An Emerging Strategy for the Asia-Pacific Area

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https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-tr3n-x685

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AN EMERGING STRATEGY FOR
THE ASIA-PACIFIC AREA

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Donald C. Hilbert
1974
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor James Roherty, under whose guidance this investigation was conducted, for his suggestions and criticisms throughout this endeavor. The author wishes to also express his appreciation to Professor Chonghan Kim and Professor Alan Ward for their careful reading and suggestions concerning this manuscript.
ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine whether the Nixon Doctrine, initially announced in Guam in July 1969 and developed further by President Nixon's foreign policy pronouncements of 1970 through 1973, provides an adequate replacement for the Strategy of Containment which has guided United States policies and programs in the Asia-Pacific area since World War II.

An historical review of the evolution of the containment strategy is conducted and its effect on foreign policy decisions from the Truman era to the Nixon Administration is analyzed.

The content and scope of the doctrine itself is evaluated in an effort to devise new programmatic supports to guide U. S. policy in a changed world environment. The strategic importance of the Asia-Pacific area to the security of the United States is discussed followed by analysis of the role the United States must play in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Nixon Doctrine is then re-examined in this new context to determine its suitability in coping with contemporary U. S. requirements as opposed to pursuing a policy of isolationism or continuing in its role as world policeman.

It is concluded that the Nixon Doctrine marks the beginning of a realistic approach to our relationship with the Asia-Pacific nations. It is recommended, however, that a more definitive strategy is needed which will set priorities to enable both the United States and its Asian allies to develop plans and policies which will realistically deal with our Asian requirements and maintain a favorable balance of power in the area.
AN EMERGING STRATEGY FOR
THE ASIA-PACIFIC AREA
PART I

INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION OF TERMS

On August 15, 1973 direct United States military involvement in Southeast Asia came to an end and with it an era in American history which was characterized by the strategy of containment which had guided U. S. policies and actions for more than two decades. After World War II the United States entered into a series of bilateral and collective security arrangements for the sole purpose of arresting the spread of communism in all parts of the world. This culminated in our military involvement in Vietnam which has resulted in a division within our nation and a disenchantment in some quarters with American foreign policy. It is the proposition of this paper that the strategy of containment, which has guided U. S. programs since 1947, is no longer appropriate. The Nixon Doctrine has embarked our nation on a new course which more realistically relates our strategic programs and policies to our national interests.

In the development of this hypothesis I will trace U. S. military strategy from 1947 to 1969 to demonstrate how the thread of containment of communism is interwoven into the
major policy decisions made during those years. This historical analysis will be followed by an in-depth analysis of the content and scope of the Nixon Doctrine. The political and military implications of the policy choices available to the United States under this Doctrine will be discussed. It will be shown that the Nixon Doctrine is not an attempt to redefine our national interests but an effort to devise a new strategy which will guide the future policies and programs of the United States. Finally, a projection of some of the implications of the Nixon Doctrine as a national strategy will be attempted.

Andre Beaufre tells us that "Strategy is not a single defined doctrine but it is a method of thought, the object of which is to codify events, set them in order of priority in order to choose the most effective course of action."¹ He further states that the aim of strategy is to fulfill policy objectives by the application of force and that a successful strategy is one that convinces an opponent that it would be useless to commence or alternatively to continue a struggle. There are two forms of strategy; that which relies on the force of arms to carry out policy objectives Beaufre labels as Direct strategy, and that

which relies on psychological forces he defines as Indirect strategy. The object of traditional strategy has been to deploy armed forces so as to compel the enemy to face inescapable alternatives of unacceptable destruction or compliance with our will.  

The Soviets have employed Indirect strategy in the past two decades to operate against the direct threat of the United States nuclear power. Soviet actions in Iran in 1946, Greece in 1948, Korea in 1950, Indochina in 1953, North Africa in 1954, Cuba in 1960, the Congo in 1961 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 are examples of this strategy; and the U.S.S.R. achieved better results than they could normally have expected from a major military operation. Strategy, however, can no longer be considered as an art practiced only by military leaders as described by Liddell Hart in 1929, when he defined it as "The art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy." The definition of strategy by Clausewitz as being "the art of the employment of battles to attain objectives" is also a definition of the past and is no longer apropos.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff define national strategy as the art of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to afford maximum support to policies and to secure national objectives. Strategy, therefore, has undertaken the requirement of totality and encompasses all fields: political, economic, diplomatic, military and sociological.

The term national interest is also often subject to different interpretations. A nation's interest has been described as being centered upon its own welfare and the preservation of its political doctrine and national life-style. It has been defined by Walt Rostow as the conception which nations apply in trying to influence the world environment to their advantage. To Hans Morgenthau national interest is "the political tradition and the total culture context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy." National interest is conceived to be the goals of a nation, at a particular time and under a particular set of circumstances and has been employed to describe, explain or evaluate the adequacy

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of a nation's foreign policy. National interest is not "a singular objective truth that prevails whether or not it is perceived by the members of a nation but rather it is a set of objective preferences that change whenever the requirements and aspirations of the nations' members change." National interest is dynamic and constantly demands new formulation.

In its most extreme form the national interest can be described as what the national decision maker decides it is. Attitudes of the leaders, rather than geography or devine law, determine national interest. In addition, economic, political and ideological factors shape a government's perception of national interest. The defense of our national interests, therefore, can not be treated as a singular objective and our actions must be tailored accordingly. Defense of some interests, for example, may simply require diplomatic measures, others economic, political or psychological measures; a small minority will require war itself.

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7 Ibid., p. 35.
Forming a part of a nation's interest are those interests which a country considers to be vital to her existence. These interests again are not fixed by nature or identifiable by any accepted standard criterion. They simply are products of fallible human judgment on matters concerning which agreement within a nation is usually less than universal. Vital interests concern issues in foreign affairs that are thought to effect the survival or security of a nation, specifically security against military attack. A nation is prepared to take military action when she feels her vital interests are threatened. A perennial problem for the leaders of a superpower such as the United States is to determine the outer boundaries of what is truly vital to our national security and to decide under a range of circumstances what kind of response is appropriate for each specific threat. Lincoln Bloomfield contends that "nothing is vital except our own survival as sentient human beings." To me this assertion is too simple and naive because the survival of the United States is closely associated


with the survivability of the entire Western Hemisphere. In addition, the territorial independence of the Western European countries is also considered by many to be of vital interest to the United States. Even in the Pacific, renowned political writers, such as Hanson Baldwin, have written "What happens in Asia may well determine the question of life or death for Americans yet unborn."  

In addition to self preservation, other elements such as independence, national integrity and economic well-being are considered vital to U.S. interests and these elements are predicated on a sound national security policy. Our national objectives must, therefore, be directed to support these interests.

A nation's strategy, therefore, is dependent on its perception of her vital interests. It has been suggested by some that our foreign policy with regard to Asia has been "an excess of interventionism." They argue that our failures of the past were due to the fact that we assumed a broad commitment to objectives that we could not fulfill and thus exceeded the limits

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of our power. The war in Vietnam has exposed the high cost of a universally applied containment policy and has thus caused a reappraisal of our overseas commitments, our vital interests and our national strategy.

\[14\text{ Ibid., p. 38.}\]
PART II
EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT

The thread of continuity in foreign policy which was woven throughout the administrations of Truman through Johnson was persistence in the view that the primary threat to the United States national interest was the spread of international communism. These administrations believed that the Soviet Union was motivated by one goal; to be the dominant power in the world in order to eventually fashion the rest of the world into a single political system based on the Soviet model. The United States thus structured its foreign policy in order to demonstrate to the Soviets by successful containment that they could not hope to expand their influence throughout the world and would be required to modify their policies. 15 American leaders during this period regarded it as axiomatic that the Soviet Union and Communist China were expansionist and that any extension of Communist control and influence anywhere in the world constituted a threat to American security.

In 1947 George Kennan wrote in a famous article, "The main element of a United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term potent but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." Kennan in this article merely enunciated the position of President Truman who had experienced one frustration after the other in dealing with the Soviets in Europe immediately after World War II. As early as the winter of 1945-46, President Truman relates in his "Memoirs" that he interpreted the Soviet pressures on Iran and Turkey, and later power plays against Greece, Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade, to be an immediate threat to the world balance of power. The expansionist policy was initially perceived as being aimed primarily at Europe and the Middle East. Our initial efforts of containment were, therefore, oriented towards that area of the world. NATO became the unequivocal commitment of United States military power to counter the Soviet attempt to exploit its military might in Europe.

At the same time events were also taking place in Asia which would have far-reaching consequences on future United States foreign policy. A civil war in China had, by 1949, driven

the Chinese Nationalist Government to the island of Formosa and left
the Communist Government of Mao Tse Tung in charge of the main-
land. Korea had been partitioned at the 38th parallel after World
War II, presumably to expedite the handling of Japanese prisoners
by the United States and Russia. This dividing line became more
and more permanent and after some futile attempts to unite Korea
under one government, Korea found itself split into two camps with
the North receiving military equipment and supplies from the
Soviets. Even in Vietnam, a tiny nation in Indochina, the French
were having problems with their former colony. The Potsdam
Conference of July 1945 had decreed that Vietnam would be occu-
pied by British forces south of the 16th Parallel and by Chinese
forces north of that line until France was able to reoccupy the
country and re-establish law and order. During this period,
the desire for independence was exploited with great skill by
Moscow trained Ho Chi-minh. His cause was helped a great
deal by the Japanese who had destroyed the old colonial order
of the French during their occupation and by the United States
which for a time aided Ho Chi-minh believing that he was a
nationalist. By 1949, Ho Chi-minh had received recognition
of his Vietminh state by Communist China and the Soviet
Union. Preoccupation with events in Europe, however, allowed
many of these events to take place without countermeasures on the part of the United States.

By 1949 the Asia-Pacific area was beginning to occupy a place of prominence in U. S. affairs. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a speech before the National Press Club, defined our defensive perimeter in Asia as "Running along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands and from there to the Philippine Islands." At the same time General Douglas MacArthur from his headquarters in Tokyo, stated that "The Pacific has become an Anglo-Saxon lake and our line of defense runs through the chain of islands fringing to the coast of Asia."18

Acheson was of the opinion, however, that it would be impossible for the United States to guarantee the entire Pacific area from military attack and that the initial burden of defense must be borne by the nation involved until a commitment by the United Nations could be ascertained. Critics of the Truman Administration, such as Senators Taft and Vandenburg, asserted that this attitude gave the communists the green light to attack South Korea. This attack took place on June 25, 1950 and it

18 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 357.
was determined by the administration to represent an overt expression of the communist expansionist policy which, if successful, could start a disasterous chain of events which may prove to be the undoing of U. S. power in Asia.

In a message before the Congress in January of 1951, President Truman explained his actions in Korea by stating that:

"Free nations are acting through the United Nations against aggression. Korea is not only a country undergoing the torment of aggression, it is also a symbol. It stands for the right and justice of the world against oppression and slavery. If we let the Republic of Korea go under, some other country would be next and then another.... We realized that the issue was whether to fight in a limited area now or a much larger scale later on."

The Korean conflict thus marked the globalization of containment in terms of United States operational commitments.

As a result of the Korean conflict the United States began to firm up its alliances in Asia to prevent further Soviet expansion. The Truman administration had come to the decision that security arrangements were essential in a world in danger and that in the Pacific, social and economic progress would be impossible unless there was a shield which protected nations from the paralysis of fear.

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20 Ibid., p. 329.
In September 1951 the United States and the Philippines signed a treaty of mutual defense and by the end of that year the U. S. had signed security treaties with Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Thus, the containment policy that worked so effectively in Europe was shifted to the Asia-Pacific area in an effort to show the Soviets that the United States was prepared to confront them at every point in the world where they showed signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. The Truman Administration attempted to convince the Russians that they would be made to suffer more than they might expect to gain by an aggressive policy in the Asia-Pacific area.

Although the Korean armistice talks commenced in July of 1951, the fighting was still continuing when Dwight D. Eisenhower ran for the presidency in 1952. Eisenhower made the Korean war the major point of his campaign and pledged to bring an end to the war if elected. At the same time pressures were being brought to bear on the Chinese and North Koreans by the United Nations and in July of 1953 the armistice was finally signed. A tentative and precarious place had come to Asia. Assuming office with President Eisenhower were a group of advisors who had for a long time been involved with United States policy in Asia. One particularly well-qualified
and dedicated man was John Foster Dulles, who Eisenhower selected as his Secretary of State. Dulles had been active in Asian affairs under the Truman administration and had negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty while acting as a special advisor to the State Department. As Secretary of State, Dulles' policies were to have great influence on U. S.-Asia-Pacific involvement for many years to come. Dulles' cornerstone for the security of free nations was contained in a collective system of defense. He determined that the "Soviet leaders desired to divide and weaken the free nations of the world and make their policies appear bankrupt by overextending them in efforts that go beyond their strength."21 He believed quite strongly in the idea of containment and oriented U.S. foreign policy in that direction. The United States, under the leadership of Eisenhower and Dulles, extended its treaty commitment to include SEATO in which the United States, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan agreed to meet the danger of communist expansion, "in accordance with its constitutional process," by means of armed attack.22


Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were attached to the treaty by a special protocol.

Although President Eisenhower was able to conclude a settlement in Korea, he was faced with a more vexing problem in Southeast Asia. The French were involved in a revolutionary war in Vietnam. The United States, after recognizing the French backed Bao Dai regime in February of 1950, began supplying the country with financial and military aid. It was determined that the struggle in Indochina was part of a worldwide resistance to a communist attempt at conquest and subversion and that France was playing the primary role in Indochina such as the United States had assumed in Korea.

By early 1954 the French were in dire straits and requested additional assistance from the United States. With the experience of Korea fresh in his mind, plus the fear that direct involvement by the Chinese or Russians would occur if the U.S. intervened, Eisenhower agreed to involve the United States only if other nations, in particular Great Britain, agreed to participate. He felt that to suffer a unilateral defeat in that area would have worldwide repercussions. On the other hand, Eisenhower envisaged the

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23 Department of State Bulletin, (June 1952) p. 1010.
Indochina situation as similar "to one piece in a row of dominoes, if one falls it upsets the rest." He felt that the loss of Vietnam would expose Thailand's entire eastern border to Red China and this in turn would impose a threat on Burma and Malaya. Eisenhower concluded that however ominous that threat may be, the United States would not take unilateral action in Southeast Asia. He felt that an involvement in such an action would result in "drawing off our resources and thus weaken our overall defensive position." In addition, Dulles advised that a war in Indochina would force the U. S. into a major war against a third rate communist power which he believed would be a colossal blunder. The British, in turn, refused to become involved in Indochina and the situation was brought before the Geneva Convention in May of 1954. Vietnam was divided at the 17th parallel and according to Dulles "The Communists made their first territorial gain since Mao Tse Tung seized Tibet in 1950." The United States were observers at this conference and did not sign the Geneva agreement. They recognized only the Republic of South Vietnam led

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24 Gerson, op. cit., p. 186.
26 Gerson, op. cit., p. 186.
by Ngo Dinh Diem, who Eisenhower said had the makings of another Chiang Kai-shek or Syngman Rhee.

Another aspect of containment in the Eisenhower Administration was the introduction of the idea of "massive retaliation." The United States, because of its superiority of nuclear weapons, decided to discourage Soviet expansion by the threat of massive nuclear employment. Dulles was of the opinion that a massive strategic striking power would deter the Russians, thus lessening the need to contain them all around their perimeter. He conceived a central mobile reserve which would be kept in the United States for employment in any "hot spot" in the world. Under the Eisenhower Administration containment had taken on certain new aspects, i.e., the threat of massive retaliation, collective security and a desire to stay away from internal conflicts in Asia.

Upon the assumption of John Kennedy to the office of the Presidency, we find still another approach to security in Asia. Kennedy did not entirely agree with the principle of "massive retaliation." He felt that this strategy would not provide the necessary options for U.S. security policy and left us only a choice between world devastation or submission. He determined that the United States had a deficiency in its ability to fight "limited" wars. This was a critical deficiency
because as Kennedy perceived the world situation, the United States was adequately prepared to contain the threat of "big" wars in Europe but technological developments had rendered the possibility of these "World Wars" less likely. The Communists at the same time were continuing to pursue their expansionist desires by introducing a new type of warfare, announced by Kruschev in January 1961, which called for Communist expansion through "wars of national liberation." Kennedy had seen examples of this type of conflict being waged in Algeria by the FLN and in Cuba by Castro. Now in 1961 he was witnessing this type of conflict taking place in Laos and Vietnam.

President Kennedy had inherited a difficult problem in Laos. After careful consideration and advice, he decided not to intervene militarily in that area but sought peaceful negotiations to seat a neutral coalition government. Having obtained a ceasefire, which was brought about by the threat of U. S. intervention in the area, the International Conference on Laos met in Geneva and a coalition government was formed.

The situation in Vietnam, however, was not that easily disposed. In 1956 Diem had refused to hold nationwide elections in Vietnam for fear that the North had a distinct advantage over

the South because of the North's united front. In 1959 Ho Chi Minh decided that it was time to unite all of Vietnam through guerrilla raids and acts of terror. Kennedy believed that in the end it would be the people of Vietnam who must win the war over the Communists. De an Rusk was appointed as Kennedy's Secretary of State. He, like Dulles, was not a novice in the foreign policy field, having served as Deputy Under-Secretary of State and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in the Truman Administration. Rusk believed that it was the obligation of the United States to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia in their fight both because of our responsibilities in connection with the formation of these states and because of our duties in regard to the SEATO Treaty of which Vietnam was a protocol member. President Kennedy's efforts were initially directed at convincing the North Vietnamese and the Communist Chinese that continued aggression would prove to be frustrating and unprofitable. Early in his administration Kennedy made the following decisions with regard to South Vietnam:

1) He would hold the line in South Vietnam in face of heightened Communist guerrilla activity.

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28 Ibid., p. 732.

2) He would increase the Eisenhower commitment of men and material to assist the South Vietnamese forces.
3) That the survival of the Saigon government would be a major objective in American foreign policy.

In his State of the Union message of January 30, 1961, President Kennedy made this statement:

"The relentless pressures of the Chinese Communists menace the security of the entire area from the boarders of India and South Vietnam to the jungles of Laos. We must never be lulled into believing that either Russia or China has yielded in its ambitions for world domination." 30

Kennedy, like his predecessors, was convinced that a withdrawal in Vietnam might mean the collapse of the entire area. He believed in the domino theory enunciated in the Eisenhower era and publically stated that the fall of South Vietnam would give the Chinese an "improved geographic position for a guerrilla attack on Malaya" and give the rest of the world the impression that the future of Asia would be determined by China and the Communists. Under the Kennedy reign the number of military advisors in Vietnam increased from 800 men to more than 16,000. The United States was firmly committed to the

31 Ibid., p. 43.
defense of Vietnam and to the containment of Communism in that part of the world. President Kennedy, therefore, acted as did all post World War II Presidents before him and was guided in his actions by the policy of Communist containment in South-east Asia.

President Johnson initially followed the Kennedy lead in Vietnam. His first message after taking over the Presidency revealed his feeling on this matter:

"It remains the central objective of the United States in South Vietnam to assist the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."\(^{32}\)

Until 1964 the escalation of the war can be described as marginal increases in support of the South Vietnamese government. After the 1964 election, however, the war took on a broader aspect and the United States began to assume the full responsibility of insuring that the Communists did not win. President Johnson ordered U. S. force responses to the Gulf of Tonkin incident and increased the U. S. force commitment to where it was deemed necessary to commit U. S. ground troops.

As far back as 1961 President Johnson had stated:

"The fundamental decision required of the United States - and time is of the greatest importance - is whether we are to attempt to meet the challenge

of Communist expansion now in Southeast Asia by a major effort in support of the forces of freedom in the area or throw in the towel. The decision must be made in full realization of the very heavy and continuing cost involved in terms of money, of effort and of United States prestige. It must be made with the knowledge that at some point we may be faced with the further decisions of whether we commit major United States forces to the area or cut our losses and withdraw should our efforts fail."33

That point in time came in March of 1965 when the decision was made to introduce U.S. ground combat units into the area. President Johnson reasoned that "the challenge we face in Southeast Asia today is the same challenge we have met with strength in Greece, Turkey, Korea, Lebanon and Cuba."34 He was supported in his decision by an overwhelming majority of the Congress and the nation as a whole. Dean Rusk, President Johnson's Secretary of State summed up the national feeling at that time by postulating that the threat in Southeast Asia was closely intertwined with the security of the United States and that the action taken by the President was an attempt to prevent the extension of Communist domination on the perimeter of Communism. 35 Thus, once again, the United States found itself on the Asian battlefield waging a war.

33 Galloway, op. cit., p. 20.
34 Johnson, op. cit., p. 117.
in order to stop the spread of Communism. This war, because of its length, and lack of unity of effort came to be an extremely unpopular one. Even more poignantly, many people both in and out of government began to question the purpose behind the war and whether or not it was in our national interest to have become involved in a war in Southeast Asia. As a result, the Johnson Administration was plagued by internal unrest.

The one thread of continuity in our foreign relations over the last twenty-seven years has been our rugged adherence to the strategy of containment. Each post World War II administration based its national security decisions on the premise that Communism must be checked and not be allowed to expand throughout the world. The United States, as the leader of the non-communist world, was commissioned to play the leading role in this endeavor. The U. S. assumed the role of world policeman which proved to be costly not only in men and materials (which has pushed our defense budget above the 80 billion dollar mark) but in national spirit as well. By the late 1960's the United States was forced by new conditions in the world to move away from our strict adherence to the policy of containment and towards a new strategy which would provide the adequate flexibility to cope with the changing world situation.
PART III

THE NIXON DOCTRINE

A. Background and Scope.

Since the early 1940's the United States has been required to send armed forces to fight in Asia on three specific occasions. No other region has required this effort and sacrifice and in no other area has the failure to create peace been so costly as in the Pacific. It was with these factors in mind plus the domestic unrest brought about by the Vietnamese war that President Nixon, in July 1969 on the island of Guam, announced the beginnings of a new United States policy for the Asia-Pacific area. Since that time, many questions have been advanced regarding the exact meaning and policy implications of this Doctrine. In this section, I will discuss the background of the Nixon Doctrine, its meaning and the possible impact that this Doctrine may have in the Asia-Pacific area.

World conditions have changed drastically since the inception of the policy of containment shortly after World War II. The security shield erected by the United States, as well as the collective security agreements and bi-lateral agreements entered into by our government, has permitted the nations in
the Asia-Pacific area to plan and shape their future without outside interference. This was not accomplished, however, without great sacrifices on the part of the American people.

Through the years our allies in the Pacific have become stronger. Japan, for example, has developed economically into the third most powerful nation in the world. As a result of this wealth, Japan is able to undertake a greater role in assuring the peace and stability of Asia. Over the next few years Japan will devote greater resources to the economic assistance of the rest of Asia. Japan has already taken a major role in the economic rehabilitation of Indochina. The size of Japan's military forces continues to grow at the rate of 17 per cent a year and though she is not likely to play a major security role in Asia in the next few years, there is good reason to believe that she will possess a capability for an adequate conventional defense of her own territory in the near future.

Korea has also improved greatly since 1952. Korea's economy has been increasing at a rapid pace over the last six years and as has been demonstrated so vividly in Vietnam, she is now much more capable of providing for her own security

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than she was at the conclusion of the Korean conflict. In addition, newly developing nations, such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, have increased in economic viability due to a newly acquired spirit of cooperation. Co-operation which has developed among many of the Asian countries in recent years with the assistance of organizations such as the Asian Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Economic Commission for Asia. These nations have emerged with a strong sense of nationalism and a desire for regional independence.

The Communist camp has also undergone changes over the past years. No longer is there a monolithic communist world ruled over by the Soviets, but a group of independent communist countries whose goals differ widely in many aspects from those of the Russians. "Communist nations have moved from solidarity to diversity and even in some cases intensive rivalry in their relationships with one another."37 This polycentrism has resulted in a loosening of ideological rigidities and has provided an atmosphere in which serious discussions between the two poles may take place in an environment relatively free of ideol-

logical obstructionism. A change has also taken place in the nuclear balance of power. The United States no longer possesses a monopoly or overwhelming superiority in the atomic weapons field and, thus, our ability to provide a true nuclear deterrent against another nuclear power has greatly diminished. In addition, our failure to attain a clear cut military victory in Vietnam has had a profound effect on the thinking of the American people with regard to our world-wide responsibilities and the extent to which our country should commit itself to meet these responsibilities. The Nixon Doctrine, therefore, takes into consideration the changes that have taken place in the Asia-Pacific area and in the world, and is presented as a means of fulfilling our global responsibilities on a sustained basis by evoking both the contributions of our allies and friends and the support of our own people.

As Melvin Laird so succinctly points out:

"The Nixon Doctrine is the basic philosophy underlying the conduct of both our foreign and national security affairs policies. It provides the essential link between basic principles of the President's policy for peace and the parochial implementary programs to which most of the attention and debate concerning defense planning and budgeting are directed." 39

38 Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 20.

The Nixon Doctrine was formulated to provide the United States with a strategy that would encompass our relationship with all nations, and would hopefully represent a turning point from past discouragements in our Asia-Pacific relations.

Prior to a discussion of the political and military implications of the Nixon Doctrine on the future of the world, it is important that we first examine the Doctrine itself. The Nixon Doctrine was not designated to be an Executive Directive that can be referred to in order to find answers to specific questions. It is a statement of national policy and, as such, it will be subject to a constant state of evolution and change. To be effective the policy must be flexible and be able to conform to the changing world conditions. The basic principles of President Nixon's framework for a durable peace are: Partnership, in which obligations as well as benefits are shared; Strength, to insure that would-be aggressors will not be tempted to make dangerous miscalculations; and a Willingness to Negotiate, for the purpose of seeking those areas of agreement that might be reached as a means of resolving conflicts.

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The President underlined Partnership as basic to our foreign policy and spelled out the United States' responsibility in this regard in his Guam pronouncement:

1. "The U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments."

President Nixon further elaborated on this in his foreign policy reports of 1971, 1972 and 1973 and stated that "We will respect these commitments because of their intrinsic merit and because of the impact of a sudden U.S. shift on regional and world stability." In regard to new international commitments, Nixon points out that we will take a close look in order to determine our national concern, the threat and the effect our involvement would have on world conditions. The Doctrine does not rule out new commitments, but if undertaken they would have to be directly related to the national interest of the United States.

2. "We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security."

In effect, this policy of the United States would control against nuclear blackmail or even conventional aggression backed by nuclear power.

3. "In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance in accordance with our treaty commitments, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."\(^{41}\)

Thus, the level of U.S. military involvement has been raised and in many cases U.S. involvement will not be forthcoming. A recent example of this attitude was brought out in the 19 January incident involving the Paracel Islands. The United States declared that it was "not involved in the dispute" thus abandoning its earlier position that any loss of territory to Communist control in Southeast Asia would have an effect on all anti-Communist countries in the area and thus jeopardize vital American interests. The falling dominoe theory for Southeast Asia is no longer accorded the same status as it would have had a decade ago.

We will examine these three elements more closely in an attempt to derive policy implications from them. The first element, that of keeping our treaty commitments, seems on the surface to be fairly clear cut. Its implementation, however, may introduce some problems. Most of our treaties in the Asia-Pacific area do not require automatic military actions, but involvement is contingent upon the "constitutional process." At the present time, the probability of Congressional support for direct military involvement in combat operations in the Asia-Pacific area is fairly slim. Since the end of World War II, American military power has been employed on many
occasions, not in response to treaty commitments but in response to actions which were perceived by our top policy-makers as affecting our security interests. The Korean conflict, the Taiwan Strait, Lebanon, Cuba and the Dominican Republic are but a few examples of this type of action. Our actions were in response to specific circumstances which were not legislated for beforehand. The War Powers bill, which was passed by overriding a Presidential veto in November 1973, will limit to a degree the freedom of action of future Presidents. President Nixon has repeatedly re-affirmed, however, that we are a Pacific power and that we will maintain balanced military forces in that region. 42

The second element, that of providing a nuclear shield for our allies, is based on the premise that the U.S.S.R. or the Chinese Communists might be tempted to militarily impose its will upon a nation by relying on their nuclear capability in order to discourage U.S. intervention in the area. We are attempting to guard against this nuclear blackmail by assuring these nations of a protective shield. In fact, however, the United States will be much more restrictive in applying this commitment since the

consequences are so great. The decision of whether or not to carry out this element of the Nixon Doctrine will be dependent on the national authority's conception of the danger to our national interest imposed by the threat. Thus, the nuclear umbrella could be restricted to the protection of selected allies.

The third element regarding "the military and economic assistance in cases involving other types of aggression" is to me the crux of the entire Doctrine and introduces a truly new interpretation of the role the United States as a global power. It does not exclude the possibility of intervention by American combat forces, but spells out clearly a preference for certain modalities as against others which are considered less desirable. It brings out for the first time President Nixon's determination to avoid, whenever possible, involvement of American combat forces and especially ground forces in defense of friendly nations in the Asia-Pacific area. It confirms the fact that the U.S. will participate in the defense and development of the Asian allies, but that we will not conceive all the plans, design all the programs and execute all the decisions as we have done in the past. It is a public realization that the United States can no longer provide the security around the globe. "It serves the domestic imperative of restraint in our
international role, without sacrificing our interest in Asia or defaulting on our obligations."\(^{43}\) As President Nixon has stated in defense of his policy:

"The Nixon Doctrine is essentially a plan for strengthening our alliance, for spreading more equitably the burdens of peacekeeping, for enlisting more nations more fully in the task of securing their own defenses and for helping insure that future conflicts which are peripheral to the central interests of the great powers should not directly involve the great powers themselves."\(^{44}\)

It dramatizes the end of the American combat role in Indochina while informing pro-American regimes that American money, technology, arms and diplomatic support will be committed to those nations who would help each other in preserving their freedom. In Southeast Asia there seems to be a definite pronounced shift of emphasis. The future of that area is seen to be dependent upon regional co-operation and an expanded role to be played by Japan.\(^{45}\)

At this point, the question can quite logically be posed as to whether the United States is not more willing today than it was a decade ago to accept a certain degree of communist expansion in Asia. This question is an obvious result of a feeling of dis-

\(^{43}\) Nixon, *Building for Peace*, p. 94.

\(^{44}\) Nixon, *Real Road to Peace*, p. 36.

enchantment by the citizens of our nation, because of past errors in foreign policy. The war in Vietnam is just one in a series of disappointments that the American people have experienced as a result of our leadership role in the "free" world. Other events have also contributed to this attitude: The internal frustrations and loss of confidence in our governmental leadership and institutions as a result of "Watergate"; the severe economic pressure on the United States, Europe and Japan as a result of the energy crises and the position taken by the Arab world after the recent Arab-Israeli conflict; the internal conflict which has developed within the Atlantic Alliance in recent years as evidenced by their refusal of the U.S. request for over-flight rights during the Arab-Israeli war; the apparent failure of many of our economic aid programs to provide rapid modernization in developing Asian and African nations; the disappointment with the Alliance for Progress programs in South America; the rapid spread of military regimes throughout the world, especially in Asia, Latin America and Africa; and finally the utter frustration experienced by the United States in Southeast Asia when superior military hardware and doctrine failed to defeat insurgency movements in that part of the world.

These and other factors have forced many members of the Congress to look inward and to re-evaluate our existent policies.
To some, the Nixon Doctrine represents a pledge of non-involvement in Asia. The operations conducted in Cambodia in 1970, the support of the Laotian operation in 1971, the renewed bombing of North Vietnam, the support rendered to Israel in October of this year and the resultant military alert of our U.S. and European based forces does not appear to be an indication of an abandonment of our policy to assist our allies when it is deemed necessary to do so.

The Nixon Doctrine supports the view that a world order of stability and peace is linked very closely with the security and interests of the United States. It re-emphasizes the fact that the United States expects to remain a world power and attempts to more realistically align our strategic policies with our present capabilities. Future military commitments will be treated on a case-by-case basis, predicated on our national interest, the size and scope of the threat and the capabilities that we and our allies possess. As President Nixon has said, "We will view our commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests and those of other countries, of the specific threats to those interests and to our capacity to counter these threats at an acceptable risk and cost."46

The Doctrine introduces a concept of a flexible and controlled response to situations. In cases where our interests and our treaty commitments are not involved, the role of the United States will be a limited one. We will bring our influence to bear to prevent hostilities and in the event that war breaks out, we will continue to use our influence to bring the war to an end. 47 U.S. adherence to this policy was demonstrated in the recent Arab-Israeli encounter and provides an indication as to our future response in the Asia-Pacific area when a conflict is considered to be internal and does not involve one of the major powers in the world.

The other two principles which form the triangular cornerstone of the Nixon Doctrine are strength and negotiation. President Nixon has often repeated the maxim that we must have sufficient strength to deter aggression because it would be impossible to pursue the other two principles of the Nixon Doctrine if we lacked the necessary strength for deterrence. To meet a crisis in Asia the U.S. will have to possess a balanced force posture. United States strength is established in Asia through a policy which has been labeled "realistic deterrence." Realistic deterrence takes into consideration all the vital elements of

47 *Nixon, Real Road to Peace*, p. 36.
national security: economic, diplomatic, psychological socio-
logical and military capabilities, in arriving at national de-
cisions. This policy is directed toward an indirect, rather than
a direct, means of defending American interests. Realistic de-
terrence requires the preservation of a U. S. military defense
policy in Asia, to include United States nuclear and conventional
war making capabilities. At the same time realistic deterrence
supports the development of indigenous individual and regional
capabilities to cope with internal conflicts or "wars of liberation"
which may occur in the area. The policy seeks to maintain the
peace in Asia by deterring future armed conflict at every level.
The ultimate objective of realistic deterrence is to eliminate, if
possible, armed conflict as a viable means of one nation imposing
its will on another. At the same time it acknowledges that as long
as there remains a threat in the area, adequate military power
must be maintained to counter that threat. According to former
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, "realistic deterrence is
based on a sober and clear view of the multiple threats to peace
which exist in today's world without exaggeration or under-
estimation of those threats. It provides for the maintenance of
a strong Free World military capability as the essential founda-
tion of deterrence and it takes into account the strategic, fiscal
manpower and political realities while steering a prudent middle course between the two policy extremes of world policeman and isolationism.\textsuperscript{48}

The essential elements of realistic deterrence are, therefore, strategic sufficiency, technological superiority, improved readiness, modernization, total resource utilization, strong reserves and security assistance. An important aspect of this security policy is "Net Assessment" which is defined as a comparative analysis of the military, technological, political and economic factors which impede or have the potential to impede U.S. national security objectives, with the factors available to enhance the accomplishment of these same national security objectives.\textsuperscript{49} An accurate net assessment is the key to the success of realistic deterrence.

President Nixon and Secretary of Defense Laird have presented guidelines for the implementation of the policy of realistic deterrence which can be used in the planning of security programs:

\begin{itemize}
  \item In deterring strategic nuclear warfare the primary responsibility
\end{itemize}


Rests with the United States and its strategic deterrent force. In the deterrence of theater nuclear warfare in Asia, again the principal responsibility of deterrence remains with the United States under the umbrella of her tactical nuclear forces. The deterrence of theater conventional warfare (a major non-nuclear war involving either the U.S.S.R. or the Peoples Republic of China) will be a shared responsibility between the Asian allied forces and those of the United States. This latter guideline, it is hoped, will induce our allies to take a greater share in the responsibility for deterrence. Sub-theater or localized warfare deterrence will be the unique responsibility of the Asian nations themselves. The United States will provide assistance as appropriate in the event American interests are at stake.

Realistic deterrence attempts to outline the appropriate U.S. responsibilities for deterrence in Asia. The policy does not indicate, however, the U.S. response in the event deterrence fails and, as a result, leaves this most important area open for conjecture. Realistic deterrence requires that all appropriate resources of the United States and its allies be employed in the implementation of its deterrence policy.

In the planning for the use of military forces there are four categories of force planning which are normally considered:

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Combined force planning; assumes integration of U.S. and local forces which is the policy in Korea and Okinawa. A second category is labeled complementary force planning; in which the obligations of the U.S. military are recognized but where the prepositioning of U.S. ground forces is not required as in Japan. A third force planning concept is supplementary force planning, where U.S. support in providing security assistance is required to supplement local capabilities, as in Cambodia. The fourth and final category is unilateral force planning, which is employed only in an emergency, when the vital interests of the United States are at stake and when we cannot expect active support from other nations.

Although this latter planning is listed as one of the four categories and must be recognized, the President would be hesitant to have our nation commit its forces in Asia under unilateral circumstances. Unilateral planning would be limited to the employment of strategic nuclear forces, maritime and air assets only and not to the employment of ground forces except as a last resort.

Early political influence is impossible without a strong military back-up. Our options in the event of a conflict without

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51 Laird, Statement of February 22, 1972, p. 64.
an effectively balanced force would be to accept defeat or resort
to strategic nuclear weapons. The President has pledged to leave
a representative ground, air and naval presence in the Asia-Pacific
area and these forces will be backed up by a General Purpose Force
reinforcing capability.

The principle of negotiation has been pursued vigorously in
the last three years by President Nixon and his Administration and
may, in the long run, emerge as the most effective of the three
principles. President Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 has
resulted in a change in political atmosphere that has been unpre-
cedented in our Asia-Pacific dealings. The actions taken by the
Communist Chinese in the United Nations and their public pro-
nouncements against the Soviet Union has changed to a measurable
degree the climate in which our foreign relations can be carried
out in that part of the world. The meeting in November of last
year between Secretary of State Kissinger and Premier Chou en
Lai has further fostered better relations between the two powers.
In addition, the continuing dialogue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
has resulted in a period of detente which manifested itself in a joint
U.S.-Russian peace proposal to the recent Mideast crisis. The
wheat sale by the United States to Russia and the continuing
economic and cultural exchanges between the two super-powers will
hopefully continue to reap dividends in maintaining the peace in Asia.
The overall purpose of these negotiations in light of the other two principles is to bring about conditions that would reduce the military threat to the countries in that area and perhaps bring about international stability. As President Nixon pointed out, "The success of our Asia-Pacific policy depends not only on the strength of our partnership with our Asian friends but also on our relations with mainland China and the Soviet Union."\(^{52}\)

**B. Consequences and Future Effectiveness.**

One of the effects of U.S. adherence to the principles of the Nixon Doctrine is the requirement for the formation of regional groupings in the Asia-Pacific area. A sense of regional identity and self-confidence must be developed among the Asian states. This will be a difficult task to accomplish however since many of the Asian nations such as Korea and Vietnam reject the idea of an East Asia Community of nations. Their ardent nationalism which rejects the traditional subordinate relationship added to their fear of Japanese economic dominance lead them to look beyond East Asia in order to help preserve their political economic and cultural independence.\(^ {53}\) SEATO, in the past provided one framework in which some Asian nations could work together effectively.

\(^{52}\) Nixon, A New Strategy for Peace, p. 60

In addition, regional co-operation is evident in projects such as the Asian Development Bank, the development of the lower Mekong Basin, the Asian and Pacific Council and the Association of South-east Asian nations. This latter agency is seen by some as a replacement for SEATO as a South Asian regional alliance capable of providing the muscle and determination to resist satellite status and as a possible forum for bringing peace to the area. In April of 1971 a new five power agreement to assist in the defense of Malaysia and Singapore was worked out by these two nations, plus Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The responsibilities which have been borne by the United States in Asia for so long should now be shared. No longer should it be necessary that the Asia-Pacific area be subject to the dominant influence of the United States. According to President Nixon, "Southeast Asia will, in the future, rest on two pillars--the collective interest of Asian nations acting in regional groupings and the policy of the four major powers concerned with the region." Reduction of U.S. forces in Asia can be safely accomplished only by an increase in allied military participation.

At present, increased allied capabilities is dependent upon U.S. military and economic aid. The U.S. Military Assistance

\[54\] Nixon, Building for Peace, p. 92.
Program must play an important role in the development of regional security. In the past, the United States has been training and equipping foreign military units so that they could become components of an allied "Order of Battle" under U.S. military command. Since the aim of the Nixon Doctrine is to foster self-reliance, it becomes imperative that foreign military establishments develop their own doctrines and procedures in their own indigenous environment using resources with which they are familiar and which they can use and afford instead of highly technical and sophisticated equipment which quickly becomes valueless as a result of a lack of trained maintenance personnel.

At this point let us examine some of the expected effects of the Nixon Doctrine on the security of the nations of Asia. In Northeast Asia, Japan, Korea and the Republic of China on Taiwan, are bound to the United States by bilateral agreements. Their status will not change unless the status of one of the states were to change or alternate multilateral guarantees were to be found which would be agreeable to the nations concerned. At present the United States maintains bases and in some cases ground troops on position in these countries. An attack on any one of these nations by either Russia or China would surely evoke an

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55 Bundy, op. cit., p. 78.
immediate military response by the United States. Japan, as a result of the Nixon Doctrine and President Nixon's overtures towards the U.S.S.R. and Communist China, is almost certain to expand her conventional military forces in the future. Japan could easily begin to develop nuclear weapons within the decade if she determines it to be necessary for her security. By the mid 1970's Japanese civilian based nuclear power will have the capability to produce small nuclear weapons. The Japanese are well aware, however, that a rearmed and nationalistic Japan would probably generate an intense and dangerous arms race with the Soviet Union and China. Peking and Moscow would be apprehensive to say the least if Japan chose either to develop her own nuclear weapons or to form an alliance with one communist power at the expense of the other. Hence, the continuation of the basic security relationship between Japan and the United States remains vital to the stability of the Pacific basin.  

Japan has expressed a desire to enter into regional security arrangements with Taiwan and Korea which she considers to be vital to her security. She has entered into negotiations with China with
the hope of increased economic co-operation leading to a mutual understanding in the area.

In Korea reduction of U.S. ground forces would hardly effect the existent deterrent situation. At the present time, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies report on military balance, the South Korean Army and Navy have more men under arms than does North Korea. The South Korean Army has approximately 10 divisions and 200,000 more men than does North Korea. The South Korean Navy possesses a more modern and better equipped fleet than does the North Koreans. The North Korean Air Force, however, possesses approximately 300 more combat aircraft than does the South. In addition, the South Korean Army is in need of more modern U.S. equipment. Korea's improving economy has had a strong psychological effect on North Korea and with the recent meetings between the representatives of North and South Korea, the chances of open hostilities in the near future have diminished accordingly. President Nixon has promised continued air and naval support to Korea and even with the removal of all American ground troops the U.S. commitment to the security of Korea will remain. The thought of a rearmed Japan is very unpleasant to Koreans and they are desirous that the United States keep a moderating influence on Japan as she rearms.
Security ties will be maintained with Australia and New Zealand but no new American commitments can be expected in the area of Malaysia or Singapore and the British will be relied on to provide security in that area. We are aligned with Australia in both the ANZUS and SEATO treaties and are increasing rather than decreasing our military posture in that country. Australia, however, can be conceived as being highly instrumental in the development of regional security arrangements in the area. They are an economically viable nation and are committed to the West, both culturally and militarily.

It is in Southeast Asia that the United States is working towards disengagement. Southeast Asia is not of vital interest to the security of the United States. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from that area marked an end to a bitter experience in foreign affairs which will not quickly be forgotten by either the policy makers or the people of our nation. Future involvement of these nations in insurgent or guerrilla warfare will, in all probability, be dealt with by the indigenous forces of that country. Military and economic assistance to supplement local efforts will be provided, but American presence in that type of environment in the future will be avoided. President Nixon announced in 1971 that he envisaged a new relationship with American allies which would avoid the direct involvement of the United States in any future
Vietnam-type conflicts.

Thailand, because of her established U.S. bases and facilities, (over 1 billion dollar investment) presents a different situation and at least for the time being is militarily significant to the United States. On March 6, 1962 a joint communiqué issued by then Secretary of the State Dean Rusk and Minister Thanet Khaman stated that the United States would come to the support of Thailand even if other SEATO signatories refused to participate. In July of 1969 President Nixon reaffirmed this commitment when he stated "The U.S. will stand proudly with Thailand against all of those who might threaten it from abroad or from within." In essence, the U.S. has a bilateral treaty with Thailand and will continue to receive military support especially when U.S. installations are thought to be endangered. This situation could change as a result of the events of October 1973 in Thailand but thus far Prime Minister Sanzo Thammasch has not shown an inclination to do so.

In the Philippines, the United States has a long-standing commitment and could expect U.S. assistance in the case of external involvement, but this would not necessarily be the case

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when it comes to internal strife. Henry Kissinger, during a briefing at the summer White House at San Clemente, California, was asked: "If the Philippine Government underwent an internal change that seemed likely to produce a Communist or Communist-leaning government, would the Nixon Doctrine apply?" Dr. Kissinger replied, "If there was a guerrilla movement in the Philippines, then what we would try to do is to apply the principle of the Nixon Doctrine according to which guerrilla wars really ought to be fought substantially by the countries threatened, with American material and technical assistance... So we believe that if the Philippine Government, with our technical and perhaps financial assistance cannot handle its own guerrillas, American troops will probably not be very successful."\(^{60}\)

The above statement signifies the extent to which the present administration is willing to go in applying the Nixon Doctrine. The fact that we may not employ troops in support of the Philippine Government, with whom we concluded one of our first security treaties after World War II, is indicative of the administration's desire to avoid at all costs internal squabbles, even when they are backed by a hostile ideology. It is also clear that, in the future,

the United States will be reluctant to militarily support a government that is not able to adequately control its own internal problems.

The Nixon Doctrine has attempted to insure the nations of the Asia-Pacific of the continued presence of air and naval forces throughout the area. Additional reliance will be placed on indigenous forces for security of U.S. forward bases, but sufficient ground forces will be maintained in the area to act in the event of open hostilities which threaten U.S. vital interests in the area. Thus, "while assisting our Asian allies in the improvement of their forces, the United States will maintain land, sea and air deployments in Asia at a level which will provide assurances to the allies and demonstrate our ability and determination to meet our commitments."61

The Nixon Doctrine reflects a change in the basic U.S. attitude towards involvement in Asia. It is a withdrawal from our post World War II role of acting as the world's policeman. It is a basic modification in our policy of containment. It is a removal of our powerful order of battle from around the rim of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The Nixon Doctrine is not, as some have

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suggested, an abandonment of Asia and our commitment to the free nations in the Asia-Pacific area. Under the Nixon Doctrine the U. S. is making sincere effort towards normalization in an age when more and more nations are developing the capability to completely destroy each other. U. S. policies in Asia in the past have been costly and a new approach is being attempted with the hope that it may prove to be more successful and less hazardous.

The Nixon Doctrine has come under criticism by some elements within our nation. Some of our leaders in Congress and the business community feel that the Doctrine is an abrogation of our responsibility to the nations of Asia. It is argued that in a situation where the United States feels that it can no longer shoulder the costs required to shape world events, it is going to be extremely difficult to co-ordinate a global strategy with allies who define their goals and responsibilities differently.

Others argue that as the result of the emergence of the Nixon Doctrine, American consensus in U. S. foreign policy has deteriorated. It is pointed out that the Nixon Doctrine depends heavily on summity and the skillful diplomatic initiatives of the Executive. This comes at a time when there is question as to

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the ability of the Executive to effectively govern and when there is an open denunciation of the Presidential war-making powers by the Congress. The effectiveness of the Nixon Doctrine is dependent to a great measure on the authority of the Executive to negotiate with the full backing of the American people. The President, himself, has stated that if our Asian allies conclude that they can no longer depend on the United States for at least the critical margin of assistance in protecting themselves, they may feel compelled to compromise with those who threaten them. Conversely, if our adversaries conclude that we have lost our willingness to take positive measures when pushed too far, then the criticality of balanced agreements will largely disappear. The electronic and news media have made it virtually impossible to confine policy making to a small elite which further obstructs the national authority and at times even the Congress from taking actions on a timely and effective basis. The Nixon Doctrine is vulnerable in its present state because it has capitalized on a spirit of isolationism at a time when that feeling has gained in popularity in this country. It must be remembered that any withdrawal from our previous international commitments is an irreversible trend and may result in a deterioration of U. S.

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influence in the world.

In the limited application of the Nixon Doctrine to date, we are again faced with some negative impacts. No one can deny that the President's initiatives towards the Peoples Republic of China has proved to be a very successful move in U.S. international relations. However, it should also be noted that these moves have substantially upset the U.S.-Japanese alliance at a time when Japan had begun to assume her responsibility in Asia. The outcome of this "shock" is not predictable, but Future U.S. initiatives must take into account the maintenance of the alliance if they are to be truly effective. Critics of the Nixon Doctrine have pointed out that thus far "the pillar of Partnership has been neglected in favor of Negotiations with adversaries." 64

We have thus far examined the Nixon Doctrine's strategic implications and have analyzed a number of programs and policies emerging from this strategy. It is now necessary to examine the political, economic and military conditions that exist in the Asia-Pacific area today and contrast them with the U.S. national will, spirit and needs of our own citizens in order to determine if the Doctrine is adequate to deal with these problems and truly serve as our national strategy in the decade to come.

64 Kintner, op. cit., p. 75.
PART IV
AN EMERGING STRATEGY FOR ASIA

The question can logically be posed as to whether or not the Asia-Pacific area is of strategic importance to the United States. The answer to this question will form the basis for an approach to our national strategy and to the formation of our national security policies. Asia is today strategically more important to the United States than she has ever been. Now more than ever the United States finds itself dependent upon other nations of the world for many essential products and raw materials. For the first time in our nation's history we no longer have the option of turning inward and relying on our own resources alone to function as a nation state. As strange as it may seem, the U. S. has become a "have not" nation in many critical areas of raw materials. The recent crisis in the Middle East has dramatically demonstrated that without the assistance of the other nations of the world our ability to expand or even maintain our standard of living will be endangered. Our lack of natural resources dictates that we must remain involved with other nations. Our own national interests are inextricably linked to the economic and political health of
the rest of the world.

In Asia the U. S. must insure that no other major power gains unilateral control of the area, which could consequently provide them with the ability to cut off our access to the raw materials, natural resources and manufactured products critically required by the United States. President Nixon has stated repeatedly that the United States is and will remain a Pacific power. Our interests in Hawaii, Wake Island, Guam, the Aleutians and the Marianas must be protected and at the same time, we must protect the sea lines of communication which link us with these countries and our other trading partners in Asia. The industrial and economic base of Japan and the resource potential of other Asian nations, such as the newly found oil in Indonesia, make them strategically important to the U.S. Without freedom of movement, the economic fiber of our nation would be endangered. In addition, as has been previously stated, the United States still maintains treaty commitments with many Asian nations and these cannot be indiscriminately abandoned without major repercussions throughout the rest of the world. Most importantly from a purely strategic point of view, Northeast Asia is one of two areas of the world where four of the five world powers have major interests, thus it is an area where the possibility of conflict remains great.
The relationship between the United States, Russia and the Peoples Republic of China has undergone a major change over the past two years. Since February of 1972 when President Nixon made his historic visit to China, the balance of power on the continent of Asia has been subject of a great deal of uncertainty. We have experienced at first hand the explosion of the myth of monolithic Soviet communism. We have become acutely aware of the vast differences that exist between Russia and China, in particular their perceptions of world affairs. This situation has placed the United States in a unique position in that the Soviet fear of China's political rivalry in Asia and China's fear of Soviet military confrontation on their northern border has resulted in a movement towards detente by both the Soviet Union and China towards the United States. A withdrawal of U. S. military and economic presence in this area at the present time would be politically unwise and have far reaching consequences.

Earlier in this paper I defined national interest as dealing with the welfare of a nation and the goals set by this nation in order to preserve its national life style. The changes that have taken place in the international environment have stimulated a

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rethinking of the nature of American security. The United States has political, economic and national security interests in Asia. These interests are not absolute by any means because they rely heavily on conflicting personal value judgements. They are in a constant state of flux due to such factors as changes in national leadership, changes in technology and changes in a nations capabilities and intentions. The basis of our interests in the Asia-Pacific area today therefore rests on the United States' desire to prevent domination of the region by a single power or group of powers. Politically we are obliged to maintain U.S. influence in the area to insure a relative balance among the major Asian powers and develop among these major powers a favorable diplomatic concert vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Economically our interests lie in preventing domination of Japan's economic base by a hostile power. We can accomplish this by earnestly promoting mutually beneficial trade relationships with Japan and the other nations of the area. We must remain a major economic partner of Japan in international trade and strive to maintain our access to the Asian markets. In addition, the United States will continue to be interested in the development of regional co-operation and burden sharing among the less developed nations of the area in order to insure that these nations do not fall under the exclusive dominance of another external power.
The national security interests of the United States in Asia revolve about a desire to present an effective deterrent in the area and the avoidance of a regional power shift. We desire to maintain stability and prevent an unwanted change in the present regional balance of power alignment. The paramount security interest of the United States is the prevention of a nuclear war and, therefore, we must avoid at all costs a major Asian conflict. In conjunction with this, another major concern of the United States is in the control of the further development of nuclear weapons by the nations of Asia, to include Japan. The development of nuclear weapons by Japan would alter dramatically the situation in the area and could very well lead to a re-alignment of the power relationship in Asia, i.e., a Sino-Soviet detente, which would not be in the interest of the United States. We would prefer to maintain the present nuclear arrangement between Japan and the U.S. and avoid the possibility of introducing a new area from which a nuclear holocaust might emerge.

In the fulfillment of our security interests we must insure that the United States retains its freedom of movement in the international air and sea corridors. The stationing of representative air and naval forces in the area is an indication of our interests in preserving this freedom. We must insure that we retain the capability to reintroduce American military forces into
the area in the event these freedoms are violated and our inter-
ests are endangered. We must guard against a too ambitious
definition of security interests in the area because by doing so
we could be brought unnecessarily into a conflict with one of the
other major powers of the area. This could result in a greater
financial, moral and military expenditure than the American
public is prepared to accept. The Nixon Doctrine has provided
the United States with a general guideline upon which our future
security policies can be built, but thus far specific guidance in
carrying out these policies has been lacking.

- Having determined that U. S. national interest is intrin-
sically linked with that of Asia, the job of protecting these in-
terests, without at the same time endangering the internal co-
hesion within the United States itself, must be explored. In so
doing we must move away from our post World War II policies
of unilateral involvement and world protectionism and strive for
a more realistic system in order to guard against an over-
extension of our known capabilities. The only acceptable alter-
native to war in Asia, according to Melvin Laird, is the creation
of a balance of power. 66 Robert Scalipino tells us that "it is

primary role in the full range of defense needs of the non-communist Asia-Pacific states. The American role should be directed essentially at seeking to prevent or limit external forces (i.e. Russia or China) from entering the scene. 67 Under this system the United States would remain very much involved in world affairs but not permanently and completely committed to one ally. A decision to intervene militarily would depend not so much on our relationship with the country being attacked as it would on the effect of this attack on the regional balance of power. The United States would strive for a set of relationships among the major powers of Asia (U.S.S.R., Japan, China) so that no single power or combination of powers could threaten the security of the United States. 68 This can be possible only as long as the Sino-Soviet alliance is split. The Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent trips by the President to Peking and Moscow have done much to promote this end. China, as a result of these meetings with the President, now relies on the United States to keep the Soviet Union from gaining predominance in the Asia-Pacific area. As incredible as this may seem, China has publically welcomed U.S. presence in the Pacific as a hedge against Russian dominance. The

67 Seabury and Wildarsky, op. cit., p. 136.
Russians, on the other hand, have steadily expanded their naval presence over the past decade and it is envisaged by some that having been blunted on the ground, they are hoping to expand their influence in the area through the strength of their navy. It is hoped that the U.S.-Soviet initiatives for military detente and improved trade relations will go far in providing stability in the area.

The policy of negotiation, which has pushed the U.S. forward into a dialogue with traditionally unfriendly competitors and has permitted an atmosphere more open to a free flow of people, ideas, goods and capital, has been effective and is an important part of our emerging national strategy. We are moving slowly from a defense arrangement built about a bipolar orientation to a more flexible polycentric orientation. This will allow us to work with these other Asian nations either individually or as a group in order to keep a regional balance.

The industrial base and significant military potential of Japan make her the keystone to the security of the Asia-Pacific region. The central element in the development of United States strategy for peace and security in the region should be based on the maintenance of a close co-operative relationship with Japan. Japan ranks third economically of the nations of the world and as
such is able to wield much power and influence in the area. One can say candidly that as Japan's economic dominance grows, the economic future of Asia will lie increasingly in their hands.

In 1969 Japan replaced the United States as the leading trading partner in Asia and today Japan does more business, gives more aid and sends more tourists to the region than any other country. In 1971 Japan was responsible for 45.8 percent of the market share of imports in Taiwan, 41.7 percent in South Korea, 41.6 percent in the Philippines and 26 percent in China. The latter figure is expected to increase substantially commencing this year as a result of the opening of relations between Japan and China. Japan is attempting, and quite effectively, to make trade and aid the basis of her national strategy in preference to a massive build up of arms. She has attempted to resume normal trade relations with China and has increased her trade with the U.S.S.R. Japan is not politically naive by any means, and her governmental leaders are well aware that the livelihood of Japan has historically been dependent on open sea lines of communication. Over 90 percent of the Japanese petroleum, the lifeline of her industry, comes through the Malacca Straits.

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69 Kintner, op. cit., p. 75.
the Middle East in recent months has brought home quite vividly the frailness of the Japanese economy and the necessity of maintaining a strong U.S. military presence in the Pacific area. Japan has repeatedly announced her dependence upon the United States for external defense as outlined in the Mutual Security Treaty. She is quite anxious to have U.S. military presence in the area and despite a quite vocal left wing dissent to the contrary, the Japanese leaders have most willingly allowed the U.S. to maintain essential military bases on their territory. Japan has assured the United States that she will play a future military role in the international community and will work towards an autonomous defense by 1976.\textsuperscript{71}

Japan should be encouraged to assume a more equitable share of the Pacific defense burden and could be asked to contribute to an offset fund to reduce U.S. expenses created by the American military presence. A Pacific defense fund could be created, with Japan as a major financial contributor, to lessen the U.S. financial burden. The Japanese have shown a sincere interest in assisting the other nations of the Asia-Pacific sphere in the areas of economic aid and development. Japan can provide assistance to these nations in the areas of technology, education, institutional development, marketing and resource development. The security interests of the U.S. are well served when Japan accomplishes the

\textsuperscript{71}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
above tasks and provides trade opportunities and technical aid programs for developing countries. Our relationship with the Japanese has progressed from one of total economic and political dominance to one of interdependence, with the United States providing the military shield within which the Japanese are able to economically and politically operate in order to maintain the power balance in the area. A deterioration of the economic relations between the two countries, should trade be substantially reduced, could have far-reaching consequences. Japan, because of her complete dependence on outside trade for her economic existence, could be forced to find other markets for manufactured products and other sources for certain raw materials now supplied by the United States. A severe trade conflict between the U.S. and Japan can lead to a rupture of the Mutual Security Treaty. A change of government in Japan could eventually bring about the elimination of U.S. bases, and Japan might even elect to move toward neutralism, an event which would have a debilitating effect on the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific area. An event such as the Middle East crisis might cause Japan to enter into a more favorable alliance with the Soviet Union or China in order to maintain her economic stability. The basic goal of the United States then must be to maintain its own viability as a Pacific power in order to assure a continued...
ambivalent role of protector and economic competitor with Japan.
If the U. S. is able to do this, the future security of the Asia-
Pacific area will be enhanced. An interdependent relationship
with Japan, therefore, should form the cornerstone of any United
States strategy for Asia.

Having examined the strategic importance of the Asia-
Pacific area today, the interests of the United States in Asia, and
specifically the U. S.-Japanese relationship, it is imperative that
we re-evaluate the Nixon Doctrine strategy in that context. In
Part III of this paper we looked at what the Nixon Doctrine is and
what it was designed to accomplish. Let us now examine some
of the Doctrine's "short-falls" and deficiencies.

The most obvious inadequacy of the Doctrine, in my esti-
mation, is its failure to properly delineate the threat. Under the
strategy of "containment" the threat of monolithic communism
was finite and irrefutable. All actions, programs and policies
were initiated to cope with this threat whenever and wherever it
would take place in the world. Today, in a polycentric communist
world, there is a tendency to blur the sharpness of these aggressive
threats. This has been vividly demonstrated by President Nixon's
elaboration of "detente" with the Soviet Union and rapprochement
with China. The apparent rift between the U. S. S. R. and China
blurs the issue even further since the goals and objectives of these
nations are not as clear as they once seemed to be. The threat of world domination by the Communists does not ring out as clearly as it once did. The U.S.S.R. is finding that the threat to her southern border is every bit as real as her perennial threat on her western flank. International issues, such as the India-Pakistani War, recent events in East Africa and the border clash between China and Russia, give evidence of just how fragmented this monolith has become. The perceived threat, therefore, is not as sharp as it once was. The Nixon Doctrine attempts to provide guidance for the entire strategic gamut from the Soviet massive nuclear threat to the threat of insurgency.

The lack of a precise definition of U.S. vital interests in the Asia-Pacific area is also a deficiency of the Doctrine. I have listed earlier some United States interests in Asia, but I am not convinced that we are able to pinpoint in the Nixon Doctrine exactly where the U.S. will stand and fight. At this time of economic, political and resource retrenchment in the United States, the citizens of the nation will not tolerate massive defense expenditures in order to provide forces to meet all contingencies discussed in the Doctrine. They will, therefore, require the national authority to outline those areas considered to be vital to the security of the United States and place the priority on the defense of these interests at the expense of others. The
commitment of President Nixon to "honor all treaty commitments" is a noble statement indeed, but a little overambitious. Realistically he cannot fulfill the defense requirements for all these commitments. The Nixon strategy should reflect the degree of defense to be provided in each area in order that forces may be structured to meet each eventuality. In essence, although the Nixon Doctrine proclaims to be a breaking away from our former role as world policeman, I cannot see in this Doctrine a clear cut release from our former commitments.

Advocates of a withdrawal to semi-isolationism have suggested that we reappraise the threat to our national interest beginning with the defense of the continental United States and working outward to our lines of communication and then to the security assistance of our allies, attempting to constrain use of military force beyond our own borders. The obvious fallacy in a strategy such as this is that we would soon lose the confidence of our allies and this would have a dramatic impact on the regional balance of power. A course of action between the two extremes would be more in consonance with our present day Asian status and it should be clearly defined and understood by all of the participants.

Linked closely to the criticism expressed above is the feeling that the rationale to support the Nixon Doctrine is superficial and when it arrives at the time to actually employ American forces in support of this Doctrine, a more specific and dramatic cause will have to be provided to rationalize their use. This criticism is a result of the war weariness of our nation, the U.S. desire to devote a larger portion of our national resources towards solving domestic problems, our raging inflation, our increased balance of payments deficits and the lack of confidence in our national leadership as a result of Watergate and the recent resignation of the Vice President. In order to inspire the future employment of U.S. troops in Asia, a direct parallel will have to be drawn between their employment and the economic or military survival of the United States. If this is not clearly perceived by our citizens, they will not be motivated to support any such move.

These important facets of our national policy must be considered by our leaders when planning and formulating our national strategy. The support rendered by the United States to the Israeli Government demonstrated that we will stand ready to assist our allies with military hardware if it is deemed necessary and thought to be worthwhile. The employment of
United States forces in any future Asian conflict, however, will necessitate the presentation of clear cut objectives and goals.

Another deficiency of the Nixon Doctrine is that it is perceived by many to be a cover to legitimize a policy of retrenchment and withdrawal from our commitments in that region. The tactic is defined as "military retrenchment without political disengagement" and it is suggested that the objective of the government is to extricate the United States from Asia, reduce military expenditures and manpower levels and, thereby, prevent American involvement in future Asian conflicts. This criticism is a result of a lack of understanding of the explicit rationale upon which the Nixon Doctrine is based. This criticism has had an effect on Japan, Korea and Thailand and was the stated reason for the Japanese overtures toward the Soviet Union and the re-establishment of relations with Communist China. Many in Asia believe that the United States can no longer be depended upon to actively support the Asian cause. They rationalize that it is no longer necessary for the U. S. to maintain the responsibility for the security of Japan and the Asia-Pacific area since the U.S. has now succeeded in gaining a rapprochement with China, a detente with Russia, a beginning of Korean negotiations plus the fact that Japan has developed into an economic superpower in her own right.

73 Osgood, op. cit., p. 8.
74 Ibid., p. 23.
Another short fall of the Nixon Doctrine is in its attempt to attain a "global structure of peace." The implementation of realistic policies to attain this goal poses great problems to the United States. In a world of over one hundred independent states and the accelerating complexity of problems facing these nations, it is too ambitious to assume that global peace can be attained by a concept of the great powers alone. The evident void that exists between the haves and have nots of the world is not to be easily reckoned with. Any attempt to build a global structure of peace based on United States standards would entail a commitment of men and resources which would not be acceptable to the American public. The emergent spirit of nationalism found in many of these aspiring nations should caution us that their goals may not fit in with the established U. S. conception of a world community. A move toward global manipulation would again spell needless involvement in the affairs of other nations and would have adverse internal results. Our approach to international involvement should be one of careful reflection and consideration. We must determine U. S. interests, establish U. S. objectives and set our political, economic and military goals in a U. S. context, thus avoiding unnecessary alignments which have resulted in so much grief in the past.
Proponents of the Nixon Doctrine see it as a realistic approach to the problem of the Asia-Pacific area today. They argue that it has been fashioned to preserve American leadership in Asia, but to do so at an economic and political cost which the American people can bear. It proposes to maintain American influence at a moderate cost and risk in a potentially dangerous international environment. The Nixon Doctrine, it is asserted, has restored the concept of self-determination as the basic principle of U.S. foreign policy. It has placed the burden of maintaining cohesive government upon the nations themselves and urges those nations to avoid internal conflicts through the implementation of economic development and social reform.

The Nixon Doctrine it is argued provides the framework for a useful and functional strategy for Asia, it responds to the changing world environment and recognizes the need for a multipolar economic and political structure throughout the world. Henry Kissinger summed up the thinking embodied in the Nixon Doctrine when he stated, "In seeking to establish new relationships, our concern is not to withdraw from the world. We are trying to find a posture to remain committed to the world and yet
to have a policy that is emotionally sustainable in this country." 75

Reduced budgets, economic problems at home and a lessening of the national desire to be the protector of the free world, all tend to dictate a reduction in U.S. force presence in the Asia-Pacific area. The willingness of the Asian nations to assume a greater share of the defense burden, however, is dependent to a considerable degree on their perception of U.S. resolve and capability to come to their assistance at a time of national peril.

Our strategy must be built upon the premise that Japan forms the cornerstone to the security of Asia. As a result the United States must develop a practical framework, based on a platform of mutual respect and full understanding of each others problems. This program must be designed to enable the continuation of close ties between the nations. In order to carry out this strategy, the U.S. must maintain the credibility of its nuclear shield and for the time being provide unrivaled maritime and air superiority with forward bases located on the island chains. These would include bases in Guam, Okinawa, Philippines, South Korea, Thailand, Marianas, Taiwan and the Japanese mainland itself. From these bases the United States will be able to oppose any

interference with the peaceful use of the Pacific shipping lanes which are so vital to the economic well being of Japan and will be able to prevent the use of the sea to support aggression. In addition to those mentioned above, back up positions in Hawaii will provide the military flexibility necessary to insure that Japan remains secure and that a military balance is maintained in that part of the world.

With regard to ground forces, it will be necessary only to maintain a force sufficient to cope with a threat to our military installations in the area. This can be accomplished by maintaining forces in Okinawa and Korea. In the event of a withdrawal of forces from Korea, the Philippines or Hawaii can serve as a jump-off point for a highly mobile combat ground force. The maintenance of additional ground forces elsewhere in Asia could have an unstabilizing effect and provide a forward target for political attacks on the United States, and at the same time provide an excuse for procrastination on the part of host governments in the construction of their own defense policies. The continued presence of a large contingent of ground forces in the area also presents a false and unnatural situation in which the United States loses its military flexibility. As long as the United States remains in force in Asia, the Asians will never
come to grips with their problems and thus will not develop their own regional security program. We must also be careful to avoid political and economic alignments which could commit U.S. forces to an undesired conflict. It must be made clear to our allies that with the possible exception of an attack by one of the major powers, (USSR or China) that might result in altering the strategic balance in the area, the U.S. response will be limited to assistance of a materiel and technical nature. Future U.S. efforts should be directed towards the establishment of an effective regional defense arrangement. Japan again must be encouraged to play a leading role in this endeavor and, if necessary, assume the major financial burden.

The Nixon Doctrine has been structured upon a horizontal framework which gives equal priority to all Asian defense requirements. This requires planning and preparation for a wide spectrum of military contingencies ranging from insurgencies to full scale nuclear conflict. The United States is required to structure its forces to meet these contingencies which is not economically feasible. The strategy which I have suggested above is founded on a vertical framework by which United States

76 Pranger, op. cit., p. 23.
priorities are clearly defined. It postulates that the primary interest of the United States in the Asia-Pacific area is to maintain a balance between the four principle countries represented in the area (U.S., U.S.S.R., China and Japan) and to prevent domination of the region by a hostile aggressive power. In such a framework Japan plays the key role. We thus place our emphasis on insuring Japanese security and encouraging her to operate as an autonomous committed participant in the Asian balance. Japan more than any of the "big four" is able to influence the economy and life style of both the Soviet Union and China. Her great technological know-how can greatly assist in the development of both of these nations and hopefully prevent the expansionist tendencies which often result from internal domestic pressures. At the same time the United States security guarantee for Japan will allow this country to continue its peaceful economic development without resorting to the production of nuclear weapons which eventually would greatly effect the relative balance in the area.

By developing our strategy on this vertical model our defense planners would be able to more realistically structure our forces on a priority basis with Japan as the focal point and the maintenance of an Asian balance serving as the regional
objective. Strategic nuclear forces, air and maritime forces and mobile ground units can be structured and emplaced to enforce this strategy. At the same time, a deterrent to hostile actions throughout the remainder of Asia will be provided without the unacceptable cost required as a result of horizontal planning. Forward basing, as outlined earlier, would insure the responsiveness necessary to challenge an attempt to alter the status-quo in the area.

In addition to our security preparations, emphasis must be placed on building an atmosphere of interdependence and detente. A continuous dialogue between ourselves, our allies and our adversaries is paramount to a successful Asian strategy. Continued expansion of our efforts in the area of education, trade and culture with the Soviets and Chinese is also an essential ingredient of the strategy. The spirit of "detente" with Russia and "rapprochement" with China will do much to insure stability in the area. The opening of liaison offices in Washington and Peking in 1973 was a milestone in our Asian relations and this together with increased trade, ping pong diplomacy and State level visits will lower the extreme tension that has existed between our two nations since 1949. Increased trade, economic assistance and technological advise should form the basis of our relationship with our Asian allies. This, together with the es-
establishment of a viable Asian regional community based on economic co-operation, political stability and military preparedness will do much to insure the security of the Pacific area. United States military presence in the area can diminish without resulting in a subsequent lessening of Asian security. On the contrary, the Asian community in concert can provide a much more secure area than can be provided by U. S. participation alone.

The strategy of containment, like that of isolationism before it, is no longer an effective U. S. strategy for Asia. A strategy based upon interdependence; a balance of power in Asia based on a realization of the current multipolarity in the area; an increased emphasis on detente as a replacement for the cold war tactics of the past, will form the basis for an effective Asian strategy. The Nixon Doctrine marks the beginnings of a realistic approach to Asia and with additional structural guidelines and the establishment of priorities as outlined above, an effective strategy for Asia can emerge which will guarantee the preservation of United States interests in the area and at the same time provide the necessary assurance to the Asian nations of a continued U. S. commitment to their security.
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