Who Controlled Cruise?: The 1983 Deployment of Cruise Missiles in the United Kingdom and the Post-1945 Anglo-American Special Relationship in Defense

Colin James Donald

College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd

Part of the European History Commons, International Relations Commons, Military History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Recommended Citation
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-pkmb-3741

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.
WHO CONTROLLED CRUISE?
THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE POST-1945 ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DEFENCE

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of American Studies
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Colin James Donald
1989
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

[Signature]
Author

Approved, August 1989

Clayton Clemens

David Dessler

Edward Crapol
DEDICATION

To Mum and Dad
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I. THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINED</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II. WHOSE BOMB IS IT ANYWAY?</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III. CRUISE, KEYS, CONTROVERSY</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV. THE DUAL-KEY DENIED</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Clayton Clemens, under whose guidance this investigation was conducted, for his careful and detailed scrutiny of the text. He is indebted to Professor David Dessler and Professor Edward Crapol for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript.
ABSTRACT

This thesis explains how the government of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher came to accept the deployment of American nuclear-armed cruise missiles on British soil without any physical means of preventing them from being launched. The missiles were accepted in the face of massive public opposition to them and particularly to the absence of a physical means of control known as the "dual-key" system.

Chapter one defines the "special relationship" between the UK and the USA, arguing that the relationship grew up mainly during World War Two and was elaborated upon after that. Chapter two narrates the history of Anglo-American defence relations, concentrating on the presence of American nuclear weapons and delivery systems stationed in the UK and the agreements concerning control over their use. Chapter three tells how and why the NATO allies agreed to the stationing of cruise missiles in Europe. Chapter four explains why the stationing of cruise in the UK aroused intense public opposition and examines what British and American officials and politicians thought the agreement over the control of cruise actually meant. The British maintained that the agreement constituted a veto over their launch; some Americans either denied or refused to affirm this.

The conclusion is that the USA and the UK have arrived at a quid pro quo. The USA provides the UK with strategic delivery systems so that the UK can maintain a nuclear force under its own control. The UK provides the USA with bases for American forces and American nuclear weapons; these bases are essentially under American control.
WHO CONTROLLED CRUISE?

THE 1983 DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM AND THE POST-1945 ANGLO-AMERICAN SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP IN DEFENCE
INTRODUCTION

Fall 1983 marked the beginning of the installation of 464 American-owned, ground-launched cruise missiles in bases in Europe. They had been requested by the European members of NATO. The Europeans feared that the strategic parity in nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union, the recent Soviet superiority in theater nuclear weapons and the possibility of a SALT III that would include theater nuclear missiles would all combine to limit theater systems in a manner disadvantageous to the security of Western Europe. Specifically, they were afraid that Western Europe would be decoupled from American nuclear forces and would lack the strength in theater systems to counter the Soviets' corresponding systems. Thus, the agreement with the United States to provide nuclear-tipped, theater-range cruise missiles had originally been hailed by Western European governments as a sign of Atlantic solidarity in the face of a mounting Soviet threat.

Amongst the European publics, however, there was anything but such unanimous approval. In Great Britain, two criticisms were made of the arrangements to provide cruise.
One was that any increase in any nuclear weapons in any place, at any time, for any reason was to be deplored. Such criticism came from the disarmament movement, specifically the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and many members of the Labor party, in the House of Commons and in the party as a whole. The other, much more widely voiced criticism of the arrangements for cruise concerned not the ownership by Britain of nuclear weapons nor the presence on British soil of American nuclear weapons, but the means by which the launching of the wholly American-owned missiles might be allowed or prohibited by the British government. The criticism centered on the Thatcher government's refusal to purchase the so-called "dual key" control system for cruise. Dual key referred to a system used on the only other previous occasion when the Americans had agreed with the British to place missiles not wholly under British control on British territory. The weapon in question had been the Thor intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), in service in Britain between 1959 and 1963. The dual key control system meant that the missiles had been bought by the British, the warheads were owned by the Americans and the launching of each whole weapon depended on permission being given by both one American and one British officer by means of two keys, one in the possession of each officer. This gave both the American and the British governments an effective veto on the launching of Thor. Now that a
comparable weapon was being installed, there was strong feeling amongst the public and members of Parliament of all the parties in favor of a new form of the dual-key system. Yet the Thatcher government successfully resisted the considerable political pressure generated by this feeling, insisting that there was a "special relationship" between the United States and Britain, that this had given a context for relying on written and verbal assurances by the Americans that they would not launch any nuclear delivery system from British territory without the agreement of the British government and that these assurances were an adequate safeguard. This thesis will discuss why the Thatcher government was willing to trust to this special relationship in a matter of the most vital national interest.

The thesis is divided into four parts. The first defines the special relationship. The second traces the history of the Anglo-American relationship in matters of nuclear energy and weapons, with a particular emphasis on nuclear weapons delivery systems based on British territory and the inter-governmental agreements about them. The third discusses the issue of who controlled cruise. The fourth draws conclusions about the refusal of the Thatcher government to have a dual-key control for cruise and its implications for the special relationship.
There are two terms which need some clarification regarding their use here. The terms "cruise" and "cruise missile" I shall use to refer to the ground-launched cruise missile, 160 of which were located at the Greenham Common and Molesworth air bases in Great Britain. In fact, there have been and are a great variety of missiles which share the same characteristics of being low-flying and air-breathing, beginning with the German V-1, and these will be referred to by names other than the terms "cruise" or "cruise missile." The term "dual key" will be used to refer to the arrangement whereby the warhead would be owned by the United States and the missile by Great Britain. For cruise, unlike the control system for the Thor missile, there would not necessarily be any actual keys. In other words, the term "dual key" has the merit of conceptual clarity, since it makes comprehensible popular concern about whether the British government could physically prevent the launching of American cruise missiles from British territory. For the reasons of common usage and conceptual clarity, I will retain the term.
CHAPTER I

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP DEFINED

The most comprehensive definition I have found of the term "the special relationship" as it pertains to the subject of this thesis has been given by John Baylis, a British professor in international politics, in the preface to his 1984 book, Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984. For this reason I will use it as the basis of my own definition, adding remarks of my own and by others as necessary.

For many writers, one crucial feature of the special relationship has been that, as Baylis notes, "the particularly close nature of the alliance stems essentially from sentimental attachments, cultural affinities, historical traditions, similar institutions and a common language." He cites Sir Dennis Brogan, author of American Aspects, observing that "the linguistic and cultural relationship between England and America is not paralleled in any other pair of relationships" and quotes the argument of political science professor Arthur Campbell Turner that, "the foundation of the special relationship between Britain and the United States is demographic, the basic fact is
that to a considerable extent the population of the United States derives from British sources."

A second feature has been the convergence of strategic interests. The two nations have been concerned with protecting themselves (and to a lesser extent other nations) against the expansionism of both the Axis powers during the Second World War, and the USSR after 1945. Although there have inevitably been differences in interests between the UK and the USA, these have never attained sufficient importance for a sufficiently long period to offset the convergence of strategic interests.

A third feature has been the manner of the relationship's conduct. Henry Kissinger's detailed description of this manner, as set down in White House Years, is well worth quoting at length:

...the special relationship with Britain was peculiarly impervious to abstract theories. It did not depend on formal arrangements; it derived in part from the memory of Britain's heroic wartime effort; it reflected the common language and culture of two sister peoples. It owed no little to the superb self-discipline by which Britain had succeeded in maintaining political influence after its physical power had waned. When Britain emerged from the Second World War too enfeebled to insist on its views, it wasted no time in mourning an irretrievable past. British leaders instead tenaciously elaborated the "special relationship" with us. This was, in effect a pattern of consultation so matter-of-factly intimate that it became psychologically impossible to ignore British views. They evolved a habit of meetings so regular that autonomous American action somehow came to seem to violate club rules. Above all, they used effectively an abundance of wisdom and trustworthiness of conduct so exceptional that successive American leaders saw it in their self-interest to obtain British advice before taking major decisions. It was an extraordinary relationship because it rested on no legal claim; it was formalized by no document; it was carried
forward by succeeding British governments as if no alternative were conceivable. Britain's influence was great precisely because it never insisted on it; the "special relationship" demonstrated the value of intangibles.

What is striking about this account is its emphasis on the importance of the manner of the relationship's conduct, the informality, the (deliberately conditioned) habit of consultation and, to paraphrase Harold Macmillan, the willingness of London to play Athens to Washington's Rome. Such a manner led Kissinger to make the additional observations that:

One feature of the Anglo-American relationship was the degree to which diplomatic subtlety overcame substantive differences. In reality, on European integration the views of Britain's leaders were closer to de Gaulle's than to ours; an integrated supranational Europe was as much anathema in Britain as in France. The major difference between the French and the British was that the British leaders generally conceded us the theory -- of European integration or Atlantic unity -- while seeking to shape its implementation through the closest contacts with us. Where de Gaulle tended to confront us with faits accomplis and doctrinal challenges, Britain turned conciliation into a weapon by making it morally inconceivable that its views could be ignored.

If we accept that the three elements of common culture, shared interests and a particular manner of handling Anglo-American affairs are the defining characteristics of the special relationship, then a sound argument can be made for accepting the Second World War as the period within which the special relationship was mainly formed, despite Kissinger's comment (which I readily accept as a qualification) about post-war elaboration. Whereas the
common culture of course has a considerable history, interests were not shared as fully prior to the war as during it and since. One need only consider the American people's sustained isolationist sentiment between the First World War and even beyond the outbreak of fighting in Europe in 1939 as compared with the perceived congruence of interests in the wars against both Hitler and Hirohito and in the Cold War that followed, to see that this is so. Similarly, the unprecedented closeness of the American and the British governments and the scope of the consultation, which included most departments of both administrations in almost all aspects of the war effort, including even the Manhattan Project, were uniquely a product of the Second World War.

Bearing in mind that the close consultation only arose in the Second World War, we can for the purposes of this study put to one side the argument of H. C. Allen that the special relationship grew steadily from the Eighteenth Century onwards, with its contention that the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, the success of isolationism and the freedom of the American Civil War from European intervention were all facilitated by British naval protection. The growth mainly occurred during the Second World War, with the extreme need to protect the British Isles against both a direct invasion and a subsequent blockade by German forces, the later use of Britain as a
staging area for Operation Overlord and the continuing requirement for coordination between all the Allied forces (American, British, and Commonwealth) in the other theaters of the war.

The contention of British historian H. G. Nicholas that the special relationship dates from the First World War does not hold true given the definition I have offered. The acknowledgement by the two states of strategic interdependence and the setting up of one joint naval command do not come close to the intimacy of the liaison in the war that followed.

Thus, I find myself basically in agreement with Professor Coral Bell, who dates the special relationship from 1940, while acknowledging that an "unavowed alliance" began with the Monroe Doctrine. However, in accepting Kissinger's observation that the relationship was assiduously elaborated on after the war, it is worth noting that Churchill's famous "iron curtain" speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, also contained the phrase "a special relationship" and helped give it a degree of popularity. The American public and press were at the time indifferent, if not openly hostile to the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. Yet the perception in the years that immediately followed that international communism was a growing menace made Britain seem an increasingly attractive partner in world affairs.
This was particularly true among the American political elite, but they were careful not to acknowledge this in public. Journalist David Dimbleby and historian David Reynolds relate in their book *An Ocean Apart* the delightful anecdote of Dean Acheson discovering in 1950 a memo written by a subordinate in which reference was made to the special relationship. Ordering all copies of the offending document be burned, Acheson acknowledged "the genuineness of the special relationship" but believed the memo "could stir no end of a hullabaloo, both domestic and international."4

Thanks to the insight of the social sciences that the world of human affairs exists largely in the manner that the majority of people think it exists, we must acknowledge this particular date as important, as the special relationship would become more and more an accepted fact of Anglo-American relations to the extent that politicians and bureaucrats heard it first named and then realized it themselves as a possibility and finally took it for granted. After Kennedy assumed the Presidency, White House aide McGeorge Bundy was authorizing a press release that stated "'Special relationship' may not be a perfect phrase, but sneers at Anglo-American reality would be equally foolish."5

Given either the immediate need for close cooperation, as in the Second World War, or the promulgation of the idea of the relationship as being essential for the maintenance
of peace and the growth of what Churchill called "world organization", the intimate manner of the consultative process became self-reinforcing, as noted by H. G. Nicholas:

The working relationships thus established not only guarantee a smooth discharge of decisions arrived at the highest levels; they reflect and create a climate of common purpose and frank discussion. Consequently they persist, by a healthy momentum of their own, even when, as at Suez, rupture and conflict impair the functioning of "the highest levels."6

Such working relationships require large staffs in the embassies of each state to the other and we may well agree with Nicholas' observation on the diplomats involved that, "What the activities of these practitioners are helping to create is hardly indeed, in the conventional sense of the term an alliance at all; it is more nearly a community."7 The facility with which working relations are conducted and the possibility of a community are both helped by the fact that, as Arthur Campbell Turner observed of the demographics of Americans with a British background in 1930, "The British immigrants...tended to occupy a more than average proportion of professional and administrative posts."8 Despite the fact that American foreign policy now has a heavy emphasis on relationships with nations of the Pacific Rim, it is unlikely that the American establishment can develop an equivalent special relationship with, say, Japan, unless circumstances conspire to force the two nations together and, perhaps more importantly, there are
enough Asian Americans in high political and administrative office who have that intangible "feel" for the other nation.

To describe the special relationship as having certain characteristics and even to go into the ramifications of those characteristics is not, however, sufficient to capture the special relationship in its totality. In order to do that, we must catch the relationship "on the wing", as it were. Only by seeing how the relationship manifests itself in specific events over a period of time and how those events can in their turn effect the relationship can the relationship be fully understood. In other words, the relationship, while susceptible to characterization, can best be understood, like many other social phenomena, as a process, rather than as a thing. For this reason, the decision by the British government under Margaret Thatcher to accept cruise without dual-key has to be analyzed in the context of the how the American and British governments have in the past handled their relationship in the fields of nuclear energy and weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems.
CHAPTER II
WHOSE BOMB IS IT ANYWAY?

It took some time for the British to persuade the Americans that British scientists could make a useful contribution to the effort to research and construct the atomic bomb which had been theorized about before even the outbreak of the Second World War. Once cooperation on nuclear matters got under way and the construction of an atomic weapon seemed likely, it was then necessary for the two allies to begin to formalize their relations in the whole atomic field.

The single most important agreement on atomic affairs came with the signing by Churchill and Roosevelt of the Quebec Agreement in August, 1943. This gave the British an effective veto on the American use of the atomic bomb, thanks to the stipulation that neither state would use the weapon against a third party without the consent of its ally. As a quid pro quo and one which was intended to allay suspicions in Congress of British intentions with regard to the commercial exploitation of atomic energy after the end of the war, the British agreed that the American President could set the terms for the industrial and commercial use
of atomic energy in the future. This effectively allowed the Americans to dictate how the British could develop their post-war atomic energy program.

The Ottawa agreement was further clarified in September 1944 by the Hyde Park aide-memoire, also signed by the two leaders. In this, it was agreed that the two countries would continue their full collaboration in developing nuclear energy for military and commercial purposes until this was terminated by joint agreement. In due course, Churchill gave his agreement to the use of atomic bombs against Japan, though he was not consulted about specific targets and did not consider his agreement to be more than a formality.

However, it soon transpired that some members of the American government were deeply unhappy with the terms of the Quebec Agreement and the aide-memoire as Simon Duke explained in US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom.

Dean Acheson had argued against the acceptability of the Quebec Agreement primarily for strategic reasons, but the official line of argument was political. It was argued that the agreement imposed a restraint upon the President's power as Commander-in-Chief to act freely in the national interest and it was therefore unconstitutional. At the end of 1945 there were moves afoot to change the agreement, with a recommendation to the Combined Policy Committee that a new document should be prepared to replace the Quebec Agreement 'in toto'. The new proposal in its first clause recommended that the governments of the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom 'will not use atomic weapons against other parties without prior consultation with each other', thus aiming directly at Clause 2 of the Quebec Agreement which had expressed atomic weapons would not be used without each other's consent. The meeting between Truman, Attlee and Mackenzie-King of Canada in November 1945, and subsequent
meeting, failed to persuade Britain to give up her veto right.

Yet matters took a very different semblance the following year, as the Americans became most unwilling to continue to share their atomic secrets. Not only did Truman and some of his senior advisors, like Secretary James Byrnes, feel this way, so did the Senate Atomic Energy Committee, as Robin Edmonds, a former official with the British Foreign Office, explained in his book, Setting the Mould. Following the British decision to build a plutonium-producing reactor and the discovery of a spy ring in Canada, which included Alan Nunn May, a British physicist who had worked on the Montreal atomic project, the Committee acted swiftly. In the space of nine days, they amended a section of the McMahon bill on atomic energy and provided for the full range of penalties for criminal actions involving unauthorized dissemination of 'restricted data' which was defined in terms that allowed very little latitude.

This prohibited the passage of atomic information from the United States to any other country. McMahon himself years later agreed that had he been told of Anglo-American cooperation in the atomic field, the legislation would have been less restrictive. It would take Eisenhower and the shock of the Sputnik launch to persuade Congress that cooperation in atomic affairs should be fully resumed with the United Kingdom. In the meantime, the British initiated their own program for the development of an atomic bomb,
out of fear of renewed American isolationism, of a need to remain a great power and of a desire to bring the Americans to believe that the partnership might, indeed should, be renewed.

In January of 1948, the Americans and the British revised their arrangements on atomic matters in a document called the modus vivendi. The United States was to receive a much greater share of the uranium ore coming out of the Congo, which had previously been divided on a fifty-fifty basis, in return for renewed cooperation and exchange of information with Britain. Also, the British power of veto over the American use of atomic weapons was dropped, in return for the Americans dropping their restrictions on the British industrial development of atomic energy. In keeping with what was becoming standard practice for the post-war relationship, the modus vivendi was a general declaration of intent and no document was ever signed. Thus, the President did not have to refer the matter to Congress. Secrecy was maintained on both sides of the Atlantic.

Opinions on the quality of the agreement vary. The view of Lord Sherfield, who participated in the negotiations, is that the modus vivendi opened the door slammed shut by the McMahon Act. The other view, propounded by Margaret Gowing, is that the British gave away their veto over the American use of atomic weapons for too little in return.
Margaret Gowing, the official historian of Britain's atomic energy program, criticizes the *modus vivendi* for giving away the British veto at all, when the American use of the atomic bomb might eventually have led to Britain's "annihilation." The use of the word "annihilation" in this context is tendentious. After all, the veto was given up in January 1948 and the Soviet Union was not known to have acquired its own atomic capability until 1949. From the perspective of the British government of the time, it might have seemed much more pressing to acquire the additional wherewithal to develop its own atomic industry than to worry about the possibility of the Soviet Union sometime in the future dropping an atomic device on London because of something the Americans had done. Even if one does not share Gowing's views fully, one can still agree with her that the British giving up of the veto was strange in one particular respect, that the British did not even press to have the word "consultation" substituted for the word "consent," though the British chiefs of staff had proposed this in 1947.

Shortly after the veto was given up, there came the Berlin crisis and a turn of events which had serious implications for Anglo-American relations in matters of the control of American atomic delivery systems based in British territory. To understand this we must go back to
1945 and some talks between USAAF General Carl Spaatz and the British Air Marshal, Sir Arthur Tedder.

The two men were concerned about the strength and growing influence of the Soviet Union and the weakness of post-war Europe. They pondered that if the USA wanted to deploy its B-29 bombers to Europe, no British airfield could accommodate them and so they decided in July 1946 that four bases should be made ready for these aircraft by mid-1947. Atomic bomb assembly and loading facilities were constructed at some bases. All of this was done without any public debate on the subject. The Strategic Air Command had in March 1946 implemented a policy of "rotating" small units of B-29s abroad to give crews training in regions where they might operate in the future. The new bases fit in with the rotation scheme perfectly. None of the Silverplate B-29s (those converted to carry atomic weapons) were actually based in Europe until the summer of 1949, but for propaganda purposes, non-Silverplates still had the reputation of being atomic bombers.

The 1948-49 blockade of Berlin by the Soviet Union led not only to a massive airlift, but also to the British government agreeing to base sixty American B29s. The sixty arrived in July 1948, with the total number rising to ninety in September of the same year. However, the circumstances of this deployment were most revealing of how the special relationship was evolving in the Cold War era.
Baylis accounts for the aircrafts' arrival as follows:

The reasons for the arrival of the aircraft in Britain, at least initially, were political rather than military. They were a token of US interest in the defence of Europe. Their symbolic effect was emphasized by the fact that although the B29 was the American delivery vehicle for atomic weapons the B29s in Britain were not modified until 1949/50 to carry nuclear bombs.11

Investigative journalist and defence specialist Duncan Campbell provides additional and more detailed evidence in The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, his book on the American military presence in the United Kingdom. He explains the schedule for the B29 force being converted to Silverplates and for some being based in Britain.

At the end of 1948, the 30 Silverplate aircraft were still at their US home base of Roswell, New Mexico. Gradually, the rest of the force was converted, and the first A-bomb carriers came to England in 1949. By late 1950, all the bombers returning to Britain from the United States on "rotational tours" had been converted.12

What is most striking, however, is that according to Campbell, the British government itself did not know whether the B-29s were Silverplates or not. If this were not remarkable enough, Duke quotes a Foreign Office document that:

The USAF already had the informal authority to rotate medium bomber groups to the United Kingdom under the Spaatz-Tedder agreement and that 'we seem committed to the proposal [to base the 60 B-29s] in principle, a fact of which the Prime minister does not appear aware'.13

Finally, Campbell notes, "no questions were raised at the political level about the terms and conditions of the Americans' tenure"14. Taken together, these facts indicate a
profound confusion in the British government's management of its defence relations with the USA. A naive trust substituted for decision-making based on facts, clearly defined policy aims, and coordination between different parts of the British administration.

Exactly why the British were so keen to allow the bombers to be based in Britain remains a little unclear. Baylis observes that:

Mr Bevin [the British Foreign Secretary] in particular welcomed the presence of US bombers in Britain as helping to bind the United States closer to Western European defence.15

Duke gives a more complex explanation for the acceptance:

Fear of Russian expansionist aims in Europe following the successful Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, the imminent withdrawal of Russia from the Berlin Kommandatura, fear of an American retreat into isolationism that characterized the interwar years, and last, but not least, the Spaatz-Tedder agreement effectively making any other decision improbable.16

To this list we might add Britain's profound economic and military weakness. Yet all these compelling reasons for admitting the bombers are not reasons for handling the matter in such a confused manner. Furthermore, there was certainly no public discussion about the B-29 deployment. (This silence regarding military nuclear affairs has since become an established fact of British political life.) It is difficult to disagree with Duke's conclusion that while the British government had considered the implications of
temporary presence, little attempt had been made to consider the future.

However, as investigative reporter David Henshaw explained in an article on dual-key in *The Listener* magazine, the Americans had been eager to get air bases in Britain for quite some time:

But right from the start there was a considerable discrepancy between American plans for the bases and the official British version of how long they were here for and what they were equipped to do. Only one MP -- the renegade Labor lawyer John Platts-Mills -- questioned the arrival of the B-29s: he was told they were here on a temporary mission for "goodwill and training." And yet on the very day the bombers flew in, the American Defence Secretary, James Forrestal, wrote in his diary: "We have the opportunity now of sending these planes, and once sent, they would become something of an accepted fixture." If the American were keen to seize this opportunity, it was because their planes were still limited in range; so that, while they still had a monopoly of the atomic bomb, they needed forward bases, close to the Soviet Union, from which to launch an attack. Documents previously classified as "top secret", but now available under the American Freedom of Information Act at the National Archive in Washington, show that as early as October 1945 the Pentagon generals were considering a policy of "first strike" and that Britain was one of three base areas close to the USSR that they might have to "seize and hold." In July 1948, the bases were obtained by invitation.

The Americans began to develop this strategic facility soon thereafter. September 1948 saw the United States initiate negotiations between the American and British Chiefs of Staff to allow the construction of buildings at the Sculthorpe and Lakenheath bases to house components of atomic bombs. Silverplate B-29s first arrived in April 1950 and the President approved the stockpiling of non-nuclear components of atomic bombs in the UK in July 1950, which
meant that only the nuclear cores need be moved to Britain in the event of a crisis. For a while, the American view was that Britain was too vulnerable a location for stockpiling all the components or complete nuclear weapons. This view changed with the coming of the Eisenhower administration and in June 1953, the President agreed that the US military could store complete nuclear weapons at bases abroad.

As of 1950, all Western nuclear weapons remained entirely under American control. A 1950 plan to transfer some atomic bombs to the British was killed by the State Department, which emphasized the need to maintain the American stockpile and the possibility that the British might not actually use the weapons in the event of war. British concern about American bases centered around the costs of construction work. The Ambassador's Agreement of April 1950 (an exchange of letters between the US Ambassador and a representative of the British government) confirmed how the bases were to be expanded and how the construction costs were to be shared. There was also an assurance of the British right to terminate the agreement. Yet that was all. The stationing of American forces was not given a time limit and there was no attempt to secure British control over the use of the bases.

If the British were anxious about the Berlin blockade, they had a good deal more to be anxious about two years
later. With Truman's threat to end the Korean war by using atomic bombs, the British found that: they did not have either a veto over nor a right to be consulted about the American use of atomic weapons; the Americans did have an atomic weapons delivery system on British soil; the British did not have any agreement at all on the operational use of the bases given over to the Americans. Worse still, the Soviet Union now did have the capability to retaliate with atomic weapons against an ally of the United States (for instance, Great Britain) if one of its friends (for instance, the newly-formed People's Republic of China) were victim to Truman's threat. Prime Minister Attlee hurried across the Atlantic to dissuade President Truman from acting on his threat. No doubt he was hastened on his way by the fact that the British were at that time wholly ignorant as to the contents of the US Strategic Air Plan. Clearly, from the British point of view, that they should have no control over the use of the bases and no idea of how the USAF might drop its atomic bombs was a state of affairs which could not be allowed to continue, no matter how "special" the relationship. Attlee's meeting with Truman was riddled with ambiguity. Truman was willing to promise "consultation" verbally, but would not put this in writing. The Americans again fell back on their argument about the President being unable to limit his powers as
Commander-in-Chief. The final wording of the communique was:

The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.18

This was the only document which emerged from the meeting. The Americans refused to accept the British record of the meeting, since it contained the word "consultation" with reference to atomic bombs. Attlee nevertheless affirmed to the Cabinet in December 1950 that the British would be consulted except in "an extreme urgency" and told the House of Commons that the President's assurances were "perfectly satisfactory."19

The British were in fact still concerned about the need for consultation and their lack of knowledge about the US Strategic Air Plan. They continued to raise the issue in 1951, with the Foreign Secretary's visit to Washington in September. This led to more talks, involving the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, and representatives of the Truman administration. Consultation was again affirmed by the Americans in private, but Franks was concerned to get something agreed upon for public consumption before the British general election of October 25. The agreement was in fact made public after that date when Churchill announced it in the House of Commons in December 1951.
The agreement which was reached is the form of words still used by the British government today in reply to any query regarding its degree of control over the use of American bases on British territory and the nuclear weapons and the delivery systems that are stationed there. The relevant sentence reads: "The use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time." The crucial words here are "joint decision" and much of the cruise missile debate in Britain has been over their exact meaning. This debate over the interpretation is a matter for the next chapter.

At the January 1952 summit between Churchill and Truman, the talks proceeded in the same manner as previous talks. Consultation about the use of atomic weapons from bases in Britain was affirmed, but not included in any written statement. The final communiqué again used the "joint decision" wording. However, Churchill did make the very real gain of being briefed on the Strategic Air Plan.

Following the first test of an atomic bomb by Britain in October 1952 and the election of Eisenhower, further agreements about the US bases, in terms of what facilities would be provided and at what cost, were made between the two countries, but as usual not in the form of a treaty, as that would have necessitated disclosure in Parliament and
to the public of the terms. From 1954 onwards, the McMahon Act was gradually watered down and it was repealed in 1958. This led to Britain obtaining the information necessary to build atomic power plants for submarines, which in turn allowed the British to accept the offer of the Polaris missile system in 1962, since they could build the submarines to carry them. (In May 1957, the British proved that they were not so far behind in other fields by detonating their first thermonuclear device.)

The 1956 Suez crisis severely strained the special relationship but it is an indication of just how extraordinary the relationship can be that one of the first steps taken by the Americans to restore it to its former good health was to offer Britain some intermediate-range Thor ballistic missiles (IRBMs), free. The offer was made in January 1957. Prime Minister Macmillan accepted the offer at a conference with President Eisenhower at Bermuda in March of the same year. All 60 Thors were in service by May 1960. As well as wanting to restore the special relationship, Macmillan was also eager for the British to have a missile system which they had not at that stage been able to develop themselves and for the British military to have hands-on experience with state-of-the-art missile technology.

The Americans had a number of compelling motives for stationing IRBMs in the United Kingdom. The New Look
defence policy had led to an emphasis on relying on nuclear weapons to take the place of large, conventional forces. Many tactical and theater nuclear weapons systems were deployed in Europe at this time to bolster the relatively small NATO forces in the face of an overwhelming Soviet conventional capability. In *The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy*, Michael Armacost draws an interesting parallel between Thor and the B29 bomber.

Above all, however, the transfer of Thors was appealing because, as in 1949, in adjusting to a technological revolution in strategic delivery systems, the United States found itself developing first-generation systems whose range required advanced bases for any strategic utility. And as in the late 1940s when B29s were emplaced on British bases, the desire for immediate deployment overcame the reluctance to resume a posture of mutual dependency. Thus, deployment was spurred by the quickening technology race between the USA and the USSR, a race which would come to public attention later in the year with the launch of the Sputnik satellite. Finally, one should not overlook the fact that the British agreed to pay for the privilege of basing the weapons, a minor factor, but one sure to appeal to the budget-conscious Eisenhower.

In an article in the (London) *Sunday Times* the newspaper's defence correspondent made one of the few recent public mentions of the agreements for the control of the sixty Thor missiles:

After a succession of nuclear developments in the mid-50s, something much more specific [than the 1952 agreement] was needed. In the run-up to the arrival of Thor missiles, and soon after the acquisition of the British independent
deterrent, Harold Macmillan, then prime minister, put his mind to negotiating a detailed and precise "procedural paper." The result, thrashed out between Patrick (now Sir Patrick) Dean, a deputy under-secretary at the Foreign Office, and a State Department official named Murphy, is still so classified that it is not supposed to exist. The agreement lays out just how the command and control of American nuclear forces based in Britain would work in time of crisis.

Since 1958 it has been adapted to take account of subsequent nuclear developments, and it has been reaffirmed every time a new prime minister or president takes office. It makes clear that the release of nuclear weapons from British soil cannot take place without the prior agreement of the British government. That is a much better guarantee than any of America's other allies have secured [under the 1962 Athens Guidelines].

Campbell, however, claims that Dean-Murphy did not significantly modify the existing arrangements. It is widely accepted that the secret part of the Anglo-American base agreements is periodically updated. The extent to which any single update marks a "significant" change is largely a matter of conjecture.

Until 1989, the arrangements for control over Thor and the rationale for the arrangements had seemed quite straightforward. The rationale was that only physical control was finally sufficient for the British national interest. Rather than accept the missiles free, even with dual-key control, the deal was that the British would in fact own the missiles, the Americans the warheads. The British would provide the base facilities. Dual-key was promoted as a sign of renewed trust between the USA and UK. The announcement that the missiles would come to Britain
and the terms of their siting was made on February 27, 1958.

It is national policy in Britain to keep secret documents under lock and key for thirty years. At that time their current status is assessed again and some are released. When the papers for 1958 were released in 1959, The Observer reported that there had been a second, secret part to the Thor basing agreement:

Britain was forced onto deceiving its own public; although Macmillan persuaded President Eisenhower to let the missiles have British crews while the US controlled the warheads, he also accepted a secret second half to the deal. In the secret letters of understanding, the Americans were promised that they could apply to instal more Thor missiles, with US crews, when and if they wanted. Meanwhile, [Defense Secretary] Sandys told the Commons the US had not asked to control the missiles themselves.23

Further, Macmillan had even considered scrapping the British nuclear deterrent on the grounds that it was more for prestige than military use and cost too much.

The dual-key control of Thor had two crucial political limitations. The first was its applicability to a limited number of a potentially larger number of missiles. The second, and politically most important limitation, was that dual-key was limited to the Thor system. This physical control over Thor by the British led to Macmillan being asked what control the British government had over the SAC bases and their nuclear weapons. Macmillan replied:

I have the assurance of the US government that pilots have specific instructions not to arm the weapons until they are directly ordered to do so in order to carry out an
operation of war. Such an order would be given after agreement between the two governments.24

Small wonder, then, that during the 1983 controversy about a dual key for cruise, the Conservative government tried to bury the idea as quickly as possible. If it had come to light that the Thor dual-key arrangement had been part of a larger and secret deal by a previous Conservative administration, that would have been highly inflammatory in itself. But actually having a dual-key for cruise would have made Prime minister Thatcher as vulnerable as Macmillan to the same questions regarding British control over other American nuclear systems based in the United Kingdom.

 Barely was the Parliamentary debate (and Sandys' lying) over than both governments found themselves severely embarrassed, as Macmillan recalled:

There was a great "flap" this morning over an extraordinary statement by a certain Colonel Zinc -- an American "Eagle Colonel" of the Air Force who claims to be about to take over operational command of the rockets and rocket bases in England. As this is in direct contradiction (a) to the terms of the agreement published last Monday (b) what we told Parliament on Monday and in the debate yesterday, Colonel Zinc has put his foot in it on a grand scale.25

As Baylis notes:

The Prime Minister no doubt had the "Colonel Zinc incident" in mind when he went to Washington on 7 June 1958. In his discussions with the American President, Macmillan once again brought up the question of US bases in Britain and the use of bombs and warheads which were under joint control. As a result both heads of state apparently initialled an agreement at the end of the talks which
replaced "the loose arrangement made by Attlee and confirmed by Churchill."\textsuperscript{26}

Both countries had agreed that the 1952 agreement was inadequate and had replaced it. Yet, when the debate began over accepting cruise, without a dual-key control, it was to the 1952 document that reference was exclusively made by the Thatcher government in public addresses and Parliamentary debate alike.

The Thor system was withdrawn from service in 1963. The system was one of liquid-fuelled missiles which were supposed to take some fifteen minutes to ready for launch and which were kept above ground. In fact, launch preparation took so many hours that it was possible that Thor might still have been on the ground when a second wave of Soviet missiles arrived. (It was even alleged that the missiles could be destroyed by rifle fire and a \textit{.22 rifle} at that.) It was hardly surprising that they became more of a threat to the owner as a likely target for a wholly successful pre-emptive strike than a deterrent to the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, in 1960, the American were allowed port facilities for their nuclear missile submarines at Holy Loch in Scotland, in return for allowing the British the right to purchase the Skybolt ballistic missile. Britain had also expressed an interest in acquiring Polaris. Macmillan recalled the deal in his memoirs.
The President and I had merely exchanged a note and in return for Skybolt I had agreed, also 'in principle', to the establishment of an American submarine base in Scotland. Actual details were to be set out in a formal agreement....Everything was soon arranged, and the Minister of Defence was soon able to conclude a formal agreement regarding Skybolt, while maintaining our claim to Polaris, if this should at any time become necessary. It was this undertaking, entered into by President Eisenhower, that his successor was to honour, at my request, two years later.27

Though there was a Parliamentary debate about the base in December, 1960, the Labor party was, happily for Macmillan, sharply divided between those pressing for unilateral nuclear disarmament and those advocating a multilateral approach. This left it unable to launch an effective opposition to the base agreement.

Once Skybolt failed miserably in testing, the British played on the special relationship to obtain Polaris and succeeded at the Kennedy-Macmillan Nassau summit in December 1962 in the face of strong opposition from some members of the Kennedy administration to having more than one center of command in a time of crisis (such as the Cuban missile crisis which had transpired in October). In April 1963, the Polaris Sales Agreement was signed and Britain was assured of a deterrent for many years to come, with the Polaris submarine and the Vulcan bomber forces as its components. There was no question that these systems were anything other than wholly under British operational control. Though the British had to rely on the Americans for a great deal of nuclear technology, only the British
could launch their Polaris missiles or their Vulcan bombers. With regard to the British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (a counter-proposal to the multilateral nuclear force the British detested for its very threat of taking away British control over British nuclear weapons), Harold Wilson assured the Commons on December 16, 1964, that there was no possibility of a dual-key control system for British Polaris missiles. After 1964, public concern shifted from nuclear weapons to other issues and the politicians and the military in Britain were generally well enough satisfied with the state of the nuclear deterrent.
CHAPTER III
CRUISE, KEYS, CONTROVERSY

During the 1970s successive British governments became concerned about two nuclear weapons issues. One was the prospect of having to update Britain's nuclear deterrent for the 1980s and beyond as the Polaris missiles and the submarines carrying them approached obsolescence. As an interim step, the Heath government decided to update the Polaris system by putting multiple warheads on the missiles and the Callaghan government continued the programme.

The other issue was the apparent danger that the SALT II treaty might decouple the European members of NATO from the nuclear deterrent provided by American strategic systems. The fear was that SALT II would leave the two superpowers with a parity in strategic systems, while the Europeans would then be faced with a Soviet superiority in theater nuclear weapons. Theater nuclear weapons are nuclear-armed missiles and aircraft which both NATO and the Warsaw Pact deploy in Europe and aim at targets in Europe. The two issues eventually became intertwined for the British at the Guadaloupe summit of the USA, Britain, France, and West Germany in January 1979.
As part of the reevaluation of their deterrent, the British became concerned about the need to find a replacement for the Vulcan bomber as it grew older during the 1970s. The Carter administration was considering extending the life of the B52 bomber by giving it a stand-off capability. The aircraft would have a payload of cruise missiles that could be launched well away from the borders of the Soviet Union so that the B52 could leave the missiles to do the work of penetrating Soviet air defenses and delivering the nuclear warhead. The British thought that the Vulcan might also be remodelled in this way, but it transpired that the aircraft was simply too old. Yet this decision against using the Vulcan to launch cruise led to the missile system alone being viewed with increasing favor by the British defence establishment. Cruise represented a new technology, with the promise of being able to penetrate Soviet air defenses readily on a wide range of types of mission, with a nuclear or non-nuclear payload as desired. If there were any misgivings, they were mostly on the part of the Royal Air Force, who feared cruise might almost eliminate the need for piloted aircraft. Further, the missile appeared cheap if compared on a one-for-one basis with any of the larger ballistic missiles (though this cost-saving was illusory, being in fact outweighed by the considerable expense of the backup systems like the TERCOM guidance system and the satellites.
which serviced it and gave cruise its supposed extreme accuracy). This led to some debate about the suitability of cruise as the next generation British deterrent. The final decision was that the Trident I missile was the best option and that the Americans should be asked to sell it to Britain.

Meanwhile, all the members of NATO, including Britain and the United States, were becoming caught up in the debate about theater nuclear weapons. The first major discussion of the topic was when Western defense ministers gathered at Hamburg in January 1976 for a meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. The first public expression of the debate was the October 1977 speech by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on the subject. The overriding concern of the United States was that this debate should end well for NATO, which had recently been shaken by a debate about the neutron bomb which had ended badly and divisively. Thus 1976 to 1979 saw a great deal of diplomatic activity both within NATO circles and outside it, among the member nations, as the allies tried to put together an agreement on theater nuclear weapons which would satisfy everyone. One crucial meeting was the Guadaloupe summit in January 1979.

Guadaloupe was convened at the behest of the White House. According to John Newhouse's account, in War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, it was probably the brainchild of
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser. At any rate it was Brzezinski who claimed credit for it later and who personally contacted the European heads of state, James Callaghan, Giscard d'Estaing, and Helmut Schmidt.

From the American viewpoint, Brzezinski told Newhouse, "We needed to establish some sense of strategic direction after the ERW [neutron bomb] debacle."\(^{28}\) Carter also needed European support for SALT II to encourage the Senate to ratify it. Carter's NSC staff saw the summit as the ideal opportunity to propose the deployment of cruise and Pershing II missiles as the answer to the theater nuclear weapons problem. Thus far, this idea had been discussed only at the lower levels of NATO.

The British saw Guadaloupe as the ideal time to approach the United States for Trident. Prime Minister Callaghan had an excellent rapport with Carter. Also, the summit itself was planned to be highly informal. The only other people present were the leaders' national security advisors and the leaders' families. Callaghan would therefore have the best opportunity to exert his personal influence over Carter.

As Callaghan recollects in his memoirs, *Time and Chance*, he was able to approach Carter when the President was alone. He explained that he needed to know the American position regarding a possible sale of Trident. Callaghan had already paved the way for the discussion by eliciting
Schmidt's opinion that Germany would prefer that France was not the only European power with strategic nuclear weapons. This allowed him to argue that Britain might need Trident both for its own security and also to reassure the West Germans:

The President heard me out. He said that like Helmut Schmidt, he also was glad that Britain possessed the nuclear deterrent. He did not take up my comments about Germany directly, but said that he hoped that Britain as well as France would remain a nuclear power. In his view, it was better that there should be a shared responsibility in Europe, rather than that American should go it alone, as he would not wish the United States to be the only country in confrontation. 29

Carter agreed that "he could see no objection to transferring this technology to the United Kingdom" 30 and further agreed that two British officials should visit Washington to discuss the technical and financial details. (Neither Carter's 1982 memoirs, Keeping Faith, nor Brzezinski's 1983 memoirs, Power and Principle, give any account of the conversation. Callaghan's memoirs were published in 1987, by which time the Trident deal had been settled between the Thatcher and Reagan governments.)

Carter, Callaghan, and Schmidt agreed at Guadaloupe that cruise and Pershing II should be deployed to counter the growing number of SS-20 missiles being deployed by the USSR. They also agreed that continuing talks with the USSR might lead to an agreement that would eliminate the SS-20s and so avert any need for NATO to deploy the new weapons. These decisions were to become official NATO policy on
December 12, 1979, when the alliance formally agreed to the deployment. The deploy-and-negotiate concept was popularly referred to as the "two-track" policy.

For the purposes of this study, there are two crucial questions regarding the decisions taken at the Guadaloupe summit. Was the British agreement to accept the basing of cruise missiles in the UK linked to the American agreement to sell Britain the Trident system? Was any decision taken about providing the cruise missiles with a dual key control?

The evidence collected by Newhouse leads him to conclude that the cruise basing and Trident sales were implicitly linked.

And was there a link between the two-track decision and Trident? "The link was never explicit," says a closely involved British official. "People here [in London] were well aware of the lurking danger of repeating the history of the early sixties [a reference to Skybolt]. We had expected a very tough negotiation, but it turned out we were pushing on an open door."31

Newhouse also asked David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy, about a possible link.

"We expected a lot of help from the British [on the two-track decision]," says Aaron. "And it wasn't necessary to link support for it and the Trident. The Brits were bending over backward to help. 'You want to deploy cruise missiles in Britain,' they said. 'Go ahead and do it.'" According to Aaron, there was little resistance to approving Callaghan's request for Trident.32

In short, the British acquiescence to cruise deployment preempted any need for the Americans to make an explicit
link. Both sides knew that an implicit link already existed.

Was the issue of control discussed at Guadaloupe? According to Aaron, it was.

"They never discussed the first question: Should we do this at all?" says David Aaron, who as deputy NSC advisor also played a major role. "They only discussed the mix of force options. Whether the weapons should be all US."33

The way in which Aaron phrased his remark and the fact that he does not mention dual-control, suggests that the leaders decided at Guadaloupe to deploy the missiles under sole American control.

They would have had several compelling reasons for reaching such a decision. The issue of control over nuclear weapons based on West German territory has always been a delicate one for West German leaders, who have wanted the protection they believe is afforded by such weapons, but have not wanted to confront the USSR with a nuclear-armed West Germany. It has been in the best interests of the West Germans that no nuclear munitions on their territory are under their control. None of the leaders at Guadaloupe would have wanted to change this state of affairs, particularly while SALT II was still alive and well.

Further, the whole point of the new weapons was to couple the USA with its European allies, that is, to convince the USSR that the USA would use its nuclear weapons to defend those allies. Dual-key control might tend
to weaken the deterrent value of the weapons, since the use of the weapons would be subject to more than one veto. Finally, it would have weakened the show of unity which theater nuclear weapons deployment was supposed to produce, if one nation opted for dual-key while others did not.

After Guadalupe, a good deal of consultation and arm-twisting brought both the enthusiastic and the recalcitrant European members of NATO more or less behind the proposal to deploy the missiles. The first public announcement of the scheme was made by the Carter administration on January 19, 1979. According to The New York Times, administration officials said that Guadalupe conferees "made no firm decision on the missile question" but that they "agreed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 'should explore very actively' its options..." Thus the Carter administration immediately put the issue into the NATO arena to avoid any impression that the four leaders were trying to dictate policy to the whole of Western Europe and to make it a vital issue for NATO, which would allow pressure to be put on NATO members which did not want to fall in line with the scheme.

When Schmidt tried to back away from the idea (by proposing siting the missiles at sea, while the whole point of them being land-based was their high visibility), the United States put on the pressure for acceptance. The formal proposal was presented to European leaders by David
Aaron in late July and by early August, Carter's officials were confidently predicting that "the alliance could agree formally on a missile deployment plan by the end of the year."

As events unfolded, various NATO study groups and committees fell into line by presenting favorable reports. The theater nuclear missiles proposal was put before the NATO Council on 12 December 1979 at a meeting in Brussels. All the member nations agreed in principle on the scheme, though it took some last minute bargaining to find a formula which would suit Belgium and Holland. Both countries had a strong anti-nuclear movement and a coalition government unsure of its ability to carry out deployment. Each country delayed accepting the missiles (Holland for two years, Belgium for six months) to give priority to the arms control track. All other NATO members, including Britain, accepted the proposal without reservations.

Throughout the run-up to the December meeting, the issue of control for Britain surfaced very briefly in the press. The New York Times reported on October 10:

The British, although they are willing to have the missiles, are likely to insist that some of the cruise missiles be built here under licence and that some be placed under British control, reaffirming Britain's position as a nuclear power.

This rather vague report (which gives no indication of how the "control" would be implemented) was contradicted on
November 1, when the same newspaper ran a lengthy article, "Now Europe Shuns Its Nuclear Trigger." This focused mainly on West Germany and its reasons for not wanting dual-key, but mentioned other nations which had refused.

Britain, Belgium, and the Netherlands...have also indicated that they will probably want them [the missiles] controlled by a one-key system.37

Only ten days later, the British Defense Secretary Francis Pym was putting his full weight behind deployment of missiles without dual-key.

The secretary said that his first priority was reaching agreement with Britain's European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the deployment of American-made and American-manned cruise missiles here and on the Continent.38

The proposal presented in December included the offer to the European nations of a dual-key system, with a price tag which included some of the research and deployment costs. There were no takers.

Given that the December meeting was the culmination of many meetings and in-depth consultation, it is clear that the whole issue of dual-key control was settled in advance of the meeting. One can only speculate how far in advance. It seems highly likely that such a crucial topic would have at least been raised at Guadaloupe, probably by Schmidt. It is certainly possible that a single-key policy may have been agreed upon at that time, just as the dual-track policy was. Whether dual-key control was rejected at Guadaloupe or during the consultation process leading up to
the NATO Council meeting, the rejection became part of official NATO policy on 12 December, 1979. The Thatcher government had committed itself to American control for the cruise missiles which were to arrive in the United Kingdom in 1983.
CHAPTER IV

THE DUAL KEY DENIED

Given that the Thatcher Government had committed itself to the deployment of American owned and operated cruise missiles, 1983 was to prove an extremely uncomfortable year. There was opposition to cruise right from the December 1979 announcement. That same month, British historian and anti-nuclear activist E. P. Thompson went full tilt at the policy in the course of several pages in the left-wing political weekly The New Statesman. Popular sentiment against cruise grew both in size and intensity as 1983 drew nearer. In December 1982, some 30,000 women protested by encircling the Greenham Common air base, which, along with the Molesworth base, was to be the site for the weapons. By 1983, the issue dominated the British political scene.

Opposition to cruise coalesced into two groups. The unilateralist group centered around the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the Labor Party. The group in favor of dual-key was more diffuse. The Social Democratic Party favored dual-key control and there were sympathizers amongst both Labor and Conservative members of Parliament.
Those members of the public backing dual-key included unilateralists and multilateralists. At the beginning of the year, an opinion poll conducted for *The Sunday Times* found a staggering 93% in favor of a dual-key for cruise.39

In reply to the Thatcher government's reliance on the "joint decision," a letter to *The Times* by a Dr. Terence Moore of Clare College, Cambridge put the opposing view most succinctly.

The test case for dual-key comes on the single, critical occasion where the President and the Prime Minister disagree. I need hardly elaborate on the possibly devastating importance of such an occasion....For the UK to retain its essential responsibility for British-based nuclear weapons it should insist, as the SDP in its defence "White Paper" has insisted, on a double safety catch on American nuclear missiles based here in the UK. The country's self-respect demands no less.40

Moore's letter expressed popular support for dual-key very well. The British public was highly concerned that their government had no visible, physical control over the firing arrangements for the missiles and there was also the feeling that Britain was demeaned by the proposed arrangements.

The Conservative party itself, not normally given to the kind of internal feuding so prevalent in the Labor party, came close to a backbench revolt over dual-key. Alan Clark, member of Parliament for Plymouth, collected 38 signatures from a broad spectrum of his fellow Conservative MPs, asking for "a mechanism for sovereign physical control of theatre nuclear weapons based in this country."41
(Sovereignty was of course a highly-emotive issue in the wake of the Falklands war.) It was also felt by Conservatives in favor of dual-key that the presence of this control system would end much of the public opposition to the missiles. After all, the same opinion polls showed no majority against Britain's own nuclear deterrent. Senior Conservatives immediately put heavy pressure on Clark and he finally backed down.

Conservative ministers, led by the Secretary of State for Defense, Michael Heseltine, flatly rejected the notion of approaching the American government for dual-key. Heseltine argued in January that "in 1979 the Americans had offered a dual-key arrangement, but it had been declined by the Europeans." This was a clear reference to the ramifications for NATO of Britain deciding to break ranks and opt for dual-key. The following month, Conservative ministers were reassuring visiting Vice-President George Bush that they would not raise the issue with the United States. Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe reaffirmed his government's commitment to cruise when he visited Washington in July.

The Conservative government relied on a number of arguments against dual-key. One primary argument was that dual-key would cost too much. Another was that the 1952 Churchill-Truman agreement for "joint decision" was sufficient and any attempt to modify it would severely
damage the mutual trust enjoyed by the two nations. Other arguments were that the missiles were guarded by British Royal Air Force personnel, who were needed to help disperse the missiles to their launch sites and that installing dual-key would delay deployment.

The argument that dual-key would simply cost too much had the merit of being simple, thus more readily delivered to the public than abstruse calculations of deterrence. However, it was vulnerable to several counter-arguments. The most obvious one was that even by the standards of a government committed to saving money wherever possible, it was sheer folly to balance the relatively modest financial benefit of free missiles against a foreign nation being able to use the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom for purposes which might lead to the annihilation of the British people.

Even taking the argument on its own terms, it had serious deficiencies. As is so often the case with calculations of defence expenditure, no-one could agree how much it actually would cost to buy into cruise, and, as is also so often the case, projections of the costs varied enormously.

One writer for The Economist came up with a relatively conservative set of figures:

During the 1979 negotiations on stationing cruise in Europe, the Americans proposed, not unreasonably, that, if the Europeans wanted to own the missiles, they should pay
The entire programme will cost about $5 billion (in 1980 dollars). Infrastructure costs -- buildings, storage magazines, roads and the like -- are shared across the alliance by an agreed formula. If the missiles were financed by the same formula, it would cost Britain around 165m at current exchange rates. But, if the British were to buy them outright, the cost could range from at least 1300m to over 1500m. While that is not going to break a British defence budget of over 114 billion, it is not negligible.\footnote{43}

The defence correspondent of The Sunday Times demurred, and suggested a much less negligible figure:

Installing a dual key would be straightforward enough. Just as in the late 1950s we bought 60 Thor rockets from America -- the only actual missile ever based in Britain -- so, now, we might buy cruise, for around 11 billion.\footnote{44}

The Conservatives of course gave the least conservative estimate of all:

Defence Minister Michael Heseltine said Sunday on television that Britain had rejected the idea of dual control when cruise missiles were first discussed. He said existing safeguards were satisfactory and Britain would have to buy the cruise system at a cost of $1.5 billion to gain dual control.\footnote{45}

The financial argument cruise was widely regarded outside the Conservative party as being merely a political ploy. It certainly can be seen as an attempt to set the debate in terms which would steer clear of discussion of the whole notion of "joint decision."

The argument in favor of relying on the Anglo-American base agreement had a number of serious drawbacks when used in political debate. One was that it was literally intangible. The idea of direct physical control was simple and much more concrete. Another drawback was that since the agreement was largely secret, there was little that could
be said about it for public consumption. At least, that was what Conservatives claimed as they repeated the wording of the 1952 Churchill-Truman communique ad infinitum. Parliamentary exchanges such as the one following became commonplaces during the 1980s.

Mr. Cryer asked the Secretary of State for Defence, in the worst possible circumstances of a nuclear war, whether arrangements have been made for consultations with the United States of America on the use of cruise missiles in the few minutes available; and whether the United Kingdom government will have, at any stage of any nuclear confrontation, the inalienable, unqualified and unconditional right of veto over their use.

Mr. Pym: As I made clear again in yesterday's debate, the use of United States forces of the bases concerned in the United Kingdom would be a matter for joint decision between the two Governments in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. The bases may not be used without such a joint decision.

This deliberate refusal to explain thoroughly how the joint decision-making process would work lead to contradictory interpretations. Thus, the British newspaper, The Guardian carried what was for it an unusually optimistic view of a nuclear weapons issue. The editorial for November 6, 1983, noted this argument, as put forward by Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine:

[Heseltine] said, no British government could signal conditions which it might wish to impose since it was the essence of a deterrent strategy that such things should be hidden from the Russians. That might be taken as a hint that arrangements between the two governments are tighter than official statements have revealed -- but it is hardly substantial enough to deter those who want a dual key from continuing to advocate it.
The Economist, however, was a good deal more skeptical about the implications of the secrecy surrounding the Anglo-American agreements:

[The agreement] implies a British right of veto before launching and is apparently much tighter than the "Athens guidelines" governing American nuclear weapons on the territories of other NATO countries, which promises consultation "time and circumstances permitting." The problem is that the British public has to take it on trust that the Anglo-American agreement says what the government claims it does. Obsessed as usual with secrecy at any price, the British government has never publish the text. Unpublished, it can hardly be used as the basis of a campaign to make people pro-cruise. The poll seems to show either that the British public has never heard of the agreement, or that it does not believe it says what it is claimed to say. Mr Heseltine should see that it is published -- unless, after all, it is full of holes. 48

Though the publications drew wholly different inferences about what the secrecy meant, both commented on the severe limitation of the agreement in making the case against dual-key.

A third drawback was that while the Conservatives were trusting the United States for support in time of war, they were buying from that country the Trident missile system for use in exactly the circumstance of the United States failing to give its support. Conservatives trying to square the circle on that usually prefaced their remarks with a good deal of special relationship speechifying, then jumped over the contradiction into an impassioned explanation of why the United Kingdom required an independent deterrent.

The Parliamentary debate on cruise was held on 31 October was a typically boisterous affair, particularly as
it was held in the wake of the invasion of Grenada by the United States. This event was held by many to demonstrate the impotence of the Conservative government to influence the nation which was supposed to be so special to the United Kingdom. Despite the depth of feeling in the country in favor of dual key, the Conservatives survived the debate unscathed. Conservative members of Parliament did not break ranks to vote in favor of dual-key and as the Labor party was committed to a unilateralist platform, it was not prepared to support it either. Only twenty-two votes were cast for dual-key, all from MPs of the Social Democratic and Liberal parties.

The debate within the United Kingdom was only half of the story, of course. The other half lay with the Americans. Two main sources of information are available regarding American attitudes. One is the glut of official documents generated by Congress, particularly from Congressional committees. The other is the policymakers themselves.

The main problem in dealing with the documents is that, for the purpose of this thesis, the most pertinent material has been deleted on security grounds. However, some interesting points do emerge, particularly from a comparative reading of a number of documents.

Authority to Order the Use of Nuclear Weapons, prepared by the Congressional Research Service in 1975 from non-
classified sources, is a good starting point. It states quite unambiguously that the President of the United States has sole authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, but adds that he may delegate this authority "virtually without limitation" and that whether such delegations have been made is unknown. It goes on to say:

The President's authority to order the use of theater nuclear weapons in the event of a war involving NATO, while subject to certain procedural arrangements, is similarly unlimited.

It goes on to refer to an agreement to "consult" with NATO allies and to emphasize that in any event, the President will control U.S. theater nuclear forces even after they have been assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR -- NATO's highest ranking military officer). This last, peculiar arrangement can be effected because SACEUR is always an American officer (specifically, he is the U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe) and so under the direct authority of the President. The analysis surmises:

While a factor the President would undoubtedly consider, the agreement to consult hardly constitutes a constraint on his authority; more accurately, the obligation would serve to influence the President's policy decision. There is little reason to doubt that the President would consult with the heads of government of the NATO allies if such consultations were not considered prejudicial to the national interest, including the protection of America and allied forces.

In neither the section about the United States nor that about the United Kingdom, is there any mention of any bilateral arrangement regarding nuclear weapons or base
use. Final authority for the British deterrent is said to lie with the Prime Minister and the study goes on to explain how British nuclear weapons are committed to NATO.

There are several striking points here. Nowhere is there any of the "joint decision" language which British governments emphasize. Britain is lumped together with the rest of NATO. Further, American consultation with NATO allies is regarded as being liable to certain qualifications. Finally, the lack of limitations on the President's authority is frequently repeated.

Other documents tend to repeat these points either singly or in various combinations. A typical example is another report by the Congressional Research Service, "The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces," prepared for the House Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East in 1980. The report notes:

Defense Minister Pym has indicated that the United Kingdom will have a degree of say in the authorization for use of the new systems. However, the precise implications of his statement are unclear.

Remarkably, in the midst of frequent use of the "joint decision" phrase, the CRS managed to find the sole occasion upon which a Conservative politician did not stick to that exact form of words.

If one has doubts about the quality of work done by the CRS, nevertheless, the records of hearings before the
Senate Armed Services Committee for the annual Defense Department appropriations include similar emphases in statements given by people closely involved with American and NATO defense matters. In 1978, Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert stated:

Theater nuclear forces are responsive to the direction of the political authorities...only the President can authorize their use, and that would be done only after consultation with our NATO allies.  

McGiffert omitted any reference to a bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom and went on to explain the Athens Guidelines and how the consultation required by them was qualified by time and circumstance. In 1982, General Bernard Rogers, then U.S. Commander in Chief, Europe, replied to a query by Senator Goldwater, "The ultimate authority, Senator, is the President or the Prime Minister for their own weapons." He then went on to give a very brief description of the NATO arrangements for release of nuclear weapons, failing to mention Anglo-American nuclear arrangements, despite his immediately prior reference to the British Prime Minister.

The British press were on several occasions able to pose direct questions to present and past American policymakers. The main areas of interest were specifically how the Americans interpreted the "joint decision" formula and whether it was even still possible in 1983 to acquire the dual-key system so long after it had been rejected.
The Times reported that American officials, from the distant vantage point of Washington, were expressing bland surprise that there was anything to debate. Interestingly, while British politicians were proclaiming that the Churchill-Truman accord was special, a State Department official was lumping all the Europeans together.

Agreed procedures have been established within the alliance, in the event it should become necessary to consider the use of nuclear weapons [and] have proved fully satisfactory to successive allied governments... 

All European NATO nations except the UK fall under the rubric of the Athens Guidelines, which agrees how the United States would consult its allies if it wished to release nuclear weapons from their territory. Yet the British government did not refer to the Guidelines, since these allow only for "consultation," rather than the "joint decision" supposedly mandated by the Anglo-American agreement. Whether the State Department official was merely speaking in general terms, or had let slip that the true American attitude was to treat all Europeans equally, can only be a matter for conjecture. 

The Reagan administration publically agreed with the Thatcher government's reading of the 1952 document and both gave as their reason for not going into too much detail over the exact nature of the decision-making procedure that the Soviet Union had to be kept ignorant of such matters.
Hence the following exchange between President Reagan and a British television journalist:

Mr. Suchet. Mr. President, a major issue in the British general election is the basing of American cruise missiles in Britain. Mrs. Thatcher has said in Parliament that she has received an explanation from you as to who will be in control of firing these missiles, but you, as yet, have said nothing publicly. Would you tell the British people who now is ultimately in control of firing these missiles, you or Mrs. Thatcher?

The President. Well, let me say that we will -- I don't think either one of us will do anything independent (sic) of the other. This constitutes a sort of veto power, doesn't it? But we have an understanding about this and would never act unilaterally with any of our allies on this.

Mr. Suchet. I think the British people are very concerned about the basing of these missiles in their own country. Perhaps they deserve to be all the more so, since you seem reluctant to say that the power to fire them does not rest with you.

The President. Well, they can rest assured. But my reluctance to say anything is based on the fact that we get dangerously into the area of telling others not friendly to us what our policies might be. And I don't think we should do that.

While the British and the American governments of the day were busily broadcasting their interpretation of the words "a matter for joint decision," the British journalist David Henshaw was finding a very different interpretation amongst former members of past American administrations. Henshaw began with Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger's interpretation of the phrase:

[Churchill and Truman] issued a communique: the use of nuclear bases in Britain was to be "a matter for joint decision." Yes, but what if there were no "joint decision"? Would Britain have a veto? "The communique," said Mr. Weinberger, "speaks for itself. I don't think it would
serve any purpose, nor would it be very helpful to you, in trying to elaborate on words that are perfectly clear."

He then went on to ask several former top American officials if they thought that the agreement gave the United Kingdom a veto. He began with Lucius Battle, who, as senior aide to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, helped draw up the deal.

So what does Lucius Battle think "a matter for joint decision" actually means? "I haven't the slightest idea... Each side perhaps believes, sees, views the agreement as exactly what he was trying to get... it's part of diplomacy in a way." And did the Americans think they'd given a veto to the British? "No, absolutely not." Even of nuclear weapons based on British soil? "No." 56

This was also the opinion of one of Battle's contemporaries, Eugene Zuckert, Assistant US Air Force Secretary at the time the agreement was made.

And it was Mr Zuckert who, in the end, came up with a metaphor which left little room for ambiguity. "My feeling is that a 'joint decision' would mean that a one-one tie would be construed in favor of the Americans. In other words, it was not a veto." 57

Other policymakers expressed similar views.

No American politician I spoke to thinks it gives Britain a veto over the use of the bases: according to Paul Warnke, who was Assistant Secretary of Defence under President Johnson, it's doubtful if most people in the Pentagon even know that the agreement exists. Robert McNamara, who had seven years in charge of Defence in the Sixties, said: "I don't conceive of it as a veto, no. I think 'consultation' means a discussion... with the party having the final authority -- in this case the US -- making the final decision." James Schlesinger, Richard Nixon's Defence Secretary, is a little more flexible: but in the end, do we have a veto? "I think it comes close to be a veto -- but the intention is that there be an intimate consultation." Not the same thing as a veto? "It is, if there is time available." The trouble with crises, of course, is that, invariably, time is rarely available." 58
Henshaw then went on to ask how the agreement had been reached and to what end.

Certainly the Americans wanted Churchill to feel that -- as Lucius Battle puts it -- he'd had "a good visit." As to what the agreement on the American bases really meant to each side, there was considerable ambiguity. "I don't believe that either side wished to mislead," says Battle. "I think both sides felt they had got as far as they could in emphasizing the need for consultation, joint decision...if at all possible."59

Finally, Henshaw refers to an event which, in his view, completely destroyed any claim the 1952 agreement has to giving the British government a veto.

...three weeks after it [the communique] was announced the American Assistant Secretary of State Jack McFall, told Congress: "The talks were not in any sense negotiations towards final and binding decisions on the part of either government." The man taking over as British ambassador in Washington at the time of the Churchill-Truman agreement was Sir Roger Makin -- now Lord Sherfield. He couldn't recall the McFall announcement but, given the lack of faith that announcement suggested, how substantial did he think the 30-year-old agreement was today? "I think binding agreements dealing with matters of national security are very difficult to come by and not perhaps wholly to be relied upon."60

Simon Duke has also argued that the Americans do not see the 1952 agreement (or similar agreements with other NATO partners) as constituting a veto. He also quotes former Secretary of Defence James R. Schlesinger:

Such consultation procedure does not imply any actual inhibition on the capability of the United States to operate the [nuclear] systems.61

He also points out that when the USSR seemed poised to intervene in the Yom Kippur war, the USA put its forces on Def Con III without consulting any of its allies. The
British were told one hour after the decision was made. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defence at the time, later admitted there had been time for "consultation and discussion." Henry Kissinger's hindsight is even more chilling: "We could not have accepted a judgement different from our own."

Thus, the weight of evidence is against the 1952 agreement being construed by the United States as a veto. Reagan and Weinberger refused to give an unequivocal assurance that the United Kingdom could indeed positively veto the use of cruise or the American bases in the UK. Other officials gave the unequivocal assurance that the United Kingdom did not hold a veto.

As for dual-key control over cruise, it seems likely that the Reagan administration was no longer offering it by 1983. The evidence here is circumstantial. David Henshaw suggests that the offer was withdrawn:

Given the apparent desire of the British public to have a similar safeguard for cruise (according to the polls) -- and given that Jimmy Carter's administration had offered dual key four years ago -- I asked Mr Weinberger if the offer still stood. As Christopher Wain suggested recently in THE LISTENER, it doesn't look like it. "The arrangement that we have," said the Secretary of Defence, "has always been considered completely satisfactory to both countries." So was he saying, in effect, we couldn't now buy a dual key? "I'm always worried about questions that start out 'Are you saying, in effect?' What I'm saying is what I've just said."
Also, The New York Times reported that Secretary of State George Schultz, on a visit to the United Kingdom in 1983, had "brushed the idea aside."\textsuperscript{65}

Indeed, from the American perspective, why should dual-key still have been available? The issue had been settled in 1979. To encourage hope of dual-key in 1983 would have been giving aid and comfort to Prime Minister Thatcher's enemies (inside and outside the Conservative party) and needlessly stirring up trouble in NATO at a time when maintaining a united front was essential.
CONCLUSION

The special relationship was characterized in chapter one as having three defining features. These were a common culture, shared strategic interests, and an informality in handling relations. The informal diplomacy permitted base agreements which were quickly drawn up and implemented and perceived by both parties as in their mutual strategic interest of containing potential Soviet expansion. The common culture made the presence of the US servicemen less of an intrusion than they might otherwise have been. Many of the British tended not to perceive them as truly "foreign" in the way that they perceived their fellow Europeans. The special relationship was absolutely essential to America being able to build up its forces in the UK so rapidly and to such a large size.

However, from the British perspective one major problem emerged with the special relationship in the decade after the end of the Second World. As John Baylis observes:

Despite the 1948 modus vivendi, atomic energy clearly stood out against the web of inter-dependency which was being woven between the two states at this time. The British thus went ahead with their own nuclear programs, while using the informal diplomacy of the special
relationship in their attempts to restore that relationship to its wartime status of closeness in nuclear matters.

The special relationship eventually permitted a solution to this problem and one which is unique in recent history. The solution was (and is) a quid pro quo in which the British received the nuclear technology they needed for their strategic interests and the Americans received the bases they needed for their strategic interests. This trade-off depends ultimately on successive British governments believing that the possession of a strategic nuclear deterrent is absolutely essential for Britain's survival. It also depends on the two nations perceiving their strategic interests as being broadly convergent. The informal diplomacy has made the handling of the quid pro quo relatively simple. The executive branches of both nations could largely circumvent their respective legislatures by relying on agreements that lacked the status of treaties. The governments could also rely on that style of diplomacy to ensure that the profound differences in interests which did and do exist need not be emphasized in political relations between the nations and that when disagreements do occur, they are quickly left behind.

Successive British and American governments have believed that the quid pro quo has yielded substantial benefits. The British can point to the purchase of strategic delivery systems and emphasize that these are
independent in the one sense that British governments deem
paramount: Britain ultimately has sole and complete control
over their use. The Americans have their bases and a
minimum of British control over their operational use, as
contrasted with the troubles which have arisen over bases
in, for instance, Spain and Greece.

Outside the nuclear arena, the *guid pro quo*
relationship holds good, too. The British gained crucial
American assistance during the Falklands war and later
reciprocated by allowing the Americans to bomb Libya from
the UK and by doing so in a most public manner. Each nation
helped the other in the face of certain damage to its other
interests. There is also an unusually high degree of
cooperation in the intelligence field.

One crucial reason why *guid pro quo* has remained a
guide to action for so long is that in each country there
are well-established bipartisan policies with regard to the
other country. The unspoken agreement between Conservative
and Labor party leaders that Britain requires a nuclear
deterrent has led to an equally tacit agreement that the
agreements on bases must be allowed to stand. This has
overruled both nationalist sentiment within the
Conservative party and unilateralist sentiment within the
Labor party, either of which might have threatened the
American bases. Since there tends to be more of a consensus
in American politics regarding foreign policy, it is not
surprising to see Reagan following the lead of Carter in supplying Trident. Finally, we must not underestimate the personal factor, in that many of the Presidents and Prime Ministers have struck up very good friendships despite the inevitable large differences in their backgrounds. Kennedy and Macmillan are perhaps the most striking pair in this respect. This friendship and that of Reagan and Thatcher no doubt smoothed the way for the sales of Polaris and Trident, respectively.

Why, then, did the Thatcher government resist extremely strong popular support for a dual-key for cruise? There are several answers to this. One is that it had the political will and ability to do so. As a strong government with a large majority facing a divided opposition, there could have been little doubt about its ability to prevail, particularly once the dissenting backbenchers had been put in their place. Beyond that, the other answers are all bound up with the special relationship.

The dual-key was probably not being offered by the Reagan administration. It is entirely possible that it was never really offered at all and that the issue of control was settled at Guadaloupe, with the subsequent deliberations by NATO committees merely rubber-stamping this decision. The Thatcher government would hardly have desired the Anglo-American discord and the domestic
humiliation which would have resulted from asking for something which was not available.

Even if the dual-key had been available, asking for it would have created other problems at the same time that it would have quieted public concern over cruise. Having dual-key for cruise would inevitably have led to even more questions about control over other American nuclear delivery systems based in the United Kingdom. It might have become the thin edge of the wedge, leading to more pressure for more control over the American systems and hence to increasingly strained relations with the United States. Further, if the United Kingdom had asked for dual-key, other NATO allies would have very likely done so too, and that would also have led to increasingly strained relations with the United States. Strained relations, arising from whatever source, were to be assiduously avoided at a time when the United Kingdom was in the process of buying Trident, its next generation deterrent, from the United States.

As for the parallel issue of control over the bases, it seems highly likely that the United Kingdom does not have an effective veto over their use. The United States could use those bases in a manner not congruent with the interests of the host nation. However, the Thatcher government was no doubt well aware that such an act by the Americans would be both unlikely and difficult to carry
out. The special relationship is predicated on the belief that the two nations have highly congruent strategic interests. Hence, independent action by one nation to the detriment of the other has been a rare occurrence and this is likely to hold true for the immediate future. The presence of British personnel at Greenham Common, for instance, would make it difficult for the Americans to operate the cruise units if the British were ordered to prevent them from doing so. Finally, it seems that the Thatcher government, in adhering to the base use agreements as drawn up in 1952, was maintaining the continuity of British policy in favor of keeping an independent deterrent and relegating the issue of base use to second place.
NOTES


3 Kissinger 90.


5 Dimbleby and Reynolds 255.


7 Nicholas 176.


11 Baylis, 40.


13 Duke 31.

14 Campbell 30.

15 Baylis 41.

16 Duke 31.

17 Henshaw 3.
18 Duke 66.
19 Duke 68.
24 Campbell 56.
26 Baylis 96.
30 Callaghan 556.
31 Newhouse 327.
32 Newhouse 327.
33 Newhouse 325.


44 Connell 16.


53 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1983, pt. 7, p. 4334.


56 Henshaw 2.

57 Henshaw 4.

58 Henshaw 4.

59 Henshaw 3.

60 Henshaw 3.

61 Duke 172

62 Duke 165.

63 Duke 165.

64 Henshaw 4.


66 Baylis 207.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

BRITAIN


UNITED STATES


SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS


ARTICLES


Colin James Donald