The search for security: Indian-English relations in the Trans-Appalachian region, 1758-1763

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THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY: INDIAN-ENGLISH RELATIONS IN THE TRANS-APPALACHIAN REGION, 1758-1763

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

PH.D. 1983

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The Search for Security:
Indian-English Relations in the Trans-Appalachian Region,
1758-1763

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Michael N. McConnell
1983

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APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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To Alice and Michael

with love
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Forword. ........................................ vi
Acknowledgements. ......................... x
List of Maps. .................................... xii
Abstract. ...................................... xiii

Chapter I. The Trans-Appalachian Indian World in 1760. .......... 2
Chapter II. The Anglo-American West to 1754. ................. 83
Chapter III. The Roots of Anglo-Indian Relations
in the West; 1755-1758. ..................... 112

Chapter IV. The Search for Security:
The Anglo-American Occupation of the West,
1758-1762. ................................ 189

Chapter V. The Quest for Security:
The Indian Search for Accommodation,
1758-1761. ................................. 288

Chapter VI. The Failure of Accommodation,
1761-1762. ................................ 337

Chapter VII. Toward War, 1762-1763. ......................... 399
Afterward. ................................... 432
Conclusions. .................................. 439
Bibliography. .................................. 446
Vita. ............................................ 461

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FORWARD

From May 1763 until late fall 1764 Indians living west of the Appalachian Mountains fought a brief, though costly, war with the English. This conflict, popularly known as the "conspiracy of Pontiac", was in fact the outcome of a nearly five year effort on the part of Great Lakes and Ohio Valley Indians and a variety of English and colonial interests to control the future of the west in the wake of the conquest of Canada during the Seven Years' War.

Historians have traditionally regarded this conflict either as a footnote in the history of the first British empire or as a contest between inherently inferior native people and the on-coming tide of Anglo-American civilization. A variation on this latter theme has been a fixation with the Ottawa war leader Pontiac and the question of whether his activities at Detroit in 1763 represented a pan-Indian "conspiracy" directed against English pretensions to control the west. Regardless of the theme, however, an air of inevitability hangs over these analyses that assumes English victory and tends to focus on the military aspects of the Anglo-Indian conflict. Having limited their attention to British imperial politics or a single native leader, previous studies have largely ignored the context within which this Anglo-Indian conflict developed and was played out.

Examined from an ethnohistorical perspective the 1763-1764 con-
flict appears as another episode in the long-standing effort by Indians and English colonists to deal with each other in ways that would ensure their own security and independence. A close examination of events surrounding the 1763-1764 war itself reveals that the collapse of the French colonial empire in North America after 1758, culminating in the surrender of Canada in 1760, presented both Englishmen and Indians with several problems never before encountered. For colonists and royal authorities, the conquest of New France enlarged Britain's American domain and offered new opportunities for settlement and economic exploitation. At the same time, however, conquest created managerial and security problems made more difficult due to the absence of any coherent policy for dealing with the new lands and the numerous, potentially hostile, people they held. For army and Indian service officers and their men, security issues, paramount of which was the control of western Indians, dominated their relationships with the natives. Bound by war-time commitments to protect Indian lands and to create a fair trade in return for peace, these officials had also to confront renewed colonial interest in land and trade in a region long coveted and denied.

The numerous trans-Appalachian Indian societies confronted their own problems after 1758. For them the end of the inter-colonial wars brought little promise of security and the threat of renewed invasion by people still defined by many Indians as enemies. The war that led to the defeat of France exposed Indians to population loss as well as social, political, and economic disruption; the French defeat having upset a century-old alliance system based on trade and mutual interest.
that had created a familiar, advantageous environment within which Indian communities could pursue their own interests. At the same time, however, increased trade since the 1650s had left western Indians more dependent on European sources of supply, especially for such economically necessary items as muskets, powder, and lead without which hunting, and therefore trade, were nearly impossible by 1760. The French defeat shattered this stable world and forced western Indians to confront a victorious, aggressive invader who threatened the natives' own political and economic security.

Neither English Americans nor Indians responded to the rapidly changing circumstances in the west as cultural monoliths. Rather, local, particular economic and political interests and timing determined the pattern of relationships that emerged as various Indian groups—defined largely in terms of village communities—attempted to create new, peaceful relations with an equally fragmented collection of English colonial and royal interests. In the pattern of relations that emerged between 1758 and 1762 there emerged a complexity that belies the notion of a pan-Indian movement to forestall the English at any price. The leaders within native communities that emerged at this time, among them Pontiac, represented a wide range of responses from armed resistance to accommodation. At the same time, regional differences in native approaches to the English appear, based on local conditions, regional history, and patterns of inter-societal relations that further call into question the validity of arguing either for or against the notion of "conspiracy". Rather, the evidence suggests that the dynamics of Anglo-Indian relations during this time are best under-
stood in terms of local, often competing interests. While land was an
overriding concern of Indians living in the Ohio country, for example, it was less so for Great Lakes Indians whose interests lay in making
the English conform to older patterns of inter-societal relations. This was equally true of the English Americans, whose traders, land
speculators, and soldiers sometimes cooperated but more often collided as official efforts to rationalize Indian policy conflicted with private interests.

Cooperation, taking many forms, developed between specific In­
dian groups and the English as royal forces continued to occupy west­ern forts abandoned by the French. This cooperation was never uni­
versal and was ultimately wrecked largely by official English refusal
to conform to patterns of inter-societal relations that had develop­
ed in the west over the previous century. On the contrary, orders
issued by the American commander-in-chief, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, were
directed toward altering Anglo-Indian relations in such a way as to
make those relations conform to the new political realities in the west
as defined by royal officials. For western Indians, however, such an
alteration amounted to a wholesale revolution in relations that threat­
ened native security and independence. This, coupled with the sudden
realization by the end of 1762 that the French—and with them the old
order—would not be restored as many had assumed, led to a growing,
though never universal, awareness that resistance now represented the
only alternative to submission to a hostile, aggressive invader. Rath­
er than the inevitable clash between "Indian" and "white", the 1763–
1764 war was the outgrowth of a failed process of cultural interaction
as all parties attempted to create a world in the west best suited to
their needs.
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base and some very impressionistic notes and creating the maps con-
tained herein.
LIST OF MAPS

Map

1. The Trans-Appalachian Region . . . . . . following p. xiii.
2. Trans-Appalachian Indians, 1760 . . . . . following p. 82.
   1758-1763
ABSTRACT

Between May 1763 and the fall of 1764, Indians living west of the Appalachian Mountains waged a war they hoped would rid them of the growing menace posed by English military forces and colonial traders and settlers. These Anglo-Americans had begun to occupy the trans-Appalachian region in 1758 as French power in North America declined during the last years of the Great War for the Empire.

Historians since Francis Parkman have tended to deal with this Anglo-Indian war in two ways. First, the conflict has been interpreted in terms of a pan-Indian conspiracy led by a single visionary figure, Pontiac. This interpretation tends to ignore causation in favor of assumptions about Anglo-Indian relations rooted in concepts of civilization versus savagery and directs attention to the military conflict itself. A second interpretation, represented in studies of British imperial politics during the eighteenth century, deals with the dynamics of Anglo-Indian relations only insofar as they relate directly to larger issues of imperial policies and administration. This London-centered perspective precludes any understanding of events in America on their own terms. Neither of these general interpretations has placed the events of 1763-1764 in a context of ongoing Anglo-Indian relations nor satisfactorily explores the reasons why these relations degenerated into a war that had ramifications both for those directly involved and the larger pattern of English and colonial frontier policies.

By looking at the conflict as the result of efforts by colonists, royal officials, and western Indians to deal with each other on several levels, a new interpretation based on an ethnohistorical approach to largely traditional sources emerges. In the wake of the French defeat, both Indians and Englishmen faced a number of pressing security problems generated by the radically altered political and economic balance of power. Far from being immediately hostile to the oncoming English, western Indians displayed a variety of strategies in their efforts to deal with the new invaders, strategies rooted in cultural values as well as past experience. Difficulties arose when English military leaders increasingly defined their solution to an expanded American empire in terms of reducing Indians to a level of impotence and manageability through trade regulation and armed force. In the process and in the absence of direction from London, these officials revolutionized Indian relations in ways that compelled increasing numbers of natives to define war as their only option.

The conflict that erupted reveals the lack of "pan-Indianism", the complexity of Anglo-Indian relations that precludes simple definition, and the weakness of England's hold over the west prior to the American Revolution.
THE SEARCH FOR SECURITY
CHAPTER I

The Trans-Appalachian Indian World in 1760

On December 4, 1758, a delegation of Ohio Indians led by the Delaware sachem Tamaqua arrived at the forks of the Ohio River to hear the words of British General John Forbes and to determine the Englishman's intentions. The Indians were not the least intimidated by the presence of Forbes' troops and had frustrated Colonel Henry Bouquet's occupation plans by warning the English to leave the Ohio at once. Three such warnings were issued before a compromise was struck: Bouquet could keep a token force in the ruins of Fort Duquesne but the Ohio Indians would accept no responsibility for their safety and would offer no assistance. The English proceeded to establish "Pittsboro," none too secure in the knowledge that their hosts had made it clear that the land was theirs and the troops remained at native sufferance.¹

Two years later, in mid-November 1760, delegations of the Wyandots, Ottawas, and other native groups living along the south shore of Lake Erie conferred with another representative of His Majesty's arms, Major Robert Rogers. Following the surrender of Canada, Rogers and a body of troops had been dispatched by the British commander-in-chief in America, Sir Jeffrey Amherst, to take possession of the French posts on the Great Lakes. In addition, Rogers, like Forbes and Bouquet on the Ohio, was to assure the local Indians of English friendship, or at least to allay their suspicions until stronger
garrisons could be sent west. At the Cuyahoga River and later at Sandusky and Detroit, the Ottawas and Wyandots agreed to give the English safe passage through their territories, but only in return for gifts and pledges of a renewed trade on native terms, the giving of which underscored native possession and control over what Amherst and his subordinates recognized as England's newest American territory.  

The sachems and war leaders who met the English on the Ohio and at Detroit represented a large number of Indians who, regardless of French losses or English victories, still retained effective control over what had become England's reward as victor of the Great War for the Empire. Until recently, many of these people had taken up the hatchet against the English and some, notably the Delawares and Shawnees, had taken serious losses or had been forced to re-locate towns as a result of English and colonial retaliation for costly and effective raids against frontier settlements and forts. Any understanding of subsequent relations between these Indians and the on-coming Anglo-Americans in the early 1760s must necessarily begin with the natives who occupied Britain's "conquest": their locale, numbers, culture, and conditions as Anglo-Americans began arranging for the military and commercial exploitation of the trans-Appalachian region.

I

The Indians who spoke with the English at Fort Duquesne and Detroit occupied a territory extending from the headwaters of the Allegheny River to the upper Mississippi valley and south to the Ohio.
Their lands included what the French called the pays d'en haut—the upper country: the lands drained by the upper Great Lakes and the upper Mississippi River. For the purposes of this study this region will be more closely defined as including the lands lying between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, bounded on the east by the Appalachian Mountains and the Genesee River of New York and on the west by the upper Mississippi and Fox Rivers. This region contained a variety of landforms and vegetation ranging from the rolling hills and numerous secondary streams of the Allegheny Plateau to the prairie lands along the Mississippi and the mixed forests and lake-riverine network of the Canadian Shield.

The native inhabitants of this region included parts or all of fourteen groups. The majority of these were Algonkian-speaking peoples belonging to the Delawares, Shawnees, Ojibwas (including the Mississaugas and Saulteaux bands), Ottawas, Potawatomis, Sauk, Fox, Kickapoos, Illinois, Mascouten, Menominees, and Miamis (including the Weas/Ouatanons and Piankashaws). In addition, there were the Iroquoian Senecas, Wyandots, and a hybrid group known as the Ohio Iroquois or Mingos. Finally, there were the Siouan-speaking Winnebagos. Though living outside the area defined above, the eastern Sioux and the remaining five of the Six Nations Iroquois played an important part in determining the politics and power relationships within the region.

Trade, inter-societal and inter-colonial wars, dispossession, disease, and depletion of food reserves had, in various combinations, led to significant re-locations of native groups. As a result, by
the end of the Seven Years’ War few of the Indians in the Old North­west were living on lands occupied by their predecessors in the early seventeenth century. Generally speaking, however, the upper Great Lakes witnessed less large-scale migration and re-settlement after 1700 than did the Ohio River valley which, after 1720, saw widespread settlement by Indians from western New York, eastern Pennsylvania, and southern Michigan.\textsuperscript{4} This process of settlement continued during, and was disrupted by, the English occupation of the region after 1758. In addition, the fur trade had the effect of creating international trading communities composed of elements of several native groups. The best example of this is Detroit.\textsuperscript{5} Observations made by travelers, soldiers, and fur traders, and the narratives of English men and women taken prisoners during frontier raids permit a relative­ly complete reconstruction of the location of the trans-Appalachian Indians at the end of the Seven Years’ War and the circumstances that brought them to these places.

Along the Niagara River one or more settlements of Iroquois had earned a living for several decades carrying supplies and trade goods for the French over the portage road. In 1718 a French report men­tioned a “Seneca village of about ten cabins” whose occupants were “employed by the French, from whom they earn money by carrying goods of those who are going to the Upper Country.”\textsuperscript{6} The back-breaking task of carrying heavy loads up the steep Niagara escarpment—the Seneca named the carrying place “Duh-jih-heh-ah” or “walking on all fours”—did not prevent a number of western Senecas, and perhaps other Iroquois, from taking advantage of the employment opportunity or of

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having occasional confrontations with their French employers. It was this latter problem that led the Senecas to dispatch a sachem to Buffalo Creek, near present Buffalo, New York, to oversee the work and act as labor mediator. Around him grew a small village in addition to the cabins reported downstream. The number of those living and working on the road is difficult to determine with any accuracy, although in 1750 the Swedish scientist Peter Kalm estimated that "above 200 Indians, most of them belonging to the Six Nations." portaged furs for the French. In 1759 Captain Pierre Pouchot, French engineer and commandant of Fort Niagara, placed several "Indian huts" on his plan of the fort and its environs. Whether these represented yet another portage settlement or a camp for French auxiliaries is not certain. While there is no direct evidence of any Indian laborers on the road at the time of the English occupation in July 1759, it is reasonable to assume that some, if not all, of the Iroquois living there would have continued their lucrative work, even under new management.

Across Lake Ontario from Niagara, bands of Mississaugas had settled at what was known as the "Head of the Lake" and in the vicinity of the French trading post at Toronto. These, like the Senecas on the portage road, were initially drawn to the Niagara area by the presence of French traders and the proximity of the English emporium at Oswego. These Mississaugas remained in the area after the French surrender of Niagara and attempted to re-establish trade with the English.

South of the Niagara River, the Ohio valley represented the
most recently occupied as well as the most heavily settled part of the trans-Appalachian region. From the Seneca towns on the upper Allegheny to the forks of the Ohio, the valley was dotted with at least eight towns and numerous smaller hunting and farming camps on the eve of Forbes' march on Fort Duquesne. While the inhabitants included some Wyandots and elements of the Shawnees and some refugee Fox Indians, the majority were Delawares and Mingo Iroquois. In 1748 the Pennsylvania Indian agent Conrad Weiser estimated the number of warriors on the Ohio as 789; the Delawares and Iroquois were represented by 180 and 292 respectively. First settled in the 1720s by bands of Shawnees and Delawares seeking a haven from conflicts with both the Six Nations and the colony of Pennsylvania, the valley had witnessed rapid population growth as other Indians sought to escape food shortages and land-hungry whites. In the 1730s and 1740s movement into the valley was given further impetus by the arrival of both Anglo-American and French traders who followed earlier native migrations and established trade networks throughout the region.

Since the mid-1740s the Ohio country, and the trade and settlement opportunities it offered, had been the object of a three-way contest between the Indian inhabitants, the Anglo-Americans of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the Canadian French. The result had been a more or less continuous shifting of population as bands and villages moved into and out of the area seeking trade or security from enemies, Indian as well as European. By the fall of 1758 yet another series of movements was taking place in response to the sudden change in the military balance of power brought on by the French retreat from the
forks of the Ohio.

The Shawnees, who had been the pathfinders of the Indian movement west, had all but abandoned the upper Ohio by November 1758. Prior to that time they had maintained, with French support, a sizable community at Logstown below Fort Duquesne, on the site of an earlier Iroquois town. Shortly after the English arrived at the fort, Christian Frederick Post made a trip to Logstown and found the remains of "about thirty houses" built by the French for the Shawnees. The ungathered corn reported by Post suggests the haste with which the occupants left the town. Post further observed that "Between Sacague[sic] and Pittsburgh, all the Shawanas towns are empty of people." That the Shawnees feared English retaliation for their support of the French cannot be doubted. However, an observation made a year later by George Croghan sheds additional light on why the Shawnees abandoned their upper Ohio towns. Croghan's Indian informants told him that the "Shawnesse have sent to bring all their people who have been several years amongst the Creeks, home" and appeared to want to concentrate their whole population farther down the Ohio. If so, those on the upper Ohio may have had political reasons for leaving, which the English invasion made more compelling.

Upon the removal of the Shawnees the upper Ohio valley was left to the Ohio Iroquois and Delawares, with the exception of raiding parties of Ottawas, Wyandots, and others from across the Lakes. Iroquois hunting and trading parties had begun moving into the Ohio country in the 1730s and 1740s, drawn by the plentiful game and by the presence of French traders on the Cuyahoga River and at Sandusky.
By 1749 the French reported a Seneca town known to them as "Paille Coupe"—or Broken Straw—on the upper Allegheny. This town, known to the English as Buckaloons, and another at Conawango, appears to have been occupied through the early 1760s. Croghan reported in March 1761 that Iroquois from "Connawaga a Town at the head of the Ohio" had come to Fort Pitt.19

Other Iroquois communities on the upper Ohio included a small settlement above the junction of French Creek and the Allegheny River. Known simply as the "Mingo Cabbins" in 1760, this town under the leadership of White Mingo moved down the Ohio in 1761 to build a "Small Town where the Game is plenty."20 That this group should have felt compelled to move in search for food suggests an economic problem that the Anglo-American military presence only exacerbated. Finally, in 1760, another town, known as "the Crow's Town", had been founded at Cross Creek, seventy miles below Fort Pitt. The Crow, a Seneca leader, had first made his plans known late in 1759. No mention was made of where the Crow and his people came from; possibly they represented another phase of the continuing—and to the English and Six Nations, troublesome—out-migration from the Iroquois towns in New York.21

By the 1750s those Delawares living on the Ohio had emerged as a political and military force in regional affairs. Their numbers alone commanded respect and during the border war with Pennsylvania from 1755 to 1758 raiding parties had wreaked havoc upon the province.22 Their authority and influence continued after the withdrawal of the French from the Ohio in 1759. Delaware sachems and war leaders in-
itiated diplomatic contacts with the Anglo-Americans, negotiated commercial relations and served as intermediaries between the English and other Indians to the west.

From the time of Colonel John Armstrong's raid against their villages at Kittanning in 1756 through 1762, the location of the Delawares on the Ohio River was in a state of flux. This was due primarily to the state of war that existed between the Delawares and Pennsylvania and the larger Anglo-French conflict that threatened the Ohio country. Nonetheless, a trend can be observed. From the abandonment of Kittanning and smaller villages on the Allegheny in 1756, the Delaware population moved generally west and southwest toward the upper reaches of the Beaver River and the Muskingum River in central Ohio. This trend accelerated after the French failed to stop the advance of Forbes' army at Fort Ligonier on October 12, 1758. According to one captive, after the battle "They the Delawares" brought their wives and children from Lockstown, Sackum, Schomingo, Mamalty, Kaschkaschkung, and other places... to Moschkingo about one hundred and fifty miles farther west."23 By mid-November 1758, several towns had been established, including Beaver's Town or Tuscarawas at the junction of the Tuscarawas and Big Sandy Rivers in Ohio, Newcomer's Town on the upper Cuyahoga, and Mahoning Town on the Mahoning River near modern Youngstown, Ohio. In addition, Kseekheoong or Salt Lick Town, fifteen miles north of Mahoning, may have been founded at this time.24 A Delaware community on the Hockhocking River dating from 1751 and known as White Woman's Town continued to be occupied at least through 1759.25

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Not all Delawares moved so far west. The complex of villages known collectively as Kuskuskies Town at the confluence of Neshannock and Mahoning creeks continued as a focus of Delaware population and influence in the Ohio country. Initially settled by Iroquois and Wyandots in the 1740s, the Kuskuskies towns were Delaware by the mid-1750s. In 1758, there were four towns containing about ninety houses. Further upstream were the villages of Shenango and Pymatuning, both of which seem to have been occupied into the 1760s. Downstream, at the mouth of the Beaver River, a community variously known as Beaver's Town or Saucunk was still occupied in 1759. This town was associated with the well-known Delaware war leader Shingas, whose raiding parties had done so much damage to the Pennsylvania and Virginia back country. At the mouth of French Creek was the village of Venango and, above it on French Creek Custaloga's Town. Other Delawares lived with the Iroquois at Conawango and at Ganestio. Finally, although many Delawares were resettling to the west and south, others were moving into the Ohio country. In 1762 and again the following year reports reached the Anglo-Americans that Delawares from the Susquehanna River were being encouraged to join their kinsmen on the Ohio. Kuskuskies was the focal point of this migration and Delaware leaders hoped that "a Great Town" could be founded there. Others went to the Salt Licks Town and talked of re-establishing Saucunk, then abandoned.

Below the new Delaware towns on the Muskingum was the Shawnee settlement of Waukautamike. A new town, it had only existed since the fall of 1759. The center of Shawnee polity and population, how-
ever, lay to the south and west on the Scioto River at the town known as Scioto, "Lower Town", "Chillicothe", or "Meguck". Founded in 1758, it remained the center of the Shawnee people in the Ohio country through the 1760s. Both Waukautamike and Scioto reflected the continuing movement of the Shawnees. Prior to 1758 they had been located in two villages: Scioto at the mouth of the Scioto River, and a community known as the Upper Town located on the south side of the Ohio above the mouth of the Kanawha River. Both of these older towns were abandoned in the late 1750s. The town of Scioto was finally moved in 1758 after periodic flooding made the site undesirable. In the move north of the Ohio the two older towns appear to have maintained their older relationship of "upper" and "lower", with the new Lower Town or Scioto growing up on the site of an older Shawnee town known as Meguck; hence the persistence of that name in the records until 1761.

To the west and north of the Shawnee towns, along the Wabash and Maumee river systems, several groups known collectively as the Miamis or Twightwees had their villages. By 1760 the original six groups had been reduced through a process of combination to three: the Wea, also known as the Ouiatanon, the Piankashaw, and the Miamis proper. The Weas and Piankashaws had, by the middle of the eighteenth century, settled along the Wabash River near the French posts of Ouiatanon and Vincennes. The Miamis were located at the head of the Maumee River at the village of Kekionga, established in 1718. The French later built Fort Miami on the site to maintain influence over the Indian town and to protect the inland trade routes which
followed the river. In 1733 this town was temporarily abandoned in the wake of a smallpox epidemic, but was fully re-established when visited by Ensign Thomas Hutchins in 1762. In addition to the town of Kekionga, at least two other bands of Miamis were located on tributaries of the Maumee: the group led by Le Pied Froid on the Eel River, and the Tepicon on Tippecanoe Creek. Closely associated with the Miamis groups were the Mascoutens and Kickapoos. These Indians had lived at Kekionga until the late 1730s, then moved to the Wabash where, in 1762, Hutchins found them living with the Weas near Fort Ouiatanon.

Another Miamis village, known as Pickawillany, had a short but significant existence on the middle Miami River between 1747 and 1752. Founded by the pro-English leader La Demoiselle or "Old Britain", Pickawillany quickly became a haven for Scotch-Irish traders from Virginia and Pennsylvania and a threat to the security of French trade and settlement in the mid-west. After the failure of repeated efforts to negotiate with La Demoiselle, the French finally took punitive action in 1752, destroying Pickawillany and La Demoiselle.

The lands lying between the Muskingum and Scioto rivers and Lake Erie were claimed by the Wyandots, whose principal village was at Detroit. However, this group had only begun to settle south of Lake Erie in 1738, when a village known as Anioton or Canuta was founded near Sandusky Lake. This town, and subsequent Wyandot settlements to the south and east, resulted from a dispute between that people and the Ottawas of Detroit over Wyandot negotiations with the southern Chickasaw Indians. Threats of Ottawa attack and a lack
of French support led to the migration of at least one band of Wyandots which resulted in the Anioton settlement.

A larger Wyandot migration occurred in the mid-1740s when the sachem Nicholas Orontony, miffed at the earlier response to his people's needs and attracted by promises of trade and alliance from Anglo-American traders, led a substantial number of his people to Sandusky. There he and his Anglo-American partners planned to overthrow the French in the west—a plan that came to naught in 1747. Subsequently, Nicholas and part of his group moved south to the forks of the Muskingum where they established Conchaké. Others went east to the trading community at Cuyahoga and then to Kuskuskies. The Conchake settlement continued until about 1750 or 1752 when it was abandoned. Smallpox and French promises of reconciliation appear to have been behind the decision to return to Detroit.

During the 1750s the Sandusky settlement was augmented by a French trading post and an intermittent Wyandot-Mohogan settlement on Pickerel Creek, near Sandusky, and another town on the Sandusky River known as Lower Sandusky. The Pickerel Creek settlement, known as Suntendeand, consisting of only a handful of cabins near the French post, appears to have been a way-station for returning war parties during the Seven Years' War. Both Major Robert Rogers and George Croghan mentioned the existence of both Sandusky towns in the winter of 1760-1761. By this time Anioton was known as Junundat. In 1762 the English built a blockhouse on Pickerel Creek near Suntendeand.

The principal Wyandot village remained at Detroit throughout the eighteenth century, where it formed part of a large trading community.
which included resident Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas as well as others who came on a seasonal basis. At the time of Major Rogers' arrival, the Detroit Indians occupied at least four villages along the Detroit River above and below the French settlement. A summary of western Indian population, compiled in 1763, mentions a single Wyandot town opposite Detroit. The Potawatomis, who had arrived between 1712 and 1717 from the St. Joseph River, occupied a town below the fort on the west side of the River. An English captive reported that in 1756 there were three Ottawa towns: one two miles above the Wyandot village, another, smaller, town on Lake St. Clair, and a third settlement about two miles below Detroit on the west side of the river. In 1762, Ensign Hutchins' map of the trans-Appalachian region shows one Ottawa village just above the Wyandot town on the east side of the river.

The Potawatomis and Ottawas at Detroit represented only parts of these people. The Potawatomis had towns at both Chicago and on the St. Joseph River where, in the aftermath of the first Fox War, the French established Fort St. Joseph to sustain and protect the Potawatomis who had come there from their former settlements at La Baye. The Ottawas likewise had several other towns, primarily along the western shore of Lake Huron. Those Ottawas who had gravitated to the French post at Michilimackinac moved in 1742 to the west and established the village of l'Arbre Croche, which remained their principal village in the area into the 1760s. At the head of Saginaw Bay a village of Ottawas shared the area with groups of Ojibwas.

In addition to these towns, Ottawa hunting parties were found
along the south shore of Lake Erie and, in 1760-1761, one group from Detroit attempted to resettle at Sandusky, away from their more militant neighbors and closer to English trade. During their trip to Detroit in the fall of 1760, Rogers and Croghan reported encounters with Ottawas at Ashtabula, Cuyahoga, and Cedar Point. The group at Cuyahoga may have remained in the area through 1764, at which point references to Ottawas there ceased. Finally, bands of Ottawas were located on Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron and, by 1763, at Chicago and Milwaukee.

The region north of Saginaw Bay through the Straits of Mackinac and across the northern shore of Lake Superior was the home of several bands of Ojibwas. Their hunting culture, based on small, mobile, groups with only seasonal gatherings of bands, makes precise location over time difficult, but several locations can clearly be associated with one or more groups of Ojibwas. Their principal focus was Fort Michilimackinac. The Ojibwa village was on nearby Mackinac Island but, in their discourse with the trader Alexander Henry, the Indians made it clear that their claims extended to the mainland. Henry also mentioned a "village of Chipeways" located at Sault Ste. Marie, but observed that the site was only occupied during the summer, probably as a fishing and trading center. According to a French report of 1736, these sites had been occupied at least from that time. In addition, this document placed Ojibwa bands at Keneewa and Chequemegon on Lake Superior. A 1757 French report listed nine Ojibwa villages including one near Detroit. Henry mentioned both Lake Superior sites between 1763 and 1765.
At La Baye, on Lake Michigan, lived another mixed community of Indians. Aside from a small group of Potawatomis, the territory adjacent to French Fort La Baye and the Fox River was occupied by groups of Sauk and Fox Indians, the Menominees and Winnebagos. The Fox community represented the remnants of a people who had been engaged in two wars with New France and her native allies earlier in the eighteenth century. Although the French were never able to destroy their enemy as they had hoped, the Fox groups were sufficiently reduced in numbers and power to remove them as a threat to French interests in the west. The close association between the Fox and Sauk Indians dates from this time and parts of both groups were already moving west to the Missouri River.

Available sources from the time of the English occupation are extremely vague on the location of the several Indian communities in the area. Thomas Hutchin's map shows only a single Menominee town near the fort. Beyond that the map is imprecise, noting only Winnebago, Sauk-Fox, Potawatomis and Menominee towns "some distance to the Westward of the Bay." The English commander at La Baye, Lieutenant James Gorrell, was little more precise. However, he did make it clear that there were at least three Winnebago towns when, in 1762, he mentioned the arrival of the "chief of the third town of the Puans." Even more imprecise are references to the eastern Sioux who had used the French post as a source of trade goods for re-sale to Indians farther west on the Plains. The best Gorrell could do was to note that they numbered over 30,000 warriors and lived "On west side Mississippi, near 300 leagues off." In his enumeration of western Indians
in 1762, Hutchins failed to mention the Sioux at all.  

II

Making an accurate determination of the size of Indian populations is difficult for any time in the eighteenth century. In some cases a simple lack of sources makes population estimates all but impossible. For the trans-Appalachian region, a wealth of information exists for individual villages or even larger areas, such as the upper Ohio valley. Aggregate figures, when available, do not readily reflect changes in population that are suggested in other references to migrations, warfare, and disease. At no time before 1763 did the English have accurate figures for any part of the west. Indeed, Lieutenant Gorrell's comment upon reaching La Baye in 1761 adequately sums up English knowledge. According to Gorrell, the number of Indians near his post was "more than was ever thought of." Fortunately, the French periodically compiled figures on Indians living within their trade and diplomatic orbit. These, when coupled with figures available from English sources, allow a general, but by no means flawless, assessment of how many people occupied the lands that Britain inherited through conquest.

The Six Nations have been studied and counted at great length and little can be added here beyond some general observations. By 1763 the best estimates assigned 1950 fighting men to the Iroquois, or between seven and nine thousand people. To this figure may be added the Iroquois League's various clients living in New York and
along the upper Susquehanna River. This would add another 200 warriors, something less than a thousand people, to the total. It should be noted, however, that these figures may not include the sizable Iroquois population living in the Ohio country.

Three decades of settlement and exploitation had given the Ohio valley a rather heavy concentration of people by the early 1760s. The earliest reliable figures for the region, dating from 1748, give a total of 789 warriors from at least five Indian groups. This would suggest a total population of between three and four thousand people occupying the dozen-odd towns and camps discussed above. It is impossible to state with any accuracy how many of these people were temporary residents—in the valley only to hunt or trade—but any seasonal losses would have been off-set by other groups moving in for similar reasons or to settle. How long the population continued to grow is also uncertain, but one authority has concluded that by the mid-1750s "the Indian population of the area probably reached and passed its peak." 69

Contemporary sources indicate that the majority of the Ohio valley towns were located on, or very close to, the Ohio River and its major tributaries. While this made sense from the standpoint of communication, subsistence, and trade, this preference for riverine locations also made the towns much more vulnerable to attack. In addition, these towns appear to have varied considerably in size. Pymatuning, located north of Kuskuskies, contained only fifteen houses and about forty warriors. 70 At the other extreme, towns such as the Kuskuskies complex, Logstown, Saucunk, and Kittanning were
swollen by an influx of warriors from both the Ohio and Great Lakes areas during the Seven Years' War. As bases for military operations against Anglo-American settlements, these towns also benefited from French largess. George Croghan observed that all thirty-eight houses at Saucunk were "built by the French for the Indians, some with stone chimneys." Further, Logstown, Kuskuskees, and the Lower Shawnee Town at Scioto were trading and diplomatic centers, making them unusually large and cosmopolitan.

Little descriptive information on the Ohio towns exists for the period. However, what is available permits some generalizations. The larger towns appear to have actually been clusters of clan or family communities sharing a common council house or farming area. The Moravian John Heckewelder described Tuscarawas as a complex of three villages and a trader's establishment lying along the Muskingum River. Kuskuskees consisted of four distinct towns "each at a distance from the others", the whole community consisting of ninety houses in 1758.

A map of Kittanning, drawn at the time of Colonel Armstrong's raid in 1756, gives the clearest representation of what such communities looked like. On a terrace overlooking the Allegheny River was the "Long House", or council house. In all directions from this central point lay clusters of cabins each inhabited by distinct family groups. Those of the Delaware leaders Pisquetomen, Tamaqua, Shingas, and Captain Jacobs are clearly marked. Near the river's edge are the cornfields extending the entire length of the village complex. Undoubtedly most if not all of the larger Iroquois, Delaware, and Shaw-
The smaller towns, such as Pymatuning or Hockhocking, consisted of a small cluster of cabins, a council house, and fields.\textsuperscript{75}

The extent of agricultural activity at these towns also varied with size and function, but the magnitude may be understood from an observation by Major Rogers of the new Delaware town at Tuscarawas. Aside from its population of 180 warriors, Tuscarawas was the center of farming activity that included "about 3,000 acres of cleared ground."\textsuperscript{76} While this town may have been unusually large, English observers seldom failed to remark on the presence and extent of farm land near these towns.\textsuperscript{77}

The Wyandots of Sandusky were reported to have had about 200 warriors or about 800 people.\textsuperscript{78} How many of these lived at the village of Junundat and at Sunyendeand can only be inferred from the sources. Ensign Pauli, commandant of Fort Sandusky in 1762, gave the total population near his post as 200. The fact that this is identical to Hutchins' estimate of the total number of warriors suggests that Pauli was referring to fighting men, rather than to the entire population. The town of Junundat held between seventy and eighty men, or roughly 300 people. Assuming Pauli's estimate at Sunyendeand was for the total population, this would leave between seventy and eighty warriors at Lower Sandusky and any other satellite villages in the area.\textsuperscript{79}

Ensign Hutchins' 1762 survey of the west revealed 230 Miamis and Ouiatanon warriors at and near Fort Miamis(Kekionga). On the Wabash he estimated 300 Ouiatanons and Piankashaws. Based on this information the total Miamis population would have been at least 2100. To this
can be added the Mascoutens and Kickapoos living on the Wabash, the former having ninety warriors, the latter 180 in 1762.

As might be expected, Detroit was in the midst of a substantial native population at the time of its occupation by English troops. Hutchins' estimates for the Indians residing there reveal a total of 970 warriors or at least 4,000 people, all living within twenty miles of the fort. Information supplied by English captives points to Ottawa villages that were band-local and averaged between 200 and 300 people each. As early as 1736, French sources reported a "Sinago" village and one known as "Kiskakon". These names refer to two of the Ottawas' kinship groups. No such information exists for the Wyandots, Potawatomis, or Ojibwas, but it can be assumed that their towns were similarly ordered along kinship lines.

The Potawatomi village at Fort St. Joseph was estimated by Hutchins as having 200 warriors in 1762. A neighboring Ottawa town contained 150 men. No information is available for the third Potawatomi town at Chicago.

Population estimates for the upper Great Lakes in the early 1760s exist, but are less precise in linking numbers to locale. Hutchins gave the number of Ojibwa warriors "At Missilimackinack" as 400, or perhaps between 1,200 and 1,600 people. This number probably represented both the Saginaw Bay and Michilimackinac bands and was only a fraction of the 4,000 Ojibwas and Ottawas reportedly "settled about Lake Huron & Erie & Ontario, who have no fixed residence." This latter figure would undoubtedly include some, at least, of the Mississaugas living near Niagara, but cannot be accepted as reflecting the total
Obiwa-Ottawa population throughout the Great Lakes north and west of Detroit. The one specific piece of information on Ojibwa village size comes from Alexander Henry. He observed that in 1761 the village on Mackinac Island held one hundred warriors, or between three and four hundred people.

Like its counterparts to the east, the trading post at La Baye was the center of a large cosmopolitan population. The four Indian groups resident at the post and along the Fox River were reported by Hutchins to have had 1,090 warriors between them in 1762. This would suggest a total population of between thirty-two hundred and forty-three hundred people for the area.

The Sioux, least known of all the Indians the English would encounter after 1758, were estimated as having in excess of thirty thousand warriors, a number more reflective of English ignorance than Sioux strength. On the strength of a closer association through trade and exploration, French estimates for the 1730s may be taken as somewhat more accurate. In 1736, the Sioux living west of Lake Superior were said to have had three hundred warriors; those of the "Prairies" were said to number two thousand men.

These numbers, while limited in accuracy and usefulness, suggest a formidable native population west of the Appalachians. Other information suggests, however, that by 1760 there had been a general decline in the region's population. This decline did not affect all groups equally, and the causes were manifold. But primary among them were warfare and disease. Separately, either of these phenomena had the potential to play havoc with native groups. What made the middle
decades of the eighteenth century particularly threatening and un­settling for trans-Appalachian Indians was the coincidence of the two, with consequently greater impact.

Smallpox, agues, fevers, and other ill-defined sicknesses periodically swept the trans-Appalachian region. In 1733 an outbreak of smallpox forced the temporary evacuation of the main Miamis town at Kekionga. In 1751-1752 a more widespread outbreak of the disease struck the west. It was centered in the Wyandot town of Conchake, but apparently spread to Detroit, perhaps by Wyandots fleeing the Ohio town. The political repercussions were equally severe. At the same time that large numbers of Miamis were defecting to the English, the epidemic killed the Miamis leaders most inclined toward the French.

Coinciding with these outbreaks was both inter-societal and inter-colonial warfare. The second Fox War of the late 1720s and early 1730s and sporadic fighting between French-allied Indians from the Great Lakes and the Chickasaws from 1731 through the early 1750s took their toll. Indeed, the devastation wrought against the Fox was such that the group's survival was ensured only through alliance with the Sauk. Finally, between 1744 and 1760, the western Indians were directly or indirectly caught up in the last of the Anglo-French wars for empire. The short interim between the peace of 1748 and renewed fighting in 1754 saw little stability in the Ohio country and eastern Great Lakes. Rather, a "cold war" continued as rival traders and their Indian partners kept tension high in their struggle to control the Ohio fur trade.

The large-scale military operations and stepped-up frontier raid-
ing that marked the Great War for the Empire involved large numbers of Indians from as far away as La Baye and the Illinois country. While battle losses among native auxiliaries appear to have been comparatively light, the war took its toll in other ways. Returning warriors brought home scalps, booty from dead enemies, live captive for adoption or ritualistic execution, and smallpox. The worst outbreak of the disease came in the wake of the capture of Fort William Henry in the summer of 1757. In the looting and limited killing of sick and wounded English prisoners that followed the fort's surrender, the western warriors contracted the disease. In the months that followed it swept through villages throughout the Great Lakes, depleting numbers and weakening both the will and ability of western Indians to aid the French in future campaigns.93

As the Iroquois no doubt discovered, allies could be as deadly as enemies. In 1757, Sir William Johnson reported an outbreak of smallpox among the Mohawks, some of whom apparently caught the sickness while at the English garrison of Fort Johnson.94 Given the generally unsanitary condition of military camps, it was only a matter of time before the redcoats' native allies were stricken. The same was true of those Indians dealing with or aiding the French. One hundred Caughnawaga Mohawks from the St. Lawrence region died in 1756 from smallpox contracted during their stay at forts Niagara and Catar­aquii.95

Illness did not abate with the end of active warfare. Thomas Hutchins reported sickness in virtually every Indian town he visited in 1762. His report and those of others suggest a combination of
diseases. The Indians at La Baye were stricken by smallpox, the Ouiatanons and Miamis were suffering from "a Severe Sickness", the Shawnees--the worst afflicted--suffered from an "Epidemical disorder." It would be safe to assume that much, if not all, of this suffering was directly related to contact with English and French military forces. In fact, at Fort Pitt the correlation seems inescapable. In 1762 the Quaker trader James Kenny reported the garrison suffering from a "Cold & Cough", five days later Kenny himself was taken sick with the "Epidemic Cold & Fever". On the very next day he observed that the Indians in and around the fort "are all chiefly Sick with ye Cold & Cough." Such was the return on trade and alliance.

To the twin burdens of war and disease must be added starvation, either threatened or real. Food shortages, like illnesses, appear to have been largely a function of the general dislocation caused by war. While warriors could be assured food and other supplies while on campaign, their families were at the mercy of post commanders or traders and often did without. With men gone for months at a time, fields were not cleared and game was not secured. Finally, European troops must have seemed at times like plagues of locusts as they trampled or stole crops, drove cattle through fields, and generally disrupted native life. Taken together, the three decades before the Anglo-American occupation of the west, especially the last five years, had been an unsettling, traumatic time for the Indians living in the region. Their response to Anglo-American expansion would be conditioned by this prior experience as well as the cultural milieu in which they lived.
The Indians living in the trans-Appalachian region had been engaged in trade and diplomacy with one another for centuries and with Europeans for a century and more before 1760. It has been customary for historians to examine Indian-European inter-cultural contact in terms of eventual—and inevitable—native cultural demise. In reality, the contact between the trans-Appalachian Indians and Europeans was far more complex. Change did not influence all aspects of native culture equally nor did it occur quickly. Rather, some elements of native cultures changed quite rapidly while others persisted throughout the centuries of contact. Further, cultural change and the tensions created by differential change were phenomena which were neither unique to the post-contact period nor to Indians alone. Native cultures had been evolving and changing for generations and, in the fluid human frontier that was colonial North America, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and other Europeans experienced culture change as well. What must be recognized is that the Indians of the west, like their English and French counterparts, engaged in the process of cultural contact and exchange from a position of self-recognized cultural superiority and were selective in what they borrowed and added to their own cultural inventories.

Finally, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, at least until the collapse of the French colonial empire in America, the changes evident within native cultures were largely non-directed.
What was borrowed was integrated into Indian societies in ways determined by native, not European, values. Try as they might, the imperial agents of New France and New England could not bring Indians to the kind of "civility" dreamed of by the early promoters of western planting. In short, the Indians who met Robert Rogers and Henry Bouquet along the line of Anglo-American expansion were still Indian, even if their outward appearance often suggested otherwise.

This is not to say that western Indians did not feel the effects of contact or that inroads were not made by colonial cultural agents. There is abundant evidence to suggest that changes, however superficial, occurred in many aspects of native life. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the growing dependence of western Indians on European material culture.

The principal agency for material culture change as well as other, more subtle, changes in native society was the fur trade. While largely viewed as a system of economic exchange, the trade was more than business. It was, in fact, a complex web of diplomatic, social, and economic relationships that resulted in inter-cultural exchange on many levels. And not only between colonists and Indians. The trade nexus involved and altered relations between native groups as well.

This inter-cultural exchange system required cooperation and peace, without which the accumulation of wealth for either side would have been impossible. Cooperation, however grudgingly given, was quickly seen by all sides as having distinct advantages beyond economics.
Trade could be, and was, used as the avenue toward useful alliances that could maintain peace as well as give some groups advantages over others. The Six Nations Iroquois, preeminent arbiters of Indian-colonial relations in the east before 1760, neatly summarized this relationship when they declared that "Trade and Peace we take to be one thing." As the numerous "beaver wars" of the seventeenth century attest, trade often brought war and was ultimately self-destructive, but while it lasted it gave Indians and colonists a common ground on which to engage in the larger, creative struggle for cultural control and independence.

The traders who displayed their wares at Logstown, Detroit, La Baye, and elsewhere offered their Indian customers a wide variety of goods, some of which were more popular than others. By using inventories of trade goods, contemporary observations, and the available archaeological record, it is possible to determine with some accuracy what Indians were buying and to what extent the traders' goods had replaced the natives' own by the middle of the eighteenth century. Cloth and household items such as kettles and tools, including scissors, needles, knives, and hatchets appear to have dominated Indian interest. In addition, by mid-century, muskets and the ever necessary gunflints, lead, and powder were present in quantity, suggesting the extent to which European weapons technology had superseded native items. Finally, trade inventories always included what might be called cosmetic items. These included paints, jewelry, hawk bells, ribbon, and trade silver.

Contemporary observations confirm the widespread use of European
goods by western Indians, as well as the apparent changes wrought in native cultures as a result. Captives such as James Smith, Hugh Gibson, and Alexander Henry were able to observe native societies at close quarters. All reported substantial adoptions of at least some European products by their captors. Smith, soon after his capture in 1755, was given a new set of clothes consisting of a ruffled shirt, cloth leggings decorated with ribbons, and quill-worked garters. Similarly, Hugh Gibson, taken by the Delawares in 1756, was given a "Breech-cloth, leggins, porcupine-quill moccasins" and a shirt. Alexander Henry, whose narrative is one of the best sources on upper Great Lakes Indian life, was given face paint, a shirt "painted with vermilion", a wampum collar, trade silver, and scarlet cloth mitasses (leggings) by his adoptive Ojibwa family in 1763. He further participated in trade with Frenchmen at Michilimackinac, during which the Ojibwas purchased shirts, mitasses, blankets, and tobacco.

These observations are supported by those other colonials who saw the Indians at a distance. The missionary John Heckewelder, active in the Muskingum valley before 1763, reported blue, red, and black cloth, trade silver, bells, thimbles, and vermilion among the Delawares. Warren Johnson, nephew of British Indian Superintendent Sir William Johnson, observed "Check shirts" with ruffles of the same material, "Indian shoes Stockings & Night Caps" among his Mohawk and Oneida neighbors in New York. Indeed, the eastern Iroquois appear to have done their western counterparts one better by accepting the luxuries and comforts of Europe and the colonies. According to Warren Johnson, straw beds and sleighs could be found in several Mohawk
houses in 1761.\footnote{113} Along with the use of manufactured goods, the western Indians augmented their cultural inventories in another direction, one largely ignored by students of Indian history in the east: through the acquisition of domestic animals. For the agricultural communities of the Ohio valley and western New York such an adaptation would not have been difficult. On the contrary, it appears to have been widespread by the 1760s. Moravians arriving at the Delaware town of Tuscarawas were given several chickens by a village leader. Among those things destroyed by Sir William Johnson's Indian raiders at Canestio in 1764 were horses, cows, hogs, and saddles. The missionary David Zeisberger noted that the Delawares among whom he lived satisfied their fondness for milk and butter by obtaining cows.\footnote{114}

Less studied than the general use of domestic animals by western Indians was the particular fondness of these people for horses.\footnote{115} This attraction is reflected both in references to the appearance of and desire for the animal among Indians and in the numerous incidents of horse theft which occurred in the Ohio country as young Indians availed themselves of the British army's seeming overabundance of these prized animals.\footnote{116} Among the Potawatomis, it has been argued that horses represented another form of technological improvement, akin to that brought with brass kettles or firearms. To what extent this was true of other Indians in the region has yet to be determined. Clearly, however, the horse offered an alternative to walking or canoe travel and could give warriors greatly increased mobility.\footnote{117}

The archaeological record provides another window through which
to view the process of culture change. However, this record is not
without limitations. For the trans-Appalachian region prior to 1800
few sites have been excavated and fewer still reported in a meaning­
ful way. Most of those excavated are single or multiple burials, thus
skewing the record away from habitations or other forms of human
activity. Further, while the earth yields some items, it obliterates
others. Metal, glass, wood, ceramics, stone and, sometimes, leather
usually survive while cloth, paper, and delicate metal objects so not.
Thus, the artifact record is further distorted in the direction of
certain types of materials which may or may not have been as abundant
on a site as the remains indicate. However, the sites do show arti­
facts in context, contexts sometimes overlooked by contemporary ob­
servers. Taken together, written accounts and sites can yield as com­
plete a picture of a native society at a given point in time as we
are likely to have.

The available sites offer confirmation of what the historical
record suggests: that by the last quarter of the eighteenth century
trans-Appalachian Indians had replaced a substantial portion of their
traditional artifact inventories with material imported from Europe
and the colonies. Specifically, the sites show how this process took
place and the relative speed of artifact displacement. The earlier
sites contain a wide variety of European goods including beads, kettles,
Jesuit signet rings, and some metal tools, yet in no great quantities. Remains dating from circa 1750 through the 1780s show a marked change
in three directions.

First, the number of native artifacts declined relative to those
of European origin. Second, the inventories have expanded to include silver ornaments of various kinds. Finally, toward the end of the eighteenth century, utilitarian items appear to have given way to materials that were ornamental in style and function. Again, some utilitarian items may not have survived the ravages of time. Further, the context of many sites--burials--would dictate what was placed in the site. Ornamental objects may have been closely identified with the deceased and therefore interred with them. Nonetheless, the variance is striking. By the turn of the century, the transition is even more pronounced, with virtually no items of native manufacture included in site remains. Thus, on the one hand, historical and archaeological records reflect a steady and pronounced change in the material culture of trans-Appalachian Indians during the eighteenth century.

On the other hand, however, these same records reveal the degree to which native material, and thus cultural values, persisted during the period. Further, and of greater significance, the context of European materials reflects the adaptation of these objects to native needs and uses, not the reverse.

In most of the sites pre-dating 1780, some material of native manufacture appears. These include effigy pipes, ceramic or shell beads, pottery, and some stone tools. Adaptation of European materials to native uses is also reflected. Sheet copper was re-worked into tinkling cones, brass wire was coiled for use as facial hair removers, and the ever-popular glass beads were sewn onto skin garments, undoubtedly as an attractive, and less time-consuming, substitute for
traditional quill-work.  

At the same time, the majority of these objects were found in a special and wholly native context—graves. The custom of placing a deceased's personal possessions in the grave had been part of funeral rituals of western Indians for centuries prior to contact with Europeans. The appearance of iron axeheads or copper kettles in a grave instead of their stone and clay counterparts suggests only a conscious decision to acquire and use what were manifestly more efficient forms of well known tools. The function, however, remained native throughout.

The accounts of European observers give further evidence of cultural continuity and the adaptation of foreign form to native function. James Smith's observations on Delaware sugar manufacturing are revealing. He noted that the Indians used bark buckets for collecting the maple sap, but brass kettles for boiling it into sugar. Clearly a decision had been made to substitute a metal vessel for boiling as being more efficient for the task, while the traditional bark bucket remained better suited—and more cheaply and easily made—for the task of collecting and transporting large quantities of maple sap. The wardrobes given to adopted captives included some items of native manufacture, such as wampum collars and quill-worked moccasins. In addition, trade items were altered to fit native needs and styles. Stroud cloth became mitasses—a trade variance of traditional deer-skin leggings.  

Shirts were painted, usually with vermilion, perhaps in imitation of the painted or shell and quill-worked skin garments formerly worn. Trade silver ear coils, bracelets, or beaded
garters were again only substitutes of material; the function continued to be defined in native terms.

While the strong persistence of Indian cultural values and practices tended to define the role that European materials would play in native societies, the trade did bring about significant changes in native societies in at least three ways. In the first place, by replacing even a few traditional articles with their European counterparts, the natives were placing themselves in a position of dependence upon the suppliers of such goods. It has almost become a truism that the trade resulted in the Indians' economic dependence in that they became trapped in a market economy they could not fully comprehend, let alone control, and that without the trade the goods to which they had grown accustomed could not be replaced or repaired. To a large extent this was true. As the supplier of a semi-finished product, the Indian hunter was on the outer edge of a market system that responded more and more to the politics and economic conditions of Europe and colonial America than it did to decisions made in native villages. Further, European and colonial officials had become adept at manipulating various Indian groups through trade. This manipulation became easier due to the growing native dependence on alien goods and accompanying services. As the archaeological evidence suggests, this dependence grew over time as more and more items in the Indians' inventories came from Venice, Stroudwater, and Amsterdam.

While dependence grew, however, native abilities to reproduce European materials did not. Little evidence exists for the trans-Appalachian region that would indicate success in this respect.
Rather, the repeated requests of Ohio valley and Great Lakes Indians for blacksmiths and gunsmiths reflects a growing dependence on European technology, not only for supply, but also for maintenance. One of the ironies of western Indian resistance to Anglo-American expansion after 1758 was the natives' efforts to maintain political and cultural autonomy at a time when economic and technological dependence had become a way of life for many Indians.

The second direction of trade related change was toward what one anthropologist has called a "pan-Indian" culture in the Great Lakes region. Basing his conclusions on both archaeological and historical evidence, George Quimby observed that "by 1760 or shortly afterwards the Indians of the western Great Lakes region had discarded most of their material culture in favor of new things introduced by fur traders." This systematic replacement led to the creation of a universal material culture in which most Great Lakes Indians participated. While the degree to which this change overtook specific native groups at specific times is open to debate, such a transformation was well underway when British and colonial agents began moving into the region in the wake of the conquest of New France. The creation of cosmopolitan trading communities at places like Detroit and Michilimackinac accelerated this trend. But the blurring of cultural distinctions between Indian societies did not end with the artifacts of trade.

The trade altered inter-group relations to a marked degree, transforming older alliances into enmity and changing local power relationships throughout the west. In both diplomacy and belief systems a
transformation, at least among some societies, appears to have taken place that further reflects the development of a pan-Indian culture in the Great Lakes region. The use of the calumet as a symbol of peace began to appear among Great Lakes Indians in the late seventeenth century. Originating with Indians to the west and north, it became a necessary part of international relations among the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis. The use of the calumet also appears to have extended into the east. The reason for its adoption seems to have been the need by Great Lakes Indians to negotiate with Indians farther west over such questions as rights of passage through band territories and access to hunting grounds.

The same thing may have been happening with the spread of the medicine society known as the Midewiwin. According to one scholar, the Mide cult "developed in response to a need for pantribal institutions which could aid in the unification of independent clan groups" at a time when the trade was serving to atomize western Great Lakes Indian society.

The third transformation of native societies brought about by the trade resulted for a far more intimate contact than that experienced over the trader's counter. Beginning in the 1730s a generation of children of mixed French and Indian parentage began to appear. This group and its offspring became common elements of all the French trade posts and settlements in the west. Over time they coalesced into a group defined both from within and without as racially, culturally and, at times, politically distinct. These "Métis" people ultimately became an influential force in western Indian relations. With their
bi-cultural background Métis men and women could move with relative ease between two societies, serving as interpreters, political agents, and culture brokers. Not limited to the Great Lakes region, the Métis were to be found throughout the Canadian sub-arctic and, in the region exploited by the Hudson's Bay Company, included children of Anglo-Indian marriages as well.  

The burial sites in the west reflect a marked degree of continuity of values in the face of the kinds of changes discussed above. This was due in large part to the inherent flexibility and cohesiveness of Indian societies and institutions. Another factor was the proximity of European cultural agents. While fur traders and their servants were a common sight in Indian towns, these men were less interested in altering native cultures than they were in maintaining a flow of pelts out of the west and into ships bound for the European marketplace. Missionaries, on the other hand, went west specifically to reduce Indians to both western civilization and Christianity. However, the only sustained missionary effort in the west was that maintained by the Jesuits. At mission stations established at forts and trading stations, Jesuit fathers continued their efforts to win the bodies and souls of the native population for France and the Church. By and large, this undertaking was a failure. The missions were too few and the Indians too many and too widely scattered to allow effective conversions. Further, the close association of missions and trade posts presented the Indians with a first-hand look at the contradictions of European society and further undermined their interest in, or respect for, Christianity. Finally, the growth of the Midewiwin,
the persistence of vision quests and other forms of traditional ritual and belief attest to the continued resilience of native cultural values.\textsuperscript{136}

The cumulative impact of cultural exchange on the non-material aspects of trans-Appalachian Indian life is more difficult to determine. European observers tended to ignore those aspects of native culture not directly related to the business at hand, whether trade, diplomacy, or conversion. Nowhere is this more true than with native religious practices. Any discernible changes in this facet of Indian life may suggest a tear in the social fabric that could affect responses to outsiders or toward other members of society.

One historian has recently theorized that northeastern Indian values and beliefs quickly succumbed to the material, biological, and spiritual aspects of European contact.\textsuperscript{137} While this may have been the case with some specific groups in the northeast, the application of such a model to the Indians of the trans-Appalachian region appears to be inappropriate.

Site reports from the west show no clear movement toward acceptance of Christian mortuary practices or any major disruption of traditional culture patterns for burials dating from circa 1670 to 1800. The only significant intrusion is the appearance of wood or bark coffins, sometimes held together with iron nails, in sites dating after 1730.\textsuperscript{138} This may signify some attempt to accommodate the intruding European cultures, but may reflect only the adoption of a different form of covering the dead, which had previously been done with skins, sheet bark, or stone or wood-lined burial chambers.\textsuperscript{139}
The burials also reflect a mixture of type and orientation. By the middle of the eighteenth century extended burials appear to have been most common, but variations of body position occurred both within and between Indian groups. One possible example of post-contact influences may be the changes evident in Seneca burial customs. Until the middle of the seventeenth century Seneca burials continued to be universally flexed, or fetal, in position. By the 1670s this had changed significantly with an increasing number of supine burials.

The documentary evidence on Indian burials in the west underscores the basic continuity of traditional practices. A 1731 description of a Seneca burial ceremony includes mention of all the elements of ritual behavior: the painting of the corpse, the emotional mourning and refusal to mention the name of the deceased, and the inclusion of the deceased's personal possessions in the grave. The same pattern was observed by missionary John Heckewelder who, in 1762, witnessed the burial of the wife of the Delaware war leader Shingas. In addition to the traditional mourning ceremonies, Heckewelder observed another example of the adaptation of European forms to native function. He watched as the coffin lid was secured and a bag of vermilion placed next to the corpse by way of a hole cut through the lid at the head of the coffin. The Delawares explained that "This hole is for the spirit of the deceased to go in and out at pleasure until it has found the place of its future residence."

Finally, the practice of covering the dead through gifts was very much in evidence. Shingas distributed a variety of clothing and hardware to the mourners to quiet their grief and also to compensate...
his wife's lineage for its loss. This redistribution of wealth also served to enhance Shingas' stature as a man of both material wealth and generosity. The gifts may have been of English origin, but their use was dictated by Delaware beliefs and practices. 144

Among the Iroquois, the condolence for the dead was still an integral part of diplomatic as well as social behavior. Among the Mohawks, the practice of including grave goods with the dead seems to have fallen off by the middle of the eighteenth century. This may have been a reflection of the continuing acculturation of these people to the ways of their Anglo-Dutch neighbors. 145 At the other end of the League's symbolic longhouse, the Senecas continued the traditional practices, including grave goods, mourning rituals, and the avoidance of using the names of the dead. 146

This same kind of cultural persistence is to be found among the Ojibwas as well. Alexander Henry witnessed the funeral of a child accidentally killed at a sugaring camp in 1764. A temporary scaffold burial was erected until the body could be taken to the family grave site. Upon final interment grave goods, including a "carrying-belt and paddle" to reflect her status as a female and food, were placed in the grave. The burial ritual concluded with the interment of trade blankets and the sacrifice of a dog. 147

The socio-political aspects of trans-Appalachian Indian life also reflected both continuity and change. In this facet of native life the stress and tension created by the conflict between change and tradition was also most evident. Upon approaching this subject, two methodological points are in order. First, I have used the term
"socio-political" to reflect a fundamental fact of western Indian societies. Unlike the institutionalized European societies with whom they dealt, trans-Appalachian Indians made no distinction between social and political activities. Rather, their societies were seamless webs with the spiritual, social, and political aspects of life interacting. Rituals satisfied the spirit and also served to sanction warfare and bind communities together. Decisions governing group activities were achieved by the whole community with each family or clan segment being represented in council. To isolate political activity from its social context is to distort such activity and deprive it of its meaning. 148

Second, any discussion of American Indian history necessarily means confronting the notion of "tribe". In the traditional literature on Indian-white relations, the tribe has always been equated with the basic native social and political unit. This approach may have lent order to narratives, but it has distorted the realities of native societies. As the findings of anthropologists and ethnohistorians have revealed, the term "tribe" and related labels such as "chief" and "nation" have tended to cover up more than they reveal. While there is as yet no consensus over when or whether "tribe" can be applied to Indian groups, there is agreement that looking to the local communities, or even individual clan segments and lineages, will lead to a better understanding of the nature of native society, decision making, and contests for influence. 149 It was the extended family and the local community that gave an individual his identity and sense of place. Within each village or band families or clan segments
selected their own leaders; village councils consisted of all these lineage representatives acting together to reach a consensus on issues. The village chief or headman was usually someone elected to represent others of equal rank and authority, though such offices were often transformed as a result of contact with Europeans.

Beyond the village community, organization and identity were more poorly defined and allegiance less compelling. For none of the Indians in the west during the eighteenth century was there anything akin to a tribal system that bound local communities together into a single polity in such a way as to permit unified action over a definable area. What has been called "tribe" could better be termed ethnic identity. Such identity was based on common language, rituals, and inter-marriage. But among western Indians social and political affairs continued to be determined at the local level, with little regard for any tribal identity or obligations. When Indian leaders purported to speak for the "tribe" or "nation" they were engaging in a kind of political posturing not unknown to European politicians.

Even the seemingly most obvious exception to this pattern confirms the central place of local communities in native life. The Iroquois League, with its six "nations" and central council at Onondaga, presented a picture of unity and power that placed it in the center of international affairs on the colonial frontier and in much of the literature on early European-Indian relations. But as the dean of Iroquois studies, William Fenton, reminds us, the six confederated nations and the League itself were composed of semi-autonomous villages bound together by spiritual and ethnic ties into a confederacy.
which was often divided and sometimes at war with itself. The Onondaga council, composed of fifty clan leaders representing the villages of the Six Nations, gave the Iroquois a unique instrument with which to project the image of unity even when such unity did not in fact exist. In order to understand Iroquois actions, as well as those of other Indian groups, however, it is necessary to go to the local level where issues were debated, decisions reached, and actions taken. For these reasons I have consciously avoided the use of the terms "tribe" and "nation". Instead, at the risk of some grammatical clumsiness, I have chosen to employ words that more accurately reflect contemporary conditions.

There is little contemporary material reflecting the degree to which the kinship networks that bound trans-Appalachian Indian societies together had changed by the middle of the eighteenth century. Given the conservative nature of native societies and the fundamental importance of kinship in determining human relations, the traditional systems undoubtedly persisted to a large degree unchanged. Among the farming villages of the Ohio country and in western New York, the matrilineal system of clans continued through the century. The few captivity narratives that refer to domestic life suggest coherent family and band systems.

Information on housing further reflects the continuity of traditional kinship systems while at the same time suggesting that, for some Indians, kinship ties may have been weakening. Travelers to the Iroquois villages in western New York in 1750 found "large and roomy" structure "with three or four fireplaces" and entrances at both ends,
all of which indicates housing similar to the traditional longhouse. Such a structure was representative of the matrilineages and clan segments which comprised the village system among the Six Nations. Further, "the huts were ornamented with red painting of deer, turtles, bears, etc. designating to what clan the inmates belonged."\textsuperscript{155}

However, alongside the older dwellings and the kinship system they reflected, new forms appeared. One scholar has concluded that by the middle of the eighteenth century single family log houses had begun to supplant the longhouse among the Senecas.\textsuperscript{156} This change is reflected in a report on the destruction of the Delaware-Seneca town of Canestio in 1764. There, Sir William Johnson's agents found two hundred houses "most of which were well built of Square loggs with good Chimneys."\textsuperscript{157}

This transition to different forms of housing and nuclear, rather than extended, family units occurred among the Shawnees and Delawares as well. The Shawnees appear to have moved away from their traditional winter houses to log structures similar to those found in Anglo-American frontier communities.\textsuperscript{158} On the other hand, the traditional summer house survived among the Shawnees into the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{159} Among the Delawares David Zeisberger observed that "each family prefers to live in its own house, hence they [the houses\textsuperscript{160} are small.]" The Delawares' Ohio Seneca neighbors, however, continued to use the traditional longhouse, perhaps reflecting a more conservative outlook than their kinsmen in New York.

For Indians living west of the Ohio River less is known about residence and dwellings. What information exists points to the con-
timuance of traditional residence patterns. The Miamis seem to have adopted the log house for the summer but continued to use family-size, easily transportable huts in winter camps.

While more research needs to be done on the subject of residence and housing among trans-Appalachian Indians, the evidence available suggests changes among farming societies that may in turn reflect changes in kinship systems, though no conclusive determination can be made. While smaller cabins point to the atomization of the family and community life, the presence of council houses in the larger towns reflects a continued sense of community and identity through ritual. Information about other aspects of western Indian life may shed more light on changes in residence and housing styles.

The status of women among farming societies in the west appears to have been reinforced by those influence—trade and war—that were threatening other facets of native culture. Among the Delawares and particularly among the Iroquois, the elder women who led the matrilineages had traditionally enjoyed much influence. Chiefly titles were inherited through the female line, passing, for instance, from a man to his sister's son. These leaders were selected by the elder women of each lineage. Among the Oneida Iroquois, these clan matrons could speak in council, either directly or through male spokesmen, and serve as "Agoianders", the group of village councilors advising the sachems. Among the Miamis and Shawnees two parallel leadership systems existed, one male, the other female, with each having certain rights and powers in directing the activities of the village. Beyond this, Delaware and Iroquois women controlled
agricultural capital, including the land and output. As heads of 
households they had the right to adopt outsiders to replace de-
ceased members of the lineage. These rights combined to give 
Iroquois women, at least, a decided influence over the most funda-
mental issues facing the community. Women also engaged in other 
activities. There is evidence to suggest that Delaware women active-
ly engaged in trade on behalf of their families. In both Delaware 
and Iroquois society, women played prominent roles in ritual activities, 
funerals, and other village-wide gatherings. And, like their counter-
parts in other western Indian communities, some of these women could, 
through sexual liaisons or skills as interpreter, become mediators 
between their societies and various European interests.

Warfare and the fur trade tended to increase the influence of 
Iroquois women, although this pattern is less clearly defined for 
other groups. Both war and trade tended to keep men away from 
the villages for extended periods. This resulted in women shoulder-
ing more of the routine responsibility for community affairs. Further, 
the increase in war-related deaths enhanced the matrons' already con-
siderable influence because new leaders needed to be selected and the 
dead replaced. In the complex negotiations over peace, war, and 
trade, clan matrons were active, both directly and through their own 
male representatives.

If warfare tended to enhance the influence and prestige of clan 
matriarchs, it tended to eat away at kin groups and thus the social fab-
rice of native communities. During the last of the inter-colonial wars, 
all the Indian societies in the west suffered losses which placed a
strain on their socio-political structures. In order for families to survive, and in order for the psychological trauma resulting from lost kinsmen to be overcome, deaths had to be avenged and gaps in the family structure filled. One method, but by no means the only one, of mending the social fabric was through the adoption of prisoners. These became not merely members of the community at large, but living replacements for specific dead kinsmen whose names, status, and attributes were given to the adopted individual. 172

The extent to which native communities had been hurt by the Great War for the Empire can be inferred from the prolonged and never completely settled contest between Indians and Anglo-American officials for white captives taken and adopted. The great reluctance and emotion that accompanied the return of Anglo-American captives attests not only to bonds of friendship and love between individuals, but also to the important role captives played in maintaining and perpetuating native societies. 173

The tension and uncertainty that resulted from attacks on the structure of society surfaced in many forms, the most obvious being the use of alcohol. There is little doubt that by the 1750s the consumption of rum, whiskey, and brandy had become common among western Indians; so much so that liquor was a common item of trade and a constant source of concern for colonial officials as well as native leaders. 174

Aside from being a form of group and individual recreation, drinking took on other, culturally defined, meanings for Indians. Sufficient consumption of liquor could result in a stuporous state during which
the individual could experience dreams. Dreams were considered a link with the supernatural and an avenue by which a person could communicate with the spirit world and seek his own special supernatural guardians. In pre-contact times such dreams were acquired through rigorous vision-quests which included fasting, other forms of self-denial, and isolation. Alcohol simply made the desired goal more readily and easily attainable. In addition, liquor and drunkenness provided an emotional "time out", an excuse for behavior that would not have been sanctioned under other circumstances. Theft, assault, or, occasionally, homicide, could be overlooked or pardoned since, by native rationale, the guilty party was in a state of possession due to the liquor and not responsible for his actions. Nevertheless, trans-Appalachian Indians did acknowledge limits of drunken behavior beyond which no one was expected to go.

That most, if not all, drunken behavior was directed at the in-group rather than toward outsiders indicates such limits on such behavior. At the same time, in-group drinking provided an excellent opportunity for venting frustrations and anger against those in the community who were, or were perceived to be, responsible for problems or a general lack of social harmony. Further, drunkenness may have released a flood-tide of aggressive emotion and frustration that could not have been expressed in any other way. While acting as a catharsis, such behavior could be destructive and add further to social trauma. The violence that seemed to mark so much social drinking, and the resulting injuries and deaths, may suggest a heightened sense of anxiety stemming from losses of kin, a decline in status, or uncertainty about
the future. 179

The growing problem liquor created for western Indians can also be inferred from the words and actions directed against its use by the natives themselves. Representatives of four western groups complained in 1753 that "The Rum ruins us" and asked that its transportation west by traders be stopped. 180 A decade later these words were echoed by Indians at the 1761 Easton conference in Pennsylvania. In this case, the Indians' request was especially revealing: they did not want rum sent to them. Rather, they would come to the settlements to buy it as their needs arose. They further pointed to the diplomatic problems which could arise from drink by accusing the English of employing drunken Indian messengers who "some times lose the Belts and messages, and sometimes drink them away." 181 While these Indians talked others, notably the Oneidas, acted. In 1762 men and women from the main Oneida town attacked and destroyed a military sutler's store near Fort Stanwix in an attempt to rid their community of liquor. 182

Anglo-American officials also voiced their concern, but the lure of profits, geography, and willing Indian customers combined to undermine the limited attempts made to control the flow of rum into native towns. 183 While these officials were largely concerned with removing a potential cause of Anglo-Indian confrontations, they, like native leaders, recognized the harm drunken behavior did to Indian societies.

The observation made by David Zeisberger that, among the Delawares "the young no longer rever the aged as used to be the case" points to another problem confronting mid-eighteenth century western
Indians: inter-generational conflict. The driving force behind this conflict was the desire of young men, the warriors, for status and a voice in community affairs. Additionally, rapid changes in material culture and similar, if less profound, changes in other facets of culture combined to create a cultural gap between parents and children. When taken out of the family and placed in the context of village and inter-societal relations, however, this inter-generational conflict created one of several political problems faced by trans-Appalachian Indians.

Traditionally, the Indian societies in the west maintained a division of war and peace functions. Elder men who had turned from active participation in warfare, were charged with the conduct of day-to-day affairs and the preservation of harmony both within the community and with outside groups. The younger men whose tasks included protecting the village, were normally expected to keep still until war had formally been declared in council. Upon learning of such a decision, emergent war leaders would call for men, usually kinsmen, to join them in raids, the planning of defenses, and would, to varying degrees, take over management of affairs from civil chiefs. Then, with peace restored, these war leaders and their followers were expected to once more recede into the political background and yield the council to the older men. Further, each native society had clear rules governing the selection of leaders and succession to offices upon the death or removal of a headman or councilor. This system of parallel war and peace functions carried within it the seeds of conflict. By definition, peace leaders were responsible for main-
taining the status quo. However, young men naturally saw warfare as
one of the traditional avenues to status and influence and as a way
of demonstrating manhood. By blocking this avenue, civil leaders
guaranteed that tension would exist between these two competing ele-
ments of the community.

This problem may have been resolved, or allowed to continue as
it had in the past, had it not been for the wars of trade and empire
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Fox Wars, the
Chickasaw conflict, and the larger inter-colonial wars created a
189

188

crisis within Indian communities, a crisis that Europeans could turn
to advantage. The endemic warfare provided the perfect opportunity
for warriors to gain status and power at the expense of civil leaders.

In order to ensure continued Indian participation in military campaigns,
French and English officers negotiated directly with warriors, rather
than through civil chiefs and thus further enhanced the former's status
and influence at home. 190 As a wartime problem, this situation was
bad enough. But, as was the case with the Iroquois, warriors, having
tasted power, were loath to give it up. Rather than receding into
the background once the hatchet had been taken from their hands, they
continued to challenge the civil chiefs, accusing them of "Keeping
them in the Dark by misrepresentations" and referring to village lead-
ers as "a parcell of Old People who say much, but who mean & act very
little," and asserted the warriors' position as "in fact the People
of Consequence for managing Affairs." 191 These sounds of discord
could be music to the ears of Anglo-American officials, such as Sir
William Johnson, to whom these remarks were directed. This inter-
generational struggle, and the factional disputes it engendered, could be used as a means of dividing and controlling Indian communities at a time when England was faced with the problem of reducing a vast territory and its people to order and obedience.

This conflict over status and influence did not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it represented only one of a number of changes and problems which occurred in the areas of leadership and decision making. Some of these were rooted in the traditional values and structure of native societies. Others arose from the peculiarities of eighteenth century relations between Indian peoples and the English and French colonies. Among them, the loss of leaders due to warfare and disease may have provided added impetus for warriors seeking to assert their influence.

Losses among native leaders were both widespread and disruptive. The smallpox epidemic resulting from the siege of Fort William Henry in 1757 killed as many as three hundred Menominee warriors, including many civil and war leaders.\(^{192}\) The same event may have caused similar losses among the Ojibwas. In 1761 they apologized for not addressing issues raised in council with the English at Michilimackinac. The reason given was that "we have nobody in our Nation who speaks well or hath understanding, We have had Great Chiefs & fine Speakers, but they are all dead, and there only remains the Sons of those great Men, who have not understanding like their Fathers."\(^{193}\) While this explanation of why some Ojibwas were acting as "villans" toward the English may have been contrived, the minutes note that the Ojibwas were using a Delaware speaker. The worst such losses appear to have
occurred among the Shawnees who, by 1756, had had many of their warriors and war leaders killed in raids against the Anglo-Americans. So severe were these losses that the Shawnees were "forced to borrow a Captain from their Cousins the Delawares." 194

The social and political problems stemming from the warriors' challenge to traditional authority and the loss of substantial numbers of leaders and potential leaders was further complicated by a growth in the variety of Indian leaders and the evolution of leadership categories previously unknown among western Indians. This phenomenon was directly related to the demands placed on native communities as a result of contact with Europeans. Simply put, new leaders emerged whose talents made them more suitable for dealing with Europeans than traditional village leaders. For example, the office of Iroquois council speaker, the man whose special oratorical and memory skills were sued by sachems as the voice of authority, was adapted to contact with colonial and imperial agents. Out of this came an entirely new position, that of "pine tree chief", men who held chiefly rank based on certain skills and contacts with Anglo-American communities and officials rather than by virtue of lineage. In many cases these "pine tree" or "merit" chiefs were men who could exploit special relationships of trade, marriage, or friendship with Anglo-Americans to the advantage of themselves and their kinsmen. 195

Among the Potawatomis another pattern emerged. By the early eighteenth century there emerged in the larger Potawatomi towns the "chief" or principal spokesman, a position not connected with traditional practices or social structure. The reason for the emergence of
this leader type was French insistence on dealing with one designated representative of a town rather than a confusing array of family and clan elders. This role came increasingly to be filled by non-Potawatomis, specifically Sauk, whose ties to the Potawatomis by marriage gave them legitimacy but who, as outsiders, could exploit their positions free of many of the social or cultural restraints that a Potawatomi felt. Their status as "chiefs" was further guaranteed by French support, both political and economic. While this situation was undoubtedly a boon to both French officials and the individual Indians concerned, the result for the Potawatomis as a people was, according to a recent study, "personal and group conflict" as a gap appeared between idealized and actual behavior. 196

The kind of European manipulation of native societies reflected in the Potawatomis' experience was by no means new to Indian-white relations and became more pronounced as European colonial power grew during the eighteenth century. On the other hand, such interference could, and did, meet stiff resistance from Indians bent on preserving their independence. David Zeisberger noted that the successor to the Delaware leader Netawatwees, Gelelemand, was not given the respect due his office since he "was chosen by Europeans prominent in Pittsburg." Sir William Johnson likewise recognized the limits of Anglo-American influence, observing that English-chosen leaders among the western Indians would generate jealousy and would prompt the Indians to reject such men. 197

Finally, in discussing the changing pattern of leadership and power prevalent in the west by 1760, those people cannot be overlook-
ed who, without official sanction, used their special skills and relationships to establish positions as mediators and power brokers. The Metis have already been mentioned. This group would also include native women who engaged in relationships with Anglo-American army officers and traders in the west, and men who acted as messengers, interpreters, or suppliers of food for military posts or settlements.

The result of this proliferation of leaders was a general decline in the prestige and authority of traditional leaders, both peace and war. Those whom Anglo-American observers and subsequent generations of historians called "chief" or "sachem" were not always the people of authority within an Indian community. They may have been representatives of the nameless, faceless power brokers behind the scene or men who, apart from Anglo-American or French support, had no legitimate claims to authority at all. All of this means that intercultural relations were becoming more complicated as well as more prone to misunderstandings between Indians and Anglo-Americans and within native communities as lines of legitimacy blurred and power vacuums were created and filled in ways not always in accord with former practices.

Conflicts between warriors and civil leaders also contributed to factional disputes. Factionalism was rooted in the past and was a part of traditional social dynamics. Among the Iroquois, for whom the best information exists, factionalism may have pre-dated contact and appears to have become institutionalized to an extent, with the parties involved maintaining their identities over long periods of time. The Iroquois experience suggests that factionalism reflect-
ed a social flexibility that allowed dissident groups to move away and re-establish social order elsewhere to their own liking. The Iroquois migrations into the Ohio country may, in part, be attributed to such separations.

What had long been a part of the dynamics of Indian societies took on an added dimension as a result of contact with Europeans. Again, old issues and conflicts were exacerbated as they were played out against a backdrop of inter-colonial war, the influx of an alien culture, and the arrival of men intent on propagating new beliefs. The result was an increase in factionalism. But it would be a mistake to place such conflict in the simplistic idiom of "pro-French" or "pro-English". Doing so robs the disputes and their resolutions of any meaning for the Indians involved and reduces the native actors to cyphers or pawns of European colonial powers. While it is true that conflicts arose over issues involving relations with English or French colonials or their European masters, at heart was always the question of how best to preserve Indian identities and freedom of action. The Ottawas who declared their intention to move from Detroit to Sandusky in 1760 and 1761 did so out of a desire for peace and economic stability, not necessarily because they perceived the Anglo-Americans as particularly benevolent or because of direct English influence in Ottawa decision-making.

Rather than a conflict between pro-English or pro-French groups, much Indian factionalism centered on fundamental questions of identity, changes, and social values. Conflicts within the Wyandot community at Detroit from 1712 to the 1730s appear to have revolved around the
growth of a Christian element within the town. Whether this was later reflected in Nicholas's decision to side with Anglo-American traders against the French in the 1740s is as yet unclear. Among the Senecas shortly after the end of Anglo-Indian hostilities in 1764, the missionary Samuel Kirkland witnesses a protracted conflict between those who wished to preserve traditional values, primarily warriors and war leaders, and the sachems who desired closer cooperation with the English, cooperation which included the establishment of missions in Seneca towns. In this dispute the issue was not "pro" or "anti" English but rather one of how best to preserve community values and harmony and still face the reality of declining Seneca power vis-a-vis the Anglo-Americans. The presence of the missionary did not cause the dispute, but certainly lent it special urgency.

The ramifications of factionalism were many. It further complicated Anglo-Indian relations by increasing the number of parties who claimed a voice in inter-cultural affairs. Conversely, this facturing made outside manipulation of native societies and decision-making easier. Finally, intra-community conflicts made a united front against expanding English imperialism harder to maintain.

The problems caused by population losses, drinking, and various forms of social and political conflicts based on questions of legitimacy and the goals of public policy may well explain the evident changes in residence patterns among some trans-Appalachian Indians. The continued migration of Iroquois people to the Ohio country may further reflect discord at home. For many of the Indians living west of the Appalachians, the years prior to the arrival of English troops were
years of unrest, loss, and uncertainty.

IV

The changes and conflicts evident in community affairs were reflected in the web of international relations in the west. By the mid-eighteenth century some patterns of inter-societal relations, including those involving Europeans, had become clearly established. On the other hand, the region witnesses shifts in power relationships, changes in alliances, and the emergence of new political forces; changes that were still occurring when the Anglo-Americans first appeared on the Ohio and at Detroit.

Patterns of relations between Indian groups reflected both traditional practices and changes brought by intensified competition for furs and alliances with European colonists. The warfare between the Shawnees, Delawares, Ohio Iroquois, and some Great Lakes Indians and the Cherokees and Catawbas had its source in earlier blood feuds the origins of which were at best dimly remembered by the participants in the 1750s. Much of the importance of this warfare lay in the opportunity it gave young men on both sides to achieve full membership in their societies as successful warriors. This aspect became more important by mid-century as other avenues to status and influence were blocked. While this north-south fighting increased as first the French then the English drew native allies into wars against Indian enemies, it would be incorrect to subscribe this wholly to European machinations. Though Anglo-American officials, for instance, used this warfare as a
way to divide and control western and southern Indians, the native participants were motivated by more traditional goals: captives, booty, and personal glory.

In the Lake Superior region, fur trade induced competition had altered patterns of group relations, resulting in conflict between the eastern Sioux and the Ojibwas. This warfare was of recent origin, dating from the 1730s, and supplanted an earlier period of Sioux-Ojibwa cooperation as Ojibwa middlemen exchanged French trade goods for Sioux furs. Direct French contact with the Sioux resulted in the demise of this symbiotic relationship. The Ojibwas fought to restrict Sioux contact with French traders and also for the now-vital furs, no longer coming from Sioux trading partners. For their part, the Sioux sought to maintain their newly found contacts with New France as a way of holding on to their own middleman's position relative to Indians on the northern plains, a role that originated before contact with Europeans. The disruption of trade caused by the Great War for the Empire thus strongly influenced the responses of both Indian societies to the English who arrived at La Baye in 1761.

To further complicate matters in this area, a smoldering feud between the Menominees of La Baye and the Ojibwas of Mackinac, resulting from the killing of a Menominee at the latter place, existed in the early 1760s. English observers noted the Menominees' desire for revenge and the possibility that this blood feud would involve other Indians, particularly the Sauk, whose interests lay in the economic impact of the dispute.

The Indians living in the vicinity of Detroit and eastward into
the Ohio country experienced far less conflict of the kind common to the Ojibwas and their neighbors. Part of the reason for this was the affiliation between the Detroit Ojibwas, Potawatomis, and Ottawas known as the "three fires". While each group acted independently in the eighteenth century, the bonds of this affiliation served to limit conflict and provided a basis for cooperation. Another factor was the presence of the French trading establishment and French diplomatic efforts which, over a century prior to 1760, had served to weave the independent Indian communities into an alliance system. This system was continually subjected to stress, particularly as Anglo-American traders began to penetrate the French trading empire and offer alternative sources of goods and friendship to the native population. However, as the Fox wars, the Chickasaw war, and the Pickaway raid make clear, the French could rely on a core of native allies whose own interests were best served by supporting specific French policies. Foremost among these were the Potawatomis and Ottawas of Detroit and St. Joseph and the Ojibwas of Mackinac. Given the long standing economic contact between these Indians and the French, and the inter-marriage of these two peoples, it is not surprising that these native communities were among the most threatened by the French defeat in 1760 and those least likely to welcome the intrusion of a former enemy into their lands and economic system.

Another feature of inter-societal relations in the west was the influence of the Wyandots of Detroit. While not militarily powerful, they parleyed their contacts with the English, their earlier ties to New France, and their relations with other Indians at Detroit and the
Ohio country into a role as recognized spokesmen for a number of Indians in their relations with the Anglo-Americans after 1758. In 1759, for example, the Wyandots acted as intermediaries for eight other Indian communities in a conference with the Anglo-Americans and Delawares at Pittsburgh. In the wake of this gathering the Wyandots and Miamis accepted Delaware speech belts on behalf of other western Indians. This special Wyandot position was confirmed two years later when Sir William Johnson acknowledged two Wyandot sachems as leaders of a new Anglo-Indian alliance based at Detroit.

In the Ohio valley, the emergence of the Delawares and Ohio Iroquois as local power brokers marked a change in the power relationships in that important area. By 1758 the Delawares had become the leaders in native negotiations with the newly arrived Anglo-Americans. Far from being a sudden occurrence, this situation developed over more than a decade and was tied to shifts in population and the regional balance of power that combined to make the Ohio country the focus of the Anglo-French conflict.

Those Delawares who were to play a leading role in the history of the Ohio country represented groups which, due to a desire for better sources of food and because of dispossession, began moving into the Ohio River valley in the late 1720s. By the 1740s they, along with their close associates the Shawnees, and the Ohio Iroquois, found themselves in the middle of the growing Anglo-French struggle for possession of the trade and territory of the middle west. Preliminary negotiations initiated by Ohio Indians and Anglo-American
traders led in 1748 to a formal alliance between the Indians and the colonies of Virginia and Pennsylvania. This alliance was initially managed by two Ohio Iroquois, the "half-kings" Tanaghrisson and Scarouady.

As the Anglo-American position in the Ohio country rapidly deteriorated between 1748 and 1753, it became clear that the Six Nations were unable or unwilling to maintain the status quo in the region. The Iroquois position in the region was an increasingly anomalous one. On the one hand, the Onondaga council railed against the "mere hunters" and "giddy young men & children" on the Ohio for entering into negotiations with the Anglo-American without working through the League. The result was, in effect, Iroquois abandonment of the Ohio country and the creation of a power vacuum into which stepped the French and, upon their departure beginning in 1758, the Ohio Indian groups led by the Delawares.

The evolution of a Delaware identity and negotiating position in the west had begun in the 1720s and was still evolving in 1758. At the core of this Delaware community were a number of towns identified with one of three totemic clans: Wolf, Turkey, and Turtle, each clan having recognized spokesmen. Whole these clans and their constituent towns still maintained a large degree of autonomy, they did cooperate in the face of outside threats and, by the late 1760s, tended to recognize and lend support to a Delaware "head chief".

At the time of General Forbes' arrival at Fort Duquesne, the most visible Delaware leaders were Pisquetomen, Shingas, and Tamaqua.
From the summer of 1758 through 1762 Tamaqua appears most frequently as chief spokesman for the Ohio Indians. As his role grew, those of his brothers declined until only glimpses of them appear. The reason for Tamaqua's rise to authority seems to be connected to his non-participation in the recent war with Pennsylvania. Thus, unlike his brothers and many other Delaware leaders, Tamaqua could pursue negotiations with the Anglo-Americans untainted.

Paralleling the rise of the Delawares on the Ohio was the growing independence of the Ohio Iroquois. Between 1748 and the early 1760s, these people used the volatile state of affairs in the west to confirm their independent status in relation to their elders in New York. The two "half kings" had given the Ohio Iroquois a voice in regional affairs, in defiance of the Six Nations' declaration that they were only hunters and could not act in a politically independent manner. With the deaths of Tanaghrisson and Scarouady in 1755 and 1756 new Ohio Iroquois leaders emerged, best known of whom was Kayahsota.222

Several things are clear about the large and varied Indian population of the trans-Appalachian region as it prepared to respond to the on-coming Anglo-Americans. For these Indians traditional values, social organization, beliefs, and customs were still very much a part of every day life. Yet the native societies in the west were not static. Change was occurring throughout the region, most notably in the growing dependence of Indians on European materials and the trade through which these were obtained. European trade goods were just one aspect of a complex system of cultural exchange which, while selective
on the part of all concerned, nonetheless produced stress in native societies as new ideas and values collided with tradition. The warfare between Indian groups and between natives and Europeans during much of the first half of the eighteenth century, and the recurring and traumatic epidemic illnesses that often accompanied these wars, further strained the native social fabric. The result was an Indian population in a state of flux. To all of this was added the collapse of French power in the west and with it much of the economic and diplomatic structure upon which many western Indians had come to depend. This set of circumstances would help determine western Indian responses to the Anglo-American soldiers, traders, and settlers who began to appear in the wake of the French defeat.
Notes for Chapter I

1 The official version of this meeting is contained in Donald H. Kent, Louis M. Waddell, et. al., eds., The Papers of Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg, 1951-1978), II, 621-26, hereafter cited as Kent and Waddell, eds., Bouquet Papers. For the Indian warnings and resistance to English occupation, see "Two Journals of Western Tours by Charles Frederick Post," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., Early Western Travels, 1748-1846 (Cleveland, 1904-1907), I, 282-85, hereafter cited as "Post Journals".


3 Randolph C. Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgh, 1969), chpts. 4, 5.


7 Ibid., 70.

8 George Mason Dow, ed., Anthology and Bibliography of Niagara Falls (Albany, 1921), I, 55.

9 Kent, Iroquois Indians, II, 113.


15 "Post Journals", 281.

16 Ibid.

17 "Croghan's Journal”, 356.


20 "Croghan's Journal”, 378, 406; Rogers, Journals, 233.


23 "The Narrative of Marie Le Roy and Barbara Leininger for Three Years Captives Among the Indians," PMHB XXIX (1905), 412.

"Croghan's Journal", 364.


"Post Journals", 196.

"Croghan's Journal", 404.

Ibid., 329-30.

Ibid., 354.


Ibid., 25-26; Wheeler-Voegelin, "Ethnohistory of Indian Use," Ibid., 240.


Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 172-73.

41 Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Northwest Ohio, 33-34; Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 171-72.


48 "Croghan's Journal", 395-96; Rogers, Journals, 231; Beverly W. Bond, Jr., ed., The Cours. of the Ohio River Taken By Lt. T. Hutchins Anno 1762 and Two Accompanying Maps (Columbus, 1942).

49 Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Northwest Ohio, 40-41.

50 Bond, ed., Courses of the Ohio.

51 "Stuart Captivity", 74-75.

52 Bond, ed., Courses of the Ohio.


55 "Croghan's Journal", 368.


57 Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures In Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (Rutland, Vt., 1969), 42-47, 62.

58 The 1718 enumeration is in Kinietz, Indians, 164-66; the 1736 enumeration is found in Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan and Berthold Fernow, eds., Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York (Albany, 1853-1887), IX, 1052-58, hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, NYCD.


60 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 149, 187.

61 Edmunds, Potawatomis, chpt. 2 for an excellent summary of the Fox wars.

62 Johnson Papers, X, 521-29; Bond, ed., Courses of the Ohio.

63 "Lieut. James Gorrell's Journal," State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Collections, I & II (Madison, 1854), 34, hereafter cited as "Gorrell Journal".

64 Ibid., 32; "List of Indian Nations" Sept. 24, 1762, Amherst Papers, WO 34/49, Public Record Office (microfilm, Public Archives of Canada), hereafter cited as WO 34.

65 "Gorrell Journal", 27.


67Johnson Papers, IV, 241-42.

68Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Oct. 13, 1763, Ibid., X, 670; O'Callaghan, NYCD, IX, 1056.

69Kent, Iroquois Indians, II, 211. Obtaining reliable population figures for the trans-Appalachian region is complicated by a number of factors. Most often estimates were expressed in terms of "cabins", "warriors", or total population, but seldom in a combination that permits a warrior-dependent ratio to be arrived at that can then be used throughout a given area. Further, most data comes from 1748 through 1764, a time when regional Indians were suffering unusually high losses due to war and disease. This was also a time of population movement and consolidation. Guy Soulliard Klett, ed., Journals of Charles Beatty, 1762-1769 (University Park, Pa., 1962), 60-61 contains a population estimate for Newcomer's Town in 1766 which mentions 200 men and a total population of between 500 and 700 people, yielding a ratio of 1.2-1.3. Assuming this number would reflect post-war losses both from battle and disease as well as returned captives, I have followed the lead of Tanner and Wheeler-Voegelin in their ethnohistorical studies of the Ohio region and raised the ratio for the pre-1763 period to 1.4. This and any population figures derived from it should be taken as estimates only, subject to alteration as more data becomes available.

70Kent, Iroquois Indians, II, 218.

71"Croghan's Journal", 376.

72Paul A.W. Wallace, Thirty Thousand Miles with John Heckewelder (Pittsburgh, 1950), 41.

73"Post Journals", 196.

74This map is reproduced in William A. Hunter, Armstrong's Victory at Kittanning, Pennsylvania Historical Leaflet # 17 (Harrisburg, nd), 3.

75Wheeler-Voegelin, "Ethnohistory of Indian Use," in Tanner and Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795, I, 243-44.

76Rogers, Journals, 234-35.

77"Post Journals", 261; Hunter, Armstrong's Victory, 3; "Kenny
"List of Indian Nations" Sept. 24, 1762, WO 34/49.


"List of Indian Nations", WO 34/49.

Ibid.

"Stuart Captivity", 74, 75; O'Callaghan, NYCD, IX, 1053.

Clifton, Prairie People, 111-18; Edmunds, Potawatomis, 18, 21;

"List of Indian Nations", WO 34/49.

Ibid., Johnson Papers, IV, 244; information taken from Henry, Travels and Adventures, 110 suggests a warrior-dependent ratio of 1:3 for the hunting bands of the western Great Lakes and I have used this figure in estimating the total population for the Ottawas and Ojibwas living north and west of Detroit.

Henry, Travels and Adventures, 38.

"List of Indian Nations", WO 34/49.

"Gorrell Journal", 32; O'Callaghan, NYCD, IX, 1054-55.

Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Northwest Ohio, 34; Emily Blasingham, Dorothy Libby, and Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin, Miami, Wea, and Eel-River Indians of Southern Indiana (New York, 1974), 27.


Clifton, Prairie People, 87-89, 90, 93-94.

Lawrence Henry Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, IV: Zones of International Friction; North America South of the Great Lakes Region, 1748-1754 (New York, 1967), chpts. 6-9, hereafter cited as Gipson, IV; Donald H. Kent, The French Invasion of
Western Pennsylvania, 1753 (Harrisburg, 1954), passim.

93 Edmunds, Potawatomis, 55-56; Kellogg, French Regime, 432-33.

94 William Johnson to Peter and Elizabeth Wraxall, Jul. 17, 1757, Johnson Papers, IX, 800.

95 Ibid., XII, 412.


97 Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Mr. 7, 1760, Johnson Papers, III, 197; Johnson to Amherst, Mar. 24, 1760, Ibid., 201; Johnson to General Thomas Gage, Apr. 8, 1760, Ibid., 218; Johnson to Amherst, May 26, 1760, Ibid., 252; on the Michillimackinac council Ibid., 543; Major William Walters to Johnson, Apr. 5, 1762, Ibid., X, 427.


101 Clifton, Prairie People, 105.

102 For examples of native persistence in the face of European cultural imperialism see Axtell, "The English Colonial Impact on Indian Culture," in European and the Indian, 245-71; James P. Ronda, "We Are Well As We Are: An Indian Critique of Seventeenth-Century Christian Missions," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d Ser., XXXIV (1977), 66-82; Edward H. Spicer, "Yaqui," in Perspectives in American Indian Culture Change, 7-93.

103 The literature on the colonial fur trade is large and growing. Any study should begin with Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada (Toronto, 1970), and W.J. Eccles, "A Belated Review of Harold Adams Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada," Canadian Historical Review 40 (1979),

Peter Wraxall, *An Abridgment of the Indian Affairs, Contained in Four Folio Volumes, Transacted in the Colony of New York, from the Year 1678 to the Year 1751*, ed. Charles Howard McIlwain (Cambridge, Mass., 1915), ix; Rotstein, "Trade and Politics," *WCA* 3 (1972), passim.


Timothy Alden, ed., "An Account of the Captivity of Hugh Gibson Among the Delaware Indians of the Big Beaver and Muskingum from the Latter Part of July 1756, to the Beginning of April 1759," in Massachusetts Historical Society, *Collections*, 3rd Ser., VI (Boston, 1837), 143, hereafter cited as "Gibson Captivity".


Ibid., 147.


Johnson Papers, XIII, 191.

Ibid., 190, 192.

Clifton, Prairie People, 128-29.


Clifton, Prairie People, 128-29.

The exception is the Crabapple Point site, which appears to have been a lead smelting site, see Janet Spector, "Crabapple Point (Je93): An Historic Winnebago Indian Site in Jefferson County, Wisconsin," Wisconsin Archaeologist 56 (1975), 270-345.


Clifton, Prairie People, 125-28.

Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 124-31; Jennings, Invasion of America, 87.

Rotstein, "Trade and Politics," NCJA 3 (1972); Eccles, "Belated Review," CHR 60 (1979), passim, for the political importance of the trade.

Zeisberger, History, 21.

"Gorrell Journal", 30, 34.

Quimby, Indian Culture, 140.


Clifton, Prairie People, 124; Howard, Shawnee, 127.


Brose, "Valley Sweets Site," Mich. Arch. 12 (1966), 10-12; Seeman and Bush, "Snderle Site," Ps. Arch. 49 (1979), 2-4; Quimby, Indian Culture, 145; a thorough analysis of one historic burial complex is to be found in Robert C. Mainfort, Indian Social Dynamics in the Period of European Contact: Fletcher Site Cemetery, Bay County Michigan State University, Anthropological Series 1, v. 4 (East Lansing, 1979).


143 Wallace, Heckewelder, 59-60.

144 Ibid., 60-62.

145 Johnson Papers, XIII, 204.


147 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 143-44.


153 Ibid.

154 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 110.


156 Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 23.


159 Howard, Shawnee, 75-76.

160 Zeisberger, History, 17; "Gibson Captivity", 146.

161 Zeisberger, History, 17.


166 Bonvillain, Iroquoian Women," in Studies On Iroquoian Culture, 54; Zeisberger, History, 90 on the exclusion of Delaware women from councils.


168 Bonvillain, "Iroquoian Women," in Studies On Iroquoian Culture,
50, 53, 57, also 49 on the limited male role in agriculture; Wallace, "Woman, Land, and Society," Pa. Arch. 17 (1947), 9-10.

169. Wallace, Heckewelder, 56; Kenneth P. Bailey, ed., The Ohio Company Papers, 1753-1817, Being Primarily Papers of the "Suffering Traders" of Pennsylvania (Arcata, Calif., 1947), 42, 53, 56, 57, 69, 147, for examples of Indian women appearing on traders' lists as debtors.


173. Personal communication with Henry Dobyns, Oct. 2, 1981, on this point and its significance due to the continued decline of native populations in the 1750s and 1760s.

174. The basis for the following discussion on drinking is Craig MacAndrews and Robert B. Edgerton, Drunken Comportment, A Social Explanation (New York, 1969), esp. chpt. 7.


176. MacAndrew and Edgerton, Drunken Comportment, 149-56.

177. Ibid., 156-65.

178. Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 72-74, 123 on the ability of Moravian missionaries to move about unharmed during drunken sprees.

179. Francis P. Jennings, "The Delaware Interregnum," PMHB 89 (1965), 179-80; Beauchamp, Moravian Journals, 72-74, 116; Johnson Papers, XIII, 156.


182. Johnson Papers, X, 460-83.

183. Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 162-64.
Zeisberger, History, 75-76, 80.

Ibid.


O'Callaghan, NYCD, VI, 974.

Johnson Papers, III, 697-98.

Keesing, Menomini Indians, 74.

Johnson Papers, III, 542-43.

Hanna, Wilderness Trail, II, 159.


Ibid.; Fenton, "Factionalism," in Actes du IVe Congress In-
ternational, 331-32, 335.


201 Helen Hornbeck Tanner, "The Location of Indian Tribes in Southeastern Michigan and Northern Ohio, 1700-1817," in Tanner and Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795, I, 199-200.

202 Kirkland Journals, 21-26, esp. 23.


209 Clifton, Prairie People, 103; Edmunds, Potawatomis, chpts. 1-3 on the close Potawatomi-French alliance.


212 Johnson Papers, III, 491, 494.


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There has been little work done thus far on Indian-Indian relations in this region; see Downes, *Council Fires*, chpts. 2-3; Wallace, *Death and Rebirth*, chpt. 5. For a recent biography of Tanaghrisson, see *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, III, s.v. "Tanaghrisson".

Ps. Col. Rec., IV, 635.


"Gibson Captivity", 142-43.

*Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, IV, s.v. "Kayahsota".
Trans-Appalachian Indians: 1760

1. Cenewango...Senecas
2. Custaloga's...Delawares
3. The Koshukus...Delawares
4. Saucunk...Delawares
5. Beaver's Town...Delawares (post 1760)
6. Lower Town...Shawnees
7. Sandusky...Wyandots
8. Detroit...Wyandots, Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis
9. Saginem...Ojibwas, Ottawas
10. l'Aubre Croche...Ottawas
11. Kekionga...Miami
12. St. Joseph...Potawatomis
13. Dutilalong...Weas

Indian Towns:
1. Conewango...Senecas
2. Custaloga's...Delawares
3. The Koshukus...Delawares
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9. Saginem...Ojibwas, Ottawas
10. l'Aubre Croche...Ottawas
11. Kekionga...Miami
12. St. Joseph...Potawatomis
13. Dutilalong...Weas

Lake Superior
Lake Michigan
Lake Huron
Lake Erie
Lake Ontario
Lake Ontario

ウィノメネ
トスカローダ

ウィンネベゴス
オタワス
オージーブワス
ミシサグアス
CHAPTER II
The Anglo-American West to 1754

By 1760 the largest number of Anglo-Americans close to the trans-Appalachian region and its inhabitants were embodied in the armies that had recently occupied Canada and the Ohio country. These forces were comprised of a mix of English regulars and provincial troops from New England, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. In all, some twenty thousand men were arrayed on the periphery of the west. While most of these troops were stationed in Canada to ensure the loyalty of the French population there, garrisons were established on the Niagara River and at Fort Pitt in numbers that exceeded those previously mustered by the French. And, as Major Rogers embarked on his mission to Detroit, British detachments were being pushed into the upper Ohio River basin and being readied to move west throughout the Great Lakes region.

While these troops were preparing to consolidate and hold England's conquest, Anglo-American settlers were beginning to return to lands immediately west of the Appalachians. These earlier farms had been abandoned in the face of French and Ohio Indian raids that swept over the Pennsylvania and Virginia back country in the wake of Braddock's defeat in 1755.

Although Anglo-Irish traders from these colonies had been well established throughout the Ohio country by 1754, settlements had only begun to penetrate the region. In New York, the presence of the Six
Nations served to limit actual expansion, if not land speculation, west of the Mohawk River, while in Pennsylvania the mountains, pierced only by the West Branch of the Susquehanna River, presented a formidable barrier to westward migration. As a result, many of those people who wanted land followed the Great Valley into central and western Virginia. Nevertheless, some Anglo-Americans did succeed in crossing the Appalachians. Prior to the outbreak of war there were settlements of a sort on both the Greenbriar and Kanawha rivers, and a small settlement at Stewart's Crossing (present Connellsville, Pennsylvania). Christopher Gist, agent for the newly-formed Ohio Company of Virginia, had a "plantation" on the Monongahela River, although it appears to have been more of a plan than a reality in 1754.

Aside from Gist's plantation and the tentative settlements along the Greenbriar, Anglo-American schemes to settle west of the mountains remained largely on paper in the form of charters for the Greenbriar Company and the larger Ohio Company. Both groups had been given land grants along tributaries of the Ohio River on condition that the grants be surveyed and occupied. In the Ohio Company's case, however, settlement took second place as the Company attempted to establish its own trade with the Ohio Indians. Such efforts further complicated the growing Anglo-French trade and imperial struggles in the region. These conflicts reached a climax early in 1754 when French forces evicted Ohio Company employees from the forks of the Ohio and built Fort Duquesne where the Company's store was to have been.

The outbreak of war in the Ohio country put an immediate and effective end to Anglo-American trade and settlement ventures. Traders
were driven out of the region and their establishments either destroyed or appropriated by the French, with substantial losses to the merchant houses that supplied the trade. Immediately after disposing of Colonel George Washington's motley force at Fort Necessity on July 4, 1754, the French officer, Coulon de Villiers, burned Gist's settlement and the Ohio Company storehouse on Redstone Creek, thus making French control of the region complete.

Having routed Anglo-Americans in the west, the French and their Indian auxiliaries from Canada and the Great Lakes began to carry the war to the settled parts of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, as well as the Mohawk Valley of New York. In 1755, as Braddock's army crawled toward the Ohio, French-led parties struck Will's Creek, Maryland. In the aftermath of Braddock's defeat, the Indians living on the Ohio began their own war against the Anglo-Americans. Pennsylvania and Virginia experienced a new round of attacks that continued through 1756 and only began to subside after the Delawares' forward base at Kittanning was abandoned in the wake of Colonel Armstrong's raid in September of that year. Although the entire Anglo-American back country lay open to attack during this period, Pennsylvania appears to have suffered the heaviest losses. By the spring of 1758, Harris' Ferry and Carlisle represented the westernmost pockets of settlement in the colony as Cumberland County and parts of York County were all but abandoned in the face of raid, the inhabitants streaming back to Lancaster and Philadelphia. Lines of stockades and blockhouses proved ineffective both as a barrier to raiding parties and as a psychological boost to the civilian population. The raids had a similar...
effect on the morale of those to the south. Virginians and Marylanders abandoned their western settlements, leaving Winchester and Fort Cumberland to stand as advanced bastions against the French and Indians.\textsuperscript{12}

Though precise figures are not available it appears that the inhabitants of the colonies bordering the west suffered as heavily from the war as the Indians living on the Ohio and Great Lakes. In November 1757 the Palatine German settlement of German Flatts on the Mohawk River was destroyed. Losses included some two hundred people killed or captured and the destruction of large numbers of buildings and livestock.\textsuperscript{13} Lists of prisoners compiled by returned captives and the records of Anglo-Americans returned by Indians after the war further suggest the magnitude of losses in Pennsylvania and Virginia. The captive Marie Le Roy knew the whereabouts of thirty-eight persons among the Indians. More comprehensive, but my no means exhaustive, are the records kept by Anglo-American officials of returned captives. Between August 1759 and April 1763, the Indians living in the Ohio country and lower Great Lakes returned at least 403 men, women, and children to the garrison at Fort Pitt. The Detroit garrison received another twenty by the end of 1760.\textsuperscript{14}

While only a sample, these lists give some indication of the number of people taken in frontier raids between 1755 and 1758. The total was certainly greater since Indians were reluctant to part with those they had adopted and some captives resisted repatriation to what, after several years spent in native societies, seemed an alien world.\textsuperscript{15} Finally, the figures of returned captives only hint at the total losses in dead and injured. Assuming the number of killed to have been at
least twice the number carried off, due to those who chose to re-
sist or who failed to survive wounds or the trip west, losses in
Pennsylvania and Virginia could easily have exceeded two thousand
people, exclusive of other, military losses.

Like their Indian counterparts and enemies to the west, Anglo-
American settlers were hurt in other ways by the war. The loss of
numbers of people did not produce the same degree of social disruption
it did among native groups due mainly to the fact that Anglo-American
families were not the sole basis for the socio-political system. This
is not to say, however, that Anglo-American settlers were immune to
the effects of war. Losses of kin and neighbors weakened families
and communities and led to a heightened sense of insecurity, making
panic and flight more likely. In Carlisle, William Trent reported
that "a Lad who went from McDowell's Mill to see what fire it was
\[at a neighbor's farm\] never returned, the Horse coming back with the
Reins over his back." Such a scene must have been all the more
terrible for people who had lost homes and families and who had fled
to Carlisle for safety. From the summer of 1755 through the fall of
1758 episodes such as this were common all along the ever-contract-
ing line of settlement.

Along with the problems of staying alive and keeping ones family
together under conditions of guerilla warfare, Anglo-American settlers
were confronted with other difficulties. While the number of enemy
raiders in the field at any given time was small, their effective-
ness tended to keep the inhabitants in a state of siege. Believing
that "the Woods from Juniata to Shamokin are full of Indians, seeking
for plunder and scalps", farmers were reluctant to sow and reap and thus faced the possibility of loss of both subsistence and livelihood. As the raids reached a peak those living in outlying farms and settlements began to "gather in the greatest consternation" in the larger communities or in the dozens of private "forts" that sprang up around mills, stone houses, and trading posts. Those who fled to the towns found confusion, overcrowded conditions, filth, and disease. Smallpox broke out in Philadelphia in July 1757 and appeared the following spring in Lancaster. While the illness was probably introduced by sailors or soldiers coming into Pennsylvania, the less than healthy environment in the refugee communities created ideal conditions for its transmission.

The anxiety and frustration created by this border warfare was revealed in a number of ways, both by provincial governments and their citizens. Confronted by an unconventional war which seemingly could not be won by conventional means, the governments of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Virginia by 1756 resorted to the one element of Indian warfare that did so much to terrorize civilians: scalping. Provincial scalp bounties marked a serious departure from accepted European methods of warfare and reflected an attempt to "fight fire with fire" as well as a search for an inducement to get otherwise reluctant fighting men into the field. While the effects of scalping and scalp bounties as a deterrent to enemy activities is problematical, the bounty system became an acceptable method of financing frontier military operations throughout the latter half of the war, and in later conflicts with western Indians.
Scalp bounty proclamations reflected the frustration of colonial officials and their search for more effective defensive measures. For those under fire, the border was took its toll in other ways. In Pennsylvania, for example, those living in exposed areas began to turn their anger and frustration against all Indians and their own government. Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, reported that the survivors of the November 1755 raids called for attacks on Indians "without Distinction", an attitude that boded ill for those small groups of Indians still living at peace within or close to the settled part of the colony. 21 Worse than any emerging Indian-hating, from the point of view of the Philadelphia officials, was the growing bitterness over the government's inability and seeming unwillingness to respond to the obvious need for defense. The belief that an unresponsive, indeed criminally negligent, government must be made to act in the public interest, prompted hundreds of frontier farmers to descend on the capital late in 1755 to demand action.22 The tactic worked, after a fashion. In response to public outrage as well as shifts in the currents of provincial and imperial politics, steps were taken to raise troops, fortify the frontier and to initiate negotiations with local Indians in the hope of ending the colony's Indian war.23

What ultimately spared those Anglo-Americans facing the west was the success of military campaigns led and composed largely of English troops. In the summer of 1758 Colonel John Bradstreet destroyed the French depot at Fort Frontenac at Cataracu on the eastern end of Lake Ontario. The subsequent abandonment of Fort Duquesne and its occupation by General Forbes' army in November ensured the Anglo-Americans a foot-
hold in the Ohio country. Both of these successes hampered the French war effort and tended to relieve the pressure on the border settle-
ments. These victories also increased French logistical problems by interdicting supply lines to troops and Indian allies in the west. The loss of the vital entrepot of Fort Niagara in July 1759 effective-
ly severed the western territories from their administrative and logis-
tical center in the St. Lawrence Valley. By the end of 1759 the re-
mainder of the French posts in the Ohio country had been abandoned, bring-
ing military operations in the west to an end.

The opportunities presented by the quasi-peace that existed in the trans-Appalachian region after 1758 were quickly exploited by Anglo-
Americans. Those who went into the west; whether military or civilian, rode on a wave of conquest that heightened the conviction that a prize so dearly won should be at the disposal of the victors. In this, the Anglo-Americans who moved west after 1758 differed from the Indian people they would meet. For the former, the surrender of Canada re-
presented security and opportunity; for the latter it meant insecurity and apprehension about the future. For both, the conquest of Canada created problems that made peace difficult to achieve. What underlay these problems was the difference between the invader and those being invaded.

Like the Indians they would encounter, the Anglo-Americans who went into the west did not comprise a monolith. While these people all sought, in one way or another, to take advantage or opportunities presented by military victory, they did so in ways defined by particular interests or responsibilities. These, in turn, tended to fracture the
Anglo-American presence into a number of often competing, sometimes antagonistic groups. This interest group competition tended to complicate official efforts to consolidate the battlefield gains and control expansion, both because of the conflict thus generated and because these competing groups presented something less than a unified front to the Indians whose cooperation, or at least acquiescence, was needed if the west was to be secure. What was for provincial and royal officials often a problem and complicating disadvantage could, however, be of potential value to Indian interests in their efforts to deal with this new wave of Anglo-American expansion.

Responsibility for maintaining royal control of the ceded territories in the west, and crown policies toward the Indians was vested in the office of the American Commander-in-chief. Sir Jeffrey Amherst, who held that post from 1759 until the fall of 1763, had at his disposal two agencies with which to carry out policies originating in London: the regular army and the Indian service. In theory, policy would originate in London, based on recommendations and information supplied by military, provincial, and Indian service officials. Policy decisions would, in turn, be carried out in a coordinated fashion by Amherst, using the enforcement powers of the army in conjunction with the diplomatic skills of the Indian agents.

The Indian Department, the northern division of which was controlled by Sir William Johnson, reflected both the crown's determination to coordinate and centralize Indian affairs and the largely de facto nature of Anglo-American policy toward the west and its inhabitants. Created in 1756, the Indian superintendencies and the handful of agents
who comprised the northern and southern departments were to have responsibility for coordinating and carrying out Indian policy in the wake of colonial mismanagement. Throughout the period from 1756 through the Revolution the Indian service was administratively a sub-branch of the military command in America. The two superintendents—Johnson in the north, John Stuart in the south—held their offices by royal commissions issued through the commander-in-chief. Further, the service was wholly dependent on the army for its budget, both for diplomatic expenses and salaries. Since the superintendents were to act as the primary conduits of information between London and the various Indian groups in and bordering the colonies, they were privileged to correspond directly with the Board of Trade and the Secretary of State for the Southern Department, while at the same time being subordinate to the army command. Sir William Johnson, whose district came to include the newly-conquered territories west of the Alleghenies and north of the Ohio River was technically in sole charge of relations between the western Indians and both the crown and individual colonies.

The army, aside from its role as a conquering force, was assigned the additional responsibility of policing the trans-Appalachian region and of enforcing whatever policies and regulations governing Indian affairs the government might decree. For a number of reasons, the forces available were ill-suited to the task assigned them. Among other things there were far too few soldiers and too much territory to govern to make enforcement effective. Nevertheless, local commanders did attempt to fulfill their regulatory duties and, in so doing, came into direct confrontation with traders, settlers, and speculators.
The end of hostilities was a boon to those in the Anglo-American business community who sought the quick profits available through the fur trade. Indeed, traders, acting independently or as factors for the commercial houses of Albany and Philadelphia, moved west even as initial peace negotiations with the Indians were being held. In a few cases traders managed to reach the Great Lakes trading posts well ahead of the troops dispatched to protect and regulate trading activities.

The trade was still significant enough to the economies of New York, Pennsylvania, and Canada to make it an attractive undertaking. The profit margin also made the Indian trade a good investment, especially for commercial companies seeking to diversify and obtain quick returns. Evidence suggests a nearly 300 percent return on goods carried to Detroit from Montreal in 1762 and 1763, and the trade regulations promulgated by Johnson allowed for generous profits—as much as 50 percent or better at the posts on the upper Great Lakes. In addition, several entrepreneurs from the older colonies and a number of retired army officers went to Montreal and the western posts, attracted by the reported back-log of pelts resulting from the war and bent on taking over direction of the former French-Canadian trade system. Finally, some of those who engaged in the post-war trade did so to recoup losses suffered during the French occupation of the Ohio country between 1752 and 1755.

Equally conspicuous and potentially more damaging to Anglo-Indian relations were the increasing numbers of farmers and hunters who moved into the west, largely from the border areas of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Many of these people followed English troops, using the new
military roads which led to the Ohio River.\textsuperscript{33} The garrison at Fort Pitt itself became the center of a thriving community of hunters, traders, sutlers, soldiers' families, and various hangers-on.\textsuperscript{34}

This migration into the Ohio region, especially along tributary streams such as the Monongahela, Youghiogheny, and Kanawha rivers, represented the continuation of the tentative expansion that had been interrupted by the war. Some of those involved undoubtedly hoped to re-claim farms abandoned in 1754-1755, others attempted to stake claims through squatters' rights. Still others went west with the encouragement of land companies, often supported by provincial governments.

Foremost among these was the Ohio Company which sought after 1758 to re-assert its pre-war claims to several hundred thousand acres of land south of the Ohio River. Added impetus was given by the wartime promise of Virginia's Governor Dinwiddie of western lands as a bonus for those who served in the colony's forces. As the war drew to a close, Virginia officers, among them Ohio Company members George Washington and George Mercer, lobbied for land grants in the western lands claimed by Virginia through her royal charter.\textsuperscript{35}

The Ohio Company's activities were only one example of what Sir William Johnson called "the Pestilential Thirst for Land" running through the colonies.\textsuperscript{36} In Pennsylvania the Susquehanna Company of Connecticut, again through claims based on provincial charters, made its first attempt to plant settlements on the upper Susquehanna River, near Wyoming. The Company and its agents, most notorious of whom was John Henry Lydius of Albany, had acquired through questionable means a deed to the desired lands from several Iroquois at the 1754 Albany
conference. Ignoring the later repudiation of the sale by the Six Nations and the ban on settlement west of the Susquehanna made proclaimed at Easton in 1758, the Company persisted in its efforts, to the alarm of local settlers and Iroquois, not to mention to proprietary government of Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{37}

In New York, along the Mohawk River, similar attempts were being made by land interests. The practical necessity of maintaining Six Nations friendship during the war had led to a reduction, though never a cessation, of estate-building and speculation in the area west and south of Albany. By 1760, however, pre-war claims to large tracts were being pressed which, if successful, would embrace most or all of the lands used and occupied by the Mohawks and Oneidas. The most notorious of these claims was the Kayaderosseras Patent, embracing eight hundred thousand acres north and west of the Mohawk River. As with the Ohio and Susquehanna companies, the New York patentees had been issued titles by their own government but had not succeeded in extinguishing native claims in a manner satisfactory to all parties concerned.\textsuperscript{38}

Land speculation was one area in which individual colonies could advance their claims to attractive western lands through semi-private companies. In the case of Pennsylvania, however, determination to preserve and enhance provincial claims extended into the realm of Indian affairs as well. Since the formation of the royal Indian service, the colony had been reluctant to part with its control of local Indian relations. In addition, Pennsylvania's relations with both its Indian neighbors and the crown were complicated by the on-going feud between
the Penns and anti-proprietary elements led by Philadelphia's Quaker elites. While largely political in nature, the conflict led to repercussions in Indian affairs as the Quakers, through their Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians, used the proprietary's less than admirable record of Indian land purchases as ammunition. Using their political clout and their support they came to enjoy with the military command in the colony, the Quakers worked to establish provincial trade regulations and their own control of government-supported trading stores. The object was to maintain peace by guaranteeing a fair, plentiful trade. One result of this was to introduce another unwelcome entrant into an increasingly competitive, crowded business.\textsuperscript{39}

The response of the English army and Indian service to trade and settlement activities varied from active attempts to enforce the emerging, somewhat confused program toward the west and its native inhabitants, to cooperation. Relations at any given time were largely governed by local circumstances and often based on decision made on the spot rather than after consultation with higher authority.

The largest point of conflict between the army and traders was over the transportation and sale of liquor. A cheaply produced item much in demand among Indians, rum could yield greater profits than bulky, more expensive hardware and cloth. From the official point of view, however, the liquor trade induced drunken violence and encouraged sharp practices by traders that left Indian customers stripped of their means of support and a lingering bitterness toward Anglo-Americans in general. On a more practical level, Indians destitute of clothing
and food from dealing with unscrupulous traders became an unwelcome
public charge on the garrisons' own, often meagre, stores. 40

The same desire to ensure fair treatment of Indians to maintain
the peace led the army to confront speculators and squatters on west­
er lands. Bound by treaty promises to preserve those lands still
claimed by native groups, the royal government acted to restrain those
Anglo-Americans who sought to appropriate protected lands for them­
selves by legal or illegal means.

The army was not uniformly opposed to western settlement, how­
ever. As early as 1761, Sir Jeffrey Amherst made known his wish to
locate farmers and ex-soldiers at the western posts as a way of support­
ing the garrisons. Reminiscent of European frontier garrison settle­
ments in Eastern Europe and Ireland, those in America were to aid in
the defense of England's new territories. 41 Practical military con­
siderations also prompted Amherst to encourage the settlement of the
vital Niagara portage by a partnership of traders and former army officers.
He hoped that such a scheme would ensure the passage of supplies to the
upper posts by putting their transportation in the more trusted and,
presumably, more reliable hands of Anglo-American, rather than Seneca
of Mississauga, porters. 42

By the same token, military-trader relations were often cordial,
or at least cooperative. The merchant houses that supplied traders
also held contracts to supply the army and Indian agents, thus provid­
ing one avenue of cooperation. Beyond this, traders performed valuable
services as interpreters, messengers, sources of intelligence, and, in
the face of fiscal restrictions, suppliers of goods for soldiers as well
as occasional gifts for Indian negotiations. 43

The Indian service, like the army upon which it depended, found itself in a similar relationship with private interests. As the resident authority on Indian affairs in the west, Sir William Johnson was expected, and indeed, sought, to propose and promote policies designed to create a climate of peace within which Anglo-American interests could flourish. In carrying out his responsibilities, Johnson and the service he led became a focal point for royal and private interests. Throughout the 1760s, Johnson, to the extent that he had an Indian Department bureaucracy at all, tended to enlist traders such as George Croghan, Alexander McKee, and Jean Baptiste de Couagne as agents. As a major New York land baron whose estates resulted from his special relationship with the Mohawk Iroquois, Johnson was sympathetic to the desires of others to expand their estates. Throughout his tenure as superintendent, Johnson added to his holdings and those of political allies, using his contacts with both Iroquois and English politicians for private gain as well as public good.

The combination of private interests and public policy presented a tempting opportunity for employees of the Indian service. Among the stores of liquor confiscated by the commander of Fort Niagara in 1762 were 286 gallons belonging to de Couagne. At the same time that military and Indian service officials were complaining about the illicit liquor trade at Toronto, Indian agents went there to dispose of goods and rum that could not be sold in the over-stocked marketplace at Niagara. George Croghan, Johnson's deputy in the Ohio country, used his position to acquire extensive landholdings north of Fort Pitt,
technically in contravention of the ban placed on western settlement.\textsuperscript{45}

Trade and land interests also found themselves cooperating. At the time of its organization in the late 1740s, the Ohio Company saw the Indian trade as another, perhaps major, source of revenue and as a means of gaining Indian acceptance of the Company's land schemes. Traders such as Hugh Crawford, Thomas Cresap, and Hugh Parker in the Company's employ established trading stations in the Muskingum valley and at Kuskuskie.\textsuperscript{46} What is more, Parker, Cresap, and William Trent, as well as Christopher Gist, acted as advance men and surveyors for the Company.\textsuperscript{47} In the aftermath of the Great War for the Empire, many Ohio country traders and their merchant employers sought ways of recovering the losses they had suffered at the hands of the French and hostile former Indian customers. The plan developed by the "Suffering Traders"--a land grant from the crown--made cooperation with land ed interests once again attractive. Speculators and traders began to combine their resources in an effort to circumvent restrictions on western expansion by calling for land grants as recompense for war-related losses.\textsuperscript{48}

Though they often appear as a single force in western affairs, the traders themselves cannot be seen as a unified group. Regional differences led to conflicts over trade regulations and methods that were never fully resolved before war erupted in 1763. The problem grew out of efforts by a number of Scottish merchants to take control of the French-Canadian trade network in the Great Lakes region. Relying on the expertise of Canadian voyageurs and methods developed
during the French regime, these entrepreneurs sought to re-open the northern trade in its old form, which included permitting traders to go directly to Indian customers rather than being restricted to a few posts. Under this plan, the garrisons on the Great Lakes would serve as periodic rendezvous where pelts would be trans-shipped to Montreal. This scheme, while well adapted to the realities of the Great Lakes trade system, collided both with royal interests and those of traders from the older colonies. On the one hand, Johnson and Amherst objected to anything that hinted of unrestricted activity on the part of traders. On the other, traders from Albany and Philadelphia, lacking the geographic advantages held by the Canadians, complained of unfair competition. Conflicts were exacerbated by the presence of British officer-traders at Niagara Falls who were accused of attempting to intercept Indian traders before they reached Fort Niagara, where trade was supposed to be conducted. Finally, Pennsylvania traders resented the Quaker-operated provincial store at Fort Pitt, both because it was Quaker and because it appeared as an attempt to fix prices and create a provincial monopoly against which independent traders could not compete.

While the conquest of Canada presented some private interests with opportunities in the west, it also presented a number of problems for Anglo-American officials charged with the responsibility of consolidating and defending the trans-Appalachian region. Fundamentally these officials worked to realize two closely related goals: the security of the west and its integration into the imperial system, and peace with the large native population of the region. While the capitulation
of Montreal effectively ended the Anglo-French conflict, such was not the case between English colonials and the western Indians who had taken up arms against them between 1755 and 1760. Peace with the Indians was a recognized prerequisite for the successful occupation and exploitation of the Great Lakes basin as well as the actual transfer of sovereignty to England.

The problem which confronted the American commander-in-chief and his subordinates reflected both the nature of England's war effort and immediate post-war concerns and the character of the Anglo-American position relative to the west. As the Canadian scholar W.J. Eccles has so aptly pointed out, England's war leaders had made no plans for peace, particularly a peace that included the transfer of a vast territory to the crown. What this meant in practical terms was a lack of guidance and a clear understanding of precisely how colonial and crown officials were to go about imposing order on and managing what had once been New France. Of necessity, much was left to the discretion of officers on the scene who tended to fall back on military expediency.

Another facet of this problem was the question of what status should be accorded the Indians living within the conquered territories. Whereas the Canadian French living in the west were automatically assumed to be under direct British rule, this assumption did not necessarily extend to the Indian inhabitants. On the one hand, the lands on which these people lived and depended had passed under English rule by right of conquest. On the other, however, no clear statement emerged as to the status of the Indians themselves. Rather, they were defined as being under the protection of the crown, which assumed a moral obligation
to protect native rights. From the Anglo-American point of view, this obligation proceeded from the recognition that protection and aid were the crown's to give or withhold and that decisions to that end did not have to be made in consultation with the Indians themselves.  

Although no policy existed at the time of the conquest of Canada, there was little doubt about who should be responsible for securing the west and maintaining peace. The crown continued on the course it had embarked upon in 1756 of consolidating both defense and Indian affairs in royal offices empowered to act in the best interests of the home government. Both Amherst and Johnson recognized that a well regulated trade was the surest way to peace because "trade is undoubtedly the strongest cement to bind the Indians to our alliance." At the same time, the newly-conquered lands could best be secured by a standing force rather than a part-time militia responsible to one or more provincial governments.  

A number of circumstances worked to limit the extent to which royal control could be imposed over the west and to limit the army's and the Indian service's ability to maintain peace. Britain's enormous war debt forced her political leaders to cut expenses wherever possible and to search for new sources of revenue. This post-war economic mood appeared in Anglo-Indian relations in two ways. First, the size and efficiency of the army steadily declined as troop establishments were reduced as a cost-cutting measure. Second, the commander-in-chief was under pressure to trim extraordinary expenses wherever possible. Since the largest of these was the budget for Indian diplomacy, the
Indian service found itself called upon to curtail gift-giving, expensive diplomatic meetings, and other activities that had long been part of the reciprocal nature of Indian diplomacy.

Money was just one problem that plagued Johnson and the Indian service as the French war ended. Since its inception, the Indian service had been subordinate to the army. Both its budget and its orders came from the military headquarters in New York. This made perfectly good sense in time of war when Johnson's primary task was to further British war aims by engaging Indian auxiliaries. But the new responsibilities that came with peace exposed serious weaknesses in Indian affairs. Administratively subordinate, charged with the responsibility of developing regulations for trade and settlement, Johnson was given no enforcement powers. His small group of agents comprised an ad hoc department with little more than advisory powers. Johnson and his staff were further hamstrung by having to deal with an army bureaucracy stationed in New York, isolated from the realities of inter-cultural relations and little inclined to remedy the situation.

Aside from problems arising from the political and fiscal circumstances that grew out of the war, Anglo-American authorities were confronted with problems peculiar to any conquering power bent on invading and holding alien lands and people. The most obvious of these was spatial: the sheer size of the trans-Appalachian region made its occupation an imposing task. Given the small number of soldiers that Amherst felt able to release for western duties, the task was even more monumental. The necessity to economize both money and manpower and the need to show the flag throughout the west would determine the
methods and means used to occupy the region.

Finally, Anglo-American knowledge of the human geography of the west was at first incomplete and limited. While good information supplied by traders and other western travelers could be found in the maps of John Mitchell and Lewis Evans of 1755, these were of little use to officials trying to ascertain the whereabouts and numbers of Indians in the post-war period. As in former times, much information was provided by traders and native informants, supplemented by reports on local conditions by post commanders. In each case, however, such information tended to be localized. It was not until late 1762 that Anglo-American officials received a first-hand account of the numbers and location of Indians living south of the Lake Erie and Lake Michigan.

In that year, Ensign Thomas Hutchins made a fact-finding tour from Fort Pitt to La Baye. His findings, embodied in the so-called "Hutchins Map" became, with later revisions, the basic source on trans-Appalachian Indians until the Revolution.56

From 1755 until their troops reached the Ohio River in 1758, Anglo-Americans, like the Indians they would encounter, had experienced warfare and the losses and dislocation that the Great War for the Empire brought in its wake. Also like the Indians of the west, the English colonials and their royal protectors had only incomplete and equally culture-bound notions of how to deal with those on the other side of the Appalachians. For each society the war brought profound changes, especially since it permanently altered the pre-existing power relationships in the west. In the years immediately following the arrival of Anglo-American troops in the west, both sides would work
to develop policies and responses to changes wrought by war. In this, the Anglo-Americans had a distinct psychological, if not military or political, advantage: they emerged from what they defined as a contest between two empires the clear victor.

The confrontation of victorious Anglo-Americans and Indian groups who did not count themselves a part of the conquest was, however, neither abrupt nor without precedence. During the previous decade English colonials and a number of Indian groups had attempted to accommodate each other and to limit the impact of war through and elaborate system of economic and political negotiations. While never wholly successful, these previous contacts provided the basis for attempts at accommodation in the period between 1758 and 1763.
Notes for Chapter II


5 Bailey, Ohio Company, 66, 68, 304; Hunter, Forts, chpts. 2-4.

6 Hunter, Forts, 139; Bailey, ed., Ohio Company Papers, passim for information on specific traders' losses during the 1750s.


9 Robert D. Mitchell, Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley (Charlottesville, 1977), 39n: most raids struck south and west of the Shenandoah settlements; from 1754 through 1758 only 137 people were killed there.

11. Hunter, Forts, 211; Gipson, VII, 52.


13. Ibid., 152-53.


18. John Heckewelder, A Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren (Philadelphia, 1820), 60; Elisha Saltar to Governor Morris, Hazard, Pa. Arch. (I), II, 613; on the private forts see Hunter, Forts, 348-64.


22. Ibid., 413-15.

108


26 John Stuart succeeded Edmund Atkin as southern superintendent in 1761.

27 Robert S. Allen, "The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America, 1755-1830," in Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History 14 (Ottawa, 1975), 5-125 contains the best summary of the northern service and its personnel; on Sir William Johnson see Arthur Pound, Johnson of the Mohawks (New York, 1930), James T. Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks (Boston, 1979), and the most recent published biography, Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson, Colonial American (Port Washington, N.Y., 1976), see also David S. McKeith, "The Inadequacy of Men and Measures in English Imperial History: Sir William Johnson and the New York Politicians, a Case Study (Ph.D. diss. Syracuse University, 1971). A good biography of this most important individual has yet to be written.


29 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 12, chpt. 4; "Lieut. Gorrell's Journal," Wisconsin Historical Collections, I & II (Madison, 1854), 25, 26, hereafter cited as "Gorrell Journal".


31 On trade profits, see Johnson Papers, III, 330-31; for an example of the profit margin, see "A Calculation of Ammunition and Ind-


36 Johnson Papers, II, 737.


40 Shy, Toward Lexington, 96-104.

41 Kent and Waddell, eds., Bouquet Papers, IV, 531-36; Jeffrey Amherst to James Hamilton, Mar. 30, 1760, Johnson Papers, III, 205-206.

42 Walter Rutherford to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Apr. 28, 1761.
WO 34/21; General Amherst to Pitt, May 4, 1761, Pitt Correspondence, II, 426-27; Jeffrey Amherst to Sir William Johnson, May 7, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 387; Walter Rutherford to Sir William Johnson, May 12, 1761, Johnson Papers, X, 265-66.

43 "Gorrell Journal," 38, 41.


45 Johnson Papers, III, 719; Ibid., XIII, 234; Wainwright, Croghan, chpt. 13.


49 Bailey, Ohio Company, 8-9, 10-11.

50 Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics, 80; Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 2146, 46, 51-56.


54 Shy, Toward Lexington, 62.

55 Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and An Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa, 1981), 240-41.

56 Lawrence Henry Gipson, Lewis Evans (Philadelphia, 1939), chpt. 4;
Alvord, Mississippi Valley, I, 79-82; on Hutchins, see Beverly W. Bond, Jr., ed. The Courses of the Ohio River Taken By Lt. T. Hutchins Anno 1762 and Two Accompanying Maps (Columbus, 1942).
CHAPTER III

The Roots of Anglo-Indian Relations in the West:

1755-1758

The ways in which trans-Appalachian Indians and Anglo-Americans responded to each other after 1758 was, in part, conditioned by the pattern of relationships that had developed between them in the years preceding the Great War for the Empire. Even during the war, when trade was disrupted and Anglo-Americans retreated from the west, diplomatic exchanges continued. At no time before 1758 were relations between the two peoples rigidly prescribed. Rather, these relations, economic and political, continued to evolve and were redefined in light of current circumstances. Indeed, even as Anglo-American troops appeared on the Ohio in November 1758, western Indians and colonial officials had already begun to search for ways to deal with each other in light of rapidly changing realities.

I

Anglo-Indian relations, including affairs in the west, had long been held together and rationalized by a number of inter-cultural alliances. The oldest and best known was the Covenant Chain which bound the Six Nations Iroquois and several English colonies in a special relationship. Founded in the 1670s by New York's governor Edmund Andros, the Chain—a metaphorical device signifying the special, close friend-
ship between the Iroquois, their clients, and the English--was directed toward rationalizing Indian affairs and preserving peace on New York's exposed western and northern frontier.

According the Francis Jennings, foremost student of the Chain, this alliance was an "inter-societal" system "created by contract for eliminating violence and reducing conflict between Indians and Englishmen within specified and bounded territories." Further, from the English point of view, the Chain provided a means of adjusting colonial-Indian boundaries and furthering English expansion against the French and those natives not included in the alliance.¹

As originally conceived, the Covenant Chain had several characteristics. On the English side, New York strove to maintain itself as the sole spokesman for Anglo-American interests. The alliance itself was based on mutual needs and reciprocal obligations. On the Indian side, the Iroquois, with New York's backing, acted as the official voice for other Indians in the Chain. Finally, although the Chain was an English contrivance, its success and continuity came to rest on the cooperation of the Iroquois and, more specifically, the Mohawks, through whom New York sought influence with the more distant and less well known Iroquois communities.²

By virtue of their geographic position astride the major arteries of trade and war in the northeast and lower Great Lakes, and their internal organization--the "League" or "Confederacy"--the Five, later Six, Nations were able to exercise influence over native and inter-colonial affairs out of proportion to their numbers or actual power.³ Due to their early access to Dutch firearms, Mohawk, Seneca, and other
Iroquois warriors were able to wage a series of successful campaigns against less well-armed trade competitors, real or potential. In these co-called "Beaver Wars" the Iroquois defeated or scattered most of the Indians living in the lower Ontario peninsula and the lands immediately south of Lake Erie. Success was made possible as well by the League council which, through kinship ties, debate, consensual agreement, and the condolence ceremony to suppress internal blood feuds, served to limit, but by no means eliminate, internecine conflicts. Thus, while Mohawks, Onondagas, and Senecas occasionally fought each other for control of trade routes and the dominant role within the confederacy, the image most often projected to less informed outsiders was one of unity and centralized leadership.

Iroquois influence and vitality was further maintained by the Six Nations' policies toward other Indian groups. In the mid-seventeenth century the Iroquois were able to make good losses from war and disease by incorporating individual prisoners and whole villages into their osciety. The adoption of entire Huron villages by the Senecas, for example, was only an extension of the traditional practice of replacing the dead with live captives or by means of their ritualistic execution. At the same time, the Iroquois developed a policy of acting as protectors for those Indians who, as victims of epidemics, wars, or dispossession, were forced to vacate their own lands. The League's reasons for assuming this role were not entirely humanitarian. As European settlements pushed up the natural avenues into the interior, especially along the Delaware, Susquehanna, and Mohawk rivers, the Iroquois responded by planting these smaller native groups at strategic
points as "props" for the League's symbolic longhouse. Each Iroquois group seems to have taken charge of that area over which it had special claims or interests, thus the Oneidas' and Onondagas' involvement in affairs on the Susquehanna River and the Senecas' interest in the Ohio region. In the latter case, special regard for the Ohio country resulted also from the Senecas' special role as keepers of the western door of the metaphorical longhouse. The result was that in addition to the Six Nations proper, client groups—the props—were given land and a place in the Covenant Chain in return for guarding the Iroquois' frontiers.

The Chain extended this clientage system into the arena of Anglo-Indian relations and at the same time enhanced Iroquois prestige and their image as a powerful force in international affairs. As the system evolved, the Six Nations came to serve as the sponsor of other Indian groups in the alliance. By the early eighteenth century these included the Delawares, the so-called River Indians, refugee groups from Maryland and the lower Susquehanna valley, and immigrant groups of Shawnees who moved into Pennsylvania from the Ohio and Tennessee river valleys. Clientage did not mean coercion, however. The spirit of reciprocity, common in native relationships, extended to the Covenant Chain as well. In return for protection and security in their new or traditional homelands, Conoy, Tutelos, Delawares, and others appear to have accepted Iroquois domination of their external affairs. The clients, for their part, were expected to cooperate in maintaining peace and securing the lands embraced by the Chain. They could not be compelled to do so. Iroquois demands for military assistance in
the seventeenth century were often met by protest or quiet refusal suggesting that, far from being "conquerers, the Six Nations were limited by traditional values and dependence on English support.\textsuperscript{10}

The Covenant Chain did not remain static but continued to evolve and expand as circumstances governing Indian-European relations changed. As the alliance evolved, it became more complex and took on new characteristics. Power relationships within the Chain shifted as well until, by 1753, the whole system had been thrown into disarray in the wake of growing distrust and military conflict centering on the trans-Appalachian region. The later history of the Chain came to include many of the people who would find themselves in confrontation in the west after 1758.

Prior to the collapse of Anglo-Indian relations in the west, the Covenant Chain alliance changed in several ways. First, the role of the Six Nations as the dominant native group changed after 1701. Second, the Chain took on a coercive aspect toward some Indians as it became more and more a tool of Anglo-American expansion. Finally, the network of relationships that made up the original alliance were altered as new English and Indian groups were brought into the Covenant and as new partnerships only tangentially connected to the original Chain were formed. By the late 1740s these trends had converged in the economically and strategically important Ohio country.

By the time the Ohio valley crisis reached its peak, the influence of the Six Nations in the Covenant Chain had come to be based as much, or more, on Anglo-American support for and perceptions of the Iroquois than on any inherent authority or power of the League itself. Since
1701 Iroquois policy toward the growing conflict between England and France had been one of official, though at times aggressive, neutrality which allowed interested Iroquois groups to play off or balance the two competing European powers to their own advantage. The basis for this policy had been the treaties with New France and New York, known collectively as the Peace of 1701. Through these agreements the Six Nations hoped to extricate themselves from a costly war with the French, re-establish their prominence in the western fur trade, and still maintain the Covenant Chain with New York. The results worked well enough in the short run. Peace and neutrality helped the Iroquois rebuild trade connections to the west as Great Lakes Indians took advantage of new access to the Albany market. This trade enriched the Iroquois as well as New York. The French, for their part, received Six Nations pledges of neutrality in any future inter-colonial wars. Finally, in order to ensure access to beaver hunting grounds north of the Great Lakes, the Iroquois deeded to England their own dubious claims to these lands by right of conquest, a claim more valid in European courts than in native councils. England thus found itself holding a questionable claim to a vast territory with which to counter similar French ambitions. 11

While the 1701 treaties gave the Six Nations the means to survive between and even play off the colonial powers, the settlement was less a triumph of Iroquois military power than it was an example of the Six Nations' diplomatic acuity. Neutrality was the price the Iroquois had to pay in return for peace with New France. And while trade and neutrality had their benefits, each to a large extent depended on Euro-
pean perceptions of Iroquois intentions and abilities to tip the balance of power in favor of one side or the other. Any noticeable efforts by the League to support English over French interests would result in a French response that had the potential of wrecking the western trade and perhaps the Iroquois themselves. Conversely, if it appeared that the Six Nations, as the principal Indian partners in the Covenant Chain, could not help thwart French expansion into disputed regions, the English could by-pass the League altogether and act alone or with other Indians to redress the balance of power. For over a decade the Iroquois were able to avoid this dilemma due in large part to the rapprochement that existed between France and England after 1715. ¹²

Nonetheless, the Six Nations were never able to re-assert the territorial or military influence they had enjoyed before 1701. While Anglo-Americans in New York, and later in Pennsylvania and Virginia, continued to base their Indian and inter-colonial policies on a perception of Six Nations influence and power over other Indians, the basis for that perception was eroding. In one sense it had never existed at all. Prior to the 1730s, the Iroquois had not voiced claims of conquest over Covenant Chain clients, and relations between Indian groups within the alliance were based on reciprocity rather than force. ¹³

In the first place, while the 1701 peace brought a chance to rebuild and to recoup twenty years worth of war-related losses, the New York Iroquois population continued to decline. This decline was in part due to continued invasions of diseases combined with periodic
local shortages of food. However, the early eighteenth century witn 
essed out-migrations that eventually alarmed both Iroquois and Anglo-
American leaders. On the one hand, Iroquois people continued to re-
settle at French mission towns such as Caughnauaga and Oka and, after 
1748, at the new settlement of La Presentation at Oswegatchie. This 
migration was a continuation of one begun in the 1660s, when whole 
families of Christian Mohawks had emigrated to La Prairie de la Mag-
delane, later known as Sault St. Louis.

To the west, increasing numbers of Iroquois, principally Senecas, 
were opening up the Ohio country to settlement. This pioneering effort 
developed gradually as hunters, seeking alternatives to game shortages 
and crop failures at home, decided to take permanent advantage of what 
amounted to the last unexploited game reserves and fresh farming regions 
east of the Mississippi. Existing population figures suggest the 
magnitude of the migration. This appears to have begun in earnest in 
the 1720s and increased in the 1740s as local famines drove people out 
of the Genesee valley. By 1748 some 730 Iroquois men were reported 
living in the Ohio country, representing a total of perhaps three 
thousand people. In that year also, Conrad Weiser was told that 292 
Iroquois warriors were living in the vicinity of Logstown and the Kus-
kuskies on the upper Ohio. A lack of population data for the Six 
Nations in New York before 1763 renders comparisons difficult. In the 
latter year, the Iroquois were said to have 1,950 warriors, including 
those living in the west. Assuming that the Ohio Iroquois population 
remained the same—and wartime conditions may well have increased the 
westward movement—then a significant number of these men and their fami-
amilies were living outside the traditional bounds of the confederacy.\cite{17}

Distance from New York also brought independence and a new identity. While continuing to pay lip-service to their elders in the Mohawk region, the Ohio Iroquois charted their own course in international affairs. By the late 1740s, their leaders were playing a central role in regional affairs, in defiance of Six Nations wishes.

At the same time that the Six Nations were losing people to other lands, they were losing the political initiative at home. While maintaining an official neutrality in the two decades after 1701, constituent elements of the confederacy pursued more locally advantageous policies. Desiring to maintain their favorable trading relations with both Albany and Canadian Indians, the Mohawks tended to lean toward the English during the renewed imperial conflict, known as Queen Anne's War. Perceiving this support as potentially damaging to his government's economic and military position, Governor Vaudreuil of Canada approved the fortification of the Niagara portage in 1720 to offset the Anglo-American trading advantages with the west which had come with the treaties of 1701.\cite{18} Done with the approval of local Senecas, who sought to profit from the French establishment, this action prompted a like response from New York's Governor Burnet who four years later authorized the building of Fort Oswego at the mouth of the Oswego River, within Onondaga Iroquois territory.

The militarization of western New York, representing a shift in the political initiative to England and France, resulted in a greater reluctance on the part of the Six Nations to actively engage in affairs related to inter-colonial competition. After the mid-1720s, Iroquois
neutrality became more rigid than it had been in the past. 19

While the establishment of Oswego posed a real economic and
cultural threat to the western Iroquois, it was a boon to those west­
ern Indians who sought trade with the English. The proximity of the
post to the Great Lakes trade routes removed the necessity of direct
negotiations with the Six Nations over trading rights and travel
privileges. Oswego further ensured the continuance of economic con­
tacts between the Anglo-Americans of New York and the Great Lakes In­
dians. 20

In large measure, the reluctance and failure of the Six Nations
to retain control over affairs in their own country and their continued
reluctance to actively engage in international affairs resulted from
a lack of consensus over what path to follow. The Niagara-Oswego con­
troversy divided the confederacy. The western Senecas stood opposed
to any Anglo-Iroquois effort to remove the French from Niagara, while
the Onondagas and eastern Iroquois questioned the legality of a settle­
ment at the falls that had not been approved by the full confederacy
council. 21 At the same time, the death of important leaders, notably
the Onondaga diplomat Teganissorens, created voids that were difficult
to fill.

Even though the Six Nations experienced internal disunity, they
were able to project an image of unity and purpose through the medium
of the League council. The picture of all forty-nine confederacy sachems
meeting to conduct business and define policy was better understood by
hierarchy-oriented Europeans than was the reality that lay behind the
image. That the Iroquois consciously employed this imagery in their
dealings with Anglo-Americans is clear from the actions of Iroquois speakers in council. It became almost a standard part of Six Nations council rhetoric to invoke the "League" when in fact speakers often stood for only a particular interest or group. This in turn led to Anglo-American policies and actions that sometimes had confusing, costly results.

The hallmark of Anglo-American Indian policy had long been the assumption that the Six Nations would regulate the activities of client members of the Covenant Chain as well as foster English colonial expansion. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Chain and the Iroquois' role in it had changed. This was due in part to changes in Anglo-American interests and in part to the acceptance of these by certain Iroquois individuals and groups bent on maintaining their influence both among their own people and within the alliance. The changes taking place in the Chain were typified by Pennsylvania's Indian policy between 1736 and the early 1750s.

The first change came as Pennsylvania sought to construct a relationship with the Iroquois that would avoid reliance on New York. The reasons were similar to those that had prompted the creation of the original Chain nearly a century earlier: the need to control and rationalize Indian affairs in order to facilitate the colony's expansion. The agreement was also similar: in return for Six Nations assistance the proprietary government would acknowledge the League as the sole arbiter of Indian affairs within the colony and on Pennsylvania's western frontier. What was different was the distinctively coercive nature of the Penns' alliance with the League as it came to bear on
those Indians whose lands the Proprietors coveted.

The outline of a new addition to the old Chain emerged in 1732 when the Proprietors applied to the Six Nations for aid in preventing the wholesale migration of the Shawnees to the Ohio country. Concern that such a migration would damage the fur trade as well as cause security problems led to the request. Iroquois cooperation, while it failed to prevent the Shawnee move, led to a formal understanding in 1736 as a new chain of friendship was forged and a new council fire, quite separate from that at Albany, lit at Philadelphia. It should be noted that, in the first place, the Six Nations failure to prevent the Shawnee migration reflected the League’s own limited control over that group. Further, at none of the councils wherein the Iroquois and Pennsylvania created their new alliance were the Mohawks present. Their close commercial and historic ties to Albany and the New York Chain gave them considerable influence in confederacy affairs, influence that may have been jeopardized if they suddenly turned their backs on their Anglo-Dutch backers.  

The climax of the Penn-Iroquois rapprochement came in 1742 when the Proprietors and their agent, James Logan, called in the Six Nations to rid the province of Delaware opposition to the Walking Purchase. Preliminaries for what amounted to the forced eviction of the Delaware group occupying the disputed land had been laid years earlier through the careful negotiations of Logan and interested Iroquois parties. These Iroquois expressed initial concern over such a move, which violated native principles of patron-client relationships. Further, the Iroquois voiced no special claims to the lands in question. Several
factors may have contributed to a change of heart on the part of the Onondaga leader Canasetago and his Six Nations followers. As the central actor in the subsequent drama, Canasetago may have hoped to increase his own standing with the English and his own people. Further, in acting the "heavy", the Iroquois could reinforce the Anglo-American image of League unity and authority that was a vital element in the Six Nations' strategy for the survival in the colonial world. Finally, the Iroquois would be well paid for their efforts. This last may not have been an insignificant influence on the final decision since the Iroquois who ultimately became involved in the 1742 eviction notice were said to have been in a "starving condition."26

The result, in 1742, was the forced eviction of the Delaware band led by Nutimus, and the reinforcement of the myth of Iroquois "conquest" of the Delawares, by which the lands in question became Iroquois after all. This notion of conquest was extended to all Delawares, whether living on the Ohio or Susquehanna and became the fictitious basis for later British Indian policy.27 The price, beyond the trade goods paid to Canasetago and other Iroquois participants, was the alienation of the Delawares.28

In the five years after 1742 the Covenant Chain was further enlarged by the inclusion of Virginia in 1744.29 Efforts by the colonies to enlist the active support of the Six Nations in King George's War failed as the Iroquois, with the notable exception of the Mohawks, tended to hold to a neutral course. It was the reluctance of the Six Nations to support Anglo-American ambitions, coupled with events in the west, that led to another significant departure in Anglo-Indian relations.
The Anglo-French conflict had created a shortage of supplies at the western French posts which in turn provoked mounting discontent among France's trading and military partners. Fanned by Anglo-Irish traders who sensed profits from French losses, one element of the Detroit Wyandot town attempted to organize a pan-Indian assault on the French throughout the west. While this effort ultimately failed, it did give the English the initiative in the growing commercial war in the west—a struggle which tended to overlap and was finally engulfed by the larger imperial conflict for mastery of the trans-Appalachian region. Another immediate result was a diplomatic initiative by the Indians living in the Ohio country to enlist Anglo-American aid against the French. Prompted by the Pennsylvania trader George Croghan, this invitation led to a conference at Philadelphia in the fall of 1747 and the first direct political contact between the western Indians and English colonials.30

The Indians who came to Philadelphia represented the "warriors of Ohio" and their spokesman, the Ohio Iroquois sachem Scarouady, indicated their intent to support the English against the French in spite of official Six Nations sanctions against such actions. Of greater importance was the tone of disagreement and dissatisfaction with League policy. Scarouady informed the Pennsylvanians that "these Indians on Ohio, had concluded to kindle a Fire in their Town" and to call all neighboring Indians to it in an alliance. In effect, the Ohio Iroquois, the dominant group in the region, was declaring independence from Onondaga, prompted by the rise of Anglo-American influence in the west.31

What Pennsylvania officials had witnessed at the council was the
manifestation of a shift of power from the New York Iroquois to those living on the Ohio. This resulted in part from the Six Nations refusal to take any positive actions to sanction the goals and actions of the Indians in the region. Also, by the late 1740s, the migration to the west from New York had resulted in the transplantation of a considerable number of Iroquois warriors to the Ohio.\textsuperscript{32}

This shift in the locus of Iroquois power presented Pennsylvania with both an opportunity and a dilemma. The opportunity was the proffered Indian alliance and with it prospects not only of expanded trade but the strengthening of the Penns' claims to lands west of the mountains. The dilemma arose over whether to continue to support the Six Nations as the preeminent Indian group in colony affairs or to bypass the League in favor of direct relations with the Ohio Indians. In the end, considerations of profits and practicality overcame any scruples about commitments to the Six Nations. Richard Peters, the Provincial Secretary, summed up the new realities in the west when he observed that "our only game to play now is with the Ohio Indians and Twightwees[Miamis]."\textsuperscript{33}

The new alliance with the western Indians was consummated the following year at an important meeting at Logstown on the Ohio River. In the fall, Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's Indian agent, met with representatives of the several Ohio Indian communities and participated in the ceremonial lighting of a council fire, thus making Logstown the center of Anglo-Indian affairs in the west. The ceremony also marked the Ohio Iroquois' self-proclaimed emergence from the subordinate status of hunters and warriors to that of councilors and independent
men of affairs. This move was heartily supported by Anglo-American trading and land interests. On behalf of these interests, and to promote the image of Anglo-American unity, Weiser gave the assembled Indians gifts valued at £1,100 on behalf of Pennsylvania and Virginia.34

The men most responsible for this turn of events were two Ohio Iroquois leaders, the Seneca Tanaghrisson and his companion, Scarouady.35 Although traditionally labelled Six Nations viceregents in the Ohio country, these men were more likely local leaders whose position as spokesmen for other local groups, notably the Delawares and Shawnees, grew from the latter's recognition of special Iroquois claims to the Ohio region. Both men clearly saw their own and their followers' best interests as being served by charting an independent course of action which, after 1747, led to a closer association with the English of Pennsylvania and Virginia.36 The influence of these men resulted in part from the support, both political and economic, given them by Anglo-Americans. At Logstown in 1748, Weiser gave Tanaghrisson the trade goods necessary to allow the sachem to have treaty wampum made and invitations sent to other Indians in the vicinity.37 Further, Weiser deliberately ensured the predominant role of these two leaders by rejecting any other meeting place than Logstown, Tanaghrisson's residence.38

Even before his trip to the Ohio, Weiser was confronted by offers of alliance by the Miamis, the "Twightwees" referred to by Peters. Their dissatisfaction with the volume and quality of French trade goods and desire to foster more—and more advantageous—trade competition, led some Miamis under the leadership of La Demoiselle to
seek closer ties with the English colonies. Thus, in the wake of the Logstown council, Pennsylvania and Virginia had begun to forge a new alliance system with the Ohio Iroquois, Wyandots, Miamis and, to a lesser degree, the Delawares and Shawnees, and alliance that bypassed the Six Nations and the old Covenant Chain. Characteristically, neither the League Iroquois nor New York looked with favor on the new arrangement in the west, each seeing it as a threat to its own favored diplomatic position.

The new partnership between Ohio country Indians, Pennsylvania, and Virginia was short-lived. Within six years of the Logstown meeting Anglo-American traders were being driven from the west in the face of a French military invasion. This invasion was the culmination of French efforts to re-establish their trading system and political hegemony over the west in the face of the new Anglo-American initiatives. Further, the threat posed by the recently formed Ohio Company of Virginia demanded a prompt and vigorous response if New France was not to be severed from its granary and its Great Lakes communication network disrupted. Military action was initiated when it was determined just how low French prestige and influence had sunk in the face of aggressive Anglo-American traders and political agents.

The arrival of a new Governor-General, Duquesne, resulted in a more aggressive policy aimed at redressing the strategic balance. Retribution, when it came, was swift and effective. In 1752 a French-Indian war party based at Fort Michilimackinac destroyed the English-Miamis trading town of Pickawillany and with it La Demoiselle and the Anglo-American trading alliance. The following year, Duquesne sent
forth over two thousands troops to occupy and fortify the upper Ohio valley as the best, perhaps only, way of keeping the English out and the Indians cooperative.\textsuperscript{43}

For their part, the Anglo-Americans continued to work at cross-purposes with the only point of agreement being the desire to exploit the Ohio Indian population for material gain. By 1751 Pennsylvania, whose Quaker-dominated Assembly refused to commit itself to armed intervention on the Ohio, dropped out of the contest, leaving the field to the more aggressive Virginians. Virginia interests in the region were largely those of the Ohio Company, whose land speculation schemes rested on Ohio Indian cooperation. At Logstown, in 1752, Tanaghrisson and his followers, pressed now by French and English alike and striving to maintain their own freedom of action, agreed to permit the construction of an Ohio Company "storehouse" on the Ohio but, in a neat diplomatic dodge, refused to consider settlement plans without referring the whole matter to the League council at Onondaga.\textsuperscript{45}

The Six Nations had observed events in the west from a distance. Upset at the rapprochement between the English colonies and the Ohio Iroquois, the League council told Weiser that "the Ohio Indians were but Hunters and no Counsellors or Chief Men, and they had no Right to receive Presents that was due to the Six Nations" but that "they must receive [a share] from the Six Nations chiefs under whom they belong" and thus confirm their subordinate status.\textsuperscript{46} This and other verbal efforts to assert League claims to dominion over the Ohio Indians fell on deaf ears as Pennsylvania ignored Six Nations claims in the face of new realities. Such verbalizing represented the extent of Iroquois
involvement in western affairs prior to the outbreak of inter-colonial warfare in 1754. There were several reasons for this. In large measure, the internal divisions that limited the Iroquois' response to Anglo-French activities in the 1720s were at work two decades later. Weiser, after a journey to Onondaga in 1750, described what he found to Thomas Lee. Not only were seasoned leaders such as Canasetago dead, but some of their successors seemed to be leaning toward the French, perhaps in response to the vigorous pursuit of western lands by the English. Further, the confederacy was divided within itself, with the western Senecas distinctly cool toward the Anglo-Americans and even normally reliable Mohawks were "divided in their counsel."

The leadership and political problems were further aggravated by the inconsistency of Anglo-American policy toward both the Six Nations and the west. Divided councils and a lack of what the Iroquois saw as proper behavior by New York toward its allies and friends led to distrust, especially when added to the growing threat to the Iroquois' homelands by New York land barons.

Finally, English or French expectations of an "Iroquois" response to events in the west were misplaced. Given both the division of responsibility between constituent groups for oversight of affairs and the high degree of local autonomy within the League, a unified response may not have been regarded by the Iroquois as necessary or appropriate. In 1757, Six Nations leaders placed responsibility for western affairs in the hands of the Senecas. It was through them that all affairs concerning the Ohio country had first to pass before being dealt with by the confederacy as a whole. In the face of a French military invasion
and faced with internal divisions, the Senecas chose not to act decisively in the years before 1754.49

The web of alliances between Anglo-Americans and the Six Nations and western Indians finally collapsed in 1753. On the Ohio, French troops, albeit sick and hungry, managed to fortify the Allegheny River.50 Having all but won the trade war as a result of their victory at Pickawillany the year before, the French consolidated their advantage by checking English expansionist plans as well. Meanwhile, in Albany, sachem Hendrick Peter of the Mohawk town of Canajoharie expressed in no uncertain terms Iroquois anger at their treatment by provincial officials and disgust with English policies. Declaring, largely for dramatic effect, that he spoke for all the Six Nations, Hendrick announced "the Covenant broken between you and us." The finality of his statement and the breadth of his support at home may be questioned in retrospect, but his words ultimately had the desired effect of stirring the Anglo-Americans to reconsider their Indian policies. For the moment, however, the Covenant Chain lay in pieces and the Pennsylvania-Virginia Indian alliance on the Ohio was in a shambles.51

On the Ohio, Tanaghrisson and Scarouady made a last-ditch effort to shore up the English and their own position. While Scarouady attempted to muster colonial aid, Tanaghrisson met the advancing French near Fort le Boeuf and issued the traditional three warnings to depart. In each case the sachem and his wampum were ignored by Sieur de Marin, the French commander.52 Rebuffed by the French, Tanaghrisson was also repudiated by the Six Nations, whose only action was to send a number of clan matrons to inquire if Marin intended any hostility against the

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Iroquois or other local Indians. Also, as Duquesne observed, the Six Nations indicated that they would not "meddle in my affairs, and that they would look quietly on, from their mats." 53

The confrontation between Tanaghrisson and Marin also revealed the weakness of the Ohio Indians' commitment to the English. None of the local Delawares or Shawnees, whose role in the alliance was ambivalent at best, bothered to second Tanaghrisson's warning, even though he claimed to speak for "all the warriors who inhabit the Belle Riviere." 54 Unlike Tanaghrisson, the Delawares and Shawnees were able to see clearly the regional shift in power that had come with the French. Stunned by the Pickawillany raid and the subsequent departure of the Anglo-American traders, the Miamis and Wyandots had already begun to make their peace with the French. In either case, policy was based far less on any "pro-French" or "Pro-English" attitude than it was on a clear reading of the economic and political realities in the west. Having engaged in an advantageous, abundant trade with the Pennsylvanians, the Ohio Indians were now faced with an economic crisis of great proportions. Resistance to the French juggernaut would have further endangered, rather than improved, the situation. Rather than fight, the Delawares and their neighbors to the west attempted to retain their freedom of action by making the best of a bad situation. The French army also brought with it opportunities to offset those lost with the English retreat. Duquesne observed that the Indians in the upper Ohio valley were "assisting with their horses that they have brought with them, in making the [le Boeuf] Portage." 55 As cold weather approached and in the absence of Anglo-American traders,
the local population found itself heavily dependent on French sources of supply. At a condolence ceremony for the recently deceased Marin, Indians from Venango reminded the French that "you have driven off the English, and that your Children will be in a pitiable state if they do not see you here. Or, should you wish to stretch out their necessities, the winter is long. Remember your promise and remember them; do not abandon them."\(^56\)

The decision by Ohio Indians to accommodate the French, however reluctantly made, was made necessary and perhaps easier by the Anglo-American response to the western situation. Basically, the Ohio Indians were caught between English promises and French actions. Having been presented with a \textit{fait-accompli} on the Ohio, hamstrung by a reluctant legislature, and bereft of any support from neighboring Pennsylvania, Virginia's Governor Dinwiddie fell back on bluffs and stall. His instrument was young George Washington, whose first mission was to deliver what was ultimately to be a meaningless warning to the French to withdraw from English territory or face the consequences. The French accepted the message for what it was. During his journey to Fort le Boeuf, Washington was given aid by Tanaghrisson, who still hoped for some form of English support. The depths to which Tanaghrisson's authority had fallen was shown by the total disregard given his messages by the Delawares and Shawnees. When ordered to bring in all the wampum they had been given by the French, none complied.\(^57\)

Dinwiddie's next move was to fortify the forks of the Ohio, basing his decision on military necessity and the approval received at Logstown for a trading house on the Ohio. Again Washington was placed
in command. The young colonel, through a series of deceptive statements, led Tanaghrisson to believe that a real English army was en route to answer the Indians' request for aid. At this point the majority of Ohio Indians were still unwilling to commit themselves openly in the growing conflict. Washington's subsequent actions in the spring and summer of 1754 did much to change that. The "army" of which he spoke turned out to be a poorly organized and equipped collection of farmers as inexperienced as their leader. The humiliating surrender of Fort Necessity on July 4 ended colonial attempts to deal with the French invasion. It also clearly demonstrated French strengths and victorious ways to the local Indians. And it ended the careers of Tanaghrisson and Scarouady and the political dominance of the Ohio Iroquois they represented. The two sachems left the Ohio country with many of their people, some of whom eventually resettled in New York. The Senecas on the upper Ohio remained, however. Tanaghrisson died late in 1754 and the Delawares and Shawnees became the principal Indian political and military force on the Ohio, but one still divided over what role to play in the war just begun.

II

In the wake of Hendrick Peter's announcement that the Covenant Chain was no more, and the virtually uncontested French occupation of the Ohio country, the royal government in London moved to strengthen its strategic position in North America. On instructions from the Board of Trade, delegates from the colonies north of Virginia met at
Albany in the summer of 1754. The purpose of the meeting was two-fold. First, the colonies were to mend relations with the Six Nations and their clients. Second, the colonial officials, now hopefully supported by the League, were to devise some means of inter-colonial defense and a coherent Indian policy. Measured against these goals the conference was a distinct failure. Whole-hearted Six Nations support was not forthcoming and the Plan of Union, for which the Albany conference is famous, was ultimately rejected by colonial and royal officials alike.

Indeed, far from solving problems, the Albany conference created new ones. The meeting gave land agents from Pennsylvania and Connecticut a golden opportunity to gain Indian signatures on deeds for coveted lands on and west of the Susquehanna River. As it turned out, each colony's agent ended up buying much the same piece of real estate but from different groups of Iroquois. It mattered little to the Anglo-Americans that the Six Nations sachems who signed the papers had no authority to do so. It did matter, however, to the Iroquois, Delawares, and Shawnees living on the lands in question, and the fraudulent sales added further to the declining state of Anglo-Indian relations.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement of the imperial conflict on the Ohio, both England and France stepped up military activity. For its part, England dispatched two under-strength regiments from Ireland to Virginia. Their leader, Major General Ed: al Braddock, was to take the French forts on the Ohio and, in conjunction with provincial forces led by Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts and William Johnson of New York, roll up the French forts all along the northern and west-
ern perimeter of the colonies. The campaign resulted in the well-known disaster on the Monongahela River and virtual stalemate elsewhere. In the west, the overwhelming French victory over Braddock and the corresponding English losses both in manpower and prestige resulted in a quantum leap in the number of raids launched against the Anglo-American border settlements. Anglo-Indian relations were further thrown into disarray by the reluctance of the Iroquois to enter the conflict as English auxiliaries. Only the Mohawks had participated in Johnson's Lake George campaign in any numbers and their losses, which included the death of Hendrick Peter, made them reluctant to engage in further campaigns. The Mohawk lesson was not lost on the other Iroquois, who stood behind the League declaration of neutrality made years earlier.

The task of re-establishing cooperation between the colonies and the Six Nations, and peace between England and the now-hostile Indians in the west fell to William Johnson. His commission as "Colonel of the Six Nations" and coordinator of crown Indian policy in the north, issued by Braddock in 1755, was confirmed the following year in instructions from the Board of Trade. As new Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the northern colonies, Johnson, soon elevated to the title of baronet, was to coordinate and direct all matters relating to the Six Nations and their "dependents"—those Indians in the Ohio country currently at war with the colonies. Essentially, Johnson's task was three-fold: to re-establish the Covenant Chain; to end the growing border war plaguing the colonies; and to draw away Indian support from the French while at the same time increasing that given to the English. The inducement offered
to achieve this last point would be guarantees of peace, economic cooperation, and the restoration of lands taken from Indians under questionable circumstances.

All three aspects were intimately interrelated both in fact and in Johnson's strategy for dealing with them. Through a renewal of the Chain, Johnson hoped to re-assert League authority over those of its clients who had taken up the hatchet. In addition, the Chain, with its prospects of inter-cultural peace and trade, could be used as an inducement to other western Indians to leave the war and re-establish relations with the Anglo-Americans as they had been before 1753. This program was to be achieved through a number of means, primary of which, in Johnson's mind, was "an equitable trade established with a plentiful & proper supply of Goods" which would be "the chief means by which we may expect to obtain & retain them in our Interest" and without which, Johnson believed, any gains would not be forthcoming.

Johnson confronted a number of problems in carrying out his charge. Paramount of these was the lack of any coordinated program for Indian affairs in the colonies, a deficiency which had resulted in the dispossess of the Delawares in Pennsylvania, the loss of influence on the Ohio, and the alienation of a least a substantial part of the Six Nations. As Johnson and others would subsequently learn, this situation was directly responsible for the hostilities then plaguing the colonial frontiers. The source of this was the insistence by colonial governments that their particular provinces be permitted to retain control over internal affairs, including Indians, without inter-
ference from above. Even with a royal commission, Johnson received stiff opposition from provincial leaders, particularly in Pennsylvania; it was not until 1758 that he was able to gain control over that colony's Indian affairs. Finally, Johnson's authority was questioned, and his advice often ignored, by the military commanders-in-chief for whom he worked. Foremost among these was Massachusetts Governor William Shirley, who assumed command upon Braddock's death. Handicapped by a lack of independent authority, and dependent on the army for his and his agents' salaries, Johnson was hard-pressed to present himself as the sole voice of the English government in Indian affairs.

Six Nations reluctance to declare openly and unanimously for the English continued through 1758. To Johnson and other Anglo-American officials this presented a frustrating problem on which much time and money was to be expended. Insisting that the Covenant Chain relationship included a military commitment on the part of the Iroquois, Johnson tried to convince them to take up arms against the French. By 1757, the superintendent had been largely thwarted in his efforts and was by then engaged in an effort to retain as many Iroquois auxiliaries as possible while trying to ensure the neutrality of the rest.

For the Iroquois' point of view, the situation was more complex than a matter of accepting or rejecting a military alliance with the English. The council minutes and reports of British agents and individual Iroquois reveal a number of issues and problems that tended to divide the League and create reluctance at all levels of society to choose sides. The war presented the Iroquois with a potentially
serious security problem. With hostile armies facing each other across Six Nations territory, any action that suggested favoritism one way or the other could result in reprisals reminiscent of the French raids which had struck the Iroquois late in the last century. Compounding this problem was the economic attachment and peculiar security needs of some Iroquois communities. Because of their long-standing partnership with New York, the Mohawks, especially those of Canajoharie, tended to support the English. This stand was taken in part as a result of a sense of special relationship with the colony, made stronger by Johnson's personal ties with the leading families of the town. On the other hand, the proximity of French forces to the Mohawk towns made such a relationship all the more advantageous. In return for Mohawk aid, the English were expected to fortify and garrison the Indians' towns and provide for the women and children.

The situation was much the same for the Senecas, especially those living near Fort Niagara and on the upper Allegheny. These communities enjoyed personal and economic relations with the French which limited their options.

Another problem, not born of the war but certainly exacerbated by it, was the struggle between constituent members of the League and between factions within the towns. Those Iroquois who had early chosen a position of neutrality tended to distrust and feel threatened by those who chose a stand that might result in disaster for everyone. In 1755 the Mohawks received a warning from the other members of the confederacy not to meddle in the war since "the English and French had a design to kill them all." If the warning was not heeded, the other
Iroquois would "Kick them [the Mohawks] from us and have no more to say to them."\textsuperscript{73} Likewise, jealousies appear to have existed between the Oneidas and Onondagas which the French sought to turn to advantage.\textsuperscript{74}

At the local level, war increased tensions between warriors, often supported by clan matrons, and sachems. For the former, warfare still represented the primary avenue to status and authority. The latter, regardless of any personal preferences, were duty-bound by office to advise peace and forbearance. One Onondaga sachem stepped down from office because his people would not consider his advice "with sufficient cordiality.\textsuperscript{75}" Warriors countered by blaming the sachems for "keeping them in the dark by misrepresentations" and for incurring English anger by not allowing the young men to join Anglo-American forces.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, the Iroquois showed great reluctance to engage in a conflict that might place Six Nations warriors in the position of having to kill or be killed by kinsmen living in Canada. The so-called Mission Iroquois of Caughnawaga, La Presentation, and Oka, while physically removed from the League and distinguished by their acceptance of French Catholicism, nonetheless felt themselves to be culturally one with their kinsmen to the south. Lineage affiliations still existed which lent additional strength to the bonds between them. Throughout the war, parties of Six Nations and Canadian Iroquois met and reaffirmed their cultural unity and desire to take no steps that might result in injury to either group. This reluctance to engage in a fratricidal war of revenge doubtless had as much as anything else to do with Iroquois' decisions to remain neutral.\textsuperscript{77}
Added to these purely Iroquois concerns and issues in dividing opinion on the war was the Anglo-American war effort. Johnson repeatedly warned his superiors that failure on the battlefield was making it difficult for him to bring increasingly skeptical Indians to the English camp. Yet failures continued as one humiliating surrender or abortive campaign followed another, from Fort Oswego in 1756 through General James Abercrombie's bloody defeat at Fort Ticonderoga in July 1758. To make matters worse, the methods employed by Governor Shirley to enlist Iroquois warriors bordered on press-gang tactics and further injured Anglo-Indian relations. Those Iroquois who did participate in Anglo-American campaigns suffered losses greater than their communities could sustain, both from bullets and the ever present camp fevers and smallpox. The Mohawks were particularly fearful that the English would "swallow all our Fighters at once" and accused English leaders of having "drained both our Castles of most of our young men." Finally, the war gave rise to the belief that the fighting between England and France was merely a sham, a prelude to a European plot to destroy or at least dispossess all Indians by first dragging them into a conflict that would weaken and compromise them. Iroquois leaders indicted both European nations as "Common Disturbers of this Country" and warned their people that "the present War between the English and French was but a pretended one & that by & by they would make Peace & unite to destroy the Six Nations." This belief was not peculiar to the Iroquois, but was echoed in the west. The Delawares had also heard that "the English and French made an agreement to cut them off[?] & then take their Lands in Possession." These and other
statements reveal a deep-seated distrust of European motives and the
sincerity of Anglo-French assurances that the war would result in the
preservation of native lands. This theme of a European conspiracy
to destroy Indians would appear again in the west as Anglo-Americans
began to occupy the Great Lakes region at war's end.

The Iroquois response to the myriad internal and external problems
created by the war was continued official neutrality. As in the past,
the League worked to preserve this position while, at the same time,
constituent groups could pursue that course of action best suited to
their own needs or interests. It was a policy grounded in Iroquois
notions of localism and individual autonomy. It also gave the con-
federacy council a way of preserving Iroquois freedom of action. By
standing on official neutrality, they could conveniently disavow actions
by those who did go to war and, at the same time, preserve an image of
unity.

The same lack of unanimity and caution that characterized the
Six Nations' approach to military involvement was reflected in their
participation in efforts to end French-supported raids along the Anglo-
American frontier. Soon after these raids began, Sir William Johnson
and Lieutenant Governor Robert Hunter Morris of Pennsylvania lobbied
to gain Iroquois support in ending what was, in some respects, an In-
dian war against Pennsylvania, separate from the larger imperial con-

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not only from the Iroquois' reluctance to become entangled in Pennsylvania's troubles, but an equal reluctance on the part of the "clients" to play a subordinate role.

Escaped prisoners and information derived from the complex negotiations later initiated by the Ohio Indians reveal the sources of native, and especially Delaware, hostility. The decision to take up arms against the Anglo-Americans was taken reluctantly by many Ohio Indians and was never fully endorsed by all. From 1755 through the decline of hostilities in the wake of Forbes' expedition three years later, a clearly definable group among the Delawares kept up negotiations aimed at ending the war. This, and the reasons given by Indians for the fighting, belie the simplistic notion that native participants in colonial conflicts were merely pawns of European powers. While it is true that the economic and military circumstances in the west after 1754 did limit Indian options, those who chose to fight or negotiate did so with their own best interests in mind, interests which, for a time, happened to coincide with those of French and English imperial goals.

Land and the issues of independence and security were prominent on the list of reasons given by Ohio Indians for waging war. A former captive of the Delaware war leader Shingas, Charles Stuart, reported that Shingas and others decided to break with the English after being told by General Braddock that "No Savage Should Inherit the Land" in the wake of the anticipated English victory. This reply came after Shingas sought assurances that Braddock's army would restore control of the Ohio country to the Indians. At the same time, Stuart re-
ported that the Indians gave as another reason for fighting "their own Safety": they had been threatened with the loss of needed supplies if they failed to support the French. 87

Other sources confirm Stuart's account. Susquehanna Delawares, who became involved in the fighting alongside their Ohio kinsmen, told the English that the Anglo-French conflict over the west had prompted a chain of events that left the Indians little choice but to fight. 88 In 1758 an Ohio Shawnee leader, Ackowanothio, issued a stinging explanation of events. Expressing indignation over the constant English inquiries about the Indians' reasons for fighting, he enjoined Pennsylvania officials to "get sober and think impartially." In the message that followed, he listed English "land hunger" as high on the list of grievances. He further pointed out that many Ohio Indians had remained neutral even in the face of the French invasion. 89 Sir William Johnson also pointed to encroachment on native lands as a prime cause for war. 90

The litany of injuries did not, however, end with land frauds and dispossession. Both Indians and Englishmen blamed Anglo-American military actions, but for different reasons. To Johnson, Braddock's defeat was a disaster in more ways than one since it allowed the French to gain support from "several of those Indians who were before in our Interest and some who held themselves as it were neutral till they saw how the event of that Expedition would turn out." 91 This view was supported by Ackowanothio, who also acknowledged that the defeat had pushed some Ohio Indians, particularly the Shawnees, into the French camp. 92 On the other hand, some Ohio Delawares appear to have been
resentful of the English, believing the latter unnecessarily blamed them for Washington's surrender in 1754 and Braddock's fiasco the following year.93

Traditional motives also played a part. While direct evidence is lacking, it can be assumed that Ohio warriors, like their Six Nations counterparts, saw the war as an opportunity for achieving status. Further insight into motives is gained from information supplied by the Susquehanna Delaware leader Teedyuscung. He informed Pennsylvania agents in 1757 that several hundred western Senecas had gone to war against the frontier settlements. Their reason for so doing was the desire to avenge the earlier murders of Senecas by settlers in Virginia.94 Thus revenge, and the corresponding need to cover and replace the dead—both traditional motives for war—appear to have still been valid during the Seven Years' War. The large number of prisoners taken and adopted into Delaware, Iroquois, and Shawnee families would lend further support for the centrality of these motives. For many Indians, the war may have offered an opportunity to carry out cultural responsibilities and at the same time restore populations ravaged by recent epidemics.95

Finally, for at least some Delawares in the west, their prior relationship with the Six Nations appears to have influenced the decision to take up arms. On the one hand, the Delawares expected support from their "uncles" on whose lands they had settled and with whom they had a long-standing relationship. When this aid against the French was not forthcoming, and given the varying response of local Iroquois to the invaders, the Delawares felt obliged to support, or at least tolerate, the new regime.96
On the other hand, the recent history of Iroquois-Delaware relations must have resulted in lingering resentment on the part of the latter. As the war would subsequently demonstrate, the role of "women"—signifying people who took a subordinate, non-aggressive, role in relation to their masculine patrons—hung heavily on those Delawares still living in the east. Many of the Delawares living on the Ohio undoubtedly migrated from eastern homelands at Shamokin and elsewhere to escape the increasingly onerous position as Iroquois clients, particularly after the shift in Covenant Chain relations in the 1730s. In addition, as recently as 1752, the Ohio Iroquois Tanaghrisson, in collusion with Virginians, appointed Shingas "king" of the Ohio Delawares. The irony of this event was that while the coronation was done chiefly to facilitate Anglo-Indian relations, the act gave the Delawares a spokesman who was legitimate in the eyes of his people and thus unwittingly contributed to the on-going development of a Delaware identity in the west. This growing identity, coupled with the obvious interference in Delaware affairs and the threat posed by the Anglo-Iroquois policy of subordinating as many Indians as possible to the Chain, must have prompted some Ohio Delawares to see the war as an opportunity to strike a blow for political independence.

Again, given the recent history of provincial-Indian relations, it is not hard to understand why Pennsylvania took the brunt of the frontier war which erupted. Aside from the close proximity of the colony's outlying settlements to French bases on the Ohio, longstanding Delaware and Shawnee resentment over land policies added another dimension to what has usually been defined as a wholly Anglo-French.
conflict. Indeed, between 1755 and 1758 Pennsylvania, by its own declaration, was engaged in its own Indian war, a conflict which was at once distinct from, but subsumed by, the larger international conflict.

Shortly after its outbreak, this Indian war led to a lengthy and complex series of negotiations as provincial and crown officials attempted to isolate the causes of the conflict and create a settlement that would allow English military operations against the French to proceed unmolested. By late 1756 this negotiating process had come to include various elements of the Six Nations, the Delawares, Shawnees, and other Indians living west of the Appalachians, the Delawares living on the Susquehanna River, Pennsylvania political interests, and crown Indian agents. The process of arriving at some sort of accommodation that would satisfy all parties concerned also underscored the issues and problems that Anglo-American policy makers would have to confront in the post-war period.

III

When war broke out, Anglo-Americans' responses were based on their conception of the Covenant Chain as a power relationship in which the hostile Delawares and Shawnees were under Iroquois control. This view was best summarized by Braddock's successor, Shirley, who informed the Six Nations that "The Indians the Delawares & Shawanese always lived under your Direction, they looked upon you as their Master." His point of view was seconded by Pennsylvania's governor as well as by
Sir William Johnson. As a result, initial efforts to end the fighting were made through the League with colonial officials insisting "strenuously on their using all means possible to check their [Delaware and Shawnee] proceedings." However, it fell to Johnson to move negotiations through the League and to rebuild the now-shattered Chain by inducing those Indians at war with the colonies to re-affirm their earlier friendship with the English. The initial Iroquois response was favorable and conciliatory messages were sent to the Ohio by the end of 1755.

However, the same issues which led the Six Nations to avoid involvement in the war also limited their enthusiasm for saving colonists from angry Ohio warriors. While agreeing that they had "by a series of conquests" attained superiority over the Ohio Indians, the Iroquois passed the diplomatic ball back to the English. When pressed by Johnson to take positive action, the Six Nations speaker, Red Head, replied "we always look'd upon the Delawares as the more immediate care of Onas [the governor of Pennsylvania], that they were within the circle of his arms; we therefore are of opinion, that he has not taken that friendly care of them as he ought to do."

The conference punctuated by Red Head's speech marked the limit of Iroquois involvement in western affairs until 1758. While the Six Nations continued to send messages and engage in their own efforts to learn the causes of the war, they were careful not to become embroiled in the conflict itself. Their ability to intervene was limited as much by traditional limits on inter-group relations as anything else. Added to this was a distrust of Anglo-American motives and a lack of
confidence in their ability to defend themselves.

This assessment was based on two closely related events. Early in 1756 the frontier war grew as Delawares living on the upper Susquehanna River took up arms against Pennsylvania. Acting in response to a call from their Ohio kinsmen, and presented with an opportunity to retaliate for the Walking Purchase and similar acts of dispossession, Teedyuscung and other Delawares struck suddenly and hard. Responding to this and earlier attacks from the west, Pennsylvania issued a declaration of war on April 1, 1756 against all Indians then in arms against the colony. This act caught the Iroquois and Johnson by surprise and infuriated both. Johnson was of the opinion that, by acting before he had learned the outcome of the Iroquois' inquiries, Governor Morris had threatened to wreck any chance of peace as well as to further weaken English standing with the Six Nations. Moreover, he wondered out loud how the Ohio Indians would respond to what could easily be interpreted as English duplicity. Morris's actions underscored further the gulf between royal and provincial policies and the inherent lack of coordination in Indian affairs.

Negotiations to end the war began soon after the hostilities spread to the Susquehanna. The center of attention for all concerned soon became the previously little-known Susquehanna Delaware and sometime Moravian convert, Teedyuscung. Anxious to conclude peace, provincial officials were attracted to Teedyuscung, who claimed to be the voice of "ten nations" living on or near the Susquehanna River. At the same time, Quaker politicians were drawn by his desire to expose fraudulent proprietary land deals which, if properly handled,
could be used as ammunition in the on-going Quaker-Proprietary feud.

In preliminary talks at Easton in 1756 and in a truce arranged the following year at the same place, proprietary leaders and Teedyuscung were able to agree on ending the Susquehanna phase of the war pending the outcome of serious talks which were to address a number of basic Indian grievances. At the same time, in another effort to promote peace at a meeting between the Six Nations and the Susquehanna Delawares, Johnson removed the "petticoat" from the latter group. This act was designed to allow the Delawares to speak for themselves in council on issues specific to them and so facilitate peace-making.

Johnson had no desire to dis-establish the system whereby the Six Nations acted as spokesmen and negotiators for other Indians in the Covenant Chain. In short, his actions were based on political necessity. At Easton in 1756, the Iroquois bowed to political realities and acknowledged the independent stand taken by the Delawares. In the words of the Six Nations' speaker, "as you have thrown off the Cover of your modesty . . . We now give you a little Prick and put it in your Private Parts, and so let it grow there till you shall be a compleat man." The implication was that the Iroquois made the Delawares "compleat men". But an exchange earlier that year suggests a reluctance to withhold what the eastern Delawares had assumed as a matter of right. At that earlier encounter at Otsinigo, the Delawares declared that "we are Men & are determined not to be ruled any Longer by you as Women." They further warned their uncles to "say no more to us in that head, least we cut off your private parts & make Women of you as you have done to us." As a declaration of independence,
this statement has few rivals in Indian or European history and served to underscore the role that Delaware political aspirations played in both bringing on the war and opening the way to peace.

All of this diplomatic activity was watched with great care and interest by the Delawares, Shawnees, and others living west of the mountains. Contacts between these groups and Pennsylvania had continued through the summer of 1755 as the regional situation continued to deteriorate in the wake of Braddock's defeat. These contacts were marked by efforts of some Ohio Indians, notably the Sandusky Wyandots led by Jagea, the Delawares led by Tamaqua and Delaware George, and the Ohio Iroquois led by Scarouady, to maintain English and Six Nations support in the face of growing French power. In this diplomatic exchange, the leading role was assumed by Scarouady, who served as messenger between the Ohio Indians, Philadelphia, and the Iroquois towns in New York.

During the latter part of 1755 and most of 1756, a diplomatic hiatus appears to have taken place during which direct contact between the west and Anglo-American officials was very limited or altogether nonexistent. However, in light of subsequent negotiations, which began in the fall of 1756, some idea of conditions in the west can be obtained. From the opening of hostilities, it is clear that not all Indians in the Ohio country of Great Lakes region were committed to supporting French aims or taking revenge on the English. Apart from those actively engaged in fighting, there emerged another group which tended to initiate and direct the negotiations with the English. The goals of these men, representing Delawares, Iroquois,
Wyandots, and Shawnees, were to demilitarize the Ohio country, restore the economic system of the fur trade vital to continued well-being, and to insure native control over regional affairs. Neither "pro-French" nor "pro-English", this group was interested only in peace and the future of its own people. At the center of this group, which was never formalized and whose membership fluctuated with wartime conditions, were the Delaware leaders Tamaqua, also known as King Beaver, Pisquetomen, Delaware George, and Netawatwees, or Newcomer. Beaver and Pisquetomen were brothers, nephews of the Delaware leader Alumapees and thus legitimate claimants to Delaware leadership on the Ohio. Pisquetomen and a third brother, Shingas, had chosen to go to war against the English in 1755. So successful was Shingas in this that Pennsylvania offered a special bounty for his scalp. Tamaqua, on the other hand, kept scrupulously aloof from the conflict, establishing himself as the least tainted with English blood and thus most qualified to talk of peace. It is unclear precisely when Tamaqua emerged as the principal Delaware spokesman. By 1758 he was being referred to as King Beaver and his name tended to head the list of known Ohio Delaware leaders. It should be noted that not all Delawares acceded to Tamaqua's leadership. The notable exception was Custaloga's group living near Venango. Tamaqua's ascendancy coincided with the eclipse of Shingas and may perhaps be dated to after the damaging English raid on Kittanning in 1756. Active negotiations with the English began soon after this event.

Coinciding with the emergence of what may be called the "peace" group among the Ohio Indians was the emergence of the Delawares as the
dominant group in the region. That the two events were connected cannot be doubted. In the absence of the moderate Ohio Iroquois group formerly led by Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, Tamaqua and his followers, taking advantage of the current Delaware preponderance of numbers and their own regional influence, worked to establish themselves as brokers between the Anglo-Americans and other Indian groups farther west. At the same time, the creation of new political relationships in the west serves to reveal aspects of intra-societal relations among the Delawares. Throughout the period from 1756 through 1758, the leaders of the Turtle and Turkey clans on the Ohio, Netawatwees and Tamaqua, appear to have cooperated in seeking a resolution to the frontier conflict. However, the Wolf clan leader, Gustaloga, played a separate, but not necessarily hostile part. Physically separated from the other Delawares, Gustaloga's people maintained a much closer relationship with the Seneca towns on the Allegheny River. They had, in addition, established a symbiotic relationship with the French garrisons in the area, supplying food and labor in exchange for trade goods and cash, as they later attempted to do with the Anglo-Americans.

Significant contacts between the western Indians and the English resumed late in 1756 as the result of a message sent by Sir William Johnson's deputy, George Croghan. Croghan's message was delivered to Gustaloga at Venango and, according to one Delaware witness, the Indians "Seem'd desirous of Peace." Characteristically, Gustaloga and his people, while personally interested in opening talks, deferred to "their Uncles, the Senecas" who warned against making a reply. The reason reveals the care with which the Indians were proceeding to re-
open normal relations. According to the Seneca Garisagee, who knew Croghan, the message belts were "not proper Belts on this Occasion." A proper belt was to have "Men wrought in it for the several Tribes he [Croghan] wants to meet with (himself taking us by the Hand), made of old Council Wampum." In the absence of this, the Senecas acted as if no message had been sent.

In August 1757, in the wake of the Easton treaty that produced a cease-fire between Pennsylvania and the eastern Delawares, another exchange with the Ohio Indians took place. This time the initiative came from the west in the form of "Three Indian Men, and a Boy about Sixteen Years of Age" who bore a message from Menatochyand—Delaware George—and Netawatquemsmond—Newcomer, "Two of the Principal Men of the Ohio Indians." The intermediary in this case was Pennsylvania's former enemy, now partner in peace, Teedyuscung. Unlike Croghan's abortive and mishandled attempt the year before, this Ohio Delaware message was received and elicited an official reply from Governor William Denny of Pennsylvania. The Ohio messengers offered a regretful apology for their people's part in the war and expressed interest in learning more about the negotiations between the colony and Teedyuscung. They further pledged to refrain from further warlike acts until the outcome of such negotiations was made known to them. Denny replied to his "Grand Children" through Teedyuscung, who was asked to encourage his Ohio kinsmen to participate in general peace talks. This message was sent in the care of Teedyuscung's son to Delaware George "who was waiting at Venango for a reply." This exchange and others to follow.
undoubtedly increased the influence of Tamaqua's group and helps account for their emergence as the dominant voice in Ohio country affairs by the end of the following year.

The following spring, Teedyuscung returned to Denny with news that eight western nations had chosen him as their voice and wished to send a message to the governor. These eight nations underscored the serious tone of their message by sending with the wampum belts a calumet, the ceremony surrounding which had long before developed in the west as a means of transcending inter-societal conflicts and establishing peaceful relations. Teedyuscung listed the eight nations which included Ottawas from Saginaw Bay and Lake Erie, Miamis, Ojibwas, Caughnawagas, Potawatomis, Mahoojas, and Nolaschawanas. Denny's reply was positive, and not a little presumptuous. The belts and calumet he sent in return were directed to "the Indian Towns on the Ohio, and the other Towns who have not entered into our alliance." The message itself indicated that "His Majesty, King George, embraces these Eight Nations and receives them with open Arms into the Union established between you [Teedyuscung] and us." Whether through ignorance or design, Denny was making it appear as though peace had now been reduced to a mere formality—a position emphatically rejected by the Ohio Indians in later negotiations. From their perspective, such initial contacts were strictly preliminaries, a way of "clearing the path" so that meaningful exchanges could continue.

Irregardless of the apparently central role played by Teedyuscung, it is nonetheless clear that the western Indians regarded him only as a convenient messenger, someone who had Onas's ear, not a bonafide
negotiator. Teedyuscung's current status as Pennsylvania's favorite Indian made him the logical choice as an intermediary. But the prime movers behind western Indian peace initiatives were unquestionably those Delawares associated with Tamaqua. One of the three Indians who delivered the message and calumet to Teedyuscung was Gela-pamund, a brother of Netawatwees. In addition, the messages sent west by Denny were apparently carried first to Netawatwees, who then forwarded them to Tamaqua at his current home at the Kuskuski. Information about subsequent negotiations on the Ohio also demonstrated the central role played by Tamaqua in bringing other interested Indians into contact with the English. Finally, Delaware messengers who arrived in Philadelphia later in 1758 to open talks claimed not to have heard the messages carried by Teedyuscung and his agents. This suggests a rejection of his self-proclaimed status as official negotiator—only direct contacts with mutually acceptable agents would suffice.

The evident success of Ohio Delaware leaders in drawing other western Indians into negotiations with colonial officials was made easier by the changing nature of French-Indian relations throughout the west. As with those Indians living on the Ohio, not all Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, or other Great Lakes Indians would have been favorably disposed toward a war with the English. This would have been especially true for those who had worked and risked much to establish trade relations with the Anglo-Americans that benefited Indians through competitive prices and a wider variety of goods. The Seven Years' War had the added effect of seriously limiting French aid for
those western Indians who did take up arms and also upset normal social and economic patterns. The result, by 1759, was growing Indian disenchantment with French policies and a corresponding interest by some to open contacts with the English in the hope of repairing at least some of the war-related damage.

Having subdued Indian and Anglo-American attempts to overthrow them, the French, by 1753, had reasserted their role as the west's chief supplier of goods and principal military force. In the face of Anglo-American threats to the French commercial empire and settlements in North America in 1755 the Canadian Governor General, Vaudreuil, and his field officers moved to muster western Indian support for the impending conflict. Using fears of English land hunger, French agents were able to lead impressive numbers of Great Lakes and Ohio Indians in the victorious campaigns of 1756 and 1757.

By the end of 1757, however, conditions were changing and the marriage of convenience between French and western Indians was, in some instances, strained to the point of divorce. Part of the problem was external. The British naval blockade of Canada was keeping needed supplies out of the colony. The capture of Louisbourg in 1758 made the situation even worse. The degree of Indian dependence on the French was indicated by a captured partisan officer who indicated that the garrisons of the Ohio forts planted corn just for the Indians, and also supplied them with clothing. The curtailment of this support, especially for the families of warriors in the field, led to increased unrest. In 1757, "Several drunken Mississaugas" threatened to destroy the post at Toronto. More serious was a show-down at Fort Duquesne
between a Miamis war party and the garrison that resulted in an exchange of gunfire and several Miami deaths. Also, it was observed that Indians living near the eastern Great Lakes were having second thoughts about the French destruction of the English trading post at Oswego.

The French bore the brunt of Indian anger over war-related losses as well. The Kittanning raid in 1756 undoubtedly inspired some Delawares to reconsider their role in the war, particularly when they reflected on how little protection the French had given them. It appears, however, that the epidemic of 1757-1758 which swept the Great Lakes served as a major turning point in French-Indian relations. In assessing the rising discontent among western Indians, a French observer attributed it to "The great loss they have suffered from the smallpox, the bad medicine the French have thrown them." This tendency to blame the French for disease and death was not farfetched, since the illness appears to have been carried west by Indians who participated in the siege of Fort William Henry. Refusing to limit their anger to words, Menominees at La Baye besieged the fort there for several days and killed a dozen French civilians living nearby. The appearance of Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis among the "eight nations" represented by Teedyuscung suggests that some, at least, of these people were also becoming disillusioned with the French. By the time Anglo-American forces arrived on the Ohio, other Great Lakes Indians were moving to contact them, through the offices of Tamaqua.
As the French position in the west continued to deteriorate, Anglo-American contacts with the Ohio Indians took an important turn with the arrival in Philadelphia of two Delaware messengers, Pisquetomen and Keekyuscung. Upon meeting Christian Frederick Post at Wyoming they indicated that they had come "to see some of the Inhabitants of Pennsylvania with whom we could speak ourselves, for we cannot believe all that we hear, and know not what is true and what is false." While the arrival of these men may have been prompted by Pennsylvania messages sent west by Teedyuscung in response to the eight nations' calumet, Pisquetomen suggested another explanation. In expressing the Delawares' regret at having gone to war, he said that they "wished often to have seen some Messengers from the Government with whom they could have spoken" and he "complained strongly that they never had heard any Satisfactory Account of the Peace made at Easton, nor any Treaties that had been held, nor received any Gifts 'till now lately." This and other statements indicate that those Ohio Delawares bent on negotiating felt it necessary to make direct contact with Pennsylvania and divorce themselves from Teedyuscung and the eastern Delawares. Further, this insistence that previous messages had not been heard and the Delawares' emphasis on contact with the colonial government may also have been a token of the Indians' insistence that their interests be recognized as separate and distinct from those involving Indian groups on the Susquehanna.

In view of the impending advance of General John Forbes' army to-
ward the Ohio country, the arrival of Pisquetomen and Keekysucung aroused great interest. They offered the possibility of ending hostilities with the Ohio Indians, which would greatly increase Forbes' chances of success. In his reply to the Ohio delegates, Governor Denny outlined previous peace negotiations and emphasized that "We do assure the Allegheny Indians, and all others who hold on the Peace Belt, that they are, and shall be included in this important matter, and that every Offense that has been passed shall be forgot forever." 142

Both Denny and Forbes were anxious to have Pisquetomen and his companions return to the Ohio. Not only were they to certify the English intent to negotiate but were asked to keep provincial and army officers informed about French plans and operations. To further insure the veracity of Pennsylvania's message and to convey vital intelligence to Forbes, Denny asked Christian Frederick Post to accompany the Delawares. 143

Post's account of the journey to the Ohio in July and August and the reception Denny's message was given tells much about how the western Delawares and their neighbors viewed the Anglo-American peace proposals. In addition, Post witnessed the still-divided nature of the Ohio Indian community, due both to the issue of peace and to the fact that the population along the Ohio was in a state of flux as groups tended to move farther west and south to avoid the war. The prospects of opening talks clearly appealed to Tamaqua and his followers. According to Post, Delaware George, Tamaqua's associate, "said he had not slept all night, so much had he been engaged on account of my com-
That Tamaqua's associates were responsible for arriving at a suitable reply to Denny's message is clear from Post's journal. Post spent most of his time at Tamaqua's town at the Kuskuskies, and both Tamaqua and Delaware George served as his hosts and protectors.

While eager to exchange views with the Anglo-Americans, the Ohio Delawares made a point of emphasizing that such proceedings were only preliminaries. A state of war still existed and many Delaware warriors were even then in the field. Further, Post was made to understand that as "all the Indians, from the sunrise to the sunset, are united in a body, it is necessary that the whole should join in the peace, or it can be no peace," and that, therefore, the English should not expect the western Delawares to speak for all or to make peace alone. It was this view that peace could not be achieved until all parties were included that prompted Tamaqua's later activities as an intermediary between Indians to the west and the Anglo-Americans. English notions of diplomacy aside, for the Indians involved peace meant the inclusion of allies, trading partners, and kinsmen.

Some insight into the problem confronting Tamaqua and others in achieving a consensus on the issue of peace was also revealed to Post. In contrast with his cordial reception at the Kuskuskies due to the influence of Tamaqua, Pisquetomen, and Delaware George, was Post's treatment at Saucunk, sometime residence of both Shingas and Netawatwees, at the mouth of the Beaver River. Post observed that "The people of the town were much disturbed at my coming" and that "their faces were white distorted with rage." Only Post's timely recognition of an Indian acquaintance in the town limited, and to some extent, reduced...
the expressions of hostility. Perhaps the best expression of the abiding bitterness and distrust toward the English held by many Delawares was that of the warrior Shamokin Daniel. Having heard Post assure Shingas that Pennsylvania would rescind the bounty it had put on his head, Daniel interrupted, telling Shingas "Do not believe him, he tells nothing but idle lying stories." In the face of Post's strong protestations to the contrary, Daniel's anger burst forth. He lashed back by telling Post "D—n you, why do not you and the French fight on the sea? You come here only to cheat the poor Indians, and take their land from them." While Shingas and other leaders later apologized for Daniel's outburst, his words cut to the heart of the matter. What the Ohio Indians wanted was a guarantee not only of peace but of future non-interference in their affairs by Europeans.

Far from being the ravings of a man acting "as if he was drunk", Daniel's expression of distrust of Anglo-American motives in sending peace belts was shared by others, including Tamaqua and other negotiators. The reason for this was the apparent gap between English protestations of peace and the continuing advance of the Anglo-American army. Governor Denny's message, reiterated in council by Post, spoke of friendship and alliance. The war hatchet was to be buried "on both sides" and the same peace that had been made in the east in 1757 was to be extended to the Ohio. Post opened a road from the Delaware towns to Philadelphia and assured the assembled Indians that Forbes' army was directed only at the French.

It was this last point, among other issues, that prompted continued concern among the Indians. By mid-August, as the Indians were meeting
to consider Denny's message, the advance elements of Forbes' army were already approaching Loyal Hanna Creek, soon to build Fort Ligonier. The advance of an English army on one side and the French garrisons on the other reinforced the belief that "you and the French contrived the war to waste the Indians between you." The Delaware leaders continued by suggesting that Post had knowledge of this, but was ordered by Denny to remain silent. Of equal concern was the presence in the army of several hundred Catawba and Cherokee warriors. These Indians had long been enemies of those living north of the Ohio and their appearance as English allies further suggested treachery. Tamaqua, Pisquetomen, and others made a point of exposing what, at the very least, was bad English planning and timing when they observed "if you had brought the news of peace before your army had begun to march it would have caused a great deal more good."

Aside from the apprehension and divisiveness caused by the difference between Anglo-American words and deeds, the peace proposals themselves led to some debate and resistance. In the first place, it is clear that Indians on the Ohio did not feel themselves included in, or wish to be embraced by, the treaty of 1757. While this treaty did end fighting in the east, it failed to address fundamental issues, particularly land. To Tamaqua and his followers, the current negotiations were only a first step toward peace. Such was not, however, going to emerge from a flat acceptance of English promises and requests. Rather, the Ohio Indians took advantage of Pisquetomen's mission to send signals of their own.

On the fundamentally important issue of land, the assembled lead-
ers' stand was clear. Emphasizing that "the land is ours, and not theirs [the English]", the Indians asserted that they would insure the removal of the French if "you will be at peace with us" and if the English dropped any plans for expanding into the west. The repatriation of English captives was also a matter for concern. This issue struck at the heart of native society and, like the other points, would become a major issue in Anglo-Indian relations over the next several years. The principal objection, as Post observed, was that "it appears very odd and unreasonable that we should demand prisoners before there is an established peace; since an unreasonable demand makes us appear as if we wanted brains." Further, as Post had earlier indicated, repatriation of prisoners, many of whom had been adopted, was no easy task since redemption meant weakening native kin groups. Also, no mechanism, coercive or otherwise, existed by which Indian leaders could guarantee repatriation. Thus, Anglo-American demands that peace be linked to prisoner returns served to increase tension within the Indian community on the Ohio and made a consensus on peace harder to achieve.

After having expressed their positions on these matters to Post, the assembled native leaders issued a formal reply to Denny. The message, carried back east by Pisquetomen and the Delaware warrior Thomas Hickman, reveals both the extent to which Tamaqua and his followers had created a rough consensus among the Delawares and how tenuous this consensus was. The list of Delawares who issued the message was headed by Tamaqua. Significantly, the second name on the list was Shingas'. His agreement to the proceedings, as well as that of other
Delaware war leaders such as Kill Buck and Captain Peter, may have been intended as a further signal to the Anglo-Americans of the Delawares' willingness to consider reasonable proposals. The men whose names were appended to the message represented all three Delaware clans on the Ohio, though Custaloga's and Netawatwees's names were not included. One additional measure of a new-found agreement is found in Post's comment on the initial hostility shown him at Saucunk. He had particularly wingled out Whiteyes and Kill Buck on this occasion, but later noted that their attitudes had changed. Both mens' names appear on the list. On the other hand, the fragility of the consensus is expressed in the Delawares' request that the English "make haste, and let us soon hear of you again." Tamaqua and his followers seem to have needed additional signs of Anglo-American good will, especially since Forbes' army was continuing its advance against Fort Duquesne.

The Delawares' message made no mention of peace being accepted, only an interest in peace. In addition, even as Pisquetomen and his party traveled to Pennsylvania, Delaware warriors participated in the near annihilation of an Anglo-American detachment and engaged in an abortive French attack on Forbes' advance base at Fort Ligonier. Such activity reflected the assumption that, until formal peace was made directly with the English to the satisfaction of all the Delaware interests involved, a state of war existed and that not all Delawares may have accepted the idea of negotiating at all. Significantly, the English were asked to inform the Ohio Indians when a formal peace had been concluded in the east. The implication that the western Indians would deal separately with such an event was reinforced by the suggest-
ion that the Ohio Indians would send any news of such a peace agreement to the western Indians themselves. 161

Pisquetomen's party arrived at Philadelphia and then went to Easton where it arrived in mid-October in the midst of the general peace conference being held between the crown, Pennsylvania, the eastern Delawares, and Six Nations. 162 The conference had been called to settle outstanding problems between the Indians and the colony and to complete the process begun a year earlier with Teedyuscung. While Anglo-American officials hoped that the results of the treaty would induce western Indians to stop fighting, the conference was not called specifically for that end. Indeed, until Pisquetomen's arrival, affairs on the Ohio had hardly been mentioned during the proceedings.

The background to, and proceedings of, the 1758 Easton Treaty have been amply dealt with elsewhere and need not be repeated here. The conference did play an important role in future relations between western Indians and Anglo-Americans. As recent scholarship on the Treaty has made clear, there emerged from Easton a new foundation for Anglo-Indian relations, one on which royal officials over the next decade and a half would attempt to construct a realistic, coherent, and manageable policy. The Treaty's most immediate result was to confirm peace with the Susquehanna Delawares. Out of this emerged a number of important points. First, the treaty marked the emergence of Sir William Johnson as master of Indian affairs in Pennsylvania. Although Johnson did not attend the meetings, it was through his solicitations to the Board of Trade that the conference was held, and his deputy, George Croghan, was present to monitor the proceedings and represent
Johnson's interests. In this, Croghan was supported by the Six Nations delegation. Not only were the Iroquois present, but they managed the Indian side of the negotiations from the outset. In addition, the Susquehanna Indians agreed to acknowledge the leadership of the League in international affairs once again. Thus, Johnson was able not only to put his own stamp on the proceedings but to begin the task of rebuilding the Covenant Chain as well. To be sure, the new Chain that eventually emerged bore little resemblance to its pre-1754 predecessor, but in 1758 none of this was yet evident.

In return for acknowledging Iroquois leadership, the Susquehanna Indians obtained support from the League in settling the still sensitive issue of lands which, by Delaware and Iroquois admission, was at the bottom of the Indians' alienation during the war. Aside from settling specific Delaware claims to lands along the Susquehanna River, the conference witnessed the retrocession of the 1754 Albany purchase to the Six Nations, with a promise that settlement west of the mountains would be stopped until Indian and crown leaders could meet and agree on reasonable cessions. Coupled with this was a pledge to open a regulated trade under provincial supervision at selected locations, one of which was later to be at Fort Pitt.

What the Anglo-Americans asked in return for thus opening a road to peace was an assurance that hostilities would end. In addition, all prisoners taken during the war were to be returned as soon as possible. While the Six Nations' sachems agreed in principle to both requests and urged their clients to do likewise, actual compliance was another matter. For the Indians involved, achieving peace was a continuing process.
based on achieving and maintaining a consensus on the issues at hand. Unlike their Anglo-American counterparts, no native leader could ratify a treaty and suddenly declare peace. This was due in part to the local, consensual nature of Indian society and the limited authority enjoyed by leaders. Of greater importance was a value system that defined relations with outsiders as potentially hostile rather than peaceful. Peace was considered fragile and had to constantly be renewed, rather than merely declared.¹⁶⁸

This fundamental difference in outlook between the Indians at Easton and their Anglo-American adversaries carried profound meaning for this and future encounters. To the Six Nations, the eastern Delawares, and Pisquetomen's delegation observing from the galleries, Easton was one more step toward normalization of relations, the finality of which would depend on how sincere the English appeared to be about maintaining peace and keeping their promises.

It was with this outlook that Pisquetomen and Thomas Hickman departed for the Ohio with news of the Easton Treaty and Governor Denny's message. Significantly, the Delawares were accompanied on their return by two Cayuga sachems.¹⁶⁹ The presence of these men among the western Delawares, the English hoped, would lend weight to the news of the treaty proceedings and underscore the Six Nations' renewed role as leaders of regional affairs. Denny's message reiterated the Anglo-American desire for peace and called on the Ohio Indians to re-enter the Covenant Chain alliance. He also promised to open a road—to normalize relations with them—in return for an end to hostilities. The road, however, was to lead to the council fire at Philadelphia,
with no mention of a similar meeting place on the Ohio. 170

The reception given the news from Easton by Ohio Indians is revealed in the journal of Christian Frederick Post's second trip to the Ohio country in November 1758. Post was not involved in any way with carrying messages to the west and did not accompany Pisquetomen from Easton. Rather, his mission was to gather and report intelligence on Indian and French activity for the British army. 171 He did, however, engage in talks with Indian leaders at the Kuskuskies, but by no means directed negotiations.

Post's observations reveal the extent to which the Delawares remained divided on the subject of negotiating with the English. In addition, the specific issues that had been the source of debate in July were still pressing matters that fall. Perhaps even more so, given the continued movement of Forbes' army and the steadily weakening French resistance.

It took little time for these concerns to surface. En route to the Ohio, Pisquetomen argued with the officers of Post's escort, Captain Bull and Lieutenant Hays, over the issue of land and the continued presence of Anglo-American forces in the west. Insisting that the Indians be allowed to deal with the French in their own way, Pisquetomen emphasized a sore point when he told the officers "We are jealous the English will take the land from us." This seemed not an unreasonable conclusion, given the road the army was cutting through to the Ohio, a road wide enough to carry settlers' wagons as well as gun carriages. 172 Pisquetomen's agitation was not lost on Post, who cautioned his companions "to be careful how they argued with the Indians; and be sure
to say nothing that might affront them" lest the Englishmen be con-
fronted by what Post had faced at Saucunk the previous summer. 173

Pisquetomen's words only hinted at the intense concern land had
become among the western Delawares. Upon reaching the Kuskuskies,
Post noted that the Indians "were afraid the English would come over
the river Ohio" and that "they concern themselves very much about the
affair of land; . . . and are continually . . . afraid the English
will take their land," 174 Indian anxiety over land was rooted in far
more than economics. The Delawares on the upper Ohio had migrated
once already in the face of white land hunger and had seen their Ohio
homes invaded by the French, and invasion that brought economic and
political disruption and war. Now, as winter approached, a second in-
vasion seemed imminent. Having been deprived of mastery of their own
affairs in the past, the Delawares were not willing that the same thing
happen again. What made matters worse was the rapidly deteriorating
situation on the Ohio and the continuing contradictory signals being
sent by the Anglo-Americans. On the one hand, as the French prepared
to abandon Fort Duquesne, most Shawnees and many Delawares also began
moving away from the forks of the Ohio. On the other, the Delawares
began receiving messages of peace from both Forbes and Denny as the
Anglo-American army prepared for its final push against the French—a
push which, correctly or not, the Delawares believed was aimed at them
as well. 175 The feeling that the English were not sincere about peace
seemed to be confirmed when Post arrived at the Kuskuskies accompanied
by an armed escort, hardly the actions of an emissary of peace. In-
deed, so upset were the Delawares by this that they cautioned Post not
to call Bull by his military title since "their young men would be mad that we brought a warrior there." Post also found that the air of cordiality and consensus that had existed when he left the previous summer had largely disappeared. The sachems were also sensitive about this and enjoined him not to "regard what the common people would say, but only hearken to the chiefs." He was also expressly forbidden to speak to any of the English captives held in the town and were furious when Post's companions proceeded to do so. The reasons appear to have been a concern that the prisoners would spread false reports about their treatment, which could damage negotiations, and also give intelligence about the state of local affairs. In addition, the Delaware warriors were particularly irritated both at Post's presence among them and the nearness of Forbes' army. Their attitude in this regard was founded in traditional values associated with warfare. Post ascribed their behavior to a "murdering spirit" born of having been repulsed in an attack near Fort Ligonier. What he witnessed, however, was grief over losses and the urge to revenge the dead and so appease their spirits. An attempt by French agents to incite the Delawares also added to this unrest. The French produced letters supposedly taken from English troops confirming Anglo-American determination to take and keep the Ohio lands.

What appears to have tempered this anger and general unrest was the arrival of Tamaqua, Shingas, and the two Cayuga sachems at the Kuskuskees several days after Pisquetomen and Post. Isaac Still, a Delaware leader, took advantage of the Cayugas' arrival to silence the warriors. Telling them of the proceedings at Easton and of the Iro-
quois' participation in them, he challenged the young men to "go
tell them [the Iroquois] that they are fools. Go and tell the
Cayuga chiefs so, and you will become great men." While dissent con-
tinued, Still's tongue-lashing appeared to end the most bellicose out-
bursts.

Tamaqua's arrival marked the beginning of formal consideration
of the Anglo-American messages. With him were Keekyuscung, Shingas,
Pisquetomen, and Delaware George, the core of the group which had led
negotiations that summer. Having listened to Denny's messages, the
assembled chiefs and warriors also attended to advice offered by the
Cayugas. Speaking for the Six Nations, they told the Delawares that
the war hatchet belonged to the white people, "let them use it among
themselves, it is theirs, and they are of one colour; let them fight
with one another." They punctuated these remarks by advising the Dela-
wares to "be still and quiet at Kushkushking," away from the English
and French armies. It was anticipated by Pennsylvania and crown officials
that the Delawares would heed such advice and once again come under the
direction of the League. Post had hinted at such when he earlier re-
minded the Delawares that the Iroquois "are the chief owners of the
land" and that "they will settle the affair."181 In view of past Iro-
quois performances with regard to affairs in the west, it is doubtful
that all Post's listeners were impressed or convinced.

Having taken account of the several speeches and admonitions, the
Delawares spent the next day in private meetings discussing the issues
and preparing a reply. Tamaqua explained what to Post must have seem-
ed a delay in the proceedings by telling him that "It is a great matter,
and wants much consideration," and that each of the three Delaware clans had to discuss and arrive at some agreement on each proposal before all three could act together.  

On November 28, Tamaqua, again speaking for the assembly, expressed general agreement with what they had heard. They agreed to remain uninvolved in the military operations and expressed satisfaction with the tone and substance of Denny's message. Tamaqua also agreed to carry word of the Easton Treaty to the Indians living beyond the Ohio, in hopes of including them in future negotiations. He did, however, persist in asking that the English "after having drive away the French, not settle there." 

His request was reinforced by Ketiushund, "one of the chief counsellors." This man warned Post, as the latter prepared to depart, that "all the nations [clans] had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at Allegheny, and suffer nobody to settle there." He further observed that, as many of the local Indians were now "very much inclined to the English interest" that the latter would do nothing to wreck the rapprochement. 

Post's reply was to direct the Indians to Forbes, who alone could make any determination on whether Englishmen would remain west of the mountains.

Even as Tamaqua and his companions deliberated over the messages from the English and Six Nations, Forbes' army had completed its mission. Unable to slow or stop the English advance, the French blew up Fort Duquesne and evacuated the forks of the Ohio, which was occupied by Forbes' tired and threadbare troops on November 25. The imminent arrival of the Anglo-American forces undoubtedly played a role in determining the outcome of the talks at the Kuskuskes. The Delawares
had received periodic situation reports throughout the council and were well aware of French plans. The Indians had earlier rejected French requests for aid, largely due to the obvious weakness of the latter's situation. 186 While Post recalled that the Indians "danced round the fire till midnight" on November 22, celebrating the arrival of the British army, it is doubtful that many rejoiced at the thought of bidding farewell to one invader only to greet another. Shingas' reply to Denny's message was more cautious. He told Post that he and the warriors were "pleased" with the governor's speech, but went no further than that. 187

V

It has been part of the lore surrounding the Easton Treaty and the English occupation of the Ohio country that the treaty somehow guaranteed Anglo-American military success by preventing the western Indians from striking Forbes' army, and that the English force so overawed the Indians that they had no choice but to settle for the best terms available. Contemporaries believed this to be true and later historians have concurred, citing Colonel Henry Bouquet's observation to William Allen that the peace made at Easton had "knocked the French in the head." 188 Echoing this, Nicholas Wainwright summarized the Anglo-American occupation of ruined Fort Duquesne by observing that while "some Ohio Delawares had approached Forbes after his victory, most of them were terrified of his vengeance and sought safety in flight." 189
To the extent that some Delaware leaders chose to deliberate over the news from Easton and attempted to keep their warriors home during those deliberations, the treaty may have had a minor influence on events at the forks. However, Tamaqua and other Delawares at the Kuskuskies did not make peace, accept the treaty as explained to them, or in any way suddenly change course. Certainly there is little evidence of "terrified" Indians fleeing the vengeance of the English hosts. Something of this sort may be attributed to the Shawnees who had lived at Logstown. They did precipitously abandon their town and moved down the Ohio toward the Scioto River in order to avoid Forbes' army, but also to maintain their contacts with the French, contacts that had become essential to their economic well-being. Some of the Delawares also left, abandoning Saucunk, their town closest to Fort Duquesne. However, this represented a trend in population movement that had begun earlier, initiated in the wake of the Kittanning raid two years before. A substantial number of Delawares continued to live at the Kuskuskies as well as in towns farther north, enough to give Anglo-American commanders cause for concern for months to come. Finally, the Indian messages sent to Forbes and Bouquet urging them in the strongest terms to "go back over the mountains, and stay there" do not reflect the actions of a beaten, frightened people.  

Rather, the Delawares based their actions on a clear understanding of the possible as well as on their own continued desire to see all of the Ohio country de-militarized and left for the use and management of its native inhabitants. In this regard, William Hunter's observation that the arrival of Forbes' army made peace more attractive is
somewhat closer to the mark. Standing alone, the Delawares found their options restricted that winter. The French retreat, and with it the disappearance of needed supplies or hardware and food, threatened to further disrupt the local economy. The Iroquois' advice that the Delawares remain quiet in their towns suggested that little support could be counted on from that quarter. Finally, the still-divided state of the Delaware community precluded with a hasty peace and continued, concerted, resistance.

Faced with a sudden and significant change in the regional balance of power, the Delawares sought to follow a middle course of continuing negotiations while at the same time striving within current limits to obstruct further military operations in their land. The goal was neatly stated in response to a French call for Delaware aid in driving the small English garrison from the forks. In reply, the Kuskuskie community refused, saying "they would have no war in their country." As it turned out, fighting in the region did decline, but the Delawares could not stop Colonel Bouquet from leaving troops in the ruined French fort, though they warned him of the possible ill consequences of such actions. The posting of Anglo-American troops on the Ohio, however few, inaugurated a new phase in Anglo-Indian relations, one to which both Indians and Anglo-Americans would have to adjust.
Notes for Chapter III


2On studies on the eighteenth century Iroquois, see Chapter I, note 66.

3By 1722 the Five Nations had become the Six Nations with the inclusion of the Tuscaroras from North Carolina.


5Trigger, Aataentsic, I, 224, II, 726, 733-34, 794-95; James Wesley Bradley, "The Onondaga Iroquois: 1550-1655, A Study in Acculturative Change and Its Consequences" (Ph.D. diss. Syracuse University, 1979), 394-403.


8Ibid.

9Ibid.


11Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca
178


21Ibid., 206-20.


24 "Treaty of Friendship", 1736, in Van Doren and Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties, 3-4, 23.


31 Ibid., 105.

32 Ibid., xlii.


34 Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959), 17-20; Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 404; Van Doren and Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties, 1, li.

35 Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III, s.v. "Tanaghrisson"; on Scarouady, the only information is in the dated C. Hale Sipe, Indian Chiefs of Pennsylvania (Butler, Pa., 1927), 213-54.

36 For a traditional view of the role of these men in Ohio Indian Affairs, see Lois Mulkearn, "Half-King: Seneca Diplomat of the Ohio Valley," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine 37 (1954), 65-61.


46 Wallace, Conrad Weiser, 317.


48 Jennings, "Miquon's Passing," 408.


50 Kent, French Invasion, 40, 53-54.

Kent, French Invasion, 46-49.

Ibid., 45, 51; The Marquis Duquesne to the Minister [Quebec], Aug. 20, 1753, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles, 50-51.


Duquesne to the Minister [Quebec], Aug. 20, 1753, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Wilderness Chronicles, 51-52.

Kent, French Invasion, 65-66.


Ibid., 15.


On the military campaigns see Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 168-74; Guy Prégault, Canada, the War of the Conquest, trans. Margaret M. Cameron (Toronto, 1969), 82-111; Alfred Proctor James and Charles M. Stotz, Drums in the Forest (Pittsburgh, 1958), 32-35; Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution, VI: The Great War for the Empire: The Years of Defeat (New York, 1946), 71, hereafter
cited as Gipson, VI.

64. Johnson Papers, II, 125-76; IX, 234-38.


68. William Johnson to the Earl of Loudoun, Mar. 17, 1757, Johnson Papers, IX, 640; Thomas Butler to Johnson, May 23, 1757, Ibid., 769; Johnson to the Board of Trade, Jun. 18, 1757, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 745-48.


70. O'Callaghan, NYCD, VII, 181-82.


72. Johnson Papers, IX, 706.


74. O'Callaghan, NYCD, X, 269.

75. Ibid., 438-39.

76. Ibid., VII, 178; Johnson Papers, IX, 631-32.


78. William Johnson to the Board of Trade, Jun. 18, 1757, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 745-48.
79 Prégault, War of the Conquest, chpts. 4, 5, 7; Eccles Canadian Frontier, 173-74, 178.

80 William Johnson to James de Lancey, Aug. 8, 1755, Johnson Papers, I, 841; Ibid., IX, 212-13, 217-20.

81 Ibid., II, 125-26; O'Callaghan, NYCD, VII, 181-82.

82 Johnson Papers, IX, 668-69; William Johnson to the Earl of Loudoun, Sept. 3, 1757, Ibid., 823-33.

83 Daniel Claus to Johnson, Apr. 5, 1756, Johnson Papers, II, 438-40.

84 Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 48.


89 Ibid., III, 548-49; on the identity of Ackowanothio see Mulkearn, Mercer Papers, 500.

90 William Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 28, 1756, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 717-26.

91 Ibid.


93 Governor Morris to Scarouady, Nov. 8, 1755, Pa. Col. Rec., VI, 682-67; Ibid., VII, 70-71.


95 John Bartram, Observations on the Inhabitants and Other Matters Worthy of Notice: Made by Mr. John Bartram in His Travels from Pennsylvania to Onondaga, Oswego and Lake Ontario in Canada (London, 1751), 78-79.


97 "Treaty of Logg's Town," in VHM, 13 (1913), 167; Jennings,


102 Governor Morris to William Johnson, Nov. 15, 1755, Johnson Papers, IX, 309-10; Ibid., 328-29.


104 William Johnson to William Shirley, Dec. 16, 1755, Ibid., IX, 333-34; Ibid., 1476-78.

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107 William Johnson to William Shirley, Apr. 24, 1756, Johnson Papers, II, 447; Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 28, 1756, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 721-22.

108 The standard biography of this man is to be found in Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung.


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111 Johnson Papers, II, 680-81.

112 Ibid., IX, 747.


115 Jennings, "Delaware Interregnum," PMHB, 89 (1965), 197.


121 Governor Denny to William Johnson, Nov. 10, 1757, Johnson Papers, II, 752-53.


123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., 54-56.

125 Ibid., 32-35.


127 Ibid.

128 "Minutes of Conferences, At a Meeting Held at Easton" Oct. 13, 1758, in Van Doren and Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties, 223.

129 For example, see O'Callaghan, WCD, X, 295.

130 Hamilton, ed., Adventure in the Wilderness, 151, 158 for a list of Indian participants in the 1757 campaign against Fort William Henry.

131 Ibid., 180; Frégal, The War of the Conquest, 160-61, 213; Eccles, Canadian Frontier, 176-77, 179.


133 Hamilton, ed., Adventure in the Wilderness, 144; Johnson Papers, II, 774-75.


144 "Post Journals," 195.


155 "Post Journals," 199.
157 Ibid., 416-17.
158 "Minutes of Conferences, At a Meeting Held at Easton," in Van Doren and Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties, 224.
159 Ibid., 223.
160 James and Stotz, Drums in the Forest, 49-50.
163 Wallace, Teedyuscung, 192-207; Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations, 210-17; Jennings, "Seven Years' War," passim.; Gipson, British Empire, VII, 278-80; Wainwright, George Croghan, 145-52.
164 Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations, 210-17; Jennings, "Seven Years' War," 20.
167 Ibid., 233.
168 Ibid., 222.
169 Ibid., 237.
172 "Post Journals," 240.
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174 Ibid., 256, 258.

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CHAPTER IV
The Search for Security:
The Anglo-American Occupation of the West,
1758-1762

As Anglo-American forces gradually nibbled away at New France, the American commander-in-chief and his senior subordinates were confronted with problems of imperial management born of conquest. The tenuous occupation of the Ohio country, the capture of Fort Niagara, and the fall of Canada in 1760 necessitated the occupation of a vast and ill-defined territory and the imposition of order and English rule on those who lived there. This difficult task was complicated by London's failure to anticipate the need to administer the west. Unlike the heartland of New France, where the French administration system aided the transfer of power, in the pays d'en haut the English succeeded only in gradually occupying isolated posts and settlements. English control, political and economic, remained incomplete in the region through the outbreak of war in 1763. Instead of a swift and complete transfer of control from conqueror to conquerer, the west witnessed what Louise Kellogg has aptly termed an interregnum. From the point of view of the resident Indians, however, even this term would not accurately describe the situation. As sovereign people in their own land, they only witnessed the removal of one colonial force and its attempted replacement by another.

The western Indians, many of whom persisted in their economic
and political relations with the French, presented Sir Jeffrey Amherst and Sir William Johnson with a major, but by no means their only, challenge. In addition, the west had to be occupied and a reliable logistical system created to sustain local garrisons and government. Further, the French population in the Great Lakes region, though small and scattered, had to be closely watched and properly administered. It was Indian affairs, however, that held the attention of Anglo-American officials and demanded the greatest care and supervision. Johnson made it clear that not only the occupation of the west but the continued security of the older colonies depended on "the Improvement and Extension of His Majesty's Indian Interest."

While this statement may have appeared obvious to royal officers who had attempted to direct and pay for the recent war and to those colonists who had been terrorized by Indian warfare, it was deceptively simple. It was clear that "His Majesty's Indian Interest" was best served by establishing a firm peace with the western Indians and soliciting their cooperation in Anglo-American plans to occupy and exploit the west. The central problem was how that interest was to be achieved. And, inevitably tied to this was the question of the role that Indians should play in the new regional order. True, certain guidelines had been made explicit. Anglo-American officials left the 1758 Easton Treaty committed to fulfilling certain specific promises made to the Six Nations and their "dependents" and which were extended to other native groups as these re-opened diplomatic and trade relations with crown and colonies.
These obligations were later given recognition as policy by officials in London. Beyond this, however, the crown left the determination of short-term policy to the commander-in-chief. The result was a series of de facto measures designed to bring western Indian affairs under control. Some of these were later included in the Proclamation of 1763. Until then, Indian affairs in the west were confronted by officials in America who attempted, in the face of real and immediate problems, to create a workable program that would secure and extend royal interests.

In attempting to do so, however, the officials themselves sometimes collided over the best means to obtain desired ends. They also found themselves opposed by private interests which did not share the official concern that exploitation of the west should be well ordered and care taken to secure the good will of the Indians. Finally, the efforts made to bring order to the west, and particularly to Indian affairs after 1758, reveal the gap between intention and implementation. Between New York City or Johnson Hall and the tiny western garrisons was a vast gulf of understanding as well as of space and time.

I

Anglo-American efforts to rationalize Indian affairs before 1763 fell into four broad categories: trade, settlement, diplomacy, and military. Agreement between the leading policy makers on any given issue tended to vary for a number of reasons. However, both
Amherst and Johnson did agree on certain fundamentals upon which all future policy decisions would be based. The first of these was the view that Indians, irregardless of questions of local sovereignty, had been clearly reduced to subordinate status as a result of the French defeat. English leaders recognized from the outset that the Conquest had shattered the old survival strategy whereby various native groups could play-off English and French interests for their own benefit. Thus, Amherst's observation in 1762 that the English "are the only People who can Protect them." Both he and Johnson spoke of "managing Indians" and of "keeping them in Subjection" to royal authority. While in more heated moments Amherst was even disposed to lumping Indians with other English "subjects", their comments reflect an attitude more closely akin with directing a conquered people. Not only did such assumptions underly much subsequent decision-making, it was voiced in unmistakable terms to the Indians. At a meeting with a number of western groups at Fort Pitt, George Croghan reminded his audience that "you must now be Sensible Your Brethren the English is the most powerfull People in the Country."

Concommitant with this assumption of Anglo-American superiority and native dependence—an assumption reinforced by Anglo-American military successes against the French—was another given. Neither Amherst nor Johnson, not any other officials involved in Indian and western affairs, questioned the fact that Indian policy ultimately existed to serve Anglo-American, not Indian, needs. Repeated references to "our interest" or "His Majesty's Interest" when speaking of Indian affairs leave no room for doubt that policy decisions
were a means to a greater end. The object was always the neutralization of Indians as a potential military threat so that, eventually, Anglo-Americans could reap the benefits brought by the conquest of Canada.

Beyond these points, however, Amherst and Johnson parted company in their views on Indians and Indian affairs. As a professional soldier and one who had little contact with Indians outside the battlefield, Amherst's understanding of the natives and the complexities of western affairs was severely limited. In addition, the commander-in-chief brought to his office an imperialist's view of native people better suited to the Northwest Frontier of India in 1860 than North America in 1760. His opinion of Indians was clearly not a flattering one and deteriorated as he wrestled with the problems of Indian affairs. He had little respect for their culture, capabilities, or sensibilities. As late as May 1763, just weeks before confirmation arrived of warfare on the Lakes, Amherst could tell a subordinate that "I have a very Contemptible Opinion of the Savages." This attitude of thinly veiled contempt was conveyed to military commanders in the west who were reminded that they had little to fear from the Indians as long as precautions were taken. To what extent Amherst's field officers, many of whom experienced day-to-day contact with western Indians, accepted their chief's views is problematic. One, Lieutenant-Colonel William Eyre, denigrated intelligence given his garrison by local Senecas as of little value, given the unreliable source. This disregard for Indians appeared repeatedly in Amherst's dealings with them, as when he rejected out
of hand protests against a new fort at Sandusky, an establishment that lay astride the natives' east-west diplomatic road linking the Ohio country and the Great Lakes.  

Mixed with Amherst's lack of regard for Indians as people and his view of them as a subordinate people was a confirmed distrust for the natives. In this regard his feelings seem to have grown from personal experiences during the campaign of 1760. At that time several hundred Six Nations warriors had joined the army advancing on Montreal. Denied, by Amherst's orders, a chance for scalps and plunder after the capture of a French outpost, the frustrated warriors left en masse, leaving an infuriated general seething with resentment at "treacherous" Indians.  

This incident seems to have reinforced a predilection to view Indians as savage and therefore sinister. Amherst's observations on Indian affairs are full of references to Indian "treachery" and "villany" and orders to frontier commanders to guard against Indian "mischief". Indeed, during the period from 1758 to 1763, there is evidence of a growing concern for, and even expectation of, a conflict with the western Indians, reinforced by the very real attempts made by the Senecas in 1761 to generate resistance to Anglo-American expansion.

Standing somewhat opposed to Amherst was Sir William Johnson. Unlike his superior, Johnson had spent some twenty years in close association with the Mohawks and, through them, with other Six Nations and Algonkian Indians. Johnson suffered from no illusions of noble savagery and was quick to point out the necessity of "civilizing" the Indians through a variety of means.
close observation and a conscious effort to learn about his native trading partners enabled Johnson, as well as his agents, to understand Indian views on Anglo-American policies and actions. He was also aware, as Amherst never was, of the value the Indians placed on traditional practices and the cultural significance associated with activities such as trade, gift giving, and treaty making. Thus, where Amherst demanded cost-effectiveness and a swift transition to English control over the west, Johnson counselled gradualism during which customary practices would be maintained as a sign of friendship and good faith toward the western Indians.  

While much of what ultimately separated these two men on policy issues was rooted in personalities and experience, the role that each played cannot be overlooked. In the final analysis, each man served different interests. Both were royal agents charged with enlarging and securing England's overseas territories and to that extent were responsible to crown officials and obligated by royal interests for their rank and offices. This was particularly true of Amherst, whose fortunes and continued enjoyment of office were linked to a less-than-stable government in London.  

In order to maintain his equal-ibrium and lacking any constituency in America, the commander-in-chief was compelled to act in ways calculated to impress metropolitan politicians and thus ensure his own personal and professional advancement. One way for Amherst to demonstrate his responsibility and concern for the crown was to economize as much as possible, especially in the area of extraordinary expenses for both military and Indian affairs. Another way was to occupy the west quickly and efficiently
by vigorously enforcing policies designed to answer Indian complaints about land and trade, as well as other abuses. To some extent Johnson found himself in similar circumstances. As a royal officer he, like Amherst, was responsible to superiors in London, in this case the Board of Trade. Further, Johnson and Amherst were linked together due to the latter's final authority over the activities and expenses of Johnson's department. However, Johnson, unlike his superior, had interests deeply rooted in the politics and economy of the colonies. Johnson, as a militia officer, Indian Commissioner and Justice of the Peace for Albany County and the province of New York, was closely allied with local elites. Further, his long-standing involvement in the fur trade and land speculation strengthened his ties to local interests. Even without his royal commission, Johnson would have remained a powerful and wealthy man by virtue of his investments, landholdings, and alliances with New York's ruling elite. Thus, in his handling of Indian affairs, Johnson was influenced not only by royal interests but by those of his friends and neighbors as well. As his later career indicates, he was not above sacrificing royal interests when the opportunity arose.

Given these differences, Amherst and Johnson often found themselves on opposite sides of specific issues. This was particularly true in matters concerning diplomacy and settlements. On one subject, however, they were in total agreement. Both believed that England's enjoyment of its western domain depended largely on a regulated fur trade.
Johnson had continuously reminded his superiors at home and in London that "an extensive Indian trade & Interest are inseparable." In so doing, he was referring to the role which this system of bi-cultural economic exchange had come to play in the growing imperial ambitions of European powers. By the eighteenth century the fur trade had become the chief means by which England and France sought to influence or control native groups. Both Indians and Europeans recognized this. Indians, enjoying the profits to be had from being solicited by both foreign powers, deftly played each against the other and, in so doing, acquired more and better goods and continued freedom of action. For their part, both England and France understood the material terms on which Indian support would be forthcoming. As a result, as the imperial conflict intensified, the French increasingly supported and regulated the fur trade as a weapon in the conflict with England.

While some Anglo-American officials, especially in New York and Pennsylvania, also recognized the place of trade in the conflict, the inherently de-centralized nature of English colonial administration before 1760 precluded the effective use of trade as a political weapon. Further, the unregulated, particularistic nature of the Anglo-American trade led to inter-colonial conflicts and, worse, price-gouging, cheating, and violence that threatened to drive established and potential Indian customers away. It was to this last problem that Johnson spoke and which both he and Amherst strove to correct.

Johnson's proposed remedy was to "open an advantageous Trade for the Indians and to have it put under such authoritative regula-
tions as may convince the Indians how much it is for their interest to maintain Peace & Friendship for the English." Advantagous trade meant "supplying them at as reasonable a rate as the traders can afford," as well as supplying a wide variety of needed and sought-after goods. On the more important point of "authoritive regulation," Johnson planned for, and Amherst supported, a trade open to all Anglo-Americans on a license basis, but limited to certain posts where military officers could oversee trade and enforce proper etiquette, as well as an official price schedule. In all of this, Johnson and Amherst had the support of the home government. Secretary of State Egremont urged Amherst to clean up the trade and emphasized the king's intention of dealing humanely and fairly with the Indians.

The need to act quickly and decisively was made more imperative for two reasons. First, at Easton and subsequent meetings, trans-Appalachian Indians had been promised that trade would be re-opened at the earliest possible moment. The Indians repeatedly called for this, as they attempted to re-order their lives and economies in the wake of the Seven Years' War. Responding to this call, and sensing the profits to be made without French competition, Anglo-American traders moved west with such rapidity that they were often ahead of the troops dispatched to protect and control them. George Crogan aptly summed up the feelings in Pennsylvania in the wake of Forbes' success when he told Johnson "the People of this Province are all running wild after the Indian Trade."

The program that evolved to ensure a fair and regulated trade
was grounded in executive orders issued by Amherst or Johnson with the general's approval. No laws were passed at the royal level governing trade, although Pennsylvania and New York had enacted codes of their own. Each trader was to purchase a license issued either by Amherst, Johnson, or a designated subordinate, or the military governors in Canada. Once licensed for a single season, the trader could transport goods to one of seven posts at which trade could legally be conducted. Passes and shipping manifests were to be given to the post commander who, along with the resident Indian agent, would oversee trading activities. This close supervision would, it was hoped, ensure fair trading and satisfied Indian customers. Equally important, it would prevent the sale to Indians of certain proscribed items such as liquor and ammunition.

The use of liquor as an item of trade and its consumption by Indians had long been recognized as serious problems by Indians and colonial officials alike, for practical as well as moral reasons. Rum traders, looking for quick, easy profits, would often intoxicate their customers before engaging in barter. Thus, Iroquois complained to Johnson that "when our Hunters come out of ye Woods with Firs, Skins, Meat & the like, there are always Some of yr People ready with liquor to intoxicate them & thereby deprive them of wt they with labout & loss of time procured for the Sustenance of their Families." They further emphasized that such traders treated their customers very badly and "obliged [them] to go off without any Satisfaction." It was this last that Anglo-American officials and more scrupulous traders wanted most to avoid, since such behavior
could ruin the trade and lead to possibly fatal reprisals.  

On another level, from the point of view of the army and Indian service, Indians under the influence of rum were more difficult to deal with and control. Drunkenness postponed councils, made Indian auxiliaries less valuable, and led to violent confrontations that, on at least one occasion, resulted in the death of a colonial soldier. Finally, Indians who, while drunk, gave away or lost their means of purchasing supplies, became a public charge on local garrisons, something Amherst wished to avoid. To remedy these problems and to put trade and Indian relations on the best possible footing, Amherst and Johnson acted to prohibit the transportation or sale of liquor in the west. Post commanders were strictly enjoined "not to permit any of these pernicious Articles to Pass."

Along with liquor, Amherst also planned to restrict the supply of weapons and ammunition available to the Indians. He was quick to point out that "the less ammunition they have, the More regular they will be." From a purely military standpoint, and given Amherst's tendency to assume Indian hostility, such a policy made sense. From a practical and political perspective, however, it proved troublesome. This was especially true when the general expanded the list of potentially dangerous, and therefore proscribed, items to include "Scalping & Clasp Knives, Razors, Tomahawks, . . . Fowling pieces . . ." In response, Johnson warned that the curtailment of such a necessary item as gunpowder would create a real hardship for western Indians who depended upon firearms for both the
procurement of food and pelts for trade. The problem was apparent-
ly compounded by the inability of traders to obtain gunpowder in
sufficient quantities to meet native demands. Without subsidies
from the army or Indian agents, local commanders felt that "it
would be impossible to keep them in temper." Finally, the
elimination of certain trade goods, especially ammunition, sent
the wrong message to the western Indians.

Coupled with efforts to restrict liquor and ammunition was
Amherst's insistence that the custom of treaty subsidies and period-
ic gift exchanges with the Indians be curtailed. The general's de-
cision to reduce gifts was based on financial considerations as
well as his perception of Indians. As recent war-time experience
had proven, subsidizing Indians could place an enormous burden on
the army's budget. Once the need of such expenses had passed, Am-
herst was eager to reduce the cost of gift giving to a bare minimum.
His firm belief that this should, and could, be done was grounded
in his limited understanding of, and prejudices about, Indians.
Convinced of the inherent savage and hostile nature of the natives,
the general was certain that gifts "only serve to Encourage them in
Idleness." These idle people would, he believed, "never thing of
providing for their Families by hunting, if they can Support them
by begging Provisions from us," a practice which, once begun, would
never end. Finally, ignoring the symbolic implications of gift
exchange, Amherst equated it with bribery, something to which he
would not contribute.

Taken together, the trade regulations and Amherst's insistence
that gift giving, and particularly the giving of ammunition, be severely restricted, pointed toward a new definition of Anglo-Indian relations. By blocking other outlets to needed supplies which, Amherst believed, encouraged the Indians in idleness and a false sense of importance, the general appears to have sought to reduce the natives to the level of a peasantry, managed and controlled by agents of the royal government. In a discussion of the new trade policy, Amherst indicated to Johnson that "I think it much better to avoid all presents in future, since that will oblige them to supply themselves by barter & of course keep them more Constantly Employed by means of which they will have less time to concert, or Carry into Execution any Schemes prejudicial to His Majesty's Interests." Basic to this scheme was the restriction of ammunition "since nothing can be so impolitick as to furnish them with the means of accomplishing the Evil which is so much Dreaded." On another level, hungry Indians, less sure of handouts in times of scarcity, would be less apt to drink away their labors, thus removing another source of expense and cause for alarm.

On this latter point, Amherst may have been on to something. The problem with this plan, and one that caused Indian resentment to mount, was the nature of the Indians' post-war economies. As Johnson and others repeatedly observed, the disruption of French trade and sources of supply had left western Indians seriously short of a number of essential items, especially gunpowder. Without the use of muskets, which had become the common hunting tool, pelts and skins could not be collected in sufficient quantities for
trade. Further, as Johnson pointed out, until the new trade was
set in motion, the only source of cloth, emergency rations, gun-
powder, and tools were the garrisons and Indian agents. Thus,
to the degree that Amherst's wishes were translated into actions
at individual posts, western Indians found themselves in a curious
and frustrating situation. Needing trade to re-build their own
disrupted economies and to re-stock supplies of essential goods,
they were at the same time prevented from obtaining the initial
capital outlay needed to obtain pelts for trade without which,
given Amherst's policy, they could not obtain the purchasing power
to buy supplies. 53

II

Amherst's insistence that gift giving be curtailed also had
potentially serious non-economic implications for Anglo-Indian re-
lations. Gift exchange, as a means of social integration and of
establishing peaceful relations with outsiders, held much signifi-
cance for western Indians. Within communities, gifts were exchang-
ed between lineages in order to "cover the dead", to compose group
conflicts, and as part of the ceremonies that accompanies the in-
vestiture of new leaders. 54 The Indians of eastern North America
had endowed gift-giving with symbolic meanings which pre-dated con-
tact with Europeans. Thus, the gift served as an extension of the
self, and was endowed with spiritual value. 55 Gifts also served
to animate and confirm the importance of messages exchanged be-
tween groups.

The act of gift exchange was also surrounded with spiritual and symbolic meaning. As Marcel Mauss pointed out, the act of gift exchange creates a spiritual bond that transcends any lingering animosity. Further, gift exchange is not a wholly voluntary thing. The recipient of a gift, given for whatever reason, is placed under a moral obligation to respond in kind. Finally, gift-giving also served to re-distribute wealth within and between groups, although this function was, traditionally, secondary to the social and spiritual significance of the act.

Gift exchange also carried important symbolic meaning in international relations. Gift-giving served to compose differences between politically autonomous groups just as it did within local communities. In addition, out groups who wished to cross territory claimed by another, or use trade routes pioneered by other individuals or groups had to purchase the right to do so. Thus gift exchange acted as an acknowledgement of group rights while serving as a contract under which autonomous groups could cooperate for mutual benefit.

Of even greater importance, gift exchange between sovereign groups constituted a bond of peace, a pledge of cooperation. In the absence of any international authority that could impose or maintain peace, gift-giving, on a regular basis, served to bridge differences and maintain peace. In addition, following pre-determined formulas, it could prevent a revenge war from erupting over a single incident involving death or injury. However, in the absence
of reciprocal gift-giving, or if one party refused to honor the spirit of reciprocity, a state of hostility would be implied and assumed.

Europeans were also integrated into this system. In the fur trade, gift exchange became necessary in order to create a social and spiritual climate suitable for economic exchange. Trade could only take place once friendship and alliances had been symbolically renewed.

However, it was in the political realm of Indian-European relations that gift-giving took on special importance. Indian owners of land and trade routes and political leaders continued to insist that the traditional protocol be observed before business with European agents could be amicably conducted. Unable to force natives to conform to the bureaucratic practices of Europe, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and others had no choice, short of war, but to deal on native terms. Thus, colonists and royal governments found themselves following native practices of periodically exchanging gifts to "brighten the chain of friendship." This periodic exchange also served an economic function; it supplemented the increasing flow of European goods to Indian peoples.

While Europeans accepted, more or less gracefully, the act of reciprocal gift-giving, they seldom comprehended the full meaning of the act as defined by native participants. Rather, gift-giving came to be defined as an economic act and as part of a political process. The meaning of gift exchanges was also altered to some extent by Indians as well. The Europeans' willingness to bestow
their largess on cooperative Indians was capitalized on by native leaders, or would-be leaders, who wished to strengthen their political base at home. A full coffer of sought-after European goods that the recipient could re-distribute among his own people heightened his own prestige and, thus, his ability to influence the group for his own or his sponsor's purposes. A good example of this arrangement was that between Tanaghrisson and the Pennsylvania and Virginia interests that hoped to control the Ohio country between 1748 and 1754. However, as much as the act of gift exchange may have been used for pragmatic purposes, Indians still invested it with symbolic importance and any violation of this essential ingredient of intersocietal relations tended to increase tension between natives and Europeans.

This is precisely what happened in the wake of Amherst's directives aimed at reducing gifts to Indians. To the extent that the general's commands took effect, they stood in stark contrast to the generosity that had marked English subsidies to Indian allies during the Seven Years' War. Indian service agents attempted to warn their superior of the consequences of what Johnson called "an Ill-timed Parsimony". Not only would it be difficult to conduct normal diplomatic relations without adequate gifts for treaty councils, but the interpretation placed on the new policy by native observers boded ill for Anglo-American interests in the west. Amherst ignored the warnings and proceeded, through ignorance and a soldier's desire to control and rationalize, to revolutionize Anglo-Indian relations.

Attempts to alter patterns of trade and the reciprocal nature

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of Anglo-Indian relations ultimately aimed at re-defining the whole of those relations. Aware that the conquest of Canada had fundamentally altered the balance of power in the west, Amherst and Johnson sought to bring Indian affairs in line with new political realities. Simply put, the older relationship based on cooperation between sovereign peoples was to be replaced by one based on English superiority and Indian subordination. A regulated trade and the restrictions on firearms and other potentially dangerous objects would go a long way toward the realization of this goal. The termination, or at least reduction, of gift-giving also pointed toward a new relationship; gift exchange was unnecessary in dealing with a subordinate, dependent people. This effort to guarantee western Indian subordination and cooperation also led to a fundamental re-definition of the Covenant Chain and to a more complex Indian diplomacy that found the Anglo-Americans striving to "play-off" various Indian groups.

Since the Easton Treaty of 1758, Sir William Johnson had worked to assert Six Nations authority over groups which, by English definition, were subordinate to the League. This was particularly true in the case of those Indians living in the Ohio country. By placing this strategic region and its people under Iroquois control, and by once again employing the League as a proxy in western affairs, royal officials could simplify Indian relations and weaken the local Indians' bid for independence. While the Six Nations supported such a plan as part of their own survival strategy, the Delawares, Iroquois, and others living on the Ohio were less
than enthusiastic, given the determination with which those groups had asserted their independence in the previous decade.

The full extent of the new, more coercive, Chain was made known in another realm of Anglo-Indian relations and this time struck directly at England's most privileged allies, the Iroquois. Faced with repeated instances of Indian assaults on Anglo-Americans, Amherst attempted to end such actions by extending English law and punishment over Indians as well as Europeans living west of the mountains. In 1760 he had ordered the court-martial at Fort Niagara to try several western Indians accused of attacking a working party from the fort. Then, in late 1762, Sir William Johnson learned that Senecas living on the upper Allegheny River had killed William Newkirk, a trader, and one other Englishman. Amherst, upon learning of the incident, ordered Johnson to demand that the guilty be turned over to the New York authorities for trial in Albany. When asked by Seneca sachems to accept the customary payment in wampum to cover the two dead Englishmen, an action which accorded both with Iroquois custom and previous Anglo-Iroquois usage, Johnson refused. Amherst's intransigence, expressed through the Indian superintendent, presented the Senecas with a serious problem. In order to comply with the demand, they would have to violate principles of local autonomy and individual responsibility that lay at the heart of their social order. Not to comply, however, left the issue unresolved and left open the possibility of English revenge for the two men. Equally important, the incident, which was never fully resolved to Amherst's or Johnson's satisfaction, represented a radical
departure in Covenant Chain relations. Amherst's demand pointed toward a reduction of Iroquois autonomy. It is true that the general had previously assured the Six Nations and other Indians of equal justice under English law.\textsuperscript{73} The problem was that justice had now to come from the English alone; the older system by which each society appeased the other through acts of condolence—acts which reinforced and ensured the sovereignty of each party—would no longer suffice. It was this last point that concerned League sachems when they wondered about whether Amherst had something more in mind than simple justice.\textsuperscript{74}

To further secure the frontier, Johnson embarked on a policy of divide and rule. In effect, it would now be England that would have to devise a play-off system in order to prevent what military leaders expected and most feared: a pan-Indian alliance against Anglo-America. While cultural differences and political and economic differences made this unlikely, Johnson proceeded to act on the opposite assumption, noting that "If ever a Strong friendship subsists between our Neighbors \{the Iroquois\} & the Western Indians, the former on being attacked or threatened will find an asylum amongst the latter, & both in Conjunction Ravage our Frontiers."\textsuperscript{75} Through the use of diplomacy and by taking advantage of existing Anglo-Indian relations and inter-group animosities, Johnson hoped to forestall this "conjunction".

Diplomatically, Johnson sought to keep alive suspicions and distrust between the Iroquois and the western Algonkins, but still prevent open warfare between them. The climax of this policy came
at Detroit in the fall of 1761. Johnson went there to make peace with the local Indians and to lend support to the so-called "Ottawa confederacy" which embraced the Indians living along the Detroit River and for whom the local Wyandots acted as spokesmen. By lighting a separate council fire at Detroit, Johnson hoped to create a counterpoise to Iroquois power in the east. As he later explained, "I did all in my power in private conferences to create a misunderstanding between the 6 Nations, & western Indians, as also between the latter and those of Ohio, so as to render them jealous of each other . . . for could they arrive at a perfect union, they must prove very dangerous Neighbors."76

Conflicts between native groups as well as colonial-Indian wars also gave Johnson the opportunity to drive wedges between native groups and to re-direct Indian affairs. Since 1759 South Carolina had been engaged in a war with the neighboring Cherokees. Pointing to the colony's obvious need for help and knowing the traditional animosity that existed between the Cherokees and northern Indians, Johnson and his agents called on the Six Nations, Delawares, and Great Lakes Indians to aid the English in punishing the Cherokees. Under these circumstances any scruples about arming Indians were laid aside as war parties stopped at Fort Pitt and other outposts for supplies of food and ammunition before taking the Warrior's Path to the Carolinas. In addition, Johnson and his subordinates encouraged revenge raids launched by northern Indians against other traditional enemies: Catawbas and Chickasaws, as well as Cherokees. In all of this, the Anglo-Americans were not promoting something new, but
rather used traditional native values and activities to imperial advantage. In so doing, however, crown officials generated tensions and conflicts within native communities that tended to negate whatever positive results such policies produced.

Finally, just as Amherst and his subordinates were attempting to implement programs designed to reduce Indians to proper subordination, the commander-in-chief took steps to dismantle the agency most responsible and best equipped to deal with Indian affairs. Amherst's move to trim Indian expenses by trimming the Indian service was based both on a perceived need to economize and on the notion that, with the French war over, a large Indian department was no longer necessary. His desire to cut Indian service personnel and costs also appears to have been motivated by a desire to curb what were seen as excesses within the agency. The service's agents had earned an unsavory reputation for both combining public service with private gain and for spending other peoples' money with abandon. Colonel Henry Bouquet complained about having "more Managers than Indians" and represented the Indian agents at his post as a "Load Stone" for idle Indians expecting hand-outs.78

Johnson and his agents responded in two ways. For his part, the superintendent warned Amherst that any sudden reduction in personnel could have serious repercussions, especially since his agents were adept at collecting intelligence and patching up the inevitable differences between Indians, soldiers, and traders. At the same time, however, Johnson warned his agents to exercise care and frugality in running their agencies, given Amherst's latent hostility.
On the other hand, the local agents continued to conduct business as usual, both because of the necessity of doing so and because they had received no clear orders to the contrary. The best example is George Croghan, whose personal reputation did much to tarnish the department he served. Even while Amherst was demanding, and Johnson was promising, greater economy, Croghan continued to hire agents and other support personnel for his operations at Fort Pitt. While the Indian service survived, indeed prospered, during the 1760s, Amherst's attempt to limit its size, scope of operations, and budget suggest the role he thought it, and Indian affairs, should play in the post-war era.

Amherst also had to face the ever-present problem of land and colonial expansion into territories claimed or held by native groups. Of all the issues that soured relations between Indians and colonists throughout the eighteenth century land was the most aggravating. And, in the wake of the Seven Years' War, it became apparent that peace with the western Indians would in large measure depend on how successfully royal officials guaranteed Indian rights to western lands.

London's commitment to finding a way of limiting the uncontrolled invasion of Indian lands was reflected in the royal approval given to the Easton Treaty and the order-in-council halting land purchases from Indians in New York. During and after the Seven Years' War Sir William Johnson continued to press the Board of Trade to give the matter of land speculation and settlement serious study.

The need for control over western expansion, both to preserve peace with the Indians and as a means of imposing order on an ex-
panding empire, was reflected in 1763 in provisions of the royal Proclamation of that year which forbade settlement beyond the Appalachi ans until proper purchases had been made by the crown, not individual colonies. In the meantime, however, royal officials in America were left to their own devices in order to control western settlement and preserve native lands. Guidance was provided by the Easton Treaty and the limited steps already taken by the home government on such matters. Between 1759 and 1763 officials both in the colonies and London reiterated the Easton Treaty's guarantee to protect Indian lands. In his first message to the Ohio Indians, Amherst told the natives that, aside from guaranteeing their rights, "I mean not to take any of your lands." His words were supported by provincial and Indian service officials who assured the western Indians that Anglo-American troops had been sent west "without any design of settling those lands themselves" and spoke of the establishment of a boundary line between Indians and settlers to further ensure peace.

While subsequent actions demonstrated the sincerity of the crown's intent to meet its treaty obligations, Amherst made it equally clear that promises to honor Indian land claims would be conditional. In the first place the general let it be known that any promises or commitments made by the crown would be honored only as long as the Indians "behaved like good and faithful allies." He also made it clear that, in the absence of such friendly behavior, he would be forced to "treat you as enemies," which included the invasion and appropriation of native lands.

In the next place, Amherst, ever mindful of the need to secure
the territory in his charge, made one significant exception to the guarantees that he and others made. As he informed Governor Hamilton of Pennsylvania, "I mean not to take any of their Lands, except in such Causes, where the necessity of His Majesty's Service obliges me to take Post where I must and will build Forts." He did concede, however, that "the Lands adjoining [the forts] will Continue their own." Notwithstanding, as early as 1760, a memorandum appeared suggesting the advantage of settling farmers at military posts along the communication route from Pennsylvania to Fort Pitt.

Amherst's scheme for "taking Post" included more than forts and garrisons, although these alone were to cause serious conflicts with local Indians. As the 1760 memorandum suggests, farmers and tradesmen were to be settled at the more strategic posts to help provide food and services for the army. On military grounds this may have been reasonable. But the presence of civilians at Fort Pitt, Fort Ligonier, or the Niagara portage, in addition to Amherst's insistence on occupying all forts formerly held by the French as well as several new ones, resulted in conflicting signals reaching Indian observers and provided another source of misunderstanding and resentment.

III

In the absence of any civil authority, provincial or royal, in the trans-Appalachian region, Amherst relied on martial law and the British regular army to enforce trade regulations and Indian affairs.
This decision meant that Indian affairs would invariably take place in the shadow of garrisoned posts whose commanders became, in effect, extensions of the Indian service. In addition, the commander-in-chief's insistence that the west be securely occupied and patrolled meant that the army would become one of the most visible features of the new Anglo-American Indian policy. While use of the army made a great deal of sense from a strictly military point of view, the nature and capability of this force needs to be examined.

Although in the fall of 1760 some twenty thousand regular and provincial troops were in the field, that number diminished rapidly after the surrender of Montreal. Provincial forces were quickly demobilized both as an economy measure and because these men could not be kept in the field beyond a single campaign due to provincial objections and the soldiers' own sense of fairness. While several thousand men, largely from New England and New York, were raised on a year-to-year basis from 1761 to 1763, they were employed largely in what would now be called "rear-echelon" duties: constructing roads, repairing forts, and hauling supplies for the regular forces. The increased military activity in the West Indies, resulting from Spain's entry into the Seven Years' War, drew away many of Amherst's veteran troops. During the summers of 1761 and 1762, regiments marched from Canada to embarkation points on Staten Island and New York City, bound for Guadalupe, Martinique, and Havana.

Also, between 1761 and the outbreak of the Indian war in the west, the size of the army was twice reduced, again for reasons of economy. This reduction in the establishment meant that a regiment
whose strength had been one thousand men in 1760 would have been reduced to five hundred by the summer of 1763. Finally, the rigors of campaigning, the reluctance of colonists to enlist for long terms, coupled with provincial enlistment bounties the regulars could not match, meant that the average infantry regiment was often below strength or, if full, composed of men who had enlisted for short terms or the duration of the Seven Years' War.

All of this meant that the army in America in the years preceding the Indian war was not large. Making matters worse was the territory this limited force had to occupy and control. For example, a general field return of December 1762 showed a total of 7,764 men in North America, exclusive of several disease-ridden battalions recently arrived from the West Indies. Of that number some 6,500 were assigned garrison duties in what had been New France, occupying towns and forts from St. John's, Newfoundland to Montreal. Discounting a further four hundred men stationed in South Carolina and Georgia, that left fewer than one thousand men to occupy the Trans-Appalachian region and lend the force of arms to royal policies.

For the most part, the few hundred men who could be spared for duty in the west were drawn from a single unit, the first battalion of the 60th Foot, the Royal American Regiment. Its commanding officer in the field during the early 1760s was Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Bouquet. A Swiss, Bouquet, like many of the officers who served under him, was a mercenary. The presence of such men in the Royal Americans made the regiment markedly different from its sister units. Raised in 1756, the regiment was organized specifically for service
in America. Its commissioned ranks were opened to the large num-
ber of foreign professionals seeking service and, for most of its
American career, the regiment drew its enlisted men from the colon-
ies, although some appear to have been raised in Germany. Thus,
the 60th took on an unusually cosmopolitan character and contained
easily as much, or more, military talent as any other part of the
army. Many of the western forts, such as Fort Pitt, Fort Ontario,
and Fort Ligonier, were designed and built by officers and men from
Bouquet's battalion. Aside from the number of Swiss and German
officers such as Bouquet, Joseph Schlosser, and Simeon Ecuyer, the
battalion also had a large number of Scots and two junior officers,
Lieutenant James Gorrell and Ensign Thomas Hutchins, who were natives
of the colonies. 95

Although Bouquet was the field commander of the battalion, in
actuality his control was largely administrative for those detach-
ments stationed beyond the Ohio River. Indeed, the chain of command
for the western posts reflected the de facto, patchwork nature of
England's occupation of the west. Commanders at the major posts,
Detroit and Niagara, could and did communicate directly with Amherst
and Johnson. In addition, Brigadier General Thomas Gage, governor
of Montreal, exercised some authority over the troops along the Nia-
gara River. Basically, the outposts in the Ohio country relied for
command and support on Fort Pitt and its commanding officer. The
small posts on the upper Great Lakes were dependent on Detroit which,
in turn, was administratively responsible to Bouquet's subordinate
at Fort Niagara. Orders of all but a strictly regimental nature came
directly from the commander-in-chief through Bouquet.

Part of the command and supply problems, never wholly resolved before 1763, stemmed from the perceived necessity of occupying all of the former French posts in the west as well as several new forts deemed necessary to secure communications. Between 1759 and 1762 Bouquet's troops built or occupied fourteen forts west of the Appalachians. Of these, four (Forts Pitt, Ligonier, Bedford, and Sandusky) were built by regular forces. The others were formerly French, modified and occupied to suit English needs.

The occupation of the west began in the summer of 1760. Bouquet's forces, including Pennsylvania and Virginia provincials, took over the recently abandoned French forts along the upper Ohio and reopened communications with the lower Great Lakes. Four hundred men of the Royal Americans were then sent to Fort Niagara. In the meantime work was begun on Fort Pitt.96

The surrender of Montreal in September 1760 resulted in an additional one hundred men being sent from the Ohio to occupy the French forts on the upper Great Lakes.97 Bad weather and insufficient manpower prevented this force, led by Major Robert Rogers, from completing its mission, though Detroit and Fort Miami were occupied. During the next two years, especially in the summer of 1761, the upper lakes were alive with military activity as reinforcements, drawn largely from Fort Niagara, and supply convoys pushed west to complete the occupation.98

By the fall of 1762, the Royal Americans were scattered in posts from Bedford to La Baye and from Niagara to the Wabash valley. With
only some seven hundred men available for duty, the blanket of English authority and protection was terribly thin. At the six posts covering the upper Great Lakes were 264 men of the 60th plus a handful of rangers and men of the Royal Artillery. Fort Niagara was held by just over 120 men, to which was added a company of the 80th Regiment from the Montreal area. The remaining men of Bouquet's battalion were tied down at Sandusky and a half-dozen forts in the Ohio country, with over two hundred men at Fort Pitt. While major posts, such as Fort Pitt or Detroit, had respectable garrisons—far more than the French had maintained before 1760—the smaller outposts were often held by fewer than twenty men and in some cases barely a dozen. Bouquet summarized his troops' situation when he observed that "We have detached officers more than 600 miles from here [Fort Pitt] and this poor battalion is divided and scattered throughout our immense conquests to the west." What particularly worried Bouquet was the effect such duty was having on his men and their ability and willingness to perform their assigned duties.

Part of the sense of isolation and many of the health and discipline problems that confronted the battalion's officers stemmed from the nature of the forts themselves. As the garrisons varied greatly in size so too did the forts vary in composition and complexity of design. Descriptions, some in great detail, and engineers' plans exist for the larger and more elaborate of these posts. Others, particularly the older French trading stations on the Great Lakes are less well known. By far the largest of the western posts was Fort Pitt. Construction began in 1759 and proceeded through 1762. A
pentagonal earthwork with projecting bastions, it was built to
hold nearly one thousand men and its landward ramparts were faced
with locally produced brick. Its troops also fared somewhat better
than others in terms of accommodations; the barracks appear to have
been well constructed and included brick fireplaces. The fort's
sheer size, however, and location at the confluence of the Allegheny
and Monongahela rivers, posed several problems for its defenders.
The nearly 6/10 of a mile circuit of the ramparts made adequate
defense by its small garrison all but impossible. Worse, spring
rains and thaws twice led to flooding which so damaged the fort that
its riverside walls were all but ruined, along with precious stores
of food and ammunition.

None of the other forts rivalled Fort Pitt in size. Fort Niagara,
at the mouth of the Niagara River, was the next largest and
boasted earthen ramparts, a dry moat, and several batteries of cannon.
Both Detroit and Fort Michilimackinac were little more than stockades
surrounding small communities of habitants, traders, and priests, and
with a minimum of defensive works and artillery. The smaller out-
posts consisted of little more than a square stockade enclosing a
blockhouse, or several buildings used as barracks, storehouses, and
Indian council house. Of these posts, only Fort Ligonier, securing
the communications from the Ohio to Pennsylvania, was more elaborate,
largely due to its role as a base for military convoys bound for the

Regardless of their size or configuration, all of these forts
had several things in common. They were all built of locally avail-
able materials, particularly earth and timber, and were in a constant state of disrepair.\textsuperscript{108} Ice, thaws, rain, and the effects of wind and rot threatened to undermine the ramparts and caused storerooms, barracks, and magazines to leak.\textsuperscript{109} Barrack space was limited with perhaps as many as a dozen men sharing a room eighteen feet square.\textsuperscript{110} Added to this was the constant filth that resulted from a general lack of sanitation, mud, and dust. Finally, these forts were often separated from one another by several hundred miles of forest and water. In the Ohio country the Venango Path, which linked the upper Ohio posts with Fort Pitt and Forbes' Road, considerably lessened feelings of isolation and problems of supply and communications. Farther west, however, the only avenues were the Great Lakes and the rivers feeding them. Seasonal storms, particularly on Lake Erie, made travel dangerous, and portages at Niagara and between the Miamis and Wabash rivers could add days to a re-supply or reinforcement timetable. The flat-bottomed batteau was the principal craft used for transporting men and supplies and, in all seasons, most of a garrison's time and energy were consumed by the seemingly endless task of moving needed supplies and keeping communications open.

Judging from the amount of correspondence devoted to them, the major concerns of the various post commanders were the health and discipline of their commands. Only the constant logistical problem occupied more of their time. As might be expected, given the vagaries of supplies and the less than sanitary living conditions, the health of soldiers in the west left much to be desired. However, it would be
a mistake to portray these men as altogether decrepit and debilitated. Reports from the various forts suggest that the incidence of sickness, injury and death varied widely and also tended to be seasonal, with the worst time being from mid-fall to early spring. Lieutenant Elias Meyer, busy building Fort Sandusky, reported five of his thirty men sick in mid-October 1761. By early November half his men were down with various ailments, including frostbite. By the middle of the month, however, the sick list had been reduced to three men, due largely to Meyer's determination to get his post finished and his men under cover. 111 At the same time, Captain Gavin Cochrane's command at Fort Presqu'ile had twelve men sick, a rate double that of the previous August, and the Detroit garrison had an equal number of men on the sick list, out of a total of some one hundred men. 112

Officers were no more immune to illness than the men they led; duties in isolated posts and unusual fatigue duties seem to have offset the advantages of additional food, liquor, and better clothes that officers enjoyed. Ensign Robert Holmes, who later commanded Fort Miami, was said to have "been at the gates of Death" at Detroit in 1761. Captain Richard Mather reported from Fort Venango that he was "now reduced so Low as scarce to be able to Crawl the Length of my Room." 113 Although he recovered from his bout of illness, Mather finally succumbed to other ailments in March 1762 and was buried at Fort Pitt. 114

Not all the posts fared as badly as Sandusky or Detroit. Lieutenant Christie at Fort Presqu'ile proudly reported in April 1761 that
"There has been None of this Garrison Sick this Winter," and the same was reported from Niagara. Fort Niagara, in fact, appears to have been something of a paradise in terms of health. Much of the good health its garrison enjoyed can be attributed to the conscientiousness of its officers, especially the fort's surgeon, Dr. Stevenson. By keeping the men busy and encouraging them to supplement their diet with fresh fish, and by providing liberal quantities of the anti-scorbutic spruce beer, Stevenson could write that "We have not lost by sickness any men for upwards of fourteen or fifteen months" prior to December 1762. This record contrasted favorably with that of the fort's previous occupants, the 44th Regiment, who in 1759 and 1760 turned the post into a pest hole and died in considerable numbers in their own filth.

Illness came in many forms. Among the ailments most commonly mentioned were scurvy, the pox, fevers, colds, and the bloody flux. In addition, at least one man suffered from epilepsy. In addition to appearances of these diseases, the western posts seem generally to have been attacked by an infectious fever in the summer and fall of 1762. The outposts north of Fort Pitt were infected, as well as Sandusky. Less is known about its presence in other posts farther west, or the source and identity of the disease, but it is noteworthy that a similar contagion was sweeping through the Indian communities throughout the Ohio-lower Great Lakes drainage at the same time.

Officers and men also succumbed to a variety of accidents and non-disease related health problems. Among the latter, frostbite
was the most common. Without anything resembling winter uniforms, couriers, men working on supply convoys, and those detailed for hunting or woodcutting duties rosked over-exposure in severe weather. The only men to die at Fort Niagara between 1760 and the spring of 1762 did so from exposure and complications from frostbite. Virginia militiamen marching home from Fort le Boeuf in February 1761 suffered terribly due to inadequate footwear, a problem that also plagued working parties sent out from Fort Pitt. Injuries related to construction work or portaging were also quite common, understandable given the fact that these tasks, more than anything else, occupied a soldier's time. Lieutenant Stair Campbell Carre sent a man down to Fort Pitt from Venango with a dislocated collarbone, and a soldier at Fort le Boeuf was in need of care for an infected finger, injured during fatigue duties. While such injuries were relatively minor and did not affect operations greatly, other accidents cost the army dearly, as in the case of a supply convoy swamped on Lake Huron with the loss of six men and most of the cargo. Major William Walters at Fort Niagara undoubtedly faced the worst manpower shortage due to injuries. By June 1761 he was forced to discharge eleven men, ten of whom were "very Infirm & Render'd unfit for Service." The nature of their debility is revealed in a letter from Amherst on the matter. It appears that some, if not all, suffered from ruptures. However, Amherst, hard pressed to keep the ranks full now that the French war was over, ordered that the injured men be kept in service, observing that "Men who are Ruptured are not deemed Incapable of Service in England much less
must we think them so here, where the Difficulties are so great in Recruiting any to Replace them." The attitude expressed was not uncommon. Given the need to keep men in the army for funding purposes as well as the simple need for manpower, subordinate officers doubtless retained many men who could have been of no use to the army. Amherst's strictures made it likely that the number of such men actually increased down to 1763, when a general reorganization of the army allowed commanders to finally discharge the halt and the lame.

There was little that individual officers could do to prevent the disease and accidents that often reduced their commands to little more than bands of convalescents. With only one surgeon and a surgeon's mate to care for the entire battalion, outpost commanders had to make do with what little medical knowledge and few medicines they possessed. More important, the two things that could have ameliorated health conditions--adequate clothing and food--were always in short supply since regimental and army quartermasters were at the mercy of lakes, portages, weather, and the poor quality and general shortage of boats.

The soldier's ration was uniformly bland and sparse, consisting largely of salt meat and bread, of which each man received eight pounds of the former and nine of the latter per week. As surgeon Stevenson demonstrated, this onotonous and somewhat unhealthy diet could be fleshed out by recourse to locally available fish and game. In the Ohio country, at least, the outposts consumed large quantities of venison purchased from local Delawares. Officers also encouraged their men to plant gardens and set the example by ordering quantities
of seeds and plant sets. Judging from the variety of vegetables mentioned and reports on crop yields, many of these gardens were quite large and were undoubtedly a major reason why scurvy and other forms of vitamin deficiency do not appear to have reached epidemic proportions.  

Finally, in order to supplement a poor diet and to boost morale in the face of chronic shortages, officers resorted to regular rations of rum, beer, and other spirits. Taken in excess, though, alcohol created as many problems as it solved. Major Wilkins at Fort Niagara seems to have overcome this problem by building a brewery for the production of spruce beer. Its mild alcoholic content and anti-scorbutic qualities made it an ideal beverage, even though its taste ran more toward turpentine than ale. Wilkins' project was encouraged by Amherst, who also believed the beer to be a good substitute for the liquor then falling into the hands of the Indians.

Even if adequately fed, soldiers would succumb to illness and exposure if inadequately clothed, and no amount of hard work or inventiveness could make up for the failure of the year's supply of clothing to arrive. Characteristically, an English soldier received a new regimental coat--his main item of clothing--only once every two years. The old coat would be made into a sleaved waistcoat and the old waistcoat into breeches. In theory, a new complete set of clothing would be issued to each man every three years. In practice, however, as the complaints and requests from frontier commanders attest, England's legions in the west were seldom properly attired and cut much less the figure of well-heeled Guardsmen at St. James
than of "clowns"—as Bouquet once described his troops. Captain Cochrane at Fort Presqu'ile summed up the general situation when he observed that "we have Scarce Shirt, Shoe, or Stockings", and he worried about the possibility of Amherst ever seeing his men "so ill clothed." A year after Cochrane's report, the garrison at Fort Venango was so badly off that "Sume of them has nothing left but the neck and wristbands of their Shirts" and their commander reported that "they Cut a very od[d] figure on Sentry."

The unreliability of the army's supply system and transportation were largely responsible for the clothing shortages. But the unusual demands of frontier service placed both men and equipment under stresses that quickly wore down both. What was expected to last a year or more in Europe lasted only a few weeks or months on the frontier. This was especially true of footwear. Standard issue shoes could not stand up to the rigors of portaging and the extremes of climate under which the troops operated. As a result, many men were barefoot and in some cases officers were forced to buy shoes out of their own pockets in order to keep their men on duty. When the shoes did arrive, they and other supplies were often of poor quality or damaged. Major Walters, at Niagara, received 264 pairs of shoes for his and the western garrisons. Upon inspection, however, most were found to be poorly made and rotten. Blankets were also found to be of poor quality and sometimes previously used.

Given the conditions under which Bouquet's troops served, it is not surprising that the post commanders regularly reported morale...
discipline problems. Reports of "great Ferment" among the troops and "a Spirit of discontent & desertion" were accompanied by officers' references to their "banishment" at the outposts and at least one request for indefinite leave of absence.  

The letters that contained these warnings of unrest and pleas for rescue from oblivion also shed light on the causes for such feelings. Foremost among these was the keen sense of isolation and cabin fever felt by officers and other ranks alike. The boredom and anxiety attached to being part of a seventeen-man garrison in the midst of alien and possibly hostile people can easily be imagined. Even at the larger forts life could be less than grand. While admitting that Detroit was "the best frontier Garrison", its commander, Captain Donald Campbell, complained that "I begin to know the People too well, I doe not think they improve on a long acquaintance." Even Bouquet, presiding over the largest and best equipped post in the midst of a substantial Anglo-American community, complained of the endless fatigues undergone by his men, unrelieved except on Sundays. Further, the combination of fur traders turned sutlers and the unreliability of the paymaster meant that the troops often went months without pay.

Finally, for those who cared or needed to keep abreast of affairs outside the west, frontier duty could be particularly oppressive. News of any kind was slow to arrive and often fragmentary. Captain Campbell, for example, complained that "There is now five Months, Since we Know any Thing of the World," and other officers frequently appended requests for newspapers to their dispatches.
The complaints voiced by fort commanders concerning the conditions under which they and their men lived should not be allowed to overshadow the fact that, for the privileged and fortunate, life on the frontier could be made tolerable. For officers accustomed to European garrisons and frequent visits to cities and estates, Fort Pitt or Detroit truly must have seemed at the ends of the earth. However, the gentlemen in these same garrisons could pass the time rather well. Captain Campbell, always with an eye for the finer things in life, was overjoyed to find that "The Women [of Detroit] Surpasses our expectation like the rest of America" although he judged the men "very indifferent." At Fort Pitt as well, the presence of a sizeable civilian population gave opportunities for a variety of diversions, most of which appear to have had as their object the meeting and seduction of the post's eligible women.

At Fort Pitt Captain Simeon Ecuyer seems to have initiated or at least sustained an active social calender. He mentioned a club which met on Mondays and "a ball every Saturday evening, made up of the prettiest ladies of the garrison." Hinting at what must have been the major purpose of his soirées, the Captain wrote further that "We regale them with punch, and if it is not strong enough, the whiskey is at their disposal. You may be sure that we shall not be completely cheated." Campbell bragged of weekly parties involving about twenty couples held at his own residence. The tedium at Detroit was also relieved by card parties and the arrival of new officers and visiters from England.

By contrast, Dr. Stevenson at Fort Niagara complained that "the
want of Society & being obliged to pass our time, so miserably uniform, hurts us every way." His only diversion, aside from keeping the garrison healthy, were trips to Niagara Falls. He told Bouquet that it "would give me great pleasure, to have an opportunity of attending you at the Falls." But the opportunity never arose and Stevenson pressed for a change of station or discharge. His plight was undoubtedly shared by officers at the smaller posts who, aside from visits by traders or messengers, or liaisons with local Indian women, had little to divert them from the tedium of garrison life.

What officers provided for themselves as a matter of privilege they strove to deny those under them on grounds of order and discipline. In an effort to eliminate as many causes of insubordination as possible, Bouquet and his subordinates issued a number of orders directed at ridding the forts of two principal sources of vice and disorder: liquor and women. By the end of 1760, Bouquet felt compelled to ban the sale of liquor at Fort Pitt by all but licensed sutlers. All offenders would suffer summary justice by court-martial. His efforts seem not to have been very successful, for the following spring he went so far as to suggest that a stockade wall be built around the then sprawling town of Pittsboro, with one gate by which his fort guards could more carefully screen the citizens. The problem of on and off-duty drinking also spread to the small post of Venango whose commander had to discipline the fort commissary for being habitually drunk. In an interesting attempt to meet the requirements of the regulations and still profit from the forts,
sutters and traders attempted to sell diluted rum, but were still forced to get rid of their stock. 150

Women and liquor often went together. Several of the dram shops at Pittsboro that Bouquet sought to close were operated by women belonging to the garrison. These women, officially listed as laundresses, were common in the army, which permitted a fixed number per company while in garrison. Most were wives of enlisted men and their wages came from a common fund managed by company officers. Little remains to suggest how many women were at the various forts but their number must have been more than Bouquet felt necessary. In 1762 he issued orders allowing outpost commanders in the Ohio country to provide rations and support for only one woman per fort. 151

The principal reason for restrictions on the number and activities at the forts was their activities as prostitutes or as accomplices to deserters. These activities seem to have gone hand-in-glove at Fort Pitt where a Mrs. McIntosh not only kept a disorderly house but was accused of having hidden two deserters soon after their attempted flight. She and several other women constituted what Bouquet referred to as "a Colony sprung from Hell" and were particular targets of his wrath. 152 Added to the problem was the continual flow of people into and out of the Ohio region, a movement which included "a number of Inhabitants the scum of the Neighboring Provinces, who have no visible means to live" and who, it was believed, would seduce the garrisons from good order and discipline. 153

While the general conditions under which the enlisted men lived and worked, and the limited diversions allowed them, contributed to
the unrest that led to insubordination, these tended to pale against another, more important, issue: the inability of men to leave the ranks once their time was up. As Amherst's orders to Major Walters indicated, the army could ill afford to lose any more men that it already had. The lack of recruits and the need to keep western battalions as full as possible left the commander-in-chief little choice but to freeze enlistments. Although Amherst seems to have agreed in 1761 to release all men whose time had by then expired, his usual directive was that such men "shall have their Discharge as soon as the Service will permit"—an order suitably vague to cover all complaints and contingencies.

For the enlisted men who held terms for a specific number of years, vague promises and fair words did nothing to relieve anxiety and a sense of being held captive in remote posts at their officers' discretion. Their frustration was made worse by knowledge that other battalions, especially those bound for the West Indies or home service, were discharging large numbers of men. The officers of the Royal American Regiment filed numerous reports on the quarrelsome, seditious nature of men who knew they had a right to an immediate separation but were being kept nonetheless. Fear of mass desertion, mutiny, or worse prompted garrison commanders to request exemptions to Amherst's orders and to submit lists of men entitled to discharges. Indeed, such fears appear not to have been groundless. Bouquet discovered "some Insolent letters" at Fort Pitt addressed to the troops there from those in the upper Ohio posts. The latter, Bouquet observed, "have increased the discontent of ours, in regard to their discharges."
Eligible men were also careful not to accept bounty money offered then to stay on another year. Even though the prospect of hard cash was tempting, acceptance constituted re-enlistment, something that most men sought to avoid. Finally, for those few men who could write or obtain help from those who could, petitioning offered another way of expressing discontent. One such petition, addressed to Bouquet from Private William Harris in 1762 sums up what must have been felt privately by many. Harris complained about the officers making "a hundred fair promises Without the least intention of Ever performing one of them." He told his colonel that "I have been abused with the false promises of Officers from the Beginning of July in the year 1760" and referred to the "hardships, and fatigue a soldier is obliged to go through" and the Ill treatment they receive from their officers," which "is sufficient to make them hate the Service." He ended his letter by telling Bouquet that he would have attempted desertion long ago "had I not always Expected the performance of your promise." Without some sign that he would be discharged the following spring, "Captain Campbell with all his Retorick shall not be sufficient to Detain me any Longer." The act of desertion that Private Harris referred to constituted a common form of protest against bad treatment and a remedy for general discontent with the army. As Harris' letter suggests, many left illegally to protest being kept beyond their enlistments. Others fled the army to escape punishment for breaches of discipline or crimes. John Geddis deserted while en route to Fort Presqu'ile from Niagara because, while drunk, he lost money belonging to his
comrades. The money had been entrusted to him so that the Presqu'ile garrison might have the opportunity to buy personal items at the better-stocked Niagara post. In some cases the desire to get out of the army led men to repeated attempts to desert, sometimes while incapacitated due to punishment inflicted for previous attempts. One of the most notorious deserters was John Sherlock (Shirlock), who ran away at least three times from Fort Niagara—and was apprehended each time. Lieutenant Archibald Blane reported that one Dunfin "who I thought incapable to move" had again deserted from Fort Ligonier. The report implies that Dunfin's incapacity resulted from punishment inflicted for a previous attempt to run away.

While officers sometimes expressed satisfaction that certain undesirable elements had chosen to desert, the problem was such that it posed a serious threat not only to discipline but to the already reduced strength of the western posts. Desertion was a universal problem, striking all the western forts. Incomplete reports and vague references to individuals, coupled with fragmentary information on how many deserters were caught or returned make accurate estimates of numbers difficult. Officers could do little to stem the tide. An exasperated Bouquet reported that if men chose to leave at the end of their enlistments "it would not be in my power to prevent it." The reason, as Bouquet explained it, was "their long stay in this Department" which "had made them acquainted with the woods & I can no more have them taken up as formerly."

The extent to which Bouquet's men had adapted themselves to their
new environment is reflected not only in the numbers who felt they could survive alone in the woods while fleeing but also in the number who left their posts in favor of neighboring Indian communities. The largest single example of this appears to have been at Fort Niagara where an Indian service agent encountered nine men from the fort on their way to the western Seneca towns. However, officers farther south and west faced similar situations. Two men from the Sandusky garrison "deserted to the Savages" as did Lewis Trofield from Detroit, who was suspected of having "gone toward the Illinois with some Indians." How many others followed their example is uncertain, but enough did to cause commanders like Bouquet additional worry as they attempted to locate these men and negotiate, with mixed success, for their return.

The fact that some English soldiers deliberately sought refuge in Indian towns suggests that assumptions of universal Indian hostility toward Anglo-Americans during this time may be incorrect. Indian motives for harboring deserters, often in the face of thinly veiled threats from officers or promises of rewards, remains unclear. Certainly deserters brought with them arms, ammunition, and other equipment, taken in flight. More important, however, may have been the men themselves. Faced with uncertainty about English strength, weaknesses and ambitions, and with reduced lines of communication, deserters may have been looked upon by Indians as valuable sources of information, general as well as technical. In short, deserters may, unwittingly, have become a new breed of cultural broker at a critical time for western Indians. Finally, the role of deserters as hostages...
cannot be overlooked. As with prisoners taken during the Seven Years' War, western Indians may have held on to deserters as a form of insurance against attack by Anglo-Americans. For whatever reasons, though, some Indians harbored deserters, an act which could give little peace of mind to security conscious English officers.\footnote{173}

Confronted with rising desertion and their troops' familiarity with the land and its people, Bouquet and his subordinates attempted to fight fire with fire by employing Indians to hunt down and retrieve runaways.\footnote{174} While this method appears to have enjoyed some success, Sir William Johnson observed that, among the Six Nations, "it is a thing they are not fond of doing (in general)." This was due "in great measure to their having been often promised payment and often disappointed." He further noted that if local commanders would be more sensitive to this issue "no Deserter could make his Escape."\footnote{175} While there is little to suggest that western officers heeded Johnson's advice, they did continue to employ Indians to track deserters. That the army was able to do this says less about the military's skills in Indian diplomacy than it does about the Indians themselves. Some western natives for reasons of their own cooperated with the army. In so doing they demonstrated a flexible response to Anglo-American expansion and attempted, as in other areas, to create a mutually beneficial relationship with the new invaders.

In dissecting the composition and condition of the British army in the west, it is easy to dwell on the most obvious and more publicized elements: the garrisons themselves, their enlisted inmates, and the problems they confronted. However, to understand the role

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and quality of the frontier garrisons it is useful to note in passing the condition of its officer corps. In so doing, it becomes apparent that enlisted men often had models for objectionable behavior in their own leaders. While of an altogether different social class, and often ethnically different from the men they led, the junior-grade officers—lieutenants and ensigns—exhibited similar behavior rooted in boredom and frustration.

Learning the ages of the officers in the western forts is no less difficult than compiling personal data on the men in the ranks. It should not be assumed that men listed as "ensign" or "lieutenant" were necessarily young. Promotions occurred within regiments or the army only as vacancies and the money necessary for purchasing rank became available. For a man to remain a junior officer for ten years or more was not uncommon and Simeon Ecuyer, promoted to captain late in 1762, claimed to have seen some twenty years' service as a junior officer in Europe.176

Officers as well as enlisted men had a low regard for their current duties. Captain Campbell's comments about Detroit, and those of Dr. Stevenson on Fort Niagara have already been noted. Ensign James Dow protested orders transferring him from temporary duty at Presqu'ile back to Fort Niagara and wondered if he was being punished. His father, a lieutenant in the same battalion, actively sought his son's transfer to Fort Pitt.177 When informed that the Royal Americans would spend yet another year scattered across the west, Lieutenant Archibald Blane at Fort Ligonier was crestfallen, "for till now I always had some hopes of our being employed in some other Corner of
Officers, like enlisted men, not infrequently succumbed to the rigors of their duties though their frustrations, fears, and boredom were often vented in different, sometimes violent, ways. Unable by ethical code or position to desert, and often unable to obtain home leave or transfers, Bouquet's officers directed their negative energies elsewhere. Quarrels with superiors were not uncommon, as Major William Walters found at Fort Niagara, where conflicts between the major and his subordinates became something of an institution. The most serious case involved charges and countercharges between Walters and Ensign William Hay stemming from Hay's refusal to do more additional duties. The case went to court-martial and the appeals dragged on for two years, ultimately involving Bouquet and Amherst. Hay mercifully died at Niagara early in 1763, before final disposition of his case in London.\textsuperscript{179}

While Hay's case was pending, Walters was confronted with a more widespread case of insubordination. On this occasion all the lieutenants then in garrison wrote a letter of protest concerning the burden of their duties as well as Walters' apparent habit of appropriating the best food and liquor for himself, leaving his junior officers to survive on salt provisions and whatever they could buy from local Indians. This letter went to Bouquet and was quickly followed by one from Walters, who apologized for the "Spirit of Disobedience" among his officers. Bouquet upheld the major, as might be expected, but cautioned him to show more regard for his men in the future. Of the three officers who signed the original letter, all ended up being
detached to outpost duties in the Wabash valley, Detroit, and the Ohio country. 180

Lieutenant George Demler and Ensign Francis Schlosser were of a more violent turn of mind. According to Major Walters, on October 13 1760 "a Dispute had Happened between them occasioned by some provoking words that passed between them which came to Blows & some kicks" which Walters expected would have ended in a duel had not both men been arrested and confined. Finally, bowing to the demands of honor, Walters allowed the duel. He was silent as to the manner of combat but did note that neither man was injured. 181 Schlosser, whose father was a captain and also stationed at Fort Niagara, seems to have had a penchant for heavy-handed behavior. Later, as commander of the old French post at St. Joseph, he so alienated the habitants with his bullying that he was threatened with dismissal, despite his father's intercessions. 182

Both Major Walters and Lieutenant Blane offered explanations for their fellow officers' behavior. Walters was convinced that much of it had to do with "being set down in a wilderness Detached from the world" which of necessity would "make great alterations in peoples tempers." Blane pointed to the human dimension when he commented that the turnover in officers in his battalion due to deaths or resignations meant that "the one half of us will be Strangers to the other." 183 Indeed, he could well have been speaking as well for the enlisted ranks where loss of trusted comrades and an influx of strangers led to less esprit and trust and more toward a sense of self preservation and wariness. Whatever the particular case, Walters
and Blane adequately summarized the plight of England's trans-Appalachian garrisons.

IV

Given the condition of these troops and their scattered, often isolated state, it is not hard to imagine them as less than effective in the performance of their duties and as something less than ideal ambassadors to foreign lands and people. In fact, confronted as they were by the stark realities of western duties, they could readily see the chasm that lay between their government's and commander-in-chief's pretensions and the limits of Anglo-American power. Knowing this, fort commanders often took it upon themselves to alter policy to conform to reality. In other cases they faithfully attempted to do what was a seemingly impossible task. If post commanders appeared lax in the enforcement of regulations or cast a blind eye on clearly illegal practices, they did so knowing that at the very least, their efforts mattered very little and, at the worst, their troops' lives depended on selective enforcement.

In carrying out their duties, post commanders complained about being left to their own devices when it came to Indian affairs. While Amherst and Johnson were debating issues such as gift-giving, the liquor trade, and general trade policy, military officers appear to have operated without coherent orders or guidelines, at least through the fall of 1761. Captain Donald Campbell, at Detroit, reported that he did not know "How to behave in Indian affairs, as I have no
orders on that head" and trusted to common sense and "good luck," which seem to have kept everyone at least reasonably happy.

Lieutenant James Gorrell, who commanded the remote post at La Baye, also voiced his concern about a lack of instructions, particularly on matters relating to Indian diplomacy. Less is heard on the matter from the Ohio country, due in large measure to the presence of veteran Indian agents such as George Croghan and Alexander McKee. In the absence of such men on the Lakes, what may have saved Campbell and Gorrell was the presence at many western posts of experienced Anglo-American and French traders who could serve as interpreters and intermediaries until formal orders were received.

Those orders began to arrive late in 1761. As part of his trip to Detroit, Sir William Johnson was expected to announce recent decisions governing Indian affairs and trade. Aside from fixing trade prices at the western posts, Johnson issued a minimum of directions to fort commanders on the conduct of Indian relations. Among other things, the officers were enjoined to be indulgent of Indian requests for blacksmiths and armory work, to ensure strict compliance with trade regulations, and to generally maintain good relations with the natives.

While Johnson's directions may have helped relieve uncertainty in the minds of western officers as to their duties and how best to carry out their orders, subsequent commands from army headquarters had only the opposite effect. By late spring 1762 Amherst's directives governing the restricted use of gifts and orders curtailing the giving of food and ammunition to Indians reached the Great Lakes.
The impact was immediate and negative. Through the remainder of the year western commanders bombarded Bouquet and Johnson with protests of the new frugality.

Alone, without instructions, and forced to get on as best they could, local commanders quickly learned the prevailing customs and protocols of Indian-white relations and followed suit. As Major Walters explained to Amherst, he had given provisions to several Indians who had come into the fort to talk since such a gesture "has been always a custom." Other officers found much the same thing prevailing in their areas and, while they might, as did Lieutenant Meyer, feel put upon by demanding Indians, the officers complied as a matter of course. Captain Campbell offered the best explanation for continuing accepted practices when he reported that since gift-giving "was the Custom It would not be prudent in me to deviate from it in my Present Situation." His present situation was revealed when he further noted "I had not Men enough to doe the duty in this large Fort, and a great many Indians assembled at that time." Campbell's post was relatively well built and his garrison larger than most. Those in smaller, less substantial outposts had even more cause for caution. Lieutenant Gorrell's only comment upon learning of the new policy governing Indian affairs was to express his personal uneasiness and voice concern over keeping large numbers of Indians cooperative with barely twenty armed men.

Faced with a choice between following orders and self-preservation, the Great Lakes officers seem to have chosen the latter with few reservations. Campbell at Detroit informed Johnson that "I still
continue to give them some Tobacco and other Trifles, and have allowed the officers commanding at the other Posts to do the same."

He further emphasized in this and other reports how necessary it was to continue gift-giving, both as a diplomatic measure and as a way of encouraging Indian hunters and farmers to establish business relations with the perpetually hungry troops. While Johnson may have been sympathetic, Amherst clearly was not. He continued to press Campbell and presumably others to cut expenses. Lieutenant Gorrell at La Baye needed no signal from Campbell to continue gift-giving "consistent with frugality." In just the first half of 1763 alone he ran up nearly £1,100 of expenses with five trading firms for items related to Indian diplomacy.

Campbell's reasons for re-interpreting his orders in light of local conditions are revealed in a number of letters. While others were less inclined to express their motives, there is every reason to believe that Campbell's sentiments were shared by many of his fellow officers. While he was against "Great Treatys and large Presents," he was realistic enough to recognize the need for accepting native protocol and suggested that relenting on the subject of ammunition would actually be constructive and would prevent unrest. This last matter weighed heavily with Campbell, who was afraid that if the western Indians ever "had the least hint that we intended to prevent them frome the use of Ammunition, it would be impossible to keep them Quiet." Given his apprehension, he was willing to risk Amherst's and the Treasury's wrath rather than a war his weak garrison could not hope to win.
Circumstances were different in the Ohio country. Unlike the upper Lakes, where orders arrived slowly and isolation led to a great deal of local discretion, officers on the Ohio appear to have conformed more to the spirit and letter of Amherst's directives. The less isolated nature of the Ohio forts, the presence of a large garrison at Fort Pitt, and adequate, if not altogether reliable, communications undoubtedly led to a greater feeling of security and allowed army headquarters in New York to intervene more easily in regional affairs. However, Colonel Bouquet's continued presence on the Ohio through the winter of 1762 was certainly decisive in giving a different color to Indian affairs east of Detroit. A sampling of the correspondence of Bouquet and George Croghan indicates that by early spring 1762 a more restrictive policy governing generosity toward Indians had taken hold on the Ohio. As early as February, Bouquet was instructing Fort Pitt's new commandant, Simeon Ecuyer, that "The General will not allow of any Presents to Indians, therefore you will not give them Powder or Lead, or any Present whatever without orders for that Purpose." The only exception would be for "such as appear to be objects of charity." While the latter caveat could be used as a convenient loophole, available as circumstances warranted, a very frustrated George Croghan's experiences attest otherwise. His efforts to extract supplies for Indian leaders and war parties headed south were met with mixed success. On one occasion he managed to convince Bouquet to supply an Ohio Seneca war party, but when similar groups returned from the Carolinas and asked for supplies and ammunition, Bouquet's reply was that "it was not in
his power to give any Warriors either Powder, or Lead, much less
Presents, without further Orders from General Amherst." The
generally tight-fisted enforcement of policy by Bouquet tended to
generate those feelings among local Indians that Campbell hope to
avoid by tempering his superiors' orders with a large measure of
practicality.

V

On the subject of native-held lands, Amherst's caveat that he
meant to take no Indian lands "except in such Causes, where the
necessity of His Majesty's Service obliges me to take Posts" led
to a selective enforcement of treaty promises to exclude Anglo-
American farmers and hunters from the west. Problems arising
from Indian demands that western lands be left exclusively to them
centered in the Ohio country. There, farmers and speculators who
had been driven out of the west in the 1750s returned to press public
and private claims to the land. Conversely, pressures from Anglo-
American settlement were not directly felt in the Great Lakes region.
Distance and a lack of legitimate provincial claims made this area
inaccessible and comparatively unattractive. The French habitants
living in the west lived in settlements which in some cases dated
from the beginning of the century and which had developed a symbiotic
relationship with neighboring Indian communities.

Men and women hopeful of staking a claim to the long-denied
lands along the Ohio wasted little time moving west. By 1760 Penn-
sylvania's provincial secretary, Richard Peters, reported a growing number of settlers following Forbes' Road to the Ohio, while others went west to take up farms abandoned during the Seven Years' War. Soon after, settlers began pressing claims to the land.

Much of the pressure that was ultimately applied to army officers to relent on settlement restrictions, however, came from the same provincial governments and semi-privyate companies that had attempted to exploit the Ohio country before the war. The object of their attention was Colonel Bouquet who, to his credit, attempted to abide by the Easton Treaty and the army's own commitments to the Ohio Indians. The temptation to do otherwise must have been great. As early as September 1760, Thomas Cresap of Maryland, acting for the Ohio Company, offered Bouquet a bribe in the form of a partnership and twenty-five thousand acres of choice land if the colonel would turn a blind eye toward the Company's activities. Bouquet refused to act, citing the Easton Treaty as the basis for his answer. That he was not put off by the bribe or unfriendly to the Company's plans is revealed by his stated support for settlement in principle, and his suggestion that, once a plan for governing a new settlement was better conceived, the Company should try again. The significance of Bouquet's decision lies, however, in his insistence that treaties negotiated by royal officers were binding on all the colonies even though, in this case, neither Maryland nor Virginia was involved in the Easton conference.

The Company refused to be thwarted by legalities and enlisted the aid of Virginia's governor, Francis Fauquier. His lobbying
efforts did have some impact. Fauquier's protests directly to Amherst resulted in Bouquet's having to defend himself against charges of violating the colony's charter rights and of accepting bribes from settlers and traders, presumably those whose interests did not coincide with the Company's. In direct correspondence with Bouquet, Fauquier was also able to obtain an agreement whereby all those who could demonstrate a "just right" to lands based on prior occupancy would be allowed to take them up again.

Of more immediate concern to Bouquet and the Ohio Indians was the increasing number of squatters entering the Ohio region by way of Redstone Creek and the Monongahela River. As early as 1760 Pennsylvanians were petitioning their government against those who "during the late hunting season, have gone in companies far into the Indian Country in pursuit of Deer and other Game, to the great Damage and Displeasure of the Indians." Bouquet, responding to increased complaints from Ohio Indians, took more stern measures. In the fall of 1761 he issued a proclamation forbidding "any of His Majesty's Subjects to Settle or Hunt to the West of the Allegheny Mountains on any Pretence whatsoever" without specific orders from Bouquet or his superiors. Backing word with deed, Bouquet ordered squatters' cabins on the Youghiogheny and Monongahela rivers burned and their inhabitants driven out of the region.

While the army's eviction of squatters had some short-term impact, there were far too few soldiers and too many civilians for Bouquet to effectively close the frontier. As the tide of immigration increased, Indian complaints likewise rose in number and intensity,
particularly against hunters who further depleted scarce game reserves. Indian protests did not stop with words. As the invasion intensified, those who felt threatened retaliated with force; in May 1762 George Croghan reported the killing of two Virginia hunters at their camp near Redstone Creek. While Croghan passed the incident off as the work of "Some Straggling Indians" whose motive was a desire for the Virginians' rifled guns, it seems clear from the rising level of Indian discontent that other factors were at work.

While Bouquet was trying to stem the tide of white settlement in the west, Amherst was permitting exceptions to the injunction against western expansion. The reason lay in his desire to facilitate the occupation of the western forts and to convert these into self-sustaining bastions of English power in the region. While, on the one hand, the commander-in-chief supported restrictions on settlements on the Ohio and ordered Bouquet to clear the region of squatters, he approved a scheme to establish a line of taverns along Forbes' Road to facilitate transportation of men and, particularly, supplies, into the west. While this plan by itself may not have posed a serious problem for local Indians, it did point toward the eventual influx of more and more colonists. In the meantime, around the walls of Fort Pitt "Pittsboro" was being transformed from a name on the map to a bustling frontier community that served to show local Indians the shape of things to come.

In April 1761, less than a year after construction had begun on the fort, there was a population of 233 men, women, and children around the site. Added to this were 43 soldiers who lived alone or
with their families outside the fort. The majority of these people lived either in the "Lower Town"—an area lying between the ramparts and the Allegheny River—or in the "Upper Town" which lay on the landward side of the fort just beyond the ditch. A few lived in what was called "the Artillery", a collection of buildings lying close to the Monongahela River and presumably built by, or for, the resident detachment of the Royal Artillery. Only 29 of the 160 houses were occupied by what may be assumed to have been nuclear family units. Two houses in the Upper Town were also owned and occupied by women alone, one by Nancy Thomas and a child and the other by Ellenor Crawford and one other unnamed woman. While these women may have been widows, it is also possible that they were among the camp followers whom Bouquet sought to put out of business. The overwhelming number of houses, many of which appear to have been rude shacks, were occupied by workmen employed at the fort or by fur traders. Of the latter, the names of Hugh Crawford, Thomas Calhoun, and George Croghan appear as does that of John Langdale, the Pennsylvania province storekeeper. Some of these establishments doubtless also served as taverns and, perhaps, brothels. The character of the community is further revealed by the fact that there were only 45 women and 25 children as opposed to 163 men. The military residents included 23 soldiers' women and 13 children.

There appear to have been no Indian complaints about this settlement, although they were less than pleased with the fort itself. Certainly there were no protests directed at Pittsboro as there were at the squatters to the south and east. This may have resulted, in part,
from a realistic assessment of the situation. More likely, given the large number of traders and the variety of goods available, the potential problems represented by this settlement may have been offset by the economic advantages it represented. The same cannot be said of another settlement scheme, this one directly supported by Amherst and located athwart the Niagara portage.

The attempt to establish settlements near Fort Niagara grew out of Amherst's wish to see that vital link in the army's communications more secure and less dependent on local Indians for portage and supplies. At the same time, and as part of this larger plan, the general was initiating a ship-building program near the falls on Navy Island to further secure transport and communications, as well as a new fort at Sandusky. According to Amherst, an establishment at the Niagara portage would be advantageous to the fur trade as well as to the garrisons of forts Niagara and Schlosser, above the falls. Exactly how this would come about he did not say, except to explain that the vital portage could be better held if totally in English hands. Amherst's plan awaited only an opportunity for implementation, which came in April 1761 in the form of a petition from former army captain Walter Rutherford on behalf of a company of former officers and fur traders. Their plan to establish a carrying trade and settlement met with Amherst's immediate approval and a grant for ten thousand acres of land was issued, conditional on crown approval.

While Amherst may have had only portaging in mind, Rutherford and company clearly had other ambitions which they made little effort to hide. Their petition spoke of their already having sent people
to the falls to build houses "also horses and oxen as well for farming as for the Conveyance of Boats and Goods." They also indicated their intent to obtain a title directly from the Senecas, an act in contravention of recent regulations. Later protests by fur traders at Niagara also suggest that Rutherford and his associates planned to use their advantageous location to interdict the flow of pelts before they reached Fort Niagara where, according to regulations, traders had to conduct business. That the company actually moved beyond the planning stages of its various schemes is revealed in reports from Niagara. Amherst acknowledged a letter from the fort dated July 13, 1761 that mentioned the arrival of horses, wagons, and various carpentry and portaging equipment. Sir William Johnson, who kept a particularly anxious eye on the situation, said that, while at Niagara en route to Detroit later in July, he found "some Carpenters at work, finishing a large house for one Stirling, near the Falls, and have since heard others are shortly to be built thereabouts."

The portage installation soon came under fire from all quarters, including the local military commander, whose garrison the establishment was to have supported. The biggest and potentially most dangerous losers were the western Senecas and Mississaugas who, for over a generation, had earned a living on the portage road. Johnson warned that the new buildings and equipment "must greatly add to the Indians' discontent, being on the Carrying Place." He went on to emphasize that even the Indians living there could not dispose of so vital a piece of land on their own. Aside from the economic damage a settlement would do to the local Indians, the very presence of farmers...
and teamsters would, as Johnson pointed out, "confirm all the Nations in the opinion they have long had, of our design of rooting them out of their Country." This was particularly true for the western Senecas and those living on the upper Allegheny River. With Fort Niagara and the portage road firmly in English hands, the Seneca towns would be seriously exposed to attack if war broke out. Characteristically, when war did come in 1763, the Senecas' main effort was against the portage where they dealt the English a bloody defeat and temporarily closed the road.

The traders at Niagara, for reasons already mentioned, saw the Rutherford operation as "of the greatest prejudice to His Majesty's Interests" by interfering with free trade and causing unrest among the Indians. By-passing Amherst altogether, these traders directly petitioned the Board of Trade to cancel the grant and order Rutherford and his men out of the region.

Finally, Major Walters at Fort Niagara voiced his objections. His concerns were practical and immediate. In particular, he warned about the supply and price of firewood for his garrison, since the Rutherford grant embraced the timber areas normally used by the troops for that purpose. In addition, he expressed concern about the cost of maintaining the fort's livestock by now having to rent pasturage from the grantees.

Amherst's replies to these critics was quite in character. To the Senecas he reiterated what must have seemed a now hollow promise to respect native lands "unless the necessity of the service" dictated otherwise. He also reminded them that Rutherford's activities were
conditional on royal approval—small consolation to Senecas being squeezed out of land and jobs. To Walters he said much the same thing, insisting that Rutherford's activities were not meant to be a settlement, only a portaging service; Walters clearly saw something different.

Amherst was unable to reply to the traders. Before he could, he received orders from the Board of Trade in the fall of 1762 to immediately stop this and other grants which might be pending. The letter fell heavily on the commander-in-chief, who felt compelled to compose a lengthy, defensive reply. In the meantime, somewhat reluctantly, he issued orders to Major Wilkins, the new commandant at Fort Niagara, to carry out the Board's directives. However, he explicitly ordered that Wilkins "not publish the orders to the Indians as that may be attended by bad consequences" by which he meant his fear that the Senecas would seize the unguarded road. Even though the Rutherford settlement was officially undone, there is nothing to indicate that the buildings or their inhabitants were entirely removed from the portage. It made little difference to Indian affairs, however, since the damage had already been done.

VI

While the army and Indian service attempted to cope with settlers, these agencies had to contend with a flood-tide of traders. Here, at least, orders from army headquarters appeared to be direct and unequivocal: trade was to be restricted to armed posts and regulated
through a licensing system and instructions originating with the commander-in-chief or Sir William Johnson. However, as with other aspects of England's efforts to extend law and order over the west, the actual conditions under which trade was conducted seldom reflected the ideal.

Traders from the older colonies, as well as merchants seeking opportunities to take control of the former French network in Canada, lost little time in going west. In fact, one of the problems involved in controlling trade was that traders, in many cases, arrived at western forts and Indian towns ahead of the soldiers sent to enforce regulations. As early as February 1759, James Kenny reported that private traders were shipping their goods toward the Ohio and in late March a man working for George Clark returned from the Youghiogheny with two horseloads of pelts obtained through trade. The situation was similar on the Lakes where, at Fort Michilimackinac, the garrison arrived in 1761 only to find two traders already there. At the same time, Colonel Bouquet requested permission to issue passes for traders at Fort Pitt who wished to work out of Detroit.

While these traders soon covered the entire trans-Appalachian region, the focal point of their activities was clearly the center of the former French trading empire, the upper Great Lakes. In early April 1761 traders from Pennsylvania were striking out for Detroit, which soon became the hub of trade activities for men from that province as well as New York and Montreal. Others, such as Michael Teaffe, established stores at Sandusky, while several traders joined Henry Bostwick and Alexander Henry at Michilimackinac. The com-
petition resulting from the scramble quickly saturated the Great Lakes market and compelled latecomers to consider other options. By mid-May 1761, for example, former lieutenant Hambach of the Pennsylvania militia was writing to Bouquet that "the Trade at Detroit is none of the Best" and mentioned that he and his partners were at a loss to know what to do with their inventories. Part of their problem resulted from the fact that the Detroit habitants were still dealing directly with their old factors in Montreal and that the Indians were taking many pelts to Niagara, presumably for the better prices and liquor offered there. As a result, Hambach, Robert Callendar, and Messrs. Spear and Vandervelden sought to shift their activities to the south, toward the Shawnee towns on the Scioto River and the new Delaware towns on the branches of the Muskingum River.

Complaints made by Hambach, Callendar, and others, point to what these men saw as a drawback to trading at a few posts: overcrowded markets. As Callendar indicated, one alternative was to leave the forts and establish trade in the Indian towns themselves. The idea was appealing and was soon adopted by a large number of traders. James Kenny, at Fort Pitt, observed "Many Traders gone with Goods to Trade at ye Indian Towns" and reported that Pennsylvania trader Michael Teaffe had set off for the Miami towns in company with several Seneca warriors. Hugh Crawford was reported to have been working at the Lower Shawnee Town in 1762, while Lieutenant Gorrell at La Baye mentioned that one Lottridge had lived all of one winter among the Indians on the Winnebago River, while another
La Baye trader was preparing to send men and supplies to Indians living at Milwaukee. By the time war broke out in 1763, the movement of traders directly to Indian towns had reached epidemic proportions in the Ohio country. A list of traders reported killed that year showed them to have been in virtually every town west of Fort Pitt. On the Lakes, the temptation to go directly to Indian customers was heightened by the human geography of the region. The native population, scattered in villages and hunting camps throughout the Great Lakes region, was often far enough away from the forts to make trade there inconvenient and impractical. Taking a chapter from the French experience, Montreal-based traders attempted to overcome this obstacle by taking trade to the Indians.

This activity attests to the ease with which traders could, and did, ignore regulations designed to control their activities. The whole point of such orders was to keep traders out of Indian towns where trouble could more easily begin. Aside from the obvious economic advantages that could accrue from trading in Indian towns, other factors compelled traders to defy regulations. One was the inconvenience of having to travel between specified points by army-approved routes. In order to register at all military posts along the route to the fort where trade could be conducted traders had to consume additional time and take on added expenses. William Patterson, perhaps fed up with the system, petitioned to be allowed to by-pass Fort Pitt on his way east with a load of pelts. Others may not have been so procedurally oriented. Still other traders, confronted with Rutherford's activities at Niagara, may have been compelled to use similar
tactics in order to survive in a highly competitive business. Finally, given the small force available to compel adherence to the rules, and the other distractions faced by the army and Indian agents, it seems to have been all too easy to ignore regulations, a temptation that many could not overcome.

The army was as ill-equipped to deal with the regulation of trade as it was most other aspects of its western mission. In part this was due to the paucity of manpower, all of which was tied to a few forts and unable to conduct patrols along well-used traders' paths. While the number of traders active throughout the west is difficult to determine, in areas like the Ohio country traders may have substantially outnumbered the soldiers posted to govern them. Furthermore, the spatial problems confronted by the army—too few men, too much land—served as an open invitation to traders to bypass the forts in favor of Indian towns. As Lieutenant Blane at Fort Ligonier observed, anyone who wished could easily avoid his small post and there would be virtually nothing in Blane's power to prevent it. In addition, it appears that local commanders, beset by requests and perhaps influenced by bribes, decided not to fight the trend and began issuing illegal passes allowing men to go directly to the Indians.

On the other hand, the military could only be as effective as its leaders made it. With trade, as with diplomacy, orders were slow to arrive, contradictions arose and, no real "system" of trade was ever created before war began in 1763. It was not until the fall of 1761 that Sir William Johnson was able to issue orders governing
prices and the conduct of trade. By then, however, the trade was well underway, having been re-opened on the Great Lakes months before Johnson arrived. While these regulations must have been welcomed by harried officers, they still fell short of what was needed. What would have been a substantial help, given how the management of trade was actually being carried forward, was, as Lieutenant Blane suggested, lists of those traders authorized to work at each post for each trading season. In the absence of such checklists and agents to compile them, commanders were forced to accept a man's pass as authentic even though some passes were forged.

Further complicating matters was the apparent lack of coordination of the issuance of licenses. What confused Blane was an order from Bouquet prohibiting a trader named Stimble from trading at Ligonier even though the man held a pass issued by Indian agent Crognan. More serious was the jurisdictional conflict which arose involving Brigadier General Gage, governor of Montreal. Gage, according to the plan for regulation, could issue licenses to men living within the Montreal district. He did so but often permitted traders to go where there were no garrisons. Furthermore, Gage apparently disputed the right of anyone else within his jurisdiction, in this case the Indian agents, to issue passes. The confusion was not lessened by Johnson's claim that all passes, throughout the west, should bear his imprimatur.

Knowledge of these disputes could not have increased the confidence of those charged with enforcing trade regulations. Neither would an awareness that, even if offenders were apprehended, there
was virtually nothing that the army or Indian service could do to them. Although there is evidence that the army did make an effort to enforce order, it pales beside the volume of complaints and admissions that trade was not being conducted according to the plan. In one such case, a court martial at Fort Pitt tried a French trader, Duperon Baby, for operating away from the forts. Even so, Bouquet was forced to admit that "most of the Indian Traders here take all possible methods to evade" the newly posted regulations.\textsuperscript{245} Johnson, equally exasperated, pressed the commander-in-chief to turn de facto regulations into law, under which offenders could be tried in royal or provincial courts. Amherst's reply was not encouraging. All he could do was suggest that reliable Indian agents be held responsible for policing the trade in such a way that court action would be unnecessary.\textsuperscript{246} The limits of administrative power, based on executive decrees, was evident in Johnson's plaintive letter to New York's Attorney General, John Tabor Kempe. Asking for advice on how to prosecute offenders of the liquor regulations, Johnson ended his letter by admitting that "I am at a loss what steps are to be taken thereon."\textsuperscript{247} In truth, there were none, since no colony's authority extended over the western lands and Amherst's decrees lacked the force of law. All Indian and army officers could do was attempt to deprive repeat offenders of licenses or lucrative contracts as provisioning agents and sutlers at the forts.

Nothing better illustrates the problems associated with trade regulation than the attempt to suppress the liquor trade. By far
the largest number of trade-related complaints dealt with liquor. Given its limited resources, the army actively attempted to confiscate all liquor within reach. But the rum trade continued unabated through the 1760s.

The early appearance and universality of the rum trade is made clear in correspondence coming from the west. In February 1759, farmers from the frontier counties of Pennsylvania were shipping liquor into the Ohio country. Colonel Hugh Mercer, commandant of the garrison left in the ruins of Fort Duquesne, did nothing to stop the traffic, citing lack of orders and the absence of any laws governing the transportation and sale of rum. The trade continued until, by mid-1761, it had become an established, if aggravating, element of the fur trade. No part of the west was free of rum and other beverages, but forts Niagara and Pitt appear to have shared the distinction of being awash in the stuff. Given their locations and strategic role as entrepôts and meeting grounds for Indian affairs, this was perhaps inevitable. Also, as Captain Campbell reported from Detroit, his success in suppressing liquor at that post drove potential Indian customers to Niagara where no such situation prevailed at the time. Likewise, it would appear from Campbell's reports that much of the liquor entering his post came from the vicinity of Fort Pitt, despite Bouquet's efforts to control trade at that end. Indeed, the ease with which liquor flowed at the forks of the Ohio is attested to by the clerk of the Pennsylvania trading store at Fort Pitt, James Kenny. He recorded instances of Indians purchasing liquor at or near the fort, an observation confirmed by
Kenny's arch-rival, George Croghan. One aspect of this liquor trade was revealed by Kenny, who claimed that anti-Quaker traders were promising Delaware Indians liquor if they would cease doing business with the Friends at the provincial store.\textsuperscript{251}

As the use of liquor continued so did complaints from traders who refused to countenance the practice. Those traders who on principle would not sell rum complained of unfair advantages enjoyed by their competitors who used rum in barter. Albany traders, faced with such conditions at Fort Niagara, bluntly told Sir William Johnson that they could simply not carry on business under such circumstances.\textsuperscript{252} Faced with the potential disruption of trade and the attendant loss of influence and control over the Indians, and convinced that natives with liquor constituted an intolerable threat to frontier security, royal officials sought the total suppression of the rum traffic.

Military and civil officers confronting the problem were under no illusions as to the difficulty of their task. Colonel Bouquet complained early in 1761 that "it has not been in my Power yet to end the villainous Practice of selling Rum to the Indians." He also worried about the disorderly nature of the community around Fort Pitt, which allowed "the nightly Trade of Rum with Indians" to proceed virtually undetected by the nearby garrison.\textsuperscript{253} One year later, after orders had been issued and steps taken to stop the flow of rum into the west, Johnson echoed Bouquet's concerns. Again, part of the problem was the ease with which settlers and traders moving along well-travelled routes could avoid detection by regular garrisons.\textsuperscript{254}
Nevertheless, efforts were made to stop the trade, efforts which reveal both the magnitude of the problem and the variety of obstacles that prevent an effective solution.

Although orders banning liquor in the west were issued by Amherst and Johnson as early as January 1761, it appears that their impact was not felt for a full year. This situation reflected the difficulty post commanders had in implementing regulations and imposing order on a trading system that had operated virtually uncontrolled since early 1759. Equally important was the speed with which the army was able to place troops west of the mountains. While substantial forces were available at Fort Pitt and along the Niagara River from the summer of 1759, the army was unable to occupy all the forts in the upper Great Lakes region until 1762. In the meantime, the occupation process proceeded in stages and was never able to keep pace with the growing trade. Consequently, imposition of controls on liquor came late and was less effective beyond the eastern part of the trans-Appalachian area.

Characteristically, the area around Fort Pitt witnessed one of the most persistent campaigns to stop the rum trade. In March of 1762, Bouquet was able to report that "since I am here, I have permitted no Strong Liquors to be Sold, given, or Carried to the Indians", a policy which he extended to his outposts. Discounting efforts to put his administration in the best possible light, it appears from other sources that Bouquet's determination was having some impact. One Francis West of Carlisle sought the colonel's aid in reclaiming money from Andrew Reed to whom, on credit, West had sold
ninety-five gallons of rum. The latter had been confiscated at Fort Pitt and Reed's license revoked. Likewise, smugglers operating near Bushy Run were caught by troops and their liquor destroyed. The officer in charge, Captain Barnsley, threatened to prosecute and jail those caught if they did not stop harassing the sergeant who made the seizure. 257

On the other hand, Bouquet's efforts failed to deter the more persistent or those whose privileged position allowed them to circumvent the regulations. Indeed, the intensity of Bouquet's measures may have contributed to the smuggling Barnsley discovered, and could be offered as one reason why many traders tried to stay as far away from the forts as possible. The post sutler at Venango was caught smuggling a private supply of rum into the fort with the garrison's ration, though he had been warned repeatedly against doing so. James Kenny, always alert for transgressions by George Croghan, recorded in his journal that the Indian agent "has sent up lately a Quantity of Liquors" as did others, which resulted in "Many of ye Sutling Inhabitants hav'[ing] got kegs of it & Drunkeness makes its appearance again." How much, if any, of this liquor found its way to the Indians Kenny did not say, but some undoubtedly did, either through sale at illegal tippling houses or transportation directly to native towns. 258

While the problem of rum trading was widespread in the west, the portage at Niagara seems to have been a major point of entry for the traders' stock. Observations by western officers that Niagara seemed to be a major source of their problems have been noted earlier.
Bouquet joined the chorus when he told Amherst that "Niagara was said to be the great Inlet for liquor" as well as the scene of other violations of trade regulations. The large volume of correspondence to and from Niagara tends to confirm this and sheds light on the problems faced by those attempting to stop the trade.

It appears that efforts to suppress liquor trading began late at Niagara, most of the recorded activity dating from 1762. Early in that year, Major Walters raided the local traders and confiscated nearly two thousand gallons of rum and other liquors. In a report to Sir William Johnson, he gave the particulars. Among the offenders were Walter Rutherford, William Newkirk, whose death at the hands of western Senecas later that year created such a stir, and Jean Baptiste de Couagne. The latter was an interpreter and agent in the Indian service. A dozen of the traders involved petitioned Johnson that such actions were unwarranted, since at the time they took out licenses no liquor ban had been imposed. Amherst appears to have agreed. He ordered Walters to allow the men to dispose of the liquor but to ensure that none of it got into the hands of enlisted men or Indians.

While Walters' coup may have temporarily rid the Niagara area of liquor, those who traded in rum remained undaunted and the problem continued. One solution hit upon by rum traders was to shift operations in order to avoid official scrutiny. The site chosen was the former French post at Toronto, which had not received an English garrison. Toronto appears to have been "discovered" the previous year as an ideal place to trade beyond the bounds of regulations.
En route to Detroit for his western Indian conference, Sir William Johnson mentioned trading at Toronto. Further, he condoned a side trip by his deputy Jelles Fonda who, unable to sell his wares at Niagara, sought a better market elsewhere.\textsuperscript{262} From then on, Toronto figured prominently in official correspondence as more and more traders resorted there. In June 1762, the Niagara garrison was forced to send a detachment to Toronto to determine whether the trading there was sanctioned by licenses. De Couagne observed at the time that increased trading at Toronto threatened to ruin merchants at Niagara. His conclusions were later confirmed by Johnson, who blamed Toronto for the general reduction in trade at Niagara and for hurting Indian relations. The post's location, between Niagara and Detroit, astride a centuries-old trading route, also served to draw trade from the upper Lakes, to the detriment of men like Hambach and Callendar.\textsuperscript{263} The Indian superintendent, ignoring his own agent's earlier participation in the Toronto business, was particularly adamant that no trade be allowed there under any circumstances.\textsuperscript{264}

Though no trade should have been permitted at Toronto by the terms of the new trade regulations, it was given something approaching official sanction by General Gage in Montreal. Gage issued a number of passes to traders which, according to those who saw them, gave these men permission to trade at Toronto and, worse, to carry liquor into the west.\textsuperscript{265} Examples of these passes confirm the charges.\textsuperscript{266} It appears on closer inspection that Gage was the victim of his own naiveté, lack of knowledge about current military affairs in the west, and the duplicity of the men with whom he dealt. In a letter to Mia-
gara in which he mentioned complaints from Fort Michilimackinac about the Toronto trade, Gage assumed that the Niagara commander had put a garrison into the place. This assumption, a false one, may explain why Gage continued to issue passes. It also says little for his command of affairs in the region immediately west of his department. When he eventually learned of the true state of affairs, he roundly criticized Major Wilkins at Fort Niagara for not having taken the initiative in both informing him of conditions at Toronto and shutting the place down. Also, evidence suggests that traders licensed by Gage attempted to smuggle liquor into Toronto and to cover their actions by forgery or by altering their passes. Captain George le Hunte, commander of Fort William Augustus in the St. Lawrence River above Montreal, told of an attempt by George Knagg, who held a pass from Gage, to run boatloads of liquor past the fort at night. While le Hunte caught on to the trick, at least part of the cargo managed to pass upriver. Finally, as Amherst himself learned, passes could easily be forged or altered without much chance of detection except by the issuing officer. That such actions were common cannot be overlooked and Gage may have been the victim of this ploy as well.

The result of all of this was a renewed effort late in 1762 to curb the illicit trade around Fort Niagara. Amherst directed stern letters to Gage regarding his role in the affair and ordered new efforts to end the Toronto liquor trade. He did not, however, totally ban all trade there. He merely ordered that the Niagara garrison send a detachment from time to time to ensure the continued
ban on liquor. There is no indication that this half measure had any more impact than sterner measures taken elsewhere. If nothing else, the problem at Niagara demonstrated that traders were far more creative in violating the rules than the army was in enforcing them.

Efforts to stop settlement, control the trade, and to re-define the nature of Anglo-Indian relations all reflected a larger effort to cope with the conquest of New France. These efforts clearly demonstrated the real limitations of royal power in the west, as well as the direction and goals of royal policies. Few troops, indifferently led and motivated could not hope to make the ambitious plans of royal officials a reality. Junior army officers in the field clearly saw the gap between plans and the ability to carry them out and the danger inherent in the direction those plans were taking. Trans-Appalachian Indians gradually came to similar realizations as they attempted to make sense of, and gain some control over, this new Anglo-American invasion.
Notes for Chapter IV


4 Secretary Egremont to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Dec. 12, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 588.


7 On Indians as "subjects" see Amherst to Captain Baugh, Aug. 1, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 835.


9 The standard biographies on Amherst are John Cuthbert Long, *Lord Jeffrey Amherst, A Soldier of the King* (New York, 1933) and Lawrence Shaw Mayo, *Jeffrey Amherst, A Biography* (New York, 1916). A more recent essay appears in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, IV, s.v. "Amherst, Jeffrey, 1st Baron". Amherst's American career and his influence on Indian affairs has still not been comprehensively examined.


11 Amherst to Colonel Bouquet, May 2, 1762, in Sylvester K.
Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg, 1940-1943), series 21634, 87-89, hereafter cited as Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers.

12 Colonel Eyre to Amherst, May 18, 20, 1760, WO 34/21.

13 Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 9, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 515-16.


15 For example: Amherst to General Robert Monckton, Nov. 3, 1760, Aspinwall Papers (Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 4th Ser., IX [Boston, 1871]), 347, hereafter cited as Aspinwall Papers; Amherst to Colonel Farquhar, Sept. 11, 1759, WO 34/23; Amherst to Johnson, Jun. 24, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 421; Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 18, 1761, Ibid., 519; Amherst to Johnson, Feb. 22, 1761, Ibid., 343-47.

16 Amherst to Major Wilkins, May 29, 1763, WO 34/23.

17 Johnson to Amherst, Feb. 12, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 331; Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 17, 1759, in Edmund Bailey O'Callaghan, ed., Documentary History of the State of New York (Albany, 1849-1851), II, 784-85, hereafter cited as O'Callaghan, DHSNY.

18 Johnson to Secretary Egremont, May, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 460-65.


20 Ibid., 50, 110-11.

21 Ibid., 110-11.

22 Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 17, 1759, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 784; Johnson to Secretary Egremont, May, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 460-65.


24 Johnson to the Board of Trade, May 17, 1759, O'Callaghan, DHSNY, II, 782; Johnson to Governor William Denny, Jul. 21, 1758,


Johnson to Amherst, Feb. 22, 1759, *Johnson Papers*, X, 103-104; Johnson pointed to Pennsylvania's new act governing the fur trade as an example of what needed to be passed for the west as well. This document, with annotations, is reproduced in Lois Mulkearn, comp. & ed., *George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia* (Pittsburgh, 1954), 153-65.

Secretary Egremont to Amherst, Dec. 12, 1761, *Johnson Papers*, III, 588.


For examples of the price lists issued, see *Johnson Papers*, III, 531-32(Fort Pitt), 533(Sandusky), 534-35(Fort Miami).

Examples of traders' passes are preserved in WO 34/22(passes issued by General Gage at Montreal).


For example, Johnson to Amherst, Apr. 1, 1762, *Ibid.*, III, 664-65.

Amherst to Johnson, Dec. 30, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 597-98; Johnson to Amherst, Jan. 7, 1762, Ibid., 601.

Amherst to Bouquet, Jan. 16, 1762, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 57; Bouquet to Lt. Carre, Apr. 8, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 122-23; Amherst to Major Walters, Jan. 17, 1761, WO 34/23; Amherst to Major Wilkins, Nov. 21, 1762, Ibid.

Captain Campbell to Johnson, Jun. 9, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 758.

Amherst to Johnson, Sept. 20, 1760, Ibid., X, 187-88; Amherst to Walters, Nov. 2, 1760, WO 34/23.

Amherst to Johnson, May 7, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 387-88.

Johnson to Amherst, Mar. 21, 1761, Ibid., X, 243-47; Johnson to Amherst, Sept. 24, 1762, Ibid., III, 884; Ibid., XIII, 270; Johnson to Amherst, Jul. 24, 1761, Ibid., III, 513; Campbell to Bouquet, Oct. 12, 1761, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21647, 161-62; Campbell to Bouquet, Nov. 8, 1761, Ibid., 190-91.

Amherst to Walters, Jan. 17, 1761, WO 34/23.

Ibid.


See especially Amherst to Bouquet, Jul. 25, 1762, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 95-96; Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 9, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 515.

Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 9, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 515; Amherst to Johnson, Dec. 20, 1761, Ibid., 594.

Amherst to Johnson, Dec. 30, 1761, Ibid., 597-98.

Walters to Amherst, Jun. 29, 1761, WO 34/21; Johnson to Amherst, Jun. 12, 1761, Johnson Papers, X, 286-87.

Johnson Papers, X, 448-49.


56 Mauss, The Gift, 11.

57 Ibid., ix, 10-11; Richards, People in Perspective, 114-15, 117.


59 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 155, 169; John Phillip Reid, A Better Kind of Hatchet: Law, Trade, and Diplomacy in the Cherokee Nation during the Early Years of European Contact (University Park, Pa., 1976), 35; Bruce G. Trigger, The Children of Aataentsic: A History of the Huron People to 1660 (Montreal, 1976), I, 63-65.

60 Sahlins, Stone Age Economics, 169, 174, 183.


63 Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure", 60, 68, 242; Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade, 67-68.


65 Johnson to Amherst, Mar. 24, 1760, Johnson Papers, III, 202.

66 Amherst to Johnson, Mar. 16, 1760, Ibid., 199; Amherst to Colonel Massey, Aug. 27, 1760, Ibid., X, 176.

67 Croghan to Gates, May 1, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 246-47; Croghan to Bouquet, Dec. 10, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 597; Johnson to Amherst, Jun 21, 1761, Ibid., 291; Johnson to Amherst, Jan., 21, 1763, Ibid., 612.

68 Johnson Papers, III, 214.

Amherst to Colonel Eyre, Jun. 16, 1760, WO 34/23; Amherst to Eyre, Jul. 25, 1760, Ibid.

Johnson to Amherst, Nov. 12, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 932.

On the customary manner of resolving such issues, see Johnson Papers, X, 626-30, 630-31, 679-80.

Amherst's message to the Ohio Indians is reproduced in Aspinwall Papers, 240-42.

Johnson Papers, X, 678-80.

Johnson to General Gage, Mar. 16, 1764, Ibid., IV, 368.

Johnson to Gage, Jan. 12, 1764, Ibid., 296; Johnson to Gage, Feb. 19, 1764, Ibid., 308, 331.

Amherst to Johnson, Nov. 8, 1760, Ibid., III, 277-78; Johnson to Amherst, Feb. 12, 1761, Ibid., 332; Johnson to Daniel Claus, Mar. 10, 1761, Ibid., 352-54; Richard Shuckburgh to Johnson, Jan. 21, 1762, Ibid., 611; Amherst to Johnson, Jul. 25, 1762, Ibid., X, 475; Amherst to Bouquet, Jun 7, 1762, in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 90-91. On the cost of the Indian service, see the estimate of salaries for agents at Fort Pitt and Detroit in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 188-89.

Bouquet to Gates, Sept. 22, 1760, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21653, 27-28; Bouquet to Amherst, May 24, 1762, Ibid., 133-34; Amherst to Bouquet, Jun. 7, 1762, Ibid., series 21634, 90-91.

Johnson to Amherst, Aug. 14, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 858; Johnson to Amherst, Sept. 5, 1762, Ibid., 876-77.

Johnson to Claus, Mar. 10, 1761, Ibid., 352-53.

Croghan to Johnson, Jan. 13, 1761, Ibid., 394; Croghan to Johnson, Feb. 10, 1761, Ibid., 329. By late January 1761, Croghan had ten agents employed in the west, six of them at Fort Pitt.

For the Easton Treaty, see Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and An Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa, 1981), 210-15; Johnson to Cadwallader Colden, Feb. 20, 1761, The Letters and Papers of Cadwallader Colden (New York Historical Society, Collections, L-LVI [New York, 1917-1923]), VI, 102-103, hereafter cited as Colden Papers; Johnson to Goldstrow Banyar, Apr. 29, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 725. For the Board of Trade's response to Virginia's efforts to expand into the Ohio country, see Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations, 255.
The standard works on the British army in America during and after the Seven Years' War are still Shy, Toward Lexington, especially chapter 2 on the standing force in America after 1760. Equally important, particularly for understanding the administration and costs of the army during the war is Stanley M. Pargellis, Lord Loudoun in America (New York, 1968). Useful and interesting documents on the army's activities in America are found in Pargellis, Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765 (New York, 1969).

In the British army at the time the terms "regiment" and "battalion" were generally interchangeable. Most regiments consisted of single battalions each of nine or ten companies. The Royal American Regiment was different. This corps consisted of four battalions, each of ten companies, with a total authorized strength of over four thousand men.
in America, has been written. However, a good summary of his early life and career is to be found in Kent and Waddell, *Bouquet Papers*, I, xvi-xxiii.


99 Bouquet to Monckton, Jan. 26, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 390-91. At that time Bouquet reported having 776 men in the ranks. See also Bouquet to General Abercrombie, Jan. 27, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21653, 170 in which Bouquet referred to the "scattered situation of our Battalion."


102 Bouquet to [?], Oct. 18, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21648, 84-86.

103 For a brief description of the Ohio outposts, see Stevens and Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles*, 202, 220.

104 On the design and building of Fort Pitt see James and Stotz, *Drums in the Forest*, 169-74.


James and Stotz, Drums in the Forest, 63, 71, 76-79.


Cochrane to Bouquet, Sept. 7, 1761, ibid., 103; Meyer to Bouquet, Sept. 24, 1761, ibid., 132-33.

Lt. McDonald to Bouquet, Sept. 18, 1761, ibid., 123; Captain Mather to Bouquet, Sept. 24, 1761, ibid., series 21647, 64.

"Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 44; Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 20, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 76-77.


Dr. Stevenson to Bouquet, Dec. 7, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 174; Stevenson to Bouquet, Apr., 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 137; on the soldiers' diet, Stevenson to Bouquet, Apr., 1761, Ibid.

Bouquet to Walters, Jun. 10, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 202-203; James and Stotz, Drums in the Forest, 111.


120 "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 158, relates an incident in which both Bouquet and Captain Lewis Ourry were injured while riding east from Fort Pitt. Ourry suffered a broken leg, Bouquet was badly shaken.

121 Walters to Bouquet, Apr. 4, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 64; Mather to Bouquet, Feb. 13, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 33-34; "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 34.


123 Captain Ecuyer to Bouquet, Dec. 10, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 180.

124 Walters to Bouquet, Jun. 19, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 212; Amherst to Walters, Jun. 22, 1761, WO 34/23.


126 On food shortages see Schlosser to Bouquet, Jan. 24, 1762, Ibid., 9-10; Lt. Guy to Bouquet, Feb. 26, 1762, Ibid., 38; Campbell to Bouquet, Feb. 10, 1762, Ibid., 22-23.


128 For an idea of the volume of meat consumed see Bouquet to Monckton, Jan. 14, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 360; Mather to Bouquet, Jan. 29, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 21; Mather to Bouquet, Feb. 13, 1761, Ibid., 33-34; Meyer to Bouquet, Oct. 12, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 164-65; Carre to Bouquet, Nov. 26, 1761, Ibid., 208.


Amherst to Major Wilkins, Nov. 28, 1762, *WO 34/23*.

Bouquet to Campbell, Jul. 9, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21652, 68-70.


Bouquet to Walters, Apr. 10, 1762, *Ibid.*, 70-72; the men of the battalion were to get one pair of shoes each that year.


Bouquet to Monckton, Jun. 12, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 421.

Cochrane to Bouquet, Sept. 27, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21647, 155-37; his troops have not been paid for six months; Meyer to Bouquet, Nov. 8, 1761, *Ibid.*, 188-89; gave his men fresh meat instead of their pay; Carre to Bouquet, Dec. 24, 1761, *Ibid.*, 241; has run out of cash; Campbell to Bouquet, Oct. 12, 1761, *Ibid.*, 161-62; all the garrison's cash has gone out of circulation; he has applied to the regimental quartermaster and paymaster for more.


Campbell to Bouquet, Mar. 10, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 61-62; Lt. McDonald to Bouquet, Mar. 10, 1761, Ibid., 63; Campbell to Bouquet, Feb. 10, 1763, Ibid., series 21648, 22-23, wherein Campbell mentioned the arrival of Sir Robert Davers, an English gentleman making a tour of the Great Lakes. He was killed the following spring in the early stages of the Indian war. See also Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III, s.v. "Davers, Sir Robert".


Bouquet to Monckton, Apr. 22, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 406.

Baillie to Bouquet, Mar. 26, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 77-78.

Bouquet to Schlosser, Apr. 8, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 119-20.

Bouquet to Cochrane, Jul. 12, 1761, Ibid., 70-71.

Bouquet to Monckton, Mar. 20, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 397; "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 408, 416.

Amherst to Walters, Nov. 2, 1760, WO 34/23; Walters to Bouquet, Nov. 8, 1760, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21645, 184-86; Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 30, 1762, Ibid., series 21634, 79, wherein Bouquet expressed his concern about the strength of the Royal Americans; with no new enlistments and the eventual discharge of many men, his battalion will be severely understrength.

Bouquet to Walters, Jun. 10, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 202-203; Amherst to Walters, Aug. 7, 1761, WO 34/23.

Bouquet to Monckton, Dec. 4, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 356-57; Bouquet to Monckton, Jan. 14, 1761, Ibid., 381.


Bouquet to Amherst, May 24, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 133-34.

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Studies on desertion in the British army during the eighteenth century include Arthur N. Gilbert, "Why Men Deserted from the Eighteenth-Century British Army," Armed Forces and Society 6 (1980), 553-67; Gilbert, "The Regimental Courts Martial in the Eighteenth Century British Army," Albion 8 (1976), 50-66; and Gilbert, "British Military Justice During the American Revolution," The Eighteenth Century 20 (1979), 24-38. While these essays contain a wealth of information on soldiers' motives for deserting and the army's efforts to cope with the problem, they are only suggestive of affairs in America. Some general information can be found in Pargellis, Lord Loudoun, 333-37. The abundance of documentary material available for the colonies, especially for the era of the Seven Years' War, offers a starting point for a comprehensive study of soldiers' lives and behavior for which Gilbert's essays can serve as a useful guide.

162 Bouquet to Monckton, Jul. 27, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 439.


164 de Couagne to Johnson, May 26, 1763, Johnson Papers, X, 684; Bouquet to Monckton, Jul. 21, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 436-37 on a similar case at Fort Pitt.


167 Bouquet to Amherst, Dec. 1, 1763, Ibid., series 21634, 294; Bouquet to Amherst, Oct. 5, 1762, Ibid., 99-100.

168 Bouquet to Amherst, Oct. 5, 1762, Ibid., 99-100.

169 Court martial held at Fort Niagara, Dec. 4, 1762, WO 34/22.

170 Bouquet to Amherst, Feb. 3, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 63-64; Campbell to Bouquet, Jul. 7, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 7-9.

171 Amherst to Bouquet, Mar. 2, 1762, Ibid., series 21634, 73; Ibid., series 21655, 167 for negotiations with Mohican John's Town for the return of two deserters from Sandusky; Meyer to Bouquet Nov. 8, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 188-89.
281


173 Amherst to Wilkins, Dec. 5, 1762, WO 34/23.


187 Walters to Amherst, Aug. 14, 1760, WO 34/21; Walters to Amherst, Jun 29, 1761, *Ibid*.


189 Campbell to Bouquet, May 21, 1761,*Ibid.*, 162-64.

190 *Ibid*.


199 Thomas Hay to Bouquet, Apr. 9, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds.,
Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 97.


204 Quoted in Thayer, Pennsylvania Politics, 80.


208 Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21657, extract of Amherst's letters to Bouquet Apr. 5, 1761 with orders to drive off the Monongahala squatters; Jun 28, 1761, leave given to set up taverns along Forbes' Road; see also Solon J. Buck and Elizabeth Hawthorn Buck, *The Planting of Civilization in Western Pennsylvania* (Pittsburgh, 1968), 141.

209 The basis for the following discussion is "A List of Houses and Inhabitants at Fort Pitt, Apr. 14, 1761," Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21646, 103-108.

210 For a ground plan of Fort Pitt in 1761, see James and Stotz, *Drums in the Forest*, 163.


Rutherford to Amherst, Apr. 28, 1761, WO 34/21.

Johnson to Walters, Apr. 29, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 728.

Amherst to Walters, Jul. 25, 1761, WO 34/23; Johnson to Amherst, Jul. 29, 1761, Johnson Papers, X, 320-21.

Johnson to Amherst, Jul. 29, 1761, Ibid., 320-21.

Johnson to Daniel Claus, May 20, 1761, Ibid., 270.

For details on this engagement see Shy, Toward Lexington, 125; Howard Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (New York, 1970), 223-25.

Amherst to Wilkins, Oct. 17, 1762, WO 34/23; Johnson to Walters, Apr. 29, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 728.

Henry Van Schaak to Johnson, Nov. 7, 1762, Ibid., 928.

Walters to Amherst, Jul. 30, 1761, WO 34/21.

Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 9, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 515.

Amherst to Walters, Aug. 9, 1761, WO 34/23.

Amherst to William Sharpe, Oct. 20, 1762, WO 34/74.

Amherst to Wilkins, Oct. 17, 1762, WO 34/23.


Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures In Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (Rutland, Vt., 1969), chpt. 4, esp. 52-53; Bouquet to Monckton, Jan. 26, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 391, Kellogg, British Regime, 10-12.

Lt. Hambach to Bouquet, Apr. 6, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 91; Campbell to Bouquet, May 21, 1761, Ibid., 162-64; Robert Callendar to Bouquet, May 23, 1761, Ibid., 168; "Croghan's Journal", 405.

"Croghan's Journal", 422; "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 34; Kellogg, British Regime, 10-12; "Gorrell Journal", 37-38 for the names of traders at La Baye; Meyer to Bouquet, Dec. 9, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21647, 232 for information on twenty traders at the Sandusky post; Ibid., series 21654 for a
list of traders in the Ohio country in 1763.

230 Hambach to Bouquet, May 24, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 171; Callendar to Bouquet, May 23, 1761, Ibid., 168.

231 Hambach to Bouquet, May 24, 1761, Ibid., 171.

232 Callendar to Bouquet, May 23, 1761, Ibid., 168; Hambach to Bouquet, May 24, 1761, Ibid., 171.


235 Carre to Bouquet, Feb. 2, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 17.

236 Amherst to Johnson, Feb. 14, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 362-83.

237 Blane to Bouquet, Mar. 12, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 46.

238 Johnson to Amherst, Sept. 24, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 883.

239 Regulations for forts Pitt, Miami, Sandusky, Johnson Papers, III, 530-35; price lists are to be found in Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21645, 270.

240 Blane to Bouquet, Mar. 6, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 43.

241 Blane to Bouquet, Mar. 14, 1762, Ibid., 47.

242 Johnson to Amherst, May 6, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 731; Amherst to Johnson, May 16, 1762, Ibid., 742.

243 Claus to Johnson, Feb. 16, 1762, Ibid., 637-38.

244 Johnson to Claus, Aug. 9, 1761, Ibid., X, 323.

245 Bouquet to Monckton, Mar. 18, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 393.

246 Amherst to Johnson, Feb. 22, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 343-45.

247 Johnson to John Tabor Kempe, Dec. 18, 1762, Ibid., 976-77.
Mercer to Forbes, Feb. 28, 1759, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania from the Organization to the Termination of the Proprietary Government (Harrisburg, 1838-1853), VIII, 369.

Campbell to Bouquet, May 21, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 162-64; Campbell to Bouquet, Jun. 1, 1761, Ibid., 183-84; Campbell to Johnson, Jun. 17, Jul. 8, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 439, 450.


Johnson to Amherst, Apr. 1, 1762, Dec. 7, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 664-65, 962-63.


Amherst to Johnson, Aug. 22, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 489; Johnson to Amherst, Aug. 28, 1762, Ibid., 496.

Amherst to Walters, Jan. 17, 1761, WO 34/23.

Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 7, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 75-76; Bouquet to Carre, Apr. 8, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 122-23; "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 44.


Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 7, 1762, Ibid., series 21634, 75-76.


Collin Andrews et. al. to Johnson, Apr. 27, 1762, Ibid., 720-21; Amherst to Walters, May 9, 1762, WO 34/23.

Johnson Papers, XIII, 234.

Johnson to Wilkins, Dec. 22, 1762, Ibid., 281.

Amherst to Wilkins, Jul. 25, 1762, WO 34/23.

Amherst to Wilkins, Oct. 24, 1762, Ibid.; Amherst to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 942-43.

For examples of passes issued by Gage see Jun 5, 1762, pass issued to Lucas Van Vechten and Company; Apr. 1, 1762, pass issued to John Segar and Thomas Finley; May 27, 1762, pass issued to George Knagg, WO 34/22.

Gage to Wilkins, Oct. 7, 1762, WO 34/22.

Captain George le Hunte to Wilkins, Sept. 23, 1762, WO 34/22.

Amherst to Wilkins, Oct. 24, 1762, WO 34/23; Amherst to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 942-43.
Anglo-American Occupation of the West: 1758-63

- **Military Posts**
  1. Ft. Cumberland ................. 1758
  2. Ft. Bedford ................... 1758
  3. Ft. Ligonier .................... 1758
  4. Ft. Bud [Redstone Creek] .... 1758
  5. Ft. Pitt ........................ 1758
  7. Ft. Niagara .................... 1759
  8. Ft. Venango .................... 1760
  9. Ft. Le Boeuf ................... 1760
 10. Ft. Presqu'ile .................. 1760
 11. Ft. Detroit .................... 1760
 12. Ft. Sandusky ................... 1760
 13. Ft. Miamis ...................... 1761
 14. Ft. Ouananock .................. 1761
 15. Ft. St. Joseph ................. 1761
 16. Ft. Michilimackinac .......... 1761
 17. Ft. Edward Augustus Ille Bayel... 1761
 18. Ft. de Chartres (French to 1765)

- **Trade Posts**
  - Principal English Military Routes West

- **Scale**: 30 miles
CHAPTER V

The Quest for Security:
The Indian Search for Accommodation,
1758-1761

Regardless of the orders issued, precautions taken, and forces mustered by General Amherst, the degree to which Anglo-Americans were able to hold and control the west depended in large measure on the Indians living there. Far from being passive observers to what amounted to a revolution in their relations with European intruders and a renewed assault on their lands and independence, western Indians played an active role in post-war affairs. They, like the Anglo-Americans who feared their potential for war or sought their lands and peltries, entered the post-war period with certain expectations, goals, and perceptions of those whom they confronted. Further, the natives west of the Appalachians were fragmented into a variety of interests, some of which divided communities or cut across community lines to create something akin to regional cooperation.

It would be a mistake to assume that all Indians in the west were immediately hostile to intruding colonists and that war was inevitable from the outset. Native groups responded to Anglo-Americans in a variety of ways based on local needs, the political and economic climate in their regions, and, most of all, on the amount and kind of information available about the intruders' intentions and actions. These responses were in all cases rooted in the social and economic
dynamics that had developed prior to the Seven Years' War. Indian actions in the face of renewed Anglo-American invasion represented an on-going process in the same way as did the actions of Amherst and Sir William Johnson.

Some measure of the expectations held by western Indians regarding Anglo-American behavior and of the ways in which English officials explained royal policies to native audiences can be gained from the numerous councils held during the early 1760s. These meetings included formal gatherings called to confirm peace and smaller, less formal, exchanges between men representing specific native interests and Anglo-American officials. In these meetings, royal agents worked to create and maintain peace while extending "His Majesty's Interest." It was here that commitments were made and explanations of Anglo-American actions given. On their part, western Indians used these councils in three ways. First, they used the council forum to outline their policies and the bases upon which peace could be achieved. Second, such meetings allowed native audiences to hear the official Anglo-American position, which could then be measured against subsequent actions and used to formulate responses to those actions. Finally, when, as often happened, English words and deeds did not coincide, Indian leaders could voice opposition or complaint in public, thus placing and obligation on Anglo-American leaders to rectify matters to native satisfaction.

While royal agents tended to use the council as another tool for manipulating Indians through a combination of threats, misinformation, promises, and half-truths, the Indian participants
tended to hold another view. To them the council, and its proto-
col, represented a bond between people. Commitments made in such
meetings, confirmed by the exchange of gifts, were meant to be
carried out. This difference in outlook between royal expediency
and native traditional values contributed in no small way to grow-
ing misunderstanding and resentment on both sides.

I

The first of these diplomatic encounters took place within
days of General Forbes' occupation of Fort Duquesne. Responding
to a call from Indian agent George Croghan, local Delawares led by
Tamaqua arrived on December 4, 1758, having just missed the fatally
ill general, who had departed for Philadelphia. The Indians' delay
was occasioned by the discussion of the Easton Treaty, news of
which had recently arrived by way of Pisquetomen and Christian
Frederick Post.

At Fort Duquesne the Delawares were reminded of the power of
Anglo-American arms: a power reflected in the still-smoldering ruins
of the fort. In addition, Colonel Henry Bouquet emphasized that the
army's purpose was not to take possession of any lands but only to
drive out the French—the common enemy and disturbers of the peace—
and to protect those who, Bouquet promised, would "open a large and
extensive trade." Finally, the colonel urged Tamaqua to continue
working for a general peace by carrying news of the Easton Treaty to
Indians living west of the Ohio.¹

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Characteristically, Tamaqua responded cautiously. While agreeing to send messages westward of the Anglo-Americans' peaceful intentions, he studiously avoided any commitment to help the army against the French troops who remained in the Ohio country. Given the proximity of those forces, Tamaqua's reply was a wise one. Finally, while voicing strong reservations about English troops remaining on the Ohio, Tamaqua, on behalf of the assembled Delaware leaders, agreed to permit a two hundred-man garrison under Colonel Hugh Mercer to hold the forks of the Ohio. This last concession permitted Mercer's troops to hang on until the following summer, when the arrival of regular troops under General John Stanwix, coupled with the fall of Fort Niagara, made the Anglo-American position on the Ohio more secure.

This brief meeting, lasting just two days, contained the essence of subsequent official exchanges. For their part, the Anglo-Americans strove to emphasize their power and peaceful intent, underscoring these with promises of trade; all in return for Indian cooperation in maintaining peace and aiding, or at least acquiescing in, the presence of royal forces sent to "protect" native lands and the fur trade. In reply, the Indians expressed their willingness to accept certain conditions for peace—conditions that tended to change over time—as long as peace and trade were forthcoming and as long as Anglo-American forces made no attempt to usurp native lands. Additionally, the Indians living on the Ohio did not define the December meeting as the beginning of normal relations but only one more step toward the normalization of relations between the two societies,
normalcy being defined in native, not English, terms. Finally, the December meeting was conducted, as were others over the next two years, in the context of traditional protocol, complete with the exchange of presents and wampum which marked the exchanges in council as binding on both parties.

The dialogues between western Indians and Anglo-American agents continued to expand, both in the number of participating interests and in the substance of negotiations. The widening diplomatic contacts which eventually included Kickapoo and Kaskaskia from the Illinois country as well as Indians from throughout the Great Lakes, resulted from several factors. One was the continued influence and activity of Tamaqua and his supporters within the Delaware community. Fulfilling his promise to Bouquet, Tamaqua worked energetically throughout the winter and spring of 1758-59 to arrange councils and communicate the substance of the Easton Treaty and Bouquet's messages. His success was due in part to his own neutral position and in part to the symbolic role his people played in the political order of the west. In the extended kinship terminology that defined such relations, the Delawares were recognized as the "grandfathers" of the Algonkian groups living west of the Ohio, just as the Delawares were, in turn, the "nephews" of their nominal overlords and "uncles" the Iroquois. This terminology defined less a power relationship than it did one of respect and deference. As dutiful grandchildren, Great Lakes Indians listened with respect and trust to messages received from the older, wiser, Delawares. The influence of Tamaqua and his people was further reflected in the subsequent Anglo-Indian
meetings wherein Tamaqua served as principal Indian spokesman and often opened the proceedings and established the agenda on behalf of other native participants.

While Tamaqua's labors and influence were decisive in bringing about a rapprochement between the English and western Indians, other reasons emerge for the apparent eagerness of at least some natives to open negotiations and seek peace. The Seven Years' War had been costly to western Indians in a number of ways. Military campaigns not only cost lives but also kept a town's economic mainstay--its young men--away for extended periods of time. The result was a disruption of trade, food procurement, and perhaps a decline in crop yields due to the absence of manpower to clear and protect new fields. As long as the French empire in the west remained intact and well supplied, such problems could be overcome by demanding higher prices for military aid. However, by 1758 conditions began to deteriorate. Colonel Mercer, at the site of Fort Duquesne, reported that many Delawares "are starving at home" due in part to the loss of cornfields during their westward migration the previous summer in response to Forbes' march. Crop failures also seem to have struck the western Senecas in 1759 and this may have extended into the upper Ohio region. The following August, Colonel Bouquet reported that Indians returning to Presqu'ile from Niagara were "being about Starved" and offered another explanation for this by noting that "the Deer [have] now left the Lake." The extent to which Indians on the Great Lakes suffered from the same problems is reflected in reports from Detroit. Indian spies told George Croghan in May
1760 that "the Inhabitants about D'Troit are much Distrest with the want of Provisions" and more important for Anglo-Indian relations "Indian goods are very scarce there." The bleak state of affairs was confirmed by the town's new English governor, Captain Donald Campbell. He found the government storehouses "almost empty" while noting the habitants' apparent joy at being relieved from war and suffering. He further observed that the "Indians here in great distress for want of Ammunition" which made hunting difficult if not wholly impossible. Less is known about conditions beyond Detroit. While the 1757-58 epidemic and related wartime losses certainly affected Indians in the upper Lakes region, the impact on local economies is problematical. The absence of large concentrations of foreign troops and the hunting economy of many of the Indians living north and west of Detroit may have lessened the impact of the war. Further, Indians living south of the Great Lakes near French forts on the Maumee and Wabash rivers may have enjoyed a better supply of food and gunpowder than those living closer to the theatre of war. For these latter, the arrival of English troops on the Ohio, however poor their own circumstances, offered a chance to normalize economic conditions and the trade upon which much of the natives' livelihood had come to depend.

For some of the Indians living on the Ohio River the presence of English and colonial forces was encouraging for another reason. Early in January 1759 Colonel Mercer greeted a delegation of Iroquois, Delawares, and Shawnees who had come down from the Allegheny town of Conawango in order to learn the details of the December meet-
ing with Bouquet. The Iroquois dominated the subsequent exchange, reflecting the fact that Conawango was a Seneca town to which Delawares and Shawnees had attached themselves. In a private meeting with Mercer the Iroquois unburdened themselves. They urged the English to persevere in the war against the French for, without such aid, the Iroquois feared they would be destroyed by the French and their western Algonkian allies. Telling Mercer that the French and Ottawas were so close that "one of them Sits on my Shoulder, and the Other on My Arm," the Conawango speaker warned the colonel that a lack of resolve meant the destruction of both Englishmen and Indians.\textsuperscript{10} Warning further that the Delawares and Shawnees could not be trusted, the Iroquois spokesman, Ocondenage, instructed Mercer to reject publicly the official call by the Indians for the English to withdraw from the Ohio, instructions which Mercer carried out on cue the next day, thus allowing the Iroquois to fulfill the official purpose of the meeting in order to satisfy the suspected onlookers.\textsuperscript{11} Mercer amplified the Iroquois' concern to his superiors. He remarked on their "jealousy" of the western Indians, especially the Delawares and Shawnees who, Mercer believed, would use the French to "shake off" their dependence on the Six Nations.\textsuperscript{12}

The Iroquois' concern about an attack from the west illustrates another problem created by the war. As native groups engaged as auxiliaries for the warring Europeans they risked setting off revenge wars and reprisals that had little or nothing to do with the colonial conflict. Going beyond the problem faced by the Conawango Senecas, which may have grown out of a purely native response to attack and
counter-attack, the Six Nations proper faced a similar dilemma. In 1760 the Indians living at Detroit were ready to go to war against the Iroquois in order to avenge the killing of western warriors by the Six Nations during the siege of Fort Niagara the previous year.\textsuperscript{13} While such political conflict could prove advantageous to English designs, it could well prove disastrous to the Indians involved. An alternative to revenge-motivated warfare was presented by the Anglo-Americans on the Ohio who were calling on all western Indians to disengage from the war. This would be a useful and necessary first step toward resolving outstanding differences between native groups.

Finally, English peace overtures began to look attractive in relation to declining French military power in the west. Throughout the period from mid-1759 through early 1763, western Indians proceeded to re-evaluate their circumstances in light of the changing balance of power in the west, insofar as they were able to understand it. Many who had reluctantly accepted French control of their lands and economies now sought to chart a new course. As a returned captive said of the Detroit Wyandots, the campaigns of 1758 and 1759 had demonstrated the inability of the French to maintain their position in the west. As a result, "the most Sensible Indians are for Standing Neuter."\textsuperscript{14} This neutral path, it was hoped, would disentangle Indians from a war that had cost native groups dearly and had availed them nothing. That not all western Indians were overjoyed at the turn of events was confirmed by an observer who noted that "the Chiefs of all Nations over the Lakes hath much more affection
for the French than for the English"—an affection born of a
century-old cooperation through trade and mutual interests. 15
The same could not be said of the newly arrived Anglo-Americans
who remained unfamiliar and unpredictable. It was this combination
of realism and a need to know what the English intended to do with
their victories that led many Indians to meetings at Fort Pitt
and, later, at Detroit.

The Indians who entered into these encounters did not do so from
a position of military defeat but as equals with their Anglo-America-
can counterparts. Indeed, they used the councils as forums to
amplify their own expectations and to voice their demands and terms
on which the English could expect peace. As skilled diplomats in
their own right, native leaders were aware of the give-and-take
necessary on such occasions and were prepared to concede certain
points in return for Anglo-American assurances of coopera- on on
matters vital to native interests. What complicated negotiations
for Indian leaders was both the localized nature of their own so-
cieties and the number of interests that had to be satisfied before
any commitments could be made or treaties ratified. In the first
place, agreements could not embrace anyone who was not included, or
chose not to be included, in negotiations. For example, Tamaqua
spoke only for those Delawares who recognized his authority or stand-
ing as a negotiator. Others, notably Custaloga's people near Venango,
acted independently of their kinsmen to the south. Further, sacheams
could not make peace with the Anglo-Americans without the cooperation
of two powerful interests at home: women and warriors. Only warriors
could end fighting by symbolically burying the war hatchet. Women, particularly among the matrilineal Delawares and Iroquois, would have to be mollified with gifts and other forms of compensation for lost kinsmen before they would agree to stop promoting raids aimed at restoring the dead through captives or scalps. Thus, Anglo-American responses in council and willingness to follow accepted customs and to give the necessary assurances were important if native leaders were to argue convincingly against continued hostilities and arrive at a consensus on peace. Fundamentally this meant that relations with the Anglo-Americans could only be re-established on terms that satisfied native values and expectations. These, in turn, were defined in light of past experience with both the English and French and included an emphasis on reciprocity and overt signs of friendship, usually in the form of gifts.

The numerous meetings held in 1759 and 1760 defined the conditions on which peace could be established and the framework within which western Indians were willing to develop a cooperative relationship with the Anglo-Americans. These councils also chart the growing interest among western Indians in peace from the fall of Fort Duquesne through the collapse of French power in the west in 1760.

On the Ohio early in 1759, local Indians raised two issues that were to become constants in Anglo-Indian relations: the presence of Anglo-American forces in the west and trade. The Conawango Iroquois who spoke to Colonel Mercer in January had been delegated by the Delawares and Shawnees of that town to press the English to withdraw from the Ohio country, a request first made the previous December.
While the Iroquois turned the meeting to their own purposes, the subject of troops on the Ohio remained a real one for Indians in the region. The reason for native insistence on this matter was revealed in information supplied to Mercer by the Delaware Thomas Bull. According to Bull, the Ohio Indians who were otherwise disposed toward peace with the English wanted the war taken "over the Great Water"—that is, away from Indian lands and people who wished to be spared the necessity of choosing sides in any future fighting. The Quaker trader James Kenny also observed that "ye Indians do not want us to remain here."  

During a meeting with Mercer in July, a meeting which laid the groundwork for a full-scale peace conference the following month, the issue of English troops and forts was again raised. In a private conversation with Pisquetomen following the council, James Kenny again recorded that "ye Indians are very jealous of ye English coming here with an army; they seem jealous of their lands being settled." He also mentioned his close interrogation during the meeting by Pisquetomen who wanted Kenny "to tell what ye English or ye General [Stanwix] meant by coming here with a great army" and reminded Kenny that, as a Quaker, he "should speak truth & not lie."  

By way of a reply, the trader held to the official line: that the troops were needed to keep the French out and to protect the traders. Though western Indians from the Ohio country and Great Lakes continued to urge royal officials to remove the troops, the soldiers remained. And while resentment and apprehension continued to grow, little else was done for the moment. The reason, as Kenny's ex-
change with Pisquetomen suggests, was trade. At a meeting in February 1759, Tamaqua again emphasized the important place trade relations held in establishing peace. Given his current role as shuttle diplomat between the English and Indians living west of the Ohio, it was particularly important that the Delaware leader be able to carry back to the interested Indians tangible signs of Anglo-American interest in supplying desired and sorely needed goods. To this end, Tamaqua brought several of his own warriors "with their Skins and Furrs, in hopes that the Goods which you promised to send to trade with us are come." Colonel Mercer, whose own troops were reduced to a diet of horsemeat, dogs, and shoeleather, could only promise again that trade goods would be forthcoming, as indeed they were, in the form of James Kenney's outfit from Philadelphia as well as numerous other traders who began to move west as winter receded.

Throughout the year, at councils held in July and October, the call for trade was repeated, made more urgent, as one Ottawa explained, because "We have thrown away the French & must now depend upon you for Suppllys." The price that would have to be paid, however, was the continued presence of the garrisons. As George Croghan explained at the July meeting on the site of Fort Pitt, due to the state of war trade as it was conducted before 1754 could not take place. Rather, troops would have to build "strong houses" to protect the traders. The implication, doubtless recognized by Croghan's audience, was that the end of the war would mean the removal of the garrisons and the normalization of trade as it had been before the
war. Disappointment grew when, after 1760, the French departed but the redcoats stayed and even extended their hold over the west. In the meantime, Croghan's explanation served as the perfect rationale for maintaining an army in the region. Indians who complained or resisted risked the loss of trade and further hardship.

Closely associated in the Ohio Indians' minds with the continued presence of English soldiers was the issue of native lands. Reminding the Anglo-Americans of past abuses, Ohio Indian leaders in July 1759 put the colonists in mind of the commitment made by the crown at Easton the previous October to protect Indian lands from further encroachments. Subsequent assurances that native rights to lands they claimed would be protected, including a message from General Amherst, appeared to confirm Anglo-American sincerity.

Underlying initial Indian assumptions and expectations and, consequently, their initial responses to Anglo-American incursions into the west was a widely held belief that the present conflict would end in the resumption of Indian-European relations as they had been before 1754. Indians living in the Great Lakes region appear to have anticipated a French victory, hopes of which were effectively dashed by the loss of Fort Niagara and the subsequent disruption of trade and the loss of French prestige. Nonetheless, the idea that the English might win and hold what was then New France and the French trading empire in the west was something that appears not to have entered into native calculations on how best to deal with the current state of affairs. Basing their policies on the limited information they received and on past experience, many
western Indians assumed that this war would end in the same status quo ante as had previous colonial conflicts. On the Ohio, the Indians who met Colonel Mercer expressed a strong desire to see their lands de-militarized as they had been prior to the French invasion of 1753.

As French fortunes continued to decline, more western Indians sought some way of accommodating to the advancing Anglo-Americans, but did so believing either in a French restoration after the war or, at the very least, that the English would acknowledge and accept cultural relations on the terms that had existed before the war. One reflection of this outlook was the assumption that the Anglo-Americans would continue to acknowledge Indian sovereignty and equality through gift exchanges and through continued adherence to other forms of native protocol. Commanders of English garrisons on the Great Lakes reported that Indians expected gifts, particularly ammunition for winter hunting, "as it was the Custom" as was also the council protocol that military men seldom understood or appreciated. To the Indians such expectations were reasonable as compensation for the use of trails, land, and food supplies, as well as a sign of friendship, however contrived. Ironically, in the initial stages of their occupation of the west, royal officials continued the war-time practice of attempting to buy peace and cooperation with gifts. While to the Anglo-Americans such actions were merely an expedient to be dispensed with as soon as possible, Indians, equally culture bound, interpreted the largess in very different terms. As the royal attempt to revolutionize relations began after
1760, western Indians began to measure English actions against the yardstick of wartime and pre-war relations, especially with the more generous French. In nearly every case the Anglo-Americans were found wanting.

While western Indians took full advantage of the treaty councils to state their positions, they also learned something of Anglo-American sentiments regarding peace and coexistence. First, English negotiators, whether Indian agents or military officers, were quick to re-affirm the promises made at Easton regarding the re-opening of trade and the sanctity of native lands west of the mountains. At an important meeting at Fort Pitt in July 1759, one attended with great interest by Wyandots representing several Great Lakes groups, George Croghan promised that "the English will never violate any of their Engagements to you or any of your Brethren of any other Nation, but hold fast the Chain of Friendship." He continued to assure the assembly that as soon as the French menace had been removed a trade conforming to Indian desires would be fully established. Croghan's words were echoed by General John Stanwix, British commander on the Ohio. In October he met with western Indians to give his and the crown's stamp of approval to earlier exchanges and agreements. In so doing he promised that "everything relating to the Peace made between us has been performed on our part" and would continue to be. At subsequent meetings the same message of fidelity was passed to native audiences. The apparent sincerity of these messages was reinforced by the large gifts that punctuated the councils.
However, the Delawares, Shawnees, Wyandots, and the other western Indians they represented soon learned that English cooperation carried a price. As Amherst's message to the Indians, delivered at Fort Pitt in August 1760, emphasized, all agreements were conditional on the Indians' behavior as "Good and Faithful Allies." To Amherst this meant that the Indians should cooperate with, and accept subordination to, the Anglo-Americans. The issue was never put that bluntly to native audiences, though the latter were not slow to understand the meaning of the new partnership. Rather, the Anglo-Americans defined "Good and Faithful Allies" as those Indians who would do two things. First, the Indians, especially those in the Ohio country whose attachment to the French had been at best lukewarm, were expected to actively support the Anglo-American operations against the remaining French strongholds in the region. Of far greater significance, however, was a caveat that appeared repeatedly in formal and informal exchanges: the return of English captives. Both demands found little favor among the Indians concerned. Participation in military operations, while guaranteeing a flow of much needed supplies, nevertheless would not solve the fundamental problems created by native involvement in a European war.

It was the prisoner issue that truck the hardest. The link between permanent peace and the repatriation of captives first arose at Easton in 1758 and was amplified in subsequent negotiations. Groghan told the Ohio Indians that "we do insist, that you also perform those [promises] made on your part, by restoring to us our flesh and blood that yet remain among you, as we can never taste Satisfaction
til this is done." General Stanwix also urged compliance when he told the October 1759 meeting that he insisted on the return of all captives. The same message was carried to the Great Lakes where, in December 1760, Detroit Indians were reminded of their earlier agreement to return captives, something Amherst expected them to do "forthwith."

In calling for the return of captives, the Anglo-Americans had struck at two powerful and, at the moment, volatile elements within native societies: women and warriors. Among groups such as the Iroquois, Delawares, Miamis, and Wyandots, women were often initially responsible for the captives being taken when they called for raids to replace lost kinsmen. Prisoners subsequently taken became the property of the women's families or the warriors who took them. Captives taken and adopted became in effect, full members of their new communities, filling the places left by deceased members. Returning such people to their own kind threatened to rend the fabric of native communities and could only be done with the consent of the families directly affected. A village leader's role in such an affair was limited to attempting to convince the families involved to give up white adoptees. For this, compensation in the form of gifts was required, gifts that had to come ultimately from the Anglo-Americans who initiated the demand.

In the early stages of negotiations, the Anglo-Americans were reluctant, indeed unable, to impose stringent schedules for the return of prisoners. George Croghan, falling back on years of experience with western Indians, told natives at Fort Pitt that "we do not
think it practicable for you to deliver up at once, or in any Place, all our People." He thus acknowledged the complicated and tension-producing negotiations within native communities that would result from the demand for the captives.\textsuperscript{37} As time went on, however, and the Indians appeared to be falling behind in their commitment to return the captives English pressure mounted, including threats of trade sanctions against those who did not comply.\textsuperscript{38} This pressure was felt more strongly by the Ohio Indians than those in the Great Lakes region. The former appear to have held the overwhelming number of captives, judging from the number subsequently exchanged. Conversely, the Lakes Indians claimed to have very few prisoners.\textsuperscript{39} The small number returned appears to bear this out and may be explained by the practice of ransoming captives to the French in return for money, supplies, and arms, a practice evidently not engaged in by Indians further east who seem to have been more interested in strengthening their own communities through adoption.\textsuperscript{40} The pressure to return people who, by native standards, had become fully integrated members of local communities was increased by the linkage created by the Anglo-Americans between repatriation, trade, and peace.

II

The negotiations through which each side made its expectations known and during which hints of later tension and conflict emerged were part of a necessarily elaborate, time-consuming process. For
Anglo-Americans the goal was twofold: to detach western Indians from the French, and to establish peace with the natives which would facilitate expansion. On the other side of the council fire, the Indian participants also sought peace, but measured in terms of security, continued independence, and the re-establishment of the pre-war pattern of relations. The climax of this peace-making came late in the summer of 1759 when, at two councils on the Ohio, local Indians and some, but by no means all, of the Great Lakes Indians made peace with the English. Again, the moving force was Tamaqua who, as he had promised the previous winter, arrived with delegates from Detroit and the Maumee and Wabash valleys who were prepared to enter into the diplomatic exchange. The councils at Pittsboro also shed light on the motives that induced some western Indians to bury the war hatchet and explore avenues of accommodation with the Anglo-Americans.

Between July 5 and 15 George Croghan hosted a council which, by his own estimation, included nearly five hundred natives. Led by the Delawares, the Indian representatives included Detroit Wyandots who in turn spoke for other Indians living at or near Detroit. While the Ohio Iroquois were present and their delegates followed the proceedings closely, the council belonged to Tamaqua. It marked the culmination of his efforts to bring trans-Appalachian Indians to the fire with the English. As the Wyandots explained, they had come representing eight other "nations" "as was agreed upon in a Council held over the Lakes by the Beaver King [Tamaqua] with their Nations." The purpose of the meeting was to fix conditions upon
which peace could be made. The participants were civil leaders, but they were mindful of the limitations of their authority and the influence still held at home by their warriors. When asked to delay any formal negotiations until a major treaty council could be held in Philadelphia, the western delegates refused. Their reason was their insistence that peace be quickly confirmed so that they might then urge their warriors to abandon both the French and thoughts of continued raids against Anglo-American settlements.

Tamaqua, speaking for both his own Delaware followers and his Shawnee allies, reaffirmed his own commitment to peace. More important, he took the initiative on the prisoner issue by releasing two adopted female captives. Their role in Delaware society as well as the degree to which Tamaqua looked upon them as kin rather than captives is revealed in his public remarks on the occasion. He referred to them as "my Mother" and "my Sister." His reluctance in returning them was made evident by his insistence that "I love them as well as I do my own Mother and Sister" and his request that the English not "hide" them as he hoped to see them again. Finally, Tamaqua asked the English to show their sincerity by keeping their Catawba Indian allies—avowed enemies of the Ohio and Lakes Indians—out of the Ohio country.

Having made their own interests and needs known and having learned the conditions on which the Anglo-Americans were willing to make peace, the assembled Indians departed. One month later another meeting was held, this time to publicly bury the war hatchet. Again, Croghan had extended the invitation, but as in the July meeting, the
driving force appears to have been Tamaqua. On this particular occasion the Anglo-Americans acted largely as observers, Croghan having indicated that "my reason for calling them was to hear what they had to say to each other" and to have those who had first taken up arms declare peace in open council. The cast of native characters was significantly different from that of the July meeting. With the notable exceptions of Tamaqua and Delaware George, the participants were all "captains", that is, war leaders, representing most of the groups mentioned in the minutes of the earlier meeting.

Tamaqua, by reminding the warriors of the commitments he had earlier received from their civil chiefs, asked them to take the necessary steps toward confirming peace with the Anglo-Americans. In order to do this, the parties that had first sent out the call for war had to call upon the other participants to stop fighting. The Delawares, admitting their part in urging other Indians to strike the colonists, did so, thus opening the road to peace. The principal Delaware war leader then announced to the assembly that "we take the Hatchet we sent you out of your Hands," after which, with a display of the appropriate council wampum, he metaphorically buried the war hatchet under the Tree of Peace where, he hoped, it "may never be found more." "Think no more of war," he urged the warriors, "but go a hunting, and travel this Road of Peace and visit your Brethren the English, and exchange your skins and furs, for Goods to cloth your Women and Children," thus underscoring once again the principal basis for peace: trade, both as economic exchange and
as a sign of continued good faith and friendship.\textsuperscript{53}

The encounters on the Ohio reveal more than the persistence of traditional council practices. These and subsequent meetings offer glimpses of both inter-societal relations and the state of affairs within native communities which influenced Indian efforts to deal with the Anglo-Americans. The agreements reached with George Croghan and later ratified by regional army officers were not considered by the Indians as binding on those who did not actively participate in the meetings. Tamaqua, for example, while speaking on behalf of both the Delawares and Shawnees, appears to have been supported by the same coalition that had existed in the fall of 1758. At the July 1759 meeting he was accompanied by Delaware George, Shingas, Keekysoung, Killbuck, and Captain Pipe, all of whom were prominent in the encounters with Christian Frederick Post a year earlier.\textsuperscript{54}

Absent from the 1759 negotiations, however, were two important Delaware leaders, Netawatwees and Custaloga. Tamaqua, following accepted practice, could not presume to speak for these men and their followers unless delegated to do so. Whether he was so appointed is unclear, at least in the case of Netawatwees, who was not listed among those in attendance at the 1759 meetings. He may not have wished to participate or, equally likely, may have deliberately stayed away lest his known hostility toward the Anglo-Americans damage prospects for peace. He may thus have chosen to follow the course charted by Tamaqua. Netawatwees’ absence may also be explained by the relocation of his own town to the Cuyahoga River, a move that was completed by 1760.\textsuperscript{55} Whatever the situation, Netawatwees did not appear before
the Anglo-Americans until August of 1760 when he was part of a Delaware group that came to hear Amherst's message to the western Indians. 56

Characteristically, Custaloga remained detached from affairs around Fort Pitt, although it appears that as early as January 1759 some Delawares from Venango were attempting to sound out English intentions. 57 Custaloga's detachment can be explained in part by the presence of French troops in his neighborhood well into 1759. Also, his close association with the Ohio Senecas, who were themselves divided over how to deal with the Anglo-Americans, may have given him pause. 58 Custaloga's absence from the 1759 meetings meant that he did not have to consider himself duty bound to accept their outcomes, as George Croghan learned in 1760. While marching with troops bent on occupying the French post at Presqu'ile, Croghan reported that Custaloga's people "upbraided Me between Jest & Ernest" telling "I tuck a very good Method to first Make a Road Throw thire Cuntry and then Aquaint them I was going to Do itt." 59

The Lakes Indians who first appeared in the council records in July 1759 also represented specific groups rather than whole "nations". The particular identities of these people are more difficult to determine, though it would appear that the Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and Ottawas represented part, or all, of their towns at Detroit and, perhaps, Saginaw Bay. Their close association in these meetings with the Detroit Wyandots would suggest this to have been the case. For nearly a century these three groups and the Wyandots had been linked together in European accounts as the "three fires" or the

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"western confederacy" for which the Wyandots traditionally acted as public spokesmen. 60

The prestige and influence wielded by the Wyandots among western Indians is also reflected in their being designated spokesmen by the Kaskaskias, Miamis, and other groups living west of Detroit who were interested in pursuing relations with the Anglo-Americans. Undoubtedly, these western groups could have, had they chosen to, spoken directly with royal officials. That they chose instead to work through the Wyandots reflects an acknowledgement of the special relationship the latter enjoyed with other western Indians, by whom they were called "grandfather". On a more practical level, previous Wyandot trade contacts with Anglo-Americans may have made them ideal go-betweens, much as Tamaqua's neutrality did for the Delawares. 61

The role of the Iroquois on the Ohio continued to be ambivalent, as did the Anglo-American policy toward the League and its role in the affairs of the Ohio country. The situation that had existed can better be understood by making a distinction between the League Iroquois and the "Six Nations of Ohio" whose dominant members were the Senecas living on the Allegheny River above Venango. The latter group, under Tanaghrisson and Scarouady, had taken an active, independent role in regional affairs before the Seven Years' War, while the League had chosen not to involve itself in the growing crisis on the Ohio. This pattern continued after 1758. At the July 1759 meeting and again in October, the "Iroquois" mentioned in the council minutes were those from the Ohio. One of their leaders, Kayahsota, along with another Ohio Seneca, Tahaladoris, was implicated in a Seneca
effort in 1761 to organize a pan-Indian resistance to Anglo-American expansion. The presence of Ohio Iroquois at these meetings, the role they played as spokesmen for some Algonkian groups, coupled with the absence of any strong voice from Onondaga suggests that the Ohio Iroquois were recognized as a dominant force in the region, not their elders in New York. When it suited their purpose, the Delawares and Shawnees also deferred to the Ohio Iroquois and acknowledged their primacy in the area. For example, when pressed by General Robert Monckton to sell land to the settlers around Fort Pitt, Tamaqua directed the general to "our Uncles" the Six Nations. The Six Nations he referred to were those on the Ohio, not New York. Other Delaware groups, notably Custaloga's and those living at Conawango, maintained a closer subordinate relationship with the Ohio Iroquois that pre-dated the Seven Years' War. The League's presence in regional affairs was minimal and limited largely to supporting Anglo-American policies and pronouncements, as was the case both during and after the 1758 Easton Treaty.

The Ohio Iroquois community was no more unified in its responses to the English than were other Indian groups. However, their growing hostility to the Anglo-Americans after 1758 stood in contrast to Tanaghrisson's decidedly friendly posture a decade earlier. Part of the explanation lies in the composition of the Ohio Iroquois community. After Washington's defeat in 1754 and Braddock's fiasco a year later those Iroquois who had supported the English vacated the Ohio country, going first to eastern Pennsylvania and then to New York Iroquois towns. Those who remained, largely Senecas, continued
to pursue policies aimed at self preservation, which in this instance included taking up arms for the French. The continuing conflict over policy was reflected in the competition between the Belt of Wampum, who supported the English, and Kanaghorganait [White Mingo] for leadership of the Ohio Iroquois after Tanaghrisson's death and Scarjuady's departure. Kanaghorganait, Kayahsota, and Tahaiadoris appear as part of that element of the Ohio Iroquois traditionally labelled "pro-French". It is more useful, however, to view these men, who also had close ties to the Genesee Senecas, as favoring a policy of keeping the Ohio country free of European intruders, particularly settlers. Doubtless the close ties between the western Senecas and the French--Tahaiadoris was identified as a son of Philippe Joncaire--influenced their position. However, an east-west division within the Senecas is thought to have been long-standing and rooted in purely local social dynamics which Europeans could, and did exploit. Further, as appeared so often in Indian complaints, the natives saw a clear distinction between English and French policies and favored the latter as being less threatening and more supportive of Indian goals. The internal division persisted into the 1760s. In 1761 White Mingo, who had represented the Conawango Senecas two years earlier, removed with a number of followers to a new village farther down the Ohio.

The relations between Indian communities, while important for understanding the environment within which choices and decisions were made, falls short of explaining why, in the relatively short period from early 1759 until the English occupation of Detroit, so many west-
ern Indians demonstrated an interest in negotiating with, rather than fighting, the on-coming Anglo-Americans. Answers to this question lay within the towns that sent men to the meetings as well as their geographic location. A look at community and locale also helps explain the behavior of those who remained in arms or who showed a calculated reluctance to swing fully toward accommodation.

One factor in the equation, often overlooked, is the continued influence of traditional leadership. Tamaqua’s success in bringing warriors as well as civil chiefs to the council fire testifies to his and others’ capacity to overcome interest and generational conflicts and to work toward a consensus, however fragile, on the question of peace. The conflict between warriors and civil chiefs by no means disappeared after the French fled the Ohio country. The war had provided opportunities and influence for warriors and war leaders, advantages they would have been reluctant to give up. Though village leaders often complained that they could not control their young men as a way of deflecting blame for damage done to colonists by raiding parties, it is nonetheless true that tensions persisted between the two interests, tensions that were not lessened as English policies became better known. Even so, dynamic leadership could and apparently did set examples and offer alternatives that status-concious warriors were ready to accept at least for the moment. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the large number of Anglo-American captives returned by Indians in the Ohio country. Characteristically, it was Tamaqua and other civil leaders who took the lead in returning these people.68 The warriors and the women
who supported them appear to have followed this lead rather faithfully through 1762.

The reception initially given the warriors and women by Anglo-American leaders may also have influenced them. The appearance of traders on the Ohio by mid-1759, and the continued practice of traditional protocol, including gift-giving, may have convinced many to wait and see what path the English might tread, despite lingering suspicions engendered by troop movements into the west. Further, Anglo-American agents offered presents in return for captives, a practice which, intentionally or not, conformed to native practices. At least as important as trade to the warrior-hunters was their role as protectors of their communities and their ability to gain status at home by acts of war abroad. The early willingness of traders and political agents to dispense gifts, often in the form of ammunition, made protection and the hunting of game and traditional enemies easier, particularly when French suppliers were disappearing from the west.

The contraction and eventual destruction of the French trade empire and military power may also have caused Indians to reflect on the changes wrought by this state of affairs and to consider more closely the words of those who urged a cautious effort to accommodate with the English. General Stanwix lost little time in announcing the fall of Quebec at his conference with Ohio and western Indians in October 1759. Earlier that year the Ohio Indians had seen the French evacuate their remaining forts along the Allegheny River. This and the fall of Fort Niagara was felt in the Great Lakes area

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as well. Further, news that Indians living near Niagara had also initiated contacts with the English on seemingly favorable terms may have influenced some to the south and west.\textsuperscript{71}

Geography also helped account for the differential responses to the Anglo-American advance. Location gave some Indians an advantage in coping with the disruption caused by the collapse of French power in the region. As James Clifton has pointed out, for example, the Potawatomis living at St. Joseph and Chicago, by their closer proximity to sources of French supplies by way of the Illinois country and New Orleans, were much less inclined to meet with the English than were those whose base of trade rested at “troit, where storehouses rapidly emptied after the fall of Fort Niagara.\textsuperscript{72} Similarly, the Shawnees appear to have exercised independence of action that exasperated royal officials. Anglo-American observers were universal in their condemnation of the Shawnees as singularly "conceited" and disturbers of the peace and who, of all the western Indians, were most reluctant to part with captives. One Pennsylvania official went so far as to suggest building a fort at the Lower Town to "put a bridle upon them."\textsuperscript{73} The Shawnees' advantageous location astride a communications and economic crossroads that linked them to the Great Lakes, the Mississippi valley, as well as with members of their own society living among the Upper Creeks in Tennessee, gave them a flexibility denied other Indians in dealing with intruders, one that the Shawnees used to resist Anglo-American expansion until after the American Revolution.\textsuperscript{74}

Until the middle of 1760, distance from the English and easy
access to supportive Seneca groups helps account for the aloofness of Custaloga's Delawares. Not surprisingly, Venango was the scene of an attempt in July 1759 by a man identified as Teedyuscung's brother to stiffen Ohio Indian resistance to the Anglo-Americans. It took direct intervention by Tamaqua, prompted by requests from western Indians, to squelch the plan and salvage the council negotiations then under way. It took direct intervention by Tamaqua, prompted by requests from western Indians, to squelch the plan and salvage the council negotiations then under way. A year later, however, as the English army advanced up the Allegheny, the Venango Delawares changed their tactics to meet the challenge of a potential foe closer to home.

The distance between the advancing Anglo-Americans and Ottawas and Ojibwas of the Michilimackinac region, as well as the various Indian groups near La Baye and south of Lake Michigan permitted these people to assert their control of the land and their own economies in a much more forthright manner than did Indians to the east. Conversely, the upper Lakes Indians were more prone to suffer economically as the French trade network collapsed after 1759.

Regardless of specific circumstances, western Indians' responses to Anglo-American peace overtures were universally marked by calculation and caution. The negotiations on the Ohio, at Niagara in mid-1759, and at Detroit in December 1760 did not, as one scholar has argued, witness the subordination of western Indians to English influence or control. As Indians at the time acknowledged, native communities often needed trade and a more stable environment within which to repair the damage done by the recent war. But the Indians who met Anglo-American agents, no less than those who did not, con-
continued to pursue policies aimed at preserving their security, independence, and economic wellbeing. Negotiations represented one of several strategies for dealing with the Anglo-American intrusion and the accompanying downfall of the old economic and political system. Hostilities continued between some western Indians even as negotiations continued with others. The continuing shift of Indian communities from the Ohio River west and south represents yet another response to the impending military occupation of the region. The flexibility of the natives' response is further illustrated by Custaloga's Delawares, who moved from detachment to limited accommodation as circumstances and opportunities warranted. This cautious response to changing conditions led most western Indians toward a policy of wait and see and to cooperate with the invaders only as much as was necessary to ensure achievement of goals determined at home. None of this implies surrender to the inevitability of Anglo-American control over the west. Peace and friendship would depend in large measure on the ability and willingness of the invaders to adapt to and meet native ways and needs. Anything less would lead to continued friction.

Cooperation took many forms. In some instances, western Indians attempted to develop a symbiotic relationship with the Anglo-Americans by responding to the latter's particular needs, needs which could also be turned to native advantage. In other cases, native values and activities happened to mesh with Anglo-American policies to create what appeared, on the surface, to be mutually beneficial arrangements. In either case, from 1758 through 1761 many western Indian groups
actively sought to establish ties with the invaders that were defined in terms of equity and reciprocity as well as mutual interest or self-interest.

Participation in trade and cooperation in efforts to establish peace were themselves forms of inter-societal cooperation founded on native needs and interests. So, too, was the limited help the British army received from some western Indians in pursuing and apprehending deserters. In the latter case, such help may have been offered as an additional, tangible example of the willingness to establish friendly relations, particularly with the most worrisome, threatening, and least predictable element of Anglo-American society in the west. The Six Nations Indians who brought in deserters and wampum to neighboring Fort Niagara may have had just such a motive in mind.79

In a different area, western Indian attacks on the Cherokees and other southern Indians between 1759 and 1763 reflected a willingness to cooperate with the English against a common enemy. This cooperation, however, had more to do with traditional native values than with relations with the English per se. Rather than another case of a conscious choice to extend aid or friendship, Indian acceptance of an English call to war against the Cherokees illustrates a case of the coincidence of native and Anglo-American needs in such a way that western Indians could pursue their own interests while at the same time appearing to cooperate with the invaders. Of course, royal officials in the west and their superiors in New York viewed things differently. From their point of view, western Indian raids
against the Cherokees, with whom the English fought a protracted war between 1759 and 1762, served colonial ends by adding to the pressure being exerted on the Cherokees, often ineptly, by royal troops. The more perceptive of England's Indian agents, however, also saw in the traditional native conflict a convenient way to keep potentially dangerous enemies from combining against the settlements. 81

...
test the sincerity of Anglo-American pledges of friendship and alliance. George Croghan was told that a number of Indians, including Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, and Weas wished to go to war but would delay any action until they "could be assured of our Friendship & Support." As the requests of increasingly numerous war parties suggest, the assurances the Indians expected were tangible as well as symbolic. Colonel Bouquet and Croghan at Fort Pitt—which lay astride a main native road to the south—spent much time outfitting warriors en route to the Carolinas and, occasionally but reluctantly, fed and supplies returning bands. Encouraged by Anglo-American agents, who were quick to demonstrate their support for native warriors, the western Indians engaged in raids in increasing numbers and greater frequency until, by the summer of 1762, the northern raids seem to have reached a peak. Lieutenant Elias Meyer reported that the Wyandots of Sandusky were particularly active in this regard and his successor, Ensign Pauli, reported that in mid-February 1762 nearly all the warriors had left for the south. Both James Kenny and George Croghan recorded numerous parties passing through Fort Pitt between April and December 1762, many of which were composed of Ohio Iroquois.

At least as widespread as participation in warfare was the practice, engaged in by Ohio and Lakes Indians alike, of supplying food to English garrisons. Amherst's message to the western Indians included a request for land on which the troops could grow their own crops and, at Detroit in December 1760, the local chiefs were enjoined by Croghan to "Incourage your young Men to Hunt & bring their meat
to me for which they shall be paid in Powder & lead." Both requests reflect the army's efforts to live off those it had come to control, a practice which had a long European pedigree. The fact that many western Indians rose to the occasion may seem curious when one considers the otherwise cautious and latent distrustful native response to the redcoats.

The explanation lies both in the army's situation and in George Croghan's remarks at Detroit. Faced with what were at time insurmountable logistical problems, Colonel Bouquet and his subordinates found themselves in genuine need of items that skilled Indian farmers and hunters could safely supply in abundance: corn and meat. For the Indians, particularly the warriors, the prospect of a cash and carry business offered a chance to refill dangerously depleted stocks of ammunition, especially when increasing difficulty was experienced in obtaining these supplies through other channels. The Indians' promising business, like trade and the assistance given against the Cherokees, was based on mutual needs and interests. Success, as in other inter-societal ventures, depended on the degree to which each participant upheld his part of the bargain and reciprocated as the other desired.

The development of a symbiotic relationship based on the provisioning of English troops was made easier by both the army's eagerness to fill its storehouses and the ease with which Indians could accommodate this demand within the limits of traditional values and practices. Indian hunters could continue to engage in acceptable activities while turning a profit from and developing peaceful re-
lations with local garrisons. The extent to which the army, particularly on the Ohio, was dependent on Indian suppliers is evident from a report by Colonel Mercer at Pittsboro. Praising the Delawares and other local Indians for their "zeal & fidelity", he emphasized that "but for them our circumstances could scarcely have been made known to you, or supplies so readily obtained."^92

The business seems to have flourished. By mid-1761, military correspondence was full of references to purchases of food, principally venison, from the natives. The business had its center in the Ohio country but officers as far away as the Wabash valley and St. Joseph's River were also engaging Indian hunters for as much meat as they could deliver.^[93] For some of these officers the language barrier proved troublesome. Lieutenant Meyer told his superiors that "The detachment suffers by [the lack of a competent interpreter] and I fear will suffer considerably later, because in our present unfortunate position, without hope of any help, we have need of them [Indians] both for the hunt and for Indian corn."^94 Meyer apparently overcame this problem because, a month later, he was able to report enough venison coming in to supply his Sandusky garrison for the winter.^[95]

Another aspect of the provisioning business was its transformation into a cash enterprise. It is difficult to determine who was responsible for initiating the use of cash and credit as payment for supplies. Captain Mather, after a meeting with Custaloga's people at Venango early in 1761, observed that "I told them they shod receive Ready Money [for meat] which pleas'd Them not a little."^[96] While his letter suggests that he introduced the idea, Mather's observation of the Dela-
wares' response indicates their interest in such a deal and that they may have initially proposed the arrangement. Regardless, the Indian hunters soon proved themselves as adept at manipulating the market for food as they were in dealing with traders. While the officially quoted price of venison was two pece per pound, available evidence indicates that local commanders were forced to pay much more. Ensign Robert Holmes at Fort Miami complained that the Miamis Indians brought in little meat "and what they Bring I have to pay an Excessive price for." The tactic of withholding supplies until demand forced up prices seems to have been widespread. Lieutenant Meyer also reported only a "small quantity" of venison available for which he was forced to pay over thirty-six shillings.

Not only were the Indians driving hard bargains, they also demanded "ready money" for their goods or refused to deal. Lieutenant Carre at Venango reported difficulties arising from the Delawares' refusal to accept bills of credit drawn on Bouquet at Fort Pitt. Distance and the winter season certainly influenced the rejection of a form of payment fraught with inconvenience, but one also detects a suspicion of anything but hard currency. The question remains, however, of what numbers of Indian hunters did with relatively large amounts of cash. One obvious answer is that much of it found its way into the pockets of fur traders or sutlers, as did most of the money disbursed to pay the soldiers. Some may have been transformed into jewelry or traded to other natives. Another possibility is that much of the Indians' new-found wealth supported the illicit liquor trade throughout the west. Finally, some of the coins may have purchased
arms and ammunition later used against the English outposts. By whatever route, it can be assumed that much of what Indian suppliers earned left their towns rather quickly, something that should not be surprising given the lack of an exchange system based on coin within native societies.

As the profits to be made from provisioning became evident, Indian suppliers found themselves faced with colonial farmers and hunters, as well as traders, eager to claim a share of the market. The army would undoubtedly have preferred depending on its own people rather than potential enemies and, to encourage colonial participation in the provisions trade, the army paid more to frontier farmers than to Indians. Less well known was the attempt by traders in the Ohio country to become middlemen between Indian suppliers and military consumers. Ensign Thomas Hutchins at Venango noted that local traders were seeking permission to sell to the army stocks of corn they were then purchasing from neighboring Delawares and Iroquois.

The emergence of the Indians' provisioning business as a major enterprise may have caused new problems even as it enabled natives and soldiers to co-exist. One explanation for the continuing Indian movement away from the upper Ohio region in the 1760s has been an acute shortage of game. Existing evidence makes it difficult to assess just how severe game depletion became by 1763 and military records yield only fragmentary information on the volume of meat purchased by the garrisons. It is possible, however, that the sudden increase in the region's population, which now included several hundred soldiers, workmen, traders, and their dependents, may have been sufficient to
upset the previously favorable balance between man and animals. Further evidence of this may also lie in the particular hostility Ohio Indians displayed toward colonial hunters, enmity that ended in several deaths and near-fatal clashes. As game supplies dropped native hunters may have seen these interlopers as a serious economic threat, whether these hunters were acting for themselves or in order to sell to the natives' military customers. In one instance the focus of an attack on Virginia hunters may have been their rifles, much improved weapons that made taking large or small game more likely. It may be that local Indians, seeking every possible means of securing enough meat for themselves and trade, resorted to theft of superior weapons as well.

Finally, while it served as the basis for inter-societal cooperation as well as an avenue whereby Indians could obtain needed supplies and information about the other side, the provisioning business did not create, as did the fur trade, a long-standing symbiotic relationship between Indians and Englishmen in the west. Unlike the trade, the Indians' role as de facto quartermasters for the British army did not force the latter to accommodate to the natives to any great extent. The reason was the army's unwillingness to keep itself at the mercy of a potential enemy any more than it had to. Food, unlike furs, could be obtained elsewhere, and as the army slowly brought order to its supply system, aided by the growing number of settlers moving west, the Indians' role as suppliers was reduced to that of a useful alternative. In addition, while provisioning and services as military allies permitted specific groups of Indians and Anglo-Americans to strike co-
operative arrangements, the larger problems growing out of continued English expansion remained and intensified.
Notes for Chapter V


5 Mercer to Bouquet, Aug. 15, 1759, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 78.


7 Croghan to Major Horatio Gates, May 22, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 250.

8 Captain Donald Campbell to Bouquet, Dec. 24, 1760, Ibid., 358; Campbell to Bouquet, Dec. 23, 1760, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21645, 259.


11 Ibid., 30.


13 Croghan's Journal", 371.

14 Ibid., 366; Croghan to General John Stanwix, Jul. 21, 1759, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21655, 48-49; for similar attitudes among the Ohio Indians see Pa. Col. Rec., VIII, 311-12.


19 Ibid., Pa. Col. Rec., VIII, 389; as late as October Wyandots from Detroit asked that the troops depart, see *Ibid.*, 427.

20 Ibid., 432; "Croghan's Journal", 372.


22 Ibid., 308.

23 Ibid., 388-89; 434; "Croghan's Journal", 350.


30 Ibid., 430.


34 Ibid., 388, 430.

35 Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 95.


39 Ibid., series 21655, 98; "Croghan's Journal", 324.


41 The Ohio Indians made a separate peace with Pennsylvania at Lancaster in 1762. For details see Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959), 187-89; "Minutes of Conferences . . . held at Lancaster," in Carl Van Doren and Julian P. Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin (Philadelphia, 1938), 263-300.


43 For a list of Indian participants, Pa. Col. Rec., VIII, 382.

44 Ibid., 307-308.

45 Ibid., 386.

46 Ibid., 385.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 389.
Ibid., 391.

50 Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 71.

51 Ibid., 70-71.

52 Ibid., 71-73.

53 Ibid., 74.


58 Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin, "Ethnohistory of Indian Use and Occupancy in Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795," in Helen Hornbeck Tanner and Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin, Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795 (New York, 1974), I, 272-76.

59 Croghan to Johnson, Sept. 6, 1760, Johnson Papers, X, 179.


64 For example, see the speech of the Iroquois Otschinnaywesaa, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 110, wherein he claimed to have come on behalf of the Six Nations to "settle affairs" with the Ohio Indians "for your [English] Interest."


Croghan to Monckton, Jul. 18, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 272.

"Croghan's Journal," 330-31, 332; Croghan to Stanwix, Jul. 23, 1759, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 54; Ibid., 59; Mercer to Stanwix, Aug. 6, 1759, Ibid., 67; Croghan to Stanwix, Aug. 6, 1759, Ibid., 68; Mercer to Governor William Denny, Aug. 6, 1759, Pa. Col. Rec., VIII, 396.

Croghan to Monckton, Jul. 18, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 272.

For example, see Alexander Henry's reception by the Ojibwa leader Minevavana at Michilimackinac in Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures In Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (Rutland, Vt., 1969), 43-45.


Major Wilkins to Amherst, Dec. 7, 1762, WO 34/22.

On the Cherokee War see Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations

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81 Croghan to Gates, May 20, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 247.
82 Kent and Waddell, eds., Bouquet Papers, II, 625.
84 Campbell to Monckton, Jun. 1, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 416.
85 "Croghan's Journal", 355.
86 Ibid., 416, 419-20, 422.
89 Pa. Arch.(III), III, 746; Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 96; Clifton, Prairie People, 104.
91 Campbell to Bouquet, Dec. 11, 1760, Ibid., series 21645, 223-25.
92 Mercer to Bouquet, Jul. 16, 1759, Ibid., series 21655, 46.
93 Campbell to Bouquet, Nov. 8, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 190-91.
95 Meyer to Bouquet, Nov. 8, 1761, Ibid., 188-89.
96 Mother to Bouquet, Jan. 29, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 21.


CHAPTER VI
The Failure of Accommodation,
1761-1762

Efforts by western Indians to adjust to the Anglo-American invasion and the changes taking place throughout the trans-Appalachian region failed to result in a new, stable, peaceful relationship. While royal officials spoke of enforcing the Easton Treaty and gave, often in good faith, promises of fair trade, protection for native lands, and friendship based on trust and mutual interest, it became increasingly evident to Indian observers that English deeds were not following the path marked out in council speeches. Even as trade was being re-established and as some western Indians sought ways of accommodating to, and profiting from, the on-coming Anglo-Americans, native attitudes and the basis for Anglo-Indian relations were changing.

I

Western Indian relations with the Anglo-Americans had included friction and latent hostility from the start. As noted earlier, attempts were made by Delawares to defuse militancy among Custaloga's people which threatened negotiations at Pittsboro. During the spring and summer of 1760 the army was again faced with raids and threats of attack from Indians, primarily from the Great Lakes, who either refused to participate in peace talks or who ignored the agreements.
reached by their war and civil leaders. At Fort Niagara Colonel
William Eyre was warned by local Senecas that western Indians were
thinking of attacking and taking the fort for the French.¹

From the Ohio country Colonel Bouquet reported enemy scouts near
his camp at Presqu'ile, scouts who later ambushed and killed several
of his men.² Finally, the tension between Indian societies created
by the colonial war threatened to engulf the English. George Croghan
found that some western Indians, particularly Ottawas, Ojibwas, and
Kickapoos from the Illinois country had decided to make revenge raids
on the Six Nations for losses suffered at the hands of the latter at
Fort Niagara. According to Croghan's informant, the Indians agreed
that they would probably have to strike the English as well since
"it would be impossible to strike the Six Nations without striking
the English likewise, as they were so closely connected."³

Hostilities subsided in the wake of negotiations and the loss
of French aid. But the reduction of armed conflict did not signal
the Indians' passive acceptance of a new political order. The in-
dependence, testiness, and caution that marked the treaty encounters
appeared often as western natives evaluated the Anglo-Americans' per-
formance and found it wanting. Soon after trade re-opened in the Ohio
region, resident Indians detected and complained about radical dif-
ferences between pre- and post-war prices and the quality of goods.
Croghan, who served as a one-man complaint department for western
traders, reported that the Indians "Complained of the price of
Strouds saying it was dearer than what they formerly gave the Traders
for it."⁴ He also noted that the Delawares and Wyandots complained
of the "Extravagent price" charged by the Pennsylvania store at Fort Pitt for hunting saddles and the general price schedule at that establishment. This and the initial short supply of goods in the region led many Ohio Indians to question the sincerity of the oft-repeated pledge of an abundant, cheap trade.

Closely associated with trade were Indian responses to the presence—or absenence—of liquor, both as an item of trade and as a customary council refreshment. Both trader journals and official documents attest to the early requests by Delawares for liquor. What is striking is the general ambivalence among Indians over the use of rum and other forms of alcohol. Tamaqua called for the "sparring" sale of liquor in 1759, but two years later was reported to have "approved much of the Prohibition of the Sale of Spirituous Liquors to the Indians." Other Ohio Indian leaders also thanked the English for "keeping Rum from them" and Custaloga took it upon himself to seize a trader's liquor in his town and "gave the man a severe beating." Oneida Iroquois likewise took steps to ban liquor from their towns. However, other Indians held different views. Wabbicommicot, influential leader of the Ojibwas living near Fort Niagara, asked for and received liquor; and evidence suggests that Amherst's ban on rum sales, once it began to take effect east of Detroit, caused considerable unhappiness in Indian towns.

The varied response to liquor policies reflects several native concerns. Civil chiefs and, among the Iroquois, clan matrons, wished to prevent the consumption of liquor which, by mid-century, had created a worrisome social problem in many native communities. Custaloga's
actions, while unusual, underscored the desire by community leaders to keep socially and economically disruptive liquor out of their towns. On a more practical level, sober hunters and warriors could more easily be controlled and led by the powers of persuasion, and were less likely to engage in disputes with trigger-happy soldiers or traders. On the other hand, the growing resentment that paralleled the imposition of liquor regulations after 1761 may have reflected a growing awareness by some that the regulations signalled a shift away from traditional patterns of relations wherein rum had been a common and popular item, both for trade and negotiation.

Of a different nature were conflicts which arose from the interaction between Indians and Anglo-Americans, particularly in the Ohio country. By far the greatest number of incidents involved the garrisons in that region and consisted of both clashes between soldiers and Indians and native assaults on military property, largely in the form of horsetheft.

Indian attacks on soldiers appear to have proceeded from a variety of causes. Drunkenness was associated with the death of at least one soldier at Bushy Run in May 1760, and the wounding of three Ohio Iroquois resulting from a drunken fracas with the Virginia garrison at Fort Venango earlier that year. Theft by Indians may also have resulted in the death of Corporal Sweeny of the Virginia Regiment, whose rifle was later found in the possession of an Ohio Iroquois. More common, however, were incidents of the kind reported near Presqu'ile where an express rider was stopped, had his weapons, ammunition, and provisions taken, but was "otherwise used civilly." The express
rider's experience offers a clue to the motives behind such assaults in that his food, and the means for acquiring more, were taken but nothing else. Economic necessity as motive is reflected by another incident reported by the commander of Fort Venango. Lieutenant Francis Gordon reported that several Indians intercepted a group of soldiers en route to his post from Fort le Boeuf, "felt their Napsacks for Provisions, found none and let them eskip without further molestation." Yet another motive appears in a confrontation between a member of the Fort le Boeuf garrison and three unidentified Indians. The soldier, ordered out hunting, was accosted by the Indians who "took away [h]is powder horn & bullets & told him not to come out there any more."

Native assaults on or harassment of the army in the Ohio country may also have been prompted in part by similar treatment at the hands of soldiers. In this regard, the troops seem to have given as well as they took. An Ohio Seneca was shot and killed near Fort Venango, and Delawares living near the fort complained through Custaloga of being "Ill-used, by soldiers of [the] Garrison, and often Insulted by them" as well as the resident traders." Robbery, willful destruction of property, and physical violence were also part of the Ohio Indians' bill of indictment against the army. What is striking, in comparing the acts committed by each side on the other, is the controlled, specific, largely non-violent nature of Indian-provoked confrontations. By comparison, soldiers' actions, whether in reprisal or not, tended to result in a higher degree of physical abuse and vandalism, and does not appear directed at a single group, though
the Ohio Senecas living near Venango seem to have taken a dispro-
portionate share of the bruising.

Local commanders were aware of the problem of soldier-Indian
conflicts and were equally aware of the damage such incidents could
do to fragile Anglo-Indian relations. Bouquet "recommended" to Lieu-
tenant Carre that every possible step be taken to lessen the friction
between local Indians and the Venango garrison. Carre and others
complied by enforcing their commander's orders that all soldiers or
dependents believed guilty of acts against Indians be severely punish-
ed "tho' they Might at first have had the Right on their Side."19 As
a result, at least two soldiers of the Royal American Regiment were
given whippings for theft and vandalism.20 Perhaps believing that
they had right on their side these and other soldiers doubtless har-
bored more bitterness against their Indian neighbors after the lash
than before.

It does not appear that the motives that led Indians, as individuals
or groups, to harass the army explain the soldiers' actions. When
officers discussed the problem at all, they passed it off as the result
of a lack of communication and understanding between their men and In-
dians.21 In this they were doubtless right. But they failed to men-
tion the character or condition of their troops, both of which made
acts of violence against feared and despised Indians more likely.
Further, it is unlikely that the soldiers acted without provocation
in all cases. News of Indian thefts of personal or government issue
items from enlisted men, as well as thinly veiled threats against
military game poachers, may have prompted a cycle of attack and
retaliation in which the soldiers' fear, isolation, and frustration collided with Indian warriors' perceived needs, desire to know and test the enemy, and equal frustration brought on by earlier unsettled acts of violence. Adding to the already high level of tension between the army's small, ill-managed occupation force and Indians who had no desire to bear the occupation was the natives' propensity for stealing the garrisons' livestock, especially horses.

In his study of the Potawatomis, anthropologist James Qilfton noted briefly that these Indians, and presumably others living south of the Great Lakes, had begun to incorporate horses into their technological arsenals in substantial numbers by the middle of the eighteenth century. He adds that previous contact with horses used by European soldiers, settlers, and traders allowed the Potawatomis to easily absorb this item of western culture into their own societies. In so doing, the horse began to cause changes in transportation patterns just as the musket, stell trap, and other European cultural artifacts did in other aspects of native life.22

Evidence from the Ohio country in the early 1760s suggests that the same pattern was emerging in that region, though as yet no study has focused specifically on the role of the horse or other domesticated animals in Ohio Indian society. The fact remains, however, that Ohio Indians clearly sought horses and went to some lengths, and risks, to obtain them. The lack of any other source of this animal led interested natives to appropriate them from the region's biggest potential supplier: the army. From the Indians' perspective, the result was the transfer of many horses to native communities under conditions
that would not necessarily have been looked upon as dishonest. From the army's point of view, Indian horse theft quickly grew to epidemic proportions and threatened not only the army's ability to supply itself, but served as both an insult and a constant reminder of the relative ease with which Indians could violate a garrison's security. The result was a further escalation of tension and a growing military distrust of Indians.

It is also possible that stealing horses and other army livestock presented warriors with an opportunity both to gain status at home and to test the reactions of the invaders. If horses were becoming a more important element in native society, as the steadily increasing efforts to obtain them suggest, those who obtained or owned them would be at an economic and, perhaps, political advantage. Horse theft also demonstrated the extent to which soldiers would react to threats while handicapping the army's ability to move and supply itself. Finally, horse theft may, in many cases, not have been theft at all, but appropriation of animals defined by Indians as strays or stock which was grazing on property claimed by native families. In such cases, the horses became free for the taking or payment for the use of Indian pasturage. In any event, Ohio Indians soon learned how the army chose to respond. Orders went out to shoot on sight any Indian caught attempting to take livestock. The effect of this order at Pittsboro in 1759 is suggested by Colonel Mercer's observation that losses declined once the word got around.23

Though western Indians began voicing complaints about the nature of their relationship with the Anglo-Americans, they did so in a limit-
ed way. From the natives' point of view, the conflicts between Indians and soldiers grew out of the need to know the occupying forces and the need for items which the army in abundance. In either case Indian depredations were limited and controlled, more so than the army's response. In addition, little was said before 1761 about issues which became paramount two years later: land and the overall meaning of English policies to native independence and continued security. Indian speeches and actions between 1758 and 1761 represented the natives' initial response to a piecemeal, somewhat confused and haphazard Anglo-American effort to organize and control the west. Characteristically, most of the tension evident in these years arose in the Ohio country where the greatest number of troops and traders still resided. Between 1761 and the end of 1762, however, the level of concern and discontent among western Indians increased and spread beyond the Ohio River as more natives began to interpret Anglo-American actions in ways which began to limit options and preclude the continuance of peace on English terms.

The period from early 1761 through the end of 1762 saw a significant increase in the level of Indian dissatisfaction with Anglo-American behavior. Further, as royal agents attempted to extend their government's control over the west, Indian concerns broadened to embrace issues and problems not previously expressed. Finally, the geographic scope of native unrest widened to include by the end of 1762 parts or all of the Indians living in the trans-Appalachian region. However, native responses to Anglo-American policies and actions tended to remain varied both in kind and intensity, reflecting local or regional
concerns, geographic location, and inter-societal relations. In each case the goal remained the same: to respond to the new realities brought about by English military success while at the same time preserving native autonomy and a system of inter-cultural relations that worked toward that end.

Complaints about the trading system continued, and spread to the Great Lakes as traders, followed tardily by regulatory orders, moved west. Prices and the quality of merchandise continued to rankle Indian customers such as the Shawnees, who "made great Complaints in the Name of all the Indians of the dearness of the Merchants Goods & the low Price that was set on their Furs." Significantly, the emphasis began to shift from the traditional and perpetual haggling over prices and quality control to the nature of the new trading system itself. Indian consumers were acutely sensitive to changes in the manner of trade, particularly when it appeared to work against them or, worse, seemed to symbolize an English determination to subordinate them. As Amherst's and Johnson's regulations became known in the west, so the level of native discontent with the new system grew. As early as May 1761, Captain Campbell at Detroit reported that Indians from his vicinity were all going to Niagara "where there is noe control on selling Rum." More important from the Indians' perspective was the order restricting traders to armed posts. While Anglo-American diplomats tried to explain this as a precaution against the French, by mid-1761 many western Indians were unwilling to accept such specious explanations. Trader Robert Callendar experienced first hand the displeasure of Sandusky Wyandots who complained "because I would not sell them goods, as I
had formerly been a Dealler amongst them." At Fort Pitt, Bouquet also observed the Indians' sensitivity on this matter, noting that local Delawares and Iroquois "do not complain of anything, except that the Traders are not permitted to go to their Towns." He added that the Shawnees and traders were so eager to return to the old system that the latter were willing to overlook previous abuses at Shawnee hands in order to go to their towns. Bouquet refused.26

The difference between the pre-war and post-1758 trading systems lay at the heart of these complaints. Prior to the Seven Years' War, traders, both English and French, had gone directly to Indian customers or operated out of posts, such as Michilimackinac, which were more trading communities than military establishments. Not only was this system convenient for Indian hunters, it also placed the principal trade encounter in a native-controlled environment. English regulations threatened to destroy this system which had accommodated those on both sides of the counter for nearly a century. By having to go to the posts to trade, Indians experienced inconveniences and, in times of acute shortages of food and ammunition, real hardship as well. In addition, not all the former French trading posts were to be occupied under the English system. Further, given the general level of tension between soldiers and Indians and the decidedly military character of the posts after 1758, trading at these establishments may have appeared doubly undesirable. While all of this threatened western Indians' economic well-being, the impact went much farther. The Shawnees from the Scioto River complained to Robert Callemand that the English "did not look upon them as brothers & friends."27
Closely associated with growing Indian resistance to the imposition of a new trading system was the impact of Amherst's policy governing gifts and the sale of ammunition to the natives. Before 1761 this had not been an issue in exchanges between western Indians and royal officials; as long as the English foothold in the west was uncertain and the war with France continued, the flow of goods was likewise guaranteed. However, events in 1760 and the general's attempt to re-define the nature of Indian relations generated unrest on this matter as well. The Iroquois living at Conawango demanded ammunition as compensation for the inconveniences associated with English troops in their country, especially as the army had established itself "in ye hart of our Counry & on ye Warrers Road." The Indians' expectation of payment for the appropriation or use of their territory and the inconveniences suffered by the cutting of the main avenue to the Carolinas was perfectly reasonable from the natives' point of view and in keeping with traditional practices. The increasing reluctance of the army to honor such practices and its apparent determination to appropriate whatever it needed did little to lessen native fears concerning ultimate Anglo-American intentions. Though not yet widespread, resentment over the colonists' and army's reluctance to act in acceptable ways was growing, as the Detroit commander confirmed when, in early June 1761, he spoke of the necessity of maintaining a strong guard over his post due to the Indians' discontent, partly rooted in the lack of gifts. Adding to this was the increased native demand for ammunition at a time when the English were less willing to meet that demand. Confronted with decreased English generosity, an unfavor-
able trade system that necessitated the collection of more pelts that earned fewer goods, and renewed warfare to the south, warriors and their village leaders were hard pressed to keep themselves properly armed and their families clothed, fed, and protected. The added necessity for some of traveling greater distances to trade also tended to exhaust ammunition, expended in hunting along the way. Finally, the English practice of supplying south-bound war parties but not those coming home added to the economic burden as well as the negative image of Anglo-Americans developing in many native minds.

As the army and its camp followers moved into the west, Indians, particularly in the Ohio country, were forced to confront and deal with new and far more ominous threats to their security. As early as December 1759 Indians living in the vicinity of Pittsboro were, according to George Croghan, "very Jealous seeing a large Fort building here." That jealousy increased as the former French outposts at Venango, le Boeuf, and Presqu'ile were re-built and occupied by redcoats during the summer and fall of 1760. While direct evidence is lacking to indicate precisely how local Indians interpreted this activity, their actions leave little doubt as to their feelings. It was this chain of Ohio forts, more than any others in the west, that witnessed harassment of troops, livestock theft, and more violent confrontations between soldiers and Indians. Underlying these incidents appears to have been the Indians' growing resentment of English troops in their midst, especially since a similar French menace had only recently been removed.

More disturbing still was the construction of new forts where
none had been before. In particular, Amherst's plan to fortify Sandusky as a way-station for convoys moving between Niagara and Detroit, met with protests and threats of retaliation from neighboring Wyandots. Aside from their dislike of armed Englishmen in their midst, the Wyandots were expressing concern over a larger issue that touched other Indians as well. Sandusky stood astride the major east-west trail linking the Six Nations and Ohio Indians with the villages at Detroit and the upper Great Lakes. An English fort there posed potentially severe problems since it would allow the army to cut traffic on the old and well-travelled road.

The Wyandots of Sandusky responded by protesting to Amherst who, characteristically, insisted that the fort be built. Left to their own devices, the Wyandots attempted to exact at least a token rent for their land from Lieutenant Elias Meyer. According to that officer, this consisted of his being "fretted" by Indians pressing him for "Gifts, Provisions &c which he had not to give them." He did not fail to note the Indians' "uneasiness" over the construction of the blockhouse that became Fort Sandusky. Rebuffed or at least left dissatisfied in their efforts to obtain compensation, the Wyandots attempted to accommodate while at the same time working to convince the troops to leave. After some difficulty, Meyer bought meat for his hungry men, though his successor was left to confront still smoldering Wyandot resentment. At a council with the Indians, Ensign Pauli was told by "a head of Coomuduth Town[Sandusky]" that he'll have it[the fort] burnt in the Spring when the hounders[hunters] Comes home." The threat was not made good perhaps because, as Pauli noted, "the rest
of the Nations are very quite and most of the young men heraboots are gone to ware against the Cherokees.\textsuperscript{35} Such circumstances may have precluded any immediate action against Sandusky although in 1763 the Wyandots wasted no time in burning the troublesome post.

Making matters worse for the Ohio Indians was the simultaneous invasion of their lands by people who, by treaty and repeated promises, the English were obligated to keep out of the region. It is difficult to determine either when or the extent to which Anglo-American hunters and settlers began migrating into the region in numbers sufficient to prompt a native reaction. Judging from those reactions, this invasion had reached alarming proportions by mid-fall 1761.

From Redstone Creek British Sergeant McDonald reported "Crowds of Hunters" moving into the Monongahela valley in October. At the same time, Bouquet mentioned "repeated Complaints from the Indians" about the hunters who were competing with natives for the limited game in the area. It was this increased volume of Indian complaints that eventually led Bouquet to drive squatters out of the Ohio country.\textsuperscript{36}

Beyond the verbal protests registered at Fort Pitt, the Indians most affected by this invasion, Shawnees and Ohio Iroquois, took no action on the matter before 1762. The season may help account for this, as it did the failure of the Sandusky Wyandots to drive the English from that post. By late October villages were already making arrangements for winter hunts. Finally, although direct evidence is lacking, civil leaders may have continued to influence more volatile warriors and restrain them from any overtly hostile action.

Although the construction or re-occupation of forts and the
appearance of colonists eager for land posed real and serious threats to the Ohio Indians, the Indians in the Great Lakes region were not similarly affected. In the first place, distance and lack of Anglo-American interest rendered the region immune from settlement. While French villages did exist at most of the larger trading posts throughout the west, they had long been integrated into the bi-cultural social and economic system that had developed since the seventeenth century. Further, with the exception of the Niagara portage, the British army had as yet been unable to realize plans to occupy the western posts. Finally, the small garrisons which, by late fall 1761, had been able to take over some of the former French posts, posed no serious threat to the security of the Indians living near them. The Great Lakes Indians undoubtedly recognized what the local English commanders were painfully aware of, that isolated twenty-man garrisons could be easily intimidated or destroyed by the vastly superior native population.

What may have given Great Lakes Indians cause for concern, however, was the sudden increase in military activity on the lakes beginning in mid-summer 1761. From July to October British forces under Major Henry Gladwin, numbering nearly four hundred men, travelled the upper Great Lakes and completed their occupation by establishing posts at St. Joseph, Michilimackinac, La Baye, Miamis, and Ouiatanon. This and the corresponding increase in supply traffic to and from these posts may have raised native suspicions about English intentions even as Sir William Johnson, speaking for Amherst and the royal government, was at Detroit addressing western Indians in terms of peace and friendship.37
Johnson's trip to the west and the numerous meetings he held along the way confirmed what English agents had been hearing from the Indians. It also raised the additional issue of the Covenant Chain and the role of various western Indian groups in it. Finally, the trip and the diplomacy that emerged from it offer clues to the particular responses of western Indians to the emerging English program for the west.

Johnson's trip was intended to "settle and establish a firm and lasting treaty" with the Indians at Detroit and with other western groups who had earlier participated in councils at Fort Pitt. In addition, the superintendent hoped to defuse growing Indian resentment of the trading system, and introduce regulations to govern the several western posts as well as answer Indian complaints. Lastly, as Johnson subsequently explained to his superiors, his diplomatic efforts were intended to create a new English-centered Indian alliance at Detroit to offset the power of the League Iroquois and the Ohio Indians, an alliance which he hoped would place the English at the center of power in the west through an adept policy of divide and rule. Though this was never announced to the Indians involved, Johnson's plans were obvious enough to the Iroquois to cause them no small measure of concern. At a meeting with Johnson at Fort Niagara in late July, Onondaga sachems told him they were "surprised to find you are going to call a Council at Detroit, as you know the Chief, and the only Council fire burns at your house, excepting that which we have at Onondaga." They further reminded Johnson that, as aggressors in the last war, the western Indians should properly come to him, by way of the Six
Nations. This concern about the status of the Iroquois in the
English scheme for the west was increased by the treatment the Six
Nations had received since the fall of Canada. At this and earlier
meetings, Mohawks, Oneidas, and Onondagas had all registered complaints
about the unfriendly behavior of soldiers, traders, and land speculators,
all of which was making them "uneasy," especially since such incidents
flew in the face of Johnson's earlier and repeated promises of fair
dealings and continued brotherly relations. This and Johnson's dis-
turbing refusal to accept "the Antient Custom subsisting between you
and the five Nations of immediately condoling with each other on any
mischance"—in this instance the death of a German farmer at the hands
of an Onida—suggested a shift in Anglo-American attitudes toward
both the Six Nations and the Covenant Chain, recognition of which was
made when the Onondagas protested Johnson's unprecedented step of go-
ing to Detroit.

In reply, Johnson explained that "Our Conquests in this Country
being at present very considerable our trade and alliances must of
course be more extensive than heretofore." As a result, new council
fires would have to be established in order to "Strengthen the Ex-
tensive Alliance which continues to encrease by the acquisition of
Nations, who are daily coming into, and uniting themselves with us." The "us" may have given the Six Nations some consolation as to their
future role in the Covenant Chain. However, to Johnson the Iroquois
had been reduced in importance as the locus of English interest and
power in North America shifted from Onondaga to Detroit and the Ohio
country, regions where Iroquois influence was at best of limited value.
At Niagara, while awaiting his supplies and escort to be portaged, Johnson held meetings with local Ojibwas and Senecas. Each group emphasized that a lack of ammunition was leading to economic hardship. Wabbicommicot, spokesman for the Mississaugas, told the superintendent that his people were unable to provide for themselves "by reason of their being debarred the liberty of purchasing ammunition to kill game for their carrying on of trade." He added a request for tools and technical assistance from the fort's gunsmith and locksmith. Wabbicommicot also "asked the reason for so many Men, & so much artillery passing by."

Local Senecas, led by Sonajoana, made similar requests. In addition, they expressed irritation over the theft of several of their horses by soldiers from the fort and great concern over the deaths of Senecas at the hands of the Fort Venango garrison. Johnson was told that these deaths had so upset the Ohio Senecas that many of them had removed to the Genesee towns, communities that quickly gained a reputation as the center of anti-English activity among the Iroquois.

Arriving at Detroit on September 3, Johnson was met and welcomed by a Wyandot delegation on behalf of the other council participants. The Indians assembled, numbering about five hundred people, including elements of the Detroit towns plus Miamis, Kickapoos, and Ottawas and Ojibwas from the Saginaw Bay vicinity. In addition, representatives of the Ohio Indians led by Tamaqua and Mohawks who had accompanied the superintendent were in attendance. George Croghan, who had arrived ahead of his superior, had participated in preliminary meetings wherein the Delawares had met with and encouraged the Wyandots to con-
time their efforts to establish peace with the English. 46

Having established the proper atmosphere for discussions by con­
dolences and formal exchanges of greetings, Johnson and his hosts pro­
ceeded to the main task of "renewing the old Covenant Chain" and con­
firming the peace agreements made the previous year on the Ohio. 47
Johnson repeated the ritual promises of trade and English protection
of native lands while reminding his audience that the war with France
had been waged as much for the Indians' benefit as for that of the
colonists. 48 Symbolizing the new peace and the renewed Covenant Chain,
the superintendent also lit a new council fire, making Detroit the
center of Anglo-Indian relations in the west as well as underscoring
his own authority as director of England's Indian affairs in the region. 49
With this act went new pledges of friendship to those who took hold of
the Chain, a friendship to be sealed by "an extensive commerce on the
most Equitable terms." 50 In this act as in his other proceedings at
Detroit, Johnson was quickly seconded by the Mohawk delegation led by
the sachem Nickus from Canajoharie, the town with which Johnson enjoy­
ed the closest personal and political ties. Nickus' presence and
participation served both Mohawk and English ends. His voice appear­
ed to lend Six Nations support to Johnson's diplomacy while at the
same time underscoring the Mohawks' special relationship with the En­
glish. Nickus made a special point of this, telling the western In­
dians that "We are the Door of the six Nations" through which the
westerners should step in order to deal with their new English allies. 51

In a lengthy and measured reply, the Detroit Indians offered
their own conditions for continued peace. Speaking through the Wy-
andot sachem Anaiasa, they accepted Johnson's offer of an alliance and the Covenant Chain, but expressed the hope that "on your parts you will . . . never forget the Words you have now made use of, but that you will send us a plenty of goods, & that at a Cheaper rate than we have hitherto been able to procure them." Having thus established the basis for friendship, Anaiasa moved to another point. He apologized for the horse thefts prevalent at some of the posts, noting that it was not sanctioned by community leaders. Taking the offensive, he pointed out that "Many of our people having been frequently abused as well by the Soldiers, as Inhabitants of this place, we therefore entreat you to take the same into your consideration & prevent them from so doing for the future." He then punctuated his reply with a complaint about both the high price and scarcity of trade goods, especially ammunition; the lack of which meant that "we must shortly be obliged to leave off hunting entirely," a circumstance undesirable to Indians and Anglo-American traders.  

Anaiasa's remarks were supported by both the Detroit Ottawas and Wabbiconaicot, speaking for his own Mississaugas and other Ojibwas from Detroit and Saginaw Bay. Confirming his own group's intention to remain at peace, the Ottawa speaker Macatepilesis made a point to define the basis of the Anglo-Indian relationship. Recounting the process that had led to the present council, he told Johnson that, since the Fort Pitt meetings, "we have begun to look upon you as Friends."  

As the last official act of the council, Johnson delivered a large present as confirmation of the peace that now existed between
the Great Lakes Indians and the English. At the same time he attempt-
ed to turn native relations to English advantage. He told the Wyandots
that "he looked upon them as the head of the Ottawa Confederacy, for
which reason he had lighted up a Council fire at the Detroit." In
return for this mark of esteem, Johnson hoped they would "take care
to keep it [the confederacy] in good order, and not neglect their
friends and Allies." He then dismissed them with a "private present." No record of the Wyandots' reply remains other than that they promis-
ed to consider what the superintendent had said. Their status as pub-
lic spokesmen for the Detroit Indians was recognized at any rate and
did not depend on Johnson's approval. The latter's action may also
have represented an act of intimidation since, by implication, he
could have chosen to bestow England's favor on another group, thus
threatening the Wyandots' historic position as well as sowing the seeds
of jealousy and discord within the Detroit community. As earlier En-
glish and French practice and Johnson's subsequent remarks on the coun-
cil suggest, both possibilities probably crossed his mind.

The Detroit council revealed both the particular concerns felt
by Great Lakes Indians and the basis upon which they were willing to
maintain peace with the Anglo-Americans. Absent was any public con-
cern about land and little complaint about treatment accorded natives
by English soldiers who, even after the occupation of the west was
substantially completed, were few and widely scattered. What interest-
ed the Detroit Indians most was trade and the manner in which relations
with the English would be conducted. Given high prices, shortages of
ammunition, and a scarcity of necessary goods and services due to the
war, it is understandable that questions of trade took precedence.

Beyond economic interests, however, lay the symbolic nature of trade and diplomacy. As Macatepilesis suggested, the western Indians would accept the Anglo-Americans as friends—that is, as equals. The Anglo-Americans were expected to return the favor through, among other things, the creation of a fair trade system, honoring traditional practices, and giving the natives no cause to fear for either their personal security or property.

Also absent from the dialogue was any concerted Indian reaction to the increased military activity on the Great Lakes. Johnson avoided any mention of the conquest of Canada beyond the fact that the French posts were now English and the garrisons posted to protect commerce. But as Wabbicommicot’s inquiry at Niagara suggests, the future of the region was on the Indians’ minds. The natives were told that troops were necessary since the war with France was not yet over. Explanations of this sort may have led to the assumption that the issue of which Europeans would eventually remain in the west was still in doubt, prompting appropriately cautious responses.

At the same time, however, the British army was doing little to allay whatever mute suspicions western Indians harbored. Captain Henry Balfour of the 80th Regiment of Foot had been ordered to lead the reinforcements and their escort to the posts beyond Detroit. Leaving that post on September 9, the same day the Indian council began, Balfour’s detachment rowed north and west through the lakes, depositing garrisons at Fort St. Joseph and Fort Michilimackinac. At the latter post, Balfour met and talked with the Ottawas and Ojibwas.
from Mackinac, l'Arbre Croche, and Manitoulin Island who, apparently, were not directly involved in the Detroit negotiations. He announced at the outset that he had "nothing but good things to say" to the assembly, but then proceeded with little tact to say things that were not so good. Balfour made no secret of the fact that the English had "conquered, and are become entirely Masters of the Dominions of the King of France in Canada." While no western Indian would have admitted that he or his lands were part of the French domain, Balfour's statement must have given his listeners cause to wonder about English intentions.\(^55\)

Though Balfour was quick to assure the Ottawas and Ojibwas that the soldiers had come to guarantee fair trade, his response to native requests for economic assistance was less than gratifying. While to the Indians such requests seemed not unreasonable given prevailing shortages, Balfour belittled them, blaming shortages and the generally poor local economy on intemperance and laziness. In reply to the Delaware who spoke for the Ojibwas, the captain told them they did not deserve the name of men "because you prefer a little Rum to your old people, your wives, and your Children. You foolishly expend what you have, without ever considering that those who remain in your Villages are perishing of hunger." However true Balfour's observation may have been in particular cases, it stung his audience, men who, in straitened circumstances, were struggling to overcome the recent loss of several important leaders.\(^56\) Adding insult to injury, Balfour agreed to give them aid "Thou' you do not Merit [it]."\(^57\) The grudging manner in which their new "friends" met requests for aid, in addition to Balfour's
imperious tone, was not lost on the local population.

Balfour's behavior may have made an already bad situation worse. Trader Alexander Henry had arrived at Michilimackinac from Montreal a month before the troops. Taken first before the Ojibwa leader Minavavana (le Grand Saulteux), Henry was left in no doubt of the continued hostility of the Mackinac Ojibwas toward the English and their expectation that the latter would treat them with equity in the customary manner. At the same time, Henry learned that the Ojibwas welcomed an opportunity to trade, the war having left them, "in much want." Aided by his Canadian guides, the trader was able to initiate trade and satisfy the Ojibwas as to his good intentions. His reception by the Ottawas of l'Arbre Croche was markedly different, with less hostility and a more immediate interest in trade. Even so, the Indians laid down the rules of exchange and credit and gave Henry no choice but compliance. In each case, Henry's encounter revealed serious concerns held by the Indians, paramount of which were their determination to stand as independent people equal to the English, their insistence on not being included in any capitulation of Canada, and a need for goods—both for economic reasons and as signs that the English would be willing to play by the rules and acknowledge regional power arrangements as defined by the natives. Balfour's proceedings could not have removed much of the latent hostility and tension that Henry's earlier meetings revealed.
Great Lakes Indian responses to English diplomatic overtures and efforts to occupy the region are another illustration of one kind of strategy that emerged for dealing with the Anglo-American invasion. Like their counterparts in the Ohio country between 1758 and 1761, Great Lakes Indians chose to negotiate, to define the conditions on which peace and friendship could be built, and to gauge the Anglo-American response to see if deeds matched words. Furthermore, the still uncertain fate of the French in North America and the small number of soldiers and colonists actually in the region—even after reinforcements reached the western posts—made a conservative response possible and necessary.

To the east, however, the situation was different. Increasing disillusionment with Anglo-American behavior generated, by late 1761, a more hostile response. The Seneca war belts which circulated in mid-1761 demonstrated that even then some Indians on the Ohio and lower Great Lakes were beginning to see warfare rather than accommodation as the likeliest way of dealing with the Anglo-American invasion. The response of Indians outside the Ohio country to this call for war also illustrates further the extent to which regional and local issues, rather than a sense of "pan-Indianism", influenced decision making.

News of the war belts first came from Captain Campbell at Detroit, who first learned of them about June 16 when they arrived at Detroit in the care of two Ohio Senecas, Tahiadoris and Kayahsota.61 Campbell's initial information, quickly forwarded to Amherst, was in-
complete and vague, and derived from local French settlers. According to the captain, the belts came from the Six Nations and represented a plan to overthrow the English, one that reportedly embraced "all the Indians from the Baye of Gaspie to the Illinois." The two Senecas intended to hold a council at Sandusky with representatives from the Detroit villages as well as Delawares and Shawnees from the Ohio country among whom, according to Campbell's sources, was Tamaqua. Subsequent efforts by Campbell to stop the Senecas attempt to enlist western Indian support and inquiries made by Johnson and others reveal much about both the sources of hostility and the nature of Indian inter-societal relations.

Campbell's success in learning the details of the plans the belts represented and the reasons that led to their circulation was due in part to his own timely knowledge of the arrival of the Senecas. Armed with information supplied by French interpreters, he revealed his extensive, if still incomplete, knowledge to the Detroit Wyandots who then admitted that they, as the leading group in the vicinity, had extended hospitality to Tahiaidoris and Kayahsota, an act in keeping with traditional practices and not necessarily indicative of Wyandot sympathies. Beyond this, however, much of Campbell's subsequent success rested on the cooperation of local Indians, particularly the Wyandots. The captain's knowledge of the belts may have thrown some Indians off guard and made them less inclined to commit themselves publicly to the Senecas. Campbell himself acknowledged that there were elements within all the Indian towns at Detroit which were initially ready to support a call for war. But, it is clear that
Indian-centered issues played a role as well and it was in council with the Wyandots and other Detroit Indians that the Senecas and their message were rejected.

Though Campbell took credit for preventing the local Indians from going to Sandusky for the planned meeting, his role may have been less significant than the Wyandots' determination to retain control over regional affairs in their own town rather than let the initiative slip away to the satellite community at Sandusky. Tension between the two towns over direction of affairs was not new, and the rejection of the Sandusky meeting site appears to have resulted from Detroit Wyandot influence. Additional proof of the influence of the Detroit town came as the Senecas delegates pressed those at Sandusky to conduct the council anyway. According to Campbell, the latter "refused to take up the hatchet without the Consent of the Nations here." Faced with the ruin of their initial scheme, Kayahsota and Tahiadoris agreed to go to Detroit where they held a council on July 3. Campbell again learned of the proceedings from French informants whose services he highly recommended to Sir William Johnson.

At the meeting the two Senecas, addressing their remarks to the Wyandots, attempted to enlist local Indian support. In so doing they voiced a concern that, to this point, had perhaps been felt but not stated by many western Indians. Producing a large red war belt, the Senecas accused the English of treating the Indians with much disrespect and said further that "we have the greatest reason to believe by their behavior they intend to cut us off entirely; they have possess-ed themselves of our Country" and warned that the Indians must act...
now before the English grew stronger. 69

Though they may have felt sympathy for the Senecas and those who had joined them, the Detroit Indians ultimately rejected the belt, warning that "if you go on to engage in Conjunction with other Nations against the English we shall look upon you as disturbers of the pub-lick tranquillity, & will be obliged to interpose to put a stop to your proceedings, & restore peace and quiet again in the Land." 70

The belts went no further. Having been discovered by Campbell, Kayahsota agreed to give details of the Senecas' plan and Tahiodoris indicated that since the Detroit Indians had rejected the call for an alliance "he would bury all bad thoughts and forget the injuries done against them by the English." 71 Subsequent events demonstrated that the Senecas continued to remember.

The plan represented by the war belt, as revealed to Campbell and later by Kayahsota to George Croghan, showed the instigators to have been well advanced in their thinking on how to eliminate the English threat. It also suggests reasons for its rejection by the Detroit towns. Having enlisted the Ohio Indians and those from Detroit, the Senecas planned a coordinated attack on all the western forts, each group taking the posts closest to it. What is more, the plan envisioned something akin to a "pan-Indian" movement by its inclusion of the Cherokees. 72 In the plan's greatest potential strength, however, lay its greatest weakness. There is no indication that any groups of village size or larger adopted the plan or accepted the belts though, as Campbell suggested, there were Indians at Detroit who were in sympathy with the Senecas. Campbell also reported that
the influential Tamaqua was at Sandusky with other Ohio Indians, ready to meet the Seneca messengers. No other source places him there, and his subsequent activities at the Detroit council in September suggests that, even if he was at Sandusky, he rejected the belts. Bouquet noted that the Delawares protested ignorance of any details surrounding the belts and continued to serve as intermediaries in ironing out disputes between the army and the Shawnees. The records are silent, however, on the activities of the latter people, or other Delaware groups, especially those living close to the Senecas on the upper Allegheny River. It does seem likely, however, that Tamaqua's influence, coupled with economic need and the newly established relations with traders and garrisons led these people to respond cautiously to calls for war and to continue to bide their time.

Wyandot leadership also appears to have played a significant role in the outcome of the Senecas' council at Detroit. Beyond this, regional jealousies and different experiences with the Anglo-Americans also played a part. Detroit Indians, who had clashed with Iroquois warriors at Fort Niagara in 1759, may have balked at cooperating with people who were still considered enemies. Related to this may have been Wyandot reluctance to enter into any relationship with part or all of the most powerful of the Six Nations, a relationship that could mark the end of Wyandot influence. Of greater importance was the Detroit Indians' unwillingness to rekindle war with the English at a time when trade was being renewed and life was returning to normal in some respects. The Wyandots' admonition to Kayahsota and Tahladoris not to disturb the peace reflected and unwillingness to return to conditions
as they had been only months before. In addition, the Indians on
the upper Great Lakes, while they may have listened attentively to
the Senecas' words, had no particular reason to wish for war at that
time. At earlier councils on the Ohio trade had been promised and
indeed re-established, and the Anglo-Americans had continued to be-
have in acceptable ways. The Detroit garrison, barely one hundred
men, was virtually the only English force in the region before the
fall of 1761, and the natives had yet to experience the proliferation
of forts that hampered communications and which led the Senecas and
other Ohio Indians to feel "hemmed in".

While Campbell was busy at Detroit, George Croghan and Sir William
Johnson were busy gathering information on the causes of Indian hos­
tility and on who precisely was involved. Most of Croghan's information
came from Kayahsota and Tahiodoris who, after their confrontation with
Campbell, agreed to carry messages from him to Fort Pitt. There, in
meetings with Croghan, they elaborated on the source of the belts, the
messages they represented, and the problems that had led to their cir-
culation. It appears that the information came at a price: Croghan
referred to gifts for the two men before the meetings began.74 Kayah­
sota made a point of denying that he or Tahiodoris had asked the west­
ern Indians to attack the English immediately, making the Senecas' plan appear as a contingency, though this contradicts the substance
of their meeting at Detroit where the two had urged the Indians to act
before the English could prepare a defense.75 Kayahsota also employed
as a reason for the Senecas' latent hostility the fact that "the En­
glish General [Amherst] had used the Six Nations very ill since the
reduction of Canada"—a belief found by Johnson during his western trip. This led them to believe that "the English had some designs against all Nations of Indians." Though he mentioned the "Six Nations", Kayahsota ended his discussion with Croghan by pointing out that the entire scheme was "the Senecas Plan." More significant still was the introduction of a theme that was to become more widespread over the next year. Far from interpreting their plan as having limited goals, Kayahsota and Tahiadoris told Croghan that, once they attacked the English, "they expect a french Army to Retake Canada." The notion that any attack on the English would lead to a French restoration reflected a desire to return to the more comfortable, predictable pre-war arrangements and suggests the influence of French agents. Tahiadoris was identified as the Seneca son of Philippe-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire, a well-known and respected French partisan officer whose ties to the western Senecas were akin to Johnson's among the Mohawks. Further, Johnson was told at Niagara that the Seneca messages were circulated "chiefly in Chabert Joncaire's name, who ... recommended it to the Senecas that in case the french should be conquered, they were to propose to the other Nations to unite & fall upon the English." It is difficult to corroborate these statements. They may have been made to lend legitimacy or added weight to the war belts. It is, however, possible that earlier messages from Joncaire or other French agents may have prompted the Senecas to believe they could rely on such aid if they chose war with the Anglo-Americans.

Much of what Croghan learned from the two Senecas agreed with information supplied by other Iroquois sources. These agreed that
"the Six Nations look upon themselves to be very ill treated by the English General, and in particular the Sinicas," a reference to Amherst's refusal to permit them the spoils of war during the Montreal campaign. These unnamed Iroquois sources also pointed to the transient nature of Anglo-American relations by noting that "contrary to their Inclination they . . . Join'd the English to encourage all their young Men to Act in favour of them." This equivocal alliance, based on close observation of political realities marks the path taken by many western Indians as French fortunes declined. Also high on the list of grievances was the English occupation of Niagara, which not only made normal travel difficult for Indians but also threatened the livelihood of those who had previously worked on the portage. The inclusion of this point suggests further that the disaffected Senecas included those living near Buffalo Creek and the falls. Coupled with this was a complaint that "the General [gave] away their Country to be Settled," a reference to the Duncan-Rutherford portage settlement scheme. These issues, along with the belief that the English were keeping them short of lead and powder and anger over the new trade regulations that prevented trade at native towns led these Iroquois to conclude that "the English had a mind to cut them off[f] the face of the Earth." These sentiments explain why the Senecas were the first to act against the English; they were also feelings that, in the coming months, would be echoed by increasing numbers of western Indians.

There is little doubt that the war belts, if not all of the sentiments they expressed, were of Seneca origin. Captain Campbell
was content to refer to the "Six Nations" in his reports, reflecting his own vague knowledge of Indian affairs. Sir William Johnson's inquiries, however, led to the Senecas, more specifically the villages in extreme western New York and the upper Allegheny River, and allow some tentative statements about how the belts could have been issued at all. Johnson first learned of the Kayahsota-Tahiodoris mission while near Fort Stanwix on his way to Fort Niagara. He immediately began quizzing local Iroquois and pursued his investigations all the way to Detroit where, at the conclusion of the general meeting, he confronted the perripetetic Kayahsota. Information supplied by some Mohawks came from a village "beyond Chenussio"—that is, on the Allegheny River. Later at Niagara, Johnson was told by local Senecas that the war belts were "set on foot by some Indians living on the Ohio, who had one of their people killed at, or near Fort Pitt last spring, others much abused by the English"—a description that fits the Senecas living near Fort Venango. In addition, both Kayahsota and Tahiodoris were associated with the Ohio and Genesee Senecas. It thus appears reasonable to assume that the belts originated either with the western, Genesee, Senecas, or with those from the Ohio country, or perhaps were sent jointly since the ties between these groups were strong, the Ohio people being an off-shoot of the New York group.

In making his inquiries, Johnson repeatedly found Iroquois leaders unfamiliar with the war messages. At Fort Brewerton, just west of Fort Stanwix, an Oneida sachem had heard only that Senecas had gone to Detroit to perform the condolence there on behalf of the Six Nations, in order to cover the dead from the 1759 Niagara battle.
When told of the war belts, the sachem, Sequaresera, "seemed greatly surprised, declaring solemnly that no such design had ever been agreed to by the Six Nations." At Niagara the story was the same. The Seneca sachem Sanajoana told Johnson that "No such Message [has] been ever to our knowledge sent by our Nation." Johnson, exasperated by what he believed to be stalling and equivocation, attacked Sanajoana, telling him that he was thoroughly convinced that "any . . . Tribes of your Nation (tho' ever so remote) would not presume to undertake so dangerous an affair without your Concurrence & approbation", and that "matters of the smallest importance are never agreed to without the consent of you all." As a final gesture of disbelief, Johnson returned Sanajoana's council wampum—in affect calling him a liar.

Johnson's evaluation of traditional Iroquois practice, though substantially correct, ignored the possibility that these practices may have been circumvented by elements of the western Senecas and totally ignored by those on the Ohio. The belts appear to have originated with the warriors of these groups. Neither Kayahsota nor Tahiadonis was styled "sachem" and in none of the information supplied by Iroquois informants does it appear that the war messages were sanctioned by any formal convention of civil and war leaders. Instead, it seems likely that disaffected elements from the Ohio towns, joined by likeminded individuals or groups from the settlements near Niagara, took it upon themselves to act independently of the constituted practices to which Johnson referred. The issues that led to the appearance of the belts—economic privation exacerbated by English
policies, the occupation of key communications routes with the security threat that implied, and the generally threatening tone of Anglo-American activity—would tend to bear this out. All of these were circumstances that threatened the well being of local communities, one of the primary concerns of warriors. Further, complaints about shortages of ammunition suggest another factor. It may be that the belts reflected a growing division between the traditionally opposed interests within Seneca society, warriors and civil leaders. The latter, bent on maintaining social cohesion through peace and stability, may have found it more difficult to successfully confront those whose traditional function and avenue to status lay in warfare or its alternative, hunting. This conflict of interest was as old as the Senecas but English policy and the actions of soldiers and colonists since the fall of Canada added new and troubling dimensions to the problem. The references to lake of ammunition, to Amherst’s imperious treatment of Seneca warriors outside Montreal, and the infuriating treatment accorded them at the forts suggest growing alarm about status as well as concern about the Anglo-Americans’ willingness to behave in ways that coincided with native values and practices. Johnson himself saw evidence of the growing rift within Seneca society. At a meeting in April 1762, Seneca warriors apologized for the late arrival of their sachems but asked that the council begin anyway since "we are in fact the People of Consequence for managing Affairs, our Sachems being a parcell of Old People who say much, but who mean & act very little, so that We have both the power and ability to settle matters." The desire for action on important issues and the per-
ceived inability or unwillingness of established leaders to act led to the assertion of authority by the one group within Seneca society the English had the most cause to fear. The emergence of Kayahsota at this time as a leader on the Ohio Senecas also signalled the rising influence of militants within the Seneca towns.

To varying degrees, this social conflict over how best to confront a growing external threat was played out in other native communities throughout the west, tempered only by the influence of leaders and the extent to which particular communities had yet been imposed upon by the advancing Anglo-Americans. By the end of 1762, however, those who still held out for accommodation were becoming a minority as the warnings sounded by Kayahsota and Tahadioris took on a harsh reality that could not be ignored.

III

Though the Seneca war belts were intercepted, western Indians' hostility remained very much alive. During the winter and spring of 1762, Anglo-American observers continued to hear about and investigate stories of Indian alliances and war belts all directed at the western forts and other symbols of English power in the west and Canada. While much of this information reflected Anglo-American susceptibility to rumor and a predisposition to believe the worst since discovery of the Seneca belts, there can be little doubt that native unrest continued and, indeed, increased during the course of the year. At the same time, the tone of Indian complaints began to shift from specific
issues toward a growing regional recognition that specific, undesirable Anglo-American actions and pronouncements were really manifestations of something far more sinister.91

Trade continued to generate complaints throughout 1762; complaints directed not only at the price of goods but at the nature of the new trade regulations. A growing sore spot was the breakdown of credit arrangements in the Ohio country.92 James Kenny observed that George Croghan's permission to extend credit to native customers did not turn out well, "ye Indians paying, ye Credit stops: there is dissatisfaction on both sides."93 Not only did friction continue over trade in the Ohio country, it began to appear in the Great Lakes region where Lieutenant James Gorrell at La Baye was confronted with complaints about traders' conduct and was asked to underscore his promise of redress with a "small" present as tangible proof of good will.94 Captain Campbell also reported unrest at Detroit when the local Indians learned of the ban on liquor sales.95

Similarly, western Indians stepped up their protests against the shortage of ammunition. So angry were Detroit Indians that the fort's commander worried about the consequences of their finding out that the shortages were deliberate and hoped that Amherst had since changed his mind.96 At Fort Pitt, George Croghan underscored Campbell's concern by observing that continued hostility among the Ohio Senecas was the result of "there Nott being allowed Amunision & Nessarys as they pass & Repass hear to Warr."97 Not confined to the neighborhoods around these two forts, Indian discontent spread to the Miamis and others living south of the Great Lakes.98
More ominous and potentially more dangerous than complaints about trade, however, was the marked increase in conflicts between Indians and local soldiers and settlers. In spite of Colonel Bouquet's proclamation and other efforts to clear the Ohio country of illegal settlements, local Indians still found good cause for registering anger over the invasion. James Kenny observed that "It Grieves ye Indians to see ye White People Settle in these Lands, especially in Virginia side [the Monongahela valley]." One reason for this was suggested by Croghan. Writing several months after Kenny, the Indian agent noted that the Ohio Indians were angry that the English had not compensated them for the lands now occupied by the forts and their surrounding settlements. An added worry for the Delawares came early in 1762 with the arrival in the Muskingum towns of Moravian missionaries. John Heckewelder, assistant to Christian Frederick Post, was soon made aware of the suspicion under which they both worked. Heckewelder reported that the Delawares fears "that this missionary scheme might prove a mere pretence, in order to enable the white people to obtain a footing in the Indian Country." The Delawares' suspicions seemed to be confirmed when Post began to stake out what the Indians believed to be far too extensive a tract for two austere Moravians, and ordered him to accept a much smaller plot, telling him that they feared being "driven further back, as has been the case ever since the white people came into this country."

While some Ohio Indians were content to register verbal complaints, others, primarily warriors who felt most directly threatened, took a different tack. The result was a marked increase in attacks on Anglo-
Americans and their property. Horsetheft, both as a way of obtaining the desired animal and as a form of economic warfare, continued. In addition, groups of warriors going south against the Cherokees killed livestock belonging to the army at Fort Pitt and near-by settlers. Robbery and other forms of harassment also continued in the Ohio country with economic need still a motive. Traders operating among the Shawnees were robbed as was the mustering agent of the Royal Americans. The latter was prepared to defend himself but was prevented from doing so by a companion when it became clear the Indians, probably Ohio Iroquois, were looking only for food. Faced with food shortages brought on by both game scarcity and limited supplies of ammunition, plus the high price of trade goods, these Indians left with some flour and a small keg of rum. 

The killing of Virginia frontier settlers by some Shawnees marked a dangerous escalation in the conflict between Indians and colonists over land and control of the Ohio region. It also illustrates the limited influence civil chiefs exercised over warriors who were determined to act according to their own interests. The year 1762 was punctuated by several more Anglo-American deaths. In April two Virginia hunters were found dead in their camp near Redstone Creek. Though robbery was cited as the motive, it is more likely that anger over the invasion of the Ohio country by such men was an additional factor. In August, William Clapman, a trader, was killed near Sandusky. The incident appears to have been the result of his two Panis slaves' desire for freedom, but they seem to have been aided by local Ottawas. The non-economic motives for Clapman's death are
revealed by an investigated by Fort Sandusky's commander, who report- ed that after killing him, the Indians destroyed Clapman's goods. Finally, in November, came news of the deaths of William Newkirk and one other trader at the hands of the Senecas. Subsequent information revealed that the killer or killers had fled to the Seneca town of Canestio, the same place to which disaffected Senecas had withdrawn the previous year from Venango.

Besides reflecting the continuation of Indian efforts to stem the tide of the Anglo-American invasion and forcing the invaders to conform to acceptable behavior, the tensions and conflicts in the Ohio country were symptoms of a combination of events peculiar to 1762. The first of these was a widespread shortage of food and similar wide-ranging illness among western Indians. It is difficult to determine precisely when these occurred other than to say that they appeared together. As early as September 1761, Ojibwas at Michilimackinac were expressing their fear of hunger in the coming months. Captain Campbell at Detroit was more specific in identifying the cause of shortages in his locale when he reported that Indians and habitants alike had experienced bad harvests that year. By year's end, localized shortages of food were mentioned among the Iroquois and among Indians in the upper Allegheny region where severe weather also cut short the winter's hunt. By the spring of 1762 John Heckewelder felt able to make the general assertion that "there was a famine in the land."

Little is known about the sickness that struck western Indians at the same time. In the records it is referred to simply as "sick-
ness" or a "severe sickness" from which many natives died. Given the close proximity in time to the smallpox outbreak of 1757-1758, it is unlikely that that disease had struck again over such a wide area. Likewise, tropical diseases, which were prevalent later, were unlikely to have arrived at this time since the principal carriers, British soldiers who had returned from West Indian duties, had not yet arrived. More likely, the illness could have been a respiratory ailment, perhaps influenza which appeared in the mainland English colonies in 1761.

Whatever the source, sickness and the attendant shortages of food were widespread. Acting on orders from George Croghan, Ensign Thomas Hutchins of the Royal Americans left Fort Pitt in early April to investigate the state of Indian affairs in the west and to collect information on the Great Lakes region. Traveling first north to the lakes, Hutchins returned by way of Michilimackinac and Fort St. Joseph on the lower Michigan peninsula. Here among the Potawatomis he first encountered the illness and privation the Indians were experiencing. Even in early August the natives were still combating the disease and its consequences. The story was the same throughout the territory Hutchins traversed between Lake Michigan and the Ohio River. The Ouiatanons, Piankashaws, Mascoutens, Kickapoos, Miamis, and Shawnees were all stricken. At the Shawnees' Lower Town, Hutchins reported that "their People were sick and are Dying every day."

Coinciding with this crisis came the increased enforcement of Amherst's rules governing Indian affairs. Though this regulatory system had begun a year earlier in the Ohio country, its full impact
was not felt for some months. By mid-summer 1762, however, Indian reaction to restrictions on trade and most of all on the efforts by the English to abandon gift-giving and reciprocity was becoming widespread and more emphatic, due in large measure to the more severe impact Amherst's decrees now had on sick and hungry native communities. Hutchins found widespread dissatisfaction with the way in which Anglo-Americans were responding to the Indians and their needs. Through planning or oversight, Hutchins was sent west without a store of goods suitable for the gift exchanges that formed a necessary part of council meetings. At Michilimackinac both Ottawas and Ojibwas were "much dissatisfied at their being disappointed" by not receiving any token of friendship after talking with Hutchins. The same reaction was found elsewhere but had particularly negative affects on those groups badly hurt by sickness and food shortages. The Potawatomis were "greatly Surprised" that Hutchins had no means by which to help them in their trying condition, especially since they had expected that "Sir William Johnson wou'd send them some few Presents to keep their Women and Children from the Cold" since "their whole Nation was afflicted with Sickness which Rendered them incapable of hunting." Bitter over this singular lack of regard for their welfare, the Indians gave Hutchins a stern lecture and a thinly veiled warning of what might happen if Anglo-American attitudes and policies did not change. The Ouiatanons and Kickapoos told the ensign that "If we were to go to the French at the Illinois they would give us ammunition at least" and suggested they would do just that if the English were not more generous. Equally significant in the natives' eyes was the seeming refusal of
the Anglo-Americans to make gunsmiths and blacksmiths available, an important issue since native hunters were wholly dependent on European skills to mend firearms and other metal tools. Hutchins got the message. To Corghan he wrote that he found "in private conversation with them that they were not so well [pleased] as I could have wished as they were disappointed in their Expectations of my bringing Presents for them." He added that the Indians were quick to point out that "during the Late War the French had always Acustomed themselves to make these People great Presents three or four times a Year and always allowed them a Sufficient Quantity of ammunition." Hutchins concluded by observing that the Indians "think it very strange that this Custom should be so immediately broke off by the English and the Traders not allowed even to take so much Ammunition with them as to enable those Indians to Kill game Sufficient for the support of their families." The sentiments expressed by the Potawatomis, Miamis and others demonstrated growing disenchantment with the Anglo-Americans and their efforts to revolutionize Indian relations. Especially embittering was Amherst's deliberate attempt to reduce natives to a controlled labor force while at the same time terminating long-standing customs and practices that lay at the heart of inter-societal relations. The inconsistencies of such a policy were abundantly clear to Indian hunters who found they needed to trade under what they considered inconvenient and extortionate conditions yet were denied the means of doing so. When catastrophe struck at home, the English appeared willing to ignore the natives' needs and to be callously indifferent, an attitude that
defined them more as enemies than friends.

IV

The views expressed by the Indians with whom Hutchins spoke were widely held by 1762 as growing numbers of Indians became alarmed at the implications of English policies. More often than in the past Indian spokesmen returned to a central theme: they wished that the English would conduct themselves as they had before the Seven Years' War.\textsuperscript{124} Coinciding with this was the continued, almost nostalgic, comparison of English with French practices—a comparison the Anglo-Americans could not win. This outlook was expressed several months before Hutchin's trip by an Iroquois war leader. Angry that his men were being denied ammunition at Fort Pitt for their homeward journey from the Carolinas, he pointed out that "it has alwayes been a Custom Long before this Warr by both ye English & french" and "while ye Warr between you & ye french Seem'd Doubtfull you ware Genrous a nuff to all Nations But sence you have Conquerd ye french ... you Look on us as Nobody."\textsuperscript{125}

This was echoed by other Ohio Indians. James Kenny observed in his journal that the Delawares were uneasy over the fact that Neta-watwees, now recognized as "the Chief Man of ye Delaware Nation," had been ignored by the English, who had not made him any presents in recognition of his status and to renew friendship with the Delawares.\textsuperscript{126} Ohio Iroquois warriors were also angry because the English would not supply their raiding parties at Fort Pitt, even though "all the Six
Nations were promised to be Supply'd here by you, as they past;" and further told Croghan that such was their right "as being the Proprietors of the Land."  

By the end of the year, George Croghan was forced to admit that "the Indians Seem Disappointed In thire Expectations of presents as useal & spear Very Sulky & Ill Tempered." This was particularly true of the warriors who, used to being "Indulged by both french & English" and carrying heavy burdens of responsibility for the welfare of their people, were acutely sensitive to "this Suden Change in our Generosity to them."  

Indian frustration and apprehension were manifested in two ways, both rooted in traditional values. Among the Delawares living west of the Ohio River there appeared a prophet whose message offered a solution to this latest assault on their way of life. The prophet, Neolin, was himself one of several men who appeared among the Delawares, both in the west and on the Susquehanna River, offering divinely inspired messages to their people. The messages preached by these men sparked nativistic revitalization movements among the Delawares of which the one led by Neolin was directly related to affairs in the west.  

Information about Neolin and his message is limited primarily to that gathered by James Kenny from Indian informants at Fort Pitt. Kenny first mentioned Neolin in October 1762 when he wrote of "ye Imposter which is raised amongst ye Delaware, in order to shew them ye right way to Heaven." By the time Kenny first learned of Neolin, it seems that the latter's message had already attracted a considerable
following, though numbers and locale are all but impossible to determine. Kenny noted that "The Indians at their Towns make feasts & perform their new devotions by Dancing, Singing & sometimes all Kneeling & praying."\textsuperscript{131}

The heart of Neolin's message lay in his insistence that the Delawares could insure their salvation and cultural identity by rejecting the values and technology of the Europeans and by returning to the ways of the forofathers. According to a "Book" or "Indian Bible" used by Neolin as an instructional aid, a copy of which was shown and explained to Kenny, the Delawares' path to heaven had been blocked by the arrival of Europeans and the subsequent decline of native culture due to the influx of alien ideas and goods. However, Neolin claimed to have revealed to him a new path, one that could be gained only through cultural revitalization.\textsuperscript{132} Kenny's informant, James Mokeson, revealed some details on how this revitalization was to be achieved. According to him "all the Boys are to be Train'd to ye use of the Bow & Arrow for Seven Years Then to live entirely on dry'd Meat . . . ye Women & Antient Men may raise & Eat Corn at ye Expiration of ye Seven Years, to quit all Commerce with ye White People & Clothe themselves with Skins."\textsuperscript{133} In addition, the Delawares were to concoct and drink a purgative, "A Sort of Bitter Drink," which if consumed by any non-Delaware could cause death.\textsuperscript{134}

Neolin's message and the movement it generated has been characterized as "anti-English". Anglo-American observers such as Kenny may have been alarmed by what they saw or heard and it also appears that Neolin predicted that war between the Delawares and English would
follow the breakdown of peace making efforts. Neolin's teaching also identified Anglo-American society as the source of the Delawares' current troubles. His message appears reactive and anti-English, however, only if viewed from an English perspective. Viewed from the Delawares' position, the revitalization could best be characterized as "pro-Delaware" since it offered a prescription by which this society could overcome the problems created not only by English expansion, but by two centuries of contact with Europeans generally. At the same time, the Delawares would be preserving and promoting that which was good and positive in their own culture. Beyond its spiritual implications, the revitalization reflected the continuing process of social re-integration of the western Delawares, a process marked by the growing cooperation of the three clans and the emergence by 1762 of Netawatwees as the symbolic head of the Delawares living on the Muskingum River.

While the Delawares were responding to Neolin's message a more widespread transformation was taking place in western Indians' perceptions regarding the Anglo-Americans. Ever since the dramatic turn of events that had transferred titular sovereignty of the west from France to England, western Indians had periodically expressed their expectation of Anglo-American vengeance for acts committed during the war. As early as May 1760 George Croghan was warning his superiors that it would be necessary to allay the Indians' suspicions that revenge would be the ultimate goal of any English actions. The following year James Kenny also observed that the Delawares seemed to harbor "jealousies of ye English, having revenge or some ad-
vantage in view." Kenny's enemy, Groghan, agreed. The Potawatomies and other Indians living in the Great Lakes region seemed equally predisposed to expect those whom they attacked to seek revenge if the opportunity arose. This culturally conditioned outlook, like others governing inter-societal relations, helps explain native responses to Anglo-American words and actions. Yet, in this instance, Indian fears and expectations were made worse and seemed to be confirmed by actions taken by English officials. Thus in 1760 Ottawas and Ojibwas had their suspicions confirmed when they discovered that council wampum and pipes given to the commander of Fort Niagara had been removed from their customary place in the council room. This situation, resulting from the officer's dispatch of the materials to Amherst, represented a serious breach of council etiquette.

By 1762 the cumulative impact of new trade regulations, altered givit-giving policies, and the imperious tone taken by royal officials toward Indians had resulted in the widespread acceptance of the notion that English policies were deliberately designed to weaken the foe before the revenge attack was launched. Sir William Johnson found this outlook among Indians as far east as the St. Lawrence valley and Maine where the "Abenaquis have confessed to me that they are all greatly alarmed at the many reports propagated amongst them, that the English intend to destroy them." In August the Wyandots at Detroit had intercepted another Ohio Iroquois war belt, accompanied by the warning that "ye English are going to Strike them." By December acceptance of this view by western Indians was widespread. George Croghan's assistant, Alexander McKee, reported that the Shawnees "In Gineral
are Discontented & grow more Jealous Every Day of us & publicly Say
that ye English has a Designe of Cutting them of[f] of Else they wold
Lett them have more powder and Lead." The Shawnees also pointed to
renewed pressure on them to return captives as a sure sign of English
plotting. Groghan told Colonel Bouquet that he had learned that
the Delawares, Shawnees, and Ohio Senecas "Say its full time for them
to prepare to Defend themselves & their Country from Us." And,
he went on, "They Interpret the General's Frugality in Lessening the
Expense of Presents in a Design of Revenging what is past, being con-
scious they Deserve to be punished."

While less direct pronouncements are available from the Great
Lakes, the subsequent actions of many groups in that area reveal similar
feelings. In addition, such sentiments expressed above were sent with
belts and calumets to Indians at Detroit and the Wabash valley. Though
less hard pressed than their counterparts to the east, the Great Lakes
Indians were also experiencing the adverse impact of English policies
and were expressing a desire to return to the pre-war system of re-
lations. Also, it is noteworthy that these expressions of concern
and determination to resist the Anglo-American revolution came large-
ly from warriors.

Growing anticipation of hostile English action and a determination
to resist was revealed in one, possibly two, ways. First, the anti-
English outlook characterized by the Seneca war belts of the previous
year spread to groups which had previously rejected such overtures.
The Senecas "were Still continuing Mischief" and appeared to be direct-
ing their efforts specifically at the Delawares. By mid-March
1762 reports had come in suggesting that Ohio Senecas and Shawnee warriors "had joined the Southerly Indians for to strike the English" and were unsuccessfully trying to enlist the Wyandots.\textsuperscript{150} If true, this report would suggest that the Senecas and Shawnees were preparing to end hostilities with their long-standing enemies in order to better equip themselves for what they were beginning to see as the inevitable conflict with the Anglo-Americans.

By September it appears that the Great Lakes Indians had also begun to accept the idea of an English conspiracy. Croghan received information about "a Great Council Held at the Ottoway Town above D'Troit" which included sachems and war leaders from the Ottawas, Wyandots, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis from Detroit "with some other Tribes who lived amongst those Indians on Lake Superior above Michilimackina and Fort le Boef." The latter referred perhaps to Ojibwa bands from Mackinac, Saginaw, and farther west.\textsuperscript{151} The meeting was held in strict secrecy, from both other Indians and Englishmen, perhaps at the request of "Two French Men [who] came down with the Indians that came from above Michilimackina in Indian dress."\textsuperscript{252} The council resolved to send delegates to the Miamis, Ouiatanons, Piankashaws, and Kickapoos to acquaint them with the proceedings but was careful to keep word of the meeting from the Six Nations. This last decision reflects the continued distrust that existed between the western Indians and the League. Also, it appears that the Indians, whose meeting discussed the possibility of war with the English, feared that the latter would be warned by their Iroquois allies. Croghan also believed that any western Indian attack when it came would be directed
at both the colonists and the Six Nations. 153

Finally, in November, Colonel Bouquet learned of a "pretended new conspiracy" embracing the Ohio Senecas, Shawnees, and Delawares whose goal, according to Alexander McKee, was to "strike the English now living in their Country." 154 Yet this information also reveals continued regionalism and lack of cooperation that had marked Indian efforts to organize the previous year. Bouquet was relieved to hear that "the distant Nations [have] refused to join" those on the Ohio and that the Miamis, who initially informed the English of the Ohio Indians' activities, had likewise rejected the war belts then circulating. 155 However, at the same time traders operating among the Shawnees came back to Fort Pitt saying they were afraid to remain among them and "are of opinion that the Indians will Break out again in war." 156

This ominous warning suggests the extent to which relations between Anglo-Americans and many western Indians had deteriorated in the space of two years. While these Indians attempted to convince the invaders of the necessity of conforming to time-honored practices or, in the case of the Ohio Indians, worked to create a mutually advantageous relationship through which peace could be promoted, a disadvantageous trade system, the seeming inability of the English to make good on a variety of treaty promises, and the persistence of an armed force in the west were all signs that, by late 1762, pointed to a conscious unwillingness by the English to cooperate and promote peace. The result for the Indians was a growing feeling of appre-
hension that had moved westward and had infected increasing numbers of native people. Assessing all that had been said and done by royal and provincial representatives from their own cultural perspective, western Indians were gradually moving toward the conclusion that English policies were designed to work to the natives' disadvantage and to lessen their security. At the same time, this outlook resulted in the assumption that the ultimate goal of Anglo-American machinations was the destruction of all Indians in the west. While no decisions had yet been made about how to deal with these perceived threats, the native population in the west was, as Croghan's informants suggested, restive and sensitive to any changes in prevailing relations that might indicate further efforts by the English to rob them of their security, independence, or lives.
Notes for Chapter VI

1 Colonel William Byer to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, May 18, 1760, Amherst Papers, WO 34/21, Public Record Office (microfilm, Public Archives of Canada), hereafter cited as WO 34.


3 George Croghan to Major Horatio Gates, May 22, 1760, Ibid., 250.


6 Croghan to Stanwix, Aug. 6, 1759, Ibid., 68. There is virtually no way to ascertain with any certainty or accuracy the validity of Indian complaints about trade prices. The unregulated nature of the pre-war trade makes this so. However, the Ohio Indians had been involved in the trade for several decades and it can be assumed that they knew whereof they spoke.


10 Alexander C. Flick, Milton W. Hamilton, and James Sullivan, eds.,

11 Amherst to Major Walters, Jun. 6, 1762, WO 34/23; Capt. Campbell to Bouquet, Jun. 8, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 139-41; "Croghan's Journal", 433.


15 Lt. Gordon to Bouquet, Aug. 18, 1762, Ibid., series 21640, 63-64.


17 Johnson Papers, XIII, 227-28; see also Bouquet to Lt. Carre, Oct. 13, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21653, 81-82.


19 Bouquet to Lt. Carre, Oct. 13, 1761, Ibid., series 21653, 81-82.

20 Carre to Bouquet, Jul. 3, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 6; Johnson Papers, X, 329.


24 Campbell to Bouquet, May 21, 1761, Ibid., series 21646, 162-64; Johnson Papers, X, 328.

25 Campbell to Bouquet, May 21, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 162-64.
26 Robert Callendar to Bouquet, May 23, 1761, Ibid., 168; Bouquet to Monckton, Jul. 24, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 434-35.


28 "Croghan's Journal", 403.


30 Johnson to Amherst, Jun. 21, 1761, Johnson Papers, X, 291.

31 Croghan to Johnson, Dec. 22, 1759, Ibid., 131-32.

32 Johnson to Croghan, Jul. 21, 1761, Ibid., 319.


35 Ibid.

36 Sgt. McDonald to Bouquet, Oct. 25, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 175; Bouquet to James Livingston, Oct. 31, 1761, Ibid., series 21653, 87; Bouquet to Governor Francis Fauquier, Feb. 8, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 20-21.


38 Johnson Papers, XIII, 214; Johnson's proceedings appear in two journals, the official and by far most detailed is found in Johnson Papers, III, 428-503, an abbreviated account is in Ibid., XIII, 215-74. Secondary accounts and interpretations of this trip are found in James Thomas Flexner, Lord of the Mohawks (Boston, 1979), chpt. 18; Milton W. Hamilton, Sir William Johnson, Colonial American (Port Washington, N.Y., 1976), chpt. 23; Nicholas B. Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959), 179-83.

39 Johnson to General Thomas Gage, Feb. 19, 1764, Johnson Papers, IV, 308, 331; Johnson to Gage, Mar. 16, 1764, Ibid., 368.

40 Ibid., XIII, 444.

41 On meetings with the Iroquois en route to Detroit, Ibid., III, 429, 432, 443.
42 Ibid., 430-31, 434-35.
43 Ibid., 446-47.
44 Ibid., 455-56.
45 Ibid., 453-54, 463-64.
46 Ibid., 470, 475.
47 Ibid., 477.
48 Ibid., 477-78.
49 Ibid., 476, 494.
50 Ibid., 478.
51 Ibid., 481-82.
52 Ibid., 485-87.
53 Ibid., 487-91, esp. 487.
54 Ibid., 494-95.
55 Ibid., 538; Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures In Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (Rutland, Vt., 1969), 44.
56 Johnson Papers, III, 543-44.
57 Ibid., 545.
58 Henry, Travels and Adventures, 44-45.
59 Ibid., 45.
60 Ibid., 49-50.
61 Dictionary of Canadian Biography, IV, s.v. "Kayahsota".
63 Campbell to Bouquet, Jun. 17, 1761, Aspinwall Papers, 423.
64 Campbell to Amherst, Jun. 17, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 438; Campbell to Bouquet, Jun. 21, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21646, 217-18.
Campbell to Bouquet, Jul. 7, 1761, Ibid., series 21647, 7-9.
Campbell to Johnson, Jul. 8, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 449.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 450-51.
Ibid., 452.
Ibid., 453; Campbell to Bouquet, Jul. 7, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21647, 7-9.

"Croghan's Journal", 411.
Ibid., 410; Campbell to Johnson, Jul. 8, 1761, Johnson Papers, III, 451.
"Croghan's Journal", 410; Johnson to Amherst, Jul. 29, 1761, Johnson Papers, X, 321-22.
"Croghan's Journal", 411.
Ibid., Walters to Amherst, Jun. 29, 1761, WO 34/21.
Johnson Papers, III, 456, 460.
"Croghan's Journal", 409-10.
Johnson Papers, III, 437.
Ibid., 493.
Ibid., 439.
Ibid., 459.
Johnson to Daniel Claus, Feb. 9, 1762, Ibid., 630.
Ibid., 440.
Ibid., 463.
Ibid., 464-65.

Wainwright, George Croghan, 184, has correctly called 1762 the "critical year" in Anglo-Indian relations; see also Randolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio* (Pittsburgh, 1968), 99.


"Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 152.


Campbell to Bouquet, Jun. 8, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21648, 139-42.


Croghan to Johnson, Mar. 31, 1762, *Johnson Papers*, III, 663.


"Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 167-68.

Wallace, Heckewelder, 41.

"Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 38; "Croghan's Journal", 419.

106. "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 43; Bouquet to Amherst, Mar. 7, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 75; Amherst to Bouquet, Apr. 4, 1762, Ibid., 84-85.

107. Sgt. McDonald to Bouquet, Apr. 8, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 61; Bouquet to McDonald, Apr. 10, 1762, Ibid., 69-70; McDonald to Bouquet, Apr. 15, 1762, Ibid., 75-76; Bouquet to Amherst, May 24, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 133-34; "Croghan's Journal", 423, "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 158.


109. Amherst to Major Wilkins, Nov. 21, 1762, WO 34/23.

110. Johnson Papers, III, 543.


113. Wallace, Heckewelder, 56.


116. Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21655, 185-86 for Croghan's instructions to Hutchins, 167-74, for Hutchins' journal; Johnson Papers, X, 521-29 for another copy of the journal.


118. Ibid., 169.

119. Ibid., 171.

120. Ibid., 172.

121. Ibid., 173.

122. Ibid., 173-74.

123. "Croghan's Journal", 432-34.


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127 Croghan to Johnson, Oct. 8, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 548-49.
128 Croghan to Bouquet, Nov. 25, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 167-68; Croghan to Johnson, Oct. 5, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 890.
130 "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 171.
131 Ibid., 172.
133 "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 171, 188.
134 Ibid., 188.
139 Croghan to Gates, May 20, 1760, Aspinwall Papers, 248.
141 Clifton, Prairie People, 103.
142 Walters to Amherst, Aug. 19, 1760, WO 34/21.
143 Johnson to Amherst, Apr. 1, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 664.
"Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 164.

"Croghan's Journal", 432; Wainwright, George Croghan, 195.

Croghan to Bouquet, Dec. 10, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 597-98.


Croghan to Bouquet, Dec. 10, 1762, Johnson Papers, X, 597-98.


Pauli to Bouquet, Mar. 16, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 51-52.

"Croghan's Journal", 430.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bouquet to Amherst, Dec. 12, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 116-17; McKee to Bouquet, Nov. 22, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 158; "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 174, 179.

Bouquet to Capt. Ecuyer, Nov. 25, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21653, 160-61; McKee to Bouquet, Nov. 22, 1762, Ibid., series 21648, 158.

CHAPTER VII
Toward War, 1762-1763

Though the atmosphere surrounding Anglo-Indian relations had grown more tense by late 1762, there was as yet no sign that western Indians were doing more than re-evaluating their position and Anglo-American actions. As 1762 drew to a close, however, circumstances proceeded to change in ways that continued to limit native options and strength the position of those who sought a quick military solution to the growing English menace.

One manifestation of growing militancy was the re-appearance of war belts among the western Indians. Reminiscent of the ones circulated the year before, these later belts appear to have had the same source; the Ohio Senecas. In August reports of a belt reached Fort Pitt.\(^1\) Subsequent information confirmed earlier news. However, while the belt came from the Ohio, the Indians at Detroit responded to it without the prompting of Seneca messengers as had been the case the previous year. What is more, the council called to discuss the war message embraced interested Ottawas and Ojibwas from Saginaw Bay and Mackinac as well as local Indians.\(^2\) The meeting, details of which are sketchy, suggests a growing sense of solidarity on the part of Indians living in the upper Great Lakes region.

In November came word that "ye Mingoes has a War Belt & Bloody Tomahawk now offering to ye Shawanas," a belt the Shawnees appear to have accepted and passed to the Miamis who brought it to the attention of the commander of Fort Miami later that winter.\(^3\) English officers

\(^{39}\)
characteristically dismissed the notion of impending war, perhaps justifiably, given the late season. But James Kenny observed as early as October that "Many of ye Old Traders say they are of opinion, that the Indians will Breake out again in War." By year's end even veteran agent George Croghan was issuing warning of a general wave of native unrest and of the potential for war in the spring.

The Anglo-American perception that western Indians were again restive was not unfounded. By the fall of 1762, the new Indian policy—as defined and implemented by Amherst—of keeping the natives dependent, poorly armed, and under the gun, had taken root throughout the west. As conditions worsened, native responses—in the form of councils, calls for war, and increased efforts to build alliances—became more common. It would be difficult to assign one cause to this growing unrest. Rather, what Anglo-Americans witnessed and reported in late 1762 resulted from the cumulative impact of trade regulations, military occupation, disease, and the Anglo-Americans' persistent disregard for traditional relations that extended over the previous three years.

The widespread sickness witnessed by Ensign Thomas Hutchins began to take its toll in other ways by the autumn of 1762. Among farming communities south of the Great Lakes, sickness and death threatened both planting and harvesting and resulted in shortages of corn. Worse, hunting seems also to have been less successful. Again, reduction in the number of those able to work may account for much of
the shortfall. Yet the difficulty that western Indians had in obtaining needed ammunition and repair of firearms certainly added to the hardship—and increased the bitterness felt toward those who created and enforced such policies. To make matters worse, the economic and population crisis did not end with reduced food stores as winter approached. Less food spelled additional hardships for people who now found themselves under the necessity of hunting more in order to buy at higher prices what their former allies had given freely.

Chronic shortages of ammunition made the task of supplying blankets, kettles, and other items more difficult and promised shortages when trade resumed in the spring. John Heckewelder's general observation that "there was famine in the [Delawares'] land" in 1762 was true of other areas as well. In mid-July Ensign Pauli at Fort Sandusky was forced to request additional supplies since "it is impossible to buy venison" because "the present time is so hungry with the Indians that they hardly able to keep themselves alife." Two months later, Lieutenant Gordon at Fort Venango further undermined Indian relations by refusing supplies to hard-pressed Iroquois, even after the natives had produced a ration chit signed by George Croghan. In desperation, they plundered the garrison's corn fields saying "they had not Eat Any thing for Three Days." Gordon, with only eight men under arms, let the incident pass, though the treatment of his garrison less than a year later suggests the local Indians were less forgiving. This situation was also reflected in the upper Great Lakes as well where, in late September, Major Henry Gladwin at Detroit reported that the Miamis and Ouiatanons "are very sickly, and almost destitute of Pro-
visions." Finally, Alexander Henry's experiences at Michilimackinac indicate that the hardships were not confined to the Detroit area, nor were they limited to the latter part of 1762. As late as June 1763 Henry, in protective custody of his adoptive Ojibwa family, reported that there was then "much scarcity of food . . . we were often for twenty-four hours without eating."^10

Making a bad situation worse for western Indians was the fact that trade relations with the Anglo-Americans had not improved, nor had the latter's willingness to extend aid and behave in a friendly manner. The increasing difficulty Indians had in obtaining aid merely underscored the lesson learned in the wake of Hutchinson's visit: the English had no genuine interest in Indians or in maintaining the time-honored basis for peace and friendship. This lack of aid and generosity took on an added dimension due to the continuing warfare between the Cherokees and Indians living in the Ohio region and lower Great Lakes. As late as January 1763, Major Gladwin reported that Detroit Indians were preparing to raid the Cherokees in retaliation for an earlier attack.^^11

The net result by the end of 1762 was, as Croghan explained, growing Indian frustration with the consistent failure of the Anglo-Americans to act in acceptable ways, frustration made worse by the initial assumption, reinforced at early councils, that the English would continue to maintain relations and generosity at pre-war levels. Having been rudely disabused of this notion over the preceding three years, many Indians had grown "Very Sulky & Ill Temperd . . . In particlcker ye Warrers of Every Nation."^12
Adding to the disintegration of Anglo-Indian relations was the growing alienation of Indians who, previously, had shown marked restraint in the face of colonial and military encroachments and who had worked hard to arrive at some accommodation with the invaders. Principal among these had been the Delawares who, since the summer of 1758, had supported Tamaqua's peace-making efforts. By the end of 1762, however, Tamaqua and a growing number of Delawares had become disillusioned and latently hostile to the Anglo-Americans. The catalyst for this changing attitude appears to have been the 1762 Lancaster treaty council between the Delawares and Pennsylvania. The purpose of the meeting was to finalize the peace between the colony and the Ohio Indians and to complete the repatriation of captives. To judge from English reports, the results were less than propitious. While some captives were returned and others promised soon, the Delawares left the council in a distinctly different mood from that in which they had arrived. On September 11, James Kenny had learned that Tamaqua had rejected treaty gifts from Governor Hamilton, and the following day observed that "The Beaver is return'd & seems unwell & not so cheerful as befor." Several weeks later, Kenny told Colonel Bouquet that "ye Indians were much dissatisfied with ye Treaty at Lancaster," a view shared by George Croghan.

There are several possible ways of accounting for the Delawares' change of attitude. Kenny observed that Tamaqua and other Indians just returned from the meeting "seem half Snow'd with Rum," a condition which, if true, may account for Tamaqua's seeming unwell and "not so cheerful as befor." A temporary over-indulgence in liquor
would not account for the perceived change in attitude noted by several Anglo-American observers, though consumption of rum may have been symptomatic of other problems. Kenny also mentioned that treaty gifts were divided "unequal" at Lancaster, implying that some native participants may have felt cheated.\(^\text{16}\) As principal Delaware spokesman, Tamaqua may have been given a proportionally greater amount of the largess and attention which could have left him vulnerable to criticism by others not so favored. Finally, Crogan noted that at least some of the Indians' anger stemmed from their "haveing been Robd of allmost all thire horses & other things on thire Way" from the council.\(^\text{17}\)

While possible breaches of etiquette or backwoods highwaymen may have contributed to the unease expressed by the Delawares, other evidence suggests problems that cut much deeper and emphasized the deteriorating nature of Anglo-Indian relations. The treaty, ostensibly between Pennsylvania, the western Delawares, and those other Ohio Indians associated with Tamaqua, was to focus on prisoner exchanges and the final settlement of affairs between the two parties. As it turned out, the Philadelphia Quakers and Teedyuscung once again used the meeting as a forum to press particular claims against the provincial government, putting Tamaqua's delegation in an uncomfortable position between the province and its political enemies.\(^\text{18}\) In addition, it appears that the treaty was used by private interests to gain access to trade on the tributaries of the Susquehanna River, something the Delawares "Tuck in a Nother Light Imaging ye Desire was to Setle thire Country, and flatly Denied ye Governers Request."\(^\text{19}\) The Delawares may have
come away particularly upset that a treaty of peace had been diverted into both a political contest in which they had no stake and into another cover behind which Anglo-Americans could maneuver for more land. Given the previous three years' experience on the Ohio, the Delawares may have been even less willing to forgive colonial indiscretions.

Thus for a variety of reasons, the most basic of which was a history of Anglo-American efforts to unfavorably alter relations with them since 1759, the Delawares seem to have grown more disillusioned. By no means, however, was this true of all. John Heckewelder made a point of noting that, though the Delawares' friendship had "considerably cooled", Tamaqua still appeared favorably disposed toward the English. For others, however, the Lancaster incident merely reinforced what Heckewelder had observed earlier that year: a growing suspicion of Anglo-American motives and behavior.

The Lancaster Treaty, as well as the general condition of both western Indians and their relations with the Anglo-Americans, reinforced the prevailing notion that the English were planning to dispossess or destroy the natives. Yet there was little before late fall that would have indicated the inevitability of warfare, Croghan's warnings notwithstanding. The war belts circulated earlier in the year alarmed the army but suffered the same fate as the belts passed the year before. Part of the reason was the persistent localism on the part of western Indians that continued to preclude cooperation across regional boundaries. The war belt sent from the Shawnees in the fall failed to rally the Miamis, who showed a singular lack of trust in
others by rejecting the war message. According to Ensign Holmes, the Miamis chiefs complained that "if we had ever so much mind to kill the English, there is always some discovery made before we can accomplish our design," perhaps a statement of the Miamis' desire.22

Warfare to the south and severe problems at home in the aftermath of the 1762 illness may have further distracted attention away from the Anglo-Americans and toward more immediate issues. In addition, the still unresolved state of Anglo-French relations may have prompted some, perhaps a majority, of Great Lakes Indians to bide their time under the assumption that, eventually, conditions would return to normal—defined as a French restoration.

On the other hand, as 1762 drew to a close, native dissatisfaction continued over the Anglo-Americans' refusal to comport themselves as Indians believed they should. Complaints persisted about the sudden lack of friendship in the wake of English victories against the French and of the problem that forts and squatters continued to represent.23 At the same time, at least in the Ohio country (for which more information is available), no consensus had been reached on how to deal with these problems and the threat they posed to native independence. As late as the end of January 1763, a Shawnee was able to tell Fort Pitt's commander that "we were much divided in our Opinions [concerning a recent war belt], one half of our Warriors was for making War." However, the the absence of any agreement, the belt was sent back and the Shawnees and Delawares remained watchful but uncommitted.24

Thus it appears that in the Ohio country, and perhaps elsewhere, the late fall and winter of 1762 saw a continuation of a pattern now

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several years old: a pattern of sporadic efforts by some to rally support for a plan of resistance, and the wrecking of those plans on the rocks of factionalism and indecision. While native frustration grew over what many now saw as deliberate English efforts to reduce them to dependency or destroy them altogether, the still unsettled conflict between France and England suggested that matters might still be resolved in ways that would guarantee the restoration of the pre-war balance of power and pattern of Indian-European relations. Such an outcome would enhance native freedom of action once again by eliminating the necessity of dealing exclusively with the increasingly abrasive and dangerous Anglo-Americans whose only goals seemed to be the revolutionizing of Indian relations in ways that spelled disaster of the natives.

II

The difficulty in determining Indian actions and perceptions in the last critical months before the outbreak of armed resistance in May 1763 is the result of the singular lack of information available for the Great Lakes region during that time. The contrast with the previous year is striking. The observations of men such as George Croghan and Alexander McKee more often reflect information gathered earlier in the fall by native informants or evaluations of fragmentary reports coming in during the winter months. The seasonal pattern of native life helps account for this. From October until the following spring many Indians, especially those living beyond the Ohio, were
occupied in hunting and trapping that took them away from permanent
villages and neighboring forts or trading posts.25

It cannot be assumed, however, that the dispersal of Indian com-
munities to winter hunting camps marked a diminution of the growing
apprehension that had marked Anglo-Indian relations during the previous
year. The picture that emerges by late spring 1763 suggests quite the
opposite. From April through early June native hostility came to a
head and exploded first at Detroit, later on the Ohio and in the region
south of the Great Lakes.26 The conflict was also marked by the exit
of leaders and the waning of groups previously associated with a policy
of accommodation and the appearance of men, the Ottawa war leader
Pontiac among them, who advocated the kind of resistance first suggest-
ed two years earlier by the Ohio Senecas. Unlike the situation in 1761,
however, by early 1763 many more western Indians appear to have regard-
ed the military option as the only alternative to continued exploitation
by the Anglo-Americans.

What triggered this change in attitude toward their own, and the
invaders' position, and led to what may be described as a new consensus
on war, was the arrival in the west of news that the Anglo-French war
had finally been resolved in the form of a definitive peace based in
part on the cession of Canada to England, a settlement that effective-
ly removed France from the west.27

The arrival of this news among the Indians cannot be precisely
dated. Colonel Bouquet informed Captain Bouyer, Fort Pitt's commander,
of the preliminary peace between the two crowns on December 22, 1762,
although official word did not arrive at army headquarters in New York
On that day, General Amherst wrote to Major Wilkins at Fort Niagara informing him of the peace and ordering a public display at the fort. Though not mentioned in the records, it can be assumed that similar instructions were issued to other western posts. A letter from Major Gladwin at Detroit, dated February 21 and sent in reply to Amherst's letter of January 21, includes congratulations on the peace and the expected cession of Canada.

When or how western Indians learned of the news is problematical. George Croghan noted on February 6 that he had complied with Amherst's orders that the Ohio Indians be informed of the treaty. Indians farther west, as well as those on the Ohio, would certainly have learned at least some details from local garrisons and traders, though such information would have been unofficial and doubtless laden with rumors which never reduced its efficacy. It is also possible that news of the peace may have come into the Great Lakes region by way of the French in the Illinois country and New Orleans.

One thing does emerge, however, and that is the deliberate failure of the army and Indian service to make a formal, official announcement of the treaty to Indians living outside the Ohio country. In early May, Amherst informed Croghan of an upcoming council between the southern colonies and their Indian neighbors at which the peace treaty and cession would be explained. The commander-in-chief went on to observe, however, that "this had not immediate regard to the Indians in the Department where you are" and that regardless of "whatever idle notions they may entertain in regard to the cession made by the French Crown" the Indians' opinions were of "very little consequence" since they
were expected to behave peacefully or suffer the consequences.\(^{31}\)

As far as Amherst was concerned, western Indians now had no choice
but obedience and cooperation, "for the Peace must, at once, Cut
off all their hopes of Encouragement from the French, and they will
See the Folly of Disobliging Us."\(^{32}\)

What thus became for Amherst an advantage born of the removal of
French influence over dangerous Indians became, for the latter, a
problem of major proportions. The issue was not the degree to which
the French had been or were at the moment encouraging or otherwise
aiding the western Indians. The issue, from the natives' point of
view, was that the potential for aid should a conflict begin with the
English was now apparently gone. And with it went the Indians' best
opportunity for future security. By having the potential of French
support—potential realized during the previous century—Great Lakes
Indians could better withstand the current threat to their security;
in effect they could continue to "play-off" Englishmen against the
threat of a renewed Franco-Indian alliance. With the coming of peace
the play-off strategy was lost. That such an approach to inter-societal
relations had loomed large in Indian thinking is reflected in the his-
tory of Indian-European relations before the Seven Years' War as well
as in the repeated efforts to get the Anglo-Americans to conform to
acceptable standards of behavior by comparing them unfavorably to the
French. An encounter between Ottawas and Lieutenant Leslie at Fort
Michilimackinac further illustrates Indian thinking. Having learned
of unrest among the local natives, Leslie was told that they believed
they could strike the English with impunity since "if they attempt
anything against the English here they could retire to the Illinois." Leslie promptly moved the squelch any such notions by telling the Ottawas that an English army was even then (September 1762) en route to New Orleans in order to occupy the Illinois country—a statement based wholly on Leslie's imagination, but one perfectly designed to heighten, not defuse, a tense situation.  

While the threatened removal of the French created a serious problem for Great Lakes Indians by undermining one of their principal survival strategies, additional details of the peace settlement struck hard at all western Indians. Not only were the French to retreat from the west, but they had ceded their claims in that region to the English. Indians who learned of this were outraged, having never assumed nor acknowledged French ownership of any lands claimed by native groups. George Croghan, with some understatement, summarized news from Detroit by observing that "the Indian Nations this way seem somewhat disturbed since they heard of it, and says, the French had no right to give away their Country; as, they say, they were never Conquered by any Nation."  

Trader James Kenny was more to the point, noting that the Delaware leader Netawatwees "was Struck dumb for a considerable time" upon learning of the conditions for French withdrawal.  

Colonel Bouquet, in a letter urging Amherst to explain the peace to the western Indians, warned that "their fears for their land may be increased."  

Earlier in the year, Alexander McKee had witnessed precisely what Bouquet feared as he attempted to explain the peace treaty to the Shawnees. Asserting English rights to the west by virtue of victory in the war with France, McKee observed that "this
seemed to increase their Jealousy and they said plainly that the English would soon be too great a People in this Country. 37

Thus, as 1763 began, western Indians found themselves in a situation that some had warned of two years earlier. With the French officially gone from the west and with the Anglo-Americans claiming ownership of the region by right of conquest, Indians faced circumstances that few could have anticipated. Now the English, as the Shawnees feared, would indeed be "too great a People" with no one available to act as a counterpoise except the natives themselves. It must have seemed to many that the English effort since their occupation of the west to revolutionize Indian affairs had now paid off. Suddenly, native options had narrowed as they confronted victorious and now unchallenged people who had consistently shown a lack of regard for the Indians' offer of friendship based on reciprocity and accommodation. The confusion that resulted from news of the peace and what it might mean could only have been increased by the Indians' long-held expectation that, given the opportunity, the Anglo-Americans would take their revenge for injuries suffered during the Seven Years' War. The opportunity appeared to have arrived. The fact that the English made no effort to communicate news of the peace to native leaders and the renewed insistence that all prisoners remaining in Indian hands be immediately returned could only have added to the growing feeling of insecurity and "jealousy". 38

Given the Indians' assumptions about the meaning behind Anglo-American behavior over the past several years, and the radical change in the regional balance of power brought about by the unforeseen re-
moval of the French, the choices remaining were few and none of them were wholly attractive: to do nothing and accept what would come, or act positively to regain the initiative and drive the threatening Anglo-Americans away. Both clearly involved risks, yet to do nothing meant, in effect, surrender either to destruction or at the very least continuation of the prejudicial manner in which affairs were being conducted. By resisting, western Indians could both forestall the expected blow from the English and, hopefully, rid themselves of the myriad problems that had arrived with the invaders. By late spring many, though by no means all, Indians had chosen resistance as a way of preserving their world from the threats posed by Anglo-American domination.

One measure of the shift in emphasis toward war can be seen in the changes in leadership within Indian communities. As tension mounted and the threat to native security grew, men who identified with war supplanted those who had argued for peace. This change came earliest among the western Senecas and those living on the Ohio. By mid-1761 Kayahsota and Tahiadoris were actively involved in planning for war and declared themselves to be spokesmen for the Senecas as well as for other Six Nations Iroquois, an assumption of authority denied by the sachems. Another warrior, Kindarunti, was also identified as a "promoter of the Scheme to carry on a war with us." In all cases, warriors were challenging traditional leadership at home by advocating a military solution to the growing Anglo-American problem.

The same kind of transition appears to have taken place among the Delawares, though much later and in the wake of the Lancaster
Tamaqua, who for nearly five years had led many Delawares down the path of cautious accommodation with the English, appears to have stepped—or have been moved—aside by early 1763. The timing, reasons, and details cannot be recovered with certainty, yet by the time war broke out in May 1763, Netawatwees had emerged as the Delaware "king", a position from which Colonel Bouquet later sought to remove him in favor of someone more pliable. The change of leadership, and a corresponding change from peace to war, seems to have been finalized during the months after Tamaqua's return from Lancaster.

En route to the treaty, Tamaqua was accompanied by "king Netatwahelmy" (Netawatwees), suggesting perhaps that the latter was already in ascendance. At the treaty, however, Tamaqua was the leader of the Delaware contingent and reprised his former role as spokesman for his own people as well as for others who spoke through the Delawares. Little appears between the council and the outbreak of hostilities the following summer. In late February the English at Fort Pitt learned of the Delawares' negative reaction to news of the Anglo-French peace. Christian Frederick Post, who had returned at that time from the Muskingum towns, made a point to describe Netawatwees's reaction, but said nothing of Tamaqua or other Delaware leaders. John Heckewelder adds one final glimpse of the changes taking place within the Delaware communities and of Tamaqua's status. Early in 1763, Tamaqua reportedly informed the missionaries and traders operating among his people that he and other leaders could no longer guarantee their safety and urged them to leave the region.

Tamaqua's popularity and influence may have fallen victim to the
rising discontent resulting from the convergence of an unsatisfactory meeting at Lancaster, the revitalization message of Neolin, and the earth-shaking news of the Anglo-French peace. Faced with growing sentiment for war, Tamaqua may have bowed to the inevitable and stepped aside in favor of the more militant Netawatwees. The possibility cannot be ruled out, however, that Tamaqua's apparent eclipse was another example of the deft political behavior that had served him so well in the past. By standing apart from the impending conflict, Tamaqua both avoided dividing his people and placed himself beyond recrimination by the English and in a favorable position to take advantage of any eventuality.

To the northwest there emerged yet another figure whose name and career have been irrevocably linked to native resistance: Pontiac. Irrespective of the virtual absence of any solid information about his early life, career, or position within his own society, volumes have been written about his leadership or native resistance and his role as the arch-conspirator and architect of the war which broke out in 1763. Of his role in leading the attack against English forces in and around Detroit there can be no doubt. His influence beyond Detroit—or even among non-Ottawas at that town—is at least problematical and at best of no great historical significance. Taken out of the context of "great man" history or "pan-Indian" conspiracies, and placed in historical and regional context, Pontiac emerges as another example of the growing shift from toleration of Anglo-American encroachments to a belief that only war would restore a favorable balance of power in the west. As has been seen, it was the news that the west
was to be delivered to the English that particularly threatened the Great Lakes Indians. Again, however, the timing and circumstances surrounding Pontiac's emergence at Detroit are difficult to ascertain. Aside from the so-called "Pontiac Manuscript", now attributed to Detroit resident Robert Navarre, there is precious little to shed light on Pontiac's activities before the spring of 1763.45

Pontiac's first recorded activity as a leader advocating war was a council held at the Ecorse River near Detroit on April 27, 1763. At that meeting Pontiac attempted, and apparently successfully, to create a consensus for military action among the local Ottawas, Potawatomis, Ojibwas, and perhaps part of the Wyandot community. His plan, which called for the solicitation of aid from other regional groups, echoed that presented by the Senecas over the previous two years.46 If one thing causes Pontiac and his followers to stand out in the historical record it is the fact that they acted where others previously had faltered. Much of this success may indeed have to do with his special character and will as his biographers have insisted. Yet the climate of the time and the universal and growing Indian perception of the inevitability of war with the English makes it likely that Pontiac was also blessed by being at the right place at the right time. Nevertheless, action at Detroit served as an example to others throughout the west in the weeks following the outbreak of hostilities at Detroit on May 9.

Pontiac, Kayahsota, and Netawatwees were emergent leaders whose rise to influence reflected growing native convictions that Anglo-American power and aggression, real or imagined, could only be met
by force if Indians were to preserve their independence. In a larger sense the emergence of these men reflected the continued function of traditional values in native communities. Faced with external threats and the inability or unwillingness of civil leaders to respond, the warriors, in whom were vested responsibility for supplying and defending society, emerged to assert their traditional role. What resulted in 1763 was the use of traditional means to combat an Anglo-American revolution in Indian-European relations.

III

While Indians in the Ohio country had long worked to keep their lands free of either French or English occupation, those living in the upper Great Lakes region had engaged in a relationship with the Canadian French that was economically beneficial yet not a threat to local autonomy. With the arrival of the English army and colonial traders, however, a system of economic colonialism based on mutual need and respect was threatened by a more aggressive form of imperial expansion based on political and military as well as economic domination. What is more, those who attempted to implement these new arrangements had previously been counted as enemies.47

The extent to which western Indians were dissatisfied with Anglo-American practices was made known in the repeated requests that the new colonists behave more in accordance with former French practices. By early 1763 growing rancor over English policies led at least some Great Lakes Indians to define resistance in terms of re-establishing
the pre-war system, including the restoration of the more benign French trading network. Such a goal was reflected in Indian contacts with French officials still resident in the Illinois country after hostilities had broken out at Detroit. At Fort Ouiatanon, Lieutenant Jenkins reported in July that local Ouiatanons had asked the French to launch an attack against his post, a request that was denied. More suggestive was the message sent from the Detroit Ottawas to the French commander in the Illinois country. The speech indicated both the sense of isolation felt by Detroit Indians since the French departure and the persistent hope that news of the Anglo-French peace and the cession of Canada were merely English lies and that French aid would soon be forthcoming.48

The hope of a French restoration was doubtless reinforced by the fact that the Great Lakes region contained in 1763 several hundred habitants, traders, and a handful of priests, the remnants of France's claim to the west. Precise figures on this Canadian French population are unavailable. By far the largest number lived at Detroit, whose population was placed by Colonel Bougainville at two hundred in 1757. Three years later Captain Campbell found eighty houses in the town.49 Outside Detroit, numbers become even more vague. Alexander Henry found thirty houses at Fort Michilimackinac, but said nothing about those who may have lived away from the fort. Sir William Johnson spoke of "Several French Familys" at Fort Miami and a like number at Fort Ouiatanon.50

These settlements had originated in the missions and trading stations established over the previous sixty years and had continued
to survive on trade, subsistence farming and supplying food and services to the traders and small military detachments at the major posts. Ties between these French and the surrounding Indians went beyond trade or mutual occupation of the land. By the end of the Seven Years' War there were a number of people—the métis—who were the offspring of Indian-French unions.

The radical shift in power in the west that so upset Indians' lives hurt the habitants and traders as well. Unable to obtain supplies because of the war, these people were at least as poorly off as their Indian neighbors by the time English occupation forces arrived. Native informants told the English in the spring of 1760 that "the Inhabitants about D'Troit are much Distressed," a picture confirmed by Captain Campbell who reported that "we found the Kings Stores here almost empty" and the habitants "in great want of Every Thing." Anglo-American traders did a brisk business supplying French needs and though crop failures persisted into 1761 at Detroit, conditions elsewhere seem to have improved to the point where outpost commanders were buying some of their meat and flour from local settlers.

What doubtless concerned the western French as much or more than shortfalls in supplies was that their economic base, the fur trade, was in the process of being aggressively taken over by Anglo-American entrepreneurs. Further, as the inhabitants of a newly conquered land, the French were placed under the same kinds of restrictions—for many of the same reasons—as their former native customers. Considered potentially hostile and a threat to regional security, the habitants and French traders soon began to experience the kind of imperial
authority that had irritated and finally alienated the Indians. As early as 1761 efforts were being made to curb the activities of French trader Duperon Baby, who had managed to maintain his business connections with the Shawnees despite the British army's occupation of the Ohio country. The following year Amherst, on advice from Sir William Johnson, took steps to insure that western garrisons stopped the trading reportedly going on between the king's new subjects at Detroit and the French towns and forts in the Illinois country.

While royal officials had little to say about the day-to-day activities of the French in the west, when war broke out in 1763 crown agents were quick to blame them and other French "agents" for Indian hostility. In part this predisposition was rooted in reports of clandestine French activity associated with anti-English councils and war belts over the previous two years. Johnson was told by Indian informants, and was inclined to believe, that Frenchmen had been active at the Detroit council in the late summer of 1762 wherein the subject of war with the English had been discussed. Further, he was warned that Frenchmen from the Illinois were attempting to turn the Shawnees into a hostile path by warning them of English "plots".

By the time Johnson learned of the appearance of two Frenchmen "dressed as Indians" at Detroit, news of similar activities began to arrive from other western posts. At La Baye, Lieutenant Gorrell reported that local Frenchmen had tried, unsuccessfully, to alienate neighboring Indians from the English garrison. From Fort Pitt came word of some "French on the Illinois that are striving to Spirit up [the Miamis] against the English." Later in 1761, James Kenny was
told that a French officer, accompanied by several Shawnees, had been observing the fort and that the Shawnees believed the French would help them attack the post in the spring. 61

While such information suggests that French activities among the Indians had become widespread by 1762, English reports failed to identify either the motive behind such actions—beyond the assumption that the French were by inclination hostile to their new overlords—or which Frenchmen were engaged in "subversive" activities. Finally, while Johnson, Amherst, and others were willing to accept the idea that the French played a large, if not decisive, part in stirring up otherwise controllable Indians, it cannot be assumed that native resistance was primarily the result of outside agitation.

Though more research needs to be done on the nature of French relations with both the English and western Indians at this time, some tentative explanations can be offered as to why some Frenchmen would actively work to weaken Anglo-American control over the west. In the first place, the French, like their Indian neighbors, were faced with living under an alien regime that had recently been hostile and whose future plans for the west and i's inhabitants were unknown. Large numbers of soldiers to be quartered and fed, and increasing regulation of economic activity, coupled with the potential revocation of land titles and civil rights may have prompted some to resist. 62

Further, so long as war continued, some Frenchmen may have felt duty-bound to continue to wage war against the invader by whatever means were available. Small pockets of French soldiers continued to live among western Indians and may well have continued to urge resistance.
on the part of both local French and Indians. There is also slight
evidence that French Indian agents attempted to create what might be
called a "doomsday" system for insuring native resistance even after
French forces had left the west. Sir William Johnson learned that
the French had left war belts with western Indians before departing
in 1760, though Johnson's informant was quick to point out that other
issues, not the belts, were the source of current Indian hostilities.

Finally, and perhaps of greater immediate concern, was the damage
the Anglo-American occupation had done to the French fur trade. With
the capture of Montreal, the French trading system passed under English
control and was quickly re-established based on Anglo-American leader­
ship and money and Canadian expertise and labor. To Frenchmen living
on the fringes of a vast trading empire such a change spelled disaster
since credit and markets were now in the hands of foreign competitors.
Trade factors at Detroit or La Baye, bereft of goods and credit must
have looked bitterly on as canoe loads of Anglo-American merchandise
passed by headed for native customers. Lieutenant Gorrell gave some
indication of the extent to which French traders were willing to go
to keep interlopers out of their marketplace. In October 1762 he re­
ported that several French voyageurs, working for licensed Anglo-
American traders, "did all in their power to persuade the Bay Indians
to fall upon the English." Gorrell noted, probably correctly, that
such actions were directed at hindering Anglo-American traders from
approaching the western posts.

When it came to identifying those Frenchmen involved in efforts
to create Indian resentment or keep it at high levels, Anglo-American
observers were less than specific. French officials at Fort de Chartres, New Orleans, or the other posts in the Illinois country and Louisiana were most frequently cited as the source of the unrest. On closer examination, however, the picture is more complex. French military officers and civil officials undoubtedly continued to lend moral and material support to the western Indians as long as the war with England continued. Governor Kelerac of Louisiana reported as much in his dispatches to authorities in Paris. He also indicated that, once news of the peace reached him, he ceased such activities. That his actions were by no means singular is made clear by the response of Captain de Villiers to Indian requests for aid in the summer of 1763. As commander of the Fort de Chartres garrison, de Villiers was in an excellent position to give support to the warring Indians. However, in a reply to the message sent from Detroit, he refused, citing his legal obligations and urged the Indians to reconcile themselves to English authority. In a similar message to the French habitants at Detroit, de Villiers confirmed the news of a general peace and asked the settlers to help reconcile the Indians and English.

Though the official French position after the spring of 1763 was one of judicious non-involvement, the same cannot be said of the habitants and traders living in the Great Lakes region. Some of these appear to have actively sided with the Indians from the outbreak of hostilities, though in Detroit, at least, the French community was divided on the matter. Characteristically, support for the Detroit Indians came largely from "above 300 young men", traders, métis, and voyageurs, while the leading citizens such as AntoineGuilliere, Francois...
Meloche, and Baptiste Campeau, urged strict neutrality. 69

The principal motive of those Frenchmen who did support Indian resistance seems to have been self interest. In so doing, their goal—the removal of the Anglo-Americans—coincided with that of an increasing number of Great Lakes Indians. Lacking the means to drive the English away themselves, the French turned to the Indians, whose own anger and growing militancy offered a ready-made solution to the problem. At the same time, it is possible that after 1760 the French suffered from the same fragmented, often contradictory information about their future as did the Indians. Thus, reports propagated by these French that King Louis's troops would return to restore peace and harmony in the west may have been more than the propaganda of interested political agents. They may also have been the sincere hope of another group of people suddenly faced with a radically different world. French activities among and statements to western Indians doubtless contained elements of both political calculation and genuine hope for a Bourbon restoration in the west.

While French efforts to support and profit from Anglo-Indian hostility cannot be denied, such efforts were at best only a minor contributing factor to the conflict that began in 1763. Indian hostility was rooted in issues and problems of which French activities were only one part. By their words and actions, certain French interests helped sustain, but did not create, Indian resistance in the Great Lakes area and in so doing may have made warfare seem a more plausible option. The irony is that the Indians' decisions for war came at precisely the
time when French aid, which Great Lakes warriors had counted on and expected, was denied.
Notes for Chapter VII


7 Ens. Pauli to Bouquet, Jul. 23, 1762, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21648, 16.


9 Gladwin to Amherst, Sept. 20, 1762, WO 34/49.

10 Alexander Henry, Travels and Adventures In Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776 (Rutland, Vt., 1969), 113.

11 Gladwin to Amherst, Sept. 20, 1762, WO 34/49.
For a useful summary of events surrounding the treaty see Nicholas E. Wainwright, George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat (Chapel Hill, 1959), chpt. 9; the treaty minutes are found in Carl Van Doren and Julian P. Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties Printed by Benjamin Franklin (Philadelphia, 1938), 263-98; for additional background see "Kenny Journal, 1761-1763", 161-62; "Croghan's Journal", 426.


Ibid., 175.


Wainwright, George Croghan, 187-89; Van Doren and Boyd, eds., Indian Treaties, 270-72, 274-77.

"Croghan's Journal", 427.

Wallace, Heckewelder, 67.

Ibid., 63.

Holmes to Gladwin, Mar. 30, 1763, WO 34/49.


Ibid., 196.

"Croghan's Journal", 437-38; on Ojibwa seasonal activities see Henry, Travels and Adventures, chpts. 14-19.


There was never a general consensus among Great Lakes or Ohio country Indians on the question of war. Pontiac was unable to win the unanimous support of the Detroit Wyandots, at least part of whom remained neutral. Likewise, Sir William Johnson mentioned that the Seneca town of Canadasegey had not been involved in the war, see Johnson to Amherst, Oct. 6, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21694, 282-83.
Bouquet to Ecuyer, Dec. 22, 1762, Ibid., series 21653, 167; J. Clarence Webster, ed., The Journal of Jeffrey Amherst (Chicago, 1931), 299; Amherst received a copy of the final treaty on May 4, 1763, Ibid., 303.

Amherst to Major Wilkins, Jan. 21, 1763, WO 34/23; Gladwin to Amherst, Feb. 21, 1763, WO 34/49.


Amherst to Croghan, May 10, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 162-63; Amherst to Bouquet, May 23, 1763, Ibid., 178. Bouquet urged such a council as being the best way to preserve the peace, see Bouquet to Governor Horatio Sharpe, May 21, 1762, Ibid., 175-76.

Amherst to Bouquet, Mar. 13, 1763, Ibid., 144-45.

Lt. Leslie to Amherst, Sept. 16, 1762, WO 34/49.

Croghan to Amherst, Apr. 30, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 158-59; Gladwin to Amherst, Feb. 21, 1763, WO 34/49.


Bouquet to Amherst, May 19, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 172-73.


"Croghan's Journal", 438; Croghan to Amherst, Apr. 30, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 158-59.

Johnson to Daniel Claus, Feb. 9, 1762, Johnson Papers, III, 630.


Ibid., 187.

The classic study of Pontiac and the Indian war is Francis Parkman, *The Conspiracy of Pontiac* (Boston, 1851); for recent works that tend to reflect the paradigm established by Parkman see Peckham, *Pontiac*; Wilbur R. Jacobs, "Pontiac's War: A Conspiracy?" in Jacobs, *Dispossessing the American Indian* (New York, 1972), 83-93; the lure of conspiracy and the influence of Parkman can be seen in the most recent effort to reconstruct Pontiac's life, see Dictionary of Canadian Biography, III, s.v. "Pontiac".

The manuscript is reproduced in full in Quaife, ed., *The Siege of Detroit*; a deposition filed by M. Jordeau at Detroit in Dec. 24, 1763 mentioned that "Pontiac and some chiefs went to Fort Pitt to sound out the English [in 1760]" on the basis of which meeting "they allowed Rogers with a handful of Men to take Possession of the Fort [Detroit], and Colony, receiving them with Joy, and using Monsieur Belletrc [the French governor at Detroit] with much disrespect," (emphasis added) see Johnson Papers, XIII, 317-21; see also Thomas J. Maxwell, Jr., "Pontiac Before 1763," *Ethnohistory* 4 (1957), 41-46, the only other recent effort to trace Pontiac's activity, and not a particularly satisfying one.


Campbell to Bouquet, Oct. 12, 1761, Stevens and Kent, eds.,


Amherst to Johnson, Nov. 21, 1762, *Johnson Papers*, III, 941.


"Croghan's Journal", 399, 403; Stevens and Kent, eds., *Bouquet Papers*, series 21653, 54.


"Gorrell Journal", 25-26, 27.

My thanks to Michael Foret for bringing information on this subject to my attention, particularly a forthcoming essay by Carl A. Brasseaux and Michael LeBlanc, "The Indian Alliance: French Strategy and Pontiac's Rebellion", and the use of his thesis "Irresolution and Uncertainty: French Colonial Policy in Louisiana, 1699-1763" (M.A. thesis University of Southwest Louisiana, 1982).

For the text of de Villier's message to the western Indians see *Johnson Papers*, X, 819-21.

Ibid., 822-23, for de Villier's message to the Detroit settlers. He singled out Pontiac as a person through whom the settlers should
work, evidence of his rising influence by the fall of 1763.

69 Johnson Papers, XIII, 317-21; Peckham, Pontiac, 192-93.
The war that began at Detroit on May 9, 1763 took the English completely by surprise despite warnings the previous winter. In rapid succession, from May 27 to June 1, forts St. Joseph, Miami, Ouiatanon, and Michilimackinac were taken, their garrisons bloodied but largely left intact to be exchanged later. La Baye was spared the fate of these posts; Lieutenant Gorrell was allowed to take his troops unharmed to Montreal due largely to protection extended by local Indians who had no desire to involve themselves on the side of traditional enemies. Though Fort Pitt was sporadically attacked beginning on May 27, the war in the Ohio country did not gain momentum until mid-June by which time all the outposts north of Fort Pitt had been swept away. It is noteworthy that the two most violent incidents of the war occurred in the Ohio country, rather in the Great Lakes. On June 16 Ohio Senecas massacred the garrison of Fort Venango, having first forced its commander, Lieutenant Gordon, to compose a list of native grievances. Just weeks later, these same Indians succeeded in closing the troublesome English portage at Niagara and in the process destroyed a substantial part of the garrison there.

The timing of these attacks, carried out with speed, skill, and determination, suggests that local concerns and decisions, more than a centrally coordinated movement, was responsible for the actions. There can be little doubt, however, that once word of the attacks at and near Detroit spread outside that area others, already predisposed to fight, took the cue and acted, though in accordance with their own
concerns and in ways befitting their own relations with local garrisons and traders. Thus, Great Lakes Indians dealt more charitably with captured troops than did Indians in the Ohio country where Indian-army relations had long since soured.

General Amherst's reaction to news from the west was one of mixed disbelief and outrage, coupled with his ever-present arrogance toward the "savages" who had now presented him with the opportunity he doubtless had long awaited. Having been caught wholly unprepared, the commander-in-chief had only the sickly remnants of regiments recently returned from the West Indians to send as reinforcements. In desperation he gathered together two small battalions of Highlanders and anyone else who could walk and pushed them west by way of Forbes' Road and the Mohawk River. Marching to the relief of Fort Pitt, now under close siege, Colonel Bouquet's Scots encountered and drove off a large force of Senecas and Delawares at Bushy Run on August 5 and 6. While declared a victory in official dispatches and by subsequent generations of historians, Bouquet's encounter was more of a draw. He managed to get to the fort and evacuate several hundred civilians yet casualties amounting to twenty percent of his force prevented the colonel from carrying out his instructions and re-occupying the smaller outposts. Similar relief efforts managed to sustain Detroit, the only other fort west of Niagara still in English hands, but efforts to break the siege there met with disaster.

English and colonial shock and frustration over the new Indian war showed itself in two other, more ominous, ways. Settlers in Pennsylvania, panic-stricken over news of fighting on the Ohio, braced for
another round of attacks. Fear boiled over into anger at Indians that reflected a racial, rather than cultural, bias and exploded at Conestoga and Philadelphia later that fall and during the following year. The army, particularly its senior officers, also displayed a contempt for Indians that went beyond a soldier's feelings for the enemy. Both Amherst and Bouquet discussed a number of alternative ways for dealing with hostile Indians, including the use of mastiffs in a manner reminiscent of Spanish conquistadors centuries earlier. Worse was their use of disease in a deliberate attempt to lessen the natives' numerical and fighting advantage. Evidence revealed so far points without dispute to the deliberate attempt to infect Ohio Indians with smallpox at Fort Pitt during the summer of 1763. That effort, coupled with the various illnesses brought into the west by infected soldiers, led to a new wave of sickness that played its part in weakening Indian resistance in the coming months.

Ironically, as fighting reached a peak by late summer 1763 and as British officers were reaching new depths in their efforts to defeat the enemy, the home government was promulgating an act to prevent abuses and disorder of the kind that had led to war. Responding less to Amherst's desire to reduce Indians to a conquered peasantry than his need for an enforceable Indian policy, the Proclamation of 1763 represented the first of a series of steps taken to assert royal jurisdiction over the west, as well as bring order to colonial expansion and ensure peace with the Indians through fair treatment and enforcement of treaty obligations. Embodying many of the recommendations proposed by Sir William Johnson since 1757, the Proclamation included a provision for
a boundary line between the colonies and the yet unorganized trans-
Appalachian region, which was to remain under military rule. The con-
cept of a boundary, not finalized until 1768, along with royal control
of lands claimed by several provinces, never completely satisfied the
needs of Indian affairs due to the persistence of administrative
problems first revealed in the 1760s. Further, the Proclamation
came to symbolize a serious threat to provincial autonomy that increas-
ing numbers of colonists felt duty-bound to protest and defy.11

The British army's failure to mount successful offensives against
the Indians, sickness on both sides, and the Indians' inability to
sustain combat now that trade was disrupted led, by mid-fall 1763, to
a stalemate.12 Pontiac and his followers lifted the siege of Detroit
and moved inland, to remain a threat to the English for several years.
On the Ohio, Fort Pitt continued to experience attacks until the ad-
vent of winter led to a mutually agreed upon cessation of hostilities.

Though exhaustion and military failure, coupled with the beginn-
ing of an English-induced epidemic among western Indians, contributed
to an end of the fighting by November, other factors may have contribut-
ed as well. In the first place, many Indian groups appear to have had
limited goals in striking the army and Anglo-American traders. For
example, once the upper Ohio posts and the Niagara portage were elimi-
nated and neutralized, the western Senecas did not pursue operations
further. Likewise, Miamis, Cuiatanons, and Ojibwas at Michilimackinac
appear to have been content to see the source of their own local problems
destroyed. Having demonstrated their willingness and ability to re-
move forts, soldiers, uncooperative traders, and squatters, many In-

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dians may have believed their war to have been over. Certainly Pontiac was an exception. Indeed, his activities after the fall of 1763 in trying to persuade others to fight and in soliciting, unsuccessfully, French aid, largely accounts for his standing in the historical record. In addition, winter demanded that warriors turn from hunting men to the more important task of hunting game, a task made more difficult this winter due to the war and the disruption of trade.

The coming of spring and summer would witness far less fighting as both sides moved back to negotiations as a way of settling an issue than neither could win on the battlefield. While the English ultimately re-occupied the west and, by the end of 1765, even extended their hold into the newly acquired Illinois country, their control of these lands was no less tenuous than it had been before 1763. Indeed, the Indians achieved a victory of sorts in the removal of Amherst, for whom the war turned into a distinct political liability, and his replacement by General Thomas Gage. Gage, conscious of cost as well as the limitations of military power, decided not to re-occupy the smaller posts in the upper Great Lakes and the Ohio country. Having failed to crush native resistance, the English, through Indian Superintendent Johnson, engaged in new negotiations directed at making good the terms embodied in the 1763 Proclamation. On their parts, western Indians began anew the complex pattern of bargaining—along the same local and regional lines—that had marked their earlier efforts to address the problems of the Anglo-American invasion. As English-colonial relations deteriorated after 1765 the west played a less important role in royal planning, giving natives an opportunity to exploit new divisions within Anglo-American society while enjoying fewer English impositions.
Notes for Afterward

1 The best secondary accounts of the war itself are to be found in Howard H. Peckham, Pontiac and the Indian Uprising (New York, 1970), passim; John Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 1965), 111-124; the primary material is voluminous but the best material on military operations can be found in Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., The Papers of Colonel Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg, 1940-1943), esp. series 21634, 21649.


3 Peckham, Pontiac, 167, 224-25; Sir William Johnson to Sir Jeffrey Amherst, Jun. 16, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 212-13; Colonel Henry Bouquet to Amherst, Sept. 7, 1763, Ibid., 263; Amherst to Bouquet, Oct. 3, 1763, Ibid., 281-82.

4 Peckham has made the argument that the Indian war does not represent a pan-Indian "conspiracy" or movement, a point with which I agree, though for different reasons.

5 Amherst to Bouquet, Jun. 6, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 182-83; Amherst to Bouquet, Jun 23, 1763, Ibid., 197-98; Bouquet to Amherst, Jun. 16, 1763, Ibid., 189-90.

6 Peckham, Pontiac, 175, 206-207; Shy, Toward Lexington, 120-22; Amherst to Bouquet, Jul. 16, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 218-19; on the larger issue of the military establishment in North America at the time see also Charles S. Grant, "Pontiac's Rebellion and British Troop Moves of 1763," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 40 (1953), 75-88.

7 On the impact of Bushy Run on the military situation on the Ohio see Bouquet to Amherst, Aug. 11, 1763, Stevens and Kent, eds., Bouquet Papers, series 21634, 243-44; Bouquet to Major Campbell, Sept. 7, 1763, Ibid., series 21653, 219-20; Amherst to Bouquet, Sept. 18, 1763, Ibid., series 21634, 272-73.

8 Bouquet to Amherst, Jun. 19, 1763, Ibid., 191; on the Conestoga massacre see Peckham, Pontiac, 219; on subsequent Pennsylvania-Indian relations see John R. Danbar, ed., The Paxton Papers (The Hague, 1957).

9 Bernard Knollenberg, "General Amherst and Germ Warfare," NVHR 41 (1954), 489-94 and Donald H. Kent's reply, Ibid., 762-63; see also

10. Henry Dobyns, personal communication Jan. 13, 1982, suggests that smallpox may have been only one, and perhaps not the most lethal, of several diseases introduced by British troops. See also J. Clarence Webster, ed., "Journal of John Montressor's Expedition to Detroit in 1763," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada 3rd Ser. XXII (1928), 22, hereafter cited as "Montressor's Expedition".


CONCLUSIONS

Between 1758 and 1762 Indians throughout the trans-Appalachian region attempted to adjust to the fundamental economic, diplomatic, and military changes wrought by French defeat and Anglo-American efforts to occupy and exploit the west. The loss of French support made resistance to the English more difficult, though it did not entirely preclude such an option. It was native uncertainty about the nature of the Anglo-American invasion, the outcome of the Seven Years' War, and, of equal importance, the social and economic disruption caused by the war that initially directed many western Indians toward accommodation rather than resistance.

Accommodation was initially sponsored by Tamaqua and those Delawares who had opened talks with colonial and royal officials during the war. In a series of conferences on the Ohio and, after December 1760, at Detroit, increasing numbers of western Indians tentatively agreed to cease hostilities and enter the renewed and expanded Covenant Chain with the English. From the natives' perspective this constituted not an admission of defeat, let alone conquest, but a willingness to compose differences and establish peace as equals on terms that accorded with pre-war practices and native values. These terms included a fair and abundant trade and the spirit of friendship and reciprocity exemplified by periodic renewals of treaties and exchanges of gifts. Western Indians also expected gifts as payment for, or tokens of, native ownership of lands and rights-of-way that the British army sought to use for its own purposes. Further, Indians in the Ohio
country were anxious that the soldiers be removed from their lands as soon as possible, the demilitarization of the region being an early and paramount goal in all negotiations.

Efforts to establish relations with the Anglo-Americans that were both peaceful and mutually beneficial took several forms. The rapid re-opening of trade constituted the most obvious. Beyond this, the peace councils themselves served to reaffirm friendship and create an atmosphere within which native leaders and their people could make their own needs known while learning as much as possible about Anglo-American intentions, strengths, and weaknesses. In addition, individual communities developed their own strategies of accommodation, notably through supplying neighboring garrisons with food and by acting as guides, messengers, and occasionally as retrievers of army deserters. Finally, Indian communities in the Ohio country, which held the largest number of Anglo-American captives taken during the late war, began returning these people in substantial numbers even though such action placed additional burdens and stress on families and towns into which the captives had often been adopted.

By mid-1761 these efforts to adjust to changes in regional power relationships were being negated by English imperialism. For the Anglo-Americans, the period immediately following Forbes' victory in the Ohio country was also one of change and uncertainty. In the wake of the campaigns that finally led to the capitulation of Canada in 1760, traders, speculators, and prospective settlers rushed to take advantage of England's conquests, outstripping efforts by individual colonies and the army to control their activities. Moreover, officials in
London had no program at hand for the management of the conquest or the structure of Anglo-Indian relations. Such a program would not be forthcoming until the summer of 1763. In the absence of an agenda or program from London, the American commander-in-chief assumed the responsibility for organizing and controlling the newly acquired territories that stretched from the Bay of Gaspe to Lake Superior.

Fully convinced of both his government’s absolute right to the western territories and of his own moral and military superiority, and equally convinced of the inherent treachery and war-like demeanor of the native occupants of those lands, General Amherst moved to reduce these Indians to proper obedience and control. In doing so he enacted a series of regulations based largely on narrow military considerations, while ignoring informed opinion and advice from both Indian service officers and his own field commanders. Such advice, if followed and founded on the need to gradually accommodate Indians to a new political order without provoking a war that current English fighting strength could not face, may have allayed at least some of the Indians’ suspicions and latent hostility. As relations between various Indian groups and garrisons suggest, hostility did not have to be the immediate result of Anglo-Indian contacts in the west. Yet Amherst pursued his determination to secure the west by reducing the Indians to a state of dependence on Anglo-American power and good will. His garrisons, composed of men equally fearful of and unfamiliar with Indians, ultimately came to be a dangerous burden as they began to enforce their general’s directives governing trade and diplomacy.

Amherst’s policies, translated into action first in the Ohio
country, later in the Great Lakes region, triggered a more hostile response in native communities already sensitive to the slightest change in Anglo-American behavior. The attempts to redefine trade and power relationships as well as the sudden termination of wartime largesse, particularly much-needed ammunition, seemed to native observers to signal the end of relations based on equity and an effort by the English to revolutionize Indian affairs to the distinct disadvantage of the natives. A further dimension of the problem appeared in the form of renewed warfare between the Indians of the Great Lakes and Ohio country and their traditional enemies to the south. Though rooted in native values and interests, this new round of fighting was directly sponsored by the English in an effort to both break Cherokee resistance to colonial expansion and to divert northern Indian energies and manpower. At the same time, Amherst's insistence that new policy directives be enforced led to a noticeable reduction in the means by which Indian warriors could provide for their families while occupied in distant campaigns. The net result was the alienation of the warriors, a volatile force within native society. First among the Ohio Senecas, later among elements of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Indians living near Detroit, calls for war against the English were heard.

Though the call for resistance to English expansion first emerged on the upper Ohio, it was not immediately accepted by those living outside that area. Regional interests, jealousies between communities, and the slowness with which English troops and policies entered the west led to differential native responses. Whereas the Ohio Indians
were more concerned about land and were experiencing changes in Anglo-American attitudes and behavior by mid-1761, the same was not the case farther west. There interest was directed primarily toward trade and on how the invaders would behave, measured against pre-war conditions. This regional, sometimes local, variation in response to the problems presented by the Anglo-Americans also precluded a unified response, as the Ohio Senecas discovered at Detroit.

While the Senecas were thwarted in 1761, the warning took on new meaning in the west only a year later. Food shortages, an unsatisfactory trade system, and severe and widespread illness created a climate of anger and apprehension that encompassed much of the trans-Appalachian region: anger because of the manifest lack of expected English help, apprehension because the absence of a friendly response seemed to confirm what most Indians were predisposed to believe, that the English were in fact preparing to take revenge for their losses during the Seven Years' War. The result was a two-fold change in native responses to Anglo-American policies and actions. On the one hand, the notion of an English and colonial conspiracy to destroy all Indians gained currency. On the other, pressures on Delaware society at this time brought about a new wave of cultural revitalization. The message preached by Neolin called for the purification of the Delawares' culture and souls through the rejection of all but native modes of behavior and values. Neolin's message, though directed toward his own people, reflected a strong desire to rid the west of the troubles caused by European, particularly English, inroads, a feeling that may have been shared by growing numbers of trans-Appalachian Indians by
the end of 1762. Among many Great Lakes Indian communities, this outlook was reflected in a growing wish to see conditions in their region revert to the pre-1760 pattern of relations when the French dominated the trade and conducted themselves much better than the more abrasive, truculent English.

News of the Anglo-French peace and the impending cession of Canada--and the west--to the English, following hard on the military occupation of the upper Great Lakes, pushed Indians there, formerly reluctant to engage in hostilities, into the forefront of efforts to drive the Anglo-Americans out of the west. The news of peace arrangements seemed to confirm the Indians' worst fears and accelerated the shift from accommodation to confrontation as options narrowed by the spring of 1763. Adding to native perceptions of English goals and alarm at the sudden removal of the French, and with it any opportunity to counter-balance English power, were the actions and words of disaffected Frenchmen living at the western posts. While documentation of Indian activities within Great Lakes communities in the months preceding April 1763 is scant, by spring a local coalition at Detroit, led by warriors such as Pontiac, prepared to use force to rid their locale of English troops and traders.

As the war belts that came from the Ohio Valley during 1762 suggest, a similar transformation was under way there as well. In the months preceding the outbreak of war at Detroit, leaders who had counselled caution and accommodation were replaced by those who argued for a more forceful response to the growing Anglo-American threat. In both places, smoldering resentment over three years had given way to
a commitment by many to armed resistance to the English effort to at
once revolutionize relations and reduce the west's native population
to economic and political subordination. The spark struck at Detroit
in May 1763 helped ignite similar local outbreaks elsewhere as west­
ern Indians sought to regain the initiative and to restore inter-
cultural relations to what they had been before the Seven Years' War.
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