2000

Ruled with a pen: Land, language, and the invention of Maine

Gavin James Taylor
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RULED WITH A PEN:
LAND, LANGUAGE, AND THE INVENTION OF MAINE

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Gavin Taylor
2000
APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

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Approved, August 2000

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ABSTRACT

As Europeans expanded across North America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they parceled their territorial acquisitions into a variety of administrative subdivisions. Naming and dividing the land became an integral part of the project of colonization; the conquest of territory involved the transformation of unknown places into clearly defined jurisdictions. This dissertation examines the invention of one jurisdiction, the province of Maine, viewing the evolution of its boundaries as a reflection of the growth of state power in the region. Taking issue with the tendency of historians to treat places as if they were objective facts of the environment, it argues that territories are symbolic artifacts that legitimate the possession of resources by one group to the exclusion of others. Seeing an inextricable link between social and territorial boundaries, it ties the development of the territory of Maine to the formation of an alliance between property owners and the state. The alliance promoted a vision of territoriality in which the land was divided into clearly marked jurisdictions exclusively governed by particular towns, counties, and provinces. These jurisdictions, in turn, granted and protected clearly marked estates that were the exclusive property of individuals; property rights and state sovereignty reinforced one another. This English system of territoriality was not without competitors; other visions of the land became attached to different social arrangements. To Native Wabanakis, the right to use the land flowed from membership in fictive kin groups that included both human beings and the spirits of surrounding animals and natural features. Territory was defined not in terms of exclusive boundaries but as an emanation of the bonds of affinity between people and their human and non-human neighbors. French officials of the same period treated their possessions adjacent to the Gulf of Maine as a network of military, economic, and missionary outposts that upheld the authority of church and state in a peripheral region. English notions of territoriality gained precedence over others because the alliance between the state and property owners facilitated the large-scale mobilization of human and material resources in trade and warfare. Confident that their investments in real estate would be protected by the government, land speculators drew migrants and capital from both sides of the Atlantic to develop their holdings in Maine. New England’s armies, meanwhile, were bolstered by the support of tens of thousands of soldiers and taxpayers who recognized that their collective interests rested with the defense of English frontiers in Maine. The victory of this alliance resulted in the consolidation of Maine as a bounded territory. Far from being unproblematic facts of the environment, Maine’s borders are the physical traces of a historical process in which English colonists acquired vast quantities of natural resources at the expense of their French and Indian rivals. To give legitimacy to these conquests, the colonists promoted a form of sovereignty characteristic of English-speaking North America: the land, under this system of territoriality, was construed as a measurable object to be possessed by individuals and protected by the state.
RULED WITH A PEN:

LAND, LANGUAGE, AND THE INVENTION OF MAINE
INTRODUCTION
FERDINANDO GORGES'S MAINE

Just as none of us is outside or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over geography. That struggle is complex and interesting because it is not only about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about forms, about images and imaginings.
--Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism

The history of Maine began around 1622, in the mind of a West Country knight named Sir Ferdinando Gorges. Former commander of the Channel defenses and long-time advocate of American colonization, Gorges had worked tirelessly for nearly two decades toward the establishment of an English settlement on the coast of northeastern North America. By 1620, he had taken a seat on the Council for New England, which possessed a royal patent to all the lands between the fortieth and forty-eighth parallels of the continent. The territory was systematically distributed to the members of the Council, and in 1622 Gorges and his partner, Captain John Mason, won a charter to form a colony between the Merrimack and Kennebec rivers. With the consent of the Council, Gorges and Mason called the colony "the Province of Maine," probably after the French county of the same name, or perhaps as a result of repeated references to "the Maine" -- the mainland -- in previous charters.¹

¹ James P. Baxter and Mary Frances Farnham, eds., Documentary History of the State of Maine, 24 vols. (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1889-1916), 7: 65-71. (Future references to this series cited as 2
When Gorges and Mason received another grant for roughly the same territory seven years later, they rechristened it Laconia after the lakes of the interior, where they hoped to launch a fur trading enterprise. Ten days earlier, the partners had divided their holdings in two, with Mason receiving the territory southwest of the Piscataqua River, renaming it New Hampshire. Gorges's share, which extended from the Piscataqua River to the lower Kennebec River, was named New Somersetshire in 1635, after the proprietor's home county. Finally, in 1639, four years after the Council for New England had reverted its patent to the crown, Gorges obtained a royal charter for his province, and definitively reverted to the original name. "We do name, ordain and appoint," Charles I declared in his letters patent, "that the Portion of the Main Land and Premises aforesaid shall forever hereafter be called and named the Province or County of Maine, and not by any other Name or Names whatsoever."\(^2\)

The name did indeed become permanent, although there was little in the history of Gorges's grant that promised that it would. The courtier attracted few migrants to his colony and by the time of his death in 1647 the province of Maine remained more imaginary than real, drawn in maps and described in charters but having little palpable reality beyond a few fishing posts and straggling farms. The eastern portion of the grant became a virtually independent colony known as Lygonia, and by 1658 the colony of Massachusetts Bay had annexed both Maine and Lygonia, renaming them Yorkshire. Having sprung like Athena from the mind of a single man, the fledgling province of Maine struggled to live beyond its infancy. The lands claimed by Gorges had been given

\(^{2}\) DHSM. 7: 224.

other names a century earlier, such as Norumbega and Tierra de Corte Real, and Maine only narrowly avoided the same fate as these stillborn labels.³

The fleeting quality of such names reminds us that there is a distinction to be made between the concept of Maine and the territory it represents. Royal charters and proprietary maps referred to concrete places with an undeniable physical existence -- rivers, bays, landmasses, islands -- but the labels appended to them, and the ways in which they were grouped together, were the products of human imagination. Water flowed between the banks of the Kennebec, but it was a human decision to call it a river and a political act to make it the eastern boundary of a colony. As the Mexican historian Edmundo O'Gorman once pointed out, America did not have a hidden essence waiting to be discovered, but was imaginatively created by Europeans trying to reconcile the findings of Columbus with their inherited understandings of the world.⁴

This distinction is worth bearing in mind, for historians and social scientists have traditionally treated places as containers of action rather than products of human agency. When we refer to the history of a place we usually mean the history of the people who lived within its borders, not of the locale itself. This habit of mind is understandable: by treating place as a constant, scholars have been able to get a fix on social dynamics, either by comparing one region to another or by tracing the development of a single society over time. Yet this tendency has also produced what geographer Edward Soja calls "a

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critical silence, an implicit subordination of space to time" that obscures the subjective and imaginative dimension of place. Different communities and individuals have their own separate ways of organizing and representing space, and these differences belie the assumption that places are mere containers. Created through the engagement of people with their environment and sustained by social interaction, landscapes are as dynamic and mutable as human society.5

The "critical silence" of historians on this question is most audible in their division of history into separate national and regional categories, a practice reinforced by disciplinary rules that force them to become specialists in the history of one country or another. By placing the history of colonial North America into courses on the United States before the Civil War or Canada before Confederation, scholars reify present-day political boundaries, as if it were possible to extend the forty-ninth parallel backward in time. This anachronism is lamentable, given that boundaries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were fluid and often contradictory and the history of colonization marked as much by failures as successes. Worse still, in treating current borders as natural, scholars promote a teleological view of history in which European conquests become inevitable and native claims to the land are virtually erased. Though the political map of North America now seems neutral and uncontested, it was created through

centuries of struggle in which possession of the land was transferred from Indians to colonists and from one colonial state to another. A full account of the colonization of the Americas must begin with the recognition that boundaries, both past and present, are ideologically charged symbols that reflect and determine the ownership of the land by competing groups.6

This is not to say that historians or geographers have given short shrift to questions of land use and ownership. Beginning in the middle of the twentieth century, the "Berkeley School" of historical geography, led by Carl Sauer and his students, took a more sustained look at the role of land in the colonial societies of the Americas. Reacting against positivist scholars who reduced human geography to spatial science, the Berkeley School sought to recapture geography's cultural and historical dimensions. Sauer was particularly interested in how cultures and the natural environment shaped one another over time, paying special attention to the formation and evolution of "landscapes" -- traces of human occupation such as fields, pastures, houses, and orchards that revealed the cultural imprint of different peoples.7

One of Sauer's students, Andrew Hill Clark, adopted this method of historical geography to the examination of specific regions over time, focusing on places where Europeans had conquered indigenous peoples and colonized their lands: New Zealand,

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Prince Edward Island, and Acadia. Clark's own students at the University of Wisconsin extended this approach into other parts of North America where settler societies had been established, such as the St. Lawrence River Valley, southeastern Pennsylvania, and backcountry Virginia. In recent years, environmental historians have shifted the emphasis from culture to nature, examining the ecological consequences of the invasion of European people, plants, and animals into the Americas.

While these works have served as an invaluable corrective to geographers dismissive of history and historians oblivious to the natural environment, most scholars continued to treat geographical regions as boundaries for their studies rather than as historical variables in their own right. Interested in the relationship between nature and society, the Berkeley School tended to view the land as an object that was acted upon rather than a subjective category whose meaning could change over time. Sauer and his followers believed that nature, land, and geographical region were profoundly shaped by human activity but were nonetheless ontologically distinct from society. The problem with this assumption, as some critics have pointed out, is that the land is itself a culturally defined concept that is organized by the human imagination. "Place," as geographer Yi-Fu Tuan has written, "at all scales from the armchair to the nation, is a construct of

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experience; it is sustained not only by timber, concrete, and highways, but also by the quality of human awareness." The Berkeley School's emphasis on the external shape of landscapes left it blind to the symbolic and subjective dimensions of place, the ways in which nature was cognitively devised category rather than an objective fact.

The philosophical assumption that nature and society are separate categories, interrelated but with different essences, has informed most historical writing on territorial issues. The tendency among historians has been to treat regions such as Maine as parcels of territory that were transferred from one people to another or that were reshaped by human effort. But the European conquest of North America involved a great deal more than the simple cession of territory; it entailed the erasure of an existing landscape and the invention of another. The creation of the states and provinces of North America was the product of a social transformation by which Europeans gained control over the natural resources of the continent while simultaneously developing rationales for their possession. The land was not simply conquered by Europeans; it was also reimagined in such a way that it legitimized the creation of a new social order. Unfortunately, a division of labor among historians has kept them from linking the invention of new territories to the evolution of colonial society. Much has been written of an antiquarian nature on the history of American placenames, and generations of scholars have devoted their careers to explaining how Europeans managed to conquer North America. But

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12 The most far-ranging study of this kind is George R. Stewart, Names on the Land: A Historical Account of Place-Naming in the United States (New York: Random House, 1945).
virtually no one has attempted to systematically link the creation of particular places to
the emergence of new patterns of human relations.\textsuperscript{13}

This dissertation attempts to fill this void by examining the development of the
territory of Maine from the early seventeenth century to the fall of New France, seeing its
history as the simultaneous creation of a place and a social order. What makes Maine a
particularly interesting subject of study is its marginality: perhaps more than any other
part of the continent, the lands adjacent the Gulf of Maine during this period were
contested ground.\textsuperscript{14} In the first century and a half of European colonization, portions of
the territory between the Piscataqua and the St. John rivers were claimed by five separate
English colonies, the French provinces of Canada and Acadia, dozens of Wabanaki bands

\textsuperscript{13} A number of studies have examined the different strategies that Natives and colonists used to mark and
defend their claims to the land. Most prominent among these Patricia Seed, \textit{Ceremonies of Possession in
Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Donna
University Press, 1990); Cronon, \textit{Changes in the Land}. One of the few scholars to systematically link the
development of a territory to particular social coalitions is Thongchai Winichakul, in his \textit{Siam Mapped: A

\textsuperscript{14} Colonial Maine has also been marginal in the historiographical sense, at least until the 1970s. While
Massachusetts was for many years the focus of most scholarly writing on early American history, Maine
typically was treated as a historical footnote, an outlier that did not conform to the model set by the Bay
Colony. Even those historians who placed northern New England at the center of their attention continued
to use Massachusetts as the standard against which Maine's history was measured. Charles Clark, for
example, pointedly drew a contrast between the hard drinking, loose living West Country fishermen of
early Maine and the stolid Puritans of southern New England. Edwin Churchill called into question Clark’s
portrait of Maine, claiming that the early colonists were "an ordinary lot of men," but his implicit definition
of what was "ordinary" -- a peaceful, orderly community -- suggested that the Puritan colony was a point of
reference. It has only been in the past thirty years that scholars have begun to treat Maine not as a pale
reflection of Massachusetts but as a border region with its own distinctive characteristics. Historians and
archaeologists such as Emerson Baker, Gretchen and Alaric Faulkner, Kenneth Morrison, and John G. Reid
have brought into focus the significance of Maine as a zone of culture interaction, where Native peoples
and colonists lived, traded, intermarried, and fought with one another over a course of generations. Their
research has revealed that in some ways colonial Maine bore greater resemblance to contemporaneous
frontier areas such as western New York and backcountry South Carolina than it did to southern New
England. See Emerson Baker, "Trouble to the Eastward: The Failure of Anglo-Indian Relations in Early
Maine" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1986); Edwin A. Churchill, "Too Great the Challenge:
The Birth and Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maine, 1979); Alaric
Faulkner and Gretchen Faulkner, \textit{The French at Pentagoet, 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait of the
Acadian Frontier}, Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta,
Me.: New Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987); Kenneth M.
Morrison, \textit{The Embattled Northeast: The Elusive Ideal of Alliance in Abenaki-Euramerican Relations

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and villages, and even for a short time by the Dutch. Over several generations, the Gulf of Maine became a geographical laboratory in which various placenames and boundaries gradually took hold while others withered away. Ultimately, Maine developed as an exactly-measured state jurisdiction whose boundaries have remained unchanged since 1842. My aim is to recapture the lost alternatives of the colonial period and to explain why one way of organizing the land persisted while others did not.

A fundamental premise of this study is that territorial boundaries did not become "real" -- real in the sense that they impinged on people's actions -- until a critical mass of individuals accepted their validity. One might draw an analogy in this respect between territories and money. Although they may occasionally take the physical form of paper bills or coins, units of currency are essentially symbols that denote the worth of goods and services. They only have substance when they become the nexus through which an array of human transactions such as buying, selling, lending, and investing take place. A dollar lacks value unless the people who engage in these transactions accept it as legal tender; that is, if they consider it to be an adequate symbol of economic worth. For a unit of currency to gain this status, it needs to be supported by wide range of institutions and individuals: a central bank that issues paper money and is able to redeem its bills, a large number of merchants and banks willing to accept it as tender, a commercial economy that depends on cash transactions. These people and institutions must not only support the currency, but also depend on it. By allowing people to defer the completion of economic exchanges indefinitely, money removes the need for barter and permits them to carry out

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transactions over a wider geographical area. Banks, businesses, and customers would not be able to carry on their daily affairs if they lost faith in the value of the dollar.

The same might be said of a territory. Like money, placenames and boundaries are symbols that do not gain currency until a wide cross-section of people and institutions begin to use and depend on them. Ferdinando Gorges's imaginary province of Maine became real because a host of groups took a shared interest in its existence: settlers who held their land titles under Gorges, investors with shares in his company, royal officials with ties of patronage and clientage to the colony's promoters. A social network was created out of a shared desire to extract the fruits of the land and this web of interdependency was both sustained and responsible for the continued existence of Maine as a territory. The boundaries of Gorges's province were real only to the extent that the constituent members of this network could protect them, and the land claims of Gorges's grantees were valid only to the extent that his province was real. Far from being objective attributes of the natural environment, the territories of Gorges and other colonial projectors were social creations: as geographer Robert David Sack has put it, "society and space are... mutually constitutive, each requiring and altering the other."

The survival of Maine as a name and a particular kind of territory -- a bounded and exclusive jurisdiction -- was, in other words, also the triumph of the social network that gave backing to its existence. This network consisted not only of people and institutions, but a whole host of social arrangements: the invention of the territory of Maine was inextricably entangled with the growth of state power and the development of a distinctively Anglo-American form of private property within its borders. The

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consolidation of public institutions and private property in the region depended on a particular way of seeing the land; as territory was brought within the English sphere of influence it was re-imagined as the exclusive property of individuals and the sole jurisdiction of governments. The pages that follow examine how this way of representing the land facilitated the growth of English power in the region.

The first two chapters are sketches of three kinds of territory in circulation in Maine during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one belonging to native Wabanakis and the others to French and English colonists. These competing visions of the land were sustained by coalitions of people whose interests were attached to their existence. The first chapter examines Wabanaki notions of territoriality, showing how knowledge and social relationships were written into the landscape through stories and daily activities. Territorial boundaries were an emanation of these relationships and were inseparable from the social ties that bound communities together and distinguished them from their neighbors. Because patterns of kinship and alliance were ambiguous and in a constant state of evolution, such boundaries were imprecise, permeable, and negotiable.

The Europeans who arrived in the region during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries radically altered the map of land ownership in the region, erasing Wabanaki claims and drawing new ones of their own. The second chapter turns to the development of boundaries in European maps of the region, tracing the connections between state formation, the evolution of property rights, and the growth of geographical knowledge. French and English maps reflect a different pattern of state power in their respective empires, the latter characterized by an alliance between property owners and governments.
and the former exerting its influence through forts, missionary outposts, and alliances with Wabanaki groups.

The remainder of the dissertation addresses the question of why the English territorial vision gained precedence over the others. The third chapter looks at how governments and landowners in London and Boston were able to win a measure of control over large portions of Maine's territory. Groups in England and Massachusetts Bay sought ownership of Maine's natural resources but could not do so directly because of their distance from the colony. The solution was to exploit the extensive networks of communication that connected Maine to the wider world. The position of people within these networks shaped both how they viewed and controlled the lands of the region.

Ownership of the land was also contested by the region's native inhabitants, who mounted a lengthy resistance to English expansion. The following chapter focuses on the encounter between English and Wabanaki notions of territoriality, treating land disputes as a moral as well as a political conflict. The transcripts of treaty meetings between the two groups reveal that the two groups were divided by more than a desire to own the same lands; they also the different moral responsibilities they attached to ownership of the land.

Ultimately, this conflict led the two groups into the battlefield, in a series of imperial wars that began in 1688 and ended with the fall of New France in the Seven Years War. The final chapter offers a geographical interpretation of this military struggle, emphasizing the connections between the civilian and military worlds. The strategies, tactics, and war aims of the groups who fought these wars were shaped by the kinds of logistical and moral support civilians lent to their soldiers. At the same time, the
terms on which the English conquered Wabanaki and French lands were determined in large part by the nature of their war effort.

Language, broadly construed to include forms of communication such as maps and rock art, looms large in these sketches. Ownership of the land required groups to first imagine their territories and then to mark and defend them. Language, both as a medium of representation and as a means of communication, was central to all these activities. It follows that differences in the nature of land ownership were closely tied to the ways in which various societies used language: whether they were literate or used abstract symbols, whether they placed a high value on politeness or on self-assertion, whether their transportation networks spanned large distances or were limited in extent.

The development of European territories in Maine were predicated on a language of abstraction, an ability to reduce the complexities of the human and natural universe to scientific laws and orderly principles. This way of describing the world -- which included distilling territories into a more tractable form by rendering them as geometric figures on maps -- was, as James C. Scott has pointed out, closely related to the "state's attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion." Instruments of statecraft such as cadastral maps, tax valuation lists, muster rolls, and

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17 In this respect, I am following in the footsteps of scholars such as Karl Deutsch, Harold Innis, and Richard Brown, who all have asked how communications allows people to gain power over the land and over each other. See Harold A. Innis Empire and Communications (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Inequality (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1966); Richard D. Brown, Knowledge Is Power: The Diffusion of Information in Early America, 1700-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

customs records not only allowed governments to tighten their control over Maine's territory but also shaped the terms on which people conceived of this territory. Called into being by a stroke of Ferdinando Gorges's quill, Maine was in a very real sense ruled with a pen.

A Note on Terminology

A study that spans nearly two centuries and involves several highly distinct cultures and languages strains any attempt to find a standard orthography or system of dating, but I have tried to follow a consistent set of rules throughout. All English dates have been changed to New Style, so that February 3, 1702 in the original appears as February 3, 1703 in the text; French dates have been left as they are recorded in the original documents. English quotations have been transcribed verbatim, with the exception of abbreviations such as &t, yr, and Govr, which have been rendered and, that, and Governor. French quotations are translated into English in the text, with the original provided in the footnotes. The letter 8, used by many French writers for the diphthong of Algonquian languages, has been changed to w or ou. Because Wabanaki languages are written according to several different orthographic systems, I have left most Wabanaki words as they were spelled in the original.

The term Wabanaki itself needs explaining, since its meaning is ambiguous and its uses have been various. It was probably used originally by Montagnais Indians, who in speaking to the French referred to the peoples living to the east as "Dawnland" or "Eastland" people -- or Wabanakiak. In their own languages, these groups called themselves as arenabéak (in the dialect spoken at Norridgewock, along the Kennebec...
River), alnōbiak (in Western Abenaki), or skijim (Maliseet), all meaning "the people." French people had difficulty pronouncing and transcribing the initial w sound in the Montagnais, and generally called these groups Abënaquis or Abënakis. Explorers in Acadia also called the coastal groups living between the St. John and Saco rivers Etechemins, possibly a transcription of the Maliseet term for themselves, leading many recent historians to believe that they were a separate people. These groups formed a confederacy with the Mi'kmaq and several villages of Canadian Indians in the eighteenth century, and began referring to themselves as Wabanakis, a term that was probably borrowed from the Montagnais via the French, but is still current today. Some scholars distinguish between Abenakis, a narrower term for Wabanakis living in northern New England and southern Quebec, and Wabanakis, a broader term that includes the Mi'kmaq, Maliseets, and other culturally similar groups. Although this dissertation concerns mainly the former groups, I have chosen the broader term because the constant swirl of migration and cultural exchange in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries makes it difficult to draw clear boundaries between particular groups.

In referring to the native people of North America more generally, I have used the term "Indian," rather than Native American (U. S. English), Native (Canadian English), or First Nations People (also Canadian English), because of its simplicity and general currency. Any pejorative associations connected to the name are unintended.

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19 Several authors, most recently Bruce Bourque, have argued that the Etechemins were a separate ethnic group that occupied the Penobscot and Kennebec River drainages in the early seventeenth century and were later displaced eastward as a result of disease and military conflict. See Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759," Ethnohistory 36 (1989), 257-84. Dean Snow, on the other hand, has chided such scholars for their uncritical reading of the source material and has argued against the theory of Etechemin mass migration. See Dean R. Snow, "The Ethnohistoric Baseline of the Eastern Abenaki," Ethnohistory 23 (1976): 291-306.

20 The name Mi'kmaq is inflected with the animate plural -aq; "Mi'kmaqs" is as ungrammatical as "Iroquoises" or "Chineses."
Algonquian refers to a language family as well as its speakers, who despite great social differences share some common cultural traits. Algonquin refers to a tribe living in present-day western Quebec and eastern Ontario.

Finally, I have used the terms objective and subjective in a very specific sense. By objective, I mean relating to things (objects) rather than people (subjects). An "objective" argument is one that is based on the observation of inanimate things rather than a "subjective" consideration of social relations. Of course, the distinction between objects and subjects is culture-bound, since many things that Europeans considered inanimate -- rocks, trees, stories -- might have been seen as animate subjects by Wabanakis. So "objective" propositions are objective only in the sense that the speaker bases his or her arguments on the observation of things he or she considers to be inanimate and divorced from the social world.
CHAPTER I

GLUSKAP'S FOOTPRINTS

In all the land and everywhere in the Eastland, there is nowhere where it does not show what Kuloskap did.
--Passamaquoddy Texts (1921)

Long ago, when there was nothing but forest, sky, and sea, Gluskap fell from a hole in the heavens and splashed into the ocean. Dazed by the fall, he sank until the briny water filled his mouth and entered his nostrils. Coughing and sputtering, he came to his senses and struggled to the surface. When he looked around there was little to see: water surrounded him in every direction and above him was only sky. He squinted harder and saw a large canoe bobbing in the distance. The giant slowly swam to the canoe and, gripping its sides, lifted himself into it. He discovered a large paddle at his feet and dipped it into the water, taking long strokes as he looked in the distance for signs of land. After many days of paddling, he grew tired and decided to rest. Still fruitless in his search for the shore, he used his magical powers to turn his canoe into rock. Slowly it grew, until it formed a great granite island, so large that millions of fish came from all around to look at it. The island is now known as Newfoundland. Gluskap lived on this island for a while but he grew tired of spending his days alone and decided to set off in search of adventure. He built himself another canoe and paddled south until he discovered the mainland, where he made his new home.
Tall pines soared above the rocky coastline of this place, which he called the Dawnland because it was the first place on the continent to see the sun every morning. When Gluskap first arrived, he saw that the rivers were too muddy, so he reached for his bow and cleared the murk from their waters. Then he dug passages in the ground so the water would run to the ocean. As he finished this task, he noticed that all the animals lived near the sea. He told some of them to move to the forests and the mountains because there was not enough for them to eat on the coast. They complained that it was too cold in the interior, but he persisted, and the moose, the deer, and other animals went to live in the forest. Gluskap was pleased with what he had done but still felt an itch for adventure. He set off to explore new parts of the Dawnland and everywhere he left his indelible mark on the landscape.

Near Cape Canso, he chased a man who had transformed himself into a beaver, throwing a rock at him which landed in the water and turned into an island. He kept pursuing the beaver all the way to the mouth of the St. John River, where he threw a clod of earth that landed and became Partridge Island. Another day, at Broad Cove on Cape Breton, a giant whale washed up on the shore and people and animals came from all around to see it. Each species took muscles from the whale; the moose putting them on its back, the beaver in its tail, and human beings placing them on their legs. But soon the whale began to stink, so Gluskap took out his bow and arrow and shoved it into the water. The carcass of the whale became an island in the middle of the cove.

On another occasion, Gluskap heard that a village near Moosehead Lake was being terrorized by a giant moose who was eating all the village's inhabitants. Gluskap heeded the villagers' pleas for help and set off to hunt the moose. As he ran after the
creature, he made footprints with his snowshoes, which can still be seen in the rocks near Sebec River. After many days of scouting and tracking he finally found the moose and slew it with his arrows. He dragged the cadaver to his camp and gutted it, giving the intestines to his dog, who let some drop into the water as he ate. The intestines became a streak of white rocks at the bottom of the bay near Cape Rosier. Then he cooked the moose, and overturned his kettle after he had finished his meal. The kettle is now Kineo Mountain.

Remarkable natural features elsewhere had similar stories behind them; the reminders of Gluskap's actions were so ubiquitous that when people found stones that resembled a human form, they assumed they were self-portraits that the giant had left behind. Gluskap eventually left the Dawnland and paddled off to a distant country, many years' journey to the south or the east. But he left behind his children, the human beings he had fashioned with arrows shot into trees, who kept his memory alive by telling tales about what he had done.¹

When storytellers related Gluskap's feats to their listeners, they were vague as to when they happened, as if it were so long ago that it scarcely mattered anymore. But if asked where they took place -- and usually they did not need to be asked -- they were always highly specific. Sometimes they told the stories as they passed the site of their

occurrence, with the landscape acting as a key that called to memory Gluskap's actions. To the people of the Dawnland, the natural environment was a vast repository of stories, not only of Gluskap, but of personal anecdotes, family histories, accounts of battles fought long ago, tales of hunting expeditions, and rumors of magical transformations. As people crossed a river, passed by an unusually shaped rock, or spotted a familiar island, they were often prompted to speak of a momentous event or odd occurrence that had happened there. The stories that Gluskap's children told of these places acted as a kind of mental map that oriented themselves in the world, a map that not only told them how to get from one place to the next but also rooted their identity and their understanding of the world in local surroundings.

By comparison, contemporary maps that depict the same region before the arrival of Europeans seem sparse and lifeless. Reduced to two-dimensional space on a sheet of paper, Gluskap's country appears as a thin outline of coast and an interior streaked with the names of various linguistic or tribal groups. The rivers are sinuous lines and nothing more, the mountains only shaded areas, and stories are nowhere to be seen. While adequate for the purposes of their authors -- to distinguish and locate ethnic groups -- these maps fail to express the wealth of associations that Dawnlanders attached to the places where they lived. By emptying the landscape of these local meanings, modern cartographers turn the natural environment into a mere backdrop, a setting against which people act out their lives. Geography becomes an incontrovertible fact, bereft of human agency.

To recapture the human element of the land requires us to imagine it not as a context, but as a medium. Dawnlanders lived their lives through their environment, not against it. Continually moving from one place to the next in pursuit of sustenance, they developed patterns of living that connected daily routines with the places where they were carried out. Locales became encrusted over time with layers of significance, developed through experience and communicated from one generation to the next through stories and anecdotes. The landscape was animated by the imagination of the Dawnlanders and organized according to their patterns of movement and activity.²

The reverse was also true: the physical realities of the environment directed human experience along certain channels. Seasonal fluctuations in the location of flora and fauna forced families to periodically shift residence, and these shifts of residence made them familiar with certain preferred paths, waterways, and campsites. As people passed through these channels, they inevitably came upon places that evoked memories. Encoded as stories, these recollections allowed the landscape to "speak" to the Dawnlanders, to remind them of their personal and collective past. Such stories were thought to have a life of their own, independent of the speaker who told them. They often imparted a moral message, reminding tellers and listeners of the obligations they owed to their fellow beings. Many of Gluskap's adventures were cautionary tales that illustrated the dangers of not sharing with those in need or the dire consequences of overhunting game animals. The routines of daily life, which led people to regularly pass by the places that evoked such stories, reinforced these moral lessons through repetition. Locales became a kind of compass that kept people on a straight social path. To Gluskap's

² On the notion of landscape as a medium, see Christopher Tilley, A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments (Oxford: Berg, 1994), 7-34.
children, the natural environment was not so much a setting as an actor, a guardian keeping a watchful eye over their well-being.\footnote{On the didactic qualities of storytelling, see Robert M. Leavitt, "Storytelling as Language Curriculum," in William Cowan, ed., \textit{Actes du quatorzième congrès des Algonquinistes} (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1983), 27-33. There is a similar connection between places and stories in other parts of North America: see Keith H. Basso, \textit{Wisdom Sits In Places: Landscape and Language among the Western Apache}}

An accurate map of the Dawnland, in this light, requires its maker to do a great deal more than plot villages and tribes at the correct coordinates of latitude and longitude. To understand the terms on which Wabanakis possessed their land -- and the ways in which it possessed them -- it is necessary to consider the places where they lived as sites of experience and memory. Though they appear as thin lines or blank spaces in contemporary maps, the forests, rivers, lakes and mountains of the region were alive with the signs of human occupation for thousands of years before the arrival of Europeans. Through their daily activities and storytelling, the inhabitants of the Dawnland, like their father Gluskap, left footprints everywhere they went. They left not only physical traces of their existence, but also stories, paintings, songs, and dances, all of which animated their natural surroundings and filled their lives with meaning. A faithful map of human occupation in the Dawnland would allow us to begin tracking these footprints, seeing the landscape as something that was directly encountered and actively imagined by its inhabitants.

\textit{The Yearly Round}

Gluskap's children did not treat the landscape as an idyll, to be passively observed while sitting still. Nor did they view it from on high, as would an eagle surveying the panoramic scene beneath. Instead, they approached it level, from behind the gunwale of a
canoe or treading along a winding path. They knew the lay of the land by actively engaging their environment, learning its dimensions through paddle strokes and footsteps. At the time that Europeans first encountered them, Wabanakis drew nearly all the necessities of life from their immediate surroundings. Animals provided them with meat, clothing, tallow, quills, and a variety of bone tools. From plants, they made dishes of corn, squash, acorns, and berries, as well as medicines, emetics, and other curatives. From trees, twigs, bark, and resin, they fashioned not only their houses and their canoes but baskets, dishes, and boxes. With stones, they made arrowheads, axes, and pendants; with clay they made pottery. Dependent on the environment for all their material needs, Wabanakis developed an encyclopedic store of ecological knowledge, including a canny ability to remember when and where game, fish, seals, plants, and other resources would be most abundant. Constantly consulting and revising this mental map of resources, Wabanakis periodically moved from place to place in search of the plants and animals that gave them life.

The paths that they took differed from one area to the next, for the Dawnland was a patchwork of different environments, each with its own distinctive physiography and ecology. People grafted their settlement and subsistence patterns on to their local environment so as to make optimal use of their surroundings. The result was a highly diverse map of settlement in the Dawnland, with populations adapting themselves to the natural environment of their particular area. Subsistence strategies also changed over time, as fluctuations in plant, animal, and human populations forced people to exploit a continually evolving mix of resources. It is difficult to recapture the full diversity and variability of subsistence patterns and it would be misleading to speak of a single

"traditional" or "pre-contact" way of life among the Wabanakis. But it is possible, at the risk of over-generalization, to adumbrate four major patterns of settlement that predominated in the Dawnland on the eve of European colonization.

On the northern half of the Nova Scotian peninsula and the northeastern part of New Brunswick, as far as the Gaspé -- roughly the area occupied in historic times by the Mi'kmaq -- people tended to spend their summers on the coast and winters in the interior, taking advantage of seasonal variations in the availability of fish and game. Most groups lived year-round along the banks of a river, making seasonal movements upstream and downstream. In the spring, as the river ice began to break up, families paddled downriver to the bays, coves, and estuaries of the coast, where they set up fish weirs to catch migratory fish such as salmon and alewives on their spawning runs. In the summer, men went fishing off the coast for flounder, cod, skates, and other inshore-feeding fish, and also hunted for sea mammals such as walruses and seals. Women, meanwhile, dug up shellfish such as clams, scallops, and mussels. Throughout the spring, summer, and fall, men also hunted migratory birds such as loons, herons, and geese. As temperatures cooled and food became less abundant on the coast, people moved inland for the winter, where they hunted for large game such as moose, caribou, and deer, and went trapping for smaller animals such as beaver. On Cape Breton Island the pattern was reversed, with people spending their winters on the coast and their summers by the interior lakes.4

Immediately to the southwest of the Mi'kmaq was a zone of coastal settlement stretching from the Bay of Fundy to southern New England. People in this region tended to live year-round along the estuaries of major rivers or at the mouths of smaller streams.

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Lying at the intersection of fresh-water and maritime environments, estuaries provided families with an abundance of resources throughout the entire year. During the summer, families lived much as they did in northern Nova Scotia: hunting seals and walruses on offshore islands; digging clams, oysters, and other shellfish on the tidal flats; catching fish with nets, spears, and lines. But during the winter, people remained close to the coast, feeding themselves on shellfish and game caught at the heads of estuaries. Some families between Penobscot Bay and the St. John River spent the winter in partially submerged houses that sheltered them from the blustery winds of the coast. In the spring, they moved upriver and set up weirs and nets to catch the runs of migratory fish. They then returned to the coast, occasionally assembling in large villages where they traded and feasted with people from nearby areas.5

A third cluster of communities was concentrated along the valley of the upper Connecticut River and the eastern shores of Lake Champlain. The rich intervale of this region offered an abundance of plant and animal resources and supported a large human population. Toward the end of the prehistoric period, from about the fourteenth century onward, people tended to live year-round in villages along the valleys of rivers, or at the confluence of lakes and rivers. For several hundred years before then, communities had become increasingly attached to certain spots along rivers, to which they returned every year during the warmer months to gather nuts and acorns. Beginning some time after 1000 AD, they complemented these activities with horticulture, raising corn, beans, and

squash in the fields near their villages, although wild plants still remained a more significant part of their diet. From the main villages, men went on occasional forays to nearby rivers and lakes to catch fish and eels or to forested areas to hunt and trap deer, bear, mink, bobcat, and other animals. Villages also served as ceremonial centers, with large numbers of people regularly congregating at certain spots for feasting and exchange.6

Between the Connecticut River Valley and the coast was a region of upland settlement. The northern arm of the Appalachian Mountains reaches through the center of Dawnland as far as western New Brunswick, with a ridge of peaks that includes the White Mountains and Mount Katahdin. Amidst these mountains lie dozens of lakes that are the sources of the large rivers of the region, which run from the upland areas to the bays and inlets of the coast. People living in the upland region tended to prefer to settle near rapids or waterfalls where the fishing was good, as well as at the outlets of lakes and the confluence of streams and rivers, which were ideal for trapping beaver. Archaeologists know comparatively less about this region, and it is possible that inland sites may have been temporary camps set up by people from other areas.7

Subsistence strategies within each region depended on the calculated management of risk. Because the availability of particular plant and animal species fluctuated over time, people had a vested interest in exploiting as wide a variety of species as possible. Large ungulates such as deer and moose were the hardest animals to track and kill but

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they provided hunters with a large caloric payoff and were the object of the longest hunting expeditions. Knowing that these expeditions carried hunters away from home for weeks with no guarantee that they would return with quarry, communities balanced the risks of hunting large game by exploiting plants and animals that provided fewer calories but were easier to procure.

Most of the burden of providing communities with a daily supply of food fell on the shoulders of women. The general rule in native communities was that adult men caught vertebrate fish and hunted mammals, while women, children, and the elderly brought home wild and domesticated plants as well as shellfish and other marine invertebrates. Women's activities tended to be less physically demanding but more continuous than those of men: they were charged with cooking meals, caring for their children, dressing and stretching skins, sewing clothes, making containers, fetching wood and water, and gathering a regular supply of shellfish, nuts, acorns, and berries. Women generally stayed within a day's journey of their homes, making short trips to the fields to tend to their crops or to the mud flats to dig for clams.8

Because women ranged less widely than did men, the location of settlements tended to be closely linked to the demands of female activities. While fish and big game provided more calories than did plants and shellfish, hunting was inherently risky -- a season of bad fortune brought with it the threat of starvation. The food gathered by

women, on the other hand, provided a more regular if less abundant source of calories and acted as a hedge against failure in the hunt. Families tended to move their homes to places where women could find a plentiful store of food. Thus families in coastal areas generally moved only when women had used up the store of shellfish in their vicinity. To avoid depleting the stock of clams in their flats, women generally dug up only older and larger clams, judged by the size of their siphon holes, and left the smaller clams to grow to maturity. Once the larger clams were taken, they were forced to move to a new flat to find fresh stocks of shellfish. The decision to shift camp was probably taken primarily by women in response to the depletion of clam banks. It made little sense to travel long distances to dig for clams when their nutritional value was relatively light. The potentially large returns derived from hunting, on the other hand, justified long journeys in pursuit of game, making the location of dwellings relatively less important for hunters. A similar logic led families in other areas to choose the site of their homes on the basis of female activities.9

The choice of a home was limited not only by the availability of resources but by the presence of other people. Archaeologists have uncovered ample evidence of population growth throughout the Dawnland for at least a thousand years before the arrival of Europeans. The trend throughout the Ceramic period -- a term archaeologists

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use to describe the era from the introduction of pottery around 500 BC to the beginnings of European colonization — was for people to exploit a greater variety of species of both plants and animals, to hunt and gather smaller and more marginal species of animals, and to hunt and fish in less productive territories. Human skeletal remains in Casco Bay have also shown evidence of stunted growth among children, probably due to starvation or malnutrition. In all likelihood, population pressures forced people to find new sources of food and to become more protective of the resources they already had. There is considerable evidence of a tendency towards sedentism throughout the Dawnland during this period as communities became increasingly attached to certain river valleys or estuaries, living there year-round or returning to them at regular intervals. This increased sedentism, combined with the need to find new sources of food, encouraged women as far north as the Saco and Kennebec rivers to adopt horticulture towards the end of the Ceramic period.10

Time and Space

The arrival of European colonists in the seventeenth century threw the native societies of the Dawnland into disarray, with far-reaching effects on settlement patterns.11 Epidemic diseases carried by the colonists laid waste entire communities, killing about


11 William Wicken has contended that the Mi'kmaq had suffered gradual population loss in the sixteenth century as a result of diseases contracted from their contacts with European fishermen, the spread of diseases preceding the establishment of colonies. But his argument is based on a single documentary source compounded by a host of hypotheticals, and may not apply to the Wabanaki groups living in Maine.
three-fourths of the total native population. Those who survived often fled to neighboring villages or moved to new areas to avoid the spread of disease. The migrants sometimes carried old subsistence strategies to their new homes: by the late seventeenth century, villages as far north as the St. John and Penobscot rivers practised horticulture, probably introduced by migrants from the south and the west. The expanding scale of the fur trade also may have led Wabanaki men to change their hunting practices, putting greater effort into trapping small mammals such as beaver, mink, and squirrel. Yet even by the eighteenth century, the pattern that had developed in the Ceramic period remained. Communities still followed a seasonal round that involved regular movements along rivers and estuaries in search of seasonally available resources.  

Consider the calendar of the village of Norridgewock, as described by its Jesuit priest, Sébastien Râle, in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. Norridgewock was the northernmost settlement of the Kennebec drainage, lying near the confluence of the Kennebec and the Sandy rivers. Despite the ravages of disease and warfare, it remained one of the largest Indian villages in Maine, with a population of several hundred at the time of Râle’s writing. As they had done since at least the sixteenth century, the inhabitants of the village cultivated com, beans, and squash, depending on domesticated plants for a large portion of the calories in their diet. In a letter written to his brother in 1723, Râle remarked that the men of the village had overhunted large game in recent years, making deer, elk, beaver, and bear very scarce in their vicinity. The lack of game

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See Wicken, "Encounters with Tall Sails and Tall Tales: Mi'kmaq Society, 1500-1760" (Ph.D. diss., McGill University), 190-97.

meant that they had been forced to rely even more heavily on agricultural produce than before.\textsuperscript{13}

According to Râle, the Norridgewocks' calendar consisted of a series of seasonal movements that accommodated the requirements of planting and harvesting their fields while taking advantage of seasonally-available wildlife. They planted their corn in the spring and did their last tilling early in June. Then they conferred among themselves to decide on a suitable coastal spot to live until harvest time. Having reached a consensus, they then made their way to the sea where they lived off shellfish, seals, birds, and other animals for several months. They returned to their main village in late August to gather their harvest and subsist on corn, beans, squash, nuts, and acorns until early November, when they went to the coast for a second time. Râle testified that they ate well during this season, living on an abundance of large fish, shellfish, fruit, sea birds, and numerous kinds of game. They returned to their village in mid-winter when the men separated from the rest of the village to hunt large game further upland. In the springtime, the men came back to the village and went to nearby rivers to catch migrating fish. At the same time, the women began sowing seeds, starting once again the annual round of activities.\textsuperscript{14}

One way of thinking of the Norridgewocks' calendar is to imagine it as a pair of overlapping circuits, one tracing their passage through time, another their movement in space. In both circuits, the villagers moved progressively from one activity to the next, but their progress was cyclical, always returning them to familiar places at yearly

\textsuperscript{14} JR, 67: 213-19. The Norridgewocks' yearly round probably would have been quite different at the beginning of the seventeenth century. When Samuel Champlain visited the Kennebec River in 1605, its headwaters were still occupied by other groups of Indians. See H. P. Biggar, ed., \textit{Complete Works of Samuel de Champlain}, 6 vols. (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1922-36), 1: 311-23.
intervals. Men and women were constantly on the move -- canoeing from the village to
the seashore, walking from the fields to the woods -- but their travels brought them back
to the same spots year after year. This pattern conformed to a tendency of communities,
observable elsewhere in northern New England during the Ceramic period, to organize
their lives around focal places such as the village and the estuary. Because the rhythms
of the natural world regulated both their daily pursuits and shifts of residence, the passing
of the seasons represented the most important divisions of the Wabanaki calendar. The
year was broken into periods of natural abundance that anchored activities in space and
time -- sowing and fishing at the village during the spring, digging for clams and hunting
seals on the coast in the summer.

At Norridgewock, time was measured according to the intersection of human
experience with the patterns of the natural environment. The villagers counted years by
winters, because the winter represented the hunting season. Shorter units of time were
also marked by natural cycles: days by the rising and setting of the sun, months by the
waxing and waning of the moon. The months drew their names from seasonal activities.
April was known either as anmsou-kizous, "the moon in which we catch an abundance of
herring", or kikai-kizous, "the moon in which we sow". July was the moon in which
blueberries were ripe (sattai-kizous) and eel fishing began (matsinipenanmous),
September the moon of acorn gathering (maouinai-kizous), and November the moon of
the beaver hunt (pekouamhani-kisouts). Given the diversity of subsistence patterns in the
region, it is hardly surprising that neighboring communities had different names for the
months or that these names changed over time [see Table 1.1].15

15 Sébastien Rasles, A Dictionary of the Abnaki Language, in North America, ed. John Pickering, in
Memoirs of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, n. s., vol. 1 (Cambridge: Charles Folson, 1833),

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Wabanaki families tended to remain in places as long as food was abundant and to work only as hard as was necessary to satisfy their immediate needs. The result was that people ordered their days according to the tasks they had to perform, rather than to a rigid schedule. Early European observers were often struck by the Wabanakis' apparently relaxed attitude toward the passage of time. "[T]heir days are nothing but pastime. They are never in a hurry," remarked the Jesuit Pierre Biard in 1616, after having spent several years in the fledgling colony of Acadia. "Quite different from us, who can never do anything without hurry and worry." The Sieur de Dièreville, who visited Acadia some seventy years afterward, noted that the Wabanakis "do not calculate the years by days, weeks, or months, only by the nights, or by events of importance which occur during them, and frequently they let the time pass without keeping account of it."17

The French, as Biard pointed out, were more conscious of time than the Wabanakis and demanded greater precision in its measurement. To the colonists, time was palpable: something that could be spent, saved, or wasted, like money. Wabanakis, by comparison, cared very little for these matters, being oblivious to the ticking of clocks and the demands of fixed schedules. The difference was as much social as conceptual. Broadly speaking, increased precision in time measurement has almost always been associated with a growing scale of human organization. In large-scale societies such as Baroque France or the modern West, the coordination of a multitude of activities over large areas makes it necessary to adopt units of time that are artificial, such as the twenty-four

16 JR, 3:85.
17 Sieur de Dièreville, Relation of the Voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France [1708], trans. Mrs. Clarence Webster, ed. and intro. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933), 172. Indians counted years by winters, because wintertime was the hunting season: see Public Archives of Canada, Archives Nationales, Série C11A, vol. 122, fol. 185 [future references to this series appear as PAC, AN].

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hour day or the seven-day week. The complex division of labor in such societies means that the pace of work varies greatly from one vocation to the next. When people of different walks of life communicate with each other, they need to use notions of time that have no necessary connection to their particular activities. The solution is to adopt systems of measurement that are arbitrary and abstract, suited to the requirements of large-scale activities but divorced from local contexts.\textsuperscript{18}

But in small-scale societies where there is little division of labor, people tend to root their understanding of time in experience. The important markers of time are local, not abstract. Just as Wabanakis saw the cyclical passage of time in terms of seasonal activities, their understanding of linear time -- time as an arrow of sequential events -- was framed in equally concrete terms. The important signposts of history for them were not numerical dates, but events that were local, idiosyncratic, and often highly personal: a battle in which many villagers lost their lives, the day on which an infant died, a year in which a comet was sighted in the sky. Because Wabanakis valued knowledge that was acquired first-hand, they tended to personalize their understanding of time, to place themselves at the center of the temporal universe. Storytellers in the Dawnland always related historical events as if they themselves had been witnesses.\textsuperscript{19}

Notions of space were similarly framed in terms of immediate experience. Just as the months of the calendar were linked to particularly activities, placenames served as a map of locally available resources. The names given to many of the bays, lakes, and

rivers of the region suggest the intimate association between space and activity: Passamaquoddy ("place where the pollock are taken"), Cobbosseecontee ("sturgeon gathering place"), Kenduskeag ("eel-weir place"), Manesdayik ("place of collecting clams"). Other names call to mind the eye of a traveler looking to set up camp near a pleasant prospect: Penobscot ("where the rocks widen"), Wulastukw or the St. John ("beautiful river"), Androscoggin ("river of rock shelters"). As elsewhere in native North America, Wabanaki placenames imparted cultural and ecological knowledge that was passed on from one generation to the next. Although people sometimes disagreed about the precise meanings of names, it was generally understood that places were intimately linked with human activities.

To Wabanakis, the landscape consisted of a host of places whose attributes were defined by the engagement of people with their immediate environment. There was no such thing as a culturally empty space; all natural features of the land were filtered through human experience. This view of the land shared very little with the abstract forms of land measurement that Europeans rediscovered during the Renaissance: Euclidean geometry, which allowed people to imagine space in terms of ideal, quantifiable shapes with regular dimensions, and Ptolemaic geography, which enabled them to identify any point on the globe as a set of coordinates of latitude and longitude.

The Euclidean universe presumed a number of discrete forms, such as points, lines, and shapes, that could be identified and measured according to their intrinsic properties:

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19 Speck, "Penobscot Tales," 35.
square always had four sides, the angles of a triangle always added up to 180°. Because
the regularities of such forms never changed, their existence was independent of context.
By the same token, standardized measures of distance and size were also context-free:
just a pound of lead weighed the same as a pound of feathers, a mile of valley and a mile
of mountain were of equal length.

By contrast, Wabanakis valued geographical knowledge that was dense with local
context; rather than isolating objects from their surroundings, they made connections
between the two. None of their languages contained exact words for abstract shapes such
as triangle, square, and circle. Instead, they had a rich vocabulary for indicating the
qualities of objects or relationships between objects. As in other Algonquian languages,
the Wabanaki lexicon contains a potentially infinite variety of compound words, made by
combining verbs and nouns with affixes that modify their meaning. Many of these
affixes, as well as various verbs and nouns, indicate location, shape, or direction. For
example, the Norridgewocks' word for land, as translated by Râle, was ki. When the
locative suffix -ek was added, the word became kik, "on the ground." The prefix spem-,
meaning "above" or "on high", produced spemkik, "above the ground", or heaven.
Alternatively, the prefix aranm-, "inside" or "under", made the word aranmkik, or hell. A
recent dictionary of Western Abenaki includes over a hundred affixes denoting spatial
relationships or attributes.21

This manner of word formation meant that Wabanaki representations of space
were necessarily relational: they situated one object in terms of another and indicated

21 American Friends Service Committee, Wabanakis of Maine, section D, 69-74; Gordon M. Day, Western
shape as an attribute, not an abstraction. Context was an essential element in the representation of place and direction. Descriptions of places without any local context were useless to Wabanakis because they did not attach themselves to any of the guideposts by which they oriented themselves in the world. Instead, they placed value on words and phrases that were thick with references to familiar landmarks, that emphasized relationships rather than ideal forms. Even measurements of distance were relative, expressed in units of a human scale. Short distances were represented as "looks" -- the furthest extent a person could see along a stretch of river -- while travel to more remote places was measured in terms of days and nights of journey.22

Wabanaki perceptions of space and time were rooted in a distinctive way of knowing the world, which was shaped in turn by the patterns of their daily activities. Educated Westerners often equate intelligence with an ability to reason abstractly and treat literacy as a necessary element of education. These presumptions are rarely questioned in a world where social success is difficult if not impossible without a degree of formal learning. But in a small-scale society where survival depends on a direct engagement with the natural environment, abstract reasoning has little utility and formal learning is of less value than the skills acquired through first-hand experience. Wabanakis spent their entire lives developing a store of wisdom about their environment, taught by example and mastered through observation and practice. Men learned to tell the size, age, and condition of moose and deer simply by looking at their tracks,

\[\text{Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1994); Rasles, Dictionary, 455, 497, 533.}\]


\[\text{The Algonquian tendency to look for connections between subjects and objects is not limited to descriptions of space. Many nouns always carry a possessive prefix -- the Norridgewock word for father was never "father" (\textit{mittangous}) in the abstract, but "my father" (\textit{nemi\text{'}ittangous}), "your father"}\]
developed a detailed knowledge of the migratory patterns, mating habits, and physiology of a wide variety of species, and became highly skilled at tracking and marksmanship. Women gained an equally impressive understanding of botany, being able to identify hundreds of species of plants, recall the medicinal properties of herbs and roots, and raise numerous domesticated crops. Such knowledge had value precisely because it was local and idiosyncratic; the people who had the most thorough knowledge of their immediate environment were those who were best able to survive.

Paths and Knowledge

If islands and rivers were evidence of Gluskap's deeds, paths and trails were the visible residue of human activities. As they moved from clam-digging to berry-picking or made the rounds of their trap lines, people cut trails through the brush or left tracks on the ground. Because they were both the product and the conduits of human action, travel routes came to stand metaphorically for the activities they made possible. Just as months and placenames drew their meaning from human action, trails and rivers gained significance from their uses. Not surprisingly, paths were a recurrent motif in Wabanaki culture: in the dictionary he compiled while living at Norridgewock, Father Râle listed the local term for road or path (anoudi) and a host of variants: ourighen (a good path), matsighen anoudi (an evil path), tekouankanoutsesen (an ascending path), penankanoutsesen (a descending path), pekaganoutsesen (a crossing path), panbêbetganoutsesen (a winding path), sasaghisoui (a straight path), ouani'té (a path in the snow that no longer appears because the snow has melted). He also included a number of terms describing activities related to paths, including cutting a trail, searching

(ke'mi'tangous), "his/her father" (wemî'tangous).
for a road, and praying while travelling. The expression to cut someone's path
(nenitouspenaran nenitou'kasen, "I cut his path") meant to take a shortcut to talk to
someone who was already en route.\textsuperscript{23}

Because they were evidence of people's daily activities, paths came to represent
the distinctive life experiences of individuals and groups. Among hunter-gatherers, it is
common for people to describe their personal histories as a matter of following old trails
and blazing new ones. This tendency is true of collectivities as well as individuals, since
paths were used by entire communities. The identity of Wabanaki families was linked to
the networks of rivers and paths they used for hunting, fishing, and gathering. According
to the ethnologist Frank Speck, who did fieldwork among the Penobscots early in the
twentieth century, hunting ranges in upland areas were traditionally known as nzi'bum,
literally "my river," and were marked by a set of crossing trails that radiated from a
central campsite. Along these trails, people carved or painted their family emblems on
trees and rocks or cut out birch-bark silhouettes which they placed at the edges of their
territory. The emblems were adopted after the animals most abundant in their lands or
because their family shared some characteristic with the animal. The animals themselves
were known as ndo'dem, or "my co-relative."\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{23} Rasle, Dictionary, 384, 411.
\textsuperscript{24} Tilly, Phenomenology of Landscape, 37-67; Frank G. Speck, Penobscot Man: The Life History of a
Forest Tribe in Maine (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 77-78, 203-17; Fannie
Hardy Eckstorm, Old John Neptune and Other Maine Indian Shamans (Portland, Me.: Southworth-
Anthoensen Press, 1945), 50. In Algonquian languages, the word "totem," or odem, means a group of
people tied together by kinship; the Wabanaki name for St. François, Odanak, or "village," is a variant of
the same term. Totems also referred to the animals that were emblems of families or groups (in Penobscot,
according to Frank Speck, they were known as niitum, or "my partner of a strange race"). A French census
of 1736 mentions several emblems used by Wabanaki families, such as the bear, turtle, partridge, beaver,
and otter. A joint letter sent by the Norridgewocks and their allies in 1721 represents each group by a
totem, as do the signatures of sagamores on treaties and land deeds. Totemic animals were distinct from
 guardian spirits in that they could be spoken of openly and were not subject to prohibitions against being
236-37; Frank G. Speck, "The Family Hunting Band as the Basis of Algonkian Social Organization,"
Family members believed that they were descended from a common ancestor and shared stories about how this ancestor came to be. The inhabitants of the estuaries of the Penobscot and St. John rivers, for example, believed that their origins lay in an encounter that Gluskap had with a giant bullfrog who had swallowed the world's supply of water. Suffering from drought, both people and animals implored Gluskap to confront the bullfrog and the Gluskap accorded their wish. He travelled to the bullfrog's lair and politely asked him to release the waters, but the frog refused. Gluskap responded by felling a tree that landed on the bullfrog's back, sending the water flushing out in a great torrent. Some people were so eager to quench their thirst that they immediately dived into the stream of water and in so doing were transformed into turtles, lobsters, fish, and other sea creatures. The descendants of these animals took their family emblems from these ancestors and made their homes near the stream of water, which, according to one version of the story, had become the Penobscot River.

The web of connections that tied hunting territories to personal and family identity meant that travel along trails and rivers was more than a matter of getting from one place to the next. By habitually following certain routes for their hunting, families established and reinforced bonds of affinity between themselves, their ancestors, and the animals and other spirits who dwelled on their land. Men who used the same hunting


25 Speck, "Penobscot Transformer Tales," 200-2; W. H. Mechling, "The Malecite Indians, with Notes on the Micmacs," Anthropologica, 1st ser., 7 (1958), 111. By the nineteenth century, many of the "salt water" families with fish, turtles, or other sea creatures as their totems had moved upland. Speck speculated that salt water families, whose myths of origin were not shared by upland families, may have been migrants from southern New England. But recent archaeological research has shown that there were distinct estuarine and upland populations in Maine for thousands of years before European contact. The creation of

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trails every winter developed a superior knowledge of their local environment and tended to have greater success in the hunt than less experienced partners. From a Wabanaki point of view, this success was best explained not in terms of factual knowledge but as a consequence of the social bond that developed between hunters and their game.

Wabanakis believed in a reciprocal relationship between people and neighboring animals, sustained by a continuous flow of exchanges between the two groups. The animals were thought to be persons — "bodies animated by a rational spirit," according to an eighteenth-century French observer — who allowed themselves to be killed if hunters treated them with proper respect. People went to great lengths not to offend their prey, hanging the bones of dead animals on trees, cutting out fishes' eyes so the fish would not see who had killed them, and never burning the bones of animals. If the animals were shown appropriate courtesy, they would reward hunters by giving themselves as prey, and in some cases by acting as the hunters' guardian spirits. If not, their spirits would refuse to be reborn and the hunters' lands would be depleted of game. Because men could not have success in the hunt without the favor of the animals they pursued, it was important to develop a sense of familiarity between themselves and the animals' spirits. The creation of this bond of trust required hunters to establish channels that linked them with their quarry: paths that led them to the same places year after year and rituals that expressed their respect for the animal spirits.\textsuperscript{26}

Travel renewed the ties that attached people to their surroundings and reinforced the feeling of kinship they had with their animal relatives. Paths were not merely a means of transportation but a social medium that connected people with their natural environment. A similar flow of interaction allowed families to cultivate harmonious relations with their human neighbors. Wabanakis often described political alliances as paths that were kept clear through constant use. If the paths were not followed, if the allies failed to keep up the constant flow of transactions necessary for effective communication, they would become overgrown and disappear. It was commonplace for orators in the Dawnland to exhort their allies to keep the paths between their villages free of obstacles.

One of the earliest recorded uses of this metaphor was spoken in 1653 by a Wabanaki ambassador, in response to an incident that had taken place the previous winter. Five men from a Connecticut River village who were hunting in the lands south of the St. Lawrence River had been caught and tortured by Algonquins from Sillery, who mistakenly thought the hunters were Iroquois lying in ambush. When the prisoners were brought back to Sillery, a Montagnais chief identified them as Wabanakis, and the Algonquins released two of them, sending them to their country with orders to bring back a representative of their village. Soon after his arrival at Sillery in May 1653, the Wabanaki ambassador laid out several strings and belts of wampum in the house of a Jesuit, which he explained one by one to his Algonquin counterparts.

The first belt had a violet and white pattern that illustrated the route between Sillery and his village. Lifting it up, he told the Algonquins, "Behold the route that you must take to come and visit your friends." The belt, he continued, depicted the all lakes,
rivers, mountains, portages, and waterfalls to be passed on the way. "Note everything," he implored them, "to the end that, in the visits that we shall pay one another no one may get lost. The roads will be easy now, and no more ambuscades will be feared. All persons who are met will be so many friends." The knowledge contained in the wampum belt allowed both parties to prevent misunderstandings of the kind that had happened in the winter and gave them a means to explain themselves when such mishaps did occur.

The third string of wampum, made in the form of earrings, made this point clearer. "Those," said the ambassador, "are for piercing your ears, in order that we may speak to one another as friends are wont to do, and that we may take part in one another's councils." As the ambassador and his listeners knew, alliances could not exist without continuous communication, and the significance of paths, literally and metaphorically, was that they made this interaction possible.

Paths were also a medium in the sense of being a material upon which people could inscribe their thoughts and memories, a kind of natural canvas. Knowledge to the Wabanakis was not an abstraction but a palpable object, something that was alive. To acquire a piece of knowledge was to form an alliance with it, much in the same way that people formed political unions with their neighbors or reciprocal relationships with animals. Such alliances could only be sustained through constant renewal, since a person's skills were easily lost without frequent practice. A common method of remembering bits of knowledge was to encode them in the landscape, either by making a physical inscription upon a rock or a tree or by taking mental note of a certain place.

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Because paths regularly brought people back to these familiar places, they constantly revived knowledge that would otherwise be forgotten. Trails themselves were a form of knowledge that could be taught, learned, and remembered; Râle's dictionary includes an entry for the term *neki'kinoussaran*, literally, "I teach him/her the path."  

The physical layout of Râle's own mission at Norridgewock provides an example of how information could be written into places. During his thirty years at Norridgewock, Râle presided over the construction of a large, well-adorned church east of the village's palisade, as well as two smaller chapels, one dedicated to the Virgin Mary and the other to the Guardian Angel. Both chapels were built on the path leading to the woods and the fields, and Râle observed approvingly that whenever people passed by the chapels, they went inside to offer prayers. The location of the chapels next to the village's main path was probably strategic, for it integrated Christian ritual into the daily activities of the villagers. When leaving to go to the fields in the morning and returning to their homes later in the day, men and women always passed by the two chapels, which reminded them to pray and acted as avenues of communication with the spiritual world.  

The village's path in this case played a role analogous to the Christian calendar. The round of sabbaths, saints' days, fast days, and holidays punctuated the year with reminders of important events in the life of Christ and his apostles. The names of these holidays in Wabanaki were often vivid and literal descriptions of these events: Easter was

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ni étwousi kigh'housisa, "when he resurrects", the Ascension was ni édoutsi spemkik ariransa, "when he ascends to Heaven", the Assumption was ni édoutsi sang-Mari spemkik aroussaresa, "when blessed Mary ascends to Heaven". Though these days were celebrated by all, their significance could be highly personal. The missionary of the Wabanaki village of Odanak (St. François), near Trois-Rivières, reported that his parishioners were eager to learn about the lives of their patron saints and showed great joy when they were told that it was their saint's day. Some kept painted images of their patron and even tried to adopt his or her characteristic virtues. The calendar in these instances served the same purpose as the layout of the village, imparting and reinforcing Christian concepts through constant repetition. Knowledge was encoded into the cycles of daily life, making it possible to retain important ideas by following familiar paths and observing the passage of the seasons.30

Far from being wholesale European introductions, these practices were accepted by the inhabitants of Norridgewock and Odanak precisely because they conformed to native ways of thinking. Wabanakis had themselves developed a variety of methods for remembering ideas with the aid of the landscape, some of which had been in use for thousands of years. The most visible of these methods were travel shrines and rock art, many examples of which still scatter the landscape of New England and the Maritimes. Travel shrines were heaps of material -- usually stone, but occasionally brush or sticks -- placed at the sides of trails or pathways where important historical or mythological events had occurred. When travellers passed by a shrine, they threw a stone or some other

30 Rasles, Dictionary, 455; JR, 63: 35. Other Christian concepts have similarly evocative names in Wabanaki languages -- in Western Abenaki, the crucifixion is sidákwaatakâwógan, "being struck right to the wood", and the incarnation is called ainòbaaistsowógan, "he becomes a human being" or more precisely, "he becomes an Indian". See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues (Québec:
object on the heap as a way of commemorating the event. A notable example of such a shrine was the pair of stone heaps known as "the Two Brothers," erected at a Casco Bay conference between Massachusetts officials and the leaders of Norridgewock, Anmesokkanti, and Naurakamigou in June 1701. At the end of the conference, the two parties agreed that they should commemorate their alliance by raising two heaps of stones because, as the Indian delegates put it, "We understand it better than signing of a writing." At a place known as Andrews' Point, the commissioners of Massachusetts each laid foundation stones and the other English added smaller stones until they had formed a square pyramid. The Indians made a "roundish" pyramid nearby. Andrews' Point was renamed Two Brothers Point, and whenever the English or Indian delegates passed by the cairns, they added stones to the two heaps as a symbol of their continued alliance.31

Natural features of the landscape could serve a similar purpose, allowing people to recall past events by associating them with the places where they occurred. Various points of land surrounding the Penobscot village of Panawapskik (Indian Island) were named after incidents in the seventeenth-century war against the Mohawks, and the names survived into the twentieth century. At a ledge in Passadumkeag Stream about five miles from its mouth, a company of old women had been killed by raiding Mohawks, who scalped them and impaled their bodies on stakes. The pointed boulder where the event took place is known locally as Psinkwandissek, or Scalping Rock. On another

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occasion, the Penobscots captured a Mohawk and brought him back to Panawapskik, putting him to death on a square boulder located at the end of the village's main path. They buried him there, but soon afterward they found the grave full of stones: the Mohawks, according to rumor, had stealthily taken his body away and filled the hole with rocks. The Penobscots kept the memory of this event alive by recounting its details when they passed the boulder, the outcropping of rock acting as a mnemonic device that preserved historical knowledge.32

Natural features of this kind were more than symbols, for in many cases Wabanakis considered them to be alive, to be inhabited by spirits. In his account of his first voyage to the Kennebec River in 1605, the French explorer Samuel de Champlain noticed a cape along the river -- probably Hockomock Point, a high bluff near the river's mouth -- where people left arrows whenever they passed by it. According to Champlain, they believed that "unless they do this, misfortune will befall them." Several decades later, the fur trader Nicolas Denys observed a tree that floated in the water not far from the St. John River. Nearby Indians called it a "manitou" (a spirit) and made offerings of pelttries and arrowheads when they encountered it. Writing in the same decade as Denys, the English naturalist John Josselyn noted that when Indians in New England were cured of diseases, they sent wampum belts and furs "to the Eastward, where there is a vast Rock not far from shore, having a hole in it of an unsearchable profundity, into which they throw them."33 The offerings that Wabanakis left to the spirits of these places were


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probably intended as tokens of respect, meant to preserve a sense of mutuality between
travellers and the spirits of the land. Failure to observe these practices would have
displeased the spirits, leading them to bring bad luck to the travellers. Unusual natural
features such as floating trees and oddly-shaped rocks were similar to animals in that they
were sentient beings who possessed great power. People could harness this power and
use it in their own favor, but only if they managed to avoid offending the spirits.

Certain points of the landscape acted as preferred channels of communication
with the spirit world, some formed by nature but others made through human effort. At a
few sites in northern New England, people engraved ledges of rock with images of
people, animals, and other forms. Typically, these rock carvings are located next to water
and beside major thoroughfares of travel. In some cases, such as the petroglyphs on the
shore of the Kennebec River near present-day Solon, there are over a hundred distinct
figures depicted at a single site. At Solon and at other petroglyph sites in the Dawnland,
the etchings feature many of the motifs characteristic of rock art among North Americans
generally and northern Algonquians in particular: phallic figures, vulvaforms, men in
canoes, men with raised arms or horns, animals such as moose or deer, mythical figures
of Algonquian legend such as the horned serpent and the thunderbird, and shapes such as
dots, lines, and crosses [see Figs. 1.1-3]. In both New England and in other parts of
North America, these images were usually associated with shamanism.34

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Seventh Algonquian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1976), 281-88; idem., "Rock Art and
the Power of Shamans," Natural History 86 (1977): 42-49; William A. Haviland and Marjory W. Power,
107; Churchill, "Evolution of Maine Placenames," 75; Marion Robertson, Rock Drawings of the Micmac
Indians (Halifax: Nova Scotia Museum, 1973); Campbell Grant, The Rock Art of the North American
Indians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 53-55; Kenneth E. Kidd, Indian Paintings of the
Known at Norridgewock as *metéourenouak*, shamans were men, and sometimes women, who sought power with the assistance of the spiritual world. They typically had one or more guardian spirits (known in Penobscot as a *baohigan*), who enabled them to foretell the future and brought them good fortune in hunting and other activities. Both the shaman and his spirits were able to change shape, transforming themselves into animals, human beings, balls of fire, or other objects. The *baohigan* would do its master's bidding, but only if the shaman found the means to communicate with it. The success of shamans depended upon this skill, for the spirits needed to be cajoled into working in their interests. People could come into contact with the spirits in their dreams or by entering a trance state through a combination of fasting, sweat baths, meditative isolation, or repetitive drumming and chanting. When shamans reached these altered states of consciousness, their souls left their bodies, journeying to distant regions, performing remarkable feats, and speaking with other spirit beings.35

Before they went into a trance, people often went to places that conducive to communication with the spirits. Spots near the water were preferred, for it was thought that the underwater world was a spiritually-charged place where people could find both valuable substances such as shell and copper, as well as mythological beings such as the great horned serpent. Numerous scholars have argued that the rock art sites of northern New England, all located near water, were sacred places that shamans used as a gateway

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35 Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," esp. 249-53; Eckstorm, Old John Neptune, esp. 5, 97; CDRH, 3: 97; Rasles, Dictionary, 471. Råle lists the singular form, *metéourenou*. Speck translates the term *baohigan* as "instrument of mystery", but in his recent dictionary of Western Abenaki Gordon Day glossed the merphon e *bao-* as "exert personal power by wishing, wish with power", suggesting that a more apt translation might be "grantor of wishes". See Day, *Western Abenaki Dictionary*, xxix.
to the spirit world. The figures etched in stone were probably depictions of the spirits and images they encountered when their spirits journeyed out of their bodies. When shamans returned to rock art sites, the etchings they found there were guides that linked them back to the spirit world, providing them with a map of the paths their souls had taken in previous journeys.

While the intended meaning of these maps was accessible only to their authors, it is likely that people who had acquired a degree of shamanistic knowledge could "read" the etchings of others, to the extent that they could decipher the significance of common motifs. The readers could then use the maps sketched by others to help induce a trance of their own. The location of rock art sites along travel routes suggests that they were meant to be treated in this way and were not merely mnemonic devices but a form of communication. Rock carvings were palimpsests, texts whose originals were constantly being rewritten but never entirely erased. When shamans visited the petroglyphs, they preserved memories of their own visions by inscribing them in stone, and also drew power from the etchings of previous visitors. Because rock art tended to be located at well-frequented places -- the Solon site, for example, was near a fishing spot not far from the village Norridgewock -- it became one of the methods by which spiritual knowledge was passed on from person to person and from one generation to the next.

The value of such knowledge was social as well as instrumental, for it bound people together through their shared experiences and beliefs. The spirit journeys encoded in petroglyphs, like the stories that dwelt in travel shrines and natural features, had significance not only because they reminded people of important truths or because they contained useful advice. Their telling and retelling also brought people together and formed bonds of solidarity between those who shared such knowledge. The inhabitants of Panawapiskik all knew that hundreds of places in the vicinity of their village contained fragments of their collective history. The recounting of the stories that made up this history brought tellers and their listeners together, giving each a sense of membership in the community. The landscape in this sense was a symbolic resource that helped to establish and sustain human relationships. To know the names of places and the stories that lay behind them was to ally oneself with a particular worldview, a shared set of understandings about the workings of the world. By learning these points of reference, people gained a sense of belonging, both to their community and to their natural surroundings. At Norridgewock and other places in the Dawnland, people were inclined to say, nekak'santekandamen ioukki, or "I am attached to this land."38

**Hunting Territories**

By aligning themselves with those who shared an attachment to the land, people also drew a line of difference that separated their community from outsiders. To hunt along a stream and its tributaries, to use the estuary of river, to walk along a set of paths, was to lay claim to the land, to establish a set of reciprocal bonds that made the environment a part of one's self. Those who did not follow the same paths were

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38 Rasles, *Dictionary*, 388.
outsiders, who lacked both knowledge and experience of these paths and as a consequence had not established a right to use the land. Whether this bond between families and their environment constituted a form of ownership is a question that has been hotly disputed by scholars in this century.

Among the first writers to weigh in on this matter was Frank Speck, whose fieldwork among the Penobscots, Montagnais, and other tribes in the first half of the twentieth century led him to develop the notion of "northern Algonquian hunting territories." Through interviews with hunters, Speck discovered that many Algonquian-speaking groups in the Northeast divided forested areas into clearly-defined hunting tracts that belonged to particular families and were heritable. On the basis of his reading of historical sources, Speck argued that this practice developed before the arrival of Europeans and was rooted in the ecological realities of North America's northern deciduous forests. Because groups in this region were relatively dependent on the meat of smaller, sedentary mammals such as beaver and squirrels, the geographical distribution of animal resources in their territories did not fluctuate greatly from one year to the next. By comparison to subarctic hunters, whose pursuit of migratory animals such as deer and caribou forced them to range widely across the tundra, Wabanakis were more likely to subsist on a familiar network of rivers and trails to which they returned every year. Because their livelihood depended on the animals killed along these routes, hunters developed a degree of proprietary interest in their territories and were more inclined to protect their traplines against the incursions of trespassers.39

Speck's description of Algonquian hunting territories was challenged in a 1954 article by Eleanor Leacock, who called into question both their aboriginality and their significance in the historical period. Basing her claims on documentary research and interviews conducted with Montagnais from Quebec's Lower North Shore, Leacock found that hunters seasonally moved from one hunting territory to the next depending on the abundance and scarcity of game. Families were somewhat protective of their traplines, but allowed other hunters to use their territories to hunt for deer, caribou, and other animals taken solely for their meat. Leacock argued that hunting territories did not exist before the development of the European fur trade and contended that exclusive hunting territories existed only in the case of animals taken for sale rather than those captured for use. The latter point was later extended and applied to colonial New England by William Cronon, who maintained that Indians claimed use rights to specific resources rather than full ownership of the land itself. The terms on which groups held usufruct rights to different species of game depended on the distribution and migratory habits of the animals: sedentary animals such as beaver were more likely to give rise to well-defined hunting territories than more migratory species such as moose or deer.¹⁰

A more recent study by Harald Prins has also cast a shadow of doubt on the empirical basis of Speck's notion of Algonquian hunting territories. Through interviews with Mi'kmaq and Maliseet families, Prins reconstructed the history of land use in the St. John River Valley in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with an eye toward mapping the geographical distribution of hunting activities. Instead of finding a clearly-drawn set

of territorial boundaries, Prins discovered considerable overlap in the hunting tracts of
different families, consistent sharing of resources, and a remarkable fluidity in tribal
alignments. Dismissing Speck's notion of hunting territories as ahistorical and overly
rigid, Prins suggested that Wabanaki groups in the nineteenth century, and probably
earlier, organized their lands into ambiguously defined hunting "ranges" whose territorial
limits were permeable and whose geographical extent changed according to the
availability of game and the distribution of human population.41

Yet there is documentary evidence of Wabanaki hunting territories dating to the
early eighteenth century; whether they corresponded Speck's well-defined "tracts" or
Prins's vaguely delineated "ranges" is open to dispute. The earliest description of
Wabanaki territoriality was written in 1710 by an anonymous Jesuit missionary. "These
Indians divide hunting territories amongst themselves, each family head having a river
where he goes to hunt," he observed. "[A] man of another family would never hunt there
without running the risk of being accused of theft, for which he would have to make
amends if the owner were convinced of his guilt." Twenty-one years later, the surveyor-
general of New England's forests, David Dunbar, made a similar observation. On a visit
to the Penobscots to inquire about lands that he wanted to purchase, Dunbar spoke to a
former resident of Norridgewock named Captain Nathaniel, whom he considered "a very
sensible man." Nathaniel told Dunbar that "it is the received opinion of every Indian
that by nature, each has an interest in every individual spot of ground, and that it is

41 Harald E. L. Prins, "Tribulations of a Border Tribe: A Discourse on the Political Ecology of the
Aroostook Band of Micmacs (16th-20th Centuries)" (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1988),
203-87; see also Bruce J. Bourque, "Ethnicity on the Maritime Peninsula, 1600-1759, Ethnohistory 36
(1989), 274-75.
inalienable," but that "they agree for peace and order sake among themselves, to have certain rivers, ponds, and tracts of land for their particular fishing and hunting." In 1764, the surveyor Joseph Chadwick confirmed Dunbar's report, indicating that along the Penobscot River, "their hunting ground and streams were all parcelled out to certain families, time out of mind."42

All three writers indicated that hunting territories were a tradition of long standing, not a recent innovation. Although there is no documentary proof of the existence of hunting territories in the seventeenth century, circumstantial evidence suggests that they predated European contact. Archaeological findings at Ceramic period sites in Maine's interior indicate a heavy reliance on beaver and other sedentary animals; over 90% of the faunal remains at some sites consist of beaver bones. Even in the historical period, Wabanakis trapped beaver as much for their meat as their pelts; during his 1711 voyage from Nova Scotia to Quebec, Major John Livingston and his Indian guides subsisted mainly on beaver as they passed through Maine's interior. This dependence on sedentary animals probably fostered a more pronounced sense of territoriality among hunters.43

It is possible that the introduction of the fur trade made hunters more protective of their lands, but given the modest scale of the fur trade before the 1620s, it hardly seems

42 "Relation par lettres de l'Amerique septentrionale," PAC, AC, Série C11A, vol. 122, fols. 302v-303 (my translation; the original reads: "Ces Sauvages se partagent entre eux les endroits de chasse, chaque chef de famille a une riviere ou il va la faire et ou un homme d'un autre famille n'oserait aller chasser a moins qu'il ne veuille qu'on l'accuse de larcin auquel il faut qu'il satisfasse s'il en est convaincu."); Lt. Gov. Dunbar to Mr. Popple, from Fredericksfort, Nov. 17, 1730, CSP, vol. 37 (1730), fol. 533, pp. 345-46; Joseph Chadwick, "An Account of a Journey from Fort Pownal — now Fort Point — Up the Penobscot River to Quebec, in 1764," Bangor Historical Magazine 4 (1889): 143.

likely that the territories were a product of European contact. A more credible explanation is that population pressures in the Ceramic period forced families to develop more exclusive claims to the places where they hunted and fished. When large numbers of people are competing for scarce resources, there is a tendency to establish social controls that prevent over-exploitation, such as stinting (intentionally limiting one's use of a resource) or to introduce property rights (which exclude others from using it). In arranging river basins into hunting territories, Wabanakis gave each family sole responsibility for managing the tract from which its members drew their livelihood. If someone overhunted his territory, he ran the risk of offending the animals who lived near his river, making it likely that these animals would refuse to let themselves be killed in future years. It was therefore in the hunter's interest to limit his annual hunt and to prevent others from using his lands. Chadwick noted that Penobscot families hunted only once every third year, killing two-thirds of the beaver and leaving the rest to breed. "[T]heir Beavers," he added, "were as much their stock for a living as Englishman's cattle was his living." The absence of such controls would have depleted the stock of beavers and led to disputes between families over the right to hunt prized areas.44

The rights that families enjoyed to such territories were established through customary use and reinforced by experienced hunters' superior knowledge of familiar environments. When hunting trails became overgrown -- when the channels that linked hunters to their quarry were not used -- hunters effectively relinquished any prior claim to use of their hunting grounds. If outside observers had attempted to map the distribution

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44 Chadwick, "An Account," 143. Frank Speck remarked that Penobschts left portions of their hunting territories fallow every year. See Speck, Penobscot Man, 207.
of hunting territories in any single season, they would have been able to identify certain families with their respective hunting trails. But if they kept records for a longer period, they would have been forced to draw a more complicated picture. Changes in the distribution of resources constantly forced families to move to new areas and find new hunting trails. More importantly, families themselves were in a state of continual evolution, as births, deaths, marriages, and adoptions changed their composition. Sons replaced fathers as heads of household, newly-weds moved in with their spouses' families, boys came of age and joined the hunting party. If a family became too large, or if there was not enough game to support it, people might split from the main lodge to find a territory of their own, marking its paths with a new family emblem.45

Although Harald Prins claims to have refuted Speck's theory of hunting territories, their descriptions of hunting practices are not necessarily incompatible. In any one season, hunters would have been dispersed into their respective territories, each family distinguishing itself by using a particular network of rivers, lakes, and trails. But as people formed friendships and gained new kin, they inevitably moved into new hunting territories and abandoned old ones. Anthropologist José Mailhot has observed this pattern among the present-day Montagnais-Naskapi of Labrador; because of marriages, births, deaths, and evolving friendships, people in this region typically move into new hunting territories once every five years. Such moves are almost always a direct consequence of changing social relationships and Mailhot argues that the territorial

45 Speck, Penobscot Man, 208-209, 229-30.
distribution of band members during a hunting season is "a spatial projection of operative kinship ties at that precise moment."46

To treat hunting territories as containers in which people lived out their lives, in other words, is to put the cart before the horse. As they passed through various stages of the life-cycle, people formed new social relationships and dissolved others; the changing use of hunting territories reflected these changes. Land use was so integrated into the cultural world of Wabanakis that it was impossible to separate questions of ownership from patterns of kinship. Because the land was filtered through the lens of people's daily activities, it made little sense to treat it as an alienable commodity. More accurately, it was a source of life that provided Wabanakis with all the materials they needed to survive: food, clothing, shelter, transportation. Material sustenance was so closely tied to the land that people at Norridgewock said that they "ate" their fields. To deny a family land under such circumstances was to condemn it to starvation -- an unthinkable act among the Wabanakis, who shared food as a matter of course. Family hunting territories allowed people to enjoy the fruits of the land equally and represented a form of communal sharing. To equitably share the land's common wealth, villages allotted hunting territories to individual families so that each would have enough resources to feed itself.47

47 Rasles, Dictionary, 407. Indians in southern New England also said that they "ate" the land and it was common among North American Indians to describe hunting grounds as a "plate" from which all could eat. See Bragdon, Native People, 136; "Paroles des sauvages Onnondaguez, a Monsieur le marquis de Vaudreuil," Montreal, January 28, 1710, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 31, fol. 91; Victor P. Lytwyn, "A Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Valley Region," in Pentland, Papers of the Twenty-Eighth Algonquian Conference, 210-227. Judging from Speck's map of nineteenth-century hunting territories in Maine, the tracts seem to have been similar in size, all being large enough to feed an extended family.
Because it was membership in a community that gave a person rights to the land, the boundaries of land ownership were shaped by the limits of sociability. Property rights are primarily social, not legal, in character: broadly defined, they are relationships between people with respect to the right to use certain objects. If a family "owns" a tract of land, it is because its neighbors recognize that it has established an exclusive claim to its use. The concept of ownership necessarily draws a line of distinction between people who enjoy these rights and those who do not. A shared right to the land implies a sense of mutuality, and if this right is not extended to others it is because they are outsiders, people who do not belong to the community. The Western legal tradition has tended to treat these matters implicitly, emphasizing not relationships between people but the relationship between the object and its owner. The strength of a claimant's rights to the land, from this point of view, is based on the extent to which he or she has developed a rationale for its exclusive enjoyment: someone might claim possession to a piece of land by inheritance, by purchase, by custom, or by discovery. Wabanakis were more inclined to make the social character of property explicit, paying greater attention to the human consequences of dividing the land. The most important consideration from this perspective was not the strength of an individual's claims to ownership but the effect of land tenure on human relations.48

It was this emphasis on the social dimension of land ownership that represented the most important difference between English and Indian notions of land tenure, more so than the distinction between usufruct rights and absolute rights to the land. The concept of usufruct originated in Roman law, which had a highly restrictive definition of property

48 Bragdon, Native People, 135-9; Cronon, Changes in the Land, 54-81; Alan Barnard and James Woodburn, "Introduction," in Tim Ingold, David Riches, James Woodburn, eds., Hunters and Gatherers, 2
as an absolute and inalienable right held by individuals. Usufruct, literally "use and enjoyment," was a residual category that accounted for cases of land use that did not fit this narrow definition. English common law, by contrast, allowed much greater latitude in the definition of real property rights and accommodated customary uses of forests, commons, and rivers. The records of every colony in New England are replete with examples of usufruct rights: water rights, fishing rights, mill rights, rights of way. Rather than accepting an anachronistic separation of absolute and usufruct rights, it makes far greater sense to treat ownership, as Henry Sumner Maine once put it, as a socially recognized "bundle of rights and duties." Because colonists and Indians used the land differently, it follows that the bundle of rights that each group accorded to land owners was not the same. The intensive farming practices of the English forced them to rework large swaths of territory and they tended to see land ownership as a matter of possessing surface area. Wabanakis, on the other hand, were likely to view possession in terms of the paths and rivers that gave them access to plants and animals. But the two groups were distinguished by more than the kinds of rights they accorded to the land; the manner in which these rights were asserted and protected was altogether different. Wabanaki land tenure was characterized, to a degree that would have been unimaginable to the English, by an inextricable connection between land use and patterns of sociability. Because the land was owned communally, the most important criterion in determining ownership was

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the degree of social integration into the collectivity, rather than the strength of legal title.

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_Territorial Disputes: Three Cases_

Land claims were consequently enforced not according to a rigid set of rules but as improvised responses to specific situations. Extant evidence of land disputes -- the few examples involve land contested between tribes rather than within communities -- suggests that the resolution of these conflicts was a matter of diplomacy rather than jurisprudence. The parties involved were as much concerned with smoothing over misunderstandings as they were with protecting their territorial claims. The quarrel that took place in the first decade of the eighteenth century between inhabitants of the Wabanaki village of Odanak and their Montagnais and Algonquin neighbors offers an illuminating example of this approach to settling disputes. By 1700, Odanak was a community of several hundred people on the St. François River, with a population largely of refugees from northern New England. The village had been established by Sokoki migrants from the Connecticut River around 1670 and had a drawn a steady stream of Wabanaki refugees since then, particularly in the bloody aftermath of King Philip's War and its northern sequel. This stream became a flood in 1700, when Jesuits moved the mission of Saint François de Sales from the Chaudière to the St. François River. The Chaudière mission was itself the product of relocation, having drawn much of its population from the mission village of Sillery, originally established for Montagnais converts in 1637. Two prolonged wars against the English between 1688 and 1713 had

driven hundreds of new refugees to Odanak, swelling its population with migrants from the Connecticut River Valley and Lake Champlain, as well as more distant regions such as the Merrimack and the Kennebec rivers.\textsuperscript{51}

The hunting territories of Odanak at this time extended well beyond the immediate area of the village, and many inhabitants went far afield in search of game. In the winter of 1705, a band of about 60 families from Odanak crossed the St. Lawrence River to hunt in the region south of Lac St.-Jean.\textsuperscript{52} According to some French locals, the Wabanakis of Odanak had begun to hunt in this area only in the past five or six years, and had had little success in capturing beaver nearby. Going no farther than forty or fifty miles from Trois-Rivières, they had caught few beaver and no moose. With the encouragement of French fur traders, the Wabanakis in 1705 went further afield, making their way up the St. Maurice River into territory usually hunted by the Montagnais and the Algonquins. The season was a success: the Wabanakis, joined by a number of Hurons from Lorette, took 350 moose hides as well as beaver and marten furs, which they traded at Trois-Rivières and Quebec. But it was also marred by quarrels with their neighbors over hunting rights. On one occasion, a Wabanaki hunter wrested a moose hide from the hands of an Algonquin hunter named Miniomeiguici, accusing him of hunting on Wabanaki territory. Miniomeiguici raised his hatchet at his accuser and was stopped from striking him at the last moment by another Wabanaki. A seigneur from Trois-Rivières later remarked that many at the time were afraid that a war would erupt between the two groups.


\textsuperscript{52} The following account is based on the documents contained in PAC, AC, Série C11A, vol. 25, fols. 29-
In the spring, a Wabanaki sagamore named Tekwerimat and his son Louis found traps in his territory and, being short of provisions, decided to follow the trapline until it led to its owner. They agreed that once they had found the trapper, they would ask him for some food and inform him that he was hunting on their land. Tekwerimat and Louis soon arrived at the cabin of Joseph Marachicatik, a Montagnais who had been hunting south of Lac St.-Jean that winter. The Wabanakis told him that he had placed his traps on Wabanaki territory and asked for restitution. Marachicatik complied, giving them six moose hides and offering to let them stay the night. The next morning, he told them where they could find caches of food and provided them with a sleigh for their voyage home. Tekwerimat and his son assumed that the matter was resolved, but the next fall they received a summons from the intendant of New France to respond to a complaint by the agent of the Compagnie du Canada in Tadoussac, François Hazeur.

Hazeur, a prominent merchant who sat on the governor's council, complained that the Wabanakis had ravaged the district to the south of Lac St.-Jean, killing all the moose and other animals and leaving the Montagnais and Algonquin hunters of the region unable to pay their debts. Some of the hunters, now dependent on Hazeur for supplies, had applied to a headman from near Lake Mistassini for the right to hunt on his band's grounds. Hazeur asked for restitution and suggested that the Wabanakis be forbidden from hunting north of the St. Lawrence River. When Louis arrived before the council, he explained that the territory where they had been hunting was closer to Trois-Rivières than to Lac St.-Jean and that the lands belonged to his father, who had inherited them from

47, 75-85; vol. 27, fol. 55.
Louis's grandfather. Louis insisted that the Montagnais were in the wrong, for they "had in effect killed the Abenakis by killing all the Animals of that place."53

Though he did not mention it at the time, Louis's family background helps to explain the confusion over hunting rights. Tekwerimat was almost certainly a successor of Noël Negabamat, the most prominent of the original neophytes at the Jesuit mission of Sillery. Negabamat was a Montagnais from the north shore of the St. Lawrence, who had first encountered the French at the trading post at Tadoussac. He grew interested in their religion and at the invitation of Father Paul Le Jeune he became the first settler of a new mission village at Sillery. While the mission itself was a failure, Negabamat was baptized in 1639 along with his wife and children. His faith was tested soon after the baptism, when a smallpox epidemic swept through Sillery, afflicting Noël and killing four of his five children. He was deeply affected by their loss, and early in the 1640s he began calling himself Tekwerimat, probably an alternative spelling of the Montagnais word Outagaouerimon, or "he grieves their death." These trials only strengthened his attachment to Christianity, and over the next several decades he distinguished himself both as a trusted ally of the French and a peacemaker among Indians. Three years after his death in 1666, his family resuscitated his name in an elaborate ceremony at Sillery, bestowing it upon a Tadoussac war captain formerly called Negaskaouat.54

The Louis Tekwerimat who presented himself before French officials in 1706 was, by adoption or direct descent, either the grandson or great-grandson of Noël

53 PAC, AC, Série C11A, vol. 25, fol. 35-36v. (My translation; the original reads: "les dites montagnais ont Comme tué les abenaiquis en tuant toutes les Bestes qui estoient en cet endroit la.")

Negabamat. Louis' family had probably moved from Sillery to St. François de Sales in the 1680s and then to Odanak around 1700. According to French officials, his father had become a powerful sagamore at Odanak, receiving tribute from many of his neighbors. He was known by two names: Tekwerimat to the French, and Outakamachíouénon to the Wabanakis. (In the dialect spoken at Odanak, the word *machinawinno* means "dead person"; his name was almost certainly a direct translation from the Montagnais.)\(^5\)\(^5\) In all likelihood, the family continued to hunt the same territories their ancestors had established in the seventeenth century. But their identification with the Wabanakis had made the continued use of these lands a touchy issue, for the hunting districts on the north shore of the St. Lawrence had customarily belonged to the Montagnais and Algonquins.

The influx of war refugees from northern New England, which had brought Odanak more mouths to feed, probably led the inhabitants of the village to test the boundaries of these territories. The Montagnais and Algonquins understandably viewed their hunting trip as an incursion into their lands and reacted accordingly.

The aggrieved parties resolved their dispute through a delicate balancing act between aggressive assertions of their respective rights and conciliatory attempts to resolve their differences. Indians did not have a court system nor a sovereign authority charged with enforcing the law. Instead, when someone had trespassed on their lands or had done them some other injury, they defended themselves through their own exertions or with the support of their kin. Threats of retaliation were one of the most effective means of protecting territorial boundaries under these circumstances, for they forced

\(^5\)\(^5\) Day, *Western Abenaki*, 1: 282. One of the signatories of a 1749 dedicatory letter from Odanak to the chapter of Chartres was Michel Terrouémant. Possibly Terrouémant and Tekwerimat (also spelled Tekouerimat or Thék8erimat) are the same name. See IR, 69: 71; Day, *Identity of the St. Francis Indians*, 88.
potential intruders to consider the consequences of their actions. If the Wabanakis entered the hunting grounds with "hatchets in their hands" and "knives at their wrists," as it was rumored, the Montagnais were wise to take notice. But the disadvantage of violent threats was that very often people were forced to make good on them, creating a desire for revenge on the part of the trespasser and his kin. This desire could be satisfied only by another act of violence, which would in turn lead to further acts of vengeance: in short, a cycle of bloody retribution spiralling out of control.56

Matters rarely came to such a head, for Indians had more peaceful means of settling their quarrels. Above all, they depended on exchanges of gifts and words as a way of mending social wounds and compensating injured parties for their losses. Just as an arrowhead or beaver skin could placate the spirits of sacred places, a similar token of respect, combined with a few words of apology, could erase the resentments aroused by trespasses and other injuries. Gift-giving was a well-established custom under these circumstances. If a hunter pursuing a moose was led to enter another's territory, he always gave a present of furs to the family that owned the land. Similarly, when travellers entered into the territory of another group, they were expected to pay a few skins as tribute. Such presents symbolically recognized the proprietor's claims to stewardship of the land and ensured that there would be no misunderstandings between the intruder and the offended party. "The greatest offense one can make against an Indian is to accuse him of stealing," said Godefroy, Sieur de Saint-Paul, a seigneur of Trois-

56 "Déclaration Messurs Les Directeurs Generaux de la Compagnie de la colonie de Canada," Chicoutimi, 21 mai, 1705, PAC, AC, Série C11A, vol. 25, fol. 84. Wabanakis also protected their lands with magic. According to Frank Speck, shamans used their powers of divination to detect any intruders on their territories. The shamans then called on their guardian spirits to punish the intruders. See Speck, "Penobscot Shamanism," 244.
Rivière, "but the Tribute they demand from other Indians is not considered by them to be theft or pillage but as a right that is due to them."^57

Such exchanges fostered a sense of goodwill between people by creating a bond of trust between the giver and the recipient.^58 They also helped to establish the channels - the paths -- that made communication possible. Exchanges of words and goods through these channels allowed people to develop a sense of community and a degree of shared interest. An obstacle in the path, such as a land dispute, could threaten this feeling of mutuality. But people were more inclined to remove the obstacle, to settle or to forget the dispute, than they were to abandon the path altogether. Thus Tekwerimat, mindful of the need to appease his French and Montagnais allies, backed down from his claims. The Wabanakis gave up their hunting territories on the north shore of the St. Lawrence and did not return again until the nineteenth century. The desire to preserve peace with their neighbors ultimately outweighed the Wabanakis' legitimate claims to ownership of the land through customary use. The intervention of the French in this respect was crucial, for Tekwerimat did not want to jeopardize his alliance with them for the sake of a few moose hides and beaver skins.^59

In cases where the social distance between opposing parties was greater, Wabanakis tended to be less forgiving. If paths did not exist or were overgrown, there were few channels for resolving disputes peacefully and little incentive to do so. The


^59 Gordon M. Day, "Western Abenaki," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Handbook of North American Indians,
potential for violence in such cases increased dramatically. The inhabitants of Odanak took a more rigid position when it was their enemies, not their allies, who encroached upon their lands. When English colonists, spurred by rapid population growth and a burgeoning economy, began to eye the fertile lands of the upper Connecticut River valley in the early 1750s, the Wabanakis who hunted and planted in these regions had little interest in accommodating them. Since the late seventeenth century, the Wabanakis and the English had squared off in five bloody wars, with each side developing a growing sense of antagonism toward the other. The latest round, part of a larger imperial struggle between France and Britain, had ended in 1749 with the signing of a treaty between the Wabanakis and the provinces of New England at Falmouth in Casco Bay. Far from ending hostilities, the treaty merely reduced them in scale. Over the next few years, the two sides wrangled over the return of war captives, compensation for peacetime murders, and English incursions into Wabanaki lands.

In July 1752, delegates from Odanak met in Canada with Captain Phineas Stevens, commander of New Hampshire's Fort Number 4, to complain about the arrival of a surveying party sent by a land speculating company to a meadow near the Indian village of Cowass (Koes) on the upper Connecticut River. In the presence of the governor of Canada and Mohawk representatives from Kahnawake and Kanehsatake, Odanak's chief orator, Artiwaneto, told Stevens that the elders of village had allowed the English to settle as far as Schaghticoke but he would not permit them to take "one inch" more. He continued that the English could live and trade on the coast, but that "we expressly forbid you to kill a single beaver or take a stick of wood from the lands where we live." Stevens responded that the surveying party had not been authorized by the
government and asked if recent attacks on English settlements were made in response to incursions on Indian lands or as vengeance for the murders of Wabanakis by Englishmen. Artiwaneto explained that the previous year’s attacks were carried out because the English had murdered a man and woman from Odanak, but that recently two backwoodsmen had been killed and two others captured because they had gone trapping in Wabanaki territory. "Listen, our English brothers," he said, "this is the Indian way; among us, if we find people on our lands we take their game and if they resist we break their heads." 

Artiwaneto’s bald threat contrasted with the more diplomatic tone of Indians who lived closer to English settlements. The inhabitants of villages near the coast, such as Norridgewock and Panawapskik, were more cautious in the wording of their grievances to New England’s officials. Since they lived far away from the French colonies -- about two or three weeks journey from Quebec -- and within a few days of the closest English settlements, they were dependent on the English for guns, powder, and other trade articles. They also had borne the brunt of English attacks in recent wars and did not want to break the tentative peace they now enjoyed. While many at Norridgewock and Panawapskik retained an attachment to the French, a sizable pro-English faction had emerged in recent decades as it became clearer that peace would not be possible without some form of Anglo-Wabanaki entente. When Loron (Laurent) Sauguaaram, a leading sagamore of Penobscot, spoke to Massachusetts officials at Fort St. George in August 1751, he complained that an Englishman had built a house on Matinicus Island in

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60 “Paroles des Abenakis de St. François au Capitaine Stevens,” CDRH, 3: 509-12, quotations on 510 and 512. (My translation; the original of the first quote reads: “nous vous défendons très expressément de tuer un seul castor, ny prendre un morceau de bois sur les terres que nous habitons.” The second quote reads: "Ecoutez, nos frères les Anglois, quelle est notre manière sauvage; entre nous des personnes que nous trouverions sur les terres que nous possédons, nous prendrerions leur chasse et s’ils faisaient quelque résistance nous leur casserions la tête.”) Indian threats against English trappers on the upper Androscoggin River led the government of Massachusetts to pass a law forbidding all trapping north of English
Penobscot Bay, where the Indians hunted birds and seals. Rather than threatening the English officials with violence, he reminded them that according to the terms of the treaty they both signed in 1725, colonists were not allowed to live on the island. "[T]hat Island is our Livelihood," he told them, adding that the treaty "says we shan't loose a Foot of Ground."\(^6\)

Sauguaaram had himself been a signatory of the 1725 treaty and had acted as the leading negotiator of the Wabanaki delegation. Since then he had expended great effort in rallying other Wabanakis to respect the peace and forcing the English to abide by the terms of the treaty. His work had helped to clear a path between the Penobscot Indians and the government of Massachusetts, which, he hoped, would allow them to redress each other's grievances in a peaceful manner. But the Anglo-Penobscot alliance was constantly threatened by conflicts between colonists and Indians. In the summer of 1751, the settler at Matinicus, Ebenezer Hall, had shot and killed two Indians, burying them in his garden. In a deposition made three years later, one of his servants explained that Hall had entertained and lodged Indians during their hunting season, but one day late in the summer, thinking that a war had broken out, he had fired upon two hunters passing near his house. The murders were cause for violent retribution, but the sagamores of Penobscot, in deference to the terms of the 1725 treaty, decided to resolve the matter by applying to the governor of Massachusetts for Hall's removal. Two years later, after receiving several more complaints from the Penobscots, including a letter in which they threatened to remove Hall themselves, the government finally took action, issuing an order for his expulsion from the island in June 1753. The Penobscots' reluctance to resort

settlements or east of the Saco truckhouse. See *DHSM*, 23: 443-4.

\(^6\) *DHSM*, 23: 416. Matinicus had been a favorite spot for English traders and fishermen since the early
to violence in this case was a consequence of their desire to live harmoniously with their English neighbors. Unlike the Odanaks, who lived a great distance from English settlements, the Penobscots could not afford to be uncompromising in the defense of their lands.62

The most important consideration for the Penobscots was not the strength of their claim to the island but the human consequences of land use. The island was their source of food, their "Livelihood," which they would gladly share with others. If their guests acted in an unsociable or hostile manner, as did Ebenezer Hall, the Penobscots withdrew their hospitality. Yet they did so in a way that would not threaten the peace by offending their allies in the Massachusetts government. Territorial boundaries were inseparable from social boundaries, for Wabanakis willingly shared with their friends and kin, but were indisposed to do so with their enemies.

*Inside the Wigwam*

This attitude toward land ownership meant that land claims were always somewhat ambiguous, for the lines that divided social groups from each other were not always clearly drawn. It is wrong, in this respect, to imagine the Wabanakis as they are sometimes represented in modern-day maps: as well-bounded tribes with an unchanging territorial base.63 A better approach is to think of political relationships in terms that the groups themselves would have understood. As Benedict Anderson has argued, nations

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62 DHSM, 23: 448-9, 451-2. Loron's son had died in the last war and he was at pains to prevent further deaths from warfare.


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and other polities are "imagined communities," organizations created by human intellect and sustained through communication. Words keep these communities together, for people cannot feel an affinity for one another unless they share their ideas and experiences. Words also allow people to represent themselves collectively, to see large groups, whether they number in the hundreds or the millions, as a single unit. To gain a faithful understanding of the social universe of the Wabanakis, we need to retrieve the vocabulary they used to describe themselves and their relations with others.64

The organizing principle of the Wabanaki political world, and of eastern North America generally, was kinship. Wabanakis spent most of their years with an extended family group who lived together in a single wigwam or a number of wigwams placed together.65 At regular intervals, they joined together with other families in villages or large camps to perform certain tasks, such as planting, fishing, and feasting, but the family band remained the fundamental social unit throughout the entire year. A family was a valuable source of support, for its members looked after each other both materially and socially. When men had bad luck in hunting, they went to their relatives to obtain food; when travellers went on long journeys, they stayed overnight in the homes of their kin. And when someone had been caused an injury, he or she turned to family for assistance. People consequently measured their political power in terms of the number of

65 Archaeologists have recently discovered the remains of a longhouse at Norridgewock, the only known example of such a structure in Maine. See Robert S. Grumet, Historic Contact: Indian People and Colonists in Today's Northeastern United States in the Sixteenth Through Eighteenth Centuries (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 82-4.
kinfolk they had: at Norridgewock, the expression nemesairangoudamen meant both "I have many relatives" and "I have many allies."\(^{66}\)

Since the family group was a source of social support, Wabanakis defined kinship inclusively so as to bring as many people as possible within the family circle. Wababakis sometimes referred to their cousins as siblings and spoke of their friends as cousins or brothers. This practice confused many Europeans, who thought it odd to be called cousin or brother by near-strangers. When the English explorer Christopher Levett visited Casco Bay in 1624, he was told by local sagamores that he should be their cousin. "[Y]ou may imagine I was not a little proud," he commented wryly in a later account of the voyage, "to be adopted cousin to so many great kings at one instant."\(^{67}\) Behind Levett's bemused remark was a very real difference in the ways in which English and Wabanakis defined kinship. In England, one of the central roles of the family was to transmit property from one generation to the next. Lineal kin -- that is, relatives descended from the same line, such as fathers and sons -- tended to have close attachments to each other, because property was passed on from parents to children. Collateral kin -- relatives not descended from the same line, such as cousins and siblings -- had weaker ties to each other, and those who were not blood relatives were considered to be outside the family altogether.\(^{68}\)

\(^{66}\) Rasles, Dictionary, 499.

\(^{67}\) Levett, "A Voyage into New England," 87. See also the Sieur de Dièreville's surprised reaction at being called brother by a Micmac acquaintance. Dièreville, Relation, 150-1.

\(^{68}\) Consider John Demos' description of kinship in the Plymouth Colony: "Direct bloodlines were accorded a special sort of precedence in the family feeling of the colonists: a man was involved, first of all, with his wife and children, and then with his grandchildren. Somewhat less intense was the relation to his own brothers and sisters, and to their children. Parent-child; grandparent-grandchild; brother (or sister)-brother (or sister); uncle (or aunt)-nephew (or niece): this was the general order of priority." Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), 124. See also Alan Macfarlane, The Family Life of Ralph Josselin, a Seventeenth-Century Clergyman: an Essay in Historical Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 105-43. Two of Josselin's cousins were prominent figures in early Maine; Henry Josselyn was a magistrate in Gorges's province and James Josselyn was a naturalist who wrote a book on the natural and social worlds of New England.
Wabanakis did not accumulate much property during their lifetimes and what little they owned was buried with them when they died. The transmission of property was consequently a minor consideration in the Dawnland and figured very little in the reckoning of kinship. What did matter was the need to share the risks associated with hunting and planting. All hunters, no matter how skilled, at times faced runs of bad luck and failed to bring animals home to their families. Similarly, a summer of drought or blight might cause crops to die, leaving a village without a harvest. Such failures caused hunger and even starvation if people were left to their own devices. But if a family could turn to a network of in-laws, siblings, cousins, and friends for food during times of hardship, the consequences of bad luck in hunting and planting were much less severe.

Collateral kin were as valuable as lineal kin in this respect, for cousins and siblings often dwelt in areas where game was more abundant or nuts and berries more plentiful. The importance of this social tie may explain the Wabanakis' elaborate vocabulary for describing collateral kin. In Wabanaki languages, there are four terms for sibling: "my brother" (spoken by a male), "my brother" (spoken by a female), "my sister" (spoken by a male), and "my sister" (spoken by a female). There are also single words that describe male and female cousins (each with a different form for male and female speakers), and equally concise terms for more complicated relationships, such as "my father's sister's daughter's husband" (spoken by a male).69

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The flexible nature of Wabanaki kinship made families open-ended, always capable of bringing new members within their fold. The connection between kinship terms and actual relations of consanguinity was more tenuous among the Wabanakis than in Europe, and names such as "father" or "cousin" were often meant to imply a set of social obligations rather than an actual blood tie. This practice allowed people to express all social relationships in eastern North America, even relations with near-strangers, in the language of kinship. Units of political association larger than the family band were understood as metaphorical extensions of the family circle. Alliances, for example, were often described as wigwams, in which various peoples lived under the same roof. Early in the eighteenth century, the villages of the Dawnland formed a confederacy with the Mohawks of the St. Lawrence Valley and Algonquian groups to the north and the west. According to oral tradition, they described the confederacy as a wigwam enclosed by a great fence. In the middle of the wigwam was a fireplace, which was kept at the Mohawk village of Kahnawake. The fence symbolized the confederacy agreement, and all those who tried to escape from it -- those who violated the terms of the alliance -- would be whipped by the "father" of the confederacy, the Ottawas, who had played a leading role in the formation of the league. The wigwam itself symbolized the peace between the members of the confederacy, for the peoples living within it had to act as a family. "There would be no arguing again," it was said. "They had to live like brothers and sisters who had the same parent." All the members of the confederacy except the Ottawas described themselves as siblings of graded ages. The Penobscots, who by the eighteenth century had become the most influential Indian group in their region, were considered the eldest brother of the Wabanaki communities.70

The symbol of the wigwam resonated because the home was the focus of family life. It was also a symbol of order, of social boundaries. For practical reasons, family members each had reserved places within the house according to their age and gender. In the cramped space of the wigwam, it was difficult to move without disturbing others, so people performed all their activities while sitting in their assigned place. Fathers and mothers sat at the back of the house behind the fire, while boys and girls sat on the sides. A place of honor was always reserved for guests. Even when the family broke camp and moved to a new area, the seating plan remained the same. From outside the wigwam, it may have appeared that families were in constant movement but within the wigwam the social spaces of the family were fixed. At confederacy councils, the delegates had assigned places that symbolized their place within the alliance. In metaphorical terms, this meant that the hierarchy of the confederacy would remain constant no matter how much the world changed around it. Wabanaki members sat on one side of the fire, with the Penobscots acting as their leading spokesmen, while western delegates sat at the opposite side, with the Ottawa representative holding a whip, symbolizing his paternal authority over the other league members.71

The fireplace at the center of the delegates was itself a metaphor, represented by a large wooden hoop in the council house at Kahnawake. As in other cultures, the hearth


was a symbol of domesticity because the fireplace was always the focal point of the home. A council fire stood for the polity itself because the hearth implied, by metonymic extension, the family that sat around it. The image of the fire also evoked the ephemeral nature of alliances, since friendships, like campfires, die out if they are not continually renewed. When the confederacy members met at the council house, they marked the end of their speeches by presenting belts of wampum, which they hung on the wooden hoop that symbolized the fire. Orators said that the belts were "brands" that they placed in the fire to keep it burning brightly. If they failed to stoke the fire by adding new belts every three years, it was assumed that the fire would be extinguished and the confederacy with it.72

In Penobscot, people figuratively referred to wampum as gelusewangan, "speech," and it was believed that the belts contained or embodied the orations of the delegates. A single bead of wampum was known as a "word," and people could "write" belts by stringing varicolored beads into a pattern and "read" them later by deciphering the pattern.73 The hanging of belts around the hoop at Kahnawake symbolized the renewal of alliances through the exchange of words. The purpose of such speeches was to create bonds of affection and trust among the delegates. The confederates rarely expected their meetings to produce clearly-worded policies or binding pacts. Instead,

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73 I put these terms in quotes because wampum belts were not strictly speaking a system of writing. Written texts symbolically represent components of language such as phonemes and words. Wampum belts, on the other hand, embody stories and ideas and do not stand for specific linguistic formulations. Holders of the belts usually tell their stories in their own words and do not worry about adhering to their original phrasing. See David R. Olson, The World on Paper: The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 69-71.
their orations served much the same purpose as a stone thrown on a travel shrine or an arrow left at Hockomock Point: they regenerated alliances by keeping channels of communication open. The paths that they cleared in council allowed the allies to air their grievances, make amends for injuries, and resolve conflicts peacefully. But if they did not periodically renew their friendship, the paths would become overgrown and the fire would flicker out.74

This way of imagining alliances was fitting to an oral culture, in which units of political association did not exist "on paper" but needed to be constantly and actively renewed and recreated. Reciprocal bonds, established through ties of kinship and reinforced through sharing and gift-giving, were the social glue that held people together and imbued them with a sense of common purpose. Since land use was one of the means by which these social ties were expressed, territoriality in the Dawnland was characterized not so much by lines of division as by links of reciprocity. The strength of land claims was commensurate with the intensity of social ties. Families shared their land in the same way they shared their food -- in fact, the two were inseparable in their minds -- and would willingly let allies hunt on their territories if the visitors demonstrated their goodwill by paying furs as tribute. Land dealings, from this perspective, were social rather than economic transactions. If one group allowed another to hunt on their lands, they effectively invited them into their wigwam and signaled that they would treat each other as kin. Such an invitation benefited the host as well as the guest, for the arrival of

74 Michael K. Foster, "Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in Jennings, ed., History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 99-114. Other valuable items such as beaver skins could serve the same purpose as wampum. When Noël Negamabat visited the Kennebec River in the winter of 1650-1, he brought with him a bundle of furs, which he presented as a gift to John Winslow, the Plymouth colony's agent at Cushnoc. He told Winslow that the furs were his "word", which he "added" to the word of the governor of New France, delivered by Father Druillettes. He expected that Winslow would transmit both their messages (the gift and his speech being one and the same) to the governor of Plymouth.
new kin into a community swelled the ranks of its warriors and widened the circle of sharing, providing all concerned with greater military and material security.\textsuperscript{75}

When strangers began arriving from across the ocean, Wabanaki sagamores treated them as potential allies and eagerly sought to win their favor by exchanging presents and inviting them to live near their rivers.\textsuperscript{76} The wording of early land deals between Englishmen and coastal sagamores suggests that Wabanaki leaders in the early part of the seventeenth century understood land deals as alliances, rather than commercial transactions. The preamble of the 1638 deed stated that the sagamores "are Inclined to have the English Inhabit amongst us," adding that English settlement would eventually make the natives of the region "Strengthened against our Enemys the Tarenteens [Mi'kmaq] who yearly doth us Dammage." The sagamores were "Likewise... purswaded that [settlement] will be for the good of us and our posterity." The deed conveyed the coastal area between the Merrimac and Piscataqua rivers to the English but allowed Indians to continue hunting, fishing, and fowling within the same tract. The sagamores received a gift of coats, shirts, dried foods, and other items in return for the land, with the "Chief Sagamore" of the region, Passaconaway of Pennacook, being promised a yearly payment of one coat of trucking cloth by the English settlers.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{75} One example of such a transaction is the invitation made in 1719 and 1723 to the inhabitants of Odanak to "go eat the beaver's tail" in the Foxes' lands south of the Great Lakes. The Foxes, who had been at odds with the French for over a decade, were poised to enter a war against the Illinois, Sauteurs, and Ottavas. Their invitation to the Wabanakis to come live in their lands was an attempt to recruit warriors for the impending conflict. The inhabitants of Odanak, mindful of governor Vaudreuil's disapproval of the Foxes' gambit, ultimately refused the invitation. See Vaudreuil au Ministre, October 11, 1723, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 45, fol. 148-9v; JR, 67: 129.

\textsuperscript{76} For early attempts by sagamores to lure French and English colonists to settle on their lands, see Levett, \textit{Voyage}, 88, 92-3; JR, 2: 249, 3: 269; \textit{Voyages of Samuel de Champlain}, 1: 294; Marc Lescarbot, \textit{History of New France [1618]} (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1907), transl. and edited by W. L. Grant, 3 vols., 1: 355.

The terms of purchase were typical of seventeenth-century Anglo-Wabanaki land transactions. Many other deeds stipulated that Indians could continue to hunt and plant on the lands sold to the English, even though these tracts nominally belonged to the purchasers. From a Wabanaki perspective, the "sale" of land in 1638 may in fact have been a declaration of alliance whereby the sagamores of the region invited the English to come live with them and received trade and military support in return. The articles they received in exchange for the land, in their eyes, were a form of tribute that the English paid to show their respect for the original owners. The sagamores had little to lose in the transaction, for the epidemics of 1616-19 and 1634 had ravaged native New England, leaving coastal areas with only a small fraction of their former population. With their villages greatly reduced in size, native communities probably had more land than they needed and it was in their interest to find new sources of support, including trade with Europeans.78

Needless to say, the sagamores did not know that the purchasers were the crest of a human tidal wave that would soon swamp all of New England. Nor did they fully understand that the English, who had never heard of Gluskap and knew nothing of what

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Deeds. The date of the deed is listed as 1629, and the purchase had supposedly been made while the colonists were still living in England, but this date is almost certainly the result of forgery. The sale of land was probably made in April 1638, when the Reverend John Wheelwright and his followers, expelled from Massachusetts because of their involvement in the Antinomian crisis, decided to make a settlement at Exeter in present-day New Hampshire. See Charles E. Clark, The Eastern Frontier: The Settlement of Northern New England, 1610-1763 (Hanover, N. H.: University Press of New England, 1970), 37-9. 78 Emerson W. Baker, "A Scratch with a Bear's Paw: Anglo-Indian Land Deeds in Early Maine." Ethnohistory 36 (1989): 235-56; Dean R. Snow and Kim M. Lanphear, "European Contact and Indian Depopulation in the Northeast: The Timing of the First Epidemics," Ethnohistory 35 (1988): 15-33; Arthur E. Speiss and Bruce D. Spiess, "New England Pandemic of 1616-1622: Cause and Archaeological Implication," Man in the Northeast 34 (1987), 71-83. Deeds drawn up later in the century tended to give the English purchasers exclusive rights the land but as late as the 1680s, English farmers in York County paid a peck of corn every year to Madockawando, the leading sagamore of the region in recognition of his suzerainty over their lands. See depositions of John Boden and Richard Webber, December 27, 1736, in Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title of the Late John Leverett... (Boston: Kneeland and Green [], 1736), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 4098; State of the British and French Colonies in North America
he had done, imagined the landscape in a manner entirely different from their own. To
the colonists, the country where they chose to settle was literally a new England, a blank
slate on which the landscape of old England could be redrawn. Over the next several
centuries, they busily covered the land with their own distinctive footprints -- turning
forests into fields, meadows into towns, bays into harbors -- with consequences that
Gluskap's children could not ignore.

TABLE 1.1. WABANAKI CALENDARS, 17TH-19TH CENTURIES.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Gaspé, 17thC</th>
<th>Norridgewock, 18thC</th>
<th>Penobscot, 19thC</th>
<th>Odanak, 19thC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan.</td>
<td></td>
<td>time of great cold</td>
<td>hard times/</td>
<td>New-year's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>winter moon</td>
<td>greeting moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.</td>
<td></td>
<td>fishing moon</td>
<td>wind scatters</td>
<td>bough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>leaves over</td>
<td>shedding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td></td>
<td>abundant fishing</td>
<td>egg-laying moon</td>
<td>moose-hunting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>moon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.</td>
<td></td>
<td>fishing herring/</td>
<td>alewife moon/</td>
<td>sugar-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sowing moon</td>
<td>spearfish moon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
<td>covering the corn</td>
<td>planting moon</td>
<td>planting moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td></td>
<td>when we bank up</td>
<td>seals rise on</td>
<td>hoeing moon</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the corn</td>
<td>water</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td></td>
<td>blueberries ripen/</td>
<td>berry ripe moon</td>
<td>hay-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>eel season</td>
<td></td>
<td>moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td></td>
<td>large sun/long days</td>
<td>seals fattening/</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>harvesting</td>
<td></td>
<td>corn moon</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>moon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td></td>
<td>gathering acorns</td>
<td>animal rutting/</td>
<td>corn-reaping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>reddening of</td>
<td>moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>leaves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.</td>
<td></td>
<td>when the shores</td>
<td>leaf falling/</td>
<td>leaf-falling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>freeze</td>
<td>ice forms on</td>
<td>moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rock-cod moon</td>
<td>ice-forming</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>rivers begin to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>freeze</td>
<td></td>
<td>moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.</td>
<td></td>
<td>tomcods ascend</td>
<td>the moon is</td>
<td>winter moon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the river</td>
<td>long</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>big moon/</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>winter coming/</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xmas eve moon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Chrestien Leclerc, *Relation of Gaspesia*, 138-9; Rasles, *Dictionary*, 478; Speck, *Penobscot Man*, 263-4; Laurent, *New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues*, 223. For the sake of brevity the word "moon" has been omitted in some entries.
Canoes in rock art, from: (a) Lake Kejimkook, N. S.; (b) Solon, Me.; (c) Agawa Rock, Lake Superior, Ont.; (d) Solon, Me.; (e) Lake Kejimkook, N.S. Drawings of canoes and other boats are a common motif in petroglyph sites throughout North America, and are probably associated with the travels of the shaman's spirit. Sources: (a,e) Robertson, Rock Drawings of the Micmac Indians; (b,d) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs"; (c) Grant, The Rock Art of the North American Indians.
Ithyphallic themes in rock art, from: (a-f) Solon, Me.; (g) Machiasport, Me. To Wabanakis, spiritual power and sexual potency were closely related, indeed inseparable from each other. Men may also have seen an analogy between the pursuit of game and the pursuit of women — present-day Cree hunters in James Bay jokingly use the same expressions for "he shoots" and "he ejaculates", "shotgun" and "penis", "gunpowder" and "sperm", "gun sheath" and "condom". See Colin Scott, "Science for the West, Myth for the Rest? The Case for James Bay Cree Knowledge Construction," in Laura Nader, ed., *Naked Science: Anthropological Inquiry into Boundaries, Power, and Knowledge* (N. Y.: Routledge, 1996), 75. Sources: (a-f) Snow, "Solon Petroglyphs"; (g) Ray, "The Machiasport Petroglyphs".
Human heads in rock art, from: (a) Bellows Falls, Vt.; (b) Dighton Rock, Taunton, Mass.; (c) Peterborough, Ont.; (d) Fairy Point, Missinaibi Lake, Ont. The horns on the heads of human figures are symbols of their shamanic power. Similar figures, also with haloes and power lines emanating from their heads, are found throughout North America and around the world. Sources: (a) Haviland and Power, "Visions in Stone;" (b) Mattingly, Picture-Writing of the American Indians; (c) Grant, The Rock Art of the North American Indians; d) Thor Conway, "Scotia Lake Pictograph Site".
CHAPTER II
DRAWING LINES

Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
--Robert Frost, "Mending Wall"

Suppose it were possible to lay all the maps ever drawn of Maine end to end and in chronological order. If this column were wrapped around a spinning reel and viewed through an aperture, one could see all the maps in rapid succession, like a film. Imagine for a moment how this film might appear. In the opening scenes the foreground is the Atlantic Ocean, crisscrossed by rhumb lines, dotted by clusters of fishing banks, and decorated with fanciful sea monsters swimming at the edges of the frame. The interior of the continent is largely blank, with the exception of a scattering of names along the coast, indicating geographical features such as rivers and bays. The shoreline itself takes shape only gradually, evolving from a wavering, inchoate shape into an precise tracing of the jagged coast of northern New England.

Soon the major rivers of Maine -- the Androscoggin, the Kennebec, the Penobscot -- begin to snake their way into the interior, revealing their sources among the lakes and highlands of the region. The map also becomes cluttered with the signs of human occupation: a scattering of European settlements huddled against the coast, a number of
Indian tribes farther inland. Colonies appear, indicated as free-floating words slightly larger than the names of the Indians. Eventually, a number of boundary lines divide these colonies from each other, though not from the Indians, who in a matter of time seem to vanish altogether. At first the boundaries are clumsily drawn and flicker wildly from one map to the next. But after a while they gain a certain consistency and vary only in their details. As these lines become more fixed, the rugged, lopsided diamond shape of the state of Maine emerges, bounded to the west by the inverted triangles of New Hampshire and Vermont, and to the north and east by the gaping mouth of Quebec and the scraggly parallelogram of New Brunswick.

Suppose that this film had a narrator, or several narrators, for it tells at least three different stories. In one version, the story would be one of growth, of the cumulative expansion of European knowledge about the territory of Maine. In the earliest maps this knowledge was tentative, hypothetical, based on explorers' sketches of the coast, added to scraps of information gleaned from Indians, and supplemented by a heavy dose of educated guessing. Through a process of trial and error, Europeans gradually produced a more precise picture of the territory, methodically plotting the coast and the interior on mariners' charts and surveyors' plats. The steady accumulation of empirical observations produced an image of the territory that was more scientific, if less colorful. The Penobscot River in the earliest maps had been the site of the mythically opulent city of Norumbega;¹ by the close of the eighteenth century the river's meanderings close to the

¹ Historians since the nineteenth century have puzzled over the origins of the name Norumbega, some suggesting that it was a corruption of a Wabanaki word, others that it is derived from the name Norvegia, or Norway. But no one has yet considered the possibility that Norumbega was a variant spelling of Norimberga, the Latin name of the city state of Nuremberg. Early in the sixteenth century, Nuremberg was an important center of humanist scholarship and the printing trade. Its printers were especially known for their woodcuts and copper engravings — Albrecht Dürer's works being the most famous examples — and these skills made Nuremberg one of the mapmaking capitals of Europe. Europe's oldest existing globe,
coast had been measured to the last rod and its sources farther inland dutifully recorded by military engineers. The effect of several centuries of such painstaking observation was to transform, in the European imagination, a formless terra incognita into an exactly measured landscape.²

This transformation was not innocent, for the story of expanding knowledge is connected to a second narrative, a story of conquest. The dimensions of the American landscape, recorded and described by explorers and colonists, were more than an object of idle curiosity for Europeans. Maps of the Americas gave them information that allowed them to steer their ships safely into harbor, to find the interior waterways of the continent, to catalogue and lay claim to the natural riches of the land. Cartographic knowledge in these respects was a faithful handmaiden of colonial enterprise.

As early as the sixteenth century, mapmakers placed flags and coats of arms on the North American continent to symbolize the sovereignty of various European powers.

² On the expansion of geographical knowledge of northern New England, see Baker et al., American
over its territory and people. Over time these quixotic claims to continental empires, made on the basis of a hazy knowledge of the coastline, became self-fulfilling prophecies. Early in the seventeenth century, colonization companies sponsored by the crowns of France and England began to exploit the natural resources of eastern North America through a combination of trade and settlement. The French and English colonies asserted their authority over a widening swath of territory, extending their government over all who lived within their respective jurisdictions.

If the expansionist impulses of Europeans remained constant throughout the colonial period, the means by which they marked their conquests did not. A third story of the film -- less perceptible but just as important as the other two -- is one of changing form, of an evolution in the methods by which cartographers represented the limits of state power. In the earliest maps, European powers planted their flags in the middle of the continent, writing the proposed names of new colonies in large letters across the lands they claimed to possess. By the early years of settlement, the flags had disappeared, but the names remained. In a few maps, they were separated by dotted lines or colored wash, but in most cases there were no boundaries on the map. In French versions, the names of native tribes were often written alongside the names of colonies, and portions of the continent seemed to belong simultaneously to New France and the Indians. Early maps also depicted a growing number of settlements along the continent's coastline and river valleys, represented by dots, crosses, and clusters of houses.

Cartographers of the eighteenth century continued to use the vocabulary developed by their predecessors -- boundaries as lines, settlements and forts as points, colonies and tribes as free-floating names -- but they reshuffled its order of emphasis.

Beginnings, especially chapters 1-3.
giving increasing attention to the definition of boundaries. Mapmakers began drawing lines between colonies, some of them following the course of rivers and others running straight through the interior. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the boundless, ambiguously defined polities typical of the early cartography of the region had disappeared almost entirely. Mapmakers now carved the eastern half of the continent into a number of multicolored jurisdictions, each separated from the other by clearly drawn lines: a motif familiar to anyone who has ever consulted a twentieth-century atlas or road map.

The emergence of boundary lines in the eighteenth century was of great consequence to the inhabitants of Maine, for their region had been a borderland from the earliest years of European settlement. In other parts of North America, colonies had expanded outward from territorial nuclei formed early in their existence: Canada had taken shape along the St. Lawrence, New Netherlands and New York along the Hudson River, Maryland and Virginia in Chesapeake Bay. But the lands between the St. John and Piscataqua rivers had seen a succession of colonies rise and fall -- Sagadahock, Laconia, New Somersetshire, Lygonia, Acadia, Devonshire, Georgia -- each of them laying claim to portions of the same territory but none of them managing to establish exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Far from being dominated by a single colony, the region was defined by a series of borders that separated one colony from the next.

The distinctive character of the region makes it necessary to approach its early history not in terms of the growth of a single colony but as a gradual evolution of political borders. The emergence of clearly drawn boundaries in the eighteenth century represents a watershed in this history, yet has been the subject of surprisingly little attention among
historians. Perhaps the Anglo-American tendency to see frontiers and boundaries as distinct subjects has blinded historians to the continuities between the two. Content with the geographer's dictum that one is an area and the other a line, most scholars have treated the frontier as the exclusive province of social historians and boundaries as the bailiwick of high diplomacy. But as Lucien Febvre once remarked, frontiers and boundaries are variations on the same theme: both are the envelope of the state, the outer edges of political power. While linear boundaries are virtually the sole expression of this concept in present-day maps, past societies have imagined and protected their peripheries in a variety of ways, from the marches of Carolingian Europe to the defensive walls of the Chinese empire. These kinds of frontiers were not supplanted by the linear boundaries of the modern map until after the sixteenth century, as the territorial state began to squeeze out other forms of political organization.³

Seen in this light, the replacement of free-floating polities with well-bounded states in maps of Maine during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was inseparable from the growth of state power in the region. Boundaries are never neutral or merely descriptive; they decide what belongs to whom and allow governments and landowners to exert control over places and people. The transformation of frontiers into boundaries during the eighteenth century was part of a larger complex of social and political changes that ultimately served to produce the territorial state in North America. Our map film depicts this process in miniature, graphically illustrating how the vaguely-defined borders of seventeenth-century Maine became the exactly surveyed lines of the present day. But

it also presents this change as if it were the inexorable unfolding of a grand plan, wholly independent of human agency. This image is illusory, for the development of boundaries was the cumulative product of countless decisions by political officials, military leaders, and ordinary people. By rewinding the reel and examining it frame by frame, we can recover the human side of the story, seeing each map as product of its social and political context.

Two Kinds of Map

The earliest European cartographers of North America were faced with a blank slate, a continent of which virtually nothing was known. But if the land was new to them, the techniques they used to represent it were not, for the mapmaking art was centuries old by the sixteenth century. Political maps had an especially long and distinguished lineage, for cartography had always been a tool of political elites. The development of mapmaking as a craft in ancient Europe and Asia was closely related to the emergence of states as a form of political organization, since rulers on both continents found maps to be a useful aid in monitoring and controlling the more distant parts of their dominions. Political maps in the ancient and medieval world served a multitude of purposes, from the evaluation of land values to the planning of pilgrimages. They took an equally diverse number of artistic forms, ranging from the mappae mundi of medieval Europe to the "fish-scale" property maps of Ming China. But in the broadest terms, cartographers tended to use a combination of two basic motifs in preparing maps for political purposes [see Fig. 2.1]. The first was a pattern of nodes and links, a map in which strategic points of the political landscape such as cities and forts were connected together by a network of frontier (frontière).
rivers and roads. This kind of map was well suited to the planning of military campaigns or the collection of tribute and taxes, for it illustrated the lines of communication that allowed rulers to control the peripheral regions of their dominions. The second pattern was one of bounded areas, of a page divided into shapes by straight and curving lines. This motif allowed rulers to identify and separate different jurisdictions or, more commonly, to record the ownership of real property. In general, the second pattern was reserved for plans of a small scale, and was characteristic of cadastral maps, which illustrated property rights in land.4

The first European maps of the New World tended to be of the first type, with the difference that political centers were linked to the Americas by an ocean rather than a river. The earliest maps were generally compilations of nautical knowledge, which illustrated the features of the American coastline and the rhumb lines that allowed European navigators to find their way safely into harbor. This knowledge was of greatest interest to pilots and adventurers, who purchased portolan charts made by cartographers in the Atlantic ports.5 The mapmakers usually conferred with pilots and shipmasters from nearby areas, who provided them with sketches and descriptions of the coast. The cartographers supplemented these sketches with information drawn from older maps, from which they copied the missing portions of their charts. The portolan charts

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5 Portolan charts were nautical maps that were commonly used in the Mediterranean during the Middle
were suitable for shipboard use, providing navigators with careful tracings of the coastline, along with the compass roses and rhumb lines that allowed the pilots to find their bearings and set their course [see Fig. 2.2].

The workshops that drew the portolan charts were the cartographic equivalent of medieval scriptoria, being small guilds of skilled artisans working with pen and ink to produce elaborately decorated documents. Although they did make copies of their works, mass reproduction was beyond their means; by the end of the sixteenth century they had become specialists in customized maps made for an exclusive clientele of merchants, shipmasters, and pilots. Members of the wider public who had an interest in New World exploration had to turn to maps issued by the urban printing presses of Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. At first made with woodcuts, then by copper engraving, printed maps of the Americas were often inserted as supplementary sheets in editions of Ptolemy's *Geographia* that kept readers abreast of recent exploration in the New World. Unlike portolan charts, which scattered the coastline with flags and coats of arms, printed maps tended to be cautious in illustrating political jurisdictions, leaving boundaries ambiguous and including only colonial claims that were beyond dispute. Wanting to reach as broad a public as possible, commercial map printers avoided alienating potential buyers by taking sides in territorial disputes. This political neutrality meant that commercial cartographers stood at a distance from the crowns and merchants who backed colonial ventures and were not privy to conversations with explorers. Printed maps were

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Ages. They were drawn on vellum and were generally accompanied by a written text.

consequently of little value to navigators, since they were based on information that was often ten or twenty years out of date.\textsuperscript{7}

But for ordinary readers commercial maps provided a compendium of European knowledge about the world and illustrated widely shared understandings about the extent of colonial claims in the Americas. Gerardus Mercator's celebrated 1569 world map offers an example of how learned Europeans might have imagined North America in the mid-sixteenth century [see Fig. 2.3]. At first glance, the form of the map seems familiar enough; the continent's coastline has roughly the same shape that it has today and is crisscrossed by a grid of longitude and latitude. But upon closer examination, the political landscape of the map appears alien to present-day sensibilities. The names of La Florida, Apalchen, and Norombega -- a colony, a tribe or mountain range, and a quasi-mythical place -- are written in the same size type, as if they belonged to the same category of place. New France (Nova Francia) apparently embraces the entire region surrounding the St. Lawrence River, yet Mercator also recognizes native cities such as Honguedo (a settlement of Gaspé, incorrectly placed near the site of present-day Quebec).\textsuperscript{8} The territorial limits of the colonies, furthermore, are left ambiguous since there are no boundary lines on the map other than the colored wash that tints the coastline.

This apparent confusion was not simply a product of Mercator's ignorance of the New World, for his illustration of Europe jumbles together political labels and geographical features in a similar manner. Political jurisdictions such as France and

\textsuperscript{7}Lloyd A. Brown, \textit{The Story of Maps} (New York: Dover Publications, 1949), 113-79. Mapmakers did have to please local officials, since maps, like other printed materials, had to pass inspection by government censors.

\textsuperscript{8}Jacques Crevel, \textit{Honguedo ou l'histoire des premiers gaspésiens} (Québec: Garneau, 1970).
England are mixed together with the cultural regions of Germany and Italy, and boundary lines are entirely absent. Far from being exceptional, Mercator's approach to the representation of political jurisdictions was typical of sixteenth-century cartography.

Like other mapmakers of his time, Mercator used the writings of the Alexandrian geographer Claudius Ptolemy as a model for his work. Although none of Ptolemy's maps survived, European cartographers tried to duplicate the image of the world described in his *Geographia*, and their maps were consequently based as much on classical models as they were on contemporary reality.9

Cartographers of the late Roman Empire and Middle Ages had paid little attention to the definition of boundaries in world maps, being more concerned with the location of important places and the direction of roads and rivers that connected them. The typical map placed the emperor or the pope at the center of the world, with roads radiating out from his seat of power in Rome or Constantinople. This cartographic form was a graphic expression of the concept of imperium, or the absolute authority of the emperors and popes. The power of popes and emperors was thought to extend to the ends of the earth, making it impossible to represent the outer boundaries of the empire on maps. Boundaries might separate provinces or kingdoms, and outposts might mark the limits of effective political control, but the ends of the Empire and Christ's Kingdom, which were imbued with spiritual significance, could never be drawn.10

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10 Pol Trousset, "La frontière romaine et ses contradictions," in Yves Roman, ed., *La frontière: séminaire de recherche* (Lyon: GDR-Maison de l'Orient, 1993), 25-33; C. R. Whittaker, *Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). The Romans made a crucial distinction between *fines*, which were the boundary lines of particular provinces, and *limes*, which were outposts that defended areas under Roman control: one might imagine the distinction as one between a boundary map and a map of links and nodes.
By the early years of European exploration in the Americas, the ideology of imperium had been adopted by many monarchs in Europe, who were eager to curb the power of the papacy and to gain an upper hand over noble magnates within their own dominions. Most promulgated an attenuated version of imperium, under which the absolute authority claimed by early modern monarchs was limited to their own kingdoms. But concepts of imperium became more expansive in the New World, which was open to legitimate conquest by Christian kings because it was peopled by "heathens." Limits to colonial possessions in the Americas were set only by the competing claims of other European powers, which forced the crowns to develop distinct spheres of influence on the continent. Cartographers recognized these spheres of influence by recording the names of colonies and placing royal coats of arms at the center of their territories. But it made little sense to draw boundaries between these territories, not only because their frontiers were poorly defined, but because each crown held out the possibility of further conquests.11

Of course, the symbolic representation of state sovereignty on maps had only a tenuous connection to the actual control exercised by Europeans in North America during the sixteenth century. Aside from a few failed attempts at permanent settlement, the sole European footholds on North American soil north of Florida were makeshift stations established by traders and fishermen during the summer months, which were privately funded and did not depend on the approval of the crown. The weakness of royal authority in these regions did not necessarily undermine the crowns' claims to their possession, for imperium was an innate quality of the monarchy distinct from the actual

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power exercised by kings. The French crown had taken the St. Lawrence River, or New
France, under its jurisdiction because it had established an exclusive right to its
possession: whether it chose to exercise this right or not was immaterial. There was, in
other words, a vast gulf between the theory and practice of sovereignty in the New World.
The nodes-and-links pattern of early maps allowed cartographers to finesse this problem
by leaving the actual extent of colonial possessions open to interpretation.

*Merchants and Monopolies*

The gap between theory and practice began to narrow in the seventeenth century,
as trading companies from France and England established permanent settlements on the
mainland. Faced with increasingly intense competition in the cod fisheries and fur trade
during the last decade of the sixteenth century, merchants in the Atlantic ports looked for
new sources of fish and furs and sought monopolies over existing fishing grounds and
trading posts. Many entrepreneurs also supported the idea of establishing permanent
colonies, which prevented competitors from landing on American shores and provided
their backers with a continual supply of commodities. Like monopolies, permanent
settlements depended on the support of the crown, since they required a royal charter that
excluded others from their territory. Although many smaller operators opposed such
monopolies, politically influential investors in both France and England used their
connections at court to obtain colonial charters in the first decade of the seventeenth
century.12

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12 On the controversy over monopolies, see Harold Innis, *The Cod Fisheries: The History of an
International Economy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 52-94.
In 1603, five years after the marquis de La Roche's disastrous attempt to settle Île de Sable, Henri IV of France created a commission to draw up a new colonial charter for New France, which was ultimately awarded to Pierre du Gua, sieur de Monts, a Protestant soldier who had been appointed governor of Saintonge as a reward for his service to Henri during the Wars of Religion. The charter gave de Monts a ten-year monopoly over trade in the lands lying between 40° and 46° of latitude, or "La Cadie", the name being a variation of L'Arcadia or l'Acadie, a term found in many sixteenth-century maps.¹³

Around the same time, West Country investors in England were sponsoring a series of reconnaissance voyages to the Gulf of Maine in the hope of finding new sources of fish and other commodities. Ships commanded by Bartholomew Gosnold in 1602, Martin Pring in 1603, and George Weymouth in 1605 all returned from their voyages to New England with abundant supplies of fish and furs, as well as a number of Indian captives. They also brought back promising reports of rich winter fishing grounds off the coast of New England, raising hopes that the region might serve as a base for year-round operations. In 1606, a company of investors from Plymouth applied for and received a colonial charter from James I, who granted them all the lands between 38° and 45° of latitude in North America not in the possession of the French.¹⁴

Both the English and French companies soon moved to make good on their claims. In 1604, de Monts set out from Le Havre with a Saintongeais pilot, Samuel de Champlain, to chart the coasts of the Bay of Fundy and establish contacts with the Indians of Acadia. Champlain remained for three years, mapping the coast between Cape

Sable and Cape Cod and helping to establish a small settlement at Port Royal. Toward the end of his stay, in 1607, a party of Englishmen led by George Popham, son of Lord Chief Justice John Popham, established a rival colony at the headwaters of the Kennebec River. Both colonies were short-lived: the settlement at Port Royal was abandoned in 1613 after it was sacked by a fleet from Virginia, while the Popham colony barely lasted a year, with many of its inhabitants dying from disease and hunger. Yet the two colonies represented the beginnings of a determined effort to establish a permanent European presence in North America, an effort that would bear fruit in the ensuing decades.

Compared to the seasonal voyages of sixteenth-century fishermen and fur traders, these enterprises required enormous expenditures on the part of their financial backers. With little chance of receiving immediate returns on their investment, colonial companies had to supply and outfit ships to transport the settlers, furnish them with several months' provisions and a stock of merchandise to trade with Indians, and advance the funds and materials necessary to build houses and fortifications. While fishing voyages received their backing from small circles of creditors in the port towns, colonial ventures demanded a much larger outlay of capital and depended on wider networks of investors. In England, the projectors responsible for these colonies looked to inland commercial centers for new sources of credit and found a large and diverse group of investors who were becoming increasingly speculative and aggressive in their dealings. In France, merchants of various port towns banded together to support colonial enterprise jointly. With access to a more substantial pool of capital, seventeenth-century entrepreneurs in
both countries had a better chance to succeed in New World ventures than their predecessors of the previous century.\textsuperscript{15}

To protect their territories against competitors, colonial investors also needed political backing from the crown, typically in the form of a charter. This kind of recognition tended to be difficult to obtain, for when monopolies were granted they frequently gave rise to cries of corruption and political favoritism. Faced with a threat to their livelihood, rival firms vociferously and often successfully opposed the charters, as when the protests of Malouin merchants forced King Henri III to revoke the monopoly he had granted in 1588 to Etienne Chaton and Jacques Noël for the fur trade in Canada. The success of colonial companies consequently depended on their ability to enlist the support of gentlemen and nobles with influence at court and to convince the wider public that royal charters were necessary to the well-being of colonial enterprise.\textsuperscript{16}

Pursuing political leverage and a far-flung network of investors, colonial companies undertook extensive public relations campaigns, designed to convince others of the benefits of overseas colonies and the need for trade monopolies to ensure their success. Beginning with Richard Hakluyt, colonial promoters from the late sixteenth century issued dozens of books, handbills, and pamphlets describing riches of the New


\textsuperscript{16} Henry P. Biggar, The Early Trading Companies of New France: A Contribution to the History of Commerce and Discovery in North America (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1901), 34-35; Trudel, Beginnings of New France, 58-60. On English political controversies surrounding monopolies, see Linda
World and exhorting their readers to take the lead in exploiting them. Published by the printing shops of Paris and London, this propaganda circulated throughout the provinces, finding a ready market among nobles, merchants, and gentlemen seeking outlets for their capital.17

Many of the publications included maps drawn by pilots and officials who had visited the colonies. Like the texts they illustrated, these maps were colored by the political interests of their authors, presenting an image of the New World that legitimized the claims of the colonial companies. The first printed maps of Acadia and New France, included as plates in Marc Lescarbot's *Histoire de la Nouvelle France*, reinforced the colonial vision of Monts and his lieutenant, Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt. Lescarbot was Poutrincourt's lawyer and had accompanied him to Port Royal in 1606, returning to France the following year when Monts's charter was revoked. In 1609, he published an account of his stay in Acadia, to which he added an idiosyncratic history of sixteenth-century voyages to North America and an epic poem recounting a raid led by the Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou on a village at Saco.

Like the accompanying text, the several maps included in Lescarbot's work were a mixture of informative detail and thinly-veiled propaganda. His large-scale map of New France and Acadia [Fig. 2.4], copied from Champlain's sketches of the coast and engraved by Jan Swelinck, depicted the Bay of Fundy for the first time in a European map. The plate's imagery suggested the importance of fish and furs to the colony, dotting the sea with fishing banks and scattering the coastline with wigwams. A cornucopia of maize and grapes at the lower left-hand corner illustrated the region's potential wealth,

and the Bourbon coat of arms, placed above it, signified royal sanction of Poutrincourt's enterprise. The various crosses placed at points of French control also reminded the reader that the colony was an outpost of Christianity. This symbolism equated the private interests of Lescarbot's client with the public good, making it clear that the colony not only brought profits to its investors, but extended Christian knowledge and royal authority into the New World. Since Poutrincourt had intensively lobbied for the renewal of his monopoly since 1607, Lescarbot's map amounted to a graphic legal brief on his client's behalf. 18

"Upon View of the Mapps"

Although it is their promotional quality that is most striking, the maps commissioned by early colonizing companies also had utilitarian value. The leaders of the companies were faced with the problem of controlling and developing lands that lay an ocean away. Maps were a vital tool to these men, for they gave a concrete form to their possession, which was otherwise an abstraction. A clearly-drawn plan enabled investors to survey their lands as if they were a chessboard on which various pieces -- settlers, forts, ships -- could be played. With their possessions laid out before them on a map, the shareholders of companies had a ready knowledge of limits and location of their patents, making it possible to sell, divide, or bequeath them with relative ease. One of the most notable instances of this way of using maps was the division of the New England patent. Following the failure of the Popham colony, the members of the Plymouth company had put the settlement of New England on hold, devoting their funds to fishing

expeditions instead. But the growing number of vessels sailing to fish in the wintertime off the coast of New England in the second decade of the seventeenth century had revived interest in permanent settlement.¹⁹

In 1620, a group of over forty gentlemen and nobles led by Sir Ferdinando Gorges formed the Council for New England, a body that assumed control over the northern portion of the original 1606 charter. Two years later, the council divided the patent into shares, with each member of the council receiving a tract of land along the coastline. Lacking any first-hand knowledge of the region, the council assigned shares "upon view of the mapps," which provided knowledge of the location and names of rivers, bays, and islands. The boundaries of each individual tract were defined by rivers and imaginary lines that extended through the interior. The Duke of Lenox, for example, was given a patent for rectangular tract extending fifteen miles eastward from the mouth of the Saco River and thirty miles northwest into the interior. A second division took place at Greenwich in 1623, with the council presenting King Charles I with a map of all the coasts and lands of New England, carefully apportioned into 20 individual shares. The division of the patent was recorded in a 1624 map by Sir William Alexander, the Earl of Stirling, who had himself received a charter for Nova Scotia in 1621. The map was printed in support of Alexander's own claims in Nova Scotia, but it also took note of the grants of the Council for New England, inscribing the names of each shareholder along the coastline to indicate the tracts they had received [see Fig. 2.5].²⁰

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¹⁹ Only six or seven English vessels fished on the New England coast in 1620; by 1624 the number had risen to fifty or so. See Harrington, "Wee Took Great Store of Cod-Fish," 203-207.
²⁰ DHSM 7: 20-45, 61-64, 73-75, cit. 63.
Brian Harley has singled out Alexander's map as an instructive example of the imaginative power of cartography. Not only did the map erase all signs of native possession in the region it described, it allowed the patentees to divide a distant region into political jurisdictions and alienable property. Without ever having laid eyes on the New World, Harley points out, the Council neatly portioned New England into shares to be held in perpetuity. Yet this power had its limits, since the division of shares was essentially meaningless if the Council did not succeed in establishing and protecting its monopoly. Determining the boundaries of a tract was only the first step of land ownership: full possession would come only when the boundaries were also marked and defended. While the Council had successfully completed the first step, the second and third steps, as they were soon to learn, would be far more difficult.

The division of the patent was never consummated and the inaction of most of the patentees left the initiative for settling New England in the hands of Gorges and Captain John Mason, who had recently completed a six year term of service as governor of Newfoundland. In 1622, Gorges and Mason had obtained a joint charter for the province of Maine, which extended from the Merrimack to the Sagadahock rivers, reaching sixty miles inland. The following year, the Council issued a grant of 6,000 acres in Maine to Christopher Levett, a mariner from Somersetshire, and several months later Levett sailed to New England to trade for furs and to find a suitable spot for settlement. When he arrived, he found numerous fishermen and traders plying the coastal waters, even though the New England charter's banned ships from visiting the coast without a license. Determined to defend the Council's authority in New England, Levett approached one of

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the leading traders in Casco Bay and reminded him that he was acting against the law. The trader dismissed Levett's charge out of hand. Claiming that the Council had "sent men over into [New England] with commissions, to make a prey of others," he told Levett that "he cared not for any authority in that place, and though he was forbid to truck, yet would he have all he could get." He was both willing and able to defend this claim against his rivals, Levett noted, having seventeen pieces of ordnance and fifty men on his ship.22

The trader did not speak only for himself, for many other small operators chafed at the Council's restrictions. The year before, Gorges had sent his son Robert along with Captain Francis West to New England to enforce the company's regulations, but the fishermen of the region -- "stuberne fellows," as West called them -- paid him no mind.23 The problem was that the Council's monopoly lacked teeth: Gorges and his colleagues received neither financial nor military backing from the crown and did not have the means to defend thousands of miles of coastline against well-armed fishermen. Independent operators could ignore the warnings of West and other company agents, since in practical terms the company possessed little authority on the American side of the Atlantic.

To prevent their competitors from fishing and trading on the coasts, colonizers would have to establish permanent outposts manned by company agents. Lacking the means to fund such stations itself, the cash-strapped Council issued land grants to individual entrepreneurs, assigning them exclusive rights to fish and trade at strategic points along the coast. In return, these entrepreneurs upheld the authority of the Council

22 DHSM 7: 64-73, Levett, Voyage, 89-91.
23 Quoted in Innis, Cod Fisheries, 73. The fishing monopoly was revoked by Parliament in 1624.
in New England and in many cases pledged to bring over a required number of settlers within a stipulated term of years. Beginning in the early 1620s, the Council allotted the islands and bays of New England in a piecemeal fashion to various merchants, gentlemen, and colonizing companies. As early as 1622, Gorges had established a fishing station at Damariscove Island, and over the next ten years other English investors launched operations at Cape Newagen, Piscataqua, Monhegan, Pemaquid, and Richmond Island. Fur trading posts also sprang up along the region's waterways, some supported by West Country merchants, others by the Plymouth colonists of southern New England. By the early 1630s, these outposts were joined by a growing number of permanent settlers who farmed the lands adjacent to the coast and along the banks of rivers.24

Although the growth of English settlement strengthened the Council's grasp of the region, it did not eliminate challenges to its authority. Land grants merely shifted the burden of defending claims onto the shoulders of individual patentees. For those who held patents to fur trading posts, the defense of title often involved violence or threats of violence since there was no civil authority that protected their trading rights. Traders had a vested interest in keeping their rivals from encroaching on their territories because competition for furs allowed Indians to sell to the lowest bidder and thereby reduce the traders' profits. Often the only way they could keep their competitors from trading nearby was to threaten them with muskets and shot.

The fur trade was a high-risk enterprise that promised enormous profits but also entailed the possibility of heavy losses and violent confrontation. Like privateers and

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pirates, the men who engaged in the trade were often adventurous types eager to get rich quickly. Some had few scruples when it came to business practices and sought to make their profits by hoodwinking their native trading partners or stealing from their European rivals. The near-absence of state authority at trading posts meant that the victims' only avenue of redress was to take violent revenge for their injuries. The earliest permanent English resident of Richmond Island, Walter Bagnall, was killed by Wabanakis for trading abuses in 1631, making him the first in a long line of frontier traders whose shady dealings were punished by death.\textsuperscript{25} The intense competition of the fur trade, combined with the weakness of state authority and absence of strong social ties, meant that frontier traders had little reason to trust each other. To gain a measure of security in the region, traders had to develop alliances with Wabanakis and other Europeans, or intimidate rivals through displays of force. The second option was chosen as often as the first, leaving the early years of the fur trade in New England punctuated by violence.

Some of the best known incidents occurred at the Plymouth colony's northern trading posts, which had been established in the late 1620s. Burdened with debts and sorely in need of exportable commodities, the colony had sent a ship to the Kennebec River in 1625 which returned laden with seven hundred pounds of furs. The Pilgrims returned to the Kennebec over the next several years, and by 1629 they had established a permanent trading post at Cushnoc and obtained a patent to the lands adjoining the river. They began another post at the Penobscot River the same year, and in 1631 they started a trade at Machias. The easternmost stations fell within the jurisdiction of French trader Charles de la Tour, whose father had been in Acadia since 1610. In 1632, the Treaty of St. Germain had returned Acadia to the French crown and La Tour received a commission

from the French king for the governorship of Acadia. In 1633, he sent a group of men to Machias, who killed two of the Plymouth traders, seized all their goods, and sent the remaining captives back to France. The same year, a party of French landed at Penobscot, forcing the Plymouth traders to hand over some £400 or £500 in furs and other merchandise. Two years later, another party of French, this time led by La Tour's rival, Charles Menou d'Aulnay, removed the Plymouth traders for good, forcing them to hand over their trade goods and abandon their post.  

The Plymouth colony was troubled by English competitors as well. In 1634 a Piscataqua trader named John Hocking sailed up the Kennebec River, intending to go beyond Cushnoc to fetch furs. The captain of Cushnoc, John Howland, refused him passage, but Hocking ignored the order and anchored his pinnace upriver. When Howland sent his men in canoes to cut the ship's cables, Hocking fired upon them, killing Moses Talbot. A friend of Talbot shot back and Hocking fell to his death. One of Hocking's kinsmen sought justice for the murder, writing to the proprietors of the Piscataqua colony in England and applying to Governor John Winthrop of Massachusetts Bay for a trial. Winthrop set a date for a hearing at Boston, but the representatives from Piscataqua failed to appear and the governor let the matter drop.

Although Plymouth's governor, William Bradford, lauded Winthrop's handling of the case, the decision not to prosecute anyone for the murders owed as much to the


weakness of colonial government as it did to Winthrop's wise jurisprudence. Fur traders tended to be independent-minded men who did not brook political interference in their affairs unless it worked in their favor. Unable to muster much in the way of military force, colonial authorities could not cudgel them into submission and had little muscle in the more distant parts of their jurisdiction. Traders aligned themselves with particular colonies, investors, companies, and even crowns as it suited their purposes, not out of a reflexive sense of allegiance. It is anachronistic in this sense to treat them as representatives of nation states, since their primary attachments were local: to family, to partners, to patrons. Not only are there many examples of peaceful cooperation between members of different national groups in the region during the seventeenth century, there were also some notable instances in which traders who were ostensibly subjects of the same crown fought for control of the same territories. In Acadia, the La Tour family and Charles d'Aulnay feuded for nearly twenty years over the control of the Acadian fur trade, with each party claiming to be the rightful governor of the province.28

Two Kinds of Colony

Yet the national origins of traders mattered to the extent that French and English leaders pursued different strategies of colonization. The early rulers of Acadia were nearly all noblemen who had received offices and grants of land from the king as a reward for military service. The rules of dérogéance, which prevented nobles from pursuing occupations that were not suitable to their rank, kept them from engaging in

manufactures or other "demeaning" commercial activities. But the fur trade, with its attendant risks and promise of adventure, was an occupation open to them, and they sought to make it second only to the fisheries in order of economic importance.29

Acadia's proprietors did sponsor the migration of a few hundred French men and women, the majority of them settling along the tidal flats of the Bay of Fundy. The lands in these areas were nominally held under a seigneurial system of tenure, but tenants' fees were negligible in comparison to the great profits to be reaped from the fur trade and fisheries, and lords often did not bother to collect them. With the energies of leaders such as La Tour and Aulnay devoted primarily to the fur trade, the Acadian settlements developed as relatively autonomous and self-regulating communities. Settlement was concentrated in the coastal areas of the Acadian peninsula -- there were never more than a hundred French people living west of the St. John River valley -- and the seigneuries that were granted in southwestern Acadia during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were essentially monopolies that gave their holders exclusive rights to trade along rivers.30

The trading outposts La Tour and Aulnay established in southwestern Acadia between the St. John and Penobscot rivers were bastonaded forts made of stone, and were clearly intended to be permanent establishments. At Pentagoet, Aulnay erected a mill and

 Fortune and La Tour: The Civil War in Acadia (Toronto: Methuen, 1983).

29 Two of the founders of Acadia had served as governors of frontier provinces in France before they made their way across the Atlantic: Monts was governor of Pons in Saintonge, and Poutrincourt governor of Méry-sur-Seine in Champagne. See "Biencourt de Poutrincourt et de Saint-Just, Jean de," and "Du Gua de Monts, Pierre," in DCB 1:96, 291.

a farmstead and built several ships using lumber from nearby areas. In order to develop a
bond of trust with their trading partners, leading fur traders also made alliances with their
Wabanaki neighbors: the younger La Tour even married a Wabanaki woman. The
importance of these alliances to the fur trade, combined with the nobles' highly cultivated
sense of honor, made French traders unlikely to cheat the Wabanakis in their commercial
dealings.31

The English trading posts, by contrast, were sparsely furnished wooden buildings
manned by agents of trading firms from England and southern New England. The
stations' ramshackle architecture was a consequence of their impermanence, since most
English merchants treated the fur trade as a temporary measure that would raise the
capital necessary to pay off debts, purchase land, and launch other business enterprises.
Southern New England's Puritan and Separatist leaders tended to regard fur traders with a
degree of suspicion -- on various occasions, William Bradford referred to traders as
"profane", "base fellows", and "loose and drunken fellows" -- and countenanced their
libertine way of life only because the colonies needed the quick profits that came from
the trade. The transitory character of the trading posts left English colonists with
relatively little interest in diplomacy with their native neighbors. Marriage between

31 Alaric Faulkner, "Gentility on the Frontiers of Acadia, 1635-1674: An Archaeological Perspective,"
Dublin Seminar for New England Folklife, Annual Proceedings 14 (1989): 82-100; Alaric Faulkner and
Gretchen Faulkner, The French at Pentagoet, 1635-1674: An Archaeological Portrait of the Acadian
Frontier, Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, No. 5 (Saint John, N. B. and Augusta, Me.: New
Brunswick Museum and Maine Historic Preservation Commission, 1987), esp. 1-20; Naomi Griffiths,
"1600-1650: Fish, Fur, and Folk," in Philip A. Buckner and John G. Reid, eds., The Atlantic Region to
Confederation: A History (Fredericton, N. B. and Toronto: Acadiensis Press and University of Toronto
Press, 1994), 59. The ideology of nobility, both in the Old World and the New, was in tension with the
emergent commercialism of French life. Nobles paid lip service to the feudal belief that commerce was
dishonorable, yet they actively sought out new sources of wealth to support their genteel way of life. The
noble background of the early colonizers did not make them reluctant to engage in commercial enterprise;
to the contrary, they aggressively searched for economic opportunities. Aulnay, for example, built several
ships at Pentagouet on the Penobscot River and owned farmland near the fort. But these activities were a
supplement to the fur trade, and Aulnay would never have styled himself a merchant, a farmer, or a
Wabanakis and English settlers was unheard of, and when Plymouth's authorities
discovered that a trader named Edward Ashley had engaged in sexual relations with
native women, they sharply reprimanded him for his "uncleanness."32

The social and religious background of Plymouth's authorities helps to explain
their ambivalence toward the fur trade. The leaders of southern New England tended to
be members of the gentry with little military experience and a distrust of courtly life.
Although they recognized the importance of fisheries and the fur trade to the prosperity of
their region, men such as Bradford and Winthrop hoped to establish colonies that were
"plantations," or settlements with agriculture as the dominant economic activity. Devout
Calvinists, they believed that people should slowly accumulate their wealth through
discipline and hard work, rather than seizing it by plunder and profiteering. They
expected that husbandry and industry, pursuits that required diligent labor, would become
the basis of their colonies. The fur trade in New England was expected to be a prop to
settlement and not an end in itself.33

The permanent settlers who arrived in northern New England in the 1630s and
1640s did not necessarily share the religious beliefs of their neighbors to the south, but
they did have the same economic aspirations. Brought over as servants of fishing
companies or as tenants of the Council's patent holders, English people purchased and
settled parcels of land along the coasts and rivers, with the largest communities

32 Cranmer, Cushnoc, esp. 51, 89; Bradford, History, 219, 232-33, 244-45; Emerson W. Baker, The Clarke
and Lake Company: The Historical Archaeology of a Seventeenth-Century Maine Settlement, Occasional
Publications in Maine Archaeology No. 4 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation Commission,
1985), 10-12, 62. According to a French report of 1715, the Wabanakis of Penobscot, Passamaquoddy, and
the St. John River never married English settlers, war captives included. See letter of Begon to the
33 Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England (New
York: Norton, 1995), esp. 64-106.
developing at Strawberry Bank (Portsmouth) and Kittery along the Piscataqua River.

While the inhabitants of coastal fishing stations and interior trading posts were predominantly unattached young men, settlers usually arrived as nuclear families headed by middle-aged fathers. \(^{34}\) Like other English people of their time, these families hoped to acquire the economic independence that came from land ownership. Agricultural land in seventeenth-century England was the primary source of productive wealth, providing families with food and other products for home consumption and commodities for exchange. It was also a patrimony that could be passed from one generation to the next, allowing children to enjoy the fruits of their parents' labor. Without land, a family would be dependent on others for its economic well-being; with a small allotment of acres its members could become comfortably self-reliant. \(^{35}\)

While land was scarce in the Old World, it was abundant in New England, making it possible for a wide section of the colonial population to acquire real property. Vast areas of land in the region were opened to settlers as crowns and colonies established their jurisdictions in the New World. Because the possession of land depended on the political control of these authorities, land owners were forced to pay taxes or other fees to their government, essentially as a form of tribute. Maine's earliest settlers did not have absolute rights to their lands but held them under socage tenure, whereby a tenant's rights to the land were derived from his lord. Sir Ferdinando Gorges envisioned a colony with a seigneurial system of land tenure, in which settlers would receive the protection of their

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\(^{34}\) In the 1640s, the government of Maine passed an act forbidding women from living on the Isles of Shoals, the main site for fishing stations at the mouth of the Piscataqua River. See Charles T. Libby, Neal W. Allen, and Robert E. Moody, eds., Province and Court Records of Maine, 6 vols. (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1928-75), 1: 119. (Future references to this series appear as PCRM.)

lords in exchange for quit rents and work duties. In the early land grants, tracts of land were leased to patent holders for annual fees, with the expectation that the patentees would in turn receive rents from the settlers they transported to the colony.36

"We Shall Understand a Little Geogrify"

One of the earliest patentees to settle in the colony was Edward Godfrey, a merchant from London who had been associated with the Council for New England since the early 1620s. Around 1630, he had migrated to Maine, establishing residence along the Agamenticus (York) River. In 1636, Godfrey returned to England and obtained a patent from the Council for the lands lying to the south of Gorges's possessions along the river. Several years later, Godfrey and his associates divided the 12,000 acres of the patent amongst themselves, with Godfrey and his partners receiving a substantial portion of the tract. The settlers who lived on his lands asked him to confirm their title, and he complied, granting deeds and running the bounds of their estates. By 1655, at least seventeen inhabitants owning over six hundred acres of land traced their title to deeds issued by Godfrey.37

Although Godfrey hoped to receive a return on his investment by collecting rents and other dues from his tenants, he discovered that many settlers were reluctant to comply. In a 1654 petition to the General Court of Massachusetts Bay, he complained that the inhabitants of York had divided and shared a large portion of patent's unallocated

lands amongst themselves. Remarking that settlers had taken control of most of the marshland in the patent -- marshes being prized as pasture for livestock -- he claimed that his "Rentes and acknowledgments" had "been detayned," leaving him without enough marsh to feed even five head of cattle.\textsuperscript{38}

The tension between Godfrey and the inhabitants of York had been exacerbated by Massachusetts Bay's 1651 annexation of most of Maine's settlements. In the 1640s the outbreak of civil war in England had forced Gorges to neglect the administration his colony, leaving the Bay colony with the opportunity to assume control of his lands. Massachusetts leaders managed to do so with relative ease, partly because their landholding system was more appealing to settlers than the seigneurial regime of Maine. Lands in Massachusetts were held under "free" socage tenure, which allowed people to purchase and possess tracts without paying entry fees, quit rents, or other manorial exactions. Landowners held their titles in perpetuity and received their grants directly from the towns or the colony. As Joseph Wood has put it, towns in colonial Massachusetts were "effectively manors without lords."\textsuperscript{39} To many of Maine's settlers, rule by Massachusetts Bay offered an opportunity to gain a clearer title to their land, unencumbered by quit rents and work duties. Godfrey, on the other hand, actively opposed annexation, knowing that it would wrest power from local magistrates and place it in the hands of the Massachusetts General Court. By 1652, it was clear that the battle

\textsuperscript{38} DHSM 4: 121-22; Reid, \textit{Maine, Acadia, and New Scotland}, 133-35. Godfrey was not the only proprietor whose lands were divided by inhabitants. After the deaths of Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Captain John Mason, thirty settlers at Kittery and Agamenticus (York) divided the lands of their patents amongst themselves and seized the mills built by Mason. See \textit{DHSM} 4: 94-95.

had been lost and Godfrey petitioned the Massachusetts General Court for confirmation of his land titles.\textsuperscript{40}

Though Godfrey had denigrated the Court, accusing them only six months earlier of attempting to "ingraspe" Maine's lands, the magistrates of Massachusetts grudgingly accorded Godfrey's request. Throughout the controversy over annexation, they had promised not to interfere with existing property rights, and in setting up an inquest into Godfrey's titles, they were merely keeping their word.\textsuperscript{41} The refusal to punish Godfrey or any others for their opposition signaled the determination of Massachusetts leaders to remain impartial in the adjudication of disputes over real property. Custom and legal title, untarnished by political favoritism or personal vindictiveness, would continue to be the basis of land ownership.

This approach placed objective criteria, such as the placement of fences and the content of written deeds, above social considerations in the adjudication of property disputes. While the seigneurial system was defined by human relationships, particularly the ties that bound tenants to their lord, the laws of Massachusetts emphasized the owner's exclusive right to enjoy his property. The defense of this right was grounded not in self-interested individualism but in the knowledge that disputes over property were a threat to social harmony. By making property rights explicit and exactly defined, the leaders of Massachusetts allowed judges and juries to adjudicate disputes on the basis of criteria that were in theory impartial and impervious to political influence. As early as 1647, the General Court passed a law requiring selectmen to run the boundaries of their

\textsuperscript{40} DHSM 4: 36-7. By the second half of the seventeenth century, most of the seigneurial provisions of land deeds -- time limits on leases, work duties, quit rents -- had disappeared, making freeholds virtually the only form of tenure in Maine. See Churchill, "Too Great the Challenge," 269-70.

\textsuperscript{41} DHSM 4: 17; Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts, 3: 333-34, 363.
towns every three years, taking care to record and maintain the ditches and stones that marked the limits of their jurisdiction. The preamble of the law explained that the "deficiency and decay of markes" caused "great jealosies of persons, troubles in townes, and incumbrances in Corts." Soon after their annexation, the towns of southern Maine were ordered to perform similar perambulations, with explicit orders not to interfere with existing property rights. Wrangling over competing claims left local officials unable to carry out the surveys themselves, and they were forced to turn to commissioners from Boston, who laid out the dividing lines between the towns. By the end of the century, virtually all the boundaries of the southwestern towns of York County had been surveyed and agreed upon.

The annexation of Maine was itself justified by surveys commissioned by the Bay colony. According to the terms of its 1628 charter, the northern limit of Massachusetts Bay was set three miles to the north of the Merrimack River. At the time, the members of the Council for New England believed that the river ran eastward from the interior to the coast. But explorers soon discovered that the river changes course some twenty miles from the coast, winding northward as far as Lake Winnipesaukee. In August 1652, the General Court hired two surveyors to find the northernmost point of the river, which they fixed at a latitude of 43° 40' 12" north. In November of the same year, the Court declared this latitude to be the northern limit of colony, running east-west from sea to sea, and renamed the part of Maine that fell within this line York County [see Fig. 2.6].

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42 Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts, 2: 210. Property disputes in Maine tended to be more rancorous than in the Bay colony, and in many cases were marked by violent incidents. For examples, see PCRM, vol. 1: 44, 51-52, 53, 58-62, 106-107; vol. 2: 24; DSHM, 4: 8-9.
years later, the Court sent another pair of surveyors to Casco Bay to find the same latitude along the coast. Using nautical instruments and mathematical calculations, they placed the limits of the colony across the bay from Clapboard Island, marking several trees with the letters "MB," for Massachusetts Bay.  

Many inhabitants of Maine saw Massachusetts' actions as a transparent ploy designed to justify the Bay colony's aggressive expansion into their jurisdiction. Godfrey, who had become governor of the colony following Gorges' death in 1649, wrote that he "marvell[ed]" that Massachusetts extended its government from sea to sea, adding that "we shall understand a little Geogrify or Cosmogrifie." Yet in basing the boundaries of the colony on the wording of their charter and the scientific measurement of space, the leaders of Massachusetts simply extended the logic of property rights to include the land possessed by the colony itself. If the annexation of Maine was a matter of applying the letter of the law, then the General Court's actions were impartial and above politics. Working with the pen rather than the sword, the leaders of the Bay colony legitimized their claims by grounding them in documentary title.

The General Court's understanding of its jurisdiction, like its approach to real property rights, was based in a belief in the sanctity of written contract. The Puritans' understanding of themselves as a covenanted community, combined with their opposition to the absolutist tendencies of the early Stuart kings, made them committed to the need to draw up and to obey written agreements. Once the colony's charter, or any other transaction, had been framed as a legally binding document, the Puritans believed that the

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44 DHSM 4: 18; DHSM 7: 273-76; Shurtleff, Records of Massachusetts, 3: 361-62.
45 DHSM 4: 18.
46 Innes, Creating the Commonwealth, 194-97. The contractualism of Puritan society was also a result of their widespread involvement in a commercial economy; the colony itself was originally a joint-stock
signatories were bound to its terms. When parties interpreted the contract in divergent ways, as did Massachusetts Bay and the Council for New England, they could resolve their differences by appealing to the provisions of the contract, which were theoretically objective and unbiased, since both parties had agreed to them.

The belief that property rights could be defined objectively was a fiction, since there was always a subjective element in the resolution of property disputes. The enforcement of contracts depended on an elaborate social edifice of laws, courts, magistrates, clerks, and governments. These agencies oversaw the drafting of written agreements and punished those who failed to conform to their terms. The validity of land deeds and other legal titles was inseparable from the authority of such agencies, since property owners depended on the protection of courts and governments. When governments failed to exert their authority over lands that lay within their jurisdiction, the rights of landowners were placed in danger.

No one knew this better than the patentees who held their lands under Gorges's charter. Other than two brief periods, 1636-37 and 1640-45, in which a proprietary government held courts and received petitions, the settlers in his colony were left to fend for themselves. Matters were often confused by vague or overlapping titles which assigned portions of land to two or more owners. Lacking an exact knowledge of the region's geography, the Council allocated its lands in a haphazard fashion that made disputes between title holders inevitable. One of the most notable conflicts took place between George Cleeve, an entrepreneur and early settler of Maine, and John Winter, a representative of English merchants Robert Trelawney and Moses Goodyear. As an

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47 Gorges's descendants also tried, unsuccessfully, to reestablish proprietary government on two occasions.
incentive to settlement, Sir Ferdinando Gorges had promised Cleeve 2,000 acres of
unoccupied land in New England, and around 1630 Cleeve had established himself at the
mouth of the Spurwink River in Casco Bay. He soon formed a partnership with Richard
Tucker, who had purchased an adjoining tract. But two years later, the Council issued a
patent for Richmond Island and the adjoining mainland -- a tract that included the land
possessed by Cleeve -- to Trelawney and Goodyear. Winter arrived in New England to
manage their operations the next year and drove Cleeve and Tucker from their original
settlement, forcing them to relocate on a neck of land adjoining the Casco River. Cleeve
returned to England in late 1636 and obtained a patent for the new settlement from
Gorges, but soon after his return Winter attempted to seize the lands occupied by Cleeve
and Tucker, again claiming them on behalf of Trelawney and Goodyear. The dispute was
left to fester until Sir Ferdinando Gorges sent his nephew Thomas Gorges to Maine late
in 1639 to establish regular government in the province. The following year, Cleeve
brought two trespass suits against Winter at a Saco court and both juries found in his
favor, rewarding him with damages and a confirmation of his title to the lands on the
neck.48

The weakness of property rights and the persistence of disputes over land owed
much to the relative absence of a strong provincial government. Because large portions
of Maine had been distributed in the form of extensive patents in the 1620s and 1630s,
much of the authority over land holdings remained in the hand of individual patentees,
who were only sporadically checked by provincial authorities. Listing twenty distinct land grants within the territory of Maine, one anonymous writer in the mid-1630s remarked that disputes between settlers of different patents were "seldome, or never ended because there is none in the countrie that hath authority to decide them; every mans power beinge limited, with his owne Patent." Like many other colonists, the observer pleaded for the establishment of a central authority that would adjudicate disputes between the patentees, explaining that "[t]here wants uniformytie in the Lawes and Customes of severall Patents and alsoe a generall unitie, in thinges that concerne the publique good of the Countrie."49

The proprietors' inability to provide adequate protection to landholders in the province made many settlers receptive to the entreaties of the Massachusetts Bay, which promised regular courts and an orderly system of town government. In a 1656 petition to Oliver Cromwell, the supporters of the Bay colony in Maine complained of the proprietors' silence over several years, "both in their tongues and penns," which had let the colony "sinke into great distractions," and had forced them to look to Massachusetts Bay for effective government.50 Over the next several decades, York's inhabitants began to clarify their titles through the county courts, settling land disputes through a series of suits and counter-suits. While judges and juries tended to base their decisions on customary possession, plaintiffs and defendants in civil suits presented written deeds and depositions from knowledgeable neighbors.51

50 DHSM 4: 139.
51 PCRM, vols. 2-4, passim. Town governments were also had a vested interest in recording of real property rights; the town of Wells ordered in 1651 and 1658 ordered a survey of its marshes to make it easier to rate taxes. See PCRM 1: 171, 2: 37

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In the early years of the colony, the allocation of land had taken place informally, often without any written documentation or official recording of property titles. Typically, proprietors or towns issued grants of a specified number of acres to settlers, who searched for parcels of land that could be immediately turned to cultivation. Because land was abundant and the settler population largely illiterate, few smallholders recorded the exact limits of their estates. Many did not delineate their property boundaries until disputes with neighbors over salt marshes and other scarce resources forced them into court. But once they became embroiled in land disputes, settlers began to appreciate the value of clearly defined property boundaries. John Treworgy, an early settler of Kittery who quarreled with his neighbor John Heard over a marsh near Sturgeon Creek, proposed that the dispute be settled by informally dividing the marsh according to natural markers such as trees and bushes. "Come, what should wee have difference about marsh," he told four of his fellow townspeople, "wee will devid it and live like neighbors." Unfortunately, this informal division did not settle the matter; Heard successfully sued Treworgy in 1645 for trespassing on his marsh and Treworgy lost a counter-suit in 1647. A year before, Treworgy had tried to reclaim the marsh by force but had been violently beaten back by Heard's wife. It was perhaps the threat of such unneighborly behavior that caused the town meeting of Cape Porpoise in 1663 to lay out the property boundaries of six of its inhabitants "[f]or the preventing of striffe, that peace and quietnesse may bee mantayned amongst us."52

Gradually, towns and courts began to accumulate a large store of knowledge about property boundaries, transfers of title, customary uses, and land grants. Although the county government did not compile a full-fledged registry of its lands, its role as an arbiter of land disputes and a repository of deeds and wills forced it to develop an extensive understanding of real property rights in its jurisdiction.53 By the 1670s, the measurement and description of land grants issued by both towns and the province became increasingly precise. Towns in the last quarter of the seventeenth century began to hire or appoint surveyors to lay out the grants and append their signatures to the deeds; by the early eighteenth century, virtually every chartered town in York county had appointed at least one person to the office of land surveyor.54 Earlier town grants had often been vague; a 1653 deed to Robert Beth and Walter Pemwell from the town of Saco (Biddeford) allowed them a tract of land "60 poles in breadth or ther abouts be it more or less."55 By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, towns such as Kittery sometimes included small diagrams of the grants in their records and typically described the parcels as being "measured and laid out" instead of "granted and laid out," the less precise phrase used in grants made before the 1670s [see Fig. 2.7].56

The earliest existing property maps of Maine date to the 1670s, and in the next two decades provincial and town officials stepped up their efforts to place land titles on a
more solid footing. The government of Massachusetts played an important role in these efforts, strengthening its own hand in the process. Merchants and speculators from southern New England had been acquiring land titles in Maine since the 1630s, and the integration of the province into the political fold of Massachusetts offered them an opportunity to purchase new holdings or to protect the legal basis of their existing deeds. In 1680, two years after the Gorges family had ceded its outstanding claims to Maine to Massachusetts in exchange for £1,250, the General Court reorganized the government of the province. The General Court appointed Thomas Danforth, a magistrate from Cambridge, to the office of president of Maine. Danforth was given the powers of a colonial proprietor, having the right to grant new townships to existing towns or companies, confirm land titles granted in the past, or grant lands of his own accord. Among the earliest actions of this government was an order requesting a survey of lands in Maine.57

Virtually the same powers were assumed by Edmund Andros, who was appointed governor-general of the Dominion of New England in 1686. A fierce defender of the royal prerogative, Andros sought to make the crown rather than the provincial government the ultimate source of land titles in the colonies. He ordered that New England's inhabitants would have to validate all future land purchases with new deeds and would be forced to pay quitrents on the same. Although many New Englanders were outraged by the reforms, several prominent landowners in Maine with connections to Andros's regime eagerly seized the opportunity to place their holdings on a more solid

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57 England Folklife Annual Proceedings (Boston: Boston University Press, 1980), 9-46. The first map included in the Kittery town records was dated March 2, 1696: see vol. 1, fol. 71.
footing. They convinced many neighbors with more modest estates to do likewise: the result was a flood of petitions that requested confirmation of new or existing tracts of land to the eastward; well over a hundred settlers applied to Andros for deeds to their land.58 Surveyor Richard Clements measured out twenty-three such grants in Falmouth to local allies of the Andros administration [see Fig. 2.8].59 Because the region's settlers welcomed this opportunity to gain more secure title to their lands, many had no qualms about paying hefty fees to the Andros government in return for a survey of their lands and a confirmation of their deeds. Several landholders from Massachusetts who had gained title to large patents under the presidency of Thomas Danforth were outraged by Andros's rejection of their titles but it was Andros's dismissal of existing land rights, not the involvement of the provincial government, that stoked their ire.60

Some settlers in Maine were also angered by what seemed to be a form of extortion by Andros and his allies. The settlements east of the Piscataqua River had been riven by faction for generations, largely because there had been so many competing sources of authority: first the various holders of patents under Gorges, then the competing governments of Massachusetts and Maine, and finally the supporters of Andros and the backers of the Danforth administration.61 But all landholders wanted more secure title to

58 For petitions to Andros for confirmation of land titles see DHSM, 6: 219-468, passim.
their holdings; the dilemma was to determine which government held ultimate authority over the region's lands. By the last decade of the seventeenth century, it was becoming increasingly clear that the province of Massachusetts was the only sovereign authority that could reliably grant, record, and protect real estate holdings in Maine. By the early eighteenth century, land grants by the General Court were increasingly becoming a matter of routine: although most grants were issued by towns, the province also confirmed and granted numerous tracts of land in York County every year, frequently including diagrams of the real estate next to the orders that confirmed them. The increasingly active involvement of the provincial government in the authorization, measurement, and protection of land titles served to tighten the connection between Maine's settlers and the General Court.

Occasionally, towns and the province stumbled in their effort to accurately measure the private holdings of their citizens. In 1710, for example, the town of Kittery was forced to redraw the property boundaries of several inhabitants who had discovered that the placement of their fences did not accord with the descriptions of their deeds to the land.62 On another occasion, the Massachusetts General Court granted land along the Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River that already belonged to a settler named Thomas Broughton.63 But both towns and the province owned up to their mistakes and redoubled their efforts to measure their land holdings more accurately. Treating the land as durable and consistently measurable object served a valuable political purpose: if governments demonstrated an ability to impartially record and protect property rights, they gained legitimacy in the eyes of the region's settlers.

62 York Deeds, vol. 7, fol. 175
63 DHSM, 4: 13.
There was, in other words, a thread of authority that attached the titles of land owners to the jurisdiction of governments. Lands could not belong to private individuals unless the title holders received the backing of courts and political authorities. If these authorities were weak, or if their jurisdiction overlapped with another government, the owner's exclusive right to use his or her tract was jeopardized. But if the government had established an uncontested claim to sovereignty over the land, the owner's rights were secure. Conversely, the government's own authority depended on its ability to make itself legitimate in the eyes of the people it ruled. Governments that threatened existing property rights -- such as the administration of Edmund Andros, which called into question the very basis of land titles in the Bay Colony -- were unpopular and liable to be overthrown. In New England, where property ownership was widely diffused, the strength of political authorities depended to a large extent on their ability to defend private property. Towns, counties, and colonies were consequently defined as clearly defined territories with well-marked boundaries, all having the right to grant lands within their respective jurisdictions.

Two Kinds of Frontier

This type of arrangement could only work in areas with substantial English settlement. In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts Bay had its strongest hold on the small towns of southwestern Maine -- Kittery, Wells, York, Scarborough, and Falmouth --

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64 On Andros's assault on land titles in Massachusetts, and the consequent rebellion of New Englanders against his administration, see Martin, Profits in the Wilderness, 260-80.
65 The thread of authority arguably extended as far heads of household, nearly all of them male, who theoretically had exclusive control over the disposal of their families' real property.
- where nearly all the English population was concentrated. The colony did little to extend its authority beyond these towns, failing to hold courts east of Wells or to build any large forts in Maine before the 1675-78 Anglo-Wabanaki war. On coastal islands and at inland trading posts, political authority effectively remained in the hands of traders and fishermen. The traders were nominally subjects of the French or English crown, but they were notoriously flexible in their loyalties. In 1674 a party of English and Dutch privateers sacked French outposts at Pentagoet, Machias, and St. John, claiming them on behalf of the Prince of Orange and using them as bases for the plunder of English ships. When they were brought to trial in an English court, they pled innocence to charges of piracy, insisting that they had received letters of marque from the Prince of Orange and were defending his territory against English interlopers. The privateers were sentenced to death, but the episode laid bare the weakness of state authority in the region east of Casco Bay.

Because the leaders of Massachusetts Bay had neither the means nor the will to enforce its authority in these distant regions, which in any event were not included in the colony's original charter, they involved themselves very little in the regulation of such disputes. Before the 1675-78 war, most frontier traders were independent operators with little interest in attaching themselves to one government or another. Political authority near the frontier outposts consequently had a different character than in settled areas. Although the territorial boundaries of traders' monopolies were described precisely in patents and other land grants, in practice they were ambiguous. The aim of most traders

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66 In 1675, there were roughly 3,500 English people living in the towns between Piscataqua and Sagadahock, and another 775 or so living between Sagadahoc and St. Georges River. See Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier, 1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 259-60.
67 DHSM 6: 49-88; 7: 328-34.
was to secure important thoroughfares of communication such as harbors and rivers and thereby monopolize all the commerce that passed through them. They defended their monopolies by forming alliances with trading partners and by using force to keep out their competitors. No traders ever bothered to survey the boundaries of their grants, since their interest was in controlling strategic points of trade, not in the protection of large swaths of agricultural land.

There were, in short, two kinds of frontier in seventeenth-century Maine: one consisting of outposts and the other of settled farmland. In cartographic terms, the first was best expressed by the pattern of nodes and links. The nodes were the outposts that enforced political control in peripheral regions, such as towns and forts, while the links were the maritime and riverine transportation routes that allowed colonies to provision and supply the outposts. Nearly all the large scale maps of New England in the seventeenth century took this form [see Fig. 2.9]. Political boundaries in such maps were either absent or ambiguously defined, since no colony had exclusive political control of frontier regions. Possession of Penobscot Bay was claimed by the English, French, Wabanakis, and even the Dutch, and any political boundaries that might have been drawn around it in the seventeenth century would have been artificial. In practical terms, possession of the Bay had to be negotiated, either by placating rivals with presents and favors or intimidating them with displays of force.

If power at frontier outposts came from the barrel of a gun, in settled areas it flowed from the nib of a pen. Although county courts and town meetings had some coercive power, their authority ultimately came from their ability to protect property and to regulate social rifts in a peaceable manner. Knowledge, not force, was the foundation
of their power. Property owners depended on the documentary authority of the government to such an extent that when the county recorder in 1686 announced that he was intending to move Maine's records from York to Black Point -- a journey of only twenty-five miles -- over a hundred men petitioned the government to forbid the move, claiming that the previous recorder had dropped deeds and other documents into rivers in his travels, "to the great Damage of many of the Inhabitants."68

Because of their importance in granting land and settling property disputes, towns and counties were defined territorially, as bounded and well-defined jurisdictions. Their limits were clearly marked and measured, since land owners depended on a government that had exclusive control and exact knowledge of its lands. A pattern that had since ancient times been associated primarily with maps of land ownership -- a landscape divided into a patchwork of regular shapes -- began to be applied to political cartography. The similarity was no coincidence, since the clear definition of political boundaries in early New England was a consequence of the division of the land into private property. The first jurisdictions to clarify their boundaries were settled areas such as towns and counties, where land values were highest and where disputes over real property rights were most likely to take place. These boundaries tended to stick because property owners had a vested interest in supporting a government with exclusive authority over their lands: the boundary lines between the towns of Kittery, Wells, and York in the late seventeenth century were roughly the same as they are today. These borders did not generally appear in large-scale maps, since they were only of interest to people who had a stake in the land. But in a few instances, such as John Seller's 1675 map of New England

68 DHSM 6: 213-15. The occasion of the move was the replacement of Edward Rishworth by Thomas Scottow as clerk of the court.
[see Fig. 2.10], the boundary lines of colonies and counties were clearly if awkwardly drawn. Although this pattern was only vaguely discernible in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, over the next hundred years it would begin to appear in maps of New England with increasing regularity.

**Imperial boundaries**

If the delineation of boundaries in regional maps was caused by property disputes, the development of border lines on a continental scale was the result of imperial wars. During the last third of the seventeenth century, the crowns of France and England tightened their control over their colonial possessions, taking a more direct role in their administration and becoming more vigilant in the collection of customs duties and the regulation of trade. As royal power expanded, the crowns assumed many of the roles that had previously been played by the proprietors of colonial companies. Perhaps the most important change was that the monarchs now became responsible for the military protection of their subjects in the colonies. Regular troops replaced militiamen and proprietors' private armies at frontier outposts, and navy ships protected ocean shipping lanes against pirates and privateers. The involvement of the crowns in military affairs brought the colonies greater prosperity through the expansion of trans-Atlantic trade, but it also involved them in imperial conflicts of an increasingly large scale.

Like colonial proprietors, royal officials found maps to be an effective instrument of political control, serving both as propaganda and as sources of information. As early as 1675, English officials had complained of a "want of maps," and the next year they sent a circular letter to the governors of New England requesting them to send accurate
maps of their colonies. By the end of the century, the Board of Trade, a committee of the Privy Council charged with oversight of colonial affairs, had compiled several dozen maps of the colonies, most of them in the private collections of Board members such as William Blathwayt. The French government, meanwhile, had also launched an ambitious cartographic program under the guidance of Louis XIV's Comptroller General, Jean-Baptiste Colbert. In 1663, he ordered provincial officials to gather local maps and to send them to the royal cartographer for correction. The government also requested maps of French exploration in North America, usually drawn by Jesuit missionaries, whose academic curriculum placed a heavy emphasis on cartography and geographical knowledge.69

Both crowns sponsored the publication of maps, providing royal cartographers with manuscript maps and other materials necessary for their preparation. Where sixteenth-century printed maps were cautiously neutral, their eighteenth-century equivalents were overtly political, with the typical sheet spelling out the cartographer's royal commission at a corner of the page. To please their patrons, mapmakers presented the most generous possible interpretations of their respective crown's territorial claims in the Americas. The map of New France engraved by royal cartographer Nicolas Sanson in 1656, for example, placed the limits of the colony at the Kennebec River, even though two years before English privateers had seized control of Acadia and had removed all French officials from the region [Fig. 2.11]. Like other maps of the time, Sanson's sheet

was a mixture of propaganda and practical information, illustrating the course of rivers and the location of Indian tribes while simultaneously backing the French crown's vaunted notions of its North American empire.  

The delineation of boundaries in Sanson's map was exceptional, since most maps of his time represented the colonies as free-floating names. But over the course of the next century, boundary lines became commonplace in the maps of royal cartographers, largely as a result of the series of imperial wars that took place between France and Britain between 1689 and 1763. Extensions of dynastic conflicts in Europe, the wars accentuated national differences in the colonies, forcing colonists to identify themselves as subjects of one crown or the other. Territories that lay between the French and British colonies became flashpoints of imperial rivalry as both sides claimed them as their own. The positions of both crowns were graphically supported in royally-commissioned maps that traced boundary lines around the possessions of each crown. Each map invited a response from the opposite crown, leading to a prolonged cartographic struggle in which the exaggerated claims of one side were met by the extravagant counter-claims of the other. The opening volleys were fired in early eighteenth-century maps prepared by cartographers such as Guillaume de l'Isle and John Senex, but the battle reached a fever pitch in the "map wars" of the 1750s, as the printing presses of London and Paris rolled off dozens of maps supporting the claims of their respective crowns in North America [see Figs. 2.12, 2.13].

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71 On the map wars of the 1750s, see William P. Cummings, British Maps of Colonial America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 59-60.
Unlike the straight lines that separated towns and counties in New England, the borders that divided New France from the English colonies never became fixed. While an exact knowledge of town limits was necessary to preserve social peace, imperial boundaries were essentially military fronts that guarded the possessions of one crown from the armies of the other. The colonies of New France and New England were girdled by a chain of forts, garrisons, and missionary outposts that acted as a line of first defense against enemy attacks. The boundary lines of continental maps approximated the pattern of this chain, but the extent of political control was a matter of interpretation and could change as the military fortunes of either colony rose or fell. The diplomatic representatives of the two crowns never agreed upon an official border line between their respective colonies -- indeed, none of Louis XIV’s treaties ever made mention of political boundaries, either in Europe or the Americas. When the French crown handed possession of Acadia over to the British in 1713, the territorial extent of the colony was left ambiguous, with its boundaries to be decided by a joint commission at an unspecified date in the future. The French dragged their feet on the issue, making political control of the region a matter of unresolved dispute over the next fifty years.\footnote{Foucher, L’invention des frontières, 60. Boundaries were frequently mentioned during the negotiation of treaties in the first half of the eighteenth century, but were never incorporated into the written texts. During negotiations for the Peace of Utrecht, French and English officials shuttled maps of Acadia back and forth, with each side illustrating the extent of their respective claims with dotted lines. See “Precis de ce qui c’est passé pendant la Negotiation de la paix d’Utrecht au Sujet de L’Accadie…”, July 1711-May 1713, PAC, AN, Série C11D, vol. 8, fol. 3-25.}

Though imperial maps of the mid-eighteenth century implied that the French and British crowns had exclusive sovereignty over their North American dominions, their control in border areas was tenuous at best. The most distant outposts of empire in the eighteenth century were manned by military officers and other royal agents who upheld
their jurisdiction through a combination of military force and political suasion, much like the frontier traders of the previous century. If colonial officials failed to win the obedience of people living in frontier areas, the boundaries of imperial maps remained more theoretical than real.

This point was not lost on the British officials charged with assuming control of Acadia after the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Two years after the treaty's signing, the government of Nova Scotia sent two representatives in a sloop to proclaim the authority of the British king in newly conquered areas. They met a cool reception throughout Acadia. At the mouth of the Penobscot River they were greeted by several hundred Indians from Panawapskik, who listened stoically as they read their proclamation. After holding council, a spokesman for the village told the officials that "I will not make an Oath of loyalty to anyone; I do not want a Foreign King; I have my natural Kings and governors who are my chiefs and elders." To add insult to injury, the Indians prevented the officials from seizing a trading vessel from Casco Bay that was plying the waters of the Penobscot. The shipmaster was trading illegally, since he did not have a license from the Nova Scotia government, which claimed jurisdiction of the lands east of the St. George River. But the Penobscots, who were his trading partners, told the Nova Scotians that the Indians would consider the seizure of the ship's cargo as theft of their own property. Not wanting to provoke a party of several dozen well-armed men, the officials returned to Annapolis Royal without making an arrest.73

73 Lt. Gov. Caulfield to Council of Trade, Annapolis Royal, Jan. 3, 1715/6, CSP, vol. 28 (1714-15), fol. 142, p. 63; Begon au ministre, Quebec, Sept. 25, 1715, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 35, fol. 109-114, cit. 113. (My translation; the original reads: "Je ne veux point prester Serment de fidelité a personne, Je ne veux point de Rois Etranger, jay mes Rois naturels et mes gouverneurs qui sont mes chefs et mes anciens.") Indian speakers used the first person singular when referring to their village or tribe collectively.
As Nova Scotia's government learned, agreements made in the drawing rooms of Europe were not always easy to enforce in the forests of North America. No matter where boundary lines were drawn on maps, governments could not control territories unless they forced or enticed people within their borders to bend to their rule. The inhabitants of borderland regions, who were distant from political centers and often courted by more than one colony, tended to be particularly difficult to govern. The Wabanakis who lived in the lands south of the St. Lawrence River valley and north of the Piscataqua were adept at playing British against the French and extracting concessions from both. The Wabanakis' trump card was the strategic location of their villages, which lay in a buffer zone between the colonies of New France and New England. The travel corridor formed by the Kennebec and Chaudière rivers represented a potential invasion route between Quebec and New England, and officials from both colonies vied for its control. Since Wabanakis were virtually the sole inhabitants of the region, no government could control the border region unless it had the support of the Indians.

French and British officials, of necessity and by design, undertook different strategies to win the allegiance of the Wabanakis. Faced with the problem of administering a thinly-populated continental empire, the governors of New France adopted policies that played to the strengths of French colonial enterprise. Although New France had not matched the commercial success of the British colonies, the French by the end of the seventeenth century had succeeded in gaining possession of the two most extensive river drainages of the continent: the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system and the Mississippi River. These river systems acted as vital links in a network of entrepôts that facilitated the distribution of trade merchandise and military supplies. In the imagination
of French officials, New France was a vast hinterland controlled by the government at Québec through a network of military garrisons, trading posts, and mission villages. Since the French population of the furthest outposts was tiny, control of surrounding areas usually depended on the support of Indian allies.74

Acadia was a peripheral concern to the governors at Quebec, who devoted most of their attention to the settlements of the St. Lawrence River and the outposts of the Great Lakes. During the latter half of the seventeenth century, French officials had established military garrisons at the forts of Pentagoet near the Penobscot River, and Nashwaak and Jemseg on the St. John. The rulers of New France had also considered building a string of outposts along the Chaudière and Penobscot rivers to facilitate communication between Québec and Pentagoet. But the cost of such projects was too high, and by the end of the seventeenth century Acadian officials increasingly looked to defend their southern frontiers with Wabanaki warriors fighting under the command of French officers. Following the Treaty of Utrecht, the French withdrew the officers, leaving Jesuit missionaries and French traders as their only representatives in the region.75

French maps of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries consistently recognized the importance of the Franco-Wabanaki alliance. The Wabanakis always appeared in maps of the northeast, which placed their names in large letters across their homelands. A 1713 map of Canada and Acadia drawn by the Jesuit missionary Father Joseph Aubry, for example, assigned the Atlantic coast between Casco Bay and the St. John River to the

74 W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, rev. ed. (Albuquerque, N. M.: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), esp. 1-11. The leaders of New France even thought this way about the British colonies, describing them not as bounded territories but as hinterlands controlled by political centers. They referred to Massachusetts as Baston (Boston), New York as Orange (Albany), and New Hampshire as Pescadoué (Piscataqua).

75 On communications between Québec and Pentagoet, see CDRH, 1: 207, 209, 211, 212-14, 243, 325-25; Jean Talon, "Mémoires sur le Canada, 1673," PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 4, fol. 43.
Wabanakis, and identified the isthmus of Chignecto with the Mi'kmaq. The only major settlements in the interior, the map seemed to suggest, were the Wabanaki villages of Norridgewock, Narakamigou, Panawapskik, and Medoctec. Yet Aubry still claimed the entire region on behalf of "Canada ou Nouvelle France," drawing the line between the British and French colonies at the Kennebec or St. George rivers [see Fig. 2.14; see also Fig. 2.15].

Aubry's map is puzzling to the modern eye, for it recognizes the Wabanakis' territorial possessions while simultaneously claiming them on behalf of the French crown. Since the Wabanakis were independent political actors and French officials understood them as such, it seems a contradiction that their lands could belong to both themselves and the French colony. Yet it is a contradiction only if one accepts the modern assumption that territories cannot belong to two polities at once. Present-day political maps, with their clearly drawn boundaries, are based on the premise that states have exclusive jurisdiction of their territories. Government may be divided into different levels of an administrative hierarchy, with municipalities, counties, and provinces neatly fitting into each other like a set of nested Russian dolls. But every inch of land must belong to only a single city, a single county, and a single nation; it is impossible for two jurisdictions of the same kind to overlap. In the eighteenth century, by contrast, polities did not necessarily define their sovereignty territorially, making it possible for lands to belong to two or more groups at once. If an empire is treated as a web of human relationships, in which a king is connected to his subjects through ties of fealty and deference, the territorial extent of the empire becomes a matter of secondary importance.
What matters instead is the personal bonds that make the ruler and the ruled loyal to one another.

Aubry's map presents a view of sovereignty in which territorial possession flows from human relationships, a view that had long been held by French officials. Since the earliest years of colonization, the French had based their territorial claims in North America on ceremonies that registered the willing subjugation of native peoples to the French crown. The legitimacy of French rule, both in theory and in practice, depended on the consent of Indian nations. The territorial extent of New France was determined not so much by the boundaries recorded in colonial charters as it was by the alliances that the French government developed with native groups such as the Wabanakis. While the Wabanakis did not consider themselves to be subjects of the king, they called the governor of New France their "father," and expected to receive presents from him in return for their loyalty and military service. French claims to the region to the south of the St. Lawrence depended almost entirely on these reciprocal bonds, which were renewed every year by the distribution of gifts and strengthened by the presence of Jesuit missionaries in Indian villages. Practically the French had little control over the Wabanakis' territory, yet the Franco-Wabanaki alliance allowed officials in Québec to claim the Indians' lands as their own in the imperial struggle against the British.

New England's leaders were also aware of the strategic importance of Indian alliances, yet the Wabanakis did not figure prominently in their cartographic imagination. Few British maps of the sixteenth and seventeenth century ever depicted the Wabanakis,

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76 Seed, Ceremonies of Possession, 41-68.
and those that did were usually military plans or copies of French originals.\textsuperscript{78} The absence of Indians in maps was a consequence of New England's diplomatic policy toward the Wabanakis, which aimed at pacification rather than alliance.\textsuperscript{79} Since the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the settlements of northern New England had been devastated by Indian raids, losing hundreds of lives and untold amounts of property during the 1675-78 war and the imperial wars of 1688-1713. In the hope of preventing future attacks, Massachusetts leaders launched a number of policies designed to appease the Wabanakis. In the 1690s, the province assumed control of the fur trade, establishing truck houses that sold Indians English merchandise at low cost. At conferences and truck houses, Massachusetts officials treated Wabanaki leaders with gifts and favors and even issued military commissions to pro-English sagamores. New England's leaders also attempted, with little success, to establish Protestant missionaries among the Wabanakis. Yet these policies were based on a denial rather than a recognition of Wabanaki sovereignty. Since the 1690s, Massachusetts' governors had demanded that Wabanaki leaders take oaths of submission to the British crown as a condition of their treaties. If they were treated as British subjects, their lands fell within the dominion of the crown,

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\textsuperscript{78} The only colonial map that represented Wabanaki lands as a bounded territory was drawn by a Frenchman. In October 1738, the owner of the fief of Lussauldière, Jutras des Rosiers, wrote the Minister of the Marine to complain about Indians from Odanak who had used some fifty acres of his land with the tacit approval of Father Aubry and Governor Vaudreuil. He appended a map representing his fief, along with the "Village des Sauvages" (Odanak), and two large rectangular areas on either side of the St. François River marked "Terrain dont Jouissent les Sauvages" (land enjoyed by the Indians). See Rosiers to the Comte de Maurepas, October 1738, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 70, fols. 230-34, map on 234.

\textsuperscript{79} The Iroquois were the only Indian group that appeared regularly and prominently in English maps, largely because of their roles as military allies of the British and middlemen in land deals between colonial speculators and western tribes. See, for example, Lewis Evans's famous 1755 map of the middle colonies, in which Iroquois territories stretch from the Ohio Valley to Lake Champlain.
and their attacks on English settlements became acts of rebellion that invited swift and unmerciful reprisal on the part of Massachusetts' authorities.\(^{80}\)

The ultimate goal of this policy was to neutralize the Indians as a military force and open their lands to English settlement: it was the Wabanakis' lands, not the Wabanakis themselves, that interested the leaders of Massachusetts. By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, merchants and political officials on both sides of the Atlantic had taken a growing interest in the lands east of the Piscataqua River, seeing them as a potential source of timber, naval stores, and agricultural land. But economic development of the region could not proceed if French-supported Wabanakis resisted English incursions into their territories. With the backing of royal officials and mercantile interests, Massachusetts' governors sought to bring the Indians to heel through a combination of diplomacy and intimidation. Gifts and truck houses were one side of this strategy, scalp bounties and garrison forts were the other.

The forts and truck houses represented the effective limits of British control in northern New England, yet they were not depicted with any regularity in maps of the region. The boundaries of Massachusetts, in the minds of its leaders, were defined not through alliances with the Indians but by the terms of its charter. From its beginnings, the colony's jurisdiction had been defined territorially, as an expanse of land that could be parcelled out to settlers and towns. The outer limits of the colony were not entirely clear during the seventeenth century, since Massachusetts' claims were challenged by rival colonies and the crown. But the advance of settlement in the eighteenth century led to an

\(^{80}\) Ronald Oliver MacFarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the Indians," New England Quarterly 11 (1938): 48-65; Axtell, Invasion, 247-54; Myron O. Stachiw, comp. and ed., Massachusetts Officers and Soldiers. 1723-1743: Dummer's War to the War of Jenkins' Ear (Boston: The Society of Colonial Wars in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and The New England Historical and
increasingly precise definition of boundaries, as the distribution of lands forced the colonies of New England to clarify their respective jurisdictions.

_Maine Takes Shape_

In the years that followed the Treaty of Utrecht, the population of northern New England grew rapidly, as settlers migrated to frontier regions in search of cheap land and real estate companies sought to develop their holdings in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. In 1690, there were fewer than 6,000 English inhabitants residing in twelve towns in northern New England. By 1760, the region's population had swelled to almost 60,000, with the number of incorporated towns rising to sixty-five.\textsuperscript{81} The growth of settlement entailed the transformation of thousands of acres of forest and vale into parcels of real estate. As in the previous century, the occupation of these lands took place within a political framework that attached property owners to town meetings and county courts. Since the security of land titles depended on the strength of civil authorities, the spread of settlement brought with it an expansion and a reordering of political jurisdictions. Dozens of new townships, all with the power to grant lands, were chartered where none had existed before.

It was imperative under these circumstances to eliminate overlapping jurisdictions, which inevitably gave rise to disputes between settlers over conflicting land titles. This problem was particularly sticky along the border between New Hampshire and Massachusetts. Although New Hampshire had been independent of Massachusetts

\textsuperscript{81} Clark, _Eastern Frontier_, 336. The number of towns was artificially large in New Hampshire, since the provincial government had granted several "paper townships" to obviate a British law that prevented logging outside town boundaries.
since the late seventeenth century, the Bay colony still held claims to the lands north of the Merrimack River according to the terms of its original and second charters. In the 1720s, the expansion of settlement led both provinces to grant overlapping townships in the region between the Merrimack and Connecticut rivers, with the leaders of Massachusetts hoping an influx of settlers from the Bay colony would strengthen their territorial claims. Since neither province had clear or exclusive jurisdiction over the new townships, the inhabitants’ property rights were left in the air. Numerous violent skirmishes took place between settlers living in the disputed territory, with many being jailed for their refusal to pay taxes to both provinces. Unable to resolve these disputes themselves, the government of New Hampshire in 1733 asked the Board of Trade to establish a boundary commission that would arbitrate between the two sides.82

After several years of lobbying and appeals, King George II finally issued an order in 1740 settling the boundary line between New Hampshire and Massachusetts. His decision favored New Hampshire, setting its southern limit three miles north of the Merrimack River until it reached Pawtucket Falls, at which point it continued in a straight line due west. The ruling placed nearly thirty Massachusetts townships under the control of the government of New Hampshire. The decision also drew a boundary between New Hampshire and Maine, represented by an imaginary line that began at the mouth of the Piscataqua River, ran up the Newichawanock (Salmon Falls) River as far as Lovell’s Pond (Great East Lake), and followed a straight course 2 degrees northwest for another 120 miles [see Fig. 2.16]. This northerly line was not run until a dispute over timber

82 The boundary dispute between New Hampshire and Massachusetts was one of many in the British colonies during the mid-eighteenth century. The Board of Trade was also forced to settle the boundaries between New York and New Jersey, Virginia and North Carolina, South Carolina and North Carolina, and Pennsylvania and Maryland (the latter survey carried out by Charles Mason and Jeremiah Dixon, hence the
rights led the Massachusetts General Court to order a survey of the Maine-New Hampshire border in 1763.83

In the twenty-year period that preceded the 1740 ruling, both colonies had experimented with new methods of town planning designed to promote the rapid and orderly settlement of their frontiers. Although there were many other models, the typical plan by the 1740s was a township six miles square, divided into a checkerboard of hundred-acre farms. The rectangular shape of townships and lots was adopted because it made surveying a simple matter of running straight lines with compass and chain. Individual farms were allotted as shares to proprietors, with each receiving a number commensurate with the value of their investment. The lots were then sold or leased to tenants or occupied by the proprietors themselves. These "range" townships, as they came to be known, rationalized the process of settlement, making it possible for town planners to rapidly divide and distribute their lands as numbered lots. For this kind of township to be successful, proprietors had to survey their holdings in advance of settlement, measuring and marking the boundaries of lots on the basis of a predetermined plan.84

It was this pattern that became the prototype for settlement in Maine during the second half of the eighteenth century. The English population of the region had grown

"Mason-Dixon line.")


84 James L. Garvin, "The Range Township in Eighteenth-Century New Hampshire," in Benes, New England Prospect, 47-68; Roy H. Akagi, The Town Proprietors of the New England Colonies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1923; reprint ed. Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), 230-81. Surveyors kept notebooks in which they recorded points of reference such as marked trees and heaps of stones, the direction of the lines run (according to degrees and minutes of the compass), and rods travelled. They later translated the information into plats of property boundaries, using a ruler and protractor. For an early example of a surveyor's notebook, see John Brown, "Field Book of Bakerstown &c., 1767-68 (Now Minot)," Pejepscot Proprietors Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me.,
steadily since the Treaty of Utrecht, but the advance of settlement had been slowed by the renewal of warfare against the French and Wabanakis after 1745. With the conquest of Quebec in 1759, this barrier to English settlement was removed and the result was an explosive growth in population east of the Piscataqua. Between 1763 and the American Revolution, the number of English inhabitants in Maine doubled from 23,000 to over 47,000. Almost a hundred townships were founded during the same period, most of them range townships. Many were established east of the Kennebec River, a region that had been sparsely settled before the end of the imperial wars.  

The town of Gorham offers an example of how these settlements were created. Originally known as Narragansett No. 7, Gorham was one of seven townships awarded by the provincial government in 1733 to veterans of King Philip's War and their heirs. Although most veterans of the Narragansett campaign had since passed away, 840 people in Massachusetts still claimed land under the grants and all were eager to gain a share of the buoyant real estate market of the 1730s. The grantees divided themselves into seven corporations of 120 partners each, and every corporation was awarded a township. The seventh of these proprietary bodies, which was later renamed after its leading light, John Gorham, was given the rights to form a township to the west of Falmouth.  

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the settlement of the township proceeded slowly, the proprietors were quick to order several surveys of their holdings. In the surveys, the lands of the township were divided into rectangular lots, which were assigned to individual proprietors. The township became the physical embodiment of the corporation, the lots within the town representing shares of each individual proprietor [see Fig. 2.17].

Other land companies emerged from the embers of long-lapsed patents, transforming seventeenth-century frontier outposts into agricultural settlements. The holdings of the Plymouth Company, one of Maine's most prominent of the land firms in the eighteenth century, were possessed under the Plymouth colony's original patent to lands along the Kennebec River, which was sold to four Boston merchants in 1661. The Plymouth Company had also acquired two adjoining tracts along the river that had originally been held by two fur traders from Boston, Major Thomas Clarke and Captain Thomas Lake. The fur traders had abandoned their posts during the 1675-78 war and had never returned. But their land deeds were kept by their descendants, who divided them into shares, which circulated among investors in Boston during the early part of the eighteenth century. Following the conclusion of a peace on the Maine frontier in 1749, the shareholders decided to begin the division and settlement of their tract [see Fig. 2.18].

The intent of the original patent holders had been to trade for furs, and the boundaries of their patent, which encompassed some 1,500 square miles, were meant to represent the limits of their trade monopoly. But in the hands of the Plymouth proprietors, the patent became a title to a vast agricultural estate, which could be

87 Cranmer, Cushnoc; Baker, Clarke and Lake; Gordon E. Kershaw, "Gentlemen of Large Property & Judicious Men": The Kennebeck Proprietors, 1749-1775 (Portland, Me.: Maine Historical Society, 1975),
parcelled out into individual farms and sold to settlers. By the 1750s the proprietors had begun measuring and dividing their tract into townships in preparation for settlement. They also sought to defend their title against rival claimants, launching an ambitious public relations campaign and bringing ejectment suits against settlers who obtained their lands from other companies. Although their plan did not unfold as smoothly as they had hoped, the proprietors by the end of the century had succeeded in establishing a ribbon of townships along both banks of the Kennebec River.88

As the Kennebec valley was divided into townships and the townships sectioned into farms, the region began to assume the shape of a property map writ large, a landscape overlaid with a rectangular grid [see Fig. 2.19]. By the late eighteenth century, forts and trading posts had disappeared from maps of the region, and the river itself had become a property boundary that broke up the regular rectangular pattern of the townships. The Kennebec Valley was not exceptional in this respect, for in other parts of Maine the nodes-and-links pattern of the outpost frontier was also being transformed into a grid of orderly settlement. In the decades that followed the end of the American Revolution, lands seized or purchased from the Wabanakis were quickly occupied by migrants from southern New England, and the rapid growth of settlement led to the creation of dozens of townships and several new counties. As the white population pushed eastward along the coast and northward into the interior, disputes over logging and land rights between Downeasters and New Brunswickers also made it necessary to demarcate the border lines between Maine and its neighboring governments. Although Maine did not assume its present-day shape until the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842

3-20.
88 Kershaw, The Kennebec Proprietors.
settled its northern boundaries, by the late eighteenth century it was increasingly clear that the district would be a bounded territory, with its borders defined by its ability to grant and protect real property.  

The straight lines of the state's boundaries were a visible trace of the distinctive path of state formation in Maine and North America generally. While the interior and exterior boundaries of countries in Europe and much of Asia have an irregular pattern that typically corresponds to natural features such as rivers and mountain ranges, much of North America is divided by straight lines that separate states, provinces, counties, townships, and farms. The immediate cause of this difference was the Northwest Ordinance, the Homestead Act, the Dominion Lands Act, and other legislation that authorized the distribution of public lands in an orderly manner.

But the deeper cause of the differing patterns was a divergence in the evolution of political authority in North America and Eurasia. An alliance between property owners and the state had also fostered the creation of clearly delineated boundaries in Europe but the political dynamics of the continent left a different impression on the political map. Because traditional landowners such as nobles, peasants, and burghers formed powerful political blocs within their respective countries, states were inclined to respect existing property boundaries. Borders both between and within European countries tended to reflect idiosyncratic patterns of land ownership that had developed over centuries as well as "natural" frontiers such as rivers and mountains that impeded the progress of

89 The eastern boundary was surveyed by the St. Croix boundary commission of 1798, and the northern boundary was settled by the Webster-Ashburton Treaty. The boundaries of Maine's territorial waters (an oxymoron if there ever was one) were not defined until the Gulf of Maine Treaty of 1984. On the boundary disputes of the 1790s and 1840s, see David Demeritt, "Representing the True St. Croix: Knowledge and Power in the Partition of the Northeast," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 54 (1997): 515-48; Howard Jones, To the Webster-Ashburton Treaty: A Study in Anglo-American Relations (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1977).
conquering armies. In North America, on the other hand, customary property boundaries were virtually erased as states pushed Indians into reservations and parceled their lands out to white settlers. Once the Indians were removed as a barrier to expansion, vast sections of territory were opened for occupation. Straight lines, because of the ease with which they could be surveyed, facilitated the process of settlement, making it possible for the spoils of conquest to be allocated according to a rational plan. The rapid and peaceful manner in which lands were distributed -- as distinct from the violent way in which they were taken from the Indians -- owed much to an alliance between states and property owners, in which each gave backing to the exclusive territorial claims of the other. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the creation of an egalitarian republic of property holders, in Maine as elsewhere in North America, was made possible by the virtual eradication of the Indians' rights to the land.90

90 On property ownership and the rise of the territorial state in Europe, see Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). A pattern of irregular boundaries developed in most of South and Central America, even though many Latin American countries were settler societies like the U. S. and Canada. The difference is partly attributable the region's geography, which is divided between coastal lowlands and interior highlands, which made the gradual westward movement of population that characterized North America an impossibility. But just as importantly, the primary instrument of colonization in Spanish America, particularly in peripheral areas, was the encomienda, which gave encomenderos authority over people but not their lands. Territorial boundaries were consequently more likely to reflect customary patterns of land ownership that had been established before the arrival of Europeans. See David J. Weber and Jane M. Rausch, eds., Where Cultures Meet: Frontiers in Latin American History (Wilmington, Del.: SR Books, 1994).
Two kinds of map: (a) is a boundary map, while (b) forms a nodes-and-links pattern. The extent of territorial control is clearly demarcated in the first map, but in the second it is ambiguous and depends on a host of contingencies, such as the trade contacts between the two towns, the strength of the fort, the nature of the terrain, and so on.
A later portolan chart of the French Dieppe school, drawn on parchment. Some place names may appear upside down or sideways because portolan charts were meant to be rotated by their users. The lines radiating from the compass rose helped pilots to set their course; Levasseur's chart, like many other portolans of his time, also includes lines of latitude. By the end of the sixteenth century the French knew of fishing banks as far south as Cape Sable, illustrated by clusters of dots, and were well acquainted with the course of the St. Lawrence River. The Bay of Fundy is missing, suggesting that French mariners did not venture beyond Cape Sable at this time. Photocopied from Joan Dawson, *The Mapmaker's Eye*, Map 1:3.
The first example of Mercator's projection, this map was intended for seafarers — "ad usum navigantium" — although there is little evidence that it was ever used as such. The coast of North America as far as the Gulf of Mexico is colored with a brown wash, while Newfoundland, called by its Iberian/Latin name "Terra de Bacalaos" (land of cod), is tinted yellow. Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France, Figure 23.
Since Lescarbot never travelled west of the St. Croix River, it is almost certain that he obtained his geographical knowledge second hand, probably from Champlain, who drew a detailed map of the colony's coastline on vellum in 1607. Champlain's earliest printed map, included in an account of his voyages, was issued in 1613. Lescarbot lacked Champlain's skills as a draughtsman, and his map appears rather crude by comparison. Photopied from Seymour I. Schwartz and Ralph E. Ehrenberg, The Mapping of America.
The names of the patentees stretch from Cape Cod to Penobscot Bay. This map was printed in support of Alexander's own claims in Nova Scotia, although it also includes an illustration of the New England Company's holdings. While Alexander probably consulted maps drawn by Champlain, he eliminates nearly all traces of French possession south of the St. Lawrence River, turning Acadia into New Scotlande, la Baie Franfaise (Bay of Fundy) into Argals Bay, the St. Croix River into the River Tweede, the St. John into the River Clyde. Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
Following the annexation of Maine, the Massachusetts General Court prepared a map for the English Parliament delineating the boundaries of the colony. It was lost in transit to England in 1655, but a second map was produced ten years later. The above is a later copy, presented to the Lords of Trade by agents of Massachusetts Bay in 1678. Note the latitude scale in the center of page, and the line cutting through Lake Winnipesaukee and Casco Bay at a latitude of $43^\circ\ 40'\ 12''$. Photocopied from photosat at the Library of Congress.
FIGURE 2.7. NINETEEN ACRES "MEASURED AND LAID OUT" FOR WILLIAM PEPPERELL BY WITHERS BERRY (SURVEYOR), 1720

A confirmation of tract in Kittery originally granted in 1699 to Pepperell, one of the leading merchants and land holders in the town. Photocopied from Kittery Town Records, vol. 2, January 13, 1719/20.

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One of twenty-three surveys carried out in Falmouth by Richard Clements, deputy surveyor under the Andros administration. The map represents a grant to Sylvanus Davis, who along with Edward Tyng, supported Andros's demand that land titles in the town be reconfirmed upon payment of a fee to the provincial government. Photocopied from Massachusetts Archives, Maps and Plans, 3rd series, vol. 33, fol. 7.
Speed's plate is one of the later examples of the Jansson-Vischer series, a group of maps of New Netherland and New England based on originals printed in Holland in the 1630s. This version erroneously has the Merrimack River running into Lake Champlain (Lake of the Iroquois). The edition of this map in the possession of the Lords of Trade has boundary lines drawn in watercolor around the New England colonies. The southern boundary of Maine is set at the Piscataqua River, its northern boundary near the Penobscot. New Hampshire appears on the map, bordering Massachusetts just north of Salem. Photocopied from reproduction at Library of Congress.
Published in Seller's *Atlas Maritimus*. The printed map is based on manuscript maps sent from Boston to London. The boundaries of Essex, Middlesex, and Suffolk counties in Seller's map are roughly the same as they are today. The land to the north of Norfolk (the name of New Hampshire while under the control of Massachusetts) is called, "Lacona or the Province of Maine." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
The limits of the colony are represented by a dotted line, which is filled in around New England. The name "Etechemins", another term for Wabanakis west of the Acadian peninsula, is written across the river. Sanson leaves the unknown regions of the interior blank, and his map is sparse in comparison to the ornate plates of his predecessors. Photocopied from Marcel Trudel, Atlas de la Nouvelle France. Fig. 36.
From his *Atlas Universel*, a compilation of 108 maps. Vaugondy was the royal cartographer of Louis XV, and prepared this map following the end of the War of Austrian Succession. All of the territory north of the Kennebec River is claimed on behalf of the Estechemins, or Wabanakis. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine, Reel 21: 10204.
One of many maps that illustrated the causes of the conflict between the French and British colonies in the 1750s. The shaded area, as the cartographer explains, represents "French Incroachments" on British territory. The map does include the Wabanaki village of Norridgewock, but it is placed far in the interior, just to the south of the St. Lawrence River. The map also illustrates two British forts built along the Kennebec River in the 1750s, Fort Halifax and Fort Western. Photocopied from the Smith Collection at the Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine, Reel 21: 9896.
Aubry was a missionary who lived at Odanak for many years, and prepared this map for French authorities at Québec. Crosses represent Wabanaki mission villages, squares stand for European settlements. The waterways of the interior, of great interest to French authorities, are represented in detail. Source: PAC, H3/900. Photocopied from W. J. Eccles, The Canadian Frontier, 1534-1760, 138.

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A map published in France representing French possessions in Acadia. The name of Acadia stretches from the Penobscot River to the Acadian peninsula, but portions of the same area are assigned to Wabanaki ethnic groups such as the Eihechemins, Canibas, Abenaquis, and Socquis. Photocopied from photostat at the Library of Congress.

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A manuscript version of a map that Langdon later published for the government of New Hampshire in collaboration with Joseph Blanchard. The 1740 boundary lines between Massachusetts and New Hampshire are clearly drawn. The curving line of the townships in the western part of New Hampshire are the result of the claims of the Masonian Proprietors, a group of investors who revived Captain John Mason's patent to a semi-circular tract of land radiating sixty miles from the mouth of the Piscataqua River. Photocopied from a photostat at the Library of Congress.
A survey of lots ordered by the town proprietors and recorded in their records. Photocopied from Gorhamtown Proprietors' Records, Maine State Archives, vol. 1, p. 77.
This map was included in a pamphlet published by the Brunswick Proprietors, who were rivals of the Plymouth Company. The map places the Plymouth claim far into the interior, on the reasoning that the Kennebec River to the south of Merrymeeting Bay was called the Sagadahock and therefore did not belong to the Plymouth patent. The Plymouth Company responded with a map of their own a year later, also published by Thomas Johnston, in which their lands extended all the way to the coast. The two Indians in the cartouche at the lower right hand corner, one carrying a war club and the other a rifle, are made to speak the words, "GOD hath planted us here," and "GOD decreed the land to us," sentiments that presumably support the validity of Indian deeds. Photocopied from reproduction at Library of Congress.
One of the leading American cartographers of his time, Carleton based this map on proprietary plats and surveys carried out under a 1794 Massachusetts town mapping law. Much of the land in the eastern counties of Lincoln, Washington, and Hancock has been laid out in a grid pattern, and the lands on either side of the Kennebec Rivers are divided into townships. A corridor of land along the upper Penobscot River is marked, "Land reserved for the Indians." Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.
CHAPTER III
LEVIATHAN'S TONGUES

The effective government of large areas depends to a very important
degree on the efficiency of communication.
--Harold Innis, Empire and Communication

In October 1756 northern New England's first newspaper was launched by Daniel
Fowle, a Boston printer who had recently arrived in Portsmouth. Named the New-
Hampshire Gazette, the weekly was printed on a single large sheet folded into four pages
and distributed through the mail to subscribers in New Hampshire and Maine. Like other
provincial newspapers of the time, the Gazette published little in the way of original
material, relying on stories reprinted from periodicals in Britain and Boston for most of
its copy. To the news stories were added local advertisements, lists of ships arriving and
departing from the port of Piscataqua, printed letters, and bits of gossip spread by word of
mouth. The Gazette's contents were meant to suit the tastes of the local gentry, and
Fowle wrote a brief editorial in the newspaper's first edition in praise of their good sense.
He noted that the many "Friends to Learning, Religion and Liberty" in the province had
encouraged him in his efforts and that their appetites for timely news had been whetted
by the recent outbreak of war in America and Europe. Newspapers such as the Gazette,
he continued, allowed "every Lover of Mankind" in New Hampshire "to be acquainted
with the Affairs of his own Nation and Country."1 Fowle's editorial was somewhat
disingenuous -- the truth of the matter was that he had run afoul of authorities in Boston
and fled to New Hampshire -- but in his second edition he pressed the point further,
publishing an essay in celebration of printing.

Claiming that the printing press was "one of the most useful Inventions the World
has ever seen," he recited the great advances in civil and religious liberties since the
advent of the printed book. In Turkey, where printed materials were outlawed, there was
"neither Liberty, Property, true Religion, Arts, Sciences, Learning, or Knowledge." But
in countries with a lively press, these things flourished. The printed word, he reasoned,
broadened the mind because it diffused knowledge throughout the world, imbuing all
readers with a sense of fellowship. The spread of information through newspapers and
books united the inhabitants of the world, giving them the ability to see beyond their local
surroundings and to understand their commonalties with the rest of humanity. Periodicals
such as the Gazette facilitated the "speedy Communication of the State of Affairs from
one part of the World to another" and the "Intercourse maintain'd between the different
Parts of a Kingdom." The transmission of information through the printed word united
the subjects of the British crown, allowing them to learn of events in other parts of the
empire and to determine "what Measures connected with the general Good are to be
pursued." The diffusion of printed news, Fowle concluded, was "like a good Circulation
in the natural Body," for it "keeps the Body Politic (if not alive, at least) in sound
Health."2

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1 New-Hampshire Gazette. October 4, 1756.

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Fowle's comparison between bodies physical and political was no more original than his second-hand copy or his characteristically British prejudices. The image of a body politic had its roots in the writings of classical authors such as Plato and had become a stock phrase by the Middle Ages. Only a century before, the metaphor had been brilliantly extended by Thomas Hobbes, who compared a commonwealth to a leviathan or "Artificial Man," whose anatomy could be dissected and analyzed in the same manner as a human body. If there was anything new in Fowle's editorial, it was his observation that the health of the body politic depended on a steady circulation of information. Hobbes himself had noted that speech was necessary for the creation of a civil society but his discussion of language was only tangentially related to his treatment of politics. Fowle, on the other hand, placed language at the center of his argument, holding that communication was the lifeblood of the political world, creating affinities between strangers and facilitating the dissemination of information. The boundaries of the human community and the British commonwealth, he seemed to suggest, were defined not by borders but by the limits of human interaction.

This point of view came easily to someone living in northern New England, where it was difficult to indulge in the illusion that colonies were self-contained worlds. Maine was twice a colony, a satellite of Massachusetts that also felt the tug of the mother country's political gravity. Since its beginnings, the colony's lands had been controlled to varying degrees by outsiders from Boston or London, who lived at distance from the settlements yet claimed them as their own. The ability of merchants and administrators make good on their claims of ownership depended on the co-operation of agents and allies living in the colony, which they won through a continual exchange of favors,
rewards, and payments. This flow of transactions between Maine and its two metropoles was the means by which outsiders gained access to the region's resources and the method of Maine's connection to the wider world.

The land, from this perspective, was a collection of resources whose exploitation depended on the co-operation thousands if not millions of people living on both sides of the Atlantic. The holdings of individual landholders in Maine were confirmed by towns and protected by the county courts, and towns themselves received their charters from the provincial government. The provincial government, in turn, held its charter under the crown and was answerable to the Privy Council. The development of these holdings was a joint endeavor that required an even higher level of social cooperation. Maine's families worked together to provide themselves with food, shelter, and clothing, and also produced large quantities of goods to be sold at market. For the marketing of these commodities, they looked to merchants and wealthy landowners, who provided them with wages, credit, and milling services. The merchants also handled the distribution of exportable goods to foreign markets, shipping them to overseas ports with the aid of ship captains, mariners, stevedores, and shipwrights. Shipping lanes, meanwhile, were protected against pirates and privateers by the merchant marine and royal navy, who were paid with revenues collected from British taxpayers. This web of interdependency could be extended almost infinitely, since New Englanders participated in an international economy with a highly complex division of labor.

It may be fruitful, in this context, to imagine the region's polities in Fowle's terms: not as bounded territories but as social networks woven by communications. These networks were not contained within territorial boundaries; to the contrary, it was the
existence of far-flung social ties that allowed people to control and exploit the land.

Northern New England's relationship with the mother country was defined not by a static constitutional framework but by the exchange of words and goods across the ocean. Merchants and administrators in London sought to tap the riches of the region by sending agents and officials across the Atlantic to promote their authority and to lay claim to a portion of the products of the land. New Englanders, on the other hand, defended their interests at home by establishing agents and patrons in London. This pattern of give-and-take between metropolis and colonies had its beginnings in the late seventeenth century and had become a central fact of political life in the New England by the 1750s.

It is impossible to understand the development of this relationship without taking into account the modes and methods of communication that linked the two sides. The degree of control that Londoners and Bostonians exercised over the lands of Maine rested on their ability to establish lines of contact with the region. Letters and parcels carried by sailing vessels and post riders were the means by which merchants and officials from distant capitals gained authority over northern New England, and also the tools that the region's inhabitants used to tap into the imperial economy. To trace the lineaments of the leviathan in northern New England one must begin with what Fowle called the "Circulation" of the body politic: patterns of communication.

Arteries of Communication

To people accustomed to the bustling cosmopolitanism of London or the burgeoning commercial life of Boston, the lands east of the Merrimack River, or "Eastern Parts" as they were known in the eighteenth century, must have seemed a backwater, a
region far removed from the center of things. But the people living on this remote frontier were not without attachments to a wider world. Merchants in Kittery and Portsmouth knew that crop failures in Madeira and sugar gluts in the Leeward Islands would cause fluctuations in the prices of commodities at their own ports. Settlers in Brunswick and Dover understood that when war was declared in Europe, it would only be a matter of time before their farms were threatened by French-backed Indian raids. While the forests and meadows of the interior invited settlers to push further into the continent, the attraction of markets in Europe and the West Indies pulled them back toward the arteries of water-borne transport. Like the other colonies of the North America, Maine and New Hampshire were the product of commerce and empire and looked to the ocean for their contacts with the wider world.3

In the earliest years of the colony, Maine's trade was oriented primarily toward England, particularly the West Country. Fishermen relied on the metropolis for supplies of fishing gear and provisions and found a ready market for their catch in England, where it was re-exported to southern Europe or consumed domestically. But by the mid-seventeenth century, the relative importance of English trade declined as Boston's traders exerted increasing control over the colony's economy. Faced with an unfavorable balance of trade with the mother country, the merchants of Massachusetts Bay actively sought supplies of exportable commodities in neighboring areas: furs from Maine and the

3 In 1796, real estate agent Alexander Baring remarked that settlers in Maine were "in general nearly equal in information, manners and comforts of life to those of the old New England states." He saw newspapers in nearly every farmhouse and was impressed by the settlers' grasp of European and American politics. The prosperity and sophistication of the settlements, he explained, were "an advantage resulting from the easy water communications with all parts, which in fact brings them nearer the old countries than any back lands at not one third the real distance." See Alexander Baring to Hope and Company, Philadelphia, December 3, 1796, in Frederick S. Allis, Jr., ed., William Bingham's Maine Lands, 1790-1820, 2 vols., Publications of the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 36-37 (Boston: Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1954), 2: 768.
Connecticut River Valley, fish from the Gulf of Maine, and lumber from the Piscataqua. They also looked for commercial opportunities in distant parts of the Atlantic basin, finding outlets for the fish and lumber in southern Europe, the Caribbean, and the islands of Madeira, the Azores, and the Canaries. As the volume of this trade grew, New England's merchants assumed an increasingly important role in the emerging Atlantic economy.⁴

By the last quarter of the seventeenth century, this economy had developed a discernible pattern. The bulk of New England's maritime trade was carried on with the sugar plantations of the West Indies and the vineyards of the Atlantic Islands. The economies of both groups of islands were oriented toward staple production and their inhabitants were in constant need of food and other provisions. Extensive cultivation on the islands had led to deforestation, making them dependent on foreign supplies of wood for housing, cooperage, and firewood. Vessels from New England brought cargoes of fish and lumber to the islands, returning to their home ports laden with sugar, molasses, rum, fruit, wine, and other tropical commodities.⁵ The importance of this trade is readily apparent in the port records of Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Records for the last decade of the seventeenth century indicate that nearly half the ships entered and cleared by the naval officer at Portsmouth were trading with the West Indies. Most of the West Indian

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⁵ These commodities were not the only things that were exchanged; trade was more than a simple barter of goods. New England's merchants faced a chronic trade deficit with the mother country and were constantly in search of "returns" such as commodities, specie, and bills of exchange that would get them out of the red. Ships that sailed to the West Indies returned not only with sugar, rum, and molasses, but also with trade credits that enabled New Englanders to purchase manufactured goods from Great Britain.
The West Indian trade retained its central place in the maritime trade of northern New England during the eighteenth century, but the region's merchants also found new commercial opportunities in the Carolinas, the Chesapeake, Nova Scotia, and southern Europe [see Figs. 3.1, 3.2]. Vessels to and from the West Indies continued to account for nearly half of Piscataqua's traffic in 1724, with an increasing portion of the vessels sailing to the Leeward Islands, which were overtaking Barbados as the center of sugar production in the British Caribbean. Merchants in Kittery and Portsmouth also developed contacts in North Carolina, exchanging lumber, rum, and English manufactured goods for naval stores and provisions. Another outlet for trade was to the northeast: northern New England supplied Newfoundland, and later Nova Scotia, with provisions, timber, and livestock. New Hampshire's merchants also traded on a more modest scale with Philadelphia, New York, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Bermuda, and West Africa. Nearly all this commerce was carried by smaller vessels -- sloops, schooners, brigantines,

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6 Some of the clearances for Barbados may have in fact ended up trading with other colonies. Since Barbados was the most windward of the islands, shipmasters usually arrived there first, and if they found a poor market for their goods, followed the winds to the Leeward Islands and Jamaica.

7 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fols. 1-5. These figures are based on a partially incomplete series of naval office lists for Portsmouth kept between August 1694 and September 1695. Earlier, less complete records exist for a twelve-month period in 1680-81 and a three-month period in 1692. Fifty-one vessels were reported to have entered at Portsmouth between April 14, 1680 and April 12, 1681, but the customs officer noted that many of the ships were "driven in by contrary winds and made but little stay." See CSP, vol. 11 (1681-85), fol. 98, p. 46. For the quarter in 1692, clearances included four vessels bound for London, one for Newfoundland, one for the Canaries, and one for Virginia, twelve coasters for Boston and one for Nantucket. Entries included five vessels for Barbados, three for London, eight coasters from Boston, and one coaster from Hampton. See Nathaniel Bouton, ed., Provincial Papers of New Hampshire, 7 vols. (Concord, N. H., 1868-72), 2: 77-83.
and the occasional snow — with crews of fewer than a dozen men and burdens of less than a hundred tons.8

Only a small portion of Piscataqua's trade was directly with Great Britain, and the bulk of this commerce was carried by mast ships, vessels of several hundred tons with hulls specially designed for transporting masts. The ships arrived as a fleet during the summer, after the spring thaw had flushed cut timber downriver to the harbors of Piscataqua and Casco Bay. Their outward cargoes consisted mainly of manufactured goods, which were purchased by Piscataqua's merchants with the profits of the West Indian trade. The return cargoes were consignments of masts, spars, bowsprits, timber, and naval stores, which were transported to the naval shipyards of England. Many of Piscataqua's leading families had West Country connections and also acquired manufactured goods from the ports of Devon, Cornwall, Hampshire, and Somerset. Merchants also traded periodically with ships from other parts of the British Isles, obtaining coal from Swansea, linen from Cork, and sundry manufactured goods from Liverpool and Glasgow.9

The naval office shipping lists generally did not include the coastwise trade between Piscataqua and southern New England, since the sloops that carried the trade were not large enough to require customs inspection. But the existing evidence indicates that considerably more coasting vessels than ocean-going ships called at the ports of northern New England. In the twelve-month period between August 1694 and July 1695, 92 coasters were cleared for Boston in the port of Piscataqua, while only 28 vessels left for other ports. By 1713, the number of coasters sailing from Piscataqua to Boston had

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8 Public Record Office, CO 5/967-68. Piscataqua in this context referred not only to the river but to the entire drainage, which included the Salmon Falls, Cocheco, Lamprey, Oyster, and Exeter rivers.
risen to 129, and by 1724, even as northern New England was embroiled in a war with the Wabanakis, the figure had reached 197. Coasting vessels from other ports in southern New England, such as Salem and Newport, also visited Portsmouth in smaller numbers. Because Piscataqua was the center of the timber industry in the early part of the eighteenth century, it received most of northern New England's coastal traffic. But as settlement and the lumber trade moved eastward, a growing number of coasters plied the route between Boston and Casco Bay. In 1773, Hugh Finlay, the surveyor of the post roads for North America, remarked that there were two or three packet boats "in constant employment" between Boston and Falmouth, each of them making some twenty trips yearly.¹⁰

The importance of the coastal trade was a consequence of Maine's economic dependence on southern New England. The region's quasi-colonial relationship with Massachusetts Bay had developed in the middle of the seventeenth century, as entrepreneurs from Boston sought to tap the rich natural resources of northern New England and the Gulf of Maine. The merchants had established trade contacts with West Indian and Iberian planters and had built the vessels necessary to transport fish and timber to other Atlantic ports. But they also needed the labor of fishermen and lumbermen, without which there would have been no commodities to export. Since most producers in northern New England lacked the means to purchase fishing vessels or saw mills and had few ready outlets for their commodities, they looked to Boston's merchants for credit and

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merchandising opportunities. The Bostonians advanced them physical capital -- ketches and gear for fishermen, oxen and saw mills for lumbermen -- and provided them with provisions and alcohol to tide them over during the fishing and lumbering seasons. In return, the merchants received a share of their produce, which they sold overseas at a high markup. This proved to be a very profitable relationship for the Bostonians, who held a virtual monopoly on the supply of fish and lumber while also cornering the market on finished goods in northern New England. As the English visitor John Josselyn remarked in 1674, merchants from Massachusetts "set excessive prices" on manufactured goods, and "if they do not gain Cent per Cent, they cry out that they are losers." Josselyn added that many fishermen in Maine were indebted to the point that they became "the Merchants slaves," and were forced to forfeit their land and livestock to their creditors.11

Boston's grip on northern New England weakened slightly during the last quarter of the seventeenth century as mercantile communities developed in Portsmouth and Kittery. The leading families of Piscataqua by the beginning of the eighteenth century owned several dozen vessels and were actively involved in the carrying trade of the Atlantic.12 Yet the colonists of northern New England, particularly those who lived east of Kittery and York, remained economically dependent on Massachusetts's merchants. Most inhabitants marketed their timber and fish through Boston on coasting vessels. When warfare discouraged coasters from making trips to the eastern settlements, colonists were often unable to dispose of their produce. In a letter to Boston in 1746, the

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12 In 1697, the governor of New York and New England, Lord Bellomont, reported that the merchants of Piscataqua owned eleven ships and thirteen smaller vessels. The shipyards of Maine were nearly as active as those of New Hampshire, building twenty-three ships and twenty-seven smaller vessels between 1674 and 1714, although most were owned by merchants in Boston and Britain. See William G. Saltonstall,
leading inhabitants of Falmouth complained that warfare had left the families to the east of Casco Bay in "the most dispirited, distressed Condition," not only because Wabanaki attacks threatened their homes but because the dearth of coasters had turned their winter's work "to no account," leaving thousands of cords of wood rotting on the ground.13

In peacetime, the coasters arrived more regularly, with most vessels shuttling back and forth between Boston and Maine several times a season. The rhythms of maritime life at Piscataqua were tied closely to the demands of coastal trade. The heaviest period of traffic at the port was during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived from Boston to take on wood and timber that had been cut during the winter. Because of their small size, the coasting sloops did not spend long periods in port loading and unloading their cargoes, and during the summer most made round trips between Boston and Piscataqua every fortnight. Between March and October in 1695, twenty coasters made trips between New Hampshire and Boston, with some of them making as many as ten voyages [see Fig. 3.3]. Winter was the slack time for the coastal trade, as many shipmasters laid their vessels up for the season, but some coasters continued to make voyages in December and January, carrying timber for re-export to the West Indies or for domestic consumption in Boston.14

Ocean-going traffic, meanwhile, tended to follow the schedules of the West Indian trade. Although there were entries and clearances for the West Indies in every month of the year, certain months were more active than others. The produce of sugar plantations came gradually on the market between February and June, and shipmasters

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13 Boston Gazette, April 29, 1746.
14 Public Record Office, CO 5/968, fol. 9.
from New England tried to time their arrival accordingly. The trick was to arrive before
the market for fish and lumber was glutted but after the planters had brought their
produce to harbor. If vessels landed too early, they would have to spend idle time in port
or be forced to sail to another island; if they landed too late, they would be forced to sell
their cargoes at a low price. Since the voyage from Piscataqua to the West Indies
generally took about six weeks or seven weeks, the peak period for clearances to the West
Indies was in January, with ships leaving in time for the beginnings of the sugar market.
Mid-summer represented a second, if lesser, jump in the number of clearances at
Piscataqua. While many vessels engaged in the West Indian trade made a third leg
between the Caribbean and Great Britain, others completed two six-month round-trips
every year, departing for the second voyage in June or July. The busiest period of entries
at the port came somewhat earlier, during the spring and early summer, as vessels arrived
from Europe and the West Indies to load cargoes of timber [see Fig. 3.4].

The arrival and departure of ships at Piscataqua was a matter of interest to many
people in nearby areas, since they relied on maritime traffic for the circulation of goods
and information with the rest of the world. Merchants and political officials had the
greatest investment in these contacts, but others also looked forward to the arrival of
ships. The vessels came loaded not only with West Indian sugar and English goods but
with letters from friends and family and newspapers from other ports. During the
seventeenth and most of the eighteenth centuries, these communication networks were
sustained by an informal method of letter carrying. Shipmasters made public
announcements of their dates of departure and left mail bags hanging in a tavern or coffee
house to be filled with letters, each costing the sender a penny. The shipmasters then

carried the bag to their designated port, and made a second public announcement asking the recipients to come fetch their letters. In 1699, the deputy postmaster for the North American colonies, Alexander Hamilton, proposed that all letters to and from America be required to pass through the post office, but his suggestion was not followed and most letters continued to be carried by private shipmasters in the eighteenth century.16

But Hamilton, with the cooperation of colonial legislatures, succeeded in establishing an intercolonial postal system in the last decade of the seventeenth century. In 1691, a Whig courtier named Thomas Neale had been awarded a monopoly for the colonial posts, and Neale appointed Hamilton, then governor of East and West Jersey, as his deputy. With Hamilton's encouragement, several northern legislatures passed acts establishing an official post office in their colonies. Under the terms of Massachusetts's law, passed by the House of Representatives in 1693, the postmaster at Boston was to receive two pence for single letters sent to Europe and the West Indies, and four pence for packets of letters sent overseas. Letters sent to Piscataqua cost six pence—about a half-day's pay for a typical laborer—and were carried by a post rider who made weekly trips to the north. The postal service did not extend past the Piscataqua River, so letters to people living in Maine were deposited at the Portsmouth post office to be picked up by their recipients, or, if a sufficient number of letters were collected, to be delivered by a post rider. As Maine's population grew, post riders made their trips with increasing regularity, and by 1757 a weekly mail was established between Piscataqua and Falmouth. During the summer this postal route carried relatively little mail, since most letters were

16 Memorial of Andrew Hamilton, April 26, 1699, General Post Office, Treasury Letter Books, vol. 1691-99, fols. 253-58. Hamilton remarked that the informal system of letter-carrying was susceptible to abuse by merchants who rifled through mail bags to find their competitors' letters, and shipmasters who tossed
transported by coasters from Boston, but during the winter the overland post became the primary means of communicating with southern New England.17

Because travellers had to cross dozens of rivers, streams, and rivulets as they moved along the coastline, their progress was often slow and arduous. The towns of northern New England cleared fording places, made by placing stones across a river so that travellers could step or wade across the water when its level was low. When the water level was higher, people were carried across the river by a ferryman, who was typically also an innkeeper. During the winter, the ferry was not needed because most rivers became frozen highways, easily traversed on foot. A number of towns also built bridges, although the cost was steep and some towns by the middle of the eighteenth century began to raise the funds through lotteries or by petitioning the province's General Court for aid.18

Townspeople were also responsible for building and maintaining the road network of the region, a task they performed with mixed results. Since the seventeenth century, inhabitants of towns had been required to devote several days of work a year to the repair and laying out of roads, a practice rooted in the manorial custom of corvée. But towns often neglected the duty, and their roads, many of them little more than trails, were often impassable during the summer. The county court tried to correct this problem by issuing

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orders that forced the towns to build and maintain an adequate system of roads. The
court had initiated plans for the cutting of roads as early as the 1640s and its orders
became more systematic after the region was annexed by Massachusetts. In 1653 the
court demanded that York and Kittery make "Convenient ways" and bridges between the
towns that were "fitt for horse and man," and in the ensuing years the court issued orders
for further roads from Portsmouth as far as the Saco River. Towns often ignored the
court's decisions, preferring to pay fines than to bear the expense of building roads and
bridges. A 1673 plan to build a highway (country road) between Wells and Casco Bay
was dashed because the cost was too great. But over time a small road network
developed in York County and was most elaborate in the settled parts of Kittery,
Berwick, York, and Wells. Further east, roads were fewer in number and in greater need
of repair. The upper portion of the King's Highway -- the name of the less-than-majestic
road that connected Maine's settlements from Portsmouth to Casco Bay -- was not
completed until around 1740.

Because most people in Maine relied on water-borne transport for their travel,
existing roads sometimes received little use. During the War of Spanish Succession
(Queen Anne's War in the colonies), the ferrymen licensed by the towns of Kittery and
York petitioned the General Court for aid, complaining that the war had cost them their
business. By law, soldiers and officers were ferried for free, forcing both men to
continuously attend to their posts. Meanwhile paying passengers, as the ferryman at York

19 PCRM, 2: 14-5.
20 PCRM 1: 255, 3: 107, 261, 277; Jones, The King's Highway, 15. According to a guidebook published
in 1731, roads linked forts and settlements along the coast as far as Fort Richmond and Brunswick in Casco
Bay, although the quality of the easternmost roads was probably very poor. See Thomas Prince, The Vade
Medium for America (Boston: Kneeland and Green for Henchman and Hancock, 1731), 195-97.
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put it, were "few... indeed almost none at all." Even in peacetime, road traffic was light; in denying a petition from Falmouth requesting funds to repair a bridge over the Fore River, the General Court noted that "not one in five hundred" of the inhabitants of York County ever passed over the bridge.

Roads were most frequently used for travel over short distances, acting as links between neighboring farms and settlements. The earliest court orders required highways to be large enough to accommodate a horse and a man, but by the last quarter of the seventeenth century most orders and statutes stipulated that highways should be sixty-six feet wide when running straight and slightly wider along curves and at fording places. This breadth made it easier for farmers to drive their livestock to market, since wide spaces allowed the animals to graze or sleep on the road and enabled the drovers to keep watch for wild predators. Smaller roads and trails connected neighboring farms and were used by settlers to visit kinfolk and friends, to attend church and town meetings, and to exchange cloth, eggs, butter, cider, and other produce with their neighbors. Another set of roads in the backwoods allowed lumbermen to haul their timber to water with chains, carts, sleds, and oxen.

Although governments and settlers saw a need for better roads, ambitious plans for improving inland communications were rarely realized. Maritime transport was essentially a private matter: merchants built, maintained, and insured their own vessels


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and whatever benefits they received from their use were undeniably their own. Roads and bridges, on the other hand, were usually public property and building them was a politically contentious matter. Because the routes established by roads were fixed, land owners inevitably lobbied for roads that connected their holdings to ports and market towns -- thereby raising their value, since roads made it easier and less expensive to market their produce -- and against roads that cut through their farms, stripping them of valuable land.24

Disputes also arose over the expenses of inland transportation because road and bridge projects required a pooling of capital and labor. In 1693, Massachusetts passed a law that required every town to appoint two selectmen as surveyors of the highways as a way of ensuring that roads and bridges would be built and maintained within their jurisdiction. In 1713 the act was amended, allowing justices of the peace to require towns to lay out public roads and private ways. But the role of the provincial and county governments under these acts was punitive rather than enabling: the courts fined towns for failing to maintain their roads, but did little to fund their construction or repair. Although some town proprietors by mid-century scored minor victories in winning funds for bridge and road building, there was little public support for such projects because the benefits of the roads accrued mainly to the proprietors while their expenses were borne by all the taxpayers of the province. Reporting on the Plymouth Company's efforts to receive provincial funding for roads within their patent, surveyor of the posts Hugh set 24

settlement, colonists were forced to use Wabanaki trails and portage routes, often with the aid of an Indian guide.

24 Inland transportation projects of a large scale did not begin anywhere in North America until early in the nineteenth century. These undertakings depended on a growing concentration of capital and an increasing willingness of state governments to support and partially finance inland transportation projects. In both the North and the South, states gave charters to private companies responsible for the building of turnpikes and
Finlay explained that "[t]he Public says, let the Plymouth Company improve their property by opening high-ways, why shou'd the people contribute to make their estate valuable." 25

Lacking public funding and frequently in a state of disrepair, Maine's muddy back roads supported a commercial world that was tiny compared to the far-flung trade networks of the Atlantic. While oceanic shipping lanes carried thousands of tons of commodities, the paths of Maine facilitated bartering and borrowing on a small scale, often so small that it was never recorded in account books. Ocean-going vessels and inland roads supported two distinct if interrelated economies, one based on profitable long-distance exchange and the other oriented toward local self-sufficiency. 26 There were many points of articulation between the two economies and it would be misleading to refer to the region's settlers as subsistence farmers. According to a 1751 petition from the town of Kittery, fewer than a half of its inhabitants were able to make their own clothing, grow their own wheat, or raise their own livestock. 27 Although towns with more fertile and abundant lands were more self-sufficient, none was divorced from the commercial economy. The inhabitants of Falmouth and Berwick spent their winters cutting and canals and often helped to pay for their construction and maintenance. See George R. Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (New York: Rinehart, 1951), esp. 18-55.

25 Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, 1: 136-37, 721-22; Hugh Finlay Journal, 15. The Plymouth Company had made some efforts in road building; in 1757, the proprietors' committee, "being apprehensive that the laying out good Roads in Towns for plantation will be of very great advantage to the Inhabitants round about," proposed construction of two roads running from Fort Shirley on the Kennebec River to Wiscasset on the Sheepscott River and Newcastle on the Damariscotta. See Committee to Samuel Goodwin, Boston, October 5, 1757, Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Maine, Box 1, Folder 18.

26 By an insidious logic, poor transportation networks acted as a lag on economic development and economic underdevelopment impeded the improvement of communications. The rude state of roads made it difficult and expensive to bring produce to market and nearly impossible to transport merchandise in large quantities. High transaction costs discouraged trade, limiting the amount of investment in the region. Without the funds that came from trade, towns were unable to afford the taxes and loans necessary to improve their roads.
sawing wood and many were dependent on wages for their subsistence. Farmers who owned salt marsh and meadows in Scarborough, Biddeford, and the Kennebec River Valley raised livestock for sale in overseas markets, curing and barrelling their meat or shipping live cattle and horses to purchasers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies. Merchants in port towns who made their fortunes through the wholesaling trade of the Atlantic also played an important role in the local economy. Families such as the Pepperrells, the Frosts, and the Hammonds sold English manufactured goods to their neighbors, extended credit to producers, and provided milling services to farmers and loggers.

Pine Tree Politics

While the loggers and hardscrabble farmers of Maine's back settlements had little in common with the periwigged merchants and tar-smeared seamen of the port towns, channels of communication extended even to the most isolated farmsteads, linking them with other parts of the British empire. People living in New England and London viewed these connections differently, as if they were looking through the opposite ends of a telescope. In the unlikely event that merchants and royal officials in London ever thought about Maine at all, they considered it a marginal part of the empire whose worth was commensurate with its ability to supply the metropolis with scarce commodities. But New Englanders placed themselves at the center of their world and cherished their connection to the mother country, not for its own sake but because it provided political favors, military protection, and commercial opportunities.

In general, this difference in perspective did not matter since both sides benefited from their relationship. But there was one issue over which colony and metropolis were sharply divided and would remain so throughout the century: the disposal of Maine's woods. The crown's interest in the forests of New England had been inspired by the expansion of the English navy, which had grown steadily since the civil war and by the middle of the eighteenth century had become the backbone of the nation's military might. At the end of the seventeenth century, the navy had built a fleet of nearly a hundred ships and was competing with Holland and France for naval supremacy in Europe. The construction of men-of-war demanded a large and skilled workforce, as well as a continual supply of building materials, particularly timber. Approximately 50,000 cubic feet of timber were needed in the construction of a third-rate ship of 1,000 tons. Ships also required timber for at least 23 masts, cross yards, and a bowsprit. Larger men-of-war were fitted with a main mast that could be as large as 40 inches in diameter and up to 120 feet in length.28

Navy shipwrights built hulls with domestic supplies of oak, but they needed to search abroad for the pines used to make masts, yards, spars, and bowsprits. The navy had traditionally purchased its masts from Scandinavia and the Baltic but by the second half of the seventeenth century, these supplies were becoming inadequate. The hulls of men-of-war tended to be more durable than their masts, which were easily broken during battle or worn through use. Ships in wartime were frequently refitted with new masts, making it necessary to find ample supplies of tall pine trees suitable for large ships. During the first Dutch War in the 1650s, the navy had procured shipments of masts from

northern New England, where white pines grew in abundance. New England's pines, it turned out, were superior in quality to those of Scandinavia; because they retained their moisture under hot and dry conditions, pine masts from Maine and New Hampshire lived four times as long as sticks from Norway. The demand for New England masts grew in the second Dutch War of 1664-67, as Dutch blockades and a Swedish ban on the felling of pine trees had forced the English navy to outfit their ships with American masts.

Colonial imports seemed to be an ideal solution to the problem of acquiring pine trees since shipments from New England kept trade within the empire and made the crown less dependent on foreign powers. But the colonial trade had problems of its own. Not only was it expensive and risky to transport pines across the ocean, the supply of masts was threatened by the rapid deforestation of coastal New England. The timber trade had played an important part in the region's economy since the beginnings of permanent settlement. Nearly every town in northern New England built a sawmill within a few years of their establishment, and by 1682 there were some twenty-four mills operating in Maine, each capable of producing between 500 and 1,000 feet of pine boards per day. Northern New England's timber trade by the last quarter of the seventeenth century had eclipsed the fisheries in importance, and the export of sawn lumber to Boston, Iberia, and the West Indies had become an indispensable source of income for Maine's settlers.

29 Albion, Forests and Sea Power, 200-230.
30 Charles F. Carroll, The Timber Economy of Puritan New England (Providence: Brown University Press, 1973), 104-11; Willis, "History of Portland," 179-80. By 1709, there were about seventy sawmills in operation along the Piscataqua and its tributaries. See CSP, vol. 24 (1708-1709), fol. 428. Maine's fishermen by the 1670s were finding it increasingly difficult to compete with their counterparts in Essex County, who received better financial backing and were better equipped to exploit the cod-filled waters of the Grand Banks off Newfoundland.
Colonists made use of all species of trees, fashioning fence rails with ash, staves with oak, boards with hemlock, pegs and clothespins with birch. But for commercial purposes, white pines were preferred because they were more easily floatable and less likely to be rotten than old-growth hardwoods such as maple, birch, and hemlock. Loggers often bypassed hardwoods near settled areas as they searched for the tall conifers that flourished at higher elevations. While the work of cutting and hauling the trees was performed by poorer settlers, who went logging in winter to earn credit and cash for their farms and families, the processing and marketing of timber was the responsibility of wealthy and well-connected merchants. Making pines into masts or boards was a profitable but laborious process that involved dozens of workers and large outlays of capital. Lumberjacks first "bedded" a pine by felling trees that were in the path of their fall, then sawed until the tree was toppled. After stripping it of its bark, they "baulked" the tree to the river by wrapping it with chains attached to teams of oxen and dragging it through the snow or along a cleared path. Once they reached the riverside, they flipped, or "twitched," the tree into the river. The pines made their way downstream until they reached the mast ponds of the ports, where they were finished by mastwrights or cut by sawmills, and loaded into ships. The merchants who backed this enterprise needed deep pockets because they had to pay crews of lumberjacks their daily wages, supply several dozen teams of oxen, and purchase shares in the large ships that transported the masts.31

Like other merchants, timber traders sought to limit competition while opening markets for themselves. The British system of military contracting offered just such an opportunity for a select group of merchants, since the navy granted exclusive contracts to mast suppliers in England, who hired agents to cut the pines and ship them from America.

31 Saltonstall, Ports of Piscataqua, 56.
Merchants who failed to win such contracts were naturally hostile toward the system, dependent as they were on the sale of pine to overseas markets. Most were inclined to ignore royal directives, devoting themselves to the production of boards, planks, staves, and other sawn lumber while sending many potential masts to the sawmills. Other pine trees were sold as masts in Portugal and Spain, or as ship timber at the dockyards of Piscataqua, which by the last quarter of the seventeenth century specialized in the construction of large ships. The settlers' activities were a cause for concern among royal officials, since the deforestation of Maine and New Hampshire threatened the navy's future supply of masts. Edward Randolph, a former timber agent for the navy and a commissioner of the Lords of Trade in New England, sent home a report in 1676 that brought the problem to their attention. Randolph excoriated Massachusetts for its open defiance of the Navigation Acts, and claimed that New England's timber trade violated trade laws and depleted the stock of pine trees in Maine and New Hampshire. The Lords of Trade quickly responded to his criticisms, revoking the colony's charter and appointing Randolph surveyor of pines and timber in Maine and New Hampshire, a post that came with a £50 annual salary. Randolph became mired in the controversies of the Andros administration and did little to serve his office, but his reports brought the mast problem to the attention of the Lords of Trade.

Randolph and Governor Andros were jailed during New England's version of the 1688-89 Glorious Revolution and returned to England upon their release. Randolph remained an influential figure at the Colonial Office and helped to insert a clause in

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Massachusetts's second charter that reserved to the crown all white pine trees greater than two feet in diameter growing on the province's public lands. Because Randolph had burnt his political bridges in New England, he could not enforce the provision himself. But by early 1690s, as the depredations of French privateers limited the supply of masts and naval stores from the Baltic, the Lords of Trade and the Navy Board took a growing interest in New England's supply of pines. This interest was cultivated by merchants and political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic, who saw the development of forest policy in New England as a potential source of enrichment and political advancement.  

New Englanders hoped to obtain contracts for the supply of masts and bounties for encouraging the production of naval stores such as tar and pitch. A month before the granting of the second charter in 1691, governor William Phips, a native of Maine and a former ship carpenter, had written a letter to the Lords of Trade informing them that there were ample quantities of timber in Piscataqua and Nova Scotia fit for naval purposes. In addition to oak and ash, there were "such abundance of pines that were they well improved they would supply the whole Navy with pitch and tar, better and cheaper than in Europe." A group led by Joseph Dudley repeated Phips's overtures in 1693-94, lobbying the crown with the aid of Sir Henry Ashurst, a merchant and member of Parliament with close connections to New England. Ashurst and Dudley looked to obtain a charter for the production of naval stores and arranged a trial shipment of masts to England in the hope of winning the favor of the Lords of Trade. Encouragement also

came from England, both from merchants lobbying for masting contracts and political officials eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the crown.36

Although New England and the Naval Office had a shared interest in the promotion of the mast trade, they understood its benefits differently. Both knew that the navy's demand for masts and naval stores was matched by the abundant timber supplies of Maine and New Hampshire, but each side sought to tip the scales of the market in its own favor. As timber producers, New Englanders supported royal forest policy only to the extent that it opened up commercial opportunities for the region's lumbermen and merchants. In their eyes, masting contracts were valuable because they limited competition and gave lumbermen a reliable market for their timber. Without subsidies and protective legislation, New England was unable to compete with Scandinavia in the sale of timber and naval stores. High labor costs and the long Atlantic voyage made the transportation of masts and tar expensive and risky in America. John Taylor, a New Hampshire merchant with many years in the masting trade, made this point clear in a memorial presented to the Lords of the Admiralty in 1694. "I would gladly see this Kingdom independent of Sweden and Denmark," he assured them, "but I must speak as a merchant who judges his trade only by the measure of profit; and then arises the difficulty of how we shall bring bulky goods from a very remote part as cheaply as from countries near us." Taylor explained that it was impossible for Americans to sell masts and naval stores at as low a price as the Scandinavians and suggested that the crown should treat New England as a supplier of last resort for timber products, "with more regard to getting it than the price." The surest way of guaranteeing a supply of naval stores, he concluded,

was by encouraging the manufacture of pitch and tar in New Hampshire, presumably with bounties and other subsidies.37

British authorities were willing to support Taylor's program, but they also sought to protect naval timber against indiscriminate felling by New England's lumbermen. As purchasers of timber and naval stores, the navy commissioners wanted a continual supply of pines and oak for as low a price as possible. The rapid depletion of the forests of New Hampshire and Maine threatened to limit this supply and drive prices upward. In a 1700 report to the Privy Council, the Board of Trade speculated that "in two or three years time there will not be a good tree left for the use of His Majesty's Navy, but what will be so far up in the country that the carriage to Piscataway will cost more than it will be worth."

Pine trees suitable as masts on naval vessels were being cut into deals and staves or were sent as masts and spars to Portugal and Spain, countries that, the Board reminded its readers, "upon a turn of affairs, may prove our enemies." The only way to protect white pines against the depredations of lumbermen was to introduce punitive measures, preferably through an act of Parliament, that would force the inhabitants of New England to reserve a portion of the forest to the crown.38

On the basis of these recommendations, Parliament passed a law in 1705 that extended the provisions of the Massachusetts charter to include all of the northern colonies, placed bounties on the production of naval stores, and prohibited the felling of pitch and tar pines for non-naval purposes. This act became the basis of the crown's "broad arrow" policy in North America, so called because surveyors of the woods marked

37 CSP. vol. 14 (1693-96), fol. 967.
38 CSP. vol. 18 (1700), fol. 841, pp. 563-67. The Board's report was based primarily on information provided by the Earl of Bellomont, governor of New England and New York, who was looking to win points with his superiors by taking the lead in the development of royal forest policy.
potential mast trees with three hatchet strokes that resembled an arrow or a crow's foot.

Soon after the passage of the act, Jonathan Bridger, a former shipwright and naval purser who had played a leading role in formulating the broad arrow policy, was appointed surveyor-general of the king's woods in America. Unlike his predecessor, Jahleel Brenton, a customs collector who had done little to earn his salary as surveyor, Bridger was firmly determined to uphold royal authority in New England's forests.

*Surveying the Woods*

The broad arrow policy made all tall white pines on public land in New Hampshire and Maine the property of the crown, prohibiting lumbermen from felling them without a royal license. But the crown's property rights did not have teeth unless it defended them in the courts or protected them with the sword. Like colonial proprietors of the previous century, royal officials were presented with the problem of making good on land claims that had more legitimacy in Europe than in America. Separated by an ocean from Maine and New Hampshire, royal officials in Whitehall could not control crown lands directly and depended instead on agents in the colonies. The agents' task was to defend the crown's property through a combination of enticements -- in the form of bounties on pitch, tar, turpentine, and hemp -- and the enforcement of prohibitive timber laws.

Like Gorges and Mason, the crown was hamstrung in this task by a lack of funds and weak lines of communication. Jonathan Bridger in 1705 was paid a salary of £200, which was rather modest given that a substantial portion of it was used to pay his deputies and to cover travelling expenses. With the aid of two or three deputies, Bridger
was expected to mark all the tall white pines found near the Piscataqua and its tributaries -- a vast area that extended some fifty miles into the interior -- and to protect them from illegal cutting. Because the territory was so large and his deputies so few, Bridger had little hope of catching violators red-handed and depended on paid informants who fingered wrongdoers, receiving a portion of the seized logs in return. Even when lumbermen were caught and prosecuted, they were unlikely to be convicted because their cases were tried by the county judiciary, which was dominated by local timber interests.

In 1708 Bridger brought charges against John Plaisted, a prominent New Hampshire merchant and council member, for cutting mast trees without a license. Claiming that he had a license through Francis Collins, an English merchant with a contract from the navy, Plaisted had sent lumbermen into the woods during the winter, telling them to cut as many mast trees as they could. Bridger estimated that only one in four of the trees that they felled were deemed worthy to be masts, while the rest were sent to the sawmills. Bridger took the case to York County court, but after a summary trial the jury found Plaisted innocent of all charges, leading Bridger to grumble that the jurymen were "all as guilty" as the defendant.39

Although Bridger's superiors in London were sympathetic to his cause, there was little they could do to help him. In the age of sail, distance presented a formidable barrier to administrative centralization and left the American colonies with a remarkable degree of political independence. Merchantmen sailing between Britain and New England in the eighteenth century had to complete a voyage of some 2800 miles, which most sailed in seven or eight weeks. Although vessels became more complex in their sails and rigging during the eighteenth century, the duration of this journey did not decline much before

the introduction of the clipper and the ocean steamer in the 1830s.\textsuperscript{40} Trans-Atlantic correspondents had to contend with a two-month lag in the transmission of their letters, a problem that was compounded by the seasonality of commerce between Britain and New England. The only time of the year in which vessels from the mother country were certain to be calling at New England’s ports was in the summer, when the mast fleet made its arrival. During the rest of the year, correspondents were often forced to find more circuitous methods of communicating across the ocean.

The uncertainty of communication was particularly burdensome for royal officials, who were expected to report regularly to the Board of Trade. Joseph Dudley, governor of Massachusetts during the War of Spanish Succession, often lamented in his letters that the irregular traffic between Boston and London prevented him from reporting to the Board of Trade as regularly as he would have liked. Between October 1705 and July 1706, he received no letters from the Board, while sending four of his own, one in April by a vessel that he considered to be an "uncertain conveyance" and another in July sent via Barbados to be transferred to a packet boat travelling to England. In this last letter, which did not arrive at the Board’s offices until November, Dudley remarked that

\textsuperscript{40} Steele, \textit{English Atlantic}, 17, 57-77, 249-50, Table 4.4; Gary M. Walton, “A Quantitative Study of American Colonial Shipping: A Summary,” \textit{Journal of Economic History} 26 (1966): 597. Improvements in maritime transport before the American Revolution were the result of a growth in the frequency, rather than the speed, of voyages. The expansion of Atlantic trade, particularly after the Treaty of Utrecht, created a steady increase in the volume of oceanic traffic at all ports in the British empire. More vessels built to accommodate this traffic, and the existing mercantile fleet became more efficient. The growth of markets made it easier for ships to acquire and dispose of cargoes, so that vessels did not need to spend long periods in port waiting for the arrival of goods. Fewer days in port meant more days in transit, and vessels by the mid-1700s were making more voyages during their lifetimes than they had a century earlier.
he had so little confidence in the trans-Atlantic mails that he did not intend to send a full report until the departure of the mast fleet in September.41

Maritime communications became somewhat more dependable after the Peace of Utrecht, and Massachusetts's officials by mid-century were less likely to encounter difficulties in exchanging letters with the Board of Trade. But the long oceanic voyage remained a source of frustration. The length of the journey made it impossible for the metropolitan government to respond immediately to crises in North America or to involve itself to any significant extent in the day-to-day business of governing the colonies. The Privy Council intervened only periodically in the administration of the colonies, issuing broad directives to governors, adjudicating disputes, and appointing and dismissing colonial officials. Even in these cases, the Council's authority was limited because the enforcement of orders depended on the compliance of local authorities and its personnel decisions were invariably influenced by lobbying on the part of colonial agents. The governors-general, who acted as the crown's representatives in the colonies, were more directly involved in provincial politics, but they, too, were constrained by distance. A journey of at least a day by sail and as much as a week by horse separated Boston from Casco Bay, making it difficult for royal officials in the capital to react promptly to events on the eastern frontier.

The barriers of land and sea made government primarily a local responsibility. The town meeting in Maine and New Hampshire was the focus of most political activity: assessing and collecting taxes, distributing lands, cutting roads, building churches and schools, maintaining garrison houses, settling minor disputes, caring for the poor, and

41 CSP, vol. 23 (1706-1708), fols. 288, 443, pp. 213, 178-79. Dudley had improvised in similar fashion in the past, having sent a letter to the Board by way of Lisbon in April 1704. See CSP, vol. 22 (1704-1705),
supporting ministers. Because selectmen met their fellow townspeople nearly everyday, it was easy for them to respond promptly to local concerns. Officials working in London and Boston, on the other hand, were distant from the places they governed, and encountered more difficulties in gathering information and enacting policies. The crown's authority in the New World depended on the existence of trans-Atlantic political networks sustained by maritime transportation and the written word.

Every year the Board of Trade, the advisory body charged with oversight of the American colonies, received hundreds of letters from correspondents in North America and the West Indies and dozens more from colonial agents in London. Although the Board was staffed by an assortment of clerks and copyists, it was not in any real sense a bureaucracy; its commissioners were political appointees rather than career civil servants and its procedures were relatively informal. More importantly, the Board did not have an agency devoted exclusively to the disinterested gathering of information and depended on reports from outsiders for its knowledge of the colonies. The bulk of these reports came from governors and other royal officials, who owed their posts and salaries to the crown and were consequently loyal to the royal prerogative. Official memoranda were supplemented by letters from colonial agents, representatives of proprietary companies, and private individuals, who weighed in on issues in which their interests were at stake.42

This communication was often personal in character; many letters were addressed to individual commissioners rather than the Board itself and were couched in deferential

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language that explicitly recognized the social superiority of the person being addressed. Letters and petitions — the typical method by which corporations, informal associations, or private individuals brought their grievances to the authorities — were customarily directed to an "honored Sir" and signed by a "humble and obedient Servant." This deferential language reflected not the slavish subservience of the correspondents but the continuing importance of patronage and personal ties in the political world of the early eighteenth century. Although many impersonal, "modern" forms of political association, such as lobbying organizations and national parties, had their tentative beginnings in eighteenth-century Britain, family ties, friendships, and patronage remained central to political life. The Board of Trade, as Ian Steele has pointed out, "should be viewed as a changing group of individuals rather than a bureaucratic institution," because "in the early eighteenth century [personal] connections were bureaucracy." At both the Colonial Office and other departments of the government, the exercise of power depended on a pyramid of patron-client relationships that connected the political centers of Westminster and Whitehall with the localities.

These relationships acted as conduits for both patronage and information. Possessing only the bare bones of bureaucratic organization, agencies such as the Board of Trade drew their knowledge of the colonies mainly from petitions and reports, which were inevitably colored by the interests of their senders. The typical petition began by

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43 A petition in the eighteenth century could be brought by a single individual and did not need to be accompanied by a long list of signatures. Much of the legislation of Massachusetts General Court during peacetime was initiated by petitions; Alison Olson has estimated that about half the laws passed in the American colonies before the Revolution were based on petitions. See Alison G. Olson, "Eighteenth-Century Colonial Legislatures and Their Constituents," Journal of American History 79 (1992): 543-67.

outlining the problem at hand, skewing the information to make the writer's demands seem reasonable. The petitioner then outlined a plan of action for the government, emphasizing its importance to the interests of king and country, even though its most immediate beneficiary was nearly always the petitioner himself. Because such petitions and letters formed the basis of the Board's knowledge of the colonies, they strongly influenced the formulation of colonial policy. The commissioners knew that letters from America served as a useful guide to public opinion and as an indication of the extent to which royal initiatives would be palatable in the colonies.45

Political favor, as a consequence, tended to flow along the channels cut by communication; unless people had the ear of the government, they could not expect it to work on their behalf. Personal ties mattered a great deal under these circumstances, since government officials were inclined to see the justice in their friends' grievances and the faults in those of their enemies. Patronage flowed freely to those who won the favor of the government and ran dry for its opponents. Not surprisingly, political life in Georgian England was characterized by intrigue and underhanded dealings as ambitious merchants and politicians courted the favor of the powerful while simultaneously attempting to undermine their rivals. Because political figures represented and drew support from their followers, competition for place and patronage was not merely a matter of personal striving but a contest between rival interest groups.46

45 As Richard Bushman has pointed out, deferential language of petitions allowed people to express their grievances against the authorities without calling into doubt their sense of allegiance. See Richard L. Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 46-54.

Personal attacks against public figures in this context were also assaults against the policies they represented. If laws and directives were based on petitions and pleas from the localities, the crown could count on local cooperation in their enforcement since the inspiration for the policies lay among the very people they were intended to affect. But initiatives devised by outsiders needed to be enforced by outsiders, and colonial resentment against unpopular laws was usually directed against the officials sent to uphold them.\textsuperscript{47} The provisions of the 1705 forest law that rewarded the lobbying efforts of New Englanders, particularly the bounties on naval stores, were well received in America and did not face popular resistance. But the punitive aspects of the law, which placed a ban on the felling of pines, were drawn up in Britain by men such as Edward Randolph and Jonathan Bridger, who were indifferent if not hostile to the interests of New England. These provisions had little support in New England, and local opposition focused on the man who was appointed to enforce them, Jonathan Bridger.

Soon after Bridger began to prosecute lumbermen such as John Plaisted for violations of forest laws, the notables of New Hampshire and Maine launched a counterattack against him, assailing his reputation in England and America. Through their contacts in England, Plaisted and his allies sent messages to the Board of Trade accusing him of corruption and suggesting that he had allowed local mill owners to saw mast trees into lumber in return for bribes. When Bridger was informed of the rumors, he dispatched a letter to the Board in March 1709, denying all wrongdoing and asking that his accusers come forward to be publicly interrogated on their charges. Aware that his connections in the mother country were in need of repair, he apologized for past

"mistakes," particularly his persistence in asking for a higher salary. He then made a journey through the settlements of New Hampshire, posting notices on meetinghouse doors in which he refuted the charges and promised a reward of £100 to any person who could prove his guilt. He also listed the regulations for cutting trees and promised a reward to people who brought information that led to a successful conviction.48

Bridger understood that attacks against his reputation threatened his political career. Like all royal officials in America, his political survival depended on his ability to remain in the good graces of the Board of Trade, which was responsible for his appointment and his salary. Its members needed to be assured that he was carrying out his office honestly and not using it as a platform for jobbery and extortion. Since the Board did not have any impartial agents who could monitor Bridger's actions, its evaluation of his performance was based on information obtained from letters written in the colonies or from conversations with colonial agents. This information was inevitably colored by the interests of those who delivered it because few people would bother to write unless they had a political axe to grind. If Bridger's opponents managed to cast doubts on good faith, he would lose the Board's confidence and would be recalled to England. And if they undermined his reputation, they would call into question the credibility of his reports from the colonies. Bridger knew the danger of malicious rumors, and his regular correspondence with the mother country was meant to ensure that the Board would see his side of the story.49

48 DHSM 9: 270-71.
49 When Bridger prosecuted three men in 1720 for cutting mast trees, he told the Board of Trade that they "may expect a cloud of witness's affidavits against me," because he had attempted to uphold the prerogative. See CSP, vol. 32 (1720-21), fol. 118, p. 55.
Because his office led him to trample on local interests, the surveyor of the woods inevitably became a magnet for personal attacks. The most sustained assaults came in the second decade of the century, as timber merchants in New Hampshire and the “populist” party in Massachusetts -- a group of assemblymen hostile toward the expansion of royal prerogative -- united in their opposition to Bridger. The earliest accusations came from merchants who were directly affected by Bridger’s prosecutions. In February 1710, Bridger complained in a letter to the Board of Trade that he was being made the object of a personal vendetta by John Mico, the agent of Francis Collins, a London merchant who held a masting contract with the navy. Mico’s "mallice is as great as ever," he told them, "and reports all over the countrey he will turn me out, if it cost him £10,000." Bridger was not mistaken: a few months later, a number of merchants allied with Mico and Collins brought a report to the Board of Trade accusing Bridger of being "guilty of bribery and corruption, and making devastation of the woods he was sent to preserve." They claimed that Bridger had allowed the "common people to cut what trees they please" in exchange for bribes and had recently received £50 for an illegal shipment of masts.50

The circle of Bridger’s enemies widened after the Peace of Utrecht as growing numbers of investors in Massachusetts became interested in the lands of Maine and New

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50 CSP, vol. 25 (1710-11), fols. 86,329. Bridger’s reputation also came under attack by fellow officials. His first voyage to New England in 1698 had been described to the Board of Trade in an unflattering light by the Earl of Bellomont, then governor of New York and New England. Bellomont reported that Bridger and two other surveyors sent by the commissioners of the navy had been blown off course and forced to land in Barbados, where Bridger and a colleague fell sick of a fever "contracted by a debauch." Bridger’s colleague, considered "the better of the two" by Bellomont, died in Barbados, but Bridger recovered and went on to New Hampshire. The governor scolded Bridger for his "foolish and unhappy parsimony," which had brought "much disappointment and loss of time" in the task of furnishing the navy with naval stores from New England. Though Bellomont was a loyal defender of royal forest policy, he saw Bridger as an officious meddler and potential rival, and his remarks about the surveyor’s syphilitic episode in
Hampshire. In 1713 the provincial government revived the Committee of Eastern Claims and Settlements, which had been established for two brief periods in 1700 and 1702. The committee began preparing the Book of Eastern Claims, a registry of land titles for the region east of Wells that allowed former inhabitants of Maine to reclaim holdings they had abandoned during wartime. The list of people who presented deeds to the committee included former inhabitants of Maine as well as speculative land companies from Boston that had purchased seventeenth-century patents and other titles in the hope of profiting from the settlement of Maine's lands. 51

One of these groups of investors was the Lincolnshire Company, or Muscongus Proprietors, who had acquired title to approximately one million acres between the St. George and Penobscot rivers on the basis of a 1630 patent to John Beauchamp and Thomas Leverett and a 1694 deed between Madockawando and Sir William Phips. The original deeds belonged to the descendants of Leverett and Phips, who in 1719 sold shares to thirty investors expected to provide the financial backing for the settlement of their lands. Several of the shareholders were also members of the populist party, including Dr. Elisha Cooke, Jr., one of the most vocal critics of royal prerogative in the House of Representatives. To men such as Cooke, Bridger became both a symbol of arbitrary royal power and a practical impediment to the development of their holdings in York County. 52 Early in 1718, Cooke and his allies launched a campaign to discredit Bridger, using Massachusetts's agent in London, Jeremiah Dummer, to lobby for his

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52 Cooke and others had substantial holdings in Maine even before the acquisition of the Muscongus Patent.
dismissal. Cooke also took direct aim at the broad arrow policy, arguing that it did not apply to Maine's lands. Since the region had been purchased from the Gorges family, he reasoned, it was private property, and according to the terms of the 1705 act white pines were protected only in territory that was not divided into private holdings.53

In February 1718, Cooke took his case to the House of Representatives, accusing Bridger of corruption. Loggers, he claimed, had been forced to pay bribes to the surveyor before entering the woods to cut white pines. In the ensuing months, Cooke collected depositions from more than a dozen lumbermen, most alleging that they had been made to pay six shillings for every team of oxen sent into the woods. In a later speech to the House, Cooke reported that John Mico had paid the surveyor £50 for the right to send a shipload of masts to England. Many of those who backed Cooke's charges were respected figures in northern New England; among the deponents were members of New Hampshire's leading families, including Archibald Macpheadris, Timothy Wentworth, and Elisha Plaisted. Bridger had already been threatened with dismissal in the winter of 1715-16 and had been forced to return to England to restore his reputation. Cooke's campaign, combined with Jeremiah Dummer's lobbying efforts in London, put the final nails in the surveyor's coffin. By October 1718 a letter arrived in Boston reporting that Bridger had been relieved of his post and replaced by Charles Burniston, a London merchant. In a letter written the same month, Bridger openly criticized the Board's decision but also admitted that his unpopularity in Maine and New Hampshire had made it nearly impossible for him to carry out his office. Claiming that "my life is threatened if

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53 On the political background of Cooke's campaign, see William Pencak, War, Politics, and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 62-67. Bridger received support from governor Samuel Shute, who opposed Cooke's plan for the establishment of a private bank to increase
found on my duty in the woods," he reported that backwoodsmen had "begun to cut [and] 
destroy all before them" since news of his dismissal had spread to northern New 
England.54

Although he almost certainly did not reach the heights of venality described by 
Cooke, Bridger had probably engaged in activities that left him open to charges of 
corruption. Like other royal officials of the time, Bridger was remunerated not only with 
a salary but with various perquisites of office that allowed him to increase his income. 
The crown in this respect behaved much like a merchant of the time, both of them faced 
with the problem of directing large organizations with an insufficient supply of funds. 
Wholesalers in port towns advanced credit to producers such as farmers and fishermen 
with the knowledge that both creditor and debtor would receive a share of their crops or 
their catch. Debtors would divide their time between producing for the market and 
working for their own subsistence. This arrangement allowed merchants to limit their 
expenses because they did not have to provide for their workers year-round. It also 
passed some of the merchant's risk on to the producer, since debtors were legally 
obligated to make good on their loans. In similar fashion, the crown advanced a post and 
a modest salary to its officeholders with the understanding that civil servants would make 
additional income through the performance of their office. This practice cut the expenses 
of governments and allowed them to shift some of the burden of risk -- say, of failures to 
collect revenues or of botched privateering expeditions -- on to their office holders. But

54 CSP, vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 33, p. 10; vol. 30, fol. 735, pp. 368-69; vol. 31, fol. 578, pp. 365-68. 
Cooke's charges were later confirmed by Bridger's successor, Robert Armstrong, who reported that Bridger 
had accepted bribes from timber merchants and had looked the other way as they illegally cut mast trees. 
Yet Armstrong's charges were self-serving, since he had a vested interest in appearing more vigilant than 
the crown, like a wholesaling merchant, could not directly supervise its employees and
was dependent on their good faith, hence the constant ruminating at the Board of Trade as
to whether the reports of royal officials "had credit" or were credible.55

In Bridger's case, the salary that came with the post of surveyor was inadequate to
maintain a genteel lifestyle, and it was understood that Bridger would also receive a share
of all the fines exacted under the forest laws. But Bridger was unable to collect this
revenue because of his inability to successfully prosecute violations of the laws. Even
when he finally managed to secure a conviction in 1713 against three men for cutting a
mast tree, none of their neighbors would purchase their estate at public auction, making it
impossible to collect their fines.56 Without the fines, Bridger's deputies and informers
could not be paid their rewards and consequently had little reason to be vigilant in the
enforcement of the forest laws. In a December 1717 letter to the Board of Trade, Bridger
reported that he had appointed seven deputies "well knowing in the woods and people of
good repute," but admitted that he "cannot give them any reward so what may be
expected from them I humbly submitt to their Lordshipps."57 To make matters worse, the
surveyor did not receive any salary at all in the last two years of his tenure and was
dependent on loans for his subsistence. In all likelihood, the frustrations of his office led
Bridger to charge all lumbermen a fee before entering the woods, thus guaranteeing
himself a steady income and a modicum of control over the timber trade.

55 On the connection between merchant credit and the management of risk, see Rosemary E. Ommer, ed.,
Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton, N.B.: Acadiensis Press,
1990); on credit and the economy of early modern England, see Craig Muldrew, The Economy of
Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (New York: St. Martin's
56 CSP, vol. 27 (1712-14), fol. 518, p. 257; fol. 249, p. 126.
57 CSP, vol. 30 (1717-18), fol. 283, pp. 139-40.
In accepting this compromise, Bridger effectively admitted defeat in his battle against New England's timber merchants over the enforcement of forest laws. Far from accepting the notion that white pines were the property of the crown, the inhabitants of Maine and New Hampshire treated the trees that grew on public lands as a common resource to be divided amongst themselves. This point of view was upheld by the judges and juries of the Court of Common Pleas, who consistently thwarted any attempts to enforce the broad arrow policy. Acting as agents of community sentiment, the courts refused to indict offenders of the forest laws and tacitly defended the notion that forest products were owned by New Englanders themselves, to be sold to the highest bidder on an open market. Because the county courts were the only legitimate arbiter of property rights in the region, Bridger's attempts to prosecute the laws were doomed to failure. He admitted as much in several letters to the Board of Trade, telling them that "all the people on the frontiers depend on the woods for their livelihood and say the King has no woods here, and they will cut what and where they please as long as the Charters good."58

Bridger's only recourse was to turn to his superiors at Whitehall for support, but they failed to provide him with the funds and personnel necessary to enforce the forest laws. Worse still, New Englanders proved effective at using trans-Atlantic lines of communication to their own advantage. By flooding the Board of Trade with rumors of Bridger's wrongdoings, Elisha Cooke and his allies undercut the surveyor's authority in New England by calling into question his reputation in the mother country. This strategy eroded Bridger's power and allowed New Englanders to evade punitive forest laws. Not only did Yankee merchants continue to export masts and other timber to Iberia and the

58 Ibid.
West Indies, they also transshipped naval stores from North Carolina to England, collecting the bounties on tar and pitch made by the Carolinians.59

Bridger's ordeal was an instructive example of the limitations of imperial power in the First British Empire. As Jack Greene has argued, the coercive model of late nineteenth-century imperialism fits poorly with the political facts of the previous era of colonization. The effective operation of early modern empires century depended on the consent of colonists living at the peripheries, who accepted royal authority only because it protected their customary liberties.60 The circuitous methods by which imperial authorities controlled and gained knowledge of distant territories tended to reinforce this relationship. In the heyday of nineteenth-century imperialism, European powers ruled vast territories through colonial bureaucracies whose knowledge of their subjects depended little on the cooperation of native inhabitants. The authoritarian structure of power in these colonies was reflected and reinforced by centralized techniques of information-gathering: British knowledge of India, for example, owed little to native map-making and much to large-scale land surveys carried out by highly trained engineers using geodetic triangulation.61 In the eighteenth-century, by contrast, knowledge and control of the land depended on the cooperation of colonists, who were steadfast in their defense of customary rights and liberties. The flow of information determined the balance of power; because the Board of Trade received much of its information about

Maine from merchants and agents from New England, its centralizing policies were
doomed to fail.

_Samuel Waldo and the Muscongus Patent_

The short trip between Boston and Maine posed a less of an obstacle to political
authority than the Atlantic, and the leading figures of the Bay Colony wielded greater
influence to the eastward than did their metropolitan counterparts. The resettlement of
Maine following the Peace of Utrecht brought the region’s towns deeper into the political
fold of Massachusetts, as the provincial government took an active role in sorting out the
land claims of returning colonists. After they had resolved disputes between rival groups
of proprietors over the distribution of common lands, towns from Casco Bay westward
became increasingly integrated into the world of provincial politics, sending
representatives to the assembly, winning a handful of appointments to the council, and
shaping legislation through petitions and informal influence. To the east of Casco Bay,
on the other hand, lay a large expanse of territory that had been weakly held or never
occupied by the English. With the cession of Acadia by the French, the time seemed ripe
for its settlement, and the lead was taken by a number of land companies from Boston
and environs who derived their title to vast proprietary holdings from seventeenth-century
patents, grants, and Indian deeds.62

To the merchants and gentlemen who invested in these companies, the lands of
Maine were a form of capital stock whose value was expected to accrue over time. With
a rapidly expanding population and a growing demand for natural resources, it was
generally understood that the value of land would steadily rise throughout New England. The safest investments were in holdings within chartered townships but the most spectacular profits were made in frontier areas, where land could be purchased cheaply and sold later at a much higher price. As in any speculative venture, investments in land companies were made with the expectation that the value of stocks would rise in the future. The stockholders of the companies believed that population growth would fuel a demand for lands in marginal areas such as Maine, and that as more colonists settled in York County, the clearing of roads and construction of mills would drive up land prices further still. But the problem was to establish ownership of the land in advance of settlement and to hold the land in reserve until prices had risen sufficiently.63

Success in this regard required a defensive strategy of protecting the land against rival claimants and an offensive strategy of promoting the settlement of proprietary holdings. The effective use of communication was essential to both aims. In the eighteenth century, merchants made their profits not so much by increasing the volume of production as by merchandising and speculation. Traders flourished when they cornered the market on various commodities and controlled their distribution. Because their success depended on their ability to link producers with consumers, merchants were constantly in need of reliable and timely information about prices, markets, and sources of goods. They were also continually courting political favor, since the ability to secure exclusive rights to a commodity often depended on the influence of public authorities. The land was a good like any other in this respect, and the successful promotion of

company holdings depended on the creation of human networks that enabled proprietors in Boston to develop and protect their lands from afar.

The case of Samuel Waldo, one of the leading promoters of proprietary holdings before the Seven Years War, provides an illuminating example of how such networks were created. Waldo's great-grandfather, Cornelius, had been one of the founders of Chelmsford and Dunstable, and his father and uncle were two of the original investors in the Lincolnshire Company. By the time he was in his twenties, Samuel was trading merchandise from his house on Queen Street in Boston on capital advanced by his father, Jonathan. In 1728, Jonathan also gave Samuel his share in the Muscongus Patent as a deed of gift, encouraging his son's emerging career as a speculator in Maine's lands.64 A year earlier, Samuel had begun to purchase portions of the estate of Sylvanus Davis, a seventeenth-century trader who had built two sawmills and acquired extensive land holdings in Falmouth. His interest in Maine real estate climbed dramatically after he negotiated the confirmation of the Muscongus Patent by the Privy Council in 1732 and was rewarded half the Patent for his services. He added to his holdings after his return to New England, investing over £14,000 in Maine lands between 1732 and 1736 and receiving an additional share from the Lincolnshire Company.65 By the time of his death in 1759, Waldo had acquired approximately 13,000 acres in Falmouth, 350 acres in Scarborough, 200 acres in Biddeford, some 1,000 acres in North Yarmouth, two mills with four saws at Presumpscott and Stroudwater streams near Casco Bay, as well as the

400,000-acre share he held in Muscongus Patent: the executors of his estate valued his holdings in York County at £41,387.66

Although Waldo made frequent visits to his eastern holdings, his business was carried out for the most part by a number of agents acting on his behalf. In the 1730s, he formed a partnership with Thomas Westbrook, a masting agent and landowner who had moved to Falmouth after serving as commander of Maine's forces during Dummer's War. Not long after the war, Waldo won an appointment as the agent of Ralph Gulston, an English merchant who held a masting contract with the royal navy. Waldo retained the services of Westbrook as his own agent, who hired teams of lumbermen to cut and haul the trees specified in the contract and brought additional timber to Waldo's sawmills. Westbrook had acted in the past as a representative of the Pejepscot and Lincolnshire land companies and Waldo came to rely on him as his eyes and ears in real estate dealings in York County. The two men jointly purchased numerous tracts in Maine, and Westbrook kept Waldo abreast of potential buyers and sellers, estates made available by the deaths of landowners, and threats to Waldo's interests.67 A similar role was later played by Waldo's sons, Francis and Samuel, Jr., and his son-in-law, Isaac Winslow. A variety of other agents served Waldo in Maine by collecting rents and debts, paying bribes, organizing shipments of lumber, and retailing provisions and other goods. Still others carried out

66 Inventory of Waldo estate, Boston, August 18, 1760, Waldo Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me., box 1, folder 8, fols. 4-5.
land surveys and facilitated the settlement of the Lincolnshire Company's townships [see Fig. 3.5].

The regular communication of Waldo with his agents was made possible by the frequent sailings of coasting sloops between Boston and Maine. As the center of timber trade moved from Piscataqua to Casco Bay, a steadily increasing number of vessels called at Falmouth and points eastward, carrying cargoes on the accounts of Waldo and other merchants. Waldo was not himself a ship owner but the steady stream of coasting vessels trading to the east allowed him to keep a constant communication with his agents in Maine. In May and June 1744, he received over two dozen letters from correspondents in York County, with some correspondents writing several times a week. The high volume of mail was largely due to preparations for war -- Waldo was commander of York County's eastern regiment -- but it also reflected the rapidity and reliability of communication between Boston and Maine. Waldo made ample use of coasting vessels, corresponding and visiting his eastern settlements regularly. The success of his business in Maine depended on this active involvement; when Waldo went to England for several years after 1749, his son remarked that his "Eastern affairs" suffered from neglect.

But it was in his effective use of overseas networks of communication that Waldo made his mark. Located in a region where land claims conflicted and political authority

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68 For purchases of land, see indenture with Thomas Smith, October 27, 1732; for the collection of rents and debts, see letter of Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 6, 1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass.; indenture with Enoch Freeman, December 29, 1758; for shipments of timber, see letters of Thomas Carver, May 18, 1744, Enoch Freeman, June 6, 7, 8, 1744, Samuel Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; for payments of bribes, see letter of Enoch Freeman, June 8, 1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society; for retailing, see letter of Captain Phillips, Boston, June 29, 1753, Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, Mass., vol. 50, fol. 119; certificate from Thomas Fuller, Knox Papers, vol. 50 fol. 133; receipt, Knox Papers, vol. 54, fol. 2; for surveys, see depositions of George Drinkwater, January 14, 1734/5, Jonas Willson and Henry Macintire, March 27, 1734, Stephen Jones, May 19, 1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 9, 32.

69 See 26 letters dated May and June, Samuel Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
was precarious, the Lincolnshire Company's holdings were secure only if the owners managed to get the backing of several levels of government. Waldo was intensely aware of the connection between commerce and politics and spared no effort in his attempts to influence provincial and imperial leaders. The first challenge he faced was from David Dunbar, an Irish-born military officer who was appointed surveyor-general of the woods in 1728.71 Having learned from Bridger's failures that surveyors could not count on local cooperation in the enforcement of the broad arrow policy, Dunbar introduced a proposal that would allow the crown to gain tighter control of New England's forests without having to defer to the region's authorities. His solution was to establish a royally-administered settlement in Sagadahock, the name traditionally given to the territory between the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers. Soon after his arrival in New England in 1729, the surveyor-general recruited some three hundred Scotch-Irish migrants to move to the lands east of the St. George River and proposed that a separate province be established east of the Kennebec, to be called Georgia. 72 Knowing that Dunbar

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70 Letter of Francis Waldo to Samuel Waldo, May 18, 1752, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 110.
71 Dunbar's strongest backer at the Board of Trade was Colonel Martin Bladen, one of the leaders of the West Indian party in Parliament. Like other West Indian planters, he resented New England's extensive involvement in illegal trade with the French Caribbean, which flooded the British market with French tropical produce and drove down the price of sugar from the English islands. Beginning in 1727, Bladen took the lead in pushing for a reform of the colonial administrative system, demanding tighter control of the colonies and a more rigid enforcement of the Navigation Acts. As the colony responsible for the most flagrant violations of trading laws, Massachusetts became a focal point of Bladen's campaign. In an effort to bring the New Englanders to heel, Bladen and his allies introduced legislation designed to clamp down on smuggling in the West Indies and also attempted to enforce existing imperial regulations, including the forest laws. See "Bladen, Martin," in Romney Sedgwick, ed., The House of Commons, 1715-1754, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 1:465-66; James A. Henretta, "Salutary Neglect": Colonial Administration Under the Duke of Newcastle (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), 60-106.
72 DHSM, 10:451-69. The lands east of the Kennebec nominally belonged to Massachusetts on the basis of its 1691 charter but they had been virtually unoccupied by the English since French and Wabanaki forces razed their fort at Pemaquid in 1696. After the Peace of Utrecht, various companies had floated schemes to settle the region, including a group led by the merchant-philanthropist Thomas Coram, who had begun his career as a shipwright in New England and had since become one of London's most successful merchants. Coram's plan to settle discharged soldiers in the region was scuttled after the bursting of the South Sea Bubble in 1720. But the merchant brought his scheme to the attention of the Board of Trade...
threatened the validity of the Muscongus Patent and promised to interfere with his masting operations, Waldo departed to England to plead the case of the Lincolnshire proprietors. Conscious of the value of metropolitan connections -- he even went so far as to name his youngest son after his English patron, Ralph Gulston -- Waldo exerted his influence at the Privy Council for over a year, winning a revocation of Dunbar's colony in 1732.73

The Privy Council's decision did not spell the end of Dunbar's stay in New England; in 1731 the Board of Trade had appointed him lieutenant-governor of New Hampshire in order to strengthen his position as surveyor-general. In the years that followed, Dunbar was drawn into a peculiar alliance with Waldo, the two of them united in opposition to the governor of Massachusetts, Jonathan Belcher. In 1734, an employee of Waldo's, William Leighton, organized a logging party to cut pine trees in Berwick in a forested area whose title was held by John Frost, a member of Piscataqua's oligarchy of merchant families. Dunbar assisted in the operations, marking the trees that were suitable for shipment as masts. Frost took Leighton to court on trespass charges, as much to make a political point as to collect damages. The county court found in Frost's favor, and over the next several years the case became tied up in a series of appeals and counter-appeals, eventually reaching the Privy Council in London. Much to Waldo's dismay, Belcher failed to lend support to his case and tacitly worked to advance the cause of Frost and his allies.74

once again in 1728 and it was quickly adopted by Dunbar. See CSP, vol. 27 (1712-14), fols. 357, 364, 366, 385; vol. 29 (1716-17), fol. 577; vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 628; DHSM, 10: 436-444.

73 DHSM 11: 134; Samuel Waldo, A Defence of the Title of the late John Leverett, Esq.; to a Tract of Land in the Eastern Parts of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, commonly called Muscongus Lands, lying upon St. George's, Muscongus, and Penobscott Rivers (Boston: Kneeland and Green[?], 1736), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 4098, 7-9.

Two years later, the governor again provoked Waldo's ire by failing to support him in a dispute with the Wabanakis over the settlement of the upper St. George River. Knowing that Belcher's reputation was vulnerable on both sides of the Atlantic, Waldo launched a public relations campaign at home -- which included two lengthy pamphlets that delineated the history of the Muscongus claim and insinuated that the governor surreptitiously encouraged the Indians -- and an intense lobbying effort in London to remove Belcher from office. By 1741, Waldo's efforts bore fruit with the replacement of Belcher by William Shirley, who had acted as Waldo's first lawyer in the Leighton case and was given a share of the Muscongus Patent as a reward.75

In his many voyages to England -- he made fifteen in his lifetime -- Waldo did more than protect his political interests; he also did much to promote the development of the Muscongus Patent. The recruitment of settlers was crucial to this effort, since the worth of real estate grew as its population increased; in 1729, Waldo told a colleague that the Muscongus Patent would in a few years be "very valuable, more especially as Lands adjacent thereto will soon be settled." But because Maine's soils were relatively infertile and its settlements vulnerable to Indian attack, land companies were hard pressed

75 Samuel Waldo, Whereas since my Return from St. George's River.... (Boston: n. p., May 22, 1735), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40087; idem., Defence of the Title; indenture of land from Samuel Waldo to William Shirley, July 3, 1738, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fols. 34-35. Waldo belonged to one of several groups in New England who called for Belcher's removal. Elisha Cooke and his radical allies opposed the governor on constitutional grounds, criticizing on principle the representative of the prerogative in Massachusetts. The Wentworth family of Portsmouth was irritated by Belcher's close friendship with Richard Waldron and William Vaughan, who were the factional opponents of the Wentworths in the New Hampshire assembly. Belcher's attempts to control appointments to the provincial council and his desire to annex New Hampshire to Massachusetts bothered them even more. Both Waldo and the Wentworths had powerful metropolitan connections: William Shirley was the brother-in-law of the Duke of Newcastle, while Mark Hunking Wentworth was the masting agent of John Thomlinson, an influential figure in the Walpole administration. It was these connections that made Belcher's removal possible. See John A. Schultz, "Succession Politics in Massachusetts, 1730-1741," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 15 (1958): 508-20; CSP, vol. 41 (1734-35), fol. 166, p. 103; Malone, Pine Trees, 118-23.

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to attract families from southern New England. Waldo printed numerous handbills and inserted several advertisements in Boston newspapers announcing the availability of tracts in Maine, but because farmers preferred to purchase lands within their own townships or nearby areas, few people from Massachusetts proper took his offer.  

Like the proprietors of other companies, Waldo was forced to look across the ocean for settlers, recruiting migrants from Ireland, Scotland, and Germany. As early as 1720, the Lincolnshire Company had contracted with an agent in Ireland to send fifty families to settle two townships on the St. George River. But the deal fell through, as did several later attempts to recruit Irish settlers, and it was not until the 1730s that large numbers of foreign immigrants began arriving in the lands of the Muscongus Patent.

The first group were the fifty families brought over by David Dunbar, many of whom later purchased deeds from Samuel Waldo for holdings between the Muscongus and St. George rivers. In 1735, Waldo contracted with another group of Scotch-Irish families to settle at St. George River and in 1740 he made a similar agreement with some forty German families from Saxony. Although many of the settlers abandoned their holdings during the War of Austrian Succession (King George's War), others returned after the war and were joined by several more shipments of migrants in the 1750s. By 1760, it was

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76 Samuel Waldo to Thomas Paine, December 22, 1729, Miscellaneous Mss., Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.

77 For an example of a handbill, see Samuel Waldo, Samuel Waldo of Boston, merchant... hereby notifies all Persons... (Boston: n.p., March 3, 1734), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40088; for an example of a newspaper advertisement, see Boston Gazette, August 22, 1737.

estimated that there were 145 households established on Waldo's holdings at St. George, Medumcook, and Broad Bay, most of them with Scottish, Irish, or German surnames.  

The transportation of these immigrants across the Atlantic was an audacious undertaking that involved the coordination of several networks of communication. Recruiters in Europe sought out information about sources of prospective settlers and the costs of transporting them, sent out printed and spoken calls for migrants, and made arrangements for the settlers in America. The immigrants themselves shared information about transportation costs, economic opportunities in America, and prospects in different colonies. Agents in America, meanwhile, organized the transport of migrants from major ports to frontier areas, located and divided unsettled lands, and supplied the migrants with provisions. Waldo's role was to bring these networks together, encouraging and facilitating the movement of families from Europe to his holdings near the St. George River. He proved remarkably adept at synthesizing information drawn from various sources, contacting immigration agents in Frankfurt, recording the freight rates charged by shipmasters in Rotterdam, and learning how a settler family could support itself in its first year in Maine.

Yet he faced major obstacles in his efforts to recruit migrants. As a location for settlement, Maine paled in comparison to Pennsylvania or the Carolinas, which offered migrants richer soils and readier access to markets. German and Scotch-Irish settlers were more likely to follow their kin and neighbors to the Middle Colonies and the South.

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79 List of the settlers in St. Georges River, Medumcook and Broad Bay, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 166.
81 See, for example, letter of Waldo to Jean Palairet, Sept 20, 1757, Fürstlich Wiedisches Archiv Neuwied, Schrank 30, Gefach 3, Fascil 1 (photostat at Library of Congress), fol. 69-77, in which Waldo lists freight.
than to take their chances in cold and war-torn northern New England. Even when Waldo located a willing group of migrants, he was unable to bear the full cost of transporting them across the Atlantic and needed assistance from immigration agents or the immigrants themselves. Waldo countered the first problem by launching an ambitious propaganda campaign, issuing printed circulars in Ireland and Germany that advertised the availability of land in Maine. Generously describing the region's climate as "healthy" and its soils "exceedingly fruitful," the handbills offered attractive terms of settlement, typically allowing migrants one hundred acres gratis or for a nominal quitrent. The circulars specifically asked for migrants who could pay their own freight, and Isaac Winslow informed Waldo in 1752 that the Germans who migrated to Broad Bay were families who were "little in debt."

Constantly short of funds, Waldo also attempted between 1757 and 1759 to entice a Rhineland count to provide financial backing for the migration of a thousand German families, offering him a 200,000-acre share of the Muscongus Patent in return. Waldo once again painted a deceptively rosy picture of his holdings, reporting to the count's agent that Maine's lands were more fertile than those of Pennsylvania, that he had already settled three hundred German families along the Medomack River, that the value of some

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82 According to a petition from the immigrants, most owned land and houses in Germany, which they sold to pay their way to New England. See petition on behalf of Palatines, May 25, 1748, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 15A, fol. 33.


85 Waldo made this rationale clear in a letter to one of his agents in 1749, when he wrote that "the most effectual way to increase [the value of his holdings] will be to sell a Large share of the Lands to some Gentleman of Distinction, Fortune or Interest." Samuel Waldo to Captain Bradford, Boston, October 20, 1749, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 53, fol. 427.
of Waldo’s holdings had increased between thirty and seventy times since he first purchased them, and that the provincial government was considering plans to build a fort on the Penobscot River large enough to house a thousand soldiers. Waldo also floated a scheme in which the count would send a regiment of soldiers to fight in North America and have them settle in Maine after the end of the war. The deal foundered because English law prohibited the ownership of so large an estate by a foreigner, but Waldo’s creative efforts underscored his inability to finance migration on his own.86

Once the migrants had arrived in Maine, they continued to rely on Waldo’s assistance. Most settlers were indebted to Waldo, either for his payment of their passage or for shipments of provisions and tools from Boston. They were obliged to make good on their debts, typically by sending him shipments of timber or by performing services on his behalf. Waldo himself was chronically indebted, so much so that he was forced to foreclose on the properties of his partner Thomas Westbrook in 1743. Financial difficulties also led him to return to England in 1749 to collect fees for military services — after he had successfully defended a suit by his former ally William Shirley, who charged him, among other things, with failure to make good on debt payments.87 A scarcity of money, combined a need to share the risks of settlement and the timber trade, created a web of interdependence structured by patterns of debt and credit. Because people at all stages of the social hierarchy had an interest in Waldo’s enterprises, no one was exempt from their risks: Waldo, his settlers, agents, and patrons were all linked

87 Account of trial between Shirley and Waldo, Boston, February 1749, Knox Papers, vol. 50, fol. 96.
together in a chain of credit fashioned out of the promises each group made to one another.

Thus in October 1752, Waldo's agent, Isaac Winslow recorded the sums owed by 27 German settlers for shipments of provisions and tools, for amounts running from a little over five shillings to nearly £84. Meanwhile, Winslow and other agents were running their own debts with Waldo's Boston business partner and future son-in-law Thomas Flucker, who had loaned Waldo £280 in 1747 and continued to ship goods to his eastern settlements. Waldo himself was indebted to his English patrons; the letters he received from England consistently reminded him of his financial obligations. In England in 1757, he borrowed £8,000 from William Sitwell of London, a weighty sum even for a prosperous merchant such as Waldo. Because such loans were granted on the basis of trust -- prosecutions against debtors, as Waldo well knew, were costly in financial and personal terms and were to be avoided except as a last resort -- Waldo and his settlers became enmeshed in a network of debt and credit that increased their reliance on one another. Settlers came to depend on Waldo for the land and goods he advanced them, while Waldo drew much of his income from the rents and commodities supplied by his tenants in Maine.88

Waldo and his settlers were also bound together by a shared interest in the land.

One of the greatest demons Maine's inhabitants faced was the precariousness of their hold

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on their farms; persistently faced with Indian attack and disputes with rival claimants, frontier families were grateful to anyone who strengthened the security of their title. Waldo gladly played this role, defending his settlements against competing companies and using his influence to bolster English defenses on the eastern frontier. Following the declaration of war against the French in 1744, Waldo received dozens of letters and petitions from his settlers, asking for reinforcements to garrisons, shipments of provisions, financial aid to outlying towns, and commissions for officers. The merchant complied with many of the requests, taking a leading role in recruiting soldiers in 1744 and acting as one of the leaders of the Louisbourg expedition. He also battled more familiar enemies, preventing a rival proprietor from chartering a township on land belonging to his settlers.89

Although he was not elected to office, Waldo served as a political representative of his settlers, receiving petitions from aggrieved parties and exerting his influence in the provincial government. His son, Francis, also played a more official role, as a representative in the provincial assembly and customs inspector for Falmouth. Far from resenting the political connections of their landlord, settlers recognized that their interests were tied to his own and advanced by his influence on public officials. "I thank the Lord," wrote a clergyman from Georgetown of Waldo's friendship with William Shirley on the eve of war in 1744, "who hath put a Gentleman into the Chair of Government to

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89 Letters of Joshua Bang, May 4, 1744; Alexander Nichols, May 5, 1744; letter from townspeople of Walpole, May 8, 1744; William Burns, May 20, 1744; Benjamin Larabee, May 20, 1744; William McCleland and George Ferguson, May 24, 1744; Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 25, 1744; Sebastian Zuberbuhler, May 31, 1744; Joshua Moody, June 16, 1744; Arthur Savage, June 16, 1744; Robert Carver, June 16, 1744; Samuel Wheelwright, June 25, 1744; Henry Alexander, June 28, 1744; Joseph Woods, July 2, 1744; William Burns, July 2, 1744; Boyce Cooper, July 5, 1744; William Burns, August 25, 1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
whom you have ready access, with whom you have a Good understanding, and whose
Impartial administrations give us great consolations in this day of trouble."90

As in the case of earlier land companies, settlers and proprietors were tied
together by a shared claim to ownership of the land. By weaving a web of
communication that tied the interests of both London merchants and frontier farmers to
the protection of his property rights, Waldo managed to gain a large measure of control
over his holdings. Where imperial agents had failed to gain the support of the local
population, he deliberately fostered an identification between the public interest and his
private emolument.91 Of course, the only people entitled to Waldo's protection were
those who accepted his authority; those who claimed holdings under rival proprietors had
interests directly opposite to those of the Lincolnshire Company. Because Waldo's claim
was backed by an order of the Privy Council, few were willing to contest it and the rights
of his settlers were generally secure. But further to the west, in the region adjacent to the
Kennebec River, several large and powerful land companies made overlapping claims to
large portions of the same territory. The Kennebec (Plymouth), Pejepscot, Clarke and
Lake, Brunswick, and Sheepscot companies all held claims along or near the lower
Kennebec River, which they defended with greater energy following the declaration of
peace in 1749.92

Settlers who held title to their lands under rival companies ran the risk of being
ejected from their farms for no other reason than being on the wrong side of a proprietary

90 M. Clenachan to Samuel Waldo, May 23, 1744, Waldo Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society.
91 Waldo's success in prosecuting cases in the York County Court of Common Pleas is a measure of his
influence in the region: the court found in his favor in every one of the nearly two dozen cases he contested
at the county level: see York County Court of Common Pleas Records, Maine State Archives, Augusta,

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dispute over legal title. Deeds issued by the Kennebec Proprietors in the 1750s required settlers to hinder others from lumbering or planting on the proprietors' lands. Squatters and settlers who held title from rival land companies were to be brought to the attention of the proprietors and charged with trespass. In general, the proprietors sought ejectment rather than damages in trespass suits, calling into question the defendants' rights to the land and forcing them to quit their claims if they lost the case. The proprietors were also more likely to bring their suits to the Supreme Court, since the justices who sat on the provincial bench tended to be members of Boston's elite with family or political connections to the proprietors. Although York was one of the least populous counties in Massachusetts, it consistently provided a large proportion of the trespass suits heard by the Supreme Court. With less than one-tenth of the province's population, York accounted for twenty-two of the sixty-seven, or nearly a third, of the cases tried by the Court in 1750.

The actions of proprietary companies sometimes made innocent victims of Maine's settlers, who worked the land with their own hands and depended on it for their subsistence. Summary ejectments cost families tracts that they had themselves improved and the high cost of company lands left many with so little land that they could not make a living. By the 1760s, frontiersmen in Maine began engaging in acts of sabotage and intimidation against representatives of the proprietary companies, and after the American

93 Kennebec Purchase Papers, Maine Historical Society, Portland, Me., box 1, folders 4-18.
94 Peter E. Russell, Provincial Society and the Superior Court in Massachusetts, 1692-1774 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1990), 27-35; Appendix 1, Table 2. These figures are based on a generous estimate of York County's population in 1750. According to the census of 1765, Maine's population stood at a little under 23,000, while Massachusetts's total population was estimated at about 240,000: Maine accounted for about one-tenth of the population. But the rate of population growth between 1750 and 1765 was much
Revolution many became involved in what amounted to an open revolt against the proprietors.95

But in the 1730s, before there was much English settlement east of Casco Bay, Waldo and his colleagues faced a more immediate threat from a different quarter. In August 1735, a band of Wabanakis set fire to several bales of hay that Scotch-Irish settlers had cut on the east side of the Wiscasset River and told an ensign at the St. George blockhouse that they would to the same to the home of another settler who lived above the falls of St. George's River. Two years later, the Indians threatened to kill the sheep and cow of a settler named Thomas Gregg, one of them leaving a gun flint at the house of his wife as a reminder that a war would ensue if he did not leave. Like later white settlers, the Wabanakis held their land by custom and depended on it for their subsistence. They would not, as Waldo learned, abandon them without a struggle.96

higher in the Eastern parts than it was in the rest of Massachusetts; the proportion was almost certainly lower in 1750.

95 Alan Taylor, *Liberty Men and Great Proprietors: The Revolutionary Settlement on the Maine Frontier, 1760-1820* (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 11-87. Others opposed the proprietary companies because their reluctance to sell their holdings before prices rose acted as a brake on the advance of settlement. A critic of the Pejepscot Proprietors wrote in 1715 that absentee landowners, like "the Dog in the Fable will neither serve themselves, nor let others be serv'd." Forty years later, a Boston merchant living in London sharply criticized absentee proprietors in a 1755 memorandum, branding them "Monopolisers of Lands" who were "Imaginary Rich in Waste lands," and called for a tax that would force them to dispose of their holdings. See CSP, vol. 28 (1714-15), fol. 521, p. 234; John Barrell, "An Account of the Northern Colonies," London, March 6, 1755, in Stanley M. Pargellis, *Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1763: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle* (New York: Archon Books, 1969), 75-76. There were provincial regulations that required recipients of land grants to settle a minimum number of families on their lands within an allotted period of years, but they were usually winked at by provincial officials.

FIGURE 3.1. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA, 1694-95.

Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/968.
FIGURE 3.2. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES FROM THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA, 1723-25.

Entries, June 1723-Dec. 1725 (N=81)

- West Indies
- British Isles
- So. Europe
- Atlantic Islands
- BNA
- Other

Clearances, June 1723-Dec. 1725 (N=139)

- West Indies
- British Isles
- So. Europe
- Atlantic Islands
- BNA
- Other

Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/967. In Figures 3.1. and 3.2, entries to and from other ports in New England have been excluded. The discrepancy between the number of entries and clearances is due in part to the sale of ships: many vessels cleared from Piscataqua's shipyards were sold at foreign ports and never returned. The decline in the proportion of entries and clearances to the West Indies also took place in Boston, where vessels from the Caribbean accounted for more than half the entries in 1687-88 but only a quarter by 1718-19. The trend was reversed at Piscataqua later in the century; by the 1750s, vessels to and from the West Indies accounted for over half the port's traffic once again. This change reflected a shift in the center of the timber trade from Boston to New Hampshire and Maine; Boston assumed the role of a regional entrepôt that organized the shipment of commodities to and from other parts of greater New England. See Ian Steele, The English Atlantic, 61-62.

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FIGURE 3.3. CLEARANCES OF COASTING VESSELS FROM PISCATAQUA FOR BOSTON, AUG. 1694-SEPT. 1695.

Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/968.

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FIGURE 3.4. ENTRIES AND CLEARANCES AT THE PORT OF PISCATAQUA, JAN.-DEC. 1755.

Source: Public Record Office, CO 5/967.
The surveying of townships before settlement made it possible for proprietors to allocate their holdings as shares. The lot described above was recorded in the proprietors’ record book in 1738. Photocopied from the Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, vol. 50, fols. 23-27.
CHAPTER IV

A SWEET MOUTH BUT A BITTER HEART

As I said before, so I now say, that the Lands we own let us enjoy, and no Body take them from us. We said the same to those of our own Religion the French; altho we are a Black People yet God hath planted us here: God gave us this Land, and we will keep it, God Decreed all things, he Decreed this Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English Possess it but we will.
--Colonel Louis, Penobscot sagamore, 1752

Formal conferences between Wabanaki and English leaders never failed to attract an audience, for they offered one of the few great spectacles to be seen on the Maine frontier in the eighteenth century. Sagamores arrived in ruffled shirts and cocked hats, with strings of wampum wrapped around their necks. They were accompanied by as many as six hundred followers, many of them warriors with painted faces. Colonial commissioners, resplendent in fine clothing and powdered wigs, also arrived with pomp and ceremony and made a show of treating the sagamores with presents and refreshments. A cannon blast in the morning announced the beginning of the meeting and sagamores arrived in a flotilla of canoes with a Union Jack at the helm. The meetings, which usually lasted for a week or more, were conducted with a high degree of solemnity and concluded by an exchange of toasts and a dance performed by the young men of the Wabanaki delegation. Following two conferences with the Norridgewocks and Penobscots in June
and July 1754, the Reverend Thomas Smith of Falmouth remarked that the "summer's scene" was "of as much bluster as a Cambridge Commencement."1

The conferences were remarkable not only for their spectacle but in the degree to which their protocol was a compromise between European and Indian styles of diplomacy. The procedure for formal conferences was gradually established in the last quarter of the seventeenth century and had become regularized during the long period of imperial wars, as the conclusion and ratification of peace treaties required colonial governments to meet with the Wabanakis more frequently. Although the meetings took place in English towns or forts, New England's officials made many concessions to Wabanaki custom. The commissioners conformed to the Indian practice of turn-taking, with each delegation alternately talking while the other sat quietly. They also adopted the vocabulary of Eastern Woodlands diplomacy, speaking of the Wabanakis as their brothers, their alliance as a path, and peacemaking as a matter of burying the hatchet.2

The Wabanakis, for their part, opened the conference by toasting the British monarch and closed their treaties by signing or ratifying a written document. Wabanaki speakers gave weight to their words by laying beaver pelts or wampum belts on the ground after their speeches, but they also requested written minutes of the meetings from the English delegation.

The compromises made by both sides were a testament to the delegates' sincere desire to find common ground and to establish a lasting peace. The English hoped to

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2Some English officials incongruously used Iroquois diplomatic imagery, referring to the Anglo-Wabanaki alliance as a "covenant chain" that was "shined" by their words. In a 1714 meeting at Portsmouth, the governor of Massachusetts proposed that a peace agreement be commemorated by covering a hatchet with a kettle in the Iroquois manner. Querrebuit, the Wabanaki speaker, told him "I never saw how they put the Hatchet under the Kettle," but gave assurances that "I have put my Hatchet away." See DHSM, 23: 71.
persuade the Wabanakis to renounce their alliance with the French and cease their attacks against northern New England. Wabanakis tried to convince the English that their encroachments on Indian lands threatened the peace. But their collective efforts failed to create a lasting alliance, and the English could not prevent Wabanakis from joining arms with the French in every imperial war. Worse still, the conferences themselves bred hostility between the two groups, with each side feeling that the other had not spoken honestly. At a July 1713 meeting in Portsmouth, Governor Joseph Dudley flashed copies of seven treaties before the Wabanaki delegates, accusing them of breaking the terms of every single one. Later governors repeated these charges and blamed the Wabanakis for their alleged treason and bad faith. Many Wabanakis, for their part, distrusted the English and often suspected that beneath a veneer of friendliness the English were filled with greed and ill will. In 1721, several sagamores from Norridgewock, complaining that colonial leaders had twisted their words, declared that the English were "thieves and usurpers who wanted to unjustly invade their lands."3

Recent historians have placed most of the blame for these conflicts on the shoulders of English officials. According to the prevailing view, colonial leaders willfully broke treaties and produced sham deeds in a thinly-veiled attempt to legitimize the seizure of Wabanaki territory. In a recent article, historian David Ghere has argued that the government of Massachusetts "conducted a policy of deception" with respect to land ownership, leading the Indians to be "deceived by misleading rhetoric." Reproving English governors and interpreters for their incompetence and bad faith, he concludes that

3DHSM 23: 40-43; Vaudreuil and Begon to Minister, October 8, 1721, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 43, fol. 374; Vaudreuil and Begon to the King, June 8, 1722, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 44, fol. 303v. (My translation; original reads: "des voleurs et des usurpateurs qui vouloient Envahir injustement Leurs Terres.")
Massachusetts officials engaged in the "deliberate and systematic use of mistranslations and misinformation" to mislead the Indians. At the root of the English failure to establish peaceful relations with the Wabanakis, Ghere argues, was their unwillingness to communicate truthfully. Colonial officials obfuscated or glossed over contentious treaty provisions and stubbornly refused to listen to Wabanaki objections to English policy. If the Indians failed to adhere to the terms of written treaties, it was because English leaders deliberately mistranslated or misrepresented their contents. In short, Ghere shares Francis Jennings's belief that English officials shrouded their aggressively expansionist policies in a "cant of conquest" that legitimated unscrupulous land grabs by framing them in falsely contractual terms.4

Like the work of Jennings, Ghere's article forces us to view the self-serving rhetoric of colonial officials with a skeptical eye and has left the validity of colonial treaties open to question. But in dwelling on hidden motives and tampered documents, these historians have tended to caricature the English as venal charlatans and the Indians as hapless victims. That a complex history should be reduced to such simplistic terms is unfortunate, for the transcripts of frontier conferences provide rich documentation of a century-long debate between Indians and colonists over questions of land ownership, social obligations, and the just exercise of political power. Since conferences were focused on the specifics of peace making, many historians have seen their transcripts as nothing more than a tedious record of endless squabbles over the price of beaver pelts and the redemption of war captives. But if they scraped beneath the surface of these disputes,
they would uncover a struggle between two opposing moralities, each rooted in the daily interaction of people with their natural and social environments.

The immediate context of this struggle was the migration of English colonists into lands that had traditionally belonged to Wabanakis. But New England's eastward expansion was only one chapter in a larger story of Europe's encounter with a wider world. Since the fifteenth century, Europeans had migrated to the Americas in search of wealth, whether for the riches of Potosí or the hardscrabble independence of a fifty-acre farm. The movement of people across the Atlantic was both a consequence and a cause of the economic growth of the West from the fifteenth century onward. While many economic historians blithely refer to this period of growth as Europe's "take-off" to industrialization, it entailed many wrenching social changes, particularly in the English-speaking world, where commercial expansion occurred earlier and more rapidly than anywhere else. Economic change produced fortunes for some and a steady rise in income for many, but others were stripped of their land and thrown into lives of destitution.

One of the most important consequences of economic "development" in England was the transformation of communally owned resources into privately owned land, through the enclosure of common fields and the introduction of stringent game laws that abridged customary rights to forests and rivers. The beneficiaries of these changes found advocates in political economists such as Adam Smith and Bernard Mandeville, who argued that the untrammeled pursuit of economic self-interest created greater aggregate wealth, paradoxically serving to benefit the general good. The victims of economic expansion, meanwhile, expressed themselves in the language of the "moral economy," a term that gained currency in the late eighteenth century. Placing the demands of
communal obligation above those of economic self-interest, many English cottagers and wage laborers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mounted a sustained defense of manorial custom, common rights of ownership, and the just price. Less educated and not as well-connected as political economists, the defenders of the moral economy articulated a vision of society in which the wealthy had a moral obligation to provide for their less fortunate neighbors in times of dearth and hunger.5

The debate between English and Wabanaki leaders at treaty conferences was a distant echo of the struggle between the moral and political economies in Britain. As in England, a group of people claiming customary rights to the land stood in the way of those who wished to convert it into private property. And as in England, conflicts between these two interests sometimes erupted into violent confrontation. But the similarities ended there, for the terms of the debate were framed by the particular circumstances of the Maine frontier. Unlike those who enclosed common fields in England, colonists in New England had few social or cultural ties with the people whose lands they sought to possess. They were also members of a settler society in which a relatively high proportion of the population owned land. The Indians whose lands they encroached upon, furthermore, bore little resemblance to the cottagers of Great Britain. While farmers in England worked their fields with plow and oxen, Wabanakis subsisted on fishing, gathering, hunting, and swidden agriculture. They based their defense of customary right not on manorial traditions but on the moral imperatives of a society of hunter-gatherers. While the Old World's moral economy was rooted in the realities of social class, the Wabanakis belonged to a society in which all social relationships were


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described in the terms of kinship. Seeing their close neighbors as members of an extended family, they were both strongly egalitarian and unbendingly individualistic, objecting to actions that threatened social harmony or compromised the autonomy of individuals. This point of view -- typical of foraging societies -- was eloquently expressed by sagamores who discussed matters of land ownership, trade, treaties, and sovereignty with the English.

The Language of Land

At eighteenth-century conferences, English and Wabanaki delegates ritually danced a verbal minuet whenever the discussion turned to questions of land ownership. Wabanakis usually took the lead, informing the governor that they were uneasy with the rapid advance of English settlement. The Indians then proposed a boundary line that would mark the limits of English towns. Colonial representatives praised the Wabanakis for their openness but also reminded them that British subjects were entitled to settle all the lands they had legitimately purchased. A clerk would present parchment copies of seventeenth-century deeds, showing the Wabanaki delegates the totems of long-dead sagamores who had ceded their lands to English buyers. The Wabanakis responded that they knew nothing of the purchases, that the sagamores had been drunk when they signed the documents, or that Indians had been insufficiently compensated for their lands. Invariably, the governor dismissed these objections out of hand and reminded the Wabanakis of their treaty obligations.

No matter how many times they went through these paces, the two sides never found any basis for agreement. Several articles of a 1678 treaty were devoted to

Press, 1993).
questions of land ownership, and all the written treaties signed in the ensuing century included some mention of the issue. From the 1713 Treaty of Portsmouth to the 1749 Treaty of Falmouth, the documents used roughly the same wording: the English were permitted to settle all the territories they owned before the outbreak of war, while the Wabanakis retained their inland hunting grounds as well as fishing, hunting, and fowling rights on English lands. Yet when English and Wabanaki leaders spoke about these matter at conferences, it was clear that they were talking at cross-purposes. These misunderstandings hinged on differing beliefs of what it meant to own the land.

The colonial view of land ownership was colored by the changes that had taken place in English society since the sixteenth century. In the Middle Ages, European estate surveys had been carried out by manorial officials, who made a perambulation -- a walk around the perimeters -- of the manor, making note of the boundary markers of the tenants' holdings. The bailiff then summoned the tenants and asked them to testify as to the size of their fields, as well as the rents, fines, and services they owed the lord. Tenants renewed pledges of homage and fealty to their lords at these occasions. These surveys were undertaken not so much to determine property rights as to reaffirm the bonds of loyalty and deference that characterized the social world of the manor. Although the lord of the manor recorded the location of his tenants' holdings, the boundaries of their lands were generally determined through customary use and common agreement. Knowledge of these boundaries ultimately rested with the tenants, who learned them through daily activities and confirmed them at regular intervals by "beating the bounds" -- making a collective perambulation of the limits of their parish or manor.6

The estate survey was transformed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as it increasingly became the province of paid professionals commissioned by the lord of the manor. This change first occurred in the more commercialized countries of Europe, particularly England and the Netherlands, where landowners showed an active interest in the efficient management of their estates. In England, the professionalization of surveying began in the sixteenth century as inflation and rising population caused land values to soar. Because tenants under customary forms of tenure typically held their lands at fixed rents for their entire lifetimes, inflation ate into the income of landlords, causing the real value of their rents to drop. Faced with the threat of falling income, landlords, yeomen, and ambitious tenants sought to acquire tighter control of their lands and thereby gain a freer hand in their disposal. Clearer title to the land made it possible for owners to raise rents, evict tenants, engage in land speculation, or experiment with new agricultural methods. Professional surveyors were important allies of landowners, for a lord could scarcely hope to sell or improve a tract of land without knowing its size, boundaries, and soil quality. By rendering an entire estate on paper, a surveyor undercut the authority of tenants' customary knowledge and freed landlords from the need to consult with their rentiers about the location and value of holdings. As lords and tenants gained a clearer knowledge of their property rights, Andrew McRae has written, a worldview "dominated by moral standards and interpersonal relations gave way to a discourse which facilitated economic individualism and competition."7

This modern view of property rights was reinforced by the colonial experience of New Englanders. The majority of families who arrived in New England in the

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7Ibid., 89, 144-5; Andrew McRae, "To Know One's Own: Estate Surveying and the Representation of the Land in Early Modern England," Huntington Library Quarterly 56 (1993): 333-57, quote on 352; E. P.
seventeenth century were wealthy enough to purchase real estate, as well as the draught
animals and tools necessary to start a farm. Because land was abundant in the New
World, many families were able to acquire a few hundred acres for their own use and
depended very little on the town commons. Once they had acquired a parcel of real
estate, colonists invested heavily in its improvement. A successful farm depended on the
unstinting labor of an entire family working together year-round. The early years of a
farmstead were the most difficult, as colonists devoted years of hard effort into cutting
trees and plowing the soil, converting forested areas into arable land.8

These investments brought abundant returns, particularly as the development of
regional and trans-Atlantic transportation networks opened up markets for agricultural
surpluses. A successful family could subsist on its own farm produce and acquire
manufactured goods with the money earned from selling grains and livestock at market.
The strenuous work of agricultural life, and its attendant returns, gave English settlers a
strong proprietary interest in their lands. Settlers wanted the benefits of their labor to
accrue both to themselves and their children, since they knew it took a lifetime to
establish a farm. They fully expected that their deeds of purchase would be confirmed
and protected by the county courts and that the ownership of land could be passed from
one generation to the next. Merchants and gentlemen who purchased land titles with
commercial profits also assumed that their hereditary rights of ownership would be
protected by provincial authorities. Both merchants and settlers in the eighteenth century
depended on the primacy of written contracts as a basis for land ownership, and feared

Thompson, "Custom, Law and Common Right," in Customs in Common, 97-184.

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anything that undermined the validity of their legal title to the land. "Taking away Men's Estates," Governor Jonathan Belcher reminded the Wabanakis at a 1732 conference, "is like taking away their Lives." 9

Because they were answerable to an electorate of property holders, colonial representatives at frontier conferences always upheld the validity of registered deeds to Maine's lands. In the negotiations of the 1725 treaty with the Penobscots, Lieutenant Governor William Dummer balked at a Wabanaki proposal to limit settlement near St. George River since such a promise would have abridged the rights of English landholders. "Those Lands are the Property of particular Persons who have the Indian Right by fair Purchase," he said after presenting the deeds of sale, "you cannot reasonably expect that the said Proprietors should be hindred of making Improvement of what is their own." In 1726, Dummer again rejected a proposal to limit English settlement to the area west of Pemaquid and south of Arrowsick Island in Casco Bay. Claiming that titles to the disputed lands had been purchased from Wabanaki sagamores and confirmed by later treaties, he reminded the Wabanakis that since the lands were "for a long Time since purchased by His Majesty's Subjects, and the Property vested in them, the Government cannot Disclaim them." Dummer reasoned that the government was being impartial in recognizing the titles, since as British subjects the Wabanakis were also given the benefit of the law. 10

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9Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher, Esq... with Wewankenk, chief sachem of the Penobscut Tribe; Loran, one of the chief captains of the same tribe; Lorus, chief sachem of the Norridgewock tribe; Adiawando, chief sachem of the Pigwacket tribe; and Medaganesset, chief sachem of the Amerescoggin tribe... at Falmouth in Casco-Bay, July 1732 (Boston: B. Green, 1732), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 3554, 15. Belcher's statement was made in reference to an incident in which Wabanakis killed several cows from a Casco Bay farm.

10DHSM 23: 201; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians... at Falmouth... in July-August, 1726 (Boston: reprinted by S. Kneeland, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no.
English opinion on this question was not unanimous. Some critics of provincial Indian policy argued that clear boundaries were necessary to preserve the peace. In September 1721, Council member Samuel Sewall issued a printed broadside in which he explained his disapproval of a proposed military expedition against the Norridgewocks. He noted that at a 1717 meeting with Governor Samuel Shute at Arrowsick Island, the Indians had objected to the construction of forts on the Kennebec River and, fearing a rapid influx of new settlers, suggested that a line be run between the English settlements and the Indians. The governor rejected the proposal, but Sewall, who had himself dabbled in surveying, felt that their suggestion was eminently reasonable. "Without doubt," he declared, "Boundaries are necessary for the preservation of Honesty and Peace among those that border one upon another." The wisdom of this policy, Sewall continued, was evident from the Massachusetts law that required townships to run their boundaries once every three years.  

Sewall's case for a boundary line was grounded in the belief that clearly understood property rights were a cornerstone of civil society. If Wabanakis and English people had an exact knowledge of the boundaries of their lands, he contended, they would have no reason to fight. Although Wabanakis shared Sewall's desire for boundary markers, their position was rooted in a rejection rather than an embrace of formal property rights. Because they lived in a small-scale society in which disputes could be resolved through face-to-face mediation, Wabanakis had little need or understanding of formal land titles. They also had less proprietary interest in the land than the English. While families in New England drew their living from farms as small as a hundred acres,

7216, 8-9.
11Samuel Sewall, *A Memorial Relating to the Kennebec Indians* (Boston, 1721), Early American
Indians used the land more extensively, subsisting on the ecosystems of entire rivers, lakes, and estuaries. Although they raised crops and managed forest resources by setting fires and limiting hunts, Wabanakis did not alter the natural environment to the same extent that European colonists did. The tendency among Indians was to base their seasonal movements on the patterns of natural abundance rather than to rearrange the land to suit their needs. Because they expended less effort in working the land, Indians had a weaker sense of land ownership than the English. Though their emotional attachment to the land may have been stronger, they suffered less of an injury if someone trespassed on their territories.12

This distinction held for the products of the land as well as the land itself. While settlers assumed that farm produce belonged exclusively to the owners of the land, Wabanakis always shared their food with neighbors. As in other foraging cultures, sharing was a social imperative among the Wabanakis, a custom that could not be broken. Early European visitors such as Father Biard were often struck by the extent of their generosity. "No one would dare refuse the request of another," he remarked, "nor to eat without giving him a part of what he has." Wabanakis were often contemptuous of Europeans' unwillingness to reciprocate this liberality; one Indian told Biard that "you are thieves and deceivers; you are covetous, and are neither generous nor kind; as for us, if we have a morsel of bread we share it with our neighbor."13

Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2292, 1.

12 Anthropologist James Woodburn has argued that "delayed-return" foragers who make significant investments of time and labor in procuring their food tend to have more defined notions of property and territoriality than "immediate-return" groups who do not use storage or traps. The difference is even more pronounced when comparing foragers with agricultural societies, whose return on their investments of labor, time, and capital is often delayed over a course of years. See James Woodburn, "Egalitarian Societies," Man, n. s., 17 (1982): 431-51; idem, "Hunters and Gatherers Today and the Reconstruction of the Past," in Ernest Gellner, ed., Soviet and Western Anthropology (London: Duckworth, 1980): 95-117.

13 JR 3: 95, 1: 173. See also, JR 2: 79. The practice of sharing has even been confirmed archaeologically;
The imperative of sharing and a weak sense of proprietary interest were two sides of the same coin. When English families claimed ownership of the land, they announced their refusal to share its resources without some form of material compensation. Lacking the same sense of ownership, Wabanakis were more willing to give their wealth to others. This is not to say that their generosity was reducible to a lack of proprietary interest; sharing served a valuable social purpose. The practice of enjoying food and other necessities in common fostered a sense of mutuality in families and villages and created a web of interdependency that sustained individuals in times of hardship. Kin and friends provided each other with material and political support, ensuring that no one would go hungry or suffer injuries without revenge or compensation. To Wabanakis, social investments in kinship and alliances mattered a great deal more than material investments in the land. Because they depended on others for their survival, people lived well when they cultivated harmonious relationships with their neighbors. The pursuit of private property threatened this ethic of mutual support because it limited sharing and tore apart the bonds of interdependency among extended kin groups.14

at one Ceramic period site on the St. Croix River, the bones of large animals such as bears and moose were spread throughout different hearths and were almost certainly shared among the settlement's various households. Archaeologists have discovered some possible evidence of social inequality in the distribution of "status" items such as jewellery, copper, and exotic lithics in late Ceramic and early contact burial sites in Maine. But there is no evidence, either archaeological or ethnographic, that this inequality extended to the distribution of food or other necessities of life. See David Sanger, The Carson Site and the Late Ceramic Period in Passamaquoddy Bay, New Brunswick, Archaeological Survey of Canada, Paper No. 135 (Ottawa: Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1987), 65-67; Arthur E. Spiess, Bruce J. Bourque, and Stephen L. Cox, "Cultural Complexity in Maritime Cultures: Evidence from Penobscot Bay, Maine," in Ronald J. Nash, ed., The Evolution of Maritime Cultures on the Northeast and the Northwest Coasts of America, Publication No. 11, Department of Archaeology (Vancouver: Simon Fraser University, 1983), 91-108; Bruce J. Bourque, "Evidence for Prehistoric Exchange on the Maritime Peninsula," in Timothy G. Baugh and Jonathan E. Ericson, eds., Prehistoric Exchange Systems in North America (New York: Plenum Press, 1994), 23-46; Robert G. Doyle, "Analysis of Lithic Artifacts: The Identification, Petrologic Description, and Statistical Analysis of the Lithic Artifacts Recovered from the Turner Farm Site," in Bruce J. Bourque, Diversity and Complexity in Prehistoric Maritime Societies: A Gulf of Maine Perspective (New York: Plenum Press, 1995), Appendix 6, 297-316.

14The ethic of sharing did not come naturally, and many Wabanakis probably had moments when they did not want to share their possessions with others. Biard reported an incident in which a group of hungry
The intransigence of English leaders on questions of land ownership seemed to be a violation of the Wabanaki ethic of sharing. Norridgewocks and Penobscots saw many advantages to peaceful co-existence with the English and frequently invited the colonists to establish trading posts near their villages. But Wabanakis were only willing to support an arrangement that was mutually beneficial to both sides; all too often the English built mills or set nets that disrupted Indian fishing, went trapping without permission on Wabanaki hunting grounds, or erected fences that interfered with the migratory patterns of game animals. Although they officially retained fishing and hunting rights on unfenced English lands, the establishment of English towns in Maine inevitably ate into Wabanaki territories and made it increasingly difficult for the Indians to provide themselves with the necessities of life.

Wabanaki delegates frequently made this point at treaties, reminding the English that an aggressive policy of colonial expansion would undermine their friendship. At a 1753 conference, the Norridgewock orator Quenois pleaded for a limit to English settlement along the Kennebec River, arguing that the growing influx of colonists threatened to bring the Norridgewocks to the point of starvation. The Plymouth Company had recently erected a fort on the east side of the Kennebec River above Swan Island and had plans to build two more further upriver. It had also sponsored the settlement of two tracts near the mouth of the river that would receive town charters a year later. Quenois began his plea by offering a boundary for English settlement. "Here

women hid in the woods to avoid sharing a kettle of fish with a party of people passing nearby. (See JR 3: 95-97.) Selfish tendencies were curbed by powerful social sanctions that rewarded the generous and punished the stingy. Those who shared were regarded with affection by others, but selfish or miserly individuals inevitably became the subject of gossip and, if their behavior was persisted, witchcraft accusations and social avoidance. Similar social sanctions existed in neighboring societies: see, for example, Bruce G. Trigger, "Maintaining Economic Equality in Opposition to Complexity: An Iroquoian Case Study," in Steadman Upham, ed., The Evolution of Political Systems: Sociopolitics in Small-Scale
is a River belonging to us," he said, "[y]ou have lately built a new Garrison here; we wish you would be content to go no further up the River than that Fort." He then remarked that governors Dudley and Dummer had promised many years before that English settlement would not go beyond Fort Richmond, a garrison on the west side of the river. "We live wholly by this Land," he told the English, "and live but poorly; the Penobscotts hunt on one Side of us, and the Canada Indians on the other Side; therefore do not turn us off this Land."  

Later in the conference, Quenois returned to the subject of lands and rehearsed the promises English governors had made at the treaties of 1713, 1717, and 1726. At the 1713 treaty, the English promised to settle no further than Brunswick, North Yarmouth, and Casco Bay; the Norridgewocks were told that if the governor would forcibly remove any settlers who went further than these townships. For the sake of peace Norridgewocks gave ground in 1717, allowing the English to settle as far as Fort Richmond. Quenois offered another compromise, whereby English settlement would be limited to the area downriver of the new fort. The orator appealed to English consciences, telling them that the advance of settlement beyond the fort would threaten the Norridgewocks' livelihood and jeopardize the peace. Allowing that the English "should settle all the Lands below the New-Fort... with Courage and a good Spirit," he told them that "You have Land enough below the New-Fort, without going any further up." In making this demand, the orator continued, "We have told you our Hearts; we hope you will not settle any further

15_Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Conference held at St. Georges in the County of York on the twentieth day of September... 1753_ (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1753), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7025, 15.
up the River; the Indians hunt on both Sides of us; we have but a little Space; we desire to live as Brothers." 16

No doubt Quenois intended to shame the English into softening their rigid stand on questions of land ownership. Using more land than was necessary was a violation of the ethic of sharing, particularly when allies depended on the same territory for their survival. Wealthy as they were, the English did not need the lands further up the Kennebec, and their insistence on taking them seemed particularly reprehensible given the Norridgewocks' dependence on the river for their survival. In Wabanaki society selfish behavior of this kind would have been unimaginable among kin and allies, and it is no coincidence that Quenois stressed the fictive bonds of kinship that bound the English to the Norridgewocks. The Wabanaki orator hoped -- vainly, as it turned out -- that the English would relent if they were made aware of the deleterious effects of their expansion on their Indian allies. "It would hurt us," he reminded them, "for you to settle higher up the River than the New-Fort." 17

The Penobscot orator Loron Sauguaaram had made a similar point during the 1726 conference with Lieutenant Governor Dummer. Disputing Dummer's insistence that seventeenth-century land purchases were still valid, Loron remarked that "we have a Number of young People growing up who never were acquainted of the Lands being Sold." Massachusetts was "a Great and Rich Government," and could easily purchase the

16Ibid., 20-21. The Norridgewocks had made the same plea in a letter to the governor written seven months earlier. See DHSM, 23: 445.
17Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753, 21. Western Abenakis also criticized the English for the same reasons; in March 1753/54, a number of sagamores told a fort commander that they objected to English settlement at Cowass on the Upper Connecticut River Valley, informing him that "the English had no need of that land, but had enough without it... the English had a mind for war, if they should go there." See letter of Spencer Phips to Benning Wentworth, March 19, 1753, Jeremy Belknap Collection, 1685-1790, Peter Force Collection, Library of Congress, Series 7E, Item 8.
lands on the Penobscots' behalf, since they were sold for a small sum and cost very little. The importance of hereditary title paled in comparison to the immediate needs of the present, and the English insistence on recognizing the validity of land deeds seemed contrary to the spirit of peaceful friendship. Like Quenois, Loron tried to prick English consciences by reminding the settlers of their moral obligations as allies.¹⁸

But Dummer refused Loron's request, just as the commissioners of Massachusetts dismissed Quenois's plea out of hand. Since English officials placed greater stock in the protection of private property than in the renewal of Indian alliances, the sagamores' words did not have their intended sting. Land ownership in English society was based on objective considerations of customary use and written title rather than subjective notions of need. Because they invested heavily into their lands, property owners needed assurances that their estates would be protected against trespass or arbitrary seizure. The court system accommodated this demand by basing its rulings on an ostensibly impartial consideration of documentary title and customary right. Whether other families needed the land was immaterial to judges and juries: what mattered was the strength of their legal case for ownership.

The Wabanaki conception of land ownership, by contrast, gave greater weight to subjective considerations of social obligation. Wabanaki orators consistently rejected seventeenth-century deeds as a legitimate basis for the ownership of land. Quenois claimed that the deeds were no longer valid, offering several reasons: elders at Norridgewock had never heard of the purchases, the Indians who signed the deeds were drunk, the agreements were made before the Norridgewocks became Christians, the sellers had not been paid enough for their lands. Quenois and his fellow orators did not

¹⁸Massachusetts Bay, Conference at Falmouth, July-August 1726, 8.
claim that the deeds were forgeries -- they recognized the names of the sagamores who
signed them -- but they argued that agreements made in the distant past had no relevance
to the circumstances of the present. Far more important was the need to maintain a
peace between English and Wabanakis by removing the threat of English expansion. If
settlers continued to migrate to the Kennebec River Valley, the Norridgewocks would be
forced to take up arms against them. Norridgewock leaders had made this point many
times in the past: in 1717, the noted sagamore Wowurna told the English that the
Norridgewocks wanted "no further Settlements" because "[w]e shan't be able to hold
them all in our Bosoms, and take care to Shelter them, if it be like to be bad Weather, and
Mischief be Threatned." Foul weather, as the English undoubtedly knew, was a metaphor
for conflict.

Even if the Norridgewocks' livelihood had not been threatened by colonial
expansion, they would not have seen the deeds in the same light as the English. On
several occasions, Wabanakis seemed to suggest that all Maine's lands -- including those
that had been cleared and fenced by English colonists -- belonged to the region's native
inhabitants and that English settlers held their lands at their sufferance. As Wowurna put
it in 1717, "We can't understand how our Lands have been purchased, what has been
Alienated was by our Gift." Wowurna's comments rankled the governor, who told the
Indians that they "must not call it their Land, for the English have bought it of them and
their Ancestors." The governor's understanding of the matter was rooted in the belief
that land was an economic good that could be bought and sold like any other. English

19 Massachusetts Bay, A Conference held at St. Georges... September 1753, 22.
20 "Conference between Governor Shute and the Eastern Indians at Georgetown on Arrowsick Island,
21 Ibid., 369, 367.
deeds spelled out the exact location and dimensions of parcels of land, assigning them to individuals or companies in perpetuity. This practice objectified the land, removing it from the domain of social relations and treating it as an alienable commodity. Once a tract of land was sold, it became the exclusive possession of a single person, to be used or disposed of as he or she saw fit.

Wabanakis were more likely to see the land as a host of natural actors who were part of the social world of human beings. The natural environment was an extension of the human community, an active part of people's lives. Wabanakis treated animals as their kin and believed that spirits dwelling in rocks and rivers could bring them good or bad fortune. Without a rigid boundary between the human and natural words, they extended the circle of sharing to include animals and spirits, offering prayers and sacrifices in return for prey and harvests. The attachment between people and their environment was so strong that orators could only express their relationship to the land in spiritual terms. At a 1752 conference at Fort St. George, Penobscot orator Colonel Louis argued that Wabanakis possessed the land by divine sanction: "God hath planted us here: God gave us this Land, and we will keep it. God Decreed all things, he Decreed this Land to us; therefore neither shall the French or English Possess it but we will."

Because the stewardship of the land was based on social relationships between people, animals, and spirits, it was no more possible to exchange territories than it was to buy and sell friendships. As the Penobscot orator Captain Job informed Samuel Waldo in

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1735, the Indians "could not dispose of the Land, which God had given to them." Groups could share their lands with others, which is what Wowurna probably meant when he said that the Norridgewocks gave their lands as a "gift" to the English. Sharing the land in this fashion was a kind of material exchange that helped cement the friendship between the English and the Norridgewocks. Of course, English people did not see things the same way; as Waldo told Captain Job, "the English Constitution was different from the Indians, and... English Men had a Right to Settle their own Lands as they pleas'd."24 Treated as a gift, the land was part of a web of reciprocal obligations that tied people to God and one another; seen as property, the land was a factor of production that could be possessed as a matter of right. Implicit in these points of view was a different understanding of the social consequences of land ownership. For English people, the acquisition of legal title allowed landowners to dispose of their holdings as they wished, and freed them from the need to consult with their neighbors before using their lands. But among Wabanakis, the possession of the land had the opposite effect: it entered people into a world of social obligations and forced them to treat neighboring people and animals with respect.

_The Language of Trade_

If disputes over land ownership drove English and Wabanakis apart, a shared interest in the fur trade brought them together. Since the earliest years of contact, English people had traded with Indians for furs, hides, and feathers, obtaining the fruits of the

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24Samuel Waldo, _Whereas since my Return from St. George’s River..._ (Boston, 1735), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 40087, 1–2; Samuel Waldo, _A Defence of the Title of the late John Leverett, Esq.: to a Tract of Land in the Eastern Parts of the Province of the Massachusetts Bay, commonly called Muscongus Lands, lying upon St. George’s, Muscongus, and Penobscott Rivers_ (Boston, 1736), 36.
land through peaceful exchange instead of violent conflict. Although the value of the trade declined over the course of the seventeenth century, it remained the primary point of contact between colonists and Indians. By the eighteenth century, Wabanakis were dependent on the fur trade for many of their material needs. Men needed rifles, gunpowder, and shot for their hunting expeditions and had grown accustomed to metal knives, axes, and other manufactured implements. Women had come to prefer European textiles over animal skins, since cloth was lighter and easier to sew. Families had also grown accustomed to pork, peas, biscuits, and other dried goods that tided them over during the starving time of late winter and early spring. While some of the demand for European merchandise was satisfied by presents and trade goods from Canada, Wabanakis living in present-day Maine preferred to trade with the colonists of New England, who sold their wares at lower prices in forts and ships much closer to the Indians' villages. French officials in the late seventeenth century often fretted over the possibility that New England's advantageous terms of trade would draw the Wabanakis into an alliance with the English. This prospect caused them far less worry as Wabanakis repeatedly demonstrated their loyalty in imperial wars, but trade remained the chief advantage of the English in negotiating an alliance with the Wabanakis.

In the early seventeenth century, Wabanakis living near the Atlantic coast found several outlets for their furs. Private traders and companies from Acadia and New England established trading posts at places such as Cushnoc, Arrowsic Island, and Machias, which were close to Wabanaki settlements and offered the most reliable market for pelts. Indians could also find purchasers at garrisoned forts such as Pentagoet and Pemaquid, which also served as trading posts. Wabanakis found a third outlet of trade in
shipmasters from southern New England who plied the Maine coast, selling alcohol and manufactured goods to fishermen and Indians in exchange for fish and furs. Although companies and colonies held nominal trade monopolies for large portions of Maine and Acadia, their exclusive rights were often contested and the trade was largely unregulated. Any colonist with a boat and a small stock of goods could sail along the coast and trade with Wabanakis for pelts and hides. Because many traders viewed these exchanges as short-term ventures, they were inclined to cheat the Indians as much as possible, even to the point of robbing them of their furs. On several occasions in the early seventeenth century, unscrupulous traders brought Wabanakis and English colonists to the brink of war. When warfare finally did break out in 1675, disputes over trade were sorest point of contention, particularly the kidnapping of several Indians at Machias by a Massachusetts trader and the refusal of English authorities to provide powder to starving Wabanaki hunters.25

After the war, New York's government at Pemaquid introduced stringent trade regulations that prohibited the sale of liquor to Indians and limited trading to daytime hours. Massachusetts followed suit in 1694, placing the fur trade under government control. Following the signing of a peace treaty between Governor William Phips and several Wabanaki sagamores in 1693, the General Court passed an act designed to continue the Indians' "dependance upon the English for supplies of clothing and other necessaries," while ensuring that "the Christian religion be not scandalized, nor any

injustice done to the Indians, in the taking of unreasonable and excessive prices for the
goods and supplies sold unto them." The 1694 act laid the foundation for Massachusetts's
"truck house" system, which banned private trade with Indians and established
province run trading posts at Fort Richmond and Fort St. George. A more
comprehensive law was passed in 1699, making it clear that the purpose of the truck
houses was to "undersell the French" and supply Wabanakis "at such easy rates and prices
as may oblige them to adhere firmly to the English interest."26

Although they continued a modest clandestine trade with private shipowners,
Wabanakis in the eighteenth century seem to have conducted most of their trade with the
truck houses, and total annual receipts at the posts climbed as high as £20,000 by the
early 1750s.27 Yet Wabanaki leaders frequently criticized the English conduct of the
trade at conferences, complaining that the English were poor trading partners. Some of
their criticisms -- particularly their pleas for higher quality goods at lower prices -- were
not really criticisms at all but part of a bargaining strategy that couched demands for
favorable terms of trade in the language of diplomacy. Like other North American
Indians, Wabanakis tried to obtain preferential rates of exchange from their allies by
combining pleas for pity with threats to go elsewhere with their furs.28 But on other

26Edmund Andros, "Orders and Directions fo[r the] Commander att Pemaquid," September 22, 1677, in
Peter R. Christoph and Florence Christoph, eds., Books of General Entries of the Colony of New York,
1674-1688 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1982), 176-77; Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, 1:
172, 384-85; Proposal of the Committee of the Board, March 19, 1699, Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119
(Trade), fol. 167; Ronald Oliver Macfarlane, "The Massachusetts Bay Truck-Houses in Diplomacy with the
Robert L. Bradley, ed., The Forts of Pemaquid, Maine: An Archaeological and Historical Study,
Occasional Publications in Maine Archaeology, no. 10 (Augusta, Me.: Maine Historic Preservation
27Macfarlane, "Massachusetts Bay Truck-House Trade," 58a; Robert E. Moody, "The Maine Frontier,
1607 to 1763" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1933), 353.
28On Indian harangues as a bargaining strategy, see Arthur J. Ray and Donald B. Freeman, "Give Us Good
Measures": An Economic Analysis of Relations between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before
occasions, Wabanaki orators were clearly exasperated by the failure of English officials to conform to Indian trading practices. Although their complaints usually concerned narrowly economic matters of price and inventory, they related to broader social questions of mutual obligation and proper conduct. Above all, Wabanaki grievances were rooted in a dissatisfaction with the impersonal manner in which the English carried on the trade.

At eighteenth-century conferences, Wabanaki delegates generally began discussions of trade by complaining that the English had not lived up their promise to give the Indians preferential rates at truck houses. Itemizing the rates of exchange for various trade articles, they suggested that cost of European goods continually rose while the price of furs always fell. "We have not above half so much for our beaver as formerly," the Wabanaki delegation told Governor Dudley at a 1702 meeting at Casco Bay. When the Governor explained that the price of beaver had plummeted in Europe, they responded, "We are always promised beaver will rise but we think never."

Wabanakis made similar complaints at the 1713 Treaty of Portsmouth and later conferences. Even after the conquest of Canada, Passamaquoddy Indians arrived at the Council chambers in Boston with a long list of grievances, ranging from the dearth of cloth and provisions at the St. George's truck house to the use of new weights and measures by the fort's truckmaster.  

Governor Dudley, like other English representatives, expressed a willingness to extend favorable terms of trade to the Wabanakis, but stopped short of promising them goods at lower prices than the market would bear. His exchange with the orator

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29Governor Dudley to Board of Trade, Boston, August 5, 1702, CSP, vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504; DHSM, 24, 116-20.
Franxwaxer (François Xavier) was typical of discussions of trade at Anglo-Wabanaki conferences. "I am no merchant, and get nothing by it," he told the orator, "but am Governor of the merchants, and will see they use you kindly." François Xavier replied, "You can govern the matter better than it used to be," and asked for the same rates of exchange as were current when the peace was first made. Dudley answered that he would allow the Wabanakis to "have goods as cheap as may be," but at prices that would let "the merchants live."  

The governor's point of view was shared by later colonial representatives: they would tell their truckmasters to sell goods to Wabanakis at retail prices that were current in Boston, but would not go so far as to divorce truck house prices from the workings of the market. While colonial leaders promised to protect Wabanakis against extortion and price-gouging in trade, they refused to fix the prices of trade articles at permanent levels. Instead, they assumed that prices would fluctuate according to the laws of supply and demand. In response to Wabanaki complaints concerning trade, Lieutenant Governor Dummer told them in 1727 that changes in exchange rates "proceed[ed] only on the Account of the Price of Beavers falling at the Market and not from any Rise on the Cost of our Goods." Assuring them that "the English Government scorn to raise one farthing on the true Cost of the Goods," he repeated the explanation, made a year earlier, "that the Prizes of all Goods would be sometimes higher and sometimes lower at the Markets, and that no Body could help it."  

30Dudley to Board of Trade, August 5, 1702, CSP, vol. 20 (1702), fol. 810, p. 504.  
31Massachusetts Bay (Colony), The Conference with the Eastern Indians at the Further Ratification of the Peace, Held at Falmouth in Casco-Bay, in July 1727 (B. Green and S. Kneeland, 1727), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 2885, 20. See also, Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians... July-August, 1726, 11-12.
When Dummer spoke of "the Market", he was referring not to a physical place but to an abstract commercial sphere. Like other educated English people of his time, he believed that this market operated according to natural laws that were beyond the control of any single individual. And like other colonial leaders, Dummer assumed that government interference in the market was necessary only in cases where merchants gouged or cheated their customers. This point of view puzzled many Wabanakis, who suspected that the English varied their prices to hoodwink their Indian customers. In 1732, Loron speculated that Dummer's promise was not made in good faith: "the Governour told us that Goods would be govern'd by the foreign Markets, sometimes cheaper and sometimes dearer; but the Goods have always risen in their Price." The existence of a provincial monopoly in the fur trade fed these suspicions; Wabanakis often complained that truck house prices compared poorly with the rates offered by Boston and Albany retailers, or with the prices of goods sold on ships trading illegally along the coast. The Wabanakis probably also knew that the holders of the beaver monopoly in Canada kept prices constant at their trading posts regardless of whether the value of beaver rose or fell in Europe.

The notion of an abstract market governed by fluctuations in supply and demand was an alien concept to Wabanakis, who had a difficult time understanding how events in Europe might affect the price of cloth and gunpowder in Maine. While English officials assumed that prices were set by the self-regulating mechanism of the market, Wabanakis

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33 Massachusetts Bay. A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 11.

34 Matthew R. Laird. "The Price of Empire: Anglo-French Rivalry for the Great Lakes Fur Trades, 1700-
were more inclined to view changes in the terms of trade as an index of the degree of
friendship between trading partners. This is not to say that they were oblivious to
questions of profit and advantage; they always told the English that "the Custom is where
persons sell the Cheapest there we go to trade." But Indian leaders repeatedly asserted
that a firm alliance went hand in hand with an amicable trading relationship. "[T]hey that
are loving to each other will trade together," the Penobscots reminded the governor in
1755. Five years earlier, a Penobscot named Sebaooset remarked that "Cheapness of
goods increase[s] love and friendship." Wabanakis presumed that trade was embedded in
social relationships and that the terms of trade were set by people rather than impersonal
market forces.

The English were well aware of the connection between trade and diplomacy,
having established the truck house system as a way of luring the Wabanakis away from
the French. In their conference speeches, English officials often reminded the Indians
that the attractive prices offered at the truck houses were a compelling reason to join them
in an alliance against the French. English speakers usually made this point as an appeal
to the Wabanaki "interest," as when Governor Belcher told the Penobscots, "It is greatly
for your Interest to keep with Us, because We are nearer than the French, and can supply

1760" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1995), 149.
35Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal of the Proceedings of Jacob Wendall, Samuel Watts, Thomas
Hubbard, and Chambers Russel, Esqrs.: Commissioners Appointed by the Honorable Spencer Phips, Esq.,
to Treat with the Several Tribes of Eastern Indians, in Order to Renew and Confirm a General Peace
(Boston: J. Draper, 1752), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 6881, 8. See also, DHSM, 23:322.
36DHSM, 24: 56, 23:374. Among historians of the fur trade, there has been a long-standing debate over
whether Indians engaged in trade for its material advantages or as a means of cementing alliances. The
current consensus is that the two motives were not mutually exclusive; Indians used diplomacy to
strengthen their bargaining position in trade and attracted allies by offering favorable terms of exchange.
For a succinct recapitulation of this debate, see Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's
"Heroic Age" Reconsidered (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), 183-94.
you cheaper." Like other educated men of his time, Belcher subscribed to the oft-quoted maxim "interest governs all": every person was motivated by a desire for personal betterment, particularly through the acquisition of riches. Eighteenth-century thinkers believed that the pursuit of pecuniary interest was a means of restraining the passions, particularly the thirst for glory through military conquest. Belcher and other colonial leaders hoped to harness the military threat posed by the Wabanakis by offering them incentives to trade peacefully with the English.

Wabanakis did indeed appreciate the favorable prices offered at truck houses, knowing that better exchange rates would make it easier for them to provide themselves with their necessities. But their eyes were not fixed solely on the bottom line and they expected the trade to be conducted in a spirit of friendship, with each party treating the other as kinfolk. Commerce was one of the paths that fostered alliances, creating ties mutual dependence between trading partners. As Loron said in 1740, it was important to take "great care" in regulating the trade, for "it is the great means of keeping the Peace." The self-seeking behavior of profitable trade needed to be counterbalanced by the generosity of gift-giving, which reassured trading partners that they could trust one another and had a genuine concern for each other's welfare.

Wabanaki trading parties at frontier forts expected to be treated with the same lavish hospitality as diplomatic delegations at treaty conferences. Captain John Gyles remarked in 1726 that Indians were "disgusted" unless they were allowed to trade in "great Numbers," and had an "abhorrence of Restraint in Coming to a Trading House."

37DHSM, 23, 269. See also, Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georges... September 1753, 8.
39DHSM, 23: 269.
Before and after they traded their furs with truckmasters, Wabanakis also exchanged small gifts such as paddles and game birds to soldiers for pork, peas, and other provisions. They also expected truck masters to treat them with rum and tobacco, and saw the refusal to provide such refreshments as a sign of unfriendliness. "When we have been absent two or three Months and visit the Truck House we shou'd be glad that the Truck Master wou'd give us a pipe and a little Tobacco and a Dram especially when we have no Truck to purchase withal," Loron told Governor Belcher in 1740, complaining that many truckmasters "have exacted every Pennyworth." Such stinginess was contrary to the spirit of alliance: "If we were used as Friends and Neighbours, as we are at other Trading Places, when we are on a Visit, it wou'd be a Means to preserve Peace and Friendship." Friendliness was also a spur to trade, for as the Penobscots told the government in 1763, "If we had a good humor'd man to trade with We should bring more Beaver into the Fort."40

Wabanakis repeatedly informed the English that they preferred to trade with men who were familiar to them and were particularly fond of those who spoke their own language. Captain Gyles, who was taken captive by Wabanakis as a child and spent six years with a Maliseet family, was frequently praised at treaty conferences for his service as interpreter at St. George's truck house. Soon after his return to English society in 1698, Gyles interpreted several conferences between Massachusetts officials and Wabanakis and became a fixture at Anglo-Wabanaki conferences until his death in 1755.

"I respect him as my own Child," the Penobscot sagamore Wenemouet told the English in 1713, approving of his service as interpreter. Another Indian representative in 1727 remarked that "[w]e look upon Captain Gyles as a Captain of the Tribes in our Parts."

When Gyles took sick in 1738, Loron told Governor Belcher that "we know not what we should do if he should die, we like him very well and believe it would be an hard matter to find such another man."41

The lavish praise extended to Gyles was in stark contrast to the sharp criticism of truck masters who dealt with Wabanakis in a brusque or penny-pinching manner. Conference speakers often complained of poor treatment at the truck houses and on several occasions they demanded the removal of truck masters from their posts. In December 1727, a number of sagamores presented complaints to Lieutenant Governor Dummer against Captain Thomas Smith, truck master of St. George's at the time, asking for his dismissal. Smith had underpaid Indians for their furs and overcharged them for cloth, and his unorthodox trading practices -- particularly his habit of paying the same price for spring and fall beaver -- led many Wabanakis to believe that he was deliberately cheating them. Worse still, Smith abandoned his post for long periods, which "much offended" the Indians who needed goods from the truck house. "It is very strange to us," Loron told the Lieutenant Governor, "that now the Truck Master is come away, the Door is fast, the Key is turned on the Lock, and we cannot get any thing now, nor can our Wives and Children get the Necessaries of Life." The provincial Council, mindful of the need to avoid a rift with the Wabanakis, removed Smith from St. Georges and offered the Indians £77 in reparations.42

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41DHSM, 23: 61, 228, 242.
42DHSM. 23:220-29; Massachusetts Archives, vol. 119 (Trade), fols. 297, 302-07; Massachusetts Bay,
The House of Representatives later cleared Smith of all charges and he was transferred to Saco Fort, where Wabanakis once again complained of his suspicious conduct. In 1731-32, Smith had abandoned his post for several months, leaving his slave to conduct the trade with the Wabanakis. Speaking on behalf of a Pigwacket sagamore, Wahway of Androscoggin informed Governor Belcher that "Adiowando and his People are dissatisfied that a Negro has the Ordering of the Trade at Saco-River. We did not know that King George was served by Negroes." Belcher responded that the slave was "a very honest Man," and chastised Wahway for his racial prejudice: "God made us of different Colours, the Negros black, the Indians not so black, and the English white; and I don't despise the Indians because they are not so white as the English, for they are as God made them." But Wabanaki delegates were bothered by Smith's shady business practices rather than the color of the slave's skin: Smith and his slave overcharged and double-charged Indians for goods, sometimes forcing hunters to pay both master and servant for a single item. Wabanakis were also uncomfortable with strangers who did not understand their way of trading; in 1736, Penobscot representatives expressed a preference for English over Irish settlers, explaining that Wabanakis and the English "fell out as boys do at play, yet afterwards we were reconciled and got friends again, but as to foreign men we were not acquainted with their manners and did not know their customs."43

The most persistent criticism of truck masters such as Smith was that they seemed to be indifferent to the Wabanakis' welfare. Not only did they charge high prices for their goods, they also failed to show sympathy for the Indians when they were in need. Loron

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43Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, 12, 20; DHSM, 23: 240.
complained in 1738 that Smith's successor at St. George's "do's not treat the poorer Sort of Indians kindly if they come with a few feathers and to truck he will throw them away and bid them go trade with the French." Four years later, Loron told Governor Shirley that the Penobscots "now are kept much in the dark as to our trade," since the truck master was a Protestant minister and "understands verry little as to our Language or trade... we a little wonder at his comming to trade here." He added that, contrary to treaty agreements, there was not a full stock of goods at the truck house and Penobscots lacked "Provissions and many other nesessarys and have a long time bin without them and in the middle of Winter the most nessesary time we would want them in." Were the English sincere in their desire to live as brothers, sagamores repeatedly told colonial officials, they would offer them a steady supply of goods at prices they could afford. If prices rose too high, Indians would be unable to acquire the necessities of life and would go hungry or suffer from want. Toxus, a sagamore from Norridgewock, made this connection directly when he complained that high prices and a scarcity of beaver made it nearly impossible for hunters to provide for their families: "what one Man can get till Winter" -- he was speaking in July -- "will hardly procure a Pair of Stockings."44

Unwilling to interfere with the workings of the market, New England's governors turned a deaf ear to these complaints and insisted that the Indians would be better off if they weathered fluctuations in the price of beaver. Quite accurately, they argued that Wabanakis would profit more in the long run if they allowed prices to rise and fall according to the vagaries of supply and demand. What they failed to realize was that the long run matters very little to people faced with pressing short-term needs. The

44DHSM, 23: 244, 285-86; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, 18.
Wabanakis' way of life made them susceptible to occasional periods of hunger and dearth, and during these times they looked to their friends and neighbors for aid. It was assumed that trading partners would treat their opposites generously when they were hungry and that this generosity would be reciprocated in the future. Favorable terms of exchange in such instances were a sign of respect, an indication that trading partners were close enough to provide for each other in times of hardship. When English leaders claimed that they were unable to alter the terms of exchange -- telling the Indians that the market, not the government, set the price of beaver -- Wabanakis tended to think that governors were ineffectual or, worse yet, that they were insincere in their offers of friendship.

*The Language of Treaties*

The exchange of views over questions of land ownership and trade was not an idle exercise but was meant to clear the air of lingering resentments between the English and Wabanakis. The purpose of treaties, as both delegations understood them, was to put an end to wars and build a lasting peace between their respective peoples. But even in this respect, Indians and colonists did not see eye to eye. Both parties hoped to dispel hostilities through diplomacy, but neither side could find the words necessary to placate the other. This failure was a consequence of substantive disagreements over issues of sovereignty and land ownership, but also of differences in conference etiquette. Though they adopted many of the customs of their counterparts, Wabanaki and English representatives continued to use two different styles of formal speaking at their conferences and were irritated when their counterparts failed to follow their respective rules of verbal etiquette. Although this difference hinged on seemingly minor questions
of politeness and frankness, it was neither trivial nor superficial. The linguistic rules
followed by conference speakers were also social rules: when to be voluble and when to
be quiet, how to address social superiors and subordinates, how to broach delicate
subjects without hurting the feelings of others. Violations of these tacit rules were often
interpreted in moral terms, as personal flaws in the speaker.

Such differences were painfully apparent at a 1732 parley between Governor
Jonathan Belcher and several Wabanaki sagamores at Fort St. George's. Belcher began
the meeting by reprimanding the Indians for their abuse of rum and demanding to know
what measures they would take to prevent it. Loron, the Penobscot speaker, avoided the
question and remarked that since it was peacetime there was little to be discussed.
Belcher ignored Loron's remark and returned to his original subject, treating the
Penobscots to a temperance lecture and asking them to stop purchasing rum from private
traders. Loron once again gave a noncommittal answer, saying "[w]e will think of what
your Excellency mentions to us." Belcher then asked that the Wabanakis accept
Protestant ministers and send their children to English schools. The Penobscots again
promised to consider the matter. The next day, Loron disclaimed responsibility for the
abuse of rum and refused to address the other two subjects, reminding Belcher that
Dummer's treaty promised no interference in religion. The governor denied that he was
trying to bully the Wabanakis, but then suddenly declared his intention to build a
settlement near Cushnoc along the Kennebec River. He told Loron he expected an
immediate answer from the Wabanakis: "When I propose any thing, and you don't object,
I suppose you consent. If there should be a Town, you shall have Lands there, and live
with the English." Taken aback by the governor's abrupt ultimatum, Loron responded, "It is not our Way to give a sudden Answer to what is proposed."

Belcher learned his lesson and a year later he wrote that the Wabanakis "are a humersome [i.e., temperamental] people, and must be tenderly treated." Although the Governor's prickly personality may have exacerbated differences between the two groups, his standoff with Loron was not atypical. Similar exchanges took place whenever English delegates pressed Wabanakis to fulfill contentious treaty obligations, such as the return of war captives or the abandonment of their alliance with the French. Colonial officials usually stated their demands directly and bluntly, with the Wabanakis making an evasive or noncommittal answer. Rather than dropping the subject, English speakers continued to badger the sagamores until they obtained a satisfactory answer. Wabanaki delegates usually tried to sidestep the issue or offer a face-saving compromise. Both sides inevitably became exasperated by the poor manners of their counterparts and left the conference irritated and resentful.

For English officials, a sense of frustration arose from the inability or unwillingness of Wabanakis to make good on their treaty promises. To colonial leaders, a treaty was synonymous with its end result: a binding written document signed by the participants. Treaties, in other words, were a class of contracts that related to diplomatic affairs. Like civil contracts, they required some means of enforcement and needed to be spelled out in clear and objective language. Because they were put down in writing, their terms were fixed and could be consulted and examined long after their signatories had passed away. To be effective they required a degree of trust between delegates, based on

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45Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 6-11
46Belcher to David Dunbar, Boston, July 17, 1733, in Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 6th
a shared belief that both parties were acting in good faith and would uphold their end of the bargain. English officials repeatedly made this point at conferences, underlining their determination to adhere to treaty articles while chastising Wabanakis for their failure to do the same. "When the English Promise," commissioner William Pepperrell remarked at a 1753 conference, "they religiously comply with it."47

If a party failed to comply with the terms of a contract, English people usually tried to enforce them through the courts. Colonial officials assumed that if Wabanakis were brought under the sovereign authority of the British crown, they would be legally obligated to make good on their treaty promises. In 1693 and at every succeeding treaty, English officials inserted a provision that declared the subjection of the Wabanakis to the crown of Britain. This article allowed colonial representatives to act as the judicial representatives of the crown, ensuring that the Wabanakis' contractual agreements would be enforced. English delegates often adopted the tone of judges at a conferences, speaking to the Indians in a manner that was by turns inquisitorial, solemn, magnanimous, and authoritarian. This way of speaking was acceptable in colonial courtrooms because settlers had invested the state with the ability to examine and punish people who broke contracts or threatened the civil order.

But to Wabanakis, who frequently denied their subjection to the crown, the officials' tone of voice was bullying and unfriendly. The purpose of treaties from the Wabanaki point of view was not to draw up contracts but to form and continue alliances and friendships. Treaties took place when groups wanted to "cover the blood" (forgive and forget wartime deaths and injuries), recruit military allies, or "clear a path" of alliance

47Massachusetts Bay, A Conference of His Excellency Jonathan Belcher... at Falmouth, p. 16.
through an exchange of views. A treaty, in other words, was a declaration of amity rather than a binding contract. The many cordial greetings and compliments exchanged at the beginning of conferences, as well as the lavish banquets and frequent toasts, were more than empty formalities and constituted an important part of the process of treaty-making. The actual contents of the written agreements, on the other hand, were less important the sense of love and unity that was created through exchanges of words and gifts. While the English considered treaty articles to be an end in themselves, Wabanakis saw the points discussed at conferences as a means to an end: "obstacles" to be "cleared" in order to open the "path" of alliance.48

Once again, a matter that English delegates saw in objective terms, as a written document, Wabanakis treated as a subjective question of human relationships. Treaties were a way of quelling hostilities and fostering a sense of unity between groups. Confrontation or direct contradiction were to be avoided at conferences because they threatened the very harmony that the meetings were supposed to achieve. Participants handled grievances delicately to avoid giving offense to the opposite party. Where English speakers tried to make their meanings as clear as possible, Wabanaki orators often spoke in elaborate metaphors, stating their points of view indirectly or obliquely.49 In some cases, they merely responded with silence. Their style of speech, which linguists call "negative" or "deference" politeness, showed a high degree of respect for the feelings and autonomy of listeners. Sagamores did not force their opinions on others but tried to convince them of their good sense through persuasive speaking. This approach was

48For Wabanaki explanations of the concepts of "clearing a path" and "covering the blood", see DHSM, 23: 32, 365-66.
49The most admired Wabanaki orators were called neba'ulinowak, or "riddle men", because of their ability to devise impenetrably recondite metaphors. See Frank G. Speck, Penobscot Man: The Life History of a
typical of the Wabanaki style of leadership, which was based on a form of authority that was, in the words of Father Biard, "most precarious, if, indeed, that may be called authority to which obedience is in no wise obligatory."\textsuperscript{50}

Lacking the ability to command or interrogate others, Wabanaki leaders expected that treaty participants would make good on their promises out of a sense of personal good will rather than a fear of punishment. It was necessary to cultivate a sense of trust between speakers so that each would feel a personal sense of obligation to the other. Wabanaki speakers built this trust by making constant protestations of love and fidelity. Orators frequently claimed to speak from their hearts, a turn of phrase that expressed openness ("Our hearts are open if they wear to be seen they are all truth and Sincerity"), good will ("our Hearts are good," "we Salute you with a Friendly Heart"), honesty ("What we now say and do proceeds from our hearts"), affection ("I am glad from my Heart to see your Excellency in good health"), loyalty ("this Belt we Present to you as a Plegg of our fidelity and faithfulness to your Self, Pray [ac]cept it the same, we now Lay open our hearts to you"), and commitment to memory ("what we have heard we will keep it in our hearts to spread it abroad among our People"). Those who spoke from their hearts could be counted on to keep their word. When Governor William Shirley asked

\textit{Forest Tribe in Maine} (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1940), 269.
\textsuperscript{50}JR 2: 73; Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson, \textit{Politeness: Some Universals of Language Usage} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 129-211; Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon, \textit{Intercultural Communication: A Discourse Approach} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 36-42. Powerful sagamores generally remained silent at conferences, allowing their juniors to act as orators in their place. When David Dunbar first encountered the Penobscots in 1729, he noted that their leading sagamore, Wenemouett, seemed "grave and reserved," and he asked him why he was not more voluble. Wenemouett answered that "it was in great respect to [Dunbar] that he was so, and when he was better acquainted, he would be as merry as I pleased." Col. Dunbar to the Duke of Newcastle, Boston, December 10, 1729, \textit{CSP}, vol. 36 (1728-29), fol., 1019, p. 553.
Norridgewock's delegates to a 1749 meeting in Boston whether they had "any credentials," they replied that "[w]e have brought no other than our hearts."¹⁵¹

This manner of talking reflected a worldview in which the import of words was inseparable from the spirit in which they were said. Because the fulfillment of promises depended on mutual trust, words were believable only when they were spoken between people who had formed a personal bond of allegiance: truth was inextricably tied to troth. While English leaders sought adherence to the letter of the law, Wabanakis were more concerned with preserving the spirit of friendship. Having a "good heart" — being filled with honesty, sincerity, and good will — was as important as the formal observance of treaties. When New England's conference speakers dourly demanded the fulfillment of treaty articles, Wabanakis wondered if the English were filled with a "secret hatred" for the Indians. The bullying manner of colonial representatives belied their professed desire to live harmoniously with their Wabanaki neighbors, leading many Indians to believe that English offers of friendship were not sincere. "It is in vain that you accuse us having a bad heart," the orator Artiwaneto told Captain Phineas Stephens in 1752, denying his charge that Wabanakis had broken the peace by attacking English farms. "It has always been you, our brothers, who have attacked us; you have a sweet mouth, but a bitter heart."⁵²

In 1695, two Wabanakis from Androscoggin, Ouranmikoues and Eskambamet, responded in similar fashion to an offer of amnesty from Massachusetts Governor

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¹⁵¹DHSM, 23: 32, 45, 62, 88, 254, 308; Massachusetts Bay, A Conference Held at St. Georges... September 1753, 14; Massachusetts Bay, The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bay, July 1727, 1.

⁵²Letter of "l'abnaquis" to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 1, fol. 267v (my translation; original reads "secrète haine"); Speech of St. François Abenakis to Captain Stevens, 5 July, 1752, in CDRH, vol. 3, 509 (my translation; original reads: "C'est en vain qu'on nous taxe d'avoir le coeur mal fait, c'est toujours vous nos frères qui nous ont attaqué; vous avez une bouche de sucre, mais un coeur de fiel.")

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William Stoughton. The governor had accused the Androscoggins and other Wabanakis of treason and rebellion for their raids against English settlements, but had offered to send presents to those sagamores who opposed the assaults to show the government's good faith in the face of Wabanaki treason. Ouramnikeues and Eskambarnet remarked that the governor would recognize the tone of their letter, for he had provided it in "writing with too much haughtiness." They retorted "in the same manner," saying that the "heart" of the English "has always been inclined toward malice and treachery," and pointed to two recent instances of betrayal at English forts in Saco and Pemaquid as proof. Stoughton had in fact merely acted his role as magistrate, excoriating the Wabanakis for their failure to live up to their treaty promises and granting them amnesty if they promised to pledge fidelity to the crown. While such judiciousness won praise in courtrooms or the chambers of the provincial Council, it ran contrary to the Wabanaki spirit of treaty-making, which was based on personal ties of affection rather than the impersonal enforcement of the law. In Wabanaki eyes, Stoughton's entreaties were undercut by his apparent hardness of heart, revealed in the authoritarian tone of his letter and the misdeeds of his soldiers.

Because treaties were built on the subjective notion of "heart," the written contents of treaties were of secondary importance to Wabanakis. Like other Indian groups of eastern North America, Wabanakis remembered treaties not in terms of a written document but as the entire verbal exchange between conference participants.

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53Report of Frontenac to Minister, 1695, CDRH, 2: 196 (my translation: original reads: "Tu reconnoistras aysément mes parolles, et comment ne les reconnoistras tu pas? C'est toy, pour ainsi parler, qui me les fournis, m'escrivant avec trop de hauteur, tu m'obligez à te répondre du mesme style.... Il faut bien que ton coeur ayt esté porté de tous tems à la méchanceté et à la fourberie.")

54For similar American Indian perspectives on treaties, see Michael K. Foster, "On Who Spoke First at Iroquois-White Councils: An Exercise in the Method of Upstreaming," in Michael K. Foster, Jack Campisi, eds., Extending the Rafters: Interdisciplinary Approaches to Iroquoian Studies (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY
Conferences were treated not as a single text but as a conversation in which speakers exchanged different points of view. Treaties were binding in the sense that speakers were honor-bound to keep their word, but there was no authoritative version of a treaty that all participants were expected to follow. Father Biard observed early in the seventeenth century that Wabanakis often failed to conclude any agreements at their councils, with sagamores departing "more confused and disunited than when they came." As in other small-scale societies, political talk in Wabanaki communities did not usually result in decisive action. Without the apparatus of a state -- courts, legislatures, police -- leaders could not force their views on others and had to live with a degree of factionalism in their communities. For the sake of social harmony it was important to have an appearance of consensus, but respect for their fellows' personal autonomy prevented sagamores from demanding adherence to the letter of their agreements. Council speakers generally agreed to disagree, knowing that they could not coerce others into sharing their beliefs.\textsuperscript{55}

But conferences were not an empty exercise, nor were council speakers as confused as Biard presumed. When leaders talked at treaties, they put their points of view on record and staked their personal honor on their promises and opinions. Their words could convince others of their wisdom and good intentions and might be held against them in the future. As New Hampshire councilman Samuel Penhallow noted in the 1720s, Wabanakis kept oral accounts of their meetings and customarily had "the whole of their tribes present" at treaties, "having no other record of conveying to

\textsuperscript{55}JR 3: 91; Karen J. Brison, \textit{Just Talk: Gossip, Meetings, and Power in a Papua New Guinea Village} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Donald Brenneis and Fred R. Myers, eds., \textit{Dangerous
posterity, but what they communicate from father to son, and so to the son's son."^{56}

Orators were self-consciously aware that their words would be committed to memory. At a 1720 conference on Arrowsic Island, Kennebec speaker Mogg held a belt of wampum above his head and declared that "we are all upon a Hill in Vew of all the Indians, who see and know that we are here to act for them, and this Belt is a Token of it."^{57}

Speakers were also aware that contending versions of the truth would circulate after the meetings. Following the ratification of Dummer's treaty in 1727, the Arresaguntacook representative, Auyaumowett, warned the governor that their agreement might be undone by gossip: "As I have shaken Hands with my Brother there is no doubt but that many Stories will arise on it, that your Honour as well as our Selves will be told Stories." Assuring the governor that such rumors would "have no ill Effect on either side for we are all as one," Auyaumowett declared that the true meaning of the treaty consisted of the words spoken on the record between the participants. "As we are here now in this Place where the Peace has been Concluded," he told his audience, "we desire that nothing which may be spoken out of Doors or transiently be taken notice of." He asked them to remember only "what has been said here to one another in this Place," adding that "this is what is to be observed... it is the Conclusion of the Peace."^{58}

Although he addressed it to the governor, Auyaumowett's pronouncement was clearly intended for his fellow Wabanakis. By the eighteenth century, "Arresaguntacook" was an ambiguous term that referred to Wabanakis living along the travel corridor formed

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^{56}Samuel Penhallow, The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians... (Boston: T. Fleet, 1726; reprint, Cincinnati: Dodge and Harpel, 1859), 82.

^{57}DHSM, 23: 98.

^{58}Massachusetts Bay, Conference with the Eastern Indians... July 1727, 18.

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by the Androscoggin and St. François rivers, and often included the village of Odanak. Like other Wabanaki communities of the time, the Arresaguntacooks were riven by factionalism, with some leaders remaining resolutely loyal to the French, others more inclined toward the English, and still others favoring neutrality. At Odanak and other settlements close to Canada, the pro-French faction was more numerous. Grey Lock, a Missisquoi sagamore who had since 1723 led a campaign against English settlements along the Connecticut River, wanted to continue the war and refused to meet with colonial authorities from New England. Sagamores from Odanak had turned down several requests to ratify the 1725 peace between Massachusetts and the Penobscots, and many people still wanted to take revenge for the deaths of their relatives at the hands of the English. Auyaumowett, who lived along the Androscoggin, risked his reputation in meeting with English authorities, for in making concessions to the Wabanakis’ longtime enemies he opened himself to charges of betrayal and cowardice. Knowing that the pro-French party would inevitably spread malicious gossip about his meeting with Dummer, Auyaumowett preemptively put his own version of the treaty on record.

The significance of the words spoken at treaties, as Auyaumowett knew, was inextricably tied to judgments of the person who spoke them. Loron remarked at the same conference that Wabanaki sagamores who signed the treaty staked their reputations on the benefits of a peace with the English. If the English failed to uphold their part of

the bargain, sagamores such as Auyaumowett and Loron would lose face in their communities. Observing that the terms of trade at truckhouses had recently become unfavorable to the Indians, Loron remarked that "this turns out to our shame, when we told the Tribes how the Trade was to be carried on, and it proves otherwise, it makes us Lyars." He added that the "there are a great many that talk to us in another Language" -- an allusion to the French -- "and tell us this Trade is but for a little while, it is to draw us in for a small time, and then it will fall, and we shall be laughed at." A few months earlier, Loron had sent Dummer a letter asking to be paid an annual gratuity and "some tokens of special respect" at English forts in return for his efforts on behalf of the peace. Because he had risked his personal honor in supporting peace with the English, Loron wanted assurances that colonial authorities would reward him for his service.\(^6^1\)

While the English recognized the importance of cultivating ties with Wabanaki leaders such as Loron, they demanded more of them than loyalty. English delegates wanted treaty agreements to be binding for all the Wabanakis represented at the conferences and always began treaties by asking Indian delegates if they represented their whole tribes. The English in this respect wanted to treat tribes as mirror images of European polities: as clearly-defined territorial jurisdictions whose leaders had executive authority over their subjects. Imagined in this way, Wabanaki sagamores would be able to enforce contracts with the decisiveness of governors or courts. But the reality was that Wabanaki leaders were unable to force their opinions on others, and their authority extended only as far as their persuasive powers. All the promises they made at

\(^6^1\) Massachusetts Bay. The Conference with the Eastern Indians... in Casco-Bay, in July 1727, 19; Benjamin Colman, "Some Memories for the Continuation of the History of the Troubles of the New-English Colonies, from the Barbarous and Perfidious Indians..." in Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, 1st ser., vol. 6, (1797), 116. During treaty negotiations, Loron had criticized the English for
conferences were consequently personal in character and rested on the honor of the speaker and his influence over others. When colonial officials pressed Wabanaki leaders to do more than they were able -- insisting that they prevent all Wabanakis from siding with the French or that they retrieve war captives who had been adopted by Indian families -- sagamores inevitably felt that their fidelity to the English was insufficiently rewarded and that English leaders had little regard for their personal honor. In 1751, Loron angrily responded to charges that the Penobscots had not done enough to prevent other tribes from attacking the English. "I have been the Man that has been the first in all Treatys," he told the English representatives, "but you think I am not capable to manage for the other Tribes. -- I have been the Man that has quell'd all the rest."62

Underlying such misunderstandings were differences in the way power was exercised among the Wabanakis and the English. New England's governments were invested with the ability to act on behalf of society as a whole and to coerce others into accepting their rulings. Orders issued by political leaders carried great weight because they had the backing of the state, and those who disobeyed them could expect to be punished. Wabanakis, on the other hand, rejected the notion that any person was owed obedience as a matter of right. Political relationships were formed through continual negotiation, with each person showing respect for the personal autonomy of others. Wabanaki criticisms of the English way of speaking were at their heart a denial of the legitimacy of state power, and were rooted in the belief that social harmony was more important than adherence to the letter of the law.63

misinterpreting his statements. See Ghere, "Mistranslations and Misinformation," 8-11.
62DHSN, 23: 420.
63On the differences between between speech in state and stateless societies, see Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology, Robert Hurley, trans., in collaboration with Abe Stein

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The Language of Status and Obligations

Although Wabanakis and colonists had differing understandings of power, they established a political relationship that began in the seventeenth century and has persisted to the present day. But the two sides had different understandings of the nature of the relationship and the obligations each party owed the other. From 1693 to the American Revolution, English leaders insisted that the Wabanakis were subjects of the British crown and that their territories lay within the jurisdiction of the British empire. This point of view was bolstered by the cession of Acadia to Great Britain under the terms of the Peace of Utrecht, which weakened New France's claims to suzerainty over Wabanaki lands. As subjects of the British crown, rather than citizens of Massachusetts, Wabanakis were not obligated to pay taxes to the province, nor were they expected to perform militia duty, or even try their internal disputes in provincial courts. But colonial leaders demanded that Wabanakis demonstrate their allegiance to the crown by renouncing their alliance with the French, forsaking future attacks against the English, and promising to settle disputes with colonists by applying to the governor for redress.

This policy was aimed at giving English colonies the upper hand in the imperial struggle with the French. Knowing that Wabanakis played an important role in the Canadian system of military defense, English officials sought to bring them to heel by claiming exclusive jurisdiction over their lands. Although most Wabanakis saw no contradiction in forming alliances with both the English and the French, colonial authorities at Boston and Quebec insisted that the Indians choose sides. English leaders were determined to establish exclusive military authority within their own boundaries,

and to reach this goal they needed to cut the Wabanakis' ties with the French. In a 1722 letter to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor Samuel Shute of Massachusetts insisted that the Norridgewocks, who were on the verge of war with Massachusetts, had subjected themselves to the British crown and that their lands belonged to the English under terms of the Peace of Utrecht. "If they chuse the Allyance and Protection of the French," he wrote, "In Gods Name, let them move into the Confines of the Government of Canada; I am very sure the place of their residence at present Vizt Norridgewock is within the Territory of Great Britain." By virtue of the crown's sovereignty over their lands, royal representatives claimed absolute military control over the Wabanakis. When Norridgewocks objected to the construction of a fort on the Kennebec River in 1754, Governor William Shirley answered, "I did not ask your Consent... King George, nor any other Prince, ever asks the Consent of any Person to build Forts within their own Territories." As subjects of the king, Wabanakis owed complete obedience to the crown in all military matters.64

Wabanakis saw things differently, as they made clear at several treaty conferences. The notion of monarchical government was alien to them; the Wabanaki word for "king", kinjames, had its origins in the early seventeenth century, when Wabanakis first began to meet subjects of King James I. Governor Francis Bernard speculated in 1763 that the word referred to James II and was a Jesuit-inspired "system of verbal Jacobitism," but Wabanakis even addressed Louis XIV as nekintsemesem, "my King James," a twist of historical irony that apparently eluded the missionaries.

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64Samuel Shute to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Boston, April 23, 1722, in Baxter, Pioneers of New France, 307; Massachusetts Bay (Colony), A Journal of the Proceedings at Two Conferences Begun to Be Held at Falmouth in Casco Bay... on the Twenty-Eighth Day of June 1754... and on the Fifth Day of July Following (Boston: J. Draper, 1754), Early American Imprints, 1st ser., no. 7222, 17.
transcribing their letters. Wabanakis preferred to describe political relationships in kinship terms and treated the language of sovereignty as a foreign innovation. While English and French governors rancorously debated whose crown had authority over the Indians, Wabanakis described themselves as brothers of the former and children of the latter. "All the French are our fathers, that is what we call them, the others are only our brothers," a Wabanaki soldier named Colonel Louis told Pierre Duponceau, a French interpreter at Valley Forge in 1778. The English "also wanted them also to call them fathers," he continued, "but the Indians would not consent; the French alone were their fathers."66

Colonel Louis's account was correct: with the exception of a 1701 conference in which they called King William their uncle, Wabanakis had always referred to the English as "brothers," a term memorialized by the "Two Brothers" stone cairns at Casco Bay. Throughout the eighteenth century, Wabanakis had spoken of French governors as their "fathers," also referring to them as Onontio or "great mountain," a literal Iroquois translation of the name of New France's second governor, Charles Huault de Montmagny. Such precise distinctions were of great importance to the Wabanakis, for fraternal and filial relationships entailed two different sets of obligations. Among Wabanakis, a father was a provider, a man who saw to the material needs of his family. Children owed

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65DHSM, 13: 371; letter of "Tabnaquis" to Louis XIV, [1715?], PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 1, fol. 266. By the nineteenth century, Wabanakis had devised compound words such as kinjameskua (queen, using the feminine suffix-skua), kinjamessis (prince, using the diminutive suffix-sis), and kinjamesigamigw (palace, with the word gamigw, or wigwam). See Joseph Laurent, New Familiar Abenakis and English Dialogues (Quebec: Leger Brousseau, 1884), 40, 48.
obedience to their father, but only so long as he generously provided them with food, clothing, and other necessities of life.\textsuperscript{67}

French authorities had established themselves in this role by the last quarter of the seventeenth century, lavishing gifts upon loyal sagamores and establishing mission villages for Indian refugees. In return, they expected Wabanakis to support them in imperial wars and to serve under French officers in Acadia. Their relationship was not based on treaties -- Maine's Wabanakis never made any written agreements with the French -- but was created through a continuous flow of gifts and favors.\textsuperscript{68} After the Treaty of Utrecht, the French continued to provide for their allies in a more roundabout manner, giving gifts to Wabanakis visiting Quebec or distributing them through Jesuit missionaries and Acadian families such as the Sieurs de St. Castin. In 1716, the government of New France established an annual fund of 4000 livres for their Wabanaki allies, to be paid out in the form of presents at Quebec and Isle Royale (Cape Breton). French authorities also helped to fund the construction of churches at Norridgewock and Medoctec. The generosity of the French won them the allegiance of most Wabanakis; as the Penobscot orator Meskouadoue said in 1700, "I have no other hatchets but that of Onnontio... I have no other will but your own, I will do exactly as you wish."\textsuperscript{69}

Although the Wabanakis filled the subordinate role in this relationship, the burden of obligation lay on the shoulders of their French fathers. The obedience of the Indians


\textsuperscript{68} A Penobscot delegate signed the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701, but was essentially a witness to an agreement between the Iroquois, the French, the Ottawas, and the Hurons.

\textsuperscript{69} Catherine M. Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 52 (1995): 609-30; Vaudreuil and Begon to Ministre, Quebec, October 14, 1716, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 37, fols. 27-29; "Paroles des Iroquois... le 3e septembre 1700," PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 18, fol. 87. (My translation; original reads: "je n'avoi point d'autres Haches que celle d'onnontio... je n'ay point d'autre volonté que la sienne, je suiveray exactement tout...")
was limited to military affairs and during peacetime they owed nothing to the French. But when Wabanakis brought grievances or demands to the French governor during peace or war, he was morally obliged to provide for them. Indians usually made their requests to French authorities as pleas for pity. "It is true that I am altogether poor," a delegation from Panawapskik told Governor Frontenac in 1691, in a request for trade articles. "I am without a hood, without blankets, without shirts, without leggings, without a cap, without shot, without powder, without peas and without tobacco, so that if I want to smoke a bit to ease my sorrow, I have to use tree leaves and wood chippings."

Admitting they were "denuded of everything," they assured the governor that they "think at present about nothing but making war," and if they were not sent powder and shot they "would use kettles and the bones of game animals to make arrows." In exaggerating both their destitution and their devotion, the Penobscots appealed to the governor's moral duty as a father to provide for his children, making it impossible for him to deny their request. Frontenac gladly played the role demanded of him and ordered a shipment of powder and shot as well as a canoe of trade articles to be sent from Quebec.70

Frontenac and other French officials won the loyalty of Wabanakis because they were consistently able to take care of the Indians' needs. In Wabanaki society, leaders attained a dominant social position only if they were able to provide for others, and their authority was precariously tied to their liberality. When French officials showed stinginess or tried to compel obedience, Wabanakis acted angrily and refused to do their

70 CDRH-2: 34-38. (My translation; original reads: "Il est vrai que je suis tout à fait pauvre. Je suis par exemple sans capotte, sans couverte, sans chemises, sans bas, sans bonnet, sans plomb, sans poudre, sans fèves et sans tabac, en telle sorte que sy je veux fumer quelques fois pour dissiper mon chagrin, je suis obligé de me servir de feuilles d'arbres, de bois et de tondre." "n'importe que je soys ainsi denué de tout" "j'employeray mes chaudieres et les os des bestes que je tueray à faire des flèches.")
officials' bidding. In August 1751, the Marquis de la Jonquière, governor of New France, learned that French authority over the Wabanakis had its limits. In his annual meeting in Quebec, a representative from Panawapskik expressed concern over recent attacks Odanaks had made against the English in retaliation for a murder of one of their kinsmen. Observing that the French had failed to provide for his village in recent years, the sagamore explained that the Penobscots were dependent on trade with the English and would be cut off from supplies if war broke out between the two groups. The governor was rumored to have supported the attacks and the sagamore chided him in a roundabout way for his complicity. Jonquière sharply reprimanded the delegate, telling him that the Penobscots were "poor subjects, corruptible by a dram of drink." Accusing them of taking orders from the English, he reminded them that though they were a "blazing fire" he would "reduce them to ashes" if they disobeyed his orders. Only if they were to "beg and Repent" for their infidelity could he forgive them. The Penobscot sharply retorted, "We dont like any that go to fright us. The Penobscots are not to be frightn'd. We [d]ont beg of any. We live on our own Rights what God has given us and where we live wele die." Even in the face of the governor's threats, members of the pro-English party continued to work toward peace with their neighbors from New England. A father could not command obedience, but had to earn it: officials like Jonquière who tried to stretch their authority too far tended to lose the allegiance of their followers.

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72 "Abenakis de Panna8anske, Parolles d'un chef qui s'est noye,” August 27, 1751, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 97, fols. 62-63; DHSM, 23: 425-26. (My translation; original reads: "vous etes des mauvais sujets, qu'un coup de boisson en capable de corrompre"; "je vous reduiray en cendres.") Pro-French factions at Panawapskik later expressed assurances of their loyalty to the governor and their willingness to prosecute war against the English: see "Parolles des Abenakis fidels au Village de Panna8amske," September 19, 1751, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 97, fol. 78.
If French officials occasionally stumbled in their efforts to win the obedience of the Wabanakis, the English failed altogether. Like their French counterparts, New England's leaders were relentless in their diplomatic pursuit of the Wabanakis' favor. In the language of European diplomacy, they sought to establish the sovereignty of the British crown over the Indians and their lands. This translated into a desire to become the Wabanakis' "fathers," since English officials wanted to command absolute obedience from the Indians in military affairs. But Wabanakis consistently rejected the paternalist claims of the English, and treated them as mere "brothers": equal allies whose relationship was structured through trade rather than gifts. The relationship of father and son involved a set of reciprocal duties, and if one party failed to fulfill its obligations the relationship was dissolved. While the English demanded obedience from Wabanakis, they failed to show the generosity necessary to command their loyalty. English leaders rarely responded to Wabanaki requests with the alacrity of the French; instead, they questioned the sagamores' wisdom and pushed their own ultimatums back at the Indians.

To the Wabanakis, it seemed that English governors lacked the magnanimity necessary to be fathers. "Governour Dummer was a good man," Penobscot sagamore Wenemouett said in 1729, "but he had not power like the Governour of Canada to performe what he promised."73 Wabanakis preferred to see their relationship with the English as one of equals: brothers who were bound together by trade and friendship but did not owe each other allegiance in war.

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73Col. Dunbar to Mr. Popple, Boston, December 10, 1729, CSP, vol. 36 (1728-29), fol. 1018, p. 553. In English political culture, petitioners were expected not only to state their grievances, but to make their case convincing to the authorities. The government then decided whether the petition had sufficient merit to be granted. But among Wabanakis, followers merely had to state their needs to their leaders: the onus was on the father to provide for his children. This difference has been a persistent source of misunderstandings between Indians and whites, even to the present day. For an illuminating contemporary example, see Ron Scollon and Suzanne B. K. Scollon, Narrative, Literacy and Face in Interethnic Communication (Norwood,
Although English treaty speakers called Wabanakis their brothers, they had little understanding of what such kinship terms involved. New England's officials were more inclined to think according to the principles of sovereignty, and in these terms they owed Wabanakis little. The crown had gained jurisdiction over the Indians under the terms of Phips's Treaty of 1693 and had taken control over their lands by the Peace of Utrecht. From the English point of view, these documents gave English governors authority over the Wabanakis whether this pleased the Indians or not. As in their defense of private property, English people clung to the belief that the possession of land was a right that entailed no social obligations.

Wabanaki leaders gave voice an alternative perspective, one that emphasized the need to maintain harmonious relations among people, and between human beings and their natural environment. The Wabanaki moral economy emphasized the obligation of kinfolk to provide for each other and to ensure that the land would sustain their descendants in the future. Rejecting formal notions of justice, property, and trade, Wabanakis were intensely concerned with the personal and immediate effects of social interaction, and saw that the recognition of English land claims -- whatever their legal merits -- would threaten their traditional way of life.

Although representatives from both sides sought to slacken the tension between these two points of view, they often failed and the inevitable result was violence. The threat of warfare hung over the heads of conference delegates, particularly as Anglo-Wabanaki conflicts became entangled with a larger imperial struggle between the French

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and the British. If words failed, weapons would ultimately decide who possessed the lands of Maine.
CHAPTER V

THE WAGES OF WAR

"You've lived in England; are they as crazy there as in France?"
"It's a different kind of madness," said Martin. "You realize that these two countries are fighting a war over a few acres of snow near Canada, and they have spent more on this fine war than all of Canada is worth."
--Voltaire, Candide

Without supplies no army is brave.
--Frederick II of Prussia, 1747

In February 1764, Samuel Holland, a Dutch-born military engineer and veteran of the sieges of Louisbourg and Quebec, received a royal commission to launch a large-scale survey of the northern half of British North America. At Holland's suggestion, the Board of Trade divided the mainland colonies into northern and southern districts, assigning the region north of the Potomac River to Holland and leaving the southern portion to William De Brahm, surveyor-general of Georgia and South Carolina. Soon after receiving his commission, Holland appointed a deputy to assume his duties as surveyor-general of Quebec, and organized a number of surveying parties to prepare maps of uncharted areas of the northern colonies.1

One of the leaders of the parties was an officer of Holland's regiment named Joseph F. W. Des Barres, who undertook hydrographic surveys of Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia, and the coast of Maine. Des Barres and Holland hired several assistants and some twenty or thirty laborers each and, with the aid of theodolites, telescopes, and other surveying instruments, took soundings of harbor depths, measured degrees of latitude and longitude, and made exact calculations of area and distance. By 1775, the surveyors had produced several dozen plans, nine of which illustrated the coastline between the Saint John and Piscataqua rivers. Artistically polished and remarkable in their technical sophistication, the maps were compiled into a single atlas the same year, published under Des Barres's name as the Atlantic Neptune [Fig. 5.1].

The Holland-Des Barres surveys were the latest of a series of reconnaissance expeditions that rode the wake of British victories in the Seven Years War. In May 1759, Massachusetts governor Thomas Pownall had ordered military engineers to survey Penobscot Bay and the lower part of Penobscot River, with a view to building a fort at its headwaters. Captain John North and Lieutenant Joseph Small presented the governor with a map of the region, with water depths, portages, and levels of elevation marked at strategic locations [Fig. 5.2]. Seven months later, Lieutenant John Montréal embarked on the first of two voyages between Maine and Quebec following the conquest of the

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French capital. Leaving in the dead of winter with a party of thirteen men, Montrésor travelled by canoe down the Chaudière River to Lake Mégantic, then made his way to the head of the Androscoggin River by a series of portages. Lacking provisions and debilitated by frostbite, Montrésor's rangers were forced to eat their moccasins and leather pouches to survive. The next year Montrésor embarked on a second journey from Quebec to Maine, this time wisely choosing to leave in mid-June. Once again he canoed down the Chaudière, but portaged to Moosehead Lake and then travelled on the Penobscot River until it wound close to the Kennebec, which he followed until he reached Fort Halifax. On both occasions, Montrésor recorded his findings in pen-and-ink maps of the travel corridor [Fig. 5.3].

The surveys carried out in Maine between 1759 and 1775 were one element of an imperial inventory of conquered lands following the Seven Years War, which included James Rennell's surveys of Bengal and James Cook's charts of Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence River. The purpose of such surveys went beyond mere stock-taking; maps were intended to be a blueprint for territorial expansion. At the Penobscot River, Governor Pownall informed the Indians he met that he would "make the land English," truculently reminding them that "I am able to do it -- and I will do it." The immediate end of Pownall's expedition was to build a fort, but in the long run, "making the land English" meant parcelling it out to British subjects protected by English-speaking courts. This point of view was shared by the commissioners of the Board of Trade, who told

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5 On Captain Cook's charts, see R. A. Skelton and R. V. Tooley, The Marine Surveys of James Cook in North America, 1758-1768: Particularly the Survey of Newfoundland: A Bibliography of Printed Charts and Sailing Directions (London: Map Collectors' Circle, 1967); on Rennell, see Matthew H. Edney, Mapping an Empire: The Geographical Construction of British India, 1765-1843 (Chicago: University of
King George that Holland's maps were necessary to devise measures for "the dividing, laying out and settling such parts of your Majesty's American Dominions," adding that it was advisable to grant the lands "as soon as possible" because of the "advantages which such Settlement will produce to the Trade, Navigation and Manufactures of this Kingdom." 6

The people of New England did not need encouragement from the crown, for they had already set out to make the land English. Provincial speculators leapt at the opportunity to survey and map the newly acquired territories after 1759, and in the 1760s and 1770s, land companies from Massachusetts dispatched dozens of surveyors to Maine to prepare plats for proprietors and lay out holdings for settlers. Their efforts barely kept pace with the flood of land-hungry settlers who migrated eastward in the 1760s and 1770s. In the two decades after the fall of Quebec, English settlement expanded rapidly along the coast as far as Machias and pushed inward toward the interior along the valleys of the Penobscot and Kennebec. 7

Just as the surveys opened a new chapter of Maine's history, they closed another. More than in any other part of North America, the inhabitants of the region had suffered the depredations of nearly a century of imperial warfare, losing lives and property on an alarming scale, given their small numbers. Northern New England had been the site of a bloody Anglo-Wabanaki war between 1675 and 1678 and was one of the focal points of a long period of intermittent imperial warfare between 1688 and 1713. An Anglo-

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6 "Journal of Pownall," 376; Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations to King George III, December 21, 1763, Public Record Office, AO 3/140, fol. 27.
7 I have located over fifty maps prepared by surveyors from the Kennebec and Pejepscot proprietors between 1759 and 1776 at the Maine Historical Society in Portland. The plats represent only a small proportion of the total number of surveys undertaken in Maine during this period.
Wabanaki conflict flared up again between 1722 and 1725, and was followed after 1745 by two wars between the French and British crowns for control of the continent, in which the region's inhabitants once again suffered greatly. If the terms of the peace were to shape Maine's future, the realities of war had defined its past.

With few exceptions, historical treatments of colonial warfare in Maine have consisted of accounts of battles and dissections of strategy. The interest of historians in these subjects is understandable, for the rise and fall of military fortunes makes for gripping narratives. But military studies that focus solely on events on the battlefield tend to remove war from its social and political context, making it seem as if conflicts are decided solely by the valor of soldiers. As Michael Mann has put it, military power is "promiscuous," in the sense that war-making depends on economic and political supports from the civilian world while at the same time serving to advance the aims of civilian leaders. Military force was the means by which the British gained control over Maine, but the army's power rested in turn on the pillars of civilian society: wealth generated

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9 The volume of materials that have been written on colonial warfare is dauntingly large. In addition to contemporary histories by Benjamin Church, Cotton Mather, and Samuel Penhallow, there were several lengthy treatments of Anglo-Wabanaki warfare in the nineteenth century. Francis Parkman's multi-volume France and England in North America is the best-known, although Parkman wore his whiggish prejudices on his sleeve and his Victorian brand of racism is offensive to modern readers. Herbert M. Sylvester's Indian Wars of New England, 3 vols. (Boston: W. B. Clarke, 1910) is written in the spirit of Parkman and provides a detailed account of battles from the early seventeenth century to the fall of New France; equally useful is Samuel A. Drake's The Border Wars of New England, Commonly Called King William's War and Queen Anne's War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897) and A Particular History of the Five Years French and Indian War in New England and Parts Adjacent (reprint, Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970). More recently, the work of Douglas E. Leach has become an invaluable point of reference, particularly his Arms for Empire: A Military History of the British Colonies in North America, 1607-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1973) and Northern Colonial Frontier, 1607-1763 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966). Recent treatments of colonial warfare with an ethnohistorical slant include Armstrong Starkey, European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815 (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New York: Norton, 1988).
from labor and trade, revenues drawn from taxes, technology devised by industry, and a burgeoning population that filled the ranks of armies with a steady flow of recruits.\textsuperscript{10}

The surveys carried out following the Seven Years War offer a telling illustration of this intermingling of military and civilian power. Carried out by military men under the employ of the imperial and provincial governments, the projects were intended to prepare newly conquered lands for settlement by colonists. But the conquest of these lands had depended in turn on the cooperation of these same colonists, working in concert with the metropolitan and colonial governments and serving as soldiers, taxpayers, and sutlers. Military victories had secured civilian aims -- the protection and acquisition of lands for farmers, loggers, and land speculators -- yet military successes had depended on the human and material wealth of New England and its metropolitan backers.

The contours of the political map of Maine, both before and after the Seven Years War, were shaped by this intersection of the military and civilian worlds. Military might was a source of power for the English, French, and Wabanakis who had strategic and material interests in the region. The extent of this power was not merely a matter of brute force but depended on the array of supports that each society lent to its fighting men. Armed conflict in Maine was more than a matter of rival soldiers meeting in the battlefield; it was also a contest between neighboring societies, each having a different vision of how the land was to be used.

The Geography of War

Voltaire had the Ohio Valley in mind when he quipped that the Seven Years War was fought over "a few acres of snow near Canada," but his observation would have applied with equal force to Maine. By comparison to much of North America, Maine was a barren place, with a cold climate, dense forests, and acidic soils unsuited to wheat cultivation. Yet both sides in the imperial struggle sacrificed hundreds of lives and spent untold sums for its possession. Meanwhile, places that were far more fertile and prosperous, such as Boston or Rhode Island, emerged largely unscathed from the wars, without suffering even a single attack. This paradox forces us to consider what might be called the geography of war. Why was conflict concentrated in some places, but not others? Why was Maine a cockpit while nearby regions -- of far greater economic and political value -- enjoyed peace?

Modern geographers have traditionally paid scant attention to military history, and a search through the index of any textbook on human geography would be lucky to yield more than one or two references to the subject. With their sights trained on the interaction between people and their environment, students of human geography have traditionally been interested in patterns of subsistence, trade, and residence, rather than the ephemeral, event-driven world of war. But like any other human activity, war has a spatial dimension and is shaped by contingencies of climate, terrain, vegetation, and transportation.

Throughout most of human history, distance has imposed rigid limits on the extent of military power. In the ancient world, armies could march only for three or four days -- one scholar estimates an equivalent distance of about 90 kilometers -- before
depleting the provisions they carried with them. Even with horse-drawn transport, few armies could travel further than this distance without requiring more supplies. To continue their march, they would have to requisition food, fodder, and other supplies from friendly settlements or plunder the same from their enemies. A similar dilemma was confronted by military commanders in medieval and modern times. Until armies developed dependable supply lines that connected political centers with troops in the field, the need for provisions would take precedence over other military objectives: Martin van Creveld has termed this problem the "tyranny of plunder," arguing that its chains were not fully broken until the twentieth century.11

As long as transportation networks were inadequate to the task of supplying armies over long distances, the military power of political capitals was limited. The dependence of armies on plunder as a source of supply meant that the aims of the state were often subordinated to material needs of soldiers. In the ancient and medieval world, military expeditions were undertaken as much to win booty as they were to extend the influence of political leaders. The difficulties of supplying and controlling long-distance campaigns meant that states ruled more through threat of military force than its actual use, presiding over networks of tributaries who made periodic payments to avoid attack. Even when armies conquered surrounding areas militarily, the conquest generally entailed a degree of political decentralization. Since most states did not have the

11 Mann, Sources of Social Power, 138-42; Martin van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), esp. 5-39. John Lynn has criticized Creveld for underplaying advances in European logistics before the nineteenth century, pointing out that armies did not depend on plunder and foraging as their sole source of supplies. Soldiers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries drew their provisions from a variety of sources, including purchases from local merchants, forced contributions, étapes (stores of food maintained by local merchants) and magazines (stores of food and arms maintained by the army). See "The History of Logistics and Supplying War," in John A. Lynn, ed., Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1993), 9-27.
revenues necessary to pay wages to their armies, they compensated them instead with rewards of plunder, land, or political office, installing officers as the lords or governors of the regions they subjugated.12

This system of rewards, of which feudalism was one variation, continued to characterize war in Europe in the Middle Ages. But the conduct of war was gradually transformed between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries, as the introduction of new tactics and technologies, the growing power of monarchies, and the increasing scale of commerce raised the stakes of military conflict. One by one, European states replaced feudal levies with paid mercenaries, built bastioned forts, and outfitted their armies and navies with cannon and muskets. Collectively, these innovations dramatically increased the expense of war, both in expenditures and human lives. Smaller city states and principalities that could not bear these costs were pillaged or absorbed by their larger neighbors. Powerful monarchs, meanwhile, found themselves in an arms race with their rivals, with constant pressure to find new sources of revenue for their armies. The lion's share of royal budgets were devoted to financing wars or servicing debts incurred by war. As the cost of campaigns mounted, governments became more intrusive in the lives of their citizens, devising new methods of extracting taxes and obtaining loans, and demanding military service from a growing share of the male population.13

This system of warfare favored territorial states over other forms of political organization because they generated more revenues than city states and were more

12 Mann, Sources of Social Power, 130-77.
compact, and hence easier to defend, than dynastic empires. In the Middle Ages, the
countryside of Europe was dotted by hundreds of castles, which acted as the strongholds
of local magnates. These magnates were allied with princes, kings, and pontiffs, whose
dynastic estates were often noncontiguous and scattered throughout the continent. As the
political fortunes of magnates waned and the strength of monarchs waxed, the castles
became increasingly unnecessary and were replaced by a ring of frontier fortifications
that protected the outer edges of states. Under the direction of Louis XIV's chief military
engineer, Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, 133 strongholds at the fringes of France were
built or rebuilt, while the fortifications of Paris were torn down. Vauban's projects were
emulated by monarchs in other parts of Europe and the result was a military landscape in
which violence was pushed out toward the frontiers of the state, with its territorial core
acting as a supply center for the peripheries.14

This pattern was duplicated in Europe's colonies. In the early years of settlement,
vioent conflicts were relatively small in scale and geographically diffused: in early
seventeenth-century New England, few places were entirely free from the threat of piracy
or Indian raids. But as colonies developed economically, they became increasingly adept
at providing military protection for the more densely settled seaboard towns. Because
cities such as Boston or Providence were also commercial centers with large populations,
it was easy to recruit and provision large armies for their defense and the protection of
nearby areas. The more sparsely populated regions at the edges of colonies were far less
able to defend themselves and were consequently more likely to be chosen as military
targets. Places such as Maine and southern Acadia, which had small populations and

14 Parker, Military Revolution, 42-43.
were claimed by rival crowns, became militarized frontiers that depended on supplies and
troops sent from colonial capitals. Because no side was able to gain a decisive advantage
over its rivals in these frontier regions, their inhabitants were constantly vulnerable to
attack.

The successful prosecution of war in a frontier area in Maine depended on the
ability of colonial officials to establish an umbilical cord of supply and troops that linked
the peripheries with commercial and political centers. Logistics, more than strategy or
tactics, was the central problem faced by military commanders leading campaigns in
Maine. Unless they managed to recruit, transport, fortify, provision, and supply troops on
the frontier, political leaders could not gain control over the land. For much of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial leaders had mixed success in this regard.
The English oversaw a steady increase in the number of forts, garrison houses, and
soldiers in Maine throughout the eighteenth century, but before the 1750s the numbers
were not large enough to overwhelm their enemies.

Lacking the funds or the transportation networks necessary to launch large-scale
campaigns, English, French, and Wabanaki forces all adopted military styles that
departed from European convention. By the eighteenth century, warfare in Europe was
typically conducted according to a set of unwritten rules: by and large, war was fought by
professional armies, acting on behalf of states, seeking decisive military victories that
resulted in territorial conquest or diplomatic concessions. These rules were put into
writing in the nineteenth century by the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz,
who called war "the continuation of policy by other means." The modern form of warfare
described by Clausewitz was built on the assumption that armed force is monopolized by
states, and that the soldiers hired by the states have a disinterested determination to advance their policies.\textsuperscript{15}

In Maine, as in the ancient and medieval world, these assumptions did not apply. It may be helpful in this respect to imagine warfare in terms of a spectrum of organized violence, running from small raiding bands to large-scale professional armies [see Fig. 5.4]. Because modern states have substantial revenues and highly developed transportation networks, soldiers are adequately paid and supplied by their governments and do not have to resort to plunder. Instead, their attention is devoted exclusively to following orders and serving the interests of the state. Armies of a smaller scale, on the other hand, tend to be less well funded and more oriented toward the pursuit of plunder and the individual interests of soldiers. While far less costly than professional armies, they also are less effective at advancing state interests.

None of the groups fighting in Maine conformed to the image of a professional army, although some came closer than others. Soldiers on all sides went to the battlefield in search of plunder and personal profit, and few were wholly dedicated to the interests of the state. Their tactics, as often as not, were designed to bring home captives and booty rather than to advance the policy aims of their leaders. The tyranny of plunder still held sway in colonial Maine, although the degree to which soldiers remained committed to its pursuit depended on many things: political circumstances, the wages and supplies offered by governments, inherited traditions of warmaking, and cultural assumptions regarding military honor and the legitimacy of violence. English, French, and Wabanaki soldiers received different kinds of support from their respective governments, and understood the

aims and conduct of warfare in divergent ways. The result was a confluence of different
styles of warfare, which grew from separate cultural traditions and evolved under the
press of events. How these styles differed and how they determined the balance of power
in Maine are questions that bear further examination.

*The Sociology of Scalping*

French entrepreneurs and administrators had claimed possession of Acadia since
the first decade of the seventeenth century, but their rights to the province -- particularly
its southern reaches -- had little practical backing. English and Scottish forces claiming
the territory on behalf of the colony of Nova Scotia captured the capital of Port Royal in
1629 and again in 1654. When French authorities regained possession of the colony in
1670, they ruled the southern portion through a handful of military garrisons, which lost
the colony's most important trading posts to Anglo-Dutch privateers in 1675 and its
capital to English soldiers in 1690. The inconsiderable French population of Acadia,
which numbered only a few hundred in the seventeenth century, was incapable of
mounting a sustained defense of its settlements. The more substantial population of the
St. Lawrence River Valley was itself vulnerable to Iroquois and English assaults and was
in any case too far removed from Acadia to lend it any assistance. Regulars from France
were expensive to transport and even costlier to maintain after they had crossed the
Atlantic. French administrators recognized very early that they could not defend their
North American footholds alone and would have to look to native allies for assistance.

Indians were a unique class of soldiers, very different from Canadian militiamen
or French regulars. They had their own assumptions about the proper conduct and aims

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of war, and their unwillingness to conform to Old World standards of military discipline exasperated many colonial military commanders. But the colony's desperate need for military assistance forced French administrators to adopt tactics, rewards, and methods of recruitment that were familiar to the Indians and bore little resemblance to standard European practice. Although New France's governors acted as the warriors' commanders-in-chief, the terms of their employment were determined more by the Indians than by the French. In this respect, Wabanakis were similar to Cossacks, Highland Scots, and other "nomadic" groups who were induced to serve on behalf of European states in eighteenth-century wars. Like these other peoples, Wabanakis negotiated an alliance with a European power which allowed them to retain a degree of independence -- specifically, in the Wabanaki case, the right to enjoy their lands without intrusion by Europeans -- in return for military service.

The Franco-Wabanaki military alliance came to fruition in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, but its roots extended as far back as the earliest years of colonization. The French had established themselves at the head of a continental system of native alliances by insinuating themselves into diplomatic networks that had existed before their arrival. Because the main points of French interest in North America were the Atlantic coast and the St. Lawrence-Great Lakes system, they naturally gravitated toward the Indian groups who controlled access to these regions. The groups first encountered by French colonists in Acadia were known as the Souriquois (Mi'kmaq), the Etechemins (whose villages extended from the Saint John to the Kennebec rivers), and the Almouchiquois (whose villages lay to the south of the Kennebec). As elsewhere in
the Northeast, these groups were tangled in a web of alliances and enmities that included dozens of villages and bands sometimes hundreds of miles apart.

In the first decade of the seventeenth century, there was sporadic warfare between the Mi'kmaq and Etechemins, although it was mitigated by a constant flow of trade and diplomacy between factions on both sides. Mi'kmaq had also launched attacks against the St. Lawrence Iroquoians in the sixteenth century and had contacts with Montagnais living at Tadoussac on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River. Etechemins were also allied with the Montagnais and carried on trade with corn-growing villages from Saco southward. Tensions sometimes existed between neighboring villages; Captain Robert Davies in 1607 was informed of a war between two groups living at the headwaters of the Kennebec River.  

The exotic origins of trade goods uncovered by archaeologists in Maine gives some indication of the geographic extent of this system of trade and alliances. Objects dated toward the end of the Ceramic period include a Norse penny, a Labrador Inuit tool, copper and chalcedony from Nova Scotia, and quartzite from Lake Mistassini in northern Quebec. Documentary evidence also indicates a far-flung range of alliances: three separate European authors in the first decade of the seventeenth century described contacts between the Montagnais leader Anadabijou and the coastal population of Acadia. In 1603, he was seen by Samuel de Champlain at his home in Tadoussac, hosting a feast to celebrate a recent defeat of the Iroquois with an army of warriors that included many Etechemins. Four years later, he gave his blessings to a raid on Saco led by the renowned

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Mi'kmaq sagamore Membertou. And in the first decade of the century, Indians from Penobscot Bay informed the English that they sometimes travelled to the St. Lawrence Valley to trade with him because he had access to European goods through the French.17

Wabanaki armies rarely if ever numbered over a thousand men, placing them at the low end of the military spectrum. But they still required a considerable degree of organization, both in the recruitment of warriors and the planning of battles. Native leaders spent much of their time cultivating alliances with neighboring groups, recruiting warriors from nearby areas, and compensating recruits for their services. Although persuasive speaking was a necessary part of their efforts, sagamores were unlikely to gain much support unless they backed their words with gifts, food, and other displays of largesse. In general, military organization in the Northeast was structured by four kinds of material exchange: tribute, feasts, trade, and competitive gift-giving. Each form of exchange fostered the social relationships necessary to mobilize armies.

Most Wabanaki commoners at the beginning of the seventeenth century paid tribute to their sagamores in the form of pelts, corn, or other valuable items. In return, sagamores acted as the leaders and representatives of their kin and allies in peace and war. They served as war captains, mediated disputes, and provided dogs, canoes, and supplies to hunters. The more powerful sagamores had retinues of unmarried young men who presented their leaders with all their furs and served under them as warriors. The payment of tribute was a recognition of sagamores' skills as military and political

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organizers: because powerful men could convince hundreds of warriors to take up arms against their enemies, they guaranteed a degree of safety to their followers. Families who gave gifts to their sagamores were sure to receive military backing if they were injured by outsiders. Those who failed to align themselves with an influential strongman left themselves vulnerable. In a sense, the relationship between sagamores and their followers was a protection racket in which military security was exchanged for tribute.\textsuperscript{18}

Sagamores did not usually keep tribute for their own use, but put furs and other valuables back into circulation to recruit more military support. Early European visitors were impressed by the size and frequency of feasts hosted by Wabanaki sagamores. "As long as they have anything," Pierre Biard wrote, "they are always celebrating feasts and having songs, dances and speeches; if there is a crowd of them you need not expect anything else." Although some banquets were attended merely for pleasure, others had a decidedly political tone. Sagamores did not give their wealth away piecemeal but stockpiled it so they could make an ostentatious display at feasts.\textsuperscript{19}

By the last quarter of the seventeenth century and probably earlier, sagamores prepared for war by hosting a dog feast for the warriors about to go into battle. Several dogs belonging to the sagamore -- typically his favorite ones -- were slaughtered, boiled in kettles, and served to the warriors. One by one, the sagamores attending the feast


\textsuperscript{19} JR, 3: 107. See also, Sieur de Dièreville, \textit{Relation of the Voyage to Port Royal in Acadia or New France [1708]}, trans. Mrs. Clarence Webster, ed. John Clarence Webster (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1933),
would throw their hatchets onto the coals beneath the kettles and announce their intention to join the expedition. The feast emboldened its participants to go to war and also served as a token of the sagamore's esteem for his warriors and allies. This practice acted as a ritual of alliance in which warriors and their leaders paid respect to one another.20

Other feasts were held during peacetime to solidify alliances or cultivate friendships. The feasts usually served as an occasion for trade or gift-giving between sagamores of allied groups. After they had eaten, leaders distributed large quantities of gifts to their allies -- typically prestige goods such as furs, exotic cherts, copper, wampum, hunting charms, or European merchandise. The gifts symbolized the sagamores' respect for their allies while also advertising their ability to gather tribute from their own followers. While it was conducted in a spirit of generosity, gift-giving often had a competitive edge: if a sagamore's gifts were not reciprocated by his partners, it was likely that one or the other would lose face. When the Mi'kmaq sagamore Messamoet presented Saco River leader Olmechin with a large gift of French merchandise in 1605, preceded by an hour-long speech proposing an alliance between Saco and the Mi'kmaq, he became resentful when Olmechin did not return the favor. An unreciprocated gift was equivalent to a payment of tribute and implied the submission of Messamoet to Olmechin. Messamoet recoiled from such an interpretation and, according to French observers, planned to make war on Olmechin.21

Mi'kmaq sagamores such as Messamoet were placed in a position of advantage in the late sixteenth century because of their privileged access to European goods. The coastal areas of Cape Breton, Acadia, and Gaspé that were frequented by European fishermen in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries belonged to the Mi'kmaq, who were able to monopolize the occasional trade that complemented fishing expeditions. Acting as middlemen in the trade between Indians and Europeans, Mi'kmaq travelled along the coast and into the interior, exchanging European goods for furs and food and using the trade to cement alliances with other native groups. Some scholars have suggested that the wars between Mi'kmaq and neighboring groups in the early seventeenth century were occasioned in part by struggles over control of the trade.  

Yet it is difficult to untangle the motives that led people to go to war. Certainly, it would be a mistake to assume that Wabanakis operated under the Clausewitzian assumption that war is a continuation of policy by other means. Kinship, rather than the state, was the organizing political principle of their society, and sagamores did not formulate or enforce "policy" directives. Violent conflict arose from personal disputes between individuals, who drew on their kin and friends for support. Smaller disagreements were resolved by mediation or by a form of ritualized combat in which two rivals stood face-to-face, wrestling and pulling at each other's hair. More serious offenses, such as murder or wife-stealing, were more likely to give rise to raids, ambushes, and other violent reprisals that resulted in death. The most common cause of wars was a desire to revenge the murders of kinfolk, a form of conflict Daniel Richter, following Marian Smith, has called the "mourning war". Relatives of the victims took to

the warpath after their death, to assuage their grief, retaliate against their enemies, and bring home captives to replace their loved ones.23

The kin of the deceased were naturally inclined to seek vengeance, but raids often involved warriors who had no direct relationship to the victim. These warriors were not simply following orders -- sagamores did not have that power over their followers -- but were impelled to fight for their own interests or to please their families and friends. Since sagamores led by consensus, the organizing of a war party required them to recruit followers through speeches, dog feasts, and presents. But the greatest attraction of the warpath was the opportunity to fight, since warfare brought men many rewards: plunder, captives, scalps, glory, and honor. War in this sense was not simply a means to an end but an end in itself.

Unmarried men were customarily the most bellicose element in Wabanaki society, largely because they occupied a precarious position in their communities. Before they were married, they could not keep their own dogs or hunting sacks and were subordinate to their parents and sagamores. Nor could they marry until they proved to the fiancee's parents that they were able hunters and providers and had procured enough goods to pay her brideprice. Warfare provided young warriors with opportunities to fulfill all these requirements. A man won respect in his community by returning home with scalps, prisoners, and other war trophies that proved his valor and certified his ability to act as a protector. Any plunder he could find -- usually furs, wampum, and copper -- could be

distributed to friends and family or used toward the payment of brideprice, although few accounts of Wabanaki warfare mention plunder as an important object of war.

Another method of finding a wife was to capture her in battle. European accounts of Wabanaki battles suggest that warriors specifically looked to take their enemies' women as captives. When the Penobscot River sagamore Bashabe was killed by Mi'kmaq raiders in 1615, Ferdinando Gorges reported that the raiders took his wives, daughters, "and such other matters as they thought of value." Pierre Biard noted that the theft of wives was an occasional cause of war among Wabanakis. And in his poetic account of a 1607 Mi'kmaq raid on Saco, Marc Lescarbot mused that the warriors planned to take the village's stores of corn, "and if we want their women as plunder/We will have them as well."²⁴

Although wife-stealing may have involved jealousies and other romantic entanglements, the value of female captives lay above all in the importance of their labor. Much of the daily work in Wabanaki society was performed by women, and no man could reach a position of status unless he was married. The most powerful sagamores of the region generally had more than one wife and some, like Cacagous of the Saint John River, had as many as eight. The sagamores explained to Pierre Biard that this practice not only multiplied the numbers of their kin and offspring, but gave them control over the labor of their wives. Their work was highly valued because, as Biard put it, "they have

²⁴ Ferdinando Gorges, A Briefe Narration of the Originall Undertakings of the Advancement of Plantations in the Parts of America, Especially, shewing the Beginning, Progress and Continuance of that of New England [1658] (Boston: Publications of the Prince Society, 1890), 90; JR, 3: 93-95; Lescarbot, History of New France, 502. (My translation; original reads: "Et si voulons avoir leurs femmes au pillage/Nous les aurons aussi"). In a 1605 raid against the Etechemins, the Mi'kmaq sagamore lounescou and his followers carried away women from the battle, although the captives were later put to death: see Biggar, Works of Champlain, 1: 435-36.
no other servants, slaves, or mechanics but the women." Pressed by the need to organize a continual round of feasts for their kin and allies, sagamores prized the additional work of female captives and treated them as a valuable reward of battle.25

While the desire for scalps, plunder, and captives has been well documented, there is no evidence that Wabanaki leaders ever sought the conquest of territory. European observers remarked that sagamores had authority over particular river drainages, but this way of talking was likely a shorthand description of the geographical extent of their tributary networks. The basis of sagamores' power lay in their influence over other people rather than their ability to control resources -- or more precisely, the control of resources was embedded in social relationships, and sagamores came to power through their capacity to mobilize kin and allies in the defense of group interests. Human rather than material wealth was the object of wars: sagamores and young men went on the warpath to take captives and scalps, to awe their allies and intimidate their enemies, or to win tribute and honor. If wars were ever turf battles, they were struggles over personal authority and the collection of tribute and had nothing to do with the permanent occupation of villages or river basins. The tactics used by war captains were unsuited to territorial conquest; raids and ambushes may have been effective in securing booty and prisoners, but they did not give the attackers political control over their enemies.26

26Patrick M. Malone, The Skulking Way of War: Technology and Tactics among the New England Indians (Lanham, Md.: Madison, 1991), 26-31. These remarks apply specifically to the Wabanakis: the more sedentary groups living in the densely populated parts of southern New England had a stronger sense of territoriality and may have fought over land. But even in these regions the collection of tribute and the taking of vengeance seems to have weighed heavier in the minds of war captains.
The conquest and defense of the land did not become an issue until the demographic expansion of New England and the growing strength of New France forced Wabanakis to take sides in the imperial wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most Wabanakis leaned toward the French in these conflicts, having forged a tentative military alliance with New France during the Iroquois wars of the mid-seventeenth century. The partnership between the French and Wabanakis was part of a wide-ranging defensive alliance that included Hurons, Algonquins, Montagnais, and other groups threatened by Iroquois raids. Elements of the alliance had been formed at least as far back as the sixteenth century, but the growing influence of European powers, combined with the increasing frequency and scale of Iroquois attacks, led these disparate groups to form closer diplomatic contacts in the seventeenth century.27

New France's earliest trading contacts outside of Acadia were with the Montagnais and Algonquins north of the St. Lawrence River and with the Hurons of Georgian Bay, all of whom were engaged in occasional warfare with the Iroquois. The French alliance with these groups, and their closely related desire to control access to trade with the Great Lakes region, drew them into conflict with the Five Nations. Epidemic disease, which depleted native populations and gave rise to a desire for war captives, and competition for furs led to a sharp increase in the intensity of Iroquois raids in the 1630s. The victims of the attacks included Wabanaki villages along the upper Connecticut River, who in the 1640s were drawn into war against the Iroquois and a tentative alliance with the French. In 1650, French authorities dispatched Father Gabriel
Druillette and Noël Tekwerimat to Norridgewock and surrounding communities to enlist eastern Wabanakis and English colonists in the defense of Connecticut River villages. Some Christian Wabanakis, already allied with Algonquin and Montagnais converts, gladly joined. In the 1660s, hostilities worsened as Mohawks, the easternmost Iroquois tribe, launched a prolonged campaign against native villages and European outposts as far as the Kennebec and Penobscot rivers.28

The defensive alliance of the Iroquois wars was translated into a French-dominated system of military defense during the colonial wars of the next century. New France's most reliable Wabanaki allies in these conflicts came from the Canadian mission villages of Odanak (St. François) and Wölinak (Bécancour), which were established in the last quarter of the seventeenth century to accommodate the growing number of Wabanakis at Sillery and the influx of Indian refugees from King Philip's War in New England. Devoutly Catholic and loyal to their French protectors, the domiciliés, as they were known, provided a steady supply of auxiliary troops for French wars. Warriors from Odanak fought in every conflict against New England from 1688 to 1763 and also saw service in New York, the Great Lakes, and Louisiana. French officials exerted their influence to a milder degree among the Wabanakis remaining in Acadia, largely through Jesuit missionaries in villages such as Norridgewock, Panawapskik, and Medoctec in the last quarter of the seventeenth century.

Wabanakis did not merely follow the French lead in these wars but were drawn into an alliance through shared interests. In the earliest stages of the War of the League of Augsburg, western Wabanaki antipathy toward the English and the Iroquois tended to feed into each other, since Mohawk leaders were allied with New York and depended on the English for supplies of arms and ammunition. New France had begun a war against the Iroquois in the summer of 1687, two years before the formal declaration of war between the British and French crowns. Wabanakis from Odanak had assisted in a raid against the Senecas, the westernmost Iroquois tribe, and had returned with Iroquois and English scalps. The Senecas were allied with New York, which officially had jurisdiction east of the Kennebec River in the 1680s, and the Iroquois looked to their English allies for succor. A dispute was already brewing between the English and eastern Wabanakis, who had fought a war between 1675 and 1678 and whose relations were strained in the decade that followed. In 1686 and 1688, English officials sponsored expeditions against the trading house of the Baron St.-Castin, a veteran of the Iroquois wars who had set up shop as a fur trader in Penobscot Bay, marrying the daughter of Madockawando, the most powerful sagamore of the region. These attacks exacerbated tensions between the Wabanakis and the English, which had already been aroused by trading abuses, the encroachment of settlers on Wabanaki fishing spots and planting grounds, and the failure of the English to pay tribute to the sagamores who claimed suzerainty over their lands.29

Wabanakis entered the war for self-interested reasons, but they gravitated toward an alliance with the French, deferentially calling governors their "fathers" and accepting the guidance of French officers in the battlefield. Far from being instinctive, this deference was the result of a calculated strategy on the part of the French to win the loyalty of their Indian allies through the distribution of presents. Like sagamores, governors gained the allegiance of their military followers by providing for their needs and making ostentatious displays of generosity. But French authorities had access to far greater quantities of presents than any sagamore, and the flow of revenues from royal coffers enabled them to mobilize and command a network of military allies of a continental scale. Needless to say, the allegiance of Wabanakis to the French crown was not simply a matter of pecuniary interest, and owed much to a shared devotion to Catholicism, ties of kinship, and a common distrust of the English. But according to Wabanaki custom, the exchange of gifts fostered political relationships, acting as a social lubricant that brought allies closer together. The lavish distribution of royal presents offered tangible proof of French goodwill and bolstered their claims to paternal authority over Indian allies.30

In the first of the imperial wars, the recruitment and payment of Wabanaki troops was split between Quebec and Port Royal, although the Acadian government played a

30 For a contrary view, see David L. Ghere, "The Maine Experience During the French and Indian War," in William Cowan, ed., Papers of the Twenty-Fourth Algonquian Conference (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 188-98. Ghere argues that "the utility of gifts was minimal on Maine frontier diplomacy," and that the "Abenaki-French alliance was based on factors other than gift-giving." He points out that the exchange of gifts between 1748 and 1755 failed to quell hostilities or to induce Indians to switch their allegiances. But by choosing to limit his discussion to the final years of the colonial wars, Ghere skews his evidence to suit his conclusions. The Franco-Wabanaki alliance developed over generations and, according to statements by both Wabanakis and the French, it had been solidified by the exchange of presents. By the 1750s the English were offering the Wabanakis presents of equal or greater value than the French, but the fact that these offers did not bring a reversal in their allegiances does not discount the importance of gift-giving in Wabanaki diplomacy.
more significant role. The leadership of Acadia was dominated by military men -- governors Hector de Grandfontaine, Jacques de Chambly, and Joseph Robinau de Villebon were all military officers and veterans of the Iroquois wars -- but the military strength of the colony was negligible. William Phips's 1690 expedition against Port Royal, followed by the depredations of Leislerian vessels from New York, had levelled the provincial capital and forced the colony's government to relocate to the St. John River. In October 1699, Governor Villebon reported there were only seventy-seven regular soldiers in Acadia, about the same number stationed there ten years earlier. According to a 1703 report, the colony's military strength had increased to four companies of fifty men each, all of them garrisoned at the recently rebuilt capital of Port Royal. A half dozen smaller militia companies were added to this total, although the militiamen were used primarily in the defense of their own communities. The military establishment was inadequate unless bolstered by Wabanaki warriors, and Villebon and other officials were frankly aware of their dependence on native allies. With the exception of privateering expeditions, every French victory in New England during the War of the League of Augsburg was scored with the assistance of Indian troops.31

The price of this service was paid in presents, distributed first by French missionaries or military officers to sagamores and then from the sagamores to their followers. The presents accounted for a little less than half of Acadia's wartime budget and generally ranged between 2,000 and 6,000 livres annually. The staple items of gift-giving were the tools of war: muskets, pistols, powder, shot, flints, bayonets, and


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hatchets. French authorities also provided their allies with a wide array of provisions and other trade goods, such as bread, flour, rice, brandy, tobacco, shirts, leggings, blankets, hats, yarn, thread, and cloth. The range of goods was similar to the merchandise available at English trading houses, although munitions rather than provisions were the mainstays of French gifts. While miscellaneous items such as chocolate, buttons, molasses, sails, seeds, and paddles were occasionally added to this list, the basic packet of goods remained the same in later wars.32

Warriors also expected to earn further rewards through battle, over and above the presents distributed at war feasts and by missionaries. The gifts covered the cost of arms and the support of their families, but the real profits of war came from the battles themselves. Warriors regularly took plunder from the houses of English settlers, although the booty was limited to easily portable items such as coins and guns. They also returned home with captives: some were adopted by Wabanaki families while the less fortunate were summarily killed or tortured to death. Warriors sold most of their prisoners to the French, who kept them as servants until they found an opportunity to exchange or sell them back to the English. During the War of Spanish Succession, governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts resolved "never to Set up an Algier Trade" of war prisoners with the French, but most New England families went to great lengths to redeem their loved ones from captivity, and paid the French accordingly. French authorities also purchased scalps; according to one English captive, Wabanakis who


32 CDRH, 1: 447, 471, 474; 2: 73-74, 111, 129-30, 178, 201, 203, 206-7, 291-92. Records of presents dispensed to Wabanakis by the royal storehouse in Montreal during the War of Austrian Succession indicate a similar variety of goods, including a cow given on the occasion of a war feast. The gifts were distributed at feasts, rewarded to warriors returning from battle, or given to their wives and children while

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visited Quebec in 1692 were paid £10 for a captive and £5 for every scalp. Joseph Dudley reported in 1709 that the going rate for scalps in Quebec fluctuated between 20 shillings and £5. Scalps continued to fetch an attractive price in later conflicts: at the beginning of the Seven Years War, Wabanaki warriors were paid 40 to 50 livres (about £3 or £4 sterling) for each English scalp brought to the French. For young Wabanaki men, the possibility of such spoils was the greatest material incentive for going on the warpath, while the distribution of presents before the battle guaranteed them a minimum reward for their service.33

When added to the expense of war feasts and presents, scalp bounties could amount to considerable sums. But the costs of recruiting and provisioning Wabanaki troops remained far lower than the expense of maintaining regular soldiers. According to Villebon's 1692 budget, the total value of Indian presents for the year amounted to 2950 livres. The presents were distributed among Mi'kmaq, Maliseet, and Abenaki warriors as far south as the Kennebec River, who together could muster some 500 warriors. Under the conservative assumption that only half of all adult male Wabanakis fought against the English, and that only half of the latter received presents from Acadia, the cost of a year's service for each warrior would have been about 24 livres. Regular soldiers, by contrast, were paid a salary of 9 livres per month, or 108 livres annually; high-ranking officers received monthly salaries as high as 90 livres. Wabanaki troops also had several practical advantages over their French counterparts: they did not have to be paid or garrisoned year-round and could be recruited for particular campaigns and released immediately.

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they were off at war. See "Dépenses a l'occasion de la Guerre, 4 derniers mois 1746," PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 86, fols. 178-231. See also, vol. 87, fols. 2-21.
afterward. The costs of provisioning and arming them, furthermore, were subsumed under the expenses of presents, which always included guns, powder, shot, and food. By any accounting measure, Wabanaki warriors were a better buy than French regulars.34

But in purchasing military protection at such a low price, French authorities forfeited a degree of military control. Wabanaki troops lacked the discipline of their European counterparts and on several occasions refused to continue fighting when they encountered bad omens. Wabanaki leaders also proved to be fickle allies, who attacked the English ferociously when the desire for vengeance ran hot, but made entreaties of peace if material deprivation or heavy losses cooled their ardor. After suffering some painful defeats in Dummer's War (1722-25), most Wabanakis in Maine pursued a policy of neutrality, although English intransigence usually pushed them onto the French side. Even during Dummer's War, Indians from Maine were more inclined to take prisoners than to kill settlers, a fact noted with disapproval by Huron warriors from Canada, who said the Norridgewocks "were but women in the war."

During the War of Austrian Succession, twenty Pigwackets took refuge with the English, some of them even serving as soldiers in the English army. The Penobschts, who lived further from English settlements, attempted to remain neutral in 1755 and were forced to choose sides only because the English demanded their exclusive allegiance.36

33 "Statements of Grace Higiman and Others," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 18 (1864): 161-62; DHSM, 9: 259, 294. Presumably both Higiman and Dudley were speaking of English pounds, and not French

livres.


35 CSP, vol. 34 (1725), fol. 741, 430.

36 Boston Gazette, July 10, November 30, and December 4, 1744; DHSM, 24: 11-62.
Wabanakis in Maine were inspired to fight over local issues: the protection of their lands, vengeance of dead relatives, retribution for trading abuses. In many cases, their acts of aggression -- particularly the killing of livestock -- were simply intended as a protest against English encroachments on their territory. Whenever it became clear that warfare might cost them their lives or their homes, they were inclined to negotiate a peace with the English. Warriors were willing to take risks to capture scalps and prisoners, but they did not engage in foolhardy campaigns that endangered the lives of their wives and children. This reluctance did not please the French, who depended on Wabanakis to defend their territorial claims in Maine. French officials lent their support to warriors because they trusted the Indians to defend their lands against English armies. From a French point of view, warfare was meant to advance the strategic interests of the French state, and Wabanakis had value only insofar as they served this cause. But Wabanaki warriors failed to fit the model of a professional army and remained committed to their own interests, fighting for the French only so long as the alliance was beneficial to their communities.37

Even when they were loyal to the French, Indian auxiliaries fought in a way that limited the military options of French commanders. Wabanaki tactics and strategies were designed with an eye toward taking as many captives and scalps as possible, without suffering significant losses themselves. Conquest or permanent occupation did not figure in their plans. Typically, non-Christian Wabanakis consulted with a shaman before

37 The villages of Odanak and Wōlinak were not threatened by English armies until 1759, and their warriors were generally more eager to fight than the Wabanakis of Maine. By the 1720s, a large proportion of the attacks on English settlements in Maine were made by Indians from Canada. Included among these Indians were Wabanakis, but also other domiciliés and allies of the French: in addition to the 150 warriors raised from Odanak and Wōlinak during Dummer's War, French and Wabanaki leaders recruited about 200 Mohawk, Huron, Nipissing, and Algonquin warriors. See Rapport de Longueil et Begon, Oct 31, 1725, PAC, AN, Série C11A, vol. 47, fol. 67.
setting out to battle, asking him if omens advised against making a raid or if any ambushes laid in wait. Christians took confession with their priest. Then, if the signs were good, they rendezvoused and divided themselves into companies of thirty or forty, each one choosing a town they would "eat," or attack. The companies approached the towns quietly, looking for opportunities to catch their enemies by surprise, and struck rapidly. Battles generally only lasted a few hours and rarely continued for more than a few days. Warriors almost never tried to storm an armed fort or garrison, choosing instead to stand outside its walls, taunting its occupants to come outside to fight. Warriors took as much plunder and as many captives as they could and beat a hasty retreat into the woods. They then bound their captives, loaded their canoes, and began the voyage home. This style of warfare suited Wabanaki military objectives and also made use of their skills as hunters, since the tactics of the raid closely resembled the stages of the hunt: divination to determine the location of quarry, tracking to find its whereabouts, shooting to kill, and a return home with prey.38

Harrowing as they were to frontier settlers, Wabanaki military actions never threatened the existence of New England as a whole. Although Wabanakis scored spectacular victories in raids on Salmon Falls, Fort Pemaquid, and Oyster River, their attacks were directed only at outlying communities and never resulted in the conquest of territory. As French officials often put it, the effect of Wabanaki attacks was to harceler les Anglois -- to harry the English. Indian raids put English colonists on the defensive, forcing them to divert a considerable portion of their military resources to frontier patrols and garrisons. But without greater supplies of munitions, ships, and disciplined troops, French commanders could not hope to launch the kind of large-scale expeditions that

38 JR, 67: 203; Dièreville, Relation, 156-57; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 238.
secured English conquests at Port Royal, Louisbourg, and Quebec. A shortage of provisions and arms dashed French plans for assaults against Boston in 1696 and Annapolis Royal in 1745, and officials knew that the conquest of New England was only possible if the French crown provided colonial forces with large quantities of ships, ammunition, provisions, and men. This level of metropolitan commitment was not forthcoming until the Seven Years War: the heavy cost of European wars had left Louis XIV and his successors deeply in debt and they were reluctant to empty their pockets to defend a marginal and economically insignificant corner of their kingdom.  

Lacking firepower and men, the French were forced to make a reciprocal arrangement with the Wabanakis, who defended the colony's imperial frontiers and received presents and other forms of succor in return. French presents and diplomatic support gave Wabanakis leverage in their disputes with the English, and helped to slow the incursion of New Englanders into Indian lands. Wabanakis, for their part, created a military buffer between New France and New England and acted as the proxies of the French in imperial disputes. This agreement allowed both sides to make the most out of scarce resources, but it also underscored the precariousness of their claims to the land. An underfunded, undermanned army could achieve the limited goals of capturing plunder, prisoners, and scalps but had little ability to topple fortified strongholds or conquer large towns. French and Wabanaki forces left New England reeling during the 1690s, but as English forces became more adept at parrying their opponents' thrusts, the weakness of this arrangement became apparent.

39 Steele, Warpaths, 131-74.
Loosely organized and small in number, French-supported Wabanaki armies were apparently a weak match for their English opponents. New England's population was several times the size of New France, its provincial treasuries were filled with substantial revenues, and its active commercial life made it possible to supply frontier outposts with large quantities of arms and provisions. Yet in every war before 1754, Wabanakis fought the English to a standstill, making minor concessions in peace treaties but retaining effective control over their territories. The English failure to win a decisive victory against the Wabanakis was a testament to both the skill of Indian warriors and the inadequacies of New England's military system. Although they had more considerable forces at their disposal, English commanders in the early eighteenth century labored under the same conditions as the French: strapped by insufficient funds, lacking in soldiers, suffering from inadequate supply, and confused over strategy and objectives.

These problems were acute in Maine, where the forested environment favored the Indians' guerrilla tactics and the local English population had neither the numbers nor the wealth to defend itself. York County's militia was too small to defend its own towns -- as the region's inhabitants had painfully discovered during the First Anglo-Wabanaki War -- and English settlers in Maine looked to the provincial government for soldiers, munitions, supplies, and funds in later conflicts. Because Maine was far removed from the population centers of the province, the supply of arms and men to the region was costly. A week's march separated Maine from Boston and even troops and supplies transported by sail took at least a full day to arrive. This distance placed a considerable burden on the provincial government, which was responsible for building and supplying forts, recruiting...
and paying soldiers garrisoned at the posts or marching between towns, equipping and
provisioning troops, and organizing maritime patrols in the Gulf of Maine to defend
fishing vessels against privateers.

Although Maine's militiamen and taxpayers contributed substantially to the
defense of their towns, most of the cost was borne by the inhabitants of southern New
England. Military and naval expenditures accounted for as much as 90% of the
provincial government's budget in wartime -- the percentage reached its peak during the
War of Spanish Succession -- and even in years of peace, about half of all public
expenditures went toward the army and navy. The revenues were raised through a variety
of methods: bills of credit, the sale of public lands, paper money, and, after 1749,
subsidies from the British parliament. But the single largest source of revenue was taxes,
whether in the form of excise, customs, polls, or assessments of property. Because New
England was hit harder by French attacks than any other English province, its inhabitants
paid higher taxes than elsewhere in British North America. Although the main
beneficiaries of military defense lived on the frontiers, taxes ran highest in Boston and
other commercial centers, which suffered under fiscal laws that assessed agricultural
property at lower rates than commercial investments.40

Many townspeople in Boston and central Massachusetts were understandably
reluctant to loosen their purse strings for military campaigns in Maine. Few would have
hesitated to pay for the defense of their own homes, but the protection of the remote and

40Julian Gwyn, "Financial Revolution in Massachusetts: Public Credit and Taxation, 1692-1774," Histoire
sociale-Social History, 17 (1984): 59-77; H. James Henderson, "Taxation and Political Culture:
Massachusetts and Virginia, 1760-1800," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 47 (1990): 90-114; Robert
A. Becker, Revolution, Reform, and the Politics of American Taxation, 1763-1783 (Baton Rouge, La.:
Louisiana State University Press, 1980), 8-41. As Henderson points out, New England also had higher tax
rates than southern colonies in the 1760s because its provinces spent more heavily on schools and roads.
sparsely populated towns of York County was of secondary importance to most. New Englanders were far more willing to support large-scale expeditions against French strongholds in Canada and Acadia, which entailed exorbitant costs and high risks but promised large quantities of plunder and clear-cut military victories. In the first decade of the eighteenth century, the provincial assembly repeatedly refused to fund the construction of a new fort at Pemaquid -- the previous one having been razed in 1696 -- claiming that its dubious strategic value did not warrant the expense. But even as it cried poor over the defense of the Maine frontier, the House of Representatives gave financial backing to naval and military expeditions against Port Royal in 1707, 1709, and 1710, and Quebec in 1709 and 1711, each campaign costing considerably more than the price of rebuilding the fort.

Frontier campaigns also failed to recruit the thousands of soldiers who signed on for expeditions against French capitals. The attractions of a campaign against Quebec or Louisbourg were too great for many young men to resist: a short term of service, the possibility of plunder, a chance for military glory. Service in the backwoods of Maine was a dismal prospect by comparison. Soldiers spent year after year at frontier garrisons, making occasional marches in the biting cold or through swampy marshes in a futile search for the enemy. There was little plunder to be won, other than a few packets of furs seized from hunters and the occasional ornament pillaged from a church. Only two years after they had recruited some 4,000 soldiers for the expedition against Louisbourg, New England's leaders found themselves unable to enlist even 200 volunteers for service in

But before the defeat of the French in the Seven Years War, military spending remained the greatest financial burden for New England's provincial governments.

41 On opposition to the rebuilding of Fort Pemaquid, see DHSM, 9: 89, 114, 117, 125, 130-35, 138, 169-72, 199-201, 227-228.
Maine. Most men, they were told, did not want to sign on for a term of three years on the eastern frontier. Captain David Cargill, writing from Sheepscot in 1747, told the provincial secretary that the country was in a "Deplorable state," with its "Garrisons so scattered with so few men In them that we are in no Condition to help one Another, and our people Almost worn out with Duty." A year later, James McCobb reported from Georgetown on Arrowsic Island that the town was in a "Defenceless Condition," with only 50 soldiers in its garrisons, 42 of them local inhabitants.42

The challenge for political leaders in Boston was to entice young men to fight in frontier campaigns without putting undue strain on the provincial treasury. Conscription was the cheapest and most effective way of forcing young men into the army and many of the soldiers who fought in Maine were impressed into the service by the government. But the press was unpopular, and many avoided it by paying fines or offering substitutes. Government officials were more likely to entice recruits by offering them a carrot -- in the form of bonuses and incentives -- than by beating them with the stick of impressment. Although the eighteenth century militia included all able-bodied men between the ages of 16 and 60, it was in practice a pool of potential recruits from which "marching troops" -- the companies of volunteers who participated in offensives -- could be drawn.43

The troops posted in Maine were a mixture of militiamen from York County's towns, drawn into the service to defend their own homes, and volunteers from southern New England, motivated by patriotism, a lust for adventure, a desire for profit, or a lack of alternative employment. Muster rolls from Dummer's War, which occasionally


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recorded the soldiers' places of origin, indicate that the defense of Maine depended to a large degree on the support of troops from southern New England. Some companies, such as the 38 men who served under Captain James Grant in the summer of 1725, were made up entirely of volunteers from York County. But just as typical was the company of Captain Joseph Heath, stationed at Fort Richmond between June and November of the same year. Only 5 of the 45 men in the company were from York County: 15, including the Captain himself, were from Essex County; another 15 were from Middlesex and Suffolk, including 10 from Boston; others were drawn from such places as Barnstable, Nantucket, Plymouth County, Connecticut, and Philadelphia. All but 2 of the 19 privates in Captain John Gyles's company, meanwhile, were Irish -- presumably immigrants living in northern New England -- while the officers were nearly all residents of Essex County.44

Because most captains did not record the residences of their soldiers, it is impossible to determine the exact percentage of soldiers fighting in Maine who were from York County. But the large number of muster rolls that included such information may be treated as a representative if unscientific sample of the whole [see Table 5.1]. Of the soldiers who were known to have served in companies posted in Maine and whose places of residence were recorded, fewer than half in Dummer's War and King George's War came from York County. Over two-thirds of the soldiers in both wars were from York, New Hampshire, and the two Massachusetts counties closest to Maine, Essex and

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44 William Blake Trask, "Letters of Col. Thomas Westbrook and Others, Relative to Indian Affairs in Maine," New England Historical and Genealogical Register 48 (1894), 439-40; 49 (1895), 184-87. The origins of two men in Heath's company are not listed. Gyles' roll listed the sons of two privates, both of them from Ireland, not included in this tally.
Middlesex. In all the wars, York contributed more soldiers to its defense than any other county yet depended on troops from elsewhere for the majority of its soldiers.

Admittedly, the data culled from these rolls underrate the extent of York County's participation because they do not count unpaid volunteers or the hundreds of York's inhabitants who served at Louisbourg and other offensive expeditions. Yet even if these additional numbers are taken into account, there is little denying Maine's dependence on troops sent from elsewhere in Massachusetts. The geography of recruitment in New England was not unlike that of Europe, where soldiers were drawn in disproportionate numbers from both cities and frontiers. In per capita terms, York County made a larger human contribution to the war effort than other counties, but because of its small population it also needed reinforcements from urban centers in Essex, Suffolk, and Middlesex counties.45

Table 5.1: Place of Origin, Soldiers Serving in Maine, 1722-27, 1744-55.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>York</th>
<th>Essex</th>
<th>Middlesex</th>
<th>Other MA Counties</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1722-27</td>
<td>115 (43.6%)</td>
<td>49 (18.6%)</td>
<td>16 (6.1%)</td>
<td>51 (19.3%)</td>
<td>33 (12.5%)</td>
<td>264 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1744-55</td>
<td>204 (22.7%)</td>
<td>193 (21.5%)</td>
<td>186 (20.7%)</td>
<td>286 (31.8%)</td>
<td>30 (3.3%)</td>
<td>899 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The onus for recruiting soldiers fell on the shoulders of captains. Although the army in provincial Massachusetts was a public institution, it depended on officers who acted essentially as private contractors. Every year during wartime, the governor or

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lieutenant governor would formally appoint a colonel to command the regiment stationed in Maine, sending him a packet of blank commissions for his junior officers. The colonel would then appoint or re-appoint a captain, ensign, and lieutenant for each of the companies in the regiment. Captains and colonels were the point men of this system, charged with the recruitment and command of the soldiers. In most eighteenth-century wars, the captains were allowed a recruitment bounty for every volunteer they enlisted, which was usually divided between the officers and their soldiers. At intervals of six or eight months, the captains would present muster rolls for their companies to the provincial treasurer or commissary, who paid them the soldiers' wages in a lump sum.46

Because the wages were paid at the end of their service, soldiers were advanced supplies and provisions by their captains, who deducted the cost from their wages or, if necessary, paid them out of their own pocket. Major Thomas Church, who led an expedition to Maine in 1690, complained that delays in the outfitting of transport ships caused him great financial difficulty because his troops "daily expected to be treated by him."47 The financial risks of military expeditions were borne as much by the companies as they were by the government. In August 1725, the company from York County led by Captain James Grant protested the declaration of a cease fire by the government, explaining that they had gone to great trouble and expense to equip and arm themselves for their term of service, which had begun in June. Without the wages gained from a full six-month term, the company found itself deeply in debt, and Grant speculated that since many of his soldiers were "very poor men," he would have to cover their debts himself. Grant pleaded for -- and was ultimately given -- a chance to make an expedition against

46 Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 323-38.
the Wabanakis, which allowed his men wages for an additional three months, as well as the possibility of captives, scalp bounties, and plunder.\textsuperscript{48}

Of these four possible rewards, wages were the most reliable, if not the most lucrative. Nominal wage rates for soldiers did not fluctuate much over the course of the century: in 1703, privates serving in Maine were paid 5s. a week for garrison duty, 6s. if they were posted elsewhere; in 1746, they were paid 25s. per month, plus 5s. for billeting; in 1755, the monthly wage for marching troops had risen slightly to 26s. 8d. During Dummer's War, volunteers were paid 2s. 6d. per day while on duty. These sums compared favorably with the going rate for farm laborers, who were paid a higher daily wage but were lucky to work more than three days a week. Soldiers, on the other hand, were paid for six days of work a week, and usually finished their term of service with enough money to pay off their debts or purchase a few acres of land. Officers, who ranked higher than their soldiers in both the civilian and military worlds, received higher wages: in 1755, captains of marching companies were paid £4 16s. per month, lieutenants £3 4s., and sergeants £1 14s. 1d.\textsuperscript{49}

Wage rates for soldiers were an attraction of military service, but in the eyes of many they were not high enough to justify the hardships of life in the army. Agricultural labor was strenuous and demanding, but farm hands did not suffer the myriad discomforts of camp life, much less the possibility of violent death or dismemberment on the battlefield. To many, such risks were only justified if ample plunder was promised as a

\textsuperscript{47} Benjamin Church, The History of the Eastern Expeditions of 1689, 1690, 1692, 1696, and 1704 against the Indians and French (Boston: J. K. Wiggin and W. Parsons Lunt, 1867), 68.
\textsuperscript{48} DHSM, 10: 318-19.
\textsuperscript{49} Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves, 8: 35-36; 13: 521; 15: 347; DHSM, 10: 283; Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1850 (Chapel Hill, N. C.:}
reward. The leaders of expeditions against Port Royal and Louisbourg openly recognized the importance of booty to their troops, and William Phips reported in 1692 that soldiers fighting in Maine were "much encouraged" by the distribution of plunder and captives among them. In his study of the siege of Louisbourg, George Rawlyk opined that a desire for plunder was "probably the most important single reason" for soldiers to enlist for the expedition. But unlike French capitals, Indian settlements did not have large stores of moveable wealth ready to be pillaged, and service on the Maine frontier was consequently less profitable for soldiers.\textsuperscript{50}

But the provincial government found a ready substitute for plunder in the form of scalp bounties, which were introduced in a 1689 law and revived in every successive war. The practice of scalping is reprehensible to modern sensibilities, and many have pointed to New England's scalp bounties as evidence of genocidal intentions toward the Indians. Even in the eighteenth century, the idea of scalping made some people uneasy, particularly those whose understanding of war was conditioned by Old World experience. Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth century were gradually developing a notion of "civilized" warfare: a style of war carried out under a set of rules that prohibited sadistic forms of brutality and forced soldiers to act according to an unwritten code of honor. Many considered scalping and torture -- two aspects of pre-contact Indian warfare that continued to be practised in the seventeenth century -- as the sort of behavior outlawed by the rules of "civilized" war. In 1709, governor Joseph Dudley of Massachusetts denounced scalping as a "Barbarous" custom and excoriated the French for

placing bounties on English heads. But Dudley's words were betrayed by his deeds, for he himself had approved legislation that rewarded soldiers for taking Wabanaki scalps.\textsuperscript{51}

English leaders such as Dudley overlooked their moral qualms over the practice because the grim logic of scalp bounties was too compelling to ignore. In frontier campaigns, the English faced two chronic problems: a lack of funds and an inability to deal decisive blows to the enemy. Scalp bounties addressed both problems, creating incentives for soldiers without exhausting the treasury. The strategic logic of scalp bounties was the easiest to understand. Because Wabanakis withdrew from their villages whenever they were threatened with attack, the challenge of frontier warfare for English soldiers lay more in finding their enemies than in fighting them. English troops might raze a Wabanaki village one week only to see its inhabitants build their wigwams somewhere else the next. The object of warfare was consequently to kill and capture the enemy rather than to seize their territory. In order to defend themselves against Franco-Wabanaki raids, English forces would have to adopt guerrilla strategies themselves.\textsuperscript{52}

Not surprisingly, many English commanders recruited soldiers who were familiar with guerrilla warfare. A number of captains drew most or all their soldiers from

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} DHSM. 10: 3; George A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, Me.: University of Maine Press, 1969), 46; Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 191-92. Plunder taken from Indians was divided among soldiers in proportion to their wages: see Massachusetts Archives, vol. 71, fol. 102.
  \item \textsuperscript{52} Musing that New England's Indians may have been descended from the Scythians, Cotton Mather repeated Julius Caesar's observation regarding Asian tribes, \textit{Difficilius invenire quam interficere}: "It is harder to find them than to foil them." See Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 203. Although Mather's genealogical speculations were off the mark, his allusion was apt. The Roman frontier in Asia roughly corresponded with the limits of arable farmland, and the groups beyond the frontier were, like Wabanakis, mobile tribes who could strike quickly and retreat rapidly.
\end{itemize}
Protestant Indian communities in Massachusetts, where there was an abundance of young men with tracking skills and a dearth of alternative occupations. Benjamin Church, who led numerous military expeditions to Maine in the 1690s and 1700s, expressed a preference for Indian soldiers, remarking that "I know certainly of my own knowledge, that they exceed most of our English in hunting and sculking in the woods." Church asked that at least 300 of the 1,000 soldiers recruited for a proposed mission to Maine in 1704 be Indians. In 1725, 42 of the 98 men in Captain Richard Bourne's company in 1725 had identifiably Indian names, a testament to his active recruiting campaign in the native communities of southern Massachusetts.53

But the pool of Indians available for service was limited, and the soldiers posted in Maine were more likely to be men with scant experience in the woods and little emotional attachment to the region's towns. War-weary companies saw their numbers dwindled by a regular trickle of deserters and the steady attrition of disease. Finding themselves virtually alone in the wilderness, soldiers were undoubtedly tempted to limit the possibility of engagement with the enemy either by staying in their garrisons or by making only half-hearted attempts to discover Wabanakis. Scalp bounties gave soldiers a compelling reason for venturing into the woods. In placing a high price placed on Wabanaki heads -- as much as £300 for the scalp of an adult male by the Seven Years War -- the government made it possible for English soldiers to double or treble their earnings by finding and killing opponents in battle. The four companies of soldiers who attacked and razed Norridgewock in August 1724 were awarded £405 for 27 Indian scalps, £20 for 4 prisoners, as well as £100 for the scalp of Father Sébastien Râle. The

total was roughly equal to the wages paid to an entire company for six months of service.\textsuperscript{54}

The average reward for Wabanaki scalps taken at Norridgewock was rather low compared to the bounties paid to soldiers in other circumstances. From 1706 through Dummer's War, the government posted a graded system of scalp bounties that varied according to the age and sex of the victim as well as the enlistment status of the soldiers. The scalps of adult male Indians generally earned double the price of women or children and slightly less than the amount paid for captives.\textsuperscript{55} The government also offered higher bounties to the soldiers least dependent on provincial supplies and equipment. According to the 1722 law that set scalp rates during Dummer's War, the bounty for adult male scalps was £15 for regular soldiers, £30 for companies defending a town or garrison, and £100 for volunteers serving without pay. The latter reward encouraged ordinary townspeople to outfit and provision themselves for bounty-hunting missions, which did not cost the government a penny unless the volunteers killed or captured the enemy. Similar acts passed in the eighteenth century gave preferential terms of enlistment to soldiers able to furnish their own arms and equipment.\textsuperscript{56}

This system of bounties had an economic rationale that benefited both the government and its soldiers. If volunteers failed to find any Indians during their marches -- as was usually the case -- the government did not lose anything beyond the soldiers' expenses.


\textsuperscript{55} At the beginning of Dummer's War, the rewards paid for scalps were twice as high as the price of captives: see Massachusetts, \textit{Acts and Resolves}, 2: 258. In the seventeenth century, many of the Indians taken prisoner were sold into slavery; the profits were divided among the soldiers of the company that captured them.

\textsuperscript{56} Massachusetts, \textit{Acts and Resolves}, 1: 292, 530, 547, 558, 594, 2: 258, 8: 38, 44-45; Samuel Penhallow, \textit{The History of the Wars of New-England with the Eastern Indians} (Boston: T. Fleet, 1726; reprinted...
wages, if any wages were paid at all. But if the troops returned with scalps, the
government had palpable proof of enemy losses: an immediate return on its investment.
Like the rewards paid to surveyors of the woods, scalp bounties were a device that
allowed the government to pass risk on to its employees. Lacking the funds necessary to
arm, clothe, and supply a large complement of soldiers, the province advanced soldiers a
basic packet of provisions and reasonably high wages. If these soldiers provided their
own guns and uniforms, they were given the opportunity to make ample profits through
scalps or a decent living from their wages. For companies of vigilantes fighting without
pay, the rewards were even higher. If companies failed to kill or capture enemy warriors,
the consequences were borne by the soldiers themselves, who failed to collect the
bounties and thus gain the most attractive financial reward of military service.

But if provincial leaders had genocidal intentions toward the Wabanakis, scalp
bounties did not prove very effective. The deployment of troops on the Maine frontier
served a purpose that was essentially defensive, and English armies rarely scored
impressive victories against Wabanakis. In every war from 1702 onward, the provincial
government assigned the bulk of its troops in Maine to a string of forts and garrison
houses that acted as a line of first defense for the settlements of northern New England
[see Fig. 5.5]. A portion of the soldiers were stationed permanently in the garrisons,
ready to come to the defense of settlers in case of attack. Other companies were detached
as scouting parties that roamed the backs of towns by horse, snowshoes, or on foot.
Detachments of soldiers were also sent to protect parties of lumbermen or farmers
harvesting their crops. The soldiers who were stationed in towns were often billeted by

Cincinnati: Harpel, 1859), 22, 48, 93, 96; James Axtell, The European and the Indian, 142-43; Eames,
the inhabitants, and according to a 1705 act soldiers serving in garrisons were allowed to cultivate farmland belonging the townspeople they protected. During peacetime, soldiers devoted much of their time toward farming, fishing, trading, and surveying: so much so that settlers sometimes wrote to the General Court to complain that the troops assigned to protect them were neglecting their military duties.\textsuperscript{57}

This system of defense gradually brought results, limiting the effects of Wabanaki attacks while failing to disarm the warriors completely. In the War of the League of Augsburg, combined French and Indian forces had scored devastating victories against the English in Maine and New Hampshire: 30 killed in Dover in 1689, 30 killed and 50 taken captive at Salmon Falls in 1690, 48 killed and 78 taken prisoner at York in 1692, 100 killed or captured at Oyster River (Durham, N. H.) in 1694. In the next war, the French and Wabanakis picked up where they left off, killing or capturing 165 people at Casco Bay, Saco, and Wells in 1703; killing 47 and taking 109 captive at Deerfield in western Massachusetts in 1704. But after the Deerfield raid, a more aggressive prosecution of the war by the governor, in which garrisons and scouting parties played a central role, forced French and Indians to be more cautious, attacking in smaller parties and avoiding forts and patrols. Although Wabanakis continued to inflict large numbers of casualties in later wars, they never again exacted the punishing defeats that the English suffered during the first two imperial conflicts.\textsuperscript{58}


\textsuperscript{58} Penhallow, \textit{History}, 1-21; Mather, "Decennium Luctuosum," 206, 252.
The English government also took the offensive, sponsoring wartime expeditions against Wabanaki strongholds such as Norridgewock, Pigwacket, and Panawapskik. Benjamin Church led campaigns against Androscoggin and Pejepscot in 1689-90, Panawapskik and Taconic in 1692, and along the coast all the way to Minas in 1696 and 1704. English troops in Dummer's War mounted assaults against Norridgewock, Pigwacket, and Panawapskik. One party travelled as far as the White Mountains, albeit without discovering a single Indian. The expeditions were far more costly than garrison patrols, since troops had to be equipped and provisioned for several days' journey, and commanders needed to requisition whaleboats and sloops as transports for their soldiers. Few of the expeditions were unqualified successes; the 1724 attack on Norridgewock and Robert Rogers's 1759 raid on Odanak were the only major English victories against Wabanaki communities in the eighteenth century. More commonly, the English only captured or killed a few people and failed to win enough plunder and bounties to cover the expenses of their expedition. At the end of his term of service in 1689, Church found himself with only 8 shillings in his pocket and was forced to borrow money from a friend to transport himself home.

The high cost of supplying expeditions against Wabanakis made it difficult for English people in Maine to gain a clear victory against their enemies. The ability of Wabanakis to cover vast territories in a short period allowed them to elude enemy troops and forced the English to expend considerable sums on futile search-and-destroy missions. The nature of the terrain added to English frustrations. Thick forests slowed the progress of marching companies, prevented the transportation of large artillery pieces,  

59 On the difficulties of supplying armies, see Eames, "Rustic Warriors," 100-102, 229-31.  
60 Penhallow, History, 66-109; Church, History, 77.
and provided camouflage for warriors. Large vessels, meanwhile, could not navigate the region's rivers beyond the fall line, making it impossible to carry supplies directly to Norridgewock and other interior settlements. The pace of movement could be painfully slow: in July 1754, it took five days -- "five days of the hardest Duty that I ever saw my troops employ'd on," according to Captain John Winslow -- to transport 600 soldiers and several pieces of heavy artillery 18 miles between Cushnoc and Taconic Falls on the Kennebec River.61

The costs of offensive expeditions were certainly not justified by the results. Although Wabanaki migration from Maine to Canada gave English people the impression of a steady native population loss, David Ghere has shown that the total Wabanaki population of Canada, Maine, and the upper Connecticut River Valley remained remarkably stable in the first half of the eighteenth century. By Ghere's calculation, only 26 warriors -- if that many -- were killed by English troops during Dummer's War. The results of earlier conflicts were not much better: Samuel Penhallow, a chronicler of the New England's frontier wars, estimated that every Indian killed in the War of Spanish Succession cost the government of Massachusetts £1,000. At such a high price, the prosecution of war against the Wabanakis hardly seemed worth the effort.62

The English in this respect were similar to other sedentary populations of farmers whose borders were contested by nomadic hunters or pastoralists: the agricultural populations faced with invasions by horsemen from the Asian steppe are perhaps the

most famous example. In both cases, a numerically superior group found itself at the mercy of small bands of raiders whose mobility was their chief military weapon. Like the Chinese or the Romans, the English had a relatively well-funded and well-disciplined army, but were in no position to fund lengthy expeditions over wide territories in pursuit of their enemy. Instead, they were forced to accept an uneasy equilibrium between the two sides, with English patrols giving frontier settlements a measure of protection but failing to extinguish the Wabanaki military threat altogether.63

The English did not manage to tip the equilibrium in their favor until the 1750s, when Britain and its colonies stepped up their military effort in North America. In Maine, the government of Massachusetts, with the assistance of land companies, established forts up the Kennebec River (forts Shirley, Western, and Halifax, all built between 1752 and 1754) and at Penobscot Bay (Fort Pownall, built 1759). The forts undercut Wabanaki military strength by cutting off their most frequently used portages and dramatically reducing the distance and cost of expeditions against Norridgewock and Panwapskik. Not only could the forts hold companies of soldiers, they also housed the provisions necessary for long marches into the interior. At the same time, combined British and colonial forces launched a massive military and naval effort against French bases in North America, culminating in the conquest of Quebec in 1759 and the capture of Montreal in 1760. The fall of the French capital left Wabanakis without a base of

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63 See Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 1940), esp. 53-102; Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD 1757 (London: Blackwell, 1989); Keegan, History of Warfare, 155-217. The most important difference between steppe populations and North America's Woodland Indians was the horse, which proved to be most terrifying weapon of the Huns, Vandals, Turks, Mongols and other groups. Horse-led charges made these people a far more imposing military force than the Wabanakis, allowing them to
supply and forced them to negotiate a peaceful settlement with their English neighbors, closing a long chapter of violent conflict between the two groups.64

The Territorial Consequences of the War

By the Seven Years War, Maine was no longer a central theater of battle in North America, and the extinction of French claims to its possession was a consequence of losses at Louisbourg, Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Quebec, not of battles fought in Maine itself. Fittingly, the military struggle over control of the region, which had long depended on supplies sent from distant political centers, was ended by the siege of a city over a hundred miles away. The causes and consequences of the British victory at Quebec are well known, and it would be redundant to retrace General Wolfe's footsteps or to explain how the aftermath of the Seven Years War led to the outbreak of the American Revolution. But it may be worthwhile to consider how the nature of the military effort set the terms by which the English occupied the conquered lands of Maine.

The Seven Years War in America resembled a European campaign far more than any previous colonial conflict. In the North American version of the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-98), there were never more than 2,000 men under arms on either the French or English side at any time -- a tiny number compared to the 400,000 men who fought for Louis XIV in Europe. By and large, the fighting consisted of raids and skirmishes conducted by small companies and Indian warriors, combined with plunder

and privateering expeditions against merchant vessels and French settlements. There were no battles that could even begin to compare with the prolonged sieges that characterized the war in Europe. For the most part, assaults were indistinguishable from the kind of guerrilla warfare that characterized King Philip's War in New England or the colonial piracy and privateering ventures of the mid-seventeenth century. The aims of war were rather modest: with only a few exceptions, attacks were intended to result in plunder, captives, revenge, or intimidation, rather than the outright seizure of territory.65

The scale of conflict grew larger with each successive imperial war and increasingly came to resemble the struggles of the European theater, both in aims and conduct. Ambushes and raids remained important tactics, but they were overshadowed by sieges of forts and cities, backed by trains of heavy artillery and massed infantry firing in volley. Although colonial armies continued to hire Indian warriors and backwoods sharpshooters, increasingly commanders turned to farmers, laborers, and artisans who had no military experience but could be quickly trained and disciplined. Many officers turned their noses up at the "skulking" tactics of guerrilla warfare and looked to European drill manuals as a guide to training their troops. The proportion of Indian soldiers in New England's armies dwindled, as recruiters saw less value in their tracking skills and more to fault in their lack of discipline. The rapid escalation in the scale of warfare caught many by surprise. The defensive walls of Montreal had been built between 1717 and 1744 on the assumption that an assault on the city could only be carried out by a massed attack of colonial infantry, and that the rapids along the Lake Champlain-Richelieu River prevented the transportation of heavy artillery. When General Jeffrey Amherst surrounded Montreal in September 1760 with several batteries of artillery -- the pieces

transported from Quebec, Oswego, and Lake Champlain -- the city's architects were proven wrong.66

Because it involved lengthy supply lines, large armies, and massive investments in arms and ammunition, siege warfare demanded a much greater commitment on the part of this colonies, both in men and expenditures. The demands were met in part assistance from the mother country. For the first time, Britain intervened decisively in the military affairs of its colonies, posting 42,000 troops in North America by 1758 and deploying a quarter of the British Navy -- then the largest in the world -- to American waters. Parliament also compensated its colonial partners for their military expenditures, to the tune of over £1 million. The contribution of Massachusetts to the war effort was, in per capita terms, even greater. A third of its duty-eligible males were pressed into service, with total enlistments for the war numbering over 30,000. The provincial government, while partially compensated by parliamentary subsidies, spent nearly £1 million on the war and very nearly collapsed into bankruptcy. That the province had financed and fought costly campaigns against Louisbourg and Canada a decade earlier made its contribution all the more impressive.67

The large scale of warfare made the provincial government more active than ever before, forcing it to demand more from its citizens and creditors than in previous wars.


Fearing that the very existence of their colonies was at stake, the members of the General Court temporarily set their factional disputes aside and rallied to the defense of their colony. Not only did the House of Representatives regularly vote for the enlistment of thousands of troops between 1755 and 1762 -- particularly after the high-handed Lord Loudoun was removed as commander of the British forces in late 1757 -- it also borrowed over £1 million and levied a tax averaging £80,000 new tenor from 1756 to 1760. All told, the General Court was forced to cover three-fifths of its expenditures during the war and raised between 1,000 and 7,000 troops every year between 1755 and 1762. Of course, it was the inhabitants of Massachusetts, as soldiers and taxpayers, who ultimately bore the burden of fighting the war. The high levels of recruitment represented a virtual levée en masse in the Bay colony, and in both emotional and material terms New Englanders were asked to make a sacrifice comparable to the military efforts of the Revolution, the Civil War, and the World Wars of the twentieth century.68

This high degree of popular mobilization left the provincial government with a substantial debt to its citizens at the end of the war. In part, this debt consisted of arrears

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Anderson, A People's Army, 1-25; William Pencak, War, Politics, and Revolution in Provincial Massachusetts (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1981), 135-37. Needless to say, the sacrifice was not borne evenly, and some even benefited from the war. Merchants accrued ample returns on money they lent to the government, and those who secured contracts to supply campaigns profited handsomely from the war effort. The choicest contracts usually went to Bostonians, but merchants from Portsmouth and Kittery also reaped rewards from the opportunity. Military suppliers from northern New England enjoyed a trading boom during both sieges of Louisbourg, since Piscataqua was closer to Cape Breton than any other major English port. William Pepperrell, a merchant from Kittery, was the leader of New England's troops during the first siege, and used his position to open trading possibilities for himself, his son Andrew, and fellow members of the Piscataqua oligarchy. Not only did they assist in the outfitting of troops for the siege, they also participated in the supply of the citadel after its fall. Between 1745 and 1749, vessels from Piscataqua supplied large quantities of food, livestock, tools, building materials, wood, clothes, and sundry other goods to the English soldiers stationed at Louisbourg. Between April to September in 1746, the port of Piscataqua exported 1,591 tons of merchandise to Louisbourg; an impressive total given that the monthly volume of all trade cleared from the port in summer typically averaged a little over 1,000 tons. The tonnage between April and September 1747 totalled 1,480. See, Public Record Office, C. O. 5/968,
in pay and a moral obligation to provide for wounded veterans and war widows. Over £800,000 in debt in 1763, the General Court would have been hard pressed to provide for these people monetarily. But military victories had left the province with a vast quantity of public lands at its disposal, allowing it to circumvent the problem of revenues by paying its soldiers with land grants. The practice was not new; Massachusetts had distributed public lands to its veterans since the seventeenth century, and the provincial government had parcelled out hundreds of thousands of acres to its soldiers since the 1720s.69

Nearly all the grants made to veterans following the Seven Years War were located in frontier areas, particularly Maine. A township six miles square east of the Union River, facing Mount Desert Island, was granted to veterans in 1762, one of twelve townships created between the Penobscot and St. Croix rivers in the same year. Mount Desert Island itself was given to governor Francis Bernard. General Joseph Frye, a veteran of two wars, was allowed another six-mile township, now known as Fryeburg, at a site not far from the old Wabanaki village of Pigwacket, which had been virtually abandoned following a bloody 1725 battle with the English. The House of Representatives granted two larger tracts adjacent to Fryeburg to Captain Henry Young Brown in 1766 and 1770 (now called Brownfield). In all, between 1758 and 1770 the

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69 Murrin, "Anglicizing an American Colony," 118. Jack Radabaugh has estimated that the General Court granted 451,163 acres, or 704 square miles, of land to its veterans between 1675 and 1740. A large portion of this acreage was allotted to the proprietors of the "Narragansett" townships, seven towns created in 1733 to compensate the veterans of King Philip's War and their descendants. Two of the townships, Narragansett No. 1 (Buxton) and Narragansett No. 7 (Gorham), were located in Maine. See Radabaugh, "Military System," 209-14.

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Massachusetts government earmarked over 42 square miles of territory in Maine for the use of military veterans.\textsuperscript{70}

But the redistribution of land was only part of the bargain. The inhabitants of Massachusetts had been willing to bear the great burdens of the war only because they assumed that the crown and the provincial government would protect their interests. Most New Englanders who enlisted in the army had done so with their eyes open, believing that their very livelihood was threatened by the French. They had tacitly entered into a social contract with their government, in which they agreed to make sacrifices of blood and taxes as long as the state continued to defend their lives, liberty, property, and faith. Enlisting by the thousands and suffering great financial burdens, the people had done their part; they now expected the government to keep its end of the deal. By demonstrating their exclusive allegiance to the crown and to their province during the war, New Englanders had earned the right to the generosity and protection of the state. They expected that they would share in the spoils of war, particularly the vast expanses of land that were opened up after the fall of Quebec.\textsuperscript{71}

At the same time, they assumed that groups who were disloyal, or whose loyalty had been questionable, would be denied these same benefits. This reasoning was evident in arguments for the expulsion of Nova Scotia's Acadians from their homeland. Since the cession of their colony to Britain in 1713, the Acadians had attempted to remain neutral in wars between the French and English, refusing to take oaths of allegiance to the British

\textsuperscript{70} Massachusetts, Acts and Resolves. 16: 160; 17: 169-74, 363, 489-90; 18: 140, 457. Even private land companies used quasi-feudal rewards of land as a recruitment tool; the Pejepscot Company promised 100 acres to soldiers who volunteered to serve at nearby Fort George. See DHSM, 23:251-52.

\textsuperscript{71} On the connection between wars, citizenship, and state formation in the modern world, see Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Ma.: Blackwell, 1992), 67-126; idem, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich
king because they still held the hope that their territory would be reconquered by the French. In a 1746 message to the governor, the members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives complained of the "Traitorous Disposition and practices" of Acadians who had lent tacit or clandestine aid to French and Indian forces planning an assault on Annapolis Royal. They protested that Nova Scotia's French-speaking inhabitants were "a People who have all the Priviledges of his Majesty's other Subjects," and yet who "live almost or quite without publick Taxes, while we their Neighbours... are burden'd almost to ruin, by the necessary Charges of the Government for the Defense and Protection" of Nova Scotia. The delegates jeered at the Acadians' description of themselves as "Neutral Subjects," calling it "a Contradiction in Terms, a Set of People who have a right to Protection, but no Obligation to Obedience, who are his Majesty's Subjects, and yet may rebel against him and do what they please, have a Right to be defended by the King, and yet not bound to defend the King."  

This logic applied a fortiori to the Wabanakis, a "savage" people whose claims to the land were tenuous in English eyes. While Acadians practised plow-driven agriculture and had avoided participation in imperial wars, Wabanakis were hunter-gatherers who had played a leading role in attacks against New England's frontier communities for nearly a century. Although most of the Wabanakis remaining in Maine had sought to remain neutral in the last two wars, their failure to side exclusively with the British was seen by New England's leaders as a form of treason that erased their pretensions to

Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-191.


ownership of the land. When governor Pownall met with several Wabanakis at Fort St. George on his journey to Penobscot Bay in 1759, he informed them that "by breaking their Faith and the Conditions of their Treaties, they had forfeited their Lives, their Liberties, and their Lands." He offered, as a token of his magnanimity, to place them "under his Protection": he would "Protect their Lives," while saying nothing about their lands. Pownall's successor, Francis Bernard also promised to become a custodian of the Wabanakis' interests, but he, too, gave them no guarantees with respect to their lands. Upon hearing Penobscot objections to the rapid pace of English settlement near their river, Bernard dismissed them out of hand. Unlike past governors, he did not contend that the English held legal title to the land; instead, he argued that they had won it by military conquest. "The English have conquered this whole Country," he told them, "and the Indians must not prescribe to them what shall be the bounds of their settlements."74

As they witnessed a steady flow of trappers, loggers, and farmers entering their territory, Wabanakis had little reason to celebrate the British victory. Some lamented the departure of their French "fathers" and hoped that the children of King Louis would return to their shores. Others, like the Penobscot sagamore Tomah (Thomas), proposed that the Indians begin a resistance movement against the English. According to Oso, a Penobscot woman on friendly terms with the colonists, Tomah had introduced the idea at a tribal council in 1764. "Why shall the English live upon our Lands?" he asked his listeners. "Let us take them and drive them off.... the English have no right to Command us; let us be our own Masters and not be Slaves under them." But the majority of the council, knowing that they were outmatched by British arms, were unmoved. "What can we do?" they asked. "The English have got possession of our land." Wary of the

colonists but weary of war, they decided to follow the path of peace: "It's best for us now to live in Friendship."\textsuperscript{75}

FIGURE 5.1. [FALMOUTH HARBOR] (DETAIL), FROM THE ATLANTIC NEPTUNE, JOSEPH FREDERICK WALLET DES BARRES, [1776?]

One of over two hundred sheets from Neptune, possibly from its first printing in 1776. Des Barres studied mathematical physics as a youth in Switzerland, and was trained as a military engineer at the Royal Military College at Woolwich after emigrating to England. He conducted dozens of surveys from his base in Halifax between 1763 and 1774, and upon returning to England he worked with some twenty assistants to engrave plates for the maps. Des Barres's technique, including his use of cross-hatching to represent topography, was typical of military cartography of the time. After the American Revolution, both Des Barres and Holland returned to British North America; Des Barres serving as governor of Cape Breton and Prince Edward Island, and Holland playing an instrumental role in laying out the townships of Upper and Lower Canada. Photocopied from the Smith Collection, Osher Map Library, University of Southern Maine, Reel 26: 12469.

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The map is based on several surveys, including those of North in 1758 and Small in 1759, and a concurrent survey and sounding the upper reaches of the river by Lieutenant John McKechnie. The map indicates the place where governor Thomas Pownall buried a leaden plate "as a Memorial of Possession" on May 23, 1759, with the words: "Province of Massachusetts Bay — Penobscot — Dominions of Great Britain — Possession Confirm'd by Thos. Pownall, Govr."

The product of Montresor's second voyage into Maine; the primary purpose of his first voyage was to deliver military dispatches between Quebec and New England. Montresor also drew a map after the latter trip, representing the river route on an elongated strip of paper. The son of the chief military engineer of Gibraltar's British forces, Montresor was sent to North America in 1754 and became the chief engineer of Major-General Edward Braddock, serving at Louisbourg, Quebec, and later in Pontiac's Uprising and the American Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of Congress.
**Figure 5.4. The Spectrum of Organized Violence.**

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<td>Size of armies:</td>
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<td>Degree of central control:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of technology:</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character of armies:</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
<td>Regimented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of discipline:</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives of war:</td>
<td>Plunder/captives/tribute</td>
<td>Territorial conquest/control of nat. resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of soldiers to state/leaders:</td>
<td>Vassalage/kinship</td>
<td>Citizenship/employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rewards for service:</td>
<td>Plunder/captives/land/offices</td>
<td>Wages and salaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale for fighting:</td>
<td>Personal allegiance/vengeance/profit</td>
<td>Patriotism/professionalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military skills:</td>
<td>Marksmanship/equestrian</td>
<td>Drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactics:</td>
<td>Raids/ambushes</td>
<td>Sieges/military fronts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corresponding level of political organization:</td>
<td>Bands/tribes/chieftoms/</td>
<td>Nation states/tributary states</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart represents a continuum of correlated traits, running from the smallest to the largest armies. The two columns represent ideal types; most armies fall somewhere between the two extremes. Large-scale professional armies differ from small-scale bands at least three ways: (1) they are raised by societies with extensive communication networks, advanced technology, and a complex division of labor, and are consequently able to produce violence more efficiently and on a larger scale than their smaller counterparts; (2) large-scale societies have a much greater demand for resources, and hence are far more interested in the conquest of land; (3) large-scale societies are better able to pay for soldiers and munitions, and, all things being equal, well-compensated soldiers are more likely to carry out orders faithfully than their underpaid counterparts.
Distribution of soldiers, according to an order of the House of Representatives. Each bar represents ten soldiers; white bars represent the number of soldiers to be drawn from local militias. The figures have only an approximate correspondence to the actual number of soldiers posted at the garrisons; colonels and captains were constantly scrambling to fill their muster rolls with the required numbers. The disposition of troops forms a long chain of garrison houses and forts that protect the backs of frontier towns. The northernmost posting along the Kennebec River were the 25 soldiers at Fort Richmond, the easternmost posting was at Fort St. George. Both were still a considerable distance from Norridgewock and Panawaskik. Source: Acts and Resolves, 14: 108-9.
EPILOGUE

MOSES GREENLEAF'S MAINE

I believed that the woods were not tenantless, but choke-full of honest spirits as good as myself any day,-- not an empty chamber, in which chemistry was left to work alone, but an inhabited house,-- and for a few moments I enjoyed fellowship with them.

--Henry David Thoreau, The Maine Woods

In the decades that followed the American Revolution, thousands of families uprooted themselves from southern New England and made new homes in Maine. Searching for the independence of freehold land ownership, they cleared vast tracts of forest, raised thousands of houses and barns, built hundreds of meetinghouses and schools. Entrepreneurs and settlers established new towns in the backcountry, launched the region's first newspapers, chartered its first colleges, and advanced plans for new roads and canals. Their collective efforts left a lasting impression on Maine and laid the basis for its achievement of statehood in 1820. In the fifty years between the Revolution and the issue of a state charter, Maine developed a distinctive character that has persisted to the present day: a region of tightly-knit communities and hard-working producers, humble in their means but fiercely proud of their singularity.¹

During this same period, Maine was also taking hold as an idea. Before the Seven Years War, Maine was a little-used term for Gorges's former province, and York County was more an administrative category than a focus of emotional attachment. But after York was divided into smaller counties and renamed the District of Maine, the revived term increasingly became a source of identity for settlers and a shorthand for a distinctive regional culture. This change was actively promoted by the region's political and social elite. Maine took shape in the maps of Osgood Carleton, who, with encouragement from the Massachusetts Historical Society, drafted several maps that were engraved and published by John Norman in the 1790s. It also evolved in the written works of James Sullivan and William Williamson, who wrote the first book-length histories of Maine. Sullivan, a jurist and Federalist statesman originally from Berwick, wrote his History of the District of Maine in 1795, squeezed between a treatise on the origins of money, a history of land titles in Massachusetts, and a dissertation on the freedom of the press in the United States. Twenty-seven years later, Williamson outdid Sullivan, publishing a fact-filled if ponderous two-volume history of Maine that has remained a standard reference for historians even to the present day. Williamson had begun compiling materials for the work in 1817 while he was postmaster of Bangor and continued to work on the book after his tenure as governor of the state between 1821 and 1823.

Collectively, the work of men such as Carleton, Sullivan, and Williamson promoted the view that Maine was a unified region with its own distinctive history and destiny.2

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But few did more to create the idea of Maine than Moses Greenleaf. Along with the rest of his family, Greenleaf had moved from Essex County to the District in 1790, when he was thirteen years old. At the age of twenty-two, he left the family farm and opened a general store in his hometown of New Gloucester in Cumberland County. A few years later, he moved eastward: first to Poland, then Kenduskeag, and finally to Bangor, where he remained in business until 1806. Struggling to stay in the black, he decided to close shop and try his hand at real estate instead. He became a partner in the newly-founded township of Williamsburg in Piscataquis County in 1806, and in the years that followed he took a passionate interest in promoting his holdings. By 1810, he had moved to Williamsburg along with his wife and children. As he considered methods of developing the township and nearby areas, he found himself frustrated by a lack of reliable information about Maine's interior. For the next three decades, he set about correcting this problem, gathering surveyor's plats, land surveys, soil samples, historical accounts, and census data. He also engaged in searches for stone and mineral deposits, and lobbied for the construction of roads, canals, and a railroad in Piscataquis County.3

After several years of research, he decided to put his findings into print, believing that the dissemination of information about Maine's interior would be a spur to commercial development. In 1815, he published a map of Maine, accompanied the following year by a 154-page volume entitled A Statistical View of the District of Maine. The book contained a compendium of information on subjects ranging from land values and soil qualities to climactic variations and population levels. Its contents, as Greenleaf

explained in his introduction, gave investors and public officials a thumbnail sketch of
the District, allowing them to assess its economic potential and possibilities for
development. When Maine became a state in 1820, he printed a revised edition of the
map and continued to gather information about its lands and people. In 1829, with the
aid of a $1,000 grant from the state legislature, he published updated and expanded
versions of both the map and the statistical summary. Included in the new book were
several plates that used maps to illustrate various facets of the state: its topography,
population, political divisions, and territorial history [see Figs. 6.1, 6.2, 6.3].

Where the Maine of Ferdinando Gorges had been a controversial claim, Moses
Greenleaf's Maine was an established fact, a unit of analysis rather than a figment of the
imagination. By 1829, the existence of Maine was beyond dispute; while Gorges's
writings were marked by passionate advocacy, the tone of Greenleaf's book was one of
detached intellectual curiosity. His maps and statistical tables treated the region as an
object whose qualities could be empirically measured, tabulated, and analyzed; the reality
of this object received daily confirmation in land registries and tourist maps,
congressional districts and legal jurisdictions, censuses and tax levies. Dozens of
institutions and hundreds of thousands of people had a vested interest in the Maine
described by Greenleaf and few still believed that the region's territory might be
organized differently.

Greenleaf's maps and commentary marked the full flowering of a view of
territoriality that had taken root in the seventeenth century. It was based on four

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and Political Economy* (Portland, Me.: Shirley and Hyde, 1829). On the widely-held belief in the early
nineteenth century that the dissemination of knowledge was the key to a prosperous republic, see Richard
premises: that land was a resource that could be possessed as private property, that
governments could grant and protect real property rights, that sovereignty over the land
could not be shared between states, and that boundaries were defined by objective
attributes rather than human relationships. This view of the land had gained precedence
in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries because it supported and was sustained by
a larger and more powerful coalition of people and institutions than any other form of
territoriality.

Indeed, the strength of Greenleaf's Maine was that it was suited to a large-scale
society in which tens of thousands of strangers lived in close contact with one another.
Among small-scale polities such as the Wabanakis, disputes over land use could be
resolved through face-to-face mediation and the bonds of trust that daily interaction
created among neighbors. But in cases where there was greater competition for resources
and a weaker emotional bond between disputants, personal diplomacy became more
difficult. Because the earliest English colonists were united more by their common
pursuit of material betterment than by ties of kinship, they had little reason to trust each
other and had ample opportunities for conflict. Frustrated by the constant strife and
violence of the early years of settlement, colonists gradually put their trust in the
provincial government and county courts, expecting them to enforce contracts and
preserve civil order just as their counterparts had done in the mother country. Peaceful
relations were fostered not through personal mediation but by the establishment of
institutions with executive power. The legitimacy of these institutions came from their
willingness to adjudicate conflicts according to their legal merits, showing as little

favoritism as possible. In the case of land disputes, this meant giving precedence to objective criteria such as the contents of formal deeds, improvements made to the land, and surveys of boundary lines. The land had to be viewed as something outside the domain of human relations, something that could be measured or possessed but had no active role in human affairs. The notion of objectivity in this respect played much the same role as divination and omens among the Wabanakis: it removed potentially contentious questions from the social world and resolved them in a way that was seemingly above politics.5

Paradoxically, Greenleaf's objective view of the land served a valuable subjective purpose, preserving social harmony by divorcing the natural environment from human relations and offering it up as a catalogue of resources ready for exploitation.6 The image of Maine as a bounded area became the coin of the realm because it reified the state's exclusive and undisputed sovereignty over the land, which in turn protected the rights of English-speaking land owners. Competing visions of territoriality that did not strike this balance between an impersonal state and the interests of property owners -- such as Gorges's plan for a seigneurial system of land tenure or Wabanaki notions of the land as a

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6 Treating the land in this way did not entirely remove the possibility of disputes; the decades that followed the Revolution were marked by violent conflicts in Maine between squatters and absentee proprietors. But the source of the disputes was the failure of the county and provincial courts to decide trespass cases impartially, giving a more favorable hearing to wealthy and well-connected proprietors than to smallholders from the backwoods. The settlers who led the revolt against the proprietors did not reject the rule of law but sought to redress its abuses by demanding that their rights of ownership -- established by the objective facts of having cleared and improved the land -- be recognized. They emphatically rejected the notion that social obligations should be attached to land use and embraced land ownership as a source of economic independence and political liberty. Far from abandoning the concept of private property, they
shared source of nourishment among kin -- fell away because they were supported by smaller and less powerful coalitions.

Instead, an implicit bargain was negotiated between tens of thousands of landholders and English governments at the local and provincial levels. On one hand, the inhabitants of New England offered the state substantial support in the form of taxes, military enlistments, and voluntary labor. This popular backing made the provincial army a formidable power and strengthened the state's claims to exclusive jurisdiction over its territory. But English support for the army was predicated on the assumption that the state existed to protect a collective claim to the land by all colonists; the French and Indians were considered a danger because their own territorial claims conflicted with those of the English. The other side of the bargain was that the state would look after the interests of its citizens, particularly their property rights in land. The state's guarantee that it would and could protect these rights -- as when the provincial government finally gave its approval to Samuel Waldo's claims to the Muscongus Patent -- gave landholders the incentive to develop their holdings, secure in the knowledge that the fruits of their labor would accrue to themselves or their children. Confident that their land claims would be backed by the government, merchants such as Waldo invested considerable sums into the development of their holdings, tapping into international pools of capital and migrants to promote the settlement of Maine. The state, in this sense, was Janus-faced: glowering outward to its frontier it projected a line of forts and garrisons meant to intimidate its external enemies, but smiling inward it presided over a peaceful, prosperous commercial community. The potential for violence among competing land owners within

asserted that the state had a moral obligation to protect lands that were, from their point of view, rightfully theirs. See Taylor, Liberty Men, 61-121.
the colony, ever present in the early years of Maine's existence, was gradually directed outward towards the enemies of the empire as a whole.

While this arrangement suited those who received the state's protection, it was catastrophic for those who did not. The growth of English settlement in Maine, and the attendant wealth it brought to both merchants and smallholders, was a direct result of the encroachment of the colonists on lands that once belonged to the Wabanakis. While the provincial government recognized that the Indians possessed a form of aboriginal title to the land, this right was weakly protected and frequently ignored. The defense of Wabanaki territory rested ultimately on their military strength, backed by the resources of the French state, which treated the Wabanakis as a proxy for its own imperial claims. For nearly a century this compromise allowed Wabanakis to retain most of their traditional territories and forced the English to accommodate their demands for peaceful trade. But when the French were removed from America in 1763, the Indians lost their most effective barrier against incursions by their English-speaking neighbors.

By the end of the eighteenth century, Wabanaki leaders knew that they could not stem the tide of white settlement and tried to negotiate an arrangement that would accommodate the immigrants while still allowing the Indians to gain a livelihood. In the 1790s, the Penobscots and Passamaquoddies, the two organized tribes remaining in the District, ceded most of their territories to the state of Massachusetts in exchange for an assortment of gifts, annuities, and fishing and hunting rights. Over the next forty years, large portions of their remaining lands were whittled away by a series of sometimes fraudulent purchases. As their territories shrank, it became impossible for Wabanakis to survive solely by hunting, fishing, and gathering, and most families in the nineteenth
century worked a variety of occupations, from lumbering to basket weaving, to make ends meet.

While some have described these changes as the passing of a traditional way of life, they might equally be seen as a continuation of the Wabanakis' ability to adapt subsistence strategies to changing circumstances. As in the past, they limited the risk of hunger by pursuing a variety of activities, complementing hunting expeditions with stints at farmsteads, shipyards, mills, docks, and logging camps. They also continued to view the land in ways that would have been familiar to their ancestors, as the writer Henry David Thoreau learned in the three trips he made to Maine's interior in 1847, 1853, and 1857. On portions of each trip he was accompanied by Wabanaki guides, including Joe Aitteon, who later became the first elected governor of the Penobscots, and Joseph Polis, a hunter from Old Town. Having consulted Greenleaf's map of Maine in the first trip -- which he found to be "a labyrinth of errors" as far as the rivers and lakes of the interior were concerned -- Thoreau discovered an entirely different way of mapping the land among his guides. The Penobscots saw dozens of animals hidden in the forest where their guest could see none, told stories of battles against the Mohawks at the sites where they had taken place, carried on extensive discussions about the etymology of placenames, and were able to orient themselves simply by looking at the surfaces of rocks and trees. Although Thoreau never forgave the Indians for their failure to live up to his romantic image of the noble savage, he began in the final voyage to see their survival skills as a form of knowledge as rich and complex as his own scholarly learning. "I have much to learn of the Indian," he owned, "nothing of the missionary."

Yet the Penobscots were increasingly aware that they needed additional skills to survive in the modern world. Joe Polis was an accomplished hunter, but he was also literate and a strong advocate of formal education. A devout Protestant, Polis belonged to the "New Party," a Penobscot faction that supported the establishment of English-language schools at Old Town. He told Thoreau that he wanted his children to attend college, since with an education "you could keep'em property -- no other way." Although Polis continued to travel along the paths of his ancestors, he also understood that the landscape made by maps, deeds, and surveys was too powerful to deny. Because it was supported by a coalition of hundreds of thousands of people, Maine's sovereignty over its lands was unquestionable. If the Indians were to win redress for the wrongs that had been committed against them, they would have to do so through the courts and the legislature, basing their arguments on treaty provisions and legal precedent rather than subjective considerations of need.8

Polis would have been disappointed to learn that the Penobscots were to wait another 123 years before they received compensation for their losses. But when restitution finally came in 1980, the legal case launched by the Indians revived many questions that had laid dormant since the early nineteenth century. What was the basis of the state's sovereignty over its territory? How did groups establish rights of ownership to their lands? Is the legal system adequate to resolve disputes between indigenous peoples and their settler neighbors? Although the Indians withdrew their case after receiving a settlement from state, the questions remain. The history of the region's colonization has a very direct bearing on such issues, and if there is a lesson to be drawn from this study it is that all representations of the land -- even the scientific and dispassionate maps drawn by

8 Ibid., 293.
Moses Greenleaf and later cartographers -- are social in character. As vast tracts of
Maine's forests are sold by timber companies to real estate developers, and as land use
becomes an increasingly prominent subject of public discussion, we would do well to
remember that determining ownership of the land is more than a matter of jurisprudence.
Behind deeds, treaties, and surveys lies the more fundamental question of what
responsibilities we have to each other, and to the plants and animals around us. It is not
too late to heed the advice of Wabanaki conference speakers, who knew that it was
unwise to take from the land without giving something in return.
FIGURE 6.1. PLATE I, FROM MOSES GREENLEAF'S ATLAS ACCOMPANYING HIS SURVEY OF THE STATE OF MAINE, 1829.

The first plate of Greenleaf’s atlas depicts the topography of the state; Henry David Thoreau found his representation of the lakes and mountains of the region to be a “labyrinth of errors.” Photocopied from reproduction at the Library of Congress.

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The fifth plate depicts the state's counties, listing their populations and the value of their taxable property; dotted lines represent the progress of white settlement since the American Revolution. Photocopied from the Library of Congress.
The sixth plate represents grants of land in the state. Tracts marked "M" in the northeastern part of the state are townships allotted to Massachusetts after Maine was granted statehood. Photocopied at the Library of Congress.
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Dissertations and Theses


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Gavin Taylor was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1969. Raised in Montreal, Quebec, he graduated from Westmount High School in 1986, and attended Marianopolis College CEGEP for a year before enrolling in the University of Toronto in 1987. He received his B.A. in History in 1991, and in 1992 he was conferred a M.A. in History, also from the University of Toronto. After spending a year teaching in Japan, he enrolled in the College of William and Mary in 1993, passing his comprehensive exams in the spring of 1995. In 1999, he was hired by Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, as an Assistant Professor of History.