The mythical monolith: American China policy and the Sino-Soviet split, 1945--1972

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THE MYTHICAL MONOLITH:
AMERICAN CHINA POLICY
AND THE
SINO-SOViet SPLIT, 1945-1972

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Rhonda Smither Blunt
1978
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Author

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Approved, May 1978

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Richard B. Sherman

Craig N. Canning
DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my husband, Allen Blunt, for his moral support and practical assistance in running our home while I have been occupied with graduate work.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this work is to demonstrate through a specific case study how profoundly foreign policy is directed by domestic considerations—considerations which ultimately rely upon our perceptions of ourselves and others—perceptions that are subject to manipulation, coercion, and distortion.

It is the thesis of this work that American China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. This misperception began within ourselves and was fed, reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the policymaking process.

Chapter I deals with American China policy between 1945 and 1972. Chapter II concentrates upon domestic political and intellectual influences which provided the ambience for misperception in the formulation of China policy. Attention is given to the disruptive effects of the China bloc, the China Lobby, Joseph McCarthy, and the Committee of One Million. Chapter III presents a survey of the perception of the Sino-Soviet split, 1956-1972, on the part of American academicians, journalists, and policymakers.

The results suggest that the irrational fear of Communism created by the various China lobbyists and Senator McCarthy molded China policy into a rigid orthodoxy, drove Asia scholars into conservatism, and distorted perception of the Sino-Soviet split on the part of American academicians and policymakers.
THE MYTHICAL MONOLITH:
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SINO-SOVIE T SPLIT, 1945-1972
INTRODUCTION

From our first smack on the buttocks to our final gasp for air we all respond to the world around us. When we stop responding we are dead, or may as well be. Our response is not always to objective reality, however, but to a perception of it.¹ In other words, men frequently respond to fictions they themselves have created. This is true of relationships between individuals, and unfortunately, it is carried into relationships between nations as well. Thus, international relations are often a matter of faulty perception rather than of objective reality. To say that there are no objective problems in international affairs would be folly, of course. But world politics lends itself all too readily to the development of wide gaps between what reality is and the way it is perceived. Because of this, perception probably plays as important a role in international relations as does reality itself.² Perception is the essence of this work--perception of China and the Sino-Soviet conflict as it unfolded.

Chapter I will deal with American China policy between 1945 and 1972, which was, unfortunately, founded upon a large measure of myth and misperception. Chapter II will concentrate upon domestic political and intellectual influences which provided the ambience for such misper-
ception, e.g. the China bloc, McCarthyism, the China Lobby, and the Committee of One Million. The ideological orthodoxy imposed upon American foreign policy through these influences strongly affected the subsequent blindness of many American professionals to the Sino-Soviet split, which is the subject of Chapter III. A survey will be conducted of professional academicians, journalists, and policymakers, and an attempt will be made to divide their opinions into schools of thought and to discern which type of professional best perceived the realities of the situation. These professional groups have been selected for study because they offer informed opinion that has been assumed, traditionally, to have some input in the foreign policymaking process. Chapter IV will present conclusions drawn from the information presented in Chapters I through III.

It is not my purpose to provide a definitive analysis of American China policy since World War II, the domestic atmosphere that helped create it, or the subsequent misperception of Sino-Soviet relations on the part of American professionals. My purpose is, rather, to demonstrate through a specific case study how profoundly foreign policy is directed by domestic considerations—considerations which ultimately rely upon our perceptions of ourselves and others—perceptions that are subject to manipulation, coercion, and distortion.

It is the thesis of this work that American China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations
between 1945 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. This misperception began within ourselves and was fed, reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the policymaking process. It is hoped that similar mistakes can be prevented; but prevention cannot come about without change, and change is never instigated until a need for it is realized. This study, then, illustrates the workings of a mistake.
I acknowledge that there are those who would argue that no reality exists outside one's perception, but for the purpose of this paper, we will assume that it does.


The occupations of those professionals whose works will be discussed in Chapter III are crucial to the conclusions drawn in this work. Biographical data appear in later footnotes, but to avoid redundancy this information will not be provided every time reference is made to an author. It is suggested that the reader refer to the chart on page 73 if he is interested in this information at other points in his reading. In some cases, occupational categorization is not beyond dispute, but I consider my classifications justifiable. Also, not all professionals represented in this work are Americans. Since non-Americans who are known, published, and read in the United States unquestionably contributed to and became a part of American perception of the Sino-Soviet split, they are rightly included here.
CHAPTER I

CHINA, 1945-1972: MYTH, MISPERCEPTION, AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES

Long ago, in America's distant past, domestic affairs and foreign affairs existed as more separate entities than they do today. Domestic politics constituted one sphere, and foreign relations another, for the most part. This was never a hard and fast rule, of course, but the problems of one area overlapped, crisscrossed, or otherwise intruded into the other only infrequently. It was, indeed, a less complex era; and it has passed.

This chapter attempts to demonstrate that American China policy between 1945 and 1972 was part of a very different era. It was primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics, shaped by myth, misperception, and missed opportunities. Postwar changes in the foreign policymaking process contributed to the difficulty of sound policymaking, and various elements combined to make what has been dubbed, quite aptly, the "China myth."1

The oldest element of this myth was the belief that a vast market for American goods could be developed in China, and that China, therefore, was essential to American well-being. "China market" rhetoric flourished in such abundance that the distinction between the potential and
the reality was often lost, and many Americans came to cherish a "market" that never actually existed. After the Chinese Revolution of 1911, Americans inaccurately viewed China as a developing democracy; and with Chiang Kai-shek's rise to power, we convinced ourselves that under his astute leadership, China would become Christian. (Chiang professed to be Methodist.) The dogma that Communism was monolithic, with all Communists working in concert to overthrow the world, was another element of the myth. This led to American misperception of Chinese Communism as an extension of the Soviet brand, while it actually represented an indigenous Chinese movement. Native Communism in China was something that we could not accept, however. It did not fit into our self-delusional perception of China as an oriental extension of ourselves—an importer and consumer of American goods, a democracy, and a Christian democracy at that.

Thus, various American political groups, together with the Chinese Nationalists, had a fertile field for the biggest myth of all—the myth that somehow the United States had "lost" China through the Communist victory of 1949. As China never belonged to us, it is difficult to see how we could have "lost" it, but nevertheless the myth grew, fired by a neurotic fear of Communism that was fed by lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians. Included among them were the China bloc, the China Lobby, the Committee of One Million, and Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin. American policymakers, sinking
in a mire of delusion, took the bombastic rhetoric of China's new leaders at face value and based policy upon the myth that Communist China was a dangerously expansionist power. Ostrich-like, we began to claim that the People's Republic would expire, and we proceeded to formulate China policy upon that premise. American leaders, with vision clouded by myth and misperception, missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American relations. (Moderate elements in China had been interested in improving relations with the United States as late as June 1949.)

The various China lobbyists wielded considerable clout in Washington in the late forties and early fifties and developed to perfection the art of manipulating public opinion. The Truman Administration, consciously concentrating upon Europe first, left itself vulnerable to the charges of neglect toward Asia and the "loss" of China. The myriad of myths, misperceptions, and missed opportunities that were outgrowths of this domestic political environment contributed to American China policy between 1945 and 1972. Such were the elements of foreign policymaking in a government that had long outgrown the simple days of separation between domestic and foreign affairs. These elements are graphically illustrated in the discussion of American China policy that follows.

During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt maintained a strong commitment to China's being
one of the "big four" powers, which, along with the Soviet Union, would guarantee postwar peace. The goal was "a united, democratically progressive, and cooperative China which will be capable of contributing to security and prosperity in the Far East." Washington urged the coalition of Nationalist and Communist forces in the hope that the Communists could eventually be absorbed into a unified Chinese government. Mutual mistakes compounded with mistrust destroyed any hope of postwar Soviet-American cooperation, and events were to prove that Roosevelt's dreams for China were also founded upon illusion.

The American Ambassador to China during the war, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, believed that if the Chinese Communists were cut off from American support they would buckle under and come to terms with a coalition government. Neither Hurley's staff at the Embassy nor the foreign service officers serving as political advisors to the military command accepted his estimate of Chinese conditions. There was agreement that policy should be directed toward coalition, but the career diplomats were convinced that the intransigence of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek) was the main obstacle to Chinese unity. Many officers believed that Hurley grossly underestimated the determination of the Chinese Communists. They felt that in the absence of aid from the United States, the Communists would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance, creating problems
between America and Russia over China.³

In January 1945, more than four years before they achieved national power in China, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, the leaders of the Communist forces, offered to come to Washington to talk with Roosevelt in an effort to establish a working relationship with America. Their message was not forwarded, except as a secondary reference in another context, either to the State Department, the War Department, or the President. It was held up in Chungking by Ambassador Hurley. Consequently, the United States never responded to the overture.⁴

An obvious question is whether the Chinese Communists were flexible enough ideologically in 1945 to desire seriously an association with America. Barbara Tuchman, long-recognized as an astute observer of China, feels that they were. According to Tuchman, the Communists were, above all else, pragmatic. They wanted to convince the President that they, not the Nationalists, represented the future in China; they wanted recognition as a major party, not as an outlaw; they wanted to acquire belligerent status as a party to the coming Allied victory; they had in mind that an American connection would help them meet the day when the Soviets would enter Manchuria; and John Stewart Service, a career foreign service officer, was convinced that the Chinese Communists hoped to avoid an exclusive dependence upon the Soviet Union.⁵ As late as 1947, O. Edmund Clubb, the U.S. consul general in Peking, reported that the Communists preferred American
to Soviet aid: "'A future tied to the Soviet Union alone offers them nothing but bleak prospects in terms of obtaining needed industrial and consumption goods. . . . The large stock of inspiration they get from Moscow will do little toward restoring China's shattered industry and prostrate finances.'"\(^6\)

There are those who feel that American non-response to the 1945 overture represented one among many missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American relations. I, however, differ with this interpretation. United States Presidents do not meet with the leaders of every guerrilla group that threatens the security of a foreign nation's established government. Although Hurley cannot be excused for not forwarding the Communists' request to Washington, it is unrealistic to assume that Roosevelt would have or should have taken it seriously. The situation had changed, however, by 1949, but American policy remained locked intractably in established patterns that had lost their viability.

If the Communists, nonetheless, retained hopes for American support, a statement by Hurley on April 2, 1945 severely dampened those hopes. He announced that the American government would support only the Kuomintang regime and would not recognize or supply any other forces.\(^7\) When officers of his embassy reported accommodation to be less likely than he believed, Hurley charged that they were anti-Nationalist and were thus subverting American
policy. Because of his complaints, most of the foreign service officers who understood the Chinese Communists were transferred to positions outside China. A tragic side effect of these transfers was the early misperception on the part of American observers that Chinese Communism was an extension of Soviet Communism, which it indeed was not. It was, rather, an indigenous expression of uniquely Chinese social problems. In fact, Sino-Soviet relations during this period were noticeably mundane, according to the reports of one diplomat, John F. Melby:

My primary job was to keep track of what the Russians were up to in China. The assignment was socially pleasant since the Soviet Ambassador was an educated, charming, and shy man whom I had known rather well in Moscow, and several members of his staff were equally congenial. But it was professionally rather nominal since it developed that they really were not up to much of anything beyond the usual diplomatic routine and formalities. Of course, it would have been possible for the Soviets to direct activities outside of the normal diplomatic channels, but if they did, such activities went unnoticed and unrecorded by such astute observers of Sino-Soviet affairs as O. Edmund Clubb.

The difficulties inherent in bringing about Nationalist-Communist accommodation eventually became apparent to Hurley, who resigned suddenly in November 1945. He was unwilling, however, to accept any personal blame for his failure, and he left China making accusations that anti-Nationalists in the State Department and the China mission were subverting American policy. Although Hurley's
resignation was of minor importance when it occurred, it was to take on ominous significance during the ignominious McCarthy era.

After Hurley resigned, General George C. Marshall was sent to China to accomplish Nationalist-Communist union through a mutually acceptable constitutional system. He secured a truce for a short time, but the arrangement collapsed and fighting resumed. He finally dispaired of his tenure in China, which lasted from December 1945 until January 1947, and returned to the United States to become Secretary of State. Marshall blamed his failure less on the Communists than on the Nationalists; Chiang's intractability proved a constant stumbling block. But despite these difficulties, a high-level consensus emerged that America should back non-Communists in China against the Communist opponents.10

Marshall supported a non-Communist solution to problems in China, but because of his 1945-1947 experience, he had doubts as to whether the United States should support the Nationalists. Marshall's replacement in the China post, John Leighton Stuart, also acknowledged the defects of the Nationalists' regime, but he had a strong affection for Chiang and believed that the United States should guarantee his survival. Like so many others, Stuart believed that the Communists were authoritarian dupes of Moscow, and that sufficient American aid to the Nationalists could secure the latter's success.11
Discussion of American China policy in the late 1940's cannot take place as if it existed in a vacuum. Policy vis-à-vis one nation evolves concurrently with domestic politics and a global ambience, and in 1947, the Truman Administration was occupied with issues that outweighed the China problem. In March, the Truman Doctrine requesting immediate aid to Greece and Turkey was announced, and the Marshall Plan followed in June. Implicit in both was the overriding importance of Europe to American security and economic well-being, with Asia being of lesser significance. China policy was being reconsidered by the Administration during this period, but in a context of secondary importance.

In June, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the United States reverse its policy of official non-interference in the Chinese civil war. As part of this reappraisal of China policy, and in an effort to placate domestic elements that wanted increased aid to Chiang, Marshall sent General Arthur Wedemeyer to China to evaluate the situation. Accompanied by a small staff, Wedemeyer toured China for a month, visiting the Nationalist capital, Formosa, Canton, Shanghai, and areas in the north and northeast. He delivered his report of the mission to Marshall and the President on September 19, 1947. Wedemeyer recommended considerable military and economic aid, contingent upon Chiang's agreement to carry out sweeping reforms. He also suggested that United Nations
action be taken in Manchuria to relieve Chiang of the responsibility of maintaining that area.\textsuperscript{13}

Truman and Marshall did not consider East Asia sufficiently important to American security to warrant such measures. They were convinced that security dollars would provide infinitely greater returns when invested in Europe. This was not publicly disclosed, however, and the Administration decided to suppress the Wedemeyer report, leaving itself susceptible to charges of deceit that eventually followed.

Truman and his advisors realized their vulnerability on the China issue; they took a calculated political risk and allowed the public to remain in the dark on China. A full-scale educational campaign explaining the primary role of Europe to American security could have been launched, but the Administration realized that the Republicans could have turned the former's own argument against them, asking why the same logic would not apply to Asia. If a non-Communist Europe was essential to American security, was not a non-Communist Asia just as important? This was one political gamble whose consequences reverberated throughout the next quarter century, and it serves to illustrate that domestic politics and foreign affairs were not separate entities in the forties, but were entwined intricately; thus they remain today.

The decision against intervention in China was conveyed to Congress in February 1948, but pro-Chiang pressure continued from some in the diplomatic and military missions,
Perhaps definitions of the China bloc and the China Lobby would be helpful at this point. The China bloc was not a formally organized group; it was, rather, an amorphous body of congressmen, the numbers of which changed from time to time. What did not change was that they consistently demanded greater support for the Nationalists. With the exceptions of Pat McCarran of Nevada and James Eastland of Mississippi, who were Democrats, these congressmen were very conservative Republicans. Pro-Chiang senators, in addition to Eastland and McCarran, included Owen Brewster (Republican, Maine), Styles Bridges (Republican, New Hampshire), Harry Cain (Republican, New Jersey), Homer Ferguson (Republican, Michigan), Joseph McCarthy (Republican, Wisconsin), and Alexander Smith (Republican, New Jersey). Pro-Nationalist members of the House of Representatives were O. K. Armstrong (Republican, Missouri), Walter Judd (Republican, Minnesota), Joseph Martin, Jr. (Republican, Massachusetts), Lawrence Smith (Republican, Wisconsin), and John Vorys (Republican, Ohio). This group was almost pathologically alarmed by what they saw as a monolithic conspiratorial force, directed by the Soviet Union, with the aim of suppressing liberty everywhere, overthrowing free enterprise, and "burying" the United States.

The China Lobby, which should not be confused with the congressional China bloc, consisted of an inner core
of well-financed Nationalist Chinese officials and supportive right-wing Americans. It worked through many variegated organizations and publications. Among them were the Universal Trading Corporation, the Chinese Oil Corporation, Commerce International Corporation, the American Technical and Military Advisory Group to the Chinese Government, the American China Policy Association, the China Emergency Committee, the Committee to Defend America by Aiding Anti-Communist China, the Committee for Constitutional Government, "America's Future, Inc.," The China Monthly, and Plain Talk. These groups were formulated specifically as branches of the China Lobby, but several long-standing American publications supported the Nationalist Chinese and their views. Among them were Collier's, the Saturday Evening Post, Human Events, American Mercury, Reader's Digest, U.S. News & World Report, The New Leader, and Life. Outstanding among pro-Chiang newspapers were the New York Journal-American, the Washington Times-Herald, the Examiner (both Los Angeles and San Francisco), the Oakland Tribune, and the Manchester, New Hampshire, Union Leader. 17 Both the China bloc and the China Lobby will be discussed at greater length in Chapter II.

During the debates over the Marshall Plan, China lobbyists attempted to add aid to Chiang to the appropriations for the European Recovery Program. What emerged was a compromise--the China Aid Act of April 1948--which was tacked onto the Foreign Assistance Act. It provided for $338,000,000 in direct economic aid and $125,000,000 in
military assistance for one year. This, in reality was merely a sop to the China lobbyists, as the Truman Administration had already decided that the internal conditions in China were such that large-scale intervention would be imprudent. As Senator Vandenberg later said, the China Aid Act amounted to no more than "three cheers for Chiang Kai-shek." The aid did not reach Chiang in time, and whether it would have done any good if it had is questionable. In October 1949, the Communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and in December, Chiang and what was left of his forces fled to Formosa.

Although debate raged for a decade about what should have been done, real debate about whether to intervene militarily in China stretched only over the year from Spring 1947 to Winter 1947-48. American options during this period were to try to save Chiang by exorbitant military aid and advice, or to bend to China's indigenous realities. The second option was followed, and as Dean Acheson explained in his introduction to the China White Paper, "the unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States . . . . It was the product of internal Chinese forces."

It is an irony of history that the Truman Administration considered an explanation of the difference between areas of vital concern to the United States and areas of peripheral concern too subtle for the understanding of the American public. As has been mentioned, such an explanation could have been attacked by political opponents, but left unexplained by the Administration, the issue was to
become potent ammunition in the argument of China lobbyists for the "loss" of China through internal betrayal.

There are those who feel that before the Korean War the Truman Administration was consciously withholding recognition and attempting to isolate the new Communist regime only as a tactic to force the Chinese to live up to its definition of proper international obligations. If those obligations had been met, the Administration would probably have extended recognition, as it wanted to encourage Titoism in China and to promote a rift in Sino-Soviet relations. Whether the Administration considered recognition to be a viable policy option is questionable, but it was certainly discussed—a fact that was repeatedly denied during the McCarthy witch hunts when it meant professional suicide to admit that one's understanding of international relations went beyond the orthodoxy of paranoia.

Moderate elements in China showed interest in American recognition as late as June 1949, but after that time, the United States had missed its chance with the People's Republic. From then on, the more radical anti-American forces in China had gained the upper hand, and the Chinese Communists were the badge of Communist orthodoxy and were openly committed to a pro-Soviet policy. The United States, by siding with the Nationalists in the civil war, had helped to solidify the Communists in that position . . . . In his speech of July 1, 1949, Mao Tse-tung had revealed the key to his strategy. China,
he said, could not look to imperialist powers for help; only the revolutionary Soviet Union would be prepared to provide the assistance that would make China's sinews strong. Consequently, China would lean to the side of the Soviet Union.

On January 5, 1950, Truman announced a policy of non-support for the Nationalists in the Chinese civil strife, and Acheson added that this was proof to the world that America would not meddle in internal Chinese affairs. With Chinese Communist entrance into the Korean War in November, however, Truman reversed this nascent policy. The United States became solidified in opposition to the Chinese Communists and in containment of Communism in Asia as well as in Europe.

This represented a watershed in American foreign policy that set the United States on a course not to be reversed until Richard Nixon visited the People's Republic in 1972. China was added to the ranks of the Soviet Union as enemy of the United States.

Sadly, this policy, which was to span a quarter of the twentieth century, was founded upon a number of underlying myths. Primary among them was the assumption that Communist China was the obedient tool of Moscow. This stemmed from the dogma that all Communist governments were united in an unswerving determination to conquer the world. Titoism revealed a fissure in what was believed to be an invincible monolith, but it was ignored, as was the subsequent Sino-Soviet split for so many years. Rather than watching China's actions, America listened to
its rhetoric and assumed that it was expansionist. We also buried our heads in the sand and based policy upon the wishful thought that the People's Republic would expire. These were the immediate elements of the myth, but underlying them were beliefs that had been internalized by American policymakers and cognizant elements of the public—beliefs that took a quarter of a century to erode. It was felt that China, after the Revolution of 1911, had been a developing democracy that could become Christian under Chiang, who was China's undisputed leader. China was our ward, and a ward that represented an almost infinite market for American exports.\textsuperscript{25} Such an ambience was fertile ground for the growth of another myth—the myth that we had "lost" China, as if China had ever been ours to lose in the first place.

The decade that followed Truman's decision to reinvolve America in Chinese affairs witnessed the further development and hardening of anti-Chinese attitudes. The administration of Dwight David Eisenhower tolerated and abetted the McCarthyite emasculation of the State Department; and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles convinced himself of the immorality of all Communists, neutralists, and Chinese Communists in particular. Having promised in 1952 that he would end the neglect of the Far East, Dulles tried to isolate, encircle, and bring about the collapse of the Peking government. The United States would recognize no China but the Republic of China.\textsuperscript{26}

The Eisenhower Administration used political, economic,
and military ammunition against the Chinese Communist regime. American bases were developed rapidly in East Asia, and mutual defense treaties were signed with those Asian states willing to make anti-Communist professions. As Stalin's quest for security in Europe had stiffened Western resistance and had helped effect the very military encirclement he feared, by the same token, China's intervention in the Korean War produced a more threatening military posture by the United States. Of all alliances, however, it was the American relationship with Taiwan that most exacerbated Sino-American relations.  

When Peking's forces threatened the islands of Matsu and Quemoy in 1954 and 1958, the United States provided Chiang with the logistical support necessary to hold them. And in May 1957, America and the Nationalists announced that missiles capable of carrying conventional or nuclear warheads were being based on Taiwan for the purpose of deterring attack and repelling it if necessary.  

John Fitzgerald Kennedy took the reins of the American government in 1961, and his years in office were marked by dangerous adventurism vis-à-vis Asia. While the Administration worked toward a détente with the Soviet Union, which it was slowly coming to see as a status quo power, it retained its Cold War posture in Asia.  

In the years immediately following Kennedy's assassination in 1963, President Lyndon Baines Johnson strove to improve Soviet-American relations, and some began to speak of the end of the Cold War. Progress toward China, however,
came more slowly. American China policy was intended to be
two pronged: to simultaneously reduce tensions and to
demonstrate American determination to stand firmly against
Chinese aggression. The policy was known as "containment
without isolation."  

Regrettably, Johnson perpetuated Kennedy's decision
to draw the line on Chinese "aggression" in Vietnam. No
one seemed to notice that the Chinese had much less to do
with the Vietnamese struggle than they claimed--"that
Vietnamese Communism was no more an extension of Chinese
power than Chinese Communism was of Russian power."  
In the muddy morass of Southeast Asia, the quest for normal-
ized relations with China bogged down.

Richard Milhous Nixon became President of the United
States in 1969, and slowly, a series of actions indicated
his desire to improve relations with China. Travel and
trade restrictions were eased and the Seventh Fleet's
mission in the Formosa Straits was brought to an end.
Finally, in February 1972, the first United States
President in history visited China. America was coming
to deal with the Dragon as pragmatically as it dealt with
the Bear.

The events that occur are essential information for
anyone who seeks to understand American foreign policy,
but just as important is a basic knowledge of how policy
is made. The Second World War brought with it a revolution
in the foreign policymaking process. New instruments and
agencies became integral parts of international relations: foreign aid, increasingly complex trade and monetary arrangements, intelligence gathering and evaluation, under-cover activities, propaganda transmission, the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations, arms control and weapons technology, and military planning and operations. The State Department concurrently mushroomed into a huge bureaucracy and lost its dominant role in the conduct of foreign policy. The Department of Defense developed an international affairs component parallel to and often more influential than the Department of State, and from Dulles' death in 1959 until Kissinger's assumption of the role, the Secretary of State ceased to be an officer of first importance for the conduct of foreign affairs. The Secretary and his Department were overshadowed by special advisers to the President and their staffs—McGeorge Bundy for Kennedy, Walt Rostow for Johnson, and Henry Kissinger for Nixon, until Kissinger became Secretary of State.33

These special advisers, or national security managers, were forced by the nature of their jobs to be generalists. To serve the President and keep his confidence, which was the only source of their power, they had to be prepared to commit themselves to any crisis wherever it occurred. They had to relate the rush of events into a coherent pattern that the President could understand. This meant that facts had to be shoved into available theories in which bureaucracies had big investments. Obscure events required location in a familiar ideological landscape. Because of
such a policymaking apparatus, planners were still talking about the Sino-Soviet bloc for years after the split in the Communist alliance had exploded into public view. The global manager could not afford to compromise his ideology with contradictory facts, for his reputation rested on being able to manipulate events according to a theory.34

The role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy or in being manipulated to advance foreign policy objectives became more controversial and complex. National security managers understood that public outcries and threat of punishment at the polls did not come from spontaneous reaction to national security decisions but from political exploitation of these decisions by skillful adversaries—a China Lobby with sufficient money to haunt every office in Congress, a demagogue with enough appeal to tag an Administration with the "loss of China" or with "twenty years of treason."35 In short, the boundaries between domestic affairs and foreign affairs, never sharp even in the simplest times, disappeared completely after 1945.36

This crumbling of traditional boundaries, tenuous as those boundaries may have been, profoundly affected American China policy between 1945 and 1972, which was primarily an outgrowth of domestic politics, shaped by myth, misperception, and missed opportunities. Elements of the domestic political scene in the U.S., including tenacious lobbying organizations and ambitious politicians
such as the China bloc, the China Lobby, the Committee of One Million, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, attacked the Europe-oriented Truman Administration where it was most vulnerable and charged it before the American public with the "loss" of a potentially Christian, democratic China—a China with a large market for American goods. This mythical portrait was compounded by the misperception that the People's Republic was a dangerous, expansionist power on the verge of expiration. Adhering to such myths and misperceptions, American policymakers missed opportunities for more pragmatic Sino-American relations (e.g. American failure to court moderate elements in China in the spring of 1949), and postwar American China policy became locked into unreasonable postures. The rise of the national security managers and the concurrent decline in the importance of the State Department added to the paucity of China policy between 1945 and 1972.

Elements of the American domestic political scene such as the various China lobbyists, McCarthy, and the transformed foreign policymaking bureaucracy affected much more than American relations with the People's Republic of China, however. The mistake was much bigger than that. In Chapter II we will investigate how these elements affected the domestic intellectual and political environments; and Chapter III will deal with how they contributed to misperception of the Sino-Soviet split on the part of three American professional groups.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 The author has borrowed this rubric from Sandra Hawley, "The China Myth at Mid-Century" (Ph.D. dissertation, Case Western Reserve University, 1973).


4 Barbara Tuchman, Notes from China (New York: Collier Books, 1972), pp. 77-79.

5 Ibid., pp. 87-90 and p. 102.


9 The only Soviet activity in China during this period that Clubb referred to in 20th Century China involved the Kuomintang—not the Chinese Communists.


12 The official policy was noninterference, but in reality the U.S. was supporting Chiang. See The United States and China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition, Senate Exec. Doc. 86-025, 93rd Cong.,

13May, pp. 20-23.


16Dulles, pp. 70-71.

17Koen, pp. 50-51.

18May, pp. 28-33.


20One scholar who holds this view is Robert Blum, who wrote The United States and China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition. See p. 3.


22The United States and China in 1949 and 1950: The Question of Rapprochement and Recognition, p. 11.


25See Tuchman, pp. 257-259, for American notions about post-1911 China.

26Cohen, p. 215.

27Ibid., pp. 215-216.


31. Ibid., pp. 222-223.

32. Ibid., p. 223.

33. Ibid., p. 224.


36. Ibid., p. 316.

37. Smith, p. 545.
CHAPTER II
CREATION OF ORTHODOXY:
THE CHINA BLOC, THE CHINA LOBBY,
THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION, AND JOSEPH McCARTHY

The 1940's and 1950's were a time of tremendous strain in American politics. They were wracked with the harsh realities of a World War, an incipient Cold War, Communist victory in China, and the Korean War. To these international strains were added the disruptive tensions that exploded in McCarthyism at home.

The American public's reaction to these events was confused and befuddled, especially concerning events in China. Americans had long thought of themselves as the protectors and benefactors of the Chinese, and what they knew of realities in China was nebulous at best. They were unable to believe that the Chinese would substitute one form of government for another without some form of American consultation. It was a simple step from such an attitude to the conviction that American policy had been designed intentionally to hand China to the Communists.¹

This attitude among the population provided fertile ground for the congressional China bloc and the China Lobby. These groups worked together in the forties and
fifties to support Chiang Kai-shek against Mao Tse-tung, and to discredit anyone and anything that could be construed as opposition to Chiang.² Before Mao's success in 1949, their primary objective was to obtain increased aid for the Nationalists, who were led, of course, by Chiang Kai-shek. This necessitated stressing the importance of Nationalist China to American security. After 1949, primary attention was given to preventing American recognition of the People's Republic of China and blocking its admission to the United Nations. The China Lobby and the China bloc were joined, in 1950, by the junior senator from Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy. Another group, the Committee of One Million, carried the China Lobby's mantle through the 1960's.

In pursuance of their objectives, the groups listed above became catalysts for defining anti-Communism, pushing American political thought and action to the right, and restricting the scholar of Asian studies to apolitical scholarship. During the process, reputable Asia specialists in the government, academia, and journalism were discredited, and American foreign policy was frozen unrealistically by the silencing of rational and informed dissent. It should be remembered, however, that none of this could have been accomplished without the receptivity of the American people.³

Many issues were exploited by the China bloc, the China Lobby, McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million in pursuit of their objectives, but seven events were most salient. Major exploitation of these events
occurred after the Communist victory in China in 1949, which in several cases was a number of years after the events had taken place. These seven events were the Yalta agreement, the Amerasia affair, the resignation of Patrick Hurley, the failure of the Marshall mission, the "spy ring" revelations of the ex-Communists, the conviction of Alger Hiss, and the war in Korea. 4

How these events were exploited is a long and involved story that is secondary to our purpose. What is central is that we gain some understanding of the effect of the gradual acceptance of a well-defined propaganda line, i.e., that China had been essential to American national security; that it was "lost" as the result of deliberate treachery by various private Asia specialists and State Department officials; and that further damage had to be prevented by non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and its exclusion from the United Nations. The evolution of this line into American political orthodoxy affected non-governmental American Asia specialists including academicians, journalists, and scholarly organizations and foundations. It also affected governmental specialists, most of whom were State Department employees.

American Asia specialists, who were few in number in the 1940's and '50's, tended to be divided into two schools of opinion. 5 One group was interested in the more traditional China of the Christian missions, the treaty ports, and the Kuomintang, as they were most familiar with those elements of
Chinese society which had absorbed Western ways. They believed that Chiang Kai-shek could retain control of China with only a minimum of help from the United States, and that he represented democratic forces in the American sense. The victory of these democratic forces would result in a China which would be anti-Soviet and pro-American. The group as a whole believed that all Communists were tools of Moscow, and were, therefore, in conflict with America. They tended to reduce all foreign policy questions to a problem of Communism versus anti-Communism, a problem which they saw as essentially one of morality rather than one of power. Among American military personnel, adherents to this school of opinion included General Claire Lee Chennault, General Douglas MacArthur, Major General Patrick J. Hurley, and Vice Admiral Oscar C. Badger.

Those of the second school of opinion placed greater emphasis upon revolutionary China. Where the first group concentrated their attention upon those who were in power, the second focused upon their opponents. They either supported the policy of noninvolvement that America had at least partially attempted toward China after 1945, or they criticized that policy on the basis that it was tied too intimately to Chiang. The most important question for this group was not which Chinese forces were more pro-American, but which were more likely to win. These specialists believed that the Communists would probably control China's future, and that the United States should not, therefore, alienate them. Military supporters of
this view included General Joseph W. Stilwell, General
George C. Marshall, and Major General David G. Barr.

No civilian government specialists appear to have
adopted the view of the first group after 1945. On
the other hand, a long list supported the second position.
Among them were John Carter Vincent, John P. Davies, Jr.,
John S. Service, and Oliver Edmund Clubb.

The overwhelming majority of civilian specialists
in non-governmental positions supported the view that
Chiang would lose if left to run things his way, and that
he should be forced to meet American conditions for aid.
Indeed, this was the prevailing view between 1944 and 1949.
Adherents included such academicians as John King Fair-
bank, Nathaniel Peffer, Owen Lattimore, Lawrence Rosinger,
T. A. Bisson, Derk Bodde, Harold M. Vinacke, Charles P.
Fitzgerald, Benjamin Schwartz, Kenneth Latourette, William
Johnstone, W. W. Lockwood, and Dorothy Borg.

After the Communist victory in China, a few academic
specialists began to voice the argument that those special-
ists who had expressed a belief in the ultimate triumph
of the Communists had actually contributed, by such
expression, to the Communist victory. Some of them also
argued that such specialists were either pro-Communist
or the Communists' dupes. The most prominent members
of this group were David Rowe, William McGovern, Karl
Wittfogel, Kenneth Colegrove, and George E. Taylor.
These views were largely unpublicized until after the
Communist victory, though they may have been held before
then. This early silence meant, in practice, that the
government, news media, and scholarly organizations came to
be dominated in the period from 1944 to 1949 by those who
adhered to the Stilwell view.

Under such circumstances, it was necessary for the
pro-Nationalist spokesmen to discredit the prevailing
school of thought. Asia specialists' reputations were
called into question through repeated accusations of
"Communist connections." In other words, the attack on
American policy toward China was accompanied from the
beginning by direct, personal attacks upon anti-Chiang
specialists.

One of the earliest of these attacks came in 1944
when G. Barry O'Toole accused an academic Asia specialist,
Nathaniel Peffer, of having rehashed "'in meticulous
detail all the standard lies devised by Red propaganda
and all the misleading half-truths urged by unintelligent
American criticism.'"^6

A new element joined the pro-Nationalist spokesmen
in 1950. The China bloc had spearheaded the main assault
against the Truman Administration's effort to develop a
viable China policy in the winter of 1949-50, but when
Senator Joseph McCarthy entered the scene on February 9,
1950 with his charges of Communism in the Department of
State, he gave both new direction and new intensity to the
attacks of the China bloc and China Lobby on the Truman-
Acheson Far Eastern policy. His speech at Wheeling,
West Virginia, in which he told the members of the local Women's Republican Club that he had a list of 205 persons in the State Department known to the Secretary of State as Communists and still shaping foreign policy, was to have fateful consequences. Earlier charges of Administration appeasement in Asia were transmuted under McCarthy's influence to accusations that policy was the result of a pro-Communist conspiracy in Washington. McCarthy had seen a chance to build his own political future by playing upon the public's anxieties, and he pursued this chance with callous disregard for truth or consequences. 7

In the spring of 1950, the disruptive effects of McCarthyism could be seen everywhere, but the greatest impact was on the conduct of Far Eastern policy. Moves to cleanse the Far Eastern Division of the State Department had been initiated as a result of General Hurley's charges before McCarthy came on the scene. Among the more important persons transferred during this first period were John Paton Davies, advisor to Stilwell at Kunming; John Carter Vincent, counselor at the embassy at Chungking and later head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs; and John S. Service, third secretary at Chungking. Their error, in each case, was reporting the weakness of the Nationalists and the mounting strength of the Communists. 8

When McCarthy launched his attacks, he made no direct charges against Davies but specifically singled out Service and Vincent as being pro-Communist. Both
men were cleared after a series of investigations and 
loyalty reviews, but pressure was too great to allow them 
to remain in the Department. Service and Vincent were 
Davies was fired in 1954. With Davies' departure, not a 
single experienced China specialist remained in the Depart­
ment on the policymaking level. No better example could 
be found of the oppressive hand of McCarthyism on the 
operations of the State Department than the loss of such 
men, against whom no valid evidence of Communist sympathies 
was ever produced.9

Another consequence of McCarthyism was the suppression 
of objective reporting on China by the best-informed 
observers in the journalistic and academic worlds. Their 
mistake was that they agreed with State Department specialists 
on the bankruptcy of the Nationalist regime, the futility 
of extending aid to Chiang, and the advisability of 
complete disengagement from the civil war in China.

These China experts included such scholars and 
journalists as Owen Lattimore, John King Fairbank, Edgar 
Snow, Nathaniel Peffer (who had come under attack as 
early as 1944), Joseph Barnes, Harold Isaacs, and T. A. 
Bisson. In a study published in 1961, Robert Newman 
reported that between 1945 and 1950 the above group of 
writers had reviewed in the New York Times twenty-two 
of thirty books dealing with China, and in the Herald 
Tribune, thirty out of thirty-five. Between 1952 and 1956, 
however, none of them appeared in the book review pages
The restraints imposed on these writers left an open field for right-wing publicists such as John Flynn, Felix Wittmer, and Freda Utley to shape opinion according to their views. The virtual suppression of factual reporting on the Far East greatly widened the ever-present gap between myth and reality in both official and popular understanding of China.

The attack upon Owen Lattimore is an outstanding example of what happened to non-governmental Asia specialists during this infamous period of American history. Lattimore had come under serious public scrutiny in an article by Alfred Kohlberg published in October 1945. He remained under constant attack for almost five years in media ranging from Columbia (a publication of the Knights of Columbus), to the floor of the United States Senate. Finally, in March 1950, Senator McCarthy presented in the Senate chamber a resume of all of Kohlberg's attacks on Lattimore. These charges made bold headlines across the country and focused extensive public attention upon the scholar.

Subsequent to McCarthy's charges, a long series of hearings was held by the Tydings Committee, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Two former Communists, Freda Utley and Louis Budenz, added to McCarthy's charges. Budenz accused Lattimore of being a member of a Communist cell in the Institute of Pacific Relations.
and suggested that he was a sinister architect of Far Eastern policy and even a Russian spy.

The majority of the subcommittee rejected the testimony and its implications. They concluded that Lattimore was no spy, that there was nothing to support the charge that he was a Communist, and that his influence on American Far Eastern policy had been no greater than that of hundreds of other specialists who voiced opinions.

In July 1951, however, the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, under Senator McCarran as chairman, began an inquiry into the Institute of Pacific Relations that again centered on Lattimore. As a result of these hearings, the subcommittee concluded that

"'Lattimore was for some time, beginning in the middle 1930's, a conscious, articulate instrument of the Soviet conspiracy.'"13

As a result of these hearings, Lattimore endured almost three years of litigation on charges of perjury resulting from statements made during the subcommittee investigations. He was not convicted and was legally vindicated, but his scholarly reputation was devastated by the fact that those accusations had been sanctioned by the United States Senate. In addition, the mere mention that any Asia specialist had been in any way associated with Lattimore was enough to cast doubt on that specialist's integrity.

Thus, one of the effects of McCarthyism was the destruction of the reputations and influence of many of the most
prominent non-governmental Asia specialists in America. These effects also extended to the organizational framework within which Asia specialists functioned and through which their knowledge was channeled. The Institute of Pacific Relations, for example, was shrouded with such suspicion that it was forced to fold for lack of funds. 14

A source from which McCarthy drew much of his information and which proved to be a disturbing influence on policy was the vague entity that came to be known as the China Lobby. Not to be confused with the congressional China bloc, although often in close association with it, the China Lobby was composed of officials from the Nationalist embassy in Washington, their paid propaganda agents, and many rabid anti-Communists drawn from the ranks of American businessmen, retired Army officers, and conservative State Department specialists. Alfred Kohlberg, a businessman, was the Lobby's most direct link with Senator McCarthy. 15

The China Lobby as it was originally constituted eventually faded away. Its place was taken by a group initially called the Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Communist China into the United Nations. It sprang from a movement on the part of pro-Nationalists to block what for a time appeared to be a possibility that America would reverse its position on the representation issue. Having succeeded in its goal in 1953, the original Committee disbanded and reorganized as the Committee of One Million to throw its influence behind a broader campaign to ensure the complete political isolation
of the People's Republic of China.

In 1966, the Committee enrolled on its list no less than 334 members of Congress. Marvin Liebman, its secretary, stated that the Committee's purpose was to arouse congressional and public opinion against the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, diplomatic recognition, and trade relations.16

It is impossible to unravel the threads that bound together the congressional China bloc, the China Lobby, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million. They worked separately as well as together. Yet always in the background was the same hard core of anti-Communists who remained convinced that American policy should be to support Chiang and make no concessions to Mao.

The total effects of these combined groups upon American domestic and foreign affairs would be impossible to measure, but some generalizations can be made. The dismissal of such dissenters as Davies, Clubb, Service, and Vincent from the Department of State made the risks of informed criticism far too great for the majority of officials. For the most part, such criticism ceased, eliminating intelligent debate as a part of the policy-making process. The discrediting of Lattimore and others pushed Asia scholars into conservatism.17 Until very recently, few scholars of Asia cared to remind their classes, or themselves, that the scholarly work being done was largely the produce of men who had either survived
or missed a purge. With few exceptions, only two kinds of China specialists survived: the cold warriors who believed in an international Communist conspiracy, and those who retreated into a limbo where value-free truth was always equidistant between any two current extremes. The institutional framework through which non-governmental specialists worked was damaged. Journalists were also affected. Theodore White did not write on China for a long while. Edgar Snow continued to write, but from a base in Switzerland rather than the United States. The quality of material on China fell off dramatically, partially because of the silence of those who had previously dominated the field and partially because of the wall which separated the United States from China. In short, the Cold War ethic was internalized by an entire nation, and a political orthodoxy was created.

The propaganda of the China bloc, the China Lobby, the Committee of One Million, and Senator Joseph McCarthy triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception. An atmosphere of paranoia was created in the United States, and this atmosphere unquestionably carried over into American foreign policy. It was in such an ambience that discussion of the Sino-Soviet antagonisms first began, and it was this Cold War intellectual and political environment that directed and for many years confined the perception of the Sino-Soviet split that is the
subject of Chapter III.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


3 Ibid., p. ix.

4 Koen, pp. 56-57.

5 The following discussion of American Asia experts and their opinions draws upon Koen, pp. 113-116.

6 G. Barry O'Toole, quoted in Koen, p. 118.


In The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1970; 1st Schocken Paperback edition, 1974), Richard Freeland offers the interesting analysis that the emotional and political forces upon which McCarthy capitalized were fully developed by 1948. These emotions were aroused and a Cold War consensus emerged, Freeland argues, as the result of a deliberate and organized effort by the Truman Administration in 1947-1948 to mobilize support for the Marshall Plan. The Administration combined the propaganda of crisis mentality with police activities (deportment of subversive aliens, the Federal Employee Loyalty Program, the Attorney General's list) to create a consensus that would guarantee the passage of its European Recovery Program to "save Europe from Communism." I find such an analysis intriguing food for thought.

8 Dulles, p. 81.

9 Ibid., p. 81.


The following discussion of what happened to Owen Lattimore draws upon Koen, pp. 119-131.

IPR Hearings, Report, p. 216, quoted in Koen, pp. 128-129.

Dulles, p. 88.

Ibid., p. 88.

Ibid., pp. 88-89.

This opinion, expressed by Richard Kagan in his Introduction to The China Lobby in American Politics, supports the contention I originally made in 1973, and that appears in this work in the conclusion, that China scholars were hampered by fear of censure in expressing their perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split.


CHAPTER III

AMERICAN PERCEPTION OF THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT:
1956-1972

We have seen that foreign policy between 1945 and 1972 was very different from what it had been before the Second World War. Any separation of foreign and domestic affairs had totally disappeared, and the national security advisor, whose power came directly from the President and was subject to his whim, had greatly displaced the traditional power of State Department personnel. Myth and misperception combined with missed opportunities to freeze American policy toward China in an unrealistic mold. Although the Chinese Communists had been interested in improving relations with the United States as late as June 1945, we ignored them, and with the help of propaganda bombardment from the China bloc, the China Lobby, and Senator Joseph McCarthy, we came to believe what we were predisposed to believe—that the United States had "lost" a potentially Christian, democratic China—a China with a tremendous market for American goods. This loss, we believed, was designed and carried out by Communist sympathizers in the United States whose positions varied from State Department officials, to academic Asia specialists, to newspaper
reporters. The beautiful China these traitors had caused us to lose had been transformed into an expansionist Communist Dragon—the puppet on a string held in Moscow. And the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, or Red China, as we called it, were united in blissful agreement to overthrow the world.

Such was the political and intellectual environment of the United States by the mid-1950's. Informed dissent to orthodoxy was mute; dissent was un-American. Nevertheless, that orthodoxy was wrong. In the following pages, we will discuss the factors which did indeed contribute to a giant fissure in the Sino-Soviet monolith, the events of the fissure's history, and the perception of the split by three groups of American professionals. What we will find should not be surprising to the reader who has gone with us thus far, but this study is no less disturbing because its results can be anticipated partially. After all, we are discussing years of ill-conceived policy toward major world powers. We are discussing a mistake whose reverberations we still feel.

Most informed observers of Sino-Soviet affairs date the beginning of serious antagonisms between the two Communist giants from Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. We will look at the publications and public statements of academicians, journalists, and
policymakers dealing with the rift between 1956 and 1972 when the Sino-American rapprochment radically altered the balance of world power. These professional groups have been selected for study because they offer informed opinion that has been assumed, traditionally, to have some input in the foreign policymaking process.

It would help our understanding of professional perception of the split if we had some idea of what contributed to the conflict between the two countries. There were many factors. The first and most important was a long history of hatred and mistrust. In addition, each country felt that the other was a corruptor of Marxism. The Russians resented Mao's claim that he was the Asian Marx and his egocentric desire to go down in history as one of the prophets of Communism rather than one of its disciples. The Russian elevation of Lenin could hardly be considered less egocentric, however. Differences in the political environments of Communist China and Communist Russia also gave rise to divergence of outlook. The sense of apprehension on the part of Chinese Communist leaders because of the existence of the Taiwan regime was significant. Some scholars would argue that there was no parallel to this in the Soviet environment, and that much of Chinese Communist militancy could be attributed to fear of an East-West détente at China's expense. Another factor in the conflict was economic. The Soviet Union was becoming a "have"
nation while China remained a "have not" nation. A military element was also salient. As the Chinese Communists had no atomic or nuclear weapons until 1964, they had to rely upon Soviet military power which was not always at Chinese disposal. Still another factor that contributed to differences between the two countries might be called their separate revolutionary interests. In the perspective of both countries, the world was in revolutionary ferment and ultimately destined to become Communist, but in hastening this process, differences of priority, of sectionalism, and of timing arose. For example, for Khrushchev to have split DeGaulle away from the Western alliance would have been a bigger prize than a Communist Algeria, but for Mao, a Chinese-supported Algerian insurrection seemed to be the gateway to North Africa.²

Just as important as the factors contributing to the split were the events which made its history. It has been said that "the three years from Stalin's death until the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress in February 1956 was the only real period of friendship between the Russians and the Chinese."³ Khrushchev's speech at the congress denouncing Stalin's "cult of personality" was the opening salvo of what was to become a mighty feud. Resentful of Khrushchev's failure to consult them before launching this attack, the Chinese subsequently raised the issue of polycentrism.⁴ Although
the dispute evolved privately for some time, points of difference apparently arose even during the days of maximum collaboration. Signs of discord were discernible in 1958, but special knowledge of Communist jargon was required to detect them. The first open indication of antagonism came in April 1960 with the Chinese publication of a three-part article commemorating Lenin. It argued that an unnamed but clearly indicated Soviet leadership had betrayed Leninism, and the Soviets responded with articles attacking Chinese positions. Once in the open, the controversy mushroomed. Both Chinese and Soviet spokesmen sought support among other Communist parties, and in August 1960 the Soviets applied an economic squeeze on the Chinese by withdrawing all Soviet technicians from China. The situation was made even more difficult for the Chinese by the fact that the Russian technicians took all of their blueprints with them. In the autumn of 1961, Khrushchev openly denounced Peking's principal supporter, the leadership of the Albanian Communist Party, accusing them of "errors" committed by the Chinese. In 1962, the two countries clashed bitterly over the handling of the Cuban missile crisis and the Chinese attack on India. Peking began criticizing Khrushchev by name in 1963, which may have contributed to his ouster in 1964. The Brezhnev-Kosygin team immediately ended anti-Chinese polemics, apparently trying to normalize relations, and Peking responded
favorably. However, in 1968 the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the enunciation of the "Brezhnev doctrine" (asserting Moscow's right to intervene in Communist countries where policies deviated from Kremlin standards) convinced Chinese leaders that the Russians were capable of attacking China as well. By 1969 Peking's border troops numbered more than a million, and Soviet military build-up had reached huge proportions. Skirmishes occurred on March 2, March 15, and again in mid-June. On September 11 a brief but decisive meeting between Chou En-lai and Kosygin took the Chinese and Russians off their collision course. They agreed to open talks which began on October 19, but after more than a year of negotiation, the only visible result was that the slide toward war had been arrested in late 1969. The talks did nothing to halt the exchanges of vitriolic propaganda, nor did they discourage the continuing reinforcement of frontier zones. In 1971 and 1972 the Kremlin was still building up its troop strength in Siberia and Central Asia while the Chinese were stiffening their air defenses with new radar networks, surface-to-air-missiles, and other modern equipment.

The political and intellectual climate described in the preceding chapter of this work profoundly affected perception and interpretation of the events detailed above. The earliest publications on Sino-Soviet relations
following Stalin's death emphasized Russo-Chinese solidarity. In 1954, C. M. Chang said that Peking's sense of solidarity with Moscow in an international cause went much deeper than most observers imagined. Any appearance of their being out of step was merely a strategem to further befuddle a confused world. "Those who expect Moscow and Peking to get in each other's way and trip each other up will be disappointed." 7

Another publication clearly representative of its time was Moscow-Peking Axis, Strengths and Strains (1957), by Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip E. Mosely, and Benjamin Schwartz. This collection of essays was intended to educate the reader to the implications of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the consensus was that "the general community of belief and purpose underlying the Sino-Soviet alliance give prospect of its being a reasonably durable and highly effective union." 8

G. F. Hudson, also in 1957, expressed opinions similar to those of Boorman, Eckstein, Mosely, and Schwartz. He contended that during Stalin's lifetime there had been no dispute between Peking and Moscow that reached the dimensions of a publicly acknowledged conflict. De-Stalinization and praise for collective leadership had been embarrassing to Mao, but "now that Khrushchev has made a clean sweep of his rivals and abruptly put an end to collective leadership in Moscow, he and Mao will be able to meet on equal terms as fully autocratic
leaders of totalitarian party states."  

On October 6, 1957, Christian Herter said at a news conference that from outward appearances it seemed that the Russians and the Chinese were working very closely together.  

Considering this climate of opinion, the emergence of a school of thought considering schism between the Soviet Union and China a myth, unimportant, and even dangerous if pursued by the West is certainly understandable. Adherents to this school maintained that the Communist powers had an overriding aim in common—the conquest of the non-Communist world—and that they pursued this aim relentlessly and in cooperation.  

The most radical representative of such thought was the November 5, 1960 supplement to National Review, "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?" In his article, "Operation Will-o'The-Wisp," which served as an introduction to the supplement, James Burnham ridiculed C. L. Sulzberger and Joseph Alsop for suggesting the possibility of a break between China and the U.S.S.R. He continued by stating that although most persons believed the Sino-Soviet conflict formula to be true, this did not guarantee that they were correct. "'The Sino-Soviet conflict' may be only the latest in the fifty-seven-year series of strategic will-o'the-wisps that have beckoned the West away from the main road."
In the same supplement, David Nelson Rowe expressed his view of the Russo-Chinese relationship in "Chinese History." According to Mr. Rowe, the dependence of the Chinese Communists upon Russia was required by the objective situation in which they found themselves. Any slight, temporary problems, if they existed, were not enough to threaten the alliance; moreover, the Chinese Communists could feel that in terms of China's history and tradition their dependence was psychologically and politically acceptable to themselves and to their people. So far as they sought guidance from their history, they had no reason to wish or expect that the relationship would be altered in the near future.\(^{12}\)

"Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?" also included "Demography" by Karl A. Wittfogel, in which he offered the following comment:

> When Mao Tse-tung declared that after the First World War the communists controlled 200 million people, that after the Second World War they controlled 900 million people, and that the next major holocaust would probably destroy all remaining non-communist power centers, he was expressing his belief in a historical perspective that makes any idea of a break between Peking and Moscow palpably absurd.\(^ {13}\)

Similar opinions were expressed in the same supplement by Natalie Grant,\(^ {14}\) Wlodzimierz Baczkowski,\(^ {15}\) and Stefan T. Possony.\(^ {16}\)

This school of thought neither began, (as has been illustrated), nor ended with the November 5, 1960 supplement to National Review. In 1961, A. R. Field
published an article in which he discussed Sino-Soviet relations. He stated that he did not agree with Western observers who suggested that the long-term interests of the Soviets and Chinese would eventually clash in Sinkiang. The development of industries in the area seemed to negate such an argument. In fact, Russian and Chinese industrial complexes appeared to be slowly shifting closer together—a fact suggesting that whatever antagonisms that might exist were being kept well within bounds.17

In 1962 the book Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations contained several articles similar to Mr. Fields' and those appearing in "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?." Peter H. S. Tang, in "Sino-Soviet Border Regions: Their Changing Character," expressed the opinion that all Sino-Soviet dealings must be viewed within the context of the two countries' determination to secure the victory of international Communism. He felt some observers' judgment that Moscow and Peking would eventually clash along their common borders was unrealistic, for it was unlikely that either would be willing to jeopardize the triumph they expected for Communism by indulging in fraternal strife, especially in such a petty area as economic and physical encroachment in the border areas.18

As late as 1966, at least one reputable academician,
George E. Taylor, upheld this same point of view. He maintained that because the West still had to deal with the bloc as a whole, the Sino-Soviet conflict made no difference to the American position in Asia. Peking and Moscow still had fundamental interests in common which would outweigh any possible differences, and he warned that in concentrating on the dispute Americans risked overlooking the effective unity of the Communist bloc. Peking and Moscow could not be regarded as two utterly separate powers, for they were not.¹⁹

It may be noted at this point that three of the scholars in the first school of thought, Messrs. Rowe, Wittfogel and Taylor, were among those academicians who, in 1949, accused liberal Asia scholars of contributing to Communist victory in China by the mere expression of their beliefs. Two of the three are China scholars.

Not all observers were quite so right-wing as those of this first school, however, and slightly less conservative opinions did appear. A second school emerged which contended that while a shared determination to establish Communism throughout the world set limits on the conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, there were indeed serious differences between them. The basic divergence between the first and second schools of thought, then, was that the second acknowledged the existence of significant tensions within the axis.

John F. Kennedy was one of the earliest observers to
comment upon Sino-Soviet problems:

The fragmentation of authority within the Soviet orbit has been one of the main gains of the post-Stalinist era. The totalitarian succession has not passed easily from Stalin to Khrushchev. There are other Communists—Mao, Tito, Gomulka—who claim to speak with Communism's authentic voice. Nationalism is a force cutting into the Soviet world as well as the Western. What will be the full effect of the growth of these centripetal currents remains to be seen, but Mao is surely right in the belief that Moscow's one total monopoly of the gardener's craft has gone.

He continued by condemning the stifling atmosphere that prevented legitimate dissent: "There have been and still are good reasons for non-recognition of China; but we must take care not to rigidify our policy through ignorance, failing to detect change in the objective situation when it comes. If criticism is not allowed, policy becomes rigid and vested interests harden to the point where established viewpoints cannot be altered."21

As President, Kennedy changed his tune somewhat. At a news conference on November 8, 1961, he said that "'none of us can talk with precision about the details of relationships between Russia and China. It is a matter of surmise and on this experts may differ. Therefore, I don't feel that it is probably useful now for us to attempt to assess it.'"22

In December 1959 a survey of the United States' foreign needs for the future was made public by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. It had been prepared by a
fourteen-man team headed by two former assistant secretaries of state, Adolph A. Berle, Jr. and Dean Rusk. The report observed that a rift in the Sino-Soviet alliance was not to be expected in the near future, but the coming decade might see a strain between the two powers. The panel warned against a policy that might drive the two countries closer together, but added that actions designed to split them would probably fail. Later testimony of Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee indicated that he was cognizant of Sino-Soviet differences.

Chester Bowles expressed sentiments similar to those held by Kennedy in his senatorial days. He believed America had the power to play a significant role in Asian affairs, but he questioned whether we had the tact, subtlety, and flexibility. To begin, we needed to put aside some of our doctrinaire preconceptions and realistically examine the complexity of the Sino-Soviet relationship. "Deep potential differences exist between Chinese and Russian Communism as a result of the radically different cultures, experiences and leaderships in the two countries." He added that no outsider could be certain of the present or future state of Sino-Soviet relations, but the assumption that there was a rigid, monolithic, and unchangeable alliance was out of date. Consequently, efforts of State Department officials to depict Khrushchev as the leader of a world Communist
movement and to chastise him for not keeping China in line were self-defeating and naive. He proposed that we realize that both Communist alliances and Communist nations were subject to the eroding effects of nationalism, history, and economics.  

A. Doak Barnett, a well-known China scholar, believed in 1960 that strong ideological, political, military, and economic ties united Peking and Moscow. They shared common aims and gained mutual advantages from their alliance, and both would pay a tremendous price if it were dissolved. Yet, beneath the surface, there were significant tensions, problems, and differences that could not be denied.

Another member of the second school, Roderick MacFarquhar, said in "Sino-Soviet Relations" that economic considerations would seem unlikely to allow friction to endanger monolithic solidarity within the bloc, but that China's dissent from Soviet Russia's political concepts was indeed serious. Peter Mayer said essentially the same thing in Sino-Soviet Relations Since the Death of Stalin.  

In 1961, Zbigniew Brzezinski acknowledged that ideology was a source of friction between Russia and China, yet he argued that the dispute had been and would continue to be confined by three limits, consciously observed by both parties:

1) Both parties have recognized that
both would lose by an open split, hence that unity must be preserved; 2) each realized that the other's leadership is firmly entrenched and that, for better or worse, Khrushchev would have to deal with Mao Tsetung and vice versa . . . ; 3) the Chinese, for the time being at least, have striven to reassure the Soviets that they are not trying to displace them as leaders of the bloc but are merely anxious to persuade them to adopt a different strategy. . . .

The bloc is not splitting and is not likely to split. To talk of a Sino-Soviet conflict, or even war between them, merely illustrates a profound misconception of the essence of the historical phenomenon of Communism, which, while affected by traditional national considerations, has from its very beginning reflected a conscious emphasis on supra-national perspectives.

Brzezinski elaborated in "The Problematics of Sino-Soviet Bargaining," (1962). He felt that serious elements of friction within the alliance could only be described as those between two unequal units that could win "only if they stay together," or each lose alone. This resulted in a conflict with an overriding common interest, the nature of which was not likely to be altered substantially. "Naive tinkering and continuous wishful talk about a Sino-Soviet split can have only one effect: to draw them closer together. One cannot promote a heresy in a church to which one does not belong." 33

Kurt London, who edited Unity and Contradiction, in which Brzezinski's 1962 article appeared, stated that he was unwilling to make any concrete predictions as to where conflicts between the Soviets and Chinese would lead the alliance, but he personally was reluctant
to believe they would sacrifice their most valuable asset—the unity of the socialist camp.\textsuperscript{34}

That same year, Donald S. Zagoria published a monograph, \textit{The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61}, in which differences between the Chinese and Russians were covered thoroughly; yet he also minimized the possibility of an open schism.\textsuperscript{35} An article he published in \textit{Foreign Affairs} reflected the same thought.\textsuperscript{36}

William E. Griffith continued along the same line: "One should still beware of predicting an inevitable, total and above all permanent Sino-Soviet break."\textsuperscript{37} The same thought was voiced in later years by Franz Michael\textsuperscript{38} and Robert A. Scalapino.\textsuperscript{39} And in 1971, O. Edmund Clubb published what seems to be a logical extension of such thought, \textit{China and Russia: The Great Game}. Clubb believed that the Sino-Soviet rift was of Mao Tse-tung's personal choice and making, instead of representing a Moscow decision or even the consensus of the eighth Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee plenum before Mao's purge: "The quarrel was between two party leaderships that happened to be in charge of their respective states."\textsuperscript{40} He also felt that from the time when Moscow directed its attack specifically against Mao, it was apparent that if Mao were to be removed from power and his hostile policy toward Russia were abandoned by his successors, the Sino-Soviet alliance could once more be made into a
working political and economic arrangement. The relationship could not be restored to its 1950-56 condition, but Mao would pass, and China would be directed by a new leadership—probably a more pragmatic one.

And with the advent of pragmatists to power in Peking, the Sino-Soviet alliance could, without any great difficulty, be made to operate in a fashion that would service some of China's basic needs—and would, in corresponding satisfaction of a Soviet desideratum, preserve China as a buffer zone between Soviet Siberia and the American naval and air power in the West Pacific.

A third school of thought eventually emerged which held that the tensions within the axis acknowledged by those of the second school rendered a break inevitable. Adherents to this school argued that the interests of the two Communist partners were ultimately incompatible. Viewpoints varied depending upon the importance accorded to the place of ideology in Russian and Chinese motivation. One position was that Russia was becoming a status quo power, its conflict with China arising from the fact that its interests necessarily diverged from those of a partner whose population pressure and revolutionary fervor drove it to expand at all cost. Another view was that the national interests of the two countries conflicted and that competition for control over border areas such as Outer Mongolia must lead them to split. Finally, some within this school maintained that rupture between China and Russia was inevitable because the Communist system demands absolutely centralized control, and
neither Russia nor China would relinquish its claim to power.\textsuperscript{42}

One of the earliest publications to emphasize tensions between China and Russia so strongly as to imply a split was Allen S. Whiting's "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis," published in the \textit{Journal of Politics}, February 1958. Mr. Whiting discussed the military, economic, and ideological aspects of the relationship at length, ending his article with an analogy between Sino-Soviet and Anglo-American relations:

The concatenation of military, economic, and ideological trends in the Sino-Soviet alliance point to increasing independence of Peking from Moscow. If the comparison with the Anglo-American relations offers any insight it lies in dismissing alternative categories of 'satellite' and 'equal partners.' Neither category offers an accurate enough description of reality to be meaningful in a wide range of specific instances. Just as Stalin's view of the Anglo-American alliance suffered from a simplistic analysis remaining fixed over time, so certain Western estimates of the Sino-Soviet alliance appear remote and rigid, requiring close appraisal of the dynamics of divisive as well as of cohesive forces in trend analysis.

Mr. Whiting carried his analysis further in "Conflict Resolution in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," in which he stated that two things seemed certain. In the 1960's, serious problems confronted coordination within the Moscow-Peking axis. As Chinese power increased relative to that of the Soviet Union and as the interests of the two countries expanded geographically, the partners would have increasing opportunity to differ and decreasing
opportunity to impose their will upon each other; and by focusing upon the tensions within the axis, the West could contribute toward a better response to it. 44

Like Whiting, the Marxist journalist Isaac Deutscher spotted problems early. In his syndicated article of August 14, 1958, Deutscher discussed the Middle Eastern turmoil, which he felt had revealed a crisis in the Soviet-Chinese relationship. According to Deutscher, it was the revelation of discrepancy between Moscow's and Peking's reactions to the events in the Middle East that sent a gravely disturbed Khrushchev on his journey to China. Having gone to the brink, Khrushchev felt disconcerted by Chinese backseat driving. During the three days of Mao's and Khrushchev's conference there was hard bargaining, and there were mutual concessions. While Khrushchev called off the planned summit meeting over the Middle East, Mao acknowledged the merits of summit diplomacy in general and recognized in advance that Khrushchev would be acting correctly if he sought another summit meeting on some future occasion. "The outcome was thus a token of coordination and a compromise, which is not, however, likely to prove very stable." 45

In December 1960, Deutscher voiced his opinion that the Declaration of the Eighty-One Communist Parties (published by Moscow on December 6, 1960), for all its elaborate character and stylistic élan, was not likely to put an end to the controversy. It would, rather,
serve as one of those texts which each disputant could, and unquestionably would, quote in support of his own views and policies.\textsuperscript{46}

In 1959, G. F. Hudson was expressing opinions quite different from those he had held in 1957. Indeed, by the end of the fifties he was in accord with Whiting and Deutscher: "The decision to set up communes in China was indeed a parting of the ways, and there is no turning back."\textsuperscript{47}

Joseph Alsop also suggested a parting of the ways in September 1960:

A threatened break between the Soviet Union and Communist China looks more and more like the missing piece in the deeply disturbing puzzle of recent Soviet behavior. . . . Even the smallest possibility of a break could be counted on to exert great pressure on Khrushchev. But the evidence suggests that the possibility is not small. It is no slim chance now, but rather a strong possibility. If a mid-October meeting between Khrushchev and Mao fails to compose the conflict, however, the betting will be rather better than even on an open Sino-Soviet break at the meeting of communist leaders over all the world that is expected to be held in Moscow in November.\textsuperscript{48}

Another observer who viewed the situation as Whiting, Deutscher, and Alsop did was Ferdinand Lundberg. After having read Donald S. Zagoria's "China's Threat to Russia,"\textit{ New Leader}, April 24, 1961, Lundberg drew a more far-reaching conclusion than the possibility of Eastern and Western empires of Communism centered in Peking and Moscow, as Zagoria had suggested. Mr. Lundberg maintained that Moscow and Peking were conducting
a political war on two fronts, one veiled and the other in the open—against each other and against the bourgeois world. The whole history of Leninist Communism testified that one or the other must knuckle under unless there was to be an open competition for power. Sharing power was impossible under Communism; such sharing was bourgeois. When one considered the need of the Communist system for absolutely centralized power it was hard to see how one could magnify the significance of Chinese-Russian differences. Nationalism and culture had been the big contradictions within Communism since the emergence of Red China, and no Communist faction since 1917 had voluntarily subordinated itself to another.49

There were others who stated similar opinions. Marvin Kalb concluded in Dragon in the Kremlin that for economic, ideological, and military reasons, it was clear that the Russian-Chinese alliance had been plagued by a rash of disagreements and anxieties. Both Peking and Moscow seemed to realize that they were bound by a common ideology which gave them strength, purpose, and direction, yet they had been unable to reduce the frequency and intensity of their disputes. Developments indicated that strong disruptive pressures existed within the alliance, but it would be folly to anticipate its dissolution owing to these pressures. It was likely that for the immediate future the Russo-Chinese axis
would continue to function as a viable and powerful political, economic, and diplomatic force. The key phrase in Kalb's analysis was "for the immediate future." He predicted that when China exploded a nuclear bomb it was possible that tensions between Moscow and Peking would force a rupture between them. Therefore, the United States should adopt a highly flexible foreign policy aimed at exploiting divisive pressures so that Moscow and Peking would be deprived of the opportunity of facing the U.S. as a united team. He suggested that the United States should recognize the People's Republic of China; admit it to the United Nations; recognize the government of Outer Mongolia; make every effort to begin a program of exchanges with Communist China; find areas where our interests coincided with the Soviet Union's, and if possible, embark on joint projects; and educate China specialists in the United States.50

Like Kalb, Alexander Dallin also discussed dissension between the two Communist giants. He felt that the rift between them had stimulated competition for control of the international Communist movement. Unwilling and unable to turn his back on international Communism as a failure, Khrushchev was given the choice between two contrary impulses in coping with dissension in the movement. He could strive to maintain a fictitious unity in the Communist world, or he could revert to classical Bolshevik principles of organization:
determination to preserve a pure nucleus at all times. (Lenin's **Better Fewer but Better** provided the formula for the second approach.) "Whatever the formal outcome, the discrepancy between universal ideology and fragmented authority points toward more, rather than less, tension and conflict within international Communism." 51

Stavro Skendi reached the same conclusion in analyzing the Albanian problem. 52

After the polemical winter of 1962-63, there were still those who doubted the seriousness of Sino-Soviet antagonisms, but there were many who voiced an opposite point of view. In his July 3, 1963 article, Isaac Deutscher said that over the last several years the Russians and the Chinese had agreed to disagree, but now they were unable to agree even on this. "The monolith has in fact broken; and no one can put it together again." 53 Exactly the same opinion was expressed by Edward Crankshaw in *The New Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin*, 54 and by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (who had completely reversed his 1962 opinion), in "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism," (1963). 55 Brzezinski held to this view in later years, 56 and he was supported by others such as George F. Kennan, 57 Lucian Pye, 58 Richard Lowenthal, 59 Bernard Fall, 60 William E. Griffith (who by 1967 had reversed his 1964 position), 61 and John King Fairbank. 62

As Sino-Soviet animosity flared, some observers, who
came to constitute a fourth school of thought, developed a more extreme view than that of most other commentators. Walter Z. Laqueur said in 1962 that "for world Communism 1961 was the year of the great schism."63 Even if the Sino-Soviet dispute could be resolved (a most unlikely prospect), world Communism would never again be the same. For the more distant future, even the possibility of war between China and the Soviet Union could not be ruled out.

What separated Laqueur and others of similar persuasion into a distinct school, therefore, was that they seriously discussed the possibility of war between Russia and China.

In 1966, Thomas W. Wolfe spoke of the possibility of war in the future,64 and in 1969, Harrison Salisbury's War Between Russia and China appeared. To the question, "Is war between the Soviet Union and China inevitable?," Salisbury's answer in 1969 was a qualified "no," the qualification being that if events were permitted to continue on the present pattern, war would become inevitable. He maintained that if the United States were to take a serious role in the Sino-Soviet dispute it needed to establish a viable relationship with China. Concerning the possibility of Sino-Soviet détente following the death of Mao Tse-tung, Salisbury stated that the possibility should not be overlooked, because unexpected, illogical events change the course
of world history, but the odds against rapprochement were long.65

In 1970, L. LaDany said that China, for its part, probably did not want war; but it feared attack and was therefore engaged in military preparation.66 Hans Morgenthau, too, emphasized the possibility of war.67

Oton Ambroz concluded in Realignment of World Power that "it seems unlikely therefore that a change of leadership in Peking will itself significantly affect the substance of the dispute. . . . The Russo-Chinese conflict has deep historic roots and the Communist regimes were simply not able to change the hard geopolitical facts."68 On the question of war, Ambroz pointed out that military experts studying the logistic infrastructure of Russia's war industry and transportation system came to the conclusion that Moscow was preparing itself for action against Red China. A large portion of China's armed forces and missile bases, on the other hand, were stationed in the country's northern and western parts along the border with the Soviet Union. He ruled out complete reconciliation between the Communist big two: "The Sino-Soviet axis was an unnatural alliance, and its collapse should be viewed as natural."69 Stanley Karnow expressed similar sentiments in Mao and China.70

Like Salisbury, Ambroz, and Karnow, Richard Thornton wrote of Sino-Soviet tensions. In The Bear and Dragon:
Sino-Soviet Relations and the Evolution of the Chinese People's Republic, 1949-1971, Thornton did not rule out any relaxation of tensions between the two countries, but he considered it unlikely. He concluded that, from the Soviet viewpoint at least, indications suggested that the U.S.S.R. was more likely to develop a long range pincer envelopment of China, while maintaining a powerful position along the border.  

As time passed, some observers came to believe that while severe Sino-Soviet tensions still persisted, the danger of war was over. This, then, constitutes a fifth school of thought.

One analyst in this school, Richard Lowenthal (who had shifted from an earlier position), expressed the opinion that the continuation of controlled conflict between China and Russia was a more plausible prospect for the future than its end by either reunion or catastrophe.

Michel Oksenburg presented a somewhat more sanguine analysis: "Following the armed clashes in 1969 over the disputed islands in the Ussuri River in Manchuria, Sino-Soviet relations have improved somewhat. Peking and Moscow plan increases in their trade and are engaged in border talks."

On the same topic, Seymour Topping said:

Between June 1959 and October 1961, the Chinese-Soviet alliance in effect dissolved. . . . the Chinese, faced with the prospect of a lasting confrontation with Soviet military
forces superior in strength to their own were compelled to look for new political and diplomatic arrangements in the world to bolster their position vis-à-vis Moscow. The task was given to Chou En-lai, and he responded with a search for new allies and Ping-Pong diplomacy.

It could be said that in the era that began with Russia's acquisition of advanced nuclear weapons, Communist China's emergence as a great power, and Stalin's death, the main fault of American policymakers lay in misperception. Not understanding the internal weaknesses within the Communist world that could have offered options for American diplomacy contributed greatly to this misperception. Although Sino-Soviet estrangement has altered drastically the balance of world power, knowledge of the split was limited to the specially initiated alone for many years. The following chart, listing the professionals in the schools of thought discussed in these pages, should make the reasons for this clearer. Academicians are labeled with (A), journalists with (J), policymakers with (P), and China scholars are specially indicated with asterisks. Publication dates follow the name of each author.
### School #1

Those who saw no problems or few problems and expected no split

- (A) C. Chang '57
- (A) * G. Hudson '57
- (A) * H. Boorman '57
- (A) A. Eckstein '57
- (A) P. Mosely '57
- (A) * B. Schwartz '57
- (P) C. Herter '57
- (A) J. Burnham '60
- (A) * D. Rowe '60
- (A) * K. Wittfogel '60
- (P) N. Grant '60
- (A) W. Baczkowski '60
- (A) S. Poszony '60
- (A) A. Field '61
- (A) P. Tang '62
- (A) G. Taylor '66

### School #2

Those who expected no split, but saw severe problems within the axis

- (P) J. Kennedy '57,'61
- (P) A. Berle, Jr. '59
- (P) D. Rusk '59,'62
- (P) C. Bowles '60
- (A) * D. Barnett '60
- (A) * R. MacFarquhar '61
- (A) Z. Brzezinski '61,'62
- (A) K. London '62
- (A) P. Mayer '62
- (A) D. Zagoria '62,'62
- (A) W. Griffith '64
- (A) * R. Scalapino '64,'66
- (A) F. Michael '66
- (P) * E. Clubb '71

### School #3

Those who saw problems which they expected to cause a split

- (J) I. Deutscher '58,'63
- (A) * A. Whiting '58,'62
- (A) * G. Hudson '59,'60
- (J) J. Alsop '60
- (J) H. Salisbury '60
- (J) M. Kalb '61
- (J) F. Lundberg '61
- (A) R. Lowenthal '61,'66
- (A) R. Skendi '62
- (A) A. Dallin '62
- (J) E. Crankshaw '61,'63
- (A) Z. Brzezinski '63,'66,'72
- (P) G. Kennan '64,'66
- (A) L. Pye '66
- (A) B. Fall '66
- (A) W. Griffith '67
- (A) * J. Fairbank '72

### School #4

Those who talked of war

- (A) W. Laqueur '62
- (A) T. Wolfe '66
- (J) H. Salisbury '69
- (J) L. LaDany '70
- (A) H. Morgenthau '71
- (J) S. Karrow '72
- (A) O. Ambroz '72
- (A) R. Thornton '72

### School #5

Those who believed that tensions persisted, but danger of war had passed

- (A) R. Lowenthal '71
- (A) M. Oksenburg '71
- (J) S. Topping '72
The preceding chart represents the opinions of thirty-seven (37) academicians, nine (9) journalists, and eight (8) policymakers. Among scholars, one can see a liberal-conservative split, with twenty-three calling for Sino-Soviet unity. Hudson, who expected no split in 1957, had changed his opinion by 1959. Brzezinski reversed his position during the winter of 1962-63 when polemics were flying back and forth between Russia and China, and Griffith did the same some time between 1964 and 1967. Including these three, seventeen academicians expected a Sino-Soviet split. One of this group, Lowenthal, moved from School #3 to School #5 between 1966 and 1971. All nine journalists expected a split, but seven of the eight policymakers did not, at least according to their public statements.

These figures suggest several things. First, the journalists as a group were more astute in perceiving the reality of Sino-Soviet antagonisms than were the academicians and the policymakers. This could possibly be attributed to the fact that journalists are by nature more gregarious than scholars and are therefore more often placed in situations where current events are discussed by those who make them. It would seem, however, that other factors are also involved. It was noted in an earlier chapter of this work that journalists as well as academicians and policymakers were affected by the McCarthyite purges. Theodore White stopped writing on China for some time, and Edgar Snow changed his base
to Switzerland. Our survey of professional perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split would indicate, however, that the effects of McCarthyism lingered in academia and government much longer than in journalism. Perhaps the long and tedious preparation required for an academic career makes scholars less willing to tackle issues that could jeopardize their positions than journalists whose formal preparation seldom demands more than a four-year degree. In fairness to scholars, however, one will note that there was evidence of suppression of maverick works (e.g. Ross Koen's *The China Lobby in American Politics* was purged from library shelves in 1960). I do not know of similar examples in journalism, though they may have existed.

There is also a crucial difference between the traditional roles of journalists and academicians. Journalists are expected to report events as they occur. If the happenings of today overturn the judgment made in yesterday's article, then so be it. The world, after all, is in flux. Academic specialists, on the other hand, in admitting they were wrong, may have to renounce years of work upon which they have built a reputation. Consequently, such respected and perceptive scholars as Brzezinski were slow to give up public adherence to the ideology of monolithic Communism. Strict adherence to this ideology rendered more than half of the scholars represented in this paper incapable of perceiving the demise of a monolith even in the face of overwhelming
evidence pointing in that direction.

One will notice that the majority of China scholars represented here are on the radical right or rightist side of the spectrum. A second implication of this survey, then, is that the severe treatment of Asia scholars in the late forties and early fifties left deep scars that are evident in their writings on Sino-Soviet relations. The suggestion is that not only were the China experts directed by ideology in this instance, but by fear of attack. One who has been burned is not likely to stick his hand into another fire.

Some Asia scholars have contrasted their field and Russian studies to stress the former's independence from government. The fact that Russia scholars did not suffer attack during the McCarthy era suggests to them that the Russian field was more closely aligned with government views than the Chinese field. There may be some validity to this claim, but one must take into consideration here that Russia had not recently been "lost." Russia scholars were not attacked because there was no need to blame them for anything. After all, the Russian Revolution occurred in 1917—not 1949.

It is true, however, that there are differences in the backgrounds of the majority of scholars in these two fields. There were few experts on the Soviet Union before World War II. The immediate post-war boom in Russian studies was largely a product of interest in the Soviet
Union as the enemy. China studies, on the other hand, had been dominated by scholars of Chinese culture and history. Because the large scale study of Russia developed initially in a Cold War context, the field came to be dominated by professional anti-Communists, military strategists, and Eastern European and Russian émigrés. These are interesting differences with implications for separate periods of recent American history. It is possible that these differences contributed to the vehemence of attack upon China scholars during the McCarthy era and the relatively immune position of Russia scholars. But for this very reason, Russia scholars could depart from orthodoxy sooner than Asia scholars would dare risk. Academic discussion of Sino-Soviet relations in the late fifties and sixties was more conservative on the part of China scholars than on the part of other academicians, I believe, because of their different experiences in the McCarthy era.

Policymakers, unlike journalists and academicians, present special problems for the historian who attempts to analyze their statements. Anyone familiar with American political life would suspect that there is often significant divergence between the privately-held and publicly-announced beliefs of policymakers, resulting from the fact that they rely upon public whim for their positions. If some policymakers were cognizant of the true nature of Sino-Soviet relations
during the period we have studied, I believe there were several reasons why they would not have made their beliefs public. The first reason would be the Cold War slant of public opinion; the second would be the memory of what happened to government Asia specialists such as O. Edmund Clubb, John S. Service, John Paton Davies, and John Carter Vincent, during the McCarthy era. Government specialists, like China scholars and unlike Russia scholars, suffered horribly during the McCarthy purges. Although some journalists suffered also, they neither spent as many years preparing for their careers as did academicians, nor depended upon public approval for their jobs as did elected policymakers. Compounding the effects of these factors would be the conservative input of the national security managers who emerged after World War II. As their power came from and depended completely upon those they advised, they could be and were easily led into feeding their superiors the information they most likely wanted to hear. I believe these factors directed the public opinions of policymakers toward conservatism concerning China policy and Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972, and I have no knowledge that their private opinions were different, although they may have been. The only policymaker surveyed here who made any public statement of recognition of the Sino-Soviet split was George Kennan, and he was no longer in government. Thus, it would appear that there are several
reasons for the lag in perception by policymakers as well as by academicians and for the comparative insight of journalists.

Another inference I draw from this survey is that policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972. I do not mean, however, that academicians had an effective input in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a basic difference between the government-university relationship and the government-journalistic relationship—a difference that still exists. The latter relationship reveals relatively more independence. After World War II, area studies departments were begun in universities all over the country. In case after case, they were financed through government grants. Academicians either followed the line of orthodoxy in order to attract funds, or they retreated into the private "think tanks."

A case in point of how the government used academic opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967. He described a series of policy-planning sessions in the State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department as an adviser at that time). Such issues were discussed as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach fractured Communist parties in third world countries,
should we manipulate the Sino-Soviet split or lie low, and what should be done vis-à-vis mainland China. Thomson revealed that to many in the Department, this represented the first realization that there was a split between Russia and China. Thomson wanted to use the split to begin a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China, but Secretary of State Dean Rusk refused.77

What is interesting is how the bureaucracy in the Department and the White House decided to deal with the China problem. Rusk initiated a study on China to be undertaken on the outside under foundation grant. What resulted was an eleven-volume work on "The United States and China in World Affairs," edited by Robert Blum and written by top China experts, including A. Doak Barnett, A. M. Halpern, Lucian Pye, and Alexander Eckstein. The volumes produced represented the views of top American China experts on many facets of Sino-American relations. The conception and execution of the study show how scholars were mobilized and funds made available for one government policy study, and the suggestion is that the process has been and is repeated. This example defines the role of the area expert and his function as a public relations man for policymakers--not to furnish policymakers with new ideas--but to hush clamors for liberalization of policy. The result in this instance was a weighty Council on Foreign Relations study that gave the Rusk containment policy the academic seal of approval.78
Another suggestion of this survey is that led by the journalists all interpreters of Sino-Soviet affairs have tended to drift very, very slowly from School #1 toward Schools #4 and #5.

This survey of the perception of the Sino-Soviet split by three American professional groups, then, suggests several things. First, journalists were undeniably more astute in perceiving the realities of the split than were academicians and policymakers. Several factors could have contributed to this outcome. Journalists tend to be more gregarious by nature than academicians, thus placing themselves more often in social situations where world affairs are discussed by those who make them. The shorter academic preparation required for a journalistic career compared to the long and tedious preparation required for the scholar may make the latter more hesitant to voice opinions that could possibly jeopardize his position; and, finally, the societal roles of journalists and academicians are quite different. Journalists are expected to report events as they occur; scholars fit those events into theories based upon years of study and reflection. And policymakers, unlike journalists, are dependent upon public whim for their positions.

Second, Asia scholars were more conservative in their perceptions of Sino-Soviet relations than were Russia scholars, and I attribute this to their separate
treatment during the McCarthy era, Asia scholars having been censured and purged while Russia scholars were not.

Third, policymakers failed to perceive the realities of the Sino-Soviet split (or admit that they did) for several reasons: the Cold War slant of public opinion, the memory of what had happened to government Asia specialists during the McCarthy era; and the conservative input of national security managers.

Fourth, policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating Sino-Soviet-American relations between 1945 and 1972. This use was not altogether healthy, however. "The United States and China in World Affairs," edited by Robert Blum and written by top China experts, defined the role of the area expert and his function as a public relations man for policymakers, not a contributor of new ideas. I suspect that this government/university symbiosis is broad and has affected American foreign and domestic affairs in general and not just Sino-Soviet-American relations between 1945 and 1972.

And finally, led by the journalists, all interpreters of Sino-Soviet affairs have tended to drift very, very slowly from School #1 toward Schools #4 and #5.

In Chapter IV, we will look concisely at the results of this entire study.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


2 The discussion of the second through seventh factors relies heavily upon Zagoria, pp. 14-19. Mr. Zagoria is a senior fellow at the Research Institute of Communist Affairs and Assistant Professor of Government, Columbia University.

3 Stanley Karnow, Mao and China (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 475. Karnow has reported on East Asia for American newspapers and magazines for more than twelve years. He is currently a diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Post.

4 "Polycentrism" can be defined as the recognition of the validity of various brands of Communism, e.g. Titoism, Stalinism, Maoism, etc.


7 C. M. Chang, "Five Years of Communist Rule in China," Foreign Affairs 33 (October 1954): 107-108. Formerly Professor of Government at Nankai University, in 1954 Mr. Chang was at Lingnan University, Canton.

8 Howard Boorman, Alexander Eckstein, Philip Mosely, Benjamin Schwartz, Moscow-Peking Axis, Strengths and Strains (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957). Howard Boorman, as one part of his work in the Foreign Service, established and conducted for several years a special bureau at Hong Kong for the study of developments in Communist China. He was for some time the Director of the Research Project of Men and Politics in Modern China at Columbia University, and he is now teaching at Vanderbilt University.
Alexander Eckstein is associated with the University of Michigan, and Benjamin Schwartz, author of Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, is teaching at Harvard. Philip Mosely was until his death the Director of Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and was formerly Director of the Russian Institute of Columbia University. During World War II he was chief of the Division of Territorial Studies, a section of the Department of State which prepared many background and policy analyses for use in the postwar settlement, and between 1943 and 1946 he was engaged in several major negotiations with representatives of the Soviet Union.

Although the consensus of the authors of Moscow-Peking Axis, Strengths and Strains was that the alliance would be durable and effective, Mr. Eckstein did suggest the possibility of economic exploitation in Soviet dealings with China, Mr. Schwartz pointed out some ideological differences, and Mr. Boorman hinted at the possibility of trouble in border areas. I mention this only in respect to scholars who, understandably, would not want to be misinterpreted.

9G. F. Hudson, "Mao and Moscow," Foreign Affairs 36 (October 1957): 79 and 90. In 1957, Mr. Hudson was a Fellow at St. Anthony's College, Oxford, in charge of the Center of Far Eastern Studies.


12David Nelson Rowe, "Chinese History," in "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?," pp. S19-S22. David Nelson Rowe has held numerous posts with government agencies, and from 1954-1956 he was representative of The Asian Foundation in Taiwan. In 1960 he was Professor of Political Science at Yale University.

Mr. Wittfogel was born in Germany. He came to the U.S. in 1935 via England after having been imprisoned in a concentration camp when Hitler came to power. In 1960 he was Professor of Chinese History at the University of Washington and head of the University's Chinese History Project, stationed in New York.

14 Natalie Grant, "Disinformation," in "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?" pp. S40-S45. In this article, Ms. Grant said that "a careful study of material forming the alleged grounds for concluding that there is a serious Sino-Soviet conflict proves the absence of any objective foundation for such a belief" (p. S45). At one time, Ms. Grant was a Foreign Service officer in the Department of State. In 1960, she was writing a book on the treatment of Soviet problems by the United States in the era preceding recognition of the Soviet government.

15 Wlodzimierz Baczkowski, "World History," in "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking?" pp. S9-S13. Mr. Baczkowski stated that in the overall history of Sino-Soviet relations, two clearly defined currents could be traced: one of strife and suspicion, and one of cooperation and friendship. Although no one could know for certain, Baczkowski felt that the tendency toward friendship and cooperation would prevail (p. S12). Mr. Baczkowski is a Polish-born historian and political analyst. He edited the quarterlies, Problems of Eastern Europe and Orient, and he is the author of Towards an Understanding of Russia, among other books. In 1960 he was an Associate Member, Ethnic Institute, Georgetown University.

16 Stefan Possony, "Strategy," in "Bear and Dragon, What Is the Relation Between Moscow and Peking," pp. S28-S32. Mr. Possony said in this article that Communist world strategy continued to be made in Moscow, and the Chinese were obliged to execute orders issued from the Kremlin (p. S32). Possony was born in Vienna and came to the U.S. in 1940. In 1960 he was Professor of International Politics in the Graduate School, Georgetown University, and an Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Among his books are Strategy of Air Power and A Century of Conflict.


18 Peter Tang, "Sino-Soviet Border Regions: Their


John Kennedy, "A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 36 (October 1957): 48. At this time, Mr. Kennedy was a United States Senator from Massachusetts.

Ibid., p. 50.

Kennedy, quoted in Congressional Quarterly, p. 109.

Ibid., p. 96. In 1959, Adolph Berle, Jr. and Dean Rusk had both held the position of Assistant Secretary of State. Dean Rusk was later to become Secretary of State.

Congressional Quarterly, p. 111. This testimony was given on April 5, 1962.


Ibid., p. 485.

A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 381. In 1960, Barnett was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute. He was born in China and was at one time Professor of Government and Chairman of the Contemporary China Studies Committee, Columbia University.

China Quarterly, the major scholarly journal of modern China.

29 Peter Mayer, Sino-Soviet Relations Since the Death of Stalin (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1962). Mr. Mayer is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Francis College, Loretto, Pa.


32 Ibid., p. 405; emphasis added.

33 Ibid., p. 405.


35 Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-61; see especially p. 6.


39 Robert Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in
Africa," Foreign Affairs 42 (July 1964): 640-654. See also Robert Scalapino, "Evolution or Revolution?," in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, pp. 35-42. Mr. Scalapino is editor of the Asian Survey and Professor of Political Science and chairman, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley.

40 O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), p. 519. O. Edmund Clubb was the U.S. Consul General in Peking when Sino-American diplomatic and consular relations were broken off in 1949. Since retiring from the State Department after twenty years of service in Asia, he has lectured on Chinese history at Columbia University, Brooklyn College, and the New School for Social Research, New York.

41 Ibid., p. 519.

42 Professor Zagoria presented an excellent discussion of the first three schools of thought in his monograph. See especially pp. 3-4. What is presented here is not identical to his interpretation, however. At the time of his publication, the thought which I have labeled Schools #4 and #5 had not appeared, and Zagoria thought of Schools #1 and #3 as thesis and antithesis, the synthesis being what I have called School #2.

43 Allen Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis," Journal of Politics 20 (February 1958): 161. Mr. Whiting is Professor of Political Science and Associate at the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan. From 1962 to 1966 he served in the State Department as Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East. From 1966 to 1968, he was Deputy Consul General in Hong Kong.


Russia or China, and thereby to influence relations between them, remains extremely limited. Even assuming that the few instrumentalities in our possession are used as well as possible, the United States, as the leader of the 'imperialist' camp, will remain the major enemy of both Russia and China, and its ability to exploit the rift will be extremely limited" ("The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the West," p. 171). Zagoria, 1966: "Moreover, even among the analysts, myself included, who closely followed the development of the Sino-Soviet dispute from its inception, there was an almost complete lack of awareness of the extent to which American policy has been a cause of the rift. It was the collective failure of government analysts, official and academic specialists to appreciate the enormous impact of our policies on the Communist world" ("A Strange Triangle: China, Soviet Union, and United States," in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, p. 44). A. Doak Barnett, 1960: The nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance today clearly makes it unrealistic to believe that any changes in U.S. policy toward China could promote a split between them (Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy, p. 381). Deutscher, 1960: The Moscow Meeting of the Eighty-One Communist Parties brought about an ideological truce between Peking and Moscow designed to cover the critical period during which Moscow will be testing the intentions of the new American administration. Every move made by Khrushchev and Kennedy will be scrutinized throughout the Communist world and eagerly evaluated as evidence in support either of the Khrushchevite or the Maoist line. In a sense, therefore, Kennedy will be the unwitting arbiter of this inter-Communist controversy (Deutscher, pp. 221-222).

46 Ibid., pp. 218-219.


48 Joseph Alsop, "Matter of Fact," Washington Post, 16 September 1960, p. A16. Mr. Alsop is a syndicated journalist whose articles on politics and world affairs are widely read. This article bolstered what Harrison Salisbury had suggested in May of the same year.

49 Ferdinand Lundberg, "Russia and China," New Leader 44 (May 1961): 29-30. Mr. Lundberg's career has combined journalism and education. He has written for the Chicago Daily Journal and the New York Herald Tribune, and he is currently an adjunct professor of
social philosophy at New York University, as he has been since 1962. He is perhaps best known for his book The Rich and the Super-Rich (1968).

50 Marvin Kalb, Dragon in the Kremlin (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1961). Marvin Kalb was press attache at the American embassy in Moscow, 1956-1957 and the CBS news correspondent in Washington, D.C. since 1963. In Dragon in the Kremlin, it was not so much Mr. Kalb's view of the Chinese-Russian relations as his suggestions for American foreign policy that were impressive.

51 Alexander Dallin, "Long Division and Fine Fractions," Problems of Communism 11 (March-April 1962): 16. Born in Germany, Alexander Dallin became a naturalized citizen of the U.S. in 1947. He has taught at several major American universities and is currently Professor of History and Political Science at Stanford, where he has been since 1971.

52 Stavro Skendi, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict," Foreign Affairs 40 (April 1960): 478. Dr. Stavro Skendi, a native of Albania, is a naturalized American citizen. He teaches Balkan languages, literatures, and history at Columbia University where he has been since 1951.

53 Deutscher, p. 267.

54 Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow v. Pekin (Hammondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963). Mr. Crankshaw, born in London, began a career in journalism in 1931. From 1941 to 1943 he was attached to the British military mission in Moscow. For many years he has been known as the Observer's correspondent on Soviet affairs and has also written extensively about Russia for American journals. In fact, an article by Crankshaw anticipating a split appeared in the New York Herald Tribune on February 19, 1961.


57 George Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," Foreign Affairs 42 (January 1964): 171 and 174; and
George Kennan, "U.S. Policy Toward the Communist World," in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, pp. 204-205 and p. 207. George Kennan was the American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1961-1963. He previously served as Ambassador to the Soviet Union as the head of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State. Following his retirement from government service he joined the faculty of Princeton University.


Richard Lowenthal, "Diplomacy and Revolution," in The Sino-Soviet Dispute, p. 34. See also Richard Lowenthal, "National Interests and the Orthodox Faith," in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, pp. 27-32. See especially pp. 30-31. Formerly a research associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, and senior fellow at the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University, in 1966 Mr. Lowenthal was teaching at the Free University of Berlin.

Bernard Fall, "The 'Third World,'" in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, p. 182. Formerly Professor of Political Science at the Royal Cambodian Institute of Administration, in 1966 Mr. Fall was Professor of International Relations, Department of Government, Howard University, Washington, D.C.


John Fairbank, The United States and China, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 383-388. Mr. Fairbank, a Harvard professor, is one of this country's best known China specialists.

Walter Laqueur, "The End of the Monolith: World Communism in 1962," Foreign Affairs 40 (April 1962): 360 and 372, quotation on p. 360. Walter Laqueur is Professor of History at Brandeis University. He is co-editor of the Journal of Contemporary History and Director of the Institute of Contemporary History, Wiener Library. He has written extensively on recent European and Middle-Eastern history. Among his books are Europe Since Hitler, The Fate of the Revolution, Russia and Germany, Young Germany, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, The Middle East in Transition, and
The Road to War 1967: The Origins of the Arab-Israel Conflict.

64 Thomas Wolfe, "Two Approaches to Military Strategy," in Sino-Soviet Rivalry: Implications for U.S. Policy, pp. 53-61. Mr. Wolfe, who retired from the USAF and was formerly air attache at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, is professor at the Institute of Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University.

65 Harrison Salisbury, War Between Russia and China (New York: Norton, 1969), pp. 203-205. Mr. Salisbury is an editor of the New York Times. It may be pointed out that Marvin Kalb made the same suggestions about American relations with China in 1961 that Salisbury made in 1969.

66 L. LaDany, "China: Period of Suspense," Foreign Affairs 48 (July 1970): 711. In 1970, Mr. LaDany, a minister, was editor of "China News Analysis," Hong Kong. He is currently editing "Letters from Asia," also in Hong Kong.

67 Hans Morgenthau, "Changes and Chances in American-Soviet Relations," Foreign Affairs 49 (April 1971): 433. Mr. Morgenthau is Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Modern History, University of Chicago, and Distinguished Professor of Political Science, City College of New York.


70 Karnow, p. 472.


Michel Oksenburg, "The Strategies of Peking," Foreign Affairs 50 (October 1971): 15. Mr. Oksenburg is an Associate Professor of Political Science, Columbia University, an International Affairs Fellow, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Seymour Topping, Journey Between Two Chinas (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), pp. 354 and 361. "Seymour Topping, now Assistant Managing Editor of the New York Times, has spent more than twenty-five years of his life actively watching China from both inside and out. In 1946 he visited Mao's blockaded guerrilla headquarters and talked with the men who would become the leaders of the Communist state. In 1949, after three years as a correspondent on the war-torn Chinese mainland, Seymour Topping was the first journalist to meet the Communist Army as it entered Nanking, Chiang Kai-shek's capital. In the spring of 1971, in the wake of Ping-Pong diplomacy, the opportunity came to go back to China. For five weeks, accompanied by his wife Audrey, a photo-journalist, he traveled on the mainland, talking with peasants, students, urban workers, and government officials of every rank. His trip ended with a long interview with Chou En-lai.

In the intervening years Topping continued to be a close student of China. During the early 1950s he reported for the Associated Press on the collapse of French Indochina. Subsequent assignments took him to London and Berlin, then for the New York Times to Moscow, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia. Topping served as Foreign Editor of the Times before assuming his present position" (Topping, p. 460).


Coburn, p. 88.
CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

It has been the purpose of this work to demonstrate through the study of American China policy from 1945 to 1972 and perception of the Sino-Soviet split from 1956 to 1972 that American foreign policy is no longer a separate entity from domestic affairs. It is, rather, directed by domestic considerations which ultimately rely upon our perceptions of ourselves and others. These perceptions do not simply evolve spontaneously; they are manipulated, coerced, and distorted by groups and individuals who hope to attain the triumph of their ideas, or gain personal power and influence, or perhaps destroy an enemy. The reasons why American perceptions are manipulated are as varied as the manipulators themselves. American China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon myth, misperception, and missed opportunities.

After World War II, the people of the United States were afraid of powerful enemies whose ideologies conflicted with their own. Nazism and Fascism were no longer serious threats to our way of life, but a new ideological
enemy—Communism—had come of age. We were not so much afraid of powerful nations as we were of powerful adversary ideologies, which we perceived as having transcended the older enemy, nationalism. The Soviet Union, a temporary ally of necessity during World War II, was a bastion of the new enemy ideology and therefore an enemy of the United States. Stalin's attempt to create a buffer zone in Eastern Europe, which he perceived as a bottom line of defense, was perceived in America as Moscow-directed Communist aggression. The new enemy, Communism, loomed larger and larger in our minds.

Our perception and understanding of China had always suffered distortion, and this distortion grew after World War II. We clung to the myth that since the Revolution of 1911 China had been a developing democracy and compounded it with the misperception that under Chiang Kai-shek, the Nationalist leader, it was turning toward Christianity. "China market" rhetoric endured, and we believed China was essential to American well-being because of its vast market for American goods. This market had never really existed, but we told ourselves it did so many times that we believed it did. Because we also believed Communism was monolithic and Moscow-directed, we could not understand Mao and the Civil War in China. Mao could not, in our minds, be the leader of an indigenous Chinese brand of Communism. China, after all, was a developing democracy, and all Communism was
directed by the Soviet Union. Because we misunderstood so many things, American policymakers missed the opportunity to court moderate elements in the Chinese Communist movement before and during the spring of 1949. Had we pragmatically established a relationship with the Chinese Communists at that time, the history of American foreign policy for the subsequent quarter-century might have been different. We misperceived the nature and strength of the People's Republic and took its bombastic rhetoric at face value, basing policy upon the idea that it was dangerously expansionist. Confused at the loss of the democratic China that had only existed as a figment of our imaginations, we compounded policymaking mistakes by formulating China policy upon the myth that the People's Republic would soon expire, and China would again be ruled by Chiang Kai-shek.

As our fear of Communism continued to grow, redevelopment packages for Europe were sold to the American public in terms of protecting democracies from Communist aggression. We were told that this was essential to American national security, but no explanation was made of the difference between areas of primary concern to American interests (Europe) and areas of secondary concern (Asia). This political gamble on the part of the Truman Administration backfired on the gamblers. The congressional China bloc, the China Lobby, Senator Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million
developed and spread a well-defined propaganda line: China had been essential to American national security; it was "lost" as the result of deliberate treachery by various private Asia specialists and State Department officials; and further damage had to be prevented by non-recognition of the People's Republic of China and its exclusion from the United Nations. Public reaction to China lobbyist propaganda was hysterical. We wanted these traitors purged—all of them. The careers of reputable China specialists in the State Department were destroyed, as were the careers of many in academia, and journalists were forced to stop writing on China or leave the United States. Policymakers could not risk rapprochement with China. The suggestion of such a thought would mean certain professional ruin. In short, we were not basing our foreign policy upon rationality, but upon fear that began within the continental boundaries of the United States and was founded upon gross misperception and deliberate distortion.

After the hysteria of the McCarthy era died down, misperception remained to affect American foreign policy. Since the myth of monolithic Communism was so ingrained in our minds, and since informed dissent was professionally dangerous, rigid adherence to orthodoxy dominated formulation of China policy as well as policymakers' and academicians' perceptions of the Sino-Soviet split. Journalists, whose societal roles gave them more independence
and flexibility than academicians and policymakers enjoyed, became aware of the reality of Sino-Soviet relations, but policymakers did not listen to them.

The policymaking process had changed greatly since World War II. The State Department had declined in importance, and national security advisors, whose power and positions were dependent upon the elected officials they advised, had come to wield authority and influence. The tendency was for them to over-simplify, fitting facts into established theories. Concurrently, a government/university symbiosis developed. The government ordered and paid for policy studies; academicians gave them what they wanted to hear. After all, funds could be attracted that way, and dissent, as the McCarthyite purges proved, could be very dangerous. Thus, the propaganda line espoused by the China bloc, the China Lobby, Joseph McCarthy, and later the Committee of One Million, triumphed in a society predisposed to its reception by unrealistic fear of an ideology different from its own. This line, which was founded upon myth and gross misperception, molded American thinking into a rigid orthodoxy that simply could not allow for a Sino-American rapprochement or the acknowledgement of a fissure in the Communist monolith, in spite of overwhelming evidence that the monolith did not in fact exist. Consequently, many American academicians were blinded by ideological rigidity and fear, failing to perceive the Sino-Soviet split.
China scholars, who were censured so severely during the McCarthy era, were driven to conservatism. Policymakers, bound by orthodoxy and reinforced by national security managers with tunnel vision, used scholars as "yes men" for their positions by handing out handsome grants for policy studies. Finally journalists, from their comparatively independent positions, began to voice the truth, and America began, slowly, to listen. In 1972, an American President visited the People's Republic of China, and the correction of a long lasting, serious error began.

It has been the thesis of this work that American China policy and American understanding of Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972 were the outgrowth of domestic affairs and were founded upon gross misperception. This misperception began within ourselves and was fed, reinforced, and perpetuated at level after level of the policymaking process. It is hoped that similar mistakes can be prevented; but prevention cannot come without change, and change is never instigated until a need for it is realized. There is indeed a need for change; this study illustrates the workings of a mistake.
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reasons for the lag in perception by policymakers as well as by academicians and for the comparative insight of journalists.

Another inference I draw from this survey is that policymakers used academic opinion more than the opinions of journalists in formulating China policy and in treating Sino-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1972. I do not mean, however, that academicians had an effective input in the foreign policymaking process, or that the press was not manipulated by those in power; but there was a basic difference between the government-university relationship and the government-journalistic relationship—a difference that still exists. The latter relationship reveals relatively more independence. After World War II, area studies departments were begun in universities all over the country. In case after case, they were financed through government grants. Academicians either followed the line of orthodoxy in order to attract funds, or they retreated into the private "think tanks."

A case in point of how the government used academic opinion was revealed by James Thomson of Harvard University in an Atlantic Monthly article in October 1967. He described a series of policy-planning sessions in the State Department in 1962 (he was serving the Department as an adviser at that time). Such issues were discussed as how to deal with bipolar adversaries, how to approach fractured Communist parties in third world countries,