regiments around cadres of veterans. John Lamb, recently released from captivity, recruited in the area between Connecticut and Philadelphia. Nine of his companies organized in the spring: four in Connecticut, 3 in New York, and 2 in Pennsylvania. Three existing units rounded out the regiment: Captains Bauman's and Alexander Hamilton's companies (the latter now under John Doughty of New Jersey), plus the

original 1775 company reorganized under Isaiah Wool. John Crane, a native Bostonian, raised nine companies for his regiment in Massachusetts, where Ebenezer Stevens assembled three other companies for the Northern Department. Stevens never understood that technically he was part of Crane's regiment and believed throughout 1777 that he commanded a separate corps, including a company of artificers whom he recruited at Albany to perform maintenance.  

Washington and Knox intended to organize their third regiment around Proctor's Pennsylvanians, supplemented by companies from New Jersey and Maryland, making it in effect a Middle Department regiment. Pennsylvania undermined them by expanding its state artillery into a ten-company regiment under Proctor on 6 February 1777. The state did transfer the regiment to the Continental Army in the summer. The net effect of this sequence of events left Proctor's regiment with only ten companies instead of the twelve Knox intended. Two other regiments in the Southern Department provided the total of five Knox envisioned. One was the 4th South Carolina Regiment. The other Congress created on 26 November 1776 by expanding the two existing Virginia companies into a ten-company regiment under Colonel Charles Harrison.

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Knox's proposal also encompassed the special logistical requirements of his branch. He wanted Congress to create a supporting company of artificers, regroup the staff of the Commissary of Military Stores, and establish laboratories and a foundry so that the Army could produce its own cannon, ammunition, and related items. Until those facilities came into service, he and Washington recommended that Congress import weapons from Europe. Their goal was a mobile train of brass field pieces in proportions which corresponded to European concepts: 100 3-pounders, 50 6-pounders, and 50 12-pounders, plus a number of heavier 18- and 24-pounders for general support and siege needs.28

Congress located the foundry at Philadelphia and the laboratories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Both laboratories served throughout the war as ordnance depots for army operations in the northern half of the country. Knox personally supervised setting up the former. The somewhat larger Carlisle establishment came under Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Flower, formerly the commissary of military stores for the Flying Camp. Flower recruited two companies of ordnance technicians and repairmen who, unlike the hired artisans of earlier years, were soldiers. Captain Isaac Coren commanded a standard artillery company at Carlisle. The second company, led by a master carpenter, kept the Main Army's artillery park in working order.29

During the winter Knox and Washington addressed the problem of improving the mobility of the field artillery so that it could accompany

the infantry. In the Trenton campaign each infantry brigade drew support from a company of artillery with two to four guns. This successful concept remained a fixture of the Continental Army for the rest of the war. The brigade's company, preferably from the same state as the infantry, selected armament to fit its particular mission. The normal allocation in 1777 was two 6-pounders, although this weapon required the largest crew of any field piece. Other companies served in the artillery park, or general reserve, or manned heavy garrison artillery in fortifications. Doctrine specified that the artillerists concentrate their fire on enemy infantry. This placed a premium on rate of fire and maneuverability rather than range.30

Up until this time the Continental Army relied on three sources for its cannon: old guns already in the colonies, captured British weapons, and iron guns produced domestically. American craftsmen produced 30,000 tons of iron a year by 1775 and quickly turned to military production. Unfortunately, few available weapons from these sources met battlefield needs. Iron cannon and old British pieces in particular weighed so much that they could only be used in permanent fortifications. Washington counted on foreign imports and the new Philadelphia foundry to provide the lighter brass guns for direct support of the field armies.31

The imports came mostly from France. That nation, with some Spanish help, used the firm of Hortalez and Company as a channel for transmitting clandestine aid to the Americans. During the war the French government furnished over 200 artillery pieces, over 100,000 1763-model Charleville muskets, and other vital military supplies to the United States. The first significant shipment, one of several by Hortalez and Company, arrived at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in April, 1777. Knox judged the 23 French 4-pounders too cumbersome for American conditions and sent them to Springfield to be melted down and recast. The other cannon went directly to the Main Army.32

Continental Army artillerymen turned to a British tactical handbook when they cast their own guns, or when they remounted imports on improved carriages. John Muller's Treatise of Artillery first appeared in 1757 as a textbook for the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. The Americans published an edition at Philadelphia in 1779 specifically for the Continental Artillery. Actually, Muller's proposals proved more important to the Americans than to the British, who never gave them formal approval. Part of Muller's appeal came from his innovative ideas for mobile iron guns and part from his detailed instructions for casting and for constructing light carriages.33

The emphasis on mobility seen in the reorganization of the artillery extended as well in a third element added by the legislation adopted on 27 December. Unlike the additional infantry regiments and expanded artillery, 3,000 light dragoons represented a novel element in the Continental Army. While in Europe cavalry remained an offensive force which could win battles with a thundering charge, the nature of the terrain in America eliminated the need for such a heavy force during the colonial period, although troopers served as scouts or messengers. By the start of the Revolution a few colonies had regiments of mounted men, but they acted as mobile infantry rather than as true cavalry. The costs associated with maintaining a horse insured that such units included only the social elite.

During the middle of the century renewed European interest in reconnaissance and skirmishing led to a limited return of the light horseman. The British sent two regiments, the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons, to America. Each consisted of six troops, a titular colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant, a chaplain, and a surgeon. A troop initially contained a captain, a lieutenant, a cornet, a quartermaster, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals, 1 hautboy (drummer), and 38 privates. In the spring of 1776 each troop added another cornet, 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 30 privates. General Howe had the option of mounting the augmentation with local horses or using them as light infantry. One German cavalry regiment, the Brunswick Dragoon Regiment von Riedesel, served in Canada as infantry.34

34. Barrington to Gage, 31 Aug 1775; to Howe, 29 Jan 1776 and 16 Apr 1777; British Headquarters Papers, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, #27, 114, 491. Force, American Archives, 4th Ser., 6: 271-3. Riedesel's regiment had 4 troops, each with 3 officers and 75 men, plus a staff of 8 officers and 16 men.
The Continental Army's static operations in 1775 and early 1776 did not require a cavalry force, although Congress toyed with the idea several times. Even the Southern Department's ranger regiments served as mounted infantry rather than true cavalry. It was during the later phase of the New York campaign that Washington decided he needed horsemen for reconnaissance duty. The effectiveness of Major Elisha Sheldon's detachment of Connecticut mounted militia and the intimidation of some of the American infantry by the British dragoons prompted Washington to request permission to recruit Continental light horsemen.35

Congress' initial response came on 25 November 1776 when it called upon Virginia for the use of its six troops of light horse. Major Theodorlc Bland had raised them as state troops during the summer. Each troop contained 3 officers, 3 corporals, a drummer, a trumpeter, and 29 privates. The state transferred them to the Continental Army, and in March 1777 Bland reenlisted them as a Continental regiment.36 At Washington's suggestion Congress on 12 December 1776 also directed Sheldon to raise a Continental regiment of light dragoons. Washington gave Sheldon, and the other two regimental commanders, the same free hand in selecting junior officers that he accorded to the commanders of the additional infantry regiments. He interpreted the resolve of 27 December as including


On 14 March 1777 Congress approved a regimental organization for the light dragoons developed by Washington. It provided 3 field officers, a staff, and 6 troops for each regiment. Every troop contained 3 officers, 6 noncommissioned officers, a trumpeter, and 34 privates. One of the sergeants specialized in logistics while two of the privates drew higher pay for serving as armorer and farrier. The regimental staff, similar to an infantry regiment's, also contained a riding instructor and a saddler to keep leather gear in repair. Four supernumeraries were cadets undergoing training and served the colonel as messengers. The Continental light dragoon regiment specialized even more than the British regiment in reconnaissance missions. Its organization strengthened the ability of each troop to conduct independent operations, anticipating the need for dispersion during actual service.\footnote{Ibid., 12: 290. Hammond, Sullivan Papers, 1: 403. Ford, Journals of Congress, 7: 178-9; 9: 869. See Figure 7. Sheldon's regiment had a slightly different configuration from the other three until 5 Nov 1777.}

Washington believed that the light dragoons' mission was reconnaissance, not combat. Because of this he wanted only reliable, native-born recruits and inconspicuous horses. These high standards, special
CONTINENTAL LIGHT DRAGOON REGIMENT OF 1777

Regimental Staff
- 1 Chaplain
- 1 Riding Master
- 1 Surgeon
- 1 Surgeon's Mate
- 1 Quartermaster
- 1 Paymaster
- 1 Saddler
- 1 Trumpet Major
- 4 Adjutant
- 4 Supernumerary

Troop
- 1 Captain
- 1 Lieutenant
- 1 Cornet
- 1 Sergeant
- 4 Corporals
- 1 Trumpeter
- 1 Farrier
- 1 Assayer
- 32 Privates

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

a. Instructor in horsemanship.
b. Cadets undergoing training to become officers.
c. Variously designated as Drill Sergeant or Orderly Sergeant.
equipment, and long training periods all contributed to the lengthy period needed to complete the regiments. Moylan's regiment organized at Philadelphia specifically to have access to the Army's main supply center. The fact that three of the four regiments came from Virginia and Connecticut, the two colonies noted for raising horses in the eighteenth century, indicated the importance of supply factors in Washington's allocation of the regiments. 39

Congress created the additional infantry, artillery, and light dragoon regiments on 27 December 1776 at Washington's request. Tactical operations in late 1776 demonstrated the need for these units as the Main Army faced European-style open warfare for the first time. Unlike the regiments of the state lines, the new units organized directly under Continental authority. Washington carefully allocated them to recruiting areas where they complemented the state lines and used officers left out of the state lines as cadres. During the spring the line regiments and the newer units assembled at various rendezvous. Moulding them into a coordinated military machine which incorporated the lessons of the Trenton campaign became the major task of Washington and his generals.

Fielding the New Army.

While Washington formed the new regiments, the individual state governments reorganized their lines. Congress intended to have them conform for the first time to a single pattern. It also wanted them to make

maximum use of veterans. Particular attitudes and problems in some states, however, blocked compliance in every detail. In the spring the troops reported to various strategic locations to begin the 1777 campaign. There Washington and the department commanders marshalled them into brigades and divisions. During this period Congress and the military leaders also modified the Army's staff and support organizations to meet the needs of the larger force.

The deep south had the easiest time adjusting to the new quotas because regiments from that area remained at home as the Southern Department's combat force. Georgia did not reduce to the single regiment of the 16 September quota, but retained the one ranger and four infantry units authorized in 1776. Despite some losses as original enlistments expired, aggressive recruiting as far away as Pennsylvania brought all five regiments into the field.40 South Carolina kept its six regiments, converting the two rifle regiments to normal infantry and exchanging half of the 3d regiment's rifles for muskets. The 4th remained an artillery regiment, and absorbed the separate artillery companies.41

North Carolina and Virginia transferred their regiments to the Main Army, following a trend started in 1776. Since the current enlistments of the six North Carolina and nine Virginia regiments lasted until 1778

they only had to recall detachments serving in South Carolina before departing. Although North Carolina thought its new quota was unrealistically high, it went ahead and raised three new regiments. The result was that when the nine arrived in Philadelphia in early July, they contained only 131 officers and 963 enlisted men instead of the 7,000 called for on paper. Virginia added six new regiments, two of which had veteran cadres. Daniel Morgan built his 11th Virginia Regiment around the survivors of his 1775 rifle company plus the five Virginia companies of the Maryland and Virginia Rifle Regiment. The state frontier companies reenlisted as Continentals as part of the 12th. Virginia retained its ten-company regimental formation for all fifteen regiments and also recruited men only for a three-year term, not for the duration as Congress preferred. The effort to recruit these regiments, two separate Continental companies for the frontier, and three regiments of state troops exhausted Virginia's manpower resources.

The middle states faced different problems, for existing units were on duty outside their home states and under enlistments which expired at the start of the year or shortly thereafter. The states turned to legislative liaison committees to prepare new arrangements which retained the 1776 regiments and added new ones as necessary. The new regiments depended on veterans from the militia or state troops, particularly the

Flying Camp, for their cadres. This expedient caused some turmoil because of arguments over rank, but it allowed all of the 1777 regiments to start with experienced nuclei.

Delaware's reorganization consisted of filling vacancies in its single regiment and reenlisting the men. Maryland's problems were more complex. The state argued that its quota was unrealistically high and made an effort to raise just seven regiments. The original 1776 regiment and attached companies regrouped respectively as the 1st and 2d Maryland Regiments. The four Flying Camp regiments furnished cadres for the 4th through 7th. The 3d assembled its officers from a variety of sources.

Officers from New Jersey and Pennsylvania readily remained in service, but the problems caused by regiments remaining in the Ticonderoga winter garrison slowed reorganization for both states. New Jersey refilled its three regiments and added a fourth from militia veterans. To relieve the Continental officers from combat duties while the reorganization took place it formed four temporary state battalions during the winter. The 1st Continental Regiment, six Pennsylvania Battalions, and Mackey's frontier regiment became the 1st through 8th Pennsylvania Regiments. Three new regiments joined them, with the 9th and 10th drawing

experienced officers from the two state troops regiments organized in 1776. The 11th was completely new. Cook's frontier regiment, which was just starting to recruit, expanded to eight companies as the 12th. The two state regiments consolidated into a single ten-company regiment since the men's enlistments did not expire until 1778. On 10 June 1777 it transferred to the Continental Army as the 13th Pennsylvania Regiment. New York and New England units had already served for two full campaigns, more than the units from the southern or middle states. Casualties, normal attrition, and lower quotas made their reorganization more comprehensive. New York reduced its line from seven to five regiments. The loss of Manhattan and Long Island led the state to disband the old 1st New York Regiment, consolidate the two regiments from the Albany area, and renumber the line regiments to reflect their commanders' relative seniority. Nicholson's Regiment disbanded, but Dubois' became the nucleus for the new 3d under Peter Gansevoort. Colonel Dubois himself raised a new 5th New York Regiment when Congress authorized a higher quota for the state on 30 November 1776.


Connecticut's quota remained eight regiments, but the legislature sought the best possible officers regardless of the nature of their prior service and broke up all existing units. The officers retained then recruited according to a new geographical arrangement. Although the state offered extra land grants to stimulate enlistments, it could not obtain substantial numbers of men until April. Rhode Island dropped from four regiments to two by employing the same device used during the previous year's reduction. The 9th and 11th Continental Regiments became, through reenlistment, the 1st and 2d Rhode Island Regiments with the best officers from the disbanded regiments filling vacancies. A brigade of state troops competed for recruits, but compensated by helping to contain the British forces in Newport. New Hampshire used its three Continental Regiments as cadres in the same manner as Rhode Island.

Massachusetts' quota of fifteen regiments reduced by two the number in service during 1776. One legislative committee directed the formation of seven regiments from men on duty at New York, trying to preserve unit continuity, while a second went to Ticonderoga to arrange five more in

the same manner. Three others were organized within the state. Generals Heath, Ward, and Gates provided advice to the committees. When recruiting tapered off the legislature first proposed offering additional pay, but the idea was rejected by Congress. The legislature then turned to a limited draft in April. The state's efforts raised 7,816 men, mostly for the line regiments, by early July. The average number of recruits for each regiment was 470, with four surpassing the 600-man level and only four falling below 400. 53

The reorganized regiments assembled in three primary locations in the spring of 1777. Ticonderoga and Peekskill (in the Hudson Highlands) had obvious strategic importance. Troops at those points protected important fortifications and denied the Hudson River to the British. Morristown, Washington's headquarters, served as the other rendezvous because it protected Philadelphia from an overland advance from New York City. Once the regiments reached these objectives Washington and the commanders of the Northern and Highlands Departments assembled them into brigades and divisions, the primary formations used in 1777 to maneuver the Continental Army.

Washington in January planned for a brigade to have three full infantry regiments (over 2,200 men) and a company of artillery, and for a division to have three brigades. When he asked Congress to appoint additional general officers to command these formations, he also requested three lieutenant generals to act as senior commanders. Many delegates

considered the new rank a threat to republican virtue, and Congress rejected the idea. It did appoint 6 new major and 14 brigadier generals, but only after considerable political maneuvering on the part of delegates advancing the careers of individuals.\textsuperscript{54}

The Main Army drew most of its resources from the middle states, plus the regiments transferred from the Southern Department. Although many of the regiments reported to headquarters in company-sized detachments over a period of months and others still had not appeared, enough men were on hand by mid-May to allow the Commander-in-Chief to proceed with revised plans. Thirty-eight infantry regiments from Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey plus various detachments accounted for that time for 673 officers, 708 sergeants, 241 drummers and fifers, and 8,378 rank and file. Only about a third of the regiments were over half strength. Washington adjusted to this problem, as well as a shortage of generals, by establishing ten permanent brigades between 11 and 22 May. Each contained 4 or 5 regiments, from the same state where possible, and an artillery company. The arrangement established four Virginia, three Pennsylvania, one New Jersey, and two Maryland Brigades. Two brigades formed a division.\textsuperscript{55} The brigade staff consisted of an aide, a brigade major, a brigade quartermaster, and a chaplain (who replaced the regimental chaplains). The division staff included the


\textsuperscript{55} Weekly Return, Main Army, 21 May 1777; Record Group 93, National Archives. Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, 7: 236, 278-9, 396-7, 447-8, 451-2; 8: 40-41, 49-50, 88-89, 97-101, 170-2; 9: 103-4, 149.
major general's aides, a quartermaster officer, and a conductor of military stores who repaired small arms and prepared ammunition. 56

Although reflecting an acute shortage of troops, this formation allowed Washington great flexibility. During the summer divisions shifted along the main roads between Morristown and Philadelphia as the British appeared to threaten either the Hudson Highlands or the Delaware Bay. In a detached role Washington expected a division to harass the enemy advance and buy time for the rest of the army to concentrate. 57

In battle he deployed the Main Army in a double line. The First Line consisted of two or more divisions abreast. The Second Line deployed to the rear and provided depth to absorb shock. The Left Wing and the Right Wing each contained portions of both lines and were used to allow an intermediate level of command between Washington and the divisions.

By December 1777 the Order of Battle approached European complexity. Ten brigades deployed in the First Line and six in the Second. One additional brigade was held in general reserve. Each wing also used two light dragoon regiments and supporting separate infantry formations, both militia and Continentals, for flank security or skirmishing. 58

Improved arms and training reinforced the advantages inherent in the new tactical organization. The 1763 model French Army musket, known colloquially as the "Charleville," became the Continental Army's standard

infantry weapon. This .69 caliber smoothbore, firing a 1-ounce ball, had greater range and was more durable, reliable, and accurate than the English "Brown Bess." It was an ideal weapon for the Continentals since their infantry organization placed a premium on musketry rather than shock action. Training stressed battlefield maneuvers rather than the manual of arms. New standing regulations introduced during the summer improved marching, the baggage train, and guard duty, all vital to maneuverability.

Under Washington's guidance the Highlands and Northern Departments instituted divisions and brigades to take advantage of the improved musket and training. These organizations also facilitated the movement of reserves from one area to another. At first Washington intended to send the Massachusetts and New Hampshire regiments to the Northern Department and use New York, Connecticut, and Rhode Island units to garrison the Highlands. Since New England was in no immediate danger, the Eastern Department needed only three Massachusetts additional regiments to stiffen available militia and state troops. But recruiting and various emergency problems gradually altered that neat plan.


By mid-May, with units still arriving, the Highlands Department had 3 New York, 8 Connecticut, and 6 Massachusetts infantry regiments plus Webb's Additional Regiment and the leading detachments of Rhode Islanders. The Continentals included 156 officers, 197 sergeants, 94 drummers and fifers, and 2,502 rank and file. Strength continued to mount, allowing Israel Putnam to institute brigades shortly after he assumed command of the department in early June. By 5 August, despite numerous transfers of units to the Main Army and Northern Department, he had two divisions, each with two brigades. Schuyler's Northern Department finally wound up with four brigades from Massachusetts and one from New Hampshire. It did not need a divisional organization as long as the troops were tied to the defense of Ticonderoga.62

The new tactical organization of the field armies required more administrative and support organization to gain full value. It made the Adjutant General more important as the chief administrative officer, but Joseph Reed resigned the post at the start of the year. Washington limped along with temporary appointments until he persuaded Colonel Timothy Pickering of the Massachusetts militia to accept the assignment. His hard work restored order to the strength reporting system by the fall. An expansion of the mustering department made Pickering's job easier. It provided a deputy mustermaster for each territorial department and

enough subordinate officials to muster every unit once a month. The cross-checks established by this system and the program of preparing weekly and monthly returns separately eventually gave Washington and Congress reliable and timely data for strategic planning.

Washington also had to reorganize his personal staff to handle the increased correspondence and messenger requirements. He conducted a search for influential young men with secretarial skills and a willingness to work to replace the aides who took positions in the additional regiments and dragoons. The search was successful, adding such talented individuals as Alexander Hamilton, Richard Kidder Meade, and John Laurens to the household during 1777.

Washington also used the new office of Commissary General of Prisoners, created on 27 December 1776, to relieve part of the headquarters burden. Its nominal function related to the care of enemy prisoners and of Americans held captive by the British. Under Elias Boudinot it coordinated intelligence activities as well.

Logistical and medical staff departments all reorganized during 1777 for greater efficiency and better support of the field armies. The Commissary Department split into specialized purchasing and issuing departments. The Quartermaster Department regrouped its personnel into sections to handle transportation, quarters, forage, and baking. A new section, the Clothier General's Department and associated Commissary of Hides,

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handled the responsibilities arising from Congress' decision to directly clothe the troops. The hides department converted raw hides left over from the cattle consumed by the Army into needed leather products. 66

Resumption of British offensive operations in the summer tested the new arrangement of departments, divisions, and brigades, and the enlarged staff. As expected, the first blow fell on the Northern Department. General John Burgoyne's British and German regulars quickly reduced Ticonderoga, although General Arthur St. Clair was able to evacuate the garrison. Schuyler's systematic destruction of the roads leading south from the lakes broke down Burgoyne's already insufficient transport organization and bought the Northern Department time to regroup and draw reinforcements from the south. Schuyler set plans in motion which led to later defeats of British detachments in the Mohawk Valley and at Bennington.

The fall of Ticonderoga had a more important political impact than a military one. The more radical delegates in Congress distrusted Schuyler and had made one effort to unseat him in 1776, and a second in May 1777. Both failed because Schuyler's military reputation was strong enough to win support from most of the more conservative southern and central states' delegates. But when Ticonderoga was lost, Schuyler's reputation went with it. Congress recalled him on 31 July, and appointed Gates as his replacement four days later. Although there were personal and sectional factors at play in this incident, there was a compelling undercurrent of ideology at work, too. The Army's requests had been met

during the winter by Congress without significant opposition. The dele-
gates who had formerly favored a military reliance on militia or short-
term troops conceded to advocates of a standing army only because re-
sults were promised. When disaster struck they counterattacked. Gates' 
supporters were finally able to topple Schuyler by arguing that the only 
significant reinforcements the Northern Department could receive would 
be New England militiamen, who would serve under Gates but not under 
Schuyler.

In fact, however, several brigades of Continentals moved north from 
the Highlands Department and one vital unit hurried up from the Main 
Army. This unit was a provisional rifle corps which Washington organized 
under Colonel Morgan on 13 June. The men, primarily Virginians and Penn-
sylvania, were selected for their marksmanship and their skirmishing 
skills. Like Knowlton's 1776 rangers, the corps acted with the Main Army 
as a picked body of light infantry. In the north Morgan worked with a 
provisional light infantry detachment under Major Henry Dearborn which 
Schuyler had organized before his relief. Together they quickly intimi-
dated Burgoyne's Indians and left the British without reconnaissance 
forces. 68

Gates went on to inflict two defeats on Burgoyne, cut him off from 
Ticonderoga, and force him to surrender on 17 October. Saratoga was

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590, 596, 604. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 2: 209-12, 336-7, 351-2, 
Horatio Gates: A Biography (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University 
68. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 156, 236-7, 246; 9: 70-71, 
78. Lloyd A. Brown and Howard H. Peckham, eds., Revolutionary War Jour-
unquestionably a smashing victory, bagging nearly 6,000 enemy soldiers and massive quantities of stores and arms. Militia had turned out to serve under Gates, swelling the Northern Department forces to 1,698 officers and 20,652 men by the time of the surrender, not including various artificers, batteauxmen, and the 700-odd riflemen. That total is misleading since most of the actual combat was carried out by the much smaller contingent of Continentals. Less than a third of the department's forces were regulars: 15 Massachusetts, 1 Canadian, 3 New Hampshire, and 2 New York regiments plus detachments of cavalry, artillery, and riflemen. Only five of the thirteen brigades were Continental, and three of them had militia regiments attached. The total Continental infantry contingent amounted to 52 field, 457 company, and 72 staff officers, 526 sergeants, 262 drummers and fifers, and 7,644 rank and file. Only some 5,000 were combat effectives.69

Part of Gates' strength had come from the Hudson Highlands, which also sent three brigades to the Main Army. By October Putnam had only General Parsons' 1st Connecticut Brigade as a field force and the 5th New York Regiment and part of Lamb's artillery as fort garrisons. General Sir Henry Clinton took advantage of this weakness and captured the main forts on 6 October, after a hard fight. The defeat did not have a

69. Various returns located in the Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society, must be consulted to determine the exact breakdown of his strength by component. These include: General Return, Northern Department, 16 Oct 1777; State of the Army at Saratoga, 17 Oct 1777; Return of Continental Troops at Van Schaick's Island, 7 Sep 1777; and Brigade Returns for Paterson's, Nixon's, and Shepard's /Glover's/ Brigades, 25-26 Oct 1777. Very important to the correct interpretation of the returns is Deputy Mustermaster General Richard Varick's 10 Sep 1777 report on the inspections and musters he had just completed also in the Gates Papers.
permanent effect on the Continental Army because Clinton returned to New York City when he learned of Burgoyne's surrender.  

Washington's Main Army also suffered defeat during the 1777 campaign. Howe decided to attack Philadelphia from the rear and landed after a long sea voyage at Head of Elk, Maryland. A provisional light infantry force organized by Washington to replace the rifle corps harassed Howe's advance, but could not stop it. Washington stood and fought at Brandywine on 11 September but was outflanked by Howe. Washington prevented a catastrophe by shifting units from his unengaged flank and withdrew under the cover of an aggressive rear-guard action. Execution of this difficult maneuver impressed the professional German officers serving with Howe, but it did not prevent the loss of Philadelphia on 26 September.

On the night of 3-4 October the Continentals counterattacked. Because Howe had gradually fragmented his army in an effort to hold open communications to the fleet in the lower Delaware River, Washington devised an intricate plan similar to the one he used at Trenton to strike an encampment at Germantown. Excellent march discipline and intelligence allowed the leading brigades to overrun the 2d Battalion of Light Infantry and drive back other units. One astonished German officer saw

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70. Wright, "Too Little, Too Late," pp. 73-88. Transcript of the Court of Inquiry into Putnam's Conduct, 5 Apr 1778; McDougall Papers, New-York Historical Society.
"something I had never seen before, namely the English in full flight."  
When confusion and the staunch British defense of the stone Chew House robbed the attack of some of its momentum, Washington withdrew. Howe spent the next month and a half clearing the defenders out of the fortifications along the Delaware below Philadelphia.

By early November the Main Army contained a dozen Continental brigades plus a smattering of militia. Its combined infantry strength came to 1,167 officers and 15,927 men, about half of the Continental Army's total force. Officers included 82 of field grade, 865 of company grade, and 220 on regimental staffs. Sergeants accounted for 1,009 of the enlisted men and fifers and drummers another 523, leaving 14,395 rank and file. About 4,500 were sick and another 2,100 on command, mostly in the river forts or related duties. Washington's actual combat strength was probably about 10,000 men, too few to continue an active campaign.

After calling for reinforcements from Gates, he went into winter quarters at Valley Forge on 20 December.

Summary.

The Continentals camped at Valley Forge in December 1777 superficially resembled the men who retreated through New Jersey a year earlier. Both armies looked back on months of defeats and hardships. The differences held greater significance. As permanent bodies, the regiments of

74. Weekly Return, Main Army, 3 Nov 1777; Record Group 93, National Archives.
1777 did not have to undergo another dangerous reorganization. Accumu­lated experience enabled the Army to incorporate lessons from the Trenton campaign, and Washington could anticipate further improvement following 1777's actions.

The army of 1777 began to move away from a traditional colonial force and resemble the balanced combined arms organization of many European armies, although it still lacked sophistication. It clearly was more mobile in 1777 than in 1776. The permanent brigades represented the single most important innovation, enabling Washington partially to offset British control of the sea by shifting reserves from one department to another. Lack of resources or errors in generalship caused most of the defeats in 1777, not a lack of fighting ability on the part of individual regiments. Basic organization appeared to be sound, although training and doctrine continued to lag.

Washington anticipated a rosier future on Christmas Day 1777 than he had a year earlier. He knew that his army could fight, and even beat, the British under favorable conditions. One of his remaining problems was to insure that it won consistently. The other was more complicated. Congress voted a large standing army with some 119 regiments. It should have contained over 90,000 men, but fell far short. Yet Congress expected him to produce results with that force. Beginning in 1778 Washington's problems related to preserving and filling the army rather than expanding it. The arena for that struggle was in Congress.
CHAPTER VI

PROFESSIONALISM: NEW INFLUENCES FROM EUROPE

The winter encampment at Valley Forge played an extremely important role in the history of the Continental Army. Congress and the Army's leaders used their first winter without problems of rebuilding to review the campaign of 1777. Two very different points of view emerged. One group believed that the Army should improve its battlefield performance by returning to the earlier model drawn from two centuries of Anglo-American experience. The other sought inspiration from European, particularly French, professional soldiers and military writers. The struggle between the groups for political domination reached a brief but intense peak during the first months of 1778. Neither side won clear predominance, but over the next year and a half Washington secured adoption of many reforms based on new European ideas. This period witnessed the gradual transformation of the Continental Army into a professional eighteenth-century fighting force.

Valley Forge.

Congress approved an army to serve for the duration of the war in September 1776. It accepted a major departure from American tradition without serious opposition because military commanders insisted that victory could be won only if they had such a force. Three months later the delegates increased the size of the Army for the same reason. They
expected the permanent army to produce results. During 1777 the Main Army lost most of its battles, but Gates won a smashing victory with the assistance of large militia forces. Policy debates during the winter involved two basic interpretations of the lessons of the 1777 campaign.

One group of delegates, supported by some army leaders, remained committed to the militant republican attitudes of 1775. They remained suspicious of a standing army and believed that victory could only come from a total commitment on the part of the population. Saratoga appeared to be a proof of their assumption. During the 1777-1778 winter they argued for a program which marked a return to the concepts of the 1776 campaign: a small Continental Army resembling the colonial Provincials, supplemented for major battles by a large militia force. Washington, most of the senior officers, and another group of delegates followed a more cautious and pragmatic course. They believed that the transformation begun during 1777 was correct, that the Continentals had fought well at Brandywine, Germantown, and Saratoga. Their program called for further improvements. Neither faction won a complete endorsement for its position.¹ The central issues of the winter debate related to the overall direction of military affairs, professionalization of the officer corps, and the size of the Army.

The policy debate began with the Board of War. The original Board, a standing committee of Congress, simply could not cope with the volume of business and as early as April 1777 recommended redefinition of the Board as a permanent administrative body. The delegates approved a version of that concept on 17 October 1777 which called for three permanent members and a clerical staff. In addition to the administrative functions of the Congressional committee the Board became responsible for supervising recruiting, prisoners, and weapons production. It also became the sole official channel for Congress' dealings with the Army and the states on military matters. On 7 November Congress named Quartermaster General Thomas Mifflin, Adjutant General Timothy Pickering, and Robert H. Harrison, Washington's Military Secretary, as the members. Harrison promptly declined.2

Mifflin reported first and immediately took an active role. His early influence derived in part from the fact that one of the Board's first tasks involved reorganizing the Quartermaster Department. He persuaded Congress to expand the Board to five members on 24 November and recommended Horatio Gates and Richard Peters (the secretary of the old Board) for the new vacancies. Congress appointed both and replaced Harrison with former Commissary General Joseph Trumbull. At Mifflin's suggestion it also named Gates as President of the Board and allowed him to retain his rank and right to field command. In a sense the appointments

reflected a desire to select individuals with expertise in specific staff areas. On the other hand, all five members came out of the militant political tradition of the early 1770's.3

Gates took up his new duties in January 1778. He arrived in York, Pennsylvania, with glowing praise for his Saratoga triumph still flowing from various delegates and army officers. He also knew that Congress had initiated investigations into the losses of the forts in the Highlands and along the Delaware River and had openly criticized Washington for not confiscating supplies from Pennsylvania civilians to keep them out of enemy hands.4 Pushed by Mifflin, some of the delegates, and a handful of other disgruntled officers, Gates attempted to convert the Board of War into an agency to control military operations.

Colonel Moses Hazen suggested to Gates in October 1777 a method for capitalizing on the Saratoga victory. A small force could attack Montreal in the winter when ice neutralized British warships on Lake Champlain and complete the conquest of Canada in the spring with reinforcements. Brigadier General John Stark independently convinced Congress to approve a small raid by militia volunteers on the St. John’s naval base. Gates, working through the Board, convinced Congress in January to expand the raid into an "irruption" into Canada along Hazen’s lines. The Board assumed complete control over the operation. At Gates’ suggestion

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Congress named Major General the Marquis de Lafayette as the expedition's commander, assisted by Major General Thomas Conway, Stark, and Hazen.  

Conway, an Irish veteran of the French Army, became openly critical of Washington during the late fall. On 13 December 1777 Congress promoted him, over a number of senior brigadier generals, to the rank of major general and named him inspector general. Conway planned to make that new office a field agent of the Board, but Washington effectively froze him out of any role within the Main Army. Gates then selected him for the Canadian expedition, assuming that he would be the real commander. Lafayette was expected to be a figurehead. Lafayette had a limited military background but was definitely not a political novice. He refused to participate in an activity which undermined Washington's authority as Commander-in-Chief. He objected to Conway and insisted that orders for the expedition pass through Washington rather than through the Board. He even threatened to return to the French court if these demands were not met. This strong support for Washington brought the project to an end and Congress cancelled the invasion on 2 March.

The demise of the "irruption" and Congressional airing of Conway's criticism of Washington ended the challenge to Washington's leadership of the Army. Conway was ostracised, and when he submitted his resignation in a ploy to regain stature Congress quickly accepted it. Gates, realizing that a majority in Congress would not reduce the Commander-in-Chief's role, abandoned the Presidency of the Board to return to a field command in the north. Mifflin, in turn, was pressured into resigning on 17 August 1778, and the Board of War reverted to a purely administrative role. These decisions solidified Washington's authority as the single voice of the Army on matters of military policy. Apart from political considerations, if Gates' Board had developed in the manner he and Mifflin intended, it would have served as a vehicle for returning the Continental Army to the relatively small cadre of 1776 and would have effectively increased the role of the militia in combat situations. Washington, on the other hand, continued to work for a Continental Army which carried out the basic combat function of the Revolution with limited outside help, a policy implicit in the resolve of 16 September 1776.

Washington's first effort to advance his ideas centered on professionalizing the officer corps. In the British Army, and most of its European counterparts, an officer who wished to leave the army could sell

his commission (under government supervision) and use the proceeds as
retirement income. Officers involuntarily separated in peacetime re-
ductions remained in a form of reserve status and drew half of their
normal pay. Washington and his senior advisors believed that the Con-
tinental Army needed a similar program to attract able officers and ade-
quately compensate them for inflation and economic loss. During the
1777-1778 winter financial problems forced many officers to leave the
service. Unfortunately, politicians with ideological objections to
standing armies distrusted any measures such as half-pay which would
create, as James Lovell put it, "a set of haughty idle imperious Scan-
dalizers of industrious Citizens and Farmers."9

On 10 January 1778 Congress decided to send a "Committee of Con-
ference" to Valley Forge to discuss this issue and other matters rela-
ting to efficiency and economy in the Army. The committee's proponents
wanted it to consist of members of the Board of War as well as delegates.
But when the tide of Congressional opinion turned against the Board,
participation in the committee was limited to delegates, led by Francis
Dana and Gouverneur Morris. Although the members nominally represented
a cross-section of opinion, they were in reality pragmatists open to
Washington's ideas.10 During the extensive discussions with Washington

3: 34, 153-6; Greene to McDougall, 25 Jan 1778; McDougall Papers, New-
York Historical Society; Henderson, Party Politics, pp. 102-4, 120-4;
tics, pp. 120-1. Dana and Nathaniel Folsom were New Englanders but not
from the militant core of that region's delegations; Joseph Reed was a
pragmatist whose military service with Washington had weakened his ties
to the militants; and Morris and Charles Carroll were established sup-
porters of Washington. The Board representatives were to have been Gates,
Mifflin, and Pickering.
and his advisors from 28 January to 12 March, the committee gradually turned to formulating policy by preparing recommendations for numerous reforms. It filled the role Mifflin and Gates intended for the Board of War, but with one major difference: it echoed Washington's positions. Congress rejected some of its suggestions, including the peacetime sale of commissions and half-pay. Intense lobbying by Washington and the committee did secure a compromise on the latter point. On 15 May 1778 Congress promised that officers serving to the end of the war would receive seven years of half pay to ease the transition to civilian life while enlisted men would receive a lump sum of eighty dollars.  

The committee's second major objective was to reconcile the extensive army approved in the 1776 resolves with the reality of the 1777 campaign. Most regiments started 1777 below full strength. Subsequent rank and file losses forced Washington to issue muskets to sergeants and junior officers to compensate. In spite of shortcomings in the number of enlisted men, most regiments contained nearly full complements of officers, and Washington hoped to procure enough replacements to fill every unit. Since Congress lacked the legal power to enact a draft, which was the only practical way to obtain as many men as Washington needed, the committee received instructions to look for ways to consolidate units, trim surplus officers, and reduce quotas to realistic levels.


By the start of February 1778 the committee found that the Main Army contained the majority of the Continentals. Georgia and South Carolina units and Harrison's Artillery Regiment served in the south, and the equivalent of three brigades remained in the Highlands and Northern Departments. All of the other regiments, a force which should have exceeded 60,000 men, were either at Valley Forge or its outposts. The infantrymen in the fifteen brigades at Valley Forge accounted for 990 officers, 931 sergeants, 642 drummers and fifers, and 17,491 rank and file. Only 7,600 rank and file remained completely fit for duty, and a third of them were on detachments. Almost 5,000 were sick, 1,100 on furlough, and 3,700 who were healthy lacked either shoes or clothes and could not be used in combat. The portions of three artillery regiments at Valley Forge contained 117 officers and 810 men; the four regiments of light dragoons at Trenton another 70 officers and 438 men. The committee faced a situation in which the Main Army had only about a third of its authorized strength.

The press of other business prevented Congress from implementing substantive reforms before the start of the 1778 campaign. On 26 February, on the advice of the committee, it did recommend that the states institute a comprehensive recruiting organization and a system of nine-month drafts to fill quotas. It also reduced Rhode Island's quota for the campaign to a single full regiment and Pennsylvania's to ten regiments.

More lasting legislation came in May and involved basic revisions of the organization for the various types of regiments. The economy-directed

13. General Return, Main Army, 9 Feb 1778; Record Group 93, National Archives. It does not include two brigades wintering at Wilmington.
resolve of 27 May 1778 reduced the maximum size of most regiments to levels easier to fill and particularly cut the number of officers in each. Washington, satisfied with the old structure, had hoped to avoid these changes. On the other hand, the resolve created two new types of units specifically requested by the Commander-in-Chief.15

The basic change came in the infantry regiment. After first rejecting a radically different organizational model suggested by Major General Charles Lee,16 Congress adopted a structure which moved back towards the British regiment. Each regiment gained a ninth company as a permanent light infantry company, but reduced the total number of officers from 40 to 29 and enlisted strength from 692 to 553.17 Through attrition each regiment would eliminate its colonel leaving only two field officers. This structure also simplified prisoner of war exchanges since a British colonel was not a combat officer. The other major reduction came in the staff where the adjutant, quartermaster, and paymaster ceased to be separate positions. Subalterns from line companies assumed the duties of the former two offices as additional tasks, while one of the captains, elected by the unit officers, doubled as paymaster. All three received extra compensation.

Within each company one lieutenant was eliminated, and several captains in the regiment lost their positions as the field officers, like

17. See Figure 8.
FIGURE 8
CONTINENTAL INFANTRY REGIMENT OF 27 MAY 1778

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Paymaster
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major

Light Infantry Company
1 Captain
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
53 Privates

Field Officer's Company
1 Field Officer
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
53 Privates

Line Company
1 Captain
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign
3 Sergeants
3 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
53 Privates

3 (2)
5 (6)

a. Or just a lieutenant colonel commandant.
b. Additional duty of a company officer.
c. The lieutenant of the colonel's company was designated as a captain-lieutenant.
d. Five line companies in those regiments having three field officers; six line companies in those with only two field officers.
their British counterparts, assumed command of companies. If the regiment still had a colonel, the senior lieutenant, as captain-lieutenant, exercised practical control over his company. Each company also lost a sergeant and a corporal from the organization approved in 1776, paralleling the reduction in officers. The number of privates was cut by a third, from 76 to 53. Rank and file strength, the true power of the company, fell from 80 to 56. A regiment now deployed for combat, if it retained its light company, with a bayonet strength of 504 out of a total of 582. If, as was normally the case, the light company was detached, the strength dropped to 448, roughly on a par with a British regiment.

Congress created a regiment which cost $270 per month less than the 1776 regiment in salaries alone, but which was only 70 percent as strong. Its combat efficiency was even lower since two or three companies had only two officers and the reduced staff no longer furnished a pool of spare officers to replace casualties in combat. Except for the creation of the permanent light infantry company the new regiment was inferior to the old one on paper as a battlefield force. Congress viewed the changes as important from a financial point of view, and also as an acceptable compromise with the reality of the recruiting levels experienced during 1777. Washington knew the theoretical advantages, particularly in the area of tactical control, of the old structure, but he also recognized the importance of reaching an agreement with Congress on the nature of the army which the nation would support. He accepted Congress' decisions on regimental structure although he remained opposed to that body's insistence on using line officers for staff duties outside the regiment, another new departure in the May resolve.
The artillery regiment underwent less change. It gained a third second lieutenant for each company, but lost the spare staff officers in a change which paralleled the transformation of the infantry regiment's staff. Similar staff reductions took place in the light dragoon regiment. Unlike the infantry, however, the cavalry structure was expanded. Each troop added a second lieutenant, 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, and 22 privates. The four regimental supernumaries and the troop armorer were eliminated. A new troop called for 4 officers and 64 enlisted men, nearly double the 1777 size. The new regiment required 29 officers and 386 men. This increase brought the ratio of officers to enlisted men in the mounted arm into a more economical arrangement in Congress' eyes.

Although implementation of the new organization was a gradual process, the 27 May 1778 resolve completed Congress' direct role at Valley Forge. The delegates began the winter with the contrast between Saratoga and Washington's loss of Philadelphia fresh in their minds. One group believed that Gates' success was due to a combination of Continentals and militia. Their program, which initially won majority support, amounted to a return to the policies of 1776. They expanded the role of the Board of War and filled it with military men who supported their position, planning to use the Board as an instrument of change. Washington stood off that challenge to his leadership, but lost his own battle for permanent half-pay and the sale of commissions. A majority in Congress also overruled Washington's mild objections to a reduction in the size of the authorized Army. The 27 May 1778 resolve reflected the delegates' return

18. See Figure 9.
CONTINENTAL LIGHT DRAGOON REGIMENT OF 27 MAY 1778

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Paymaster
1 Riding Master
1 Saddler
1 Trumpet Major

Troop
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Cornet
2 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Corporals
1 Farrier
1 Trumpeter
54 Privates

a. Additional duty of a company officer.
to a British model for infantry regiments. On the other hand, Washington's influence with the committee at Valley Forge limited the change in the artillery and actually strengthened the cavalry. The resolve also added two new types of units which Washington requested as part of his effort to recast the Army on a French model.

Foreign Advisers.

Washington, too, spent the winter at Valley Forge considering the lessons of the 1777 campaign. He decided that the Continentals needed to adopt many characteristics of European military organization to improve on their past performance. Personal experience and his reading of military textbooks played a role in this decision, but expert advice from a number of foreign volunteers was almost as influential. The first impact of this new concept came in the form of a dramatic improvement in the Army's engineering efforts. It was also reflected in its mounted arm and in the creation of a variety of special units.

Established tradition in Europe allowed officers to serve in the armies of other nations to win glory, gain promotions, and taste adventure. In 1776 a number of individuals came to America for these reasons. Many claimed to have technical expertise and made exorbitant demands for high rank, but turned out to be frauds. Congress' hopes that Germans could recruit in the German-American community and that Frenchmen could attract Canadians proved groundless. Since most of the early officer volunteers were not fluent in English they could not be assigned to line units. Particularly incompetent performances came from two men who served as brigadier generals in the Northern Department in 1776: Frederick
William de Woedtke, a former Prussian officer, and a Frenchman, Matthias-Alexis, the Chevalier de La Rochefermoy.\(^{19}\)

Congress brought about a subtle change in the quality of the volunteers when it dispatched Silas Deane to France in the summer of 1776. Deane and his fellow diplomats secured the services of three groups of professional soldiers. On the advice of Caron de Beaumarchais of Hortalez and Company and General Jean Baptiste de Gribeauval (the century's leading artillery expert) Deane contracted with Philip Charles Jean Baptiste Tronson du Coudray to organize and lead the first of these groups. Coudray, despite extravagant claims, was a minor military theorist and protege of Gribeauval whose French rank was equivalent to an artillery major. Deane granted him a contract which promised virtually a free hand in artillery and engineering operations, the rank of major general, and the title of General of Artillery and Ordnance. Coudray's group arrived in America in the late spring of 1777 and proved to be rather undistinguished. Congress commissioned two members, Conway and Philippe-Hubert, the Chevalier de Freudhomme de Borre, brigadier generals. It finessed the storm of protest which arose when the Army thought that Coudray might replace Knox by commissioning the Frenchman as Inspector General of Ordnance and Military Manufactories rather than General of Artillery and Ordnance. Coudray's death in the fall in an

\(^{19}\) Idzerda, *Lafayette*, 1: 68-87. Chevalier Dubuisson des Hayes later commented that the first volunteers were "officers who are deeply in debt, and some of them have been discharged from their units." He criticized the governors of the French West Indies for deliberately sending them to America with inflated credentials as a way to rid themselves of troublesome individuals.
accident ended any chance that he might have made a contribution to the Revolution, and both brigadier generals resigned within a year.\(^{20}\)

A second group of technical experts came to America through the efforts of the French Minister of War, the Comte de Saint-Germain. He formally "loaned" four military engineers to the Continental Army. In contrast to the previous volunteers, the contracts given to these men promised commissions only one grade higher than their French rank, and the men were carefully selected for real skills. Their leader, Louis le Bègue de Fresle Duportail, recently revised the engineer regulations for the French Army, and on 8 July 1777 Congress commissioned him as a colonel, giving him command over all engineers shortly thereafter. His obvious skill and cooperative attitude led to his promotion on 17 November to brigadier general, giving him status equivalent to General Knox's. Duportail's group quickly unmasked Coudray's false claims to technical training as an engineer.\(^{21}\)

The third contingent consisted of proteges of the Comte de Broglie, one of France's top commanders. Deane offered a major general's commission to the group's leader, Gilbert du Motier, the Marquis de Lafayette, because of his powerful connections in the French court. A similar


offer went to Bavarian-born Johannes de Kalb, a grizzled veteran of the French army. Deane promised this group assignments in the infantry rather than the technical services. Unfortunately, by the time they reached Philadelphia the temper of Congress and the Army had turned and they were coldly received at first. Lafayette's personal enthusiasm, the group's offer to serve as unpaid volunteers, and demonstrations of competence eventually earned most of them commissions.  

The immediate impact of these foreign volunteers came in the field of military engineering. Americans could not match the training of British engineers at the Woolwich school, let alone that of the French who perfected the science of military engineering. Because of this, most of the early European volunteers received engineer commissions in the Continental Army although few had formal training or could perform useful service. The single exception, a young Polish captain named Andrew Thaddeus Bonaventure Kosciuszko, had received formal training in France. Congress commissioned him as a colonel of engineers on 18 October 1776.

Although Washington included a request for a coherently organized corps of engineers in his plans for the 1777 army, and Congress authorized him to form such a body in its resolve of 27 December 1776, the shortage of proficient engineers prevented him from taking any action. Colonel Rufus Putnam, the best American engineer, returned to infantry

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22. Idzerda, Lafayette, xxiv-xxvi, 7-12, 17-18, 33-36, 53-56, 68-87, 145-50. Lafayette actually was a cavalry captain in a reserve status without combat experience, but as de Kalb later commented was a gifted natural soldier.
duty and a more cautious Congress halted the commissioning of untested volunteers. Until Duportail's group reached Philadelphia, the Army had only Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, Kosciuszko, and a number of infantry or artillery officers detailed to engineering duty. Duportail's emergence as a trusted expert gave the Army a standard on which to judge Europeans for professional merit for the first time. He secured the services of men such as Jean de Murnan, who had talent but whose career in the French Army was blocked by court intrigue.

One of the first improvements the engineers made was the formation of a bridging train to improve the Army's mobility. On the night of 11-12 December 1777 they constructed two bridges over the Schuylkill River at Swede's Ford. One consisted of a roadbed laid across floating rafts. The other was constructed by placing 36 wagons in the shallows and stringing rails across them. Later more sophisticated flat-bottomed pontons with special wheeled carriages were constructed at Albany, which in 1781 accompanied the Army to Yorktown. The second technical contribution involved permanent fortifications. After the defeats of 1777 Washington concentrated his resources on the field army. He only refortified the Hudson Highlands to serve as the Main Army's strategic


pivot. From the winter of 1777-1778 until the end of the war a major part of the engineer corps worked on the fortress complex at West Point. Duportail's engineers avoided the single large fort which could be lost in one stroke and erected a complex of small, mutually-supporting works for defense in depth.27

At Valley Forge Duportail proposed to supplement the officer engineers with companies of trained combat engineers. Following European custom he called them companies of sappers and miners. Sappers received special pay for digging the entrenchments (saps) of a formal siege; miners constructed underground tunnels. The companies could execute small projects or supervise infantry details in more extensive undertakings. Washington particularly liked Duportail's plan to train the officers as apprentice engineers, insuring a steady supply of native-born engineers for the first time. Congress approved forming three companies on 27 May 1778, but implementation took longer. Washington appointed the officers on 2 August 1779, after Duportail had personally interviewed the candidates, and transferred literate, intelligent enlisted men from infantry regiments a year later. Each company was authorized 1 captain, 3 lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, and 60 privates.28

Congress took the final step to regularize the engineers on 11 March 1779. In response to Washington's continued pressure it resolved "that

the engineers in the service of the United States shall be formed into a corps, styled the 'corps of engineers,' and shall take rank and enjoy the same rights, honours, and privileges, with the other troops on the continental establishment. 29

This legislation gave the engineers the status of a branch of the Continental Army. They received the same pay and prerogatives as the artillery. As commandant Duportail supervised the engineer officers and companies of sappers and miners, functioned as a special advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, and made the assignment of individual officers to specific posts prior to the start of each year's campaign. 30

Indirect French influence effected a separate section of topographical engineers. Following the Seven Years' War France had begun rigorous training of a small topographical corps, the Ingénieurs Géographes (distinct from the Corps Royal du Génie). They were responsible for preparing a systematic library of maps for reference in planning operations. 31 As a former surveyor Washington understood the value of accurate maps. On 19 July 1777 he asked for a topographical staff; six days later Congress told him to appoint a "geographer and surveyor of the roads, to take sketches of the country, the seat of war" and necessary subordinates. Robert Erskine accepted the job but did not report to headquarters until June 1778. Erskine, a Scot who came to New Jersey in 1771, was a famous civil engineer and inventor. Until he died of
pneumonia on 2 October 1780 Erskine coordinated up to six survey teams from his home at Ringwood Forge. He and his successors transformed the raw data into a comprehensive survey of the Main Army's area of operations. The resulting maps matched French standards of accuracy and were vastly superior as a planning resource to anything available to British commanders. 32

Washington intended to have another foreign volunteer upgrade the effectiveness of the mounted arm in the way Duportail improved the engineers. Congress answered his long-standing request for a cavalry commander on a par with Knox on 15 September 1777. Casimir Pulaski, a fiery Pole, became the Commander of Horse with the rank of brigadier general. Louis de Fleury soon became his brigade major, and the four light dragoon regiments went into winter quarters at Trenton in 1777-1778. Washington and Pulaski used the winter to begin transforming the troopers from a reconnaissance force into an offensive weapon. Pulaski established a riding school to train horses and men in European-style shock action including cut-and-thrust saber tactics. The dragoon regiment reorganization authorized on 27 May 1778 suited a battle mission better than patrolling. Unfortunately, Pulaski had clashed with his American officers and resigned as Commander of Horse a month earlier. Washington never found a replacement, and the strategic changes after

Monmouth returned the light dragoons to a reconnaissance role when the British declined to fight open battles as they had in 1776 and 1777.

While the dragoons did not complete their transformation into a true European cavalry force, the Continental Army introduced a number of light units patterned after the partisan corps which had emerged in the Seven Years' War. Major Nicholas Dietrich, Baron de Ottendorf, a Saxon veteran of the Prussian Army, commanded the first of these units. On 5 December 1776 Congress ordered him to recruit a company of chasseurs (light infantry) and two of jaegers (riflemen). A large proportion of the officers for Ottendorf's four companies (the extra company was added in April) were foreign volunteers but the enlisted men came from the German-American community. Ottendorf, however, deserted in the spring of 1777, and Congress placed Charles Armand Tuffin, the Marquis de la Rouerie, in command. It also told Armand on 19 May to raise a partisan corps of 200 Frenchmen, but Armand did not fill that unit until 1778.

When Pulaski resigned command of the cavalry Congress allowed him to raise an "independent corps." It consisted of a troop of 68 lancers and 200 light infantry organized into a "legion." The cadre of the troop came from the light dragoons he trained at Trenton in special

lance tactics. On 7 April 1778 Congress rewarded Captain Henry Lee for excellent service on the outpost lines around Philadelphia by allowing him to organize a similar unit. Lee's troop of the 1st Continental Light Dragoons was withdrawn from the regiment and expanded into two troops; a third was added on 28 May. Lee, now a major, used the small light dragoon troop organization of 1777 which was appropriate for the reconnaissance and raiding missions that the partisans performed. Armand finally recruited his Free and Independent Chasseurs after Congress approved an organization for it on 25 June 1778. It consisted of three large companies based on Marshal Saxe's legionary concept. Each contained 4 officers, 8 noncommissioned officers, 2 drummers (or horn players), and 128 privates.

By the end of the 1778 campaign the Main Army had three partisan corps. Lee's was entirely mounted and composed of native Americans. Pulaski's, usually operating in conjunction with Ottendorf's remnants, was a combined arms unit mixing Americans and foreigners. Armand's was completely infantry and heavily foreign. Washington reviewed their performance and concluded that the most efficient partisan organization contained equal numbers of mounted and dismounted men. At his request Congress annexed Captain Allen McLane's company (formerly of Patton's Additional Regiment) to Lee's unit on 13 July 1779 and on 14 February 1780 increased Lee's corps by another 70 men to form three mounted and dismounted companies.

three dismounted troops. The success of this expedient led Congress to rescind an earlier directive and on 23 February 1780 to consolidate Pulaski's and Armand's corps. 36

A special mounted police unit, the Marechaussée Corps, authorized on 27 May 1778, represented another European concept without Anglo-American precedent. It consisted of 5 officers, a clerk, 8 noncommissioned officers, 2 trumpeters, and 47 privates (4 of whom served as executioners). The corps assisted the Provost Marshal in maintaining order in camp and on the march. In combat it took station behind the Second Line to provide rear security and prevent desertion. Captain Bartholomew Von Heer, a Prussian veteran, recruited Pennsylvania-Germans from Berks and Lancaster Counties. The unit contributed to the general improvement in the Army's internal order and discipline. 37

The Army's other police unit arose from expediency rather than European inspiration. It merely guarded prisoners of war, a function normally performed by militia. Burgoyne's army did not surrender unconditionally: the "Saratoga Convention" only stipulated that the regiments had to leave North America and not return unless exchanged. When the British failed to honor some of the minor provisions, Congress suspected that Howe would renounce the agreement. It detained the regiments and in the fall of

1778 transferred them to Charlottesville, Virginia, for better security. Instead of using militia guards, Virginia decided to raise a 600-man regiment under surplus Continental officers. Congress adopted the Regiment of Guards on 9 January 1779. The unit remained under the governor's control, rather than under the operational command of the commander of the Southern Department, until it disbanded in stages between 10 April and 9 June 1781 as the "Convention Army" moved to Maryland.

The Corps of Invalids, a specialized unit established in 1777, also reflected a desire to professionalize the Continental Army. Great Britain used separate companies of men not fit for field duty to garrison fortifications in the home islands. The Invalids performed a similar mission in the Continental Army, freeing combat units from defending depots. On 20 June 1777 Congress authorized Colonel Lewis Nicola, a strong proponent of the concept, to organize the corps. Congress went beyond British precedent by directing Nicola to set up a "Military School for Young Gentlemen" to train ensigns for assignment to line regiments and to conduct recruiting and training of replacements. Detachments were organized at Philadelphia and Boston during 1777 and

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1778. The regiment never fulfilled its training function, but it performed valuable garrison duty until the end of the war, especially at West Point.  

The growing sophistication of the Continental Army, inspired in part by foreign volunteers, also showed in improved organization of support troops. Following Coudray's death in the fall of 1777, Washington, Knox, and the Commissary General of Military Stores, Benjamin Flower, moved to upgrade the Army's ordnance staff. On 11 November 1777 Congress added two more artillery artificer companies. Knox and Washington hoped to group the companies into a regiment for better administration and assign detachments to each division at the start of the 1778 campaign to maintain small arms. On 11 February 1778 Congress consolidated responsibility for ordnance, munitions, military equipment, and repair of weapons under Flower who also became commander of the Artillery Artificer Regiment. The two old companies, the two new ones, a fifth company added in the spring, and veterans of Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens' maintenance company formed the regiment. Its officers held special commissions which restricted their authority to the regiment, a wise precaution since they actually were technicians.


Congress did not make the Military Stores Department subordinate to Knox as Washington wished. It remained under the supervision of the Board of War. Repeated pressure from Washington and Knox did lead to the creation of the Field Commissary, a new officer directly supporting the Main Army. Other improvements in cooperation between ordnance officials and the artillery served to increase technical skills. Artillery officers received practical training at ordnance depots on a rotating basis. Another new office, the Surveyor of Ordnance, put an artillery colonel officially within the ordnance staff which made the technical service more responsive to the needs of the troops in the field. John Lamb, the colonel with the greatest technical proficiency, served as the Surveyor.

During the summer of 1778 Washington returned to a concept used in 1776 but discarded in 1777. The skilled workmen serving in the Quartermaster General's Department were assembled in provisional "companies," or work crews, under the supervision of Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin. Since Baldwin demonstrated an aptitude for supervising construction parties, the assignment conveniently removed him from a position where he might quarrel with the French engineers. The artificers carried out construction at West Point, maintained the Army's wheeled vehicles, and served as pioneers to mend roads during marches. When the Artillery Artificer Regiment proved successful, Congress directed Washington on 11 November 1779 to permanently arrange for a Quartermaster Artificer Regiment. The

new unit observed most of the same restrictions as Flower's, and ultimately contained nine companies.

The foreign volunteers who arrived in America after 1776 contributed to the broadening and sophistication of the Continental Army. Their technical skills enabled Washington and Congress to implement improvements planned, in some cases, as early as the 1776-1777 winter. The most immediate contribution was a professional engineer service, both combat and topographical. Foreigners staffed the former almost exclusively; the latter combined French inspiration with practical American surveying. European concepts of cavalry combat lapsed because they did not fit American conditions after Monmouth, but foreign volunteers and partisan theory added several contingents of light troops to the Army. Among the special supporting units which Washington and Congress formed, foreign inspiration and example had direct impact on the Marechaussée and Invalids and indirectly justified the others. The greatest foreign contribution, however, came in training and administration.

The Introduction of European Theories.

The foreign volunteers expanded the professional horizons of the Continental Army by bringing ideas recently developed by European theorists to the attention of American officers. In large part, however, they merely reinforced an intellectual growth already begun by Washington and other concerned military leaders.

During the eighteenth century armies developed the ability to maneuver in new ways, particularly after the Seven Years War. This battlefield transformation was preceded by a significant theoretical debate. Experiences in the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War impelled officers, especially the French, to seek better ways to handle armies in the field. The British Army, the major institutional influence on the Americans prior to Valley Forge, lagged behind most other nations in the development of new doctrine. British officers learned on the job, contributed few books containing original thought, and by and large even failed to read available European works.  

Most British authors prior to the Revolution produced mere drill manuals rather than profound theoretical volumes. The two most important manuals early in the century repeated the best aspects of the Duke of Marlborough's army: Humphrey Bland's *A Treatise of Military Discipline* in 1727 and Richard Kane's *Campaigns of King William and Queen Anne* in 1745. Under the Duke of Cumberland and Field Marshal Ligonier the British came under the influence of Prussia. This trend appeared first in a series of translations of Prussian regulations by William Fawcett in 1754 and 1757, and Fawcett's 1757 translation of Malosti de Martemont's *The Spirit of the Modern System of War, by a Prussian General Officer*.

A Prussian-inspired drill regulation was issued in 1757 and expanded by amendments adopted in 1759. That regulation led to the publication of Adjutant General Edward Harvey's *The Manual exercise, as ordered by his majesty in 1764*. "The '64" remained the official British drill until 1795, although laxly enforced. British writers produced two other drill manuals with some appeal: Campbell Dalrymple's *A Military Essay* in 1761; and William Windham's and George Townshend's *Norfolk Discipline*, a simplified volume published in 1759 for militia use.

Three other Englishmen authored widely-read volumes in the 1760's and early 1770's. In 1768 a collection of miscellaneous orders and notes Major General James Wolfe prepared, mostly while a regimental commander, appeared posthumously under the title *Instructions to Young Officers*. It contained no systematic theory. William Young was a prolific author of volumes dealing with drill, fortifications, and outpost duty. Wolfe's material reappeared in 1771 in conjunction with Young's collected works as *Manoeuvres, or practical observations on the art of war*. A similar two-volume compendium by Thomas Simes, *The Military guide for young officers*, followed a year later. These books served only to introduce junior officers to routine regimental life.

True European theorists wanted to find a system of warfare which extracted the maximum value from the weapons and soldiers available to the standing armies of the century. Proponents of linear warfare (*l'ordre mince*) dominated the early part of the century and considered Frederick

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the Great as the foremost practitioner of their school. After 1760 translations of his *Instructions for his Generals* became quite popular. Frederick's battlefield success came from his personal genius and capacity for hard work, and the *Instructions* remained essentially sterile because it did not contain a well-rounded theory of war. 46

The first alternative, l'ordre profond, argued that infantry formed in dense columns could successfully attack lines of infantry by ignoring musketry and relying on shock effect and the bayonet. The major exponents of this rather impractical school were Chevalier Jean-Charles de Folard (1669-1752), Joly de Maizeroy (1719-80), and François-Jean de Graindorge d'Orgeville de Mesnil-Durand (1729-99). Eventually the French worked out a practical solution in the form of l'ordre mixte. That school combined the line and column to meet the tactical requirements of a variety of circumstances in a flexible manner. It also stressed training men to perform both line and light infantry missions. Jacques Antoine Hippolyte Comte de Guibert's 1772 *Essai général de tactique* became the most important military book of the century. Most French officers became disciples of the mixed order by the end of 1778 even though it was not formally espoused by the French Army until 1791. 47

North America had little impact on European writers prior to the Revolution because its terrain and Indian adversaries were not relevant to European conditions. Americans, however, imported or reprinted many British, French, and German works and avidly read them.48 One major group of volumes covered technical artillery and engineering subjects. John Muller, the Woolwich instructor, wrote many volumes which enjoyed a wide popularity, particularly his *Treatise of Artillery* (1757) and *A Treatise Containing the Elementary Part of Fortification* (1756). Both Muller and Lewis Nicola, later the commander of the Invalids, produced translations of Louis André de la Maîne, the Chevalier de Clairac's *Field Engineer* (in 1758 and 1776 respectively) which were frequently read. Other key books included: Benjamin Robin's *New Principles of Gunnery* (1742); Guillaume Le Blonde's *Treatise of Artillery* (1746) and *Military Engineer* (1759); Charles Vallancey's translation of M. de Bonneville's *An Essay on Fortifications* (1757); J. C. Pleydell's *Essay on Field Fortification* (1768); and a 1776 Philadelphia compendium, *The Art of War*, which included writings of Jean-Florent de Vallière (1667-1759). Muller, Pleydell, and Robins remained basic texts for Woolwich into the 1790's, and the technical writings available to Americans generally conformed to British preferences.49

Drill manuals constituted the largest category of imports and reprints. The popularity of Bland's *Treatise* through the opening phase of the French and Indian War extended to America, where a dozen editions appeared between 1743 and 1759. Connecticut officially adopted Bland for militia use in 1743 and only discarded it in 1769 when officers complained that it was "prolix and encumbered with many useless motions." American publishers printed two editions of Fawcett's translation of the Prussian infantry drill and four of Cumberland's regulation during 1757 and 1758. In 1776 they also produced single editions of Simes' *Military guide*, Dalrymple's *Military Essay*, and the Earl of Cavan's minor work, *A New System of Military Discipline*. Washington himself owned copies of Bland, Cavan, Simes, Windham's *Norfolk Discipline*, and Young's *Manoeuvres*. Simes received semi-official endorsement from Pennsylvania and North Carolina officials during the Revolution. Windham became popular in New England where five editions appeared between 1768 and 1775. Both Massachusetts and Connecticut adopted it for official militia use. Although it simplified regular drills somewhat, Windham's manual of arms still included 50 commands and 155 separate motions, 24 of which related to firing. A large part of the book's value to Americans came from the numerous

references to various classical and contemporary European authors. Wolfe's Instructions appeared in three editions in America during the Revolution, two of which were joint bindings with either Young or Harvey. Americans did not reprint Frederick the Great's Instructions, but most of the Continental Army's key generals had read an imported edition.

Harvey's 1764 Regulations became the paramount manual for American officers from 1766 until 1777. Nineteen imprints appeared in cities stretching from Boston to Williamsburg, most in 1774, 1775, and 1776. The volunteer companies prior to Lexington rated it highly, and Massachusetts and Rhode Island officially adopted it for militia use in 1774. Virginia, North Carolina, and Connecticut followed suit the next year for militia and Continentals. Harvey became the most popular work for Continental officers serving in the Main Army in 1776 and on 18 July 1777 Brigadier Generals McDougall and Parsons, with Washington's blessing, made its use mandatory for their brigades.

In 1775 and 1776 a number of American officers also produced drill manuals which modified various British and Prussian systems. Timothy Pickering, at the time a Massachusetts militia colonel but later the Continental Army's Adjutant General and Quartermaster General, published the most widely known manual in 1775. His *An Easy plan of discipline for a militia* modified Windham's *Norfolk Discipline* and gained some currency among units besieging Boston, although Massachusetts rejected it as an official manual.55 Thomas Hanson of the Philadelphia Associators and briefly of the 12th Pennsylvania Regiment published a two-volume work, *The Prussian evolutions in actual engagements* .... Washington obtained copies of both of these works as soon as they appeared. The next year, 1776, Lewis Nicola published his *A Treatise of military exercise, calculated for the use of the Americans*, and Adjutant Thomas Davis of the 1st Virginia Regiment brought out a brief handbook, *A Treatise on the military duty*. Neither work enjoyed the readership of Pickering's or Hanson's.

One significant exception to the lack of innovation among the British appeared in North America during the French and Indian War. Generals John Forbes and Henri Bouquet (a Swiss serving the British) turned to several European thinkers to solve the problem of operating with regular troops in the American wilderness. Forbes based his successful campaign against Fort Duquesne on the *Commentaires sur les Mémoires de Montecuculi* of Lancelot, Comte Turpin de Crissé. Bouquet refined Forbes' techniques during Pontiac's rebellion by also consulting Maurice, Comte

de Saxe's *Mes révèrîes*, a posthumous work published in French and English in 1757. Bouquet's "Reflections on War with the Savages of North America" appeared in 1765 as an appendix to William Smith's *A Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCCCLXIV*.

Raimond di Montecuculi (1609-81), Crisse, and Saxe all saw the Roman conquest of Celtic and Germanic barbarians as proof that regular troops adequately trained in line and light infantry missions could defeat masses of loosely disciplined irregulars in wilderness conditions. Outside of Saxe these authors did not enjoy wide influence in European circles, and even Saxe tended to be eclectic rather than systematic in his writings.56

Americans, particularly Washington who served as one of Forbes' brigade commanders in the 1758 campaign, paid a great deal of attention to the application of the Crisse-Saxe-Forbes-Bouquet line of thought. One of Washington's friends from the Fort Duquesne campaign, Captain Joseph Otway, published a translation of Crisse in 1761 which Washington quickly obtained, along with the William Fawcett 1757 translation of Saxe. Knox, Greene, Wayne, and a host of other officers down to the lowest ranks in the Continental Army also paid attention to Saxe because they recognized that his arguments were particularly applicable to the American situation. They took special interest in Saxe's references to

aimed musketry in skirmishing action, and to his emphasis on joint training by infantry, artillery, and cavalry.  

Americans displayed an intense interest in another group of relatively minor European theoretical works. Austrian introduction of light troops during the middle of the century forced all other armies to develop similar bodies to counter them, and a school of theory on the proper organization and handling of partisans in "petite guerre" grew up. Central works from the partisan school imported or reprinted in America included Roger Stevenson's *Military instructions for ... carrying on the petite guerre*, M. de Jenny's *The Partisan; or the Art of Making War in Detachments*, and especially M. de Grandmaison's *La petite guerre*, the text which Frederick the Great preferred. Americans such as Henry Jackson believed that partisan operations suited the "natural genius" displayed by American rangers during the French and Indian War. They also had one significant native American text, Thomas Church's 1716 account of his father's campaigns against the Indians during King Philip's War and King William's War. Benjamin Church (1639-1718) was a master of using Indian-European teams to counter hostile Indians in the wilderness, and the account served as a tactical case book.  

Few native-born Americans secured commissions in the British Army during or after the French and Indian War. Individuals, like Washington, who were interested in a military career had to turn to reading to replace regular service. This fact probably explains the extensive array of imported or reprinted military volumes that appeared in America in the 1760's and 1770's. Most of the individuals who remained in important leadership positions in the Continental Army by 1777 knew the general issues behind European theoretical debates and read many of the important authors whose works existed in translation. The accumulated American experience in colonial wars colored their preferences to a very high degree. Problems with a terrain that covered wider areas and contained more obstacles than Europe's and the particular differences which arose from fighting Indians made Saxe and exponents of partisan operations more important to American generals than to their English counterparts. American traditions demanded emphasis on flexibility, marksmanship, and simplicity.

In November 1775, Washington wrote to William Woodford, then colonel of the 2d Virginia Regiment but soon to become a brigadier general, outlining the essentials of successful military leadership. He also mentioned the five works which he felt constituted the basic texts: Harvey, Crissé, Stevenson, Jenny, and Young. The list reflected availability, but it also indicated the importance of flexibility. On 8 May 1777

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Washington expressly ordered all Continental officers to read "Military Authors" in their spare time. French and Hessian professional soldiers noted that they obeyed. Captain Johann Ewald, who became a leading theorist of light infantry after the Revolution, commented that this fact served as "a true indication that the officers of this army studied the art of war while in camp, which was not the case with the opponents of the Americans."\(^{60}\)

At about the same time that he directed the officers to expand their professional horizons, Washington moved to establish a standard system of "discipline, maneuvers, evolutions, and regulations for guards" which every unit would follow, an important development to improve battlefield performance. The advent of the 1777 campaign prevented Washington from doing more than preliminary work on the regulations, although subordinate commanders worked hard on practicing rudimentary battlefield maneuvers. Foreign volunteers noted the lack of uniformity, and at Valley Forge a number worked on the problem. Thomas-Antoine, the Chevalier de Mauduit du Plessis, a graduate of the rigorous French artillery school at Grenoble who proved his valor at Germantown and Fort Mifflin, introduced the Army's leaders to Guibert's writings.\(^{61}\) Frederick Steuben played an even more important role.

60. Quoted in Fuller, British Light Infantry, pp. 152-3. Also see C. Fiske Harris, ed., "Diary of a French Officer 1781 ...," Magazine of American History, 7 (1881), p. 295; and Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 8: 29.
The Contributions of Steuben.

"The Baron," as Frederick Wilhelm Augustus "von" Steuben became known, synthesized official doctrine, trained the Main Army, and created a new element in the administrative staff which melded Americans and Europeans to produce uniformity and competence on the battlefield. He began his military career as a junior Prussian infantry officer and for ten years learned how to train troops. In 1757 he became the principal staff officer of Johann von Mayr's frei korps, a special partisan unit organized to counter Austrian light troops. This duty exposed him to a less rigid form of military organization and gave valuable administrative experience. Steuben continued to rise through staff assignments until 1762 when he became a member of Frederick the Great's special corps of aides and received the best staff training available in the eighteenth century. Army politics forced his retirement in 1764 as a captain, and he spent the next decade out of the military. 62

During 1777 Steuben, using the Comte de Saint-Germain as an intermediary, offered his services to Benjamin Franklin. The three men prepared credentials falsely identifying Steuben as a lieutenant general. Congress accepted his offer to serve as a volunteer without rank, and on 23 February 1778 he arrived at Valley Forge. Washington asked him to inspect the troops and talk to the senior officers. When Steuben reported that they were the finest raw material for an army that he had ever seen, Washington told him to prepare the drill regulations planned in 1777.

62. Steuben's claim to be a baron appears to be groundless; his family's use of the ennobling preposition "von" clearly was. In America Steuben habitually used the French form "de" rather than the Germanic "von."
Steuben analyzed the existing practices, primarily based on Harvey, and compared them to various European systems. As he later told Franklin:

"circumstances ... obliged me to deviate from the Principles adopted in the European Armies, ... Young as We are, We have already our Prejudices as the most ancient Nations, / and / the prepossession in favor of the British service, has obliged me to comply with many Things, which are against my Principles."  

Steuben's genius created an entirely new system in which he borrowed elements from British, Prussian, and American practices. The drill emphasized a simple manual of arms, improved execution, new techniques of marching, and use of the bayonet. A column of fours replaced single-file marching to produce more compact formations and better deployment on battlefields. The standard pace became the Prussian norm of 75 two-foot steps per minute, not the English standard of 60. Officers, not noncommissioned officers, now had the responsibility for drilling the men.

On 19 March 1778 Steuben began instructing a special "Model Company" in the new system. His colorful curses, delivered in a variety of languages, amused the large crowds that assembled each day at Valley Forge to witness the spectacle. The cursing actually was a calculated psychological device designed to smooth adoption of the drill. Members of the model company and selected officers extended the instruction to all units at Valley Forge within six weeks, and later to the rest of the Army.

Steuben drew on many sources in compiling his drill, which impressed foreign observers with its efficiency and originality.

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63. Steuben to Franklin, 28 Sep 1779; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. Also see Laurens, *Army Correspondence*, pp. 131-3, 145-9.
Steuben did not limit himself to the manual of arms, but also produced a simple, efficient method for maneuvering on the battlefield. Like Guibert and other French theoreticians of the ordre mixte school, he used both the column and the line for tactical flexibility. Divisions and brigades practiced marching in closed columns for speed and control, and rapidly deployed into line for musket fire or bayonet work. Skirmishers, either light infantry companies or details from line companies, covered the columns during advance or withdrawal. They specifically kept one hundred yards (the effective range of musket fire) from the column to prevent enemy harassment of the main body. As soon as the columns deployed into line the skirmishers withdrew through gaps between regiments to reform. The men maintained silence when marching, a practice which particularly impressed French officers.

In the fall of 1778, after the battle of Monmouth, a board of general officers reviewed the drill. Washington agreed to their single suggested improvement and replaced the traditional command "Present!" with "Take Sight!" as the order immediately preceding "Fire!" The change emphasized the Continental Army's continued reliance on marksmanship. After polishing by Steuben, the drill received Congress' approval on 29 March 1779 and was published by the Board of War. Virtually every army officer received a copy. Although Steuben hoped to have it classified as a state secret, as Frederick's Instructions had been, Washington overruled him. Copies of the drill went to every state government in the hope that the

various state militias would also adopt it and allow men to receive
basic training before they became Continentals.\textsuperscript{68}

The Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the
United States Part I (better known as The Blue Book) covered all aspects
of infantry service. It specified that a regiment deploy tactically in
eight companies, each under its own officers to prevent the type of con­
fusion that crippled the Hessians at Trenton. A regiment with more than
160 files (i.e. 320 corporals and privates) formed two four-company bat­
talions; those with fewer than 80 files (160 men) either temporarily com­
bined with a second small regiment or did not take a place in the line
of battle. A special twelve-man color guard gave each regimental comman­
der an emergency reserve force. The light infantry company deployed as
skirmishers or went into a provisional light infantry battalion. The
column became the standard maneuver formation; training emphasized
movement through broken terrain and rapid deployment into line.\textsuperscript{69}

Other chapters of the Regulations improved the efficiency of the
trains to let the Army move without encumbrance but still be able to fight
a sustained engagement immediately. Routine of army life emphasized
health and morale. Administration insured sustained concern for regimen­
tal business. An appendix clearly explained the functions of every

\textsuperscript{68} Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 14: 151-2, 227-31, 369, 444-6,
13: 384-5. Charles Thomson to Steuben, 5 Apr; John Jay to Steuben, 6 Apr;
Pickering to Steuben, 26 May, 19 Jun and 12 Jul; Peter Scull to Steuben,
26 Jun and 27 Jul; Ternant to Steuben, 29 Sep 1779 and 7 Jan 1780;
\textsuperscript{69} Steuben, Regulations (Philadelphia: Styner and Cist, 1779). At
least seven other editions appeared by 1785. Figure 10 shows the regi­
ment's disposition.
individual in a regiment from its commander to the lowest private.

Senior noncommissioned officers received training to replace staff officers in an emergency or to supervise the four squads that formed each company. The progressive attitude of the regulations culminated in the dramatic direction that a captain's

  first object should be, to gain the love of his men, by treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, enquiring into their complaints, and when well founded, seeing them redressed. He should know every man of his company by name and character.70

Steuben's contribution to the professionalism of the Continental Army did not stop with the Blue Book. He also gave substance to a new staff office: the Inspector General. Between 1778 and 1780 this office grew, and Steuben emerged as Washington's de facto chief of staff. The office originated in a proposal by Baron d'Arendt, commander of the German Battalion, and the Main Army's Council of War endorsed it as a way to effectively employ foreign volunteers. Congress' authorization on 13 December 1777 for two inspectors general, one of whom was to be Conway, radically altered the concept. Legislation required the inspectors, presumably one each for the Main Army and the Northern-Highlands area, to "see that every officer and soldier be instructed in the exercise and manoeuvres which may be established by the Board of War." Their other duties, "agreeable to the practice of the best disciplined European Armies," related to discipline, paperwork, and investigation of fraud.

70. A second volume, "Baron von Steuben Regulations for the Cavalry or Corps Legionnaire" was completed in manuscript by Steuben on 22 Dec 1780, but not published. It minutely parallels the infantry regulations, and is in the Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society.
FIGURE 10

SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF AN INFANTRY REGIMENT DEPLOYED IN TWO BATTALIONS 1779

LTC (15 paces in front)
2d Co.  5th Co.  LTC's Co.  3d Co.

COL (15 paces in front)
MAJ's Co.  4th Co.  COL's Co.  1st Co.

ADJ (15 paces in rear)
(20 paces between battalions)

KEY

Field Officer
Captain
Lieutenant
Ensign with Colors
Ensign
First Sergeant
Sergeant
Senior Corporal
Corporal
Drum Major
Fife Major
Drummer
Fifer
Rank and File

One Company

2d Platoon  1st Platoon
First Rank
(one pace)
Second Rank

(2 paces in rear)

(4 paces in rear)
They reported to Congress directly, not to the Commander-in-Chief. 71 Washington ignored Conway and used Steuben's superior credentials as a European expert to regain control over this office. On 28 March 1778 he appointed Steuben as temporary Inspector General pending Congressional approval. Four sub-inspectors acted as division-level assistants. One major from each brigade extended the inspector system to that echelon. Their first duty involved implementing Steuben's drill. 72 The arrangement worked so well that on 5 May 1778 Congress approved it and commissioned Steuben as a major general, the rank Washington lobbied privately for. 73

When the Main Army marched out of Valley Forge Washington used the sub-inspectors as divisional adjutants general. He also reaffirmed that tactical command remained with the unit commanders. Inspectors simply insured that drills followed official Army doctrine. New legislation on 18 February 1779 stated that there would only be one Inspector General who ranked as a major general and remained responsible for drafting regulations. He now conducted inspections on the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or commanding officer of a territorial department, and reported through those commanders to the Board of War. Brigade inspectors (majors) absorbed the functions of the brigade majors and became the

senior staff officers in each brigade. Sub-inspectors (lieutenant colonels) continued to perform similarly at the division level. They also acted as adjutants general for wings of the Main Army and for territorial departments. In the temporary absence of the Adjutant General the senior sub-inspector replaced him.74

Colonel Alexander Scammell replaced Timothy Pickering as Adjutant General on 5 January 1778. He worked closely with Steuben to standardize the Army's paperwork. They developed printed forms for most of the routine regimental and brigade bookkeeping chores and even issued individual "blank books" to each soldier for personal records. Their partnership paved the way for the gradual merger of the two major staff agencies. Steuben developed policy while Scammel concentrated on routine administration. Congress agreed that consolidation made sense, and on 17 May 1779 reduced the Adjutant General's department to the Adjutant General, two assistants, and a clerk. They operated the Headquarters orderly office.75 The Inspector General gradually rendered the mustering department redundant as well. On 12 January 1780 Congress abolished it.76

Consolidation of Steuben's staff hegemony came on 25 September 1780. New legislation officially designated the Adjutant General as the

Assistant Inspector General for the Main Army. It also authorized inspectors for artillery, cavalry, and militia on active duty with the Continental Army. Under Steuben the inspectors assumed duties similar to modern chiefs of staff. The emergence, surprisingly, lacked significant opposition. Changes in personnel and the growth of Washington's immediate staff weakened the Adjutant General, the one official in a position to challenge the new hegemony. Steuben's close relationships with the two final Adjutants General, Scammell and Brigadier General Edward Hand, cemented the arrangement. The rise of the Inspector General stands in contrast to Europe where either the Adjutant General or Quartermaster General became paramount. It shows the flexibility that the Continentals exercised in their use of European precedents. They borrowed where appropriate, but were not afraid to experiment.

The Reorganization of 1778-1779 in Practice.

The 1778 campaign opened before Washington could implement the organizational changes mandated on 27 May 1778, but after Steuben, Duportail, and the other foreign volunteers began contributing to the maturity of the Continental Army. France's declaration of war on Great Britain pushed the War of American Independence into a global struggle in which North America faded in importance. The first impact of the strategic change came in the British decision to evacuate Philadelphia rather than risk

77. Ibid., 17: 764-70; 18: 855-61.
losing New York City. Washington set out from Valley Forge and on 28 June caught up with Sir Henry Clinton's troops at Monmouth, New Jersey. General Charles Lee, recently exchanged, failed to grasp the change in the effectiveness of the Continental Army since his capture in December 1776. As a result he mishandled the start of the battle and Washington had to settle for a hard-fought draw. Clinton reached New York City without further incident and Washington moved on to White Plains where the Main Army joined forces with the troops from the Highlands and prepared for further action.

During the year that followed Monmouth Washington and Congress gradually implemented the 27 May 1778 organizational changes. Action came on a state-by-state basis. Various factors influenced the timing of each reorganization and its specific arrangement. Recruiting success, the strength of the regiments, and location all played a role. On 9 March 1779, after a careful review, Congress reduced the state lines to a paper total of 80 infantry regiments by lowering New Jersey's quota to 3, Pennsylvania's to 11, Virginia's to 11, North Carolina's to 6, and Georgia's to one. 79

New Hampshire's regiments adopted the new structure on 23 December 1778, Connecticut's on 11 July 1779, and most of Massachusetts' on 22 July 1779. The three strongest regiments of the remaining Massachusetts brigade reorganized on 1 August 1779 when they rejoined the Main Army after detached duty in Rhode Island; Bigelow's and Alden's Regiments somewhat later. The Massachusetts regiments received numerical designations

on 1 August for the first time since 1776. Washington numbered them according to the relative seniority of their colonels. 80

The Commander-in-Chief established the New York Brigade on 22 July 1778 but continued to use it primarily to defend New York's frontier. All five New York regiments reorganized later, on 30 May 1779. Congress allowed New Jersey to reduce its quota to three regiments in 1778 but the 4th New Jersey Regiment did not disband until 7 February 1779. Its personnel went to the remaining regiments which reorganized on that date. 81

Although Congress decided to reduce Pennsylvania's quota to ten regiments on 26 February 1778, it did transfer Hartley's Additional Regiment on 27 March as a new 11th Pennsylvania Regiment since Hartley was a popular recruiter. The reduction actually came on 22 July 1778, allowing the Pennsylvania units to adopt the new structure well in advance of the other states' regiments. 82 Maryland and Delaware regiments enjoyed successful recruiting during the winter they spent at Wilmington and did not reorganize until 12 May 1779. 83

Virginia loaned the 1st and 2d Virginia State Regiments to the Continental Army to replace 1777 losses. Washington's main problem

involved reenlisting the veterans of the senior nine Virginia regiments whose terms of service expired at Valley Forge. He experimented with a series of provisional reorganizations, including reducing the Virginia line to three brigades on 22 July 1778. Permanent reorganization came on 12 May 1779 when the eight weakest Virginia regiments with the Main Army consolidated to form four and Washington renumbered the line. On 5 May 1779 he ordered General Scott, who was in charge of recruiting in the state, to organize all available officers, convalescents, and recruits into three new provisional regiments as reinforcements for the Southern Department. The first marched from Petersburg under Colonel Richard Parker in October and reached Charleston on 5 December. Colonel William Heth's unit arrived there on 7 April 1780. The last, under Colonel Abraham Buford, failed to reach that city before it fell, but suffered defeat at The Waxhaws shortly afterwards.84

North Carolina's nine regiments joined the Main Army in 1777 so weak that their field officers recommended transferring all enlisted men to the three most senior units. On 29 May 1778 Congress ordered the transfer and in addition directed the state to use the surplus officers to form four new regiments for a total of seven. Late in 1778 the cadres of the newer units went to South Carolina as provisional reinforcements. The 3d North Carolina Regiment returned home in the spring of 1779 to

recruit, leaving only the 1st and 2d with the Main Army. The latter reorganized under the new structure on 22 July 1779. 85

Although they did not serve in the north, the Georgia and South Carolina forces also declined in strength. Idleness, climate, and the expiration of enlistments all took their toll. A full company of the 1st South Carolina Regiment, serving as marines, died on 8 March 1778 when the frigate Randolph blew up during an engagement with the British battleship Yarmouth off Barbados. The remnants of Georgia's troops suffered virtual annihilation during the winter of 1778-1779 when the British overran that state in a new offensive. Congress finally empowered Major General Benjamin Lincoln, who assumed command of the Southern Department on 4 December 1778, to consolidate the two lines and reform the regiments under the new structure. Local political jealousies blocked action until 20 January 1780. Lincoln reorganized the Georgia units, which existed only on paper, as one infantry regiment and one of mounted rangers. South Carolina's formed one artillery regiment and three of infantry. 86

Congress concentrated reductions and economies on the separate companies and Additional Regiments. These generally started out understrength

and lacked the political support of the state lines. Congress normally consolidated units drawn from the same or adjacent areas, retired excess officers, and transferred the consolidated unit to a state line if possible. Patton's and Hartley's Additional Regiments plus the four Pennsylvania companies of Malcolm's became the 11th Pennsylvania Regiment of 1779. Spencer's Additional Regiment absorbed the other four companies of Malcolm's. Virginia's three Additional Regiments consolidated on 22 April 1779 under Colonel Nathaniel Gist. Massachusetts' three combined under Colonel Henry Jackson on 24 July 1779 as the 16th Massachusetts Regiment. Webb's became the 9th Connecticut Regiment on the same day. On the other hand Sherburne's had to disband on 1 May 1780. Its personnel transferred to Webb's, Jackson's, and the 2d Rhode Island Regiment depending on native state. When the 1st Canadian Regiment could not join the New York line it reduced to five small companies. The 2d Canadian Regiment, however, continued under its special four-battalion configuration.87

Rhode Island's infantry reorganization represented a unique solution to its manpower problems. Most states turned to their Negro inhabitants, slave or free, when recruiting lagged among Caucasians. Most of the time the blacks served in integrated units performing the same duties as other Continentals, but Rhode Island tried a different approach. In January

1778 the 1st Rhode Island Regiment transferred its privates to the 2d, and the officers and noncommissioned officers returned home to refill the 1st primarily with Negroes. The state government purchased slaves who wished to enlist from their owners, promising them emancipation at the end of the war. Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, Washington's aide, persuaded Congress to approve a similar plan for South Carolina on 29 March 1779, but the state refused to implement it. 88

The formation of permanent light infantry companies during the reorganization simplified Washington's task of organizing special strike forces. In 1779 four provisional light infantry regiments under General Wayne achieved a smashing success in a night attack on Stony Point. The following year six light battalions operated as a division under Lafayette. The use of special light infantry forces seemed to run counter to the European influence that permeated the Army at Valley Forge. Gullbert and Saxe, for example, stressed the value of training infantrymen for both line and light infantry roles. In fact, the Continentals did train every individual in a regiment to perform both missions, while the light corps used standard linear formations as well as skirmishing. 89


89. Wayne to Irvine, 7 Jun 1779; Wayne Transcripts, New York Public Library. Davies to Steuben, 31 May 1779; Scammell to Steuben, 22 Jul 1780; Hamilton to Steuben, 23 Jul 1780; Steuben Papers, New-York Historical Society. In 1780 the light companies of the 1st and 3d Pennsylvania Regiments drew rifles and served as a special body within the light corps under Major James Parr.
Washington and Knox implemented the artillery portion of the reorganization with less difficulty than the infantry part. The only major organizational impact came when Maryland's separate companies joined Harrison's Virginia regiment, provisionally in 1778 and permanently on 9 May 1780. Maryland raised three large artillery companies (4 officers and 102 enlisted men each) as state troops, but formally transferred them to the Continental Army in late 1777. Assigning numerical designations to the artillery regiments created more difficulty than any other phase of the reorganization. Washington needed two boards of general officers to resolve seniority disputes. In August 1779 the generals decided that neither Lamb nor Crane could claim continuity from Knox's regiment. Harrison's therefore became the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment and Proctor's the 4th based on the dates of their Continental authorization. The others drew lots to settle seniority, with Lamb's becoming the 2d and Carne's the 3d.

Knox stabilized the weapons of the artillery arm at Valley Forge. He planned to have four brass 3- or 6-pounders for each brigade. An artillery park for general support included two 24-pounders, four 12-pounders, four 8-inch and eight 5-inch howitzers, and ten smaller fieldpieces. The unmanned reserve of 24-, 12-, 6-, and 3-pounders moved with the Main Army's trains while a siege battery of heavy iron guns and mortars stayed

91. Ibid., 12: 458-9; 15: 170-1; 16: 76, 173. Doughty to Lamb, 27 Jan 1778; Oswald to Lamb, 7 Jun 1778; Charles Thomson to Arnold (copy), 29 Aug 1778; Lamb to Washington, 12 Mar 1779; Crane to Washington (copy), 16 Mar 1779; Lamb to Board, 6 Aug 1779; Board of General Officers' Report, 8 Aug 1779; Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society. Knox to Stevens, 7 Jan 1778; Ebenezer Stevens Papers, New-York Historical Society.
at Carlisle and Springfield. French imports, captured British guns, and pieces produced in America, all mounted on Muller-style carriages, existed in surplus numbers by 1778. Knox even had to abandon a plan in 1780 to standardize fieldpieces with French 4-pounders (the most efficient combination of mobility and firepower) because he could not waste the massive stockpile of stores on hand for 6- and 3-pounders. Companies were rotated among the brigades, large garrisons, and the artillery park to maintain proper cross-training. Knox established a program of instruction and endorsed the theory that field artillery should fire at infantry targets. During the battle of Monmouth this tactic proved extremely effective.  

Forage problems and changed strategic considerations led Washington to scatter the light dragoon regiments in late 1778, and they never again assembled as a brigade. Serious shortages of men and horses also began to appear. Washington considered, but abandoned, the idea of arming the troopers with blunderbusses in 1779 to increase their firepower. A more practical suggestion originated with Major Benjamin Tallmadge of the 2d Continental Light Dragoons. Since new recruits could be found

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more easily than mounts, he suggested that they be equipped temporarily as light infantry. Washington ordered the 2d to implement this plan on 14 August 1779, and on 24 September told Colonel Stephen Moylan's 4th to do the same. The 1st and 3d Continental Light Dragoons transferred to the Southern Department in 1778. They did not use the infantry expedient but rather served throughout the rest of the southern campaigns as a composite mounted unit under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington.⁹⁴

Implementing the 27 May 1778 resolve took a year. It produced major changes only in the infantry regiments. Steuben's Blue Book and the other improvements in training and support increased the effectiveness of officers and men, partially compensating for the weaknesses inherent in the new regimental structure. The artillery merely improved extant forms and practices, while the mounted army and partisans reverted to reconnaissance duty. The permanent brigade consisting of several infantry regiments and an artillery company remained the basic tactical element of the Army. Washington improved it by adding to the specialized staff serving the brigade commander. The brigade inspector, functioning as chief of staff, controlled a maintenance section under a conductor of military stores, a logistical section under a brigade quartermaster and a brigade commissary, and an administrative section. The division, though a less permanent unit of organization, had a comparable staff.⁹⁵

During that same period the Army's territorial department structure stabilized. Washington exercised effective control over all operations outside the south. The Main Army continued to function as the principal force, eliminating the need for a distinct Middle Department command. The Northern and Highlands Departments remained separate commands but operated in close conjunction with the Main Army. The former normally contained the equivalent of a reinforced brigade; the latter a reinforced division. The Eastern Department's field army kept watch over the British in Newport with New England militia and state troops, reinforced by one or more Continental brigades. The newest territorial department, established in 1777, was the Western Department. It protected the western frontiers of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania but received only two regiments in 1778 and remained a minor command. Through 1778 the Southern Department contained essentially only Georgia and South Carolina units.

Summary.

By July 1779 the Continental Army achieved the status of a competent, well-trained force. Excluding the two thousand or so effectives in the Southern Department and a handful of regiments in isolated frontier garrisons in the Northern and Western Departments, Washington had about 25,000 officers and men. The Main Army and Highlands Department contained

98. Lincoln to Congress, 1 Sep 1779; Record Group 360, National Archives.
99. Monthly Return, Main Army, Jul 1779; Record Group 93, National Archives.
thirteen brigades stationed in the vicinity of New York City and four more under Sullivan attacking Indian villages in the Mohawk Valley. Those 17 brigades' infantry contingents averaged about 65 officers, 80 sergeants, 50 drummers and fifers, and 1,000 rank and file apiece, all of whom were available for combat. Their aggregate strength in July included 107 field, 737 company, and 260 staff officers, 1,409 sergeants, and 871 drummers and fifers fit and present with their regiments. Another 78 field, 629 company, and 51 staff officers and 492 sergeants, drummers, and fifers were sick, prisoners, or detached. Nearly 14,000 rank and file were on duty with the line companies; most of the 2,600 others "on command" served with the light infantry corps. Fewer than 2,000 rank and file were sick. The force in Rhode Island contained 142 infantry officers and 2,255 enlisted men. Artillery with the Main Army and in the Highlands and Eastern Departments accounted for another 200 or so officers and almost 2,000 men. Together, these troops represented a sizeable combat force, although they probably amounted to only half of the strength called for on paper. Congress' decision to cut costs by using line officers to perform staff duties at echelons above the regiment employed 13 field and 209 company officers, a significant diversion of Washington's battlefield resources. Doctrine and training extracted the maximum value from the troops, but full quotas would have materially expanded the force at Washington's disposal.

After Monmouth, units in the northern half of the country saw limited combat. The variety of conditions under which portions of the Main Army successfully engaged the enemy demonstrated the value of the professional skills nurtured by Washington and Steuben. In 1779 highly successful
operations against the Iroquois Indians by General Sullivan and Wayne's nighttime bayonet assault on Stony Point demonstrated the Army's flexibility. 1780's battles at Springfield, New Jersey, showed conclusively that a single brigade under its self-contained organization could successfully stand off a superior force until the rest of the Main Army could arrive.

Britain's decision to shift offensive operations to the southern states in part reflected the difficulty in successfully engaging the Main Army. The shift did force Congress to transfer units from the north. Both remaining North Carolina regiments arrived at Charleston on 3 March 1780 where they rejoined the 3d which had been filled again. The Virginia line (minus one regiment stationed at Fort Pitt) followed. Brigadier General William Woodford reached Charleston on 6 April 1780 with the 1st, 2d, and 3d Virginia Regiments at full strength and the others with officer cadres only. These units and the Georgia and South Carolina remnants surrendered on 12 May 1780 when Charleston fell, the worst defeat the Continental Army suffered during the entire Revolution. Still, the sustained 42-day defense of an inferior position demonstrated the Army's ability to fight. Sophisticated use of artillery crossfire and ricochet techniques held the British at bay until jaeger sniper fire silenced the guns.

100. Washington's use of the brigade is identical to the role of the division in Guibert's writings and the corps in Napoleon's campaigns.
On 5 April 1780 General de Kalb received orders to march the Maryland division and the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment to reinforce the south. De Kalb provisionally reorganized the division on 15 July for greater efficiency since it now represented the only Continental force in the department. He formed his infantry into four full eight-company regiments and sent the surplus officers home to recruit. On 24 July General Gates arrived as the new Southern Department commander. Gates led the division and reinforcing militia to crushing defeat at Camden. De Kalb's Continentals fought very well until they were overwhelmed when the militia broke and uncovered their flank. After the battle, the division's superior training enabled General Smallwood to reassemble it quickly as a provisional regiment with two four-company battalions and two light infantry companies.

On 18 January 1778 Captain Johann Heinrichs of the Hesse-Cassel jaegers commented in a letter to the Hessian Minister of State "Nor is their standing army to be despised ... it only requires Time and good leadership to make them formidable." The accuracy of this observation was clear. The Continental Army came of age between 1778 and 1780. Regiments trained by Washington and Steuben continued to suffer from shortages of personnel but fought well under a wide range of conditions. The Army's

organization achieved sophistication; its leadership down to the company level emerged as an experienced, tough, and competent group with few exceptions. The "Europeanization" of the Continental Army evolved from foreign volunteers and the wisdom of Washington and other American leaders in selecting only those concepts which they realized would work in the American situation.
CHAPTER VII
PERSEVERANCE TO VICTORY

The first years of the War of American Independence witnessed the growth of the Continental Army from a small nucleus patterned after the provincials of earlier wars into a long-term force which included men from every state as well as foreign volunteers. The latter, particularly Steuben and Duportail, contributed European military theory and training skills to go with practical American experience. Beginning at Valley Forge that blend produced a complex and relatively sophisticated organization which solved the purely military problems that faced the Continental Army. During the final years of the Revolution a recurring problem with recruiting and the general collapse of the American economy forced retrenchment. The Continental Army eventually disappeared as a standing military force, but first it triumphed at Yorktown and then it disbanded without undermining the government.

Economy and the 1781 Reorganization.

Congress' plan for reorganization in 1778 emphasized reduction of expenses and adjustment of quotas to more realistic levels. Those goals continued to be an important consideration in succeeding years despite the weakening of the Main Army as units transferred to the Southern Department to counter a growing British danger. By October 1780, as the original three-year enlistments threatened to expire, the Army was
clearly under great pressure. New efforts to conform to realistic limitations and still extract a maximum advantage from available resources produced a major realignment of military force.

In January 1780 Robert R. Livingston, a delegate with a strong concern for the Army, suggested increasing efficiency by reducing the infantry to sixty full regiments. Surplus officers would retire on full pay, subject to recall to fill vacancies, eliminating the cost of allowances. Washington and Steuben persuaded Congress to avoid a major reorganization at that time. Washington argued that it was not necessary until enough French naval and economic aid became available to make a major offensive possible. He did take the opportunity to point out deficiencies in the existing regimental structure. Congress decided on 9 February not to disband any regiments and established quotas to place 35,211 men in the field for the coming campaign. Congress based that figure on Steuben's report that anticipated operations required a minimum of 36 rank and file per company, or a total of 324 for each infantry regiment. That plan produced 21,000 infantry, 2,000 artillery, and 1,000 cavalry for field armies plus sufficient supporting troops and garrisons.¹

At the time of these discussions the Continental Army actually contained approximately that number of officers and men. The Southern

Department held all the troops from Georgia and the Carolinas, the three provisional Virginia regiments, two regiments of dragoons, and Pulaski's corps. The equivalent of a brigade of Continentals served in the Eastern Department while the Northern and Western Departments each had about two regiments. Sixteen brigades plus supporting troops, the heart of the Army's fighting strength, manned the Main Army and the Highlands Department. Excluding the New Hampshire Brigade at Danbury, Connecticut, Washington's infantry included 168 field, 1,209 company, and 273 staff officers; 1,650 sergeants; 1,579 drummers and fifers; and 14,673 rank and file. Artillery added 180 officers and 1,190 enlisted men, cavalry another 64 officers and 672 men. More significant, those brigades lacked 331 officers, 315 sergeants, 242 drummers and fifers, and 13,353 rank and file.

In the spring Washington began to hope that the Continentals and an expected French force under the Comte de Rochambeau could attack New York City. He redoubled recruiting efforts and prepared to call for militia. Rochambeau's troops reached Newport, Rhode Island, too debilitated from the sea voyage to participate in action in 1780. Washington reluctantly cancelled his plans. By September, despite transfers of the Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware regiments to the south, Washington still controlled a dozen Continental brigades, supporting units, and a number of separate garrisons. His infantry now included 169 field, 1,091 company, and 261 staff officers; 1,381 sergeants; 774 drummers and fifers; and 17,232 rank and file. Three artillery regiments added 140 officers and 1,097 men; cavalry somewhat more than 500 of all ranks. Militia on duty in

2. Monthly Return, Main Army, Jan 1780; Record Group 93, National Archives.
New York and Rhode Island amounted to 181 officers and 3,192 men. Shortages remained acute, particularly among ensigns, artillery second lieutenants, and enlisted men. The infantry lacked 372 officers, 384 sergeants, 340 drummers and fifers, and 12,718 rank and file; the artillery regiments 77 officers and 652 men. Equally important, over 200 infantry officers detailed to perform staff duties did not serve with their regiments.\(^3\)

Washington's ability to compensate for transfers through recruiting came in part from close cooperation with a Congressional committee. It journeyed to headquarters in late spring to investigate logistical problems but had a secondary mission to recommend ways to cut expenses by unit reductions and reorganizations. The committee members, Philip Schuyler, John Mathews, and Nathaniel Peabody, interpreted their mandate broadly and gradually came to view themselves as a permanent executive agency working in harmony with the Army. A majority of delegates disagreed with the committee's outspoken statements and recalled it on 11 August. On the other hand its recommendations formed the basis for a series of fall reorganizations of the various staff departments.\(^4\)

In 1780 the Continental Army received a series of major blows: the fall of Charleston, the debacle at Camden, and the terrible shock of Benedict Arnold's treason. In August Washington pushed Congress to act

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3. Monthly Return, Main Army, Sep 1780; Ibid.
quickly since the three-year enlistments of 1777 would expire during the coming winter. He recommended total centralization of military affairs under Congress' control and institution of a three-year draft to offset decreasing enlistments. Washington argued that a strong Army cost less than constant militia calls and reminded the delegates that

No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. Even those nearest the seat of War are only valuable as light Troops to be scattered in the woods and plague rather than do serious injury to the Enemy. The firmness requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a constant course of discipline and service.

On 28 August Congress responded by appointing a committee to prepare a reorganization plan. In addition to Samuel Adams, who often disagreed with Washington on policies, it contained Joseph Jones of Virginia, Thomas McKean of Delaware, John M. Scott of New York, and Ezekiel Cornell of Rhode Island. Those four were close associated and predisposed to follow the Commander-in-Chief's recommendations. The committee consulted Steuben and then recommended that Congress require each state to have a full complement of men in the field by 1 December each year. They knew a draft posed insurmountable political problems. As an alternative to it they convinced Congress to require each state to enlist its full quota for the duration of the war. Until it reached that goal a state had to provide men for not less than one year's service. The importance of this new approach lay in the stipulation that the men remain until replacements came.

Congress gave preliminary approval to a comprehensive reorganization plan on 3 October 1780 which attempted to balance financial limits and Washington's military desires. As James Duane told Washington, the plan was "submitted, as it is, to your Opinion. It is only to be considered as an Essay open to such Alterations as you may suggest." On 21 October, true to its word, Congress adopted verbatim the changes Washington requested. The plan reduced "the regular army of the United States" on 1 January 1781 to 49 infantry regiments, Moses Hazen's special Canadian infantry regiment, 4 artillery regiments, 4 legionary corps, 2 partisan corps, and a regiment of artificers. Washington confirmed that the engineers, Sappers and Miners, Marechaussée, and Invalids remained unchanged. All other units had to disband and transfer their enlisted men to the line regiments. Every unit except Hazen's and the partisans found itself allotted to a single state to simplify subsistence and replacement problems. At Washington's request Congress let the Army rather than the state governments decide which officers to retain.

Infantry reorganization formed the heart of the change. Congress apportioned the forty-nine regiments on the basis of a realistic estimate of the states' ability to raise men rather than on total population. Hazen's unallotted regiment, now designated as the Canadian Regiment, continued under its four-battalion configuration because of the unique

9. See Table 5.
### TABLE 5
1781 QUOTAS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>STATE</th>
<th>INFANTRY REGIMENTS</th>
<th>ARTILLERY REGIMENTS</th>
<th>LEGIONARY CORPS</th>
<th>PARTISAN CORPS</th>
<th>ARTIFICE REGIMENTS</th>
<th>TOTAL REGIMENTAL EQUIVALENTS</th>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>2</td>
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agreement Hazen had with Congress. It absorbed the remaining Canadians from Livingston's old 1st Canadian Regiment and other miscellaneous men. Washington persuaded Congress to make some changes in the structure of a regiment because he doubted that every regiment actually would reach full strength. The Commander-in-Chief complained that if the three regiments allotted to South Carolina and Georgia were excluded, a reasonable assumption since those states had been overrun by the British, the plan provided only 18,000 infantry. Washington needed 22,000: 18,000 for mobile field forces, 2,500 to garrison the Hudson Highlands, and 1,500 on the frontiers.

The original Congressional plan continued the basic regimental alignment of one light and eight line companies, all equal in size. It added three enlisted men to each and left the officers unchanged. At Washington's request Congress made major changes. Each regiment's three field officers, either a colonel, lieutenant colonel, and major, or a lieutenant colonel commandant and two majors, no longer served as company commanders. This change enlarged the Army's pool of field officers and increased the number of captains in each regiment, increasing flexibility. Every company now expected to have three officers present in combat. Two sergeants, one officially designated for the first time as the first sergeant, and another corporal joined each company. The number of privates rose substantially from 53 to 64. Four extra lieutenants joined the regimental staff as permanent paymaster, adjutant, quartermaster, and regimental recruiter. The latter remained in his home.


11. See Figure 11.
FIGURE 11
CONTINENTAL INFANTRY REGIMENT OF 1781

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant (Lieutenant)
1 Quartermaster (Lieutenant)
1 Paymaster (Lieutenant)
1 Recruiter (Lieutenant) b
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major
1 Drummer (Recruiting) b
1 Fifer (Recruiting) b

Light Infantry Company
1 Captain
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign c
1 First Sergeant
4 Sergeants
4 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
64 Privates

Company
1 Captain
1 Lieutenant
1 Ensign c
1 First Sergeant
4 Sergeants
4 Corporals
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
64 Privates

a. Where the regiment was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel Commandant, two majors were authorized.
b. As a permanent recruiting party on duty in the regiment's home state.
c. Initial retention of surplus lieutenants in the ensign positions was authorized.
state with a drummer and a fifer and devoted full time to securing re­placements. Surplus lieutenants created by the reduction in the number of regiments filled these positions and vacant ensigncies.

Washington liked the new specifications for an infantry regiment. Even without the recruiting party and the light company, which would be detached under normal circumstances, it had considerably more power than the 1778 regiment. Each company's rank and file strength, the true measure of force, increased by slightly more than 20 percent from 56 to 68. More officers and sergeants promised better control. A regiment engaging in combat at full strength would deploy 544 rank and file under 40 ser­geants, 24 company officers, and 3 field officers. The 1781 regiment still remained weaker than the 1776 version, but it corrected most of the deficiencies of the 1778 plan and employed better organization than a British unit.

The new artillery regiment proposed by Congress added eleven matro­ses to each company but reduced the number of companies in a regiment. Staff and company officers and noncommissioned officers remained unchanged. Congress initially planned on nine companies per regiment, but Washington convinced the delegates to simplify administration by authorizing ten. Otherwise he accepted Congress' plan. Although the number of artillery companies in the Army dropped to 40, the number of matrosses rose sharply on paper from 1,344 to 1,560. Allotment of the regiments to Virginia, New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania was based on their primary recruiting areas. The 1st and 3d regiments converted through attrition. Lamb's 2d, a very strong regiment, and Proctor's 4th, which had only eight companies,

12. See Figure 12.
FIGURE 12

CONTINENTAL ARTILLERY REGIMENT OF 1781

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant\(^a\)
1 Paymaster\(^a\)
1 Quartermaster\(^a\)
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Sergeant Major
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
1 Drum Major
1 Fife Major

Company
1 Captain
1 Captain-Lieutenant
1 First Lieutenant
3 Second Lieutenants
6 Sergeants
6 Corporals
6 Bombardiers
6 Gunners
1 Drummer
1 Fifer
39 Matrosses

\(^a\) Additional duty of a company officer.
presented more of a problem due to a long-standing argument between Lamb and Pennsylvania. Washington consolidated the two companies of the 2d from Pennsylvania with Gibbs Jones' separate company and Isaac Coren's company of laboratory technicians in the Artillery Artificer Regiment. The resulting companies transferred to the 4th, bringing both regiments to the ten-company limit.  

Congress also intended only minor changes in the four light dragoon regiments, adding five privates to each troop. Washington, conscious of forage problems and the success of the 2d and 4th regiments' experiments, countered with a very different proposal. Under his plan each regiment dismounted two troops, turning the unit into a European-style legionary corps. "I prefer Legionary Corps," he told Congress, "because the kind of Service reconnaissance duties we have for horse almost constantly requires the aid of Infantry." The infantry contingent gave each regiment the ability to defend its camp when on patrol. Congress liked the savings achieved by eliminating over one hundred horses per regiment. As in the case of the artillery, allocation reflected original recruiting areas.

Similar considerations led Washington to make one further recommendation with respect to mounted units. He stated, "Tho' in general I dislike independent Corps, I think a Partisan Corps with an Army useful in

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14. See Figure 13.
FIGURE 13
CONTINENTAL LEGIONARY CORPS OF 1781

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant
1 Quartermaster
1 Paymaster
1 Riding Master
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Trumpet Major
1 Saddler

Mounted Troop
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Cornet
2 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Corporals
1 Trumpeter
1 Farrier
60 Privates

Dismounted Troop
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Cornet
2 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Corporals
1 Trumpeter
60 Privates

a. Additional duty of a company officer.
many respects. Its name and destination stimulate to enterprise.\textsuperscript{16} Congress approved retaining one for the Main Army and one for the southern army, under Henry Lee and Colonel Armand respectively. Although similar in most respects to a legionary corps, the troop organization had major differences. Each had only fifty privates reflecting the fact that the partisans did not disperse as much as the legions. Three dismounted troops provided greater staying power because a partisan corps operated at a greater distance from its army than a legionary corps.

Congress reduced the support units to a single regiment containing eight sixty-man companies. At the state's request and because Philadelphia's urban status promised to be a more fertile recruiting area for "mechanics," Congress allotted it to Pennsylvania. The delegates did not specify which of the two existing artificer regiments to retain until 29 March 1781. Then Congress directed Baldwin's Quartermaster Artificer Regiment to disband and regroup its men into single companies in the Main Army and southern army. The rest of the companies came from Flower's Artillery Artificer Regiment. Actually the artificers served in detachments for the remainder of the war and the planned eight companies never materialized. The southern army supplemented them in 1782 with a provisional pioneer company.\textsuperscript{17}

The plan for the Army in 1781 called for a total of sixty-one regimental equivalents. States supporting the Southern Department furnished,

\begin{footnotesize}
\end{footnotesize}
FIGURE 14

CONTINENTAL PARTISAN CORPS OF 1781

1 Colonel
1 Lieutenant Colonel
1 Major

Regimental Staff
1 Adjutant\(^a\)
1 Quartermaster\(^a\)
1 Paymaster\(^a\)
1 Riding Master\(^a\)
1 Surgeon
1 Surgeon's Mate
1 Trumpet Major
1 Saddler

Mounted Troop
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Cornet
2 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Corporals
1 Trumpeter
1 Farrier
50 Privates

Dismounted Troop
1 Captain
2 Lieutenants
1 Cornet
2 Sergeants
1 Quartermaster Sergeant
5 Corporals
1 Trumpeter
50 Privates

\(^a\) Additional duty of a company officer.
on paper, a total of 1 artillery and 21 infantry regiments, 2 legionary corps, and a partisan corps. Washington expected to have the services of 29 infantry regiments (including Hazen's large unit), 3 artillery regiments, 2 legionary corps, and 1 partisan corps, plus the Sappers and Miners, Marechaussée, Invalids, and his guard. This arrangement, including the nominal services of the artificer regiment, reflected the different types of operations faced in each theater. Washington had more artillery, infantry, and specialist troops in anticipation of an attack on the fortified base at New York City. The Southern Department's smaller infantry and artillery contingents but proportionately larger cavalry force gave it more mobility. Implementation of the reorganization officially took place on 1 January 1781. 18

The Main Army reorganized in winter quarters. The four New England lines easily accomplished the transition by consolidating units where practical or by disbanding higher numbered ones and transferring personnel. New Hampshire chose the latter route, Rhode Island the former, ending its experiment in segregation in the process. Massachusetts cut from 16 to 10 regiments and Connecticut from 9 to 5 through consolidation. Both renumbered their lines to reflect new seniority sequences. Brigades now required only three infantry regiments to sustain the combat power of four old ones. These four lines organized six brigades: 3 from Massachusetts, 2 from Connecticut, and 1 from New Hampshire. Rhode Island's regiment rounded out the 2d Connecticut Brigade, and the 10th Massachusetts Regiment served as the third element of the New Hampshire Brigade. This

arrangement produced a regional force of three divisions with significant
homogeneity and strength.\textsuperscript{19}

New York's reduction from five to two regiments occurred in the
Northern Department where the state's brigade maintained garrisons. Con-
solidation produced the required enlisted strength but left a surplus of
experienced officers. The state used them to lead a new corps of state
troops which assumed responsibility for frontier defense with Congress'
financial support.\textsuperscript{20} New Jersey simply disbanded its 3d regiment and
reorganized the remaining two at Pompton. A full company of the 2d im-
mediately marched to occupy the Wyoming Valley and mediate a Connecticu-
Pennsylvania territorial dispute.\textsuperscript{21} Each state continued to field a
brigade, although both lacked one regiment.

The reorganization precipitated a major crisis in the Pennsylvania
line, camped for the winter at Morristown. On the evening of 1 January,
before actual implementation, the enlisted men mutinied over chronic
shortages of food, clothing, and pay. Most men believed that the reduc-
tion released them from 1777 enlistments ambiguously recorded as "for
three years or the duration of the war." Sergeants gained control, mar-
ched the regiments to Princeton, and negotiated with representatives from
Pennsylvania's government and Congress. The men proved that they only
wanted a redress of grievances by arresting several British agents. The

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 20: 410, 491; 21: 40-41, 45, 69-70, 405.
Memoir and Selected Correspondence of Philip Van Cortlandt} (Tarrytown:
settlement of the mutiny established an impartial review panel which examined each man's enlistment and released 1,250 infantrymen and 67 artillerists by the end of January. The remaining 1,150 men clearly had enlisted for the duration and received furloughs until 15 March. The soldiers received promises of back pay, clothing, and freedom from reprisals. The reorganization, with an effective date of 17 January, consolidated paper cadres for six regiments and ordered them to reassemble at specific towns.22

The mutiny not only deprived Washington of the two planned Pennsylvania brigades, it opened the door to future revolts. On 20 January the New Jersey regiments attempted to extract similar concessions. Washington reacted swiftly this time and asked Congress not to interfere. He sent General Robert Howe from the Highlands with a detachment of New Englanders and orders to "compel the mutineers to unconditional submission" and to execute "a few of the most active and incendiary leaders." On 27 January Howe suppressed the mutiny and shot two ringleaders, checking the spread of unrest.23

Active operations complicated the reorganization of the southern units. Washington realized that recruitment problems there dwarfed his own and favored creating a mobile force to pin the British into coastal...

enclaves rather than attempt to reduce fortified cities. On 14 October 1780 he selected Nathanael Greene to replace Gates as department commander. To assist in rebuilding the department's forces he assigned Steuben to Greene. Greene left Steuben in Virginia to establish lines of communications and oversee the rehabilitation of Virginia's forces and arrived himself at Charlotte, North Carolina, on 2 December. The next day he formally relieved Gates.  

The heart of the southern army remained the infantry regiments from Maryland and Delaware. After Camden the Delaware men served in Peter Jacquette's line company with the Maryland troops and Robert Kirkwood's light infantry company. Surplus officers returned to Delaware to fill the rest of the regiment but only organized two companies by mid-1781. Maryland assembled recruits and men from disbanded units for Greene. The veterans and first replacements reestablished the 1st and 2d Maryland Regiments. The 6th and 7th disbanded, and the 3d, 4th, and 5th reorganized at cadre strength in Maryland. The 5th refilled first and reached Greene by mid-February; the 3d and 4th did not set out until 28 August and 4 September, respectively.

Greene knew he had no hope of organizing Continentals from Georgia or the Carolinas and told Steuben to concentrate on rebuilding Virginia's regiments. Civilian officials handled recruiting, freeing Continental officers to organize the provisional units required to face a series of crises. The use of provisional formations undermined Washington's plan to refill the regiments lost at Charleston. The return of escaped prisoners of war who claimed that their captivity had released them from their enlistments, frequent reshuffling of the provisional units, and diversion of officers to command militia detachments all complicated Steuben's task. The Virginia line's reorganization amounted to a paper arrangement of officers except in the case of the regiment at Fort Pitt, the only unit not lost at Charleston. It was reorganized with only two companies and redesignated from the 9th to the 7th Virginia Regiment.

Without the Virginia infantry regiments Greene remained dangerously weak. Washington and Congress sent him Henry Lee's 2d Partisan Corps in December and in February 1781 decided to shift the Pennsylvania line once it recovered from the mutiny. Major General Arthur St. Clair found reassembling his regiments in that state unexpectedly difficult. To expedite matters he formed three provisional regiments, each containing eight 40-man companies. A detachment of the 4th Continental Artillery Regiment with four guns and one troop of the 4th Legionary Corps (containing all the men

who had horses) complemented them. After overcoming major financial
and logistical problems and crushing a minor mutiny, Anthony Wayne
finally departed from York in late May. St. Clair remained behind
to continue recruiting. 28

The October 1780 plan for sixty-one regimental equivalents divided
into two major commands did not materialize. Washington's Main Army
and subsidiary commands in the north lost the services of the 2d Parti­
san Corps and Pennsylvania's legionary corps, its artillery regiment,
and the six infantry regiments. The Southern Department fared worse.
It completely lacked the 7 infantry regiments projected for the Carolinas
and Georgia and had only 3 of the 14 authorized Virginia, Maryland, and
Delaware infantry regiments. None of the Pennsylvanians reached the area
during the first part of 1781. Greene's single artillery regiment amoun­
ted to the crews for a handful of fieldpieces, his two legionary corps
actually operated as a small cavalry regiment, and only one of the two
partisan corps remained fit for combat. On the other hand the regiments
serving in the Continental Army in 1781 contained very experienced cadres.
The reorganization left only the most competent officers and placed them
in command of efficiently organized units. During 1781 those troops
engaged in the war's decisive campaigns.

Keene to Board of War, 10 Apr 1781; St. Clair to Board of War, 5 Apr 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
Triumph at Yorktown.

The 1781 campaign conclusively demonstrated the maturity of the Continental Army as a small but effective military force. Washington and Greene wrested the strategic initiative from the British, took advantage of their troops' strengths, and adjusted plans to meet changing circumstances. Their joint actions combined with French military, naval, and financial support to create and exploit a defect in British dispositions. In October they inflicted a major defeat on Great Britain at Yorktown, Virginia, an engagement which proved to be decisive.

The year's operations began in the Carolinas. General Charles Cornwallis suffered a major setback at Cowpens on 17 January when Banastre Tarleton engaged the Southern Department's light troops under Brigadier General Daniel Morgan. Morgan had several contingents of southern irregulars, special militia units which contained a large proportion of Continental veterans, and Greene's best troops. He developed tactics which blended the talents of these diverse groups. Morgan deployed the irregulars in a double line of skirmishers, forcing Tarleton to commit his reserve before the British reached the main American line. A sharp counterattack by the Continentals shattered the disorganized British and destroyed Tarleton's force. Losses in this battle and an earlier defeat at King's Mountain eliminated most of Cornwallis' light troops. 29

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Although Cornwallis chased Greene across the Dan River into Virginia, the pursuit so debilitated his regiments that they had to withdraw to Wilmington, North Carolina, to refit. That allowed Greene time to regroup his troops, establish a supply system, and dispatch Henry Lee's 2d Partisan Corps into South Carolina to assist irregulars in harassing British outposts and lines of communications. By concentrating on quality and mobility, Greene turned the small size of his regular force into a logistical advantage. He only called out large militia contingents shortly before a battle. The rest of the time he left these part-time soldiers to restrict British reconnaissance and freedom of movement with occasional assistance from Lee and William Washington's composite detachment of Continental cavalry. 30

Greene reentered North Carolina and on 15 March fought Cornwallis at Guilford Court House. As at Cowpens, militia and irregulars in skirmish lines forced the British to deploy prematurely and inflicted heavy casualties. The Continentals then punished Cornwallis with accurate artillery and small arms fire. The Marylanders even drove back the elite Guards Brigade in a bayonet charge before Greene broke off the action. Cornwallis' losses of nearly 50 percent crippled his regiments as fighting units and ruined their morale. 31 Greene next moved against the depot at Camden. He gambled that operations in South Carolina would restore civilian morale and deprive the British of vital logistical support.

Cornwallis chose not to follow. He hoped that he could disrupt Greene's Virginia base before his own subordinates met defeat.

In a series of maneuvers and engagements Greene gradually drove Francis Rawdon and Alexander Stewart back to the coast. On 8 September he attacked Stewart's camp at Eutaw Springs. Militia and irregulars led the attack, with the Continentals in reserve. The high number of recruits in his regiments forced Greene to deploy into line sooner than planned, robbing his attack of some of its momentum. When his advance slowed, Greene committed his reserve in "a brisk charge with trailed Arms, through a heavy cannonade, and a shower of Musket Balls."

This maneuver routed the main British body. On the American side, broken terrain and casualties among key officers disrupted most units, allowing Stewart to rally some of his men in dense thickets and a large brick house. Rather than risk defeat, Greene withdrew. Eutaw Springs left the British incapable of further offensive action in the south. Cornwallis' gamble that his subordinates could hold the Carolinas and Georgia had failed.

As Greene planned his spring offensive Washington assembled the Main Army's light infantry companies, each raised to a level of at least 5 sergeants and 50 rank and file. On 19 February 1781 Washington formed them into three battalions. Lieutenant Colonel Elijah Vose's contained the companies of the 1st through 8th Massachusetts Regiments. Another, under Jean-Joseph Gimat, included the remaining 2 Massachusetts companies, the 5 from Connecticut, and Rhode Island's. Francis Barber's battalion began with the 2 New Hampshire light companies and the single light

32. Greene to Congress, 11 Sep 1781; Record Group 360, National Archives.
company of Hazen's Canadian Regiment; on 22 February it gained the 2 light plus 3 line companies from New Jersey. Lafayette took command of the light corps on 20 February.  

Benedict Arnold in his new role as a British brigadier began operating along Virginia's James River in January. Washington sent Lafayette's light infantrymen south to trap Arnold in conjunction with French warships from Newport. Shallow waters frustrated the first naval expedition while a superior British squadron drove off a second. Lafayette's Continentals remained in Virginia, however, as reinforcements from New York City and Cornwallis' column from North Carolina joined Arnold. Although Lafayette could not defeat the British, Cornwallis lacked the mobility to catch him or to prevent the arrival in Virginia of Wayne's Pennsylvanians. Wayne reorganized his provisional units into two stronger regiments on 14 July, sending excess officers back to Pennsylvania to assist in recruiting.  

While Greene and Lafayette gradually pressed the British troops in the south into a few coastal enclaves, Washington planned a Franco-American offensive to recapture New York City. By June, when he called on Rochambeau to march his expeditionary corps from Rhode Island, the Main

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Army and its outposts contained 8 brigades, Hazen's regiment, 2 artillery regiments, 1 legionary corps, and various special units. Including the light corps with Lafayette (about 1,300 men), the infantry portion of Washington's force amounted to 61 field, 623 company, and 118 staff officers, 810 sergeants, 461 drummers and fifers, and 7,854 rank and file. The regiments remained 120 officers, 295 sergeants, 166 drummers and fifers, and 6,510 rank and file below authorized levels, a discouraging fact. The artillery accounted for another 91 officers and 711 men, short 45 officers and 597 men; Sheldon's legion had 23 of 32 officers and 303 of 423 men. Rochambeau added over 5,000 experienced, professional troops in 4 2-battalion infantry regiments, a legion, 6 artillery companies, 2 companies of miners, and a company of bombardiers. They had recently participated in the French war games that tested the latest developments in military theory. Washington also expected Admiral the Comte de Grasse to move up from the West Indies with additional troops and a large naval squadron.

Washington and Rochambeau joined forces at Dobbs Ferry, New York, on 6 July. Morale climbed still more with the news that the frigate Resolue had reached Philadelphia from France with arms, clothing, medicines, and two million livres in cash. When he learned that de Grasse intended to sail to the Chesapeake rather than come directly to New York, Washington agreed with Rochambeau and decided to attack Cornwallis. Washington took

35. General Return, Main Army, Jun 1781; Record Group 93, National Archives.
about half of the Main Army and all of the French troops south. General Heath, assisted by Generals McDougall, Stirling, and Stark, remained behind to secure West Point and the northern frontier. They relied on militia and state troops plus the New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Connecticut infantry regiments, the Invalids, the 3d Continental Artillery Regiment, and the 2d Legionary Corps. Extraordinary efforts by Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris and allied logistical staffs, drawing heavily on French cash, handled the largest and most complex troop movement of the war with skill and dispatch. Washington's shrewd use of deception obscured the change in plans from the British until they were powerless to intervene. 37

De Grasse's squadron defeated a British fleet off the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay on 5 September, completing the isolation of Cornwallis. Washington opened his headquarters at Williamsburg ten days later and began organizing the allied troops for siege operations. Major General Benjamin Lincoln, the senior American commander, took charge of the allied Right Wing. The six Continental brigades formed divisions under Lincoln, Lafayette, and Steuben and acted as the first line of the American wing. Virginia militia formed the second line. The Continental force amounted to 41 field, 355 company, and 66 staff officers, 547 sergeants, 272 drummers and fifers, and 6,412 rank and file. Militia contributed another 188 officers and 3,426 men. Rochambeau commanded the

Left Wing which consisted of his own corps and some 3,000 troops from the West Indies under the Marquis de St. Simon.\textsuperscript{38}

Washington advanced on the evening of 28 September, urging the troops to place their principle reliance on the Bayonet, that they may prove the Vanity of the Boast which the British make of their particular prowess in deciding Battles with that Weapon.\textsuperscript{39}

Surprisingly, Cornwallis abandoned an outer line of defenses and enabled Washington to complete investment with only minor casualties. The siege itself followed formal European practices. Engineers started trenches during the night of 6-7 October at a range of 600 yards. Batteries opened fire on the ninth and quickly silenced defensive guns. A second or inner ring of trenches followed on the evening of 11-12 October. Because two detached redoubts threatened to outflank this new line Washington stormed them on 14 October. The French attacked one and Lafayette's light infantry assaulted the other. Preceded by a detachment of Sappers and Miners to cut a patch through obstacles, one of Lafayette's columns charged directly into the little fort while the other cut off retreat. American pride soared when they secured their objective more quickly than the elite French chasseurs and grenadiers. New batteries opened fire on the sixteenth, convincing Cornwallis that further resistance was hopeless. On 19 October his troops laid down their arms.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{38} Weekly Return, Main Army, 13 Oct 1781; Record Group 93, National Archives. Fitzpatrick, \textit{Writings of Washington}, 23: 134-5, 146-7.
\textsuperscript{39} General Orders, 27 Sep 1781; \textit{Ibid.}, 23: 147.
Plans to continue the offensive against other British garrisons in the south ended when de Grasse announced that his fleet had to return to the West Indies. Rochambeau decided to winter in Virginia, allowing the Continental to split up. Major General St. Clair took some to reinforce Greene, arriving at Round O, South Carolina, on 4 January 1782. He had two Delaware companies, the 3d and 4th Maryland Regiments, a provisional Virginia regiment, Wayne's two Pennsylvania regiments and a third which arrived at Yorktown after the siege, plus all available mounted troopers from the 1st, 3d, and 4th Legionary Corps. Greene quickly regrouped the Pennsylvanians into two strong regiments, disbanded his 5th Maryland Regiment to fill the other four from that state, and transferred his Delaware men to the new companies. Armand's 1st Partisan Corps had to remain in Virginia because it required a more extensive re-organization, beginning with the transfer of fifty men from the light infantry corps.

Most of the rest of the Continentals marched from Yorktown under Lincoln and joined Heath in the Highlands. On arrival the light corps broke up and the individual companies returned to their regiments for the winter. Hazen's regiment escorted prisoners to Lancaster, and then

assumed responsibility for guarding the depot there. Lamb's regiment, initially assisted by the Sappers and Miners, transported the siege train and over 200 captured British pieces to Elkton, Maryland. The captured guns went on to Philadelphia to be overhauled by an artificer company; the field pieces accompanied the brigades to West Point; and Lamb's regiment camped for the winter at Burlington, New Jersey, with the siege train. It did not resume its march to West Point until August.

Washington spent the winter at Philadelphia to discuss the future with Congress. The Continental Army had met the challenge during 1781. Greene's army, Lafayette's contingent, and Washington's Franco-American forces completely altered the course of the war. Yorktown ended British hopes of overrunning the south and reduced the enemy to a few footholds. French financial, naval, and military aid played a major role in achieving victory at Yorktown, but the Continentals' own battlefield prowess and superior mobility set the stage for the denouement. Washington had every reason to be proud of the year's combat, but he still had to face recurring economic problems and the failure of the states to furnish their full quotas of men.

The Road to Newburgh.

During the last two years of the Revolution the Continental Army did not engage in any major battles. Lack of French naval support prevented assaults on the remaining British strongholds, and changed political conditions in England made it clear that peace would be negotiated. Congress and the American people, weary of a long war, increased the pressure on the military establishment to reduce costs. Washington's role in gradually dismantling the Army became one of his most important contributions to the new nation because he guided it through a severe political crisis.

Washington's winter conferences with Congress quickly established that the delegates wanted to trim expenses. They limited the number of generals on active duty for the first time and reviewed staff organizations for ways to reduce costs. A committee recommended cutting the number of infantry regiments and the proportion of officers since:

the Class of Men who are willing to become Soldiers is much diminished by the War and therefore the Difficulties of raising an Army equal to former Establishments have increased and will continue to increase.  

Washington countered with arguments that the Army had eliminated regiments faster since 1777 than the British, that captured documents indicated that the British had more Loyalists on their rolls than he had Continentals, and that combat experience showed that the ratio of officers to men was already too low. He won his case for the time being, but on 23 April 1782 Congress overturned one of the important features of the 1781 regiment in the interest of economy. The delegates eliminated three

lieutenants from each regiment and ordered that company officers perform the functions of adjutant, quartermaster, and recruiter. 45

Congress' 1782 economy drive concentrated on the Army's support structure. It used the new permanent executive "ministers" as the primary vehicle for making changes. Robert Morris, who became Superintendent of Finance on 20 February 1781, played a major role. Even more important was the Secretary of War, the office filled on 30 October 1781 by Benjamin Lincoln. Lincoln's official functions were quite similar to the Board of War's and his English counterpart's. In practice he acted as Washington's liaison with Congress and Morris. Under Lincoln the War Office relied on an assistant, a secretary, and two clerks, and on the part-time use of line officers to eliminate most staff officials. Congress did insist on reducing many of the individuals concerned with the direct support of the field armies, particularly those concerned with transportation, although Washington protested that the change impaired the Army's mobility.

Washington reached Newburgh on 31 March 1782 and formally resumed command in the north four days later. A private's letter written at that time reflects the conditions he found: "Times are very dubros sic at present for there is no news of Peace as yet. But the armies are all

well disciplined and in wonderful good spirits and draw very good provisions." By the Continental Army's standards conditions were good. The Highlands area contained long-established depots and housing. Training programs existed. Yorktown had raised morale. The army also included a high proportion of hardened veterans able to make the most of their circumstances.

In June Washington and Steuben began monthly comprehensive brigade inspections designed to evaluate appearance, unit paperwork, maneuvers, and marksmanship. Washington liked the overall performance and competitive spirit of the exercises, but warned the men to remember that "It is the effect of the shot not the report of the Gun that can discomfort the Enemy and if a bad habit is acquired at exercise it will prevail in real action." This rigorous training program culminated on 31 August. Washington moved the Main Army's camp from Newburgh to Verplanck's Point to simplify subsistence. In the process he tested the feasibility of an amphibious attack on New York. Five brigades, including fieldpieces, embarked in batteaux followed by other boats with baggage. Boat assignments kept units intact and careful alignment insured cohesion and rapid deployment as the craft reached the landing zone. This experiment was a striking success and indicated that if de Grasse's warships had been available for a real assault, Washington's veterans probably would have been able to capture Manhattan.

48. Ibid., 24: 322.
Washington also established a system of rewards in 1782 to enhance morale. He authorized an honorary badge, a chevron worn on the left sleeve of the uniform coat, for all enlisted men who "served more than three years with bravery, fidelity and good conduct." Two chevrons represented six years of such service. The Badge of Military Merit, a heart of purple silk edged with narrow lace and worn over the left lapel, became a special decoration. Washington proudly proclaimed that "The road to glory in a patriot army and a free country is thus open to all." He only granted three of these awards, all in 1783.

In August 1782, when Washington practiced the Verplanck's Point landing, his forces in the northern half of the nation included eight brigades, Hazen's regiment, two artillery regiments, a legionary corps, and the smaller specialist units. The infantry contributed 67 field, 475 company, and 119 staff officers, 813 sergeants, 448 drummers and fifers, and 9,210 rank and file. That amounted to roughly two-thirds of authorized strength. The two artillery regiments contained 100 officers and 907 men, the Invalids 27 officers and 337 men, and the Sappers and Miners 5 officers and 77 men. Sheldon's 2d Legionary Corps and the Marechaussée contributed 30 officers and 355 men, raising the basic strength at Washington's disposal to about 800 officers and 12,000 men. Because of the shortage of recruits, Washington bowed to Congress' desire to reduce the Army still further. On 7 August Congress ordered

50. Ibid., 24: 488.
51. Ibid., 24: 487-8; 25: 7, 142; 26: 363-4, 481. Recipients of the Badge of Military Merit were Sergeants William Brown (formerly of the 5th Connecticut Regiment) and Elijah Churchill of the 2d Legionary Corps, and a Sergeant Bissel of the 2d Connecticut Regiment. Qualification for the Badge was based on a combination of gallantry in action and overall meritorious service.
all state lines to reform on the first of the year into complete regiments containing no fewer than 500 rank and file. It did restore, on 19 November, the regimental adjutant and quartermaster positions to full staff status. At Washington's suggestion junior regiments disbanded to provide the personnel to fill the remaining units.  

On 1 January 1783 New York retained its two full regiments. Connecticut reduced its line to 3 regiments and Massachusetts to 8, each of which amounted to at least 500 rank and file. Because New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and New Jersey all came close to this minimum strength, Washington obtained special permission from Congress to delay their reorganization until 1 March. Those states complained that this policy amounted to a disproportionate quota and failed to furnish the necessary recruits. On 1 March the 2d New Hampshire and 2d New Jersey Regiments were reduced to battalion strength. Each had 4 companies, 2 field officers, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a paymaster, and either a surgeon or a mate. The Rhode Island Regiment formed a similar battalion with six companies.

Greene faced greater problems during 1782 although the British evacuated Savannah on 11 July and Charleston on 14 December. The southern army only engaged in skirmishing during this period, but its less stable provisional regiments suffered greater neglect than Washington's

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units. Washington directed Greene to rebuild the lines from Georgia and the Carolinas so that the other regiments gradually could shift back to the Main Army. As a preliminary step he halted the movement of recruits from Pennsylvania and Maryland to the south.54

Greene's Pennsylvanians reorganized as a single provisional regiment under Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar on 4 November 1782. On 1 January Congress reduced the Pennsylvania line on paper from six to three regiments which remained depot cadres in contrast to Harmar's crack combat unit. Greene handled the permanent Maryland regiments differently. The 3d and 4th disbanded and transferred personnel to the 1st and 2d. A detachment of new Maryland recruits served with the Main Army in 1782 under Major Thomas Lansdale as a first step towards eventual movement of the line back to the north. The last two companies of the Delaware Regiment went home. The men received extended furloughs when they reached Christiana Bridge on 17 January 1783.55

Greene simply released the short-term Virginia troops as their enlistments expired. The state's permanent regiments reorganized on 1 January. All but two disbanded. The arrangement retained officers in proportion to the number of enlisted men remaining from the old regiments. The 1st Virginia Regiment formed at the Winchester replacement depot.

The 2d, only partially filled, contained the Virginians on duty at Fort Pitt. Virginia's portion of the 1st Continental Artillery Regiment became a single overstrength company under Captain William Pierce; the Maryland portion remained a single company with Greene. The 1st and 3d Legionary Corps formally consolidated as a five-troop unit.

Stabilized conditions in 1782 promised hope for reestablishing the Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina lines. Only North Carolina had real success, following efforts to raise 1,500 men for a period of eighteen months' service. Greene temporarily formed them into two regiments and on 2 November permanently organized them as a regiment and a battalion. The South Carolina legislature decided to reorganize two regiments, but even after the evacuation of Charleston made no progress. Georgia planned to form its regiment and on 29 July 1782 even decided to mount two companies. Major John Habersham recruited some pardoned Loyalists, but the unit never reached strength. Congress did not approve the projected variation in its composition.

The winter months of 1782-1783, when the Army adjusted to the new quotas, became a critical period in national politics. Various groups


realized that the war would end shortly and that they had to act quickly to obtain special goals. One group of politicians wanted to increase the powers of the central government and hoped to use the military to pressure Congress into adopting a taxation program devised by Robert Morris. Officers and enlisted men sought to relieve their own financial problems by collecting back pay and securing promised benefits before the Army disbanded. Discontent began to mount in the Main Army's winter quarters at Newburgh. Washington sympathized with both groups but had real fears that the troops might get out of hand. He warned Congress that he would spend the winter in camp and "try like a careful physician to prevent if possible the disorders getting to an incurable height."58

Hints that Congress might renounce the promise of half pay made in 1778 precipitated action. General McDougall, accompanied by Colonels John Brooks and Matthias Ogden, carried a petition to Philadelphia in January. Unlike earlier protests, the officers this time spoke for the entire Army. Washington, who personally favored stronger central government, wrote private letters to several delegates from the nationalist faction. He reminded them that the petitioners deserved the first claim on Congress' resources. A committee reported favorably on the petition, but Congress defeated a resolution offering to commute the pensions with

a sum equal to five years' pay. Attention turned immediately to the Main Army to see how the Continentals would react. A generation that matured listening to rhetoric about the dangers of a "standing army" fully expected trouble. 59

Alexander Hamilton, now a delegate from New York, urged Washington, with moderation, to use the Army's demands to push Congress towards strengthening the national government. Joseph Jones, a more cautious nationalist delegate from Virginia, gave the Commander-in-Chief a clearer picture of Congress' financial problems. He also warned Washington that

The ambition of some, and the pressure of distress in others; may produce dangerous combinations .... If there are men in the army who harbour wicked designs, and are determined to blow the coals of discord, they will greatly endeavour to hurt the reputation of those adverse to their projects. 60

Washington's views came closer to Jones' than Hamilton's. Although he decided not to become openly involved in a political matter, he prepared to neutralize a small group within the Army who might act. 61

Those malcontents centered around Horatio Gates, who had rejoined the Main Army on 5 October 1782. 62 In March Major John Armstrong,

62. George Mesam to John Armstrong (copy), 14 Sep 1780; William Clajon, another Gates protege, fed Gates poisonous comments on Washington ("George IV") and his Congressional supporters ("the Sanhedrin") in letters of 1 Mar and / 11-14/ Apr 1781 and 10 Mar and 13 Apr 1782; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
Gates' aide, prepared an anonymous address to the Army which Gates saw and approved. This document called upon the officers to plan a course of action to pressure Congress. Armstrong later explained that the purpose of the address was

to prepare their minds for some manly, vigorous Association with the other public Creditors - but the timid wretch / probably either John Brooks or Walter Stewart / discovered it to the only man / Washington / from whom he had expressly engaged to make it known - to be more explicit he betrayed it to the Commander in Chief - who, agreeably the original plan, was not to have been consulted till some later period.63

The First Newburgh Address appeared publicly on 10 March, followed two days later by a second. Washington reacted swiftly by calling for a general assembly of officers, warning Congress in the meantime that, although the delay would allow time for hotheads to cool, Congress would have to alleviate the underlying problems. With fine dramatic flair Washington dominated the officers' meeting on 15 March. He fumbled through the first paragraph of a prepared speech, then put on a pair of glasses, murmuring that he had not only grown grey in the service of his country, but he was also going blind. The speech condemned the addresses as a call to mutiny and suggested that the author was a British agent. The officers, some of whom broke down and cried, quietly adopted a very moderate petition to Congress.64

Delegates, regardless of their political views, overwhelmingly approved of Washington's brilliant handling of the crisis. On 22 March, the same day that Washington's report arrived, the Connecticut delegation reversed itself and Congress approved commutation. The officers

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63. Armstrong to Gates, 22 and 29 Apr 1783; Gates Papers, New-York Historical Society.
64. Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington, 26: 211-8, 222-7, 229-34, 323-5.
accepted that offer, ending any threat of a coup as well as the ideologi-
cal problem that the half-pay pensions had posed.65 This settlement
and the news on 12 March of the preliminary peace treaty cleared the
way for Congress to dismantle the Army. It ordered an end to hostili-
ties on 11 April and gave approval to the text of the preliminary treaty
four days later. Washington implemented the armistice at noon on 19
April -- eight years to the day after the first shots at Lexington.66

Washington and Lincoln promptly worked out the mechanics of dis-
banding the Army, and Congress adopted a general resolution on the sub-
ject on 23 April. The policy represented a compromise between those
who hesitated to act until the British evacuated their last posts and
others who wished a swift disbandment to stop expenses. Congress decided
that duration enlistments expired only with the ratification of a de-
finitive treaty but allowed the Commander-in-Chief to furlough the troops
at his discretion. That device enabled the Army to reassemble if nego-
tiations collapsed. Other instructions on 26 May specified that all
detachments march home under the control of officers and allowed the
men to keep their arms as a bonus.67

65. Ibid., 26: 221-2, 285-93. Ford, Journals of Congress, 24: 207-
10. Burnett, Letters of Congress, 7: 88-90, 93, 106-8, 110-1, 246-8,
376-88. Syrett, Hamilton Papers, 3: 317-21. Christopher Collier,
Connecticut in the Continental Congress (Chester, Conn.: Pequot
from Connecticut, and cost Eliphalet Dyer and Erastus Wolcott their
political careers.
161-2. Ford, Journals of Congress, 24: 253-4, 269-71, 275-6, 358-61,
Washington announced the furlough policy on 2 June. General Heath supervised the arrangement of the remaining men into units. Heath completed his task on 15 June and six days later the Main Army moved into garrison at West Point. The force consisted of 4 infantry regiments from Massachusetts, 1 from Connecticut, 5 companies from New Hampshire, 2 from Hazen’s regiment, and 6 artillery companies: 2 from the 2d Continental Artillery Regiment and 4 from the 3d. A provisional light corps under Lieutenant Colonel William Hull marched into Westchester County to help restore civil government to that strife-torn region.68 The rest of the Army, including the troops from the Southern and Western Departments, went home on furlough.

On 17 August 1783 Washington turned command of West Point over to Knox and set out for Congress.69 The previous year and a half had presented difficult challenges which he had successfully met. In 1782 he sustained morale in the absence of action and honed the Main Army to its peak of training and efficiency. At Newburgh he crushed the first hint of army action which went against the ideals of the Revolution. During June he supervised the reduction of a wartime Continental Army to a small force suited to peacetime missions. Washington now turned his attention to the composition of that “peace establishment.”

69. Ibid., 27: 111.
The important transformation to a peacetime force still faced Washington and Congress in the fall of 1783. Objections to a Continental Army enlisted for the duration of the war ended in late 1776 when Congress realized that single-year regiments modeled on the provincials of the colonial period did not fit the realities of a long war. Those same ideological arguments resurfaced, however, during the debate over the legality of any permanent army in peacetime. The framework of discussion established in 1783 and 1784 colored the development of the United States Army for the remainder of the century. 70

Planning actually began in April 1783 at the request of Alexander Hamilton's Congressional committee appointed to investigate the subject. The commander-in-chief discussed options with key officers before submitting the Army's official views to Hamilton on 2 May. Significantly, the generals agreed on the basic needs of a peace establishment. Washington recommended four components: a small regular army, a uniformly trained and organized militia, a system of arsenals, and a military academy. He wanted four infantry regiments, each assigned to a specific sector of the frontier, plus an artillery regiment. The regimental organizations he proposed followed Continental Army patterns in general but provided for expanded strength in wartime. Washington expected the militia to serve as a reserve for the regulars and the military academy to train artillery and engineering officers. Steuben and Duportail

70. The best discussion of military policy from the establishment of the peacetime force through the start of the Jefferson administration is Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783-1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975).
submitted separate proposals which largely echoed Washington's for Congress' consideration.

Congress tabled the report of Hamilton's committee on 12 May, but realized that some troops had to remain on duty until the British evacuated New York City and several frontier posts. The delegates told Washington to release the men enlisted for the duration on furloughs and retain those enlisted for fixed periods as temporary garrisons. A detachment of the latter from West Point reoccupied New York City without incident on 25 November. Unfortunately, Steuben's July effort to negotiate a transfer of the frontier forts with General Frederick Haldimand collapsed and the British retained control of them into the 1790's. The failure of that plan and the realization that most remaining enlistments expired before June 1784 led Washington to order Knox, his choice as the commander of the peacetime army, to release all but 500 infantry and 100 artillerymen. The former regrouped as Jackson's Continental Regiment under Colonel Henry Jackson of Massachusetts. The single artillery company, John Doughty's New Yorkers, came from the remnants of the 2d Continental Artillery Regiment.\(^2\)


Congress' proclamation on 18 October 1783 which thanked the troops for faithful service also approved Washington's reductions. The Commander-in-Chief released his own Farewell Order to the Philadelphia newspapers for nationwide distribution to the furloughed men. In the message he expressed his gratitude to the officers and men for their assistance and reminded them that

The singular interpositions of Providence in our feeble condition were such, as could scarcely escape the attention of the most unobserving; while the unparalleled perseverance of the Armies of the United States, through almost every possible suffering and discouragement for the space of eight long years, was little short of a standing miracle.\(^73\)

Washington believed that blending persons from every colony into "one patriotic band of Brothers" represented a major accomplishment, and he called on the veterans to continue this devotion in civilian life.\(^74\)

Washington said a personal farewell to the Main Army's remaining officers on 4 December at Fraunces' Tavern in New York City. On 23 December he appeared in Congress, then sitting at Annapolis, and returned his commission as Commander-in-Chief

Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of Action; and bidding an Affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life.\(^75\)

Congress ended the War of American Independence on 14 January 1784 by

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73. Ibid., 27: 223.
ratifying the definitive peace treaty that had been signed in Paris on 3 September 1783. 76

Congress rejected Washington’s large peacetime force in June and October 1783. Nationalists could not secure enough support for that plan. Moderate delegates offered an alternative in April 1784 which scaled the army down to 900 men in one artillery and three infantry battalions. Congress rejected the idea in part because New York objected to retaining a predominantly Massachusetts force which might side with its home state in a territorial dispute. Another plan calling for retaining 350 of the existing men and recruiting 700 new soldiers also failed to win support. On 2 June 1784 Congress ordered the discharge of all remaining men except for 25 caretakers at Fort Pitt and 55 at West Point. The next day it created the peace establishment. 77

The plan required four states to raise 700 men for a single year's service. Congress instructed the Secretary at War to form them into eight infantry and two artillery companies. Pennsylvania’s quota of 260 men allowed it to nominate the lieutenant colonel, the senior officer. New York and Connecticut each had to raise 165 men and nominate a major; the remaining 110 men came from New Jersey. Economy dominated this proposal for each major served as a company commander and line

officers performed all staff duties except chaplain, surgeon, and surgeon's mate. Under Josiah Harmar the First American Regiment slowly organized and achieved permanent status as an infantry regiment of the Regular Army.

This small peacetime Regular Army gradually expanded over the next decade, led by Continental veterans. It inherited the rules, regulations, and traditions of the Continental Army. Steuben's Blue Book remained the official manual for the regulars, as well as the militia of most states, until Winfield Scott adapted the 1791 French Army Regulations for American use. At Fallen Timbers in 1794 Anthony Wayne applied the techniques of wilderness operations perfected by Sullivan's 1779 expedition against the Iroquois. The integration of ex-Continental soldiers into the militia, coupled with the passage of a national militia bill in 1792, improved the military responsiveness of that institution until the veterans began to age.

America's victory in the War of American Independence surprised many European observers. Frenchmen tended to attribute it to a frontier mystique: "it may be asserted that North-America is entirely military, and inured to war, and that new levies may continually be made

without making new soldiers." 79 Loyalists and some British observers suggested instead that the British did more to lose the war than the Americans did to win it. 80 Many modern historians feel that the British faced insurmountable logistical obstacles and suffered from bad leadership, particularly on the political level. Others see the militia, either as guerrillas or as the enforcement arm of Revolutionary government, as the most important military institution. It limited British authority to those areas physically occupied by troops. As the war became a global struggle, Great Britain's manpower reserves could not sustain the strain. 81

The militia did play a very important role in the War of American Independence. Particularly in the first several years of the war its political functions probably were indispensable. As a military institution the militia, supported by state troops, continued the traditional colonial responsibility for local defense and remained a general reserve of men in arms. It could not operate effectively as a main battle force at any distance from home or for an extended period of time. Congress recognized that fact from the beginning of the war and turned to full-time

regular troops, the Continentals. As long as a field army of Continentals remained in the vicinity, a British commander had to concentrate on it, not on the militia.

Britain's defeat cannot be explained solely by the problems of a 3,000-mile line of communications. The mother country sustained a war effort for eight years, five of them after North America became a secondary theater in a global conflict. Logistics and the Atlantic acted as a handicap, particularly by increasing the interval between the time a casualty occurred and the arrival of a replacement, yet the British consistently placed more regulars and military supplies in their commanders' hands than Congress did. British seapower, unchallenged by America, could have been extremely valuable along the coast. Washington's forces offset it in the field with better organization of land transport. American commanders used their mobility to outmaneuver their opponents. When forced to flee, as in the retreat through New Jersey or Greene's race to the Dan, they could always escape to secure areas and reorganize. That ability to outdistance pursuit also robbed British battlefield victories of decisive impact.

Continental infantry regiments generally had superior organization after 1775. The official structure approved by Congress, usually reflecting Washington's desires, made American units more efficient on paper than British or German. Greater line combat strength, higher ratios of officers and noncommissioned officers, and a developed regimental staff produced a powerful and responsive regiment. In practice units of both combatants operated below ideal strength. Continental regiments, however, normally sustained company officer and noncommissioned
officer levels better than their opponents', preserving the leadership essential for a prompt response to changing tactical situations. The British never matched the permanent brigade instituted by the Continentals in 1777. These factors allowed the Americans greater control even in semi-dispersed formations and suited the Continental Army's belief in infantry marksmanship. The two-rank battle formation enhanced this advantage. Honed by a doctrine of aimed fire and the use of training which included target practice, the Continentals often inflicted heavier casualties on the British in a battle and dominated skirmishes.

Knox's artillerymen used better organization and doctrine. They employed the newer concept of concentrating fire on infantry targets; the British used counterbattery fire. Particularly at Monmouth tactical use of regimental headquarters as an intervening echelon of command enabled Knox to mass guns for a specific transitory mission. More important, assigning a company of artillery to each permanent brigade developed close teamwork between the arms. Rotating companies between garrison, general support, and direct support assignments maintained training and insured that every company could perform any mission in an emergency. Once Americans overcame early procurement problems Knox could tailor the armament of each company to its specific task.

The mounted arm of the Continental Army never had the opportunity to develop into a battlefield force, although William Washington's troopers gave a fine account of themselves in the later phases of southern operations. The dragoons did perform well in the original mission of reconnaissance. Theoretical development and practical necessity combined to produce the 1781 legion, an excellent configuration for carrying out this role in the prevailing conditions. The partisan corps, a European concept, developed into an excellent long-range independent force that could stiffen local irregulars.

A well-rounded group of support troops backed the combat units. Unlike the British Army, Washington had specialized units to perform ordnance, maintenance, quartermaster, and military police functions. Highly trained engineers, both officers and units, functioned well in offensive or defensive assignments after 1777. All units, presided over by a competent general staff, functioned by 1782 as a team equal or superior in quality to any European army of the day.

The officers of the Continental Army in the beginning owed their selection to political rather than military credentials. Yet in crises over the years, including the Newburgh incident, they justified their reputation for reliability. Experience nurtured latent talents and produced an effective team of commanders, although few individual members could be called "great captains." Once his trusted subordinates (Greene, Heath, Sullivan, Stirling, Lincoln, and McDougall particularly) became commanders of territorial departments, Washington assumed a more active role in general policy. His practice of consulting with his subordinates, usually in a Council of War, has frequently been wrongly
interpreted to mean that a committee ruled the Army. This conclusion misjudges his desire to allow each officer to state his opinions and feel that he was participating in the war effort. Washington, however, was the Commander-in-Chief in every respect. He alone carried the burden, and to him is due the credit. Even his opponents understood that basic fact. 83

Although tradition in the United States depicts the Continental Army as a hardy group of yeomen farmers and middle-class tradesmen under amateur officers defeating one of the best European armies in the world, an army of lower class troops commanded by aristocrats, after 1776 the Continental Army did not fit that image. The long-term Continentals also tended to come from the poorer, rootless elements of American society to whom the Army, despite its problems, seemed to offer greater opportunity than civilian life. Enlisted men were young (over half were under twenty-two when they enlisted), mostly common laborers, and so poor as to be virtually tax-exempt. A sizeable minority were either hired substitutes or not native to the place where they enlisted. 84

The officer corps, on the other hand, came from the upper social strata. In the deferential society of eighteenth-century America members of the leading families naturally assumed leadership in the regular forces just as they did in the militia, politics, law, the church, and business. Although it was possible for an enlisted man to become an officer, particularly during the reorganizations of 1776 and 1777, Washington's desire to maintain the distance between officers and men as a disciplinary tool kept them from rising far. In small colonies a basic family unit, reinforced by cousins, in-laws, political allies, and business associates dominated entire regiments.

In a force of this nature discipline posed a problem. Desertion rates ran high, although few men actively joined the British. Basic morale factors explained this phenomenon during the Revolution. Washington coped by developing, in conjunction with his Judge Advocates, a system that adapted British military justice to the conditions of American society in the 1770's. His approach was mild by contemporary European standards, but extremely sophisticated. He executed a few individuals for particularly serious crimes. The rest of the time Washington preferred to issue last-second reprieves that extracted a maximum psychological advantage from a situation that resembled a morality play.

Washington led the Continental Army to victory in the longest war in American history before Vietnam. Together he and his men overcame physical and spiritual obstacles which at times appeared insurmountable.

Washington's ability to hold the Army together stands as a tribute to his inspirational leadership and great judgement. That he also moulded it into a crack professional fighting force and then disbanded it without incident when economic considerations forced him to do so won him great praise from his contemporaries, for it conformed to the highest standards expected by men schooled in the Whiggish tradition.
APPENDIX

PRINCIPAL OFFICERS OF THE CONTINENTAL ARMY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Duration of War</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
<td>George Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, Eastern</td>
<td>Artemas Ward</td>
<td>4 Apr 1776-20 Mar 1777</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>William Heath</td>
<td>20 Mar 1777-7 Nov 1778</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Horatio Gates</td>
<td>7 Nov 1778-Nov 1779</td>
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<td>Commander, Northern</td>
<td>Philip Schuyler</td>
<td>25 Jun 1775-19 Aug 1777</td>
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<tr>
<td>(New York) Department</td>
<td>Horatio Gates</td>
<td>19 Aug 1777-17 Apr 1778</td>
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<td></td>
<td>John Stark</td>
<td>17 Apr 1778-19 Oct 1778</td>
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<td>Edward Hand</td>
<td>19 Oct 1778-20 Nov 1778</td>
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<td></td>
<td>James Clinton</td>
<td>20 Nov 1778-25 Jun 1781</td>
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<td>25 Jun 1781-15 Oct 1781</td>
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<td>15 Oct 1781-21 Nov 1781</td>
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<td>21 Nov 1781-29 Aug 1782</td>
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<td>Commander, Highlands</td>
<td>William Heath</td>
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<td>Department</td>
<td>Alexander McDougall</td>
<td>21 Dec 1776-12 May 1777</td>
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<td>Israel Putnam</td>
<td>12 May 1777-16 Mar 1778</td>
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<td>16 Mar 1778-20 May 1778</td>
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<td>20 May 1778-24 Nov 1778</td>
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<td>24 Nov 1778-27 Nov 1779</td>
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<td>27 Nov 1779-21 Feb 1780</td>
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<td>Robert Howe b</td>
<td>21 Feb 1780-21 Jun 1780</td>
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<td>Alexander McDougall</td>
<td>21 Jun 1780-3 Aug 1780</td>
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<td>Benedict Arnold</td>
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<td>George Washington</td>
<td>25-28 Sep 1780</td>
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<td>Alexander McDougall</td>
<td>28 Sep 1780-5 Oct 1780</td>
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<td>Nathanael Greene</td>
<td>5-17 Oct 1780</td>
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<td>William Heath</td>
<td>17 Oct 1780-11 May 1781</td>
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<td>John Paterson b</td>
<td>11 May 1781-24 Jun 1781</td>
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<td>Alexander McDougall</td>
<td>24 Jun 1781-18 Jan 1782</td>
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<td>William Heath</td>
<td>18 Jan 1782-24 Aug 1782</td>
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<td>Henry Knox</td>
<td>24 Aug 1782-end of war</td>
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<td>Commander, Southern</td>
<td>Charles Lee</td>
<td>1 Mar 1776-9 Sep 1776</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Robert Howe</td>
<td>9 Sep 1776-25 Sep 1778</td>
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<td>Benjamin Lincoln</td>
<td>25 Sep 1776-13 Jun 1780</td>
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<td>Horatio Gates</td>
<td>13 Jun 1780-31 Oct 1780</td>
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<td>Nathanael Greene</td>
<td>31 Oct 1780-end of war</td>
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a. Lord Stirling.  
b. Acting.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commander, Western</strong></td>
<td>Edward Hand</td>
<td>10 Apr 1777-26 May 1778</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Department</strong></td>
<td>Lachlan McIntosh</td>
<td>26 May 1778-20 Feb 1779</td>
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<td>Daniel Brodhead</td>
<td>5 Mar 1779-24 Sep 1781</td>
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<td>William Irvine</td>
<td>24 Sep 1781-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commander, Canadian</strong></td>
<td>Richard Montgomery&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9 Dec 1775-31 Dec 1775</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Department</strong></td>
<td>David Wooster&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>31 Dec 1775-6 Mar 1776</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Charles Lee&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17 Feb 1776-1 Mar 1776</td>
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<td>John Thomas</td>
<td>6 Mar 1776-1 Jun 1776</td>
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<td>John Sullivan</td>
<td>1 Jan 1776-2 Jul 1776</td>
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<td>Horatio Gates&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>17 Jun 1776</td>
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<td><strong>Adjutant General</strong></td>
<td>Horatio Gates</td>
<td>17 Jun 1775-5 Jun 1776</td>
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<td>Joseph Reed</td>
<td>5 Jun 1776-13 Jan 1777</td>
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<td>VACANT</td>
<td>14 Jan 1777-17 Jun 1777</td>
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<td>Timothy Pickering</td>
<td>18 Jun 1777-5 Jan 1778</td>
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<td>Alexander Scammell</td>
<td>5 Jan 1778-8 Jan 1781</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Edward Hand</td>
<td>8 Jan 1781-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Paymaster General</strong></td>
<td>James Warren</td>
<td>27 Jul 1775-19 Apr 1776</td>
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<td>William Palfrey</td>
<td>27 Apr 1776-14 Dec 1780</td>
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<td>John Pierce</td>
<td>17 Jan 1781-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Mustermaster General</strong></td>
<td>Stephen Moylan</td>
<td>11 Aug 1775-7 Jun 1776</td>
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<td>Gunning Bedford</td>
<td>18 Jun 1776-10 Apr 1777</td>
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<td>Joseph Ward</td>
<td>10 Apr 1777-1 Mar 1780</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Judge Advocate</strong></td>
<td>William Tudor</td>
<td>30 Jul 1775-10 Apr 1777</td>
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<td>John Laurence</td>
<td>10 Apr 1777-3 Jun 1782</td>
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<td>4 Jun 1782-1 Oct 1782</td>
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<td>Thomas Edwards</td>
<td>2 Oct 1782-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Inspector General</strong></td>
<td>Thomas Conway&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>13 Dec 1777-28 Apr 1778</td>
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<td>Frederick Steuben</td>
<td>28 Mar 1778-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Quartermaster General</strong></td>
<td>Thomas Mifflin</td>
<td>14 Aug 1775-7 Jun 1776</td>
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<td>Stephen Moylan</td>
<td>7 Jun 1776-28 Sep 1776</td>
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<td>Thomas Mifflin</td>
<td>28 Sep 1776-7 Nov 1777</td>
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<td>8 Nov 1777-1 Mar 1778</td>
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<td>Nathanael Greene</td>
<td>2 Mar 1778-5 Aug 1780</td>
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<td>5 Aug 1780-end of war</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commissary General</strong></td>
<td>Joseph Trumbull</td>
<td>19 Jul 1775-18 Jun 1777</td>
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<tr>
<td>of Purchases</td>
<td>Joseph Trumbull</td>
<td>18 Jun 1777-5 Aug 1777</td>
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<td>William Buchanan</td>
<td>5 Aug 1777-9 Apr 1778</td>
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<td>Jeremiah Wadsworth</td>
<td>9 Apr 1778-2 Dec 1779</td>
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<td>Ephraim Blaine</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Charles Stewart</td>
<td>18 Jun 1777-Nov 1781</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Acting.

<sup>b</sup> Appointed but never served in that capacity.

<sup>c</sup> Appointed but troops withdrawn from department before assumed command.
GLOSSARY

AGENT. In the British Army a civilian appointed by the colonel of a regiment to handle all the financial accounts of the unit.

ADJUTANT. The regimental staff officer responsible for the unit's administrative paperwork and for the supervision of daily details.

AIDE-MAJOR. Archaic term for ADJUTANT.

BATMEN. Hired servants who cared for the baggage and personal effects of an officer. Also used to describe privates detailed to perform these functions.

BATTALION. The basic tactical unit of eighteenth century warfare composed of a group of COMPANIES or PLATOONS and usually commanded in combat by a LIEUTENANT COLONEL. In both the British and Continental Armies most REGIMENTS had only a single battalion, and the terms were virtually synonymous.

BOMBARDIER. An artillery specialist. Rank given to privates who prepared ammunition and fired mortars. The bombardier merited supplemental pay for his more hazardous duty.

BRIGADIER. In the British Army a rank held only in wartime. Given to the officer commanding a brigade, it fell between the ranks of LIEUTENANT COLONEL and COLONEL and was not a general officer.

CAMP-COLOUR-MEN. A duty detail consisting of approximately one man per company to assist the regimental QUARTERMASTER in preparing a new camp site. The camp colors were small pennants used to mark the outlines of the regimental area.

CAPTAIN. The commanding officer of a company or troop.

CAPTAIN-LIEUTENANT. In infantry or cavalry units where field officers also served as captains of specific companies, the lieutenant who exercised actual command of the colonel's company. He ranked as the senior LIEUTENANT in the regiment. In artillery companies the second ranking officer.

COLONEL. The commanding officer of a regiment. In the British Army this was a titular rank and the colonel was concerned only with financial matters. In the Continental Army the colonel actually commanded and had responsibility for tactical leadership as well as administration.

COMMISSARY. A civil official performing various logistical duties.
COMMISSIONED OFFICER. An officer who exercised authority by virtue of a commission issued by the King or Continental Congress. Commissions ranged from ensign to general. In the British Army they were a form of property and could be bought or sold under governmental supervision.

COMPANY. The smallest administrative unit of infantry or artillery. In both the British and Continental Armies companies could be either separate entities or components of a regiment. In both armies it was virtually synonymous with the tactical platoon.

COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. The officers serving in company-sized units: captain, captain-lieutenant, lieutenant, ensign, and cornet.

CONDUCTOR. A member of the civil staff responsible for the supervision of depots, magazines, or groups of wagons.

CONTINENTAL ARMY. Those units of regular soldiers enlisted for full-time service, generally for extended periods of time, and for whom the ultimate authority for their organization, maintenance, administration, and discipline remained the Continental Congress.

CORNET. The most junior officer in a troop of cavalry. Equivalent to an ensign in an infantry company.

CORPORAL. A noncommissioned officer who normally was responsible for supervising a squad. In combat corporals served in the line of battle with the privates.

ENSIGN. The lowest-ranking commissioned officer in an infantry company. In the Continental Army a regiment's ensigns carried the regimental colors on a rotating basis and were particularly responsible for the dress and cleanliness of the company.

FIELD OFFICER. Officers concerned with the operations of a regiment as a whole. Colonels, lieutenant colonels, and majors were field officers.

FIREWORKER. The rank of the youngest lieutenants in the artillery. They were particularly responsible for preparing ammunition.

GENERAL. The category of officer responsible for the command of large units. In the British Army there were three ranks of general officer: major general, lieutenant general, and general (a still higher rank, field marshal, was not employed in North America). The Continental Army had two ranks: brigadier general (normally commanding a brigade) and major general (division). Washington's rank as "General and Commander-in-Chief" was unique.

GUNNER. An artillery private with special status derived from responsibility for aiming and loading an artillery piece. He received higher pay than a matross.
LANCE CORPORAL. An acting CORPORAL. In eighteenth century European armies the rank given to future officers receiving on the job training. Both the British and Continental Armies preferred to call such individuals "cadets" or "volunteers" and not give them pay or official standing in the army until they were commissioned.

LIEUTENANT. The middle rank of COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER. When organizations contained more than one lieutenant per company, the distinction was drawn between first, second, and third lieutenants.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL. The second in command of a regiment. In the British Army this individual actually commanded the regiment in the field. In the Continental Army when a lieutenant colonel was the senior officer of the regiment he was usually called a lieutenant colonel commandant.

LINE. The component of the Continental Army under the auspices of a specific state. Also used to refer to the aggregate of the light dragoon regiments or of the artillery regiments. The term applied only to combat units, and was used for administrative purposes, particularly to determine seniority for promotions. In battlefield dispositions the segment of the army deployed in linear formation.

MAJOR. The lowest ranking FIELD OFFICER in a regiment, particularly responsible for administration. Infantry majors were the only regimental officers who went into battle mounted, and had the responsibility to rally the regiment if its line became broken.

MATROSS. The term applied to artillery privates. Matrosses performed the semi-skilled tasks in firing a cannon.

MILITIA. The basic military force of each state or colony, nominally composed of the total male population capable of bearing arms and organized into geographical units. State governments always exercised final authority over the militia even when it served under operational control of the Continental Army. Because it was essentially a local defense organization, provisional units performed most of the extended service required of the militia.

MINER. A special engineer soldier who constructed tunnels during siege operations.

MINUTEMAN. A member of the MILITIA responsible for immediate response to an emergency. Minutemen received extra training and partial monetary compensation. This organization was used only in 1775-1776.

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER. SERGEANTS, CORPORALS, and drum and fife majors appointed by the regimental commander to exercise immediate supervision over privates, drummers, and fifers. Only the regimental commander or a court martial could remove them from their rank.

PAYMASTER. The officer formally charged with the care of a regiment's funds and the payment of the troops.
PIONEER. Troops responsible for the repair of roads, and occasionally with the preparation of fortifications.

PLATOON. The tactical unit of the smallest size in the eighteenth century. Normally a BATTALION would deploy in eight platoons. In European armies platoons were frequently temporary formations existing only for a specific battle; in the British and Continental Armies COMPANIES and platoons were virtually synonymous.

QUARTERMASTER. An officer responsible for logistical functions relating to housing, feeding, equipping, and moving troops.

RANK AND FILE. The privates and corporals of a unit. A classification used to reflect the actual combat strength of a unit deployed for linear combat. Also referred to as the "bayonet strength" of the unit.

REGIMENT. The basic administrative unit of eighteenth century armies. In both the British and Continental Armies regiments normally had only a single BATTALION, so the terms were used synonymously.

SAPPER. Special engineering troops used to dig entrenchments ("saps") during sieges.

SERGEANT. The noncommissioned officer armed with a halberd and used to supervise discipline and act as a file closer in battle.

STATE TROOPS. Regular forces, frequently for full-time service, raised on the authority of a state or colony government. Unlike Continentals, the state governments remained the ultimate authority for state troops. They sometimes operated with the Continental Army for extended periods.

SUBALTERN. Company-grade officer below the rank of captain: LIEUTENANT, ENSIGN, or CORNET.

WARRANT OFFICER. An officer exercising authority through a warrant rather than a commission, and usually assigned to staff duty. Warrants were issued by lesser authorities than a commission.
A scholar can easily spend a lifetime trying to master the rich source materials relating to the War of American Independence. By the time I began writing this dissertation I had identified over 3,500 references ranging in size from a journal article to a major manuscript collection. Obviously, I was not able to research all of them. The bibliography which follows indicates those items which I did use and which I found of particular value. It by no means represents the full list of works I consulted nor does it presume to be an exhaustive list of all possible sources. I have attempted to examine a reasonable cross-section of materials that reflect the problems and thinking of commanders at every level from company to army, and to cross-reference the records of the other major participants in the war.

My research indicated that scholars have not always exploited this richness of primary accounts. The recent revolution in technology which makes microfilming and reproduction possible on an affordable scale should go far to opening up hitherto neglected materials. I found that certain materials were especially valuable in my approach to the structure of the Continental Army. Unit records, particularly the various types of rolls and rosters maintained by different headquarters, provide a base of data which can be tapped for empirical verification of organizational concepts. Doctrine expressed in the several regulations and drill manuals is explained and highlighted by official and private accounts of engagements and reorganizations, particularly by officers
of field grade. Official transcripts of courts martial and courts of inquiry, in which all the concerned parties were military men, are another important source of information. Similarly, the accounts of the war transmitted by the German professional soldiers in the service of Great Britain to their comrades back in Europe represent a technically-oriented, surprisingly impartial set of documents.

This bibliography follows a somewhat unusual arrangement. I have grouped the most useful printed sources and doctoral dissertations according to subject matter. A discussion of manuscript collections and a list of major American imprints of military manuals published during or prior to the Revolution precedes the topical arrangements. General and reference works are followed by sections dealing with aspects of the military, political, and diplomatic background of the war. The next sections deal with the Continental Army's general officers, various headquarters functions, and specialized areas of service. Items which relate to specific states are grouped next, proceeding in geographical order from New Hampshire to Georgia, and culminating with a section on miscellaneous Continental Army units. The remaining sections deal with the other major military forces and the operations of the war. The bibliography ends with a brief list of the most important works on the immediate post-war American military developments. I believe that this arrangement will make it possible for a reader to immediately decide if my comments on a particular topic are based on sound scholarship.

Manuscripts relating to the War of American Independence are not concentrated in Federal hands, but remain widely scattered, primarily in state archives and in state and local historical societies. The National Archives and Records Service does have custody over two groups of
records which were of particular value in research for this dissertation. The Papers of the Continental Congress (Record Group 360) include more than the official journals of the Congress and the papers of its various committees. They also include important bodies of material on the Board of War, and a file of all correspondence received from senior military commanders. The War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records (Record Group 93) largely related to logistical matters and muster rolls. Most of the latter were laboriously rebuilt following a series of fires early in the nineteenth century and the result is by no means complete. The other important Federal repository, the Library of Congress, has a wider range of materials. Key items there include the George Washington Papers and the Peter Force Transcripts. The Library also has microfilm copies of numerous collections located in Europe and elsewhere in America.

I selected the New-York Historical Society in New York City as the central archival collection outside the Washington area on which to concentrate. One important consideration was accessibility. Even more significant, however, was the fact that it contains the papers of those individuals that I considered to be most important for my work. The Baron von Steuben Papers provided me with most of the important insights into the emergence of a tactical doctrine found outside the Washington Papers. Its collection of Orderly Books and the Erskine-DeWitt Map Collection served to illuminate other important points. Among the major Continental Army generals whose papers have not been published, the Society houses those of Horatio Gates, Alexander McDougall, and William Alexander (Lord Stirling). Each of those collections proved to be of enormous value. Lesser figures' papers were also useful, especially those of James Clinton, Marinus Willett, Walter Stewart, Edward Hand,
Allen McLane, and Lachlan McIntosh. The Society represents a concentrated source of information on the Continental Army's artillery in the form of important regimental orderly books plus the papers of John Lamb, Ebenezer Stevens, Sebastian Bauman, and Thomas Machin.

While I did not attempt to exhaustively mine all the various repositories of manuscripts relating to the British Army, I did use one collection to provide balance to my work on the Continentals. The Colonial Williamsburg Foundation's set of photostats, The Headquarters Papers of the British Army in America, represents the official papers of Sir Guy Carleton, the final British Commander-in-Chief in North America. As such, it includes file copies of the important correspondence of his predecessors and that of various subordinates in semi-autonomous commands. The original documents, calendared by the Historical Manuscripts Commission as the American Manuscripts in the Royal Institution, were returned to Great Britain in 1957 and are currently Class 30/55 in the Public Record Office.
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VITAE

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