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Belonging to the army: Camp followers and the military community during the American Revolution

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Belonging to the army: Camp followers and the military community during the American Revolution

Mayer, Holly Ann, Ph.D.
The College of William and Mary, 1990

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BELONGING TO THE ARMY:
CAMP FOLLOWERS AND THE MILITARY COMMUNITY
DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

A Dissertation
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Holly A. Mayer
1990
APPROVAL SHEET

This dissertation is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

[Signatures]

Approved, April 1990

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For my parents:
Colonel Jack Mayer, U. S. Army Ret.
and
Ruth Katherina Beckstein Mayer
(always on active duty)
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As a student of the American Revolution I have always been interested in discovering how the War for American Independence affected people's lives and, in turn, how people's actions influenced the outcome of the war. While casting about for a dissertation topic that encompassed such interests, I found one that was admirably suitable: camp followers. The choice reflects both my academic concerns and my personal background. I followed the military as an army "brat" and then later served in the United States Army. At some point during my service, the army celebrated "The Year of the Military Family" to recognize the importance of the family to military life and perhaps to bury that old joke "If the army had wanted you to have a wife it would have issued you one." The military's civilian adjuncts--families and employees alike--merit recognition. It is my firm belief that camp followers and their contributions to military life have been too-often neglected or denigrated.

When I began my research, I was primarily interested in the attitudes and actions of women with the Continental Army; but I quickly discovered that the other camp followers could not be ignored, for they too, perhaps even more than the women, have been forgotten in most historical literature. While researching the Continental Army, I became more and more disturbed by a lack of published information on camp followers. Except for a few notable exceptions, authors either disregarded these people or only referred to them in passing. I set out to find these forgotten "revolutionaries."
process, I found a vital, sometimes chaotic, sometimes highly disciplined, and singular community—a Continental Community.

What had begun as a rather narrow study of a particular group of individuals ended as an examination of the legal, labor, and social relationships and interactions between the Continental Army, its uniformed personnel, and its civilian attachments. The study of the army as a community rather than just as a formal military organization is intriguing and rewarding. In this particular case, one sees how the military side of the Revolution affected those most intimately associated with the army and how they contributed to the military in return.

In rendering quotations, I have retained the original spelling and grammar (or lack thereof) whenever possible. Changes and additions appear in brackets. Empty brackets indicate that a word was obscured in the original text. Superscript letters have been brought down to the line, and most dashes have been transcribed into periods. Words repeated at the end of one page and at the beginning of the next appear only once.

A dissertation ultimately represents the vision and labor of one person, who must accept responsibility for all faults found therein, but only with the assistance and support of many people can it be completed. My advisor, Professor James P. Whittenburg, taught and advised me from my first day at William and Mary to my last. I thank him for his unending courtesy, his patient listening, and his gentle guidance. Professor Michael McGiffert challenged me in class and focused a gimlet eye on this work. I greatly appreciated both. A big thank-you also goes to the other members of my dissertation committee: to Professor Cam Walker for her editing and
suggestions; to Professor Thad Tate for his insightful comments; and to Professor Don Higginbotham of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill for the excellent advice that will help me as I continue to work on this topic. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professors Edward Crapol and Judy Ewell for their help and friendship over the past few years.

During the course of my research, I was assisted by numerous people at various institutions. The David Library of the American Revolution in Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania, is a wonderful place in which to work. The library’s president and director, Mr. Ezra Stone, offered me warm hospitality at the Feinstone Research Center. Dr. David J. Fowler, the research director, answered queries, suggested additional materials, and helped fine-tune parts of my research. Their assistant, Mrs. Marilynn Huret, also looked after me. My sincerest thanks go to them all. While up in that part of the country, I also worked at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania where I was very grateful for the staff’s, especially that of Ms. Linda Stanley’s, assistance. Further to the west, at Carlisle Barracks, Mr. John J. Slonaker and Mr. David Keough showed me what the United States Army Military History Institute had on the Revolutionary War. I also thank the staffs at institutions further south. Various librarians assisted me in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress as did others at the National Archives. At the latter, Mr. William E. Lind of the Military Reference Branch, who I believe has since retired, proved especially helpful. Dr. Robert K. Wright, formerly of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, gave me extensive bibliographic assistance when I was still formulating my topic. In Richmond, the staff of the Virginia Historical Society delivered many a manuscript to my table. Mr. Conley L. Edwards III and Mr. Minor Weisiger helped my investigations at the Virginia State
Library. Dr. Sandra Gioia Treadway, of the same institution, has given me suggestions and information, and I count her as a friend.

I am very grateful to the College of William and Mary in Virginia and its Department of History for the fellowship, assistantships, and research grants that made it possible for me to pursue the Ph.D. I also wish to thank the State Council for Higher Education in Virginia for the Commonwealth Fellowship in 1988, the Board of Trustees of the David Library of the American Revolution for the generous research grant I received in 1989, and the National Society Colonial Dames XVII Century for scholarships in 1985 and 1986.

It is with great pleasure that I now turn to thank some friends and my family. Gail S. Terry has been a wonderful classmate, colleague, and confidante. She and her husband, the historian John M. Hemphill II, have listened to me, advised me, and been unendingly supportive. Janet L. Coryell, a William and Mary graduate now at Auburn University, spurred me through the tough times, cheered me on at each milestone, and was always ready for fun. Christine Styma, who was completing her dissertation at the same time I was, also helped ease the process. My parents, Jack and Ruth Mayer, and my brother, Jon, have my most profound gratitude for all their love and support. They are terrific people who have never failed to back me in my endeavors. Finally, I must acknowledge the contribution of my grandmother, Anna Maria Schrepfer Beckstein, who did not live quite long enough to see me finish, but whose motto "Alles mit Humor" I tried to follow during the Ph.D. process and which I will try to keep in mind as I continue on in life and the history profession.
The thesis of this dissertation is that the Continental Army was the cause and the core of a military community made up of both army personnel and camp followers, who together and separately affected the military mission. The dissertation focuses primarily on the civilian, as opposed to the military, members of the "Continental Community."

Books and articles on armies have typically dealt with the military structure, the campaigns and battles, and the exploits of uniformed heroes or traitors. Those accounts provide merely the background in this story. In this dissertation, the military community is illuminated: its good points revealed, as well as the bad. Thus, this history will include the prostitutes that most people immediately think of when they hear the term "camp follower," but, as American soldiers were too infrequently and poorly paid to support a large retinue of such followers, they will be only a very small part of this work. Actually, the spotlight will shine on those persons specified in Article 23, Section XIII of the 1776 Articles of War: "All sutlers and retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of the United States, . . ." The dissertation examines the sutlers and other merchants who supplied the encampments, the family members, servants, and volunteers who fell under the heading of retainers to a camp, and the other civilians who served with the army in various capacities. It is this very broad definition of camp follower that makes the topic unique. Few people have written about camp followers, and those that did have generally focused solely on women.

This dissertation shows that camp followers engaged in numerous tasks to support the army. Men entered the camps to sell goods and services (from soap and liquor to dancing lessons), or busied themselves in the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments. Women did more than just cook, clean, and sew. Some of them nursed the sick and wounded, while others engaged in espionage. Many African-Americans served not only their individual masters, but the army as well. They were allotted jobs as diverse as courier duty and ditch-digging.

The subject is an exciting one. It lends itself to both analysis and storytelling. Fitting within the broad context of social history, it is also a part of the new military history. It is the story of how war affects a community, and how that community affects a war.
BELONGING TO THE ARMY:

CAMP FOLLOWERS AND THE MILITARY COMMUNITY

DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
Chapter I: Precedents and Premises

Last Sunday the Rebel army was Mustered at the White plains, when it was reported amongst them that they have 20000, but the Friends to Government say if they be 14000 that is the outside of them. [T]hat the Women and Waggoners make up near the half of their Army.

British Intelligence Report
New York, 11 August 1778

Soldiers alone do not make an army. Leaders and followers, as officers, soldiers, and civilians, together create, build, and maintain the military forces called armies. An army is an hierarchical organization of people, and units of people, arranged and coordinated to do combat against an enemy. The uniformed personnel within this organization are commissioned and noncommissioned officers and soldiers. They belong to the army because of their oaths of service. However, there are also civilians, namely camp followers, who belong to the army: people who live and work with the military and accept its governance of their affairs. This assembly of both uniformed and nonuniformed personnel is the military community: a society that reflects the state which creates it, encompassing people from all walks of life and with all manner of speech and thought. It is a mobile community, where not only individuals move in and out of the society, but the group moves as a body as well. This community accepts and promotes the military mission: the defense of a nation's property and policy. As an army serves a nation, in this case, the Continental Army and the fledgling United States of America, it in turn is supported by its followers.
Many people equate "camp follower" with "whore," but such a categorization not only ignores the legions of other civilians who also followed the drum but slanders them as well. Camp followers of the Continental Army, those "others belonging to the army" referred to by contemporaries, were male and female, young and old, and professed a variety of occupations. They were people who were not officially in the army: they made no commissioning or enlistment vows. However, they moved with the army and lived on its periphery in an attempt to be near loved ones or to support themselves. This diverse company encompassed both patriots, those who embraced the cause of independence with a fervor equaling or surpassing that of any soldier, and leeches, who were there merely for personal gain. A few prostitutes and scavengers trailed after the army, but family members, servants, and other authorized civilians outnumbered them by far. Article 23 in Section XIII of the 1776 American Articles of War provided a definition of camp followers: "all sutlers and retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of the United States."2 Sutlers were merchants or traders permitted to sell provisions to the troops. Retainers followed the army because of personal inclination, pleasure, or the possibility of provisions and paying positions; they included women, children, servants, and volunteers. Finally, civilian employees working in or affiliated with the military's staff departments received the designation "persons serving with the army."3 These were not the first civilians to follow an army, nor would they be the last.

As long as there have been armies, there have been camp followers. When the Roman Legions trod through Europe, they included servants in their baggage trains and allowed traders to trail behind them. Their foes also had auxiliary personnel. "Barbarian" armies battled the Romans while
accompanied by families and neighbors. Womenfolk, old folk, children, livestock, bag and baggage were all carried with the warriors, to the detriment of their speed and maneuverability. These followers, however, added to the psychological terror of battle by mingling their yells with the war-cries of their fighters, and pelting any enemy who strayed into their midst.4

After the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe continued to be the scene of numerous skirmishes and wars. Medieval nobles struggled against the infidels and brawled among themselves. Knights charged off to do battle trailing retinues of squires, male servants, sutlers (many of whom were female), female servants and whores. At times armed ladies joined these armies with their own contingents of aides and servants. Eleanor of Aquitaine, with her husband Louis VII of France, pledged herself and her vassals to the task of rescuing the Holy Land in 1146. "Amazons," as her noble ladies came to be called, accompanied her. Although the Bull of Vézelay forbade many of the indulgences that normally accompanied a military campaign, concubines and troubadours, as well as many other such luxuries, were part of the entourage.5 These crusaders, men and women, warriors and servants, set out in glory, but much of that pleasure and pride faded in the rigorous months and years that followed.

The ability to endure hardship marked the careers and characters of army women from the Roman to the early modern eras. Carrying babes in their arms and their households on their backs, these women trudged after the men and armies that gave them work and bread. Even as the troops provided these women with a livelihood, women's work was vital to the operation of the early European armies. Yet their tasks were not extraordinary; indeed their work was identical to the everyday chores of their sisters at home. They cooked the food, did the wash, mended clothing, took care of the sick and
wounded, helped their fellow women, lay with men, and then bore and raised their children.6

These women labored to support themselves and their families. Female sutlers were often soldiers' wives or widows, not outsiders. Like their male counterparts, most women merchants made their living selling liquor and other staple items to the soldiers; a few, however, did supplement their income by engaging in prostitution. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries army women exercised many options to adjust to circumstance and ensure survival. The fact that the army was a community aided them in their efforts. The army had to serve itself. Even as armies grew larger, becoming instruments of state rather than private formations, and took greater control over support services instead of contracting out, military supply continued to remain partly in the hands of noncombatant followers. Although sutlers and other service support groups came increasingly under direct military control during the eighteenth century the result was not necessarily bad for the followers: the loss of some of their independence was offset by their achieving a semiofficial status.7

In line with other European armies, the British army developed both formal and informal policies to regulate camp followers, but there were differences. Whereas prostitutes were an accepted part of the Italian armies in the Renaissance, and the Spanish armies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries acknowledged their value, the English army chased them out of camp.8 It chased them away again and again over the years, for those indomitable women always came back. Even as the army tried to rid itself of them, policy assured such entrepreneurs an open market by making it difficult for the soldiers to engage in "legal" sex. By the late seventeenth century the army strongly discouraged marriage for soldiers. In 1671 soldiers
in the footguards were forbidden to marry without their captain's permission; in 1685 this became the policy for the whole army. Soldiers were to think only of duty, not of family.

A few men did receive permission to marry and maintain their wives "on the strength" of the regiment. The British army generally allocated women "on the strength" a space in the barracks and a portion of the rations. As a number of men married without permission, there were also many "off the strength" wives living around the camps and garrisons. Such women did not receive the housing and ration privileges of the others, nor could they participate in the pool from which was drawn the names of the wives allowed to accompany the regiments on campaign (the British used a quota system to limit the number of wives traveling with the troops). Many women without permission followed the army anyway. Some made their own way out to join the regiment, while a few others managed to gain a berth by accompanying officers as servants.

As a soldier's pay barely covered his own needs, let alone those of a family, the wives had to work. They formed a readily available and cheap labor force for the army. At the same time, the army in effect legitimized their position within the organization by giving them work. These followers found a niche for themselves as washerwomen, cleaning women, and nurses. Almost all of the British army's nurses were female by 1750 (a few came from civilian hospitals, but most were soldiers' wives). Women also filled a number of other positions within the eighteenth-century army hospitals. They were laundresses, cooks, and matrons. The matron was the highest-paid woman in the medical services and had considerable respect and prestige. She supervised the nurses and had the general responsibility of overseeing the
patients' comfort. Nursing and associated care-giver positions, then, assured
women places within the military organization.

Americans were familiar with British camp follower practice and policy
by way of their participation in the French and Indian War. The experience
left provincials with mixed feelings about the value of such arrangements. A
love-hate relationship existed between colonists and regulars to begin with;
camp women only aggravated the situation. New Englanders did not permit
women to accompany their regiments on campaign, but they did observe many
women in the British camps. Even though the British army regulated women
by way of general orders and subjected them to martial law, the provincials
tended to regard them all as doxies. It did not seem to matter that most of the
soldiers' wives in America were legally married and often very loyal to their
husbands.

Actually, the British high command had the same reservations as the
Americans. Many officers reluctantly accepted the presence of women even
though some of them believed they debauched the troops, spread venereal
disease, and were prone to stealing. Not only was it costly to maintain wives
and children, but they were deemed lazy and recalcitrant as well. Officers
tried to cow the women into obedience by threatening them with being
drummed out of camp, having their rations revoked, or even confinement,
whipping, and death. However, although commanders barked out many orders
and threats, camp women often found ways to circumvent the regulations, or
ignored them altogether.

Not many army wives accompanied the troops to America during the
period 1755 to 1783. During the French and Indian War approximately six
women per company had permission to follow the army. This number actually
decreased during the American Revolution. The British army in America
also lacked the usual contingent of experienced nurses who commonly followed the army on the continent. The army in the colonies had to rely on untrained soldier's wives who generally disliked the duty because it separated them from their spouses. It was hard, poorly paid work that could prove dangerous to the nurses if an epidemic raged through a hospital. So the provincials saw that the British command allowed women to accompany the forces, but limited the number. They observed that the army regarded the women with suspicion, but seldom harshly disciplined them. They noted that some women provided essential services, while others shirked their duty. Americans absorbed all this contradictory information and came to the conclusion that camp women were more trouble than they were worth.

The colonials more readily accepted the other, preponderantly male, camp followers: sutlers, contractors, and staff or civil department employees. British expeditionary troops and their colonial counterparts often resorted to sutlers to replenish personal supplies and supplement their diet. These retailers were very important to troop morale—that is, when they were not gouging the soldiers' pay with high prices. Contractors were generally less conspicuous; they moved in and out of encampments as they delivered equipment and conferred with officials in the army's military branches and public departments. Civil department personnel were everywhere. By the mid to late eighteenth century the British army had fully operational civil or public divisions; they included the Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, Commissary General of Stores and Provisions, and Deputy Paymaster General departments among others. Although they eventually became militarized (in the nineteenth century), all commissaries and paymasters at that time were civilians. There were also civilian storekeepers, clerks, and artificers.
Americans, familiar with these positions from their service with the British, incorporated them into their own military establishment when the time came.

The Continental Army collected a contingent of followers shortly after it took to the field in 1775. Leaders such as General George Washington were dismayed, but they were not surprised. When they tried to deal with these civilians, officers frequently turned to British precedents for guidance. Their practices reflected the English example, but they also often used common sense to adapt to ever-changing situations. Local arrangements were the rule rather than the exception, for there was no concerted army-wide policy covering all followers at all times. This flexibility cannot be considered surprising given the people, army, and nation involved. The American army was a new "citizen" army, not an established professional one; it was an organization often subject to confusion because of state and congressional fits and starts. This was also war on the homefront, not a foreign campaign. These were people fighting for an ideal not merely soldiers following orders to implement a distant national policy.

As sutlers, women and children, servants and slaves, and other civilians followed the soldiers into camp, the army had to decide what to do with them. Generally, the military either welcomed or ran off the sutlers depending on their services and savoriness, tried (usually unsuccessfully) to discourage the women and children from staying, put the servants and slaves to work assisting their masters, and engaged all other able-bodied civilians in tasks that supported the military mission. When it soon became obvious that camp followers, like soldiers, required regulation, American commanders utilized the British model to fit their general needs; individual or special problems continued to be dealt with at the discretion of the local commander.
Soldiers are buyers, and there have always been plenty of people eager to sell everything and anything to them. The American Revolution saw no exception to this maxim. As a result, both the British and American armies paid strict attention to the activities of the sutlers in their camps. Section VIII of the British Articles of War of 1765 (which were in force at the beginning of the Revolution) regulated sutting by limiting hours of operation and allowing the army to determine what goods could be sold and at what quality and price. Sutlers, however, also received a certain amount of protection under the section's Article IV: it forbade commanders to charge exorbitant rents for the buildings let out to the merchants. The American Articles of War of 1775 included almost verbatim most of the British regulations; the articles of 1776 contained them all. The armies could not control the merchants in city or countryside, but they could control who sold what in camp. An appointment as camp sutler was extremely valuable, especially when the sale of liquor was authorized. No matter how high they raised the prices, sutlers could always find buyers for liquor. Both commanders and other merchants were aware of this and tried to curb profiteers. But sutlers could only be controlled, not disposed of entirely. They were too important for the good and morale of the troops. Besides these authorized concessionaires, numerous other peddlers hawked their wares in and around camp, including peddlers of the flesh. Armies were good for business.

Armies also offered employment to their followers. The British army commonly gave wives "on the strength" (and some of those "off the strength," even though they were not supposed to be encouraged to remain with the troops) laundry detail. The wives also generally sewed and mended uniforms. When in garrison, some camp women took on the cooking for a company or filled positions as servants to officers and their families. The women also
accepted any other odd jobs that popped up. When following the troops on the
march, they performed the same tasks, although cooking was often done by
the men themselves. At times these dependents were ordered to serve in the
hospitals as nurses or other service personnel, and occasionally they herded
cattle or sheep, or sold merchandise to the troops.22

The American army tasked its women with the same sort of work their
counterparts performed for the British army. The prevailing sentiment
seemed to be that if the army had to accept their presence, they could at least
earn their keep, contribute to the cause, and stay out of trouble. Although
Washington complained that there were too many of them, he knew that if he
did not supply them with rations or a way to provide for themselves he would
lose their husbands and fathers as soldiers.23 Thus, even though some officers
recommended and implemented a quota system in their units, it was never
adopted as army policy during the Revolution. Indeed, whereas some people
thought the army was burdened with too many followers, others thought there
were too few of these supporters. One man who observed American troops
during the war thought that their ragged and unkempt appearance was due to
the lack of enough women to wash and mend their clothing.24

Both forces took little care of their followers during march or battle.
The British commonly ordered their women to walk (no matter how burdened
with packs or children) behind the army's baggage. When the troops engaged
in battle, commanders expected camp followers to remain out of the way. The
noncombatants usually clustered around the baggage, where they were safe
enough unless the army had to make a quick retreat or the enemy attacked the
supply train. American camp followers received the same orders. Washington
and other officers repeatedly commanded the women to stay off the wagons
and walk alongside them. The women just as repeatedly ignored such
commands and climbed aboard. Although the women did generally obey the orders to accompany the baggage and stay out of the way, they were still exposed to the hazards of war. The army could not always provide adequate protection for its baggage trains, and the enemy took advantage of that, subjecting some camp followers to the terror of ambush and capture. Such was the case during Burgoyne's campaign when a British detail on Wood Creek captured boats laden with baggage, women, and invalids making for safety at Fort Ann.25

Officers rarely, if ever, tasked their visiting wives with the same chores handed out to the other women with the army; they were also more attentive to their desires. Officers' wives were ladies, and there was a distinct difference in the courtesies accorded them on the march and in garrison. It was not uncommon in the British army for officers to take their wives along on military expeditions. A number of officers' wives were with General John Burgoyne's troops in 1777; they included Christian Henrietta Acland ("Lady Harriet") and the wives of Major Hamage and Lieutenant Reynel. Lady Harriet became known for her perseverance in overcoming all the difficulties that beset her during that campaign. When her husband Major John Acland was wounded and taken prisoner on 7 October (at what has been called the second battle of Freeman's Farm or the battle of Bemis Heights), Lady Harriet requested and received permission to enter the enemy's lines to nurse him. The German contingent also had a distaff side, including the Baroness Frederika Riedesel and her three children.26

American officers' wives were not as likely to follow their husbands on campaign as to join them in camp. Most waited until the marches and battles of the season were over and the army was tucked into winter quarters before entering the military's realm. This tradition began early in the war when
Martha Washington (often referred to as Lady Washington), Catharine Greene, and others joined their husbands in the camp outside Boston during the winter of 1775-76. These women generally contributed to the war effort by sewing and knitting and visiting with the troops to offer encouragement, but their exertions were always primarily for their husbands. Camp time, for some of these women, took on the aura of a social season; it was a time for formal calls, dinners and dances. This pattern of visiting and activities continued throughout the war, from Cambridge to Valley Forge and on to Charleston and Yorktown.

A great many of the officers and their ladies had servants to attend to their needs. Some of these servants in the military community were soldiers detailed to the duty; some of the others, those not in uniform, were actually slaves. British officers often selected uniformed personal servants, or batmen, from the ranks, but they could also choose to have civilian servants with them. Those people in service to military personnel did not have an easy time of it: their work was hard, and as with any other soldier or camp follower, they were subject to the vicissitudes of war, including capture and death. The 20 July 1779 return of the prisoners taken by the Americans at Stony Point included two attendants left at Kakeal and 25 officers' servants sent to Easton. American officers also engaged military or civilian personal servants, but the practice was not quite as commonplace as in the British army.

Both the American and British armies employed African-Americans as soldiers, servants and slaves. Lord Dunmore, royal governor of Virginia, issued a proclamation on 7 November 1775 freeing all indentured servants and slaves belonging to the rebels if they could and would bear arms in His Majesty's army. Dunmore hoped not only to deprive rebel planters of their
workers, but also to gain valuable laborers for the royal regiments as well. Many slaves accepted his offer. The governor enlisted many of them as soldiers, but the British army and navy put others to work as sailors, foragers, guides, and manual laborers. To add insult to injury, when the British raided the countryside, they not only burned down houses and destroyed crops, they also carried away slaves. Although British service often proved detrimental to their health (especially for refugees billeted on transport ships teeming with parasites and disease), blacks generally stayed with that army and provided valuable services to the royal effort. One of the reasons given for the American failure at Savannah in the fall of 1779 was that Colonel Maitland used perhaps "2000 negroes" to strengthen and add to the British earthworks.

African-Americans were valuable to the American army as well. The Continental Army had numerous blacks in military service by 1778. Most of them were in the infantry, but many of these soldiers were sidelined into personal service as waiters or supporting roles such as cooks. Other blacks acted as spies, guides, messengers, and laborers. Public levies procured slaves to clear land, repair roads, and construct redoubts and other fortifications. Black women also aided the army. Usually slaves, they served as nurses and cooks. Their employment released soldiers for other tasks.

Other civilians followed the armies who were not so intimately connected with them as were family members and slaves. Numerous volunteers rode into the camps in search of commissions. Many stayed with their chosen units, even fighting alongside them, until they received the appointments they wanted. Others took positions in the staff (such as Quartermaster and Commissary) departments. The British army brought along most of its necessary civil department personnel and then hired the rest, as
needed, in America. The Continental Army built up its staff departments over
the course of the war, but because of staffing difficulties the distinction
between military and civil branches was never as great as in the British army.
Due to a lack of qualified civilians, especially for the higher positions, many
officers accepted additional staff duties, and many soldiers received either
temporary or permanent artificer assignments. The militarization of these
departments in the American army preceded the event in the British army.
However, the Continental Army did employ a great number of civilians for
various jobs. Then as now, war created a demand for skilled artisans and
laborers. The army joined battle with civilian manufactures over these
people, and although it generally lost out to the higher pay offered by
domestic industries, the army did manage to hire many carpenters,
blacksmiths, forge men, nailers, wagoners, and others. Some actually enlisted
in the army; others worked for the army in a noncombatant status. In either
case, their pay generally exceeded that of the ordinary soldier.34

One staff division, the Hospital Department, hired many female as well
as male civilians. In great need of nurses throughout the war, military
hospitals recruited among the camp followers and the local populaces.
Although army wives often nursed the sick and wounded, the army did not
acknowledge them as army nurses unless they were actually hired for that
task. Needless to say, the army did engage many dependent wives for nursing
duties, but it also employed other women, previously unconnected with the
military, as matrons and nurses for the army hospitals. Legislation passed in
1777 and after did not specify sex, but nurses were usually women because
commanders did not want to release precious manpower for that duty.35
Female nurses and some male (those not drawn from the line) attendants were
camp followers: they did not enlist in the army, nor were they given the
titular designation of officer as the physicians and surgeons-mates were, but they provided a valuable service.

Some people, who had nothing in goods or services to offer the army, took from it instead. Thieves recognized neither politics nor noble causes. Vagabonds on the road and inhabitants from near-by communities scurried into camp and carried away just about anything they could get a grip on. Some villains impersonated soldiers in order to draw rations for themselves.36 Even as the army battled with Congress for more supplies, it found itself hard pressed to hang on to the stores it did have. The Continental Army was besieged on more than one front.

As the American army struggled to maintain itself physically, it fought to sustain its ideological foundation as well. This was an army built upon anger, patriotism, and an incipient nationalism. It was an army created out of fighting men, not one created to make men fight. Even after the rage militaire vanished, and both army and nation settled down to deal with limited pools of manpower and learned to accept, or at least tolerate, military discipline and training, most revolutionaries still preferred to think of the army as a voluntary association that aided the cause rather than a standing army necessary to its success.37

The War for American Independence pitted a citizen army against a professional one.38 American volunteers fought against British career men. Revolutionaries joined militias and Continental regiments for varying lengths of time, to serve for a matter of weeks or for the war's duration. Very few of them had ever served as soldiers before. They and their followers were from all ranks of life, representing all manner of occupation, religion, and heritage. Farmers had turned in their plowshares for swords, and tradesmen their tools for guns. Confronting them across the battlefield was a national
army whose techniques and tactics had been honed in battle for over a hundred years, and with traditions that extended even further back in time. The British officers, sprigs of the nobility and gentry, commanded soldiers (and soldiers' wives) drawn from the lowest level of the social order. In contrast to their opponents, who enlisted for a set time and a set cause, most British soldiers enlisted for life. Their *raison d'être* was the military mission: the implementation of Britain's national policy via warfare whenever and wherever needed.

American revolutionaries had other reasons for serving in or with their army: they were defending the homefront and trying to implement an ideological program. The war was fought on their turf. They looked around and saw "the remains of burnt and destroyed houses, once the fair fruit of hard industry, and now the striking monuments of British brutality," and walked over the dead bodies of people whom they had once loved. They fought for "their own estates and property, their own rights, liberties and government." They joined the army to repel an invading force that threatened everything they had come to hold dear.

Colonists loyal to the crown disputed this interpretation of the conflict. They complicated the issue of invasion and occupation by claiming that America was their home as well and by welcoming the British troops that would uphold their interests. But those desiring separation from England retorted that loyalists were not true Americans if they wanted to have their land ruled from abroad. As the armies ranged over the countryside combatting the issue, they displaced thousands from both sides. Many of the displaced then joined one or the other of the armies because they had nowhere else to go or nothing else to do; some enlisted so as to regain what they had lost. They joined those who had enlisted in the hopes of preventing enemy
occupation or destruction of their property. Families joined their men when they had nowhere else to go.42

Both the British and American contingents tried to either control or drive out all hostile civilians in their occupied areas. Revolutionaries viewed loyalists as malcontents and possible spies and thus often officially invited them to leave. Governing bodies were most severe with male suspects, but women also suffered persecution. The Pennsylvania Assembly on 6 June 1780, resolved that the wives and children of men with the enemy had to depart the state within ten days. If they remained after that time they were to be given no protection and considered enemies of the state.43 With husbands already fighting with the British army, few or no friends, and minimal provisions, many loyalist women acted as Dorothy Goodrich of Virginia did.44 They petitioned their state assemblies for permission to cross the lines in order to join their husbands. Other women, such as the resolute Grace Galloway in Philadelphia, remained on their property in hopes of preserving it from confiscation. When conditions were reversed and the British controlled an area, families sympathetic to the American cause often tried to flee. Sometimes they made it out of the occupied zone; sometimes they did not. The British under siege in Savannah in the fall of 1779 refused a request by the American generals to release trapped women and children.45 On the other hand, the British allowed a number of women to ship out of Charleston in August of 1780. Upon their arrival in Philadelphia they said that they had been well treated by the British when they applied for permission to leave. The mitigating factor in that case may have been the onslaught of sickness in the city.46

As people streamed in to join with the Continental Army, whether for reasons of patriotism or displacement, the contention that Americans had just grievances against Britain remained ever fresh. The army also fostered a
growing sense of unity among its people. Where the newspapers had
stimulated the growth of American nationalism, the army nurtured it. The
newspapers had presented the recipe for American patriotism, but the army
was the cauldron in which it boiled and simmered and then boiled again. As
Washington reminded his suffering soldiers at Valley Forge:

Surely we who are free Citizens in arms Engaged in Struggle
for every thing Valuable in Society and partaking in the
Glorious task in laying the foundation of an Empire should
scome . . . to shrink under those Accidents and rigours of
war, which Mercinary hirelings fighting in the Cause of
lawless ambition, Rapine Devastation, Encounter with
Cheerfulness and Elacrity. We should not mearly be
equal, we should be superior to them in every qualification
that dignifies the man or Soldier in proportion as the
motive from which we act and the final hopes of our
toils are superior to theirs. 48

The British army, deployed as a mere fighting machine, had to confront
troops animated by ideological zeal. A new front was added to the prosecution
of war, one on which the British were not prepared to do combat. 49

Whereas service in or with the military seems to have expanded men's
allegiances to include nation as well as colony or state, women with the
military were not so politicized. Male volunteers and staff department
personnel identified with the military mission. They were sure their work
contributed to the achievement of independence, and their sense of
importance grew accordingly. In contrast, many of the women who served
the army did so for personal reasons rather than broad political convictions.
Their contributions to the war effort were on a secondary level: they
supported the men who fought the war. Even those who did harbor strong
convictions usually channeled their patriotic efforts through appropriate
female work. Their identities remained fixed in the domestic sphere. 50

However, women did become more aware (to some this must have come as a
rude awakening) of how the political world could infringe on their domestic
one. That intrusion led some women to step out of their homes and express their opinions in the public arena. They did so through petitions, boycotts and personal behavior (such as associating only with men and women of like opinions) and thereby discovered how their actions could affect public acts and opinions. The first two actions were more common at home than at camp, however, for the military hierarchy and the exigencies of camp life gave camp women little opportunity to develop or exercise political expression. But women of the army did behave patriotically, in and out of the feminine sphere, in numerous instances.

Abigail Adams declared that a woman's patriotism was the most disinterested of all the virtues because such patriotism was without thought of ever attaining public office or honor. Adams spoke from experience, for she had continued to support American independence and her husband John's struggles toward that goal, even after he brushed aside her calls for new laws in favor of the female sex.51 Other women stood with her:

On the commencement of actual war, the women of America manifested a firm resolution to contribute as much as could depend on them to the deliverance of their country. Animated by the purest patriotism, they are full of sorrow at this day in not offering more than barren wishes for the success of so glorious a revolution. They aspire to render themselves more really useful; and this sentiment is universal, from the north to the south of the Thirteen United States. Our ambition is kindled by the fame of those heroines of antiquity, who have rendered their sex illustrious, and proved to the world that, if the weakness of our constitution, if opinion and manners did not forbid us to march to glory by the same path as the men, we should at least equal, and sometimes surpass them in our love for the public good. 52

American men, in turn, honored women for their patriotic stands even as they continued to accord them no political recognition. When the widow Mary Fishbourne died in October of 1781, the Pennsylvania Gazette lauded her not only for her excellent social and maternal character but also for her "steady
and zealous regard to the rights of her country." Americans, male and female, began to believe that women had a national, if not political, identity as well as a domestic one.

While most women patriots at home and in camp contained their efforts to the domestic sphere, some did step out of that domain. Women disguised as men had served in European armies throughout the last half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Their ability to perform as soldiers may have been advanced by changes in military technology in the latter part of the seventeenth century. The decline in the use of the pike and matchlock musket, and the issue of the lighter flintlock and other weapons was advantageous not only to the men but also to the women who would fight.

Female participation in military actions continued into the American Revolution. Thousands of women were involved in active combat or military operations during the war. Some disguised as men enlisted in the army, others following the army took up arms when the situation seemed to demand it, and some of the women at home found it necessary to defend person and property. Enlisted women included Deborah Sampson and Samuel Gay (only her pseudonym is known). The camp follower Mary Ludwig Hayes, who has often been referred to as "Molly Pitcher," became famous for manning an artillery piece at Monmouth.

A number of women performed their patriotic service by acting as spies and couriers. One such woman was Deborah Champion of Westchester, Connecticut. In September of 1775 Champion's father asked her to carry intelligence to Washington at Boston. To justify his request Colonel Champion told her that it was better for a woman to carry the despatches than for a man. His daughter jumped at the chance to assist her country and General Washington. Placing the papers in her bodice, Champion rode off for Boston.
The slave Aristarchus accompanied her, for he understood "the mighty matters at stake." They stopped to rest after the first day, but then rode through the second night and straight into trouble. Late that second night they ran into a British sentry. Luckily Champion persuaded the soldier that she was not worth waking up his captain for.58 Deborah Champion was able to complete her mission, just as other women later successfully completed theirs.

Even though Aristarchus played a secondary role in the Champion episode, blacks starred in other espionage stories. African-Americans were in a peculiar situation; they observed white men fighting for a concept called freedom and yet saw slavery of blacks continued. The slaves of rebels could flee to Dunmore to take up his offer of freedom, but slaves of loyalists were allowed no such opportunity. Revolutionaries cried out for liberty and then put slaves to work to secure it for them. The wonder of it was that many slaves, despite the discrepancies and hypocrisy around them, did indeed identify themselves with the American side and fought, spied, and labored for the rebels. General Nathanael Greene's black courier was not an anomaly.59

The Continental Army was both the reason for and a part of a military community. This Continental Community was a society of very different individuals who shared similar goals and lived according to military regulations. American officers, soldiers, and camp followers represented a wide variety of ethnic groups and social ranks, but they all talked of liberty and freedom and of the right to property and prosperity. Both men and women followed that talk with action. The differences in their actions were a matter of degree: many fought for a nation's freedom, while others fought for their own; some strove to drive the enemy from state and property, but others just tried to keep body, soul, and family together. To prevent or diminish the threat the differences presented to successful military action, the army
imposed military government, via orders and courts, on all who belonged to it. In that manner the army focused everyone's attention on the military mission. The Continental Community's uniformed and nonuniformed personnel were sometimes in conflict with each other, but more often they worked together to effect independence.
Chapter I Notes


2. John O'Brien, *A Treatise on American Military Laws, and the Practice of Courts Martial; with Suggestions for their Improvement* (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1846), 322. Although Article 23 does not itself use the term camp follower, various authors (see below) over time have used the term to describe the people listed or have called this the "camp-follower article."

3. Ibid., 150. There are a few discrepancies in how various authors define these groups. All of the authors I consulted agreed on the definition of a sutler; however, there was not a consensus on who was a retainer and who a public servant. I used O'Brien's definitions because they most accorded with my own research. His interpretation is supported by William Winthrop, *Military Law and Precedents*, 2d ed. (1st ed., 1886; 2d ed. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920; Arno Press reprint, 1979), 98-99. Winthrop describes retainers (for Article 63 in the contemporary articles of war which included sutlers under the heading of retainers) as "camp-followers attending the army but not in the public service," and "persons serving with the armies in the field" as "civilians in the employment and service of the government [italics are his]." Giving more support to this argument is Frederick Bernays Wiener's *Civilians Under Military Justice: The British Practice since 1689 Especially in North America* (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), 7. Wiener, in classifying the civilians who accompanied the British army in the field in 1689 and thereafter, states that retainers included officers' servants, volunteers, women, and children, and he differentiates them from the individuals who served in the civil departments of the army. Reading the article somewhat differently were William C. DeHart, *Observations on Military Law, and the Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial,...* (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846), 24-25, and S.V. Benét, *A Treatise on Military Law and the Practice of Courts-Martial* (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1862), 29. Both DeHart and Benét define retainers as those connected to the military service by pay or fee (I think Benét took his definition directly from DeHart), and "persons serving with the armies" as including all persons who receive their compensation from private sources (such as servants).


7. Ibid., 650, 655.

8. Ibid., 651.

10. Ibid., 30-32 *passim*, & 86.

11. Ibid., 105.


15. Ibid., 17-19, 24-25.

16. Ibid., 26-27.


31. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 24 November 1779, p. 3, col. 1. In a report coming out of Charleston, October 20, some reasons were given why the assault on Savannah did not succeed.


38. Ibid., 133. Royster said that by 1777 "the hope for interchangeable citizens and soldiers no longer described the Continental Army," but there was still the belief that soldiers were citizens and would return to civilian life after service. Therefore I call this a citizen army as opposed to Britain's professional army where soldiers enlisted for "life."


40. Trustram, *Women of the regiment*, 18. "Until 1847 enlistment in the army was for life or until a discharge on medical grounds was granted."

41. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 30 October 1782, p. 2, cols. 1-3. In this response to the Earl of Shelburne by "Common Sense," a number of points are made about why Americans rebelled and continued to fight.
42. Walter Hart Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia: George MacManus Co., 1952), 58. Blumenthal states that in 1775, shortly after Lexington and Concord, many women were left homeless. But few of these women followed the Minutemen; most went to friends and relatives in the countryside. It was only later that more and more women joined their men in the army. The *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 18 June 1777, p. 3, col. 2, contains a report on the assembly's resolutions concerning the evacuation of Philadelphia residents should it become necessary.


44. The petition of Dorothy Goodrich, in Miscellaneous Petitions, 1779, Legislative Petitions, Virginia State Archives, Richmond.


47. Higginbotham, *War of American Independence*, 263. Higginbotham states that Revolutionary War newspapers spurred Americans to call for freedom and then on to a sense of nationalism. He points out that although the colonists shared a common culture they only decided on independence in 1776 when Britain failed to meet their demands. Higginbotham then declares that whereas nationalism was an instigator of revolutions in Europe, Africa, and Asia it was merely the product, not the cause, of revolution in America. I would say that nationalism was both product and cause. It was produced by the war, yet it in turn caused others to enter the war and prolong the fight, and in the end nationalism led to a constitutional revolution.


49. Higginbotham, *War of American Independence*, 412-413. Higginbotham refers to Charles Stuart, a British officer, who after seeing the courage and determination of American soldiers, felt something new was being added to warfare: that to win, officers and men must be animated by common ideals. Of course shared zeal as an ideological weapon was not entirely new to war: for example, the English Civil War saw its share.

50. Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 73-74. Kerber states that it is not clear that shared hospital service politicized army nurses the way shared military service widened men's allegiances. "Most women who furthered the patriots' military purposes did not do so in an institutional context; . . . , they served as individuals, . . . They did not change their domestic identity (though they put it to a broader service), and they did not seriously challenge the traditional definition of the woman's domestic domain."


53. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 10 October 1781, p. 3, col. 2. Mrs. Mary Fishbourne, the widow of William Fishbourne, died suddenly on Tuesday, Oct. 2, at the age of 55. She was an excellent mother, a kind neighbor, a patriot, and full of charity.


55. Linda Grant DePauw, "Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience," *Armed Forces and Society*, 7, no. 2 (Winter 1981): 209-210. DePauw states (perhaps overstates) that tens of thousands of women were involved in active combat. She divides these women into three groups: those who served in a distinct branch of the Continental Army and were referred to as "women of the army"; those who enlisted in the regular troops; and those women who served as irregular fighters affiliated with local militias. In trying to show the importance of women to the army, a laudable goal, DePauw is a bit extreme in stating "women of the army" formed a distinct branch of service.

56. McKenney, "Comment," 688. Both women were discharged as soon as their sex was discovered. McKenny's article is a refutation of some of DePauw's claims.

57. There is a controversy over the designation of "Molly Pitcher." Common lore has it that Molly Pitcher was Mary Ludwig Hays, but some evidence seems to point to that title being invented years after the war (Thacher in his *Military Journal* does refer to a Molly Pitcher on 4 July 1778, but there are some inaccuracies in his story leading me to wonder whether he recorded it at the time or added it in for publication later) and may have been used to amalgamate and personalize the heroism of all such women in the war. Perhaps the best way to define this heroine is to say that "Molly Pitcher" is the idealized Mary Ludwig Hays; her tale is based upon the exploits of Hays and is used to illustrate the contributions of women in the Revolution.

58. Deborah Champion to friend Patience, 2 October, 1775, Deborah Champion Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress.

59. Thaddeus Kosciuszko to General Nathanael Greene, 19 September, 1782, Nathanael Greene Collection, Series IIIA, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress. Besides relaying some intelligence to Greene Kosciuszko informed him that "Janus"(?) in Charleston wanted a new courier (who he named) to be used instead of a Negro. No reason was given why this change in procedure was requested.
Chapter II. The Army: A Continental Community

I found a mixed multitude of People here, under very little discipline, order, or Government.

General George Washington
Cambridge, Massachusetts
27 July 1775

General George Washington rode into the army camp at Cambridge on 2 July 1775. The "commander-in-chief of all the troops raised, and to be raised, for the defence of the United colonies" looked around and immediately began to plan for the bitter campaign to come: the campaign to establish a well-regulated and respectable military community. By August he had broken one colonel and five captains for cowardice or embezzlement and arrested two other colonels on the same charges. At the same time he struggled to straighten out the "indifferent" officers, he worked on shaping up the rank and file. Washington fumed that the provincial troops by no means deserved the heroic reputation they had garnered in the press. He found them to be "exceeding dirty & nasty," but, showing a modest amount of optimism, concluded they would fight well if properly officered. During those frantic first months Washington paid little heed to camp followers unless they were volunteers petitioning him for commissions or sutlers able to provision his troops; later in the war he devoted more attention to all the followers for they profoundly affected the force he had to make fit to fight.

The "Army of the United Colonies" was the legislative creation of the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. On 14 June 1775 that body voted to
assume control over the armies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island which were assembled at Boston. In addition, it requested that the other colonies also provide troops. Legislatively, there was now a unified Continental Army. However, it was really up to Washington, named commander in chief on the 15th, to mould the soldiers, mentally and physically, into an army. It was a challenge.

Washington surmounted tremendous difficulties to create a new army--the Continental Army--and its by-product, the Continental Community. Military and civilian personnel, or, in other words, combatants and noncombatants, peopled this community. The attitudes and actions of each group can only be fully understood when one is offset by the other, when the community as a whole is presented. One must examine officers, soldiers, and camp followers as separate groups as well as interrelated ones--each helped create the environment in which the others operated--in order to understand the military community. Community may be defined by mental or spiritual as well as physical ties. "It may be found in, or be given symbolic expression by, locality, religion, nation, race, occupation, or crusade. . . . Fundamental to the strength of the bond of community is the real or imagined antithesis formed in the same social setting by the non-communal relations of competition or conflict, utility or contractual assent." A community can be formed because of individual beliefs and practices or in spite of them. In creating the American military establishment, Washington tried to build what was essentially a community based on a common calling, a Gemeinschaft, but he recognized that he would have to establish a network of legal relationships and contracts because his community was essentially an artificial construction, a Gesellschaft, created to achieve a specified end by specified means. For although the Continental Community was a society on crusade, its members
sometimes forgot the "cause" in their concentration on occupation, location, and regulation.

I
Common Causes

The Continental Community, like so many earlier American associations, was founded upon an ideological as well as a material base. However, where freedom of religion had figured prominently in many of the earlier cases, the Continental Community's raison d'être was the independence of a nation and people. When the earlier societies had been established, they were often internally oriented; the Continental Community had an external orientation from the start. But common to all these groups was the desire, of the community as a whole and the members individually, to be free and prosperous.

Washington recruited officers and soldiers by appealing to both the ideological and the material interests of his countrymen. If liberty, independence, equality, and honor could not impel a man to take up arms then surely property, and the desire to protect or acquire it, would. Nor did Washington ignore the men already in the service. In November of 1775 he bemoaned the lack of public spirit that was leading to a disintegration of the line. He decried the "dirty, mercenary Spirit" that pervaded the army; but on a calmer day, even after receiving depressing regimental returns, Washington realistically recognized that "there must be Some other Stimulus besides, Love for their Country, to make men fond of the Service." He remarked to John Hancock that it would cost the government nothing extra but do much good if soldiers were to receive their pay for October and November and perhaps an advance of a month's pay.5 Throughout the war the general continued to
remind his soldiers of their patriotic duty while he labored to provide them with the necessities for life and battle.

The American military community developed around this dichotomous core of duty and self-interest. Newspapers, pulpits, and orders bombarded soldiers and army civilians with the message that they must persevere in the struggle to maintain American liberties. Soldiers and civilians ingested huge amounts of rhetoric detailing the political positions of the warring parties. One of the facets that made this war so revolutionary was this injection of "ideological conflict into warfare." Yet despite all the propaganda and proselytizing, many in the military community still had a difficult time choosing between public or national liberty and personal freedom. In the extreme, in battle, the virtuous warrior may be called upon to relinquish his liberty and perhaps his life to secure the liberties and lives of others. Even everyday army life demanded that all military and associated personnel give up some measure of individual choice and action so as to preserve order and insure combat readiness. It was a constant struggle to reconcile personal autonomy with national need. Washington recognized these internal conflicts; he painfully acknowledged that soldiers would not always do their duty: they would not always stand and fight in the face of overwhelming odds. He felt that their lack of discipline reflected the fact that they were free men. The revolutionaries' devotion to freedom and representative government led to their revolt against the crown, but it also made them unreliable soldiers. They were restive under military discipline, and yet that discipline was necessary to the preservation and success of the army. Fortunately for those trying to build an American fighting force intact, the very insistence on individual rights that sometimes made military life chaotic also served to keep many people in the army. They did not take well to army discipline and duties, but
they were determined to fight. A foreign officer serving with the British observed, "what Religion was there [during the Huguenot wars in France], Liberty is here, simply fanaticism, and the effects are the same." Throughout the war, Washington and others constantly rekindled that dedication, or what some would call fanaticism in order to preserve the army's strength.

As Doctor James Thacher, a young physician who wished to (and soon did) join the Continental service, recorded in January 1775, "In no country . . . is the love of liberty more deeply rooted, or the knowledge of the rights inherent to freemen more generally diffused, or better understood, than among the British American Colonies." He went on to write on 21 April of a burgeoning American patriotism after the battles at Lexington and Concord: "The people of New England have taken the alarm, and their hearts are animated even to enthusiasm. There is an enthusiasm in religion, in politics, in military achievements, and in gallantry and love, and why not an enthusiasm in the love of country? No species of enthusiasm surely can be more laudable, or more honorable. Never was a cause more just, more sacred than ours; . . ."10

Colonial (later state) legislatures, the Continental Congress and the commander in chief never let nation or army forget that theirs was a sacred endeavor. God's blessings were for his enlightened but beleaguered people. When the Massachusetts legislature decided to make Thursday, 23 November 1775, a day of public thanksgiving to offer praise and prayer to God so that he would continue "to smile upon our Endeavours, to restore peace, preserve our Rights, and Privileges, to the latest posterity; prosper the American Arms, preserve and strengthen the Harmony of the United Colonies, and avert the Calamities of a civil war," Washington commanded that "all Officers, Soldiers & others" take part.11 Even though God did not immediately restore peace or
divert civil war, Americans continued to make the deity a part of their military strategy. Whenever Congress directed that there be a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer, as it did for 22 April 1778, Washington encouraged the troops to participate by ordering that no work be done that day and that the chaplains prepare appropriate discourses. God and politics did mix during the American Revolution.

Providence, patriotism, posterity, and property loomed large in all rallying and battle cries. As soldiers of the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment (or 1st Continental Regiment as it was also then designated) were informed on 2 July 1776: "The time is now near at hand which must probably determine whether Americans are to be freemen or slaves—Whether they are to have any property they can call their own—Whether their houses and farms are to be pillaged and destroyed and they consigned to a state of wretchedness from which no human efforts will probably deliver them. The fate of unborn millions will now depend under God on the courage and conduct of this army." The troops had an obligation to fulfill the dreams of those who lived and died for independence, and an obligation to ensure freedom for future generations. A little over a year after the above oration, troops were asked, "Who can forbear to Emulate their [the resolute militia to the north] noble Spirit? Who is there without Ambition to Share with them the applauses of their Countrymen & of all Posterity, as the Defenders of liberty & procurers of Peace & Happiness to Millions in the present & future Generations?" Weighed down with their obligations to the dead, the living, and those yet to be born, but uplifted by the promise of being honored by God, nation, and millions of future Americans (the revolutionaries were positive posterity would never forget their triumphs and tribulations), the incentive to join and then remain with the army was strong. However, honors were not enough.
II
Pay and Positions

Constituents of the Continental Community required physical sustenance. The government intermittently provided food, shelter, and clothing (in varying quantity and quality) for military and associated personnel, but that was never enough: it also had to pay its servants. Payment was not a matter merely of reward; it was vital to survival. Officers and soldiers had to supplement their government issues with items bought from camp sutlers and in civilian marketplaces. Army employees and other followers received little in the way of government issue to begin with (they often did receive rations) and so had to pay for almost everything they needed or wanted. Wages were even more essential to the many people who supported not only themselves but families as well. Pay proved pivotal to the retention of personnel--both military and civilian.

Doctor Thacher noted in July of 1778 that many officers were dissatisfied and then went on to explain why. He commented that officers generally joined the army for one or a combination of three reasons: patriotism, monetary reward, or the "novelty of the employment." Whatever the category they fell into, all believed the contest would be short. They were wrong. As the fight continued over the years, patriotism dissipated, money depreciated, and the military commission lost its appeal. Many officers had left lucrative employment to serve their country only to contemplate the possibility of destitution by war's end. As a result of these ruminations many officers resigned. Washington, worried about losing too many of his experienced officers, approached Congress about a solution in 1778. Upon his recommendation, Congress decided to award all commissioned officers, who
served to the end of the war, an annual pension that would commence at the war's conclusion and continue for a total of seven years. The pension would be one-half the present pay of such officers. Congress also resolved that the noncommissioned officers and soldiers who served to the end of the war would receive a reward of eighty dollars at that time. That was not the first solution nor was it the last. Officers and soldiers wrangled with their representatives in the Continental Congress over the financial rewards of service throughout the Revolution and into the postwar years.

After the first flush of excitement that accompanied rebellion faded, most men contemplating enlistment took time to weigh patriotism and adventure against monetary recompense. The scale often tipped in favor of civilian security over military glory. After strolling around the camp at Cambridge in December 1775, Thacher noted that many of the Connecticut troops could not be persuaded to remain in the army; they quickly left camp after their enlistments expired. Thacher said that recruiters were distributed throughout New England, but voluntary enlistments proceeded slowly. He seemed to subscribe the desire for higher wages to a subsiding of the patriotic spirit. His observation was basically sound. When nobler impulses failed to induce a man to join the army, bounties, pay hikes, and pensions that offered land as well as money sometimes succeeded. The problem was that "sometimes" was not good enough. When diminishing ranks continued to be a problem, the army occasionally resorted to the impressment of vagrants, and recruiters (although enjoined not to) enlisted British deserters and prisoners of war into the American service. Also, although Washington and other officers voted against the enlistment of African-Americans in October 1775, by December the commander in chief supported it. As Washington continued to have difficulty manning his army he proposed that men be drafted into the service.
Congress, after pondering the proposal awhile, finally consented to a military draft that would be essentially controlled by the states. Congress gave the states quotas to fill, which the states in turn usually divided among their militia regiments. Thus a militiaman might find himself conscripted to serve with the Continental forces. Being drafted, however, did not mean one was left without alternatives. Sometimes a draftee could avoid such military service by paying a fine or by getting a substitute to go in his place. Actually, other enlistees also had that option in times of sickness, disability, and approved leaves of absence. John Beach turned to a substitute when he became ill. He gave Michael Linch his enlistment bounty and returned his clothing issues to his captain. Linch then enlisted in Beach's place as a matross, or gunner's assistant, in Captain Mansfield's company.

Other members of the Continental Community—the civilians with the army—did not face the necessity of providing substitutes when they wanted to leave their jobs, but then they rarely received bounties or pensions as recompense either. They did, however, have as much, or more, difficulty in receiving their wages and rations. Joseph Trumbull, commissary of stores and provisions, employed many people in his department. On 20 January 1776 he petitioned Congress to accept and direct that his people be paid agreeable to the amounts he proposed on his annexed list. Apparently his employees "had no pryor allowance for their Services, nor has any pryor All[ow]ance therefor been established for them." Some of Trumbull's people may have been officers or soldiers of the line detailed for special duty, and as such they would have received military pay, but Trumbull's list indicates that most were not. His clerks, laborers, coopers, and cooks all started work without a guaranteed rate of pay and rations. Problems in acquiring, paying, and rationing staff department personnel (Commissary, Quartermaster, Adjutant General,
Hospital) continued throughout the war. Part of the difficulty lay in the constant vacillating between using military (meaning line/combat) or civilian personnel in these departments. Generally, as the military system developed, the army preferred to put uniformed members into these positions. The practice not only saved money, it helped to maintain military control and order in the staff departments. For example, by 1782, according to a congressional resolution, the adjutant general, his deputies and assistants, all came out of the military line, but clerks could be either subalterns (lieutenants) or volunteers. Other departments also generally became more militarized over time. One big exception was the Quartermaster Department; during the last years of the war that department turned over many of its duties to civilian contractors.

The Quartermaster Department also hired artificers to supplement the soldiers detailed to the department and the volunteers who had enlisted to serve specifically in artificer companies. The civilian artificers in the army community usually received higher pay than their enlisted colleagues, but the army had ways of getting some of that back. In January 1781 there was a problem in getting money to pay the artificers employed in the department, so Quartermaster General Timothy Pickering decided to provide them with clothing. Pickering told Joseph King, the clothier of the Quartermaster Department, that enlisted men were entitled to bounty clothing, but "Cloathing issued to any other persons employed by Colonel [Hugh] Hughes [Deputy Quartermaster for New York], is to be charged to him at their just Value in specie, as the same Articles would have sold on the 19th. of April 1775-- Colonel Hughes in settling with the persons receiving Cloathing as above mentioned will either charge them at the same prices or higher according to the nature of his Contracts with them." All of the artificers continued to receive their
rations, but whereas the enlisted artificers could comfortably (relatively speaking) await their pay in their new clothing, the hired ones not only were stuck waiting for their wages, but then also owed for the new clothes they wore. They were not free to quit the community until they paid their bills.

Quite a number of other civilians found work in the Hospital Department. A few civilian physicians assisted in the military hospitals from time to time, but most doctors and surgeons' mates were commissioned officers in the Hospital Department or in the regiments. They directed personnel, such as apothecaries and their mates, stewards, orderlies, and nurses, who joined the army to serve in medical positions or who were drafted from their regiments into them. However, most commanders were not happy to have their soldiers detailed out of the line. Thus the medical department suffered a chronic lack of service personnel. It tried to counter the problem by hiring civilians—both male and female. In the fall of 1780 Doctor William Eustis had some trouble organizing the hospital in the vicinity of West Point. He wrote to Colonel John Lamb at that post on 12 October and asked if he could "recommend some poor honest refugee or other person suitable for a steward to the Hospital. The pay is too trivial to induce any person to accept the place who has any other business; at the same time it is a place of decent maintenance for a poor man. If there is any one on the point or near whom you think suitable, [I] shall esteem it a favor if you would send him over as we are in want of such assistance." The army not only looked for a few good, but poor, men, to man its hospitals, it also recruited women to serve as matrons and nurses. Their work was hard, the tasks menial, and the pay paltry, but nurses also received rations to sustain themselves and their families.

Other women in the camps became entrepreneurs, most commonly engaged in the laundry business. The task of washing clothing was sometimes
imposed upon women followers by company commanders; it served to justify the rations given to these women. Other women set up shop on their own, charging as much as the market could bear. However, as with everything else, the army did step in and try to regulate their business practices. In June of 1780, the officers commanding companies at West Point reported that in their opinion "the following Prices be paid for Washing; to the Women, who draw provisions, with their respective Companies; For a Shirt two Shillings; Woolen Breeches, Vest, and Overalls, two Shillings, each; Linen Vest, & Breeches, one Shilling, each; Linen Overalls, one Shilling & Six Pence, each; Stock, Stockings, & Handkerchief, Six Pence, each; The Women who wash for the Companies, will observe these regulations."28

Other entrepreneurs, in particular the camp sutlers, had to heed military authority. Washington made that quite clear when he established the rules in August of 1775. He had no objection to the appointment of one sutler to each regiment as long as the appointment cost the public nothing, and provided the colonel of each regiment "doth become answerable for the Conduct of the Sutler so appointed, and taking care, that he conform strictly to all Orders given for the regulation of the Army, and that he does not in any Instance attempt to impose upon the Soldiers in the price of their goods."29

The military community was a company town. In some form or another just about everyone within it worked for the army. Besides providing jobs and promising pay, the army decided where its people would stay (both the community as a whole and the individuals within it as well), determined the social and legal hierarchy, and legislated, executed, and reviewed its own regulations. Within this controlled and rather peculiar community people tried to live as ordinarily as possible in the most extraordinary of circumstances.
III
A Mobile Community

The military community was both mobile and segmented. Each of the many cells that made up the whole could at any one time be in garrison, battle, or on the move. Even in its infancy the army sent out units to engage the enemy and occupy key terrain. On 5 September 1775 an order required "A Detachment consisting of two Lieut. Colonels, two Majors, ten Captains, thirty Subalterns, thirty Serjeants, thirty Corporals, four Drummers, two Fifers, and six hundred and seventy six privates; to parade to morrow morning at eleven O'Clock, upon the common, in Cambridge, to go upon Command with Col. Arnold of Connecticut." One company of Virginia riflemen and two companies of Colonel William Thompson's Pennsylvania regiment of riflemen were to meet the rest of the detachment on the parade ground, and the quartermaster general was to see to it that the gathering units had all the tents and other supplies they might need. Three days later, on 8 September, Washington ordered that Arnold's detachment be taken off the duty roll. Arnold was immediately to march his troops to Cambridge Common where supplies would await them. The rifle companies would march to join him there in the morning. After loading up, the troops moved out. The detachment split into maneuvering elements that marched out of Cambridge between 11 and 13 September to head north. Captain Daniel Morgan commanded the Virginia riflemen and Captains William Hendricks and Matthew Smith led the Pennsylvanians.30 Women and Indians accompanied the troops on the grueling trek to Canada. A Pennsylvania sergeant by the name of Grier had his wife along, while Jemima Warner marched with her husband, James, of
Morgan's riflemen. Among their Abnaki Indian guides was the woman Jacataqua.31

 Civilians followed the army throughout the war, and the army constantly made allowances for them. When word came down on the night of 5 July 1777 to abandon Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, Doctor Thacher received orders "to collect the sick and wounded, and as much of the hospital stores as possible, and assist in embarking them on board the batteaux and boats at the shore." Thacher moved his people out, making note that "Having with all possible despatch completed our embarkation, at three o'clock in the morning of the 6th, we commenced our voyage up the South bay to Skeensboro', about thirty miles. Our fleet consisted of five armed gallies and two hundred batteaux and boats deeply laden with cannon, tents, provisions, invalids and women."32 Further to the south, and a month and a half later on 23 August, General George Weedon at Stanton near Germantown relayed Washington's orders that the army was to march through Philadelphia and that no women belonging to the army were to be seen with the troops on their march through the City. Washington believed in making a good show; the men were excused from carrying their camp kettles that day as well. Five days later at Wilmington, Washington and Weedon ordered their people to prepare for an active campaign. They wanted officers and men to store nonessential baggage, to deliver the sick to the Director General of the Hospital, and to limit the number of camp women: "the Women are forbid any longer under any License at all to ride in the Waggons, and the Officers are earnestly call'd upon to permit no more than are absolutely necessary & such as are actually useful to follow the Army."33 Then on 13 September Weedon's orderly book carried the message that "no Women under any pretence what ever to go with the Army but to follow the Baggage, The Soldiers are to Carry their Camp Kettles
which, if the Army should come to Action are to be put into the Waggons with their Tents." Action came at Paoli, Pennsylvania, on 20 September, and, following the British occupation of Philadelphia on the 26th, at Germantown on 4 October.

Women figured in the marching orders of later campaigns as well. One of the duties of the Marechaussee corps, a special provost unit of light dragoons, in 1778 was "to Remain on the old Ground till the Colems & Baggage have Marched off in order to secure all such Soldiers as have loitered in Camp and the Officers are to see that the soldiers and women who march with the Baggage do not Transgress the Genl. Orders made for their Goverment." However, the women did tend to ignore orders, especially ones that infringed on their comfort. Every year women rode on the wagons, and every year officers ordered them off; and sometimes the officers ordered them out of the line altogether. On 19 June 1781 the posted order read, "No Women will be suffered to ride in Waggons, or Walk in the ranks this Campaign, Unless there are very Perticular reasons for it, of which the Genl. officer, or officer commanding the Division or Brigade to which they belong, is to be the Judge. A written Permission only will avail, without this the officers of the Day, or Police, are not only authorized to turn them out, but requested to inflict Inst. Punnishment upon those who shall Be found transgressors of this order."

Washington wanted no one to hold back his troops in 1781, for he had decided to harass the enemy constantly in a series of military operations. He prepared for the campaign by sending some troops down to the southern theater and gathering his main army for an offense against the British in New York. General Anthony Wayne's division, approximately 960 men strong, marched south in late May and June to reinforce the Marquis de la Fayette. The Pennsylvania troops moved rapidly; they allowed nothing to slow them
down, not even justice. On 24 June, in James City County, Virginia, a soldier was convicted of deserting to the enemy at 4 o'clock in the afternoon and shot at sunset; the troops then marched out at dark in an attempt to surprize Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton's corps. However, when they found that Tarleton, upon receiving word of their approach, had retired from the arena, they instead settled down to set up camp. By this time the Pennsylvanians were part of the larger Continental force challenging the enemy in Virginia.

It consisted of eight thousand militia, Stephen's and Lawson's brigades; of one thousand light infantry, New England troops, . . . the Pennsylvania line, as it was called, . . . , commanded by Gen. Wayne, with a good train of artillery; one thousand Riflemen, under Gen. Campbell, of King's Mountain, and part of the regiment of Virginia Continental troops, under Colonel Febiger, a Dane; a vidette corps of dragoons, under Captain Larkin Smith; and a single company of Harrison's regiment of artillery, . . . ; there were some additional militia, under Major Willis. The British army was more efficient; seven thousand infantry, who had fought the battles of the South; Tarleton's and Simcoe's full regiments of cavalry, and a fine train of artillery. Over the next few months these American and British troops jockeyed for position in the state. Between military engagements and domestic alarms, the troops had no time in which to become bored. Americans and British clashed at Spencer's Tavern on 26 June and then again at Jamestown Ford and Green Springs on 6 July. Within a few weeks of those battles some of the American troops settled down around Goods Bridge on the Appomatox River. Life was quite peaceful there until 2 o'clock in the afternoon on 25 July when the bridge collapsed. A number of soldiers were on the 30 foot high span at the time, and some women were doing wash underneath it, but no one was hurt. However, the incident did give everyone something to talk about until they marched out on the 30th.

In mid-August Washington committed himself to a major offensive in the South. Upon receiving word of Admiral de Grasse's movements on 14
August, Washington informed subordinates to ready their commands for movement. General Henry Knox's efficiency was just one example of the speedy response exhibited by all the commanders. By the 18th Lamb's artillery had its orders: "All the Park, except the four light three pounders, which were ordered today, are to march, under your directions, tomorrow morning 7 o'Clock in the manner that will hereafter be directed. The spare ammunition and everything belonging to the Park, are included in this order, and the artificers belonging to your own regiment, with travelling forges and a proportion of the necessary tools." Crane's regiment was to be left behind, but commissaries and quartermasters, wagonmasters, and forage masters, all were expected to accompany the troops. Women and children accompanying the troops received the usual order to keep off the wagons. They were also forbidden to mix with the men on the march, and told to keep to the rear of the baggage.

As the Main Army, composed of Continentals and allied French forces, trundled rapidly south, the troops already in Virginia moved in a more leisurely manner to the rendezvous point between Jamestown and Williamsburg. On the 24th of August the Pennsylvania troops marched early in the morning towards the James River. They encamped at Mrs. Byrd's "farm" (William Byrd III's widow) for a few days, taking the time to examine and admire the estate. They marched again on the 27th and 28th, reaching Westover on the latter date. As part of their maneuvers to remain constantly between Cornwallis and possible escape routes, they crossed the James on the 30th. On 2 September the troops camped opposite Jamestown, where they paused long enough in their chores to cheer when the French landed on James's Island. The mood in camp was somewhat more subdued that evening after one of the Marquis' sentinals shot General Wayne in the thigh with buck
shot. On the 3rd the Americans crossed the river and marched for Green Springs under a drenching rain. The next day the troops marched to Williamsburg and quartered in the College of William and Mary for the night. Starting on the 5th the troops marched back and forth through Williamsburg until they found a proper campsite a half mile from town on the 8th. As the American and French forces waited for their confrontation with the British they washed clothes, cooked their rations, organized their baggage, and carried out their duties—most of which were mundane and even boring. Lieutenant William Feltman of the First Pennsylvania only managed to stay awake while checking on his sentinals at two in the morning by listening to a mocking bird. Then on the 17th he took time off to catch crabs at College Landing. But time for such pursuits soon ran out; Washington arrived in Williamsburg on 14 September.

Washington's part of the main army took a few days longer to reach that southern city and connect with the other forces. It crossed the Delaware River on the 1st of September and marched through Philadelphia on the 2nd. The line of march, including appendages and attendants, extended nearly two miles. The general officers and their aids, in rich military uniform, mounted on noble steeds elegantly caparisoned, were followed by their servants and baggage. In the rear of every brigade were several field-pieces, accompanied by ammunition carriages. The soldiers marched in slow and solemn step, regulated by the drum and fife. In the rear followed a great number of wagons, loaded with tents, provisions and other baggage, such as a few soldiers' wives and children; though a very small number of these are allowed to encumber us on this occasion. The day following, the French troops marched through the city, . . .

The army finally disembarked at the harbor between Jamestown and Williamsburg (the ships must have followed a James River tributary to come further inland) on 22 September. On the 25th the troops marched from their encampment on the banks of the river through Williamsburg, the capital of
Virginia, "but in other respects . . . of little importance." They arrived at Yorktown on the 26th and settled down within a mile of the enemy's redoubts. On the 27th the Pennsylvania brigade, which had been waiting for the units from the north, marched to join them. The whole army, French and American, then marched at 5:00 am on the 28th to their assigned positions facing the enemy's line of defense. On the 29th the American army moved in closer. On the 30th the British abandoned their outer works, the Americans closed in, and the siege was on.

The battle of Yorktown, like all battles, was the extreme expression of the military mission. This mission, the implementation of the offense or defense of a nation, was the foundation of the military community, yet the violent physical manifestation of it also disrupted the community it helped to form. Death was the ultimate disrupter in terms of weakening military units and fragmenting families, but preparation for engagement was a prime contributor to community disorder. Sometimes the disorder was slight, at other times substantial. When the combined army marched on Yorktown, a detachment of 200 men stayed behind in Williamsburg to guard the provisions, stores, and hospitals. Many noncombatants remained behind with the baggage as well. Indeed, Washington and other commanders tried to trim the Continental Community of any excess personnel long before the first sounds of battle. Lieutenant Feltman reported on 16 August that Lieutenant Crawford of his regiment left the encampment near Bottoms Bridge in New Kent County that morning to escort some soldiers' wives back to Pennsylvania. Further north, after issuing the orders directing the troops to march south, Washington forbade women or children to travel on the baggage or other wagons, and ordered that women unable to endure the fatigues of a march had to be sent to West Point where they would draw provisions. Major General
Benjamin Lincoln passed the order along and then reminded the units under his command that they were to consider themselves as Light Troops. As such they were supposed to be fit for immediate action and free of incumbrances. He advised them to deposit at West Point "such of their Women, as are not able to undergo the fatigue of frequent Marches; and also of every Article of Baggage which they can in any wise dispense with." Lincoln intimated that women were so much baggage, to be dispensed with as the men saw fit. Neither sentiment nor order was unusual. Just one year earlier, in August 1780, Doctor Thacher noted that the commander-in-chief ordered the army to "disencumber itself of all heavy baggage, which, with the women and children," were to be sent to West Point, and then to hold itself ready to march at a moment's notice.

Yet Thacher also made note of instances when women would not be shunted aside. Some women followed their spouses into battle, and when enemy fire killed their husbands, a few of them stepped into the breach and fired back. Thacher specifically commented on Margaret Corbin, who received a pension for her services at Fort Washington, and a woman he called Molly Pitcher. Such women showed how strongly some followers would internalize the military mission.

This focus on mission by followers as well as by military members helped the community survive the stress of warfare. The mission served as both an excuse and an explanation for the disruptions inherent to army life. However, army life was not one of constant alarms and excursions; when a battle ended the army either encamped on the spot or marched off to garrison elsewhere, and once settled in place, servicemembers and civilians returned to the more mundane duties associated with life in the "Continental Villages."
Washington saw the Revolution as a "war of posts." His strategy was to maintain the integrity of the American army by avoiding large-scale actions which might result in such a massive defeat that there could be no recovery.\textsuperscript{56} Washington's plan reflected the general military thinking of the day. As armies were so difficult to recruit, train, and maintain, eighteenth-century strategy rested as much on preserving the army as doing battle.\textsuperscript{57} Time and survival, important components in the conduct of any war, were absolutely essential for American success.\textsuperscript{58} The War for American Independence could continue only so long as there was an army; the army, in turn, could continue only so long as there were posts and encampments to which it could retire to recuperate, recruit, plan, and train. Each army post or garrison was a Continental village. The Continental Community could and did exist outside of the Continental villages, but it was within the villages or garrisons that this community's governmental and social organization most clearly developed.

\textbf{IV}

\textbf{A Regulated Community}

The basic organization of the military community remained stable throughout the war; battles did not shake it, nor did the myriad reorganizations of the line and staff. Officers remained in command, soldiers performed their duties, and civilians made their contributions to both camp comfort and confusion. In 1775, as Washington handed down order after order relating to rules and discipline, the relative ranks of units and officers, and the requirements for effective military action, the encamped soldiers and civilians coalesced into the Continental Community. It was a community that adapted easily to the reorganizations of 1776, 1777, 1778, 1779, 1781 and 1783.\textsuperscript{59} It could do this because it was greater than the individual units that made up
the army; if a regiment disbanded, deployed, or reorganized, it often meant only that a superimposed army organizational unit had changed, not the underlying base of people.

There was continuity because the fundamental mission of the army never changed, the people remained essentially the same (if not individually, at least in the aggregate), and the community's government remained consistent throughout the war. The Continental Community was a heavily regulated community. Government was by decree. When Washington took charge of the army at Cambridge, he made sure that all inhabitants of the community knew they were subject to orders: "The Adjutant of each Regiment is required to take special care, that all general orders are communicated, as well to the private men, as to the officers-- that there may be no Plea of Ignorance." On 17 July 1775 he repeated and clarified the previous order by telling the adjutants to read the orders to the off-duty men every evening, and then pounded home his point on the 20th when he told the aides-de-camp and brigade majors to keep all general and brigade orders recorded in a book, again so that there would be no excuse for ignorance. Commanding officers worried about the dissemination of orders throughout the war and constantly reminded their subordinates that they were duty-bound to know all applicable regulations and orders and to pass them on. After orders (supplementary orders given after general, brigade, or regimental orders) for the 3rd New York Regiment at Fishkill on 6 March 1777 specified that the general orders Colonel Cortlandt copied from General Alexander McDougal's orderly book "be placed in the Main Guard Room" and that the officers acquaint their men with the contents. A month later, garrison orders for Fort Constitution included a request that the commander of the artillery send a person daily to the post commander to receive the latter's orders for the garrison, and "if any
Commanding Officer of a Company neglect to provide an Orderly Book and appoint an Orderly Sergeant or Corporal to Receive the Daily Orders--It will be Esteemed Disobedience of Orders, Orderly Sergeants or Corporals who Neglect to attend the Adjutant at the Beating of the Sergeants call, The Adjutant must Confine for Disobedience of Orders."63 Commanders also promised dire punishment for any person found defacing or tearing down orders posted in the guard houses and continued the general policy of reading orders at the evening parade.64

Everyone--officers, soldiers, and camp followers--had to obey the rules that regulated the Continental Community within its own boundaries and in its relationship with the surrounding civilian communities. While orders most commonly dealt with the discipline and duties of the soldiers, officers received plenty of guidance as well. Washington set the tone in August 1775 when, after hearing of the unauthorized visits to the nearby towns by too many officers, he directed that

the Commanding Officers of Corps, to be particulary attentive to the Behaviour of all their Officers, and without Favor or Affection, confine any Officer, who is absent from the Camp or Lines, where, he is posted or encamped, without Leave in writing first had and obtained from the General commanding the brigade. And the Commanding Officers are strictly enjoined, to put in Arrest, any Officer, who shall for the future disobey this order; When Officers set good Examples, it may be expected that the Men will with zeal and alacrity follow them, but it would be a mere phenomenon in nature, to find a well disciplin'd Soldiery, where Officers are relax'd and tardy in their duty; nor can they with any kind of propriety, or good Conscience, set inJudgment upon a Soldier for disobeying an order, which they themselves are every day breaking; . . . 65

Earlier, in July, Washington had warned the sutlers, tavernowners, and innkeepers in the vicinity of the camp that if they continued to supply soldiers with "immoderate Quantities of Rum, and other spiritous Liquors" without the written permission of the soldiers' captains they could expect
severe punishment. Not only sutlers, but wagoners and women as well, had orders to take proper charge of their horses at Smithes Clove in June 1779. General orders promised retribution to any person who allowed his or her horse to continue to graze and trample the inhabitants' property.

The orderly books also illuminated another way in which the military community was regulated—through returns and rosters. All army units, companies and above, kept written rolls of their personnel. These rolls most commonly took two forms: muster rolls and inspection returns. The former usually had names and ranks followed by remarks columns; the latter divided the unit by rank and then listed the number present for duty, those sick, on furlough, prisoner, etc. However, the army at times also requested returns on special groups of people, both soldiers and civilians. For example, headquarters personnel at White Plains on 20 August 1778 wanted "Returns of all the Negroes, in the Several Rigements to be made out Immediately[,] Rigementally Digested into Brigade Returns & brought into the Orderly Office Next Saturday." In 1777, at Fort Schuyler, when company commanders had to submit returns of their men, Major Marquitee, the post engineer, had to submit a list of all the carpenters, artificers, and labourers (except those soldier-artificers belonging to regiment and garrison) he had employed at the time. In 1780 the West Point commandant wanted the garrison quartermaster to furnish him with a "Return of all the Sutlers in Garrison, and by whom they are Licensed." As the war progressed, army commanders became very concerned about the number of dependents accompanying their troops and periodically requested information about them. According to general orders of 14 June 1781, "An exact return of all the Women with the Army who draw Provision from the Public is to be given in at the Orderly Office, as soon as may be." The next day the brigades and regiments picked up
on the order: the commanders were to hand in their returns of the women with each company to the regimental adjutant at the beating of retreat, and the regiments in turn were to deliver their returns to the brigade major at orderly time on the 16th. In this manner army commanders tried to keep track of all the people within the perimeters of their units.

Hard as commanders strived to keep their people within the lines, they tried harder to limit access to camp and garrison to those who belonged or were attached to the army, and to local inhabitants authorized to offer goods and services to military personnel. The Continental Community was a restricted as well as restrictive community. Physical security was necessary both to deny the enemy information and to deny thieves their livelihood.

Washington verbally flayed his people on 15 July 1775 when he found soldiers and officers conversing with the enemy around Cambridge. He promised that any officer, noncommissioned officer, soldier, or "any other Person whatever" found conversing or corresponding with enemy officers or sentries would be court-martialed and severely punished. Later that month Washington ordered that all passes be discontinued, and that no one "be admitted into the Lines, unless introduced by an Officer, who can vouch for him, or by Order of the Officer commanding in the Lines." In September 1776, when the American army faced the British in New York, he further intensified camp security. Washington ordered officers not to allow anyone to pass beyond the outer sentries without a written order from him. Sentries were to be informed of this requirement, and they were to fire upon anyone disobeying the directive. Washington added that any person entering the camp from the enemy's lines was to be brought for questioning before the brigadier of the day. That individual, in turn, was to send a written report along with the person to the commander in chief. Variations of these directives established
security throughout the war. Sentries at West Point in February 1780 had orders not to allow any suspicious person or stranger to enter the works unless that person was acknowledged by an officer. In April, down in New Jersey, Washington, after being told that there were suspicious characters lurking around camp, directed

that Officers in Genl. and more particularly those of the guards will take up and examine all strangers who are found in Camp or in the Vicinity; and if they have not passes or other credentials from proper Authority, will send them to the Officers of the day for particular examination who will either dismiss or confine them as circumstances may require. The importance of surpressing spies demands the strictest attention.

That the supposedly secured community had holes there was no doubt. Spies gathered information (some of it correct) on the Continental Army both from without and within the camps. Perimeters around the encampments in New York in 1778 were as secure as a sieve. On 1 August a Mrs. Ogden reported to Colonel B. Robinson that Washington had no more than 2000 troops with him at White Plains. She said that Greene marched off with 4000 men to join Sullivan in an attack on Newport by land while the French attacked it from the sea. She believed the rebel army to be well supplied not only with provisions but with courts-martial as well: four of their generals—Lee, Schuyler, Mifflin, and Sinclair—were up on charges. She concluded with a report on Maxwell's brigade in New Jersey, a remark that the Indians were causing havoc on the provinces' frontiers, and an observation that most people in New Jersey were sick of the war and wished for reconciliation. On the same day, Richard Brook, an Englishman who had emigrated to the country about eight years earlier, reported in to the British after deserting from the 11th Virginia Regiment. He talked about Colonel Daniel Morgan's scouting party and gave an estimate as to the number of men in the American forces. On the 9th a trio of deserters, all Irish in this case, carried information to the British, while the spy Henry
Crombes came in from the rebel camp to make a more formal report complete with diagram. Crombes, of the British 71st, had enlisted in an American artillery battalion on 12 February of that year. On the 11th and 12th of August more deserters from the American army arrived in the British camp. Among them was William Miller, a Scotsman who had lived 13 years in the colonies and been with the Continental Army for 18 months as a carpenter and three months as a soldier. His information included estimates on American magazines, provisions and wagons.

That fall the British intelligence service sent out Joseph Styres to spy on the American army. He travelled to North Castle, then to Butter-Mill Hill and on towards Brouten bridge, returning by way of the heights above Tarrytown. Information from a deserter who knew him resulted in his arrest two miles from a Colonel Hammond's (probably Lieutenant Colonel James Hamman of the New York militia) post. He was brought before the colonel and examined, but before anything else could happen he managed to escape from a sentry and make his way back to his own lines to report on the enemy's numbers and movements. Many spies managed to get in and out of the American camp; however, the Continentals did catch—and hold on to—a few of them. A division court-martial at Danbury in October 1778 tried David Farnsworth and John Blair for spying around the "Encampment of the Armies of the United States" and for carrying counterfeit money brought from New York. The court found them guilty of the charges and sentenced them to death. Washington approved the sentence and ordered them to be executed as soon as they arrived at Gates's division. Doctor Thacher in 1777 noted that the American army equated Tory recruiters with spies and treated them accordingly. When Daniel Strong "was found lurking about our army at Peekskill, and on examination enlisting orders were found sewed in his clothes; he was immediately tried as a
spy from the enemy, sentenced to suffer death, and was executed accordingly."83

The American army also tried to keep its people and property safe from enemy Indians and myriad thieves. The Indian problem was most troublesome in the New York Highlands and on the frontier, where both tribes and individuals affiliated with the British or working on their own attacked colonists and Continental personnel and posts. Fort Schuyler's commander reminded his people of the threat in garrison orders of 12 April 1778: "There being reason to suspect that there is a Scouting party of Enemy Indians skulking about this place no person is to be suffered to Straggle into the Woods or to go any Distance from the Fort except they are on Command. The parties who go out to work, are to have proper Guards."84 Where fortifications were strong and guards attentive, the Continentals blunted Indian incursions, but where defenses were weak the Indians proved highly destructive.85 Thieves struck through the army's defenses as well. On the night of 8-9 November 1779, at an artillery park in New York, someone broke into the shop kept by the field commissary of the Military Stores Department and took a chest containing steel, brass files and other articles. Samuel Hodgdon, the commissary, promised a reward for the apprehension of the thief. He also provided the information that an inhabitant seen lurking about the shop with a two-horse wagon may have committed the robbery.86 People stole and pilfered army supplies throughout the war, for although the Continental Army did eventually beat the British, it never did rout the thieves that plagued it in garrison and on the march. Orderly books held numerous advertisements concerning items lost or stolen and offering rewards for the return of goods or bringing in the thieves. The books also made it clear that thievery was not confined to civilians, but that military members engaged in it as well.87
As the army struggled to keep some people in camp and others out, as it endeavored to regulate the actions of all who came in contact with the troops, it extended its scope to include the movement of persons moving not only through the camps themselves but the American lines as well. Perhaps the widest the military cast its net was in southeastern Pennsylvania in the winter of 1777-78: it tried to control all movement going in and out of Philadelphia. The army wanted a complete stop of traffic in information and provisions. Sentries already routinely checked out the men who wanted to pass through their posts, but at that time they received specific orders to regulate the movement of women as well. Orders issued from the headquarters at White Marsh stated that "No Women coming out of Philadelphia are to be permitted to pass the First Guards without being told they cannot return again [;] if upon being informed of this they chuse to come out they are to be allowed to pass the Guards into the Country."88 The order applied not only to guards but to scouting parties as well. Women were again under scrutiny in February of 1778. First the army had to squelch rumors that Mr. Jones, the deputy commissary general of issues, had given a pass to a woman to carry 30 pounds of butter into Philadelphia.89 Then, having become too lenient over the winter, it had to clamp down on visitors in camp.

The most pernicious consequences having arisen from Suffering Persons (Women in particular) to pass and repass from Philadelphia to Camp under a pretence, of coming out to visit their friends in the Army and returning with necessaries to their families, but really with an intent to entice the soldiers to Desert, All Officers are desired to use their utmost endeavours to prevent Such interviews in future by forbidding the Soldiers under the severest penalties from having any communication with such persons and by ordering them when found in Camp to be immediately turned out of it, --if any of them appear under peculiar circumstances of Suspicion they are to be brought to immediate trial and punishment if found guilty. 90
Soon thereafter the army again reminded everyone of its authority in the area. An order circulated that March informed officers commanding outposts and scouting parties that they were not to issue passes into Philadelphia because such permits defeated the very purpose of their guards and scouts.91

The army's actions did have an impact on the civilians living within its realm of influence. Sarah Wister, a young Quaker from Philadelphia staying with relatives outside the occupied city, recorded her encounter with a sentry determined to do his duty. It was a fine May day when Sarah and three other young women decided to stroll over to a neighbor's place. They ambled past two picket guards who did not interrupt their excursion, but on their way home a sentry stopped them and said he had orders not to allow anyone to pass without leave by the officer at the guard house. The friends faced a dilemma: the officer was surrounded by men, and it was not at all proper for the young women to go to him, but it was also quite stupid to stay there as night fell. Sarah tried to talk the sentry into letting them pass, but to no avail. Then one of her friends attempted to just walk by the man; that was a mistake, for the guard then presented his weapon, bayonet fixed, and scared them further. Fortunately, at that point the officer came over, sorted out the problem, reprimanded the soldier, and let them go.92 Sarah Wister and her friends were no threat to the army's security, but the sentry probably did not deserve a reprimand for he was right to be suspicious of women who wandered about the military's perimeter. Women did carry intelligence to the enemy in Philadelphia. Margaret Hutchinson's millinery business required her to travel in and out of the city. Sir William Howe's aide-de-camp recognized what a wonderful cover she had and employed her to carry letters to and from British spies in the American army. She also reported on what she saw as she moved between the lines.93
Throughout that long season at Valley Forge, whenever it apprehended someone acting suspiciously, the military incarcerated the accused and then brought him or her before a military tribunal. A general court-martial in April found three inhabitants of Pennsylvania guilty of attempting to aid the enemy. Philip Culp and John Blooman received 50 lashes and duties in the public service (their work to continue until the enemy left the state) for attempting to transport flour to the British in Philadelphia. The court allowed that they could get out of their enforced employment if they enlisted in the military. John Evans, who attempted to send provisions into the city, did not suffer the lash, but he was sentenced to labor for the public's good at Carlisle as long as the enemy remained in the Pennsylvania.94

Although the army tried to control civilian actions that aided the enemy and harmed the Continental cause, its focus was always on its own people. While the army attempted to minimize any friction that might arise between the military and civilian communities, it concentrated on retaining its personnel and regulating their behaviour. Washington issued a lot of orders, which included threats of dire punishment, to prevent plundering. He appealed to his soldiers' patriotism as well as their consciences. In 1776 he told the troops to remember "that no plundering Army was ever a successful one."95 When that lesson did not take, he reminded them again in 1777: "were we in an Enemies Country such Practices wil be unwarrantable but committed against our friends are in the highest degree base Cruel & Injurious to the Cause in which we are Engaged. . . . Such crimes have brought reproach upon the army and Every Officer & Soldier Suffers by the practice of it."96 The general continued not only to issue such admonishments throughout the war, but followed his words with action. Offenders suffered the full weight of the law, often by way of the whip, but sometimes in the form of the noose.
Washington, often charitable to those found guilty of various other crimes, commuting or lightening sentences handed down by the court, was seldom merciful to those convicted of plundering. He could not condone the subversion of one of the tenets of the Revolution: the protection of property. He was successful in that his Continentals were less destructive than the British troops.97

However, to maintain cordial relations on both sides, army commanders had not only to prevent miscreants in the Continental Community from abusing their neighbors, but also to protect their own people from abuses by outsiders. The Continental Congress and state governments occasionally helped by passing resolutions that controlled local government and resident dealings with the soldiers. For example, in 1777 the General Assembly of Delaware passed a resolution stating that it was unlawful to arrest a soldier in the American army for debt, unless the plaintiff swore before the proper witnesses that the soldier owed more than 50 dollars. It also declared that "no inn-keeper, tavern-keeper or public house-keeper, shall demand, take or receive from any recruit or soldier, whilst upon a march, any more than One-sixth of a Dollar for any one meal, or demand, take or receive any thing whatsoever for the lodging of any recruit or soldier,..."98 The governments passed such resolutions not only to regulate the contact between civilians and soldiers, but also to help keep the soldiers in the ranks where they belonged.

Keeping the ranks filled was a constant problem for not only did soldiers get pulled out for various reasons, but some stepped out on their own accord: they deserted. Newspapers and orderly books contained numerous notices and trial accounts of deserters. Company and regimental commanders advertised in local papers for the return of their runaways. They included descriptions of their errant troopers and promised rewards to anyone who
would restore the soldiers to the army. Once captured, men accused of
desertion were brought to trial and, if convicted of the offense, punished.
Punishment was usually a whipping administered in front of the troops.
Instead of always promising retribution, Washington sometimes offered
pardons to deserters if they turned themselves in. This generally happened
when there was a profound escalation in desertions and Washington believed
it wise to refill his line without overloading the courts, or when there was an
occasion to celebrate (such as when France became an official ally in 1778).
At those times Washington published a proclamation in the newspapers
offering full pardon to all deserters who rejoined their corps by a prescribed
time. Those who did not take the opportunity offered them were assured that
they would be pursued and punished.

Desertions constituted only a part of the full dockets facing the court-
martial throughout the war as they attempted to enforce military discipline
and adjudicate disputes. The Continental Community, similar to any
community where a large number of people are brought together in close
confines, suffered disruptions due to interpersonal contests. Usually disputes
could be handled by commissioned or noncommissioned officers low in the
chain of command without ever having to bother the courts, but sometimes
matters escalated to the point where a formal procedure was necessary. The
most extreme disputes, represented by riots and mutinies, often resulted in
trials, hangings, and dismissals, but sometimes they opened a dialogue for
renegotiation. When the Pennsylvania line mutinied over lack of pay and
disagreements over the soldiers' terms of enlistments in January of 1781, few
of the mutineers were punished; instead both plaintiffs and defendants
submitted to the arbitration of their dispute. However, when the New Jersey
troops attempted to follow Pennsylvania's example, the army's officers
clamped down before a pattern could be established. Some of the mutiny's leaders were immediately tried, and two were executed. General Wayne followed the latter example when mutiny once again reared its head among the Pennsylvania troops that May. Six men accused of disorderly and seditious behaviour were condemned to death. Wayne pardoned two; the other four were shot. Such massive disputes were rare compared to the daily contretemps and arguments that were part of camp life. The participants resolved most of these contests by themselves or had them handled summarily by the most senior person present, but sometimes formal application to the law was required. Such was the case at Fort Schuyler early in 1778 when Nancy Weedon and Sergeant Dean of the artillery squared off. The angry sergeant confined Weedon for "impeaching his Character," but was in turn imprisoned on the accusation of "Defrauding Mrs. Weedon of her provision." As neither could think straight the court took over, studied the charges, found both not guilty, and ordered them released from confinement. The records do not say whether the combatants then shook hands and reconciled their differences or merely entered into a smoldering cease-fire.

Such contentiousness was not confined to the lower ranks of the army: officers regularly battled among themselves. They argued over seniority, leadership, orders, privileges, and honor among other things. Denied the satisfaction of resolving their problems by duels (Articles 2 & 3, Section VII of the 1776 Articles of War outlawed dueling), most challenged their adversaries in court. Others dueled anyway and then ended up in court. Doctor Thacher mentioned a number of his fellow officers' encounters in his journal. He was contemptuous of a practice that wasted lives for mistaken points of honor. Washington was, by turns, enraged, dismayed, and sorrowed by such activities. When a court martial sentenced Ensign John Foster of the 6th Pennsylvania
Regiment to be discharged for challenging Captain Walter Cruise to a duel and for behaviour unbecoming an officer, Washington approved the sentence but upon considering the circumstances restored Foster to his former rank. Washington, however, took the opportunity to observe how sorry he was to observe that a dispute between officers was conducted in such a manner. Officers high and low found themselves in court. The more senior the officer, the more likely the charges would stem from his conduct in battle or during a campaign. Generals brought up on charges included Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler, and Arthur St. Clair. Junior officers were more often brought up on charges of insubordination. Such was the case at Valley Forge in December 1777. A court martial found Ensign Benjamin Arnold of Colonel Israel Angell's 2nd Rhode Island Regiment guilty of "behaving in a disorderly unsoldier like manner in Camp on the 6th. of December, with refusing to retire to his Quarters when ordered by the Colonel, sending him for answer that he would go when he pleased and not before, & also with refusing to do his duty when regularly warn'd and threatening to leave the Service, whether he could a discharge or not." The court sentenced him to be cashiered with infamy with the commander in chief's full approval.

V
Community Life

Ideology, survival, mobility, and regulation defined the parameters of the Continental Community. Against them one could measure the value of life within the community. They affected the inhabitants' play, work, and living conditions.

When not engaged in battle (whether with colleagues or the enemy), officers participated in a very active social life. Lewis Beebe, a physician with
the army, thought the activities of the officers did them no credit. He scathingly noted at Crown Point on 4 July 1776, that although the army had been encamped there for several days and feared an enemy attack, no moves to fortify the garrison were being undertaken. Instead of preparing to meet the foe, the generals occupied themselves with riding their gaily accoutered horses about the camp, the field officers spent most of their time sitting on courts martial, and the captains and subalterns could be generally found at grog shops. Two years later, in November 1778, Doctor Thacher expressed his own mixed feelings about camp amusements. He offered a partial excuse for himself and his fellow officers by saying that the campaign was drawing to a close and they were stationed far from the enemy in New York City (the Americans were in the Highlands). Feeling secure "and military duty not being very urgent, our officers appear disposed to relax in their discipline, and contract a habit approaching to dissipation. They have adopted the practice of giving suppers alternately, with music and dancing through half the night. These are the favorite amusements of the Virginia and Maryland officers, but they do not accord precisely with my own views of time well spent, though I am frequently enticed to a participation in their banqueting revels."109

Officers at all levels of command filled their social calendars with dinners, dances, teas, and numerous other engagements. Generals and regimental commanders, especially when their wives visited them, frequently issued formal dinner invitations to one another. They, and other commanders, also often invited junior officers to dine. General Washington was known for his wide hospitality, as was General Nathanael Greene. Lieutenant Francis Brooke of the 1st Continental Artillery reminisced after the war about Greene's graciousness. Brooke had been at the headquarters outside
Charleston to have a requisition endorsed by the general. After doing so, Greene commented to Brooke that he kept a roster of the officers and invited them to dinner in rotation. Greene told Brooke that he would be invited in time, but mentioned that whenever he was off-duty Mrs. Greene would be happy to see him. Brooke believed he received the extra invitation because his family in Virginia had shown Catherine Greene hospitality when she passed their home on her journey south to join her husband. Thereafter Brooke was often at headquarters and, according to him, became something of a "pet" of the general's. Actually, the dinners and soirees given by the senior officers were not merely pleasant diversions (and some lieutenants would probably have questioned the appellation pleasant), they also served as training forums for the junior officers and furthered their indoctrination as members of the military brotherhood.

The officers further strengthened this brotherhood by presenting and attending military reviews and celebrations. A visit by the French and Spanish ministers, Monsieur Gerard and Don Juan de Mirrilliars, in May of 1779 spurred the army into a grand display. "At the signal of thirteen cannon, the great and splendid cavalcade appoached in martial pomp and style. Having arrived on the field of parade, the commander-in-chief, with the foreign ministers and general officers, passed in front of the line of the army, from right to left, in review, and received the military honors due to their rank." After that the gentlemen dismounted and took seats next to the visiting ladies in order to comfortably watch the army go through some field manoeuvres. International relations served as an excuse for many other celebrations and parties as well. In July 1781 a few American officers received an invitation to dine with some of their allies. The French received their guests under an elegant marquee and offered them an excellent meal of roast
beef served in the French style. The only difficulty, according to Doctor Thacher, who was at the meal, was language. As each group was ignorant of the other's language, conversation lagged. However, in the course of that campaign, the allies continued to trade invitations. And a year later, on 31 May, the American army at West Point celebrated the birth of the dauphin of France with a most elegant entertainment. General Washington hosted a dinner for his officers and honored guests—the count was over 500.

Such engagements formed only a small part of an officer's social life. More often they visited back and forth among themselves, shared in afternoon teas, or passed around the grog upon the conclusion of the day's labors. At times a few would get together to play cricket or some other sport. And when not carousing among themselves, they enjoyed the company of women at the many dinners, dances, and teas held in garrison and on the road.

Women figured prominently in the social lives of most officers. The officers courted, cajoled, and called upon not only the female relations accompanying their colleagues but mixed with the women in the communities they passed through. Baron Ludwig von Closen of the French army, being a visitor to the United States, was not content to merely enjoy the company of American women—he positively studied them. In the course of a year, from December 1780 to December 1781, he recorded his opinion of the "fair sex" from Boston to Williamsburg. When the French army quartered in Rhode Island, Closen discovered that the women of that state generally had fine features and beautiful complexions but bad teeth. They dressed in the English style and loved to dance. During a mission to Boston in March he made comparable observations of that city's ladies; he decided that not only were they pleasant, but they were distinguished for their education and fine figures. Later that year, as the army marched south to Virginia, Closen found
consolation for the fatigue of the journey in the company of a variety of women--some quite proper and some perhaps not. Closen saw many pretty women in Philadelphia with good manners and elegant clothing in the French style, but thought they suffered in comparison to the beauties in Boston. Then, after settling into winter quarters in Virginia after the battle of Yorktown, Closen studied the women of Williamsburg. He felt that no one could be more hospitable than the inhabitants of that city. They received the officers in their homes and did everything in their power to provide entertainment for them. The women were not among the prettiest Closen had seen, but they formed a very agreeable and generally well-bred society. After Rochambeau's ball, Closen noted that Williamsburg women were very fond of minuets and danced them quite well, in fact better than those of the North. All of them liked the French quadrilles; indeed, in general, the women found French manners much to their taste. One young woman from Yorktown was so bewitched by the visitors that she succumbed to temptation and soon found herself, as the French would say, enciente.

Just as the officers looked forward to the company of ladies, so too did the women welcome their arrival. Sarah Wister filled her journal with her excitement and pleasure at having military visitors. In October 1777 "two genteel men of the military order" rode up to the Foulke farmhouse and asked if General William Smallwood could be quartered there. Wister's aunt consented, and by evening the general was in residence with his military family and the farm was surrounded by a large guard of soldiers, horses, and baggage waggons. A delighted Sarah Wister went to bed that night to dream "of bayonets and swords, sashes, guns, and epaulets." Smallwood and his officers remained there for approximately two weeks, enlivening the ladies' teas and evenings with much reading, talking, and laughter. Wister
mentioned dining with some of the officers and walking out with a few of
them. When the army marched out, Wister wrote of her dismay: "for when
you have been with agreeable people tis impossible not to feel regret when
they bid you adieu perhaps for ever. [W]hen they leve us we shall be immur'd
in solitude."118

When officers felt in need of some of that solitude, they were often able
to take leave of the army for short periods of time. At the end of a campaign,
onece the army was in its winter quarters, many officers requested and were
granted leave to visit their homes and families.119 And although commanders
expected a prompt return, they accepted (or resigned themselves to) excuses
and delays when circumstances changed their subordinates' travel plans. In
1778 Lieutenant Colonel Oswald of the 2nd Continental Artillery wrote Colonel
Lamb that he had not proceeded to camp in accordance with his orders because
his daughter, Polly, had been ill; but after her death he set out to join his
unit.120 If discontented in camp, distracted by troubles at home, or just
desirous of change, officers also had the freedom to resign their commissions
and leave the army. Oswald threatened to resign in 1777 after clashing with
the officer commanding the post at which he was stationed.121 Lamb
convinced him to stay in, but Oswald did eventually resign for other reasons in
1778. In 1780 a Lieutenant Hubbell passed word to Lamb that he would have to
resign if he was not allowed to stay with his wife until she recovered from her
illness. Lieutenant William Hubbell of the 2nd Continental Artillery resigned
that year on 1 October.122 The social life and relative freedom of movement
enjoyed by officers reflected their status as gentlemen.

Many officers were not of gentle birth or occupation, but upon
receiving a commission they became gentlemen. Some foreign officers did not
accept the transformation: a German officer held by the Americans in
Cambridge in 1777 mentioned that the officers from the two opposing armies did not associate with one another. There was more than just a touch of snobbery in his comment that "the regiments here are militia and nearly all their officers are artisans. It cost a lot of pains to get the idea into the heads of the inhabitants here that our officers have no [civil] occupation; it was thought that they simply refused to ply their trade from caprice."\textsuperscript{123}

Washington could not recruit officers only from the small pool of distinguished planters, merchants, and professional men; there were not enough of them to lead the army through the almost eight years of war.\textsuperscript{124} Although the senior officers generally came from the upper echelons of American society, junior grade officers represented a more democratic mix. Some people may have deplored the necessity, but they accepted the army's policy to recognize all officers, regardless of origins, as gentlemen with all the rights and privileges that accompanied that social station.

Soldiers came from all ranks in American society, but a good many, if not the majority, came from the lower orders. Many were quite young, and some were black. A British officer at the capitulation of Charleston described the American troops as a "ragged dirty looking set of People," but gave them credit for having acquired some discipline over the course of the war.\textsuperscript{125} Baron von Closen, an ally more disposed to think well of American soldiers, expressed his admiration for them on at least two occasions in July of 1781. He first commented that although ill-clothed in "only some trousers and little linen jackets," the troops were "very cheerful and healthy" in appearance. Later he exclaimed that it was "incredible that soldiers composed of men of every age, even of children of fifteen, of whites and blacks, almost naked, unpaid, and rather poorly fed, can march so well and withstand fire so steadfastly."\textsuperscript{126}
Although the army preferred to have free white adult males filling the ranks, it did accept both whites and blacks in bondage as well as some very young adolescents. Then it had to decide what to do with them. The army quickly incorporated the formerly indentured adult white males into the line units, but it had difficulty placing blacks and boys. Many people feared giving weapons to blacks (whether free or slave) and protested the enlistment of African-Americans. The army initially tried to accommodate the protesters by barring the enlistment of blacks, but it soon reversed itself when faced with a manpower shortage. By December 1777 so many blacks had joined the service that an outside observer, a German officer who was a prisoner in Cambridge, was able to say, "You never see a regiment in which there are not a lot of negroes." He reasoned that the numbers resulted from masters sending their blacks to serve in their place, not because African-Americans freely chose to fight. His reasoning was faulty; many African-Americans independently made the decision to join the army. The military, however, remained ambivalent about black troops throughout the war and thus diverted many into supporting roles as wagoners and waiters. The army also often channeled into noncombat positions the boys who enlisted. It placed them in the drum and fife corps or had them serving as waiters to the officers, but, sometimes it was more creative in its assignments. In 1782 Baron Frederick von Steuben created a special guard or company of boys who were too young and small to serve in the line but were to continue with the army for the campaign. He put them in the charge of a sergeant from the 2nd Connecticut Regiment and assigned the detachment to Brigadier General Edward Hand, the adjutant general of the army. Hand then undertook the task of finding a sober and steady corporal who would keep the boys in order and perhaps instruct them in reading and writing. Just one year earlier, Hand had
grumbled to a colleague (after complaining about some recruits, black and white, who were mentally and physically unfit for service) about the many boys in every brigade who were too small and young for the army. Steuben's and Hand's experiment was unusual; other officers kept the boys in their units in an attempt to maintain unit strength or, like Captain Lieutenant Jacob Reed of the 2d Continental Artillery, shunted them off into supporting roles. On 8 October 1778, Reed wrote to his colonel about a lad he had sent over to his quarters the day before: he had enlisted the boy with the drum major. The new drummer or fifer told Reed he was indentured to a Mr. Keating but had his master's permission to join the army.

Rhode Island, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware (within limits) permitted servants and apprentices to enlist without their masters' permission but monetarily compensated the masters for their loss. Other states required such enlistees to have permission from their masters and usually did not provide compensation. With or without permission, numerous indentured laborers and slaves enlisted in the army, leaving their masters to fill the newspapers with advertisements promising rewards for the runaways. Both state governments and senior commanders ordered officers not to accept such people into their companies, but many refused to look too deeply into their recruits' antecedents: they just wanted, no needed, soldiers to fill the ranks.

Soldiers lacked the freedom of movement granted the officers, nor were they as readily accepted by the communities around which they camped. Many enlisted men and noncommissioned officers became as tired of or disgusted with army life as their officers did. Some suffered from severe homesickness and became weak and melancholy. Others worried about their farms, businesses, and families. For all of these men, finding relief was a
problem. As their officers seldom granted them leaves, and resignation was not an option, quite a number of them resorted to desertion. Some came back after resolving their problems; others did not. Solomon Bans was one who wanted to rejoin his unit if he could return without punishment and at his previous rank. He wrote to Colonel Lamb to explain why he had deserted and to ask the favor of reinstatement. His explanation could serve for many of his fellow deserters. Bans believed he had enlisted for only three years, but then did not receive the discharge he thought he deserved. Not only was his discharge withheld, but he had received next-to-nothing for all his years of service. Finally, he had a young growing family and a small patrimony at home which demanded his care. He felt these reasons at least partially excused his conduct. Washington and his officers deplored and despised desertion, but they did make allowances. Over the course of the war, Washington issued many general pardons for deserters who returned to the army. The courts martial sentenced others to corporal punishment (painful but soon over) and reduction in rank, and then sent them back to join their comrades.

It was in the company of those companions that soldiers also tried to find relief from their problems. Their activities did not always sit well with their officers or their civilian neighbors. The inhabitants around Fishkill, New York, complained to Major General Benedict Arnold in September 1780 that some of the troops stationed at that post were not kept under proper military discipline: the soldiers had plundered their property. Less heinous than plundering, but no less dismaying to officers, was the soldiers' habit of rambling. The men found New York City particularly enticing when they were there in 1776, much to the detriment of military readiness. Some of the soldiers also undermined the military's relationship with the civilian
populace by their swimming habits. General Greene dressed down his troops after hearing Long Island inhabitants complain "that Some of the Soldiers Come there [the Mill Pond] to swim In Open View of the Women and that they Come out of the Water and Run up Naked to the Houses with a Design to Insult and Wound the Modesty of female Decency." He did not prohibit the soldiers from bathing—in the proper places—but he questioned the absence of the modesty, virtue, and sobriety for which the New Englanders were renowned.138 Soldiers were as liable to engage in rowdy behavior in camp as out of it. Despite numerous prohibitions and threats of dire punishment, soldiers frequently fired off their weapons within their own lines. Celebrations often set off the barrages, but sometimes it was just high spirits.139 Soldiers drank and swore, gambled and whored, and engaged in a number of other diversions. Their active and colorful social life occasionally tempted an officer into trying to participate; the result was often ruinous for the officer. A court martial found Lieutenant Anthony Wright of the Artillery Artificers guilty of refusing to pay his debts to some matrosses, drinking with private soldiers in public houses at their own expense, going to one of their dances without having first been invited, playing cards that same night with some of the privates, beating and abusing two matrosses (gunners' assistants), and for borrowing a pair of shoes from a matross and not giving them back.140

Wright would not have gotten into trouble if he had followed the guideline published in October 1778 that stated that officers should encourage "purity of morals" by way of example, influence, and penalties. The particular impetus for that advice, which was really only a reiteration of earlier counsel, was the continuing rise of a common kind of licentiousness: swearing had "arrived to a most distinguishing heighth [sic].-- A Regard to decency should
Conspire with a sense of Morality to banish a Vice productive of Neither of Advantage or pleasure. Doctor Beebe commented on the problem earlier in the war, in the spring of 1776. As he dealt with the sick and dying of his regiment, he contemptuously wrote that "Death is a Subject not to be attended to by Soldiers; Hell & Damnation is in allmost every ones mouth from the time they awake till they fall asleep again, the Stupidity of mankind in this situation is beyond all Description." He found it incredible that the troops always found some duty to do so that they could not attend to daily prayers or even the preaching on Sunday. He noted that it was "esteemed very unpopular, and unbecoming a Gentlemen, in the Camps to attend upon any religious exercises, and happy would it be, did not many officers endeavour to inculcate, & establish this principle in the minds of others." Beebe was still muttering in October of that year: "Our chaplain does not yet return, the Regt. is extremely happy in his absence, as they can bear to hear Edwardeanism preached with the same degree of pleasure as a Living animal can b[e]ar hot burning coals." Observers outside the camps became aware of such behavior and sentiments and expressed their dismay as well. "A True Patriot" inserted an article in the Pennsylvania Gazette about the evils of libertinism. He said he admired the gentlemen of the army for their bravery in defending the country, but was sorry to see by their actions that they obviously felt that religious precepts should offer no restraint upon men. He deplored their frequent balls, their excessive drinking, the cursing and swearing, their disregard for public worship, and their neglect of the laws passed by Congress to restrain vice in the army. He stated that the chaplains were probably as unprincipled as the other officers. John Adams wrote General Greene that the public's perceptions of army life hindered its recruiting efforts. "The Prevalence of Dissipation, Debauchery, Gaming, Profaneness, and Blasphemy,
terrifies the best people upon the Continent from trusting their Sons and other Relations among so many dangerous snares and Temptations. Multitudes of People who would with cheerfull Resignation submit their Families to the Dangers of the sword shudder at the Thought of exposing them to what appears to them, the more destructive Effects of Vice and Impiety."144

Observations such as these showed that the Continental Congress and General Washington were not entirely succesful in their endeavors to create a godly or pious army, even though Congress passed a resolution in 1776 allowing one chaplain to each regiment, and suggested that the regimental commanders pick exemplary persons to fill the positions, and then see to it that the officers and soldiers accord the chaplains the proper respect and attend religious exercises. Congress reminded everyone that "the blessing and protection of heaven are at all times necessary but especially so in times of public distress and danger." Washington compounded the directive by stating that he hoped each one of his people would "live and act as becomes a christian soldier defending the dearest rights and liberties of his country."145

Throughout the war, Congress, Washington, and other army commanders set aside days for religious observances and promoted attendance at religious services. Their efforts were not in vain, for many people in the army did attend to their ministers and attempted to live moral lives. One young soldier wrote his parents that he was constantly visited by a chaplain while in the hospital at Greenwich, New York. Then he passed on the observation that "Yorkers" were very profane people; he had heard women swear as many bad oaths as the old soldiers, and thus, although a sinner, he was not tempted by them at all.146 Although critics such as Beebe and "The True Patriot" were never satisfied, the Continental Community scarcely equaled Sodom and Gomorrah. Indeed, sometimes civilian inhabitants expressed happiness with
their army neighbors. The citizens of Burlington, New Jersey, thanked
Colonel Lamb and his officers for their attention and care in maintaining
order among their troops while they were stationed in the vicinity. They
wished the army well and offered their hope that the war would soon end so
that all could soon enjoy domestic life once again.147

As the residents of Burlington discovered, the army was not constantly
engaged in amusements. Most officers worked hard to fulfill the demands of
their positions, and some even followed Washington’s recommendation to
spend their leisure moments furthering their military education. Washington
always advocated study for his officers, but he made a point of mentioning it in
May 1777 after forbidding play at cards, dice, or any other games except those
involving exercise at Morristown. He said, "Officers will find enough to do in
training & disciplining their men; providing for them, & seeing that they are
clean, neat & present a soldierly appearance. What vacant moments they have
should be invested in the study of military authors (it would reflect well on
them & better their performance)."148

Both officers and soldiers found their days filled with numerous duties.
Their primary tasks were purely military in nature: they drilled to improve
their maneuvering and fighting skills; they stood guard, went out on patrols,
and, ultimately, engaged the enemy. Of secondary, but no less vital,
importance were the chores they performed to keep the army fit to fight.
Valley Forge over the winter of 1777-78 was the scene of great and continuous
activity. It provided a prime example of the army’s life in camp. Only when
the weather was bitterly severe did the officers release the soldiers from their
duties to go huddle in their huts. Days began with brigade parades. Then
details of men would split off to march out and relieve outposts and guards, or
perform labor such as foraging, fortifying, and building. Some helped the
artificers who repaired the wagons, weapons, and other equipment. Those not otherwise engaged hauled firewood or visited the camp markets.149

Soldiers often laid down their arms to pick up reins, hammers, and ladles. Commanders commonly assigned a few of their men to handle their units' wagons and horses and, when pressed, to drive the Quartermaster Department's wagons. Even soldiers who were unfit, due to injury or illness, for other supposedly more strenuous or specialized camp duties received assignments as wagoners.150 The army was not about to waste manpower. This was particularly evident in the way it utilized the many skilled craftsman who filled its ranks. Every time the army went into winter quarters, orders went out to pull all the carpenters, wheelwrights, joiners, and other assorted artisans from their companies and set them to work plying their trades. The other men received assignments that required less skill—such as knocking together their barracks.151 At other times regiments and companies received orders to release just a few of their men for special duties that ranged from carpentry to cooking.

The soldiers generally dressed or prepared their own provisions, but they did not always cook them. Sometimes women served as cooks, but often commanders ordered one or a few men to do the cooking for a prescribed number of soldiers.152 Officers also determined where the camp kitchens were to be placed and then later inspected the cooking facilities and the soldiers preparing food in them to make sure everything was in accordance with the health standards of the day.153 At the end of the war, soldiers not only dressed their provisions; they grew some of them as well-- Washington encouraged the troops to create regimental vegetable gardens.154

Washington could encourage gardening by 1783 because the war was winding down and most of the soldiers were well-versed in their camp and
combat roles. It had been another story at the beginning of the war. At that
time Washington tried to cut out all non-essential chores so as to focus his
soldiers' energies on fighting and surviving. At first fighting took a backseat
to survival when sickness in camp proved more deadly than enemy shells.
Washington found he first had to train his people in elementary camp
hygiene before he could concentrate on military drills. As the Massachusetts's
Provincial Congress told him upon his arrival at Cambridge:

altho' [the soldiers are] naturally brave and of good
understanding, yet for want of Experience in military Life,
have but little knowledge of divers things most essential to
the preservation of Health and even of life.
The Youth in the Army are not possess'd of the absolute
Necessity of Cleanliness in their Dress, and Lodging, continual
Exercise, and strict Temperance to preserve them from Diseases
frequently prevailing in Camps. 155

So, to clean things up, the commander-in-chief laid down some rules and his
subordinate commanders proceeded to enforce them. At the simplest and most
intimate level, officers reminded soldiers (especially when they went on guard
duty or parade) to attend to their personal hygiene: to wash their hands and
faces, shave their beards, and comb their hair.156 Then they concentrated on
getting their people to dig and use latrines, as well as when and where to cook
and clean. Instructions quickly changed to orders, with threats of dire
punishment for noncompliance, when the soldiers or their followers
disregarded proper procedures.

In August 1775 Washington ordered that every company appoint a
camp color man (someone detailed to do camp maintenance), who, under the
direction of his unit's quartermaster, would sweep the streets, fill up the
latrines and dig new ones, and bury all the filth that could affect the health of
the troops. The quartermasters in turn, were responsible for seeing that their
people persevered in the battle to "remove that odious reputation, which (with
but too much reason) has stigmatized the Character of American Troops."\textsuperscript{157}

Unfortunately, that reputation still wafted after the army years later. General Greene had to order a fatigue party out in August of 1777 to bury all the filth in and around the camp at Germantown. He ordered the camp color men to fill up the old vaults and dig new ones, and then to gather up all the human waste outside the vaults and bury it. Greene complained that "such a stench arises on every side of it [camp] now as threatens the passengers [passers-by] with immediate Pestilence."\textsuperscript{158} The hygiene battle continued into 1779 when brigade quartermasters had to supervise the removal of all the rubbish in camp and then see to it that every hole in the streets was filled up upon the completion of the proper necessary houses. They also had to make sure that no one relieved (they used the term "eased") himself anywhere other than in the proper facilities. Published orders gave due warning that soldiers detected in the crime would not only be punished but would also be fined one dollar which would be paid to the informer; women and children caught in the act would be turned out of the encampment.\textsuperscript{159} In 1781 the commandant of Burlington Barracks, New Jersey, promised confinement for trial by court martial, to "Any persons who should be Detected in Easing themselves About the Baracks yard or fence which Enclose the yard- Excepting the Little house for that purpos-- or any non Commissioned Officer or private who shall be Detected in easing themselvs in the Little house Now building for the Officers." The commandant then found it necessary to expand his orders in April of 1782: throwing filth and waste water out of the back windows of the barracks, as well as out of the doors and off the galleries (balconies), were also court-martial offenses.\textsuperscript{160}

In the never-ending struggle to maintain a reputable army, officers gave both men and women plenty of opportunities to wash their clothes. However, for some reason, perhaps because they did more laundry, women got
into trouble more often for illegal or unsafe washing procedures. At Fort Schuyler in May 1778, garrison orders forbade women to wash clothing within the fort or in its ditch. \(^{161}\) That October, at Fredericksburg, the camp commandant ordered his officers and men to police the women. He had heard that the women of the brigade continued in the practice of washing their dirty clothes in the run upon which the men depended for drinking water. Any woman found washing in it, unless she was below the brigade's encampment, was to be immediately placed in the guardhouse. \(^{162}\) In July of 1779 the 1st Pennsylvania's regimental orders included a stricture against women washing in front of the tents or throwing soap suds and any other filth onto the regimental parade ground. \(^{163}\)

Public health suffered because of many private abuses. Disease struck officers, soldiers, and camp followers alike. Although busy after battles "Amputating libs, trepanning fractured skulls, and dressing the most formidable wounds," Army medics spent most of their time treating assorted fevers (inflammatory, intermittent, remittent, bilious, putrid, etc.), dysentery, scurvy, rheumatism, venereal disease, numerous other disorders, and occasionally the pregnancies of camp women. \(^{164}\) They also isolated and treated smallpox victims and carried out the army's inoculation program (which encompassed everyone in camp, women and children included) against that disease. \(^{165}\) Regimental surgeons and their mates tried to deal with most of the complaints within the perimeters of their own units, but when the number of patients multiplied too rapidly or an illness became too severe, they sent the sick into hospitals.

Many times headquarters would send down orders that the sick were to be removed from the camp and sent to the nearest Continental hospital. \(^{166}\) The Hospital department set up both temporary and permanent hospitals in
churches, government buildings, and private residences. It established these medical centers in centralized locations such as Yellow Springs, Philadelphia, Sunbury, Trenton, Pluckemin, Baskenridge, Fishkill, and Albany.\textsuperscript{167} When it had the chance, the army also set up smaller brigade hospitals. At Valley Forge the officers commanding brigades received orders to set aside some ground near their units, preferably in the center rear of the brigade area, where hospitals could be erected. These hospitals were huts: plans called for them to be fifteen feet wide and twenty-five feet long and at least nine feet high, with a window on each side and a chimney at one end.\textsuperscript{168} Once hustled into these hospitals, the sick received not only medical treatment, but the attention of line officers as well. Washington ordered each of his brigade commanders at Valley Forge to daily appoint a captain to visit their units' sick in or near the camp. Those captains had to make sure that the patients were well-attended and had everything they needed (as much as circumstances permitted) to regain their health. In almost the same breath, Washington turned to "preventive medicine" by commanding that an officer be appointed every day to inspect the soldiers' huts to see that they were clean and their roofs weatherproof.\textsuperscript{169}

Commanders struggled to get their people under cover for most of the war. The housing problem was less acute during the summer campaigns when the army was on the move and the troops could sleep under the stars if necessary, but when precipitation mounted and temperatures dropped the Continental community needed to move out of its tent cities and into sturdier housing. Doctor Thacher eloquently described the situation in December 1779. It was a situation the army had faced in previous years and would face again.

[O]n the 14th [we] reached this wilderness, about three miles from Morristown, where we are to build log-huts for winter-quarters. Our baggage is left in the rear, for want of wagons to transport
it. The snow on the ground is about two feet deep, and the weather extremely cold; the soldiers are destitute of both tents and blankets, and some of them are actually barefooted and almost naked. Our only defence against the inclemency of the weather, consists of brush-wood thrown together. Our lodging the last night was on the frozen ground. Those officers who have the privilege of a horse, can always have a blanket at hand. Having removed the snow, we wrapped ourselves in great-coats, spread our blankets on the ground, and lay down by the side of each other five or six together, with large fires at our feet, leaving orders with the waiters to keep it well supplied with fuel during the night. 170

Thacher went on to explain that when the baggage finally did arrive it was difficult to pitch tents on the frozen ground. However, the tents were only a temporary solution. The officers moved quickly to warm their soldiers: they put them to work building log cabins.

Many of those rough huts not only housed the troops in the winter of 1779-80, but again served the needs of the army the following winter. Although some had been demolished over the course of the year, when Pennsylvania soldiers returned in November 1780, they found enough cabins left, with only minor repairs required before habitation, to house them all. Those durable huts showed what lessons had been learned at Valley Forge: they had been built and laid out according to the regulations issued at that encampment. Each hut, complete with fireplace, was about sixteen feet long by fourteen wide and generally housed ten to twelve men who slept in bunks built up along the walls. The common layout of an encampment placed the officers' quarters directly to the rear of their soldiers' lodgings. Officers' huts, although not always uniform in design, usually had two rooms that were occupied by three or four men. 171 Regimental hutments also included kitchens and sometimes huts designated solely for the women who belonged with the troops. At one time the New Hampshire line had thirty-six soldiers' huts, ten officer cabins, three kitchens, and twelve women's huts. The 1st and 3rd Massachusetts's brigades recorded they had the sum of ninety-four soldiers'
huts, fifty-four quarters for officers, twenty-eight kitchens, but only ten huts for women. 172

The Continental Congress acknowledged that huts were not houses, so to recognize their soldiers' fortitude in accepting such accommodations at Valley Forge, as well as their patience, fidelity, and zeal in the cause of their country, the delegates voted on 30 December 1777 to give them one month's extraordinary pay. 173 Whether they ever actually received that pay is another matter altogether. Although Congress thought it had to make amends for what it perceived to be substandard housing, most of the officers, soldiers, and camp followers found their log huts tolerably comfortable. 174

The army built barracks where it was more permanently garrisoned, as in Boston, Massachusetts, and Burlington, New Jersey. Elsewhere, when it could, it placed its people in public houses and government buildings, and when it could not, it put them in tents. 175 The quartermaster general was responsible for the issue and care of the tents and marquees that housed the army for most of the war. He handed them out at the beginning of each campaign and then demanded their return as the soldiers marched into their barracks or huts at the end of the season. 176 His was not an easy job. The quartermaster general would mutter about the misuse or misappropriation of his tents, only to have the officers and soldiers retort that his tents were ill-made and ill-suited to their needs. Timothy Pickering encountered this problem in 1781 when everyone complained that the new tents were too small to hold the proper number of men. 177

The quartermaster general was not the butt of all complaints: everyone had a lot to say to the commissary general (and later the civilian contractors who took on the job of provisioning the troops) about the food as well. They complained about both quantity and quality. The soldiers often did not receive
the full rations they were entitled to. Sometimes there was a dearth of certain items, perhaps due to a poor harvest or the hoarding of supplies by civilians; sometimes the transport system broke down and there was no way to get the goods to camp. In the fall of 1777 there were recurring shortages of salt, whiskey, and flour. Thomas Jones, the issuing commissary, often had no bread or flour to issue to the troops, but he was able to stave off starvation because of the almost regular arrival of cattle from New England. The supply situation worsened over that winter at Valley Forge. When some members of the Continental Congress heard about the hungry troops they urged Washington to seize whatever food his people needed. Although he sometimes had to resort to such measures, Washington resisted such suggestions then and at other times. He realized that relieving his soldiers through the seizure or impressment of civilian supplies would undermine the principles for which they were fighting and destroy the political support of the people.

Washington, instead, tried to work through the system to ensure the delivery and distribution of provisions.

According to a 1775 resolution by the Continental Congress, provisions were to be divided among the American soldiers as follows:

One pound of fresh beef, or 3/4 of a pound of Pork, or one pound of Salt Fish, pr diem.
One pound of Bread, or Flour pr diem.
Three pints of Peas, or Beans pr Week, or Vegetables equivalent;

One pint of milk pr Man, pr diem, when to be had.
One half pint of Rice, or one pint of Indian meal pr Man, pr Week
One quart of Spruce Beer per man, pr diem, or 9 Gallons of molasses pr Company of 100 Men.
Three pounds of Candles to 100 Men pr Week, for Guards, &c.
Twenty-four pounds of soft, or eight pounds of hard Soap for 100 Men per week.
One Ration of Salt, one ditto fresh [meat], and two ditto Bread, to be delivered Monday morning; Wednesday morning the same. Friday morning the same, and one ditto salt Fish.
In the course of the war, Congress and the general officers would fiddle with the proportions as the availability of foodstuffs waxed and waned. However, the changes never altered the essential quality of the food: it remained plain if not always hearty.

Throughout the Revolution soldiers received one ration per day unless on a special work detail, but the number of rations allowed officers changed over the years. In 1775 officers were allocated rations in proportion to their rank. For example, a surgeon drew three rations per day, but his mate could take only two. Then in 1778 Congress resolved that officers were entitled to only one ration a day, but they would receive a subsistence allowance "that they may live in a manner becoming their Stations." After officers bemoaned their reduced state and protested against such meanness, Congress changed their allowances once again to include graduated rations according to rank as well as subsistence money. According to that 1782 resolution, surgeons then received 1 & 1/2 rations per day and over 4 dollars subsistence pay a month. A surgeon's mate received only 1 ration and a bit over 3 dollars. Women, children, and volunteers also drew rations; they could receive anywhere from a quarter to a full ration depending on what services they provided. Sometimes the army even placed civilian clerks and artisans on the ration rolls.

By February 1783 the American army was better covered, clothed, and fed than it ever had been before in winter quarters. It took him over seven years to do it, but Washington finally had an army fully fit to fight. As it turned out, however, his troops were all dressed up to go nowhere except home. While Congress examined the provisions of the preliminary peace treaty, Washington began to disband the Continental Army. When peace was officially proclaimed that fall the remaining soldiers and followers broke
ranks and left camp; they left behind a very small cadre that continued to serve as the United States Army.

From 1775 to 1783 Washington not only successfully commanded an army but competently administered a community as well. The United Colonies created the Continental Army to implement independence. This army, founded and fostered on ideology, was the core of a Continental Community that included civilian personnel and dependents. Some of these civilians joined the community in order to contribute to the American cause; others were there only to make a living. Washington had to manage them all: officers and soldiers, government servants, families, and camp merchants. With the intermittent advice and assistance of the Continental Congress and state governments, Washington determined who was allowed into the Continental Community, where it would be located, and how it would operate. He advised his people on everything from religion and justice to cooking and outhouses. Sometimes the community's inhabitants heeded his advice, and sometimes they did not. While Washington labored to field an army, his officers to lead their troops, and their soldiers to fight the enemy, most camp followers focused on more mundane objectives: family, job, and market.
Chapter II Notes


7. Robert Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789 (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 509, & 334-335. Middlekauff points out that public responsibility vs private desires is one of the classic dilemmas all free people face at one time or another.


12. Orders, 18 December 1777 & 22 April 1778, Major General Heath's Headquarters Orderly Book, from Boston to Providence, 23 May 1777-20 October 1778 (hereafter cited as Heath's HQ Book), War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records, Record Group 93 (overall collection referred to
hereafter as RG 93), Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, National Archives, Washington, D.C..


14. Royster, A Revolutionary People at War, 102. He mentions that the war became "one of the obligations of a contract between the living, the dead, and the unborn."


16. Thacher, Highlands, opposite West Point, 3 July 1778, Military Journal, 136-7. Thacher later recorded in May 1780 (pp. 193-5) that after officers continued to harp on the same old grievances, and Washington took up their cause, Congress finally offered more compensation to keep them in the service.

17. Cambridge, December 1775, Ibid., 34.


19. The issue of enlisting African-Americans into the army was a troubling one for many officers, and one that was brought before the committee Congress appointed to look into army matters in the fall of 1775. At that time [Cambridge, c. 18 October 1775] the question was raised, "Ought not Negroes to be excluded in the New Inlistment? especially such as are Slaves—By a Council of Officers both are." Footnote 24 (p. 189) refers to the answer given by the Council of War on 8 October: "agst them altog[e]ther." In December Washington lifted the ban on enlisting blacks; he gave some of his reasons in the General Orders of 30 December and in a letter to John Hancock on 31 December, in Abbot, Papers of George Washington 2:188, 189, 620, 623.


21. Lieutenant Colonel Eleazer Oswald to Colonel John Lamb, Fishkill, 12 November 1777, John Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society (microfilm), reel 1. Article 7, Section XIII, of the 1776 Articles of War imposed limits on hiring substitutes: "No soldier belonging to any regiment, troop or company, shall hire another to do his duty for him, or be excused from duty, but in case of sickness, disability or leave of absence."


23. The difficulty for the historian is determining who was civilian and who was military in the staff departments. The use of a rank or title only
sometimes helped— at the beginning of the war many persons in the staff departments received rank as part of their compensation even though they were not line officers, most later "staffers" were not authorized line ranks (such as captain or major) but used them anyway. Adding to the difficulty was the ambivalence of some Continentals as to whether staff department personnel were really members of the military. Checking rank and unit affiliation helped place some people; for others it was more a matter of extrapolating their condition from the positions they held.


28. Artillery Orders, West Point, 29 June 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 June- 30 December 1780, 4 August- 13 October 1781.


30. General Orders, Headquarters, Cambridge, 5 & 8 September 1775, and the information in footnote 3 (pp. 415-6), Ibid., 1:415-6, 432.


32. Thacher, 14 July 1777, *Military Journal*, 82-3. Thacher notes that they reached "Skeensboro" at 3:00 pm but had to flee again within two hours after a suprise attack from Burgoyne's troops, in the process all their cannon, provisions, much of the baggage, and several invalids fell into enemy hands (pp. 83-4). One wonders how the women fared.

34. General After Orders, Headquarters, Germantown, 13 September 1777, Ibid., 49.

35. Summary of duties for Marechaussee corps, published for edification of army at large, recorded on 11 October 1778, in Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 September-27 November 1778.


37. Headquarters, 19 June 1781, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 29 May-22 June 1781. The word "only" was underlined in the book.


42. Middlekauff, The Glorious Cause, 563.

43. Brigadier General Henry Knox to Colonel Lamb, Camp near Dobb's Ferry, 18 August 1781, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 2.

44. Regimental Orders, Haverstraw, 23 August 1781, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 June-30 December 1780.

45. Journal entry, Virginia, 24 August 1781, Pennsylvania Itinerary. It appears that Mrs. Byrd's farm was one of that family's secondary estates and not Westover itself, for a reading of the journal leaves the impression that the army marched from there to Westover (it did not appear to be circling back to Westover).


47. Thacher, marching south, 8 September 1781, Military Journal, 271-2.


51. Feltman, [Near Bottoms Bridge, New Kent County, Virginia], 16 August 1781, Journal, 1781-2. Feltman was probably referring to Edward Crawford who had served with the 1st Pennsylvania earlier, but had, according to Heitman in the *Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army*, transferred to the 3rd Pennsylvania on 1 January 1781.


54. Thacher, Providence, Rhode Island, 30 July 1779, & Highlands, 4 July 1778, Ibid., 169 & 138.

55. An encampment in the New York Highlands, probably in or near Fishkill, had the name "Continental Village." I adopted it here to cover all the Continental Community encampments.


57. Ibid., 298.


59. Robert K. Wright, *The Continental Army* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1983), passim. Wright gives a quick and clear overview of the many changes and experiments tried by both line and staff as the army tried to increase its effectiveness and make the best use of the men and materials available to it.


62. After Orders, Fishkill, 6 March 1777, Mss. Orderly Book kept at the Headquarters of LTC Marinus Willett of the 3rd New York Regt., from Feb. 17, 1777, to May 21, 1778, New-York Historical Society (microfilm; hereafter cited...
as Mss. 3 New York Orderly Book). The Colonel Cortlandt referred to here was possibly Philip Van Cortlandt of the 2d New York.

63. Garrison Orders, Fort Constitution, 5 April 1777, Ibid.

64. Garrison Orders, Fort Constitution, 7 May 1777, & Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 20 December 1777, Ibid.


67. General Orders, for the right wing at Smithes Clove, 29 (or possibly 30) June 1779, 1 Pennsylvania Book, May- August 1779.


69. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 13 June 1777, Mss. 3 New York Orderly Book. Major Marquitee may have been a foreign volunteer or civilian; Marquitee (as that or under other possible spelling variations) was not listed in Heitman's Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army.

70. Garrison Orders, West Point, 21 August 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 June- 30 December 1780.


72. Headquarters, [New York], 5 August 1781, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 20 June- 21 October 1781. The orders were quite specific about limiting access to camp to people "belonging to the Army" and those with special authorization.


75. Headquarters [New York], 22 September 1776, George Washington's HQ Orderly Book, New York, 31 August- 4 October 1776, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, National Archives.

76. Headquarters Robinson's Farm, 7 February 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 30 November 1777- 4 February 1779 & 11 January- 18 February 1780.

77. Headquarters [Morristown?], 10 April 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 28 March- 12 June 1780.
78. New York, 1 August 1778, British Intelligence, New York, 1778, 2248, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

79. New York, 9 August 1778, Ibid.

80. New York, 12 August 1778, Ibid.

81. New York, 1 October 1778, Ibid.

82. General Orders, 23 October 1778, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 September-27 November 1778. Also in Headquarters, 23 October 1778, 1 Pennsylvania Orderly Book, July-December 1778.

83. Thacher, Upstate New York (possibly Ticonderoga), 30 January 1777, Military Journal, 73.

84. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 12 April 1778, Mss. 3 New York Orderly Book.


86. Artillery park (Chester, New York?), 9 November 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 24 August 1779-20 February 1780.

87. There are numerous advertisements concerning items lost or stolen in Headquarters Valley Forge Orderly Book, 1-31 January 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, National Archives, and in Valley Forge Orderly Book, an example in the latter (p. 72) was General Orders, Headquarters [Skippack?], 7 October 1777.


89. Report, Headquarters Valley Forge, 3 February 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 220.


91. Orders, Valley Forge, 26 March 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 270.


94. Headquarters Valley Forge, 13 April 1778, Heath's HQ Orderly Book.


99. Ibid., 30 July 1777, p. 3, col. 3.

100. Headquarters White Marsh, 11 November 1777, Copy of Orderly Book, 1st Virginia State Infantry Regiment, 1777-78, & Headquarters Moore's House, 15 August 1779, 1 Pennsylvania Book, May-August 1779. In the first instance the court found Ensign Saunders of the Virginia State Regiment guilty of being absent and neglecting his duty and sentenced him to be reprimanded. In the second case a division court martial found Thomas Martin and James McKrady of the 1st Pennsylvania guilty of desertion and attempting to go to the enemy; the court sentenced them to receive 100 lashes each. Although Saunders was not charged with desertion per se, I included him here to show that officers found guilty of unexcused absences were punished; however, as in all cases, officers did not receive corporal punishment.


104. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 5 March 1778, Mss. 3 New York Orderly Book. Nancy Weedon is not to be confused with General Weedon's wife, Catharine.


Henry Knox) to Colonel Lamb, a Sunday morning in 1778, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.


120. Lieutenant Colonel Eleazer Oswald to Colonel John Lamb, New Haven 1 April 1778, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.

121. Oswald to Lamb, "On a dirty, filthy Hill behind the Church" [Peekskill?], 1 July 1777, Ibid., reel 1.

123. Letter from a German Officer, Cambridge, 18 December 1777, Pettengill, Letters From America, 132.


127. Letter from a German Officer, Cambridge, 18 December 1777, Pettengill, Letters From America, 119.


131. Captain-Lieutenant [Jacob] Reed to Lamb, 8 October 1778, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.

132. Higginbotham, War of American Independence, 394-5. Pennsylvania Gazette, 28 May 1777, p. 1, col. 3, published resolve of Delaware Assembly to allow officers of the state's Continental battalion to enlist apprentices or servants whose terms of servitude did not exceed two years (with the payment of an appropriate amount of money to the master/mistress). Randolph W. Church, compiler, in Virginia Legislative Petitions: Bibliography, Calendar, and Abstracts from Original Sources 6 May 1776- 21 June 1782 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1984) lists a number of petitions from masters for compensation for servants who enlisted; most petitions were rejected. Among the examples are Lewis Lee's and John Aimes's petitions (recorded 21 November 1777); both asked for compensation for indentured mulatto servants who enlisted in the military service and both requests were denied (pp. 146-7, no. 478, 480).

133. Pennsylvania Gazette, 21 May 1777, p. 4, col. 2: a Dutch servant boy named George Wass, 30 years old, may be looking for "labouring work;" reward offered unless enlisted. 20 August 1777, p. 1, col. 2: two young gunsmith's apprentices ran away from Michael Wittner; Wittner hoped that if they approached a recruiting officer that officer would send them back. That same day (same page & column of Gazette) Isaac Budd advertised for the return of his Dutch servant man, promising a reward even to a recruiting officer who may have enlisted him. 5 September 1781 issue, p. 3, col. 3, carried an ad for the return of a "NEGROE MAN, named CAESAR," who was believed to have gone to Philadelphia with the intention of enlisting or serving aboard a ship.
134. Thacher, around Springfield [New Jersey?], 19 June 1780, Military Journal, 202-3. Thacher mentioned that "we are troubled with many perplexing instances of indisposition, occasioned by absence from home, called by Dr. Cullen nostalgia, or home-sickness. This complaint is frequent among the militia and recruits from New England. They become dull and melancholy, with loss of appetite, restless nights, and great weakness."


136. General Benedict Arnold to Lamb, Headquarters Robinson's House, 8 September 1780, Ibid., reel 2.

137. Orders to stop the unsoldierly and dangerous practice of rambling away from quarters and encampments, Headquarters, 4 September 1776, Hand's Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment Book. Order repeated on 10 September.

138. Orders, [Long Island], 18 May 1776, McCarthy, Papers of General Nathanael Greene (microfilm), pt. 1, no. 00421. There is an earlier example of the same problem: General Orders, Headquarters Cambridge, 22 August 1775, Abbot, Papers of George Washington 1:346. "The General does not mean to discourage the practice of bathing, whilst the weather is warm enough to continue it; but he expressly forbids, any persons doing it, at or near the Bridge in Cambridge, where it has been observed and complained of, that many Men, lost to all sense of decency and common modesty, are running about naked upon the Bridge, whilst passengers, and even Ladies of the first fashion in the neighbourhood, are passing over it, as if they meant to glory in their shame: The Guards and Centries at the Bridge, are to put a stop to this practice for the future."

139. Brigade Orders, 26 December 1777, Copy of Orderly Book, 1st Virginia State Infantry Regiment, 1777-78, Virginia Historical Society. Note that this was the day after Christmas; although most Americans did not celebrate the holiday as richly as the Germans, they did recognize it as a special day.


146. Thomas Hale to his parents, Greenwich [New York], 13 September 1776, Sol Feinstone Collection (microfilm).


149. Barbara MacDonald Powell, "The Most Celebrated Encampment: Valley Forge in American Culture, 1777-1983" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1983), 14-15. Powell's description of a very active army at Valley Forge is supported by the orderly books that cover that place and period; one such book that covers numerous orders for fatigue and guard duty is Headquarters Valley Forge Orderly Book, 1-31 January 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, National Archives.


156. Headquarters White Plains, 1 August 1778, & Division Orders, Paramus, 4 December 1778, 1 Pennsylvania Orderly Book, July-December 1778.


164. Thacher, Albany, 24 October 1777, Military Journal, 112-3, & various returns of the sick and wounded in camps and military hospitals, 1778-1780, Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775-1783, M246, roll 135, National Archives (microfilm, David Library). Two pregnant patients are listed in the return from the hospital at Danbury for the period 20 October-7 November 1778.


167. "A General Return of the Sick and Wounded in the Military Hospitals, belonging to the army, . . . ," from 1 February to 1 March 1780, Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775-1783, M246, roll 135, National Archives (microfilm, David Library). This return listed "Places where Military hospitals are open."


169. Orders, Headquarters Valley Forge, 29 January 1778, HQ Valley Forge Orderly Book, 1-31 January 1778 (herafter cited as above), RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, National Archives.


172. "Return of Quarters for the New Hampshire Line & the Lst and 3d Massachusetts Brigades," no date or place, RG 93, Letters, Returns, Accounts,
and Estimates of the Quartermaster General's Department, 1776-1783, M926, National Archives (microfilm, David Library).


174. Captain [John] Doughty to Lamb, Park of Artillery [Valley Forge], 27 January 1778, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1. "We are all Happily seated for the Winter in our Logg Houses, which prove very comforta[ble] & shall enjoy much Happiness if Mr British don't Disturb us." Martha Washington to Mercy Warren, Valley Forge, 7 March 1778, Washington Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. "Officers and men are chiefly in Hutts, which they say is tolerable comfortable; . . . The Generals appartment is very small [;] he has had a log cabben built to dine in which has made our quarters much more tolerable than they were at first."

175. Colonel Timothy Danielson to Washington, Roxbury Camp, 31 July 1775, Abbot, Papers of George Washington 1:200. Danielson wrote Washington that he had received his orders (via General Thomas) to remove Captain Ball and company from his quarters in order to "accommodate one Mr Waters with a convenient House of Entertainment." He protested Ball's removal to "gratify a Dram Seller," especially when there were too many of them in camp already, and hoped that the order would be repealed. Noted in footnote 1: Joseph Reed wrote to Brigadier General Thomas on 15 July saying that Colonel [Joseph] Trumbull had applied to Washington on behalf of a person who wanted a house occupied by some soldiers in order to keep a tavern. Reed said Washington left the matter up to Thomas. If Thomas agreed, arrangements could be made. If needed, Trumbull would furnish tents for the men.

176. General Orders, Headquarters Cambridge, 22 November 1775. Ibid., 2:416, & Headquarters Valley Forge, 4 January 1778, HQ Valley Forge Orderly Book, 1-31 January 1778. In both instances orders were given that as soon as the men moved into their barracks (or huts) the tents were to be immediately delivered to the Quartermaster General.

177. Pickering to Colonel Jabez Hatch, Camp Phillipsburg, 12 July 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vol. 127. Pickering told Hatch to remind the tent makers of the proper dimensions for their product.


181. Thacher, [upstate New York], September 1776, Military Journal, 60-61. Thacher listed the monthly pay of officers and soldiers and mentioned how rations were allotted.

182. Copy of congressional resolution, Headquarters [Valley Forge?], 2 June 1778, Heath's HQ Book.
183. Knox to Lamb, Camp Prakenis, 12 July 1780, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 2. Knox commiserated with Lamb on having to subsist on only one ration while his duty (command at West Point) put him to much greater expense than any colonel commanding a brigade. He mentioned it to Washington, but Washington would not do anything about it for fear of setting a bad precedent. Knox told Lamb that the general officers had urged Congress to allow officers to draw the number of rations as originally established. Congress heard, but it took it awhile to act- change came in 1782. Resolve of Congress (22 April) published in orders, 1 May 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 February-7 August 1782.

184. See chapters 4 & 5 for more information.

Chapter III. Sutlers, Contractors, and Marketers All

To Mr. . . . . of . . . .

You are hereby permitted to exercise the functions of a sutler in the American army now laying before York; conforming yourself to the rules & regulations of the army; & particularly to such as are or shall be made respecting sutlers.

Given under my hand in camp before York the . . . day of . . . 1781-

T. Pickering QMG
Form of a license for sutlers
8-9 October 1781

The Continental Army, like armies both before and after the American Revolution, was a market. Sellers of a wide variety of products and services swarmed into and around camps and garrisons in the hopes of making a profit. Merchants and tradesmen determined to exploit this market closely affiliated themselves with the army, becoming sutlers and contractors. The former quickly became some of the first civilian residents of the Continental Community. When New England militiamen, followed by Continental soldiers, coalesced into an army around Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the spring and summer of 1775, sutlers attached themselves to the ranks in order to supply soldiers with the goods required to make army life bearable: generally liquor, soap, and extra provisions. The army, in turn, adopted sutlers and placed them under orders. Unlike sutlers, contractors were merely visitors for much of the war as they moved in and out of camps to fulfill their business obligations; but after the army switched to a new system of provisioning by contract in 1781-82, some contractors and their agents became relatively permanent members of the military community. The contractors' increased contact and closer
affiliation with the troops resulted in their receiving more army supervision; the military had an almost proprietorial interest in their affairs. The army also attempted to regulate the people who sold goods and services just outside its encampments. Most of these vendors were local people who saw the presence of a military unit in their neighborhood as a serendipitous business opportunity: a market to be exploited only so long as it remained in the area. Army commanders accepted, even welcomed their presence, but tried to make sure that military personnel did not suffer from illegal or unhealthy (a service such as prostitution was often both) business practices.

Although only some of these sellers became members of the Continental Community, all of them helped to create it. Their businesses, the goods and services they offered, attracted other people into the military realm. Civilians who wished to follow the army found it easier to do so when there were marketplaces and merchants, such as sutlers, available to supply them with the necessities of life. A sutler was a person with military authorization "to reside in or follow the camp with food, liquors, and small articles of military equipment, or others, for general use or consumption." That was the most precise definition, but, unfortunately for clarity, not the one always adhered to during the Revolution. The army sometimes used the noun when referring to any person who sold "provisions or drinks, or other commodities or merchandise whatsoever"; and it often used the verb, sutting, to describe vending, authorized or not, in and around camp. Such broad connotations gave the army legal leeway when regulating all those who engaged in trade within its lines.

As it did with everyone else within its jurisdiction, the army regulated sutlers and other merchants according to the Articles of War and through the issuance of orders. If they did not follow orders, or if someone accused them of
malfeasance, traders could be court-martialed and driven from camp. As they were adjuncts often integral to camp operations and soldier morale, the Continental Congress deemed it desirable to adopt British and other European precedents of placing sutlers and other retailers under direct military control. In 1775 Congress used the British Articles of War as a guide when they created their own rules; however, the British articles and those first American articles were not identical. Whereas British Article 23 (Section XIV) stated that sutlers, retainers, and others serving with the army were subject to orders "according to the Rules and Discipline of War," American Article 32 (no sections) stated that they were "subject to the articles, rules, and regulations of the continental army." The American version was more restrictive of the exercise of military authority over civilians. In effect it said that the American army had to govern its followers according to published orders and regulations instead of the more flexible "Discipline of War." The American Articles of War of 1775 differed from the British ones in another way as well. They did not include an article that permitted all officers, soldiers, and sutlers to bring into garrison "any Quantity or Species of Provisions, eatable or drinkable, except where any Contract or Contracts are or shall be entered into by Us, or by Our Order, for furnishing such Provisions."

In 1776 Congress discarded the old rules and enacted the second Continental Articles of War, which were much closer to the original British model. Article 23, Section XIII, placed sutlers and others under orders "according to the rules and discipline of war." A possible legal loophole was thereby closed, and military authority strengthened. Articles 1 - 4, Section VIII of the American legislation echoed the same articles and section of the British version, including the second article that allowed officers, soldiers, and sutlers to bring into army forts any "eatable or drinkable" provisions not
already contracted for by the government or army (this was amended in April
1777 to include only eatable provisions because of problems with intoxication
in camp). The first article stated that sutlers were not allow'd to sell liquor or
food, or keep their shops open "for the entertainment of soldiers, after nine at
night, or before the beating of the reveilles, or upon Sundays, during divine
service, or sermon." The penalty for doing so was dismissal from all future
sutling. Article 3 required all commanding officers in American forts,
barracks, or garrisons to see to it that all sutlers supplied the troops "with good
and wholesome provisions at the market-price." Failure to do so could result in
charges of neglect of duty. This article thereby insured that commanders paid
as close attention to their sutlers as to their soldiers. The final article forbade
commanders to charge "exorbitant prices for houses or stalls, let out to
sutlers," or allow others to do so. Nor could they, for their own advantage, lay
duties upon "or be intrusted in the sale of such victuals, liquors, or other
necessaries of life, which are brought into the garrison, fort, or barracks, for
the use of the soldiers, on the penalty of being discharged from the service."5
Thus Section VIII broadly outlined what was expected of both sutlers and the
officers who were to supervise them.

The Articles of War provided the army with the ways and means to
maintain order in soldier-sutler relations and to exercise quality control.
Under the aegis and within the guidelines established by the articles,
commanders issued orders to control the actions of all sellers, but they directed
most of their orders to those people who could properly be called sutlers, the
traders who had the closest continuing contact with the troops. Other
merchants came and went and thus merited less attention. If they were
contractors, abuses were dealt with at higher echelons--by the state
governments or the Continental Congress. If they were local people selling
goods in a camp market, complaints could be brought before local magistrates. Such outside jurisdiction was often not feasible or desirable in the case of sutlers, however. Sutlers were always with the army; they belonged to the army in ways the others did not. Therefore the army regulated their conduct.

On 11 July 1775, just over a week after assuming command in Cambridge, Washington began to curb the liberties taken by sutlers. He noted, "Notwithstanding the orders of the provincial Congress [meaning the Massachusetts government], some persons are so daring as to supply the Soldiers with immoderate Quantities of Rum, and other spiritous Liquors." The general tried to eliminate the problem by informing sutlers, tavernkeepers, and innholders that they risked severe punishment if found selling liquor to any noncommissioned officer or soldier without written permission from that soldier's company commander. Then on 7 August Washington gave qualified approval for military, rather than governmental, appointment of sutlers. After reviewing the applications that had been made in favor of sutlers supplying regiments with necessities, he stated that he had no objection to each regimental commander appointing one sutler to serve his own troops, "provided the publick is not to be taxed with any Expence in his Appointment--and Provided also that each Colo. be answerable for the Conduct of the Sutler so Appointed--And taking Care that he Conforms Strickly to all orders Given for the Regulations of the Army and that he does not intend on any Impose on the Soldier in the price of his goods." Although the appointment of sutlers at the regimental level changed over the course of the war, the rest of the order remained in effect as general policy.

Throughout the war Washington and his subordinates tinkered with the general regulations in order to sharpen their applicability at certain places and in particular situations. The tinkering began almost immediately.
Washington issued another order to further regulate sutting on 6 September after a growing proliferation of "pretended Sutlers" (unauthorized vendors) produced such a traffic in liquor that the troops were constantly debauched. He forbade anyone to sell liquor or other stores to the troops unless appointed to a regiment by that unit's commanding officer or by the government. When that order, in turn, caused confusion and consternation among commanding officers over the following months, Washington stepped in and on 14 November stated that people had incorrectly interpreted the order to mean that sutlers could sell liquor to soldiers belonging to other regiments without the permission of the soldiers' commanders. Therefore he issued a new order stating "that no Commanding Officer of a Regiment, shall authorize more than one Sutler to a Regiment, and such appointment shall be notified in Regimental Orders, and no person being authorised, shall presume to sell spiritous Liquors to any Soldiers belonging to any other regiment, without leave in writing under the hand of the Commanding Officer to which such Soldier belongs."8

As the army settled into Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-8, a board of general officers convened to develop new guidelines on sutting. Their deliberations resulted in a recommendation that "a Sutler be appointed to each Brigade whose Liquors shall be inspected by two Officers Appointed by the Brigadier for that purpose and those Liquors sold under those restrictions as shall be though reasonable." Washington simultaneously published and implemented their suggestions on 26 January by ordering that brigade sutlers be appointed and that they sell their stock of liquor at the sanctioned prices which he then listed. He also directed that

any Sutler who shall be convicted before a Brigade Court Martial of having demanded more than the above rates or of having adulterated his Liquors or made use of
Deficient Measures shall forfeit any Quantity of his Liquors not Exceeding Thirty Gall[ons] or the value thereof at the foregoing rates, The fourth part of the Liquors or the value thereof so forfeited to be applied to the Informer and the remainder of the Liquor to be put into the hands of the person Appointed by the Brigadier who shall deliver it out to the Non Commissd. and privates of the Brigades at one [G]ill p man p day, If Money [,] to be laid out in Liquors or Necessaries for the N:Commissiond Officers & privates of the Brigade and distributed in due and equal proportions.

Washington concluded by giving the sutlers permission to sell leaf and "Pigg Tail" tobacco and hard soap at designated prices, and then reminding them that neither they nor any person acting under them could sell articles that were reserved for the public market.9

Washington added to the preceding orders in April. After reiterating that only one sutler could be appointed to each brigade, he ordered the brigade commanders to submit the names of their sutlers to the adjutant general and then report any change in the situation thereafter. He also stated that these authorized tradesmen were to have only one sutting booth within the limits of their respective brigades where they could sell liquor and other merchandise; he forbade them to sell their alcoholic stock anywhere else. The commander in chief expected sutlers to sell their alcoholic beverages solely to members of the brigades to which they belonged at newly prescribed prices (he lowered January's prices). After limiting the sutlers' trading practices, Washington then moved to protect their interests while the army remained at Valley Forge. He prohibited anyone, besides licensed sutlers and commissaries sent by the states, to sell liquor in camp, or within seven miles of the camp. Persons found violating this directive would have their stock seized (without payment) for the army's use. There were exceptions to this rule. Washington authorized the quartermaster general to permit one or more houses of entertainment to operate near camp in order to accommodate any travellers in the vicinity.
Persons receiving an operating license for that purpose, however, had to promise not to sell liquor to anyone belonging to the army.10

The quartermaster general exercised more and more authority over merchants in and around camp as time passed. In 1781, as the army dug in before Yorktown, headquarters notified commanders that "permission may be granted to sutlers to sell liquor & refreshments to the Army under such regulations as the QM Genl. shall establish upon complyanc of which they will meet with due incouragement & protection in person & property."11 Although commanders continued to control the sutlers belonging to their units by demanding that they comply with brigade and regimental orders, the quartermaster general served as arbitrator in establishing general army regulations.

As the war wound down in 1783, some generals, brigade commanders, and officers commanding regiments met with the quartermaster general at Newburgh to establish more specific regulations "respecting the sutlers and markets of the army." They delivered the results of their collaboration to the commander in chief who, on 2 March, ordered the army to observe ten new regulations, some of which merely repeated previous ones. The first rule was an old one: only one sutler per brigade. The second stiffened up licensing requirements. A license to suttle could be provided "only on the Joint recommendation of the Commanding Officers of the corps in a Brigade" and when approved by the brigade's commander. The third regulation required brigade commanders to appoint weekly, or more often if needed, a committee of officers to look into the quality of their sutler's stores and the prices being charged for the merchandise. These officers had to report their findings to their commander so that he could compare their notes and then correct any abuses practiced by the affiliated sutler. The fourth requirement closely
followed the third. Policing officers had to visit the sutler’s quarters daily in order "to Discover and report any Disorderly practices." The commanders refused to give sutlers permission to sell mixed liquors in the fifth regulation. In the sixth they warned that any sutlers not licensed in the approved manner must leave the army within twenty days after publication of these regulations or find their stores forfeit, but the sutlers could try to sell off their stock within those twenty days. The seventh regulation did not directly apply to the merchants: it outlined pay policy. The eighth ruled, "That there shall be two market places, one near the interval between the York and Jersey Brigades, and one near the public Building." The ninth regulation set aside Wednesdays and Saturdays as market days, while the tenth conveniently established Friday as payday. 12

The commanding officers of both garrisons and individual units supplemented general regulations with ones pertinent to their own situations, either as preventive measures or to counter corruption already present. Sometimes they merely emphasized or fine-tuned a rule already stated in the Articles of War or in general regulations. That happened at Crown Point in July of 1776 when orders forbade sutlers to sell liquor to the soldiers after sunset or allow the soldiers to linger about their huts after that time. It was a dual-edged order: sutlers were required to shoo soldiers off their premises, and the soldiers received complementary orders to "Repair to their Respective tents at tattoo Beating & not to bee Stroaling About the Camp after that time." 13 At other times commanders responded to more specific problems within their realms. When there was too much intemperate sutting at Ticonderoga that same July, Major General Horatio Gates recommended that the commanding officers of the corps exert themselves to suppress it. He strongly suggested that they seize all rum and other liquors from sutlers who were not officially
attached to the units and deliver the goods to the commissary. Two weeks later, one of Gates's subordinate commanders clamped down on a sutler in his specific brigade. Colonel Arthur St. Clair, after hearing that a sutler had been passing his own private "Notes of hand" among the soldiers as cash, requested his regimental commanders to collect the notes held by their soldiers. He wanted to compel the sutler to pay the full amount of the notes' declared worth as a punishment for "so Infamous and Pernicious a Practice." These latter two examples represented actions taken by officers after a problem developed. Orders to and about sutlers often were a reaction to events, but officers also issued preventive commands in the hopes of forestalling abuses.

All orders circumscribed sutler transactions, for commanders generally did not allow free enterprise in their camps. Commanding officers commonly fixed prices, especially for liquor. As previously noted, Washington set some prices in January and then again in April of 1778. At those times he was primarily concerned with establishing the cost of peach and apple brandy, whiskey, and a few other beverages, but Washington stipulated prices for other liquors, such as rum, French brandy, and gin that spring as well, primarily because vendors had taken advantage of the fact that they had not been listed in the initial orders. Disgusted with exorbitant rates, Washington called for a council of all the officers commanding brigades to meet and determine the proper prices to be charged. They published the authorized prices on 28 March. Officers met many times during the war to fix prices according to current currency values, and although the cost of liquor remained of paramount interest, they determined the prices of other goods as well. When Lieutenant Chilton Ford, regimental adjutant for the 2nd Continental Artillery, posted the authorized prices for goods offered by Mr.
Freeman, the brigade sutler, on 24 June 1779, the regulated merchandise included tobacco, paper, ham, bacon, coffee, sugar, as well as rum and claret.16

Other brigade and garrison orders, in line with general regulations, determined what sutlers could sell, when they could sell, and how they could sell. Accordingly, the 1st Pennsylvania Brigade with the Main Army in August 1778 informed its subordinate regiments that no one was allowed to suttle for the brigade "except Such as will Govern himself as follows—To provide as much Mutton [,] Fowls and Vegetables as Shall be apply'd for by the Officers—every Monday & Thirsday--Officers are to Bespeak what they want on Saturdays & Wednesday mornings all at moderate prices." Besides insisting on those requirements, the brigadier also prohibited sutler sales of liquor to soldiers without a written permit from an officer or for any reason after the beating of retreat.17 The last part of that order was echoed in a 1780 orderly book of the 2nd Continental Artillery. Therein West Point garrison orders on 16 September required that soldiers retire to their quarters at the beating of tattoo and warned that any sutlers found harbouring or entertaining soldiers "after that time, may depend on having their Liquor seized; --and themselves sent from the Point." One week later the garrison commandant again threatened confiscation and banishment for another offense. After being informed that some sutlers had refused to accept Continental currency in their transactions, the commandant gave a firm response: "Any Sutler who shall hereafter refuse to Sell for Continental Money may depend on having his Effects Seized, and be obliged to quit the Point."18 Eventually certain orders that were repeated time and time again by regimental, brigade, and garrison commanders were reiterated in general orders and became army policy. After various post and unit commanders prohibited sutlers to sell alcohol to soldiers without written permission from a commissioned officer (a slight shift in
policy from previous orders that demanded the permission come from a commanding officer), Washington, in May 1783, finally ordered that all "contractors and sutlers of the army" were to observe the same restriction. He also asked that "any instances which shall be discovered of fraud or unfairness in the dealings of sutlers or traders might be reported in writing to the orderly office, in order that measures should be taken to remedy all abuses of that kind."19

Besides limiting the numbers of sutlers allowed with the military and regulating their actions within the camps, the army also attempted to control sutlers by insisting that they register with the commands they served. On 3 July 1776 all the sutlers at Crown Point had to submit their names to the deputy quartermaster generals (or quartermasters as they came to be called) of the regiments to which they belonged. Noncompliance would result in dismissal from the grounds; but to insure compliance and prevent excuses, commanding officers received orders to send their orderly sergeants to notify sutlers personally of the requirement. The commanding general also felt obliged, due to sutler extravagance and extortion, to ask that the officers send him the prices their soldiers paid for certain goods along with the sutlers' names.20

Garrison orders at Fort Constitution in March 1777 instructed: "The Commanding Officer of the Artillery to make a Return of the Strength of that Corps in the Garrison. The Commissary & Quarter Master to make a Return of the Provisions, and Stores of the Garrison. The Armourers and other Artificers[,] Bakers[,] Sutlers[,] Retailers and every other Person belonging to, or residing in this Garrison are to report themselves to the Commanding Officer immediately."21 In that particular case, sutler registration appeared to be a normal part of camp administration. By late 1778 there was an attempt to centralize sutler registration in the Main Army. A summary of the duties of
the Marechausee Corps, published that October for the edification of the army at large, included a requirement that Captain Bartholomew Von Heer, its commander, keep lists of all licensed sutlers and confine followers of the army who suttled without permission. Therefore, every newly authorized sutler was ordered to signify his appointment to the captain and produce a certificate (which would come from his unit's commanding officer) proving it. Such registration helped strengthen the affiliation between sutler and unit and destroyed any future pleas of ignorance on either side when a misdeed was discovered. Commanders thereby knew that they had sutlers, and knew them by name, and sutlers became familiar with the command and staff members who could issue them orders.

The governments and commanders who appointed sutlers were supposed to be very discriminating in their choices: they were expected to weed out knaves, charlatans, and officers. The Continental Congress, first through the Articles of War and then by way of a supplemental resolve, wanted to prevent the last group from making a profit from its association with soldiers. The 1775 Articles of War stated that commanding officers could not be interested in the sale of provisions and liquors to the soldiers; involvement could result in discharge from the service. When officers who were not commanders began to engage in suttling, Congress moved to close the gap in the legal code. On 17 June 1776 Congress resolved that "no Officers Shall Settle or sell to the Soldiers under penalty of being Fined one months Pay and Dismissed [from] the Service with Infamy on Conviction before a Court Martial." The resolution then passed among the brigades and regiments; and when it was published at Ticonderoga it included what appeared to be a caveat from either that posts commanding officer or the commander in chief: "The Gen. Earnestly Hopes that no Officer High or Low will be Guilty of a Breach of the Above Resolve. When an Officer
Desends to be mean enough to Turn a Huxter to his men he cannot expect any due Obeydiance from them. Soldiers will ever esteem a man of Honour as much as they will Dispise a Contray Caractor."23 The resolution continued in force as a supplemental measure after Congress passed the 1776 Articles of War without the appropriate change in Article 4, Section VIII. However, it took a while for the resolution to be put into effect in all the army camps spread out over the states: on 1 September a Lieutenant Colonel Belinger was still sutling at German-Flatts in the Mohawk Valley of New York.24

Although Congress and command prohibited sutting by gentleman officers, both legislators and commanders preferred to have gentlemanly sutlers, or, more precisely, solid middle-class tradesmen in the camps. A few candidates for the posts apparently fit the bill. General Henry Knox in August of 1778 informed his brigade at White Plains that "Messrs Piercy & Marvin" had appointments as sutlers to the park of artillery, adding that "They will conform to the Rules, establish'd for their Conduct." He also, however, safeguarded their territory by commanding the brigade quartermaster to check around from time to time to see that no sutlers, except those with his permission, entered or remained in the vicinity of the park.25 The artillery often divided up into smaller tactical units that were then attached to various infantry brigades or sent off to different posts. That could explain why less than five months after Messieurs Piercy and Marvin became authorized sutlers another vendor was appointed to the corps. Piercy and Marvin may have already left the brigade or been found wanting, but, more likely, they stayed with one part of the corps as it entered winter quarters and thus left the 2nd Continental Artillery stationed at Pluckemin, New Jersey, in the winter of 1778-9 in need of its own sutler. That unit soon filled the position with a very
worthy applicant: "Silvanus Seeley Esqr." received the appointment of sutler to the corps on 9 January.26

In May 1782 Washington saw Mr. Nathaniel Sackett as a proper candidate for a sutler position. He gave him permission to suttle to the army until there were orders to the contrary and as long as he conformed "to the regulations for conducting that business." The quartermaster general was to instruct him in the latter.27 Although Mr. Sackett appeared to be a trustworthy merchant and may even have been a gentleman, Washington wanted to make sure he knew the rules. All too many sutlers, with or without the "mister" before their names, had undermined army order and discipline throughout the war by disregarding regulations. Much of the problem could be traced back to sutlers who mislaid gentlemanly or honorable behavior in their pursuit of profit and to other sutlers who were only hucksters with no desire to maintain or attain an honorable station. The army dealt with them all by informing them of regulations, giving them orders, and punishing transgressors.

On 30 August 1782 the army's headquarters at Newburgh issued orders for the movement of troops, women, and baggage to Verplanck's Point. Supplementary orders directed the behavior of sutlers. As the army gathered itself together, Major General Knox moved to control not the sutlers' selling practices but their acquisitiveness. The order was a bit unusual, but its promises of retribution were not. Knox directed that all the boards used as beds by the officers and soldiers, as well as other things which had been taken out of the barracks, be collected and stored. Then he said, "If any sutler or trader is found purchasing any of the foregoing articles from the soldiers, they may depend upon not only having their licenses taken from them, but also be otherwise punished."28 That other punishment could include, as it did
throughout the war, summary confiscation of stores and banishment from post, as well as court-martial and a variety of sentences from fines to whipping to imprisonment. Commanders were not at all loathe to drag sutlers before military tribunals. John McClure discovered that in December of 1777 when a general court-martial tried him "for suttling in Camp contrary to Genl. orders." McClure pleaded guilty. After hearing his plea and reviewing the evidence, the court rather leniently concluded that his suffering in the provost jail had sufficiently punished him for his crime and ordered his release. A general brigade court-martial was not as lenient to another sutler in November of 1778, but then his crime was considered more heinous. The court found John McGraugh guilty of abusing and defrauding a local inhabitant. It sentenced him to receive 100 lashes on his bare back, "well Laid on," and to return the ill-gotten money. The court also ordered that he be drummed along the line and then confined until he revealed his accomplices.30

Sometimes sutlers suffered at the hands of the army not because of their own misdeeds but because of the necessities of a campaign or the problems, such as incompetence and interrupted supply lines, that often arise in war. When Major General John Sullivan prepared for the 1779 summer campaign, he tried to divest his troops of all nonessential personnel; he included sutlers within that designation. He would allow none to accompany his troops on the expedition into New York, nor would he allow any to stay at the Wyoming post. Sullivan ordered the commissary to accept what liquor the sutlers had on hand and to pay a reasonable price for it; he also promised that any sutler trying to sell his stock after that time could expect to have his liquor seized without hope of recompense. The general did not want to be bothered by sutlers while on campaign, but he wanted their stock because he found the commissary's liquor
stores to be inadequate. Although they rarely resorted to it (the army did not want to alienate its dependent merchants any more than it wished to disturb other civilian suppliers), commanders did occasionally seize sutlers' stores, usually with promises of payment, to supplement inadequate rations. Greene confiscated rum from sutlers and other followers of the army when his troops ran out of the spirit in September 1780; but he, like Washington and many other officers, preferred not to impress goods. Commanders did it only when there was no other choice left to them: they had to either impress what was needed or see the army dissolve, and if there was no army there would be no independence.

Impressment of sutler or other civilian supplies was always a last resort; commanders used it only when the supply system the army was operating under at the time broke down. As the army struggled to avoid draconian measures to ensure supplies, Congress tried to help by reorganizing, several times, the Commissary and Quartermaster departments and then, finally, by turning much of the problem over to contractors in 1781. The use of contractors was not new; what was different was the extent to which the army then began to utilize them.

In the first months of the war, many state units employed contractors to procure and deliver their provisions. One such contractor, Richard Backhouse, supplied Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment for part of the summer of 1775. As a middleman in the supply, specifically procurement, chain he bought goods from his contacts (both men and women: they included John Hendershot who supplied him with beef, Ann Snook who sold him mutton, and Jane Allen who baked bread for him) in nearby civilian communities, then hired people to haul the provisions to camp, and finally,
upon completion of these transactions, presented his accounts to the army for recompense. Most of these early contractors or independent agents operated on a small scale, working for one or more military units, although a few (especially in New England) operated at the state level, but when the Continental Congress incorporated all the state units into the Continental Army, it built supply departments around merchants with even greater contacts so as to develop a more extensive and somewhat more centralized supply network.

Congress organized and then reorganized the agencies or departments that supplied the army, eventually settling on a bifurcated design for them. It established field units to handle the receipt and issue of supplies to the troops and departmental units to procure and deliver the supplies. The field detachments were under close departmental and military control, but the procurement units were initially little more than groups of merchants who obtained the materials needed by the supply chiefs in the Quartermaster and Commissary departments. The latter units eventually expanded to include production, repair, and storage of military items, developing into fixed subordinate branches of the supply departments that were administered by deputies. The deputies were at first called purchasing agents. They not only bought necessary equipment and provisions themselves, but established contracts with other merchants and tradesmen for supplies as well. For example, Abraham Livingston put the butcher Daniel Hinslee of New York City under contract to supply the Continental troops in that city with fresh beef in March of 1776.

Most of the deputies' subordinate contractors cannot properly be called camp followers for they were too far removed from the military realm. These contractors made their arrangements with purchasing agents or other supply
department personnel and then fulfilled their contracts by delivering the goods to a deputy, a magazine, or, if near the proposed recipient, to a designated quartermaster or commissary within a military camp. They did not issue the supplies to the troops themselves, nor did they generally follow the army on campaign. They commonly carried out their contracts in their own shops or territory; some operated close to the army, others distant from it; some worked on a large scale, others, small. A few of these people had appointments as county contractors: they supplied the military with various wares and provisions collected from within their designated area. Other contractors operated at a more elementary level, offering only one product or service, such as providing firewood, to a nearby garrison or encampment.36

The military's supply system relied heavily on these people.

Even as Congress established commissary operations in 1775, some of its members, especially after looking at the cost of rations, seriously considered the possibility of supplying the army wholly by contract without the intervention of staff departments. Although Congress decided to continue the departmental supply system, it did approve ration contracting for the troops in Virginia and permitted other supply contracts elsewhere. Such contracts usually applied to small units separated from the main army.37 Most of the contractors involved also operated efficiently enough to provide an uncomplimentary contrast when the Commissariat ran into problems.

When the Commissary Department was unable to buy or otherwise acquire enough provisions in December 1779, Congress asked the states to provide the army with certain supplies. It promised that each state's contribution would be credited toward the money each was required to raise in taxes for the United States. After reviewing this measure, Congress came to believe that if the needed supplies could thereby be procured, it could dismiss
many Commissary Department purchasing agents; thus, what had initially been an emergency maneuver became a new system of supply in 1780. The specific supply system required that each state collect, and deliver to designated places within their boundaries, the quotas of meat, flour, rum, salt, forage, and tobacco that Congress apportioned to them according to their resources. Congress would then give them credit for all items that passed inspection and were accepted by the army. 38

Many supply officers criticized the new system. Quartermaster General Nathanael Greene said it was more convenient for the states than good for the army. He complained that the quantities ordered were not only inadequate but the supply conduit itself was not adequately set up. Congress tried to correct the latter problem in July 1780, when it gave the Quartermaster Department the tasks of transporting and storing all public property, including the specific supplies gathered by the states. Greene did not have to bother with the new duties; late that month he resigned his staff appointment and joyously resumed his line duties. He left the new quartermaster general, Timothy Pickering, and the commissary general of purchases, Ephraim Blaine with the problem of trying to make the system work. They tried, but both found it inefficient and inadequate. 39 By the spring of 1781, the army had to resort to impressment once more, and Congress began to study the idea of contracting for supplies.

In May Congress completed its preliminary study and initiated operation of the contract system. After having the Board of War provide an estimate on the rations required by the Main and Southern armies, and after deciding that rations were to be contracted at an agreed-upon price for the period from 1 July to 1 January of the next year, it opened the bidding to interested parties. There was a bit of confusion at this point over who could make these contracts.
Congress did not initially assign the responsibility to any one department, but the Board of War assumed that the contracts would be made by the chiefs of the regional military and staff departments under the direction of the superintendent of finance, Robert Morris, since he was supposed to supervise everyone employed in procuring public supplies and spending public money. Congress formally gave Morris the power to contract for all supplies needed by the army that July and, in doing so, essentially closed out the commissariat system. Blaine remained in office until the conclusion of the 1781 campaign, but after helping provision the troops on the journey north after Yorktown, he retired from the service. Contractors then took over both the procurement and issuing of supplies.

They supplied much of the army over the second half of 1781 while Congress and the army evaluated the value of the switch. Then, midway through that initial contract term, Morris validated the new system by advertising for proposals "for supplying by contract, the rations deliverable by the public at the post of Wyoming [and elsewhere], to such Officers, Soldiers and others, as are or may be entitled to them, from a certain time to be fixed in the contract until the expiration of twelve months thereafter." After that time the army renewed some old contracts and made new ones. Relations between the army and its contractors were far from harmonious, however; they squabbled over bills and payment, the method of issuing supplies, and the quantity, quality, and nature of the provisions. Yet, even as they complained about the inadequacies and avarice of contractors, most staff and line officers believed contracting to be more efficient and economical than the previous supply systems. The new system did eliminate many staff or middlemen positions in the procurement, transportation, and issuing of supplies. As Pickering wrote to Ralph Pomeroy, one of his deputies, in December 1781: "All
the commissaries will shortly be superseded by the contractors; & with the dissolution of the commissariates many quarter masters at posts will become unnecessary." Another factor, more easily seen now than at the time, also contributed to the new system's efficient operations: the contract system operated under more stable conditions. After Yorktown there were no major campaigns; instead of provisioning troops on the move, contractors supplied garrisons.42

The army maintained supervisory control over contractor operations in camp. When Morris or his designated deputies signed agreements with contractors they did not give them autonomy. The army regulated contractors, especially their agents in camp, in a way similar, although not identical, to how it regulated other camp civilians. The military exerted somewhat less control over contractors' everyday behavior; it did not reprimand them in the orderly books or bring them before courts-martial as it did other followers. This difference could be attributed to the more peaceful conditions under which the army was operating at the end of the war (there appear to have been fewer courts martial of other civilians at that time as well), and to the willingness of Morris to break contracts on account of contractor malfeasance and thereby rid the army of a few unwanted adjuncts.43 Actually, the nonappearance of contractors before the courts may merely indicate that they engaged in a smart business practice: adhering or appearing to adhere to the guidelines established by the army.

The military concentrated on regulating the contacts between contractors and military personnel. It established what each party had to do in order to make the supply system operate; and when problems developed, its quartermaster general tried to devise solutions. Pickering appears to have acted as the middleman between the army, or more precisely Morris, and the
contractors, as well as serving as the mediator in military-contractor disputes at more subordinate levels for the first year of the contract system.\textsuperscript{44} Then, in September 1782, Morris lightened Pickering's load somewhat by appointing Ezekiel Cornell as inspector of contracts. Under Morris's aegis, Cornell negotiated contracts and arbitrated disputes arising from them.\textsuperscript{45}

Pickering, as quartermaster general, was particularly interested in maintaining accurate provisioning rolls. Correct returns helped minimize waste and greed by facilitating both the planning and reviewing stages of the system. Unit quartermasters had to compile rosters of both military and authorized dependent personnel so as to request sufficient supplies. Contractors needed personnel numbers in order to figure out the quantity of supplies they had to provide and thus needed to buy from their own subcontractors or other tradesmen. Pickering wanted to see the lists so as to study the accounting methods on both sides and make sure costs remained as low as possible. The result was more paperwork. Line and staff personnel submitted lists to various offices at all levels in their chains of command. A number of letters and orders illustrated the administration process. For example, on 18 December 1781 Pickering wrote Colonel Hugh Hughes, his deputy in New York, that he required a return of all the people employed in his department. Pickering especially wanted to have the names of those employed at all the posts from Wappings Creek to Kings Ferry listed along with their pay and the number of rations drawn for each worker and his family. He had to have the information in a hurry because he had promised to give the information by the end of the week to the contractors who were to supply those posts with provisions.\textsuperscript{46} A little over a month later, the commandant of Burlington Barracks in New Jersey wanted Doctor Garret Tunison, the 2nd Continental Artillery's surgeon, to report to him the number and state of the
sick every Saturday morning. He then ordered that "All Orders upon the Contractor, for Provision for the Sick, must be sent to the Commandant to be countersigned," before completing his method of checks and balances by stating that the surgeon would issue stores and provisions to all patients except those in the hospital or recuperating in the Sappers and Miners quarters.47

After the contract system had been fully implemented, the army formally established the new standard operating procedures whereby provisions were to be issued. Major General Benjamin Lincoln, the Secretary at War, published the rules in May 1782. They spelled out the actions commanders and quartermasters had to take in order to receive supplies. Both line units and staff departments had to establish the rations allowed to each individual and then hand in returns which "must specify the number, stations, or occupations of the persons, the number of days to be drawn for, the commencing and ending of the time, both days included, and the number of rations in the whole; this return, with proper receipts, will be sufficient voucher for the Contractors."48 The army wrote these regulations to give uniform guidance to the military side of the military/contractor equation.

Contractors did not figure in regulations the way sutlers did because sutlers belonged to the army in a way contractors did not. Contractors belonged perhaps not as much to the army as with it. When sutlers lobbied for and accepted appointments from line commanders, they agreed to be controlled by them. Contractors, on the other hand, bargained with staff department chiefs before reaching an agreement: an agreement or contract that included instructions concerning their services with and for the army. When their preliminary instructions proved insufficient, contractors usually contacted Lincoln, Morris, Pickering, and later Cornell, not local commanders, for clarification. Lincoln, in December 1781, referred a contractor team,
Smith and Lawrence, to Pickering for directions relative to the issuing of firewood and forage to the posts north of Poughkeepsie. So Pickering sent them, with recommended modifications, the "plan for conducting the quarter master general's department" that Congress had passed in July of 1780 and an order regulating the issue of wood published by the Board of War in January 1781 to serve as guidelines. Pickering mentioned that they should not religiously dispense just the specified quantities when "necessity, humanity, & the good of the service" required extra allotments; they could change the rules in such cases.49 A month later Pickering also clarified matters for Comfort Sands, Esqr. and Company. After receiving letters of instruction from the superintendent of finance and the secretary at war, the contractors could not determine whether or not they were to provision Colonel Hughes and his assistants. Pickering said that although the plan for his department did not assign them public provisions, circumstances required that they be supplied. If Congress did not sanction this, the rations could be charged to their pay, "hardly a shilling of which have they received to this day; and without their rations they could not possibly have existed. It is also true that near a year [has passed] since I reported this matter to Congress, who have not to my knowledge made any objection. It is impossible for me to furnish money for their subsistence, and if provisions be denied them the department in this state will be dissolved. I have therefore to request that their usual rations be allowed them until I get the affair settled at Philadelphia."50

The army did not merely instruct contractors or make suggestions on how to conduct their business, it also gave them orders. In March 1783 the headquarters at Newburgh issued the command that officers drawing provisions for fatigue men, or other parties not able to draw supplies with the rest of their regiment, must sign separate returns for them. The second part
of that command ordered contractors to issue provisions to soldiers away from their regiments only when such a separate return was signed and submitted, except in cases where the commander in chief directed otherwise. Later that same month, a general order included the request that contractors acquire an ample supply of vinegar so that it may be regularly issued once the weather warmed up.51

Contractors, however, were seldom purely recipients of orders. Just as they had a say in formulating their contracts, they often helped to make subsequent rules. On 27 December 1782 Washington ordered brigade and regimental commanders to meet with the contractors who were scheduled to start supplying the army from 1 January. They were to assemble at Major General Howe's quarters on the coming Sunday. The officers and contractors who met that day, the 29th, "agreed that to accommodate service, the Officers will for the present apply to their respective Commissaries on the Afternoons of Tuesday, Thursdays and Saturdays in e[ver]y Week, commencing those Drafts on the first of January on Tuesday the 31st Instant, which rules will be observed, except on special occasions, which for the convenienc[e] of Officers in that situation, the Contractors have agreed to dispence with it."52 The contractors, having made that concession, soon asked for one on the part of the army. On 25 February in the new year, general orders noted that the contractors for the army having requested, agreeable to their contracts, that a person be appointed to inspect the cattle reserved for the military, one Henry Wikoff of Fishkill was appointed for that purpose "untill the pleasure of the Superintendent of Finance Shall be known."53

Besides inviting contractors to participate in certain conferences, the army provided them with military guards for their stores as well. Sutlers were very important to troop morale, but if necessary the army could operate
without them. As welcome, but not always essential auxiliaries, it offered them the security of the camp and protection or recompense from thieves and vandals under the articles of war. Contractors, on the other hand, were vital to military operations, therefore the army took extra precautions to safeguard their services and supplies. Regiments stationed at posts where contractors were located rotated guard details among themselves. It was not really a new duty: they had done the same for earlier quartermaster and commissary stores and continued to provide the service for all remaining stock in those departments (upon the closure of the Commissary Department the Quartermaster Department assumed the duties and stores that were not taken by the contractors).

Quartermaster stores, and soldiers to guard them, were still necessary because contractors did not provide everything everywhere at all times. On 1 May 1782, Pickering received a letter from Colonel Lamb at Burlington informing him that the contractors at that post were no longer furnishing the artillery there with forage. After getting Morris's approval, Pickering wrote Colonel John Neilson, the deputy quartermaster general of New Jersey, to send the necessary supplies on to the artillery. He said that Morris would provide the money and that the bearer of the letter, Abraham Rand, forage master, would receive and issue the forage. Pickering explained his choice of Rand by telling Neilson that the forage master had purchased "most of the hay for the contractors, at from three to four pounds per ton; and has as much as seven tons engaged, which will be about a months supply." Pickering concluded with the instructions that Rand should "give his certificates of the quantities, qualities & prices agreed on, to the sellers," whom Neilson must then pay. Pickering had to make such arrangements for other units as well.
Contractors replaced the Commissariat and worked in tandem with the Quartermaster Department; but, like the army's supply departments, they could not supply the troops with everything they needed, much less wanted. As a result, sutlers and other entrepreneurs found the army a lucrative market throughout the war. Sutlers had a corner on that market inside camp boundaries except when commanders allowed soldiers and dependents to engage in trade or welcomed outsider civilians in to sell on designated days.

The army generally strictly limited trade within its camps when it was on the move, but commanders were often more permissive, as long as sellers followed orders, when settled into garrison. Fort Schuyler in New York fit the latter model. After Colonel Peter Gansevoort and his 3rd New York Regiment bravely defended the post in the 1777 campaign, Congress officially appointed Gansevoort colonel-commandant of the fort on 4 October. Gansevoort's duties as commandant included the government of the military and civilian entrepreneurs in his community--something he had engaged in even before he received his official appointment. On 23 September he reminded the people who pastured cows at the post that they received their feed "from the Publick"; therefore "Six Pence pr. Quart is the highest price that they may Receive for Milk." Any person found charging more than that would find his or her cows confiscated and "delivered over for the Use of the Sick of the Hospital." Not everyone heeded the warning. On 2 May 1778, a court martial found Private James Patterson of Captain Henry Tiebout's company guilty of selling milk for nine pence per quart even though he had received public fodder and ruled that his cows be given to the hospital. Gansevoort approved the sentence, ordered that the cows be delivered, and had the prisoner released. The story did not end there, however, for a very contrite Patterson asked for forgiveness and the restoration of his livestock (and, coincidentally, a vital part of his
livelihood). On 5 May Gansevoort magnanimously accepted Patterson's promise of future good behavior and returned the cows, but took the opportunity to assure Patterson "and all others who may be posses'd of Cows at this Garrison that this is not to be a precedent for any future Offence of this Kind." When not engaged with cows and milk peddlers, Gansevoort focused on other economic enterprises. On 5 April 1778 he ordered all persons (be they soldiers, camp followers, or neighboring civilians) with hogs running about the garrison immediately to ring (corral) them or see them slaughtered; the hogs had injured the fortifications. Earlier, on 14 December 1777, he commanded the garrison's bakers (who could be either civilian or military) to charge no more than one shilling for a loaf of bread, and those loaves, in turn, had to weigh six pounds.56

Sutlers encountered more competition, and commanders more trouble, right outside garrison gates, primarily on market days but at other times as well. The military community's neighbors operated market stalls and grog shops, engaged in major wholesale transactions and minor retail sales, and tried just about everything, legal and illegal, to make a profit off the army's people. Commanders tried to control profiteering by extending their authority over all markets and marketers serving the Continental Community. Besides supervising the tradespeople who lived and operated within camp and garrison lines, as Gansevoort did with his cowherds and bakers, commanders regulated businesses brought into the lines temporarily and businesses outside the lines that were readily available to their people. Even though most of the marketers were local people who did not belong to the army, although at certain times and places they were subject to martial law, the army determined what they could legally sell to servicemembers, where they could sell their wares, and what prices they could charge.
The army established its control over marketers early in the war. In September 1775 General Greene noted that inhabitants were gouging soldiers' pocketbooks by demanding exorbitant prices for their produce. To combat that practice, he appointed Mr. Asa Minor clerk to the market and instructed him to establish a marketplace in front of Colonel Brewer's regiment. He then informed everyone that "No marketing what Ever is to Be allowed in any oather part of the Camp but at that place So appointed by the Clark. He is al[l]so to Regulate the Prises of all produce Brought into Camp and no Parson to Exceed the prices on penelty of having thair Porduce Saized and taken From them for the Benefit of the armey." Gansevoort followed that precedent at Fort Schuyler. On 31 December 1777 he said he would fix the prices on articles brought in for sale "so as to prevent any Imposition on this Garrison." The next February he delegated this authority to a "Court of Regulation" which established prices for cider, vegetables, fowl, dairy products, tobacco, and other items. This court ordered, "That for the future, No Farmer[,] Officer[,] Soldier or other shall be allowed to sell any of the above Articles at a higher price, . . ." There may have been a problem with this development: the passage was crossed out of the orderly book.

There was no such problem or question at Valley Forge. The orderly books in that command recorded numerous directions for markets and marketers. On 20 January 1778 Washington ordered his generals and other brigade commanders to meet at General Sullivan's quarters the next morning so as to decide whether or not a public market should be opened in the camp. If they decided in the affirmative, he wanted them to determine where and when the market should be held as well as what regulations and how many guards would be necessary to preserve good order. They also had to settle upon (after seeking the advice of "some of the most Intelligent Country Men")
appropriate prices for the items that would be offered for sale. These officers did not follow the first part of the order but did meet the remaining conditions. Instead of meeting on the 21st, they met a few days later on the 24th and at that time agreed to the establishment of a public market. Washington had the results of the committee's deliberations published in his orders of 8 February. In accordance with their recommendations, he declared that starting the next day, Monday the 9th, the market would be held at the Stone Chimney picket post on the east side of the Schuylkill river every Monday and Thursday, set up near the North Bridge every Tuesday and Friday, and placed near the adjutant general's office every Wednesday and Saturday. He also mentioned that they had fixed the prices on much of the merchandise and that handbills printed with the regulations would be delivered to the brigades so that the rules could be disseminated to the troops. As they had not yet settled upon a "clerk of the Market," Washington ordered the officer commanding the Stone Chimney picket detail to see to it that the regulations were followed and "to distribute the Handbills amongst the market people who attend."60

When Washington was comfortable with his three established and regulated avenues of supply--Commissariat, sutlers, and markets--at Valley Forge, he closed out supplementary acquisitioning. On 17 April he ordered regimental quartermasters to travel out into the countryside and contract with people for milk and other necessities for the sick. He wanted them to complete these transactions by the 21st, for after that date no one would have permission to leave the camp in order to purchase provisions: "henceforward no Officer[,] Soldier or other Person belonging to the Army shall go or send out to purchase any of those Articles which are usually brought to Market or bargain for them any where else."61 The markets had adequately and
efficiently (although, as it turned out, temporarily) filled the remaining gap in the supply system.

Marketers filled the gap, or at least part of it, from Cambridge to Newburgh, and the army welcomed their support even as it suspiciously scrutinized their business practices. When West Point's commandant in August 1780 ordered inhabitants bringing in items for sale to first have their names and business reported to him and then set up their wares at Elderkin's Wharf near the commissary's store and nowhere else, he was following well-established procedures forged in previous years and at other posts. But even as he regulated the outsiders, he made sure his own people did not interfere or discourage civilian enterprise. After hearing that soldiers attending the ferry had exacted pay from people using the ferry to transport their products to the garrison, the commandant strictly prohibited the practice and guaranteed severe punishment for transgressors. The army wanted no one to interfere in the exchange of goods once it had established regulations and sellers were abiding by them.

When or where the army found it difficult to control sellers, it tried to regulate buyers. In the summer of 1779, a board of officers established a price ceiling for produce and other items purchased by army personnel in the right wing of the army. Noncommissioned officers or soldiers found acceding to and paying higher prices were threatened with court-martial. After Washington recommended that other units abide by the newly established prices, the field officers and captains of the 2nd Continental Artillery encamped near Chester, New York, decided to adopt the new regulations within the artillery park with one temporary exception: as Mr. Freeman, sutler to the park, had already stocked up on certain items and arranged for more to be delivered as a result of an agreement with the corps, he could charge more and soldiers could, without
penalty (except to their purses), pay his prices. The officers did not want Freeman to suffer from a change inaugurated after their original agreement, but they granted this dispensation only for products brought into camp within a certain period. Colonel Lamb approved their recommendations and enjoined his officers "to secure & bring to punishment, any soldier who may be found acting contrary thereto." He also extended the order to include "women belonging to the park and should any one of them be found guilty of a breach of these Orders will be dismissed from the park with disgrace." Gansevoort enacted a similar measure at Fort Schuyler in 1777. After ordering that no one was allowed to sell liquor or any other article to a soldier without first receiving permission from the man's commanding officer, Gansevoort commanded that "no Soldier shall buy Spiritous Liquor or Articles of any other Specious at the present Exorbitant price upon penalty of being punish'd for Disobedience of Orders." Given the relative infrequent appearance of such orders in the books, commanders apparently preferred to regulate sources rather than recipients, especially where liquor was involved. Drunkenness was a continuing problem throughout the war. General Greene attempted to combat the problem on Long Island in August of 1776 by forbidding gin shops to sell their stock to soldiers and threatening soldiers found "disguis'd with Liquor as has been too much the practice heretofore" with dire punishment, "as no Soldier in such situation can be either fit for defence or Attack." He also ordered sutlers to sell soldiers no more than one-half pint of spirits per day. Greene warned everyone that if his orders were not complied with he would see to it that no more liquor would be retailed at all. Years later Washington was still fighting the problem. In May 1782 he tried exerting control at Newburgh via the liquor rations; he suggested that each corps maintain a liquor roll, "from which the name of
every soldier shall be struck off who adds himself to drunkeness or injures his constitution by intemperance." He also condemned the "evil practice of swallowing the whole ration of liquor at a single draught" and suggested that it could be prevented if sergeants would "see it duly distributed daily and mixed with water at stated times; in which case instead of being pernicious, it will become very refreshing and salutary." A year later the 2nd Continental Artillery was battling inebriation at West Point: "It has been observed that some of the Non-commissioned officers, and many of the Soldier[s], have (of late) been frequently seen Drunk on the Parade--As such conduct is not only destructive of all Order and Discipline, but disgracefull to the regiment; the Officers, are earnestly requested, streniously to exert themselves, to prevent, if possible, a practice, so extreemly injurious to the service; and ruinous to the Soldiers: as it totally unfits them for either Military, or, Civil Life."

The army attempted to prevent alcohol abuse by carefully distributing liquor rations and, more particularly, curbing the sale and sellers of the substance. In August 1775 Greene requested that officers in each regiment at Prospect Hill submit lists of the names and business places of persons retailing liquor without a sutler's license so that steps could be taken to "Supress impositions of this kind and the offendars brought to Due punishment." Early the next month, Greene dispatched a fatigue party out to "Plowd Hill" to put "Benjman [P]iper and [P]encan" out of business for retailing sutler's (liquor) stores without a license within the brigade's boundaries, whereby "the Throops are much Debauched [and] the Soldiers rendred Undutiful." Greene wanted Piper and Pencan imprisoned in the main guardhouse until further orders and their property confiscated. Other commanders at other times and places tried to rout out the problem as well. Four years later, in August of 1779, unlicensed people were selling liquor to soldiers in West Point and on
boats docked in nearby rivers, much to the subversion of good order and discipline. Major General Alexander McDougall decided to put a halt to it by having their liquor stocks seized and deposited with the commissary.69

When the alcohol problem became especially bad, commanders would not merely force unlicensed people out of business, they would also revoke sutting licenses and demand that those vendors leave camp. The army at White Marsh banished sutlers in the fall of 1777, but the measure proved ineffective when some of the sutlers and neighboring inhabitants opened "tipling Houses within and adjacent to the encampment." As a result the deputy quartermaster received orders to discover such houses and suppress them and to warn everyone engaging in "this pernicious trade that if continued any longer their liquors shall be seized and they expelled from the Neighbourhood of the Army on pain of the severest punishment if they return."70

The army never conquered the alcohol problem. It followed the troops wherever they went, often marching with the troops under the aegis of the soldiers and women followers who participated in the liquor trade. The 2nd Continental Artillery's commander, Colonel Lamb, strictly prohibited the practice at West Point in July 1780 after hearing that soldiers and their wives were selling rum to the men of the corps. He promised that men caught transgressing the directive would be severely punished and women offenders sent from the garrison. He then sent out the sergeant major to seize whatever illegal rum stock he could find and report back with the names of the delinquents. He essentially repeated the order for the corps (for his units at West Point and probably for those stationed elsewhere) three months later: "No Soldier, or Soldier's Wife to be permitted to sell any kind of Liquor, on pain of having it Seized, and the Soldier punished for disobedience of Orders."71
John Flagley, a matross in Captain George Fleming's company, almost experienced how painful the punishment could be. A court-martial found Flagley guilty of disobedience of orders for selling liquor and sentenced him to receive fifty lashes on his bare back. Before Flagley had to strip, however, Lamb or a detachment commander overturned the conviction by saying the charge was not supported. Apparently it was extremely difficult to keep artillerymen and, especially, their wives, out of the liquor business; for a year later, as the corps was bombarding Yorktown, an irritated Lamb again addressed the issue: "The Commanding officer is astonished, that altho' he has repeatedly issued orders, to prevent the Soldiers Wives selling Rum, the practice is still continued. He earnestly calls on each officer, to exert himself, in preventing it in future, as it is not only injurious to the Service, but disreputable to the Regiment."

Sexual misconduct was as injurious to the service as alcohol abuse, although not as prevalent. Promiscuity and prostitution fostered disease. In October 1778 Doctor John Cochran reported 20 men down with venereal disease at Fredericksburg, New York. A colleague, George Draper, reported 42 cases at Smiths Clove on 13 July, 25 cases at West Point on 2 August, a number that rose to 33 on 10 August 1779. William Brown, a physician and director-general of hospitals, in his "General Return of the Sick and Wounded in the Military Hospitals, belonging to the Army, . . ." for the month of February 1780, recorded that 115 venereal patients remained in the hospitals as of 1 March. Commanders tried to prevent the spread of social diseases and, more important to some, social and military disorder by banning prostitutes from their camps.

Very early in the war, in June 1775, General Artemus Ward ordered that no lewd women be allowed in camp. Anyone knowing of such people was to report them so that the "nuisances" could be dealt with. In May a year later,
while encamped in New York City, the 1st New York regimental commander, Colonel (later General) McDougall, ordered, "No Woman of Ill Fame Shall be permitted to Come into the Barricks on pain of Being well Watred under a pump, and Every Officer or Soldier who Shall Bring in Any Such woman will be tryd and Punished by a Court Martial." Unfortunately for McDougall and other commanders, New York City offered a variety of other locations in which the pleasure trade could be pursued. An area called the Holy Ground (it was owned by Trinity Church) was known as a prime location for prostitution. Stories circulated that Holy Ground prostitutes infected as many as forty soldiers from each regiment and that a few of them had killed two soldiers and castrated a third there. Supposedly, other soldiers wrecked the houses where the latter crimes had been perpetrated.

Prostitution was a problem but not a great one. Orders guarding against prostitutes were rare, courts-martial against women accused of the crime even more so. Civilian women formally engaged in the trade apparently rarely followed the often impoverished American soldiers. Smart businesswomen preferred British officers who had more disposable income, although the association could be dangerous if their client happened to be on parole, as a couple of women learned at Prospect Hill in June 1778. An American sentry mortally wounded Lieutenant Brown, of the 21st British Regiment, when he insisted on passing the sentry's position while "riding in a chaise between two women of (easy) virtue." As it was contrary to general orders to allow women to pass the lines, it was the sentry's duty to stop him. "The unfortunate officer treated the sentry with contempt, insisted on passing, without giving any reason for so doing; upon which the sentry, after repeated orders to the officer to stop, shot him through the head." A few female followers of the American army may have turned a trick or two when desperate, but the
evidence suggests that the great majority never practiced the profession. On
the other hand, as hospital returns indicated, men and women of the army
were by no means celibate. An occasional letter illustrates the point as well.
Samuel McKenzie, a surgeon in the Hospital Department, wrote to his superior
and friend, Doctor Jonathan Potts, from Bennington about his social life: "I
want Doctr. Treat here very much to prescribe Rules for the Doctrs as they
[s]eem very fond of Bundling and the Tory Girls seem to have no Objection to
that kind of amusemt. I assure you tho' our room is not 12 feet square we had
no less than three females last night and expect more this [evening]." He went
on to say that he intended to take a room at the Parrons; the added attraction
there was Mr. Parron's daughter, a "Delicious fine Girl" who could not be
debauched for that had happened some months ago.79

A few other army neighbors and followers endeavored to offer other
special services. When Doctor James Thacher returned from his furlough to
resume his duties at the hospital in Albany in February 1778, he found that
some "gentlemen belonging to the hospital[,] being desirous of improving in
the accomplishment of dancing," had convinced a Mr. John Trotter to instruct
them in that art every afternoon. Trotter had taught dancing in New York City
for many years and was considered an accomplished master.80 Thacher did
not explain why Trotter was in Albany, but it is possible that the aging Trotter
(at approximately 58 years of age) was a refugee from British-occupied New
York City. The 2nd Continental Artillery instituted another sort of school
when it was quartered at Pluckemin, New Jersey, in February 1779. The
artillery had been using the local schoolhouse or academy for courts-martial,
officers' meetings, and other official functions, but then it went a step further
and engaged Mr. Colles, the preceptor, to teach the officers of the corps
mathematics and other pertinent subjects that would better qualify them for their duties.81

Civilians provided the army with the services and supplies it needed (although frequently not at the time or in the quantity required) and some it did not. These sellers, as sutlers, contractors, and other marketers, "belonged to the army" in different degrees, the "belonging" determined by who was doing the selling, and where, when, and how they marketed their wares. Some of the army's followers engaged in trade, and sometimes those engaged in trade became camp followers. Sutlers, by the very nature of their appointment, lived and operated under military control. Contractors accepted military supervision but enjoyed certain legislative as well as mercantile prerogatives within the Continental Community. Other marketers included soldiers' wives, who as followers were already subject to military government, and neighboring inhabitants, who as unaffiliated civilians were not. Whether or not they actually belonged to the army, they all found themselves subject to military intervention whenever they pursued their trades in or close to the Continental Community.
Chapter III Notes


2. William C. DeHart, Observations on Military Law, and the Constitution and Practice of Courts Martial, . . . (New York: Wiley and Putnam, 1846), 24-25. This is a later interpretation of a later set of articles, but the camp follower article did not change much in the 70 years after the 1776 Articles of War, nor did the military's definition of sutlers/traders and their liability.


4. British Article II, Section VIII, Ibid., 935.


9. Headquarters Valley Forge, 26 January 1778, Headquarters Valley Forge Orderly Book, 1 January- 31 January 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, National Archives.

10. Headquarters Valley Forge, 16 April 1778, Major General Heath's Headquarters Orderly Book, from Boston to Providence, 23 May 1777- 20 October 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection.


14. Headquarters [Ticonderoga], 27 July 1776, & Brigade Orders, [Ticonderoga], 9 August 1776, Ibid. The brigade orders specifically referred to Colonel St. Clair so I called him such in the text; however, St. Clair was promoted to brigadier general effective that same day—9 August.


16. Camp near Chester, New York, 24 June 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 8 June, 14 June-19 August 1779 (kept by Chilian Ford). Entry mentions the price of "flitch"; flitch generally referred to bacon, as in a flitch of bacon.


19. Examples of brigade & garrison orders forbidding sutlers to sell liquor to soldiers without their customers having written permission include that already stated in note 16 and then the orders at West Point, 1 March 1783, in Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 20 February-28 March 1783. The transformation into a general order came at Headquarters Newburgh, 21 May 1783, *General Orders of George Washington . . .at Newburgh*, 82-83.


23. Headquarters [Ticonderoga], 5 September 1776, Orderly Book of the 4th Pennsylvania Battalion, 10-30 April 1776 & 21 June-20 September 1776, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. It is sometimes difficult to determine which general these orderly books are talking about, at times they refer to Washington and at others to their local commanding general; in this case it appears that Washington sent on a comment to be delivered with the resolve.

24. The above copy of the resolve only reached Ticonderoga on 5 September, another copy had reached the 1st Pennsylvania Regiment by 21 June (with the caveat that "The Genl. expects a strict obedience will be paid thereto), in Orderly Book of the Pennsylvania Rifle Regiment, 16 June-4 October 1776, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. "Lt. Col. Belinger" was mentioned in Citizen Soldier: The Revolutionary War Journal of Joseph Bloomfield, ed. Mark E. Lender & James Kirby Martin (Newark, New Jersey: New Jersey Historical Society, 1982), 103. No Belinger or Balinger is listed in Heitman's Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army, but he lists a Lieutenant Colonel Fred Ballinger of the New York Militia and a Colonel Peter Bellinger also of the New York Militia.


27. Headquarters Newburgh, 13 May 1782, Boynton, General Orders of George Washington...at Newburgh, 18.


33. The Richard Backhouse Account Book, 1775, at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, contains statements from suppliers on the amount of money they received for their goods, certificates from company commanders that Backhouse supplied their riflemen with provisions, notes by Backhouse on what he was paid by Captains Chambers, Hendricks, and Miller of Thompson's
regiment for delivering their supplies, and a mileage count from Pennsylvania to Massachusetts among other things.


35. McKesson, John, *In Committee of Safety...* New York, 30 March 1776. A pass issued to Daniel Hinslee, butcher, allowing him to travel into different areas of New York and on into Connecticut in order to procure cattle to fulfill his contract. The Abraham Livingston referred to in the pass may have been the same man who became a captain in the 1st Canadian regiment that December. Sol Feinstone Collection (microfilm).

36. Pickering to David Matthews, Wagon Conductor, Newburgh, 21 December 1780, about procuring forage for horses, etc., and mentions that Mr. Hoops, contractor for "Sussex Country," can winter any horses Matthews leaves with him. Pickering to Aaron Forman, Assistant Deputy Quartermaster, Newburgh, 30 January 1781, about stockpiling wood—he disliked employing soldiers for the task of cutting and hauling wood for it cost too much, so he advertised for persons willing to contract to supply the troops with wood and received some responses. In Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 124.


38. Ibid., 230-1.

39. Ibid., 232-3.

40. Ibid., 244-5, 187.


42. Risch, *Supplying Washington's Army*, 252-8 *passim*. Support for Risch's analysis can be found in the Pickering papers, Numbered Record Books, M853. Examples include Pickering's letter to Ralph Pomroy, New Windsor, 19 December 1781, roll 26, vol. 82 (part of which was quoted in paragraph); Pickering to Colonel Jabez Hatch, New Windsor, 15 December 1781, roll 26, vol. 127; Pickering to Colonel Hughes, New Windsor, 28 December 1781, roll 26, vol. 82; and Pickering to Comfort Sands, Esqr. & Co. (contractors), New Windsor, 4 January 1782, roll 26, vol. 83.


44. Earlier in the war, when the army employed "small-scale" contractors, they could be dealt with at subordinate levels in the staff departments or at the smaller unit level, but the big contractors at war's end needed to be handled at a central office. Pickering became a central point of contact; one can see this role develop in the correspondence referred to above.


46. Pickering to Colonel Hugh Hughes, Deputy Quartermaster General, New Windsor, 18 December 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vol. 82.
47. Garrison Orders, Burlington Barracks, 29 January 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 December 1781- 4 February 1782.

48. Copies of Benjamin Lincoln's "A System on which Provisions are to be issued" are in Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 February- 7 August 1782 and in the Orderly Book, Colonel John Crane's Third Regiment of Continental Artillery, 12 March- 18 May 1782, in New-York Historical Society's Collection of Early American Orderly Books (microfilm, David Library). "Monthly Abstract of Provision for the Quarter Master General's Department, under the Contract for the States of New York [&] New Jersey In the Month of January 1783" is an example of a provision return found in Record Group 93, Letters, Returns, Accounts, and Estimates of the Quartermaster General's Department, 1776-1783, M926, National Archives (microfilm, David Library). Extra note: officers did not receive ration allowances under the contract system as they had under the old methods; they received a subsistence allowance which they could use to purchase rations. Regimental Orders, Burlington Barracks, 10 January 1782(2), Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 December 1781- 4 February 1782.

49. Pickering to Smith & Lawrence, Contractors, New Windsor, 26 December 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vol. 82.


51. Headquarters Newburgh, 12 March 1783, & General Orders, Headquarters Newburgh, 19 March 1783, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 20 February- 28 March 1783.


57. Greene's Orders, [Prospect Hill], 19 September 1775, Robert E. McCarthy, ed., The Papers of General Nathanael Greene (Scholarly Resources, Inc., microfilm edition), Part I, part of Hitchcock Orderly Book no. 2 (with its extremely poor spelling & punctuation, this book records Greene's orders but is not representative of his better writing). Asa Minor is not mentioned in Heitman's Register as an officer in the army.
58. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 31 December 1777, & an entry that was
added to or just followed 7 February 1778 orders, Mss. Orderly Book kept at
the Headquarters of LTC Marinus Willett of the 3rd New York Regiment, 17
February 1777- 21 May 1778.

59. Headquarters Valley Forge, 20 January 1778, Headquarters Valley Forge
Orderly Book, 1 January- 31 January 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War
Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection.

60. Headquarters Valley Forge, 8 February 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book,
228-229. John Trussell examined the establishment of markets via Weedon's
orderly book in Birthplace of an Army: A Study of the Valley Forge
Encampment (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission,
1979), 31-32.

61. Headquarters Valley Forge, 17 April 1778, Heath's Headquarters Orderly
Book, from Boston to Providence, 23 May 1777- 20 October 1778, RG 93,
Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection.

62. Garrison Orders, West Point, 13 & 16 August 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly
Book, 26 June- 30 December 1780.

63. Camp near Chester, New York, 1 July 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 8
June, 14 June- 19 August 1779.

64. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 30 October 1777, Mss. Orderly Book kept
at the HQ of LTC Marinus Willett of the 3rd New York Regt., 17 February 1777-
21 May 1778.

65. Orders, Long Island, 16 August 1776, McCarthy, Papers of General
Nathanael Greene (microfilm), Pt. I, from Henshaw Orderly Book.

66. Headquarters Newburgh, 16 May 1782, Boynton, General Orders of

67. Regimental Orders, West Point, 2 May 1783, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 28
March- 25 June 1783.

68. Orders, [Prospect Hill, Massachusetts], 19 August & 2 September 1775,
McCarthy, Papers of General Nathanael Greene (microfilm), Pt. I, from
Hitchcock Orderly Book.

69. Headquarters at Moor[e]'s House, 12 August 1779, Orderly Book of the 1st
Pennsylvania Regiment, 24 May- 25 August 1779, Historical Society of
Pennsylvania.

70. Headquarters White Marsh, 24 November 1777, Major General Heath's
Headquarters Orderly Book, from Boston to Providence, 23 May 1777- 20 October
1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection.

71. Artillery Orders, West Point, 27 July & 26 October 1780, Lamb's 2CA
Orderly Book, 26 June- 30 December 1780.
72. No date or place but filmed before the 7 September 1780 entry, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 September-2 November 1780.

73. Regimental Orders, before Yorktown, 12 October 1781, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 20 June-21 October 1781.


78. Linda Grant DePauw, "Women in Combat: The Revolutionary War Experience," Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1981): 211. Although I do not agree with much of DePauw's analysis, I do agree that prostitution was rare and army women generally respectable. While courts-martial of prostitutes were rare, civilian court proceedings might tell another story. Brown's story was published in The REMEMBRANCER; or, Impartial Repository of Public Events. For the Year 1778. Vol. 6 (London, 1778), 346, and followed up in Vol. 6 ( . . . For the Year 1778, and Beginning of 1779), 2. Rare book room, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

79. Samual McKenzie to Potts, Bennington, 27 August 1777, Dr. Jonathan Potts Papers, 1766-80, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.

80. Journal entry, Albany, 4 February 1778, James Thacher, Military Journal of the American Revolution (1862; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1969), 122. Trussell in Birthplace of an Army places Thacher and Trotter at Valley Forge when they were actually at Albany. Thacher accompanied sick soldiers to Albany in July 1777 and remained there, except for his furlough, until the hospital was ordered to move to the Highlands in June 1778. Trussell may have been misled by Thacher's general December entry in which he recorded news of Valley Forge. (He also entered the page as 146 instead of 122, perhaps he had a different edition.)

IV. Retainers to the Camp

Among the diverse peoples who flocked to the army were many who could be categorized as retainers to the camp. While sutlers and other vendors followed the army in order to pursue profit, commerce was rarely the primary motivating reason for most of the other civilians who accompanied the troops, although some of them did engage in mercantile activities after they settled within the Continental Community. Retainers to the camp included servants, dependent family members, and volunteers: a varied group in terms of positions and power, they all had the same legal status under military law because they were people who followed the army on account of personal attachments and private intentions or loyalties. Some of them expressed patriotic sentiments and aided army operations, but their attention was generally focused first on the private and then on the public arena.

Retainers, by attaching themselves to officers or soldiers, helped form domestic units, families or circles of intimates, within the broader military community. Most could be labeled attendants: persons who accompanied and attended or served another person. They were servants, companions, friends, and family members. A few others would be more properly called adherents: followers or partisans, friends and companions who acted as aids and allies. Servants and slaves fit within the first category. Whether willing or unwilling, they were there to relieve their employers of domestic chores: to attend to their gear, meals, and quarters among other things. Wives and other family members, partisans and allies though they may have been, acted
primarily as attendants. When they visited male relatives in garrison or accompanied them on campaigns, they, too, took care of domestic matters, but they were also there to provide companionship. Volunteers, the term referring in this case to gentlemen in search of a commission or men who wished to be officers and thus gentlemen, performed as adherents, companions-in-arms, rather than as attendants. Commanders accepted them within their military families so as to utilize their talents and promote their training. A few volunteers were men who just preferred to fight as independents, but most planned to join the service. After presenting their petitions for officer’s appointments at headquarters, they socialized and even fought side-by-side with the officers and units they wished to join as they awaited word on their commissions. They could have returned home to await the answer, but volunteers were men who preferred action in the interim.

These camp followers had personal, as opposed to official, ties to the army (if they received and then operated an official sutting concession or if they accepted jobs within the civil or staff departments, they essentially moved out of this category of followers and into one of the others). They, more than any of the other camp followers (sutlers and persons serving with the army), seemed to fit the later British phrase that described such people as the army’s human *impedimenta*. Their ties to the military may have been somewhat tenuous and ill-defined, but commissioned and noncommissioned officers regulated them as they did everyone else they perceived as “belonging to the army.” If a retainer did not obey military orders, he or she could be punished and dismissed from camp. The military community’s need for order and security meant that everyone within it, including those not directly employed or contracted to the army, had to accept military discipline.
Private servants and slaves accompanying military personnel belonged to the army only as they owed service to their masters. Their masters or employers established their duties and supervised the work they did within the personal or domestic realm. The army usually remained a secondary supervisor, only adding extra external rules to the ones already imposed on them by their individual masters; but sometimes the army's or public's needs outweighed private ones, and the army appropriated their persons and labor for its own use. At such times the army also generally ordered that soldiers serving as servants return to the ranks and resume combat duty.

As a secondary supervisor, the army tried not to undermine a master's authority; it usually recognized the primacy of the master-servant relationship. The exception to this practice occurred when the army occasionally impressed slaves to serve the army's needs. Even then, the army generally did not commandeer slaves serving military personnel; it tended to impress slaves belonging to civilians just as it did provisions and transport animals. This happened to John Turberville of Westmoreland county in Virginia. In March 1778 the army impressed a wagon, team, and Negro driver belonging to him in Alexandria to transport soldiers from Virginia to the Continental Army in Pennsylvania. As it happened, the army then detained his property for further public service. When it had still not returned the driver, team, and wagon years later, nor paid for their use, Turberville presented a petition in 1781 to Virginia's House of Delegates for restitution. Although he presented affidavits to support his claim, his case was weakened by the fact that he had not been present at the impressment and had received no certificate recording the seizure. The house rejected his petition.
Turberville was not lying about the impressment, and the driver had indeed disappeared, then it was possible that the driver took impressment as an opportunity to gain his freedom, either driving away from the army after he completed his task, or, after declaring himself a freeman, continuing in the military's service either as a soldier or as a wagoner in one of the civil departments. The driver may also have died while with the army.

There is no evidence that the army as an organization ever owned slaves itself; but it readily accepted the labor of slaves on loan (whether willingly or unwillingly furnished) and then tenaciously held on to them for as long as possible. General William Smallwood once wrote the president of the Maryland Council to request that the sale of two black women provided for his unit be suspended. He said they provided a valuable service: they released soldiers from kitchen duty. The Quartermaster Department also benefitted from slave labor. When manufacturing armaments in Philadelphia in 1780-81, it paid owners for the use of their black servants.

In theory, if not always in practice, the American army acknowledged the right of masters to their human property. Military policy forbade the enlistment of indentured servants or slaves. Recruiters and other officers sometimes ignored the stricture when trying to fill their quotas, but it was always at the risk of being discovered and punished. The army looked equally askance at its people usurping the bodies or services of other people's servants for their own (as opposed to military) purposes. A general court-martial held on 8 April 1778 tried Lieutenant William Orr of the 10th Pennsylvania "for ungentlemanlike behaviour [in] conniving with Serj. Heine, in secreting stolen food. 2dly for countenancing him in carrying off & offering for sale a Mulatto Slave belonging to Major Shaw." It found him guilty of the first
charge (the record does not mention the results on the second) and sentenced him to be discharged from the service.5

The army had to work on a larger scale to determine status and return slaves when it was inundated with African-Americans at Yorktown in 1781. On 9 October, after being informed that some officers had in their possession "Negroes, who have come out of N[ew] York," Washington ordered that reports of all such newcomers be made to the adjutant general. He guaranteed that militia and Continental officers found keeping such persons unreported and in their service would be called to "severest account." That was not the end of the matter; with the capitulation of the British, the problem of runaway slaves in camp escalated rapidly. Washington noted on 25 October that "many Negroes & Mulattoes the Property of Citizens of these states have concealed themselves on Board the ships in the Harbour, that some still continue to attach themselves to British Officers & that others have attempted to impose themselves upon the Officers of the french & american Armies as Freemen & to make their Escape in that Manner." To close that avenue of escape, Washington directed, "all Officers of the allied Army & other Persons of every Denomination concerned . . . not to suffer any such Negroes or Mulattoes to be retained in their service but on the contrary to cause them to be delivered to the Guards which will be established for their Reception at one of the Redoubts in York & another in Gloucester." He appointed a Mr. David Ross to superintend the internees and to issue them passes that would enable them to return to their masters. African-Americans who could prove they were free would be allowed to determine their own fate. Washington also mentioned that he wanted the officers who had reported "Negroes in their Possession agreeable to the Order of the 9 inst" to deliver them to Ross that day or the next.6
Washington's concern may have been due to the rumor that the British had sent a large number of blacks sick with smallpox out of Yorktown just before the battle in the hopes of infecting their besiegers. A more probable explanation for Washington's close supervision in the matter was his profound belief that one of the army's duties was to safeguard the property of American citizens. Although he had begun to question the morality and the economic feasibility of slavery before the war, it was not his right or duty as commander in chief to deny owners their possessions, even when those possessions were human beings.

The American military's methods of dealing with slaves serving with or in the army were also a response to British practices and public outrage. John Murray, earl of Dunmore and royal governor of Virginia, issued a proclamation in November of 1775 that sparked outrage and controversy throughout the colonies, but especially so in the southern ones. He promised freedom to all black slaves and white bondsmen (with rebel masters) who joined the British army. Thousands of slaves responded to that call during the course of the war. The British army made soldiers of some of them but utilized most as laborers. Americans reacted with fear and anger, threats and closer supervision. They took measures to prevent slaves from reaching British lines and published warnings in their newspapers to be passed on to slaves and those who would help them. Papers included articles describing British mistreatment, including reenslavement, of blacks, as well as promises of punishment for those found guilty of insurrection. The 13 December issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette carried a 29 November report from Williamsburg, Virginia, that stated that blacks were already deserting Dunmore due to his cruelty. The article warned slaves and masters alike: it told the former that Dunmore intended to place them to the front of the battle lines to prevent
them from fleeing, while telling the latter that some blacks had been sent to
pillage the neighborhood. The paper concluded its account on the
Dunmore/slave issue by reporting the fate of some African-Americans who
had attempted to attach themselves to the British army instead of remaining
with their American masters: "Nine Negroes (two of them women) who have
been endeavoring to get to Norfolk [to join Dunmore's forces there] in an open
boat, and put ashore on Point Comfort, were fired upon by some persons in
pursuit, taken, and brought here on Thursday; two of the fellows are wounded,
and it is expected the rest will soon be made examples of."10 There were few if
any comparably desperate flights on the part of blacks to follow the
Continental Army.

The exodus of slaves continued in Virginia and elsewhere. In February
1779 David Crane advertised a reward for the return of his mulatto, James, who
supposedly sought refuge aboard an English ship in 1777 but had since left
that army to lurk around Philadelphia. That July Persifor Frazer also
published his loss: "Ran away about 14 months ago, & went into Philadelphia
whilst the British troops were there, a young Negro Wench, named PEG, about
20 years old, very lusty of her age, . . . , there is great reason to believe she is
in, or at no great distance from, Philadelphia, possibly in the Jerseys, as she
was seen last winter in the market. Whoever takes up and secures said Wench,
so that I may have her again, shall have One Hundred Dollars Reward."11 On 4
April 1780, Captain John Peebles of the British army in Charleston, South
Carolina, reported that five blacks "came in to us having made their escape
over the works."12 A letter from Hampton, Virginia, published in the
Pennsylvania Gazette on 22 August 1781, mentioned that African-Americans
were flocking to the British at Yorktown and Gloucester, where they "ease the
soldiery of the labourer's work." The paper reported on the issue in a
different vein that November: "It must inspire every feeling bosom with horror and resentment, when they are told, that out of upwards of 2000 slaves, who joined Lord Cornwallis's army, upwards of 1500 have perished from disease and famine. . . . provisions were only given to those men who were able to work, whilst the women, children, and men debilitated by sickness, were left to linger out a miserable existence, . . . Many were turned out in such a situation, that they expired before they could reach our army."13

The British also stole slaves (there was a fine distinction between American impressment and British stealing—the interpretation rested on who did the taking, who was the victim, and who reported the situation). Joseph Holmes, junior, reported in the Pennsylvania Gazette in May 1777 that "on or about the 10th day of December last, Anthony Woodward, junior, of Upper-Freehold, county of Monmouth, in the eastern part of the state of New-Jersey, came to my house, in said township, with others, seised on my Negroe man, two horses and waggon, and sent them into service of the British army." Years later, in August 1781, one of the paper's correspondents in Virginia informed the public that the British, in passing through a plantation about twenty miles from Richmond, stole fifty slaves, thirty horses, all the cattle, sheep and hogs, and then burned the barns. The author was particularly aggrieved because the slaves, who had been placed on board a British vessel that was shortly thereafter captured by American privateers, had been awarded to the privateers as prizes. He thought there should be a policy change on salvage rights.14

Others believed that a policy or legislative change on a broader scale was required; they thought the United States should not worry about compensating owners for human property lost in the war but instead should take the opportunity to abolish slavery altogether. Some Americans agreed
with the sentiments expressed by the author of an article in the 7 August 1782 Pennsylvania Gazette. They saw a contradiction between the nation's ideology and its practices: it fought for independence under a banner that declared all men equal and deserving of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and yet kept some of its people enslaved. African-Americans were aware of the irony. Most continued to live with the contradiction because the majority of men with the power to free them either did not see or did not accept the contradiction. A few blacks, however, did use opportunities presented by the War for American Independence to escape bondage. Some African-Americans found that they could gain their freedom and personal independence by aiding the British rather than the Americans; it was another of the war's ironies.

The evidence strongly indicates that there were more black camp followers, as refugees and laborers (including servants), with the British army than with the American forces. But the British did not free all slaves; Dunmore's proclamation did not apply to the slaves of those loyal to the crown, nor did British policy convince Americans to change their own. American and allied officers, like their British counterparts, continued to employ a number of African-Americans as their personal servants. Washington's mulatto servant, Bill (or Billy), was a familiar sight around headquarters. Bill sometimes rode behind the commander at parades and accompanied him when he dined outside his own quarters. Baron von Closen, with the French army at Newport in June 1781, mentioned how everyone, especially at the beginning of a campaign, tried to provide for himself when an army left garrison. He himself set out with two servants and four horses. One of his servants, Peter, was a black man who had been born in Connecticut of free parents. Closen described Peter at various times as good, faithful, and honest. While it appears
that Peter was a free black, General Rochambeau wrote Governor Harrison of Virginia in June of 1782 that several French army officers, including himself, employed African-Americans, some of whom were free and some not.17

American officers employed both free and enslaved blacks but seldom differentiated their servants' status when writing about them. Servants were servants, and they all "belonged to" a master, whether that master actually owned them or not. The military position that camp followers belonged to the army echoed this attitude. Officers generally saw their servants as members of their families as well as employees and ordered them about accordingly. They tended to keep a close watch on their conduct, but they also included them in certain pastimes and worried about them when they were ill. When General Hand found a wounded black soldier by the name of Robert, who was suspected of having British sympathies, repeatedly visiting his quarters and his black servant woman, he became disturbed. He had reason to be alarmed; after overhearing a conversation between Robert and the woman, Hand concluded that Robert still intended to desert to the enemy and was attempting to seduce the servant to go with him. Hand confined him and then sent him on to Doctor (Charles) McKnight to be kept under close supervision until he healed and the matter of his loyalties was resolved.18

Colonel John Lamb of the 2nd Continental Artillery occasionally had servant troubles as well. In October 1777 an uncle, via another kinsman, sent him Jack, a black servant.19 Jack was a prisoner of the British by the end of 1779 (or did he cross the lines willingly and then tell another story when he returned?), and then, upon his escape that December, a slacker, as he settled in with his wife at Andrew Breasted's place in Essex County. Breasted wrote Lamb on 1 September 1780 that he had so little work to give Jack that the man did not
"half earn his Bread." He said that Jack wanted to remain there until his wife gave birth. He went on:

As they are both faithful Servants I cannot take on me to forbid him my house without Youre positive Orders[.] I have repeatedly told him I did not choose he should remain here without his Master's Consent & Order'd him to acquaint You of his being here, but having not hear'd from you, and thinking the Letters he wrote you might have miscarried was the Occasion of my sending you these Lines--As I would not have you think I mean to detain your Servant[.] Should be glad of an Answer to know if You think proper of Indulging him in his request or if he must be sent immediately to you. 20

While Jack pursued his own ends, Lamb was left with Ichabod (who appears to have been an African-American) and at least one servant boy. Ichabod was industrious enough, but the boy was another matter. When Captain John Harrison wrote Lamb on 14 July 1780, he asked Lamb if he had received the information about his horse that Harrison had sent him in answer to an earlier request. If he had not, the boy who carried the messages "est un Coquin ." Apparently Harrison had had a very strange conversation with the boy upon his delivering the initial letter. As the boy had been a stranger to Harrison, the captain had asked him if he belonged to Lamb. When the boy anwered in the affirmative, he asked what had happened to Ichabod. The boy said he had "gone off." Harrison was astonished, "What! [W]ith Colo. Lambs Baggage[?]" The boy replied, "Yes." Harrison was left to think this "a Devil of an affair" until Ichabod showed up "and set all to Rights."21

Doctor Jonathan Potts, as he transferred from his post in the Northern Department and assumed his duties in the Middle Department, received word of the death of one servant and the contrariness of another. On 15 January 1778 Doctor Robert Johnston at Albany wrote Potts that his servant, Mike, (apparently left behind because of illness) had died: "When taking Medicines to remove the Eruption he frequently went out, got Drunk & exposed himself to
the Cold, which I apprehend were the Occasional Causes of an Inflammation in his Liver, the predisposing Cause of a total Stagnation in the Nervous & Vascular System; which was the Proximate Cause of his Death."22 On 16 March John B. Cutting at Carlisle wrote a note to Potts at Reading about transportation problems due to high waters and medical supply problems due to lack of money. He also said that he had ordered Pott's female black servant to accompany supply wagons to Manheim. The wagons set out ten days ago, "but they were detained so long at the River that Madam grew tired and returned here again." On the 25th Cutting again wrote Potts, this time from Manheim, "I expect a fine Parcel [of volatile salts] manufactur'd at Carlisle, tomorrow, by a Waggon in which, Your Negro Wench was order'd to come hither."23 The servant woman was apparently being moved around so that she could clean Pott's house(s) and perform other chores in Manheim and Carlisle.

Servants and slaves belonging to military personnel figured not only in personal correspondence, but in newspapers, court-martial proceedings, and legislative petitions as well. For example, Andrew Caldwell advertised a reward for the return of "a Mullattoe fellow, named JACK" in the 23 May 1781 issue of the Pennsylvania Gazette. After describing Jack's appearance and character, Caldwell mentioned that Jack was "well acquainted with the country, having been two or three times at Boston, and was servant to Doctor Hutchinson when the army were at Valley Forge."24 Black servants also appeared as either defendants, witnesses, or when referred to as property, as evidence in courts-martial. A brigade court-martial acquitted Anthony, "a Negro belonging to Capt Carter," of the charge of theft in December 1778. When the commanding general upheld the opinion, Anthony was released from confinement.25 In September 1780 another brigade court-martial tried a wagon conductor, Patrick Quilley, "Chargd with fraud in Exchanging a publick horse for a
private one and selling the latter for a Negro Wench which he has as his own property." The court found him not guilty. Although it appears to have been unusual for someone not of the officer ranks to carry a slave with him in the service, Quilley's case proves it was not unheard of.

Service with a member of the military could occasionally lead a slave to freedom. When the armies faced off or maneuvered around each other, a slave on the American side could escape to freedom within British lines. Thomas Hughes's servant did that. Hughes, probably the Lieutenant Hughes who served with the 2nd and then 7th Virginia Regiments, petitioned Virginia's government in June 1776 for compensation for a slave he had purchased to serve as a servant for £20. His slave, trained as a soldier, served with spirit in many skirmishes, but then deserted to Lord Dunmore's forces on 19 January. The convention rejected the request for compensation. Another slave's service led to legal emancipation. Thomas Walker, Jr., petitioned for the emancipation of William Beck, a mulatto slave, first owned by Major Thomas Meriwether, and then purchased by Walker from Meriwether's heirs. Walker requested that Beck be declared free because during his servitude he "behaved in a most exemplary manner, while with him, under Colo. Charles Lewis in several Campaigns to the northward," and because Beck had also paid Walker his initial purchase price. Virginia's house and senate agreed to the request.

The slaves who followed the American army were African-Americans, but not all African-Americans with the army were slaves. Officers also employed free blacks as servants, used black soldiers as waiters (a common term for military servants), and the army's staff departments hired black laborers and wagoners. The black servants worked alongside white ones. Major General von Steuben provided an example of the mixture (and
inadvertently indicated a servant hierarchy as well) in a 1779 letter in which he related his 1777 welcome to the United States: "My reception at Boston was just as flattering for me as that at Portsmouth... Mr. Hancock took upon himself the provision therefor [for Steuben and his suite]. Wagons, sleighs, and pack-horses were procured for me; five negroes were given me as grooms and drivers, and a commissary to provide quarters and forage on the way. Since I had brought along from Paris only one valet and one cook, I engaged two Englishmen in Boston as servants, and made up my field equipage for myself and my officers."29

Both soldiers and civilians engaged in domestic or personal chores for the officers. Unfortunately, however, officers seldom indicated which type they were using when they mentioned servants in their letters (often carried by the very servants, acting as couriers, they referred to). For example, when Major Sebastian Bauman wrote his commander, Lamb, in January 1783, he asked, "Please to let me know whether Capt. Hubble has been at Newburgh... and if, whether he has left my Subsistance notes with you, if he has, please send them to me by the Bearer my servant."30 In another situation a few years earlier, Pickering wrote to a Major Willet, one of his assistant deputy quartermasters, to facilitate a servant's errand: "The bearer a servant of captain Rochefontaine waits on you with this request, that you will endeavour to obtain of David Spafford of Sharon (or whomever the horse shall be found with) Capt Rochfontaines horse, which the bearer is to bring to Camp. I have given him two hundred dollars new emission... to pay for the keeping of the horse & defray his expences to & from Camp."31

Such servants, whether carrying out courier or waiter duties, were often soldiers who had been assigned to the detail in lieu of their primary military occupation; thus they were not and could not be considered camp
followers. Washington, however, did not like to see his military manpower diminished in such a manner. He probably preferred that his officers use civilian servants as he himself did. Washington was attended not only by Bill but by women housekeepers as well. One of these housekeepers, Mrs. Thomson, "a very worthy Irish woman," saw to the general's comfort at his New Jersey headquarters in the winter of 1779-80. When Washington's table was reduced to rations and he did not have a farthing for extra fare, Mrs. Thomson asked him to have an aide attain extra bushels of salt for her. She then bartered the salt among some local people to obtain extra provisions for Washington's dining pleasure.32 Benedict Arnold followed Washington's example by employing Catherine Martin, the wife of a sergeant major in the 3rd Pennsylvania, as a housekeeper at West Point.33 But black body servants and female housekeepers were the exception, not the rule.

Many officers did not use--indeed, most could not afford to hire--outside help. The economic problem was a natural consequence of the necessity to build an officer corps which included men from outside the gentry. The other, or social, side of the problem was the fact that many officers believed they were entitled to military attendants as one of the perquisites of their rank: the use of waiters or batmen in European armies served as precedent. Washington understood the situation: when a man was commissioned as an officer, he was also declared a gentleman, and a gentleman had to live in a certain manner. So when the commander in chief found he could not unilaterally prohibit the practice (there were a few attempts),34 he tried to control it instead. First, Washington and other commanders wanted strict accountability of the use of their troops. In April 1778 commanding officers of regiments received orders "to be exceeding exact, to mention those offrs. in any Department, who detain any of their Soldiers as waiters or for any other
purpose, and every particular circumstance relative to their absence, as his [Washington's] fix'd determination is, that he will know the true state of his army." The 2nd Continental Artillery, like other units, was still complying with that order in 1783: in its last return, in April, before it was partially disbanded and then reorganized as the New York Corps of Artillery, its muster roll of the field and staff officers and noncommissioned officers not attached to any company included not only the sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant, drum major, and fife major, but Privates John Cumbo, James Brown, and Benjamin Chatsey, who were the servants to, respectively, Colonel Lamb, Lieutenant Colonel Stevens, and Doctor Tunison.

Washington and others next tried to retard the degradation of the ranks by limiting the number of soldier-servants allowed and by insisting that some of these men continue to bear arms and perform some of their military duties. Robert McCready noted on 26 October 1778 that the Western Department's commanding general, Lachlan McIntosh, had determined that, according to that week's returns, "above one 20th part of our little Army are employed as officers servants." McIntosh thought that excessive, especially as the having of servants was "Rather an Indulgence than allowd. and the men have hard Ducty between guards and fatigue." The general wanted his gentlemen to restrain themselves to a moderate number of servants, and to make sure that those soldier-servants gathered on the parade once a day to show that their arms and accoutrements were in order. In November 1779, because of the scarcity of men available for duty, Lamb asked his officers to "detain as few waiters as possible and order some that they have for that purpose to do duty in their compys." A general, probably Benjamin Lincoln, commanding the Yorktown division of which the 1st Virginia Battalion was a part on 16 October 1781, reminded his corps commanders to abide by the general orders issued in
1780 that established the number and disposition of the attendants allowed officers. The orders, or regulations, allowed field officers to have two servants "not Carrying Arms," permitted captains to have one armed and one not, and granted subalterns (lieutenants) one servant who had to bear arms. Servants who carried arms had to turn out with their companies on every occasion but did not have to perform guard duty. West Point's commander in September 1780, Arnold (before he fled to the British later that month), had refused to lighten servants' duties by even that much. He ordered that "Officers on Guard, and fatigue are to take their Waiters with them, who are to be considered as part of the details." He thought it "shamefull and injurious to withhold their services from the Public." Occasionally, Washington thought it important to remind his officers that their attendants were part of the army, not personal employees: "He persuades himself that it is totally unnecessary to signify that no retiring officer is at liberty to take with him his waiter be [he?] a soldier, or enlisted at the publick expence, but least through inadvertency such a thing should be attempted, it is hereby strictly forbidden."

Orders issued at the Philadelphia headquarters on 18 and 19 January 1782 more fully established the army's policies on soldier-servants. On the 18th the general ordered that in the future "no Person belonging to the Civil Staff, be permitted to take a Soldier as a servant: and that those Gentlemen in that Department, who now have such, return them to their respective Regts. or Corps, on or before the first day of April next, by which time he hopes they will be able to provide themselves otherwise, without Inconvenience." Washington then asked his corps commanders to attend to that order and do their part by recalling all men who were absent without proper authority, "especially those with Officers who have retired from the service." The next
day's orders informed corps and regimental commanders that they were not to provide servants or wagoners in the future unless expressly ordered to by the commander in chief or the commanding officer of the army to which they were attached. The orders then spelled out the new allowances for "Officers actually belonging to Regts. or Corps and serving with them." Colonels in the infantry, artillery, and all corps serving on foot could have two servants without arms. Lieutenant colonels and majors were also allowed two servants each, but one had to bear arms. Captains, subalterns, surgeons and their mates were each permitted to employ one servant who also bore arms. Field officers in the cavalry were allowed two servants each; their servants did not have to bear arms, but they did not receive public horses either. Captains, subalterns, surgeons, and mates received one each, without arms or public horses. All the field officers could take one servant with them on furlough, but no one else could take one from his regiment for any reason.4

Then, in what appeared to be a reversal, or at least an amelioration of the orders of the 18th, the new regulations allowed the general and military staff, and "Officers not belonging to Corps" to have servants (all without arms) in the following proportions: major and brigadier generals could have four, colonels two, and lieutenant colonels down to captains, plus aides-de-camp, and brigade majors could employ one. The contradiction to the previous orders was in the following proviso: when they could not obtain servants by any other means, they could take them from the army.4

Servants carrying arms were exempt from sentry duty and other camp chores, but had to appear under arms when their regiment paraded. They also had to mount guard with the officer whom they served. In contrast, servants without arms were "never to appear in Rank or File except at the Inspection." Enlisted men detailed as servants without arms essentially became servants
first, soldiers second. Finally, the regulations stated that when a regiment marched out but left its camp standing, one servant to each company was permitted to remain behind. When a camp disbanded, and the baggage loaded, all servants were required to join their regiments.44

Some officers obeyed the various regulations over the course of the war; others worked around them. Lieutenant Isaac Guion, who had just assumed the additional duties of paymaster for the 2nd Continental Artillery, wrote Lamb about pay and clothing allowances in September 1779. He then asked to be allowed to remain with the artillery park at New Windsor instead of being shipped off elsewhere. He reasoned that his quarters were there and it would be "Attended with many difficulties on my part to remove, first the want of a Waiter, as I shall have to leave the one I now have, & in my Absence from Camp There'l be no one to take care of my tent & Clothes--likewise forage for my horse; I shall be ever ready to my duty from this place."45 Lieutenant Colonel Richard Varick, an aide-de-camp to Arnold at West Point, wrote to Lamb, who was also at the post in August 1780, that he was "much in want of a Boy" but did not have it in his power to procure a suitable servant. He then rather confusingly wrote, "The Bearer or his Companion a Negro Boy of Tom Ludlow is disposed to inlist in the service for the war. I shall be very happy if You will inlist him & permit me to have as a Servant. The only present Objection thereto is his not being furnished with under Clothes. I hope that Deficiency can be remedied."46 Varick could have been asking for either the bearer or his companion, but the likelihood is that both men wished to enlist, and Varick wanted Lamb to accept the black recruit as well as the white one and then send him back to Varick.

As Quartermaster General, Timothy Pickering was quite sensitive to the issue of staff officers using soldiers as servants. When Colonel Hughes sent on
a boy he had procured from General McDougall to serve Pickering's wife,.
Pickering wanted the servant returned to either West Point or sent to the
hospital, wherever he could serve best. After thanking Hughes for his
kindness to Mrs. Pickering, the quartermaster general explained why he could
not accept the gift: "I cannot consent that a servant for my private family [as
opposed to his military family] be taken from the army. Groundless
reproaches (and they do not seem to be wanting) I can bear almost without
complaining: but I should be mortified with a charge of public abuse were I
conscious of giving any colour for it." It was sometimes difficult enough to
justify the use of soldiers as servants to military personnel, but to justify the
use of one by a camp follower (as Mrs. Pickering then was) was almost
impossible.

Servants, their numbers and use, were an issue throughout the war
because they were a public expense. If they were soldiers, they received pay,
provisions, and clothing; if they were civilian servants, the army still
allocated provisions and clothing, or in 1783, a subsistence allowance, for their
upkeep. Pickering tried to explain this to a contractor firm, Comfort Sands and
Company, in January 1782:

By your issuing only part of the provisions ordered on Colo. Lutterloh's last return, I supposed you thought
no allowance was to be made for servants. But surely Officers
who procure their own servants, & pay & clothe them at
their own expence, may much more reasonably demand
an allowance of provisions for them, than those who take
soldiers from the line: yet the latter as soldiers cannot be
denied. However to remove all doubts I have proposed to the
secretary at war that provisions should be allowed to servants
enumerated in the inclosed list, and the conditions therein
mentioned, to which you will observe, he [h]as agreed. 48

General Greene in South Carolina that September showed that officers did not
necessarily even have to clothe their personal servants. To establish his
army's clothing needs, Greene ordered the regimental clothiers to obtain
certificates from the proper authorities detailing the number of men
mustered, those who had since died and those who had since joined, and "the
number of Servants, belonging to Officers, who are not mustered as Soldiers,
and are entitled to Clothing." After those numbers were added up, appropriate
deductions were to be made for personnel in the Wagon Department, Captain
Wilmot's detachment, and for all who have left on furlough "either as Bat Men
or Servants to Officers."49

When the army regulated the number of servants "not carrying arms,"
it determined not only how many soldiers could be so detailed but how many
personal servants could legally be provided for by the army. Officers put such
attendants on provision and clothing rolls or, under the new regulations
effective in January 1783, provided for them themselves with the subsistence
allowance given them for that purpose.50 So when regulations allowed an
officer one or more unarmed servants, and that officer utilized civilians
instead of soldiers in that role, he could in all propriety request (for most of
the war) that the army provision his private servants as it would have
provisioned "government-issue" ones. Indeed, the numerous orders suggest
that many officers went beyond propriety and requested (and received)
provisions for unauthorized servants as well.

Although many, if not most, of the servants with the army were actually
in the military, a great many others were civilians. Some, like James
Anderson (alias Asher Crocket), followed the army as officer's servants until
they were old enough or big enough to enlist. Anderson was about 16 years of
age when he ran away from his master in Hampshire County, Virginia, and
fell in with the Continental Army. He followed the army into Pennsylvania
and New Jersey and stayed with it for two years while serving in the capacity
of camp boy and waiter. When, upon his return to Hampshire county, his
master attempted to reclaim him, Anderson turned to the army once again. He first tried to substitute for a draftee but was rejected because of his size. He was, however, then allowed to enlist on his own account. African-Americans comprised the other major servant group. Black slaves and free servants either followed their masters to war or were provided by other individuals and organizations to serve the men who served the country. A few women, black and white, and a few adult white males followed the army in the capacity of servants, but the majority in this category were male juveniles and black men. These civilian servants with the military were often people deemed ineligible or undesirable for service in the army.

II
Family

Women were ineligible for military service, but they were a highly visible, vocal, and patriotic part of the Continental Community. Their positions within that community reflected both the sphere of women in society as a whole and the respective classes from which they came. The majority of women with the army represented the poorer elements of American society. When people talked about "women of the army," they were referring to the low-status women who lived and worked among the troops. The association of these followers with the military contrasted sharply with that of the senior officers' wives, the next most visible class of women. The wives, or ladies as they were also called, of the senior officers visited the military's ranking personnel to give domestic cheer and comfort. Both groups followed the army to remain close to loved ones, but whereas the first also operated under the necessity to find sustenance, the second entered the camps prepared for an active social life. A third group, junior officers' wives, appears to have been
quite small and composed of a socially mixed membership. Some members demonstrated attitudes and activities that mirrored the first category of women, and others, the second.

The army, although sometimes begrudgingly, endeavored to provide for all its female dependents. Officers put soldiers' wives to work and allocated rations for them while squiring their own wives to dinners and dances in both the military and civilian communities. Then, when the army readied itself for a campaign, most officers sent their own wives home and ordered the soldiers' dependents who would continue with the army to stay out of the way and obey all regulations applying to their conduct. Sometimes they obeyed, and sometimes they did not, as they juggled their jobs, domestic obligations, and personal desires within the military framework. Obedience was contingent upon a variety of factors: the strength of the desire to remain with the army, the acceptance of the primacy of the military mission, and, for a few, an identification with the army and a belief that they could contribute to its efforts to achieve national independence.

Dependent camp followers came from every state in the new nation. Although a few of them did pick up arms on occasion, they entered the Continental Community not to fight but to be with male kin, sustain their families, and generally to serve their own interests. Most women with the army remained focused on their own domestic circles and chores throughout their association with the military, or more accurately, their association with military personnel. They remained within the feminine sphere even as they entered the military one. Both their attitudes and their jobs reflected those held by their counterparts in civilian communities. Indeed, residence within the Continental Community reinforced their beliefs (and those of the soldiers) on femininity and female roles. Exposed as they were to the horrors of war
and the harshness of life on campaign, both the men and women of the army may have clung all the more tenaciously to an image of peaceful domesticity. They tried to maintain a facsimile of it when *en famille* with the army and looked forward to recreating it at home when the war was won. The very nature of the military community and way of life magnified the issue of female dependence. Whereas women left alone at home when husbands or other male family members joined the army learned to exercise and often to like autonomy, women with the army remained heavily dominated by males. That domination was twofold: on a primary level they were controlled by their male family members, and on a secondary level by that most male of institutions, the military. Although repeatedly, if not daily, exposed to a revolutionary rhetoric that denounced enforced dependence, and although they called themselves patriots as they labored to support their soldiers and the war effort, most camp women did not use the Revolution's precepts to revolutionize their personal lives: they instead accepted the growing glorification of their domestic position.

The women of the army, like their sisters elsewhere, saw their domestic roles become politically and even militarily significant. Women's roles within household and society did not fundamentally change; what did change was the perception of the importance of those roles. A woman could display her patriotism through her actions as consumer, household manager, producer, wife, and mother. She could strike at the enemy by boycotting British merchandise, and then curtail household consumption and step up home industries so that she could provide her army with needed provisions. Finally, in her most patriotic act, a woman could subordinate her needs to those of the nation's and send her father, husband, brothers, and sons to war.
This shift in the perception of the role of women was a result of the American rebellion and a part of the American Revolution. Women themselves did not take this opportunity to rebel against their position in society; instead, they used their position to aid the efforts of the United States, but their utilization of that position and the recognition afforded it by male Americans established its place within the new political environment. "Republican motherhood" was the most visible and long-lasting result. Both men and women came to believe that the future and security of the new republic rested upon the ability of the nation's mothers to educate their sons to be responsible citizens. That proved to be a momentous step, for after women established the importance of their influence within the household they set out to prove that the intelligence and capability required there could and should be applied outside the home as well. Their part in what was essentially a political revolution would lead to later American social evolution.

Camp women differed from their sisters at home in that instead of sending their men off to war, they followed them into camp. That made their patriotism suspect to some people who believed that the presence of retainers in camp distracted the soldiers and that retainers burdened the army's resources. Indeed, some female followers were not patriotic: they did put their own needs first. But other followers may have thought that their actions revealed a high level of patriotism: to allow the family's principal laborer join the army and then to follow him was a form of abnegation—a renouncing of what could possibly have been a more stable and prosperous way of life for a very risky one with the service. Actually, patriotism was a secondary issue, and the critics' arguments had value. Most families with the military were there simply because they had no alternative means of support; because of poverty or British occupation, they had no property or business to maintain
them at home while the father or husband was away. They relied on their uniformed family members to support them on a soldier's wages and rations, and they attempted to supplement that meager fare with rations allocated to dependents and by obtaining work within the Continental Community.5 6

Washington did not like to see his army laden with women and other family members. They distracted his soldiers, disrupted operations, and prevented the army from presenting a neat, uniform appearance. However, he accepted their presence because he knew that he would lose a good portion of his army if he did not. Men with families in trouble would desert or ask for hardship furloughs or discharges as Private Ralph Morgan did in December 1775. Colonel James Mitchell Varnum wrote Washington that Morgan, whose wife and two children were without a roof to cover them, had requested an eight-day furlough to deal with the problem. Varnum could not oblige on his own authority because of general orders that forbade furloughs for men who had not reenlisted (Morgan had declined the honor), so he asked Washington to make an exception in this case. Morgan received more than a furlough; he got a discharge.5 7 In the process of trying to deal with such petitions and desertions due to family problems, Washington came to accept the fact that in order to keep his army together he had to allow his soldiers the opportunity to keep their families together. After making that concession, Washington tried to make such retainers earn their keep and prevent their embarrassing him and the army.5 8

Washington never achieved the latter goal; female camp followers continued to embarrass him throughout the war. The majority of these women refused to display the decorum he expected of their sex, nor did they readily obey his orders. The problem was ultimately one of class roles and expectations. Washington associated with women of his own class. He
welcomed the presence of his wife when in winter garrison and enjoyed the company of his senior officers' wives when they visited the camps, but he was uncomfortable with women of the lower orders. In that society, where a person's place and behavior was defined both by class and gender, Washington was used to ladies (female + upper class = ladies), courteous to women (female + middling class = women), but bewildered by females (female + lower class = female). Ladies, and the women of the middle classes who tried so hard to mimic them, he could deal with, but females who followed a different social code were another matter. All of these women, regardless of social standing, occupied domestic positions and displayed so-called feminine behavior, but the duties inherent to their positions and the behavior acceptable to their peers differed according to class.

Most female camp followers lacked the polish and graces that were so much a part of the eighteenth-century lady. They did not retire from public view when pregnant and then give birth within the confines of their homes; instead, they followed the army even when big with child and then gave birth in camp or military hospital. They did not accept the concept of a genteel poverty; they would rather steal than starve. Finally, some of these women could match their men curse by curse and drink after drink. In other words, they practiced the domestic, economic, and social skills they needed to survive in their particular environment. Yet, to so generalize about these women is to ignore their diversity. There were both native-born and foreign women among the rank and file, single women and married women, women with children and others without. Some women had a great sense or need of family; others had none. On one occasion, a Presbyterian minister "suggested to the wife of the grenadier, Gabel, of the Royal Deux-Ponts [an allied force], that she leave him one of her daughters, whom he would adopt as his own
child, in return for some thirty louis to ease the campaign for her. The grenadier and his wife, who were very much attached to this child of four, steadily refused [his] offer. While some women wished to escape the confines of camp, others saw camp life as an escape. An Irish servant woman by the name of Mary Montgomery ran away from her master, John Heap, in 1777. When he advertised for the return of the runaway, Heap mentioned that he suspected that "she went after Captain Matthew Irvine's company, in General Weedon's brigade." Whatever their origins, these women were hardy people.

The army could not rid itself of these family followers, nor could it ignore them, so it decided to provide rations and a few services for a number of them, set some to work, and place all under military government. In the British army, a soldier's wife, one who had been married with the permission of the soldier's commanding officer, became part of the regiment. She was entitled to certain privileges which were denied the wives who were married without leave. The British army created this system of military marriage in order to control the rate and number of marriages among the troops, and to establish a means of absorbing the women and children into the hierarchy of the regiment. It minimized the threat to a man's military loyalty and efficiency by making the family indebted to the benevolence of the regimental officers and by subjecting everyone to military discipline. The family's allegiance thus belonged to the regiment rather than solely within and to itself. The American army could not establish a system of approved military marriages, especially since many men were already married before they signed on, but it could decide how many family members it would carry "on the strength" of its regiments. It also determined that retainers to the camp, especially those receiving army provisions, were subject to orders. If a
person accepted the army's food and hospitality then that person also had to accept regulation by the army. As in the British army, the American army implemented these measures in order to minimize the demands a family would place upon an individual soldier and to insure the allegiance of the family to the army.

There did not appear to be as substantial a following of retainers at the beginning of the war as at the end; it was either that, or the army just did not see them as a great problem initially, for it made few requests for official returns of the women and children in the early years. However, it may be that officers dealt with the problem rather informally at first, but later, when the army's supply system became more established (and, in particular, when contractors took over the provisioning for the army), they required a more formal accounting. In August 1779 Fort Sullivan's commanding officer, probably Colonel Israel Shreve of the 2nd New Jersey, informed his subordinates that he wanted returns of all the troops of every regiment left in garrison along with the women and children there. He said that no rations would be issued to anyone except those included in the returns. Captain Aaron Aaron of the 3rd New York complied with the order by submitting "A Return of the Women & Children Left in Charge of Baggage, Necessary to wash for Genl. Clintons Brigade." He counted the women and children belonging to the New York regiments. The 2nd New York had two women, a Mrs. Lambertson and a Miss Smith, and two children (who Aaron affiliated with Smith). The 3rd New York included a Mrs. Barker, and the misses Sherlock, Haburn, and Jackson on its rolls. Aaron did not give names for the 4th and 5th regiments, only numbers: four women and two children for the former, and three women for the latter.
After 1780 requests for information on families in camp multiplied. On 17 November 1780, while at West Point, the 2nd Continental Artillery, in accordance with that day's general orders, asked its company commanders "to furnish immediate Returns, of the Women, & Children, in their respective Companies, who draw Provisions; distinguishing those that are married; and those that are not." At another time, 19 August 1781, and place, "Cinksing," the army again asked for returns, this time "of all the Women and Children in Camp, distinguishing those that have Husbands, and also Returns of the Husband's Names, & whether they be in this Division of the Army or not." It wanted the returns delivered to headquarters by noon the next day. The 2nd Continental Artillery jumped right to it and ordered the returns made up and then delivered to its own brigade major at 10 o'clock the next morning. This artillery unit continued to keep tabs on its women even when there were no general orders specifically demanding returns. In May 1782 it asked that returns of the women in the companies, "specifying the Time they have been in the Regt.," be delivered to the adjutant. Then on 17 December it ordered that company returns of the women drawing provisions be given to the regimental quartermaster.

As the army entered the new year, and the last year of the war, it attempted to establish a new way to provision its families. The transition began with two orders: in the first Washington decreed that sixteen rations would be issued for every fifteen men in a regiment or corps, thus fixing that for every fifteen men one ration would be set aside for the women accompanying them; in the second he ordered, "A return of the number of Women in the several Regiments, which compose the Army, Certified by the Commanding Officer of the Corps, they respectively belong to; is to be given at the Orderly Office on the Second Day of January next." Then on 5 January
more figures were requested. Washington wanted to make a comparison between "the number of Women and Children, that would have drawn Rations, in the several Corps under the late regulations," and "the number of Extra Rations daily drawn in the Corps, agreeable to the present regulations." The army's administrators and supply managers included the 15:1 ratio in their new system of issuing rations under contract in an attempt to depersonalize the provisioning of families and to prevent abuses and overdrafts on the supplies, but Washington, although he accepted and implemented their new regulation for provisioning these retainers, did not like the new rule and set out to discredit or circumvent it.

The new system was in actuality not at all new. The British army had utilized ratios to determine the supplying of women, generally accepting six or fewer women per company of 100 men, both before and during the war. American commanders, lacking guidance from their own headquarters, had used that ratio as an informal guideline when apportioning rations for their companies or regiments. By 1781 the army's administrators clamored to have a rule regulating the provisioning of camp women established. General Hand, the army's adjutant general, in a report to the Board of War that May, wrote, "I wish it could be determined what number of women should draw rations in a regiment or rather what proportion their number should bear to that of the men; and whether Children be allowed Rations." A month later Benjamin Lincoln, the secretary at war, and Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance, told Washington that they thought women's rations should be limited to a fifteenth of the rations issued to noncommissioned officers and privates. Washington disagreed at that time and continued to disagree almost two years later after such a ration plan was finally (although, as it turned out, temporarily) implemented. In January 1783 Washington
explained to Morris that he thought the new regulation implied that an abuse had existed which needed correction, and that he believed that was an incorrect reading of the situation. After consulting his orderly book, Washington stated, "upon every return of the number of Women called for (at different periods) when compared with the totality of the Army, it has been found, that no general Rule consistent with American, or British Customs, could be established that would not encrease the aggregate amount of the Issues and therefore that it was better to submit to a surplusage in some Corps than to render the expence greater and the evil more extensive by adopting a limitation whh. would pervade the whole Army, especially too, as some of those Corps were, and still are, under particular circumstances." He gave as his example the New York regiments who carried Long Islanders and others on their rolls who had fled British occupation. After seeing the suffering children, and hearing the cries of the women and the complaints of the husbands, Washington took action. He said that the latter had justly remarked that their wives "could earn their Rations [wages with which to buy their own food], but the Soldier, nay the Officer, for whom they Wash has naught to pay them." Washington felt the army had to provide for soldiers' dependents "or lose by Desertion, perhaps to the Enemy, some of the oldest and best Soldiers in the Service." 72

Washington always focused on the welfare, mental as well as physical, of his men rather than their dependents; but because the latter affected the former, he made concessions. Officially, Washington, as commander in chief and a public servant, stated (and associates such as Joseph Reed repeated) that families could not be supported on the public's or military's stock of provisions unless an emergency warranted it. 73 In practice, as a commander of and among troops, he took care of their (and thus his) retainers. After expressing
his disapproval of the new regulation to Morris and telling him that he thought it "a right inherent, with Command to limit (as circumstances and the nature of Service may require) the proportion of Women to the Men of an Army," Washington decided to exercise that right. On 8 March he wrote Knox that

The number of Women and Children in the New York Regiments of Infantry before the new System of Issues took place obliged me, either to depart from that System and allow them provision or by driving them from the Army risk the loss of a number of Men, who very probably would have followed their Wives. I preferred the former and accordingly directed that the whole of the Women and Children then with the Troops, should be allowed to draw as usual. So far as the Artillery Regimt. was under the same circumstances they are entitled to the same indulgence: but as that indulgence was to remedy, and not to create, an evil, I would by no means extend it to Women who on the prospect of it, have since been brought into Camp; and I would wish you to see that no such do draw Provisions. 74

Proof that Knox passed the word down to his artillery regiments appeared on 11 March when the regimental orders for the 2nd Continental Artillery stated, "The women who drew Rations from the publick previous to the General Orders of the 28th Decem[] last, will again be entitled to recieve provisions for themselves and Children."75

Washington's direct intervention in that case was somewhat unusual. He usually tried to stay above the problem, especially in the early years of the war, and thus avoid taking a stand that contradicted official policy. Instead, he permitted his subordinates to take care of their retainers as long as they did so prudently and accepted responsibility for their own actions. In effect, Washington recognized that a state of emergency often existed but left it to his subordinates to make the decision to help in individual cases and to find their own solutions.
Pickering encountered the problem of reconciling policy with practice in a particularly difficult case early in 1781. That February he wrote to Colonel Alexander Hamilton, one of Washington's aides-de-camp, for advice on provisioning the destitute families of two men, Moses Dean and Hezekiah Gibson (or Gillson), in Colonel Baldwin's Regiment of Artificers. Pickering filled pages with his distress:

A daughter of Gillson Lives with Mrs. Pickering; a little wanderer, a perfect stranger. Some time since she came unasked[,] when told by one of the Servants to go home, she replied 'her mother had nothing for her to eat.' Dean informs me that he has two other Sons (besides those now in the Artillery) who have served as Soldiers for three years. I enquired of both how they had subsisted their families in time past. [T]hey replied, that they had sold every thing they had brought with them . . . even to their very Clothes: and that during the last summer, & untill Arnold's Flight, they had been allowed to draw three Rations each for their families. They said that Genl. Poor at first, afterwards Genl. Arnold, gave orders for those Issues, which the Commissary had stopp'd since Arnold's flight. Dean first requested a similar order: but it appeared to me highly improper that public Officers, . . . should at their option become discretionary Almoners for the public. It would open a Door for innumerable Abuses. Too many irregularities of the Kind have already been practised. Yet the forlorn Condition of these poor men demands Relief. But they are not alone. Hundreds of Soldiers Families are also distress'd. What is granted to one should not be denied to another in like Circumstances: . . . I am clear it will be better to discharge Dean & Gibson than give them four daily Rations. But if we begin to discharge Soldiers to relieve their distress'd families, where shall we stop? . . .

As Cases similar to the above must frequently have fallen under your Notice, I beg you will inform me what order has usually been taken concerning them. 76

Hamilton replied that "the situation of the two artificers can only be pitied not redressed. The families of men in the service cannot be the object of military provision, and it will be impossible to discriminate. This is the General's sentiment and has governed in all former application of the same kind."77

Pickering apparently did not accept that as the only way to deal with the problem. In a letter to an assistant commissary of issues at Fishkill Landing,
Richard Platt, a deputy quartermaster, wrote, "The Q MGenl. having agreed, in consideration of the Wives of Hezekiah Gibson & Elihu Cary, cooking each, for a mess of Artificiers, which superseded the necessity of two men being employed on that Business, that one Ration should be allow'd, daily, to each of those Women." There was no mention of Dean and his family, but Pickering probably found a way to help them too.

Later that year, on 11 August, Pickering noted that the number of rations to be given to the families of the boatwrights serving the army in the Highlands was left to his judgment. He asked his deputy in New York, Colonel Hughes, to determine how many adult and juvenile dependents he would have to provision and how much each should be allowed. Pickering was anxious not to give them too much for he feared that they would sell or trade surplus and thus give "general offence." Hughes quickly responded, for just one week after his initial request Pickering wrote that he agreed to the ration allowance that Hughes had fixed upon.

Army personnel confronted rationing problems, including those resulting from retainers following prisoners, at every level in the chain of command. Lieutenant Garret H. Van Wagenen, a deputy commissary of prisoners at West Point, wrote Lamb at Fishkill on 13 September 1779 that he would willingly supply a Mrs. McCarty with provisions as soon as it was determined that her husband was a prisoner of war. Van Wagenen said the delay resulted from the fact that Mr. McCarty had changed his story: he had first declared that American troops had captured him just before Burgoyne's surrender but later asserted that he was actually a deserter from the British army. Van Wagenen asked Lamb to question the woman for her side of the story. A day later he had to again write to Lamb because Mrs. McCarty had taken matters into her own hands and had visited him that morning. She
declared that her husband was a deserter, so Van Wagenen told her that if that
proved true her husband would be released and if it was not, he would supply
her with provisions.\textsuperscript{80} Many dependents did not personally approach officers
with their supply problems; they instead asked the noncommissioned officers
for help. An example of this occurred in February 1780. Sergeant John
Mnthorn [sic] certified that the bearer of his note, Robert Blowers, and
Blowers's wife were each entitled to a two-weeks supply of state stores.
Blowers delivered the note to Captain Mead of the 1st New Jersey who, in turn,
added his authorization and sent it on to a Lieutenant Darby, issuer of state
stores.\textsuperscript{81}

The number and condition of families with the troops varied
considerably by time, place, and military unit. A provision return from New
Windsor in June 1781 indicated that 137 women received rations, while
another return in January 1783 showed that 405 women were provisioned at or
in the vicinity of West Point and New Windsor.\textsuperscript{82} Unfortunately, an
inadequate number of returns and the unequal distribution of followers (as
noted by Washington above) made an accurate accounting of these people
difficult then and now, but they did indicate that they numbered in the
thousands over the course of the war. Various notes and orders gave a better
indication of the quality of camp life than of the number of those who
participated in it.

The army's assistance to followers extended beyond rationing. It
quartered them within barracks, huts, and tents; and it gave them both
medical and legal aid. When the troops settled into barracks, space was
allocated for their families. In winter cantonments such as Valley Forge and
Morristown, commanders assigned camp women to the few huts set aside
specifically for them. The army also occasionally provided tents for retainers
when on the march or in more temporary encampments. On 17 August 1777
Captain Robert Kirkwood recorded his division’s instructions for determining
the number of tents needed. Brigade majors had to consult with the
quartermaster on the availability of tents and then turn to their adjutants to
receive a count of the men and women in their respective Regiments. After
that they were supposed to calculate the number of tents needed by figuring
one tent for every two commissioned or staff officers, one tent for four
sergeants, and one tent to six privates or corporals, as well as wagoners and
women and others. Circumstances, namely, not enough tents, caused the ratio
to be altered by 13 September. Each field officer received his own tent, but
other officers had to share four to a tent, and everyone else became quite
chummy at eight to a tent.83

Followers in need of medical assistance received care at the military
hospitals. Mary Beaches was laid up with a fractured femur in the hospital at
Albany in August 1777, while the hospital at Danbury took care of two
pregnant patients in the period from 20 October to 7 November 1778.84
Military hospitals and surgeons treated numerous retainers, but an accurate
count of the number of such patients and the nature of their illnesses cannot
be determined because the doctors and institutions did not always indicate
their patients’ status in their returns. Although many returns did give names
and unit attachment as well as reason for treatment, others only listed
disorders with the number of people treated, released, convalescing, or dead.
In the latter returns, unless the condition was sex-specific, such as pregnancy
and inflammation of the testes, there was no way to determine how many of
the patients may have been women.

Camp women who had been victimized sometimes had access to the
military legal system in their search for justice and redress. A garrison court-
martial at Fort Sullivan (this was probably the stockade built at Tioga Plains in August 1779) found a soldier, John Emersly, guilty of "Stealing & Selling Clothing belonging to Catharina Castner." Castner was very likely one of the nurses and washerwomen allowed to remain at this forward post after the garrison commander ordered all excess women to return to the rear in Wyoming, Pennsylvania. The garrison court sentenced Emersly to receive 100 lashes, the punishment to be carried out in front of the troops, and ordered that half his pay be held back or diverted each month until he had reimbursed Castner.85 Female plaintiffs appeared to have been quite rare; women more commonly appeared as defendants, although that too was relatively rare, accused of having violated officers' orders and army regulations.

Under Article 23, Section 13, of the 1776 Articles of War, retainers to the camp were subject to orders according to the rules and discipline of war. Noncompliance could result in the follower facing charges before a court-martial or, more commonly, summary punishment within the unit; officers frequently tacked on reminders of these possible consequences when they issued orders to followers. The army resorted to these orders in an attempt to prevent or ameliorate any negative impact the retainers may have had on civilian-military contacts, camp life, and army operations. The orders, with or without threats of dire punishment, served as a constant reminder of the army's jurisdiction over civilian dependents.

Army commanders strove diligently to maintain good relations with the civilian communities in which they encamped or through which they passed. They most especially did not wish to be embarrassed by the actions of their accompanying women, nor did they wish to be embroiled in quarrels or legal complaints that resulted from followers' misdeeds. Unfortunately, they frequently found their wishes ignored. On 16 July 1778 a general, either
Washington or a division commander, expressed his indignation that some
villain had dared to perpetrate horrible depredations in the neighboring
friendly countryside. To prevent further abuses, the general ordered that no
soldier or woman be permitted to leave camp except when accompanied by a
noncommissioned officer, both of whom had to have a pass from the
commander of their regiment specifying the time they left and the hour by
which they must return. The general warned, "any Soldier or Camp woman
found out of Camp, without such a pass to receive Immediately 50 Lashes, and
100 if found Plundering."86 Almost exactly one year later, the army again
received of numerous complaints from neighboring inhabitants. Horses
belonging to the army had cropped the harvest. As the army preferred to
believe that horses "of them that are not allowed By the Regalation of Congress
to keep any" were responsible for most of the destruction, the commanding
general at Smithes Clove requested regimental commanders "to order from the
Camp all those Belonging To women[,] soldiers and others not Inlisted within
thir Respective Commds."87 In August 1782 a garrison commandant, who may
have been at Burlington, New Jersey, but was most likely at West Point, ordered
stricter measures after hearing complaints that some soldiers and their wives
had been plundering the neighboring corn fields. He declared, "As they can
have no occasion to pass throught the Corn Fields, they are strictly forbiden to
do it in future: and such of the Soldiers as shall be detected in stealing Corn,
may depend on being severely punished. The Women who are found guilty of
the like, shall be drummed out of the Corps."88

The same commander ten days later "thought proper to direct that any
Women who may be found with the Regiment after this information [order],
that has not belonged to the Regiment prior to their arrival at this Post; and
who cannot produce Permission in writing from the Commandant for his
approbation of their continuance—may depend on being drummed Out of the Corps."9 Quite a few officers believed that the best regulation (or defense against problems) was good riddance (to launch an offensive against the women and children in camp). Washington had tried to implement such a policy in August 1777; when the army was encamped near Philadelphia, he prohibited the admission of new female followers in the camp and endeavored to get rid of some of those already in place.90 Such orders seldom resulted in a permanent reduction in the female force. Women ordered out of camp often returned.

As the army could not beat, either by drum or cat-o-nine-tails, all female retainers out of camp, it focused on preventive as opposed to punitive measures to regulate their conduct within its perimeters. It assigned them places and supervised their conduct both on the march and in garrison. Washington repeatedly ordered the women to remain with the baggage instead of marching alongside the troops when the army was on the move, and then constantly reminded them that they were to walk with the baggage, not ride in the wagons carrying it.91 These orders were passed down the line. Kirkwood recorded orders on both 26 July and 13 September 1777 that forbade women to accompany the troops and told them to stay with the baggage. The former order added that none were to ride the wagons except those judged really sick.92 It was not only a matter of image, important as that was to most Continental officers, there was a tactical reason for this as well. Baggage wagons encumbered the army's movements and were a major liability in battle. In the latter case, the wagons could be driven off the field and out of action's and harm's way.

The army generally saw its women and children as ambulatory baggage and ordered them about accordingly. If it served its purpose, however, the
army did occasionally allow its followers to ride, on both horses and boats, instead of walk. In August 1779 the headquarters at "Quiletimank" (in or near the Wyoming Valley in Pennsylvania) issued orders to units leaving there by water commanding that excess passengers on the boats be returned to shore unless they had a certificate from their commanding officer that stated they were unable to march. Headquarters also informed regimental commanders to order such women as could ride to disembark from the boats and proceed on horseback. Women riding the spare horses would "Diminish the Number of Drivers taken from the army."93

Officers also ordered women either to remain in a certain camp or go to a different one when they felt their units were too heavily encumbered with women. They were most likely to order this when preparing for movement or action. Washington recommended such a dispersal when he gathered his army together and marched it down to Virginia and Yorktown in 1781. Subordinate commanders did it when their own plans made it advisable. Orders telling the Delaware regiment on 18 June 1777 to ready itself for the march also directed that the women left on the other side of Connell's ferry and the men left to guard the baggage be brought immediately into camp.94 They would wait there until the troops returned or until they received orders to move out and join them elsewhere. The commander of Fort Sullivan, who was, coincidentally, General Sullivan, tried to strip his garrison of all superfluous personnel in August and September of 1779. On 27 August he ordered all the women (those same women who had accompanied him by horseback and boat up from Wyoming) except those employed as nurses and those "Absolutely Necessary to wash for the Troops" to get ready to move. He planned to ship them back to Wyoming where they would draw provisions until the troops returned to that post. Women who could produce certificates from officers
stating that they were to remain behind "to take Charge of Baggage or for any other Necessary Purpose" were allowed to stay. The commander warned that no provisions would be issued to women who presumed to stay without certificates or proper employment. On the 28th he gave the word that two large and 53 small boats would set out that evening. After reminding the women to embark in accordance with his previous orders, he added to his earlier warning: women who endeavored to stay without permits would not only receive no rations but would be sent out in a later party of boats. After a few weeks, still feeling weighed down by excess personnel, the commander ordered, "The Invalids & all supernumery Officers that have no Charge of Baggage are to go to Wyoming as soon as Conveneant, all Woemen that are Not Absolutely Necessary as Nurses in the Hospital, or to Wash for the troops, are Also to Go Down to that Post."95

The one thing that could guarantee a retainer a place and provisions with the army was her or his labor. Eighteenth-century Americans preferred to see their women working within the home; however, they also understood when economic necessity forced women to seek employment elsewhere. But such understanding seldom translated into more job opportunities or placement of women in well-paying, responsible positions. Women who did obtain the latter positions generally did so upon the death of their spouse: they managed the family business to support their children and then often handed it over to a son when he was of age to handle it. Most jobs available to women were simply extensions of the work they did at home: they sewed, cleaned, laundered, and nursed. And, if necessary, they or their husbands also put their children to work. Boys and girls, especially those of the poorer or middling economic classes, helped their parents in the home and at work, each within their gender-related spheres.96
The Continental Community mirrored the rest of American society in its utilization of female and, when using boys as waiters and girls as mothers' helpers, child labor. The army would have preferred to have done without women's help but found it could not, yet it offered little thanks for such support services. There was no glory in such work; because it belonged within camp and baggage train and off the battlefield, army and society awarded it little recognition. Such work belonged to women, and men wanted no part of it. However, when women were not available to assume these chores, or if they refused to have the entire burden shifted to their shoulders, men did learn to perform some of these tasks. Soldiers learned to cook and wash and nurse. Indeed, they were part of a new military trend: from the eighteenth century on, armies first assumed greater control over and then internalized (or militarized) their support services. The role and importance of noncombatants declined. Perhaps Washington's attitude against retainers was not a personal or instinctive reaction: it may have reflected his preference for a more modern military (as in controlled and professional) approach to support services. Unfortunately for Washington, he did not have enough manpower to perform these duties; he had to resort to womanpower. As it turned out, the employment of camp women helped resolve a dilemma: as they had to ration most of these followers anyway, leaders found they could better justify their largesse if the women were actually working for their companies and regiments.

American commanders set their female retainers to work at a variety of domestic chores and domestic manufactures. Although it appears that it was not common, or perhaps it was just another of those ignored and thankless tasks, women sewed and mended military apparel and equipment. On 11 January 1781 a pleased Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens of the 2nd
Continental Artillery informed his company commanders that he had procured enough cloth that could be made into coats for the regiment. Interestingly, on the 16th a regimental order asked for an immediate return "of all the Taylors, and Women in the Regiment." The women were probably asked to help in the endeavor, but orders on the 22nd only mentioned, "Those Taylors that have been returned, are to get ready to work upon the Mens Coats tomorrow morning." It was quite possible, for it was a common distribution of tasks, that the women cut out the patterns and left the actual tailoring to the men. In April 1782 Pickering wrote to Peter Anspach (there was a clerk and paymaster of this name in the Quartermaster Department) telling him that he wanted Mr. Meng (probably Christopher Meng, a storekeeper with the Main Army) to examine the bolts of oznaburg cloth that had arrived from Virginia and pick out what was best for knapsacks and get as many made as possible. Pickering suggested that if Meng cut out one in the proper shape, "he could get some careful woman to cut out the residue; & employ other women to make them up." Meng may have turned to camp women to get the job done.

A few women entered domestic service in Continental Community households. Washington had housekeepers, as did a number of other general officers. These senior officers, and their wives, hired camp women to attend to their household needs. Just eleven days before Arnold's desertion, his aide, Lieutenant Colonel Varick, wrote Lamb, "The Genl. begs me to ask you if you can recommend a trusty industrious & decent Woman, now at the Point, to him, to be employed as an Assistant to his Housekeeper." The new employee's duties would include washing and other domestic chores. Things must have been piling up in the Arnold household; the general appeared quite eager to have her services as soon as possible. Lamb was asked to facilitate domestic matters again in December, this time for General and Mrs. Knox. A Major T. Shaw
wrote, "I shall be much obliged if you will give orders for Chas. Proud of Lymond's company, and Wm. Sinnex of mine, to repair immediately to this place. The former is husband to Mrs. Knox's woman, and is intended to be annexed to the Artificers in the Park, pour conveniance de la femme. The other is wanted by the General." Domestic harmony reigned when both household mistress and help were happy.

Positions within a household were rare because there were not many true households in the Continental Community; the more commonly available jobs were those of cook, laundress, and nurse. Such positions were often of a more temporary nature as well; army units and hospitals hired women for varying periods of time: from a few days to months. Some of these employees were local women paid to perform these duties while the army was in their area, others were actually camp followers. Hannah Thomas, who may or may not have been a retainer, received fifty-eight pounds, two shillings and sixpence in payment for cooking for twelve men in the Quartermaster General's Department during the month of October 1780. When some artificers gathered at Fishkill in 1782 to work for the army, they brought female relations with them. The Quartermaster Department paid a few of them to cook for the men. Sarah Parsell cooked for the wheelwrights, Mrs. Cregier performed the same service for the blacksmiths, and Mrs. Lloyd served up meals to the express riders. Parsell and Cregier received twelve days pay, at two shillings per day, for work done that January, while Lloyd worked from May through September at ten dollars per month. Parsell and Cregier received considerably less than their artisan relations, but Lloyd's monthly pay as a cook equaled that of her ostler husband. There did not appear to be any discrimination in the wages of women cooks as opposed to those of men in the same position. Thomas Wright, a cpok for the tent makers at Fishkill, also
received two shillings per day for his twelve days of work in January, while Andrew Wear, a Quartermaster Department cook at West Point, was paid six and 64/96 dollars per month for his services that year.102

More female retainers found paid work as washerwomen than as cooks. They were a familiar sight in the military community from war's onset to its end, and commanders often mentioned them in orderly books and letters when they hired them, provided for them, and tried to regulate them. On 20 June 1776 Captain Joseph Bloomfield delivered a return to his colonel that included three washerwomen among the seventy-two soldiers, two officers, and at least one volunteer who were present and accounted for in his company.103

Captain George Fleming wrote his superior, Colonel Lamb, in September 1780:

*I have been unfortunate in losing Peter Young, by his taking a hearty draught of cold water. I propose continuing her still a washerwoman belonging to the company, as a small recompense for her long service & late husband's service, in case she chooses.*

*David Cornwall tells me you will admit his wife to draw provisions, provided I certify she is a washerwoman to the company; if that will be sufficient, I willingly certify it, as the man behaves exceeding well, and it gives me pain to think a woman should want victuals, when her husband is faithfully doing his duty with me, & it out of his power to help her.* 104

That November Fleming consulted Lamb about washerwomen once again. The army's experimentation with a new supply system had left Fleming perplexed as to how to provide for his laundresses. He had not known that washerwomen were to be included when the company drew provisions from state stores until Lieutenant Colonel Stevens had informed him, when he noticed Fleming's omission, that he had added two washerwomen to his return so that he could get the extra supplies. Fleming was happy to know he could get his women provisioned, but said Stevens's estimate was too few by half. So he asked Lamb,
"as the proportion one Woman to Wash for ten, makes four the Compliment. If not too late, you will please to make the number of Women Four." 105

Officers and soldiers could pay these laundresses by the piece, or they could attempt to hire women to do their washing for a set wage. There were problems inherent to each method. Washerwomen sometimes outrageously overcharged for piece work, but if a man tried to circumvent that by making a woman an employee, people were liable to wonder why he needed private laundry service and perhaps wonder what else the woman was doing for him. Sergeant John O'Neill noted in February 1779 that "wash women belonging to y army" made a practice of charging the officers and soldiers extravagant prices for the work they performed in camp; so regimental commanders attempted to halt the practice by stipulating the prices to be charged. Laundresses, when soap was provided for them, could ask only one-half dollar per dozen (a dozen of what, O'Neill did not specify); those "who will presume to Charge more than y price afore mentioned will immediately be ordered out of Camp & not to be sufferd to return." 106 In June a year later, officers at West Point focused a great deal of attention on camp women in general, and washerwomen in particular, as they tried to lessen the number of women draining the stock of already depleted provisions. After first ordering unmarried women to leave, and the remaining married ones to obtain passes certifying they had permission to stay, the commander ordered that no woman could draw provisions unless she did laundry at a reasonable rate that would be determined by her corps' commanding officer. Within days the 4th New York determined what prices its women could charge. The regiment later revised its previous rates on 19 August 1782, when it was at Newburgh: the women could charge two shillings per dozen (large and small) articles if they used their own soap but only one and sixpence if the army provided it. 107 A few officers
attempted to avoid ruinous laundry bills by putting a washerwoman on their own payrolls. Colonel Ebenezer Huntington exclaimed in January 1780 that because continental money was so worthless, his wash bill exceeded his wages. He decided that it would be best to hire a woman to live in the camp to do the laundry for him and some of his officers. He knew that some people would misconstrue his actions, but he was determined to do it because it was cheaper to hire a woman than to pay by the piece.108

Although some civilians, male and female, nursed individual soldiers and then asked for recompense, the army generally did not pay for "piecework" nursing. It preferred to hire women and men, whether retainers or local inhabitants, to serve as nurses in the Hospital Department; and it preferred to employ volunteers over draftees, but, when there were too few nurses or orderly men readily available, it did resort to impressment. The Pennsylvania battalions at Ticonderoga in July 1776 received orders that one woman was to be chosen from each of their companies and sent to the general hospital at Fort George to nurse the sick. The draftees would receive the customary allowance and provisions from the hospital's director. Washington offered the same assurance at Valley Forge in May 1778 when he ordered regimental commanders to assist their regimental surgeons in acquiring as many women of the army as could be convinced to serve as nurses. The army did convince a number of camp women to become nurses, both temporarily, such as after battles, and for longer periods, as when the Hospital Department was especially short of personnel. One retainer, Jane Norton, the wife of Drum Major William Norton, recounted years after the Revolution, when trying to obtain a pension, that she had not only followed her husband throughout his service during the war, but had nursed sick and wounded American soldiers as well.109 A distinction has to be made, however, between camp women who
temporarily or intermittently cared for the sick and wounded with their companies or regiments and nurses who served in the Hospital Department. The former were retainers; the latter should be classified as part of that contingent of persons who served with the army.

Some female nurses who served with the army did so for money; others did so to contribute to the effort for independence. The latter had counterparts among the many retainers who did see themselves as patriots. But the patriotism of camp women tended to be quite different from the idealized female patriotism promoted by many men, George Washington included. Men thought women should express their patriotism in passive ways: by admiring the actions of the revolutionaries and by quietly enduring the suffering that attended war. Women, however, preferred to express their patriotism more actively. Patriotic women delivered their opinions in broadsides and practiced their civil faith in their domestic economies. A few women, whose actions later earned them the sobriquet of "Heroines of the Revolution," exercised their patriotism by acting as couriers and spies. Camp women could and did participate in all of the above activities. And like the men they followed, many felt their very presence in camp was a patriotic statement. They admired their soldiers when the latter did something worth admiring; they also suffered and endured, but rarely quietly or passively.

Patriotic camp women alerted authorities when they found threats to the army's security. Some informed officers when troop unrest and dissatisfaction reached dangerous levels and others thwarted outright conspiracies. In 1776 a few members of the Commander-in-Chief's Guard became part of a two-pronged conspiracy: they planned to desert to the enemy when the British invaded Manhattan, and they decided to assassinate Washington. They chose Private Thomas Hickey to carry out the assassination.
As Hickey was friendly with the general's housekeeper, he decided to ask her for assistance. She pretended to comply but actually informed Washington of the plot to poison him. Washington and his housekeeper played along in the roles of victim and conspirator up to the point when Washington refused the poisoned peas set before him. Shortly after that incident, Washington ordered Hickey's and Private Michael Lynch's arrests. On 26 June a court-martial determined Hickey was guilty of mutiny and receiving pay from the enemy. He was hanged on the 28th. Another woman, acting on her own initiative, successfully frustrated a conspiracy in the Southern Army in 1782. That spring, as the army was encamped outside Charleston, the British bribed a Sergeant Peters of the Maryland line, who was also Greene's cook, to "corrupt" other American sergeants and soldiers. Peters and the British developed a plan whereby the conspirators would first secure all the officers and then signal a troop of British horsemen to come in and take custody of the officers while the sergeants marched the army out to where the British desired it. Peters then laid the plan before his conspirators.

Fortunately, one of the Sergeant's wives, who suspected something was going forward, curiosity prompted her to follow them and listen, by which means she discovered the whole plan and communicated it to General Greene next morning; upon which the Sergeants and principal conspirators were apprehended; . . . A Sergeant of the Pennsylvania line (who was at the head of the revolt in the Jerseys, in 1780) was immediately shot. Peters is condemned to be hanged; . . . 112

Women had played important roles as informants in those earlier January 1781 revolts as well. After hearing of the mutiny in the Pennsylvania line, General Heath had a camp woman mingle with some of the troops at West Point and then report back on their state of mind. Her information was inaccurate, but that of a retainer with the mutinous New Jersey troops was not. She disclosed their plans to one of the New Jersey commanders on 20 January, but the
information came too late to stop the revolt. Sometimes commanders employed retainers as spies, but it appears that most of the time, women acted on their own volition.

Although it certainly did not fit within Washington's concept of female patriotism, some camp women chose to demonstrate their allegiance by assuming combat roles. Their doing so caused both admiration and consternation. When such women performed well, men lauded their patriotism but then generally turned around and tried to discourage other women from emulating their actions. However, some women may not have seen the actions as being so far out of the female sphere. There were times and places when gender role divisions in colonial society blurred. Women in farming families sometimes labored in the fields, and women on the frontier occasionally took up a weapon to defend life and property from marauders. When armies squared off in battle, they operated in what became essentially a temporary frontier (an area where different countries or societies—or in this case, armies—verged), and a very troubled frontier at that. The women in that environment acted accordingly: they either fled, stood fast, or fought. When they chose to engage in battle, they did so to help themselves, their loved ones, cause, and country.

It may be impossible to determine whether most women following the army did so only for economic or family reasons, or whether they did so to also make a political statement; but the few who actually fought in battle did make a profound declaration of their commitment to the army's survival and success. Mary Ludwig Hays became the most famous of these women. Commonly referred to as "Molly Pitcher" in folk tales years later, Molly Hays became celebrated for her actions at Monmouth on 28 June 1778. On that day, Hays, the wife of Sergeant John Casper Hays, hauled pails or "pitchers" of water up to
the soldiers manning their battle positions. When Hays found her husband lying wounded by his cannon, she took his place and helped load the cannon throughout the remainder of the battle. Another camp follower known for her actions under fire was Margaret Corbin, who became known as "Captain Molly." When her husband, the matross John Corbin, was killed at his cannon in the battle of Fort Washington in November 1776, Corbin took over his duties of swabbing and loading the gun until she, too, was hit. Corbin, hit by grape shot in arm and chest, was partially disabled for the rest of her life.

Anna Maria Lane never received the widespread accolades accorded the two Mollys, perhaps because she never recounted the exact details of her exploits in battle. Lane appears to have been with the army both as camp follower and as soldier. When her husband, John, enlisted in the Continental Army in 1776, Lane may have enlisted at the same time or else accompanied him as a retainer. Whatever the case, whether she ever actually enlisted in the army or not, Anna Maria Lane, dressed a soldier, first fought and then was wounded as a soldier in the battle of Germantown on 4 October 1777. Her sex may have been revealed when she received treatment for her injury, but, if so, it did not result in banishment from the army. Lane, either as soldier or as retainer, followed her husband for the rest of the war. The exact nature of her status remains vague: if she officially enlisted in the army, then her story is that of a soldier; if she did not, then her exploits illustrate the diversity of a female follower's experiences.

The experiences of female retainers were as varied as the women themselves. The majority of such retainers, and those of utmost concern to the army, were women destitute of home and funds. Their actions in camp and on battlefield reflected their desire to, first, survive and, second, to assist the organization that supported them and served their country. Few of the
remaining women retainers to be discussed followed the army as a matter of survival or because of a need to help cause and country. Although a few officers' wives may have been with the army for the same reasons as those following noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, most were there to enhance or express family solidarity and to socialize. They were generally seasonal camp followers.

Most officers left their wives and families at home and then invited them to visit in camp during periods of low military activity. These men depended on their wives to maintain house, farm, and business while they were away, and to report back everything that occurred on the homefront. Some of these women administered everything themselves; others, with extensive holdings, supervised estate managers and overseers. When a woman could not do the job, whether because of accident or incompetence, the army invariably lost an officer. That was the cause of Lieutenant David Perry's resignation in September 1775: his wife had fallen from a horse and broken both her arms, thus rendering herself incapable of caring for the couple's "small & helpless Children." 117

Even when their families were forced from their homes, officers generally preferred to have them find temporary lodgings with friends or in rented houses rather than have them follow the army from camp to camp. Lamb's wife and daughters became refugees when the British occupied New York City and some of the surrounding area in 1776. By February 1777 Lamb had them settled in Captain Robert Walker's Stratford, Connecticut, home. Walker, one of Lamb's junior officers, had graciously offered the use of his house as he had little need of it at the moment. A few months later, Lamb moved his family into rented lodgings in Southington, a town approximately 21 miles to the north of New Haven and esteemed for the fact that "there is not
a single Tory in the whole Parish." Lamb had to move his family again early in 1779, but by October 1782, when von Closen mentioned seeing Lamb's "several very pretty young girls" there, the family was again in Southington.118 Considering that Lamb expended a great deal of time in getting his family settled, and was away from camp on numerous occasions to visit them, they may have been less of a distraction if they had become camp followers. Walker, too, later spent some time away from his army duties in order to put his personal affairs in order. In April 1779 he wrote Lamb that he had married a Mrs. Peggy Brashier and would soon be setting out to Redhook (possibly Red Hook, New York) where he had left her so as to escort her to Stratford. He ventured the opinion that he did not like "keeping a wife at such a distance especially at the first going off."119

Other officers probably came to agree with Walker's sentiments about keeping wives at such a distance. Although Hester Hicks could have been in camp, it was more likely that she was at home when she engaged in the "infidelity and infamous conduct" that caused her husband, Captain-Lieutenant Giles Hicks of the 10th Pennsylvania, to seek a divorce.120 Yet others may have preferred to keep their wives away. Captain Andrew Moodie may have wished that his wife were anywhere but in camp; Lieutenant Henry Williams certainly would have liked to see Moodie's wife elsewhere. On 30 June 1781 Williams asked Lamb for a transfer from Moodie's company due to the "eternal discord" within that unit. On 1 August he again tendered his request and elaborated on his reason:

I am sorry to say I am Commanded by Mrs. Moodie & not him as whatever She says is Intirely a law with him... the Other evening a Small debate happened between Capn. Moodie and me Concerning Cadets in hearing of her[,] who [L]ays in next Marquee to me[;] we both parted friends[,] and I went to my bed. [S]oon after He and Mrs. Moodie [had] High Words... Curiosity prompted me
to listen to ye discourse which was this, that Capn. Moodie was not the Man he used to be or he would never take such discourse from me and advised him to make use of his pistols which he ought to have done Long before this . . . . Since that he has been indeavouring in A Manner far below that of a Gentleman to Injure my Character. 121

Economics and social rank defined which officers’ wives were in camp, when, and for how long. The wives of junior officers with property generally stayed home. Although a few had resources to hire help to look after things while they were gone (or had an understanding family to do so) and to afford transportation and lodgings for a visit, most did not. The wives of junior officers without property either stayed with friends and relations who could keep them or followed the family’s top earner just as some of the enlisted men’s wives did. The latter case would have included wives of men who had been in the ranks until awarded commissions as officers. Even though there is not enough information to indicate whether Mrs. Brown was a permanent or seasonal follower, she and her husband, Captain W. Brown (probably William Brown of the 1st Continental Artillery), appears to have had sufficient financial resources to allow them some leeway in their accommodations. While stationed at Fort Schuyler in September 1780, Brown wrote Lamb at Fishkill that his wife wished to lodge in or around that place until his company was relieved from its present post, and so he asked Lamb to assist and advise his wife as she settled in there.122 In contrast, Captain Painter (apparently Gamaliel Painter of Baldwin’s Artillery Artificer Regiment) needed to rely on the army’s hospitality to house his family. Richard Platt, a deputy quartermaster, asked Baldwin "to remo[y]e Capt Painter & family to the Barracks as speedily as may be, in Case there is a Room vacant & no better provision can otherwise be made."123

The Quartermaster Department helped move officers’ families in and out of the camps and elsewhere. Pickering personally ordered transportation
assistance for a number of junior officers in the spring and summer of 1781. In April, after receiving orders from Washington, Pickering provided wagons and other conveyances to move the family and baggage of a Lieutenant Pepin, described as a Canadian refugee (there was a Lieutenant Andrew Peppin in the 1st Canadian Regiment), from Newburgh to Philadelphia. A few months later, Pickering directed one of his assistants to assist a Captain Bolter, who had been directing the artificers at Springfield, in moving his family from that post to Boston. Then, in August, Lieutenant Hoey (probably Benjamin Hoey of Flower's Artillery Artificer Regiment), who directed the laboratory at Philadelphia, wanted to bring his family down from Springfield. Pickering, obviously wanting to keep the supervisors of his various manufacturing units happy, obliged. 124

Senior officers, especially colonels and above, commonly came from prominent social and financial backgrounds and could afford to have their wives visit them in camp. The operative word was visit. These men issued invitations to their wives when they had settled into a winter garrison or, especially in the final years of the war, in other seasons when they knew they would not shortly decamp on campaign. Only a very few of these wives, General Knox's wife Lucy for one, accompanied their husbands during active campaigns. When these wives arrived, they not only established a semblance of domestic comfort, they also initiated a social whirl. The women visited among themselves and helped their husbands perform their social duties.

The first thing an officer had to do if he wanted his wife with him was to determine whether the army was to stay in one place for a while; then he had to discover whether acceptable accommodations were available. Doctor Samuel Adams, surgeon to the 3rd Continental Artillery, made no mention of a visit to or from his wife, Sally, when he wrote her in October 1778. There could
be no thought of a such a treat in those uncertain and uncomfortable days:

"Where the Park will Winter is unknown to me, should the enemy leave N.York we shall move immediately and I have it from so good Authority as Genl. Knox's Lady that if that event should happen, the Park will winter in N.York: but if they remain, the Genl. will **endeavour** to carry the Park to Springfield or Farmingtoun: but if Mr. British does not go off we shall remain where we are, to wait their motions 'til very late, if not Winter here. [M]y mode of life is the same as when I wrote you last, my house a tent, the ground, my bed."125

The next spring Adams wrote Sally, "Nothing on earth could afford me so much happiness as to have you & my little darling, with me, in case I could provide you with quarters in which you could be comfortable (and which I could easily do while we remain here) but how soon we may be ordered from here I know not, and the operations of the ensuing campaign are exceeding uncertain." He was afraid he would have to move out and leave her with strangers, nor he was he sure he could support her in camp, be he "ever so prudent," in the manner to which she was accustomed.126

Other officers, refusing to be so long apart from their wives, managed to find suitable housing or, on occasion, allowed their ladies to join them even when the accommodations were not the most comfortable. Martha Washington, Lucy Knox, Catharine Greene, and "Lady" Stirling with her daughter Kitty were all at Valley Forge, where they got a taste of life in the huts, either for themselves or friends, until their husbands settled into better quarters. General Greene was quite good at ferreting out more suitable lodgings for his wife; before that winter was over he had moved his wife (and himself) out of a hut and into "Moore Hall" down the road.127 He had done even better the year before when he invited Catharine to summer in New Jersey while the army campaigned in that state and adjacent ones: Greene
arranged for his wife to stay at "Beverwyck," the home of Mr. and Mrs. Abraham Lott, nine miles from Morristown and twenty-two to twenty-three miles from where the army was to encamp. Then in January 1780, Greene provided better housing for his wife than for his commander in chief. Washington was rather upset about it: there was not enough room to comfortably lodge the numerous members of his military family and the Ford family on whom they had descended. "Eighteen belonging in my family, & all Mrs Fords are crowded together in her Kitchen, & hardly one of them able to speak for the colds they have caught." Washington preferred not to burden Greene with the question of his accommodations beyond having his subordinate issue the appropriate orders and materials, but something had to be done. Washington said he did not blame Greene for the fiasco; indeed, he was satisfied that it was the person to whom Greene had delegated the task who was at fault; but he could not resist a sharp comment: "Far, very far is it from me, to censure any measures you have adopted for your own accommodation [sic], or for the more immediate convenience of Mrs. Greene--at times I think you are entitled to as good, as circumstances will afford; and in the present condition of your Lady [she gave birth on 31 January] conceive that no delay could be admitted--I should therefore with great willingness have made my convenience yield to hers, if the point had lain there." That was an unusual situation. Washington generally saw the ladies as adding to, rather than subtracting from, the meager comforts of army life.

Senior officers' wives created a social, as opposed to purely military, circle of the ranking army couples. They attended and hosted numerous teas, dinners, and dances. These could be large, formal events or smaller, more intimate gatherings, and they by no means excluded the multitudes of bachelor (whether by lack of marriage or due to geography or other
circumstances) officers. For example, Doctor Thacher recorded on 27 July 1778 that a Colonel Malcome (probably William Malcolm) from West Point, "with his much-admired lady, and several other officers, favored us [the gentlemen of the hospital across the river from West Point] with their company to dine." Then on the 28th, the gentlemen of the hospital returned the visit "and were entertained in the most genteel manner." Such entertainment continued up the social ladder: Greene sponsored a little dance in March of 1779; Mrs. Alexander Hamilton served tea at the New Windsor headquarters on 1 March 1781; and Martha Washington proved her hostessing skills at the formal dinners given at the Hasbrouck House headquarters in Newburgh in 1782-3. Hundreds of these gatherings enlivened camp life. Officers seemed to feel that the ladies, as they called them, added graciousness, gaiety, and color to whatever they attended and thus made sure to include them in all their planned fetes. As Washington put it when he ordered a *feu de joie* for 30 May 1782 in honor of the birth of the dauphin of France: "The Commander-in-Chief desires his compliments may be presented to the officers' ladies with and in the neighborhood of the army, together with a request that they will favor him with their company at dinner on Thursday next, at West Point. The General will be happy to see any other ladies of his own or friends' acquaintances on the occasion, without the formality of a particular invitation." Military life offered the ladies with the army many pleasant occasions and social obligations.

Visiting camp also gave officers' wives the chance to meet, talk with, and support one another. Martha Washington not only dispensed hospitality in her parlors at the various headquarters but facilitated group efforts and camaraderie as well. As they sewed, knitted, and darned items needed by their husbands and sometimes their husband's soldiers, officers' wives could discuss
the war, the army, their homes and families and how each affected everything else. They relied on one another for both news and fellowship. When a woman left camp, she was likely to keep in touch with one or more of the women that remained. If that communication ceased, as it did for Anna M. Parker in 1779, the woman could become concerned and feel cut off. Anna Parker refused to accept silence. When she heard that Colonel John Brooks was in Philadelphia, she seized the opportunity to get a message to him. She asked him about the health of his wife and daughter and then explained why she even had to ask: "I have not been favour'd with a line from Mrs Brooks since I parted with her tho' I have repeatedly wrote to her; indeed I have not received a letter from any o[f] my friends at West Point since September. . . . tell me how you left Mrs. Brooks and where you left them that I may know where to direct my [letters?]." Mrs. Brooks was still at West Point in August 1780, where she had to take comfort in the company of other women whose husbands had left them there while they officered their troops elsewhere.

All these women and other dependent family members, whether accompanying privates or generals, were camp followers. The differences between them were a matter of degree—the magnitude of their dependency, and the nature of their time in camp. For some following the army was a matter of survival; for others, it was a matter of family loyalty or social obligations. Those who looked from their spouses or fathers to the army for quarters and provisions were properly called retainers to the camp. Most of these retainers, the women of the army, were from the lower orders of American society and filled the lower ranks of the Continental Community. Other dependent followers, however, represented the middle and upper ranks. The ladies with the army were not retainers to the camp the same way the
others were: they did not have the same economic ties, but they, in common
with the others, conducted their lives according to the army's rules.

III
Volunteers

Some volunteers, namely, gentlemen accompanying the army without a
commission or appointment, qualified as retainers. Those who did, whether in
search of a commission or just proffering aid in a particular situation,
occupied a category somewhat similar to that filled by the family followers of
most officers: they were typically of the same class, were not economically or
by oath bound to the army, but had to obey regulations pertaining to camp
conduct and security. They, like other retainers, followed the army in order to
fulfill their own needs; but, unlike the visitors who sometimes swarmed into
camps and the many retainers who stayed on the sidelines, they entered camp
"not as Spectators, but with a View of Joining the Army & being Active during
the Campaign." Retainer-volunteers pursued adventure, honor, and,
usually, rank. They accompanied the army in battle, on the march, and into
camp, unlike neighborhood volunteers who turned out to defend local
territory and then went home. Retainer-volunteers also should not be
confused with the men who volunteered to be soldiers and were also
occasionally referred to as volunteers. Men who entered the camps so as to
enlist seldom experienced much of a delay between their offer and the army's
acceptance. Thus they did not have to, nor did they generally offer, to work or
fight gratis while waiting for an acceptable appointment (though they often
complained, with reason, that they were working for nothing after enlisting).

Gentlemen who wanted a commission had to find a vacancy in one of the
army's regiments or departments first. The army did not automatically
commission all suitable candidates and then try to find them positions. State control and department politics precluded such an arrangement. States wanted to see their own citizens commanding state regiments. As they helped pay for these regiments, either in money or provisions, they could insist on it. Civil department chiefs also guarded their right to screen and appoint candidates within their areas. As a result, both American and foreign applicants descended on various regimental, departmental, and higher headquarters, with letters of recommendation in hand, to scout out the situation and present their qualifications. While they waited for a response, many stayed in camp in order to make contacts, perhaps attach themselves to a particular commander or military family, demonstrate their potential, and participate in upcoming military actions. Both Matthias Ogden and Aaron Burr, after being recommended to Washington by John Hancock in July 1775, served as volunteers during Arnold's Quebec campaign in the fall and winter of 1775. They proved themselves to be capable young men. Ogden received a lieutenant colonel's commission in the 1st New Jersey in March 1776. Burr served on Washington's staff for awhile that spring and then became an aide to General Israel Putnam. In January 1777 Burr left staff duty to accept a lieutenant colonelcy in Malcolm's Additional Continental Regiment.137

A number of Europeans sailed across the Atlantic to find positions in the Continental Army. Some came with recommendations or guarantees of commissions from American commissioners, such as Benjamin Franklin, posted abroad. In many of these cases, the men acted as volunteers while Congress and the army's general officers debated their qualifications and decided whether or not to offer them commissions. Baron Frederick von Steuben attached himself to the army very shortly after his arrival in America and vigorously pursued his duties as a volunteer inspector-general for months
before receiving the commissioned rank of major general. Other applicants of lesser renown, and some with rather dubious antecedents, also tried to establish places for themselves in the new army. For those who did not know the language, the task was doubly difficult. When William Clajon recommended a Captain Parison to Lamb in 1777 he detailed Parison's intentions because the captain could not explain them in English. Clajon wrote:

He offers his immediate Service as a Volunteer, not to lose the present Opportunity of manifesting his Zeal in our Cause, and desired to be so stationed, as to receive his Orders from you; otherwise, his Usefulness would be lost, he being unable to understand an English Officer, who cannot speak the French Language. Captain Parison is a very respectable Man; and every Body must believe it, when they know he is the first Sergeant in the French Artillery who ever was made an Officer in that Corps. . . .

When the Enemy are driven off, Capt. Parison intends to wait on Congress, or General Washington, to solicit the Preferment he expected, when he sailed from France, and not to obtain from you, and General Putnam, the Certificate and Recommendation his Conduct shall entitle him to. 139

Apparently there was a problem with either Parison or his story. He did not receive a commission in Lamb's artillery unit, nor did he serve as a commissioned officer elsewhere in the American or allied French armies. He either continued to serve as a volunteer, or left. Quite a few foreign applicants took the latter action when their stories met with no better results.

Most petitioner-volunteers were young men in search of entry-level positions. Many first approached the units they wished to join. If no position was available, sympathetic commanders often referred them to neighboring or higher headquarters for information on vacancies in other units. Washington received a great many of these referrals, especially at the beginning of the war. Inundated as he was with strategy sessions and paperwork, he begged his subordinates to stop the flood of applicants before it
reached his door. He was willing to advance the careers of a select few, but he
did not want to deal with those unknown to him or trusted colleagues. In
December 1775 he wrote Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed, his military
secretary at the time, "At the sametime that I thank you for stopping visitors
in search of preferment, it will give me pleasure to shew Civilities to others of
your recommendation--Indeed no Gentleman that is not well known, ought to
come here with out Letters of Introduction, as it puts me in an awkward
Situation with respect to my Conduct towards them."141

By that time Washington was very weary of dealing with all the
petitioners: he had been responding to their pleas and those of the men who
had recommended them since July. Among the many he helped were John
Grizzage Frazer, a fellow Virginian who owed him money and had come
recommended by Patrick Henry, and George Lewis, who had accompanied
Martha Washington on her journey to Cambridge that November. He had tried
to help Anthony Walton White, an applicant recommended by George Clinton
in Congress, but when he could not give White (who had lingered in
Cambridge for months) a coveted aide-de-camp position, he advised him to go
to New Jersey and seek an appointment in one of the two battalions being
raised there. Washington's recommendation proved a good one: White became
lieutenant colonel of the 3rd New Jersey in February 1776.142 Washington
also forwarded to the Continental Congress his own preferences for candidates
to fill senior positions. Impressed by volunteer Henry Knox's help in building
area fortifications, Washington wrote Congress on 28 November 1775, "I have
now to inform you that Henery Knox Esqr. is gone to New york, with orders to
forward to this place, what Cannon & Ordnance Stores, Can be there procured,
from thence, he will proceed to General Schuyler, on the Same business, . . .
[I]t would givie Me Much Satisfaction, that this Gentleman, or any other whom
you may think qualifyed, was appointed to the Command of the Artillery Regiment." Congress anticipated Washington's request. Knox had actually ceased being a volunteer on 17 November when Congress appointed him colonel of the artillery regiment. A little over a year later he was a brigadier. The early volunteers generally did well; the later ones had to struggle a bit more to make rank.

Although it decreased over the course of the war, there was always a contingent of petitioners and volunteers with the army. Washington continued to deal with a number of them, but departmental and regimental chiefs handled most of the petitioners and supervised those who volunteered their services as well as their presence. In June 1778 Henry Williams, after thanking Lamb for earlier recommending his nephew, Henry Abraham Williams, to Knox when Lamb did not have a lieutenancy to offer, renewed his nephew's appeal. He said the young man had waited in vain for an appointment or commission, but "Being now inform'd, that there is orders for an augmentation to your Regiment, I have taken the liberty to direct my Nephew, to waite personally on you, to renew our former application, hoping and not doubting, but it within your line of duty, you will grant our suit, as He hath given some evidence of his resolution of a Soldier on the day of action at Fort Montgomery as Captn Moody and other Gentn of the core can well inform you." Young Williams evidently fought as a volunteer at the battle of Fort Montgomery in 1777 with Captain Andrew Moodie's company. However, Lamb could not fulfill his wish for a lieutenancy until September 1780. John Smith did not have to wait that long for his commission in Lamb's regiment. Lieutenant Colonel William S. Smith asked Lamb in February 1781 to give his brother, John, an appointment. He believed that his brother deserved preferment over any other candidates because of his previous service. John
had been an ensign in Colonel Lee's regiment in 1778-1779 but had left the army to join the marine service. Taken prisoner at Charleston and then exchanged, this man of action was eager to resume the fight. Lieutenant Colonel Smith gave further proof of his brother's enthusiasm in his conclusion: "As Lt. Colo. Stephens [Stevens, Lamb's second-in-command] is to command the artillery in the present detachment I shall take him with me & if oppurtunity offers he will act with the Corps as a Voluntier." John Smith had to act as a volunteer for just a few months; in June he made second lieutenant.

Most regiments and departments, like Lamb's 2nd Continental Artillery, fostered many volunteers, some of whom they managed to promote into competitive officer positions. Captain-Lieutenant Daniel Gano recommended a volunteer to Colonel Lamb in June 1777. The volunteer, Samuel Young, had served as an officer with a Captain Wiley in the summer of 1776, and at the time of Gano's letter had been a volunteer in Moodie's company (of which Gano was a member) for six weeks. In this particular case, the volunteer did not get the position he wanted; he had to look elsewhere. In March 1779 a list of gentlemen "under Nomination for appointments in the Corps of Sappers & Miners" included the volunteers Mr. Richard Mount with the 2nd North Carolina or 2nd New York and Mr. Welch with General Huntington's brigade. John Welch made the grade; he became a lieutenant in that corps in August. Doctor Amos Windship was one of the first of many physicians who volunteered to help in the Continental hospitals. Windship escaped from Boston during the British occupation in 1775 and served without a commission until he received an appointment as surgeon's mate in 1776. Some physicians volunteered with the specific aim of receiving preferment. Patrick Galt gave medical assistance in the early months of 1776 to companies that became part
of the 9th Virginia Regiment in the expectation of receiving the regimental
surgeon position. When he did not receive the appointment, first he, and then
his executor after he died, petitioned the state of Virginia for recompense.\textsuperscript{147}
Other physicians just offered assistance when the army was stationed in their
area.

Most of the retainer-volunteers had never been in the American army
and were seeking their first appointment, but a few were men who had
resigned or otherwise lost their commissions. Among the latter were those
who wished to rejoin, like John Smith, and those who had no desire to reenter
the service but wanted to help out for a time. Joseph Reed resigned from the
army in January 1777 but served as a volunteer aide to Washington during the
ensuing campaign. When Congress offered him an appointment as brigadier
that May, Reed declined the honor.\textsuperscript{148}

The army did not pay these men, but it did provide bed and board. In
return, it expected them to obey the officers of the units to which they were
attached. As these gentlemen wished to make a good impression so as to
become officers, they generally followed orders. Discipline problems appear
to have been few or minor and dealt with at a local or personal level:
volunteers did not figure in court-martial proceedings nor were they
drummed out of camp. If a volunteer's behavior was unacceptable, the officers
of the unit to which he was attached could first counsel him, and then, if there
was no improvement, deny him any chance at a commission and ask him to
leave. The army preferred to handle these "informal" officers in informal or
unofficial ways.\textsuperscript{149}

Volunteers belonged to the army only so long as they wished to belong
to it, or as long as the army would have them. They were not under contract as
sutlers were, did not receive wages as persons serving with the army did, nor
were they tied to family members in the service as the other retainers were. Most did not follow the army for economic reasons; they followed because they wanted to be in the army, or because they felt they belonged with the army. If camp life did not meet their expectations, or if the army did not give them what they wanted, they left. As a group, they were perhaps the most temporary of all the camp followers. They could come and go as they pleased while awaiting word on their petitions, and then, upon receiving an answer, they either became officers or departed to seek their destiny somewhere else. Obviously, once they became officers or left the camp with no intention to return, they ceased to be camp followers.

Retainers to the camp accompanied the army in order to serve themselves or their families and masters. Personal matters had priority; the army's desires or requirements came second. Servants and slaves saw to their masters' needs; if they did their job well, their master could concentrate on military instead of domestic matters. Women of the army provided domestic services for their own family members and the army at large in return for the provisions, shelter, and security they needed to ensure survival. Ladies with the army visited camps to sustain family and social ties. Even the volunteers, most of whom were ardent patriots, concentrated first on finding agreeable positions before turning their attention to the fight. These followers were part of the Continental Community's domestic and military families. As attendants and adherents, their attachment to the army was primarily on a personal as opposed to official basis. But through Article 23, Section 13, and various other regulations and orders, the army tried to minimize any negative impact these persons and their personal concerns might have had on military matters and maximize all positive contributions.
Chapter IV Notes

1. Myna Trustam in Women of the regiment: Marriage and the Victorian army (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 82 & 84, quotes The Lancet (1861) and the United Service Gazette (1874) on "the human part of an army's impedimenta" and "the female impedimenta of the regiment."


4. Mrs. Elizabeth Lawrence received money in payment for "work done by her Negro man... for the Use of the United States in Col. Benjan Flower QMstres Departmt" on 2 October 1780 and 8 February 1781 in Philadelphia; vouchers in Letters, Orders for Pay, Accounts, Receipts, and Other Supply Records Concerning Weapons and Military Stores, 1776-1801, M927, National Archives (microfilm, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pa.).


11. Ibid., 24 February 1779, p. 3, col. 3, & 7 July 1779, p. 3, col. 3.


15. Ibid., 7 August 1782, p. 1, col. 1.

16. Thacher recounts that in New Jersey on 14 May 1779, Washington, followed by his mulatto servant Bill, reviewed his brigade with a number of Indian chiefs, Military Journal, 163; Charles Carroll Mason to James Murray Mason, information to be given to Judge Mason about Thomson Mason (d. 1784), includes a Revolutionary War story about Washington breakfasting at the Mason home accompanied only by his servant Billy, Washington [D.C.], 19 September 1859, in Hugh Blair Grigsby papers, Section 122, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.


20. Andrew Breasted to Lamb, Essex County, Gotham, 1 September 1780, Ibid., reel 3.


23. Cutting to Potts, Carlisle, 16 March, & Manheim, 25 March 1778, Ibid.


25. Brigade Orders, probably Pluckemin, New Jersey, 12 December [recorder put '76 instead of proper '78], Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 30 November 1778- 4 February 1779 & 11 January- 18 February 1780. As this said "belonging to Capt Carter" instead of belonging to Capt. Carter's company, I interpreted Anthony's status as that of servant.

27. Church, Virginia Legislative Petitions, Petition 110-P on p. 32.


32. Thacher, New Jersey, 1 January 1780, Military Journal, 184.


34. Headquarters, Morristown, 8 December 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 December 1779- 27 March 1780. The order of this date repeats an order from an earlier date that had tried to halt the use of soldiers as servants: "The order of the Sixteenth of May 1778 prohibiting the taking of Soldiers from the Army as Servants is to be strictly observed."


36. "Muster Roll of the Field and Staff Officer, of the 2nd or New York Regt. Artillery with such Noncommissioned Officers as are not attached to any Company," West Point, (April 1788) 26 May 1788, RG 93, Revolutionary War Rolls, M246, roll 117, National Archives (microfilm, David Library).

37. Fort McIntosh, 26 October 1778, Robert McCready Journal, 4 November-2 December 1778, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.


42. Orders issued from headquarters at Philadelphia, 18 & 19 January 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 February-7 August 1782.

43. Ibid.

44. 19 January orders only, Ibid.

45. Guion to Lamb, New Windsor, 15 September 1779, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.

46. Varick to Lamb, Robinson's House at West Point, 15 August 1780, Ibid., reel 2.

47. Pickering to Hughes, Camp near Dobb's Ferry, 7 August & 24 July 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vols. 82 & 127, National Archives. Pickering first mentions the servant and expresses his reasons for refusal on 24 July, but apparently is still trying to get rid of him on 7 August when he gives more explicit directions for his disposal. The emphasis on certain phrases is Pickering's.

48. Pickering to Messrs. Comfort Sands & Company, Contractors, [New Windsor], as this is sandwiched in between two 31 January 1782 entries one can assume this letter was of the same date, Ibid., roll 26, vol. 83.


52. Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 47. Kerber suggests that the cult of domesticity may have been a response to the war's disruption of family life. While she looks at it as a possible result of the disruption and separation on the home front, I see the response as quite likely among the men and women who tried to maintain some semblance of family life within the army's camps. John Todd White in his essay "The Truth About Molly Pitcher," in James Kirby Martin's and Karen
R. Stubaus's *The American Revolution: Whose Revolution?* (Huntington, New York: Robert E. Krieger Publ. Co., 1977), 99-105, disagrees with the concept of a battlefield domesticity; he says there was little distinction between male and female roles in the lower socio-economic strata, especially in the military environment. I agree that gender roles were sometimes indistinct in that environment, but attempts at domesticity did occur.

53. Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), 147. Norton mentions that widowhood and independent wage earning could alter an eighteenth-century woman's perception of herself and her role: "Females who spent part of their lives outside the confines of male-dominated households and the traditional domestic sphere often proved reluctant to surrender their autonomy and regarded dependence, the supposed hallmark of the feminine character, with overt distaste."

54. Both Kerber and Norton analyze female patriotism and contributions during the war in their respective works. Of particular attention here would be Kerber, *Women of the Republic*, 8-9, 19, 42-3, & 85, and Norton, *Liberty's Daughters*, 155-6, & 167-8. Examples of appeals to female patriotic contributions abound in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*: On 19 July 1775 Philadelphia's Committee of Safety asks for "scraped Lint and old Linen for Bandages;" on 9 August of that year an ad for spinners states that "In this time of public distress you have now each of you an opportunity not only to help to sustain your families, but likewise to cast your mite into the Treasury of the public good." On 28 June 1780 the paper notes the patriotic subscription for the relief of American soldiers that was raised by Philadelphia women while on 15 November 1780 and 24 October 1781 it again appeals for lint, linen, and bandages. The *Gazette* also notes on 31 July 1776 that women in New Jersey and Connecticut managed to get most of the harvest in and that "many of them have declared, that they will take the farming business upon themselves, so long as the rights and liberties of their country require the presence of their sons, husbands, and lovers in the field." In Dorman's *Virginia Revolutionary Pension Applications*, vol. 1, there is a pension request from Elizabeth Adkins, the widow of James Adkins, a man who was drafted in Culpeper County in the spring of 1775. According to her application, "He was gone all summer and she had to plough and hoe his corn to raise bread for his children."


62. Trustram, Women of the regiment, 190. Although Trustram concentrates on the Victorian army, she does establish the earlier precedents for its military marriage system.

63. Walter Hart Blumenthal, Women Camp Followers of the American Revolution (Philadelphia: George MacManus Company, 1952), 60. Erna Risch, Supplying Washington's Army (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1981) on page 189 states that when the war was winding down and the main army declining in size, the number of camp followers also declined. I tend to agree with Blumenthal that there were more followers at the end than at the beginning but also believe that Risch is correct in her belief that when soldiers went home their followers did too. In all probability, but the lack of figures makes this a tentative conclusion, the greatest concentration of family followers was in the years 1777 to 1781.


65. "A Return of the Women & Children Left in Charge of Baggage, Necessary to wash for Genl. Clintoins Brigade," in Israel Shreve papers, Rutgers University Library, New Jersey. This is a return of the camp followers probably left at Fort Sullivan in Tioga, Pennsylvania in July and August 1779. It was submitted by Captain Aaron Aaron, who is not listed in Heitman's Historical Register. (This information and return complements of John Rees, a researcher at the David Library.)


68. Regimental Orders, probably at Burlington Barracks, New Jersey, 22 May 1782, & Regimental Orders, West Point, 17 December 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Books, 7 February-7 August 1782, and 27 November 1782-5 January 1783.


Headquarters Fort Sullivan, 15 September 1779, and recorded in Myers German Regiment Orderly Book mention supernumeries, men and women; the former put their number at 1 in 12 while the latter permitted them to draw provisions for a journey.

71. Hand to the Board of War, New Windsor, 29 May 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 17, vol. 162.


73. Joseph Reed to Frederick Antis, Philadelphia, 26 May 1780, in Sol Feinstone Collection, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pa. Reed said, "it cannot be presumed that Women & Children are supported out of the publick Stock unless on some special Emergency--in which the Necessity of the Care would palliate & even justify the Measure."


75. Regimental Orders, West Point, 11 March 1783, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 20 February-28 March 1783.


78. Platt to Mr. Else, Newburgh, 1 April 1781, in Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 125.


81. Mead (noted as George on document file note, but name was probably Giles) to E. (probably Ephraim) Darby, 3 February 1780, in Sol Feinstone Collection, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania (microfilm).

82. Blumenthal, *Women Camp Followers*, 76, 79. Most of the follower returns asked for in the orderly books did not survive; those that did sometimes appear incomplete or vague. I have not yet found the returns Blumenthal refers to, and the few I did find were on the small unit level, thus I cannot properly estimate numbers at this time except to say that the 15:1 ratio for rations did not (according to Washington) adequately cover the number of dependents with the army in 1783.


85. Garrison Orders, Fort Sullivan, 1 September 1779, Myer's German Regiment Orderly Book. Fort Sullivan is apparently overlooked or ignored on most maps. After searching for information on the movements of the German Regiment as well as data on Pennsylvania/New York border warfare, I found Lewis S. Shimmell's published dissertation, Border Warfare in Pennsylvania during the Revolution (Harrisburg, Pa.: R.L. Myers & Company, 1901). On page 106 he mentions the German regiment under Hand and its hooking up with Sullivan's expedition in July 1779; then from 106 to 116 he describes Sullivan's expedition from Wyoming to Tioga Flats/Plains and points northward. He mentions that a stockade was built at Tioga Plains that August and that a garrison remained there until 5 October when everyone started south for Wyoming again. For more information on the women at Fort Sullivan see pages 37-38 and endnote 89.

86. Headquarters (no specific place given), 16 July 1778, Myers's German Regiment Orderly Book.


88. Garrison Orders, probably West Point but may be Burlington, New Jersey, 16 August 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 9 August-27 November 1782.

89. After Orders, West Point or Burlington, 26 August 1782, Ibid.

90. General Orders, Roxborough farm, 4 August 1777, in Fitzpatrick, Writings of Washington 9:17. Blumenthal mentions this in Women Camp Followers, 64.

91. Fitzpatrick's Writings of Washington has numerous examples, as do other orderly books, of orders telling women to march with the baggage and stay off the wagons.


93. After Orders, Headquarters "Quiletimank," 2 August 1779, Myers's German Regiment Orderly Book.


100. Pickering to Mr. Peter Anspach, Philadelphia, 23 April 1782, in Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vol. 83. Anspach and Meng are noted in a listing of Quartermaster department personnel, 1780-81, in roll 25, vol. 126 of the Numbered Record Books.

101. Varick to Lamb, Headquarters Rob[inson] House, 14 September 1780, & Shaw to Lamb, Ellisson's (?), 1 December 1780, in John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 2. No Major T. Shaw is listed in Heitman's *Historical Register*. The emphasis on la femme is Shaw's.


105. Fleming to Lamb, with Brigade of Infantry near the Great Falls, 19 November 1780, Ibid.


108. Blumenthal tells this story in Women Camp Followers, 63.

109. There are numerous examples of people petitioning the Virginia state government for recompense for expenses and labor incurred while nursing soldier sons or other soldiers left in their care in Church's Virginia Legislative Petitions and confirmed in the Legislative Petitions themselves in the Virginia State Archives, Richmond. Drafting of women for nursing duties shown in: Orders, Headquarters Ticonderoga, 13 July 1776, Orderly Book of the 4th Pennsylvania Battalion, 10- 30 April 1776 & 21 June- 20 September 1776, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Order of the Day, Valley Forge, 31 May 1778, in Booth, Women of '76, 171. A copy of Jane Norton pension application, dated December 1836, is in the Molly Pitcher Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

110. Kerber analyzes the meaning of female patriotism in chapter three of Women of the Republic. Of specific importance here are her discussions on pages 106 & 110.


114. A later but very clear example of the conflict appears in Herman Mann's The Female Review: Life of Deborah Sampson, intro. & notes by John Adams Vinton (Mann's original, 1797; Vinton's, 1866; reprint, Arno Press, 1972), 118-119. Mann wrote this book to publicize Sampson's (she had dressed as a male and had enlisted as Robert Shurtleff) military service. After extolling his heroine's virtues and resolution in particular, and women's in general, Mann said, "I cannot desire you to adopt the example of our Heroine, should the like occasion again offer; yet, we must do her justice." Norton discusses the blurring of gender roles on the frontier on page 13 in Liberty's Daughters.


118. Samuel Broome to Lamb, New Haven, 14 November 1776; Walker to Lamb, Fort Schuyler, 11 February 1777; Lieutenant Colonel Oswald to Lamb, New Haven, 8 April 1777; Major James Hughes to Lamb, Windsor 13 July 1778; McDougall Orders, Peckskill, 2 February 1779; John Harrison to Lamb, Fishkill, 21 March 1779; these and others showed Lamb family movements in John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reels 1-3; Closen, 27 October 1782, *Revolutionary Journal*, 262.

119. Walker to Lamb, Greenfield, 16 April 1779, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.


121. Williams to Lamb, Fort Harker, 1 August 1781, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 2.


124. Pickering to Thomas Anderson, ADQM, Newburgh, 20 April 1781; Pickering to Pepin, Newburgh, 20 April 1781; Pickering to Isaac Tuckerman, ADQM, Camp near Dobbs ferry, 20 July 1781; Pickering to Colonel Hughes, DQM, Camp, 8 August 1781; Pickering to Isaac Tuckerman, Camp near Dobbs ferry, 8 August 1781; all in Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 125, & roll 26, vol. 127.

125. Samuel Adams to Sally (Preston) Adams, Artillery Park at Fredericksburgh, 31 October 1778, Sol Feinstein Collection (microfilm).

126. Samuel Adams to Sally Adams, Pluckemin, 6 May 1779, Ibid.


132. Memorandum, Newburgh, 29 May 1782, Boynton, General Orders . . . at Newburgh, 22. The celebration was actually postponed to the 31st. Other examples attending or being invited to celebrations are: Orders, Newburgh, 29 January 1783, Ibid., 66-67; Thacher, April 1778 entry, Military Journal, 127.

133. Blumenthal mentions the women gathering in Martha Washington's sitting-room to mend uniforms, sew shirts, etc. in Women Camp Followers, 86; Boynton notes that Mrs. Washington received female callers every morning in her parlor at Hasbrouck House, General Orders . . . at Newburgh, 9.

134. Anna M. Parker to Colonel John Brooks, ca. 1779, Sol Feinstone Collection (microfilm).

135. Samuel Adams to Sally Adams, West Point, 17 August 1780, Ibid. Adams tells of "Terrible times with the women on the point, their husband's all gone & left them. Mrs. Jackson[,] Mrs. Brooks &c &c left to keep house alone."

136. John Hancock to Washington, Philadelphia, 19 July 1775, the note from Hancock is not transcribed in toto, but the part recommending Ogden and Burr including this comment is given in Abbot, Papers of Washington 1:132. The comment succinctly gives the motivation of most volunteers.

137. Ibid., 132 and footnote 1 on 1:133.

138. Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army During the War of the Revolution (1914; reprint, Baltimore, Md.: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1982), 518. This is one of the few entries in Heitman that acknowledges volunteer service.

139. William Clajon to Lamb, Fishkill, 6 October 1777, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.

140. I did not find Parison in my list of 2nd Continental Artillery officers, nor is he listed in Heitman's Historical Register as either an American or French officer.


142. Patrick Henry to Washington, Philadelphia, 31 July 1775, & footnote 1; Fielding Lewis to Washington, 14 November 1775, & footnote 1; George Clinton to Washington, 4 July 1775, & footnote 1; Washington to George Clinton, Cambridge, 25 August 1775; Washington to Anthony White, Cambridge, 25


144. Henry Williams to Lamb, Poughkeepsie, 16 June 1778, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 1.


146. Gano to Lamb, Stratford, 20 June 1777, Ibid., reel 1; Orders, Artillery Park at Pluckemin, New Jersey, 13 March 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 5 February - 30 May 1779; Heitman's Historical Register lists John Welch as a lieutenant in the Sappers and Miners as of 2 August 1779.

147. Washington to Hancock, Cambridge, 21 July 1775, & footnote 2, in Abbot, Papers of Washington, 1:144; Smith (executor for Galt), Accomack County, 19 November 1777, Legislative Petitions, Virginia State Archives; Church mentions petitions in Virginia Legislative Petitions, 241-P & 472-P, on pages 72 & 145.


149. "Instructions from the Continental Congress" to Washington, Philadelphia, 22 June 1775, Ibid., 1:21-22. These include: "You are to victual at the continental expence all such volunteers as have joined, or shall join the united army. . . . In addition to yr Instructions it is Resolved by Congress, That the troops including the volunteers be furnished with camp Equipage & blankets if necessary at the continental expence." As for discipline--my research in various orderly books and other records did not turn up volunteer offenders brought before courts-martial. The few letters that referred to volunteers indicate that the army tended to be both careful and casual (which sounds like a contradiction but was not) in its treatment of volunteers.
Chapter V. Persons Serving with the Army

_In an Army properly organized, there are sundry Officers of an Inferiour kind, such as Waggon Master, Master Carpenter, &c._

Washington to Hancock
Cambridge, 21 July 1775

When Washington referred to those "Officers of an Inferiour kind," he was not necessarily implying that they embodied mediocre or worse qualities (though the thought did cross his mind at times); he merely meant that they were not commissioned line officers. He was referring to appointed staff or public officers, some of whom were in the army, and some of whom were not. The last category of camp followers mentioned in Article 23, Section 13 of the 1776 Articles of War included persons serving with, but not in, the army. Some of the people serving with the army and in the staff departments—although not line officers or soldiers—were fundamentally members, not followers, of the military. Others were civilians following the army or living within its camps so that they could work for the staff departments. They were appointed or employed, as opposed to commissioned or enlisted, in the public service and maintained at public expense; and their service was supposed to facilitate army operations. These army civilians served in various positions, including those of deputies, clerks, conductors, wagoners, artificers, nurses, and laborers. And they, like their military counterparts, were subject to army regulations.

The army accepted civilian employees when it did not have enough staff or line personnel to handle the support functions so necessary to military operations. Washington preferred to have "inferiour" or public service
officers and men in the staff departments but, when necessary, accepted the appointment of line personnel to those duties. While there was no question about the line officers' affiliation with the military, there was some confusion about that of the staff officers. Washington generally considered them as part of the military establishment and thus subject to military regulation. The Continental Congress apparently agreed with him, for in providing pay, pensions, provisions and, initially, ranks comparable to those given line officers, Congress essentially declared most staff officers to be military officers, but officers answerable to it first, as the governing civil body, and then to Washington. As for the actual staffing of the civil departments, Congress usually followed the recommendations of the department heads and the commander in chief. When Washington and other line and staff commanders concurred that military regularity would be best served by enlisting rather than employing staff personnel, Congress gave them the go-ahead. Companies of artificers were the most visible result. However, the shortage in manpower forced Washington and his advocates to retreat from a full militarization of the staff departments and hire civilians. Often, the result was confusion. Enlisted men and employees mixed together, each demanding the privileges accorded the other, and each claiming that different rules applied to their individual groups. Commanders and staff managers, sometimes confused as to who was actually in the army and who was serving with it, tried to surmount these difficulties by providing comparable provisions to servicemembers and employees alike, and by insisting that all of them, civilians included, obey army regulations and the orders of their officers.

The staff departments performed what twentieth-century armies would call service support functions. They provided administrative and logistical support to the army's combat units. Some staff personnel marched with the
troops, but others remained stationed in garrisons for most of the war; their jobs generally precluded direct involvement in combat. The officers in these departments were not leaders or commanders as the officers of the line were supposed to be. Staff officers were specialists and managers. And their subordinates, whether enlisted men or employees, were usually technicians, skilled tradesmen practicing their crafts for the army. Armies over the ages utilized civilians in these service support positions; however, in the early modern era armies began more fully to incorporate service support functions, and thus the positions and the people, within the military establishment. The Continental Army showed signs of this evolution in military organizational design: the militarization of the staff departments.

The Continental Congress appointed staff officers and created staff departments at various points during the war, usually upon the recommendations of Washington and other military commanders. The first staff position was that of adjutant general, and Brigadier General Horatio Gates received the appointment. His successors were also officers with line commissions, as were most of their subordinates; however, there were a few civilians, generally clerks, operating in their midst. The Adjutant General's Department managed personnel. The Ordnance and Clothing Departments, the former created early in the war, the latter developing over time until organized by ordinance in 1779, focused on acquiring, making, and fixing their designated stores, respectively, ammunition, weapons, clothing, and the materials necessary to produce them. The Ordnance Department had both civil and military branches; the first was run by a commissary of military stores while the second was headed by a commissary general of military stores, who was defined by military rank as well as job title. None of the clothier generals,
nor their deputies, held a line rank. Joseph Trumbull, as the commissary general of stores and provisions, and later, after the Commissariat was reorganized into two branches (purchases and issues) as commissary general of purchases, as well as his successors and deputies, also did not hold line commissions, although they were sometimes addressed by military rank. These "inferior" officers concentrated on provisioning the Continental Army, while their colleagues in the Quartermaster General's Department focused on the acquisition, transportation, and utilization of other supplies. The Quartermaster Department eventually consisted of two branches, civil and military, for acquisition and issue, and supervised two subordinate divisions: the Wagon and Forage Departments. Considered the most vital of all the staff departments, it was also one of the most military; indeed, it was occasionally referred to as the Quartermaster's Line instead of department. The quartermaster general usually held a commission in the line (Stephen Moylan, who acted as quartermaster general for a few months in 1776 and first received his military or line rank with that office, was the exception) and was expected to be well-versed in military strategy. He acted as an advisor to the commander in chief, and his deputies, military and civilian, acted in the same capacity on regional and regimental levels.2

The last important staff division was the Hospital Department, and it was the department that maintained the clearest distinctions between military and civilian labor. This department dealt with the care and repair of people, and on paper, was initially the best organized of all the staff departments. In practice there were a few serious problems. Regimental surgeons and their mates owed their appointments to their regimental commanders and so gave their allegiance to their individual line units instead of to the Hospital Department. The result was a continuing power and supply struggle between
surgeons of the line, and their commanders, and the director-general and his
deputies in the Hospital Department. However, whether or not they identified
with a line unit or the staff department, surgeons and surgeon's mates were
officers. The army did not assign them line ranks such as colonel or
lieutenant; it continued to address them by job title, but the army formally
established their relationship when it formulated their pay, benefits, and
pensions. Assisting these medical officers in the Hospital Department were
apothecaries and their mates, clerks, storekeepers, orderlies, nurses, and
laborers. A few of these had enlisted in the army's line and then been detailed
to the department; others had enlisted specifically for such duties; but most of
the men, and all the women, were civilian. They did not hold military rank,
nor did they generally receive military pensions.3

Unfortunately, the relatively clear distinction between military and
civilian personnel seen in the Hospital Department was seldom mirrored in the
other staff departments. Just as some confusion existed over the official
positions, ranks, and affiliation of staff officers, there was confusion over
when and how their subordinate staffs and workers should be affiliated. In
the early years of the war, line officers complained about Congress's tendency
to give military, or more precisely line, rank to staff appointees and, when
Congress was not the culprit, the tendency of staff officers to assume such
ranks. Trying to put an end to the latter practice, in August 1777 Washington
declared, "As the Congress never have & the Genl. is persuaded never do
Intend to give Rank to any of the Waggon Masrs. in this Army, except the
Waggon Masr. Genl., They are order'd not to Assume the title of Majors Captains
&c. but to be Distinguish'd by the names of Division or Brigade Waggon Masrs.
... Waggon Masrs. are useful in every Army & will be supported all their Just
Priviledges, but the way for them to obtain respect is by a diligent & faithful
discharge of their respective Duties. . . . This Order is to extend to Persons in every other Department who have not rank given to them by their Commissions or appointments by Congress."4 Most line officers considered staff officers, except the quartermaster and adjutant generals, to be civilians with support, as opposed to military or, more precisely, combat, duties. On the one hand, Congress seemed to substantiate this position by its desire to have the civil departments acting as checks on military units, but on the other hand, Congress did tend to equate staff officers with line officers and continued to do so throughout the war when providing for them. Most staff officers themselves saw their employment as military service: they were serving country, commander in chief, and army. However, in May 1778, Congress did make a concession to the line officers; it ruled that no one appointed to the civil staff after that time would be entitled to any rank in the army solely because of such a staff appointment. That did not totally rid the army of excess colonels and captains, however, for staff personnel continued to use complimentary ranks.5 Also, to confuse the issue further, if a line officer took such an appointment as an additional duty he could keep his rank. So, were staff officers in the army or with it? If one accepts the evaluation of most line officers, staff officers were not in the army. If one prefers to accept the judgment of some members of Congress as well as the opinion of staff officers, then the answer is yes they were. The problem existed at lower levels in the staff departments as well.

The civil departments, in trying to maintain sufficient personnel levels, resorted to numerous expedients. They employed civilians for prescribed lengths of time or hired them to do piecework; they tried enlisting civilians into special companies of artificers or wagoners, and they drew officers and soldiers from the line. At any time, and in any place, a department could be
staffed by one or more of the preceding methods. For example, by 1780 the Wagon Department's top staff included the wagonmaster general and eleven deputy wagonmasters general. The middle management spots were held by 108 enlisted wagonmasters (those who had enlisted directly into the department), three wagonmasters taken from line units, and two hired or civilian wagonmasters. Filling up the ranks were 256 enlisted wagoners, 104 wagoners diverted from the line, and 272 civilian wagoners. The department also hired some packhorsemasters and men.6

In 1776 Commissary General Trumbull submitted to Congress a list of persons employed in his department: they were all hired civilians or departmental enlistees, and they were all anxious to be paid. They included four storekeepers, twenty-three clerks, two bookkeepers, a commissary for Colonel Arnold's detachment, twenty-two laborers, six coopers, two cooks, and one man "employ'd constantly in Riding, to one Place & another to get in Stores, pro[visions,] Teams &c."7 That early return showed a very civilian department; the Adjutant General's Department made a distinct contrast. It had always been a militarized organization, but the congressional resolution of 1 August 1782 showed just how military its staff was. Congress resolved that it would appoint the adjutant general from the general officers, colonels, or lieutenant colonels in the army. It authorized the adjutant general to appoint two assistants and one clerk, insisting only that the appointments be approved by the commander in chief. The assistants were to be majors or captains, but the clerk could be a subaltern or volunteer. Deputy adjutant generals attached to each of the separate armies had to be field officers. They could each have one assistant, who was to be either a major or a captain.8

The Quartermaster Department showed more of a personnel mix than either of the previous two, perhaps reflecting the strongly dualistic nature of
its role: its military and civil branches handled both administration and logistics. Quartermasters contributed greatly to the administration of the army and individual units as well as managing logistic operations. In comparison, commissaries were purely logistic personnel, while adjutants were administrators; the army readily accepted civilians in the former role but preferred its own people in the latter. The Adjutant General’s Department was also more elitist: it was a management organization that did not require a contingent of manual laborers. The Quartermaster Department had both managers and laborers; civilian appointees and military officers filled the first group, while civilian employees and enlisted men made up the second. A 1780 return shows deputy quartermasters for the states both with rank and without. It included Major Richard Claiborne of Virginia (line rank) and Colonel Hugh Hughes of New York (rank attained when Congress gave them to staff officers in 1777), as well as Donaldson Yates, Esquire, taking care of Maryland and Delaware, and Ralph Pomeroy, Esquire, of Connecticut. The return also divulges that some brigades employed lieutenants and captains as quartermasters while others looked outside the line; a few sergeants were forage masters as were some civilians; and some deputy wagonmasters held line ranks while others did not. The return does not mention rank for the many clerks, ostlers, and express riders.9

Quartermaster General Pickering proposed to militarize the military side of his department even more thoroughly in 1782. That March, perhaps using the Adjutant General’s Department as a guide, Pickering recommended that all, if possible, of the department’s higher staff personnel be taken from the line (his recommendation served two purposes: not only would it help him staff his department with proper military personnel but it would also offer an alternative to supernumerary officers who were losing their places in the
shrinking army). He did add, however, in April, after hearing about a congressional committee's deliberations on a new plan for his department, that additional pay would have to be offered in order to entice line officers, who enjoyed light duties and high honors, to take on the drudgery of staff work. And then, while still promoting the use of line officers in his department, Pickering backpedaled a bit by indicating that this initial plan was impractical and unjust because it would compel the dismissal of some experienced and worthy staff officers in favor of the supernumeraries. 

The congressional committee and then Congress listened to Pickering's opinions. When Congress resolved later that year to reorganize the department, to be effective 1 January 1783, it implemented a number of his suggestions. Congress authorized the quartermaster general to appoint, with the approbation of the commander in chief, the following officers for the armies of the United States: one deputy quartermaster, one wagonmaster, one commissary of forage, one director and one subdirector of a company of artificers, "and as many Assistants as the service may require in the Main and Southern Army, to perform the Duties of Quarter Masters of Brigades, Storekeepers, Clerks, and such other Duties in the Quarter Masters Departments as the service may require, and also as many Waggon Conductors." It then went on to state that the wages listed in the resolution included their pay in the line. Having dealt with the military branch, Congress turned to the civil side and resolved that the quartermaster general could appoint, with the approbation of the secretary at war (as opposed to the commander in chief), "so many Assistants to reside in the several States as the publick service may require." It then resolved that all of these officers, "of whatever denomination," had to take "the Oath of Allegience and the Oath of Office
precribed by Congress." High office in the public service, like all offices in
the military service, required a demonstration of commitment.

The dual nature of the Quartermaster Department, and of most of the
other staff departments for that matter, caused trouble. Time and again,
debates ensued over the issue of control: who controlled the staff departments,
and, in turn, who and what did the staff departments control? Officially,
Congress created the staff departments, appointed their senior officers, and
had a final say over their affairs; however, it often formally delegated its
power of appointment to military commanders and informally relinquished its
supervisory powers to them as well. In July 1775, writing to Washington that
the Continental Congress had made Trumbull the commissary general of stores
and provisions agreeable to Washington's recommendation, President John
Hancock said that the appointments of quartermaster general, commissary of
musters, and commissary of artillery were left to Washington's discretion
because "Congress not being sufficiently acquainted with persons properly
qualified for these offices" did not want to make the decisions. Two years
later, being somewhat disorganized at the time, Congress authorized Major
General Israel Putnam, the commander at Peekskill, to appoint deputy
commissary generals for that area if the deputies chosen by it declined the
posts. A month later Congress told the governor of Connecticut he could
choose the officers if Putnam did not. Congress's willingness to abide by
military recommendations and to delegate the power of appointment led some
officers to assume powers of control over staff functions. Washington, as
commander in chief, exercised a great deal of control over the civil
departments. The heads of those departments accepted his authority, and at
times his interference, because he was their secondary commander under
Congress. But the staff chiefs deeply resented attempts to control their
departments by other military commanders. They did not want interference from the line in the management of their personnel and functions, especially when they saw such interference occurring in the civil branches of their departments.

Pickering engaged in a vigorous, and at times venomous, dispute with General William Heath and Colonel Moses Hazen over the control of his department's people and activities at Fishkill in the winter of 1780-81. The staff-line battle began when Pickering forbade his officers to obey any of Hazen's orders that would have infringed on department business. Then Heath issued orders at West Point that were designed to regulate public issues at Fishkill but, according to Pickering, would only "unhinge all public business there & go near to dissolve my departmt in the State." Pickering asked Washington to intervene, for he believed Heath issued the orders "at the instigation of Colo. Hazen, whose overbearing disposition aimed at the absolute control of every transaction at that post." The quartermaster general had not wanted to bother the commander in chief about this matter but had to do so because Heath entertained "a mistaken principle in the case." Heath had censured Hazen's initial orders because he believed that Hazen "had no right to interfere with the great branches of the staff departments," but when he added that Hazen had the right to control the subordinate officers and the issuing of public supplies, he cleared the way for further incursions. Pickering felt Heath's mistake came "from his confounding a civil with a military post. Were Fishkill a mere place of arms, and a Garrison posted there for its defence, the commanding officer ought undoubtedly to regulate & controul the distribution of every species of stores: for he would be answerable for its safety; . . . In like manner when an issuing officer is appointed merely to serve a military corps, he must be subject to the controul
of its commanding officer." But Fishkill was a magazine for a wide variety of public stores and served not only troops but various persons in the public (as opposed to military) service as well. "Colo. Hazens Regt. is accidental. It is not necessary for the security of the place. A captains guard could perform all the military duties of the post." Pickering bolstered his argument by stating that he did not think the situation would have escalated as it had if Colonel Hughes had not been engaged in important business at Albany. "Had he been present Genl. Heath would hardly have thought of requiring the deputy quartermaster of the state to carry his provision return to be countersigned by Colo. Hazen or perhaps one of his captains." Pickering warned that if the orders were not revoked Hughes was sure to resign as were his assistant and other subordinate officers and "his large collection of excellent artificers." 14

After asking Washington for his help in the matter, Pickering wrote Major (apparently another one of those courtesy titles) John Keese, the assistant deputy quartermaster at Fishkill (the assistant ready to resign), "I shall not cease my attention to the case till the rights of the department are acknowledged and guarded against future incroachments." He wanted everyone to await Washington's decision. Pickering also stated that he believed Heath would not have issued the offensive orders "had he adverted to the resolves of Congress, which his orders, if executed, would in effect repeal. By the plan for the Commissary's department established June 10 1777 'the quarter master general & any of his Deputies or Assistants' are authorized to give Orders for the issues of Provisions. The right thus given to you no General Orders can take away: for it will not be denied that an Order of Congress is of superior authority." So he ordered Keese to demand, as usual, the rations due the department, and to continue, as usual, making issues within the department. "There is a variety of business to be done at the post which
has no connection with the military. The deputy of the State is answerable that that business be executed. But for this purpos[e] he must employ a variety of Persons & he must furnish them with the means of doing that business. These means are principally (as money is wanting) fuel and provisions; . . . . Your right & power to order the issues of these Articles is delegated to you by Congress, with which no person delegated by inferiour authority to Colo. Hazen can [ ] in competition."15

The problem was that Pickering saw the personnel at Fishkill as part of the civil branch at an essentially civil post, while the army commanders there looked upon the resident quartermaster personnel as supporting a military unit at a military post. The combatants worked through the problem but never fully resolved it. Indeed, that August, Pickering himself further confused the issue (if not for those originally involved then at least for historians trying to untangle civilian from military personnel). At that time Pickering chose Hughes to be deputy quartermaster to the army under Heath's command. He said, "The probable situation of this army will admit of his [Hughes] attending to the business in the state as well as if he resided at Fishkill." Pickering guaranteed that Heath or anyone who might succeed him could depend on Hughes "for every kind of supply, & the means of transportation by land & water. Nine tenths of the business will be of a civil nature, which nobody could manage better than Colonel Hughes; and his intimate acquaintance with every part of this state & its resources will I trust be singularly useful. In the military branch of his new office he will not be embarrassed: if more military knowledge & experience than his line of duty has led him to acquire be needful, he is sure of every necessary aid." After declaring Hughes and his people essentially separate from the army's command structure, Pickering now attached them to it. He appointed Keese deputy commissary of forage,
Captain Hasfield White deputy wagonmaster, and Joseph King storekeeper, for Heath's army. They now straddled the military and civil branches of the Quartermaster Department. The Fishkill battle and resolution were representative of many disputes over support and autonomy between staff departments and the line.

A lot of people straddled the civil-military staff department fence. They included those essentially civilian, like Keese and King, and those who never let anyone forget that they were first and foremost military, including Nathanael Greene when he was quartermaster general and Lieutenant Francis Brooke. When Greene, happily finished with his staff appointment, appointed Brooke quartermaster of the park of artillery for the southern army in 1781, Brooke only accepted "on the express condition that I should not lose my rank in the line; as I did not come into the army to go into the staff." Brooke added that "having two duties to perform, I was very attentive to that in the line." Brooke's sentiments were echoed by many of the other officers detailed to staff duties.

Line officers generally had a poor opinion of staff department or public officers. As Colonel Walter Stewart, who was actually acting in a staff capacity himself at the time, irritatedly wrote Lamb in July 1782, "I find nothing but disappointment takes place when we depend upon the Publick Officers to execute Business." Lamb's muster rolls had lain at the quartermaster general's office in Philadelphia for days holding up Stewart's work as inspector for the main army. After waiting for the office to send the rolls out, Stewart went by to speed things up only to find they finally had sent them out. But the delay meant that now he had to ask that Lamb's officers prepare the rolls as quickly as possible so that they (along with their troops) would be ready for his review later that morning. Stewart knew he would find a sympathetic audience in
Lamb. Just a few years earlier, Lamb, after inspecting the laboratory at Springfield, had written the Board of War about the deficiencies of a public officer there: "I find on the strictest enquiry, that Mr. Eayres, Superintendent of Artificers an Ignorant overbearing Man [ ] has been the origin of all the disputes and uneasiness, that has happened between the Officers and has constantly kept in a state of anxiety ever since he has been considered as a Major in Flower's Regiment." He also discovered that Eayres kept an office and employed his son, "a Lad about 15 years of Age," as a clerk, both at the public's expense. Lamb believed, "Both the Office, and Clerk, . . . may be dispensed with, . . ."19

Accustomed as they were to looking down on staff officers and cursing them for malfeasance or incompetence, most line officers found it disconcerting and degrading when they were appointed to staff positions. Actually, the staff's poor reputation may have been a result of just such appointments: some line officers were ill-equipped, by disposition, education, or intellect, to handle staff duties. Nonetheless, some line officers did find themselves with staff duties when there was no one else to perform them. The 2nd Continental Artillery needed both an adjutant and quartermaster in June of 1777. Lieutenant Daniel Gano did recommend a candidate for the latter position to his colonel, but apparently the candidate was either not acceptable or the regiment was not very efficient in procuring him, for a week after Gano's note Lieutenant Colonel Oswald wrote Lamb, "We are in great want of an Adjutant & Quarter Master, as I am oblig'd to do their Duty as well as my own--Our Officers here [ ] seem to think it a degradation to act in either Capacity, however I have appointed Lt. Ashton to do Adjutant Duty. I have been obliged to go myself to Fish Kill, for Cloathing, . . ."20 At one time or another, the problem and the solution (with the commander making the appointment or
the officers voting on who received the appointment) were echoed by the army's other regiments and by the staff departments.21

Washington and his subordinate commanders did not perceive the appointment of line officers to staff positions within regiments as a terrible hardship, for the officers remained with their units and could continue to perform combat duty as well as staff duty. What they did not like was the appropriation of line officers by the staff departments. In July 1779 Washington, after being "informed that some commissioned officers hold appointments in the commissary and forage departments," ordered the practice to be discontinued: "The demands upon the line for the Staff officers authorized by congress are so numerous that it would be injurious to the service, to permit any other than they have pointed out."22 Circumstances conspired to prevent wholesale adherence to that order. As the staff departments continued to suffer from a shortage of manpower, the army continued to loan them officers and soldiers from the line. For example, in August 1782, Greene's orders noted that Lieutenant North of the Pennsylvania line was appointed deputy wagonmaster to the Southern Army and that Sergeant Samuel Filson received an appointment as wagon conductor to the Maryland line.23 Then, of course, there were those congressional resolutions in late 1782 that promoted the use of line officers in the staff departments.

Although there were many line officers doing duty in the staff departments, most staff officers were originally civilians who received direct appointments. For a good number of them, such appointments served as stepping-stones to line commissions. Washington made John Parke an assistant to the quartermaster general in August of 1775; within a year Parke crossed over to the line and became an ensign in the 2nd Pennsylvania Battalion. John Grizzage Frazer, appointed to be another assistant to the
quartermaster general in September 1775, left his staff post to assume the duties of major in the 6th Continental Infantry the following January. In March 1778 Congress appointed Matthew Clarkson an auditor "to settle, and adjust the accounts of the whole army." Within months Clarkson had resigned from that post to become a major and aide-de-camp to General Arnold.24

Other appointees stayed within the staff departments, serving with the army if not in it. Jeremiah Wadsworth, who had been a deputy commissary general of purchases in 1777, became the commissary general of purchases in April 1778 and remained in that post until 1780.25 Deputy Quartermaster Hugh Hughes of New York gave years of service and both appointed and supervised numerous assistant deputy quartermasters within his district. In 1782 alone, these assistants included John Campbell, Daniel Carthy, John Keese, Edward Kiers, Uriah Mitchell, Nicholas Quackenbush, and Charles Tillinghast.26 Stationed at different posts, such as Fishkill, West Point, and Newburgh, these staff department officers supervised lesser officers and employees in the acquisition, storage, and issuance of quartermaster supplies. Their staffs included foragemasters, storekeepers, paymasters, and clerks. Such personnel acted as the middlemen between the purchasing agents or deputies in the civil side of their departments and the military units who were the ultimate recipients of their goods and services.

The more closely staff department officers were affiliated with the army, in working and living conditions, the more likely they were to consider themselves as part of or in the military. The more removed they were, the more inclined they were to think of themselves as civilians in the public's service. Another determinant was where they fit in the chain of command. If they regularly operated under military orders, their sense of belonging (and the army's sense of "owning") increased; if, however, they generally operated
under instructions (channeled through the heads of their staff departments) from Congress, the Board of War, or the secretary at war, then they were removed from the military command structure and were truly officers in the public rather than military service.

Staff officers supervised both military and civilian personnel, who ran the gamut from storekeepers to unskilled laborers. As Congress neglected to provide the staff departments with an adequate number of workers, sometimes actually undermining recruiting efforts by establishing limits on the number of staff employees allowed and caps on the wages allowed them, some staff chiefs went out and hired departmental assistants, clerks, and other personnel on their own. They then put their people on the public payroll and presented Congress with a fait accompli. Both Mifflin and Trumbull staffed their departments this way. Other officials, especially in the Hospital Department, preferred to complain and make Congress take action. Both the staff officers and Congress also turned to the army for help in ameliorating civil department personnel shortages. These three methods—personal initiative, congressional resolution, and army intervention—defined staffing procedures throughout the war.

Staff officers often worked on their own initiative, instead of acting upon specific congressional or state recommendations, in hiring certain departmental personnel such as storekeepers, paymasters, and barrackmasters, and office personnel such as clerks, assistants. Six months after Congress appointed him the commissary general of stores and provisions, Trumbull had established four major magazines or stores (Cambridge, Roxbury, Prospect Hill, and Medford), each under the supervision of a storekeeper, at least three of whom had previous commissary experience. He also either
provided each with staffs of clerks and laborers, or approved the storekeepers' own choices of subordinates, before he submitted the staff list to Congress so that the employees could begin to receive their pay.28

Clerks were generally civilians hired to handle business and sometimes personal correspondence, take care of certain monetary transactions, keep department accounts, and maintain office operations when their superiors were away. For comparison, and as a gross generalization, one could say military line officers had aides-de-camp while staff officers had clerks. For example, Samuel Hodgdon, deputy commissary general of military stores, sent his clerk, Mr. James Boyer, to call on Lamb in October 1780 to settle or close the account on the thousand dollars given Lamb (apparently under the aegis of Lieutenant Colonel Ebenezer Stevens) to defray his expenses when he went, acting as an inspector in the public service, to Springfield.29 Although a few clerks were enlisted men, such as Thomas Jones of the artillery artificer unit (he enlisted in June 1777), most, like those employed in the public service by Deputy Quartermaster Hughes, were stationed at various posts that housed substantial staff department contingents. Some of the clerks on Hughes's payroll in 1782 were Jacob Boerum, clerk to the issuer of forage at Fishkill; Theunis Bogert at the Continental Village; Anthony Byvanck, clerk to the assistant deputy quartermaster at Fishkill; George Denniston at West Point; John Gilbert at Kings Ferry; and Dirick Hunn at Albany. They were paid between twenty and thirty-five New York dollars per month for their services.30 Decent and regular pay was vital to the retention of these important employees, and an issue of continuing concern to their employers. Pickering wrote Hughes in October 1780: "The pay of Storekeepers, Clerks, artificers [&]c whom you shall find necessary for the service, you will fix at your discretion, according to their merit & services respectively: but if
engaged for more than two months the plan directs that the condition be approved by the Quarter Master Genl. . . . However if I rightly recollect, Col[o]. Miles expected to engage all his storekeepers and Clerks at from thirty to forty or forty five dollars at most P month, they finding [for; meaning provisioning] themselves."31 A little over a year later, Pickering told Major Richard Claiborne, a line officer and deputy quartermaster, that "the pay of clerks you must fix on the best terms in your power; they are essential in business."32 Myriad other workers, including supervisors, tradesmen, and laborers, were also essential to staff department business. Indeed, because the departments could not function without them, staff officers resorted to various measures in their efforts first to obtain and then to keep these people. Staff officers began by hiring (and then continued to employ) civilian workers, but when too many of them proved transient and insubordinate, the officers (with Congress' approval) tried enlisting men directly into their departments. The results were not decisively positive: the departments did get some people in this manner but not enough to fill their ranks. Tradesmen, knowing their worth on the open market, often did not want to enlist and thereby decrease their mobility and earning power. If they did enlist, it was generally for limited periods instead of a soldier's enlistment of three years or the war's duration. The tradesmen also insisted upon, and received, better pay and more rations than the average soldier. The departments continued to have personnel shortages, so staff officers resorted to drafts on the line.

Soldiers labored for the staff departments from the war's beginning to its end. On 1 October 1775 Washington ordered that "the Colonels and commanding Officers of Corps, are upon application from the Qr Mr General, immediately to employ under his direction, all the Carpenters in their several regiments, to erect barracks for the Regiments and Corps they respectively
The next fall Washington first commanded the brigades of Putnam's division to furnish men for the hospital and then ordered that no officer (in any brigade) was "to take off any Soldier who is employed either as Waggoner, Butcher, Tallow Chandler or other Business under the Q. Master Gen or Comm. Gen without first applying to the Head of the Department." Staff officers late in the war followed their predecessors' examples. In May 1781, when Pickering felt that boat building and repairs were proceeding too slowly at some Hudson River posts, he asked Hughes, "Will it not be adviseable to get a draught from the line of a number of ship carpenters or boat builders, to make all the repairs at West point, under the direction of one good man of yours? . . . Will it not even be adviseable to apply for a dozen of ship carpenters & boat builders to be taken from the line, to be employed at Wappens creek, untill the army takes the field?" Unit commanders and post commandants usually tried to comply with the continuous demands on their troops. The commandant at Burlington Barracks in March of 1782 directed that the "Mechanicks in the Artillery" who were willing to assist the artificers be lent to Mr. Thorp. As there was little time remaining before the opening of the year's campaign and still much to be done, the commandant asked that the men who worked last year do so again. He assured them that they would be paid for their work. The commandant at West Point in June 1783 also guaranteed "proper encouragement" (extra pay or rations or both) to the masons, brickmakers, carpenters, and blacksmiths in the corps who helped to construct the magazines at that post.

Soldiers knew that civilian or enlisted artificers in the staff departments received more provisions and higher pay than they did and wanted to reap the same benefits if they performed the same labor. As department chiefs and line commanders preferred to have volunteers rather
than draftees perform the work (a person who wants to do the work is likely to work better and perhaps faster than one who does not), they often did provide inducements. That commandant at Burlington Barracks ordered the soldiers who worked with the artificers the previous year, in 1781, to get "certificates from the Commanding officer of that Corps, of time they respectively Served & give them to Lt Allen on Monday morning that he may make Out an Abstract of the whole & procurr the money." The headquarters at Newburgh issued a similar order in June 1783: "All Non[-]commissiond Officers and Soldiers who have Money due them for Services in the Quarter Master Generals Department, will lodge the Certificates thereof with Orders thereon in the hands of their Pay Master, who will settle for the same."39

However, as obliging as most commanders were about providing extra manpower to the staff departments, they had no intention of relinquishing all control over the services of their men. They reminded staff officers that the soldiers were loans, not gifts, and insisted that their men be free to take up arms when the occasion demanded it. Administrative changes implemented at Morristown in January 1780 required that returns include an additional column, titled extra service, under which wagoners, artificers, and "all others who are so Imployd" were to be counted and considered "as Part of the Effective force of the Army." A later addendum required that "those that cannot appear under Arms in time of Action" also be recorded.40 A few months later, in April, headquarters requested that "All genl. and Staff Offrs. not immediately connected with the line . . . inform the Adjt. Genl. what guards[,] fatigue parties[,] Artificers or Assistants they have, or may want from the army that they may be furnished on or before the 8th inst. As all troops belonging to the line hower imploy'ed will be call'd in immediately after that day."41 Commanders were also less likely to release noncommissioned officers
than enlisted men for such special details. Garrison orders at Fort Schuyler on 9 January 1778 illustrated that reluctance: "No Sergt. or Corpl. to be Employ'de as Artificers unless a especial Order from the Commanding Officer." 42

The Continental Army was a vast and diverse labor pool. That was one of the advantages of having a volunteer force that was composed of men from all walks of life and various professions or trades. Staff officers took full advantage of what was available, but, given all the strictures and complaints they heard over their demands on the line, it was no wonder most preferred to create their own departmental labor force. They not only employed civilians in their departments; they also enlisted people into what they called "the public service." The quartermaster general and commissary general of military stores in particular enlisted men into companies of wagoners or artificers.

The commissary and commissary general of military stores engaged a number of wagoners and conductors (who supervised armorers as well), but it was the quartermaster general, generally under the aegis of his subordinate agency, the Wagon Department, who controlled most of the rest of the wagons, wagoners, conductors and other transport personnel and equipment. From 1777 to 1780 the Wagon Department hierarchy included the wagonmaster general, deputy wagonmasters general, wagonmasters, and wagoners. Staff officers without line rank filled the first two positions; civilians, men drawn from the line, and others enlisted into the staff department filled the latter two. After the 1780 reorganization, wagonmasters were the senior officers, deputy wagonmasters next, then conductors (those who had formerly been called wagonmasters), and finally wagoners. Furthermore, the quartermaster
general, with the approval of Washington or the commanders of the separate armies, could draw officers from the line to fill the higher positions. Pickering did exactly that when choosing a candidate for the top post, and Washington concurred: "As the Direction of the Waggon Depart[ ] is a charge of great importance in foreign Armies, and generally intrusted to a Field Officer of the Line. [A]nd as it is thought the Service will be benifitted by a similar practice in our Army; Major Cogshall [Thomas Cogswell] of the first Mass[ts]s Regiment is appointed Waggon Master to the Main Army and to be obeyd as such." Some deputies were also drawn from the military line but others, such as Alexander Lamb at Fishkill, were appointees in public service. Wagon conductors, too, could be either appointees, like Kamp Ayres (another member of the Fishkill contingent), or line personnel. While the army thought the wagonmasters in the last years of the war should be comparable to (if not actually in the line) field officers, it treated their deputies and conductors similarly to (and sometimes better than) company-grade officers. When Washington restricted officers of the line to one ration each in the winter of 1780-81, Quartermaster General Pickering attempted to insure his staff's exemption so that men who had drawn two rations earlier would continue to do so. He also arranged for an equitable rum allowance: conductors receiving the same amount as subalterns, and deputy wagonmasters that of captains.

A few of these staff officers, like some staff officers elsewhere, saw these positions as a way to attain line assignments. Theophilus Brower wrote to Colonel Lamb in May 1780 recommending a commission for his brother William, "Who has acted in the Service for this 12 Months past in the Character of Conductor of M[ilitary] Stores. And is now very desirous of Joining your Regiment, And as Coll. Stevens has assur'd him he shall have the first
appointment in the Regiment if agreeable to your approbation. Therefore shall take it as a particular favour done, if possible, to procure him a Lieut. Commis[.] in your Regiment."47

In a role similar to that of company-grade line officers, conductors (or, before 1779-80, wagonmasters) supervised small units of men, in this case wagoners, and generally conducted small-scale operations, meaning, however, actions involving supply, not combat. They acted as supervisors in brigades of public service or staff department wagoners as James Login did in 1779, or performed as adjunct officers in line units. In 1781 Pickering wrote Lieutenant Colonel John Popkin of the 3rd Continental Artillery, "I told Mr[.] Fisher Conductor at the park that he must go with the Detachment Being an officer of the Brigade he is subject to your orders as Commanding Officer--It is most proper he should go, as he is acquainted with the particular mode of gearing the Artillery Horses & management of what pertains to the artillery."48 When serving with the line, especially during an active campaign, conductors, as Pickering reminded Mr. Fisher, received their day-to-day instructions from line commanders. When Lamb wanted to move some artillery pieces and ammunition out of Fishkill in June 1778, he ordered Mr. Mavins, his conductor of stores, to carry out the assignment. Lamb also told Mavins how many horses belonging to the regiment were available for the operation before writing Lieutenant Colonel Udney Hay, an assistant deputy quartermaster general, to apprise him of the situation and to warn him that he had told Mavins to apply to him for extra horses.49 Conductors also operated under the direct orders of their staff department supervisors. In early December 1780 Pickering sent out a lot of letters to wagon conductors and associated personnel ordering them to proceed to various places where the horses could be wintered.50
Both line and staff officers expected wagonmasters or conductors to supervise their wagoners properly, see to it that the horses and oxen were cared for, and insure that the wagons were always ready to roll. Washington clearly stated the priorities in September 1777 when he ordered "that every night the Waggon horses be put to the Waggons & there kept--& if it be necessary at any time for them to go to grass, that it be in the day time only, and then the Waggoners must be with them constantly, that they may be ready to tackle at the shortest notice--The Waggon Masters are requird to see this order carefully executed." Commanders also expected wagoners to keep their four-legged charges from disrupting camp, trampling neighboring fields, or disappearing altogether. Carelessness was unacceptable. As a brigade order stated in September 1778, "When ever a Horse Strays away the Waggon Master is to Report the Waggoner in whose care said Horses was to the Officer Commanding the Regt. who is Directed to have the Matter Immediately enquired into and the Delinquent Punished." Line and staff commanders also promised punishment if the wagoner was so delinquent as to allow himself to stray. If a man enlisted as a wagoner for a proscribed period in the public service and left before fulfilling his obligation, the army considered him a deserter. Alexander Turner, a deputy wagonmaster general, made that clear in June 1780 when he advertised in the Pennsylvania Gazette for apprehension of the wagoners James Parker, Irish-born, "a taylor by trade, about 48 years of age.... [and] much addicted to liquor," and Michael Sellsar, a Pennsylvanian of Dutch (probably German) extraction who could only speak broken English. And when the military was not busy rounding up its human strays, it was usually engaged in combatting the malfeasance of those who remained. Wagoners, or drivers as they were also sometimes called, had a reputation for untrustworthiness and unreliability. They not only embezzled supplies but
destroyed them as well. In trying to lighten a heavy load they sometimes drained the brine preserving the salt pork from the casks and thereby spoiled the meat. If they could not drain away the load, they sometimes simply dumped it on the roadside. Officers tried stricter supervision and punishment, but they could not halt the practices nor could they circumvent them by doing without wagoners—the army had too much need of them.

The army had a lot of trouble with wagoners, but the matter of disciplining the ones it had paled in comparison to the problem of obtaining enough of them. Part of the problem was money; another part, the very nature of the job. When Congress tried to control costs by limiting wages, which it did for a good part of the war, especially in the early years, civilian wagoners preferred to work in the more lucrative private sector than in the public service. Then when the Quartermaster Department tried to enlist wagoners, it found that people did not want to take on such laborious duties. Nonetheless, the quartermaster generals continued to try to furnish the army with enough wagoners for its needs throughout the war. Mifflin employed civilian wagoners in 1775, and then in the fall of 1776 he suggested that when enough could not be hired, soldiers be used. Washington did not like the solution. Before the 1777 campaign began, the commanding general ordered the quartermaster general to look to the neighboring inhabitants and not his soldiers. To make such service appear more attractive, Washington ruled that people so engaged would be considered in the service over the period of their contract and thus would be excused from militia duty. It was not a strong enough inducement: Mifflin still had to divert soldiers from the line. Washington again tried to end the practice in January 1778 and again had to swallow his objections during the succeeding campaign.
Colonel Lamb's and his conductor Mr. Mavins's difficulties in getting artillery pieces and other equipment moved that summer were not unusual. On 1 June, the same day he had written Hay for horses, Lamb informed General Gates that he could not move the artillery from Farmington as soon as he would like "for want of Horses, and Drivers." On the 2nd he wrote Nehemiah Hubbard, an assistant quartermaster general at Hartford, to ask how many horses and drivers he had obtained and to urge him to procure a full complement "as speedily as possible" for getting the artillery to headquarters was extremely important. Hubbard answered that he had enough horses, "but am afraid we shall meet with Difficulty in Raising Drivers--Mr[,] Bingham Return'd without any, have sent him out to hire Men to go to Head Quarters with the artillery & there be Discharg'd--he'll Return next Monday--will then inform you of his success." Bingham was apparently unsuccessful, for on 4 July Lamb asked Hay to engage some drivers and forward them to Farmington because Hubbard was still having difficulty procuring (he crossed out the verb "inlisting") enough drivers.57 If Hay was not able to oblige, Lamb would have been forced to detail some of his artillerymen to do the work.

In April 1779 Congress eliminated its earlier wage restrictions by authorizing the quartermaster general to employ wagoners at the best terms he could obtain, as long as Washington approved them.58 If the quartermaster officers thought that would solve all their problems, they soon discovered they were overoptimistic. They still could not hire or enlist enough wagoners; as a result, they continued to request drafts from the line for the rest of the war.

Money continued to be a major factor in the procurement problem. Pickering used it as an excuse in June 1781 when he asked the adjutant general for soldiers:

The impossibility of obtaining money has prevented the
inlistment of the necessary number of waggoners for the army: I am therefore constrained to request a draught from the line, A doz[.] lads of the recruits least fit for military duty may answer the present exegencies; & that number I beg you will take the necessary measures to furnish to Major Cogswell.

This demand is as unfortunate to the department as it may be disagreeable to the officers in the line; & it will be peculiarly so if they should be frequently changed: for it will require some time & pains to instruct them in their duty: I wish therefore, if it be possible, that such may be selected as may best be spared from the ranks during the campaign. Perhaps there are some men too old as well as too young for military duty, and some newly recruited negroes, who may without any material deduction from the effective Strength of the army be furnished to the waggon department. 59

When the Quartermaster Department could not hire enough teams it sometimes resorted to impressment, and although impressment officially applied only to livestock and equipment, it sometimes resulted in the acquisition of a driver as well. A master might send a slave along to keep an eye on his property or he might drive his team and wagon himself. William Anderson of Rockbridge County in Virginia did the latter in the summer of 1781. As a result, the rather unwilling camp follower was "in hearing of the cannon when Cornwallis surrendered."60 However, impressment remained an undesirable and unreliable method for obtaining manpower, resorted to only when civilian recruitment and drafts from the line proved insufficient for the military's needs. The Quartermaster Department always preferred to use enlisted wagoners like Peter Archer in a "Brigaid of Waggoners," or hire team owners like Major Adams and Jacob Hanch to fill brigades of wagons, or employ people such as William Hunn (an African-American) and Jacob Barbazet as wagoners in the public service.61

The Quartermaster Department employed a number of other public servants to transport supplies. As the new nation lacked a good road system, and bad weather adversely affected the condition of the roads that did exist, the department tried to use boats and boatmen whenever and wherever possible.
British naval patrols limited the use of transport boats and ships along the coast, but the army did employ ferries and other boats on many inland waterways. From 1778 to 1780 the Quartermaster Department included a Boat Department with a "superintendent of naval business," ferry operators, shipwrights and their supervisors. When Pickering became quartermaster general, he closed out the subordinate department by reducing personnel, but he did not discontinue its functions; instead he incorporated them within his larger department (and thus basically returned to pre-Boat Department practices). Also, throughout the war quartermaster officers contracted with the owners or captains of privately owned vessels to transport army supplies and hired artisans and boatmen to care for and crew the boats the department itself owned.62

As early as July 1775, even before the Quartermaster Department was organized, Washington wanted boats available to transport men and supplies. He contacted Joshua Davis, a Boston ship captain, about building and manning 100 boats for the army. Davis's answered with a plan calling for 601 men exclusive of officers. He included a master boat builder at captain's pay, twenty-five boat builders at sergeant's pay, a boat master for each boat at sergeant's pay, and six men to crew for each boat.63 The plan was never implemented in its entirety for the army did not require or, more specifically, could not afford so many nautical employees or followers. Instead, the Quartermaster Department preferred to hire shipwrights for short periods of time to build and repair the boats necessary for a campaign and then hire crews or use soldiers to man them. The latter part of this method did have its drawbacks. In March 1782 Pickering informed Washington that "the loss and destruction of boats are occasioned principally by their being committed to the management of soldiers indiscriminately." The use of soldiers as watermen
had apparently appeared to be a good economy move at first but proved otherwise. Pickering had come to believe that people had to be employed specifically to take care of and crew the boats. However, since he believed hiring such men would cost too much, he proposed enlisting a company of thirty-five to forty watermen. Washington approved his plan. Thus the Quartermaster Department's use of boatmen mirrored its use of wagoners: it hired some, enlisted others, and drafted soldiers for the task when there were insufficient employees.

Other Quartermaster Department employees had the task of delivering information rather than supplies. Express riders were couriers: civilian employees appointed by the quartermaster general to convey dispatches and to obey or carry out any other related orders or duties (such as delivering a horse or two to another officer or post) given them by the commander in chief, the quartermaster general, or his deputies. They were generally furnished with a Continental horse (though some may have used their own), which they could exchange in camp or on the road when necessary, so as to carry out their duties. Express riders, or expresses as they were also called, were expensive, and the army at times tried to cut costs by eliminating certain routes and reducing the number of men so employed; but invariably it had to reestablish chains of expresses (the riders necessary to keep the information exchange open along a certain route or in a certain area) and accept the high costs that accompanied the service. It does not appear that the army or the staff departments ever tried to enlist express riders. The nature of the work and the fact that only a few needed to be stationed at any one place may have hindered militarization here. The army did, however, occasionally use dragoons for the task. An account tallied up at Newburgh on 1 January 1782 showed that twelve dragoons carried dispatches between the army on the
Hudson and Hartford and that thirteen hired expresses carried the dispatches between Hartford and Boston.67

Associated personnel included directors or superintendents of expresses, who, like Robert Dunn at Tappan in October 1780, were directed to examine daily and see to it that the expresses "are provided with suitable horses and other things requisite to enable them properly to perform their duty; to send every rider in his proper tour, so that each may do his proper share of duty in the most equal manner; to keep a register of the times when the riders go out and return & to examine their horses when they come in; and if any do not return in due season; of if their horses appear to have been ill used, you are to report the same to me [Pickering]. . . . and . . . ride as an Express when therto required . . ."68 There were also stablekeepers like Vincent Carter, who also, on occasion, acted as a measurer of grain and express rider, and ostlers like George Hutton in the public service.69

Pickering may have been correct for one brief moment when he told one of his deputies, Hughes, in November 1780 that the artificers with the army were either enlisted or "draughted from the Line,"70 but such a simple declaration was not possible before that time or after. The Continental Army, from the day it was formed to the day it was formally disbanded, needed workers to manufacture and repair buildings and boats, tents and wagons, clothing and equipment, and weapons and ammunition. In order to wage war effectively, it needed not only soldiers but multitudes of artisans and laborers. It obtained the services of these people by hiring them by the day or the piece, by enlisting them in the line and then transferring them to an artificer company, by enlisting them directly into staff department artificer units, or by detailing soldiers to do the work for specified periods.
During the first year of the war there was no established policy on the employment and regulation of artificers. Army commanders and the quartermaster general simply tried to negotiate the best terms possible when employing the necessary civilian artisans. Negotiations did not substantially lower wages, for the army found the cost of civilian labor to be dear. But the army continued to use the expensive civilians, with the consent of Congress, and began to arrange them into companies so as to better supervise their labor. Then in June 1776 Washington ordered the formation of a provisional artificer regiment: "As many useful men belonging to the army have been drafted and others have been hired for the different works of the camp and as their assistance may be wanted to repel the enemy such carpenters, armourers, Smiths and other artificers as are now under the direction of Capns Post, Pollard, Bruin[,] Ford and Bacon are forthwith to be formed into a distinct Corps under the Command of Col. Jonn. Brewer and Mr. Parke Asstn QM Genl. who are to act pro-temporary as their Col. and Lt. Col." Washington wanted the regiment operational, its personnel continuing their normal duties but prepared for combat, during the "present exigency" and then disbanded at campaign's end, which turned out to be that November. By 1777 the army was unifying the employment and direction of artificers under specific departments.

Most artificers belonged to the quartermaster general or the commissary general of military stores, but some belonged to the artillery. In accordance with Washington's orders of January 1777, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Flower, the commissary general of military stores, raised three companies of artillery artificers, including one deployed with the artillery in the field, and one company of artillerymen laborers to work at his laboratories at Carlisle and Philadelphia. In 1778 the collective companies became the
Regiment of Artillery Artificers. Over that same period General Knox enlisted a company of carpenters, one of blacksmiths, another of wheelwrights, one of armourers, and a company of harnessmakers under the artillery's direct command at Springfield. Then in February 1778 Congress placed all artillery artificers except those in the field under Flower's command. Artificers following the army into the field belonged to the line unit to which they were attached. As Knox put it when he wrote Lamb about Captain Anthony Post of the artificers at Fredericksburg in August 1777, "I have given him Instructions to consider himself as belonging to the Artillery, and to take his particular orders from you." Years later, in 1780, Knox still kept some artificers under the artillery's direct command. He told Lamb, "Whatever terms the Q.M. General engages his artificers upon may be given for those wanted for the artillery." He wanted more blacksmiths, carpenters, and wheelwrights engaged for the war or three years, and if enough could not be enlisted, Lamb was to ask his garrison commander to draft some of the troops to fill the jobs. Lamb was also to detail some of his own artillery men to serve as artificers for a year.

As Knox knew, the quartermaster generals engaged artificers upon varying terms according to the year or month they were hired and the place they were to work. Throughout the war the Quartermaster Department preferred to hire civilian artificers for short terms so as to minimize the expense of their wages. At various times it would also contract with civilians for piecework. However, when the army's needs for artificer goods and labor indicated that longer periods of service would be necessary, the department preferred to enlist workers into companies of artificers. From 1775 to 1778 a few army commanders, such as General Schuyler of the Northern Department when he needed boats in 1776, and the quartermaster general contracted with
master artisans to raise companies of civilian artificers. These companies were designed as temporary "shops," established to perform a certain task or fill a specific order and then be discharged. Then in 1778 the Quartermaster Department decided to create permanent companies of artificers and began to enlist (for three years or the war's duration) men possessing the appropriate skills, such as carpenters and wheelwrights. The department promised enlistees good pay, a bounty, a suit of clothes, fatigue rations (usually larger than a soldier's ration by half), and such other compensation as was granted by Congress to soldiers in the line. In return it got a more stable work force that was without question subject to the army's rules and regulations. In July 1778 Quartermaster General Greene appointed Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin commander of the quartermaster artificers. Baldwin remained in command of the Regiment of Quartermaster Artificers (commonly called Baldwin's regiment or Baldwin's artificers) until early 1781, when Congress dissolved it. The Quartermaster Department had supplemented the ranks with civilian artificers throughout that period; now its new director, Pickering, decided to reverse the trend and once again rely on a civilian workforce (which made an interesting contrast to his advocacy of military officers in the management positions) while reducing the number of the enlisted artificers.76

Pickering decided on this reversal within months of assuming office. When he became quartermaster general in August of 1780, he first focused on reforms within the regiment. He felt that the companies were not only necessary in army manufactures but could also form a useful corps in action as the men were equipped with arms and occasionally instructed in how to use them.77 But as he examined the companies in response to Congress' decision to reduce the regiment, and as he tried to economize, Pickering came to believe that the regiment was too expensive and enlisted artificers too slothful. On 31
January he wrote Hughes, "I have been long disgusted with the manner of doing Continental work. Artificers in general who have fallen under my observation did not do half a day's work in a day. This occasions prodigious loss to the public, the Indolent will eat as much as the industrious, and in the present mode we are obliged to employ double the number which would be other wise requisite. My wish is therefore to employ none but good workmen, to allow them just and even generous Pay, and then to compel them to work with diligence." A day later he informed Baldwin, "For my own part, I am very far from thinking a Regimental Establishment of Artificers the most eligible. I am certain that at this Period of the war it is not the best way to procure artificers remarkable either for their Skill or Industry." When he wrote to Richard Peters, a member of the Board of War, on 2 February, seeking further clarification of Congress' intentions relative to the reduction of artificer companies, Pickering offered another solution to the organizational as well as economic problem:

This I am certain of from my own observation, that one hundred skillful & industrious artificers, would do more & infinitely better service, than the whole new regt. if composed of such men as Col. Baldwin's. The expence of that regt. has been prodigious. There is all the parade about it of a regiment of soldiers; The officers assume as much state, and so as little work, as the officers of other regiments, and are allowed the pay of artillery officers. I declare again, that I am sicke of the establishment, & wish it were done away. Yet I would not in dissolving the corps discharge the men: there are about 90 enlisted for the war. I have suggested to Genl. Knox that these might be annexed to his company of artillery artificers, . . . He was much pleased with the idea. But some artificers will be necessary with my department: and if I might take my own method in getting them, I would hire one director of the whole and two or three master workmen, who with fifty journeymen, . . . ; would perform all the services requisite in my department. 

The Board of War and Congress decided to implement Pickering's ideas. On 29 March 1781 Congress resolved to disband Baldwin's regiment and have the
remaining enlistees reassigned by order of the commander in chief (he transferred most to the artillery artificers and others to garrison laboratories). 81

Within two months Pickering authorized the raising of a new company of artificers. Although he had spoken against the regiment of artificers and had advocated the employment of civilian workmen, he retreated from his earlier stand when he realized, first, that he did not have enough civilian artificers immediately available and, second, that he needed workmen to serve with the main army during the campaign just then getting under way. He appointed Stephen Clapp, a carpenter, captain of the new company and directed him to appoint one lieutenant, who was also to be a carpenter, as his deputy and enlist four foremen, fifty privates and six cooks. The distribution of the foremen and privates was to be in the following manner: twenty-five carpenters, fifteen smiths, six wheelwrights, four boat builders, two saddlers, and two harnessmakers. Pickering wanted the company raised in the western areas of Massachusetts and Connecticut and the men marched from there to join the army. The big difference between this company and the earlier ones was the term of enlistment. Instead of enlisting for three years or the duration of the war, these artificers were only to be engaged to serve until the last day of December, unless sooner discharged. Pickering did, however, state that if any of the men were "disposed to inlist for a longer period, it may be done; provided the engagements extend to an intire Campaign, or to the last of December in each year." He said he actually prefered such long enlistments. 82

After arranging for his new company of artificers, Pickering tried to supplement the artificer shops in various garrisons. He authorized Mr. Cheeseman, his director of masons, "to inlist six masons to be imployed at West point or elsewhere as the public service shall require... to serve until the
first day of January next, unless sooner discharged." But in this case
Pickering equated the verb enlist with hire or contract. He did not give
Cheeseman a rank as he did Clapp, nor did he make the masons privates. He
also specifically said, "You are to keep correct accounts of the number of days
that all the artificers under you shall be employed distinguishing those that
are hired from those drawn from the line." This difference in definition
can be explained by the fact that Cheesemen and his masons worked in
garrisons and were seen as in the public service or, more precisely, the civil
branch of the department: they were district artificers as opposed to field
artificers.

When some artificers in Hughes's New York district accused Pickering
of partiality and injustice because he managed to get two months pay for the
company of artificers with the army but none for them, Pickering defended
himself: "Let it now be noticed that these artificers have been exposed to all
the hardships of service in the field—that they marched 500 miles with the
army to Virginia—that such fatigue & change of climate endangered their
heal[l]ths & lives—that two of the company have in fact died during the
expedition, & that several others at this day if alive remain sick at the hospital
at Williamsburgh. After hearing this detail of facts, who can with reason
blame me for paying these field Artificers in preference to others?" But the
district artificers' complaints did affect Pickering's enlistment and
organization of artificers for the next year's campaign.

During the winter of 1781-82 Pickering resolved to discharge all
artificers in the public service and instead procure quartermaster stores by
the piece. He also decided to engage some of the former district artificers as
field artificers for the new campaign. Pickering began the switch in
December when he informed Colonel Jabez Hatch to start discharging
artificers at public or army posts. As he explained to Hatch, Major Richard Claiborne (another deputy quartermaster), General McDougall, and just about everyone else with whom he corresponded, public artificers were indolent and expensive. Henceforward, artificers (no question about their being civilian now) were to be paid by the piece instead of by the day or month. By 19 February Pickering was able to inform Secretary of Finance Morris that "this change took place in New York the beginning of January. I have since permitted two or three artificers to be continued at Albany till farther orders, as they would have employment, and the prices of work done by the piece were extravagantly high there. There were some kinds of work immediately necessary for the army in the Highlands, for which I have contracted to pay by the piece. The prices are lower than any artificers in this city [Philadelphia] will work for; . . ." For example, Pickering contracted with Mr. Jacob Reeder (who, in turn, employed five workers) at Newburgh to do the smith's work required by the main army. After taking care of that business, Pickering focused on the continuing need for field artificers. He wrote to Captain Clapp that he would again have need for a company of artificers for the coming campaign, but that he could not appoint him to the new command because "motives of humanity & the public interest . . . require the company should be formed of the artificers lately employed by Colo. Hughes, all of whom where discharged the beginning of January." Pickering explained that the artificers could not easily move from the state to find employment and had families which were suffering. Also, "as the city of New York will be the object of our operations the ensuing campaign, the engaging artificers that were originally citizens thereof, promises much advantage. The public interest will also be promoted in this way--that the New York artificers are on the Spot, and there will be no wages or expences paid for the time lost
in travelling to camp & home again." He then contacted Mr. John Parsell, who had been the superintendent of wheelwrights at Fishkill, and authorized him to enlist carpenters, smiths, wheelwrights, a collier, wood cutters, boat builders, saddlers, and cooks to serve with the army during the coming campaign. Interestingly, Pickering made no mention of rank other than the job titles of director, sub-director, and foreman.

That artificers, whether enlisted or employed, were necessary there was no doubt. They performed a multitude of tasks at all the army's camps and garrisons. Most served as colliers, bellows makers, smiths, coopers, rope and tent makers, masons, and carpenters, but a few, like Mr. Morgan the cutler sent to Morristown in December 1780, occupied rarer positions. Carpenters, if not outnumbered by smiths, made up the largest contingent among the artificers. They acted as both district and field artificers in the Quartermaster Department, enlisted as artillery artificers, and worked for the commissary general of military stores. As quartermaster and artillery artificers, they built the army's barracks and huts, erected the necessaries or outhouses, measured cannon so as to hew gun mounts, and occasionally acted as wheelwrights, making axles and wheels. The commissary general of military stores, Benjamin Flower, utilized their talents in his laboratories from Philadelphia to Springfield.

Flower enlisted some of his artificers but hired a lot more of them; he also engaged women to do piecework. Captain Theophilus Parke supervised Flower's leather accoutrements factory in Philadelphia in the fall of 1778. His muster rolls listed whitesmiths (tinsmiths, or finishers and polishers of iron), shoemakers, burers (borers?), and workers just registered as hired men. Parke hired most of his civilian workers by the month. Some worked consecutively for months on end; others quit after just a few days or weeks of
the work. Flower also operated a thriving munitions industry in Philadelphia. He employed people like John Beaks to work in the laboratory at 5th Street, and, as certified by Nathanael Triplett and P. Jones, conductors of military stores, also paid Beaks for musket cartridges made by him and his wife. Deborah Beaks and many other women, including Sarah Cribbs, Catherine Faries, Ann Eyres, and Elizabeth Young among others, made thousands upon thousands of cartridges from the fall of 1780 to the spring of 1781. And another woman, Rebecca Young, made five thousand brushes and wires "for the use of the United States." Although it would be difficult to say that they served with the army, these people all deserved mention because they did work for it.

Some persons served with the army or in the public service as unskilled laborers. Deputy Quartermaster General Hughes employed William Adams as an overseer of the fatiguemen with the engineers (those who planned and built roads and fortifications). Adams, other public service overseers, and line officers supervised crews of laborers who dug ditches, leveled and repaired roads, built bridges, and raised redoubts and revetments. Many of these fatiguemen were African-Americans, for the army hired black followers and detailed black soldiers to do much of the hard labor associated with military operations. This division of labor was quite evident in the Southern Army of 1782. In July Greene ordered the quartermaster to "collect all the Negroes and have the roads repaired this evening, between this and Mr. Cattle's plantation on the Ashley River." Then, after a summer of such special assignments, Greene commanded that "all the Negro's that have been employed on different kinds of service with the army, and upon extra duty, are to be sent into the quarter Master General's, who will appoint a Captain of pioneers [engineers] to
superintend them, as the service may require. He thereby culled a good many of the blacks out of the ranks of soldiers and followers and established them as laborers under the Quartermaster Department in an engineering or pioneer unit.

Other departments also utilized hired and enlisted fatiguemen to handle some of their more laborious duties. The Hospital Department, in particular, used quite a number of them. They figured rather prominently in Boston-area hospital accounts from 1775 to 1776. These laborers worked in the army's general hospitals, both its main building and its smaller "sick houses," and the small pox house (a building set aside for those recovering from inoculation as well as the "natural" illness). Many were white, but a few were black; the latter included slaves hired out to the hospitals. For instance, the Hospital Department paid David Wart for the services "of his Negro Man Sam as Waiter & his Negro Woman as Washer for 4 Months." As this indicates, hospital laborers did not only tote the bales or dig the ditches (in this case probably necessaries) that engineer laborers did; they also took on service tasks similar to those engaged in by followers who acted as servants and domestics with the line units. This was further illustrated in an advertisement for female nurses in the 4 March 1776 issue of the *Boston Gazette and Country Journal* which also asked for male laborers who would act as assistants to the nurses; it mentioned that men from the distressed seaport towns would be given preference. As the war progressed and the department established more hospitals in other military districts and near other garrisons, it not only hired civilians to do such chores but asked for and received details of soldiers as well. In June 1776 Greene ordered the camp colormen (soldiers detailed to camp maintenance) to attend not only to the camp but also to work at the hospital. Patient and personnel returns for the hospital at Albany in 1778 included
fatiguemen, numbering anywhere from five to over a dozen, detailed from neighboring regiments.97

The same Albany personnel returns included tallies of soldiers taken from the line to do nursing duty and female nurses hired for the job. The hospital there had an even distribution of twelve to thirteen male and eleven to twelve female nurses over the early months of 1778. For although the Hospital Department hired many general laborers and accounted for them as such, it also employed a great many other workers for more specific duties. Most of the hired hospital personnel filled the lower ranks of the medical department's hierarchy. The congressional resolution of 27 July 1775 established the initial hierarchy by authorizing one director general and chief physician, four subordinate surgeons or physicians, an apothecary, and twenty surgeon's mates, as well as assistants in the form of a clerk, two storekeepers, a nurse to every ten patients, and occasional laborers as needed. Over time the establishment expanded to include the director, chief hospital physicians, chief physicians and surgeons of the army, physicians and surgeons, purveyors, apothecaries, assistant purveyors, and assistant apothecaries. They were to be appointed and commissioned by Congress and receive all the benefits enjoyed by officers of the line. Assisting these gentlemen of the hospital, and sharing in their status if not their benefits, were a few civilian adjunct and volunteer surgeons, but the majority of hospital employees occupied lower status and lower paying positions. Congress authorized the director and chief hospital physicians (and after 1781, in the absence of the aforementioned personages, other physicians and surgeons of the hospital) to employ as many persons "as are necessary for the good of the Service," or as later stated, as "necessary for the regular management of the
hospitals." These people included clerks, storekeepers, stewards, ward-masters or managers, apothecary laborers, matrons, and nurses.

Civilians serving with the army in the medical department worked either in hospital administration or medical service. Clerks, storekeepers, stewards, ward-masters, and matrons were administrators or managers. They accounted for supplies, distributed provisions, maintained the physical plant, and supervised their subordinates. Hospital mates, apothecary laborers, nurses, and fatiguemen (when acting as orderlies) assisted the surgeons and other medical personnel and attended to the patients. Hospital mates occupied a position similar to that of surgeon's mate. Doctor John Morgan wrote his colleague Jonathan Potts, "Let me give You a piece of Advice or Hint that may be useful to You, which is to make it a part of the Duty of the Mates to assist the Apothecary in making up & dispensing Medicines. I call all Mine Hospital Mates, not merely Surgeons Mates, because I will not suffer Names to mislead, or allow any of them to refuse that Duty under a Notion that they are Surgeons Mates, & that it is not part of their Duty to assist the Apothecary; . . ." Actually, few if any of these mates served as civilians (or volunteers) for a substantial length of time, for most quickly obtained an officer's appointment within the department. However, whereas regimental surgeon's mates received direct commissions from Congress, hospital mates (also called surgeon's mates in hospitals) were appointed, and certified by warrant, by the director of the Hospital Department. They were, in effect, warrant officers with the duties and privileges of commissioned officers. Nurses, on the other hand, never received commissions or warrants, or, indeed, ever enlisted as nurses in the service. Some nurses were enlisted men, but they were soldiers taken from the line so as to nurse for a time. The other nurses, whether male or female, were always hired to serve with the army, never in it, and their
employment was contingent upon demand. When Doctor Dirk Van Ingen set up a small hospital in two rooms of the barracks at Schenectady in August 1777, he immediately hired "a Couple of Women and a Couple of men to attend on the Sick," and when his patients multiplied (on the 16th he had forty-three of them), he looked around for more.101

The Hospital Department hired matrons and nurses from civilian communities and the Continental Community. When the General Hospital in Massachusetts wanted nurses for its houses at Cambridge and Roxbury in the spring of 1776, its advertisement noted that preference would be given to Boston and Charlestown women. A few months later, the Continental Hospital at Williamsburg, Virginia, published its need of nurses in the Virginia Gazette and promised that anyone with good recommendations would "have good encouragement."102 General officers and regimental commanders also encouraged, sometimes quite strongly, female retainers (the "women of the army") to take nursing positions. In July 1776 Greene declared, "The sick Being Numerous in the Hospital And But few Women Nurses to be Had, the Regimental Surgeon must Report the Number Necessary for the sick of the Regt and the Colonels are Requested to supply accordingly. A Daily Report to Be made to the Commanding Officers of Corps by the Surgeons of the Watchers wanting in the Hospital Which are to be supply'd Accordingly."103 The colonels could supply male or female nurses, but females were preferred because every male detailed from the line meant one less soldier available to fight. Therefore commanders sometimes drafted women followers as nurses, first, by promising full rations and an allowance for volunteers, and second, by threatening to withhold all rations from those reluctant to take on the duty.

A few commanders also apparently thought of hospital duty as a way to test a woman's loyalty and used the institution as a sort of low-security
reformatory or prison. Although this attitude was probably very rare, General Israel Putnam demonstrated it in April 1777 when dealing with a woman named Elisabeth Brewer. Brewer was apprehended coming out of British-occupied New Brunswick, New Jersey, and questioned on the reasons for her movements. During the interrogation she gave information against a number of men, two of whom Putnam secured and another who, after discounting her testimony, he released on the condition that the man inform the Americans of British movements. Putnam informed Governor William Livingston that Brewer "has an Inclination of entering the Hospital as a Nurse; in which employment she has been before employ'd at this place, and the Surgeon giving her a good Character, I have that purpose to detain her here for that purpose--If you have any Objections and will let me know, I will send her Immediately to you."104 There must have been objections, for in June a general court-martial found Brewer guilty of espionage and recommended incarceration.105

Actually, hospital work might have proved a harsher and more fitting punishment for Brewer and other such criminals if it were not for the fact that the patients would have had to suffer from their ministrations. Most Continental hospitals were overcrowded, poorly ventilated, and very unsanitary. When Doctor Lewis Beebe described the hospital serving Mount Independence and Ticonderoga, he described most of the army's other medical facilities as well: he said the sick were "crowded into a dirty, Lousy, stinking Hospital, enough to kill well men."106 The hospitals were as much a health hazard to the people who worked there as they were to the people treated there. And for the nurses, illness posed a threat to their livelihoods if not their lives. After asking Doctor Potts whether nurses were allowed any liquor, Doctor Joseph Young asked if nurses who took sick were "entitled to nurses
wages during their illness?" It can be hoped that Potts answered in the affirmative. Of course, some hospitals were better than others. In April 1778 the Reverend James Sproat, hospital chaplain of the Middle Department, commented that the hospital at Yellow Springs was "very neat, and the sick comfortably provided for," and that the French Creek Church hospital was "very neat and clean, and the sick seem well attended." That June he again commended the facilities at those locations, specifically mentioning their airiness.

In good conditions and bad, matrons and nurses labored to assist the surgeons and aid the sick. Although her activities included drinking tea with the doctors and providing hospitality to visiting officials, a matron was usually busy supervising the nurses and directing housekeeping activities. The steward would issue supplies, such as wine, brandy, rum, sugar, raisins, and other items prescribed by the surgeons, to the matron, and she, in turn, would see that they were distributed according to orders. She also toured the hospital two to three times each day so as to check that the patients had their food properly prepared, that the nurses were doing their duty, and that the wards and their inhabitants were clean and neat. Nurses attended to the immediate needs of the sick and performed housekeeping duties. They dealt more with hygiene than medicine: only when the hospital or surgeon's mates were not available did they administer medicines and dress wounds. Nurses generally concentrated on obeying the matron and keeping wards and patients clean. Their duties included: keeping themselves clean and sober; emptying the chamber pots as soon as possible after use into necessaries or vaults dug for that purpose; washing newly admitted patients and then returning to wash their hands and face and comb their hair every morning; changing patients' linen as directed by the surgeons; sweeping out the wards
every day if necessary and sprinkling them with vinegar three or four times a
day; and delivering the effects of dead patients to the ward master. They were
never to be absent without leave from the physicians, surgeons, or matron,
and they were never to steal from their patients or colleagues. Offenders
would be punished. 110

The work was hard, and the pay poor--conditions that adversely affected
both the recruitment and retention of matrons and nurses. In 1775 Congress
authorized a salary of four dollars a day for the director general and chief
physician of the department but only four dollars a month for the matron and
two dollars a month for the nurses. In comparison, soldiers received six and
two-thirds dollars a month. But as the need for nurses grew, Congress
periodically increased their wages. In 1776 nurses' salaries doubled, and then
in 1777 their wages were set at eight dollars a month. There was no specific
legislation on nurses' pay after that time, but hospital directors and chief
physicians exercised discretion in the matter when attempting to maintain
their nursing staffs. 111 But poor as the pay was, it was better than nothing.
That pay, plus the supplementary rations and, in the case of camp retainers,
command inducements, attracted women to hospital duty. The Albany hospital
in July 1777 counted nine women--Eunis McNabe, Elisabeth Simson, Catrinea
Sullivan, Nancy Smith, Loies Hart, Ellaner Staries, Mrs. Obrain, Mary Weston,
and Sealey Tonstor--among the nurses on wards N1 to N10; only N6 had two
male nurses instead of one of each sex, and N10 may have been bereft of a
partner for Tonstor. The same hospital in March 1780 rationed its female
personnel and their children as well as female and child patients. The matron,
Sarah Ray, received two rations for herself and her son. Nurses Rachel
Clement (who had two children) and Mary DeCamp (with one) also each
received two rations. But their colleagues, Mrs. Perkins (with three children)
and Sarah Lancaster (with her one child), only received one ration apiece. The other nurses, Grace Gilbert, Susannah Low, Mary Antrim, Sarah Demont, and Mrs. McMurry, were listed without children and received the standard one ration each. For comparison's sake, the hospital provided its carpenter, Edmd. Kingsland, and his wife and three children with three and one-half rations a day, and divided twelve rations among the nine women and ten children patients.112

The army expected all persons serving with it to obey regulations and follow orders. Some civilians supervised other civilian employees within the staff departments, but ultimately, the military directed the actions of all of them. Sometimes the direction was quite general, as when the commander in chief established an area of operations and informed the Hospital, Quartermaster, Commissary, and other staff departments to set up the appropriate administrative and logistics agencies, networks, and personnel to support the army's actions. At other times the direction could be quite specific, with military personnel directly supervising civilian operatives. Peter Gansevoort, colonel-commandant of Fort Schuyler paid strict attention to the artificers working at his post. In January 1778 he reminded the carpenters that they could not under any "pretence whatsoever quit work until Ordered." Then in March he appointed a line officer, Lieutenant William Tapp, superintendent of the "Engineers-Business," and ordered the artificers and "others" to obey Tapp as such. Gansevoort also took the opportunity to state, "All the Artificers who work under Cover are to begin to work in the Morning when the Drum beats the Troop for Roll Calling [sunrise]." But in April the commander still expressed himself dissatisfied with artificer productivity. He wanted every subsequent officer of the day to walk around
the works and observe if all the working parties and artificers were diligently employed; the officer was to note deficiencies on the back of the guards' morning reports. The reports apparently revealed patterns of abuse, for a month later, Gansevoort ordered the superintendent of the Engineers Department to make sure the artificers kept the proper hours at mealtimes and to dock them one quarter of a day for every quarter of an hour they were late at the works.113

When artificers and other persons serving with the army disobeyed orders or abused privileges, military commanders both promised and delivered punishment. After hearing that soldiers had been seen reeling out of the carpenter's shop "very much disguised in Liquor," Gansevoort made his displeasure known in garrison orders published on 8 April: "The Commanding Officer takes this Method of acquainting the Carpenters; that if any of them are found out in disposing of any Spiritous Liquors to the Soldiers, Their allowance of Rum shall be Withheld from the said Carpenters and the person found to Offend by Transgressing of this Order shall be Tried by a Court Martial, And punish'd for Disobedience of Orders."114 The commander soon got the chance to deliver on his promise. "John Duncan a Carpenter employed about the Works at this place having been found Guilty of transgressing the Order of the Eight of this Month, in not only selling Rum Contrary to the said-Order but Receiving a Soldiers Blankett for pay for the said Rum . . . . The Commissary is to Issue no more of the allowance of Rum, which may hereafter be due to the said John Duncan, nor is Mr Gardner the Master Carpenter to include him in his Rum Return for the Time to come."115

Staff officers, even when in public as opposed to military service, were no more immune to military prosecution than their subordinate civilian employees. A court-martial found Mr. Edward Miles, a deputy assistant in the
Commissary Department who was attached to the light troops of the Southern army, guilty in August 1782 "of a breach of the first article, twelfth Section of the articles of War," and sentenced him to be dismissed from the department and to forfeit all pay due for his services.116

Officers and employees in the staff departments found out soon after taking their positions that they belonged not only to their respective departments but to the army as well. Service with the army was much like service in the army, mainly in that both public service and military personnel lived with regimentation and deprivation. The differences existed in matters of work performed, personal freedom, public recognition, and pay. Public service personnel provided support services for the military. Their work in administration and logistics allowed line personnel to concentrate on tactics and strategy. Because they were not combat personnel, most appointees and employees were free to resign or quit their positions at any time; they could choose to terminate their service when and where they wished. Only those who enlisted or signed a contract for a term of service relinquished that freedom; but their enlistments often differed from those of soldiers in the line by being of much shorter duration. Many, but not all, public service employees also obtained better pay than that given soldiers. While the staff officers generally had salaries comparable to their counterparts in the line, wagoners, artificers, and others of that ilk often made Congress and the army pay dearly for their services. On the other hand, laborers and nurses did not do as well. Finally, the very nature of their employment often precluded staff personnel, both those who remained in garrison and those who followed the army into combat arenas, from receiving the recognition or accolades accorded officers and soldiers of the line. There was very little glory in public service.
Chapter V Notes


2. Erna Risch, Supplying Washington's Army (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981). Risch studies the various staff departments in detail and does a good job of unraveling the sometimes complicated mechanisms by which they operated. Of particular note here are pages 310-315 on the Ordnance Department, 265 & 275 for the Clothing Department, 160-171 on the Commissariat, and pages 29-30 introducing the Quartermaster Department. Another excellent source on staff department operations and problems is Wayne E. Carp's To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984). As for mention of a Quartermaster Line instead of department, see Knox's letter to Lamb, Valley Forge, 11 May 1778, in the John Lamb Papers, New-York Historical Society (microfilm), reel 1. In that note Knox began to refer to it as a department, but then crossed it out and inserted line. Of course, he may have done so as a concession to Greene, who had just taken over the department and was carrying the letter to Lamb.

3. Carp, To Starve the Army, 25-26. Congressional resolutions acknowledged that medical officers were also officers in the army. Examples include: Congressional Resolution of 11 June 1781, stating, "that the officers of the Hospital and Medical Department, now in service be allowed the Depreciation upon their pay, in same manner as officers of the Line of the Army," published in General Orders, 21 June 1781, Orderly Book, Colonel John Lamb's Second Regiment of Continental Artillery, 20 June-21 October 1781, New-York Historical Society Collection of Early American Orderly Books (microfilm, David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pa.); Congressional Resolution of 16 May 1783 dealing with pensions, published at Headquarters Newburgh, 27 May 1783, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 28 March-25 June 1783. All of Colonel Lamb's orderly books (all listed under the same basic title) in the New-York Historical Society's Collection will hereafter be referred to as Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book and differentiated by date.


5. In footnote 5 to Benjamin Harrison's letter notifying Washington that he could appoint some officers to the staff, 21 (-24) July 1775, it is mentioned that John Adams was not pleased about allowing Washington to appoint staff officers. Adams felt such officers should act as checks upon Washington and he, in turn, should serve as a check on them; such a close connection could hinder that. In Abbot, Papers of Washington 1:145, 149. Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 46-47. In discussing the issue of rank, Risch does not mention the adjutant general because she focuses on the personnel and operations of the logistics branches; the Adjutant General Department was a purely administrative one. Carp, in To Starve the Army, 157, mentions that the ways in which staff officers described their roles expressed their patriotism.
6. Ibid., 74-75.


8. 1 August 1782 Congressional Resolution, published in General Orders, at Headquarters Newburgh, 26 December 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 27 November 1782-5 January 1783.


11. Congressional Resolution reorganizing the Quartermaster Department, 23 October 1782, published in General Orders, Headquarters Newburgh, 28 December 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 27 November 1782-5 January 1783.


18. Stewart to Lamb, Bristol, 8 O'Clock, 3 July 1782, John Lamb Papers (microfilm), reel 2.


21. Washington to Lamb, West Point, 13 August 1780, Ibid., reel 2. Washington mentions that a resolution of Congress states that paymasters are to be chosen by majority vote of all the officers in a regiment while
quartermasters and adjutants are to be chosen by the field officers. He does not indicate whether appointees should already be in the military.

22. Orders, Camp near Chester, New York, 1 July 1779, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 8 June, 14 June-19 August 1779.


24. General Orders, Headquarters Cambridge, 16 August & 22 September 1775, Abbot, Papers of Washington 1:312, 2:35. Parke is mentioned in Francis B. Heitman's Historical Register of Officers of the Continental Army (1914; reprint, Baltimore, Md.: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1982) on page 312; John Grizzage Frazer (or Fraizer) is entered as John Gizzard Frazer in Heitman on page 236. Orders, Valley Forge, 25 March 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 269. A Major John Clark (no such major indicated in Heitman) is also mentioned as an auditor appointee.

25. Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 180; Wadsworth also noted in Heitman, Historical Register, 562.

26. All of these people, and their times and places of service, are recorded in the War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records (called Record Group 93 and hereafter referred to as RG 93) in Compiled Service Records of American Naval Personnel and Members of the Departments of the Quartermaster General and the Commissary General of Military Stores Who Served During the Revolutionary War, M880 (hereafter referred to as Compiled Service Records, M880), National Archives, Washington, D.C. (microfilm, David Library), roll 1.

27. Carp, To Starve the Army, 28-29.


32. Pickering to Claiborne, no place mentioned, November 1781, Ibid., roll 26, vol. 127.

33. General Orders, Headquarters Cambridge, 1 October 1775, Abbot, Papers of Washington 2:76.

34. Headquarters New York, 2 September & 3 October 1776, George Washington's Headquarters Orderly Book, New York, 31 (misprint in records
says 21)August- 4 October 1776, in RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collections, National Archives.


36. Garrison Orders, Burlington Barracks, 26 March 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 February- 7 August 1782.


38. Garrison Orders, Burlington Barracks, 16 March 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 February- 7 August 1782.


40. General Orders, Morristown, 23 January & 5 February 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 December 1779- 27 March 1780. Washington basically reiterates the earlier command when he orders, on 27 May 1781, "only such men as are not expected to do duty with arms Viz- Genl. Field & Staff Officers Servents, Waggoners, Butchers, Bakers, Commy. QM & Forage Mastr. Assistants, and one Armourer for each Regt. in each Brigade to which a Travelling Forge is attach'd be returned on Extra service. That all others on duty in Camp or Garrison, whether with Arms, on fatigue or occasionally employed as Artificers (except Guards placed for the security of Magazines of Ammunition, Clothing or Provisions not in Garrison) be returned present on Duty, and comprised in the Number fit for action." General Orders, New Windsor (?), 27 May 1781, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 21 February- 28 March (actually goes to 28 May) 1781.

41. Headquarters Morristown or Highlands, 5 April 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 28 March- 12 June 1780.


43. Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 89.

44. General Orders, Headquarters Orangetown, 30 September 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 September- 2 November 1780. Note: Heitman in his Historical Register records that Cogswell of the 1st Massachusetts became a lieutenant colonel in the 15th Massachusetts on 26 November 1779.

45. Lamb and Ayres listed in Compiled Service Records, M880, roll 1.

46. Pickering to Cogswell, Camp Phillipsburgh, 9 July 1781, & Pickering to Stewart, Camp Near Dobb's Ferry, 2 August 1781, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 26, vol 82. Apparently there were still some problems over the double rations that summer, even though Pickering thought he had cleared it all up earlier.
47. Brower to Lamb, Pompton, 18 May 1780, John Lamb Papers, (microfilm) reel 2.


49. Lamb to Hay, Farmington, 1 June 1778, John Lamb Papers, (microfilm) reel 1.

50. Numerous letters from Pickering to wagon conductors about winter quarters for horses are in Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 123.

51. General After Orders, Headquarters Wilmington, 6 September 1777, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 38.

52. Brigade Orders, probably the Artillery Park near Fredericksburg, 26 September 1778, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 September-27 November 1778.

53. Pennsylvania Gazette, 7 June 1780, p. 3, col. 3.

54. Carp, To Starve the Army, 62.

55. Ibid., 44, 61.

56. Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 75.

57. Lamb to Gates, Farmington, 1 June 1778; Lamb to Hubbard, Farmington, 2 June 1778; Hubbard to Lamb, Hartford, 5 June 1778; Lamb to Hay, Farmington, 4 July 1778; all in the John Lamb Papers, (microfilm) reel 1.


61. Archer was an enlisted wagoner in wagon conductor James Login's brigade of wagoners in 1779. Adams was in John Springer's brigade in the state of Delaware for a few weeks in 1779 while Hanch was on David Boggs' payroll for a number of days, again in Delaware, in 1780. Hunn and Barbazet were stationed at Albany while wagoners in the public service under Hughes in 1782. All recorded in Compiled Service Records, M880, roll 1.


66. During 1780-81 there were a number of letters referring to the suspension of express operations, where and when expresses were necessary, the expense, and the establishment or reestablishment of routes. They included: Washington to Greene, Headquarters Morristown, regarding dismissal of expresses except those with main army and at certain posts, 27 January 1780, in Sol Feinstone Collection; & Pickering to John Neilson, Newboro (Newburgh), on establishing a permanent express at Trenton, 2 December 1780; Pickering to Abraham Appleton, Newburgh, "Expresses are too expensive to be employed on any but extraordinary services that do not admit of delay," 15 December 1780; Pickering to Hughes, Newburgh, "chain of Expresses to be reestablished from Head Quarters to Rhode Island," 2 February 1781; last three examples in Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 124.

67. "Estimate of Money due for Expresses Sta[ ] on the Road leading from Hudson River to Boston, Newburgh, 1 January 1782, in Letters, Returns, Accounts, and Estimates of the Quartermaster General's Department, 1776-1783, In the War Department Collection of Revolutionary War Records, M926, National Archives (microfilm, David Library), 1 roll.

68. Pickering to Dunn, Camp at Tappan, 5 October 1780, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 126.


70. Pickering to Hughes, Camp Totowa, 8 November 1780, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 123.

71. Among the "Questions for the [Congressional] Committee," Cambridge, c. 18 October 1775, was one asking if it was acceptable to continue employing artificers at the high rates they demanded, in Abbot, Papers of Washington 2:188; Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 152-3.


73. Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, 327-328.


75. Knox to Lamb, Camp at Pracaness, 13 October 1780, Ibid., reel 2.

77. Pickering to Governor Trumbull, Camp at Totowa, 22 October 1780, Numbered Record Books, M853, roll 25, vol. 126.


81. Pickering to "To whom it may concern," Newburgh, 13 April 1781, after mentioning what arrangements had been previously made for the officers of the artificers' regiments, he mentions that Baldwin's regiment had been dissolved, Ibid., roll 25, vol. 125.


84. Pickering to Hughes, New Windsor, 4 January 1782, Ibid., roll 26, vol. 83.

85. Pickering to Hatch, New Windsor, 18 December 1781; Pickering to Claiborne, New Windsor, 16 January 1782; Pickering to McDougall, New Windsor, 14 January 1782; Ibid., roll 26, vols. 82 (Hatch letter) & 83.


87. Pickering to Joseph Bowne (storekeeper), New Windsor, 1 February 1782; Pickering to Comfort Sands, Esq. & Co., New Windsor, 1 February 1782; Pickering to Washington, Philadelphia, 8 February 1782; Ibid., roll 26, vol. 83.


90. See Compiled Service Records, M880, roll 1, for listing of names and occupations of artificers employed in the Quartermaster General's Department. Mr. Morgan the cutler mentioned in letter from Pickering to Aaron Forman (assistant deputy quartermaster at Morristown), Newburgh, 20 December 1780, Numbered Record Books, roll 25, vol. 124.

92. Names, some of their trades, and dates hired and quit, of personnel in Commissary General of Military Stores Department found in Compiled Service Records, M880, rolls 1 & 2.

93. Voucher Record and Letter Book from Commissary General of Military Stores Department, Philadelphia, 2 October 1780-2 June 1781, in Letters, Orders for Pay, Accounts, Receipts, and Other Supply Records Concerning Weapons and Military Stores, 1776-1801, M927, National Archives (microfilm, David Library). Entries on John Beaks are numbers 655, 689, 729, 772, 816, & 872 (the last two mention cartridges made by his wife. Entries on Deborah Beaks include 642 & 697. Cribs mentioned in 643, 698, 733, 791, & 894; Faries in 895, Eyres in 897, Elizabeth Young in 901, and Rebecca Young in 862.

94. Compiled Service Records, M880, include William Adams as overseer of fatiguen in, and William Bocrum as a fatiguen man, among others in the Quartermaster Department, roll 1; Philip S. Foner in Blacks in the American Revolution (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1976), 68, mentions black laborers; Orders, Headquarters near Bacon's Bridge, 6 July 1782, & Headquarters Ashley Hill, 4 September 1782, in Orderly Book: Greene's Orders, Southern Army, South Carolina, 1 July-5 November 1782.

95. Financial Account from American Continental Hospital to Dr. John Morgan, 8-28 December 1775 & 31 March to 3 May 1776, in RG 93, Revolutionary War Rolls, 1775-1783, M246, National Archives (microfilm), roll 135.


98. "Army Nurse Corps History," 4; "Plan for Conducting the Hospital Department," 30 September 1780, in Jonathan Potts Papers; Congressional Resolution of 17 January 1781 recorded on 10 February in Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 17 December 1780-20 February 1781; Examples of hospital personnel listed in Morgan to Potts, Copy of Congressional Resolves of 17 June 1776, sent 26 July 1776, & Dr. Samuel Stringer to Potts, Albany, 30 December 1776, Jonathan Potts Papers.


100. "Plan for Conducting the Hospital Department," 30 September 1780, Ibid.

101. Van Ingen to Potts, Sch[en]nectady, 16 August 1777, Ibid.


107. Young to Potts, no date, Jonathan Potts Papers.


109. On 12 & 13 June 1778 Sproat mentions drinking tea with the doctors and matron and being "Genteely treated by Dr. Otto and the matron, Mrs. Adams," Ibid., 443-444; "Army Nurse Corps History," lists the matron's duties as described in "Rules and Directions for the better regulation of the Military Hospital of the United States," 13.

110. Nurses duties from same source as above, Ibid., 13-14.

111. Pay issues discussed in Ibid., 4-5, 9.


114. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 8 April 1778, Ibid.

115. Garrison Orders, Fort Schuyler, 26 April 1778, Ibid.

116. Greene's Orders, Headquarters Ashley Hill, South Carolina, 17 August 1782, Orderly Book: Greene's Orders, Southern Army, South Carolina, 1 July-5 November 1782.
Chapter VI. Subject to Orders

All sutlers and retainers to a camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of the United States in the field, though no enlisted soldier, are to be subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war.

Article 23, Section XIII, American Articles of War, 20 September, 1776

To visitors and residents alike, the Continental Community often appeared to be a chaotic rather than an ordered community. Children shrieked and ran around the tents and cooking fires. Women looked up from their chores to shout at their offspring or make rude remarks to sergeants and officers passing by. Independent-minded soldiers sometimes spat at their commanders' feet and questioned orders; enraged officers occasionally responded with blows. Even among the higher echelons of the military hierarchy peace and order were seldom maintained; officers dueled among themselves, both verbally and physically. Under cover of the confusion, thieves and spies sneaked through the lines to pilfer supplies or gather information.

The army not only had the enemy to defeat, it also had itself to control. Maintaining order presented a constant challenge to military commanders throughout the war. From the beginning, starting with General Washington's encampment at Cambridge, civilian courts and procedures proved both inconvenient and inadequate for maintaining the discipline necessary in an effective military force. As a result, Congress and the army collaborated to create a military justice system by which officers, soldiers, and adjunct
personnel were controlled not only by the local laws governing all people but by additional and more stringent rules of war. The Continental Congress erected the constitutional framework for military law by passing the 1775 and subsequent 1776 Articles of War, ordinances governing the army. Orders—written and verbal commands, whether general orders or regulations issued by a general officer to control an army or specific orders given by a company commander to a subordinate—provided further legal restraints. Finally, military personnel were bound by the custom of war, the established or customary principles and practices peculiar to army life. The three tiers of authority—laws, orders, and custom—regulated the military community.

When the fighting commenced at Lexington Green, the Massachusetts militia was already operating under articles of war passed by the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay on 5 April 1775. The Massachusetts assembly resolved that the "Articles, Rules and Regulations for the Army, that may be raised for the defence and security of our lives, liberties, and estates, be, and are hereby earnestly recommended to be, strictly adhered to, by all Officers, Soldiers, and others concerned, as they regard their own honour and the publick good." The legislators copied most of their articles almost verbatim from the articles of war then in force in the British army, and both sets of rules in turn were models for the American Articles of War that followed.

The Continental Congress enacted the first American Articles of War on 30 June 1775. These articles became effective on 10 August. Following the Massachusetts example, this code of law made punishment less severe than that required by British law. Most of the law-makers thought that the patriotism and dedication of the American soldier would make harsher punishment unnecessary. Many Americans believed that native courage reinforced by the love of freedom was enough to make a revolutionary into a good soldier, but
within months, if not within days, the new army's general officers decided that courage could not replace discipline. Although they continued to recruit by appealing to patriotism, and continued to vaunt their soldiers' determination to preserve liberty, the generals often saw their subordinates' dedication to personal freedom as a military drawback and tried to temper it with military ritual and law. This proved a difficult task. Washington's first attempt at uniform regulation met with rejection. After the 1775 Articles of War were passed, he tried to get all the officers and soldiers to subscribe to them. Many refused because they feared it would lengthen their service obligation. Washington decided not to press them on the issue, for he "did not experience any such Inconvenience from their Adherence to their former Rules [Massachusetts articles], as would warrant the Risque of entering into a Contest upon it: More especially as the Restraints necessary for the Establishment of essential Discipline & Subordination, indisposed their Minds to every Change, & made it both Duty & Policy to introduce as little Novelty as possible." He believed the difficulty would cease with the establishment of the new army in 1776. In the meantime, the courts-martial decided cases using either the Massachusetts or 1775 Continental articles depending on the status of the defendants. For example, on 15 November 1775 a general court-martial found Lieutenant Soaper (possibly Amasa Soper) and Ensign (Avery) Parker guilty "of a breach of the 46th Article [conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman] of the Rules and Regulations for the Massachusetts Army." Their abuse of two other lieutenants led to their dismissal from the army.

While the commander in chief struggled to establish the legal code and system upon which military discipline would depend, Congress made further provisions. It amended the original code on 7 November 1775, only to repeal it within a year and replace it with the American Articles of War of 1776, passed
on 20 September. The new articles echoed the British law more closely and remained in force throughout the war. This military law extended over officers, enlisted men, and "civilians who served with or accompanied the army in the field." Many of these civilians, along with other Americans, objected to a legal system "in which indictment by grand jury and other fundamental rights were unknown," but military necessity was considered justification for military (rules regulating military personnel) or, more specifically, martial (regulation over all people within a militarily controlled area) law. Congress reiterated its approval of the rules and articles in force during the Revolution by adopting them (with the 1786 revision of Section XIV) under the Constitution on 29 September 1789. They continued in force until replaced by the Articles of War of 1806.

Military commanders issued orders and regulations within the limitations imposed by civilian legal codes, articles of war, and the chain of command. Such orders took on the force of law; violation or disobedience could result in a court martial. Officers at all levels issued orders, but the regulations ordered by a general took precedence over all others. General orders affected entire armies; division, brigade, and regimental orders applied to those specific units; while further down the organizational ladder, even more restricted in scope, were company-level commands. Finally, all officers could give direct orders to anyone under their command.

There were standing orders and situational orders. The first kind covered activities no matter what the time, locale, or circumstance. Washington issued one such standing order against plundering in September 1776: "The General does not admit of any Pretence for plundering--whether it is Tory Property--taken beyond the Lines or not it is equally a Breach of Orders & to be punished in the Officer who gives Orders or the Soldier who goes
without."8 This was in line with Articles 16 and 21, Section XIII of the 1776 Articles of War. Article 16 declared that the malicious destruction of "any property whatsoever belonging to the good people of the United States, unless by order of the then commander in chief . . . , to annoy rebels or other enemies in arms . . . ." would result in a punishment determined by the nature of the offense, and by the judgment of either a regimental or a general court-martial. Article 21 stipulated that an officer or soldier convicted of leaving his post in search of plunder could be sentenced to death by a general court martial.9 Congress and Washington allowed no one to forget that this fight was about personal and political liberty, not the "liberation" of property. Situational orders rarely held an ideological interpretation; they were generally job specific. Some were as arbitrary and deadly as the order before Germantown on 15 September 1777 that commanded officers in the rear to immediately execute "any man who is not wounded whether he has Arms or not, turns his back on the Enemy & attempts to run away or retreat before orders are given for it . . . . The Man does not deserve to live, who basely flies, breaks his solemn engagements & betrays his Country."10 Other orders reflected a milder temper; on 1 September 1777, when the line of march for Wilmington was published, officers were "desired to prevent the Wagons being loaded with men & weomen, none to ride but those soldiers who are unable to march."11

On the march or in garrison, officers regularly posted orders for the regulation of civilians in the proximity of the troops. This was very evident at Valley Forge, where the army supervised a number of camp markets. The adjutant general had the market regulations printed on handbills and then delivered to the brigades so that they could be read to each regiment. Officers and soldiers were not the only ones made familiar with market procedures and
prices; civilians who manned the market also received the handbills. Army officers, high and low, regulated sutlers even more closely. On 1 September 1776 at German-Flatts, Captain Joseph Bloomfield noted that some of his soldiers crossed the river, got drunk, and did not make it back to garrison at night. To correct such misconduct, he ordered out a guard to round up the miscreant soldiers, and forbade the selling of liquor by any sutler except Lieutenant Colonel Belinger, who already had permission to sell near the garrison. A year later, sutlers with General Weedon's brigade at Wilmington were ordered to move away from the front of the encampment. A few months after that, on 1 November, general orders directed the commissaries to buy, at a reasonable price, all the liquor held by sutlers. If the two parties could not agree on a common price, the sutlers were to cart their stock away, for "no Sutler shall be allowed to continue in the army after the 5 Inst." The sutlers came back; indeed, they never really left. The same held true for women with the army.

While the army could not rid itself of female followers, it was determined to control them. Commanders constantly reminded women when they could accompany the forces, how they could travel with the troops, and what they could or could not do in camp. Orders regulated the most intimate parts of their lives. On 1 July 1777, at Lincoln Mountain while on the march from Princeton, the commander of the Delaware Regiment ordered "That the Women belonging to the Regt. be paraded tomorrow morning & to undergo an examination [probably for venereal disease] from the Surgeon of the Regiment at his tent except those that are married, & the husbands of those to undergo said examination in their stead. All those that do not attend to be immediately drumed out of the Regiment."
Regardless of gender, all civilians with the army or just passing through its lines had to deal with intrusive army tactics. Officers had orders to check out "all strange faces & suspicious Characters which may be discover'd in Camp, & if upon examination, no good account can be given why they are there, they are then to carry them to the Majr. Genl. of the day for further examination." This was to be done in as inoffensive a manner as possible. It was a necessary order only in that it told the officers what to do with suspicious characters; otherwise, it served only to remind them of a customary and prudent duty: checks were necessary for the proper management of the troops and the security of the camp.

Custom, as much as military law and orders, regulated army life. The custom of war, or what was in effect the common law of the army, was not a formal written code. It was, instead, "collected from the general regulations of the army, and from the habits, practices, and rules which prevail[ed] in the military body." This military common law served as a guide in the administration of army justice. Congress formally recognized custom as a component of military regulation and judicial proceedings in Article 3, Section XIV, of the 1776 Articles of War. Article 3 required that each member of a court-martial swear to "duly administer justice according to the rules and articles for the better government of the forces of the United States of America, without partiality, favor, or affection; and if any doubt shall arise, which is not explained by said articles, according to your conscience, the best of your understanding, and the custom of war in the like cases." The custom of war supplemented the Articles of War; it did not supersede them. It extended military authority and jurisdiction by filling in any gaps left by the written laws.
This three-fold form of regulation—statute law, army regulations, and military custom—was essential to the survival of the army. Policing of this community was necessarily rigorous and enforcement swift, for dissent within such a self-contained organization undermined discipline and impaired the ability of the army to wage war effectively. Enlistment or the acceptance of a commission entailed the subordination of individual interests to those of the army. Soldiers temporarily surrendered some of the very rights and liberties they swore to defend. Commitment to American independence supposedly compensated for any feeling of sacrifice. Unfortunately, as Lieutenant Colonel Edward Hand of Thompson's Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion found out, convincing soldiers that army life and successful campaigns required the subordination of their individual interests proved difficult. As early in the war as September 1775, the officers of that unit had to put down a small revolt triggered by the disciplining of a sergeant. Mutinies flared up periodically, desertions were frequent, and insubordination was commonplace. In September 1775 a general court-martial found Moses Pickett, a soldier in Captain Merrit's (probably Lieutenant John Merritt) company of Colonel John Glover's regiment, guilty of "disobedience of orders, and damning his Officers." It sentenced him to receive thirty lashes and then to be drummed out of the regiment. The problem continued throughout the war, but as the army could not afford to dismiss men just for insubordination, punishments remained painful but less extreme (especially when the culprit refused to obey a noncommissioned, as opposed to commissioned, officer's orders). At what was probably a regimental court-martial, Anthony Parras of the 2nd Continental Artillery was found guilty of "disobedience of Orders, and Insolence towards Sergt Cochran" in 1782. The court sentenced him to "wear the Log," attend all parades and perform fatigue duty for one week, and ask the sergeant's pardon.
at parade. Officers, who were supposed to be good examples to their men, frequently questioned or side-stepped orders as well. The commander in chief tried to squelch such maneuvers by reminding officers of their obligations:

> It is not for every Officer to know the principles upon which orders are issued, and to judge how they may, or may not be dispensed with or suspended: but their duty to carry them into execution with the greatest punctuality and exactness—They are to consider that military movements are like the working of a Clock, and will go equally regular and easy if every Officer does his duty: but without it, be as easily disorder'd; because neglect in any one part, like the stopping of a Wheel disorders the whole. 25

The officers and troops of the Continental army did learn to accept discipline. Indeed, they displayed such discipline and tenacity (some opponents thought it sheer perversity) in the face of hardship that foreign observers came to admire them.

Camp followers had to accept military discipline as well, for they were admitted into the military community and allowed to remain only so long as they did not disrupt it. As merchants licensed to sell in camp, sutlers were obligated to conform to camp policies, obey orders, and adhere to the stipulations of their contract. On 26 January 1778 Washington approved the recommendations of a board of general officers: "that a sutler be appointed to each brigade whose Liquors shall be inspected by two Officers Appointed by the Brigadier for that purpose and those Liquors sold under those restrictions as shall be thought reasonable." Besides liquor, these sutlers could also sell tobacco and hard soap, but no other articles reserved for the public market. If a sutler charged more for his liquor than the fixed rate, or adulterated it in any way, he could be tried at a brigade court-martial and upon conviction forced to forfeit either part of his stock or its monetary value.
Compared to the sutlers, women in camp were in a more precarious situation, for their tenure depended more on sufferance than on contracts. The army never established a formal policy to regulate camp women beyond their accountability to the Articles of War, so subordinate commanders established their own ways to discipline them. If the women did not live by the rules, they could, and often were, summarily punished. Such was the case on 16 July 1777, when Captain Robert Kirkwood of the Delaware Regiment recorded that a woman belonging to the division was ducked for stealing and insolence. The meticulous Kirkwood made no mention of a trial preceding the punishment.

The army demanded that all civilians, not just sutlers and women, serving with the military accept the regulations imposed on those serving in "uniform." The government of the United States backed the army on this point, making specific reference to civil department officers. Congress on 10 June 1777 resolved

That the Commissy. Genl. of purchases and Issues and their respective deputies for neglect of Duty or other offences in their respective Offices shall be subject to Military Arrests and trial by order of the Commander in Chief or any Genl. Commanding a Division in the Army, Post or Department, where such neglect of duty or Offences may happen and their respective Assistants of the D:C: Genl. of purchases and Issues shall for the same causes be liable to Military Arrests as Commissd. Officers in the Army by any Genl. Officer or any Officer Commandg. at a Detach'd Post to which Such Assistant may be Assigned. 29

In practice, the rule extended to quartermasters, wagonmasters, surgeons, nurses, clerks, and artificers as well. Some of these people held dual appointments: although commissioned or enlisted in the military line, they also filled staff positions. In such cases there was no problem about military jurisdiction. However, for those people in the staff departments who held no military rank, this ruling clarified their position under military law.
Camp-follower compliance with military regulations and orders did not depend on the discretion of the followers themselves. Commanders governed camp civilians by invoking custom, common-sense, and courts-martial. They used both social custom and military custom to control women and servants. Men, as husbands and masters, were expected to be able to influence their wives' and servants' actions. Men, as officers and soldiers, were within a chain of command, and as such responsible for the care and regulation of their dependents. When custom and habit provided no guidelines in a particular situation, commanders relied on their own judgment in dealing with followers. The use of custom and common sense was neither unusual nor illegal in eighteenth-century local government and jurisprudence, but should any camp follower have protested that such a practice was not a legal basis for the military's disciplining of civilians, he or she would have found that loophole closed when American military jurisdiction over camp civilians became a matter of law. In 1775 the Massachusetts Articles of War included a statute for the control of all sellers to a camp and persons serving with (not in) the Massachusetts army in the field. The Continental Congress took Article 31 of the Massachusetts articles and with the appropriate modifications included it as Article 32 in the 1775 American Articles of War passed that June. Military legal jurisdiction over camp civilians was confirmed by Article 23, Section XIII of the 1776 Articles of War. These statutes, reflecting earlier British ones and repeated in later revisions of military law, have historically allowed wartime commanders to control all persons within their areas of operation. In peacetime the army handed such civilians over to local civilian courts for disciplining, but most legislators agreed with military men that war required swift and decisive action. Thus all sutlers, retainers to the camp, and persons serving with the armies of the United States in the field were subject to orders
according to the rules and discipline of war, and whether connected with the army either accidentally, temporarily, or permanently, they were liable, "by order of the commander, to trial by court-martial for any breach of good order, whether as affecting the discipline of the army, or the private rights of individuals."30

The justification for Article 23 and all other regulations concerning the army's civilians was always the necessity to maintain good order. These dependents enjoyed certain privileges, including rations and tent space, in return for the services and conveniences they offered to the soldiers. Furthermore, when they voluntarily entered the army community with all its additional and distinctive laws, they indicated their willingness to conform to those laws or suffer the penalty when they broke them.31 For even as the commander was responsible for his people, all his people, so too were his people obliged to obey him. Ignorance did not justify disobedience; Washington put a halt to such pleas in September 1777 when, upon learning that many regiments had only one orderly book, he ordered all regimental commanders "to see that the Officers & Men are clearly Inform'd of every order which relates to them respectively, by reading or causing the same to be read to them" until each company had an orderly book.32 Additional steps were taken to make sure followers got the message. From his headquarters at Verplanck's Point on 8 September 1782, Washington decreed: "As there are many orders for checking irregularities with which the women, as followers of the army, ought to be acquainted, the ser[g]leants of the companies to which the women belong, are to communicate all orders of that nature to them, and are to be responsible for neglecting so to do."33 Washington was only formalizing what was already standard operating procedure for many units.

In a wartime situation, the commander had to be able to control accompanying
dependents and civilians just as he controlled his soldiers. These people became "to all intents and purposes, so far as crime may be committed, members of the army." They could not be considered separate from it, for their crimes might disgrace the service and could lead to its disorganization. There was also the possibility that if they were not punished by a military tribunal, they would escape justice and serve as bad examples to soldiers as well as other civilians.34

The security of both government and army, as well as the morale and discipline of the troops, required that these civilians be governed in like manner as the people with whom they associated.35 A closed camp was an impossibility, so commanders posted pickets, employed signs and countersigns, and assigned patrols to guard against espionage, but security ultimately rested upon the discretion and patriotism of all the people who passed through the check points. Patriots had a responsibility to prevent disclosure of military information to the enemy; but some people did not reserve their patriotism for the United States, and others put personal gain ahead of national allegiance. Spies regularly infiltrated the camps.

The British had an impressive intelligence system in the state of New York in 1778. One of their most effective agents, a woman who mingled with American troops to sell thread and other supplies, loitered around Washington's quarters to record conversations. During one mission, from Tuesday, 11 August, to Saturday, 15 August, she listened to officers debate the possibility of taking Long Island, found out that Gates and Morgan had light infantry troops under their command somewhere near Dobbs Ferry, and discovered that 3000 army troops and 2000 militia under the command of Lafayette had marched for Rhode Island on 3 August (the day after she left the camp on a previous mission). She also uncovered information about Lord
Stirling's (General William Alexander) command, counted the equipment in
the park of artillery, and learned from a friend in the camp that Captain
James's whole troop was ready to desert. Her report on that mission also
detailed the disposition of the troops, including the fact that on Thursday the
13th the whole army was drunk after having received two months pay (she
believed that had the British army advanced on that day they could have
destroyed the Americans). On her mission from 12 to 17 September, she
observed the army at White Plains, marched out with the Pennsylvania troops
heading to North Castle on the 15th, reached Washington's headquarters at
Peekskill with them on Wednesday, and left them Thursday morning at sunrise
when they moved out. Later that month, when she again joined Washington's
army, she ascertained not only the strength and position of the American
forces but also conversed with a talkative officer who revealed the defenses at
Danbury and then gossiped about Washington's low spirits. The woman was
unable to fade out of camp on that particular mission. She left the army on
Friday night, but being discovered by a person named Smith (a deserter from
the 27th Regiment), was detained by General Grant's aide-de-camp from
Monday the 28th to Wednesday. Upon her release, she made her way back to
the British lines and reported in on 30 September. American vigilance
proved ineffective in this case; either the female spy's cover as a merchant
held, or her sex made her questioners lenient. This spy was released; others
were not so lucky.

In such cases there was no need to argue over jurisdiction or statutes of
law. Article 19, Section XIII, of the 1776 Articles of War declared that
"Whosoever shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or giving
intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death, or
such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted." The
legislators added no caveat to restrict this to persons in or with the army, or to restrict culpability by sex; they considered women capable of committing treason. The Continental Congress made that point earlier in the conflict when it stated that "all persons abiding within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to said laws, . . ."38 In time of war, people, whether soldier or civilian, charged with spying and abetting the enemy were usually tried by military tribunals. One military court at the American headquarters at Providence, on 1 October 1778, tried four civilians at once: Job Tibbots, James Austin, Joseph Hunt, and Nathanael Noyes, accused of being spies for the enemy, pleaded not guilty, and were released for lack of evidence.39 A year later a civilian court (at a session of oyer and terminer) in Philadelphia tried and acquitted three men charged with treason.40 In the first instance, the suspects had been brought up on charges in an area that had recently seen military action and remained under the control of the army; in the second case, the military presence was slight and local courts were fully functional. Military trials for civilians were not popular, but when a city or state was beset by internal and external enemies, it could authorize the army to try civilians charged with treason and other high crimes against the state. Both New York and Pennsylvania gave such authority to the Continental Army in 1777, but Washington, who preferred civil trials, sometimes handed over the offenders to civilian authorities anyway.41

Camp followers were subject to various military laws at specified times, but not to military law per se. Military law was, and is, intended for service members and employed to maintain military discipline. It is applied in conjunction with the common and civil law, for the soldier retains his responsibilities as a citizen and is answerable to the civil courts for his actions
in that capacity. However, when accused of military crimes or offenses within the military arena, the soldier can be arraigned before a court martial.

The military judicial system embraces private citizens through martial law. An army or government uses martial law to administer and control all people in a military situation in a time of war or national crisis. It "is the application of military government—the government of force—to persons and property within the scope of it, according to the laws and usages of war, to the exclusion of the municipal government, in all respects where the latter would impair the efficiency of military law or military action." Martial law is invoked when the exigencies of war demand it. Camp followers with the army "in the field" (i.e., on campaign) or in occupied areas, which include encampments, are almost always subject to this system of law, or, as Article 23, Section XIII succinctly put it in 1776, "subject to orders, according to the rules and discipline of war."

Even in wartime, however, followers were not always, or indiscriminately, punished by military courts. If a civil court was available, and the alleged crimes were punishable by municipal criminal codes, then followers were supposed to be, and sometimes were, handed over to a local magistrate. This did not constitute special treatment for followers; Article 1 of Section X of the 1776 Articles of War guaranteed the same procedure for service members:

Whenever any officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime, or of having used violence, or committed any offence against the persons or property of the good people of any of the United American States, such as is punishable by the known laws of the land, the commanding officer and officers of every regiment, troop or party, to which the person or persons so accused shall belong, are hereby required, upon application duly made by or in behalf of the party or parties injured, to use his utmost endeavours to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil magistrate; ... 44
The pertinent phrase was "upon application." Civilian authorities had to ask that the accused be delivered to them. The "Commissioners for detecting &c Conspiracies" in Poughkeepsie did this in September 1780. They asked Colonel Lamb, then in command at West Point, to send the prisoner Frederick Cookingham to them "to be dealt with as his crime deserves." Cookingham may not have been a soldier, but if suspected of being a spy, as he evidently was, he could be confined and tried by the military unless a civilian court claimed precedence. In return, civilian courts and magistrates delivered fugitives accused of military crimes over to the army. Joseph Chandler, a justice of the peace, sent a man he judged to be a deserter up to Lamb under militia guard in October 1780. Anyway, if no application for justice by municipal court action was made, army authorities could act as they saw fit, and choose either civilian or military tribunals for soldiers and others accused of crime within the military arena. Commanders apparently employed the application rule with followers as well.

The application rule did not come into play when a follower committed a military offense. Maintaining discipline in the ranks meant that all offenders, whether in uniform or out, had to be punished. The army refused to countenance civilian neglect or disobedience of orders, insolence to the commander or to any commissioned officer. As such offenses were only punishable by military tribunals, the army had to provide justification before hauling civilians in for judgment. Article 23 was again the answer: it gave commanders the legal authority or jurisdiction to try the perpetrators of such offenses in a military court. The most serious offenses were tried by general courts-martial; others could be tried either by the general or the regimental courts. For minor breaches of order or law, officers often utilized their authority to summarily judge and punish miscreants. Thus people within the
military community were never outside of the law, rather they were regulated by a tight network of both municipal (civil and criminal) and martial (which included army regulations and custom) law.

When a crime was committed, the army responded in a variety of ways. If the perpetrator was seen and recognized, apprehension was generally swift. If the crime was committed by an unknown person, notices were sent out and searches undertaken. The army's orderly books held numerous advertisements for the return of lost or stolen goods. Many victims offered a reward for the return of their property, and promised to ask no questions. One advertisement guaranteed no questions and twenty dollars to whoever returned a pair of brass mounted pistols stolen off of General Peter Muhlenburg's horse at the Skippack headquarters on 6 October 1777.47 Exactly one month later, at the White Marsh headquarters, someone made off with a chest of surgical instruments (as well as some clothing of no great value). In that case the amount of the reward was not specified, but again there was the promise of no questions.48 If the crime was great, or the victim willing to wait upon more formal police action, officers initiated searches. When John Grant was robbed as the Jersey troops marched through White Marsh around the 1st of December 1777, headquarters responded by ordering the officers of those units to inspect the packs of their men.49

The pursuit of justice was not confined within the military community. Advertisements describing military criminals or stolen goods appeared in public newspapers as well. The Pennsylvania Gazette, on 20 August 1777, ran a notice about the stolen goods found in the possession of one Catherine Wilson, the wife of James Wilson, an enlisted man in Captain Alexander Patterson's company. The advertiser, Samuel Rea, stated the items were thought to be stolen from the army (military personnel) and listed them as a
small roan horse, a Hessian cutlass, a regimental blue coat, one blue and one white vest, two white hunting shirts, eight linen and tow shirts, two pairs of cloth breeches, one pair leather breeches, seventeen pairs of stockings, leggings, and six Indian blankets. People could claim their property by proving it was theirs and paying applicable charges to the subscriber.50 J. Hiltzheimer's Gazette advertisement, on 5 January 1779, promised a hundred dollar reward for the return of two Continental Army horses and the apprehension of the thief, who was identified as John Anny, a wagoner in the service of the United States.51

The army tried to be more discreet in its handling of civilians thought guilty of crimes against the state (as opposed to crimes against the army). In addition to Article 19, Section XIII (the espionage article), the military had the right to apprehend and try civilians alleged to have broken Article 18, Section XIII, in the 1776 Articles of War: "Whosoever shall relieve the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbor or protect an enemy, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted."52 The article was particularly relevant over the winter of 1777-1778 when the American army endured on short supplies, while the British in Philadelphia dined on the country's harvest. Yet, however much Washington wanted smuggling through the lines stopped, he did not want it at the expense of the inhabitants legally transporting goods throughout the area. When encamped at Valley Forge, on 7 March 1778, he commanded "that captures of Provisions, actually going into Philadelphia, must be made under the Eye, and by the approbation of a Commission'd officer, and no forfeitures will otherwise take place." The general enjoined officers to use caution when capturing supplies, for such a mission was not an excuse for plundering.53 Nor was it an excuse for nonchalantly clapping civilians in irons. Just two
days before issuing the above order, the dismayed Washington protested the
practise of bringing in Pennsylvania residents and leaving them with the
provost guard on charges of being disaffected, or for other reasons, which did
not hold up under court-martial examination. To prevent such needless
imprisonment, Washington ordered the adjutant general to refer questionable
cases to the judge advocate. If the judge advocate did not think the evidence
supported the charges, the prisoners were to be immediately discharged.54

An earlier order, dated 6 November 1777, embraced a wider
constituency; it applied not only to civilians outside the camp, but those inside
as well: "All prisoners not being Continental Soldiers and suspected Persons
are to be carried to the Major Genl. of the day to be examined and dealt with as
he shall see fit."55 It was up to the general to determine if a camp follower
accused of criminal activity should go before a general court-martial. The
generals appeared especially vigilant in the apprehension and examination of
sutlers. Long before the headquarters in Pennsylvania issued the order
detailing the arrest procedure for civilians, Major General Schuyler was
following it in the Simpson case. On 19 August 1776, at German-Flatts, Captain
Bloomfield received a letter from Schuyler ordering him to arrest the sutler
Simpson for stealing things from Johnson Hall. Bloomfield spent the next day
questioning Simpson and then sent him under guard to the general in
Albany.56 However, if a camp follower stood accused of a lesser offense, his or
her arrest and confinement often remained the concern of the immediate
commanding officer. That reflected the accepted practice for dealing with
soldiers accused of petty crimes. An order issued out of the Princeton
headquarters in May 1777 stated that in the future all soldiers so charged were
to be "confined in Qr. Guards and tried by a Regimental Court Martial."57
Generally, arrest procedures of camp civilians closely followed those used in arresting non-commissioned officers and enlisted men. Soldiers, unlike officers, were imprisoned upon arrest (officers were honor-bound to remain in camp or garrison), and remained in custody until tried by court-martial or discharged by a proper authority. The Articles of War specified that pre-trial custody be short, preferably not longer than eight days. They also required the arresting officer to provide the provost marshal with a written statement specifying the charges, when delivering the accused to him. The provost marshall in turn, was to deliver a statement of charges to the regimental commander (when the offense related only to that corps) or the commander in chief. That was how it worked in ideal situations.

Unfortunately, justice often lacked a swift sword; the result was crowded jails and case back-logs. That was the situation at Valley Forge on 30 December 1777. It was cold outside the prison, and freezing inside. As a great number of prisoners were suffering, the order went out to set up brigade general courts-martial, which were to sit every day until every man awaiting trial in the respective brigades had his day in court.

The only military court legally qualified to try "every description of persons known to the rules and articles of war, and for every offence declared by them," was the general court-martial. It also served as the military's appellate court. A general court-martial consisted of at least thirteen commissioned officers, with the president of the court holding the rank of field officer or above. It was the only court allowed to pass a sentence of death, but it could do so only when two-thirds of the officers there concurred. Sentences of the court could not be executed until a report of the proceedings had been presented to Congress or to the commander in chief of the forces of the United States, and approval obtained.
Regimental courts-martial could mediate disputes and judge criminal actions not specifically reserved to the higher courts. They generally judged soldiers (camp civilians were usually referred to the higher court) accused of drunkenness, being absent without leave, selling or wasting military stores, or harassing people bringing supplies into camp. The court consisted of five officers appointed by the regiment's commander, except when it was impossible conveniently to assemble that many, in which case, three was sufficient. Judgment was by majority opinion. The judges could recommend corporal punishment for small offences, but no sentence could be carried out until the commanding officer (if not a member of the court) or the commandant of the garrison confirmed it.62

There were similarities in the operation of both courts. Both adjudicated cases within specific military units or between them. A general court-martial could be convened within one brigade (or division), the judges drawn out of that body's officers, to try cases falling within the jurisdiction of that unit. A general court-martial could also have more sweeping jurisdiction with the presiding officers chosen from the entire army and the accused a member of either the army or the civilian community. The nature of the crime, who committed it, and where, would determine whether the court-martial was to be handled at the brigade or army level. Regimental courts-martial could be called to deal with matters within one regiment or between regiments. In all of these situations the judge advocate general, or a person appointed by him, presented the prosecution in the name of the United States of America. Both the prosecution and the defendant (who faced court and prosecutor without counsel) could call on people to give evidence. Witnesses testified under oath, and if they refused to testify could themselves be court-martialed.63
While the pre-trial wait was sometimes prolonged, the trials themselves, especially those of junior officers, enlisted men, camp followers, and civilians were both simple and speedy. Prosecutor and defendant argued their cases, presented their evidence, and heard judgment passed, often all in one day or less. It was quite common for the court to hear numerous cases in a single day. This was possible because of the way in which the courts-martial operated. "In a certain sense the court-martial of the Revolution was not really a court at all but merely a hearing conducted by a board of officers who examined the evidence and rendered a verdict which was reviewed by the commanding officer. There was no judge or jury nor was the prisoner entitled to defense counsel."65

Although the court determined the verdict, execution of the sentence awaited the concurrence of the commanding officer. If the commander believed due process (proper procedure) had not been observed, or the sentence was improper, he could reject it and order a new trial. Washington did exactly that when he reviewed the sentences of deserters Thomas Coshall and Samuel Burress of Colonel Lamb's regiment. After both prisoners pleaded guilty, the brigade court-martial sentenced them to 500 lashes each. Washington denounced the sentences as illegal (500 lashes were over the legal limit of 100) and ordered a new trial by general court-martial.66 If the commander believed the verdict and sentence appropriate, he gave his formal approval and the sentence went into effect.

It was only after the general approved a not-guilty verdict that a prisoner was released from custody. A general court-martial acquitted Lieutenant (probably Abner) Dunn of Colonel John Patton's regiment, General Charles Scott's brigade (the 4th Virginia), of charges of striking and behaving ungentlemanly towards Lieutenant Street (possibly Benjamin Street of
Hartley's Continental Regiment), on 31 March 1778; but he was not discharged from his arrest until the commander in chief confirmed the verdict on 6 April.67 Thomas Scott, a wagonmaster, charged with taking forage contrary to the general orders of 31 December, was acquitted at a general court-martial on 22 January 1778. The general approved the verdict and ordered his release on 28 January.68 Hanna Taylor and Barbara Boure, charged with trying to persuade soldiers to desert, faced separate general courts-martial in May 1777. Upon their being found not guilty, the general ordered their release.69 A division (general) court-martial on 21 January 1778 acquitted William McIntosh of the 2nd Virginia Regiment, John Keyton of the 10th Virginia, and Ann McIntosh of the charges mutiny and desertion. The general approved the court's findings and ordered them released from confinement eight days later on 29 January.70 Washington, always concerned about the military's treatment of private citizens, tried to be especially quick in his review of cases involving civilians. Samuel Harvey, an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, was tried for attempting to supply the enemy with provisions at a general court-martial at Valley Forge on 15 April 1778. When Harvey was proven innocent of the charge, the discharge order came through three days later on 18 April.71

When a commander approved a guilty verdict, punishment commenced. Article 51 of the 1775 Articles of War listed what punishments besides death the courts-martial could mete out. They included "degrading, cashiering, drumming out of the army, whipping not exceeding thirty-nine lashes, fine[s] not exceeding two months pay of the offender, imprisonment not exceeding one month."72 The 1776 articles were more severe. Offenders could be sentenced to 100 lashes, have stoppages put on pay until the loss or damage was recovered or repaired (officers, store-keepers or commissaries convicted of embezzlement, etc., could be made to pay for the loss or damage out of their
own pockets, forfeit all pay, and be dismissed from service), or suffer "such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted." The articles of 1776 declared that offenders could be sentenced to death for "mutiny, sedition, striking an officer, desertion, sleeping at or abandoning a post when on duty, giving a false claim, misbehavior or cowardice in action, discarding arms and ammunition, making known the watch-word, aiding the enemy and plundering." Within those limits, the military courts had a great deal of freedom in which to determine appropriate punishment. Camp followers, under Article 23, Section XIII, could be charged with most of the offenses listed in the 1776 Articles of War and sentenced accordingly.

Although the army insisted that sutlers were subject to the same military discipline as all other camp inhabitants, military courts generally did not handle sutlers and other contracted vendors in the same manner they dealt with officers, enlisted men, and most other followers. The very distinct nature of their relationship was illustrated by the crimes they were most often charged with and the punishments that followed conviction. Sutlers and other vendors brought before a court-martial were generally accused of abusing their privileges as sellers and suppliers. In turn, their punishment was usually the severing of the association and revocation of privileges. Punishment could also involve the confiscation of property. A December 1782 general court-martial at West Point tried Samuel and Sarah Warren, sutlers, for "receiving a Sign Board, from a Soldier in Colonel Cranes Regiment of Artillery.--contrary to the rules of the Garrison, for the Government of Sutlers. Secondly--encouraging Soldiers to bring Hogs, from Constitution Island the property of William Dean, and James Forsyth. Thirdly.--For Stealing four Barrels of Flour the property of Gamelian Babesch." It decided they were guilty of the first charge, that the second was unsupported, "and that the 3rd
Charge is entirely of a private and civil nature, and cannot come under the Cognizance of the Court." The court sentenced the Warrens to leave West Point on or before the 14th of the month.75

Retainers, specifically women of the army and servants, commonly suffered the punishments allotted to enlisted men. The same court-martial that acquitted Ann and William McIntosh, and John Keyton, pronounced others guilty of similar charges. Edward Driver of the 2nd Virginia was sentenced merely to be reprimanded before all the troops by the division's commanding officer. Jeremiah Bride of the same regiment received a sentence of 100 lashes on his bare back. The court reserved its harshest punishment for a woman. It sentenced Mary Johnson, charged with plotting (her own as well some soldiers?) desertion to the enemy, to receive 100 lashes and then be drummed out of the army (camp) by all the drums and fifes in the division.76 There was no evidence that any of the army's ladies or gentlemen volunteers were ever brought before a court-martial.

Quartermasters, commissaries, and other staff department appointees serving with the army had the standing of officers, and the courts-martial treated them as such. If found guilty of a crime, they could be reprimanded, fined, dismissed (cashiering, the severest form of this, usually being reserved for officers found guilty of cowardice or multiple offences), or drummed out of camp, but they could not be sentenced to corporal punishment.77 In January 1778 a general court-martial heard the evidence against Dunham Ford, a commissary in General Greene's division, charged with theft. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay Mr. Spencer and Mr. Hotawell 200 dollars. After procuring a certificate from Greene that he had delivered the appropriate payment, Ford was to "be brought from the Provost Guard mounted on a horse back foremost without a Saddle, his Coat turn'd wrong side out his
hands tied behind him & be drum'd out of the Army (Never more to return) by all the Drums in the Division to which he belongs and that the above sentence be published in the News papers." Washington approved the sentence. That March a brigade court-martial tried, "with his own consent," Mr. Robertson, the adjutant of the 13th Virginia Regiment on charges of encouraging a soldier's wife to sell liquor in Muhlenburg's brigade without permission, for taking the liquor after it was seized by order of the brigade's commander, refuting the order, and "for Repeatedly getting Drunk and behaving in an Ungentlemanlike manner." The court found Robertson guilty of "detaining & using seized liquors & saying it shouldnt be taken away," and sentenced him to be reprimanded in brigade orders. He was acquitted of the other charges. In 1782, while the Southern Army was in South Carolina, a general court-martial found William McKenzie, apothecary's mate to the general hospital, guilty of "refusing to do his duty." General Greene approved the court's sentence of dismissal from the service, remarking as he did so, "that it is difficult for him to conceive how an Officer in the Medical department, knowing the critical Stages of disorders, could urge a slight indisposition to excuse himself from making up a prescription, on which the life of his brother officer might depend." Officers and civilian adjuncts of comparable status, if convicted of disorderly conduct or crime, could expect punishments that struck at a man's honor, face (standing in army and civilian communities), and pocketbook.

Military courts tried and punished low-ranking staff department employees much in the same manner as they handled enlisted personnel. The only differentiation in the sentencing was perhaps a tendency to be more sparing in the use of the whip and a greater willingness to get rid of troublemakers by simply dismissing them from employment. A general court-martial at West Point in 1778, after determining that Elissee Printer of the
artificers was guilty of leaving the post without permission and neglecting his

duty, sentenced him to be dismissed from the service. Two years later, a
general court-martial found Gabriel Gill, a wagon conductor, guilty "of carting
private property whilst in public service" and sentenced him to refund the
money he received or was to receive for carrying the private iron instead of
public flour. General Arnold thought the sentence too lenient to serve as a
proper deterrent against future offenses of a similar nature and recommended
that the court reconsider. It obliged by adding corporal punishment. A
general court-martial at Steenrapie in September 1780 tried the express rider
Reubin George "for Delaying 300000 Dollars on the road which he had in
charge to Deliver to Moore Furman Esqr. D.Q.M.G. [deputy quartermaster
general] for the express purpose of forwarding provisions to the army which
delay if not early discovered would have been attended with the most fatal
consequences to the army. 2dly for expending part of the mony and making
preparation to desert to Virginia with the Residue." The court decided that
George did delay the delivery of the money but did not realize the serious
consequences that would have resulted if the problem had not been discovered
in time. It also determined that he did spend some of the money, but that it did
not appear that he intended to desert to Virginia with the rest. George's
sentence included repayment of the money spent, 100 lashes on his bare back,
and dismissal from employment. When Washington approved the sentence, he
added that George was to remain under provost guard until released by General
Greene. The same court found Joseph Smallwood, a wagoner in Continental
service, guilty of "insulting & knocking Lt. Barret off his horse on the publick
Road on the 23d last," and sentenced him to suffer 100 lashes on his bare
back.
Civilians found guilty of spying or otherwise aiding the enemy, if not sentenced to death, faced imprisonment (which could include hard labor) or punishments similar to those given service members and followers. Courts-martial seldom sentenced soldiers to imprisonment, for such a sentence deprived the army of valuable manpower. Confining disaffected civilians, however, deprived the enemy of manpower, even as it increased the security of the American army. A general court-martial at Princeton in 1777 tried Mary Quin (also spelled Quan) and Elisabeth Brewer on charges of being enemies to their country. The court released Quin for lack of evidence but found Brewer guilty of spying. It sentenced her to imprisonment. The general approved the sentence and ordered her to be sent to Philadelphia and confined there "in Such place as the Commanding Officer shall direct during the War." Within the year Philadelphia was in British hands and the military courts of Valley Forge were inundated with cases of civilians caught attempting to aid the enemy.

The courts could have tried the accused civilians under the 1776 Articles of War, but in most of these cases the charges were referred to as violations of the congressional resolutions of October 1777 and January 1778, forbidding the transfer of supplies or intelligence to the enemy's army. These later statutes reflected a growing determination on the part of American nationalists to isolate the enemy at all levels and in all ways. On 24 March 1778, a general court-martial sentenced William Morgan, a Pennsylvania resident charged with leaving Philadelphia, stealing a horse, and attempting to take it back into the city, to hard labor for the duration of the war. The court added a caveat to his sentence: if he attempted to escape, he was to suffer death. Just one month earlier, another general court-martial passed over hard labor and settled straightaway on a death sentence for Joseph Worrell. Although it had
acquitted him of spying and acting as a pilot for the enemy, the court
condemned him for acting as a guide for the British. Two general courts-
martial, one sitting at the end of January and the other in early February 1778,
tried a total of ten civilians, nine for attempting to provision the enemy, and
one for communicating with Philadelphia. The latter was acquitted, as was
Jacob Gibbons who had been accused of selling sheep to a butcher in the city.
The other men were sentenced to varying punishments that included up to 250
lashes, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation of property. Washington
approved the corporal punishment (even though the lashes exceeded the
amount allowed under military regulations) and imprisonment but remitted
confiscation as he believed that was not recognized by martial law.

The commander in chief could not only approve, reject, or mitigate
sentences, he could also pardon offenders. Regimental commanders had the
same power when reviewing the actions of regimental courts-martial.
Washington was quite liberal with his pardons; he lived always in the hope
that his clemency would engender future better behavior in the offenders. He
pardoned offenders of all ranks and set aside sentences of varying severity.
Lieutenant Armours (probably Thomas Armor) of the 1st Pennsylvania was
guilty of conduct unbefitting an officer and sentenced to be discharged in
March 1778. The court recommended a pardon, however, in consideration of
the excellent character references given on his behalf, and the fact that the
prosecution appeared to have been malicious. The general agreed with the
court and delivered the pardon. That same year, after word of the French
alliance reached the United States, Washington was in a very magnanimous
mood. He wanted to reclaim rather than punish offenders; so, as part of the 6
May 1778 celebration of the alliance, Washington was merciful towards two
men guilty of having been misled by traitors. He pardoned William McMath,
of the artillery, and John Marrel, of Colonel Henry Jackson's Additional Continental Regiment, both of whom had been awaiting death. Camp followers benefited from such consideration by Washington and other generals as well. The sutlers Samuel and Sarah Warren, who had been ordered to leave West Point by 14 December 1782 after being found guilty of disobeying General McDougall's orders for the regulation of sutlers at the garrison, were given a reprieve on the 13th. After garrison orders published that day noted that "Many Officers of high Rank, and respectable Characters" had requested the sentence be remitted because of the former good behavior of the sutlers. The general (either Washington or Knox, who was then commanding West Point) complied, but hoped that "the most punctual attention to all orders, respecting Sutlers will be the consequence of this Lenity." Death, imprisonment, and substantial corporal disciplining were all judicial punishments. They could be imposed only by a court-martial. Individual commanders, however, could order nonjudicial or immediate punishment for minor offenses. One of the most common offenses was the disorderly firing of weapons. Commanders constantly harangued their men about shooting their muskets in camp: it was a waste of ammunition, and it could frighten camp residents into thinking there was an attack. They promised immediate retribution to all offenders. An order of 22 December 1777 stated, "Every soldier found discharging his Musket without Leave and in an irregular manner is to receive 20 Lashes immediately upon the Spot." Four months later the stakes were raised; a soldier or non-commissioned officer caught in the act was to be brought before a commissioned officer who "shall order him to be tied up immediately, and receive 39 lashes on his bare back." Cleanliness in the camps was also a vital concern. New vaults or necessaries were built, old ones filled in, and the men ordered to use them. Disobedience in
this matter was, at first, a court-martial offense, but over time commanders came to rely on summary punishment. In October 1777, a man caught not using the necessary was to be dragged before a regimental court-martial. A few months later, in March of 1778 one caught not using the proper facilities could have had the scare of his life. General Weedon gave orders that sentinels be posted with orders to fire on any man found in a compromising position; but that order was soon mitigated. In April the sentinels were ordered just to take such persons prisoner and deliver them to their regimental commander, who was immediately to order five lashes. Women could be summarily punished for all the usual breaches of order and more; some found themselves ducked and drummed out of camp for giving men venereal disease. The men, who could and did pass on such diseases to women, were usually just given medical treatment.

Nonjudicial punishment was to be used with caution and never excessively. This field-expedient method of justice (which could be considered a component or derivative of the custom of war) offered commanders a way in which to deal quickly with minor problems before they could become major ones; unfortunately commanders did not always record offenders and offenses dealt with in this manner and thus left incomplete records on how they managed refractory troops and followers. In contrast, commanders did usually name defendants appearing before courts-martial and record the results of judicial actions. Judicial punishment was the preferred method for dealing with army personnel and followers charged with crimes (rather than the simple community misdeeds that followers, especially women, were likely to be accused of); it had the sanction of law and followed only upon the conclusion of the military legal process.
The American army during the Revolution built a legal system based upon custom, orders, and law. Officers and soldiers alike used the custom of war when they checked their actions against the unwritten code of habit and historical precedent that formed the military memory. They often referred to this body of unwritten law, or in other words, adopted long-established European military practices, when governing camp followers. However, custom alone could not control an army and its community, so commanders issued orders as well. Orders regulated both the minutiae and overall plans of both camp and battle. They were often the most current and concrete of all the rules governing the army and its followers. Finally, blanketing not only the Continental Community, but some civilians outside of it as well, were the American Articles of War. These laws took precedence over all other military regulations and furnished the framework for the military judicial system. They defined military crime, established military legal jurisdiction, instituted courts-martial, and provided guidance on appropriate punishments. These articles in combination with orders and custom affected all persons and all facets of life within the Continental Community.
Chapter VI Notes


2. Massachusetts Articles of War, Ibid., 947.


15. Headquarters (?), 1 November 1777, Ibid., 112.


18. John O'Brien, *A Treatise on American Military Laws, and the Practice of Courts Martial; with Suggestions for their Improvement* (Philadelphia: Lea & Blanchard, 1846), 223. O'Brien, in his preface, mentions that army officers had long needed a treatise on military law. They needed to know "not merely what principles are applicable, but also what decisions have heretofore been made in similar cases, and also the reasons and arguments on which these decisions are founded." They could not fulfill that need because there was no such appropriate work on American military law. I was in a similar quandary. I found records of the laws, orders, and courts-martial, but singularly little on interpretation. Thus, I had to resort to later works on military law to uncover the reasoning behind earlier military legislation. Such sources were not my first choice, but unfortunately, they proved my only option in pursuing this topic. When using them, I tried to take into account any skewing that might have resulted over the years.


Historical Society’s Collection will hereafter be referred to as Lamb’s 2CA Orderly Book and differentiated by date.


31. Ibid., 30.

32. General Orders, Headquarters (Germantown?), 26 September 1777, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 59.


34. O’Brien, Treatise on American Military Laws, 151.

35. Winthrop, Military Law, 98.

36. New York, 19 August, 19 & 30 September 1778, British Intelligence Journal, New York, 1778, 2248, Library of Congress. The female spy was never given a name, probably for security reasons; she was just referred to as "the woman." In this intelligence log she first appears in July and then apparently stops active operations after her detention in September. A woman spy was mentioned on 28 October, but it cannot be determined if she is the same one. Heitman's Historical Register records no General Grant (perhaps the woman meant Greene).

37. American Articles of War of 1776, Winthrop, Military Law, 967.


39. Headquarters Providence, 1 October 1778, Major General Heath’s Headquarters Orderly Book, from Boston to Providence, 23 May 1777-20 October 1778, RG 93, Revolutionary War Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, National Archives.
40. Pennsylvania Gazette, 6 October 1779, p. 3, col. 2. At a session of Oyer and Terminer on 20 September, John Holden, Robert Strettel Jones, and Edward C[t]buth were tried for treason and acquitted. Bills for high-treason were found against Peter Miller, Richard Mason, William Cassedy, and Joseph Wirt.


42. DeHart, Observations on Military Law, 16.


44. Articles of War of 1776, Winthrop, Military Law, 964.


46. Joseph Chandler to Lamb, Bethlehem, 7 October 1780, Ibid.

47. Headquarters Skippack, 6 October 1777, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 69.


51. Ibid., 5 January 1779, p. 1, col. 2. Hiltzheimer promised eighty dollars for the apprehension of Anny, and ten dollars for each horse recovered.

52. Articles of War of 1776, Winthrop, Military Law, 967.


54. Headquarters Valley Forge, 5 March 1778, Ibid., 249-250.

55. Headquarters (?), 6 November 1777, Ibid., 119.

56. German-Flatts, 19 August 1776, Citizen Soldier, 101.


58. Articles of War of 1776, Winthrop, Military Law, 969. Articles 15 through 19 in Section XIV outline the arrest and confinement procedures.

60. Benét, *Treatise on Military Law*, 38. Benét discusses the military courts under the American Articles of War of 1806 (appeals allowed under Article 35), but his observation applies just as well to the Revolution's courts (appeals under Article 2, Section XI, Articles of War of 1776).


63. Articles of War of 1776, Ibid., 967-968. This information was culled from articles 2, 3, 5, 6, and 9. Further proof was found in the Valley Forge headquarters entry for 15 March 1778 (*Valley Forge Orderly Book*, 258-259): for a general court-martial ordered to sit on 16 March "Each Brigade gives a Capt'n. for the Court all Evidences & persons concern'd are desired to attend at the time & place mentioned, more Especially against the Inhabitants of this State now confined in the Provo, as their Tryal will come on tomorrow[.]"


65. Ibid., 124.

66. Headquarters Valley Forge, 10 March 1778, *Valley Forge Orderly Book*, 253. The brigade court-martial was held on 8 March. Article 3, Section XVIII, of the Articles of War of 1776, places the limit on the number of lashes allowed in punishment.

67. Valley Forge, 6 April 1778, Ibid., 280-281. General Washington approved the acquittal, but took the occasion to declare that too many court-martial proceedings seemed to originate out of personal prejudice and private animosities, and that "gives him very sensible pain." He wanted officers to consider themselves a band of brothers.

68. Headquarters Valley Forge, 28 January 1778, Ibid., 213.


71. Headquarters Valley Forge, 18 April 1778, Heath's Headquarters Orderly Book.


73. Articles of War of 1776, Article 3, Section XVIII; Articles 1, 3, and 4, Section XII; the quote was the final statement in a number of the articles, 970, 965-967.

75. General or Garrison Orders, West Point, 3 December 1782, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 27 November 1782-5 January 1783.


77. Berlin, "Administration of Military Justice," 203; note: doctors also liable to courts-martial as officers, 207.


79. Headquarters Valley Forge, 10 March 1778, Ibid., 252-253.


81. General or Garrison Orders, area of Fredericksburg, New York, 13 October 1778, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 26 September-27 November 1778.


83. Headquarters Stee[napie], 10 September 1780, Lamb's 2CA Orderly Book, 7 September-2 November 1780.


85. Headquarters Princeton, 22 May, 29 May, 11 June 1777, Kirkwood's Delaware Regiment Orderly Book. Kirkwood writes on 22 May that Mary Quin was confined on suspicion of being an enemy. Then on the 29th the book records that a court of inquiry checking on Mary Quin and Elisabeth Brewer was in session. The court-martial's decisions were published on 11 June. Brewer was to be sent to Philadelphia in the company of James Cox, who had been convicted of desertion and sentenced to 100 lashes and confinement. He was not specifically referred to as a soldier, but he probably was, and as such was one of the few service members so imprisoned.

86. Headquarters Valley Forge, 3 April 1778, Heath's Headquarters Orderly Book.

87. Headquarters Valley Forge, 1 March 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 247.

88. Headquarters Valley Forge, 8 February 1778, Ibid., 225-228.

89. Articles of War of 1776, Article 2, Section XVIII, Winthrop, Military Law, 970.

90. Headquarters Valley Forge, General Orders, 16 March 1778, Valley Forge Orderly Book, 262.
91. Orderly Office Valley Forge, 6 May 1778, Ibid., 309-310.


93. Headquarters Valley Forge, 22 December 1777, Ibid., 165.

94. Valley Forge, 11 April 1778, Ibid., 286.

95. General Additional Orders, Headquarters Skippack, 1 October 1777; Brigade Orders, Headquarters Valley Forge, 13 March 1778; Valley Forge, 14 April 1778; all in Valley Forge Orderly Book, 255, 288-9.

96. Camp at [Ramapaugh?] Clove, 12 July 1777, Kirkwood's Delaware Regiment Orderly Book. Captain Kirkwood was usually quite thorough in his entries. In this entry he made no mention of a trial or sentence, just the punishment and the reason for it. As he mentioned other women's trials, I am left with the assumption this was summary punishment.
Chapter VII. Conclusion

Continental camp followers were civilians who accompanied the Continental Army during the War for American Independence in order to exploit military personnel, remain with loved ones, or find employment. The term camp follower is often thought synonymous with that of whore, but such a definition is limited, misleading, and demeaning. A few prostitutes did follow the American army. They were, however, a minority among the camp followers, but the public's (as well as the soldiers') interest in their activities magnified their presence in the army's train. In actual numbers, there were probably more gentleman volunteers with the troops, but few people remember that they, too, were civilians following the army. Actually, sutlers and other vendors, servants and slaves, family members, and civilian or public service employees made up the majority of the army's followers. They were not in the army, but they worked and lived with it.

These camp followers, along with the army's officers and soldiers, created and sustained a military society that could be called the Continental Community. Military law and order regulated the actions of the community's residents as they struggled to make a living, maintain family unity, and support the army amidst the hazards of war. Although some camp followers hindered army operations, most contributed to the successful completion of the military mission. Yet their contributions resulted in little personal gain or group recognition. Most sutlers and contractors did not get rich; most slaves with the army for American independence did not gain their freedom; women
with the army were not enlightened or liberated by the experience; and many of the army’s civilian employees did a lot of work for little money and even less glory. And unlike their military relatives and colleagues, the Continental Army’s camp followers received little contemporary or historical recognition.

After the Continental Congress recognized the inevitability of civilian followers with the army, it defined followers and their status in camp in the 1775, and then the 1776, American Articles of War. The military, by applying that legislation in orders, regulations, and courts-martial, enlarged the definition. Article 23, Section XIII of the 1776 articles categorized followers as sutlers, retainers to camp, and all persons whatsoever serving with the armies of the United States. The army then determined that rules pertaining to sutlers could be applied to other sellers, and, furthermore, used the term or name itself to cover a wide variety of merchants who were not technically sutlers—licensed vendors to the troops in camp. Servants, slaves, wives, and other family members fell under the designation of retainer and were the people most commonly thought of when that term was used (indeed, when the term follower was used). But another group of followers, volunteers, also came under this heading, because they, like the other retainers, accompanied the army, without a contract to bind them or guaranteed pay and positions to hold them, to pursue their own ends. Although different from the other retainers in terms of position, power, and dependency, volunteers ranked legally as retainers. Although not all people in the public service worked with or for the army, persons serving with the army were generally officers or employees in the public service. They worked in or for the staff or civil departments that provided administrative or logistical support to the army. In summary, the army tended to see sutlers, contractors, and other sellers as adjuncts, business people who added to or complemented the military supply
system; retainers as domestic or unit attachments, bound by personal affection or interests; and persons serving with the army as auxiliaries who transported, supplied, and quartered the troops and thus were more intrinsically part of the military organization than any of the other camp followers.

Officers, soldiers, and followers—all belonged to the army, but in varying degrees. Men who accepted a commission or signed an enlistment essentially delivered themselves into the army's possession; they surrendered their personal freedom so as to serve the public good. Belonging was not merely a matter of association in their case; it was a matter of ownership: the army owned their services for the duration of their contracts—in an officer's case until resignation, dismissal, or discharge, and in the soldier's, until discharge or expiration of enlistment. The army also possessed civilian followers, but possession, more specifically control, was more tenuous: it rested upon sacrifice, the army forgoing a measure of security and mobility, and the followers, comfort and security; mutual interests such as patriotism and defense; and both formal and informal agreements that association and subordination would immediately benefit not only the army but the followers as well. When sutlers, contractors, and staff department employees accepted appointments or made formal arrangements to provide goods and services, they entered into a contract with the army. The army assured them of access to the camps, guaranteed their markets or wages, and provided military protection for as long as they were needed and heeded its regulations. In the case of retainers, the military evidently believed that if it fed them, it owned them. But "belonging to" was not defined merely by the army's claim of ownership or control; it also described the feeling of connection with the military that some followers had. Although many followers never looked
beyond their own business or personal concerns, many others strongly identified with the army and its mission: while they may have acknowledged they were not in the army, they felt themselves to be a part of a broader military organization.

This broader military organization or society was the Continental Community. The core of this society was the army: it supplied a reason for the community's existence, provided employment, created a market, and established a form of government. It was a mechanical (as opposed to an organic or naturally developing) society in that it maintained itself primarily by focusing on an outside threat, through legal and military constraints, and by a controlled and systematic distribution of labor.2 Civilian followers not only helped to create the community by establishing a symbiotic relationship with the army and its uniformed personnel, but legitimized the army's command structure as the government of the community by accepting its rules. The Continental Army and its followers established the precedents by which later civilian residents of the American military community would be governed. For example, an 1846 interpretation of the legality of military authority over camp followers stated:

\textit{camp followers} entering into a new society, having peculiar laws of its own, by their own voluntary act, must conform to those laws, as such is an understood condition of their admission: they are therefore liable to receive the orders of their military superiors, and are to act in conformity thereto, though rather in a civil than in a military capacity. These persons cannot be called upon to perform military duty; but in all that relates to the maintenance of the peace and order of the camp, the observance of rights, public or private, the arrangement of their goods, horses and carriages, and in matters pertaining to the police, safety or convenience of the camp, they are as liable to military command, and punishment for the non-observance of the same, as the enlisted soldier; . . . they should, . . . make themselves acquainted with the orders and regulations by which they are governed; . . . ignorance of the law is no
The Continental Community did not exist merely because of a mechanical, legal, and social solidarity. It was also a community built upon shared beliefs. First of all, army service attracted people intent on American independence and willing to achieve that end by military means. Although such sentiments were generally strongest in the officers and soldiers, some civilians decided to follow and serve the army as their contribution to the cause. Second, the army fostered a creedal solidarity in its personnel and followers. Patriotic lectures and displays, religious sermons, and fireside debates all served to reinforce appropriate existing beliefs and indoctrinate soldiers and followers alike in revolutionary political ideology and the need for American unity—a unity that needed to be displayed in the Continental Community so that it could serve as an example to the states. Yet, all too often, that unity was not evident in the Continental Community (thus the dependence on external controls). Americans, especially the Americans in and with the army, had much in common, but they had a great deal of difficulty in learning how to work together. Continental Army or Community life tested the ability of revolutionary Americans "to live continentally as well as to think and talk continentally." Some could not do it; they could not operate in this unfamiliar, new, and temporary community that had a national as opposed to local orientation. A few responded by causing trouble in the community; others simply left or deserted. But others were profoundly "Continentalized" or nationalized by the experience of living and fighting alongside men and women from different states; they became critical of a limited federal government, provincial concerns, and states' rights when such things interfered with the achievement of independence and, later, a more powerful American nation.
The war itself, the battles, constant movement, and deprivations, also fostered that sense of community--of belonging to the army--in the army's followers, and encouraged in them a belief that the army or nation owed them something for their services in that community. They not only endured the same hardships and encountered the same hazards as the officers and soldiers, but sometimes suffered additional misfortune because of their particular role with the military. Sutlers lost their stores, while contracted laborers and other employees lost their property and the tools of their trade. They, along with other followers, could find themselves prisoners if they did not remain in a secure position on march or in battle, and if not laid low by the diseases that ravaged the camps, they could be killed, as a volunteer was at the contested occupation of Plowed Hill in or near Cambridge on 26 August 1775, or wounded by musket balls and artillery fire.5

Sutlers, contractors, and contracted or salaried employees generally knew how to take care of themselves and their property, but sometimes they encountered problems they could not avoid or solve. They took precautions against thieves in the camps by guarding their goods themselves or by utilizing guards that the army provided, but when caught in defeated company, they had no defense against the robbery called confiscation. Although commanders on both sides of the conflict frequently asked, as the British general Cornwallis did after his defeat at Yorktown, that traders be allowed to preserve their property and that no civilians be punished for having joined with or followed their troops, their requests were not always honored. These followers, like the armies, also had no defense against the biological agents that incapacitated and sometimes killed their livestock. The campaign of 1781 ended with many casualties among the teams of oxen that served the American army. Quartermaster General Pickering told the
wagonmaster general, Major Cogswell, to scrutinize the casualty claims so as to see "what losses ought to be borne by the public, and what by the owners of the teams," but he believed that "the capital loss of Oxen occasioned by the fatal contagion in Virginia, must doubtless be sustained by the public."6

The public also sometimes sustained the capital loss of other property, human property, destroyed or captured when aiding the army. Lucretia Pritchett and William Churchill, executors for the estate of Joseph Pritchett, asked for and received compensation from the Virginia legislature for the loss of the male slave, Minny, who was killed in action against a British tender in the Rappahannock River while serving as a volunteer. Anne Cocke, James Taylor, and Anne Burwell also all received compensation from Virginia for slaves lost to them. Cocke's slave had first been impressed by the American army to help ferry the 2nd Virginia Regiment from Jamestown to Edward's Landing below Cobham and then was captured by the British in November 1775. Taylor lost two slaves who had been moved to Great Bridge (sometime in 1776 or early 1777) to help prepare fortifications and then died there, and Burwell's slave was accidentally drowned while transporting ammunition for the Virginia troops in December 1776.7 In these cases compensation was awarded to persons who had not followed the army themselves but had assigned others to do so: the payment was for persons who had fallen while following or serving the army as part of their duties.

Other African-Americans, whether as slaves, free servants, or free laborers following the army, also suffered and died during the war. Some slaves ran away to one or the other of the opposing armies in attempts to gain freedom only to be captured after a military engagement and returned to their owners. Both slaves and black freemen, some with an army, some not, were also captured or commandeered by both armies at various times. The victory at
Cowpens in January 1781 netted the Continental Army hundreds of British prisoners, "two pieces of artillery, two standards, eight hundred muskets, one travelling forge, thirty five baggage waggons, seventy Negroes, and upwards of one hundred dragoon horses." Captured African-Americans were almost always mentioned in reports for not only were they prizes of war, but they could be put to work in future army operations. This contrasted with the silence that generally attended the capture of camp women (sometimes seized while accompanying baggage wagons), who were seen as liabilities and often quickly released. But silence often, though not always, followed the death of black followers. Sometimes their loss was recorded in letters or rosters, and even occasionally in the newspapers. An account of the battle of Sullivan's Island (the garrison later called Fort Moultrie in honor of the officer who commanded there during the fight on 28 June 1776), first published in the *South Carolina Gazette* in August 1776 and then copied a month later in the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, mentioned that an officer's mulatto waiting boy was killed.

The black soldiers, servants, and laborers who lived, worked, and had colleagues die in the Continental Community saw themselves as integral parts of that society and wanted their services recognized and rewarded. A few slaves did receive their freedom, and some other African-Americans were quietly honored for their efforts, but most black inhabitants of the Continental Community never had the same sense of community or belonging as did whites. However, the heroism displayed by some of them and their undeniable humanity that close contact within the community revealed, may have caused a few white Americans to reconsider the place and status of blacks within American society as a whole.
There was little or no reconsideration for the status of women on account of their fortitude and actions with the army. As they had with African-Americans, white male Americans had a great deal of difficulty working with women followers (as opposed to just ordering them to do something) and according them recognition for hardships endured and jobs done well. Women and children lost husbands and fathers (Captain Richard Shortridge's two young sons saw their father buried at Crown Point on 8 July 1776) and were injured or killed themselves by accidents in camp or engagements with the enemy. The British and American armies also sometimes captured their enemy's retainers. Recognition though, usually through the awarding of pensions, was given in only a few extraordinary cases, such as those involving Mary Ludwig Hays, Margaret Corbin, and Anna Maria Lane, where the women performed above and beyond the call for women's duties. Women belonged to the army, but they belonged to it in the same way they belonged to anything else—as domestic attachments. Even the nurses, women and men, in the Hospital Department worked primarily within the domestic, not medical, sphere, and because of that received little financial or public reward for their labor.

This lack of recognition often extended to civil or staff department officers and employees. Although Congress awarded some of them official titles or ranks, especially those working within the military branches of their departments, and promised pensions and land grants to those appointed as officers in or those who enlisted in the public service, the public seldom acknowledged or praised them the way it did officers and soldiers of the line. There was no glory in staff work. In fact, the public tended to see many of them, especially the public agents or purveyors and contract employees, as opportunists feeding off the army and often blamed them (sometimes with
reason) for the administrative and logistics problems that plagued the military throughout the war. Then, after the war, the new nation ignored the roles played by most civil department personnel, as it did those of most other camp followers, as it created a mythology of the Revolution. Americans concentrated on tales that ennobled the ragtag fighters who surmounted all odds to win the war. They saw nothing noble about ragtag women or men who wielded account books or artisans tools instead of swords and muskets.

Such neglect was aided both by the advent of peace and by the ongoing militarization of civilian support services to the army. In June 1783 Washington furloughed most of his noncommissioned officers and soldiers, and in October Congress declared that the Continental Army would be officially disbanded as of 3 November. When the men dispersed and returned to their homes, they took their retainers with them. This caused the military market to shrink (the new American army was tiny), and so sutlers and other sellers also left. As there was no need for large-scale administrative and logistical support, civil department personnel were dismissed. Therefore, when historians and myth-makers (they are not necessarily the same thing), even those writing immediately after the war, looked to a current army as a model, they did not see a prominent contingent of civilian followers affecting army operations and so did not think to include them in their analysis of the earlier army. And when they talked with veterans and their descendants and then wrote about the war, they focused on battles, not camp life. The myopia increased over time, especially as armies began to enlist people or train soldiers to do the tasks once done by followers.

The Continental Army, although it experimented with tactical and organizational techniques that would be fully implemented in the armies of the nineteenth century, was ultimately an army for and of its time; it was an
eighteenth-century army that still relied heavily on nonmilitary support services and personnel. Its reliance on such people placed it historically with the European armies it took as examples; even the methods whereby it controlled its camp followers were copied from the British model. But the army's eagerness to control these people more tightly, evidenced by its willingness to court-martial them and its attempts to incorporate them within the army (as in the case of enlisted artificers), foreshadowed the increasingly professional armies of the next century. Armies became, more than ever, communities of uniformed men. The need for camp follower support declined as the army incorporated service functions within the organization, and as the need declined, people forgot that such support was ever necessary and that a great number and variety of civilians once followed the army.

This is not to say that camp followers disappeared. They did not. Wives and other family members continued to enliven the social life at army garrisons, but service personnel just faded further into the background of army life until war once again made the army require additional support. There were shifts in the composition and some of the duties of the followers according to time and place. During peacetime retainers tended to outnumber other kinds of civilians with the military. When the army stationed a man at a new post, he usually brought his family with him. Officers' wives received no official (as opposed to social) recognition, but many other retainers did, and their duties mirrored those of their predecessors: personal service, domestic work, and nursing. In 1797 "Regulations To be observed in the Delivery and distribution of Fuel and Straw To the garrisons on the Sea Coast and Recruiting parties" included the provision that the same quantity of straw allowed soldiers be provided "for Servants or Batmen not Soldiers, and for Washer-Women attached to each Company in the proportion of one Washer Woman to
every seventeen non commissioned officers and privates."12 As the army continued to need washerwomen and nurses, it continued to supply them with rations (the former at a limit of four women per company, but as many matrons and nurses as required) at least until 1878 when it officially banned the enrollment of laundresses on ration lists.13 During time of war, as in the Civil War, persons serving with the army in the field outnumbered retainers. The latter group consisted of clerks, teamsters, laborers, hospital attendants, guides, spies, military railroad personnel, and telegraph operators.14

In the years following the Revolution, the army still had the power to regulate its followers and to punish them for conduct detrimental to the security and good order of the service, but it could usually use its ultimate control mechanism—the court-martial as a method whereby it could imprison or execute followers—only in time of war or when and where civilian courts were not available (such as on the frontier). The camp follower article was copied almost verbatim each time the army, with congressional approval, revised the Articles of War during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The 1916 revision actually expanded military jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime, something which was continued under the Uniform Code of Military Justice that replaced the articles in 1950. By 1960, however, the Supreme Court declared it unconstitutional to court-martial civilian employees or dependents in peacetime. Military legal control was another matter during war, but court-martial was always a last resort.15 Then as now, when confronted with disorderly or criminal civilian dependents and employees, military commanders prefer to revoke their privileges or, in extreme cases, banish them from camp, garrison, and post.

Continental camp followers were a diverse group and represented all the states, a variety of races, religions, and socio-economic classes. Some
helped the army; some hindered it; and still others did a bit of both. They assisted in the development of a Continental Community that not only depended on and was governed by the army but ultimately contributed to the American success in the War for Independence. Although the public assured the Continental Army's officers and soldiers that posterity would remember their ardor, courage, and efforts and then took steps to guarantee it, it made no such promises to followers. As a result, most of the names and stories of individual camp followers are lost; but they were there, and it is time for posterity to give them a proper salute.
Chapter VII Notes


2. I am using Emile Durkheim's distinction (though perhaps not his precise definition) of mechanical vs organic social solidarity here. Durkheim's methodology is discussed in Robert A. Nisbet's *The Sociological Tradition* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966), 82-97 (84-86 most applicable here).


7. Petitions 89-P (Pritchett & Churchill, 15 June 1776), 107-P (Cocke, 21 June 1776), 349-P (Taylor, 30 May 1777), & 486-P (Burwell, 22 November 1777), in Randolph W. Church, compiler, *Virginia Legislative Petitions: Bibliography, Calendar, and Abstracts from Original Sources, 6 May 1776 - 21 June 1782* (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1984), 25-26, 31-32, 103, & 148. The Pritchett-Churchill petition states that Minny was killed while voluntarily serving under Hugh Walker. Walker is not mentioned in Heitman's *Historical Register* or Sanchez-Saavedra's *Guide to Virginia Military Organizations in the American Revolution*.


took the garrison at St. John's on Lake Champlain with 180 prisoners total, including women and children, 15 November 1775, p. 4, col. 2; Ibid., among the 7247 prisoners taken at Yorktown were 6039 rank & file and 80 "followers of the army," 7 November 1781, p. 2, col. 2. Unfortunately accounts of *American followers*, as opposed to Americans on the frontier or in civilian communities, as prisoners did not get much coverage.


12. Copy of Secretary of War James McHenry's orders sent to Major William Campbell, 8th U.S. Regiment, at Culpepper Courthouse, via Colonel Thomas 'Parker, 1797, in Campbell Family Papers, Orange County, Virginia, 1744-1859, folder 21, Virginia State Library, Richmond.


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