Praxis and History

Gordon Garnjobat

*College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences*

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PRAXIS AND HISTORY

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Master of Arts

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Gordon Garnjobst
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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
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Master of Arts

Author

Approved, May 1987

Gary A. Kreps
Satoshi Ito
Jon Kerner
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ABSTRACT

This study is an explicit attempt to formulate a conception of social phenomena according to principles derived from Taoist philosophy, especially as set forth by Robert Pirsig in his *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*. The result is that the study was compelled to take an historical approach. Then we shall see how such a conception may be drawn upon in order to solve problems of policy legitimation. In Chapter One, we shall consider the possibility that a dominant interpretive scheme in social theory serves to obscure social reality. Dualistic thinking tends to inform social theory with an array of logical puzzles that impede access to social reality. In Chapter Two, we shall examine how hierarchy is a form of dualism, and how this allows hierarchy to substitute for an historical conception of social phenomena. In Chapter Three, our goal of social reality is restored to the extent that we can grasp the reality of Domination. Following a preparatory look at domination in both everyday life, (the Black struggle for affirmative action), and the rise of Fascism in Germany, historical analysis shall be used to sensitize us to the relationship between American Indian History and nuclear war, using a critical theory of distorted communication and concealed domination. A conclusion is put forth that the suppression of praxis in social theory is, in the final instance, determined by the suppression of American Indians in our society. This analysis will then be summarized and correlated with some properties of bourgeois visual perception, in Chapter Four.
PRAXIS AND HISTORY
CHAPTER I

LOGICAL PUZZLES

Shall we sit back and watch the social system crumble on the TV screen, or can we step out of our private views and interests, figure out what is good for humanity and act on it? Of what use is the sociological imagination to this legitimation crisis? Sociological interests derive from matters of ultimate concern, but this source is frequently lost sight of in debates that seem to oscillate between the poles of logical puzzles. And while this is going on, societal means increasingly take on a life of their own, becoming ends in themselves. Interpretive understanding is sundered into disjunctive, bi-polar categories, and the best we can do is take one category in our left hand, and one category in our right hand, and try to solve the puzzle of how they fit together.

The need in the modern world is for symbols, and theories, that give meaning to our experiences. At the same time, our very relation to our experience has been placed at stake by the development of the modern world. The late Alvin Gouldner was hopeful that ideology could serve as the symbol system we need. Indeed, he warned us that the attenuation of ideologies in the modern world constitutes not simply the
undermines the legitimacy of the total social order of everyday life in the modern world (Gouldner, 1976: 210). In other words, we face a legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1975). How can ideology guarantee the meaning of our experiences, our ability to believe, when the culminating triumph of its historical (bourgeois) development as a tunnelizing, problem-focused structure, is also the condition for the attenuation of all ideology (Gouldner, 1976; Debord, 1983). Where do we turn for rational justifications for policies when the very phrase "rational justification" places objective facts in our right hand, places relative values in our left hand, while we wait for some ultimate means-to-end consummation. So far, the only such consummation on the horizon is nuclear war.

Nowadays an everyday life must be lived under the shadow of a nuclear war, while our experience grows increasingly split between the personal and the socio-historical. It is this same split keeping facts and values apart. If facts and values could be represented horizontally, we could then picture a disjunction between the personal and socio-historical vertically.

Figure 1.

Socio-historic Meaning

Subjective Values  

Objective Facts  

Personal Experience
Figure One reveals two very important points concerning the unfolding of this thesis. The horizontal line is the dimension on which dualism exists. It represents the decay of social theory into the polemic use of terms in debates about the methodology of social science (Levy, 1981: 111-12). The vertical line is both the source of the horizontal line as well as that which the horizontal line excludes by setting itself up as the totality of what we can be aware of and accomplish. As a fettered form of the vertical line, dualism both reveals and conceals a compelling level of analysis.

The same dualism that keeps our left hand values and our right hand values spinning away from each other prevents us from engaging our sociological imagination. The sociological imagination is simultaneously an epistemology and an ontology. It is not a logical puzzle whose elements are held in each hand. It allowed Thorstein Veblen, for example, to see more deeply into social reality when, in Absentee Ownership, he restored to awareness the relationship between slavery and the phenomenal form of business in his day:

Perhaps also it was, in some part, in this early pursuit of gain in this moral penumbra, [slavery], that American business enterprise learned how not to let its right hand know what its left hand is doing... (Veblen, 1967: 171).

Veblen saw that connections between elements of experience were not being made within a given form of social reality, and mode of social relations, because a more
elemental connection was not being made between that social structure and the slavery which preceded it. By analogy, we should follow Veblen’s lead.

Social reality is more than exploitation and slavery. Since Veblen wrote, we have seen an extension of civil rights legislation, and finally a gratification-based consumer culture; and nuclear weapons that stand ready to destroy the way of life which they nominally defend. Yet we must admit that social reality is even more than this. It is a totality. The epistemological problem we face is as challenging as it is necessary, for nuclear weapons now place the totality at stake in the modern world. Accordingly, this thesis must be read as an attempt to address the epistemological challenge. Richard Slotkin (1985: 53) completes our image of social totality succinctly:

The fact of dispossessing Indians to make way for plantations and slavery had important consequences for the development of American ideology and myth.

Here is your vertical dimension in Figure 1

Sociology has a goal. This goal is usually referred to as dialectics. Another word for this goal is praxis. This goal is immersed in and permeated by a cultural complex of dualities, themselves derived from our post-medieval heritage. The resolution of fundamental ambiguities informs every logical puzzle with an aura of alchemy. Much effort goes into puzzling over something in our left hand and something in our right hand. Just how do these two things
"fit"? We are given over to a mode of thinking called Rationalism, which is where we get the expectation for solving these dualistic logical puzzles. Rationalism is both the source of these logical puzzles and the answer to them. Rationalism promises too much.

Bourgeois thought inherited the ambiguous post-medieval heritage of Western Europe. The medieval synthesis of sacred Christianity and secular Roman Empire had, in this modern period, fallen apart. Rationalism emerged as a compensation for the historical withdrawal of transcendental reason with the waning of the middle ages. The world was becoming estranged from its religious and metaphysical grounding. Becoming widespread was an inability to hold beliefs with the same kind of confidence attending the religious faith. Rationalism derives from this former religious cultural context (E.A. Burtt, 1954). At the same time, rationalism is a distinctly modern outlook. But it is this post-medieval background that informs our logical puzzles.

The dominant logical puzzle in sociology today is probably the dialectic of action and order:

Every social theory inherently combines an answer to the question of action with an answer to the question of how a plurality of such are interrelated and ordered... and this is precisely the task of critical theoretical thought (Alexander, 1982: 90).

The intended meaning of this framework is that we derive from it standards by which to evaluate theory. The
claim is made the the solution to a logical puzzle is found in the logical puzzle. Alexander promises too much.

Whatever else it may be, rationalism expresses the belief that logical puzzles have solutions. Logical puzzles can be visualized as a goal and the elements to be combined into the goal. The dialectic of action and order is presented in Figure 2.

Following Gregory Bateson's (1979) lead, we can represent logical puzzles generically. All this means, in reference to figure 2, is that you can fill in the circles with whatever concepts correspond to your own favorite logical puzzle.

![Figure 2: Dialectic of Action and Order](image)

Bateson would tell us the no matter how clever you are at specifying the linkages between the poles of your logical puzzle, they ultimately do not "add up" to the desired synthesis:

no amount of rigorous discourse of a given logical type can 'explain' phenomena of a higher type (Bateson, quoted in Berman (1984) : 230).

My argument shall be precisely that historical analysis requires attending to the "higher type" phenomena referred
to by Bateson. What is needed is a source we can tap into, so to speak; the repository of subsidiary awareness which dualism tries to emulate but from which it merely derives; a reservoir of unstructured meaning and a model of ideology which can attend to it (Berman, 1984; Gouldner, 1976). This cultural resource may very well lie in our history (Barbu, 1971).

Our problem is one of attending to this higher reality. As with the Tao, (the God-Head resides just as comfortably in a poorly-tuned machine as it does in a well-tuned one), so with dialectics. The dialectic continues to operate through all its fettered forms. But it is only from the vantage point of the higher reality that we can distinguish the difference. Bourgeois thought, on the other hand, reifies the fettered form, thereby degrading it and ultimately having to seek refuge in a metaphysical realm of ideals. Whatever historical reality presents itself from outside of this conceptual straightjacket is experienced by bourgeois thought in two major ways. In the first, are the forms of constituted unreason. Reason ends up confronting itself in a mystified form. In the second are the forms of nostalgia and romanticism that we see everyday as retrospect.

The main tenet of the sociology of knowledge is that our ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in the reality of our social existence. The potential of this approach has been fettered by a dominant interpretive scheme
which tries to find a link between social structure and cultural meanings: another logical puzzle. As a mystification of the potential from which it derives, the logical puzzle both conceals and reveals that potential (Kosik, 1976).

An interpretive method is based on the following two-fold proposition: to identify the forces giving shape to our form of life, you recognize the systematic exclusion of something essential that, in its very absence, continues to influence this deficient form of being: our condition of estrangement. Then, by attending to it, you realize how what you attend to ultimately shapes the form of life. In the process, reality is expanded (Quinney, 1982) by being given a dimension of depth. In this dimension of depth is a vantage point that transcends the limitations on public discourse (distorted communication) and allows us to once again speak about rational justifications for policies in the human interest without being accused of relativism or relying on the continued oppression of outgroups remote from our everyday life. It was this dimension of depth which Thorstein Veblen tapped into, thereby expanding the self-contained world of business enterprise in his day with its historical source. To abolish the conditions under which capitalist society experiences history in mystified ways is to actually incorporate history. This position, says Karel Kosik, is the only possible logical construction of social existence (Kosik, 1976: 85, 112-113).
Our goal is a conception of the social which offers more than a logical puzzle. We may be able to find this in an historical approach:

All points of view in politics, Mannheim argued, are but partial points of view because historical totality is always too comprehensive to be grasped by any one of the individual points of view which emerge out of it (Mannheim, 1936: 151, cited in Keller, 1968: 332). As each of the elements in a logical puzzle is only a partial aspect of the meaning from which they derive, it does not follow that the sum of those elements equals the meaning at the source. Only in the isolation produced by the imagination may these elements exist as dualisms in the first place. In the arena of policy legitimation, dualism presents us with distinctions in meaning between ideas that are related through the distinction: ideologies. Without a common source from which to derive, there would be no dimension to contain their divergence from each other. A mode of awareness which only sees the divergence does not see how the elements may actually be related, except as a logical puzzle. Consciousness is tricked into believing that only one or the other may be focused on at a time, thereby converting them into ideologies. In the process, their meaning is diminished, rendered relative to material interest, polarized from each other, and no longer compelling to believe in. It is this legitimation crisis which characterizes the modern model of bourgeois politics:

The one side affirms what the other denies, and vice versa ... That view and this view produce each other... That view involves both a right and a wrong and this view involves both a right and a wrong: are there two views or is there actually one? They have not found their point of correspondence, the pivot of the Way (Holbrook, 1981: 110).

Many of us in sociology have derived our traditional interests from Emile Durkheim. According to Karl Mannheim (1982: 208-209), Durkheim was "on to something", and could have distinguished it adequately had he not clung so closely to the rationalist standard which insists social reality be apprehended in terms of a synthesis of logic and empiricism.
Durkheim was in fact attending to higher level phenomena with his principle of association the way in which elements are combined in a relationship produces effects whose whole is greater than the sum of the parts. A rationalist logical puzzle undermined his goal. Durkheim conceded: less apparent facts are doubtless more essential, but

at this stage of scientific knowledge they cannot be visualized save by substituting for reality some conception of the mind (Durkheim, 1982: 75).

Durkheim's ambivalence about the ultimate reality of his "social facts" is perhaps well known by those familiar with his work. Are social facts "real things", or are they "like" real things. Or should we simply treat them "as if" they are. This hang-up from way back was where Durkheim was deriving his standards for evaluating theoretical development, and not from an adequate conception of the social. Durkheim tended to a structural-functional ontology, and this "synthesis" breaks down into a logical puzzle itself. The ambiguous legacy we inherit from Durkheim is that while social facts are an external, empirical order of reality not available to direct experience, the causes of social phenomena are ultimately internal to society (Durkheim, 1982).

To this we must add that Durkheim gave us a rather non-historical image of social phenomena. The effects of group association he attended to seem to occur after the groups
have come into existence. The actual genesis of these groups is not considered. This missing dimension is ontologically significant because, without it, the question of the existence of important social classes remains unsettled, precisely because of the rationalist demand to apprehend them through a synthesis of logic and empiricism. Analysis breaks down into the fetishism of merely using concepts to designate a reality which conforms to the theorist's position on the logical puzzle. Karl Marx did not have this problem when he set social classes in their historical context (Laclau, 1977).

The logical puzzle and the exclusion of historical context are related. A forced synthesis of structuralism and functionalism was Durkheim's mystified way of representing a reality he recognized as essential, but which rationalism systematically excludes due to its close affinity with the bourgeois principle. If rationalism relies on the ability of logical thought to rid itself of collective representations and detect the essential, (Fuhrman, 1984), logical puzzles reveal instead that we are not dealing at all with a rational expression of nonsense, but a "mystified expression of a rational reality" (Kosik, 1976: 146-148).

Rationalist reason tends to be dualistic. A logical puzzle is the attempt by bourgeois thought to build a bridge over this division, "thus playing a trick on itself all the time, deceiving itself and hoping for unity" (J.
Krishnamurti, quoted in Butcher, 1986: 46). Instead of achieving its goal, this faulty method must settle for a substitute which then, under scrutiny, breaks down again into the logical puzzle form, sending bourgeois thought back into the same state of ambivalence from which it derives.

In chapter two, we will focus on a process whereby Hierarchy reproduces the split between poles of logical puzzles onto a vertical dimension, thus maintaining dualism in the form of a disjunction between the personal and the socio-historical. Hierarchy exists as a representation of higher type phenomena, and as a substitute for it. This is because hierarchy encodes a dualistic organizing principle onto a vertical dimension. Then, in chapter 3, we build on the previous chapter's defense of the sociology of knowledge. Problems of praxis are illustrated by examples from everyday life, (the Black struggle for affirmative action), and from Ernesto Laclau's analysis of Fascism in Germany. Ultimately, though, we return to the theme of the depth of social reality as the meaning of social existence and the source of our sociological interests and experiences. Our attention will focus on the American Indian struggle against genocide at Big Mountain, in Arizona. We shall look for a possible link between American Indian History and nuclear war, using a critical theory of distorted communication and concealed domination. A conclusion shall be presented stating that the suppression of American praxis compels us, as sociologists of knowledge,
to come to terms with the suppression of the American Indian. I shall then draw upon this conception of social reality to advocate the necessity of legitimating American Indian treaty rights. The thesis will then close with a summarization in Chapter 4 correlating the analysis with some properties of bourgeois visual perception.
CHAPTER II
HIERARCHY

Our goal is a conception of the social that offers more than a logical puzzle. Only in the nature of the social world in which we dwell will we find the standards by which to evaluate theories and policies. Our task in this chapter is to examine what we find in place of our goal. Social analysis systematically excludes social reality every time it insists on apprehending it in terms of a solution to a logical puzzle. In its place are substituted other concepts of reality—whether referring to structural, natural, or spatial phenomena. In the substitution, social reality becomes a subject of itself, and a deformation into a conditioned phenomenal form of life shrouded with ambiguity. Yet, in a sense, our estrangement from social reality is still within social reality. Social reality does not cease to exist when cast out by the mystifying standard which insists that the more of reality we can illuminate by a synthesis of logic and empiricism, the more ‘real’ this reality will be regarded as (Kosik, 1976: 148). Although we are "taught to believe that an experience is more real if it is filtered through some machine or apparatus before it
reaches our senses" (Slater, 1977: 149), social reality demands more of us than this:

Social existence is an area of being, or a sphere of existence, of which orthodox ontology, which recognizes only the absolute dualism between being and meaning, takes no account (Mannheim, 1936: 294).

We associate Karl Mannheim with a tradition that, in recent times, has fallen into disrepute: the sociology of knowledge. The main tenet of this tradition - that our ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in the reality of our social existence - derives from an abiding concern this tradition has with reconciling rationality with belief. Indeed, the post-medieval, modern world was born of this fundament of ambiguity.

The problem I wish to address in relation to these ultimate concerns is: how can we view dualism in social context? If rationalism insists on apprehending social reality through a necessary solution to a logical puzzle, it is because rationalism derives from a larger world view which insists reality be apprehended in terms of an absolute distinction between the sacred and the secular. If the most striking feature about the post-medieval, modern world is its secularism, how are we post-moderns to understand secularity when its culmination leaves no counterpart alive with which to compare it? Now, for the first time, we are truly in a position of having to give meaning to our experiences all by ourselves:
The secularization of the contemporary age has meant not so much the demise of the sacred as it has meant the infusion of the sacred into every realm (Quinney, 1982: 168).

My approach in this paper is to bid old Gods their destined farewell, while recognizing that what we have in their place is our accumulated collective experience - our history. I shall draw upon two premises concerning the nature of social reality to begin this project:

1. Social reality is more than that to which we can consciously attend in our everyday lives.
2. There exists in the world that which is transcendent of everything in the world yet fully present in everything in the world.

The essence of dualism lies in the capture of our attention by the 'circular' precept-percept perceptual circuit of the dominant bourgeois interpretive scheme. Distinctions in meaning between ideas that are actually related through the distinction, polarized from each other and relative to material interest, are actually splits in which each side of the split is contained in just such a vicious circle. As such, each partial value becomes absolute unto itself. Originally a value is derived from a higher order conception, part of which is made manifest and the remainder being latent (Stanley, 1968). Think of it as a figure emerging into view against a background. The stability of the perception is belied by its actual process whereby data is continually filtered into the foreground and
excluded into the background in such a way as to maintain the organization. Once in place, the perceiver is likely to filter in only the information which provides positive feedback to the figure. A different type of information processing is required for a gestalt switch which would reorganize the whole into a new figure-ground configuration (Phillips, 1972: 151). In a dichotomy, the polarized values themselves provide the points of reference for perceptual continuity. Now we have a new situation. The background that was present in the case of the perceived single value is now repressed, and twice removed from the situation at hand, so that its role in the process is entirely tacit. Each value is now the background for the other value. Each value excludes the other while each requires the other. Each alone is inconceivable - a ding an sich - as Bateson (1979) puts it: a sound of one hand clapping. If each idea is clear and distinct, we must also accept that this clarity is associated with a repressive mechanism: "[A] balanced adjustment, individual or collective, requires the presence in the field of perception of certain selecting, emphasizing, and eliminating processes for the purpose of smoothing or avoiding tensions and conflicts (Barbu, 1960: 39-40)."

Barbu maintains this response developed as an adjustment to the "high-strung" anxieties associated with the waning of the Middle Ages. The association of a narrowed focusing of the attention with heightened awareness can also
be seen as a way of dealing with moral ambiguity. In the course of repression, Barbu maintains, we have lost an important connection to our history. In the separation, the world acquired depth in spatial terms for the first time, as a substitute for what was lost.

Ideology inherited the post medieval ambiguity. As an adjustment, however, distinctions in meaning between ideas that are related through the distinction are transformed into absolute fragments, the limitations of which are attributed to the interests of their adherents, who must use ideology to take what is partial and make it represent the general interest of the whole society. Thus is born the bourgeois principle.

Dualistic splits may well be symptomatic representations of a more basic disjunction between the personal and the socio-historical (Gouldner, 1976). The problem is with the bourgeois principle: you cannot extend a derivative to its source and expect to account for that source in terms of the derivative. This faulty method can only offer a substitute. In what follows, we shall consider Hierarchy as being this substitute.

Hierarchy is a vertical spatial metaphor that reproduces the split between poles of a logical puzzle onto a vertical dimension, in which our learned classification of 'higher' and 'lower' and the learned value that 'higher' is better than 'lower' is coded so as to preserve dualism (Schwartz, 1976).
Dualism as a logical type is carried over into hierarchy. Hierarchy begins with a logical puzzle, such as the demand to synthesize induction and deduction, and reproduces the split onto a vertical dimension. Hierarchy takes this: (each side of the split is a vicious circle).

Figure 3

and incorporates it like this:

If you imagine Figure 3 being superimposed upon Figure 1, the poles of the logical puzzle are on the horizontal line. When this state of being serves as an epistemology, our ability to give meaning to our experiences is impaired, thereby allowing the disjunction between the personal and social-historical to grow. How may we conceive of this epistemology?
Hierarchy emerges out of a process of intergroup bias which maintains group boundaries on a horizontal dimension of inclusion and exclusion. The ingroup-outgroup distinction is our most basic social experience of binary contrast (Schwartz, 1976, 160). In what follows, we shall examine findings that lend support to the idea that a categorical social relation is the elementary prototype for a dominant interpretive scheme.

Let us begin with our most basic form of social experience. We are, all of us, included in some groups and excluded from others. Ingroups and outgroups provide for us our most basic form of social experience. To exist in a social category is to have a prototype by which our perceptual experience is organized. These schemata are like paradigms: data which 'fit' the schemata are selectively included while data which do not 'fit' are filtered out. Categorization minimizes perceived differences among members within a group, and maximizes them in reference to an outgroup. Similarities of outgroup members to ingroup members will be minimized. The category alone is necessary and sufficient for this to take place (Tajfel, et al., 1971). This is why we often hear racial comments about how people of a different race than ours all tend to look alike. The way we perceive is the way we relate.

This rudimentary fact also contains a moral classification. Outgroups will be discriminated against even when standards of fairness are supplied in experimental
situations. The salience of group identity is inversely related to the application of moral worth to outgroups (Tajfel, 1971). Thus any horizontal classification implies a hierarchical one as well:

When judgments concerning some quantifiable or rateable aspects of stimuli which fall into distinct categories are called for, differences in value or relevance cannot fail to influence the quantitative judgments in the direction of sharpening the objectively existing differences between the stimuli (Tajfel, 1981: 70).

Sense perception is a process of filtering, whereby "relevant stimuli are included and others excluded" (Mead, 1982: 15). An organization which distinguishes between "figure" and "ground" is our most basic perceptual experience. This "selective perception" is precisely the definitive property of a dominant interpretive scheme:

Differentiation at the level of cognitive representations is always associated with evaluative and behavioral discriminations (Tajfel, 1981: 60).

Social categorization is not just an organizing principle used in the absence of other guideposts; it is capable of creating deliberate discriminatory behavior (Tajfel et al., 1971: 163).

The group to which we belong shapes and distorts our perception of outgroup members in such a way as to be most conducive to keeping the distinction between the groups clear (Tajfel, 1981).
If a person desires stability in her or his social relations, information that is consistent with the person's definition of the social situation should be useful because it reinforces and stabilizes one's perception of the situation. Thus, in an intergroup setting a person should prefer information indicating that ingroup members are similar to oneself and that outgroup persons are dissimilar. This pattern of information preference is consistent with and serves to strengthen perceived differences between the ingroup and the outgroup (Wilder, 1981: 227).

Categorization minimizes perceived differences and similarities between people when these perceptions would otherwise diverge from what would fit into the category. These same naturally occurring differences and similarities are maximized in the direction of their respective categorical stereotypes. This is why people tend to recognize individuals of their own race more easily than individuals of some other race, who all tend to look alike.

This elementary state of intergroup bias provides an organizing principle for social hierarchies as well. Evidence of perceptual distortion in terms of categories also works on a vertical ordering of perceptual distortions (Schwartz, 1981: 54). Since any ingroup members are more variable in their perceived features than outgroup members, group evaluation is affected by virtue of being categorized into an ingroup or an outgroup (Mc Arthur, 1982: 161-5). Tajfel and his associates report:

the curious finding that subjects often act to maximize the difference between groups rather than simply maximizing benefits for the ingroup (Wilder, 1981: 232).
Categorization is a pervasive cognitive process (Wilder, 1981: 213), as well as perceptual (Schwartz, 1981, 142). Hierarchy derives from the same code as horizontal group classifications, in which binary discrimination is the most primitive mental operation (Schwartz, 1981: 28, 54). With this in mind, binary contrast can be seen as the most basic form of social experience. It is precisely through the binary mode that vertical categories align themselves with other types of dual classifications:

Disposing us as it does to binary categorization, this cognitive operation [hierarchy] reinforces (if it does not actually derive from) the dualisms within society itself (Schwartz, 1981: 152).

The relation between classification and binary thought takes two dimensions: horizontal and vertical:

On the collective level, an availability of objective dual classifications not only reflects and sustains the boundaries of groups; it also leads to joint action toward that which is classified (Schwartz, 1981: 156).

The findings I have summarized illustrate a relationship between binary social relations and binary ideas and values that is holistically mediated through perception, then perceived dualistically, after the fact. Perception is selective. Group boundaries are perceptual schemata that filter perceptual stimuli so that data which are included in the schemata are precisely the positive feedback which reproduce the schemata. Only in the bourgeois
imagination is this reality then regarded as more real than that which is filtered out or excluded.

Social reality is more than that to which we can consciously attend in our everyday lives. Bourgeois thought reduces this reality into its own terms, then extends itself back into that reality. Hierarchy is the result. Hierarchy represents a particular historical consciousness that comprehends nothing beyond itself. A self-contained world view needs an epistemology to reproduce itself as it excludes troublesome portions of reality. This (bourgeois) principle leads us to predict that in that very excluded reality lies the source of the exclusionary epistemic principle.

Bourgeois thought, however, could never appear legitimate on the basis of hierarchy alone. Certainly the bourgeoisie's co-optation of natural science gives hierarchy a legitimately appearing guise in society, but still, the continuity with the old regime would have been too obvious for its class project to succeed. The triumph of the bourgeoisie was mediated by, and exalted by, ideologies. Ideologies made it possible for the bourgeoisie to extend itself into society in such a way that its class interest could be articulated on behalf of the interest of society as a whole. At the same time, those very same ideologies also prevented any understanding of human social existence as lived in the reality of the whole world, especially the continuity with the old regime. As a result, the bourgeois
experience with ideology is a matter of premising certain achieved values in order to focus on precarious and scarce values. Paradoxically, this focus then undermines those achieved values premised as given (Gouldner, 1976).

Bourgeois ideologies are tunnelizing, problem-focused structures. Thus they could exclude the old regime and replace it with a mystifying concept referring to the interest-tainted social location of the adherent of an ideology. This development presented Karl Marx with a real dilemma. How can we develop a sociology of knowledge, (in which we declare that our ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in the reality of our social existence), when bourgeois thought uses it (with seemingly equal force) in its own domination-concealing way? The sociology of knowledge has yet to emerge from this struggle whole.

Something was lost when the sociology of knowledge transplanted itself on American soil: its abiding concern with the rationality of society's goals rather than with merely the rationality of the means to achieve them. The limits such a context place on rationality have been spelled out by Gouldner (1976: 241):

All problem solving premises that some features of the situation are unchangeable. These features are defined as given. The 'givens' limit and constrain foci of activity so that administrators focus the bureaucracy on the residual, non-given elements from which it selects its problematics.
The means to ends relationship is pressed into serving as an epistemology which excludes attending to larger contexts. Social reality is more than that to which we can consciously attend in our everyday lives, but the dualistic nature of calculative thinking (Quinney, 1982) causes rationality to become a circular precept-percept perceptual circuit. The means thereby become ends in themselves. The "wheels of redundancy" keep turning endlessly. In a world rendered calculable, only so much is known as might be so rendered (Mannheim, 1982: 155). Then, without any goals, there is no standard by which to measure anyone's views (Schell, 1982: 151).

Emile Durkheim was on to something when he wrote:

the attention, in concentrating the mind upon a small number of objects, blinds it to a greater number of objects (Durkheim, 1953 : 21).

The excluded reality continues to exist even when we are not aware of it. Durkheim could have, at this point, gone on to reveal social existence had not his rationalist inclinations prevented him from doing so:

Everything is a product of certain causes. Phenomena must not be presented in closed series. Things have a 'circular' character and analysis can be prolonged to infinity (Durkheim 1983: 67).

Instead Durkheim set up social reality as an external determinant:
A false method again ends up making inadvertent substitutions that the scholar overlooks: he discusses 'reality' whereas his false method has meanwhile transformed reality into something else and has reduced it to 'conditions' (Kosik, 1976: 78,91).

These 'conditions' have had two serious and negative consequences for the sociology of knowledge. Just how these 'conditions' contain and ground subsequent developments becomes, for the sociology of knowledge, a logical puzzle: can we empirically establish a link between conditions and consciousness. A second and even more serious problem, is relativism. What happens when the rationality which discovers that ideas and conceptions of social reality are grounded in the reality of social existence sees itself in the same light? Karl Mannheim was aware that these two problems are related. Relativism as a doctrine premises Rationalism (Mannheim, 1936: 78-79).

The same narrowed concentration of the attention which excludes significant portions of reality also serves a dominant interpretive scheme which creates the logical puzzles that can only apprehend social reality in a mystified way. Dualism, the organizing principle of hierarchy, is also an epistemology that excludes from awareness that which hierarchy represents, or emulates. Bourgeois epistemology contains a fundamental dualism that is due to a dominant interpretive scheme, which uses our experience of social categories - ingroups and outgroups - in order to make it impossible to think historically.
"Out of itself, the bourgeois [principle] undertook to produce the order it had negated outside itself (Adorno, cited in Levy, 1981: 91). The bourgeois principle contains an epistemological orientation with which it both reproduces itself and excludes the significant portions of reality to which my level of analysis aspires. Then, out of itself, it undertakes to emulate the excluded reality as it reproduces itself. It is this principle which seems to establish the disjunction between the personal and the sociohistorical, assuring that specific "troubles" do not get interpreted as the symptoms of the public "issues" generating them.

All I am saying is that hierarchy is a mystified substitute for a level of analysis we find ourselves estranged from. A hang-up from way back divides reality into separate realms of appearance and essence, and allows the scholar to deny ontological status to appearances while treating essence as the more real reality hidden behind the appearing one. Furthermore, the ultimate 'proof' of this method is based on observation - a most curious position if you think about it (E.A. Burtt, 1954). At best, a compromise position allows the scholar to regard hierarchy as a heuristic device (Wallace, 1983).

In the sociology of knowledge, this "two-world theory" (Quinney, 1982) treats "ideologies" as appearances and has varying conceptions for essence that all boil down to "conditions". In the separation, we are then led to expect that someday someone will be clever enough to specify the
link between them. And, if not, then the theory violates this all important standard and is discredited. In the midst of all this, our "conditions" are being held to ground certain special effects or properties. In the separation, however, the scholar inadvertently ends up with a non-historical image of social relations in which association by itself is held to be the source of the special properties unique to social reality. The missing meaning is then expected to be revealed as a solution to a logical puzzle of 'conditions' and consciousness - a mystification.

The dualistic organization of opposites which defy integration, the logical puzzle, is found in our most basic form of social experience: ingroup and outgroups. It is a faulty sociology of knowledge which addresses this issue by extending this dualism back into that reality to try to emulate it, but from which dualism merely derives, in the form of a logical puzzle. The logical puzzle reduces social reality to the conditions which ground ideas of social reality. Our ideas and conceptions are grounded in the reality of our social existence, but the potential realization is stillborn as soon as a logical puzzle insists that we demonstrate a link between conditions and ideas:

What we have done as it were, is to take a great pair of scissors and cut the single proposition out of the concrete situation in which it functioned and did its work, and then on this dislocated fragment we have constructed a fantastic and meaningless structure to build it back into the whole (Berman, 1984: 157).
Whatever rationality is involved in this approach is the rationality from which it derives but which the approach then abandons in the course of solving a logical puzzle. The existential determinants of thought are thereby reduced to the interest-ideology, or base-superstructure, logical puzzle. The jargon today is in terms of "premises" and "paradigms" (Gouldner, 1976; Perrow, 1979) but the situation is the same. Instead of the rationality of the sociology of knowledge being grounded in social reality, it "grounds out" in the interest-tainted position of the adherent of an ideology.

A mere shift in perspective, intended to reveal certain aspects of reality, actually forms a reality that is altogether different, or rather, substitutes one thing for another while being oblivious of this substitution (Kosik, 1976: 54).

The sociology of knowledge practiced as a logical puzzle derives from its abiding concerns with rationality. However, in this shift in perspective, there is not at all a successful emulation of that source, but only a substitute for it. We, the inheritors of this substitution, forget that you cannot emulate a reality with principles that merely derive from that reality. This rationalist alchemy, which conceals the reality it derives from, is itself responsible for the characteristic paradoxes of Western thought (Berman, 1984: 128). Addressing the cause of the crisis, James W. Garrison (1986: 336) writes of:
the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically substructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable - our everyday life world...

The modern natural philosopher inherits this substitution. The result is that he has forgotten that the life world is the meaning fundament of natural science and his formulae are thereby usurped of their meaning.

The reality which rationalism attempts to emulate, but from which it merely derives, remains fully in existence, and present in all that rationalism accomplishes. Martin Jay (1984: 137) argues that pretending it is not is a contributing factor to the "maintenance of the very hierarchical distinctions that [social reality] hopes to overcome".

Dualism, the organizing principal of hierarchy, is also an epistemology which excludes from its dominant interpretive scheme that which hierarchy represents. Hierarchy can be understood as a continuation of dualism; as the attempt to get beyond dualism in terms of dualism. The essence of humanity is the unity of subjectivity and objectivity but,

The antinomy between 'conditions' and consciousness is one of the different transitory historical forms of the subject-object dialectics which in turn is the basic factor of the dialectics of society (Kosik, 1976: 70).

To abolish the conditions under which we apprehend the social through logical puzzles is to actually incorporate
the social. The nature of our subject matter contains within itself the critical significance by which to evaluate our field of study. If our goal is a unified conception of opposites, we must approach it from a level which lies beyond the sum total of dialectical pairs of opposites (Kosik, 120). Without this level, mental developments are mere substitutes for it.

For an adequate ideology, and epistemology, we need a complex of symbols, whose components adequately render the items of experience in a meaningful order. For knowledge in this known realm to hold, however, it must be integrated with a realm that is unknown, but whose reality must be accepted if the meanings established in the known realm are to hold (Levy, 1981: 11). To do otherwise is to resort to abstract sentiments (ideals) with which to cement together our polarized ideologies. This is the same model of bourgeois politics which is responsible for the very problems that it is changed with solving.

A system that cannot generate a humane existence without altering beyond recognition its basic mode of production, responds by attempting to integrate the problems of its own creation into the overall system (Quinney, 1980: 64).

Jonathan Schell (1982: 177) wrote, in The Fate of the Earth, that we will not be able to make the world cohere horizontally until we first integrate it vertically. By vertically, Schell means historically. Hierarchy, by virtue
of its vertical dual coding, is able to substitute for the historical depth of reality that is the fundament of meaning from which our institutionalized values are derived and made concrete. Its terms of resolution are an attempt to emulate something they merely derive from. Social ontology is informed by a structure of meaning, from which focused, polarized ideologies are derived (hence, also informed by). In the polarization, however, this relation is lost, and polarized ideologies merely bounce off each other, ironically taking from their opposites some of their own inner qualities, even as they reduce to relativistic, interest-bound perspectives. Our concrete experiences acquire meaning only when referred to the higher order conceptions from which they derive (Quinney, 1982: 95).

As a collective representation, hierarchy both reveals and conceals a fettered dialectical analysis:

Hierarchy is... not a chain of superimposed commands or even the ranking of different values, but rather an expression of a holistic unity of opposites that is as much a part of the structure of human thought as the binary oppositions posited by Levi-Strauss (Jay, 1984: 141).

With historical analysis, and in the following chapter, we have an opportunity to contribute to a project advocated by the sociologist Richard Quinney (1982: 72-75):
A vastly different way of thinking about the sacred and the secular is to conceive of two qualities of existence, with the awe-filled character of the sacred informing the everyday secular pursuits of life. It is this conception, as opposed to the [binary] notion, that I shall draw upon...The sacred-secular distinction prevents us from understanding our human existence as lived in the reality of the whole world.

In this dialectic of the sacred and the secular, Quinney finds the depth of reality.

Social reality does not just revolve around the subjects and objects of our logical puzzles. It does not just passively illuminate them. It is not subordinate to them in any way. It has created them. They are subordinate to it. The very existence of the logical puzzle itself is derived from social reality (Pirsig, 1974: 215).

The method of rationalism is to apprehend social reality through a synthesis of experience and reason. The theory of rationalism promises that the world's logical puzzles have solutions. Rationalism can't be both, and in these terms, as we have seen, it promises too much. Our efforts are undermined by what should become known as the bourgeois principle: you cannot extend a derivative in such a way that it subsumes its source. This attempt is responsible for the post-medieval ambivalence we continue to experience in bourgeois society. The same dominant interpretive scheme which splits subjectivity and objectivity is found in the disjunction between the personal and the sociohistorical. Hierarchy is the attempt to emulate integration at this level in terms of polarized
relativism (in the policy arena, where all this applies, ultimately). In these terms, it is a substitute for a higher reality. In going beyond dualism, we recognize that the transcendent (historical) is not beyond the realm of existing facts, but:

as long as consciousness is captive of this split, it will not behold its historical character (Kosik, 1976: 125).

Logical puzzles are actually decayed and fragmented remnants of pre-modern, or medieval, cultural values. Logical puzzles are the conceptual categories, the medieval spectacles, through which we look, and think. The main epistemological effect of these medieval spectacles is to prevent us from seeing our very real continuity with the European Middle Ages. The ironic thing about these medieval spectacles, or logical puzzles, is that to move beyond the Middle Ages, we must first perceive clearly that we are still in the Middle Ages. Perhaps if we begin to view the logical puzzle as the hang-up from way back that it actually is, we can begin to abolish it. To abolish the conditions under which we apprehend history in mystified ways is to actually incorporate history (Kosik, 1976: 125). It is my thesis that as we begin to recover our sense of history, we shall abolish the conditions under which we apprehend the social through the solving of logical puzzles. Instead, we can begin to view the world as standing always within the encompassing presence of all that is (Barrett, 1979: 166).
Concerning the following chapter, it will also be immensely helpful to keep this dictum in mind: the reality to which we attend is never only what it is, but also what it was. It is a system which has depth (Barbu, 1960: 9).

The logical and empirical poles of the rationalist logical puzzle, when abolished, do not add up to anything, but instead will collapse into each other, in a most curious sort of way, like a black hole in space (Jones, 1982). Out of this metaphorical black hole emerge the phenomena in our everyday life that are of final consequence. A sancrosanctness that Marx (1971: 41) called a universal "ether" of being, John O'Neill (1974) calls it the collective focus of seeing and being seen that is the natural light of man:

Then, as out of a mist, there emerge the material and dynamic aspects of the earth, revealing themselves as powers in their own right, and no longer wearing the masks of the parents. They are thus not a substitute but a reality that corresponds to a higher level of consciousness (C.G. Jung, 1964: 36-7).
CHAPTER III

AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY AND NUCLEAR WAR

Domination: its effects are mediated by a social category in such a manner as to conceal domination from ordinary methods of interpretation. Domination has a dominant interpretive scheme whose effects are to conceal domination. Our ability to detect such realms is conditioned by those very realms. In societies prizing egalitarian values, it is important to conceal domination (Gouldner, 1976: 205). This is accomplished by a process of distorted communication, which makes use of social categories:

Categorization deflects discourse away from the content of a dispute, (i.e., what the powerful are doing), to whether the subjects making the truth claims are like everybody else (Sennett, 1980: 182).

Domination takes advantage of the epistemological properties of social categories and thereby stays hidden from perception:

If there are important systems in the world that are complex without being hierarchical, they may to a considerable extent escape our observation and our understanding (H. Simon, quoted in Wallace, 1983: 169).
A dominant interpretive scheme binds our attention to the dualistic thought form, thereby preventing us from adequately conceptualizing the disjunction between the everyday life and the socio-historical. Nowadays the everyday life is lived in, immersed in, and permeated by the nuclear world. All our experiences have reference to, and derive from, this world (Schell, 1984: 69). Our common response is to dissociate ourselves from this reality and retreat into our private lives. In our minds, we choose this dissociation (Aronson, 1983: 269). This is how we experience the disjunction between the personal and the socio-historical. Our ability to do this is precisely the same mental operation put into play when social categories engage the perceptual process of binary contrast in order to produce dualistic thought. It is in this mental "compartment", dissociated from everyday conscious awareness, where domination exists. The matter is at once ontological and epistemological. Domination conceals itself in such a way that is directly useful to domination.

The complex politics of cultural and social life is concealed beneath a "harmonious display of essences" or embedded in "bundles of meaning" too densely knotted for simple skepticism to unravel (Slotkin, 1985: 24).

The bourgeois principle, a social category, and distorted communication: these are the elements with which domination produces de-historicized ideas and conceptions of social reality. The social reality hidden behind this
scheme is precisely the social reality producing it. Domination transcends social categories. It is a system which has depth.

Non-interfering, receptive, Taoistic perception is necessary for the perception of certain kinds of truth...The intrinsic validity of enlarging the consciousness involves realizing that the knowledge revealed was there all the time, ready to be perceived. (Maslow, 1976: 80-81).

A theorist's meta-framework and choice of substantive interest do not develop independently of each other. If we can state compelling reasons for our substantive choices, we will have a model of analysis with applicability in the public policy arena. The thesis of this paper is that the true test of a theory is not its position on a logical puzzle, but rather, its ability to uncover domination. The presence of logical puzzles in bourgeois theory, and the presence of polarized relativism in bourgeois politics, indicates that we are dealing with a form of concealed domination. The veil that hides the social is as old as political philosophy (Frankfurt Institute, 1972: 17).

Domination is a mode of social relationship whose real effect on our ideas and conceptions of social reality is veiled by polarization and relativism in our political culture. In this context of domination, our ideas and conceptions are substitutes. In social science, the major form domination takes is the logical puzzle. The main effect of the logical puzzle is precisely to impede the
necessary theoretical development our situation demands (Wexler, 1983: 62-4). In the arena of public policy:

Legitimation crises are... not the result of deficits of meaning, but expressions of perceptible polarizations and the inability of ordinary methods of cultural defenses to contain them (Wexler, 1983: 80).

The aim of critical theory is to discover the social reality hidden by the ideological concepts of conventional logical puzzles (Wexler, 1983: 88). This essentially historical dimension of social existence is screened out of bourgeois awareness by a process of distorted communication, which makes use of common social categories in order to de-historicize domination's particular social relation and re-present that relation as a social category. In this context of domination, distorted communication reduces policy legitimation to a matter of not discriminating against anyone. According to the bourgeois principle, discrimination is an inherently more liberal and humanizing way of human relations than is domination. Hence its status in today's society as the standard to use in resolving problems in human relations.

As discourse goes, so go attention and awareness. How may we attend to what we cannot yet speak about (Quinney, 1982: 13). Today our post-medieval form of life depends on the manipulation of human beings, the most liberal attainment which the bourgeois principle is capable of. Policy legitimation is largely a matter of avoiding
discrimination. Evidence of legitimacy is dependent upon a standard of living attended by a steady supply of consumer gratifications. False consciousness is a belief about the source of those gratifications that is wrong. During a legitimation crisis, however, the bourgeois principle has nothing to fall back upon. Subject to de-legitimation by the attendant scarcity of gratification endemic to the periodic fluctuations in the circuits of capital, this situation can only be explained by having to provide a social theory that would also delegitimate the bourgeois principle by exposing the exploitation and domination upon which the consumer society feeds (Gouldner, 1976).

The bourgeois principle emerged out of an historical struggle against domination. Ideology - the power of ideas - was its light and its hope. But the very ideologies in print that gave legitimacy to the limited bourgeois revolution in 1789 were printed on material manufactured out of surplus cloth, itself manufactured by textile mills with cotton picked by slaves in America (Gouldner, 1976).

However:

The initial period of expansion had been characterized by the acquisition of land through warfare against the Indians (Slotkin, 1985: 227).

It is no mere accident of history that the material preconditions for our liberation were achieved in the west at the very time nuclear weapons were developed (Aronson,
If the "unthinkable" happens - a likely possibility within the next 25 years, according to E.P. Thompson - the event will be entirely internal to bourgeois society. In the dominant interpretive scheme, bourgeois 'realism' has reference to the bourgeois perceptual world, which is organized into means and ends (Mead, 1982). Bourgeois analysis predetermines the range of its results by excluding from analysis of politics and society any decisive concepts which might threaten to illuminate its dark side (Aronson, 1983: 264). In the exclusion, the means have lost their object, their goal. The means become ends in themselves in an "ever-more-progressive substitution of technical solutions for political ones" - precisely in order to conceal prevailing social and political tensions. For this reason it is no accident that our society should generate a tendency toward the "self-destruction of its subject as a defining trait of its most recent stage" (see Aronson, 1983: 279-81). In this analysis, concealed domination is the key to understanding nuclear war.

All modern development is enmeshed in a process of domination, as well as something yet more explosive. "We are living in the very midst of social dynamics which promote the urge to turn to genocidal solutions for unsolvable problems" (Aronson, 1983: 192-200). Yet such a political logic forces us outside the realm of the usual perceptible determinisms within the bourgeois world view. The matter is
at once epistemological and ontological (Aronson, 1983: 255). The usual bourgeois semiotic refers to a world that does exist. At the same time, everyday life is lived in the fog of denial, and retreat into privatism (Aronson, 1983: 259-69). And the public sphere is frozen into an uncontrollable, "accumulating logic of process" (Aronson, 1983: 274).

Seldom are such matters made the subject of public debate. Public discourse today does not have the ability to step outside the limits of the sum total of the viewpoints that make it up. Public discourse is plagued by a multitude of crises and ambiguities that go beyond a human being's capacity to integrate and attend to holistically. I recently watched a televised public forum where American Black spokesmen discussed their deep concern for domination in South Africa, while ten minutes later expressing optimism that American economic growth offers some hope for Black Americans to make some gains under the Reagan administration.

A further example is provided by the problem our society faces in trying to legitimate the policy of affirmative action. An outgrowth of previous civil rights legislation, affirmative action does not have the legitimacy of civil rights legislation because it attends to a form of life - a mode of social relations - excluded by a dominant interpretive scheme which addresses social reality
exclusively in terms of discrimination. In addressing the fact that slavery, (domination), still oppresses Blacks today, affirmative action is placed in the contradictory position of having to satisfy liberal demands for non-discrimination across social categories. Affirmative action is de-legitimated by the charge of "reverse discrimination". In the context of these ingroup versus outgroup dynamics, distorted communication makes use of social categories to try to extend a principle of justice into a form of life and mode of social relations from which the principle of justice merely derives. It is the bourgeois principle again which applies the dominant interpretive scheme in its faulty attempt to subsume the legacy of slavery with a principle addressed to, and grounded in, a mode of association that has historically derived from slavery, i.e., discrimination.

To continue with the example: some time ago, when I lived in Iowa City, a conflict erupted in the local school system and was reported in the local newspaper, the Iowa City Press Citizen (March 13, 1985). The school board and an association of Black parents whose children attend school in Iowa City were the antagonists. The month was February, and "Ground Hog Month" was in competition with "Black History Month" for the official cultural policy in the school system. The Black parents came into conflict with the school board when the latter would not publicly endorse Black History Month after it had already committed itself to
its traditional policy by investing in Ground Hog Month. By the time of a scheduled school board meeting, the issue was so charged that the school board was accused of "racism". One board member left the meeting in tears, protesting that she had two adopted black children in her family. Ultimately, the board's final decision came down to their not being sure of the curriculum changes the new policy would require. They needed time to study the matter.

Something was going on in this local milieu, and we should try to identify the public issue it represents (Mills, 1959). Does Ground Hog Month "mean" anything, or is it just a cultural ornament? The suppression of Black History Month as a policy, in favor of the cautious advice of liberal bureaucrats on the school board, was defined as a curricular issue requiring further study. After all, discrimination is no longer supposed to be an issue in our post-civil rights era.

But Ground Hog Month may have some hidden meaning in its own right. In an age of manipulation, symbols are like advertising: innocuous fictions nobody believes in, but they "work" selling products and helping things run along smoothly. Likewise, from the school board's point of view, the symbolism of Black History Month was to be interpreted as a subjective package in which to wrap a curricular product, for which arguments on behalf of by Black parents could be rendered relative and superfluous, with simple
compromise being held sufficient to achieve the type of consensus that would go into the school board's final decision in the next round of debate. Anything beyond this could be, and was, dismissed by the school board as "ideological".

According to Habermas (1975 : 112-13), compromises in these polarized situations are only pseudo-compromises that disguise the actual domination extant in the political arena. In this essentially domination-concealing discourse, Ground Hog Month is a way of assuming a stable background scheme that is taken to be achieved and non-problematic (Gouldner 1976). Its unobtrusive symbolism, (slightly steeped in manipulation), is actually a tacit claim that all is well within this particular institution. Its reality is political, not emotive, as we are conditioned to believe. Black History Month challenges the tacit legitimation conveyed by Ground Hog Month. The symbolism of Black History Month is a form of life speaking to us - a window opening to the past - and not a window-dressing draped over a curricular product. Yet those were the limits placed on it and the terms in which it was to be judged and interpreted. The problem is that Black History Month was deprived of its critical significance, its slavery uncovering function, by the politics involved in interpreting symbols. If you are oppressed, on top of being discriminated against, you are forced into the contradictory
position of having to represent this fact with a mode of discourse capable of rendering only a de-historicized version of what you are trying to say. The dominant structure which oppresses you is concealed by a mode of discourse that only signifies a social relationship that is merely a derivative of where you are coming from (Coward and Ellis, 1977). In this case, discrimination is a remote derivative from slavery (domination). Consequently, your struggle for justice appears as superfluous ideology, and you are effectively de-politicized, subject to the charge of relativism.

The ideological role of Ground Hog Month in the Iowa City school system was to represent an important institutional premise: that of a stable background scheme. The role of this premise was to substitute itself in the place of the historical reality that Blacks were demanding be publicly recognized, thereby excluding it from attention and awareness. The premise itself became the arena of debate, thereby setting the limits on what would be acceptable discourse.

Even with history repressed in the background, twice removed from the situation, the institutional premise conveyed by Ground Hog Month still serves as a mystified reminder of the level of awareness demanded by the situation. As a mystification, the premise reveals and conceals a compelling repository of "subsidiary awareness"
(Gouldner, 1976 : 204) that is the "space" which domination uses, but did not create. The "space" itself is a creation of history alone, to which the Blacks were claiming to be the rightful heirs. Thus, domination can be understood as being in competitive struggle for this "space" with the very social reality of which it is merely a form. Estrangement from this level of awareness was experienced as polarization and relativism at the level of policy legitimation. Attention became bound to the elements of the split, and was unable to transcend the ideological contradiction; unable to supply the missing meaning to this local legitimation crisis.

As a methodological guideline, any historically given, concrete, general mode of social relations with which we deal must be actively related to previous formations from which the given mode derives, but only in the sense that an antecedent state does not determine a subsequent one. The relation between them is exclusively chronological (Durkheim, 1982). In a sense, each formation is a version of what it derives from, but even more importantly, each formation is also a version of that which its predecessor has derived from. The internal principles operating in a previous mode continue to operate through the new mode. Each formation is never only what it is, but also what it was. It is a system which has depth. Ernesto Laclau makes this key point in his "Fascism and Ideology". Laclau was
writing about exploitation and class struggle, informing the rise of fascism in Germany with a Marxist perspective. Laclau tells us that while the bourgeois principle attends only to the liberalizing passage from exploitation to a more general and stable form of discrimination attending bourgeois class antagonisms, inequality is still a product of domination:

the struggle between classes only becomes intelligible if the overall political and ideological relations of Domination characterizing a determinate social formation are brought to bear.

Laclau goes on to ask:

What is the relation between these two kinds of antagonism? What is the relation between the ideologies in which both kinds of antagonism are expressed? (Laclau, 1977: 104-5).

When conditions allow, the general attainment of exploitation does not stabilize into a more general (liberal) relation of discrimination, characteristic of bourgeois state democracy. Industrialization and capital accumulation in pre-Nazi Germany, with widespread feudalism still intact among the Prussian Junkers, revealed in Fascism not how class antagonisms led to Domination, but rather, how they derive from it. With Fascism, those who were least aware of their economic exploitation became the prime target of Nazi hegemony: the lower middle class. The isolation of this class from the working class movement caused an insurmountable split between capital and labor, making it impossible for them to share state power. Capital
accumulation and state power could then only be combined in a social formation of domination.

In Laclau's analysis, this development was possible due to an ideological crisis in the working class of the German society. In Marxist analysis, exploitation, the struggle between classes, is historically in between domination, (feudalism and slavery), and bourgeois state democracy. In the case of Fascism, exploitation failed to open out in the more liberal direction. Instead, something far less liberal appeared instead of democracy. The previous mode, closer in time to feudalism, from which the given mode of class antagonism (exploitation) derived, re-formed itself when the given mode was unable to reform itself according to the more liberal relations inherent in bourgeois class antagonisms (discrimination). Fascism (domination) facilitated a revolutionary sweeping away of pre-bourgeois feudal economic forces without a corresponding democratization. The hardest hit in the ensuing economic disaster was precisely the lower middle class, the very class closest in time to those pre-bourgeois feudal forces being swept away by this "revolution". It was this very class, which supported the National Socialist (Fascist) party the most, whose social position was most conducive for the domination to form:

The primary problem was not that the German lower middle class turned to Nazism in droves but that it existed in the first place as a particularly regressive social constellation... (Aronson, 1983 : 58-9).
Aronson goes on to cite Barrington Moore, Jr.:

[T]heir values are those of early competitive capitalism, they are petty bourgeois rather than bourgeois...with a strong overlay of both bureaucratic and even feudal features” (Aronson, p.51. Emphasis added).

History revealed what the bourgeois principle concealed. Fascism revealed not how the lower middle class was led into domination, but actually how it derived from this type of formation which it subsequently helped shape. Fascism was able to dehistorize this, its particular social relation, by re-presenting the lower middle class as a social category. This is probably where the category of Jew enters in. Discrimination against Jews was significant not only for what it did to Jews, but for what it did to undermine the relevance of the working class to the new formation. The working class was isolated from the new formation. Isolation of labor from capital served to dramatically increase the visibility of the relationship between labor's ideology and its social location. Unable to articulate an ideology free from the distortions of its social location, this crisis came into sharp relief with the structural isolation of the working class. The working class was depoliticized when its long-standing disputes fell by the wayside and its interests reduced to a matter of who was and who was not a Jew.

The category of Jew, then, concealed the lower middle class' social location as much as it revealed the social
location of the working class. A mystified expression of a real reality, it also engaged a dominant interpretive scheme which prevented anything compelling from being said about it.

Domination is the creation of a dominant interpretive scheme which mystifies social reality in a way that is directly useful to domination. It ensures that social analysis will be deprived of its object while at the same time it provides social analysis with substitutes for this goal. It is my belief that we can apply this interpretive method best if we let it run its full course. It is capable of discovering the reality which fetters analysis, thus discovering its own object, much like the Zen approach which aspires to the level of awareness in which the eye which sees becomes able to see itself. In our society, this objective reality is to be found in American Indian History.

We do not "see" American Indian history. It is our "blind spot". Thus, it has the property of a sociological "black hole". Our collective dissociation from this reality is what our history is all about. It is in the past. Indians today are merely one more social category along with other minorities.

It was no accident of history that only after the anti-discrimination, civil rights reforms of the 1960's did the American Indian Movement become as visible as it did (Burnette and Koster, 1975). After years of force-feeding
American culture to Indians while systematically denying it to Blacks, the Black struggle was then represented as a legal problem amenable to legislative action. In actuality, it is the Indians who have had the legal problem of stolen land (Deloria, 1969). The American Indian Movement revealed not how anti-discrimination reforms eventually extended to Indian-White relations, but rather how civil rights is only a derivative from that fundamental social relationship.

Today Indians exist as a category. The American Indian has a special status in our society, but as a category that status is concealed. A sociology of knowledge which is capable of fully understanding the relationship between ideas and conceptions of social reality and the reality of social existence should begin with the American Indian. How may we attend to this phenomenon, (and I can't stress this enough), in which an actual social relation produced its own social category?

In fact, the tragic climax of formal fighting between the United States and the Indians - the slaughter of Big Foot's band of Minneconjou Sioux at Wounded Knee, South Dakota - did not mark the end of the Indian struggle to preserve national identity. Although virtually unnoticed, the fighting continued into the twentieth century as surely as it had during the previous century of contact. The spectacular aspect of war bonnets, clashing cavalry swords, and the flaming frontier was simply missing, and without those dramatic and traditional symbols of Indian warfare, people thought that the Indians had been tamed (Deloria, 1974:4).
From first contact to final dispossession, the American Indians have always protested the degradation, injustice, and cruelty they suffered under European domination. A form of life speaking to us, we have not listened, no doubt due to our insistence on comprehending them through the distorting category of "Indian" - a category which still exists to this day, unexamined but very much in need of theoretical attention (Berkhofer, 1978). Social science has not been very responsive to this challenge. Termination, a particularly odious policy imposed upon several tribes in the 1950's, for example, devastated the economic basis of the sovereign Menominee nation of Wisconsin. In 1953, the same year as the passage of the termination resolution, legislation was passed in Congress giving certain states jurisdiction over Indian reservations. Generally known as Public Law 280, it was an explicit attempt to extend a principle of justice, i.e. "self-determination", all the better to facilitate the real intention of Termination. The rational justifications put forth in behalf of P.L. 280 were all carefully couched in discursive terms referring to "discrimination":

The best example of... legislation during the termination era is "Public Law 280", passed in 1953, in which Congress took the unprecedented step of passing general legislation extending state jurisdiction into Indian country...
The Termination Act provided that after the transfer by the secretary of title to the property of the tribe, all federal supervision was to end and the laws of the several states shall apply to the tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction (Getches, et al., 1979: 468; Getches, et al., 1977: 142, 151, emphasis added. See esp: 143).

Termination was designed to get the American government "out of the Indian business". Termination revealed instead that the government still remains very much in the Indian business. Termination can be traced back to a treaty with the Chactaw in 1830. On that fateful day a "black hole" appeared that continues to bombard our society with its "neutrinos" today (Jones, 1982):

Whereas the General Assembly of the State of Mississippi has extended the laws of said State to persons and property within the chartered limits of the same, and the President of the United States has said that he cannot protect the Choctaw people from the operation of these laws; Now therefore that the Choctaw may live under their own laws in peace...[etc] (Kappler, 1972: 310-11).

The Choctaw were removed to what is now Oklahoma. And live under their own laws they did - until 1898. In that year the Curtis Act dismantled the fully functioning constitutional democracies of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma.

The years between 1871 and 1934 were certainly the darkest hour for the American Indian. Then, in 1934, the Indian Reorganization Act was passed, establishing a "democratic" tribal council system of government. We will
not take the time here to go into the extent of coercion and manipulation involved in this event, but it should be remembered that to this day, traditional Indian people have never accepted the I.R.A.

A conservative backlash in government set in motion plans for Termination in 1946. The chief proponent for Termination was Dillon S. Myer, who headed the War Relocation Authority in W.W. II, which was a system of concentration camps for 140,000 Japanese Americans. All these camps, except for one, were on Indian Reservations. Dillon S. Myer then had these credentials on his resume when he became head of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1950 (Drinnon, 1987: 265).

Termination itself was an extensive program of relocation from the reservations to the cities. One half of all Indians were coax ed and bribed into the cities, where they could get their "civil rights", thereby obfuscating an important promise of the I.R.A.: reducing a question of special legal status to one of race. Concurrently, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 was able to modify the tribal-federal relationship as a source of Indian rights, so that instead of a land base, the Indians were now offered a Bill of Rights. The continuity with the past is perhaps best revealed by Vine Deloria (1969). Before the arrival of missionaries, Indians had land and the missionaries had the
Bible. After their arrival, the Indians had the Bible and the missionaries had the land.

A person might wonder how it came about that the I.R.A., in 1934, led to Termination, in 1953. But the Curtis Act of 1898 reveals instead that the I.R.A. derives from Termination, which it subsequently helped shape with P.L 280.

The ultimate significance of the Curtis Act is revealed to us by Felix S. Cohen (1971 : 428-30). An autonomous Indian Territory in the Territory of Oklahoma impeded white settlement and political institutions from developing. The Curtis Act was a way of imposing the Dawes Allotment Act of 1887 in such a way as to "dissolve the tribal masses", thereby creating the political constituency for the I.R.A., by way of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924. The process set in motion by the Curtis Act was completed in 1906. Thus was born the State of Oklahoma. Immediately, Oklahoma sent a delegation to Congress in order to repeal Federal laws designed for the protection of the Indians in the State.

Termination is the "negative space", it mirrors negatively, that which is demanded. Ultimately, reality presents itself in a compelling way. Ironically enough, it was in the context of urbanized discrimination created by Termination that the American Indian Movement was born, in 1968, revealing how we experience repressed history in mystified ways, down the road. A trend taken to its extreme
generates its own opposite, proving that Termination reveals Sovereignty even as it suppresses it. Philip Slater (1974) calls this process a social eversion. Social reality does move in the direction of that which is demanded (Quinney, 1980: 1).

The impossibility of ontology turns out to be a suppression of that which is demanded (Levy, 1981: 68). In terms of this thesis, then, the impossibility of praxis turns out to be a suppression of the American Indian. Frederick Turner (1980) has, regarding this problem, told us that the emergence of the bourgeois experience of history in mystified ways is grounded in the genocidal depopulation of Indians.

I have found Federal Indian Law a compelling subject, precisely for its wealth of evidence of distorted communication. And where was social science in the 1950's? During the termination proceedings designed to sell out sovereignty to the ideology of self-determination, academic social science was silent (Getches, 1979: 90).

The situation seems no better today. At this very moment, several thousand Navajo and Hopi Indians are facing up to a piece of legislation called Public Law 93-531: the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Act, which passed Congress in 1974. Traditional Navajo and Hopi people are currently asking the American public to assist them in stopping this program of forced relocation. The United States government claims to
be resolving an historically rooted land dispute between the Navajo and Hopi nations, but in reality is clearing the Indian people from their homeland because of the 55 billion dollars worth of coal, oil, and uranium underneath the surface. Hopi prophecy has warned that desecration of this land will bring forth the end of the world. Hopi spiritual leaders through the centuries have prognosticated a "gourd full of ashes" that would bring vast destruction to the earth. The mining of uranium from this land at Big Mountain in Arizona represents an inextricable link between genocide against American Indians and the escalating arms race. A form of life speaking to us, we will not listen. What methodological inhibition prevents us from simply listening, and hearing this? Indeed, there is no word for relocation in the Navajo language. To relocate means to disappear, never to be seen again.

It is not regret for the sunken Atlantides that animates us, but hope for a recreation of language. Beyond the desert of criticism, we wish to be called again (P. Ricoeur, quoted in Quinney, 1982).

Structurally, the struggle has taken on the phenomenal form of a dispute between the Navajo and Hopi tribal councils. The Hopi tribal council has lawyers from Salt Lake City making sure that their side will not be discriminated against in the distribution of foreseen royalties after leasing the land to Anaconda Mining and Kenicott Copper - both heavily owned by the Mormon church,
of which the Hopi's lawyers are stock holding members. These lawyers first approached the Navajo Tribal Council with their offer of "assistance". They were rejected outright. Then, these same lawyers went to the Hopi Tribal Council and got themselves hired. Two of them, Boyden and Owens, were the same people who wrote the bill mandating the Arizona courts to "partition the [Joint Use Area] without prejudice" (Redhouse, 1981: 28. Emphasis added).

Historically, we must recall what was said earlier about the Tribal Council system of government that was formally imposed upon Indian Nations in 1934. Significantly, the first tribal council to come into existence was the Navajo, in 1923, right after the discovery of the vast mineral deposits on their reservation. The land from which the Indians are to be removed under P.L. 93 - 531 is exactly the same land surveyed in 1923 (Redhouse, 1981).

According to the General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, Public Law 93-531 cannot be repealed because the requirement for relocation is the result of a final court order and to prevent the required move, the Congress would have to defy the Courts. It is unclear whether the Courts will ever be willing to reconsider their mandate, which appears to be completely unworkable (Proxmire, 1986).

One thing in particular stands out in these findings by the G.A.O.: the nature of the relationship between court
order and congressional legislation. American Indians have historically always borne the brunt of the American Government's inability to solve its own internal organizational problems. The case of the Cherokee Nation vs the state of Georgia in 1831 represents this point well regarding the relationship between the federal government and the states. The G.A.O. findings just summarized seem to raise this problem regarding the relationship between the legislative and judicial branches of government: the requirement for relocation is the result of a final court order and to prevent the required move, the Congress would have to defy the Courts. The point I wish to make now is that if we cut through the distorted communication being brought to bear as the dominant interpretive scheme, we shall reveal a hang-up from way back. In addressing the situation at Big Mountain, Hollis Whitson (1985: 374) tells us:

> Congressional policy makers seem to view their role as one responding to judicial determinations, while the federal judges say that their role is to effectuate congressional policy.

Elsewhere in the same article, Whitson (1985: 396-7) states:

> Many policymakers on Capital Hill believe that the relocation policy is mandated by federal court decisions and cannot be disturbed by an act of Congress. This argument is only partially true. The federal courts have indicated that their affirmance of the relocation policy is based in large part on congressional intent.
What we seem to have here is a situation in which a shared legislative and judicial concern to extend principles of justice to interested parties in a non-discriminatory way is undermined and unworkable in practice because it is precisely in Indian Law (and History) that are set the conditions from which these principles of justice are derived. Expectations that these principles can then be extended to Indian Law reverses this historical relation and thus prevents legislative and judicial branches from working together to solve the problem. A fundamental injustice lies at the historical origin of the situation at Big Mountain and continues to operate upon and through the subjects and actors. The principles and discursive terms we employ cannot be extended to this situation because in actual history those very principles have derived from it. Resolution of American principles of justice requires priority focus on Indian Law:

Like the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shift from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith (Felix S. Cohen, 1971).

Those interested in pursuing this line of study would do well to examine the approach taken by James P. Boggs (1984: 205-31):
In this paper, I have examined a contemporary event, the sale of reservation resources to a large energy company. Many elements of this event exhibit historical parallels and analogues. The Northern Cheyenne-Arco deal opens a window on the past and brings history into greater relevance for studying contemporary policy issues.

The reality to which we attend is never only what it is, but also what it was. It is a system which has depth. How are we to attend to this "higher reality"? How has the sociological relationship involving Indians and Europeans given us this problem? The answer may be found in the categorical conception represented by the very term Indian itself. Why do we call them Indians? What hang-ups from way back does our analysis reveal?

In societies that are still in the process of establishing a sense of identity, the establishment of a normative, characteristic image of the group's characteristics is a psychological necessity; and the simplest means of defining or expressing the sense of such norms is by rejecting some other group whose character is deemed to be the opposite (Slotkin, 1973: 68).

The category of Indian is a representation that justifies and rationalizes policies whose latent function is to avoid the historical ambivalence in the dualistic cultural climate of post-Medieval Europe. Europeans projected various means of dealing with their basic problems through the adoption of varying stances toward the Indians (Slotkin, 1973: 118). One such problem for the emerging democratic society was confusion about the relation between equality of condition and equality of opportunity:
Without a cheap land base and access to them, the paradox or even conflict of these two sides of American political and economic liberalism would have become apparent (Berkhofer, 1978: 137-8).

The situation in Indian Affairs has not changed since the infamous day when President Andrew Jackson sent the Cherokee on the Trail of Tears. "Justice Marshall has rendered his decision. Now let him enforce it." To this day, Indian policy continues to be an exercise in oscillation, whether between federal and state levels, the houses of Congress, Congress and the Courts, or within the BIA itself. Indians are suffering because their "development" requires precisely those things that white society requires them to be deprived of: land, capital, and education (Shkilnyk, 1985: 240-1).

Instead of the policies that are demanded, and which would have to be grounded in social change of the most fundamental sort, legislated at the highest levels of Constitutional Law, the category of Indian remains out of touch with the status of American Indians. The main effects of the category are to rationalize and justify bourgeois policies precisely in order to treat Indians as pawns in a game of high stakes that is supposedly being played for their benefit (Shkilnyk, 1985: 216-230; see also Berkhofer, 1978).

The price our society pays for subjugating those whose democratic principles inform this very society is
estrangement from the Constitution at the statutory, regulatory level. Many legal phenomena occur in everyday life that violate the U.S. Constitution. Jammed courts are a manifestation of this phenomenon. The U.S. government is still breaking Indian treaties, when they are in fact the highest possible type of political document. Our society seems especially to need a renewal in legal and social theory. In the words of Richard Quinney (1982: 91), "The unity of the sacred and the secular is the paradigmatic solution for the crisis of social existence."

The enlightened world of the Renaissance tended to look at the New World through Medieval spectacles (Steiner, 1976: 144). Europeans were always of two minds toward Indians. The Puritan understanding of Indians represented their understanding of themselves (1976: 239). Medieval ties of association were gone. Ambiguities that were now free-floating elements had to be redefined if chaos was to be avoided. What the Puritans desired above all was "a tabula rasa on which they could inscribe their dream" (Slotkin, 1973: 38). The most significant aspect of this was the substitution of racial-cultural distinctions for the traditional English divisions of class and religion (Slotkin, 1973: 68). In practice, two opposed images of the Indian developed from the ambivalence of the colonists (Slotkin, 1973: 153). When the Indian was good, he was a "noble savage". When he was bad, he was demonic. The
category itself served to generalize a conception to all Indians, conceive Indians in terms of their deficiencies according to White ideals, and most importantly, use moral evaluation as description of Indians (Berkhofer, 1978:25-6):

The cultural climate of the late Middle Ages was organized in terms of basic contradictions and polarities ... [T]he moral world assumed a duality at a quasi-objective level, in the sense that both virtues and vices were projected on to an external world. (Barbu, 1960: 64).

Puritanism was both an extreme reaction to a state of disorientation and an attempt to establish a new balance between sacred and secular values:

The basic elements which were closely integrated in the structure of western medieval culture had, during this [modern] period, fallen apart...

While polarity connoted opposite forces within a basically integrated whole, ambivalence involves the idea of oscillation between extremes, and even that of a split (Barbu, 1960: 142-159).

Democracy was not a product of Medieval culture (Awkesasne, 1978):

The first step in achieving a new social order is, apparently, to construct a new nature that will justify, and even demand, its implementation (Evernden, 1985: 19).

Perhaps there is no better representation of our historical estrangement than the American Progress mural, reproduced in Figure 4. The mural is a representation of
hierarchic society to itself. The mural is not a collection of images, but a social relation mediated by images. According to Guy Debord (1983):

it is obviously because history has not yet been liberated that the forces of historical absence begin to compose their own exclusive landscape.
The ideological function of Euro-American spatial representation has been to:

substitute the credible prospect of an infinite reservoir of land and economic resources as an alternative to the intense conflict of social classes, economic interest groups, or regional groupings of slave and free states. But in the real-world pursuit of expansion, American political leaders discovered that each new advance of the territory of Freedom served to provide new occasions for the acting out of inescapable conflicts (Slotkin, 1985: 211).

In regard to Figure 4, consider that the bourgeois perceptual world is organized into means and ends. Any act of perception occurs in a surrounding social space (Mead, 1982: 31). The space being filled by Europeans seems somehow qualitatively proportionate to the historical aspects of reality being excluded by the narrow tunnel vision of the bourgeois world view. Concealed domination is on record as cultural ambivalence:

The adequate record of even the confusions of our forbears may help, not only to clarify these confusions, but to engender a salutary doubt whether we are wholly immune from different but equally great confusions (Pearce, 1985: xii).

The reality to which we attend is never only what it is, but also what it was. It is a system which has depth (see Figure 5):

The present forms in which our myths appear embody not only the solutions to past problems and conflicts; they contain the questions as well, and they reflect the conflicts of thought and feeling and actions that were the mythmakers original concern...
It is this myth whose fictive fatalities lurk in the cultural environment we inhabit, whose significance can still be seen behind the silhouettes of skyscrapers, casinos, pipelines, gantries, and freeways (Slotkin, 1985: 12-20)...

Behind the mystique of the Indian wars lay a concept of social relations that insisted on the racial basis of class differences, and insisted that in a society so divided, strife was unavoidable until the more savage race was wholly exterminated or subjugated (Slotkin, 1985, 531).

Indian survivors of the Pequot massacre in 1637 were taken to the Caribbean as slaves (Goodman, 1981: 237). American Indian history reveals not how domination leads to annihilation, but rather, how domination derives from annihilation:

A few more moons. A few more winters - and not one of the descendants of the mighty hosts that once moved over this broad land or lived in happy homes, protected by the Great Spirit, will remain to mourn over the graves of a people--once more powerful and hopeful than yours. But why should I mourn at the untimely fate of my people? Tribe follows tribe, and nation follows nation like the waves of the sea. It is the order of nature, and regret is useless. Your time of decay may be distant, but it will surely come, for even the White Man whose God walked and talked with him as friend with friend, cannot be exempt from the common destiny. We may be brothers after all. We will see...

And when the last Red Man shall have perished, and the memory of my tribe shall have become a myth among the White Men, these shores will swarm with the invisible dead of my tribe, and when your children's children think themselves alone in the field, the store, the shop, upon the highway or in the silence of the pathless woods, they will not be alone...
At night when the streets of your cities and villages are silent and you think them deserted, they will throng with the returning hosts that once filled them and still love this beautiful land. The White Man will never be alone...

Let him be just and deal kindly with my people, for the dead are not powerless. Dead, did I say? There is no death, only a change of worlds (Sealth, 1854).
We cannot expect the world to cohere horizontally if it is not joined together vertically as well (Schell, 1982: 177).

The reality to which we attend is never only what it is, but also what it was. It is a system with depth. (Barbu, 1960).

Society "comes down" to us historically, as general as the falling rain, but not nearly so uniform in the distribution of its effects. These must be 'represented' (Author's meditation on Emile Durkheim).

It's Snowing History. (From R.H. Brown. 1985).
CHAPTER IV
DOMINATION AND PERCEPTION

Reality is expanded when dualism is abolished. There is an evolutionary ontology in performing interpretive tasks (Sennett, 1980). Praxis is no mere matter of taking theory in one hand, methods in the other, and fitting them together. These logical puzzles are mystified substitutes for the social ontology they exclude, due to their epistemological properties. This social ontology, I maintain, is found in the materials of history. In this paper I have presented findings that lend support to the idea that repression of areas of conciousness (involved in the adjustment people make to living with "The Bomb") is grounded in a social relation of repression which then, in turn, represses that relation from awareness too. American Indian History demands to be revealed precisely because it is so concealed. Accordingly, we have had to deconstruct the dominant conception of the sociology of knowledge as a logical puzzle, and thereby give it an historical rendering which enables us to assert that the suppression of Praxis is grounded in the suppression of the American Indian.

Social reality is even more complex than the pseudo-complexities thrown up at us by logical puzzles The
heirship cases comprising the land claims on the White Earth Reservation in Minnesota comprise probably one of the most complex phenomena you can imagine. A sociologist who, in the course of studying this, chooses to toy around with a logical puzzle is making a serious mistake. Say that he or she chooses to study it in terms of the observer versus observed "dialectic". Since this "dialectic" has merely replaced the master-slave dialectic in Social Science (Hearn, 1985: 196), you see we are dealing with a form of concealed domination. How ironic that we, as sociologists, take for granted an entire curriculum organized into integrating theory and methods, for example. Are we up to the challenge of social reality? Only the interests of our masters are served if we do not seek to make the complexities of consciousness standards for collective experience (Sennett, 1980). Concerning American Indian History, our first task is to abolish the disjunction between the category of "Indian" and the actual status of American Indians. At present, the disjunction prevents us from understanding the nature of their sovereignty and treaty rights, and the relationship of these to our society. If domination is the "trouble", my message is that sovereignty is the "issue".

Of domination, three conclusive things may be said. Our ability to detect such realms is conditioned by those very realms. Merleau-Ponty has said that there is an informing of
perception by culture which enables us to say that culture is perceived (Ihde, 1986:52). Domination, however, is invisible. This is why we must resort to a theory of distorted communication. The ultimate grounding of our being in social existence is not through vision. It is through language (Quinney, 1982).

The second thing we can say about domination is that it is as close or as far away as your next experience. If increased material benefits serve to compensate the masses for loss of liberty, likewise objectivity and detachment compensate social scientists (as we are called in this age) for moral ambiguity (Gouldner, 1976). Our understanding of this is given to us through the notion of the paradigm.

Thirdly, domination mirrors negatively true social being. It is the ultimate distortion of social existence, yet itself is a form of social existence.

A post-modern sensibility must come to inform our efforts as social scientists if we are to free ourselves from our massive continuity with the European Middle Ages. Our modern confusions are essentially medieval, giving modern society its historical aura, its social properties. In this realization is to be found a heightened awareness.

The form of this continuity with the past maintains a dualism which prevents us from relating to it. This is what makes it a hang-up from way back. Yet, there is a distinctly modern twist to our condition. Somewhere back in our
history, ambivalence, oscillation, and dualistic splits in consciousness became reorganized into the modern structure of consciousness we in sociology understand by the notion of the paradigm. Zevedei Barbu's assessment of Rationalism is that it is essentially a product of visual perception.

In modern times, perceptual experiences tend to be separate and distinct, with visual stimuli and experience prevailing above all others (Tuan, 1982:115).

The emphasis on relating clear sight with clear thinking has been a cornerstone of Western Rationalism. Barbu summarizes nicely:

The gradual decline of religious beliefs and superstitions, and the rise of secular rationalism following the close of the sixteenth century was .... associated with the reorganization of the human perceptual field (Barbu, 1960:26).

My point is that medieval ambivalence, itself a product of visual thinking, has been reorganized in such a way as to preserve visual perceptual dominance. Paradigms are figure-ground structures of perception. The distinction between figure and ground is the most elementary act of visual perception. Our modern condition has been described by Gunnar Mydral (1944:xlix):

People will attempt to conceal the conflict between their different valuations of what is desireable and undesireable, right or wrong, by keeping away some valuations from awareness and by focusing attention on others...For the same opportune purpose, people will twist and mutilate their beliefs of how social reality actually is...But people also want to be rational.
Boundaries between ingroups and outgroups make use of perceptual distortions. Wilder (1981:214), whose research was summarized in Chapter Two, also tells us that "boundaries are created through cognitive organization of persons in an analogous manner to that used in the organization of physical objects".

According to Alvin Gouldner (1975:429), "objects constitute stable differentia in regions, thus constituting the terms in which regions are defined. One "sees" the objects rather than the enregioning space". In this world view of objects, the means of rationality become ends in themselves (Kosik, 1976:53-8). Instead of being grounded in social reality, modern rationality grounds out in a world view of objects.

Domination is invisible. It is allowed to appear only to the extent that it is not visible (Debord, 1983:7). It is a structure and a process that appears as a logical puzzle of structure and process. The reality it excludes from its cognitive schemata continues to exist fully through it. Its one-dimensionality is belied by its self-defeating nature. It can succeed only by destroying everything.

Domination appears hierarchically. We have the ability to select visibly appearing phenomena in order to represent the invisible world. According to David Bloor (1984:66-7), "it is perfectly possible for systems of thought to reflect society and be addressed to the natural world at the same
time". In this sense, Hierarchy is a collective representation. Our only other option, it seems to me, is to revert to a hang-up from way back: are hierarchies "real" or not. Wallace (1983) seems to take this approach in his recent text.

Nowadays we are conditioned to think with our eyes. The senses with which we perceive the social world are social products too (Kosik, 1976). Dualism involves a mode of information processing found in visual perception. Each side of a dualistic split is like an ingroup and an outgroup. Each side of the split is contained in a feedback loop schemata; a circular precept-percept perceptual circuit. Precepts selectively perceive stimuli which feed back upon, and reinforce, the precepts.

In their German Ideology (Easton and Guddatt, 1967), Marx and Engels' very point of departure in critiquing Feuerbach is for his error in confusing visual perception for awareness. This prevented him from attaining an historical perspective. If some of you haven't noticed this, remember what Paul Ricoeur has to say: one principle for interpreting texts is that you don't get their meaning unless you already live under the aura of what you are after.

Ideologies are like paradigms in the work of Alvin Gouldner. In The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology (1976:195), Chapter 9 begins with the French Revolution:
Like the eyes with which we watch events around us, it was the events watched, not the eyes watching them, that were centered in attention.

The term "ideology" was coined by Detracy in 1790, in a treatise whose first part attends to the relationship between visual perception and our ideas and conceptions of social reality. For the eye to see, it must select some data and repress other data. Ideologies treat social and historical reality in much the same way. The reality that hides itself behind this presence is also manifest through it. The background is also always present with the foreground. (Barrett, 1978:166-7).

Our task is to free analysis from the redundancy of the socially conditioned narrowness of perspective. We thereby seek to incorporate social reality in a meaningful and ontological sense. We are finally compelled to take an historical approach. Historical reality can simply and effectively be grasped in the following metaphor.

Take one large cardboard box and label it "Annihilation". Take a slightly smaller box and call it "Domination", and place it inside the first box. Now take a next size smaller box and call it "Exploitation". Place it inside the box marked "Domination". Take a next size smaller box and call it "Discrimination". Place it inside the box called "Exploitation". Finally, take a next size smaller box and place it inside the box marked "Discrimination". This last box is called "Manipulation".
This relationship between Annihilation, Domination, Exploitation, Discrimination, and Manipulation captures historical reality. It is a set of nested concepts of subsequent modes of association relating to previous ones as the higher order conceptions from which they have derived. And far from the criticism that this conceptualization is an infinite regress, it is a Totality. This nested set of higher order conceptions is the reality that hierarchy substitutes for in Chapter Two above. It is the basis for my proposition that nuclear war and American Indian History both reveal not how Domination leads to Annihilation, but rather, how Domination derives from Annihilation.

I.A. Newby (1965:189), himself a student of Gunnar Myrdal, discloses this relationship well in reference to Blacks:

Finally, Congressman James M. Griggs of Georgia broached the ultimate solution. Noting an increased amount of racial agitation among Negroes, he warned in 1908 that "the utter extermination of a race of people is inexpressibly sad, yet if its existence endangers the welfare of mankind, it is fitting that it should be swept away".

At the turn of this century, an official census recorded the population of American Indians in the United States at 250,000. Ten thousand gave their lives in W.W. I. Following the war, a flu epidemic swept through Indian country and nearly one out of four perished. Thanks to a phenomenal growth rate in the 1960's, their population today
is approximately 1.5 million. Prior to European contact, there were at least 12-14 million of them (Dobryns, 1982).

One central reality (Shkynluk, 1985:240) our society's relationship to its indigenous people is its central reality. "To regain the center of life is the objective in the reconstruction of a metaphysic in our time" (Quinney, 1982 87). The gunships patrolling and surveilling the Big Mountain region reveal that forced relocation is intentional. The New Lands selected for the relocatees are radioactively contaminated by a corporate discharge into the region's main river by United Nuclear in 1979. One of our ultimate fears is groundwater pollution. American Indian History reveals that our very relation to our environment is grounded in the relationship to the American Indian (see Shkynluk, 1985).

The fundamental inability of government to deal holistically with a shattered society has remained as constant as the Indians' powerlessness to effect social justice (Shkynluk, 1985:206).

There is a sense among a number of Indian leaders in Canada that such conditions could not possibly be tolerated in the society in the absence of an implicit acceptance of Indian genocide. Certainly such a speculation is understandable in view of the wide gulf separating the stated objective of government policy, "to lead the Indian people toward the full, free, and non-discriminatory participation in Canadian society", from the apparently negative results of policy. But the assumption of deliberate malice on the part of bureaucrats who implement policy does not fit the history of the Grassy Narrows relocation, for example. Yet in this case we can observe clearly the workings of an inplacable logic that produced an outcome contradictory to the intent (Shkynluk, 1985:235. Emphasis added).
The sociology of knowledge should begin looking at this central reality. That which has been most repressed turns out to be of final consequence. By **de-constructing** the dominant conception of Indians as a social category, the path is open to incorporating a more adequate and historically informed understanding of American Indians. This type of interpretive task gives us the evolutionary ontology that Richard Quinney calls the Depth of Reality. Without this development, we remain victims of Domination. The words of Richard Sennett (1980) ring true, that only the interests of our masters are served if we do not seek to make the complexities of consciousness standards for collective experience.

There has always been an "American Indian Movement". The "spectacle" (Debord, 1983) that was Wounded Knee in 1973 revealed that the category of Indian in effect is so distorting that Indians themselves are distorted into a phenomenal form. But they are also a reality. Our category's final effect seems to have ontologically split the Indian people themselves (Berkhofer, 1978). But the source of this effect is within our experience, not theirs. Winona LaDuke tells a story about the White woman who heard about the problems Indians are having and decided she wanted to help them. One day she saw an Indian woman on the street and walked up to her. She told the Indian woman about her concern and asked if there was something she could do to
help. (Maybe we could hold a raffle or something, eh?). The Indian woman said, "There is something you can do to help me. You are standing on my foot."

The methodology of the history of bourgeois perception promises a "coming home" to the sociologist of knowledge (Lowe, 1982). As a sensitizing motif, let us from now on endeavor to keep mindful watch on "the continuing Indian Wars" (see Johansen and Maesta, 1979) as the appropriate notion for our interpretive task.

Emanations are flowing through our society now that bear this thesis out: White Earth Reservation in Minnesota; Big Mountain; The Black Hills; Northeastern Wisconsin; the Upper Peninsula of Michigan; these are all designated as "National Sacrifice Areas", in order to supply energy to growing cities. And 80% of the usable uranium in this country is on Indian land. We must be alert to signs and portents; events and sayings in the human and natural worlds that others might regard as trivial, but which the Gods have entrusted with momentary meaning, pertinence, and power (Quinney, 1982). One such omen is the recent appearance of the post-modern novel White Noise (DeLillo, 1986). Another is the representation of the recent space shuttle disaster in the (1981) film Koyanisquatsi, a film based on Hopi prophecy.

The symbolic import of this analysis was revealed long ago, from the center of the world, in the Black Hills:
Then when he had been still a little while to hear the birds sing, he spoke again: "Behold the earth!" So I looked down and saw it lying yonder like a hoop of peoples, and in the center bloomed the holy stick that was a tree, and where it stood there crossed two roads, a red one and a black. "From where the giant lives (the north) to where you always face (the south) the red road goes, the road of good," the Grandfather said, "and on it shall your nation walk. The black road goes from where the thunder beings live (the west) to where the sun continually shines (the east), a fearful road, a road of troubles and of war. On this also you shall walk, and from it you shall have the power to destroy a people's foes. In four ascents you shall walk the earth with power."

I think he meant that I should see four generations, counting me, and now I am seeing the third. (Black Elk, in Neihardt, 1961:29).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Gordon Garnjobst has a B.A. from Buena Vista College in Storm Lake, Iowa. He enrolled at the College of William and Mary in 1981. His current research interests are Federal Indian Law and the history of bourgeois visual perception. His future plans are to continue working in the area of social foundations of public policy. He currently lives in Iowa City.