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Revitalization or extirpation: Anglo-Powhatan relations, 1622--1644

Michael J. Puglisi

College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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REVITALIZATION OR EXTIRPATION:

ANGLO-POWHATAN RELATIONS, 1622 - 1644

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Michael J. Puglisi
1982
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

[Signature]
Author

Approved, August 1982

James L. Axtell
James P. Whittenburg
Thad W. Tate
DEDICATION

To my parents and family, without whose support I would not have reached this level, and especially to my lovely wife Claudia, whose constant encouragement, advice, and help have played an invaluable part in this thesis.
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PREFACE

Researching Anglo-Powhatan relations is an interesting yet sometimes difficult endeavor. The existing records relate the treaties, the military campaigns, and the official relationships between the two groups, but discovering the motivations which influenced both ethnocentric cultures proves more challenging. The researcher must dig beyond the surface of the written records to examine such areas as cultural priorities, religious beliefs, geographical positions, and physical needs. In order to do so, the primary sources naturally provide the best clues, but current interpretations, including anthropological outlooks, are also helpful.

The early phases of the struggle are, for various reasons, much easier to research than the period preceding the second uprising. First, many Englishmen left accounts of the new colony in hopes of attracting new settlers. Second, some early Virginians wrote detailed histories of the colony's first years. Third, the Virginia Company records were quite complete until its dissolution in 1624. For these reasons, Samuel Purchas' *Purchas His Pilgrimes*, John Smith's *Generall Historie of Virginia*, and Susan Kingsbury's *Records of the Virginia Company of London* are valuable sources for the initial encounters between the colonists and the natives. They also help to uncover the attitudes held by the two groups.
The second phase, especially during the 1630s, is more difficult to research because two of the main sources of information mentioned above were no longer produced. Englishmen no longer needed to write attractive works on the New World, and the Virginia Company was abolished. The best sources to replace Kingsbury for this period are W. N. Sainsbury's Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, and his various abstracts of early colonial records in the Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. Also, William W. Hening's Statutes at Large and H. R. McIlwaine's Minutes of the Council and General Court of Virginia and Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia provide some help.

Researching the inter-uprising period, however, requires much more than examining what anyone at the time recorded. One must look at the physical realities which existed, at times unnoticed by one group or the other. Specifically, the land records provide the key, and Nell M. Nugent's Cavaliers and Pioneers is invaluable. In addition, Irene W. Hecht's dissertation "The Virginia Colony, 1607-1640: A Study in Frontier Growth" aids in interpreting the evolving situation in the colony. As for ethnological information on the Powhatans, William C. Sturtevant's Handbook of North American Indians and Ben C. McCary's Indians in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, along with various works by James Mooney and Maurice Mook, provide a look at the tribes' changing position, both physical and cultural, during the period.

Finally, understanding the person of Opechancanough is important in the study. Of course, the "emperor" left no personal records, so the only existing view of him comes through the eyes of the English, his lifelong enemies. Still, the picture is impressive. Robert Beverley's History and Present State of Virginia relates a fairly contemporary
image, while J. Frederick Fausz's "Opechancanough: Indian Resistance Leader" provides a fine current evaluation of the chieftain.

The study of Anglo-Powhatan relations is a fascinating subject, but one that requires digging further than the superficial records of treaties and battles if one is to discover the motivations behind the actions. Often the search appears fruitless. The information exists, however, though usually not in neat packages. No source points concurrently to the attitudes of both cultures at any given time during the struggle. Rather, it is left to the historian to evaluate the information at hand and to present the changing nature of Anglo-Powhatan relations during the crucial period between the uprisings of 1622 and 1644.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor James Axtell, under whose guidance this investigation was conducted, for his advice and encouragement. The author also appreciates the help provided by Professor Emeritus Ben C. McCary and Professor Helen C. Rowntree. Finally, thanks go to Professor James P. Whittenburg and Professor Thad W. Tate for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript.
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to observe the changing relationships between the English colonists and the Powhatan Indians in Virginia during the 1620s and 1630s, and thus to discover the motivations behind the conflict which erupted in 1622 and 1644.

Contemporary English writings, geographical distributions in the colony, and population figures of both groups, were examined as were the conflicting cultural and physical needs of the natives and the settlers. This examination indicated that both the tangible and intangible avenues of intercourse between the English and Powhatans changed significantly during the first four decades of the colony's existence.

As a result of these changes, the sources of conflict also shifted. While the English goals and position in Virginia evolved prior to 1644, the Powhatans' response to the challenge remained one of opposition and often violence.

However, this thesis suggests that the primary motivations for the conflict changed from cultural in 1622 to physical by 1644. In response to English conversion efforts, the Indians' revitalization movement provided the best indication that the first uprising resulted from cultural tensions, while the English expansion and declining Powhatan population of the 1630s implied that in 1644 the Indians fought for physical survival. The loss of both struggles brought the Powhatan Confederacy to its knees while the English reigned supreme in Virginia by the middle of the seventeenth century.
REVITALIZATION OR EXTIRPATION:

ANGLO-POWHATAN RELATIONS, 1622 - 1644
INTRODUCTION

In 1622, the Powhatan Indians under Opechancanough rose up in a bloody assault against the English settlers in tidewater Virginia. Twenty-two years later the natives again rebelled in one last effort to drive the Europeans from America. The colonists presented a challenge to the natives' way of life, and the Indians responded forcefully to the threat posed. Both sides in the struggle held strong convictions about their respective places and needs, and these convictions caused the tensions which led to open conflict. The explanation of Anglo-Powhatan relations, however, goes beyond military campaigns and treaties. Both sides chose to fight rather than submit because of their respective need for cultural and physical survival.

Before 1622, the main tension was cultural in nature. The English occupied a small portion of tidewater Virginia, and the Powhatans could have avoided contact with the settlers, if the English had allowed them. But, these particular Englishmen were aggressive, and one of their professed goals was to civilize and convert the Indians. The English attitudes were not unique and reflected typical European ethnocentric ideas toward the New World. The Powhatans, however, were also ethnocentric and remained steadfast opponents of any cultural mixing. Opechancanough designed the uprising of 1622 as a stroke for Powhatan cultural integrity, and the English war effort from 1622 to 1632 was a struggle for the defeat of what they described as "savagism" in America.
When the Powhatans rebelled again in 1644, the major sources of conflict had changed. While cultural integrity still occupied Opechancanough's mind, this uprising represented the Powhatans' final effort to drive the English from their land. The English population in Virginia rose sharply during the 1630s, and the Powhatans were increasingly caught in a vise between the colonists and the unfriendly piedmont Indians. Land and related physical necessities became the main causes of friction by 1644. Already wracked by disease and starvation, their population dwindled, and once-powerful Powhatans had no place to go as long as English settlers remained on their traditional lands. The only logical course of action in Opechancanough's eyes was a second uprising.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Powhatan resistance to the English settlement of Virginia was virtually nullified. Although Opechancanough remained the key to the natives' struggle throughout the period, the sources of the conflict changed between 1622 and 1644. When the threat to the Indians shifted from cultural to physical, their fate was assured. The English population increase and geographical expansion during the 1630s secured the permanence of the colony and the outcome of the struggle which had to result in the elimination of one culture or the other.
CHAPTER I
CULTURAL CONFLICT AND WAR, 1622-1632

On the morning of March 22, 1622, Indians of the Powhatan Confederacy entered the homes of the English colonists in Virginia along a seventy-mile stretch on both sides of the James River. As on any other morning, these seemingly peaceful natives carried fowl, deer, and other provisions which they traded to the English. The Indians, however, came not to trade but to carry out a plan designed to drive the white intruders from their territory. In one swift, well-planned assault, warriors from the tribes under "Emperor" Opechancanough's control killed nearly 350 colonists. But the attack failed to dislodge the English from Virginia and, in the end, actually did the Indians more harm than good. The "massacre" of 1622, as it was termed by contemporary Englishmen, was a reaction against English threats to the Powhatans' way of life and was largely a result of Opechancanough's efforts to protect the culture of his people. Because of the strong, proud culture which the Powhatans maintained, especially in relation to the emperor's revitalization movement, a conflict of expulsion between the equally ethnocentric English and Indians became probable if not inevitable. The decade from 1622 to 1632 marks the first phase of the decisive struggle for cultural survival, and although they fought stubbornly against great odds, the Indians were destined to lose.

The story of Anglo-Powhatan relations during the 1620s begins at the time of initial contact between the two groups and the conceptions
which each group formed of the other. Virginia Indians probably had not learned to hate Europeans by 1607, as some have maintained. The Powhatans may have had knowledge that the white men could mean trouble, but it is unlikely that they recognized the English as a strong, permanent force when the settlers first landed on the north shore of the James River.\(^1\) Both groups, however, quickly formed attitudes, based both on preconceptions and experiences, which significantly guided their actions in the following decades.

Two of the professed goals of English colonization were to convert the native Americans to Christianity and to civilize them in the European way. English writers dismissed Indian religion as devil worship and hoped that the Christian example would rescue the natives from their heathen beliefs.\(^2\) The Virginia Company of London also shared these goals, as English authorities felt a duty to bring civility to the Indians. The English saw the hand of Providence in the discovery of the New World, and believed that God intended for them to populate the land and educate the natives according to His Word.\(^3\) This belief reveals the basic ethnocentric attitude with which the English entered North America. This attitude was not unique to Englishmen and was shared by all Europeans who approached the New World. They saw themselves as agents of a universal plan which the Indians had no natural rights to resist.

English clergymen, especially, believed that the Indian priests, or shamans, represented the major obstacles to conversion. The shamans were the pillars of Indian religious integrity and order, but the Europeans saw them only as Satan's representatives among the natives.\(^4\) In 1621, the Reverend Jonas Stockham summed up the clergy's feelings against Indian shamans when he suggested that, "till their Priests and
Ancients have their throats cut, there is no hope to bring them to conversion." This attitude toward the priests reveals that the English recognized the strength of the Powhatan religion, even though they would never admit it. Indian religion was central to Indian culture, and Stockham's severe advice actually represented the only way that the English could have transformed the native society, in the face of the Powhatans' steadfast resistance. Few Europeans recognized the existence of a formal Indian religion and those who did disregarded its validity. After the uprising, George Wyatt advised his son, Governor Francis Wyatt, that "Religion is the bond both of Peace and War . . . ." The colonists in Virginia would have been much better off if more Englishmen had recognized this fact earlier and realized that the Indians believed the same.

The English believed that the Indians were basically similar to Europeans, and that all signs of incivility would disappear once they were shown the finer aspects of English life. The goal of converting the Indians extended far beyond the limits of religion and included all aspects of culture. In reality, the English sought to restrain the Indians' "savage" instincts and reduce them to a state of total dependence. In providing the natives with what they considered an infinitely superior way of life, the English saw no harm in totally remaking Indian society to fit European expectations. In effect, they considered it a great advantage to the Indians to accept the new image. The ethnocentric English saw their culture as the basis for judgment and disregarded the Powhatan system largely because it differed from their own. The idea of "savagism" in America, which presented a civilization devoid of formal social arrangement, laws, political authority, and religion, preceded the settlement of Virginia. Despite the
complexities they observed in native society, most Englishmen chose to persist in their generalization of savagism, which gave purpose and justification to the European role in America.9

The settlers of Virginia also had more practical reasons for working toward the civilization of the Indians. To be successful, the colony had to show a profit, and most of the Virginia Company officials believed that conversion offered the best assurance of both economic and physical survival. Although most Englishmen held idealistic beliefs about proselytizing the native Americans, it was also true that the company and colonial officials were opportunistic in their colonization efforts.10 The colonists regarded the Indians as treacherous, but because of their vulnerable position, they had no other choice. They must have understood, subconsciously if not openly, that the Indians would fight for their land and their culture rather than submit.11 This idea presents a paradox between the ideological writings of company officials in London and the experiences of settlers in Virginia. While English writers could believe in the natural superiority of their culture, the colonists surely recognized the frightening realities of their existence with the Indians.

The best way to reduce the Indians to civility, by removing what the English saw as an undesirable state of independent pride, was the adoption of Indian children into English homes to learn the Christian way of life.12 The settlers, however, found that the Indians were "very loath upon any tearmes to part with their children."13 The English did not realize that the bonds between parent and child were tight in Powhatan society, and that to give up their children would have represented, in effect, an abandonment of their cultural future.
One area in which the English felt infinitely superior to their native counterparts was technology. While the settlers expected the Indians to stand in awe of European innovations, the Indians recognized that much of the new technology had no use in Virginia. The Powhatans clung tenaciously to their traditional culture, to a large extent because they found it superior in their environment. They saw little worth emulating in European culture and adopted only isolated innovations to augment the survival of their own culture. In fact, they compared their own condition to that of the initial settlers and found themselves to be in a much better state. During the early years of the colony, the Powhatans had no reason to believe that their society and technology were in any way inferior to that of the English, or that the gods could possibly love the miserable English any more than they did the prosperous Indians.

The Indians possessed a heightened sense of pride and self-dignity which allowed them to discourage most of the early English expansionist efforts and cultural assaults. They were able to survive the colonists' efforts to transform Indian life and to keep their society intact, though the cultural pressures multiplied with each passing year. The Indians proudly chose not to cooperate in their own cultural collapse, and the English could not understand the nature of their resistance.

Throughout the early decades of the colony's existence, the settlers depended upon trade with the Indians for much of their food supply. This fact represents a marked contrast to the English goal of reducing the natives to a state of total dependence. Initially, the Indians shared generously with the colonists, but they lacked the resources or the desire to feed themselves and the English. Unwilling
or unable to provide for themselves, the colonists took a highhanded approach and backed their demands with force, thus adding increased tension to Anglo-Powhatan relations. Tragically, the English never quite recognized that they were involved with a strong, traditional society, and the concept of native savagism persisted. Upon the Powhatans' "contineweing their mallice Ageinste [them]" in the face of unreasonable demands, the English "Cutt downe their Corne[,] Burned their howses and besydes those wch they had slayne browghtt some of them prisoners to [their] foarte." Unfortunately, the colonists did not alter their attitudes toward the Indians during the following years.

Powhatan was willing to outwait his adversaries, employing a strategy of attrition, striking back whenever possible, and relying on mobility rather than direct assaults. The situation was complicated, however, because not all of Powhatan's subordinates agreed with his methods. Opechancanough, his brother and the chief of the powerful Pamunkey tribe, disliked the passive policy and resented the apparent submission to the English. Though never disloyal to Powhatan, Opechancanough looked forward to revenge against the aggressive Englishmen. When Powhatan abdicated in 1617, Opechancanough overcame his brother Opitchapan in a power struggle and took control of the confederacy. The position of emperor or chieftain as an institution meant nothing in itself; power depended on personal charisma and military strength, which both Powhatan and Opechancanough possessed. Even the English recognized the new emperor's qualities and described him as "a Man of large Stature, noble Presence, and extraordinary Parts," who "caused all the Indians far and near to dread his Name." Although the English
initially felt secure with the new chieftain, he intended to make them also dread his name.

Opechancanough's top priority after 1618 was to strengthen and revitalize his people's culture in the face of English aggression. Anthropologists define revitalization as "a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture," and includes a "strong emphasis on the elimination of alien persons, customs, values, and/or material" from the environment. The culturally tense situation in Virginia set the perfect stage for Indian revitalization and provided a dangerous threat to an already uneasy peace between the dominant English and the struggling Indians. The Powhatans had all of the characteristics of a native society in need of reform. By 1618, they were wracked by disease and starvation and, for this reason, probably felt that the gods were displeased with them. They were in the process of attempting to strengthen their society, which indicates that they found fault with Powhatan's earlier attitudes toward the English. Finally, the Indian leaders believed that the gods intended for the Indians to remain physically and culturally distinct from the invaders, and Nemattanew, a charismatic mystical leader who became very popular among the Powhatans personified this belief.

The role of Nemattanew as an intercessor between the Indians and their gods was essential to Opechancanough's revitalization efforts. These reform movements must include the belief that the gods favor the Indian people, and Nemattanew provided the vital link between the unassailable authority of the supernatural beings and the oppressed humans. For this reason, he set himself apart from the people,
transfigured both spiritually and physically. The English knew Nemattanew as "Jack of the Feathers" because "hee commonly was most strangely adorned with them." The Indians believed that he was "immortal from any hurt could bee done him by the English." 

By 1620, English pressure on Indian culture was becoming unbearable to the point that the Powhatans' peaceful alternatives were drastically inadequate. They could give in to the English demands on their culture and land, which amounted to cultural suicide, or they could retreat further inland, which would result in physical suicide because of their piedmont enemies. The only other alternative open to the Powhatans was to launch an all-out attack designed to drive the English from Virginia. Opechancanough liked the chances of this alternative's success by 1620, and apparently, most of his followers shared his opinion. For four years after 1618, the emperor bided his time while the threats to Indian culture multiplied. By 1622, the cultural tension reached a crisis level, in the Indians' eyes, but Opechancanough's revitalization movement was at its peak, and the Powhatans enjoyed unprecedented unity and solidarity.

In light of the existing situation, Opechancanough became convinced that continued peace with the English meant only losses of corn, land, and culture for the Powhatans, so he formulated an intricate plan to annihilate the intruders. The foundations of this plan included two essential components. First, Opechancanough concluded a formal peace with the colonists to make them feel secure and to give the Indians more freedom of movement, and the English were more than happy to accommodate the emperor. Second, he appeared willing to cooperate in the conversion of his people to Christianity. In late 1621, Opechancanough met with George Thorpe, the closest any Virginian ever came to
being a missionary, and "willinglye Acknowledged that theirs [Indian religion] was nott the right waye, desiringe to bee instructed in ours [Christianity] and confessed that god loved us better then them."\textsuperscript{30} Thorpe was driven by a typical ethnocentric paternalism toward the Indians, but he must also have been very naive. What Opechancanough suggested amounted to an unthinkable heresy in the Powhatan religion, and if Thorpe had taken a realistic look at the situation, he would have seen the impossibility of such a drastic reversal by one who had long been a steadfast opponent of English culture. The emperor counted on blind acceptance of his suggestion by the English, and they did not disappoint him. Not surprisingly, the English blamed "that treacherous Infidel" for their confusion in light of the uprising, when in reality they themselves lost sight of the true situation with the Indians.\textsuperscript{31}

Opechancanough's personal power was at an unprecedented height in early 1622, and waiting to launch his attack could only diminish his authority. Actually, he certainly decided by the summer of 1621 that if the Indians did not act soon, the English would overwhelm them. All he needed was an excuse to launch his long-awaited stroke for freedom.\textsuperscript{32}

This opportunity came in early March, 1622, when two colonists killed Nemattanew after accusing him of murdering their master, a Mr. Morgan. Some historians have claimed that Opechancanough cared little for Nemattanew and that the chieftain actually made statements against him, but it is unlikely that the emperor would have disliked the charismatic leader of his revitalization movement.\textsuperscript{33} If he did make such comments, Opechancanough probably did so in an effort to lull the English into a false sense of security, in the same manner in which he cooperated with Thorpe. Similarly, after Nemattanew's death he
"cunningly disenabled his intent," and assured the colonists that "he held the peace so firme, the sky should fall before he dissolve it."34

The colonists probably felt as if the sky had fallen in on them after close to 350 were killed in the Powhatan uprising of March 22, 1622. Any successful assault requires a defined objective—to relieve some potential threat—and Opechancanough's goal was readily apparent. He was not limited by the traditional, often almost recreational, nature of Indian warfare. He determined to kill as many of the English as possible, and thus to convince those who survived that they should give up their Virginia settlement.35 The English regarded the Indians' method of deceptive attack as treacherous and barbarous, but the element of surprise was a vital part of primitive warfare. The Indians, who generally preferred offensive to defensive action, relied on the effects of swift mobility and efficient fire to shock their adversaries. As Robert Beverley wrote in 1705, "whatever was not done by Surprize that Day, was left undone, and many that made early Resistance escaped."36

Despite the fact that many escaped, the attack was well-planned and well-executed, and the English were fortunate that their loss was not much greater.

The uprising of 1622 clearly demonstrated that the Powhatans did not share the English goal of conversion and civilization. They showed the European intruders that they would not accept assimilation and that they would fight to remove the cultural threat rather than submit to it. Unfortunately, for Opechancanough and his people, the assault failed to obliterate the English or to dislodge them from their grasp on Virginia. Despite the loss of over one-fourth of the total population, enough Englishmen survived to keep the colony alive.
Figure 1:
TIDEWATER VIRGINIA INDIAN TRIBES

1. Accohannoc
2. Accomack
3. Appamatuck
4. Arrohsteck
5. Cantauncack
6. Caposepock
7. Cattachiptiono
8. Chesapeake
9. Chicakhominy
10. Cuttatawman I
11. Cuttatawman II
12. Kecoughtan
13. Kiskiack
14. Matchotic
15. Mattaponi
16. Meherin*
17. Menapacunt
18. Moratico
19. Nansatico
20. Nansemond
21. Nantajntscund
22. Nottoway*
23. Opiscockan
24. Orapaka
25. Paraconosko
26. Pamareke
27. Fumunkey
28. Faspahgh
29. Piakatank
30. Pissaseck
31. Potaunk
32. Patowmek
33. Powhatan
34. Quackohamock
35. Quiyoughcohanock
36. Rappahannock
37. Secacawoni
38. Shamapem
39. Tappahannock
40. Tauxenent
41. Warraskoyack
42. Weanock
43. Werowacomoco
44. Wicocomoco
45. Youghtanund

*Eastern Iroquoian, not under Powhatan control
Although the Virginia colony survived the uprising, the immediate response was an increase of fear and paranoia, the intended result of the Indians' shock tactics. In order to eliminate the threat of renewed attack on the outlying settlements upriver, Governor Wyatt and the Council ordered all of the survivors to concentrate in a few central locations. They decided to hold "James Cyttie, wth Paspehay, and Certen Plantacons one the other side of the river over against the Cyttie, and Kickoghtan and Newports news[.] Southampton hundred, Flowerdei hundred, Sherley hundred & a Plantation of mF Samuell Jourdes[Jordan]." Each settlement was placed under a military commander, and all other plantations were at least temporarily abandoned.

In April, 1622, the Council informed the Company that the first priority was to find a suitable location for defense and asked for permission to move to that location, possibly on the Eastern Shore. The Company, as expected, opposed the plans and called the relinquishing of Charles City, Henrico, the Iron Works, the College Lands, and Martin's Hundred "things not only of discontent, but of evill fame." The colonial executives apparently resented the Company's attitude, based largely on the desire for profit. They responded on January 20, 1622/23, that the plan for removal "was a thinge only in dispute & speculations" and had been given up. The Governor and Council, however, upheld their actions, defiantly maintaining that the "quittinge of soe many Plantations was absolutely necessarie, and wee more willinglie suffer a reprooff in preserving your people, then Comendatione in their hazarde." This exchange reveals the dichotomy between the visionary desires of the Virginia Company officials and the realistic experiences
Figure 2:
EARLY VIRGINIA SETTLEMENTS

1. Falling Creek  
2. Sheffield's Plantation  
3. College Land  
4. Henrico  
5. Piersy's Plantation  
6. Charles City  
7. Berkeley Hundred  
8. Westover  
9. Swinhow's Land  
10. Weyanoke  
11. Southampton Hundred  
12. Jamestown  
13. Martin's Hundred  
14. Newport News  
15. Kecoughtan  
16. Warrasqueoc  
17. Martin's Brandon  
18. Ward's Plantation  
19. Spilman's Plantation  
20. Flowerdew Hundred  
21. Maycock's Plantation  
22. Merchant's Hope
of the colonists. Both of these factors influenced English policy toward the Indians.

The letter of August 1, 1622, in which the Company discouraged the abandonment of the outlying plantations, also placed the blame for the destruction upon the colonists and their neglect of proper worship. Edward Waterhouse wrote shortly after the uprising that "the hearts of the English [were] ever stupid, and averted from believing any thing that might weaken their hopes of speedy winning the Savages to Civilitie and Religion." The Company absolved itself of any mistakes in the conversion effort, despite its previous encouragement to the colony, and the governor and Council forcefully rebutted these accusations. "You may be pleased to Consider," they wrote in January 1622/23, "what instructions you have formerly given us, to wynn the Indyans to us by A kinde entertayninge them in oF howses, and yf it were possible to Cohabitt w * * * ur * * * . . . ." The colonial officials considered the censure "unworthie of our sufferinge yf not of our industrie." The colonists claimed that the Company officials in London did not understand the situation in Virginia and were concerned only with profit, even at the expense of the colonists' security.

In reality, neither side fully understood the nature of their relationship with the Powhatans. The colonists pointed to the formal peace concluded with Opechancanough as an excuse for their unpreparedness. They failed to recognize that the peace was not stable; it was more a continuing struggle in which the English had temporarily gained the upper hand. In no way, however, were the Indians willing to submit to English aggression. Although an insecure peace existed from 1614 to 1622, underlying tensions remained between the two parties. The
English maintained a deep conviction that the Indians were uncivilized savages and the Indians an equally strong belief that it was essential to preserve their culture. The colonists and the Company officials blamed each other for the uprising, but neither side was innocent. Also, neither party seems to have considered that the Powhatans themselves possessed the capability to rebel against the aggressive nature of English policy.

One of the few Englishmen to take a more objective view of the Powhatan uprising was George Wyatt, the governor's father. While pointing an accusing finger at neither the Company nor the colonial officials, the elder Wyatt afforded the Indians a just respect for their strategy. "I doe not with contempt reccon of them as cowards, as our common opinions esteemes , . . ." he wrote to his son in 1624. "For their flight, it is the manner of their fight. They as we were wel ware not to stand still to receive bullets in their bosomes." Aside from praising the Powhatan's hit-and-run strategies, Wyatt recognized the death of Nemattanew as the logical spark of the uprising. While he favored revenge, he was one of the few Englishmen to advise Governor Wyatt to practice equity in distinguishing between innocent Indians and those responsible for the uprising. After 1622, examples of English humanity toward the Indians became increasingly rare.

The English attitude toward the Indians changed to the image of an unredeemable and hopelessly debased savage. In the aftermath of the uprising, Englishmen more and more adopted the idea that the natives had "'no paticular propertie in any part or parcell of that countrey, but only a generall residencie there, as wild beasts have in the forests.'" The Indians lost any trace of human characteristics in the eyes of
English writers, and the natives were derided even in British poetry. One work, dedicated to the theme of the "Late Massacre in Virginia," described the Indians thus:

For, but consider what those Creatures are,  
(I cannot call them men) no Character  
Of God in them: Soules drown'd in flesh and blood;  
Rooted in Evill, and oppos'd in Good;  
Errors of Nature, of inhumane Birth,  
The very dregs, garbage, and spawne of Earth; . . .  
Sprung up like vermine of an earthly slime,  
And so have held b'intrusion to this time.  

Instead of misguided natives deserving of Christian conversion, the Indians became "Errors of Nature," unworthy of humane treatment. Many English writers, and especially Waterhouse, saw God's work in the uprising as a sign to the English that He desired "the more speedy conversion of the Children of those Savages to himselfe, since hee so miraculously preserved so many of the English." As for the adults, Waterhouse was certain that through the tragedies befallen the English in Virginia, the hand of Providence was clearly "making way for severitie there, where a fayre gentlenesse would not take place." While Waterhouse and others admitted that the colonists had made mistakes, they still maintained that God intended the attack to arouse the English to drive away those Indians who refused conversion. The general consensus in English writing after 1622 reflected the desire for swift and full revenge of the Indians, "a people so cursed, a nation, ungrateful to all benefitts, and uncapable of all goodnesse." The English advocated an unceasing war to eliminate the uncooperative natives. Even the poet Christopher Brooke advocated the "extirpation of that Indian crew," and encouraged Governor Wyatt to effect "An expiable warre unto the dead." After 1622, English policy toward
the Indians turned from optimistic and paternalistic hope of conversion to unrestrained enmity, segregation, and contempt.

The colonists in Virginia shared the opinion of their cousins in England that the only solution to the Indian problem was complete extermination of the Powhatans, or at least the removal of the tribes from the English claims. The uprising "gave the English a fair Pretence of endeavouring the total Extirpation of the Indians," wrote Beverley, "but more especially of Oppec [h] ancanough, and his Nation."51 The emperor was seen as "a haughty, politic, and bloody Man, ever intent on the Destruction of the English, and ready to catch at every Pretence, for effecting his Purpose."52 This description was probably intended to insult the Indian leader, but at least it recognized that the Indians would not rest until they had driven the English from Virginia or died trying. The periods of uneasy truce which occurred during the two decades following 1622 should not be mistaken for a resignation on the part of the Indians in any way. The House of Burgesses summed up the situation in the colony when it declared, in 1623, "The termes betwixt us and them are irreconciliable," and the only hope the English had of survival involved "the charge of driveinge [the Indians] away . . . ."53

While the Virginia Company ordered the colonists to take revenge for the uprising, it also advised them to "observe the rules of Justice." But the governor and Council replied that they held "nothinge injuste, that may tend to theire ruine, (except breach of faith)."54 English writers realistically believed that conquering the Indians was easier than civilizing them because "a conquest may be of many, and at once; but civility is in particular, and slow, the effect of long time, and great industry."55 Obviously, the Virginians had
given up any intention of converting the Indians. After the uprising, the Indians were to be eliminated by the quickest and safest means the colonists could muster.

A few Englishmen advised against the extirpation of the Powhatans because they provided a potential labor force in Virginia. Despite this possible advantage, the English never seriously considered Indian servitude. They feared and hated the natives, and sought only to exclude the Powhatans from the area.56

During the summer and fall of 1622, the colonists began to take physical reprisals on the neighboring Powhatan tribes in the form of organized raids, scattering the Indians, killing some, taking their corn, and burning their towns. Although the Indians' mobile tactics made revenge difficult, the English claimed by the end of 1622 to have "slaine divers, burnte theire Townes, destroyde theire Wears, & Corne."57 Whether or not the colonists' claim that they killed more Indians in 1622 than in the previous fifteen years combined was accurate, the aftermath of the uprising held serious implications for the Powhatans. Opechancanough apparently overestimated the success of the attack for some time because at the end of March, he boasted to Japazaws, chief of the Patowmeks, "that before the end of two Moones there should not be an Englishman in all their Countries."58 The emperor disregarded the possibility that those colonists who survived the uprising would have the fortitude to seek revenge. When it finally became obvious to Opechancanough that his plan had largely failed in its major objective of driving the English from Virginia, he must have realized that the price to his people would necessarily be an increased struggle, not only for their cultural integrity but also for their very existence.59
The events of the next two decades, however, were to reveal that Opechancanough was not about to shrink from the challenge.

Though the colony survived the uprising, it was left in a miserable condition, and a serious food shortage ensued. When the colonists abandoned most of their outlying plantations, they also conceded most of their fields and neglected their planting. Many destroyed what little corn there was before it was mature to prevent it from falling into the Indians' hands and to avoid the danger of ambushes. The colony depended on trade, almost entirely, for sustenance, and anyone who could acquire any corn to sell in Jamestown could make a sizeable profit. The governor's Council repeatedly attempted to regulate the grain trade because it "was usually carried on by Men of Substance, to their own Gain and Advantage." The colony naturally turned to England for help, but not much grain arrived to relieve the famine.

The Company replied to the colonists' request on August 1, 1622, that it had no corn to send. Instead, it took the opportunity to lecture them against their habit of overplanting tobacco. All of the letters received in London during 1622 and early 1623 reflected the extreme situation, and the famine proved almost as tragic as the uprising itself. Sir Nathaniel Rich reported before the Company "That the people now remayning in the Colony are but few," and "they are most weake and miserable beeing in danger to be ruyned by famine and by the hands of th' Indians." Despite the food shortage, the Company provided little aid in the way of grain. It did, however, send more settlers, thereby compounding the strain on the Virginia plantations. In 1622, fifteen ships arrived, carrying between 670 and 700 people, and the next year, the Company sent thirty-one vessels, with between 405 and 410 new settlers. The officials in London, who not only
refused to accept any blame for the uprising but also denied the colonists' pleas for help, apparently expected the colony to resume normal operations on its own.

The wake of the uprising clearly revealed the weaknesses and mismanagement of the Virginia Company. It became obvious to the crown that the Company was too inefficient to handle the affairs of the colony. In late 1622, a group of Virginians petitioned King James I to assume control of the colony, and in 1624, a royal commission in Virginia reported that "Theire generall desire is to bee immediately under the government and protection of his Majestie." In response to the controversy, Charles I revoked the Virginia Company Charter in 1624, making Virginia a royal colony.

With no hope of direct aid from England, the colonists were forced to rely on internal trade, generally for corn from the Indians. The only tidewater tribe with which the English maintained peaceful relations immediately after the massacre were the Patowmeks. At the time of the uprising, Captain Henry Spelman and Captain Ralegh Croshaw were trading with the tribe, and Croshaw remained at Patowmek because the English recognized the importance of keeping Japazaws "as an opposite to Opechancanough, and adher[ing] him unto us, or at least mak[ing] him an instrument against our enemies . . . ." While Croshaw was at the Indian town, Opechancanough sent the Patowmek chief two baskets of beads with a request that Japazaws kill the English traders. After two days of deliberation, the chief returned the gift and warned the Pamunkeys "to come no more into his Country, lest the English, though against his Will, should do them a Mischief." Not only did the Patowmeks pledge their allegiance to the English and trade freely with them, but
they also aided the colonists in obtaining corn from other tribes along the Potomac River. Japazaws gladly sent "40 or 50 choise Bow-men to conduct and assist" Captain Ralph Hamor in a raid on the Nacotchtanks, the Patowmeks' enemies. Hamor's force acquired a large quantity of corn, and the Patowmeks took great joy in slaying eighteen Nacotchtanks. The colonists undoubtedly welcomed these opportunities for Japazaws to confirm his loyalty to the English, but unfortunately, the English did not feel an obligation to uphold the agreement.

On June 17, 1622, Governor Wyatt commissioned Captain Isaac Madison "to go into the River of Potomack . . . and assist the king of Patomack, against his and our enemies, and to defend them and theire Corne to his utmost power." Unfortunately, Madison did not trust the Indians as Croshaw did, and he separated himself from them as much as possible. When late in the summer an exiled Patowmek erroneously informed him, through the interpreter Robert Poole, that Japazaws had agreed to a plot with Opechancanough, Madison panicked and grossly overreacted. He locked the Indian king, his son, and four other Indians in his strong house and "fell on the Town with . . . his Company, and slew thirty or forty Men, Women, and Children." Although Japazaws truthfully denied all knowledge of the plot, Madison took him and his son captive and proceeded to Jamestown. Despite the king's innocence, the Patowmeks still had to provide corn as a ransom for his return. Madison's actions proved to be unfortunate for the colonists and destroyed the alliance concluded by Croshaw, which would have been valuable to the English. Instead of strengthening their agreement with the willing Patowmeks, the colonists revealed their own
hostility to yet another tribe. All of the commissions for trade in
the Potomac region in the fall of 1622 ordered "either of warr or
trade, Corne be procured from the Indians, by whose Treachery we have
been hindered this p'sent yeare."\(^7\) The colonists dwelled upon the
treachery of the Indians who carried out the uprising, but they appar­
ently felt no guilt at their own senseless attack on their ally's town.

Tragedy struck the English on the Potomac in April, 1623 when
Captain Spelman and eighteen of his men were ambushed by the Pascoticons,
a Conoy subtribe. These bold Indians even attempted to attack the
pinnace Tiger, an unprecedendted action. The colonists avenged the
Pascoticons the following fall, but they still failed to recognize
their own highhandedness as the cause of such assaults. Peter Arundel
was one of the few colonists who realized that "Wee ourselves have
taught them how to bee trecherous by our false dealinge with the
poore kinge of Patomecke that had alwayes beene faythfull to the
English." "Spilmans death is a just revenge," he added and admitted
that the whole incident could have been avoided it the English had
grown their own provisions.\(^7\) As long as the colonial government
allowed the forced trade to continue, however, the colonists neglected
to plant corn.

Without corn obtained from the Indians, the colony would not
have survived the famine which followed the uprising of 1622. Despite
the necessity of this trade, Governor Wyatt and other officials
attempted to discourage it and to encourage the planting of corn.
According to Wyatt, "nothing can be more dishonorable to o' nation,
then to stand in need of supplies of o' most necessarie food from these
base Salvages."\(^7\) The governor and the General Assembly repeatedly
passed prohibitions on trade. The strongest effort appears to have occurred during the spring of 1624 when the Assembly prohibited "all trade for Corne with the salvages as well publick as private after June next." Despite these proclamations, Virginians increasingly became as interested in trade, if not more so, as they were in fighting with the Indians, and no quantity of laws passed by the colonial government daunted the Virginia traders. The Privy Council even entered the picture during the late 1620s when it forbade "all persons whatsoever to receive into their houses the person of any Indian or to parley, converse or trade with them" without permission from the governor. As the colony grew stronger, however, the trade with the Indians only became more widespread.

Physical recovery in the colony was remarkably rapid, and many colonists reclaimed their fields in time to plant in the spring of 1623. Most of the letters received in London that summer reflected a "hope to make a good crope, both for tobaco and corne." Certainly, by all reports, the colony had sufficient grain stores to eliminate any possibility of a continued famine by late 1624, but it is unlikely that harvests alone were responsible for the improved situation, since the efforts to prohibit the Indian trade continued throughout the decade.

The record of expansion after 1622 contradicts the colonists' apparently helpless condition. The census of 1625 revealed that the population had risen to over 1,200 people, the approximate level prior to the uprising, and that the colonists had spread out from their central locations to inhabit thirty separate settlements. In this desire to return to their land, the colonists were driven not by need
to plant corn, but by greed to plant tobacco. Although the price of tobacco fell from a high of 1s8d per pound in 1622 to a low of 2d in 1630, Virginia increased its annual exports of the weed from approximately 60,000 pounds in 1622 to as much as 1,500,000 pounds by the end of the decade. As they were returning to normalcy and even prosperity, however, the colonists were involved in a declared war against the Powhatans, and the greed for land probably attracted as many colonists to fight as did the desire for revenge.

The second Anglo-Powhatan war (1622-1632) fully revealed the attitudes which the uprising uncovered. After 1622, there were no more false pretenses; the Indians unleashed their long-suppressed hostilities, and the colonists openly displayed their hatred of the natives. Just as the Powhatans were fighting for cultural survival, the English had a similar concern. They felt that defeat at the hands of the Indians meant the obliteration of civility and the triumph of savagism, but extirpation of the Indians represented a triumph over savagism. This attitude, compounded by the colonists' desire for land, deepened the resolve of both parties in the struggle.

In August of 1622, Governor Wyatt and his Council resolved "to make warre upon Opachankano, with 500 men, hopinge by Gods helpe this winter to cleare the Country of him and setlinge the Colony in a farr better estate, then it was before." The odds were heavily stacked against the Indians because the colonists formulated a plan designed to drive them from the region by starvation. The Powhatans' determination, however, was revealed in their ability not only to withstand the settler's assaults but also to wear down the English war effort.
Indian warfare totally frustrated the colonists. The English believed that Providence intended for them to inhabit the region, but try as they might, the colonists could not effectively drive the Powhatans from the peninsula by conventional means. Not understanding the value of mobility in the natives' strategy, the English misinterpreted them as "very timorous when they come to Action," and noted that the Indians "rarely perform[ed] any open or bold feats;" but rather, relied "chiefly on Surprize and Ambuscade."82 The natives employed the strategy of hit-and-run, but at no time could they be accurately described as timorous. Their tactical principle was to use fire power and mobility in conjunction, which involved getting away once the objective was accomplished or the conditions became unfavorable. Although war played an important role in Indian masculinity, they were not ashamed to retreat from a superior force.83 As much as the English decried Indian warfare, they soon became convinced that traditional methods were unsuited to the Virginia environment.

The colonists' determination to starve the Powhatans into submission reveals that the English subconsciously recognized the advanced level of the native culture, though they would never openly admit as much. Although seventeenth-century Englishmen had no concept of sociological terms, a modern definition serves to support Powhatan civilization. One of the accepted characteristics of a civilized society is a predominantly sedentary lifestyle based on agriculture. According to this definition, the English gave grudging recognition to the Powhatans' highly developed civilization in reasoning that they could drive the Indians out of the region by depriving them of their corn.84 The colonists turned not only to a strategy of starvation but also adopted the same treacherous methods of which they accused the
Indians. The Englishmen "pretended Articles of Peace, giving [the Indians] all manner of fair Words and Promises of Oblivion," enticed them to plant their corn, "and then . . . cut it up when the Summer should be too far spent to leave them Hopes of another Crop that Year." The English completely justified their treacherous strategies in their writings but continued to refer to the Indians as untrustworthy savages.

The first significant Indian assault after the uprising occurred on September 9, 1622, when they killed two men working in a cornfield at Captain Thomas Nuce's plantation in Elizabeth City. Using the stalks as cover, the natives ambushed two more colonists the next morning, before destroying most of the crop. The English mounted their first large-scale expedition since the declaration of war in October, when Sir George Yeardley and Captain William Powell "tooke each of them a Company of well disposed Gentlemen and others to seeke their enemies." According to English writers, at least, the colonists involved in the war were gentlemen, while the Indians were treacherous savages, though they both had the same goals and eventually employed the same strategies.

After sacking the towns of Nansemond and Warraskoyack, Yeardley's force next sailed up the York River to Pamunkey, Opechancanough's seat. The emperor escaped the colonists' clutches, but they found most of the Indians "exceedingly astonished, and pretending, much to desire Peace, and to give them any Satisfaction in their Power." This apparent submission, however, was only a method of procrastination, which fooled the colonists for nearly two weeks while the Pamunkeys hid their supply of corn in remote areas. Doubtless the English, unwilling to admit they had been outmaneuvered, numbered this incident among their examples
of Indian treachery. Finally, the colonists discovered the Pamunkeys' actions and carried off what corn remained at the town. A poem written by "a gentleman in that Colony," presented an exaggerated and over-optimistic view of the expedition.

So to Opachankenowes house,
they marched with all speed:
Great generall of the savages,
and rules in's Brothers steed.
But contrary to each man hopes,
the foe away was fled:
Leaving both land and corne to us,
which stood us in great stead.

... The Indianes flie, and we I hope shall nere more want indure:
For those that put their trust in God,
shall of his grace be sure.
Now Deere and Swine and Turkies,
will dayly so increase:
That faire Virginia, will I Hope,
prove plentifull by peace.89

Virginia, however, did not enjoy peace, and the colonial government concerned itself with raising a force to serve as a running army in opposing the Powhatans. Although the governor and Council reported in January, 1622/23 that "300 [men] were thought to bee the lest number to assault Apochancono him selfe [\ldots] there could nott be levied above 180 men, wherof 80 at least were only serviceable for Caryinge of Corne."90 The Crown even became involved in the efforts to raise an organized force. To the Virginia Company's "humble Suite \ldots for certaine old Cast Armes remayning in the Tower," the king "graciously condiscended."91 Although the Privy Council felt the antique munitions--suites of armor, iron shields, halberds, and murdering pieces--were unsuited for modern European warfare, the Crown assumed they might have been effective against the primitive natives. Actually, the outdated weapons were of little use in Virginia.
In the spring of 1623, Opechancanough sent two Indians to Martin's Hundred "with a messuage ... that blud inough had already been shedd one both sides, that many of his People were starved ... & that they desired they might be suffered to plante at Pomunkie, and their former Seates." The English finally seemed to have learned a lesson because they did not blindly accept this offer of peace on its face value. Instead, they welcomed it as an opportunity to commence a strategy of their own. By agreeing to a peace, the colonists hoped the Indians would "grow secure upon the treatie, and we shall have the better Advantage both to surprise them, & to cut downe their Corne." In effect, the English planned to employ the same strategy against the Powhatans in 1623 as the Powhatans had employed against them in 1622. The colonial government also took due precautions, ordering plantation commanders to keep constant watch and reminding all colonists not to go about unarmed. The English obviously gained no comfort from the peace offer, despite the opportunity it afforded them.

The colonial officials planned to carry out their plan on May 22, 1623, when they sent Captain William Tucker to Patowmek to secure the release of the English prisoners and concluded the peace with Opechancanough. After many "fayned speeches" of peace, Tucker suggested they seal the agreement "in a helthe or tooe in sacke which was sente of porpose ... to poysen them." The English estimated approximately 200 Indians were poisoned by the wine prepared by Dr. John Potts. In addition, at a given signal, the English negotiators fell to the ground, and the force accompanying Tucker "gave in a volie of shotte" into the crowd of Indian chiefs. The colonists thereafter believed that Opechancanough was among those killed, but
the emperor somehow escaped the treacherous assault. Sometime during the same month, Opitchapan, whom the English regarded as the "lawful Emperor," sent word to Governor Wyatt proposing a plan to either capture or kill Opechancanough, but nothing resulted from the proposition.

The governor and Council optimistically reported to the Company during the early summer of their "succesfull stratageme" by which they "cutt of some kings, and divers of the greatest Comanders of the Enimy, amongst whom wee are assured yt Apochancono, it beinge ympossable, that he should escape." The colonists hoped that the assault would discourage the Indians into submission, but conversely, Opechancanough survived and the conflict continued. The House of Burgesses declared in February, 1623/24 that "Our Govr, Counsell and others have used their uttermost and Christian endeavors in prosequitinge revenge against the bloody Salvadges . . . ." The English continued to see their own strategy as based on Christian principles.

The climax of the second Anglo-Powhatan war occurred in the autumn of 1624 with a two-day, open-field battle between 800 Indians and eighty-four Englishmen. The Indians, mostly Pamunkies, were fighting "nott only for safegarde of theire hówses and such a large quantetie of Corne, but for theire reputatione wth ye rest of the Salvages." Although they claimed victory, the English noted the "greate resolutione" of the Indians, who "shewed wt they coulde doe, havige maintayned the fighte two days together, and much therof in open fielde." In the end, the colonial force succeeded in destroying the Indians' corn, and the dismayed natives finally gave up the fight.

Despite the English boasts of success against the Indians, the Assembly continually warned the colonists to properly arm themselves and look to the defense of their settlements. These constant admonitions
reflect not only the English fear of a renewed attack but also their frustration at not being able to eliminate the Indians. By 1625, however, many colonists became more interested in planting tobacco than in fighting Indians, and the colonial government had to make an active effort to counter the complacency. After the important battle in late 1624, both sides began to realize that total annihilation was impossible. Enthusiasm for the war declined, and the organized English raids tapered off.

John Smith, who estimated the English population in Virginia at somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 in 1627, wrote that the colonists rarely saw any Indians near their settlements. Aside from a few isolated ambushes, the Indians had not attempted any attacks since 1625. During the late spring and summer of 1627, however, the colonists began to fear renewed assaults by the Powhatans, and the Assembly ordered a campaign against all neighboring villages on August 1. In October, the colonial government authorized a force of volunteers collected from the whole colony to attack Pamunkey. Raising forces to undertake any campaigns against the Indians was increasingly difficult by the late 1620s, and the colony stood to gain little from these expeditions.

The English constantly reported, almost from the time of the uprising, that the Indians desired peace, but in April, 1628, the General Court resolved "not to make any peace or dishonorable treaty wth them, & to give order that none of them should come to our Plantations." The colonial officials did agree to a truce in August of that year, in order to gain the release of some captives, but intended to honor the peace only until they saw an easy opportunity to break it.
This they did in January because the colonists had become neglectful of their guard, and the Indians had ignored the conditions of the treaty. The Assembly proclaimed that after February 20, 1628, the war was to resume, and in 1629, again ordered regular raids against the Indians throughout the year.\textsuperscript{104}

As late as the summer of 1632, the General Assembly regarded the Indians as "irreconcileable enemeyes" and forbade any unauthorized contact with the natives. The governing body even instituted a penalty of one month's service or twenty lashes for any person caught speaking to an Indian.\textsuperscript{105} In September, 1632, however, the colony agreed to conclude a formal peace with the Pamunkey and the Chickahominy tribes, but it was clearly an uneasy peace with which the colonists did not feel secure. The Assembly continued to refer to the natives as enemies and repeated its proclamation against unnecessary parleys between Englishmen and Indians. The colonists were even warned to continue preparations for defense and to carry their guns with them to the fields and to church.\textsuperscript{106} The peace of 1632 ended the second Anglo-Powhatan war, but it removed neither the doubts nor the determination with which each side regarded the other.

The story of Anglo-Powhatan relations during the seventeenth century was one of the challenge presented by the English intrusion into Virginia and the Indian response to the threat it posed. It became evident that the conflict would lead to the elimination of one culture or the other because both sides involved in the struggle remained steadfast in their convictions. The Powhatans preferred death to cultural submission, but the English did not recognize that Powhatan culture was worth fighting for. The result of the uprising of 1622 and the ensuing war was the permanent exclusion of the
Indians from tidewater areas controlled by the English. The Powhatans fought desperately in their attempt to drive the colonists from Virginia, but by 1632, they were forced to move further inland as the English domain expanded. Opechancanough, his people hampered by starvation, was forced to concede the first round of the conflict to his English rivals, but he represented the Indians' stubborn struggle for cultural survival. As long as Opechancanough lived, so too did the Powhatans' pride, courage, and resiliency. During the ensuing decade, however, English expansion placed increased pressure not only on the Indians' culture but also on their physical existence.
CHAPTER II
STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1632-1644

For a full decade after the Powhatan uprising of 1622, the English colonists in Virginia and their Indian counterparts engaged in an active war. The colonists, spurred by the idealistic writings of Virginia Company officials and the reasonable fears of further Indian assaults, sought complete revenge for Opechancanough's effort to drive the English from Virginia. What initially commenced as a long-awaited stroke for Powhatan freedom quickly evolved into an English crusade to exterminate the Indians, or at least to remove the tribes from the area of English settlement. Fortunately for the Powhatans, the colonists soon tired of the venture. When the colony agreed to the formal treaty with the Pamunkeys and the Chickahominies in 1632, a new phase in Anglo-Powhatan relations began. But, the underlying tensions remained, and in 1644, the Powhatans rose again in bloody revolt. They were motivated not primarily by cultural pressures, as they were previously, but by the more serious threat posed to their very existence as the English domain expanded. The failure of this last major uprising resulted not only in the death of the aged chief-tain, who represented the Indians' stubborn resolve, but also hastened the humiliating subjugation of the once powerful Powhatans by their English conquerors.

Prior to 1622, the English were driven by the professed goals of converting the Indians to Christianity and civilizing them in the
European way. The Powhatans likewise held strong ethnocentric beliefs, and they resisted all of the English cultural assaults. After the uprising and the ensuing second Anglo-Powhatan war, however, the colonists abandoned their efforts to acculturate the Indians and instead turned to more practical matters, such as land acquisition, tobacco cultivation, and trade. Opechancanough's tribes, depleted by starvation and disease, could only watch the English advance and bide their time while the intruders confidently encroached further onto Indian lands.

Although the Virginia Assembly concluded the formal peace in September, 1632, the government still regarded the Indians as enemies, not to be trusted under any circumstances. Colonists often complained to the General Court of "mischiefs" done by the natives, and in February, 1633/34, Governor John Harvey reported to the Privy Council that although the colony was "upon fair terms" with the natives, they were to be doubted and the colonists to "stand at all tymes uppon [their] guarde." In fact, during the summer of 1632, the Assembly issued several commissions for expeditions against the Indians, who the colonists persisted in labelling "our irreconcilable enemies." No record of the causes or results of these actions remains, but they attest to the continuing tensions between the two groups, despite the peace settlement.

The uprising of 1622 and the following conflicts confirmed the English suspicions that the Indians were treacherous, cunning, and hostile. Realizing that the assumed obligation of converting the natives was unnecessary and even futile, the colonists finally abandoned these attempts as a result of the hostilities. During the 1630's, the idealistic writings of company officials no longer existed to influence the settlers, and they began to concentrate on their own
livelihoods. For the most part, the settlers who came to Virginia after the dissolution of the company were not agents of a conversion effort but farmers who regarded the Powhatans only as obstacles to geographic expansion. The early colonists needed the proximity of the native population both for the corn it provided and for the opportunity of fulfilling the mission in Virginia. By the 1630s, however, Englishmen welcomed the removal of the Indians from potential tobacco fields. The colonists could not make the Indians disappear, but after 1632, the natives apparently retreated far enough up the peninsula to allow English planters increased freedom to expand.

Though not totally defeated in the war, the Powhatans were definitely weakened by the conflict. Some historians have characterized them as "terrified into a suspension of arms," but more probably the Indians voluntarily welcomed a return to peaceful farming and the opportunity to strengthen their depleted society. Opechancanough recognized the limited results of his actions. The chieftain apparently accepted the peace in hopes of rebuilding his people for a future assault on the colonists. Unfortunately for the Powhatans, English expansion during the next decade negated whatever gains the Indians made.

The toll on the Powhatan population between 1622 and 1632 was significant, but the hunger, exposure, and psychological shock which resulted from the English tactics proved much more costly than the military conflicts themselves. Undoubtedly, the drastic reduction in numbers experienced by the Indians played a major role in bringing about the uneasy peace of the 1630s. While there can be little doubt that the food shortage was responsible for much of the Powhatans'
suffering after 1622, the increased role played by European diseases on the weakened natives is not so clear. Certainly, disease, whether of European or American origin, must have seriously affected the famine-struck Indians. Only a combination of various causes could have produced the severe decrease in population experienced by the natives. In any case, the English definitely did not destroy the Powhatans as a direct result of the uprising; they accomplished the goal through slower yet still effective methods.

During the 1630s, the most outstanding development affecting Anglo-Powhatan relations was geographic expansion by the English, not only throughout the peninsula but into other sections of tidewater Virginia as well. At least by the beginning of the decade, the colony initiated a general northward movement toward the York River, and the relative success against the Indians made such a policy feasible. On October 8, 1632, the Virginia Assembly approved an act "for the securing & taking in of a tract of Land . . . bordering uppon the dheife residence of ye Pumunkey King." Actually, this tract of land on the York River was over twenty-five miles below the forks, where Opechancanough lived, but the move represented an important step in securing English dominance over the peninsula. The colonial government offered liberal land rewards to anyone who pledged to settle immediately in the area, and the effort proved remarkably successful. Once established, the Chiskiak settlement, named for the Indians native to the area, grew rapidly. The significance behind the seating of Chiskiak was the opportunity it provided to create a strong line between the York and the James, and the long-awaited pale between the heads of Archer's Hope Creek and Queen's Creek became a reality. In theory at least, the palisade excluded the Powhatans from the lower
peninsula, but the structure probably would not have seriously ob­structed a concerted Indian attack. The pale's practical purposes were to reinforce the colonists' confidence and to provide an enclosed range of approximately 300,000 acres for their livestock.

Although settlement had spread up the James River to the area designated as Henrico prior to 1622, relatively few colonists returned to the outlying plantations after the uprising. Fear of Indian violence tended to discourage most Englishmen from venturing too far beyond the security of the lower peninsula, and during the 1620s the population concentrated in the older, established areas. The pale potentially could have done as much to confine the settlers inside the peninsula as to exclude the Powhatans from the region. In this respect, Opechancanough recognized some accomplishment, but the line fixed between the two groups did not last for long, as the colonists soon regained their confidence and sought to expand geo­graphically by the mid-1630s.117

A land boom beginning at that time is reflected in the Virginia patent books. The existing records for the first four decades of the colony's existence are understandably incomplete, and prior to 1635 the evidence appears especially lacking. No evidence exists to explain such a sharp land surge as is reflected in the records; so conceivably, Virginia's land boom may have begun somewhat earlier than 1635.118 In any case, certainly by the mid-1630s land was increasingly in demand in the colony. This new wave of acquisition contrasted with that of earlier periods in various ways. Prior to 1624, for instance, only twelve percent of all the patentees who received land from the Virginia Company actually planted or seated their claims. Conversely,
under the post-1624 headright system, most colonists who acquired patents had a definite interest in the development of the colony, and thus generally improved the land. The landowners were no longer company shareholders with large, unseated paper grants but planters who imported servants to settle and work the land. Additionally, between one-half and two-thirds of all land patents issued from 1635 to 1639 conveyed tracts of 500 to 2,000 acres, the optimal size for a private commercial tobacco plantation.\textsuperscript{119}

As during the earlier period, a large percentage of the land patented between 1635 and 1640 was situated in the counties representing the lower peninsula: Elizabeth City, Warwick River, southern Charles River, and southern James City.\textsuperscript{120} In addition to settlement in these established areas, however, the Virginia colonists spread in increasing numbers far up the peninsula along both the James and York Rivers, into northern James City, Charles River, Charles City, and Henrico. On the south bank of the James River, Warrasqueoc, Isle of Wight, Upper Norfolk, and Lower Norfolk Counties all experienced a sharp influx of settlers during the period. By this aggressive expansion, the colonists not only broke through the buffer zone which evolved out of the decade of war, but placed increased pressure on the major Powhatan tribes inhabiting the affected areas.

At least as early as 1635, colonists began to patent large amounts of land in the more remote sections of Charles City and Henrico Counties. Although the company established settlements in both areas prior to 1622, Opechancanough's uprising virtually destroyed the outlying plantations, and the land records reflect that during the ensuing decade, few new colonists dared inhabit the frontier. Prior to the
mid-1630s, these two counties possessed only a small proportion of Virginia's English population. In 1635, in addition to filling in central James City County, along the pale, Englishmen began to patent tracts on the western boundary of the county, on the lower reaches of the Chickahominy River, especially in the area of Checroes Creek. Further inland, colonists eagerly sought land from the Weanock section in Charles City all the way up to the area of Four-Mile Creek, Varina, Curles Neck, and Arrohateck in Henrico County. At the same time, the settlers branched off from the James and seated a number of tracts along the lower Appamattox River. Although some settlements had existed in most of the above areas prior to 1622, the English apparently made little effort to renew expansion upriver until the mid-1630s. The dormant period benefitted the Powhatans, but the sharp, subsequent development only multiplied the pressure on their native lands with each passing year.

The trend initiated by 1635 continued and expanded during the decade. In James City County, settlers continued to inch up the Chickahominy until by 1639, patented land reached as far as five miles from the mouth of the river. Settlement also swelled and extended along the upper James River, as patents approached the fall line in 1636. At the end of the 1630s, numerous colonists had patented tracts at the falls of both the James and Appamattox Rivers. Within a period of five years, or slightly longer accounting for the deficiencies in the surviving land records, the English increased and strengthened their domain in Virginia with amazing speed and efficiency.

On the south side of the James River, "over against the Cyttie," settlement almost exclusively occurred along the riverfront, especially
in Warrasqueoc County, renamed Isle of Wight in 1637. Across from Jamestown, colonists ascended only a short distance up Lawnes Creek, Lower Chippokes Creek, and Upper Chippokes Creek, but since few Indian villages existed in the immediate area, this trend appears to have taken place more because of the attraction to James River transportation and commerce than a fear of the natives. Upriver, the Englishmen did run into Indian lands, despite the fact that plantations such as Martin's Brandon, Flowerdew Hundred, Merchants' Hope, and Jordan's Journey were seated prior to 1622. As with the upriver settlements north of the James, the plantations in southern Charles City County which survived the uprising flourished little during the 1620s. By the end of the next decade, however, colonists patented significant amounts of land in or adjacent to the above areas.

During the 1640s, although the records are lacking for the early years of the decade, an important trend with potentially more serious implications for Opechancanough's tribes became established. In 1639, George Menefie, a member of the Governor's Council, patented a tract on the north side of the York River, approximately opposite the Chiskiak settlements, and the next year, Argoll Yeardley followed the precedent. These were the first recorded patents north of the peninsula. The Virginia Assembly formally opened the region to settlement in 1641, on the conditions that the colonists settled in large groups and that they "Compound[d] with the native Indians there whereby they may live the more securely." The legislators, though, did not naively count on Opechancanough's cooperation and included provisions for northward expansion without the Powhatans' approval. Therefore, after 1641, the trickle became a flood. The next year, Englishmen moved
away from the York River, patented extensively in the Mobjack Bay area, and progressed further up the tidewater region. During 1642, colonists settled not only on both sides of the Piankatank River but also reached the north bank of the Rappahannock River, extending as far as thirty-five miles up that stream. By 1643, the year before Opechancanough's second uprising, the English inhabited all areas of the tidewater region, as they recorded the first patents on the Potomac River, along its tributary, the Yeocomico River.

This quick expansion north of the peninsula held serious implications for the Powhatans. Not only were colonists pressing Opechancanough's people to their westward limit, the fall line, but the emperor also saw his core tribes becoming surrounded by English settlement along the Rappahannock and Potomac Rivers. The desire for additional landholdings, inspired almost entirely by the tobacco boom of the late 1620s and early 1630s, must have caused the Powhatans, and especially Opechancanough, considerable anxiety.

The Crown repeatedly attempted to limit the amount of tobacco grown in the colony, both to regulate the market and to encourage the Virginians to plant grain. But the colonists constantly resisted such efforts, citing the needed encouragement for immigrants to settle in the region, "whereby the Collony [would] bee better strengthened and secured from anie trecherous practices of the Natives." Without heavy immigration, the Virginia Assembly replied, "the Colony would bee ... much weakened and in shorte tyme ... should bee disabled to defend [itself] ... from the tyranny of the Indyans." Despite the Crown's endeavors to restrain the tobacco trade during the late 1630s, Virginia's exportation of the weed increased steadily while the price per pound remained below one shilling throughout the decade.
This new immigration and vast geographical expansion imposed physical pressure on the Powhatan tribes and even displaced some from their native villages. At the time of contact, John Smith accurately recorded nearly two-hundred villages inhabited by Powhatan or related tribes throughout tidewater. Although Indian settlements dotted the banks of every Virginia tidal river, the highest concentration existed along the James and York, together with their tributaries. In addition, most of the natives lived in the western half of the tidewater region, leaving a thin buffer zone east of the fall line. Within this concentrated area resided the core tribes of the Powhatan Confederacy: the Appamatuck, Weanock, Arrohateck, Powhatan, Pamunkey, and Mattaponi. In the midst of these tribes, the powerful Chickahominies remained politically independent of the confederacy.\textsuperscript{134} The English, by chance, chose to settle in the nucleus of one of the most powerful and highly developed Indian groups in eastern North America at the time.

After initial contact, the Powhatans continued their general shift away from the lower peninsula, and this movement became accentuated during the 1620s and 1630s. As a result of the war, many tribes scattered from their native habitats, as their lands were devastated, and some of the smaller groups ceased to exist as definable bodies.\textsuperscript{135} Although some returned to their lands after the war, the English expansion of the late 1630s extended dangerously into Indian territory and caused tension. With the colonists settling on the upper James and along the northern rivers by 1643, the core around the Pamunkey Neck became the Powhatans' last stronghold.\textsuperscript{136}
The Kiskiack and Weanock tribes were affected most directly by the English reprisals and expansion. The Kiskiacks, the only tribe which inhabited the south bank of the York River below the forks, abandoned their settlement during the war and moved to the Piankatank River, where they remained loyal to Opechancanough. While the initial English patents along the Piankatank did not directly infringe on the Kiskiacks' new land, they, like their cousins on the James and Pamunkey, felt the increased pressure by 1643. At contact, the Tanx Weanock occupied the north bank of the James, above the Chickahominy, and the Great Weanock inhabited the opposite bank. As did the Kiskiacks, the Weanocks completely left their lands during the 1620s. They migrated south of the James, but because of the continued tension caused by English expansion, they could not escape future conflicts. The colonists drove these two tribes far from their lands, but all of the Powhatans experienced pressures created by English settlement.

Colonial expansion pinned the Indians in a dangerous vise between the English and the Powhatans' mortal enemies in the piedmont. The Occaneechi on the Roanoke River, the Monacans on the James, and the Manahoac on the Rappahannock, all of Siouan stock, traditionally threatened the Algonquian Powhatans. Opechancanough's people could not move west of the fall line, and the English settlement throughout the tidewater seriously imperiled their physical continuance.

The Powhatans experienced losses not only in available land, but also drastic decreases in population after 1622. Realistic estimates place the tidewater Indian population at approximately 8,500,
including 2,500 warriors, in 1607. Although no contemporaries made any estimates after the uprising until 1669, the Indians surely suffered from the combined effects of war, and many colonists noted the depleted condition of the native population by 1632. By 1669, after two uprisings and three wars, the Powhatans could count only roughly 2,000 persons, including 528 warriors.

While the native population declined, the number of Englishmen in Virginia increased sharply during the period. There were approximately 1,240 whites in the colony prior to the uprising of 1622, and even though the Indians killed over one-quarter of the colonists, English population rose once again over 1,200 by 1625. From that milestone, steady immigration insured the colony's growth. Certainly, by 1634 over 5,000 Englishmen inhabited the colony, and at the time of the second uprising, anywhere from 8,000 to 15,000 colonists populated tidewater Virginia. Regardless of the actual number present after 1635, it was evident that most settlers felt secure and cared little about anything except their land. They were so confident that a majority of the colonists disregarded the existing tension and no longer feared the Indians "but kept them at a greater Distance than formerly." According to Robert Beverley, the Powhatans conversely became apprehensive and "seeing the English so sensibly increase in Number, were glad to keep their Distance, and be peaceable." Unfortunately, English population growth and geographical expansion precluded the existence of separate spheres in the tidewater and mutual tolerance.

An important shift in the Virginia Indian trade after 1622 also added to the increasingly strained situation. Prior to the
uprising, dealings between the English settlers and the tidewater tribes proceeded without much organization or regulation, and despite the colonists' highhanded approach, especially as concerned the grain trade, the mutual desire for commerce suppressed serious hostilities. While the English were concerned mostly with food, skins, and furs, the Powhatans valued numerous manufactured items, including copper, jewelry, cloth, utensils, and tools. This Indian attraction to trade goods represented not an acceptance of European culture, as the English hoped, but simply an effort to augment the native culture.

During the period of active war, Virginia traders turned away from the tidewater tribes and looked to develop profitable commerce in the northern Chesapeake Bay. The policy of perpetual enmity against the Powhatans tended to isolate the tidewater natives, except those along the Potomac, and deprived Opechancanough's people of the highly regarded trade. The reasons for this shift were not entirely political, though largely so, as the tidewater skin supply was significantly depleted by 1630 due to overhunting. Trade in the northern Chesapeake offered many advantages; it opened to the colonists the Susquehanna River system and thus a much larger source of commerce, it avoided the constant tensions and conflicts in Virginia, and the distance from Jamestown allowed the traders to evade interference by the provincial government.

The colony authorized several official trading expeditions during the late 1620s and the 1630s, but none left any evidence of contact with the Powhatans south of the Potomac River. For instance, on a 1627 expedition, Captain William Claiborne traded in all the rivers of the northern bay, including the Potomac, but there is no
indication that he entered the Rappahannock, Piankatank, or York. Likewise, in 1632, Captain Henry Fleet undertook an extensive trading excursion similar to that of Claiborne. In his journal, Fleet carefully recorded each tribe with which he dealt and of them, only the Patowmeks were associated with the confederacy. These two men were among the leaders of the Virginia Indian trade, and significantly, neither mentioned the central Powhatan tribes after 1622. In addition to the concentration on the northern Chesapeake, by 1633 a considerable trade sprang up with the Indians below the James, and the colonists even showed some early interest in dealing with the piedmont Indians, still to the exclusion of Opechancanough's tribes.

The colonial government sought to perpetuate the isolation of the Powhatans by issuing regulations on trade and social intercourse with the natives, and although the colonists often ignored these regulations, Virginia never returned to a policy of free dealings between Englishmen and Indians. Throughout the decade preceding 1644, the Assembly prohibited trade by anyone without a commission from the government, and the Crown even reflected this desire in its instructions to Governor William Berkeley in 1641. The greatest concern of the Assembly was that arms and ammunition would fall into the Indians' hands through the trade, and the fear was well-founded. During the entire period between 1622 and 1644, the Virginia government made "trading with the Indians for arms and ammunition a felony," punishable by imprisonment and forfeiture of personal property. The laws proved ineffective, however, and apparently the Powhatans received many English weapons prior to 1644.

Throughout the period, while the majority of the colonists confidently planted their tobacco, many government officials remained
wary of the natives. In fact, some Englishmen even criticized Governor Harvey after 1632 for "making a dangerous peace with the Indians against the advice of the Council and country." This statement possibly resulted from the popular sentiment against Harvey, but nevertheless, a feeling of unease and suspicion existed in the colony. Colonial officials regarded the Powhatans as untrustworthy "savages ever awake to do them injuries in the streightest times of peace." In addition, the colony lacked the arms and ammunition necessary to defend itself.

The General Assembly, sensitive to the tense situation, sought to avoid violent conflict with the Powhatans. In response to complaints "rec'ed by divers concerning ye Indians," the Assembly authorized settlement commanders to "apprehend and detayne without violence the next Indian cominge upon his Grounde beinge of that Territorie where the Damage was done ... untill such satisfaction bee given as to the Com'ander shall seeme reasonable." The Court so feared an Indian revolt that in December 1640, when a colonist named John Burton killed an Indian whom he mistakenly suspected of theft, the government ordered him to leave the county in which he lived and to pay a fine of £20 sterling. Opechancanough, for some unexplained reason, interceded on Burton's behalf, and the Court remitted the punishment. Perhaps the emperor felt the time was not quite opportune for another revolt, and he wanted to build the colonists' confidence in preparation for a future surprise.

As was the case twenty years earlier, Opechancanough attempted to lull the colonists into a false sense of security with a formal peace treaty in 1642. In the spring of that year, the General Assembly
agreed to settle and reaffirm peace with the Powhatans, but this time
the English did not fall completely into the trap. Within the year,
colonists complained of numerous "outrages committed by [the] indians," and the Assembly reiterated its warnings to remain prepared for
hostilities.156

Aside from tension caused by the English expansion and the loss
of trade, the political and social upheaval both in Virginia and in
England apparently influenced Opechancanough to once again assault
the invaders. The 1630s were a decade of chaos in Virginia because
of both the popular unrest against Governor Harvey and the rivalry
with Lord Baltimore's Maryland colony. By all admissions, "the whole
Colony was in Confusion." Amid the strife, the "subtle Indians"
saw "the English uneasy and disunited among themselves, and by the
Direction of Oppecancanough their King, laid the Ground-work of another
Massacre."157 Even before the uprising, many colonists expressed
apprehension that the Powhatans would take advantage of the internal
dissensions, and the colony was "full of rumors of warrs . . . with
newes that the Indians [were] gathering heade."158

In addition to the discord within Virginia, Opechancanough
knew of the war in England, though he may not have understood it.
Believing "that all was under the Sword in England," the emperor
determined that 1644 "was his time or never to roote out all the
English." His plan and goals were almost identical, at least by
subsequent evaluations, to those recorded in 1622. Opechancanough
again intended to "surprize and kill under the feigned masque of
Friendship" as many of the colonists as possible and to leave the
survivors helpless and hopeless. The news of war in England supplemented
the plan because the remaining colonists, Opechancanough assumed, would receive "no supplyes from their own Country [...] which could not helpe them." From an Indian confession after the uprising, it appeared that the colonists' expansion provided the largest source of built-up anxiety for the Powhatans, and the opportunity presented by the struggle in England represented the immediate impetus for the assault. But Opechancanough over-estimated both the potential of a revolt and the implications of the English Civil War in the colonies.

From his chief town, Cinquoteck, near the confluence of the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers, the aged emperor watched the developing situation throughout the 1630s. Many interpreted the decade of tenuous peace and virtual separation as a sign that the Powhatans accepted their defeat as permanent, but despite his age, Opechancanough retained his hatred of the English invaders. Although his mind operated as keenly as ever, the chieftain's body was deteriorating because of "his great Age, and the Fatigues of War." By 1644, he had "grown so decrepit that he was not able to walk," according to Robert Beverley, "but was carried about by his Men, where-ever he had a Mind to move . . . . and his Eye-lids became so heavy, that he could not see, unless they were lifted by his Servants." Very possibly, his own declining physical health influenced Opechancanough to attempt one last desperate assault against his lifelong adversaries.

The emperor must have recognized the danger of a revolt in 1644, but he was a shrewd strategist. He undoubtedly weighed all of the factors, and though hopeless in retrospect, an uprising appeared logical in Opechancanough's cultural frame of reasoning. As in 1622, his people evidently supported his opinion. Whether his warriors
actually believed they could succeed or merely possessed a fatalistic preference for a quick, honorable death over the indignities of submission is impossible to ascertain. Certainly, they knew the dreadful effects of war and the cost of defeat, but like their emperor, the Powhatan people willingly risked an all-out assault.¹⁶³ So in the spring of 1644, with their land dwindling and their peaceful survival seriously threatened, Opechancanough led a new generation of warriors in a final attempt, against all odds, to drive the English from Virginia.

The strength of the 1644 uprising came from the Pamunkey, Chickahominy, Paspahegh, Warraskoyack, and Mattaponi tribes.¹⁶⁴ Little is known of the actual uprising, and the few contemporary English accounts described the attack in terms amazingly similar to those of the first revolt. On April 18, the Indians "beset the English houses a little before the break of day, waiting for the first person who should open the door." After "Beating out his brains" the natives reportedly "entered the house, slew all within, and then burned the building with the dead, or wounded women and children."¹⁶⁵ Although the Powhatans probably did not significantly alter their methods of attack over the period of twenty years, the few English writers who left accounts of the 1644 uprising may have referred to relations from the 1620s for details.

Evidence about the assault is sparse, and in fact, the only indication of the date is the General Assembly order of February, 1644/45 that April 18 "be yearly celebrated by thanksgivinge for our deliverance from the hands of the Salvages."¹⁶⁶ The attack apparently came suddenly, but unlike the uprising of 1622, it failed to penetrate the frontier fringes of the colony. The Indians hit most heavily near the navigable
heads of the rivers and south of the James. Over 500 settlers lost their lives, but by 1644 the colony was so well established and the English population in Virginia so large that the toll did not seriously threaten its survival. More importantly, the uprising reaffirmed the Powhatans' determination to remove the source of their anxiety. They never considered permanent assimilation or coexistence as an acceptable situation, but after 1644 they lost any chance of guiding their own destiny.167

Also unlike the first uprising, there was very little written response after 1644. Whereas Virginia Company officials and colonial officials argued over just who was at fault in 1622, Englishmen generally seemed to take the second revolt in stride, with hardly any notice of its occurrence. Only the New England Puritans, who held a particular animosity against the Virginians anyway, censured the southern colony. Shortly before the uprising, Virginia expelled two Puritan ministers from the province. Both John Winthrop and Edward Johnson expressed the opinion "that this evil was sent upon them from God for their reviling the gospel and those faithful ministers we had sent among them."168 In the one similar response to the two uprisings, Englishmen outside the colony in both cases blamed the Virginians' religious practices for inciting the wrath of Providence, disregarding the physical and cultural tensions between the natives and the intruders.

The immediate reaction in Virginia, as before, was one of panic, though much less so than in 1622. Settlers from the frontier, where the Indians struck hardest, fled to older sections of the colony which were unaffected by the uprising, but again, some colonists, especially north of the York River, resisted leaving their homes, and the
governor had to use force to compel them to temporarily move to safety. Also as in 1622, the colonial government complained that the shortage of corn was "beyond all Miseryes" and that "unless some tymely Course [was] allowed to the Inhabitants to pvide some Reliefe," the colony would "fall into . . . Intolerable want." Therefore, in October, 1644, the Assembly allowed colonists to return to their frontier settlements, provided they did so in large numbers for protection. At the same time, the government made it lawful for persons with commissions, to "trade or traffique for Corne onely, wth any Nation being in peace and Amity wth [the colony]," but the trade was to be strictly for corn and then only if the traders could obtain it for less than 100 pounds of tobacco per barrel.

Whether Opechancanough recognized the futility of the uprising or simply over-estimated its initial success, the Powhatans did not follow up their attack. Instead, they reportedly "fled away and retyred themselves many miles distant off the Colony: which . . . gave the English opportunity to gather themselves together, call an Assembly . . . and to thinke upon some way to defend themselves, . . . and then to offend their Enemies." The largest problem facing the colony after the uprising, at least according to the General Assembly, was the shortage of arms and ammunition. For this reason, in June the Assembly sent Governor Berkeley to England to seek the Crown's assistance. Later in the summer, Virginia requested "powder and shot" from Massachusetts, "to prosecute [the] war against the Indians," but the Puritans claimed they had none to spare. During the upheaval, the Virginia Assembly enacted familiar restrictions on the movement of the colonists and warnings to remain defensively prepared. In addition,
that body ordered "that six pounds of tobacco per poll be leavied for every tithable person" for "defraying of the public charges" of the various marches against the Indians.\textsuperscript{173} Although the uprising did not seriously threaten the survival of the colony, the Virginia government reacted strongly to the challenge.

The colonists reaffirmed the Powhatans as "Irreconcileable enemyes by the late Bloody Massacre" and pledged to "for ever abandon all formes of peace and familiarity with the whole Nation." Further than merely seeking the implied separation, the Virginia Assembly vowed "to the utmost of [its] power [to] pursue and root out those which have any way had their hands in the shedding of [English] blood and Massacring of [the] People."\textsuperscript{174} The Assembly again ordered the colonists to cut down the Powhatans' corn and issued orders for expeditions against the native tribes. In June, 1644, the government ordered the residents of Upper Norfolk to attack the Nansemonds and Warraskoyacks, while the residents of Henrico and Charles City went against the Tanx Weanocks. Both of these campaigns were to serve as diversions to prevent those tribes from aiding the Pamunkeys, the objects of the main assault under the command of William Claiborne.\textsuperscript{175} No details or accounts of the various expeditions remain, but within two years of the uprising, the colony began to consider peace.

On June 16, 1645, shortly after Berkeley's return from England, the Virginia Council received a letter from Margaret Worleigh, a prisoner among the Powhatans, stating that Opechancanough desired peace. The governor and Council agreed to a truce and a meeting with twelve of the emperor's principal men, but apparently the meeting never occurred.\textsuperscript{176} In March, 1645/46, the Assembly authorized an expedition under Captain
Fleet to force the Indians into peace, and the government agreed to pay for the campaign only if Fleet succeeded. This effort also failed, and the colonists remained at war with the Powhatans.

The English, however, did not exchange hostilities with all of the Virginia tribes. As always, they continued to trade with the natives on the Potomac River and on the Eastern Shore. In fact, the Assembly sought to employ these Indians in the effort against Opechancanough, as guides if nothing else. In February, 1644/45, it ordered "that the service of some Indians either of Ackomack or Rappahannock be treated with and entertained for the further discovery of the enemie." Even though these tribes were under Opechancanough's control in name only and probably did not participate in either uprising, there is no evidence that they joined the conflict against their native cousins.

One of the most significant and far-reaching results of the war effort was the creation of forts on the four rivers surrounding the lower tidewater region of Virginia. Also in February, 1644/45, the General Assembly authorized three forts: "one at Pomunkey to be called Fort Royal; another at the Falls of James River to be called Fort Charles, and the third on the Ridge of Chiquohomine, . . . to be called Fort James." One year later, the Assembly ordered construction of the fourth fort, located "att the Falls of the . . . Appomattock River, nominated fforte Henry." The motivations behind the establishment of Fort Henry were the same as those for the others. The government cited "the defence of the inhabitants," the prevention of the Indians from fishing in the tidal reaches, and "the cutting down [of the Indians'] corne or performeing any other service upon
them" as justifications for the forts' existence. The importance of the forts became obvious in the decades following their creation, as they served western traders and explorers, and helped control the contacts between the remaining Powhatans and the colonists.

The downfall of Opechancanough and his people came in the summer of 1646. By that time, Englishmen assumed the emperor was "either not at all, or at least . . . abandoned by his people." They described the Powhatans as "soe rowted[,]slayne and dispersed, that they are noe longer a nation." The colonists suffered more from "robberie [by] a few starved outlaws then a warr;" and they confidently hoped "by Gods assistance within one yeare more, to roote out those few that [were] left of [the] cursed generation." Berkeley himself led the final campaign when he learned that Opechancanough was encamped somewhere between the falls of the James and Appomattox Rivers, "at some Distance from his usual Habitation." The governor, "with a Party of Horse . . . surprized him in his Quarters, and brought him Prisoner to James-Town; where," according to Beverley, "he was treated with all the Respect and Tenderness imaginable." This statement contrasted sharply with the author's admission that curious crowds of people were allowed to view the captured emperor as if he were a circus attraction. Realizing this, Opechancanough, who "continued brave to the last Moment of his Life . . . call'd in high Indignation for the Governour" and "scornfully told him, That had it been his Fortune to take . . . Berkeley Prisoner, he should not meanly have exposed him as a Show to the People."183

In fact, that is exactly what the governor planned to do. Berkeley hoped to augment his reputation in London by "presenting his
Majesty with [the] Royal Captive." The scheme was not to be, however, as one of the soldiers sent to guard Opechancanough, "resenting the Calamities the Colony had suffer'd by this Prince's Means, basely shot him thro' the Back . . . of which Wound he died."\(^{184}\) This murderous end was, ironically, perhaps more merciful to the old warrior than the humiliation of being paraded before the court in London and then possibly executed anyway. At least Opechancanough died in his native land, for which he had fought so vigorously.

Even before Opechancanough's capture, the Assembly saw little point in continuing the war against the beaten Powhatans and concluded "that a peace (if honorably obtained) would conduce to the better being and comoditie of the country."\(^{185}\) The colony needed only an opportunity to dictate the peace, which the capture and death of Opechancanough provided. The Indian opposition dissolved, and Necotowance, the new chieftain of what remained of the formerly powerful confederacy, negotiated a peace with the colony in October, 1646.

The peace treaty virtually stripped the Powhatans of their independence, their lands, and their freedom of movement. First, Necotowance acknowledged the sovereignty of the Crown and its right to confirm or appoint his successors. Accordingly, the colony agreed to protect the Powhatans against rebels or enemies, in return for an annual tribute of twenty beaver pelts. Also, the treaty prohibited the natives from hunting or living on the peninsula below a line between the falls of the York and James Rivers or in the Southside above a line drawn from the head of the Blackwater River to the falls of the James. The Assembly stipulated that any Indian caught within the restricted region could legally be killed. While the government
York River, it retained the right to open the area for settlement after informing the chief. The treaty further restricted trade. The Indians north of the James were permitted to trade only on a designated spot on the north side of Fort Royal; those south of the river were to report to the south side of Fort Henry, and trade was allowed only between the Indian representatives and the commanders of the forts. Any official messengers, either from the governor or the Indian chief­tain, were to wear "badges" of striped coats, obtained at the forts, to designate them as such and thus protect them in their business. Through this treaty, the English sought finally to delineate the relationship between themselves and the natives, and in doing so, they strictly regulated the terms of contact permitted.

The clause of the treaty which most clearly indicated the completeness of the English success was Necotowance's acknowledgement of the tribes' tributary status to the king. The provisions that the royal governor controlled the succession of chieftains, the settlement of Indian lands, and the Indian trade effectively made the Indians' survival dependent upon the colonial government in every way, a goal which the English sought since the earliest contact. The colonists apparently felt secure with the new peace, most probably because of Opechancanough's death, and as Beverley wrote, "all the Thoughts of future Injury from [the Powhatans] were laid aside." In fact, the remnant Powhatans never again rose against the English in Virginia.

Most significantly, however, was the treaty's specifically stated policy of distinct boundaries between the colonists and the Indians, which foreshadowed the later reservation system. The desire for separation
of the two groups was not new in 1646, as the English had abandoned all hopes of peaceful coexistence after 1622. An unofficial buffer zone resulted from the initial conflict, but not until the Powhatans agreed to the new peace treaty did the Virginia government possess the power to control the boundary or the Indians' movements. Virginians claimed that their actions were designed to protect the tribes, but in reality, the treaty gave the governor authority to restrict the land on which the Indians could settle.

The situation which existed in Virginia, with respect to the relations between the colonists and the native population, was somewhat unique in the English colonies. Virginia was planted directly in the midst of one of the most powerful Indian confederacies on the east coast, and no other early English colony existed so close to such a highly developed group. Only Massachusetts Bay, with the Pequot War of 1636 to 1638 in the Connecticut River valley, came close to paralleling the Virginia situation. Neither Maryland nor Plymouth, both settled during the first half of the seventeenth century, experienced initial conflict with their respective native neighbors, for a variety of reasons.

In the case of Maryland, the colonists first settled on the Chesapeake Bay, far from the major Piscataway villages up the Potomac River. This geographic separation was vital because it took over fifty years, until the 1690s, for English migration to reach Piscataway lands. By that time, the tribe's strength was deteriorated and the colony's permanence well established. The attitudes of the colonists also played an important role. Like the Powhatans, the Piscataways never welcomed acculturation, but unlike the Virginians,
early Maryland settlers showed little desire to civilize or convert the Indians. Maryland officials avoided using force in their dealings with the tribe and were content to leave the Piscataways undisturbed. 192

Likewise, the first settlers of Plymouth experienced peaceful relations with the proximate natives, the Wampanoags under Massasoit. Soon after settlement, the colonists and the Indians agreed to a pact of mutual defense and friendship. 193 Several factors contributed to the lasting peace. First, the benevolent leaders, William Bradford and Massasoit, actively sought to strengthen the peace and cooperation by avoiding areas of conflict. Only after both died, in 1657 and 1660 respectively, did discord over such matters as land become serious. 194

In addition, the Wampanoags were hit heavily by a plague which devastated their population and weakened the tribe severely prior to the Separatists' arrival. Most significant, however, was the colonists' attitude toward the Indians. The Pilgrims accepted the natives as they were, initially anyway, as long as peace lasted. Not only did Wampanoags such as Squanto and Hobbamok live among the colonists, but the Englishmen valued the knowledge and instruction of the natives. The original settlers even respected the Indians' property. Soon after concluding the peace, the Pilgrims gave "full satisfaction . . . to those [natives] whose corn they had found and taken when they were [exploring] at Cape Cod." 195 This last instance provides a sharp contrast to the situation of highhanded and forced trade which prevailed in Virginia, where, unfortunately, no system of separation as in Maryland or cooperation as in Plymouth existed.

Because of this situation, Virginia colonists could only live with the Powhatans by defeating them. Therefore, when Governor Berkeley
announced in March, 1651 "The Indians, God be blessed round about us are subdued," he expressed a relief and thanksgiving which the colony had not known for the first forty years of its being. The treaty allowed the colonists to put aside their fears of the Powhatans and to use them as scouts and allies against outside Indians. By making the former confederacy tribes tributary to the royal government, the peace created "friendly" and "foreign" Indians. In doing so, the government sought to preserve the old union of the Powhatan Confederacy, in its harmless state, to keep the tribes consolidated as allies against "foreign" invasions. The colonists finally gained the submission of the natives, a goal long-opposed by both Powhatan and Opechancanough.

The colony, however, could not maintain any cohesion among the shattered tribes. After 1646, the Pamunkies lost control of the tribes south of the James River, and the ever independently-minded Chickahominies also broke off any allegiance to the defeated confederacy. As a result of subjection, the natives apparently lost heart, remembering the shamans' prophecy "that bearded men . . . should come and take away their Country and that there should none of the original Indians be left within a certain number of years." The senseless decay became unstoppable. Indeed, only approximately 2,000 Indians remained in tidewater in 1669, compared to the over 8,500 who inhabited the area at the time of initial contact in 1607. The final insult came during Bacon's Rebellion, when the colonists arbitrarily attacked the innocent Appamatuck, Pamunkey, and Chickahominy tribes. By the new treaty of 1677, these natives ceded all their lands to the colony and were confined to small reservations for which they still had to pay tribute.
As much as they would have like to, the English could not make the Powhatans disappear, either through conversion or extirpation, but the victory they finally gained by mid-century was so remarkably complete that the natives' position in Virginia became negligible. Just as remarkable, however, had been the steadfast resistance of Opechancanough. His death in 1646 ended not only a long and masterful career of opposition to English aggression but also an era of Indian history in Virginia. Opechancanough was the last of the "true" Powhatans; he represented the pre-contact glory of the confederacy while struggling for both the physical and cultural survival of his people. His refusal to submit and his emphasis on self-respect set an important example for the Powhatans and allowed them, at least temporarily, to gain the strength to confront English aggression. For Opechancanough, and thus for the majority of his followers, the "ability to cope was the ability to fight bravely against overwhelming odds and to die with dignity and purpose."201

Although the emperor's resistance remained constant throughout the period, the sources of conflict shifted somewhat between the uprisings of 1622 and 1644. The first encounter resulted largely from cultural tensions. The presence of a limited number of Englishmen, though offensive to the Powhatans, did not seriously threaten their physical survival, and the natives could not have foreseen the extent of the future English expansion in Virginia. However, the Europeans attempted to take away the natives' way of life, and cultural survival became of paramount concern to the Powhatans. For this reason, they chose to rise in the 1622 revolt, designed to drive the intruders from the region. After 1632, the tensions revolved more
Around the threat to the Powhatans' very existence, caused by English expansion in the colony. The colonists gave up their efforts to convert the natives to English culture, but their vast geographical expansion displaced some tribes, took valuable hunting and farming land from most others, and generally placed intensifying pressure on the Powhatans' ability to maintain their already depleted population. Therefore, Opechancanough saw one more attempt to drive the settlers from the region as the logical response. Of course, the attack proved futile, and in defeat both the emperor and the confederacy died. Opechancanough was spared the humiliation of submission to the English, but the formerly powerful Powhatan tribes suffered devastating decay in their subsequent tributary position.
## APPENDIX A

### VIRGINIA ALGONQUIAN POPULATION ESTIMATES

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## VIRGINIA ALGONQUIAN POPULATION ESTIMATES

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Note: Data were originally given in terms of "warriors" or bow-men." A 3:10 ratio was used to compute total population figures.

* Shown on Smith's map (1612) but no figures given.

** McCary made only one combined estimate for the Cuttatawoman tribes.

Figures taken from:

NOTES


Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility*, pp. 2-3, 21-22, 95. Vaughan, *Expulsion*, pp. 59-60. John Smith was one of the few settlers who came to recognize the strong Powhatan government, which he "counted very civil." This does not imply, however, that Smith respected the Indian system. Wesley Frank Craven, *White, Red and Black* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971). p. 43.


Kupperman likened the situation to a person walking on ice—he expects the ice to be treacherous because he knows he is vulnerable to it. Kupperman, *Settling With the Indians*, p. 129.


Craven, *White, Red and Black*, p. 53.


Many Indian conflicts were guided by the attitude that, "If you kill them all now, what fun will there be in the future?" Harry H. Turney-High, *Primitive War*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971). pp. 103, 141.


48 Kingsbury, Records., III, pp. 553-554. "Waterhouse's Declaration." Waterhouse optimistically stated that the massacre "must needs bee for the good of the Plantation after, and the losse of this blood to make the body more healthful." Ibid., p. 556. See also: Smith, Generall Historie., p. 284.


52 Stith, Settlement of Virginia., p. 209.


Kingbury, Records., IV, pp. 9-10. Governor and Council to Company, January 20, 1622/23. The colonists claimed that "By Computations and Confessione of the Indyan themselves we have slayne moer of them this yeere, then hath been slayne before since the beginninge of ye Colonie." Ibid., p. 10.

Smith, Generall Historie., p. 298.


Kingsbury, Records., III, p. 668. Company to Governor and Council, August 1, 1622.


Madison was also empowered to defend himself against any Indian attack or treachery, but the captain was oversensitive to the possibility. Kingsbury, Records., III, pp. 654-655.

Stith, Settlement of Virginia., pp. 238-239. After the attack commenced, Japazaws began "crying out to intreat the Captaine cease from such cruelty: but having slaine and made flye all in the towne, hee returned, taxing the poore King of treason." Smith, Generall Historie., p. 305. Morton, Colonial Virginia., I, p. 78.

One commission, issued to Croshaw on March 16, 1623 forbade him from forcing the Indians to trade or offering them any violence. This provision was not common by the end of 1622. Ibid., IV, p. 470.


Governor's Proclamation, May 9, 1623. Sometime prior to May 7, 1623, Wyatt commanded that no person, other than plantation commanders, "shall hold any conference with any Indianes." Ibid., p. 167. Governor's Proclamation, pre-May 7, 1623.


Hecht listed the population as 1,216. Irene W. Hecht, "The Virginia Muster of 1624/5 As a Source for Demographic History," William and Mary Quarterly., III, 30 (1973), pp. 72-73. Quisenberry put the total at 1,232, including Blacks, and he noted only nineteen settlements. [A. C. Quisenberry], "The Virginia Census, 1624-25," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 7 (July 1899-June 1900), p. 366.

Except for a slight decline in 1625, the exports of tobacco increased each year during the 1620s. Hecht, "Virginia Colony," pp. 176, 199, 356-357. See also: Kupperman, Settling With the Indians, p. 182.

Kingsbury, *Records*, II, pp. 115-116. Letter from Captain Ralph Hamor read in Company Council, October 23, 1622. In addition, the Company offered "a great and singular reward" to any person who captured or killed Opechancanough. Ibid., III, p. 673. Company to Governor and Council, August 1, 1622.


Turney-High, *Primitive War*, pp. 93, 96. While they were not ashamed to retreat, the Indians felt that the only honorable thing to do if captured was to endure torture and death without flinching. Morgan, *American Slavery*, p. 58.


Smith, *Generall Historie*, p. 301.


Kingsbury, *Records*, IV, p. 12. Governor and Council to Company, January 20, 1622/23. Ibid., pp. 67, 159. The Assembly reported to the Crown Commission in 1624 that the only way to defeat the natives "is to have a running army continually afoot to keep the Indians from settling on any place that is near us." "Aspinwall Papers," p. 66n.

Kingsbury, Records., IV, p. 98. Governor and Council to Company, April 4, 1623. Reverend Mead wrote earlier that many Indians lamented the uprising, "affirming that they loved the English above all men in the world... but that their God will not let them alone but terrifies them & incites them against their wills to this wrong." Johnson, ed., "Massacre of 1622," pp. 408-409. Mead to Sir Martin Stuteville, July 13, 1622.


Ibid., pp. 221-222. Robert Bennett to Edward Bennett, June 9, 1623.


McIlwaine, Journals of the House., I, p. 37. Burgesse's Declaration, February 1623/24. Colonial officials proudly reported to the Company that they had revenged the Indians by means of "a fraudulent peace." Kingsbury, Records., IV, p. 450. Governor and Council to Company, January 30, 1623/24. Harvey's Declaration of 1624 stated that the war was caused by "the late massacre on the Salvages parte, and on the parte of the English a later attempt of poysoning Opochancano and others." "Aspinwall Papers," pp. 69-70.


McIlwaine, Minutes., pp. 147, 151, 155.

Ibid., p. 172.

Ibid., pp. 184-185, 198, 484. The General Court accused that the Indians "have beene soe false unto us in all the Condifions Concluded... they have frequented our plantaçons... and further have killed
many of our hogs and Cattell and done injuries to divers of our men hunting in the woods." Ibid., p. 189. See also: McIlwaine, Journals of the House., I, p. 52. Hening, Statutes., I, pp. 140-141, 153.

105Hening, Statutes., I, pp. 167, 176.


108McIlwaine, Minutes., p. 484.


113Craven argued that little evidence exists to support the belief that European diseases took an inordinately high toll on Virginia Indians prior to 1644. Craven, White, Red and Black., pp. 65-66. McCary, on the other hand, blamed smallpox and tuberculosis, especially, for Indian suffering throughout the century. McCary, Indians., p. 84. Sheehan claimed that the Indians suffered much more from a wide range of English diseases than did the importers. Sheehan, Savagism and Civility., p. 179. For population figures, see page 10 of this paper.

Captain Thomas Young recorded on July 13, 1634 that when Harvey arrived in Virginia "he found James River only inhabited . . . but now, he hath settled divers good plantations upon [York] River, which lieth northerly from James River." "Aspinwall Papers," p. 111.


For all references to geographical expansion during these years, unless otherwise noted, see: Nugent, Cavaliers and Pioneers., pp. 21-154. [1635, pp. 21-37; 1636, pp. 37-55; 1637, pp. 58-83; 1638, pp. 84-106; 1639, pp. 106-122; 1640, pp. 118-127; 1641, pp. 125-129; 1642, pp. 128-142; 1643, pp. 143-154.]


Nugent, Cavaliers and Pioneers., pp. 21-37.

Ibid., p. 112.

Ibid., pp. 106-122.

The largest exceptions to this trend were ascents up the Nansemond and Elizabeth Rivers in Upper and Lower Norfolk Counties, respective-ly. Ibid., pp. 21-154.

127Nugent, Cavaliers and Pioneers., pp. 21-122.

128Ibid., pp. 120, 126.


130Nugent, Cavaliers and Pioneers., pp. 128-142.

131Ibid., pp. 149-150. A patent was also issued for a tract on Cedar Island Creek. Ibid., p. 153.


144Beverley, History and Present State., pp. 57-58.


Hening, Statutes., I, pp. 219, 227, 255. After the second uprising, in June, 1644, the Assembly "suspected under the Color of Licence for Commerce the Natives have beene furnished both wth Gunnes Powder and shott wth other offensive Instruments thereby tending to our utter ruine . . ." "Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 23 (1915), p. 236.


Ibid., p. 268. Secretary Richard Kemp to Secretary of State Francis Windebank, April 6, 1638. Ibid., p. 276. Governor to King, June 12, 1638. Harvey reported in 1637 that he "Has in hand a great business for setting a force upon a neighbouring Indian strong of people, but necessary to be removed or cooped up for the general good." He did not state to which tribe he referred, what caused the incident, or what resulted, if anything. W. N. Sainsbury, "Virginia in 1637; Abstracts of the McDonald Papers," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. 9 (1901-1902), p. 270.


McIlwaine, Minutes., pp. 478, 483.


Beverley, History and Present State., p. 60.
Aspinwall Papers," p. 113. Harvey worried that "the Indians would take ... courage from the Colony's want of arms and ammunition & our own dissensions." Sainsbury, "Virginia in 1632-33-34," p. 157. Governor to Secretary Windebank, July 14, 1634.


Beverley, History and Present State., pp. 61-62.


Robinson, "Tributary Indians," p. 55. Lurie suggested that Opechancanough hoped to play on the factionalism between Maryland and Virginia and gain support from outside the colony. Lurie, "Cultural Adjustment," p. 51.


Hening, Statutes., I, p. 290.


Wodenoth, "A Perfect Description," p. 11.


Acts, Orders and Resolutions," p. 229. This statement of June, 1644 contrasts with one of November, 1645, which claimed "the warr is conceived to be a defensive warr." Hening, Statutes., I, p. 307.


Neill, Virginia Carolorum., p. 188.

Hening, Statutes., I, p. 319.


Hening, Statutes., I, p. 319.


Notes to pages 56-60

183Beverley, History and Present State., p. 62.
184Ibid., p. 62.
186Hening, Statutes., I, pp. 323-326.
188Beverley, History and Present State., p. 63. Although the Powhatans never again rose against the English, the innocent Appama-tuck, Chickahominy, and Pamunkey tribes suffered during Bacon's Rebellion. Sturtevant, North American Indians., XV, p. 257.
190Craven, White, Red and Black., p. 42.
191The geographic separation allowed both groups to live peacefully while both benefitted from the trade established. James H. Merrell, "Cultural Continuity Among the Piscataway Indians of Colonial Maryland," William and Mary Quarterly., III, 36 (1979), pp. 555, 567-569.
192Ibid., pp. 567-568.
194Demos, A Little Commonwealth., p. 15.
195[Bradford], History of Plymouth., p. 87. The colonists saw Squanto as "a special instrument sent of God for their good, beyond their expectation." Ibid., p. 80. Bradford also showed compassion for the Wampanoags in his description of their weakness due to the plague. "Thousands of them died, until the living were not able to bury the dead, and their skulls and bones were found in many places lying still above the ground, where their houses and dwelling places had been,--a very sad spectacle." Ibid., p. 86.
[Notes to pages 61-62]

196McIlwaine, Journals of the House., I, p. 76.


201Fausz, "Opechancanough," p. 34.
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VITA

Michael Joseph Puglisi


Other training in the field includes an archives and historical editing internship at the George C. Marshall Research Foundation in Lexington, Virginia in 1980.