Duff Green and the United States' telegraph, 1826-1837

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DUFF GREEN AND THE "UNITED STATES' TELEGRAPH" 1826 - 1837

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

Ph.D. 1981

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DUFF GREEN AND THE UNITED STATES' TELEGRAPH
1826 - 1837

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
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In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Kenneth L. Smith
1981
This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

Born in Woodford County, Kentucky, on August 15, 1791, Duff Green taught school, fought in the War of 1812, and married Lucretia Maria Edwards before moving to the Missouri territory in 1816. He soon became a prominent citizen of Missouri, eventually served in both houses of the state legislature, and in 1824 became the editor of the St. Louis Enquirer, an influential newspaper in the state.

In 1826, Green moved to Washington to become the editor and publisher of the United States' Telegraph, the recently established Jackson press in the city. The Telegraph played a significant role in General Jackson's election in 1828, but Green's influence in the new administration was minor.

In 1831, Green and his political favorite, John C. Calhoun, were read out of the Jackson party. Thereafter, the editor devoted himself to the defense of the South Carolinian and his elevation to the Presidency. As for Calhoun, he welcomed the aid of Green's press but kept his distance from his friend's numerous political and financial schemes. Meanwhile, the Telegraph defended nullification, advocated state rights, slavery, and Southern unification, and viciously attacked the abolitionists and Martin Van Buren.

Because of his financial ineptitude, Green was constantly on the brink of insolvency. Ultimately, after his loss of the Congres­sional printing in 1835, he undertook a number of speculative enter­prises to maintain his press. When these enterprises failed in early 1837, the Telegraph was forced to cease publication.

Green's perpetuation of the demagogic style of journalism and his propagation of state rights and proslavery principles unintentionally helped to prepare the mind of the South for secession in 1860.
POLITICS AND JOURNALISM IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA
INTRODUCTION

In October, 1826, when Duff Green assumed control of the United States' Telegraph, Washington was a slowly growing town of no more than 15,000 souls. The city and the surrounding countryside were dotted with a number of handsome private buildings, and a few of the public buildings were aesthetically pleasing. Nevertheless, the capital of the young republic was generally an oversized frontier town with an "unkempt" appearance. Vacant lots dominated the city of grand vistas, the streets were little more than "rutted paths," and various parts of the town, including the Mall, were uninhabitable swampland. Many of Washington's citizens were also crude and slovenly. Instead of the nation's elite promenading the city's streets, "straggling vagabond beggars" were attracted to Washington by the hope that a merciful government would take care of them. In addition, "small-time confidence men," needy pamphlet writers, "persons afflicted in mind or body," and perhaps, worst of all, "a class of swaggering sycophants forcing themselves into the presence of distinguished and well-bred people" were conspicuous among the city's inhabitants. Finally, there were more than 4,000 blacks in Washington, over half of them a growing free black population whose assimilation into the community worried many of the capital's leading citizens.

Of the city's elite, the President and Vice President, the Cabinet, Senators, Congressmen, and Justices of the Supreme Court--in short, the governors--were typically the subject of conversation and gossip at
the place of government. Unfortunately, the nation's rulers, though at the center of attention, were usually lonely, often disillusioned at their impotence, and frequently homesick. Consequently, when not on official business, these men sat in their dreary boardinghouses, gambled incessantly, chewed tobacco, and waited anxiously for the end of the Congressional session and their return home. Moreover, since Congress was in session only after the fall harvest and before the spring planting, and the Federal Government practically shut down for Washington's hot mosquito-plagued summers, most of the governors were able to spend over half of their time away from the Capital. Yet there were members of the Washington establishment who enjoyed the community. Almost half of the government employees were residents of Virginia and Maryland, and their presence, along with a preponderance of private householders born in Dixie, gave the District's society an "enduring Southern atmosphere."

Though that background led to the occasional application of the "Code Duello," the results of which sometimes horrified Southerners as well as Northerners, it also provided Washington with a potentially graceful social life far beyond that of a group of ladies frivolously gossiping over their tea.

In 1826, Washington was a commercial desert. There was little trade, and the efforts to attract business failed, or had effects contrary to those intended. For example, an attempt to build a canal connecting the city with the Ohio Valley not only cost the stockholders their entire investment, but the unfinished work eventually became nothing more than an "open sewer." In March, 1826, the Bank of Columbia closed, the directors blaming "thirty-two years of bad management, neglect and confusion" for the demise of the District's oldest financial
institution. At the same time, the citizens of Georgetown declared that "our town, notwithstanding its local and natural advantages for trade, has been gradually declining; our population is diminished; our houses untenanted; and the people earnestly pleading that the avenues of commerce may be opened." Little wonder then that A Description of the Etiquette at Washington City, published in the first year of the Jackson Administration, observed that "the greatest and most respectable business that is done in Washington is keeping boarding-houses."

Actually, there was another type of enterprise in Washington that was as old as the city itself. Far from pioneering the newspaper business in Washington, the Telegraph was merely the latest of a series of presses, most failing after a few years, and only one, the National Intelligencer, having the quality and endurance to be considered an established press. First published in the fall of 1800 by Samuel Harrison Smith, the Intelligencer was an immediate success in large part because of its ability to portray the new Capital as more than "empty space."

The editor, owner, and printer of the Intelligencer, an influential man who counted Jefferson among his friends, did much, along with his socially adept wife, Margaret Bayard Smith, to popularize the young city, and the country quickly realized that the newspaper was the authoritative press in Washington. Yet, despite the high regard for the Intelligencer under Smith, the journal did not flourish until Joseph Gales, Jr. and William Seaton assumed control in 1812. The son of a newspaper editor, Gales had worked with his father, Joseph Gales, Sr., on the Raleigh, North Carolina Register before leaving for Washington in 1807 to become associated with the Intelligencer. Two years later, he became Smith's partner,
and in 1810, upon the elder man's retirement, Gales became the sole publisher and editor of the newspaper. Coming from a prominent Virginia family, Seaton edited newspapers in Virginia and North Carolina before joining the Register. He soon married the daughter of Joseph Gales, Sr., became a partner with his father-in-law in the Register, then in 1812 began a fifty-year partnership with his brother-in-law editing and publishing the Intelligencer.

The Intelligencer was the most respected press in Washington because of Gales and Seaton's accomplishments in three areas of their profession. First, by their acquisition of the art of shorthand from Joseph Gales, Sr. the two editors became the first to preserve regularly the debates of Congress. One man covering the House, and the other the Senate, they would at the end of the day's proceedings write their reports from their shorthand notes, often failing to record the debates verbatim, but always maintaining the "sense" of the speaker's words. At a time when some citizens were becoming more interested in the work of Congress, their reports were welcomed by the people, who increased their circulation, and the legislators, who accorded them special seating and other privileges in each house of Congress. Second, Gales and Seaton simply published a quality newspaper. The Intelligencer's literary style was polished and dignified, and the "tone of the paper commanded respect." Adams, Calhoun, Clay, and Webster regularly contributed to the newspaper; the last, admittedly a close friend of both men, considered Gales and Seaton "two of the wisest and best heads in this country." Finally, besides being excellent journalists, the two men were capable politicians. In the first twelve years of their partnership they possessed enough political acumen
to align themselves with the republicanism of the Virginia Dynasty, thereby receiving from the party in power a large share of its patronage in the form of government printing jobs. Then in the election of 1824, the "court press," being forced to choose among the factions of the Republican Party, eventually supported William H. Crawford. Nevertheless, the Intelligencer wisely continued its "traditional dignity," stopping short of extreme praise or denunciation of any of the candidates, and, as a result, following the abatement of the election's tumult, Gales and Seaton could quietly put their press behind the Adams Administration. But, their political adroitness notwithstanding, they could still expect to pay a price for this necessary partisanship, especially since they had alienated the most popular candidate in the election, the vengeful Andrew Jackson.

Though the Intelligencer was clearly Washington's leading press in 1826, four other presses deserve mention, if only for their impact on the Telegraph. The National Journal was established in November, 1823 by Peter Force, a practical printer who later made his reputation as a book collector and a publisher of American documents. Having little experience as a political editor, Force evidently left the political direction of the newspaper to John Quincy Adams who, as Secretary of State, supported the press by giving it his department's patronage. In July, 1824, after Calhoun had decided to run for Vice President, the Journal absorbed the financially troubled Washington Republican, a paper launched in 1822 to enhance the now discarded Presidential aspirations of the South Carolinian. The newspaper subsequently spoke for Calhoun and Adams in the campaign, but after the election, Calhoun's enlistment with the Jackson opposition compelled the Journal to return to its former role as
personal mouthpiece of Adams. About one hundred miles south of the Capital in Richmond, there were two influential newspapers with which the Telegraph would have numerous contacts. Founded in 1804, the Enquirer quickly became a successful newspaper, which for the next forty-one years made its editor, Thomas Ritchie, one of the most powerful journalists in the nation. As a member of the Richmond Junto, a small group of Eastern Virginia politicians who controlled politics in the Old Dominion in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, Ritchie used his press to espouse the group's state rights doctrines, and in 1824 he supported William Crawford on the basis of his Jeffersonian, strict constructionist views. Then, following Crawford's defeat, Ritchie moved the Enquirer strongly behind Jackson. A thorn in Richie's side was the Richmond Constitutional Whig, established in January, 1824, by its editor for the next twenty years, James Hampden Pleasants. Under the guidance of this vituperative Virginian, the Whig instantly became the leading Adams press in the state, wholeheartedly supporting his election in 1824, as well as his bid for reelection in 1828. Lastly, back in Washington, the predecessor of the Telegraph was the Gazette. Jonathan Elliot, the paper's only publisher and editor, began the Gazette in January, 1814, only to have his press destroyed the following summer by the invading British army. In November, 1815, the newspaper reappeared, and soon thereafter it started to champion Crawford for the Presidency against James Monroe. Elliot's efforts for Crawford failed miserably, but the grateful Georgian, now Secretary of War in the Monroe Administration, helped to keep his organ alive by giving it the printing patronage of his department. Regarding opposition to Monroe futile in 1820, Elliot waited until 1824 at which
time his press again labored diligently for Crawford. But when Crawford's
stroke eliminated him as a potential candidate, the Gazette was sold to
John S. Meehan in early 1826 and renamed the United States' Telegraph.

Unbeknownst to the sleepy capital, the birth of the Telegraph
signaled the beginning of the Jackson revolution in Washington. The
Hero of New Orleans had returned to Tennessee after his bitter defeat at
the hands of Adams and Henry Clay, and had begun to plan his strategy
for his vindication in 1828. Two of his principal assistants in this en-
deavor were William B. Lewis and John Henry Eaton. A Virginian by birth,
Lewis had moved to Nashville as a youth, and a few years later, he eloped
with the daughter of William Terrell Lewis, a prominent Tennessee planter
and land speculator. He was soon invited to Jackson's home, the "Hermitage,"
where he quickly developed a friendship with Jackson that would be cemented
by his capable work as the General's quartermaster during the War of 1812.
Immediately following the war, Lewis was one of the first to see Jackson's
availability for the Presidency, and in the next thirteen years he devoted
himself to the election of his friend. A North Carolinian, Eaton
studied law, moved to Tennessee, and then after fighting briefly in the
War of 1812, married a second daughter of William T. Lewis. Now the
brother-in-law of William B. Lewis and the husband of one of Jackson's
wards, Eaton was soon completing a highly laudatory biography of the
General, speculating in Florida lands based on a tip from the Hero, and
serving in the United States Senate again probably as a result of Jackson's
influence. When the General decided to run for President, Eaton, as an
influential Senator, was dispatched to various parts of the country to
stir up support for the candidate, and after Jackson was defeated in 1824,
Eaton was evidently the organizer of a Washington press earmarked to become the Hero's leading campaign organ in 1828.

Jackson, Eaton, and Lewis had undoubtedly realized that the absence of a press in Washington during the previous campaign had cost them enough votes to throw the election into the House and create the circumstances for the alleged corrupt bargain between Adams and Clay that led to the former's election. So in 1826 they arranged the purchase of the Gazette's press, which appeared in February as the Telegraph under the editorial direction of John S. Meehan. But Meehan, the former publisher of the Columbia Star, a newspaper of the Baptist Church, lacked the fiery eloquence, the damming invective, and a reckless disregard for truth necessary to excite the people enough to oust Adams and Clay from the President's mansion and place there its rightful tenant. Fortunately, Jackson already knew of a man possessing these qualities. In 1825, upon his return to the "Hermitage" from Washington, he had travelled part of the way with Duff Green, who as editor of the St. Louis Enquirer had demonstrated his abilities as a crusading, rabble-rousing newspaper man willing to wallow in the muck to smear his opponent and unafraid to defend his candidate with innuendoes and half-truths. This was the type of editor the Jacksonians needed to "set the country on fire" for the Hero, and after a brief hesitation on his part, Green was persuaded to abandon his career in Missouri and come to Washington as the owner, editor, and publisher of the Telegraph.

In the campaign of 1828, Green helped "to arouse a sleeping giant of a people" for Jackson who rode "their fervor back to Washington." The Jackson revolutionaries who had employed this "mighty sword of
democracy now were ready to reinvigorate a government community that had become ineffective as a result of its isolation from the people. By the end of the Adams Administration a "government at a distance and out of sight" had become crippled by "separate and rival interests" in the Washington community. Despite their Jeffersonian, negativistic view of government, the Jacksonians, above all, sought office, and to achieve their goal, they began a complex national political party to organize the people, and they preached a democratic rhetoric, promising an equalization of the benefits and burdens of society to mobilize the common man for their candidate. In response, the masses began to take a strong interest in politics, electing enough Jacksonians to give the party so complete a dominance over the central government as to enable it to overcome the factionalism of the Washington community and once again govern the nation. Therefore, the Jackson revolution, by mobilizing the people, promised to transform quiescent Washington into a busier, more lively place of government where a politically attentive people would come to seek satisfaction from an expanding and ever more powerful government.

Unfortunately, Green would be a proponent of this revolution for less than two years. When John C. Calhoun, Green's political mentor, broke with President Jackson in February, 1831, Green was read out of the party with the Carolinian. Thereafter, the Telegraph editor opposed the Jackson Administration, its favorite son, Martin Van Buren, and its expansion of the central government. Duff Green thus found himself in the curious position of attempting to destroy a political movement which he had played a part in creating.
NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION


3 Green, Washington, 21.

4 Ibid., 107-110.

5 Ibid., 114; Young, Washington Community, 24.


8 Ibid., 22-25.

9 Ibid., 33-38.

10 Dictionary of American Biography, s.v., "Thomas Ritchie." Hereafter cited as DAB.

11 DAB, s.v., "James Hampden Pleasants."


13 DAB, s.v., "William Berkeley Lewis."

14 DAB, s.v., "John Henry Eaton."

16 Young, Washington Community, 249.
CHAPTER I
FROM KENTUCKY TO MISSOURI TO WASHINGTON:
THE EARLY CAREER OF DUFF GREEN

Duff Green's first American ancestor was Robert Green, who emigrated to Virginia from England in 1712. Robert's father, William, was an officer in the bodyguard of William III and held the social position of a gentleman. He was also "a cadet of the family of Green's Norton in Northampton, and descended from the same ancestor as Sir Thomas Green, the father of Matilda or Maud, who married Sir Thomas Parr and became the mother of Katherine Parr, sixth wife of Henry VIII."

William's wife, Eleanor Duff, belonged to the Scotch family of McDuff. It was with her brother, Sir William Duff, that her son Robert, only seventeen years old, went to Virginia in the midst of Queen Anne's war.

Settling in Tidewater on the James River, Robert Green and his uncle received in 1732 a patent for 120,000 acres in the Valley of Virginia. This was "perhaps the earliest patent west of the Blue Ridge" and was one of the most significant factors in the settlement of the region. Sir William Duff thereupon returned to Scotland, and dying without children, he left his large interests in Virginia to his nephew. Meanwhile, Robert had married a Scot, Eleanor Dunn, and had made his permanent home near Brandy Station in what is now Culpeper County. The couple had seven children, all "stalwart sons, all over six feet high, and all having red heads and beards." Hence, the family became known
as the "Red Greens of Culpeper." As a member of the House of Burgesses, a vestryman, and a large slaveholder, Green was a leading citizen of the colony. He associated with the Lees, Barbours, Marshalls, Prices, and Washingtons, and his sons maintained this elite position by marrying into such families.

The third son of Robert Green was the Telegraph editor's grandfather, also named Duff Green. Married twice, his second wife was Ann Willis, a daughter of Henry Willis, the founder of Fredricksburg, and a first cousin of George Washington. Before his death on the eve of the American Revolution, Duff Green fathered four children by Ann Willis, the third of which was named William. A volunteer in the Revolutionary army at the tender age of fifteen, the future father of Duff Green fought under General Daniel Morgan and took part in Morgan's victory over Colonel Banastre Tarleton at Cowpens, South Carolina, in January, 1781. Because William Green's father died before Virginia's primogeniture laws were repealed, most of the family estate went to his half-brother, John. Thus, William and his brothers Willis and Henry located land warrants in Woodford County, Kentucky, and migrated there with their mother and sister Eleanor. Though Henry soon returned to Virginia and died unmarried, Willis was elected a delegate from Kentucky to the Virginia Legislature in 1783, and was a member of the conventions which framed the first and second Kentucky constitutions. Eleanor married one John Smith and had three children while the widow of Duff Green the elder became prominent enough in Danville, Kentucky, to have a monument erected in her memory.

As for William Green, he married Lucy Ann Marshall, a member of another elite Virginia family, and became the father of eight children.
Willis apparently held a number of occupations, but was most prominently an Indian agent and a founder of a state rights newspaper, the Vicksburg, Mississippi, Sentinel. William, Jr. remained in Kentucky and became a judge in Russell County, while his twin brother Henry became a physician and a missionary. Of the four girls, Nancy evidently died young and unmarried, Betsy was wed to a Mr. Huling, Sarah married a Reverend Mr. Neal, and Ellen became the wife of General James Semple. But the most famous of the children of William and Lucy Green was their eldest, born on August 15, 1791, and named Duff, undoubtedly in honor of the boy's grandfather.

The product of such a rich heritage, young Duff quite naturally had a demanding yet fulfilling childhood. His father and mother were Baptists, and he received a strict religious upbringing that evidently stayed with him throughout his life. Green began his formal education in a local school along with "the children of my father's tenants, or of persons holding under adverse title." Later, after his father had acquired a large tract of land in Wayne County, Kentucky, he was able to attend the Danville, Kentucky, Academy and apparently received a good classical education despite his frontier upbringing. Proving to be a good student, he was soon teaching the children in his neighborhood. During the four years he worked at this task, Green continued his own studies and through tutoring and other jobs earned "enough to buy . . . a watch, a horse, bridle, and saddle, a suit of 'Sunday clothes,' and ten dollars in money . . . ." He then taught for a short time at the Elizabethtown Academy until the War of 1812 began.

With the outbreak of war, Green joined the First Kentucky Regiment,
which was soon sent to Vincennes, Indiana, to defend the settlers against Indian attacks. It was at Vincennes that his military adventures began. According to Green, he was caring for a sick messmate in a hotel in Vincennes when news came of an Indian attack on Fort Harrison, located at Terre Haute. There were widespread rumors of an Indian attack on Vincennes, and panic ensued. Green immediately returned in the darkness to his regiment's camp, ordered the fires put out, and suggested to the officer of the day that a nearby fortification be occupied. When the officer responded by asking him to march the troops to the fort, Private Green took command of the entire regiment and marched them off. The task completed, he then fell in with his own company like a good soldier.

Along with 1500 territorial militiamen, the regiment soon left Vincennes to relieve Fort Harrison. But when the soldiers arrived there, they found that the blockhouse containing the provisions had been burned. Moreover, the escort bringing supplies from Vincennes to Fort Harrison had been attacked by Indians, and the provisions had been destroyed. Since there were no supplies for the 2500 men other than what they had brought with them, panic again ensued among the soldiers. After restoring order, the officers placed the entire command in line and rode from one end to the other looking for volunteers to remain and defend the fort. Unfortunately, when the officers reached Green at the far end of the line, no one had yet volunteered. But apparently having visions of heroism, Green stepped out from the ranks, volunteered the entire regiment to defend Fort Harrison, and then ordered the troops to take one step forward and march. The regiment followed his command and eventually
remained to defend the fort, allowing the 1500 militiamen to return home to defend their families.

Green relates that he assumed a leading role in the fort's defense. He suffered from lack of food and won the admiration of his fellow soldiers for his steadfast devotion to duty. Consequently, when the commander of his company was killed, Green was the logical man to take his place. The defense of Fort Harrison was ultimately successful, and through luck and his own opportunism, Duff Green returned to Kentucky with a reputation as a leader if not a hero.

On November 26, 1813, Green married Lucretia Maria Edwards. The marriage was a success for Green not only because Lucretia proved to be a faithful wife capably assisting him in raising their seven surviving children but also because she provided the ambitious young man with valuable social and political connections. Except for Laura Green's marriage to J. Shelby Reed, a man her father believed was addicted to the unpardonable vices of gambling and smoking, the two parents evidently had no serious problems with their offspring. In 1836, Margaret Green became the wife of Andrew Pickens Calhoun, the son of the great Nullifier. A third daughter, Lizzie, married a Dr. Bivins, while a fourth, Mary, was wed to a Mr. Manard and became the mother of eight children. Of the two surviving sons, Benjamin and Duff, the former was to become the most prominent. A graduate of Georgetown College and the University of Virginia Law School, Ben Green (1822-1907) served as charge d'affaires in Mexico in 1844 and was sent to the West Indies in 1849 to negotiate the purchase of Cuba. Upon his return to the United States, he settled in Dalton, Georgia, became connected with his father's business
enterprises, and after the Civil War played an influential role in Georgia politics, being largely responsible for the calling of the Georgia convention of the Greenback Party in 1880. Finally, as for Lucretia, her role was apparently to produce these children and be the companion of her husband. Green rarely mentioned her (or the children) in his correspondence, and her few existing letters are confined to an exchange of news with her children and friends. Evidently, husband and wife adhered to the traditional nineteenth-century doctrine that business and politics had no place for women.

Nevertheless, Green's marriage to Lucretia provided him with several important political connections. His father-in-law, Benjamin Edwards, had been a Congressman from Maryland (Third Congress), and his brother-in-law, Ninian Edwards, was first territorial Governor of Illinois, then a United States Senator and finally Governor of that state. Green and the younger Edwards soon became political allies, and they carried on a frequent correspondence. As a Senator (1818-1824) Edwards also provided Green with connections in Washington. Indeed, he deserves much credit for developing the relationship between Green and his political mentor, John Calhoun. Two other distant relations of Lucretia also proved significant for Green. Because her cousin and John Quincy Adams had married sisters, Green later claimed to have "personal influence" in Washington long before he arrived there in 1825. And of consequence much later, the nephew of Lucretia Edwards (Ninian Wirt Edwards) was a brother-in-law of another Kentuckian, Abraham Lincoln.

After the war Green returned to his teaching position at Elizabethtown and also began to study medicine. Soon, however, he turned away
from academic life, and with the help of a $10,000 loan he became a partner with Major Ben Helm in a Kentucky store. Though he had some success in this enterprise, in 1816 he abandoned the business to become a Surveyor of Public Lands near the Missouri River. One year later, Green and Sabret Johnson purchased a large tract of land in central Missouri and laid out the town of Chariton on the property. Owing to its location as the westernmost town on the Missouri River, Chariton initially grew rapidly and even promised to rival St. Louis as a commercial center. Green eventually settled in Chariton and built a brick house "so large and pretentious" that the townspeople called it "Duff Green's Folly." Perhaps this epithet was more fitting for the entire town. Because of its location on low lands, Chariton was a very unhealthy place and constantly suffered from the "encroachments" of the Missouri River. Thus, "in 1825 [about the time Green left for Washington] the fortunes of the little town . . . began to wane . . . until about 1840, when the town was abandoned, men leaving without even effecting a sale of their property."

Green was involved in a number of other interests in the Missouri territory. He acquired a contract to carry the mails in Missouri, became Postmaster and clerk of court in Chariton, and established the first stagecoach line west of the Mississippi. In 1819, he purchased 640 acres of land around Bluffton, Missouri, in the hope of achieving a large profit from his speculation. Finding time to study law, he eventually established a profitable legal practice. Finally, when Ninian Edwards loaned Rene Paul $30,000 to stock his St. Louis store, Green was asked to go to Philadelphia to purchase the goods. But because Paul's brother,
a Baltimore businessman, had recently made large purchases in Rene's name, the Philadelphia merchants required that Green guarantee payment by agreeing to sell the goods if Paul would not accept them. Returning to St. Louis, Green found Paul overstocked from his brother's purchases and unwilling to make the guarantee. He then gave the St. Louis merchant security for payment, and because of ice on the Missouri, remained at St. Charles for the winter. In the spring, he began stores at St. Charles, Franklin, and Chariton, selling at low prices to liquidate his inventory. Other merchants were angered by this tactic, but the opportunistic Green quickly sold his goods, apparently made a profit for his brother-in-law, and built up a large mercantile business in Missouri.

Given these accomplishments, Green had by 1820 become one of the leading citizens of the Missouri territory and was therefore ready to play a significant role in its politics. His business interests and his law practice had led him to become a member of the most powerful political faction in Missouri. This "little junto" was "a relatively small, conservative combination of businessmen, speculators, and lawyers, centered in St. Louis," who had interests in the fur trade and desired a liberal land policy. Its best-known member was Thomas Hart Benton, the most prominent Missouri politician of the antebellum period. The principal opponent of the "little junto" was the nationally known editor of the Missouri Gazette, Joseph Charless.

The leading issue of the time in Missouri was of course whether or not the territory would enter the Union with restrictions on slavery. This question would create serious controversy throughout the country, threaten the immediate dissolution of the Union, and provide the
explosive sectional issue that would eventually lead to Civil War. As for Missourians, even though they saw themselves as Westerners instead of Southerners, they were overwhelmingly of Southern origin and felt themselves "one people with the older slave states." Moreover, they strongly resented what they termed "Yankee" meddling in their affairs, and they felt that "Yankees . . . are generally obnoxious to the good citizens of Missouri." Yet despite this apparent unity in the fight against restriction, Missouri was a largely unsettled society containing a minority of Northerners. Consequently, the antirestrictionist leaders felt it necessary to arouse the public against slavery restriction by way of mass meetings, jury declarations, and public dinners.

It was through the public dinner that Duff Green made his contribution to antirestrictionist fervor. On May 29, 1819, the citizens of Franklin gave a public dinner to a Captain Nelson in honor of the steamboat Independence. Actually, the dinner was merely an excuse for the town's citizens to raise their voices against restriction. Though not a citizen of Franklin, Green was present at the dinner and proposed a toast surprisingly similar to that uttered by Calhoun at the famous Jefferson Day dinner of April, 1830: "The Union--it is dear to us; but liberty is dearer." On June 1, 1819 another dinner was held at Chariton with Major J. S. Findlay presiding and the town's founder as Vice President. Again, toasts were drunk against the restriction of slavery in Missouri.

Duff Green and his fellow Missourians drinking toasts would not gain statehood any more than the first Missouri Compromise would accomplish it. Nevertheless, after the passage of the Compromise of 1820,
Missourians considered themselves a part of the Union and proceeded in May, 1821, to elect forty-one delegates to a convention to frame a state constitution. One of five delegates elected from Howard County, Green introduced three important measures to the convention. He opposed the disqualification of priests and preachers from holding office, and by a combination of two resolutions, he favored the individual responsibility of stockholders in the state bank for the debts of that bank. All these measures were defeated by the convention, and evidently Green's "impress" on the first Missouri Constitution was "comparatively slight."

Though Green's role in the framing of the constitution was minor, his part in the printing of the document proved to be politically controversial. At issue was the cost of providing copies of the new constitution. As chairman of the printing committee, Green was in a position to choose between two printers, Henry and Company, publishers of the St. Louis Enquirer, or Joseph Charless, editor of the Missouri Gazette. Since Henry and Company was controlled by Isaac N. Henry and Thomas Hart Benton, members of the "little junto," Green's obvious political course was to give these men the contract. But no sooner had he done so than Charless claimed that he had offered to print the constitution for one-fifth the cost of Henry and Company. Green attempted to respond to this charge of political favoritism and corruption in a letter "To the Voters of Howard County," but his reply was ineffective and his political fortunes soon suffered a setback.

Still not a state, Missourians confidently elected a state legislature, governor, and representatives to Congress. Green was a candidate for the state legislature from Howard County, but the election, coming
in the aftermath of the printing scandal, resulted in his decisive defeat. Fortunately for Green, one of the delegates from Howard County died during the first session of the legislature. Elected to fill the vacancy, the lucky young man apparently did a creditable job since in 1822 he was elected to the Missouri State Senate.

In the legislature, Green supported Thomas Hart Benton for the United States Senate, even though he did not personally approve of him, because Benton was the editor of an influential newspaper (St. Louis Enquirer) and had opposed the restriction of slavery in Missouri. The decisive factor in his decision, however, was the political reality that Benton was a fellow member of the "little junto." Thus Green reluctantly yielded to the wishes of the faction and helped send Benton to Washington.

In another incident in the legislature, Green was not so agreeable. During a heated debate, Alexander McGirk threw a pewter inkstand at his fellow Howard Countian. Displaying the militancy that would later characterize his behavior as an editor, Green then charged at McGirk, and a fist fight ensued on the floor of the legislature. Governor Alexander McNair attempted to restore order, but friends of Green pushed the Governor aside and allowed the fight to continue. There is no record of the outcome.

The two most important concerns for the first Missouri legislature were the passage of a "Solemn Public Act to insure the state's conformity with the Second Missouri Compromise and the enactment of legislation to remedy the effects of the Panic of 1819 in Missouri. Governor McNair called a special session of the legislature to deal with the first issue. On June 4, 1821, the legislature convened, debated the question, and chose a select committee to report on the numerous
resolutions concerning the objectionable clause in the Missouri Constitution. This committee eventually submitted a twenty-two-hundred word report closing with the "Solemn Public Act" requested by Congress. In the debate that followed Green emerged as one of the leading supporters of the act. Though minor opposition developed, the "Solemn Public Act" passed the legislature easily and McNair approved it on June 26, 1821. When President Monroe proclaimed Missouri's admission into the Union to be complete, the "Missouri Controversy" and "Missouri's Struggle for Statehood" were over.

Green played a much greater role in the highly controversial question of providing relief for the victims of the depression. The legislature responded to the misery of its people by passing an ineffective stay law, abolishing imprisonment for debts on contract, and exempting some basic personal property (furniture, one cow, and one spinning wheel) from debtor's sale. It was left to Green, however, to introduce "the most ambitious and controversial" relief legislation of the special session. With the passage of Green's Loan Office Act, $300,000 of loan office certificates were issued in denominations from fifty cents to ten dollars and loaned to individuals using land and other personal property as security. These certificates also served as a common circulating medium of exchange, and the state received them as payment for taxes and other state debts. Unfortunately, opponents of the loan office certificates quickly pointed to their lack of financial backing. When many merchants and other creditors refused to accept the certificates as payment, they began to depreciate rapidly. Finally, the St. Louis State Circuit Court declared that the Loan Office Act violated the United States Constitution
"because it provided for the issuance of bills of credit by the state and attempted to make something other than gold or silver legal tender." The state then quickly dismantled the operations of the loan office, and debtors had to begin immediately to pay off their loans.

Green led one other fight for the relief group. In a special election to the Missouri legislature for a seat from Howard County, he championed the relief candidate against his anti-relief opponent. Evidently, he continued to be popular in his home district since his decision to make the election a personal referendum was enough to insure the victory of the relief candidate. Elsewhere, however, influential citizens threatened to move against him. His leadership in the relief movement had cost him political support especially with the business class of the state. He had also become unpopular with the St. Louis politicians because of his support for legislation to curb the excesses of the stockholders of the state bank. Thus, by making enemies faster than friends, Green exhibited a tendency fatal to the longevity of any political career.

If Green was aware of this fatal penchant, he chose to stand on his principles. In December, 1823, he opposed Thomas Hart Benton's plan to get a caucus nomination for Henry Clay in the Missouri legislature. According to Green, one of Benton's friends came to him and promised him anything in return for his support of the Clay caucus nomination. Green relates that he replied to this entreaty by threatening Benton with the introduction of a resolution inquiring why he was in Missouri politicking instead of in Washington attending to his duties as Senator. Ultimately, Green notes that he "defeated the nomination and Colonel Benton left St.
Charles for Washington before the Senate met the next day." But he also had made an enemy out of the most powerful man in Missouri.

Green's attitude toward Henry Clay was at least partially a result of his relationship with his mother's cousin, Humphrey Marshall. As a Senator from Kentucky, Marshall had provoked Clay's scorn by voting for Jay's Treaty. Eventually, Clay and Marshall fought a bloodless duel over the political tensions arising from the treaty debates. Green admits that the quarrel between the two men negatively influenced his estimate of Clay's character. Moreover, since Marshall was a journalist as well as a politician, his influence may have predisposed young Duff toward newspaper work. The Kentuckian established the American Republic in 1810 as well as other newspapers at a later date, and his fiery editorial style was apparently adopted by his young relative. Consequently, when Green moved to Missouri, he carried with him his antagonism to Clay and his penchant for newspaper work. He exhibited both in his legislative career, opposing the Clay caucus nomination, and serving as a part-time legislative reporter for the Boonslick Advertiser (Franklin, Missouri). Nevertheless, his career in journalism formally began in late December, 1823, when he purchased Bencon's old organ, the St. Louis Enquirer.

Green officially assumed control of the Enquirer on January 3, 1824. Immediately, the paper began to concentrate on national political events, and just as quickly, it started to support Calhoun for the Presidency. On January 6, for example, the Enquirer came out for Calhoun and began to criticize his chief opponent, William H. Crawford of Georgia. Two weeks later, Green was claiming that Calhoun had saved millions in the War Department, while the Georgian had wasted much money as Secretary of the
Treasury. This support for Calhoun was predictable. Assisted by Ninian Edwards, the mutual admiration between Calhoun and Green had been growing since the latter's arrival in Missouri. In 1818, Calhoun had successfully recommended Green's appointment as Brigadier-General in the Missouri militia to President Monroe. The two men were in agreement over the issue of slavery in the territories, and, as will be seen, from 1821 to 1823 Green corresponded frequently with the Secretary of War regarding Indian affairs on the Missouri frontier. Finally, in September, 1823 Calhoun informed Edwards that he was "much pleased with General Green . . . . He is intelligent and decisive, and may in time become important in the West." Thus, it was no surprise that by 1824 Green had already become one of the Carolinian's staunchest supporters.

But by the end of February, 1824, Calhoun had withdrawn from the Presidential contest, and Green then switched his paper's support to Andrew Jackson. Actually, Green's press had always spoken well of Jackson. On February 16, for instance, the Enquirer reported on a party given at Washington by Mrs. John Quincy Adams and attended by over 700 persons. It was happy to relate that "the Hero of New Orleans was there in all the simplicity of a Cincinnatus, yet bearing the polish and elegance of a Chesterfield." Then on April 19, the newspaper formally began to support Jackson:

"The Hero of New Orleans is rapidly ascending towards the Presidential chair. The decisive stand taken in Pennsylvania in favor of General Jackson . . . plainly indicates that if Jackson should not be the choice of the college, he will at least be sent into Congress with such a powerful expression of the vox populi, that the House of Representatives . . . cannot, will not resist it."

Green continued his support for Jackson throughout the spring and summer of 1824. In June, the editor of the Enquirer found himself in a
quarrel with the Missouri Republican because the Adams paper had charged him with inconsistency in switching support from Calhoun to Jackson. As he would often do as the Telegraph editor, Green dismissed the accusation by claiming that the Republican was also inconsistent in switching from Clay to Adams. The election of course provided no candidate with an electoral majority. By December 11, however, Green had correctly concluded that Clay had the influence to make the next President. Therefore, "convinced as he must that a bargain with ... [Adams] would be at the expense of his reputation," Clay, Green appeared certain, would not "hesitate to yield to the necessity of the case and permit the people to triumph, by withdrawing his name in favor of the Hero of New Orleans."

When Clay failed to follow the editor's advice and threw his influence to Adams, it was a mixed blessing for Green. Jackson had lost the election, but in his warning to the Kentuckian about the effect of the bargain charge, the future editor of the Telegraph already had the issue to ignite the masses for the Hero in 1828.

Duff Green first reached Washington by way of his interest in Indian affairs on the Missouri frontier. In March, 1821, he reported to Calhoun an account of an "outrage" committed by Indians on some persons at Council Bluffs and wanted the government to indemnify these citizens for their loss of property. In January, 1822, Green asked the Secretary of War for an appointment as Indian Agent at the Fox Indian lead mines so that he could oversee the lead mine lands that he hoped to receive from the government. Unfortunately, lack of adequate funds in the Indian Department prohibited the appointment. Then in January, 1823, Green warned Calhoun that the British Northwest Company was attempting to prevent Americans from trading with Indians on the Missouri River. He
asked him to appoint Major Thomas S. Locke subagent and interpreter for the Sioux and Mandan Indians in order to counteract British influence in the area. Again, however, lack of funds prevented Locke's appointment. Finally, in September, 1823, Green wrote the Secretary requesting him to provide a blacksmith and "some presents" for the Iowa Indians. Calhoun then ordered General William Clark to make arrangements with Green to supply the needed blacksmith. Moreover, he mentioned to Clark that he was attempting to get an appropriation for employment of an Indian sub-agent and that Green appeared "to be a gentleman well calculated to fill it."

Though Green never received an appointment as Indian agent, he continued to show a strong interest in Indian affairs, British influence, and business opportunities on the Missouri frontier. He also acted as attorney for settlers who desired to be indemnified by the Federal Government for depredations of Indians. In March, 1825, his representation of parties having "large claims against the government for Indian depredations" led him to make his fateful first trip to Washington.

According to Green's self-serving memoir, he arrived in the capital only a few days after the House had decided the election of 1824 in favor of Adams. He noted that "it was deemed of so much importance to secure the influence of my press [the Enquirer]" that Congressmen John Scott of Missouri and Daniel P. Cook of Illinois, both Clay men, were "deputed" to enlist him in support of the Adams Administration. These men attempted to lure him with promises of federal patronage and assured him that "there was nothing in the power of the government to give which I might not confidently expect to receive." Implicit to Green in their
promises was the suggestion that he one day could have a seat in the United States Senate.

Green, however, spurned the overtures of the Clay-Adams coalition. With perfect hindsight, he later explained that the tendency of the coalition was to strengthen the antislavery party through a high tariff and internal improvements. High duties would create a surplus revenue to support a "log-rolling, sectional, antislavery party majority in Congress," would benefit Eastern manufacturers who were supporters of antislavery, and would provide surplus revenue to build turnpike roads connecting the Northeast and Northwest and excluding the South. Thus, Green believed that the Clay-Adams coalition was "predicated upon a deliberate purpose of plundering and oppressing the South." He saw the South responding to this oppression by forming a "counter-organization" in defense of its rights. The result, he feared, would be a sectional conflict that "would necessarily endanger the peace and perpetuity of the Union."

Though Green rejected the overtures of the Clay-Adams coalition for political reasons, he also refused initially the offer of Andrew Jackson for personal motives. He had become acquainted with the General during his stay in Washington, and upon his return to St. Louis, the Hero accompanied him as far as Louisville. During this trip, Green later claimed, Jackson urged him to come to Washington and take charge of an anti-administration newspaper. He considered the offer, then declined it for the following reasons:

I had established the first line of stages west of the Mississippi. I had a profitable contract for carrying the mail . . . . I had a valuable business as an attorney. I was the editor and proprietor of a leading paper, giving
me considerable profit, and I was investing my income in and adjoining the city of St. Louis. I had a young and interesting family, and my social and political position was second to that of no man in the state. I had refused to exchange my position for a seat in the Senate of the United States, and I did not consent to become the editor of a party paper in Washington.30

In 1825 Green was a successful man. Though it is simply untrue that his "social and political position was second to that of no man in the state," his hard work, opportunism, and good fortune had made him a prominent citizen of Missouri. Yet in 1825 Green was also ambitious. Fame, wealth, and prestige are great attractions even for a successful man. All these could be his on a grander scale, but selling out in Missouri and starting over in Washington was a gamble. According to Green, he eventually "sacrificed" his career in the West to move to the Capital because of his desire to fight the "Bargain, Intrigue, and Management" of the Adams Administration. But equally as decisive, though he would not be expected to admit it, was his confident assessment that he could turn his sacrifice into a glorious triumph in the nation's Capital.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER I


4 Lewis, *Green Family*; Herbert Weaver, "Foreigners in Ante-Bellum Mississippi," *Journal of Mississippi History*, XVI (1954), 156-157; Duff Green to Willis Green, June 12, July 9, 1829, Green Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.


7 Green, *Facts and Suggestions*, 16; Green to Ann B. Marshall, October 29, 1834, to Laura Green Reed, November 5, 1834, February 3, 1835, J. Shelby Reed to Laura Reed, October 30, 1834, GP-SHC; Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, *Nullifier*, 1829-1839 (New York, 1949), 309; Lewis, *Green Family*; National Historical Publications Commission, *The Duff Green Papers in the Southern Historical Collection of the University of North Carolina Library*, Ritchie O. Watson (ed.) (Chapel Hill, 1967), 9; Three of the children, Jessie, Constance, and William, died in infancy. On the fourth daughter, Florine (possibly named for Calhoun's wife Floride), no information was found. Duff Green, III married a Dickins and had three children, including, of course, a boy named Duff. Ben Green and Lizzie Waters produced three children (one named Duff), and the Andrew Calhouns gave the Nullifier and his editor nine more grandchildren. Incidentally, Laura and Shelby evidently were able to settle their differences as the couple eventually had six children. Lewis, *Green Family*. 


13 Floyd C. Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood (Jefferson City, Mo., 1916), 92-93. See Chapter V for an account of the Jefferson Day Dinner. The similarity between the two toasts is probably a coincidence, but according to Charles M. Wiltse, Calhoun had been expressing this sentiment since around 1824. Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 71.

14 Ibid., 148ff.

15 Ibid., 171n-172n.

16 Ibid., 148,268.

17 Green, Facts and Suggestions, 22; McCandless, History of Missouri, 17; Walter S. Stevens, "Alexander McNair," Missouri Historical Review, 17 (1922-23), 17.

18 McCandless, History of Missouri, 21-21; Moore, Missouri Controversy, 272-273; Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood, 310-312.
19 McCandless, History of Missouri, 23–30; Broadhead, "Leading People and Events in Early Missouri History," 286–287.


21 Green, Facts and Suggestions, 25.


24 Enquirer, February 16, April 19, 1824.

25 Ibid., June 7, December 11, 1824. As late as August, 1825, Green was still attacking Clay, evidently with success. According to Finis Ewing, a Presbyterian Minister from Boonville, Missouri, "there is still a noise kept up by Duff Green and his minions. I regret that his paper has so extensive a circulation in this state--some of his subscribers, however, will discontinue their patronage." Ewing did not have to wait long for relief. Having decided to move to Washington, Green sold the Enquirer in the late summer of 1825 to Stephen W. Foreman and Charles Keemle, publishers of the Missouri Advocate (St. Louis) who then changed the name of their Clay press to the Missouri Advocate and St. Louis Enquirer. Finis Ewing to Clay, August 6, 1825 in James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves (eds.), The Papers of Henry Clay (5 vols. to date, Lexington, Ky., 1959– ), IV, 567–569; Ibid., 379n.

27 Green, Facts and Suggestions, 26. For Green's continuing interest in frontier affairs, see William Clark to Calhoun, January 11, 1824, Calhoun to Green, September 13, 1824 in Hemphill et al. Papers of Calhoun, VII--471, IX--314.

28 Green, Facts and Suggestions, 26-27.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., 27.

31 See Chapter III of Facts and Suggestions, 27-28 for Green's explanation of his decision to move to Washington and edit the Telegraph.
When Duff Green finally decided to come to Washington to assume control of the *United States' Telegraph*, he became the publisher of a daily newspaper and the director of a potentially diversified, productive press as well as the editor of a political organ. In addition to its editorial columns, the *Telegraph* was a reliable source of information for its readers, providing them with news, entertainment, and knowledge about trade, the weather, and various products. Eventually, Green also used his press to publish a number of books, pamphlets, and periodicals, some of them political, others dealing with law, medicine, and agriculture. Nevertheless, most Americans, especially his rival journalists, viewed him as a fiery political editor free in his use of invective, half-truths, and emotionalism. Moreover, the intensity of these editorial rivalries and the touchiness of politicians and newspapermen in Jacksonian America frequently involved Green in verbal, legal, and physical confrontations, which in one instance resulted in serious injuries for the editor. As he painfully discovered, journalism could be a dangerous business.

1 The *United States' Telegraph* consisted of four pages, six columns to a page. These pages were slightly smaller than the modern newspaper, but the narrow columns, lack of headlines, and smaller print allowed
Green to publish much more information on a sheet than the modern editor can. Yet Green could never hope to increase the Telegraph's number of pages to that of the smallest modern newspaper since postage costs, paper and printing expenses, and a lack of advertisements dictated a single folded sheet. Just below the title on page one of the Telegraph was the newspaper's motto: "Power is always stealing from the many to the few." Appearing in the first issue of the newspaper, this quotation was apparently a reference to the corrupt bargain between Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams in the election of 1824, but Green never considered changing it in later years, evidently finding it equally applicable to the alleged corruption of the Jackson Administration after his break with the President in 1831. The remainder of the first page was devoted almost exclusively to advertisements. There were notices for auctions and other sales, mainly of land, buildings, and machinery but sometimes human beings. Stagecoach and steamboat lines in the Washington area gave notices of their routes, times of departure and arrival, and of course their fares. Boardinghouses and hotels in Washington and elsewhere advertised in the Telegraph, as did schools seeking students and financial contributions. The front page was also used by Green to print prospectuses of his various publications, and he sometimes placed the prospectuses of other newspapers beside them. Advertisements for recently published books occasionally appeared. For example, the Lady's Book of 1832 contained reflections for each day of the year, Mrs. Somerville's Mechanisms of the Heavens, and Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy. Finally, merchants throughout the country advertised shoes, groceries, dry goods, machinery, and countless other items.

When Congress was in session, the second page of the Telegraph
held reports of the proceedings in the House and the Senate. During Congressional recesses, however, this space was devoted to reprints of speeches, extracts from political and economic treatises, accounts of dinners and celebrations, and articles from other newspapers. Near the end of page two or at the beginning of the third page under the headline, "Washington City," began the newspaper's editorial columns. Though Green usually wrote a lead editorial on the most pressing issue of the day, he sometimes published an open letter, often part of a series, to the readers of the Telegraph. After this letter or lead editorial there generally followed a number of shorter articles, commenting on an editorial in a rival newspaper, and in many cases filled with the vituperative charges and countercharges between the Telegraph and its competitors. Finally, Green frequently added several reprints to his editorial columns supporting his newspaper's stand on an issue or providing additional news. The next two or three columns of the third page were devoted to editorial correspondence. Most of the letters were predictably supportive of a particular editorial stand recently taken by the Telegraph. Sometimes, though, Green published the latest of a series of letters, usually written under a pseudonym and, in the case of Carter Beverly's letters of "A Virginian," continuing over several years. At other times he used the space to present a lengthy correspondence as, for example, his intermittent reprints of the Calhoun-Jackson correspondence over the schismatic Seminole affair.

The rest of page three included a wide range of informative topics. Ship arrivals, departures, and cargoes were reported, and under the headline "Commercial," daily prices of agricultural products were cited. When significant events were occurring in Europe (e.g., the
Revolution of 1830 in France), the Telegraph kept its readers informed with dispatches under the headline, "Foreign Intelligence." Local notices filled out the page. Meetings and social gatherings in the District were announced, and of course deaths, births, and marriages in the community were reported. The final page of the Telegraph was similar to its front page. Advertisements for schools, transportation, publications, and the wares of merchants were listed. Yet the majority of products advertised on page four were household medical remedies. Appearing in all nineteenth-century newspapers and magazines, these notices for miracle cures were sometimes of questionable taste, and the products themselves were undoubtedly similar to the elixirs of the Western medicine show. Thus, for an upset stomach there was "Crumbacker's Celebrated Tonic and Anti-Dyspeptic," and for the relief of "internal vermin" (worms) readers were encouraged to rely on "Vermifuge." The Telegraph advertised "Albion Corn Plaster" for the feet, "Dumfries' Highly Approved Eye Water" for better vision, "Cambrian Toothache Pills" for rotten teeth, and "Dr. Heintzelman's Late Improved Truss" for support. Finally, no list of remedies advertised in the Telegraph could end without mention of "Dumfries' Remedy for the Piles."

Contrary to the usual format, the Telegraph contained features that added interest for its readers. For example, when a prominent American statesman died, Green put his paper into mourning by bordering his columns in black. The Telegraph paid this respect to Madison, Monroe, DeWitt Clinton, and Rachel Jackson, but the deaths of Jefferson and John Adams on July 4, 1826 caused the newspaper to go into extended mourning. Throughout the remainder of the month, its columns were blackened, and its pages were filled with articles eulogizing Jefferson
as the founder of the Telegraph's political principles. Conversely, the Federalist John Adams received the scant notice that he did only because he had died at the same time as the Virginian. Green also provided variety to his columns by reporting unusual and sometimes humorous news. On January 17, 1831 an eighteen-inch snowfall in Washington prompted the Telegraph to forecast a "true Siberian winter" with severe cold as far south as Georgia. During the summer and fall of 1832, Green kept his readers informed on the spread of the cholera epidemic that was raging throughout North America. In Pennsylvania as early as June, the disease had reached epidemic proportions in New York, New Jersey, and Canada by July, Norfolk by August, and the rest of the country by November. To combat the cholera epidemic days of "fasting, prayer, and humiliation" were set aside in the larger cities, and Green suspended publication of the Telegraph on August 1, Washington's day of atonement. Not surprisingly, the editor's political biases sometimes intruded into his human interest stories. A meteor shower in November, 1833, just after Jackson's heavyhanded removal of the Bank deposits led Green to augur that political terror awaited the country. Then in January, 1835, the Telegraph noted with obvious satisfaction that the English actress Fanny Kemble had characterized her New York audience as "swine." "The good citizens of Gotham," commented the newspaper, "now know what is thought of them by their theatrical goddess." Finally, the most ridiculous advertisement ever to appear in the Telegraph was undoubtedly the notice for an appearance of "Apollo the Grecian Dog." Travelling the East Coast in 1828, this amazing canine could answer questions in Arithmetic and Astronomy, spell any name, show a knowledge of chess, demonstrate an appreciation of beauty, and "detect a card only touched by a lady."
The most entertaining addition to the Telegraph's editorial columns was the satirical poem, occasionally accompanied by a political cartoon. Written under the pseudonym of Peter Pindar, Jr., these colorful verses and pictures ridiculed Jackson, Van Buren, Thomas Ritchie, the Kitchen Cabinet, the tariff, and other persons and issues. Thus, in September, 1832, when Jackson was ready to "smuggle" Van Buren into the Vice Presidency, Pindar produced a satirical version of "Hushaby, baby," entitled "Granny Jackson's Lullaby to Little Martin." The poem was accompanied by a caricature of Jackson holding the diminutive Magician on his lap while feeding him soup from a large spoon:

Hushaby, Martin,
Let the wind blow;
Vice you shall be,
Whether or no;
I'll get you in somehow,
Through key-hole or cranny;
Then hushaby, Martin,
And trust to your granny.

Hushaby, Martin,
Though the bad boys
Have cruelly stolen
Your nice English toys;
I've got for you others,
Just equally nice;
And the best of grandmothers
Will make you her Vice.

Hushaby, Martin,
Lie quiet and still;
I'll say that ill usage
Has made my pet ill;
And then the State doctors
Shall swear, in a trice,
That nothing will cure you,
Unless you're made Vice.

Hushaby, Martin,
Look sad and seem sick;
Blair and Tom Ritchie
Shall keep up the trick;
And run for the doctors,
And swear as they go,
At the mischievous boys
Who have treated you so.
Hushaby, Martin,
Don't you despair,
When Granny is gone
   You shall sit in her chair;
And in the meantime,
   As a sugar-plum nice,
I'll get Uncle Sam
   To appoint you his Vice.

Then hushaby, Martin,
On the tree-top
I'll place you, before I
   The matter let drop;
But if the bough breaks,
   Together we fall;
And down comes Andrew,
   And Martin and all.

Despite the fun that Green had in teasing his political opponents, operating the Telegraph required a great deal of hard work, political and business judgment, patience, and luck. In 1826, the year of its establishment, the newspaper already had an exchange list of at least 163 newspapers, reprinting its articles and thereby spreading its opinions to untold Americans who had never seen a copy of the Telegraph. Two years later, at the end of the campaign of 1828 and at the height of its popularity, Green claimed a circulation for his press of over 20,000 and a value as low as $25,000 or as high as $50,000 depending upon his reason for citing the figures. Thus, as the publisher of a major national newspaper, he had to concern himself with personnel relations, marketing, and accounts, as well as the paper's content. The Telegraph was an unwieldy business to oversee, and Green encountered numerous problems in the undertaking.

Green offered three editions of the Telegraph—the daily paper at $10 annually, the semiweekly paper or Country Telegraph at $5 per year, and the weekly Telegraph at $2.50 annually. The weekly edition was basically a summary of the week's news and editorials, while the
semiweekly paper, published three times per week during sessions of Congress and twice during recesses, presented the most significant portions of the daily. In 1834, Green doubled the price of the Country Telegraph, but with payment in advance the subscriber would also receive at no extra charge the daily proceedings of Congress, entitled the Register of Debates. Moreover, if the reader still wanted a $5 paper, Green offered the Political Register, which, like the old country edition, contained a compilation of the week's editorials, Congressional proceedings and speeches, and which, with payment in advance, would entitle the subscriber to receive free the Register. Though he justified this change by pointing to the enlargement of his semiweekly paper, Green was also attempting to obtain badly needed revenue and, by the reward for advance payment, hoping to limit the financially troublesome accumulation of overdue accounts. To gain an advantage over his competitors in the early reporting of the news, Green varied the time of his newspaper's publication. When Congress was in session, the Telegraph was published in the morning to enable it to report the Congressional debates of the previous day and the local news of that evening. But during Congressional recesses, the Telegraph became an evening paper so that it could anticipate papers of the following morning by having the benefit of both the Northern and Southern mails. Finally, for the campaigns of 1828 and 1832, Green published the Telegraph Extra. Issued from March 1, 1828 to January, 1829, at a rate of one dollar for the entire thirty-six numbers, his first Extra was devoted to the proof of the "Bargain, Management, and Intrigue" of the Adams Administration and the exoneration of Jackson from the murder of the six militiamen. Conversely, the second Extra Telegraph, issued from September 3 to October 23, 1832, at five
dollars for ten copies of thirteen numbers each, attacked the Jackson Administration, accusing the President of abandoning his principles and attempting to appoint his successor. Unfortunately, because of Green's apparent inability to collect the subscriptions, both campaign papers proved to be financially disastrous for him.

Green employed a number of means to circulate his paper, some of them of doubtful legality. First, he quite honestly hired agents to find readers and collect subscription payments. Yet because he had to pay these agents, some of whom might devote little time to their work, and some of whom might prove dishonest, Green relied as much as possible on government employees to help him maintain his press. Before Jackson's election, the Hero's partisans in Congress gladly abused their franking privileges to aid the party organ. For example, in 1828 the National Journal charged that Congressmen John Randolph and Andrew Stevenson of Virginia, Henry Daniel, Thomas P. Moore, and Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky, Samuel D. Ingham and Espy Van Horne of Pennsylvania, and James Findlay of Ohio were all abusing their mailing privileges to circulate the Telegraph. Moore was particularly notorious for his liberal use of the frank. The postmaster at Maysville, Kentucky, once counted 1610 packages of the Telegraph franked by him, and in July, 1828, the Kentuckian was accused of franking a huge number of newspapers to Zanesville, Indiana. Green's press of course denied any wrongdoing as it complained that the Zanesville postmaster was tampering with the mail and later counter-charged that Congressman John J. Culpepper of North Carolina was franking "Coalition" pamphlets. In his unpublished autobiography, however, Green proudly declared that Moore had received the nickname "Free Tom" for franking the Telegraph.
Following Jackson's election, Green became even more dependent on the corruption about which he so frequently wailed. He now had at his disposal an army of friendly postmasters that Jackson had recently appointed. These grateful spoilsmen circulated the Telegraph's prospectus, collected payments, and frequently settled delinquent accounts for the Jackson Administration organ. Given this assistance plus the continued aid of friendly Congressmen, Green no longer had any need for agents, and he could therefore cut his operating expenses. But his finances at this time were still in a shambles. After his break with Jackson in 1831, the helpful postmasters disappeared, forcing Green to rely on traditional agents. Nevertheless, he continued to work to reduce his costs, first, by supporting legislation to eliminate postage on newspapers, and second, by maintaining good relations with Congressmen of both parties. Estimating in 1832 that his postage expenses were $10,000 annually, he lobbied for relief in the Senate and House, only to see Senator George M. Bibb's amendment die in the Committee on the Post Office and the House version quickly tabled. Yet he still had the help of the Calhounites, who faithfully obtained subscribers for their organ, as well as Jacksonians like James K. Polk, who as late as November, 1834, was still acting as Green's agent in Tennessee, and Whigs like Willie P. Mangum, who franked Green's letters and handled his subscriptions in North Carolina.

Not only was lack of administration support expensive, but it was detrimental to the newspaper's well-being in three other ways. First, when it became obvious that the Telegraph no longer spoke for the Jackson Administration, a number of Green's subscribers dropped his newspaper. For example, as an employee of the administration, Edward Satchell of
Pittsburgh felt he should not patronize a paper opposed to Jackson. Less courteous than Satchell, Alfred Flournoy accused the editor of abandoning his old friends and prospering by his new political course, while Richard Hyatt ridiculed Green for violating the private correspondence of Jackson, Amos Kendall, and Francis P. Blair of the Washington Globe. Conversely, it was at this time (Spring, 1831) that Green was beginning to think that the editor of the Globe was violating journalistic ethics by stealing his subscribers. He chose to believe rumors that Blair was making raids on his subscribers, especially in the North, by pointing to the change in his politics as well as his disreputable character. Moreover, the friendly postmasters who had served as the Telegraph's agents were, according to Green, now trying to prevent the distribution of his newspaper. This belief, which he also held during his opposition to the Adams Administration, led him to complain to Postmaster General William T. Barry that his subscribers were not receiving the Telegraph. Later, during the Nullification Crisis, he claimed that Southern postmasters even suspected of sympathy to nullification were being dismissed to prevent the "dissemination of obnoxious journals."

Finally, in a June, 1836, response to a complaint from readers in Tuskegee, Alabama that the regular mail from Washington took seven days to reach them while the Telegraph took 25 to 34 days, Green's press sarcastically explained that it was the "pleasure of Mr. Postmaster Amos Kendall" to put it on the "slow mail."

Though Green could blame his opponents for attempting to suppress the Telegraph, he could hold only his subscribers responsible for their refusal to pay for the newspaper. Unwilling to discontinue the paper to a delinquent reader, he nevertheless found himself making repeated
requests, pleas, and demands for payment. Over the years the problem became worse as Green's reminder in October, 1826, that the *Telegraph* "should be paid for" had by December, 1830, become his requirement that the "subs list is so long and the amt. due me so great that I cannot send the paper unless compliance is made with my terms." Evidently, he feared that discontinuing the paper would end any chance of the reader paying him. Yet this policy resulted in one active subscriber in May, 1835, owing Green for his subscription of 1828, another discontinued subscriber having a balance of five dollars since 1831, and the *Telegraph*'s claims in January, 1834, of having over $50,000 in delinquent payments. Little wonder then that even before his break with Jackson, Green responded to John M. Buchanan's inquiry about establishing a newspaper with the lament that "the press is so badly sustained by the democratic party that there are few situations which will justify the expense of publication."

Rivaling Green's problems with his subscribers were his disputes with the employees of the *Telegraph*. He had his share of minor personnel conflicts as for example, in December, 1830, when he was forced to explain to James Crossfield that he had forgiven him for his past behavior but could not rehire him because it would be an injustice to his other loyal, hard-working employees. Moreover, after a Mr. Simmons failed to insert an article in one of Green's publications, the publisher promptly dismissed him. Finally, political heresy sometimes prompted an employee's termination. Though Green denied in April, 1833 that he had dismissed E. B. Robinson for his political views, the following December he discharged his agent in Cincinnati, William Burke, for serving on an electioneering committee "to foster Van Buren on the people."
As unpleasant as these incidents were, they were delightful in comparison to Green's difficulties with Russell Jarvis, Amos Kendall, and his journeyman printers. A lawyer, Jarvis had studied under Calhoun's legal mentor, Tapping Reeve, before serving for a short time as the editor of the Boston Patriot and then becoming in 1827 a frequent contributor to one of Green's editorial allies, the Boston Statesman. Because of his desire for eastern representation on the Telegraph and because of his usual need for additional capital, Green formed a partnership with Jarvis, the New Englander agreeing to pay him $8,000 in return for a share of all profits from subscriptions and the government printing patronage. Beginning his duties at the Telegraph on January 2, 1828, Jarvis, who possessed the same high-strung temperament as Green, soon started to quarrel with his new partner. Jarvis accused Green of failing to treat him as an equal, and Green, though complimentary of Jarvis's literary talents, complained of his partner's attempts to dominate the paper despite his poor political judgment. Green's evidence of this lack of political acumen was the Bostonian's embarrassing disputes with the Adams "Coalition." Even before he began his duties at the Telegraph, Jarvis resorted to violence over a caricature that was to appear in the National Journal. While in Boston, he intercepted a letter from John Agg of the Journal to Daniel Webster containing a political cartoon that Agg wanted the Boston artist, David Claypool Johnston, to engrave. A depiction of Green teaching the devil to lie, the cartoon made Green say, "If I cannot teach you alone, I have lately engaged an assistant, and both of us will surely succeed." Enraged, Jarvis then sought out Johnston, who, agreeably enough, offered to omit the portion referring to him. Jarvis instantly refused and proceeded to track the engraved stone to the
shop of John and William Pendleton, prominent Boston lithographers, with the stated intention of preventing the publication "of the whole" cartoon. Jarvis and the Pendletons later told conflicting stories about their confrontation. According to Jarvis, when the Pendletons refused to stop their work on the engraving, he grabbed the stone and broke it by throwing it to the floor. The Pendletons then attacked Jarvis with the intent of giving him a merciless beating, but their inability to pin Jarvis's legs allowed him to kick one of the Pendletons hard enough to fracture his ribs. Evidently feeling that he had completed his mission, Jarvis heroically concluded that he retreated from the shop like "Xenophon thro' the enemy's country." On the other hand, the Pendletons recalled that they had just received the stone when Jarvis entered their shop demanding to see it. They read Jarvis the inscription, claiming they could not identify Green's assistant, at which time the intruder, announcing that he was that person, damaged the stone. The Pendletons then swiftly kicked Jarvis out of their shop. As for the broken ribs, they reported that "Jarvis had too much care for his health to offer any personal violence, or to do damage that a few shillings would not repair."

Though Jarvis claimed victory in his battle with the Pendletons, the two lithographers repaired the stone and issued it. Borrowing a phrase from Jarvis's account, they also produced a cartoon on the fight entitled "Xenophon's Retreat out of the Enemy's Country," which showed one of the Pendletons kicking Green's new partner out of the door of their lithograph shop. Jarvis, who was unwilling to allow the incident to fade away, now started to ridicule Webster for his part in the affair. Webster, however, refused to be drawn out on the matter, and the fiery Jarvis soon gave up his attacks on the unresponsive Senator. Yet, in
the meantime, he had found a new combatant. When the President's son, John Adams, Jr., snubbed him at a party and then made obnoxious remarks about him, Jarvis again sought revenge. Consequently, upon seeing him in the halls of Congress, he pinched the youngster's nose. Since John, Jr., was on official business from his father, a Congressional investigation of the incident was held in which Green capably defended his partner and also had the unique opportunity to cross-examine his leading political opponent, President Adams. There the matter was settled despite the subsequent charge by the administration press that Jarvis had called the first lady a "pimp."

Given their quarrels and Jarvis's quick temper, Green had decided by July 1 to terminate their relationship. But when he offered to return the $5,000 that Jarvis had invested in the Telegraph, his new partner countered that their agreement would stand unless Green would pay him $25,000, one-half the estimated value of the newspaper. Paradoxically, Jarvis then offered to buy out Green for $7,000 under the stipulation that the senior partner would not publish a paper in Washington for ten years. Green responded by threatening to place the Telegraph in the hands of a trustee while settling the matter in the courts, yet apparently fearing the possible consequences of this step, he soon agreed to match Jarvis's settlement figure and also proposed to return his two notes worth $4,000. The two men continuing to haggle over the terms of dissolution for the remainder of July, Green finally announced on August 7 that Jarvis was ready to end their partnership. Their agreement initially stated that Green was to pay $5,000 in September, at which time David Henshaw of Boston and James Hamilton, Jr., of South Carolina would decide how much more Jarvis should receive. Three days later, though, the terms had
changed, as Green would now pay Jarvis $3,000 immediately, $5,000 in October, and an additional sum to be determined by a board of three arbitrators—Hugh Lawson White, Levi Woodbury, and Hamilton. In September, Green borrowed $5,000 from Dr. William Ingalls of Boston to meet his requirement, and the three arbitrators having met in the interim, agreed to award Jarvis an additional $2600.

Vehemently protesting the settlement, Jarvis took his case to the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia where in May, 1829, he filed an affidavit implying that Green's financial troubles would prevent him from paying if the increased award was delayed too long. Though the court eventually confirmed the award of White, Woodbury, and Hamilton, the temperamental journalists were still not finished with each other. In June, 1829 Green urged Jackson not to appoint his former partner to any office because of Jarvis's poor character. Then in the fall, Jarvis wrote a series of letters for the Boston Evening Bulletin and the National Journal, accusing Green of boasting that as the editor of the most influential press in the country he could control political events by making and unmaking Presidents. Denying these allegations, Green tried to dismiss Jarvis as a disappointed liar. The Telegraph also published numerous reprints to defend its editor, the most convincing from the hostile Richmond Whig, which concluded that Jarvis's letters had done little to hurt Green or his press.

Green's argument with Amos Kendall, which proved to be much more significant for the future of the Telegraph, was an outgrowth of his dispute with Russell Jarvis. A further consideration for Green in his attempts to dissolve his partnership was his desire to offer the Telegraph's editorial chair to Kendall, whom he regarded as a threat to
start a rival Jackson press in Washington. Consequently, on September 17, 1828, immediately after his settlement with Jarvis, he invited the editor of the Kentucky Argus to become his political chief. When Kendall was reluctant to accept, Green made another offer of $2,000, also unsatisfactory to the Kentuckian, before dropping his invitation. Nevertheless, Kendall's apparent wish to remain in Kentucky softened Green's disappointment, and the relieved editor of the Telegraph seconded this desire by encouraging his potential rival to continue his excellent work in the West. Actually, Kendall was eager to move to Washington, but $2,000 simply did not provide enough financial security for a man reared in poverty. Kendall, moreover, would have undoubtedly remained in Kentucky if the Jackson Administration had not seen fit to reward him for his services in the campaign by appointing him Fourth Auditor of the Treasury.

Soon after Kendall's arrival in Washington, Green received information from Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky that led him to change his attitude toward Kendall. In his autobiography, Green recalled that Johnson, who had acted as an intermediary in his employment negotiations with Kendall, had informed him of the existence of a cabal among the Jacksonians whose sole ambition was to see Martin Van Buren become the President's successor. Because this cabal believed that Green, as a staunch supporter of Calhoun, would never put his press behind the Magician, they persuaded Kendall to decline his offer so that he could become a treasury auditor and thus be in a position to start a press for Van Buren. According to Green's memoir, he immediately related this story to Jackson, who strongly denied that there would be favoritism in his Cabinet, and to reassure Green, promised that his first official act
would be to give his editor the patronage of Van Buren's State Department. Conversely, in his autobiography, Kendall remembered that early in Jackson's first administration, one of the President's closest advisers, Secretary of War John Eaton, had approached him about sharing the government printing with Green. Before accepting Eaton's offer, Kendall claimed that he sought Green's consent, and failing to receive it, he informed the Secretary of War that he would remain in his present position. A short time later, when his confirmation as auditor was before the Senate, Kendall recalled that Green had suggested that, if rejected, he should return to Kentucky and resume his newspaper work there. Kendall replied that he would remain in Washington even if the Senate failed to confirm him. His subsequent confirmation, in which Calhoun cast the deciding vote, Kendall saw as an attempt by Green and Calhoun to make him feel indebted to them. Evidently, it was at this time that he began to believe that Green was more a friend of Calhoun than of Jackson. Meanwhile, Green, who was armed with Johnson's conspiracy rumor, had developed a strong distrust of Kendall. The Kentuckian had been appointed treasury auditor just as Johnson had predicted, and his determination to remain in Washington without an office evidently convinced Green that he was biding his time until the Van Burenite cabal could put him at the head of a press rivaling the Telegraph.

The growing conflict between Kendall and Green, which was based on nothing more than a series of misunderstandings, would have remained private if it had not been for the establishment of the Globe and the subsequent break between Jackson and Calhoun. Following the publication of the Seminole correspondence in February, 1831, the Globe, echoing Kendall's sentiments, began to charge that Green had long been involved
in a conspiracy to oust Jackson and bring out Calhoun as a Presidential candidate. Evidently, Kendall was Francis P. Blair's assistant during the ensuing editorial war with the Telegraph, and the man once considered for the editorial chair of Green's press now played a significant role in driving Green from the Jackson party. On the other hand, Green was now convinced that Kendall had been one of the founders of the Globe, a press that he thought had been established to destroy the Telegraph. Moreover, he later came to believe that Kendall was part owner of the newspaper, its anonymous co-editor, and one of the leaders of the "malign influence" perverting the mind of the President. Yet despite the bitter enmity each man felt for the other, there is no evidence of wrongdoing on the part of either. Kendall had always expressed friendly intentions to Green, and though fearing him as a potential rival, Green had done nothing to injure Kendall. In fact, because of this fear, Green may have attempted to persuade Vice President Calhoun to support Kendall's confirmation as Fourth Auditor. Therefore, to find the source of the Green-Kendall conflict it is necessary to look for third parties capable of sowing distrust and suspicion in the fertile minds of Kendall, Green, and even Jackson. If Green's memoir is correct, Richard M. Johnson, future Vice President under Van Buren, was one of these scheming men.

Green's dispute with his printers was a consequence of his establishment of the Washington Institute, an organization to provide a school for orphans, increase the number of printers, and supplement economically the employees of his press. In October, 1832, Green described to the Reverend John F. Hickey of Emmitsburg, Maryland, his plans to construct a large home one mile east of the Capital which would house between 100 to 300 orphans from age six to twenty-one. These youngsters would
receive a classical education from the Roman Catholic Sisters of Charity, but they would also serve as compositors, binders, and pressmen in the Telegraph office. Following a strict upbringing as Catholics, they would be granted a loan upon their departure "so that none shall be thrown helpless on the world." Then, apparently because of his financial difficulties, he dropped his plans for the Washington Institute. In August, 1834, though, Green again proposed a school providing about 200 boys from eleven to seventeen a classical and scientific education, this time from Catholic priests. In addition, these youths would be employed as Congressional reporters throughout the session and as apprentices in the various departments of his press during Congressional recesses.

But just as Green was ready to complete his preparations to open the Washington Institute, his journeyman printers staged a walkout to protest the competition threatened by such a large number of apprentices. To change their minds Green pointed out that his school would produce only about twenty-five new printers a year, a figure less than the 189 immigrant printers that had landed in New York alone during a six-month period in 1833. Yet these arguments failed to move his printers who made it clear that the Washington Institute would have to be abandoned before they would return to work. This impasse continued for the next two months as Green vacillated about the future of his institute while the printers remained adamant. On September 8, he privately stated his willingness to abandon his school, but he still reserved the right to educate "some 40 or 50" boys in his office. Publicly, though, he waited for his printers to return to work until October 7, when he appeared to surrender to their demands by announcing the abandonment of the institute in the Telegraph. Now satisfied, the journeymen prepared to return to
their jobs only to discover a new promotion in the newspaper for the hated institute. The "Printers of the District of Columbia" thereupon held a meeting at which they decided to send a committee to talk to Green, who greeted them with the stubborn declaration that he would quit the printing business before giving up the Washington Institute. The printers' union then passed a formal strike resolution against the Telegraph's publisher, and they issued a circular warning "the printers of the United States" about the "vacillating and deceptive course of Mr. Green" as the means to prevent other printers from becoming strikebreakers. Finally realizing the printers' resolve, Green announced on October 15 a retreat to his earlier plan of educating several boys in his office. The journeyman printers, who had been out of work for over two months, accepted this compromise as an indication of their employer's sincerity and immediately returned to work. Green, however, was bitter about the recalcitrance of his unionized printers as he was still fuming over four months later about the "conspiracy among my journeymen."

Green's Washington Institute was a mixture of benevolence and business. Though he probably wanted to establish a school for orphan boys, he was just as concerned in the fall of 1834 with finding enough inexpensive labor to print the various books and periodicals he was publishing. Before his break with Jackson, he confined his efforts to the publication of his newspaper, issuing only a few speeches, a biography of Calhoun, and of course his campaign extra in addition to the three editions of the Telegraph. But after the break, when he began to believe that he needed new sources of revenue to replace his loss of executive patronage, Green devoted much more time to the publication of specialized periodicals
and professional journals in the hope that he could profit by making his press more useful. By September, 1832 he was offering the Farmers Magazine and the Mechanics Magazine to provide practical information for the two largest occupations in the country. For military enthusiasts, he had plans to issue the Army and Navy Journal. Designed to honor America's military heroes (but not the Hero!), the first number of the magazine was to include a biographical sketch of George Rogers Clark and a short history of West Point.

In March, 1833 Green announced that he was expanding his press to publish the debates of Congress (the previously mentioned Register of Debates) and several periodicals. Having dropped his magazines for mechanics and farmers as well as the Army and Navy Journal, he proposed instead the Metropolitan, The Jurist, and the Register and Library of Medical and Chirurgical Science, the three together constituting the "Washington Library." "A Gazette of Literature, Music, Science, and the Fine Arts," the Metropolitan was further described as a "literary miscellany with no politics." Its subscription rate was $5 annually. According to its prospectus, The Jurist would review all current legal decisions and discussions of legal questions; present the "interesting parts" of all new law books and periodicals in the United States, Great Britain, and France; and republish all standard law books. Moreover, if this amazing offer at only $10 annually did not attract the country's numerous lawyers, Green had plans to publish the proceedings of the Supreme Court in the comprehensive journal. To that end, he had an amendment introduced in Congress to allow $400 for recording the Court's activities. Yet Richard Peters, the Court reporter, accurately saw little chance of the measure's passage since Green's "Ephemeral Law
Journal" would result in "much error" by omitting points argued by counsel, and it would cost the government money by reducing the sales of the regular court reports. Finally, the Register and Library of Medical and Chirurgical Science was to provide the physician with the same benefits that The Jurist was to furnish the lawyer. Edited by Granville Sharp Pattison, Professor of Anatomy at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia, the journal would review with illustrations all new books on medicine and surgery; present medical news from Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain, and the United States; and generally keep medical practitioners informed of all developments in their profession on a weekly basis. Probably referring to the fact that the subscriber received five volumes of 650 pages each for only $10 annually, John Martin, a physician in Wilkes County, North Carolina, called the Medical Register "the cheapest and most valuable work we can get at the price."

As late as 1836, Green was still offering the public at least part of his Washington Library. Yet at the same time that he had begun its publication, he was becoming interested in producing works that would unify the Southern mind and prevent its contamination by the ideas of "Northern fanatics." His first sectionalist publication, was, appropriately enough, Thomas R. Dew's pioneer proslavery tract, "Review of the Debate in the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832." Though Dew had published the essay in 1832, Green reprinted it in June, 1833 in pamphlet form to insure a much wider circulation and consequently "set the South right on slavery." This venture proving successful, Green soon became deeply involved with the publication of school books for the South. As justification for this new project, he argued that the old federal
party was attempting to take control of the schools in order to revolutionize the politics of the country. They had already filled the minds of students in New England and New York with their fanaticism, and they were now beginning to corrupt Southern youths. The only way to defeat this evil movement, Green concluded, was to organize right-thinking Southern intellectuals so that they could author uncontaminated books to be published by his press.

In the summer and fall of 1833 Green carried on a correspondence with Dew and Judge Beverly Tucker of the College of William and Mary, and Dr. Thomas Cooper, President of South Carolina College, for the purpose of starting his Southern school book publishing company. The three men were to serve as Green's advisors, but, more importantly, he hoped that they would contribute works to his project. He wanted Dew to write a history of England, and he was happy to discover Cooper at work on a reader for Southern schools as well as a History of the United States with a sectional interpretation. To Tucker he suggested the preparation of a new American edition of Sir William Blackstone's legal masterpiece, *Commentaries on the Laws of England*. Proving receptive to his ideas, these scholars apparently were willing to add to the child's arithmetic book, the "larger" arithmetic book, and the spelling book that Green claimed to have in late December, 1833. Moreover, he reported that the legislatures of Virginia and South Carolina, evidently swayed by the influence of his three associates, had promised to use his books in their common schools. But over a year later, in January, 1835, Green wrote Tucker that he was ready to publish a spelling book, only one arithmetic book, and Cooper's reader, and he had just requested Governor Littleton Tazewell of Virginia to use his books in the state's schools.
Inexplicably, he had accomplished nothing in the interim. In the following two years, though, the company's organization received his increasing devotion, especially after his loss of the Senate printing in February, 1835, forced him to become dangerously dependent on its success for the continued existence of his press.

Location and finance proved to be most troublesome for Green in establishing what came to be known as the "American Literary Company." Through the influence of Tucker, journalist and staunch Calhounite, Richard K. Cralle of Virginia, Senator William C. Preston of South Carolina, and others, he hoped to receive financial aid from the Old Dominion and South Carolina, the two states on which he most depended for the success of his enterprise. For example, in May, 1835, he wanted Tucker to ask the faculty of the College of William and Mary for their assistance in obtaining subscriptions to a journal he planned to publish in England as a means of funding his literary company. One month earlier, in an appeal to Preston for financial aid, he informed the Carolinian that he was ready to speculate in a Mississippi cotton plantation to get the money for his school book project. Virginia was his first choice for the location of his literary company. The water power produced by the falls of the James would enable him to manufacture paper in Richmond, and the presence of the College would make Williamsburg an excellent site for his press and another school for orphans to provide him with the necessary labor. But in September he wrote Cralle that he was leaving for New Jersey to obtain an act of incorporation for the establishment of a paper mill and a large printing office in that state. Furthermore, as he had just purchased Condy Raguet's Philadelphia Political Examiner, he announced to Cralle that he was moving that paper to New York where
he hoped that Raguet and he would join him as its editor. The *Telegraph*,
he implied, might also be switched to New York, consequently giving the
country's largest city a weekly (*the Political Examiner*) and a daily
paper sustaining the rights of the South.

Uncertain in December that he would receive his charter from New
Jersey, Green was now prepared to ask South Carolina for an act of in-
corporation. That state, in which he had so many political friends,
eventually gave him his charter in the summer of 1836, and in August he
had finally completed his organization of the "American Literary Company."

Appearing in the *Telegraph* from October 12 until the paper's demise in
February, 1837, the company's prospectus stated that it desired to render
the South independent of "Northern fanatics" who were attempting to
prejudice the section against its own institutions and character. The
corporation would issue the *Telegraph* and text books for schools and
colleges, and it would manufacture the paper used for these publications.
For subscribers the "American Literary Company" would look "chiefly to
book sellers, merchants, and the slave holders of the South." All persons
connected with the company would in proportion to their salaries be re-
quired to hold its stock, the payment for which would come from a sinking
fund provided for by the employees. To market the company's publications,
the prospectus stated that distribution agencies would be established in
large cities throughout the country. Finally, boys would be employed in

If the remarks of the Gettysburg, Pennsylvania *Star and Banner* are
any indication, the Northern response to the "American Literary Company"
was hostile. On December 3, the *Telegraph* reprinted an article from
that newspaper accusing Green of attempting to establish a Southern cen-
sorship of the press that would prohibit the publication of any literary
works having antislavery implications. Fortunately for the abolitionists they would not have to endure this challenge past the winter of 1837. Following its first stockholders' election on December 8, in which Green, Cralle, A. E. Miller, William W. Moore, and Francis Pickens were elected directors, the "American Literary Company" quickly fell apart. The recession that climaxed in the spring with the Panic of 1837 made it improbable that any new business enterprise, especially one that had been so difficult to organize, would be able to gain public support. Thus, in January, Green still believed that Tucker could make a "certain fortune" by writing histories for juveniles, but he also informed the Virginian that he was "almost in despair" about his new company's future. Soon afterwards, he dropped the subject from his correspondence, leading to the conclusion that, like the Telegraph which it controlled, the "American Literary Company" was a victim of the impending hard times and another example of its founder's financial ineptitude.

The "American Literary Company" eventually became one attempt by Green to save his press after his disastrous loss of the government printing. Having once pointed out that the lack of advertising made it necessary for Washington's newspapers to have government support, he unwittingly but accurately predicted that a press without government patronage could not long stay in business. Unfortunately, there were only three sources of this vital printing patronage. First, the administration organ invariably received the printing of the executive departments. The National Journal was given much of this patronage during the Adams Administration, and the Telegraph held it from Jackson's inauguration until the establishment of the Globe; Blair's press then controlled the administration printing throughout the remainder of the Jackson Presidency and
for the single term of Van Buren. Substantially more lucrative than the executive's patronage was the printing of the House and the Senate. Until 1819 there was no Congressional printer; instead, the work was contracted to the lowest bidder by the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate. But as this procedure resulted in poor, slipshod printing, Congress in that year passed a joint resolution providing for the election of printers by the Senate and the House as well as defining the financial terms for the work.

Until the establishment of the Telegraph, the Congressional elections for printers had been little more than confirmations for Gales and Seaton. The two men were nationally known for their reports of the Congressional debates, they had a number of friends in both houses of the legislature, and their press, the National Intelligencer, was the oldest and most prestigious newspaper in Washington. Though this consensus for Gales and Seaton eroded with the factionalism of the election of 1824, they still controlled the Congressional printing in the Nineteenth Congress and won a lopsided victory for the printing of the House in the Twentieth Congress (February, 1827). In the Senate, however, the editors of the Intelligencer, now identified with the National Republicans, faced defeat by Green, who was backed by the growing Jackson forces in the upper house. Thus, to delay their loss of the Senate patronage, John M. Clayton of Delaware offered a successful resolution changing the election from a plurality to a majority which Martin Van Buren then challenged, pointing out that the 1819 joint resolution of Congress had established the rule for electing the printer, and only another joint resolution could change the procedure. The Senate, however, refused to heed Van Buren's argument and the two
succeeding attempts to elect a printer by a majority predictably gave Green only a one-vote plurality over Gales and Seaton. Nevertheless, several Senators, among them Thomas Hart Benton, John H. Eaton, and Robert Y. Hayne, had begun to argue after the first ballot that in accordance with the joint resolution of 1819 Green had been duly elected. Furthermore, both the Telegraph and the Intelligencer concurred in this belief since on March 2, the day after the balloting occurred, the former press announced that Green had been elected, and soon afterwards the latter charged that the "best manner of doing the public printing had no influence" on its election. But when the Twentieth Congress convened in December, 1827, it soon became apparent that the Senate lacked a printer. On December 4, Eaton, who as a major investor in the Telegraph was especially anxious that Green receive the Senate patronage, again argued that Green had been elected under the rules of the joint resolution of 1819, and following some debate, he introduced a resolution to this effect. The Jacksonians, having won several Senate seats in the previous election, now carried Eaton's resolution 28 to 19, and Green was officially declared Senate printer.

One year later, Eaton introduced another resolution on the Senate printing, this one to repeal the 1819 law and, like Clayton's earlier measure, change the election of Congressional printer from a plurality to a majority. The Jacksonians, who now had a majority in both houses of Congress, could insure the election of their printer and eliminate any last-minute deals to elect a darkhorse candidate by requiring this majority vote. Yet Nehemiah Knight of Rhode Island threatened to disrupt this strategy by an amendment which, similar to the practice before 1819, would allow Congress to accept bids on the printing before
holding an election. Quickly, Benton, Eaton, and Richard M. Johnson spoke to rally the Jacksonian majority against the Knight amendment, Benton pointing out that a responsible person was needed to handle a number of the confidential Congressional documents, Eaton observing that the printing prior to 1819 was of poor quality, and Johnson arguing that "there ought to be no contracts made in the country for doing the public business; it had introduced more fraud and low cunning than anything else in the world." Now alerted to the need for unity, the Jacksonians promptly defeated Knight's amendment and soon approved Eaton's joint resolution.

In February, 1829, Eaton's work bore fruit for Green as he retained the Senate printing and then defeated Gales and Seaton in a close election in the House. With his reception of the executive's patronage following Jackson's inauguration, the government printing was for the first time consolidated in one press, a financial windfall that by August, 1830, had rewarded Green with an estimated $95,000 in government funds. Meanwhile, the Congressional friends of Gales and Seaton were attempting to assuage their bitter defeat in the House. Less than a week after their ouster, Daniel Barringer of North Carolina submitted a bill in the House for the printing of Legislative and Executive documents from the First to the Thirteenth Congresses. Though it was understood that Gales and Seaton were to undertake this work, the bill passed the House with, strangely enough, little opposition by the Jacksonians, and despite the efforts of Levi Woodbury, George Poindexter, and Robert W. Hayne to kill it in the Senate, the Congressional documents legislation eventually passed the upper house to become law on March 2, 1831. A bonanza for the Intelligencer's two publishers, their publication of 750 copies of the
"American State Papers" would give them the same return as the printer to Congress, probably for a much longer period. Green was of course upset about this apparent subsidy to his two rivals. Thus, after stating that the bill was purportedly a result of appeals made on behalf of Gales and Seaton to rescue them from the financial ruin consequent upon their loyal service to the government, the Telegraph charged that such statements were designed to cover a movement to maintain the twosome's press at public expense for the next twenty-six years. Indeed, the newspaper concluded, Gales and Seaton were trying to make the most of their loss of the government printing.

Luckily for Green, the elections for Congressional printers in 1831 preceded the public dispute that was shortly to occur between Jackson and Calhoun. Because they predated the Telegraph's publication of the Seminole correspondence and the bitter editorial warfare between Green's press and the Globe, he could count on the administration support that made him "certain" of his election. In fact, so united were the Van Burenites behind Green in both the House and the Senate that one observer interpreted it as a sign that the friends of Jackson were once again in harmony. Yet regardless of the good faith shown to him in February, 1831, two years later the Jacksonians were eager to replace Green as government printer. In an obvious reference to him in the Senate debates preceding the election, Benton asserted that hostility to the administration was grounds to disqualify candidates for the printing. Also worried that the Jacksonians in Congress lacked the votes to give Blair a majority in either house, the Missourian urged that the elections be postponed until the next session when the administration candidate would stand a better chance. Unfortunately for the Jacksonians, their
failure to achieve this postponement soon confirmed Benton's fears. In the House, Blair received a plurality on each of the first ten ballots, but then on the next three ballots Gales and Seaton took the lead. Sensing this decisive shift, the Jackson forces tried to implement Benton's strategy, but the attempt failed, and on the fourteenth ballot Gales and Seaton were elected. Though Green received only one vote in the final ballot in the House, a consequence the Telegraph considered necessary for the maintenance of principle, he was surprisingly reelected printer to the Senate.

One of the persons most mortified by the results of the 1833 elections was Jackson, who complained that Congress had been subsidizing Gales and Seaton's abuse for twelve years and Green's ridicule for the last three. Subsequently, by 1835, the failure to elect the administration's printer in the meantime having also become stuck in the craws of the Jacksonians in Congress, both the Hero and his followers were frustrated and hostile about a system that apparently was designed to fatten their opponents. Thus, on the eve of the election in the Senate, Benton delivered a speech harshly critical of the existing system of public printing. Alluding to Gales and Seaton's subsidy to publish the "American State Papers," he charged that the "ingenuity of printers has been put to its utmost stretch to find out old projects for employment upon, the effect of which is to sustain party presses during a long vacation." Moreover, if an unsatisfactory "man should be imposed on him by men who were just leaving their seats, every effort should be made to rout him from his place." Ultimately, Benton suggested, a system whose corruption has exceeded "all other branches of the government put together, including the post office," should be repealed, and
in its place should be organized a national printing office, which the Senator claimed had proven so successful and economical in Great Britain.

In the subsequent election, Benton, though frustrated again in his attempts to elect Blair, at least had the pleasure of seeing the decisive defeat of Green. Showing some early strength, he eventually finished a distant third to Gales and Seaton, who defeated Blair on the seventeenth ballot, 27 to 14. The election in the House was evidently postponed by the Jacksonians until the beginning of the Twenty-fourth Congress so that their new members would finally insure the election of their candidate. The strategy proved successful as the election, in which Green was not even nominated, resulted in Blair's overwhelming victory. Green reacted to his fateful loss of the Senate printing with resignation, pointing out that he had expected defeat since both political parties had opposed him. Yet, according to Green, since the loss of the public printing would hurt the Telegraph by its detrimental effect on his personal credit, a prediction whose accuracy would soon haunt him, he warned his readers that his press would need more public support to continue publication.

Despite the presence of a number of distasteful traits in Green's character, no one could call him a coward since on four occasions during his publication of the Telegraph, he was involved in physical violence. Actually, Jacksonian America had a penchant for violence. There were a number of major riots in the large cities, and quite a few smaller disturbances. Exemplifying this theme of violence, Jackson, the symbol of the age, had fought duels, participated in brawls, and, under questionable circumstances, executed six of his soldiers. His close followers were
also quick-tempered and often ready to resort to violence to solve their problems. John H. Eaton, for example, was willing to challenge the rest of Jackson's first Cabinet because their families refused to engage in social intercourse with his wife. Newspaper editors were especially prone to get into violent controversies. When a man disliked what a press had printed about him, he would sometimes forego legal action, appeals to the courts in such matters being considered unmanly, especially in the South, and try to administer personal chastisement on the author. Furthermore, as organs of political parties, the newspapers occasionally became engaged in editorial battles so heated that their editors felt compelled to settle the matter in a way "customary among gentlemen." For instance, just prior to the 1832 election in South Carolina, when violence was regularly occurring between Unionists and Nullifiers, Benjamin F. Perry, Unionist editor of the Greenville (South Carolina) Mountaineer, became angry at "a most scurrilous and abusive attack" by Turner Bynum and quickly challenged the Nullifier editor of The Sentinel. After practicing with William Cumming, a Georgian who had placed a bullet within inches of Nullifier Congressman George McDuffie's spine in 1822, Perry met Bynum on an island in the Savannah River and mortally wounded his opponent through the hip; Bynum thus became the first martyr of nullification.

Green was just as touchy as Perry about attacks from opposition newspapers. Thus, on January 25, 1828, the editor of the Telegraph "pulled the ears and rung the nose" of the National Intelligencer's Congressional reporter, Edward V. Spearhawk, for remarks he had made in the New York American. According to Green, after learning from his assistant, John S. Meehan, that Spearhawk had acknowledged authorship of
correspondence "willfully and maliciously misquoting the Telegraph's report on one of John Randolph's speeches on slavery," he warned the reporter not to repeat his offense. Unfortunately for Spearhawk, he failed to heed this advice, and following a continuation of his attacks, Green, by another account, "pulled his hair and gouged his eyes." Since the incident had occurred in the rooms of the Senate Committee on Claims, Spearhawk, on January 29, presented a memorial to the upper house requesting that action be taken against Green for the "insult and violence" he had recently suffered. But the Jacksonians in the Senate, especially John Rowan of Kentucky, who thought that the legislative body "might as well interfere in the quarrels of two hackney-coachmen as this," were able to deflate any feelings of sympathy for Spearhawk and his petition was shortly tabled.

If Green's confrontation with Spearhawk was unnecessary, his protracted quarrel with James Watson Webb was simply ridiculous. Beginning in 1829, when Webb, the editor of the New York Courier and Enquirer, prematurely endorsed Van Buren for the Presidency, the squabble soon branched out into other areas having little to do with the original topic (See Chapter V). Eventually, after Green had called Webb a "base calumniator," the New York editor travelled to Washington with the announced purpose of horsewhipping his denigrator before Congress. Consequently, on May 6, 1830, a ludicrous confrontation occurred between the two editors. According to Green,

I yesterday, passing up to the Capitol met him (Webb) at the west front. I had been advised by a letter from New York that he was on his way to carry into execution his threats of "personal chastisement," and a friend had given me a pocket pistol; when I met him I halted on the platform, he raised his cane. I then drew my pistol--he then for the
first time spoke and said, "Throw away your pistol and I will throw away my cane and give you a damned whipping." To this I replied, "I do not intend to be whipped by you nor will I put myself in a position to invite attack from you." He then said, "Are you not a coward to draw a pistol on an unarmed man?" To this I replied, "I have no time to waste with you, so you must march out of my path." He said, "I will not." I told him, "You shall," and cocked my pistol, and presented it, saying at the same time, "March, sir, march." He said, "I will go back." "Very well," said I, "You may go backwards or forwards, as you like, but march out of my path." He then turned through the door and ran up a flight of steps into the rotunda and from thence passed into the Hall of the House of Representatives; when I entered the House he was giving his version of the transaction.38

Though Green claimed that he was only defending himself in the confrontation and really wanted the quarrel with Webb to end, he continued to write the New Yorker's associates about his cowardice, and the Telegraph kept up its attacks on the rival editor. Then on January 27, 1832, Green's press printed an extract from a confidential letter written by Webb stating that he was still trying to pick a fight with Green and would therefore provoke him by attacks in a distant paper so that he could finally "teach him a lesson." Upon seeing his private letter in the Telegraph, Webb sent his secretary, Samuel B. Barrell, to Washington to secure an apology for what the New York editor considered an invasion of privacy. But when Barrell presented the Washington editor with Webb's demand, Green, by his own account, invited him into his private office, took a cowhide whip from his desk drawer, tapped Barrell lightly on the shoulder, and instructed him to take this "answer" back to his employer. Barrell then tried to take the whip from Green, whereupon the latter raised the pistol he had in his drawer, causing Webb's secretary to stumble backward with surprise and fall to the floor. Finding his opponent prostrate, Green recalled that he could not resist giving Barrell a couple of lashes and again telling him to deliver his "answer" to Webb. Shortly
afterwards, when Green and an unnamed Congressman, both armed, went to the Capitol, they found Webb standing in the door of the National Hotel. Upon seeing his enemy, Webb made what Green termed "an ugly mouth" and walked into the hotel, but upon his return from the Capitol, he discovered that the New Yorker had posted him as a coward. Green's response in the Telegraph, that he would leave the question of his cowardice "to the public," was satisfactory to Webb, and the two men evidently decided by mutual consent that it was time for their little farce to end.

Green's good fortune finally ran out in his brief encounter with Congressman James Blair of South Carolina. Because Blair, a three-hundred-and-fifty-pound giant, who, according to Green, was "perhaps the largest man in the United States," was a Unionist, he did not care for the Telegraph's characterization of South Carolina's anti-nullification party as "Tories," and consequently warned the editor not to repeat the epithet. Much like Edward Spearhawk, though, Green refused to pay any attention to Blair, and on December 23, 1832, he again referred to the Unionist "Tories" in his newspaper. This was a mistake. As Green subsequently related from his hospital bed, on Christmas Eve he was walking on Pennsylvania Avenue when he passed Blair. Suddenly and without "previous warning" the giant Congressman struck him on the head with a "large club," then continued to beat him until he fell to the ground with a broken arm and a "severely wounded" leg. After bystanders finally separated Blair from his puny victim, the Carolinian announced to his audience that he had attacked him because of his remarks about the Union Party.

Green, however, was convinced that Blair had assaulted him in an attempt to "suppress the voice of truth and to silence the press by brute
force." Never hesitant to make political capital out of any situation, no matter how painful, the editor next informed his readers that Blair's behavior was "a practical illustration of the doctrines promulgated in Jackson's proclamation" on South Carolina's nullification of the tariff. As for his personal feelings toward Blair, he defiantly proclaimed that the bully was not only "a Tory, but a traitor," and his attack was "cowardly and unprovoked." Undoubtedly fearing the spread of such personal responses to editorials, other newspapermen quickly seconded the sentiments of the fallen journalist. The National Gazette, for example, condemned the incident as "one of the most brutal, cowardly, and disgraceful outrages it has ever been our duty to record." Though the Boston Advocate reaffirmed its opposition to nullification, it rejoiced to see Green "sustain the spirit of the free press, with a moral courage that cannot be bullied from its course by clubs and threats or broken limbs." Likewise, the courts took a dim view of Blair's behavior, and the Congressman received a $300 fine in late January from a Washington tribunal. Some time later, Blair was also sued in the South Carolina courts by Green, who then took depositions from a number of witnesses to demonstrate his assailant's guilt and submitted his own affidavit "to prove the extent of the injury done me." Held in Camden in October, 1833, only six months before Blair's death, the trial resulted in an award to Green of $350.

The incident with Blair proved to be Green's last physical confrontation as the editor of the Telegraph. He was approaching forty in 1833, and perhaps he no longer held his youthful relish for combat. Moreover, his relationships with his enemies had stabilized by 1833 so that peaceful coexistence instead of confrontation had become the norm.
But, most significantly, having been the victim of a physical conflict, Green evidently decided that there was no future marching about Washington brandishing pistol. Consequently, although he did not change his fiery editorial style or shy away from personal conflicts, the memories of the painful beating by Blair apparently made him much more sensitive to the feelings of his subjects of editorial abuse. After all, managing a national press in Jacksonian America was not a job to be undertaken from a hospital bed.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER II

1. From March 21, 1826 to March 6, 1827 the official name of the newspaper was the United States' Telegraph and Commercial Herald. The newspaper was published on Pennsylvania Avenue in the Atheneum east of Gadsby's Hotel.


6. Telegraph, February 12, 1827, February 25, June 7, 1828, July 31, October 9, 1833, March 22, June 29, 1836, Green to Richard Hyatt, April 14, 1831, to Alfred Flournoy, August 29, 1831, to William T. Barry, December 5, 1831, Edward Satchell to Green, September 4, 1832, GP-SHC.

7. Telegraph, October 14, 1826, January 1, 1834; Green to John M. Buchanan, October 8, 1830, to Leonard Curdy, December 3, 1830, Account with U. S. Telegraph, May 14, 1835, GP-SHC.
8 Green to James Crossfield, December 15, 1830, to E. B. Robinson, April 17, 1833, to William Burke, December 7, 1833, to Simmons, September 24, 25, 1834, GP-SHC.


10 Sullivan, "The Case of 'A Late Student'", 277-286.


12 Green to Russell Jarvis, July 1, 12, 16, 19, August 7, 10, September 14, 1828, Green Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GP-LC); Smith, "Washington Press," 221-227. The Telegraph dropped Jarvis's name from its masthead on October 27, 1828.

13 Telegraph, September 26, 29, October 9, 14, 24, November 25, 1829; Green to Jackson, June 24, 1829, GP-LC; Smith, "Washington Press," 221-227.


17 Green to John F. Hickey, October 25, 1832, to John Manners, August 11, 1834, GP-SHC. Green had first proposed that his school be founded for girls, but had apparently dropped the idea by the fall of 1832. Green to Hickey, August 4, 1832, GP-SHC.

18 Telegraph, August, October 15, 1834; Green to E. Drake, September 8, 1834, to William B. Pierce, February 12, 1835, "To the Printers of the United States," October 11, 1834, GP-SHC.
Though he claimed to publish the Farmers Magazine and the Mechanics Magazine in his letter to Moulton, there is no record these journals were ever issued. His plans for the Army and Navy Journal also were unfulfilled as there is no record of this magazine's publication.

The Metropolitan ran from December 5, 1832 to September 13, 1834. It was replaced by the Washington Literary Gazette which was issued from September 20, 1834 to January 29, 1835. The Medical Register was issued from July 22, 1833 until some time in 1836. Though William Stuart of the Maryland Journal was to aid Green in the publication of the Jurist and despite the existence of a bill for the legal journal, there is no record of its publication. William Stuart to Green, May 9, 1834, Bill for Jurist, April 23, 1835, GP-SHC.

The Examiner was to vindicate the rights and interests of the slaveholders. The paper was transferred from Philadelphia to Washington and evidently was never moved to New York. Though Green received several requests for the Political Examiner, there are no surviving copies or for that matter, no record of its publication. Telegraph, April 10, September 13, 1835; GP-SHC.

Green to Cralle, December 12, 1835, GP-LC; Telegraph, August 2, October 12, 1836.
26  **Telegraph**, December 3, 1836; Green To Beverly Tucker, May 2, 1836, January 12, 1837, Tucker-Coleman Papers, Swem Library, College of William and Mary; "Stockholder's Election, American Literary Company," December 8, 1836, GP-SHC.


29  **Register of Debates**, 20th Cong., 2nd sess., 2-8.


Fletcher Green, "Duff Green, Militant Journalist," 251-252; Green to John J. Mumford, May 7, 1830, GP-SHC; Surprisingly similar, Webb's account, however, states that Green would not allow him to pass because he feared that Webb would take away his pistol. *Telegraph*, May 13, 1830.

*Telegraph*, February 8, 10, 1832; Green to M. M. Noah, June 15, 1830, to John J. Mumford, May 7, 15, 1830, Green, "Autobiographical Fragments," GP-SHC.

Fletcher Green, "Duff Green, Militant Journalist," 252; *Telegraph*, December 25, 28, 31, 1832, January 31, 1833; Green to William C. Preston, July 16, October 9, 1833, GP-SHC.
CHAPTER III

THE BIRTH OF THE TELEGRAPH AND THE CAMPAIGN OF 1828

Launched by John S. Meehan and his supporters on February 6, 1826, and first published by Duff Green the following October 17, the United States' Telegraph was initially designed to serve as Andrew Jackson's central organ for the campaign of 1828. Since this canvass was begun by the Hero's followers immediately after the election of 1824, the Jacksonian opposition to the John Quincy Adams Administration took the form of a lengthy political campaign with the candidates and the major issue determined at the outset. There were in fact a number of questions of major significance on which the election of 1828 could have been decided. In foreign affairs, the debate over America's participation in the Panama Congress would be important in establishing the relationship between the United States and Latin America for years to come. Domestically, the issue of slavery lingered just below the surface of American politics; the fate of the Second Bank of the United States, later the subject of a spirited crusade by the Jacksonians, was already a topic of discussion, and the tariff, creating a sectional controversy just before the election with the passage of the "bill of abominations," was of great interest to all regions of the country. Yet because these issues involved political risks for their candidate, the Jacksonians who controlled the campaign of 1828 chose to ignore them to emphasize another question: Did Adams and his Secretary of State, Henry
Clay, through "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management" cheat Jackson and the American people out of the Presidency in 1824?

Green deserves much credit for the direction and content of the campaign. By filling his editorial columns with rumors, half-truths, and invective, he was able to keep the issue of "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management" constantly before the American people, divert their minds from other questions, and consequently insure the election of Jackson. Privately, Green, while desiring Jackson's victory, was more concerned with the continued ascendancy of his personal political favorite, better yet his idol, John C. Calhoun. He achieved this goal, the second place on the Jackson ticket, by championing Calhoun often at the expense of unity within the Hero's coalition. But Green initially had little to fear from his blatant partisanship for the Carolinian. As long as the Jackson party needed his vituperative pen and Calhoun's prestige, a single personal issue was paramount, and the common desire for power was present, toleration and flexibility were in everyone's best interest.

With the first issue of the Telegraph, John Meehan set the course of the newspaper for the next three years. Proclaiming that "in the election of our present chief magistrate, as well as by one of the first organic acts of his administration [the appointment of Clay as Secretary of State], the most sacred principles of the Constitution, and the sacred dictates of Republican policy, have been condemned and overruled," Meehan charged that the Adams Administration had used the government patronage to overrule the people and announced that at the "proper time" the Telegraph would formally oppose the reelection of Adams. Not surprisingly, this attack quickly brought rejoinders from the National Republican presses.
The National Intelligencer and the National Journal accused Meehan's press of "indiscriminate opposition," while the Richmond Whig in its first salvo saw the Telegraph's opposition to Adams as part of a secret conspiracy treacherous to the best interests of the country. Meehan, though, would not be distracted. He continued to hammer away at the Jacksonian theme that the Adams and Clay supporters had violated the basic principles of the Republic by the means it had used to gain the Presidency.

Whether or not the initial supporters of the Telegraph were conspirators, their decision to remain anonymous led to much conjecture from the administration and its editors. Adams, for example, was told that John Eaton, one of Jackson's closest friends and advisers, had purchased the press and turned it over to Meehan. The National Journal charged that the friends of Jackson and Calhoun had subscribed $30,000 to make the newspaper the organ of the opposition, and the New York Commercial Advertiser stated that the paper was "the child of Thirty-six Fathers." Obviously lacking the funds to establish the Telegraph, Meehan quite likely acted as a "blind" for the friends of Jackson and Calhoun to purchase the Washington Gazette and start an opposition press in Washington. Since he played a major role in Green's takeover of the press, and he was Jackson's agent in Washington, Eaton was undoubtedly instrumental in the launching of the newspaper. Furthermore, a number of Jackson supporters, though probably not as many as thirty-six, had possibly signed notes to buy the press in the belief that they would eventually get their money back through revenues from the government printing.

Regardless of the Telegraph's ownership, Meehan was the paper's
editor, and his greatest irritation with the Adams Administration, in line with the theme of "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management," was its abuse of executive patronage. Emphasizing that patronage was being used to control the newspapers of the country, he was concerned that executive funds would turn the press from a "sentinel of freedom into a spy of power." On another occasion, when the Telegraph's subscribers complained that they had not regularly received the paper, he suspected that postmasters appointed by the administration were attempting to suppress and destroy his journal. Yet he became most upset following the appointment of a new postmaster in Jackson's home town of Nashville. Though such appointments were known to be political, Meehan claimed to fear that the Adams Administration was trying to place a spy upon the Hero's correspondence. Thus, after Mr. Irwin, a Clay partisan, was appointed over Mr. Currey, "a man of moral, upright, and irreproachable character," (and undoubtedly a Jacksonian), the Telegraph charged that Irwin, who was allegedly less popular than Currey, was given the position solely on the basis of his enmity to Jackson. Moreover, to "mortify" the General and advance the followers of Clay, Adams had violated an 1820 act of Congress giving the Postmaster General the power to appoint postmasters. The lesson for the American people was therefore obvious: Adams, who had been elected to uphold the laws of the land, was breaking them to humiliate further the man he had recently cheated out of the Presidency.

If one side of the theme of "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management" was the corruption of the Adams Administration, the other side was the virtue of Jackson, the "abused citizen." Meehan portrayed the Hero as one, like Washington, who was above the political bargains that he saw
characterizing the present administration. Since Jackson's political past was brief and virtuous, the Telegraph could convincingly claim that he was a man "whose established reputation and undoubted integrity are necessary to retrieve the office [the Presidency] itself from the pollutions of the last election." Nevertheless, Jackson was still the Hero of New Orleans, and when in need of a comparison to flatter him and condemn Adams, the newspaper could always revive memories of the late war. Thus, "that Patriot—that Hero . . . who when Mr. Adams was at Ghent planning cunning ways to honor and promotion was on the field of battle, pillowing on the cold, damp ground, and gallantly defending the 'beauty and booty' of his native soil from the British vandals."

Despite an occasional flourish of rhetoric in the defense of Jackson or in an attack on the Adams Administration, the Telegraph under John Meehan lacked the vituperation, the spirit of a crusade, that would cause Americans to flock to the polls for the Hero. With the gift of hindsight, it is apparent that Jackson would not have needed a fiery editor to become President in 1828. Yet the Jacksonians in the spring of 1826 were apparently concerned that their new press lacked the boldness that would be necessary to elect the Hero. Meehan was a kind man; he had few enemies, but he was evidently considered too gentle to ignite the masses for Jackson. Consequently, after placing the newspaper on the course that it would follow in the campaign by condemning the "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management" of Adams and Clay, praising Jackson, and fighting a few rounds with the Intelligencer, the Journal, and the Whig, Meehan resigned as editor of the Telegraph. He was replaced by a Westerner who was crude, hated, and sometimes cruel, but who was enough of a rabble-rousing demagogue to "set the country on fire" for Andrew Jackson.
When John Meehan published the first issue of the Telegraph, Duff Green was in Missouri. Shortly afterwards, though, he returned to Washington on "professional business" and happened to board in the same house as John Agg, a political writer for the National Journal. Having some leisure time, he wrote several articles for the Telegraph attacking the Adams Administration, which Meehan published as editorials. One morning while having breakfast, Green read the Journal's reply to one of his contributions which assailed him "personally and with scurrilous abuse." Moreover, it just so happened that Agg was sitting opposite him at the table, "and his look and manner" were so hostile that an angered Green took decisive action:

I arose from the table and went directly to Mr. Meehan's office and asked him for what price he would sell his paper. He named the price, and I drew a check for the money. I went back to St. Louis. I sold my property in and near the city, at a great sacrifice. I relinquished my profession. I sold my paper. I afterwards sold my line of stages and mail contract, and concentrated my resources and my energies to defeat the re-election of Mr. Adams by demonstrating that his election was . . . the result of BARGAIN, INTRIGUE, AND MANAGEMENT, between Mr. Clay and Mr. Adams.7

Actually, Green's purchase of the Telegraph was not as quick and simple as he would have the readers of his memoir believe. Since he publicly admitted owing money on the newspaper in October, 1826, he did not pay for the press with a single sweep of his pen, and his check to Meehan probably covered only his first installment. Also, in May, 1826, he borrowed $3,000 from Eaton to enable him to run the newspaper until he could obtain sufficient private funds. Eleven men, at least some of whom were undoubtedly the original supporters of the paper, then secured Eaton for $2,000 of this debt. Among those giving varying amounts were James K. Polk of Tennessee, James Hamilton, Jr., of South Carolina,

In his agreement with Meehan, dated June 5, 1826, by which he officially purchased the "printing office and entire establishment of the United States' Telegraph," Green consented to accept all the former publisher's debts and promised to pay him $1200 for each of the three years he was to serve as an assistant on the newspaper. Immediately following the transaction, which incidentally provided him with a large debt even before he actively took control of the newspaper, he left for Missouri to close his business interests there and prepare to move his family to Washington. Green did not return to Washington until early October, the majority of his time apparently spent in travelling through Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky in order to check the political situation in these states. Thus, in Ohio and Indiana he found that the Jacksonians had done little, yet he was happy to report that the people were of the opinion that Jackson had been cheated out of the Presidency. Prospects were even better in Kentucky as Jackson presses were sprouting up so rapidly that the Hero could carry the state against favorite son Clay, much less Adams. Finally, after visiting Jackson at the "Hermitage" in August and finding him in good health, Green concluded from his travels that "we are to have an arduous struggle but an easy victory."

During the new publisher's absence, Meehan again assumed editorial control of the Telegraph, and, aided by occasional contributions from Green, he continued to make accusations against the Adams Administration centering on the theme of "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management." One especially controversial charge that Green had made before he left Washington concerned the decoration of the Presidential "palace." More
Specifically, on May 26 the Telegraph chided Adams for purchasing a billiard table and a new cloth to cover it. To the newspaper, this was an extravagance not befitting the leader of a republican government, and to its new editor, a devout opponent of gaming, it was a "pernicious sign." Three days later, the newspaper printed a welcome letter from "A Father" who was upset about the example that the billiard table was setting for the nation's youths. The writer claimed to despair that he would be able to enforce his ethics on his son when they were so openly flouted by the President. Meanwhile, the administration presses, in this case the Cincinnati Gazette, had begun to defend Adams by counter-charging that Madison or Monroe had purchased the table. In reply, the Telegraph referred to a report on "Finishing and Furnishing the Public Buildings" which allegedly demonstrated that Adams had bought from Lazare Kervand a billiard table, a cloth, cues, billiard balls, and chessmen. Nevertheless, by August the Adams newspapers were still blaming Madison and Monroe. The Telegraph, evidently pleased at its opponent's wish to continue a debate that was proving so politically profitable, then issued another salvo designed to shame Adams and defend two of his popular predecessors:

Under such circumstances, one must be at some loss which most to deprecate, the wanton disregard to public feeling and opinion in purchasing with public money, for the President's house, a gaming apparatus, which is forbidden to be used, under several penalties by the laws of almost every state in the Union—or that meanness of spirit which seeks to evade the responsibility of the act, by insidiously and falsely charging the offence upon innocent persons.

Finally, on September 30 the Meehan-Green press reported that administration papers were now justifying the billiard equipment by pointing out that the game was found "in the houses of the rich and great in Europe." Summoning up a republican self-righteousness that was to take advantage of
the common man's natural antipathy to the decadence of European civilization, the *Telegraph* responded that "what is done by the rich and great in Europe is no guide to America."

A second editorial battle fought during Green's absence from Washington involved conflicting remembrances of the War of 1812. Though the *Telegraph* never missed an opportunity to recall the war, especially Jackson's victory at New Orleans, the newspaper also constantly reminded its readers that certain men, particularly Daniel Webster, had deserted the country during the late conflict and were thus unfit for public office. But in the summer of 1826 the Jacksonians found themselves in the unaccustomed position of defending the Hero's military record, as the Richmond *Whig*, Boston *Patriot*, Lynchburg *Virginian*, and the *Phenix* (Alexandria, Virginia) *Gazette* all charged that Jackson's part in the victory at New Orleans was insignificant. The *Whig*, for example, at first attributed the victory to the mistakes of the British commander rather than the "superior skill and bravery of the American army." A few days later, though, the newspaper had a different recollection, now proclaiming General John Adair of Kentucky, commander of that state's rifle brigade at New Orleans, the "efficient head of the American army." The *Virginian*, moreover, disagreed with both these assertions, as it argued that the real hero was the dashing pirate, Jean Lafitte. On the other hand, The *Telegraph* quite accurately interpreted these accusations as an attempt to divert attention from the alleged "Intrigue, Bargain, and Management" of the Adams Administration. Thus, in its replies the newspaper declared that Jackson's enemies could no more judge his military record than they could determine the requisites of a President since they believed that "those qualifications consisted in a willingness
to pollute our elections . . . or in a willingness to seize upon the
reins of government through the agency of "bargain, intrigue, and man-
agement." Evidently, the Telegraph was not even going to allow Jack-
son's sacred military reputation to obscure what it considered the only
significant question in the campaign.

In order to keep the public interested in the "bargain, intrigue,
and management" of the Adams Administration, Green realized that he could
not long rely on unsubstantiated rhetoric. In other words, he needed
strong evidence—or at least something that he could pass off as convinc-
ing proof of his press's allegations. Consequently, the editor had to
welcome a letter from Eaton in August, 1826, which made him certain
that he could obtain such proof. According to Jackson's close friend
and advisor, a few days before Clay declared in favor of Adams to de-
cide the election of 1824, James Buchanan, a Congressman from Pennsyl-
vania and future President, had visited him to argue that Jackson
should make known his choice for Secretary of State to dispel rumors
about the Hero's likely selection as well as to counteract the Cabinet
overtures of the Adams party. Since many believed that the General in-
tended to continue Adams as Secretary of State, the Clay supporters,
appearing desiring this position for their own man, were reluctant to
give him their assistance in the impending election in the House of
Representatives. Eaton, however, recalling that he wanted no part of
such intrigues, replied to Buchanan that Jackson would make no assur-
ance on any Cabinet office. The Pennsylvanian then tried to convince
him that Jackson should simply say that Adams would not be his Secretary
of State, but Eaton would only repeat that the General would make no
promises. Still not convinced, Buchanan met the following morning with
Jackson, who, Eaton remembered, told the Congressman that he would not make any commitments until his election.

Omitting Buchanan's name, Green reported the conversation between the "member of Congress" and Jackson to his readers. He then wrote Buchanan asking him why he had spoken to Jackson about the Cabinet a few days before Clay and his friends had announced in favor of Adams. In his response, Buchanan claimed he could not remember his reason for speaking to Jackson, yet he denied that he had any authority from Clay to propose terms to the Hero. Moreover, since his conversation with the General was not in relation to the Clay vote, Buchanan protested Green's publication of the story in the Telegraph. Green was not willing to heed these objections, choosing instead to continue his charge that Clay's friends had made overtures to Jackson "before the bargain had been closed between him and Adams." Then on June 9, 1827, the editor informed Jackson that Phillip S. Markley, another Pennsylvania Congressman, was the person whom Clay had used to make the bargain overtures. With this new evidence, he pledged to carry on his newspaper campaign to force a Congressional investigation of the corrupt bargain allegation without requiring the General to become involved.

Meanwhile, Carter Beverly of Virginia had forced Jackson to confirm publicly the Clay overture. According to the Virginian's "Fayetteville letter," the General had once told him that Clay's friends had made a proposition to his friends promising to make him President "in one hour" if he would only indicate that he would not appoint Adams Secretary of State. Corroborating this statement in a June 5 letter to Beverly, Jackson speculated that the offer was an attempt by the Clayites to unite the West while insuring the removal of Adams as Secretary of State, a
traditional steppingstone to the Presidency. Furthermore, in a repetition of Eaton's earlier statements to Green, he argued that the belief Adams would continue as Secretary of State was engendered by the New Englander's friends to persuade the Clayites that they should support Adams in the House. Finally, the Hero recalled his initial hostility to the overture by proclaiming that "before I would reach the Presidential chair by such means of bargain and corruption, I would see the earth open and swallow both Mr. Clay and his friends and myself with them."

Taking its cue from the General's remarks, the Telegraph's comments on the Beverly-Jackson correspondence attempted to demonstrate that Jackson had been the logical candidate for Clay to back in 1825. By supporting Jackson, the newspaper pointed out, Clay would have obeyed the instructions of the Kentucky legislature, maintained his strength in the West, gained necessary popularity in the South and middle states, and become a likely candidate to succeed the sickly old Hero probably as early as 1828. Conversely, since he had thrown his influence to Adams, the Kentuckian had violated the will of the people as well as the instructions of his state legislature, won no support outside of New England, and now faced a hopeless clash with the popular Hero in the West. Unfortunately, Green's damning logic failed to impress the administration papers, who quite accurately insisted that "there is no evidence of Mr. Clay's participation" in the affair. Yet in its conjecture about the identity of the mysterious "member of Congress" from whom Jackson had admittedly received a proposition, the Richmond Whig named Phillip S. Markley, the person whom Green believed to be the bearer of the Clay overture, but whom he had heretofore failed to mention. The Whig's
introduction of the Pennsylvanian, though, allowed Green to put forth his own scenario of the Clay offer with Markley in the leading role. Consequently, after denying that he was the unidentified "member of Congress," then asserting that Markley was a close friend of Clay, the Telegraph presented this damaging speculation:

If Mr. Markley should in confidence have disclosed to this 'highly respectable' member of Congress that Mr. Clay's friends were to hold a consultation of a certain night, for the purpose of closing in with the offers of Mr. Adams' friends—if it should appear that he advised this respectable member of Congress to fight Mr. Adams with his own weapons—if it should further appear that that respectable member of Congress, knowing Mr. Markley's means of obtaining correct information upon this subject, did notify Mr. Markley of Gen. Jackson's reply—if it should appear that Mr. Clay, two days later, came out for Mr. Adams... And if, after all this, it appears that Mr. Clay or his agent, Mr. Adams, rewarded Mr. Markley with an office for which he was by no means qualified (Naval Officer at Philadelphia), worth $3000 per annum, it will require something more than the assertion of the Whig to persuade the people that this was all a humbug. 16

The next moves obviously belonged to Markley and the "member of Congress," neither of whom was willing to say anything publicly. Though Buchanan wrote Samuel Ingham on July 12 that the purpose of his conversation with Jackson had been to determine if he would appoint Adams his Secretary of State, four days later he informed Green that despite having "a very distinct recollection" of his talk with the General, he would not come forward until "compelled" to do so. Yet three occurrences in the same number of weeks ultimately forced the Congressman to come out on the bargain overture. First, Clay challenged Jackson to back up his accusations. Second, administration papers, continuing to imply that the entire matter was a hoax, began to charge that the "member of Congress" would not support Jackson's letter to Beverly. And most significantly, on August 7, the Hero's reply to Clay appeared in the papers and
named Buchanan as the "member of Congress." Thus, on August 8, Buchanan, now "compelled" to come forward, addressed his explanation of the bargain offer to the editor of his home town newspaper, the Lancaster Journal. According to Buchanan, after hearing rumors that Jackson would continue Adams in the State Department, he had a conversation with his friend Markley concerning the General's possible nominee during which he stated that Clay's friends would not vote for Jackson if they suspected that the New Engander would remain in the office traditionally designated for the Presidential successor. Moreover, when Buchanan declared that he would visit Jackson or his friends to contradict the rumor, Markley urged him to do so, noting, if the General would say he would not retain Adams, he "should then be placed on the same footing with the Adams men, and might fight them with their own weapons." He thereupon visited Eaton and Jackson, neither of whom would tell him anything about the membership of a Jackson Administration Cabinet.

Printing Buchanan's explanation on August 13, the Telegraph of course interpreted the letter to suggest Clay's guilt in the affair. Thus, despite Buchanan's denial that he was Clay's agent, the newspaper argued that Clay's friends had desired to send an agent to Jackson armed with the belief that they would support the General if he would only promise not to appoint Adams. Also, the statement proved at least to Green that the Adams supporters had already assured Clay he would have the State Department, given the New Englander's election. Privately, the editor doubted that Buchanan had told the complete truth since the whole story would have forced Markley to come out to defend Clay from charges of complicity. Yet the former Congressman waited seventy-nine days to reply to Buchanan, this delay alone proving his guilt to the
Not surprisingly, Markley denied any part in the matter. He had not urged Buchanan to see Jackson, he did not remember saying anything to his fellow Pennsylvanian about fighting Adams with his own weapons, and he attributed to his friend the connection between the election of Adams and the appointment of Clay as Secretary of State. Faced with what it considered an obstruction of justice, Green's press was nevertheless reduced to the gesture of calling Markley a liar.

Markley's reply to Buchanan ended a fifteen-month crusade by Green to prove that "bargain, intrigue, and management" had occurred in the election of 1824. Having gotten as much mileage as possible out of the episode, he apparently realized that the administration might begin to receive public sympathy if they were driven to the wall on the question. Ultimately, Green had failed to prove that Clay had made overtures either to Jackson or Adams. Yet he had kept the suspicion of a corrupt bargain before the public, made converts to the already mighty Jackson following, and created doubts in the minds of others about the integrity of the President and his Secretary of State. Although Clay and Adams had not been publicly convicted of any wrongdoing, Green's crusade made it even more difficult for them to establish their innocence or divert the course of the campaign to less personal issues.

Simultaneous with Green's attempts to prove bargain and corruption through the Clay overture to Jackson, he was also trying to insure that his political favorite, John C. Calhoun, would receive the second place on the Hero's ticket. To achieve this apparent victory for the Carolinian, he believed that he had to eliminate Governor De Witt Clinton of New York as a serious contender for the Vice-Presidential nomination. As early as September, 1826, Green noted that Clinton, whose chief
political asset was his influence in the state with the largest electoral vote, was being considered as a possible running mate for Jackson. Though his concern had diminished by late December, one month later the Clinton candidacy posed enough of a threat for Green to bring the matter to his editorial columns where he attacked the basis of the Governor's claims to the nomination by pointing out that Jackson did not need the New York electoral vote to win the election. At the same time, the ardent Calhounite also tried to discredit the movement for Clinton by attributing it to the efforts of the Clay-Adams coalition to sow discord within the Jackson ranks. The chief intrigant in this imaginary plot was the Secretary of State who, according to Green, was willing to settle for Martin Van Buren as the means to disrupt the Jacksonians and pave the way for a second Adams Administration. Assisting Clay were the Telegraph's two rival presses in Washington, the Journal and the Intelligencer, both of which were circulating false reports that the Jackson men were determined to drop Calhoun in favor of Clinton or perhaps Van Buren.

By September, 1827, Van Buren was no longer a threat to Calhoun for the Vice-Presidential nomination as the Magician had removed himself from consideration for the second place on the ticket. Yet despite his efforts to denigrate Clinton's value to Jackson and his attempts to discredit the New Yorker's candidacy as a coalition plot, Green was at this time even more worried about the popular Governor's challenge to his political idol. Thus, on September 2, he tried to persuade one of the Hero's closest friends, General William B. Lewis, that the Jacksonians were "bound in honor and principle to support Mr. Calhoun." Pointing out to Lewis the Carolinian's political value in the South and in Congress, Green then noted that Clinton's nomination would alienate
Van Buren's Bucktail faction, and as a result, hurt instead of help Jackson's chances in New York. Besides, he asserted without evidence, Clinton had done nothing to support Jackson and was actually working to undermine his political strength. Three days later, Green confessed to Calhoun his fears about the nascent movement to bring out Clinton for Vice President. Repeating his belief that Clay was behind the New Yorker's candidacy, he also warned Calhoun that he had "much to fear" from Virginia as Thomas Ritchie of the Richmond Enquirer had visited Clinton, and a Charlottesville paper, the Virginia Advocate, was bringing forward the Governor.

His anxiety and paranoia now aroused, Green doubled his efforts throughout the remainder of 1827 to insure Calhoun's nomination as Jackson's running mate. Since he considered Clinton's strength to be in the Northeast and the South Carolinian's political base to be the South, he directed most of his correspondence to influential Westerners. Thus, he wrote Richard M. Johnson, William T. Barry, and Presley Edwards of Kentucky about Calhoun's aid to the West in obtaining Indian lands, opening lead mines, and securing the Mexican and fur trades. He also informed his friends in Kentucky, again without substantiation, that the Clinton nomination was merely a ruse by Clay supporters to organize an opposition to Jackson in the West. In October, Green began to use his press to attack the New York rival of Calhoun. Notifying Samuel Swartout that he was about to make war on Clinton, he warned the close friend of the Governor that a conflict over the Vice Presidency would prevent Jackson from offering Clinton a Cabinet position. Clinton, Green unconvincingly asserted, had to unite at once with the Jacksonians and accept Calhoun as Vice President or join the "Northern Aristocracy."
Shortly thereafter, the Telegraph and the Clinton papers began an editorial war, with Green's press continuing its threats about the consequences of opposition to the Calhoun nomination and the New York Statesman, for example, accusing the Carolinian of prompting the Telegraph to write articles denouncing Clinton. As Green was in the meantime keeping up his correspondence with both Calhoun and Clinton supporters, he was probably devoting more time to the Vice-Presidential contest than to the larger campaign between Jackson and Adams, a fact that undoubtedly did not go unnoticed by the General's most influential supporters.

Suddenly, on February 11, Clinton died. Though the Telegraph went into mourning and printed eulogies for the New Yorker, and Green felt more confident about the future of his political idol, he was still worried that the Crawford faction would put forward Van Buren to oppose Calhoun. Yet he could not "believe that Mr. Van Buren will become the dupe of such a policy [since] he has too much good sense and I trust too much virtue to abandon his principles under such circumstances." Green was correct. Van Buren continued to show little interest in the second spot on the Jackson ticket, and Calhoun eventually received the Jackson party's support without further opposition. Nevertheless, the editor had made enemies and created suspicions by the obvious over-enthusiasm he had shown in championing Calhoun against what was actually insignificant opposition for the Vice-Presidential nomination. For example, in a letter to Jackson complaining that Green's editorial assaults on Clinton had "aroused indignation in a million of bosoms," Caleb Atwater, a leading supporter of the Governor in Ohio, declared that Clinton's followers would go for the General only by keeping in
mind that he was in no way accountable for the conduct of Duff Green. Jackson was not yet ready to believe such accusations about Calhoun's domination of his editor, preferring instead to maintain his confidence in Green's loyalty. But two years later when Amos Kendall, James A. Hamilton, and others were attempting to persuade the Hero that Green was subservient to Calhoun, Atwater's complaints, and similar stories, made it easier for him to become convinced that his editor had all along been the puppet of the Carolinian.

Though the tariff issue provided the best chance of diverting Green and his press from their work for Calhoun's advancement, as well as from their emphasis on the "bargain, intrigue, and management" of the Adams Administration, the editor and other Jacksonians realized that the question also had the greatest potential for dividing the Hero's electoral coalition of low-tariff Southern planters, high-tariff Western farmers, and miners, and the frequently ultra-protectionist laborers and entrepreneurs of the middle states. Nevertheless, Martin Van Buren, who, as a leader of the Jackson forces in Congress, was in a position to shape the tariff legislation of 1828, had a keen awareness of the possibility of using the controversial issue to manufacture the General's election. Because he knew that the South would never go for Adams and New England would never favor Jackson, his task in 1828 was to insure the votes of the decisive middle and Western states for the Hero by engineering the passage of legislation that would favor the agricultural products, raw materials, and manufactures of these crucial regions and inadvertently discriminate against the commerce and manufacturing products of New England. Consequently, when Southern Congressmen prevented passage of any amendments modifying the protective duties so that
New England would join them to kill the final bill, Van Buren, satisfied that the measure would assist Jackson, convinced his friends to vote for an amendment that would appease New Englanders by giving protection to their woolen industry. With the Magician casting the deciding vote, the amendment passed and New England, much to the dismay of the South, went for the tariff, thereby guaranteeing its passage. Van Buren had framed a tariff act that would win votes in areas where Jackson most needed them, yet he had also produced legislation that the editor of the party organ, like most Southerners, would find well-nigh impossible to support. How would Green deal with the "tariff of abominations?"

Adopting his standard procedure for legislation that he opposed, Green tried to place the responsibility for the tariff on the Adams Administration. Thus, whether the tariff passed or failed; whether it pleased the North, West, or South; whether it had high, low, or moderate duties; Green was ready to blame any dissatisfaction on Adams and Clay. The editor, moreover, was certain that he had discovered the administration's "secret movement in relation to the tariff." When the National Journal correctly reported that Van Buren was in control of the tariff bill in Congress, the Telegraph denied that the New Yorker had any influence in framing the legislation and claimed instead that the administration had secretly determined to defeat the measure so that it could blame the Jacksonians for its defeat and subsequently keep the public excited about the tariff. The Adams Administration, charged the newspaper, hoped to win support in protectionist areas by linking Jackson with his Southern low-tariff followers.

With the tariff bill's passage, Green made no attempt to conceal
his disappointment. His press predicted that by the time the new tariff took effect in September, 1828, speculation and heavy importations would result in a severe drain of specie that would "tend to increase the excitement which we apprehend will pervade the whole of the Southern states to an extent not heretofore known." Nevertheless, the policy he suggested to Southerners to meet the tariff crisis was one of patience and moderation. The aggrieved citizens should hold public meetings to adopt addresses and resolutions calling for the amendment of the legislation, and they should begin "economy and retrenchment" in their business practices to counteract the effects of the "bill of abominations." Denying the charges of the administration presses that Southern leaders had sought to make the tariff as oppressive as possible in order to excite the section to insurrection, the Telegraph declared that the region's Congressmen had returned home to appease their constituents. Yet despite the fact that he saw no movement in the South for a second Hartford Convention to protest the tariff, and "although we do not approve the measure, it is not for us to condemn the call for a convention calmly to discuss this important subject."

Regardless of his strong sympathies for the South, Green still understood the political value of a protective tariff to the Jackson party. The Telegraph, for example, boasted ridiculously that the Hero was so much the friend of domestic industry "that his own clothing has been for years manufactured in his own family." The newspaper also claimed that it had viewed the possibility of a tariff veto by Adams "with alarm" since it might have produced a coalition of New Englanders and Southerners that would have been his "only chance of re-election."
Though the creation of such an alliance was highly improbable under any circumstances, Green logically saw that the Adams Administration would blame a defeated tariff bill on the Jacksonians. Thus, he rationalized, since the administration had forced the Hero's supporters in Congress to advocate and pass the tariff measure and then had failed to veto it, the Jacksonians were to be applauded for the tariff of 1828 while the Adams administration was to be condemned for oppressing the South with the "bill of abominations." Green, in short, hoped to straddle the issue at least until the election.

The discussion of the tariff provided a significant but brief respite for readers who were being bombarded with the constant accusations that the rival newspapers were throwing at each other and the candidates. Throughout 1827 and 1828 the Telegraph's editorial columns were filled with allegations against Clay and Adams as well as replies and counter-charges concerning Jackson. These indictments became progressively more personal and more incredible until the campaign of 1828 climaxed with possibly the most ridiculous profusion of mudslinging in American political history.

Green's press continued to give priority to accusations relating to the "bargain, intrigue, and management" of the Adams Administration. The Telegraph and his campaign newspaper, the Telegraph Extra, repeatedly charged the administration with using the tariff, internal improvements, or any other issue or incident to divert attention from the bargain between Adams and Clay in the election of 1824. Also suspecting the two men of trying to destroy the credibility of the opposition presses to conceal their intrigues, Green even claimed to believe that Clay had issued instructions to the administration papers to make false
charges against Jackson so that the people would consider the corrupt bargain allegation to be equally misleading. The editor, moreover, was ready to counteract any attempts by the administration to explain away the bargain. Thus, in December, 1827, just after the conclusion of the Buchanan affair, the presses of the coalition began to circulate the story that Clay had told "confidential friends" several months before March, 1825, that he would vote for Adams. This disclosure was intended to put an end to the belief created by the Buchanan affair that the two men had conducted any negotiations prior to the election in the House. In its comment, the Telegraph asked why Clay had made declarations in Kentucky against Adams calling him a "renegade Federalist" and "an enemy of the West," why his partisans in the state legislature had come out for Jackson, and why he had concealed his decision for over two months after his arrival in Washington. Furthermore, one of the "confidential friends" supposedly aware of Clay's decision to vote for Adams was a Doctor Drake, who according to the Telegraph had once been expelled by a medical school in Cincinnati because of his "obnoxious behavior" and his lies. Thus, Drake was not to be believed. Actually, concluded the newspaper, Clay had never meant to commit himself, but had planned to remain free "to act afterwards as circumstances might require."

As the campaign plodded onwards through the muck, the personal lives of Clay and Adams came under an increasingly heavy attack from the Telegraph. For example, since Clay was allegedly in debt to the Bank of the United States and to Transylvania University for almost $70,000, the President's defeat in the coming election would force him to pay his debts; the Kentuckian would then become "a mere outcast in society--a
bankrupt in reputation and property—deserted by pretended friends, and the scorn of honest men." His illness in the summer of 1828 led Green to charge that the Secretary of State was malingering so that he could go electioneering and neglect his duties in the State Department. Shortly afterwards, the Telegraph began to print extracts from a History of Kentucky by Humphrey Marshall, the cousin of Green's mother, to show that Clay was an "abettor" of the Burr Conspiracy. Moreover, when Clay allegedly condemned Jackson for trading slaves, Green's press contended that Clay had once purchased a freeman for $125 in order to place him in bondage. As for the Unitarian President, the Baptist editor of the Telegraph declared that he was not an "orthodox Christian, "especially since he was paying his local minister out of the executive's contingency fund and had recently taken a pew at the Catholic Church, evidently to court the vote of his former subjects of abuse. Adams, the Telegraph pointed out, had attempted to create excitement against Masonry even though he was a member of that secret society. Subsequently, when the Dunkirk Gazette tried to prove that the President was not a Freemason, Green's press countered with the testimony of Benjamin Russell of the Columbia Sentinel who claimed that he was present at the hypocritical New Englander's initiation. Finally, as Rachel Jackson would not be spared slanderous accusations, Green made sure that the reputation of Louisa Adams was also tarnished. After the Telegraph had charged that Mrs. Adams was a foreigner, and the National Intelligencer had countered that her father was an American citizen, Green inquired of the Intelligencer's editor "if they do not know that he was married to the mother long after the birth of Mrs. Adams." This scurrilous bit of journalism was
a violation of the Hero's orders as he had earlier informed his editor: "I never war against females." Nevertheless, because of the attacks on Rachel Jackson and Green's own stubbornness, the Telegraph made no apologies.

Given the quantity of accusations made against Jackson by the Adams presses, it is remarkable that Green had time to indulge in his own mudslinging. Though the administration papers had no indictment comparable to "bargain, intrigue, and management," they did have the dark and bloody past of Andrew Jackson with which to work. Other than his military record, the Hero's background in 1828 was a mystery to most Americans. Politically, this obscurity could be helpful, especially when the General wanted to avoid an issue like the tariff, the legislation he desired on the question being simply "judicious." Yet his murky past also provided fertile ground for imaginative journalists who desired to show him unfit for the Presidency. Fortunately, Jackson had an equally imaginative editor who was often able to explain away the abuses of the Adams papers and reply in kind.

The most notorious allegations against Jackson involved his marriage to Rachel Robards and his execution of six militiamen during the War of 1812. The source of the attacks on Jackson's beloved Rachel was Charles Hammond, editor of the Cincinnati Gazette and "bosom friend" of Henry Clay. In essence, Hammond claimed that Jackson had lived in sin with Rachel after he had stolen her from her husband, Lewis Robards, who had died a brokenhearted man immediately after the "disgraceful transaction" between his ungrateful wife and the immoral interloper. Rachel and Jackson, who incidentally was the son of a "common prostitute," then cohabited in a way that would have resulted in any other man being
indicted for notorious lewdness. Green responded to this shameful but highly entertaining tale with what appeared to be a convincing refutation. According to the editor, since he was born in the neighborhood where Rachel had lived with her first husband, his mother had known Mrs. Robards and often repeated to young Duff the story of her "aggravated wrongs." Lewis Robards, moreover, had actually deserted his wife, sued her for divorce, and remarried before Rachel's wedding to the Hero, which was recorded in the Nashville city records. Unfortunately, Green's account is as much a fabrication as the story of Charles Hammond. While he was born and reared in Kentucky, Lewis and Rachel Robards spent their short and unhappy marriage at the Robertson settlement on the Cumberland River in Tennessee, where in 1788 Jackson took up residence. After a period highlighted by repeated quarrels between husband and wife, Rachel and Jackson, chaperoned by Colonel John Stark, fled to Natchez. Eventually coming to believe that Robards had obtained a divorce, they were married in August, 1791. But because Robards had obtained only an enabling act for a divorce and had never filed for an interlocutory decree in a court of law, Rachel's first marriage was still intact, and she was legally a bigamist. Discovering their error, the happy couple soon made arrangements with Robards to have Rachel's first marriage dissolved, and, finally, in January, 1794, they repeated their vows a second time.

That Jackson had murdered six militiamen during the War of 1812 was a more difficult accusation for Green to refute. Unlike the tale about Jackson and Rachel, the editor, though a creative liar, could not deny that the General had ordered the execution of the men for desertion during his campaign against the Creek Indians. Instead, he had to justify Jackson's actions, and at least initially, persuade others of their
legality. Thus, in October, 1827, after he had been informed that part of the General's War Department correspondence was missing, an uneasy and suspicious Green suggested to Jackson that he quickly come to Washington to look into the matter since his correspondence would have to be "perfect" to counter the charge against him. Also in October, he tried to convince Secretary of War James Barbour that his pamphlet on the affair, in which he claimed that the militiamen were not deserters because they had been mustered for only three months, was mistaken. Barbour, though, would not listen to reason, and having found persuasion to be an ineffective means of refuting the charge, Green had by the winter again sought refuge in a vast outpouring of verbiage, vituperation, and clever arguments. When the coffin handbills denouncing the executions as murders began to be issued in great numbers, the Telegraph angrily quipped that the Adams coalition would need many coffins in which to bury their dying hopes of reelection. As for John Harris, one of the six militiamen who, according to the Adams press, was a "Preacher of the Gospel," he deserved to die for his sins of "robbery, arson, and outrageous mutiny." Finally, in his most ingenious argument on the subject, Green predicted that the attacks on Jackson would lead to a degeneration of militias throughout the country, which in turn would necessitate a dependence on a large standing army. American liberties would then "take wing and fly," and ultimately the Coalition would find a military chieftain to subvert the republic.

Green's pretended fears of a coup by a military chieftain were doubtless a slap at the administration presses who repeatedly charged that, if elected, Jackson would turn the government into a military despotism. The National Intelligencer, for example, seemed certain that
President Jackson would create a standing army of more than 100,000 men, while the Maine Gazette was just as sure that the Hero would become a military despot and single out New England, evidently because of its support for Adams, for complete suppression. The Telegraph defended Jackson from such charges by comparing him to the immortal Washington who, after leading his country's fight for independence, became the pacific father of its republican government. The accusation also gave Green the opportunity to use his worst purple prose to depict the General as the peaceful farmer (again like Washington) "promptly obeying the dictates of patriotism" first against the Indians, then

when an equally ruthless but more civilized foe, whose watchword was 'Beauty and Booty' threatened to devastate a flourishing section of our country, remote from his dwelling and to dishonor our lovely country women, Jackson again obeyed the voice of duty, and interposed his protective arm between the myrmidons of rapacity and the intended victims of their cupidity and sensuality. His patriotic efforts were blessed with their accustomed success—a consummate victory—and millions of property and multitudes of uninjured females are the monuments of his gallant services, in the land which has been manured with the blood of the vain-glorious enemies of his country.36

Many of the allegations against Jackson, as well as Green's rejoinders, were just as ridiculous. Apparently confused by his own rhetoric, Peter Force of the National Journal claimed possession of a note written by the General to show that he was illiterate. Just as bewildered, the Telegraph defended Jackson by denying that the note was in his handwriting. When the coalition presses pointed out Jackson's poor spelling, Green attributed it to the fact that the Hero's mind was more rapid than his pen. Like Clay and anyone else whom the rival newspapers wished to name, Jackson was allegedly involved in the Burr Conspiracy. The General, moreover, was an atheist, a mulatto, and a foreigner
disqualified from the Presidency. Yet even if all these accusations failed to have any effect, the Adams journals possibly had one final scheme to save the Presidency for their candidate. Since they had emphasized Jackson's advancing age and circulated rumors of his ill health during the campaign, the Telegraph predicted that "about the time of the election, or so near to it that the report cannot be contradicted, one simultaneous movement will be made throughout the United States. It will be reported that GENERAL JACKSON IS DEAD." Green warned his readers to beware of this "hellish project."

The fantastic scheme was unsuccessful, and Andrew Jackson survived to win handily the election of 1828 by carrying the West and South, Pennsylvania, and part of New York. Though his victory was not a major landslide, Jackson and Green believed that they and the people had been vindicated in their claim that "bargain, intrigue, and management" had robbed them of victory in 1824. For the editor of the Telegraph Jackson's victory was particularly satisfying. His newspaper had been the most important opposition journal, and his editorials had played a significant role in controlling the content and course of the campaign. Furthermore, because his political favorite, John C. Calhoun, had with his (and Death's) help fought off challenges to the Vice-Presidential nomination, the Carolinian would remain before the public as a contender for the succession. Nevertheless, there were portents of trouble which even the paranoid Green failed to regard. By his zealous partisanship for Calhoun he had created suspicion among influential Jacksonians that he was more devoted to the Vice President than to the President-elect. Also, Martin Van Buren, who had in Jackson's mind done more than any man to insure his victory, now loomed as the favorite to become the party's
next Presidential nominee. The tariff was another potential troublemaker, which unbeknownst to Green had already received his political idol's treatment in the controversial *South Carolina Exposition and Protest*. Finally, having piled up a heavy debt in assuming control of the *Telegraph*, the extravagant editor had apparently spared no expense in his campaign for Jackson and Calhoun. Sooner or later, these obligations would fall due, and Green would be compelled to take political risks to keep his press afloat.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER III

1. United States' Telegraph, February 6, 8, 15, March 24, 1826.


3. Telegraph, February 9, March 6, 22, April 20, 1826.

4. Ibid., March 25, 31, April 5, 1826.

5. Ibid., February 24, March 31, April 8, 1826.


9. Agreement between Green and Meehan, June 5, 1826, GP-SHC.

11. Telegraph, May 26, 29, June 28, August 8, September 30, 1826.

12. Ibid., June 21, 22, August 11, 21, 1826.


15. Telegraph, July 2, 1827.

16. Ibid., July 2, 9, 13, 1827.

17. Buchanan to Samuel Ingham, July 12, 1827, to Green, July 16, 1827, to Lancaster Journal, August 8, 1827 in Moore, Works of Buchanan, I, 260-261, 262-267; Telegraph, July 16, August 1, 7, 1827.

18. Telegraph, August 13, 16, 29, November 3, 1827; Green to Jackson, August 29, 1827, GP-LC.

19. Green to Ninian Edwards, September 6, December 29, 1826 in Washburne, Edwards Papers, 256-258, 266-267; Telegraph, January 29, 30, March 26, June 1, 1827.

20. Green to William B. Lewis, September 2, 1827, to Calhoun, September 5, 1827, GP-LC.

21. Green to William T. Barry, September 8, 1827, to Richard M. Johnson, September 8, 1827, to Presley Edwards, December 18, 1827, GP-LC. Also on this subject Green wrote to John L. Barbour of Virginia (October 8), William Snowden of Pittsburgh (November 16), Elijah Hayward of Ohio (December), William Bonsal of Pennsylvania (December 14), and Worden Pope of Kentucky (January 4, 1828), GP-LC.

22. Green to Samuel Swartout, October 9, 1827, GP-LC; Telegraph, October 27, 1827.
23 Telegraph, February 18, 1828; Green to A. Ware, February 23, 1828, GP-LC.

24 Caleb Atwater to Jackson, February 29, 1828 in Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, III, 394.


26 Telegraph, February 23, 28, March 29, 1828.

27 Ibid., May 4, June 9, 23, 27, 1828.

28 Ibid., June 27, July 15, 30, 1828.

29 Ibid., November 11, 1826, June 23, 1828, December 11, 15, 28, 1827.

30 Ibid., May 19, June 26, July 2, September 30, October 15, 1828.

31 Ibid., June 30, 1827, June 5, August 6, October 2, 1828. Unfortunately for the Jacksonians, Russell was known as a "congenital liar" whose testimony was "practically worthless." Robert V. Remini, The Election of Andrew Jackson (New York, 1963), 139.

32 Telegraph, July 11, 1828; Jackson to Green, August 13, 1827 in Bassett, Jackson Correspondence, III, 376-378. A little over a year before making this accusation, the Telegraph also proclaimed that it would never introduce the "female character" into politics. Telegraph, March 26, June 20, 1827.

33 In the widely quoted Coleman letter written by Jackson in 1824, the Hero was ambiguous enough to convince both Northerners and Southerners that he shared their views on the tariff. Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York, 1944), 355.

34 Telegraph, March 26, 1827; Remini, Election of Jackson, 151-153.
35  Green to Jackson, October 22, 1827, GP-LC; Telegraph, October 31, 1827, January 21, February 29, March 4, April 28, June 17, 1828; Remini, Election of Jackson, 155-156.

36  Telegraph, August 23, 1826, June 16, October 4, 1828.

37  Ibid., March 8, April 23, May 30, June 18, August 4, September 10, 23, 1828.
CHAPTER IV
ADMINISTRATION EDITOR, 1829-1831

Green had a right to believe that the election of Andrew Jackson would open a glorious new era for him as well as for the country. As the editor of the administration organ, he could expect to achieve an affluence that would allow his family to live comfortably for the rest of their lives. For his efforts and sacrifices in helping to elect Jackson, Green could hope to achieve power and influence within the administration and throughout the country. The Jackson Administration had numerous offices to dispense, and Green could anticipate a strong voice in determining the recipients of this patronage. In the formation of policy, he was justified in believing that his position would make him one of Jackson's closest advisers. Green had a definite interest in modifying the tariff, in regulating the Bank of the United States, and in generally destroying the effect of a "corrupt aristocracy" so that the states and the people could regain their rightful authority. Finally, Green could look to the continued ascendancy of John C. Calhoun to a position where he would eventually become Jackson's successor.

Unfortunately, Green's experience as the Jackson Administration editor provided far less than he might have hoped. He had a voice in a few of the appointments of the new administration, and he did become the printer for the House and the Senate. His newspaper gave him a platform from which to attack the National Republicans and defend the
policies and personalities of the administration. The Telegraph pro-
vided him the opportunity to speak out on the tariff and the Bank,
denounce the "ultrafederalism" of Daniel Webster, and propagate the
principles of Calhoun. Yet Green's influence in appointments and
policy was so minor that it is ridiculous to consider him a member of
Jackson's "Kitchen Cabinet." The belief that Green had great influ-
ence in the administration and was possibly even the power behind the
throne originated with the attacks of the opposition and resulted in
numerous headaches and embittered relationships for the beleaguered
editor. Calhoun's star was also not rising, and his position on the
tariff threatened to create problems for Green with the administration.
Worst of all, Green was so deeply in debt that he became dependent on
the Bank of the United States for his financial salvation. When Jack-
son learned of this dependence, he eventually became convinced that it
was time to send for Francis P. Blair of Kentucky to replace Green as
the editor of the administration organ.

Green's speculation about the Cabinet centered on the position
that Martin Van Buren would receive. Early in December, 1828, he
claimed to know nothing about Jackson's choices, but he was reasonably
sure that Van Buren would be the Secretary of State. On December 17,
though, Green was skeptical that Van Buren would desire the State Depart-
ment since the election of Jackson had broken the precedent that the
Secretary of State was the line of succession to the Presidency. There
were rumors that Van Buren would take the Treasury Department; others
thought (and Green probably hoped) that he would accept no Cabinet po-
sition and return to New York. As for the other offices, he seemed
certain that Jackson himself did not know whom he would appoint. On
January 6, Green once again saw Van Buren as assured for the State Department, and for the first time predicted Samuel D. Ingham of Pennsylvania as the new Secretary of the Treasury. In early February he expressed further uncertainty, then on February 26, the Telegraph finally ended the speculation by announcing the members of the first Jackson Cabinet. Apparently, Van Buren's State Department had preceded the other selections since in its announcement the newspaper reported that the "Magician" had already accepted Jackson's Cabinet offer. This early notification seemed to confirm what Green had always implied in his speculations on the Cabinet: Van Buren was already at least the first among equals in the new administration.

Long before Jackson had officially begun his Presidency, the question of executive patronage had started to occupy the thoughts of his followers. Jackson was the victor, and those who supported him expected to share in the spoils of triumph. Green referred to the replacement of Adams men with Jackson men as "Reform." He wholeheartedly supported "Reform" and had definite suggestions about the policy that should guide it.

Green expressed strong concern lest appointments be given to the undeserving and disloyal. He repeatedly spoke with disdain of those who had suddenly converted from Adams to Jackson in the hope of securing an office in the new administration. New England converts in particular received Green's scorn and distrust since he regarded them as members of America's "organized aristocracy" who wanted to weaken the Jackson party and eventually destroy it. Consequently, in order to prevent party amalgamation Green advocated an appointments policy that would deny patronage to the former sycophants of the Adams coalition. If the
Jackson Administration was prudent in its policy of "Reform," the Telegraph believed that the Hero could "enrich and strengthen his party by a transfer of the lucrative offices in sound hands."

When Jackson began to undertake "Reform" in April 1829, the Telegraph applauded his efforts and justified his removals before the anguished cries of the opposition. To the appeals of the National Intelligencer and the National Journal that Jackson be "magnanimous," the Telegraph coldly replied that the President would pay them no heed and listen only to the will of the people. Those who considered their office as their property were "monarchists" and that alone was cause enough for their removal. When the majority of people elected a new President, they wanted a change not only at the top but throughout the levels of government in order to bring in men who would think as the majority did. Besides, the Telegraph declared, the Adams men who were removed had attempted to "corrupt the people."

As editor of the Jackson organ, Green was an obvious person for officeseekers to approach. Immediately after Jackson's election, he received a flood of letters inquiring about the possibility of securing an office in some department of the new administration. Green undoubtedly failed to answer all these letters and took effective action on very few. For example, Albert Smith, having "just claims" on the Jacksonians, received Green's aid in obtaining the position of Marshal. Willis M. Green received his brother's help in his attempt to secure an Indian agency. Interestingly enough, Secretary of War Eaton required several letters of recommendation before he would appoint Willis. On the other hand, Green refused to help George Strothers secure a position in the State Department. Strother and Thomas Hart Benton were having a
political quarrel, and Green wanted no friction with his old political rival. Moreover, when Carter Beverly requested his assistance to obtain another State Department office, Green declared that "I am not consulted nor do I desire to be consulted on such occasions." Finally, he bluntly informed his brother-in-law, Colonel James Semple, that he could not recommend him because of his "sense of duty to the President."  

Green's major contribution to the Jackson Administration continued to be the crusading zeal with which he infused the editorial columns of the Telegraph. Yet the demagoguery and scurrility that helped to elect Jackson seemed out of place in what was now an established government journal. Instead of assuming an authoritative stance and calmly explaining the policies of the administration, the Telegraph maintained the fervor of the campaign of 1828. Green was undoubtedly an editor for whom the campaign would never end. But for the Jacksonian leaders it had ended successfully, and perhaps they eventually began to grow weary of an editor who worried more about abusing defeated foes than making powerful new friends for the administration.

Henry Clay of course was at the top of Green's enemy list. Thus, it is not surprising that one of his editorial pasttimes was speculation about the political movements of the Kentuckian. In December, 1828, Green was certain that Clay had become the agent of the Bank and was already a candidate for the Presidency. Four months later, the Telegraph charged that the Clayites were trying to promote the belief that Jackson would not accept a second term so that Calhoun and Van Buren would quarrel over the succession and divide the party. During the fall of 1829, the Telegraph believed that Clay was trying to strengthen himself in Kentucky. This speculation continued into the winter of 1830 until Green's
press concluded that the "table orator of the Coalition" hoped to be elected to the Senate where he would be able to take command of the opposition. In August, 1830, the Telegraph stepped up its editorial attacks on the pretext that Clay was again before the public as a candidate for the Presidency. Actually, Green used the daily attacks to influence the elections in the West. And though Green's contribution is debatable, the Jacksonians did score an overwhelming victory in the 1830 Western elections.

Green would use any incident, no matter how unrelated, to attack Clay and the Coalition. When the French overthrew Charles X in 1830, Green called France "our revolutionary ally" and hailed the triumph of "Regenerated France." "The recent triumph of civil liberty in the old world," the Telegraph added, "ought to admonish us of the sacredness of the trusts confided to our care." But if the absolutist Charles X and the counterrevolutionary Holy Alliance were the enemies of the people in Europe, Clay and the Coalition were their American counterparts. Like Charles X, Clay was the advocate of "construction and consolidation." And whereas Charles X would violate the French charter for the "preservation of the states [estates]," Clay would just as quickly infringe on the Constitution for the "general welfare." Furthermore, the Holy Alliance, governing by force, and the Coalition, thwarting the will of the people by fraud and trickery, failed to consult the wishes and interests of the governed.

Because the Telegraph was not a model of journalistic decorum, the opposition press felt compelled to employ Green's demagogic editorial style to counter his newspaper. At times the National Republican papers were scathing in their attacks and even used some of Green's old
editorial material. Becoming exasperated at Jackson's patronage policy, the National Journal, for example, threatened the President with impeachment. The United States Gazette forced Green to deny its accusation that he had purchased a large amount of property with Treasury funds. Rumors about Jackson's poor health and impending death abounded in the opposition press. In January, 1829, the Telegraph tried to convince its readers that President-elect Jackson was alive and well at the Hermitage. In late August and again in June, 1830, Green felt it necessary to criticize the opposition papers for their attempts to sow discord among the Jacksonians by foretelling the Hero's early demise. When Jackson decorated the East Room of the White House, the Telegraph pointed out that the cost was "far below" one-half what Adams had paid for the same work.

In the same manner that Green had termed the Adams Cabinet the "Traveling Cabinet" because of its long absences from Washington, the National Republican press now criticized the Jackson Cabinet. The Telegraph responded unconvincingly that the Jackson Cabinet was taking short trips for personal business and were not "perambulating" the country as the Adams Cabinet had done for the purpose of keeping themselves in office.

On May 27, 1830, Jackson vetoed a bill to finance a twenty-mile-long highway connecting Maysville, Kentucky, with Lexington, Kentucky. The Jackson Administration argued that federal aid to such intrastate projects was unconstitutional and violated the principle of economy in government. Actually, the veto was a slap at Clay who advocated the measure as a part of his American System. On the other hand, the veto pleased states like New York and Pennsylvania, who were financing their own transportation projects, and Southern states rights men, who had no need for such projects and who desired to limit the powers of the
Green's press, as a supporter of the South and states rights and an opponent of Clay and his American System, naturally responded to Jackson's first major veto with jubilation. Calling Jackson's action "one of the most important events of his eventful life," the Telegraph praised the President at length for his willingness to risk his political popularity and his reelection to save the Constitution. Unlike the hated Clay, the newspaper observed, Jackson refused to use the federal patronage to make himself popular. Moreover, in an attempt to demonstrate the Jacksonians were unified behind the veto, Green filled his editorial columns with extracts from Democratic newspapers defending Jackson's position. The Telegraph announced its gratification that Democratic editors had unanimously supported the Maysville veto.

During the campaign of 1828, Green considered it unwise to discuss publicly the Second Bank of the United States or the renewal of its charter. Undoubtedly, he did not want the Bank issue to distract the public from the excitement he was stirring up over the bargain and intrigue of the Adams Administration. But in December, 1828, the Telegraph began what was perceived by at least one friend of the Bank as an effective editorial assault on the national financial institution. George Hoffmann, a director of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and a significant stockholder in the Bank, complained to the Bank's director, Nicholas Biddle, that "this inflated, flimsy Editor does mischief and may do more if not put right, his paper circulates extensively and has done a good deal for the cause of Gen. Jackson." Hoffmann was upset that a leading Jackson supporter, who also owned much stock in the Bank, had determined to sell out after reading the Telegraph. Green would
have been gratified at Hoffmann's displeasure, yet he was already aware that the Bank's friends were preparing for a great conflict on the question of its recharter. Consequently, in April, 1829, he tried to enlist his strongest editorial ally, Thomas Ritchie of the Richmond *Enquirer*, in his personal crusade against the Bank. Because Ritchie had been attacking local banks, Green first chided him and pointed out that the local banks were the last obstacles to complete control by the gargantuan financial institution. Then, apparently to arouse Ritchie's partisan sentiments, he informed the Richmond editor that Biddle had personally told him that Clay and he were working together to secure a recharter and promote the Kentuckian's political aspirations. Not to fear, though, added Green. He was ready to stop the concert by exposing their intrigues in the *Telegraph*.

Green saw the Bank of the United States as an attempt by a "corrupt aristocracy" to use a central pool of funds to control the government. To accomplish this scheme, the Bank would first buy up presses to destroy the credibility of the *Telegraph*. Thus, it was necessary to put Ritchie and his press straight on the Bank. Second, the Bank would use its funds to buy out Congress. Therefore, he warned Governor William B. Giles of Virginia that "the Bank here . . . is throwing its meshes around every member of Congress who can be tempted to borrow money from its vault." Modified for public consumption, this warning meant that "its millions will be lavished upon members of Congress and their constituents to purchase a recharter, and that when that is obtained, we shall no longer be a free people." Third, the National Republicans, the political arm of the "corrupt aristocracy," would sooner or later make their stand alongside the Bank. They would then use the
influence of the Bank on "some great question" (probably the tariff) to produce discord within the ranks of the Jacksonians and afterwards put Henry Clay in the White House. Controlling Congress and the President, and already having John Marshall, author of McCulloch v. Maryland, in control of the Supreme Court, the "corrupt aristocracy" could then claim victory.

Given Green's belief in this conspiracy, he welcomed the apparent affirmation of his views in Jackson's first annual message to Congress. The question of the renewal of the Bank's charter, Jackson declared, could not be raised "too soon." "Both the constitutionality and the expedience of the law creating this bank are well questioned by a large portion of our fellow citizens; and it must be admitted by all, that it has failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency." Thus, Jackson was highly suspicious of the Bank's operations, and he was just as skeptical that the Bank should be rechartered.

In the weeks immediately following Jackson's message, Green kept a close watch on the value of the Bank stock. Eventually, he was happy to report in the Telegraph that the effect of the message was a drastic loss in stock value. This sharp decline Green interpreted as evidence that the stock of the Bank was a speculation based on the prospects of the renewal of the charter. Moreover, as evidence of his belief in a Bank conspiracy, he declared that if the "least breath of government could cause such a drastic change and also bring the whole mass of interests affected by the Bank into opposition to Jackson, then the people could expect the Bank to attempt to produce a "monied monopoly" as powerful as the government itself. The Telegraph concluded that "all that money can do will be done to recharter the Bank of the United States."
Having already decided even before the President's message that the supporters of the Bank were conspiring to subvert the administration, in the following months Green merely repeated his warnings and continued the alarmist rhetoric of his editorial columns. In January, 1830, for instance, the *Telegraph* saw the Bank purchasing "a portion of the public press." It could now "penetrate every village and hamlet at will." By April, the Bank was "extending its power by planting its agents in the shape of Bank Presidents, Cashiers, and Directors, in the several states." But "because the act which renews the charter will put an end to civil liberty . . . the opposition to the Bank will not cease." Finally, in the summer, Green's press considered it obvious that the "Bank has loosened all its mongers," entered politics, and was ready to form its monied monopoly "consolidating the powers of the government in the hands of a few brokers located in Philadelphia." As his readers gripped his newspapers with sweaty palms and an ever-quicking pulse, Green informed them that a desperate struggle with the Bank was approaching, and they should be ready to unite "to strike down the monster."

If Green was ahead of the administration on the Bank issue, he was a couple of shaky steps behind on the question of the protective tariff. Having friends and enemies in all sections, the Bank was much more a partisan issue than a divisive sectional question. The tariff, though, provided a potentially explosive sectional controversy, pitting the South against the rest of the country. Though the administration adopted a strong stand against the Bank, it was cautious and evasive in its tariff policy. Nevertheless, the Jackson Administration opposed any significant modification of the protective duties of the Tariff of 1828. Just as decisive for Green, Calhoun, who was neutral on the Bank, strongly
opposed the protective tariff, and, unbeknownst to his ardent supporter, had authored the *South Carolina Exposition and Protest* to justify state interposition in opposition to such an unconstitutional law as the Tariff of 1828. Consequently, Green had the personal and political freedom to attack the Bank. But on the protective tariff he had to curb his personal desire to crusade against it, attempt to reconcile the various interests within the Jackson party, and still work for modification of the harsher duties.

To maintain unity within the party the *Telegraph* repeatedly pointed out that the Jackson Administration would not favor one section of the Union at the expense of another. Instead of sectional conflict, Green promoted the idea of a harmony of interests on the tariff. He derided anyone who tried to stir up sectional feeling on the issue.

This attitude led Green to quarrel with the militants of South Carolina. In September, 1828, he tried to convince Calhoun that attacks on Eastern manufacturers merely fostered their attachment to the protective system. According to Green, "the true policy of the South is to oppose the tariff on the ground of expediency--to deprecate its tendencies to weaken the Union and to exhibit in bold relief its oppressive tendencies." When James Hamilton, Jr., of South Carolina failed to follow his course of opposition and instead put forth a constitutional argument against the tariff, the *Telegraph*, for once acting independently of Calhoun, declared that the tariff could not be opposed on constitutional grounds. In addition, the newspaper even more boldly charged that the "impudence of South Carolina" had done more than anything else to rivet the protective system on the country.

Periodically, Green tried to blame Clay and the Coalition for
stirring up sectional discord on the tariff. Clay, asserted the Telegraph, desired to enflame sectional feeling so that an objective discussion of the tariff would be impossible. Clay and Daniel Webster wanted to continue all high taxes so that they could unite white laborers of the East and West against the South by deceiving them into a belief that a high tariff was necessary for the protection of labor. Their ultimate concern, argued the Telegraph, was the use of the tariff for their own political elevation. Yet these accusations, perhaps viable in 1828, were irrelevant and probably an attempt at distraction in 1829 and thereafter. Clay, Webster, and the Coalition were no longer in a position to determine whether the duties were voted up or down. Green's own party controlled the legislative and executive branches of the government, and his rhetoric would have been better placed if directed at fellow Jacksonians like Martin Van Buren. But such a course would have divided the Jacksonians and created political trouble for Green, so the editor of the Jackson organ decided to enhance party unity by intermittently dragging out Clay, Webster, and other National Republicans for public abuse.

The realities of the Jackson party and of his own political position forced Green to devise clever but uninspiring arguments to secure a reduction of the tariff's more burdensome duties. Realizing that the Jacksonians were united in their opposition to the Bank, he attempted to link a protective tariff with friendship for Biddle's "monster."

The Telegraph observed that the impending retirement of the national debt would result in the tariff producing a "surplus in the Treasury of ten millions annually." And if that sum accumulated "from year to year unexpended," it would quickly "enrich the banks in which it may be deposited." The implication, Green hoped, was thus clear for Jacksonians. Either they reduced the tariff or they contributed to the power of an
institution that, according to the Telegraph, was about to take over the government. In another argument, Green's paper declared that the effect of the tariff was overrated. Sounding like the friend of industry instead of the enemy of the protective system, the Telegraph announced that "more is to be expected from the improvement in our machinery, the industry of our labourers, and the economy of the whole arrangements, than from artificial or legal stimulants." Finally, in its most simplistic solution to the tariff controversy, the newspaper pointed out that when the cotton manufacturers of the East prospered so did the cotton growers of the South. The key to his unbounded prosperity was simply a reduction of the tariff's harsher duties.

Green's moderate stand on the tariff was his solution to an issue that threatened his political survival with the Jackson Administration. But Green was never in step with the administration. He desired a significant modification of the tariff, and the administration wanted only token reductions. What eventually forced him to take a militant stand on the tariff was his attachment to Calhoun. Though he could dismiss Hamilton's constitutional arguments, the revelation that Calhoun was the author of a plan to nullify the tariff forced him to support nullification or desert his political idol. Fortunately, the decision to support nullification was easy for Green since the Jacksonians had meanwhile read him out of the party.

Existing sectional tensions received their most prominent exposure during the famous Webster-Hayne debate of January, 1830. Representing the advocates of a strong central government, Daniel Webster argued that the federal government was sovereign, acted directly on the people, and was perpetual. Representing the states rights advocates of the South,
Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina defended Calhoun's doctrine of nullification, detailed the grievances of the South, and appealed to the West to join the South against the greed of the Northeast. Webster and Hayne thus placed in bold relief the two conflicting interpretations of the Union that would be the basis for the sectional conflicts of the next thirty years.

That the Webster-Hayne debate was sectional did not escape Green. But like the tariff, it was in his interest to interpret an obviously sectional incident in purely partisan terms. Consequently, the Telegraph praised Hayne for vindicating the South but spent most of its editorial space on the debate, attacking Webster as the agent of Eastern Federalism. Green saw Webster's replies to Hayne as an attempt to build a new Federalist party under his own banner by bringing the West into alliance with the old New England Federalists. The Telegraph of course expressed alarm at the alleged movement of the Federalists. So great was Green's concern that his press lauded old foe Thomas Hart Benton for recounting Federalist behavior during the War of 1812 and exposing the Federalist scheme to buy an alliance with the West. The Telegraph also constantly reminded its readers of Webster's supposed connection with the Hartford Convention and of the Federalist composition of the National Republican opposition. The opposition party, the newspaper said, consisted of "ultra federalists, amalgamated with recreant republicans who have renounced the Republican party, and whom that party in turn have renounced."

Green hoped that the excitement caused by the debate would unify and strengthen the Jackson party. The Telegraph claimed to see a great "political excitement" sweeping the country not matched since the days
of Jefferson. Administration editors were at their posts sounding the alarm against the movement of the Federalist party and the renewed threat of the opposition. Their work would not be done until the last vestiges of an "oppressive aristocracy" had been destroyed.

Green's reaction to the Webster-Hayne debate begs implications about the political atmosphere of the time, the condition of the Jackson party, and Green's relationship with the administration. First, his alarm about a Federalist-Western alliance indicates that he was worried that the West might desert the South on the tariff. The militancy of George McDuffie and Hamilton, and other political leaders in South Carolina, Green feared, might alienate the West as well as the East. Hayne and Calhoun also feared the loss of Western support, and in fact, the Webster-Hayne debate had begun when the South Carolina Senator had defended the Western desire for cheap public lands. Thus, Green began an editorial campaign against Webster and an imaginary Federalist party to keep West and East apart and prevent Southern isolation on the tariff. Second, Green's calls for party unity and renewed party strength suggest that there were sharp divisions within the Jackson ranks. These divisions will be discussed in detail later, but for now it is sufficient to note that they help to explain his fierce partisanship on the tariff as well as the Webster-Hayne debate. Finally, Green's concern about the party also hints that he was experiencing disappointment and frustration in his relationship with the administration and in his personal life. In truth, he was experiencing difficulties that would have a significant effect on his political and journalistic future.

As early as May, 1829, Green was upset at the treatment he was receiving from the Jackson Administration. After chastising Samuel D.
Ingham for interfering with his patronage in the Post Office Department, Green complained to him that the administration was using his press and his services but was disregard of his "character, feelings, and interests." A month later, Green was even more upset and depressed. He grumbled to Calhoun that he was receiving little patronage from the department heads, no help from his friends, and he was under a great burden of debt. Because his numerous difficulties were causing the Telegraph to suffer from neglect, he had authorized a friend in New York to find a suitable buyer for his press. Interestingly enough, Green's only positive news for Calhoun was the kindness that he had received from Van Buren. He remarked that Van Buren had made a favorable impression upon him and many others in the administration.

Questions of patronage were a repeated source of anguish and disappointment for Green. Though he apologized to Ingham in July, 1829 for the resentment of his earlier letter, he was soon upset at Postmaster General William T. Barry for failing to listen to him about recent appointments in Missouri and Illinois that, according to Green, would seriously injure the administration. Evidently, he had been unable to secure postmasterships for his old cronies in Missouri and the political friends of his brother-in-law, Ninian T. Edwards of Illinois. Then in January, 1830, he came into conflict with the President over Jackson's nomination of Henry Baldwin, a high tariff advocate with whom Green had recently engaged in a polemical battle, to the Supreme Court. Green tried to persuade Jackson that Baldwin's appointment would hurt him and the Democratic party. When he carried his objections to his editorial columns, Jackson disapproved of Green's public comments on the subject. Green then requested an audience with the President which, if
held at all, did not prevent him from nominating Baldwin. The editor meekly chose not to regard the nomination as a "declaration of hostility" against him, but his press boldly announced its continuing opposition to Baldwin.

Feeling slighted in the distribution of patronage was frustration enough for Green. What compounded his problems, though, was the widely held belief that he possessed great influence with Jackson and possibly even controlled the President. Responsibility for this misconception rested in large part with opposition papers like the Richmond Whig, which charged that Green was the "President de facto," and opposition leaders like Henry Clay, who commented on Green's undue influence in his correspondence and speeches. Mrs. Eliza Nelson, who wanted Green to use his great influence to get an appointment for her boy, and other citizens believed these stories about the great power of the Telegraph editor and consequently worried the poor man to distraction with requests for his beneficence. Even worse, Green had to contend with the anger of his wife's brother for failure to deliver political offices. No wonder he complained to Ingham and Barry!

Green attempted to combat this troublesome rumor, first by less than candidly denying he had any influence. He informed the National Journal that he had exercised no influence over the patronage of the departments and had not attempted to interfere with the President's nominations. He had recommended only two or three people for "minor offices" and had not asked for patronage for himself. To do justice to the claims of office-seekers, he claimed that he had established a new rule whereby he sent them to the departments "to which it is proper that they should have been sent in the first place." Second, he charged
that his alleged undue influence was an attempt by the Coalition to destroy his press. The Coalition was trying to make Jackson jealous of him so that the President would treat his editor badly and lessen the influence of his newspaper. Naturally, Henry Clay was the leader of this latest scheme of the Coalition. But, proclaimed the Telegraph, Jackson would not fall for such intrigues, and the "malignant attacks ... by the hirelings of the Coalition" would prove futile.

Actually, Green's efforts to repel the attacks proved futile. His failure to be candid about the little influence he did have seriously injured his credibility and gave the opposition papers new weapons with which to attack him. Though charging the opposition with a conspiracy to destroy the Telegraph was another clever diversion, it did not address the question of the amount of his influence with the President, and it possibly convinced some of the accuracy of the opposition charges. If anything, his story is one more indication that he was highly insecure about his relationship with the administration. Thus, despite his protests, many continued to believe that Green was a significant power behind the Jackson throne. And though his eventual break with the administration ended the belief, historians still list him as one of the most influential early members of Jackson's Kitchen Cabinet.

The most tangled incident involving Green and the officeholders began even before Jackson's inauguration with his interference in the patronage affairs of John Pope. According to Green, he tried to persuade his fellow Kentuckian that his acceptance of an appointment as Territorial Governor of Arkansas would brand him as a "mercenary" who would accept any office. When Pope refused to heed his warnings, Green intervened and convinced Jackson to withhold the appointment. Jackson
then offered Pope the office of first comptroller of the Treasury, and Green, transmitting the President's offer, advised Pope to accept a position that would one day be on a par with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

Meanwhile, Captain William Field, a Kentucky friend of Pope, became an associate of still another Kentuckian, Congressman Thomas P. Moore. Because Moore wanted to remove Pope as a potential competitor for a high-level position in the administration, he advised Field that Pope should take the appointment as Territorial Governor of Arkansas. After Field talked to Jackson and gave him a pledge that Pope would be satisfied with the position, Jackson again offered it and Pope accepted.

Having served Moore, Field now returned to him to get support for his own appointment. But Moore deserted Field, and he thus came to Green, acknowledged his error with Moore, and sought Green's influence to secure an office. Green eventually loaned Field money to return to Kentucky, then spoke to Secretary of War Eaton in Field's behalf. Eaton, though, made Green understand that Field probably would not receive an office at least for a long time. Green informed Field of his failure to secure an appointment for him, but to end the belief that he was interfering with the President's patronage, he omitted from his letter the conversation with Eaton.

Instead of thanking Green for his efforts, Field now believed that Green had used his influence with Jackson to defeat his nomination. The disappointed Kentuckian subsequently wrote Jackson a letter roundly abusing Green and circulated Green's reply to him as further evidence of Green's undue influence over the President. Meanwhile, Pope, who was just as upset at Green for his earlier interference, slandered the
editor's name in Kentucky, wrote him an insolent letter, and sent the
President another negative letter about him. By this time it was the
fall of 1829, and Green, though still desiring vindication, allowed the
matter to drop. This decision was probably prudent since further
correspondence would have only added to the abuse and damage he had al-
ready suffered from the incident. Not only had the troublesome accusa-
tion of his power over the President been given further notice, but even
more significantly, the letters of Pope and Field possibly weakened
Jackson's confidence in his editor and certainly increased Green's inse-
curity about his relationship with the administration.

The accusations of undue influence would not have been so annoy-
ing to Green had he not been so heavily in debt. Soon after the in-
auguration he wrote the President that he had spent $15,000 on his cam-
paign and was $20,000 in debt. Though this was serious enough, he
confessed to Jackson that the Bank, the hated "monster" which he was
ready to accuse of attempting to corrupt the press, held a large note
against him. To ease his financial burdens, he then asked the Presi-
dent to appoint John S. Meehan, whom he was paying $1200 per year,
Librarian to Congress so that he could hire another assistant at $800
per annum. At first, Jackson made known his wish to appoint another
person, but undoubtedly as a favor to his editor, changed his mind and
appointed Meehan.

Despite Jackson's kindness, by December, 1829, Green's financial
situation had become critical. In a request to James A. Hamilton of New
York, a close friend of Van Buren, to help him raise funds in that state,
Green admitted that the failure to meet financial "engagements soon to
fall due" would result in unpleasant embarrassments" for him. Rumors
of his troubles also began to spread, and in March, 1830, he privately had to deny a story that his notes had been offered at a 50% discount. Calling the report a Federal lie to destroy his private credit, Green, though confessing his inability to meet his financial obligations, claimed that he owned Washington real estate almost equal to his debts, his subscribers owed him over $50,000, and his press itself was worth about $20,000. Moreover, he implied that he had weathered his December crisis, since he had paid off $12,000 of the "old debt" in the last 27 four months.

As his financial woes continued, Green became more and more dependent on the Bank for his salvation. The financial crisis of December, 1829, had been safely passed probably as the result of a loan from Biddle. In September, 1830, Green referred creditor James Ronaldson to the Bank Director. When Alfred Stegganine threatened to expose his financial difficulties by appealing to Congress and the President for money Green owed him, Green explained that he had not paid him because of the failure of the Bank "to meet its engagements with me and the rigorous pressure for a demand which I had contracted with that institution under an assurance that the Bank would await my convenience to make the payment."

By "engagements" Green meant another loan from the Bank. On December 21, 1830, he commented that he would make application for a loan without the knowledge of Secretary of the Treasury Ingham and with the independence of his press guaranteed. In February, 1831, Green requested Congressman Joseph Hemphill of Pennsylvania to forward to Biddle his application for a $20,000 loan that would reduce his debts to one and provide a sufficient capital for the operation of his press. He added
that the loan would be secured with money from the Congressional printing and by a mortgage on his Washington real estate and his printing office. Acknowledging receipt of Green's request on February 10, Biddle told Hemphill that he would submit it to the Bank's Board of Directors where it would be considered "as a matter of business without looking to the past or the future." Biddle also assumed that if the loan was made, a condition would be placed in the note giving the editor complete freedom to speak his mind about the Bank.

Some time in late February, the "monster" granted Green's request and in so doing saved his press. Nevertheless, his long battle with debt and his ultimate dependence on the Bank had compromised him politically and made his public attacks on the Bank appear hypocritical if not ridiculous. For example, when Green in January, 1830, charged that the Bank was purchasing "a portion of the public press," little did his readers know that their crusading editor owed the Bank about $12,000 as well as his thanks for helping him avoid unpleasant financial embarrassments. Actually, the Bank, instead of purchasing the Telegraph, rescued the newspaper, and gave Green the means to abuse it. Biddle and the Bank could have easily refused his loan requests, and Green could have done nothing. After all, an editorial by the editor of the Telegraph complaining of his failure to receive a loan from the Bank would have been fantastic even for the incredible Duff Green.

Since the disclosure of Green's gross inconsistencies would have been a severe embarrassment for the Jackson Administration, his growing dependence on the Bank sealed his fate as the editor of the administration organ. Certainly, his disagreement with the Jacksonians over the tariff, his conflicts over the executive patronage, and his support of
Calhoun hurt him in the inner circles of the administration. Green was aware of these tensions, and his behavior frequently manifested the insecurity he felt because of them. Yet none of these problems were as vital to the continued success of the Jacksonians as the Bank. They hoped to use the war on the Bank to consolidate the political party which they had been building since the election of 1824. As the most significant partisan issue of the time, the "Monster Bank" would animate the political life of a generation, make Jackson "a vastly popular leader," and make the Jacksonian Democrats an unbeatable political machine. Consequently, when Green confessed to Jackson in April, 1829, that he owed the Bank a large sum of money, he became in the eyes of the administration a potentially dangerous political liability. Apparently, Jackson gave his editor time to free himself from the Bank. But, on June 26, 1830, Jackson wrote William B. Lewis that the Bank controlled Green "as much as the showman does his puppets." He would therefore have to get another organ to proclaim and defend administration policy since Green was injuring the administration more than the opposition. The Telegraph editor was not aware of it, but after this date he was little more than a caretaker for Francis P. Blair.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

1

2
Telegraph, December 6, 1828; Green to General Lyman, December 14, 1828, to William Ingalls, December 22, 1828, to C. P. Van Ness, December 28, 1828, to M. Updike, February 1, 1829, GP-LC.

3
Telegraph, April 1, 13, 14, 15, 18, 29, May 2, 5, 10, 26, June 1, 3, 4, September 17, 1829.

4
Green to Albert Smith, March 5, 1829, to George Strother, January 30, 1830, to Carter Beverley, February 14, 1830, to James Semple, November 7, 1830, Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. (hereafter cited as GP-SHC); Green to Willis Green, June 12, July 9, 1829, to William B. Lewis, July 11, 1829, GP-LC.

5
Green to Ninian Edwards, December 23, 1828, GP-LC; Telegraph, April 6, October 7, 29, November 5, 1829, February 27, August 21, 30, 1830.

6
Green to J. M. Goodenow, November 3, 1830, GP-SHC; Telegraph, 20, 22, 23, 1830.

7
Telegraph, January 29, April 15, May 9, June 3, August 25, December 18, 1829, June 30, July 15, 1830.

8

9
Telegraph, May 28, June 14, 18, July, 1830.
Ibid., December 26, 1827; George Hoffmann to Nicholas Biddle, December 20, 1828 in Reginald C. McGrane (ed.), The Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle Dealing with National Affairs, 1807-1844 (Boston & New York, 1919), 61-62; Green to Thomas Ritchie, April 6, 1829, GP-LC.

Green to William B. Giles, March 22, 1829, GP-LC; Green to Judge Wayne, July 29, 1830, GP-SHC; Telegraph, December 7, 16, 1829, January 20, April 20, July 8, 1830.


Telegraph, December 16, 1829.

Ibid., January 20, April 20, July 8, 1830.

Ibid., November 7, 1828; Green to Calhoun, September 23, 1828, GP-LC.

Telegraph, June 18, 1829, November 4, December 2, 1830.

Ibid., June 8, July 25, August 12, 1829.

Ibid., January 23, 26, 30, February 2, 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, March 16, 1830.

Green to Samuel D. Ingham, May 6, 1829, GP-LC; Green to Calhoun, June 16, 1829, Calhoun Papers, Clemson University, Clemson, S. C.

Green to Ingham, July 3, 1829, to William T. Barry, July 11, 1829, GP-LC; Green to Jackson, January 4, 1830, GP-SHC; Telegraph, January 14, 1830.

Telegraph, April 21, July 13, 1829; Green to Eliza Nelson, April 4, 1829, GP-LC; Green to Ninian Edwards, November 22, 1829 in Washburne, Edwards Papers, 446-447.

Telegraph, April 21, May 14, June 26, 1829; Green to A. M. Sterrett, September 10, 1830, GP-SHC.

Green to John Pope, April 11, 1829, to Ninian Edwards, May 11, 1829, to Worden Pope, August 15, 1829, GP-LC.
Ibid., Green to John Pope, June 20, 1829, to Presley Edwards, October 18, 1829, GP-LC.

Green to Jackson, April 23, 1829, GP-LC. Green of course did not tell Jackson about his recent investment in at least one fantastic business speculation. Early in 1829, Edward D. Tippett requested Green's aid in patenting an invention that upon "the principle or action of the crank and lever will give an increase in power without a loss of time, and which will complete that desideratim in mechanics, to-wit, the perpetual motion." Green was receptive to Tippett's amazing invention and agreed to advance him the money for the patent in exchange for becoming co-patentee and receiving one-half of all the profits. Not surprisingly, nothing ever came of his investment. Contract, Green and Tippett, February 2, 1829, GP-SHC.

Green to Jackson, May 1, 1829, GP-LC; Culver H. Smith, "The Washington Press in the Jacksonian Period" (Ph.D. diss., Duke U., 1933), 187. Smith reprints the National Journal's list of fifty-six newspapermen receiving appointments from the Jackson Administration by the spring of 1830. Telegraph employees rewarded were John C. Rives--Clerk in the Fourth Auditor's Office, William A. Rind--Post Office Clerk, H. T. Rankin--temporary appointment in the State Department, John S. Lehenanowski--clerk in General Post Office, and Meehan. According to Smith, "many of the editors owed their appointments to Duff Green." He emphasizes that Green, in return for financial favors, was "in a large measure responsible" for the appointment of several employees of the Boston press, the American Statesman. Yet Smith provides no evidence for this claim as he concludes that "it cannot be shown that he was solely responsible for the appointments." Since, except for Meehan, this writer has found no evidence of Green's assistance to any newspaperman, he must agree wholeheartedly with this conclusion. As for the appointment of his own employees, even if he had the influence, why would he take steps that would deprive him of the services of experienced newspapermen? Much more likely, these men obtained their offices through their own connections. Smith, "Washington Press," 186-197.

Green to James A. Hamilton, December 16, 1829, to William Ingalls, March 8, 1830, GP-SHC.

Green to James Ronaldson, September 15, 1830, to Alfred Steggamine, September 27, 1830, GP-SHC; Biddle to John Potter, January 9, 1830 in McGrane, Correspondence of Biddle, 95-96.

Green to Colonel Brent, December 21, 1830, to Joseph Hemphill, February 4, 1831, GP-SHC; Biddle to Hemphill, February 10, 1831 in McGrane, Correspondence of Biddle, 124-125.
On March 5 Green drew a check on the Bank for $4,000--$1500 to be paid to a Mr. Hawort and $2500 to be paid to William Ingalls. Green to Nathaniel Green, March 5, 1831, GP-SHC.


Jackson to William B. Lewis, June 26, 1830 in John S. Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (7 vols., Washington, 1929-35), IV, 156-157. James A. Hamilton, a close friend of Martin Van Buren, later warned Jackson that it was indispensable that Green be replaced as the administration editor. Hamilton to Jackson, July 29, 1830 in Bassett, Correspondence of Jackson, IV, 167-168.
Andrew Jackson first saw John C. Calhoun as his political enemy in December, 1829. It was at that time that the President began to believe that Calhoun was behind the persecution of Mrs. Margaret (Peggy) O'Neale Timberlake Eaton, the wife of his close friend and Secretary of War, John H. Eaton. Consequently, on December 31, 1829, Jackson named Secretary of State Martin Van Buren as Presidential successor and attributed to Vice President Calhoun and his friends "most of the troubles, vexations, and difficulties" he had experienced since becoming President. Nevertheless, since the knowledge of Jackson's feelings about Calhoun and about the succession was limited to his close friends, the central political consideration for Duff Green and for the public remained, as it had been since Jackson's election, the rivalry between Calhoun and Van Buren for the blessing of the Hero of New Orleans for the succession. The rivalry between these two factions of the Jackson party would continue until the winter of 1831 when it became clear to all that Jackson saw Van Buren as friend and successor and Calhoun as his treacherous enemy. Calhoun and his protege then had no logical alternative but to go into opposition.

Green was literally in the center of the Calhoun-Van Buren rivalry. He was theoretically the neutral editor of the administration organ, yet
he was actually the staunchest supporter of one of the rivals for the succession. Thus, throughout 1829 and 1830 Green had to be circumspect in his favoritism for the Vice President and deny the obvious existence of the rivalry even though he wanted to champion Calhoun publicly. But beginning in the summer of 1830, at about the time that Jackson had decided to replace him as his editor, Green privately strayed from his neutrality, especially in his remarks about the Eaton affair. Publicly, though, his press continued to maintain the facade of administration unity, and he even claimed to be satisfied with explanations given him for the establishment of the Washington Globe, the Telegraph's apparent successor as administration organ.

With the Jackson-Calhoun quarrel the tensions of the past two years came to the surface. When Green attempted to vindicate Calhoun's behavior in the Seminole Affair, the Globe and the Telegraph came into open conflict. The Globe charged that Calhoun had betrayed Jackson's confidence by publishing their correspondence in the affair. In turn, the Telegraph accused Van Buren and Peggy Eaton of causing the rupture. Though Jackson pronounced Calhoun and Green politically dead in March, Green tried to postpone his movement into opposition by separating the President from the "malign influence" of Van Buren and his friends. This strategy, however, proved unconvincing and unsuccessful, and in October, 1831, the Telegraph began editorial attacks on its former chief.

The rivalry between Calhoun and Van Buren was to be expected. Both men had supporters in the administration, and both wanted to be President. Calhoun as Vice President and Van Buren as Secretary of State were in positions that were logically in line to the Presidency.
The two men were also from different sections and disagreed on significant issues, especially the tariff. Old enough to encourage constant speculation about his longevity, Jackson increased the sense of urgency in the contest by his refusal to declare for a second term. Nevertheless, because Jackson was the party leader, the most popular political figure of his time, and the President, his blessing was the prize for which the supporters of the two aspirants covertly battled.

Given these factors, Washington in late 1828 and early 1829 was full of muted discussion about the rivalry. James Buchanan, for example, observed that "the friends of Van Buren and those of Calhoun are becoming very jealous of each other." There was also much conjecture and analysis by political observers and participants about the makeup of Jackson's Cabinet as an indication of the President's early feelings about the rivalry. The Telegraph, though, sought to assure the public that the new administration was unified and under control. When John Eaton and his controversial bride left Philadelphia for Washington after their honeymoon, the newspaper cheerfully remarked that "Mrs. Eaton was visited by a number of ladies [in Philadelphia] who were much pleased with her intelligence and affability." Contrary to the accusations of the opposition press, the Telegraph found harmony pervading the relations between Van Burenites and Calhounites and agreement characterizing the early deliberations of the Cabinet. Finally, Green cited no less an authority than the Albany Argus, the organ of Van Buren's New York Regency, to show that Van Buren had no desire to establish a new press in Washington to accompany the Telegraph and divide the government patronage.

Conversely, Green's correspondence betrayed his great concern
about the impending contest between the two factions. He took part in the speculation whether Van Buren or Calhoun would have the controlling influence in the Cabinet. When it appeared that the Van Burenites might be winning the battle for Cabinet appointments, Green caustically remarked that Van Buren was "overacting his part" on the Cabinet selections. Paranoid that certain persons in the administration would impute to him improper motives, he was afraid to borrow funds from David Henshaw, a newcomer to the Jackson party. In April, Green warned Mordecai Noah of the New York Enquirer that he would have to dispel the belief in Washington of his hostility to Van Buren or he would not share in the patronage of the new administration. In addition, the Van Burenites, who were pioneers in the use of federal offices to obtain their political goals, had control of the patronage in the states. Thus, in September, Christopher Van Devanter of Michigan, who had been Calhoun's chief clerk in the Monroe Administration's War Department, complained that only the friends of the Magician were receiving appointments in his state. Also in September, Green informed Calhoun that Jackson, strongly influenced by the New Yorker, had decided to run for reelection. Consequently, Green's correspondence not only demonstrates his concern about the rivalry, but it shows the evident advantage gained by Van Buren in the early months of the administration.

Van Buren's triumph over Calhoun was chiefly the result of the well-known Eaton Affair. In brief, the affair concerned the social relationships between the wife of the Secretary of War and the other wives of the Jackson Administration, most significantly the spouse of the Vice President, Floride Calhoun. The wives of the Vice President and the Cabinet would not engage in social intercourse with Peggy Eaton simply because
she was a woman of questionable virtue unfit for polite society. This would have been the end of the matter if Jackson, probably seeing Peggy Eaton as a reincarnation of his beloved and maligned Rachel, had not become the champion of her virtue and tried to force the other administration wives to accept her socially. In this way, a petty social conflict became a major political confrontation of far-reaching consequence for the Jackson Administration, Calhoun, and Duff Green.

The editor of the Telegraph first became involved in the affair by his attempt to repudiate a story that Peggy Eaton had received an abortion while married to her first husband, John B. Timberlake. According to the tale, the alleged abortion had occurred because Timberlake, a naval purser, had been away at sea too long to have been the father of the unborn child. The report had originated with a doctor, since deceased, who had told it to the Reverend J. N. Campbell, a noted Presbyterian minister. Campbell eventually informed Jackson of Peggy Eaton's abortion through a fellow minister, Ezra Styles Ely, but the President predictably discarded it as malicious gossip. The persistent Campbell then told the story to Colonel Nathan Towson, who again related it to Jackson. Proof was now demanded by the disbelieving Chief Executive, Campbell was summoned, a hearing was held before the Cabinet, excluding the Secretary of War, and Mrs. Eaton was quickly declared innocent and virtuous by the President and his congenial group of advisors.

Unfortunately, Eaton, on hearing of Towson's role in the affair, threatened to challenge the Colonel if he did not receive an explanation. To spare Towson, Campbell then had an interview with Green, who persuaded the clergyman to tell his story directly to the enraged husband. After
Campbell had confronted Eaton, Green, acting as an intermediary, wrote him in October, 1829, requesting proof of the charges against Peggy. Consequently, Campbell introduced a Dr. Craven apparently to corroborate the story of his deceased colleague. Green then used his reply to Craven's testimony as a means of publishing a rousing defense of Peggy Eaton's virtue in the Telegraph. Though Green's vindication failed to satisfy either the Secretary of War or the clergyman and the physician, Jackson recommended the reply to his friends as a convincing refutation of the "villainous falsehood" from which Craven and "his high chivalrous friend . . . will never be able to extricate themselves."

Regardless of the pronouncements by Jackson and his editor, the administration wives continued to ignore Peggy Eaton. In turn, Jackson became even more upset and Eaton quarreled with Jackson's nephew and secretary, Andrew Jackson Donelson, Secretary of the Navy John Branch, and Attorney General John M. Berrien. Relations between the Eaton and anti-Eaton aggregations remained tense but civil at Jackson's first state dinner in November, but on January 8, 1830, the self-righteous wives "unmercifully snubbed" Peggy at the Jackson Day Ball. A frustrated Jackson then threatened to force Ingham, Branch, and Berrien to resign if they did not compel their wives to socialize with Peggy. The three Cabinet members politely but firmly defied this threat, and after the intervention of their friends, Jackson temporarily dropped his attempted intimidation of the three men.

By mid-July of 1830, Green had changed his mind about Peggy Eaton. He probably knew that Jackson was blaming Peggy's social problems on Calhoun, so he began to see her as a troublesome and divisive personality operating on the administration. Since Green wanted to convey his views
to the President through someone who would be sympathetic to his suggestions and also have personal influence with Jackson, he wrote Andrew Jackson Donelson a long letter explaining the disastrous effects of the "Eaton Malaria" on the administration. According to Green, Peggy was using the government to force herself on society without regard for the welfare of the nation. If Jackson continued to mistake Peggy for his "sainted partner" Rachel, he would gain nothing and could lose his fame. If he continued to make membership in his administration dependent on social intercourse with Mrs. Eaton, the people might begin to agree with the toasts given at the July 14 Clay dinner: "General Jackson at the Hermitage! Blow ten bullets through the back of the damned rascal . . . Andrew Jackson supported by J. C. Calhoun and M. Van Buren--the Devil upon two sticks." Moreover, from the Eaton affair had come the "sources in which most of the difficulties which the administration has encountered have originated." Thus, Jackson should sympathize with Eaton and his wife, but he should guard his own fame and honor because "that is the only means of protecting Major Eaton . . . General Jackson can do without Major Eaton but Eaton would be immediately abandoned if the President were out of the question--yet he would be thrown back upon the sympathies of those friends who would even now preserve him from that set of hungry . . . sycophants who now seek the President's favor by flattering the vanity of Eaton's wife."

Despite a statement that he wanted Donelson to use his own judgment about showing Jackson his letter, Green clearly hoped that Donelson's influence with his uncle would alter the old Hero's course on the Eaton Affair. Unfortunately, when Donelson finally summoned enough courage to speak to Uncle Andrew about Peggy, the President angrily told him that
he too would have to resign if he did not "harmonize" with the Eatons. Donelson then dropped the matter quite abruptly, yet his own thoughts on the affair demonstrate that Green had at least made a strong impression on the President's nephew:

An infatuation kept alive by the timidity of weak friends and the interests of the political party (the Van Burenites) which have used Major Eaton as an instrument first to obtain the confidence of the President and afterwards to control him, has long since classed those who associated with Mrs. Eaton or who countenanced her pretensions to virtue and innocence, as the confidential friends of the President, and those who did not as secretly favoring the views of an opposition to his fame and character. The circumstances which ought to have removed this infatuation have confirmed it. It has now become a principle of the administration.9

Meanwhile, Green had taken on James Watson Webb, editor of the New York Courier and Enquirer, in an editorial war that for the first time brought the Calhoun-Van Buren rivalry to the nation's press. Formerly the New York Courier, that newspaper had merged with Mordecai Noah's Enquirer, Noah and Webb then becoming joint publishers of the new paper. A follower of Calhoun, Noah had nothing to do with editorial policy and soon withdrew from the paper altogether. This withdrawal was undoubtedly hastened by Webb's surprising editorial of December 19, 1829, endorsing Van Buren as the successor to Jackson in 1836 and charging Green and the Telegraph with disloyalty to the administration. In a letter to Van Buren, Webb explained that he desired to "settle beyond all matter of doubt the course to be pursued by this paper during the next presidential contest." Though Webb was involved with the Van Burenites, there is no indication that the Secretary of State authorized the premature endorsement. Major William B. Lewis, a strong supporter of the Magician in the administration, even termed the editorial "indiscreet and ill-timed" and considered it harmful to the reputation of his New York friend.
As for the charge of Green's opposition to Jackson, it was apparently designed to pick a fight with the temperamental editor of the Telegraph.

Always ready for editorial battle (and as we have seen, unafraid of a physical confrontation with Webb), Green was of course happy to oblige Webb. At first his press assumed the ground that Webb was attempting to aid those who wanted to sow discord in the Jackson party. The Telegraph argued that the endorsement had given the enemies of the party renewed hope that they could divide and conquer the Jacksonians. In agreement with Lewis's appraisal of the endorsement's effect on Van Buren, the newspaper thought that no one opposed such talk more than the recipient of the untimely recommendation. But in a letter to Noah, Green declared that he considered it disrespectful to Jackson that the friends of Van Buren speak "at the same time of him and the Secretary of State as candidates." Under such circumstances no one would believe that Van Buren considered Jackson a serious candidate in 1832. Concerning Webb's accusations of disloyalty, Green promised Noah that in case of a recurrence, "I will riddle his blanket."

To clarify his position and escape blame for causing discord within the party, Webb eventually denied that Van Buren would be a Presidential candidate in 1832 and requested that Green make the same disavowal for Calhoun. Green, though, had no intention of making peace so quickly. Charging that the Courier and Enquirer was wholly at fault in the dispute, the Telegraph declared that Webb's "whole course has been made up of low intrigue and despicable management." Furthermore, Green would make no statement about the policy of his paper in 1832 since it was premature to discuss the Presidential question at all. Privately, he saw this latest intrigue of Webb's press as an attempt by
"those who desired to monopolize General Jackson's popularity for the use of Van Buren" to drive him to the point of abandoning either the President or Calhoun.

Webb's next salvo was the publication of an unsigned letter from Washington dated April 23, 1830. The anonymous author, who Green suspected was Webb himself, stated that the Telegraph was assailing Webb because he had exposed an intrigue by Green to organize an opposition to Van Buren in support of Calhoun. To justify the movement for the Vice President, Green planned to point out that Jackson was in such poor health that Calhoun would be the party's logical candidate in 1832. Then in a reference to possible physical combat between the two editors, the writer hoped that Webb would not "personally chastise" Green since it would only excite sympathy for him especially in Congress. If the Courier and Enquirer would steadfastly maintain its principles, Webb's friend was certain that Green would soon be stripped of his "borrowed plumes" and be consigned forever to "oblivion."

The personal allusions in the unsigned letter to the Courier and Enquirer allowed Green to make accusations that quickly transformed the editorial war into a public feud. One week after Webb's publication of the letter, the Telegraph charged that the editor of the Courier and Enquirer had been forced to resign his commission in the army because, interestingly enough, he had preferred false charges against his commanding officer. After Webb pledged his commission to prove that his accusations were true, his commanding officer was acquitted, and he was thus reported for preferring false charges. Then, according to the Telegraph, Webb insulted another officer, was arrested, and was forced to resign with all these charges over him. To counter these accusations,
Webb published a letter from Winfield Scott demonstrating that he had not been driven from the army. Coming from the revered Scott, this statement was formidable support for Webb's contention that the charges were libelous. Yet Green, after offhandedly dismissing Scott's corroboration, explained to his readers that he had made the charge to "unmask" Webb and to discredit his tales about his opposition to the Jackson Administration. Moreover, in an accusation that implied cooperation between Webb and the Van Burenites, the Telegraph asserted that Webb wanted to show Calhoun as an opponent of the administration in order to receive credit for transferring Jackson's popularity to Van Buren and consequently become the editor of the Jackson party.

By June, following his confrontation with Webb at the Capitol, Green had developed an explanation for Webb's premature agitation of the Presidential question. Initially, Webb had endorsed Van Buren in the belief that Van Buren's friends in the New York legislature would then support legislation giving his press a monopoly of legal advertisements in New York City. But he gave up this project when he became interested in purchasing the National Intelligencer. Employing its own unsigned "Letter to the Editor," the Telegraph related that Webb had once provided bail for either Gales or Seaton after one of the editors had been arrested in New York for debt. Gaining the friendship of the editors and becoming aware of the financial difficulties of the editorial twosome, the New York editor eventually came to Washington to buy the Intelligencer and began to attack Green as a potential rival for the Congressional printing and for the favor of the Jackson Administration. Though Webb was unsuccessful, the anonymous writer claimed that he still hoped to purchase all or part of Gales and Seaton's press through his influence with Congress or by the
leverage of the debt the editors owed him.

The account of Webb's attempt to buy the Intelligencer, like the earlier story about his military career, was intended to discredit the editor, in this case by linking him with the National Republican opposition. Next, Green implied that Webb was aiding the opposition in its attempts to divide the Jacksonians. On June 8, the Telegraph complained of the party's division in Congress, the President's loss of popularity, and the opposition's renewed strength. Responsibility for this growing disarray of party affairs belonged to James Watson Webb, who, by his unauthorized endorsement of Van Buren, had allowed the Coalition to produce the impression within the party that there were intrigues by Calhounites and Van Burenites to make their leaders President. On the other hand, to emphasize Webb's culpability Green argued that it would be stupid for him to disrupt the party organization that provided him with prospects of good fortune.

The editorial feud between Webb and Green continued into the fall of 1830. Both men repeated charges that only served to highlight the intensity of the Van Buren-Calhoun rivalry. Finally, on September 29, the Telegraph announced that it would omit all further notice of Webb out of "contempt" and "pity" for him. Green had often made this promise in the heat of their battle, and another physical confrontation in January, 1832, between Green and Webb's secretary demonstrated the depth of the enmity between the two men. But at least for the time being Green kept his word, and Webb also ceased his warfare. But the armistice had come several months too late. The spectacle of the two editors identified with the leading candidates for the succession throwing petty accusations back and forth made it apparent that the Calhoun-Van Buren rivalry
had reached a point where either the Vice President or the Secretary of State might have to be purged to restore party unity.

Having already made his decision about the succession, Jackson was, not surprisingly, silent about the rivalry between Calhoun and Van Buren. Consequently, speculation about his sympathies grew until any utterance by the Hero was considered a significant indication of his feelings. Such was the case of the banquet held on April 13, 1830, to honor Thomas Jefferson as the political philosopher of the Democratic Party. This so-called Jefferson Day dinner began at five o'clock in the spacious dining hall of Washington's Indian Queen Hotel. After an excellent meal and undoubtedly plenty of robust beverage, the guests, including the President, Vice President, and Secretary of State, settled back to finish the evening with toasts and speeches. Following twenty-four prepared toasts and speeches by George M. Bibb of Kentucky and Robert Y. Hayne of South Carolina, the President rose to give the first of some eighty additional toasts. According to Van Buren, Jackson stood, looked sternly at Calhoun, and said: "Our Federal Union--It must be preserved." The diminutive Van Buren, who was somewhat ridiculously standing on a chair in order to see, recalled that Calhoun's hand then shook enough to spill his wine. Calhoun's toast was a sentiment he had often expressed: "The Union--next to our liberties most dear. May we always remember that it can only be preserved by distributing equally the benefits and burthens of the Union." Finally, Van Buren, as befitting his reputation as an excellent politician, offered a congenial and magnanimous toast: "Mutual forbearance and reciprocal concession: through their agency the Union was established. The patriotic spirit from which they emanate will ever sustain it."
Though Jackson had left shortly after making his toast, the majority of the one hundred guests stayed until almost everyone present had expressed himself and undoubtedly gotten quite drunk.

On April 17, the Telegraph gave an account of the dinner, including the toasts of Jackson, Van Buren, and Calhoun, but made no mention of the significance of the utterances. Two days later, and five days after the dinner, the National Intelligencer introduced the idea that Jackson's toast was a reminder to anti-tariff men that the tariff was the law of the land. In response, the Telegraph, considering the Intelligencer's interpretation of another attempt to produce discord within the party, believed that the President was not condemning the Southern position on the tariff, but was actually urging all sections to submit to the legislation while working for its revision. When the Intelligencer continued to interpret the Jackson toast as a warning to the South, the Telegraph pointed out that the toast was an extract from the speech of George M. Bibb of Kentucky given at the dinner. Bibb stated "The Federal Union must be preserved," and according to the Telegraph, upon hearing this, Jackson scribbled his toast and sent the penciled note to Green for publication with the rest of the proceedings. In his speech, the newspaper emphasized, Bibb had spoken in Calhounite terms of the "avarice" that would cause the majority to rule at the expense of the minority. Thus, contrary to the Intelligencer's analysis of the President's toast, the Telegraph saw Jackson asking (as Van Buren had) for the "mutual deference and concession" which Bibb had also stressed in his address.

The Telegraph claimed that its account of Jackson's toast came by authority from the President. Consequently, if Green's
interpretation is accurate, the implications of Van Buren's memoir, a source clearly as subjective as Green's press, lose much of their impact. On the other hand, the fact that Jackson took the text of his toast from Bibb's speech is no indication that he agreed with its principles. Perhaps a third interpretation of the toast is most accurate. After eating a heavy meal and consuming a large quantity of wine with the meal and during the prepared toasts, a lethargic and slightly inebriated Jackson, without a prepared toast, heard a catchy phrase from one of the speakers. He immediately wrote down a paraphrase of the statement, and upon being asked to give a toast, stood up and uttered the words while looking in the direction of the Vice President. Tired, half drunk, and probably bored, he then used the excuse of his advancing years to make an early departure from the festivities. Later on, though, after he had read and heard what his statement had meant, he would use it as proof of his opposition to Calhoun and nullification.

Whatever Jackson meant in April, 1830, there is no question that by June the President had decided to replace Green as his editor. Actually, rumors of Green's removal had been appearing since Jackson's election. For example, in December, 1828, the National Journal reported that Jackson would replace Green with "a more discreet, better conducted, more capable editor." Then on May 30, 1829, the United States Gazette, another opposition press, printed a "letter from Washington" charging that a new press would be established to support Van Buren and eventually displace the Telegraph as the administration organ. Fortunately for Green, the Albany Argus issued a timely denial of this story, and for the next several months the editor of the Telegraph, though having numerous problems, had no reason to worry about his future with
the administration. Yet Green showed signs of insecurity throughout the remainder of 1829. Then from a "delicate situation" on January 11, 1830, Green warned on January 24 that "the political horizon is darkened" because "some of those who have the confidence of the President are jealous of my influence and seek for opportunities to mortify my pride." By March the patronage problems, personal conflicts, and financial difficulties of the past year, as well as the tension of the Calhoun-Van Buren rivalry, had increased Green's insecurity to the point of paranoia: "I am most closely watched and all that I say is liable to misrepresentation." Though the "petty jealousies" had yielded enough in June for him "to improve the opportunity to entrench myself," one month later, he felt compelled to deny that he was a disunionist and a "mercenary" too much devoted to Calhoun. Finally, in September, Jackson's decision to replace him already made, Green identified the troublemakers of the past several months as the Van Burenites, who were now apparently paving the way for the establishment of the new organ by representing the Telegraph as a paper devoted to Calhoun at the expense of Jackson. Unaware of Jackson's decision and the reason for the Van Burenites' representations, Green still realized that he was in a perilous position and would consequently have to act with "great circumspection."

Another group, aiding the Van Burenites by causing trouble for Green, were the friends of William H. Crawford of Georgia. An enemy of Calhoun since the two had served in Monroe's Cabinet, Crawford had supported Jackson's election in 1828, and a number of Crawfordites had come to power on Jackson's coattails. Thus on October 8, Green wrote Ninian Edwards that a "powerful combination headed by his [Crawford's]
active partisans, are paving the way for the election of Mr. Van Buren to the Presidency. That influence has made a covert war upon me, and nothing but the power of my press and the force of my position has maintained me thus far." Again in November, Green informed Edwards of a project to drive Branch and Ingham out of the Cabinet and replace them with two Crawfordites, Louis McLane of Delaware and John Forsyth of Georgia. Expecting the new Crawford-Van Buren coalition to move against him shortly, Green saw this alignment of forces in the party leading to such conflicts and tensions that before the close of the next session of Congress "you [will] hear of such an explosion as will separate friends never again to be united and shaking Gen'l Jackson's popularity to its foundations . . . . Be prepared for the worst."

Given Green's frustrations, disappointments, fears, complaints, and solemn predictions, news of the establishment of the Washington Globe in December, 1830, should have produced an outburst from his press or at least a private expression of strong sentiment to one of his close friends. Surprisingly, though, he greeted the Globe's establishment with resignation, even acceptance. When he received Francis P. Blair's letter notifying him that he was coming to Washington to launch an administration press, Green, who was suspicious that the new paper would be devoted to Van Buren, nevertheless claimed that his policy would be to give the new press no cause for hostility. In a letter to Calhoun, he noted that Blair had expressed friendship for him, and he appeared satisfied that the division of the government printing, whereby Blair would take the patronage of the executive departments and Green would continue as printer to Congress, would insure him a suitable income for the operation of his press. The Telegraph's recognition of the
appearance of the *Globe* consisted of a short notice along with its prospectus and the lead editorial of the first edition. The comments of Green's press were friendly and complimentary: "Its appearance is respectable, and it promises to become an efficient co-laborer in the cause of Republicanism." Privately, Green felt that the establishment of the *Globe* would divert a number of the attacks of the opposition and would "render my own party more active for me."

Green's congenial reception of a newspaper that was obviously begun to replace his press as the administration organ was possibly the result of naivete. After all, Blair claimed to be a friend, and Green may have innocently believed him. On the other hand, he probably realized that he could do nothing about the establishment of the *Globe* so he decided to become a "co-laborer" supporting the administration and not incidentally sharing in the patronage of the administration organ. Besides, he saw the Jackson party about to divide between Van Buren and Calhoun, and the founding of the *Globe* was merely a recognition of the need for a press in Washington to represent Van Buren. The new arrangement might even reduce conflict and produce a more "active" following for the *Telegraph*. As long as Blair's press did not attack the *Telegraph*, Calhoun, or Green, it was better to share the patronage than receive none at all. But if Green detected any hostility emanating from the office of the *Globe*, an editorial war would commence that would not end until one of the presses had ceased publication.

Hostility between the two presses was not long in arriving. The sudden exposure of the Jackson-Calhoun rupture in February, 1831, forever ended peaceful cooperation between the *Globe* and *Telegraph* and eventually led to Green's opposition to the Jacksonians. Furthermore,
though the break appeared sudden, objective evidence of poor relations between the President and Vice President had been accumulating since Jackson's election. Calhounites, for example, had not been favored in the distribution of patronage, and their principles had not been endorsed in Jackson's appointments. Green had been unable to obtain sufficient offices for his friends, and his press had recently lost the printing of the departments. There were reports from Calhounites like Christopher Van Devanter that Van Burenites were controlling the patronage in the states. Another Calhoun supporter, Virgil Maxcy, had been badly defeated for clerk of the House, while Jackson had appointed Henry Baldwin, a high-tariff spokesman, to the Supreme Court. Calhoun, who was disappointed with the composition of the Cabinet, had not been consulted about the selection of its members. Added to this rational evidence were the emotional consequences of the Eaton affair. Both the friends and foes of Peggy had placed Calhoun at the head of the party opposed to her inclusion in polite society. So obvious had Jackson's negative feelings toward Calhoun on the question become that Green, in the summer of 1830, had written a desperate letter to the Hero's nephew in a final attempt to change the President's mind about the wisdom of continuing to champion the wife of the Secretary of War. But Jackson had evidently made up his mind about Peggy and Calhoun by the end of 1829 when he had secretly named Van Buren his successor. At that time relations between the two men assumed a quiet enmity that would continue until a further conflict propelled their quarrel into public view.

The vehicle for the manifestation of the Jackson-Calhoun quarrel was the Seminole affair. In 1818, Major General Jackson had led an American army into Spanish Florida in pursuit of a band of marauding
Seminole Indians. Though he had orders from Secretary of War Calhoun not to attack Indians in a Spanish fort, Jackson misunderstood or disregarded these instructions and proceeded to capture two Spanish strongholds. Subsequently, in the deliberations of Monroe's Cabinet on Jackson's actions, Calhoun wanted to disavow the Hero's conquests, but Adams, who was negotiating a treaty with Spain, defended Jackson taking the forts in order to impress upon the Spanish minister how easily Americans could overrun Florida. Eventually, the Cabinet worked out a compromise whereby the United States pledged to return the forts but did not repudiate their capture by Jackson. Adams then made the most of this decision by negotiating the purchase of Florida in 1819.

Except for the work of Sam Houston, Calhoun's views on Jackson's Seminole campaign would have died in the Monroe Cabinet. In January, 1827, the Congressman from Tennessee sent Jackson a copy of a letter from Monroe to Calhoun dated September 9, 1818, which had been stolen from Calhoun's War Department file and edited to arouse Jackson's suspicions about Calhoun's role in the deliberations of the Monroe Cabinet. Consequently, in the spring of 1828 Jackson began a correspondence with Calhoun and Monroe which ended just prior to the election. Though Jackson appeared satisfied with Calhoun's explanation at the time, he opened the matter again in May, 1830, by sending the Vice President a letter from William H. Crawford stating that Calhoun had urged in the Monroe Cabinet discussions that Jackson be reprimanded or punished for his violation of War Department orders. Calhoun's reply to Jackson's demand for an explanation completed the first of many exchanges between the two men in the next eight months. Ultimately, in February, 1831, with the disagreement showing no signs of being resolved, Calhoun decided to
publish a pamphlet to clear the air of rumors about the controversy. Yet before he released the papers to Green for printing, he sent a copy to John H. Eaton on February 16 to show the President so that Jackson could make any corrections he desired. Green was the bearer of the manuscript to Eaton, and he quickly returned it with only a few changes. Calhoun then gave the finished work to Green who printed it on February 17. Eaton, though, had evidently failed to show the papers to the President, and upon seeing the published correspondence, Jackson again felt betrayed by his Vice President. Since Eaton had kept the manuscript less than twenty-four hours, Green and Calhoun might have been suspicious about the quickness of its return. In any case, it was too late; the break between President and Vice President was now final.

In his own account of the affair, Green saw Crawford as the villain. According to the editor, in the fall of 1827 Crawford wrote Alfred Balch of Nashville about Jackson's chances of carrying Georgia in 1828. Referring to a conversation with Van Buren, Crawford declared that an assurance that Jackson's election would not benefit Calhoun would secure the votes of Georgia for the Hero. This assurance received, Crawford then set about working on Calhoun's expulsion from the Jackson party. He communicated with Jackson through James A. Hamilton of New York to inform the President that Calhoun was in favor of his arrest in the Seminole episode. Another letter by the Georgian repeated that Calhoun had opposed Jackson in the deliberations of the Monroe Cabinet and further charged that Calhoun had lied to the President about his attitude toward Jackson in the Cabinet discussions. Consequently, for Green the reason for the Seminole affair was obvious: The ultimate price of Crawford's support in 1828 had been the expulsion of the Vice
President from the Jackson coalition.

For Green, the immediate result of the rupture was the start of an editorial war between his press and the Globe. In announcing the publication of the correspondence on February 17, the Telegraph expressed its hope that Calhoun would be vindicated of the charges against him and the differences between Calhoun and Jackson would be repaired. But the Globe, undoubtedly reflecting Jackson's anger about Calhoun's alleged breach of confidence, quickly charged the Vice President with betraying Jackson by publicizing a private controversy. To defend Calhoun, the Telegraph at first argued that there was no evidence that the correspondence reached the press through him. Then, realizing that such a defense was full of loopholes, Green's press spent the remainder of its rebuttal accusing the Globe of trying to divide the party and destroy Calhoun. Throughout the spring and summer the two combatants hurled accusations at each other. The Globe, for instance, claimed that Green had been conspiring against Jackson for eighteen months prior to the rupture. To prove this charge, the newspaper printed a letter from Gideon Welles, editor of the Hartford Times, stating that Green had tried to enlist his support for Calhoun in December, 1829. Green, in turn, wrote Welles requesting his letters to him so that he could prove his innocence. The Telegraph repeatedly pointed to the former support of Blair and Amos Kendall, whom Green considered the co-editor of the Globe, for Henry Clay. The two men opposed Jackson in the election of 1824, and Blair had written Kentucky Congressmen in 1825 urging them to vote for Adams in violation of their legislative instructions. Because of their former partnership, Green insisted that the Globe would never attack Clay. Besides, Clay and Van Buren were acting in concert
in opposition to the principles that brought Jackson to power. Finally, because Blair was allegedly in debt to the Bank of the United States for $20,750, Green hypocritically charged that the Globe was under the influence of the Bank and was confirming it in its power.

When other Jackson papers attempted to act as peacemakers to preserve some semblance of party unity, the Telegraph, obviously exulting in its belligerence, assumed the role of the aggrieved party valiantly battling against the injustices of the Globe and its master, Martin Van Buren. To the pleas of the Richmond Enquirer and the Allegheny Democrat that the two newspapers adopt an "armed neutrality," Green's press responded that it could not be neutral after Calhoun had been sacrificed to elevate Van Buren to the succession. Furthermore, the newspaper announced that the editorial war would cease only when the Globe stopped making attacks on those who refused subservience to the Secretary of State. Possibly following the advice of its two editorial allies, the Globe on April 2 proposed a "parley" in the war between the newspapers. Not surprisingly, Green's reaction was of disbelief as he accused the Globe of attempting "to throw on me the responsibility of continuing the war."

Underlying the editorial conflict and accentuating Green's enmity toward the Globe was his belief that Blair was trying to steal the Telegraph's subscribers. The Globe, Green claimed, had obtained a list of his subscribers, and by calling itself the new organ of the administration, was attempting to persuade these people to switch newspapers. When Green discovered on April 4 that Blair had recently obtained so large a subscription in New York as to allow him to maintain his paper, he wrote Colonel Alexander Hamilton, son of the Federalist leader and close
friend of Calhoun, to ask him to find an "active agent" for the Telegraph in New York so that he could repel an attempt by the Globe to destroy his paper. By June Green professed to see a reaction beginning against those trying to destroy his press. He wrote George Cabell of the Lynchburg Jeffersonian that the efforts to steal his subscribers had cost him no more than four hundred readers since the beginning of March. Nevertheless, in the same month he reported that a person named Gordon had made assertions about his character as the means to convince subscribers to discontinue the Telegraph. Consequently, he requested that affidavits be sent him about Gordon's statement so that he could determine whether he should bring suit against the culprit.

To Green, the Seminole affair and the subsequent break between Jackson and Calhoun, the division of the Jackson party, the attacks of the Globe, and the attempts to destroy his press were parts of a single conspiracy by Van Buren to elevate himself to the Presidency. The Secretary of State was the leader of a group of plotters, who successfully appealed to the Hero's jealous regard of his military fame, to expel Calhoun and put themselves in a favored position. When Van Buren wrote the Telegraph denying any connection with the conflict between President and Vice President, Green's press replied that his innocence would be miraculous since every name brought up in the controversy was a "personal, political, and confidential friend of Van Buren." Green also saw the New Yorker as a "mercenary" who joined the party because of Jackson's popularity and manageability, then used his influence to divide the spoils among his followers, and finally divided the original Jackson party to insure his succession to the Presidency. As Mordecai Noah so vividly described it, "he creeped by degrees near him, for the old
chief was afraid of Van Buren, and finally he succeeded in getting him by the button and in this way got into the cabinet. He then caught hold of the skirts of Eaton, Kendall, and Blair and finally through their intercession and efforts he crawled into the old General's breeches pocket and he made him his successor." Lastly, realizing as early as the Telegraph's establishment that Green would not lend himself "as the instrument of injustice," the Magician sowed jealousies and suspicions that could afterwards be ripened into a plot to destroy Green's press. But he still needed an instrument for this destruction, so he called in his henchmen, Francis P. Blair and Amos Kendall, from Kentucky to start his "collar press," make merciless war on the Telegraph's credibility, and steal its patronage and subscribers.

If Van Buren was Green's arch conspirator in the plot to destroy Calhoun and the Telegraph, Peggy Eaton was, in Green's mind, his willing accomplice. In fact, she was the originator of his intrigues and thus was the source of "all our difficulties." On April 2, he informed Governor John Floyd of Virginia that had Calhoun "compelled his wife to return Mrs. Eaton's card, and had Ingham, Branch, and Berrien done the same, the correspondence would never have taken place." Two days later, he asserted that Ingham would soon resign in favor of Louis McLane who would give the patronage of the Treasury Department to Van Buren and compel his wife to visit Peggy Eaton. Then on April 20, the resignation of Jackson's Cabinet at first seemed to fulfill Green's accusations about the influence of Peggy Eaton. But if this were the case, why had Eaton and Van Buren resigned along with those who had received the scorn of the conniving, tainted lady? Evidently, the two favorites of the President had left with those in disfavor so that Green and the opposition
would not have the opportunity to accuse the administration of a political purge of Calhoun and anti-Eaton men. Furthermore, Van Buren, who was highly sensitive to political climates, probably desired to escape what was becoming a particularly hot spring in Washington (After all, redheads have fair skin) for the cool, soothing breezes of London. Unaware of administration reasoning, Green, though, attempted to account for the Eaton and Van Buren resignations, and make the most out of the dismissal, by blaming everything on Jackson's favorites. Instead of Eaton and Van Buren resigning to prevent political trouble for the administration and themselves, the Telegraph charged that Ingham, Branch, and Berrien had voluntarily left the Cabinet to save their fellow secretaries from the humiliation of being forced out by public opinion. To make sure that his readers did not misunderstand this confusing explanation, his press soon stated that Van Buren's rejection by the people had caused the resignation of the Cabinet. Because of his "ambitious intrigues," the Republican party as well as the people had decreed "retirement and oblivion" for the "sage of Kinderhook."

Apparently realizing that his explanation of the Cabinet dismissals was unbelievable, Green quickly returned to the influence of Peggy Eaton as the source of the dissolution. In May, he wrote his old mercantile partner, John Helm, that the Cabinet breakup was "one of the effects produced by the secret influence that seeks to use Genl. Jackson's popularity as the means of gratifying the private pique of a vain and indiscreet if not guilty woman." So great was this influence that even Andrew Jackson Donelson, the President's favorite nephew, had been "driven back to Tennessee" because he would not compel his wife to visit
Peggy Eaton. As for the new Cabinet, Green charged that the major reason for its organization was to bring Peggy into society. In June, after giving its readers time to forget its earlier explanation, the Telegraph began to suggest that Ingham, Branch, and Berrien had been dismissed because they had refused to force their families to associate with Peggy. Furthermore, the newspaper claimed that its abuse by the Globe and other administration papers was the result of its failure to support female influence in public affairs. Commanding the "secret influence" to indulge Peggy as the means of achieving their own goals were of course Van Buren and his hirelings, Blair and Kendall. Because Kendall "threw himself upon Mrs. Eaton," he gained favor with the administration and soon became Blair's collaborator at the Globe. Meanwhile, the Magician was ingratiating himself with the President by urging the wives of Cabinet members to visit Peggy. According to the Telegraph, Mrs. Louis McLane had told Green that she had visited Mrs. Eaton 38 only because Van Buren had told her it would be good for her husband. Given this apparent wealth of evidence, the newspaper ultimately concluded that the dismissal of Ingham, Branch, and Berrien occurred 39 after they refused to support Van Buren or visit Peggy Eaton.

Like the Seminole affair, the dismissal of the Cabinet led to a long correspondence involving Jackson, Eaton, Branch, Ingham, Berrien, and third parties. Though the numerous letters proved nothing, they were the source of several Telegraph editorials, one of which infuriated John Henry Eaton enough to challenge his former colleague, Samuel Ingham. When an article appeared in the Telegraph stating that Ingham, Branch, and Berrien had refused to compel their families to associate with the Eatons, the former Secretary of War singled out Ingham as the source and
ordered him to disavow it. Ingham replied that he would not deny a well known story that had previously appeared in a Philadelphia paper friendly to Eaton. Enraged, Eaton then challenged Ingham, and Eaton's brother-in-law, acting Secretary of War Dr. Phillip G. Randolph, visited him demanding an answer. Ingham, in turn, refused to reply at that time, but he eventually informed Eaton of his resolve never to take any other notice of him except "pity and contempt." Consequently, on June 20, 1831, Eaton, Randolph, Kendall, Blair, Lewis, Registrar of the Treasury Tom Smith, and Treasurer of the United States John Campbell went to the Treasury Department to carry out Eaton's threats. Informed of his distinguished visitors, Ingham, who was at his lodgings, armed himself, invited his son for support, and marched to his office. According to Green's admittedly biased account, Eaton, upon seeing the firmness of his foe, "felt the courage oozing out at his finger ends and left the office," accompanied by his entourage. Green, whose press was responsible for instigating this ridiculous affair, was well-satisfied with the incident's outcome as he smugly commented that "Jackson must be deeply mortified at the conduct of his pets."

Meanwhile, Jackson's correspondence with his friends left no doubt that he considered his friendship with Green, as well as their political ties, forever at an end. Triumphantly proclaiming both his Vice President and former editor as "completely prostrate," the Hero, on March 7, 1831, scornfully remarked that Calhoun and Green "have cut their own throats, and destroyed themselves in a shorter space of time than any two men I ever knew." Jackson was particularly upset that Green had violated his pledge of total opposition to the hated Bank. Though he was now "neutralized," the President was certain that Green and the other
Calhounites were still being supported by the Bank to carry on intrigues for the purpose of corrupting the morals of the people. On May 5, Jackson made it clear to Andrew Jackson Donelson that he also blamed Calhoun and Green for his problems with his first Cabinet. Believing that they could "make and unmake Presidents at will," the twosome had planned a trap for him whereby they would use the divisions in the Cabinet to destroy him and make Calhoun the party's candidate in 1832. Fortunately, though, the "patriotism" of Van Buren and Eaton had triumphed over their love of office. By their resignation from the Cabinet, Jackson was saved from the trap of the "Calhoun junto," and Calhoun and Green were now "checkmated and prostrate forever." Finally, in late June, the President received a letter from an old and trusted friend that had to confirm his beliefs. Colonel Robert Butler, who was with the Hero at New Orleans, must have provided the old General a self-righteous glow when he read the following plot summary:

Mr. Calhoun on his arrival at Washington in 1829, gave an entire new tone to the Telegraph and ... a deep intrigue was then set on foot to supercede you at the end of your present term and that Calhoun, McLean, Tyler, Tazewell, etc. with what aid the coalition indirectly afforded them, with their own grand puppet the kingmaker and self puff er Duff Green (who was to be foreign minister at least) were determined to effect their object, hence your nominations were to be controlled, your ministers attacked, thereby intimating that you possessed not the governing principle but that there was a 'power behind greater than the Throne.'

But, the Colonel concluded, the resignation of the first Cabinet, and the "illustrious"addition of Edward Livingston, Louis McLane, and Levi Woodbury to the new Cabinet had completely "dumbfounded" Calhoun and his friends.

Contrary to the President's decisive break with his editor, Green moved into opposition slowly and hesitantly. Initially, he tried to
maintain his support for Jackson by claiming that the President was under the "malign influence" of the Van Burenites. Given this control, he could blame Van Buren, Blair, Lewis, Eaton, and Kendall for the President's quarrel with Calhoun and his dismissal of the Cabinet and still support his reelection. Furthermore, by pointing to some of the "grossest follies" of Jackson's friends, he hoped to open his eyes to the intrigues of those about him, and possibly even influence public opinion enough to force the President to drop the Van Burenites and rely once again on the Calhounites. For example, he privately reported that Jackson's friends had staged "a large Negro ball in the President's house and I learned that the carpets in the dining room were taken up, the room lighted, and the ice cream and etc. in all the profusions of a fashionable party." Publicly, he wrote an open letter "To the Readers of the United States' Telegraph" announcing that he would support the reelection of Jackson, and expressing his concern that without a separation from his present friends, "his fame will be shipwrecked and with it the fairest hopes of the Republican party." 

Though the Telegraph was still separating Jackson from the "malign influence" as late as the middle of July, Green, as early as March, was already beginning to see the Calhounites as an independent faction having their own political goals. Based on the assumption that the Calhounites had enough political strength to decide the 1832 election, he saw the faction acting as an umpire, unable to put forth its own candidate, but willing to support any Presidential aspirant embracing its views on the important issues, especially the modification of the tariff. Consequently, on March 8, he wrote Condy Raguet, a prominent Philadelphia journalist and economist, that he desired greater concert between
between Clay and Calhoun men. In April, he tried to convince John M. Clayton of Delaware that the attacks of the opposition on the Telegraph were only aiding Van Buren. Since he was the opponent of Van Buren, the opposition papers should treat him fairly, even to the extent of helping him find subscribers for his newspaper. After Jackson's dismissal of Ingham, Branch, and Berrien, Green despaired of separating him from the Van Burenites. Because Jackson had "the weakness of old age, [he had] become a pliant instrument in the hands of those around him." He had won the election of 1828 only as the result of the "demerits of Adams and Clay," and having "deserted his old friends," he would "have but little more." By June, Green had decided that the dominance of Van Buren and Peggy Eaton had rendered the President unable to sustain himself, and alienated a "virtuous people" so much as to prevent his reelection. Thus, he abandoned his mediation strategy and prepared to launch the candidacy of Calhoun. Beginning in Virginia, the Calhoun movement would spread throughout the South, and following the consent of John McLean of Ohio to be his running mate, he saw it extending to all parts of the Northwest. Even if the ticket failed to receive enough electoral votes, Calhoun, as the alternate candidate of both parties in Congress, would easily win any election that went to the House.

Green's endorsement of Calhoun for the Presidency, although still unannounced, left him no alternative but to attack his former chief as a rival candidate. Since he had been on the verge of attacking the President in his correspondence for several months, it was easy for him to denounce Jackson on July 2 for "dividing and breaking up the Democratic party," abandoning its principles, and sacrificing its most prominent men. Then to remove any doubts about his feelings, he soon felt
compelled to inform Carter Beverly that he was no longer a Jackson man and, in the future, would only be the "advocate of truth and principle." Now certain of his decision, he was willing to advise Governor James Hamilton of South Carolina on the conduct of a newspaper campaign against Jackson. The nation, he believed, was ready to see Hamilton make war on the President, and he, too, was anxious to make him "wish he had never dirtied his fingers with Van Buren."

Despite this apparent eagerness, Green's awareness of the irreversibility of a public attack on the President resulted in the Telegraph's editorials lagging far behind his private statements. In July, after he had already begun to attack Jackson in his correspondence, his press confined itself to the repetition of the charge that the President had compelled the families of Ingham, Branch, and Berrien to associate with Peggy Eaton. Though claiming that "it would never again sail under the personal flag of any individual," Green by late August could only force his press to remark that it was "no longer anxious to re-elect Gen. Jackson." Then on September 1, in the midst of what Green saw as a growing movement for Calhoun, the Telegraph announced that it would actively oppose the President's reelection. Yet not until October 6, after the Globe had recently increased its attacks on Calhoun, did Green launch an assault on Jackson similar to those formerly reserved for Clay and Van Buren. Complaining that the President had made war on the Telegraph and plotted its destruction while it had attempted to spare him, Green's lead editorial went on to accuse Jackson of turning upon his old friends, taking "traitors to his bosom," and abusing everyone except blind followers and servile flatterers. Unimpressed by the fact that Jackson's "whole life has been war on individuals," the Telegraph boldly concluded that "we defy his malice and we disregard his rage."
NOTES FOR CHAPTER V


3. United States' Telegraph, January 16, 19, April 29, July 6, 1829.

4. Green to John Pope, December 11, 1829, to David Henshaw, January 17, 1829, to Mordecai M. Noah, April 21, 1829, to Calhoun, September 7, 1829, Green Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GP-LC); Christopher Van Devanter to Green, September 22, 1829, Christopher Van Devanter Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Robert V. Remini, *Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party* (New York, 1959), 7-10, 18-23.


6. Ibid., 35; Green to J. N. Campbell, October 19, 1829, GP-LC; Jackson to John C. McLemore, November 24, 1829 in John S. Bassett (ed.), *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (7 vols., Washington, 1926-1935), IV, 88-89.


8. Green to Andrew Jackson Donelson, July 15, 1830, Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. Hereafter cited as GP-SHC.


11. Telegraph, December 22, 1829; Green to Mordecai M. Noah, March 24, 1830, GP-LC.
12. Telegraph, March 31, May 10, 1830; Green to Mordecai M. Noah, GP-LC.

13. Telegraph, April 30, 1830.


15. Ibid., June 8, 24, 1830.

16. Ibid., June 8, 1830.

17. Ibid., September 29, 1830.


19. Telegraph, April 17, 20, 23, 1830; Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 72.

20. Telegraph, April 23, 1830.

21. Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 73.


23. Green to James Cablan, January 24, 1830, to Andrew Dunlop, March 17, 1830, GP-LC; Green to Dr. N. Jackson, January 11, 1830, to Dr. Hardage Lane, June 17, 1830, to Andrew Jackson Donelson, July 15, 1830, to Col. James Hamilton, September 29, 1830, GP-SHC.


25. Telegraph, December 11, 1830; Green to N. Green, November 17, 1830, to Calhoun, November 19, 1830, to David Henshaw, December 17 1830, GP-SHC.


27. Green to Andrew Jackson Donelson, July 15, 1830, GP-SHC. See above.

29 Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 77-82, 94-96; Green to John H. Eaton, February 16, 1831, GP-SHC.


31 Telegraph, February 17, 21, 26, March 19, 22, April 18, 23, June 8, July 15, 1831; Green to Gideon Welles, April 6, 1831, GP-SHC.

32 Telegraph, March 14, April 1, 1831; Green to John Floyd, April 2, 1831, GP-SHC.

33 Green to William Ingalls, April 4, 1831, to Alexander Hamilton, April 6, 1831, to William Kelly, June 25, 1831, GP-SHC; Green to George Cabell, June 21, 1831, GP-LC.

34 Telegraph, February 26, 28, March 17, June 17, 1831; Green to William Ingalls, March 10, 1831, Duff Green, "Autobiographical Fragments," GP-SHC; Green to George Cabell, April 16, 1831, GP-LC.

35 Green to John Floyd, April 2, 1831, to Governor Wolfe, April 4, 1831, GP-SHC.

36 Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 104.

37 Telegraph, April 22, 30, 1831.

38 Green to John P. Helm, May 20, 1831, to [? ?], June 4, 1831, GP-SHC; Telegraph, June 14, 1831.

39 Telegraph, August 8, 1831.

40 Ibid., July-October, 1831; Green to John Floyd, June 21, 1831, GP-SHC; Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 108.

42 Telegraph, April 13, 14, 15, May 27, July 11, 1831; Green to Carter Beverly, March 9, April 5, 1831, to John Floyd, April 4, 1831, GP-SHC.

43 Green to A. Stewart, March 8, 1831, to Condy Raguet, March 8, 17, 1831, to Alexander Hamilton, March 17, April 12, 1831, to Joseph M. G. Leseure, March 17, 1831, to H. M. Salomon, April 2, 1831, to John P. Helm, May 20, 1831, to [ ?? ], June 7, 1831, GP-SHC; Green to George Cabell, June 26, 1831, GP-LC.

44 Green to John J. Barbour, July 2, 1831, to Carter Beverly, July 8, 1831, to Col. James Hamilton, July 18, 1831, GP-SHC.

45 Telegraph, July 15-25, August 20, 30, September 1, October 6, 1831; Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 115. The increased attacks on Calhoun were of course the result of the Fort Hill Address, Calhoun's expose on nullification.
CHAPTER VI
ANTI-JACKSON EDITOR, 1831-1833

By July, 1831, Green found himself in the position he occupied when he took over the Telegraph. And as he had done in 1826, he immediately began to wage a Presidential campaign, this time for John C. Calhoun. Then after over two months of work by the editor, Calhoun publicly accepted nullification in the Fort Hill Address. This expose, so distressing to Green, made it necessary for him to reconsider his thinking on tariff reform. He had taken a moderate stance on the issue, but by the fall of 1831, he seemingly embraced nullification, and by January, 1832, he was calling on the South to unite to escape the tariff's oppression. Unfortunately, Calhoun's Fort Hill Address also made Green realize that the Vice President's advocacy of the controversial doctrine would place him in a minority position, and would therefore make it impossible for him to be elected in 1832. Consequently, by the end of 1831, Green no longer spoke of Calhoun as a candidate.

As they had since the Calhoun-Jackson break, the Globe and the Telegraph constantly warred and often fought the same battles that had characterized their initial disputes. In December, 1831, though, the Telegraph temporarily switched opponents and fought for a time with Thomas Ritchie of the Richmond Enquirer. Yet by the following spring, Green had resumed his venomous rivalry with Francis P. Blair and the rest of the "collar presses" obedient to the administration. In August, evidently feeling that he had to do something to stop the reelection of his former chief, Green published the Extra Telegraph to reveal the intrigues of

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Jackson and his designated heir, Martin Van Buren. He even developed a working, albeit deceitful, relationship with the Clay supporters. Nevertheless, past hostilities and his state rights principles prevented him from supporting Clay for the Presidency, and he ultimately favored the Antimasonic candidate, William Wirt. After the election, Green had some time to speculate on his own future as well as the future intrigues of the Jacksonians. But South Carolina's nullification of the Tariffs of 1828 and 1832 and the heavy-handed response of the Jackson Administration soon led him to devote his press to the defense of his Southern friends. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 ended the Nullification Controversy and cemented the rapprochement between Clay and Calhoun. Though Green had played a significant role in the rapprochement, his allegiance was still to the nullifiers, and after the passage of the compromise, he termed Calhoun's doctrines "triumphant."

Green's strategy in the campaign of 1832 was the establishment for Calhoun of an alliance between what the hated Van Buren termed "the planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North." The old Jeffersonian alliance of New York and Virginia was to be the keystone of Calhoun's support, but to make the North-South alliance unbeatable, he wanted to add Georgia and Pennsylvania to the Vice President's column. To organize this union, Green wrote numerous letters to friendly and influential men in the key states. Calhoun supporters like Colonel S. H. Storrow of Culpeper, Governor John Floyd, and journalist Richard K. Cralle in Virginia, Calhounite Alexander Hamilton and Antimasonic leader M. D. Russell in New York, Wilson Lumpkin and A. H. Pemberton in Georgia, and Stephen Simpson in Pennsylvania were the political operatives whom Green relied on to organize the grass-roots
movement that would eventually carry Calhoun to the White House.

Of the four states, Green believed that a nomination by Virginia was imperative for the success of Calhoun's candidacy. If the Old Dominion would nominate the South Carolinian, the remainder of the South would follow the state, and the Vice President would then have a political base from which to capture the rest of the nation. Green's tactics in Virginia were threefold. First, he did not want Calhoun supporters in Virginia to say or write anything that would alienate Jacksonians or wound the President's vanity. When Jackson's friends realized that he could not be elected, it would thus be easier for them to accept Calhoun as the man who could unify the party. Green, of course, would adopt this same strategy in his newspaper which, incidentally, helps to explain why the Telegraph refrained from attacking Jackson until October, 1831. Second, he attempted to persuade Calhoun's friends to begin county and state organizations for "immediate action" on behalf of the Vice President. He suggested to Storrow and other Virginia Calhounites that they organize county conventions that would quickly nominate Calhoun. After reminding John W. Lumpkin of Jeffersonton of "what was done by the schoolboys of Paris" in the French Revolution of 1830, Green asked him to start Calhoun youth organizations throughout Virginia which would eventually hold a state and perhaps a national convention. Finally, Green worked for several months to establish a Calhoun press in Richmond. Thomas Walker Gilmer, a member of the House of Delegates from Charlottesville, had originally planned such a press, but his inability to regain financial backing led Green to propose that the editor of the Lynchburg Jeffersonian and Virginia Times, Richard K. Cralle, move to Richmond and launch the sorely needed paper. Cralle, Green argued, was a staunch
supporter of Calhoun, understood Virginia and its politics, and, most importantly, was not afraid to do battle with Thomas Ritchie and his Richmond Enquirer. Floyd and other prominent Calhounites agreed, and, after being enticed by Green's promises of loans and the printing of the Virginia legislature, Cralle sold the Jeffersonian and by December, 1831, had established residence in Richmond.

Though he still had large financial obligations, Green signed Cralle's notes and borrowed several thousand dollars more so that the Virginian could start the press as soon as possible. He also used his connections with sympathetic Congressmen to distribute copies of Cralle's prospectus and provide subscribers for the newspaper. For example, George Poindexter of Mississippi, George McDuffie, Robert Barnwell, John Felder, William Harper, and Warren Davis of South Carolina, Joseph Johnson, Thomas Baldwin, and Richard Coke of Virginia, Henry Daniel of Kentucky, and Samuel Carson of North Carolina agreed to supply 285 subscribers for the new journal, and along with several other Congressmen, would distribute 1,000 copies of the prospectus in their districts. Given this support by Green and other Calhounites, the Richmond Jeffersonian and Virginia Times began publication on March 29, 1832. The press was a welcome ally for Green, who saw it filling "the place which the apostasy of Mr. Ritchie has vacated." The Times and the Telegraph drew largely upon each other, and Green still had hopes that the establishment of Cralle's press would give new impetus to the Calhoun movement in Virginia. Unfortunately, the controversy over nullification then swirling about Calhoun made it impossible for the Times to do much to aid his candidacy in 1832.

The leading Calhounite in New York was Alexander Hamilton, son of
the first Secretary of the Treasury and brother of James A. Hamilton, one of Van Buren's closest political advisers. Because of his illustrious father, Hamilton possessed considerable influence in the state, and Green depended upon him to rally the followers of the Vice President into a tightly knit group of operatives. Green's tactics for the New York Calhounites was much the same as in Virginia. Hamilton should recommend Calhoun as a compromise candidate who desired to unify the country and end party strife. To "manacle" the followers of Clay and Jackson, emphasize Calhoun's contrast to them, and give the Vice President time to choose his own friends, his supporters should not attack the two rival candidates. Yet Green and Hamilton realized that these methods would inevitably fail to provide Calhoun with a political organization strong enough to loosen the hold of Van Buren's Albany Regency on New York. Consequently, the two men placed their hopes for Calhoun largely upon his endorsement by the state's Antimasonic Party. Though the Carolinian's support by Antimasonic leaders like Thurlow Weed and William H. Seward may, in retrospect, appear ludicrous, Green was confident that the New York Antimasons would go for Calhoun if Virginia and the South would give him a strong endorsement. In his correspondence with M. David Russell, an influential member of New York Antimasonry, he argued that a nomination by the Antimasons would enable Calhoun to carry New York and New England, and in addition to the South, result in his landslide triumph over Jackson and Clay. But Calhoun and the Antimasons held antagonistic views on the tariff. Conscious of this great obstacle to Calhoun-Antimason cooperation, Green assured Russell that the Vice President would allow new interests protection against foreign competition. As for his relationship with anti-tariff firebrands like George McDuffie and Robert
Barnwell, Green explained that Calhoun's friends had taken "strong ground upon the question of the tariff and he proposed to suffer with them rather than do an act which would subject him to the charge of deserting them."

When the Antimasons convened in Baltimore on September 26 to nominate their Presidential candidate, Green was on a tour of New York and New England to determine Calhoun's strength in the Northeast. Although the movement for Calhoun in Virginia had failed to materialize, he still had hopes of an Antimasonic nomination, and he advised Cralle to send some Calhoun supporters to Baltimore. Unbeknownst to Green, though, Calhoun had already declined to be a candidate, and the convention eventually nominated a reluctant William Wirt of Maryland. Forever hopeful, Green then pointed out that Calhoun supporters had brought about Wirt's nomination under the assumption that a Calhoun uprising in Virginia would cause him to withdraw in the Vice President's favor. Nevertheless, he also admitted that the "cry of nullification" had prevented the Carolinian from being nominated by the Antimasons.

In Georgia, Green hoped to transform the Clarke faction of the Jackson party, containing the friends of the Vice President, into a Calhoun party. Opposing the Clarke faction was the Troup faction, containing the supporters of William H. Crawford, John Forsyth, John M. Berrien, and George R. Gilmer. But because Gilmer and Forsyth had a personal quarrel, the Troup-Forsyth group nominated Joel Crawford as its gubernatorial candidate in 1831 while the Troup-Gilmer group nominated Gilmer. The Clarke faction did not nominate a candidate but supported Gilmer, who eventually won the election. Aware of this division in the Troup faction, Green soon observed that the Troup-Forsyth papers had begun to attack the ousted Cabinet member Berrien, who was a friend of
Gilmer, as a supporter of Calhoun. He then wrote to Wilson Lumpkin, a leader of the Clarke faction, and A. H. Pemberton of the Augusta Chronicle, a leading Clarke press, and asked these men to defend Berrien. He noted that a "division is about to take place in the Troup party . . . and if you would permit them to quarrel you would soon find the two divisions of the old Crawford party now one. When this comes, Judge Berrien, Troup, and Gilmer will be on your side," and the Clarke faction would then be dominant in Georgia. In other words, by defending Berrien, the Clarke faction would receive the decisive friends and influence of the former Attorney General. Moreover, since Berrien's treatment by Jackson left him no choice but to go into opposition, Green believed that the rest of the now dominant Clarke faction would follow him and eventually support Calhoun. Therefore, with the Clarke faction in control of Georgia politics, opposed to Jackson, and possibly even supporting Calhoun, he would have an excellent chance to carry the state in 1832, or at least South Carolina would have an ally on her Southern border in her fight for modification of the tariff. Unfortunately for Calhoun, Green's analysis of parties in Georgia was fundamentally incorrect. First, Jackson's Indian removal policy, having won him many friends in Georgia, made it highly improbable that the Clarke faction would desert the President in 1832. Second, Green apparently failed to understand that Berrien and Calhoun had never been political friends, and, in fact, Calhoun had opposed his appointment as Jackson's Attorney General. The Jacksonian attacks on Berrien would one day drive him into opposition but as a Whig, not a Calhounite. Finally, Georgia was certainly sympathetic to state rights, but, as elsewhere, nullification was never popular.
Green's tactics in Pennsylvania were less complex and, given his political connection in the state, surprisingly successful. He simply wanted Stephen Simpson, whom he correctly considered a "mercenary," to start a press for Calhoun in Philadelphia. Formerly a cashier in Stephen Girard's bank, Simpson was an "original" Jacksonian who turned against the administration in 1829 after failing to receive his "expected reward." He then ran for Congress in 1830 on the Federalist ticket, lost the election, but received the endorsement of Philadelphia's Workingmen's Party. Apparently seeing the political potential of the labor movement, he wrote a book entitled The Workingmen's Manual in 1831 to win the confidence of labor. The work, though, turned out to be a defense of Clay's American System. It was this unlikely Calhounite that Green referred to a wealthy Philadelphian, Colonel S. B. Davis, for the purpose of making financial arrangements for the Calhoun press in Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, Green discovered Simpson's leanings toward Clay, but still needing an editor in the state, he attempted to convert the "mercenary" by promising him influence and success from his support of Calhoun. Then when Davis refused to support the Calhoun press, Green suggested to Simpson that he rally Calhoun's friends by writing letters to the Philadelphia Gazette under a pseudonym. Simpson could then call a meeting of the Vice President's friends, begin a local or even a state Calhoun party, and eventually raise enough money to finance his press. Though Simpson did not follow Green's advice, by August 16 he did have a press, and Green was using his editorials against the Jackson Administration. Nevertheless, of Simpson's support for Calhoun, Green could never be sure.

With the publication of his Fort Hill Address in July, 1831, Calhoun ended any Presidential aspirations that Green held for him. By
championing the controversial and, to some, treasonable doctrine of nullification, the Vice President took the chance of isolating himself politically outside of his home state to prevent revolution in South Carolina and possibly the ultimate dissolution of the Union. Consequently, Calhoun undoubtedly saw the futility of Green's efforts and failed to give his staunchest supporter any encouragement. In July and early August, while Green was busily organizing Calhoun's campaign, he criticized his chief for being "behind events," became upset at him for his failure to write, and finally out of frustration inquired: "Can't you say 'well done' or some such thing?" Calhoun, though, never tried to stop Green's exertions on his behalf. He had to be curious about his popularity, especially when he was ready to espouse a controversial and unpopular doctrine. Besides, he had not asked Green to put forth his name, and understanding the editor's stubbornness, he probably saw his dissuasions having little effect.

Because he saw the tariff and nullification as the great obstacles to Calhoun's political preferment, Green wanted the Vice President to "take the ground of union and conciliation" on the two questions. In an attempt to emulate Jackson's strategy in the campaign of 1828, he also advised him to be ambiguous and brief on the issues since the less detail Calhoun went into on the tariff and nullification the better his political chances would be. Given this advice and his ignorance of Calhoun's thoughts, it was inevitable that Green would swoon when he saw the ringing affirmation of nullification contained in the Fort Hill Address. In his correspondence with his political operatives following the address, he praised Calhoun, defended his doctrines as noble re-statements of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of Madison and
Jefferson, and now foresaw the Old Dominion rallying to Calhoun's support out of devotion to the Virginia doctrines of 1798. But in his letter to Calhoun about the address, he bared his feelings and expressed profound disappointment, utter dismay, and a growing depression about the future. The President, he felt, "will be much more rejoiced at the perusal of your address than he was at the arrival of the Kentucky troops at New Orleans." Apparently refusing to understand Calhoun's devotion to his fellow nullifiers and his need to maintain his political base in South Carolina, Green charged that Calhoun was too careful to sustain his friends at home at the expense of his supporters elsewhere. "Hazardous and uncalled for," the Fort Hill Address was a political sacrifice for Calhoun, but for Green it was clearly political suicide:

Why, oh why have you done this? What a pang it cost me to separate from Jackson, and now to give up in despair. What was the necessity of obstinately throwing yourself on the pikes of the beaten and vanquished enemy?

Traumatic as it was, Calhoun's expose marked a turning point in Green's stand on the tariff and nullification. Since the beginning of the controversy, he had maintained a moderate position among anti-tariff men and had scorned the militancy of McDuffie, Hayne, Hamilton, and other South Carolinians as merely strengthening the resolve of pro-tariff advocates and, even more significantly, damaging the Vice President's national political standing. After the Jackson-Calhoun break, he became more outspoken about nullification, the Telegraph going so far on March 14, 1831, as to admit that Calhoun was the author of the South Carolina Exposition and Protest. But when George McDuffie gave a fire-eating anti-tariff speech in Charleston on May 19, Green's press admonished the South Carolina Congressman to take a conciliatory tone or expect his
hostility to gain no relief for the South. He later (May 31) advised Calhoun to separate himself from McDuffie by publicly expressing his attachment to the Union as well as his desire "to give an incidental protection to manufacturers." If he did not attempt to save himself "from the folly of McDuffie," Green threatened that he "would be among the first to abandon you to your fate." Already experiencing the frustration that would explode following the Fort Hill Address, he then closed his foreboding letter by invoking "a curse on your dinners and your nullification—the word is more odious to me than any other in our language and I fear that you wish from the bottom of your heart that it now has a place in our vocabulary."

The Fort Hill Address gave Green the opportunity to carry out his threat and abandon Calhoun. Though he may have considered this course in the throes of his anguish over the sudden collapse of the Calhoun candidacy, he quickly realized that he could not foresake his mentor, especially when it would place him in the disastrous position of having no political constituency for the support of his press. Thus, after writing Calhoun a nasty letter and cursing nullification for the last time, he was soon comparing the address to the shock of a "cold bath" followed by "a healthful glow," and was applauding Calhoun for refusing to discard his principles to make himself popular. Then on September 4, he was happy to report to James Hamilton that he had become "a quasi nullifier." Moreover, he believed that a Southern endorsement of the Vice President would give him the nomination of the Antimasonic Party. But during the next six weeks, Wirt's nomination by the Antimasons and his electioneering tour of the Northeast convinced Green that Calhoun's campaign should be "postponed." Wirt now looked like an attractive candidate to Green,
and John McLean might also be persuaded to run against Jackson and Clay. Evidently, by early December he had finally accepted the fact that Calhoun's advocacy of nullification would make it necessary for him to support someone else in 1832.

Meanwhile, the Telegraph was busy defending Calhoun and his doctrines from the combined attacks of the Jackson and Clay papers. The Intelligencer, the Globe, and the Richmond Enquirer branded nullification as treasonous disunion, then identified the South Carolinian as "the high priest of the Nullifiers," constantly repeated their "syllogism," and saw it reprinted in papers throughout the country. They also charged the Vice President of reversing his 1816 position on the tariff and of being the dedicated opponent of the growth of domestic manufactures. To combat the charges of treason, the Telegraph printed the texts of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, produced sympathetic quotations by Jefferson, and repeatedly proclaimed nullification no different from the hallowed doctrines of '98. As for the accusations of Calhoun's inconsistency and opposition to infant industries, the newspaper pointed to his concurrence with the argument of Niles Register, an authoritative protectionist journal, that the "least taxed and most cheaply fed must command the market." Though the Register was referring to taxes on foodstuffs for factory workers and Calhoun was concerned with textile duties, the Telegraph claimed that the Vice President wanted to reduce all taxation so that American manufacturers would be able to dominate the markets of the world.

Never content to remain on the defensive, Green probed the statements of his attackers and analyzed the events of the time as the means of launching a counterattack. On August 31, the Telegraph printed
extracts from the Richmond *Enquirer* and the *National Intelligencer* endorsing each other's views on the tariff and nullification. Agreeing that they could not accept nullification, the newspapers felt that, in case of "intolerable oppression," secession would be the only remedy. The *Telegraph*, finding the temptation too hard to resist, immediately cried treason and labeled the two presses as disunionist. Nullification, the newspaper pointed out, would always be preferable since it would allow a state to remain in the Union and resist while the solution of the *Intelligencer* and the *Enquirer*, though admittedly peaceful, would destroy the Union and solve nothing. To show that resistance within the Union was superior to peaceful secession, the *Telegraph* then referred, as it would often do so in the future, to the Cherokee cases. When the state of Georgia passed legislation in 1830 to destroy the sovereignty of the Cherokee Indians and seize their lands within the state, the Cherokee nation appealed to the Supreme Court, which eventually ordered the state to restore their lands and upheld their sovereignty within this territory. But Georgia refused to abide by the decision, and President Jackson, who had no sympathy for Indians anywhere, supported the state. Because Georgia had, in its own way, nullified federal authority to resist "intolerable oppression," the *Telegraph* cited the cases as proof that nullification was much more practical than the disunionist idealism advocated by the *Enquirer* and the *Intelligencer*. Furthermore, the newspaper implied, it saw no difference between the oppression of Georgia by the Supreme Court and the injustice of federal tariff legislation now weighing so heavily on the citizens of South Carolina.

Interestingly enough, the issue of slavery first entered the *Telegraph*'s editorial columns in connection with the tariff. After the
Virginia legislature spent a month in the winter of 1831-1832 debating the possibility of emancipating the slaves of the Old Dominion, the paper reflected on the course of the regrettable discussions and duly blamed Virginia's manumission hysteria on the burdens of the tariff. According to the Telegraph, Virginians debated the worth of slavery because they believed that slave labor was unprofitable. This was unfortunately the case, the newspaper admitted, but the cause was heavy taxation in the form of an oppressive tariff. Consequently, if the state wanted to solve her current economic problems, she should look to the repeal of the heavy taxation and forget the dangerous talk about emancipation. Having set Virginia straight, Green's press next felt compelled to expose the suggestion of several manufacturers that the surplus revenue from the tariff be used to emancipate and colonize slaves. At first glance a generous offer, the Telegraph warned that the scheme was actually a way for the manufacturers to make more money. By using the surplus for this humanitarian purpose, the manufacturers would have a legitimate excuse to continue the present tariff. And because "every dollar levied upon merchandise of foreign fabric enables the manufacturer to lay an additional dollar on similar articles of domestic fabric," the extension of the tariff would increase the cost of goods that the South could otherwise purchase at a lower price. Again, for the Telegraph, the South's lesson was clear: It should dismiss foolish emancipation schemes and work to rid itself of the real source of its troubles.

The nullifiers considered the tariff legislation of 1832 as their final effort to obtain some relief from the tariff of abominations. Relief, to Green and the nullifiers, meant an equalization of the burdens
of the tariff between Southern planters and Northern manufacturers, and elimination of the surplus revenue, so conducive to corruption in the central government. But the legislation that Henry Clay proposed in the Senate on January 9, 1832, satisfied neither of the demands of the nullifiers. Clay's tariff bill not only failed to affect the surplus, but it actually increased Northern bounties and the corresponding burden of taxation on the South. In response, Hayne of the nullifiers proposed an amendment satisfying the anti-tariff men, then defended it in an address so rousing as to win the plaudits of the Globe. Clay, though, was not convinced, and on February 2, the Hayne amendment, and any chance of compromise in the Senate, was defeated. When the Jackson Administration introduced its tariff bill in the House, the Telegraph quickly dismissed it as an ineffective response to the needs of the South. Based on a report by Secretary of the Treasury Louis McLane, the administration bill would produce a surplus of $7,000,000, or enough money to "divide, distract, and corrupt the whole country." Moreover, since the Executive's "judicious" tariff was merely a restatement of the Clay bill, the journal concluded that only nullification was left to restore the Constitution and preserve the Union. With all parties, by the middle of June, appearing to agree that the forthcoming tariff would provide no relief for the South, the Globe soon began to charge that Calhoun and the nullifiers were doing everything possible to defeat its adjustment. The Telegraph, though, saw these accusations as an attempt to distract the public from what was, in reality, the refusal of the Jackson-controlled Congress to make a sacrifice that would damage the political aspirations of Martin Van Buren. Finally, on July 14, the President signed the Tariff of 1832. This was of course no surprise to Green; and, seeing the
legislation as the work of Van Buren's friends, his press claimed to find nothing "judicious" for the South in this reiteration of the tariff of abominations. Nevertheless, feared the Telegraph, the legislation may have satisfied enough Southerners to divide and paralyze the South, and thereby firmly establish the protective system.

The failure of the nullifiers to obtain their minimum concessions seemingly left them with a clear but hazardous decision. They could abide by the law and work to change it, or they could nullify it. Though Green favored nullification over what he regarded as cowardly submission to oppressive taxation, he preferred a course less perilous to the political survival of Calhoun, his South Carolina friends, and himself. As early as January, 1832, he began to call on the South to rally behind the leadership of South Carolina for a decisive struggle that would free it from the present tariff, and ultimately force the Jacksonians to provide a settlement satisfactory to the needs and interests of the section.

Reviving the strategy of his aborted campaign for Calhoun, he considered Virginia as the key to the unification of the South. Consequently, he suggested to Cralle that the state should follow the lead of South Carolina and form "Whig Clubs" to foster the dissemination of the Whig principles of '98. Further to propagate Whig doctrines, and simultaneously increase the influence of the nullifiers, he also advised his editorial ally to organize corresponding societies in Virginia as a prelude to their establishment in every state. At the same time by reporting the growth of an "independent and manly party" in the South, the Telegraph hoped to sway Virginia with the impression that acceptance of nullification was spreading rapidly throughout the section. The Old Dominion's movement for nullification now in progress, Green predictably turned
his attention to Georgia. In his first letter to John A. Cuthbert of the Milledgeville Union, he naturally concentrated on the sameness of the nullification of Georgia and that of South Carolina. But after his argument left Cuthbert unconvinced, Green probably confused or insulted the editor by asserting that he would support nullification once he understood the doctrine. Furthermore, when the Telegraph charged that the great difference between nullification in Georgia and South Carolina was Van Buren's hopes for the former's vote, Green was too subtly attempting to convert antipathy for the Magician into support for the nullifiers.

Green's Southern unification strategy was for once based on sound political considerations. First, Southern unity behind nullification would prevent a confrontation between South Carolina and the central government that would eventually result in the state's coercion and submission. This use of force against an isolated South Carolina was the great drawback to the application of the doctrine of independent state interposition. Moreover, if the South were united in resistance to the tariff, the use of nullification would probably not be necessary. Given a sectional crisis over the tariff, Green believed that the North would submit to Southern demands, or at worse there would be a protracted stalemate. Green was not a secessionist, and Jackson's hatred of Calhoun notwithstanding, the Hero was still a Southerner who would not make war on his united brethren. On the other hand, even if the South failed to unite, and South Carolina had to act alone, the strategy was worth pursuing. By heightening the sympathy that the rest of the South felt for the nullifiers, Green's pleas for Southern unity would contribute to the caution of the central government in reacting to independent state interposition. Though the South might not appear united, the spectacle of
the President of the United States leading an army against a Southern State would rouse Southern militancy from the Potomac to the Sabine. Finally, the unification of the section on the principles of nullification would prepare the South for its support of Calhoun's political advancement. Who else would lead a Southern anti-tariff party, and, not coincidentally, who else would be the editor of the official party organ?

Green's excitement over the tariff and nullification led him to relegate the Bank War to a secondary position in his correspondence and in his press. He claimed to fear that public sentiment would not support his attacks on the Bank, but in July, 1831, the institution still held his note for $20,000. Whatever Green's personal feelings, the Telegraph hoped that Jackson would "strangle the hydra." Yet the journal, evidently for political purposes, continued to doubt that the administration would go through with its plans to kill the Bank's recharter. For example, in December, 1831, the press reported that the Secretary of the Treasury had induced a Congressman to believe that the administration would prepare a bill to recharter the Bank. Then in early January, Thomas Ritchie suffered the Telegraph's disapproval for his fears that the Bank's application for recharter was a campaign trick designed to hurt Jackson at the polls regardless of his stand on the question. If Ritchie really was hostile to the Bank, the paper insisted that he should urge the President to kill the recharter and worry about the public good instead of his reelection. Keeping up its pressure on the administration throughout the winter and spring, the newspaper, by June, saw the Bank bill passing both houses of Congress and therefore leaving a Presidential veto as the last obstacle to the Bank's triumph. But despite a number of indications to the contrary, beginning on June 12 the Telegraph expressed "the belief
that he [Jackson] will approve of the present bill" to recharter the Bank.

When Green received Jackson's veto message, his press jubilantly declared that "it gives us great pleasure to approve this act of the executive." However, since unmixed praise for the Jackson Administration was unthinkable, the Telegraph predictably singled out, as a "glaring encroachment on the prerogatives of a free legislature," Jackson's suggestion that Congress ask the President for instructions on the makeup of a new bank. The supporters of Henry Clay also had mixed feelings about the veto message. While cursing Jackson for his destruction of their sacred Bank, they now felt confident that the veto would erode the President's popularity enough for their candidate to win in the fall. The Jacksonians, though, were equally certain that the Hero's battle with the monster would add to their electoral majority and give their party ideology a new persuasion. As for Duff Green, it is difficult to be certain what political game he was playing with the Bank issue. He definitely wanted recharter to be an issue in the upcoming election, and he went so far as to praise the President for his deathblow to the Bank. Perhaps he hoped that the defeat of the recharter bill would enable him to escape his financial obligations to the Bank. But, given the occurrence of the Bank War at the same time that his hopes for tariff relief were fading, it is much more likely that he was linking the two issues. He possibly believed that Jackson's war against the Bank would weaken the party in the North so much as to make the Jacksonians more sympathetic to Southern cries for tariff reduction. On the other hand, the Bank veto might also cost Jackson a few Southern friends, who would then be ripe for conversion to the doctrines of the nullifiers. Finally, by vetoing the recharter legislation, Jackson made certain that the Bank, not the tariff, would be the
major issue in the election of 1832. Despite their strong support in
the South, the Jacksonians had no desire to risk this popularity by
being forced to surpass Clay as the champion of the Northern manufac-
turer. This strategy was also agreeable to Green. Though he desired
a debate on the tariff, he possibly feared that the Clay and Jackson
papers, both courting the protectionist vote, would soon try to outdo
each other in their abuse of the nullifiers. And since he probably saw
the Bank issue potentially doing the most damage to the Jacksonians at
the polls, the President, if reelected, might not have the popular man-
date or Congressional support to wage an energetic campaign against the
nullifiers in the event they decided to cast their own veto against the
tariff.

The continuing editorial wars between Green's press and the ad-
ministration journals competed, often successfully, with the Bank and
the tariff for space in the Telegraph's columns. Refusing to allow the
Eaton affair and the Seminole controversy to die, Green and Francis P.
Blair periodically revived the disputes, always because of the intro-
duction of significant new evidence. For example, in November, 1831,
the Globe charged that Calhoun had sought to exclude Peggy Eaton from
Washington society because her husband, would not appoint the Vice Presi-
dent's old friend, Christopher Van Devanter, chief clerk of the War
Department. The Telegraph at first answered by defending Van Devanter
from charges of corruption while serving as Calhoun's clerk in the War
Department, and declaring that Peggy Eaton was thought unfit for Washing-
ton society by many persons having no attachment to the Vice President.
Then in a letter "To the Public" printed throughout December in the
Telegraph, Green returned fire by asserting that Blair's press had been
established to force Mrs. Eaton on society. Even worse for Green's
readers, the editor used such responses to reprint numerous extracts from the lengthy correspondence originally published during the Jackson-Calhoun quarrel and following the dissolution of the President's first Cabinet. Also in December, Green discovered a new editorial warrior in Thomas Ritchie of the Richmond Enquirer. In April, 1829, while the two men were editorial allies, the Richmond editor had allegedly observed to Green that journalists accepting offices limited the freedom of the press. Nevertheless, Ritchie added, if the President could find another "Franklin," he might be given the rank of a plenipotentiary and sent on a mission of the "highest grade." Now believing that Ritchie was referring to himself when he had spoken of a "Franklin," Green began to advance the hypothesis that the Virginian wanted to succeed Van Buren as Minister to England, which Green considered the foreign mission of the "highest grade." This accusation, made during the Senate debates on Van Buren's confirmation, was probably designed to persuade the two Virginia Senators, Littleton W. Tazewell and John Tyler, that their votes against Van Buren's confirmation would also allow them to get rid of Thomas Ritchie. Neither man, though, was apparently swayed by Green's flimsy story, and both Senators eventually voted for the Magician's confirmation out of a sense of party loyalty.

The "Franklin" episode marked the beginning of several months of editorial warfare between Green and Ritchie, both men evidently relishing the fight too much to call a halt to it. According to the Telegraph, Ritchie was the "Richmond apostate," whose devotion to his "political idol," Martin Van Buren, had led him to abandon his principles. Though Ritchie still claimed to oppose the tariff, he was the admitted syco-phant of Van Buren, the author of the "bill of abominations." As a
member of the Richmond Junto, Ritchie had been a disciple of Thomas Jefferson. But now, as the editor of one of Van Buren's "collar presses," he felt compelled to denounce Mr. Jefferson's doctrines of '98. Ritchie, moreover, was a hypocrite. When the Van Burenite sneered at Green's indebtedness to the Bank, the editor of the Telegraph declared that his $10,000 obligation was less than the Richmond pretender owed. Ritchie, in turn, devoted many of his attacks to Calhoun's alleged inconsistencies. Supposedly the free-trading champion of economy in government, Calhoun had supported the tariff of 1816 and had opposed the principles of economy in Jackson's Maysville Road veto. Once the bitter opponent of Henry Clay, he now was willing to bargain with the Kentuckian to stop Van Buren's confirmation as Minister to England. Finally, like the immortal Jefferson, Ritchie had advocated the doctrines of '98 only to see the error in these principles and eventually abandon them. Calhoun and Green, he implied, should thus admit their mistakes and cease the agitation of doctrines that threatened to destroy the Union.

The brunt of the Telegraph's attacks were of course directed at Martin Van Buren. Consequently, when the Senate failed to confirm his nomination as Minister to England, and the administration had to call its favorite son home from London, Green's joy and satisfaction overflowed his editorial columns. By rejecting Van Buren, proclaimed the Telegraph, the Senate had justifiably condemned the Magician's corruption and intrigues. He had "exploded" the Cabinet and "fled to Europe" with $20,000 of the public money "to avoid the odium." Proud of the fact that Calhoun had cast the deciding vote for his humiliation, the newspaper went on to observe that Van Buren was the first American diplomat to be rejected after assuming his duties. If he had not already been in London, the
margin of the Senate rejection would have been much greater. Immediately following Van Buren's return to the United States, Green's press began to charge that he had for some time been the leader of a multistage conspiracy to "smuggle" himself into the Presidency. After organizing "a secret and irresponsible cabal of inferiors" to surround the President, he had brought in Blair to corrupt the press, and with the assistance of his cronies as well as his own magical artistry, he had then been able to produce the schism between Jackson and Calhoun. His path to the Presidency unobstructed, Van Buren was presently waiting for the party's nominating convention, which would merely be a pretext for Jackson to abandon his most ardently avowed principle by designating the New Yorker his Vice President and ultimate successor. Now one step from his goal, Van Buren would again have to wait, but, according to the Telegraph, only for a short time. Because Jackson's health was poor, and his mental condition was deteriorating even more rapidly than his physical strength, there was "little prospect" that he would live through his next term. Thus, the moral for the American people was obvious: They should vote for a man in his prime instead of a manipulated, feebleminded Hero, attempting to "smuggle" into the Presidency a small, contemptible, intrigue, apparently unable to receive enough votes to gain the office honestly.

By August, 1832, however, Green seemed uncertain of the identity of this youthful, vigorous American. Calhoun's candidacy having become an impossibility, Green had counseled Cralle in May to stay out of the Presidential campaign. Since Jackson and Clay held the same position on the tariff, the Calhounites had "nothing to hope by entering the Presidential question at all." Then, throughout the summer, his earlier
predictions about the Van Buren conspiracy festered in his paranoid mind. Hence, on August 23 he wrote Cralle and Calhoun that it was his duty to expose the causes which had driven him from the support of Jackson. By entering the campaign, he would prevent any belief that he was giving silent consent to Jackson's reelection, and he thought that he could win new friends from among the supporters of Henry Clay. Nevertheless, he wanted it understood that he would take part in the campaign only as an opponent of Jackson and not out of any desire to see Clay elected. If Henry Clay became President of the United States because of his efforts, the Jacksonians, who had compelled him to enter the contest by their corruption and intrigues, were to blame.

Green's major contribution to the campaign against Jackson was the publication of the United States' Telegraph Extra. Much like the 1828 Extra Telegraph, which was devoted to the bargain and corruption of Clay and Adams, the 1832 edition was completely negative and unoriginal; it simply pulled together all of Green's previous accusations against Jackson and Van Buren. Jackson had abandoned his principles, he had improperly used patronage, he was attempting to appoint his successor, and he had around him politicians wishing to turn the government "into the corrupt engine of the most odious and profligate despotism." Once he had put together this diatribe against the Jackson Administration, and incidentally spent a great deal of money in the process, Green's next problem was to obtain a sizeable political and financial return on his investment by giving the paper the widest possible circulation. Concentrating the Extra Telegraph's distribution in those states he considered doubtful for Jackson, Green relied heavily on Clayites in Congress to act as his agents and, through their contacts in their
respective states, find subscribers for his campaign journal. Consequently, he asked Congressmen Chilton Allen of Kentucky, William Creighton of Ohio, Edward Everett of Massachusetts, and Senator Josias S. Johnston of Louisiana to provide him with names of potential subscribers. Still regarding Virginia as the key state in the South, Green depended upon Cralle for subscribers, but he also made up with James Hampden Pleasants of the Richmond Whig in order to get his support for the Extra Telegraph.

Green seemed to be well satisfied with the reception of the newspaper. By the middle of September, he reported that the "subscription to the Extra is beyond my most sanguine expectations." He already had 18,000 subscribers, and before the end of the month, he would double the original publication of 20,000 copies. If Green had received full payment for these 40,000 issues of the Extra Telegraph, at five dollars for ten copies of thirteen numbers each, he would have collected $20,000. Despite the costs of printing the papers, he probably would have made a profit of several thousand dollars, which he subsequently could have used to meet his $10,000 obligation to the Bank. He apparently had similar figures in mind since on September 15, he informed Dr. William Ingalls of Boston, one of his creditors, that he was "nearly out of debt." In fact, he now felt that his financial ills were improving rapidly enough to allow him to invest over $25,000 for the establishment of his school for orphan children (See Chapter II). Though this investment was clearly inadvisable for a man with his financial history, it is evident that in September, 1832, he believed that opposition to Jackson would be much more rewarding than support had been in 1828.

The employment of Clay supporters to circulate his extra, and
the distribution of the paper among the Kentuckian's National Republican followers, was, he hoped, the beginning of a relationship that he could exploit after (or before) the election. The Extra Telegraph, according to his plan, would give him an introduction to the Clay party, enable him to exert some control over their press, and lead a number of them to become regular subscribers to the Telegraph. Furthermore, he would use this new influence to change their opinions about the tariff and nullification and eventually persuade them to desert Clay for Calhoun or another candidate. To facilitate this scheme, Green carried on a frequent correspondence with the Clayites in August and September. In these letters, Green adopted a highly conciliatory tone toward his former opponents, deeply regretting his inability to support Clay, yet reaffirming his principles and trying to persuade them to look on nullification with "less abhorrence." Jackson, he pointed out, was the common enemy, and only through a union of Clay and Calhoun supporters could they prevent his reelection. For the "incidental support" Clay received by his opposition, a suspiciously magnanimous Green humbly beseeched his followers to stop their attacks on the nullifiers so that they could better serve the cause.

Suddenly, near the end of September, Green started a campaign to persuade his new friends to drop Clay and unite on the Antimasonic candidate, William Wirt. Actually, the Telegraph had spoken of Wirt as its "preference" on August 3, three weeks before Green officially entered the campaign against Jackson. Thereafter, he mentioned Wirt occasionally to his old friends, but never to his new allies, the supporters of Clay. Thus, it may have surprised James Hampden Pleasants when he read Green's letter of September 25, advising him to persuade his friends
to go for Wirt. Then in the next five weeks, Green wrote both Clay and Calhoun supporters, attempting to convince them that Wirt was the only candidate who had a chance to defeat Jackson. For the benefit of the Calhounites, he argued that the Antimasonic Party was the only Northern group who had not turned a deaf ear to the problems of the South. If the nullifiers would support Wirt, he envisioned an alliance of free traders and Antimasons which would favorably settle the tariff controversy and eventually control the country's politics. To Pleasants, Josiah Randall of Philadelphia, T. G. Woodward of New Haven, and other Clayites, he pointed out that the inability of Clay to defeat Jackson made it imperative that they unite on William Wirt. With the support of the National Republicans, the Antimasonic candidate could carry every state North of the Potomac, except perhaps Maine and New Hampshire. Besides, since Clay could not defeat Jackson, he would gain moral force and erase his reputation of bargain and corruption by throwing his influence behind Wirt. Finally, his false magnanimity having disappeared, Green issued a challenge to his friends: If they were sincere when they announced that their first objective was to defeat Jackson, they would now have to unite on Wirt.

Despite his prediction of success for Wirt in 1832, Green probably realized that the Antimasonic candidate had little chance of being elected. Instead, his campaign for Wirt was the culmination of a plan, which he had concocted at the time of his entry into the Presidential contest, to win support for Calhoun and the nullifiers in their fight against the tariff. He hoped to organize a party of Clayites, Antimasons, and nullifiers ostensibly to sustain Wirt, but eventually to help the Calhounites modify the tariff or at least be sympathetic if they decided to nullify
the legislation. In this way, Green's campaign activities were actually an extension of his earlier efforts to unify the South so that South Carolina would no longer be isolated, and a revision of the tariff might be produced, or the Jackson Administration would be forced to think twice in the event of its unilateral interposition of the tariff. After all, support from the Antimasons and the National Republicans would increase the political power of the nullifiers far beyond what a united South could provide. Furthermore, Green had personal reasons for pursuing this strategy. It gave him an excuse to intensify his warfare against the administration, and, through the Extra Telegraph, allowed him to inform more Americans about the nefarious plot being conducted by Van Buren. Since the Globe had been successful in taking a number of his subscribers, his new friends, as he pointed out, might become regular readers of his newspaper and supply him with some badly needed revenue for his press as well as his other business enterprises. Best of all, the success of this strategy would place Calhoun at the head of the opposition. He would therefore be the logical candidate of the coalition of nullifiers, National Republicans, and Antimasons in 1836, and, with strong support from his own section, he would then be able to take his revenge on the hated Van Buren.

Not surprisingly, the results of the election made a shambles of Green's farfetched plans. Wirt carried only Vermont; the National Republicans had evidently gone for Clay to a man; except for South Carolina, Jackson swept the South; and the home of the nullifiers symbolically awarded its eleven electoral votes to John Floyd, perhaps the most prominent nullifier outside of South Carolina. Having done what he could to defeat Jackson, Green, as early as October 8, acknowledged the
Hero's victory, predictably blaming the division of the opposition and the unpopularity of its candidates for the unfortunate results. Although he proclaimed that Jackson's reelection would lead to "a union of the elements of the opposition in a vigorous and efficient effort for reform, which at the next election in 1836 must revolutionize our executive," most of his statements following the election betrayed pessimism and even fear about the prospects of the next four years. The source of his anxiety was, as always, Van Buren. The Magician's use of patronage, his connections with the Crawford party, and Jackson's great popularity making him stronger in the South than the North would soon lead him to sacrifice Southern interests. Southern unification was of course Green's solution, and without it, "the fanaticism of the North will desolate the South." But divided as it was by federal patronage and its devotion to Jackson, the South would be difficult to unify, leading Green, at least for the time being, to despair of its salvation.

Given his mood on the eve of the election, and his desperation to change its probable outcome, Green would regard any unusual movement by the Jacksonians as conclusive evidence of a major conspiracy, masterminded by Van Buren. Consequently, when the Hero's followers revived the "Hickory Clubs" of 1828 to promote the President's reelection, Green suddenly uncovered a plot by which the Magician would use the deposits of the Bank of the United States to control the country's finances and tyrannize his opponents. So alarmed was Green by this discovery that he composed a lengthy letter on October 24 to be read by Nicholas Biddle and published in a Philadelphia newspaper. According to Green, the Van Buren partisans, under the guidance of Amos Kendall, had developed their plans for the next four years. First, they would begin "Hickory Clubs" and
control them with public officers pledged to the President. Second, they would organize committees of correspondence throughout the United States to circulate the public opinions of the administration and the Van Buren supporters. Third, although several of the public officers in the clubs already had the franking privilege, postmasters and mail contractors would be recruited for membership to provide the clubs with free mailing privileges. Fourth, the central "Hickory Club" in Washington would hold regular meetings to hear reports from local clubs and agree upon policy. Then with their organization completed, the Van Burenites would proceed with their attack on the Bank:

The plan of operation is to withdraw the public deposits from the Bank U. States and transfer them to local banks under the control of Mr. Van Buren's partisans. The influence thus created is to be sustained by a monopoly of all the offices and a regular examination of all the Banks by the agents of the Treasury under the pretense that such examination is necessary for the safety of the public deposits. [This] will open the avenues of all the public transactions of leading influential public men to the searching operation of Mr. Van Buren's partisans. As a measure to justify the withdrawal of the public deposits arrangements are to be entered into to create a run on the Bank, and if possible compel a suspension of specie payments.

Green also sent Calhoun an account of the plot, but neither letter gives any indication of his source. Though the Telegraph later ridiculed the "Hickory Clubs" for denouncing those who opposed Jackson's reelection as the "bribed advocates of the Bank," it presently had little to say 31 about this attempt to pervert the nation's finances. In fact, mention of the "Hickory Clubs" (but not the plot) disappears from Green's correspondence and his press after the election. Thus, it may be that this was a last minute attempt by Green to put together a few facts, several rumors, and his own paranoid thoughts in order to produce a sensational newspaper article that would hurt Jackson and Van Buren in Pennsylvania.
On the other hand, he may have genuinely believed the story. After all, he did relate it to Calhoun, and he did foresee the removal of the deposits as well as the controversy over the administration's "Pet" banks. Perhaps the most likely explanation is that he received information about the removal of the deposits; heard Van Buren's name in connection with rumors about the funds; and, believing it to be a confirmation of his earlier suspicions, sent it to Biddle for anonymous publication in Philadelphia in order to achieve the maximum political effect.

Following the election, Green's mood became still more somber, since his financial condition, which had seemed so healthy in September, had by the middle of December, taken another sharp downturn. Supposedly the source of his financial comeback, the Extra Telegraph had failed to bring him new subscribers and probably because of his overissue of the paper, had done little or nothing to decrease his debts. Furthermore, he reported that the Globe had stolen 3,000 of his subscribers in 1832, and the Telegraph would probably have a $500 deficit for the year. As troublesome as these losses were, Green was, in the meantime, compounding his problems by squandering a great deal of money. Confessing in March, 1832, that he had recently spent between $50,000 and $60,000 on his press, he soon hired Dr. Edward R. Gibson as a political editor to give him more time for his other pursuits, and then in the fall he added another Congressional reporter, apparently for the same reason. His prospective school for orphan children and his plans to start a company for the manufacture of school books for the South were foremost among his other business pursuits, which along with untold minor affairs had, by late October, required the investment of the incredible sum of $120,000. Therefore, it is not surprising that he informed Cralle on
December 16 that failure to retain the printing of Congress would force him to sell his press. And of course he saw a Van Burenite plan to deprive him of the printing, destroy his press, and subvert the freedom of the country.

Events in South Carolina and Washington did not allow Green to dwell on his financial problems. The Presidential election in South Carolina was secondary to the question of whether the Nullifiers could defeat the Unionists badly enough to gain a two-thirds majority in both houses of the state legislature, and therefore be able to call a convention to nullify the tariff. Consequently, when the Nullifiers won enough seats to dominate the state legislature, they quickly called a convention, and, having a five-to-one margin over the Unionists, just as quickly nullified the tariffs of 1828 and 1832, and declared any attempt to coerce the state justification for dissolving its ties with the Union.

Meanwhile, the Telegraph, evidently reflecting Green's somber mood, was predicting that Jackson was ready to make war on the nullifiers. Following a declaration of Jackson's peaceful intentions by the Globe, Green's press repeated the Hero's threats to punish South Carolina's leaders if they dared to interpose, and warned its readers that the administration organ was trying to lull the nullifiers into a false sense of security. Jackson would not hesitate to use the military against South Carolina, and, in the event of bloodshed, the federal government, not the nullifiers, would have to bear the responsibility.

The conciliatory tone of Jackson's fourth annual message provided a brief respite from the forebodings of Green's press as the Telegraph of December 6 praised the address and was displeased only at the President's ambiguity on nullification. But four days later, and sixteen days
after South Carolina's adoption of the Ordinance of Nullification, Jackson emphatically declared his opposition to state interposition in his "Proclamation to the People of South Carolina." Dismissing the Proclamation's paternalistic tone, Green regarded it as the President's attempt to make himself dictator, and simultaneously gratify his hatred of Calhoun. Of these two sources of Jackson's behavior, the latter was the more compelling for Green. In fact, his press was certain that "the future historian will record that, entertaining strong personal animosity against one of the distinguished sons of his native state, he had perverted her arguments, slandered her character, and threatened to imbue his hands in the blood of her citizens." Later on, though, the Telegraph began to see a political motive behind Jackson's readiness to coerce the nullifiers. Because South Carolina had been the only Southern state to reject the popular Hero in the Presidential election, the Jackson Administration hoped to use the Nullification Controversy to "revolution-ize" the state's politics so that the Unionists, whom Green saw as Jackson's "Tories," could wrest political control from the Nullifiers and convert the state into a Jacksonian stronghold. To facilitate what, in Green's mind, was tantamount to a political coup, the administration was allegedly carrying on a secret correspondence with the Unionists to keep them informed of the administration's strategy and to advise the "Tories" of the best time to move against the Nullifiers.

Following the issuance of Jackson's Proclamation, the Telegraph loaded its editorial columns with articles defending the nullifiers, the bulk of which were grounded in three basic themes. First, the paper continued to argue that the only hope for a redress of grievances on the tariff was Southern unity. Furthermore, the Proclamation had added a new
sense of urgency to the Telegraph's pleas for a united South, for Green feared that the central government was presently capable of enslaving the South or "putting it to the sword." Yet despite the apparent lack of Southern support for South Carolina, the newspaper warned the administration that the coercion of the state would never be allowed by the rest of the South. The journal was especially certain that Virginia, under the leadership of Governor Floyd, would eventually take a stand against the Proclamation and come to the rescue of her sister state immediately following Jackson's use of military force. The comparison of Georgia and South Carolina, the paper's second major theme, had also received frequent notice prior to the Ordinance of Nullification. Repeating its argument that the two cases were identical, the Telegraph now wanted to know why Jackson had acquiesced in Georgia's nullification while threatening the use of force against South Carolina. To escape the charge of inconsistency, Jackson would have to admit his hatred of Calhoun or take upon himself the interpretation of the Constitution. If he chose the former course, the Telegraph was ready to discredit the Proclamation as the product of a personal vendetta. By choosing the latter alternative, though, Jackson exposed himself to Green's accusation that he wanted to become an absolute dictator. Then on January 18, Green suddenly disclosed that the Board of Foreign Missions, located in Boston, had induced the Cherokee missionaries to drop a suit against the state of Georgia so that Jackson would have the freedom to act against South Carolina without fear of the charge of inconsistency. Coming from a "most authentic source," this misleading information and the spurious conclusion Green deduced from it nevertheless allowed him to accuse the board of helping "an infuriated old man to imbue his hands in the blood of his own brethren." In addition, the disclosure seemed to
provide evidence for the Telegraph's third major theme, Jackson's adoption of the principles of the old Federalist party. Since the Proclamation expounded principles noticeably similar to those of Daniel Webster in his replies to Hayne, the Massachusetts Senator immediately approved it, and Green quickly branded it as a document going beyond "the utmost claim of the old federal party." Furthermore, the Telegraph, after observing the administration's increasing warmth for Webster, and the entrance of a number of former Federalists into the ranks of the Jacksonians, began to predict the formation of a Jackson-Webster coalition based on the ultra-federalist principles of the Proclamation. Interestingly enough, the Board of Foreign Missions, as Green was careful to point out, was located in Boston, Webster's stronghold and the "headquarters of Federalism." Consequently, Green's rumor about the Cherokee missionaries was an attempt to associate the Jackson Administration with Boston Federalism so that he could utilize the strong anti-Federalist and anti-Webster sentiments in the West and South to elicit support for South Carolina in its fight against the central government. This depiction of Jackson, cooperating with the Federalists to coerce "his own brethren," would, he hoped, arouse Southern and Western memories of the spirit of '98 and the Hartford Convention, thereby giving the President second thoughts about using force against the nullifiers.

Jackson, though, was not to be dissuaded, and on March 2, he signed the Force Bill to provide him with the powers to collect import duties and use military force to uphold the law in South Carolina. As the realization of his worst fears, the legislation naturally horrified Green. Even before its introduction in the Senate, the Telegraph, reacting to a rumor about the bill, warned that Jackson was ready to organize a standing army of 100,000 men and declare himself the
"Protector of the Union." When the President signed the measure, Green placed the Telegraph in mourning, with broad black columns, to symbolize the enactment of "the bill to repeal the Constitution." The "bloody bill," which he considered "worse than the tariff," was, moreover, "deadly poison which if permitted to remain in the system brings certain death." Fortunately for Green, Jackson signed the Compromise Tariff of 1833 simultaneously with the Force Bill, and this combination of the carrot and the stick proved successful in ending the Nullification Controversy. The Telegraph had given strong support to Henry Clay's compromise tariff bill, which, it hoped, would unite the friends of peace and the Constitution. On the other hand, Green's press had ridiculously charged that the administration would oppose any tariff reduction as an unnecessary interference in the Hero's private war against Calhoun. Finally, in an unpublished autobiography, Green later took personal credit for the tariff compromise. According to the self-serving old man, it was he, not Clay, who had put the compromise into motion by organizing a meeting with two Clayites, Congressman Robert Letcher of Kentucky and Senator John M. Clayton of Delaware, at which "we together agreed upon and inaugurated the movement for a compromise, with the understanding that they [Letcher and Clayton] would unite in giving Mr. Clay the credit of the movement." Though he would not be expected to admit it, the meeting may have been the idea of another interested party, John C. Calhoun.

The Telegraph's support of the tariff compromise, and Green's memoir concerning it, serve to emphasize the climax of the Calhoun-Clay rapprochement, which had begun over a year earlier with their joint effort to prevent Van Buren's confirmation as Minister to England. Undoubtedly facilitating their growing cooperation by his opposition to
Jackson, and by his active, though devious, friendship for the Clayites in the campaign, Green had formed relationships that would serve him well in his remaining years as editor of the Telegraph. Yet Green's devotion was still to Calhoun, and his closest political allies were nullifiers. When South Carolina nullified the "bloody bill" after rescinding its interposition of the tariff, the state appeared to have the last word in its dispute with the Jackson Administration. Green, though, was even more positive. Speaking out of relief as much as exultation, his press proclaimed that nullification was "triumphant." Clay had received credit for the compromise, but without the courageous action of the nullifiers, there would have been no settlement of the tariff question.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI


3 Green to John H. Wallace, July 26, 1831, to S. H. Storrow, July 14, 29, August 9, 1831, to A. Powell, August 5, 1831, to John W. Lumpkin, August 6, September 4, 1831, Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. (hereafter cited as GP-SHC); Green to Richard K. Cralle, September 5, December 5, 1831, Green Papers, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GP-LC); Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 101-107.

4 Green to Cralle, January 3, February 10, 17, 29, March 5, April 30, 1832, GP-LC; Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 130; United States' Telegraph, March 31, 1832.

5 Green to Alexander Hamilton, August 5, 13, 1831, GP-SHC.

6 Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 122; Green to David Russell, July 12, August 5, 15, 1831, GP-SHC; Green to Cralle, August 21, 28, September 11, October 4, November 1, 1831, GP-LC.


9 Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Nationalist, 1782-1828 (New York, 1944), 381; Calhoun, Nullifier, 113-116; Green to Calhoun, July 25, August 1, August 5, 1831, GP-SHC.
Green to Calhoun, July 25, August 1, 5, 14, 1831, to Col. S. H. Storrow, August 14, 1831, GP-SHC.

**Telegraph**, May 6, September 23, 1830, March 14, April 9, May 30, 1831; Green to George McDuffie, July 14, 1830, to James Hamilton, August 1, 22, 1830, June 12, 1831, to Calhoun, August 15, 1830, May 31, 1831, GP-SHC.

Green to S. H. Storrow, September 3, 1831, to James Hamilton, September 4, November 9, 1831, to M. C. Shrigg, August 21, 1831, to John Floyd, December 5, 1831, GP-SHC.


**Telegraph**, August 31, 1831, January 7, 1832.

Ibid., January 26, March 2, 15, 1832.


Green to John A. Cuthbert, July 9, 31, 1832, GP-SHC; Green to Cralle March 12, 1832, GP-LC; **Telegraph**, March 12, June 26, July 30, 1832.

Green to John J. Lytle, February 16, 1831, to Cashier, Bank of the United States, Philadelphia, June 27, 1831, GP-SHC; **Telegraph**, November 12, December 13, 1831, January 5, 9, June 6, 12, July 9, 1832.

**Telegraph**, July 11, 1832.

Ibid., November 4, December 24, 1831, September 10, 11, 20, October 19, 1832. The Globe's accusation may have been related to an earlier article in the **Telegraph** suggesting that Eaton "had entertained improper passion" for Peggy during the lifetime of her first husband. Apparently, Green now believed that Peggy had once had an abortion. See Chapter V. Ibid., August 9, 1831.

Ibid., December 19, 1831; Wiltse, Calhoun, *Nullifier*, 127-128.
22. Telegraph, January 25, March 17, April 11, 23, June 7, 9, 1832.

23. Ibid., January 26, 27, February 14, 16, 25, March 19, 1832.

24. Green to Cralle, May 3, August 23, 1832, GP-LC; Green to Calhoun, August 23, 1832, GP-SHC.

25. Telegraph, August 23, 1832; United States' Telegraph Extra, September 3, 1832--October 23, 1832.

26. Green to Chilton Allen, August 27, 1832, to B. Scott, August 30, 1832, to W. Whilessey, September 12, 1832, to William Creighton, September 12, 20, 1832, to Josias S. Johnston, September 12, 1832, to Edward Everett, September 18, 1832, to James H. Pleasants, August 27, 1832, to John Marshall, Jr., September 20, 1832, GP-SHC.

27. Green to Josias S. Johnston, September 12, 1832, to William Ingalls, September 15, 1832, to Calhoun, September 21, 1832, GP-SHC.

28. Green to J. Glenn, August 27, 1832, to James L. Hawkins, August 27, 1832, to Calhoun, August 28, 31, 1832, to Josiah Randall, September 3, 18, October 8, 1832, to H. M. Solomon, September 3, 1832, to Josias S. Johnston, September 4, 1832, to John M. Browne, September 8, 1832, to Lewis Coryell, September 12, 1832, to John Forbs, September 20, 1832, GP-SHC.

29. Telegraph, August 3, 1832; Green to Pleasants, September 25, 1832, to S. H. Storrow, September 25, 1832, to John C. Spenser, September 26, 1832, to W. D. Martin, September 26, 1832, to T. G. Woodward, September 29, 1832, to Josiah Randall, October 2, 1832, to James Hamilton, October 20, November 7, 1832, to Calhoun, October 9, 1832, GP-SHC.

30. Green to J. S. Reed, October 8, 1832, to Henry Lytton Bulwer, November 5, 1832, to Benjamin Watkins Leigh, October 9, 1832, GP-SHC.

31. Telegraph, October 27, November 7, 1832; Green to Calhoun, October 23, 1832, to Nicholas Biddle, October 24, 1832, to James Hagan, October 24, 1832, GP-SHC.
32 Green to Edward R. Gibson, March 22, April 26, 1832, to Moore 
Galway, September 23, 1832, to James Whitfield, October 25, 1832, GP-
SHC; Green to Cralle, December 16, 1832, GP-LC. His Southern school 
book project was still in the planning stages at this time, but his 
financial difficulties forced him to postpone his organizational drive 
until later on in 1833. As for his school for orphan children, it was 
postponed for about two years until August, 1834. See Chapter II for 
descriptions of both these pursuits.

33 
Telegraph, November 22, 1832.

34 
Ibid., December 11, 1832, January 31, 1833; Wiltse, Calhoun, 
Nullifier, 171.

35 
Telegraph, December 12, 17, 19, 20, 29, 1832, January 9, 10, 
17, 18, 23, February 8, 1833.

36 
Ibid., January 21, 29, February 13, 22, March 4, 1833; Green 
to Cralle, March 4, 1833, GP-LC; Green, "Autobiographical Fragments," 
GP-SHC.

37 
Telegraph, March 9, 1833.
CHAPTER VII
DEFENDER OF SOUTHERN RIGHTS, 1834-1837

The Nullification Controversy transformed Green into a sectionalist. The implications of Jackson's Proclamation and Force Bill, as well as the administration's overtures to Daniel Webster, convinced him that permanent Southern unification was necessary to prevent the section's ultimate submission to a central government that had apparently adopted the consolidationist principles of the old Federalist party. The growing antislavery movement, Green argued, was the "fruit" of Jackson's conversion to Federalism. And because he saw the Proclamation and the Force Bill giving the abolitionists all the power they needed to destroy slavery, peacefully, or by the use of force, his press carried on a vigil, for the remainder of its existence, to inform the South of the intrigues of the abolitionists and their political allies.

To combat the nefarious tendencies of the Jackson Administration, the Telegraph editor intensified his attacks on the President and his hand-picked successor, Martin Van Buren. He repeatedly attacked the administration for its removal of the government deposits from the Bank, and he continued to accuse the Van Burenites of using the deposits for their own advancement and the destruction of their opponents. Soon after the removal, Green reversed his position on the Bank, defending its conduct during the recession of the winter and spring of 1834, and blaming this "Biddle Panic" on the withdrawal of the deposits. When the administration
and Senator Thomas Hart Benton attempted to substitute a specie currency for the paper money of the banks, the Telegraph termed the plan Benton's "humbug," and though it also opposed Jackson's Specie Circular as a boon to land speculators, the newspaper applauded the Deposit Act as a remedy for the corruption engendered by the surplus revenue. Finally, Green's course in the campaign of 1836 was just as deceitful as it was in 1832. At first declaring that the Calhounites would only support a candidate advocating their principles, he failed to admit that to him Calhoun was the only man who met this criterion. Then after the Carolinian disavowed any interest in the Presidency, Green began to speak kindly of Senator Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee. In April, 1835, the Telegraph endorsed the Senator, but because of conflicts with White's lieutenants and assurances of William Henry Harrison's friendliness to the South, the editor was, by August, 1835, leaning toward the hero of Tippecanoe as his favorite. Meanwhile, because Green had become heavily involved in other business activities, in October 1836, he turned his editorial duties over to Richard K. Cralle. The new Telegraph editor then endorsed both White and Harrison. Though Green agreed with this strategy, he continued to mention Harrison as his preference.

Green saw the Proclamation and the Force Bill having implications far beyond their use in the Nullification Controversy. Given their acceptance by the majority of Americans, the central government could force the states to obey its every whim, and tyrannize the people without fear of retribution. Nullification, moreover, would prove useless. Because Jackson's twin doctrines had transferred sovereignty, the final, indivisible power, from the states to the central government, one state could not hope to resist it successfully, even when armed with Calhoun's
formidable theories. Thus, several states would have to unite, and use their combined political, economic, and perhaps military strength to resist the constant encroachment of the consolidated federal government. In other words, Green believed that the South would soon be forced to use its sectional power to preserve its institutions and escape oppression.

The Jackson Administration's flirtation with master consolidationist and ultrafederalist, Daniel Webster, was, according to Green, the most convincing evidence of its plans for the South. In truth, Webster and the administration had frequently joined forces during the Nullification crisis. The New Englanider had praised the Proclamation; he had championed the Force Bill in the Senate; and in debates concerning the powers of the central government, no one doubted his role as the administration spokesman. Of course, Green exaggerated Webster's ties with the administration to gain the support of his numerous Southern and Western enemies for South Carolina. The Telegraph was quick to report any indication of Webster's friendship for the Jacksonians, and it was eager to speculate about the ascendancy of the Senator in the Jackson party. Also hoping to exploit Southern suspicions about Van Buren, the newspaper repeatedly conjectured about a bargain between the Magician and Webster which would give Van Buren New England and therefore allow him to disregard the interests of the South even more than he had in the past. Though the Compromise Tariff of 1833 had ended the Nullification Controversy and removed the threat to South Carolina, Green still saw the administration warming to Webster, and his press, if anything, intensified its attacks on this ominous political union. For example, on March 22, the Telegraph predicted that the Massachusetts Senator would
soon be applauded by the Jacksonians, and all criticism of him by the "collar presses" would be eliminated as a prelude to his official acceptance into the Jackson party. The Proclamation and Webster's replies to Hayne, the paper argued, were too consistent to keep him out of the party any longer.

But during the next three months, the relations between Webster and the administration reverted to the suspicion and hostility that characterized them prior to the Nullification Controversy. There was no longer a crisis to bring Webster and the Jacksonians together. Furthermore, the results of the President's "Grand Triumphant Tour" of New England, in June, 1833, were at best disappointing to the administration. Because he suddenly abandoned his tour and made a speedy return to Washington, many political observers believed that he had become disgusted with the hopeless political squabbles of his partisans in New England. Others, though, pointed to Jackson's cold treatment by the section's "extreme Whigs and aristocrats," many of them Webster supporters, who particularly resented Harvard College's conferral of an honorary degree on the rough-and-ready Hero. Consequently, in July, 1833, the Telegraph noticed a rift developing in the alliance. Jackson, it predicted, would once again attack the protective system, Van Buren would try to flatter the South again, and the Globe and other administration papers were preparing to launch an editorial campaign against their former ally. To explain this change, the newspaper noted that the Jacksonians had no further use for Webster, yet it considered of greater significance to the breakup a misunderstanding between the New Engander and Van Buren. Since Webster had mistakenly thought that the Proclamation had produced a new party under his leadership, he had refused to become Van Buren's
lieutenant, and, as a result, the Van Burenites were now beginning to attack Webster and fall back on the South.

By August, the Telegraph was happy to report that Jackson's conversion to Federalism was "apparent and not real." As opposed to consolidation as ever, the Jacksonians could be corrupted only by Van Buren, and eventually realizing the political cost of holding Federalist principles, the Magician would quickly desert them. Then, in the fall and early winter, after the administration had removed the deposits from the Bank, Green saw a revival of Federalism among the Jacksonians. However, his evidence for this renewal was not altogether convincing. Pointing to the former Federalist ties of the new Secretary of the Treasury, Roger B. Taney, was at least accurate, though certainly not earthshaking in its impact. But in December, when the Telegraph reported that the Jacksonians were again making overtures to Webster to enlist him in their cause against the Bank, Green overstepped the bounds of plausibility, as he conveniently forgot Webster's history of service and devotion to the financial institution. Less flimsy was his explanation of the overtures, which he attributed to Van Buren's desire to enlist Webster and so gain influence with the National Republicans. Regardless of the existence of the offer, the observation by the Telegraph in February, 1834, that the Globe had opened the "floodgates of abuse upon Webster," was proof that the Jackson Administration was breaking cleanly with the Senator, as it had earlier severed its friendship with Calhoun and Green. In fact, by the middle of June the rupture had become so wide that the Jackson papers, to the Telegraph's dismay, were charging a coalition between Webster and Calhoun to restore the principles of Federalism.

Green's handling of the Jackson-Webster alliance demonstrates his
greatest strength and his most ridiculous weakness as a political editor. In spite of the fact that he had ably pointed out the apparent cooperation between Webster and the Jackson Administration, and had successfully hung the albatross of Federalism about the neck of the President, he then declared the Jacksonians free from the sins of Federalism. Even at this point he could have saved a portion of his initial success by saying no more about the administration's Federalist alliance. But his compulsion to attack Van Buren and his need for an accusation to use against the President on the Bank, led him to revive the charge of Federalism, unfortunately without the benefit of any logical or trustworthy evidence. Moreover, he soon had to reverse himself again when the Globe launched an editorial campaign against Webster. Other than the obvious consequence of confusing his readers, Green's vacillation seriously damaged his credibility and therefore did much to undermine his original purpose, which was the unification of the South against the meddlesome tendencies of the Force Bill and the Proclamation. Undoubtedly he thought he was protecting the South from the intrusion of a consolidated central government by exposing the Jackson-Webster cooperation as a Federalist alliance, and thereby attempting to use public opinion to keep the two parties apart. Yet his reversals, his use of the Federalist accusation to strike out at Van Buren, and his ludicrous effort to introduce Federalism into the Bank issue possibly caused his readers to think that he was opportunistically employing the Federalist bugaboo for the purpose of making partisan attacks. In short, Green's inability to stop while he was ahead gave rise to doubts about his sincerity.

Green appeared much less the polemicist and much more the vigilant protector of the South when his press discussed the potential effects of
the Proclamation and the Force Bill on the section's peculiar institution. There was no vacillation on the subject of slavery. From the time his press began to devote itself to the defense of the institution in the spring of 1833 until the demise of the Telegraph in February, 1837, Green never wavered in his belief that slavery was a positive good and that the consolidationist principles in the Force Bill and the Proclamation had given unscrupulous politicians and their abolitionist friends the means to use the power of the central government for the destruction of the South. Chief among these unprincipled politicians was of course the new Vice President, Martin Van Buren. Green especially feared the Magician since he saw him as a political opportunist who would use his control over the government to humiliate the South if he thought that it would help him reach the Presidency. Far worse, though, were the abolitionists. Believing in January, 1833, that the antislavery movement was "confined to a few fanatics," Green, by the early spring, had come to see the movement as a religious and political crusade, whose doctrines would be spread by appealing to the pecuniary interests of the North. The abolitionists, moreover, would increase their strength by using the power of the central government to coerce the South into support of measures favorable to the Northern majority. Ultimately, the antislavery fanaticism that had received its impulse from the "bloody bill" would use the doctrines provided it by the Jackson Administration for the purpose of ending slavery without the permission of the South. Nevertheless, he repeated, the South had the sectional power to thwart the designs of the abolitionists as well as those of ambitious Northern politicians like the Vice President. If the section would unite behind the defense of the rights of the states, the South would
gain more respect from Van Buren, and the antislavery movement, unable to
oppress the South to gratify its adherents, would soon fade away.

To warn the South of the threat to its institutions arising in
the North and convince the section of the necessity of unification, Green
began his own proslavery crusade, which eventually dealt with every as-
pect of the debate over slavery. Since abolition was the editor's bete
noire, the major effort of the Telegraph's crusade was devoted to the
denunciation and the discrediting of antislavery leaders. According to
the newspaper, the abolitionists were meddlesome fanatics who were per-
verting the people's religion, other reform movements, and even the
American woman, to make money for themselves and their benefactors. It
saw the "vice of the present age as a sickly philanthropy, which, while
neglecting its own household, disturbs the peace and good order of soci-
ety by speculating in the concerns of others." These "wicked deluded
fanatics" were teaching their converts to break laws contrary to those
they proclaimed to be the laws of God, and the abolitionist missionaries
were preaching their heresies to slaves, whose subsequent rebelliousness
and unhappiness forced masters to add greater restraints "however unwill-
ingly they may do it." Though their own movement was odious enough, they
were also corrupting other philanthropic organizations that, regardless of
their ulterior motives, were at least trying to make some constructive
contribution to society. Consequently, the Genius of Temperance was, in
May, 1833, "aiding and abetting" William Lloyd Garrison's Emancipator;
the goals of the American Colonization Society had, by June, become the
same as the abolitionists; and in June, 1834, the abolitionists were de-
signing Sunday School books to prepare the "infant mind" for the amalga-
mation of the races. Since "fanatics of all ages have found females
their first proselytes and most efficient auxiliaries," Green was not surprised to discover women assuming a leading role in the "emancipating mania." Their temperament, moreover, was well suited for the irrational and irresponsible doctrines of abolition because they were "prone to act from the feeling, and not from the cool dictates of the head, [and] they are disposed to do what they think abstractly right, without the slightest regard to circumstances or consequences." Finally, the real object of the abolitionists, which they were slowly revealing, had little to do with emancipation, but was instead a scheme to make money through contributions. It was no accident to Green that the Northern clergy were the most active members of the movement. The Northern seminaries were producing so many clergymen that the young preachers became Abolitionist Missionaries to make "collections and put in their pockets as much as their consciences will allow them." The antislavery agitation, then, was an underhanded way for these young ministers and their superiors to trick the Northern populace into giving them their "daily bread."

To stop the abolitionists' chicanery Green had simple advice for the North in regard to slavery: "Do nothing." The Telegraph repeatedly informed its Northern readers that the South desired no meddling in its institutions; such interference only necessitated the use of stricter discipline by the master. Southerners, Green implied, also disapproved of anti-abolition mobs. When a lawless crowd broke the windows and smashed the furniture at the home of antislavery leader Arthur Tappan, the Telegraph predicted that the same mob would one day turn on the South. After dividing Southerners by leading many of them to believe there was no cause for concern about their institutions, the "aspiring demagogues" who controlled the rabble would convince them that the forcible
emancipation of Southern slaves was now in their interest. In fact, the Telegraph concluded, Tappan, Garrison, and their fellow abolitionists were probably the instigators of this "mobocracy of the North." Having instructed Northerners that the South required their inactivity, Green's press would often point to the benefits accruing to the North by their wise passivity on the question of slavery. Since Green evidently considered the Northern mind dominated by the lust for material gain, his newspaper concentrated on the economic rewards that the section received from Southern slavery. The North, for example, needed Southern markets and the proceeds from the tariff levied upon the imports of the slaveholders. On the other hand, free labor in the South would not create a greater demand for Northern products because immediate emancipation would drive the white man from the South, and create a black colony unable to afford the wares of Northern manufacturers. Furthermore, compensated emancipation would cost the North millions of dollars, and, the Telegraph sarcastically remarked, the Northern people did not have that much love of freedom in them. Abolition, the newspaper warned, would also introduce racial tensions into the Northern economy and society. Emancipated slaves would overflow Northern cities, where they would compete with white laborers at lower wages and eventually drive the whites to retaliate violently. When an elderly woman was beaten by blacks for testifying in a slave case, the Telegraph smugly observed that an additional 400,000 blacks would lead to "fine times" for the people of the North. Conversely, even the freedmen would fail to thrive in congested Northern towns away from their "natural state" of slavery. In a comparison of Southern slaves and Northern free blacks, Green's press claimed that free blacks had "nominal" political rights, were excluded
from decent society, and were free only in a "flagrant abuse of terms and perversion of language." But "mitigated as the practice of slavery now is at the South it constitutes a system of protection for our black population, under which it may be safely asserted that they enjoy a far greater degree of personal comfort, and are far better provided for in sickness, in childhood, and old age, and form in every particular, a happier and better class of people, than the depraved portion of the race to whom a mockery of freedom has been held out by their rash and misguided friends." As evidence of the "degraded station" of free blacks, and the advantages of the master's interest, Green noted the low birth rate of free blacks and the rapid increase of the black population under the protection of this benevolent institution. Thus, for Green, the antislavery agitation was irresponsible, since an institution that was necessary for the South, beneficial to the North, and "natural" for the black population could only be opposed by irrational zealots.

The Telegraph's proslavery crusade exposed it to the accusation that it was attempting to stir up the slavery issue. The administration press, especially the Globe and the Richmond Enquirer, assumed a moderate proslavery stand, and from this perspective, they saw Green and the abolitionists as allies in the quest to disrupt the Union. The Telegraph countered that the Globe and the Enquirer were leading the South to destruction by counseling it to disregard the growing threat to the Southern way of life. Furthermore, because of the Enquirer's influence in Virginia, which Green considered the key state in the South, the Telegraph was particularly harsh on Thomas Ritchie for his lack of militancy on the question of slavery. By his apathy, the "Apostate at Richmond" was deluding the South into a false sense of security, which, Green
feared, would prevent the section from taking any significant action until an emancipation bill had passed Congress. Even more infuriating to the Telegraph editor were Ritchie's admonitions to the abolitionists to stop their agitation. He considered these protests worthless, and, beyond that, he claimed to see them as an attempt by the "Richmond ally of the Emancipator" to give advice to the abolitionists. As for the Globe, Green saw its moderation directly related to Van Buren's efforts to straddle North and South on the slavery issue. Conscious of the strength of antislavery in the North, the Van Burenites refused to make a candid declaration that Congress had no power to interfere with slavery, since, by meeting the question squarely, the Magician would lose more in the North than he could hope to gain in the South. Nevertheless, the Telegraph cautioned that Van Buren would soon have to denounce the doctrines of the Proclamation, or the South would take his continued vacillation as proof that he had taken the Northern side, believing it to be the strongest.

The nomination of Richard M. Johnson as Van Buren's running mate in 1836 was a godsend for Green's proslavery, anti-Van Buren crusade. Having broken with his old Kentucky friend over the dismissal of Jackson's first Cabinet, he was now eager to publicize Johnson as the "practical amalgamator," whose black mistress and mulatto daughters made him the darling of the abolitionists. Johnson, declared the Telegraph, had practiced the infamous theories of the abolitionists in regard to the amalgamation of the races. By marrying a "jet-black thick lipped, odoriferous Negro wench," and raising a family of children, whom he had attempted to force on society, the Vice Presidential candidate "practiced what they preach." Subsequently, when Ritchie refused to follow
the rest of the "collar press" and defend "the darker shades in the character of Col. Johnson," the Telegraph had even more fun by needling the Richmond editor about his trip to Albany to "make his bargain" and receive "permission" to support only Van Buren in the campaign. Moreover, since Virginia eventually failed to support Johnson, this was further evidence to Green of the lengths the "little magician" would go to win the vote of the amalgamationists.

In 1836, Congress was forced to deal with two issues relating to the growing antislavery movement. On the question of the powers of the central government to suppress abolitionist tracts, Jackson, in his annual message for 1835, had called for a law to prohibit the circulation of the "incendiary publications" through the mail. But Senator Calhoun opposed the President's legislation on the ground that it gave the government too much control over the mail, and attempted to substitute a proposal giving the power to pass regulatory laws to the states, where he believed the matter belonged, and where he undoubtedly thought there would be less chance of the law's use against the interests of the South. Following the lead of its mentor, the Telegraph suggested that the Southern states pass legislation punishing the publishers of the tracts, the postmasters delivering the tracts, and the persons daring to receive them. Likewise, the newspaper echoed Calhoun's concern about extending the central government's power over the postal system, and then used the occasion to charge that certain postmasters were already hindering the paper's circulation because they thought that the President would prefer it. Meanwhile, Calhoun had accepted a substitute for his bill, and in late May, 1836, the proposal of Felix Grundy of Tennessee came up for engrossment. Evidently, the Carolinian then
engineered a tie so that Van Buren, as President of the Senate, would have to cast the deciding vote, and, not coincidentally, take a stand on the slavery issue. Much to the joy of Southern Jacksonians, and probably to Green's disbelief, Van Buren voted for the measure. Yet on June 8, the Grundy bill failed final passage in the Senate, and, despite the success in drawing the Vice President out on slavery, the South still lacked necessary safeguards against "incendiary publications."

The second antislavery question to attract the attention of Congress in 1836 was the disposition of petitions to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia. Though the abolitionists had long used the petitions to introduce the question of slavery into the House and Senate, Congress had referred the petitions to the committee on the District of Columbia and simply forgotten them. But by January, 1838, there were so many petitions, provoking so much discussion, that Calhoun moved that the Senate refuse to receive further abolitionist prayers. Rejecting his motion, the Senate still found a solution to the controversy by agreeing to table, without debate, any motion to receive the petitions. In the House, James H. Hammond of South Carolina also introduced a motion to refuse reception of the petitions. Hammond's proposal was in line with the Calhounite's principle that Congress had no power to legislate on slavery in the District of Columbia or elsewhere. On February 4, though, Henry L. Pinckney, South Carolinian, Nullifier, and staunch supporter of Calhoun, offered a resolution which, by referring the petitions to a select committee, conceded the right of Congress to interfere with slavery in the District, and by this precedent, throughout the country. Unable to persuade Pinckney to withdraw his resolution, the Calhounites were relegated to
the role of spectators, helplessly watching the Pinckney resolution pass the House, and then in May, reading the report of the Pinckney committee to find "the outpost" of Congressional interference with slavery "yielded" a second time. Green could also do nothing to stop the Pinckney resolution, but his press could condemn the author and expose the evil Magician behind the Southern turncoat. Thus, on February 10, the Telegraph reported that Pinckney's actions had done great injury to the South—a sentiment that, according to the newspaper, every other Southern press had expressed. Then in mid-March, after the Albany Argus had begun to praise "Pinckney, the nullifier," Green realized that his resolutions, which appeared deliberately ambiguous, were actually designed to aid Van Buren by preventing the alienation of either the abolitionists or the majority of Southerners. Now aware of Van Buren's trickery, the Telegraph continually lectured its readers that the acknowledgment by Pinckney, the "Great Abolition Killer," of Congressional power to interfere with slavery in the District had given "the whole ground to the abolitionists."

Rivaling slavery as the paramount issue in the last four years of the Telegraph's publication was the removal of the deposits from the Second Bank of the United States. Throughout the spring and summer of 1833, Green's efforts on behalf of the Bank were confined to the repetition of the charge that the Van Burenites would use the financial influence of the deposits to support their campaign and monitor the activities of their opponents. Evidently, though, their plans for the deposits had not been completed, as the Telegraph occasionally informed its readers of disagreements among the Van Buren men about the safest and most beneficial place to put them. In April, for example, Green's press believed that the public deposits would be placed in a system of state
banks under the control of the "Central Regency" so that the Van Burenites could use them to build up a banking system subservient to the mandates of their party. Yet, in August, it saw the Albany Argus and the New York Evening Post in sharp disagreement about the future home of the deposits. While the Post argued for the establishment of a state bank in New York to hold the deposits, the Argus, fearing that the new bank might fall into the hands of political enemies, still preferred the funds to be placed in state banks over which the Regency had control. In any case, the Telegraph concluded, the government deposits would work for the advancement of Van Buren.

In September, 1833, Green suddenly decided to abandon his public opposition to the Bank and devote his press to its defense from the attacks of the Jackson Administration. He believed that his support of the Bank could prevent the executive usurpation consequent upon the removal of the deposits, and he feared that the destruction of the Bank would lead to a dangerous monopoly of power in politically controlled state banks. His paramount motive, however, was the fear that Van Buren, as the sinister figure behind the removal, would exploit his dependence on the Bank to destroy his finances and force him to abandon his press. Consequently, on September 2, he wrote Nicholas Biddle that the Calhounites would aid the Bank in defeating the administration's schemes to remove the deposits if the Bank's supporters would only stop attacking their principles. Green, moreover, divulged a plan, which, by placing 150,000 copies of a pro-Bank essay in the hands of influential persons, would correct public opinion "in a way never before known," and ultimately save the Bank. Biddle undoubtedly welcomed Green's overtures. He had been trying to unify the opposition in support of the Bank all summer, and
Green's letter now gave him the confidence to approach Dr. Thomas Cooper, a prominent South Carolina educator and Nullifier. In his letter to Cooper, Biddle emphasized the common distrust of executive power that he felt would bind the Nullifiers and the Bank men into a cohesive unit. Evidently heeding Green's suggestion that the supporters of the Bank look kindly upon Calhounite principles, he even professed to Cooper that he was now opposed to Jackson's Proclamation.

On October 1, the administration began to remove the government deposits from the Bank. Biddle had so far been unable to unite the opposition, and the Telegraph, giving the Bank president little assistance, was proclaiming the differences between the Clayites and the Calhounites to be insurmountable. Green, though, had already begun work on a plan for the restoration of the deposits and the eventual recharter of the Bank. Observing that "the derangement of the currency and the consequent distress produced by the overissues of the state banks" would be the only reason for saving the Bank, he conducted an editorial campaign from the fall of 1833 to the spring of 1834 to educate the public about these two disastrous effects of the removal of the deposits. At first the Telegraph's columns were filled with warnings of financial distress. "Bank notes would be as plentiful as oak leaves," there would be distress for all except the Albany Regency, and only a large importation from Britain would save these "Regency Pets" from their irresponsible discount policy. But in that case British currency would contract, there would be a reduction in prices for American staples, and because of their dependence on English markets the Southern and Western producers of these staple crops would suffer tremendous economic hardship. Then in midwinter, appropriately enough, Green's press began to report on the distress. By February 20,
banking failures in New Orleans had occurred worth $1,260,000, and banks throughout the country were suspending specie payments. Because wheat prices in the West had dropped from $4.25/barrel to $2.30, the Telegraph was certain that complaints from Western farmers would soon be pouring in to Congressmen. In short, the paper saw the Jackson banking experiment "going on bravely--confidence declining--banks breaking--price of produce falling--suits at law increasing--glorious times for sheriffs, kitchen capitalists, office holders, and Jackson favorites of the pet banks."

Unfortunately for Green's plans to save the Bank, the public was blaming Biddle instead of the President for their suffering. After all, the Bank president had called in loans and raised interest rates on the pretext that the removal of the deposits had taken away much of the Bank's source of credit. Furthermore, many Americans, including the President, believed that he had produced the "Biddle panic" to compel the administration to recharter the Bank. Initially, Green defended the institution by blaming Jacksonian hostility to it for the country's financial problems. Because the administration had justified the removal by claiming that the Bank, without prospects of a new charter, should quickly complete its business with the government, with no recourse after the Jackson Administration had started the withdrawals, Biddle moved to implement a plan which would terminate the Bank's connection with the government, and considerably reduce the scale of its operations. Yet, the Telegraph asserted, the vindictiveness of the Jackson press soon forced him to make sharp curtailments in the Bank's discount rate for fear that, after reading the attacks of the administration papers, angry depositors would make a run on the Bank and cause it to fail. This
argument, however, was weak on two points. First, by admitting that Biddle had sharply curtailed discounts, it implied that the Bank was indeed responsible for the financial distress. Second, it failed to focus on the "derangement of the currency" that Green hoped to demonstrate as the real cause of the panic. As a result, his press began to contend that the Bank had, in fact, never curtailed its discounts. According to this amazing discovery, the Bank was actually discounting more liberally at the beginning of 1834 than at the same time in 1833 since the interest now deducted was greater in proportion to its funds than before the deposits were removed. Moreover, though Jackson had withdrawn over one million dollars in government deposits since October 1, the Bank had actually increased its discounts on its own capital. Hence, the cause of the current financial distress was not Biddle's charitable discount policy, but was, as the Telegraph had always pointed out, the severe blow to the currency resulting from the Jackson Administration's irresponsible removal of the deposits.

Meanwhile, the charge of executive usurpation had accomplished what Biddle had been unable to do--unite the opposition. In December, 1833, Henry Clay introduced two resolutions in the Senate censuring the President for his actions in the removal of the government deposits. The first resolution condemned Jackson for his dismissal of Secretary of the Treasury William Duane, who had refused to carry out Presidential orders to begin the withdrawals; the second proposal denounced the President for the "unsatisfactory and insufficient" reasons he had given Congress for the removal. After three months of debate, centering on the powers and prerogatives of the Presidency, the Senate adopted both resolutions. Clay, Webster, Calhoun, and the supporters of the three men
were so much in agreement on the question of executive usurpation that many observers saw the birth of a mighty coalition led by the triumvire. But for the Telegraph Clay's resolutions were less an opportunity to gain favor with the opposition than they were an excuse to heap more abuse on the President. Actually, Green's diatribes against Jackson for removing the deposits antedated the Clay proposals by over two months, and they would continue several months after the Senate rejection of Jackson's protest of the censure. In mid-October, his press was already wondering how long Congress would "allow the despotic control over the press of the nation, by one who already has its sword." Then in January, it was Jackson's vanity and obstinacy that had prevented him from submitting the question of removal to Congress. The President realized that he had erred in removing the deposits without permission of Congress, he knew that the legislature would never agree to the removals, yet neither he nor his supporters would admit their mistakes for fear that they would sacrifice party success and upset the stubborn old Hero. Despite the rancor of these attacks, Green became even more vituperative following Jackson's protest. The Telegraph now believed that Jackson wanted to be a "Caesar" and the "Central Dictator," and he was ready to assert "the power of having the custody of the public money in the same manner that he has that of arms, ammunition, and public property of the United States."

So limitless, in fact, were Jackson's powers as the "Representative of the People," that the newspaper predicted his eventual ascension to the throne. Apparently, some good citizens of Baltimore took this prediction seriously since, on April 25, the Telegraph reported that several men in that city had joined forces to resist an attempt by the Hero to overthrow the Senate. Though the paper claimed to be glad to see
"a free people, aroused to a deep excitement, acting in the spirit of revolutionary liberty," the editor cautioned the Marylanders not to collide with "an infuriated, infatuated, ungovernable old man," who would use their patriotism as a pretext for his evil purposes.

After the furor over the protest dissipated, Green began to devote less attention to the Bank. He had not forgotten the conspiracy to use the deposits for Van Buren's Presidential campaign; he persisted in his warnings about the derangement of the currency; and as late as February, 1836, his press declared "the Monster alive and kicking," because of the Bank's receipt of a charter from the state of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, by the early summer of 1834, as the session of Congress was ending, Green apparently realized that Jackson would not restore the deposits and would emerge from his latest battle virtually unscathed. Consequently, on June 30, he published one of his gloomiest editorials, praising the Senate for its "bold, dignified, and patriotic resistance to Executive usurpation," but considering the future of the republic so bleak as to produce a "flagging spirit." Since the "people were duped, fleeced, flattered, and enslaved," and the opposition's unity on the censure was already crumbling, the Jacksonians, he believed, now had a new resolve to subject the Senate "to the corrupt influence on which they rely for a share of the plunder." Ultimately, he predicted, without the arousal of the people to sustain the Senate, "nothing short of a bloody revolution can restore the Constitution and the liberties of the people."

As part of their anti-bank crusade, a number of Jacksonians had proposed their own revolution. Adopting William Gouge's hard-money doctrines, Roger Taney, Levi Woodbury, Francis P. Blair, and "Old Bullion" himself, Thomas Hart Benton, all hoped to exclude banks from control
over the currency and thus prevent economic depressions, prohibit the rise of independent financial powers like Biddle's Bank, and eliminate the "moneyed aristocracy" of bankers and their sycophants. As the Jacksonians' champion of a specie currency, Benton sponsored a bill to restore gold to circulation, the first step, according to the administration, toward the establishment of a hard-money currency. Benton's successful legislation of June, 1834, revalued gold to 16 to 1 in order to reverse the trend, which had begun with the undervaluation of the metal in 1805, of issuing only a few gold coins each year. A proponent of the Bank and an old political foe of Benton, Green scoffed at the gold revaluation and the creation of a "Constitutional currency." His paper foresaw a specie currency being introduced for change--"to get rid of the one, two, and three-dollar notes"--but this small circulation would be the extent of the hard money. Currency reform would fail, the Telegraph argued, because the new banking system could not prevent the issue of large quantities of rag paper money. The Bank had circulated a good deal of this money, but it had also prevented the state banks from flooding the country with it. With the Bank's control now gone, the newspaper observed that the state banks were issuing more rag paper money than the National Bank had, and the Van Burenites were making plans to increase the reliance of their Safety Fund Banks on the currency. This situation, concluded the Telegraph, would always make paper money plentiful and a specie currency impossible. Despite this authoritative argument, Green's press continued to dwell on the "advent of the Gold Millennium," evidently as the means of ridiculing Benton. When the Senator's "golden floods" failed to overflow the West, and his "golden boys" with the "silken purses" failed to appear, the newspaper condemned "Old Bullion's"
specie currency as the "Benton humbug." As for the gold, the Telegraph was certain that once it reached the bank vaults, the precious metal would remain there.

Contrary to its quick dismissal of the "Constitutional currency," Green's press strongly supported the Deposit Act of June, 1836. By distributing the government's surplus revenue to the states, the measure took from the Jackson Administration its source of vast amounts of patronage, which, according to Green, it had used to corrupt the government and the people. With the surplus at their disposal, Jackson and especially Van Buren were able to retain a large group of flatterers who were always ready to do the administration's bidding. The surplus, Green believed, enabled the Albany Regency to remove the deposits from the Bank, and it allowed the President to overstep his executive powers and then defy the Senate's censure. The editor also saw the surplus being used to finance other disreputable schemes. The colonizationists were employing federal funds to assist the abolitionists; speculators controlled much of the money for reckless investments in land, internal improvements, and railroads; and other speculators hoped to pay off the old Continental money with the surplus. On the other hand, with the surplus distributed among the states, Green believed that the government would attract virtuous men who would serve the country out of a sense of patriotism instead of a desire for gain. Moreover, the central government would not be as powerful, since, according to the teachings of Calhoun, a poor government would be a weak government. Consequently, there would be less danger that the federal government would encroach upon the rights of the states.

Green had other reasons for particularly welcoming the timing of the legislation. Prior to 1836, the other Calhounites and he were aware
that the tariff was the greatest source of the surplus revenue. Hence, they had opposed the tariffs of 1828 and 1832 not only because the measures created economic hardships for the South, but also because they feared that the surplus revenue produced by them would eventually be used by the central government to oppress the South and interfere with its domestic institutions. The Compromise Tariff of 1833, though, promised to reduce the amount of this surplus, and the Calhounites agreed to abide by this solution. Unfortunately for their plans to reduce the government's revenue, Western land sales began to make up for the loss of the tariff revenue, until, in 1836, the returns from land sales were exceeding the receipts from the tariff. The surplus having grown to $20,000,000 by late March, Green's press was naturally horrified at the accumulation of this money "to be used as the spoils of victory in corrupting and demoralising the people," and it gravely predicted a surplus of $50,000,000 by 1837. Then in the next two months, much editorial space was devoted to the promotion of this legislation to avert the central government's growing power. The newspaper attempted to arouse public indignation against the Jackson Administration by pointing to its vast expenditures in the face of its earlier promises of retrenchment. To counter the argument that the distribution of the surplus would make the states more dependent on the central government, the Telegraph claimed that the Deposit Bill would actually ensure the states' independence but enable them to support the federal government in case of an emergency. Finally, in June, after Jackson had signed the measure to distribute all surplus revenue over $15,000,000 to the states in proportion to their representation in Congress, the Telegraph jubilantly proclaimed that the measure had taken "the money from a corrupt government
and... [had given] it to a virtuous people," and it had rescued twenty or thirty million dollars from the greedy supporters of Martin Van Buren.

Green's joy over the passage of the Deposit Act turned to bitterness with the President's issuance of the Specie Circular. By accepting only specie in payment for public lands, the administration hoped to repress the widespread land speculation and inhibit the rampant inflation of the Jackson boom. The Telegraph, though, foresaw that the circular would play into the hands of the speculators by placing an impediment in the way of the settler and by drastically reducing the speculative buyer's competition at land sales. After the large speculator had purchased the bulk of the land at a sale, he would then be able to sell the property at a handsome profit to settlers giving him good bank notes. The newspaper also saw the circular related to the recent passage of the Deposit Act. It asserted that the administration hoped to reduce land sales so that the states would receive less money, and therefore less power, from the distribution bill, and the opposition would receive less credit for the distribution because of their apparent exaggeration of the amount of the surplus revenue and its inherent dangers. If the deposit bill had not passed, the paper concluded, the Specie Circular would have never been issued.

While the Telegraph was discussing the leading economic issues of the day, much of Green's political correspondence was devoted to the 1836 Presidential contest. Calhoun was of course his favorite for the Presidency, but unlike the 1832 campaign, he first attempted to start a political movement for the Carolinian before naming him as his preference. Thus, in July, 1833, he wrote John McLean of Ohio, asking that the Supreme Court Justice's friends cease their attacks on the Calhounites. He followed up this overture with a letter to Calhoun in which he tried to
persuade the Senator that McLean should be regarded as a friend. In addition, he outlined a plan by which Southerners would move in behalf of their principles, speak out for their political favorites in their state legislatures, correspond with friends in other states, and ultimately nominate a candidate. He obviously wanted Calhoun to show some enthusiasm for this strategy, but the great Nullifier gave his editor no encouragement.

During the summer of 1833, Green tried to stir up enthusiasm for the state rights candidate by proposing a Constitutional amendment for the direct election of the President. By his plan, the electors would be eliminated, and the people would directly elect the executive for a single term. In case no candidate received a majority, the election would be decided by a runoff instead of by the House. He evidently hoped that the South would nominate Calhoun in opposition to the nominees of the two major parties. Then, with the section united on state rights principles and his amendment in force, the Carolinian would probably be one of the two highest, and, given enough Western support, he would be able to win the runoff. Yet, if the South failed to nominate Calhoun, Green still believed that the candidates of the two major parties would have to respect Southern principles in order to receive a majority of the popular vote and be elected. Though he promoted his amendment through his correspondence and his editorial columns, the idea failed to receive any support, and he soon dropped it.

Green next attempted to create support for Calhoun by arguing that the opposition favorite, Henry Clay, had no chance of being elected. As evidence of the hopelessness of the Clay candidacy, the Telegraph observed that Van Buren's New York press was going so far as to encourage the Kentuckian's friends to put him forward as the nominee of
the opposition. Van Buren, the newspaper explained, realized that the majority of the North was pledged against Clay, and the South could never support him on account of his desire to consolidate the powers of the central government. As previously mentioned, the Telegraph at this time (fall, 1833) opposed any attempt to unite Clay and Calhoun in support of the Bank. In connection with his attacks on the Clay candidacy, it thus appears that Green was as much concerned with the Presidential campaign as he was with the welfare of Biddle's financial institution. He apparently hoped that his defense of the Bank would start a movement by which Calhoun would replace Clay as the Bank candidate and then be in a position to command the support of the entire opposition. Unfortunately, Green's editorial campaign for the Bank was doomed to failure by the President's popularity.

His other tactics having failed miserably, Green had decided by the late winter of 1834 to name Calhoun as his candidate. As in 1832, the movement for the Carolinian was to begin in the Old Dominion. Virginia had elected a state rights majority to its legislature in the fall of 1833, and Green hoped to capitalize on the existing political sentiment in the state to obtain a nomination for Calhoun. After Virginia had risen, he expected simultaneous movements in Pennsylvania and North Carolina, Clay's withdrawal, and ultimately, certain success. Subsequently, in the spring and summer of 1834, the editor advocated early movements, Southern unity, the formation of "state rights Whig societies," the organization of state rights conventions, and, above all, the maintenance of state rights principles for the advancement of "the state rights candidate." Yet there is no indication that any of these plans were being realized, and the movement for Calhoun seemed to be going nowhere.
Then in August, 1834, the pseudo candidacy of Calhoun reached a climax. Because James Hampden Pleasants of the Richmond Whig wanted to enlist Virginia's state rights party in support of Whig Senatorial candidate Benjamin Watkins Leigh, he proposed a deal with Green by which the Whig would give up Clay in return for a cessation of the Telegraph's efforts for Calhoun. Predictably, Green announced his hostility to the Whig's overtures unless the paper would advance the principles of state rights. After Pleasants refused these terms, Green began to exhort the state rights party to maintain its independence of both the Whigs and the Van Burenites. Soon, though, he returned to his first proposition, but this time he was more explicit. He declared that he would support Leigh, Clay, or any other candidate who would propagate the principles for which his press stood. Yet it was obvious that this proposal was meant only for effect, since his readers, the Whigs, the state rights men, and undoubtedly Green himself, understood that Calhoun was the only possible candidate who met this criterion. Meanwhile, both Clay and Calhoun were unhappy that Green was agitating the Presidential question. The Kentuckian stated that he was "shocked" at the "impudence of Green" for bringing up the Presidency, and he implied that the Telegraph's strong devotion to principle would keep the opposition to the Jacksonians divided and weak. On the other hand, Calhoun applauded his editor's maintenance of principle. Nevertheless, he instructed Green to be silent about the Presidency since those who attempted to move on the question would suffer at the hands of the public.

Green now surmised that Calhoun had little interest in becoming a candidate in 1836. Consequently, he began to speak kindly of Senator Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee. Even before he learned of Calhoun's
feelings about the coming election, his press had observed that White would be a strong candidate for the Presidency in 1836. Now with the support of state rights men, this old friend of the President could carry the entire South and West and leave Van Buren only Pennsylvania, New York, and New Jersey. Yet the Telegraph advised its readers to be cautious. White had favored the Force Bill, and further indications that he would lead a "new race in subserviency and adulation" would disqualify him for Southern support.

Green soon encountered difficulties in his support for White. When the Tennessean was denounced as a Nullifier, Green warned him not to offend the Calhounites with his response. White's reply convinced him of the candidate's sympathy for Calhoun's principles, but the Telegraph editor soon came into conflict with the Senator's chief lieutenant, John Bell. Green had earlier argued with Bell over a patronage matter, and his failure to support Bell's reelection as House Speaker now led the Congressman to consider him "as his personal or political opponent." Though Green explained that he had supported James K. Polk because of his sympathy for the Calhounites, Bell refused to accept this explanation and evidently lost all respect for the editor. According to Green, Bell then used his influence with the White supporters to change the candidate's official organ from the Washington Appeal to the Washington Sun because he believed that Green had a financial interest in the former newspaper. Green quickly wrote White of his fear that the incident betrayed a lack of trust in the state rights men. To make amends, he suggested that White's friends circulate the Appeal and speak favorably about the unification of the party on "Southern principles."

Though the Appeal and the Sun merged in April, 1835, by mid-summer
Green's support for White had become decidedly lukewarm. His press published a campaign biography of the Senator, and the editor made plans to issue an Extra Telegraph to counteract the slanders against White. Nevertheless, Green was probably still fretting about his quarrel with John Bell, and he may have had thoughts about a renewed effort for Calhoun. Above all, he seemed to be worried about White's commitment to state rights. Consequently, in August, 1835, not long after he had received assurances of William Henry Harrison's friendly feeling for the South, he began to believe that the hero of Tippecanoe was a stronger candidate than White. Better yet, he hoped that the two men could be persuaded to run on the same ticket, which would carry the entire South and West along with Pennsylvania and Ohio and easily overwhelm Van Buren. For public consumption, though, Green modified this idea. On September 22, 1835 the Telegraph announced that it would support either Harrison or White as long as they would support the newspaper's principles.

Subsequently, Green gave only incidental attention to the election. He was busy with other business ventures, primarily the organization of his "American Literary Company." Since he saw no abatement in the time he would spend on these other "engagements," he announced on August 5, 1836, that Richard K. Cralle would assume control of the Telegraph's editorial department. Under Cralle, the newspaper supported both Harrison and White without reservations. Though Green emphasized the new editor's independence, the two men undoubtedly collaborated as much as possible, and the decision to support two candidates was apparently an attempt to throw the election into the House. Privately, Green's business concerns dominated his time and thinking, but he occasionally indicated Harrison as his preference.
As in 1832, the election results were displeasing to Green. The hated Van Buren was elected by receiving 170 electoral votes, while the Whig triumvirate opposing him—White, Harrison, and Daniel Webster—captured only 113. Nevertheless, there were positive signs in the election for Green. The Magician had failed to sweep the South, as Tennessee and Georgia went for White and South Carolina again gave its 11 electoral votes to a man not running for the Presidency—Willie P. Mangum of North Carolina. More significant for 1840 was the strong showing for Green's favorite, Harrison. The General showed considerable strength in the West and also captured Maryland, Delaware, and Vermont. Unfortunately, neither Green nor Cralle would be able to use the Telegraph to "set the country on fire" for this new military hero, since on February 21, 1837, the newspaper suddenly ceased publication.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VII


3 Telegraph, August 21, October 5, December 28, 1833, February 27, June 18, 1834.


5 Ibid., May 8, July 2, 10, 17, October 4, 1833, June 2, 16, July 10, 1834, March 21, April 28, 1835, January 13, 1836; F. M. Green, "Duff Green, Militant Journalist," American Historical Review, LII (1947), 256.

6 Telegraph, May 29, June 17, July 27, August 15, September 17, 1833, July 14, August 16, September 19, December 27, 1834, June 25, July 9, 17, 18, December 2, 1835.

7 Ibid., April 30, May 1, 23, June 8, 24, 1833, October 17, 1834, July 3, August 6, September 3, 14, 24, 1835, February 2, 1836.

8 Ibid., June 1, 2, 6, 12, 15, July 18, 1835.

9 Ibid., August 18, September 10, 1835; Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 273-277.

10 Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 278-286; Telegraph, February 10, 24, March 4, 15, 19, 23, April 6, 28, 29, 30, May 19, 1836.

11 Telegraph, April 1, August 1, 13, 1833.
12 Green to Biddle, September 2, 1833, to Thomas Cooper, September 25, 1833, Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. (hereafter cited as GP-SHC); Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 210-211.

13 Telegraph, November 15, December 7, 1833, January 2, February 18, 20, March 1, April 4, 1834.

14 Ibid., December 25, 1833, February 10, 21, March 19, April 16, 1834.

15 Ibid., October 14, 1833, January 6, 15, February 26, March 7, 19, April 19, 24, 25, 1834, March 12, 1835.

16 Ibid., April 5, June 4, 30, August 5, December 8, 1834, July 5, 1835, February 8, 1836.

17 Ibid., December 30, 31, 1834, May 20, July 12, 14, 29, August 20, September 5, 1835, May 28, 1836; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston, 1945), 115-121.

18 Telegraph, November 19, 1833, February 11, March 26, 1834, March 29, 30, May 9, June 22, July 14, 1836.

19 Ibid., July 13, 1836.

20 Green to John McLean, July 1, 1833, to Calhoun, July 8, 1833, GP-SHC.

21 Ibid., Green to [???], July 8, 1833 (two letters), GP-SHC; Telegraph, September 10, 1833.

22 Green to Beverly Tucker, November 9, 1833 in "Correspondence of Judge Tucker," William and Mary Quarterly, 1st ser., XII (1903-04), 88-89; Telegraph, October 23, 24, November 26, 1833.

23 Green to Charles Fisher, April 24, 1834, GP-SHC; Green to Cralle, March 14, 1834, July 26, 1834, Green Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GP-LC); Wiltse, Calhoun, Nullifier, 217.

25 Telegraph, October 27, November 8, 25, December 20, 1834; Green to [???], December 6, 1834, GP-SHC.

26 Telegraph, January 26, March 30, 1835; Green to Beverly Tucker, January 12, 1835, Tucker-Coleman Papers, Swem Library, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Va.; Green to Calhoun, March 9, 1835, Calhoun Papers, Clemson University, Clemson, S. C.; Green to John Bell, March 25, 1835, to Hugh Lawson White, April 11, 1835, to Dixon H. Lewis, April 11, 1835, GP-SHC.

27 Telegraph, April 9, 27, May 7, July 7, September 22, 1835; H. King to Green, August 29, 1835, GP-SHC.

28 Telegraph, August 2, 5, 1836; Green to Cralle, November 4, 1836, GP-LC.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

The United States' Telegraph suspended publication in February, 1837, primarily as the result of its publisher's chronic indebtedness arising from the overextension of his finances. Originating with Green's takeover of the newspaper, his financial obligations increased significantly during the campaign of 1828 until he was compelled to obtain a loan from the hated Bank of the United States to save his press. Upon learning of his dependence on the "Monster," President Jackson decided that he would have to recruit a new editor and establish a new press to speak for his administration in its war against the Bank.

Just prior to the election of 1832, Green had strong hopes that the returns from his Extra Telegraph and the benefits of closer ties with the National Republicans were about to end his financial problems. Yet, inexplicably, he was, at this time, spending thousands of dollars making additions and improvements of dubious necessity to the Telegraph, and investing much larger amounts of money in questionable business pursuits. Furthermore, the Telegraph was annually losing more than two thousand dollars, and he apparently overextended himself on the issuance of the Extra Telegraph. Consequently, despite his claims to own a great deal of real estate in Washington, Green's reelection as printer to the Senate in March, 1833, had, by his own admission, rescued him from the exigency of abandoning his press to save his finances.
Following his reelection, his financial situation seemed to stabilize, and he wisely devoted himself to his press, temporarily abstaining from his penchant for business speculation. By December, 1834, though, there were indications that the *Telegraph* was again on a precarious financial footing. Then, in March, 1835, with both parties opposed to him, it came as no surprise to Green that he lost the printing of the Senate. Nevertheless, the Senate printing was a major source of his finances, and he now was forced to look for other means of raising income. In March, for example, he informed Cralle of his attempt to obtain a charter from the Maryland legislature for a company worth $500,000. Reviving the Southern school book project which he had begun in 1833, he hoped to obtain a charter for the American Literary Company to write, print, and market school books, periodicals, and other printed materials of a Southern bias. He planned to use the profits from his investment in a Mississippi cotton plantation, which would require an additional $25,000--$15,000 for land and $10,000 for slaves, to finance the Company's paper mill and printing office. In October, following his purchase of coal lands in Hampshire County, Virginia, he asked Cralle to help him procure a charter from the Old Dominion for the construction of a railroad and the production of iron. He later explained that he would use the railroad to ship his coal to the "Atlantic markets." Also in October, Green announced plans to move his publication office to New York where, along with Cralle and Condy Raguet, he would launch a journal to sustain state rights and rally Southerners behind correct principles. So confident was he of the success of the new paper that the *Telegraph* began to carry an advertisement for the sale of its presses, type, and "other materials used in public printing."
By late winter, 1836, Green seemed to be satisfied with the progress of his business enterprises. Though Nicholas Biddle notified him that the Bank's financial instability would make a long term loan impossible, he soon received a charter for his Maryland business, and he was confident of the early incorporation of the American Literary Company. Yet despite the apparent success of his business affairs, the Telegraph was suffering from neglect. From October 8 until December 10, 1835, and again from late March until June, 1836, the newspaper was under the editorial charge of his assistant editor, Dr. Edward R. Gibson. By April, 1836, the editorial columns frequently lacked Green's fiery touch, and the space devoted to editorial comment was about half its former size. Calhoun complained of the paper's ineffectiveness as early as January, 1836, and he pleaded with the editor to return to his duties. But Green, either unwilling or unable to follow his mentor's advice, decided instead to offer his editorial chair to Judge Abel P. Upshur, a staunch state rights advocate and a good friend of both Green and Calhoun. When the Virginian, claiming poor health, refused the position, Green was forced to apply pressure on his old ally Cralle to come to Washington and free him for his other business pursuits. Green overcame Cralle's doubts about becoming involved with the ailing newspaper by promising him that he would have complete control over the journal, informing him that he had Calhoun's blessing to edit the paper, and announcing in the Telegraph that Cralle would soon take over the press. Consequently, on August 5, the Telegraph announced that it would remain in Washington and become a subsidiary of the American Literary Company under the control of its new editor, Richard K. Cralle.

Cralle officially assumed editorial control of the Telegraph on
October 4. It was apparent from the first number that he would maintain his predecessor's editorial policies. In his first editorial, he repeated Green's concerns about the overextension of government, abuses of patronage, and the usurpation of power by the executive. His solution to the crisis—that "the Government must be abridged of its assumed powers, and its patronage placed beyond the arbitrary control of the executive"—could also have been written by the newspaper's former editor. In the following months, the Telegraph continued to complain about Jackson's currency policy, executive usurpation, the machinations of the abolitionists, and it repeatedly attacked Martin Van Buren and defended John C. Calhoun. Yet there was one significant addition. As a reflection of the South's growing concern about the future of the newborn Republic of Texas, Cralle's press began in November to take a strong stand for its immediate annexation. The Telegraph continued publication into the winter of 1837 without interruption, and from all appearances, the newspaper was healthy and ready to start its twelfth year. Then, quite abruptly, the following notice appeared in the Telegraph of February 21, 1837:

To the Public

The undersigned is compelled by other indispensable engagements to withdraw from the publication of the 'United States Telegraph' the subscribers to which will hereafter receive in its stead 'The Reformer,' a new paper published in this city by Messrs. William W. Moore and Co. and edited by Richard K. Cralle, Esq.

Duff Green

Though Green cites "other indispensable engagements" as his reason for discontinuing the Telegraph, there is much evidence that his financial difficulties and those of the nation ultimately overcame him and forced him to abandon his press. First, he was forced to send his subscribers copies of their accounts and appeal to them to meet this obligations to the
newspaper. In this urgent request for assistance, he noted that "the
general suspension of business has so much reduced the advertising
patronage and the profits on our country subscription is so small, and
so large a part of it remains unpaid" that an early payment was impera-
tive. Second, in mid-January he wrote Beverly Tucker of Virginia about
the sale of Tucker's prophetic novel, *The Partisan Leader*, and about the
prospects for the American Literary Company. This parent company of the
*Telegraph* had published Tucker's work at a cost of almost $1,000, but
Green had to report to the author that

as yet we have received not a cent in return from the sales,
and my experience satisfies me that it is useless for any
publisher to attempt to sell unless his arrangements are so
made as to unite the influence of the trade. I had hoped
that the present crisis would so unite the South as to enable
me to accomplish an organization through the American Literary
Company, and I am not without hope but such is sordid love of
gain and the drunken forgetfulness of consequences that I am
almost in despair.

Later on in January, a "sick and tired" Green informed Tucker that he was
planning to go to Florida or Texas. Then on March 6, about two weeks af-
ner the death of the *Telegraph*, he declared that someone else would
have to make an appeal to the South since "the tongue of calumny has
rendered me useless and I must take rest that I may labor elsewhere."
Next, on May 11, he reported that he had recently been on the "verge of
bankruptcy" until the suspension of specie payments "place me once more
on my feet." Finally, on July 4, after another of his speculative enter-
prises met disaster, Green was again prostrate:

I invested all the money that I could raise in mineral land
on the Potomac with the prospect of realizing a large profit.
The parties who were to have advanced me upward of $300,000
faulted, and left me with a heavy debt without the means of
payment, and I have been compelled to finances.

In his autobiography, Green recalled that his poor health had "made
it indispensable for me to relinquish my paper." He may have been sick, and he may have desired to go to Texas or Florida for his health. The cause of this sickness was probably a buildup of anxiety over the financial ailments that had plagued him constantly for over two years. Finding himself in serious financial trouble in early 1835, Green had unwittingly become part of the speculative mania that overtook the nation in the last two years of the Jackson Presidency. And as he became overextended, so had the nation's economy. Predictably, his fiscal ordeal worsened with the downturn in the national economy that occurred in the winter of 1837, and he was eventually laid low by the commercial panic that overcame the country in the spring. Though it is difficult to be precise, the Telegraph was a casualty of one of these reverses, and in this sense, the newspaper was a victim of the forthcoming depression. Nevertheless, without the presence of Green's past financial indiscretions and his frenzied business speculations of the past two years, there was nothing inevitable about the paper's demise in February, 1837. In short, his poor health and the death of his beloved newspaper were largely the consequences of his own financial ineptitude.

Green spent much of the first year after the demise of the Telegraph trying to stay in the newspaper business. Cralle had published the Washington Reformer from February 22 to April 29, 1837, at which time he became co-editor with Green of the Baltimore Merchant and Reformer. By their unusual arrangement, the Merchant, edited by Green, was to be the daily paper, and the Reformer, edited by Cralle, would be the country or triweekly edition. In practice, though, the daily Merchant contained two editorial columns—one written by Cralle in Washington and the other by Green in Baltimore. In his prospectus, Green proclaimed
that his newspaper would support the country's merchant class. Then in the following months, the Merchant urged the opposition to unite on a candidate, frequently called on the South to maintain it as a bulwark against abolition, and supported the Independent Treasury. Yet the newspaper lacked the fiery editorial style that had characterized the Telegraph, and it was obvious that Green was only halfheartedly tending to his editorial duties.

The cause of this neglect was of course Green's continuing financial troubles. In July, following the apparent collapse of his speculation in Potomac mineral lands, he feared that he would have to stop publishing the Merchant. To obtain relief, he tried unsuccessfully to convince Calhoun to support a proposed credit operation on tobacco and cotton by pointing out that "the experiment which Mr. Biddle has made with his credit in Europe proves what we could do." Later in July, he reported that Baltimore merchants were ready to rally behind the newspaper, and then in August, after learning from A. P. Upshur that the South was eager to support the newspaper, he made a Southern tour to obtain subscribers. Though this trip lifted his spirits enough for him to insist to Cralle that the name United States' Telegraph be substituted for the Reformer, his newspaper was being ignored since, for example, the Merchant failed to run an editorial column from August 30 to September 4. Calhoun was also not pleased with the newspaper. Because he saw Green's connection with the Merchant being exploited by their political enemies, the Carolinian on October 27 advised his editor to withdraw from the paper and devote full time to his business interests. For once, though, Green had anticipated his mentor since on the same date as Calhoun's letter he had begun to make arrangements to sell his press, and the previous day, Cralle had
come out with a new prospectus for the Washington *Reformer*, once again to be published in the Capital.

Out of the newspaper business for the first time since 1824, Green spent the next two years making plans to move to Texas, attempting to finance a business trip to Europe, and working to develop his mineral lands on the Potomac. He had prospects of starting a timber company in Texas, and he also spoke of opening a land office in the young republic. One of his business associates had even introduced him to Peter Reynard, an adventurous Frenchman, who was to accompany him to Texas, assist him in his land office, and teach his children Spanish. In truth, the Texas schemes were never more than dreams, as was his projected trip to Europe, which was apparently postponed and ultimately forgotten. On the other hand, by devoting much time to his Potomac lands he was able to maintain his control over much of the property, and thereby retained the promise of one day receiving dividends from this troublesome real estate. In addition, the former editor's diligence enabled him to collect a portion of the money from overdue subscriptions to the *Telegram*.

In 1840, an election year, Green predictably displayed a renewed interest in politics. Since Van Buren had experienced a disappointing first term, the Whig candidate, William Henry Harrison, whom Green had supported in 1836, stood an excellent chance of defeating the Magician. The Hero of Tippecanoe's advisers, like those of the Hero of New Orleans in 1826, realized the need for an editor to "set the country on fire" for Harrison, so they gave Green enough assurances to convince him to sell part of his mineral lands and use the money to launch the Baltimore *Pilot*. In his prospectus for the new journal, Green emphasized the country's economic troubles and predicted that "the fidelity, ability,
firmness, and moderation" of Harrison and his running mate, John Tyler, would quickly restore the nation's confidence leading to a dramatic revival of "industry, enterprise, credit, and prosperity." But in the subsequent canvass, known to historians as the "Log Cabin Campaign," he spent most of his time issuing demagogic publications like the Tippecanoe Text Book, the Log Cabin Cabinet, and the Tippecanoe Song Book. He also found time to become involved in another ludicrous controversy, this time concerning the influence of the Catholic Church in American politics. Alleging that the Romanists were planning a "great religious as well as civil revolution by means of imported Catholic votes," he converted the Pilot into an anti-Catholic journal after the election. This crusade proved successful only in driving away the paper's subscribers and consequently killing the press in 1841.

Green, however, quickly rebounded from this setback thanks to the assistance of John Tyler. Seven months after the Virginian's elevation to the Presidency upon the death of Harrison, he sent Green to Europe apparently to negotiate an Anglo-American commercial treaty, but also to lobby against French ratification of the Quintuple Treaty, and to allow him to promote his business speculations abroad. Arriving in London by early December, 1841, Green soon had dinner with two prominent bankers of the city, Thomas Baring and Joshua Bates, at which time, according to his recollection, he made overtures that resulted in Lord Ashburton being sent to the United States to conclude the famous Webster-Ashburton Treaty. In January, he went to Paris where, with the aid of Lewis Cass, the American Minister to France, and Henry Wheaton, a noted American authority on international law, he conducted a successful campaign to prevent the French from ratifying the Quintuple Treaty, a measure allowing
visitation and search of ships to suppress the international slave trade. He returned to London in the spring of 1842 and by his own account, received encouragement, but no assurances from the British Board of Trade about that country's desire to begin negotiations for a commercial treaty. Finally, in his private business ventures, he had proposed, while in Paris, the construction of French railroads and the development of a line of steam packets between France and America; then in London he had begun negotiations with some "first rate commercial houses" for his speculation in the growth of Cairo, Illinois. None of these projects ever achieved any success and, like his previous schemes, they were eventually dropped.

Returning to the United States in October, 1842, Green was by the spring of 1843 again on his way to London. Tyler wanted his executive agent to "collate" more information for a commercial treaty which, he believed, would be linked with the Oregon controversy to remove all outstanding problems between Britain and America. Soon after his arrival he used an interview with Sir Robert Peel to warn the British Prime Minister of Southern impatience over London's refusal to adjust the commercial difficulties confronting the two countries. A few days later, he created an uproar by accusing Peel's government of the willingness to indemnify the Republic of Texas for the emancipation of its slaves. Afterward, he wrote Tyler, Calhoun, and Upshur several letters urging the immediate annexation of Texas to thwart the attempts of British and Texas abolitionists to end slavery in the Southwest. As Anglo-American financial relations had still not recovered from the Panic of 1837, he discovered that his private "money negotiations" were hindered by the refusal of British bankers to "touch any American operations."
Upon his arrival in New York in early 1844, Green went to work to launch a campaign press in that city. Established in January, the *Republic* bitterly opposed Van Buren and championed free trade, slavery, continental expansion, and the nomination of Calhoun by the Democratic Party. To counteract the regular Democratic Convention to be held in Baltimore, his new press also advocated a special Calhoun Convention scheduled for July in Philadelphia. Calhoun, though, opposed the idea, and after supporting James K. Polk in the election, Green resigned his editorial chair again to devote his time to his business affairs. Meanwhile, during the Senate debates on the Tyler Administration's Texas annexation treaty, Thomas Hart Benton had introduced resolutions inquiring about Green's foreign activities and charging the executive agent with fabricating the story of the British abolition loan to create an atmosphere congenial to annexation. In response, Green asserted that he had only passed along to Tyler what the Texas Minister to England, Ashbel Smith, had authorized him to say. Smith contradicted Green's statement, but at the time of Green's letter to Tyler about the loan, he had written Anson Jones informing the Texas Secretary of State of the British government's desire to assist the republic in emancipating its slaves. Thus, despite an exaggeration obviously intended to alarm the President, Green's report to Tyler was essentially accurate.

With Benton's accusations still in the minds of Congress and the people, the Tyler Administration in September, 1844, abruptly named Green the new American Consul at Galveston, Texas. This questionable appointment was the idea of the new Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, who hoped to use his loyal supporter as his agent in Texas and Mexico City. Consequently, in the following months Green made numerous reports to the
State Department about the attitude of the Texas government toward annexation, the political maneuvers in the Mexican Capital, and the activities of Great Britan in Mexico and Texas. Yet he also caused enough consternation with his business schemes for the Texas government to return his passports. According to Texas Attorney General Ebenezer Allen, Green had abused his position as Consul "by availing himself of . . . private interviews" with members of the republic's Congress in order to gain approval for his projects. One such enterprise, the "Texas Land Company," was to have a "perpetual charter" providing for virtual autonomy over an unlimited amount of land, while another, the "Del Norte Company," had as its object the conquest of California and Northern Mexico with the assistance of some 60,000 Indian warriors. Moreover, after the new Texas President, Anson Jones, had refused to aid Green in these schemes, the fiery Consul had threatened to use the excitement over annexation to overthrow the republic's government. Jones's Cabinet then revoked Green's exequatur, but through the timely mediation of the American charge in Texas, Andrew Jackson Donelson, Jones forgave Green and allowed him to remain in the country. Green, though, had in the interim decided to become a citizen of the Republic of Texas, as he took the oath on February 8, 1845, two days prior to his resignation as Consul. Finally, on February 17, the British Consul General, Charles Elliott, noted that the new Texan had gotten one of his "devices" through Congress. The "Texas Trading, Mining, and Emigrating Company," Elliott concluded, had definite possibilities of success since Green was well "versed in the art of managing such baits upon public credulity."

Not surprisingly, the "Texas Trading, Mining, and Emigrating Company" went nowhere, and Green soon returned to the United States from
what proved to be his last major political involvement. He established three more newspapers, the *Daily American Telegraph* in 1852, the *American Statesman* in 1857, and the *People's Weekly* in 1868, but each was short-lived. On several occasions he consulted with Jefferson Davis about the Confederacy's foreign and financial policies, and because of his wife's distant kinship with Abraham Lincoln, the President gave him a private audience at Richmond in 1865 to discuss peace terms for the South. Yet most of his time was devoted to the promotion of numerous business and financial enterprises. He organized the Union Company, the American Land Company, the Maryland Industrial Agency, the Planter's Insurance Trust and Loan Company, and the Mississippi American Industrial Agency. To link Knoxville, Tennessee, with Dalton, Georgia, a town he had founded, he built the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad. Just before the Civil War, he organized the Pennsylvania Fiscal Agency, the predecessor of the Credit Mobilier of America. Then during the war, he conducted iron works in Alabama and Tennessee to provide Southern troops with arms, munitions, and other supplies. Lastly, he was busy writing a series of books on trade, finance, and politics: *Facts and Suggestions on the Subject of Currency and Direct Trade* (1861), *Facts and Suggestions Relating to Finance and Currency* (1864), *Facts and Suggestions, Biographical, Financial, and Political* (1866), *A Memorial and a Bill Relating to Finance, National Currency, Debt, Revenue, etc.* (1869), and *How to Pay Off the National Debt, Regulate the Value of Money and Maintain Stability in the Value of Property and Labor* (1872).

Green spent his last years at "Hopewell," his home near Dalton, writing on a wide range of topics, dabbling in business and politics, and reminiscing about his acquaintance with the great men of the past fifty
years. Here at 5:00 p.m. on June 10, 1875, Green, age 84, died. According to his obituary in the Dalton Enterprise, until moments before his death "his mind retained all its pristine vigor and the remembrances of his exploits, about which he loved to converse with friends and visitors." His favorite ideas, the newspaper continued, "seemed to be the payment of the national debt, the building up of Dalton, and the originating of measures which would benefit the human race." Two days later, Dalton's founder was buried in the cemetery of the town's First Baptist Church. Though it was Saturday, Dalton's "stores were closed and all business suspended." The youths of the "Duff Green Literary Society" served as honorary pallbearers, and the Reverend W. C. Wilkes filled the air with rhetoric typically reserved for the dead:

The deceased . . . was a prince and a great man in many respects: In talent and genius which in early life made him the peer of great statesmen, and linked his name with those of Calhoun, Clay, Webster, and Jackson; in his great sagacity and forecast, in seeing farther ahead than most other men; in his energy and enterprise; in his greatness of heart, his generosity and unselfishness, which in all his enterprises had, for an objective point, the greatest good for the greatest number, rather than the sordid desire to accumulate wealth for himself. But above all, he was a prince and a great man in this, that like Mary, he had chosen the better part.18

Biographers do not have the luxury of being as uncritical as mourners at a funeral. In fact, during his ten years as editor and publisher of the Telegraph, Green was never nearly the equal of Calhoun, Clay, Webster, or even Francis P. Blair; he often acted unwisely and with shortsightedness; he spent a great deal of time in an unsuccessful attempt to become independently wealthy; and none of his contemporaries would have dared to call the vitriolic editor a "prince." Certainly, some of his failures were beyond his control, yet a majority were simply a result of his poor judgment. Other persons deserve credit for his successes, but
this bullheaded, fiercely independent American, possessing a chronic persecution complex, usually prevailed alone and often in spite of himself. As for his contributions, though Clio would not consider them to be positive, his perpetuation of the demagogic style of journalism and his propagation of state rights and proslavery principles had unintentionally helped to prepare the mind of the South for secession in 1860.

Green had a few endearing characteristics. He was a diligent worker simultaneously editing a newspaper, conducting political campaigns, and of course attempting to make his fortune. Even though his thoughts were frequently directed to ridiculous schemes, Green possessed an active and creative mind. The editor was also a good father and a loving husband, and his offspring, especially Ben Green, were indebted to their father for their prosperity.

By his relationship with John C. Calhoun, Green proved that he could be a loyal friend. From the beginning of their acquaintance in the early 1820s until the Carolinian's death in 1850, Green gave Calhoun his allegiance. He avowed Calhoun's political principles, married his daughter off to the great Nullifier's son, and was his staunchest supporter for the Presidency. Nevertheless, Green was not a blind follower. He was critical of Calhoun's South Carolina friends for their militant and politically controversial stand against the tariff, and he went so far as to threaten to abandon Calhoun over Nullification. As for Calhoun's role in the relationship, he aided Green with patronage, advised him in political and business affairs, and tolerated Green's shortcomings. Undoubtedly, Calhoun was fond of Green and valued the support of the Telegraph. Yet the Carolinian always maintained a safe distance from Green's political schemes, and sometimes had to intervene to curb his editor's
overzealousness. Thus the Calhoun-Green relationship was never between equals, was at best between mentor and student, and was sometimes little more than an idol stooping to correct his most ardent worshipper.

Green obviously had much to learn from Calhoun. Though he constantly spoke of maintaining principles, he was clearly the pragmatic man for whom money, power, and prestige were always paramount. Perhaps he was attracted to Calhoun because the Carolinian possessed the principles that he so obviously lacked. Green was also dishonest. He was often deceitful with his business and political acquaintances as well as the readers of his paper in an attempt to manipulate others for his own purposes. Seeing a conspiracy in each new movement of his opponents, Green undoubtedly suffered from a persecution complex. This paranoia lessened his credibility among his associates and reduced the influence of his newspaper. Politically, he behaved like a neophyte as he expected groups with opposing interests to unite, and he claimed to be sure of victory given the reality of almost certain defeat. His only successful political effort was his newspaper campaign for Jackson in 1828, and he possessed no real influence during the two years he was administration editor. Financially, he was much more a speculator than an entrepreneur. His wildness in financial matters guaranteed his repeated failures, and besides the Telegraph, none of his business enterprises had any lasting success.

Yet regardless of his numerous personal shortcomings, and despite his apparent lack of influence and success in politics and business, the Telegraph editor inadvertently made two significant contributions to American journalism and politics. First, he perpetuated and refined the tradition of demagogic journalism in the United States. Newspapers
relying on emotion and prejudice to win converts to their causes had existed in Colonial America and had flourished during the Revolutionary era, then during the turbulent administration of John Adams. But none of the Telegraph's predecessors had its circulation, influence, or penchant for carrying on editorial crusades based on self-righteousness, fear, and controversy. "Bargain, Intrigue, and Management," "Reform," the battle with James Watson Webb, the machinations of Martin Van Buren, Jackson's conversion to Federalism, Southern unification, the vindication of Calhoun, the threat of abolition, and the defense of the Bank were the subjects of some of Green's editorial campaigns. In a few of these crusades he attempted to provoke the public's indignation against some injustice to one of his political allies. But above all, he relied on fear to shape public opinion. Especially following his break with Jackson, he dedicated his press to heighten Southern paranoia about Jackson's neo-Federalism, the abolitionists, and the South's lack of unity. Finally, at the bottom of each of Green's crusades was the desire to elevate Calhoun to the Presidency. When Green defended Calhoun, or, more ambiguously, when he supported Jackson or suddenly decided to aid the Bank, he was attempting to use his talents as the foremost demagogic journalist of his time to set the country ablaze for his political idol.

Paradoxically, Green's second contribution was the propagation of state rights and proslavery principles. The demagogic journalist, who lacked any consistent political beliefs, used his influence to spread throughout the country the doctrines of strict construction, a weak central government, and the positive good of slavery. The Telegraph repeatedly warned that the South's failure to unite on state rights would
result in the section's forfeiture of its political freedom and its ultimate subjection to a dominant central government. Green also proposed the formation of local, state, and national organizations to spread the "doctrines of '98." Yet Green's devotion to state rights principles was based on political expediency. He championed the rights of the states as an antirestrictionist in the Missouri legislature, but after becoming the Jackson Administration editor he lost interest in state rights. Then, following his break with the President, he began to assume a more radical stance, eventually dedicating his press and himself to the propagation of state rights and proslavery principles. There are two explanations for this vacillation. First, this political mercenary would abandon or espouse state rights as his self-interest would seem to indicate. Just as decisive, though, was his devotion to Calhoun. If he had to ignore state rights principles so that the Carolinian could become Jackson's successor, Green was willing to do so. On the other hand, if his idol proved to be a man of principle unwilling to give up his beliefs to become President, he showed that he was ready to set about converting the South and ultimately the nation to Calhoun's state rights and proslavery ideology.

Green's two contributions had their impact on the growing sectional controversy leading to the War for Southern Independence. The Charleston _Mercury_, Mississippi _Free Trader_, and other fire-eating Southern journalists of the 1840s and 1850s carried on the demagoguery of the _Telegraph_ as they appealed to the South's fears about interference with slavery and attempted to arouse Southern hostility against the alleged perfidy of the North. Yet these newspapers ultimately advocated secession, an alternative that Green's press had always spurned in the belief
that Southern rights had to be won within the Union. But despite this
opposition to disunion, Green had unwittingly prepared the mind of the
South for these radical editors who would eventually convince their
readers that the section no longer had any security as part of the United
States. Likewise, Green had promoted state rights for the South as the
means for it to maintain its institutions and gain political power within
the Union. Moreover, Calhoun's Nullification, the doctrine that had de­
stroyed the South Carolinian's chances for "political preferment," was
actually a relatively conservative measure whereby one state could de­
fend itself from the tyranny of the rest of the Union. Again, however,
future Southern politicians would build upon the work of Calhoun and Green
to carry state rights to unprecedented extremes. Then in 1861, after the
South had become so attached to principle that it could not compromise, a
state of mind incomprehensible to a practical politician like Green, the
section would finally unite to form a government supposedly based on
state rights and proslavery. But by this time Calhoun had been dead for
over ten years, and an elderly Green was thus left behind to support
half-heartedly the perverted consequences of his earlier labors as editor
of the United States' Telegraph.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER VIII

1
Green to H. M. Foulkes, August 29, 1833, Green Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N. C. Hereafter cited as GP-SHC.

2
Charles P. Green of Washington, North Carolina, was at this time carrying on a correspondence campaign in his state to save Green's press. He also planned to go through every county in North Carolina to solicit patronage for the Telegraph. According to Green, "I also know as you do the injury that the Editor of the Telegraph has sustained both in a political and pecuniary manner." Moreover, if the editor did not receive financial aid soon, Charles Green quoted Green as saying that "he will be compelled to strike his flag." Charles P. Green to William L. Long, December 26, 1834, to Thomas C. Matthews, to P. H. Simmons, December 27, 1834 in Henry T. Shanks (ed.), The Papers of Willie Person Mangum (5 vols., Raleigh, 1950-1956), II, 255-259.

3
Telegraph, October 23, 1835; Green to Cralle, March 4, December 12, 1835, Green Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress (hereafter cited as GP-LC); Green to William C. Preston, April 5, 1835, GP-SHC.

4
Telegraph, October 8, December 10, 1835, March-April, May 9, August 5, 1836; Nicholas Biddle to Green, February 18, 1836, Green to Cralle, March 17, May 6, 9, June 6, 1836, GP-LC; A. P. Upshur to Green, February 23, March 17, 1836, GP-SHC; Calhoun to Green, January 24, 1836 in J. Franklin Jameson (ed.), Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1899, II (Washington, 1900), 356-357.

5
Telegraph, October 4, November, December 1836, January, February 21, 1837.

6

Baltimore Merchant, May 24, June 21, August 3, September 26, 1837; Washington Reformer, April 29, 1837.

Green to Calhoun, July 11, 1837, A. P. Upshur to Green, August 4, 1837, R. Hoe and Co. to Green, October 27, 1837, GP-SHC; Green to Cralle, July 20, August 9, 1837, GP-LC; Calhoun to Green, October 27, 1837 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 383-384; Prospectus of Washington Reformer, October 26, 1837, Henry E. Huntington Library. Incidentally, Biddle's cotton corner proved disastrous and was a major cause of the failure of the United States Bank of Pennsylvania. Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era, 1828-1848 (New York, 1959), 85.

F. Green to Green, October 15, November 20, 1837, January 22, 1838, November 30, 1839, GP-SHC; Calhoun to Green, October 11, 1838 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 405-406; Thomas Harney to Green, November 17, 1838, Calhoun Papers, Clemson University, Clemson, S. C.; Green to Margaret Calhoun, June 28, 1839, Calhoun Papers, Duke University, Durham, N. C.


John Tyler to Edward Everett, April 27, 1843, Green to Tyler, May 31, 1843, July 3, 1843, to A. P. Upshur, August 3, 1843 in Frederick Merk, Slavery and the Annexation of Texas (New York, 1972), 211-213, 217-225 (hereafter cited as Merk, SAT); Green to Calhoun, August 2, 1843 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 846-849; Madeleine B. Stern, "Stephen Pearl Andrews, Abolitionist, and the Annexation of Texas," Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 67 (1963),503-504; Green to William McCulloch, August 29, 1843, Harwood Family Papers, Maryland Historical Society; Green to Ben Green, August 29, 1843, GP-SHC.

15. William R. Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs (Washington, 1936), XII, 296n.; Green to Calhoun, September 27, 30, October 7, 9, 1844 in Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, XII, 368-371; Green to Calhoun, October 28, November 12, 29, 1844 in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 975-980, 991-995, 1000-1002.

16. Ebenezer Allen to Andrew Jackson Donelson, January 4, 21, 1845, Donelson to Allen, January 6, 20, 1845 in Garrison, Texas Diplomatic Correspondence, II (2), part 2, 332-327, 346-351; Charles Elliott to Lord Aberdeen, February 8, 17, 1845 in Ephraim D. Adams (ed.), British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas (Austin, Tex., 1912), 441-442, 448-449; Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence, XII, 296n.


ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

MANUSCRIPTS

The following collections and repositories contain manuscripts relating to Duff Green. Significant sources for this study are designated.


Alderman Library. University of Virginia.

David Barton Collection. Chicago Historical Society.


John C. Calhoun Papers. Clemson University.

This collection contains several letters in the Green-Calhoun correspondence and is especially useful for Green's diplomatic activities in the 1840s.


John C. Calhoun Papers. University of South Carolina.


Green carried on a frequent correspondence with his brother-in-law during the 1820s and early 1830s, and this collection holds a few letters not printed elsewhere.

Edward Everett Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society.


This is the most widely used collection of Green papers. Basically covering the period 1824-1850, these manuscripts are especially valuable for Jacksonian politics and Green's diplomatic escapades in the 1840s. Green's frequent correspondence with Richard K. Cralle is contained in these papers.

This is the largest body of Green manuscripts. A gift of Professor Fletcher M. Green of the University of North Carolina, the collection contains 10,000 letters and business papers as well as several manuscript volumes. Though the dated correspondence (1810-1902) is mainly concerned with Green's business ventures, the manuscript volumes contain copies of letters sent by the Telegraph editor, which largely deal with politics and journalism. A number of the papers also deal with the affairs of Green's son, Ben. There is a microfilm edition of the collection.


Harwood Family Papers. Maryland Historical Society.

Johns Hopkins University Library.

Henry E. Huntington Library.
This repository holds several significant political letters written by Green during the Jacksonian period.

Emil Hurja Collection. Tennessee State Library.

Illinois State Historical Society.

John M. McCalla Manuscripts. Duke University.

Randolph Family Collection. University of Virginia.


Talmadge Papers. State Historical Society of Wisconsin.


Tucker-Coleman Papers. College of William and Mary.
This collection contains the correspondence (mainly mid-1830s) between Green and Beverly Tucker.

John Tyler Scrapbook. College of William and Mary.

Christopher Van Devanter Collection. University of Michigan.

Western Historical Manuscript Collection. University of Missouri.

NEWSPAPERS

Only papers used in this study are listed.

Baltimore Merchant and Reformer.
This short-lived paper was published by Green and edited by Green and Richard K. Cralle in 1837. The Library of Congress holds the original.

Niles' Weekly Register.

St. Louis Enquirer.
Published by Green in 1824-1825, this journal dealt mainly with the election of 1824. The Library of Congress holds scattered originals, but 1825 issues are practically nonexistent.

United States Gazette.

United States' Telegraph.
The Telegraph is the main journalistic source of this study. Because of the large number of extracts that Green printed in his newspaper, the Telegraph is also an excellent source for the editorial content of the Globe, National Intelligencer, National Journal, Richmond Enquirer, and other leading newspapers of the Jacksonian period. The paper is available on microfilm from the University of Virginia.

Washington Reformer.
Cralle's paper followed the Telegraph and was issued from February 22 to April 29, 1837, at which time it merged with Green's Merchant. Though Cralle issued a prospectus for the Reformer following the death of the Merchant, it evidently was never published.
The following printed sources are cited in this study.

Adams, Ephraim D. ed. *British Diplomatic Correspondence Concerning the Republic of Texas.* Austin, Tex.: Texas State Historical Association, 1912.


________. *The Papers of John C. Calhoun.* Edited by Robert Meriwether, W. Edwin Hemphill, and Clyde N. Wilson. 12 vols. to date. Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1959--. When completed, this work will provide students with a convenient source for the voluminous but scattered correspondence of the Carolinian. Unfortunately, the work had reached only the early 1820s when research for this study was undertaken.


Clay, Henry. *The Papers of Henry Clay.* Edited by James F. Hopkins and Mary W. M. Hargreaves. 5 vols. to date. Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1959--. When completed, this work should give a good indication of the National Republican-Whig attitude toward Duff Gween.
Collins, H. O. "Descendants of Robert Green and Allied Families in the State of Virginia." *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, VII (1900-01), 77-80, 213-216. This article proved to be a valuable genealogical source for the Green family.

"Correspondence of Judge Tucker." *William and Mary Quarterly*, 1st ser., XII (1903-04), 84-95.


Edwards, Ninian. *The Edwards Papers*. Edited by E. B. Washburne. Chicago: Fergus Printing Co., 1884. This work contains a number of the letters in the Green-Edwards correspondence of the 1820s and 1830s.


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Green, Duff. *Facts and Suggestions: Biographical, Historical, Financial, and Political*. New York: Richardson & Co., 1866. This autobiographical work is valuable for Green's early career. Nevertheless, it should be read critically, since, like most memoirs, it is frequently self-serving.

Green, Fletcher M. "Duff Green, Industrial Promoter." *Journal of Southern History*, II (1936), 28-42. This is the best introductory article on Green's business career. Unfortunately, it begins in the late 1830s and was of little help in this study.

. "Duff Green, Militant Journalist of the Old School." *American Historical Review*, LII (1947), 247-264. This article is the best introduction to Green's career as journalist and politician.


Hood, Howard A. "Duff Green: A Study of Entrepreneurship in the Old South." M.A. Thesis. Vanderbilt University, 1974. In this study of Green's business activities from the late 1830s to the Civil War, Hood finds the same wild attitude toward financial affairs that characterized his career as editor of the *Telegraph*.

Jackson, Andrew. *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson*. Edited by John S. Bassett. 7 vols. Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926-1935. This work contains several letters in the Jackson-Green correspondence and a number of other letters relating to the editor.


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"Names of the Framers of Missouri's Constitution of 1820." *Missouri Historical Review, VI* (1912), 60-63.


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