Gramsci and International Relations Theory

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GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

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A Thesis
Presented to
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In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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by
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Maste of Arts

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Approved, May 1988

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ABSTRACT

Orthodox international relations literature uses the word hegemony to describe a situation in which one nation state is able to dominate the global ordering of nation states due to its preponderance of material resources. By contrast Antonio Gramsci develops a theory of hegemony, frequently called "ideological hegemony," which situates the possibilities for hegemonic power in the ability of a dominant class to universalize its particular point of view. Although Gramsci applies the theory of hegemony to explain political power configurations within post World War I Italy, that theory provides a backdrop for a theory of hegemony in the international arena. Not only does a Gramscian theory of international hegemony allows for an understanding of power which incorporates both material resources and belief systems, but also the Gramscian approach implies particular strategies for international politics with or without hegemonic power configurations.
GRAMSCI AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY
Chapter I

Hegemony: From Political Realism to Historical Materialism

Expressed through a variety of guises orthodox international relations theorists use the word hegemony to mean the ability of one nation-state to dominate the international state system because of its preponderance of material resources. Robert O. Keohane expands the orthodox construct to incorporate the notion that mere material preponderance must be accompanied by an "ability and willingness" to assert national power. Further, Robert Cox develops a theory of hegemony within the parameters of historical materialism. Below, the orthodox frameworks are outlined with an emphasis on hegemony as an expression of national power. By way of contrast and criticism both Keohane's and Cox's contributions to an analysis of hegemony in the international system are addressed. As the argument demonstrates, all schools involved consider hegemony to be a system-wide concept. However, the component parts of that international system are constrained by theoretical building blocks. These approaches converge where material resources are emphasized, but they differ where power is defined in more than material terms.

Like all frameworks for interpreting the world, international relations theory is historically laden. One may argue that Neorealism developed as a response to perceived weaknesses in older Realist international relations thought. Archetypal spokesmen of the Realist
camp would include E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. However, the ideas of Neorealism are fundamentally rooted in Realism. And, in a sense, Neorealism represents a micro adjustment to a well established Realist paradigm.

In a succinct passage of The Twenty Years Crisis E. H. Carr outlines the main tenets of the Realist approach. First, the process of history is understood as a sequence of cause and effect relationships that exist beyond, and cannot be changed by, mind processes. Second, practice creates theory, and not visa versa. And, third, "morality is the product of power" (1946/1964: 64). Carr's emphasis on the realpolitik of power as the underlying historical reality, and motivating force in the historic process, remains central to the world view of modern Realists and Neorealists.

Although Carr presents Machiavelli as the "first important realist," the tradition of political Realism dates to antiquity. Frequently Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War is cited as a founding textual expression. In the orthodox texts one finds references to Thucydides--e.g., that "The strong do what they can. The weak suffer what they must" (Thucydides, Book V, paragraph 90 [Chapter XVII, Modern Library ed. p. 311]).¹ And, from the ancients to modernity the application of this tradition to international affairs rests its analysis on three assumptions that determine a point of entry to the world as well as possible outcomes in the international world. These assumptions may be summarized as follows (Keohane, 1986a: 7):

1. States (or city states) are the key units of action.

¹ Cited (Keohane, 1986b: 177).
2. States seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends.
3. States behave in ways that are, by and large, rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.

In brief, Realism posits nation-states as primary actors in the international field. Such states behave with nearly universal rationality to maximize their power positions in the international arena. Here the maximization of power is a key attribute of international politics. As Carr states in *The Twenty Years Crisis*: "in the international order, the role of power is greater and that of morality less" (1946: 168). And, indeed, power is a key concern of historical international relations theorists and practitioners. For instance in *Politics Among Nations* (1948/1967) Morgenthau portrays international politics as a struggle for power where agents of the nation state "think and act in terms of power"(1948/1967: 5).

Realism applied to international affairs has emphasized the importance of a balance of power within the nation-state system. In Morgenthau's writings the balance of power becomes a key concept for understanding stability and change in the nation-state system. In one of the senses in which Morgenthau expresses the balance of power, it is a natural growth which follows from the reality of power politics and the struggle for power among nations (Keohane, 1986a: 13). However,

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2 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 8).
3 Cited (Keohane, 1986a: 10).
4 In *Politics Among Nations* balance of powers possesses two referents. First, it is a "universal concept" which refers to international power balance equilibriums (Keohane, 1986a: 13). And, second, it is a "necessary outgrowth" of power politics and describes the situation of any power struggle (Keohane, 1986a: 13).
within Morgenthau's own work the idea of power remains an elusive phenomenon. Keohane aptly points out that "his definition of power was murky, since he failed to distinguish between power as a resource . . . and power as the ability to influence others behavior" (1986a: 11).

Both Realists and Neorealists tend to view the international political arena in terms of a structural analysis. In a sense, rationally behaving nation-states seek power within the parameters of an overarching international system which is subject to structural constraints. This system simultaneously acts to constrain the possibilities of rationally behaving states and lays the field upon which interstate action occurs. Structure both limits and makes possible specific possibilities in international political struggles. It is this notion of an international system which leads Kenneth N. Waltz to comment that: "The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the striking sameness in the quality of international life through the millennia, a statement that will meet with wide assent" (1986: 53).

In an effort to revamp and fine tune the Realist model Kenneth N. Waltz has developed a theory of "structural realism." He describes the nature of his systems theory, and systems theories in general, in the following way:

[Systems theories, whether political or economic, are] theories that explain how the organization of the realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it. Such theories tell us about the forces the units are subject to. From them, we can infer some things about the expected behavior and fate of the units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish (1986: 60).

From the outset it should be noted that Waltz's structural realism examines the structure as a whole, leaving aside the internal attributes
of the nation-states composing that structure (1986). He defines structure in three dimensions. First, the "ordering principle" of the international system is self-help within anarchy (1986: 81). Second, "the character of the units," or nation states, is "like units" (1986: 87). The similarity of nation states in the international system is determined by the condition of international anarchy which precludes any hierarchial ordering of states. And, third, "the distribution of capabilities across units" in the international system is a balance-of-power (1986: 93). Waltz uses power as the determinate system variable: "Power is is estimated by comparing the capabilities across units . . . . The distribution of capabilities is not a unit attribute, but rather a system-wide concept" (1986: 93). Like Morgenthau's classical Realism which assumes rationally behaving states which seek power within situation of power politics and an historical balance of power, Waltz's structural realism ends in a balance of power theory. As he clearly states: "Balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive" (1986: 121).

Another attempt to modify the Realist program while simultaneously maintaining an emphasis on international structure is Koehane's Neorealism. Keohane's proposed model is a "modified structuralist research program, which relaxes some of the assumptions of Structural Realism but retains enough of the hard core to generate a priori predictions on the basis of information about the international environment" (1986b: 191). And, to encourage this project he calls for better theories of "domestic politics, decision making, and
communication" to "narrow the gap" between international and domestic understandings of politics (1986b: 191).

Keohane emphasizes the importance of understanding the "context of action before understanding the action itself" (i.e., structural analysis emphasizes the role of structure as both constraining and creating possibilities for action), and he notes that structuralism adds a "irreplaceable component for a thorough analysis of action" (1986b: 193). It is from this basis that he restructures the Realist research program. Re-examining the assumptions of Realism he calls for modification of all three assumptions. First, although states will be considered primary actors, the new program also includes nonstate, intergovernmental organizations, and transnational actors (1986b: 193). Each was ignored in the classical paradigm, but these organizations are real actors in the modern international arena. Second, although a rationality assumption is granted to allow for a link between structure and behavior it will not assume "perfect information, consideration of all possible alternatives, or unchanging actor preferences" (1986b: 194). And, third, the assumption that "states seek power, and calculate their interests accordingly, would be qualified severely"(1986b: 194). Keohane contends that states do other things than attempt to maximize international power. In particular during situations of domestic crisis states may act to merely maintain

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5 Koehane criticizes Realist constructs of rationality, at least in part, for their affinity for micro-economic understandings of rationality. He notes that "to say that governments act rationally in this sense means that they have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light of both of those preferences and their perceptions of the nature of reality" (1986a: 11).
sovereignty without attempting to maximize their global position (1986b: 194).

By challenging the limits of structural Realism Keohane hopes to broaden the focus of debate to bring Realist theory in closer proximity to "reality." Regarding the Realist power seeking assumption, not only does he reject claims that states always seek to maximize power, but also he rejects the claim that power is systemically fungible. Rather he assumes a differentiation of "power resources" to achieve differing goals: "[P]ower resources are differentially effective across issue areas, and the usability of a given set of power resources depends upon the 'policy-contingent frameworks' within which it must be employed" (1986b: 194). His emphasis on "policy contingent frameworks" opens the possibility that beyond material structure "institutions" and "rules" ought be included in structural analysis (1986b: 194). Further, this approach broadens the parameters of what may be included as a power resource. In the Realist paradigm power is a material asset. Power can be quantitatively measured (for the most part), and it is fungible. By contrast Keohane imposes organizational and issue area dimensions to determining national power.

Keohane's Neorealism broadens the horizons of Realist thought by incorporating a generation's worth of research into economic reasoning, the development of multi-national corporations, the global recognition of international institutions, and the weight of case evidence. Nevertheless Keohane's approach is deeply embedded in the Realist tradition. Although the two schools part at certain points, they share common categorical assumptions. Keohane does not reject the
Realist framework, he merely adjusts the assumptions to fit his perception of "reality" more closely.

* * *

Above a framework for understanding the underlying premises of Realism and Neorealism was outlined. At this point I would like interject the notion of hegemony into the discussed literature. Put simply, hegemony, as it is used in the orthodox literature, refers to a condition under which one nation is able to achieve a position of international dominance because of its material preponderance. A look at Gilpin's theory of hegemonic decline and war causation, and Keohane's analysis of hegemony and cooperation in international political economy demonstrate the point sufficiently.

Within the orthodox camp Robert O. Keohane has argued that across time the major concerns of international relations are "the sources of discord and of war and the conditions of cooperation and peace" (1986a: 3). In particular his research focuses on the possibilities for international cooperation. In *After hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (1984) Keohane argues for the possibility of cooperation in international political economy after the collapse of hegemonic regimes. As given he suggests that "even where common interests exist cooperation often fails" (1984: 6). But he does not address the problems of why common interests exist in the first place, or how they can be created. In this work common interests are assumed, and he consciously leaves out economic and ideological mechanisms which may generate the perception common interests. As he tells the reader: "I neither explore how economic conditions affect patterns of interests, nor do I investigate the effects of ideas and ideals.
on state behavior" (1984: 6). It is from this perspective that he precedes to argue that hegemony is not necessary for cooperation in the sphere of international political economy.

Keohane's argument that cooperation is possible without hegemony is, at least in part, a criticism of the orthodox "theory of hegemonic stability." Put simply, the theory of hegemonic stability defines the condition of international hegemony as one nation-state's ability to maintain an order in the international arena because of that dominant nation-state (hegemon) commands a preponderance of material resources (Keohane, 1984: 12).

The theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to the world political economy, defines hegemony as preponderance of material resources. Four sets of resources are especially important. Hegemonic powers must have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods (1984: 32).

Underlying the theory of hegemonic stability Keohane finds two general propositions. First, hegemonic stability implies that "order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant actor (1984: 31). And, second, the theory suggests that the maintenance of a particular world order requires a perpetual hegemon (1984: 31). Or, as Kindleberger states: "for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer" (1973: 305). Hegemony in international politics depends upon one nation-state asserting its material preponderance. In a hegemonic international system the rules of international behavior are enforced by the hegemonic nation-

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state over the whole nation-state system. Thus, hegemony is understood as the ability of one nation-state to dominate the system as a whole due to its material preponderance. If the dominant state, or hegemon, loses its superior command of material resources (perhaps symbolized by loss of a competitive edge in the global political economy) then the order it created and stability it exported are undermined.

Like Koehane's abstention from exploring the possible cultural and ideological sources of cooperation, this theory entirely ignores non-quantifiable variables in determining hegemonic power. The theory assumes a common understanding of which raw materials are valuable, power structures that enable one nation to control sources of capital, and a common understanding of economic competitiveness. Further, it leaves out any ideological conditions that would allow for this commonality of interests.

One application of the theory of hegemonic stability can be found in Gilpin's argument that war is likely under conditions of declining international hegemony. Using essentially Realist premises he argues that "the distribution of power among states constitutes the principal form of control in every international system" (1981: 29).\footnote{Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).} Changes in the international system are reflected in rising and declining nation-state hegemony where "the conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth expansion and eventual decline" (1981: 210).\footnote{Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 177).} He suggests that the sources of hegemonic decline are rooted in economic processes that lead the formerly perponderent
nation-state to lose its hegemonic position (1981: 115, 159).^ The result of a nation-state's declining hegemonic position is a less than peaceful transformation of the global political structure, or, in other words, a hegemonic war. Gilpin's use of a theory of hegemonic stability ultimately relies on a "basic force" model of international power (Keohane, 1986b). And his use of hegemony is easily reducible to the material force model Keohane identifies with the orthodox theory of hegemonic stability.

Dissatisfied with past expositions of theory of hegemonic stability, Keohane tackles the problem of the formation and subsequent collapse of the post World War II international monetary regime which was formulated through the Bretton Woods Agreements. He finds the old theory of hegemonic stability utterly inadequate. Instead of finding that the collapse of the Bretton Woods system lead to an end of international cooperation, which the theory of hegemonic stability would predict, international cooperation continues in the post-hegemonic age. In particular he offers three criticisms of the model. First, the model focuses only on tangible resources to calculate change and leaves out the role of "confidence" in international affairs. Second, the model ignores the possibility of a "dual" nature of power relations. And, third, the model "overpredicts" the effects of a regime collapse (1984: 207).

Given these weaknesses in the theory of hegemonic stability Keohane sets out to reformulate the model along the lines of his Neorealism. Unfortunately, Keohane's exposition of his own position is

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^ Cited in (Keohane, 1986b: 178).
foggier than his criticisms of the Realist model. To Keohane, hegemony is a derivative concept which incorporates facets of political Realism and Marxism. From the Realists he inherits the concept of hegemony as a "preponderance of material resources" (1984: 32). To this he adds Immanuel Wallerstein's definition of economic hegemony:

a situation wherein the products of a given core state are produced so efficiently that they are by and large competitive even in the core areas, and therefore the given core state will be the primary beneficiary of a maximally free world market (1980: 38).

Keohane presents a sketch of Marxist understanding of hegemony based on a generic theory of Marxism which supposes that a Marxist critique of the world political economy begins with an analysis of class and uneven development within the capitalist global economy. He maintains that within the Marxist framework "theories of hegemony are necessarily partial, since they do not explain changes in the contradictions facing capitalism" (1984: 42).

Citing the influence of Marxists, Realists, and Institutionalists on his theory, Keohane provides a definition of hegemony that

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10 Keohane's analysis ultimately concerns the possibilities of cooperation in the global political economy where cooperation is understood in contrast to discord. "[C]ooperation takes place when one policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination. . . (1984: 52). From the Realist approach Keohane notes that cooperation is merely the logical extension of a grand power struggle (1984: 7). From the Institutionalist framework Keohane notes that "[c]ooperation is essential in in a world of interdependence," and institutions foster cooperation (1984: 7).

transcends the basic force model. Referring to work done by Keohane and Nye he redefines hegemony in the following way:

Hegemony is defined as a situation in which 'one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and willing to do so' (Keohane and Nye, 1977: 44).

This revised use of hegemony differs in two basic respects from the Realist construct. First, unlike the theory of hegemonic stability Keohane does not assume "an automatic link" between the possession of power and leadership (1984: 34). Second, this revamped use of hegemony not only emphasizes power, but also it considers the "internal characteristics of the strong state" (1984: 35). In summary, "[i]t does not assume that strength automatically creates incentives to project one's power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision making processes are also important" (1984: 35). By reformulating an understanding of hegemony, and the role this fosters in international cooperation, he proposes a distinction between hegemonic leadership and imperialism.

Successful hegemonic leadership itself depends on a certain asymmetrical cooperation. The hegemon plays a distinctive role, providing its partners with with leadership in turn for deference; but unlike imperial power, it cannot make and enforce rules without a certain degree of of consent from other sovereign states (1984: 46).

The emphasis on "asymmetrical cooperation" is essential to Keohane's point. Instead of overtly dominating the affairs of other nations, the hegemonic power must cooperate with the subjects of its domination to the extent that the subjected nation is willing to "defer" power to the hegemon. Hegemonic rule is differentiated from imperialism because under the latter form of international power assertion the subjected nation is overtly dominated. By contrast
hegemonic rule implies conditions under which, for one reason or another, the dominant nation is "willing and able" to extract "deference" from the group of nation-states.

Keohane's reformulation of hegemony fits neatly into a "modified research program." By relaxing the state as actor assumption he is able to include domestic structure. By relaxing the power seeking assumption he is able to assert that the possession of power does not necessarily lead to its articulation. And, by emphasizing the possibilities for cooperation he is able to set hegemony aside as a unique form of international domination. His refinements to the Realist use of hegemony separates out brute, or overt, domination from sophisticated, or sublime, control. In the former case one nation dominates the international arena because it has the material power to do so. In the latter case, mere possession of power is not enough, the powerful state must also possess sufficient intranational consensus and international deference to assert its power. Accepting Keohane's contributions towards a theory of international hegemony it is still useful to note the ability of one nation to make and maintain rules in the international arena is still rooted in material abundance. Although Keohane allows space for "willingness" and "deference," material abundance remains at the base of the theory. As I suggested earlier, Keohane's Neorealism is merely a micro adjustment to the Realist paradigm. His language and concerns remain the same as ardent realists.

In addition to Realist and Neorealist theories of international hegemony, Robert Cox has developed a theory of hegemony in the international system that, in large part, is derived from Antonio Gramsci's ideological hegemony. Cox's approach is that of an historicist
Marxist (Cox, 1986). Cox's contributions are extremely significant because he successfully bridges the concerns of orthodoxy and the insights of Gramsci's exploration of ideology as a power resource.

Cox's approach to understanding the workings of power in the international system is rooted in the tradition of historical materialism. To Cox historical materialism is a form of Marxism which "reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social relations" (1986: 214). He contrasts this mode of analysis with "structural" Marxism which is essentially static in historical perspective and focuses primarily on the capitalist mode of production. Cox sees an analogy between Realism versus Neorealism as compared to historical materialism versus "structuralism." While both Realism and historical materialism are rooted in historical modes of thought, there derivative spin-offs, structuralism and Neorealism, share an a-historical approaches and essentialist epistemologies (1986: 215).

Cox suggests that a historical materialist approach provides several useful insights for international analysis. First, historical materialism argues from the standpoint of dialectics. This affects the theory at both "logical" and "real history" levels. At the level of "logic" the dialectic approach seeks to understand phenomenon through a method of dialogic contradiction--"a dialogue seeking truth through the exploration of contradictions" (Cox, 1986: 215). And, at the level of "real history" the dialectic method explores the "potential for alternative forms of development arising from the confrontations of opposed social forces in any concrete social formation" (Cox, 1986: 215). With dialectical reasoning historical materialism approaches conflict through different lenses than either Realism or Neorealism. In both of
the latter approaches conflict is understood as either rooted in a fixed human nature (Morgenthau, 1948) or a recurring phenomenon in all international orders (Koehane, 1986a). The historical materialist approach roots conflict as part of a historical process through which human nature is reconstituted. Conflict both occurs in history with the remaking of human nature and, concurrently, in "the creation of new patterns of social relations which change the rules of the game out of which... new forms of conflict may be expected ultimately to arise" (Cox, 1986: 215). The recurrence of conflict is historically rooted in changing patterns of social relationships and a malleable human nature.

A second difference between Neorealism and and historical materialism is the latter's emphasis on imperialism as adding a "vertical" dimension to international power, or, in Marxist terms, the domination of the center over the periphery (Cox, 1986: 216). This approach violates the Neorealist assumption that the international arena is contained by a situation of self-help anarchy. By contrast a historical materialist approach would postulate a hierarchy of states, and/or regions over other states and regions; thus, the theory allows for an emphasis on core-periphery tensions.

Third, historical materialism focuses upon the relationship between the state and civil society (Cox, 1986: 216). While the Realist perspective views the State as the primary actor in international affairs, leaving out the internal attributes and ordering of the State, the historical materialist approach pays close attention to the interrelatedness, or lack there of, of civil institutions--the degree of their development and articulation--and state power. Not only is the
state as primary actor axiomatic in the Realist approach, but also, relationships within the state and interstate relations that are not articulated through state channels--such as dictums by the Holy Roman Catholic Church--are excluded from consideration.

And, fourth, historical materialism focuses on "the production process as a critical element in the explanation of the particular historical form taken by a state/society complex" (Cox, 1986: 216). While the Neorealist, or Realist counterpart, argues from the perspective of the State, the historical materialist argues from the point of the capitalist state. Within this tradition it is argued that the capitalist state is not a generic state. The capitalist state is particular state with particular interests that arise, at least in part, from the nature capitalist production techniques. Cox emphasizes: "Historical materialism examines the connections between power in production, power in the state, and power in international relations" (1986: 216). By contrast in Waltz's structural realist model the dominant relations of production within a society are of a lower order than the state, and, consequently, these relationships are excluded from rigorous structural analysis.

Cox's historical materialism utilizes a notion of "historical structures." These structures are "a picture of a particular configuration of forces" which "impose pressures and constraints" on human actions (Cox, 1986: 217). Three categories of force are of interest in this model--"material capabilities," "ideas," and "institutions" (1986: 218). Put simply, material capabilities are the "productive and destructive potentials" of a society (1986: 218). They would include factors of production--land, labor, techniques of
production—as well as tools of destruction. Ideas are both
intersubjective meanings, and cross-cultural "images" of a specific
historic structure (1986: 218). In this sense ideas are the sets of beliefs
shared within a group and across groups. For instance, the notion of
natural or human rights is shared both within many nation-states
(particular groups) across many national borders. And, institutions are
"the means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order" (1986:
219). This institutional component would include, but not be limited to,
state apparatuses, financial markets, educational systems, and religious
organizations. Regarding the relationship of these forces Cox states:

No one-way determinism need be assumed among these
three; the relationships can be assumed to be reciprocal.
The question of which way the lines of force run is always
a historical question to be answered by a study of the
particular case (1986: 218).

Taken individually and collectively the elements of a historic
structure can be used to describe the level, or degree, of hegemony
within a society. That is, one can distinguish between hegemonic and
nonhegemonic social structures. Or as Cox states, "between those in
which the power basis tends to recede into the background of
consciousness, and those in which the management of power relations
is always in the forefront"(1986: 219). Although no single element of
the historic structure causes the rise or decline of hegemonic power, the
role of institutions is emphasized because it is through institutions that
hegemonic power is articulated (Cox, 1986: 218).

Here hegemony is used in a sense which radically differs from
Realist or Neorealist understandings. Cox has defined hegemony as "the
temporary universalization in thought of a particular power structure,
conceived not as domination but as the necessary order of nature" (1982:
In this sense hegemony is not understood as material preponderance. Rather hegemony is the result of a particular power structure being legitimized to the point of universality in the eyes of historic subjects.

Applying the notion of historic structure to the international context, Cox delimits three analogous forces. First, the relationship of the prevailing organization of production and social forces (1986: 220). Second, the "forms of state" as understood from the perspective of historical materialism as civil society-state complexes (1986: 220). And, third, "world orders," or "the particular configurations of forces which successively define problematic of war and peace for the ensemble of states" (1986: 220). It is at the level of world order that hegemonic power configurations occur. But hegemony at the level of the system does not mean the domination of one state over other states merely through "aggressive military and economic policies" (1982: 45).

Hegemony at the system level requires that the social order articulated by the dominant nation appears as a natural global order. And, it should be noted that the global system does not necessarily possess hegemonic characteristics at all times. Global power structures can shift from hegemonic to nonhegemonic forms depending on the unity or disunity of international forces. The hegemonic global order could be characterized by a globally dominant form of production and nation-state civil society/state complexes which support the dominant mode of production. This would be the case for hegemony formed around a "world order" based on nation-states.

In summary the conditions for a global hegemony would include:

1. a globally dominant mode of production;
2. a dominant state (or conceivably dominant group of states acting in concert);
3. a normative and institutional component that lays down general rules of behavior for states and the forces of civil society that act across state boundaries... (Cox, 1982: 45).

These conditions are prerequisite for global hegemony. It should be remembered that Cox does not limit the concept of hegemony to the global system. It is also possible to discuss hegemony in "the social relations of production" and "social formation" (1982: 42-43). Further, it is interesting to note that Cox's preconditions for global hegemony are not at odds with Keohane's infusion of "ability and willingness" into the orthodox use. However, where Keohane extends the basic force model to allow for the role of consent and deference, his model does not articulate the necessary relationships of mediation that allow global domination to become hegemony. Keohane argues that the possession of an abundance of material resources does not necessarily translate into hegemony, and he does not specify the location of, or relationship between, institutional forces and economic forces that create a hegemonic global order. Cox's argument for historical structures offers a useful heuristic for grappling with the nature of mediated power relationships.

Following the orthodox literature Cox argues that two historic "global orders" based in hegemony within the nation-state system were pax britannica and pax americana. In each of these instances the

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12 At the level of "relations of production" hegemony occurs where both the existing mode of production and relations of production support a power structure that appears as natural, or at least, necessary. And, at the level of "social formation" hegemony occurs where two conditions are met. First, the existence of a "abroad coalition of classes under the leadership of one class that is able to make to make concessions adequate to maintain support, or acquiescence from subordinate classes in the coalition;" and, second, the existence of "a state that acts to consolidate this class coalition and to promote the mode of social relations of production consistent with the continuing dominance of the leading class" (Cox, 1982: 43).
global system was directed by a nation-state that was able to universalize its conception of the world order. Under *pax britannica* the working of the nation-state system were directed from the dominant nation-state center.

In the mid-nineteenth century, Britain's world supremacy was founded on its sea power, which remained free from challenge by a continental state as a result of Britain's ability to play the role of balancer in a relatively fluid balance of power in Europe. The norms of liberal economics . . . gained widespread acceptance with the spread of British prestige, providing a universalistic ideology which presented these norms as the harmony of interests. While there were no formal institutions, the ideological separation of economics from politics meant that the City could appear as administrator and regulator according to these universal rules, with British sea power remaining in the background as potential enforcer (1986: 223).

The decline of British hegemony and the eventual ascendance of American hegemony witnessed not only a transformation of which particular nation articulated and supported a global order, but also that transformation witnessed a change in the very structure of the world order.

The decline of British hegemony may be viewed from the perspective of changes in the interrelation of forces. In particular, the division of the world into ideologically opposed power blocks may have facilitated the rise of American hegemony. By contrast to British hegemony, American hegemony was considerably more masked. That is, although America certainly possessed the economic and military might to enforce a particular world order in the post World War II era, the period between the late nineteenth century through world war II provided vast structural changes in the global economy and make up of nation-states that encouraged Europe and Japan to follow an American
lead. Describing the hiddenness of American might during the *pax americana* era Cox suggests:

The United States rarely needed to intervene directly in support of specific national economic interests; by maintaining the rules of an international economic order according to the revised liberalism of Bretton Woods, the strength of U.S. corporations involved in the pursuit of profits was sufficient to ensure continuing national power. The *pax americana* produced a greater number of formal international institutions than the earlier hegemony. The nineteenth century separation of economic and politics had been blurred by the Great Depression and the rise of Keynesian doctrines. Since states now had a legitimate and necessary overt role in national economic management, it became necessary both to multilateralize the administrative management of the international economy and to give it an intergovernmental quality (1896: 224).

While the former British hegemony had been relatively lacking in international institutions, the post-World War II American hegemony utilized international institutions to legitimize its view of a proper global economic order. Further, the formation of this order was facilitated by the perceived Soviet threat, the relative economic deprivation of Europe after World War II, and growing economic interdependence between nation-states.

Not only did the center of international power change hands from Britain to the United States, but also the global order itself changed. On the one hand British hegemony depended on Britain's willingness and ability to articulate, export, and enforce through policy a specifically liberal world view. On the other hand, American hegemony depended not only on the ability and willingness to export a world view, but also it required the formation of coalitions to enforce that view. The United States could not by itself, universalize its perception of a natural world order. That perception of the proper world order required the active consent of potential partners. One
example of the give and take process occurring in the establishment of American hegemony is the talks between White and Keynes, spokesmen for the United States and Britain respectively, at Bretton Woods. The program for a world economic order that emerged from the talks was neither pure White nor pure Keynes. Rather the Bretton Woods system reflects interest of both parties.

Cox's understanding of hegemony is a "particular fit between power, ideology, and institutions" (1986: 230). An assessment of the orthodox theory of hegemonic stability would not assume recurring cycles of one nation-state forming and maintaining the rules of the international arena. Rather this approach would incorporate the idea of historical structure, and for any particular global order two questions would be asked regarding hegemonic stability.

1. What are the mechanisms for maintaining hegemony in this particular historical structure? 
2. What social forces and/or forms of state have been generated within it which could oppose and ultimately bring about a transformation of the structure? (Cox, 1986: 230).

Although these questions provide only a rough set of guidelines for where to begin analyzing hegemony in the international system, they do set the researcher on a divergent path from the orthodox approach. By way of critique of the orthodox theory of hegemonic stability, Cox argues that the method of historical materialism calls for a reconsideration of what is to be explained--the problematic itself. His approach would call for an examination of the "relative stability of successive world orders" (1986: 222). And, his use of hegemony, as contrasted with the orthodox use, would provide an alternative basis for understanding hegemonic world orders as stable world orders (1986: 223). In this case state power is not a given: it is part of what needs
explanation. The explanation of why states become powerful is connected with the idea of an interplay between three levels of force at the national level and corresponding international forces.

With this model the orthodox problematic of explaining "the sources of discord and war and the conditions of cooperation and of peace" is transformed. 13 First, instead of studying recurring cycles of hegemony within a relatively fixed understanding of historical structure, the revised theory of hegemony allows for transformation of the global structure (e.g., history is a succession of "global orders" rather than one amorphous unchanging structure). And, consequently, a condition of hegemony is not necessarily part of all stable global orders. Second, since the model examines the levels of production techniques and class formations, understandings of global politics are not bound by state as actor assumptions. And, third, the model suggests that nation-state centricity is historically bound. A future (perhaps already emerging) global order may be based on transnational class relations under the guidance of an international "managerial class."

At the apex of an emerging global class structure is the transnational managerial class. Having its own ideology, strategy and institutions of collective action, it is a class both in itself and for itself. Its focal points of organization, the Trilateral Commission, World Bank, IMF and OECD, develop both a framework of thought and guidelines for policies. From these points, class action penetrates countries through a process of internationalization of the state (Cox, 1986: 234).

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13 In an introduction to Neorealism and its Critics, Robert O. Keohane suggests that across history the sources of war and peace are the fundamental questions for international relations theory (1986: 3).
Above I examined three approaches to understanding hegemony: Realism, Neorealism, and historical materialism. The movement from orthodox international relations theory to Cox's historical materialism allows for a greatly enriched notion of global hegemony. The condition of international hegemony does not reflect the mere material preponderance of the state among nation-states. Instead hegemonic global orders reflect a recognized degree of uniformity in international production, and an institutional component which articulates and supports the dominant production techniques, exchange relations, and underlying belief system, or ideology, which supports these relations. At minimum the break between the orthodox international relations theory and Cox's historical materialism represents a shift from studying the structural limitations of nation-state behavior within a relatively static international system to studying changes in the production and exchange processes which create and transform particular global orders. However, despite this fundamental differences these approaches all share an emphasis on material manifestations of power. Even in Cox's careful analysis of hegemony in the world order, the "positional picture" one arrives at is filtered through the production process. Cox's work goes a long way towards developing a multidimensional model for understanding international power. However, much of his work has focused on the the level of the production process and relations of production.
Chapter II

Hegemony: a Gramscian Perspective

Since the 1971 publication of Antonio Gramsci's Selections From Prison Writings the theory of "ideological" hegemony has penetrated scholastic as well as activist literature in the English speaking world. Given the growing mass of Gramscian literature in English it should be of no surprise that Gramscian theory has been assimilated into the corpus of international relations literature. Work by Robert Cox offers provocative insights into the possibilities for expanding the understanding of power in the international sphere by incorporating Gramscian ideas. Borrowing from the wealth of Gramsci's ideas Cox develops a theory of "hegemony and production." His presentation was discussed in the first chapter of this essay. The explication of Gramsci's theory of hegemony which follows is an attempted reexamination of the meaning of, and possibilities for, hegemonic power in the international world. In particular, I argue that Gramsci develops an understanding of hegemony which is applicable at both the levels of theory and practice. As a theory, Gramscian hegemony adds to an understanding of how power is articulated in international politics. As a strategy for global transformation the idea of hegemony is a central concept, which pulls together broader programs for societal change. It is not a plea for immediacy, or the catastrophic collapse of international capitalism. Instead, Gramsci's theory of "praxis" (Marxism) calls for
root criticism, careful planning, and gradual transformation. In light of the potentially genocidal powers of the modern nation-state system, these theory attributes should be amenable to everyone.

Writing in the wake of the Russian Revolution, World War I, Italy's transition to capitalism, and the rise of Italian Fascism, Gramsci offers insights into the problems faced by revolutionaries of his age, and, perhaps most importantly, he develops fundamental criticisms of the revolutionary orthodoxy of his age—Marxism. Gramsci's approach to understanding the possibilities of social transformation differs markedly from his contemporaries of the Second International. His approach takes the form of a ruthless critique of "economism," which is the term Gramsci uses to describe various forms of reductionist Marxism. In particular, Gramsci's attack against reductionism takes the form of prison notes written against Bukarin's historical materialism.

Within the pale of Marxist thought the methodology of historical materialism has taken on a variety of meanings. In the first chapter of the present essay, Robert Cox's historical materialist method was addressed. Here I step back in history and outline a reading of the theory of historical materialism expressed in Karl Marx's "Preface" to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859/1968). The paragraphs composing the 1859 "Preface" offer a doctrine which divides the human world into spheres of production and relations of production (economic base) and the legal, political, artistic, moral norms, and etc (ideological superstructure). In this theory changes in the ideological, or superstructural, elements of society are social responses to contradictions existing between the mode of production and the relations of production. One senses a one-way determinism in
the theory as institutional and political changes are presented as reflections of changes in the economic base.

In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of the development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundations, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness... It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness (1968: 181).

In this doctrine it is understood that at certain conjunctural points in history the superstructure "comes into conflict with" developments in the economic base (Marx, 1968: 181). Changes in the economic base cause a rapid transformation of the superstructure. And during this process of change, or as Marx calls it, "epochal revolution," superstructural elements either decay or become historically progressive. Thus, in times of revolution the one-way determinism of production processes generating social consciousness gives way to the possibility of a two-way causality. In other words, during periods of societal transformation, changes in the economic base effect changes in the superstructure, which in turn affect further changes in the base. At these conjunctural periods consciousness becomes a determining factor.

In considering such transformations a distinction should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic--in short ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out (1968: 182).

However in assessing revolutionary consciousness Marx insists that one must explain it "from the the contradictions of material life, from the
existing conflict between the social productive forces (mode of production) and the relations of production" (1968: 182). Although ideology becomes a weapon, or tool, for revolutionary forces, ideology is intimately connected with contradictions in the economic base.

In light of the primacy of the economic base Marx offers two propositions that reemphasize the economically determined nature of societal change.

No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it for development have developed; and new higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions for their existence have matured in the room of the old society itself. Therefore mankind always sets itself such tasks as it can solve. . . (1968: 182).

Underlying this theory is a teleological view of society. The transformation which Marx addresses here is the transformation from Capitalism to Socialism. And, in the history of mankind, socialist transformation appears as a final human realization (1968: 182). Despite the ability of superstructural elements to act as a force in themselves, they cannot be a force for themselves. In the final analysis economic structure determines, although dialectically, forms of consciousness.

It was, at least in part, Marx's emphasis on economic structure that propelled a wave of Marxist thinkers and practitioners to view social change in almost mechanical terms. In a generic sense, changes in the economic base exacerbate contradictions between economic structure and ideological superstructure. These contradictions come to a head in revolution through which the base and superstructure are reharmonized. However, such a generic formulation of historical materialism overlooks Marx's claim that it is through ideological structures that "men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out"
(1968: 182). We may use this general problem as a point of entry into Gramsci's Marxian.

By the conclusion of World War I, Marxism, as a theory and strategy for societal transformation, had entered a period of protracted crisis. It seemed as if capitalism was infinitely malleable, able to overcome periods of crisis and regenerate itself in new cancerous forms—especially fascism. The old Marxism which emphasized the primacy of economic conditions failed to grasp the seemingly regenerative powers of capitalism. Within Marxist circles this problem became a central concern. However the 1920's and 1930's witnessed a response to this weakness in the Marxist approach. New neo-Hegelian form of Marxism, articulated by Lukacs, Korsch, and Gramsci (to name a few), emphasized the need for better understandings of proletariat consciousness (Boggs, 1984: 153). Carl Boggs notes that the new Marxists "sought to demonstrate that the stabilization of capitalism could not be understood without looking closely at the unfolding of working class existence" (1984: 155). This examination of proletarian consciousness calls for a reconsideration of the traditional formulation of Marxist analysis of levels of societal integration, or spheres of existence. As already discussed the old Marxism breaks society into spheres of base and superstructure. In this basic model of historical materialism society is formed at three levels—economic structure, civil society, and state. The economic structure is the base upon which civil society and the state are built. These latter superstructural societal elements emerge as reflections of underlying economic relationships and technologies.
Gramsci's critique of the basic model of historical materialism involves at least three movements. The first movement is a critique of "economism"--a euphemism for Bukarin's sociology in particular, and reductionistic Marxism in general. The second movement is a thorough revamping of "ideology." And, the third movement is reconsideration of the roles of the state and civil society in Marxist theory. By rejecting strict economic determinism as well as integrating civil society into the realm of determinate forces, Gramsci's Marxism calls for a thorough reexamination of not only our intellectual understandings of how society works, but also this approach redresses the role of activism in affecting social change.

Gramsci's critique of economism is spelled out most clearly in the essays "The Modern Prince" and "Problems in Marxism". Here he attacks past formulations of historical economism for utilizing essentially structural economic mechanisms to predict and understand social change. In particular Gramsci sites three characteristic weaknesses of the approach. First, "in the search for historical connections it makes no distinction between what is 'relatively permanent' and what is a passing fluctuation. . . ." (1971: 163). He attacks "historical economism" for failing to pay adequate attention to the complexity of economic class formations. Second, historical economism reduces economic development to the "course of technical change in the instruments of work" (1971: 163). And, third, historical economism proposes that both "economic and historical development

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1 Gramsci distinguishes between historical "economism"--crude reductionistic Marxism--and historical materialism--which is a more complex understanding of the interplay of material forces found in Marx's own writings.
are made to depend directly on the changes in some important element of production . . . which necessitate the new application of methods in the construction and design of machines" (1971: 163). With each of these ideas of historical economism Gramsci finds an array of problems. Summing up the essentially weak position of historical economism Gramsci proclaims:

In its most widespread form as economistic superstition, the philosophy of praxis loses a great part of its capacity for cultural expansion among the top layer of intellectuals, however much it may gain among the popular masses and second-rate intellectuals. . . . They forget the thesis that which asserts that men become conscious of fundamental conflicts on the level of ideology is not psychological or moralistic in character, but structural and epistemological; and they form the habit of considering history as a continuous *marche de dupes*, a competition in conjuring and sleight of hand (1971: 164).

In this passage Gramsci highlights unwillingness of economistic Marxism to grapple with superstructural elements—especially politics—and its consequent ignorance of the role of ideology in affecting societal change. With economism politics becomes a "marche of dupes" guided by illusions. By contrast, Gramsci suggests that although economism has been presented as an "objective principle of interpretation (objective scientific)," it too is a product of history (1971: 165). Against the objective laws of history proposed in economistic Marxism Gramsci claims that all knowledge is rooted in history: all knowledge is only understandable within a historic framework. Regarding the economistic discovery of "regularity," "law," and "'automatism' in history" Gramsci states:

It is not a question of 'discovering' a metaphysical law of 'determinism', or even of establishing a 'general' law of causality. It is a question of bringing out how in historical evolution relatively permanent forces are constituted
which operate with a certain regularity and automatism (1971: 412). The notion of "bringing out" the historical interplay of "forces" in the historical process suggests that instead of rigid laws existing in an extra-historical sense, the very workings of interactive forces occurs within the plane of history. Another essential point here is the notion of "how in historical evolution relatively permanent forces are constituted . . . ." In the Gramscian force model economic forces are only one set of forces interacting with "political" and "military" forces. Again, Gramsci attempts to avoid reductionism, especially in the direction of economic determinism. One essential aspect of Gramsci's anti-reductionism is the invigoration of "ideology" within Marxism.

A second movement in Gramsci's Marxism consists of a reworking of the role of ideology in Marxist analysis. Without doubt the question of ideology may be considered a problematic within Marxist frameworks. And, it is a problematic to which Gramsci was particularly sensitive. In a section of the essay "The Study of Philosophy" Gramsci outlines the economistic interpretation of ideology as "pure appearance" which is "distinct from" underlying economic structures and incapable of changing basic structural tendencies (1971: 376). By contrast Gramsci's use of ideology suggest that ideological views of the world are neither epiphenomenal nor false consciousness (Mouffe, 1979: 185). Instead ideology is the ground "on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, [and] struggle" (1971: 377). Gramsci reminds the reader that the study of ideology ought to begin with Marx's 1859 "Preface."

The proposition contained in the "Preface["]. . . to the effect that men acquire consciousness of structural conflicts on the level of ideologies should be considered as
an affirmation of epistemological and not simply psychological or moral value. From this, it follows that the theoretical-practical principle of hegemony has also epistemological significance. . . . The realisation of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates a new ideological terrain, determines a reform in consciousness and of methods of knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact (1971: 365-366)

By contrast to variations of Marxism which considered ideology as an illusory mirror reflecting upon the real economic substructure, Gramsci's Marxism attempts to remove ideology from the realm of illusion. He defines ideology in a broad sense.

One might say "ideology" here, but on the condition that the word is used in the highest sense of the conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and all manifestations of individual and collective life (1971: 372).

Within this Gramscian analysis all world views are necessarily ideological. Ideology consists of conceptions of the world found in all social products. If all world-views are ideological then all forms of consciousness contain ideology. And, it follows that if all forms of consciousness contain ideology then all forms of politics are essentially ideological (Mouffe, 1979: 186). Thus, there is no way out of ideology. However, Gramsci does distinguish between critically reflective and uncritical, or unreflective, forms of ideology. With predictable Gramscian wit, he calls uncritical ideologies, or ideologies of every day life, "common sense," and critical historically based ideologies "good sense." Beyond distinguishing between critical and uncritical world views, Gramsci also discusses the degree of uniformity of ideology within a social formation. Gramsci uses the notion of an "organic ideology," or the ideologies "necessary to a given structure," to describe the socially prevalent mode of thinking (1971: 376).
Gramsci's insistence on the reality of ideology follows from his general epistemological approach. As a heartfelt Marxist, with slightly Hegelian leanings, Gramsci views humanity as strictly a historical product. In a letter from Prison to his wife, Gulia, he writes, "I . . . think that man is formed completely by history, through coercion (though this should not be understood only as external violence or brutality) and I believe only that."^ However his view of humanity as strictly a historical product varies from economistic Marxism in as much as humanity is understood as the the product of the "ensemble of relations." That is the totality of human relations—not just economic production relations. It is in this sense that Gramsci speaks of ideology as a "material force"(1971: 165). Carl Boggs emphasizes this point in The Two Revolutions:

For Gramsci, ideas, beliefs, cultural preferences, and even myths and superstitions possess a certain material reality of their own since in their power to inspire people towards action they interact with economic conditions, which otherwise would be nothing more than empty abstractions. In other words, the contradictions of capitalist society do not 'explode' but are actualized and even manipulated by human will power (1984: 158).

A third move in Gramsci's reformulation of Marxism is the categorical movement of civil society from the economic base to the superstructure. This movement necessitates a thorough reexamination of the superstructure as an integral and essential element in Marxism. After all, in the Gramscian perspective, it is the institutions of civil society--the church, family structure, political parties, trade unions, the media—that articulate a world view that either supports or critically challenges State apparatuses. A statement of Gramsci's reinterpretation

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of the placement of civil society in Marxist analysis can be found in the essay "The Intellectuals."

What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society", that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private", and that of "political society" or "the state". These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and juridical government (1971: 12).

Gramsci distinguishes between the overt domination at the level of the State and the "hegemony" exercised by dominant groups through mechanisms working at the level of civil society. More than distinguishing between varieties of power articulated in superstructural formations, Gramsci's inclusion of civil society as a layer in the superstructure allows for the possibility of developing a dialectic logic between the levels of superstructural power relationships. In this approach civil society provides the "private" basis for consent, and the State reinforces that consent with the force of prisons and law. However, the notion that the private institutions of civil society and the State can share the same interests supposes that they share common world view. The formation of that common world view is accounted for by Gramsci's theory of hegemony.

The theory of hegemony found in Gramsci's writings appears to have passed through two phases. In the first phase Gramsci's use of hegemony is similar to the Leninist conception of a class alliance. In this sense one class acts in the interest of another class for political purposes (Mouffe and Laclau: 1985, Adamson: 1980). In the essay "The Southern Question" Gramsci refers to an alliance between classes which
is similar to the Leninist use of hegemony (Paggi, 1979; Mouffe, 1979). Gramsci claims:

But the important thing to note here is that the fundamental concept of the Turin communists was not the 'magical formula' of dividing the big estates, but rather the political alliance between Northern workers and Southern peasants to oust the bourgeoise from State power (1978: 442).

The class alliance use of hegemony is incorporated into the second phase of Gramsci's theory. In the *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci outlines a schematic understanding of hegemony as articulated through the dialectic of State and civil society relations. In the second use, hegemony refers not only to a unity of perceived interests, but also it refers to a unity of perceptions. Thus, hegemony refers simultaneously to class, moral, and intellectual alliances. In "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci" Mouffe remarks that hegemony "becomes the indissoluble union of political leadership and intellectual and moral leadership, which clearly goes beyond a class alliance" (1979: 179). This second use suggests that hegemony is not overt domination by the ruling classes. Instead, hegemony is a universalization the dominant class' world views. Jacque Texier describes the world view of a hegemonic class in terms of internalization of regime norms: "[I]n all domains of human activity--whether it be educational theory or politics--a type of conduct which is initially imposed by force, may subsequently be freely accepted by the subject himself. Discipline becomes self-discipline, coercion becomes self-government" (1979: 73).

One cannot overly stress the distinction between domination and hegemony in Gramsci's writings. Hegemony is a function of a unity of world views articulated through civil institutions. By contrast domination is power asserted directly by State apparatuses. In one
telling passage Gramsci states: "the general notion of the State includes elements which need to be referred back to civil society (in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)" (1971: 263). On the one hand the legal political society provides force, and, on the other hand, civil society provides the consensual basis for legitimizing State power. And, although hegemonic power presupposes the universalization of the dominant group's world view, the maintenance of hegemony requires a continuing limited consensual "give and take" relationship between the rulers and the ruled. That is the dominant groups must take into account the interests of the dominated groups to maintain power. But the concessions the ruling group makes to the ruled groups can only be of a limited "economic-corporate" kind. Concessions that actually changed the real power position of the dominated groups would undermine the existing power of the dominant group.

Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind (Gramsci, 1971: 161).

Gramsci notes that such compromises cannot be of an "essential kind" (1971: 161). That is, the "give and take" process between the dominant group and the subordinate groups cannot sacrifice the basic interests of the dominant group. The notion here is that a hegemonic power configuration must be flexible enough to allow for minor "sacrifices" by power holders to maintain the basic support of subordinate groups. If such concessions are made within the confines of the hegemonic
belief system—the values of the dominant groups—then ideological support for the dominant group is not undermined.

The process whereby the world view of the ruling groups becomes the universal world view involves an interplay of forces at three levels of society: production, civil society, and the State. Gramsci explains the interrelation of these societal levels in terms of "relations of force" existing in various "moments or levels." Like any ardent Marxist, Gramsci's analysis of the relations of force begins with production. Thus, the first level of force is the relation of "social forces" which, "is closely linked to the structure, objective, independent of human will, and can be measured with the systems of the exact physical sciences" (1971: 180). These "social forces" represent the cornerstone of the economistic Marxism Gramsci criticizes at length. And, although Gramsci sees even the physical sciences as rooted in history, they exist independent of "human will." That is "social forces" are part of an underlying objective reality. And, as in most Marxist analysis "social forces" exist at the level of the economic base.

The second level of forces in the Gramscian analysis are "political forces." Political forces represent the "evaluation of the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organisation attained by the various social classes" (1971: 181). At this level of force the analysis enters the superstructure. Here one should note that Gramsci locates political parties at the level of civil society, and, consequently, in the superstructure. In the Gramscian analysis political forces appear to be key in understanding the hegemony or lack thereof within a nation-state. After all, Gramsci discusses political forces in terms of the "homogeneity," "self-awareness," and organization of social classes.
Thus, it is through political channels that persons develop class consciousness and social solidarity.

The third level of forces which Gramsci discusses are military forces. Like political forces, military forces are located in the superstructure. But unlike political forces which are located in the sphere of civil society, military forces are located with the state apparatus. If, on the one hand, political forces in civil society generate social "self-awareness" and varying degrees of societal "homogeneity"--the bases for social consent--then, on the other hand, the State's control of military forces provide the tools to enforce the perceived societal consensus. Although the role of military forces appear less central in the Gramscian analysis than political forces, his analysis suggests that the "relation of military forces . . . [is] from time to time . . . directly decisive" (1971: 183).

"Social forces" are given by history and "military forces" are controlled by the State apparatus. In between these forces rest "political forces." It is with political forces that Gramsci attempts to explain the possibility for hegemony within a society. As mentioned above political forces represent the degree of "homogeneity" and "self-awareness" within a nation-state. Corresponding to three levels of force, Gramsci posits three levels of articulation of political force. The first level of political force is found in the relationships among members of a social class. Here members of one class identify with other members of the same class but feel no solidarity with the other social classes. Gramsci calls this level of political force the "economic-corporate" phase (1971: 181). He describes consciousness at this level in the following way:
The first and most elementary of these is the economic-corporate level: a tradesman feels obliged to stand by another tradesman, a manufacturer by another manufacturer, etc., but the tradesman does not yet feel solidarity with the manufacturer; in other words, the members of the professional group are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and the need to organise it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so (1971: 181).

The second moment of political consciousness occurs where the sense of intraclass "obligation" gives way to a sensation of interclass solidarity for members of all social classes. At this moment in the development of class consciousness the sense of solidarity is still an economic solidarity. But the realization of interclass generalized solidarity allows for movement within a class towards achieving limited political goals. In particular, subordinate classes may begin to seek "juridical" or legal equality with the dominant class.

Already at this juncture the problem of the State is posed—but only in terms of winning politico-juridical equality with the ruling groups: the right is claimed to participate in legislation and administration, even to reform these—but within the existing fundamental structures (Gramsci, 1971: 181).

Three points are worthy of note regarding the second phase of political consciousness. First, Gramsci refers to this phase as a "juncture," hence, he is implying that this phase is transitional. It does not reflect a permanent or, in Gramscian language, "organic" level of political consciousness. Second, although procedural reform is possible at this level, such reform occurs within "existing fundamental structures." This suggests that the inclusion of subordinate classes in the political process occurs on the turf of the ruling class--using their legal code, their State mechanism. And, third, Gramsci notes that the "problem of the State is posed" at this level. Here the solidarity achieved within subordinate classes comes into contact with the State apparatus;
hence, at this level one sees a link between developing class consciousness and the ability to confront the State, even where such conflict occurs within the State's "politico-legal" system.

The third level of political consciousness represents the hegemonic moment of political consciousness. At this level the limits of interclass economic solidarity is transcended by the "aware[ness] that one's own corporate interests, in their present and future development, transcend the limits of the purely economic class and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too" (1971: 181). At this level of political class consciousness the entire set of interests of various subordinate groups are fused into a set of common interests. It is the formation of a complete set (e.g., not just economic interests) of interclass common interests that rest as a precondition for hegemonic power. More than a sense of transclass solidarity of interests the notion of hegemonic political consciousness suggests a universalization of perception of interest.

[1] It is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become "party", comes into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society--bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate level but on a "universal" plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate social groups (Gramsci, 1971: 181-182).

In this passage Gramsci spells out the workings of hegemony at the level of political consciousness. It is worthy of note that he emphasizes a perception of the attainment of a "universal" plane for hegemonic authority. The notion of universality implies that particular class interests have been superseded by "universal" understanding of the
world. Further, he remarks that hegemony is held by a "'fundamental' social group over a series of subordinate groups."

The ability of a class to assert hegemonic authority depends on a combination of forces which make possible the supersession of "economic-corporative" interests by "universal" interests. The articulation of the dominant class' interests as universal interests is made possible through the institutions of civil society. In a sense the education system, family structure, exchange norms, media, and (of special interest to Gramsci) political parties act as cultural mediation mechanisms between the dominant social class and the other groups it dominates. Thus, in the Gramscian perspective control of the institutions civil society becomes central to understanding State power. It is through these institutions, especially political parties, that groups gain the knowledge and organizational structures that either maintain or challenge State power.

Gramsci's interest in the role of politics in general, and political parties in particular, for affecting social transformation should not be underestimated. His emphasis on the role of the relationship between civil society and the state suggests that political activity channelled through civil institutions offers a powerful point of entry for superstructural analysis.

The problem will therefore be that of establishing the dialectical position of political activity and of the corresponding science) as a particular level of superstructure. One might say, as a first approximation, that political activity is precisely the first moment or first level. . . (Gramsci, 1971: 137).

At the level of politics the role of political parties becomes a key concept in Gramsci's work. After all it should be remembered that Gramsci was not only a complex Marxist philosopher, but also he was an activist.
Prior to being imprisoned by Mussolini Gramsci's life effort had been concentrated into the formation and running of the Italian Communist Party. As a party strategist, Gramsci recognized two distinct paths political parties might follow for attaining national power. The first path is that of a "war of position." The second path is a "war of manoeuvre." These two paths correspond to the relative development of civil institutions within the nation-state. The strategy of a "war of position" is applicable to the Western nations with well developed civil institutions with deeply embedded bourgeois values. In these nations an open frontal assault against the State is impossible; thus, revolution is affected by means of a "tactical and informal penetration" of civil society (Adamson, 1980: 10). Adamson describes the logic of the "war of position" as follows:

Such a revolution would be an extended campaign for hegemonic influence among the population at large; once this was attained, political power would be essentially at hand and many of the conditions of the socialism would already have been realized. In this sense, the trajectory of war of position can be plotted as a single unified movement spanning pre-domination, domination, and post-domination stages (1980: 225).

In the situation of highly developed civil institutions which support the State, the other strategy, a "war of manoeuvre" becomes impossible. By contrast to the "war of position" and its gradual infiltration and subversion of the old institutions of civil society, the "war of position" is applicable to the Western nations with well developed civil institutions with deeply embedded bourgeois values. In these nations an open frontal assault against the State is impossible; thus, revolution is affected by means of a "tactical and informal penetration" of civil society (Adamson, 1980: 10). Adamson describes the logic of the "war of position" as follows:

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3 Regarding the entrenched nature of the power structures in the industrial democracies Gramsci remarks: "The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as state organizations and as complexes of association in civil society, constitute the art of politics as it were the 'trenches' and their permanent fortifications of the front in a war of position, they render merely 'partial' the element of movement which before used to be the 'whole' of war, etc" (1971: 243).
"manoeuvre" represents a frontal assault on the State—a condition of overt warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 238-238; Adamson, 1980: 225-228). This approach is suitable in countries with only partially developed civil institutions and a lack of value consensus between the State apparatus and the limited civil institutions (Adamson, 1980; Girling, 1982; Gramsci, 1971: 243).

Throughout Gramsci's prison writings the notion of hegemony recurs. It is both an analytical as well as strategic concept. Beyond strategic concerns, Gramscian hegemony suggests a unique understanding of power. It is an understanding of power which draws on both subjective and objective conditions. Belief systems articulated and reified through the web of social relations not only support but also create understandings of power. These culturally centric understandings of power are expressed in terms of levels of hegemonic development within a society, and they are enforced with the legal and military apparatuses of the State. Together the economic substructure, civil society and the State form a "historic bloc"—"i.e., unity between nature and spirit (structure and superstructure) unity of opposites and distincts" (1971: 137). Again, it should be stressed that Gramsci proposes that only a "fundamental class" can become hegemonic (1971: 161). Thus in the search for understanding the possibilities of

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4 Gramsci also addresses the idea of "historic bloc" in the following way: "Structure and superstructure form an 'historic bloc.' That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations of production" (1971: 366). Further it is worthy of emphasis that Gramsci uses the word "ensemble" to stress the multiplicity and complexity of varied social relations.
hegemony within a nation-state, or even among the community of nation-states, the possible forms of hegemony are limited. 5

Gramsci's discussions of the possibilities of a class becoming hegemonic are, for the most part, limited to nation-state examples. In particular he writes extensively about the possibilities of forming a potentially hegemonic communist party in Italy. The whole thrust of "The Modern Prince" is an examination of the history of Italian politics, the particular problems within Italy--e.g., the rise of Italian fascism and the lack of a "national popular will"--, and the development of a particular form of Italian Communist party capable of not only creating class interests but also of universalizing its ideology. Further in the essay "Americanism and Fordism" Gramsci writes of an emerging "cult of efficiency" in the United States where "Fordism" is perceived to have ushered in a whole new era of values, beliefs, and political strategies to facilitate "rationalised" production. However, there are other passages in Gramsci's writings that show quite clearly that he perceived the possibility of international hegemony. The possibilities for the formation of an international hegemony are sketched, but not spelled out, in the Prison Notebooks.

Entering a discussion of international relations and Gramsci it is wise to reemphasize the distinction between Gramscian

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5 It is essential to consider the problem that across nation-state different classes are fundamental--e.g. managerial, capitalist, landlord, peasant--according to the level of economic formation. What are the implications of this for forming an international hegemony. Cox argues that the transnational managerial class could become hegemonic in a Western bloc (Cox, 1985), but could such a class universalize its point-of-view in agricultural economies? Here it seems that domination is possible but not hegemony. Hegemony would require a unity of outlooks across cultures.
hegemony, "ideological" hegemony, and other traditional uses of the word. As spelled out in the first chapter of this essay, traditional international relations theory uses the word hegemony to mean the ability of one nation-state to dominate the international system due to its preponderance of material resources. These traditional theories examine interstate relations at the level of State interaction (State as actor assumption) as confined by an international structure. Such assumptions are incompatible with the Gramscian approach. First, Gramscian hegemony is generalized consent protected by the ability to use force. In the Gramscian approach hegemony is, by definition, a product of civil society. It is the institutions of civil society that articulate the dominant class' world view. Second, since hegemony resides at the level of civil society, any discussion of international politics that excludes the interworkings of a nation-state cannot discuss Gramscian hegemony. To discuss Gramscian hegemony the "State as actor" assumption would have to be violated. Further, traditional analysis does not distinguish between State and civil society. One may recall that Gramsci ascribes the function of overt domination to the State, and he places the function of hegemony within civil society. Thus, any discussion of "ideological" hegemony in international relations requires that the "State as actor" assumption is either abandoned or, at least, severely qualified. (In terms of qualifying the "State as actor" assumption Robert Keohane's "modified research program" offers one possible starting point.) And, third, one essential aspect of Gramscian hegemony is the notion that understandings of power change with degrees of hegemonic development and varieties of fully articulated hegemony. If one works from the position that
understandings of power changes across time and through varied social formations, then the traditional assumption that "States seek power" becomes foggy. We can no longer impose the problems of the Athenian power directly onto modern social structures.

Given these grand incompatibilities between Gramsci's use of hegemony and the way hegemony has been used in traditional literature, perhaps the clearest way of interjecting an understanding of "ideological" hegemony into international relations theory, is an examination of Gramsci's understanding of international politics. In contrast to orthodox approaches, especially Waltz's "structural realism," that view State action as constrained within an international system—an "outside-in" approach—Gramsci's analysis follows an "inside-out" method.

Gramsci introduces the way in which one could develop a theory of international hegemony in "The Modern Prince." Here he draws on the "relations of force" model and asserts that "[t]hese levels range from the relations between international forces . . . to the objective relations within society. . ." (1971: 176). Although Gramsci does not define international forces, he remarks that the discussion of international forces would include definitions of a "great power," remarks on the "combination of States in a hegemonic system," and "the concept of independence and sovereignty as far as small and medium powers are concerned" (1971: 176). And, he raises the question: "Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations?" (1971: 176). He answers this question in the following passage:

There can be no doubt that they [i.e., international relations] follow. Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical-military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the
international field too. Even the geographical position of a national State does not precede but follows (logically) structural changes, although it also reacts back upon them to a certain extent. . . . However, international relations react both passively and actively on political relations (of hegemony among the parties). The more the immediate economic life of a nation is subordinated to international relations, the more a particular party will come to represent this situation and to exploit it, with the aim of preventing rival parties gaining the upper hand. . . (1971: 176).

This passage is particularly insightful into Gramsci's perceptions of international relations. First, social changes of a "military-technical" expression occurring within a nation-state changes the relations among states. Thus, the "organic" or "relative" relations among states are effected by changes internal to a State. Second, the relationship between international relations and national politics is two-fold. On the one hand, the greater the degree of dependence between a national economy and the international economy, or a dominant sector in it, the more a political party is encouraged to "represent" this fact as a means of attaining power. And, on the other hand, by claiming to represent the international interests of the nation such a party represents "not so much the vital forces of its own country, as that countries subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic nations. . . "(1971: 177). The link drawn between national party politics and international politics involves appeals to both the "popular will" of a nation and the reality of that nation's "economic enslavement." The party seeking power utilizes the nation's international position to encourage mass support for itself, yet, simultaneously, the support generated by such a party fosters the interests of other dominant nations. This is the fashion in which Gramsci outlines the possibilities
for international hegemony. And, in a sense, he enters through an economic window.

In another section of the *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci discusses "Hegemony of Western culture over the Whole World" (in "Problems in Marxism"). Here Gramsci depicts the Western world as gaining worldwide ideological hegemony through the universalization of a belief system which "culminated in Hegel and the critique of Hegelianism" (1971: 416). He claims that both intellectuals and activists have become absorbed in a cultural process that concludes with historical materialism and the "philosophy of praxis" [Marxism]. From these movements arose "a new way of conceiving the world. . . [which] tends. . . to become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely world-wide character, capable of modifying (even if the result includes hybrid combinations) popular thought and mummified popular consciousness" (1971: 417). This modern consciousness which arose from the popularization of German philosophy gives rise, as "the crowning point of all previous history," to thoroughly historical modes of thinking--especially Marxism and humanism (1971: 417-418). 6

Perhaps Gramsci's most telling passage in regards to his belief in the possibilities of international hegemony is found in "The Study of Philosophy." In a section entitled "'Language', Languages and Common Sense" he tackles the problem of "educational doctrine and practice"

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6 The degree to which Hegelianism, in one form or another, had permeated the "popular consciousness" of Western Europe in the 1920's remains an open question. Certainly among academic circles Hegel and his disciples had become well known. However, academics are only one element of the civil complex which articulates hegemonic power. It is doubtful that a Hegelian world view was assimilated into the belief systems of all social classes manipulating civil society in Gramsci's Italy.
He proposes that our understandings of education should go well beyond "scholastic" concerns to the level of any social relation where there are leaders and lead (1971: 350). He then suggests that education is inherently encompassed within the workings of hegemonic relations:

Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in their international and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental civilisations (1971: 350).

Gramsci appears to be asserting that international ideological hegemony is not only a possibility, but also it is a real factor in international affairs. The notion of hegemonic relationships as educational relationships follows from position that hegemony is a situation of consent which is popularized through civil institutions. Throughout the above discussion on Gramscian hegemony it was stressed that hegemonic power is expressed through civil institutions. At the level of the nation-state these institutions educate national populations. Moving to the level of international relations one can envision the civil society of one nation learning from the civil societies of other nations. From recent history one may consider: the transference of business management techniques from the United States to Japan and the Newly Industrialized Nations; or the fusion of American jazz music into American rock-and-roll music which was
then transported to Britain and the European Continent. Each of these movements represents international phenomenon originating within the civil society of one nation which has grown to international proportion. In no sense did these movements stem from the juridical and legal apparatuses of the State.

In the introduction to this chapter I suggested that Gramsci's exposition of hegemony differs radically from its use in orthodox international relations theory. Hopefully the above paragraphs have made this point clear enough. In the orthodox international relations literature hegemony means one nation's ability to maintain international order due to its material preponderance. In Gramsci's writings hegemony is "national-popular" consent which is articulated through civil institutions and protected by the state apparatus. Although Gramsci speaks of hegemony primarily in the national context, he hints at international possibilities. The movement from the national level to the international level is, at best, problematic. (The possibilities for incorporating a Gramscian theory of hegemony into International relations literature, and the limitations of that inclusion, constitute the thrust of the final chapter of this essay.) Regardless of the problematic at hand, the Gramscian perspective is suggestive of an alternative model for understanding international power. First, this model would look inside the nation-state at the "relations of force"

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7 The emphasis on education as the vehicle for transporting hegemonic belief systems between nations offers a provocative point-of-entry for both the activist and the analyst. For the analyst, the educational approach would begin with cross examination of "national-popular" beliefs articulated in different national civil institutions. For the activist, the notion of gaining hegemony in the international system would begin with an infiltration of civil institutions that clearly possess transnational links. Here academia and the arts are possible starting places.
among the social spheres. Hegemony would be found within the nation-state where the beliefs and values of the dominant class transcend class boundaries and appear universal in nature. Second, this model would examine the relations of force across nation-states. Here the analysis would focus on the homogeneity of practices, beliefs, and values in exchanges between nations. Third, the model would look for a tendency towards, or away from, international hegemony in terms of the degree of development of an international "ethical-political" plane. Of course, this model would pay attention to economic and military capabilities of nation-states. After all hegemony is consent protected by the "armour of coercion." Such a model of international power would, in a sense, focus on the interplay of objective and subjective international forces. On the objective side one could count guns and butter. On the subjective side one could attempt to articulate an intercultural theory of belief components of power relationships.

I have also suggested that hegemony is not only an analytical concept, but also it implies a strategy. In this essay, I have not probed deeply into the strategic implications for the attainment of hegemony. However such a strategy would include the conscious recognition of the following points: First, Gramsci emphasizes the role of political parties as key elements in the development of "counter hegemonic" belief systems. The way in which the party is structured and its membership are of great importance. Second, the attainment of hegemony within a State depends, at least in part, on the relative development of civil institutions. In some nations a frontal assault---"war of manouevre"--- is necessary. While in other countries the gradual transformation of "popular beliefs" through infiltration into the civil sphere---"war of
position"—is the only plausible path to hegemony. Third, hegemony is only attainable by a fundamental class. Fourth, the attainment of hegemony depends upon an alliance of forces; that is the attainment of a hegemonic position requires the consent of military, social, and political forces. And, fifth, Gramsci's work provides only an outline. The details of strategy for attaining hegemony depend not only upon the development of civil society within the nation, or between nations, but also it depends upon the currently exiting levels of homogeneity of belief and value systems. In this sense, an Gramscian type strategy calls for very careful planning and analysis prior to action.
Chapter III

Hegemony: The Limitations and Possibilities for a Concept

Within the pale of orthodox international relations theory the word hegemony is used to describe one nation's ability to dominate the international system because of its abundance of material resources. By contrast the writings of Antonio Gramsci provide a theory of hegemony which locates hegemonic power within a dominant class' ability to universalize its point of view. Through the universalization of a belief system what may have appeared as domination appears as natural, or at least consensual, under hegemonic leadership. With Gramsci hegemony becomes a linking concept that not only allows for an explanation of the ability of capitalist social order to continually regenerate itself, but also the theory of ideological hegemony suggests certain strategies for action. As argued in the first two sections of this essay, there are points of convergence as well as divergence between Gramsci's theory of ideological hegemony and other theories of hegemonic rule. Most importantly, Gramsci's emphasis on the potential power of ideas adds an irrereplaceable element of subjectivity to political power relationships. However, the inclusion of ideas as a force in international politics may appear a naive idea to readers who look at the world through traditional international relations lenses. In the paragraphs that follow I outline some, but certainly not all, of the problems and potentials for enriching
our understandings of international power with a theory of ideological hegemony.

Turning to questions of strategy two problematics come to mind. First, what are the connections between Gramsci's ideological hegemony and more traditional theories of hegemony that could make Gramsci's work appealing to American international relations specialists? Given the axiomatic differences of Gramsci's "theory of praxis" and orthodox analysis the incorporation of a theory of ideological hegemony necessitates a willingness to suspend theory axioms. And, second, beyond academic considerations, what would the application of a theory of ideological hegemony strategically suggest for international actors. For both of these problems it is useful to think in terms of a "war of position." In Gramsci's writings the term "war of position" is used to describe a strategy of a gradual infiltration into the institutions of civil society wherein an emergent "counter hegemonic" belief system may be articulated. Once expressed through civil institutions this "counter hegemonic" belief system may undermine support for the dominant belief system. At this level the "war of position" for changing the mainstream use of the word hegemony from domination to "consent protected by the armour of coercion" might begin, as does this essay, with an examination of the various ways hegemony has been used.

Examining literature on hegemony one is struck by two distinct uses of the word. The use of hegemony to mean a preponderance of material resources is little more than one way of defining domination. In comparison to this use, hegemony also has a history on the political left which appears richer in content. In Hegemony and Socialist
Strategy Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe develop a "genealogy" of hegemony which suggests that the concept of hegemony develops in response to gaps in historical models of power.

Even in its humble origins in Russian Social Democracy, where it is called upon to cover a limited area of political effects, the concept of 'hegemony' already alludes to a kind of contingent intervention required by the crisis or collapse of what would have been a 'normal' historical development. Later, with Leninism, it is a keystone in the new form of political calculation required by the contingent 'concrete situations' in which class struggle occurs in an age of imperialism. Finally, with Gramsci, the term acquires a new type of centrality that transcends its tactical or strategic uses: 'hegemony' becomes a key concept in understanding the very unity existing in a concrete social formation" (1985: 7).

The understanding of hegemony as an organic concept developing within a field of historical struggle inspires the American social critics Murray Bookchin (The Modern Crisis, 1986) and Carl Boggs (Social Movements and Political Power, 1986) to incorporate a Gramscian use of hegemony into their strategic analysis. Within these current works by Bookchin and Boggs, not only is the word hegemony used to describe the embedded nature of particular power configurations, but also the word hegemony is used to describe the method by which social power can be transformed. In particular, both of these authors discuss the possibilities of the development of a "counter hegemony" to confront existing power structures. In a similar vein Stanley Aronowitz's The Crisis in Historical Materialism (1981) draws upon Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the possibilities of incorporating "New Forces for Liberation," movements arising from outside historical Marxism--feminism and ecology politics in particular--into a broader re-examination of the logic of capitalism (1981: 133-135). And, work by John Hargreaves (Sport Power and Culture, 1986)
utilizes Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the ways in which the English bourgeoise class uses sports to mitigate class tensions within Britain. Although this is only a partial list of current applications of Gramscian hegemony to social analysis, the point is clear enough: a theory Gramscian hegemony has come of age to a variety of social critics.

Robert Cox's model of "hegemony and production," Richard K. Ashly's model of "dialectical competence," and Robert Keohane's Neorealism research program offer three examples in international relations theory where scholars have commenced an examination of Gramscian theory. Cox's uses a theory hegemony to explain one set of links between institutions, forms of state, and production processes. Keohane calls for an examination of domestic politics, and he emphasizes the importance of rules and institutions in international politics. Gramsci's theory of ideological hegemony shares a great deal with the "hegemony and production" approach. Like Keohane's Neorealism ideological hegemony emphasizes rules and institutions in international politics. Although I doubt that Keohane envisages his research as one moment in a war of position, his micro-adjustments to an established approach represent the type of positioning that may facilitate a closer look at institutions and rules in international affairs. Similarly, Cox and Ashly directly apply Gramsci in their international relations theories. It should be stressed that the articulation of an expanded theory of hegemony within international relations literature

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1 Interestingly enough, Ashley's model of "dialectical competence" incorporates Gramscian hegemony as well as specific nuances of Gramsci's general theory—especially the role of "organic intellectuals" (1986: 294-296).
is only one moment of a process of reexamining understandings of international politics. The theory of "ideological" hegemony is useful not only because it provides a broader, and perhaps more "realistic," understanding of the logic of power, but also Gramscian hegemony suggests certain strategies for transforming global politics. This strategy begins with civil institutions--including universities.

As suggested in the first chapter of this essay orthodox international relations theory begins with the following assumptions. First, nation-states are the primary international actors. Second, such nation-states act to maximize power. And, third, nation-states act with nearly universal rationality. In the context of Waltz's "structural realism" the assumptions of international anarchy and nation-state self help are added.

A Gramscian analysis of international relations would diverge from the orthodox approach at several key points. First, although a Gramscian analysis would consider the State as a primary unit in international affairs, this approach would pay close attention to the internal workings of the State, the degree of development of civil institutions, and the degree of alignment of the "relations of force." Thus, the Gramscian approach seeks to expand the concept of the State. While the traditional models would exclude, or give only secondary consideration to, these intrastate factors, the Gramscian analysis would depend, at least in part, on understandings of relations within the state. Keohane's "modified research program" relaxes the "state as actor" assumption to allow for an examination of interstate and intrastate
Furthermore, the Gramscian analysis would emphasize the development of transnational institutions.

Second, the orthodox assumption of States as power seeking units has become widely contested in contemporary literature. Following a movement in orthodox economic reasoning from the language of "utility maximization" to "utility satisfaction" the works of both Waltz and Keohane recognize that states do not necessarily at all times in history attempt to maximize global power (Waltz, 1986: 127; Keohane, 1986b: 194). Within the Gramscian perspective whether or not States strive for maximal global power becomes a complex question involving the alignment of forces within the state, the alignment of forces between states, and a particular understanding of power maximization- hegemonic or otherwise. Gramsci does not articulate a thorough theory of imperialism nor a complete model of international relations; hence, any remarks regarding Gramsci's views on whether or not State's seek maximum global power are pure extrapolation.

And, third, a Gramscian analysis would reject any assumption of universal "rationality" prior to analysis. Instead of viewing rationality as a given, "rational" behavior in international politics becomes part of

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2 Waltz's sympathetic critic, John Gerard Ruggie, contests the exclusion of all domestic considerations from structural analysis because the "functional scope of the international system will also vary, depending upon the the hegemonic form of state/society relations that prevails internationally at any given time. Therefore, the hegemonic form of state/society relations, or lack thereof, constitutes an attitude of the international system and can be used as a systems-level explanatory variable" (1986: 147). Ruggie's use of hegemony in terms of "state/society" relations incorporates, to some degree, a version of "ideological" hegemony. That is, while Ruggie does not want to violate a "state as actor" assumption, he recognizes that the capabilities of the actors in the international system change depending upon the degree of consensus within the "state/society" complex.
what needs to be explained. Universal rationality would be one possibility under a globally hegemonic social order. That is, his theory of ideology would allow for a universal ideology with a universal sense of rationality within a fully developed form of global "ideological" hegemony. Gramsci's work points in the direction of a historically conditioned understanding of "rationality." Rationality does not exist prior to, or outside of, social relationships. Instead rationality, and rational behavior, derive meaning through a web of social relationships. Since rationality exist within this web of historical social relationships, the question of what constitutes nation-state rational behavior must confront the ways in which historical subjects perceive rationality.

Gramsci's analysis of the relations of domestic forces within international politics, and his emphasis on the subjective elements of power, offer two helpful insights for further development of a theory of international relations. If, on the one hand, orthodox international relations theory has emphasized the role of material resources in determining the relative power of a nation, then, on the other hand, the Gramscian analysis understands national power in terms of the interrelationship between subjective and objective forces. On the objective pole a Gramscian analysis would look at relative national power in terms of material resources—the quantifiable material resources emphasized in the orthodox approach. On the subjective side this model would examine the degree of alignment between ideological understandings of the world within a society and the perception of a degree unity of world views across nation-states. The greater the degree of unity of ideological perception within a society the closer that
nation-state would be towards developing a national hegemonic social formation. The closer an ideology becomes to being universally accepted across the international system, the closer the international system approaches a hegemonic order. This approach would examine the degree of homogeneity of world views across nations as articulated through the degree to which a nation-state's world view had been universalized throughout the nation-state system.

In the Gramscian approach the mere possession of a relative preponderance of "guns and butter" at the nation-state level (the objective forces of a nation) is insufficient to explain national power. To explain the relative power of a nation-state this model would add subjective dimensions of power—the degree of ideological unity expressed through the social levels of production, civil society, and the State. In turn, the degree of ideological unity within a State would depend, at least in part, on the degree of unity of the levels of force within the society. Instead of understanding nation-state power as a function of the quantifiable material resources possessed by the nation-state, this model would account for these forces and then incorporate an analysis of subjective power variables. The understanding of national
power arrived at through this model depends ultimately on the degree to which subjective and objective forces are unified.\(^3\)

In the orthodox literature a theory of "hegemonic stability" is used to argue that where one nation-state is powerful enough to dominate the nation-state system cooperation is more likely. In this instance the possibilities for international order depend, at least in part, on one nation-state possessing enough material power to maintain a particular international order. Cox's analysis of global hegemony as a condition within the international system where "social forces," "forms of state," and "world orders" exist with a high degree of unity offers an alternative point of entry for articulating a theory of hegemonic stability (Cox, 1986: 220-221). While the orthodox model of hegemonic stability focuses on material power variables, Cox's approach examines the relationship between material forces ("social forces"), the organization of civil society and state complexes ("forms of state"), and the historic global "configuration of forces" ("global orders") (1986: 220). His model calls for an examination of the internal ordering of the states composing the international nation-state system. However, he does not emphasize the role of subjective forces to the extent that Gramsci does. Gramsci's emphasis on the degree of homogeneity of

\(^3\) Keohane's critique of the theory of hegemonic stability in *After Hegemony* is one example of an attempt to include subjective dimensions of power. He states: "Hegemony is defined as 'a situation in which one nation is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing interstate relations and willing to do so' (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 44). This interpretive framework retains an emphasis on power but looks more seriously than the crude power theory at the internal characteristics of the strong state. It does not assume that strength automatically creates incentives to project one's power abroad. Domestic attitudes, political structures, and decision making processes are also important" (1984: 35).
ideological perception, both within a nation-state and across the nation-state system, provides a essential insight for theories of power. This is not to say that Gramsci's approach discounts the importance of material forces. Rather, material forces represent merely one layer of an expanded force model which includes "ideas" as articulated through civil institutions at both the national and international level.

If one approaches the question of the possibilities for developing hegemonic belief system through international civil society, then one encounters the problem that an international civil society exists with only weakly articulated institutions. Certainly, an international civil society is emerging. Its growth is fostered by the development of communications technology, multinational corporations, and international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations. Nevertheless, one may question to what extent the development of international civil institutions has encouraged the development of an international "political ethical" plane. Within Gramsci's writings the ability of a class to universalize its world view largely depends upon the degree of development and support for the national civil society. Thus, international institutions would follow from highly developed national civil society. That is, the support for international institutions is predicated on the existence of a set of domestic civil institutions. For instance, Cox argues that a uniquely international class--an international business management class--is evolving through which the beliefs and values of a class can become universalized. Instead of rooting the possibilities for international hegemony with formal international institutions, he emphasizes the development of an international class formation.
The application of an "ideological" theory of hegemony could enrich orthodox international relations analysis in several significant respects. Robert Cox's work provides an excellent starting point for developing a Gramscian theory of international hegemony. Cox's analysis filters hegemonic possibilities through the development of hegemony in the technology and relations of production (Cox, 1982). Institutions serve to enforce or undermine the compatibility of these relationships. As in Cox's analysis, the possibilities for "ideological" hegemony depend only in part on hegemony in production. Further determinate factors include the level of development of international civil institutions, and the relationship between military forces and these institutions. The ability of an emergent international class to universalize its belief system requires a give and take bargaining position with the military capabilities of nation-states.

Since Gramsci's use of hegemony emphasizes the subjective elements of power, this approach would require deep analysis into the interplay between international structure and social consciousness. The extent to which social consciousness in general, and understandings of power in particular, depend upon the degree of development and alignment of international forces necessarily becomes a central concern. After all one aspect of a Gramscian analysis would include a demonstration that ideas are, at least in part, molded by institutional expressions. In particular the approach would call for analyses of the ideologies expressed within the existing international civil institutions.

This approach would suggest not only that international structure changes across time, as in Cox's model, but also it would impose
a developmental understanding of international consciousness. Like social consciousness within the nation-state, international consciousness and international structures may pass through historically developmental phases culminating with an international "ethical political" plane. Here the notion of global structure would be used in Cox's sense of "world orders." In contrast to the Waltzian approach that views historical changes within the nation-state system existing within a relatively static structural container, the notion of "world orders" allows for the possibility that different historical periods actually possess different global structures. This is sense in which Cox discusses the difference between pax britanica and pax americana. The world order during these two periods differs not only in terms of which nations are dominant in global politics, and the bi-polar or multi-polar character of global politics, but also these periods differ according to their "particular configuration of forces" (1986: 220).

Again, it should be stressed that although Cox's work is useful for structuring a Gramscian analysis, it relies more heavily on the role of "social forces" than would a Gramscian model. Remarking on the materially driven nature of transformation of "world orders" Cox tells the reader: "Changes in the organization of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states; and the generalization of changes in the structure of states alters the problematic of world order" (1986: 220).

And, finally, the Gramscian approach would usher in a dualistic research approach for understanding international relations. On the one hand it would emphasize the identification of levels of force—the ways in which they are manifest and their degree of development—at
both the national and international levels. On the one hand the analysis would examine the varying degrees to which ideological homogeneity is developed according to the alignment of forces at the national and international levels. Hegemonic global formations could be found where national forces are internally aligned with international forces under the veil of a dominant global ideology.

The application of a model of "ideological" hegemony to international affairs implies a greater degree of freedom for policy makers (at the international, national, and civil levels) to affect either political change or stability. Instead of being constrained by the current balance of powers, and relying on one nation's material preponderance, to assure relative global tranquility, the notion of ideological hegemony implies that "ideas are material forces," and, consequently, that peace can be fostered by the articulation of a world view that encourages cooperation. Although the inclusion of ideas as a force for understanding of international power was a central point in Carr's critique of "idealism", one may argue that ideas do affect nation-state behavior. Further, as compared to the global political situation surrounding Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis*, one aught consider the relatively greater degree of international civil organization, the radical transformation of communications technology resulting in an abundance of information, and the transformation of global economic structures into a highly interdependent global economy as indicators which further the power of "ideas" in the current global situation.

Despite the actual transformation of the global economy, rapid growth in communications technologies, and the development of a limited international civil society, at least two problems hinder the
power of policy makers attempting to manipulate the international system through applications of a model of "ideological hegemony." In an analytic sense nation-states are autonomous. However the assumption of nation-state autonomy is countered by cultural and economic nation-state interdependence. Second, the model of "ideological" hegemony supposes a form of historical relativism. That the "ruling ideas in every age are the ideas of the ruling class" (Marx, The German Ideology) is an old adage that has fostered the interest of power holders, does not assure, in any sense, that future developments towards a global ideological hegemony will benefit poorer nations. Under a global hegemonic power formation their oppression may become hidden behind the veil of the dominant ideology. Thus, although "ideological" hegemony suggests a greater role for politics in the international arena, those politics should be carefully scrutinized. Despite these limitations, the inclusion of a Gramscian model of hegemony into the corpus of international relations literature does strengthen our understandings of the logic of power in international affairs—power is more than guns and butter. Not only does it suggest that ideas are a "force," but also it supposes ideology can be used as a tool to stabilize or transform social structure.

An acceptance of a theory of "ideological" hegemony creates an expanded understanding of power at both the national and

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4 Gramsci would, of course, contest this point and want to argue that the trend in history is towards a socialist world; that the development of counter-hegemonic belief systems will foster the interest of the formerly dominated classes. If indeed hegemonic social structures are more than false consciousness, as one of Gramsci's French critics contends, if they due usher in their own systems of justice and morality, then how are we to differentiate between them?
international level. Cox's theory of "hegemony in production" as well as Keohane's emphasis on rules and institutions provide two examples of work pointing in this direction. Even where the theory of "ideological" hegemony is examined, understood, and not actively applied, that exercise involves a critical examination of the way in which words are used. Where the theory of "ideological" hegemony is actively applied it stresses the possibility of political solutions to global problems.\footnote{For relatively weak nation-states a strategy incorporating "ideological" hegemony suggests that it may be in their interest to actively support and participate in the institutions of the emerging global civil society. In a sense, relatively weak nations could engage in a "war of position"—a struggle for an institutional say— with relatively stronger nations.} Strategically it calls for greater emphasis on the development of, and support for, international institutions. At present it seems unlikely that the dominant nation-states would be willing to transfer power from their national bases to international organizations. However, structural changes in the global economy may necessitate such a movement.
Bibliography


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John R. Dedrick was born in Fairfax County, Virginia, September 12, 1963. He graduated from McLean High School in that county, June 1982. He received his B.A. from the College of William and Mary in Virginia, May 1986. As an undergraduate student he also completed course work at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia and The University of Lancaster, Lancaster, England. He was admitted to the M.A. program in government at The College of William and Mary in Virginia in 1986. In 1987 he finished course requirements for the M.A. degree. His M.A. thesis—Gramsci and International Relations Theory—was approved May 1988. In 1987 John Dedrick was admitted to the graduate program in political science at Rutgers University where he is currently studying. Beyond academic work John Dedrick has been involved in college radio (WCWM FM.) at The College of William and Mary in Virginia. His projects at WCWM included the organization of a music show entitled "Political and Revolutionary Rock" and the co-production of a multicontextual project entitled "Radio Free Williamsburg."