1978

Who is the Soviet politician?

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WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

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by

Corliss Anne Tacosa

1978

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

Master of Arts

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Approved, July, 1978

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the two people who always had steadfast confidence in me, my ability in the field of Political Science, and in my capability of completing a Master of Arts degree, my husband, James Dean Tacosa, and Dr. Phillip Beach, Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fresno.

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PREFACE

At the time that the topic of this thesis was conceived, the author felt very deeply that in order to deal effectively with the Soviets in foreign affairs, one must understand the enigmatic representatives and leaders from the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, those politicians whose words and actions are often such a mystery to the Western world, yet could have a very large impact upon it.

Little did the author realize that the completion of this thesis would coincide with the trials of Soviet dissidents Anatoly Shchararansky, Alexander Ginsburg, and Viktoras Pyatkus. For those whose anger and disbelief join with many against such trials, this thesis should be able to help explain the predicament of the politicians of the Soviet Union and contribute an understanding of why the leaders must carry on such farces of justice.* That against the Human Rights statutes of the Helsinki Accords, the pressure the United States has applied for Soviet human rights, and the constant declaration of democracy in the Soviet state, trials, such as the ones mentioned, were the only recourse for these men to retain their dignity.

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*Hedrick Smith, in his book The Russians supports this statement on page 45. ". . . More startling, I knew of famous Soviet writers who have the banned works of Solzhenitsyn and other literary contraband quite openly on their bookshelves, a sin for which dissidents have been jailed. But, establishment status provided them protection."

It's sad to think that men must play with other men's lives in order to raise their stature in their own eyes.

This research attempts to provide a basis for a thorough understanding of these complex politicians and a glimpse at the environment in which they must function.

The Author

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Morris McCain for the patient guidance, constant encouragement, and constructive criticism that he gave her throughout the investigation and writing of this manuscript.

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ABSTRACT

WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?

The purpose of this research is to create a complete, realistic picture of the members of the All Union Soviet political elite. This is accomplished by analyzing, statistically and narratively, the memberships of the All Union political organizations, both in the Communist Party and state hierarchies.

The elite were separated into three strata, correlating for the most part with the level of the organization in which they held membership. The exceptions were members of the upper or top Party elite who held membership in most or all bodies discussed. One chapter deviates from the others by narratively analyzing the motives and tactics of these politicians, including a discussion of the political environment in which they must function. This study endeavors to generate a thorough understanding of this complex group.

The Soviet politician is an educated, middle-aged male, holding a professional position in the state or Party hierarchy, of the Slavic nationality and very adept at political maneuvering and tactics. He is also an individual trying to maintain some harmony between the conflicting natures of his private and public lives; between being a member of a very privileged class, while professing to live in a 'classless society; and between seeing the faults of the Communist society, yet always speaking of the emergence of the 'New Soviet Man.' He is one who is motivated more by ambition and material success than by Marxist-Leninist ideology.

WHO IS THE SOVIET POLITICIAN?

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL

Most of the scholarly work or published books available in the field of Soviet politics are devoted to a general survey of the Soviet political system, a general analysis of top party or government leadership, the role and influence of groups in Soviet politics, biographies of political leaders, and the relation of personal experiences under the Soviet regime.[1] Acknowledging the importance of these contributions to this field of study, one area seems to lack concise, comprehensible coverage, the Soviet political elite at the All Union level. The purpose of this thesis will be to generate a thorough understanding of this group--to be accomplished through statistical analysis and narrative accounts of the memberships of the various All Union political institutions.

This paper will consist of six chapters which will cover all the aspects of the All Union political elite. Three of the chapters statistically analyze the members of this select group, while one deviates from the other methodology by presenting narrative descriptions of the tactics and motives of these individuals. The combining of the Communist Party and state institutions within the separate

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[1]Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and Carrer Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), p. 1.

chapters was not by arbitrary assignment, but was done because of the existence of forms of comparability, structural or otherwise, between the institutions.

Definition of Terms

Before continuing with the material of this thesis, definitions of terms and several explanations are needed to clarify the contents. Though the term elite can vary in its definition from source to source, to discuss each would both lengthen this thesis unnecessarily and be of no relevance to the purpose of the research. Therefore, in this paper "elite" as a noun will refer to individuals belonging to a select group of people who assume a disproportionately larger role in society due to their highly responsible positions.[2] Though Milton Lodge, in his book, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin, divides the Soviet elite into five separate types--the full-time Party functionaries, the economic administrators, the military, the literary intelligensia, and the legal profession[3]--, for the purposes of this paper, the elite of Soviet society will be divided into only two groups, the intelligensia and the political elite. The former achieve their status by the functions they perform; among their members are outstanding or highly qualified individuals engaged in research and academic work, doctors, lawyers, and journalists.[4] The latter receive their status from the positions that

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[2]Ibid., p. 22. Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey, Summer, 1975, p. 1.

[3]Milton C. Lodge, Soviet Elite Attitudes Since Stalin (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1969), p. 1.

[4]Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", Problems of Communism (December, 1966), p. 58. Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 24.

they hold in society; this group includes those individuals involved in the power structure of the Soviet Union, the government or Communist Party apparatus, dealing with decision-making and control over people.[5] In several instances, the political elite were members of the functional group elite before becoming members of the power structure.[6]

The concentration of this research is on the political elite, often designated as Soviet politicians in this research, who hold membership in the political institutions at the All Union level. For the purposes of this paper, the group will be divided into two categories; the Party elite, those with membership in Party hierarchy organs, and the government elite, those with membership in State hierarchy organs. In Soviet society, this group as a whole consists of several strata, with pay, privilege, status, and power increasing as the level of elite increases, as will be further discussed in Chapter V. (The members of the top political elite, the men of the Politburo of the Communist Party, may also be referred to as the power elite.) Each chapter will clarify the level and category of political elite to which the memberships discussed belong.

The paper will confine itself to a discussion of the political elites at the All Union level. Though information on political elites at the republic or lower levels might enhance the applicability of the conclusions of this thesis, it would also force this paper to become too

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[5]Boris Meissner, op. cit., p. 58. Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 25.

[6]Michael Pl Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis," The American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1232.

long or too involved in detail. Therefore, the research has been limited to include only those members of the political institutions at the All Union level.

Several terms used extensively in this paper must be defined. The term social class will refer to a social group in society whose members share similar rank and status. The word professional will be defined in a narrow sense. In the paper, "professional" will designate an individual with an advanced degree, who holds a highly responsible Party or government position. Another clarification which must be made is the distinction between the terms Russian and Soviet as used in this research. Russian will denote only a nationality distinction, while Soviet designates any representative of the USSR, regardless of nationality group. All other terms needing qualification are defined at their first introduction in the thesis.

Party-State Parallelism

In order to comprehend the levels and the importance of the two groups of Soviet political elite, a discussion of the dual hierarchies in the Soviet system is merited. These two parallel hierarchies are the Communist Party and the state. The parallelism is illustrated in Appendix A. The role of the Communist Party as described in the 1977 Constitution is "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system."[7] The Party determines the direction and policies of the regime, controls the conditions upon which political or administrative advancement is achieved, and retains control of the

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[7]John S. Reshetar, Jr, The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 133.

government by determining which Party leaders will hold which government posts.[8] It is also unhampered by the law.[9] On the other hand, the state is the practical administrator of the political system. It manages the economy, enforces the laws, and maintains the defense of the country.[10] It is the legitimate controller of the country, but the Party's superiority turns this fact into near fiction. Merle Fainsod illustrates this relationship through comments about the Supreme Soviet.

> In the Supreme Soviet, all important decisions come ready-made from Party leadership. The task of the Supreme Soviet is not to question, but to execute, to cloth the Party thesis in a garb of constitutional legality. The result minimizes the authority of the whole government apparatus.[11]

With the existence of these hierarchies in this political system, conflict and tensions often create strained relations between the two. The Party elite desires to control the decision-making in all areas, especially economic, and have the final say in all appointments to influential positions; the state seeks the right to run the economy with minimum interference by Party functionaries and to select personnel without regard to political criteria.[12] Though the state has many

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[8] Ibid., pp. 95, 133.

[9] Ibid., p. 133.

[10] G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the USSR (London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.

[11] Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 384.

[12] Sidney Ploss, "Politics in the Kremlin," Problems of Communism, (May-June, 1970), p. 12.

bodies that fulfill functions not performed by the Party organizations, the Party apparatus exercises vast powers and ultimate decision-making ability, and dominates the vast governmental structure it originally created.[13]

Recruitment

Recruitment is the core of the Soviet political system, for it determines the members of the political elite. Two methods exemplify this process: Soviet elections and the nomenklatura-list system. The unifying force in both instances is the Communist Party, for it exercises the final approval over all candidates. Within the state hierarchy, representatives up to and including the deputies of the Supreme Soviet are directly elected through the Soviet electoral system. The most misunderstood concept of this system is the Soviet claim that their elections are democratic. Herbert McCloskey and John Turner discuss this Soviet assertion in the following words:

> The Communist doctrine bases its democratic claims on the mystique of the proletariat's 'historic mission'; since the proletariat is 'summoned by history' to fulfill a great democratic mission, whatever serves this mission becomes democratic by definition. And since the Party directs the proletarian dictatorship and decides the nature of the mission, anything the Party wills also becomes democratic, . . . therefore, the Soviet government can only act in a democratic manner because it is controlled by the Party . . . since everything Soviet by nature is democratic, the regime can legitimately deny that there is any contradiction between democracy and proletarian dictatorship.[14]

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[13]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 133.

[14]Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 297.

Defining democracy in this way, the Soviet state can be declared a democracy and its elections, democratic.

Though Soviet elections are often considered as non-democratic by the outside world, they appear to have actual citizen participation. Universal suffrage and the secret ballot have both been adopted.[15] There is no residency requirement on voting, and nominations for candidates may come from several sources. Elections are even declared to have a 97 to 99 percent turnout (refer to Appendix B). However, the accuracy of these high percentages comes into question in the following example, as related by Robert Kaiser in his book Russia: "a man in Moscow who once worked in a polling station in the capital said that the number of non-voting adults in his area was about eleven percent; the Party had ordered in advance what figures should be reported."[16]

Further scrutiny of these democratic characteristics reveals the existence of only one candidate for each office. John Hazard contends,

> While Western peoples do not consider one-party systems compatible with the processes of democracy, it must be admitted that there are parts of the world that are accepted as democratically governed and in which there is only one effective party . . . . It is possible for a system to merit attribution of the democratic label if there is only one Party, but there must be a choice of candidates within the Party.[17]

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[15]An explanation of the Soviet secret ballot includes this information. To vote positively, the Soviet citizen will fold the ballot and drop it in the ballot box. To vote negatively, the voter needs to go into a private booth and cross out the rejected candidates. To perform the latter, it creates an obvious reaction from officials at the polls. However, to be subjected to that is usually preferable to the harassment one receives if he refuses to vote at all.

[16]Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 155.

[17]John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 50.

In the Soviet Union, this choice does not occur. Even though the term for elections in the Russian language, vybory, has a literal meaning of choices, selections, and alternatives,[18] only one to three percent of the population seem to take this contradiction seriously. These are the citizens who refuse to vote or vote against the slate of nominees.

Nominations of candidates for the soviets are endorsed by open meetings of various public and work organizations, but it is no secret that these nominations are actually decided by the Party nucleus of the organization in prior, closed meetings.[19] If the candidate for the deputy nomination is rejected in these pro forma meetings, which has occurred, the Party officials select a replacement.[20] Most of the population accept the one candidate practice and contend that more than one candidate might indicate a lack of confidence in the candidate.[21] Soviet citizens, on the whole, place their greatest emphasis on material possessions or aesthetic things in life, being content to leave undisturbed the leadership's actions in the area of politics.[22]

Both Western sources and Soviet writers are in close agreement as to the functions of elections in the Soviet Union.[23] The purpose of Soviet elections is not to give the citizenry a choice of candidates for

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[18]Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent", American Political Science Review (September, 1968), p. 815.

[19]Ibid., p. 817.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid.

[22]Dan N. Jacobs, ed., The New Communisms (New York: Harper & Row), p. 125.

[23]Jerome M. Gilison, op. cit., p. 814.

government positions. Rather, they are used as a means of 'democratic' approval of the regime's policies in order to legitimize it in the eyes of the world, an educational and propaganda exercise to inform the people of the Party's plans.[24] During the campaigns, past, present, and future plans are presented to the populace. If they approve of the policies, they will ratify the slate of proposed candidates. If they want to express dissatisfaction or actually dislike a candidate, they will either vote against a candidate or refuse to vote altogether. Soviet elections, as they are, have become a symbol of the regime's legitimate position in the world and provide an opportunity for the regime to test its motivation powers.[25]

The nomenklatura or list system is the method by which Party or elite state positions are filled. While the exact details or mechanics of the system are not a matter of public record, there are certain aspects which can be mentioned. Each Party organ has a list of Party or government positions, its nomenklatura, over which it has special responsibility; the organ then must give its approval before the occupant of a listed post is removed or another chosen.[26] The more important the post, the higher the level of Party organ in whose nomenklatura it is placed.[27] The system is hierarchial, as is the Party structure. The candidates for nomenklatura posts are chosen from registers of preferred,

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[24]Leonard Shapiro, The Government and Politics of the Soviet Union (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 108.

[25]Dan N. Jacobs, op. cit., p. 125.

[26]Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 29, 30, 115, 116.

[27]Ibid.

promising individuals at the corresponding administrative levels.[28] In the case of choosing the delegates for the Party Congress, as an example, the Central Party organs, especially the Party Organs Department of the Central Committee, subject to careful screening the candidates selected by regional bodies for election to the Congress, and in effect, can exercise a veto power over those nominated.[29] This hints at the democratic centralism aspect in existence in this system of recruitment; though a lower body approves the nominees for membership in the higher body, and the nominees are chosen at the same level as the electing body, the higher body has the right to reject certain candidates if it so desires.[30]

A few key nomenklatura posts, such as the Central Committee Secretariat, are probably filled by direct decisions of the Politburo. Other high level organizations, such as the Council of Ministers, are chosen from their own nomenklatura, exercising total control over the selection of the candidates for their posts. The nomenklatura system works in the selection of candidates for local, Central Party, and higher state positions. The system is more a method of assent

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[28]Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 13.

[29]Federic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Soviet Political Leadership System, 1952-1965" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, I diana University, 1969), p. 145.

[30]Democratic centralism which guides all aspects of Party policies and bodies has four main principles which seems to have influence upon the nomeklatura system also.

a. election of all Party Executive bodies from bottom to top
b. periodic accountability of Party bodies to their Party organizations and to higher bodies
c. strict Party discipline and subordination of minority to majority
d. the absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher bodies upon lower bodies.

These come from the Rules of the Communist Party as quoted in Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, op. cit., p. 209.

than a system of free choice. The patronage system of political mobility flourishes in this type of atmosphere, as will be discussed in Chapter V. Soviet elections and nomenklatura or list system are the recruitment bases for the Soviet political elite.

Objective and Hypotheses

The objective of this research is to create a realistic picture of the Soviet All Union political elite in order to promote a clearer understanding of their actions in the political affairs of their country and/or the outside world. This group will be analyzed through quantitative analysis of their demographic characteristics and a narrative description of their political actions. Characteristics to be explored include educational level, occupational status, social class, age, nationality and tactics. Four major hypotheses will be investigated, along with several minor ones. The four are as follows:

1. The Soviet political elite (both Party and government) is a middle-aged group of conservative men.

2. Successful careers of the Soviet political elite (both Party and government) are related to educational levels, nationality group, age, and occupational status.

3. The Soviet political elite (both Party and government) epitomizes the "New Soviet Man."*

4. The Soviet political elite (both Party and government) constitutes an upper class in Soviet society.*

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*The concept of the "New Soviet Man" refers to the Party's desire to reshape human nature, to effect extensive changes in the minds, morals, and manners of the people,[31] to create the ideal person who dedicates himself to the state and Marxist-Leninist ideology, to the extent of living a deprived personal life. In Soviet rhectoric, the "New Soviet Man" does not constitute a new class, but rather refers to the ideal for the entire society. Major hypotheses #3 and #4 both cannot be true. This will be established.

[31]Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1967), p. 617.

The minor hypotheses explore topics related to the major hypotheses

1. The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.

2. All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have only "rubber stamp" power.

3. Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demonstrates the desire of the political elite for power and status in Soviet society.

4. Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in the Soviet political system.

5. Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of the Soviet political elite.

In Chapter Six the conclusions arrived at from the material presented will be compared with these hypotheses. A discussion of the findings will then be presented.

CHAPTER II

THE SUPREME SOVIET AND THE PARTY CONGRESS

According to the Soviets, the 'highest organs of power' in the dual hierarchies of the Soviet political system are the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of the CPSU.[1] Though actual power for both bodies differs greatly from theoretical power, their representative natures and large turnover rates seem to support the Soviet contention of mass participation* of the populace in the operation of the Soviet polity. Membership in these assemblies is considerable, 1,517 at the 1974 Supreme Soviet session and 4,998 at the 1976 Congress. With the comparability of these two organs as to type and purpose, the presentation of both in the same chapter seems merited.

The purpose of this paper is neither to discuss nor dispute the Soviet assertions of the functions of the Party and state institutions. It is to analyze the type of individual who gains membership in one of these institutions. Before delving into the data on the membership of each organ, a brief explanation of the organ and its purpose will be offered. The state body or bodies will be presented first since they are the least powerful. The discussion of the respective Party

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*Participation by the citizens in decision-making and bill writing in the Soviet political system.

[1]John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 112, 186.

organizations will follow, concluding with a summary of the characteristics of those chosen as members of the institutions dealt with in the chapter.

The Supreme Soviet

From the 1977 Constitution, the Supreme Soviet receives its description as the "highest organ of state power" in the USSR.[2] It consists of two 'equal'[3] chambers, the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The former contains one representative for about every 300,000 people, though its membership is now stabilized at 767 deputies. Representation in the latter follows a specific formula, 32 deputies from each Union Republic, 11 deputies from each Autonomous Republic, 5 deputies for each autonomous oblast,* and 1 deputy for each okrug.* The 1977 Constitution calls for equal memberships in the chambers. Table 2-1 shows that this is presently being approached.

The constitutional powers of the Supreme Soviet range from exercising all legislative power and approving budgetary and economic plans to directing the defense and international relations of the Soviet Union.[4] However, with the assembly meeting only eight to ten

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*Oblast is translated as province and okrug is translated as area, either electoral or ethnic.

[2]Ibid.

[3]The Soviets contend equality of the chambers. However, the Soviet of the Union has more Communist Party members and Party officials in its membership and, therefore, it is described by many as 'more than equal' to its counterpart.

[4]G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in the USSR (London: Soviet Booklets), p. 1.

TABLE 2-1

NUMBER OF DEUPTIES IN EACH CHAMBER
OF THE SUPREME SOVIET

Session	Soviet of the Union	Soviet of Nationalities	Total
First - 1937	569	574	1,143
Second - 1946	682	657	1,339
Third - 1950	678	638	1,316
Fourth - 1954	708	639	1,347
Fifth - 1958	738	640	1,378
Sixth - 1962	791	652	1,443
Seventh - 1966	767	750	1,517
Eighth - 1970	767	750	1,517

SOURCE: M. Saifulin, The Soviet Parliament (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), p. 35; Pravda, July 15, 1970, pp. 2-3, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 145.

days a year, it has become but a legalizing instrument for Party approved laws and resolutions. An example of this formal nature of the Supreme Soviet is illustrated in the following:

> . . . on the second day of the first session of the Eighth Supreme Soviet, in July 1970, the following agenda was completed:
>
> 1. election of a new Politburo
> 2. election of a new Council of Ministers (completed with no discussion)
> 3. an All-Union bill concerning basis labor legislation was read, 'debated', and approved . . . in one hour and a half; this was the first comprehensive labor law passed since 1922
> 4. discussion of various questions of foreign policy with two related resolutions passed
>
> . . . Since all the agenda items for the session had been exhausted, the session was declared closed that evening.[5]

Though the Soviets dislike the usage of the term, the Supreme Soviet could be said to be a 'rubber stamp' organization. Laws do not orginate on the floor of the chambers and up to the 1970's, not a single bill in a Commission* or sub-Commission had been individually or group initiated, though by law, the deputy has this right.[6]

The only time actual discourse may take place is in committee for deliberating on the details of legislation which implement general Party directives. An example of this type of discussion follows:

> A sub-Commission drafts the fundamentals of the Public Health Law. Its Chairman, N. N. Blokhin, is a prominent surgeon and scholar, and no newcomer to the Supreme Soviet, having been a deputy in its two previous sessions. Invited to this sitting by the commission were economists, trade unionists, jurists,

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*In the Soviet government, a committee of one of the chambers of the Supreme Soviet is referred to as a Commission.

[5]Roy A. Medvedev, On Soviet Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), pp. 133-134.

[6]Ibid., p. 132.

> financial experts and medical men. Every line of the projected law was closely scrutinized. Purely stylistics alterations were made, then a few substantive ones. An argument broke out: may a patient be operated on without his consent or that of his close relatives?
>
> How are we to get the required consent if, say, the patient is in a state of shock? The relatives may be away or their whereabouts unknown. The doctor simply has no time.
>
> I know of no country where legislation allows for forcible operations.
>
> Take an intestinal perforation. You may not get the patient's consent until it's too late. To save life the surgeon should be allowed to operate . . . .
>
> I disagree. During the war some wounded refused to be amputated. And though not all, many did get well. Don't you understand that I cannot saw off a man's leg without his consent?
>
> There are all kinds of cases. You cannot prescribe for all of them.
>
> That should be legislatively formalized, lest we tie the hands of our doctors in emergencies. When an operation is urgent, the surgeon should not have to search for relatives or guardians.
>
> They put that down: a doctor may, is obligated even, to decide for himself, but this in 'exceptional cases' only, when delay 'imperils the patient's life' and when 'obtaining consent appears impossible.' This, eventually, was the formula that became law.[7]

All voting in Commissions, sub-Commissions, and on the floor of the chambers is done by "raising the forearm, making a right angle at the elbow."[8] All votes are declared unanimous.

With 72 percent to 76 percent of the deputies being members of the Communist Party (see Table 2-2), Party membership is a major consideration in deciding upon nominees for deputy positions. Whereas most

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[7]Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 262-63.

[8]Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 156.

TABLE 2-2

PARTY MEMBERSHIP IN THE SUPREME SOVIET
1937-1970

	Communists, as Percent of All Deputies		
Year Elected	Soviet of the Union	Soviet of Nationalities	Combined
1937	81.0	71.0	
1946	84.4	77.6	
1950	85.5	81.3	
1954	79.8	75.9	
1958	76.3	75.8	76.0
1962	75.2	76.4	75.4
1966	74.7	75.7	75.2
1970		-	72.3
1974	-	-	75.0

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123.

of the remaining twenty-four to twenty-eight percent of the membership are Konsomol* officials, up to ten percent may be non-Party personnel. However, the latter must have Party approval.[9] A further indication of Party control of this body is illustrated by Table 2-3. Though a decrease has occurred in the membership of the Party and state officials, they still make up roughly one-third of the membership, while forty percent of the Central Committee members hold key Supreme Soviet positions. The highest organ of state power is a Party dominated and controlled body.

Second only to Party membership, the level of education seems to have become the most important characteristic in examining the qualifications of nominees. Table 2-4 gives the percentages for levels of education for deputies during a twenty-four year period. For those with only a primary education, the figure has decreased by twenty-nine percentage points, whereas for those completing higher level education, it has increased by nine percentage points. Between 1954 and 1958, the drop in the percentage for higher level education could be attributed to the power struggle in the Politburo at that time, but the increase in this area between 1958 and 1962 is due to Khrushchev's influence in recruiting more educated personnel for government positions. With the combined percentages in Table 2-4 for secondary or higher levels of education showing a twenty percentage point increase from the fifth session to the eighth, this probably reflects a corresponding emphasis on higher levels of education occurring in Soviet society at the same time.

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*Konsomol is the name of the Communist Youth Organization.

[9]Everett M. Jacobs, "Soviet Local Elections: What they are and What they are not", Soviet Studies (July, 1970), p. 70.

TABLE 2-3

PERCENTAGE OF PARTY-STATE OFFICIALS AND CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS HOLDING KEY POSITIONS IN THE SUPREME SOVIET

Session	Party	State	Central Committee
1954	-	-	24%
1958	19.0	16.0	
1962	19.0	16.0	-
1966	18.0	15.1	34%
1970	17.2	14.3	41.5%

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 139.

TABLE 2-4

EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF THE SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES

Session -	Third	Fourth	Fifth	Sixth	Seventh	Eighth
Level:						
Higher	39%	48%	43%	49%	50%	48%
Incom. Higher	7%	7%	6%	4%	3%	3%
Secondary	22%	17%	12%	17%	19%	30%
Incom. Sec.	-	10%	20%	20%	23%	17%
Primary	32%	18%	19%	11%	6%	3%

SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosziva), statucheskii sbornik (Moscow: 1970), pp. 40-41, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 136.

Occupation proves to be a difficult characteristic to analyze for the deputies of the Supreme Soviet (refer to Table 2-5). For the years 1962 and 1966, precise figures in all categories are available. However, for the more recent sessions, this is not true. With the Soviet biographer's tendency not to report white collar classifications,[10] and the percentages in these areas missing, it seems that the Soviets are becoming more and more hesitant to admit white collar status and representation. This conclusion receives further support if the reported worker representation is analyzed. The Supreme Soviet's compositional pattern is allegedly a cross section of the best in every occupation.[11] Since the worker category dominates the occupied population of the Soviet Union, it should also dominate the representation in the Supreme Soviet. Up until 1974, its status in the assembly was grossly underrepresented. In 1974, its proportion of membership increased, but remained well below its proportion of the occupied population in the Soviet Union.[12] If the unknown percentages of Table 2-5 are intepreted as belonging in the white collar category, then this group has a 59.7 percent representation in 1970 and 48.4 percent representation in 1974. Both figures are well above the corresponding percentages for this occupational group in the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviet does not mirror occupied Soviet society. It possesses a disproportionately high share of white collar representation at the expense of worker representation.

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[10]Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Executive" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornwell University, 1975), p. 162. Ms. Loeffler contends in her dissertation that Soviet biographers have a tendency to leave out reference to white collar social origin or social class membership.

[11]Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157.

[12]Roger A. Clarke, "The Composition of the USSR Supreme Soviet", Soviet Studies (July, 1967), p. 57.

TABLE 2-5

OCCUPATIONAL REPRESENTATION AMONG SUPREME SOVIET DUTIES

Category	1962	1966	1970	1974
Workers	21%	20%	21.7%	32.8%
Peasants	15	17	18.6	17.8
White Collar				
Full-time Party	19	18	17.2	17
Full-time Govt.	16	15	15.1	14.1
Military	4	4	3.8	3.7
Farm Directors	8	8	5.3	
Economic Managers	1	3	-	
Other White Collar	13	11		
Unknown	3	3	-	-

SOURCE: Pravda and Izvestia, Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosoziva), statucheskii soornik (Moscow: 1970) as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 123. John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 183.

Unlike occupational status, the nationality composition of the Supreme Soviet more closely coincides with this aspect in Soviet society as a whole. The body is dominated by the Slavic groups, the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Belorussians, just as the population as a whole is. Table 2-6 illustrates Supreme Soviet nationality representation for the years 1962 and 1966, as compared to the 1959 population census. In 1959, 76.28 percent of the population was Slavic, but in the Supreme Soviet, only 61.7 percent and 59.39 percent, respectively, were. Though dominating the assembly, the Slavic group was obviously underrepresented. Most of the minority groups, on the other hand, were overrepresented. The political leadership, however, realizes the importance of having a communication link with the many nationalities of the country, plus foster the feeling in the population that they do have an impact on decision-making. This overrepresentation of minorities on this rather powerless body might be deliberate. It also serves as excellent evidence to the Soviet claim that their assembly is the most representative in the world.[13]

An analysis of the age of deputies represents an insight into the Soviet political system as a whole. Table 2-7 illustrates this characteristic from the first through eighth session. Two trends are evident, the gross increase in the under 30 group between 1950 and 1970, and the smaller increase in the over 60 group in the 1960's. The first trend implies the rising importance of recruiting younger cadres into the operation of the state. The greatest jump between the fifth and sixth sessions can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev's efforts to recruit

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[13]Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 157.

TABLE 2-6

NATIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET

Nationality	Population 1959 Percent	USSR Supreme Soviet 1962 Percent	USSR Supreme Soviet 1966 Percent
Russians	54.65	43.38	42.52
Ukrainians	17.84	14.62	13.18
Belorussians	3.79	3.74	3.69
Uzbeks	2.88	2.98	3.43
Georgians	1.29	3.19	3.30
Azerbaijanis	1.41	3.12	3.10
Lithuanians	1.11	2.08	2.11
Moldavians	1.06	1.32	1.45
Latvians	0.67	1.46	1.85
Kirghiz	0.46	1.32	1.52
Tadzhiks	0.67	1.94	2.31
Armenians	1.33	2.77	3.16
Turkmens	0.48	1.32	1.78
Estonians	0.47	1.87	1.91
Finns	0.04	0.14	0.07
Jews	1.09	0.35	0.33
Poles	0.66	0.28	0.33
Bashkirs	0.47	0.83	0.59
Buriats	0.12	0.55	0.59
Kabardinians	0.10	0.42	0.40
Kalmyks	0.05	0.41	0.40
Karelians	0.08	0.35	0.40
Komis	0.21	0.55	0.59
Maris	0.24	0.42	0.33
Mordvinians	0.62	0.49	0.46
Ossetians	0.20	0.90	0.92
Tatars	2.38	0.97	1.19
Tuvinians	0.05	0.55	0.53
Udmurts	0.30	0.42	0.40
Chechens	0.20	0.35	0.40
Chuvashes	0.70	0.62	0.53
Yakuts	0.11	0.55	0.33
Kara-Kalpaks	0.08	0.42	0.33
Abkhazians	0.03	0.49	0.46
Others	2.42	2.56	2.77
TOTAL	100.00	100.00	100.00

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Rulers and the Ruled," Problems of Communism, XVI, 5 (September-October, 1967), 23.

TABLE 2-7

DEPUTIES OF SUPREME SOVIET BY AGE GROUP

Session	Under 30	31-40	41-50	51-60	Over 60
1950 - 3rd	6.5%	24.8%	49.9%	14.5%	4.3%
1954 - 4th	8.2	19.2	44.4	23.6	4.6
1958 - 5th	7.7	21.8	40.5	25.2	4.8
1962 - 6th	14.5	28.1	30.1	22.9	4.4
1966 - 7th	12.0	28.6	27.7	25.4	6.3
1970 - 8th	18.5	23.0	25.5	21.7	11.3

SOURCE: Verkhovni Sovet (Vosmogosoziva), statucheskii sbornik (Moscow: 1970), p. 48. As illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972),p. 144

young, innovative people into governmental positions. The second trend illustrates the beginning of the dominance of the Over 60 group in the Supreme Soviet, a trend that developed in the other political institutions as well. With the median age fluctuating between the 31-40 group and 41-50 group, plus the government and Party elite holding deputy positions and being members of the older generation, the rising of the median age seems a clear possibility.

In keeping with Marx's ideal of mass participation in the central government, the tenure of the average deputy sitting in the Supreme Soviet is not secure.[14] Only the highest Party and government officials and non-political eminent persons are likely to be re-elected to the succeeding sessions of the Supreme Soviet.[15] The turnover rate in membership has reached as high as 70 percent (see Table 2-8). This renewal rate influences most the female and less educated or non-Party deputies.[16] It could be speculated that this large turnover rate helps prevent the formation of deputy groups that could disagree with the policies of the Party elite. Supreme Soviet membership provides an excellent propaganda tool for the Soviets. Its turnover rate appears to 'prove' mass participation in the operation of its government.

Distinguished service is another consideration for membership. The Party is generally fond of symbolism and ceremony. It is proud of those who bring honor to the Motherland. Therefore, it often awards such people nominations as deputies for the Supreme Soviet. In the 1974

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[14] John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 183.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid., p. 184.

TABLE 2-8

TURNOVER RATE FOR SUPREME SOVIET DEPUTIES

Year	Percentage
1958	62.3
1962	70.0
1966	65.4
1975	57.2

SOURCE: John S. Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 184.

session, over 75 percent of the deputies were so decorated, including milkmaids, tractor drivers, coal miners, and factory workers.[17] The honor of serving as a deputy is enhanced by benefits such as an honorarium of 100 rubles a month, plus his regular salary while attending sessions, and free travel on rail, water, and air, including all expenses in Moscow.[18] In addition, a member cannot be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of his Soviet or in periods between sessions, without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.[19] However, if the Party elite decides to demote or retire an official and the official is a deputy, formal channels are often dispensed with.

To understand further the type of individual recruited as a deputy, various aspects of the position should be mentioned. Deputies are elected directly by the people and serve for a period of four years. They attend the session to listen and not participate, with the possible exception of minor participation in Commissions or sub-Commissions. Roy Medevev, a dissident historian, describes their non-participation in chambers in the following words:

> In the years of the existence of the Supreme Soviet, there has not been a single occasion on which members have

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[17] Ibid., p. 183.

[18] Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1975), p. 1.

[19] G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, op. cit., p. 5.

> criticized any bill while sitting in chambers. They have never rejected a bill or returned one for an amendment.[20]

The major job of a deputy lies in the function of ombudsman for his constitutents, a spokesman of the criticism from his constituents to the government. Government ministers are required to reply to deputy inquiries, in person, within a month's time, concerning the criticism and state what action has taken place to remedy the grievance. The regime allows this channeling of personal grievances about bureaucratic ineptitude so as to recognize them before they accumulate into dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole.[21] Deputies in turn represent the regime and its policies to their constituents and may hold conferences to facilitate this.

The average Soviet politician in the Supreme Soviet is a Party member, but not an official. He may or may not be a professional, but he is educated. He is middle-aged and holds either a white collar or worker position. He has more than likely performed some meritorious service to his country, republic, or local Party organization. His nationality is possibly Slavic and chances are he will serve in only one session. While he may contribute some to the discussions in Commissions or sub-Commissions, he does not participate in chambers, except

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[20]Roy A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 132. He goes on to say, "This should not be taken to mean either that the bills as submitted are perfect or that no deputies ever have serious doubts about them. Moreover, it is clear from the experience of the past ten to fifteen years that many bills passed by the Supreme Soviet have been ill-advised or seriously defective in some way or another. Sooner or later it has been necessary either to rescind them or to make substantial changes. But this has never happened on the initiative of the Supreme Soviet or any of its commissions . . .

[21]Peter Vanneman, op. cit., p. 247.

to register his vote. With the Communist definition of democracy and its minority representation, the Supreme Soviet could possibly be designated as a "democratic" institution.

The Party Congress

The Party Congress is regarded as the highest organ of the Communist Party by the Party Statutes. It is convened every five years. Though originally the Congress was an arena for discussion, deliberations, and spirited debates, at present, because of the sheer number of persons in attendance, the Congress is neither designed for nor capable of deciding important issues.[22] In theory, the delegates have the right to criticize leadership and their policies at the Congress, the right to formulate new policies, and elect whom they choose to lead the Party; however, these democratic potentials have never materialized.[23] The Congress functions merely as a sounding board, a rally of the faithful, a platform from which leadership announces new policies, goals, and modifications in the rules and programs, along with obtaining formal approval of new policies or shifts in the top Party command.[24] Voting is always unanimous and no signs of policy disagreement surface. In 1971, Leonard Schapiro described the Twenty-fourth Congress of the CPSU as ". . . bland,

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[22]John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 112.

[23]Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1967), p. 58.

[24]Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 217-218.

uneventful, colorless, and as smooth as a play being performed on stage for the third year running."[25] In the psychological sense, the Party Congress is symbolic of the alleged unity at home and the ostensible support which Moscow enjoys in the international communist movement.[26] Despite the genuine lack of debate and pro forma nature of voting, the Congress provides the delegates with a sense of participation, however passive and modest, and with an opportunity to see and hear the Party leaders.[27]

Two kinds of delegates attend Party Congresses. Voting ones represent Party members, and non-voting ones, candidate Party members. The formula for their election is much more complicated than for their colleagues in the Supreme Soviet. The following information explains the election process and norms of representation of delegates to the Party Congress:

Republic	Delegates chosen by
RSFSR	Oblast Party Conferences Krai* Party Conferences
Large Non-Russian	Oblast Conference
Small Non-Russian	Republic Party Conferences
Military Units Abroad	Select own delegates[28]

Nomination for delegates is through a list system. Such lists are drawn up by nominating committees which are dominated by Party secretaries. The list is then presented to the assembly for approval.

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*Krai translates territory.

[25]Leonard Shapiro, "Keynote-Compromise", Problems of Communism, (July-August, 1971), p. 2.

[26]Robert J. Osborn, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1974), pp. 212-213.

[27]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit , p. 119.

[28]Ibid., p. 112.

Rarely is any name on the list not approved. Like the Supreme Soviet, the Party likes the facade of broad participation. For this reason, delegates are likely to serve on only one or two Congress. In 1971, 74.4 percent of the delegates were attending their first conference, whereas in 1976, 73.5 percent were.[29]

Party membership and a distinguished Party career are necessary criteria for a delegate, but the level of education as a consideration is rising in importance. Table 2-9 illustrates the trend toward more highly educated personnel as Congress delegates. Between 1961 and 1976, the percentages of delegates with just an elementary or incomplete secondary education dropped by seventeen percentage points, while those with a secondary education or higher increased by nearly that much. With 90 percent of the delegates having a secondary or higher education, this lower level Party elite appears to be better educated and probably more aware than in previous years.

Occupational status of the Congress delegates as described by Table 2-10 presents a false picture of this characteristic. Though members of the worker and peasant classes appear to represent 51.8 percent of the total membership in 1976, a ten percentage point increase from 1971, only 77 percent of the 34.7 percent were actual workers while the others were various levels of managers; 28 percent of the 17.7 percent of peasants were farm directors and collective farm chairmen.[30] With this clarification and the 47.7 percent specified as white collar workers, it is obvious that in 1976 the majority of delegates to

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[29]Ibid., p. 119.

[30]Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April, 1976, Number 9, p. 16.

TABLE 2-9

EDUCATION LEVEL OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category	1961	1966	1971	1976	
Higher	52.5%	55.5%	58.0%		
Incom. Higher	5.2				90.0
		24.0	27.0		
Secondary	15.1				
Incom. Secondary or Elementary	27.2	20.5	15.0	10.0	

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S. Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 118.

TABLE 2-10

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category	1961	1966	1971	1976	
Worker	31.5%	33.0%	24.0%	34.1%	
Peasant	16.9	18.9	17.5	17.7	
White Collar					
Party Official	26.3	26.0	24.3	22.2	
Government Official	10.5	11.6	11.2		13.8
Others	2.3	2.7	2.5		
Military	6.9	7.6	-	5.4	
Academic	-	-	7.0	5.4	

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses), as reported in John S. Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 118.

the Party Congress represented the white collar stratum of the Party membership rather than the worker-peasant stratum. Herbert McCloskey and John Turner support this discovery by stating in 1960, in their book The Soviet Dictatorship,

> The Congress represents the elite rather than a cross section of the Party and is dominated by professional Communist leaders from the executive committees of the several levels of the Party organs.[31]

As is the case in the Supreme Soviet, the Slavic nationality dominates the Party Congress. Table 2-11 illustrates Republic representation in the Congress as compared to its representation in the 1970 census. The figures show that the RSFSR republic is clearly overrepresented while the Ukrainian Republic is underrepresented. With the importance of the Ukraine to the agriculture of the country, this may seem a little surprising. However, the leaders in Moscow are Russian, not Ukrainian as under Khrushchev, and this may be the reasoning behind it. The Kazakhs and Uzbek are also underpresented, but considering their locations and foreign cultures, this could be understandable. The Soviet Union will probably continue to show Russian predominance in Party organs simply because of their overwhelming position within the state. To compare this representation with that of the Supreme Soviet, one is dealing with nationality groups versus republic groups. Still, an observation can be made. The Slavic nationalities have greater representation in the Party Congress whereas the minorities have fairer representation in the Supreme Soviet. With the latter being the assembly of the state, having its representation often used as a propaganda tool, this discrepancy can easily be explained.

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[31]Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 297.

TABLE 2-11

REPUBLIC REPRESENTATION IN THE PARTY CONGRESS

1970 Census			1976 Party Congress	
Republic	Population	%	Delegation	%
RSFSR	130,697,000	54.1	3,035	60.7
Ukraine	47,496,000	20.0	894	17.9
Kazakh	13,068,000	5.4	218	4.4
Uzbek	12,305,000	5.1	159	3.2
Beylorussian	9,074,000	3.8	172	3.4
Azerbaijan	5,219,000	2.2	96	1.9
Georgia	4,734,000	2.0	107	2.1
Moldavian	3,619,000	1.5	44	.9
Lithuania	3,166,000	1.3	49	1.0
Kirgiz	3,003,000	1.2	37	.7
Tadzhik	2,987,000	1.2	32	.6
Armenia	2,545,000	1.1	47	.9
Latvia	2,386,000	1.0	51	1.0
Turkman	2,223,000	.9	27	.5

SOURCE: (Table based on data in report from chairman of Credentials Commissions for the 1976 Party Congress), Current Digest of the Soviet Press, April 9, 1976, p. 16. World Book Encyclopedia, Vol. 16 (Chicago: Field Enterprises Educational Corporation, 1977), p. 494.

When discussing the age characteristic of delegates, the trend found for deputies is followed (refer to Table 2-12). Congress delegates are gradually becoming older. Since most of the Party elite are members of the middle to old age group and foster the careers of older cadres, often discriminating against younger ones, this trend seems as if it will continue, possibly pushing the percentage of delegates Over 50 to nearly one-third. An interesting note is the sudden increase in younger delegates for the 1961 Congress. But, as in the case of deputies to the Supreme Soviet, this is probably due to the influence of Nikita Khrushchev and his belief in revitalizing the Party with the young. However, after his ouster in 1964, the senior elite returned to a more conservative outlook and the percentages of the Under 40 group eventually declined, with those of the Over 50 group beginning to increase.

The Soviet politician of the Party Congress is either a Party official or has distinguished himself as a Party member. He probably holds a white collar position and could be classified as a professional. He is middle aged and educated. He most likely is of Russian descent and will only serve for one or two convocations. He does not feel the need to question or criticize Party leaders on the issues they present to the Congress. The Party Congress endows the Party leadership with a degree of apparent legitimacy, giving them a vehicle, the delegate, through which they can relate their policies and programs to the rank and file members in Party throughout the country.[32]

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[32]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 119.

TABLE 2-12

AGE OF PARTY CONGRESS DELEGATES

Category	1961	1966	1971	1976	
40 or under	38.6%	40.2%	31.8%		70.5
41-50	37.9	34.3	41.6		
Over 50	23.5	25.5	26.6	29.5	

SOURCE: (Table based on data in reports of chairmen of Credentials Commissions at Party Congresses). As reported in John S. Reshelar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 118.

Summary

The Soviet politicians for both bodies can be considered, at the least, members of the lower stratum of elites.[33] For the most part, they are educated and have achieved some form of recognition, either for their Party or for the state. They are more than likely of middle age and may be Slavic, though in the Supreme Soviet, their nationality may be from a minority group. They probably hold white collar position for though the Supreme Soviet shows near equality between worker-peasant status and white collar status, the Party Congress is definitely a white collar organization. Between the two organizations, the Supreme Soviet is more representative in minority and worker-peasant representation. The older generation predominance in the Supreme Soviet possibly illustrates the higher importance that the Party elite puts on deputy status rather than delegate status. The great Soviet myth of the lowly proletarian rising to participation in his state government on his Party is only slightly supported by this chapter.

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[33]The reason that the phrase 'at least' was used was that some members of both the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress are also members of the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, or even Politburo. If they do hold that type of membership, then they are considered members of the upper or top stratum of elites.

CHAPTER III

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS/CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

The major purposes of the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU--administering and controlling the vast bureaucracies of their respective areas--indicate basic similarities between these two very different organizations. Though each is declared to be an actual seat of power, in practice each is only an executor, with little initiative power. Their memberships, however, are considered the upper political elite of Soviet society and enjoy the privileges and status that accompanies this designation. The comparative resemblance between the functions and membership of these organizations has suggested the discussion of both in the same chapter.

Further similarities between the two involve size and position in their respective hierarchies. Though the institutions themselves vary greatly in size, the percentages of their size to those of their respective assemblies are comparable (see Table 3-1). With but a 1.2 percentage point difference in their proportional percentages, it can be stated that these two organizations are of equivalent size in proportion to their respective assemblies. As to placement in the structure of their respective hierarchies, both organizations are subordinate to an assembly yet accountable to a Presidium (see Appendix A). Though the Council of Ministers is positionally equal to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, it is constitutionally accountable and responsible to the Supreme Soviet

TABLE 3-1

COMPARATIVE MEMBERSHIP FIGURES FOR THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU

Organization	1976 Membership	Percentage
Council of Ministers	111	
Supreme Soviet (1974)	1,517	7.3
Central Committee	426	
Party Congress (1976)	4,998	8.5

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), pp. 117, 118, 179. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", C.I.A. Reference Aid, 1977, pp. 69-71.

and between sessions, to its Presidium.[1] The Central Committee, by Party Statutes, is responsible and accountable to the Party Congress, but in practice, to the Politburo. The Council of Ministers and the Central Committee share several characteristics which make them comparable organizations.

The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers, according to the 1977 Constitution, is the 'highest executive and administrative organ of the state authority'.[2] According to a Soviet source, it oversees the enormous state bureaucracy, supervises the development of the budget and all monetary matters, administers all Party and state policies in foreign and domestic areas, and controls a substantial part of the activities of the bureaucracies of the union republics.[3] It can also issue decrees and orders which are binding throughout the Soviet Union. Its membership consists of a Chairman, two First Deputy Chairmen, eleven Deputy Chairmen, and numerous ministers and chairmen of State Committees. The chairmen of the Council of Ministers of each union republic also merit membership. Members are selected by the nomenklatura of the Council of Ministers and 'elected' by the Supreme Soviet at the first session of each new convocation.*

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*Convocation is a word used to designate the assembling of the Supreme Soviet.

[1]Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), Pennsylvania State University, 1972, pp. 200-201.

[2]John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 190.

[3]G. Moiseyev and A. Ardatovsky, Political Democracy in theUSSR (London: Soviet Booklets, 1965), p. 1.

The evidence of Communist Party control of this body comes through an analysis of its membership. First, currently and similarly in the past, six full members and two candidate members of the Politburo hold positions in the Council of Ministers, including the second most powerful man in the Soviet Union, Alexis Kosygin. His position as Chairman of this organization gives him the title of Premier of the Soviet Union. Central Committee membership by government ministers further illustrates Party domination. Table 3-2 uses a sample of the 1968 Council as an example. In 1976, sixty-six Council members* sat on the Central Committee. This overlapping of membership continues to support the assertion of Communist Party power over the governmental apparatus of the Soviet Union.

Data on the characteristics of members of this state body is very difficult to obtain. Research on the Communist Party, its organizations and its membership is more prevalent in Soviet studies. However, one study has been found that gives various statistical information which seems to generally describe the type of individual who might achieve membership in the Council of Ministers. This study is "The Education of the Soviet Party Executive" by Renee Grace Loeffler. She uses classifications of Party Executives, Government Executives, and Economic Executives. The latter two will be used as typifying the candidate for an All Union minister position or state committee chairmanship. The first category will be used for comparison purposes. Table 3-3 sets forth her definitions of these categories. Whereas her statistics include characteristics of both All Union and republic level

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*The figure sixty-six was derived by information in Tables 3-10 and 3-11.

TABLE 3-2

MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU FOR THE YEAR 1968 (A SAMPLE)

Category	Percent on Central Committee of Each Category
Chr., Deputy Chr., and Ministers	96%
Chr. of State Committees	81%
Chr. of Republic Council of Ministers	100%

SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), p. 121.

TABLE 3-3

GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMIC EXECUTIVES (DEFINITIONS)

Groups	Year - 1962
	Number in Sample
1. USSR Council of Ministers Chairman, First Deputy Chairmen, Deputy Chairmen	3
2. USSR Ministers	9
3. USSR State Committee Chairmen, Gosplan Chairman or Deputy Chairman	23
4. Republic Council of Ministers Chairmen	8
5. Republic Gosplan Chairmen, Sovnarkhoz Chairmen	21
6. Republic Capitol City Executive Committee Chairmen	4
7. Province Executive Committee Chairmen	46
8. Province Sovnarkohoz Chairmen	26
Total	140 (in one sample used)

Government Executives - 1, 4, 6 and 7

Economic Executives - 3, 5, 8

USSR ministers were divided between the two categories according to the nature of the particular ministry.

Party Executives refer to representatives of Party Officials from Province level to All Union level.

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation), Cornell University, 1975), p. 48.

state officials, about 26 percent of the figure for Government Executive and 33 percent of the figure for Economic Executives represent All Union level. Though these percentages are rather small, the statistics do describe the sample from which the members of the Council of Ministers are usually drawn.

The statistics used for this section are for the year 1962. Though that dates them by sixteen years, they can still serve as an indicator of the type of individual who may achieve membership in this state elite group. The major reason for this comes from the low turnover rate for the Council of Ministers (see Table 3-4). Between 1968 and 1977, this rate was only 35 percent. In contrast to the Supreme Soviet membership or even the Politburo membership, the Council of Ministers represents a relatively stable, unchanging organization. The type of individual who might become a member could as well be described by Ms. Loeffler's statistics as by more recent information.

The statistics on education illustrate the importance placed on this area in choosing a member of the Council of Ministers, as well as the skill and intelligence possessed by these individuals. Table 3-5 shows the tremendous advantage of Economic Executives in the area of higher learning, and for them, the unimportance of any type of Party School. The Table also demonstrates the emphasis of education for all Soviet Executives, with over 60 percent in each category having completed college or college and Party School. Intelligence comes into view with Table 3-6. If early graduation is associated with higher intelligence, then the Government Executive has a definite advantage in ability. Without this assumption, it can still be hypothesized that members of the executive group in the Soviet Union begin their careers at an early age

TABLE 3-4

TURNOVER RATE OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Category	Number of Ministers in Positions in 1971	Number of Positions Not Held by Same Men in 1968
Chairman and First Deputy Chr.	3	0
Deputy Chairmen	11	4
USSR Ministers	62	16
State Comm. Chr.	19	10
Chr. of Rep. Council of Ministers	15	9
Total	110	39

(Six Minister positions in 1977 were not in existence in 1968)

Percent of turnover between 1977 and 1968 - 35%

SOURCE: "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1877, pp. 69-71. USSR, A Strategic Survey, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 185, Appendix C.

TABLE 3-5

LEVEL OF EDUCATION FOR 1962

FOR SOVIET EXECUTIVES

	Percent of Total with that Level		
Category	Party	Government	Economic
No Higher Education	11%	15%	5%
Party School Only	27	20	2
College	48	56	91
College and Party School	14	9	2

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975), p. 63.

TABLE 3-6

AGE OF COLLEGE GRADUATION*

Age	Party Executive	Government Executive	Economic Executive
22 or less	17%	26%	18%
23 to 25	30	23	32
26 to 30	27	18	22
Over 30	13	12	9
Unknown	12	21	19

*In many cases the biographical sources did not give the exact time of college graduation, and therefore, certain assumptions were made in coding this question. Specifically, if an executive had a higher education; there was no specific information about when he completed college; he took his first known job in his early twenties; the job was of the sort that usually required a higher education; then it was assumed, if there was no indication to the contrary, then he graduated immediately before assuming his first job. Because of these assumptions, the data on age of college graduation is relatively soft.

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975), p. 75.

since over 50 percent of them had completed college by the time they became twenty-five years old. Table 3-7 shows the area of concentration of these executives. Though the emphasis for engineers and agronomists is clearly evident among the Soviet executives, the extremely large number of engineers among the Economic Executives points to a purposeful technocratic influence on Soviet economics, an innovation which can be traced to Nikita Khrushchev. The upper political elite in the state hierarchy appear to be highly educated, intelligent, and technically skilled.

The validity of the above conclusion, however, could be questioned. Though the existence of degrees, especially in agronomy and engineering is very high among Soviet executives, the competence in these areas may not be high. Robert Kaiser in his book Russia describes this phenomenon in the following words:

> Some Soviet officials, the unqualified carreerists . . . simply too stupid to be condemned, dull-witted, automatically selfish people to whom moral or even intellectural considerations were alien. Because merit alone is often insufficient to earn advancement, the best people often do not rise to the top. Many of the worst people get there.[4]

Fedor Panfero in his novel Volga-Matushaka Reka also illustrates how 'the worst people get there'. Though his novel is dated, his example is illustrative of what presently could occur in Soviet society.

> Semen Malinov was a student at the Bauman Institute, one of the finest engineering schools in the Soviet Union, and he was subsequently to become an obkom first secretary. Semen had one main gift--the ability to speak and to imitate. Thanks to such oratorical gifts, Semen Malinov was 'loaded' and 'overloaded' with assignments: he was one of the Komsomol leaders in the Institute, the chairman of the civil

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[4]Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 195.

TABLE 3-7

TYPE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Category	Party Executive	Government Executive	Economic Executive
No Higher Ed.	11%	15%	5%
Party School Only	27	20	2
Engineering	26	22	83
Agronomy	18	24	2
Others	18	19	8

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975), p. 65.

> defense unit, in the Aid to the Revolutionaries Society, and even in the sports circle . . . . And science? Science remained somewhere at the side. He did not drag himself to the books and he listened to lectures according to the proverb: 'In one ear and out the other.' But it was necessary to pass the exams, and Semen Malinov unwillingly had to resort to the method of 'dodging.' To some teachers he gave his honored word: 'I'll hand it in! I'll hand it in! Word of honor, I'll hand it in! Just give me a grade now . . . I will get it to you.' To others who were a little sterner, he answered the questions with patter, impudently looking into their eyes. When he did not hit the point, he began to complain about being swamped with work. The 'stern' professor would yield, saying 'Yes, yes, I know. I know. I've seen your picture in the Konsomol newspaper . . . .' And he wrote on the grade sheet 'Passes.' With such dodges Malinov left the institute, having received the diploma of an engineer but not the knowledge of one.[5]

The position of a member of the Council of Ministers does require skill and ability, but with the patronage system and tactics used in Soviet politics as described in Chapter V, the possibility that these characteristics lie in a non-technical area exists.

The social orgins of the state executives present an insight into Soviet politics. It must be understood that these origins are the classes in which the executive was born and may not correspond to his present social class (see Table 3-8). (The "unknown" category, in the analysis, will be grouped with the white collar group, for Ms. Loeffler indicated in her dissertation the tendency of Soviet biographers to leave out social origin if it refers to a white collar classification. Though not always true, it occurs often enough to justify grouping the two together.)

For Party and Government Executives, peasant class origins predominate. Two basic reasons can explain this. The first concerns

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[5]Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 365, quoted from n. 11.

TABLE 3-8

CLASS ORIGINS OF EXECUTIVES

Classification	Party Executive	Government Executive	Economic Executive
Worker	28%	21%	33%
Peasant	47	51	23
White Collar	6	4	11
Unknown	19	24	33

SOURCE: Renee Grace Loeffler, "The Education of the Soviet Party Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1975), p. 163.

the age of these men. Though statistics on this characteristics are unavailable for members of the Council of Ministers, with most of the members sitting in the Central Committee (refer to Table 3-2) and the majority of Central Committee members over fifty (refer to Table 3-16 and 3-17), then it can be assumed that the majority of the Soviet state executives are over fifty. With this clarification and considering the social classes in the Soviet Union at the time of these men's birth, the large representation of peasantry does not seem unusual. Also, an Economic Executive needs specialized training. This was not usually available to the average peasant in the Soviet Union at that time, therefore they opted for Party or Government careers.

The figures for the Economic Executives show a different picture. This group's strength is in both the worker and white collar group, if the latter is combined with the "unknown" group. The large worker representation can be explained in two ways. First, as in the previous situation, the era in which these men were born might dictate such a representation. Second, with an Economic Executive needing precise technical skills and the government offering numerous scholarships to the technical institutes, the possibility of easier access to these by the worker group exists. White collar representation offers another explanation. Economic careers in the Soviet Union mean stability and less restrictions on personal life than do Party careers. This accounts for their popularity in the white collar group. With the children of successful people inheriting their parents' status, though not political power and assured of the opportunity of admission into the best schools

(see Chapter V), a self-perpetuating aspect of this career type in the white collar group appears.[6]

Currently, All Union state officials are members of the upper stratum of Soviet society; however, by analyzing their class origins, career patterns and opportunities among the classes can be implied. The similarity between the origins of the Government and Party Executives could be explained by the fact that most Government Executives are drawn from the Party Executive ranks and that a Party career has been very attractive for members of the lower classes. Summing up the characteristics already discussed, there seems to be a link between education, technical skill, and social origin in the elites of the state apparatus in the Soviet Union.

The Council of Ministers, though a body to resolve bureaucratic problems of all the republics, seems to be dominated by the people of one nationality group, the Russians. Table 3-9 gives statistics for the year 1962 for the sample in Ms. Loeffler's statistics. If the 92 percent figure of Russian nationality representation is compared with the 54 percent figure of Russian nationality representation in the total population of 1959 (refer to Table 2-6), the gross overrepresentation of the Russian nationality in Ms. Loeffler's sample of the Council of Ministers is apparent. (It can be assumed that her sample is representative for the organization at that time.) An interesting aspect of this is that in 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers yet, his Council appears to have been overrepresented by Russians! If this representation is compared to the

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[6]Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 181.

TABLE 3-9

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITY GROUPINGS AMONG EXECUTIVES

Category	Posts on the USSR Level for the year 1962
Russians	92%
More Developed[a]	4
Less Developed[b]	4

[a]Economically More Developed include: Armenian, Georgian, Estonian, Latvian, and Ukrainian.

[b]Economically Less Developed include: Azerbaidzhan, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Tadzhik, Turkmen, Uzbek, Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Moldavian.

SOURCE: George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, (New York: Atherton Press, 1968), pp. 74-75.

Russian representation in the Supreme Soviet in 1962 (see Table 2-6), a large inconsistency exists. Supreme Soviet deputies of Russian nationality accounted for only 43 percent of its membership at that time. However, with the Supreme Soviet being the Soviet 'parliament', the Council of Ministers, being the Soviet state 'executive' and the Russian nationality the largest, plus most dominant in the nation, this discrepancy could possibly be explained.

The typical Soviet politician of the Council of Ministers is a technical skilled and educated individual of some intelligence, with a lower class origin. He is of middle age, a professional, and probably a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His nationality is most likely Russian. Whereas he may have secured his position for reasons other than competence, he probably displays some skill in the area of his position. The appeal for careers in the state apparatus may originate more from its security and less restrictive life than from a deep commitment to the Soviet state and the ideological goals of communism.

The Central Committee of the CPSU

Originally, the Politburo of the CPSU was to be a branch of the more powerful Central Committee. However, as the size of the latter increased (see Table 3-10), the purposes of the two bodies were reversed, and the Central Committee became an instrument of the Politburo.[7] Lenin attributed this transformation to infrequent plenary* sessions

*Plenary is the word referring to a full sitting of the Central Committee.

[7]Wasyl Kalynowvch, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 108.

TABLE 3-10

NUMERICAL GROWTH OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Year	Full Members	Candidate Members
1917	9	4
1919	19	8
1921	25	15
1923	40	17
1925	63	43
1927	71	50
1934	71	68
1952	125	111
1956	133	122
1961	175	155
1966	195	165
1971	241	155
1976	287	139

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 111.

and the daily decision-making functions of the Politburo and Secretariat.[8] In 1923 Lenin stated,

> The plenum of the Central Committee of our Party has already disclosed its tendency to develop into a sort of Party conference. It meets on the average of no less than once in two months, and the current work in the name of the Central Committee is carried on by our Politburo . . . . I think that we should complete this path on which we have entered and convert the plenums of the Central Committee into higher Party conferences.[9]

Following this direction, the Central Committee has evolved into the second level of the Party leadership, the overseer of the Central Party apparatus, and a depository from which Politburo members are chosen.[10]

According to Soviet sources, the Central Committee directs all Party activities and bodies between sessions of the Party Congress, appoints Party officials, organizes and manages enterprises which have general Party character, and manages all Central Party funds.[11] In practice, it has become a strictly planned forum which is used by the top Party elite for purposes of informing Central Committee members of and promoting new Party policies. It could be classified as a 'rubber stamp' organization for the passage of Party resolutions. Topics discussed at the plenums range from economics to ideology to reorganization. Speeches can last from one to eight or more hours.

Despite the facade of policy-making or decision-making power, the Central Committee does oversee a large bureaucracy, the Central Party

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[8] Ibid., p. 118.

[9] Ibid., p. 119.

[10] Roy D. Laird, The Soviet Paradigm (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 101.

[11] Wasyl Kalynowych, op. cit., p. 107.

Apparatus. This consists of 900 staff workers assisted by 2400 other personnel, plus several in-house Party organizations and their respective staffs.[12] Though it does not initiate any policy, in rare instances it has been known to mediate disputes or deadlocks among the top Party leaders. It also has exercised power in regard to the fate of a leader. In 1957, though voted out as leader by the members of the Politburo, Nikita Khrushchev was able to retain his position by an affirmative vote of the Central Committee.[13] Though the actual power of the Central Committee varies, its high status in the Soviet Union is always prevalent.

Membership in the Central Committee consists of upper Party and government political elites (see Table 3-11). Membership is secured as a function of one of the following:

1. power - member of the top elite such as the Politburo or its Secretariat
2. position - position in government or Party merits membership
3. representation - nationality and social representation
4. specialization - holders of specially needed skills or experts
5. symbolic - special persons such as cosmonauts[14]

Final decisions as to membership belong to the Party elite and the core elite (see Table 3-19) of the Committee. The perceptions of the top leadership as to the personnel and recruitment needs of the Committee becomes a most important imput in the decisions on membership.[15] A

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[12]A. Pravdin, "Inside the CPSU Central Committee", Survey, (Autumn, 1974), p. 96.

[13]Thomas H. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader", Problems of Communism (September-October, 1962), pp. 4-6.

[14]Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 50.

[15]Ibid.

TABLE 3-11

MAJOR CATEGORIES IN VOTING MEMBERSHIP
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Year	1966	1971	1976
Oblast and Irai Sec.	23.0%	24.0%	28.9%
USSR Govt. Ministers	18.9%	22.4%	23.0%
Union Rep. Cen. Com. Sec.	9.8%	8.0%	6.6%
CPSU Cen. Comm. Sec. and Dept. Heads	6.6%	5.8%	5.2%
Union Rep. Prem. and Dep. Prem.	4.6%	3.3%	3.8%
Military	7.8%	8.0%	7.0%

Other categories include:
City Committee Secretaries
Secretaries of Autonomous Republics Party Committees
Aides to CPSU General Secretary

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 121.

revealing aspect about Central Committee membership is the trends in recruitment as indicated in Table 3-11. Between 1966 and 1976, provincial secretary representation increased by 5.9 percentage points and government minister membership by 4.1 percentage points. Republic and All Union Party representation, much smaller originally, decreased by 3.2 and 1.4 percentage points, respectively. This implies the importance of provincial status in ones career growth and the preference for these people over the more sophisticated though possibly not as trustworthy Central Party or regional Party personnel for Central Committee membership. From Table 3-11, it can also be assumed that greater importance has been recently placed on elite government positions in Party organizations, than in previous years. Formally, the Committee is elected at the penultimate session of the Party Congress with a secret ballot; but the list on the ballot never exceeds the number of seats in the Committee.[16] Since top government and Party elite make up 81.1 percent of the membership of the Central Committee (they make up only 2.1 percent of the total Party membership),[17] the Central Committee of the CPSU can legitimately be described as a body wherein the upper political elite of the Soviet Union can be found.

The growth in the level of educational training for Central Committee members was emphasized in the following words by Leonid Brezhenv in 1971:

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[16]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 112.

[17]Boris Meissner, "Totalitarian Rule and Social Change", Problems of Communism (December, 1966), p. 59.

> Life is making continuously greater demands on cadres. We need people who combine a high level of political consciousness with a sound professional training, people who can knowledgeably tackle the problems of economic and cultural development and are well-versed in modern methods of management.[18]

As Table 3-12 shows, the 1960's brought an increase in the level of education of members in the Central Committee. Brezhnev's words indicate this trend is continuing. The Table also shows a tendency to coopt persons in a specialized field of higher education.[19]

The impetus for both of these aspects could be attributed to Nikita Khrushchev and his belief in the need for recruitment of technocrats in the Party hierarchical positions. The substantial drop in those with only Party School training implies the growing emphasis on formal and technical education and the de-emphasizing of the more ideologically oriented members or less educated personnel. This importance on education and specialized training has transformed the Central Committee into a highly trained and specialized group. In choosing membership in the future, it seems assured that educational level and technical training will probably become deciding factors.

Occupational representation indicates the dominance of the white collar stratum of Soviet society in the membership of the Central Committee (see Table 3-13). While Party Apparatus members show a slight decline in membership, state personnel show an increase. This is similar to the evidence presented in Table 3-11 which described some

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[18]Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 278.

[19]Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis", The American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1233.

TABLE 3-12

LEVEL AND TYPE OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Category	1961	1966
College	74%	82.6%
Military	-	8.1
University	-	9.3
Technical	-	65.2
Party School only	10	4.4
Incomplete College	8	-
Secondary	4	2.2
Less than Secondary	4	.5

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, Changes in Central Committee Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1961-1966 (Denver: University of Denver, 1967), p. 46. Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, "The Soviet Central Committee: An Elite Analysis", American Political Science Review (December, 1968), p. 1233.

TABLE 3-13

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN 1961 AND 1966

Category	1961	1966
Party Apparatus	48%	43%
State and Economic Officials	34	38
Military	9.3	9.7
Culture and Science	5.4	4.2
Police	-	.5
Workers and Peasants	-	2.8
Others	3.3	2.5

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 126.

of the membership groups in the Committee. The three main categories in Table 3-13 show a general range of percentages for these types of membership. This could support the claim that recruitment of Central Committee membership is based upon function areas and the perception of needs for membership by the leadership. The low representation of workers and peasants further verifies the assertion that the Central Committee is an elite element in the Communist Party apparatus.

The nationality representation in the Central Committee is similar to representation in the other political bodies discussed (see Table 3-14). The Slavic group controls. Whereas the representation in 1961 for the Russian representation was 43 percent in the Supreme Soviet and around 80-90 percent in the Council of Ministers, it was 58 percent in the Central Committee indicating, as in the others, its dominance of the Committee. Also, as in most of the other bodies, this nationality group is overrepresented, but as mentioned previously, with the importance of this group of people to the Soviet Union, this aspect does not seem unusual. In deciding upon new members (see Table 3-15), there appears to be a preference for representation from the Russian nationality. The power of the top Party elite in the decision-making process of choosing new members for the Central Committee insures the dominance of whichever nationality group it prefers.

Age represents a further insight into the membership of the Central Committee. In referring to Table 3-16, the trend toward an older membership is apparent. In 1956, 46.61 percent were 50 years or older; in 1961, 62.29 percent were; in 1966, 78.47 percent were. The dominance of the older generation in the Committee is further illustrated by Table 3-17 which illustrates the change in the average age and median

TABLE 3-14

NATIONALITY REPRESENTATION IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Nationality	1961 - %	1966 - %
Russians	58.29	47.95
Ukranians	20.00	18.46
Belorussians	3.43	5.13
Uzbeks	2.29	1.54
Kazakhs	1.14	2.05
Georgians	1.14	1.03
Azerbaijanis	.57	.51
Lithuanians	.57	.51
Moldavians	.57	.51
Latvians	1.14	1.54
Kirghiz	.57	.51
Tadzhiks	.57	.51
Armenians	1.71	1.54
Turkmens	.57	.51
Estonians	.57	.51
Finns	.57	-
Jews	.57	.51
Bashkirs	.57	.51
Tartars	.57	.51

SOURCE: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Ruler and the Ruled", Problems of Communism, 1965, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 384.

TABLE 3-15

NATIONALITY OF NEW MEMBERS

Nationality	1961 - %	1966 - %
Russians	62.9	67.03
Ukrainians	16.13	15.38
Belorussians	3.23	1.10
Uzbeks	2.42	.0
Kazaks	.81	.0
Azerbaidzhanians	.81	1.10
Armenians	1.61	2.20
Georgians	.0	1.10
Moldavians	.81	.0
Tadzkiks	.81	1.10
Kirgiz	.81	.0
Latvians	.0	1.10
Estonians	.81	1.10
Others	4.03	.0

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 79.

TABLE 3-16

AGE OF FULL MEMBERS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Age	1956 - %	1961 - %	1966 -%
To 35	0	2.86	1.03
36-40	3.01	1.71	2.56
41-45	9.77	12.57	3.08
46-50	38.35	20.57	14.87
51-55	28.57	32.57	26.67
56-60	9.77	20.0	30.26
61-65	5.26	6.29	13.85
Over 66	3.01	3.43	7.69

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 122.

TABLE 3-17

AVERAGE AND MEDIAN AGE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Year	1956	1961	1966	1976
Average	51	52	56	60
Median	46-50	51-55	56-60	

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 125. Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism (April, 1976), p. 4.

age within a twenty year period. With the turnover rate of the older top Party elite being very low and the turnover rate of Central Committee membership low (in 1971, 63.9 percent of the 1966 Committee were re-elected, and in 1976, 89 percent of the 1971 Committee were),[20] the dominance of the older generation over this body seems assured for at least the next five years.

Achieving Central Committee membership is not an easy task. Twenty years has been the usual apprenticeship period before becoming a member. In 1971, for new members, the period extended to twenty-five years.[21] With the age of entrance into the Party increasing, the age at which future generations will be able to achieve membership will be at least forty-five years. To further support the continuation of this generational control, new members that are chosen are similar, statistically, to the demoted or deceased member. As an example, if a Central Committee member who had joined the Party in 1932-34 at the age of twenty-six would leave, he would be replaced by one who joined the Party between 1930 and 1941 at the age of twenty-six; the longer the doors are closed to post Stalin elite, the greater the possibility of a generational conflict among the Party elite.[22]

The existence of a Slavic core elite within the Central Committee hints to where the real power lies (refer to Appendix C). This group controlled the Committee from 1956-1971. They were members who had served on the Committee for at least four terms. Of the group serving

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[20]Jerry Hough, "The Brezhnev Era", Problems of Communism (April, 1976), p. 4.

[21]Joseph P. Mastro, op. cit., p. 292.

[22]Ibid., p. 278.

four terms, 88 percent were of Slavic nationality and 30 percent had served in five Committees or more. In 1971, the Slavic core lost its tight grip on this group as other nationality groups were able to break into its ranks. Its representation dropped to 81 percent as the number in the core elite enlarged. Several speculations can be made from that occurrence. The leadership may have desired more communication and linkage with local populations. They may have employed this tactic in an attempt to foster a feeling in the population that they do have a stake in the system and an impact on decision-making; finally, they may have used it as an illustration of the participation mechanisms in existence in the Soviet political system.[23]

In the Soviet Union, members of the Central Committee possess an immense amount of power, prestige and are immuned to public criticism by the general population.[24] They not only have been known to abuse their status, but at times, have even been known to be fraudulent and manipulative. Though this topic will be further investigated in Chapter V, the following illustration shows the possible nature of one who has achieved Central Committee rank:

> When they were choosing a director for the Moscow Institute of Sociology, the name of one Grigorii Kvasov was put forward . . . . He was quite unknown in science and a man of no principles, but he happened to be an instructor of the Central Committee and was interested in the position. (An instructor has a status equal to that of a raikom* secretary in the capital.) When Kvasov was an aspirant (MA candidate) at Mowcow University in 1965, he began to spread the rumor just before defending his dissertation, that he was a distant relative of Brezhnev. He supposed, not without reason, that this item of information would help him get the dissertation

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*Raikom translates district.

[23]Ibid., p. 107.

[24]A. Pravdin, op. cit., p. 101.

> through. Of course, there was no truth in it, but some people believed him, because both Kvasov and Brezhnev were from Moldavia. The rumor, in any case, reached the Central Committee. Kvasov was called in (with his degree in his pocket) and warned that he should not encourage such rumors. Kvasov, who was frightened, tried to claim that he had a distant aunt who either knew Brezhnev's wife's sister, or was somehow related to her. The people of the CC decided to bring the matter to Brezhnev's notice. Brezhnev was indignant . . . but then said he wanted to see the imposter. The impudent Kvasov, though by now scared to death, managed to produce a favorable impression on Brezhnev. So that they gave him a job in the Department of Philosophy of the CC. The strange thing was that in the CC, Kvasov's real history was soon forgotten, and the story that he was a relative of Brezhnev began to circulate again![25]

Another tactic of Central Committee members is sophistry. If for some reason they are not ardent Marxists, but work with others who are, they must have the ability to produce a well argued lie.[26] Dishonesty often becomes a way of life for these members as well as for other Soviet political elite as will be discussed in Chapter V. This even extends to acquiring unearned degrees. The portrait of an intensely devoted Marxist who has dedicated himself to the Party and the state is often not an accurate description of the members of this elite Party organ.

Achievement of Central Committee membership designates one as a member of the Soviet upper political elite. With subjectivity as well as functionality playing a role in the selection of new members, the membership in the Committee is tightly controlled. The average member is over 50 years old with a high level of education. He is of Slavic origin and has been a Party member for at least twenty years.

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[25]Ibid., p. 100.

[26]Michael P. Gehlen and Michael McBride, op. cit., p. 1240.

His professional position lies either in the Party or State apparatus which places him in the upper stratum of Soviet society. He is most likely a veteran of one or two Committees. In aggregate terms, the Central Committees of the past decade were more skilled and better educated than their predecessors; in all probability this shift could be attributed to the recognized need for more specialists in elite Party positions, resulting from the changed nature of the Soviet political system in the recent years.[27]

Summary

The members of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee are regarded as the upper political elite in Soviet society. They are highly educated, especially in the technical areas, though it is possible that some degrees were not earned honestly. They are dominantly of the Russian nationality. They are members of the older generation and the trends indicate that this will continue. They are both groups of professionals, the Council of Ministers by mere fact of their positions in the state hierarchy and the Central Committee through occupational representation. In neither group is there presently much worker or peasant representation, though the social origins of many members of the Council of Ministers lie in these classes. Members of these political organizations enjoy status, power, privileges, and similar rank in Soviet society, making these bodies ones in which membership is highly sought.

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[27]Joseph Mastro, op. cit., p. 183.

CHAPTER IV

PRESIDIUMS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND SUPREME SOVIET/POLITBURO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet and the Politburo of the CPSU, the highest political institutions in the Soviet Union, have positional similarity within their respective hierarchies, each holds status and rank above a larger assembly (see Appendix A). However, power is distributed unevenly among these elite organizations, making resemblance emanate from only the structural positions of all three, not from the disbursement of power. Membership, though, in each, is highly selective and controlled. Members are considered to be the upper to top political elite in the Soviet political system.[1] Since these organizations are structurally comparable, the discussion of them in the same chapter seems justified.

Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers

Being organizations of the state, the Presidiums of both the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers, in practice, lack in major decision-making power. Their power and influence come from the overlapping membership of their personnel in the Politburo of the CPSU and Central Committee, including their respective chairmen. These are two

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[1]This holds true for all members in the Politburo and the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, but with the diverse membership in the Presidium of the Supreme as illustrated in Table 4-2, it might not be true of all of its members.

top men in the Soviet political system and their presence on these Presidiums contributes to these bodies' high regard in Soviet politics. Leonid Brezhnev, Politburo member and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, is presently the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. With the revisions of the 1977 Constitution, this position carries all chief of state functions and is designated by the title, President of the Soviet Union. Alexis Kosygin, Politburo member, is the Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers which carries the title, Premier of the Soviet Union. Party elite officials, so intertwined in the state apparatus, continue to demonstrate the dominance and control of the Party over all state affairs.

To understand further these executive organs, a discussion of their functions and a description of their membership will be presented. Statistical data on their personnel is not obtainable. Since in actual practice, the power of these Presidiums and at times, their existence, is in question, statistical studies of the individuals holding membership in them have not been done. In describing the type of person who might belong to one of these bodies, information and trends will have to be taken from the summaries of Chapters II and III.

Both organizations have the functions of administration and legislation while their respective plenums are not in session. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers in the "inner cabinet" of the Council of Ministers. It is the pinnacle of the state bureaucracy. Table 4-1 describes its members who are selected by Party leaders and approved by the Supreme Soviet. With a 17-30 percent representation from the Politburo (see Table 4-2), and from Table 4-3 an 86-100 percent

TABLE 4-1

MEMBERSHIP REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Presidium of the Council of Ministers

No. of Members - 14

Description - Chairman
Two Deputy First Chairmen
Eleven Deputy Chairmen

Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

No. of Members - 39

Description - Chairman
First Vice Chairman
Fifteen Vice Chairmen
Secretary

Other Members
High Party Officials
Women
Workers
Peasants
Politburo Members

SOURCE: John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 186. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Government", CIA Reference Aid, 1977, p. 69.

TABLE 4-2

POLITBURO REPRESENTATION ON PRESIDIUMS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Year	Number in Politburo	Presidium Membership - %
Presidium of the Council of Ministers		
1964	3 (f) 0 (c)	30
1968	3 (f) 0 (c)	25
1977	2 (f) 0 (c)	17
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet		
1962	5 (f) 2 (c)	18
1966	3 (f) 2 (c)	14
1970	5 (f) 2 (c)	18

SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 368. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", C.I.A. Reference Aid, 1977, p. 69.

TABLE 4-3

PROPORTION OF PRESIDIUMS MEMBERSHIP
ON PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Presidium	Year	No. on C.C.	Percent
Supreme Soviet	1962	14 (f) 5 (c)	58
	1966	18 5	64
	1970	17 6	64
Council of Ministers	1968	12 (f) 0 (c)	100
	1976	12 0 (c) 2 unknown	86

SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 368. Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968).

TABLE 4-4

SOURCES OF MEMBERSHIP FOR PRESIDIUMS OF SUPREME SOVIET AND COUNCIL OF MINISTERS



Presidium of the Supreme Soviet	Presidium of the Council of Min.
Politburo	Politburo
Secretariat	Secretariat
Central Committee	Central Committee
Supreme Soviet Deputies	Supreme Soviet Deputies
Local Officials	Local Government Officials
Local Party Officials	

NOTE: The same people do not sit on both Presidiums of the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

SOURCE: Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 317-318.

representation in the Central Committee, the Party control of the operations of this body is evident. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the plural executive of that body, is given its elite status by the presence of Brezhnev as its chairman, but its executive and legislative status by the 1977 Constitution. Its membership is described in Table 4-1, with Politburo representation as high as 18 percent, described in Table 4-2. Party domination is further assured by up to 64 percent of its membership sitting on the Central Committee (see Table 4-3). In accordance with state statutes, membership in these organizations can absolutely not overlap (see Table 4-4). Both of these organizations represent different branches of the Supreme Soviet. Overlapping membership could create a government group which could challenge the power of the Party elite.

The specific responsibilities of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers is to direct the Council's work, determine its organization and composition, exercise a special role in economic matters, and issue regulations; frequently, it acts in the name of the entire Council.[2] The chairman is nominally the head of the government apparatus. Unless he is General Secretary of the CPSU (an impossibility since the fall of Khrushchev),[3] his tenure in office or position in the Politburo may not be secure. However, if Party leadership falters, the position could be the basis for a power play, as this Presidium consists of a very

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[2]John S. Reshetar, Jr., The Soviet Polity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 190.

[3]Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev's Year", Current History (October, 1977), p. 111. To quote from the article, "Hence, in the general acceptance of collective leadership after Khrushchev was toppled, it was agreed among the oligarchs and ratified by the Central Committee that no one should combine the leading secretaryship and premiership."

close-knit group of professionals. Aware of this potential threat, General Secretary Brezhnev has a habit of addressing the Presidium or entire council frequently. The turnover rate of this body is very low (see Table 4-5). From 1968 to 1977, nine years, the turnover rate was only 29 percent. Out of nineteen members serving between October 1964 and March 1975, twelve still belonged as of the latter date.[4] This was also true of the Presidium of 1977. This continues to illustrate the closeness, technical skill, and longevity of government ministers.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet is the legislative authority during the intervals between the Supreme Soviet sessions. It can issue decrees or ordinances on any matter, including taxation, economic policy, organization of industry, agriculture, transportation, and law enforcement.[5] It also shares executive responsibility with the Council of Ministers, having such executive tasks as convening and dissolving the Supreme Soviet, granting awards and decorations, releasing or appointing members of the Council of Ministers, declaring a state of war, proclaiming martial law, and appointing or removing the high command of the army.[6] Its membership, elected by a joint session of both Supreme Soviet chambers, is rather diverse as is illustrated in Table 4-1, and does include women,*

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*Women do not normally belong to top elite organizations of the Party or state at the All-Union level. They have often been regarded as politically inferior in Soviet politics. That they might hold membership on this Presidium is therefore very unusual.

[4]Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975, p. 7.

[5]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 124.

[6]Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 321.

TABLE 4-5

MEMBERSHIP IN PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS TURNOVER RATE

Name	1964	1968	1975	1977
A. Kosygin	x	x	x	x
K. Mazurov	-	x	x	x
D. Polyanskiy	x	x	-	-
N. Baybakov	-	x	-	-
V. Dymshits	x	x	x	x
V. Kirillin	-	x	x	x
M. Lesechko	x	x	x	x
V. Novikov	x	x	x	x
I. Novikov	-	x	x	x
L. Smirnov	x	x	x	x
N. Tikhonov	-	x	x	x
M. Yefremov	-	x	-	-
I. Arkipov	-	-	x	x
K. Katushev	-	-	-	x
N. Martynov	-	-	-	x
Z. Nuriyev	-	-	x	x
B. Lomako	x	-	-	-
N. Rudnev	x	-	-	-
A. Shelepin	x	-	-	-
D. Ustinov	x	-	-	-
P. Shelest	-	-	-	-

Percentages of 1977 Membership: 36% remained from 1964 membership
71% remained from 1968 membership
86% remained from 1975 membership

SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviert Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975, p. 7. "Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments", CIA Reference Aid, 1977, p. 69.

lower class workers and peasants. Due to the type of membership in this body, the turnover rate is very high. Tenure is only assured for the highest political figures. Since personnel from the Politburo and Central Committee have increased in the Presidium's membership, its authority has increased and it along with the Supreme Soviet has become the chief legalizing instrument of the Party.[7]

The Soviet politician of these elite government bodies is highly educated and in most cases, technically skilled, possibly excluding the token representation of peasants and workers. He is a Party member with most likely Central Committee membership. He more than likely holds a white collar position and at present, is regarded as a member of the upper political elite in the Soviet Union. If he is not a member of the Politburo, he still may have the opportunity to influence decisions or legislation. In recent years, the status of these organizations has increased and this has, in turn, affected the status of their members. Though the Council of Ministers and its Presidium are by law subordinate to both the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, the practicing relationship of these bodies is inversely related to their legal status as organs of the state.[8] A politician of the former Presidium therefore possesses a little more power and influence than one of the latter.

The Politburo

The pinnacle both in status and power in the Soviet political system is the Politburo of the CPSU. All major decisions and policy-making originate from it. The Central Committee, the Party Congress, and all

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

organizations of the state, in practice, are subordimate to it. Membership is limited and recruitment is subjective. Though its stated work is to direct the activities of the Central Committee when it is not in session, in actuality, the Politburo is the controller, policy-maker, and major decision-maker of the entire Soviet political system.

Although it is known that decisions and policy come from the Politburo, little is known about how it operates, for sessions are held in secret and no minutes are published. The frequency of its meetings is even in dispute. In 1971 and 1973, Brezhnev is reported to have declared that it met on Thursdays, at 3:00 in the afternoon. Later, he toldthe 25th Congress that it met forty-three times a year.[9] It is known, however, that all decisions are made collectively under the presence of a dominant personality (Brezhnev's at present). Though they are reported as unanimous, it is generally known that many times dissension within the body has occurred.

As its power has increased, the Politburo has seemed to become involved in political games. Size and longevity of its membership have played very significant roles in this. Since the 1930's, the number in the Politburo (at times called the Presidium) has varied (see Table 4-6). Though no definite trend is evident, several politically relevant observations can be made. In 1939, the membership was reduced to the lowest in this forty-six year period. Possible explanations for this could be Stalin's mistrust of many of his colleagues or just the lack of qualified personnel, since the purges had ended in 1938. In 1952, during the tense time in Kremlin circles of the 'doctor's plot', the enlarging of the

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[9]John S. Reshetar, Jr., op. cit., p. 124.

TABLE 4-6

MEMBERSHIP IN THE POLITBURO

Year	Full Members	Candidate Members
1930	10	5
1934	10	5
1939	9	2
1946	11	4
1952	25	11
1956	11	6
1957	15	9
1961	11	5
1966	11	8
1971	15	6
1976 (beginning)	15	7
1976 (end)	16	6
1977	14	8

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1919-1971" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 206. Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975, 1976, 1977 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, 1976, 1977), pp. 81, 69, 96.

Politburo has been related to an attempt to cover up the annihilation of old Politburo members due to Stalin's paranoia.[10] Though decreased in 1956, 1957 brought another increase. This was the time of Khrushchev's conflict with the "anti-party" group and his attempt to recruit his supporters for Politburo positions.[11] In the sixties, membership decreased, but in 1971, again it was expanded, with Brezhnev bringing in four of his clients* as Politburo members.[12] The changing size of the Politburo can be said to have had significance in the political maneuvering which has occurred in the Politburo through the years.

The longevity of membership in recent years has also seemed to play a role in Politburo politics (refer to Appendix D). In 1977, 33 percent of the members have served thirteen years since the fall of Khrushchev in 1964; 13 percent more had served since 1967, totalling 46 percent of the 1977 membership having served since 1967. Of the other 53 percent, 27 percent were members from 1971 and 26 percent, on the body for one year or less. A political speculation can be drawn

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*In the patronage system which is prevalent in Soviet politics, as will be discussed in Chapter V, a client is a supporter of one who is politically high in rank and power. The latter is labeled a patron.

[10]Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 446-447. The doctor's plot was an affair in which allegedly doctors assigned to the Kremlin had, through incorrect diagnosis and improper treatment murdered two top officials and had conspired with enemy states to undermine the health of leading military and Kremlin officials. Others felt that it was the pre-eminance of another purge by Stalin. However, Stalin died suddenly and the purge was averted.

[11]Thomas H. Rigby, "The Soviet Leadership", Soviet Studies (October, 1970), p. 171.

[12]Myron Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue", Problems of Communism (July-August, 1971), p. 12.

from these figures. Before 1971, 60 percent of the 1964 Politburo were still on the body. Yet, after 1971, this majority dropped. During the former period, Brezhnev's influence and power were uncertain, but since the 1970's, they have both grown, along with the number of known supporters of his on the Politburo.[13] Even the pinnacle of the Soviet political system is not free from the manipulative games of politics.

To analyze the type of person who might achieve membership, the full members of the 1975-76 Politburo will be studied. Though Marshal Greckho died in 1976 and Poliansky was eventually demoted, at the beginning of 1976 both held membership and therefore, will be included in the sample. Table 4-7 is the data from which most of the remaining percentages will be derived.

In discussing age in the Politburo, the previous assertion that the older generation rules the Soviet Union is overwhelmingly supported. If fifteen years is taken to denote a generation, then two generations are represented on this Politburo, the 50-65 one with seven representatives and the 66-81 one with eight representatives, with the average age being 67 years. As Table 4-8 shows, this average age has not always been so high. Yet, with its steady climb since 1952 (excluding the slight decrease from 1961 to 1966), a generational preference seems evident. Supporting this is that despite the large turnover rate in the 1970's the new members were of the same or older generation as their demoted predecessors. The older elite of the Politburo jealously guards its position of leadership, reluctant to allow even a minor break through from younger Party executives.

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[13]Ibid.

TABLE 4-7

POLITBURO MEMBERS - 1975-76

Name	Birth Year	Age Into Party	Level of Education	Nation-ality	Area	Time as Candidate	First Year F. Mem.	Years In Party Bef. Politburo	Social Class Origin
L. Brezhnev	1906	25	Institute	Russian	Engr.	1 yr 9 mo	1956	25	Worker
A. Kosygin	1904	23	Institute	Russian	Indus.	5 yr 3 mo	1960	33	Worker
N. Podgorney	1903	27	Institute	Ukrainian	Food In.	1 yr 11 mo	1960	30	Worker
M. Suslov	1902	19	Institute	Russian	Economy	5 yr 3 mo	1955	34	Peasant
A. Kirilenko	1906	25	Institute	Russian	Engr.	4 yr 4 mo	1962	31	Artisan
K. Mazurov	1914	26	Secon. + Party Sch.	Belor.	Const.	7 yr 9 mo	1965	25	Peasant
D. Poliansky	1917	22	Institute + Party Sch.	Ukrainian	Agri.	1 yr 11 mo	1960	21	Peasant
V. Grishim	1914	25	College	Russian	Techni.	7 yr	1971	32	Worker
D. Kunaev	1912	27	College	Kazakh	Engr.	5 yr	1971	32	White Col.
V. Shcherbitsky	1918	23	Institute	Ukrainian	Techni.	5 yr	1971	30	Worker
Y. Andropov	1914	25	College + Party Sch.	Russian	Party	6 yr	1973	34	- -
A. Pelshe	1899	16	Secon. + Party Sch.	Latvian	Party	Coopted	1967	51	Peasant
F. Kulakov	1918	22	Institute	Russian	Agri.	Coopted	1971	31	Peasant

TABLE 4-7 - continued

Name	Birth Year	Age Into Party	Level of Education	Nationality	Area	Time as Candidate	First Year F. Mem.	Years In Party Bef. Politburo	Social Class Origin
A. Grechko	1903	25	Military Institute	Russian	Mil.	Coopted	1973	45	- -
A. Gromyko	1919	22	Institute	Russian	Fn. Affairs	Coopted	1973	34	Peasant

SOURCE: Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968). Kenneth Ciboski "Recruitment of the Soviet Politburo - A Social Background and Career Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), pp. 62-66. Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1919-1971" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), pp. 321, 328, 365, 366.

TABLE 4-8

AVERAGE AGE OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP
(Including Candidate Members)

1952	1956	1961	1966	1976
59.8	59.9	61.4	60.4	65.0

SOURCE: Joseph Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 125.

Another aspect dealing with the generational situation in the Soviet political elite is the orientation conflict of the old compared to the younger executives. All of the sample Politburo members were born between 1899 and 1920, reaching maturity in the twenties and thirties and entering the Party, on the average, around 1931. This indicates a Stalinist orientation plus a keen awareness of the intricacies of Soviet politics since the majority of them survived the chaotic thirties.[14] By comparison, the majority of present party members and the present Soviet population was not born until after 1930. These are people who reached maturity after Stalin's death. Their perspective on life and politics is more likely to be colored by the impact of de-stalinization as opposed to the years of purges, the continued sacrifices, and the presence of terror.[15] The difference between the old and young is more than just age. Even the 1976-77 changes in the full membership of the Politburo did not alter appreciably the orientation of the Politburo personnel. Grigori Romanov, and Dimitri Ustinov were promoted to take the places of Podgorney, Polyiansky, and Grechko.* Both were born between 1900 and 1922. The older elite seem to be resisting as long as possible the turning over of power to the post-Stalin generation, not only because they like to hold power, but also because they distrust those who have not passed through the trials they underwent.[16]

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*When Podgorny was "retired" in 1977, his position in the Politburo was not replaced, dropping its full membership from 15 to 14, though later two were promoted to candidate membership, expanding that to eight.

[14]Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 125.

[15]Ibid., p. 125.

[16]Robert Wesson, op. cit., p. 133.

Educational training of the 1976 Politburo is higher than might be expected for men of their age in the Soviet Union (see Table 4-7). During the twenties and thirties, with the emphasis on industrialization and a successful agricultural policy, many institutes of learning in these fields were founded in the Soviet Union. This accounts for their training, but Khrushchev's efforts, in part, account for them being in the Politburo. In the latter 1950's Khrushchev attempted to bring specialists and technocrats into Party career elite positions within the Party apparatus.[17] Though unpopular then, it has become the rule in the upper Party organs today. Not only do 87 percent of the sample have college or institute training, but 67 percent have specialities in engineering, agriculture, or technology. Only two or 13 percent have just a secondary education with Party School training, with two also being the number of traditional Party careerists in the body. Out of the fifteen full members, only four had any type of Party School training (refer to Table 4-7). The emphasis on education and technical training seems to have become one of the determinants in Politburo membership.

As has been shown for other bodies, the Slavic nationalities dominate the Politburo. The Russians, in 1976, accounted for 64 percent of the membership and the Ukrainians, for 14 percent (see Table 4-9). The interesting trend shown by that Table is the gross increase in Russian representation at the expense of Ukrainian and Georgian representation and an overrepresentation of the Belorrussians. A possible

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[17]George Breslauer, "Khrushchev Reconsidered", Problems of Communism, September-October, 1976, p. 26.

TABLE 4-9

PERCENTILE COMPARISON OF THE UNION REPUBLICS' POPULATION AND POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP (Including Candidates Members)

Union Republic	Population 1970	Politburo Membership 1966	1971	1976
Russian	53.8	47.4	52.4	64.0
Ukrainian	19.5	21.0	19.0	14.0
Kazakh	5.3	5.3	4.8	4.6
Uzbek	4.9	5.3	4.8	4.6
Belorussian	3.7	10.5	9.5	9.1
Georgian	1.9	5.3	4.8	.0
Latvian	.9	5.3	4.8	4.8

SOURCE: Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1919-1971" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), p. 250.

explanation could be Brezhnev's growing power and desire to recruit Russians like himself for membership in order to expand his influence. The fluctuation of the Kazakh, Uzbek, Belorussian, and Latvian percentages can be explained by the expansion of the Politburo membership in 1971 and 1976, but the decrease of Ukrainian and Georgian percentages indicate a definite decrease in membership. The control of all state and Party bodies by the Slavic nationalities implies their importance in the Soviet Union today.

In discussing the social class origins of the Politburo membership, the origin of their fathers does not represent the status of these political elite today. These men represent the peak of Soviet society, the upper stratum of elite, with all the privileges and benefits that society can bestow upon them. (To be further discussed in Chapter V) Their origins, on the other hand, are what would be expected of men born between 1899 and 1920 (refer to Table 4-7). This was the pre- and post-revolutionary times when the two major social groups in the Soviet Union were workers and peasants. Therefore, a 33 percent worker representation, a 40 percent peasant representation, and a 13 percent white collar representation does not seem unusual. These facts could also testify that the Soviet regime of the past favored working and peasant classes. This may not be true in the future, however, as it is the children of the middle* and upper* classes in the Soviet Union at present who have the

*In his dissertation, Wasyl Kalynowych defines the middle class as factory workers, teachers, and local Party bureaucrats. He defines upper class as high government and Party officials and military and scientific officials.

educational and political opportunities which, in turn, could help them inherit the leadership of the Soviet Union.[18]

To analyze Politburo membership, Party-related characteristics and career type must be discussed. In 1976, it had taken an average of thirty-three years of Party membership before full membership in the Politburo was achieved. With the average age of Party entrance rising above twenty-six years, and the wait for Politburo membership being as many as thirty-five to fifty years, youth in the Party can expect a long wait before securing a Politburo position. With 80 percent of the 1976 members having held candidate Politburo status, this may help to achieve full membership, but not necessarily shorten the long wait for it. The length of candidature for the sample Politburo ranged from one year nine months to seven years nine months, with the average being four years five months. Though four members were coopted into membership without candidate status, their previous positions and experiences could account for this. Pelshe, a Party member since the Revolution, and one of the few eligible candidates to replace the old Bolshevik Shvernik, was a respected Party careerist; Grechko held the post of Marshall of the Soviet Union; Gromyko was well-known in the foreign field; and Kulakov was a member of the Party Secretariat. Also, all four were known as Brezhnev supporters.[19] Longevity in Party membership and Politburo

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[18] Wasyl Kalynowych, "The Top Elite of the Communist Party of the USSR in 1919-1971" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1972), pp. 369-370.

[19] Patronage relationships will be discussed in Chapter V. By way of contrast, Dimitri Ustinov held candidate status for eleven years before being promoted to full membership in 1977. Originally, he had not been considered a Brezhnev supporter.

candidature seem to be two important characteristics in achieving full Politburo membership.

Career type also plays a role in achieving full membership in this top elite body. Table 4-10 gives career lines of Politburo members from 1953 to 1966. The dominance of Republic or Oblast First Secretary status with candidature indicates the importance that the top elite puts on Republic or Oblast party elite experience in qualifying for Politburo membership. The number coopted from the Party Secretariat, without candidature, implies the importance of holding that position. Looking at the 1976 sample and their penultimate positions, of those with candidature, 73 percent held Party elite positions while 27 percent held government elite positions. Of those without candidature, careers were split between Party and government elite positions. Though elite Party positions continue to dominate the career paths of Politburo personnel, an interesting aspect appears if a comparison is made between the penultimate positions of the 1976 Politburo and their present* positions (refer to Table 4-11). In their current positions, 55 percent hold elite Party positions and 45 percent elite government, an increase of 18 percentage points for the government elite. In the case of those without candidate status, the percentages remain the same. The conclusion that can be drawn from this material states that Politburo membership can contribute to ones cooptation into government elite positions whereas a Party elite career is the best background in achieving Politburo membership.

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*Present refers to the positions held by the 1976 Politburo at the beginning of that year.

TABLE 4-10

ACCESSION TO USSR POLITBURO, MARCH 1953-APRIL 1966



[a]One member (A. N. Shelepin) also was Chairman of the Committee for Party and State Control (of the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers).

[b]Of these six, three were full members (without any prior candidate status) of the expanded Politburo of October, 1952-March, 1953.

SOURCE: Kenneth Ciboski, "Recruitment of the Soviet Politburo - A Social Background and Career Analysis (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), p. 235.

TABLE 4-11

POSITIONS OF THE 1976 POLITBURO

Member	Penultimate Position*	Present Position**
L. Brezhnev	C. C. Secretary	General Secretary
A. Kosygin	USSR Min. - Gosplan	Chr. USSR Ministers
N. Podgorney	Ukrainian Presidium (Party)	Chr. of Supreme Sov.
M. Suslov	C. C. Secretary	Same
A. Kirilenko	First Sec. Sverdlosk Oblast	C. C. Secretary
K. Mazuro	First Sec. Belorussia	First Dept. C. of M.
D. Poliansky	Min. in RSFSR C. of M.	Minister of Agri.
V. Grishin	First Sec. Moscow City Org.	Same
D. Kunaev	First Sec. Kazakh	Same
V. Shcherbitsky	Ukraine Presidium (Party)	First Sec. Ukraine
Y. Andropov	Chr. State Security	Same
All the above had candidature		
A. Pelshe	Latvian Presidium (Party)	Chr. of Party Control C.
F. Kulakov	C. C. Secretary	Same
A. Grechko	USSR Min. - Defense	Same
A. Gromyko	Min. of Foreign Affairs	Same
All the above did not have candidature		

Party Officials among members - 8
State Officials among members - 5
Party Officials who moved to state positions - 2

* Penultimate position means the last position held before gaining full Politburo membership.

** Present position means position held at the beginning of 1976.

SOURCE: Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1976 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), p. 69. Edward L. Crowley, et al, eds., Prominent Personalities in the USSR (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1968).

The Politburo of the CPSU is a fascinating subject. Its adaptability to new trends has improved the quality of its membership, yet, conservatism, politics, and its self-perpetuating character has kept it controlled by a generational elite that jealousy guards its power. The politician of the Politburo is a man in his late fifties or sixties, with a degree in the technical fields. He has devoted much of his life to the advancement of his Party career, though he may hold a government elite position. His elite career is post-Stalin, but his orientation is Stalinist. By nationality, he is Russian; by origin, from the lower classes, but at present, he is a member of the highest elite of his country. He has held candidate status and opts for one of his own generation to fill a vacancy in membership. Achieving full Politburo membership takes ambition, fortitude, Party experience, and an early entrance into a Party career. The 1976 members seem to possess all of these characteristics.

Summary

From a comparison between memberships of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and of the Politburo of the CPSU, an interesting picture can be gained of the people who belong to these top political bodies. Most are men who belong to the older generation and the Slavic nationality. They are highly educated with a social status. All belong to the Communist Party and most sit on the Central Committee. Overlapping membership between the Politburo and Presidiums accounts for 39 percent of the Presidiums' memberships. This further supports the assertion that the Party desires to control and direct all the affairs of the state. The turnover rate of all three contrasts

greatly, but that of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and the Politburo presents an insight into the difference between the state and Party elite. From 1967-68 to 1977, the rate of turnover on the Presidium was 29 percent while on the Politburo, it was 53 percent. An explanation put forth could be the existence of political tactics or games entering into the recruitment of the latter, while competence and skill are the major factors of recruiting the former. As the overlapping membership and other factors of the memberships of the Politburo and two Presidiums indicate, the real center of power in the Soviet political system lies in the Politburo of the Communist Party.

CHAPTER V

THE HUMAN ELEMENT

This chapter deviates from the methodology of the previous three by presenting a narrative discussion rather than statistical data in analyzing the Soviet political elite. It is included in order to more fully develop the subject of this thesis. An inherent problem in any type of research, especially prevalent in Soviet studies, is the impossibility of completely covering sensitive subject areas due to the lack of total information on the subject, the inability to obtain needed material, or the bias of sources. Despite these drawbacks, a clearer picture of this elite group will be created, if along with the demographic characteristics, the human side, the actions and motives of this group, are mentioned. Concepts widely held about Soviet politicians which are incorporated in the major and minor hypotheses presented in Chapter I will be investigated in this chapter. Three sub-headings will be used in analyzing this human element--Patronage, Tactics, and Elitism and Corruption. Not only will the intricacies of the Soviet political system become more apparent through this chapter, but also a realistic understanding of the Soviet political elite will be completed.

Patronage

Patronage is not unique to the Soviet Union. With the oligarchic and centralist nature of the Soviet government, however, the effects of the practice may be more profound in its political system. Patronage in

the Soviet system refers to the relationship between two individuals, sharing special ties and assuming such roles in the system that are conducive to each others' political careers.[1] Many theories about Soviet politics interpret patronage not only as a principal factor in a leader's rise to power, but also as having a continuous effect upon a leader's capacity to maintain his power and secure the fulfillment of his programmatic commitments.[2] If a higher Party official is in the position to influence the appointment of members of his Party organization or a lower one, he will invariably recommend people upon whom he can rely for support.[3] The move, in the late fifties, to remove Nikita Khrushchev from the Politburo, might have been successful had Khrushchev not had the foresight to use his influence in the recruitments of cadres for the positions of Central Committee membership. While there is little evidence that he exercised much influence over All Union government appointments, his role was dominant in effecting changes among Party and government officials of the republics, who between them, make up over half of the Central Committee membership.[4] Of the 133 full members on the Central Committee in 1956, fifty-six of them were officials whose careers had been fostered by Khrushchev and

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[1]Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and Career Patterns of Obkom, First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), p. 332.

[2]Philip Stewart and others, "Political Mobility - Soviet Political Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.

[3]Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 332.

[4]Thomas H. Rigby, "How Strong is the Leader", Problems of Communism, September-October, 1962, p. 3.

some twenty others had similar relationships with Khrushchev.[5] This fact also contributed to the passage of Khrushchev-sponsored resolutions, concerning raising the level of agriculture and consumer production, at that time. Leonid Brezhnev has also proven to be adept at the use of patronage for his own benefit. As Chapter IV brought out, with the increase of Brezhnev clients on the Politburo in the 1970's, his power has increased accordingly. For the Soviet political elite, patronage is a practice fervently and widely followed in order to enhance their career potential.

Patronage is also advantageous to the client, who often is a man of power or represents real political and organizational interests.[6] Both Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev owe their political success to such a relationship, the former to Stalin, the latter to Khrushchev himself. In 1960, Leonid Brezhnev, a Politburo member and Central Committee Secretary was 'promoted' to the status of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet,* losing his Secretaryship. Frol Kozlov, a Khrushchev client, became heir apparent. In 1964, health forced Kozlov's retirement. Brezhnev, a Khrushchev supporter, regained his status as a Central Committee Secretary. After his reinstatement, he took part in Khrushchev's ouster of 1964, though he refused to give the speech to the Central Committee that removed his former patron from office.[7]

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*At that date, this position was neither important nor powerful, but rather, ceremonial.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Philip Stewart and others, op. cit., p. 1270.

[7]Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev - The Years in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 176. John Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 16.

Vasily Mzhavanadze, a Politburo candidate member until 1972 became the 'tool' of his client, Otari Lazishvili, known as the "Soviet version of the Godfather."[8] Lazishvili made full use of his relationship and often boasted to his friends that he could arrange the hiring and firing of any Republican minister or Party official for the City of Tbilisi or Republic of Georgia. The year 1972 brought Lazishvili's arrest and conviction and Mzhavandze's 'retirement' from the Politburo.[9] A patronage relationship can often backfire.

Young Party officials make every effort to secure a patron from among the rising or present Party elite. The status of client can mean faster achievement of goals or a preferred positional change. Table 5-1 illustrates known patronage relationships. (Note similarity between the movement of some patrons and clients.) Such ties usually begin in the early part of an official's career. Some characteristics which help in the establishment of these ties are among the following:

1. Common background or nationality tie
2. Contemporaneous attendance in the same educational institution
3. Association through work in the same place.[10]

The real rulers of the country, the officials of the Communist Party, are promoted, in the majority of instances, through the use of patronage and pleasing their superiors, not by winning the votes of the public or their peers.[11] Among Party officials, especially younger ones,

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[8]Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 97.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Kizhanatham A. Jagannathan, op. cit., p. 333.

[11]Robert G. Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 155.

TABLE 5-1

PATRONAGE RELATIONSHIPS
(Several Examples)

Client	Patron	Remarks
N. I. Zhurin	L. Brezhnev	Brezhnev lost membership in C. C. Secretariat in 1960, Zhurin lost C. C. membership in 1961. Brezhnev returned to position in 1964, Zhurin to C. C. in 1966.
D. S. Polianskii	A. I. Kirichenko	Kirichenko was a Politburo member from 1955-1960, Politanskii gained a Council of Ministers position in 1960.
A. I. Adzhubey	N. Khrushchev	Khrushchev was First Secretary from early fifties in 1965. A. I. Adzhubey held the editorship of Izvestiya and was youngest member of C. C. until 1964.
G. T. Stuysky	N. Khrushchev	Khrushchev was Firse Secretary from early fifties to 1964, and a Ukranian. Stuysky, a Ukranian, was personal sec. to K. and member of Party Auditing Commission in 1961. Both lost positions in 1964.
N. A. Kuznetsov	L. Brezhnev	Brezhnev was Dept. to RSFSR Supr. Sov. at 1963 and 1967 convoc. as was Kuznetsov. Brezhnev, First Sec. of CPSU from 1964 to present. Kuznetsov became his deputy and a candidate member of CPSU in 1977.

SOURCE: Kizhanatham Athinathan Jagannathan, "The Political Recruitment and Career Patterns of Obkom First Secretaries from 1952-1969" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1971), pp. 342-348.

this is a sensitive point; they have to admit that no one ever voted to give them their power and privileges, but both came down to them from above.[12] Whereas many of the individuals who hold elite Party positions are well qualified, many are not, achieving their status and privilege through the patronage system. Roy Medvedev, a dissident historian, describes the topic in the following way:

> The alarming thing is that advancement is largely dependent on personal patronage, on friendships, or family connections--political and professional qualifications are secondary. How else can one explain the fact that a man who invariably is the subject of scorn and ridicule in the scientific circles has for seven years been head of the science section of the Central Committee? . . . . A senior party official who has been working in Minsk finds jobs in Moscow for those who assisted him in Belorussia, while a different leader, who was in Moldavia, assiduously pushes his colleagues from Kishinev up the administrative ladder. In this way, extraordinary 'spheres of influence' and 'private domains' are formed within the apparatus of the government--with 'one of our boys' in charge. Individuals are often referred to as 'so and so's man.'[13]

Soviet oligarchical rule fosters the attempts by members of the upper elite to consolidate their strength and base support by establishing political strongholds, including forming groups or coalitions of support. Individuals who reach these high echelons not only possess the power and status of their political position, but also possess great persuasive power and personal support. Successes and losses of Soviet politicians often determines the careers of those whom they have helped. The influence of the patronage system upon the careers of the Soviet political elite cannot be minimized; it definitely is the lubricant of the Soviet political system.

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Roy A. Medvedev, On Socialist Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1975), p. 299.

Tactics

Tactics used in Soviet politics are similar to those in other political systems, including those used for political gain. Soviet politicians are known to maneuver for positions, edge out one another from important posts, build networks of allies and supporters, and promote and protect their own careers.[14] Among the top political elite, few real friendships exist; competition for power is usually present. Bending the law to foster their own careers is not only practices, but also, accepted by the populace. During the Watergate era, the Soviet political elite would not take the situation seriously, while the average citizen could not understand why a scandal occurred or Nixon resigned. Supposedly, moderate realistic Party bureaucrats have been known to compromise and submerge their own private views in hopes of moderating policy in a manner similar to the actions of some American politicans during the Vietnam War era.[15] Political maneuvering also occurs when filling many vacancies in the elite Party organizations. Often the career apparatchik is overlooked in favor of a provincial leader, for the former possesses too much sophistication and worldiness to be fully trusted in top positions.[16] The ones in charge of choosing replacements prefer cadres whom they feel they can thoroughly rely upon.

In order to further analyze the tactics open to the Soviet political elite, those of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev will

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[14]Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 164.

[15]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 293.

[16]Ibid.

be used as examples. Both men achieved the highest position in Soviet politics. Though their method was similar, their style and tactics were totally different. Nikita Khrushchev was not considered an intellectual. Rather, he was the epitome of the self-made Soviet man, shrewd, earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncy personality, and a quick wit.[17] His colleagues regarded him as "hardworking, but uninspired, weak in political theory, a rather ordinary, sometimes crude man . . . who would always pay dutiful attention to his 'betters' (the more experienced Party leaders)."[18] Oleg Penkovskiy, the Soviet military elite member turned intelligence agent, called him a liar, a demagogue, and an adventurer who was quite prepared to begin war if circumstances turned favorable for him.[19] Others have said that he would have made an excellent collective farm chairman. Nonetheless, Nikita Khrushchev rose securely through the Party ranks, gained Stalin's confidence, and masterfully used analysis and exploitation of the social and political forces at hand, especially rivalries, to squeeze out his competition, Malenkov, in particular to become Stalin's heir.

Khrushchev was flamboyant, dynamic, and innovative, often using these characteristics to overcome his feelings of inferiority due to his master, the evidence now at hand makes it clear that Khrushchev chafed under Stalin's restrictions, but at the time no one could match him in fulsome tributes to his mentor and none was more zealous in defending

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[17]Merle Fainsod, "Khrushchevism in Retrospect", Problems of Communism (January-February, 1965), p. 1.

[18]Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, op. cit., p. 5.

[19]Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), p. 56.

Stalin's course.[23] He destalinized the Soviet Union, while at the same time, restalinizing it. He declared support of peaceful co-existence while forcing a crisis in Berlin, furnishing atomic missiles to Cuba, or sending troops to Hungary.[24] All these contradictions earned him the reputation as self-willed, unpredictable, and unorthodox. He was a master at propaganda and admitted this in many speeches. "It may be said that Nikita Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda. If you think so, you are not mistaken. Yes, I was, am, and always shall be a propagandist . . . ."[25]

Despite his failures and fall, Nikita Khrushchev knew how to assert his dominance, use people and organizations, make use of the patronage system, tap grievances, exploit policies, and create confusion to achieve success. He was an ingenious politician.

The style of Leonid Brezhnev contrasts with that of his predecessor. He is neither flamboyant nor outgoing, but intelligent, reserved, and modest. He is the one who sits back and studies the situation before initiating action. At his rise to power, Brezhnev was described as the true "Soviet manager-politician-executive, the efficient organization man, the Communist in the grey-flannel suit."[26] However, some of the methods he used to accomplish this rise mirrored those of Stalin and Khrushchev. The strategy had three parts; (a) using the post

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[23]Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.

[24]Herman Achminow, "Khrushchev: The Apparatchik Who Fooled the World", Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR (September, 1971), p. 19.

[25]Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 2.

[26]John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 15.

of senior secretary to gain primacy in the Secretariat of the Central Committee, (b) using the Secretariat to win control over the party apparatus throughout the country at large, (c) using the party apparatus to establish dominance over the other institutions of the regime.[27] In carrying out these methods, he made extensive use of the patronage system as did Khrushchev; he too can be considered a master at it.

The tactics of Brezhnev differ from those of his predecessor. He is cautious, slow to move, and instinctive in achieving his objective. He knows when to slap a back, shake a hand, promote a supporter, or demote an adversary.[28] He is cool, calculating, and cunning, displaying the brilliance of an accomplished, educated politician. Richard Nixon once pegged him as the "best politician in the room."[29] Patience and fortitude both describe his action in gaining an objective. To neutralize his opposition in the Politburo after 1964, he ingeniously had Podgorny removed from the Secretariat and more recently, from the Politburo; Shelepin was expelled from the Secretariat and later from Politburo, at Brezhnev's initiative; he won over Kirilenko and Suslov, at first potentially strong threats to his rise to power.[30] He delayed the completion of the new Soviet Constitution until his power base in the Politburo was strong enough to support his selection as President of the Soviet Union, enchancing both his personal power and prestige. In order not to repeat the same mistakes of Khrushchev of constant reorganizations

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[27]Myron Rush, "Brezhnev and the Succession Issue", Problems of Communism (July-August, 1971), p. 11.

[28]John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 17.

[29]Ibid., p. 17.

[30]Myron Rush, op. cit., p. 11.

and replacements of cadres, he waited five years before moving into the critical area of appointments to policymaking bodies in the provinces and on the All Union level.[31]

Leonid Brezhnev characterizes the quiet, reserved politician. He stays in the middle, becoming the man upon whom all the interest groups and the warring and rival lobbies which comprise the Soviet establishment can agree.[32] Yet, he knows when it is necessary to be open, joke at a party, or tell an anti-Communist joke. Though his programs in reorganization of bureaucratic administrations have gone slower than desired, he has been able to push through a vigorous land reclamation program and reforms in industrial management. Unlike Khrushchev, he has achieved comradeliness, trust, and respect from people in the Party and has been the object of honest praise from his colleagues. Leonid Brezhnev is not the dynamic, gregarious politician, but he has been able to ingeniously use analysis, manipulation, and patience to arrograte to himself a high degree of personal power which is fully supported by his colleagues.

The tactics of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, though similar by method, vary. While Khrushchev was ready to attack any given program and attempt a solution quickly, Brezhnev sits back and waits for the correct moment, like a mountain lion stalking his prey. Where Khrushchev was gregarious and open, Brezhnev remains quiet and aloof. This reserved manner makes Brezhnev the more dangerous opponent for his true feelings are never revealed. Despite the great ideological differences between the Soviet Union and the Western world, the tactics open to and used by

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[31]Ibid., p. 12.

[32]John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 16.

the Soviet politicial elite do not vary much from those used by their colleagues in the West.

Elitism and Corruption

The Soviet Union is an elitist society with a group of people who are considered socially above the general population. Though the elite of the Soviet Union can be divided into two groups, the intelligensia and the political elite, the latter, those who hold important Party and government All Union positions are the focus of this paper and will be the only group considered in this discussion. Within this group, strata exist depending upon position and importance, with the entire system of privilege being similarly hierarchial. An ambitious young man working his way up through the ranks of the Party can see ahead the privileges he will receive at each level.[33]

The advantages of this elite status range from higher incomes and access to special shops to private country homes and special medical care. Table 5-2 illustrates the differences in income. Salary levels in the Soviet Union are somewhat deceptive, for the power elite (upper to top political elite with the exclusion of military) receive other prerequisites of power which make their real income almost incalcuable. While the military and Party elite seem to dominate the higher pay scale, the latter really does. In comparison to the minimum wage and worker's income, a large gap is evident while the rate of pay of a manager puts him in a middle range. In writing his article on "Top Incomes in the USSR." Mervyn Matthews discusses the problems in acquiring the statistics in the table.

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[33]Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 177.

TABLE 5-2

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

Category	Monthly Wage Without Benefits (in Rubles)*
Upper Range	
Marshall of the Soviet Union	2,000
General Sec. of the CPSU	900
Sec. of Cen. Comm	700 - 800
Union Rep. or Oblast First Sec.	600
Major General	600
Director of Research for C. C.	600
Ambassador or Colonel	500
Middle Range	
Coal Manager	480
Professor - Chief Researcher	325 - 525
Non-Ferrous Manager	420
Other Managers	258 - 390
Collective Farm Chr.	140 - 300
Lower Range	
Editor	240
Textile Industry Manager	215
Secretary (Private)	190
Researcher	140
Worker	130
Jr. Researcher	115
Minimum Wage	60

NOTES:
1. Wages do not include bonuses or secondary benefits.
2. In 1977, Leonid Brezhnev became Marshall of the Soviet Union, consequently, raising his wage considerably.
3. The varying ranges refer to areas where positions vary in importance.

SOURCE: Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1975), pp. 7-13.

> . . . Soviet censors have set an upper limit for published wage studies . . . . The highest figures to come to our notice in openly published discussion of wages and incomes were intervals of 300 to over 400 rubles per month . . . this may be provisionally accepted as a rule-of-thumb lower limit for elite salaries.
> . . . other pieces of evidence make a figure of 450 rubles for the head of an elite household in the early seventies seem reasonable . . . . A salary of 450 rubles was about seven times the minimum wage and three and one-half times the average wage.[34]

The difference in wage as described by Mr. Matthews may not be what they seem, for the existence of secondary benefits for the political elite drastically changes their income status.

Secondary benefits for these Soviet elites come in several categories: confidential monetary payments, restricted goods and services, and access to special advantages reserved exclusively for those of elite status. The first benefit is the "thirteenth month" salary, an automatic payment to the top political elite that requires no extra effort. The second benefit, "the Kremlin ration", is special 'gold' rubles worth more than their face value in state run special outlets and shops. These come in 16 to 32 denomination which apparently indicate two categories of seniority.[35] This benefit reaches nearly all elite households. The amount received of either benefit is determined by the level and status of the elite member. Those receiving these are given access to one, two, or all three types of special shopping. A closed distributor handles high quality Soviet and Western goods at low prices. Restricted outlets carry quality Soviet goods, unavailable or unobtainable in ordinary shops, at only slightly lower prices. Foreign

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[34] Mervyn Matthews, "Top Incomes in the USSR: Towards a Definition of the Soviet Elite", Survey (Summer, 1975), p. 7.

[35] Ibid., p. 15.

currency shops have superior Soviet and Western goods, sold well below normal Soviet prices. None but an elite member with a special pass is allowed entrance to any one of these. The reaction to these shops by the average Russian citizen is resentment.

> Many Russians are infuriated at the existence of these stores which are, in effect, a consumer goods sector where Soviet currency is not accepted. 'It is so humiliating to have stores in our country where our own money is not valid,' fumed a white collar worker. 'Not only is the money not good, but people without permission to shop there are turned away by door guards.'[36]

Soviet political elite enjoy other privileges directly connected with their status. All top government and Party institutions have their own buffets with high quality food and take-out service. Luxurious, noncrowded holiday resorts are available to members of upper elite members of upper elite organizations for free or low prices. Special medical care, known as the Fourth Directory of the Ministry, accompanies this elite status, while state-approved purchasable medical services are available to these people at a price. Housing for elites includes rented or owned dachas, such special superior apartment complexes as those run by the Central Committee and KGB, or owned apartments in housing cooperatives. The higher the position, the easier it is to obtain decent housing. Top officials such as Brezhnev and Kosygin maintain, at least, an apartment in Moscow and a dacha in the countryside. Other advantages enjoyed include private chauffeur-driven limousines for the top elite, a special ticket office for all cultural events in Moscow, and access to foreign goods from friends traveling

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[36]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 28.

abroad.[37] A superior style of living results from all these benefits for the Soviet elite. Though their distribution among the strata of the elite varies, it is safe to presume that these benefits increase income ratings of this elite type occupations by perhaps a factor of fifty to one hundred percent.[38]

Those who form the top Soviet political elite live an incredibly different life than the average Soviet citizen.[39] In Russia, they are called the nachalstvo, an untranslatable word, whose literal meaning is "the authorities", but whose true sense is more "the big cheeses."[40] An example of their separate way of life is illustrated through the following:

> A Russian workingman, as he watched a long, handmade Zil limosine roar down the reserved center land of Kutuzovski Prospect in Moscow, preceded by a yellow police car, commented, 'The nachalstvo never sees how the rest of us live. They go from home to office and home again, escorted all the way. They never go out shopping, stuff is brought to them. They don't even go to the barber, the barber comes to them and gives them all kinds of special services. Their wives don't do the cooking, their maids do. They are always under control, I mean surrounded by police, escorted here and there. No, they don't see what you and I see. They never wait in line. What kind of life is that?'[41]

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[37] Oleg Penkovshiy, op. cit., pp. 188-191. He cites, "When some goes abroad, everyone wants him to buy some presents or just some things a person needs which are impossible to get in Moscow . . . . Prior to my next regular trip to London . . . Mrs. Serov gave me a long list of things to buy in Paris and her husband asked me to buy him a lightweight tennis jacket . . . ." (This was only in his elite circles.)

[38] Mervyn Matthews, op. cit., p. 25.

[39] Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 175.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., p. 176.

The leaders apparently attempt to appear like everyone else, without class and occupational distinctions, but their privileges keep them from it. Their families are secluded from publicity, and the absence of knowledge about them tends to make them seem unlike other Soviet citizens.[42] This separation is more evident in the attitudes of their children as described by Oleg Penkovskiy, "Their children despise everything Soviet, watch only foreign movie films, and look down on ordinary people."[43] The life of luxury has its benefits, favortism, isolation, and obscurity.

In Chapter III, an often found characteristic of the Soviet political elite was expressed, that of hypocrisy. Though this elite should represent the epitome of the 'New Soviet Man', they live a life of luxury. Though they profess sincere dedication to the tenets of Marxist-Leninism, believing in honest and integrity, they lie, deceive, scheme against each other, inform on each other, and 'cut each others throats.'[44] Though they express contempt for capitalism and self-gratification, in their pursuit of more money and advancement for themselves, they become informants for the KGB on their friends and fellow workers.[45] Oleg Penkovskiy describes their life in this way,

> Our Communism, which we now have been building for almost forty-five years is a fraud. I myself am part of this fraud; after all, I have been one of the privileges . . . I praise our leaders, but inside me I wish them death . . . I feel contempt for myself because I am part of this system and I live a lie.[46]

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[42]Kenneth Ciboski, "Recruitment of the Soviet Politburo" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Washington, 1971), p. 112.

[43]Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 55.

[44]Ibid.

[45]Ibid., p. 56.

[46]Ibid.

Others express this same thought. In his book The Russians, Hedrick Smith writes,

> With a kind of deliberate schizophrenia, they divide their existence into their public lives and their private lives, distinguishing between 'official' relationships and personal relationships . . . . So they adopt two very different codes of behavior . . . 'Our public life is living a lie,' commented an elite physicist . . . .'[47]
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> A young apparatchik once said to an American at a party, '. . . But what I say and what I am thinking when I am saying it are two different things.'[48]

Soviet propaganda supports a life of lying. It says, 'We have everything in the Soviet Union and everything we have is better than the West', yet, the upper elite acquire many Western goods in preference to Soviet goods.[49] Another slogan professes, 'In our Soviet socialist society, everything is available, everything is the best', yet, even socks and underwear are difficult to obtain.[50] Even the revered leader Leonid Brezhnev does not escape this lie. Though regarded as the 'perfect' Party man, he is one who loves the good life, expensive clothes, fast and ostentatious cars, thoroughbred horses, lodge seats at Moscow's Dyamo and Lenin Stadiums, and yachting on the Black Sea.[51] There are members of the Soviet political elite who sincerely believe in the greatness of Communism and all its tenets. However, there are also many who will do anything to maintain or improve their present status, even to living a lie.

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[47]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 105.

[48]Ibid., p. 298.

[49]Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., p. 191.

[50]Ibid.

[51]John Dornberg, op. cit., p. 18.

Two other factors, possibly a result of the Soviet elite system seem widespread in the Soviet political system. These are mistrust and corruption. The first seems to not only be a characteristic of the citizens' feelings toward their leaders and each other, but also, vice versa, while corruption remains an inescapable fact of daily life throughout the Soviet Union in the lives of both the elite and the masses.[52] With the Communist dogma the ever present ideological background upon which the entire Soviet state is built, the political elite, whether sincerely believing in its principles or not, must always profess profound devotion to the Communist way of life and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine. This constant declaration is a necessity, for one never is sure of his position or who may be listening in. Several examples explain this phenomenon:

> 'Human relations are a deadly serious business here,' a member of the elite establishment once commented, 'We resent it if a foreigner comes to a party and brings along Russian friends. It ruins the evening for us because it takes us a long time to know someone and come to trust them.'
> 'You can't trust anyone but your pillow.' One young man cursed bitterly, after learning that one of his long-time friends had informed on him to the KGB.
> 'Another member of the elite once commented, 'You know, we have lived next door to another couple all our lives practically. I have known the wife since childhood and yet, I have never told her the honest truth . . . . They are different people from us.'[53]

Leona Schecter, an American, describes her and her family's reaction to this characteristic of mistrust in Soviet society, after they decided to leave Moscow, permanently, after two years of living there. (Their lives touched both the elite of the society and the masses.)

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[52]"Bribery, Embezzlement, A Way of Life In Russia", Daily Press, by Craig R. Whitney, Sunday, May 7, 1978, p. A18.

[53]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

> By the time we left Moscow, we felt we had lost our innocence. We made friends with people we didn't trust, distrusted our real friends at time . . . . The Soviet Union had little to teach us in the positive sense. After almost two years, we felt we had emotionally been to the end of the world . . . . The children acquired a veneer . . . reticent to speak freely and openly with people we didn't know well. They were careful and guarded, secretive about mentioning a friend's name when repeating some bit of information he had given us. Trust because reserved, finally, only for the family.[54]

The Soviet society is also one in which the leaders mistrust the citizens.[55] They lack complete confidence in their mandate to rule so they contrive magnanimous demonstrations of loyalty to lay their doubts to rest. In Russia, this is called 'pokazuka' which, though having no English translation, comes from the verb to show off; the slang noun means, roughly, something one does for the sake of doing it, for show; by definition, the act involved is one of no material consequences, but it looks good.[56] Further evidence of this mistrust is that public voting is always reported as unanimous and speeches on public occasions always praise the leaders and society's accomplishments.[57] Within the Soviet society, trust is an ideal to be hoped for, honesty nearly as unknown, friendships fragile, and secretism a way of life.

Corruption* is another disease that is rampant in Soviet society, reaching high into the elite Party and government ranks. It appears in various forms. Bribery is one of the most prevalent. Lenin called

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*Corruption is the behavior of public officials which deviates from the accepted norms, in order to serve private needs.

[54]Leona and Jerrold Schecter, An American Family in Moscow (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1975), pp. 400-401.

[55]Robert G. Kaiser, op. cit., p. 159.

[56]Ibid., p. 160.

[57]Ibid., p. 159.

bribery 'the worst enemy of the revolution', whereas almost fifty years later, Nikita Khrushchev tried to stamp it out, 'this disgraceful survival of the past' by ordering the death penalty for serious bribery.[58] Leonid Brezhnev has continued his predecessors' attack by calling for a continued struggle against such vestiges of the past as 'money-grubbing, bribery, etc.'[59] A typical example of this is paying off an official in order to have an off-spring accepted into a preferred institute of learning or receive a sought-after position. Other examples involving bribery are selling off state resources, granting apartment permits, receiving diplomas without earning them (refer to Chapter III) and allotting plots of land for dachas as payoffs.[60] At the high levels of society, it is not necessary to pay off grocery clerks for special merchandise or a foreign friend for currency coupons for the upper elite have their own special stores. But, "that's corruption in itself", a resentful young Party member has said, "it's why the leadership doesn't talk much about corruption anymore . . . . They're silent because they're all involved."[61] The leaders and the press do call for reform, but this is often ignored, due to the involvement, at high levels, of officials.

Embezzlement is another form of corruption prevalent in Soviet society. Millions of dollars are known to have been taken from state enterprises. The most celebrated case related to this was of Yekaterina

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[58]Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. A18.

[59]Steven J. Staats, "Corruption in the Soviet System", Problems of Communism (January-February, 1972), p. 43.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Craig R. Whitney, op. cit., p. A18.

Furtseva, the Minister of Culture and a favorite of Khrushchev's. In the spring of 1974, it surfaced that she had built a dacha in the country worth about $165,000 with state-owned materials obtained through fraud.[62] The scandal included the fact that she was building it openly in her daughter's name which constitutes passing on the perquisites of power to the next generation, forbidden by Soviet law.[63] She was required to pay the state about $80,000 for the dacha (an amount which she was able to produce in only a few days) and lost her seat in the Supreme Soviet. Yet, she retained her position as Minister of Culture until she died, later that year. Another example is the case of Vasily Mzhavanadze, a candidate member of the Politburo. As previously mentioned, he was 'retired' from his position due to his connections with one Otari Lazishvili who had built up a network of underground private enterprises together with other businessmen. Lazishvili had, as reported, swindled the state out of over 1.7 million rubles in funds and goods.[64] Reportedly, he was able to do this because he was in partnership with Mrs. Vasily Mzhavanadze while her husband sat on the Politburo. As previously stated, the year 1972 brought an end to this scandal.

Another form of corruption involving high officials is referred to as 'blat', the use of personal influence to obtain favors to which a certain department, enterprise, or official is not legally or formally entitled.[65] The upper political elite become involved when enterprises

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 100.

[64] Ibid., p. 97.

[65] Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. 42.

under their control cannot fulfill a quota or lack necessary inventory. In many cases, if this occurs, the chairman or manager is urged by the controlling official to use the parallel market, that market of goods and services which functions outside the system of institutionalized economic relationships, beyond government controls.[66] The ironical thing about this form of corruption is that in certain circumstances, on a limited scale, it makes an important contribution to organizational efficiency and goal fulfillment.

Other forms of corruption, on a more personal scale, thrive. Oleg Penkovskiy wrote,

> The sons, daughters, and son-in-laws of all important Party and government officials finish higher educational institutions and get good jobs . . . everything is done by pull, through friends and family connections. Though the newspapers scream that nepotism must be stamped out, they only punish some factory director for giving a job to his niece.[67]

Khrushchev's son-in-law was the chief editor of the newspaper Izvestiya during his father-in-law's reign. He often wrote on Communist morality, yet in private life, had to be reprimanded by Khrushchev to be more careful about his 'adventures'. He also was known to put his name to someone else's work, winning the Lenin Prize once when he did this.[68] As in other political systems, instances of moral corruption or 'fixing of the law' occur among the political elite, but these are minor compared to the other forms of corruption prevalent in the society.

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[66] Dimitri K. Simes, "The Parallel Market", Survey, Autumn, 1974, p. 51.

[67] Oleg Penkovskiy, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

[68] Ibid.

It has been suggested that one of the reasons that corruption continues to thrive in the Soviet Union is because it allows, in the masses, the feeling that they are able to manipulate and influence the system in which they live, therefore, making it more tolerable. It also leads to consolidation and unity of the two parallel hierarchies through patronage and nepotism, forcing them to work together to cut corners, break laws and regulations, defraud higher supervisory organizations, and engage in other illegal practices to fulfill goals.[69] It also allows the elites to preserve their place in society. There is little hope that corruption will be eradicated from the Soviet society for it performs too many important functions.

Summary

The Soviet political elite do not epitomize the 'New Soviet Man.' They possess all the desires, attributes, and shortcomings of any human being. They prefer a life with materialistic rewards rather than ideological goals. The society in which they live fosters the use of patronage in achieving personal and public success, making it the major factor in political mobility. Political tactics, maneuvers, and techniques are used extensively, especially in furthering careers. A superior social and materialistic status are enjoyed by members of this group with even a weakness for corruption being present. The Soviet political elite pose a strong resemblance to their counterparts in other countries. They seem to be approaching the mode of capitalistic politicians rather than that of the 'New Soviet Man.'

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[69]Steven J. Staats, op. cit., p. 47.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

A picture of the All Union Soviet political elite has been developed through the material presented in this thesis. They are a select group of middle-aged men, educated, with white collar positions in Soviet society. Though the theoretical ideal of the lowly worker or peasant achieving political heights is still professed, this analysis has shown that this myth appears only to be a reality in the Politburo, whose members have jealously guarded their generational control for years. In the other bodies, occupational representation clearly shows the dominance of white collar representation,* with most members holding professional positions in the state or Party heirarchy. Whatever the social origin or occupational representation, members of the All Union organizations covered are currently considered part of the elite stratum of Soviet society, with benefits and pay that distinguish them from the average Soviet citizen. The age factor in the description shows the dominance of the older generation in all the All Union political bodies. With the recruitment practices of Soviet politics, there seems to be little chance that this trend will change in the near future.

The majority of the political elite is of Slavic nationality with Russian predominating. However, to guard against an outbreak of

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*Social class origins may, like the Politburo, be mostly from the lower classes as the sample for the Council of Ministers indicates. However, data in the area for the Supreme Soviet, Party Congress, and Central Committee was not available.

localism plus appear to be following Marx's tenet of mass participation in the government, the Supreme Soviet, as the state's representative assembly, has an overrepresentation of the minorities rather than the Slavs. This also gives the regime better access to the feelings and reactions of all the population.

The use of political tactics is vital to the career of Soviet politicians. One wrong decision could destroy what it has taken a lifetime to achieve. Seeking the services of a more prominent individual whom the political elite pledge to support for purposes of advancing their own careers is a practice fervently followed in Soviet politics, while the existence of corruption in political circles is widespread. The All Union Soviet political elite is a unique group of people, whose study uncovers many revealing aspects of the Soviet political system.

Major Hypotheses

Of the major hypotheses offered in Chapter I, the investigations carried out through this research resulted in the support of three and the rejection of one. In order to treat each hypothesis with clarity and understanding, methodology similar to that used in the Objective and Hypotheses section of Chapter I will be followed.

1. The Soviet political elite is a middle-aged group of conservative men.

   The evidence gathered in this research on the whole supported this hypothesis. Middle age, forty years or older, dominates the memberships of the political bodies discussed in this thesis. Whereas the Supreme Soviet and Party

Congress were found to have 50 to 70 percent of their memberships over the age of forty, the Central Committee, reflecting the Council of Ministers' membership as well as its Presidium, and the Politburo, were shown to have 90 to 100 percent of their membership over the age of forty. This group has dominated these memberships since the sixties and there is little evidence that this trend is changing.

With Brezhnev's rise to power in 1964, the entire character of the Soviet political system changed. Rather than launching in to sudden schemes or innovations, characteristic of Khrushchev's reign, conservatism and maintaining the status quo came to predominate in Soviet politics. Older age of members and low turnover rates, for the most part, in recent years in the All Union political bodies, seem to project this trend. Robert Wesson specifically describes this conservatism in Soviet politics by saying,

> In recent years, the Soviet political scene has generally been monotonously placid, with hardly any signs of the kind of controversy that bubbled up during the reign of the ebullient Premier Nikita Khrushchev.[1]

The personality and style of Leonid Brezhnev seems to have had the most effect on this new trend (refer to Chapter V). John Dornberg describes Brezhnev as ". . . a conservative . . . who takes few chances . . . does not implement wild schemes

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[1]Robert Wesson, "Brezhnev's Year", Current History (October, 1977), p. 109.

to solve problems . . . who does not like to rock the boat or have others rock it."[2]

The fact that the political elite of the Soviet Union consists mostly of men hints at the 'unwritten' descrimination of women in political circles. Though the two lower political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress, show up to 23 percent women representation, since the death of Yekaterina Furtseva in 1974, no woman has held All Union ministerial or Politburo membership. Statistics are unavailable for their representation in the Central Committee but no source consulted hinted at it in this body. Though the political elites at all levels of the government and Party heirarchies were not investigated, for those of the memberships researched, the first hypothesis seems valid.

2. Successful careers of the Soviet political elite are related to educational level, nationality group, age and occupational status.

Successful careers can be defined in two different ways. One deals with contentment in career choice while the other concerns advancement and enhancement of status. If the former definition is used, though this research does not claim to have covered this subject in that trend, the hypothesis would have to be rejected due to the often

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[2]John Dornberg, Brezhnev (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 33.

existing conflict between the public and private lives of the Soviet political elite, the paranoia that someone is always watching or listening, the must of pleasing often ill-qualified superiors, and the necessity of carrying out undesirable orders. From these characteristics of Soviet political careers, career frustration could develop regardless of educational level, nationality group, age, or occupational status.

On the other hand, if the definition of enhancement or advancement of status is used, then the hypothesis was supported through the evidence presented in this paper. In each political organization, the educational level of the memberships was either very high or showing an increasing trend. Percentages for those with college or institute educations for the most recent years of the individual data ranged from 48 percent for the Supreme Soviet deputies to over 87 percent for Politburo members while members with only an elementary education ranged from 0 percent for Politburo members to 20 percent for Supreme Soviet deputies. The evidence seemed to support the assertions that educational level among the All Union political elite was rising and the higher the position desired, the higher the level ones education needed to be.

While the Russian nationality predominated in all the organizations studied, ranging from 43 percent to 64 percent of the total memberships, compared to the nearest

population census, it was overrepresented in all cases except the Supreme Soviet. The situation for a combined Slavic representation was similar. With the percentages ranging from 59 percent to 87 percent, this group controlled each organization, even the Supreme Soviet. But, again, in the Supreme Soviet, the group was underrepresented. The regime needs one organization where the minorities seem to be fully represented in order to give those citizens as well as the leaders a feeling of support for each other. Also, in Soviet politics, it is those of Slavic nationality, especially Russian, who achieve higher political position.

As previously mentioned, middle age or over forty years is the most dominant age for the lower political elite; over fifty for the upper elite; and over fifty-seven for the top political elite. The youth in the Party or government heirarchy stand little opportunity at elite positions until they have reached these age plateaus. With the older generation continually protecting its control, as related in the material, opportunity for a movement of youth into influential positions does not seem to be open. The older the political elite, the more the opportunity there is to become a member of the upper or top bodies of the government or Party heirarchies.

Occupationally, the majority of the All Union political elite hold white collar, if not professional, positions. Worker and peasant representation is only substantial in the

two lowest political elite bodies, the Supreme Soviet and the Party Congress. As mentioned in Chapter II, those figures might even be misleading. With the preference for the white collar background in the memberships, representation from the worker or peasant classes have less opportunity for participation in the Soviet political process. This research supports the second hypothesis. The best qualifications for a successful career in Soviet politics is being of middle or older age, having institute or college training, being Slavic or especially Russian, and holding a white collar position in the state or Party heirarchies.

3. The Soviet political elite epitomizes the "New Soviet Man".

The evidence contained in this thesis rejects this hypothesis. Either the Communist theoreticians were naive to think human nature could be so molded to eliminate selfishness and desire from a person's makeup or the Soviet society has not yet reached the stage at which this revamping of human nature can take place.[3] The Soviet politicians were found to be motivated by self-interest, ambition, and achievement of material success rather than a great dedication to Communist ideology. They will use manipulative tactics to reach these goals, patronage to obtain purposeful friendships, and corruption, if needed, to secure success. This group relishes the privileged life

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[3]Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions The Individual and Society (Boston, Mass.: The Christopher Publishing House, 1967), p. 618.

that accompanies their status in Soviet society and does not appear to be willing to put ideology or goals of the state above personal comfort. In the West, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexis Kosygin are often regarded as examples of the 'New Soviet Man'. This assumption is grossly misguided. Both men, like other members of the elite, especially upper elite, are protective of their status and privilege, even proud of them. Muscovites find this entire situation, especially the life style, such a mockery of Marxist ideals that they make fun of it with a joke on Brezhnev.[4]

> Brezhnev wanted to impress his mother on how well he had done in his career. He decided to invite her up from their home in Dneprodzerzhinsk, in the Ukraine and show her his ample in-town apartment, but she was nonplussed, even a little ill-at-ease. So he called the Kremlin, ordered his Zil,* and they sped out to his dacha near Usovo, one used previously by Stalin and Khrushchev. He took her all around, showed her each room, showed her the handsome grounds, but still she said nothing. So he called for his personal helicopter and flew her straight to his hunting lodge at Zavidovo. There, he escorted her to the banquet room, grandly displaying the big fireplace, his guns, the whole bit and, unable to restrain himself any longer, asked her pleadingly, 'Tell me Mama, what do you think?'
>
> 'Well,' she hesitated, 'It's good Leonid. But what if the Reds come back?'[5]

With the life of these elites being so divorced from that of the average citizen, the stage of social consciousness

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*Zil is the name for a Russian-made limousine.

[4]Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1976), p. 38.

[5]Ibid.

which must be achieved to mold the 'New Soviet Man' seems not yet to have been reached.

Karel and Irene Hulicka speak of this topic in the following words:

> Ever since the Party has been in power, it has been working on the problem of modifying the behavior and attitudes of people to conform with the type of society which it has attempted to build . . . . Its goal is two-fold and circular, to perfect social organizations so that the members of society may be perfected gradually and at the same time to transform people into higher social beings who will participate actively in the process of perfecting society . . . . Although the party has had partial success in preparing some of the pre-requisites for changes which it desires, there is no tangible evidence to support the hypothesis that it will be able to mold human nature in accordance with its goals . . . .[6]

The 'New Soviet Man' has not appeared yet in Soviet society. The evidence in this paper strongly suggests he won't, but science indicates that one is seldom justified in drawing conclusions about the results of an experiment before it is concluded.[7]

4. <u>The Soviet political elite constitute an upper class in Soviet society</u>.

The support or rejection of this hypothesis depends upon the definition which is attached to the word class.[8] For

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[6]Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, op. cit., pp. 618-624.

[7]Ibid., p. 624.

[8]Eugeni Ivanov, the Secretary for Far Eastern Political Affairs at the Soviet Embassy in 1976 told this author that 'class refers to land ownership' and since all land is owned by the state, then there are no classes in the Soviet Union. However, as will be discussed, the holding of private property exists in the Soviet Union. If that means actual land, the sources were unclear on that point.

the purposes of this discussion, class will be defined in the manner set out in Chapter I for social class. Using that definition, this research has supported this hypothesis. Hedrick Smith describes Soviet thoughts on the social structure in Soviet society. "Officially in the Soviet Union, there are two equal classes, the workers and the peasants and a 'stratum' of employees."[9] It is the 'stratum' that constitutes the elite group of Soviet society of which the political elite is the group with power. That group has developed into such an upper class, that the description of Soviet society as 'classless' also seems almost a mockery of the teachings of Marx. The Soviet system has institutionalized a double standard in life styles--for the elite especially political elite and for the masses--; these elite take their advantages for granted with an arrogant distain for the common man that often surpasses the haughtiest rich in the West.[10]

Chapter V of this thesis describes all the privileges and benefits accorded to this upper class, rising in amount with the importance of ones position in the state or Party hierarchy. At the very top, the great amount of privileges insulates that group from all the harassments and discomforts of an ordinary citizen.[11] Chapter II gives further evidence that the state supports this distinction by

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[9]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 28-29.

[10]Ibid., p. 43.

[11]Robert Kaiser, Russia (New York: Atheneum, 1976), p. 177.

offering attractive inducements to Supreme Soviet deputies, while Chapter III illustrates the link between social origin and/or occupational representation and political elite careers in the Soviet political system.

The system of privilege among the political elites has been so entrenched in Soviet society that dissidents have taken to speak out against it. Roy Medevev, one such spokeman, advocates a toning down of this practice.

> . . . It is in the interest of socialist society that its leaders have everything they need, since prosperity and well being of the whole people depend upon the quality of their work. They are in fact representatives of the nation and this function also requires additional expense . . . . An individual's talent is not just his own personal possession but also belongs to the whole people--society must nourish it with the care and attention it deserves. There is the danger however that this whole system of special privilege can become self-serving and change from a means to an end. And it is often the case that privileges tend to multiply out of proportion . . . when privileges are granted from above in the absence of public supervision, it is much easier for them to become excessive, leading to secret perogatives and the abuse of high office.[12]

This research concludes that the Soviet Union is not a 'classless' society. Its political elite is an upper class. The life-style of top Soviet government and Party officials with their foreign travel, ample expense allowances, imported clothes, dachas and servants, access to special shopping is as far beyond the ken of a Russian steel worker or a milkmaid on a collective farm as the life style of the jet set

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[12]Roy A. Medevev, On Socialist Democracy (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1975), p. 227.

American is from the life of a Detroit auto worker or a migrant farm laborer in California.[13] A Soviet citizen who is aware of the life of the political elite and desires it can only secure it through official status in the government or Party. No amount of money can buy this way of life. As a senior state official and Party member told writer Robert Kaiser, "We are attracting good young people into the Party and government apparatus, not for idealistic reasons, but for practical reasons."[14]

To balance this discussion, arguments often used by Soviets, including Marxist minded dissidents, to disclaim that Soviet society has given birth to a new class will be mentioned. First, while the children of successful people tend to inherit part of their parents' status, generally it is not possible to pass on great wealth or political power.[15] Second, whereas one day an official may enjoy the respect of his colleagues and all the comforts that the state can extend to him, the next day this could all be taken away, for if one loses his position, he loses everything.[16] However, reality somewhat changes the facts in these arguments. The power elite, by placing children or relatives in prestigious institutes, as long as they are not demoted, really do provide for

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[13]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 51.

[14]Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 192.

[15]Ibid., p. 181.

[16]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

long term status for the next family generation. (Successful intelligensia are able to pass on private wealth.) As illustrated, both in the Chapters and this conclusion, any attempt to transform Soviet society into the Marxist of 'classless' has yet to succeed.

Robert Kaiser adds an annodote to his discussion on privilege in Russia in his book Russia which not only suggests the real reason why Nikita Khrushchev was ousted, but also, hints at the feelings of the populace toward those of the privileged class in their society.

> Khrushchev had the reputation, especially among intellectuals in Moscow, of being a relatively austere man, less interested in the privileges of power than many of his colleagues. One rumor which spread through the capital a few years ago (in the late sixties and early seventies) was that Brezhnev, Kosygin and the others moved against Khrushchev in 1964 when they learned he planned to do away with many of their privileges. I never learned where this story originated and it may be baseless, but it does indicate the sort of thing many Muscovites are prepared to believe about their leaders (in regards to the privileged life).*[17]

Minor Hypotheses

The statistical and narrative material was presented in this thesis in order to investigate the major hypotheses set forth in Chapter I. However, in the course of their investigation, several minor hypotheses could not help but have been investigated due to their related subject material. It is the discussion of these that this conclusion covers now.

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*Though the basis of this rumor is unknown, it was Khrushchev who forced the top elite to move out of the Kremlin and live closer to the common people.

[17]Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 188.

1. The Soviet government elite is powerless in Soviet politics.

Though this hypothesis is not totally rejected, the evidence gathered indicated that this may not always be the case. The Soviet government elite do display some power in the political system; the dilemma is how much?

Chapter II brought out that though bills or resolutions are not usually initiated by deputies of the Supreme Soviet, the deputies can enter into the discussion of them in the Commissions or sub-Commissions and have some influence in the final form of a bill. Also, they do act as ombudsmen for their constituents. In Chapter III, the status and high regard of the Council of Ministers members as with its Presidium members (in Chapter IV) hints at the possession of political power, but to what degree? Also whereas most of the bills of the Council which are sent to the Supreme Soviet are initiated by Party directives, the overlapping membership between the Central Committee, its Secretariat, and/or Politburo and the Council of Ministers brings up the question of who initiates what and when! (However, evidence is unavailable to answer that.) Since one wrong move may mean a career in Soviet politics, the longevity in office of these ministers speaks by itself of the possession of some form of power, either personal, public, or both.

The status of government officials is also increasing in the Soviet political system. With the increase of their membership in the Central Committee and Politburo, this seems as a legitimizing effect of the power of the Soviet government

and of its importance to the party to control. With Leonid Brezhnev now a government official and the status of Alexis Kosygin, the entire government apparatus seems to be taking on the appearance of a power center. The fact that state officials are beginning to have larger representation in elite Party bodies and are able to hold on to their positions for a rather long period of time plus being accepted as members of the upper political elite implies that governofficials in the Soviet political system are not powerless.

2. All Union political institutions, except the Politburo, have only 'rubber stamp' power.

The case of this hypothesis is unique. The evidence gathered showed that in some cases this hypothesis was supported while in others it was rejected. The unmentioned power behind all the All Union political institutions is the upper Party elite or Politburo members. The fact that they hold membership in nearly every body discussed causes this hypothesis to be supported. Since major decisions of either government, economic, or Party nature have already been discussed and decided upon by them, the passage of these decisions in the form of resolutions or bills in either hierarchy is only a formal process to be carried out. Even the Council of Ministers, though not fitting the assembly image, usually only draws up bills or resolutions after Party directives have been received.

On the other hand, these institutions can contribute to these decisions and in some cases even make them. Supreme

Soviet deputies are allowed to discuss matters in committees. The Party Congress does allow various members to speak in front of a full sitting, along with the top Party officials. As mentioned, the longevity and professionalism of the Council of Ministers emanates some form of power and possible program initiation. The Presidiums may have the least amount of actual domination, but by their existence, display some control over their respective assemblies. The Central Committee is admittedly used at times to settle disputes of fate of leaders.* This hypothesis, while generally accepted in the West, has been shown to not always be the case in Soviet politics.

3. Political behavior as it appears in the Soviet Union demonstrates the desire of the political elite for power and status in Soviet society.

Acceptance was the outcome of the investigation concerning this hypothesis in this paper. Chapter V presents the evidence in detail that supports it. Covert maneuvering, accepted methodology, stiff competition, and jealously are part of the political life of the Soviet political elite in order to attain power. Double standards, a complete separation of private and public lives, and a profession (though possibly not belief) of dedication to Communist ideals is the common pattern followed in order to attain political status. The Soviet political elites are ambitious, power-hungry, and

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*This refers to the case of Nikita Khrushchev in 1957 and the case of Georgi Malenko earlier, in 1955.

status seekers with the goal of upward political mobility dominating their lives.

4. Patronage is the overriding factor in political mobility in the Soviet political system.

Support for this hypothesis was found throughout this thesis. In an oligarchical, totalitarian state such as the Soviet Union, connections or friends are very important in order to maintain or advance ones status. When power is as precarious as discussed under Major Hypotheses No. 4, those involved place great importance upon gaining supporters both superior and inferior to them in order to have some form of job security.

In Soviet elections, having a patron-client relationship with the proper level of Party elite could enhance ones opportunity for candidature for a desired position, while the nomeklatura system operates like a self-perpetuating, self-selecting fraternity, a closed corporation with the Party bosses at all levels making the important decisions.[18] Patronage can play a large role in those decisions. In top elite positions, while packing the Party and state bodies with members of their own factions and demoting those who were not entirely dependent upon them, first Stalin and then Khrushchev was able to rise to a position of all encompassing power.[19]

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[18]Hedrick Smith, op. cit., p. 105.

[19]Philip Stewart and others, "Political Mobility - Soviet Political Process", American Political Science Review (December, 1972), p. 1270.

Brezhnev, too, in recent years, using the same method, has enhanced his power and presently is recognized as the leader of the Soviet Union, both inside and outside the country.

In a study entitled "Political Mobility-Soviet Political Process", the authors found that the significance of patronage on political mobility was higher during the periods of "unchallengeable" power of Stalin and Khrushchev than during the Brezhnev-Kosygin era. Due to the latter findings, they state that the significance of patronage on political mobility in Soviet politics is probably overestimated (they see performance as significant if not more so).[20] However, their data only covered the Brezhnev-Kosygin era for three years, 1964-67. During that period, as discussed in Chapter IV, Brezhnev did not begin to display his influence or make full use of the patronage system. It was not until the early seventies that being assured of his power, he began to bring supporters into the Politburo and other memberships. Therefore, this research contradicts the conclusions of the above article, offering the summation that while performance does have a significance on political mobility, patronage is the overriding factor in it in the Soviet political system.

5. Ideological orientation is the guiding force in the life of the Soviet political elite.

As the discussions of Major Hypotheses 3 and 4 relate, the results of the investigation and subsequent evidence in

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[20] Ibid., pp. 1279-1284.

the paper shows that the guiding force in the life of the political elite appears to be material success rather than ideological orientation. With the prevalence of leading a double life for most political elites in that official duties or policy often conflicts with personal beliefs and with the great emphasis placed on personal comfort, that dedicated, ideological person does not seem to exist within this group. Rather than distribute wealth and privileges among the people, as would go along with Marxist idealism, Chapter V related how those in the privileged class guard their benefits jealously, similar to those of the older generation who intensely guard their positions of power from the intrusion of the young.

If an ideological orientation is to be the motivating force in the lives of the Soviet political elite, it would be a rationalization on the progress of Soviet society toward communism, dominated by a fervent display of patriotism for the Motherland. To the Soviet citizen as well as the elite, the Motherland is an endearing part of their lives; they think their country is 'something special'.[21] This usually does not reflect the Communist ideology of the Party programs, but the love of Russia herself. If a force beyond material success drives a member of the All Union political elite, it probably is more a love and respect for Russia than for the totalitarian country of the Soviet Union.

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[21]Robert Kaiser, op. cit., p. 190.

Summation

The All Union Soviet political elite shows a surprising amount of ability, educationally, professionally, and politically. Their actions may reflect Communist ideological goals, but more often, personal career ambitions. Though they may privately question their system of government, publically, they vocally support it. The intricacies, idiosyncrasies, and conflicts of Soviet politics has forced these politicians to function in a system where mistrust and unknowing are facts of life, non-success in an assignment could end a career, and personal dignity is a virtue unknown.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

PARALLELISM OF HIERARCHIES
ALL UNION LEVEL



Solid Arrows indicate nominal inferior body to nominal superior body.

Broken Arrows indicate actual inferior body to actual superior body.

SOURCE: Herbert McClosky and John Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), pp. 205, 319. William A. McGenaghan, Magruder's Government (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), p. 23.

APPENDIX B

ELECTION RESULTS AND DATES

Convocation	Date of Election	Total Electorate	Number and Percent Voting	Number & Percent Voting	
				Soviet of the Union	Soviet of Nationalities
I	12 Dec. 37	94,138,159	91,113,153	89,844,271	89,063,169
			96.79	98.61	97.75
II	10 Feb. 46	101,717,686	101,450,936	100,621,225	100,603,567
			99.74	99.18	99.16
III	12 Mar. 50	111,116,373	111,090,010	110,788,377	110,782,009
			99.98	99.73	99.72
IV	12 Mar. 54	120,750,816	120,727,826	120,479,249	120,539,860
			99.98	99.71	99.84
V	16 Mar. 58	133,836,325	133,796,091	133,214,652	133,431,524
			99.97	99.57	99.73
VI	18 Mar. 62	140,022,359	139,957,809	139,210,431	139,301,455
			99.95	99.47	99.60
VII	12 June 66	144,000,973	143,917,031	143,570,976	143,595,678
			99.94	99.76	99.80
VIII	14 June 70	153,237,112	153,172,213	152,771,739	152,843,228
			99.96	99.74	99.79

SOURCE: Verkhovny sovet (Vosmogosoziva), statitcheskii sbornik (Moscow: 1970), pp. 48-49, as illustrated in Peter Vanneman, "The Supreme Soviet of the USSR" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), p. 219.

APPENDIX C

SLAVIC CORE IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Members	Nationality	Four Comm.	Five Comm.	1971 Elected
Benediktov	Russian		*	
Kosygin	Russian		*	*
Mikhailov	Russian		*	
Patolichev	Russian		*	*
Pegov	Russian		*	*
Pospelov	Russian		*	
Aristov	Russian	*		
Beshchev	Russian	*		*
Brezhnev	Russian	*		*
Chernyshev	Russian	*		
Goryachev	Russian	*		*
Grishin	Russian	*		*
Kapitanov	Russian	*		*
Kuznetsov	Russian	*		*
Ignatov	Russian	*		
Organov	Russian	*		
Puzanov	Russian	*		*
Rumyantsev	Russian	*		*
Shelepin	Russian	*		*
Suslov	Russian	*		*
Titov	Russian	*		
Ustinov	Russian	*		*
Voronov	Russian	*		*
Yasnov	Russian	*		*
Yefremov	Russian	*		*
Voroshilov	Russian	*	*	
Konev	Ukrainian		*	*
KoroChenko	Ukrainian		*	
Korneichuk	Ukrainian	*		*
Mikoyan	Armenian		*	*
Snieckus	Lithuanian	*		*
Kalnberzins	Latvian	*		
Kabin	Estonian	*		*

APPENDIX C - Continued

Members	Nationality	Four Comm.	Five Comm.	1971 Elected
	Reaching Four Time Committee Members in 1971			
Dementyev	Russian			
Furteseva	Russian			
Gromyko	Russian			
Kirilenko	Russian			
Ponomarev	Russian			
Sholnikov	Russian			
Yefremov	Russi n			
Moskalenko	Ukrainian			
Podgorny	Ukrainian			
Polyansky	Ukrainian			
Titov	Ukrainian			
Mazurov	Belorussian			
Dzhavkhishvili	Georgian			
Mzhavanadze	Georgian			
Nassridinova	Uzbek			
Kunayev	Kazakh			

SOURCE: Joseph P. Mastro, "The Soviet Political Elite" (unpublished Ph.d. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1972), pp. 84, 86.

APPENDIX D

LONGEVITY OF POLITBURO MEMBERSHIP

Name	1964	1967	1971	1973	Beg. 1976	Beg. 1977
L. Brezhnev	x	x	x	x	x	x
A. Kirilenko	x	x	x	x	x	x
A. Kosygin	x	x	x	x	x	x
A. Mikoyan	x	-	-	-	-	-
N. Podgorny	x	x	x	x	x	x
D. Poliansky	x	x	x	x	x	-
A. Shelepin	x	x	x	x	-	-
P. Shelest	x	x	x	-	-	-
N. Shvernik	x	-	-	-	-	-
M. Suslov	x	x	x	x	x	x
G. Voronov	x	x	x	-	-	-
K. Mazurov	-	x	x	x	x	x
A. Pelshe	-	x	x	x	x	x
V. Grishin	-	-	x	x	x	x
D. Kunaev	-	-	x	x	x	x
V. Shcherbitsky	-	-	x	x	x	x
F. Kulakov	-	-	x	x	x	x
Y. Andropov	-	-	-	x	x	x
A. Grechko	-	-	-	x	x	-
A. Gromyko	-	-	-	x	x	x
G. Romanov	-	-	-	-	-	x
D. Ustinov	-	-	-	-	-	x

Percents Of the 1977 Membership - 33% had served since 1964
47% had served since 1967
73% had served since 1971
87% had served since 1973
87% had served since 1976

SOURCE: Grey Hodnett, "Succession Contingencies in the Soviet Union", Problems of Communism, March-April, 1975, p. 6. Richard F. Staar, ed., Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1975, 1976, 1977 (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1975, 1976, 1977), pp. 81, 69, 96.

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