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Neither heroine nor fool : Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland

Janet L. Coryell

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NEITHER HEROINE NOR FOOL: ANNA ELLA CARROLL OF MARYLAND

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

Ph.D. 1986

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Neither Heroine Nor Fool:
Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Janet L. Coryell
1986

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APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

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To my grandmothers

Bonnie Coryell Hatch

and

Florence Ray Lewis

who also love Education and History

Anna Ella Carroll

OF MARYLAND

We want no Joans of Arc to make America
vascular and alive . . . we want
faithful and true women, who neither
shriek nor protest, but pray; women
who neither mount nor sink; who are
neither heroines nor fools; but
American women, who can stand
in their shoes

--Anna Ella Carroll
The Great American Battle

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Preface

I began my research on Anna Ella Carroll certain I had discovered a much-maligned, forgotten heroine of American history, whom I would redefine and properly place in historiography. To try to find the truth about a woman surrounded by so much legend has been an enlightening experience. Sorting out her story as best I could has made me aware of how complex the past is and how difficult biography as a craft is. The late Distinguished Teaching Professor Ralph Adams Brown, biographer of John Adams, had taught me that my sophomore year in college. He was right. To him I render my thanks, as well as to Ellis Johnson and Donald Stewart, who introduced me to history and to Anna Ella Carroll as author of the Tennessee Campaign.

Carroll was one of the few women discussed in the Civil War course Stewart and Johnson taught at Cortland State. She was a legendary figure, and like all good legends, there was at least some sense and some truth to her claim. Discovering the whole story turned out to be

difficult.

In part, the difficulties lay with source materials. Some of Carroll's papers had been preserved, but many had been lost during her life. Others accidentally burned in a house fire in the 1940s. The collection in the Maryland Historical Society is extensive, but consists mostly of letters received. Tracing letters written that still survive was a hit-or-miss task. A large cache discovered in 1970 by Charles McCool Snyder in Millard Fillmore's papers in Oswego, New York, helped the most to portray a three-dimensional figure instead of a noble legend. So did letters from Carroll to William Henry Seward and Thurlow Weed at the University of Rochester. But most inquiries to collections of Carroll's correspondents resulted in a disappointing reply.

Important figures in Carroll's life remain shadowy. Lemuel Evans, John Causin, and her father, Thomas King Carroll, left behind little information. Even tracing her family history proved difficult as probate records for the appropriate period have not survived. There were, to be sure, articles and books about Carroll's life, but virtually all were repetitions of the story of her military claim that she tried for so long to have the world accept and believe.

To look beyond that story has been my task. I have had a fascinating glimpse of a nineteenth-century anomaly: a well-educated Southern woman, a Unionist who hated slavery

but refused to support emancipation, a citizen of a state known for religious toleration, yet a virulent anti-Catholic. At the same time, I have been frustrated by research that at times raised more questions than it answered. Was she a swindler, a fraud, a cheat? Did the military maliciously destroy records that would have proven she was a brilliant strategist? The answer to the first is still uncertain. The second I hope I have answered at last.

One of the final tasks and great pleasures in finishing work is thanking those people who helped you. Professor Ludwell Johnson read my manuscript several times. He questioned my generalizations, sharpened my prose, and repositioned many of my verbs. I thank him for his timely efforts. My appreciation extends as well to Professor Cam Walker and to Editor George Hoemann. They also read parts of this work and gave invaluable help, criticism, and suggestions. Committee members Boyd Coyner and Judy Ewell posed occasional questions that led me in new directions to the benefit of the whole. Part of this work will appear in a book on American women and foreign policy, edited by Professor Edward Crapol. His patience, tact, and superb editorial criticism are, I hope, reflected to some degree in the entire work.

Del Moore, Coordinator of Reference Services, and
Carol Linton, Head of Interlibrary Loan at Swem Library,

were unstintingly generous with their time and labor. Carol in particular accomplished miracles ferreting out obscure source materials and convincing libraries to loan them to me for extended periods of time. Along with these two particular individuals, I must render my appreciation to the College and the History Department. They provided two research grants, microfilming costs, computer space and time, and generally made the mechanics of my work much easier.

Karen Stuart of the Maryland Historical Society was helpful from the beginning of this project, as was Marcia Miller. As always, librarians and archivists went far beyond the call of duty at the Library of Congress, the National Archives, the Hall of Records in Annapolis, the New York Public Library, SUC Oswego, and the University of Rochester.

Carroll's childhood house still stands in Somerset County. Dick and E. B. Warbasse graciously invited me into their home and showed me the wooden shoe that was said to have been worn by a slave at Kingston Hall during the tenure of the Carrolls. They provided hospitality and interest, even in a revisionist history of their house's most famous occupant. My thanks to Paul Touart of the Somerset County Historical Trust for helping me find that lovely home and its hospitable occupants.

The love and support of my family and friends during

my work has made my life a joy. Ken and Nora Coryell provided not only sympathetic conversation but generously gave me a home away from home during research trips. They and their children supported my efforts on the East Coast, as did my parents and the rest of my family in Kansas.

My friends and colleagues became my family here in Williamsburg. In particular, I want to thank Holly Mayer, Gail Terry, and Camille Wells, who asked me questions designed to focus my work more clearly; the Williamsburg Presbyterian Church Choir, especially Jeanne Kent and Tom Marshall, who gave me escape and sustenance through music for four years; and Ben Kellam, who drew maps, served as a valuable resource to explain the Eastern Shore to me, and helped me look at my work with an English major's eye. Most particularly, I want to thank John and Ruth Ann Coski, and Mary and James Perry. They not only listened, but provided caring support far beyond any call of friendship for myself and for Ivan.

The errors that remain, when all is said and done, are mine.

ABSTRACT

Born on the Eastern Shore of Maryland in 1815, Anna Ella Carroll was the eldest daughter of Maryland Governor Thomas King Carroll. By the early 1850s, she had become a political pamphleteer for the American, or Know-Nothing, Party, a nativist and anti-Catholic organization. She wrote a number of books and election pamphlets supporting the presidential candidacy of Millard Fillmore in 1856. In the election of 1860, she promoted the candidacy of John Minor Botts of Virginia, a strong Unionist.

Once the Civil War began, Carroll worked to support Lincoln's actions, often criticized as extra-legal, and wrote several pamphlets on his behalf. She argued, as did Lincoln and his other supporters, that the President could wield war-making powers to preserve the Union, even if wielding those powers infringed on certain legal rights. A number of politicians acknowledged the value of her arguments supporting the President's position, and one pamphlet was printed by the administration and laid on every desk in Congress.

Carroll's most famous work came during the fall and winter of 1861, when she visited the Western Theatre of the war and devised a plan to invade the Confederacy by going up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, instead of down the Mississippi River. Unknown to her, the Union and Confederate forces both were well aware of the strategic value of the rivers, and already had plans to proceed in the manner she suggested to the War Department. Convinced she had presented a plan that had saved the Union by providing a successful route of invasion, Carroll spent much of the rest of her life attempting to convince Congress that she should be generously awarded for her work.

Carroll's cause was adopted by the suffragists about 1880. Until the turn of the century, suffragists' organizations and periodicals supported Carroll and her cause as prime examples of man's inhumanity to woman. Carroll's story was revived again in the 1940s by various writers. Although her claim to have developed the military strategy used by the Union army in Tennessee had been disproved, it was not until the 1970s that Carroll's other, more substantial work as a constitutional writer and political pamphleteer attracted attention and scholarly examination. This work considers her life and examines the methodology she employed that enabled her to work within the political sphere while retaining her connection to the "female sphere."

Chapter 1

Politician's Daughter

The weather is hot on the Eastern Shore of Maryland in August. Humidity can lie like a blanket across the flat farms and small villages. Late afternoon thunderstorms do not relieve the heat but make it closer, till moving itself becomes an effort. A breeze from Tangier Sound or off the Big Annemessex River might break the heat in Somerset County for a little while, but soon that breeze would die and the oppressive air would return, along with the hordes of mosquitos and the whirring of cicadas.

Anna Ella Carroll was born August 29, 1815, in Somerset County, Maryland, the eldest child of Thomas King Carroll and Julianna Stevenson Carroll. Well-educated, independent and articulate, Carroll became a political writer and lobbyist in the mid-nineteenth century. Actively involved in politics throughout her life, she achieved notoriety when she claimed to have developed military

strategy that led to Union victories during the Civil War. Carroll used her intellectual gifts and her ability to manipulate politicians and the press to develop a methodology that enabled her to pursue a lifelong interest in politics within the cultural strictures of the "woman's sphere."

The Carrolls of Somerset County claimed a common ancestry with two of the most distinguished families of Maryland, the Catholic Carrolls and the Protestant Kings. The Carrolls came to America in 1689. Charles Carroll, patriarch of the line, had been appointed receiver of Lord Baltimore's rents from the Maryland colonists by 1691. One of his grandsons was Charles Carroll, "The Signer" of the Declaration of Independence. Another was the Most Reverend John Carroll, the first Catholic archbishop in the United States.¹

Kinsman to Charles and John was Colonel Henry James Carroll.² In 1792, Colonel Carroll had married Elizabeth Barnes King, daughter of Thomas King of Somerset County, and a descendant of Sir Robert King, a Presbyterian dissenter whose family had left Ireland for Maryland in 1682.³ One of the richer planters on the Eastern Shore of Maryland, King was less than pleased at his only child's choice of husband, but he settled the young couple on an adjoining estate, Bloomsborough, in Somerset County. The mixed marriage of Catholic and Protestant produced three sons. In

1798, at age five, the eldest boy, Thomas King Carroll, went to live with his grandfather King on the family estate of Kingston Hall, where he became "the object of Sir Thomas King's devoted affection and brightest hopes."⁴

Thomas King Carroll was brought up in the best English gentry tradition, with coaches driven by slaves in livery and all the accoutrements of an English country life transplanted to Maryland. About 1802, Thomas King died, and Thomas King Carroll was joined at Kingston Hall by his parents and brothers. In 1808, Carroll enrolled at the University of Pennsylvania, where he earned a bachelor's degree in 1811 and a master's degree in 1815. He studied law and became partner to Robert Goodloe Harper, the son-in-law of Charles Carroll of Carrollton. On June 23, 1814, he married Julianna Stevenson of Baltimore, the daughter of a prominent physician, Dr. Henry Stevenson. Dr. Stevenson had converted his home in Baltimore, Parnassus Hill, into a charity smallpox hospital for the city in 1754 in an effort to promote smallpox inoculation. Another relative, Dr. John Stevenson, was said to have laid out the plan for the city of Baltimore.⁵

While on his honeymoon with the beautiful Julianna, word reached Thomas King Carroll that his father had died and Kingston Hall was now his. He returned to the plantation and its liveried slaves and began his career as a planter. But farming did not particularly interest him, and

politics did. After his return to Kingston Hall, and before his daughter Anna was born, Carroll stood for election and won a seat in the Maryland legislature, the youngest member ever elected. His twenty-first birthday came the day before he took his seat.⁶ His political activities would eventually lead him to the governorship of Maryland.

The state which Carroll served as legislator and governor has been called by one historian "an American microcosm."⁷ Its border position straddled the agricultural economy of the South and the growing industrialization of the North. Maryland was never adequately or comfortably defined as a "northern" or "southern" state in national matters. By the time of the American Revolution, grain had replaced tobacco as the primary staple crop and Baltimore with its active harbor was the fastest-growing city in the new nation, but black slavery and the plantation system of agriculture still flourished in the state. In 1663, some thirty years after the colony had been founded, there had been enough slaves in Maryland to elicit statutory recognition of their existence and legal status. While in 1783 Maryland had banned the slave trade, and in 1794 had strengthened laws against importation, the large plantations in southern Maryland and on the Eastern Shore needed slave labor to survive. Its abolition was unlikely, given the political power of those areas.⁸

Even through the first part of the nineteenth century, as the Maryland economy diversified and the cities began to grow, state politics remained the province of the slave-owning landed gentry. Two-thirds of the lawmakers from 1789 to 1830 were from the plantations of the Eastern Shore and southern Maryland. In this group were men such as Robert Goodloe Harper, who re-organized the Maryland Federalist party in 1808.⁹ The Jeffersonian Republicans were the ascendant party in the state until 1812, but the Federalists predominated through most of the War of 1812. A British blockade of the Chesapeake Bay during the war halted Baltimore's growth, severely limited Maryland's trade, and divided the Federalists into pro-War and anti-War factions within the state of Maryland, paralleling the party's national split.¹⁰ In spite of the Federalists' national decline after the war, however, the party retained considerable life in Maryland until 1821, when it rather suddenly dissolved. The Jeffersonian Republicans became the predominant party in state politics again, but little partisanship characterized voting patterns. Older, landed interests still retained most of the political control.

Not until the mid-1820s did partisan politics again come to life in Maryland. The diversity of candidates in the 1824 presidential race reawakened political interest throughout the state. William M. Crawford was nominated by an official Republican caucus, a method that had been

falling into disrepute, and failed to gain much support in the state. Candidate John C. Calhoun, on the other hand, enjoyed considerable notice from former Federalists such as Robert Goodloe Harper and former state senator Virgil Maxcy.¹¹ But it was Andrew Jackson who attracted a more substantial portion of former Federalists than did the other candidates. Popular support for Jackson was strong in Baltimore. Calhoun supporters, including former party leaders Maxcy, Harper, and Roger Brooke Taney, defected to Jackson's candidacy. Former Federalists, eager to rejoin a party with power, perceived Jackson as the only candidate "independent of party intrigue and control." He was a man "without an agreement with any party, or any combination of any knot of . . . intriguers."¹²

John Quincy Adams defeated Jackson in Maryland in the 1824 election, and won the national election, which was decided in the House of Representatives. Adams carried southern Maryland and the Eastern Shore, but Jackson won strongly in Baltimore and the west. By 1827, preparing for the next election, parties had coalesced more firmly. The majority of the Federalists went with Adams' men; the old Republicans with Jackson's, along with many of the leaders of the old Federalist party.¹³ The geographical divisions remained the same in the presidential election the following year. In southern counties and the Eastern Shore, even where enthusiasm for Adams' program of federally-funded

internal improvements was slight, Marylanders preferred Adams over the more "imprudent" and hot-headed Jackson.¹⁴ But Baltimore and the western counties maintained their support for Jackson and his motto: "'Jackson and Reform.'"¹⁵ So did at least one Eastern Shore politician: Thomas King Carroll.

Carroll had been a member of the State House of Delegates in 1816 and 1817 and had worked as a judge in the Levy Court of Somerset County before being appointed Judge of the Orphans' Court in February 1826. In December 1829, after considerable fighting between former Federalists and former Republicans, the Jacksonians elected former Federalist Carroll as governor of the state.¹⁶ His term as governor lasted a little over one year, however, as the Jacksonians lost power. The political fallout from Jackson's vetoes of internal improvements and, more importantly, over his distribution of executive patronage, gave Carroll only twelve months in office. He could accomplish little. He did manage to promote education, urging the establishment of a state-wide public school system, an improved University of Maryland, and congressional appropriations for copying British-owned Revolutionary War records.¹⁷

President Jackson's Maysville Road veto and a veto of a proposed Washington-to-Frederick turnpike spelled disaster for the Democrats in a state as intensely

interested in internal improvements as was Maryland.¹⁸ The Jacksonians quickly lost control of the state legislature, and in November 1830, Carroll lost the gubernatorial election to the anti-Jacksonian Daniel Martin.¹⁹ Upon Carroll's retirement from the governorship in January of 1831, he was elected to the state senate but refused that position, as well as the suggestion he run for United States' senator. He returned to the pressing business of trying to make a success of his plantation in Somerset County.²⁰

Carroll had his work cut out for him as he returned home to Kingston Hall. The 1819-22 recession had badly damaged the economy of Baltimore and Maryland, and the state was only just beginning to recover by the early 1830s.²¹ The state's heavy and financially imprudent investments in transportation projects, such as railroads, turnpikes, and canals, led to substantial and unpopular tax increases to pay off the resultant deficit.²² The farming sector of the economy had suffered even more as those taxes strained a collapsing agricultural base. The tobacco crop had given way to wheat by 1815, but that crop was decimated by an infestation of the Hessian fly. Land use reverted to tobacco, which exhausted the soil, or to scrub pine, which was not a cash crop. Farmers' limited liquid assets meant agricultural experimentation to increase production was seldom possible, and the failure of most state

transportation projects to extend to more rural areas further reduced the vitality of the agricultural sector, particularly in the older and more remote counties along the Eastern Shore.²³

Added to Carroll's problems of recession, high taxes, soil exhaustion, transportation difficulties, and the always cyclical and variable nature of farming, was the growing problem of slavery. In spite of Maryland's increasing resemblance to northern states in other areas, its hold to this tie with the South contributed to its tendency toward occasional pro-Southern sectionalism and pro-slavery political positions. That attitude was most prevalent on the Eastern Shore and in southern Maryland, where most slaveholders resided.

Carroll felt differently than many of his neighbors. Although conditions for slaves in Maryland were relatively milder than for bondsmen further south, the institution did not appeal to Carroll.²⁴ Kingston Hall had a substantial slave population at the time of his inheritance, and Carroll spent much of his time trying to keep the plantation solvent enough to prevent their sale.²⁵ He did not free them, apparently feeling, as did many Maryland slaveowners, that freed slaves had no proper or safe place in a slave-owning society, but he was an advocate of the African colonization movement for free blacks. Though there is no evidence Carroll was a member of the Maryland State Colonization

Society, as were other leading Marylanders of his acquaintance such as Harper and Charles Carroll, undoubtedly he supported its efforts to remove freedmen and women from their unpopular position in the state to the Maryland colony in Liberia.²⁶

In this environment, Carroll's favorite child, Anna Ella, "Miss Anne," was raised: a lesser branch of a well-known family, a gentry background maintained by the most precarious of finances, a border state that vacillated between sectionalism and nationalism in its society, economy, and politics. Little is known about Carroll's childhood. She had five younger sisters: Sallie, Ada, and Henrietta, who married; Julianna, who died in 1860, and Mary, who remained single. She had two younger brothers: Henry James, known as Harry, who became a land speculator, and Thomas King, who became a poor country doctor. Another younger brother died in infancy.²⁷

Carroll's upbringing seems to have been as mixed as the world in which she lived. Her father treated her education as he would a son's. She read Coke and Blackstone on law, Shakespearean drama, and Kantian philosophy in her father's library, as he had done in his grandfather's. Her domestic education was apparently not neglected, but her interests and enjoyment lay with books rather than with the accepted and common accomplishments of most upper-class young women of the period-- drawing, music, needlework, and

household tasks.²⁸ Politics fascinated her. By 1830, when her father took office in Annapolis, Carroll's political education was such that letters to her "wisest and dearest of fathers" were sprinkled with precocious political comments amongst the news of home. "It is my principle, as well as that of Lycurgus," she wrote at age 14, "to avoid 'mediums'--that is to say, people who are not decidedly one thing or the other. In politics they are the inveterate enemies of the state."²⁹

At fifteen, during her father's brief tenure as governor, Carroll was sent to Miss Margaret Mercer's boarding school in West River, Maryland, to finish her education.³⁰ Although she seems to have spent less than a year under Mercer's tutelage, her teacher's views on education and slavery must have served to reinforce her father's opinions. Mercer too was the daughter of a governor of Maryland and had been taught by her father. She preferred the concrete to the metaphysical in her teachings in science, philosophy, ethics, and religion. Beyond educating her female students for their "'appropriate sphere'" wherein their "'throne is the nursery, and beside the cradle,'" Mercer believed her girls needed an education "'as may prepare them for the great and good measures, the wisdom and the virtue which are requisite to the safety and prosperity'" of the South.³¹ But Mercer maintained, as Carroll would in later years, that educated women must not

despise "the refinements and delicacy which communicate an appropriate and attractive grace to the female character. These can never be laid aside, no matter how great the positive acquirements without a violation of the laws of nature."³²

Like many women in the 1820s and 1830s, Mercer was interested in the abolition of slavery. Her position foreshadowed the one that Carroll would take twenty years later. Aware of the economic and social upheaval for both master and slave that accompanied emancipation, Mercer preferred gradual emancipation with compensation for owners and voluntary colonization of freed slaves. She bought slaves herself and freed them, hiring some to work on her estate, and providing passage to Liberia for those who wished to go. She asked her students to contribute to the cause and corresponded with northern abolitionist leaders such as Gerrit Smith in search of support for her programs. The increasing impatience of abolitionists, however, eventually prompted a break with them. Mercer wanted abolition, but, she wrote, "'I will temper my zeal with as much discretion as my nature possesses.'"³³ While Mercer's position on education and slavery no doubt met with Thomas Carroll's approval, his finances apparently did not allow Anne to continue her education. Ex-Governor Carroll returned to Kingston Hall with his daughter in January 1831. His wife Julianna was ill and his plantation approaching

financial ruin.

As difficult as farming was, by all accounts Carroll was a poor manager of finances as well. His refusal to sell unneeded slaves, while no doubt viewed as a humanitarian gesture on his part, did not prevent him from using those same slaves as collateral for mortgages required to pay off loans he had co-signed for improvident friends.³⁴ The Chancery Court records of Somerset County contain several lawsuits in which Carroll was required to pay off mortgages for others. Carroll had a particularly difficult time in 1835 and 1836, as he sold two slaves, a pair of horses and a carriage, and "one black horse and one sorrell [sic] horse" to satisfy judgments against him.³⁵

By the mid-1830s, Anne Carroll took the first steps of what would become her lifelong task of trying to help her family, and particularly her father, stay afloat financially as she opened a boarding school on the plantation. Her attempt to postpone the inevitable did not succeed. The school closed, and in 1837, as a financial panic swept the country, Thomas King Carroll lost Kingston Hall. It was sold by the sheriff, and the family moved to Castle Haven, a smaller estate in Church Creek, Dorchester County.³⁶

Unfortunately, little is known about Anne Carroll in the decade between 1840 and 1850. She seems to have left her family's home around 1840 and gone to live in Baltimore and Washington. In later years she lived in boarding houses

with a servant or two; more than likely she established that pattern in this decade, since no evidence suggests that she established a separate household.³⁷ She apparently worked as a promotional writer for railroad lobbyists, and contributed letters and short articles on political matters to local newspapers.³⁸ Since the vast majority of her work was penned anonymously or under a pseudonym, examples of her writing are difficult to find and to document.³⁹ She commuted often between Baltimore and Washington, always searching for a way to make money for herself and her family. In one letter, written in November 1848 from Washington, she complained that her latest financial plans had fallen through and that arranging a mortgage on some Maryland real estate would have to suffice to raise funds so she could return to Maryland to care for her ailing parents. Her father recovered; her mother did not and died on July 31, 1849.⁴⁰

Carroll's departure from the capital city had been only temporary. By April 1849, she had returned and petitioned the new Whig Secretary of State, John M. Clayton, for a job for her father as Naval Officer of Baltimore. Thomas Carroll had become a Whig by the 1840s and had served Maryland's Whig party as a lottery commissioner.⁴¹ Carroll obtained the position and served for four years.

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With her father's immediate financial future more secure, Anne Carroll began to involve herself and her pen more deeply in national politics. At the age of 35, unencumbered by husband or child, she took full advantage of her intelligence, her education, and her family connections to participate in the political life of the nation's capital.

Because she was a woman, Carroll's participation was necessarily limited. She did not choose the paths of woman's rights, abolition, or reform, as did many political women of the mid-nineteenth century. But she was determined to exercise influence over leading politicians. Through her letters and meetings, she hoped to have an effect on political appointments. She would suggest her father as a candidate for office regularly, after his tenure as Naval Officer had ended; she would also suggest and eventually demand, appointments for many of her friends and for persons she thought would serve the government well. Carroll's unusual education and natural inclination toward politics had served to train her mind. By 1850, she had honed her skills as writer and lobbyist. Her attempt to work her way into the circles of national power could now begin.

From the few letters of Carroll's that survive from the early 1850s, it is clear that she did not believe in wasting time or energy communicating with the lower echelons of bureaucracy. For her father's appointment as Naval

Officer of Baltimore she had written directly to the Secretary of State, even though his appointment was from the Department of the Treasury. But, she wrote the Secretary, "so high is my appreciation of yourself, so perfect is my confidence in the efficiency of your power to serve me, that I must trust to your own kindness" to excuse a daughter from making the effort to find a "loved Father" a job.⁴²

Carroll's flowery phrases were typical of nineteenth-century writing and served well as part and parcel of her method to attract the attention of political leaders as she searched for patronage positions. She appealed first to the intelligence and discernment of those to whom she wrote, then to their sentimental side. Near the end of President Millard Fillmore's term, she began a mostly one-sided correspondence with him that would last for over twenty years. She sent him a manuscript to read, which he returned "with thanks for the privilege of perusing it." Disproportionately encouraged by his polite reply, she wrote to reassure him that while the Whigs were in "disastrous" shape for the coming election, at least "the American people have already stamped an impress of approbation upon your administration, which posterity will cherish for ages to come."⁴³ By May 1852, Carroll, who had been only momentarily deflected by Fillmore's suggestion that she go through channels for a position for a friend, desired an appointment with him for "very cogent reasons" to discuss

the job. She reassured Fillmore that it would be "the only case with which I shall ever presume to invite especial interposition." Signing her letter, "your little friend, A. E. Carroll," Carroll played upon Fillmore's vanity and her own supposed frail femininity to convince Fillmore to do a favor for her. After all, she wrote, "no selfish aspiration, no sordid interest, no political distinction has actuated me." It was just the good of the country and their friendship at stake.⁴⁴

A few days later Carroll wrote Fillmore again, this time to pass on good news she had heard regarding his renomination prospects, but warning him that "traitors within your own camp" were eroding his support. Within this letter, Carroll made clear her awareness of the limitations placed upon her by her sex, as well as presenting her rationale for exceeding those limits by lobbying for positions and discussing politics.

Honored Sir, it may look unique for an "American lady" to be so heartily embarked in the interest of the political condition of the country, but I am sure it will be considered a pardonable offence, when I tell you that by blood and name and spirit I am identified with those who largely contributed to achieve and perpetuate our free institutions. And that by education and social position I have been ever led to an intelligent apprehension of the structure and entire organization of our political system--And a consequent appreciation of the wisdom and virtue of those, who have signally upheld them--

Then it is no marvel that I should turn to you, with an increasing admiration your very truest and best little friend, A. E. Carroll.⁴⁵

Carroll attended the Whig national convention in Baltimore in June 1852. She was crushed by Fillmore's defeat, telling him when she discovered "that the friends of Mr. Webster would never come over to you and that hope had fled, I almost sunk under it in the gallery."⁴⁶ Sorrow over Fillmore's defeat did not blind her to the need for speed for obtaining any political largesse, however. Carroll wrote five days later renewing pressure on Fillmore to appoint a friend of hers to a position and to do it for her and for the sake of their friendship: "I do entreat you by all that is true, by all that is faithful, by all that will contribute to my happiness" She would see him that evening and no doubt expected the good word then.⁴⁷ When "unfriendly sources" later told her no appointment would be made, she refused to believe Fillmore would betray her thus, and made the rather peculiar request that he make the appointment anyway, just "to show that the wisdom of a certain person is not altogether impregnable."⁴⁸

By the end of Fillmore's term, Carroll regarded his failure to meet her demands as a personal affront. "If the President had any disposition to serve me which he professes," she wrote to Treasury Secretary Thomas Corwin, whom Carroll had apparently known for some time, she was "satisfied such a post might be had" It was time for Corwin to act on her request instead, in the "brief

period" of official power he had left at his disposal. Once again, Carroll emphasized her friendship with the official as the justification for fulfilling her request. "I know you will not forget your most faithful, your most devoted and eternal friend."⁴⁹ Friendship was a recurring theme in Carroll's demands for positions for friends, and she sought to maintain contact with political leaders even after they left office, in case their political power did not wane. Even after Fillmore and Corwin were out of office and could do no more for her, she continued to write to them as if to reassure herself both of their continued friendship and the legitimacy of her continued demands for jobs. "I could not but feel," she wrote Fillmore, three days after his successor's inauguration, "that the position I occupy justified me in making it [the patronage request]--because I am yr true & faithful and eternal friend" ⁵⁰

Just what Carroll's position was, as opposed to how she perceived it, is unclear. She did not hesitate to write to the highest officials in the land, such as the new Secretary of State, William Marcy, and she also had enough influence to see them in person. An interview with Marcy had "filled my eyes with tears and my heart with sorrow," and she followed it up with a letter written on behalf of her father who would lose his position in Baltimore with the incoming Democratic administration. Marcy had not granted her request to save her father's job. "As a Parent, as a

gentleman, I appeal to you," she pleaded, "to sustain the efforts of a daughter, on behalf of a pure and exemplary Father."⁵¹ Regardless of the degree of access Carroll may have had, either due to her family's name, her sex, or her womanly charms, she did not possess enough influence to obtain what she requested. Her father was removed from office, and many of the requests she made on behalf of others for positions were denied.

Carroll's political training served to keep her aware of and responsive to the shifting sands of politics. At the same time she wrote to the departing Fillmore and Corwin with protestations of faithfulness, she began corresponding with William Henry Seward, one of the major powers in the Whig party, and leader of the anti-Fillmore faction in New York. She praised his political acumen and his role in the nomination of Winfield Scott for the election of 1852, for "where would have been our prospects for success with any other name than Winfield Scott?" Seward's support of Scott over Daniel Webster had been in part responsible for Fillmore's inability to make any political deal that might result in his renomination, but no matter. Carroll was a politician and a pragmatist. After commenting upon the "imbecility" of the Southern Whigs who had split from the party over Scott's failure to make clear his support for the Compromise of 1850 and praising Seward as "the leader" of the Whig Party, she closed her letter by

requesting Seward to send his opinion of the party's chances in New York to her at the Whig Committee Rooms in Washington.⁵²

As she had done when corresponding with Fillmore, Carroll was careful to express her awareness of the limitations placed upon her by her sex as she wrote. "I am a lady, but by blood & name and spirit identified, with those, who contributed greatly to establish and perpetuate our free institutions." Carroll was very conscious of the singularity of her proclivity toward politics, but she told Seward, "by education & association my interest is more than that of ladies ordinarily. I read, think & write" She continued to flatter Seward's abilities prior to the election and continued to apologize for her temerity, excusing it as coming "from the impulses of a frank and generous nature, without any of those considerations which the mere politician would cautiously inquire into."⁵³

In spite of those reassurances, and in spite of the Whig loss in November 1852, Carroll remained convinced of Seward's importance in the party and was determined to continue contact. As she ceased writing to the loser Fillmore (except for notes of condolence upon the deaths of his wife and daughter),⁵⁴ she began to pressure Seward to use his supposed influence to restore her father to his position in Baltimore or to secure for him "an early and lucrative post." "I feel you can appreciate the exertions of

a daughter for a dear and honored Parent," she wrote, "especially when that effort is impelled by sacred and imperious considerations, which may involve life itself."⁵⁵ Once again, Carroll combined the presumed political sagacity of the appointment with an emotional appeal that placed her lobbying for a political position within the province of the "womanly sphere."

Carroll's attempt to save her father's position or get him a new one failed. The resulting scramble to keep him afloat financially resulted in "a state of mind almost partaking of dementation," under the influence of which she addressed a long letter to Seward that presented a detailed portrait of the degree to which her father's financial ineptitude affected Carroll.⁵⁶

While Carroll later apologized to Seward and asked him to forget he had ever received it, her letter was remarkably frank in its depiction of Carroll's concern and the sacrifices required by her "to relieve my dear Father . . . in freeing himself, from an entanglement, brought about by the noble generosity of his heart, which prompted him for others, to sacrifice his own." Consequently, Carroll considered it an act of "obedience to filial devotion" to "sacrifice whatever personal comfort may now conflict with duty" to her father, "feeling the goal is dear enough to demand it." She asked for Seward's advice about a real estate investment in Maryland that would raise

money for her father's benefit. By this time, Carroll was well aware of the necessity of protecting her father from his own "generosity." The purchase price and mortgage would be in her name. She could then maintain control of the farm, "engage myself in whatever sphere of usefulness propriety will properly permit," while "affording to my Father, all the activity of engagement his health so imperiously demands."⁵⁷ There was apparently no response from Seward, and there is no evidence Carroll ever bought the farm.

Carroll's constant devotion to her improvident yet beloved father soon faced another challenge. Thomas King Carroll had apparently learned little from the loss of Kingston Hall for his debts in 1837, for in 1853 his daughter began to search for money to pay off more of his debts. She decided upon a unique course of action.

At first "impenetrably veiled," Carroll visited the offices of leading abolitionists and philanthropists in New York City to ask for contributions so she could buy some of her father's slaves, which he had again mortgaged, to prevent their sale. While she continued to write letters to men she thought would be sympathetic to her plight, she preferred to meet individually with them, since in a personal interview there were "many little suggestions & explanations, often important, to a correct understanding of the case."⁵⁸ Slavery was a curse that had tried her

fortitude, she wrote Gerrit Smith as she applied for an interview. "I regard all my own misfortune--or that, in which I am involved, on acct. of my family, to that inheritance of slavery, to which for so many generations my family have been subjected."⁵⁹ Smith made a contribution, as did New York journalist and editor Gerard Halleck. It was Halleck who suggested she flaunt convention by removing her veil when interviewing with people for contributions. ". . . I think it may rather operate against you," he wrote as he sent her a list of additional men to "touch." "In other words," he suggested, "your frank, honest face will be a passport to you where no mere name or family distinction would be availing."⁶⁰

In connection with her search for contributions to pay her father's debts, Carroll re-established her correspondence with Millard Fillmore. Her father's "generosity and nobleness of nature" had "misguided his judgment & made him neglectful of the future," she wrote in March of 1855. Thus Carroll had had "to assume a position of responsibility" which, considering "the refined sensibility of my nature & my age [40] & inexperience in life is surely without a paralel [sic]."⁶¹ Characteristically, Carroll's first letter that renewed contact with Fillmore did little beyond praising his political astuteness and reassuring him that she would remain "with all the affection of a daughter, your faithful

little friend" ⁶² But slowly and surely the demands began creeping into the text: first a complimentary one in the form of a request that he review the table of contents for a book she was to write, then a demand for an immediate response to that request. ⁶³ A plea for a personal loan to avoid eviction proceedings on her family followed, then a request that he call to see her for "a purpose which you cannot neglect & will not regret!" All these demands were made at a most inconvenient time, when Fillmore was absorbed with last-minute preparations for a tour of Europe, beginning May 16. He apparently did not reply. ⁶⁴

Carroll's concern that Fillmore reach her was not entirely selfish. Her interest in politics had led her to an unusual degree of involvement with the newly-formed American Party. She wished to give Fillmore notice that the Know-Nothings were considering his name for its Presidential nominee for the 1856 campaign. "You may smile," she wrote Fillmore at 11:00 PM the night before he set sail, "but I believe, I can have very much to do with yr nomination by that party, which will as surely control the next election for President as that you & I live." ⁶⁵

Carroll told Fillmore that she had met with party leaders in Boston shortly after he sailed and had drafted a letter for them that requested he make his "feelings & wishes clear" regarding the American party. She revealed herself to Fillmore as the author of the letter not for

vanity's sake, but rather "that you may know the movement is sincere & in good faith."⁶⁶ Fillmore refused her request, taking a candidate's traditional position of reluctance that she accepted, but she enclosed the opening of a book on the American Party platform that she had written and asked his review of it. Once he had received it, she demanded, "write me a letter expressive of yr regard, for my efforts--I am so well assured, this will give you pleasure--I cannot feel I impose a burden."⁶⁷

Carroll spent the summer promoting the American Party and Fillmore as its candidate over his nearest rival, George Law. Although she knew she was "a woman--and have no right to interfere in politics," once again she found a way to excuse her actions and maintain the legitimacy of her work as she argued that "this American movement is above party and if the efforts of woman are ever to be exerted for God and Liberty, it is now" Fillmore's note to her in which he wished the "Cause" success had satisfied those unsure of his loyalty. Carroll was convinced of Fillmore's suitability as "my convictions as well as my hopes induce me to believe you will be the candidate of the American convention. Perhaps no one, vain tho it may seem, really knows more of the true wishes of the leading men of the Order . . . than myself."⁶⁸ Because of the paucity of papers from Carroll's early career, it remains difficult to determine exactly how much influence she did have within the

American Party as it pondered its selection for the presidential campaign. By championing Fillmore, however, for one of the few times in her life, Anna Ella Carroll had chosen the right man upon whom to expend her inexhaustible supply of literary energy.

Notes

¹Elias Jones, Revised History of Dorchester County, Maryland (Baltimore: Read-Taylor Press, 1925), pp. 296-297; Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography, ed. James Grant Wilson and John Fiske, 6 vols. (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1886-1891), 1(1891):536-538; Anna Ella Carroll, The Great American Battle, or the Contest Between Christianity and Political Romanism (hereafter referred to as GAB) (New York: Miller, Orton and Mulligan, 1856), p. v.

²The familial relationship between the Carrolls is difficult to determine. Jones' book on Dorchester County, to which the Carrolls moved about 1840, is less than accurate concerning other data and therefore must be used cautiously. Anna Ella Carroll's great-grandfather claimed cousinship to Charles Carroll of Carrollton, a claim thus far undocumented. Carroll herself claimed a common ancestry and mentioned the connection with considerable pride and frequency, particularly when justifying her involvement in activities outside the woman's sphere. See Chapter 2 below. Letter, Sally D. Mason, associate editor, Charles Carroll of Carrollton Papers, to author, 6 December 1985.

³Hester Dorsey Richardson, Sidelights on Maryland History with Sketches of Early Maryland Families (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1913), p. 156; A Biographical Dictionary of the Maryland Legislature, 1635-1789, ed. Edward C. Papenfuse, et al, 2 vols. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979-1985), 1(1979):200.

⁴Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius: Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1891), p. 4. Blackwell's biography benefits from having been written while Carroll was still alive and could provide the author with an interview. Carroll was in poor health, however, and evidence indicates most of the interviewing was conducted by note-writing and through Carroll's sister Mary, who took care of Carroll during the last years of her life. Most of the biographical information on Carroll's early years available in other sources appears to have been taken from details provided in Blackwell's small volumes. See also Papenfuse, Biographical Dictionary, 1:200. King was called "Sir" by Blackwell probably due to a family tradition.

⁵Blackwell, Life, pp. 5-7; Jones, Revised History, pp. 297-298; Biographical Directory of the Governors of the United States 1798-1978, ed. Robert Sobel and John Raimo, 4 vols. (Westport, CT: Meckler Books, 1978), 2:659; Newspaper clipping enclosed with letter, Anna Ella Carroll to James Abram Garfield, 11 September 1880, James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Papenfuss, Biographical Dictionary, 2(1985):513; Thomas King Carroll Folder, Biographical Folders Collection, University of Pennsylvania Archives, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

⁶Blackwell, Life, p. 9. Although several sources cite family reminiscences that the Carrolls had 150 slaves at Kingston Hall, this figure seems unlikely. The 1800 census listed only 29 slaves at Kingston Hall; Carroll's father, Colonel Henry James Carroll, had only 14 on his estate. Colonel Carroll was not listed in the 1810 census for Somerset County. Thomas King Carroll had 47 slaves and 4 free black males at Kingston Hall in 1820. The 1830 census for Somerset County has apparently not survived. Given the small number of young slave children in the census of 1820, there were probably about 45 slaves when Carroll received his inheritance five years earlier. 1800 Census Index, ed. Ronald V. Jackson, et al. (Bountiful, Utah: Accelerated Indexing Systems, 1976), pp. 22, 76; Population Schedule of the Third Census of the United States, 1810, Roll 16, Maryland, vol. 4 (Washington, DC: National Archives & Records Service, 1959); Population Schedule of the Fourth Census of the United States, 1820, Roll 45, Maryland, vol. 6 (Washington, DC: National Archives & Records Service, 1959), Microcopy No. 33, vol. 45, p. 146.

⁷William J. Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 1.

⁸John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, 3d ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp. 75, 140, 151.

⁹W. Wayne Smith, "Politics and Democracy in Maryland, 1800-1854," in Maryland: A History, 1632-1974, eds. Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox (Baltimore, Maryland: Maryland Historical Society, 1974), pp. 282, 243.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 251; James S. Van Ness, "Economic Development, Social and Cultural Changes: 1800-1850," in Maryland: A History, pp. 171, 177-178.

¹¹Mark H. Haller, "The Rise of the Jackson Party in Maryland, 1820,-1829," Journal of Southern History 28 (August 1962):309-310.

¹²Ibid., pp. 311-312; Harper to Maxcy, 1 March 1824, cited in Haller, "Rise of the Jackson Party," p. 311, n. 11.

¹³Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U. S. Elections (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), pp. 225, 265; Haller, "Rise of the Jackson Party," pp. 318-319.

¹⁴Smith, "Politics and Democracy," pp. 268, n. 59; Haller, "Rise of the Jackson Party," pp. 321-322.

¹⁵Haller, "Rise of the Jackson Party," p. 321.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 323.

¹⁷Tercentenary History of Maryland, compiled by Henry Fletcher Powell, 4 vols. (Baltimore: S. J. Clarke Pub. Co., 1925), 3:768-769; 4:47-48; James H. Fitzgerald Brewer, "The Democratization of Maryland, 1800-1837," in The Old Line State: A History of Maryland, ed. Morris L. Radoff (Annapolis, Maryland: Hall of Records Commission, 1971), p. 61; Frank F. White, The Governors of Maryland, 1777-1970 (Annapolis, Maryland: The Hall of Records Commission, 1970), pp. 96-99.

¹⁸Between 1826 and 1840 the state went into debt by nearly fifteen million dollars promoting various transportation projects. Smith, "Politics and Democracy," p. 269; Van Ness, "Economic Development," p. 195.

¹⁹White, The Governors, pp. 90-99.

²⁰Tercentenary History, 4:48; Blackwell, Life, pp. 25-26.

²¹Van Ness, "Economic Development," p. 191.

²²Ibid., p. 197.

²³Ibid., pp. 189-190.

²⁴Tercentenary History, 4:48.

²⁵Richardson, Sidelights, pp. 156-57.

²⁶P. J. Staudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, 1816-1865 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 70. For yearly reports on the Maryland State Colonization Society, see African Repository and Colonial Journal, 68 vols. (n.p.: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1967). Penelope Campbell, Maryland in Africa: The Maryland State Colonization Society, 1831-1857 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1971), does not mention Thomas King Carroll but Tercentenary History, 4:48 states Carroll's pro-colonization position. See also Staudenraus, African Colonization, pp. 70, 111.

²⁷Any family information about these Carrolls is difficult to obtain and difficult to verify. See "Anna Ella Carroll," Notable American Women, ed. Edward T. James, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 1:289-292; Obituary Clipping File, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland; Portrait and Biographical Record of the Eastern Shore of Maryland (New York: Chapman Publishing Co., 1898), pp. 219-220; gravestones at Old Trinity Church, Church Creek, Maryland.

²⁸Blackwell, Life, p. 15.

²⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 17 February 1830, cited in Blackwell, Life, p. 18.

³⁰Blackwell, Life, p. 19. Miss Mercer's father was Maryland governor John Francis Mercer. See James Mercer Garnett, "John Francis Mercer, Governor of Maryland, 1801-1803," Maryland Historical Magazine 2 (September 1907):191-213. Miss Mercer's teaching career at West River is mentioned in J. Reaney Kelly, "Cedar Park, Its People and Its History," Maryland Historical Magazine 58 (March 1963):47-52. An 1831 list of scholars includes Ann Carroll and Julia Carroll among those from Maryland's Eastern Shore. Presumably this was Anna Ella and her sister Julianna. See also Caspar Harris, M.D., Memoir of Miss Margaret Mercer, 2d ed. (Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston, 1848).

³¹New York clergyman the Reverend Dr. William B. Sprague presented this ruling portrait of a woman's function in life in a speech at the Packer Collegiate Institute in Brooklyn Heights. See Stephen Birmingham, The Grande Dames (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), p. 166; Harris, Memoir, pp. 27, 102-103.

³²Harris, Memoir, p. 43.

³³Ibid., pp. 113-114, 130-133.

³⁴Blackwell, Life, pp. 25-26; Anna Ella Carroll to Gerrit Smith, 26 June 1854, Gerrit Smith Collection, George Arents Research Library, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York; Tercentenary History, 4:48.

³⁵Somerset County Chancery Court Records, 21 January 1836, Somerset County Deed Book, 19 October and 29 December 1835, Maryland State Archives, Hall of Records, Annapolis, Maryland.

³⁶Jones, Revised History, p. 298; Blackwell, Life, p. 19-27; Charles McCool Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll, Political Strategist and Gadfly to President Fillmore," Maryland Historical Magazine 68 (Spring 1973):37; White, The Governors, p. 99; Paul Touart (Architectural Historian, Somerset County Historical Trust), mss. Chain of Title to author, 25 June 1986.

³⁷American Directories Through 1860 (New Haven, Connecticut: Research Publications, 1969[?]), a microfiche collection of city directories from the 1800s does not list Carroll in any directory for Baltimore or Washington between 1837 and 1850. Carroll was a member of the Second Presbyterian Church of Baltimore in 1845. Dorothy E. Milliken, church secretary, to author, 20 November 1985. See also Chapter 2, note 8 below.

³⁸Blackwell, Life, p. 23-24; see also the family reminiscences cited by Marjorie Barstow Greenbie in My Dear Lady (New York: McGraw Hill, 1940). Mrs. Greenbie interviewed surviving relatives about "Aunt Anne" but used considerable poetic license in her biography of Carroll. Her book must be used with great caution and considerable skepticism. See also Sydney Greenbie, Suit with Red Lining (Penobscot, Maine: Traversity Press, 1958), pp. 25-30. A full discussion of the Greenbies' work is found in Chapter 7.

³⁹Blackwell called the GAB a compilation of Carroll's newspaper articles in Life, p. 23; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 51, says the same of another of Carroll's books, The Star of the West; or, National Men and National Measures, 3d. edition (Boston: James French & Co., 1857). Given the nature of the two books, it is more likely that Star is a compilation. The GAB is a much more coherent text in terms of its subject matter, dealing primarily with an alleged threat to American liberties from foreign Catholics. See Chapter 2 below for a textual analysis of both books.

⁴⁰Anna Ella Carroll to John Young Mason, 6 November

1848, Mason Family Papers, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond, Virginia; Blackwell, Life, p. 23. Date of death from Julianna Carroll's gravestone, Old Trinity Church, Church Creek, Maryland.

⁴¹White, The Governors, pp. 99, 129-133; Tercentenary History, 4:48; Anna Ella Carroll to John M. Clayton, 13 April 1849, John M. Clayton Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 38.

⁴²Anna Ella Carroll to John M. Clayton, 13 April 1849, Clayton Papers.

⁴³Millard Fillmore to Anna Ella Carroll, note at top of letter Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 27 April 1852, Millard Fillmore Papers, Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society and State University College at Oswego, Oswego, New York.

⁴⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 26 May 1852, Fillmore Papers.

⁴⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 28 May 1852, Fillmore Papers.

⁴⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 21 June 1852, Fillmore Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp. 38-39.

⁴⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 26 June 1852, Fillmore Papers.

⁴⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 28 June 1852, Fillmore Papers.

⁴⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas Corwin, 15 February, 1853, Thomas Corwin Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. A manuscript sketch of Corwin survives in Carroll's papers, indicating she met Corwin prior to 1850. While most of their surviving correspondence dealt with patronage and political matters, one letter from Corwin in particular stands out as a testament to the intimacy of their friendship. He sadly recounted to her that he was a failure at life, unable to accept happiness in his own life or manifest joy "at the happiness of others." See Sketch: Senator Corwin of Ohio, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll, Craddock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland; Thomas Corwin to Anna Ella Carroll, 28 September 1854, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland

Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.

⁵⁰Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 7 March 1853, Fillmore Papers.

⁵¹Anna Ella Carroll to William Marcy, 27 March 1853, William Learned Marcy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵²Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 15 September 1852, William Henry Seward Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York; Allen Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: A House Dividing, 1852-1857 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 23-32.

⁵³Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 15 September 1852, 27 September 1852, Seward Papers.

⁵⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 15 April 1853, 12 October 1853, Fillmore Papers.

⁵⁵Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 6 April 1853, Seward Papers.

⁵⁶Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 23 May 1853, Seward Papers.

⁵⁷Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 28 April 1853, Seward Papers.

⁵⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Gerrit Smith, 26 June 1854, Smith Collection.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Anna Ella Carroll to Gerrit Smith, 18 November 1873, Smith Collection; Gerard Halleck to Anna Ella Carroll, 19 December 1853, Carroll Papers.

⁶¹Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 31 March 1855, Fillmore Papers.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 21 April 1855, 23 April 1855, Fillmore Papers.

⁶⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 5 May 1855, 15 May 1855, Fillmore Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll,"

pp. 42-43.

⁶⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 15 May 1855, Fillmore Papers.

⁶⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 28 May 1855, Fillmore Papers.

⁶⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 7 July 1855, Fillmore Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 44.

⁶⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 16 January 1856, Fillmore Papers.

Chapter 2

Carroll and the Election of 1856:

The Republican Mother As Savior of the Nation

Millard Fillmore was nominated in February 1856 as the American Party's presidential candidate. Carroll was convinced that it was thanks to her; after all, she had been a supporter of Fillmore as far back as 1852. Now at last, her choice was legitimized by the men of the party, and Carroll had been given a national platform from which to write. While she continued her private political activities of seeking influence over patronage positions through her letters to politicians, she now began to publish under her own name and to participate in more public political behavior. The next eight months would be the most productive of Carroll's career as she wrote and published books, pamphlets, articles, and editorials in support of the American Party and its candidate.

The rise of the American Party to national power

after 1854 came about as the Whig Party declined and paralleled the rise of the Republican Party. Both new organizations appealed to voters, primarily Whigs and anti-slavery men, who were disenchanted with the compromises inherent in a national two-party system. Both organizations took moralistic stands on issues with mass appeal: nativism and anti-Catholicism, and the control of slavery. Many nativists were also anti-slavery men and vice versa, and voters supported one or the other party, or both. But by the election of 1856, party loyalties were more intense. Know-Nothings were determined to win the election with a candidate who focused interest on nativism rather than slavery.¹

Historians have long argued the primacy of the slavery issue to all parties in the campaign of 1856, relative to other issues such as nativism, anti-Catholicism, temperance, and economics. Examinations of voting records in northern states where the American Party was strongest, however, have emphasized that the majority of Know-Nothings therein were more concerned with nativist and anti-Catholic issues than with the anti-slavery movement and its radical leaders, or with the growing sectionalism of the country.² Far from being a party of displaced Whigs, former Locofocos, Free-Soilers, or assorted political cranks looking for a home, the Know-Nothings represented a legitimate attempt by a substantial group to articulate a platform and promote a

party that would respond to their fears.³ Know-Nothings perceived a growing threat to the American nation by the influx of foreigners who were primarily lower-class, quickly naturalized, largely controlled by the Democratic party machine, and held responsible for the growing corruption and dissoluteness discernible in the American body politic.⁴ For the American Party, that threat was far more important than the issue of slavery expansion or control.

In the border state of Maryland, as in the more northern states, corruption, nativism, and anti-Catholicism were the major concerns of the Know-Nothings, in spite of Maryland's status as a slave state. These were the issues that attracted the majority of supporters; few expressed great concern over abolition and the slavery question.⁵ Carroll, for instance, had embraced the American Party for a number of different reasons. Her father had been a Whig supporter, as had she, and both had been disheartened when Henry Clay lost the 1844 presidential race to James K. Polk. Many Maryland Whigs had blamed the foreign Democratic vote in Baltimore for helping to give Polk the victory, even though Maryland had gone Whig in the election and the margin in Baltimore had given Polk a plurality of only 473 votes.⁶ Although Thomas Carroll had benefitted from his Whig patronage position in 1849, by 1853 the Whigs were out of office, and he was out of a job. The Whigs' continued decline by the mid-1850s made the Know-Nothings an

attractive, non-Democratic alternative.⁷

An additional influence on Anne Carroll's political choice was the Reverend Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge. Breckinridge, minister of the Second Presbyterian Church of Baltimore, which Carroll had joined in 1845, was a powerful orator and an ardent anti-Catholic. His tirades against foreigners and Catholics made a deep and long-lasting impression on Carroll: twenty years later she would recall his sermons as she wrote to him of her life's work on behalf of the anti-Catholic movement.⁸ Breckinridge, like a number of other Protestant ministers and leaders, was more than willing to use the government to accomplish the anti-Catholic goals of the Know-Nothings. Rivalry between Catholics and Protestants in Maryland was nothing new. By the 1850s, it was exacerbated by the disruptions to society caused by immigration, by political corruption, by the ineffectiveness and dissolution of traditional parties, by a sense that something was wrong. Protestants felt they were under siege; the world for which their forebears had fought and worked and died was under attack. Because they could not blame themselves, they looked outside themselves and their Protestant cultural matrix to the foreigners, to incoming "tribes" with their clannishness, their strange tongues, their different values, beliefs, and cultural systems. Foreigners became an easily identifiable enemy.⁹

If foreigners could be enemies, foreign Catholics

could be doubly treacherous. Not only did they represent a threat to "Americanism" by retaining their Old Country ways, they represented an additional threat by their allegiance to a foreign potentate, the Pope, who, "sitting and trembling upon the great shield of the Vatican at Rome," had supposedly "evinced a great desire to control the spiritual and temporal interests of this young world."¹⁰ Thus had the Know-Nothings, in a classic example of paranoid political behavior, leapt from the undeniable (that politics were corrupt and society in disarray) to the unbelievable (the Pope's Jesuit monks were infiltrating and subverting the American political system). Know-Nothings felt that their access to the political process was being threatened or limited by foreigners. Considering their politically unsound demands and the growing bloc of foreign-born registered voters controlled by party bosses, their sense of powerlessness was not entirely unjustified. But their lack of political control was perceived by them as a measure of an enemy's power that had been achieved by conspiratorial means. With such an enemy to fight, the Know-Nothings could unite as a true political party. But grounded on emotional rather than rational approaches to the issues, the American Party was not disposed to make any sort of compromise, a stand that in the troublesome 1850s meant death to ordinary politics.¹¹

It is through this prism of fear, irrationality and

emotion that characterized the Know-Nothing Party that its literature must be evaluated. Know-Nothing writers, Carroll included, were not only convinced of a Jesuitical conspiracy, they were, like most missionaries of a cause, convinced of the righteousness of their own position. Carroll's first book of 1856, The Great American Battle, could be viewed as an American Party Bible, so accurately did it portray the Party and its dictates. Like most political tracts of the times, Carroll's works were scarcely literary masterpieces. She tended toward overly dramatic prose, hyperbole, italics, and exclamation points. Still, her work is fairly coherent in its approach to its task: to state the danger and propose appropriate action to circumvent it.

The Great American Battle can be divided into three major sections. The first five chapters alert American women, men, and children, along with the Press, to the dangerous aim of the Roman Catholic Church "to unsettle the principles of our liberties and hence to destroy them" ¹² Woman's task was to perceive the danger and act upon it, "but only as a moral agent" even though her actions would be political in their ramifications. ¹³ Her province was the education of children and of men. By this education she sought and propounded "man's moral and ultimate good." Of course, to accomplish this goal she had to be educated herself, for with education, "united with

moral power, she becomes an arm of strength to free America."¹⁴ In her call to women, Carroll combined all the characteristics of Victorian culture: the high status of the mother as the transmitter of cultural identity and values, a faith in the redemptive power of education over ignorance and sin, and the imposition of the Protestant Christian framework upon extant institutions, thus reforming those institutions to reflect more closely God's will until that version of His will would "govern the mind of America."¹⁵

The tasks of the Press and the men of America seemed less noble by comparison. While the "women of America now may be said to control the destinies of ages yet unborn!" because of their influence over children, the Press was primarily urged to take the subject seriously.¹⁶ As the "judgement-seat of public opinion" its dismissal of American Party fears as "frivolous" could result in its own destruction, warned Carroll.¹⁷ Men of America, on the other hand, were by the Jesuit threat afforded a perfect opportunity to emulate patriots of old. To men, as to women, education was the key to meeting the crisis: "the instrument of liberty, property and security to America."¹⁸

The educational process Carroll called for had to be one that did not involve the use of Catholic schools, popular in the United States for their rigorous curriculum.

Such schools posed a significant danger since education nourished "the very soul of America."¹⁹ The Catholic church offered education as a way to influence and eventually control those souls through convents, schools, and colleges, she argued.²⁰ The school issue was a particularly touchy one for Marylander Carroll. In 1852, Delegate Thomas Kerney of Baltimore had introduced to the state legislature a school reorganization bill designed to simplify the administration of state-funded, locally operated schools. The bill made provisions to give state aid to private (including parochial) schools if their curriculum was state-approved. In practice, the bill would have meant public funding for Catholic schools.

Know-Nothings seized the issue as evidence of a "deep-dyed Popish plot" designed to negate traditional separation of Church and state, to gain control over the disbursement of educational funds (their next step, no doubt, was to seek control of all public funds), and underhandedly to unite church and state into a theocratic government answerable only to the Pope.²¹ Commuting between her father's residence in Baltimore and her own work in Washington, Carroll would not have been able to miss the issue.

The bill was eventually buried in legislative committee, but the clamor it raised continued to be fuelled throughout the 1850s not only by such political tracts as Carroll's work, but by arguments over the social, moral, and

political implications of using the Protestant Bible in public schools, or banning the Bible entirely at the request of Catholic bishops so Catholic students would not be exposed to it. Censorship by the Catholic church over reading matter in school continued the controversy with more protests by Know-Nothings like Carroll who thought that history would thus be "murdered" and literature "maimed and mutilated."²²

The most famous of Catholic educators, of course, were the Jesuits, and this special branch of the Catholic priesthood came in for the most virulent attack by Carroll. Through education "the humble of our land have been made lofty, the poor have been enriched and blessed,"²³ and she herself had been able to participate actively in the political world she loved. "Jesuitism," which Carroll used interchangeably with terms such as "the Romish Hierarchy" and "Popery," by corrupting children in their schools, was "threatening . . . to swallow up America; and springing its shuttle of death across her shores it pants to be able to water its steed in her great Mississippi."²⁴ Mixed metaphors aside, the American Party had been formed, declared Carroll, to forestall this Jesuitical takeover. Through (Protestant) education, legislation and, if necessary, deportation, the Know-Nothings were determined to defeat the foe.

In the second section of her book, Carroll develops

the literary device of a garden tea-party at which America and his mother (never named) visit with each other and friends and discuss the history of America's birth and rise to manhood, as well as the enemies that will assail him once he leaves the [American] party. Day by day, chapter by chapter, America and his mother discuss the nature and characteristics of the American party: comparable to the "Liberty Party" of the Revolutionary period,²⁵ secretive only because it needed time and trustworthy party members to guarantee solidity and strength of organization,²⁶ opposed to the sale of public lands to immigrants instead of to "native American citizens for public improvements and their education!"²⁷ The Union's national interests and its preservation were more important than any sectional gain. The spoils system which had resulted in the selection of "foreigners" over native-born citizens was a "Jesuit mechanism" to take over the country.²⁸ To meet those threats, the American Party, a "'purely defensive'" organization was formed; it would retire itself "'when the aggression of foreigners ceases.'"²⁹

In like manner, Carroll continued for many pages, presenting the American Party stance on all the major political issues of the day and benumbing the reader with her accusations against the "timid, servile serpents" of the Pope.³⁰ Her writing was a classic example of "paranoid scholarship": apparent facts marshaled in a rationalistic

and scholastic manner that led to a conclusion neither rational nor scholarly.³¹ Carroll brought in the history of European monarchs condemned by the Pope to prove the papal interest in controlling temporal matters. She discussed the Index of Prohibited Books and the Inquisition to prove the Catholics' attempt to restrict freedom by controlling minds.

In the last section of her book, Carroll brought the troubles caused by this supposed Papal conspiracy to the present day. She accused the Naval Board of Fifteen, which had reorganized the Navy officer line in 1855, of being controlled by the Jesuits. The reorganization had been controversial and several officers had written Carroll complaining of their reserve status. She took up the cause and found the "proof" of conspiracy in the Catholic backgrounds of Senator Stephen A. Mallory, who had introduced the original bill of reorganization, and of board members Commander Samuel F. Dupont and Commodore William Shubrick.³² Why would the Pope want to use these men to destroy the American navy (supposedly the true purpose of the reorganization)? For the same reason he wanted his subjects in patronage positions: it was "to sap the foundation of our democratic liberty and our glorious Constitution," as well as to destroy the only arm of the United States' government that could conceivably interfere in the Crimean War. Chronology aside (the war ended just

before the book went to press), Carroll was convinced of the Pope's desire to crush Russia and the United States somehow so there would be no rival to the Pope's European base of power.³³

In the end, Carroll called for the expulsion of all Jesuits and the cancellation of all treaties with countries which would not allow the free practice of Protestantism. And, of course, all true patriots should join the American Party. If a man, one was to vote for Millard Fillmore; if a woman, one's "holy mission" was to "plead, in Gospel sincerity and patriotic fervor" with the men of America to vote for Fillmore, thus preserving "our Sabbath, our Schools, our Bible and Liberty."³⁴

Beyond a statement of American Party principles of the more moderate wing of the Know-Nothings (Carroll did differentiate between foreign and native-born Catholics; the latter were still acceptable as citizens), Carroll's The Great American Battle is valuable for the insights it provides regarding her views of women's place, women's work, and of her consciousness of the societal strictures placed upon her. Carroll began her work by apologizing for her intrusion into the masculine world of politics, protesting her innocence of intent. "I have no affiliations with any principles which place [woman] in a sphere at variance with that refined delicacy to which she is assigned by Nature," she wrote, thus maintaining both her distance from the

burgeoning woman's rights movement and the individual nature of her work.³⁵ She had "no aspirations to extend her influence or position."³⁶ Yet the present dangers to the survival of America meant women could not shrink from their duty. "God has given to woman to enlighten America, and to America to light the world" America's fate depended on "the work of America's daughters."³⁷ While this was a "high political mission," Carroll again reassured her readers that it was only as a moral agent that women should act: "her aim is to develop the child for God and his country."³⁸

This ideology of the republican mother, common in the mid-nineteenth century, and the portrait of the moral superiority of woman compared to the "blundering and quarrelling of men"³⁹ recurred throughout The Great American Battle. Woman's "true position" was filled when she worked for man's moral improvement, and to achieve that goal, Carroll argued, "the intellect of woman must then be cultivated--her first and last refuge is education," since only when educated could woman secure the "respect, confidence and appreciation" necessary to become that "arm of strength to free America."⁴⁰

Even when using analogies to compare the women of her day to the women of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and the American Revolution, Carroll was very careful to present her readers with heroic women within the cultural imperative of

the republican mother and the cult of domesticity.

We want no Joans of Arc to make America vascular and alive [as religious as Jeanne d'Arc may have been, she was Catholic, dressed in men's clothing, and led men to battle, none of which appealed to Carroll's view of what women should do, even in times of national peril] . . . we want faithful and true women, who neither shriek nor protest, but pray; women who neither mount nor sink; who are neither heroines nor fools; but American women, who can stand in their own shoes"41

Of course, the most obvious presentation by Carroll of the republican mother ideology was her use of the garden tea party device to present the history and platform of the American Party. By using mother and son figures as her party spokespersons, she was able to convey the respect due women as mothers and participants in the nation's life in terms of day-to-day existence, noble acts in emergencies, and as grantors of new life by their procreative abilities. The son provided a way to express gratitude as a measure of woman's worth within the cultural framework as it existed and without the need for enfranchisement. "'My mother,'" he [America] said, "'you made me a man! You taught me to love God in my cradle, and to love my dear country I wish all the children had such a mother, then our dear country would have patriot sons.'" The happy result? "'They would all belong to the American party.'"42

At the same time that Carroll wholeheartedly embraced the use of the imagery of the republican mother, she occasionally used adjectives of political weight and

force to describe her: "She was indeed the most original and commanding of women, an elemental force of great power, and like a solvent of such range of affinity, as to combine and reconcile heterogeneous spirits into one society."⁴³ But these stronger terms were seldom used, and Carroll always returned to the less politically threatening mother image, reestablishing her subservience to the more political animal, man: ". . . our Divine Creator saw fit to dignify woman by the name of 'Mother' when he gave her to the companionship and comfort of man. It was in this sense [as a potential mother] that she became the Eve to the American family" ⁴⁴ Even when dealing with the history of women's past patriotic deeds, for instance, noting that Washington had expressed his belief that, "with [women's] active national sympathy, we had nothing to fear," Carroll was careful to attribute women's success not to masculine incentives such as dreams of achievement and glory, but to "'duty: and [they] would have fallen short, had they done less!'" Finally, to make herself perfectly clear regarding women's place in politics, Carroll stated in no uncertain terms, "Let no cry of 'woman's rights' deter you. That charge has no significance here."⁴⁵

The Great American Battle seems to have been a fair success. Carroll finished the book in early March 1856, and by May wrote to her father of the papers' announcement of the sale of "10,000 copies of the Battle and the whole

country is alive in its praise--I wish you could see half that is said."⁴⁶ She was startled, she wrote, to find that her publisher had "a woman agent," but she appeared to be a good choice since she was "getting a large number of subscribers" Her biggest concern was the number of newspaper editors who had not yet acknowledged receipt of the copies sent them. "This is Pierce acting through the P.[ost] O.[ffice]" she declared, reiterating her belief that Pierce's Catholic Postmaster-General was taking advantage of his position to purge the mails of all anti-Catholic materials.⁴⁷

But compliments for Carroll's work did make their way to her in New York City, where she was writing campaign tracts from her rooms at Holdridge's Hotel at 8th and Broadway. One letter of praise came from North Carolina American Party leader Kenneth Rayner. He looked at the book as an opportunity for the party to explain the "deep philosophy" of the Know-Nothings. A restatement of purpose, he hoped, might turn the party away from its current state, in which its principles had been "adulterated by the selfishness and sectionalism that have marked its late progress." Rayner feared the widening split in the party over the slavery issue would overshadow the more important issue of anti-Catholicism.⁴⁸ "Edifying" and "productive of great good to the American cause" though the book was, Rayner did find fault with one matter: "the distinction you

attempt to draw between native and foreign Roman Catholics you are wrong in the main, the native papists are as intolerable as the foreigners." Both groups, he believed, gave a spiritual supremacy to the Pope that was able to release Catholics "from the obligation of an oath--the oath of allegiance to the constitution we must make war upon the whole system"49

Candidate Fillmore, to whom Carroll had sent a copy of the book's opening chapters, apparently never actually read it, but did "commend her zeal in the cause."⁵⁰ His own zeal was a bit more suspect. Fillmore as a candidate did not give Carroll much to work with. Not a particularly charismatic politician, he was decidedly lukewarm about most of the tenets of the Know-Nothing Party. He was not an anti-Catholic, nor was he a nativist. But he was aware of the growing popularity of the American Party and, like most retired presidents, he was interested in employment which would not demean the office he had once held. A return to the White House would suit him just fine. The demise of the Whigs had left him temporarily homeless politically, since he viewed the Republican Party as too sectional to guarantee the country's stability. Fillmore had supported Know-Nothing Daniel Ullmann in the New York gubernatorial race of 1854 and wrote of his concern over the "corrupting influence" that the struggle for control over the foreign

vote in the state had occasioned. Protesting that he had "no desire to mingle in political strife," Fillmore nevertheless had become a sworn Know-Nothing and had accepted the nomination.⁵¹ But even as the American Party nominee, Fillmore still spoke not of anti-Catholicism or nativism, but only of "freely adopt[ing] the principles of the Know-Nothing party."⁵²

The religious issue, about which Fillmore refused to take a stand, was one which Carroll had hoped to resolve for the American Party by drawing a clear distinction between native-born and foreign Catholics. It was the "system of popery" against which she wrote,⁵³ "foreign, ungrateful refugees" who maintained allegiance to their native faith even after naturalization.⁵⁴ As the Gallican Catholics in France had stood for no papal interference in temporal matters, so native-born Catholics stood against papal interference in the American political system.⁵⁵ This distinction was crucial for Carroll to make, not only politically, but personally as well. Everyone knew the more prestigious branch of the Maryland Carrolls were Catholic. She could "honor that paternal ancestry"⁵⁶ but felt that "so baneful an evil"⁵⁷ was Papal control over votes that it had become pardonable "in all eyes,"⁵⁸ presumably including familial ones, to work to expose the evil even if she, and the American Party for which she wrote, appeared to some to be "bigots and blockheads."⁵⁹

Politically the distinction was required so that those states with strong Know-Nothing parties and large Catholic populations would stay with the party instead of defecting to the Democrats or, far worse, to the newly-formed Republican party. Both Carroll's native Maryland and the southern state of Louisiana, for instance, had substantial Catholic populations who were a part of the strongly nativist Know-Nothings. Louisiana in particular presented a problem. At the American Nominating Convention in Philadelphia in February 1856, the Louisiana delegation contained a number of Catholic members. The Convention allowed their credentials, but the feasibility of seating Catholic delegates in a strongly anti-Catholic convention depended upon this distinction between native and foreign-born Catholics Carroll had laid out.⁶⁰

Carroll could--indeed, had to--accept the distinction. She believed it, too, since she had her own family and state history to provide her with familiar and familial examples of patriotic native-born Catholics. Radical Know-Nothings such as Kenneth Rayner, however, were under no such illusions as to the contradictory nature of allowing the Louisiana delegates in. "I can not tell you the deep mortification I feel at the compromise with Jesuitism made . . . by the Nominating Convention," he wrote to Carroll. The "anti-Romish element of the order has been its great element of strength with the masses," he argued,

and admitting the delegates "I fear . . . was a fatal step . . . those bodies surrendered to the enemy the citadel of our strength."⁶¹ The damage done to the fortunes of the American Party was primarily over this issue, according to Rayner, not over the sectional question of slavery, also present at the Philadelphia Convention. Northerners had bolted from the convention, and the Know-Nothings were "likely to lose all" over "our divisions and discords."⁶² But such uncompromising anti-Catholicism as Rayner's was too offensive to survive politically. If the American Party wished to win the election, it had to tone down its anti-Catholicism enough not to lose voters to the other parties.⁶³

The Great American Battle had concentrated on the impending takeover by the "Romish Hierarchy." In election pamphlets she wrote throughout the spring and summer of 1856, Carroll shifted emphasis to concentrate on exposing corruption at the ballot box by foreign voters and on the necessity of preserving the Union.⁶⁴ The sectional appeal of Republican nominee John C. Frémont had provided the American Party an opportunity to present Fillmore as a national candidate. Unlike Frémont, Fillmore was not a candidate for those "'who desired an administration for the North as against the South, or for the South against the North" Instead, he said, "'I know only my country, my whole country and nothing but my country.'"⁶⁵

The preservation of the Union as a campaign issue was further discussed in Carroll's pamphlet, The Union of the States. While there was still mention of the dangers of a corrupted democracy because of foreign voters, Carroll devoted most of the pamphlet to other issues. Fanatical abolitionists had combined with Democrats to cause sectional strife, and it had been only "the Roman firmness of Mr. Fillmore," exhibited best when Fillmore signed the Compromise of 1850 after President Zachary Taylor's death, that had saved the Union.⁶⁶ The civil war that raged in Kansas, she argued, resulted from the Democratic administration's incompetence, a situation that could have been avoided had Fillmore been renominated and reelected in 1852. Continued "agitation" in Kansas and continued Democratic interference with the ballot box were in store if Americans did not return to Fillmore in 1856.⁶⁷

Carroll did not directly attack the Republican Party in this pamphlet, as she did the Democrats, but she did argue that Fillmore was a better candidate because he had been nominated by a national rather than sectional party. In so doing, she conveniently ignored the "Northern American" convention in New York City in June that had effectively fused with the Republicans by endorsing their candidate, Frémont. Carroll had attended the convention and been dismayed at the intransigence of the dissident northerners. It was "treason to the Union" and "madness" to

nominate a sectional candidate, and since she saw both Democrats and Republicans as sectional parties, she presented Fillmore as the only national choice.⁶⁸

Also issued prior to the election was Carroll's Review of Pierce's Administration. This was an exhaustive year-by-year critique of four years of Democratic blunders under the administration of Franklin Pierce. While the Review contained many of the same ideas as were in The Great American Battle and Union of the States, it was particularly informative regarding Carroll's ideas on foreign policy. Her opinions were characteristic of the antebellum expansionists such as Matthew Fontaine Maury, Asa Whitney, and William Henry Seward. Not limited to the continentalism of Manifest Destiny, not interested in the Young Americans' call for intervention in Europe, Carroll was primarily a commercial expansionist. She argued for a foreign and domestic policy that would benefit trade, a consular and diplomatic service to promote the expansion of American markets, reciprocity treaties with South America, a strong navy and a forceful Commander-in-Chief to protect Americans abroad, and peace with Europe to avoid the disruptions of trade any war would bring. These were all points upon which she could attack Pierce's administration as being singularly ineffective.⁶⁹

The Review, like The Great American Battle, was a fairly coherent statement of political criticism combined

with a recommended course of action for its readers. Here again, Carroll took care to reassure her readers that she knew her limits "within the province of feminine delicacy." At the same time, she knew "of no rule to exclude females from society or the discussion of any subject which has an immediate bearing on the social, moral, and political destiny" of the country. She pointed out, rather sarcastically, that "an American female is not an idle statue of a pagoda, or of a Turkish seraglio" Readers should have no fear that Carroll, or any woman expressing a political interest within these particular provinces, would "trespass either on the rights of the male sex, or wantonly expose herself to a charge of temerity." In a search for truth, all should be given an opportunity to participate since "its aim is for the welfare and highest good of individuals, of society, and of the nation." In such an interdependent society, "the interests and destiny of the mothers and daughters are in common with those of their fathers and brothers." Once again, it was part of woman's duty as a mother figure not to "be ignorant on subjects which relate[d] to the manly development of the mind," since women were responsible for "the moulding of the rising generation" Carroll's own motivation for stepping into the sphere of politics was solely her love of country and her "desire to awaken the reader to the vast importance" of the subjects treated by her work.⁷⁰

The summer of 1856 wore on, and Carroll wrote on. Fillmore had returned to the United States in late June and had greatly angered Carroll by his failure to call on her, especially considering "all I did, nay permitted, in your behalf, for I have been the author of articles which were made effective by ignorance of their source" ⁷¹ Perhaps Fillmore feared the effect of acknowledging her work printed under her own name. "For the first time in our history a woman has ventured openly and without disguise to espouse the cause of her Country" But this was something not to fear but approve. It had "drawn the applause of your sex, and every distinguished member of the party . . . have [sic] called, while, you . . . have seen fit . . . to show so much indifference" Those men, she wrote, included Erastus Brooks, New York's Know-Nothing gubernatorial candidate hoping for a ride on Fillmore's coattails, E. B. Bartlett, the National President of the Know-Nothings, and Thurlow Weed, leading New York Republican and power broker. In addition to their calls, Carroll kept up her correspondence with Thomas Corwin of Ohio, Kenneth Rayner, and Josiah Polk of Washington. ⁷²

By July, Fillmore had apologized for his neglect, writing Carroll from Buffalo where he spent the summer. Carroll wrote back for information on his previous administration to use in the Review and other pamphlets. He replied, promising a visit with her should she come to

Niagara Falls. Her hard work on his behalf was not unappreciated as it was ". . . gratifying to know that I have at least one friend on whom I can rely through good & through evil" ⁷³ Along with her campaign tracts, Carroll was finishing her massive The Star of the West; or, National Men and National Measures. Her workload was beginning to take its toll, both on her health and her work. By August she had to stop work for a while to recover her energy, but she soon picked up her pen to continue. By September, The Star of the West was ready for the press. ⁷⁴

Perhaps reflecting the strain of overwork, The Star of the West was the poorest of Carroll's campaign works, the most disjointed and incoherent. Apparently it was a collection of articles written and previously published. Gathered together for the book, the essays had little in common. She re-examined the Naval Board's reorganization work of 1855, concentrating particularly on the sad plight of Commodore Charles Stewart, the ranking officer of the United States Navy, who had been placed on the reserve list and to whom the book was dedicated, and on Lieutenant M. F. Maury, a top meteorologist also "reserved." ⁷⁵ In "The First American Exploring Expedition," she took up the cause of Jeremiah N. Reynolds of New York who had fought for years for Congressional funding of an Antarctic expedition and then was refused permission to join the United States Exploring Expedition of 1838-42 led by Lieutenant Charles

Wilkes.⁷⁶ She wrote a promotion of a transcontinental railroad which would benefit trade by giving Americans "a hold on the wealth of China . . . and her 700 Millions of inhabitants."⁷⁷ The railroad would have other salutary effects. It would make the gold of California more accessible; it would save time, expense, and trouble in trade and commerce. It would also prevent the secession of the Southwest from the United States--a worrisome possibility because of the area's isolation.⁷⁸ Isolation in the region had already led to abuses of democracy, to "disorders . . . the villainous practice of stuffing the ballot-box, the elevation of the scum of society and traitors to office"⁷⁹ A transcontinental railway would change all that, as well as serving to unite the country and to advance Protestant education and civilization, which Carroll held to be more conducive to economic growth because Protestants had fewer holidays than Catholics.⁸⁰

Incoherent as The Star of the West was (Carroll also included essays on her favorite topics of Jesuitism and the dangers of Jesuit education), it did have one unifying theme: Carroll's fascination with the idea of an American mission. Expanding ideas she had mentioned briefly in The Great American Battle, Carroll described the mission of Americans to "spread their Protestant Bible and their American Constitution on the wings of the American eagle,"

so Americans could throw their weight "in behalf of equality and justice over the countries of the world" Not incidentally, those actions would also mean that "our own strength shall increase, our own resources expand, and an additional impetus be given our moral, commercial and political greatness."⁸¹ In The Star of the West, Carroll was able to develop the subject of expansion more fully, particularly in her essay in support of William Walker's popular filibustering adventures in Nicaragua.

Walker's actions appealed to Carroll's sense of mission and duty that were so much a part of her expansionist outlook. She compared his work with what "Lafayette, DeKalb, Pulaski, Kosciusko, had done for American liberty Who, then can repress patriotic emotion or deep sympathy for his triumph?" America was right to "extend the protection" of its laws and systems of government to a people who had supposedly "invited" the United States "to take up their cause."⁸² The triumph of self-government in the American tradition for such a people tied in well not only in spiritual terms with American interest in liberty and justice, but in economic terms as well. To Carroll, Walker in Nicaragua meant that "our stars and stripes will yet float over the Pacific gate of the Nicaraguan transit" on the road to the China market, and thus the key to the Gulf of Mexico would "never fall into the hands of savages." The Central American states, so

"essential to the commerce of the United States" must never be "owned by their enemies," or by the enemies of the United States.⁸³ Walker's activities provided Carroll with the perfect example of what she viewed as the nobility of the American mission in action in Central America, restoring order and peace through American systems of government, and, at the same time, ensuring the preservation and promotion of United States trade.⁸⁴

Carroll must have been greatly pleased to receive Walker's note thanking her for the copy of The Star of the West that she sent him after its publication in October 1856. It was, he wrote, "a source of consolation as well as of encouragement . . . to receive such assurances" as she had manifested "in the cause of Nicaraguan regeneration." He promised to try to visit her before he returned to Nicaragua to converse with her personally "about some of the subjects you treat of in your volume." There is no indication that the two ever met. Her description of his public speaking presence, however ("an expression of meekness, accompanied by a nasal tone and sluggish utterance, which would arrest attention in any assembly"), was peculiar enough to suggest an encounter of some kind before his return to Central America and subsequent execution by the Hondurans in 1860.⁸⁵

Perhaps because of the essay on the popular exploits of Walker, certainly in spite of its literary shortcomings,

The Star of the West was Carroll's most popular book, running to three editions. The first came out in October 1856, the second by December 11, the third in 1857.⁸⁶ Carroll had no time to rest on her laurels, however. The election was fast approaching and she cranked out two more short pamphlets. One was distributed in Boston, where she had gone to work with her publisher on The Star of the West, the other in New York, where, she wrote Fillmore, it had been declared "the best effort now that can be made to save" that state for the Know-Nothings.⁸⁷

Carroll attacked Democratic nominee James Buchanan most vigorously in the first of the two pamphlets. Which? Fillmore or Buchanan! dragged forth the spectre of war with Spain over Cuba by reviving the issue of the Ostend Manifesto, for which Buchanan had been partly responsible, and which he was supposedly pledged to carry out if elected. The result would be "War immediately with England, France and Spain!"⁸⁸ More domestic concerns were found in Carroll's Who Shall be President? Carroll dismissed Republican Frémont's election as a "mathematical . . . impossibility" because of Southern opposition.⁸⁹ At that, she may have at last realized that Fillmore's chances for victory were slim: "every vote . . . cast for Frémont, is a vote really given to Buchanan."⁹⁰ Buchanan would bring Kansas in as a slave state; Fillmore would send in troops to restore order. The

disunion of America that was sure to result under Buchanan's administration would lead to a "general paralysis" and eventual destruction of the country.⁹¹ Carroll was becoming aware of the very real possibility of a Know-Nothing loss if the party could not attract more votes from other parties: "Republicans, Democrats and Whigs, join the American army . . . and aid us in electing Fillmore Do this now and settle minor differences at a more convenient season."⁹²

Carroll clearly did not comprehend that the Republicans would never make the necessary compromise on the slavery issue that was required to embrace Fillmore's candidacy. For Republicans to support the American Party platform of popular sovereignty, instead of their own platform which opposed any extension of slavery, was not a "minor difference." It was political suicide. The non-extension of slavery was the raison d'etre of the Republican Party. Co-optation through compromise would inevitably mean its destruction.

The "more convenient season" which Carroll hoped for would never arrive. Wanting to share information "infinitely important," Carroll left Boston to meet with Fillmore one last time before the election.⁹³ She was unsuccessful in her attempt to meet Fillmore at the Cataract House in Niagara Falls in late October. Fillmore, no doubt concerned with election matters, did not respond to

Carroll's letters asking for an appointment. Carroll, disproportionately offended when put off, was convinced that "some malignant influence" was swaying Fillmore's mind against meeting with her, especially considering all she had done for him. Or perhaps Fillmore did not "like a political woman, but my friends say I have been more than a Jessie Frémont to the Fillmore cause," she wrote, referring to John C. Frémont's politically ambitious spouse.⁹⁴ Hurt at his silence, she took the train to Buffalo to await his appearance. She added a postscript to a note requesting he call on her with what might be considered a threat, and was certainly less than gracious: "You better let me know what time it will suit you to call here."⁹⁵ That night or the next day Fillmore must have called and soothed Carroll's wounded feelings, for their correspondence would continue after Carroll returned to New York City to await election day.

Notes

¹David M. Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 249-256.

²Joel H. Silbey, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics of American Politics Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 127-165. See also William E. Gienapp, "Nativism and the Creation of a Republican Majority in the North before the Civil War," Journal of American History 72 (December 1985):529-559.

³Michael F. Holt, "The Antimasonic and Know Nothing Parties," in History of U.S. Political Parties, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 4 vols. (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1973), 1:594-595, 610-611; Frederick J. Blue, The Free-Soilers: Third Party Politics, 1848-54 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1973), p. 284; Ludwell Johnson, Division and Reunion: America 1848-1877 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), p. 21; David Brion Davis, "Some Ideological Functions of Prejudice in Ante-Bellum America," American Quarterly 60 (Summer 1963):121; Harry J. Carman and Richard H. Luthin, "Some Aspects of the Know-Nothing Movement Reconsidered," South Atlantic Quarterly 39 (1940):217, 222; Gienapp, "Nativism," pp. 530-535. See also Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978).

⁴Holt in Schlesinger, 1:569; [Friedrich Anspach], The Sons of the Sires (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., 1855), pp. 99, 189; Michael F. Holt, "The Politics of Impatience: The Origins of Know Nothingism," Journal of American History 60 (September 1973):323; Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 9; William J. Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 59-67.

⁵Jean H. Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 14; Evitts, Allegiances, pp. 96, 102.

⁶W. Darrell Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party in the

South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 12; Carman and Luthin, "Aspects," pp. 216-217; Holt in Schlesinger, 1:596-597; W. Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots 1836-1892 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), p. 504; Anna Ella Carroll, Which? Fillmore or Buchanan! (Boston: James French & Co., 1856). Most historians hold New York as the key state in the contest and argue Clay lost because his status as a slaveholder cost him Whig votes that went to the abolitionist Liberty Party. Lee Benson's study of New York state voting patterns in The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961) is cited by Silbey as proof of the decline of the Liberty Party in 1844 and the primacy of ethno-religious factors in the election. This argument validates, at least in part, Carroll's contention that Clay lost the election because of the ethnic vote. See Silbey, Partisan Imperative, pp. 4-5.

⁷Henry Adams held that the Know-Nothing Party was most attractive to "an old Whig in Tennessee, or Kentucky, or Maryland, who had grown up to despise a Democrat as the meanest and most despicable of creatures; who had been taught in the semi barbarous school of southern barbeques and stump harangues, gouging and pistol shooting, to hate and abhor the very word Democrat" See Henry Adams, The Great Secession Winter and Other Essays, ed. George Hochfield (New York: Sagamore Press, 1958), pp. 15-16.

⁸Thomas Holmes Walker, One Hundred Years of History, 1802-1902: A History of Second Presbyterian Church (Baltimore: n.p., 1902), pp. 94-142. Breckinridge was pastor from 26 November 1832 until 4 May 1845. Carroll joined the church on 12 April 1845, just prior to Breckinridge's departure. Dorothy E. Mulliken, church secretary, to author, 20 November 1985. Carroll remarked upon the distinct impression Breckinridge made with "the few discourses it was my fortune to hear from your pulpit"; "by your writings I became an early disciple of yrself in opposition to Roman Catholicism" Anna Ella Carroll to Robert J. Breckinridge, 29 November 1864, Breckinridge Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. See also Carleton Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade: The Great Know-Nothing Conspiracy, 1820-1860 (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1960), p. 172.

⁹Silbey, Partisan Imperative, pp. 71-75; John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of Negro Americans, 3d ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), pp.

77-78; Evitts, Allegiances, pp. 2-3; W. Wayne Smith, "Politics and Democracy in Maryland, 1800-1854," in Maryland: A History, 1632-1974, ed. Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1974), p. 305; Howe, Political Culture, p. 164.

¹⁰Anna Ella Carroll, The Great American Battle; or the Contest Between Christianity and Political Romanism (New York: Orton & Mulligan, 1856), p. 69 (hereafter cited as GAB).

¹¹Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), pp. 29-40.

¹²Carroll, GAB, p. 22.

¹³Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 20.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 22. See also Daniel Walker Howe, "Victorian Culture in America," in Victorian America, ed. Daniel Walker Howe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 9, 21-26.

¹⁶Carroll, GAB, p. 26.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 34, 31.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 56.

²⁰Ibid., p. 61.

²¹Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade, p. 178; Evitts, Allegiances, pp. 71-73; Lawrence F. Schmeckebier, History of the Know-Nothing Party in Maryland, Series XVII, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ed. Herbert B. Adams (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1899), pp. 15-16; Jean H. Baker, Ambivalent Americans: The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 18.

²²Carroll, GAB, p. 72.

²³Ibid., p. 82.

²⁴Ibid., p. 32.

²⁵Ibid., p. 115.

²⁶Ibid., p. 120.

²⁷Ibid., p. 123.

²⁸Ibid., p. 109. Carroll was particularly offended by the appointment of Catholic James Campbell as Postmaster-General. See Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 26 May 1856, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland; Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: A House Dividing 1852-1857 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 47, 324, 403.

²⁹Carroll, GAB, p. 104 [Mother].

³⁰Ibid., p. 178.

³¹Hofstadter, Paranoid Politics, p. 36.

³²Carroll, GAB, pp. 274-89; Charles Oscar Paullin, Paullin's History of Naval Administration, 1755-1911 (Annapolis, Maryland: U. S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp. 238-243. See also Charles Stewart to Anna Ella Carroll, 18 April and 11 May 1857, Carroll Papers.

³³This reference was to Catholic Campbell's position in Pierce's cabinet. The Crimean War was still raging as Carroll wrote, but the peace conference in Paris had begun by the time GAB was published. See also Carroll, GAB, pp. 277-278, 127.

³⁴Carroll, GAB, p. 341.

³⁵Ibid., p. v.

³⁶Carroll, GAB, p. v.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 13-14.

³⁸Ibid., p. 18.

³⁹Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 28.

⁴²Ibid., p. 92.

⁴³Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 238.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 223.

⁴⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 23 May 1856, Carroll Papers. A second edition was issued in 1859; see Walter P. Armstrong, "The Story of Anna Ella Carroll: Politician, Lawyer and Secret Agent," American Bar Association Journal 35 (March 1949):199, n. 2.

⁴⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 26 May 1856, Carroll Papers. This was a common charge of Carroll's: see also Carroll, GAB, pp. 212-227; Anna Ella Carroll, Review of Pierce's Administration; Showing Its Only Popular Measures to Have Originated with the Executive of Millard Fillmore (Boston: James French & Co., 1856), pp. 24, 28-29.

⁴⁸Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 7 March 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁹Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 12 May 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁰Millard Fillmore to Daniel Ullmann, 12 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

⁵¹Millard Fillmore to Isaac Newton, 3 January 1855, in Millard Fillmore Papers, ed. Frank H. Severance, 2 vols. (Buffalo, New York: Buffalo Historical Society, 1907) 2:347-349; Millard Fillmore cited in Anna Ella Carroll, The Union of the States (Boston: James French & Co., 1856), pp. 62-63; Charles McCool Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll, Political Strategist and Gadfly to President Fillmore," Maryland Historical Magazine 68 (Spring 1973):44.

⁵²Millard Fillmore to American Party Nominating Committee, 21 May 1856, in Papers, 2:358-359.

⁵³Carroll, GAB, p. x.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 154, 156.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 198-207.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. v.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. viii.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. vi.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 120.

⁶⁰Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party, p. 213.

⁶¹Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 7 March 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁶²Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 12 May 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁶³In like manner, Republicans incorporated anti-Catholic rhetoric in its campaign to attract Know-Nothings to its party, hoping to capture voters who were both anti-Catholic and anti-slavery-extension, since the Know-Nothings had not taken as clear a stand in the slavery issue. See Gienapp, "Nativism," pp. 542-545.

⁶⁴Baker, Ambivalent Americans, p. 47. Carroll's Union and Review are considerably less anti-Catholic than GAB, as are her two other pamphlets of 1856, Which? Fillmore or Buchanan! and Who Shall Be President? An Appeal to the People (Boston: James French and Co., 1856). A third pamphlet was a reprint of Chapter 25 of GAB: American Nominations Fillmore and Donelson, Being an Extract from a Work Entitled The Great American Battle; or, The Contest Between Christianity and Political Romanism (New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1856).

⁶⁵Overdyke, The Know-Nothing Party, p. 142; Carman and Luthin, "Some Aspects," p. 218.

⁶⁶Carroll, Union, pp. 26, 54, 12.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 28.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 49. Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, Carroll Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 45.

⁶⁹Charles Vevier, "American Continentalism: An Idea of Expansion, 1845-1910," American Historical Review 65 (January 1960):323-335; Anna Ella Carroll, The Star of the West; or, National Men and National Measures, 3d ed. (Boston: James French & Co., 1857), pp. 162-186; Carroll, Which?, pp. 13-16, 34-35.

⁷⁰Carroll, Review, pp. iii-iv.

⁷¹Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 26 June 1856, Fillmore Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp. 46-47.

⁷²Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 26 June 1856, Fillmore Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 6 November 1856, Fillmore Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 17 April and 11 December 1856, Thurlow Weed Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York; Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 November 1856, Carroll Papers; J[osiah] F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 25 April 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁷³Millard Fillmore to Anna Ella Carroll, 30 July 1856, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁴Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp. 48; Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 11 September 1856, Fillmore Papers.

⁷⁵Paullin, Paullin's History, p. 241; Carroll, Star, pp. 232-277, p. vi.

⁷⁶Carroll, Star, p. 122; see also Donald Dale Jackson, "Around the World with Wilkes and his 'Scientifics,'" Smithsonian 16 (November 1985):48-63.

⁷⁷Carroll, Star, p. 177.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 148-149.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 148.

⁸⁰Ibid., pp. 171-176.

⁸¹Carroll, GAB, p. 28; Carroll, Star, pp. 346-347.

⁸²Carroll, Star, pp. 379, 384.

⁸³Ibid., p. 385.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 378, 386.

⁸⁵William Walker to Anna Ella Carroll, Carroll Papers; Carroll, Star, p. 349.

⁸⁶Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 50; Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 11 December 1856, Weed Papers.

⁸⁷Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp. 50-52; Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 28 October and 31 October 1856, Fillmore Papers. In her 28 October letter, Carroll enclosed a clipping of a pro-Fillmore article, presumably hers, signed "A Voice From Plymouth Rock."

⁸⁸Carroll, Which?, p. 17.

⁸⁹Carroll, Who..., p. 3. This was the only time she mentioned Frémont by name.

⁹⁰Carroll, Who..., p. 4.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 8.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 31 October 1856, Fillmore Papers.

⁹⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 1 November 1856, 31 October 1856, Fillmore Papers.

⁹⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 1 November 1856, Fillmore Papers.

Chapter 3

Losses

Fillmore lost. James Buchanan and the Democrats won; John Charles Frémont and the new Republican party were second. Returns came in slowly enough to New York City that Carroll hoped that the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives. On November 5, she met with "leading Republicans" to suggest a fusion between Know-Nothings and Republicans, with Fillmore as the candidate of choice should the House vote be needed. Fillmore, she argued, was the only "national" candidate and had successfully avoided the issue of slavery.¹ That issue, according to Carroll was the "false" one of the campaign, but because the Republicans had dealt with it and thus split the national vote, they had "left the D--- to sweep the stakes. If others had fought on the same principle I did, the victory would have been complete." She blamed her sex for holding her back: "Had I been a man, I

would have had this." More important, though, was the lack of funds for the campaign: ". . . even as a woman, had I 20 thousand dollars to have worked with, to this end," victory would have resulted.

At the least, Carroll was pleased that Maryland had maintained its loyalty to Fillmore. She took credit for the win. After all, her works had "most circulated" there, and "my opinions been most freely consulted." The problem had been New York state. "For weeks I believed it safe," and sure to bring victory to Fillmore. Her beliefs, in spite of reports to the contrary, marked the difference between the "cold selfish calculations" of professional politicians and herself: "My heart enters into my acts and I loving the cause, believe in its triumph," even when political factors suggested the opposite.²

Carroll received a warm letter of condolence from Kenneth Rayner on November 14 which praised her for her "pure and disinterested devotion to those immortal principles of liberty" in the late election.³ She grew impatient to hear similar sentiments from the defeated candidate. She wrote him a letter of condolence and support, heaping praise on Fillmore's head, comparing him to George Washington, sure he would "be admired by yr. whole country at a future day." In spite of her earlier claim that the slavery issue was not of paramount importance to the campaign, she predicted that his recent position

regarding slavery would be the path chosen by all "sensible people North & West. And the soi disant [so-called] Republicans and our party must fuse" on that position to win in 1860. As much as Carroll admired Fillmore and his alleged, and unappreciated, political acumen, however, he must learn to be kinder to those who worked for the cause. "My complaint is that you can't see me as I do you--I am great in my womanly sphere." She closed her letter with a request for a letter of reference for a book tour she was about to embark upon. "I intend to disseminate my 3 works wherever I go and mean to be a power yet in this land, which it will be well to propitiate."⁴ Showing signs of her obsession for power and recognition which would eventually dominate her life, Carroll got what she wanted this time. Fillmore apparently sent the letter despite her threatening tone, and thus inadvertently opened the door on the shady side of Carroll's life.

Carroll took Fillmore's letter, along with one from Rayner and one from Thomas H. Clay, Jr., of Kentucky, and presented them to the press as support for a testimonial dinner to be given to show the American Party's appreciation for her work in the late election. This practice was common in the nineteenth century, but was usually done for, rather than by, the recipient.⁵ Carroll was still in New York City in late November and was apparently having difficulties raising enough cash for her book tour. The testimonial may

have been her idea, or that of William Scudder Tisdale, a writer for DeWitt Publishers, a New York publishing company that carried a number of Know-Nothing publications.⁶ Fillmore apparently discovered the unauthorized use of his letter and wrote to Daniel Ullmann in New York for advice. Ullmann had run unsuccessfully for New York governor as a Know-Nothing in 1854 and was now practicing law on Wall Street.

Ullmann's reply of November 25 was less than flattering regarding Carroll; clearly Fillmore had not mentioned that he knew Carroll fairly well. "She is a regular Jeremy Diddler in petticoats," Ullmann wrote, "and was once, some eight or ten months ago, arrested for swindling."⁷ Apparently Carroll had embroidered upon her family lineage to Fillmore, linking herself with Alexander Hamilton, but it was "the first time" Ullmann had heard of the alleged familial relationship. Ullmann was not impressed by Carroll's "'political proclivities.' I apprehend they hang very loosely upon her, and I suspect are adopted for each occasion." Ullmann had met Carroll about a year previously in a "circle of very respectable people" who had become "very much alarmed when they learned her real character." In fact, Carroll had "tried her game on two or three of my friends and upon me, but we were too old soldiers to be taken in." Fillmore's letter amused Ullmann, "as it is pretty much a repetition of enquiries that I have

had addressed to me several times."⁸

Fillmore was not amused. Unaware of his perturbation, Carroll wrote on December 5, telling him she had fixed his letter "to suit" her purposes for the dinner.⁹ Two days later, the notice for the dinner, with the altered letters printed below, appeared in the New York Dispatch.¹⁰ On the 8th, Fillmore heard from Tisdale, demanding money for the dinner. "The design is to make it a national affair," he wrote pompously.

When we remember that a lady of Louisiana was presented with a set of magnificent jewelry for merely stepping on board a steamboat on the Ohio River, as a representative of the Southern States, it is certainly right and proper that one who has performed ten thousand times . . . more than this mere physical act, should be the recipient of a testimonial ten thousand times more valuable than the one presented to the lady who stepped on board the steamboat.

Tisdale closed his missive with a list of the members of the Presentation Committee, which included Clay, Rayner, Thomas Whitney of New York, Senator-elect Anthony Kennedy, of Maryland and Jacob Broom of Pennsylvania.¹¹

Not only angry, but now suspicious, Fillmore wrote again to Ullmann, asking his opinion as to the dinner's legitimacy. "I shall most cheerfully contribute my mite," he emphasized, but only if "the money goes into safe hands."¹² Ullmann replied the next day. Fillmore's letter was the first he had heard of the testimonial, and he would be glad to investigate. The New York Dispatch had made it seem as if Fillmore had "a high appreciation of the lady and

the value of her services. I never did have a high opinion of either." Tisdale, he thought, was "a little hack writer" in publisher DeWitt's employ. In Ullmann's opinion, he belonged "to that numerous class whose pretensions are vastly in excess of their performance." He knew of no real scandal involving Tisdale, "yet I have conceived a rather unfavorable opinion of him." In fact, Tisdale had earlier "beguiled" Ullmann into writing a favorable account of his abilities that "was made use of very improperly" As for the weighty individuals on the Presentation Committee, no doubt, Ullmann suggested, they had approached in the same way as Fillmore.¹³

Carroll's primary motivation for using Fillmore and the idea of the testimonial dinner was doubtless financial. Had the Know-Nothings won the election, her books would have sold well. As it was, she wrote Thurlow Weed (whom she presumed she knew well enough to have sent a flirtatious demand that he call upon her) to borrow a hundred dollars so she could "buy up 500 vols Star of the West" [sic] which she could then resell for \$1.25 each.¹⁴ She had to survive on her writing as best she could. No patronage positions would fall to her after the defeat of the Know-Nothings. But while Fillmore was willing to commend her for her work for him, he had "only glanced at her publications, never . . . read one through," and was altogether unhappy that Carroll had taken advantage of her contact with

him.¹⁵

A letter on December 15 to Fillmore from Jacob Broom in Washington discussed party matters and made no mention of the dinner or the committee of which he was supposedly a member.¹⁶ A second letter arrived from Tisdale, demanding an immediate reply, and a note came from Ullmann reporting that, while he could not "learn anything very definite" about the affair, he distrusted the whole, as did those to whom he had spoken. "My own opinion is that they wish to obtain your name on which to base their operations."¹⁷ The same mail also brought a letter from Carroll, apparently in reply to a demand from Fillmore that she return all of his letters to her. "This is the first time in my history, amidst all my correspondence, that ever such a request as yrs was made." She was too busy to accede to his request, she said. She was hard at work, preparing a new book of reminiscences of great Know-Nothings and other politicians, to be called "Men as they Seem and as they Are." Besides, she had burned all but two or three of his letters. Anyway, she could not see why he was so angry. "The part published has done you more good than that of any letter, you ever wrote in your whole life before," she wrote indignantly. Carroll blamed Fillmore for many of her financial difficulties. "I have embalmed you so entirely in my Books that, their sale is utterly destroyed in certain sections." Even though she had been "repeatedly invited" to publish new

editions minus Fillmore's name, she refused "to emasculate and alter my Books I will not depart from my principles to put money in my purse." If Fillmore wanted to complain about the alteration of his letter, he was free to do so privately or publicly. "That man is yet to be born in this world whom I fear or am not ready to meet through the Press or elsewhere."¹⁸

It took Fillmore nearly ten days to recover enough of his sang froid to reply to this remarkable defensive missile. Not even a flattering letter from one Samuel St. John consoling him on his recent loss could help--for St. John referred to his "excellent friend, Miss Carroll."¹⁹ Carroll herself added fuel to the fire as she sent Fillmore a copy of the second edition of The Star of the West and asked him to pass it along to the editor of the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser so the paper could review it. John B. Floyd of Virginia and others had been to see her, she wrote. ". . . would you believe I could have defended the charge of your cold personelle [personality]?" Seeming unaware of Fillmore's anger, she inquired, "Don't you mean to answer my last letter?"²⁰

Fillmore finally answered, coldly and efficiently, on the 27th. He had sent her book on to the editor; as for an answer, ". . . some letters are best answered by expressive silence." The abuse of his private letter would teach him caution in the future. Weakening somewhat--after

all, Carroll was a charming woman, and in spite of Ullmann's accusations, she had done a good job for him and his party--he "would fain believe the act was not yours," but that of her "evil genius," Tisdale.²¹

Carroll seized upon the way out graciously provided by Fillmore, but not without a few parting shots. "Of all the trying things in my life, and you know of some, your last letter was perhaps the most so," she began. She had "sacrificed & slaved" for him, had given him time and "my hard earnings beside" The letter was given to her with no notice or marking of confidentiality. Besides, "Heaven knows it was not strong enough, or warm enough, to attract any particular notice" She had been his friend and had worked for him and the Party, and both owed her thanks and recognition in spite of the fact she had neither asked for nor been given "a single farthing" for her work. As for Tisdale, well, she had little control over his activities. He had been hired to do her proofreading and correspondence, and she saw him very seldom."²²

Tiring of the matter, yet determined to maintain his position, Fillmore tried one last time to make Carroll understand the impropriety of her (or Tisdale's) actions. Unaware that he "had exhibited such a want of gratitude as to justify" her actions, he reiterated the private nature of the letter of recommendation and expressed his sorrow at her "most extraordinary lecture" and her threat to eliminate him

from her works. "But you will pardon me for saying that such threats have no terrors for me." If her friends gave her a dinner, he would make a contribution, but that was all. "Standing as I do, I can not . . . single out one friend from all the rest for public honors. Your own good sense must convince you of this" He would blame it all on Tisdale rather than Carroll, "determined to believe" that her "upright and generous heart" was incapable of such an act.²³

Again Fillmore had provided Carroll with a graceful way out: a belief that her feminine nature would automatically preclude such trickery. Again, Carroll took it; but again, not without a few acerbic remarks about his part in the affair. If he had just told her, she would have maintained his confidence, ". . . that I might not have been the innocent cause of inflicting a pain . . . greater than that of your defeat." She would earn her laurels from public approbation of her works in the future, though Fillmore's distaste for singling out any one friend for notice did seem to her rather curious. "Had there been other ladies--or any one lady in the land, who had also occupied a position" similar to hers, she could have understood his reluctance. But there were not. And she could scarcely believe his male friends would be so "devoid of their vaunted chivalry as to envy a poor little woman" who had received special notice from his pen. As for

Tisdale, he had taken advantage of the situation, and she had taken care of him: "I found out the man--And I have freely expressed my opinion to his own Mother, who is a true woman--He will do no more for me." She remained "your tried & trusting friend, and I have to live and die with an unchanged feeling for you."²⁴

Like many incidents in Carroll's life, this one is frustrating in its lack of further evidence. Was she a swindler? Had she been arrested for the crime, she might not have been convicted; no record of conviction has survived, and there seems to have been a common reluctance by nineteenth-century judges to convict upper and middle-class women of such crimes.²⁵ How valid was Ullmann's evaluation of her "political proclivities"? Party leaders Kenneth Rayner and Jacob Broom certainly valued Carroll's opinions. Ullmann's opinion may have been sour grapes: after all, Ullmann had been defeated in 1854, and his party had just lost again. Anger at his party's failings might have taken the form of scorn at Miss Carroll's claims to have done valuable work for it. If she had tried to swindle him or his acquaintances, that would necessarily have colored his judgment of her political abilities as well. Then again, it might have been a simple case of misogyny. Perhaps Ullmann just did not like or approve of "political women".

Why did Fillmore keep trying to explain his

disapproval of her actions to Carroll? Why not just cut her off? Here again, a lack of evidence frustrates understanding. Perhaps, like all politicians, Fillmore preferred to withdraw with a door left slightly open. He might have viewed Ullmann's accusations as spite; he might have been willing to give Carroll the benefit of the doubt because she was female and therefore, in his mind, not altogether responsible for her actions. Certainly, she reinforced his notice of her femininity when she was in trouble. After the election she was a "power to propitiate." After their quarrel, she was a "poor little woman."²⁶ Perhaps he simply preferred, vain and ambitious and sensitive to slight as he was, to swallow Carroll's explanation whole, along with her ever-present flattery. If he chose to disbelieve a part of what she said, at what point could his questioning stop--before or after her pretty remarks about his noble being?²⁷

What is clear in this incident was Carroll's choice to use her sex as a defensive weapon when it suited her purpose. Clearly desiring to placate Fillmore, a powerful man still in New York and a useful contact for her, Carroll took the easy way out by blaming her indiscretions on her womanly soul. This excuse was readily accepted because of widely-held beliefs about the nature of women, and, further, it served to reinforce Carroll's overall political methodology of duty, apology, and personal petition, rather

than woman's rights or equality.

Ill in January "from the effect of a continued use of my brain & a crowd of matters pressing on me until the slightest agitation will . . . send my pulse to incredible speed," Carroll postponed her tour west until the late spring. She revised The Star of the West again, dedicating the third edition to U.S. Navy Commodore Charles Stewart, who wrote to thank her for her "generous espousal of the cause" of those still fighting the Naval Retirement Board.²⁸ She was not particularly enamoured of the trip, which she was to take with her brother: "To think one like me should have to push my own Books is hard," she wrote, "but if my friends will stand true, I can do it like a lady & make a competence."²⁹ By April, she had been to Washington and then was off to the Midwest, stopping in Chicago in June.³⁰ She maintained her contacts with her New York City acquaintances, asking Thurlow Weed to give one A. O. Alcock a job in the New York City Customs House. Weed was powerful in New York, but unlikely to have control of customs positions. No matter to Carroll. She assumed power was power and it could be wielded where it was wanted. As always, she couched her demand for a patronage post in personal terms ("You have kindly promised me your aid") and appeared to have learned little from her experience with Fillmore, as she included a sentence which could be easily construed as blackmail ("The obligations I

have placed [sic] certain parties, in withholding valuable information").³¹

As the anti-Catholicism of 1856 gave way in national pre-eminence to the slavery issue in 1857, Carroll thought of writing a book on the latter issue. She was apparently dissuaded by Kenneth Rayner's argument that passion had overruled reason on the matter. "I fear that the proper, the just, the constitutional view of the question would not please either section," he wrote. "Would there not then be danger of you hazarding the prestige you already have in the public estimation by your failure to accomplish that which I do not regard as within the scope of human achievement[?]"³² She worked instead for Maryland Governor Thomas Hicks' election in 1857 and again in 1859.³³ Also in 1859, she published Pope or President?, another anti-Catholic text. Once again, her goal was to point out the danger facing American institutions from the Roman Catholic Church in America. ". . . some one should dare assume the responsibility of revealing the astounding mysteries of the Vatican. We have allowed its own writers to untangle the fearful meshes of their crafty and corrupt system." The "extreme incredulity" of Americans to believe in the Jesuitical threat had demanded she publish the work.³⁴

Considering Carroll's vanity and her known reputation as an anti-Catholic, Pope or President?,

surprisingly, was published anonymously. Carroll may have chosen to hide her name and sex because of the lurid tales contained therein. She dealt with matters with which few women, and certainly no unmarried Southern lady, should dare admit acquaintance. Tales of physical torture were bad enough, but stories of incest, adultery, and mesalliances, even when couched in Victorian euphemisms, made it clear the author knew what those terms meant. While Carroll had clearly done her "research," though no doubt limiting it to unfavorable and anti-Catholic sources and citing evidence out of context, such a book presented to the public with a woman's name on the title page might cause as great an uproar as earlier anti-Catholic works such as Maria Monk's Awful Disclosures.³⁵ Carroll's intention seems to have been more scholarly than sensation-seeking. She took her Jesuitical conspiracies seriously. She approached the problem with the mind-set of the scholar and the argumentative style of a lawyer: ". . . we now proceed to show" "We give the dates and proof" "We exhibit it" "Our proofs will be clear and incontrovertible" "We shall fortify our facts as we proceed from step to step, by the highest and most incontestable proofs."³⁶ Her goal was to sway the American public and, more directly and specifically, the American press to take the threat as seriously as she did and then commit itself to the appropriate reaction. Sensationalism

would not do for her purposes, and a woman as author would have raised quite a stir.

A second edition of The Great American Battle came out early in 1859. In March Carroll proposed a book on Dr. Robert Kane, the famous Arctic explorer who had died in 1857. She wrote to his brother for approval of the project.³⁷ By April, she had started the work as she resumed her correspondence with William Seward, who was a member of the Kane Monument Association. In that same letter to Seward, she mentioned a work on Kansas that she was preparing, "of immense benefit to the Republican cause."³⁸

This was the first evidence that Carroll had apparently dropped her allegiance to the American Party and turned to the Republicans. While she maintained her allegiance to the ideas of the Know-Nothing party throughout her life, particularly her support for its Unionist stand and her fear of the Jesuits' influence in American politics, she was enough of a politician to realize that the Know-Nothings were losing power. To maintain whatever influence she thought she had and to gain more, Carroll had to extend herself beyond the limits of the American Party. The Republicans, while offensive in some political matters, were a rising force in the land. Carroll chose to work with them. Weed, a leading Republican in New York, had written her a letter of recommendation to Horace Greeley. He

remarked that "though for some time Americanist," she had done, "and is doing, much for Republicanism." He commended her to Greeley's attention (and presumably his payroll).³⁹ But Carroll had not given up the Know-Nothings entirely. For as long as she could, she worked for both parties. Her goal was to elect a man to the White House in 1860 who could serve the ideals of both parties. By April 1858, she had made her choice: John Minor Botts of Virginia.⁴⁰

Like Fillmore, Botts appealed to Carroll as a national candidate. "I know no North, no South, no East, no West: I only know my country, my whole country, and nothing but my country."⁴¹ "There is nothing local about him," Carroll wrote. "There is nothing sectional about him. He is emphatically, a national man he is the only man now left, who can occupy the position of such men as Clay and Webster." It might be "premature" to pick a candidate as early as more than two years before a nominating convention, but it was going to be exceedingly difficult to find one who could "harmonize and unite the contending influences" in an increasingly divided country.⁴²

By May 11, Carroll, who had no doubt met Botts through the American Party, had become his campaign manager. He sent her copies of his speeches; she was to send him all her press releases.⁴³ Botts was an experienced politician. A Whig, he had been in the Virginia state legislature from 1833-1839, in the House of Representatives from 1839-1843,

then again from 1847-1849.⁴⁴ He was an anti-abolitionist, hated the Democrats, and held both groups responsible for the agitation throughout the country over the slavery issue.⁴⁵ He was not particularly enamored of foreigners and tended to take a conspiratorial view of Democratic party policies.⁴⁶ Most important to Carroll, though, was his pro-Union stance. He would, he had written, "make a willing sacrifice of myself, if, by so doing, I could save the Union and rescue my country from ruin."⁴⁷

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill had brought Botts out of retirement, and he had run unsuccessfully for Congress as a Know-Nothing in 1854. He continued to speak out publicly after his defeat, railing against abolitionist fanatics, disunionists, and the "Democracy".⁴⁸ Appealing as his opinions might be to some, like Fillmore, he was not the most charismatic of politicians. Carroll thought the overuse of his "strong reason" in his speeches made him "but little understood by the general public." While most believed him to be brusque in his manner" and uncaring toward his opposition, "on the contrary," she argued, "he was a thoroughly refined and accomplished gentleman . . . with most agreeable manners and . . . most fluent and interesting in his conversation"⁴⁹

By 1859, Carroll was concerned enough about Botts' viability as a candidate to do some checking with her political acquaintances. Thomas H. Clay, son of Henry Clay

of Kentucky and a Know-Nothing in 1856, thought Botts a good choice, but only if "sectional issues" were "discarded" in the coming election. Buchanan was out of the question for the Democrats, he wrote, having "shewn himself worse than ever his most bitter political enemies had thought him." Seward and other Black Republicans, he thought, were "altogether impracticable" on the slavery issue. That left men like Botts or Edward Bates of Missouri or John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, behind whom all "conservative and rational men could unite."⁵⁰

Edward Bates, indeed, was a name being bandied about as a candidate. N. Ranney, a Democrat from St. Louis, wrote Carroll that even he would welcome Bates in the White House, should "the democrats divide . . . [and] the opposition . . . elect a President in 1860," something he thought unlikely.⁵¹ Carroll saw such comments from politicians as challenges to her candidate. She wrote letters to newspapers, lauding Botts' years in politics over Bates' inexperience.⁵² Josiah Polk, her friend and occasional landlord, wrote Carroll from Washington that he too was pushing Botts' candidacy to the Know-Nothings and Republicans. Botts could serve as the fusion candidate, instead of Bates or Know-Nothing John Bell or Republican Seward.⁵³

Botts was cautiously optimistic and properly grateful to Carroll, thanking her for "the manner in which

you have presented my name before the country." He realized that her work might not be reaching as many people as he needed to win a nomination, since, for instance, "the circulation of the [Know-Nothing New York] Express is limited" Still, if he were denied the nomination, he thought, it would be "by the political machinery of the politicians," not public sentiment.⁵⁴

Carroll had gone to St. Louis in July, presumably to measure Missourian support for Botts' candidacy over favorite son Bates. She went on to Chicago, where she had apparently made contact with newspapers to supply them with pro-Botts articles. She missed the Fair there, but enjoyed a "providential escape from a burning car" during her journey. Carroll returned briefly to St. Louis, where her paternal uncle Charles lived. From there she took the train across the country to New England. The trip was partly work and partly an excursion. Carroll's health was not always the best, and her friend Polk was "indeed rejoiced to learn that your health is improved. This shows the benefit to you, of exercise and mental relaxation Even the iron horses has [sic] to stop . . . now and then."⁵⁵

Botts was beginning to look more and more like a winning candidate to Carroll. Jacob Broom in Philadelphia called him the "man for the times" since he was both a Southerner and a Unionist.⁵⁶ Carroll counted Thomas Corwin of Ohio in Botts' camp, though Benjamin Wade, Judge John

McLean or Edward Bates would no doubt be considered more likely as Corwin's first choice.⁵⁷ By November, Bates had "gone over, clean and clear to the Republican party," thought Botts, which would most likely serve to drive the Whig and Know-Nothing elements into Botts' camp.⁵⁸

Carroll desperately wanted Botts to win. She had supported Fillmore and failed. Botts was her way back into power. But everyone in politics knew that William Henry Seward was destined to be the probable Republican nominee in 1860. Carroll would have to have been completely out of touch with political realities not to have realized that. She had chosen her candidate, certain, as always, that she had made the only correct choice, and she was sure Seward's abolitionism would destroy the country. So Carroll lied. She lied to herself, a necessary deception so she could continue her work for Botts. But she also lied to Botts.

Carroll told Botts that Thurlow Weed, "in sacred confidence," had told her that "Governor S[eward] is as politically dead as tho' he were . . . undergoing putrefaction in his grave, that he will not now be brought forward in the Convention, nor any other Republican." She told him Weed was "determined to nominate you if possible," that Botts' prospects "never were so strong as now." As the campaign year began in earnest, however, Botts too had heard from Weed. Weed, he wrote Carroll, had said only "that in the event of their [Republicans] having to go South for a

candidate--he would prefer me." Was this a change in Weed's views? "Under what pretense is it they have invited others [who] are entirely cut off & excluded from all possibility of a nomination?" Any fusion between Know-Nothings and Republicans was impossible under those circumstances.⁵⁹ Botts was not angry at Carroll, since he undoubtedly believed her incapable of such a deception regarding his chances. But he was furious at the Republicans for their refusal to consider any fusion candidate not a Republican.

Perhaps because Carroll knew the degree of hatred the Know-Nothings felt towards Seward, she could interpret whatever comments Weed made to her regarding Botts as support for his candidacy. The virulent anti-Catholicism and nativism that had characterized the election of 1856 was still very much a part of the 1860 electoral campaign. Seward's supporters faced letters such as the one O. B. Vienz wrote to Weed that remarked on the "widespread and deep prejudice against Seward on account of his action, as governor, on the public schools."⁶⁰ This referred to Seward's support nearly twenty years previously for public-funded education for immigrants to be taught by "teachers speaking the same language . . . and professing the same faith." Parochial schools would receive public funds--a most unpopular idea in 1840 as in the 1850s, and a controversy that clung to Seward throughout his attempts to

become a Presidential candidate.⁶¹ Vienz urged Weed to drop Seward as a candidate. "The prejudice [against him] pervades the entire Protestant church It is strongest with the clergy; but is showed more or less by the great body of the laity, even outside the council of the Know Nothings . . . while with the Americans, it is rankest--deepest--most bitter."⁶²

But even Know-Nothing Carroll could not ignore the primacy of the slavery issue in the campaign of 1860. Sectional tension had increased greatly in the years from 1856 to 1859, thanks to the Dred Scott decision, the civil war in Kansas, Preston Brooks' attack on Charles Sumner in the Senate, the LeCompton Constitution, and John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry. As sectional tensions rose, Know-Nothings were forced either to take a nationwide stance against slavery, thus losing Southern support to the Democrats, or to de-emphasize or ignore the issue, thus losing their northern support to the more inclusive Republicans. The Know-Nothings had achieved their victories at state and local levels because they had been able to appeal to nativist sentiments in the South and because they could combine that appeal with anti-slavery-extension stands in the North. But the Republicans had, by 1860, recognized nativism as an important political drawing card and an issue that was not going to disappear. Accordingly, Republican leaders made concessions to the Know-Nothings by

incorporating a degree of nativism in their party pronouncements. Combined with their anti-slavery-extension philosophy and the Know-Nothings' abysmal performances in public office, Republicans would eventually gain enough support that northern Know-Nothings would shift allegiance to the Republican Party.⁶³

Given the decline in Know-Nothing power and the co-optation of their ideas by the Republicans, Carroll had adopted Botts, a Know-Nothing but a strong Unionist, as a logical fusion candidate for president. But Botts was too unpopular in Virginia, where Know-Nothings were rapidly weakening. More important, he could not whole-heartedly adopt the anti-slavery-extension plank of the Republican platform. Kenneth Rayner warned Carroll that unless Botts could say "no extension" and mean it, there would be no nomination. Opposition to slavery extension was now "sine qua non," and as much as Rayner had hoped for a "union of the opposition to Democracy North & South . . . on a conservative rational basis of organization I doubt if such a thing be possible."⁶⁴ Botts was not willing to go far enough. In an effort at compromise, he was willing to subscribe to the entire Republican Party platform, except for the resolution regarding slavery extension. Where the platform called for no extension in the territories, Botts wanted to insert the words, "either by force, or federal legislation against the will of the people of the

territories" With those "modifications," Botts did "not see why every Whig and American in the United States should not subscribe to the Republican platform." But his modifications would change the platform from absolute non-extension to a form of popular sovereignty, a "modification" unacceptable to the Republicans.⁶⁵

Carroll went home for Christmas to Church Creek, then back to New York City to discuss Botts' future with Weed. She returned to Washington in January 1860. A friend from New York, John B. Fry, wrote that he had heard she was "overrun by visitors--the magnates of the land" at her parlor in Polk's boarding house on Pennsylvania Avenue.⁶⁶ And Carroll feasted on the news and gossip her visitors, including Jefferson Davis, Thomas Corwin, and John Sherman, brought her. The biggest topic in town was the Speakership contest in the House of Representatives. The fight had begun on December 5, 1859, and lasted until William Pennington was elected on February 1, 1860. Carroll had discussed the matter with Weed in New York in early January and had believed his opinion that "Mr. Sherman could be elected easier than any other of the party," and he was in fact the candidate the Republicans wanted as Speaker. By the 27th, though, Carroll had become "acquainted with the Bossmen of the Republican, Southern opposition and Anti-Lecompton parties," and as a friend, thought it her "duty" to write to Weed "though you do not to me."⁶⁷

Sherman could not be elected, she wrote, and "I intend to tell him the whole truth as I know it and as no man . . . would ever tell him" A union between Southern Know-Nothings and Democrats was forming that would destroy the Republicans--and Thurlow Weed as well, since it was thanks to his "interference" that Sherman was still in the running and causing no end of trouble. Weed was to pull back from his support for Sherman and push for Thomas Corwin of Ohio instead. Corwin's name had already been suggested on January 17 by Roger A. Pryor of Virginia as a compromise candidate.⁶⁸ Weed must come to Washington immediately and take charge of things, or he would "never survive the obloquy which will be heaped upon you if you allow a Republican organization to be defeated by the persistency of this present course." Carroll thought herself fully justified in both her plans to tell Sherman all and to force Weed to come to Washington.

I feel that my position before the country, my knowledge of what I am about, my principles and my sincerity in the maintainance [sic] of Republican sentiments, which I will cherish while I live (for better reasons than influence you politicians) enable me who heard [gossip about the matter and was thus able to advise Sherman to withdraw as speaker candidate] . . . will make me indifferent even should Mr. Sherman not adopt my wise and patriotic counsel. I shall have the approval of my conscience and my country hereafter--when the whole party will feel the direful calamity which will come from their own doings or those of the leaders to whom the matter is entrusted.⁶⁹

Carroll was growing a bit desperate. She had spent

over three years trying to force a fusion of Know-Nothings and Republicans. She had spent nearly two years pushing Botts for the presidency, with no real sign of Seward losing support from major Republican leaders. Weed was not returning her letters, even if he did consent to see her occasionally when they were in the same city. Botts as a candidate seemed to be out, and Carroll wanted in. The Speakership contest provided her a way. Thomas Corwin was an old and intimate friend; if he were elected Speaker, surely not only some of his glory, but some patronage would fall her way.

Carroll may have seen this election year as her last chance. She was, after all, forty-five years old. Her party had almost entirely lost its place in politics; friends and acquaintances, taking her word at face value about her influence, were hounding her for jobs; she herself was chronically short of funds and, as always, concerned about her family. She was also growing deaf. For a woman whose main attractions were her intelligence, wit, and flattery, it would be disastrous not to be able to participate in the political discussions that made her parlor so lively and provided her entree into the political world she loved.⁷⁰ The year 1860 became a frantic one for Carroll as she searched for the next President to latch onto his star to ensure her own future. She even wrote for Fernando Wood, the Doughface Democratic mayor of New York,

suggesting he be a candidate for president. Wood thanked her for "keeping his name before the public" and acknowledged draft attempts, but laughingly remarked that "but for the common sense my mother gave me I should be made dizzy" by such attention. He would be satisfied with a seat at his party's nominating convention.⁷¹

Besides her own self-interest, though, Carroll was still vitally concerned with the preservation of the country from the agitation that seemed ready to tear it apart. She supported Wood because of his stand against the agitation promised by anti-slavery Republicans.⁷² By March she had written to Weed again, telling him neither Seward nor Bates would take the nomination, and therefore Botts "is your only man." If that were impossible (Carroll's first admission of doubt), Botts would be willing to accept the vice-presidency under Judge McLean. McLean's age, 75, was a major factor in considering his candidacy. Carroll dismissed it rather callously, deciding that "if McLean did die, the North would have as good a friend" with Botts in the White House as ever Seward would be.⁷³

In April, Carroll wrote to Weed once more, telling him that McLean would be nominated at the Constitutional Union Party's convention in Baltimore on May 9, and that "he is the only man who can defeat the democracy." For the vice-president, she wanted Weed to "let it be . . . Botts You have got more power than they

[the Constitutional Union party members] will have; even in their own party! For you can regulate the Republicans."⁷⁴

If Weed did have the power over the Constitutional Unionists, he chose not to exercise it for Carroll's candidates. The Constitutional Union Party's candidates would be John Bell with Edward Everett as his vice-presidential running-mate. McLean and Botts were both nominated in the convention, but won only 21 and 9 1/2 votes on the first ballot respectively; they dropped to 1 and 7 respectively on the second ballot. Carroll, in keeping with her search for power in the winning party, quickly wrote a congratulatory note to Everett.⁷⁵

It could not have been too much of a surprise to Carroll that Botts had not been nominated in Baltimore. He himself had given up by May 1, writing sadly that ". . . all hope, expectation and . . . desire has pretty well died out," as he saw "State after State, meeting in Convention and my name not mentioned with approval in any one . . . it looks to me very much like the game is up."⁷⁶ But Thurlow Weed's inability to "regulate the Republicans" at the Chicago convention must have shocked Carroll. She had worked hard to establish a relationship with both Weed and Seward; who was Abraham Lincoln? After the Republicans nominated Lincoln on May 18, she must have been in despair. She had gone home to Church Creek, when John Wilson, another boarder at Polk's in Washington had written her that things

were "quiet and dull without you." He held out a crumb of hope: Bell's prospects were brightening, he thought, since Lincoln's nomination would necessarily mean the alienation of votes in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, which states had had their favorite sons eliminated by the dark horse from Illinois.⁷⁷

By June, no doubt exhausted, Carroll had fallen ill and could follow the campaign only through letters from Polk and other friends. By September she had recovered, but her sister Julianna had died during her stay in Church Creek. Botts successfully predicted Lincoln's election to her, and prophesied the immediate secession of the South upon the commission of any "aggressive act" by the new President. Carroll herself was soon ready to "speak of the Union as already dissolved."⁷⁸ She returned to Washington, needing to discover where she could fit in with the new administration, only to be met with another loss. The National Intelligencer announced the death of former Maryland Representative John M. S. Causin.⁷⁹

John Causin had apparently met Carroll in Chicago about 1858. She may have known him from his earlier political career in Maryland. He had been to visit his family in Arkansas and was returning to his law practice in Chicago when he died of apoplexy. In three letters from Causin's brother-in-law to Carroll, their relationship as intimate friends and probably lovers survives.

Causin's brother-in-law, L. E. Barber, wrote gently of John's death to Carroll, and of the death of his mother as she had waited for her son's body to come home. Aware that Causin had "regarded you with affectionate esteem," Barber promised Carroll that he would return her letters. Carroll wrote to request a copy of Causin's last speech and when Barber replied, he suggested he burn her letters. There were "many--very many of them," and he had accidentally read one "at a part which gave full expression to the feelings of the writer--the whole heart was bare before me." He was embarrassed by the incident and worried about sending them through the mail: "it would be mortifying if by any accident your letters should fall into other hands."⁸⁰

Carroll, relieved at his discretion, requested Barber burn the letters. She also asked him to "suspend judgment" until he "knew the facts" regarding her affair with Causin. Barber assured her he could not conceive that their relationship, whatever it might have been, could "depreciate you in our estimation Can it be that I would estimate less one whom he loved for returning that love!" While Barber could not "altogether acquit [Causin] of imprudence and of weakness in this respect," he hastily reassured Carroll of her innocence in his eyes. "I know nothing, believe nothing, suspect nothing . . . other than the simple fact that there existed a mutual affection." He

enclosed locks of hair from both Causin and his mother, thanked her for allowing his sister to keep Carroll's daguerreotype, and sent her violets from the graves of the dead.⁸¹

Carroll had suffered greatly during 1860 and early 1861. Her work would help her recover. Ill health, mourning for the loss of Julianna and Causin, and despair at the turn of events in her life had kept her quiescent for a time, but the growing threat to her beloved Union would soon galvanize her into action.

Notes

¹Since Fillmore was the nominal head of a party that had split over the slavery question in the 1856 nominating process, and since Fillmore's embrace of Know-Nothingism was lukewarm at best, Carroll's observation was optimistic and inaccurate. While Fillmore stressed the Union in his campaign speeches, and seldom mentioned slavery, the party's decision to take the popular-sovereignty position regarding slavery extension split the party in convention and in the fall election. Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U. S. Elections (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), p. 13; Carleton Beals, Brass-Knuckle Crusade: The Great Know-Nothing Conspiracy 1820-1860 (New York: Hastings House Publishers, 1960), pp. 180-181; Ray Allen Billington, The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860 (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1952), pp. 428-429.

²Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 6 November 1856, Millard Fillmore Papers, Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society and State University College at Oswego, Oswego, New York.

³Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 November 1856, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.

⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 16 November 1856, Fillmore Papers. Of the three works Carroll mentions, presumably she was referring to GAB and The Star of the West. The third work may have been one of her campaign pamphlets, or perhaps a third, unknown work.

⁵See, for example, the testimonial dinner offered Sterling Price by the aldermen of Jefferson City, Missouri. Dinners like these could serve more than one purpose. This one was to honor Price's term as governor, to propitiate those who believed Price should have been nominated to the House of Representatives, and to keep Price's political profile high. Price, incidentally, refused the honor. Robert E. Shalhope, Sterling Price: Portrait of a Southerner (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1971), p. 133.

⁶Madeline B. Stern, editor, Publishers for Mass

Entertainment in Nineteenth Century America (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1980), pp. 93-96.

⁷Jeremy Diddler was a character in the 1803 farce Raising the Wind by Englishman James Kenney. He borrowed money and failed to pay it back. See Charles McCool Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll, Political Strategist and Gadfly to President Fillmore," Maryland Historical Magazine 68 (Spring 1973):53, n. 51.

⁸Daniel Ullmann to Millard Fillmore, 25 November 1856, Fillmore Papers.

⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 5 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹⁰Newspaper clipping enclosed in letter, Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 11 December 1856, Thurlow Weed Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York. (Hereafter cited as Weed Papers.)

¹¹[William] S[cudder] Tisdale to Millard Fillmore, 8 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹²Millard Fillmore to Daniel Ullmann, 9 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹³Daniel Ullmann to Millard Fillmore, 10 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 17 April 1856 and 11 December 1856, Weed Papers.

¹⁵Millard Fillmore to Daniel Ullmann, 12 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹⁶Jacob Broom to Millard Fillmore, 15 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹⁷W. S. Tisdale to Millard Fillmore, 18 December 1856; Daniel Ullmann to Millard Fillmore, 18 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

¹⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 18 December 1856, Fillmore Papers. No book of this title has been found, but a form letter soliciting information and contributions does exist. The letter, signed by Tisdale and promoting Carroll as author of The Great American Battle (see Chapter 2 above) as well as the proposed work was

apparently sent to a number of Know-Nothings, and included the names of the leaders of the Party. For a subscription price high enough to include the cost of printing an engraving, participants could become a part of the book. See Undated Advertisement, MDHS 3655-703, Carroll Papers.

¹⁹Samuel St. John, Jr., to Millard Fillmore, 18 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

²⁰Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 22 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

²¹Millard Fillmore to Anna Ella Carroll, 27 December 1856, Fillmore Papers.

²²Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 1 January 1857, Fillmore Papers.

²³Millard Fillmore to Anna Ella Carroll, 10 January 1857, Fillmore Papers.

²⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 16 January 1857, Fillmore Papers. Later letters from Tisdale to Carroll make it clear that some sort of relationship survived this imbroglio. See Tisdale to Anna Ella Carroll, 23 August 1879, 19 September 1879, Carroll Papers.

²⁵The 1856 Minute Book of the City and County of New York Courts reveals nothing on Carroll. Joseph Van Nostrand, Archivist, Office of County Clerk and Clerk of the Supreme Court, to author, 8 March 1985. For an examination of judges' reluctance to convict middle and upper-class women of some crimes, see Elaine Abelson, "When Ladies Go A-Thieving: The Middle-Class Women in the Department Store, 1870-1914," (Paper delivered at Facing the Future: Graduate Student Conference on Scholarship on Women, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, April 13, 1985).

²⁶Carroll was emphatically not a woman's rights worker (see Chapter 2 above). The 19th-century cultural imperative that all women needed a man to watch over them, along with Carroll's occasional references to Fillmore as a father-figure, would make it easy for Fillmore to assume a paternalistic attitude toward Carroll's actions. See Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 7 March 1853, 12 October 1853, Fillmore Papers.

²⁷Glyndon G. Van Deusen, Thurlow Weed: Wizard of the Lobby (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1947), pp. 93, 151. Robert J. Rayback, Millard Fillmore: Biography of a

President (Buffalo: Buffalo Historical Society, 1959), is the best existing biography of this little-known president, and the only modern one. W. L. Barre, The Life and Public Services of Millard Fillmore (New York: Burt Franklin, 1856; reprint ed., New York: Lenox Hill Pub. & Dist. Co., 1971) is a campaign biography, as is the only other full-length work on Fillmore, [Ivory Chamberlain], Biography of Fillmore (Buffalo: n.p., 1856).

²⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 16 January 1857, Fillmore Papers; Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 59, n. 64; Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 5 September 1857, Fillmore Papers; Charles Stewart to Anna Ella Carroll, 18 April 1857, Carroll Papers. The "cause" was one that dragged on and on, prompting the New York Times to remark in April of 1858 that, while they had occasionally flattered themselves that the country was rid of it, it would not die. "It would have been the cheapest and best way to have reinstated all the officers in the beginning, and then tried each of them in detail by a separated [sic] Court-Martial. It would have saved the country some hundreds of thousands of dollars, and been much better for the Navy." New York Times, 26 April 1858.

²⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 11 December 1856, Weed Papers.

³⁰J[osiah] F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 25 April 1857, Carroll Papers. Book tours by women authors were not unheard of; for another description see Kathryn Kish Sklar, Catherine Beecher: A Study in American Domesticity (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 215.

³¹Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 11 June 1857, Weed Papers.

³²Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 October 1857, Carroll Papers.

³³Conclusive proof of Carroll's activities on behalf of Hicks does not exist. Family tradition held it true, and it seems logical to assume Carroll would work to elect Hicks, a Know-Nothing and a former neighbor. See Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, My Dear Lady (New York: McGraw Hill, 1940), p. 75.

³⁴[Anna Ella Carroll], Pope or President? Startling Disclosures of Romanism As Revealed By Its own Writers. Facts for Americans, (New York: R. L. Delisser, 1859), p. vi. Carroll established her authorship of this book in a

letter to the Rev. Dr. Robert Breckinridge, 29 November 1864, Breckinridge Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. She sent him a copy of her book by way of his nephew, John C. Breckinridge, while John was Vice-President under James Buchanan.

³⁵Allan Nevins, Ordeal of the Union: A House Dividing, 1852-1857 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), pp. 403-404.

³⁶Carroll, Pope or President?, pp. 9-10.

³⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Robert Kane, 5 March 1859, Carroll Papers.

³⁸The second edition of The Great American Battle was printed by C. M. Saxton in New York in 1859. See Walter P. Armstrong, "The Story of Anna Ella Carroll: Politician, Lawyer and Secret Agent," American Bar Association Journal 35 (March 1949):199, n. 2. Anna Ella Carroll to William Henry Seward, 23 April 1859, William Henry Seward Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York. The outside of the Kane letter bears a note in Carroll's hand that the project was interrupted by the Civil War and never completed.

³⁹Thurlow Weed to Horace Greeley, 19 October ?, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁰Anna Ella Carroll, Editorial, Louisville Journal, signed "E. Pluribus Unum," cited in letter, John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 11 May 1858, Carroll Papers. The Journal was a Know-Nothing paper and printed a number of articles by Carroll.

⁴¹John Minor Botts, The Great Rebellion: Its Secret History, Rise, Progress, and Disastrous Failure (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1866), frontispiece.

⁴²Anna Ella Carroll, "Editorial," 23 April 1858. This was a rough draft, and no place of publication is indicated.

⁴³John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 11 May 1858, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁴Clyde C. Webster, "John Minor Botts, Anti-Secessionist," Richmond College Historical Papers 1 (June 1915):10; Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971 (Washington, DC: Government

Printing Office, 1971), p. 614.

⁴⁵Webster, "Botts," pp. 11-13; Botts, The Great Rebellion, pp. 66, 162-165.

⁴⁶Botts, The Great Rebellion, pp. 127-128, 144-147; Webster, "Botts," p. 13.

⁴⁷Botts, The Great Rebellion, p. 66; "John Minor Botts," Dictionary of American Biography, ed. Allen Johnson, 12 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964-1975), 1(1964):472-473.

⁴⁸Webster, "Botts," pp. 22-25.

⁴⁹Anna Ella Carroll, "Sketch on John Minor Botts," n.d. [post 1869], MDHS 3649-93, Carroll Papers. Few of Carroll's papers from 1858 survive, but it is apparent she wrote Botts fairly often that year, as well as printing as many articles supporting him as she could. Publishing matters no doubt occupied most of the rest of her time.

⁵⁰Thomas H. Clay, Jr. to Anna Ella Carroll, 16 April 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵¹N. Ranney to Anna Ella Carroll, 29 June 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵²Anna Ella Carroll, "Letter to Editors," New York Express, signed "Hancock," undated clipping found in an October 1898 letter, ? to Mrs. Thomas Craddock, MDHS 3655-676, Carroll Papers. The "Hancock" pseudonym in the Express was referred to by Botts in a letter to Carroll, 29 June 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵³J. F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 3 August 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁴John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 6 August 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁵John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 October 1859; J. F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 11 October 1859, Carroll Papers. The reference here is presumably to the National Fair in Chicago in 1859. See Murat Halstead, Caucuses of 1860 (Columbus, Ohio: Follett, Foster & Co., 1860), p. 122.

⁵⁶Jacob Broom to Anna Ella Carroll, 26 October 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁷John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 6 November 1859, Carroll Papers; Reinhard H. Luthin, The First Lincoln Campaign (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1964; reprint ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 162. Corwin nominated McLean at the Convention, supported Bates and Wade. Halstead remarked on Corwin's "covetous glances" at Wade's Senate chair as the real reason for Corwin's support of Wade's candidacy. See Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln: Prologue to Civil War, 1859-1861 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), p. 53; Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, pp. 143-144.

⁵⁸John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 12 November 1859 and 16 November 1859; Anna Ella Carroll to John Minor Botts, 18 and 20 November 1859 (one letter), Carroll Papers; Harriet A. Weed, ed., Life of Thurlow Weed, 2 vols. (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1883; reprint ed., New York: Da Capo Press, 1970), 1:602; Nevins, Prologue to Civil War, pp. 247-259; Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, pp. 140-141.

⁵⁹John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 January 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁰O. B. Vienz (?) to Thurlow Weed, 27 November 1858, Thurlow Weed Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. (Hereafter referred to as Weed-LC Papers.)

⁶¹Glyndon G. Van Deusen, William Henry Seward (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 67-71.

⁶²O. B. Vienz to Thurlow Weed, 27 November 1858, Weed-LC Papers. See also William E. Gienapp, "Nativism and the Creation of a Republican Majority in the North before the Civil War," Journal of American History 72 (December 1985):553.

⁶³Gienapp, "Nativism," p. 537. Gienapp forcefully argues this position, saying that "the political reality of the Know-Nothings' strength, if nothing else, dictated the necessity of seeking a fusion with anti-slavery supporters of the American organization. Simon Cameron, Nathaniel Banks, David Wilmot, Schuyler Colfax, and Edward Bates were all former Know-Nothings who became Republicans between 1856 and 1860. Even Thurlow Weed was willing to include some nativist remarks to attract Fillmoreites in an attempt to prevent Democratic victories in off-year elections in New York. See pp. 540, 547-548, 556, 558-559. See also Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 248-260; Harry J. Carman and

Richard H. Luthin, "Some Aspects of the Know-Nothing Movement Reconsidered," South Atlantic Quarterly 39 (1940)::229-230. W. Darrell Overdyke holds that the Know-Nothing party succumbed partly because of their failure to take a clearly sectional stand at a point when only sectional stands could attract mass allegiance to a political party. See his The Know-Nothing Party in the South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1950), p. 294. For discussions of fusion attempts between Know-Nothings and Republicans, see Michael F. Holt, Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 175-183; Michael F. Holt, The Political Crisis of the 1850s (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978), pp. 175-181; Stephen E. Maizlish, "The Meaning of Nativism and the Crisis of the Union: The Know-Nothing Movement in the Antebellum North," in Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860, ed. Stephen E. Maizlish and John J. Kushma (College Station, Texas: University of Texas at Arlington by Texas A & M University Press, 1982), pp. 166-198.

⁶⁴Kenneth Rayner to Anna Ella Carroll, 23 November 1859, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁵John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 24 December 1859, Carroll Papers; Emerson David Fite, The Presidential Campaign of 1860 (New York: MacMillan, 1911), pp. 237-240.

⁶⁶John B. Fry to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 January 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 27 January 1860, Weed Papers.

⁶⁸Ollinger Crenshaw, "The Speakership Contest of 1859-1860," Mississippi Valley Historical Review 29 (December 1942):327.

⁶⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 27 January 1860, Weed Papers.

⁷⁰Carroll had apparently either never been paid or been paid less than what she thought her work was worth by the Know-Nothings in 1856 (See Chapter 2 above). She was determined not to repeat that mistake: "My ability as a writer is conceded by men of all parties and I don't mean ever to throw my time and talent away for any cause again," she wrote to Weed, after demanding she be "well & handsomely paid for my service by the opposition, by which I mean your

Party." Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 20 April 1860, Weed Papers. There is no evidence as to the result of her bill to Weed. Both Fry and Polk asked her to help them find positions: J. B. Fry to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 January 1860; J. F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 August 1859, Carroll Papers. Carroll's deafness came on gradually: by 1865 it was bad enough that R. W. Mundy warned a senator in a letter of introduction to be sure to speak up; by 1890, she was completely deaf. See R. W. Mundy[?] to Senator ?, 28 September 1865, Carroll Papers; Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life and Writings of Anna Ella Carroll (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1895), p. 135.

⁷¹Fernando Wood to Anna Ella Carroll, 30 January 1860, Carroll Papers; Carroll, Letter to Editor, New York Daily News, 27 February 1860, signed "Madison."

⁷²Samuel Augustus Pleasants, Fernando Wood of New York, (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1966), pp. 95-101.

⁷³Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 24 March 1860, Weed Papers.

⁷⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 20 April 1860, Weed Papers.

⁷⁵Horace Greeley and John F. Cleveland, A Political Textbook for 1860: Comprising a Brief View of Presidential Nominations and Elections: Including all the National Platforms Ever Yet Adopted; Also A History of the Struggle Respecting Slavery in the Territories, and of the Action of Congress As to the Freedom of the Public Lands, with the Most Notable Speeches and Letters of Messrs. Lincoln, Douglas, Bell, Cass, Seward, Everett, Breckinridge, H. V. Johnson, etc., etc., Touching on the Questions of the Day; and Returns of All Presidential Elections Since 1836 (New York: The Tribune Association, 1860), p. 29; Edward Everett to Anna Ella Carroll, 29 May 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁶John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 May 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁷John Wilson to Anna Ella Carroll, 21 May 1860, Carroll Papers. Carroll had at least a nodding acquaintance (though undoubtedly she would consider it more intimate) with Edward Everett prior to his selection as John Bell's running mate, having written him regarding her anti-slavery activities in the early 1850s.

⁷⁸J. F. Polk to Anna Ella Carroll, 26 June 1860, 6

July 1860; John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 2
September 1860; William Orton to Anna Ella Carroll, 1
December 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁹National Intelligencer, 6 February 1861.

⁸⁰L. E. Barber to Anna Ella Carroll, 18 February
1861, 12 April 1861, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll,
Cradock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society,
Baltimore, Maryland; Biographical Directory of the American
Congress, p. 719.

⁸¹L. E. Barber to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 May 1861,
Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

Chapter 4

"To Preserve This Union"

With the election of Abraham Lincoln, Anne Carroll feared for the very existence of the Union. "I have no doubt," she wrote in November 1860, that his election would "lead to an attempt on the part of the Southern leaders to dissolve this Union." Convinced that the secession of her home state of Maryland would mean the destruction of the Union, she urged Governor Thomas Hicks to stand firm against secessionists. "Although you were opposed to the election of Mr. Lincoln, you are for maintaining this Union," she reminded him. Lincoln had been "constitutionally elected and . . . must be inaugurated on the 4th of next March, as the President of the whole U.S." A successful inauguration depended "more upon your individual firmness than upon all other men in the nation."¹

Carroll may have overstated the importance of Hicks' position, but not the importance of keeping Maryland in the

Union. If Maryland seceded, the capital of the United States would be cut off from the North. The loss of the capital could mean the loss of the Union as well.² Both sides wanted Maryland, and in the early days of the secession crisis, no one was sure how the state would go. One party who may not have been sure was Governor Hicks himself.

Hicks was a slaveholder from the Eastern Shore county of Dorchester. He considered himself a Southerner, and, as did many Eastern Shore residents, resented the primacy of Baltimore City in state matters. In the state's constitutional convention in 1850-1851, Hicks had been disenchanted enough to call for the secession of the Eastern Shore, but only from Maryland to another state, not from the United States.³ Hicks personified the schizoid nature of Maryland. He supported slavery, saying at one point that he had "never lived, and should be sorry to be obliged to live, in a state where slavery does not exist, and I never will do so if I can avoid it."⁴ On the other hand, as a Know-Nothing he had been elected as governor on a Unionist ticket. Slaveholder and Unionist: the two political characteristics were fast becoming uncomfortable for politicians. Hicks, like his state, was caught in the middle.⁵

Carroll, an old family friend, understood Hicks' dilemma. She wasted no time in urging Hicks to stay with

the Union. She wrote first from New York City, then from Washington, where she took up residence as Congress convened in December. Over the five months between the election and the outbreak of war, she alternated between Maryland and Washington affairs, trying hard to stay in touch with matters in both areas. Most of her attention focused on Maryland, where the issue of secession had become the issue of whether or not to call the legislature into special session. Hicks had refused. The Democrats, who thought they could push a call for a secession convention through a special session, petitioned Hicks.⁶ After a "fair, frank, rational examination of the subject," he told leading Maryland secessionists he could discover no necessity to convene the Legislature in special session.⁷ The expense was unnecessary, the weather inclement. Further, the likelihood was that those called would spend time spending money instead of solving the "so-called" crisis, and Maryland was already \$50,000 in debt from the previous session. Hicks counselled patience. He urged secession leaders to wait to see what the other states would do, to allow Congress to convene and take action, to let the inauguration of the President take place.⁸ Hicks also rebuffed tentative approaches from the southern states, turning down South Carolina's allegedly innocent invitation to join with the Palmetto State in a day of fasting and prayer. He had already scheduled one and could not change

the date, Hicks replied, but he was sure that the people of Maryland would "unite, heartily with the same purpose . . . in imploring God's blessing and direction in this hour of difficulty."⁹

Carroll kept in touch with Hicks often during this period, passing along information and articles from Washington newspapers. It was a difficult time for the governor: "the waves of secession and rebellion are beating with great fury upon the frail bark of our State's executive," and he was "borne down at the same time by domestic afflictions almost without a parallel"--the death of his daughter.¹⁰ Putting his personal crisis aside, by the first of the year Hicks was ready with a message to the people of his state that enumerated what had been done since the election and what would be done in the future.

He had, Hicks said, consulted with the other border states. He was inclined to wait to take any action in concert with them. South Carolina's reasons for seceding were not good enough to persuade him to join that state in secession and, even if they had been, one state's actions should not be the sovereign state of Maryland's rationale for such a drastic step. No, Lincoln had not promised him an office if the state were kept in the Union. In spite of his lack of support for Lincoln and his party in the late election, Hicks assured his constituents, he believed that the Union, even under Republican rule, would guarantee the

protection of slavery within Maryland. He added one more reason for patience. Considering the state's geographic location, any war within its borders would be so destructive that it behooved him to give its citizens "time to breathe" and "try every honorable plan . . . to avert the necessity of War" He had two choices: "to allow Maryland to slide into the ranks of the seceded States," after it had been "hurriedly borne along into the turmoil of the political movements of the day," or, far better, "to wait with calmness the progress of events."¹¹

Although pressure from secessionists for calling the legislature continued in January, so did conciliatory measures--and so did support for Hicks. One of his most ardent supporters was Carroll, as she used her "extended relation with the leading Presses of the country" "to create a public opinion favorable to your course of patriotic action throughout the land."¹² The support was welcome, but Hicks, tired of "the harassings of calculating demagogues (and they are terrible)" expressed the "sincere wish that Congress may early do something to stave off and save a collision."

Will not the representatives from the Border States go at once to work and effect something as a salvo and will not the Northern representatives yield more for their country's safety? They have the power, will they not display the needed magnanimity and pass conciliatory measures and put the Southern extremists at fault? This I say as a Southern man. The Southern extremists wish no offers of compromise from any

quarter, but not so, the masses. And how easy a matter for Northern members to unite with conservative Border State members and the few worthies from the far South and pass a proposition of that good laboring man Crittenden or some such measure to stave off until the people can have light and the fourth of March is past.¹³

Such firmness of position and such obvious, if overly optimistic, hope for reconciliation impressed Carroll. She shared Hicks' private letter with "several leading Republican Senators & members" and was pleased to be able to lay a few rumors of Maryland's impending secession to rest. Maryland would come out of this trial "like gold seven times purified," she thought. Even if Virginia did go with the South "(which [state], in spite of the secessionists I am privately assured is true to the Union) I can see no reason why Maryland should cast her destiny with her." What would come next, she was not sure, for John J. Crittenden's proposals would never pass Congress--it would be "as easy to build a world." She was right. It was too late for Senator Crittenden's proposals to re-establish the Missouri Compromise line and to protect slavery in the South with a constitutional amendment.¹⁴

The continued secession of states (Mississippi on January 9, Florida on January 10, and Alabama on January 11), "the madness of those political metaphysicians, and aristocratic Southern tyrants" had so angered Northerners previously sympathetic to the South, thought Carroll, that they now viewed secession "as rank treason to the

government, and believe it is the planned work of traitors. As do I." In spite of her many friends among Southern politicians, "I love my country . . . far more," and she would not support her friends in such a cause as secession. She could see "nothing for the Border States to do, but to adhere to their own conservative principles and bow to the supremacy of Constitutional law. Lincoln is the Lawful President of the Nation"15

Hicks continued to buy time for anti-secession sentiment. He appointed seven Marylanders as commissioners to the February Peace Convention in Washington.¹⁶ All, however, with the exception of attorney Reverdy Johnson, were notable for their mediocrity. Johnson, moreover, proposed a resolution that while secession was deplorable, coercing "in any form the said States to reunion or submission" was just as deplorable, and the government should abstain from such coercion as it would lead to an "irreparable breach and . . . to incalculable ills." The Convention did not vote on his resolution.¹⁷ The question of coercion raised by Johnson was one Carroll had not yet settled in her own mind. She was inclined to think the Republicans as a whole were against it, since their 1860 party platform had had a plank supporting states' rights. Yet "if these Southern desperadoes are in earnest, in impeding the commerce of the Great North West, the carnage will be terrible! terrible."¹⁸

Of more immediate importance to Carroll by the close of January was her safety. Was she safe in Washington? She sought reassurance from Hicks. She was rooming at the Washington House in the city and was "the only Southerner in the whole establishment. The ladies flock to my parlor, for news and rely far more on me, than on their husbands for information & knowledge of Southern intentions. Leading secessionists who called to make farewell visits to me, gave me the earnest assurance that it was no part of the Southern programme to attack this city" If she left prior to Inauguration Day, not only would it be personally inconvenient to her as it interfered with her work, but also "it would be the immediate signal of every Northern lady's leaving--supposing it be done from apprehension of danger." Hicks apparently assured her of her safety, for not only did she stay in the city, but she wrote to a New York newspaper to express her certainty the city would not be attacked, that ". . . we are in possession of such facts as to authorize us to publish an unequivocal denial to the report of [secessionists'] intended attempt to seize the Capital no such design is contemplated"19

Her state safe, her person safe, Carroll next looked to her constant concern: patronage. The fact that Carroll thought she deserved attention and employment for her friends and family from the incoming Republicans, after she had failed to support Lincoln in the election, exemplifies

Carroll's tendency to view her abilities, actions, and influence in whatever form that could get her what she wanted. Obsessed with a desire for power, attention, recognition, and reward, she constantly reinterpreted her own actions and misinterpreted the actions of others until she arrived at a conclusion which served to fulfill her needs, however far from reality that conclusion might be.

Carroll's attempt to presume upon her acquaintance with Thurlow Weed is a prime example of this characteristic. There exists no evidence that Weed was particularly close, professionally or personally, to Carroll. In her letters, though, she demanded favors of him that few people not well acquainted with the Republican leader would even suggest. Weed's position as a mediator between the Seward faction and Lincoln made him a prime target for Carroll's queries. She began soon after the election, pressing Weed to have John Minor Botts put in the Cabinet, along with John A. Gilmer, a North Carolina Know-Nothing.²⁰ Both men were Unionists, both knew Carroll well, and both would undoubtedly feel obligated to help her with patronage positions in the future. Both Botts and Gilmer were under serious consideration by Lincoln on Weed's advice. Though there is nothing to indicate they were suggested by Weed at Carroll's instigation, she would no doubt claim the credit if either man were chosen. Lincoln settled on Gilmer as the best choice among the southern and Border State Unionists.

Gilmer met an offer of a Cabinet position with a demand that Lincoln publicly declare his intention that the new administration would back down from its opposition to slavery in the territories. Lincoln refused, and Gilmer regretfully declined the tentative offer.²¹

Carroll had urged that Gilmer and Botts both be put in the Cabinet to draw on Unionist support in North Carolina and Virginia. Failure to include either one--or any Southern man--angered Carroll greatly, and she did not know or ignored that the southerners selected had refused office on Lincoln's terms.²² She later wrote that Lincoln's actions constituted "an irreparable blunder" by "constructing his Cabinet on partisan grounds. He was intent alone in harmonizing the radical and conservative elements of his party. It was a fatal error not to have taken . . . some one, or more, representing, not party, but the Union sentiment of the South." For Carroll, the crisis to the country was great enough that party interests should be put aside. She held the disproportionate representation of Northerners in the Cabinet responsible for increasing "the power of the rebellion a hundred fold!"²³

By March, Carroll turned to more personal concerns in her correspondence with Weed, asking him to use his influence with Lincoln for an appointment for her father to the Naval Office in Baltimore. He had held the office before, and "there was never a more faithful, efficient &

valuable officer than he." She wanted Weed to write to Seward in support of her petition for her father's job: "I want it done as a recognition of my claims & without solicitation."²⁴ What claim she thought she had is unclear. Weed apparently made no effort to fulfill her request, and Carroll resentfully concluded that he did not "mean to try and aid me I thought it would have given you pleasure" She had been ill and did not want to have to go to see Lincoln herself, but "I suppose with a hundred friends I shall have to do this myself. It is wrong, that I should be obliged to see him It is due to me that my Father be tendered the Naval Office."²⁵ When Weed failed her, she turned to Botts, who saluted her for being a "dutiful daughter" but had "established it as a rule, not to interfere with any local appointments outside my own State."²⁶

Convinced that Weed possessed considerable control over patronage, Carroll continued to badger him with requests, as friends badgered her: John Fry wanted her to have a "little chat" with the President on his behalf.²⁷ Representative Thomas Corwin, Carroll wrote Weed, was too ill to accept his appointment as Minister to Mexico, but she could provide the perfect substitute in Lemuel Dale Evans, a former Representative from Texas, "eminently qualified . . . really a great man in intellect." Evans must have been a very close friend, because "if he gets it,"

Carroll wrote, "I will go with him" ²⁸ Carroll hung onto the idea of Evans as an ambassador tenaciously. Corwin accepted his nomination, so she proposed Evans for a post in Constantinople, writing to Secretary of State William Seward's son, Frederick, and then making the same proposal to Weed. ²⁹

In the midst of this constant and continuing struggle for patronage, in which Carroll had no reasonable hope of success, the secession crisis in Maryland came to the forefront again. The war had begun in April, and the transportation of United States' troops through Maryland to protect the city of Washington sparked protests from Marylanders. A riot on April 19 in Baltimore against the 6th Massachusetts Regiment was condemned by both Lincoln and Carroll. "'Our men are not moles, and can't dig under the earth; they are not birds and can't fly through the air. There is no way but to march across, and that they must do,'" said Lincoln. ³⁰ Carroll wrote to Governor Hicks. Indignant at the "disgraceful and atrocious outrages in Baltimore," she warned that unless Hicks could make it clear the city had been in momentary control of the secessionists during the riot, a "terrible retribution" would be visited upon it. It was imperative that Hicks maintain his Unionist stance, and that meant the federal troops must be guaranteed safe passage. "You cannot deny the right of transit to the Northern troops through the territory of Maryland, called by

the President to defend their capital and your own," Carroll wrote.

Maryland thank God is still a state of this Union. It is the sworn duty of Mr. Lincoln to defend the seat of government--the troops can approach it only over the soil of Maryland and what power have you to prohibit their approach? That Maryland ceded to the United States a national seat of government and then withheld the right of peaceful transit over her highways essential to make it safe and suitable for the purposes for which it was ceded, or to defend it in time of war, is so glaringly absurd as to shock the common sense of any one. And such a declaration would be [scorned] by the civilized world.

For you to pretend to say, that the troops shall not pass through the territory of Maryland would be a virtual abandonment of your whole former position and your public declaration of your adhesion to the Southern Confederacy.³¹

Hicks had had to make one concession to ease tension in his state: he had called for a special legislative session to meet in Annapolis on April 26. On the 24th, he moved the meeting place to the more peaceable and strongly Unionist city of Frederick in western Maryland. Carroll wanted to go to Frederick to use her "influence . . . to stop their madness in the disunion movement," but safe passage to Annapolis or to Frederick could not be guaranteed. "So I am flooding the Legislators, Heaven defend us from such, with letters. I will be heard there & if the miserable fools pass the ordinance [of secession], let them go & suffer the consequences."³² The legislature did not pass an ordinance; it voted on April 27 that it did not even have the right to consider secession, and in early

May, voted that it would not call a convention that could grant it that power.³³ By May 13, troops under command of Major General Benjamin F. Butler occupied the city of Baltimore. Control over the state by Unionists was at last realized. Hicks had held out successfully, and Carroll could breathe a sigh of relief that her state would remain loyal to the United States.³⁴

In her letter to Hicks after the Baltimore riots, Carroll had begun to articulate her view of the nature of the rebellion against the federal government. By the summer of 1861, she was ready to distribute her arguments in support of the President's policies to the country at large. From July 1861 until May 1862, she wrote at least four pamphlets and no doubt countless letters to the press to disseminate her opinions of the legality of the war. In those writings, in those troublesome times, Carroll ignored the fact she was a woman in a man's world. She made no apology for her intrusion into the political arena, as she had done in her 1856 election books and pamphlets. Perhaps she had seen enough women working for the war effort to know her apologies were no longer necessary. Her object was to save the Union; all else beside was frippery. She went straight to the point in her writing, wasting no time on decorating her arguments with the ideas of republican motherhood or recognizing the limits of the cult of domesticity. If her arguments did not help win the fight,

there would be no republic to be mother in, and domesticity would continue to be sadly disturbed. After the crisis, she could return to the style of her antebellum writings, but for the present, the Union was all that mattered to Carroll. She would not weaken her arguments by making distracting references to her sex.

After the excitement of the spring, Carroll had gone home in the early summer of 1861 to her father's house in Church Creek, Maryland, to be treated by her brother, Dr. Thomas Carroll, for an eye problem.³⁵ There she rested and read and wrote. On July 13, she wrote a letter to Edward Everett that was published in Living Age, in response to Everett's July 4 oration at the Academy of Music in New York City.³⁶ Everett had set out to define the purpose of the war, "the justice of the cause," and the fallaciousness of the arguments employed by the South to support its actions.³⁷

Everett held that the Union was not a compact between states, that the Constitution was entered into "by the People of the United States," not the states as separate entities. To use the general reservation of powers not granted to Congress as given to the states to imply a right of secession, Everett thought absurd. He argued that in order to use this supposedly implied power of the right of secession, the states had had to make war--a power expressly limited to the national government.³⁸ Using coercion to

re-establish the Union as it had been was necessary, Everett argued, since "within the sphere of its delegated powers, the General Government deals with the individual citizen." If coercion was necessary to enforce the laws of the Union, so be it.³⁹

The resumption of sovereign powers by the people of a state (an argument Virginia used in her ordinance of secession) was invalid as well, declared Everett. The argument, used by John C. Calhoun in 1830 in the midst of the growing controversy over nullification, had been rejected by James Madison that same year because the resumption of sovereign power could be made only by the people of the whole United States, not by individual states. Protest, repeal and amendment were the only legitimate ways to deal with unwanted laws--nullification and secession were out of the realm of legal possibilities. Calhoun, the patron saint of these two latter ideas, had not dealt with Madison's arguments against the idea of nullification, said Everett. But the disciples of Calhoun had "gone beyond the master." Calhoun had never really promoted secession as a right. Only one sentence in his Discourse on the Constitution claimed the right of a state to secede from the Union. His focus in that work was on the right of nullification. Calhoun maintained the right of revolution, but if the South were revolting, argued Everett, the causes they had given were not enough to justify that

revolution.⁴⁰

Everett's comments on Calhoun caught Carroll's attention. Everett had supported his contention that Calhoun had not maintained the right of secession with a letter by Maryland lawyer Reverdy Johnson appended to his address. Johnson had boarded in the same house as Calhoun during two sessions of Congress and had talked with him often. Calhoun, said Johnson, had placed secession on the same ground as revolution. Both would destroy the government, "and no Constitution, the work of sane men, ever provided for its own destruction." Nullification, on the other hand, was meant to preserve the Constitution "practically, but to amend it, and in a constitutional mode."⁴¹

Reverdy Johnson was wrong, wrote Carroll. While "unquestionably a gentleman of profound legal ability . . . it is in vain for him, or any individual, to attempt to prove that the secessionists assent or appeal to any other principle now than that which Calhoun enunciated . . . disseminating which he spent the labor of his entire life, and ruined two generations of Southern men, who have been educated to believe it."⁴² Calhoun's Fort Hill address, quoted by Carroll, made clear his stand, she argued. Therein, Calhoun had said that "'the final cognizance of a question of contested power would be in the states and not in the General Government.'" Since

nullification was the arrest of one or more federal acts by the state, and secession the arrest of all federal acts by the state, it was impossible for any mind to distinguish between secession and nullification.⁴³ Both doctrines meant that states could not be coerced into following federal laws, and both were insupportable if the United States was to survive as a federal government.

Having blamed the war on Calhoun and his followers, Carroll moved next to defend the President's war measures. She returned to Washington in the heat and humidity of mid-July, where she read Senator John C. Breckinridge's speech opposing a resolution to approve Lincoln's actions in the Washington papers.⁴⁴ On August 7, Breckinridge had gone to Baltimore where he asserted before a large crowd that the State of Maryland had been abolished, a military dictatorship had been established, and the people of Maryland should prepare to revolt.⁴⁵

John Breckinridge had been Vice-President under Buchanan, Senator from Kentucky, and the Southern Democrats' Presidential nominee. He was also the nephew of the Reverend Robert Breckinridge, Anne Carroll's old friend and minister. With deep pain, Carroll had watched him as he voted against Lincoln's policies in the early days of the war and gave speeches "for the purpose of stimulating and strengthening the Confederate rebellion."⁴⁶ Breckinridge's opposition stemmed from his belief that the President had

taken upon himself powers he did not possess. He had established a blockade, made war on the South, called for enlistments, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus, all powers which Breckinridge thought the Constitution had granted to Congress, rather than to the Executive. The government could "exercise such powers and such only as" were given "in this written form of government If the powers be not sufficient, still none others were granted and none others can be exercised."⁴⁷ In a pamphlet entitled Reply to Breckinridge, Carroll stated that the whole argument of whether or not the President had acted legally turned on the question of "whether the overt act of treason, which the Constitution defines to be levying war against the United States, had been committed? Whether the Confederate States of the South commenced the war?"⁴⁸ Or did the President make war upon the South?

When considering the accusations against the President, Carroll wanted the reader to keep the source of those accusations in mind. The first few pages of her short pamphlet were thus devoted to showing the decade-long conspiracy of Southerners, begun at the Nashville Convention in 1850, to secede from the United States and form a Southern Confederacy--a conspiracy in which Breckinridge took part.⁴⁹ The Southerners had also conspired to prevent Lincoln's inauguration, had seized federal property, "improvised armies," acted as provisional governments,

recruited soldiers to fight, "stormed Fort Sumter, and put in motion a formidable army for the capture of Washington and the overthrow of the Government."⁵⁰ The President's actions in meeting these threats to the nation were thus defensive by their very nature, for they were designed to defend the country against attack, to prevent the "subversion of the Government," and to ensure the national existence.⁵¹

Granted the premise that the South and not the President made the war, Carroll's next task was to consider the duties of the Executive in such a position. The Constitution provided that Lincoln should "faithfully execute the laws." While he was not given the power to declare war, he could, given the absence of a sitting Congress, ". . . defend the assault on the nation's life; because his right rests on the supreme or universal law of self-defense, common to nations as to individuals." As the defender of the life of the nation, he was expressly granted powers as Commander-in-Chief, Carroll argued, and that "express grant of war-conducting power . . . carries with it the implied power to use every belligerent right known to the law of war."⁵²

Carroll interpreted the war as an insurrection because she thought that interpretation would not grant the Confederacy belligerent status as an independent nation. Thus the power of war would stay in the President's hands as

a defender and executor of the national laws, rather than be put into Congressional hands as the body to declare war against a foreign nation. This interpretation meant that all the actions that followed: the blockade, the call for volunteers, even the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were merely means (expressly and constitutionally granted) to the end of defending the Union and the Constitution.⁵³

While Carroll's overall interpretation of the President's war powers coincided with the administration, she was confronted with the same dilemma that faced all Union propagandists seeking to support Lincoln's war measures. Lincoln's actions as the chief executive could not be legally reconciled with his actions as Commander-in-Chief. If he were acting as an executive officer and controlling an insurrection, for instance, he had no legal right to institute a blockade of Southern ports. A blockade was an act of war, and war existed between two belligerents, not between the civil government and its insurrectionary citizens. But Carroll supported the President's actions by arguing that his status as Commander-in-Chief gave him war-making powers to use as a law-enforcer, and that any power normally used in war was his to use in putting down the insurrection.⁵⁴

In the long run, Carroll was forced to fall back to the same position that Lincoln occupied when his actions were criticized as extra-legal. ". . . are all the laws,

but one, to go unexecuted," Lincoln asked of Congress on July 4, 1861, "and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?" Lincoln's answer was no, and so was Carroll's. The extraordinary danger to the survival of the Union itself outweighed the temporary suspension of specific laws.⁵⁵

In her Reply, Carroll's statement that Lincoln's war-powers carried "the implied power to use every belligerent right known to the law of war" served to weaken her argument. With her careless choice of legal vocabulary, she seemed to be saying that the federal government should view the Confederates as belligerents. If the Confederates were formally recognized as belligerents, however, the insurrection within the southern states would become a war between two national governments.⁵⁶ The administration would never make this legal distinction and, in fact, went through extraordinary manipulations of vocabulary to ensure the distinction was not made. Perhaps what Carroll meant when she referred to belligerent rights was what happened during the war. While the United States never formally recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent, the federal government conceded it belligerent rights. Captured Confederate crews were held as prisoners of war, for example, rather than as pirates. Confederate officers and soldiers were regarded as a rebel army, not a motley group of traitors. The inherent contradiction between the legal

theory and the practice of war, however, remained a controversial issue.⁵⁷

Proclaiming Lincoln's war measures as defensive in nature, Carroll did not hold Lincoln responsible for starting the war. She did view his decision to stand firm with his party's position regarding territorial slavery as the precipitate cause of secession, however. But though his decision was criticized by pacifists, Unionists (including Carroll herself), Southerners and historians, the pro-secession "conspirators" had done everything they could, Carroll argued, to ensure that no compromise on the issue of slavery would pass Congress. They wanted out of the Union, and they had fired the first shot. The war was their choice, she wrote, and in making war, Lincoln was merely defending the country and exercising his constitutional authority to put down the "heretical" doctrine that the government could not coerce a state to obey federal laws.⁵⁸

The last section of Carroll's pamphlet defended the President's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, arbitrary arrests, and the suppression of the press. This last charge gave Carroll particular pause, for "as an independent member of the press I will never consent to see its power trammled or its freedom abridged by President or ruler."⁵⁹ But the press (in this case a pro-Confederate St. Louis paper) had been used by Confederates to trample

the very institutions it was supposed to defend by calling for their destruction through the destruction of the United States. Therefore, argued Carroll, that press should be shut down. Here again, the temporary suspension of various constitutional rights, if necessary to preserve the whole Constitution, was the proper course of action for the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to take. Martial law transcended civil law when it was imposed for the preservation of that civil law.⁶⁰

Carroll's Reply to Breckinridge was well received. Samuel T. Williams, attorney for the Congressional Globe, wrote that he was sure that 'if spoken in the Senate, your article would have been regarded by the country as a complete and masterly refutation of Mr. B's heresies."⁶¹ She sent copies of it to Caleb Smith, Secretary of the Interior, and to Attorney General Bates, who also passed along a copy she left for the President.⁶² She printed some 10,000 copies for distribution throughout the Border States, primarily as her own idea, but also as a way to convince the War Department to recognize the value of her services and hire her as a pamphleteer. Momentarily, the tactic worked. On October 2, 1861, she met with Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott, who led her to understand that any pamphlets she wrote, if approved by his office, could be billed to the War Department for printing and labor.⁶³

Carroll continued to defend most of Lincoln's actions. In September, she had issued a short pamphlet supporting Attorney General Bates' defense of the President's actions; in December 1861, she issued The War Powers of the General Government.⁶⁴ Her primary argument therein was, once again, that the actions the President took such as suspending the writ of habeas corpus or making arbitrary arrests were legal, as long as they were taken to fulfill his function as President, executor of the laws of the land, and Commander-in-Chief. But Carroll also used this pamphlet to argue against the confiscation and subsequent emancipation of slaves.

Carroll had feared Lincoln's "abolitionist tendencies" from the beginning. By August of 1861, she was sure he was bent on destroying slavery as the Confiscation Act of 1861 became law. Samuel Williams had tried to assuage her fears: if Lincoln were an abolitionist, he wrote, he would, as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips had done, rejoice "over the secession of the South, because they believe & with good reason, that separation dooms slavery by removing it from the protection of Federal law. Lincoln, therefore, if he favored abolition, would, if he acted consistently, end the war."⁶⁵ Carroll may have believed this argument; after all, she had written Jefferson Davis, with whom she was warmly acquainted, on the occasion of his inauguration, that "if you

continue . . . war will result. Slavery will perish, for the nations of the earth, however they may hate republican government, cannot in this age of the world aid or abet it on this continent."⁶⁶ Carroll hated slavery, and she was sure it would eventually disappear, but she believed that the federal government could not legally interfere with the institution. If slavery were to die, it would be a natural death, not an execution.

In the rough draft of The War Powers, Carroll wrote of one correspondent who had described Lincoln to her as an abolitionist, "a renegade Southerner, narrow minded, as all ignorant men are, [who] hates the South intensely, because he did not get its votes." Carroll feared that hatred would end the possibility of restoring the Union with slavery intact, a condition which she deemed essential to preserve the Southern economy and society. Lincoln must recognize the South as part of the "great family of the Nation," in spite of its peculiar institution, and he must respect the South's constitutional right to hold slaves. Only through the efforts of "allies on the soil" of the South, Carroll held, could the North hope to restore the Union. But "while [Lincoln] acts exclusively on his anti-slavery prejudices," by threatening emancipation through such acts as confiscation, "the American people may abandon at once all reasonable hope or expectation of his ending the war. It cannot be done."⁶⁷

Carroll interpreted the government's confiscation policy as the first step toward forced emancipation. It was not. It was a way to weaken the enemy by depriving him of money and materiel. The August 1861 act provided for the condemnation and seizure of all property used to aid the rebellion. Such property of course included slaves, some of whom had helped build Confederate batteries.⁶⁸ While confiscation may have been militarily sound and a politic measure, it was legally questionable, and was rarely enforced.⁶⁹ Still, Carroll viewed the act as an opportunity for the President to emancipate slaves and held Lincoln personally responsible for enforcing an unconstitutional law.

At one point in her rough draft of The War Powers, Carroll even called for the removal of "every obstruction" that stood in the way of pursuing the war to its constitutional end (i.e., preserving the Union) "even if it be a President of the United States!"⁷⁰ But by the time she finished her pamphlet, her rhetoric had become less impassioned and more legalistic. Since the war was being waged to preserve the Constitution, she wrote, "the war power itself must not trample that instrument in the dust."⁷¹

The discussion of a second confiscation act had begun with the promised introduction of a bill by Senator Lyman Trumbull on December 2, 1861. Carroll viewed such a

bill as one of many "wild theories" being proposed and argued that all acts that suggested the government could confiscate all the property of the rebels, both private and public, were inherently unconstitutional. The United States wanted to regard the war as an insurrection rather than a war between two independent powers. It could not, therefore, abrogate the Constitution that it said was still in place within the areas in rebellion. In other words, to keep the war a rebellion required a constitutional conduct of the war. The Constitution was still the law of the land in the South, according to the North; therefore, it should not be trampled upon in order to preserve it. The Constitution forbade taking private property for public use without just compensation. Since "the Government can gain no new powers, by putting down the rebellion," it had not, by virtue of the war, gained the power to confiscate property without due process of law. If the government proposed to confiscate property under the laws of war, it would be admitting the Confederacy was a nation, the very thing it wanted to avoid. Carroll was willing to jettison Constitutional guarantees to such privileges as the writ of habeas corpus to preserve the Union; she was not willing to do so to free slaves. Although she had been able to maintain an argument that acknowledged Lincoln could take actions of war while acting as an executive in her earlier pamphlet, she did not maintain that duality in her

interpretation of any confiscation act. Carroll saw beyond the attempt's stated purpose of confiscation and included its effect of freeing slaves as the basis of her criticism.⁷²

One of Carroll's primary aims in The War Powers was to convince her readers, especially those in Congress, of the "utter impossibility" that the war could emancipate slaves in the South. The "fanatics" that desired it did not understand that the policy of abolition "can never hope to restore the Union, while it would be sheer suicide to the Constitution. Such a policy might create unity, which is a very different thing from union; but it would be the unity of a frightful despotism over both the South and North."⁷³ For Carroll, the way to emancipate was not by force or decree, but by "preservation of the Union, and with that silent progress of intelligence and virtue which the Union alone can guarantee."⁷⁴ The War Powers was printed and distributed to all the members of Congress.⁷⁵

Carroll's pamphlet did not end the question as she probably hoped it would. There can be no doubt that Carroll despised slavery. Her work to buy her father's slaves prior to the war, freeing her own slaves, her support for colonization were evidence of her hatred for the institution. But she was keenly aware of the psychological, sociological, and economic upheaval that would result in the South if slaves were freed without compensation,

colonization, or due process of law. Events in the spring of 1862, however, made it clear to Carroll that the push for emancipation had not been stalled by her writings or by her constitutional arguments. On March 13, 1862, Congress forbade the use of the military to return fugitive slaves who had escaped into Union lines. In April, a bill for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia passed Congress. It provided for the compensation of owners, but nevertheless prompted Carroll to write to the President.⁷⁶

Unopposed to the "abstract question of abolition with colonization," she still thought he should veto the proposed bill. She feared it was the wrong time; the bill would alienate all the Union men in the South, since they would see "that the abolitionists have now the control of the government," and that emancipation in the District was "the first in the series for the destruction of slavery in the South" That series had been described by John C. Calhoun in 1849: once abolitionists obtained control of the government, "they would proceed, first to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia--secondly, in the territories--Thirdly, in all the forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, etc.--fourthly, to prohibit the internal slave trade between the states--and finally to abolish it in all the States." Southern Unionists believed Calhoun had been mistaken in his assumption that the abolitionists would one day become ascendant. The success of the Republican Party

had not meant "the Abolition reign had commenced," Carroll argued; any change in the raison d'etre for the war now would change that perception. "Be not deceived, Mr. President, because the Union men of the South sustain you, in your efforts to suppress the rebellion and maintain the integrity of the Constitution, that they will ever submit to the abolition of slavery, by the [general] government." If the President signed the bill, the war would be protracted "for months, it may be, for years," and the rebels would gain "a reinforcement of at least fifty thousand fighting men" from Border States opposed to any form of emancipation. "1500 Africans" might be freed as a result of the measure, but "you consign to a bloody grave, at least ten thousand patriot soldiers." Even if Congress passed the bill over his veto, at least Lincoln's hands would be clean as far as abolition was concerned. That was the important point for Carroll: the President must not be the one to change the nature of the war.⁷⁷

Lincoln signed the bill and returned it to Congress on April 16, never doubting "the constitutional authority of congress to abolish slavery in this District" and having "ever desired to see the national capital freed from the institution in some satisfactory way." Since the bill provided for compensated emancipation with the possibility of colonization, Lincoln's only qualm was the expediency of the matter. Unlike Carroll, he believed the time was

right.⁷⁸

Carroll must have been disappointed that she had failed to stop Lincoln from signing the bill, but there was a note on her copy of her letter to him that he had not received it prior to signing the measure, which no doubt comforted her. However, she was destined to be disappointed again over the issue of confiscation, which came up in May in debates over a second confiscation act. One version of the bill came before the Senate in the spring of 1862. On May 19, Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts rose to argue for its passage "to suppress the insurrection, to punish treason, and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of the rebels" Sumner's arguments in support of the bill led to Carroll's pamphlet defining The Relation of the National Government to the Revolted Citizens.⁷⁹

Sumner argued that the peculiar nature of this civil war had placed the South in a sort of double jeopardy. They were criminals, guilty of treason; they were enemies because they had made war against the United States. Consequently, "we are at liberty to . . . treat the people engaged against us as criminals or as enemies, or, if we please, as both."⁸⁰ Criminals, as traitors, would be subject to the constitutional provisions which ordered that "Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason," which in this case Sumner argued should be the

forfeiture of property, as provided in Article III, Section 3 of the Constitution. Enemies would be subject to the "rights of war" which provided that the "private property of an enemy on land may be taken as a penalty for the illegal acts of individuals, or of the community to which they belong."⁸¹ If slaves were considered property, they could be confiscated as the enemy's property had traditionally been confiscated during time of war. If slaves were humans, they existed in a "constant state of war" with their masters anyway, by virtue of the institution which enslaved them. Thus, in freeing them, the United States was simply taking "advantage of the actual condition of things."⁸²

If Confederates were criminals, Sumner continued, it was the duty of the North to "pursue and punish them"; if they were enemies, it was the duty of the United States to "blast them with that summary vengeance which is among the dread agencies of war"⁸³ Freedom for slaves would "take from the rebellion its mainspring of activity and strength . . . its chief source of provisions and supplies . . . a motive and temptation to prolonged resistance, and you will destroy forever that disturbing influence which, so long as it is allowed to exist, will keep this land a volcano ever ready to break forth anew!"⁸⁴

Sumner's speech horrified Carroll. It encompassed all she had been fighting against: abolition, disunion, and

revenge. In a letter to Lincoln, she was even willing to move away from her earlier position that the war was an insurrection. The "so called Southern Confederacy, is now to this government, as a foreign power and people are as much under the dominion of a foreign yoke as though the States were held by France, or Great Britain, instead of domestic foes," she wrote. "Davis has coerced the obedience and submission of the entire population," and recognition of the United States as the supreme power by any Southerner would be "at the peril of his life." If the rebellion had in fact succeeded in establishing a foreign government, Carroll argued, the "the rules and regulations" of public law "apply in all their force" Confiscated property would return to its owners, under the rules of international war. But if slaves were adjudged persons, as Carroll believed they were, they could not "under the Constitution be deprived of their liberty." Confiscation, because it would lead to emancipation, meant trouble. It also meant expense, since the owners would have to be compensated for their property that was not returned to them and yet had not been "sold, transferred or lost by the war" ⁸⁵

The major problem for Carroll--and for Lincoln--regarding the Second Confiscation Act was the definition of both the status and the property of the offender, the Confederate. If a domestic criminal, due process regarding the seizure of property had to be

observed; if a traitor, punishment for treason could not constitutionally extend beyond the life of the traitor (i.e., could not extend to titled property). Therefore, a blanket declaration that all persons "in rebellion" against the United States should lose their slaves posed problems under either definition. Either all traitors would have to be tried individually, or slaves would have to be legally defined as persons, not property--which they could not be, since then they would not be liable to seizure.⁸⁶

Carroll saw "an express inhibition upon the power of Congress to abolish slavery or confiscate the property of rebels." The Constitution specifically defined what treason was and "absolutely inhibit[ed] the confiscation of the estate of the traitor to the government, leaving it free to pass to his heirs." The Confiscation Act under consideration by Congress would adjudge the Southerners guilty without trial, decide their punishment (the loss of property), and execute that punishment (by confiscating their property). A bill more directly in conflict with the Constitution could not have been drawn, said Carroll.⁸⁷

Where Senator Sumner had argued that the "peculiar circumstances" of the combination of public and private war enabled Congress to treat the South as either criminal or enemy or both, as it pleased, Carroll cited the same authorities and even the same passages to argue that the prohibition against confiscation "was inserted in the

Constitution only to prevent the exercise of this arbitrary power" during such a rebellion.⁸⁸ Sumner used the long history of confiscation to justify its recurrence. Carroll used that same history to argue that the abuse of power through confiscation had led to the inclusion of the prohibitive clause in the Constitution. The Bill of Rights had further guaranteed the security of property, reinforcing the Constitution's stand against confiscation. The Second Confiscation Act came not from a longstanding tradition, but had originated "in the worst and most malignant passions of the human heart . . . pressed in utter contempt" of those Constitutional guarantees. Carroll returned to her definition of the war as a domestic rebellion--only individually could those convicted of a crime of treason be punished by holding their property liable for damages.⁸⁹

Before Congress can claim to exercise this power of war over any portion of the American people; it must first recognize the rebellion as a success--their revolution accomplished, and the Union dissolved. In short, must concede to the rebellion--what no European power has ventured to do--that they have achieved their independence, and have established a firm and stable government, against which it is no longer proper to war with the view of suppressing it.

For Congress to take that position . . . is to become allies of the rebellion, and ourselves traitors, like them, to the Constitution.⁹⁰

The war might be raging, Carroll argued, but the Union remained. Southerners were still citizens and had to be treated as such with all the constitutional guarantees that citizenship provided. Possession of property might

pass to the government during the war, but title to that property remained, except in the case of "movable goods," with the owner or his heirs.⁹¹ Further, since the Southerners had been subjugated by a rebel force and the federal government was unable to protect them from that subjugation, "it cannot hold them responsible for any act they may commit while under the pressure of a usurping power." It would be difficult enough to restore authority and peace constitutionally; "The Union of these States cannot be restored under a mutilated Constitution, or under a new and different one." Confiscation would continue the war "for the sake of power. For the annals of the world record no instances where the usurpers of power have ever, voluntarily, laid it down."⁹²

Carroll called The Relation of the National Government to the Revolted Citizens defined her "Reply to Sumner." It too was printed and distributed in Congress, where it came in for special notice by New York Republican Representative Alexander Diven, in a speech on the confiscation matter.

A specious argument in favor of what may be done under the war power, by way of confiscation, has been made Any one who desires to see it answered will find that a clever woman has done it completely. Any clever woman could answer it She signs herself in her pamphlet Anna Ella Carroll. I commend her answer on the doctrine of the war power to those who have been following that phantom and misleading the people. And I commend it to another individual, a friend of mine, who gave a most learned disquisition

on the writ of habeas corpus, and against the power of the President to imprison men. He will find that answered. I am not surprised at this. The French Revolution discovered great political minds in some of the French women, and I am happy to see in these troublous times that there is a like development in our women.

In addition to her arguments about the unconstitutionality of confiscation, Carroll continued to campaign against the policies she thought might lead to forced emancipation. She wrote Lincoln that "any abolition programme, whether it be by Confiscation Act, Orders by Military Generals [Frémont's August 1861 proclamation freeing slaves in Missouri and David Hunter's May 9, 1862, proclamation in North Carolina], or by arming the slaves as allies of the Government" would strengthen Southern resolve to defeat the Union until "a million of men" would be required to defeat the South.⁹⁴ The expense alone would ruin the country and would destroy Lincoln. Carroll grew exasperated: "I cannot allow myself to speak of men so stupid, as to suppose they can change at once, the whole social ideas, which have from the origin of our institutions controlled the American people . . . [to lift] up four millions of African slaves, upon a plane of political and social equality." It was absurd, it was dangerous, and it must be stopped lest Lincoln become "the last President of the United States of America."⁹⁵

Carroll suggested Lincoln find some way to antagonize the abolitionists in order to reassure the Border

States and thought he should veto the final version of the Second Confiscation Act. "This bill will inaugurate a new policy," she argued, "and change the whole morale of the war."

It will no longer be regarded as a war for the maintainance [sic] of the American Constitution, but as one, for the subjugation of the Southern States, and the destruction of their social system. And the judgment of the civilized world will then decide that the South is in a just struggle for Constitutional liberty; against an arbitrary and revengeful government.

Intervention by Europe was sure to follow if he signed the bill, Carroll warned, and Jefferson Davis and his "co-traitors" would become heroes while Lincoln and his Cabinet would stand "in all the future, like George the Third and the Ministry of Lord North."⁹⁶

Lincoln did have objections to the Confiscation Act, and in fact broke precedent by sending his proposed veto along with the signed bill back to Congress on July 17. One of his objections was centered on the extinguishment of real estate titles, which was an unconstitutional forfeiture of property because it extended beyond the life of the guilty party. His second objection was also one Carroll had raised in her pamphlet. As provided for in the Act, proceedings of property forfeiture in rem, rather than in personam, led to a forfeiture of property "without a conviction of the supposed criminal, or a personal hearing given him in any proceeding." While in rem proceedings were used in

admiralty cases, Lincoln thought the Second Confiscation Act should provide "a reasonable time . . . for such parties to appear and have personal hearings."⁹⁷

Unlike Carroll, Lincoln did not object to the emancipation of slaves provided for in the Second Confiscation Act. He chose to interpret the Act's provisions regarding property forfeiture as applicable to slaves, as Carroll did. This interpretation was apparently not the one Congress made, since the Act provided separate sections for confiscation and emancipation, and did not mention slaves as property to be confiscated. But Lincoln reasoned that if property forfeited to the general government under the Act included slaves, the government, "so far as there can be ownership," owned those slaves. He then had "no objection to Congress deciding in advance that they shall be free." As for the specific provision which declared slaves of rebels "captives of war, and . . . forever free," Lincoln suggested that Congress make clear the conditions under which that provision could be enforced.⁹⁸

The fact that Lincoln signed the Second Confiscation Act, even with his reservations, made it quite clear to Carroll that Lincoln or Congress was going to do something about emancipation. Lincoln's desired policy for emancipation was the same as Carroll's: gradual emancipation to avoid social disruption, federal

compensation to prevent economic destruction, and voluntary colonization to ensure peaceful race relations.⁹⁹ While Carroll's concern was for the preservation of the South, which made her hesitate to support any war-time emancipation measures, she remembered well the days when the slave traders came to buy those whom the plantation would no longer support.

I shudder now at the sight of such horrors as came before my own eyes--a daughter, clinging to her parents & in the most delicate situation--with screams that were frantic, the whole white family of females, in tears, yet powerless to interpose . . . the most tender and devoted of mothers too far bereft by the sale of her first born boy to shed a tear Scenes like this no years have ever effaced--no time can ever make me forget¹⁰⁰

Her antipathy toward the institution had led her to work for compensated emancipation in the 1850s. In 1861 and 1862, at the same time she fought against the Confiscation Acts because of their emancipatory effects, she worked to promote the colonization of freed slaves.

By April of 1861, Carroll had begun working for Aaron Columbus Burr, a leading New York merchant, on a plan to colonize freed blacks in British Honduras in Central America. Burr, in March of that year, had become the agent for James Grant of Belize, British Honduras, to sell Grant's 150 square miles of land in "Stand" (Stann) Creek, to found such a colony. Aside from what he viewed as the humanitarian motive of colonization, Grant had asked \$65,000 for the land, which included considerable stands of

mahogany, rubber trees, "cocoa nut trees," and a brickworks.¹⁰¹

Burr had originally made a land-lease agreement with Grant for a mahogany-cutting company formed in 1860. The political unrest in the area scared off investors, but Grant had received several offers for the land itself, which Burr thought privately ought to be valued at \$100,000. Burr kept Grant from selling by promising him that he would try to sell it to the United States government. In the spring of 1861, Burr proposed to Carroll, who was, he wrote, "known as a practical advocate of colonization," that a company be formed "for the purchase of this land for the benefit of the free persons of color in the United States." Also to benefit Burr's pocket: he offered the land at what he called a "reduced price" of \$75,000, but since he had never actually purchased the land from Grant, he stood to make \$10,000 on the sale of the land to the government, some of which undoubtedly was to go to Carroll.¹⁰²

Burr apparently hired Carroll as a lobbyist to help him present his case to the government. How they met and what their agreement was is unclear, but by the fall of 1861, Carroll was corresponding with Burr and apologizing that a case of cholera in August and September had kept her too ill to do much work. At the same time, Grant was warning Burr that poachers were stealing mahogany and that the 1860 mahogany-cutting company was so hopelessly

insolvent that Burr and Grant would wind up suffering financially if steps were not taken to sell the land. Colonization of freed blacks on the land was the only way out, Grant wrote to Burr. Burr wrote to Carroll, and Carroll wrote to the President, proposing a colony in British Honduras.¹⁰³

Carroll presented the colony as attractively as possible. It was close to the United States, had a direct trading track by sea, easy access, a friendly government, a tropical climate, and fertile soil. There was an added, and perhaps overstated attraction: "the desire of the government" of British Honduras "to develop its vast resources of wealth, by receiving upon a social and political equality, the very class of persons which it is the interest of this country to furnish." It was also a way for the United States, she wrote, "to remove the colored race and make them useful to themselves," while still retaining them "as friends of the whites."¹⁰⁴

The formal proposal was finally made by Burr himself on May 6, 1862, to the Department of the Interior, which was in charge of all colonization projects. For \$75,000, Burr would transfer title, found a settlement colony named the "Lincoln Colony," and "if the government desire my services," he would "receive these freedmen as they are transported, and superintend their location upon the land, upon whatever principle may be determined by the

government." On May 13, Carroll wrote to Secretary of the Interior Smith with a full account of the improvements on the land and included a map of Scotland Town, the main settlement. The matter was laid before Lincoln by the 19th.¹⁰⁵

At this point, there may have been a meeting between Carroll and Lincoln regarding the colonization project. Reminiscing late in life, Carroll recalled a touching scene in which Lincoln asked her what he should do about the matter of colonization.

I was perfectly charmed with his cordial and simple remarks, free from every semblance of ambition. He, in the most exalted office upon earth, deferring as humbly to another, as if he had no power or aim! He was patient and gentle as a woman could be, nothing brusque about him. He got up and took a large map which he hung in the room and sat down on a small low stool by the fireplace, spread the map on his knees, and asked me to point out the place I recommended for the colonization of the freedmen. I pointed to British Honduras, in Central America, and gave all the reasons for this, as the then proper locality¹⁰⁶

Such a domestic scene may have been fact, or fancy created by the passage of time and presidential martyrdom. At any rate, Carroll did continue to contact Lincoln through letters, writing to him again on May 19. In that long missive, she argued against Liberia as a colony: transportation costs were too great, and the unwillingness of freed blacks to leave the United States for Africa was too strong. Haiti, another suggested site, was just as objectionable. The island was too small for the "American

element" (who were presumably used to the vastness of the North American continent and who were now four million in number). No doubt a "few, shrewd" colonists would succeed, but only by "sinking their Americanism and becoming thoroughly European in their caste . . . the majority . . . would be held only as laborers and producers" In addition, the "arbitrary" government of the island would give colonists "no more chance for elevating their social and political positions" than in the United States. British Honduras was the answer. Large enough to "found an empire for many millions," it was the only country in Central America that would not require civil and military support and protection from the United States for its colonists. Life, liberty, and property were secure in British Honduras, and its government would "interpose no barrier" to colonization.¹⁰⁷

It is difficult to tell exactly when Lincoln rejected the choice of British Honduras as a possible colonization site, if he did indeed consider it seriously. Carroll had sent him a box of "Central American goods" to convince him of the plenty that awaited colonists, and she thought it was still alive as a choice on August 30. She wrote to Burr telling him she was sure that the Chiriqui colonization project, another Central American site in competition with her suggestion, was defunct. She may not have known about Lincoln's recommendation to a delegation of

free blacks on August 14 that they go and live at Chiriqui.¹⁰⁸ But Carroll was correct in her perception that Lincoln was moving toward emancipation of slaves with or without colonization. Lincoln could see a way to accomplish emancipation either way. Much as she hated slavery, Carroll could not wield such a two-edged sword. In her opinion, emancipation without colonization would mean the loss of the Border States, and in the end, the death of the Union itself.

After a September 13 meeting with Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy, head of the still-lively Chiriqui project, Carroll wrote Burr that their British Honduras colonization project was dead. Instead, the "Chiriqui property will be bought & fortunes made for the white speculators through the poor Africans who will hew the wood & draw the water." The Chiriqui site was not the final choice, but the administration's two-pronged attack on slavery continued with the issuance of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22. Although this proclamation included provisions for compensation and colonization, the deadline of January 1 was a setback for moderation that no doubt angered Carroll. On October 21, she made a last-ditch effort as she asked for a meeting with Lincoln as "a sincere friend of the colored" to argue once more for the British Honduras site. If she met with him, her arguments failed to sway him, for the announced site was the Haitian island of

Ile A'Vache.¹⁰⁹

The extent to which Carroll had access to Lincoln as well as the degree of attention he paid her ideas is difficult to ascertain. Certainly he knew who she was. In August, he had thanked her for an address she had made to the people of Maryland, calling for more volunteers, which he had read "with a great deal of pleasure." Certainly his Attorney General, Edward Bates, was on good terms with her and wrote to her cordially during the war.¹¹⁰ While she may have occasionally enjoyed Lincoln's attention, she was only one of many trying to influence him. Although she did fail to convince him to follow her course of advice, Carroll did articulate soundly the concerns of the Border States regarding emancipation and colonization. Lincoln recognized and spoke to those concerns, if not in direct reply to her. In September 1862, for example, he pointed out his fear to a visiting interdenominational delegation of Christians from Chicago that "fifty thousand bayonets" from the Border States might be turned against the Union in consequence of a proposed emancipation proclamation. This was an argument and a figure that Carroll had used in her letters to Lincoln the preceding April and July.¹¹¹

Fragmentary evidence exists in Carroll's papers that suggests a favorable attitude toward emancipation after the war, and once it was a fait accompli she turned her attention to other matters. Between her writings which

supported Maryland anti-secessionists and the President's war measures, and her work on behalf of Burr for the proposed "Lincoln Colony," there was one other issue that interested Carroll greatly. In the fall of 1861, Anne Carroll turned her eyes to the war in Tennessee and her hand to military strategy, thus beginning the most legendary and the most controversial action of her long career.

Notes

¹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, November 1860, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland.

²Morgan Dix, son of the Commander of the Department of Maryland John A. Dix, remarked on the importance of controlling Maryland for the Union, 23 July, 1861. See Charles B. Clark, "Suppression and Control of Maryland, 1861-1865; A Study in Federal-State Relations During Civil Conflict," Maryland Historical Magazine 54 (September 1959), p. 248. See also W. W. Brewer, "Lincoln and The Border States," Journal of Negro History 34 (January 1949), pp. 63-64.

³W. Wayne Smith, "Politics and Democracy in Maryland, 1800-1854," in Maryland: A History, 1632-1974, ed. Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1974), p. 296; Jean H. Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 8.

⁴Cited in William Cook Wright, The Secession Movement in the Middle Atlantic States (Canbury, New Jersey: Associated University Presses, 1973), p. 35. Wright suggests, incorrectly, that Hicks was a secessionist at heart.

⁵Smith, "Politics and Democracy," p. 298; Baker, The Politics of Continuity, p. 13.

⁶Baker, The Politics of Continuity, p. 48.

⁷Thomas H. Hicks to Thomas G. Pratt, Sprigg Harwood, J. S. Franklin, Llewellyn Boyd and I. [?] Pinkney, 27 November 1860, Governor's Letterbook, Maryland State Archives, Hall of Records, Annapolis, Maryland.

⁸*Ibid.*; Thomas H. Hicks to the Maryland People, 3 January 1861, Governor's Letterbook.

⁹Thomas H. Hicks to Governor of South Carolina, 20 November 1860, Governor's Letterbook.

¹⁰Thomas H. Hicks to Anna Ella Carroll, 21 December 1860, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 16 January 1861, Carroll Papers.

¹¹Thomas H. Hicks to Maryland People, 3 January 1861, Governor's Letterbook.

¹²Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 16 January 1861, Carroll Papers. See also William J. Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances: Maryland from 1850 to 1861 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 164-165.

¹³Thomas H. Hicks to Anna Ella Carroll, 19 January 1861, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll, Craddock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. (Hereafter cited as CCJ Collection.)

¹⁴Although Crittenden's compromise was not voted on until March 2, it could be considered dead by January 16 or so, something Carroll in Washington was far more cognizant of than was Hicks. See Allan Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln: Prologue to Civil War, 1859-1861 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 392-402; David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1942), pp. 84-132.

¹⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 24 January 1861, Carroll Papers.

¹⁶Proceedings of the Governor, 25 January 1861, Maryland State Archives, Hall of Records, Annapolis, Maryland.

¹⁷L. E. Chittenden, A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Convention, for Proposing Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Held at Washington, D.C., in February, A.D. 1861 (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1864), p. 449. See also Wright, The Secession Movement, p. 52.

¹⁸Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U.S. Elections (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975), pp. 36-37; Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 24 January 1861, Carroll Papers. Carroll would later discuss the question of state rights against improper coercion in a letter protesting the assumption "that the General Government has unlimited powers even to the obliterating of State lines, and creating Provincial Governments" See Anna Ella Carroll to Editor, New

York Times, 23 March 1862.

¹⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 30 January 1861, Carroll Papers; "Independent," New York Morning Express, 31 January 1861.

²⁰Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 7 January 1861, Thurlow Weed Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

²¹The position was never specifically stated by Lincoln, but was rumored to be Secretary of the Navy or Postmaster-General. See Daniel W. Crofts, "A Reluctant Unionist: John A. Gilmer and Lincoln's Cabinet," Civil War History 24 (September 1978), pp. 231, 236-237, 241-242; Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1946), pp. 102, 114. For Lincoln's correspondence on the matter, see Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955), 4:151-153, 155, 164, 170-171, 173.

²²[Samuel T. Williams] to Anna Ella Carroll, 26 August 1861, Carroll Papers. Obviously, Carroll was not impressed with Lincoln's inclusion of Missourian Edward Bates in his Cabinet.

²³Anna Ella Carroll, Memo on War Powers, 19 August 1861, MDHS 3650-178, p. 7, Carroll Papers.

²⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 17 March 1861, Weed Papers.

²⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, n.d., Weed Papers. This letter is undated but was obviously written after the 17 March letter.

²⁶John Minor Botts to Anna Ella Carroll, 31 March 1861, Carroll Papers. Not surprisingly, considering his refusal to help her, this is the last letter that survives from Botts to Carroll.

²⁷John B. Fry to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 March 1861, Carroll Papers.

²⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 15 March 1861, Weed Papers.

²⁹Anna Ella Carroll to [Thurlow Weed], 15 May 1861, Weed Papers. The letter to Frederick Seward does not

apparently survive.

³⁰Abraham Lincoln in the Washington Star, 22 April 1861, cited in C. Percy Powell, Lincoln Day By Day, A Chronology 1809-1865, 3 vols. (Washington: Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission, 1960), 3:37. See also Baker, The Politics of Continuity, p. 53.

³¹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

³²Anna Ella Carroll to Salmon P. Chase, 24 April 1861, Salmon Portland Chase Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 26 April 1861, Weed Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Salmon P. Chase, 27 April 1861, Chase Papers. Secretary of War Simon Cameron's ineptitude was pronounced enough that both Chase and Secretary of State William Henry Seward took part in activities normally beyond their purview. See J. W. Schuckers, The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase, United States Senator and Governor of Ohio; Secretary of the Treasury, and Chief-Justice of the United States (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1874), pp. 419-420, 424. Carroll appealed to Chase for a safe escort to Annapolis. She may have met him through her friendship with Ohioan Thomas Corwin, and may have chosen to approach him as well as Seward (through Weed), since Seward and Weed were so unresponsive to her requests. As far as her letters to legislators, unfortunately, none of the delegates to the special session appear to have preserved their papers. Consequently, none of Carroll's letters have apparently survived.

³³Evitts, A Matter of Allegiances, pp. 187-188; Baker, The Politics of Continuity, p. 56.

³⁴Clark, "Suppression and Control," p. 243; Henry Adams, The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61 and Other Essays, ed. George Hockfield (New York: Sagamore Press, 1958), p. 24; Carl M. Frasure, "Union Sentiment in Maryland, 1859-1861," Maryland Historical Magazine 24 (September 1929), pp. 210-211, 223-224.

³⁵Lemuel D. Evans to Anna Ella Carroll, 7 July 1861, Carroll Papers.

³⁶Anna Ella Carroll, "Calhoun and His Nullification Doctrine," Living Age 70 (17 August 1861):444-446.

³⁷Frank Moore, ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary of

American Events, with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, Etc. 11 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam & Charles T. Evans, 1861-1863; D. Van Nostrand, 1864-1868), 1(1867):5.

³⁸Ibid., 1:10.

³⁹Ibid., 1:14-15.

⁴⁰Ibid., 1:22-37. If quantity were the only measure, Everett's opinion might make more sense, but the sentence to which he refers makes Calhoun's position on the right of secession quite clear: "That a State, as a party to the constitutional compact, has the right to secede,--acting in the same capacity in which it ratified the constitution,--cannot, with any show of reason, be denied by any one who regards the constitution as a compact" John C. Calhoun, "A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States," in The Works of John C. Calhoun, ed. Richard K. Crallie, 6 vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), 1:301.

⁴¹Moore, Rebellion Record, 1:41.

⁴²Carroll, "Calhoun," p. 444.

⁴³Ibid., p. 445. Calhoun's Fort Hill address was made 26 July 1831.

⁴⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 1st sess., 16 July 1861, pp. 137-142; Moore, Rebellion Record, 2(1867):32; Washington Daily National Intelligencer, 17 July 1861.

⁴⁵Moore, Rebellion Record, 2:58; Anna Ella Carroll, Reply to the Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckinridge, Delivered in the United States Senate, July 16, 1861, and, In Defense of the President's War Measures (Washington: Henry Polkinhorn, 1861), p. 3.

⁴⁶Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 3; Lucille Stillwell, John Cabell Breckinridge (Caldwell, Idaho: Caxton Printers, 1936), pp. 99-105.

⁴⁷Breckinridge, Congressional Globe, 16 July 1861, p. 140, cited also in Moore, Rebellion Record, 2:308.

⁴⁸Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 3.

⁴⁹Ibid., pp. 4-9. For a detailed history of the

conspiracy of which Carroll wrote, see Thelma Jennings, The Nashville Convention: Southern Movement for Unity 1848-1851 (Memphis, Tennessee: Memphis State University Press, 1980).

⁵⁰ Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 9. Norma Cuthbert, Lincoln and the Baltimore Plot (San Marino, California: Huntington Library, 1949) details the plot to assassinate Lincoln as he changed trains in Baltimore. See also Nevins, The Emergence of Lincoln, p. 451; Powell, Lincoln Day By Day, 3:19-21.

⁵¹ Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 9.

⁵² Ibid., p. 10.

⁵³ Ibid. See a similar interpretation from a contemporary in Horace Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus Under the Constitution," in Union Pamphlets of the Civil War 1861-1865, ed. Frank Freidel, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1:202-205, 252. Lincoln defended his actions in his Message to Congress in Special Session, 4 July 1861; see Basler, Works, 4:421-441.

⁵⁴ The question of the Confederacy's status vis a vis belligerency is discussed in J. G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1963), pp. 51-69. Ludwell Johnson discusses the resolution in the matter in the courts in "The Confederacy: What Was It? The View from the Federal Courts," Civil War History 32 (March 1986):5-22. On the definition of belligerent rights see Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law: the Literal Reproduction of the Edition of 1866 by Richard Henry Dana, Jr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 29-32.

⁵⁵ Basler, Works, 4:430.

⁵⁶ Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 10; Randall, Constitutional Problems, p. 61.

⁵⁷ Randall discusses the 5-4 Supreme Court decision in the Prize Cases that decided in favor of the President's actions, Constitutional Problems, pp. 51-57. See also William Whiting, The War Powers Under the Constitution of the United States (Boston: n.p., 1871; reprint ed., New York: DaCapo Press, 1972), pp. 38-49 for his statement regarding belligerent rights, pp. 82-83 for his interpretation of the general war powers of the President.

⁵⁸Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 7.

⁵⁹Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 14.

⁶⁰Because the conditions permitting the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus were discussed in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which article set out the duties of the legislative branch of the government, opponents of Lincoln's actions argued that he had no right to suspend the writ, and that suspension was obviously a power reserved for Congress. Lincoln, Carroll and pamphleteer Horace Binney all argued that if, in order to execute the laws and protect the Constitution against a rebellion, it was necessary to make arbitrary arrests and suspend the writ, that power was implicitly granted to the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. See Article II, Section I (oath to protect the Constitution), Section 2 (appointing President Commander-in-chief), Section 3 (requiring President to faithfully execute the laws). Basler, Works, 4:429-431; Carroll, Reply to Breckinridge, p. 11; Binney, "The Privilege of the Writ," p. 252; Baker, The Politics of Continuity, pp. 59-60.

⁶¹Samuel T. Williams to Anna Ella Carroll, 8 August 1861, Carroll Papers.

⁶²Caleb Smith to Anna Ella Carroll, 25 September 1861, Carroll Papers; Edward Bates to Anna Ella Carroll, 21 September 1861, Carroll Papers. Carroll, incidentally, has three copies of this Bates letter in her papers. Each copy, all in her hand, is slightly different. There is no doubt that Carroll and Bates knew each other fairly well: two other later letters from Bates make it clear they were on good terms. Apparently, Carroll used this particular letter to shore up her claim that the government ordered the printing of pamphlets she wrote. The first version states "I have sent the President the copy you left"; the last, "The President requested me to thank you most cordially for the copy you sent" This incident of editing further reflects Carroll's tendency to twist reality into that which would reflect her most favorably, making it most difficult for any historian to select which of her claims was true or to what extent any were true.

⁶³Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862, Carroll Papers; Thomas A. Scott, 28 January 1863, cited in Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius: Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1891), pp. 125-126; Lemuel D. Evans to Edwin M. Stanton, 8 August 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁴Anna Ella Carroll, "The Constitutional Power of the President to Make Arrests and Suspend the Writ of Habeas Corpus Examined" (Maryland: n.p., 1861), reprinted in Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life and Writings of Anna Ella Carroll (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1895), pp. 92-98; Anna Ella Carroll, The War Powers of the General Government (Washington, DC: Henry Polkinhorn, 1861).

⁶⁵[Samuel T. Williams] to Anna Ella Carroll, 26 August 1861, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Jefferson Davis, February 1861, Carroll Papers. Davis' reply, in which he spoke of the finality of his "leave taking" from the Union, is a copy in Carroll's hand and is of questionable authenticity. Jefferson Davis to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 March 1861, Carroll Papers; Mary S. Dix, associate editor, The Papers of Jefferson Davis, to author, 29 August 1985. Several letters from Davis to Carroll survive in Carroll's papers. He responded to patronage requests, sent her money, talked about his family, and promised to stop by to see her on his way home, "if my wife does not call for me before the adjournment." Jefferson Davis to Anna Ella Carroll, 22 December 1857, 20 March 1860, 27 February 1860, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁷Anna Ella Carroll, Memo on War Powers, 19 August 1861, MDHS 3650-178, p. 17A, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁸Bruce Catton, The Coming Fury (New York: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 397-401.

⁶⁹Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 294-302.

⁷⁰Carroll, Memo on War Powers, p. 22.

⁷¹Carroll, War Powers, p. 10.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 10-11. Trumbull had promised a quick introduction of a confiscation bill on the first day of the new session. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 2 December 1861, p. 1.

⁷³Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas H. Hicks, 11 January 1862, Carroll Papers; Carroll, War Powers, p. 12.

⁷⁴Carroll, War Powers, p. 12. "The idea of procuring the abolition of slavery by this war is the most chimerical one ever conceived by the intelligent mind" See Carroll, Loose Papers on Slavery and the

civil War, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection, MDHS 3622-103, p. 42.

⁷⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862, Carroll Papers; Blackwell, Life and Writings, pp. 46-48. Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1939), 1:410-411 places the seal of the Department of State on her work, as does Blackwell's volume which reprints the pamphlet (pp. 48-91), but all claims filed by Carroll for payment were with the War Department.

⁷⁶J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath & Co., 1969), pp. 371-376.

⁷⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 15 April 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁸Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, 16 April 1862, in Basler, Works, 5:192.

⁷⁹U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 19 May 1862, pp. 2188-2196; Anna Ella Carroll, The Relations of the National Government to Revolted Citizens Defined (Washington: Henry Polkinhorn, 1861).

⁸⁰Congressional Globe, 19 May 1862, pp. 2189-2190.

⁸¹Ibid., pp. 2190, 2192.

⁸²Ibid., p. 2192.

⁸³Ibid., p. 2193.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 2196.

⁸⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, May 1862, Carroll Papers. There was considerable disagreement among jurists in the 1860s regarding the right of confiscation in time of war. See Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 294-302.

⁸⁶Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 360-363.

⁸⁷Carroll, Relation, p. 1-2.

⁸⁸Congressional Globe, 19 May 1862, p. 2190; Carroll, Relation, p. 3.

⁸⁹Carroll, Relation, pp. 3-6.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 6.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 8

⁹²Ibid., p. 12, 15.

⁹³U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Congressional Globe, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 22 January 1862, p. 438. Sumner himself was impressed enough with Carroll's "Reply" to place a copy of it in Harvard University Library in 1862. See Walter P. Armstrong, "The Story of Anna Ella Carroll: Politician, Lawyer and Secret Agent," American Bar Association Journal 35 (March 1949), p. 199, n. 2.

⁹⁴See Lincoln's response to Frémont's and Hunter's proclamations in Basler, Works, 4:506 and 5:222. Black troops were first organized in April of 1862, and would be officially sanctioned by the War Department that August. See Randall and Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 391-392.

⁹⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 4 July 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁹⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 14 July 1862, Robert Todd Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁹⁷Basler, Works, 5:331; Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 279-280.

⁹⁸Basler, Works, 5:329-330; Randall, Constitutional Problems, pp. 360-363 discusses the logistical problems in enforcing the provisions.

⁹⁹See Lincoln's remarks on his emancipation program in his Annual Message to Congress, 1 December 1862, in Basler, Works, 5:518-537, especially 530-536. See also Richard Current, The Lincoln Nobody Knows (New York: McGraw Hill, 1958), pp. 221-222.

¹⁰⁰Anna Ella Carroll, Manuscript on Slavery, post-1864, MDHS 3652-430, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰¹John B. Fry to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 April 1861, Carroll Papers; James Grant to Aaron C. Burr, 31 August 1860, Aaron Columbus Burr Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut; James Grant to Aaron C. Burr, 13

September 1861, "Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior Relating to the Suppression of the African Slave Trade and Negro Colonization, 1854-72," U.S. Department of the Interior, Record Group 48, National Archives, Washington, DC; Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 23 April 1862, Department of the Interior, Record Group 48. (Hereafter cited as DNA, RG48.)

¹⁰²Aaron C. Burr to Secretary [Caleb] Smith, 6 May 1862, DNA, RG48.

¹⁰³James Grant to Aaron C. Burr, 9 February 1861, Burr Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Aaron C. Burr, 3 September 1861, Burr Papers; James Grant to Aaron C. Burr, 3 February [1862], Burr Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 15 April 1862, Carroll Papers. Carroll wrote to the papers as well. See Anna Ella Carroll to Editor, New York Times, 6 March 1862.

¹⁰⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 23 April 1862, and Anna Ella Carroll to Secretary Smith, 27 April 1862, DNA, RG48. One reason Lincoln may have used when rejecting the idea was the pro-secession sentiment of many of the citizens of British Honduras, particularly traders. By early 1863, supporters were eager to accept free blacks for labor in British Honduras, but only those emancipated prior to the war, since they regarded freedmen as more "intelligent" than "Contrabands." See Wayne M. Clegern, British Honduras: Colonial Dead End: 1859-1900 (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1967), pp. 22, 30, 38. Carroll also argued for a Central American site for free blacks in the Washington National Republican, 23 April 1862.

¹⁰⁵Aaron C. Burr to Secretary Smith, 6 May 1862, and Anna Ella Carroll to Secretary Smith, 13 May 1862, DNA, RG48.

¹⁰⁶Anna Ella Carroll, Recollections of Lincoln, n.d., MDHS 3655-722, pp. 105-120, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 19 May 1862, Lincoln Papers.

¹⁰⁸William Mitchell to Anna Ella Carroll, 13 May 1862, Carroll Papers. Mitchell's letter, which describes the President's delighted reaction to the box sent and praises Carroll's abilities as a writer, is a copy in Carroll's hand, and may have been used at a later date in her claims against the government. It is one of three

copies, none of which are exactly alike, and therefore must be viewed cautiously (see n. 62 above). Anna Ella Carroll to Aaron C. Burr, 30 August 1862, Burr Papers; Basler, Works, 5:370-375.

¹⁰⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Aaron C. Burr, 13 September 1862, Burr Papers. Burr protested the decision to both Pomeroy and Lincoln and warned of dire consequences if colonization proceeded elsewhere, but to no avail. See Aaron C. Burr to Senator Pomeroy, 20 September 1862, 5 October 1862, Burr Papers; Aaron C. Burr to Abraham Lincoln, 6 October 1862, Burr Papers; Basler, Works, 5:433-436; Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 October 1862, Lincoln Papers. A substantial work on the Ile A'Vache colony is by Jayme Ruth Spencer, "Abraham Lincoln and Negro Colonization: The Ile A'Vache, Hayti Experience, 1862-1864" (unpublished master's thesis, College of William and Mary in Virginia, Williamsburg, Virginia, 1971).

¹¹⁰Abraham Lincoln to Anna Ella Carroll, 19 August 1862, in Basler, Works, 5:381-382; Edward Bates to Anna Ella Carroll, 20 August 1862, James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. These two letters were enclosed in a letter from Carroll to Garfield in which she introduced herself and her claim against the government. Basler mistakenly has the Lincoln letter in Carroll's hand; both letters were copies, but not in Carroll's handwriting.

¹¹¹Basler, Works, 5:423; Anna Ella Carroll, 15 April 1862, 14 July 1862, Carroll Papers.

Chapter 5

Carroll Stakes Her Claim

In the summer of 1862, Anna Ella Carroll met with President Lincoln. She presented him with a bill for the pamphlets she had written. He dismissed her proposal that she travel to Europe to write for the Union with such vigor that she did not discuss her second proposal: that he pay her for her work as a military strategist. She had written out the introduction of the idea to Lincoln--"Now, Mr. President, there is another subject, which I desire to bring to your attention"--but her audacity seems to have deserted her.¹ Not for long. The legend of Carroll as a military genius was about to spring forth.

Carroll claimed to have discovered a route to invade the Confederacy that would bypass strong Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi River. Her account, as she presented it in later years, is as follows:

In early October 1861, shortly after making her oral

agreement with Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott to write pamphlets for the War Department, Anna Ella Carroll left the comparative safety of Washington to discover for herself the state of the Union in the western theatre of the war. She went first to Chicago, then to St. Louis, where she met her old friend and close companion, Lemuel D. Evans, who had been sent to St. Louis on a secret mission by Secretary of State William Henry Seward.²

To her dismay, Carroll found St. Louis to be a hotbed of Confederate sympathizers and discouraged Unionists. She decided to continue writing pamphlets arguing for the Union cause and went to the Mercantile Library in St. Louis to do research. There she met the librarian, who was the brother of the Confederate general, Albert Sidney Johnston. She engaged him in a warm discussion, for he was a Confederate sympathizer and expressed surprise that, as a Southern lady, she should be so avid a supporter of the Union cause and should be using her literary talents in such a losing cause. Sensing his disbelief that her convictions were firm, Carroll flattered and charmed her way into Librarian Johnston's confidence and took note of all he said. She also took note of what all those around her said and eventually decided to share the information she had gathered with the Union authorities. She went to see General John C. Frémont, who was in charge of the Western Department, but he was absent and only "his

wife was in command."³

Not deigning to share her information with Jessie Frémont, Carroll kept all these things to herself and pondered them in her heart. She knew that President Lincoln had decided that the Mississippi River must be controlled by the Union in order for the North to win the war. But all to whom she spoke assured her of the strength of Confederate fortifications down the river and of the impossibility of opening it. Furthermore, after witnessing the disheartening effects on Union sympathizers when they saw the injured and dead federal soldiers after the Battle of Belmont on November 7, she was determined to find a safer way for Union troops to invade the South, a way that bypassed the fortified Mississippi.⁴

There were two other rivers besides the Mississippi that afforded possible invasion routes into the Confederacy: the Tennessee and the Cumberland. Carroll reasoned that if she could talk to a riverboat pilot familiar with these rivers, she might be able to learn if the rivers would be navigable by Union gunboats. Fortunately, in the same hotel where Carroll was staying, there resided one Anna Scott. Mrs. Scott's husband, Captain Charles M. Scott, was a riverboat pilot and, in fact, had piloted the transport Memphis at the recent Battle of Belmont. Carroll asked Mrs. Scott to let her know the moment her husband returned, and accordingly, Carroll sent for him immediately upon his

arrival in the city.⁵

When Captain Scott arrived, Carroll questioned him intently on the characteristics of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. She discovered that the Tennessee was always deep enough for gunboats; the Cumberland was deep enough most of the time. At that moment, Carroll had a flash of inspiration. She knew in an instant that an invasion route that used these two rivers was the solution to the strategic problem that had puzzled the military leaders in the West and planners in the East and had kept the army frozen in its tracks, fearful of another raid with the death toll, disarray, and failure of Belmont.⁶

Lemuel Evans called to see Carroll just then, and Carroll turned to him with her idea that the federal troops should be transferred from the Mississippi to the Tennessee River and should use that route to invade the Confederacy. Since Evans had been born near the Tennessee River and had lived near Muscle Shoals in Alabama most of his life, Carroll trusted his opinion as an insider. He concurred with the value of her plan of invasion, and Carroll and Evans went to Captain Scott to glean as much information from him as possible. She then wrote immediately to Attorney-General Edward Bates, who had first suggested using gunboats, but on the Mississippi River,⁷ then to Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Scott, and then to President Lincoln himself, detailing her plan and promising to return to

Washington to explain it in more detail.⁸

Carroll then left St. Louis and traveled to Ohio, Covington, Kentucky, and then on to Buffalo, New York, where she met with her old friend Millard Fillmore. Everywhere she went, the talk was all about the necessity of controlling the Mississippi by storming its defenses. In Buffalo, Fillmore listened to Carroll's new plan and agreed that it was a wonderful discovery. He urged her to waste no time, but to present it to Lincoln at once.⁹

She arrived in Washington in late November and began work immediately. On November 30, her maps drawn and her papers finished, she called on Colonel Scott at the War Department with a detailed plan of attack.

The civil and military authorities seem to be laboring under a grave mistake in regard to the true key of the war in the Southwest. It is not the Mississippi, but the Tennessee River. It is well known that the eastern part or the farming interests of Tennessee and Kentucky are generally loyal, while the middle and western parts, or what are known as the planting districts, are in sympathy with the traitors, but except in the extreme western part the Union sentiment still lives.

Now, all the military preparations made in the West indicate that the Mississippi River is the point to which the authorities are directing their attention. On that river many battles must be fought and heavy risks must be incurred before any impression can be made on the enemy, all of which could be avoided by using the Tennessee River. This is navigable for first-class boats to the Mississippi line, and is open to navigation all the year, while the distance is only two hundred and fifty miles by river from Paducah, on the Ohio.

The Tennessee River offers many advantages over the

Mississippi. We should avoid the most impregnable batteries of the enemy which cannot be taken without great danger and great risk of life to our forces, from the fact that our boats, if crippled, would fall a prey to the enemy by being swept by the current to them and away from the relief of our friends. But even should we succeed, still we will only have begun the war, for we shall then have to fight to the country from whence the enemy derives his supplies. Now, to advance up the Tennessee River would avoid all this danger, for if our boats were crippled they would drop back with the current to their friends and escape all damages. But an advantage still would be a tendency to cut the enemy's lines in two by reaching the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, threatening Memphis, which lies about one hundred and fifty miles due west, and no defensible point between; also Nashville, only ninety miles northeast, and Florence and Tuscumbia, in North Alabama, forty miles east. A movement in this direction would do more to relieve our friends in Kentucky, and inspire the loyal hearts in East Tennessee than the possession of the whole Mississippi River. If well executed it would cause the evacuation of all those formidable fortifications on which the rebels ground their hopes of success; and in the event of our fleet attacking Mobile, the presence of our troops in the northern part of that State would be of material benefit to the fleet. Again, the aid our forces would receive from the loyal men in Tennessee would enable them to crush the last traitor in that region, and the separation of the two extremes would do more than one hundred battles for the Union cause.

The Tennessee River is crossed by the Memphis & Louisville Railroad [the Memphis & Ohio] and the Memphis & Nashville Railroad [probably the Nashville & Decatur] at Hamburg, where the river makes the big bend to the east and touches the northeast corner of Mississippi, entering the northwest corner of Alabama, forming the arc of a circle to the south, enters the State of Tennessee at the northeast of Alabama, and if it does not touch the northwest corner of Georgia comes very near it.

It is but eight miles from Hamburg to the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, which road goes through Tuscumbia, and only two miles from the river, which it crosses at Decatur, thirty miles above, intersecting with the Nashville & Chattanooga road at Stephenson,

Alabama.

The Tennessee River never has less than three feet to Hamburg on the shoalest bar, and during the fall, winter and spring months there is always water for the largest boats that are used on the Mississippi River.

It follows from the above that in making the Mississippi the key of the war in the West, or rather in overlooking the Tennessee River, the subject is not understood by the superiors in command.¹⁰

Carroll read the paper out loud to Scott, slowly and carefully. Greatly excited by the brilliant strategy conceived by the lady from Maryland, Scott begged her to allow him to take her plan to the President, who had already read her earlier letter and who was eager to see her final draft. If it would be of aid to her country, Carroll would leave it. So assured, she left the plan with Colonel Scott.¹¹

Lincoln embraced the plan with enthusiasm. He fired Secretary of War Simon Cameron because he was too old to carry out this new strategy and brought in the unpopular but young and energetic Edwin Stanton. Stanton sent orders immediately to General Henry Halleck who had taken command of the Western Department. Halleck ordered General Ulysses Grant up the Tennessee River to the Confederates' Fort Henry and, carrying through Carroll's strategy, continued the Union advance toward the rail junction of Corinth, Mississippi. Colonel Scott was sent west by Lincoln to ensure that Halleck and Grant understood the overall strategy and carried out the plan faithfully.¹²

CARROLL'S PLAN:

SCALE: 12 miles

Carroll's Plan moved Union troops up the Tennessee River to Muscle Shoals, Alabama, near Decatur. Such a move would cut the Memphis & Ohio Railroad near Fort Henry and the Memphis & Charleston Railroad as it crossed at Decatur. This, she thought, would drive the Confederates out of Bowling Green, Nashville, and eastern Tennessee, and would give the Union control of the railroads in that region.

The importance of the successful campaign in Tennessee cannot be overestimated. With an all-encompassing sweep of hindsight, Carroll's supporters claimed that, Because of her plan, the Confederacy was cut in two, Confederate fortifications on the Mississippi were evacuated, the enemy was driven inland from the outer borders of the Confederacy, European intervention on behalf of the South was prevented, the Northwest remained in the Union, the national credit was revived, Unionist sentiment in the Border States was reinforced, contact was made with the slave population that turned them against the Confederacy and toward support for the Union cause, Missouri stayed in the Union, Vicksburg was captured, and the Union was saved.¹³

Shortly after the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson, legislators in both houses of Congress sought to reward the brilliant general whose strategy had saved the Union. Major General Halleck, Brigadier General Grant, Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell, and Flag Officer Andrew Foote were all mentioned. Anne Carroll sat in the galleries, listening to the debates with a secret smile on her face. Lincoln, Stanton, Scott and Evans all knew the secret, as did Benjamin Wade, chairman of the recently-formed Committee on the Conduct of the War. But they all knew as well the danger of allowing the identity of the author of the plan to be known. As Lincoln was poetically to have said, "The

officers would throw off their epaulets if they knew they were acting on the plan of a civilian; and good God, if they knew it was a woman, the whole army would disband!"¹⁴

So silence reigned and those who searched for a hero eventually gave up their search and resumed the business at hand. The woman whose work had saved the Union turned her own hand to other matters, not the least of which was trying to obtain payment for her pamphlets from the War Department. Only years later did Carroll reluctantly allow herself to be pulled forth from her feminine obscurity to be presented to the American people as a true hero to be recognized and liberally rewarded.

Thus had begun the fantastical legend of Anna Ella Carroll, "Lincoln's Lady Strategist," the "Great Unrecognized Member of Lincoln's Cabinet," "The Originator of the Tennessee Campaign," and, at its fullest flight of fancy, "The Woman Who Saved the Union." And thus had begun another instance of Carroll misperceiving and twisting reality until it suited her purposes.¹⁵

Against this legend stands the more commonly accepted version of events that culminated in the Tennessee River Campaign. The Union was in dire straits after the Battle of Bull Run in July 1861 and months of inaction by his generals had driven Lincoln to despair. General in Chief Winfield Scott had conceived of an overall strategy at the beginning of the war that would surround the Confederacy

with a land army and a naval blockade. With a "powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean" to cut off interior trade added to the external pressure, the "Anaconda Plan" would gradually squeeze the life out of the South.¹⁶ Control over the Mississippi was essential. It would cut the Confederacy in two, blocking food, supplies and contact from the agricultural states of Texas and Arkansas, and block importation of war materiel from the Northwest as well.¹⁷ But Scott's plan would take far too long to work. The political situation demanded a quick end to the war.

East of the Mississippi River were the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Part of their courses ran northward through Tennessee, emptying into the Ohio River. These rivers were the natural highways of the region and the Confederates were quick to fortify them. Primary fortifications were Fort Henry on the Tennessee and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland.

By September 1861, General Grant, under command of Major General John Frémont, head of the Western Department, had established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois, on the Mississippi. He had seized and reinforced the cities of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, and Smithland, at the mouth of the Cumberland.¹⁸ By mid-October, Union gunboats were reported thirty miles below Fort Henry, and the Confederates were fearful of a Union push up both rivers. The Cumberland was "in fine boating order and

rising quite fast," and would stay deep enough for gunboats through the fall and winter. William W. MacKall, Assistant-Adjutant General to General Albert Sidney Johnston, urged Confederate General Leonidas Polk to hurry and finish reinforcing Fort Donelson: "the necessity of interrupting the Cumberland is urgent." If the Union forces were to invade Tennessee by water, they would be able to push on to the Memphis and Ohio Railroad which ran from Memphis to Bowling Green, and cut this important rail connection.¹⁹

The Union forces under Grant were quite cognizant of the Confederates' fear of their designs. On November 8, Brigadier General Charles F. Smith wrote Grant from Paducah that Confederates at Fort Henry had "been under apprehension of attack from here for the past two weeks." Lieutenant S. Ledyard Phelps of the Union Navy was "constantly moving his vessel [the wooden gunboat Conestoga] up and down the Tennessee and Cumberland" to ascertain Confederate positions and strength. On November 20, Colonel Charles Whittlesey of the Corps of Engineers suggested to Halleck that a joint land and water move up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, "the most passable route into Tennessee," would threaten Confederates in Columbus, force Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner to retreat, and provide a water route halfway to Nashville, all of which would serve to drive the Confederates out of central Tennessee.²⁰

If, contrary to Carroll's assertions, the military minds in the West were aware of the strategic importance of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers; if, contrary to what she reported, preparations were being made to invade the South by these rivers rather than concentrating Union forces solely on the Mississippi, then why was there no action in the late fall and early winter of 1861? Carroll would always believe that it was her letter to the War Department on November 30 that had informed the Western Department of the value of the rivers and that her plan had prodded the Union forces into action--the action that eventually led to the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in February, 1862. But Carroll, as a civilian and an outsider, did not have the complete picture of the state of affairs in the Western theatre. It was not a lack of intelligence or strategic understanding that kept the Union forces immobile. Supply shortages, battling commanders, a lack of cooperation between army and navy, inexperienced troops and sailors, and nominal support from Washington all contributed to the Union's failure to move rapidly on the western rivers.

At the time of President Lincoln's proclamation of the naval blockade of the South, the United States Navy consisted of forty-two commissioned vessels. These were deep-water ships, totally unsuited for use on the inland waters of the war's western theatre.²¹ Navy Commander John Rodgers was sent west in May to establish naval forces on

the river. First under the command of Major General George B. McClellan, head of the Department of the Ohio, in July Rodgers fell under General Frémont's command when the the Western Department was organized. Rodgers worked hard, purchasing three river steamers in Cincinnati and pushing for their conversion into armed gunboats. Still, it was August 12 before the alterations resulted in three low-lying wooden gunboats.²² These gunboats, though usable, were not armor-plated. So in August as well, a contract was made with James B. Eads of St. Louis to build seven armor-plated gunboats to deliver downriver to Cairo. Eads had volunteered his knowledge of the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland Rivers to the government in April 1861. "Once close them," he wrote, ". . . and starvation is inevitable in six months."²³ The gunboats built by Eads' company were promised for October 10.²⁴

By September, Rodgers had been relieved by Captain Andrew H. Foote for exceeding his authority in buying the first gunboats and for being too busy to pay proper obeisance to General Frémont.²⁵ General Grant, at Cairo by September, employed the wooden gunboats provided by Rodgers in taking Paducah and Smithland, but it not until October 12 that the first ironclad was launched and available for Union use.²⁶ Captain Foote was short of money and supplies for both the wooden and the ironclad gunboats and pleaded with Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, Quartermaster-General

Montgomery Meigs, and Secretary of War Cameron for help.

"The officers and crews of the three gunboats already in commission are clamorous for their pay," he wrote. Tired of being continually placed "in a most embarrassing position," Foote nevertheless performed miracles, drafting crew members from steamboat men, Great Lakes' sailors, and even the army, promising payment for supplies, hounding his superiors,²⁷ and occasionally fighting the Confederates with skirmishes and raids on their positions along the rivers.²⁸

One of Captain Foote's problems was his rank. As a captain in the Navy, he was the equivalent of a colonel in the army. He finally requested Frémont to recommend that the Navy Department appoint him Flag Officer of the Western Flotilla, a rank designed to prevent a situation whereby "the gunboats are liable to be diverted from the service which I know you might wish, even by a volunteer colonel of a single regiment, should he happen to be in command in the vicinity of the gunboats."²⁹ Welles gave him the appointment he requested on November 13, 1861; Frémont had been removed and replaced by General Henry Halleck on November 2.³⁰

Since the beginning of the war, there had been three different army commanders, two different naval commanders, a frantic dash to buy, convert, build, equip, and man as many gunboats as possible, all while dealing with a short-sighted and occasionally recalcitrant government incapable of paying

its bills on time. The wonder was not that the Union forces had not moved by late November, when Carroll presented her plan that had supposedly enlightened them as to the "true key to the west." The wonder was that they moved at all--which they did with decisive victories after the gunboats were available. Grant and Foote both sent messages to Halleck on January 28, 1862, that they wanted to move upriver to take Fort Henry. Halleck approved their request on January 30. On February 3, Foote led his seven gunboats up the Tennessee, followed by Grant's troops on transport ships. Fort Henry fell on February 6. Grant marched overland to Fort Donelson, which fell on February 16. Ironically, the gunboats for which the Union forces had waited were almost superfluous. Fort Henry had been practically abandoned by the Confederates, but still, it was so quickly reduced by Foote's fire that Grant's troops were not needed. Fort Donelson's batteries, on the other hand, nearly destroyed Foote's squadron, and it had to retreat to let the army have its day.³¹

If the strategy of invading the Confederacy by way of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers was well established prior to Carroll's trip to St. Louis; if actions had been delayed due to logistics instead of strategic incompetence, how did the legend of Carroll as "Lincoln's Secret Weapon" begin, and how did it maintain itself in what has become one of the most thoroughly studied and documented periods of

American history?³²

The legend began with Carroll herself. As always, whenever an event occurred in which she could legitimately claim a small part, Carroll's ego soon enlarged her contributions to monumental proportions. Thus, she wrote Lincoln in the summer of 1862, "I became satisfied that the effort then making to open and hold the Mississippi by an expedition downward could not succeed, and that the true key, was the Tennessee river I impressed these views upon military men, wherever I met them, until I returned to this city, the latter part of November, when I gave the result of my observation to the Government" As far as Carroll was concerned (and as a civilian untutored in military matters it was not an unreasonable belief on her part), that campaign in Tennessee in the winter of 1861-1862 had come from her ideas presented on November 30. "If this expedition was planned . . . upon any other suggestions," she wrote, or "if it originated with any one else, I am not aware of it." More important, "if the plan of the Western campaign was based upon the facts, furnished by me, to the Secretary of War . . . I ought now to have a substantial and liberal recognition of this service."³³

Herein lay the crux of the matter. As always, Carroll was trying to make a living. The war had provided her with an unprecedented opportunity as a writer, and apparently her agreement with Colonel Scott had prompted her

trip to St. Louis. Since her military strategy had been presented in written form, no doubt Carroll had decided that any intellectual labor, particularly one with such monumental results for the Union, would be compensable under her agreement with Scott.³⁴ In July, 1862, six months after her second pamphlet supporting the President's policies had been issued, Carroll had not yet been compensated for her work. The handsome Scott, whom Postmaster-General Montgomery Blair had once characterized as a "corrupt lobby-jobber from Philadelphia," may have overstepped his authority when promising Carroll payment for her approved pamphlets.³⁵ Scott was gallant enough to admit to the oral contract, saying that all his "interviews with Miss Carroll were in my official capacity as Assistant Secretary of War, and in that capacity I would have allowed, and believed she should be paid, the amount of her bill"³⁶ The bill had been partially paid, but that payment was out of Scott's own pocket.³⁷ "Reply to Breckinridge" had been circulated at a cost of \$1,250, which Scott had given Carroll; The War Powers and "Reply to Sumner" would cost the government \$5,000 more. While a bit steep, the bill for the pamphlets was not outrageously so, and, moreover, Carroll had done the work.

What Scott could not have foreseen was the rapid rise of inflation. The War Powers, Carroll declared to Lincoln, "was destined to stand, as long as the Declaration

of Independence" Accordingly, when she "considered the time and labor the document had cost me . . . I thought, fifty thousand dollars a small sum."³⁸ Carroll had mentioned this mind-boggling sum earlier in a letter to Scott's replacement in the War Department, Assistant Secretary John Tucker (Scott had been sent west early in 1862 to ascertain the condition of troops and railroads for the new Secretary of War, Edwin Stanton).³⁹ By July, when she met with Lincoln and read a paper considering her claim aloud to him, she had modified her bill somewhat by including a proposal that she make a trip to Europe to disseminate Union propaganda. Lincoln, whose own salary was but \$25,000 per annum, told her he thought her proposition "'the most outrageous one ever made to any government on earth,'" to which Carroll had responded stiffly that "the difference between us, was in our views, upon the value of intellectual labor, in the administration of government."

The interview was closed, but the story got out and Carroll was mortified to hear her proposition and Lincoln's reply discussed "at a public dinner table in a Washington Hotel" It was clear, she thought, that the President had misunderstood her proposition. The sum was vast, but considering the \$5,000 already owed her, the cost of journeying to Europe, finding a place to stay, keeping herself (with no doubt at least one servant to keep house while she wrote) and then arranging for the publication and

"circulation of my documents among the millions" in Europe, \$50,000 was "a very reasonable sum." She warned the President, scattering her commas heedlessly:

". . . physical force, alone, however strong it may be, can never bring this war, to a successful termination; unless, you avail yourself, of intellect, to make clear to the popular mind, the issue, about which, the country, is now, at war." There was not any "fair minded man" alive who would call her bill "absurd, or unjust." If it was too high, the error was not hers, "but that of the friends of yourself, and of the country," who had approved it. But, if he could not bring himself to admit the value of her noble service to the Union cause, she would continue with love of country in her heart, "to labor for the salvation of our liberties to the very extent of my ability, as heretofore without any pecuniary reward, or the hope of any."⁴⁰

There is no indication in this letter to Lincoln that Carroll had included in her proposition a bill for her services as a strategist. In truth, her conscience may have been nagging at her, however briefly. For the Tennessee Campaign, the most long-lasting claim to fame Anne Carroll ever possessed in her constant search for power and recognition, was not solely her idea. While denying Carroll's claim as a military strategist in terms of timeliness has been common among historians, few realized that the plan's most salient features were most likely

plagiarized from the work of her contact in St. Louis, Charles M. Scott.⁴¹

Charles Scott was a Mississippi riverboat pilot. Unlike the vast majority of his colleagues, Scott stayed with the Union in 1861. He had fled New Orleans at the outbreak of the war and made it up the Mississippi to Memphis, where he was captured by Brigadier General Gideon Pillow. Refusing to swear allegiance to the Confederacy, he escaped from custody and made his way to Cairo, Illinois, by June 19. He described the Confederate batteries he had seen in the Memphis area to Union officials, then went on to St. Louis to escort his family to Ohio for safety.⁴²

Scott's version of the events that led to the development of an organized plan to invade the South by using the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers differed a bit from Carroll's story. When Scott heard Grant had been given a command in Cairo, he returned to the area in late September and volunteered his abilities as a pilot. He knew the topography of the area well, having been a keel-boatman on the Tennessee and having hunted in the area around the Cumberland as a boy. He had often discussed the usefulness of the rivers as invasion routes with loyalist friends, but did not discuss the strategy with Grant because he thought Grant would soon be removed from command. He was, however, willing to share information on the river defenses with the General, and had served Grant as a pilot of one of the

transports at the Battle of Belmont on November 7. His "front seat" at the raid had bothered him enough that, suffering from insomnia, he betook himself to write a letter to his wife, Anna, who had come back to St. Louis to be nearer Scott. Anna received the letter November 10 and shared it with the other ladies at the hotel's dining room. One of the ladies present was Anne Carroll.⁴³

Why Carroll was in St. Louis is unclear. She may have gone there, as she claimed, to survey the territory and report back to Colonel Scott in the War Department. She did have relatives in St. Louis, but clearly was not staying with them (purportedly her sister-in-law's family, who were first cousins of Carroll's, were secessionist).⁴⁴ She may have merely come along with Lemuel Evans, who seems to have been on a legitimate mission for Seward. At any rate, Carroll talked to Evans about the letter Mrs. Scott had received, and Evans requested a meeting with the pilot. The following Sunday, November 17, Scott met both Carroll and Evans.

One conversation led to another, and before long Scott was telling Evans and Carroll (after assurances both were "agents of the government"⁴⁵) that the "true key to the West" was the Tennessee River and that the Mississippi was too heavily fortified to allow an invasion downstream. Evans knew enough about the topography of the area to understand Scott's opinion and know its value. He urged

Scott to communicate it to the authorities, but Scott protested that he "was not a good writer anyhow." Carroll, an almost silent partner to the conversation because of her deafness, was leaving the next day "with dispatches" for Washington. Scott, said Evans, could write to her, and she would place his plan before the War Department.⁴⁶

Scott wrote to Carroll twice, sending the first letter about November 23, the second about December 15. By mid-December his opinion of Grant's staying-power had improved, and he decided to share the plan with him as well in hopes "it might lead to something, perhaps to a command [by Grant] of the expedition."⁴⁷ By February 4, he wrote his wife that the Union forces were "in sight of Fort Henry I think that this move is the beginning of My Plan that I wrote to Miss Carroll at least it looks so."⁴⁸ After the fall of Fort Henry on the 6th, he was convinced that "we will continue on untill [sic] we reach the State of Mississippi when I think we will end the War by taking the Memphis and Charleston Rail Road."⁴⁹ Scott's optimism was premature, but Union forces did continue to move south toward the railroad center at Corinth, Mississippi. Scott continued to write to Carroll as well as his wife. Carroll passed along ideas and strategy to Stanton. Scott's brother, E. A. Scott, also corresponded with Carroll. Through him, she gained access to Charles's letters to his wife Anna, with their descriptions of battles and army

life.⁵⁰

Charles Scott wrote vividly and well of his experiences, in spite of what he saw as a "deficiency in grammar, that causes him to smother his writings."⁵¹ His letters portray a man who loved his country and sought to serve its interests. He sent a detailed account of the navigability of the Illinois River to Representative Frank P. Blair, along with the promise of more information on western waterways if it was needed. But, he wrote Blair, "I wish you to distinctly understand that I am not an Applicant for office direct or Indirect but am only Influenced by the hope that I may do some good by giving the facts to you."⁵² In fact, when Carroll proposed she use her influence to get him a position, Scott told her he was "unfit by Education for any office in . . . Government but that of the Lowest," and he did not want to take jobs away from those more competent, or from those more needy, such as wounded Union soldiers.⁵³ His job as pilot, while not as lucrative as he could wish, nevertheless provided him with what he needed.

Scott wrote to Carroll throughout 1862, sending her his opinions of military strategy. He thought delaying the Union move up the Tennessee to take Fort Donelson had been an error that delayed the capture of Vicksburg unnecessarily (a view that failed to take into account the obvious threat posed to Union forces by Confederate troops from the fort if

left unreduced).⁵⁴ He also thought that a Union victory in the eastern theatre would send Confederates fleeing into Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas, and eventually Mexico. Gunboats at the mouths of the Red and Arkansas Rivers, and in the Yazoo River would help control the area.⁵⁵ Carroll passed along his comments to the War Department. Sometimes she credited him, as in one letter to Stanton in which she praised Scott's "incalculable service" and requested Stanton to promote him to the Surveyorship of New Orleans (a post for which Scott may have been qualified but hardly would have wanted).⁵⁶ Sometimes she did not credit him, as with the November 30 letter that first set out the Tennessee Plan, and in the letters to Lincoln in which she first wrote of her skills as a strategist in developing that plan.

The cordial relationship Carroll and Scott enjoyed may have been what kept Carroll from pushing herself too strongly as sole author of the plan. While the two letters she wrote to Lincoln in late June and early July 1862 made no mention of Scott as the source of her information, a safe assumption might also be that Lincoln was never read the second half of the letter wherein Carroll's claim as sole strategist was laid out. A Lincoln angry at Carroll's proposition to be paid \$50,000 for her literary services was not a man to be given an additional bill for strategic services rendered. Carroll quite possibly might have stopped her reading at Lincoln's evaluation of her demand as

"outrageous" and left his presence. Hot-tempered as she was, she was politically prudent enough to know when to retreat temporarily from an unpopular cause. As for Scott, he made no mention of feeling slighted (if he knew of her attempts) and expressed no desire to be paid for his services as a strategist.

Carroll had also written to Colonel Scott and to John Tucker in the War Department in the spring and summer of 1862, seeking payment for her pamphlets, and none of the letters that survive mention her military claim; her demands are for payment "for time, labor and means expended" in producing her pamphlets.⁵⁷ Given Lincoln's reaction to her literary claims, Carroll probably simply decided she would be pushing her luck to demand payment for a plan of military strategy. Being a civilian and a woman would guarantee her little support should she choose to stake such a claim, particularly without Lincoln's support, and particularly if she chose to ignore Scott's role, since she had already mentioned his work to the War Department. Thus, in a letter to Stanton in September, she made no mention of her strategy of the previous year, but instead concentrated on her past pamphlets and on future sales: "I believe in my work on the War Powers of this government I was the first writer who succeeded in placing the power of the government to make arrests for political offenses and to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus on its true foundation!" This claim

to premiership, Carroll argued, not only should be liberally rewarded, but she would be pleased to expand the circulation of The War Powers, or, "better still . . . write a new paper, specially on the powers of the Executive to suspend the Writ . . . and to arrest political offenders."⁵⁸

Colonel Scott, responsible for Carroll's monetary predicament, was still avoiding her in October of 1862. "If I had known where to find you," he wrote her after she had tracked him down in Philadelphia, he would have called. He was "gratified" to learn that her pamphlets had been deemed useful to the cause, and he "sincerely" hoped "that you will be able through Mr. Tucker to finally arrange your matters with the department."⁵⁹ Her financial status had also worsened by this time with the collapse of her colonization plans with A. C. Burr for the Lincoln Colony in British Honduras. But in spite of her tentative attempt to bill the government for her military strategy, and in spite of her straitened finances, Carroll seems to have thought better of making her claim an issue. By the end of the war, in fact, she wrote a letter praising Captain Scott's work, deeming it "a pleasant duty to make known to the American people how much they are indebted to Captain Charles M. Scott for the crowning victory which now thrills with joy every patriot . . .

when the history shall be correctly written it will be obliged to treat the campaign up the Tennessee River

as the turning point which decided the triumph of the Union over treason and rebellion, and that this campaign was the result of the information herewith submitted [by Scott] was fully confirmed by . . . Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, to whom the country is incalculably indebted for inaugurating the movement."⁶⁰

This letter of Carroll's in the National Intelligencer not only recognized Charles Scott's hand in developing the plan, but also (mistakenly) credited Thomas Scott with the plan's implementation because of his trip west shortly after she sent the plan to the War Department. A gracious gesture by Carroll, or so it seemed. But in 1876, when Carroll and Charles Scott faced each other in a Congressional hearing on her claim to be the sole author of the Tennessee Campaign, Carroll's gracious attempt to give credit where credit was assumed due began to acquire a distinct odor of deviousness.⁶¹

According to his testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs in 1876, Scott had appeared in Washington a day or so before the letter praising him was printed. He had come to ask for help from General Grant or anyone else with influence to help him obtain relief from a 25 per cent duty on 1,000 bales of cotton. Scott had lost money in the war: he had worked for a lower salary to serve the Union, and, when captured by General Pillow in the summer of 1861, he had received a certificate of valuation for his steamer that his partners had traded for cotton. If he could get the cotton through the lines and sell it

duty-free, he decided, that would even things up.⁶² He wrote to Carroll and called on her and Lemuel Evans, two persons who had no doubt given him the impression they had considerable influence with various high-ranking officials in Washington. There with Carroll, Evans wrote out a permit, Scott testified, that gave him permission to bring in 10,000 bales duty-free. Scott handed it back, but Evans assured him that "everybody else was doing it and proposed that I should give him an interest in it": half of the profit from the extra 9,000 bales would go to Evans--and half of that to Carroll. Scott refused the permit "in toto" and left.⁶³

A few days later, the letter signed by Carroll praising Scott appeared in the National Intelligencer. The author's motivation might have been the highly noble one of honest praise. More likely, though, it was an attempt to bribe Scott with recognition in hopes of getting him to return for the 10,000-bale permit or, at the least, to keep him from disclosing Evans's dishonesty. Apparently the article attracted Scott's attention, for the three met again. Carroll, Scott said, "began to soft soap me," telling him that she and Judge Evans had written the article so they could garner public support for a claim to Congress. They would "engineer it through" in Scott's name, and Scott would divide the proceeds with them. "I told them I had only done my duty and all I asked was the privilege of

bringing in my cotton"64 The "thing dropped right there" and Scott returned to the West. His cotton claim was lost in the shuffle of bureaucracy.⁶⁵

Carroll's version of the circumstances which had prompted her generous letter was a bit different. She granted that Scott had come to Washington for help in securing his cotton, worth about \$30,000. Scott, she said, had offered her one-fourth of the \$30,000 for her help, which consisted of her going to the Treasury Department and sending him the regulations. She then wrote him that "when he complied with them he could get his cotton without tax."⁶⁶ She asked for nothing and received nothing for her aid. As for the article in the National Intelligencer, Carroll had not even written it; Lemuel Evans had. And Scott had paid the paper \$35.00 to guarantee its insertion.⁶⁷ Evans, for his part, testified that Scott had asked him for a permit for the cotton (this in spite of Carroll's assertion moments earlier that "no papers were drawn; none were needed," and in spite of her letter to Scott in which she told him she had sent him the "authority" he needed). Evans admitted that he "may have suggested the form for his application," but that would have been only to Carroll and would be "in her handwriting." As for the article, it was written "not only to do Captain Scott justice, but also to give him prominence and standing, as he complained of injustice having been done him."⁶⁸

Scott's sense of injustice had been building for a long time. Of 128 St. Louis and New Orleans pilots, he had been one of only five Union men. He had had to take a pay cut during the war from \$300 to \$250 per month.⁶⁹ After the war, when he tried to return to work as a pilot, he had had trouble getting work: "a steamboat agent in New Orleans told me he would not ship freight on a boat that I was connected with, and would use his best influence to prevent others also."⁷⁰ He had lost his steamer to the Confederates, had lost his cotton that was the steamer's exchange, and had lost his temper when he discovered in the late 1860s that Carroll had begun promoting herself as "claimant for remuneration for originating the Tennessee campaign."⁷¹

By 1872, Carroll's claim had acquired newspaper support, congressional support, and pamphlet support. Apparently, Scott decided to try his luck before Congress as well. Carroll had failed him (he thanked her for trying to find him a position--she did not succeed), but his overall motive was not revenge.⁷² As their mutual acquaintance L. S. McCoy wrote Carroll, Scott was after money. He had "little faith in the generosity of Claim grants," or whether his petition would work, but financial woes and a pushy brother-in-law (a "Mr. Fish") had convinced him to take his claim to the government. He "would prefer to have your & the Judge's [Evans] cooperation if it can be conveniently

had," wrote McCoy,⁷³ and Scott reassured Carroll that "I do not believe that I will injure your claim, but rather strengthen it if you like the idea I think you can make more out of it (my claim) than you can out of your own,"⁷⁴ presumably referring to the three-way split Evans had allegedly offered in 1865.

Scott underestimated Carroll's ability to make something momentous out of something miniscule, however. By 1876, while Scott's claim had gone nowhere, Carroll had turned her original \$5,000 claim into a request for \$250,000 "as compensation for originating the Tennessee Campaign."⁷⁵ Carroll faced an angry and embittered Scott in that Congressional hearing and won hands down.

Both Carroll's and Scott's claims to be the authors of the Tennessee Campaign rest primarily on circumstantial evidence. While Carroll would continue to build on her shaky foundations until her elaborate tale hid its questionable core, Scott retired from the fray. Only in 1889 was he again driven to make public his part in the Tennessee campaign, when he published a pamphlet regarding Carroll's "Fradulent" [sic] claim. He deemed it his duty, he wrote in his introduction, "to prevent this raid on the Treasury that I am sure is being prepared for during the present administration."⁷⁶ Scott included selected portions of the House Document that had been published after the 1876 hearing, letters of endorsement for his "valuable

information" from both Grant and Acting Rear Admiral S. P. Lee in support of his contention that the strategy was his rather than Carroll's, and a letter in which he had promised Carroll that if she did not desist in her claim, he would "take means to explode it."⁷⁷ To make his position appear as disinterested as possible, Scott even included a petition "gotten up by my steamboat friends" some years earlier that had requested a pension for him for his invention of a signal system used by passing boats, a "BOILER IRON PROTECTOR" he had invented, and for his "valuable information to those in charge of the Tennessee Campaign." The pension request had "died a natural death" and Scott swore he had had no part in getting it up. Moreover, he had only mentioned it before the hearing "to show the standing in which I have been held."⁷⁸ In fact, Scott had told the House Committee that while he had not come before them "expecting pay for doing my duty as a loyal man," justice demanded that he should be given credit as the the campaign's originator, "and if your honorable body think that any compensation is due the author, I claim that that compensation is due to your petitioner."⁷⁹

As far as Scott, Evans, Carroll and the cotton claim were concerned, Scott printed only his version of events in his pamphlet, but with Carroll's history of self-puffery, pretensions to influence and the lingering aroma of con-artistry that survived from her days in New York,

Scott's accusations ring true. Given Carroll's constant need of money, if Scott's offer of one-fourth the value of the cotton (\$7500) for her help had been made, as she claimed it had, she would have taken it. Since she swore she did not, "nor did I ever think it worth while to inquire," the greedier version of Scott's claim that Evans had offered to obtain a tax exemption for him in exchange for a half share of the profits to split with Carroll certainly seems more likely.⁸⁰

There is no question that both Scott and Carroll had an equal share in developing what they called their "Tennessee Campaign." Scott was an experienced pilot and a strong Unionist who took every opportunity to help the war effort. No doubt he did discuss the western waterways with Grant or other Union men. And Carroll did have enough access to Colonel Scott in the War Department to present the well-written and strategically sound plan she, Scott, and Evans had developed, as well as enough initiative to write to Stanton and Lincoln to pass along Scott's information and tell them how to run the war. But as far as either one of them materially affecting the outcome of the war by the submission of the "Tennessee Campaign Plan," both strategists were too late in their actions. General Grant made that clear in a letter to his friend, Representative Elihu B. Washburne:

I see the credit of attacking the enemy by the way of the Tennessee and Cumberland is variously attributed! It is little to talk about it being the great wisdom of any Gen. that first brought forth this plan of attack.

Our gunboats were running up the Ten. and Cumberland rivers all fall and winter watching the progress of the rebels on these works. Gen. Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago and I am shure [sic] I did.⁸¹

The Union leaders knew of the importance of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. The Confederates had built Forts Henry and Donelson because of the strategic importance of those rivers. The army knew their importance, the navy knew their importance, even the New York Times had printed a letter that not only detailed the importance of the rivers as alternate routes to the Mississippi, but mentioned the possibility of cutting the Charleston and Memphis Railroad by going up those rivers. That letter was published before Carroll had even returned to Washington in late November 1861. As for her comments regarding the importance of relieving loyalists in Tennessee and Kentucky, they were hardly original either. Lincoln was well aware of the importance of those areas to the Union cause by September 1861. Simply put, given the time constraints within which Carroll and Scott both placed their actions, neither one can be taken seriously by military historians as unsung heroes who had saved the Union by their brilliant strategy.⁸²

But Carroll took herself very seriously as precisely such a figure. Obsessed with a desire for recognition and

payment, once again twisting and turning the truth till it bent to fit her perception of it, Carroll sought the recognition by the world of her claim. From the fall of Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862 until her death thirty-two years later, Carroll's other interests gradually faded away until her desire for recognition became her consuming passion.

Notes

¹Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862, 2 July 1862, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. These are drafts of the same letter with two different dates on it. There is no corroborative evidence that Carroll and Lincoln met, but since Carroll later quoted Lincoln's remark in a letter, no doubt the meeting took place. See n. 40 below.

²Lemuel D. Evans to William Henry Seward, 7 September 1861, Carroll Papers.

³Anna Ella Carroll, "Plan of the Tennessee Campaign," North American Review 42 (April 1886):344.

⁴Ibid., pp. 343-344.

⁵Ibid., p. 344.

⁶H. R. Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll; The Originator of the Tennessee Campaign," Outing 6 (July 1885):407.

⁷Marvin R. Cain, Lincoln's Attorney General: Edward Bates of Missouri (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1965), pp. 137-138.

⁸Carroll, "Plan," p. 345.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Carroll was mistaken when she talked of a Memphis & Nashville railroad at Hamburg. No such railroad existed. She was most likely referring to the Nashville & Decatur Railroad, further to the east. The original text of Carroll's plan was reprinted a number of times. Each version has minor changes in the text, but they are all virtually identical. There is one version, in what is presumably the hand of a professional amanuensis, in Carroll's papers. See Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas A. Scott, 10 January 1862, Carroll Papers. The version cited here is from Charles M. Scott, The Origin of the Tennessee Campaign, by Capt. Charles M. Scott, As a Refutation of the Fraudulent Claim of Miss Anna Ella Carroll [sic] (Terre Haute, Indiana: Moore & Langen, 1889), pp. 12-14.

¹¹Carroll, "Plan," p. 345.

¹²Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," pp. 406, 407; Carroll, "Plan," p. 347.

¹³[Lemuel D. Evans], The Material Bearing of the Tennessee Campaign in 1862 upon the Destinies of Our Civil War (Washington, DC: W. H. Moore, n.d. [circa 1872]) lists the effects of the plan's strategy most comprehensively. See also Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll" and Carroll, "Plan," as well as the entry for Carroll in the National Cyclopaedia of American Biography 62 vols. (New York: James T. White & Co., 1893-1984), 5(1984):193.

¹⁴Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 409. Lincoln's reaction is given in various words. This is the most dramatic, and was taken from an interview conducted with Carroll late in her life. Since Carroll did not meet with Lincoln regarding the plan, and no direct evidence of Lincoln's reaction survives, all quotations of this kind can be regarded as poetical in nature.

¹⁵"Lincoln's Lady Strategist," Life 25 (26 July 1948):101-102; Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, My Dear Lady: The Story of Anna Ella Carroll, the "Great Unrecognized Member of Lincoln's Cabinet" (New York: McGraw Hill, 1940), Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 403; Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Lincoln Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp. 48-49.

¹⁶The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1880-1902), Series I, 51(1897), pt. 1, pp. 369-370; 386-387. (Hereafter cited as OR.)

¹⁷Virgil Carrington Jones, The Civil War at Sea, 3 vols. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, Winston, 1960), 1:184, 216; Richard S. West, Jr., Mr. Lincoln's Navy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957), pp. 158-161.

¹⁸OR, Series I, 4(1882):457-458, 408; Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U .S. Grant, 2 vols. (New York: Charles L. Webster & Co., 1885), 1:264-267.

¹⁹OR, Series I, 4:456, 457-458, 456, 459-462.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 345-346; Bern Anderson, By Sea and By River: The Naval History of the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962; reprint edition, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 88. Whittlesey's

letter to Halleck suggested that a joint land and water move up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, "the most passable route into Tennessee," would threaten Confederates at Columbus, force Confederate General Buckner to retreat, and provide a water route halfway to Nashville, thus pushing the Confederates out of Tennessee. The letter was dated 20 November 1861. OR, Series I, 7:440.

²¹West, Mr. Lincoln's Navy, p. 45.

²²Civil War Naval Chronology 1861-1865, compiled by the U. S. Naval Department, Naval History Division (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), p. 14; Alfred T. Mahan, The Gulf and Inland Waters (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883), p. 12. Missouri was added to the Department of the Ohio 6 June 1861; the Western Department was constituted 3 July 1861, made up of Illinois and all states west of the Mississippi River to the Rocky Mountains. See Mark M. Boatner, III, Civil War Dictionary (New York: McKay Co., 1959), pp. 606, 903.

²³Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, 27 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1894-1917), Series I, 22(1908):279. (Hereafter cited as ORN.)

²⁴Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, p. 13.

²⁵ORN, Series I, 22:284-285, 195, 277, 307-308.

²⁶Grant, Memoirs, 1:264; Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, p. 16.

²⁷ORN, Series I, 22:355-356, 369, 375, 378; Mahan, Gulf and Inland Waters, p. 16.

²⁸ORN, Series I, 22:379-384 discusses the raid on Eddyville on the Cumberland River, 26-28 October 1861. The raid on Belmont 7 November 1861 on the Mississippi River. Ibid., pp. 398-406.

²⁹Ibid., p. 388-389.

³⁰J. G. Randall and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, 2d ed. (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath & Co., 1969), pp. 371-372.

³¹Eads had had to threaten a work stoppage on the iron-clads "for want of funds" in late October. See ORN, Series I, 22:378. E. B. Long pointed out the difficulties

in the Western Department in "Anna Ella Carroll: Exaggerated Heroine?" Civil War Times Illustrated 14 (July 1975):33-35. For correspondence of Grant and Foote with Halleck and the reports on the capture of Fort Henry, see OR, Series I, 7:119-416. See also Bruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword (New York: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 141-142, 146-147.

³²This denomination of Carroll is from a juvenile biography: Winifred E. Wise, Lincoln's Secret Weapon (New York: Chilton Co., 1961).

³³Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June 1862, Carroll Papers.

³⁴See Anna Ella Carroll, Claim against Government, October-November 1861, MDHS 3650-176, Carroll Papers.

³⁵Howard K. Beale, ed., Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, 3 vols. (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1960), 1:127. While adequate as an employee in the War Department, Scott had also continued his position, unpaid, as the Vice-President of the Pennsylvania Railroad. The railroad obtained a number of lucrative contracts from the government during Scott's tenure. See Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1946), pp. 220-221.

³⁶Thomas A. Scott, statement dated 28 January 1863, cited in Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius: Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1891), p. 125. See also Thomas A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll [?], 2-28 January 1863, Carroll Papers.

³⁷Anna Ella Carroll, Claim against Government, 2 January 1863, MDHS 3650-183, Carroll Papers.

³⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 21 June and 2 July 1862, Carroll Papers. The first of these two letters is obviously a draft; the second is an incomplete copy of the first, but does contain a notation by Carroll that it was read to Lincoln, presumably about July 2.

³⁹Anna Ella Carroll to John Tucker, 26 March 1862, Carroll Papers; Samuel Richey Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1940), pp. 85-86.

⁴⁰F. Lauriston Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and Her 'Modest' Claim," Lincoln Herald 50 (October 1948):5; Anna

Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 14 August 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (microfilm).

⁴¹See, for example, Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and Her 'Modest' Claim"; E. B. Long, "Anna Ella Carroll: Exaggerated Heroine?" pp. 28-35; Kenneth P. Williams, "The Tennessee River Campaign and Anna Ella Carroll," Indiana Magazine of History 46 (September 1950):221-248.

⁴²Scott, Origin, pp. 6-7.

⁴³U. S. Grant to Captain Scott, 18 March 1865 and U. S. Grant to Board of Inspectors, 15 April 1862, both cited in Scott, Origin, p. 29. Neither of these letters appears in Grant's papers. See also Scott, Origin, p. 7.

⁴⁴Elias Jones, Revised History of Dorchester County, Maryland (Baltimore: Read-Taylor Press, 1925), p. 297; Greenbie, My Dear Lady, p. 132.

⁴⁵Scott, Origin, p. 8.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 9.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Charles M. Scott to Anna Scott, 4 February 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁹Charles M. Scott to Anna Scott, 7 February, 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁰E. A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 24 March 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵¹E. A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 25 May 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵²Charles M. Scott to Frank P. Blair, 31 May 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵³Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 July 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁴Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 2 May 1862, Carroll Papers; Williams, "The Tennessee River Campaign," p. 245.

⁵⁵Ibid. See also Charles M. Scott, Extracts, 23

March 1862 through 7 June 1863, MDHS 3650-202, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin Stanton, 14 May 1862, Carroll Papers and Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll, Craddock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. (Hereafter cited as CCJ Collection.)

⁵⁷Anna Ella Carroll to John Tucker, 26 March 1862, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas A. Scott, 7 June 1862, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to John Tucker, 30 June 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin Stanton, 9 September 1862, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁵⁹Thomas A. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 27 October 1862, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁰Anna Ella Carroll, (Washington) National Intelligencer, 12 April 1865.

⁶¹The hearing before the House Committee on Military Affairs was held 11 July 1876. The proceedings were the following August. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Petition of Anna Ella Carroll for Compensation for Services Rendered to the War Department during the Late War, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1876, H. Mis. Doc. 179. (Hereafter cited as HR Doc. 179.)

⁶²Scott, Origin, p. 10. Ludwell H. Johnson, "Northern Profits and Profiteers: The Cotton Rings of 1864-1865," Civil War History 12 (June 1966) cites one instance in October 1864 where 1500 bales of cotton was worth \$1 million. If so, Scott's cotton could have been worth about \$650,000. Of course the price of cotton, as with all commodities, varied greatly year to year. Presumably that figure would be a gross rather than net worth, without accounting for the costs of transportation, taxes and bribery of army and government officials for expediting its way through Union lines. See pp. 101, 102, 106, 114.

⁶³Scott, Origin, p. 19.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Scott claimed he left Carroll's and found General Grant, who took him to see Lincoln on "the very day" of his death. Lincoln took his papers and promised him a permit if

they were in order. Scott had run out of money and had to leave Washington that evening. He heard of the President's death at Harrisburg the next day. His papers were never found. See Scott, Origin, pp. 19-20. There is no corroborative evidence for Scott's statements. Lincoln did see Grant that day, but there is no mention of Scott then, or at any time in the previous few weeks. Earl Schenck Miers, ed. Lincoln Day By Day, A Chronology 1809-1865, 3 vols. (Washington, DC: Lincoln Sesquicentennial Commission, 1960), 3:320-330.

⁶⁶HR Doc. 179, p. 11.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 12. Carroll's claim that Scott paid to have the letter inserted was probably false. The letter was printed under the heading "Voluntary Communication." Such items were solicited and paid for by the National Intelligencer. See front page, National Intelligencer, 12 April 1865 and any issue.

⁶⁸HR Doc. 179, pp. 11, 30, 31.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 115.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 117.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 122.

⁷²[Evans], Material Bearing; letter to editor cited by Scott, HR Doc. 179, p. 122; letters from Samuel Hunt to Anna Ella Carroll throughout 1871 and 1872 in the Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection. Scott wished Carroll good luck on her claim and expressed his gratitude for her patronage search on his behalf in Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 January 1870, Carroll Papers.

⁷³L. S. McCoy to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 March 1872, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁷⁴Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 March 1872, cited in HR Doc. 179, p. 116.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 121.

⁷⁶Scott, Origin, p. 3.

⁷⁷U. S. Grant to Captain Scott, 18 March 1865, U. S. Grant to Board of Inspectors, 15 April 1862, S. P. Lee to Captain Scott, 1 March 1865, all cited in Scott, Origin, pp. 29, 30, 31.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 37.

⁷⁹HR Doc. 179, p. 122.

⁸⁰Carroll had warned Scott not to breathe a word of his business in cotton, "for the reason that the Treasury Department gives all its instructions secretly and they do this to cut off all illicit trade." Anna Ella Carroll to Charles M. Scott, n.d., reprinted in HR Doc. 179, p. 30. See also Scott, Origin, p. 26.

⁸¹U. S. Grant to Elihu B. Washburne, 22 March 1862, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 14 vols. (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-), 4:409; see also Bruce Catton, Grant Moves South (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1960), pp. 123-126.

⁸²Two letters in the New York Times detail the same strategic importance of the rivers, including mention of their navigability and their closeness to the Memphis & Charleston Railroad. See Correspondence signed "Tennessean," New York Times, 17 November 1861 [the most complete of the two of the strategy and remarkably similar in information content to Carroll's Plan] and 21 December 1861. The author of the articles reported giving the information to a "loyal gentleman of some military experience in June 1861. For Lincoln's views on the importance of relieving Unionists in the Border States, see Roy P. Basler, ed. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1953), 4:532; OR, Series I, 52: pt. 1, pp. 191-192 contains Lincoln's overall plan regarding the Western Theatre. It is not dated, but was written prior to 5 October 1861. See Chapter 7 below for the conclusions of Civil War historians such as Kenneth Williams and E. B. Long regarding Carroll's claim.

Chapter 6

The Search for Vindication

Gratified by the success of the federal armies in the western theatre moving in apparent response to her plan, Anne Carroll continued to make suggestions of military strategy to the War Department in the spring of 1862. On May 2, she gave the government information Charles Scott had sent her that skiffs and canoes were being sent to the Yazoo River. Fearing that Confederates would flee down the Yazoo to the Mississippi and thence to Texas and Mexico, Scott suggested the Yazoo be watched with federal gunboats. On May 14, Carroll wrote again, reiterating Scott's comments on the necessity of guarding the Yazoo and recommending the occupation of Vicksburg. General Henry Halleck was creeping toward Corinth, and the "impending battle in North Mississippi" would force the enemy to retreat to Vicksburg, she reasoned, so they could take the railroad from there to escape into Texas.¹

Carroll's continued assumption that the Confederates would be driven west of the Mississippi rather than retreating south from Corinth by either the Tombigbee River or the Mobile & Ohio Railroad, might have been due to the influence of her Texan friend, Lemuel Evans. Evans is an important but shadowy figure in Carroll's history. They had met when he took office as an American Party Congressman in 1855; they had travelled together to St. Louis in October 1861. They corresponded frequently when separated from each other. Unfortunately, only a few of Evans' letters survive in Carroll's papers. Though she remained "Miss Carroll" to him until his death in 1877, the nineteenth-century formality did not hide the intimacy of their friendship. Whether there was an additional tie is difficult to judge. Carroll had once told Thurlow Weed that she would go to Mexico with Evans if he was appointed Minister.² Her journey with him to St. Louis was apparently with no other companion or chaperone, but that was not unheard of even in the early days of the war.³ She travelled with him to Texas and cared for him during an illness. Their relationship, although very close, was public enough for her to discuss him with her family, including her father, and for former senator from Connecticut Truman Smith to tease Evans to "give my love to Miss Carroll if you dare!"⁴ Either Carroll presumed her age and her known political activities would protect her from gossip regarding Evans, or

she did not care what rumors flew. She had found a man who shared her political views, who championed her cause, and who probably helped assuage her pain at the death of John Causin.

By March 1862, Evans returned to Washington where he remained near Carroll for most of the rest of the war. He had discovered that the Union had no plans to attack Texas, and being thus "satisfied that I can no longer render adequate service," he had resigned his State Department commission of the previous August.⁵ Carroll continued to write for the war effort, but her attempts to contribute were soon rejected. Although Evans told the new Secretary of War Stanton that an agreement had existed between Carroll and the War Department, Thomas Scott had left June 1, 1862, and Carroll now dealt with Assistant Secretary Peter H. Watson, who proved less than amiable regarding her ideas.⁶ In July and August she resubmitted her bill for \$5,000 for work already done; on September 9, she suggested another pamphlet for the Department's consideration. In January 1863, she submitted her bill again, this time adjusted upward to \$6,250, noting that Thomas Scott had "directed me not to credit" \$1,250 she had received from him since he had paid that out of his pocket and when the whole bill was paid, that amount "will be returned to Col. Scott."⁷

By September 1862, Watson decided to pay Carroll off

by giving her \$750 as "reasonable compensation . . . for the public service" she had rendered. Carroll took the money and signed a receipt as a payment "in full for the above account and of all demands against the United States government."⁸ Watson no doubt considered the case closed, but Carroll, having found a source of income that enabled her to pursue her favorite activities of writing and politicking, interpreted Watson's payment not as a way to end her importunities but as a confirmation that the oral agreement she had made with Scott was still in force. Accordingly, when Carroll wrote another pamphlet on the rights of the seceded states and submitted it to the department, she no doubt expected a continuation of the account.⁹

When Carroll followed up her pamphlet with another letter that, hand-delivered, suggested a paper on emancipation, Watson had had enough. While he had been willing to pay at least a part of Carroll's bill, she was "entirely mistaken in assuming that I have undertaken to employ you to write for this Department or to compensate you for writing." Carroll was greatly surprised at his refusal. Watson, she insisted, had asked her to call. Now, she wrote, if he would simply do his duty and lay her ideas before Mr. Stanton, "I cannot doubt that, could the Sec. give his attention to the proposition, he would at once concur in the utility of such a production as mine would

be."¹⁰ In a frigid reply to her request, and "to avoid all misunderstanding and all necessity for further correspondence on this topic," Watson wrote, he was "authorized to state that the Secretary of War has never employed a public writer, on any subject whatever, and the department accordingly cannot avail itself of your services."¹¹ Carroll was only momentarily dissuaded by this icy dismissal; she would take up her cause again late that year. In the meantime, though, the presidential election captured her attention.

Carroll did not care much for Lincoln's policies as president. His failure, in her eyes, to follow her counsel regarding emancipation and colonization was a particular sore point. As early as the off-year elections of 1862 she had become certain that it had "ever been the purpose of the President and the faction, with whom he acts, to abolish slavery, in the entire South, and to restore the States upon no other condition." Lincoln's removal of General George McClellan from the command of the Army of the Potomac in the fall of 1862, after McClellan failed to capitalize on the Union victory at Antietam by pursuing the Confederates, was, according to Carroll, Lincoln's way "to get the absolute control of the Army, for this express purpose" of emancipation by force.¹² Although Carroll had maintained a cordial relationship with Lincoln's Attorney General Bates and had included a pipe for Lincoln in a gift of tobacco

pipes she sent to Bates, by 1864 she was convinced that Lincoln had to be defeated to save the country from a military despotism.¹³

In June, Carroll attended the Republican nominating convention in Baltimore; in August she went to the Democratic convention in Chicago.¹⁴ While she would later write Salmon Chase that she believed "an irreparable mistake was committed" when Chase was passed over for the Republican nomination, for Carroll, the Republican party was a lost cause regardless of the nominee.¹⁵ The President, the Radicals, the momentary candidacy of John Charles Frémont, all required the acceptance of the emancipation of slaves. Carroll was convinced that the Republicans were too intransigent to compromise on the question of slavery. That intransigence would destroy the Union if it prevailed in the upcoming election.¹⁶

Even though Carroll had perhaps begun to sense the inevitability of forced emancipation, telling Chase she had "no sympathy with a dominant race, insolent & oppressive, who violate all the conditions of liberty and then claim to be the authors of freedom," it is most likely she supported Democratic nominee George B. McClellan on his platform calling for the restoration of the Union without regard to slavery.¹⁷ The Washington National Intelligencer, to which Carroll had contributed over the years, supported McClellan for reasons of which Carroll could approve. Lincoln's

"despotic assumptions under the specious plea of 'military necessity'" made clear Lincoln's intention "to change the character of the war from the single object of upholding the Government to that of a direct interference with the domestic institutions of the States." McClellan, on the other hand, was a candidate "who promised to look with a single eye to the restoration of the Union under the Constitution," and would not "be jostled from his purpose by extraneous influences."¹⁸

The National Intelligencer reflected Carroll's opinions throughout the Civil War, and in November 1864 she wrote Thurlow Weed, Edward Bates, and Lemuel Evans that its editor, Colonel William W. Seaton, had asked her to assume the editorship of the paper. To Weed she explained that Seaton would be forced to shut down if Lincoln were re-elected, apparently because of Seaton's opposition to the administration. "Even if Mr. L-- is not elected, he will have to sell it all the same" She invited Weed to take part of the paper in a joint stock company to raise the necessary \$100,000 purchase price. Seaton would give Carroll \$20,000 of that "to carry on the paper." "I have no earthly doubt," she wrote, "about my power to conduct the editorial department . . . I could make it a great lever & I think, with due modesty, you will not dissent from this opinion."¹⁹

If Weed replied, his answer did not survive, but

since he owned no part of the paper after Seaton left, he obviously turned her down.²⁰ Edward Bates appreciated her "talents and acquirements" but cautioned that she might not understand "as fully as I do, the arduous labor required" to run the paper.²¹ Evans, on the other hand, urged Carroll to accept. "I have thought for some time that your vocation is editorial." He wrote from Chicago with the election results. Lincoln's re-election, he thought, meant a "consolidated centralized Despotism," in which Washington City would become like the Rome of old. "Henceforth," he warned, "all success depends on the ability to be . . . a part of the governing power . . . or a flatterer of the governing power." Carroll could achieve that status more easily, Evans thought, if she were editor of the Intelligencer.²²

As is true of many events in Carroll's life, there is no corroborative evidence to support Carroll's claim that Seaton offered her the paper. It is possible. Josephine Seaton, the Colonel's surviving daughter, thought enough of Carroll's talents as a writer to consider carefully her offer to write his biography and to suggest that Carroll edit a collection of her father's letters or a "political history of my Father . . . or leaders of the Intelligencer, which would no doubt be valuable, and take."²³ The editorship seems a bit of a far-fetched proposition for Carroll to have invented out of thin air.

But if it was offered to her, it came to naught by December 1864. Seaton retired, a new editor took over, and Carroll began to dun the War Department again to pay her claim.²⁴

Times were hard for Carroll after the war, and she scratched around trying to make a living. Keeping constant pressure on the War Department to pay her the rest of the money she believed it owed her, she cut expenses by moving in with her brother Henry in Baltimore and searched for other sources of income. She asked Secretary of State Seward to send her on a tour of the Southern states "in some confidential capacity for the Govt." in order to ascertain "their feelings, sentiments and aims" as the country moved toward reconciliation.²⁵ She moved back home with her father for a short time and worked on a history of the war, asking for reports from such primary sources as Seward and Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles.²⁶ She filed a formal claim with the War Department's Board of Claims, still making no mention of any work but her pamphlets, and convinced Thomas Scott to endorse her bill again. He thought since "all she asks is but a small matter . . . if under my control I should have no hesitation in allowing it."²⁷ She briefly looked for work as a teacher in New York City and, pen ever at the ready, continued her pre-war activities of seeking patronage positions for friends.²⁸ Her fortune had changed little in the interim: though she told Aaron Columbus Burr, for whom she lobbied nearly two

years for a post in Tripoli, that the senator she lobbied would "do anything" for her, "and he has," no appointment was forthcoming.²⁹ She also continued to write on the political questions of the day and revised old articles for resale.³⁰

In the winter of 1868-1869, Carroll travelled to Texas with Lemuel Evans to report on the Texas Constitutional Convention, in which Evans took part. She met the famous ex-spy Belle Boyd on the boat from New Orleans to Galveston and found her "just the bold forward creature you may suppose . . . disgusted every one talks of nothing but herself--what great men she met . . . &c"³¹ She wrote a long report on the Texas convention to President-elect Grant, suggesting Texas be divided into several new states to "destroy the power of these old secessionists forever."³² Although Carroll originally planned to come back home as soon as the convention ended, Evans became seriously ill, so she stayed to care for him. "When he got alarmed," she wrote her sister, "he proposed to turn over all his effects & money to me at once," another indication of the intimacy of their long relationship. Fortunately, Evans recovered. In the meantime, Carroll amused herself during his recuperation with a visit to a lunatic asylum ("almost all the females are so from the War--loss of friends or property or both") and enjoying a "glorious country."³³

But always in Carroll's life there was her claim. On May 10, 1869, Carroll withdrew all her papers from the War Department's files. On March 31, 1870, she petitioned the United States Senate to award her "compensation commensurate with the service" she had provided the government with her pamphlets which "communicated throughout the struggle important facts and suggestions," and her military observations which induced the government "to adopt the Tennessee River instead of the Mississippi" ³⁴

There are several possible reasons why Carroll chose to enter the public forum with her claim instead of continuing her pleas and petitions to the War Department. Edwin Stanton, whom she believed had been kept uninformed of her claim and therefore had been unable to aid her, left office in 1868 and died in December of 1869. ³⁵ Recently-elected President Grant, whom she may have believed would support her claim in order not to appear unchivalrous before his public, was in a position to wield considerable power in her favor. And Benjamin Wade, retiring from the Senate to Ohio, had written her a letter.

I cannot take leave of public life without expressing my deep sense of your services to the country during the whole period of our national troubles. Although a citizen of a state almost unanimously disloyal and deeply sympathizing with secession, especially the wealthy and aristocratical class of her people, to which you belonged, yet, in the midst of such surroundings, you emancipated your own slaves at a great sacrifice of personal interest, and with your powerful pen defended the cause of the Union and

loyalty as ably and effectively as it has ever yet been defended.

From my position on the Committee of the Conduct of the War I know that some of the most successful expeditions of the war were suggested by you, among which I might instance the expedition up the Tennessee River I also know in what high estimation your services were held by President Lincoln; and I cannot leave this subject without sincerely hoping that the Government may yet confer on you some token of acknowledgment³⁶ for all these services and sacrifices.

Wade would continue to write letters in favor of Carroll's claim. In February 1872, he wrote the Committee on Military Affairs considering Carroll's claim that President Lincoln "informed me that the merit of this plan was due to Miss Carroll" and that "both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton . . . expressed to me their high appreciation of this service . . . and they both expressed the wish that the Government would reward her liberally for the same" ³⁷ He repeated his praise of Carroll's accomplishments and worth throughout the 1870s.

Wade's most supportive letter in Carroll's behalf, however, was not published until 1881, three years after his death. In that letter, dated April 4, 1876, Wade claimed credit for convincing Lincoln to use Carroll's plan in spite of its origin. "It was a great work to get the matter started; you have no idea of it. We almost fought for it." The need for "absolute secrecy" at the time had precluded recognition of Carroll then, but "if ever there was a righteous claim on earth, you have one." ³⁸

At first glance, Wade's letters might seem to remove all doubt regarding the legitimacy of Carroll's claim. As the chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Wade's approval of her claim would be powerful support. But there is no evidence that the Committee ever discussed the movement up the Tennessee River. Most of their published hearings concerning the Western Theatre during the time Carroll set her claim (the winter of 1861-1862) dealt with Frémont's difficulties in supplying his men and with the confusion in command at the Battle of Fort Donelson.³⁹ No evidence exists to suggest that Wade and his committee ever dealt with the strategy of the Tennessee Campaign.

Moreover, Caroline Wade, the Senator's wife, was on close terms with Carroll. It was through Caroline that Anne Carroll corresponded with Benjamin Wade. Considering her penchant for bypassing middlemen, it would hardly seem likely she would use a intermediary to approach Wade on such a vital matter as establishing her claim. It would seem logical, therefore, to assume that Wade had at first simply written a nice letter of thanks to a loyal citizen who had told his wife and him what she deserved credit for. And, as the years went by, Carroll no doubt convinced the aging Senator she deserved more than thanks for her work. Wade, who like many others responded favorably to the idea of Carroll as a heroine, saw in her claim a chance to thank all the women of the war. He continued to support her with

letters of increasing fulsomeness. But the strongest letter, that of 1876, that claimed he had fought for her plan was almost certainly a forgery. However, Wade's endorsement of her claim in 1869 had clearly, for Anne Carroll, provided enough evidence to bring her claim to the public forum and pursue it through Congress.⁴⁰

She began slowly enough, couching her petition for payment with feminine delicacy and in the mildest of terms, and reassuring Republicans such as Robert G. Schenck that "in pressing my claim . . . I cannot by any possibility detract from our brave and heroic commanders" ⁴¹ As her petition failed to attract notice, she determined to strengthen it with more favorable testimonies. She wrote to John Tucker, former Assistant Secretary of War and still associated with Thomas Scott, to see if Scott, who was out of town, would support her claim. He was sure the colonel would, Tucker wrote, and would give him the papers when her returned. As for himself, while he was "much obliged for your offer of a R. Road charter in Texas" (where Lemuel Evans was Chief Justice of the state's Supreme Court and where Scott was hoping to develop the Texas and Pacific Railroad), it did not suit him, "at this time, to avail of it."⁴²

Sure enough, when Scott returned, he wrote a letter of support for Carroll's claim to Senator Jacob M. Howard, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs.⁴³ But since

Scott's letter referred only to Carroll's pamphlets, which Scott thought "were valuable at that time and served a good purpose," Howard apparently questioned Carroll as to why Scott had not mentioned her military strategy. Scott had told her she "had better not," Carroll explained, "because military men were very tenacious & jealous."⁴⁴ A few days later, Scott wrote a second letter of support, this time, and for the first time, including a specific mention of Carroll's Tennessee Plan, "which plan I submitted to the Secretary of War, and its general ideas were adopted." "Through the adoption of this plan the country had been saved millions," Scott wrote, "and that . . . entitled her to the kind consideration of Congress."⁴⁵

With additional proof of her service provided by Scott along with the support of Ben Wade, Carroll thought victory was at hand. "I have wonderful friends," she wrote her father from Washington in January 1871. "All my labours here brought me friends." The Committee on Military Affairs reported favorably on her claim and recommended she be paid for her "highly meritorious services."⁴⁶

There the matter rested. Read, passed to a second reading and printed, the bill never moved out of Congress.⁴⁷ Maryland senator George Vickers thought it might be due to Carroll's anti-Republican sentiments. Perhaps if she "had pressed it in 1865 & 1866 before the loyalty of some had cooled," he wrote, her "prospects for

success would have been greater."⁴⁸ Carroll blamed inaction on the bill on Senator Henry Wilson for failing to "take care of" her in the Senate, and on Chairman Howard himself, who had "proved a traitor & would have done me injustice. . . . You have no idea how false he played."⁴⁹

Defeated but momentarily, Carroll worked to gather more letters of support and to increase her visibility as claimant. She made friends with Samuel Hunt, secretary to Henry Wilson, the new Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, and did all she could to curry Hunt's confidence. As an insider, Hunt suggested she use publicity to help her claim and obtain as many supportive letters as she could.⁵⁰ Carroll wrote to Millard Fillmore, who remembered their meeting in November 1861 on her way back from Tennessee, but could remember none of the specifics of the conversation. Besides, he wrote, he was sure that with the favorable report by Howard she would prevail in Congress regardless of his faulty memory.⁵¹ Carroll did add support to her claim in the form of letters received in the 1860s which had complimented her on her pamphlets and justified their price from such men as Edward Bates, Edward Everett, Reverdy Johnson, and Horace Binney. She included as well a statement on the value of the Tennessee strategy from Chief Justice Lemuel Evans, by now possessed of his more impressive title.⁵²

Pressing Hunt to use his influence on Wilson that

winter, however, Carroll confronted two immovable individuals. Hunt was not willing to jeopardize his future. He had to be cautious, he later wrote Carroll, and not appear to be her advocate or his usefulness would diminish. Wilson would not place the bill on the calendar and would not discuss it with Hunt at all. Apparently he wanted more proof.⁵³

Wilson received additional proof of a sort in the form of a pamphlet published to support Carroll's claim. Although issued anonymously, the author was Lemuel Evans.⁵⁴ Miss Carroll, he wrote, "had the genius to grasp the situation and perceive that the fall of Richmond could not destroy the rebellion, and the Mississippi river could not be opened on its waters; that the Government must seize a strategic position within the cotton States, and if a fatal blow could be inflicted, it must fall there." To Carroll, alone, "therefore, must be given the credit of having solved the problem the military destruction of the 'Southern Confederacy.'"⁵⁵

In his pamphlet, published in the winter of 1871-1872, Evans added an additional laurel to Carroll's wreath by including a letter which she was said to have written regarding Vicksburg (later dated in testimony as having been written in October 1862), pointing out that Vicksburg was too heavily fortified to take from the river (which the federals had discovered as early as the previous

Carroll's plan to reduce Vicksburg, which he later claimed he had sent the War Department in October 1862, suggested a move down the Central Mississippi Railroad and the Mobile & Ohio Railroad to control the cities of Jackson and Meridian. Control of these two towns would force the Confederates to move east of the Tombigbee and to evacuate Vicksburg.

After five futile attempts, one of them down the Mississippi Central Railroad, Grant moved his forces down the western bank of the Mississippi, thus avoiding the Yazoo Delta east of the river. By May, Grant had crossed the Mississippi below Grand Gulf and was headed for Jackson. From that town he would move to take Vicksburg from the east by siege. The city surrendered on July 4, 1863.

spring when Admiral David G. Farragut had failed to take the town) and recommended that the town be taken by a land route.⁵⁶ In her letter, almost certainly a post facto creation since no evidence exists of its fortuitous receipt by anyone connected with the Vicksburg Campaign, Carroll argued for a trip down the Mississippi Central Railroad from Memphis to capture Jackson, Mississippi, and cut off Vicksburg from the east as the most "economical" plan.⁵⁷ Grant had in fact made such a move, but was driven back in December 1862.

Saving the government money had become part of Carroll's claim to fame in this pamphlet. After all, she had saved the government "three thousand millions" of dollars, Evans estimated, by her work in the war. Surely Congress would not begrudge her what he suggested she ask for: "the pay of a Major General from November 30 or December 1st 1861" since he thought she "could get through a large sum in this form" that might be more appealing than a specific dollar amount would be.⁵⁸

Hunt agreed with Evans' idea. He later wrote Carroll that he thought her method of asking for money was "rather pretty and practical" and no doubt befitting her womanly nature. Her claim, he thought, was more valuable because she was a "woman" and thus a symbol of all the women of the war.⁵⁹ It was becoming painfully apparent to Carroll, however, that her continued push for recognition

and payment of her claim was meeting with considerable disapproval, particularly among her female acquaintances. She dismissed it, however, reasoning that "women . . . are as a class jealous & envious of their sex. None are allowed to come around me, except that Miss Munroe who is a great bore & I have no doubt would at heart rejoice, if she could have seen me defeated."⁶⁰

By May 1872, Carroll was convinced once again that she was winning the battle. "My enemies have fought me desperately to defeat me or rather my claim," she wrote her father. "We fought them and contested every inch on the battle field and the Lord being my Helper in His own good time has given me great extraordinary victory!" But Carroll spoke too soon. The bill for her relief was read and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, where it died. "You can't trust a professional politician," Carroll told her sister. But she had hope nonetheless. "It is wonderful with what strength & energy Our Father in Heaven endows us in such peculiar trying times"⁶¹

By August, Carroll was ready to do battle again. She went to New York City to work for the Republicans in the presidential election, though she was less interested in getting Grant elected, "so narrow and selfish his nature," than in working for Henry Wilson as his vice-president, no doubt deciding Wilson's gratitude for her support would help her cause in Congress. The vice-president, "a respectable

man," she wrote, "will carry the ticket."⁶² In November, anxious over a new round of hearings on her claim, she contacted Hunt, who remained with Wilson after the election. She asked if he could "think of any one in this city who has more than ordinary influence with Wilson? One whom I could approach by an offer of money if successful. I would allow any per centage at all could I find the party of the right status" With Grant returned to office, Carroll thought, the Republicans "can surely now be magnanimous . . . in conceding my rights" since Grant, after all, "has never claimed to have done the service" to the country of planning the Tennessee Campaign.⁶³

Carroll finally appealed to Wilson himself, telling him that "President Grant as long ago as 67, advised me to claim the service in history," and "Judge Wade says, that the President desires to see me rewarded and will stand by me." Give justice now, she pleaded, for "if I am not successful now after all, I shall not live I fear ever to be."⁶⁴ Wilson's access to Grant's ideas being considerably greater than Carroll's, certainly had Grant desired her to have been recognized, she would have been. But Congress adjourned with no action taken on her claim.

Immediately after the new year, Carroll reached out for public support again with a new pamphlet which restated her claim and added the argument that, since historians could not agree on whose idea the campaign was (they

credited Halleck, Grant, Foote, Buell, McClellan and Frémont), it was clear that the idea "had no part in the plan of any of our generals and was at the time Miss Carroll submitted her plan to the Department unknown to the Government."⁶⁵ Ben Wade had written another letter of support for her, telling the Committee that Lincoln had informed him "that the merit of this plan was due to Miss Carroll." Secretary Stanton had agreed, and "fully recognized" (on his deathbed, according to Wade) "Miss Carroll's service to the Union in the organization of this campaign."⁶⁶

Throughout 1873, Carroll gathered letters of support for her next assault on Congress. Cassius M. Clay, United States Minister to Russia in 1861, endorsed her claim, telling her he saw "no reason why officers and soldiers who fought in the field should be more entitled to honor and emoluments, than the many eminent women, who showed great patriotism and rendered essential aid. . . ."⁶⁷ George Vickers promised his vote the next time around, but advised her she should condense her claim to make it easier reading for busy politicians.⁶⁸ Carroll also wrote to civil war historians J. T. Headley and Dr. D. W. Draper, correcting their histories of the war.⁶⁹ Lemuel Evans supported her still in this new round, warning her to keep her claim above politics if she could, "by extreme circumspection--remaining wholly in the background." Get the appropriation first;

then she could "write or visit or mix in any movement" ⁷⁰

In September, everything stopped for Carroll as her beloved father fell ill. He died on October 3. Carroll was devastated. "I have lost the best Father, the most perfect of all the race, not in my judgment only, but in that of all who had the fortune to know him." ⁷¹ Her deep grief did not blind her to practicalities, however; shortly after her father's death she questioned his former lawyer in Somerset County to see if the sale of her father's home back in the 1830s had been proper or not. If the estate was entailed, for instance, she might be able to get it back for her brother Henry. No, wrote Isaac Jones, "I have never heard any question of the absolute title in the grantee of your father." ⁷² All Carroll would inherit was her father's good name. Her uncle comforted her: his brother might have had "the usual Carroll-infirmary of great lack of the faculty of making money," he wrote, but "he had all their nobility of character, kindness of heart and sympathy of nature," loving "his family and children with almost feminine fondness" ⁷³

By 1874, Carroll was back at work. Her publication of another pamphlet had attracted the notice of Charles M. Scott, who defended himself as true author of the Tennessee Plan in a letter to the New York Daily Tribune. ⁷⁴ Questioned once again by the Committee on War

Claims about her lack of contemporaneous proof regarding the official nature of her mission to Tennessee, Carroll had "omitted" any statement in her early claims, she replied, "that to render my services more effective" she had told Colonel Scott she would visit the West. While she had written to Scott when she was there and at his official request, regarding "any thing that I might deem important to the cause," she stated, he had not written to her because he was afraid his letters would not arrive in time and because he knew she would be returning to Washington soon.⁷⁵ Another pamphlet came out in December 1874. In that one, Carroll at last responded to the resistance to her military claims and made her literary services a "distinct and separate claim" from the more controversial military service.⁷⁶

Charles Scott's attack in the press had had an effect. The New York Times wondered if Carroll had bothered to press her claim while Halleck was still alive, since he was the obvious author of the plan.⁷⁷ Carroll's defense of her claim and her assertion that she had started her petitions prior to his demise was not printed in the Times, but she was given the chance to respond in public at last.⁷⁸ On a hot July day in 1876, the two claimants faced each other in the Military Affairs Committee hearing in Washington, and Carroll, with Evans by her side, wore down her accuser, who retired from the fray. The field was hers,

and with Scott more or less consigned to the oblivion of the Midwest once again, she renewed her battle.⁷⁹

But the battle would soon be hers alone. Lemuel Evans died in Washington July 1, 1877. The Galveston Daily News took note of his passing, surprised that it seemed "to have been an event less noted by the press of the State than would have been anticipated" ⁸⁰ Carroll went on without her close friend. Another memorial was introduced in October, shortened to eleven pages and asking for compensation for her work "somewhat in proportion to its value to the country."⁸¹ In 1878, a poetical version was filed in the 45th Congress that confronted public reluctance to accept the validity of Carroll's claim. This massive memorial, which reprinted all the petitions, documents, memorials, reports and pamphlets that had previously issued in the case, praised the intelligence and discernment of the American public and asked Congress to put the matter before them. "Let the people grasp the merits of this case, and understand what results followed the adoption of this plan, by which the unity of the United States stands to-day, and we can trust them to . . . place the reward . . . so as to connect it fairly with the benefits the nation itself received."⁸² After all, "the transfer of the national armies" from the Mississippi to the Tennessee River, for which Carroll was responsible, "was the greatest military event in the interest of the human race known to modern

ages. It was nothing less than the beginning of a new and higher civilization" ⁸³ Perhaps, but the memorial was still referred to the House Committee on Military Affairs where it languished unto death. ⁸⁴

At long last, on February 18, 1879, came an answer to a congressional petition. The Senate Committee on Military Affairs, in reply to Carroll's Memorial of 1877, issued its report. The committee decided against Carroll. Every congress since the civil war, the committee argued, had had a chance to reward her and none had. "There must have been," therefore, "some very grave and important reasons underlying the non-action of these Congresses in these premises" She had been paid \$1,250 by Thomas Scott and another \$750 by Assistant Secretary Watson. Two thousand dollars for her pamphlets was plenty. As for her military strategy, all civilized nations honored the names and deeds of women like Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton "because they are heroines who have risked their lives in the cause of humanity." But if they, like Carroll, applied for a monetary reward, why "it would destroy much of the poetry and grandeur of noble deeds" and smack of "hucksterism" and barter. Carroll should be satisfied with the monies received and, should she want more, "the deficit should be supplied from the large store of gratitude which . . . republics should bestow upon their citizens." ⁸⁵

Carroll must have been crushed or, more likely, infuriated. Perhaps it was the condescending and patronizing tone of the committee that implied womanly deeds ought to be self-sacrificing enough to pay the printer that brought Carroll's case to the interest of the woman's suffrage movement. Carroll had notified the suffragists herself in 1873, when she sent copies of her early petitions and memorials to Matilda Joslyn Gage at the National Woman's Suffrage Association's annual convention in Washington. She thought, perhaps, it might interest Mrs. Gage, "inasmuch as it may serve in some degree to furnish evidence in behalf of the cause you so ably represent."⁸⁶

Gage took up the cause, about which she published a pamphlet with the combative title, "Who Planned the Tennessee Campaign of 1862? or Anna Ella Carroll vs. Ulysses S. Grant," giving a brief synopsis of the case, painting Carroll's claim in the light of injustice of "man toward woman." Carroll, a "young girl of Maryland, full of a patriotic spirit," had developed a plan which had saved the Union. Nowhere in the world had there ever existed "a person possessed of the transcendent [sic] military genius of Anna Ella Carroll." Yet Grant was fêted and honored and re-elected, while Carroll, the plan's true author, "in unregarded solitude," sought from Congress but a simple pension to support her in her sunset years.⁸⁷ "Had she not been a woman would she have met this injustice?" Gage

thundered rhetorically.⁸⁸ Actually, if Charles Scott's experience were taken into consideration, the answer might well have been yes. But no matter. Here was a cause worth fighting for.

Carroll's choice to seek support from the National Woman Suffrage Association instead of the state-based and more conservative American Woman's Suffrage Association made sense considering their respective constituencies.

Unfortunately for Carroll, however, in 1873 the NWSA was still suffering public censure for the radical free-love ideas publicized by NWSA member Victoria Woodhull in 1871 and 1872. The outcry against Woodhull had cost the four-year old organization much of its support and public approval. It was not an effective organization to mount such a campaign as Carroll required, especially considering the controversial nature of Carroll's military claim.⁸⁹ By the 1880s, however, when the suffragists began to champion Carroll's cause, members from both the NWSA and the AWSA would write on Carroll's behalf.

Gage's article was printed first in the National Citizen, the NWSA's monthly newspaper, and then brought out as a pamphlet. One more petition by Carroll to Congress followed. Carroll asked Thomas Scott for help once again, but Scott had suffered a stroke two years previously, and though his mind was clear and he continued his presidency of the Pennsylvania Railroad, he was, his assistant wrote

Carroll, "too broken down by overwork" to be of any help. Ben Wade, her other constant support, had died in 1878.⁹⁰ Carroll was on her own this time.

Called before the Committee on Military Affairs in January, 1881, she was momentarily at a loss when she was asked to talk about her claim rather than read it. But she spoke for an hour and a half.⁹¹ As had been true throughout her life, her forceful personality and speech seemed to impress those whom she dealt with much more than did her written work. On March 3, 1881, former Union general and Representative Edward S. Bragg, chairman of the Committee, reported a bill for her relief, finding that "the evidence . . . completely establishes that Miss Anna Ella Carroll was the author" of the Tennessee Campaign Plan that gave "mastery of the conflict to the national arms" The "thanks of the nation" were due Miss Carroll, and it was the recommendation of the committee that she be given a pension "as a partial measure of recognition for her public service"⁹² The pension, Carroll hoped, would date from November 30, 1861, but she would "take whatever I can get as time is important"⁹³

Time was very important. In 1881, Anne Carroll was 66 years old. Her contemporaries who had supported her were dead and gone. She was forced to rely on new sources for support and those took time to cultivate. She had contacted James Abram Garfield after his Republican presidential

nomination in 1880, offering a manuscript on Maryland's colonial history for his perusal, warning him about an alliance between Democrats and the Pope, and asking for five hundred dollars or so to publish an anti-Catholic pamphlet; in short, repeating all the activities which thirty years previously had established her relationship with Millard Fillmore and the Know-Nothing Party.⁹⁴ She congratulated Garfield on his election, finding it "so remarkable that I do not see how any true Christian can doubt that God rules and controls the governments of men."⁹⁵ When she came to Washington, she would call on him, she promised, but in the meantime, she enclosed the March 1881 report on her claim, "sure it will be gratifying to you, that this measure of success has been attained"⁹⁶

But success was short-lived. Garfield, whose brief, polite answers to Carroll's letters no doubt encouraged her into considering him a good friend and ardent supporter, was assassinated in the summer of 1881. Carroll suffered a paralytic stroke in early September, and Congress adjourned without passing the bill for her relief.⁹⁷

A woman suffering from injustice at the hands of the male-dominant national government provided the suffragists with a cause. The cause could be made only more glorious by that woman's frailty, illness, and poverty. Matilda Gage had included Carroll's story in detail in the massive History of Woman Suffrage, published in 1881.⁹⁸ By the

following year, Phoebe Couzins was able to portray a woman "unhonored, unsung and paralyzed," who lay dying "within the shadow of the capitol," where the Military Affairs Committee did its work, awarding pensions to the far less deserving. The "silence and selfishness of men" were permitting Carroll's great deeds to "pass into oblivion," wrote Couzins.⁹⁹ In truth, one man did seem to be all that stood between Carroll and her pension, which, if the War Department refused to pay the bill for her pamphlets was the least she deserved. Former Confederate Brigadier General, now Missouri Democratic Senator Francis Cockrell's "determined opposition" to Carroll's claim kept the bill from a final vote.¹⁰⁰ Added to his opposition, wrote Democratic Representative Edward S. Bragg, was that of the War Department as a whole. It stood firmly against the claim, considering it "absurd . . . that a woman's knowledge of topography and strategic lines led the advance of the warriors" ¹⁰¹

The support from suffragists was a double-edged sword. While Carroll gained organized and wide-spread publicity, members of the Committee on Military Affairs manifested "very strong opposition to woman's rights, suffrage, etc. which was made to prejudice [the] claim, though having no direct connection with the case, of course."¹⁰² But Carroll's invitation in 1873 to the suffragists to take up her cause did form a connection and,

for better or worse, she was inextricably linked with the political movement for woman's suffrage. Republican Representative John D. White of Kentucky pointed out the connections in his speech on February 7, 1884, comparing Carroll's claim with that of Fitz John Porter.

Union Major General Porter had been cashiered from the Army for disobeying an order in 1863 and had spent many of the ensuing years petitioning Congress to clear his name. He had, according to White, suffered wrongs which Congress had taken weeks to consider. Carroll, on the other hand, had suffered far greater wrongs, but, White argued, "because she is a woman and can not help herself, and because she has no political power to bear . . . for twenty years her claim has been dishonored." "Does any one doubt for one moment," White asked, "that had Miss Carroll possessed the powerful political influence of Fitz John Porter . . . she long ago [would have] received every dollar" of her claim?¹⁰³

That was the question asked again and again by the suffragists. Where Congress had failed, perhaps public opinion could succeed in gaining Carroll justice. While the suffragists prepared the matter for the public, Carroll worked within the system one more time. On January 29, 1885, William W. Warden, a Washington attorney, filed a claim for Carroll in the United States Court of Claims.¹⁰⁴

Anna Ella Carroll v. The United States was decided

by June 1, 1885. Time was of the essence, her attorney argued, for although Carroll's health had improved, she was still ill and had no income save a pension from the "National Woman's Aid Association."¹⁰⁵ Carroll's sister Mary had placed her in a private boarding home in Baltimore, and expenses were high.¹⁰⁶ Using his son Clifford's position as editor of a newspaper to drum up support for Carroll and thoroughly embarrassing her sister and the rest of her family with the publicity, Warden succeeded in gaining a favorable decision, or so he claimed. "The Court of Claims today decided the Carroll Case in your sister's favor," he wrote to Mary. "Receive my congratulations accordingly."¹⁰⁷

But Carroll had not won. The Court decided that there was simply no legal evidence to support her claim of military services. "Until that fact be shown (for it is certainly susceptible of proof)" Justice J. Nott wrote, "no court would be authorized in deciding that the strategy was not original with the military authorities who apparently planned that advance, and who were morally and officially responsible for its success."¹⁰⁸ As for her claim for literary services, while the documents she used for proof might "morally satisfy the judgment of the individual," they were not evidence "which can be received or considered by a court." As impressive as her letters from notables were, "as a court we must pronounce these certificates as

valueless as blank paper . . . they establish no judicial fact."¹⁰⁹ There was no legal support for Carroll's claim. All the Court could do was transmit its opinion as such to the House Committee. The only "victory" of which Warden wrote might be considered the Court's remark that Congress was not circumscribed by legal evidence to justify its actions. It could, if it desired, base its reward to Carroll on the morality of the claim.¹¹⁰ It did not so desire. Another bill would be introduced in 1890 for \$10,000 for Carroll and once again would meet its fate in a referral to the Committee on Military Affairs.¹¹¹

As Carroll went before the Courts, the suffragists continued their literary campaign of support. Carroll had recovered enough for a personal interview with journalist Mr. H. R. Shattuck. Carroll's appearance, blue-eyed, bespectacled, white-haired, short and stout but still animated, impressed Shattuck. "Taking both my hands in hers, she held them tightly, while she looked into my eyes with an expression of such ingenuous truth and honesty, that if I had ever any doubts of her story they could exist for me no longer." Until she began to speak, though, one might suppose she was a "simple old lady." But relating her tale (which had grown grander as the years had passed), he wrote, "she became the wonderful woman to whom some day our country will do honor."¹¹²

Carroll told her story of planning the campaign with

appropriate gestures and "eyes as bright as stars."¹¹³ She explained how she had talked to Grant after the war: "'He was like a child,'" she said. 'He asked me all about it, and how I came to think of it; and until I described my plan to him, and showed how success came from its consummation, I am convinced that he had no conception that it was this that brought us victory.'" Carroll, wrote Shattuck, "was God's agent in the nation's day of peril." And now, "because Anna Ella Carroll is a woman" she could get no recognition or reward, "another instance of the ingratitude of republics."¹¹⁴

Shattuck's article was followed a few months later by one written by suffragist Mrs. C. C. Hussey, and in 1886, Carroll herself took pen in still-crippled hand to rewrite her story for the North American Review.¹¹⁵ Mary Livermore included Carroll's story in her popular history, My Story of the War in 1889. Again, as did the other suffragists, she emphasized that it was Carroll's sex, "a fact for which she is not responsible," which had led men to ignore her claim.¹¹⁶ In 1891, the first volume of a short biography appeared, written by suffragist Sarah Ellen Blackwell and titled Life of a Military Genius.¹¹⁷

Blackwell had been corresponding with the Carrolls since the mid-1880s. She saw Carroll's case as a "brilliant exemplification of the treatment of women all the world over." Publicity would help Carroll's case, she wrote, so

Blackwell placed letters that asked for a subscription drive for Carroll's benefit in the pages of the Woman's Journal, Woman's Column, Century Magazine, and other periodicals.

She was joined in her letters on behalf of the "Carroll Fund" by Mrs. Hussey, Abbie M. Gannett, and Lucy Stone.¹¹⁸

Susan B. Anthony wrote a note to Mary Carroll, urging her to trust the suffragists' support. "No man ever has--or ever will put heart and soul & brain into the work of getting this justice done for Anna," she told her, adding, "only an earnest & true woman can succeed."¹¹⁹

The 1890 bill for \$10,000 failed, beaten by Senator Cockrell again.¹²⁰ Carroll, cared for in Washington by her youngest sister, Mary, was at times nearly destitute, in spite of contributions from the suffragists. Mary had taken an appointment in the Treasury Department in 1886 thanks to the intercession of President Cleveland's sister Rose and, possibly, her sister's letters to the President on her behalf.¹²¹ She suffered a pay cut in 1888 and again in 1892, along with a year's absence from work due to "nervous prostration," followed by a dismissal for absenteeism. Her troubles prompted frantic letters from Mary to the Clevelands on behalf of her own position and her sister's needs. "Today I have not marketing for tomorrow," she wrote, and, "I have no means even for required medicine from day to day and am well nigh desperate."¹²² Her sister was ill, her own health was failing, and her family was of no

help. The Catholic Carrolls had long memories and did not forgive Anne for her early anti-Catholic writings; the secessionist Carrolls did not forgive her for her Unionism; the rest of the family were angry at having family matters continually put on public display and were too poor to help the sisters even if they had wanted to.¹²³ The sisters clung to each other in their small Washington home on 21st Street, buoyed by visits from supporters, but financially "in great distress."¹²⁴

Rallying for a short while after a case of pneumonia and what was probably a second stroke in the summer of 1893, Anna Ella Carroll declined gradually in the fall and winter and finally died on February 19, 1894. Partially paralyzed for thirteen years, she had succumbed in the end to old age and Bright's disease, a failure of the kidneys that was probably due to circulatory problem common in the chronically bedridden. Her death certificate listed her occupation as "authoress," and she did write until the end of her life, scratching out questions and answers when she could not speak, reading her visitor's answers and questions when she could not hear.¹²⁵ Her body was taken by her sister to Dorchester County, Maryland, where she was buried near her beloved father in the Old Trinity Church yard. Her stone bears the true inscription, "A Woman Rarely Gifted--An Able and Accomplished Writer." But below that inscription, her death is misdated as 1893, in fitting irony for a woman

who spent much of her life trying to set her historical record straight.

Notes

¹Anna Ella Carroll to War Department, 2 May 1862; Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin M. Stanton, 14 May 1862, United States War Department, Record and Pension Office, Carroll File, National Archives, Washington, DC.

²Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 17 March 1861, Thurlow Weed Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York.

³Evans grew flustered when questioned about the trip in a Congressional committee hearing on Carroll's claim, first saying that he had met Carroll in St. Louis, then Washington, then Baltimore, eventually admitting that they had travelled to St. Louis together. U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Petition of Anna Ella Carroll for Compensation for Services Rendered to the War Department during the Late War, 44th Cong., 1st sess., 1876, H. Mis. Doc. No. 179, p. 15.

⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 11 January 1869; Anna Ella Carroll to Mary Carroll, 30 January 1869, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland; Truman Smith to Lemuel D. Evans, 22 March 1874, Carroll Papers.

⁵Lemuel D. Evans to William H. Seward, 3 March 1862, William Henry Seward Papers, Rus Rhees Library, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York (microfilm). No records survive in the State Department or War Department that confirm this commission. General John C. Frémont's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War indicated Evans was on his way to Texas by way of Tampico, Mexico, to find out if the Confederates were receiving supplies from Mexico. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Conduct of the War, Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 37th Cong., 3d sess., 1863, Rep. Com. No. 108, 4:120-121.

⁶Lemuel D. Evans to Edwin Stanton, 8 August 1862, Carroll Papers; Samuel Richey Kamm, The Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1940), pp. 130-133.

⁷Anna Ella Carroll to War Department, 25 August 1862; Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin Stanton, 9 September 1862, War Department, Carroll File; Anna Ella Carroll, Claim, 2 January 1863, MDHS 3650-183, Carroll Papers.

⁸P. H. Watson to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 September 1862, Carroll Papers. Receipt signed by Carroll is attached. The money for this payment, like the payment made by Thomas Scott, may have been personal. No record of any payment to Carroll was found in the books of the War Department, the Provost Fund, the Secret Service Fund or by the Disbursing Clerk. See War Department, Carroll File.

⁹Anna Ella Carroll to War Department, 7 October 1863, War Department, Carroll File. No printed pamphlet appears to have survived, merely a notation on the file that it was received by the War Department. See also Anna Ella Carroll to Colonel Hardie, 7 October 1863, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰Anna Ella Carroll to P. H. Watson, 8 January 1864, as noted on the War Department, Carroll File and quoted in Anna Ella Carroll to P. H. Watson, 11 January 1864, Carroll Papers; P. H. Watson to Anna Ella Carroll, 11 January 1864, War Department, Carroll File, notation only. The 8 January letter and the Watson to Carroll, 11 January, letters are summarized on the file in the War Department but do not otherwise survive. Anna Ella Carroll to P. H. Watson, 11 January 1864, Carroll Papers.

¹¹P. H. Watson to Anna Ella Carroll, 13 January 1864, Carroll Papers.

¹²Anna Ella Carroll to Brigadier General Mayer[?], 9 November 1862, Carroll Papers.

¹³Edward Bates to Anna Ella Carroll, 23 September 1863, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll, Essay on Military Government, mss draft, c. 1869?, MDHS 3652-425, Carroll Papers.

¹⁴Anna Ella Carroll to [Sallie] Cradock, 12 May 1864, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll, Recollections of Lincoln, undated mss, MDHS 3655-722, Carroll Papers.

¹⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Salmon P. Chase, 8 December 1864, Salmon Portland Chase Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

¹⁶James M. McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), pp.

440-442; Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: The Organized War to Victory, 1864-1865 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), pp. 98-103, 105-108; T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969), pp. 306-333.

¹⁷Anna Ella Carroll to Salmon P. Chase, 5 October 1863, Chase Papers. Carroll may have been referring to the despotism of military rule rather than the despotism of racial slavery. If she was referring to the need for emancipation, it might have been solely for effect, since she was also attempting to pry funds loose from Chase's Treasury Department for her pamphlets at the same time.

¹⁸National Intelligencer, 18 October 1864, 8 November 1864.

¹⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Thurlow Weed, 4 November 1864, Weed Papers.

²⁰There is no mention of Carroll or her offer in Weed's biography or in his autobiography.

²¹Edward Bates to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 November 1864, Carroll Papers.

²²Lemuel D. Evans to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 November 1864, Carroll Papers. Carroll also wrote of Seaton's offer to her old friend and former minister, the Rev. Dr. Robert Breckinridge, 29 November 1864, Breckinridge Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

²³Josephine Seaton to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 August 1866, and 27 January 1867, Carroll Papers. Seaton finally wrote a short eulogistic biography of her father which was published anonymously in 1871. William Winston Seaton of the "National Intelligencer" (Boston: James R. Osgood & Co., 1871).

²⁴National Intelligencer, 31 December 1864, 1 January 1865; Anna Ella Carroll to Edwin Stanton, 15 December 1864; War Department, Carroll File.

²⁵Anna Ella Carroll to William H. Seward, 4 November 1865, Seward Papers.

²⁶Ibid.; Anna Ella Carroll to Gideon Welles, 23 February 1866, Gideon Welles Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Carroll's history, Annals of the Civil War was never finished or published, since it was stored in a

trunk of papers lost when Carroll became ill. Sarah Ellen Blackwell, A Military Genius: Life of Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Washington: Judd & Detweiler, 1891), pp. 151-152.

²⁷George Gibson, Recorder, Board of Claims, War Department to Anna Ella Carroll, 14 July 1868, Carroll Papers; Anna Ella Carroll to Board of Claims, War Department, 22 July 1868, Carroll Papers; Thomas A. Scott to George Gibson, 27 November 1868, Carroll Papers.

²⁸Brantz Mayer to Anna Ella Carroll, 7 October 1867, Carroll Papers.

²⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Aaron Columbus Burr, 11 February 1869, Aaron Columbus Burr Papers, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut. See also letters from Burr to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, U.S., State Department, "Letters of Application and Recommendation During the Administration of U. S. Grant, 1869-1877," Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington, DC.

³⁰J. S. Serrill to Anna Ella Carroll, 12 July 1869, Carroll Papers, refers to anti-Johnson pamphlets but none has been found published under Carroll's name. Carroll was paid \$40.00 for an article in Harper's Magazine on Maryland history, apparently never printed. See H. M. Alden to S. E. Carrell [sic], 9 December 1870, Carroll Papers. Harper's printed "The First American Exploring Expedition," Harper's Magazine 44 (December 1871):60-64, which Carroll rewrote from her essay by the same name in The Star of the West. Harper's continued to misspell her name in the table of contents as S. E. Carrell.

³¹Anna Ella Carroll to Mary H. Carroll, 16 December 1868, Carroll Papers.

³²Anna Ella Carroll to General Grant, 28 December 1868, Carroll Papers.

³³Anna Ella Carroll to Mary H. Carroll, 30 January 1869; Anna Ella Carroll to brother, 8 December 1868, Carroll Papers.

³⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Petition of Anna Ella Carroll, Praying Compensation for Suggesting Certain Plans of Operation for the Armies of the United States During the Late War, 41st Cong., 2d sess., 1870, S. Mis. Doc. No. 100, pp. 1-2.

³⁵ Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold Hyman, Stanton: The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, pp. 606-611, 637-638.

³⁶ Benjamin F. Wade to Anna Ella Carroll, 1 March 1869, Carroll Papers. The original of this letter, in Wade's hand, survives. It was reprinted first in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Memorial of Anna Ella Carroll Asking for Compensation for Service Rendered the United States in the War of the Rebellion, 42d Cong., 2d sess., 1872, S. Mis. Doc. No. 167, pp. 5-7; see also H. L. Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade: Radical Republican from Ohio (New York: Twayne Publications, 1963), p. 317.

³⁷ U. S. Senate, 42d Cong., 2d sess., S. Mis. Doc. No. 167, p. 7. See also Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade, pp. 316-318.

³⁸ U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Anna Ella Carroll: Report to Accompany Bill H. R. 7256, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1881, H. Rept. No. 386, pp. 1-3. Trefousse does not mention this letter.

³⁹ Report of the Joint Committee, 37th Cong., 3d, Rep. Com. No. 108, vol. 4.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Caroline R. Wade to "My Dear Friend," [Anna Ella Carroll], 6 April, 30 April and 20 November 1869, 1 March 1870, Carroll Papers. Wade supported woman's suffrage. See Trefousse, Benjamin Franklin Wade, pp. 284-285.

⁴¹ U. S. Senate, 41st Cong., 2d sess., Mis. Doc. 100, pp. 1-2; Anna Ella Carroll to Robert G. Schenck, 9 April 1870, Carroll Papers.

⁴² John Tucker to Anna Ella Carroll, 20 April 1870, Carroll Papers.

⁴³ Thomas A. Scott to Jacob M. Howard, 15 June 1870, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁴ Anna Ella Carroll to Senator [Howard?], 17 June 1870, Carroll Papers.

⁴⁵ Thomas A. Scott to Jacob M. Howard, 24 June 1870, reprinted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs and the Militia, Report to Accompany S. 1293, 41st Cong., 3d sess., 1871, S. Rept. No. 339, p. 2.

⁴⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 11 January 1871, Carroll Papers; U. S. Senate, 41st Cong. 3d sess., S. Rept. No. 339, p. 4.

⁴⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Globe, 41st Cong., 3d sess., 1871, p. 895.

⁴⁸George Vickers to Anna Ella Carroll, 2 January 1871, 30 January 1871, Carroll Papers. Carroll fought against Republican party leader John Creswell in Maryland. See Jean Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858-1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 187.

⁴⁹Anna Ella Carroll to [Samuel Hunt], 3 January 1871, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Carroll Craddock, Jensen Collection, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. (Hereafter cited as CCJ Collection.) Anna Ella Carroll to sister, 2 March 1871, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁰Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life and Writings of Anna Ella Carroll (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1895), p. 133; Samuel Hunt to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 June 1871, CCJ Collection.

⁵¹Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 7 November 1871, Millard Fillmore to Anna Ella Carroll, 10 November 1871, Millard Fillmore Papers, Buffalo & Erie County Historical Society and State University College at Oswego, Oswego, New York.

⁵²U.S. Senate, 42d Cong., 2d sess., S. Mis. Doc. No. 167, pp. 8-9, 4.

⁵³Samuel Hunt to Anna Ella Carroll, 31 May 1872, 22 December 1871, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁵⁴Evans admitted authorship of the pamphlet in U.S. House, 44th Cong., 1st sess., H. Mis. Doc. No. 179, p. 29.

⁵⁵[Lemuel D. Evans], The Material Bearing of the Tennessee Campaign in 1862 upon the Destinies of Our Civil War (Washington, DC: W. H. Moore, [1871 or 1872]), p. 10.

⁵⁶Farragut had successfully come up the Mississippi in June of 1862 to join the Union river fleet coming down from Memphis to attack Vicksburg, but 200-foot bluffs on the river side and swamps north and south of the city meant only an eastern assault would succeed. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire, pp. 233-234, 308-309, 311-312.

⁵⁷[Evans], Material Bearing, p. 15. Carroll's suggestion (if in fact she made it, since the War Department file does not list receipt of the October 1862 letter on its Carroll File) neglected to take into account the vulnerability of Grant's supply lines that deep in enemy territory, or the fact that to move back to Memphis would be perceived by the public as a retreat, no matter how strategically sound. She also did not consider the near-impassable swamps of the Yazoo Delta east of the Mississippi as a potential problem in moving ground troops. See McPherson, Ordeal By Fire, pp. 311-312; Bruce Catton, Never Call Retreat (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), pp. 79-81.

⁵⁸[Evans], Material Bearing, p. 15; Lemuel D. Evans to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 May 1872, Carroll Papers.

⁵⁹Samuel Hunt to Anna Ella Carroll, 13 January 1874, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁶⁰Anna Ella Carroll to sister, 22 May 1872, Carroll Papers.

⁶¹Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas King Carroll, 27 May 1872, Carroll Papers; U. S. Senate, 42d Cong., 2d sess., S. Mis. Doc. No. 167, p. 1. Anna Ella Carroll to sister, 2 June 1872, Carroll Papers.

⁶²Anna Ella Carroll, Grant's Renomination, mss draft, c. 1872, MDHS 3653-508, Carroll Papers.

⁶³Anna Ella Carroll to Samuel Hunt, 4 November 1872, 6 November 1872, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁶⁴Anna Ella Carroll to Senator Wilson, 21 November 1872, Carroll Papers

⁶⁵[Anna Ella Carroll], Miss Carroll's Claim Before Congress in Connection with the Tennessee Campaign (Washington, DC: n.p., 1873), pp. 4, 18-19, 22-23, 36-37.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁶⁷Cassius M. Clay to Anna Ella Carroll, 24 January 1873, Carroll Papers.

⁶⁸George Vickers to Anna Ella Carroll, 31 January 1873, and 26 August 1873, Carroll Papers. Carroll's first claim was two pages; her 1871 memorial was nine; her 1873

publication ran to fifty-five pages.

⁶⁹Anna Ella Carroll to Dr. Draper, 8 March 1873;
J. T. Headley to [Anna Ella Carroll], 14 April 1873, Carroll
Papers.

⁷⁰Lemuel D. Evans to Anna Ella Carroll, 21 May 1873,
Carroll Papers.

⁷¹Anna Ella Carroll to Millard Fillmore, 19 November
1873, Fillmore Papers.

⁷²Isaac D. Jones to Anna Ella Carroll, 15 November
1873, Carroll Papers. Kingston Hall, purchased in 1837 by
John Upsher Dennis at the sherrif's sale of the property for
Thomas King Carroll's debts, still survives. A two-story
brick house and kitchen connected by a brick colonnade is
currently being restored.

⁷³[Charles] C. Carroll to Anna Ella Carroll, 12
December 1873, Carroll Papers.

⁷⁴[Anna Ella Carroll], Miss Carroll's Claim Before
Congress Asking Compensation for Military and Other Services
in Connection with the Civil War (n.p.: n.p., 1874). This
one was seventy pages long. A clipping of the Daily Tribune
letter by Scott dated 24 April 1874 was preserved in a
letter, Charles M. Scott to Anna Ella Carroll, 20 March
1865, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection.

⁷⁵Anna Ella Carroll to Committee on War Claims, 6
June 1874, CCJ Collection.

⁷⁶[Anna Ella Carroll], Miss Carroll's Literary
Services to the Country During the Civil War Stated (n.p.:
n.p., 1874), p. 1.

⁷⁷New York Times, 14 April 1874.

⁷⁸Anna Ella Carroll to Editor, New York Times, 4 May
1874. This was a rough draft of her reply which, if sent,
was apparently never published in the paper.

⁷⁹U. S. House, 44th Cong., 1st sess.,
H. Mis. Doc. No. 179. For the full account of this
confrontation see Chapter 5 above.

⁸⁰Galveston, Texas Daily News, 6 July 1877. Evans
had risen to Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court in
1870, and was its presiding judge until September 1873. He

was United States Marshal for the Eastern District of Texas at the time of his death, but died in Washington, not Texas. Mentions of Evans in state and legal histories of the period are very brief. For a man whom John C. Frémont thought "so well known that it would scarcely be possible for him to reach Texas through Missouri country" because of his Unionist stance, Evans is surprisingly invisible in the history of the period. Report of the Joint Committee, 37th Cong., 3d sess., Rep. Com. No. 108, 4:120-121. For information on Evans, see J. H. Davenport, The History of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas (Austin, Texas: Southern Law Book Publishers, 1917), pp. 95-96; The Handbook of Texas, ed. Walter Prescott Webb, 2 vols. (Austin, Texas: Texas State Historical Association, 1952), 1:576; James D. Lynch, The Bench and Bar of Texas (St. Louis: Nixon-Jones Printing Co., 1885), pp. 110-113; A Comprehensive History of Texas, 1685-1897, 2 vols., ed. Dudley G. Wooten (Dallas: William G. Scaff, 1898), 1:47; and Homer S. Thrall, A Pictorial History of Texas (St. Louis: N. D. Thomas & Co., 1879), p. 532.

⁸¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Memorial of Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland, Praying for Compensation for Services Rendered to the United States During the Late Civil War, 45th Cong., 1st sess., 1877, S. Mis. Doc. No. 5, p. 11.

⁸²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Memorial of Anna Ella Carroll, of Maryland, Praying for Compensation for Services Rendered to the United States During the Late Civil War, 45th Cong., 2d sess., 1878, H. Mis. Doc. No. 58, p. 2.

⁸³Ibid., p. 8.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 1.

⁸⁵U. S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, Report, 45th Cong., 3d sess., 1879, S. Rept. No. 775, pp. 6-7. This was in reply to U. S. Senate, 45th Cong., 1st sess., S. Mis. Doc. No. 5.

⁸⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Matilda Joslyn Gage, 17 January 1873, reprinted in Matilda Joslyn Gage, Who Planned the Tennessee Campaign of 1862? or Anna Ella Carroll vs. Ulysses S. Grant: A Few Generally Unknown Facts in Regard to Our Civil War, National Citizen Tract No. 1 [Washington, DC, 1880], preface.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 2-3.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 16.

⁸⁹Nancy Woloch, Women and the American Experience (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 309-324.

⁹⁰E. A. Rollins to Anna Ella Carroll, 5 January 1881, Carroll Papers. Phoebe Couzins (see n. 99 below) had interviewed Scott in 1880 at Carroll's request and found him in feeble enough health to fear he "might die at any moment." Phoebe Couzins, The Military Genius of the War, Anna Ella Carroll, author of the Tennessee Campaign (St. Louis: n.p., 1882), p. 4.

⁹¹Anna Ella Carroll to Mary H. Carroll, 30 January 1881, Carroll Papers.

⁹²U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Military Affairs, Anna Ella Carroll: Report to Accompany Bill H.R. 7256, 46th Cong., 3d sess., 1881, H. Rept. No. 386, pp. 1-3.

⁹³Anna Ella Carroll to Judge [Jeremiah S.] Black, 11 February 1881, Frederick Dreer Collection, The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

⁹⁴Anna Ella Carroll to James A. Garfield, 15 July 1880, 11 September 1880, 6 August 1880, James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁹⁵Anna Ella Carroll to James A. Garfield, 3 November 1880, Garfield Papers.

⁹⁶Anna Ella Carroll to James A. Garfield, 16 March 1881, Garfield Papers.

⁹⁷James A. Garfield to Anna Ella Carroll, 20 August 1880, Garfield Papers; New York Times, 15 September 1881. The story was, literally, front page news, presumably because of Carroll's spring victory in the Congressional committee. The pension was apparently set at fifty dollars a month, but never passed. See Couzins, The Military Genius, p. 5.

⁹⁸History of Woman Suffrage, eds. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony and Matilda Joselyn Gage, 6 vols. (Rochester, New York: Susan B. Anthony, Charles Mann, 1881-1922), 2(1881):1-2.

⁹⁹Couzins, The Military Genius, p. 5, 8.

¹⁰⁰Biographical Directory of the American Congress 1774-1971 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 760; William Warden to Mary H. Carroll, 23 February 1884, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰¹Edward S. Bragg to Anna Ella Carroll, 26 April 1881, reprinted in Blackwell, Life and Writings, pp. 133-134.

¹⁰²William Warden to Mary H. Carroll, 23 February 1884, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰³Hon. John D. White, Speech in the House of Representatives, February 7, 1884 (Washington, DC: n.p., 1884), pp. 6, 10.

¹⁰⁴William W. Warden to Miss Carroll, 29 January 1885, Carroll Papers. It is unclear whether Carroll, who was recovering from her stroke by 1885, instigated the lawsuit or if her sister Mary did. All of Warden's letters but this one are to Mary who, living in Washington, may have simply been acting as her sister's agent. Anne did not join Mary in Washington until after Mary had a job. See n. 121 below.

¹⁰⁵William W. Warden to Chief Justice Richardson, 13 February 1885, Carroll Papers. Aid in the form of subscriptions came from pleas in the press. See n. 118 below.

¹⁰⁶William W. Warden to Mary H. Carroll, 27 October 1884, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰⁷William W. Warden to Mary H. Carroll, 20 April 1885, 26 April 1885, 1 June 1885, Carroll Papers.

¹⁰⁸Carroll v. U.S., 20 Court of Claims 426 (Court of Claims 1885), p. 429.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 430.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 431.

¹¹¹H. R. Bill 4835, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 13 January 1890, copy of printed bill preserved in Carroll Papers.

¹¹²H. R. Shattuck, "Anna Ella Carroll; The Originator of the Tennessee Campaign," Outing 6 (July 1885):405-406.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 407.

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 408-409.

¹¹⁵C. C. Hussey, Miss Anna Ella Carroll, as Author of the Tennessee Campaign, in the Late Civil War (East Orange, New Jersey: Gazette Steam Book & Job Print Co., 1885); Anna Ella Carroll, "Plan of the Tennessee Campaign," North American Review 42 (April 1886):342-347.

¹¹⁶Mary A. Livermore, My Story of the War: A Woman's Narrative of Four Years Personal Experience As Nurse in the Union Army, and in Relief Work at Home, in Hospitals, Camps, and at the Front, During the War of the Rebellion (Hartford, Connecticut: A. D. Worthington & Co., 1889), p. 175. Livermore's book sold 60,000 copies. "Mary A. Livermore," Notable American Women, ed. Edward T. James, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 2:410-413.

¹¹⁷Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius. This volume was available at the offices of the Woman's Suffrage Society in Washington, and at the offices of the Woman's Journal in Boston, a suffragist magazine edited by Blackwell's sister-in-law, Lucy Stone.

¹¹⁸Sarah Ellen Blackwell to Anna Ella Carroll, 24 July 1885, Carroll Papers; Sarah Ellen Blackwell to Alice Stone Blackwell, 3 January 1891, Blackwell Family Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. The Woman's Journal has monthly reports throughout 1885 on Carroll and the Carroll Fund; see also Sarah Ellen Blackwell, "The Anna Ella Carroll Fund," Woman's Column 6 (18 January 1888); clipping preserved in Anna Ella Carroll File, National American Woman Suffrage Association Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC; Sarah Ellen Blackwell, "The Case of Miss Carroll," Century Magazine 40 (August 1890):638-639; C. C. Hussey to Editor, Woman's Journal 16 (7 November 1885):356; Abbie M. Gannett to [Mary H. Carroll], 30 November 1885, Carroll Papers, CCJ Collection; Lucy Stone, Editor, Woman's Journal 16 (19 December 1885):404.

¹¹⁹Susan B. Anthony to Mary H. Carroll, 19 December 1889, Carroll Papers.

¹²⁰Representative Charles F. Manderson to Anna Ella Carroll, 9 July 1890, Carroll Papers.

¹²¹Mary H. Carroll to Grover Cleveland, 26 July 1885,

Grover Cleveland Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (microfilm); Mary H. Carroll to Rose Cleveland, 18 November 1885; Appointment given 15 June 1886, U. S. Department of the Treasury, Personnel Applications, National Archives, Washington, DC.

¹²²Mary H. Carroll to Grover Cleveland, 27 August 1888, and 6 September 1893, Cleveland Papers.

¹²³Sarah Ellen Blackwell to Alice Stone Blackwell, 9 February 1891, Blackwell Papers.

¹²⁴Isabel Howland to Editor, Inter-Ocean, 30 May 1891, reprinted in Blackwell, Life and Writings, pp. 136-139; Mary H. Carroll to Mrs. Frances Cleveland, 1 December 1893, Cleveland Papers. A note attached to this letter indicates that President Cleveland interested himself enough in Mary's case to examine her record. Her pay was eventually reinstated. See Carroll File, Treasury Department Personnel Applications.

¹²⁵Death Certificate, Vital Records Division, Department of Human Resources, District of Columbia; Dr. William J. Perry to author, 24 April 1986; Blackwell, Life & Writings, pp. 140-142; Anna Ella Carroll, Gravestone, Old Trinity Churchyard, Church Creek, Maryland.

Chapter 7

Carroll as Cause

Anna Ella Carroll's story did not end with her death in Washington in 1894. The suffragists' campaign had portrayed Carroll as a woman denied recognition because of her sex. Because of her paralysis and then her death, Carroll's campaign for recognition took on an added poignancy. Her story took on added details. Over the next hundred years, the legend grew of the woman who had saved the Union through her brilliant military strategy. The shaky foundation upon which it rested collapsed only under the force of scholarly investigation of her claim.

In the beginning, it seemed as if the suffragists would win their cause. Carroll's story did not die, a fact that was by itself remarkable. She was included in the National Cyclopedia of American Biography the year of her death and listed as a strategist. President Lincoln was quoted in the entry as supporting her claim, though no

source for the quotation was given.¹ A year later, in 1895, former Representative Albert Gallatin Riddle mentioned her case in his Recollections of War Times, again quoting Lincoln as her supporter. Riddle's portrayal of a "short, stout, middle-aged maiden lady, intently listening through an ear trumpet" to debates in Congress, continued the suffragist drive to have Carroll recognized in spite of her sex. Riddle had been informed of Carroll's plight by suffragists, or the "strong-minded" as he jocularly referred to them, but he failed in his attempt to persuade Congress to reward her. His interest seems to have been momentary and may have been purely political in spite of his inclusion of Carroll's claim in his book; he too misdated her death as 1893.²

The "strong-minded" continued to fight for Carroll. Sarah Ellen Blackwell published her second volume on Carroll in 1895. The small book, which sold for one dollar, contained reprints of Carroll's pamphlets and a touching rendition of her deathbed scene. Subscriptions to the volume were sold through advertisements in the Woman's Journal.³ The September 1896 issue of Godey's Magazine put Carroll on the cover as "The Woman that Saved the Union." Lucinda Chandler retold much of what was included in Blackwell's biography, but included a hint of skulduggery by those determined to block Carroll's claim by disclosing the alleged theft of Carroll's papers twice from the Committee

on Military Affairs.⁴ The current Congress, she suggested, could "redeem their sex" from the "amazing cowardice" of preceding Congresses by placing Carroll's portrait and a plaque commemorating her deeds in the Capitol. Since she was dead, there was little sense in pursuing a monetary reward, but Chandler proposed recognition at the very least.⁵

A monetary reward was not considered impossible, though, at least not by those who survived Carroll. Someone, most likely Mary H. Carroll, persuaded Maryland Senator Arthur P. Gorman to introduce a measure for the relief of the "legal representatives of Miss Anna Ella Carroll, deceased" in July 1897.⁶ Even with the suffragists' support and the added pathos of her death in poverty, however, Carroll's claim continued to be referred to committees for proper burial.⁷

It was not until 1910 that a defense of congressional inaction was published. The suffragists had argued for years that Carroll had not been fully recognized because she was a woman operating in the male sphere of politics and war. But Ida M. Tarbell saw the supporters of Carroll and her claim as an example of the unreasonable demands of suffragists. In an article on how American women were changed by the Civil War, Tarbell argued that Carroll's work had been duly recognized by the \$2,000 payment she had received for her pamphlets and by the notice Congress had

taken of her military claims. The failure to compensate Carroll for her role as strategist, a role which Tarbell accepted unquestioningly, was due to the plan having come from a civilian instead of a military person. Carroll's sex had nothing to do with it. Her claim had never passed simply because those things happened, Tarbell stated. Carroll was recognized "emphatically and generously" for her military labors; she was just never paid.⁸

Tarbell sought to prove that the suffragists were incorrect in their basic assumption that Carroll's sex excluded her from proper recognition. Further, because suffragists demanded recognition for Carroll rather than accepting the decision of Congress as appropriate, they were treading where they did not belong. Tarbell then extended that reasoning to argue that because the suffragists demanded voting rights, rather than accepting the decision of Congress and other institutions as appropriate, they were doomed never to receive those rights. Carroll had been amply rewarded, at least in Tarbell's eyes, and nothing would ever come of any further demands. So, too, had women been amply recompensed for their lack of voting rights by the special commission, provided by God, of maternity and the rule over the woman's sphere.

In Tarbell's opinion, the Woman's Rights movement had overlooked the "one eternal fact" that argument and agitation would never accomplish their goals. Too

aggressive and too bitter, the suffragists had adopted the "dangerous practice" of espousing causes and supporting candidates that would benefit their cause and condemning all who opposed their cause, regardless of individual merit. Suffragists had failed to consider history, she wrote. Individual responsibility had always been of the utmost importance to women, but that responsibility was to be defined in moral terms. Most women did not want and would never demand the individual political responsibility of the vote as a right. Tarbell did not see the vote as a right, but as a privilege, and one which women would seek and obtain as they had other privileges: only "when they need it to accomplish some good for which they feel themselves responsible."⁹

Tarbell's reactionary view that attempted to re-establish women in a separate sphere reflected the growing fight against woman suffrage in the decades prior to the constitutional amendment enfranchising women. While she was perfectly willing to admit that the Civil War, as was true of all wars, had "by necessity" changed the place of women in American society, Tarbell was not willing to let the transformation continue into the field of politics. Duty in the form of necessity had moved women into the workplace during the war. Their actions had been on the whole collective and properly motivated. It was wrong to claim the franchise because of one unusual individual who

had been discriminated against even though she had acted with the same motivation. It was just as wrong to claim it because women's public roles had expanded and they could no longer be portrayed as being interested solely in domestic matters. Tarbell's argument against Carroll's attempt to demand recognition for her work outside her appointed sphere, even if duty had led her there, was an example of the separate-but-equal repudiation of natural rights which was common among anti-suffragists.¹⁰

Carroll's story faded gradually from public view. She was mentioned in a county history as "the most distinguished and brilliant woman Maryland ever produced."¹¹ In 1925, the Baltimore Sun ran an article on her, comparing her work with the supposed trailblazing interest in business and politics of the "modern woman." In that article, Blackwell's book and Chandler's article were clearly the sources used. Lemuel Evans' role in the drama was de-emphasized, and Lincoln was said to have gone to St. Louis to implement Carroll's plan, an invention that would presumably lend needed credibility to her claim.¹² An unconsciously patronizing article followed in 1934 by Dr. Milton Shutes who defended Carroll's trespass on the "verboden" path of military work "that has always been jealously reserved for the brilliant male!"¹³ "Somewhere a little monument is missing!" argued Shutes, because Carroll was "a civilian and--a woman!"¹⁴ Shutes thus returned both

to Carroll's argument that the military were too jealous to let her have her claim and to the suffragists' argument that held her sex responsible.

In 1940, Anne Carroll's story finally appeared in the popular press. Woman's Home Companion, with a circulation of over three million readers, published a two-part serialization of Carroll's career as a strategist.¹⁵ The story of the "unhonored general of the Civil War" again accepted the validity of Carroll's tale, again misdated her death, and again argued that her sex was the reason her work had not been properly rewarded.¹⁶ The piece, based on research by Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, added a twist to the last argument. Four years after the publication of the popular Civil War novel, Gone with the Wind, Greenbie reasoned that had Carroll been a romantic feminine figure who had defied Southern soldiers at the door, spied for the Union in the dead of night, or been a "federal Scarlett O'Hara" she would have been long remembered and greatly honored. But "hers was a man's role throughout." Because Carroll wrote for the Union, advised President Lincoln and his cabinet, and designed military strategy, she did not fit into the acceptable romantic portrayal of women's work during the Civil War.¹⁷ Her work was too cerebral, her figure too corpulent, her age too advanced to permit men to allow her to become a national heroine.

Marjorie Greenbie's research for the article went beyond the repetition of the congressional documents, Blackwell's biography, and the other suffragists' writings that earlier defenders had relied upon. She had found a treasure on the Eastern Shore of Maryland in one of Anne Carroll's nieces, Nellie Calvert Carroll, who remembered her "Aunt Anne." In Pikesville, Maryland, she had found Katherine Cradock, another niece, who had kept her aunt's papers in her attic. Greenbie had persuaded her to place them in the keeping of the Maryland Historical Society. Shortly after the magazine series was released, Greenbie's book on Carroll, My Dear Lady, was published. Although she had had time to use only a few of the documents she had discovered in her book, Marjorie Greenbie would be joined by her husband Sydney twelve years later in a second biography of Carroll that promised to use all the documents. The two Greenbies would form a team determined to put their version of Carroll's story into the appropriate place in the history books of America.¹⁸

The Greenbies were not historians. Marjorie had a doctoral degree in philology from Yale; Sydney was what might be euphemistically termed a "popular" writer, author of such books as Furs to Furrows: An Epic of Rugged Individualism, a defensive apology of manifest destiny as a positive good and a non-imperialist method of spreading American civilization. He also wrote a whole series of

travelogues on South and Central America as the "sister republics" of the United States. His works were panned by historical critics as stylish but insubstantial.¹⁹ The writing styles of both Greenbies were similar, not only to each other, but to Carroll's work as well. Hyperbole, exclamation points, and paranoia abound. "Could it be," Marjorie Greenbie began in My Dear Lady, "that there was a body of fact about the Civil War, fact intimately concerning . . . Lincoln and General Grant, which had been deliberately concealed? Could it be that much of the history of the Civil War is, in effect, untrue . . . and has been allowed to remain so?"²⁰

Greenbie had begun her research in 1937 for her first book on Carroll, after discovering Blackwell's biography. A movie short called Strange Glory which mentioned Carroll she viewed as a sign "that the long silence about Anne Carroll in written history was bound soon to be broken."²¹ Greenbie hurriedly finished her book and published it in 1940.

My Dear Lady suffered from its quick completion. It is replete with errors: incorrect dates, names (Carroll's pamphlet Union of the States is mistitled The American Union), and events. Even the epigraph taken from Carroll's The Great American Battle was misquoted. Greenbie gave Carroll numerous imaginary beaux, including both Millard Fillmore and James Buchanan. Family legend had mentioned

both, in spite of Carroll's regard for Fillmore as a father figure. As for Buchanan, Carroll's political antipathy toward the Democrats would tend to preclude any romantic attachment.²²

Carroll was also given an access to Lincoln undreamed of by any of her previous biographers. Livermore had written in My Story of the War that Carroll saw Lincoln easily and that he had kept a "special file for her communications," but few biographers were willing to suggest that Carroll could simply walk in and see Lincoln as she wished. His papers, in fact, contain an angry letter from Carroll demanding either an appointment or a reply after she had been kept waiting to see him for over a month. Greenbie, in contrast to earlier biographers, portrayed Carroll as obtaining instant access at all times.²³

Lemuel Evans was married off by Greenbie, though there is no evidence he ever married. He became Carroll's military attaché to prevent any hints of scandal or impropriety on Carroll's part.²⁴ Greenbie stressed Carroll's femininity again and again in the text, though it proved difficult for her to comply with Nellie Calvert's request that the biography be written in such a way as to "remove the false sense of strong-mindedness conveyed by her works." Carroll was to be feminine, sociable, lady-like. Any suggestion of Carroll emerging from her proper sphere without the protective shield of the image of the Southern

lady was inconceivable to her genteel niece.²⁵ Faced with the contradiction between Calvert's demands and Carroll's work and personality, Greenbie began nobly, but soon gave up trying to assert her subject's femininity in hopes of convincing the reader of Carroll's overall worth in spite of her imperious and independent nature.

She succeeded to a degree. Reviews of My Dear Lady carefully noted that Carroll's intelligence and hard work for the Union had not interfered with her femininity. As was true in the nineteenth century, however, those who heard Carroll's claim had a difficult time accepting it. They reviewed the work cautiously, granting its readability but awaiting more conclusive evidence before accepting the validity of the claim.²⁶

Greenbie had no such hesitation. She believed the Carroll story completely. Hurrying into print with My Dear Lady, she had not used many of Carroll's papers she had retrieved from her niece's attic. She wanted more time for research and promised her public that a closely-documented, less speculative work would follow that would prove Carroll's claim beyond any doubt. World War II intervened after 1500 copies of My Dear Lady had been run, and the book quickly disappeared from print.²⁷ The story, however, did not disappear. A radio play based on Greenbie's book was broadcast in June 1941, starring Agnes Moorhead as Anne Carroll. Movie offers came from several studios.²⁸

Greenbie, off in the South Pacific with her husband Sydney for the duration of the war, left the story behind and returned to it about 1946.²⁹

At the same time the Greenbies began their work on a more substantial biography, newspaper reporter Hollister Noble was writing a novel based on the life of Anne Carroll. Entitled Woman with a Sword, it was published by Doubleday in 1948.³⁰ Noble's novel, which shaved fifteen years and twenty pounds off Carroll, incorporated the romantic ideas the Woman's Home Companion article had found lacking in Carroll's story. Carroll became a secret agent paid by the War Department and under the direct supervision of Lincoln, Stanton, and Benjamin Wade, chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. Lemuel Evans became Carroll's fiancé whom she would never marry because of what Noble delicately referred to as her "psychological problem." Noble's opinion that Carroll never found a man who could measure up to her father was a reasonable interpretation of her single state. He added, however, that career demands also limited Carroll's freedom of action. Those demands were not confined to simple personal fulfillment, but included the more important demands of duty to God and country.³¹

Noble's novel was romantic and dashing and fairly well-written. It was also historical fantasy of the best-selling sort, with just enough sex and violence to make it interesting without being offensive. Book reviewers

praised the portrait of the "petite, lovely and completely charming lady," whose "ingenious and brilliant mind" had saved the Union from annihilation.³² Life magazine told her story, calling Carroll "Lincoln's Lady Strategist" and only briefly mentioning that the work was fiction.³³ Adaptations of Noble's novel were performed on Cavalcade of America, and on the Playhouse 25 broadcast of the Armed Forces Radio Network.³⁴ The more times the story was told, the greater Carroll became: a spy, a major-general, a "secret war tactician."³⁵ She met with Lincoln and Stanton often to mastermind the strategical plans of the war.³⁶ She deserved the country's thanks, but she had nobly kept her secret, so as not to denigrate the country's heroes. She died in penury (with dates as various as April, February, the 19th, the 18th, the 16th, 1893, 1894), an unsung heroine foiled by an ungrateful Congress and sexist historians, and all that had happened to her was important and destructive and romantic because she was a woman.

The romantic appeal of a lone woman, fighting the military and political leaders of the time for recognition and payment for her work, yet managing to retain her attractive femininity throughout the battle, had enormous appeal for the public. Anne Carroll would have been thrilled. At last her version of her story had been told. Granted, some of the biographers' embellishments were inaccurate (a point which would have concerned her not at

all), but all accepted unquestioningly the central issue: Anna Ella Carroll had designed and presented the Tennessee Campaign plan to the United States government during the Civil War and that plan had been directly responsible for the winning of the war and the salvation of the Union.

After the first flush of literary excitement at such a discovery in American history died down, however, critical reviews and articles began to appear. F. Lauriston Bullard, who had reviewed My Dear Lady favorably but reservedly in 1940,³⁷ published a critical analysis of Carroll's congressional claims.³⁸ A contributing editor to the Lincoln Herald, Bullard argued that claims made by and for Carroll were so incredible and so excessive that they demanded dispassionate and scholarly investigation. Bullard concentrated on the inconsistencies and changes in text found in Carroll's congressional documents, the fortuitous additions, and the credit that Carroll had willingly given to Scott in 1865, but had tried to belittle in her 1876 memorial to Congress. In the end Bullard accepted Carroll as the one who had brought the Tennessee Plan to the attention of military authorities in Washington, but argued that Charles M. Scott, "an able and honest man" was its true author.³⁹

A few months later, Carroll's Civil War pamphlets came under scrutiny by lawyer Walter Armstrong. He found them to be the "best and most persuasive contemporary

rationalization of the theory upon which Lincoln acted." As for the military plan, while Armstrong did not deny the validity of Carroll's claim outright, he pointed out that Lincoln's dismissal of Carroll's propaganda proposal made it clear that he probably would have been unsympathetic to Carroll's military claims.⁴⁰

It was not until 1950 that a scholarly appraisal of Carroll's military claim was written. Kenneth P. Williams, working on a multi-volume history of the war, considered the claim in both his history and in a journal article. Carroll's claim, which Williams thought "seemingly settled" by congressional inaction and her death, had been revived by Greenbie and Noble to such an extent that Williams was determined to rule on its veracity once and for all. His interest was not entirely academic: Williams, whom Sydney Greenbie later referred to as "the bull in General Grant's pasture," was a great fan of General Grant, and any attack on the general's abilities and accomplishments was automatically suspect.⁴¹

Williams used the official records of the war to trace the actions in the western theatre to disprove Greenbie and Noble's versions of Carroll's claim. Greenbie had not consulted the military records and had mistakenly credited Carroll, Thomas A. Scott, and Lincoln with informing Grant of the plan in February as General Halleck ordered Grant up the Tennessee. Noble had explained the

same event with a secret order from Lincoln to Buell and Halleck. In fact, that move upriver was suggested by Grant and Foote to Halleck.⁴² The official records did not support Carroll's claim, Williams argued. As for her defenders, Wade and Scott, both were partisan politicians and inconsistent in their statements on her behalf.⁴³ Since ingratitude was certainly uncharacteristic of Lincoln, Williams wrote, the fact that Lincoln turned down her propaganda proposal with such vigor further showed that she could not have been the author of a successful campaign undertaken such a short time prior to her proposal.⁴⁴

In the end, Williams was not even willing to grant that Carroll had presented the same November 30 plan to Scott as had been printed in her congressional claims because the original document had never been found.⁴⁵ In the light of his analysis of the inaccuracies of both Greenbie and Noble, his caution was reasonable. He did not, however, examine Carroll's papers for the plan, merely the War Department records. Since Carroll claimed to have read the paper out loud to Scott, it would not have been in the register of letters received anyway. Be that as it may, there was and is still no proof that the copy of the plan extant in Carroll's papers today was the one she claimed she had presented to Scott on November 30.⁴⁶

Williams did an excellent job of analyzing Carroll's claim to prove the errancy of her assumptions regarding the

effect of her plan. He also did an excellent job of provoking Sydney and Marjorie Greenbie, who had been hard at work on a follow-up biography of Carroll. Anna Ella Carroll and Abraham Lincoln was due to be published in 1952, and a friend of Williams wrote to the University of Tampa Press for a pre-publication copy for Williams. At that time, the press was run by Sydney Greenbie, and the Carroll biography was its first publication. Williams' attack on My Dear Lady had roused Greenbie's wrath, and the polite request for a copy of the new biography was met with a childish refusal. "We don't give a whoot [sic] what Mr. Williams says or whether he sees it," Greenbie wrote, angry that Williams had accused his wife of inaccuracies. "In due course we will still take him on and show him a thing or two."⁴⁷ This was the first shot in a series of nasty exchanges between Williams and the Greenbies on the validity of Carroll's claim and on the scholarly credentials of her biographers.

While the Greenbies' second volume did make use of Carroll's papers and did benefit from interviews with family members who remembered her, their extravagant and unsupported claims detracted from Carroll's reputation as a legitimate historical figure.⁴⁸ The Greenbies were convinced that Carroll's help was essential to Lincoln. They accepted her pamphlets and petitions as prima facie evidence to assert that their interpretation of Carroll was correct, that she had been denied recognition solely because

she was a woman, and that "wicked and malicious historians" were conspiratorially determined to negate her importance to the conduct of the war and to history.⁴⁹

The Greenbies' book was painfully defensive in tone. It portrayed a fantastical version of events: Carroll supporting Lincoln as early as Lincoln's Cooper Union speech in February 1860, which the Greenbies claimed she attended as a member of the committee that selected lecturers for the platform;⁵⁰ Lincoln, Stanton, Wade, and Carroll meeting together nightly in the War Department's telegraph office to plot strategy;⁵¹ Carroll so close to Lincoln and so much a part of his Cabinet that the empty chair in Francis B. Carpenter's painting of the Cabinet at the time of the Emancipation Proclamation was for her.⁵² Aside from these wholly imaginary and unsupported conjectures, the book contained an inattention to historical detail that was characteristic of the Greenbies' work and that provided a field day for reviewers. Secretary of War Simon Cameron was Simeon Cameron throughout the text; photographer Matthew Brady was William F. Brady. President Andrew Jackson's famous toast at the Jefferson Day dinner in 1830 was misquoted, as was Samuel Morse's Biblical telegraph message that inaugurated the use of his invention. Not only was historical detail badly damaged, but even literary nuances suffered from the Greenbies' inaccuracies as magnolia trees burst "into waxy bloom" in March in Washington, three months

prior to their normal blossoming.⁵³

Most damaging of all to the Greenbies' text and to their version of Carroll's claim was the inventive terminology within their footnotes. Practically every controversial claim the Greenbies made had a footnote. But practically every one of those footnotes included the phrase: "This scene is synthetic." Where evidence was missing, the Greenbies argued, "psychology must step in and, with sleuth-like determination, re-establish the facts."⁵⁴

The Greenbies met criticism of their book in the Journal of Southern History, which was the only major historical journal that reviewed Anna Ella Carroll and Abraham Lincoln, with accusations that the reviewer was exaggerating and distorting the few errors that existed "for his own ends."⁵⁵ But Sydney Greenbie saved his most acidulous replies for the criticism Kenneth Williams presented in the Lincoln Herald. For the Greenbies (at least for Sydney, since Marjorie tended to let her husband fight her battles), Carroll and her claim had by now become less a symbol of man's inhumanity to woman than the failure of "distinguished egg-heads," "subterreanean" pundits, and "academic gauleiters" to appreciate the work of outsiders in the academic provinces.⁵⁶ As Carroll had been an outsider in the nineteenth century, striving for recognition and legitimization by those in power, so the Greenbies fought for the recognition of their work by legitimate scholars.

In large part, that recognition was denied. James G. Randall mentioned Carroll and the Greenbies' work favorably;⁵⁷ Allan Nevins mentioned Carroll's claim as well, but pointed out the additional evidence that she was not the first nor the only one to conceive of the Tennessee River campaign.⁵⁸ Roy P. Basler included a letter from Lincoln to Carroll praising her "address to Maryland" in his nine-volume edition of Lincoln's papers.⁵⁹ But by and large, the academic community found Williams' condemnation of Carroll's claim convincing and substantially supported by the Official Records. Even Williams' additional, somewhat specious, argument was accepted: it was unnecessary to give Carroll credit for the Tennessee Plan because even if she had thought of it, it was so obvious it had doubtless occurred to every military mind.⁶⁰

Resigning themselves momentarily to the lack of scholarly appreciation, the Greenbies returned their attention to the popular press, where praise for Noble's work was still strong. A Hallmark Hall of Fame television production, based on Noble's novel and starring Jayne Meadows, had been broadcast in February 1952. Noble had also made a distribution agreement with Sears and Roebuck. They had sold thousands of copies of Woman with a Sword through their People's Book Club.⁶¹ If the Greenbies could not obtain scholarly regard, they were determined to protect their story of Anne Carroll from pirates such as Noble who

were making a fortune. On July 21, 1954, the Greenbies filed a copyright infringement suit against Noble, his publisher Doubleday, Sears and Roebuck, and against those who had sponsored the shows based on Noble's book: Dupont, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), Hallmark Cards, Cavalcade of America; Batten, Barton, Dunstine & Osborne, who had produced a 1949 radio show; and Foote, Cone and Belding, producers of the Hallmark Hall of Fame version.⁶²

The civil case was before the courts for nearly three years and produced over 1000 pages of testimony. Noble committed suicide just prior to the suit's filing, and eventually only his publisher and Sears and Roebuck remained as defendants. The judge ruled against Marjorie Greenbie, finding that Carroll's story was "derived from common sources and materials available to all."⁶³ Since historical facts contained in government publications were not subject to copyright, and since Greenbie had failed to prove that Noble had copied from her book rather than using the original source material available on Carroll, no copyright infringement existed.⁶⁴ Furthermore, since Greenbie's first book had not been a commercial success and had been out of print for six years before Noble published the novel, Greenbie had not been harmed financially, and could recover no damages. As for Noble's "parallel language, incidents, ideas and juxtaposition of words and events" that Greenbie had exhibited as clear evidence of

Noble's plagiarism, the judge ruled that "similarity of phraseology" did not amount to a copyright infringement.⁶⁵

"Against this Janus-faced decision" the Greenbies appealed, but withdrew after a settlement offer, citing the cost of pursuing an appeal.⁶⁶ Infuriated by the loss, Sydney Greenbie wrote a book about the writing and the plagiarizing of the story of Anna Ella Carroll. The book was valuable for additional information on Carroll's life as it recounted the interviews held with her family. Greenbie was more interested, however, in revealing that Noble's "sole original contribution to the life of a very great person was to falsify her position and her American ideals by making her and her distinguished associate, Judge Evans, into communists."⁶⁷

Noble's book, ranted Greenbie, was a collaboration by communists at Doubleday to "propagandize 'old man Marx'" and to make money.⁶⁸ Evidence of the second was a given. Evidence of the first was circumstantial. Noble had made a jarring reference to Carroll reading Marx's Civil War essays, and he had persisted in referring to the Radical Republicans as the "red Republicans."⁶⁹ He had also included a scene wherein Evans called for a restructuring of American capitalist society away from the "feudal strangle" of Southern planters that had rested on the "exploitation of man by man" in the form of racial slavery.⁷⁰ But such minor incidents of Marxist philosophy tended to be buried by

the sweeping romance of Noble's novelization. The book was not, as Greenbie preferred to view it, "a case of cultural adultery the rape of one of the great stories of American history by communists for communist ends."⁷¹

Such libelous vituperation kept any publisher from bringing out Greenbie's manuscript, and in the end he had it privately printed. But the Greenbies' championship of Carroll's cause might have had some effect on the scholarly world, for even though Williams had pretty well destroyed their version of her claim, her story did not disappear from view entirely. She appeared again, tale intact, in a history of women in the war and in a juvenile biography.⁷² One of her Civil War pamphlets was reprinted in a scholarly collection of such publications and she was listed in the biographical directory, Notable American Women.⁷³ In the 1970s, as women's history began to achieve momentum and notice as a legitimate field of historical inquiry, her entire career was given scholarly attention, free from the partisanship and literary vindictiveness that had characterized earlier work.

Charles McCool Snyder discovered approximately fifty letters between Carroll and Millard Fillmore and, in 1973, presented his findings about Carroll's career in the 1850s, characterizing her accurately as a political strategist, but dismissing her somewhat by calling her a "gadfly."⁷⁴ Jean Baker, historian of Maryland politics in the nineteenth

century, analyzed Carroll's writings in two of her texts, including a quantitative textual analysis of Carroll's The Great American Battle as a prime example of Know-Nothing literature.⁷⁵

E. B. Long, research director for Civil War historian Bruce Catton in the 1950s and 1960s, took on Carroll's military claim once again, but with a less condescending and hostile attitude than Kenneth Williams had evinced. He fully expected his attempt would "undoubtedly arouse the same acrimonious controversy that has surrounded this Maryland lady for over a century," but was willing to take his chances.⁷⁶ Long granted that Carroll had written the Plan in her papers that Williams had dismissed, and that she had presented the plan to the War Department. He also pointed out that those "with political and social axes to grind" had used Carroll's story for their own purposes.⁷⁷ Long reasoned, as had Williams, that the design of the plan was so obvious that giving any one person credit was a bit absurd. The validity of her claim aside, Long did not think Carroll was a "maliciously hidden" figure in history, but merely a "competent, capable woman," a "minor figure with a fascination all her own, but with slim importance."⁷⁸

This last assessment of Carroll must be reconsidered, however, in the light of her work outside her claims of military strategy. Carroll had used her skill as a writer to do the work she wanted in a field she loved. As

a woman, her options in politics were limited. So, in the beginning of her career, Carroll had developed a compromise methodology to fulfill her goal of participating in political activity. Writing was one of the very few socially acceptable activities outside the home for upper-class women, particularly Southern women. Even that activity was limited by the image of the "Southern lady." The pervasiveness of that image meant that to achieve social acceptability for any activities outside the norm, the woman working had to do so within the cultural framework that existed. Carroll accepted the validity of the dominant assumptions of her culture at first: the importance of politics both professional and personal, of ambition and achievement, and of the idea of the womanly sphere. Her writings reflected those assumptions. And because her work reflected those assumptions rather than doing battle against them, Carroll achieved one of her major goals: to have her work read and taken seriously by politicians.⁷⁹

At the same time, the cultural imperative of the Southern lady demanded that she present her work in a very specific manner. For Carroll, the image's cultural demand of selflessness would not take the usual and expected form of voicelessness and listening to those who had something to say worth listening to (i.e., white male politicians and preachers). Carroll's selflessness began as anonymity. Her unknown voice could present ideas important to her in a

designedly non-threatening manner.⁸⁰ Carroll's method as she began her career did not threaten to challenge the male-dominant power structure and try to change it. Nor did it threaten her own sense of feminine self. She was very aware that she was a female operating in a male sphere. But with duty as her motivation and anonymity or, later, self-effacement and apology part of her by-line, she reassured her readers. Perhaps Carroll knew claiming a right to participate fully in politics would raise a backlash that could shut her out completely.⁸¹

Carroll communicated her ideas through print and personal contact, through petitioning rather than confrontation. These three characteristics of her style are typical of what historian Linda Kerber has labeled "prepolitical" behavior: the acknowledgment of inferiority (the apology), the rhetoric of humility (the assurance that only duty had drawn Carroll into political matters and away from her more appropriate role), and the individual nature of the act of petitioning (Carroll wrote alone, even when the ideas she presented were shared by many).⁸² But for Carroll, her actions as writer, lobbyist, critic, hostess, traveller, saleswoman, or strategist, were unquestionably political acts with political goals in mind, be they publication, patronage positions, or simple acceptance of the value of her opinions and intelligence.

When Carroll began writing under her own name with

no apology, however, and when she filed for her claim and entered the public arena, her methodology had changed. Filing her claim and gathering support from suffragists represented more than a desire for money and for recognition for something she thought she had done. They were also acts that forever broke her link with the role of a proper Southern lady. Because she was no longer anonymous, she was no longer voiceless. By entering the public sphere, Carroll confronted the institutions and cultural imperatives that had proved so unaccepting of her desire for recognition.

To place Carroll into a historical category that is not a Southern lady is difficult because of the individualistic nature of her work. She was not a reformer, an abolitionist or a proto-feminist of the type identifiable from 1830 to 1860. She did not join voluntary associations. She was not a suffragist, although she did not hesitate to use their strengths to support her cause. She was not an upper or middle-class family-oriented woman preserving the hearth for a hard-working husband and embracing the cult of domesticity. Nor was she an unmarried daughter working until she was married and thus properly taken care of.⁸³

If categorized at all, Carroll was a bit of a Victorian bluestocking, albeit a sociable one, but enraptured by books and education. A prescriptive writer, her works reflected the assumption that universal moral principles could be conceptualized, understood, and acted

upon in the same manner as physics or chemistry. Feeling free to write on all sorts of subjects, Carroll exemplified the lettered women and men of the Victorian era in America who were amateur experts and believed learning and scholarship were inclusive rather than exclusive, and should be shared with others, whether as commentary or advice.⁸⁴

The fact that Carroll never married was surprising. She was an attractive and vivacious woman of a distinguished family. But she never seemed inclined to give up the relative freedom a single woman had over a married one in nineteenth-century America. Her work as a writer help support her through much of her life and enabled her to care for her father, a "congenial presence [which] seemed to be all-sufficient for her."⁸⁵ By caring for her father, she could fulfill the domestic role which society demanded of her, while retaining her independence. She was not without men in her life, but her work was her passion. Her surviving letters to politicians and family alike contain little of the domesticity that was the usual lot and focus of most women during this period, when the proper sphere of womanly activity became the cult of domesticity. Instead, her letters and those she received were full of political news and gossip, of reports and opinions, of rumors and plans, of articles and editorials. She was treated by the vast majority of minor politicians who wrote to her as a woman with a great deal of political and legal acumen and a

certain amount of influence. The former was evidenced in her published work as well; the latter was a less tangible and certainly overestimated quality.

Defining Carroll's historical importance has been limited to one-sided stands taken in support of or in opposition to her claim to authorship of the Tennessee Campaign. Fortunately, historians in the last twenty years have become aware that the past is very complex. Within that complexity, Carroll begins to assume her place more clearly. She becomes, not a simplistic figure of downtrodden womanhood that historians have either conspired to consign to oblivion or to save from obscurity, but rather a woman of active political involvement, laboring for causes she believed in, using the methods available to her.⁸⁶ As an historical persona, Carroll has become what she called for in The Great American Battle: not a Joan of Arc, but a faithful and true woman, neither heroine nor fool, but an American woman who could stand in her own shoes.⁸⁷ Those shoes might be a different size than she had planned, a different style, planted in a different place, but they are at last her own.

Notes

¹National Cyclopedia of American Biography, 62 vols. (New York: James T. White & Co., 1893-1984), 5(1894):193.

²Albert Gallatin Riddle, Recollections of War Times: Reminiscences of Men and Events in Washington 1860-1865 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1895), p. 190, 193.

³Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life and Writings of Anna Ella Carroll (Washington, DC: Judd & Detweiler, 1895); Woman's Journal 26 (19 January 1895):21. "The pamphlets form a valuable contribution . . . and an able dissertation on the principles of the constitution. As such we recommend it for study by the equal suffrage clubs and clubs for political study."

⁴Lucinda B. Chandler, "Anna Ella Carroll: The Great Unrecognized Genius of the War of the Rebellion," Codey's Magazine 133 (September 1896):255.

⁵Ibid., p. 257

⁶Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 1st session, 1897, p. 2896.

⁷Sarah Ellen Blackwell, Life of a Military Genius: Anna Ella Carroll of Maryland (Judd & Detweiler, 1891), pp. 150-163 gives some idea of the numbers of women that wrote on behalf of Carroll's cause. See also articles, letters and even poetry in issues of the Woman's Journal from 1885 through 1896. Carroll's story was also published in American Women, ed. Frances E. Willard and Mary A. Livermore, 2 vols. (New York: Mast, Crowell & Kirkpatrick, 1897; reprint ed., Detroit, Michigan: Gale Research Co., 1973), 1:153-154.

⁸Ida M. Tarbell, "The American Woman: How She Met the Experience of War," American Magazine 69 (April 1910):811.

⁹Ibid., pp. 801-802, 814.

¹⁰Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage

Movement 1890-1920 (New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 16-17, 21-22; Nancy Woloch, Women and the American Experience (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984), pp. 337-343; "Ida M. Tarbell," Notable American Women, ed. Edward T. James, 3 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 3:430.

¹¹Elias Jones, Revised History of Dorchester County, Maryland (Baltimore: Read-Taylor Press, 1925), p. 298.

¹²May Irene Copinger, "Maryland Woman Influenced U. S. Destiny," Baltimore Sun, 11 October 1925. Carroll's death was misdated as 21 February in this article, which also credits her with a biography of General Joseph Warren.

¹³Dr. Milton H. Shutes, "Meet an Unheralded Heroine," National Republic Magazine 22 (November 1934):3-4.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 34.

¹⁵"My Dear Lady," Woman's Home Companion, February and March 1940 issues [see note 16 below]. Woman's Home Companion, edited by Gertrude B. Lane, was the number one women's magazine in the United States in 1937. See "Gertrude B. Lane," Notable American Women, 2:363-365.

¹⁶"My Dear Lady," Woman's Home Companion 67 (February 1940):13.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 14.

¹⁸Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, My Dear Lady: The Story of Anna Ella Carroll, the "Great Unrecognized Member of Lincoln's Cabinet" (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1940); Sydney and Marjorie Barstow Greenbie, Anna Ella Carroll and Abraham Lincoln (Manchester, Maine: University of Tampa Press in cooperation with Falmouth Publishing House, 1952), p. viii.

¹⁹See reviews of Greenbie's work in the American Historical Review 32 (October 1926):172-173; and American Historical Review 45 (July 1940): 972, wherein the reviewer of Furs to Furrows remained "completely baffled as to why the book was ever written."

²⁰Greenbie, My Dear Lady, pp. vi-vii.

²¹Ibid., p. xvi. Strange Glory was released by Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer in 1938. The director was Jacques Tourneurs, the historical compilations were made by Charles E. Whittaker, the screenplay was by Morgan Cox. The film

does not appear to have survived to the present. Amy Turin [Archivist, National Center for Film and Video Preservation, American Film Institute, Washington, DC] to author, 17 March 1986.

²²Robert J. Scarry, Millard Fillmore: The 13th President of the United States (Moravia, New York: Robert J. Scarry, 1982), p. 5.

²³Mary Livermore, My Story of the War (Hartford, Connecticut: A. D. Worthington, 1889), p. 174; Greenbie, My Dear Lady, passim, especially pp. 260-261; Anna Ella Carroll to Abraham Lincoln, 30 July 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (microfilm).

²⁴Greenbie, My Dear Lady, p. 111.

²⁵Ibid., pp. xii, 39.

²⁶F. Lauriston Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll Career Persuasively, Eloquenty Told," Boston Herald, 19 October 1940; Lyman Beecher Stowe, "In Lincoln's Kitchen Cabinet," New York Times Book Review, 8 December 1940; Ralph Thompson, "Books of the Times, New York Times, [n.d.]; all clippings preserved in the Anna Ella Carroll File, National American Woman Suffrage Association Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

²⁷Sydney Greenbie, Suit with Red Lining (Penobscot, Maine: Traversity Press, 1958), p. 47.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 3, 49. "Anna Ella Carroll," writ., Robert Tallman, Cavalcade of America, NBC Radio, 2 June 1941.

²⁹Greenbie, Suit, p. 56.

³⁰Hollister Noble, Woman with a Sword (New York: Doubleday, 1948), pp. 3-5. Doubleday issued a separate pamphlet which reprinted Noble's bibliography and sources, apparently for distribution to bookstores.

³¹Ibid., p. 408.

³²Alice Dixon Bond, "Biography Discloses Woman Whose Strategy Saved Union," Boston Sunday Herald, 24 October 1948, clipping in Carroll File, NAWSA Papers.

³³"Lincoln's Lady Strategist," Life 25 (26 July 1948):101-102.

³⁴"Woman with a Sword," writ., Hollister Noble, Playhouse 25, Armed Forces Radio and Television Services, n.d. [1974 rebroadcast]; "Woman with a Sword," writ., Hollister Noble, Cavalcade of America, adapt., Virginia Radcliffe, NBC Radio, 23 May 1949.

³⁵Herbert Allen, "New Light on Lincoln's 'Secret' War Tactician," Boston Herald, 2 February 1949, clipping in Carroll File, NAWSA Papers.

³⁶H. E. Neal, "Secret Heroine of the Civil War," Coronet 26 (May 1949):148-152.

³⁷See Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll Career," note 26 above.

³⁸F. Lauriston Bullard, "Anna Ella Carroll and Her 'Modest' Claim," Lincoln Herald 50 (October 1948):2-10, 47.

³⁹Ibid., p. 10.

⁴⁰Walter P. Armstrong, "The Story of Anna Ella Carroll: Politician, Lawyer and Secret Agent," American Bar Association Journal 35 (March 1949):199.

⁴¹Kenneth P. Williams, "The Tennessee River Campaign and Anna Ella Carroll, Indiana Magazine of History 46 (September 1950): 223; Greenbie, Suit, p. 60.

⁴²Williams, "Tennessee Campaign," pp. 230-234. See Chapter 5 above.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 235-237.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 247.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 248.

⁴⁶Anna Ella Carroll to Thomas A. Scott, 10 January 1862, Anna Ella Carroll Papers, Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. This document contains the November 30 plan and an appended letter reiterating her advice, dated 10 January 1862, that Carroll persistently misdated in her petitions and memorials as 5 January 1862.

⁴⁷Sydney Greenbie to Monroe F. Cockrell, n.d., reply written on letter, Monroe F. Cockrell to University of Tampa Press, 9 January 1852, Monroe F. Cockrell Papers, William R. Perkins Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. Cockrell, a friend of Williams, was a businessman whose

avocation was Civil War history.

⁴⁸Avery Craven, "Review," New York Herald Tribune Book Review, 26 October 1952.

⁴⁹Greenbies, Anna Ella Carroll and Abraham Lincoln, p. 505. Hereafter cited as AEC & AL.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 193.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 366-375.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 400-404.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 140, 91, 233.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 505.

⁵⁵Richard Bardolph, reviewed AEC & AL in the Journal of Southern History 18 (November 1952):511-513. See also Sydney Greenbie to Editor and Richard Bardolph to Editor, Journal of Southern History 19 (November 1953):549-551.

⁵⁶M[arjorie] B. G[reebie], "The Making of a Best Seller," epigraph to Sydney Greenbie, Suit; Greenbie, Suit, pp. 124-125.

⁵⁷J. G. Randall, Lincoln the President, 4 vols. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1945-1955), 2(1945):66-67.

⁵⁸Allan Nevins, The War for the Union: War Becomes Revolution, 1862-1863 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 15-16.

⁵⁹Abraham Lincoln to Anna Ella Carroll, 19 August 1862, in The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler, 9 vols. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 5:381-382. This letter, written a few days after Carroll's angry reply to Lincoln's refusal of her propaganda proposition, was cited by the Greenbies to prove that Lincoln's refusal was caused by ill temper and that Lincoln and Carroll quickly returned to their close companionship. The letter is not an original, but a copy which Carroll enclosed in a letter introducing herself to James Garfield, 6 August 1880, James Abram Garfield Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. The copy is not in her hand, which makes its authenticity less suspect, but it is really just a polite note to a citizen who had done work for the behalf of the Union. Lincoln, Basler suggested, was simply trying to soothe Carroll's anger at being refused.

After all, her constitutional pamphlets had supported Lincoln and had been distributed by the administration. Lincoln's action was simple courtesy, no more. Carl Sandburg also mentioned Carroll's pamphlets briefly in Abraham Lincoln: The War Years, 4 vols. (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1939), 1:410-411.

⁶⁰Kenneth P. Williams, Lincoln Finds a General, 5 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1949-1959), 3(1952):456; see also vol. 4(1956):455-457.

⁶¹"Woman with a Sword," writ., Hollister Noble, Hallmark Hall of Fame, NBC Television, 10 February 1952. A copy of this performance, which featured Jayne Meadows as Anna Ella Carroll, survives on kinescope at Radio and Television Archives, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California. Greenbie, Suit, p. 121.

⁶²Ibid., p. 138; Greenbie v. Noble, et al, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Civil 94-300, National Archives, New York Branch, Bayonne, New Jersey.

⁶³Ibid., The Honorable Richard Levet, "Opinion," p. 44; Greenbie, Suit, p. 138.

⁶⁴Levet, "Opinion," pp. 45-48.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 54.

⁶⁶Greenbie, Suit, p. 219.

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 220-221.

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 224-225

⁶⁹Noble, Woman with a Sword, pp. 291, 332.

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 333-334.

⁷¹Greenbie, Suit, p. 187.

⁷²Agatha Young, The Women and the Crisis: Women of the North in the Civil War (New York: McDowell, Oblensky, 1959), pp. 143-147, 369. Winifred E. Wise, Lincoln's Secret Weapon (New York: Chilton Co., 1961) drops a number of years from Carroll's age as Noble had, and tries valiantly to distinguish between the American Party and the more pejoratively-denominated Know-Nothings as two entirely separate organizations. An earlier juvenile article was

Kenneth M. Gould, "Lincoln's Unknown Soldier," Senior Scholastic 68 (9 February 1956):16. Carroll's tale was also told in Otto Eisenschiml, The Hidden Face of the Civil War (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), pp. 74-82. Eisenschiml's conspiratorial approach to the history of the Civil War would no doubt have appealed to the Greenbies.

⁷³Anna Ella Carroll, "The Relation of the National Government to Revolted Citizens Defined," in Union Pamphlets of the Civil War 1861-1865, ed. Frank Freidel, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), 1:357-380; "Anna Ella Carroll," in Notable American Women, 1:289-292.

⁷⁴Charles McCool Snyder, "Anna Ella Carroll, Political Strategist and Gadfly to President Fillmore," Maryland Historical Magazine 68 (Spring 1973):36-63.

⁷⁵Jean H. Baker, The Politics of Continuity: Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 187; Jean H. Baker, Ambivalent Americans: The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), pp. 35-36, 156-157.

⁷⁶E. B. Long, "Anna Ella Carroll: Exaggerated Heroine?" Civil War Times Illustrated 14 (July 1975):29.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 33. Long was no doubt referring to the Greenbie lawsuit, in which he was called in as an expert on Lincoln and Lincolniana. Greenbie had unkindly characterized him as a "Bonga Thrower for the lords of the Lincoln industry." A bonga thrower, wrote Greenbie, was a poet laureate of African chiefs whose task was to whisper praise in the chief's ear three times a day, and to find a way to praise all his actions, even those that had failed. Greenbie, Suit, p. 199.

⁷⁸Long, "Anna Ella Carroll," p. 35.

⁷⁹Anne Firor Scott, The Southern Lady: From Pedestal to Politics, 1830-1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), delineates the image of the Southern lady, the restrictions placed upon her by southern society, and the ways in which women were politically active while still working within that restrictive framework. See also Anne Goodwyn Jones, "Southern Literary Women as Chroniclers of Southern Life," in Sex, Race, and the Role of Women in the South, ed. Joanne V. Hawks and Sheila L. Skemp (Jackson, Mississippi: University Press of Mississippi, 1983), pp.

84-85, 81, 92. Jones uses Mary Boykin Chesnut as one example in her study of the restrictions, both social and psychological, under which Southern literary women worked.

⁸⁰Jones, "Southern Literary Women," p. 92.

⁸¹Anna Ella Carroll, Review of Pierce's Administration; Showing Its Only Popular Measures to Have Originated with the Executive of Millard Fillmore (Boston: James French and Co., 1856), pp. iii-iv.

⁸²Linda Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The Institute for Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1980), chapter 9, examines women's political methodology prior to enfranchisement. See also Mary Beth Norton, Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1980), chapter 6.

⁸³Scott, The Southern Lady; Gerda Lerner, The Grimké Sisters from South Carolina: Pioneers for Women's Rights and Abolition (New York: Schocken Books, 1967); Ellen Carol Dubois, Feminism and Suffrage: The Emergence of an Independent Women's Movement in America, 1848-1868 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978). Anne Firor Scott, Making the Invisible Woman Visible (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1984); Eleanor Flexner, Century of Struggle: The Woman's Rights Movement in the United States (New York: Atheneum, 1973). One reason Carroll did not join a voluntary association may have been lack of opportunity. Religious reform societies, such as the American Home Missionary Society that would have appealed to Carroll were nearly non-existent in Maryland. See James S. Van Ness, "Economic Development, Social and Cultural Changes: 1800-1850," in Maryland: A History, 1632-1974, ed. Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1974), p. 188. Catherine Clinton, The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) and Mary P. Ryan, Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981) both discuss the status symbolically generated by a leisured wife who could create a sanctuary at home for her working husband. See also Barbara Welter, "The Cult of True Womanhood," American Quarterly 18 (1966):151-174, for a delineation of the cult's prescriptive characteristics. Thomas Dublin discusses the working patterns of unmarried women in Women at Work: The Transformation of Work and Community in Lowell,

Massachusetts, 1826-1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979).

⁸⁴Daniel Walker Howe, "Victorian Culture in America," in Victorian America, ed. Daniel Walker Howe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1976), pp. 21-23, 14.

⁸⁵Blackwell, Life, I:22.

⁸⁶Jean Gould Hales, "'Co-laborers in the Cause': Women in the Ante-bellum Nativist Movement," Civil War History 25 (June 1979):119-138.

⁸⁷Anna Ella Carroll, The Great American Battle; or, the Contest Between Christianity and Political Romanism (New York: Miller, Orton & Mulligan, 1856), p. 28.

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