The Indian trade in colonial Virginia

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THE INDIAN TRADE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA
1584 - 1725

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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Mary Miley Theobald
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Approved, January 1980

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PREFACE

THE VIRGINIA INDIAN TRADE, 1584-1725

A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Historians of the Indian trade have traditionally focused their attention on the French fur trade of Canada and the Mississippi River, the activities of Hudson's Bay Company, and the events in the Pacific Northwest. Those who studied the colonial American Indian trade concentrated on New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, where trade was of vital importance from the founding of those colonies to the Revolutionary War.

The pre-Revolutionary Indian trade of the southern colonies is a topic that has been overlooked. With the exception of Werner Crane's The Southern Frontier (1928), little on this subject was written until 1976 when John Reid's A Better Kind of Hatchet was published. Reid's legal training allowed him to provide a fresh analysis of the South Carolina trade with the Cherokees and its role in the collision of English and Indian cultures.

Crane and Reid focused, however, on the Carolina Indian trade and mentioned the Virginia trade only in passing. On the specific topic of the Virginia Indian trade, there are only three articles: A.J. Morrison's "The Virginia Indian Trade to 1673" (1921), W. Stitt Robinson's "Virginia and the Cherokee Indians" (1964), and W. Neil
Franklin's "Virginia and the Cherokee Indian Trade" (1932); and one × thesis: Shirley-Virginia Parrish's "Fur and Skin Trade of Colonial Virginia" (1972). Morrison's article is of little value. The articles by Robinson and Franklin are excellent, but the time period that they cover is later than that of this paper, and both authors limited their discussions to the Cherokees.

Parrish's thesis makes a good contribution to the economics of the fur and skin trade. She did not choose to examine the Indian trade as a whole, but rather limited her topic to the detailed discussion of one aspect of the Indian trade, the trade in furs and skins. Therefore, she described the techniques of hunting and trapping, the preparation of furs, the complexities of export duties, customs fees, taxes, and fur values, and speculated as to the reasons for market fluctuation.

Other books and articles of significant value to this thesis include Alvord and Bidgood's The First Exploration of the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians (1912). This book remains the authoritative treatment of the explorations that preceded the establishment of permanent trade relations in colonial Virginia. Erich Isaac's "Kent Island" series in the Maryland Historical Magazine (1957) is the most complete account of William Claiborne and the Kent Island trade.

The importance of this topic lies in the correlation between the Indian trade and the establishment and growth of England's first American colony. Although Murray Lawson concludes that the Indian trade was of no real importance to the English or the American economy, the evidence suggests otherwise. His statement that fur exports from the thirteen colonies comprised less than 1% of the total value of all
colonial exports to England does not take into account that the colonies themselves annually consumed roughly the same number of skins and furs they exported. Computing the export figures for all thirteen colonies is also misleading. Some colonies hardly participated in the Indian trade, while others, notably New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, found that the trade was vital to their economic prosperity.

The southern colonies found themselves, at least initially, more dependent upon the Indian trade than their neighbors to the north. For the earliest Virginia settlers, the trade was a matter of survival. Englishmen were trading trinkets for food even before the first settlement had been planted. In the 1630s, after the colonists had been weaned from food to furs, the Indian trade became a major revenue source along the York, Rappahannock, and Potomac Rivers and on the Eastern Shore. In the second half of the seventeenth century, the Indian trade and tobacco remained the two main industries of Virginia. Despite the trade's decline in the eighteenth century, fur and skin exports still ranked third in importance after tobacco and beef.

Although Virginia would never depend upon the Indian trade to the same degree as did South Carolina, the trade contributed heavily to Virginia's early growth. The lure of potential trade profits was the motivation behind virtually all of Virginia's exploring expeditions. Many storekeepers and merchants in the colony profited from the trade. The wealth of several of Virginia's most prominent families was based on the Indian trade. In addition, the trade played a major
role in Bacon's Rebellion and in the many Indian wars and uprisings
that had such an impact upon the young colony."

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Virginia Indian
trade as a whole and to note the changes that took place on both
sides in the methods of trade, the articles being traded, and the
people who conducted the trade, during Virginia's early colonial
years.
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THE INDIAN TRADE IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA, 1584-1725
CHAPTER I

THE INDIAN TRADE AND ENGLISH MERCANTILISM

In July 1584 Captains Philip Amadas and Arthur Barlowe dropped anchor inside the chain of islands that lie along the North American coast at the 36th parallel. Sent by Sir Walter Raleigh to explore the relatively uncharted new continent, the sailors scouted the area for three days before they encountered their first native. Persuading him to come aboard, the English "gave him a shirt, a hatte, some other things and made him taste of our wine and our meate, which he liked very well." In return the Indian caught a canoe full of fish which he piled on the beach for the sailors. Not a particularly significant event in itself, this episode marks the first recorded instance of the English-Indian trade, a trade that would continue for nearly two hundred years.

The first Englishmen to grasp the importance of trade with the New World natives were two influential cousins who shared the name of Richard Hakluyt. Both men's primary concern was the commercial prosperity of England. Building from the widely-accepted theory that a national economy had to be entirely independent of foreign imports to be successful, the Hakluyts sought to spread the message that the way to attain self-sufficiency was through colonial empire. Colonies could produce what England could not, lessening her economic dependence upon
other countries. It was thought that the more tropical areas of the
New World would become a source for such items as sugar, tropical
fruits, figs, wine, silk, olive oil, and cloth dyes, all of which were
now imported. Like everyone else, the Hakluyts hoped that gold and
silver might also be discovered, but their emphasis remained on a
vigorous trade, with the natives playing an integral role. The elder
Hakluyt nurtured hopes for an increasingly profitable native market,
effecting that the civilizing influence of English culture would over­
come any initial limitations of Indian purchasing capacity. Essential
to this was the conversion of the Indians not only to English religion
but to English dress and to an economy that would produce acceptable
trade goods to exchange for English cloth.

Woolen cloth was England's staple and the need to extend its
markets was an important factor in English expansion from as early as
the middle of the sixteenth century. Domestic economy depended greatly
upon the prosperity of the woolen industry, and this industry was in
the midst of a serious decline. The pressing need to develop new
markets for woolens, especially the coarser types of cloth for which
there was a limited European market, was foremost in the Hakluyts'
Minds. "The savages ... are greatly delighted with any cappe or
garment made of course wollen clothe, their Contrie beinge colde and
sharpe in the winter ... especially of our coursest and basest
northerne doosens and our Irishe and Welshe frizes, and rugges: whereby
all occupations belonging to clothinge and knittinge shalbe freshely
sett on worke." 2

It was also important that information be obtained about dye-stuffs
and dyeing methods in order to lessen England's dependence upon imported
dyes. While England was amply supplied with greens and yellows, she depended on imports for the blue dyes and vegetable oils used in the dyeing process. The situation was made more serious by the fact that the principal source of these products was Spain, whose politics, wealth, and Catholicism helped make her England's chief rival.

In his *Discourse on Western Planting* (1584), the younger Hakluyt listed furs as one of the immediate potential profit-making endeavors in the New World. A trip to Paris in 1583 gave him a clear notion of just how profitable the trade could be. In his report to Sir Francis Walsingham, who had sent him to collect information on French activities in Canada, he wrote that he had seen "in one mans house . . . the value of five thousand crowns worth of furres, as sables, bevers, otters and other sorts," and had been informed by the same gentleman that he had handled a like quantity the year before. Similar experiences led him to adopt his cousin's ideas on the feasibility of using furs to offset the initial costs of establishing overseas colonies. "Hides," wrote the elder man in a pamphlet entitled "Inducements to the liking of the voyage intended towards Virginia" (1585), would, with the profits from whaling and fishing, "presently defray the charge in good part or in all of the first enterprise."

Furs fitted neatly into the Hakluyt economic plan to reduce England's dependence upon foreign imports. Though the market for furs had fallen from its peak during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, the dwindling number of furbearing animals in England's own forests could not satisfy demand. Poland, Flanders, and more recently Russia were the sources of the furs used by the wealthy to line or trim their clothing. Finished products, like the felt hats, or "Dutch beavers,"
worn by both men and women, had to be imported as well, for until the
seventeenth century the English lacked the skills necessary to produce
them. The opening of trade with Russia was England's most recent
attempt to acquire both furs and new markets for her woolen cloth.
The trade began in 1555 with the chartering of the Muscovy Company by
Queen Mary and led an irregular existence until the company's termin-
ination in 1669. As many as seventeen ships a year were sent to Russia
for furs and naval stores, but in many years no ships at all made the
voyage. Dutch competition was largely to blame for the decline. The
Dutch, who would lose the struggle with the English for the American
fur trade, gained the upper hand in their earlier clash over the
Russian trade.

However, in the New World it was neither the English nor the Dutch
who pioneered and dominated the fur trade, but the French. Every summer
since the early 1550s, fishing barques had come by the hundreds from
St. Malo, Rouen, Dieppe, La Rochelle, and Le Havre to fish for cod on
the Newfoundland banks and to hunt whales in the lower St. Lawrence.
An informal but lucrative trade with the natives developed when the
fishermen went ashore to dry their catch. The Frenchmen soon learned
that it was far easier and a great deal more profitable to trade for furs
than to fish for a living, and by 1580 ships were crossing the Atlantic
for the sole purpose of trade. Almost overnight New France became
synonymous with furs and fortunes. Englishmen began to look with envy
on France's seemingly limitless source of wealth and to plan ways to
secure a portion of it for themselves. The fur trade was therefore
one of several potentially profitable colonial ventures simmering in the
minds of those Englishmen who, like the Hakluys, had an eye on the
future.
Though neither Richard Hakluyt would ever travel to the New World, both were very much involved in England's first American colonial endeavor, Sir Walter Raleigh's settlement at Roanoke. Their writings influenced every level of Elizabethan society, from the queen and her court on down, but the younger man's attempt to secure royal financial backing for the project met with failure. He did manage to win the queen's interest, however, and her verbal support of the ill-fated colony may have opened some gentle purses.

The many incidents of successful trade with the natives recounted in the Roanoke publications strengthened Hakluyt's belief in the lucrative future of the Indian trade. In his "Discourse on the first voyage," Arthur Barlowe told of receiving twenty skins, worth about a crown a piece in London, for a tin dish which the chief's brother hung around his neck. A copper kettle brought fifty skins. The English also gave hatchets, axes, and knives in return for food which the chief had delivered daily.

Thomas Hariot, whose "Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia" chronicled the voyage of 1585, wrote of vast herds of deer and noted that deerskins could "be had of the naturall inhabitants thousands yeerely by way of trafficke for trifles."

The Roanoke accounts are the first English documents to suggest the existence of a pre-European Indian trade. The coastal tribes of North America had been carrying on a far-reaching exchange with tribes further inland for centuries. Hariot observed that many of the natives wore "diverse small plates of copper that had been made, as we understood, by the inhabitantes that dwell further into the countrey," probably in the region of Lake Superior. John Smith's entry for July 24, 1608 in the Generall Historie of Virginia reveals that the
Tockwogh Indians already possessed "many hatchets, knives, pieces of iron and brasse ..." which they reported to have from the Sasquesahannahocks, a mightie people," who in turn probably received them indirectly from the French. Another Virginia settler in 1610 recorded having seen as many as 4,000 deerskins "pyled up in one wardroabe of Powhatan," the Pamunkey chief. Since the English colonists were trading solely for food at that time, it is almost certain that these deerskins were part of a native network that traded skins and furs northward along the coast to New France. There is no doubt that the Virginia Indians were eager to expand their trade to include the newly-arrived English who possessed such a vast array of desirable goods.

The most desirable of these goods was copper. The Roanoke chroniclers had noticed the Indians' enthusiasm for this metal -- Barlowe in his mention of the exchange of a copper kettle for fifty skins, and Hariot with his comment on the copper jewelry procured with considerable effort from great distances. More than twenty years later, John Smith made much the same observation about copper ornaments. "Their manner of trading is for copper, beads, and such like," he remarked. Quickly applying his new knowledge, he purchased for "a proportion of copper" an entire Indian town, already cleared and located on a hill, for an English settlement.

Powhatan tried to establish a private monopoly of the copper trade by buying up all he could, hoarding most of it himself, and selling small amounts to neighboring tribes for what the outraged English claimed was a hundred times its value. Instructions from the Virginia Company of London to Governor Gates in 1609 demonstrate that even London was aware of the Indians' attraction to copper. The Company suggested
a trade alliance with the tribes west of Powhatan. Since the wily chief "hath hitherto engrossed" all the copper in the immediate vicinity, other tribes, presumably as anxious for copper, were likely to be good trade prospects.

The items traded to the Indians in these early years of informal and unorganized barter fall into two general categories, utilitarian and ornamental. Utilitarian items such as hoes, knives, hatchets, and kettles were quickly substituted for existing Indian equivalents. Because they were simply more efficient versions of familiar tools, they were easily assimilated into Indian cultural patterns. The same was true of the ornamental trade goods, such as copper jewelry and belts and glass items—"such like trash," according to John Smith.

Glass was highly prized by the Indians, particularly in the form of beads. The colonists came to the early realization that they stood in great need of such things for trade purposes and went to considerable lengths to procure them. A glasshouse was deemed the solution for both the local Indian trade needs and English pressures to develop a marketable product. In John Smith's somewhat desperate letter of 1608 begging the Company for "carpenters, husbandmen, gardiners, fisher men, blacksmiths, masons, and diggers up of trees," he also recommended that the governors "send into Germany or Poleland for glasse-men."

Perhaps in response to that recommendation, Captain Christopher Newport arrived later in the year with eight Dutchmen and Poles, at least some of whom were intended to staff the glasshouse. The venture evidently achieved some initial success and Captain Newport carried back with him a sample of their first attempts to show to Company officials. No doubt this encouraged those in England who hoped the colony would
eventually export raw glass to England. But their hopes were dashed, for the fledgling industry did not get off the ground. Nothing more is heard of the project until 1621 when the Virginia Company began efforts to revive it.

In that year the Company contracted with Captain William Norton who, in return for transporting to Virginia at his own expense four Italian glassmakers, was to be granted a seven-year monopoly, 400 acres of land, and all supplies and equipment for himself, his family, and his crew. The Company expected Norton to construct the glasshouse within three months after his arrival and to "make all manner of Beads & Glasse and to content themselves with the one halfe, and the other halfe of their labours to be the Companies." Not only did the Company want half of their labor, it wanted its half to include all of the beads. Noting that beads were "the matter of Trade with the Indians" and that "the Comoditie of Beads was like to proue the verie Coyne of that Country," the Company ruled that the governor and Council could "proporcon what quantytie of Beads they shall thinke requisite to be made from time to time."

Shortly after the contract was drawn up, the Company, financially unable to fulfill its promises, was forced to reconsider its offer. Private subscribers were found to underwrite most of the costs, the deal was renegotiated, and Norton set sail with his men and supplies that summer.

This auspicious start belied the future. Shortly after the furnace was constructed Norton died. The Italian workmen, colorfully described by one disgruntled colonist who remarked that "a more damned crew hell never vomited," became wholly intractable and clamored to go home.
However, it is unlikely that they did, for the glasshouse seems to have produced some finished pieces for the Indian trade after all.

While the Indians showed a preference for "Copper, Beades, and Hatchets," the colonists' attention was riveted on food. They were especially eager to trade for corn and game which they could not or would not supply for themselves. John Smith considered the Indians' "victualls . . . their chiefest riches." He was only one of many early settlers who repeatedly loaded up with packs of copper, glass beads, knives, and hatchets and set out to trade for provisions. In 1607 Smith swapped Powhatan "a pound or two or blew beades" for 200-300 bushels of corn, and later a copper kettle for 80 bushels.

Despite the apparent inequality of such trades to sixteenth-century English and twentieth-century perceptions, there is no evidence that the Indians were any less convinced than the English that they had made an exceptional bargain. One constant characteristic of the Indian trade was that its participants considered their own trade goods quite common and those they received rare and valuable treasures. The European valued furs altogether beyond what the Indians could comprehend, for they were obtained with no great expenditure of time or effort.

Similarly, Powhatan quickly realized that the English were ignorant of the "true value" of copper which he was able to purchase and re-sell at fantastic profits. This relativism characterized every trade contact between Europeans and Indians. "Each gave to the other something that he valued lightly, and received in return something that he valued highly, and each felt a keen contempt for the stupid taste of the other."

An increasing number of English preferred to disregard even such a favorable rate of exchange. Buoyed by their superior weaponry and
sustained by their ethnocentricity, they soon replaced the barter method with a technique more akin to extortion. "Give us foure hundred baskets full of Corne otherwise we [will] breake all [your] boats and burne [your] houses and corne and all," they demanded.

Tensions mounted as foraging expeditions to nearby towns and punitive raids on those who refused to comply with the colonists' demands increased. Henry Spelman complained in 1609 that the Indians were dealing "deceitfully by pulling or bearinge upp the bottom of their baskets with their hands soe that ye lesse corne might serve to fill them." In the ensuing quarrel, Captain Ratcliffe and most of his men were killed. Intensified retaliation was the result and most Indians simply moved further west out of range. Powhatan himself withdrew to a more remote town further inland on the Chickahominy River. Killing and burning by the settlers had become so frequent that by 1609 no Englishman was safe outside Jamestown fort. But the desire of trade was strong enough to suppress their mutual hostility, so the trade continued amid intermittent outbreaks of violence on both sides.

Now that the Indian villages were no longer within easy reach of Jamestown, the colonists found it necessary to travel farther to trade, usually by water. Occasionally the natives sought out the colonists to trade for food when Indian provisions ran low, but generally the white settler went among the Indians, and by now his interests had expanded beyond mere food. One of the first colonists, William Strachey, described in his Historie of Travaile into Virginia Britannia (1612) just what one could expect on a trading expedition:

They are much desirous of our commodites and therefore when any of our boates arrive before their townes, they will come downe unto us, or suffer us to come up into their
howses, and demaund after copper, white beads, howes
to pare their cornefields, and hatchetts, for which
they will give us of such things as they have in
exchaung, as deere skins, furrs of the wildcatt, black
fox, beaver, otter, arachoune [raccoon], fowle, fish,
dear or beare's flesh dried, or dear's suet made up
handsomely in cakes, their country corre, peas, beanes,
and such like. . . .33

Ralph Hamor's 1614 discourse described a trading session at the
conclusion of a peace treaty where "Venison, Turkies, Freshfish,
baskets, mats, . . . Skinnes, boules, and tobacco" were traded to
the English by the Indians. Though the English would remain interested
in food for several years, by 1610 their attention began to shift to a
product that was immensely more profitable—deerskins and furs. That
this fur and skin trade developed almost immediately and was second only
to food is a measure of its significance to Europeans. Furs had proved
to be a source of tremendous profit to the French and the prospect of
cashing in on this lucrative trade enticed many of the colonists. The
Virginia Company's 1610 instructions recommended pursuing the trade
without delay. "Bever skynnes being taken in winter tyme will yield
good profit, the like will otter skynnes," they urged, although animals
trapped in Virginia's mild climate would yield less valuable furs than
those whose furs had grown thick during the long Canadian winters.

This overt interest in furs could have been prompted in part by
the younger Richard Hakluyt who was one of the adventurers in the re-
organized Virginia Company of 1609. Organizations, too, invested in the
Virginia Company, among them the Company of Skinners, the Company of
Leathersellers, the Company of Cordwayners (boot and shoemakers), and
the Company of Curriers (leather dressers). That these trade guilds
made any direct contribution to the management of the Virginia venture
is highly improbably. But it is not unlikely that they were prompted
to invest in an enterprise that, if successful, would bring direct benefits to their own trades.

Within ten years London sent an expanded list of desirable furs, adding sable, marten, wildcat, fox, lucern, and muskrat. The Company evinced no interest yet in deerskins, which would eventually dominate the English-Indian trade in the southern colonies.
CHAPTER II
ENGLISH TRADE REGULATIONS

An enterprise as profitable as the fur trade could not expect to remain unregulated for long. Lacking all but vague and inconsistent direction from London, each colony was left to manage its Indian affairs as it saw fit. The few orders that did come from London usually failed to conform to the colonists' views of the trade and could safely be circumvented on a technicality, if not completely ignored. But for the most part, the mother country was silent on the matter.

The history of the Indian trade is replete with attempts, both by individuals and by groups, to seize control of its operation. In Virginia, legislative efforts were frequently made to organize the trade and to channel its profits into certain proscribed endeavors. Half a dozen persons sought to acquire private monopolies during the years when the trade was at its height. But the various organizational forms that the Indian trade would assume over the century must not be seen solely as the result of English activity. The Indians, with their own monopolies, their struggles to maintain the lucrative middleman positions, and the timing of their decisions to make war and peace, were at least as influential in controlling the direction and nature of the trade as the English.
The first years of company rule were characterized by an informal and unorganized pattern of trade. Soon after the first settlers landed at Jamestown, their leaders set out on a number of expeditions to explore the surrounding countryside. Captain Christopher Newport and twenty-one others set sail within a week after their arrival to explore the James River. Newport paused at various Indian villages along the way, assuring the people as best he could of the friendship of the English. He visited as far west as the Monacans, whose villages were located some thirty miles above the falls, before returning to Jamestown fort.

The second expedition was led by Sir Thomas Dale. Immediately after reaching Virginia in May 1611 he set out with one hundred men to scout the territory along the Nansemond and the James Rivers to the falls. While the incurable optimists among them searched for gold mines, the more pragmatic kept an eye out for trade prospects. These were Company undertakings, of course, and any profits that accrued rightfully belonged to the Company's stockholders. But men had come to Virginia to make their fortunes and the distinction between Company property and private property blurred rapidly.

Sir Samuel Argall, deputy governor under Thomas West, Baron de la Warr, made what was probably the first attempt to monopolize the Indian trade. Laws had already been passed providing the death penalty for anyone making arms available to the natives. In 1618 Argall went a step further and prohibited all trade and "familiarity with the perfidious savages lest they discover our weakness." On the surface it appears the governor feared increasing contact with the Indians would lead them to the realization that the settlers were extremely vulnerable to attack. But the governor's contemporaries thought differently.
Returning colonists charged him with seizing control of the Indian trade by legislating his competition out of existence, and with using the Company frigate for personal gain. Argall had opened up the lucrative Potomac River trade several years before he was appointed governor. There, as early as 1609, he exchanged copper trinkets, white beads, hoes, knives, bells, scissors, and hatchets for deerskins and furs of wildcat, fox, beaver, otter, and raccoon, as well as for game and corn. While the food may have gone to sustain the colony's population, it seems that the profits from the furs and skins did not. This in itself was no more grave an offense than most other colonists committed and would not likely have aroused much comment. When Argall allegedly continued to trade in defiance of his own orders, however, the outcry was heard in London. Argall returned to England in 1619 to answer the accusations. With the help of his powerful friend, the Earl of Warwick, he managed to clear himself of all charges.

During these years, the Virginia Company was contemplating a plan to launch its own fur-trade monopoly. In 1621 it formed a fur-trading company as a subsidiary of the Virginia Company and backed it with substantial funds. Captain William Tucker and Henry Gates were employed as factors and sent to Virginia in the *Elianor* with £900 worth of trade goods. The two men never accounted for the merchandise.

The laws prohibiting trade were widely ignored after Argall's departure and they were tacitly annulled by the Virginia Company which sent its expanded list of desirable furs to Jamestown in 1620. By 1621 the colonists were employing Indians to hunt for furs and game, often supplying them with guns in order to accelerate the killing. The next year Governor Argall's warning took on the guise of a prediction. Opechancanough's "perfidious savages" attacked, killing one-fourth of
the settlers and causing the remaining nine hundred to flee to the vicinity of Jamestown for safety.

The uprising of 1622 dealt a severe blow to the burgeoning Indian trade, but not a fatal one by any means. By the 1620s the colonists were dealing with so many tribes that the slack in one area could readily be made up in another. While Opechancanough was making war on the James River settlements, the northern theatre was relatively quiet. Captain Ralph Hamor sailed to the Potomac and found white traders dealing peacefully with the Indians there. Shortly after the uprising, Governor Wyatt authorized expeditions into the bay for corn, and within two years a Dutch ship carried a cargo of furs from Virginia to Holland. John Pory, who in 1620 laid out the first Eastern Shore plantation, reported that during these years the Indian traders in the Chesapeake Bay numbered nearly one hundred.

In 1624 the king dissolved the Company for its shocking mismanagement of the colony and placed Virginia under his direct control. Sir Francis Wyatt continued in office as governor for two more years until he was replaced by Sir George Yeardley. This was Yeardley's third term as governor but his first under crown rule, and he no doubt noticed several changes. General supervision of the colony now fell under the Privy Council, a select group of noblemen who in turn ran colonial affairs through ad hoc committees. So it was that Yeardley received his first set of instructions from the Privy Council shortly before he embarked for Virginia to take up his post:

And that you may better avoid the Treachery of the Savages, and prevent such dangers as heretofore have fallen upon the Country, Wee strictly forbidd all persons whatsoever to receive into their houses the person of any
Indian or to parley, converse or trade with them, without the special licence and Warrant given to that purpose according to your Commission inflicting severe punishment upon the offenders. 48

These instructions represent the government's first efforts to regulate the Indian trade. Their intent was clear: in order to prevent future Indian attacks, the complete segregation of red man from white must be effected. To handle the necessary trade, the governor was to license only honest men whose dealings with the natives would be scrupulously fair. By awarding the governor the authority to grant the licenses, the Privy Council unwittingly increased both his power and income. The granting of licenses soon came to be an important mark of favor, seen as partial compensation for services rendered. It is not surprising that virtually all of the prominent traders were members of the governor's council.

Only twice did the Virginia lawmakers try to prohibit the Indian trade altogether. The first attempt, Governor Argall's law of 1618, was quietly disregarded by both the settlers and the Virginia Company; the second—similarly ineffective—was passed in 1676 while the Assembly was temporarily under the influence of Nathaniel Bacon and his hatred of all Indians. The remaining Indian trade legislation dealt with two principal concerns: who could trade and what could be traded.

The laws pertaining to the question of who could trade were, for the most part, thinly disguised attempts to seize control of the Indian trade. The issue was never permanently resolved—it merely took on new dimensions as power shifted or circumstances changed. One policy that seemed to please those in power, regardless of who they were, was the idea of gubernatorial control over trade licenses. Royal instructions to Yeardley in 1626 and Berkeley in 1641 had originally
called for such a policy, and similar laws were passed by the Virginia Assembly, with minor modifications, for the next six decades. Such laws did not satisfy the men who had neither contacts nor money enough to obtain a license, and many traded in violation of the acts.

The alleged need for such exclusionary laws was to protect both Englishmen and Indians from abuses. The act of 1661 is typical:

Whereas the frequent entrance of diverse ill minded, idle, and unskillfull people with the Indians filleth the people with rumours, disturbs the peace of the country, supplyeth the Indians with guns and ammunition and renders the trade and the government farr more dangerous then fruitful; Be it therefore enacted that no person hereafter shall trade with the Indians... unless he first obteine a commission from the governor who is desired to grant the same to none but persons of knowne integrity. 50

There was some truth in the allegation that unscrupulous traders exacerbated the usually strained relations with the Indians. However, it is worth noting that, without exception, those who wanted to exclude others from the trade justified their activities by claiming that restrictions would result in fewer abuses and better Indian relations. Uncontrolled trade, this argument ran, cheapened the value of trade goods in the eyes of the Indians and caused colonists to depend too much on trade rather than on their own cultivation for their food.

In March 1662 Virginians cited the serious damages done to those who "legally procure commissions from the governor," and used this line of reasoning to bar all non-Virginians, particularly the Marylanders, from trading with the Virginia Indians on the indisputable grounds that "they have alreadie done [it] to us." Similar logic supported the petition of May 1676 urging the king to bar the Dutch who "spoiled" 52 the trade. Again in 1675 the legislature employed this rationale when it transferred the power to issue licenses from the governor to
the county courts. William Byrd was only one of many individuals who argued that awarding him a monopoly would control trade abuses.

In 1645 a rather novel and more indirect means of managing the Indian trade was proposed. The Assembly called for the erection of three forts, "one at Pomunkey to be called Fort Royal; another at the Falls of the James River to be called Fort Charles, and the third on the Ridge of the Chiquohomine and to be called Fort James." The following March they added a fourth, to be "forthwith erected at the Falls of the said Appomattock River, nominated for Fort Henry" at the site of present-day Petersburg. This act was a direct result of Opechancanough's last uprising the year before and was designed to afford some protection to the settlers pushing west. Though the Indian trade is not mentioned in the statutes, the effect of the act was to create four centers of trade. These forts led directly, if unintentionally, to the organization of the trade and aided in its expansion to the west and south.

The logic of separating the colonists completely from the Indians and of permitting trade only at a few designated places obviously appealed to the colonists. The idea resurfaced eleven years later when the assembly gave legislative force to the de facto policy and passed an act "that no Indian come within our fenced plantations without a ticket from some person to be nominated on the head of each river where the Indians live . . . Any freeman," the law continued, was allowed "to repair to the said houses or Indian marts and to truck with the said Indians for any commodities not prohibited by the laws of this country."
This law remained in effect for twenty years. Then in June 1676 "Bacon's Assembly," led by men with decided anti-Indian biases, "utterly prohibited . . . all trade and commerce with Indians." As soon as the rebellion was put down, a new assembly acted to return the trade to its former status. At the same time they seized the opportunity to improve upon the concept of "marts or ffaires." "Forasmuch as the totall prohibition of tradeing with the Indians is experimented and found hurtfull and prejudiciall to his majestie's colony," the burgesses began, referring politely to the brief interlude of Bacon's control, regular marts or trade fairs were established. The legislation went on to list the locations and the dates that each county could hold its mart, and specified that they could "continue fforty dayes and noe longer."

The law was designed to facilitate the regulation and supervision of the Indian trade but it proved unsatisfactory. Though the assembly presumably had some control over the activities of the Virginia traders, it had no control over the Indians—a fact it failed to grasp for many years. The Indians did not understand the concept of the English fair, let alone why it should meet in April and September in one county and in May and October in another, if indeed they bothered to think about it at all. The law remained on the books for five years, but the fairs that were held, if any, were singularly unsuccessful.

England evinced little interest in her colony's efforts to regulate the Indian trade until the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century. For the next seventy-five years, the policy that emerged was simple and straightforward: encourage the expansion of the Indian trade by prohibiting the establishment of monopolies, for whatever reasons they were formed. To that end, Charles II directed in 1683 that the
trade be free and open to all. The order was repeated in 1705 and 1733. Though many were to try, no one was able to acquire monopolistic control of the trade.

The General Assembly found it even more difficult to limit what was traded than to limit who was to trade. One of the first laws passed in Virginia strictly prohibited the sale of arms or ammunition to the Indians on pain of death. This was also one of the first laws broken. Indians possessed firearms in 1617 and they probably obtained them even earlier. In spite of the dangers inherent in supplying arms to a potential enemy, some colonists could not resist the temptation. The assembly enacted a succession of laws over seventy-five years trying, without success, to stem the flow of weapons. An act of August 1633 threatened that "yf any person or persons shall sell or barter any gunns, powder, shott, or any arms or ammunition unto any Indian . . . the said person or persons shall forfeite to publique uses all the goods and chattells that he or they then have to theire owne use, and shall also suffer imprisonment duringe life."

A subsequent act of March 1643 grouped offenders into two categories. It provided the death penalty for runaway servants who might "carrie either peice, powder and shott, And leave either all or any of them with the Indians," while a free man was punished less severely, forfeiting his entire estate and "suffer[ing] imprisonment at the discretion of the Governor and Counsell." When some enterprising souls, caught trading guns to the Indians, managed to wriggle out of the charge on the grounds that they were lending, not selling, the weapons, the assembly moved to close the loophole.
Between 1659 and 1665 the "protectionists" who wished to prohibit the gun trade were temporarily defeated by the trading interests that lobbied for an open trade. The assembly observed that the presence of strict laws and stiff fines had not prevented some Virginians from furnishing the Indians with arms and ammunition. Regardless of how tightly the Virginians could have controlled their own trade, they would still have been unable to enforce their rules on the Dutch from New Netherland and other traders who had been supplying the Indians with guns for years. The assembly was well aware of the dilemma this posed:

Whereas it is manifest that the neighboring plantations both of English [Maryland] and fforainers [Dutch] do plentifully furnish the Indians with gunns, powder & shott, and do thereby drawe from vs the trade of beaver to our greate losse and their profitt, and besides the Indians being furnished with as much of both gunns and ammunition as they are able to purchase, It is enacted, That every man may freely trade for gunns, powder and shott: It derogaiting nothing from our safety and adding much to our advantage.62

But by 1665 circumstances had changed: the English had defeated the Dutch and annexed New Netherland. The law of October 1665 illustrates the reasoning that led the Virginia burgesses to declare once again a ban on the sale of arms:

Whereas there was formerly a law in force prohibiting the sale of armes, ammunition, or guns to the Indians, which, upon consideration of the said Indians being furnished by the Dutch, was omitted; It being then thought impolitick to debare ourselves from soe greate an advantage as might accrue to us by the Indian trade, when we could not prevent their supply; yet since those envious neighbours are now by his majesties justice and providence removed from us, and the trade now likely to be in our hands, and none to furnish them besides ourselves, who in these times of eminent danger have scarce ability to furnish our owne people, It is therefore enacted by this grand assembly and the authority thereof that the sale of armes, gunpowder and shott be wholly prohibited...63
This time the penalty was a fine of 10,000 pounds of tobacco or, for those unable to pay, two years in prison. With the average yearly income during this period hovering between 1,500 and 2,000 pounds of tobacco, a fine of this magnitude represented roughly five to ten years of a man's work. Even this stiff punishment failed to discourage the sale of arms. "Sade experience" demonstrated to the lawmakers that, "though good lawes have been made for prohibiting the tradeing with Indians for armes and ammunition, yet greate quantities have beene yearely vended amongst them." Virginia traders "by their avarice have soe armed the Indians with powder, shott and gunns, that they have beene thereby imboldened, not only to fall upon the frontier plantations, murthered many of our people and allarmed the whole country, but throw us into a changeable and most dangerous warr." Consequently the 1675 assembly moved to reinstate the death penalty "without benefitt of clergy" for trade violations, as well as the forfeiture of the transgressor's entire estate. To forestall any repetition of the old "lending" technicality, the burgesses added a provision applying the law to anyone found "within any Indian towne or three miles without the English plantation with powder, shott or other armes and ammunition, except one gun and ten charges of powder and shott" per man for his own use, even though "he or they be not actually tradeing."

The general peace treaty of 1677 marked the cessation of hostilities stemming from Nathaniel Bacon's crusade against the Virginia tribes. These remnants of the Powhatan Confederacy submitted to English authority, agreed to pay yearly quitrents, allowed their rulers to be confirmed by the English, and promised to assist in the colony's defense when required. Concomitantly, the assembly opened the trade
"to any of his majesties loyall subjects inhabiting this colony"—
a direct reference to the tributary Indians. From this date the trade
policy concerning arms and ammunition remained constant. In 1680 and
in 1691 "all former clauses of former acts of assembly limiting,
restraining, and prohibiting trade with the Indians" were formally
repealed, and with no trace of ambiguity the assembly proclaimed "a
free and open trade for all persons at all times and at all places with
all Indians whatsoever." The legislation was reenacted in 1705 and
1733 with minor alterations, such as the prohibition of the sale of rum
or brandy to any tributary Indian, but no further change in the status
of arms sales occurred.

Alcohol and firearms were not the only items that fell under
legislative scrutiny. For a brief period the sale of cloth to Indians
was banned as well. In 1633 the August session of the assembly noted
with concern that "great quantities of cloath, bayes, and cotton" had
been "bought upp out of the stores of this colony by such as have
traded the same with the Indians," while "the inhabitants have been in
great want and neede." Reacting quickly, the burgesses forbade any
cloth sales to the Indians without special permission from the governor.

That a serious shortage of cloth existed is not disputed. The
Indians had developed a voracious appetite for this recently-introduced
product, and merchants understandably lacked incentive to sell to the
colonists when the natives would pay so much more. Whether the law was
passed out of a sincere concern for the colonists or whether it was a
subtle pretext by which the governor and his friends could effect a
de facto cloth monopoly is not known. However, in view of the rapacious
profiteering that occurred during the frequent corn shortages, the
latter seems likely. At least one member of the governor's council continued to trade cloth to the Indians regularly throughout the nine years that the law remained in force. It was finally repealed in 1642 in conjunction with a minor peace treaty. By that time, in spite of the legal prohibitions, cloth had usurped copper's position as the English product most desired by the Indians.

The history of the Indian trade regulations includes a half-century of tangentially related regulation encouraging the growth of a local leather industry. Though the assembly's intention was to stimulate colonial manufacturing, the consequences of its legislation spilled over into the Indian trade. The gist of these laws, none of which mentioned the Indian trade, was to forbid the exportation of hides from the colony. Such a policy would promote leatherworking crafts, which were "very necessary and profitable for the use and support of the country" and would set "to work many men, women and children in this country which lye idle for want of imployment, and some naked for want of such necessaries as might be wrought out of the leather." But the effect of these laws was to limit the market for skins, driving prices down temporarily, and causing discontent among the traders.

The first of the non-exportation laws was passed in 1632 and it continued on the books until 1645 when it was re-stated in similar terms with more clarity of purpose: "Whereas it is to be desired that all manufacturers should be sett on work and encouraged in this colony, Be it enacted hereby, That all exportation of hides and leather be forbidden . . ." While the first law had aroused little comment, the
second brewed considerable controversy and was repealed a few months later. The reasons for this are obscure, but it is possible that the discrepancy in some way reflects the extent of the trade in deerskins during these years. In 1632 the European markets had yet to be fully developed, and deerskins had not begun to dominate the trade. Those injured by such an embargo were either too few to protest effectively or too busy evading it to bother. But by November 1645 hides were significant enough to prompt a quick reaction from those who traded with the Indians, and the law was "repealed and made void" in March. The struggle between the tanners, or those who encouraged the leather industry, and the traders, or those who financed and supplied them, flared up again thirteen years later. The 1658 assembly prohibited the export of wool, hides, and iron, and levied exorbitant fines on violators: "the sume of one thousand pound of tobacco fffor everie hide doe exported." This act was repealed one year later.

Once again the assembly moved to promote the growth of the leather industry, and this time the burgesses used better strategy. After passing the same non-exportation law they had written in 1658, they went on to require that "there be erected in each county at the charge of the country one or more tanhouses, and [that] they provide tanners, curyers, and shomakers, to tanne, curry, and make the hides of the country into leather and shoes." The assembly reiterated its support for "ffree trade," perhaps intending to pacify the traders. Whatever their motivation, the result was a law that remained on the books, with minor alterations in 1662 and 1663, for nine years.

In 1671 the project was pronounced a dismal failure. The law-makers reluctantly concluded that the industry had not developed as planned, and repealed all pertinent laws.
The burgesses exerted themselves a final time in 1682 in an all-encompassing industrial act prohibiting the export of any "iron, wool, woolfells [sheepskin], skins and hides tanned or untanned, of any deer, oxe, steer, bull, cow or calfe" on the familiar grounds that such commodities were "very necessary and profitable for the use and support of the country."

This act, so directly opposed to the mercantile theories of the mother country, finally prompted the Commissioners of the Customs in England to protest. They reported to the Lords of Trade that the Virginia act of 1682 violated the intention of the Staple Act of 1663 and injured the customs and trade of England. The Lords of Trade instructed Lord Howard of Effingham, Governor of Virginia, to have the act repealed.

Virginia's policy of promoting the leather industry had, until this year, provoked no objection from the crown. The relative insignificance of the trade in skins and hides to the English economy of the time was probably at the root of London's indifference. Also, since Virginia's earlier industrial endeavors had not been able to progress past the embryonic stage, the realities of the situation may have dictated a prudent non-interference until the colonists' pursuits reached larger proportions, as was the case in 1682 and later with the iron and hat industries.
CHAPTER III

THE EARLY CHESAPEAKE TRADE: 1607-1650

Geography divided the Virginia Indian trade into three distinct phases. During the first four decades of the seventeenth century, the English traded to the north along the Chesapeake Bay where the waterways served as a means of travel and transportation. By the middle of the century the trade took a decided shift to the west and southwest. Following closely behind the explorers, traders pushed inland until the Appalachian Mountains blocked their way. Mountain ranges and hostile Indians impeded further penetration of the interior until the beginning of the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century. From that point on, Virginia traders were able to work their way south into present-day North Carolina, until by 1700 they had spread into South Carolina, Tennessee, and Georgia, encountering considerable competition from those inhabitants.

During its first phase, the Indian trade was actively pursued by about one hundred men. For most, it was not a full-time occupation, merely an occasional foray into Indian territory to swap for food, and later for furs. The advent of tobacco, which commanded its highest prices during the 1620s, did not diminish the attractiveness of the Indian trade. On the contrary, the scarcity of food in Jamestown was directly proportional to the degree that the colony concentrated on tobacco. The higher the profits in tobacco, the less apt the planters
were to grow anything else. The situation was exacerbated by the willingness of the chief men in the colony to prolong the shortage by discouraging or forbidding the planting of corn. Those who had boats, or access to government-owned boats, and a commission from the governor could trade for corn along the Chesapeake and swap it for huge amounts of tobacco in Jamestown. This profiteering is reflected in the prices charged for a bushel of corn. After the uprising of 1622 when corn was scarcest, it sold at an outrageous ten to fifteen shillings. Three months later the price had risen to twenty to thirty shillings. Even at the "official" price of ten pounds of tobacco per bushel, at one to two shillings per pound, a man could clear one thousand pounds sterling from a single trading expedition into the bay.

Who were the traders during these years? Governor Argall was a principal profiteer until he was recalled in 1619. John Smith had bullied and bartered with the local Powhatan tribes, but he had left Virginia in 1609 for greener pastures. His arch-enemy, Captain Ratcliffe, was a frequent trader but was killed by the Indians in 1609. Ratcliffe had set out with two small ships to trade with the Powhatans for corn. Smith reported his demise without remorse. Ratcliffe, he wrote, "with about thirtie others as carelesse as himselfe; were all slaine, onely Jeffrey Shortridge escaped, and Pokahontas the Kings daughter saved a boy called Henry Spilman that lived many yeeres after, by her meanses, amongst the Patawomekes."

Henry Spelman typified the second wave of Virginia traders. Ambitious men from middle-class backgrounds, cunning and seldom honest,
they shared a common trait: all had mercantile connections of some sort in England. Spelman was the third son of Sir Henry Spelman of Congham in Norfolk. "In displeasure of his friends and desirous to see other country," he was shipped to Virginia in 1609 at the age of fourteen and captured soon after he arrived. Ransomed by Captain Argall in 1613 for some copper, he returned to England for a brief stay and then came back to Virginia to embark upon a trading career. In 1619 he was accused and tried for "instigating" Opechancanough. In punishment the Council "degraded him from his Capt:Ship and made him a servnt to the Collony for Seaven years in quallytie of an Interpriter."

Spelman was one of the early traders who continued to deal with the Indians in the Potomac River region throughout the turbulence of 1622. On an expedition to the Anacostans in April 1623 he was accompanied by a group of more than twenty men, including one young man of about twenty-five who had just arrived in Virginia a few months earlier. His name was Henry Fleet and his experiences with Spelman and the Indian trade paralleled those of Spelman and Ratcliffe fourteen years earlier. While trading for corn, the Anacostan Indians suddenly turned on the English, slew nineteen of the party including Spelman, and captured young Fleet and several others. Five years passed before Fleet's friends and relatives (his father was William Fleet, an adventurer in the Virginia Company) contrived to ransom him. After his return to London in 1627 he proceeded to turn his period of captivity to his advantage. Having convinced the merchant firm of Clobery and Company that his knowledge of the Indian language and customs could be mutually beneficial, Fleet returned to Virginia in September to promote the Chesapeake Indian trade on a grand scale. He sailed on
the 100-ton Paramour, registered under his name as master with that of Clobery and Company as owner, and loaded with goods for the Indian trade.

Fleet made a number of voyages to the Chesapeake during the ensuing two decades. One trip during the summer of 1632 took him far up the Potomac River where he obtained 4,000 pounds of beaver skins, worth about £4,000 sterling in London, and was promised 6,000 pounds of beaver the next season. He was traveling in the barque Warwick, having been hired as a factor for the London merchant firm of Griffith and Company. In collusion with Governor Harvey, Fleet appears to have successfully defrauded the Company by retaining the vessel and its profits. Complaints by the owners in far-away London were to no avail. After 1637 Fleet took out a license to trade from Lord Baltimore and from then until 1644 when his trading voyages ceased, he must properly be considered a Maryland trader.

Captain Ralph Hamor (?-1626), another early Chesapeake trader, served for a time as Secretary of the colony. His father was a member of the Virginia Company and a well-to-do merchant-tailor of London. To encourage the king and other potential contributors to adventure their money in Virginia, Hamor wrote an enthusiastic pamphlet describing the colony's riches and potentials. In this narrative, published in 1615, he spoke of many trading sessions with the Indians. The items traded were typical of those early years. Hamor wanted food, particularly corn. Powhatan was pleased with Hamor's gift of "two large pieces of copper, five wooden combs, ten fish-hooks and a pair of knives."

Hamor first came to Virginia in 1609. By 1621 he had attained sufficient status and wealth to be named to the Governor's Council.
He probably suffered a major setback during the uprising of 1622, for George Sandys described him the year after as "miserablie poore." But by 1625 Hamor had managed to acquire ten indentured servants and a considerable amount of land, presumably from the profits of several trading ventures. Governor Francis Wyatt sent him in the Tyger to the Potomac region in October 1622 to obtain "Corne or any other commodities, either by trade or by force" and again the following January in the William and John, and a third time in the Sparrow in January of 1624. This third voyage was the most unusual. The governor announced that "every man in the Colony [should] have leave and liberty to bring in such adventure of trucking stuffe, for which Capt Hamor [would] undertake to give them a iust accompt." Hamor was licensed to trade for anyone who cared to entrust him with his goods, in hopes of being repaid in corn when Hamor returned.

William Claiborne was one of the chief promoters of the Indian trade to the north and a rival of Henry Fleet for control of the Chesapeake trade. Born in 1600, Claiborne was admitted to Pembroke College at sixteen where he excelled in his studies. He met John Smith in London in 1620 or 1621 where it appears they became friends. Smith may have influenced Claiborne's decision to seek his fortune in Virginia. He sailed on the George with Sir Francis Wyatt in 1621 as the Royal Surveyor for the colony, a post created in response to the need for accurate surveying to initiate a new land policy. With the expiration of the joint stock arrangement of the colony in 1609, "every man that hath already冒险ed his money or person" was to be awarded fifty acres of land per share owned. As partial payment for his services, Claiborne was given two hundred acres on the Eastern Shore.
The favorable combination of Claiborne's own abilities and his background were instrumental in gaining him the post. His father and grandfather were county officials in England, but more significantly, they were merchants. Though he is often confused with a more noble but distant cousin of the same name, Claiborne was "no scion of landed gentry, no king's Cavalier." He was an ambitious young merchant's son with the right connections at home to propel his career in trade.

In 1627 Claiborne obtained a permit from Governor Yeardley to explore the "Bottome of the Bay of Chesapeick," to sail into any rivers, and to trade with any Indians for furs, skins, and corn. It was during these expeditions that Claiborne, now Secretary of State for the colony, member of the council, and good friend of the governor, discovered Kent Island.

The largest of the Bay islands, Kent Island is situated almost at the top of the Chesapeake just east of the mouth of the Severn River and the future city of Annapolis. As yet the trade potential of the area was largely underdeveloped. Henry Heet would not sail his first ship into the Bay for five months and other existing trade was sporadic and on a small scale. The area was inhabited by several tribes, dominated by the Susquehannah, who had been trading for decades with other Europeans.

Claiborne's efforts quickly developed into a modest and profitable trade. By 1630 he had set up a warehouse on the site of an abandoned Indian village named Kecoughtan, now Hampton, as a supply base. It is possible that he was financed in part by one of the richest merchants in London, Sir John Wolstenholme, who played a prominent role in the extension of English commerce, in colonization,
and in the search for the Northwest Passage. Wolstenholme was a member of the King's Council for Virginia at this time and is said to have invested in Claiborne's enterprise from its inception. If so, he withdrew his support early, possibly sensing the impending conflict that would arise with the issuance of the Maryland charter or perhaps simply tiring of the venture.

In 1631 Secretary of State Claiborne journeyed to London on official business. Virginia was suspicious that Lord Baltimore might be seeking a proprietary charter for Virginia and dispatched Claiborne to thwart his designs. While in London, Claiborne took the opportunity to search for more financial backing for his personal business affairs. He persuaded William Clobery, the wealthy merchant of Clobery and Company who was already financing Henry Fleet, to form a trading company with him and three others. Each of the three adventurers and Claiborne would receive one of the six shares in the company while Clobery would receive the other two.

Claiborne next sought support from King Charles I. He was quick to point out to the king that his plan would divert the Indian trade from the Dutch, who had that year established another settlement in present-day Delaware called Swaanendael and were industriously pursuing both the fur trade and whaling. Charles authorized Claiborne to trade "freely and without interruption" for "corne, furs, or any other commodities whatsoever with their shippes, men, boates and merchandise in all seas, coasts, rivers, creeks, harbours, lands or territories in or neare about those parts of America for which there is not already a patent granted to others for sole trade."
The license was signed May 16, 1631, and within twelve days Claiborne set sail from Deal on the Africa with a cargo of goods valued at £1,318 sterling, twenty male servants, and "one mayde to wash our linnen." They landed at Kecoughtan in July to allow some passengers to disembark and continued on to Kent Island.

"Entered upon the Isle of Kent," wrote Claiborne, "unplanted by any man but possessed of the natives and bought their right." By October the settlement consisted of one large timber-framed house and several thatch-roofed huts surrounded by a palisade. Four guns were mounted at strategic points. The inhabitants also built a mill for grinding corn, laid out gardens, planted orchards, and brought in cattle. There were four types of settlers: free men, indentured servants, servants hired for wages, and Negro slaves. Their number soon reached nearly one hundred men plus an unspecified number of women and children. The new plantation sent Captain Nicholas Martiau to represent them at the 1631 session of the House of Burgesses.

Claiborne's trade with the Indians, though irregularly supplied with goods from Clobery, flourished. His imports consisted chiefly of glass beads, copper kettles, copper rings, iron and copper bracelets, copper belts, trade pipes, pins, needles, nails, looking glasses, iron wire, small knives, small hatchets, scissors, wooden combs, fish hooks, toys, and steadily increasing amounts of trade cloth. Incoming ships also carried indentured servants to Kent Island. The exact number is uncertain because this was one of many points of contention between Clobery and Claiborne. Clobery claimed that the five ships dispatched to Kent Island carried a total of 93 servants, while Claiborne put the figure at 75.
The Africa, the first Clobery ship sent to Virginia, arrived at Kent Island in 1631. Four more supply ships arrived over the next five years: the James, the Revenge, the John and Barbara, and the Sara and Elizabeth. The return cargo for the Africa consisted of beaver pelts, corn, salt, and timber. The wood was used in England for ship-building or, if it was black walnut, by cabinetmakers for furniture, and the corn was sent to Massachusetts. More furs were ready for the next ships. In 1633 Claiborne sent home three hogsheads packed with beaver, and the following year 1,500 pounds, or roughly the same amount. All in all, he estimated that shipments of furs worth £4,000 sterling were sent to Clobery during the six years of the Kent Island operation. Such quantities were not large enough to warrant other English ships making regular calls, but many stopped on their way south from the Potomac River or northern Chesapeake. By 1633 Kent Island was growing its own tobacco and corn for export, the corn to be sold within the colony or in New England, the tobacco to be sent to England.

Claiborne conducted his operation by boat. For the most part, his settlers built their own medium-size vessels in which to trade, using some pre-fabricated parts brought from England. Typically six or seven Englishmen would venture out on a shallop or small pinnace. They were most interested in trading for furs to send home, but frequently traded also for canoes, game, wooden platters, pottery, baskets, and rush mats for their own use.

There was little use of credit during these years. Claiborne and his men, like most other Chesapeake traders, operated by simple exchange. Still, it was difficult for the traders to keep satisfactory
records of their bartering sessions. London investors constantly complained about fraud and demanded more accurate accounting. William Clobery was no exception. Claiborne attempted to explain, but to no avail:

The usuall manner of that trade is to shew our trucke, which the Indians wilbe very long and teadeous in viewing, and doe tumble it and tosse it and mingle it a hundred times over soe that it is impossible to kepe the severall parcells a sunder. . . . It is not convenient or possible to kepe an account in that trade for every axe knife or string or beades or for every yard of cloth, especiallie because the Indians trade not by any certeyne measure or by our English weightes and measures. And therefore every particuluer cannot be written downe by itselfe distinctly. Wherefore all traders find that it is impossible to kepe any other perfect account then att the End of the voyadge to see what is sold and what is gained and what is lefte. 107

Whatever his bookkeeping abilities, Claiborne's skill as a trader was the object of admiration and envy. One trader claimed that "noe other Englishman which traded with the Indians in the yeeres aforesaid made soe good voyages or gott soe many beaver skinnes for soe little trucke as appears to be gotten by the said Claiborne."

At some point during the late 1620s the ambitious Claiborne had established another island trading post, this one further north on Palmer's Island situated at the mouth of the Susquehannah River. The island had been granted in November 1622 to one Edward Palmer, a London art collector and critic and an adventurer in the Virginia Company who died two years later. Claiborne proposed to use Palmer's Island "to draw thither the trade of beaver and furs which the French then wholly enjoyed in the Grand Lake of Canada." Possession of Palmer's Island effectively bottled up the entire Susquehannah River trade, virtually assuring him of a monopoly. His ultimate aim was nothing less than to wrest a significant portion of the fur trade away from the French.
The charter granted to Cecilius Calvert, Lord Baltimore, in 1632 precipitated a long and bloody struggle for the control of Kent Island and its trade. Claiborne's claim that his island was part of Virginia, represented in the House of Burgesses and settled before the Maryland charter was granted, had considerable merit, especially since Baltimore's patent was only to include land "in parts of America not yet cultivated and inhabited by barbarians who had no awareness of the divine being." Baltimore appeared prone to negotiate and invited Claiborne to become a subject of the Catholic proprietary. With the strong support of the Virginia Council, which had always opposed Calvert's grant on religious, political, and geographic grounds, Claiborne no doubt thought he was on firm enough ground to resist Maryland's claims. In response to a petition, the king wrote in a letter dated October 8, 1634 "that Baltimore's interference with the Planters on Kent Island is contrary to justice and to the intention of our grant to said Lord: we do therefore hereby declare our express pleasure to be that the said Planters be in no sort interrupted in their trade or plantations by him... and we prohibit as well the Lord Baltimore... to do them any violence or to disturb or hinder them in their honest proceedings and trade there." At this point, Claiborne must have thought the controversy ended, but it was not. Baltimore ships seized a Claiborne pinnace in April 1635 and he responded by arming his vessels. After two fierce naval battles in April and May, Claiborne was left alone for a couple years.

In 1637 Clobery and Company recalled Claiborne to London to adjust his accounts. The differences in their respective records precipitated a bitter trial before the Admiralty Court, destroying
the partnership. During Claiborne's absence, George Evelin had been sent by Clobery to run the island. Evelin dealt surreptitiously with Leonard Calvert—probably on orders from Clobery—and allowed Calvert and thirty of his men to seize the island. Then, doublecrossing both Claiborne and Clobery, Evelin retired to his Maryland manor with all of the goods and servants that belonged to Clobery and Company as well as those that were the personal property of William Claiborne.

On April 4, 1638, the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations ruled that the Isle of Kent was within the bounds of Lord Baltimore's patent. For forty years Claiborne would attempt in vain to regain permanent control of his insular trading empire but, with the exception of a brief period in 1644 and again in 1652, neither force nor petitions were ultimately successful. In the end, Lord Baltimore's influence in London and with the king had simply been greater than Claiborne's, and Maryland's claim prevailed.
CHAPTER IV
INLAND TRADE AND EXPLORATIONS, 1650-1676

Virginia's population trebled during the two decades between 1640 and 1660. As the colony grew, settlers and traders alike began to turn their eyes west. Access to the interior was simplified by the several rivers that flowed into the Chesapeake Bay, and the territory to the fall line was not unknown. Since the time of the explorations of Captain Christopher Newport, Sir Thomas Dale, and Captain John Smith, there had been considerable settlement as far as the fall line, but the uprising of 1622 had sent the survivors scurrying back to the proximity of Jamestown fort for safety. Not until the 1640s did Indian traders begin to direct their attention to the western tribes. By mid-century Virginia's Indian trade had practically deserted the waterways of the Chesapeake Bay and was pushing inland across the Piedmont.

Exploration usually preceded the establishment of direct trade. Since knowledge of the remote region beyond the falls was scanty at best, the assembly encouraged exploration without actually financing it by issuing a series of orders over a period of some twenty years. The formula was to offer explorers the prospect of compensation by awarding them "all profitt whatsoever they in their particular adventury can make unto themselves by such discovery aforesaid, for fourteen years." Nearly a dozen of these permits was issued to
hopeful explorers, all of whom were prompted in some degree by the lure of the Indian trade. The result was a steady flow of information on the geography and the inhabitants of the western lands.

The best-known of these first explorations is that of Edward Bland, a London merchant who had been engaged in the Spanish trade. His older brother John (1612-1680), also involved in the trade with Spain, had considerable influence at court and the family was large and prosperous. Bland had come to Virginia in 1643 and soon acquired a 3,000-acre estate in Charles City County. On October 20, 1650, the assembly authorized him to explore to the west and granted him "all profitts arising thereby for fourteen yeeres."

Bland headed west from Fort Henry with two other explorers, two servants, a Nottoway Indian guide, and Abraham Wood, who would soon become the most prominent Indian trader in the colony. The group followed the Oceanechi Path as far as present-day Mecklenburg County, near the North Carolina-Virginia border. They stopped in Nottoway, Meherrin, and Tuscarora villages, which seem already to have been familiar to Virginia traders. While Wood was certainly preoccupied with the trade potential of the area, Bland's journal reveals only a secondary interest in the subject. His comments and descriptions were concerned essentially with the "exceeding rich Land" and the likelihood of future settlements. Whatever plans he may have had for the settlement of the area he called "New Brittaine" came to an end with his death in 1653.

Abraham Wood lived for another thirty years, long enough to realize his trade ambitions. Nothing is known of Wood's early life
or his death. A ten-year-old indentured servant with that name was brought to Virginia in 1620 on the Margaret and John and there is reason to suppose that this is the same person who later founded a fortune on trade, controlled well over 6,000 acres of land, became a member of the House of Burgesses, and sat on the Governor's Council for twenty-two years.

It was the uprising of 1644 that indirectly afforded Wood the means to achieve his Indian trade empire. Though more serious in loss of life than the uprising a generation earlier, the 1644 Indian attacks had far less effect on the colony's growth. Actually they contributed much to the organization of the Indian trade and aided in its expansion. As a result of the uprising, the assembly created four outposts at the falls of four rivers to protect the English frontier settlements from Indian attack. One of these, Fort Henry, was garrisoned with forty-five men and placed in the command of militia captain Abraham Wood. The burgesses soon found the maintenance of four forts prohibitive and transferred them to private control. Wood received Fort Henry at the falls of the Appomattox River, plus 600 acres of adjacent land and all boats and supplies. In return, he undertook to "maintayne and keepe ten men constantly upon the said place," during which time he was exempt from all taxes.

This fortified post became Wood's home and base of operations for at least thirty years. It was called "Wood" as well as "Fort Henry" until it was incorporated as "Petersburg" in 1748. The combination of a strategic location and the forceful personality of its owner-commander was enough to propel this fort into its position as the unofficial capital of the southwest Indian trade.
As the trade moved inland, the all-in-one mariner-trader, such as Ralph Hamor, Henry Fleet, or William Claiborne, who personally followed the circle of trade from London to the Indian villages and back to London again, became obsolete. In his place were two sorts of traders, each responsible for half of the trade circle. The wealthy merchant-trader, usually a large planter, used his access to London credit to import substantial amounts of trade goods. He seldom went out among the Indians, preferring to arrange for others to conduct the actual trades. Those who conducted the trade with the natives might be men hired on a salary or independent traders who bought or borrowed goods and struck out on their own. Wood referred to these independent men as "selfe-ended traders." He and other merchant-traders who occupied the trading forts also dealt directly with any Indians who cared to bring their skins and furs to the post to trade. Periodically the merchant-trader gathered up the skins and furs from all his sources, packed them into large hogsheads, 250-350 deerskins per hogshead, and shipped them to his agent in England.

All trade transactions which had once been conducted on a simple barter basis now operated on credit. The London merchant credited the Virginia merchant-trader who in turn credited the "selfe-ended trader" for his season's stock of goods. What the trader sold to the Indians was paid for with skins and furs obtained during the next winter's hunting. William Byrd II (1674-1744), himself a merchant-trader, explained how the process operated:

The Common Method of carrying on this Indian Commerce is as follows: Gentlemen senq for Goods proper for such a Trade from England, and then either Venture them out at their own Risk to the Indian Towns, or else credit some
Traders with them of Substance and Reputation, to be paid in Skins at a certain Price agreed betwixt them . . . These Wares are made up into Packs and Carry'd upon Horses, each Load being from 150 to 200 Pounds, and which they are able to travel about 20 Miles a day, if Forage happen to be plentiful. Formerly a Hundred Horses have been employ'd in one of these Indian caravans, under the Conduct of 15 or 16 Persons only, but now the Trade is much impair'd, insomuch that they seldom go with half that Number. 124

At one time or another, Abraham Wood experienced nearly every occupation that related to the Indian trade. He was a merchant with warehouses stocked with trade goods, a soldier with valuable experience fighting and negotiating with Indians, a landowner with a passion for buying up large tracts, an explorer in his younger years, an interpreter in later ones, and an influential politician who knew how to turn public office into private profit. As he grew older, Wood found less opportunity to venture out personally to trade or explore. Instead he hired or financed others.

Two explorers commissioned by Wood became the first Englishmen to have recorded crossing the eastern continental divide. Captain Thomas Batts and Robert Fallam left Fort Henry in September 1671 on a month-long journey west, visiting Saponi and "Totero" or Tutelo villages (near present-day Roanoke) en route. However, they found that some European had been there before them, for they discovered two trees marked with the mysterious initials: MA. NI. and MA. 126

Wood's most notable expedition set out from Fort Henry in 1673 over the Virginia Traders' Path, also called the Occaneechi Trail. James Needham, formerly of South Carolina, and Gabriel Arthur traveled south from the fort through Occaneechi country, then took a more westward route through Saponi territory, crossing the mountains into
Journeys of Batts and Fallam, 1671; Needham and Arthur, 1673; Gabriel Arthur, 1673-74

taken from:
Tennessee where they encountered the "Tomahitan" tribes, almost
certainly the Overhill Cherokees. Wood later transcribed Needham's
report, since lost, that these Tomahitans possessed about sixty guns,
one of which were of English manufacture and all of which were broken.
The Indians claimed to have received these from some "white people
which have long beards and whiskers and weares clothing" and had a
"bell which is six foot over which they ring morning and evening."
The evidence overwhelmingly points to pre-English Spanish-Cherokee
trade contacts. The trade had ceased abruptly when a Cherokee trading
party of twenty men was seized by the Spanish and sold into slavery.
Since that time these tribes had been carrying on an occasional
trade with the Ocaneechi for European goods.

The Ocaneechi Indians found their location on the present-day
border of North Carolina and Virginia to be a great advantage. They
quickly became the middlemen for all of the Virginia Indian trade to
the south and west and no doubt regarded with apprehension Wood's
efforts to open up direct trade with the Cherokees. Threatened not
only with a loss of profits, the Ocaneechis also feared the arming
of hostile tribes at their rear. It was probably their jealous
determination to maintain their middleman status that led to Needham's
murder during his return trip to the Cherokees with a load of trade
goods, postponing the further expansion of this important trade for
several years.

Sir William Berkeley, twice governor of Virginia, also
contributed to the expansion of the inland trade by promoting a series
of expeditions. He actively backed at least one and possibly all
three of the explorations of the German doctor John Lederer in 1669
JOURNEYS OF JOHN LEDERER 1670

Routes and sites he mentioned, with modern names

FIRST JOURNEY
1. Chickahominy
2. "Eminent hill" from which he first saw the Blue Ridge

SECOND JOURNEY
3. Stegge's
4. Monacan
5. Mahock
6. Nahysson
7. Sapon
8. Akenatz
9. Eno River
10. Schoccore
11. Watery
12. Sara
13. Waxhaw
14. Esw, Catawba
15. Tuscarora
16. Eruco River
17. Fort Henry

THIRD JOURNEY
18. Talifer's House

MAP II

taken from:
and 1670. Lederer had come to Virginia in 1660 and due either to his exceptional ability or influential friends, he soon caught Berkeley's eye. After the third of his short journeys into the piedmont and foothills of Virginia and North Carolina, he found himself in disfavor in Virginia, perhaps due to his association with the increasingly unpopular Berkeley. Moving north to Maryland, he made a favorable impression on Sir William Talbot, a leading citizen and a member of Maryland's Council, who translated Lederer's journals from Latin to English and had them published in London the next year. In one part of the book, entitled *The Discoveries of John Lederer in Three Several Marches from Virginia to the West of Carolina and other parts of the Continent*, Lederer gave his advice to would-be traders, providing an excellent description of the state of the Indian trade in the 1660s:

If you Barely designe a home-trade with neighbour-Indians for your skins of deer, beaver, otter, wildcat, fox, racoon, etc your best truck is a sort of coarse trading cloth, of which a yard and a half makes a matchcoat or mantle fit for their wear; as also axes, hoes, knives, sissors, and all sorts of edg'd tools. Guns, powder, and shot, etc are commodities they will greedily barter for: but to supply the Indians with arms and ammunition is prohibited in all English governments. In dealing with the Indians, you must be positive and at your word: for if they persuade you to fall anything in your price, they will spend time in higgling for further abatements and seldom conclude any bargain. Sometimes you may with brandy or strong liquor dispose them to an humour of giving you ten times the value of your commodity; and at other times they are so hide-bound, that they will not offer half the market-price, especially if they be aware that you have a designde to circumvent them with drink, or that they think you have a desire to their goods, which you must seem to slight and disparage.

To the remoter Indian, you must carry other kinde of truck, as small looking-glasses, pictures, beads, and
bracelets of glass, knives, sizars [scissors], and all manner of gaudy toys and knacks for children, which are light and portable. For they are apt to admire such trinkets, and will purchase them at any rate, either with their currant coyn of small shells, which they call roanoke or peack, or perhaps with pearl, vermillion, pieces of christal; and toward Ushery, with some odde pieces of plate or buillon, which they sometimes receive in truck from the Oestacks.130

Lederer's account points out a significant alteration in the nature of the goods traded. He lists "skins of deer" first of all the furs that the English trader would be apt to want, reflecting the shift in emphasis from furs to skins as the trade moved to warmer climates. The future of the southwest Indian trade lay not in furs, which were inferior to those from the colder regions to the north, but in deerskins. Apparently by the 1660s most traders had recognized this and adapted to the new circumstances.

The goods that the Indians desired had changed as well. Copper had fallen from its original leading position among trade goods, only to be replaced by cloth. Most of this cloth was, as Lederer says, of coarse quality. Traders usually carried broadcloth, duffield, stroud, plains, half-thicks, and dowlas, most of which was manufactured in England, fulfilling the old Hakluyt dream of stimulating the English woolen industry. (See Appendix I) Liquor was something the earliest traders never offered the Indians, but by Lederer's time it seems to have become somewhat of an institution in any bartering session. Only the "remoter Indians" were interested in the trinkets peddled by the early traders. The "neighbour-Indians" had become too sophisticated in their dealings to attach excessive value to mirrors, pictures, glass beads, or "gaudy toys and knacks for children."
Berkeley had more to gain from Lederer's explorations than geographical knowledge. As governor, he had the power to issue trade licenses. This monopoly of licenses gave him an effective monopoly of trade, and there is no doubt that he profited immensely from it. Some thought he profited too much, and that his financial stake in the trade affected his judgment on Indian matters to the detriment of the English population. One of these was Nathaniel Bacon.

Without the existence of the Indian trade, Bacon and his followers would probably never have rebelled. Not that the Indian trade was the sole cause of the uprising, but it was a major factor, and it did provide the spark that caused tensions to explode. The rebellion centered around the various facets of the Indian problem: the encroachment of settlers upon Indian territory, the conflict between those who wanted to settle the land and those who wanted to trade with the Indians, the struggle among Indian tribes for access to and control of the trade, the struggle between whites for control of the trade, and the presence of a de facto trade monopoly in the hands of Governor Berkeley and his political associates. Berkeley, Wood, and others in power were opposed by newer, ambitious men who found the road to power blocked by those who had already arrived. Men like Bacon and Byrd were confronted with a social hierarchy that had frozen before they had had the chance to climb to the top.

A very real economic depression underlay the colonists' dissatisfaction, making the Indian alarms and high taxes all the harder to bear. Neither the Indians nor the Governor could be held liable for the steadily declining tobacco prices and the growing
competition from Maryland, increasing prices of English manufactured goods, the heavy losses sustained during the three naval wars with the Dutch, the recent catastrophic hailstorms, floods, and hurricanes, the winter epidemic of 1673 that killed half of the colony's cattle, or the dry spell of 1676 that ruined three-fourths of the tobacco crop. But the governor could be blamed for not acting decisively to remove the Indian threat. As land-hungry settlers spilled into Indian territory and hostilities multiplied, the settlers demanded that the Indians be removed, restrained, or exterminated. They saw the governor's refusal to act as an effort to preserve his financial stake in the Indian trade.

The accusations that Berkeley himself was illegally trading arms and ammunition to the Indians are of doubtful merit, but the governor was indisputably granting licenses to traders who were—"traders at the heads of the rivers" who, wrote Bacon, "buy and sell our blood."  "The very foundation of all these disasters," he continued, "is the grant of the beaver trade to the Governor."  Bacon referred to the act passed in March 1676 in which Berkeley used the frontier unrest as an excuse to consolidate the Indian trade in his own hands. "Whereas the country by sade experience have found that the traders with the Indians by their avirice have soe armed the Indians with powder, shott and gunns, that they have beene thereby imboldened, not only to fall upon the ffronter plantations murthered many of our people and allarmed the whole country, but throw us into a chargeable and most dangerous warr . . ." the act began in acknowledgment of the existing situation. It went on to provide harsh punishment for any who
traded arms to the Indians, and authorized the county courts to nominate up to five "sober persons . . . to supply the neighboring Indians . . . with such goods and merchandizes as Indians usually deal for." What aggravated the already disgruntled settlers was the clause which proclaimed that "none of the late traders with the Indians nor any comissionated by them, their factors, agents or servants could be authorised." As one of these "late traders" who had just completed building a trading house, Bacon was hard hit by the prohibition excluding him "from all manner of tradeing, trucking, bartering and dealing whatsoever with any Indian."

Berkeley claimed that this was the reason Bacon had rebelled, but the explanation is too simple. Had Bacon remained a friend of the governor, he would probably have been appointed to one of the five positions in his county anyway. Bacon's motives can be determined more accurately by examining the social stagnation of Virginia society during this period.

Bacon formed his followers into a small army and set out to protect themselves from the Indians. They succeeded in frightening away, enslaving, or murdering nearly all of the nearby friendly Indians and in seizing their land and furs. The rebellion lost its driving force when Bacon died a few months later, and was eventually suppressed by Berkeley.

Ironically Nathaniel Bacon, the man who was determined "not only to ruin and extirpate all Indians in general, but all manner of trade with them" as well, became the instrument of the trade's expansion. The Occaneechi tribe had prevented English traders from passing
beyond them for decades, and had gained wealth, power, and prestige from their role as middlemen. When Bacon and his men obligingly destroyed the Occaneechis in 1676, the great obstacle to English advancement was removed and the trade could develop unhindered into the interior. The Cherokee trade now took on new significance. With the Occaneechi barrier removed, it was possible to travel south across Carolina all the way to the Savannah River near present-day Augusta, Georgia, and then to turn north to the Cherokees. The path was longer than the one Needham and Arthur had pioneered in 1673, but skirting the mountains was far easier than crossing them.

The general peace treaty of 1677 that marked the end of Bacon's Rebellion also marked the end of the Indian period in Virginia. The few remaining tribes within the colony, now classified as "tributary Indians," submitted to English authority, each village agreeing to pay three arrows and twenty beaver skins a year as tribute in return for "protection." The Powhatan Confederation, estimated by John Smith at thirty tribes with over 9,000 people, had wasted to about one-seventh of its original size. Little or none of the attrition can be attributed to migration, for no Powhatans seem to have removed from the Chesapeake region. The three Indian wars of 1622, 1644, and 1676 had, with the help of smallpox and other epidemics, managed to reduce the once formidable confederation to the point where "all which live together cannot raise 500 fighting men." Two smaller confederacies existed to the west of the Powhatans, the Monacans and the Mannahoacs with five and twelve tribes respectively, and the Nottoways and Meherrins of Iroquoian stock lived to the south. However, as white settlements
took nearly a century after the founding of Jamestown to extend beyond the tidewater, little is heard of these inland tribes until they were already far advanced toward ultimate extinction through wars, disease, and invasion by the dispossessed tribes. Clearly no trade of any consequence could be conducted with such a limited number of Indians. With the elimination of the Occanechi barrier, the opportunities that existed lay beyond the colony's borders. By 1697 Governor Andros was explaining to the Privy Council that the native Indians had dwindled away and that the trade was now carried on solely with "foreign" tribes. Fifteen years later, a report to the Council of Trade listed nine nations of tributary Indians, "Vizt: the Pamunkys, Chichahominys, Nansemunds, Nottoways, Maherins, Sapons, Stukanocks, Occoneeches, and Totteros," adding that their total population did not exceed 700. It is apparent that during the third phase of the Indian trade, from 1677 to 1725, the amount of trade in Virginia was negligible.

The extension of the trade to the Cherokee nation is regarded by many historians as having been inevitable. As the European market for deerskins increased, the traders began to comprehend the possible profits. They were not long in discovering that the thickest, most valuable skins were to be found at the higher altitudes where the Cherokee mountain tribes lived. William Bartram, the eighteenth-century American botanist, declared that "a buckskin of the Cherokees will weigh twice as much as those bred in the low, flat country of Carolina." To the English, twice as heavy meant twice as valuable. The heavier skins were sent to Europe while the Virginians kept those
weighing less than two pounds for their own tanneries, or shipped to other colonies.

Until the late 1660s, most of the American skins and furs arriving at London docks were immediately re-exported to continental Europe. The few firms of London and Bristol that cured and processed skins and furs were simply unable to compete in quality with the great establishments of Leipzig, Amsterdam, Vienna, and Paris; nor were they able to cope with the quantities that poured into the country.

The tide was turned by two events. The first was the capture of New Netherlands in 1664, giving the Duke of York not only a proprietary colony but access to the Hudson River-Mohawk fur trade route into the Great Lakes region.

The second was the appearance in London, shortly after the acquisition of the Dutch colony, of one Monsieur Médard Chouart des Grosseilliers, a successful French fur trader. Grosseilliers had immigrated to England in 1665 after he had been arrested, imprisoned, and fined the equivalent of $300,000 by the irate governor of New France for trading without a license. His scheme to establish a trading post on Hudson's Bay appealed to the Duke of York, Prince Rupert, the Duke of Albemarle, Sir George Carteret, and many others, titled and wealthy investors. After his return from Hudson's Bay in 1668 with a rich cargo of furs, the Hudson's Bay Company was chartered. Grosseilliers contributed more to the development of the English fur industry than new sources of fur. His knowledge of the technological aspects of the business stimulated the expansion of English processing and finishing trades. Almost overnight London became the center of the European fur market, in control of the
richest fur-bearing countries of the North American continent and in possession of sophisticated processing facilities at home. No longer did English noblemen and wealthy merchants buy their finished leather, hats and furs from the continent. Furs, raw and finished, now constituted one of England's regular exports.

This sudden expansion of the English fur industry was fueled by the century-and-a-half-long fad of beaver felt hats. The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 tipped the scales in favor of England by causing Huguenot hatters to flee France, destroying the rival French industry. Huguenots were reputed to be the "exclusive possessors of the secret of certain operations necessary for the fabrication of the finest hats."

This surge of interest in the fur trade was a boon to Virginia Indian traders. Though their beaver was not of the quality found in the north, it was still in demand. More important, however, was that the burgeoning English fur industry included the manufacture of leather goods from deerskin. If the north had cornered the beaver market, the south had the edge on the deer supply.

The leather that was processed on both sides of the Atlantic was used in the making of shoes, boots, saddles, bridles, harnesses, drums, gloves, breeches, upholstery, ships' rigging, wool and cotton cards, bound books, holsters, military equipment, and in the boot, top, seats, curtains, and aprons of carriages. Leather made from deerskins was most often used for clothing, boots, and shoes. One Williamsburg leatherworker advertised that he had lately come from London and was set up to make "the best Buck Skin Breeches either of
the common Tann'd colour, or dy'd Black, or of Cloth Colours, after the English Manner: Also Buck Skin Gloves with high Tops . . ."

The Indian trade was made doubly attractive by the economic crisis triggered to some degree by the Navigation Acts of 1660. As the price of tobacco dropped from 3c to as low as ½c per pound, only the very large planters who owned great quantities of land and labor were likely to make a profit. Few of the newly-freed indentured servants, small planters, or recent immigrants could hope to reach the point where they could gain by raising tobacco. But the profits from the Indian trade loomed large and business was expanding. Besides, no capital outlay was required if one hired himself out to a large trader-merchant, such as Abraham Wood or William Byrd, or found someone who would credit him with a load of trade goods.
 CHAPTER V.
MERCHANT-TRADERS AND THE EXPANSION OF TRADE BEYOND
VIRGINIA'S BORDERS

Though Abraham Wood was the first of the inland merchant-traders to hire, finance, or buy the indentures of large numbers of men to trade for him, he was eclipsed in his later years by the young and aggressive William Byrd I (1652-1704). Byrd's rise to prominence was based on the solid foundation of an already established Indian trade, developed by his maternal uncle, Thomas Stegge, Jr.

Stegge inherited well over a thousand acres of land when his father died in 1651. The combination of large land holdings and influential government offices—he was a member of the governor's council in 1664 and Auditor-General from 1664-1670—virtually assured the prosperity of his trade with the Indians. The size of the bequests in his will indicate that he had acquired considerable wealth and prestige.

Since he and his wife Sarah were childless, Stegge arranged for his sister Grace to send her eldest son, William Byrd, to Virginia to assist with the trade. It is likely that young Byrd helped to load the packhorses with beads, pots, pans, blankets, rum, guns, and cloth, and that he aided in organizing them into long caravans. No doubt he accompanied the traders on some of these journeys, returning with bundles of deerskin, mink, beaver, otter,
and other furs. The experience he gained during the years he lived with his uncle was enough to permit the eighteen-year-old youth to carry on the trade after Stegge died in 1670. Under the terms of his uncle's will, proved May 15, 1671, Byrd inherited a large estate, including over 5,000 acres at the falls of the James River, complete with "Several Slaves, Houses Cattle Households Stuff Goods [and] Merchandizes." The head start Byrd received with this inheritance contributed greatly to his early successes and rapid rise. Until the end of the seventeenth century, he dominated the Virginia Indian trade.

Byrd wasted no time in pursuing the trade. A few months after his uncle's death, the aggressive young man nearly collided with some of Abraham Wood's explorers on their journey across the eastern continental divide. Thomas Batts and Robert Fallam were somewhat startled to receive word that Byrd, "with a great company," had passed just three miles away on an expedition of his own. This incident gave Wood notice that a serious rival for control of the Indian trade had appeared on the scene.

Byrd's trade was similar in structure to Wood's. He dealt with his own and independent traders, dispersing trade goods from his warehouse at the falls. From the well-known London merchant establishments of Perry & Lane, Arthur North, and others he imported goods for the Indians as well as for small local planters. In return he exported tobacco and furs. Between one and eight large hogsheads of furs and skins were sent on every London-bound vessel he could locate. Beaver was commanding record prices during these years and the value of the furs and skins Byrd shipped was substantial.
Because the rewards were great, most of colonial Virginia's merchants and storekeepers were willing to advance credit in the form of trade goods. Few storekeepers did not engage in the Indian trade to some degree. The largest merchant-traders could afford to pursue the trade actively by hiring traders, buying indentured servants, and equipping packtrains. The smaller men, for whom their store was their major occupation rather than one of many sidelines, played a more modest role. They would stock large inventories of trade goods to sell or loan to a free trader in exchange for furs, skins, and other Indian articles. One storekeeper involved in the Indian trade was Colonel Francis Eppes (1628-1678) of Henrico County whose store at Bermuda Hundred served many small traders. The inventory taken after Eppes's death shows large amounts of pewter, tinware, woodenware, ironware, shoes and stockings, and everyday household articles, but it is probable that a major portion of the cloth, particularly the half-thicks, broadcloths, and duffields, as well as some of his other inventory, made its way into Indian hands.

Dealing with London merchants was a continuing source of frustration for all colonists involved in the Indian trade. William Byrd's London agents were no doubt typical of most English merchants in the casual attitude they adopted toward keeping their colonial clients informed of market trends. Even if they had been more conscientious, the uncertainties involved in trans-Atlantic communications would have precluded the regular transmittance of sufficient information. But Byrd constantly berated his agents. "I am Sorry that Scarce once in a year I can receive any Accot of the markett of
furrres or skins, by wh being in the darke, I have been a
Considerable losser within this twelte moneth." He was compelled
on occasion to order "by guesse, not yet knowing how the last"
order of trade goods was being received by the more distant tribes,
yet forced to send correspondence by a departing vessel. One
year he placed an order for one gross of plain belts, two gross of
jews harps, the same number of tobacco tongs, and twice that of
scissors. But by the next year the optimistic order had proved
excessive. Byrd's warehouse was still "prety well Stockd" due to
a "dull trade." "Little Bever & Skins to bee had," he explained to
Perry & Lane, because "the Indians were att war wth each other &
troubles on all hands."

The Indians were no more consistent in their business dealings
than were the London merchants. They stubbornly refused the poor
quality merchandise that London often sent, prompting Byrd to
complain to both North and Perry & Lane: "Pray Speake to the Gun
Smith that the Dogs of all the Gun Locks have good Hold otherwise
the Indians will not buy them." "Beads you sent mee large white
instead of small . . . send mee none but small white this year, all
others a drug . . . send me by the first oppertunity 2 cwt," he
raged. The Indians also refused "the kettles which they say had
holes in them."

But of all the items Byrd ordered from England, cloth plagued
him the most. "Your duffields much too light a blew," he abruptly
informed North, and again a few months later, "Yor Duffields much
complainid of both ye goodnesse & color a darker blew pleases the
Indians best." He also noted that cotton cloth was "better liked
then the plains which is much complain'd of," but continued to order large amounts of plains, mostly blue.

Byrd's competition in the Indian trade was minimal. One of his contemporaries, Cadwallader Jones, looked for a time as if he might develop into a serious threat, but by the mid-1680s he had left Virginia. Jones was born in the same year as Byrd and their lives were quite similar.

Jones was named for his grandfather, an Exeter merchant. His father, a London merchant, died in Virginia when Jones was an infant. At the age of twenty-one Jones patented 1,443 acres on the south side of the Rappahannock River below the falls. Four years later he acquired 14,114 acres in Stafford. From 1667 to 1686 he made a number of short explorations from his home as far south as the Appomattox River, ranging through the piedmont and the Blue Ridge Mountains. By 1680 he was a lieutenant colonel and by 1682 was in command of the fort on the Rappahannock at the present-day site of Fredericksburg. Control of the fort led to control of the Indian trade, with the unlimited potential to expand.

Expand he did. In February 1682 he sent Thomas Owsely, one of his agents, to Maryland to trade for roanoke and peake. These strings of polished shells, which the Indians used as a measure of wealth, were necessary for his "inland trade about four hundred miles from here S.S.W." "This year," he explained to Lord Baltimore, "the Indians will need Roanoke and I have a considerable trade with them."

It is probable that Jones referred to the Cherokees. It is certain that he traded extensively with the Occaneechis and the Tuscaroras of North Carolina.
By early 1687 it became evident that Jones was living and operating well beyond his means. Hounded by creditors, he fled from Rich Neck, his Stafford plantation, to England. There, through the influence of friends to whom he was also heavily indebted, he was able to obtain an appointment as the governor of the Bahamas. He served there for four years, during which time he tried to retrieve his shattered fortune by the "tyrannical exercise of power" and fraternization with the pirates who infested these islands. After another narrow escape to England in 1698 he returned briefly to Virginia where he turned his energies toward urging Governor Francis Nicholson to increase the Indian trade.

He submitted a plan to Nicholson on January 17, 1699, in which he proposed the creation of a "Company of Gentlemen Adventurers" to capture the Mississippi River trade from the French at Lake Erie, which he believed was located on the other side of the Blue Ridge. By Jones's estimates, 200 canoes per year could be intercepted. "The Value of furs yearely from hence return'd may be with much modesty Computed at one hundred Thousand pounds Sterlg," he wrote.

The advantages to be gained from this trade were several: "a fforeigne Prince Deprived of the Sd Sume, the Custome Considerable to our Crown, more of the manufacture of England Vent'd heere, . . . the Colledge would be Saluted wth near the Sum of two thousand pounds Sterlg per year and all waies Increaseing. Moreover a Signall and prodigious Advantage would appear to all this Country" because the inhabitants would have a "Speedy and necessary Alarum . . . as to the approach of any Indians Invadeing Us."
Though Nicholson never pursued the subject with Jones, he was far from uninterested. A few years later he resurrected some of Jones's arguments to submit to London in his own proposal concerning a company. Still in his forties, Cadwallader Jones died some months later.

After the death of Abraham Wood around 1680 and Jones's hasty departure a few years later, Byrd had no serious competition for the Indian trade. Nonetheless, he made a bid for formal monopolistic control. In February 1683 he petitioned the Board of Trade, offering "to take all possible pains to heal breaches between different tribes and to secure payment of the King's tribute . . . to discover the great tract of land to westward of the mountains," and "to pay one hundred pounds a year to the King." In return Byrd asked to be granted sole control of the Indian trade, promising "to send out no persons to trade with them but such as have given security for good behavior."

Nothing came of Byrd's proposed monopoly. Later that year King Charles II proclaimed, in what was an indirect response to Byrd and others with similar ambitions, that the trade was free and open to all. But royal proclamation did not make it so. By the 1680s participation in the Indian trade to any significant degree necessitated travelling long distances and involved considerable capital investment. Naturally such a situation favored the wealthier merchant-traders like Byrd who could afford to hire and equip large-scale expeditions to the far-off tribes. Certainly there still existed in Virginia a number of independent "selfe-ended
traders" who vigorously struck out into Indian country with their packs, but the proportion of the trade they commanded steadily diminished.

Byrd's caravans grew longer as the distance between his trading partners and himself grew wider. Great expeditions of a hundred horses, loaded with trade goods, strapped with bells, and tended by a dozen or more servants, travelled southwest from Byrd's warehouses to Saponi and Catawba country. There is no proof that his packtrains reached the Cherokees, but it is highly probable. Of course he was familiar with Needham and Arthur's contact with the Cherokees, called Tomahitans, over the mountains. Only Wood possessed the resources to compete with Byrd for the Cherokee trade and Wood was dead. Byrd was not one to sit back and let a potentially profitable market of over 11,000 people go untapped. In a letter of 1691 to Stephanus Van Cortlandt of New York he referred to his traders traveling from the "farthest part of the Tuskerora country, about 300 miles from hence ... to a nation about 100 miles farther" than that. In a letter five years earlier he noted with dismay the loss of two of his traders, "killed above 400 miles of[f]." The distance between piedmont Virginia and the Cherokee town of Echota depended upon the route taken, but never amounted to less than 500 miles. These figures correspond closely to Byrd's rough estimates.

The trading route to the Cherokees discovered by Needham and Arthur had the disadvantage of leading through the Blue Ridge Mountains. The traders soon discarded it in favor of a longer but easier route which led south, skirted the Blue Ridge, and turned
MAP III  Trading Paths from Virginia to the Cherokees.

north to reach the Cherokee towns. This route, far superior to any other, was plagued by one disadvantage: it passed through the new proprietary colony of Carolina.

Until this point, the Virginians had no external rivals for the southeast Indian trade. If the Spanish in Florida offered any competition, it was of little consequence. Spain's goal was not trade, but to stake out territorial claims and to protect them by establishing missions to bring the local natives to agricultural servitude and a Christian disposition. The Spanish had made contact with the Cherokees but that had terminated long before the English traders arrived on the scene.

After 1702 the English were forced to contend with French colonies at their back door. It was thought the French were perpetually plotting the seduction of the southeast tribes from English interests. The fear was not unreasonable, for the French consistently labored to convince the Indians that the English were their implacable enemies. The English, however, attributed to the French far more power to influence the natives than they ever possessed. Even with three forts (located in present-day Alabama) and one regular trading house (in Mississippi), the French do not appear to have exerted significant influence on the trade until much later. With inferior French cloth selling for twice what the English charged, the English naturally dominated the trade, even though the French possessed the geographical advantage of water routes. Throughout the early eighteenth century the French were a constant source of anxiety to those involved in the Indian trade. But the threat failed to
materialize. Virginia's real rivals were not foreigners, but the English and Indian inhabitants of the Carolinas.

The advent of the aggressive Charles Town traders marks the beginning of the third phase of the Virginia Indian trade. From 1675 to 1720 the Virginia traders moved far beyond the borders of their own colony, encountering stiff competition along the way. Charles Town was settled in 1670 at a time when internal tribal conflicts allowed the colonists to forge alliances with some of the coastal tribes. By 1673 the Carolinians were trading with the Catawba. By 1690 they had reached the Cherokees, although intensive trade with them did not commence for another twenty years.

The Carolina trade differed markedly from the Virginia trade. First of all, trade played a much more important role in Carolina's economy. Virtually all of the early Charles Town fortunes were founded on the Indian trade. It was the primary occupation, source of income, and export in Carolina; in Virginia it ranked third after tobacco and beef. And since England's economy was by this time geared to process skins, profits came relatively sooner to the Carolinians.

Secondly, Carolinians carried trade goods on the backs of Indians instead of horses, which were scarce during the first decades of settlement. This, they claimed, drove their costs up in comparison to Virginia's. While one packhorse could carry around 150 pounds of trade goods, Indian "burdeners" could seldom handle more than 60 pounds. Their pay scale was far from uniform. Should the Indians decide that the amount agreed upon at the start
of the expedition was insufficient, they did not hesitate to drop their packs and demand more. Their salaries were directly proportional to the increasing likelihood of Creek ambush, and frequently they would refuse to go regardless of pay.

The most significant difference was the Carolinians's interest in slaves rather than in food or furs. To keep the supply of slaves coming they subcontracted a series of Indian wars, encouraging one tribe to attack another to capture slaves for the English. At least during the first few decades, the trade in deerskins placed a distant second to the trade in slaves, although Carolina's deerskin exports still outpaced Virginia's by a wide margin. On the average, 50,000 skins were exported from Charles Town annually during the years around the turn of the century, while Virginia averaged one-fourth to one-half that amount.

Indian trade goods were different in Carolina too. The first major objects of trade were not copper or beads but salt, tea kettles, and looking glasses.

Before the colony had officially been settled, Carolinians knew that Virginia Indian traders were active in the vicinity. While visiting a Westo village, one trader recorded seeing the natives fire "a volley of fifty or sixty small arms" which he believed came from Virginia. However, Carolina traders did not actually collide with Virginians until the 1690s. By that time the Carolinians had killed off or enslaved all of the coastal tribes and had begun to push further inland.

Disturbed by the prospect of competition, the Carolina assembly acted to eliminate it legislatively. In 1698 came the first attempt.
Somewhat naively, they passed a straightforward resolution, "that the Virginians be Prohibited from Tradeing in this Province."
The Board of Trade annulled the law in a ruling that should have surprised no one, and stated that the trade was to be open to all Englishmen.

Undaunted, and considerably more ingenious, the assembly modified its strategy. In 1701 it enacted legislation that "prevente[d] Horses [from] being brought by Land from the Northern Settlements into this Province." Since Virginia packtrains had to pass through Carolina to trade even with the Indians beyond Carolina's borders, the act was merely a more subtle attempt to eliminate the Virginia traders. But it was not subtle enough, and the Board of Trade struck it down.

In 1703 Carolina tried to discourage Virginians with tax legislation. They laid a 3 pence export duty on deerskins leaving their colony, whether bound for Virginia or England. When Virginia traders refused to pay what was for them, in effect, a double tax, their goods were seized. The Privy Council forbade this levy of duties.

With London so far away, the Carolinians began to realize that their most effective course of action was simply to ignore the instructions. After all, communications were slow. It took at least a year or two for London to disallow a law, and in the meanwhile, in their eyes, the law was enforceable. Carolina periodically seized traders and confiscated their goods. The loud protests this elicited from Virginia governors resulted in censure from London but the harassment, legal or not, continued.
In 1708 the Carolina assembly enacted a second tax law on Virginia trade goods passing in and out of Carolina. The Privy Council invalidated the tax. In 1711 and again ten years later the assembly required every trader to come first to Charles Town to take out a license before he could trade. Most Virginians ignored these laws and took their chances, but some actually traveled the extra few hundred miles out of their way to obtain a license until the Privy Council disallowed each of these laws too.

The Privy Council's obvious purpose was to prevent any hindrance to the expansion of trade. London officials and merchants were of the same opinion as one Virginia governor who warned, "If that Government [of Carolina] have power to restrain all but themselves from tradeing with the Western Indians . . . it will very much diminish the Trade of this Majestys Colony, and lessen the consumption of the manufactures of England, which are now vended in that trade." It was widely believed, though difficult to prove, that Charles Town traders were not selling English made goods but were carrying on "a Constant Clandestine Trade with Currasao and St. Thomas, and import[ing] European Goods from those places." True or not, the allegation did not incline the Privy Council toward the Carolinians.

Neither did the Virginia suggestion that a Carolina monopoly would result in French domination of the trade. Virginians played on the fear that, as soon as their southern neighbors had "Shutt Out the people of Virginia from Tradeing, they will raise the price of their Goods as they think fitt, the Consequence whereof will be that, those Indians who are near Neighbours to the French at Mishasipi, will be
Supplyed from thence whereby the Trade will be in Danger of being Entirely Lost, And the French have it in their power to make Use of those Indians to annoy Your Majestys Subjects in those Parts."
But the Carolinians could play the French card too. They routinely argued that unless they had sole control over who was to trade, "great mischief and danger to this province by the intrusions and approaches of the Virginia Traders" could not be prevented.
If the Indians were abused, they would assuredly turn to the French for friendship and trade.

The Tuscarora War (1711-1713) and the Yamasee War (1715) caused a temporary lull in the legal war between Carolina and Virginia. About 1709, half of the fifteen Tuscarora villages managed to capture the middleman position in the southerly flow of goods from Virginia to the Cherokees and Catawbas. They appear to have been quite successful in temporarily blocking Virginia traders from traveling beyond them, for Governor Spotswood wrote London that between 1709 and 1711 there had been "no Trade carried on from hence with any forreign Indians, the Tuscaruros only excepted." When the Tuscaroras revolted in 1711 against the Swiss and Palatine colony of Baron de Graffenried, killing 200 settlers and capturing many more, Spotswood suspended the trade until the captives were returned. Charles Town slave traders saw in the uprising a providential opportunity to line their pockets. Rushing an "army" of thirty whites and hundreds of Indians north, they captured and enslaved the recalcitrant Tuscaroras. The war ended in defeat for the Tuscaroras, and the few who remained alive moved north to join the Iroquois League. The
Virginia trade was thus relieved of yet another middleman. Trading resumed, only to be halted again in 1715 by the Yamassee War.

The joint Yamassee Creek uprising came as close to success as any Indian insurrection in the English colonies. The real cause of the war was colonial mismanagement of the Indian trade: the exorbitant prices and fraudulent transactions, the sale of rum, the slave trade, the personal ill-treatment of the Indians, the gross immorality of the traders, and especially the crushing debts that the Indians could not hope to pay. The ultimate failure of the insurrection can be traced directly to Cherokee neutrality, which stemmed primarily from their dependence upon English trade goods. As the Cherokees themselves told the Carolinians, if they were at peace with their ancient enemies the Creeks, "they should have not way in geting of Slaves to buy amunition and Clothing." The mention of slaves here is significant. It demonstrates that the Cherokees were dependent not merely upon English manufactured goods, but upon Carolinian suppliers, for Virginians did not deal in slaves. As the statement suggests, the Virginia trade with the Cherokees had, by 1715, dwindled to an inconsiderable trickle.

What had caused the Virginia traders to abandon their trade with the Cherokees? Certainly the great distances discouraged many. Whereas the Cherokee villages were only a three-week journey from Charles Town, Virginia traders had to travel two or three times that long. In addition, from 1698 to 1721, the Carolinians made things as difficult as possible with their legislation. Despite the eventual disallowal of all these enactments, they served their
intended purpose. Also, for a few years, the Tuscarora roadblock interrupted the passage of Virginia traders. Whatever the reasons, the export figures reveal a tremendous drop of 72% in the number of furs and skins leaving Virginia ports. During the years of 1699-1701, Virginia officially exported 5,970 beaver pelts, 62,685 deerskins, 44,064 raccoon skins, and a total of 24,462 other furs such as fox, bear, muskrat, and otter. During the period of 1713-1715, after Virginia had endured fifteen years of South Carolina's legal maneuvering, the Tuscarora interference, the Tuscarora War, and the Yamasee War, the official number of beaver pelts exported fell to 1,168, deerskins to 14,814, raccoon to 12,911, and the miscellaneous total to 10,429.

One group of Virginians who professed concern at the faltering trade was the Board of Visitors at the College of William and Mary. Voicing their distress to the governor and the Board of Trade, the gentlemen complained that the institution's main source of revenue, the export duties on furs and skins, was suffering from Carolina's trade restrictions.

Governor Spotswood, a vigorous proponent of strong commercial relations with the Indians, was also troubled by the languishing trade and moved decisively to bolster it. In 1714 he pushed through the House of Burgesses an act creating a government-sponsored monopoly called the Virginia Indian Company to promote trade with the Catawba and Cherokee tribes in particular. Recovery did not follow immediately, for Virginia honored the ban on trade during the Yamasee War, meant to prevent aid from reaching rebellious Indians.
But Virginia Indian Company traders were poised to leap into the void as soon as hostilities ceased. The Charles Town economy, crippled by the war, could not make an immediate recovery and, for the moment, Virginia re-established its hegemony in the Indian trade.

South Carolina was distraught. Her traders noted that the Virginians offered better prices, that they supplied better powder for guns, and that their use of packhorses permitted lower expenditures for transportation than the Charles Town traders who still relied on Indian "burdeners". Carolinians complained that the Virginians fanned Cherokee suspicions that Carolina traders had encouraged and supplied their Creek enemies during the Creek-Cherokee War, an outgrowth of the Yamasee War. Virginians were also accused of making a "distinction in the goodness of skins between Bucks, Does, and Light Skins" which resulted for a while in South Carolina receiving the poorer quality skins. The South Carolina Board of Commissioners instructed its traders to "maintain and keep up the Trade and Correspondence we have with these Indians, even if you should be obliged by the Virginians Dealings to abate considerable your usual Price." Abate they did, in 1716, 1717, and 1718, until after the Virginia Indian Company had been dissolved and most independent traders discouraged.

South Carolina's act of 1721 requiring a license to be obtained in Charles Town before trading was the last in its series of anti-Virginia legislation. This law was no different from the act of 1711 and the Board of Trade disallowed it as it had all previous attempts to exclude competition. But the act of 1721 was unnecessary. The
Virginia traders had reached the conclusion that, for the most part, it was no longer worthwhile to journey so far for so little profit.

With the creation of the colony of Georgia in 1733 the tables were turned on South Carolina. Charles Town traders, like the Virginians before them, were forced to defend their trade against the monopolistic designs of their neighbors to the south. By the mid-eighteenth century South Carolina, too, had been pushed aside, and Georgia became the southern colony most heavily engaged in the Indian trade.

North Carolina, the colony situated in the middle of the intercolonial squabble over the Indian trade, played almost no part in these events. Trade on more than a local scale required the capital of large planters and prosperous merchants, as well as direct mercantile connections with England, all of which were conspicuously absent in North Carolina during these years. But though they were unable to compete with Virginia's trade, they could interfere. Governor Spotswood made at least two complaints to the Board of Trade in 1710 that North Carolina was hindering Virginia's trade.

The third phase of the Virginia Indian trade began with the destruction of the Occaneechis which allowed Virginians to journey to the distant tribes beyond their colonial borders. It ended around 1725 when the Virginia traders ceased to play a meaningful role in the Indian trade. The fierce competition that developed during these years spawned several attempts by large merchant-traders and politicians to seize control of the trade.
CHAPTER VI
MONOPOLIES

The first person to attempt to obtain a monopoly of the trade was William Byrd I, who, it appears, had the foresight to understand the impending threat of Carolinian competition and the motivation to act on his perceptions. In 1683 he petitioned the Board of Trade for sole control of the Indian trade, but his request was ignored. Byrd died in 1704, leaving his son to face South Carolina's intransigence.

The monopoly idea next claimed the attention of Sir Francis Nicholson (1660-1728), the perennial colonial bureaucrat. Nicholson served as lieutenant governor of the Dominion of New England, governor of Maryland, governor of Acadia, and governor of South Carolina. He was governor of Virginia on two occasions: from 1690-1692 and from 1698-1705.

Nicholson found himself interested in the Indian trade almost immediately after his arrival in Jamestown. The fact that London had denied William Byrd's scheme ten years earlier did not deter him, and he first broached the subject in a report to the Council for Trade and Plantations. In proffering his advice, Nicholson was careful to appear neither monopolistic nor opportunistic: "I am told that some English are killed every year while hunting or trading . . . I think it would be well to send instructions
concerning the Indian trade. Were it entrusted to a Company, and were anyone, whether here or in England, allowed to subscribe, money could soon be raised to carry on the trade, increase the revenue and check Indian incursions."

Nicholson sent a similar letter to the Secretary of State and followed that up a few months later with more proposals for the formation of a company. His recommendations were ignored in London and shortly thereafter he was recalled.

Returning in 1698 for his second term as governor, Nicholson tenaciously picked up where he had left off. For over a year he corresponded with the Earl of Belomont in New York, discussing ways of extending the Indian trade to the Indians "at the back of Virginia and Carolina," probably the Cherokees. At this time he submitted a second recommendation to London for a trading company. He worked hard to convince the Virginia Assembly that his plan would benefit the colony, but he encountered as much opposition there as he did in London. When the colonists refused to purchase stock, Nicholson appealed to London merchants, at which point he was rather summarily informed by the Board of Trade that Virginia's purpose was to plant tobacco.

Nonplussed, Nicholson turned his attention to an intercolonial governor's conference to discuss schemes for the Indian trade. For various reasons, the conference never took place, but Nicholson persevered. In 1702 Colonel Robert Quary carried a letter to the Council of Trade and Plantations in which Nicholson systematically countered all of the Council's previous objections. Quary's role
was to argue personally for the governor's proposals. In spite of
his somewhat questionable past—he had been removed from the
governorship of South Carolina for alleged involvement in the
pirate trade—Quary must have had considerable influence or
Nicholson would not have entrusted him with so important a mission.

Nicholson's memorial once again urged the council to create
a company to handle the Indian trade. He pointed out that only an
extra 50 to 100 men would be employed by such a company, "and the
prejudice His Majestys revenues upon the Tobacco would receive both
in England and here, by their not planting of it, would be
sufficiently recompensed by the advantages of that Trade."
Nicholson also threw in several familiar arguments that had been
knocking around for a century. The monopoly—though Nicholson never
used that word—would secure the English frontiers "against the
incursions of the French and Indians, by trading houses and ports . .
as the French have between Canada and the Bay of Mexico." He hoped
that the company, if "rightly managed" from the start, might be able
to "out-doe the French in point of Trade with the Indians by
furnishing them with proper commodities, and cheaper," thus bringing
the Indians over to "our side, or at least not against us." The
company would also see to it that English traders lived among the
natives, so that "we may probably have an account by or from them of
any designs yt. the French or Indians may have upon the English; so
that we may not be surprised with them, wch we may now be."

Robert Quary performed his part well. The journal of the
Council of Trade and Plantations noted that "he said it would be
very much for the interest of England." But the Council was not persuaded and Nicholson's proposal was shelved.

This was good news to William Byrd II (1674-1744) who had inherited his father's position as the leading Virginia trader. The hostility between Byrd and Nicholson was no secret, nor was Byrd's antipathy towards Alexander Spotswood. Both governors were well aware that Byrd was not apt to prosper if monopoly legislation was enacted. Neither expected his support for their programs and neither received it. Byrd continued the Indian trade where his father left off, sending caravans of 50 to 100 horses to Catawba Town and smaller packtrains to the Cherokees. What little Indian trade there was during the 1720s and 1730s was still lucrative for Byrd and the few others who persisted in the trade.

The monopoly idea lay dormant for ten years. It was revived by Colonel Alexander Spotswood, Virginia's governor from 1710 to 1722. Spotswood was confronted by the problem of a declining Indian trade from the start of his administration. He no doubt saw that Nicholson's plan could be updated, modified, and extended to create a package that would solve all of Virginia's pressing Indian problems at once. It would provide the opportunity to improve Virginia's frontier defenses, check French expansion, increase the dependence of the tributary Indians upon the provincial government, reverse the declining trade figures, bolster trade revenues, and promote his personal fortune in the process. His first proposal was rejected by Virginia's Assembly in 1712 but two years later he managed to push through an involved plan entitled
"An Act for the Better Regulation of the Indian Trade by Empowering the Commissioners Therein Named to Manage the Same for the Sole Use, Benefit and Behoof of the Publick."

At the core of Spotswood's plan was the creation of a trading post named Fort Christanna and a trading company named the Virginia Indian Company. Henceforth, trade was to be conducted only at this fort on the Meherrin River, and only by stockholders of the company. Spotswood contended that three-fourths of the old trade had been lost to the South Carolinians. It was his hope to regain that portion for Virginia, or, more specifically, for his company. The Virginia Assembly accorded the company a twenty-year monopoly over all trade with the tributary Indians south of the James River and over all foreign Indians. In return, the company was to provide a number of public services: it would pay £100 toward the construction of a powder magazine in Williamsburg, erect a schoolhouse at Christanna for Indian children, and pay the salaries of one officer and twelve soldiers to garrison the fort.

Apathy greeted the first invitation to subscribe to the company, but Spotswood persistently appealed to leading citizens and obtained £10,000 with which to start. By 1716 operations were in full swing. Spotswood was so enthusiastic about the plan that he plunged into building the fortress at Christanna. Each of its five palisaded sides measured 100 yards and each of its five guardhouses contained a cannon. Roads were cleared, bridges were built, warehouses were constructed, and the school was completed. A group of about 300 tributary Indians, largely Saponi, were relocated at the site and
by 1715 over 70 children, Saponi with a sprinkling of Nottoway, were enrolled in the school. Charles Griffin, later the head of William and Mary's Brafferton Indian school, was employed as schoolmaster and Spotswood paid his £50 salary out of his own pocket.

Technically the Virginia Indian Company did not constitute a monopoly. Its books were open to all who wished to subscribe, and all stockholders had the right to engage in the trade. But by setting the minimum investment at £50, the Company in effect eliminated many of the small "selfe-ended traders." The wealthier merchant-traders were left in financial control of a trade conducted by their hired men.

Of all the attempts to form a trade monopoly, this plan had the best chance of success. Spotswood studied and benefitted from earlier plans and carefully avoided their flaws. The penalties specified for infractions were not overly harsh: those convicted of illegal trade merely forfeited their goods. The company was open to anyone in England or in any other American colony who wished to subscribe. By limiting the amount of an individual's subscription to £100, Spotswood sought to ensure that no one person or small group could dominate the company. It was not a monopoly in the strict sense of the word—indeed, Spotswood presented it to the Board of Trade as quite the opposite. "For a number of years," he wrote, "most of the trade had been in the hands of 5 or 6 persons—all living on the south side of the James River." He implied that his company would break the power of this existing monopoly.
The plan resurrected all the old pro-monopoly arguments. The company would maintain peace among the Indian tribes and between the Indians and the colonists by "prevent[ing] all fraudulent practices" of white traders, by enforcing trade prohibitions during Indian insurrections, by limiting all trade to one place, and by preventing any foreign Indian from coming within 300 yards of any English settlement. The friendly tributary Indians at Fort Christanna would provide a buffer against potentially dangerous foreign Indians to the west. The Indian school and the emphasis on the propagation of the Christian faith added religious appeal.

The act reiterated the familiar arguments about increases in the quantity of manufactured goods exported from Great Britain that were certain to occur and the benefits to be derived by the College of William and Mary from rising revenues, and made dire predictions about the insidious French. Spotswood thought to avoid the fate that befell South Carolina's many exclusive acts by including a paragraph at the end providing "that nothing in this Act contained shall be construed, Deemed, or taken to restrain any person, being a Subject of his Majestys other plantations, from trading with any Indians Tributary to this Government at Christanna for any Skins and furrs, which shall be purchased with goods Actually belonging to such inhabitants and brought by them from the Province or plantation in which they Reside . . . ."

Spotswood expected that his act would meet with approval in England. Certain that it was not necessary to wait for London's
reaction, he plunged ahead. With £10,000 of stock subscribed, he placed large orders in London and engaged in a flurry of building at Fort Christanna, including a house for himself. He planned to retire from public life and live at Christanna, managing his Indian company.

The "Act for the Better Regulation of the Indian Trade" was forwarded to England on January 27, 1715, and though it was received on April 6, it was not considered by the Committee for Trade and Plantations until May 16 of the following year. During this year, opposition to the act coalesced on both sides of the Atlantic, on the part of traders and merchants of Virginia, Maryland, and South Carolina on the one hand and the English merchants who supplied them on the other. By August 1715 the mood of the Virginia Assembly too had swung around. Burgesses from nine counties were sent with grievances against the act. The opposition stemmed from agitated traders outside the company who called for its repeal. Several merchants of Virginia and Maryland, fearing genuine competition from a successful company, collaborated on a written protest to the Committee for Trade and Plantations, asking for repeal of the act.

William Byrd II refused to subscribe to the company although he did not at first oppose it. As one of the "5 or 6 persons" Spotswood alluded to in his letter, Byrd stood to lose if the plan were implemented. If he joined the company, his profits would consist of regular shareholder's dividends. He must have calculated that splitting the pie into over 100 pieces would be less profitable than into 5 or 6, even if the pie was larger. Byrd bided his time,
waiting to see which way the wind would blow, and stated only that
his absence from Virginia—he was in London—was his reason for
not subscribing.

The unhappy English merchants, headed by Henry Offley, were
more vocal in their opposition to the Virginia Indian Company. They
realized that dealing with one large customer would yield smaller
profits. Equally as unpleasant was the appointment of London
merchant Robert Carey to the position of agent of the Virginia Indian
Company with the power to coordinate the company's purchases and to
sell its incoming skins and furs. This move effectively deprived the
London merchants of their middleman position by placing most of the
profitable activities in the hands of one man. Roughly £10,000
sterling worth of goods were purchased annually from England for the
southern Indian trade, with Virginia handling about one-fourth of the
total at this time. If the Virginia Indian Company was permitted
to continue, might not South Carolina follow the example? Even more
distressed were those merchants who, ignorant of the new act, had
recently shipped cargoes of Indian trade goods to Virginia and were
now faced with the dilemma of selling to a monopoly at lower prices
or shipping the goods back to England. Rallying around Offley, they
presented their complaints to the Board of Trade, urging that body to
disallow the law lest it cause higher prices to the Indians and drive
them into the arms of the French.

For the next fourteen months, Offley, as the representative
of the English merchants, and Carey, the English agent for the
Virginia Indian Company, bombarded the Commissioners with petitions,
memorials, objections, and opinions. Governor Spotswood was busy as well, sending letters across the Atlantic defending the company, answering objections, justifying his conduct in passing the act, and attesting to the smooth working of the Indian trade under the new arrangement. Thoroughly confused, William Popple, Secretary of the Committee for Trade and Plantations, "resolved to leave the said act . . . as probationary" until he could sift through the mass of conflicting information.

At this juncture the English merchants changed their tactics and their leader. Replacing Offley with Micajah Perry of Perry & Lane, they presented a new petition on April 17, 1717, and were granted another hearing in May. Their new argument was based on the charge that the "Act for the Better Regulation of the Indian Trade" was "contrary to the Governor's instructions and to several acts of Parliament." The legal technicalities raised by this line of reasoning were enough to prompt Popple to ask for a legal opinion from the Attorney General. His reply was received on June 19, 1717. "As to the act . . . it is in several instances against the law and the chief part of it (vizt) the excluding any persons from trading who are not of the Company under the penalty of forfeiting their goods is also contrary to law and several acts of Parliament whereby the right of British subjects to trade to the Plantations is preserved." On July 31, 1717, by Order of the Privy Council, the act was repealed. On August 30 the Committee for Trade and Plantations sent to Spotswood the order to repeal, advising the Virginia Assembly to pass regulations to assist in the
payment of compensation to the Virginia Indian Company for its preliminary expenses. While questioning the wisdom of Spotswood's actions, the Board exonerated him from all charges of misconduct. On April 23, 1718 Spotswood communicated the ruling to the Virginia Assembly and the Virginia Indian Company officially ceased to exist.

However, it continued to operate for several more years until all the loose ends could be gathered. In 1717 the company had sent a packtrain of 200 horses and 40 men to the Indians, probably the Cherokees, and the next year another caravan traveled to the Cherokees, returning after many months with 70 horses loaded with furs and four Indian chiefs who came to request increased Virginia trade. Another delegation arrived in Williamsburg in 1721, this one consisting of Chickasaws and Cherokees, to complain that "Factors of the late Indian Company had totally withdrawn their Effects out of their Country, by wch they were apprehensive they shou'd have no further Trade" with the Virginians. The Council merely expressed its friendship, dispersed gifts, and promised to allow interested traders to go to their villages.

Suffering from the absence of competition, the Cherokee tribes made a number of attempts to persuade the Virginians to resume trade. In 1734 three headmen came to Williamsburg to appeal to the council for more trade, this time offering to set up their own post on a branch of the Roanoke River so as to give Virginians more convenient access to their people. The council demurred. In 1751, after outbreaks of violence prompted South Carolina's governor to halt all
trade with the Cherokees, they again journeyed to Williamsburg, complaining that the governor of South Carolina "has furnished the Creek Indians, our Enemies, with Ammunition and other Necessaries and given them very distinguishing Tokens of Kindness." They asked for the reestablishment of "a Commerce" and promised that they would "make a Road to facilitate a Trade between us," and to "guard the Road and secure the Inhabitants of Virginia in passing to our Towns, and be accountable for any Loss they may sustain." The council responded in a friendly way, promising that "all due Encouragement" would be given to any Virginian so inclined.

When Attakullakulla, or Little Carpenter, came in person to entreat the council for closer connections, the council appeared even less interested than before. Governor Robert Dinwiddie replied by recommending the reestablishment of the trade with South Carolina whose location, he pointed out, was more favorable.

Dinwiddie seems to have experienced a change of heart though, and forty years after the demise of the Virginia Indian Company, the monopoly idea enjoyed a brief revival. In 1757 Dinwiddie and the Virginia Assembly appointed a board of trustees to take charge of Indian affairs and styled them the Virginia Company for Indian Trade.

And whereas the Cherokee Indians have requested that this government would regulate the trade with them, prevent abuses therein, and . . . to strengthen the peace and friendship subsisting between the said Indians and this colony . . . Be it therefore enacted . . . that the honourable Peter Randolph and William Byrd [III], esquires, Richard Bland, Archibald Cary, Thomas Walker, John Fleming, Thomas Tabb, and John Chiswell, gentlemen, be, and they are hereby constituted and appointed trustees and directors for the better
managing and carrying on such Indian trade . . . And be it further enacted, That it shall not be lawful for any other person or persons to trade with the said Indians without a license for so doing . . . and also without having executed a bond. 225

On July 10, 1766, John Stuart of Charlestown, the Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the Southern District of North America, wrote to the Committee of Trade and Plantations reporting the emergence of this company and predicting its detrimental effect on the Indian trade. The act was disallowed later that year on the grounds that, although private trade was not explicitly prohibited, the act in effect created an illegal monopoly. The Virginia Indian trade had 226 taken its last breath.

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, Virginia traders had been fighting a losing battle, first with South Carolina, then with Georgia. During the 1730s, South Carolina exported a yearly average of over 200,000 deerskins, while Virginia's total skin and fur exports hovered around 15,000 to 20,000. In the 1740s, Georgia absorbed much of the existing trade and opened new markets as well. She had several large warehouses in Augusta alone, full of trade goods, and five large boats that made four or five trips a year from Augusta to the Atlantic ports, each with a cargo worth £1,200 to £1,500 sterling. During these years, Virginia's total annual skin and fur exports were valued at an estimated £2,000. Between Augusta and the interior some 2000 packhorses led by some 600 men were used to transport trade goods. In Virginia a handful of merchant-traders such as William Byrd III employed a few dozen men to make occasional trips into Indian country.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Virginia Indian trade began before the first permanent settlement appeared in the colony. Over the years it had altered to such an extent that the trade of the eighteenth century bore little resemblance to its seventeenth-century antecedents. From water routes to overland trails, from the occasional short foray into nearby Indian towns to the lengthy journeys to tribes dwelling hundreds of miles away, from food to furs and skins, from copper trinkets to cloth and guns and rum, from the absence of competition to the bitter struggle for hegemony between colonies, the Indian trade gradually matured.

As distances grew longer and the amount of capital needed to back a trading expedition increased, the Indian trade took on more of the complexities of "big business" and the metamorphosis of the trader himself took place. The mariner-traders who followed the flow of trade goods from England to the Indians and back to England disappeared. In their place came the wealthy merchant-traders who supplied the goods and disposed of the skins and the hired men who actually conducted the trade.

Whatever their status, the Virginia traders were engaged in a losing battle to maintain the trade. They fought against the Indian

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middlemen who jockeyed for that profitable position, against fellow Englishmen in Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia who successfully sliced away portions of the trade, and against the encroaching Dutch and French.

The Virginia Indian trade peaked during the years between 1670 and 1700 when Abraham Wood, Cadwallader Jones, William Byrd I, and hundreds of "selfe-ended traders" trekked across the Virginia and Carolina countryside in pursuit of profit. The turn of the century brought the end of sizeable profits. The decline had been set in motion by the introduction of South Carolina's aggressive competition. With the exception of the brief revival sponsored by the Virginia Indian Company, the Virginia trade steadily diminished. By 1725 a South Carolina trader could truthfully record in his journal that "the Virginia traders . . . I am Certain cannot do any prejudice to Ours in the way of Trade, there no being above two or three of them and their goods no ways sortable or Comparable to ours."
APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY OF INDIAN TRADE CLOTH


broadcloth — a woolen cloth which is felted, entangling the wool hairs of the weft and warp so that it does not unravel when cut; English make.

dowlas — a coarse linen cloth made in the north of England and in Scotland, named for the district in Germany where much was made; used for bed sheets and as lining for clothing in the 17th cent.

duffield, or duffel — a coarse woolen cloth having a thick nap; first made in Duffel near Antwerp; some made in England especially Gloucestershire.

half-thicks — a coarse woolen cloth.

kersey — a coarse and ribbed woolen fabric manufactured as early as the 13th century and used especially for blankets, hose, and clothing; named for a village in Suffolk.

limburg cloth — made in Limburg province in the Netherlands; usually traded to the Indians by the French.

peniston — a strong woolen originally from Penystone in Yorkshire.

plain — a kind of woolen fabric of simple weave; primarily manufactured in Wales.

stroud — a coarse blanket material made in Stroud, 30 miles northeast of Bristol; famous for their scarlet color.

Information from Linda R. Baumgarten, Curator of Textiles, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation, Williamsburg, Virginia.
NOTES


4. Ibid., 227.

5. Ibid., 205. The amount represents roughly 5,000 pelts.

6. Ibid., 329. The fact that two relatives of the Hakluyts had been skinners by trade may have given them more than a passing acquaintance with the world of furs. Two uncles of the elder Hakluyt, Ralph and Richard (father of the younger Richard) were apprenticed by their father in 1510 to a member of the Skinner's company. Ralph died during his apprenticeship but Richard was later admitted to the company. He died in 1557, leaving his young son Richard ("the younger") to be raised by his nephew Richard ("the elder").

7. The gradual decline in the use of fur for clothing, which occurred throughout Europe beginning in the fifteenth century, is commonly attributed to two events: the shift in styles occasioned by the availability of luxurious fabrics (patterned velvets, brocades, gold trims, satins, and silks), and the development of more efficient methods of heating and constructing houses, which kept people warmer and alleviated the necessity of wearing very warm clothes indoors. Elspeth M. Veale, The English Fur Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1966), 142-145.


Ibid., 201.


Ibid., 331.


Smith, *Generall Historie*, 91.


The western tribes were Powhatan's traditional enemies. They consisted of five tribes of Monacans of Souian descent and twelve of Manahoacs. W. Stitt Robinson, "The Legal Status of the Indian in Colonial Virginia," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXVII (1959), 49.
Notes to pages 8-12


23 Smith, Generall Historie, 72.


25 Ibid., 484-566.


28 Smith, Generall Historie, 52.


30 Smith, Generall Historie, 65.


Hamor, *A True Discourse*, 15. This is the first mention I have found of manufactured items being traded by the Indians. Later Claiborne's operation on Kent Island gladly received Indian bowls, wooden and clay, rush mats, and other products. No doubt many other settlers were happy to have these useful articles, but there is no evidence that any ever reached England.

Morrison, "Virginia Indian Trade," *WMQ*, 2d Ser., I (1921), 220.


Clarence Alvord and Lee Bidgood, *The First Exploration of the Trans-Allegheny Region by the Virginians* (Cleveland, 1912), 149.


Morrison, "Virginia Indian Trade," *WMQ*, 2d Ser., I (1921), 221.

Ibid.

Craven, *Southern Colonies*, 196.

William Walter Hening, ed., *Statutes at Large* (Richmond, 1809), II, 140.

Ibid., 153.


Ibid., 315.

Ibid., 415.

Ibid., 350.

Ibid., 410.


Ibid., 255.

Ibid., 525.

Ibid., II, 215.
Notes to pages 24-27


66 W. Stitt Robinson, "Virginia and the Cherokees: Indian Policy from Spotswood to Dinwiddie," in Darrett B. Rutman, ed., The Old Dominion (Charlottesville, 1964), 27.

67 Hening, ed., Statutes, II, 69, 480. "Free trade" referred to the absence of restrictions on the items that could be traded; "open trade" to the absence of restrictions on who could trade.

68 Ibid., III, 468.

69 Ibid., I, 219.


71 Leather manufacture was but one facet of the assembly's design which included building iron works, planting mulberry trees for eventual silk manufacture, producing woolen and cotton cloth, and other schemes to manufacture products for use at home and for export.


73 Ibid., I, 307.

74 A 1634 report showed two ships laden with skins, furs, and tobacco from Virginia changed masters at Isle of Wight so as to avoid legal responsibility for violating the law. Noel Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers: Colonial Series, I (London, 1901-1913), 176.


77 Hening, ed., Statutes, I, 488-489.
Royal activity was limited to one occasion when the king directed the General Assembly to enact a provision that "it shall not be lawful for any person or persons whatsoever to export out of this his majesties colony of Virginia any untanned hides or deerskins." Hening, ed., Statutes, II, 483. This act would seem to have been unrelated to Virginia's leather industry. More likely it was meant simply to discourage the exportation of untanned skins, which were apt to rot on the long voyage to England.

So did Ralph Hamor who commented that the Captain was "not worthy of remembring, but to his dishonor." Hamor, True Discourse, 7.

Those who believe that John Smith's story of being saved by Pocahontas was a fabrication point to this incident as its origin.


Fleet, A Brief Journal, 237.

Hamor, A True Discourse, 40.

Kingsbury, ed., Virginia Company Records, IV, 110.
Notes to pages 33-37


91 Ibid., 95.


93 Morrison, "Virginia Indian Trade," WMQ, 2d Ser., I (1921), 225.

94 Hale, Virginia Venturer, 142.

95 John Leeds Bozman, History of Maryland (Baltimore, 1837), 266-267.


97 Ibid.


99 VMHB, I (April, 1894), 425-426.


101 That Claiborne's mother was named Sara and his wife Elizabeth is reason to believe that he named the ship, but not that he owned it, as has been suggested.


Among the men issued exploration permits were William Claiborne, Henry Fleet, Abraham Wood, Rice Hoe, Walter Austin, Joseph Johnson, and Walter Chiles. Hoe was a burgess for Shirley Hundred in 1642 and for Charles City County in 1644, 1645, and 1646. Austin, Johnson, and Chiles were burgesses for Charles City County in 1641 and 1642. Alvord and Bidgood, First Exploration, 101.
A "selfe-ended trader" might sign a promisory note stating his indebtedness. This would be filed with the local court until payment was made as agreed. A typical note filed in Henrico County in July 1699 reads in part: "I Godfrey Spruill of the County of Albamarle in North Carolina doe owe and stand justly indebted unto William Randolph . . . in the sume of sixty five pounds sterling . . ." The amount was to be repaid in Indian goods, "Viz. buckskins at two shillings per skin, Doo-skins at eighteen pence per skin, Bever at three shillings per pound Otter at three shillings per skin . . ." Mattie E. E. Parker, ed., North Carolina Higher-Court Records, 1697-1701 (Raleigh, 1971), 350.

In Virginia the names of only a few independent traders are known: Henry Hatcher, James Stewart, Robert Hix, and David Crawley. Both Byrd and Wood indicate that there were many others.

Parrish, "Fur and Skin Trade," 124.


Batts was no servant. He owned 5,878 acres of land and his brother was a burgess for Charles City County. Alvord and Bidgood, First Exploration, 184.

Ibid., 73.


J. Ralph Randolph, British Travelers Among the Southern Indians, 1660-1763 (Norman, Okla., 1973), 27.

Ibid., 22.

Alvord and Bidgood, First Exploration, 169-170.

Notes to pages 50-54


133 Hening, ed., Statutes, II, 336-338. Berkeley had earlier granted Bacon and Byrd a joint fur trading license, for which he was to have received a kickback of 800 pounds of beaver the first year and 600 pounds annually after that.


139 Ibid., 133. Swanton, Indians of the Southeastern U.S., 175.

140 Beverley, History, 232.


142 VanSchreven's Index.


144 John Phillip Reid, A Better Kind of Hatchet (State College, Pa., 1976), 35.

145 Crane, Southern Frontier, 109.
Beaver was sold by the pound. Pelts were very light and it took several pelts to weigh one pound. Although the exact capacity of a hogshead is not known (its size varied over the years), it would have held hundreds of pelts and weighed hundreds of pounds. One estimate places beaver as high as 35-55 shillings per pound, but this cannot be documented and seems unlikely. William Bradford said he had never known beaver to bring less than 14 shillings, and recorded the 1633 price at 20 shillings. It remained fairly stable around this figure until the second decade of the eighteenth century when it dropped to 4s6d. Lawson, Fur, 17.
Blue was one of the Indians' favorite colors, as were red and white. They disliked green, which they linked to snakes.

All of the material for Cadwallader Jones comes from one major source. Fairfax Harrison, "Western Explorations in Virginia between Lederer and Spotswood," VMHB, XXX (1922), 323-340.

The main source of revenue for the College of William and Mary was the export duties on furs and skins. This provision was enacted by the General Assembly in October 1693. Hening, ed., Statutes, III, 123-124.


Phillips, Fur Trade, 178.


Tinling, ed., Byrd Correspondence, 163.
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Ibid., 58-60.

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Not until after 1740 did the traders of a man named Vaughan discover the Warrior's Path through the mountains. Its discovery came too late: South Carolina and Georgia had acquired too firm a grip on the trade by this time to permit Virginia's re-emergence.

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Carolina's governor reported in 1708 that "the trade we have with them (the Cherokees) is inconsiderable, they being but ordinary hunters and less warriors." Rothrock, "Carolina Traders," E. Tenn. Hist. Soc. Publ., I (1929), 10.

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Crane, Southern Frontier, 127-128. In 1716 Indian burdeners, mostly Cherokees, received ½ yd. of stroud and a pair of stockings; several years later it had risen to ⅓ yd. of blue duffield plus ½ yd. of stroud. Finally it reached 2 yds. of blue duffield. Reid, A Better Kind of Hatchet, 82.

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Randolph, British Travelers, 34.

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Crane, Southern Frontier, 155-156.

181

Ibid.

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Notes to pages 69-74


185 Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 126.


191 Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 182.


193 VanSchreeven's Index.


The Maryland governor developed a fever. Lord Bellomont of N.Y., Nicholson's staunchest supporter, died. Colonies that had little contact with Indians showed no interest. The Carolinians were not invited.

Robert Quary was a long-time proponent of the Indian trade. Currently a judge of the vice-admiralty court of N.Y. and Pa., he had served briefly as governor of S.C. He was removed for alleged involvement in the pirate trade. However, his reputation seems not to have suffered. He succeeded Edward Randolph as Surveyor-General of His Majesty's Customs in America; he was widely traveled and became a member of the councils of five northern colonies at one time. A staunch foe of chartered governments or any other system that operated outside direct royal control, Quary seems to have also acted as a special agent of the crown, reporting from time to time on the conditions of the colonies. Shirley Carter Hughson, The Carolina Pirates and Colonial Commerce, 1670-1740 (Baltimore, 1894). Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, XX, 187.

Today one of these cannon sits in the front of the Wren Building of the College of William and Mary.
Notes to pages 80-85


212 Sainsbury, ed., Calendar of State Papers, XXIX, 143, 244.

213 Dodson, Spotswood, 80-89.


215 Crane, Southern Frontier, 116.


218 Ibid.

219 Ibid.


221 Robinson, "Virginia and the Cherokees," in Rutman, ed., Old Dominion, 30.

Notes to pages 86-89

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Hunter, Virginia Gazette (Williamsburg), August 16, 1751.

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Robinson, "Virginia and the Cherokees," in Rutman, ed., Old Dominion, 31.


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