1990

Police Reform and the Boston Police Strike of 1919

David Joseph Roberts

*College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences*

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POLICE REFORM AND THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE OF 1919

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
David J. Roberts
1990
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

David J. Roberts
Author

Approved, December 1990

Richard B. Sherman

Philip J. Funigiello

Ludwell H. Johnson
DEDICATION

For the two from whom I've learned the most: my mother, who taught me to love learning, and my father, who taught me not to quit until the job is done correctly.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Richard B. Sherman, under whose guidance this thesis was completed, for his assistance and suggestions. I also wish to thank Professors Philip J. Funiglello and Ludwell H. Johnson for the time they took to read and comment on the manuscript.

Space does not permit me to enumerate the countless debts that I owe to Christopher R. Mirenzi. It will have to suffice to say that, through his willing assistance, his boundless patience and his unwavering support, he has once again proven himself to be the best best friend that the twentieth century has to offer.

D. J. R.
ABSTRACT

Police departments in American cities were significantly affected by a number of reform movements during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Like other urban reform movements of the period, these emerged in response to changing social conditions within the nation's cities. The goal of the police reformers was to eliminate the variety of social and political services that the police had traditionally provided and to create a new force whose exclusive function would be to provide efficient and impartial enforcement of the law. Reformers eventually came to believe that adequate levels of efficiency and impartiality could only be maintained if police departments adopted organizational structures that concentrated decision-making power in the hands of a single chief executive and that enabled the department to function with a minimum of outside interference. Furthermore, the new role required that all members of the department commit themselves to a new ethic of professional behavior.

Groups whose interests were more likely to be advanced by a continuation of the policemen's traditional role opposed the implementation of the reformers' ideas. In many cities, this led to a period of struggle for control of the police department. In most cases, reformers, with the assistance of other interest groups, were able to gain the upper hand in these struggles, and so, by World War I, many urban police departments had been reorganized along the lines promoted by the reformers. Throughout this period of struggle and reform, however, neither the reformers nor their opponents showed much concern about the interests of the rank-and-file patrolmen. In fact, many of the reforms that were implemented during this period proved to be detrimental to the policemen's interests.

This paper discusses the impact that police reform had on the Boston Police Department and the role that these reforms played in generating the conflicts that culminated in the Boston Police Strike of 1919. During the early twentieth century, Boston adopted many of the ideas of the reformers. At the same time that police reformers were promoting Boston's police department as a model to be emulated by other American police forces, however, growing dissatisfaction among the city's patrolmen, much of it caused by conditions that resulted directly or indirectly from the implementation of these reforms, was creating a crisis within the department. Furthermore, the administrative structures that had been adopted in response to the reform movement created obstacles that limited the city officials' ability to resolve the conflicts within the department and to avert the impending crisis. In the end, this crisis resulted in a temporary break-down of the mechanisms upon which the city depended for the maintenance of law and order.
POLICE REFORM AND THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE OF 1919
INTRODUCTION

During the half century between 1870 and 1920, American society underwent a transformation that resulted in the establishment of an entirely new social order. Just as the rapid growth of American industry forever altered the nation's economic landscape, the accompanying emergence of large urban centers gave rise to social patterns that diverged dramatically from those that had existed previously. The shift to large-scale industrial production and the increased wealth that this production generated, together with the development of corporations with their hierarchical administrative structures, created new social classes. Urban life imposed fundamental changes on the ways social groups interacted with one another. The concentration of growing numbers of people in the nation's cities and the arrival of ever-increasing numbers of immigrants injected new values, new outlooks and new ambitions into American culture. A transformation of such magnitude naturally put a tremendous strain on the society. Conflict erupted not only between the old and the new, but also among the various components that made up the new social order. As a result, this period was not simply one of profound change; it was also a time of nearly constant adjustment and readjustment to the new conditions that these changes produced.

All of the social groups with interests in the new urban society expected the city police to play a role in this process of adjustment. Since each group pursued a different set of goals, however, each held a different view of just what the police
force's proper role was to be. Machine politicians were quick to recognize that the large number of jobs available within the police department, along with the policeman's power to determine when and against whom to enforce the law, constituted valuable commodities that could be traded whenever it was necessary to gather votes or financial contributions. Conversely, rural conservatives saw the police as the last bulwark against a complete take-over of municipal affairs by these same "undesirable elements", whose influence grew in proportion to the size of the working-class populations from which they drew their support. To the working class itself, the police department offered stable jobs and, hence, opportunities for financial security and social mobility. To the industrialist, however, the power exercised by the police force gave it great potential as a means of controlling the working class and defending private property, especially during labor disputes. The middle-class moralists viewed the police force as the most potent weapon in their continuous war on vice, while to yet another group of reformers, the civic reformers of the day, the police constituted an essential component in the new municipal administrative structure that they hoped to create, a structure that they were confident would bring order, efficiency and an impartial distribution of the benefits of society to urban America. While these groups held conflicting views of the policeman's appropriate role in the new urban society and, consequently, made widely divergent demands on the police force, one thing was understood by all: the group that controlled the
police department would get to define the department's role. As a result, police history during this period is largely the story of the competition for control that was waged by the various interest groups within the urban society.

No single group ever managed to gain complete control over the police during this period. However, by 1910 civic reformers had replaced machine politicians as the group that exercised the greatest influence over the development of many city police departments. Through a series of reforms designed to make police departments more efficient, to free them from the influence of other groups and to professionalize both police work and the policeman, these reformers significantly altered both the administrative structure of the police force and the function that the police served within the community. They likewise altered the patrolman's own perception of his work. These reformers, however, like the others who vied for control of the police department, rarely devoted any attention to the needs and desires of the policeman himself. Each of these groups, in fact, viewed the policeman as little more than a functionary who was expected to compliantly assist in the accomplishment of the group's own particular aims. As a result, the police reforms of the period frequently created situations that threatened the interests of the policeman.

Boston was one of the many American cities whose police were significantly affected by succeeding waves of police reform. Between 1875 and the beginning of World War I, the Boston Police
Department was subjected to numerous changes, each of which was touted by its promoters as an essential prerequisite for improving the department's performance. By 1915, reformers rated Boston's police force one of the most effective and least corrupt in the nation. However, the very conditions that won such praise for the Boston Police Department also contributed to the increasing dissatisfaction of the city's policemen. In fact, not only did these reforms add to the patrolmen's growing list of complaints, but they also created conditions that severely limited the policemen's ability to secure acceptable redress of their grievances. At the same time, these reforms sparked a growing occupational awareness that intensified the patrolmen's determination to find solutions to these problems.

By 1919, this frustration was compounded by concern over postwar inflation and the resulting deterioration of the patrolmen's economic position. Determined to find a way to improve their situation, the policemen of Boston sought assistance from a source that had supported numerous other members of the working class in their quest for a better life: they decided to form a union and to seek affiliation with the American Federation of Labor. Uncompromising opposition from local authorities failed to deter the policemen from proceeding with these plans. During the crisis that ensued, the administrative patterns established by the earlier reforms again came into play in a way that significantly hampered city officials' attempts to diffuse the situation. These events culminated in a strike by the policemen in September 1919.
In the wake of this strike, the once acclaimed Boston Police Department was left in ruins, and the organization of a new force was begun.
CHAPTER I

POLICE REFORM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONTROL

The only way for a particular group to ensure that the police performed those functions that the group deemed appropriate was for that group to see to it that those who ran the police department were sympathetic to the group's goals. Hence, police reform during the late 1800's and early 1900's focused more attention on the administrative structure of the force than on any other single issue. In Boston, as in many other cities, this resulted in repeated reorganization of the command structure and in frequent attempts to redefine the police department's relationship with local and state authorities. As each succeeding group came to the fore, it altered the administrative structure of the department in ways that were designed to facilitate the promotion of that group's own aims and, at the same time, to minimize the amount of influence that competing groups could exercise over the police. The first wave of reform occurred between 1875 and 1890, when the state government assumed control over the Boston Police Department. The second period of reform began after 1900. By 1910, however, the restructuring came to an end, and the administrative patterns that were to continue until the 1960's were firmly in place.

By the mid-1800's, police departments had come to play a central role in the operation of local political machines in most
large American cities. Distribution of the large number of jobs available within the police department provided the party boss with one of his most important sources of patronage. Since patrolmen were often appointed on a yearly basis, and since continuance in their jobs depended upon their loyalty to those who had appointed them, the existence of a large police force automatically generated significant numbers of votes and financial contributions for the party in power. Furthermore, the policeman's position within the community, especially within the working-class districts, helped to win support for the party machine. By providing services that ranged from the provision of free food and lodging for the indigent to the return of lost children, the policeman was a symbol of the party boss's benevolence and concern for the welfare of his constituents. At election time, the police force could be put to work canvassing the neighborhoods for votes. However, it was the tremendous discretionary power exercised by the policeman on his beat, his ability to decide when to enforce the law and when to look the other way, that made him a more valuable ally than any other municipal worker in the machine politician's quest for electoral support and in his bid to reduce the power of his rivals.¹

Until the 1870's, the Boston Police Department was administered by a chief of police who was appointed jointly by the mayor and the board of aldermen and was then supervised by a committee that consisted of several of the aldermen. Such direct control by city officials, typical of mid-nineteenth century
police departments, enabled party bosses to regulate the activities of the police through their control of the city government. However, in Boston and in many other cities, this pattern of police administration eventually came under attack from a number of different sources. Opponents of the party machines sought to break the bosses' hold on the police departments, and civic reformers throughout the United States, pointing out that city council members were often saloon keepers or others whom the police were expected to control, argued for a system that would encourage more impartial enforcement of the law. In Boston, social reformers were very critical of the social welfare functions that the police performed, insisting that the police were encouraging pauperism and interfering with the reformers' efforts to identify and help the "deserving poor" by indiscriminately providing soup and lodging for vagrants. As a result, proponents of change in Boston and in many other cities launched movements to place the police under the control of special police boards whose membership would not overlap with that of the city council. Advocates of such plans argued that the creation of a police board to replace a single chief of police would also prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one administrator and would thus reduce the likelihood of corruption, favoritism or control by machine politicians. The city of Philadelphia established such a system in 1850. Many other large American cities soon followed suit, including New York (1853), New Orleans (1853), Cincinnati (1859), San Francisco (1859), Saint Louis (1861), Kansas City (1861),
Detroit (1861), Buffalo (1866), Cleveland (1866) and Atlanta (1874). Boston was one of the last cities to adopt this type of administrative structure. In 1878, the legislature of Massachusetts created a three-member board of police commissioners to run the Boston Police Department. The commissioners were to be appointed by the mayor of the city with the consent of the board of aldermen. In addition to administering the police department, this board was also given the power to distribute liquor licenses, a power that had previously been exercised by the board of aldermen.2

This move, however, did not satisfy the critics in most cities for long. Party bosses, through their ability to control the municipal officials who appointed the police boards, continued to determine the role that the police played within the city, so the conditions that had existed before the establishment of the boards persisted. Charitable organizations continued to complain that police activities undermined their work and opponents of the local party machines continued to resent the power that control over the police department gave to the party boss. In Boston, reform groups like the New England Society for the Suppression of Vice and the Citizens' Law and Order League of Massachusetts attacked the police department's laxity in enforcing liquor laws and in fighting prostitution and gambling, blaming this laxity on the influence of city politicians. In its 1884 report, the New England Society called for "a radical and thorough reform of our police system."3 Opponents of the Democratic machine that
dominated Boston politics by this time were likewise dissatisfied with the results of the restructuring. One Republican insisted, "It is [as] certain that the force will be used for partisan purposes as it is that the mayor is a politician. Who ever knew of a Democratic politician to lose such an opportunity?"  

Many of these critics began to believe that the only way to remedy this situation was to remove the police force from the control of municipal officials altogether. Reform groups like the New England Society and the Law and Order League began to agitate for a transfer of control from the city government to the state level. These groups argued that state control would remove the influence of partisan politics from the operation of the police force and hence improve the quality of law enforcement. In 1881, Annie Adams Fields, founder of the Associated Charities in Boston, wrote to the governor of Massachusetts to request that the state assume responsibility for appointing the city's board of police commissioners, insisting that, "our work for the poor in Boston is almost neutralized by the absence of help from the very source where we should look for it."

During the early 1880's, the movement to establish state control over the Boston Police Department gathered momentum. Republican leaders had by this time realized the hopelessness of their dreams of wresting control of the city government from a Democratic Party machine which drew its support from the ever-growing immigrant population of the city. Transferring control of the police department to the state government, which
was dominated by representatives from the heavily-Republican rural areas of the state, offered them a way of maintaining at least some influence over municipal affairs. Residents of rural areas themselves were becoming increasingly concerned as the number of immigrants who arrived in the city each year increased. By 1880, nearly one third of the population of Boston was foreign-born. The incorporation of such large numbers of immigrants into the city's population was having a profound (and, according to the defenders of the old norms, a profoundly adverse) impact on the social, political, economic and religious life of Boston. Suspicious in particular of the Irish, who constituted more than 56% of the foreign-born population and who were coming to dominate political life within the city in general and the city's Democratic Party hierarchy in particular, rural conservatives viewed state control as a way to ensure that the police power remained in "safe" hands. Thus, the movement for state control of the Boston Police Department linked two groups with divergent aims: the civic and social reformers who hoped that state control would lead to more impartial and effective law enforcement and the conservative Republicans who saw it as a way of wresting power from the Democratic Party bosses.6

In the wake of the election of Boston's first Irish Catholic mayor, Hugh O'Brien, in 1885, the state legislature complied with the requests of these critics. Shortly after O'Brien appointed a second Irish Democrat to the three-man board of police commissioners, Republicans in the Massachusetts General Court
introduced a bill to transfer the power to appoint the board of police commissioners to the state government. The new police board was to be a bipartisan body of three commissioners appointed to five-year terms by the governor. Since Republicans had occupied the governor's office for 25 of the previous 27 years, this effectively removed control of Boston's police force from the hands of the city's Democratic Party bosses. In case a Democrat were to somehow be elected governor, however, these appointments were made subject to the consent of the state's Executive Council, whose seats were apportioned in such a way as to ensure control by Republicans from outside of the city. In spite of opposition from Democrats, the legislature's Republican majority was able to secure passage of the bill before the end of 1885. A second bill adopted at the same time gave the state control over the city's finances by setting a limit on the city's tax rate and requiring the consent of the General Court before the tax rate could be changed.7 Boston Democrats protested that these measures violated the principle of "home rule". The Boston Globe complained,

To say that Boston has not the intelligence and the will to regulate her own immediate concerns is an insult to her citizens. The metropolis of the Commonwealth is robbed of one of the most important functions of self-government in order to gratify the malice of some, the fanatical notions of others, and the political interests of many more.8

But the Republican majority in the General Court countered such arguments with the assertion that the board of police commissioners had failed to adequately enforce the liquor laws and
that, since a local police force held the primary responsibility for enforcing laws passed by the state legislature, the General Court had a vested interest in seeing to it that the police department carried out its duties properly. A year earlier, the General Court had passed a civil service law designed to eliminate political influence from decisions concerning the appointment of policemen or their tenure in office. Armed with these measures, reformers and Republicans were now convinced that they had finally broken the Democratic Party bosses' hold over the Boston Police Department. Republicans were so pleased with the concept of state control, in fact, that over the course of the next decade they saw to it that the state assumed similar control over Boston's sewage, park and water departments.9

In states throughout the nation, rural suspicion of rapidly growing urban areas and the tendency for one party to control the city while the other controlled the hinterland led to conflicts similar to that which occurred in Boston. In case after case, legislatures dominated by representatives from rural areas removed city police forces and, later, other city services from the jurisdiction of municipal officials. Thus, when the Massachusetts legislature established state control over the Boston Police Department in 1885, it was adopting a policy that had already been tried in numerous other places. New York had assumed the lead when, in 1857, the state government assumed control over the New York Police Department. Over the course of the next thirty years, the police departments in Baltimore (1860), Saint Louis (1861),
Kansas City (1861), Chicago (1861), Detroit (1865), Cleveland (1866), New Orleans (1868), Cincinnati (1877), San Francisco (1877), Indianapolis (1883), and Omaha (1887) were all reorganized along similar lines. Urban politicians in many cities, however, protested persistently against the state governments' assumption of authority over city departments. In 1905, twenty years after the establishment of state control of the Boston Police Department, Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins called it a "violation of the first principle of home rule, and a needless and profitless wound to the pride of the first city in the Commonwealth." In 1905, twenty years after the establishment of state control of the Boston Police Department, Mayor Patrick Andrew Collins called it a "violation of the first principle of home rule, and a needless and profitless wound to the pride of the first city in the Commonwealth."11

State control of most city police departments was relatively short-lived. Contrary to the hopes of reformers, state control did not significantly improve the quality of police service, nor did it eliminate partisan politics from police affairs; it simply replaced the influence of one group of politicians with influence by another. In most cities, the alliance between those reformers who sought more effective enforcement of the law and the partisan groups, who supported state control of police departments simply because it offered a means of reducing the power of the opposing political party, quickly disintegrated. Thus, reformers did not put up tremendous opposition when, in state after state, the party that dominated city politics gained control of the state government and restored city police departments to local control. Local control was re-established in New York in 1870 and in most other cities during the subsequent three decades. In Massachusetts, however, the Republican Party maintained its
control over the state government until the 1930’s. Republicans occupied the governor’s office for all but nine of the 46 years between 1885 and 1931. Meanwhile the city’s government remained firmly in the hands of local Democratic leaders. This encouraged the state government to retain jurisdiction over the Boston Police Department for a far longer period than was typical in other cities. By 1900, only four large cities still maintained state-controlled police forces: Baltimore, Saint Louis, Kansas City and Boston. In Boston, the power to appoint police commissioners remained with the governor until 1962.
CHAPTER II

POLICE REFORM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: DEPARTMENTAL INDEPENDENCE AND CENTRALIZATION

Urban reformers carried their campaigns for improved municipal government into the new century. In fact, these campaigns took on an increased vigor after 1900. The reformers of the early twentieth century did not promote a single unified reform package, however. Instead, various directions and divergent, and often conflicting, goals can be identified within the urban reform movements of the period. Like many of their predecessors in the previous century, some reformers continued to focus on the eradication of vice and immorality, especially in the working-class districts of the city. Others argued that improved education and universal schooling would eliminate much of the squalor in the nation's urban areas. Yet other groups insisted that the solutions to the city's problems lay in increased popular control over local government. This last group of reformers advocated a democratization of government through such means as the secret ballot, home rule, direct primaries, initiative and referendum. Conversely, other reformers blamed urban problems on the irresponsibility of the city's voters and sought ways to further remove the departments that provided municipal services from the arena of electoral politics.

This latter group believed that the success of any plan to improve the performance of the city government relied ultimately
on administrative efficiency. This, they insisted, required decision-making by experts who would occupy public positions not because they were liked by the voters or loyal to the ruling political boss, but because they possessed specialized knowledge and skills that enabled them to run their respective departments effectively. The city government, they insisted, should be modeled after the administrative structures that allowed private businesses to be run profitably. According to these reformers, the proper functioning of such a system required that significant degrees of autonomy be granted to the heads of municipal departments. Not surprisingly, the leading promoters of this strain of reform tended to be prominent businessmen, professionals or members of the elite classes who had watched machine politicians use electoral politics to edge them out of their positions of control in the city.¹

It was this last strain of reform that had the greatest impact on the development of city police departments during the first twenty years of the twentieth century. Police departments provided a vital service to the city, and yet they invariably had a past that was colored by corruption and subservience to the interests of party bosses. Thus, they were natural targets for the work of these reformers. Like the civic reformers who worked to improve other components of municipal government, those who focused on the police tended to have ties with the elite, professional or business classes. Chief among these were Leonhard Fuld, a professor of administrative law at Columbia University,
and Raymond B. Fosdick, whose comprehensive study, *American Police Systems*, was published by the Bureau of Social Hygiene, an organization that was funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Scholars writing in the 1970's and 1980's have asserted that these reform impulses had their origins in the competition between classes within the urban community. Samuel Walker argues that the reformers sought to break the power that the working class held over the police. Thomas Reppetto asserts, "until well into the twentieth century, it can be argued that the call for administrative reform was simply an attempt by an upper-class minority to secure control over police administration regardless of the will of the electorate." Sidney Harring claims that the reformers' goal was to re-establish upper-class control over the police so they would remain "an effective anti-working-class force," while Eric Monkkonen insists that one of the goals of police reform was to eliminate the working-class attitudes and values of the rank-and-file patrolman.2

In contrast to the reformers of the late 1800's, the early twentieth-century police reformers did not feel that shifting control of the city police department from one level of government to another was, by itself, enough to significantly improve the performance of urban police forces. Instead, they focused far more attention on the conditions that existed within the police department itself. The aim of the police reformer of this period was to create a highly disciplined crime-fighting organization that would be independent of outside control and, hence, would
enforce laws with consistency and impartiality. The behavior of the members of such a department would not be controlled by the promise of patronage and of petty graft, but by obedience within a hierarchical command structure and by a strict adherence to a code of professional standards. The scope of the police department's duties, these reformers believed, also had to be narrowed to include nothing more than the prevention of crime and the strict enforcement of the law if the department were to perform these two functions with an acceptable degree of efficiency.³

Reformers like Fuld and Fosdick identified three characteristics which they believed were essential to the proper operation of a city police department: independence from outside interference, centralized decision-making and professionalism. In most cases they found American police forces to be sorely lacking in each of these areas. They repeatedly pointed to police departments in Europe, especially to that of London, as examples of highly efficient, well-organized agencies that were well beyond the reach of local or even national politicians. However, by 1915, American police reformers were beginning to see some of the same characteristics in the Boston Police Department. As a result, the Boston police earned a fair amount of praise from police reformers. According to Fosdick, the Boston Police Department "stood well in the lead of police organizations throughout the country." Another observer, George H. McCaffrey, claimed that "Boston had a very excellent police force, perhaps the best in America."⁴
Departmental Independence

To the police reformers of the early twentieth century, the effective performance of police duties was only possible in a department that was independent of all outside influence, and the greatest threat to this independence, in their minds, came from local politicians. As Fuld explained it, "When the politician's influence begins to be felt in a police department the efficiency of the department is bound to suffer." To Fuld there was an inherent conflict between the politician's interest in securing popularity by promoting a maximum of personal freedom and the police department's proper function, which was, in Fuld's opinion, to limit individual freedom by enforcing the law. According to Fuld, in a police department over which local politicians hold sway, the most efficient policemen will be punished while the most lax will be rewarded. Fosdick insisted that a force that is not completely independent of political control is a "force administered with an eye to the next election,...its work dictated by the political necessities of the moment." 5

In their opposition to the political machine's dominance of police departments, these reformers had something in common with their predecessors of the nineteenth century. Fuld echoed the sentiments of many earlier reformers when he wrote, "American cities have shown an utter incapacity for self-government in the department of police administration." However, the twentieth-century police reformers had seen enough of state control to know that it did not guarantee the police department's
Independence from partisan politics. Fosdick found state interference in police affairs as unforgivable as local interference. He lamented the fact that, even while under state control, city police departments had been made "pawns in the clash of party interests." According to Fosdick, "The effect of this treatment on police organization has been peculiarly disastrous."  

In Boston's case, however, Fosdick found a rare example of state control which he felt had been very successful. He praised the fact that, in Boston, "the administration of the police force was conducted with a disregard for political considerations rarely encountered in American cities" and insisted that the department's progress would not have been possible had the department remained under local control. "Whether due to a large foreign population, or some condition of civic inertia, or factors peculiarly local," he wrote, "the government elected by the city of Boston has generally been below the level of government elected by the state of Massachusetts."  

George McCaffrey insisted that, before 1885:  

the interests of the whole commonwealth were being injured by the mismanagement of police affairs in Boston. Political influence then ran the department in all its branches; officers were appointed, removed and transferred without any reference to their own personal qualifications. Vice flourished in many forms all over the city.  

However, due to the assumption of control by the state, McCaffrey noted, "political 'pull' is of absolutely no account in the police organization of to-day; there is not a single gambling house of
any account in Boston and the laws relating to the sale of liquor can no longer be violated with impunity. 8

Reformers attributed much of this success to the policies adopted by Stephen O'Meara, who served as Boston's police commissioner from 1906, when the three-man police board was replaced by a single commissioner, until his death twelve years later. O'Meara was an anomaly in the Boston political arena: he was an Irish Republican. He had been born in Prince Edward Island, Canada, and had moved to Boston with his family in 1864, when he was ten years old. O'Meara grew up in predominantly-Irish Charlestown, and then went to work as a reporter for the Boston Globe. From there he moved to the Boston Journal, where he eventually advanced from reporter to editor to general manager and finally to part-owner. In 1904, O'Meara launched a campaign to win a Republican nomination for Congress, but was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, his Republican politics and his financial success brought O'Meara a degree of contact with Boston's social elite that was unheard of for an Irish Catholic of his day. He was a member of the Exchange, Algonquin, St. Botolph's and Union clubs and was a personal friend of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. 9

O'Meara represented the new breed of police administrator that emerged during the early twentieth century. Most of his experience had been in private business, not in public administration. In fact, before he assumed command of the Boston Police Department, O'Meara had had no experience with police work whatsoever. Like August Vollmer of Berkeley, California, Richard Sylvester of
Washington, D.C. and numerous other police executives, O’Meara shared the reformers’ belief in departmental independence, centralized control and professionalism. In fact, it was the appointment of O’Meara and administrators like him that allowed the ideas of the reformers to be put into practice in city police departments.¹⁰

One of O’Meara’s foremost priorities as commissioner was to eliminate all traces of political influence from the Boston Police Department. After just a year in office, O’Meara reported:

> The first efforts of the Police Commissioner were directed to the task of convincing the members of the admirable police force over which he took control that they were to be absolutely free from outside interference....They...were to look only to their department superiors for rewards and punishments.¹¹

Five years later, O’Meara proudly announced in his annual report to the city government that "The Boston Police Department is wholly free from politics --- the root of all evil in the policing of American cities and towns." He went on to proclaim that, during his tenure as police commissioner, not a single appointment, promotion, transfer, expenditure or licensing decision "had been influenced by any political personage or political consideration."¹²

O’Meara’s ever-vigilant defense against outside interference at times drew him into conflict with other city officials. In 1910, Mayor John F. Fitzgerald attempted to bypass both the civil service commission and the police department’s regular procedures
for hiring and detailing patrolmen by personally assigning four special policemen to the department for the purpose of patrolling Boston Common and Franklin Square. In a series of letters to the mayor, O'Meara protested this action, which he believed "would be the beginning of an untested, unorganized, uninstructed, undisciplined police force, controlled...by the city authorities." He underscored the fact that "the Boston police are assigned to all parts of the city in accordance with the judgment and experience of the heads of the department," and made it clear that no one would be allowed to interfere with this prerogative.

Fitzgerald angrily replied:

I trust that mere loyalty to your own department and an excessive regard for the technicalities of the case will not override your sense of the larger interests which are involved. It seems to me your duty either to ratify these appointments or to meet the situation by increasing the number of officers on the Common and Franklin Square. 13

Nevertheless, O'Meara refused to comply with the Mayor's request, and the matter was dropped.

Even O'Meara's friend Henry Cabot Lodge could not persuade the commissioner to overlook department rules. Lodge made a personal petition to O'Meara requesting that the department hire a candidate, Francis McDonald, who did not meet the physical requirements for appointment as a patrolman. Lodge wrote to O'Meara, "I take real interest in this case and should be much indebted for anything you can do," to which O'Meara replied, "The trouble with Mr. Francis McDonald...is that he walks very badly
and for a policeman that is a fatal defect....We are obliged to be more particular.14

Unlike their predecessors in the nineteenth century, the police reformers of the early twentieth century did not invoke the principle of departmental independence merely when trying to wrest the police department from the control of the party boss. While they recognized that machine politicians posed the most immediate threat to the independence of the police department, these reformers insisted that the operation of the department remain free from any outside influence, no matter what the source (except, of course, influence from well-intentioned and insightful reformers like themselves!). For example, they disagreed with their predecessors on the inherent value of the civil service laws that governed personnel matters. Fosdick insisted that, as a result of civil service regulations, "there are in most large departments many men whose continuance in office is a menace to the force and to the community but who cannot be dismissed because the proof of incompetence or dishonesty does not satisfy the requirements of the civil service law." If a businessman were to try to run his enterprise in such a manner, he insisted, "He would be foredoomed to failure from the start." Fosdick believed that police administrators should have a freer hand in removing undesirable officers. He also claimed that allowing tests administered by a civil service board to determine which officers should receive promotions "ranks symmetry above real efficiency." Fuld insisted that the exams were not effective indicators of the
officers' potential for success for, as he put it, "the best scholar is not necessarily the best policeman." Both men agreed that a supervisor's assessment of the candidate's work provided the best measure of a candidate's readiness for promotion.15

The process for distributing promotions within the Boston Police Department was based, in part, on non-competitive exams, but it also gave great discretionary power to police administrators. According to this system, division captains nominated patrolmen for promotion. Only those candidates who were nominated and who received the approval of the police commissioner were given civil service exams. The police commissioner would then receive a list of those candidates who had passed the exam and would award promotions to those men on the list whom he deemed to be most worthy, regardless of their rank on the list. In 1913, the state's civil service commission proposed the introduction of competitive exams that would have been open to all who desired promotions in order to make the police department conform to the practices that were standard for other public agencies in the state. O'Meara succeeded in blocking this change, which he called "by far the greatest danger that has threatened this department from any source in my seven years of service as commissioner." Fosdick praised the system of non-competitive examination used by the Boston Police Department, likening it to the one used by the London Police Department, and proclaimed it the best solution to the problem of identifying officers for promotion.16
Police reformers even argued that intervention by the courts should be restricted, especially in cases that involved personnel decisions. They stood staunchly opposed to granting policemen the right to appeal their superiors' decisions in court. Fuld asserted that, "The reinstatement of dismissed members of the force, which amounts practically to a reversal of the careful and deliberate decision of the chief administrative officer of the police force by the courts, tends to lessen the respect in which the members of the force should hold their chief." Fosdick agreed, insisting that "the unrestricted right of appeal to the courts from the decision of a police administrator is a menace to the proper exercise of discipline." Again, Fosdick pointed out that such conditions would not be tolerated in a business, and he praised the Boston Police Department, whose men were forbidden to appeal administrative decisions in the courts:

On no other basis can responsibility be definitized and a police force be rid of useless or dishonest employees. To divide responsibility with a civil service commissioner, a mayor, a court, or any other authority, is to sow the seed of demoralization and to make real success impossible for any administrator.

Thus, the Boston Police Department came closer to replicating the early twentieth-century police reformers' model of a police force that was independent of outside influences than did the departments in most other major cities in the United States. To a large degree, police officials were able to exercise this independence because of the retention of state control and its
denial of influence to local politicians who had a significant interest in using the department to promote their own personal political goals. It was Police Commissioner O'Meara's unwavering commitment to and stubborn defense of the principle of departmental independence, however, that significantly limited the degree to which all outside groups, not simply local political leaders, were able to influence police department policies and practices.

Centralized Decision-making

To the early twentieth-century police reformer, the absence of outside interference in police affairs did not by itself guarantee proper administration of the department. This independence had to be accompanied by a complete centralization of the decision-making power within the department. Like their contemporaries who sought to alter the administrative structure of municipal government as a whole, these reformers placed great stock in the effectiveness of executive offices. Thus, they devoted great attention to the role of the chief administrator of the department: the police commissioner in a large city or the police chief in a small city or town. So long as he was chosen solely on the basis of his ability as an administrator, police reformers felt that the chief executive should be given virtually unlimited power within the department and that he should be allowed to continue in office as long as he performed his duties effectively.19
To the reformers, the issue of departmental autonomy was
inextricably connected with the idea of centralized
decision-making. Reformers and police administrators alike viewed
outside intervention in such matters as the appointment or
assignment of officers, the issuing of promotions or the
punishment of members of the force to be an intolerable
encroachment on the police executive's proper jurisdiction. Such
encroachment, they felt, divided the responsibility for
decision-making and severely undermined the department's ability
to perform its duties effectively. At the same time,
centralization of authority within the department was seen as the
best defense against external pressures. Fuld insisted that the
centralization of power in the hands of a single commissioner
would distance the police department from local politics, while
McCaffrey credited centralized control within the Boston Police
Department with "absolutely eliminat[ing] the influence of
politics in appointments."20 Again, recent historians have
interpreted the reformers' faith in centralized authority as a
product of the competition for control of the police by various
classes and interest groups. Robert Fogelson argues that the move
to increase the power of police executives was designed to
"strengthen their position vis-a-vis the ward bosses" and to break
the bosses' hold over the rank-and-file policemen. Sidney Harring
claims that the establishment of a strong police executive who
would function beyond the reach of elected officials was an
upper-class adjustment to the growing political power of an
organized working class. Samuel Walker agrees that centralization was primarily an effort to isolate the police department from the working class.21

To Fuld, Fosdick and other reformers, dividing the responsibility for a police department by placing it under the jurisdiction of a board of supervisors was a grave error. Unlike the reformers of the previous century who viewed divided authority as a safeguard against corruption and favoritism, Fosdick found it "an encumbrance rather than a help. The essential qualities in police administration are those which a single-headed executive can best bring to task." Upon reviewing the performance of police boards in various cities, Fosdick concluded that the lack of unity and the indecisiveness which marked such boards prevented their police departments from taking any "progressive steps." Fuld contended that:

The single commissioner system...is well fitted for the discharge of duties which require energy and rapidity of action and for which it is desirable to have a fixed and well-defined responsibility. No department of the city government requires more rapid, or more energetic, or more responsible action than does the police."

Fuld pointed out that in Europe, police departments were generally commanded by single administrators, "as [they] logically should be."22

Reformers were encouraged by the fact that the days of the city police board seemed to be numbered. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, city after city dismantled the
police boards that had been set up during the previous wave of reform. New York led the way when it abolished its police board in 1901 and transferred control to a single police commissioner. In contrast to the belatedness with which it had instituted earlier structural reforms, Boston was one of the first cities to implement this form of control. In 1906, the Massachusetts legislature abolished the three-man board of commissioners which it had created twenty-one years before and replaced it with a single commissioner. Like the earlier board, the commissioner was to be appointed by the governor with the consent of the state's Executive Council. In order to minimize possible political pressure on the commissioner, he was to be appointed for a five-year term by a governor who had to run for re-election annually. A governor could not remove the police commissioner from office without the consent of the Executive Council. In approving this restructuring, Governor Curtis Guild reiterated the reformers' position on centralized control, saying "inefficiency, if not disaster, follows divided responsibility in the control of any organized body of men, where discipline and esprit de corps must be the mainspring of success." In addition to New York and Boston, other cities including Cleveland (1908), Cincinnati (1908), Birmingham (1911), Omaha (1912), Saint Paul (1914) and Buffalo (1916) adopted single-headed police administrations. By 1920, only 14 of the 52 American cities with populations of over 100,000 still retained police boards. However, among these fourteen were Baltimore, Kansas City and Saint Louis, the only
large cities other than Boston whose police departments remained under state supervision. Boston, thus, became the only large city in the United States with a police force that was administered by a single powerful commissioner whose selection was completely beyond the control of city officials.24

Under chapter 291 of the Acts of 1906 of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the legislation that created the single-headed administration, Boston’s police commissioner was granted extensive powers over both policy and personnel matters. As the head of the department hierarchy, he maintained control over the force through the division captains, who were responsible to him alone. He was free to issue general orders and to amend the department rules at any time, and such decisions were not subject to review by any other body or official. When positions on the force became vacant, the civil service commission sent the police commissioner a list of the top scorers from the most recent round of civil service exams. The number of candidates on the list was always approximately double the number of open positions. After he had personally interviewed each applicant on the list, the police commissioner chose the men whom he wished to hire. As was true regarding the promotion of officers, the commissioner was free to choose any candidate regardless of his rank on the list of exam scores. When a disciplinary complaint was lodged against an officer, a trial board consisting of three division captains was appointed by the police commissioner to hear the case, determine the guilt or innocence of the officer in question, and recommend a
punishment. The police commissioner, however, was free to order a new hearing to be held before either the original board of inquiry, a new board of his choosing, or himself. He was also free to accept, reject or modify the board's sentencing recommendation as he saw fit. The commissioner's decisions in such cases were final and could not be appealed to the courts. Furthermore, the commissioner had the power to simply dismiss a complaint against an officer without a trial if he felt that the complaint was too trivial to warrant action. The commissioner even had control over the salaries of the department's members, for they could not be changed without his approval.  

By 1910, then, the administrative structure of the Boston Police Department showed a degree of conformity to the principles of autonomy and centralization that was unrivaled by any other department in the nation. State control had severely curtailed the influence that local politicians were able to exercise over the department leadership. The elimination of board control and its replacement by a single commissioner had placed responsibility for all administrative decisions in the hands of a single executive officer who was not accountable to the city government, to the local party hierarchy or to the voters of the city. In fact, due to the provisions that protected his tenure in office, the police commissioner was only loosely accountable to the state officials to whom he owed his position. According to the reformers, such conditions served to maximize the effectiveness of the decision-making process within the department by allowing the sole
objective of the commissioner’s policies to be the improvement of the force’s ability to fight crime. Not only did the Boston Police Department’s administrative structure conform to the model proposed by the reformers, but the man who initially occupied the top position within this structure shared most of the reformers’ views and endeavored to put their principles into practice.

O’Meara was a strong, intelligent and capable leader who had committed himself to the constant improvement of his department’s performance. As a result of these conditions, reformers repeatedly praised the administration of the Boston Police Department. However, while they placed great emphasis on structural reforms, the reformers did not fail to recognize that a flawless administrative system did not necessarily guarantee optimal efficiency in the performance of duties. Improving police performance ultimately required altering the behavior and the attitudes of the rank-and-file policeman. This was the aim of the third principle promoted by the police reformers: professionalism. Altering the outlook of the patrolman on his beat, however, proved to be a far greater challenge than modifying the department’s command structure.
CHAPTER III

PROFESSIONALIZATION AND THE POLICEMAN

While departmental independence and the centralization of authority altered the administrative structure of the police force, professionalization, the third component of the reformers' program, was designed to alter the attitudes and behavior of the policeman himself, as well as his relationship to his department. Realizing that the ultimate responsibility for carrying out performance objectives rested with the patrolman on his beat, reformers turned their attention to identifying modifications which, they hoped, would bring the conduct of patrolmen more in line with the aims of the police reform movement. This generated as much conflict as (if not more than) any other aspect of early twentieth-century police reform. In part, this conflict resulted from internal contradictions within the professional ideal itself. Professionalization, in the end, led to the pursuit of goals that were inherently incompatible with one another. In addition, though, professionalization brought the policeman into conflict with the reform movement. The reformers, socially isolated from the patrolman, had little understanding of, and even less sympathy for, his needs. As a result, the implementation of specific reform proposals was often detrimental to the patrolman's interests and frequently demanded that the patrolman distance himself from his own social and cultural background. In fact, Eric Monkkonen contends that one of the chief aims of the professionalization
movement was to eliminate the working-class nature of the 
patrolman's values and attitudes. In the end, professionalization 
had two distinct effects: it generated an increased occupational 
identity among the policemen and it contributed to the growing 
frustration that they felt on the job. These two attitudes were 
designed to collide with one another.

The rank-and-file of the typical city police department of 
the early twentieth century was recruited overwhelmingly from the 
working class of the city it served. As Leonhard Fuld pointed out, 
"Men who have enjoyed the benefit of a good general education are 
deterred from entering the police service in America, both because 
of the inadequate salaries as well as because of the generally 
undesirable character of police work." While low prestige and 
salaries comparable to those paid to skilled laborers deterred men 
from the middle and upper classes from pursuing a career with the 
police department, the relative security of the jobs in the 
department, which were less directly affected by fluctuations in 
the economy than was true of most industrial jobs, made police 
work very attractive to members of the working class. Thus, Fuld 
was able to report, patrolmen were "generally found among the 
poorer people--drivers, motormen, porters, laborers, and the 
like."2 This characterization was true of the Boston Police 
Department. In his annual report for 1914, Police Commissioner 
O'Meara divided the previous occupations of all of the members of 
the Boston Police Force, more than fifteen hundred men, into the 
following categories:
O'Meara also identified the specific occupations that the men had held before joining the police department. Thirty-one men had been in business for themselves; thirty had been managers, foremen or superintendents; five had farmed; two had been athletic instructors; one had been a photographer; one a ball player; and one a student. All of the remaining men (95.5%) had held jobs that could be classified as either skilled, clerical, service or unskilled occupations. The specific occupations held by the largest number of men were:

- Street railway motormen: 161 men
- Teamsters: 140
- Clerks: 118
- Street railway conductors: 91
- Drivers, coachmen, chauffeurs, etc.: 54
- Machinists: 50
- Metalworkers: 50
- Firefighters: 50
- Locomotive and stationary engineers and firemen: 47
- Carpenters and woodworkers: 42

Only 19 of the men (1.2%) had been policemen with another department at the time of their appointment to the Boston Police Force.3

The composition of the police force also reflected the impact that immigration had had on Boston's population. In a city in which approximately 36% of the population was foreign-born, thirty
per cent of the men on the police force in 1914 had been born abroad. Over half of these had been born in Ireland. Furthermore, by 1920 about half of all of Boston's policemen and 41% of its residents were second-generation Americans. As the figures below show, however, recently-arrived immigrant groups, such as the Italians and the Russians, whose social status tended to fall below that of the immigrant groups that had arrived earlier, were significantly under-represented on the police force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Birth</th>
<th>Boston Police Force (1914)</th>
<th>Boston Population (1910)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>670,585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1,108 (69.9%)</td>
<td>427,220 (63.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>264 (16.7%)</td>
<td>66,041 (9.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada &amp; Newfoundland</td>
<td>155 (9.8%)</td>
<td>51,363 (7.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>28 (1.8%)</td>
<td>19,048 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavia</td>
<td>14 (0.9%)</td>
<td>10,523 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10 (0.6%)</td>
<td>8,701 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3 (0.2%)</td>
<td>31,380 (4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1 (0.1%)</td>
<td>41,892 (6.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (0.2%)</td>
<td>14,417 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those born within the United States, 694 (43.8% of the entire force) had been born within the city of Boston. The overwhelming majority of the Boston Police Force, therefore, was recruited directly from the upper and middle ranks of the city's own working class, with first- and second-generation Irish-Americans comprising the largest share of the force. As a result, the members of the department had strong ties to the community which they served and, in particular, to the city's working-class neighborhoods. This was typical of most large cities.
In the United States. As Fuld observed, "the poor classes fraternize with the policemen, since the policemen are of their own social class", while the middle and upper classes tended to remain aloof.6

To the reformer of the early twentieth century, the predominantly working-class character of the rank-and-file patrolman was most regrettable. Fuld complained, "The patrolmen are almost invariably men of limited education and intelligence." In fact, the reformers displayed nothing but contempt for the very men whom they expected to play a central role in the new, more efficient city police departments they were trying to create. Raymond Fosdick described the patrolman as "often...without imagination or resourcefulness." Fuld was even sharper in his condemnation. "The low opinion in which the American policemen are held is due more to their intellectual inferiority than to anything else," he wrote. The job attracts, "the man who desires a position requiring only a minimum of work....[It] does not attract into the ranks of the policemen who would in private life attain distinction by their efforts." Not only did the average new recruit fail to meet with Fuld's approval, but, at least according to Professor Fuld, the patrolman's laziness actually increased after he joined the force. "The authority with which they are invested," Fuld said, "and the respect shown them by the citizens, create in them an inordinate desire to shirk their work or, as they themselves express it, 'to take it easy.'" These deficiencies worried Fuld considerably. Pointing out that the policeman out on
patrol somewhere in the city could not be directly supervised by his superiors at all times, Fuld argued that the job required a far greater degree of reliability and sound judgment than he felt the average patrolman possessed.7

The primary objective of professionalization, then, was to "upgrade" the patrolman. The reformers' plan was to transform what they saw as a simple-minded, working-class idler, devoid of the slightest appreciation for the significance of his position, into a dedicated, well-disciplined crime-fighting expert. They demanded that stricter physical, mental and moral standards be employed when hiring new recruits, and Fuld and others called on officials to increase salaries and to improve working conditions in order to induce the better-educated to choose policing as a career. In addition to improving the pool of candidates from which policemen were chosen, the reformers recommended measures to improve the performance of those men already on the force. For instance, they aggressively promoted the establishment and improvement of training programs. At the same time, they demanded that the patrolman's work be subjected to closer supervision and that he be held more regularly accountable for the proper observation of departmental procedures. Fuld called on the police supervisor to constantly monitor his men and to avoid fraternization and "all unofficerlike familiarity with his subordinates." Police reformers also enthusiastically advocated the employment of the latest crime-fighting methods and technology.8
Aside from improving the general level of skill possessed by the average patrolman, the reformers also sought to change the policeman's own perception of his work. Associating a high rate of turnover in personnel with the days of partisan interference, the reformers set out to stabilize the police department by introducing the idea that police work was not just a job to be held until a better one came along. Patrolmen, according to Fuld, had to be convinced to "make the police business their lifework." In short, the reformers hoped to instill a middle-class concept of career in a population that was overwhelmingly working-class in background.

The police reformers showed little regard for whether or not such fundamental changes met with the approval of the patrolmen themselves. To the reformers, and to many police administrators, the patrolman's opinion was of little value and was certainly not to enter into any discussion regarding the improvement of police performance. Samuel Walker writes, "the patrolman was regarded as clay, to be molded by the police executive." According to Fuld, "they are soldiers, whose first duty is to obey." Such military analogies were commonly invoked by police reformers and public officials alike during the early part of the twentieth century. Major Richard Sylvester, the head of the Washington, D.C. police department, referred to his men as "citizen soldiers." In 1918, the mayor of Cincinnati compared the role of the police of his city with that of the American troops fighting in France, and, in an effort to ensure the policemen's adherence to department
policy, stated, "Policemen are soldiers and they should obey orders as they have sworn to do." In fact, it was during this period that it became common for the various ranks within the police department to be given military labels: patrolmen became privates, and superior officers became sergeants, lieutenants and captains.11

Reformers and public officials of this period also began to voice the opinion that holding a public service position was a privilege and that, due to his peculiar position within the community, the policeman could not expect to be allowed to exercise the same rights as other citizens. In 1897, in the case of McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of the Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a policeman could be dismissed from his position for engaging in political activity when such activity was forbidden by a police department regulation. Holmes argued, "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman....The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered to him." These same principles were invoked when the "Goethals Bill" was introduced in the New York State Legislature in 1914. This bill would have taken away the New York policemen's right to appeal departmental disciplinary decisions in the courts. By pressuring legislators, policemen were able to prevent the passage of the bill. However, a similar measure had already deprived the Boston police of the right of appeal in such cases.12
Professionalization of the police force required alteration of more than just the policeman's behavior and perceptions, however. The range of duties that policemen performed had to be drastically narrowed, the reformers believed, if the police were to efficiently perform the crime-fighting functions for which they had been trained. Traditionally, city police forces had provided a tremendous array of services: from providing food and shelter for the indigent to compiling the annual census of school children, from investigating jurors to inspecting tenements. They supervised elections, cleaned the streets, registered voters, caught stray animals and issued licenses to saloon keepers, carriage operators, dog breeders, peddlers and musicians. To reformers, these services were unnecessary distractions. Fosdick called them "irrelevant activities" and complained that, because of them, "the primary function of the police has often been left to drift along with little guidance or oversight by administrators." "To this unwise and unsound partnership between the police force and unrelated functions of government," he argued, "much of the corruption and demoralization in American municipalities can be traced." Not only did the reformers demand the elimination of all of the non-crime-related services that the department as a whole provided, but they also called for strict limits on the types of tasks that individual patrolmen were required to perform. Fuld insisted that patrolmen should not be assigned to perform clerical
work, to assist in other municipal departments, or to run errands for superior officers. Such tasks, if they were necessary, were to be assigned to clerks, for patrolmen are too expensive for this work. They are selected for police patrol service and it is wrong to detail them for any [other] purpose.13

In Boston, Police Commissioner O'Meara did his best to promote the professional ideal among his men. His goal, like that of the police reformers, was to mold the department into a dedicated, disciplined and efficient crime-fighting force. Shortly after his death, the Boston Globe paid tribute to O'Meara by pointing out that "Mr. O'Meara had impressed it on his men that their's were not 'jobs' but 'positions,' and that they had been chosen for their work because of special fitness of which they had a right to be proud and to which they must live up."14 From the outset, O'Meara made the maintenance of honesty and integrity a top priority in his department. In his first annual report as commissioner, he announced that he had found no trace of corruption within the department, but that "the watch will continue, and the punishment of the guilty, if any, will be as severe as the laws of the State, as well as the rules of the department, will sanction." Five years later, O'Meara proudly reported that since he had assumed command of the department, only one officer had been convicted of accepting a bribe; the policeman in question had been given two dollars in return for ignoring a traffic violation. By the time of O'Meara's death in 1918, Boston's police department had been recognized throughout the
nation as a rare example of a city police force that maintained a high standard of integrity and self-respect. O'Meara himself had also earned a reputation for dealing fairly with his men.15

O'Meara likewise stressed the importance of remaining within the law even while performing normal police duties. In the face of tremendous pressure from reformers who demanded that the police take more aggressive action to combat vices like gambling, drinking and prostitution, O'Meara insisted that his men adhere strictly to proper procedure. In his 1910 report, he wrote:

The steady purpose of this department is that the policemen, above all persons, shall respect the law; and if the time ever comes when...the police assume authority which the law does not give to them, and thus themselves become lawbreakers, the people of Boston will be the sufferers....Boston newspapers, and doubtless many citizens, criticize at this time the Police Commissioner of Boston as narrow and technical because he has insisted steadily, and still insists, that the police for whom he is responsible shall follow the law at all times, not their own impulses.

O'Meara taught his men to take both verbal and physical abuse from irate citizens without responding in kind. He also made a point of proclaiming that the use of physical or mental torture to extract confessions from suspects, the so-called "third degree", which was a fairly common practice in some departments, had "no place in the Boston Police Department," and would not be tolerated.16

O'Meara's policies regarding rewards for his officers also conformed to the teachings of the police reformers. The year before O'Meara took office, a total of thirty medals had been awarded to Boston policemen "for hazardous or dangerous service
while in the performance of duty." In addition to medals, the men often received extra vacation time in recognition of particularly brave or praiseworthy acts. O'Meara abolished these practices. "I seek to convince the policeman that the best and bravest work that he can do is expected of him always," O'Meara explained. As a result, he claimed, meritorious acts "have become every-day matters." Expressing a similar sentiment, Fuld wrote, "When a policeman saves a life at a burning building or stops a runaway horse, he is merely performing routine police duty, for which he is paid." 17

O'Meara also modified the system of discipline employed by the department. During 1905, the year before O'Meara took office, 105 cases were heard by department trial boards. In 58 of these, the officer in question was found not guilty. Of the remaining 47, 26 were fined, five were demoted, seven were discharged, seven received reprimands and two resigned. Acting on the belief that frequent acquittals and minor punishments led the men to look lightly upon the department's system of discipline, O'Meara worked to minimize the frequency of such outcomes. He took liberal advantage of the power, granted to the police commissioner in the Reorganization Act of 1906, to dismiss complaints against a policeman if, in the commissioner's opinion, the charges were found to be "frivolous or otherwise without merit sufficient to justify formal hearing." However, he also stiffened the penalties for those officers who were found guilty of negligence or wrongdoing. By 1908, O'Meara had reduced the number of trials to
36, but of these, only nine ended in acquittal. Of the remaining 27, 14 resulted in dismissals and one in the resignation of the officer in question. Thus, in 56% of the cases that did not result in acquittal, the officer’s career with the force ended, as opposed to 19% in 1905. Viewing fines, the most commonly employed means of punishment during the period before his appointment, as excessively injurious to the officer’s family, O’Meara eliminated this form of punishment and replaced it with extra, unpaid duty assignments, at times assigning up to 210 hours of punishment duty for a single offense. In 1908, seven officers received this form of punishment. During the course of that year, however, O’Meara dismissed charges in 49 cases in which he felt a trial was not warranted. During O’Meara’s administration, department trial boards heard an average of 25 cases per year, down from 85 per year during the seven years before he took office. On the average, O’Meara dismissed 29 complaints, or over half of the complaints lodged against officers, without a trial each year. However, the acquittal rate fell from over 50% to 30%. O’Meara hoped that this policy would “cause a complaint and summons for trial to be regarded by members of the force as a matter of great gravity, and to deter them from the commission of petty offenses, the penalty of which they can no longer expect to be also petty.” O’Meara’s discipline policy appeared to have had the effect that he intended: the number of officers who were punished for disciplinary infractions fell from an average of 42 per year (1899 to 1905) to 17 per year (1907 to 1918).
Finally, like the advocates of police reform, O’Meara lobbied for the elimination of police duties that were unrelated to crime fighting. In this struggle, however, he did not always receive the cooperation of the state legislature. While, in 1906, the legislature released the police department from the responsibility for issuing liquor licenses, the next year it gave the department jurisdiction over the distribution of licenses for street vendors. By 1912, the department was responsible for issuing 25,000 licenses a year to, among others, dog-owners, itinerant musicians, carriage operators, and keepers of lodging houses. In 1907, the legislature ruled that the department was to take on the task of investigating the character and fitness of prospective jurors, a duty which required the police to make inquiries about and visit the homes of 7000 of the city’s residents in the first year alone. O’Meara complained that “the police are proud of this increasing trust which is reposed in them by the Legislature, but no one outside the force itself seems to have thought that there is a limit to the kind and the quantity of work which they can do.” In 1916, the state relinquished the department from the responsibility of compiling the list of the city’s quarter of a million voters, a task that occupied nearly the entire force for several days each year. A year later, however, the state legislature transferred responsibility for the listing back to the police department over O’Meara’s strenuous objections.

Compared to the structural reforms that were advocated by the police reformers of the early twentieth century, the principles of
professionalism were applied with far less consistency in the nation's urban police departments. For example, while many police departments raised the standards for new recruits and implemented more extensive training programs, most cities were very reluctant to accede to the reformers' demands for increased salaries. With over one thousand patrolmen on a police force, even a small salary increase added a tremendous sum to the expenses of a large city like Boston, and a raise for policemen usually sparked demands for similar increases from firemen and other municipal employees. So police departments did not manage to raise salaries to a level that was substantial enough to attract large numbers of middle-class recruits. In most departments, however, discipline and accountability received far greater emphasis than they had earlier. Likewise, the number of services unrelated to crime fighting for which the police were responsible generally declined during the late 1800's and early 1900's, although, as in the case of Boston, the police department was still used to some degree as a catch-all by public officials. Each police department's administrator, of course, either chose to or was able to implement only some of these reforms while he neglected others. In Boston, for instance, the aspects of professionalism that were stressed most vigorously were those that focused attention on the behavior and integrity of the individual officer. Far less emphasis was placed on issues like training and the implementation of new technology than was found in other police departments. Throughout the nation however, and in Boston especially, professionalization
communicated one message to the patrolman quite clearly: the expectations that were placed on the police officer were to be higher than ever before.20

To some degree, professionalization also had an impact on the urban policeman's own perception of his job, even though the results of this change were not always quite what the reformers had expected. Samuel Walker contends that "reformers succeeded in stabilizing the career patterns of police officers and introducing the first rudimentary sense of police work as a profession."21 The Boston Globe observed in 1918 that visitors to the city remarked on the Boston policeman’s "pride of profession."22 The majority of Boston’s policemen seem to have viewed police work as a long-term career, not simply as a job to be held until something better came along. The typical new recruit was between 25 and 30 years of age, and nearly all left other occupations in order to join the force. As the information below indicates, the attrition rate for those who completed their first year on the force was fairly low and tended to decline, albeit haltingly, during the early twentieth century:
| Year | Number remaining after 1 year (N) | Percent of N remaining:
|      |                              | 5 years | 10 years | 15 years |
|      |                              | after appointment | after appointment | after appointment |
| 1900 | 123                          | 93%     | 79%      | 68%      |
| 1901 | 70                           | 91%     | 76%      | 67%      |
| 1902 | 13                           | 92%     | 77%      | 62%      |
| 1903 | 98                           | 95%     | 87%      | 76%      |
| 1904 | 90                           | 90%     | 83%      |          |
| 1905 | 42                           | 88%     | 79%      |          |
| 1906 | 37                           | 92%     | 84%      |          |
| 1907 | 111                          | 96%     | 90%      |          |
| 1908 | 145                          | 95%     | 91%      |          |
| 1909 | 88                           | 94%     |          |          |
| 1910 | 51                           | 96%     |          |          |
| 1911 | 57                           | 95%     |          |          |
| 1912 | 103                          | 96%     |          |          |
| 1913 | 82                           | 96%     |          |          |

Absenteeism likewise remained low and generally declined during this period:

Average daily absence rate for Boston Police Department 1891-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Daily absence rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>2.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>2.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>2.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>2.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>2.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>2.18%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>2.14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2.02%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1.92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>2.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>1.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>1.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>1.69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>1.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>1.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>2.17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data, taken together with the decline in the number of officers convicted by department trial boards, indicates that the typical policeman of early twentieth-century Boston planned on remaining with the department for a significant portion of his working life and, whether due to an increased commitment to his...
profession or to the tighter discipline of the O'Meara years, appeared to execute his duties as a policeman with an increasing conscientiousness.23

In fact, policemen throughout the country experienced an upsurge in occupational identity at this time. National periodicals directed not at reformers and administrators but at the patrolmen themselves appeared during this period. Among these were the National Police Magazine, founded in 1912, Policeman's Monthly, established in 1915, and Policeman's News, which first appeared in 1919. Between 1890 and 1915, police departments in most large cities also formed policemen's fraternal or benevolent organizations. These groups provided rank-and-file patrolmen with death benefits and health insurance, as well as social and recreational activities. In general, these organizations operated independently of the police department itself. The policemen in Boston formed such a group, which they named the Boston Social Club, in 1906. Its membership was open to any of the city's patrolmen but was closed to officers of higher rank. In 1915, a national Fraternal Order of Police was created, and many of the local clubs affiliated themselves with this organization.24

Nevertheless, professionalization also generated frustration among the nation's policemen. Many policemen deemed the new policies to be impractical, unnecessary and unsolicited interference with a system which, in their eyes, had worked well for years. The end of partisan influence in the force, the elimination of many of the services that the police had
traditionally provided, and the new attention to the eradication of corruption all robbed the patrolmen of many long-standing avenues for supplementing their salaries through petty graft, but the reformers' failure to convince city governments to significantly increase the patrolmen's legitimate salary meant that little was done to replace the income that was lost due to the elimination of such practices. Furthermore, the higher standards of conduct demanded by the professional ideal not only increased the demands that were placed on the patrolmen but also, at times, confronted the policeman with conflicting expectations. For example, the police were told to behave like a military outfit that was waging a war on crime but, at the same time, they were instructed to respect the constitutional rights of the suspect, to refrain from the improper use of force, and to stay within the bounds of the law at all times. At the very moment that he was told that he was chosen because of his unique abilities and that he should be proud of his important position as the community's crime-fighting expert, the policeman was subject to increasing scrutiny and was held ever more accountable by his superiors, thus limiting his discretionary power. Finally, the services that were eliminated when the scope of police work was narrowed, services such as returning lost children or providing aid to the poor, often tended to be those functions that brought the policeman into the closest and most positive contact with the working class from which he originated. While enabling the patrolman to focus his attention on crime fighting, then, professionalization also served
to alienate the policeman from his own social group. His interaction with the rest of the working class took on a predominantly negative cast, since, in most cases, it now involved either arrests or the forceful maintenance of order.25

In the end, professionalism surrounded the patrolman with contradictions. It focused great attention on the discretionary aspects of police work, while at the same time it demanded adherence to increasingly rigid procedural regulations. It made strides toward upgrading the patrolman’s skills, leading him to expect greater freedom of action, and then it placed him under closer supervision than ever before. It impressed upon him the idea that, somehow, his role was more important than most, but then it used this same argument to deprive him of rights that were exercised by other citizens. It encouraged him to take pride in himself and his work, but then it demanded that he drastically alter both his behavior and his attitudes. It sent him into the neighborhood in which he had grown up and instructed him to remain strictly impartial. It made extraordinary performance the expected norm. It led him to expect more from his job at the very moment that it popularized the idea that it was the policeman’s duty to obediently make any sacrifice that his community demanded of him. Perhaps most significantly, however, it tried to instill in him a middle-class dedication to a career that brought him a salary and a social status that were no greater than those of the average skilled worker.26
Reformers and police administrators were relatively unsuccessful in their attempts to reshape the patrolman and make him fit into their professional model. Samuel Walker and Eric Monkkonen contend that, while the reformers were quite successful at professionalizing police executives, they never completely eliminated the working-class nature of the policeman's values and attitudes. This, of course, just added to the tensions within the police department. While professionalization did generate a significant degree of frustration for the policeman, however, it also gave him a desire to correct those aspects of his work that he found dissatisfying. As Walker points out, a worker who views his job as temporary is likely to seek a better occupation if he is unhappy with the present one. A person who perceives his job to be a life-long career and who identifies himself with that career will seek resolutions within his field of work. The growing occupational identity apparent among the patrolmen of Boston and other cities implanted in them a willingness to agitate within their departments for improved working conditions instead of looking to other occupations for these improvements. This type of behavior, of course, did not resemble the pliant obedience expected by reformers and police administrators.

In addition, their growing occupational identity gave policemen a vehicle through which to voice their dissatisfaction in the shape of the policemen's clubs which emerged during this period. These agencies eventually came to serve as policemen's advocates, communicating the patrolmen's grievances to police
officials and lobbying, sometimes successfully, for outcomes that were in the patrolmen's best interests. In 1907, for example, the Boston Social Club was able to convince the state legislature to pass a bill guaranteeing each patrolman one day off in fifteen. Reformers and administrators looked upon this with great concern. In 1912, the reformer George McCaffrey made the following observation about the Boston Social Club:

A line of activity of more doubtful value, into which the club has been led, is the pushing of the wants of patrolmen. . . . I sincerely hope that this kind of activity will not become so prominent that it will be necessary to dissolve a unique organization, otherwise very commendable. 28

Such activity laid the foundation for the police union movement that was to emerge during World War I. In the days before police reform, when the policeman's position had been wholly dependent upon his ability to remain in favor with the politicians who appointed him, union activity by patrolmen had been inconceivable. Samuel Walker points out that the irony of the police reform movement lies in the fact that professionalization made police unionism possible and, in Walker's opinion, inevitable. 29
CHAPTER IV

DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT

While the professional ideal led police departments to expect more from their patrolmen, it also prompted patrolmen to expect more from their jobs. As a result, a significant gap began to develop between the level of compensation that the patrolman expected in return for the higher levels of performance demanded of him and the actual compensation that police departments offered. This gap widened during the first twenty years of this century, generating an increasing amount of dissatisfaction within the ranks of police departments throughout the nation. Although expected to display more self-control and a greater dedication to his work than the average working-class employee, the policeman was granted neither a salary nor a level of respect that would have provided him with a social status above that of the skilled worker. The policeman's new occupational awareness, a legacy of the professionalization movement, eliminated any inclination he may have once had to just passively accept these circumstances. When the economic impact of World War I threatened to further undermine both their financial security and their relative social standing, policemen throughout the United States decided to take action in defense of their own interests.

The policemen of Boston shared in the growing discontent observable within the ranks of the nation's urban police departments. To some degree, their grievances can be attributed to
conditions that resulted from the various reforms to which the department had been subjected between 1885 and 1915. The arrival of World War I only served to exacerbate these problems. At the same time, the conditions that these reforms had created closed most of the avenues of redress which, under other circumstances, might have enabled the policemen to secure acceptable solutions to their problems. Finally, the command structure that had emerged as a result of the reforms made the chances for the resolution of discord within the department largely dependent upon the police commissioner's attitudes, on his relationship with the rank-and-file patrolmen, and on their perception of the degree to which he sympathized with their needs. During the administration of a commissioner who was capable of winning the respect of the patrolmen, a commissioner like Stephen O'Meara, for example, discontent could be contained. Under O'Meara's successor, Edwin U. Curtis, it could not.

The establishment of state control over the Boston Police Department was, to a significant degree, responsible for the rise of many of the conditions that generated dissatisfaction among the city's policemen. State control, implemented as a means of shielding the department from the influence of local officials, did have the effect desired by its promoters. The Boston Police Department's ability to operate with a minimum of politically-motivated interference earned it national recognition during the early 1900's. The very success of this reform, however,
hampered the department's ability to improve working conditions for its own patrolmen.

During the late 1800's, state governments eagerly assumed the authority for appointing city police officials. They were not so eager, however, to begin footing the bill for the police departments. As a result, while they stripped city officials of the right to choose police administrators, they forced the city governments to retain the responsibility for financing the police departments. Fearing that city officials would simply undermine the power of the state-appointed police administrators by grossly underfunding the departments, most legislatures that instituted state control passed accompanying legislation mandating that city officials fully fund all requisitions made by the police commissioners. In Kansas City, the city council was required by state law to appropriate sufficient funds to cover the board of police commissioners' estimate of expenses for the coming year, and then to fully fund any additional requests made during the year to cover expenses that were not foreseen when the board's original estimate was made. Members of the municipal assembly in Saint Louis could be fined $1000 and could be forever disqualified from holding municipal office as punishment for refusing to fully fund the budget submitted by that city's police board. City officials protested that such measures promoted unrestrained spending of city funds by an administrator who was not responsible to the city or to its voters. This, they argued, could easily drive a city to bankruptcy. In response to these complaints, some
states enacted legislative safeguards designed to offer a degree of protection to city treasuries. Most often, these came in the form of limits on the number of men that a police department was allowed to employ.¹

The General Court of Massachusetts, like most other state legislatures, passed measures designed to ensure adequate funding for the police department when it established a state-controlled police board for Boston in 1885. According to section 4 of chapter 323 of the state laws of that year, "all expense for the maintenance of buildings, the pay of the police and all incidental expenses incurred in the administration of the said police shall be paid by the said city of Boston upon the requisition of said board." The state legislature, however, granted city officials an unusual degree of control over certain portions of the police department's budget. According to section 5 of the same law:

said board of police shall not appoint any larger number of patrolmen than the present police commissioners of said city are now authorized to appoint, except as authorized by said city, nor shall the pay of the police be increased or diminished except by the concurrent action of said city and said board of police.²

While municipal officials in many cities with state-controlled police departments had the power to limit the size of the police force, it was not so common for them to have such direct control over the salaries of the department's personnel. The 1906 act replacing the police board with a single police commissioner further specified that only the mayor was to have the power to
authorize an expansion of the police force and that the policemen's salaries could only be altered by concurrent action of the mayor and the police commissioner. The only salaries that could be raised or lowered without the mayor's consent were those paid to the police commissioner and the department's superintendent. These salaries were to be set by the governor and the state legislature but paid by the city. Thus, municipal officials were prevented from attempting to alter a police commissioner's policies by using his salary as a source of leverage. The 1906 law also reaffirmed the mandate that required the city to fully fund all expenses incurred by the police department upon the request of the police commissioner.3

Not only was the mayor able to control both the size of the force and the salaries paid to the men, but the city also retained the power to set the rates for the policemen's pensions. The mayor of Boston was thus able to exercise considerable control over those portions of the police department's budget that had the most direct impact on the patrolmen. During the years from 1900 to 1920, spending for salaries and pensions constituted the department's two largest expenses. Together they generally accounted for 85% to 90% of the police department's annual budget. This gave city officials considerable control over the police department's total expenditures, and they did not hesitate to employ this power in order to minimize the department's cost to the city. In 1915, for example, the city's appropriations to the police department constituted a smaller share of the city's budget.
than did similar appropriations in the two other cities of comparable size that had state-controlled police departments. While Baltimore allocated 13.0% of its budget to the police, and Saint Louis appropriated 14.8%, the Boston Police Department received only 11.3% of the funds distributed by the city that year. Philadelphia, whose department was under direct local control, devoted 13.8% of its budget to police expenses. Throughout the late 1800’s and into the twentieth century, however, the mayors of Boston repeatedly argued for even stricter limits on the department’s spending. Shortly after his election in 1898, Mayor Josiah Quincy, for example, unsuccessfully pushed for a bill that would have prevented increases in police department spending from exceeding increases in the city’s financial resources.4

Unable to directly control other police department decisions or to utilize the department as a source of patronage, Boston’s mayors rarely saw a reason to authorize increases in those portions of the department’s budget that were under their control. Increasing the amount of money allocated to the police, after all, might require reducing the funds promised to those departments in which the mayor and council still retained some significant direct influence. Hostility between the city’s Democratic mayors and its Republican police commissioners also introduced significant tension whenever the city’s budget was redrawn. In fact, in spite of laws to the contrary, the city government sometimes even tried to avoid funding those portions of the police budget that were
beyond its control. For example, in 1910, shortly after he had succeeded in blocking Mayor John J. Fitzgerald's attempt to appoint four special police to the force, O'Meara was forced to write a letter to the mayor to complain that the sum appropriated by the city for the operation of the department during the coming fiscal year was less than the amount that O'Meara had requested. Eventually, Fitzgerald acceded to the police commissioner's request and granted additional funds to make up the deficiency in the original appropriation. For all but two of the years that O'Meara served as police commissioner, the mayor's office was occupied by either Fitzgerald or his rival within the Democratic Party, James Michael Curley. According to Francis Russell, "neither Fitzgerald nor Curley was interested in improving the conditions of a department over which they had no control and through which they could parcel out neither jobs nor favors."5

As a result of such conditions, salary increases for the patrolmen were few and far between. The salary scale that had been established in the late 1880's, for example, was still in effect a quarter of a century later. In 1913, after four years of lobbying by the Boston Social Club, Mayor Fitzgerald finally authorized the adoption of a new scale shortly before he left office. According to the new salary schedule, new recruits, known as reserve men, were to receive $730 during their first year on the force, $821.25 during their second year and $912.50 during their third year. During the second year, reserve men were eligible for promotion to the rank of first-year patrolman, but since such a promotion
depended upon the existence of a vacancy in that rank, men sometimes remained in the reserve ranks a little longer than two years. Once he attained the rank of patrolman, the officer received a salary of $1000, which was increased by $100 each year until a maximum of $1400 had been reached. This salary scale had originally been devised in 1898, but fifteen years of wrangling within the ranks of City Hall had delayed the adoption of the new schedule. During the intervening years, the cost of living had risen by 37%. The pay increase was also not enough to close the gap between the salaries of the Boston Police Department and those offered in other cities. In Baltimore, for example, first-year patrolmen received $1014 per year, in Philadelphia $1037, in Saint Louis $1080, in Pittsburgh $1095 and in New York $1250.6

Shortly after it was enacted, however, the pay increase came under attack from City Hall. Curley succeeded Fitzgerald in office in 1913. Early the following year, the mayor summoned Police Commissioner O'Meara to his office and asked that the police commissioner accede to the mayor's request that the pay increase be rescinded for 200 of the department's members. Curley justified his request by claiming that the funds were needed by other departments. The city's finance commission complained that the previous mayor had timed the salary increase "so as to embarrass the succeeding administration." O'Meara, citing the detrimental effect that such a move would have on morale, refused to give his consent to the salary reduction. Furious with the police commissioner's refusal to comply, Curley tried to have a bill
Introduced into the state legislature which would have given the mayor the power to reduce police salaries without the concurrent action of the police commissioner. The legislation was never adopted, however, and O'Meara maintained his stubborn refusal to accede to the wage cut, so the new salary schedule was retained. The incident prompted O'Meara to write in his annual report for that year:

the members of the force, after having waited twenty-five years for increased salaries, after having kept their claim continuously for four years before the mayor, and after having had it granted in two installments, are not likely to be successful applicants for further increase in the next twenty-five years.\footnote{1}

The salary scale was not the only issue that troubled the policemen of Boston during the early 1900's. Many of the men also complained that excessive numbers of duty hours were required of them. Day men worked 73 hours per week, night men 83 hours and wagon men 98 hours. With the exception of the measure guaranteeing one day off in fifteen that the Boston Social Club had convinced the state legislature to pass in 1907, this schedule had been in effect without change since the middle of the nineteenth century. Duty details in the Boston Police Department were based on what was known as the "three-platoon" system. One of the disadvantages of this system was that it allowed the men shorter periods of leisure time and required longer duty periods than the five-platoon system employed by the New York City Police Department. Boston patrolmen, for example, worked shifts of either
seven or ten hours, while in the five-platoon system the maximum length of a shift was six hours. Furthermore, in the five-platoon system, each man was given one day off in five, instead of one in fifteen. In addition to the hours of regular duty, the policemen were frequently called on to perform tasks such as appearing in court or providing security for a parade on their days off. On such occasions they were not granted additional pay to compensate for the extra work. Until the summer of 1919, the patrolmen were not even allowed to leave the city limits without permission from their division captains in order to ensure their availability in cases of emergency. According to Patrolman James Long, "We had no freedom, no home life at all. We couldn't even go to Revere Beach without the captain's permission."8

While their duty schedules remained unchanged during much of the early part of the twentieth century, the amount of work expected of the Boston police increased dramatically. Contrary to the reform ideals of the day, the Massachusetts General Court did not accede to O'Meara's requests that the department be relieved of tasks unrelated to crime fighting. The state, in fact, often added to the list of functions that the police were required to perform. This did not mean, however, that the department neglected to fight crime. On the contrary, in accordance with the teachings of police reformers and the demands of local moralists, the Boston Police Department intensified its efforts to rid the city of crime and vice. The number of arrests made by the Boston Police Department grew from 48,358 in 1905 to 108,556 in 1917, an
increase of 124%. The combined number of patrolmen and reserve men, on the other hand, rose from 1105 to 1467 during the same period, an increase of only 33%. During this period, the Boston police made twice as many arrests as the police in Baltimore and Saint Louis, two cities of comparable size. This level of activity taxed both the individual patrolman and the force as a whole. As early as 1912, George McCaffrey observed that "the department is somewhat undermanned and a considerable doubling up of routes is necessary whenever any exceptional demands are made upon the force." World War I further increased the burden that was placed on the police department. By November 30, 1917, the police had performed more than 20,000 extra tours of duty in conjunction with war-related activities that were beyond their normal scope of responsibility.9

O’Meara’s attempts to convince city officials to increase the size of his force, a precondition for reducing the patrolmen’s hours and work-load, generally met with failure. The 100 additional men hired in 1907 to enable the department to give each patrolman one day off in fifteen constituted the only large increment that the city authorized during this period. In August 1910, O’Meara said that an additional 119 men were urgently needed by the force. Mayor Fitzgerald, implying that any deficiency in manpower was probably caused by mismanagement, responded to O’Meara’s request by saying, "It is fair to inquire whether the city should undertake to augment its present police force at so
heavy an expense until every measure for the development of efficiency with the present numbers has been exhausted.¹⁰

The city was also reluctant to adequately fund the construction or repair of station houses, even though such work was badly needed. In 1917, four of the 19 station houses were less than five years old, but the rest were all from thirty to sixty years old. The station house in Division 2 had been condemned several years earlier. The city council drew up plans for a new house, discarded those plans and drew up a new set, and then shelved those as well. According to a report which O'Meara filed with the city council in 1917, ten of the houses were in need of repair. Meanwhile, the men complained about vermin, overcrowding and insufficient numbers of beds, bathtubs and toilets, especially in the older houses located downtown. The city, however, failed to act.¹¹

Until 1917, therefore, the majority of the patrolmen's complaints were the direct result of underfunding by a city government that saw no need to spend large sums of money on a department that it could not control. By the end of O'Meara's administration, however, the men began to express dissatisfaction with some conditions that originated within the department itself. They began to complain that division captains showed favoritism when handing out work details and recommending officers for promotion. Like the police reformers, the patrolmen began to object to tasks such as the inspection of lodging houses, the observation of the polls and the delivery of city tax bills which
they increasingly came to regard as unrelated to real police work. Furthermore, while the professional ideal may not have completely transformed the patrolman’s outlook, it did lead him to resent some of the degrading personal errands, such as fetching meals and newspapers, which his superiors often demanded of him.12

Thus, by the beginning of 1917 the policemen of Boston had compiled a long list of grievances. Their discontent, however, was to grow dramatically during the course of the next two and a half years. The First World War had a devastating impact on the policeman’s economic position. The war generated huge profits for industry and a tremendous demand for labor that was translated into dramatic wage increases for workers in private industry. For policemen, firemen, and other public officials whose salaries were not as responsive to fluctuations in the labor market, this brought a significant decline in relative economic status. A Boston policeman making the maximum weekly salary of $27 could easily find himself arresting a worker who was making $75 to $100 a week at one of the city’s booming shipyards or munitions factories. By the time the war ended, veteran Boston policemen were earning half as much as carpenters and mechanics. Motormen and conductors on the city’s streetcars, who occupied positions that many of the policemen had held before they joined the force, were earning 50 cents a day more than veteran police officers.13

An increased demand for goods, coupled with wartime shortages, generated rampant price increases that posed an even graver threat to the policeman’s economic position. Between
December 1914 and December 1919, the cost of living in Boston nearly doubled. In 1919, the U.S. Department of Labor reported that prices for basic foodstuffs sold in the city had risen by 81% since 1913. The price of potatoes in Boston had risen from 1.8 cents a pound to 3.7 cents; eggs were up from 32 cents to 67 cents a dozen; the price of a pound of pork chops had risen from 23 cents to 45 cents. The patrolmen were also hit hard by the doubling of clothing prices, for each man on the force was required to provide his own uniform and various other pieces of equipment. Wartime inflation pushed the total cost of these job-related purchases to an all-time high of $207, or one fifth of a first-year patrolman’s annual salary. Unfortunately, the signing of the armistice that ended the fighting in November 1918 failed to provide any relief for the beleaguered patrolmen. Reconversion to a peacetime economy took time, so the shortages and inflation persisted, accompanied now by staggering increases in unemployment as factories laid off workers and four million demobilized soldiers re-entered the labor market. 

Wartime inflation prompted the Boston Social Club to begin agitating for another salary increase in 1917. Police Commissioner O’Meara sympathized with his men but urged them to have patience; the city was not likely to accede to their request while the war was on. Then, on December 14, 1918, O’Meara died suddenly of a cerebral hemorrhage.

During his tenure as police commissioner, O’Meara had earned a great deal of respect both within Boston and throughout the
nation. In its tribute to O'Meara published shortly after his death, the Boston Globe wrote, "Before his first term had expired it began to be noised about the land that Boston had a police department of peculiar excellence." An article in Human Life had referred to him as "Stephen O'Meara: Police Chief Extraordinary". Both O'Meara and his department were praised for displaying a degree of integrity and freedom from scandal rarely found in city police departments of the day. When Governor Eugene Foss, the Democrat in office at the end of O'Meara's first five-year term, was urged by members of his party to replace the Republican police commissioner, Foss responded, "show me a Democrat as honest, as intellectual as Stephen O'Meara and I'll appoint him." Foss then proceeded to reappoint O'Meara. The commissioner was also well-liked by the men in his department. His Irish-Catholic background provided him with an important link to a large portion of the force. Furthermore, as commissioner O'Meara had developed a reputation for being firm but fair with his men. After his first year in office, the Globe wrote, "members of the whole department are frank in their expression of confidence in their ruler....Today the commissioner is more popular with the men than any commissioner in recent memory." O'Meara himself showed his concern for the well-being of his men when he wrote:

All policemen and employees who ask to see the police commissioner are received by him with courtesy and a helpful spirit....In the past eight years hundreds of members of the department have discussed privately with the commissioner their troubles and their aspirations.
While he demanded a lot from his men, O'Meara also openly displayed his respect for them. His annual reports were filled with comments that conveyed pride in the quality of his force and in its performance. Actions such as his refusal to rescind the 1913 wage increase convinced the police that O'Meara looked out for the interests of the men in his department and was willing to defend them from any external threats. After his death, one of his former patrolmen characterized O'Meara as "the fairest man anyone could hope to deal with."²⁰ His passing was mourned by both his men and the community they served.

O'Meara's successor, Edwin Upton Curtis, had been cut from a different mold. According to William Allen White, Curtis "embodied the spirit of traditional inherited wealth, traditional inherited Republicanism, traditional inherited skepticism about the capacity of democracy for self-government, and a profound faith in the divine right of the propertied class ultimately to rule."²¹ Curtis was from a Yankee family which had settled in Roxbury seven generations earlier. In 1882, he completed his studies at Bowdoin College in Maine, and three years later he began practicing law. His political interests and his loyalty to the Republican Party led him to take a position as secretary for the party's Boston City Committee, and in 1889 he was elected city clerk. Five years later, at the age of 33, Curtis became the youngest man ever to be elected mayor of Boston. Upon completion of his one-year term, however, Curtis was defeated in his bid for re-election by Josiah Quincy III, who had the support of Martin Lomasney and other
Democratic ward bosses. Curtis was never again to be nominated for elected office. He did, nonetheless, hold a series of appointed posts: in 1896, he was appointed to the Metropolitan Park Commission, in 1906, he was made assistant U.S. treasurer in Boston, and in 1909 he was chosen by President Taft to serve as collector of customs for the Port of Boston.22

Curtis had very little sympathy for the working class. As mayor, he had been known for his hostility to organized labor. Curtis was particularly suspicious of Boston’s Irish. Their emergence as a powerful political force had crowded old Yankee families like his own out of power in the city, and it was their leaders who had brought his own career in electoral politics to a premature close. It was this man, described by one observer as "stiff-necked as an old-time Salem preacher and stubborn as a horse mackerel," who assumed command of the predominantly Irish, working-class Boston Police Force at the very moment when discontent within the force was mounting.23

Succeeding in office a man as well-respected as Stephen O’Meara would have been a challenge for anyone. From the outset, however, Curtis’s own actions rapidly undermined his relationship with the men under his command. On December 30, 1918, the very day that outgoing Governor Samuel McCall administered the oath of office to Curtis, the Boston Social Club held a meeting to discuss strategies for securing a raise in salary. Although Curtis personally supported a salary increase, his first public statement, carried in the newspapers the next day, seemed to
betray a certain lack of sympathy for the plight of his men. After vowing to consult with the mayor on the subject of salaries, Curtis said, "Knowing the membership of the department by reputation we are confident that they will gratefully accept our final decision." He went on to say that "any member of the police department who is so dissatisfied that he cannot perform his work faithfully, honestly, and cheerfully, pending the decision regarding the requested salary increase, may resign." 24

Shortly after his appointment to office, representatives from the Boston Social Club asked to meet with the new commissioner to discuss the salary issue and a number of other grievances. Even though he had never given the patrolmen's organization any say in the running of the department, Commissioner O'Meara had always been willing to discuss problems with the club's spokesmen. Curtis, on the other hand, refused to meet with the men. Instead, he established a new grievance committee to be made up of elected representatives from each of the department's divisions. This move, however, just generated more controversy. The ballots cast in the elections to chose the new committee were counted in private by the division captains and were reported secretly to the commissioner. Rumors that, in at least one case, the returns had been falsified flew through the department. The grievance committee, as a result, never gained the confidence of the majority of the patrolmen. The committee was also unable to accomplish anything. It met once, on Curtis's order. No subsequent meeting was scheduled, and when the president of the committee,
Michael Lynch, asked when the next meeting would take place, Curtis responded, "Search me!"25

Curtis did take steps to address some of the men's complaints on his own. In the spring of 1919, for example, he created a committee of officers of rank who were instructed to inspect and report on the condition of every station house in the city. Curtis then forwarded this report along with his own recommendations for improvements to the mayor. Despite Curtis's insistence that extensive repairs were "imperatively necessary", the city took no action.26

At the same time, however, Curtis took steps that limited the patrolmen's ability to protect their own interests. A few weeks after the election of the grievance committee, Curtis imposed an order that forbade the men to appear before the state legislature without his permission. Since action by the state legislature was required in order to alter the city's tax rate, Curtis's measure limited the patrolmen's ability to argue in favor of the tax increase that was necessary if they were to get a raise in pay. That same spring, Curtis further angered the men when he used his clout within the Republican Party to ensure that a state law restoring a policeman's right to appeal departmental disciplinary decisions to the courts included a passage that exempted the Boston police from its provisions. Curtis's actions were seen as an attempt to protect his own authority at the expense of the interests of his men.27
Meanwhile, discussion about the men's salaries continued. In 1917, when the Boston Social Club had first begun to agitate for a raise, the police had demanded an increase of $200. After numerous delays, the city responded to the men's request in December 1918 by offering a new salary schedule that would have raised the pay of men at the top and at the bottom of the existing scale but would have left the salaries of one fourth of the force untouched. At a meeting of the Boston Social Club the men rejected this plan, voting unanimously to settle for nothing less than an additional $200 for every member of the force. Michael Lynch, representing the men, told Mayor Andrew Peters that financial distress was forcing many policemen to look for jobs outside the department. In an interview with local reporters, Lynch said that the men were simply unable to make ends meet, and he insisted that "Boston should live up to its high ideals." In February, Mayor Peters made a counter-offer that would have given each man a 10% raise, or an increase of up to $140 per patrolman. Again the men refused to compromise. Commissioner Curtis also came out in favor of the full $200 increase for all. Peters responded by offering a $200 increase for men at the top of the pay scale and $100 for all others, but once again, the men rejected the offer. Finally, in May 1919, Peters granted the demands in full, but griped that he had no idea where the city would find the money to cover the increase.28

The wage settlement failed to end the discontent within the department, however. The raise, which amounted to an increase of
between 14% and 28% for each man, was the first that had been granted since 1913, and it did not come close to matching the 106% increase in the cost of living that had occurred since that time. In fact, during just the two years since the Social Club had first presented its demand for a $200 increase, food prices in Boston had risen 27%. While the new maximum salary for a patrolman was set at $1600, government economists had determined that $1575 was the minimum amount needed to sustain a family of five for a single year. The wage adjustment, of course, also did nothing to alleviate dissatisfaction over hours, promotions, discipline and the condition of the station houses. Improvements in these areas would require even more intense pressure on police and city officials. The Boston patrolmen were convinced that they would soon be forced to take action again.29

The events of 1918 and 1919, in particular the protracted struggle over their wage increase, convinced the policemen of Boston that, if they hoped to continue to promote their own interests, they would need assistance. Relying on their own resources no longer seemed sufficient. In the past, what little protection they had enjoyed had been due to the sympathy of the police commissioner and the severely limited pressure that the Boston Social Club had been able to bring to bear on elected officials. Once Curtis assumed office, the former seemed to vanish and the latter was undermined. In the face of numerous slights and perceived attacks on their position, the men quickly forgot about the assistance Curtis had provided in their battle for higher pay.
As the men saw it, Curtis, in his attempt to bolster his own authority, had robbed them of whatever small amount of clout they had once been able to exercise. Thus, at the same time that they faced deterioration in both their working conditions and their economic position, the policemen became convinced that they could not count on support from the department's leadership. The history of the past 34 years had taught them not to expect any consideration from City Hall, and they were now forbidden to go directly to the state to plead on their own behalf. Convinced, then, that their future well-being depended upon their ability to find new sources of pressure to bring to bear on the officials in charge, the Boston police began to search for support from outside the department. The working-class nature of both the patrolmen and their grievances made it logical for them to turn to organized labor for this support.
In turning to organized labor for assistance, the Boston police joined a police unionization movement that had spread throughout the United States during the months immediately following the armistice that ended World War I. This movement, in turn, was simply one small part of the massive upsurge in union activity that followed the war. The goal of the policemen, in fact, was to tap the growing strength of organized labor and to use it to support their own fight for better working conditions. Unionization, however, was not compatible with the goals of the police reform movement. Affiliation with labor organizations, reformers feared, would compromise the police department's independence. Organized action by policemen, particularly action designed to put pressure on superiors, was seen as a threat to centralized decision-making. Lastly, the police union movement made the failure of professionalization readily apparent. The professional ideal demanded that the patrolman obey his superiors without question and that he dedicate himself to the effective performance of his duties to the exclusion of all other considerations. Unionization proved just how limited the rank-and-file patrolman's devotion to such principles really was. Furthermore, the police union movement showed how unsuccessful police reformers had been in their quest to eliminate working-class values and attitudes from the police force. As a
result, both the reformers and those officials who benefited from
the maintenance of a powerless rank-and-file stood adamantly
opposed to police unionization and used the arguments incorporated
in the reform ideal to combat it.

The period from 1915 to 1919 was one of rapid expansion for
American labor unions. During those years, union membership leaped
from 2.5 million to over 4 million. By far the largest labor
organization in the nation was the American Federation of Labor.
By the middle of 1919, the A.F.L. had grown to represent 3.2
million workers in the United States and Canada, an increase of
more than a half million over the previous year. Over 70% of the
unionized workers in the United States belonged to organizations
that were affiliated with the Federation. The A.F.L. leadership's
cooperation with the war policies of the Woodrow Wilson
Administration, along with its success at parlaying participation
in the war effort into higher pay and improved conditions for
workers, had brought the A.F.L. tremendous prestige during the
war. After the war, the nation's economic troubles stimulated even
further growth as thousands of workers flocked to the A.F.L. in
hopes that the organization could protect the gains that they had
made during the war or could help them maintain their economic
position in the face of postwar inflation.1

Among the many who joined the organized labor movement during
and after the war were thousands of public employees. Throughout
the United States, government agencies were either unable or
unwilling to provide their employees with the salary increases
that were needed to keep up with the changing economic conditions in the nation. As their earnings lagged farther and farther behind those of workers in the private sector and as rising prices undermined their standard of living, groups such as firemen, teachers, letter carriers, and government clerks formed unions and affiliated with larger organizations such as the A.F.L. In 1916, Boston's firemen transformed their benevolent organization, the Russell Club, into a union and affiliated with the A.F.L. The city's library employees formed their own union two years later, and by the summer of 1919 the clerks at City Hall were also members of an A.F.L. affiliate. All of these municipal employees succeeded in joining the organized labor movement without generating very much controversy.2

In 1918, as the war produced heavier workloads and higher grocery bills, and as they waged their frustrating battle to secure a salary increase, some of Boston's patrolmen also discussed the advisability of forming a union and seeking affiliation with the A.F.L. When word of this reached Commissioner O'Meara, he issued a general order dated June 28, 1918, which read, in part:

The police department...exists for the impartial enforcement of the laws and the protection of persons and property under all conditions. Should its members incur obligations to an outside organization, they would be justly suspected of abandoning the impartial attitude which heretofore has vindicated their good faith as against the complaints almost invariably made by both sides in many controversies.
O'Meara called the policemen "their own best advocates" and went on to conclude:

I cannot believe that a proposition to turn the police force into a union, subject to the rules and direction of any organization outside the police department, will ever be presented formally to its members, but if, unfortunately, such a question should ever arise, I trust that it will be answered with an emphatic refusal by the members of the force who have an intelligent regard for their own self-respect, the credit of the department, and the obligations to the whole public which they undertook with their oath of office.

Thus, O'Meara identified unionization as a move that ran counter to the principles of departmental independence and professionalism promoted by the police reform movement, and he addressed the move by making an appeal to the patrolmen's own commitment to these ideals. O'Meara had the order read to every policeman at roll call, and he submitted it to the press. Talk of unionizing the force soon died down.

During the summer of 1918, when talk of unionization was first heard among the ranks of Boston's patrolmen, it would not have been possible for the policemen to affiliate with the A.F.L. anyway. For over twenty years, the leaders of the A.F.L. had refused to grant charters to police unions. This policy had originated in 1897, when the Federation's Executive Council rejected an application for a charter that had been submitted by a group of special police in Cleveland. The Council explained its stand by saying, "it is not within the province of the trade union movement to specially organize policemen, no more than to organize
militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are too often controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement.\textsuperscript{4}

The upsurge of public employee militarism that accompanied World War I brought the A.F.L.'s policy into question, however. Problems similar to those experienced by the police in Boston had persuaded policemen in numerous cities to seek support from the A.F.L. They hoped that affiliation with an organization that had such a large membership would enable them to bring the pressure of thousands of voters to bear on municipal officials. So many requests for A.F.L. charters were submitted by policemen's organizations that a resolution was adopted at the 1917 A.F.L. convention referring the question of police unions to the Executive Council for further study. Since the 1890's, the A.F.L. leadership, and in particular the organization's president, Samuel Gompers, had grown increasingly cautious, so when the Executive Council discussed the resolution at their May 1918 meeting, it was no longer concern about the "forces" that controlled the police so much as it was fear of the controversy that police unionism might generate that prompted the Executive Council to announce, "It was decided to reaffirm our former position that it is inexpedient to organize policemen at the present time."\textsuperscript{5}

This did not stem the tide of police unionism, however, and policemen's organizations continued to seek membership in the A.F.L. In Boston, talk of unionization was revived the following winter when the men were embroiled in their salary negotiations with Mayor Peters. On February 19, 1919, at a meeting attended by
over one thousand policemen, the members of the Boston Social Club voted to seek affiliation with the American Federation of Labor and empowered their executive board to take action on the matter. 6

The following June, at the A.F.L.'s convention in Atlantic City, delegates adopted another resolution regarding police unions. This time, however, the delegates did not simply instruct their leadership to look into the question. The resolution passed in Atlantic City commanded the officers of the Federation to begin issuing charters to police unions at once. Thus, over the objections of Gompers and other leaders, the A.F.L. began to admit police unions to membership during the summer of 1919. The response from policemen's organizations was overwhelming. Within nine weeks, the A.F.L. received applications from 65 policemen's organizations in cities throughout the nation. By the end of August, the A.F.L. had issued charters to 33 of these, including organizations in Los Angeles, Washington, Jersey City, Saint Paul, Richmond, Norfolk, Fort Worth and Portland, Oregon. 7

Encouraged by the change in A.F.L. policy, the Boston police intensified their efforts to form a union. By the last week of July, petitions requesting a charter from the A.F.L. were circulating in each of the nineteen station houses. When Commissioner Curtis heard about the petitions, he issued a general order condemning the movement. In this general order, dated July 29, 1919, Curtis invoked the memory of his predecessor by quoting the entire text of the general order that O'Meara had issued the previous summer. Curtis then added, "I am firmly of the opinion
that a police officer cannot consistently belong to a union and perform his sworn duty." Since their duty was to carry out laws passed by representatives of the entire population, he said, policemen "should not be subject to the orders or the dictation of any other organization...that comprises only one part of the general public." Curtis finished by saying, "I feel it my duty to say to the police force that I disapprove of the movement on foot; that in my opinion it is not for the best interests of the men themselves; and that beyond question it is not for the best interest of the general public." Thus, like O'Meara before him, Curtis publicly condemned unionization as a threat to the Boston Police Department's widely-touted independence from outside interference. The press agreed with the commissioner; nearly every major Boston newspaper condemned the policemen's plans for affiliation with the A.F.L. Curtis did not, however, go so far as to expressly forbid the men from forming a union. Such a step, he felt, was unnecessary. To Curtis, it was inconceivable that the patrolmen, whose duty was to show unquestioning obedience to their superiors, would continue to pursue a course of action that deviated from the announced wishes of the commissioner or that challenged the commissioner's authority within open view of the general public.8

Three days after Curtis issued his general order, fourteen hundred members of the Boston Social Club met to decide what action to take next. Commissioner Curtis was invited to address the meeting but declined to attend, citing ill health. After
reviewing the familiar list of grievances, the members of the club voted on the issue of affiliation with the A.F.L. Of those present, 940, or about sixty-one percent of the total number of patrolmen and reserve officers on the force, voted in favor of affiliation; all of the rest abstained. The club's officers subsequently sent a telegram to the A.F.L. formally requesting a charter, and on August 9, the charter arrived in Boston.9

Two days after the Boston police received their charter, Curtis struck back. Up to this point, he had limited himself to merely expressing disapproval of the plans to unionize. Upon learning that the men had received an A.F.L. charter, however, Curtis decided to take action that would bring this affair to a speedy close once and for all. On August 11, the commissioner promulgated an addition to the department's rules. Curtis announced the adoption of section 19, rule 35 in a general order that began, "It is or should be apparent to any thinking person that the police department of this or any other city cannot fulfill its duty to the entire public if its members are subject to the direction of an organization existing outside the department." A policeman, he said, "is not an employee but a State officer." The new rule, he explained, was designed to prevent the policemen and the department from coming under the direction and dictation of any organization which represents but one element or class of the community. If troubles arise where the interests of this organization and the interests of other elements and classes in the community conflict,...[the officer] must fall in
The new rule stated that "no member of the force shall join or belong to any organization...which is affiliated with or a part of any other organization, club or body outside the department." The only exceptions to the rule were veterans' organizations such as the American Legion.10

By this point in the conflict, then, Curtis had defined the primary issue upon which the battle over unionization would be fought: affiliation with the A.F.L. would compromise the independence of the force. In the event of a strike involving other A.F.L. members, the patrolman's own membership in an A.F.L. affiliate might prejudice his actions, thus jeopardizing the impartiality which the reformers had taught was absolutely vital if police service were to be effective. Curtis also invoked parts of the professional ideal which asserted that the policeman's special position within the community meant that he could not expect to be allowed the same rights to promote his own interests that private employees exercised, and that acceptance of this sacrifice was assumed when the officer took his oath of office. Such sentiments were identical to those expressed by nearly every police reformer of the day, many of whom joined with police administrators and influential citizens to block the police union movement.11

The Boston Social Club's next step was to seek legal advice. They hired James Vahey, who was also counsel for the carmen's
union, and John P. Feeney. The attorneys argued that Curtis's new rule violated a Massachusetts statute forbidding employers to compel employees to agree not to join a union as a condition for employment. Curtis's response was that the law did not apply to policemen, for they were officers and not employees.12

Finally, the men decided to simply defy the commissioner's order. The Boston Social Club scheduled a meeting for August 15 to decide whether or not to accept the charter. The day the meeting was to be held, Boston newspapers announced that, in a none-too-subtle move to persuade the policemen to abandon their course, Curtis had just authorized a rush order for the printing of one thousand discharge and suspension forms. Rather than intimidating the men, this, along with the other actions taken by Curtis during the previous three weeks, simply increased their anger and their determination to defend their interests. At the August 15 meeting, they voted overwhelmingly to accept the A.F.L. charter establishing Boston Policemen's Union no. 16807. Boston now became the largest city in the nation whose police were affiliated with the A.F.L. At an organizational meeting held three days later, the new union elected its officers. The men chose John McInnes, a former bricklayer and an ardent supporter of unionization, to serve as their first president. On the morning after the selection of officers, however, eight of the union's leaders were summoned to headquarters for two and a half hours of questioning. On August 21, Curtis announced that the eight men
would be charged with insubordination for violating section 19 of rule 35.13
Reformers had been far more successful at reshaping administrative structures than at molding policemen to resemble the model that the reformers found most desirable. The Boston Police Department exemplified to a large degree the ideals of independence and centralized authority advocated by the police reformers. The result was the emergence of a police commissioner who, though possessing little control over some key matters such as the patrolmen's salaries, was completely autonomous in other areas, in particular those regarding discipline and the general management of personnel. Unaccountable to the city's government or to its voters, free from judicial interference in personnel matters, and appointed for a comparatively long term by a governor whom he was likely to outlast in office, the police commissioner was free to make any decisions which, in his view, would contribute to the department's ability to operate with maximum efficiency. The commissioner could make policy without having his attention diverted by a need to garner support from city or state officials, the patrolmen or the public, or by any other considerations that were not directly related to the maintenance of effective law enforcement and the conditions that facilitated it. This narrowness of perspective, the reformers claimed, was essential for the efficient operation of a police force and the impartial enforcement of the law.
In the crisis that was sparked by the Boston patrolmen's decision to affiliate with the A.F.L., the autonomy possessed by the police commissioner permitted Curtis to make a series of decisions that prevented the implementation of a compromise which may have averted the subsequent strike. As the conflict progressed, maintaining discipline and respect for his authority within the department became Curtis's overriding concern. Unlike O'Meara, Curtis did not have the ability to accomplish this and, at the same time, convince the men that he was concerned about their well-being. Curtis's social outlook, his attitudes about his men and his own role within the department, his inability to present a more amiable public image, and the social distance between him and the patrolmen all precluded this. As a result, the only option available to Curtis was to force his men back into line through a policy of direct confrontation and the unbending execution of all departmental regulations. Others recognized that the reaction of the policemen, whose mood was becoming increasingly militant, was likely to have repercussions far beyond the police department itself. Mayor Peters, for example, with an eye toward the effect that a policemen's strike would have both on his political career and on the city at large, threw himself into the affair only to have his suggestions for a compromise cast aside by the police commissioner. Instead, Curtis insisted on nothing short of an unconditional surrender by the members of the policemen's union. In the end, it was this inflexible stance
assumed by the commissioner that eliminated any possibility of preventing the policemen's strike.

Commissioner Curtis was not alone in his determination to squash the union movement within his department. Municipal officials and police executives in several cities whose policemen had received A.F.L. charters put tremendous pressure on the members of their departments in an effort to force them to relinquish their charters. In August, Mayor Frank Hague ordered Jersey City's Commissioner of Public Safety to suspend and bring charges against the policemen who had promoted the plan to seek affiliation with the A.F.L., along with any other officer who subsequently joined the union. In September, policemen in Buffalo abandoned their plans to apply for an A.F.L. charter when the city council passed an ordinance forbidding policemen to belong to a union. City officials in Terre Haute, Indiana and Norfolk, Virginia demanded that their policemen either return their charters or resign from the force. In Washington, the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia adopted a rule similar to the one promulgated by Curtis. They were blocked from enforcing the rule, however, when a restraining order was issued by Justice Ashley Gould of the District Supreme Court at the request of the Washington Policemen's Union, and when President Wilson simultaneously requested that action be delayed until after the conference of industrial and labor leaders which he had called for October. Nevertheless, in Detroit, the Fraternal Order of Police lost its bid to secure a similar injunction to prevent the
discharge of men who had promoted unionization of that city's patrolmen. In all cases, the argument that the authorities used to oppose the policemen's unions was the same as that invoked by Curtis: affiliation with the A.F.L. would jeopardize the independence of the department and would preclude impartial enforcement of the law by the policemen. As Mayor Hague put it, "the members would be serving two masters."¹

The hearings for the eight leaders of the Boston Policemen's Union took place on August 26. At the request of the union's attorneys, the hearings were not held before a trial board made up of three division captains, as was customary, but before Commissioner Curtis himself. Vahey and Feeney wanted to be sure that Curtis was forced to take full responsibility for the decision, and Curtis himself had no objection to this. The union's attorneys argued again that the commissioner's new rule violated state labor statutes and disputed Curtis's assertion that a policeman is an official and not an employee. They further argued that affiliation with the A.F.L. would in no way impede the patrolmen's ability to perform their duties effectively, for it would have no impact on the police commissioner's power to institute disciplinary action in cases of neglect of duty. Upon the completion of the testimony, Curtis announced that he would take the matter under advisement. Three days later, hearings were held for another eleven officers of the union. Again Curtis delayed announcing his findings. Up to this point, the Policemen's Union had made no official threat of a strike. However, all of
Boston was talking about the possibility of a police strike should the nineteen men be found guilty. Curtis had even taken steps to prepare for such an eventuality. Three days before the first set of hearings, the police commissioner had announced that a volunteer police force would be formed to maintain order in the city should an emergency arise.2

During the summer of 1919, the mere mention of a strike by any group of workers was taken seriously. Forces such as rampant inflation, an organized labor movement whose membership was growing by leaps and bounds, the disappearance of both the market for war-related goods and the high profits that came with it, and a determination by employers to rescind many of the concessions that they had been forced to make to workers during the period of wartime labor shortages all combined to produce a year marked by an inordinate number of labor disputes. In 1919, there were 2,665 labor disputes involving 4,160,348 workers, or 22% of the nation's work force. In every other year from 1916 to 1922, the number of workers involved in strikes and walkouts remained between 1 million and 1.6 million. From actors to transit workers, from bank clerks to steelworkers, laborers in all walks of life seemed infected by what some newspapers called "strike mania". Several of these strikes attracted nationwide attention. In February 1919, Americans witnessed the nation's first significant general strike as 60,000 workers responded to a call by the Seattle Central Labor Council and walked off their jobs in support of the city's striking shipyard workers. A similar Canadian strike also
attracted a great deal of attention in the United States. The general strike called by the Winnipeg Trades and Labor Council in May to show their sympathy for striking workers in the metal and building trades culminated in a virtual take-over of the city government by the strike committee. In the United States, the number of strikes mounted as the year wore on: there were 175 labor disputes in March, 248 in April, 388 in May, 303 in June, 360 in July and 373 in August. Then, early in September, Americans braced for what promised to be one of the most disruptive strikes of the year, a strike against steel manufacturers that would eventually involve 365,000 workers.³

Like residents of many parts of the United States, Bostonians were particularly disturbed by the number of strikes that directly affected their own area, where the frequency of strikes reached its peak during the spring and summer of 1919. The Boston Evening Transcript reported that the city experienced no fewer than forty strikes during the period from April 30 to August 1 of that year. These strikes involved, among others, garment workers, longshoremen, fishermen, carmen on the city's elevated railroads, and even the horseshoers. In April, a strike by 20,000 telephone operators tied up phone service throughout New England. Furthermore, a threatened strike by the city's firemen, who were working in conjunction with the police to secure a salary increase, was averted at the last minute when the city announced that the firemen would get a $200 raise along with the policemen.⁴
Traditionally, strikes by American policemen had been quite unusual, but during the twelve months that preceded the uproar over the creation of the Boston Policemen's Union, Bostonians had heard about such strikes frequently enough to know that such an event was possible. The police union movement that had emerged in the United States in response to the combination of inflation and fixed salaries had also surfaced in Canada and in Great Britain, where similar conditions prevailed. As a result, all three nations experienced police strikes during 1918 and 1919. These strikes were generally the result of official opposition to collective action by policemen. The first of these strikes occurred in August 1918, when 6000 members of London's Metropolitan Police Force went on strike after a member of the force had been dismissed as punishment for his union activity. The strike brought the men a substantial pay increase and a promise from the prime minister that the dismissed officer would be reinstated. One month later, 450 policemen in Cincinnati staged a walkout and announced plans to seek affiliation with the A.F.L. in response to the suspension of five fellow officers. Four of the men had been suspended for their part in organizing a meeting to discuss strategies for obtaining a salary increase, an event which had led to a scuffle between patrolmen and inspectors. The fifth was punished when, in a conference with the chief of police held to discuss the original suspensions, he likened the chief's administration to autocratic rule in Germany. The city's safety director initially threatened to dismiss each one of the striking policemen. The strike ended
after three days, however, when the mayor offered a settlement in which city officials agreed to allow the strikers to return to work without punishment and to consider reinstating the suspended officers in return for a promise that the men would relinquish their plans to affiliate with the A.F.L. In December of the same year, a strike by Montreal policemen, who demanded higher wages and union recognition, sparked several days of looting and rioting. Finally, in August 1919, as Bostonians watched the conflict between their own police and the city's police commissioner unfold, police strikes over union recognition erupted again in England, resulting in disturbances in London and two nights of rioting in Liverpool, where troops finally had to be summoned to restore order.5

By the end of August, Bostonians were discussing not only the likelihood of a policemen's strike, but also the very real possibility that the city's organized workers as a whole would stage a general strike on behalf of the policemen. On August 16, the day after the policemen voted to accept the A.F.L. charter, a headline in the Boston Herald announced that the city's labor leaders planned to stage a general strike if Curtis were to dismiss even one of the officers on trial. The next day, the Boston Central Labor Union, the coordinating body representing the more than 125 A.F.L. locals in the city, held its largest meeting in over a decade. The delegates issued a resolution announcing, "We bid a hearty welcome to the Policemen's Union to the ranks of organized labor, and we urge them to maintain their position and
promise to them every atom of support that organized labor can bring to bear in their behalf." The delegates demanded that Curtis revoke his rule concerning affiliation with outside organizations, condemning it as "un-American and hostile to the interests of all American workers," and as "a tyrannical assumption of autocratic authority." The B.C.L.U.'s business agent, P. Harry Jennings, aroused the crowd even further by declaring that "every man and woman must be ready to make any sacrifice to assist the policemen." The delegates then selected a committee of 17 to prepare plans for assisting the policemen in their quest for recognition of their right to unionize.6

The B.C.L.U. itself did not have the authority to call a general strike without the approval of the local unions it represented, but by the end of August, many locals were making veiled or, at times, open threats to strike if the leaders of the policemen's union were discharged. On August 20, the Herald announced that all of the city's major unions, including the telephone workers, the teamsters, and the workers in the building trades, were willing to participate in a general strike which, the Herald predicted, could involve as many as 80,000 of the city's workers. During the last two weeks of August, the newspaper announced that the Plumbers' Union, the Boilermakers' Union, the Machinists' Union of Hyde Park, and the Street Car Men's Union had all voted to quit work if necessary to support the police. Two days before Curtis heard testimony in the case of the first eight officers, the B.C.L.U. held another meeting at which the delegates
unanimously pledged themselves to support the police in any action they may be compelled to take. Again the press interpreted this to mean that the unions would participate in a general strike. Day after day, the newspapers reprinted union leaders' statements of encouragement for the police, their pledges of support, and their increasingly belligerent attacks against Curtis. The fervor of these statements and the large number of unions that issued them convinced many in Boston that a severe punishment for the policemen would lead to a complete shut-down of businesses and services in the city.

Among those who were most concerned about this state of affairs was Mayor Peters. The mayor was eager to avoid any situation that might result in a complete disruption of the city's daily life, as had happened in Seattle and Winnipeg, or, worse, in the type of violent chaos that had reigned in Montreal and Liverpool. On August 27, Peters issued a statement expressing his support for Curtis's position. He reiterated the idea that affiliation with the A.F.L. would lead to "complications", and he announced his hope that the Federation and the policemen would voluntarily relinquish their plans. However, he also laid the groundwork for a possible dialogue with the patrolmen when he announced that "no one would deny them the privilege of forming among themselves an association which would enable them to secure the benefits of collective bargaining." That same day, Peters appointed a committee of thirty-four influential citizens to draw up a plan to settle the dispute between the policemen and the
commissioner and to thus prevent a strike. Peters appointed James J. Storrow, a prominent investment banker and, like the mayor, a member of the Democratic Party, to head the committee. Storrow's first action as chairman was to issue a statement similar to the one that had been issued by the mayor. In this statement, Storrow made clear his opposition to a police union affiliated with the A.F.L., again citing the danger that this would pose to impartial enforcement of the law, but stated that he saw no objection to the formation of "their own independent and unaffiliated organization." Storrow's second action as chairman was to reduce the unwieldy committee of 34 to a much more manageable subcommittee of three.

Storrow and his subcommittee began the process of hammering out a settlement by meeting with representatives of the Boston Policemen's Union and their attorneys. In a series of meetings that began on August 30, the two groups discussed the working conditions within the police department. While Storrow sympathized with the policemen's grievances, he continued to insist that the only type of organization that would be acceptable was one that remained independent of any body outside the force. President McInnes of the union countered that the police already had such an organization in the Boston Social Club, but that the club had become ineffective as a means of improving working conditions. The union leaders were determined to hang on to their charter. McInnes told Storrow, "If we must strike for our rights, it will be a struggle to the finish." It was the first time that the union's
officials had openly stated that the conflict might lead to a
strike.9

Eventually, however, the union's attorneys began to advise
the men that there was little likelihood of an agreement that
would allow them to keep their charter. Police unions in New York
City and Buffalo had already abandoned their plans to affiliate
with the A.F.L., and police unions in numerous other cities were
under great pressure to do likewise. Instead of trying to retain
the charter, attorneys Vahey and Feeney urged the union's leaders
to use the issue of affiliation as a bargaining chip in order to
gain some form of guaranteed improvement in working conditions.10

By September 6, the Storrow Committee and the union's
attorneys had drawn up a compromise plan which they felt would be
acceptable to the union's leaders. The plan called for the Boston
Policemen's Union to relinquish its affiliation with the A.F.L.,
but to continue to operate as an independent organization "for the
purpose of assisting its members concerning all questions relating
to hours and wages and physical conditions of work." Second, the
plan called for the creation of a committee of three citizens to
be selected concurrently by the mayor, the police commissioner and
the policemen's union. This committee was to investigate working
conditions within the department and to report its findings to the
mayor and the commissioner. The plan also called on the police
commissioner to agree to meet with representatives of the union
whenever union leaders felt that a grievance needed to be
discussed. If at any time in the future the commissioner and the
policemen's union could not reach an agreement on a particular issue, another citizens' committee was to be formed to investigate the problem and to issue recommendations. The Storrow Committee's report, however, expressly stated that this system of conflict resolution was not to be applied to disputes concerning disciplinary action. The plan went on to forbid discrimination by police officials against union members or by union members against non-members. The final provision of the plan stated that "no member of the Boston Policemen's Union should be discriminated against because of any previous affiliation with the American Federation of Labor."\(^\text{11}\)

The Storrow Committee's compromise plan satisfied the commissioner's demand that the police remain independent of outside organizations while still providing the men with a new and potentially more effective apparatus for securing relief when grievances arose. The final provision also would have prevented the impending show-down between the police and the commissioner by compelling the commissioner to drop the charges against the nineteen members of the union. On September 6, Storrow submitted his committee's plan to the mayor, who immediately forwarded it to Curtis with the endorsement that, "It affords a speedy and, it seems to me, satisfactory settlement of the whole question."

Meanwhile, Vahey and Feeney brought the compromise proposition to the union's leaders and urged them to approve it. Later, Storrow said that he had been confident at the time that the union's leadership was inclined to approve the plan. Vahey and Feeney also
agreed to address a meeting of the full membership of the union at which they planned to advise the men to vote in favor of the compromise. When the city's Chamber of Commerce received a copy of the compromise proposal, they gave it their full support and offered to assist in the effort to convince the state and municipal officials concerned to approve the terms of the plan.\(^\text{12}\)

By the time the Storrow Committee submitted its recommendations to the mayor, Curtis had already announced that he would issue his findings in the cases of the nineteen men on Monday, September 8. Convinced that a negative finding would precipitate a strike, Storrow and Peters hoped to secure the commissioner's acceptance of the compromise as soon as possible. Shortly after Curtis received a copy of the proposal on Saturday, September 6, however, he left Boston for his home in Nahant, where he remained for the duration of the weekend. When they failed to receive an answer from Curtis concerning the proposal, Peters and Storrow decided to present the plan to the press with the hope that favorable public opinion might convince the commissioner to grant his approval to the plan. Bostonians were thus able to read the Storrow Committee's report in their Monday morning papers. In the editorial pages of every one of the city's major morning newspapers, the compromise plan received unqualified support. The Boston Post, a Democratic paper with a high readership among the city's Irish working class, called the plan "a happy solution of the whole difficulty" and praised the fact that "there is neither victory nor defeat in it." The Post went on to say, "We trust it
will be speedily agreed to by both sides." The *Globe* observed that the plan provided the police with a way to ensure that their grievances were addressed, but that "it does not take away from the disciplinary power of the commissioner." "For either the commissioner or the police to refuse this solution of the difficulty would be a grave mistake," the *Globe*'s editors insisted. The conservative Boston *Herald* advised the men to give up their A.F.L. charter, for under the terms of the compromise plan, "they can have everything else that they are in reason entitled to." The editors of the *Herald* concluded, "Mr. Curtis...will be most generous to accept this compromise, but we expect him to do so, and should so advise him." The Boston *American* called the plan "honorable and just," and urged, "No one should rock the boat. Least of all the public officials. No one should stand upon technical rights."13

To Curtis, however, the compromise represented at least a partial retreat on several points which, in his mind, were definitely not negotiable. By suggesting that the charges against the nineteen officers be dropped, the recommendations of the mayor's committee constituted an intolerable attempt by outsiders to interfere with departmental disciplinary procedures. Furthermore, granting the men a full pardon for actions taken in willful defiance of departmental regulations, he felt, would undermine the strict discipline that formed such an important component of the professional model. The provisions safeguarding the operation of an independent police union and forcing Curtis to
discuss departmental problems with its leaders promised to create conditions that would have posed another permanent challenge to the commissioner's authority to run the department in whatever way he thought best. Finally, the provisions calling for the arbitration of future grievances by a citizens' committee, one of whose members would have been appointed by the mayor, constituted a violation of the cardinal rule of departmental independence, for it would have increased the role that the mayor played in police department matters. The idea of allowing Democratic mayors to have any more influence over the department than they already had was intolerable to Curtis. Over the course of the preceding week, Curtis had come to resent the interference by Storrow and Peters in what to him was a matter of strictly departmental concern, but now they were trying to force him to accept a solution which, in his opinion, would significantly weaken the office of the police commissioner.

So, in spite of the appeals from the press, Curtis, rejected the plan outright. In a letter to Mayor Peters dated September 8, Curtis wrote, "The commissioner can find nothing in the communication...which appears to him to be either consistent with his prescribed legal duties or calculated to aid him in their performance." Curtis also asserted that he saw no legitimate reason for the compromise plan to affect his decision regarding the charges pending against the nineteen officers. Later, in his annual report for that year, Curtis further explained his objections to the compromise. In the first place, he saw no reason
to be negotiating with the union leaders at all. "I have never been able to understand," he wrote, "why any one who approved the rule and condemned the violation of it would have expected me to dicker with its violators, or that I, rather than they, should make the offer of compromise." He again insisted that the plan could have no bearing on his disposition of the charges pending against the officers, and that, therefore, "its merits could properly come up for discussion only after the men on trial had purged themselves of their violation of a rule of the department."

Concerning the proposed system for addressing grievances, Curtis wrote, "nowhere in the statute by virtue of which the Police Commissioner holds office is there any language that authorizes or permits him to divide his authority and responsibility with any one." Such a system would be incompatible with the commissioner's duties under the law and "with the sense of responsibility to the Commissioner which the members of the force must feel if proper discipline and efficiency are to be maintained." Curtis rejected the plan as

a reversion to the state of divided responsibility, vacillating policy and dilatory action, which prompted the Legislature to first take control of the police force of Boston...and then, later, to still further concentrate responsibility by transferring the control to a single commissioner.14

On September 8, Curtis had the report of his findings in the cases of the nineteen officers read by the division captains in each station house following the evening roll call. The commissioner found all nineteen men guilty of violating section 19
of rule 35, and each was suspended indefinitely. At 9:45 that
evening, the members of the Boston Policemen's Union began
balloting to determine whether or nor a strike should be called.
The final vote was 1134 in favor of a strike, with only 2 opposed.
The strike was scheduled to begin the next evening. 15

Peters and Storrow, hoping to avert the strike at the last
minute, sought a way to convince Curtis to reverse his decision
and to accept the compromise. Their own personal prestige carried
no weight with the Republican police commissioner, and public
opinion seemed to have no impact on his decisions, so Peters and
Storrow asked Governor Calvin Coolidge for assistance. The
commissioner was a state official, so they had reason to believe
that Coolidge, both as governor and as a fellow Republican, could
exercise some influence over Curtis when no one else could. Up to
this point, however, Coolidge had characteristically distanced
himself from the police controversy. Throughout the preceding
weekend, Storrow and Peters had tried to contact the governor, but
Coolidge had quietly left the city without leaving word of his
destination. On Monday evening he returned to Boston after having
delivered an address before the delegates to the Massachusetts
Federation of Labor's convention in Greenfield, in the western
part of the state. In his speech, Coolidge made no mention of the
Boston police controversy. That day, Peters forwarded a copy of
the Storrow Report to the governor's office with the request that
Coolidge give the plan his approval and use his influence to
convince Curtis to do the same. Later that evening, Coolidge met with Peters and Storrow to discuss the matter. 16

Coolidge, however, refused to interfere with the commissioner’s decision. In a letter to Peters dated September 9, the day the strike was to begin, Coolidge wrote, "there has arisen a confusion which would be cleared up if each person undertakes to perform the duties imposed upon him by law. It seems plain the duty of issuing orders and enforcing their observance lies with the Commissioner of Police and with that no one has any authority to interfere." Coolidge then remarked that if working conditions within the police department were inadequate, it was the responsibility of the mayor and the city council to remedy the situation. As for his own role, Coolidge observed, "There is no authority in the office of the Governor for interference in the making of orders by the Police Commissioner or in the action of the Mayor and the City Council....I am unable to discover any action that I can take." That same evening, Boston newspapers carried the text of a telegram that Coolidge had sent to the delegates of the Massachusetts Federation of Labor convention in response to their request that Coolidge intervene on behalf of the policemen. The telegram read, in part, "The Governor has no authority over the appointment, suspension or removal of the police force of Boston." 17

Having exhausted all possible means of convincing Curtis to modify his position, Peters and Storrow braced for the walkout.
That evening, Tuesday, September 9, 1,117 of the 1,544 patrolmen in the Boston Police Department went on strike.
CHAPTER VII

THE STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH

During the first night of the strike, Boston experienced the very sort of disorder that Peters and Storrow had hoped to prevent. A night that began with a series of relatively harmless pranks ended with widespread looting and vandalism in various parts of the city. As a result of Curtis's earlier announcement, "I am ready for anything", city officials had done nothing to provide replacement protection should the policemen actually leave their posts. Curtis himself, anticipating that the majority of the policemen would remain loyal to the department, failed to mobilize the volunteer force that the department had recruited during the previous weeks. The next morning, Curtis requested that Peters call out the state militia units stationed within the city to quell the disturbances. The mayor complied with the request, but then went a step farther. The 1885 law that had originally established state control over the Boston Police Department included a provision that empowered the mayor of the city to assume temporary control over the department in times of riot and disorder. Peters now invoked this provision. Commissioner Curtis, as a result, suddenly found himself obligated to obey any orders emanating from City Hall.¹

By the following morning, order had been restored, but only after two nights of looting and vandalism had generated $34,000 worth of damage claims from city businessmen. In addition, the riots and the State Guard's subsequent efforts to disperse crowds
and round up law-breakers resulted in a total of eight deaths.
Governor Coolidge, though, was distressed by the mayor’s
assumption of control over the police department. So, when Peters
requested that the governor authorize the deployment of additional
state militia units from outside the city, Coolidge took the
opportunity to oust Peters from command in much the same way that
the mayor had dislodged the commissioner. On September 11, one day
after Peters had taken charge, Coolidge called out the entire
State Guard of Massachusetts and authorized their use to maintain
order in Boston. At the same time, he issued a proclamation that
placed the members of the Boston Police Department under his own
personal command and required them to obey any orders he might
issue. His first order commanded Police Commissioner Curtis to
recommence performing his regular duties and to "obey only such
orders as I may so issue or transmit." Years later, Coolidge wrote
in his autobiography that he had taken such steps because he
feared that, if Curtis had been superseded, "the men that he had
discharged might be taken back and the cause lost." ²

The disorder that accompanied the walkout brought a deluge of
public condemnation down upon the striking policemen. The Boston
press universally censured the strikers. The Boston Herald
commented:

Any body of men, hired to protect the city and
sworn to defend it, that have no more moral sense
than to turn the city over to organized bands of
looters are of the sort that the sooner we are rid
of them the better. They never should have been
policemen. They never will be again, if the
community has an ounce of self-respect.
The editors of the *Evening Transcript* insisted that "the blame for Boston's black night rests primarily on the shoulders of the members of the Boston Police force, who deserted their posts of duty...and willfully and deliberately placed their fellow-citizens at the mercy of a mob of thieves." The *Transcript* urged that the police "not be allowed to escape proper punishment for their criminal course." Even the *Boston Post*, which had shown greater sympathy for the policemen's plight than the rest of the city's major newspapers, blamed the striking police for "this saturnalia of looting and reckless disorder," and pointed out that, "having deserted their posts in a body, they can hardly expect the public, which suffers so severely from their action, to approve of it."³

Numerous influential voices joined in condemning the strike. The Boston Chamber of Commerce declared that, since "the patrolmen deserted their posts of duty," they should all be discharged and a new police force should be organized. The results of a survey of seventeen sermons delivered in Boston churches on the following Sunday showed nearly unanimous condemnation of the strike by the city's clergy, as well. The Reverend Sydney B. Snow of King's Chapel characterized the strike as an "obvious attempt on the part of one class in society to wrest by violence the political control into their own hands." The Reverend George R. Stair of the Dudley Street Baptist Church praised Commissioner Curtis "for his courageous stand in this matter," and went on to demand the recruitment of "a new force, one purged entirely from the leaven which has caused the present deplorable condition." The Reverend
Cortland Myers of Tremont Temple told his congregation, "Not one of the striking policemen of this city, who trampled on the solemn oath they took to maintain law and order, should be put back on his job. I don't want to live in a city with such rotten policemen." 4

Word of the strike quickly spread to all parts of the nation, eliciting even more virulent criticism from the press and from public officials outside the city. The Baltimore Sun wrote, "To deliberately abandon a community to its enemies of the underworld is as grave an offense morally as for a soldier to desert his post." The Sun went on to urge Boston officials not to compromise with the striking police. The editors of the New York Times likewise invoked the military analogy so popular among the police reformers, arguing, "A policeman has no more right to belong to a union than a soldier or a sailor." The Philadelphia Inquirer wrote, "Events in Boston have amply justified the contention that a body of men charged with the preservation of order has no right to strike." Concerning police unionism, the Los Angeles Daily Times declared, "When policemen and firemen are bound by oath to organizations suspected of incendiaryism, arson and confiscation,...it follows that they become a menace to the public peace instead of a protection." The newspaper's editors then urged the police commissioner of their own city to demand that the patrolmen there either abandon their union or resign from the police force. Even the liberal press, which normally looked favorably on organized labor, expressed opposition to the police
strike. The New Republic, commenting on the policemen's attempt to affiliate with the A.F.L., wrote that, even though the Federation "is no doubt more often right than wrong in its contests," this did not alter the fact that "the state is not to be the instrument of a class....The Boston police, and anyone who may imitate them, will have to be opposed." President Wilson likewise added his voice to those in opposition to the strikers. While touring the nation to promote ratification of the peace treaty negotiated at Versailles, Wilson took time to comment on the police strike in a speech he gave in Helena, Montana. The President insisted, "A strike of the policemen of a great city, leaving that city at the mercy of an army of thugs, is a crime against civilization." Wilson added that, "the obligation of a policeman is as sacred and direct as the obligation of a soldier....He has no right to prefer any private advantage to the public safety."5

Much of the criticism of the police strike reflected the general fear of radicalism that had gripped the American public shortly after the conclusion of the First World War. This hysteria led many Americans to leap to the erroneous conclusion that the Boston Police Strike was the first step in a nationwide uprising by radical elements. Allusions to the Bolshevik take-over in Russia filled the editorials that appeared in response to the policemen's strike. Two days after the strike began, the Boston Post commented, "Boston is not Moscow and Massachusetts is not Russia. No soviet mob rule for us, thank you." The Evening Transcript declared that the police union's "attempt to overthrow
American government hereabout is foredoomed to failure," and referred to the strike as "this skirmish with Bolshevism."

Throughout the nation the response was similar. In its report on the disorder in Boston, the New Orleans Times-Picayune wrote, "the soviet spirit ran amuck," and compared events in Boston with the rioting in Petrograd and Moscow. To the editors of the New York Times, the strike was "this Boston essay in Bolshevism." A police strike, the paper said, "is an imported, revolutionary idea that may spread to various cities." The Philadelphia Public Ledger declared, "Bolshevism in the United States is no longer a specter. Boston in chaos reveals its sinister substance." The New York World announced, "The policemen of Boston...boldly undertook to set up a Soviet government which, if successful, would have been superior to the commonwealth." Some federal officials even succumbed to the hysteria. A few days after the strike began, Senator Henry L. Myers of Montana contended that the unionization of policemen would be followed by the unionization of soldiers and sailors. Myers predicted that, if that were allowed to happen, "We will have a soviet government within two years....There will be no need of holding an election in 1920." The accusation of Bolshevism, of course, came as a shock to the policemen, whose actual agenda was far less political and more limited in scope than that attributed to them. Nevertheless, once the striking policemen had been labeled radicals, few seemed willing to accept the less flamboyant interpretation that they were simply typical
working-class Americans in search of a way to improve their own working conditions. 6

Convinced that such negative publicity would undermine the prestige of the A.F.L., Samuel Gompers decided to involve himself in the police controversy in an effort to end the strike as soon as possible. Hoping to at least preserve the policemen’s jobs, Gompers sent identical telegrams, dated September 12, to Governor Coolidge and to Mayor Peters requesting that they allow the striking policemen to return to their posts. Gompers made reference to President Wilson’s request that enforcement of the anti-union regulation enacted by the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington be delayed until after the industrial conference scheduled for October, and he appealed for a similar deferral in the case of the Boston patrolmen. Gompers also informed the officials that he planned to contact Frank McCarthy, the A.F.L.’s organizer in Boston, with instructions that he strongly recommend to the members of the Policemen’s Union that they return to work pending settlement of the dispute. That evening, three days after their walkout began, the Boston Policemen’s Union voted unanimously to follow Gompers’s suggestion and to return to work. 7

Public sentiment against the policemen, though, made it unlikely that any elected official would adopt the course of action suggested by Gompers, and Coolidge, moreover, was still committed to allowing the police commissioner a free hand in handling the crisis. In a telegram dispatched to Gompers on
September 13, Coolidge declared, "the suggestions contained in
your telegram are not within the jurisdiction of the Governor of
Massachusetts, but only of the commissioner of police of the city
of Boston. With the maintenance of discipline in his department, I
have no authority to interfere." That same day, Curtis issued
general order No. 124, declaring the positions of all 1,117
striking policemen to be vacant, and he commenced the recruitment
of a new force.8

Upon receiving Coolidge's telegram, Gompers immediately sent
a reply in which he repeated his appeal that the men be
reinstated. This time, his criticism of Curtis was far sharper.
Gompers insisted that the issue at hand was not one of law and
order, but rather, it concerned "the assumption of an autocratic
and unwarranted position by the commissioner of police, who is not
responsible to the people of Boston but is appointed by you."
Gompers asserted, "the right of the policemen to organize has been
denied--a right which has heretofore never been questioned."9

In his reply to Gompers, Coolidge took the opportunity to
issue his strongest statement up to that point. He reaffirmed his
decision to refrain from interfering with the work of the police
commissioner, pointing out, "I have already refused to remove the
Police Commissioner of Boston. I did not appoint him. He can
assume no position which the Courts would uphold except what the
people have by the authority of their law vested in him. He speaks
only with their voice." President Wilson's suggestion to the
police officials in Washington, Coolidge observed, had no bearing
on conditions in Boston because the Washington police had not gone on strike. In response to the claim by Gompers that the policemen had a right to unionize, Coolidge replied, "The right of the police of Boston to affiliate has always been questioned, never granted, is now prohibited." The statement that captured the attention of the nation, however, was Coolidge's assertion that "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, any time." In one simple sentence, Coolidge had summarized the concerns that the entire nation had expressed regarding the police strike. Public response to the statement was overwhelming. The staunchly Republican Boston *Evening Transcript* called Coolidge's telegram "a state paper certain to enhance the highest traditions of the great office so worthily filled today." Coolidge, the paper contended, "speaks the voice of Massachusetts." Even the Boston *Post*, one of the city's leading Democratic papers, said that Coolidge's statement represented "sound doctrine," and added, "Governor Coolidge has enunciated a great truth in a terse phrase that will live." Coolidge's telegram was reprinted in newspapers throughout the nation. Within a few weeks the governor received 70,000 letters and telegrams expressing approval of his stand, and his picture appeared in over one thousand different publications. In spite of his belated involvement in the controversy, Coolidge was the one who emerged from it a national hero. His refusal to force Curtis to reinstate the striking police earned him a reputation as the man who had preserved law and order in Boston and, in so doing, had saved the
entire nation from upheaval. Later, Coolidge was able to parlay this notoriety into a Republican Party nomination for the Vice-Presidency. Thus, the police strike played a significant role in propelling Coolidge to the White House.10

As a final blow to their cause, organized labor itself retreated from its original stand of unqualified support for the policemen. Contrary to the impassioned pledges which they had offered before the strike, local labor leaders began to feel that associating themselves with a movement that had attracted such ardent public condemnation would not be in their own organizations' best interests. Furthermore, Gompers himself worked to restrain the city's other A.F.L. affiliates. Shortly after the strike began, he dispatched his personal secretary, Guy Oyster, to Boston. Oyster met not only with Curtis and McInnes, but also with Michael O'Donnell, the President of the Boston Central Labor Union. In the meanwhile, an official at the A.F.L.'s headquarters in Washington issued a statement which read, "Mr. Gompers does not want a general strike and the Federation does not want a general strike."11

After delaying any decision concerning a general strike for nearly two weeks, the leaders of the Boston Central Labor Union finally called a meeting at which the local unions' votes on the issue of a general strike were to be reported. After renewing pledges of financial and moral support for the striking policemen, O'Donnell reported that the committee created to coordinate policy on the strike "finds it advisable not to announce the
organizations that have voted to participate in a general movement." O'Donnell proceeded to declare that, in the opinion of the committee, "the time is not opportune for ordering a general strike." The meeting was adjourned without any further action, and a general strike was never called.12

Realizing that his own involvement in the controversy had only served to further damage the prestige of organized labor and, at the same time, had afforded opportunities for Coolidge and Curtis to enhance their own public stature, the President of the A.F.L. also began to distance himself from the strike. Less than two weeks after the Boston Police Strike began, Gompers testified at hearings before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, which was considering a bill to withhold salaries from any Washington policemen who belonged to a union. In his testimony, Gompers upheld the rights of policemen to form unions and to affiliate with the A.F.L. However, he also publicly announced that, in his opinion, policemen did not have a right to strike.13

The striking policemen of Boston were never permitted to return to their jobs. In November 1919, Judge Carroll of the Massachusetts Supreme Court denied their petition for a writ of mandamus which would have required Curtis to reinstate them. Instead, the police department recruited a brand new force. In order to recruit enough new policemen, however, Curtis had to ask the civil service commission to reduce the standards that new police officers were required to meet. In a further effort to
The number of patrolmen on the force was increased from 1,544 at the time of the strike to 1,614 a year later. The new force was hastily recruited, however, and as a result many of the new policemen were not able, or not inclined, to meet the demands that the department placed upon them. In the first 14 months following the strike, 253 officers resigned from the force and another 84 were discharged. In fact, the department continued to feel the repercussions of the strike for the next decade. From 1894 to 1918, an average of eight policemen had been discharged from the Boston Police Department each year. Between 1921 and 1928, the average was 25 per year. Not long after the strike, the Boston Police Department’s reputation for excellence was gone.
The Boston Police Strike also had a tremendous impact on police departments throughout the nation. This impact was two-fold. First of all, like their counterparts in Boston, police and municipal officials in several cities, including New York and Washington, responded to the strike by raising salaries and improving working conditions. On the other hand, the strike also brought the police union movement to an abrupt halt. Nearly every police union that had affiliated with the A.F.L. either returned its charter voluntarily or was forced to do so by local officials. By the end of 1920, the A.F.L. revoked the outstanding charters, and the police union movement came to an end.16

The strike had an adverse impact on the union movement within the ranks of other public employees as well. In February 1920, the A.F.L.'s official monthly publication, American Federationist, reported that within the past month alone, 23 firefighters' locals had disbanded. The strike also contributed to the decline of the American Federation of Teachers.17

The legacy of the Boston Police Strike plagued attempts to unionize policemen for decades after the strike. When organized labor launched a second attempt to recruit police officers to their ranks in the 1940's, public officials referred repeatedly to the Boston Police Strike and to the subsequent disturbances in their efforts to block the union organizers. The same arguments that had been used in Boston in 1919, arguments about divided allegiance and the threat that unionization posed to discipline within the department, resurfaced when the American Federation of...
State, County and Municipal Employees, an affiliate of the A.F.L., attempted to organize the policemen in numerous cities. A pamphlet entitled *Police Unions*, published by the International Association of Police Chiefs in 1944, and then republished in 1958, included a lengthy account of the Boston Police Strike, focusing much of its attention on the vandalism and looting that erupted as a result of the strike. The pamphlet included quotes from Wilson and Coolidge condemning the strike, and went on to say that, through the years, the strike "has served as a poignant reminder to police of the nation that divided allegiance can bring nothing but sweeping public resentment and destructive criticism." The I.A.C.P. concluded that "the prevalent majority opinion appears to be that police unions, affiliated with trade-labor organizations, are contrary to the basic nature of police duties." During the 1940's, patrolmen in numerous cities, including Los Angeles, Saint Louis, Detroit, Miami and Chicago, attempted to establish unions, but in nearly every case the unions were subsequently disbanded under threats of dismissal. Through a combination of city ordinances, department regulations and court decisions, the police union movement was again laid to rest by the end of the 1940's. Thus, until the 1960's, those police organizations that did exist were forced to remain strictly local in nature. Police unionism was not revived again until the 1960's and 1970's, when a new, much more militant mood hit the nation's police officers. This militancy resulted in the creation of many of the organizations, some
independent and some affiliated with national unions, that represent policemen today.
CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The police reformers' efforts to significantly alter both police administration and the policeman himself were responsible for the creation of a police department in Boston in which corruption was minimal and expectations for performance were high. Nevertheless, it also allowed serious problems to arise and to go unremedied. The reforms created a situation in which municipal officials and police administrators came to view one another not as partners but as enemies, and then permitted this animosity to continue for decades. This persistent hostility impeded the proper funding of the police force, and it diverted the attention of officials at exactly those times when a concerted response may have helped to resolve problems. Reform led to the emergence of a police commissioner whose power within the department went virtually unchecked and whose accountability to anyone outside the department was minimal. This autonomy meant that the department's ability to serve the interests of the community or to maintain an acceptable level of morale within its ranks was, to a large degree, dependent upon the personal characteristics of the commissioner in charge at the moment. Stephen O'Meara was able to fulfill the obligations of such a role quite successfully. Edwin Curtis was not. Thus, reform failed to create a command structure capable of maintaining a level of effectiveness that was reliably high and transferable from one administration to another. Finally,
professionalization placed increasing, and often conflicting, demands on the policeman at the same time that it instilled in him the notion that police work was a noble, life-long career rather than just a job. Together, these factors created a police force that was keenly aware of the inadequacies of its working conditions and willing to take action to remedy the situation. The professional ideal, however, severely limited the range of action that the policeman could legitimately take in pursuit of his own interests. The reformers' intent was for professionalization to produce a highly dedicated and disciplined police force. In Boston, it created one that was frustrated and willing to rebel against its commanders.

Thus, a number of forces came together to spark the chain of events that culminated in the strike by the Boston police. Rivalry among various government officials, the unrestrained power of the police commissioner and the growing frustration of the patrolmen, all of which were interrelated, laid the groundwork for the crisis that ensued. The deterioration of the patrolmen's economic position during and after the First World War and the simultaneous lure of a successful organized labor movement then provided the impetus for the action that brought the tension within the department to a head and brought the problems of the widely-acclaimed police department to light. Finally, the long-standing animosity between city and police officials, compounded by the police commissioner's autonomy, undermined the efforts to reach a compromise that may have averted the strike in
much the same way that the settlement proposed by the mayor of Cincinnati had ended the strike by that city's policemen one year earlier.

The goal of police reform had been to create a police force that would more effectively serve the needs of the community, or, more accurately, would serve the needs of the community as they were defined by the reformers. The needs of the policemen who were expected to provide this service were not attended to, nor did the reformers feel they warranted consideration. As a result, police reform often created conditions that were detrimental to the policeman's interests. The resultant frustration was further compounded by the stress that was generated when a police force recruited from the working class was expected to display behaviors and attitudes that differed dramatically from those characteristically expected from other members of that class. Originally, the reformers held the view that the policeman was simply to accept this frustration as the price he paid for the honor of serving his city. Their devotion to the concept of the policeman as an obedient, self-sacrificing servant of the community, however, prevented the reformers from addressing the fact that a disgruntled police force cannot provide a city with adequate protection.

In Boston, this frustration erupted into a conflict in which the public's interests were endangered, thus proving that, at times, it is in the best interests of the public to attend to the interests of the public servant. This lesson was not lost on the
officials throughout the nation who responded to the Boston Police Strike by improving working conditions within their police departments. Nor was it lost on at least some of the police reformers. Writing after the Boston Police Strike, Raymond Fosdick reiterated the idea that the rights to strike or to affiliate with labor unions were incompatible with the policeman's duty to serve the community. He then proceeded to point out, however, that the community has its own duty to the policeman. Fosdick found the low pay, long hours, and unsanitary station houses that characterized many police departments to be inexcusable. He observed:

If the police may not strike to improve their situation, and if they may not affiliate with organized labor, then the community that employs them owes them a responsibility which up to the present time, certainly, it has not fulfilled. It cannot strip them of the weapons of defense which other workers have, and at the same time ignore their just claims because they are merely pressed by argument.1

In the midst of the Boston Police Strike, the editors of the Boston Globe showed that they had come to a similar realization. In rejecting the policemen's bid to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor, the Globe argued, "We are only lately emerged from a long struggle to rescue the police in this country from the control of political parties and to place them on a footing of self-respecting independence....The people would not consent to see them pass into a new partisanship." However, the Globe continued:
Since it claims a special duty of [the policeman], the public owes a special duty to him....When the old spoils system was in vogue, the spoilsmen in City Councils and Congress looked out for their appointees in office, and a generation ago a Government job was among the best-paid employments. This is no longer true, and we are to blame for this.2

Thus, the police strike seems to have produced at least some awareness of the fact that, lofty sentiments of the professional ideal aside, police work must meet not only the community’s need for the maintenance of law and order, but also the policeman’s need to support his family and to derive adequate satisfaction from his work. The Boston Police Strike proved that a community must find a way to maintain an acceptable balance between these two sets of demands if it is to enjoy the benefits of effective police protection.
NOTES

INTRODUCTION


CHAPTER I. POLICE REFORM IN THE LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE CONTROL


2Carl Seaburg, Boston Observed (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 168; Richardson, pp. 36-37, 41.


4Quoted in Seaburg, p. 168.

CHAPTER II. POLICE REFORM IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: DEPARTMENTAL INDEPENDENCE AND CENTRALIZATION


5Fuld, p. 188; Fosdick, p. 232.

6Fuld, p. 15; Fosdick, pp. 101, 116.

7Fosdick, pp. 122-123.

8McCaffrey, p. 678.


14 Quoted in Russell, p. 39.


17 Fuld, p. 255.

18 Fosdick, pp. 289, 297.

19 Richardson, p. 68; Fosdick, p. 246.

20 Fuld, p. 371; McCaffrey, p. 679.


22 Fosdick, pp. 143, 149; Fuld, pp. 32-33.

23 Quoted in Fosdick, p. 108.

24 Fosdick, p. 137; Richardson, p. 69.


CHAPTER III. PROFESSIONALIZATION AND THE POLICEMAN


6 Fuld, p. 149.


10 Walker, p. 111; Fuld, p. 31.


13 Fosdick, pp. 211-213; Fuld, p. 194.


20 Walker, pp. 71, 75; Monkkonen, pp. 127, 154.

21 Walker, p. 110.

22 Quoted in Russell, A City in Terror, p. 42.

CHAPTER IV. DISSATISFACTION WITHIN THE BOSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT


12Ziskind, p. 40; Russell, A City in Terror, pp. 50-51.


15Repetto, p. 108; Russell, A City in Terror, p. 42.

16Russell, A City in Terror, p. 42.

17Ibid., p. 40.

18Ibid., p. 39.


20Russell, A City in Terror, p. 38.

21White, p. 145.

22Russell, A City in Terror, pp. 43-45.


28Gammage and Sachs, p. 36; Russell, A City in Terror, pp. 54, 56.
CHAPTER V. FORMATION OF THE BOSTON POLICEMEN'S UNION


CHAPTER VI. THE DECISION TO STRIKE


CHAPTER VII. THE STRIKE AND ITS AFTERMATH


7Herald, September 13, 1919, p. 1.

8Herald, September 14, 1919, p. 1; City of Boston Police Department, General Order No. 124, September 13, 1919 in Boston Police Strike Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.

9Post, September 14, 1919, p. 10.

10Post, September 15, 1919, p. 1 and September 16, 1919, p. 10; Evening Transcript, September 15, 1919, p. 12; Murray, p. 132.


12Herald, September 22, 1919, p. 2.


American Federationist, Vol. 27, No. 2 (February 1920), p. 182; Spero, p. 288.


CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION


Boston Globe, September 13, 1919, p. 6.
I. Documents


II. Newspapers and Periodicals


American Federationist. January 1918 to December 1920.

Baltimore Sun. September 6 to September 13, 1919.

Boston Evening Transcript. September 8 to September 18, 1919.

Boston Globe. December 14, 1918, September 8 to September 15, 1919.

Boston Herald. August 2 to September 25, 1919.
Boston Post, September 8 to September 16, 1919.
Los Angeles Daily Times, September 11, 1919.
New Orleans Times-Picayune, September 13, 1919.
Philadelphia Inquirer, September 12, 1919.

III. Pamphlets


IV. Books


V. Articles


VI. Unpublished Material

VITA

David Joseph Roberts, Jr.

The author was born in Glen Ridge, New Jersey on October 24, 1962. He was graduated from Franklin High School in Franklin, New Jersey in June 1980, and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in history and German from Middlebury College in Middlebury, Vermont in May 1984. In partial fulfillment of the requirements for this degree, he completed a thesis on the Hartford Convention of 1814 and 1815. In July 1985, the author entered the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia as a candidate for the degree of Master of Arts in history and as a graduate teaching assistant.

From August 1985 to June 1990, the author was a history teacher at Middletown High School in Middletown, Maryland. In September 1990, he accepted a position as a teacher of history and English at Chestnut Hill Academy in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.