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A Theory of Future Social Change

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College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

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A THEORY OF FUTURE SOCIAL CHANGE

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Alan M. Sica
1974
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Approved, August 1974

Marion G. Vanfossen
Jon S. Kerner

Anthony L. Gushower
This initial academic production is dedicated lovingly to my grandparents, Paul and Lena Sica, whose ascent from wretched poverty to relative security has made possible my luxurious intellectual existence. Had it been for me, we would still be in Italy, for their kind of determination is of a variety that is unknown among those of my generation.

And to my wife, Anne.
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The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Dr. Marion G. Vanfossen without whose initial prodding and continuing encouragement this study would never have been considered possible. The author also wishes to thank the other members of his committee for their criticism and other participation regarding this work.

In more general terms, I must give my wife, Anne, endless praise for her unremitting aid in this project; from stylistic emendations to the dreariness of typing, she has been a champion.
What follows is not typical of modern American sociology. References to standard authorities in the field of social change will be scarce; primary and secondary data will originate in historical, political, popular and intuitionistic sources by design. This scheme makes possible a synthesis of the disparate contributions to social change and "futurology" of, inter alia, Richard T. LaPiere, Marion Vanfossen, Alvin Toffler and myself.

Departing from the accepted thesis format is necessary to the task, that is, to predict where post-modern culture is headed by using common and, whenever useful, uncommon sociological indicators and theorists.

Probably a shocking and disconcerting aspect of the enterprise, for readers of "journal sociology", is the lack of attention paid to many discipline champions. For example, Michael Harrington's newest book, Socialism, is genuinely fascinating to read and study, particularly his "reinterpretation" of the "real" Marx. It is written with the appropriate liberating sentiment and intellectual sophistication one would expect from a professional American "revolutionary" and social scientist. However, the book is involved in an academic game for which there
is no time in the course of this thesis: it is in the lay sense "scholarly", i.e. totally, inexorably out of touch with social reality. Harrington is carrying on in the noble radical tradition, trying to effect social change by writing a normatively powerful tract. That there is little empirical evidence to support his main contention - a revolutionary potential about to erupt within the American labor organization - does not actually impune the quality of the book. Reading it is like reading The City of God: it has to do with relatively little in the real world, but as literature, human thought and normative suggestion, it is quite good.

This distinction, then, between scholarly game-playing and accurate, empirically "sensible" analysis will remain central throughout the following. While several especially useful books will be given intensive treatment, the point of the thesis will not be to display scholastic fireworks, although writing in that style is great fun and sometimes even of sociological use. Put in simplest terms, although it would be personally satisfying to write something along the lines of "The Epistemological Roots of Wissenssoziologie" or "The Revolutionary Content of Marx", the following work is a more pedestrian, Veblen-Mills style scholarship, aimed at speaking simply and directly about the readily perceivable, the sociologically accurate, about the "real world" and of nothing extraneous to it.
However, there is inherent in this a central paradox which may seem to contradict the above. What the following does not promise is simplistic solutions to the question of social change. In each part of the world, a different type of change will probably obtain, and at different rates, with different actors. Even within the limits of any given sector, there will exist easily perceived diversity. This thesis will study and prognosticate about change of major and thoroughgoing proportions within, essentially, the United States and like areas of the modern world. What will be described is the genesis of a new definition of "self", of the social actor, along with concomitant, logically necessary adjustments of the socio-political world both as cause and effect of these revised self-views.

To step slightly ahead, a theory which hopes to avoid inadequate linear projection must concern itself with an appropriate range and diversity of personality types, especially those most likely to instigate or adopt alterations in social processes, structures, and/or values. Therefore, economic and political realities will be to some degree deemphasized (as opposed to their usual primary position in studies of change) in favor of social-psychological, valuational factors. This is not however a fabricated, academic position of preference so much as a reflection of necessities in the study of change as I think it will occur in the future.
This study was undertaken in the belief that current theories of social change, especially those espoused and utilized by sociologists, are inadequate as explanatory tools regarding certain types of social change in the future.

One unorthodox theory of change, that of Richard T. LaPiere, was found to be of more use than others. This theory was radically modified to better facilitate the analysis of the latest manifestations of social change.

A survey of social change in Western history from the middle ages to the present day was performed in order to illustrate the efficacy of LaPiere's theory plus the attendant modifications proposed by the author.

Finally, the societal problems which may well evolve along with the new form of change were examined. Some minor suggestions for mitigating the impact of these problems were made.
A THEORY OF FUTURE SOCIAL CHANGE
INTRODUCTION

The following is an attempt at what has come to be termed "grand theory". Although Mills years ago attacked entrenched theorists by using the term pejoratively, some of his admirers have recently been theorizing on the macroscopic level, it might seem, in spite of his admonishment. However, the motive behind their writing has not been, as in the case of the writers Mills examined, to aid in the legitimation of a social order under the slogan "value-free" social science. Rather, men like I. L. Horowitz, N. Birnbaum, the quasi-Marxists of Britain, and an amorphous Continental contingent who combine critical philosophy with sociology (including the Frankfurt school), work at producing large-scale critiques of the traditional systems in which they operate. Gouldner's Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, although demonstrably shoddy in other respects, puts succinctly the problem of a social science enamored more of a safe, antiseptic "predictive" role than that of partisan. It should be obvious then that this thesis has been crafted in the increasingly accepted belief that sociology, diluted in its normative character, becomes dangerously neutral academic chatter. The sociology of knowledge has
conclusively demonstrated that social scientists, perhaps more than other scholars, are by definition, from the first moment of their research, inextricably embroiled in evaluative concerns.

As a prelude to this project, and in the hope of resolving major methodological questions, I made a study of the relatively new "sociology of sociology". The small but potent literature in this blossoming subfield has become radical in both methodological and substantive suggestion. (1) ("Radical" in this sense connotes an attitude of persistant critical intensity, aimed at investigating, and, warranted, debunking standard ideologies offered by those who seek to maintain unnecessarily inequalitarian social organization and structure.) It was felt that a study of social change ought first to be informed of prevalent sociological "domain assumptions" (2) and consequent blind spots common to the discipline itself. While this may seem of excessively peripheral interest, the brief study nevertheless provided a generalized legitimation for the historically maligned radical position, and thus served in supporting and corroborating the suspicion, harbored by younger practitioners, that sociology has been hiding from the more flammable, less funded areas of research. The reasons for this avoidance behavior on the part of most researchers is easily documented by common-sense evaluations (professional aspirations, fund procurement, etc.), and by more sophisticated ideological analyses.
What is amazing is not that this has been the case (given the history of the discipline and its battle to estrange itself from the ignominious near-homonym, socialism), but that given the current sentiment and interest in social policy, such behavior still persists (especially in the most statistically oriented universities and research settings).

In subscribing to this radical position, the younger researchers concern themselves less with quantifiable precision than with the overall legitimacy and meaning of any given project, and moreover, with content (process and values) and not so much with the historical subterfuge of conservatives, form (structure). It has been pointed out since antiquity that dichotomous descriptions of reality, these included, are usually highly interdependent in the "real" world, so that in fact we cannot deal with only process, only values or only content, no more than exclusively with structure, form or "patterned variables". Among the many reasons for this, the most cogent is that these terms are not mutually exclusive: they are complementary analytic/descriptive tools. However, as the post-Mills generation is quick to point out, in the past those sociologists concerned for the most part with structure and form have arrived (and/or begun) at conservative theoretical positions and promulgated upon their sociological audience a great many suggestions for research to support their reactionary contentions. By
eschewing "abstracted empiricism", the modern theorist risks being labeled "polemicist", "pamphleteer" and "popularizer" by his computerized colleagues. However, he may well produce, with sufficient attention to qualitative and historical methodology, hard-hitting, sociologically sensible work, as evidenced by many of Mills' followers and others of his ilk who wrote before him.

The present work is not a "review of the literature", a "replication study", or a test of the validity of a former theory: it is an attempt at an "original" theory of future social change. Obviously, however, there has been incurred a heavy intellectual debt to earlier thinkers who pointed in the direction taken here. This is certainly not ab nihilo theorizing. These precursors are considered by many to be extremely gifted sociologists, and to extend their insights somewhat is an "advocate's" role rather than that of the "innovator". This thesis will utilize predominately sociological and historical sources in describing and analyzing with broad strokes the history of social change (of a certain specifiable type) in the modern world. Building on that analysis, I will propose a theory of rationalized, consciously perpetrated change which claims for itself strong predictive power regarding the future of particular areas of the world. (This is done with high regard for the critical legacy of Mills, and the spirit he proposed for the social sciences, as clearly explained by Horowitz in his introduction to The New Sociology (4).)
At the same time and by way of qualification, much of this presentation, especially those sections dealing with social movements, political revolutions and the general theory of social change as borrowed from noted thinkers, is nothing but "journeyman sociology". As is typical of research at this level of the academic hierarchy, most of the useable input is derivative, not original, for example, in the use of such standards as Arnold W. Green's introductory text. The first lesson in the study of social change of whatever type is that real, purposive, singularly conceived innovation is, for a variety of sociological reasons (beyond personal limitations), a most difficult enterprise. That this axiom applies to academic theorizing should be emphasized, for the educational-scholarly milieu very often demands near-conformity, thereby excluding and denigrating innovational approaches to the subject matter.

Horowitz has given us a poignant reminder that this was so, even as recently as the mid-1950's:

...we are all too ready to pay homage to the dead. Mills received no awards which sociologists make annually for books deserving and otherwise - while now an annual award is to be made in his name. After Power Elite he was turned down for every request for a grant from the great institutions of the 'philanthropoids' with but a single honorable exception - while now sponsorship for work on Mills is available. (5)

The "newness", the contestable part of the thesis, begins very late in the work. Modern sociologists and political scientists might readily reach consensus regarding the nature of political revolutions and the etiology of
social movements. These standard analyses serve adequately when examining social change (of one important type) between, roughly, the French Revolution and the Second World War, but as aids in considering change within the last quarter century or so, the traditional concepts (and prejudices) become increasingly less useful. The reason for this is really quite simple. Like everything else in a changing world, the nature of change has been rapidly changing.

Integral to the theory attempted here is the inclusion of a revised understanding of personality. Terms such as "movement" and "revolution" denote of the participants collective interpretation and action regarding political reality. Such terms were formulated and accepted by the social science community with the implication that an "appropriate" personality cynosure of modern man was self-evident. The usefulness of collective terms it seems — in the jargon of Mannheim — has seen its finest historical moment. The post-democratic revolutionary era has until recently been dominated by easily perceived group (collective) performances. The present theory suggests that not only do these larger descriptions of change now falter, but likewise that the traditionally unquestioned cynosure can be faulted, even in its loosest understanding, as "ideal type". This insertion is left somewhat vague intentionally, but with the assurance of elaboration towards clarity in the closing sections of the thesis. (The ramifications of a revised personality theory, from
the perspectives of socialization processes, the significance of "individualism" and "private property", etc., are complex and of considerable import, and represent the most speculative element of what follows.

It becomes then the point of the thesis to show why time-honored conceptual definitions of social change no longer prove satisfactory, and further, to advance a theory which is better capable of "explaining a larger proportion of the variance" concerning change in recent history, and more importantly, in the future.

The exposition of (1) theories of social change and (2) the history of social change may of course be criticized from the standard academic posture: accuracy of fact, soundness of logic, interpretation, clarity of prose, etc. But the final prognostications included herein fall more within the realm of "educated hunches" and the new theory, due to its mildly innovational character, must stand without the usual protection afforded by the "literature" of past research, and other familiar tools of defensive scholarship. Of the many hazards unique to this non-normal mode of inquiry, perhaps the most precarious is the near certainty that theorists of the "old style" will suddenly become very precise in their conceptions of the boundaries of "scientific" work: they move with haste from the spirit of science to that of scientism. One of the "greats" in this field, Karl Popper, has been providing ammunition for conservatives since 1945 (6), apparently in the naive belief that he is defending the pristine Scientific Method against those who care more for theoretical accuracy and awareness of change, than methodological tradition. Against this type mind there is no unequivocal defense, for his premises are finally psychological and ad hominem, though carefully camouflaged with belabored "logic". It is hoped that this presentation may be received in the same spirit with which it has been constructed: with sociological sophistication, theoretical rigor and a belief in the necessity for innovation in this crucial area of the discipline, thereby avoiding tedious and unproductive quasi-arguments, so typical of Popper and his admirers.
CHAPTER I
LAPIERE’S THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

In the broadest and perhaps only somewhat useful sense, it is possible to equate sociology with social change. The most adamant systems-analysts have in the recent past included provisions within their theories to deal with change, though usually at the interpersonal, social-psychological level in lieu of macro-analyses. At the other extreme, grand theorists ever since Vico have extracted from reality one or two "independent" variables, and hung the weight of all social change on those slim members, whether they be geography, race, weather, religion, economics or whatever. A convenient breakdown of these larger theories is offered by Richard Appelbaum in a recent text (7). Without claiming originality he suggests "Evolutionary", "Equilibrium", "Conflict" and "Rise and Fall" groupings for the many theories within the tradition. Far more interesting and polemical is Sorokin's Modern Historical and Social Philosophies (8) in which he characteristically dismembers about a dozen theorists of change with acerbic grace and insight. However, his own theory somehow emerges unscathed, therefore limiting somewhat the book's usefulness.
We have learned from these critics and the many others who have zeroed in on monocausal or cyclical thinkers, that whether it be Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, Marx or even Sorokin, social change is altogether too complex a phenomenon - or more precisely, a grouping of phenomena - to be explained even in small part by one or two overloaded causatives. A more fruitful approach, and one which avoids internecine, "schools" debate, is that offered by Richard T. LaPiere in his latest text production, Social Change (9).

Of the mysteries which have developed in league with American sociology, one of the more bizarre and unexplainable is the discipline's ignoring and maligning of LaPiere. He has been producing important texts since 1938 when he wrote one of the first of the second generation treatments, Collective Behavior. In the early 1950's he produced Theory of Social Control, then somewhat later The Freudian Ethic. The book used here is his capstone achievement, incorporating elements of the others. LaPiere's concern with innovation and change was intimately related to his private and professional life: he was a creative and penetrating thinker who cared little about aligning himself with "schools". Therefore he came to understand through formalized learning as well as life experience the coercive, perverse powers of (in this case, professional) social control mechanisms. One looks in vain through any of the major overviews of the discipline written in the last 20 years for adequate or laudatory mention of LaPiere. Two
reasons come to mind. First, his areas of interest do not neatly coincide with the "mainstream" of the discipline, since the major spokesmen have carefully avoided the more explosive and difficult areas, such as social control.

Second, his style of scholarship is anathema to the Mainstreamers. He simply reads and thinks, usually without the aid of computers, tables and other gimmickry unessential to his task. For this he has won permanent unpopularity with many practitioners, although it becomes obvious upon studying his work that his suggestions for research and further investigation are eminently operational, were anyone to take the trouble.

LaPiere, in terms of modern American sociology, is an innovator. A thinker with whom he shares many traits is Wright Mills. Their writing is always an informed hair away from polemics; their synthesizing minds tear through great hunks of literature with precision and an unbending "need" to exorcise inaccurate pretentiousness, if in the form of overly grand theory, computerized triviality, or otherwise. Mills gave the discipline its most popularly influential power study, and one of its finest theoretical/methodological statements. LaPiere, similarly working alone, provided the most exhaustive study of social control, which later grew into a study of how men overcome societal restraints in the interests of change. Both writers eschew mythmaking or intellectual gamesmanship, sticking as closely as possible to readily perceivable empirical reality, and
from it drawing refreshing insights.

For reasons of accuracy and clarity, LaPiere will be, at least temporarily, the centerpiece of what follows concerning sociological theory. His writing is authoritative, lucid, comprehensive and candid. Also, unlike others, LaPiere knows and uses history to his advantage, a technique to be emulated here. It is necessary to emphasize that when a part of his theory (or a minor extension) is offered, it is with the knowledge that such a "transcribing" inevitably mutilates and undoes, in terms of concision and style, what the original writer worked so hard to avoid: sloppy expression thereby linked with inept reasoning.

To say that LaPiere's theory, at whatever level, is a "tight conceptual package" is to understate. It is hoped that a measure of his style can be retained in this presentation.

To emphasize by repetition, LaPiere's work is a complex and detailed accretion of data from many fields and sources, much of which escape the standard theorists of change. Included in this broad range are anthropological findings, especially the work of Homer G. Barnett (10), to whom LaPiere acknowledges an immense debt (11), detailed histories of inventions in all types of crafts, industries and disciplines, social history at its best (e.g. Marc Bloch and Preserved Smith), and other, more "offbeat" literatures. The theory is a subtle blend of macro and micro-sociology, for example, the Industrial Revolution
(if such an "event" actually occurred) is balanced against social-psychological requisites and conditions which produce individuals capable of creating change. LaPiere is, amazingly perhaps, as comfortable in one area as in another. As mentioned before, the vast subject of social change is a logical culminating point for one whose prior books handled collective behavior and social control (12).

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to an explication of LaPiere's theory with occasional elaborations and detours in the interests of my thesis. It is hoped that this project will not become tedious, although times the analysis and recounting of LaPiere's 550-page book into less than a tenth the space will require uncomfortable compression. The most unfortunate aspect of this attempt at synopsis is the unavoidable omission of LaPiere's voluminous documentation. Only his conclusions will be chronicled, therefore creating the erroneous impression that they are pure armchair speculation. His data-gathering is scrupulously comprehensive.

I do this so that the position of the innovator as a motor of change will be appreciated completely, without my having to create an original explanation. At the outset I should make clear several things. First, LaPiere's exposition is not to be confused with my thesis: they are not absolutely synonymous, although I willingly acknowledge his indispensable contribution. Second, I differ with LaPiere regarding the role of culture and its cumulative
quality, since it is obvious that the social actor of whatever talent cannot successfully operate without knowledge and access to a nourishing cultural milieu. Moreover, the tools of innovation are the reservoir of cultural traits and their infinitely recombinable nature. In his polemical and outspoken style, LaPiere makes a superb case for the innovator, but only winks at the problem of culture and its role in change.

On the positive side however, I go through this rather onerous operation in order to provide a well-made platform from which to extend his theory, reshape it and present my own. I allow LaPiere to speak for himself at length so as to avoid unfairness in the presentation of what must be considered an excellent sociological tract. What follows then is a blow by blow account of Social Change, selectively edited of course, and mildly bastardized in order to better serve my intellectual intentions.

"Every innovation, whether it be a new mechanical device, a new form of human relationship, an addition to the stock of knowledge, or a theory, such as that which will be presented here, is at once a utilization of established cultural elements and a violation of some aspect of the status quo" is the first sentence of Social Change. With writing as sound and appealing as that, it will be an effort not to over-quote the source. Furthermore:
...Through most of recorded social history men have apparently considered that change per se is undesirable and that the ideal social condition is stability. Folklore, myth, legend, theology, social philosophy, ethical and aesthetic standards, and other symbolic constructs have, for the most part, reflected the traditional modes of social conduct and have operated as social controls, subtly or overtly coercing the individual members of society to conform to the traditional ways of life. Even the philosophers of change, such as Plato and Marx, have usually granted the desirability of change only as a means to the achievement of the good and stable social order; men have in fact through most of social history maintained a considerable degree of social stability. Wars, invasions, and other disasters, natural or social, have been a commonplace in most times and places; but periods of pronounced social change have been few and of short duration, and during these periods only limited areas of the social system have been affected, while the vast bulk of the social heritage has persisted, generation after generation, more or less intact. (13)

Social change, then, is atypical, asocial, historically rare and something of a "regularity" only in the last three hundred years in the West.

Even now, in the midst of the most rapid social change that man has ever experienced, the social ideal would seem to lean toward the glorification of stability and the depreciation of change, as witness the fact that most contemporary sociological writing is concerned with structure rather than process, with the state of things as they are rather than how they came to be that way and in what directions they are going. (emphasis added) (14)

LaPiere's dislike for Marx and other traditional heroes of those who claim to own the inside track vis a vis the study and ideological support of change, is a potentially aggravating note for many modern students. Yet in the final analysis, LaPiere comes off as better sociologically informed and currently more useful than the more revered 19th century radical heroes. His attention is to individual innovation,
advocacy and adoption of technological, organizational and ideological changes, and not to large-scale, collective change, as evidenced in the few successful social movements and revolutions of the last two centuries.

His theory was constructed upon many others' work, yet is noticeably removed from standard sociological presentations in many instances. I have added emendations to the overarching schema, as suggested principally by Marion G. Vanfossen and like theorists, who concern themselves with the necessity of developing adequate conceptual tools toward successfully understanding the future. (Were exhaustiveness my aim, a final section on the details of social planning, in the tradition of Mannheim, Dahl/Lindblom, etc. would be included.) A crucial issue which will be given unfortunately short shrift is the idea now gaining some currency, that we should begin socializing our citizens from their youth to live in a segmented world rather than pretending we still operate in the never-never land of Gemeinschaft. This is for my purposes accepted as axiomatic, but slightly beyond the central issues, therefore mentioned rather briefly, as is the case with other significant extensions of thought.

LaPiere's analysis and description of social change in human history, especially the recent past, is the most precise, inclusive and sociologically sensible this researcher has been able to find. What will be shown is that the mechanisms of change themselves have undergone and
currently undergo transformations in form and content, and
that therefore many current writers have been misled into
considering only collective action as the motor of signifi-
cant change. Not only is this not the case in post-modern
culture, there is much evidence suggesting that this set of
ideas never has been the most accurate portrayal of the
purposive restructuring of society.

Bodin and Vico outdistanced their contemporaries by
introducing cyclical theories of change, and Locke first
posited normatively the possibility of human-designed
alterations of society. Condorcet, however, was the first
positivist for whom social engineering through scientific
study of behavior seemed possible (15). On his heels, in
the enlightenment, the idea of progress (16) as not only
possible but a positive good vied with the remnants of
conservative late medieval thought and institutions, in
which change of any type was anathema. (While modern
scholars of the medieval have worked valiantly at dispel-
ing the misnomer, Dark Ages - born in 19th century
scholarship - we still must accept the widely held opinion
that in terms of human freedom, the Middle Ages were too
immersed in tradition to allow very much. This attitude
may become tempered through efforts of more scholars like
Sylvia Thrupp (17). Examination of some modern studies
portrays the people of the Middle Ages as often having been
aware that trade procedures, military customs, and other
feudal realities (especially the Papacy) were obstructing possible betterment of life. Yet, sadly, the social structure and its overwhelmingly powerful legitimations deterred most would-be innovators and coopted those few whom it could not pacify in other ways. Changes which did occur were very slow in coming and usually of a modifying nature rather than the gross restructuring and rethinking which has become the hallmark of modern society and its theorists.)

...for it required great courage and profound contempt for the traditional to assert that not God but man himself had created society and that what man had wrought man could change to suit his needs and his conveniences. It is difficult now to appreciate how radical, how subversive in the eyes of authority, how strikingly adventurous, this idea must have seemed to most men of 18th century Europe. It rejected and ran counter to a vast collection of myths, legends, superstitions, laws and theological proscriptions. (18)

It should be pointed out that while social scientists have long since adopted the enlightenment appreciation of man's control of social reality, the vast majority of souls, even within the political borders of "advanced" nations, still feel extremely timorous when the question of their social system's legitimacy is raised. Perhaps Maine was premature in announcing the move from status to contract in the West, when there still remain among us many powerful and demanding "feudal" constraints under which people must carefully operate, lest their "contracts" be revoked for noncontractual reasons. Throughout any discussion of social change, the basic and perennial distinction between intellectual
theorists and proselytizers and the masses with their leaders, sacred and secular, requires emphasis. To forget that the mental productions of a Vico, Locke or Condorcet were literally worlds removed from those of their contemporaries is to ignore one of the basic laws of innovation: its utterly atypical and asocial quality. To innovate is to deviate from established cultural values in the most heretical way.

"Darwin became a great friend to social scientists interested in change, even though his Origin of Species often suffered in their writings. The evolution of species quickly became the "natural" evolution of society toward a "necessarily" improved state. In this way, a potentially radical theory of change lost much of its punch, being converted into a legitimation of the status quo. Capitalists' exploitation of the worker, imperialist wars and other 19th-century conditions seemed in some half-informed minds suddenly to be affirmed by ontological forces larger than man. Amazingly, the public still remains at least slightly mystified and pleased by the "survival of the fittest" theory; especially when their particular group turns out to be the fittest.

The mid-nineteenth to early 20th century was rich in theories of change: (1) social Darwinism; (2) Toennies' famous dichotomy (more symptom than cause of change); (3) the socialist conceptions (anarchism, Marxism, Fabian socialism, and the most effective in many ways in the
non-Marxist countries, moralistic reformism; (4) cyclical theories of history; (5) particularistic theories (diffusionism, geographic determinism, biological determinism); and finally (6) the sociological theories (assimilation, social ecology, social lag, cultural acceleration, to name the more famous) - each brandishing its practitioners, theorists and schools.

Of the socialistic doctrines, Fabian socialism holds the distinction of being the most accurate prognosticator of 20th-century reality. Its playing down of "necessary and immanent revolution" in lieu of compromise and moderately liberal "gradualism" more accurately reflects the changes which even now are being incorporated into modern society, than the apocalyptic visions of the Marxists. However, in terms of effectiveness of political action, the many short-lived, single-issue (segmented) reform movements win hands down. Two beliefs characterized these movements, the power of organized minorities, and the power of religious righteousness in destroying the social evils of the world (prostitution, drinking, disenfranchisement of women, heathenism in foreign countries, etc.) (21). Although clothed in obfuscating State Department ideology, this basic "show the natives how to live" sentiment is today obvious in this country's aid to "underdeveloped nations".

Cyclical theories, whether of historical (Sorokin, Toynbee, Spengler, etc.) or anthropological persuasion (Kroeber, Leslie White, Gordon Childe, etc.), when tested
scrupulously against historical reality (as best we can know it) became merely useful and interesting prods to more sophisticated research. (Sorokin's monument to group-study probably better withstands attack than other cyclical theories, and his popularized versions hold great appeal for those who wish to return to "ideational" culture. The deep-seated Puritan motives behind his chosen trichotomy are too apparent to attack. That complex society should become less sensate runs counter to the very nature of modernization and increased rationalization of culture throughout the world.) Specialists of brief historical periods have repeatedly stated that cycles make sense only to the researcher whose period of interest extends beyond the possibility of detailed knowledge: the pyramid at two miles becomes hewn stones at two yards, molecules at two micromicrons. The sociologist must exercise care that relatively unlinked, "unique historical events", do not become magically glued in order to fit a desired conceptual arrangement.

Diffusionism and the famous determinisms suffer from an error of thinking regarding causality, in assuming that a given phenomenon is in direct causal chain with a proposed independent variable, without considering the (usual) condition of intervening variables. Under modern scrutiny, the deterministic route has been laid to rest, and the concept of "weighted variables" and multivariate causation has arisen to fill the void. The many "Only"
causes have been properly downgraded to the rank "One of many". As LaPiere notes, "The(se) systems of interpretation ...were grandiose social philosophies rather than scientific hypotheses - testaments of faith neither derived from nor testable against the evidences of social history or the observable facts of social life". (22)

Without going to unnecessary lengths in refuting the major sociological theorists of change, it can be said that each one seized haphazardly upon an interesting and time-locale specific feature of social reality, and announced that "all" change was therewith produced. While Thomas, Park and others offered intriguing and somewhat useful models of change (in terms for instance of assimilation of immigrant groups, cycles of race relations phenomena, and other "ecological" occurrences), Ogburn in 1922 brought forth a somewhat more useful idea. He built on Tarde's law of invention - invention by the individual - but added to that a little Marx, giving us the still popular conception of social lag, in which material productions necessarily cut-strip in their sophistication attendant intellectual/emotive responses. To use LaPiere's trichotomy, technology confronts social organization and ideology with conflicting and challenging elements, thus creating the possibility of highly "inconsistent" behavior patterns and beliefs.

Even when these luminaries are considered, along with lesser figures - Hart, W. Moore, Martindale, etc. - their predominant fascination with stasis and structure blocks an
adequate appraisal of change. It is as if change will "take care of itself" while social scientists must concern themselves far more with the "problem" of societal ongoingness. This obvious fallacy has been attacked by more recent theorists--Mills, Barrington Moore, Barnes, to name the earliest. Out of this revolt, a most important suggestion emerges, as pointed out by LaPiere, in the words of Bendix and Berger:

"And to do this, to include in sociological concern the changes that may occur within the social system, attention must be focused on the boundary-extending as well as upon the boundary-maintaining activities of individuals, in the permissive aspects of culture and society which enable individuals to experiment with what is possible as well as upon the social controls which limit the range of tolerated behavior without defining that range clearly." (23)

That sentence better than any other of its period--1959--suggests precisely where this thesis is going. What remains to be filled in are the outgrowths and reasons which are involved in that particular view of social possibilities.

Perhaps more amazing than old-style reductionism is the often attacked (by Europeans) ahistorical quality of American theory, especially that purported to explain change. It has been pointed out frequently that current American training in sociology does not stress history due to the 19th and early 20th century fascination and enslavement to historical matters among its founders, which diluted the burgeoning sociological perspective. LaPiere suggests that a "fundamental misconception regarding social change has closed the door to sociological exploration of the field" (24), speci-
fically, the belief, inherited from this history-laden legacy, that change is a constant, ever-present element of society, an "inherent social process". LaPiere continues with the interesting aside that economists, not shackled by this belief, have developed more useful theories of change through their involvement with modernization programs:

The search for an explanation of this resistance (to change introduced from the outside) has not yet produced a general theory of social change that is sociologically acceptable, but it has led to a consensus among economists who are interested in economic stability and growth that it is the character and activities of individual members of the society, not the social system itself, that distinguishes the stable from the dynamic society, a view that is in general accord with that which will be developed in the present work. (25) (emphasis added)

In one of the most revolutionary and memorable sections of the book, LaPiere powerfully introduces key ideas under the heading "The Asocial Nature of Social Change". This section follows his critique of older theorists and sets the tone for the remaining pages. An extended quote (a practice not to be repeated) is in order at this point:

...It is the thesis of this book that the changes that occur within a society are asocial; that they are not in any sense a product of the society per se or a consequence of some universal and unvarying law of social life. Social change is not comparable to the changes that invariably occur through time in a living organism, to the normal changes that are involved in growth, maturity and decline. The changes that may occur in a society are, on the contrary, far more comparable to those violations of the normal organic processes that follow when, for reasons yet unknown, a cell goes wild - when it breaks from the "laws" that control its growth and reproduction and, multiplying, disturbs the functioning of the entire organism. The forces that make for social change are, if the organic analogy be pursued, abnormal - a violation of the normal process by which the social system is transmitted
from generation to generation of members. A change in society comes, even as does a tumor in an organism, as a foreign and unwanted agent, not necessarily of destruction, but always of disturbance to the established and organizationally preferred structures and processes of life... The idea that social change emerges directly out of the society that it thereby changes has long delayed recognition of the fact that society in all its various aspects operates constantly and consistently toward self-maintenance; that all social organization, formal and informal, is as organization inherently resistant to change; and that social change is the work of socially deviant individuals acting in asocial ways. That social change is not directly produced by the society so changed was implicit in a theory of collective behavior that was advanced in 1921 by Robert E. Park (with Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, U. of Chicago Press, pp. 865-92). Change comes about, in this theory, as an incidental consequence of the fortuitous interaction of numbers of people who have become desocialized—that is, stripped of their normal social characteristics—through participation in mass milling. In the milling process, new modes of social conduct are sometimes created and, he thought, sometimes established in the social system as the end product of a social movement. Had Park turned his attention to deviant individuals rather than to deviant masses of individuals, he might have broken the conceptual barrier that has retarded sociological study of social change and thereby inaugurated a fruitful change in American sociology. (26)

For many theorists, including in some measure the present author, this position is extreme. It underestimates the importance of institutionalized innovation (as in scientific or technological research settings and "think tanks") and it makes by implication the unorthodox suggestion that a major component of change (if not all change) in the technological, ideological and organizational realms is not subject to iron sociological laws, but actually random and unpredictable in origin and frequency. These complaints were offered in reviews of *Social Change*. However, even if they were entirely valid and fatally so vis a vis the useful—
ness of LaPiere's approach (which is not the case, as will be shown), his insight in this matter is nevertheless valuable enough to explore and amend in various ways with complementary and extending ideas. While far from perfect in formulation, this theory is more capable of "handling the data" of human history, especially in the post-modern period, than any other — although in a few instances LaPiere's conclusions and predictions arrived at by way of the theory are demonstrably weak.

A common assumption among theorists of change is an insistence upon the supposed cohesiveness of society; they imply much more interdependence with "social system" terminology than actually operates, especially concerning the post-modern situation. One need not embrace an extreme form of social atomism in order to appreciate the unalterable and unmitigated individual quality of life, a function of the physiological and mental situation of the human animal, along with societal constraints such as one's "place" in the system and the coincidences of personal history (Mills). "Social System" reasoning carries in terms of personal security a rich psychological pay-off assuredly, and as an analytical, heuristic device it may have been useful vis à vis premodern societies. Recently Gouldner and many others have pointed to the false, "Pollyanna" sentiment implicit in this approach as a product of 1930's theorists trying desperately to put back together a world in fragmentation. Marxism was
beating on the American door and more and more academic ears were attuned to the "new" tones, so Parsons and his followers fictionalized the system perspective, and to their delight, over the years since its inception, it has begun in some minor ways to correlate with reality.

Change is as diverse and pervasive a reality as stability in both the social and physical worlds, yet in many minds, the dynamic tendency is conceptualized as a single, constantly uniform quality. It would make as much sense sociologically to allow change its due in terms of various tones, textures and rates, as to lavish upon stasis, equilibrium and stability the distorted, unhealthy attention which has become the hallmark of right-wing sociology.

(However, in keeping with the nature of dialectics, it must also be admitted that of very late, those younger, "hip" practitioners - especially text writers and editors - have swung to the opposite pole with unwarranted ease, perhaps more in an effort to catch the liberated student market than to alter the direction of the discipline.)*

... Change cannot be conceived and explained in anything like the terminology suitable to stability. The nature and structure of the language itself deal a poor hand to those wishing to compose an adequate portrait of this perplexing element. It has been suggested by some anthropologists that our physiological tensions, our readiness to explode into action has historically been geared towards conservatism.

*written in 1972. The "liberated" stands as qualified.
Alterations in the environment of major dimensions were to be avoided and quite literally fought off. This truism has been entirely overdone in the interest of political conservatism, but it is nevertheless foolish to ignore what seems to be a rather basic human preference - for the predictable, usual and unthreatening. Yet, alas, we simultaneously seek after entertainment and new stimuli with nearly the same zeal with which we protect our fragile status quo.

Keeping these "dialectic forces" in mind, LaPiere divides (somewhat arbitrarily) the phenomena of change into several types: (1) normal cycles of activity and the usual and constant changes of personality, which represent the normal, non-innovative aspects of change; (2) the other, unpredictable elements of human history - great men and events, change over historical time labeled as epoch or era, and the more generic "quality vs. quantity", the most difficult to measure in some aspects and the most inclusive of all such terms (27). In addition there are other, less important types: fads, fashions, cults, movements (28).

Again turning to LaPiere, we find that:

Although a social system or particular aspects of a social system may be fairly stable through many generations, social life is nevertheless life. It exists only through the actions of the members of the society, and those actions are not in any real sense static or stable. Actions are motion; motion is fleeting; and the instant the members of a society cease acting, that society ceases to exist. (29)

His pronounced positivist, "action-theory" bias does not vitiate the statement's value. LaPiere seeks to undo the
constraining theoretical knot of the functionalists, but perhaps his view of the social fabric is a bit too loosely woven, his vision somewhat distorted due to his over-reacting to the stasis-champions. Great emphasis is put throughout his study on the need for scholarly awareness of the apparent static quality of systems, on the apparent success of social control mechanisms in inhibiting innovative behavior, yet, on the actually unpredictable, almost anarchic potential for change evidenced in some semi-socialized participants in any given society. The genesis and impact of these deviants will concern us further at a later point.

Methodological Interlude

History is very often the analysis and chronology of crises and unique, unplanned situations and events. The day to dayness, the normal and unperpetrated changes that occupy most of society most of the time also gain the attention of those who keep records: "Daily life in..." is not an unusual title. But "Social Change in the time of Henry I" would shock most medievalists, and certainly the people who occupied that historical moment. Therefore the uses of history for the scholar intrigued by change are different from those of the standard academic historians. There is enough recorded trivia to be sure, but incisive and accurate analysis of change is something which until very recently in the history of historical writing was
practically absent. The few well-known exceptions (e.g., Ibn Khaldun) prove the rule that historical writing meant a less than perfect recording of the "noteworthy" — and in less eclectic historical epochs the definition of that criterion fell largely to those few despots who could afford and were willing to support a court note-taker. Froissart, with his sly frankness concerning the social structure of late medieval Europe, or Machiavelli, whose Discourses smack of much less respect for the autocracy than does The Prince, were atypical enough to accentuate the usual legitimating, pandering words of court historians.

The time is taken here to point out the highly debateable uses of that most ambiguously handled art: pre-modern historiography. For a date, we might agree with Barnes and select Rankin as the founder of modern historical study (30). But for instance even so late as 1969, a new book, The Political Economy of Slavery (31), according to authorities, totally revised the accepted view of that ante-bellum practice, so that previous explanations were largely obsolete. And this is not the product of a new "discovery" in terms of primary materials, but more a substitution of a revised approach to the data (Marxist in this case) in lieu of the traditional one.

The problem of causality occupied this writer longer than was profitable. Some of the better studies (32) stressed more than anything else the hellish complexity of social life, particularly when viewed, as in this instance,
from a macro-orientation. Still useful is MacIver's study of causation, although his diatribes against quantitative analysis are somewhat dated. What this researcher did learn from his study, among other things, was the utterly assailable position taken throughout this thesis. A sharp quantitative inquisitor could with little effort probe into any number of large-scale generalizations in search of experimental or other proof. As in the sociology of sociology, one learns that a defensible position requires such a watering down of content, especially when of an innovative nature, that worry over problems of questioned causality are fruitless. Here, it seems, positivism has lost any sense of larger reality or meaning. When LaPiere states without apology "Social change comes for the most part inconspicuously, and for the most part it is worked by unimpressive little men whose names and achievements are rarely entered in the records of social history" (33), it either strikes one as a useful, creditable assessment of the past by an expert - and is thereby included in one's stock of knowledge as valuable and contradictory to the overriding great-man bias - or it is junked out of hand as unsupportable intuition which at best is somewhat interesting, at worst incorrect.

This section began with a few reservations and announcements regarding the nature of change. We then arrived at some equally hasty remarks about history and
causality, so that henceforth there will be no more energy spent in attempts at defending any of the many "unquantifiable" statements which follow. When one wishes to discuss "the direction of the society", he does not sweat blood trying to fit every contingency into his analysis. (Myrdal's methodological statements, both from *American Dilemma* and his more recent *Asian Drama*, support this view.)

LaPiere:

...there is a complex, uncertain and variable relationship between the qualitative and the quantitative changes that occur in society...there is some evidence that some kinds of quantitative changes do more than just reflect qualitative changes, that they actually implement qualitative changes. When this is the case, the quantitative change would appear to operate as an intervening variable, a link between two orders of qualitative changes, although not in any sense the cause of the changes that are second in time...

...there is still another way in which the uncertain relationship between quantitative and qualitative social changes makes for difficulty in analysis. Every qualitative change, be it a new tool or technique, a new idea or belief, a new form of human relationship or method of organization, begins in the mind and action of one man. At that point it is most certainly not a significant change; indeed, as will be seen, it is often socially defined as the product of mental aberration. If, however, others adopt the new, if it gains more and more adherents, a kind of quantitative change is then occurring; in simple terms, the new tool, idea, or method of organization is being diffused through the membership of the society. But the question then arises: at what point in this quantitative change is the qualitative change accomplished? When 10 per cent of the population have adopted the new? When over 50 per cent have adopted it? (34)

LaPiere is here (controversially) laying the groundwork for brief analyses of "transitory social change" -
fads, fashions, cults and movements - all of which he concluded are not of much value in effectively restructuring the social order. (I see such activities as more propitious regarding change than does LaPiere.) Opposed to this are "socially significant changes", brought about by accumulation and synthesis. Quite simply, change is "significant" when enough people have portaken of it to give the particular phenomenon the look of the normal.

What LaPiere calls accumulation is simply that: the appearance of a "startling" discovery in innovation (e.g., modern medicine) which in fact has been in the cultural works for many decades. Synthesis is the logical partner of accumulation, the putting together of cultural artifacts (meant broadly) into a fresh pattern to form an hitherto unknown product or relationship. These terms are immediately recognizable as powerful antidotes to the common belief that social change is effected predominantly by abrupt, dramatic social events or equally meteoric ideas. Furthermore LaPiere, with usual laconic sentiment, points up the modern equivalent of "prayers and incantations": social planning.

A note vis a vis planning and its relation to LaPiere: since Comte, sociologists have dreamed of constructing the rational social order, bereft of repressive myths, ideologies and other constraining devices of exploitation and inequality. Karl Mannheim (35) redirected his gargantuan talents near the close of his life towards the multifaceted problems facing those who wished to "reconstruct"
postwar Britain. In his tracks Dahl and Lindblom (36) followed, with better data and a generally more positivist orientation toward social engineering. As of late John Friedmann (37) has made his contribution to the growing list of authors who wish to be of aid in constructing a superior environment in these cataclysmic times.

Each of these authors, as well as others, finally succumbs to the bete noire of conservatives: the "floating unattached intellectual elite" with whom the hopes for a liberalized world must ride. Without entering this merry-go-round of polemics and frustrations, it should be noted that the forthcoming theory of change will, thankfully, not need to concern itself with the ancient quis custodiet dilemma. Instead of facing the problem "squarely" — and running into the same wall which has greeted every liberal planner from Voltaire to Etzioni — the elements of this theory take a less direct and therefore more effective route.

It is therefore to be expected that the significant social changes of the future will come about, as they have in the past, in a random and segmental fashion and that most of the legislated and other grandiose attempts to shape the social future will in the perspective of time turn out to be no more than social events.

At this point, however, it may suffice to say that one of the underlying assumptions of the present analysis is that man has not yet discovered a unique and effective means by which to determine his social future and that thus the same processes that have shaped the social present from the social past are working and will continue to work to make the social future from the social present. (38)
When using the concepts related to functional relativity, most theorists point hastily to the arbitrary, culturally-defined nature of "good" and "bad" elements within a system, without considering eufunctional change. Although dysfunction makes the dichotomy — normal versus abnormal — complete, a trichotomy makes more sense if adequate analyses be desired. Eufunctional changes are those which over time generate more positive than negative consequences, although at their inception they may have seemed catastrophic as viewed from the status quo. It is in the realm of the eufunctional that innovators must invariably operate.

In addition, LaPiere offers a complementary trichotomy, each of whose members provides differing climates for change. "Stable congruence" is best typified by a utopian vision — a highly unlikely social order in which any element's alteration is absorbed quickly and without excessive distortion by related elements. China between 500 and 1700 is the best modern historical example. "Static incongruence" is quickly understandable by referring to Franco's Spain, a condition which fails to provide the society with individuals inspired or permitted to work for alterations. The monogamous family system, the "American dilemma" and numerous other elements of social organization operate within this frustrating framework. Perhaps the extreme example of this condition is Sicily.
It is the usual state of affairs with statically incongruent societies that "entrepreneurs" of shady credentials arise in order to provide services and goods which the archaic legitimate machinery of state cannot. These exploitative individuals may in fact insure the continued operation of the society, even beyond the point of its "deserved" collapse; but this activity, of a parasitic nature, threatens to destroy whatever is left of the societal carcass. Black markets are the best examples, along with late-Roman corruption on the administrative level. However, usually before social chaos develops, an intruder or a revolution (lead by those who refuse to exploit in this manner) end the widespread venality. The Reformation and the French Revolution are examples, yet the former began a useful period of eufunctional change for the Church, whereas the latter only increased the misery of its intended beneficiaires by creating havoc which produced a century of counter-revolution.

Finally, there exists the post-modern culture and the area of primary concern here, "dynamic incongruence".

When the characteristics of the social system are such that the psychological tensions generated by incongruence between functionally interdependent social elements tend to be directed toward a modification of those elements, rather than an exploitation of them,...(40)

this condition is in evidence. American society is renowned for its disorganization, and since it allows for some degree of ideological and organizational modification, its more innovative members have room to work. (In an absolutistic
situation, these same individuals might well resort to artistic extravagance or insanity as expressions of innovative zeal, although one would expect the number of experimenters to be inversely related to the degree of absolutism evident in the culture. There are those of course who would maintain that just this type of "creative deviance" obtains especially in the U.S.

The most important aspect of this discussion concerns the range of possible behavior and thought in any given society. Historically there have been a great many cultures which demanded and rewarded behavior (in the ideological, technological and organizational) which maintained what by our standards is the unthinkable predictability of stable congruence. Societal members could deviate only slightly from normal patterns, for two reasons: social controls maintained their obedience with narrow definitions of what constituted "human" behavior and, secondly, the mental or logical processes necessary to rational evaluation of existence - the precursor to innovation along organizational lines - were absent.

Static incongruence generated manipulators of the inefficiency and inadequacy connected with "legitimate" social order. The roots of western trade and commerce lie in the late medieval when sly, courageous merchants braved negative sanctions of the church and in some instances the secular authorities as well, in hope of gain. Their tactics were by modern standards barbarous, yet considering the
opposition all around to their "unholy" behavior, it is surprising that some of the more persistent entrepreneurs were financing royalty during the 14th and 15th centuries (41).

But for there to be culture-wide approval and awareness of the possibility of social change, dynamic incongruence must prevail. This is why within the sociohistorical framework, innovation can almost become routine - but only in its prevalence, not in its "method", which to date has escaped codification or even precise analysis. With these general remarks, it is time to review the role of the innovator.

LaPiere feels that it is relatively easy to show historically that collective action has contributed far less to important change than has the behavior of what are being termed "innovators". (Again, for me this is somewhat hyperbolic.) What is practically impossible to illustrate, however, are any hard and fast sociological or psychological "laws" regarding either the genesis or operation of these "asocial" individuals. Whether it be in technology, social organization or ideology, the why and wherefores of innovation have not been resolved through comprehensive appraisal. While it is comforting to lean heavily on the old "social forces" idea - that the correct social conditions "produce" (in an unspecified manner) certain types of mental and physical behavior - this is hardly sufficient. On first reading The German Ideology, the sociologist is gratified
to learn that the ideological "superstructure" of a given socio-physical "substructure" is altogether appropriate, until the bald fact dawns that Marx and Engels' realization is an interesting description of reality: for an analysis one must go elsewhere. In this instance, even the encyclopedic LaPiere throws up his hands. Any attempt at systematizing the history of innovation is doomed to failure: innovators have produced their gems under any and all conditions of recorded history, sometimes in the great flurry of creative civilization (Renaissance), but nearly as often in solitude, moreover in social structures more characterized by static incongruence than by the preferable dynamic incongruence. It must be admitted that the unquestioned, unexamined a priori which underlies all that follows is the problem of how innovators "get that way". Though much documentation and caricature, perhaps even an "ideal-type" - although that stacks of contradiction - can be offered, a theory of the development of the innovator will only be sketched in roughly. If this be allowed, then much can be offered in terms of the promised theory of future social change, but if this lacuna becomes a theoretical stumbling block, the rest of the work loses its credibility.

Certainly the most aggravating feature of the innovator has to do with the incessant paradoxes which surround him. It is almost as if some mephistophelian were behind the scenes, pulling the strings of contradiction, first this way then that, in many instances tearing the subject, or
his social environment, or both into pieces. On one hand he must be enough of his historical period to perceive a need (again, technological, organizational or ideological), yet he must utilize uncommon effort and ability in radically transcending the thought and behavior patterns of his epoch, in order to arrange the data of experience differently. He must be peculiar enough in Goffman's terms to maintain that necessary distance which allows him critical time to produce, yet he must also maintain sufficient contact with his peers that he is not classified insane or foolish, and consequently discounted out of hand. Even more mysterious, he must feel somehow that his particular social setting deserves his attention (which typically is of an extreme ardor) and labor, but he must not be enamored of the status quo or the opinions of the many who are to the point that he worries over its alteration. In all instances he must conclude, albeit with many reservations, that the rewards of productive conformity do not outweigh the less structured, less assured rewards of innovative thinking and acting, a belief which runs counter to the very nature of socialization processes.

The list of paradoxes could (and will) be extended at greater length, each succeeding sentence more illuminating the character of the enigmatic performer in a world of the new. Generally it can be said that a more perfect example of the severe failure of socialization and indoctrination cannot be conjured up than the vision of the "typical" innovator (a necessary contradiction in terms). In approaching these
peculiar sorts, the study of Zen koans, full of paradoxical 
"wisdom", is perhaps of more use as an introductory exercise 
to the researcher than positivistic investigation in hopes 
of finding fabricated regularities.

Now, again allowing the dialectic its due: innovators are not in any sense the supermen of human 
history. They do not fall neatly into Hollywood caricatures a la Einstein. They are as varied and difficult to catalog 
as are their productions, and each of them has usually made 
relatively minor rearranging of the data in order to come 
up with (in a very short time) what comes to be regarded as 
cultural "of-courseism". Although H. G. Barnett in his 
monumental statement on the subject exaggerates somewhat, 
his contention supports this view:

It is commonly supposed that inventions are extra-
ordinary achievements of rare and brilliant individuals, 
and consequently that at any one period in history few 
of them appear. A contrary view is taken in this book...
i
novations - even important ones - are everyday common-
places. Everyone is an innovator, whether popular 
definitions allow him that recognition or not. (42)

Before offering any qualification of that statement, perhaps 
it is advisable to allow Barnett to mitigate to some extent 
his own hyperbole:

There are incentives for innovation, just as there 
are motivations for any other action. They may be 
treated within more than one conceptual framework, but 
it is essential that some position concerning them be 
taken. The "why" of innovation is an inescapable 
question. It is also one of the most difficult aspects 
of the problem and one of the two that have been treated 
only very superficially. The analysis is admittedly a 
formidable task, the more baffling and confusing the 
deeper the probing goes. (emphasis added) (43)
At this point, to the disgust of the sociologist, Barnett takes off on a complex Kurt-Lewin-like, entirely too psychologistic interpretation of the innovator, which takes slight and insufficient account of social factors as they operate in the phenomenon. That is a major reason for LaPiere's superior position vis-à-vis useful theory, although Barnett's ground-breaking work preceded LaPiere's by 12 years. Moreover, Barnett's entire book is based on data selected from five cultures and a sect: American, European, three Indian tribes on the west coast and an Indian Shaker cult. He admits (along with every other researcher) that these sources were as much chosen for convenience as for their intellectual value.

However, Barnett's divergent views notwithstanding, the most impenetrable problem is not determining who and what the innovator is, but how he gets that way, and why relative to the population, there seem to be either few innovators (LaPiere) or many whose suggestions for cultural rearrangement are not advocated and utilized by the culture (Barnett). (It would seem that LaPiere is talking after the fact, Barnett before.)

What has been established is the fact that the innovator must be convinced to an abnormal degree that consensual validation of his Weltanschauung - or at least a particular section of it - is not only unnecessary, but undesirable. Perhaps this explains in part Marx's displeasure towards the end of his life regarding his
apotheosis, and the concomitant gibberish which many
"Marxists" had already begun offering to the proletariat
at The Word. Marx's view of social reality in 1844 was to say
the least a radical perception when compared to the
reigning bourgeoisie of Manchester and London, who were to
a large extent the arbiters of what was and was not "Truth".
But by the 1880's, his many innovations and historical
insights in terms of economic and social thought had been
to a large extent incorporated into civilized, bourgeois-
centered operations, such as the Fabians. If Marx is
further utilized as a "typical" innovator, then his life is
most instructive: he was a miserable father, husband and
"man" by all cultural definitions of the time; he had
absolutely no status, no role, no "position" in the social
structure except that to which he appointed himself,
theorist of the Oppressed; he was slipshod and unkind in his
financial dealings with close friends, earning the distinc-
tion of being totally unreliable and cantankerous whenever
the issue of finances arose; he was in short, not a positively
sanctioned representative of what 19th century Europe offered
as its personality cynosure. And yet through terrible
harrassments by bill collectors, wife and friends, through
unending physical ailments and emotional dilemmas typical of
an innovator's consciousness, Marx persisted until death in
loudly defying the dominant culture, in rejecting wholesale
any apparent need for validation of his private, asocial
definition of what was and what was not Good, True and
Beautiful. Put colloquially, Marx for his culture was a bastard. More important, in our age of pseudo-individualism (do your own thing so long as your thing is an approved commodity or behavior pattern), it would be presumptuous and inaccurate to minimize Marx's achievement, that is of defying by intention the status quo. He should be accorded, along with most pre-modern innovators, limitless respect and awe in pursuing "undaunted" his personally approved course of action and thought. While nowadays Paul Sweezy and like-minded writers can with no great difficulty publish neo-Marxist, critical tracts, this is all a function of the marvelous diversity of tastes and persuasions that typify post-modern society. To continue with Marx colloquially, he was also a lonely bastard.

But lest the image of the innovator be inaccurately cast, it should also be mentioned that the romantic innovator (such as the current example) is only one type or style and certainly not the predominant form. He who braves the storm of social control and relentless socialization to come out blatantly "a man ahead of his time" is no more the typical innovator than Marx could be characterized as the typical 19th century economist. Adam Smith's quiet and conservative life in Glasgow or even more, Kant's comically sequestered and pedestrian existence in Königsberg make the case for unobtrusive innovators.

LaPiere:
...man has rarely, and then only in limited ways, exercised his capacity to devise new and functionally more effective forms of social life; (44)

an innovation is an idea for accomplishing some recognized social end in a new way or for a means of accomplishing some new social end...the innovating consists of the creation of a unique and to a significant degree unprece­dented mental construct, the idea that makes possible the "thing". (45)

LaPiere here points to the distinctive differences in types of innovations: technological, organizational, ideological. He notes that the process of innovation has been studied basically through the history of "mechanics, and fine arts, medicine, world exploration and the physical and biological sciences" (46) but from this it is not to be assumed that as a process, innovation along organizational and ideological lines is radically different. He does note that organizational innovation usually takes a great deal of time, and that the number of people involved in technical advance is usually smaller than those trying to change a form of social organization (47). The distinction between innovation and development is now made:

Innovation...does not occur in a piecemeal fashion; it cannot be facilitated by organization and a division of labor; and it cannot be forced by financial or other extraneous incentives (as can developments). (48)

It is in considerable measure the failure to distinguish conceptually between the process of innovation and that of development that has led many writers, including some sociologists, to advance the view that innovation is a normative social process. In this view innovation is thought of either very abstractly as the emergence of new cultural items out of antecedent ones or as the result of organized social endeavor to produce something new; as in research institutes. There is no doubt that
the development of innovations is currently facilitated by organized support; but there is good reason to believe that innovations themselves are for the most part today as in time past the product of individual endeavor that is more likely to be hampered than facilitated by membership in a business, industrial or scientific organization. (49)

LaPiere continues the discussion by pointing to the difference between discovery (a mental construct that gives recognition to the existence of something previously unknown) and invention (the creation of something by the synthesizing of pre-existing cultural elements into a new pattern) (50). He also points to the fallacy of believing that the mother of invention is necessity, when of course, necessity is culturally defined - and redefined by the innovator.

It is not some inherent necessity that mothers invention, but, rather, an asocial perception of the existence of a problem that is susceptible of solution.* That perception may be either a specific redefinition of a socially recognized inadequacy or, as is much more common, the definition as a problem of what has not previously been defined as such... From time to time in any society, vague discontent with things as they are on the part of some individuals or class of individuals may lead to political or some other form of rebellion; but a general and vague discontent does not result in the kind of asocial perception that fosters innovative efforts to change the system. It is, rather, discontent of a specific and individual nature that leads to perception of this sort, the discontent of some individual with some specific condition of life - chronic hunger, too many babies, ...or some other circumstance that is accepted as normal by the other members of the society. (emphasis added) (51)

It is well documented among historians that the plague of the late medieval and the ensuing lack of labor, along with the

*One objection to this statement lies in recent history. The Second World War produced innumerable innovations through dire necessity. However, over the centuries it would seem that LaPiere's attitude is supportable.
sentiment of the Reformation, created the markedly new conception of the dignity of the individual. This was the beginning, however tenuous, of the generation of a climate suitable to innovation which has persisted until today. However, transcending historical epochs, there is this consideration:

Although they (innovations) reflect the trend of the times in which they are made, they are made by some individual who because of peculiarities of personal experience and character is hypersensitive to some specific circumstance of his time and place. (52)

In a most informative subsection - "The Innovative Process" - LaPiere continues pointing to the inherently problematic aspects of studying the innovator, due of course to the complexity and ambiguity of the process itself.

An asocial perception of a problem does not, of course, ensure that an innovation will in due course be forthcoming. Some of the problems that men pose themselves may conceivably be unsolvable... For the most part however, failure of innovative endeavor to solve a problem seems to have stemmed from one or both of two circumstances: the fact that innovation is inherently difficult and the fact that social preconceptions of one sort or another inhibit the innovative process. Little is actually known about the innovative endeavor, aside from the fact that it is not standardized, that it is difficult, and that it is a random trial-and-error procedure that involves for the most part the use of symbols rather than things. (53)

Creative thinking, the kind that is necessary if a unique solution to a problem or any solution to a unique problem is to be achieved, involves a more or less random synthesis of symbols that are themselves often of vague and uncertain meaning. Each such putting together constitutes a trial that, upon evaluation by the creative thinker, usually proves to be an error. Essential to this process is the ability to ascertain all the possible permutations in the arrangement of the symbols that are being manipulated and the capacity to evaluate each permutation in turn in terms of its relevance to the problem. Equally essential is the
ability to continue the endeavor trial after trial and error after error until a workable solution has been found, even though the solution may not be reached for weeks, months or years. (54)

Following these seminal remarks, LaPiere gives at length data to support his contention that the talented amateur, the marginal nonprofessional has historically contributed (more often than the institutionalized members of any professional organization or discipline) significant and radical innovations which have had tremendous impact upon the professionals as well as the larger world. Needless to say, the reaction of those who have undergone the appropriate training and apprenticeship is one of scoffing ridicule, until the value of the new idea becomes undeniable.

*...it is just because American universities are in this respect (Russian-styled indoctrination) somewhat ineffective that they occasionally produce a scholar, scientist or technician who is qualified to do innovative work in his field and yet not so fully indoctrinated in the established beliefs, preconceptions, and ways of thinking of that field to preclude his engaging in fairly random trial-and-error experimentation. (55)

Following very closely LaPiere's explanation, we now arrive at myths having to do with innovation, which for convenience are here listed and compressed:

1) That innovation is a single, stunning "creative synthesis" while in fact it is a synthesis of a long series of specific innovations, each prerequisite to those that followed.

2) That there exist in science "breakthroughs" which will at one blow shatter any number of extremely difficult problems, when in fact the idea of the great and wise scientist - to whom charisma is often imputed as to political heroes - and the spectacular act are more in keeping with Jules Verne than the actual history of scientific development.
3) That innovation is a group or collective phenomenon which while in keeping with the prevalent democratic bias of the West is completely out of keeping with actuality. The "research team" is effective not because of its collective skills but because of the talent of each of its members and the rationalization of behavior and research possible through financial backing, etc. As advocate (to be discussed) the committee may do wonders for the innovation produced individually.

4) That innovations are "social imperatives"—somehow immanent within the culture—and will "out" as perhaps justice is alleged to do, with the naturalness of the coming of spring.* This is a conservative and inaccurate bias which attempts to depreciate the deviant who innovates. (56)

Very closely connected with these myths are broader stereotypic conceptions about the innovator himself. Originating in Confucian China, the idea has also been embraced by Western cultures that the innovator is of such refined and unusual sensibilities that his behavioral excesses, his "anomalisms," must be allowed so as not to smother his innovating furnaces. From this it is an easy jump into the realm of the artist, supposedly so much of another, "higher", world that peculiar or outlandish behavior, particularly in the case of recognized artists, is now considered merely par for the course. What is evident immediately to those familiar with the history of new ideas and cultural apparatus, is that a peculiarity of outward behavior does not typify the innovator so often as an oddity or unconventionality of mind, the ability and/or need to reshape reality through

*My reservation about this statement is rooted in the late Western development of complex organizations, an extremely important innovation, for which there is no ascertainable single innovator. Organizations seem to have grown out of a larger cultural heritage, and very slowly.
symbol manipulation. Although it has often been noted that some of the more famous inventors and artists behaved "strangely", or that they utilized slight infirmities to their advantage in avoiding the time-consuming duties of normal existence, these are but the partial manifestations of innovation, and not its essence.

There are many things which need to be said regarding the innovator and his indecipherable craft. These few pages have been a whirlwind statement of necessary conceptions before the remainder of the theory may be discussed. The ultimate goal, the wedding of several key theories, is not possible without a clear understanding of what the innovator is and to the degree possible, some appreciation of how he operates. It has been established that he holds an asocial perception of social reality, and through unflagging effort and a brand of hyper-motivation typically lacking in orthodox societal members, he may - but usually is not able - bring to the consciousness of the social environment his suggestion for change. That change is most often of small dimension, yet quite distinct, and even in its minor, unmonumental form it excites opposition. In order to foil the dictates of the society, in order to sidestep and personally sabotage the unceasing demands of roles, social controls, and sentiments of his culture, he must be possessed of enormous egocentricity which corroborates his belief that the thing(s) which concerns him is ultimately of more value than the conventional activities and thought he eschews. It does
not surprise the sociologist that only a miniscule proportion of any cultural population displays these personality requisites, plus of course sufficient intelligence and creativity to pursue innovative careers.

If LaPiere's trichotomy is recalled, it makes some sense to note that the innovator -- as failure in socialization -- is (theoretically) more likely to be found in American culture, known for its dynamic incongruence, than in Franco's Spain. LaPiere points to three possible responses to dynamic incongruence by those members of the culture who do not for the most part imbibe its patterns and values: there are "social parasites" (predatory criminals, social incompetents and sexual and other antisocial deviants); the similarly learned behavior of "neurotics and psychopaths"; and finally the other group who occupy us here, the innovators (57).

As can be imagined, this line of reasoning has serious implications for many current ideologies regarding the "sad lack" of continuity, integration or predictability in post-modern culture. Would it not be gravely "dysfunctional" to any culture to produce a dearth of innovators due to the society arriving at the social nirvana of static congruence?

Utopians in this instance, even those with the dialectical skills of Marcuse, may be at a loss to respond except in the most abstract and imprecise manner.

Central to the theory of Barnett and LaPiere is the subsidiary role of the "advocate" (58). Briefly, he is the man or group who has the pull to have the innovation
examined seriously by members of the culture to whom it is directed. Very often the innovator is not in a position of influence or does not have the personality best suited to the propagandizing of his invention or idea. Although both theorists allow this necessary adjunctive role considerable treatment within their works, I will not. This is where my theory begins to overtake LaPiere's and consequently where I will diverge from *Social Change*. Along with the advocate however - who finally is a more rough and tumble PR-type than the innovator - is the adopter (59), the final actor of LaPiere's theory. LaPiere is quick to point out that neither of the three roles pushing for institutionalization of the innovation, that of innovator, advocate or adopter, is any more or less easy than the others. Each is fraught with a multitude of complex difficulties, but naturally of different types. Innovation is problematic mostly concerning an alteration of consciousness; the advocate must be sufficiently persuasive and in tune with the culture that others will listen to him and not disparage his defence of a suspect addition to the culture; and the adopter is instantly ridiculed by his contemporaries, or worse, forced to fail in his use of the innovation by way of a self-fulfilling prophecy.

But again, for my purposes, the innovator takes center stage in what follows, due for the most part to the specific type of innovation central to this thesis. The role of advocate and adopter is implied, but a discussion of them is not of key significance.
CHAPTER II
A REVISED THEORY

Ever since the great democratic revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, social scientists have made the mistake of assuming that political revolution, with its self-righteous, humanistic splendor, would be the "going thing" as far as rapid social change was concerned, for some time at least. Even those who saw the limitations, historically, of this mistaken perception allowed themselves to fall into another equally fallacious theoretical rut by viewing social movements as the most important motor of change. Luckily, there have been of late some theorists and historians who recognize the inconsistency between these views and the empirical data emanating from the most advanced cultures. Building on the sound understanding of revolution and social movements offered by writers like Barrington Moore, Crane Brinton, Hadley Cantril, among many - theorists who avoid the above pitfalls - I have constructed a theory of future change in post-modern culture, which owes much to the suggestion of Marion Vanfossen.

Basically, this is a theory which considers the effects of the sophisticated, relativistic attitude or "enlightenment" on a populace, plus an appreciation for historical context such as the dissolution of feudalism,
and at the other end of the spectrum, the advent of "post-ascetic" culture. Very briefly: the breakdown of feudal social structure in terms of obligations and duties between classes brought with it the popular revolutions of France, America, Russia and China — to name only the most successful — when the aristocracy and royalty refused to revise its position in the society in favor of the "enlightened" bourgeoisie and an infuriated populace. After the particular cultures each evolved into an industrial setting, the need for political revolution was in large measure over, as was the easy possibility of it. Put bluntly, the forces of coercion — in most instances an uneasy reactionary coalition between the remnants of the aristocracy, lingering ruling houses, and the more affluent bourgeoisie — had taken their lesson of 1789 seriously, and were growing ever more skilled in the arts of oppression. However, as there were still tremendous forces extant in the interest of major social change, the social movement developed in the late 19th century as a suitable tool. It combined the large-scale impressiveness of political revolution with wisely conceived gradualistic tactics (e.g. the Fabians and reform groups), thereby avoiding holocaust and annihilation at the hands of counter-revolutionary forces. Thus far in the description, few historians and political analysts would quibble, except over details, or the sticky question of causality.

However, this is where a revised perception begins to come to the aid of scholars who, for example, look sadly
upon the memory of the liberalizing 1960's and proclaim (with the approval of their like-thinking peers), "Alas, there was no revolution, only mild changes of fashion in some elite groups; no redistribution of income, no alteration of power; no change in relations of production". I would respond: "Quite wrong - the cultural revolution of the 60's was just that. It had and will continue to have far-reaching effects in a liberating direction, not only in elite, collegiate groups, but across a wide range and diversity of personalities throughout post-modern culture".

At this point LaPiere's thoughts might be phrased in this manner: "Yes, I see that my innovator theory has been latched onto and that the user of it recognizes that especially now in an era of mounting, menacing social control agencies and mechanisms, surely the only practicable means of social change is through the innovator out-thinking, out-maneuvering, out-innovating the repressive features of the status quo".* Offered here in dramatic form, and greatly simplified, is the outline of what will follow.

Individual innovators in the persons of traders, merchants and bankers, sowed the early seeds in the late medieval which erupted into revolutionary action late in the 18th century. In that four or five century span many changes

*Very recently a financial analyst, Harry Browne, produced a popular manual, How I Found Freedom in an UnFree World (N.Y.: Avon Books, 1974) which in crass and atheoretical terms sets out one possible course of action for potential innovators, at least regarding certain aspects of modern social life. While his views are not completely coincident with mine, it is the best (only?) of its kind, and has been warmly received.
enveloped European society. The plagues decimated the feudal workforce; the Renaissance and Reformation substituted for unthinking servility necessary to the operation of the feudal social arrangement, a youthful, naive rationalism and individualism. Technological developments were rife: of extreme importance for modernization and my theory was Gutenberg's contribution. The rural, homogeneous, incestuous country folk escaped with but little reluctance to the city, where social mobility was possible and where the concomitant ideas of personal freedom and endeavor were the house ideology. The absolutistic "thought" (or lack thereof) necessary to lord-vassal allegiances and a social structure viewed as God-given, began early to fall to the "modern", more relativistic, understanding of social relations as man-created and therefore man-dissoluble. As mentioned much earlier, the perception of the possibility of change was and is of central importance to the success of all those who seek an alteration of social reality, whether it be the innovator or the mass movement leader, or for that matter he who seeks to develop "a better mousetrap". With the discovery of the American continents, the mandate for geographical and mental exploration was accentuated, and men like Luther and Calvin, Columbus and Cromwell straight through Voltaire and Rousseau - among the peculiar, outlandish and unappealingly innovational of their times - pursued the light of reason into the darkest contradictions of medieval life.
But the Age of Reason brought nearly as many problems as it solved, for with the displacement of God, Country or King as supreme being, Europe and the colonies in America fell under the merciless rule of Progress. It can fairly be said that only in the last generation or two have the millions of genuinely exploited laborers of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries been vindicated in some small way for their mutilated lives. They left their rural hamlets — in which Christopher Hill tells us they labored perhaps 15 weeks per year (60) — and migrated often by necessity to the mills, mines and factories, where around the clock til death was the schedule. But with their broken backs they produced what now is termed post-industrial, post-modern or post-ascetic culture. Certainly they are not alone responsible, but "were it not" for their slavish efforts, affluence as we know it could not have been created. But being human animals, the urban proletariat could not tolerate indefinitely the abuses to which they were constantly subjected. Some of the liberated bourgeoisie (LaSalle, Marx, Proudhon, Blanqui, Kropotkin, etc.) came to their aid, and those strong workers who could not be intimidated by their employers and whose strength was not utterly exhausted at the factory, slowly but loudly began the labor agitations of the early 19th century. And as in almost any historical period, those who revolt even mildly feel the immediate blow of reaction. Even the famous Paris Commune of 1871 ended with the terrible deaths of 17,000 "revolu-
tionaries", many of whom were infants. Thus it began to dawn upon social theorists of change that violence brought the same, and more of it; the famous British gradualist tactic, although less dramatic and requiring more patience, proved finally to be the most feasible approach. As already noted, reform movements met with amazing success, much more so than the violent expressions for change which preceded them.

What type of person joins a movement, gives his all, relates to its activities thoroughly and allows himself to be caught in a "religious" dedication to the cause? As will be detailed later, these participants are distinctly "neo-modern" or "industrial" citizens: not well educated, not yet estranged sufficiently from former, rural absolutistic thoughts about goods and evils, not mobile, not well traveled: not, then, affluent participants of post-modern culture. Even if social movements could operate efficiently in the current historical matrix, organizers would be hard-pressed to fill their rosters, to organize viable cells, to impress upon their members the ultimate goodness of their goal and the ultimate evil of their opponents, to have their participants carry cards and swallow whole a moralistic, hyperoptimistic ideology.

Put idiomatically, the world has grown too wise, the people have grown too sophisticated - that is, in the most advanced sectors of the most advanced nations. Moreover, it will not do, in criticizing this position, to note
that there have always been folk who would not accept absolutes. That Nietzsche would have been a poor follower does not impune the theory; for today there are millions of Nietzsche's, but more worldly even than he. Certainly one of the shining triumphs of the modern cultures is the number of minds whose orientation is becoming more and more cosmopolitan, non-nationalistic but international, nonlocal, nonsectarian, nonabsolutistic. These millions of minds seek— to steal from Mills— as much freedom as their reason can handle. And to date it seems that very few innovators in the realm of cultural change have exhausted either themselves or the possibilities in their search and experimentation for the rational life. Habermas' recent book, Towards a Rational Society (although from the Frankfurt metaphysical tradition), capsulizes the aspirations of those with minds, money and time. There has never before been in human history such an opportunity for individual growth through experimentation across a wide range and diversity of lifestyles and cultures as now exists for some people in our culture.

Ogburn's useful concept of social lag immediately comes to mind as we witness those who in every way are capable of relatively limitless experimentation, yet are entirely unwilling to forego their acquired cultural baggage, in the form of outdated beliefs and properties, which prevent them from making the most of the culture. I stress the historical element of the argument (i.e. the possibilities affluence brings to the social innovator) for there is throughout the
culture a peculiar combination of sentiments: first, an awareness of dizzying flux and change (adequately documented by Toffler) and second, the competing, contradictory idea that things never really change much finally, and that what was good enough for father... The resolution of this contradiction is something beyond the capabilities of many societal members.

The statement of Bendix and Berger (referred to above, p. 23) comes now into clearer focus as to its relevance to my theory. Very obviously, if one is to inhabit what can be termed a "multiplicity of selves", thereby maximizing the opportunity for involvement with others in a cross-section of situations, the whole concept of "boundary-maintenance" becomes relatively useless as compared to its opposite, "boundary-expansion". Closely connected with the first mentioned concept is one of the most potentially reactionary ideas ever to have been propounded by psychologists: the Gestalt. The idea that the social actor could ever be, or rather, ought to be, a consistent, monolithic, thereby morally predictable Oneness throughout situational variation is straight from the Bible: the soul. It is easy to picture the utility of defining people in this way, when the locus of one's entire life is a small, homogeneous, herds-driving tribe in the Middle East two millenia ago. It was functional to some degree for a man to be known as "good" or "bad" to his kinsmen and to occasional intruders into the culture. The idiocy of trying to employ such standards in the post-
modern situation is immediately obvious. The media do their best to make high tragedy out of modern life by using these anachronistic conceptions of behavior and the protagonists involved in that behavior. The favorite example in the late 60's was to show "dispassionately" the photograph of the phi beta kappa, good, down-home community boy sitting in a federal prison for resisting the draft or selling marijuana. Somehow that was to suggest the "inevitable" irony and confusion, the "alienation" if you will, "necessarily" inherent in the modern situation. This is a mistake in perception and understanding. Clearly, the "violator" was innovating, but he ran afoul of social control agencies - something proficient innovators learn not to do - and the powers that were, in very clear-eyed fashion, incarcerated him for his "bad" actions. There is no ambiguity here: the innovator knew just what he was about, and the repressive agencies knew as well. There is no high tragedy: there is only the historically usual condition of the innovator being penalized through the normatively coercive power wielded by the state. The innovator threatened - altogether too loudly of course - to overthrow in some relatively minor way the status quo, in favor of a more rational, personally meaningful world. His reward is the usual fare for people of such aspirations.

Hand in hand with the necessity for situational ethics (an unfortunate term), a resilient definition of "selves", and the desire to expand boundaries through multi-
faceted interpersonal experiences, is the relinquishing of many other key values of the acquisitive culture. The innovator in this sense does not care for property except that property which immediately promotes his capability for innovating, interpersonally and otherwise. He does not care for nor is he fascinated by power over people or things; his interest is perennially focused on the "using up" of himself and his resources in the direction of people, whom he defines as able to properly "use him". This is not philanthropic, or centrally so; what must operate however in the arena of multiplicative selves is a high level of reciprocity, inasmuch as people are capable of responding fairly for "goods" (used very broadly) they receive. This is not to be construed as "game theory" or a rehash of the popular economic models used in small groups theory. Even a touch of mechanistic thinking in an area so sensitive as this is a touch overdone. If there is a theory which approximately conveys the untended meaning here, it would be one of the 18th century models of human behavior, understood to be constituted of well-thought out, calculated and rational action, but now based on the desire to experience things and people under mutually satisfying conditions.* Parenthetically,

*There resides in the use of rationalist psychologies (known also as "naive positivism" or "Pollyanna" interpretation of behavior) a paradox which I would do well to dispose of immediately. Because there are evidenced in human behavior any number of irrational or nonlogical acts (exhaustively analyzed by Pareto among others), the theorist who therefore avoids the enlightenment understanding penalizes himself on poor grounds. Voltaire, Kant and similar thinkers were aware,
the age old debate (e.g., Hobbes vs. Rousseau; Marx vs. Smith) about whether man is "basically" good, cooperative and well-meaning or bad, aggressively autogonistic and an evil-doer, if it has any relevance here, probably finds me on the side of those who support the kinder appraisal of man. But instead of man being this way or that "by nature" of his man-ness, I would insist (in the standard sociological posture) that given an appropriate social structure, post-modern men would for the most part treat each other well, well enough at any rate to facilitate and encourage innovational behavior among one another, as opposed to the treatment historically...

For sure, that wide-eyed rationalism, most memorably represented in the social contract theory, did not offer a comprehensive definition or analysis of human behavior. What it did do with fabulous success was posit a normative vision of man, as agreeable and reasonable, in pseudo-scientific terms which typified 18th century polemics. This argumentative, hyperbolic style should not obscure the usefulness for theorists of change of the positivist legacy.

There is no debate that men manifest socially both rational and nonrational actions. In addition it is agreed that life is continuously ambiguous and difficult to exhaustively investigate. The marginal success of small groups research better than other sociological subfield testifies to the problematic nature of "mind-watching". But after that is said, what remains is the unsavory option: either we admit to the lure of apotheosizing the irrational as the central feature of life (Jung), or we largely ignore it and its unpredictable quality, and focus instead on rational activities, and most important, the possibilities for rational improvement of life when and if individuals care to attempt same. The question for sociologists should be, IF a person chooses to be as rational as he sometimes can be, THEN how does the social structure appear to handle his attempt, warmly, coolly, or indifferently? That a person may continuously live a life of thoroughly nonlogical action is admitted; that many people actually do is unlikely. Therefore the entire theory presented here is suitable for application only to those who make the effort at rational existence.
given the unorthodox. They would behave amicably simply because of the benefits derived from interaction and the concomitant lessening of social controls surrounding it.

Also essential in understanding the post-modern innovator is the realization that his definition of "self" differs radically from the psychiatrically approved recipes for "healthy" self-conception often promulgated in advanced societies. Along with the pleas for self-scrutiny, self-acceptance, self-forgiveness, self-expansion through meditation, etc., is the implication that one's unbalanced self-view is more a function of alterable internal tensions and neuroses than of an ill-constructed social order. Being aware that this line of argument is, among other things, one of the oldest of conservative ideologies, the innovator strives continuously to expand "self" by ignoring it: self is static, predictable, plugged into a status quo of an essentially unchanging collection of closely inter-related situations and personalities. The "multiplicity of selves" the innovator prefers, indeed finds necessary to his actions, is a construct of situations, not of continuity (habit) or property (home). The innovator's self is the product of his accumulated knowledges and experiences, his aim being to increase incrementally both components to the betterment of his ability to handle various, nonintegrated behaviors.

The unending demand among popular psychiatry, that people ought to become neatly, wholesomely contained entities, free of tension and distress, holds no more appeal for the innova-
tor than the multiplicity of selves idea would hold for a Southern plantation owner of the previous century. The old Southern gentleman is precluded from making personal enlightenment and experience a goal, for his position as patriarch demands that he display for the land and his chattels (which includes the family) an unreasonably, inhumanly narrow, righteous and unbending "self" which strives only to "preserve and protect". There is no more antithetical a position conceivable to this feudal mind than that of the innovator, whose being is not in having and making, but strictly in knowing and doing. The latter is in no need of "roots", family, home, "place in society", not to mention religion, community and for the most part, government, as it would have been understood by the planter. Inasmuch as there still remain in advanced cultures persons with a feudal orientation, the possibility of large-scale innovation as described here is lessened. But with the advent of post-industrialization and its continued growth, the provincial is forced into a quasi-schizophrenic condition of watching the world about him, emphasized through the media and popular culture, speeding towards the dissolution of almost everything he holds sacred - literally - while he sits on the veranda fighting with all his resources merely to hold ground. That his position is finally untenable is obvious to no-one more than to himself.

If the above plantation patriarch is thought of as an ideal-type (on the "right"), then other members of the post-modern culture may be compared with his arch-conservatism
on a continuum. For instance, the businessman who lives and works in the urban sprawl may have dispensed with religion and a love for community. He may in the interests of furthering his career, engage in random, minor innovations in circumventing distasteful restrictions imposed upon him by the government. Also he may rationalize (in Weber's sense) other types of behavior to more comfortably fit his personality and various needs, such as the exploitation of a competitor's secretary more for intelligence than sexual reasons. But, more towards the right end of the continuum, he may demand from his suburban wife and children and his professional subordinates, behavior suitable to the obsequious chattel. So, while for him life may make a great deal of sense and be in comfortable accord with the dictates and limitations of the culture, for those subject to his possible oppression, his "will to power" may constitute the single greatest irrationality of their existence. For the innovator, the possibility of being put in such a situation—that is, in the hands of a person(s) who can demand of him irrational and unnecessary acts of fealty, or put differently, one who would seek to restrain his ongoing search for new stimuli—is the ultimately detestable condition.

This has tremendous and far-reaching ramifications for our current societal arrangements. The military, social movements, clubs, religious affiliations and the more rigid complex organizations are but the most obvious targets for criticism and avoidance on the part of the innovator. In
order to maximize his benefits while minimizing costs, he must stay clear of any social arrangement which begins to operate in noncontractual fashion at least in his business and professional concerns. But even in less formal relationships and settings, he becomes the artist in the realm of "traveling light". Property means involvement with and time spent in the upkeep of. Noncontractual relations mean time and energy having to be expended which under contractual arrangements could be avoided, if that be desired. Along the same lines, it is necessary to point out the sad lack of "helpful" structures in current society designed to benefit those who wish to enrich their lives through interpersonal innovation. The lacuna now present (everywhere except perhaps in the most liberated sectors of metropolitan culture) insures for the innovator a degree of probable ineffectiveness and loneliness which prevents most societal participants from even considering innovational roles.

Costs are thought to outweigh benefits to an extreme degree.

In its most precise expression, the innovator's position may be summarized in this way: there are a regretably few and finite number of moments in life; expenditures of time, energy and attention are not to be sloppily allocated, but whenever possible activities are to be rationalized with the intention of utilizing one's life-space to the fullest; this is done in the hope of realizing maximum satisfaction of those few but precisely formulated personally-defined "goods". The cumulative effect of this Weltanschauung
across the culture is wide-scale social change. Whereas Weber was made apprehensive by this position, the post-ascetic innovator feels less anxiety over it. Those historically evolved relationships and behaviors which do not prove viable in the post-modern setting, he sets aside, often with severe regrets - and no ready alternatives. His job - the subject of the thesis - is to refashion social arrangements to suit his overarching schema. That of course is when the innovation comes in, and when negative social sanctions become the most pronounced. In reconstructing one's culture to suit oneself, the loss at the outset in terms of comforting abstract sentiments, literature and similar cultural productions may seem unbearably heavy. But the promised rewards of final emancipation from historically spent components of social organization and the beliefs which invariably accompany them, is in the opinion of the innovator worth the effort and sacrifice.

While I risk stating the obvious, it seems advisable at this point, in concluding an introductory statement of the theory, to remark about its historical position. In the development of some new mental constructs, it is possible to assess them as peculiar to only a specific time in history, e.g., that air power was something that ought to be exploited militarily, a realization only possible circa 1910 and in no other time. This theory is not of that nature. It is likely that those who were entirely disenchanted with their particular socio-historical matrix, at whatever time in
history, happened upon this theory, approximately, but threw up their hands when the possibility of implementing alternatives arose. LaPiere overstates slightly the case for the innovator, in semipolemic style, with the intention of offsetting the drift in social theory towards the collectivity. But his even bigger error is to understate the importance to change of the cumulative nature of culture, not precisely or in every case the result of single innovators' works. The point I wish to make here is that my theory makes some sense of the modern situation and is capable of predicting significant change in all major institutions of the post-modern cultures. But the fact that it does is a function not only of its attempted comprehensiveness, but more importantly, because it responds to the possibilities for change at all levels inherent in current society which were distinctly lacking in all previous societies. This is not so much the case of the epoch being ready for the idea (ideas of personal freedom being very old), but the idea having found the suitable epoch. This also explains why the theory is useful in predicting change only in those relatively small but extremely important areas of the world being termed "post-modern". The other areas are in varying states of inter-epochal flux, some frozen in extreme static congruence at the primitive level (Sicily), others in painful static incongruence (much of Africa) and still others in the beginning of dynamic incongruence necessary to the production of post-modern culture (the more advanced Latin
American countries). One tragic aspect of this is the fact that in some of these areas, there are foreign-educated nationals who have experienced resocialization while studying abroad and therefore seek the same kinds of freedom through change that I have been discussing. Their's is a sad lot unless they wish to migrate to more advanced areas (which they often do of course). One can imagine the pain of a sociologist taking his Ph.D. at Berkeley, then having to return to Japan or Thailand or any of the Latin American oligopolies, areas where the feudal-religious orientation still holds sway. However, the same kind of personal dilemma might ensue when the American student from Iowa studies with the critical school at Frankfurt or with left-wing intellectuals in Italy, only to return to his unliberated home. This kind of difficulty, personal emancipation in the midst of structural repression, will become in the non-advanced sectors (as it is currently here) more and more of a problem, to add to their already excessive list.
Prefatory note

The writing of this section was done with the awareness that certain unanticipated difficulties of scholarship seriously handicapped me in presenting an adequate selection of data to support my thesis. This is not an apologia, but a methodological explanation regarding the problems of working both the historical and sociological fields in pursuit of demonstrable Truth.

As every scholar, I had in mind the "ideal method" of handling the phenomenon in question: to secure from historians the finest bibliography of works dealing with social change; to sift patiently through them seeking data to support (or refute) my thesis about the history and future of change; and to present the findings in a grand synthesis similar in spirit, if not in method, to Sorokin's masterpiece. (Aging scholars smile at such youthful plans of grandiose dimension.) Nevertheless, I compiled an enormous list of suitable studies, began in earnest the sifting, and to my dismay these months later, have concluded that the task overwhelms and depresses me. For several reasons.

First, the sheer magnitude.
Second, social history, ever since the 19th century shift from political to sociological emphasis, has been written in very general terms, practically by definition. The move away from hyperparticularism, in the description of military and dynastic changes ad nauseum, has given way to a similarly exaggerated extolling of the "flavor of the period", etc., in homage to *Kulturgeschichte*. Therefore the most useful modern historical sources, those that consciously include sociological reflections, are invariably a mixed blessing, on one hand taking cognizance of social forces and cultural styles, but on the other, often Hegelianizing their areas of interest with overly diffuse, sometimes mystical characterization of *Zeitgeist*. If Thucydides is at times a bore because of inordinate enumeration of disconnected detail, then Alfred Weber (inter alia) for my purposes is equally useless because of his distaste for stating the nonsociological in favor of more suitably specific and psychological statements, which of course typify earlier historians. The fact remains that "social change" is a very short term for a most luxuriously rich and complex gathering of phenomena. And a reading of history with any but chronically over-sociological eyes presents disparate data, many of which cannot adequately be dealt with through sociology alone. Although this thesis is written by a sociologist, since its aim is to predict (after considering the past in broad terms), I have had to consider information from historians which often chafed and forced me to recognize
realities which fall outside the familiar terrain of my discipline.

Connected with this is the key problem: how to utilize heavily sociologized descriptions of the past in the interests of the individually-rooted theory I am defending. LaFiere chose the most obvious route in pursuing the data of technological advance, easily attributable to particular people, but what of the organizational and ideological components? My solution to the important quandary is only marginally satisfying, but necessary in order to facilitate the completion of the task. Simply this: I immersed myself in historical treatises and after a good deal more reading than I could present, I decided with some qualifications, that the history of Western development over the past millennium is largely the record of the activities of thousands of innovative souls who operated in the one major culture that at times promoted and stimulated their work. (At least in comparison with the repressions typical of Eastern social structure.) A complete documentation of this insight would require not 60 pages but several thousand. What is offered here instead are the rudiments to that documentation, an outline with some specifics interspersed, the assumption being made that "there's a lot more where that came from". The contours of innovation are therefore being detailed rather than the more perfect but less workable project, to specify point by point this critical input to social change. The "contradiction" - to generalize the specific - is more
Introduction

This section will constitute a necessarily abbreviated statement regarding that grouping of phenomena known under the rubric "social change", as it has appeared in (principally) Western history since the Middle Ages. Obviously, because I make no pretense of being an historian, all of what follows depends upon the general consensus of professionals in that discipline, the varying opinions of which I have synthesized into sociologically relevant statements.

As is well known among students of historiography, there are inherent in all historical study countless potential difficulties and confusions, depending upon how the data are comprehended and presented. For example, in this particular case extreme care must be taken not to mistake the "great-man theory" of history, of late held in deservedly low esteem, with the Barnett-LaPiere theory of the innovator in the processes of change. When in the 19th century, historians of romantic sentiments began the apotheosis of historical notables, there had just been on the European scene a number of extremely impressive and effective political leaders, the names of whom are the first the young student understands to be "History". The fact that men make times and times make men is no longer an astonishing, controversial issue. New, however, is the fact that complex society is
much less supportive of the great-man idea, due to plethoras of critical variables, most of which elude the control of any single figure. Although the media persist in elevating the actions of individuals into the limelight, this has more to do with the nature of mass entertainment than with empirical reality.

However, it is immediately obvious from an examination of Western culture that particular men at particular times with outlandish ideas have affected pervasively the technological, ideological and organizational systems. This has been true from the beginnings of civilization, yet it is seldom mentioned that many of the "great men" have no names: the innovators of the wheel, a multitude of 15th century trade practices, and so on. "History" for centuries was the work of court-paid scribes who under severe censorship lionized their employers and friends while disparaging enemies and ignoring the other 99% of civilization. Whether those important souls whose innovations genuinely aided in the debarbarization of the West should be considered "great" is more a moral-aesthetic than historical judgement. My point is that those men usually considered members of the pantheon are in many cases no more significant than the unnamed vis a vis the totality of social change over the past millenium.

I did not happen upon this view of social history merely to conform to Lapierre and Barnett, or solely through their work. One of the more esteemed "generalist" historians
of the current era, Herbert J. Muller, has made the point most clearly, although his reflections relate specifically to technological development. (However, it should not be understood that his remarks are irrelevant to ideological or organizational innovation. The reason that technology has been stressed whenever independent creativity is the point of discussion as mentioned above rests in the fact that other elements of social change are far more difficult to attribute in their origin. While we know that in 1500 Fra Luca Paciolo invented double-entry bookkeeping, revolutionizing business life, we can not so precisely assign responsibility, for instance, to those who made England the "mother of parliamentary government", or America the "birthplace of jazz". This has less to do with the nature of change than with the problems of post-facto analysis regarding innovational approaches to reality, whether technological, ideological or organizational.)

Muller:

In thus anticipating the European genius for technology, these craftsmen also foreshadowed another major theme -- the importance of the creative individual. In prehistory such individuals are perforce anonymous, at best being commemorated in some later myth like that of the master craftsman Daedalus, and their inventiveness is obscured by the slow pace of change, the gradual diffusion of new skills, and the conspicuous uniformity of artifacts. Today their importance is commonly minimized because of our awareness of their dependence on culture, and of the deep, unconscious, involuntary processes of historic change. Yet nothing would seem plainer than that every new invention must have been the work of some individual -- not the automatic outcome of an impersonal process, nor the product of a committee of embryonic organization men. Even the very gradual improvements in skills or changes in styles were due to
minor innovations that could only have been the work of individuals. The diffusion of new arts and skills itself required exceptional men bold enough to break the cake of tribal custom, perhaps defy the patriarchs or head magician. Hence the faster pace of innovation in prehistoric Europe meant among other things that there was now an increasing number of enterprising, imaginative, more or less unconventional men. We may doubt that their works were always welcomed or that their tribal societies were eager for change; but at least these societies were growing more disposed to accept change, encourage the innovator, and thereby were anticipating a civilization that would provide more opportunity and incentive for the creative individual than had any of the great Eastern societies.

(Note to the same page): In Change and History Margaret Hodgen has made a pioneering study in this field: a detailed history of technological innovation in England, shire by shire, parish by parish, over its entire history. Three major periods of innovation — ... — reflect the larger "movements" made familiar by historians and illustrate the ... impersonal processes of historic change that the innovators may be quite unconscious of. But a close study of these periods, as of the whole span, gives much more prominence to the work of individuals other than the few famous inventors. Thus it was not strictly "England" that produced or underwent these innovations: they occurred primarily in certain regions, more specifically in certain towns or parishes, and always were the work of particular men, who in the 16th century begin to be identified by name in the local records. Of the more than 12,000 parishes in England, down to 1900, fewer than 20% ever took up a new craft or industry, and most of these ventured upon an innovation but once. Most of England, in other words, remained a traditional agricultural society, at most adopting improved tools made by more enterprising men elsewhere. (61)

This has been quoted at length because of its implications for sociological investigation of past eras, the specifics for which more often than not are dispensed with in favor of "periods", "trends", and the like. There is no sense in minimizing the interdependence of creator and culture, but because of our current historical proclivities, with the boom of democratic, sociologized sentiment, to suggest that an individual mind shares little responsibility for a particular develop—
ment, is to verge on the heretical, gaining professional
responses of "great-manism" or simply "psychologism". (The
cold reception of LaPiere's Social Change sustains my suspi-
cion that sociologists' rancor is most stimulated by those in
the fold who honor the specifically individual and/or unique -
as opposed to the patterned, consensual or integrated - for
some analytical purposes in preference to the more comfort-
ably diffuse and general developments of Man.) The following
pages will attempt to walk the narrow line between blindly
sociological vs. romantically individualistic accounts of
innovations and change in history.

Along with recognizing the innovator's role, one
must also realize that particular types or "styles" of
purposive social change have been possible and effective
only under certain historical conditions. It is intuitively
clear that modes of change under the Pharaohs, within the
Greek polis, and in Charlemagne's Europe were all decidedly
different. Somewhat less obvious are the enormous differences
between successful innovating behavior in the epoch before
1789, in the 19th century and during the sixties in this
country. Styles of change which made great sense within
certain social structures made none in others, and the mark
of the innovator-leader (if they were one and the same person)
was the ability to determine when a social change device had
become antiquated, and institute a more effective one.

Furthermore, social change is often characterized
as having to do with those elements of a culture which are
conspicuously alterable: political leadership, changes in
atire, distribution of goods and services, and so on. I
propose that a fresh look offers different data, that social
change in fact will begin to escape the notice of those
analysts who are prepared and/or capable only of understand-
ing change in anachronistic terms. It was announced during
the sixties that no "real" change obtained because the "move-
ment" was ill-organized, the goals diffuse and the "revolu-
tion" merely emotional. For 30's radicals it was a disheart-
ening-affair with no party ideology, cells, secret codes of
thought and behavior and the rest of the package.

A corrective to this view is easily provided.
Social change in the past two hundred years has been pre-
dominantly structural. Marx was not the only thinker who
doggedly tied men's thought and actions to a particular
status and role. The fallacy involved here has been pointed
out too often to require repetition. Today the Weltan-
schauungen of millions have become, for sociological purposes,
indistinguishable from one another although the compared
individuals operate within entirely separate strata of the
power/privilege hierarchy. It is not as easy to predict the
values and related activities of the laborer today as it was
in 1848 or 1871. The swollen middle class has taken over
the traditional role of the elites as trend and fashion setter
(something which bothered the old-school, e.g., Karl Mann-
heim's "The Democratization of Culture"). And because of
regularized affluence for increasing numbers of the citizenry,
demands for structural and distributional modification reminiscent of the early 20th century have subsided a great deal. Put succinctly, the social analyst of change must begin looking not so much for dramatic rearrangements of social institutions, but for equally important, more difficultly detected shifts in values and processes.

I have dispensed for the most part with Eastern history since it followed such radically different contours until Westernization began in the 18th and 19th centuries. Thereafter it has been subject to similar situations and outcomes with those of Europe, given that certain idiosyncratic features, very often of religious nature, have left their mark.

Now that the basic premises are clear, I may offer, by way of recapitulation, a heuristic breakdown of the last millennium which has been employed by many current historians, although they characteristically stop short of purely sociological analysis. Before the high middle ages of the 12th century, in those centuries somewhat mislabeled "Dark" by 19th century scholars, what change took place (especially organizational) seems to have been the handiwork of individual strongmen whose hegemony was extremely local and whose interests were consequently particularistic. With the creeping growth of secularism and the merchant mentality which surfaced after the 12th century renaissance, social change took the form of conflict between liberalizing mercantile interests and the reactionary sentiments of the Papacy and some of the ruling
elites, those who failed to utilize the "soiled" capital of
the traders. With the advent of proto-rationalism through
Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, Luther, Erasmus, Descartes and
later Locke, the stage was set for a new mode of change,
although again of a largely individual nature. This mode of
change has been popularized as the extremely atomistic
behavior of "renaissance men" and reformation zealots.
As economies and concomitant political arrangements finalized
in the 17th and 18th centuries, completing the shift from
feudalism to early industrialism, the reactionary and liberat­ing
forces met head on and popular revolution became the
"Norm". This proved successful beyond the wildest hopes of
early libertarians, but with Metternich and the return of the
pendulum (cf. Henry Kissinger's The World Restored), revolu­tion
began to produce diminishing returns for those who sought
to employ it within rapidly industrializing areas. The forces
counter-revolution mushroomed; the Bolshevik enterprise of
the 20th century was in many ways 100 years too late in any
country but Russia.

What must be kept in mind is the fact that these
dialectical processes of progress and reaction were carried
on at varying rates throughout Europe. Since Britain was the
first to have a modern political revolution (1640), the first
to industrialize thoroughly and the first to become essentially
a culture of nongovernmental complex organizations (early 19th
century), it may be compared with late-blooming Russia or
Germany only to emphasize differences at given times, not
similarities. But each country went through roughly similar changes (which is not to say there is anything "inevitable" or "necessary" about such regularities), given that some advantages accrued to, for example, Bismarck, through the fatal lesson of Louis XVI. If the masses were scorned in 1770, by 1870 rulers began employing both stick and carrot, and the birth of cooptation was at hand. Socialism could not be repressed to death in any country, and the masses were quick to learn that the social movement was their only reliable weapon against poverty and frozen social position.

We now move abruptly from conventional historiography to the realm of hypothesis, the point of this thesis. The social movement in all post-modern cultures (which eliminates from comment the Third World) is no longer appropriate if genuine, penetrating and durable social change is sought. It has repeatedly been shown, in 1848, the Paris Commune, innumerable peasant revolutions in Russia and other European countries, in American labor-management warfare from the Molly McQuires on, etc. that the forces of oppression and cooptation, the social control facilities accessible to the ruling interests, have made not only political revolution, but also the social movement impractical. Whereas revolution is precluded by the sheer strength of state coercion, the social movement has been vitiated rather by the growth of knowledge on the part of the masses. A definition of self which permits "whole-hog" movement support is not terribly sophisticated, and certainly not relativistic regarding values. Absolutistic
think and social movements (historically) are inextricable
and necessary to each other. Thus we see that the likelihood
of mass support for ideologies and cell participation is
inversely related to the general level of education (used in
a specific sense not related to indoctrination or citizen-
ship training) and the inevitably ensuing critical conscious-
ness, which has played havoc with political leaders since
the French Revolution. In short, the world's worst follower
is the man who thinks independently of ideologically proffered
thought-patterns and values.

So in whirlwind fashion I have outlined the growth
of various forms of change in modern history. Moving further
into the hypothetical, we arrive at present-day Europe and the
U.S., the relatively uninhibited areas of post-modern develop-
ment.

It is an irony of history that the innovator again
comes to the fore as the most efficient and probable exponent
of change, after sharing the limelight with collective action
for the last three centuries. Given the relativism of the
age and the intense, irrevocable coercive powers of the state
(largely due to telecommunications and similar technology),
the lone-wolf innovator stands a much better chance of alter-
ing the status quo than easily recognizable and repressible
mass demonstrations of intent.

There are connected with this thought both happy
and unfortunate correlates. A necessary if not sufficient
reason for the existence in large numbers of highly rational,
independent, relativistic social actors, is both affluence and the availability of higher education for other than the traditional elites. With the diminution of supernatural systems, ideologies of various sources and related oppressive features of older cultures, the modern situation has provided the potential innovator with means, ability and willingness, three key components which in earlier epochs were often absent, either singly or altogether. However, the current period of history is anomalous because of virulent absolutism living in uncanny proximity with Weimar-like relativism vis-à-vis personal lives and commitments, or lack of same. Historically an analogous situation obtained in 14th century Rome when merchants and other radicals carried on their lives within sight of the Vatican. And, as in that time, there are frequent clashes between those whose allegiances vary with calculation and those whose are invariably stable because of emotional, nonlogical ties. The innovator, for whom feudal behavior is anathema, has learned (because of inquisitors up through McCarthy) to protect himself from zealous, feudal minds seeking consistency and predictability in those about them, by carefully clothing questionable acts and thoughts in a veneer of compliance. This runs counter of course to all conservative morality regarding the supposed Goodness of the monolithic self, but it has proven itself the single reliable road to survival for those increasing numbers who practice change.

With some repetition coupled with the addition of
new remarks, we have gained the required position from which to make a swift review of history, and in so doing pointing up two related facts: (1) social change has been largely due to independent innovators; (2) collective action undertaken in the interests of altering social reality will subsequently meet with marginal success.* (N.B.: In supporting the view of social history which casts the innovator as numero uno, I am, again, not denying the cumulative nature of culture and the disparate abilities of different societies to aid or hinder the aspiring, inevitably present innovator.)

The Middle Ages

* Since most sociologists get their knowledge of the medieval second-hand — (a few of the more fortunate read Blach’s Feudal Society) — the "stagnant feudal social structure" of Europe from 600 to 1200 has become a professionally ritualized conception. Revisionist historians like Sylvia Thrupp have been proving our static interpretation to be fallacious, and they cite numerous, newly discovered instances of purposive, violent and/or innovative behavior on the part of medieval people. It has been pointed out, for example, that legalism prevailed as one of the spirits of the age, and even the otherwise ignorant serfs committed to memory their privileges and responsibilities along with the many nonlogical

*The following will rely heavily upon the 18-volume "Rise of Modern Europe" series, edited by Langer, which has been repeatedly mentioned to me by professional historians as the finest and most succinct generalist study of modern social history. Also of value was Herbert Muller's trilogy, Freedom in the Ancient World, Freedom in the Western World, Freedom in the Modern World.
components of mental life. This fascination with the legal realm provided constant conflicts between lords and peasants, and it is heartening to encounter the tenacity with which the underdogs often fought the improprieties of their masters through the court system (62).

I knew enough about the medieval to avoid complete acceptance of the discipline shorthand: feudal Europe equals unmitigated repression and changelessness. But after consulting some of the more reliable interpreters of the period (63), for my purposes here, it is more safe than not to characterize the era as relatively undynamic, in LaPiere's terms, "statically congruent". I allow myself this somewhat begrudgingly, for if one performs too many "heuristics", the data become so compromised as to mean nothing at all. Reading reputable studies in medieval social history (of which there are an amazing number) leaves the reader with the wry impression that these people, although unlearned and ridden with superstition, nevertheless exhibited an enormous capacity for resilience and rebellion - perhaps in the search for new stimuli - in careful disregard for constraining social structure. Modern social theorists use the manorial system as a foil to complex society and with good reason. When compared to the variety we take for granted, the manor was indeed a limited scenario in which to carry out all of life's functions. But to write the entire epoch off as Dark, changeless and sterile, "waiting" for the Renaissance, is foolishness.

Traditionally, the year 476 ushered in the "dark
ages" by way of a cataclysmic defeat of the Romans at the hands of northern Barbarians. This is not quite accurate. Less dramatic, but more in keeping with the facts, we find that the invasion from the north had taken several centuries and was not a rapacious onslaught, but a quiet usurpation of power and status by upwardly mobile foreigners. Roman culture was recognized by the outsiders as superior to their own, and its lack of vitality allowed their primitive robustness to "conquer"; but, as in so many other meetings of peoples, the more simple were readily assimilated into the older, more richly endowed culture (64).

However, by the time of Pope Gregory the Great (540-604) there were indeed regularized and ferocious attacks on the remnants of Roman grandeur, along with famine and disease throughout Italy. Rome was preserved from utter destruction only by the diplomatic skill of Gregory, for he placated the Lombards and more by accident than design, initiated the hegemony of the Church over Europe for the next millennium. The 8th century showed little improvement in the lives of the "Europeans", with the Arab invasions as far as Spain; and the miniscule Carolingian renaissance died with Charlemagne leaving Europe in a 10th century of appalling despair and pessimism throughout. The year 1000 approached to no chorus of joy, for as many prophets of the age proclaimed, it seemed that Western man would not survive his first millenium.

Strangely perhaps, technological advance did not
seem to be inordinately affected by such organizational and ideological chaos. Lynn White describes the birth of the stirrup, three-field crop rotation and similarly explosive inventions all of which preceded the 11th century by several hundred years (65). This anomaly, the continuing progress of material innovation within a social structure either static or declining, from this point forward begins to typify the West—much more than the East. The static congruence of later Rome and the early Medieval gave way gradually to incongruence, and then, much later, to the dynamic incongruence of today (of course varying in quality and speed over different regions). While the divine monarchs of Eastern civilizations assured that technology was restrained and applied principally to art, the Western leaders with their pugnacious acquisitiveness never tired of employing novel devices to further their power. However, to continue in the realms of sociocultural paradox, the East developed quite early, amidst less material poverty than is often thought, conceptions of human spirituality and sensitivities which were utterly and forever foreign to the West, yet at the same time failing to rival Europe in mechanical achievements. Thus the ideological element grew into degenerate complexity and subtlety in the East, the technological component flowered without remission or conscience throughout the modern epoch in the West, and organizational developments lagged in both areas (but to different degrees), even now creating the most problems for both worlds. We may assume from this that
Individual creativity may readily find an outlet in either the Eastern or Western directions, but that those who would radically alter social organization (e.g., Cromwell, the philosophes, Lenin, etc.) chose for themselves by far the most difficult arena in which to innovate. As students of complex organizations we find this unsurprising, but in seeking a characterization of social change through history as relying heavily upon individuals, the trichotomous distinction must constantly be kept in mind. It will not do to dismiss the LaPiere-Barnett theory on grounds that large-scale organizational changes have in the past century been the result of many small increments rather than "great man" achievements. Complex organization is new in world history and unless we wish to become completely temperocentric, it is essential to recognize that as early as Gregory the Great, the individual (leader, adviser, soldier, or inventor) had far more difficulty in rearranging social relations than in coming up with novel mechanical devices or mental concepts. This is the nature of social change. Luther rather easily concocted a radicalized theology; he had tremendous difficulty in establishing a viable non-Catholic church which could successfully compete with Rome. Within less than a century after his 95 theses were proclaimed, over 180 Protestant sects had blossomed, the vast majority of which would have met with no approval from their "founder". Examples of this sort are rife through Western history. The fact then is clear: we have been very proficient at thinking up both new
apparatuses and intellectual explanations, but, as in other civilizations, our ability to sensibly organize social relations is nearly always out of step, either somewhat ahead ("open marriage") or behind (feudal demands within contract relations). This seems to hold constant even without regarding the problems of power and privilege, the "who gets what, when, how" dimension of change.

Between Charlemagne and 1100, "history", as chronicled by contemporary observers, remained tied to small and frequent baronial battles. More important for my analysis, the actual distances between levels of the stratification system were usually slight. As Europe climbed its way out of the socio-political chaos left by the complete infiltration of the Roman system by northern peoples and the concomitant dissolution of classical order, there existed insufficient opulence for anyone to exploit very much. However, out of the destruction two positive consequences were in evidence, the conversion of Norsemen into Christian Normans (responsible for major creative input later in history) and the tenuous understanding among the populations that a "Europe" was in the making. (The 9th century historian Nithard first used the term when assessing Charlemagne's impact (66).) From my reading of the period, it seems that key figures working in decidedly innovational roles propelled the West away from Roman decadence and the onslaughts of both Islamic and barbarian invaders. One can say with more certainty about this epoch than of any subsequent one, that
early Europe was the handiwork of specifiable innovators, hardheaded and foolishly courageous types who could look forward to brief and bitter existences, whether or not they sought to inject change into a dismal era.

Among these relatively few but essential figures are the leaders of the Church, generally considered the single force which made any concerted effort to maintain the social fabric of civilization. This is not the corrupt and heavily entrenched Church of the pre-reformation, but a young and still supple social force, hardly yet deserving of the name "organization". Among these early purists was of course St. Benedict. St. Odo, Abbot of Cluny in the 10th century, while preserving the shredded remnants of Western tradition, also began a militantly altruistic monastic movement on the basis of the Benedictine Rule, formulated 400 years earlier. It has been noted that this essentially proto-social work role of the early monks found no counterpart in the East, and before degeneration set in, monasteries served as centers for learning - purely intellectual and secular - and security throughout the troubled times. Moreover, the stigma attached to manual labor so typical of previous civilizations, was almost completely eradicated under the influence of this order, which, as Sombart pointed out, was very likely the root of bourgeois values: hard work, punctuality and thrift. If any organization ever worked in direct contradiction to the sentiment of the culture, it was this one, for it was said that if 99% of the monks were destroyed,
the survivors could reconstitute the entire order piecemeal — and we are left with the impression that precisely this was done on more than one occasion (67).

On the other hand, after paying homage to the positive aspects of medieval ingenuity, it must likewise be remembered that the era seethed with incessant paradoxes and contradictions. Although they retained their older technical skills and added to them, although some of the writers of the period (Boethius, John Scotus, Cassiodorus, etc.) produced laudable tracts on rational governmental theory and semi-modern morality, the strange fact persists: medieval men took some perverse pride in binding themselves to unworkable schemes, preposterous practices, Godlike oaths and ceremonies, only to break loose outlandishly, making a mockery of their self-imposed restraints. Youths fornicated in cathedrals, while "whores prowled for customers, students in holy orders played dice on the altars" (68). It was a time of "fantastic licence and irreverence" compensating for the threat of horrifying sanctions.* "At no time in the world's history has theory, professing all the while to control practice, been so utterly divorced from it" (69).

These contradictions exploded in the 13th and 14th centuries,

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*But these paradoxes and conflicts had their brighter side: "Medieval worldliness led to a growing naturalism, humanism, and individualism that anticipated the Italian Renaissance, and characteristic passion of Western man to savor, know, feel and express all the manifold possibilities of life in the natural world. In short, it promoted a spirit of freedom". Muller, Opus cited, p. 51.
but before the period of Dante's discontent, Europe took asylum from morbid introspection, during the famous 12th century.

As Charles Haskins proved long ago in a famous work (70), whatever was dark about Western (predominantly British and French) (71) civilization dissipated in the blinding light and conviviality of the 12th century. This proto-renaissance was possessed of everything good: a lack of firm national boundaries and the related promotion of cosmopolitanism; intellectual commerce with Islamic and Eastern sources, especially in regaining lost knowledge of Aristotle and Greek culture; an undogmatic clergy linked to an as yet unossified, noncoercive church — concerning, that is, those who were not potential enemies of the Crusaders. But as quickly and wondrously as the clear light of toleration had dawned over the continent, it faded, with the arrival of the bloody and treacherous 13th and 14th centuries. These were years in which seeds of discord were sown that flowered into problems of unmanageable magnitude we still face in our own time. The familiar divisions — church-state, nation-nation, Islamic-Christian, church-intellectual — and other conflictual dichotomies all find their roots in this unforgiving period.

However, both the highspots of glory and the lowest points of cultural and personal despair were basically the province of elites. For the common people, it is reasonable to suppose that life was brief, predictably strenuous and
boring. Thus, when viewing the past with sociological emphasis, those great leaps forward heralded by professional historians very often amount to ideological or organizational changes perpetrated by the upper crust, having only secondary effect upon the masses. As mentioned above, technological change is more democratically represented in history. As White conclusively illustrated (72), from the 7th century onward, innovation in nutrition, warfare, and unrelated manorial technology made possible the production of a delicate surplus economy, paving the way for the urban explosion of the early renaissance. While an intense discussion of technological change during this early period is beyond my scope, it is important to note that Ogburn was at least partially correct in his comparison of mental vs. material constructs.

It seems there was no end to technological improvements, both born of European minds and borrowed from distant cultures (73), but the rate of change in social structure and value processes significantly lagged. Apparently there existed an almost humorous cat and mouse relationship between lord and serf: the lord made a feudal demand upon the vassal's energy, the innovative vassal promptly devised a tool or method with which to shorten or ease his labor so that he might return to his own affairs, the lord "reevaluating the serf's performance", and upping the take, etc. Modern parallels are obvious.*

*In emphasizing the appreciable gap between technological and ideological development, I refer the reader to monographs on warring techniques, e.g. A. Z. Freeman's "Wall-Breakers and River-Bridgers: Military Engineers of the Scottish Wars of Edward I" (74), which emphasize the consummate skill of men engaged in mutual annihilation, but still thoroughly within an intellectually feudal framework, as late as 1307.
The heritage and significance of the middle ages for the modern world comes through most clearly in several familiar terms: Christianity, the classical tradition, the feudal system, and the urban bourgeoisie (75). While the roles of the last three in the slow growth of freedom and innovation do not require comment, perhaps several remarks about the Church and its doctrine are necessary in view of the usually negative response given "supernatural systems" by sociologists.

The first medieval treatise on government, John of Salisbury's *Policraticus*, was inspired by the behavior of the prophets of the Old Testament who rejected their sovereigns, in stipulating that subjects need not obey monarchs who disregarded the law (76). The author of this work was certainly a millennium or so ahead of his time (1159) in calling for legal responsibility on the part of ruling individuals, who within several centuries had assumed the mantle of deity. (Even today it seems behavior in the upper reaches of political life operates for the most part either in pro forma legality or cloaked extralegal maneuvers.) It is important of course to distinguish between the often repressive Church bureaucracy and Christian beliefs, the latter of which animated such radicals as Aquinas, who managed to gain official backing for his rational conceptions of men as possessing free will. On the collective scale, the peasant rebellions which came somewhat later also found intellectual and emotional sustenance in the basic Christian
premises of equality in brotherhood and its logical extension, the value of the individual. Probably most important of the many "liberalizing" sentiments built into Christian dogma was this issue of the individual, his uniqueness and inherent right to certain "natural" prerogatives, although of course most people lived without them, East and West. But as Muller states, "The barbarities of our own time seem worse because of the still-live Christian sentiment that you simply can't do certain things to people" (77). (The most poignant reminder that this spirit does not infect the entire world resides in the Bataan Death March and related ordeals through which the Japanese put their "less than human" captives in the last war. While atrocities in the West often occur, they are inevitably branded as abhorrent aberrations. Such feelings were not normally associated with beast-like aggression in other cultures.)

I made this digression on the spiritual sources of innovation because of the distinctly Western quality of existence which during the medieval emerged in full bloom and was to remain relatively continuous thereafter; and to emphasize the interdependence of innovation and freedom, which thus far has been assumed rather than stated. Without actually doing so, it could easily be demonstrated that the other three factors (classical philosophy - especially Aristotelian -, the feudal system with its incessant conflicts and eruptive nature, and the determined bourgeoisie) all
contributed to the general awareness of the strength of investigation on empirical grounds, which more than anything else determined the prospects and dilemmas of Western life. Such investigations and primitive research were naturally the bailiwick of innovators of one sort or another, and with each passing decade their mental productions multiplied (almost comically), far outdistancing demand.

All the major developments which dominated later history began as inauspicious rumblings during the middle ages, and only recently, very recently indeed, have the most advanced sectors of the West begun operating in a universe of structure, process and values for which the medieval gives few clues as to future trends.

1250 - 1700

Although a cruel and suspicious time, the 13th and 14th centuries excite and stimulate the student of change, even moreso than the preceding epoch. The death throes of medieval social organization were practically complete, and the beginnings of vernacular literature, nationalistic feelings on the parts of many societal members, and growing general intolerance for anything unconventional (particularly within the formalized supernatural system), brought an avalanche of change to Europe.

But more startling than the bloody exchanges between national armies was the unforeseen expansion of minds and purses resulting from trade and consciousness-
expansion imported by the Crusaders, from Byzantine and Islamic sources. The entrepreneur of the 18th and 19th centuries has been immortalized in social history, song and scholarship, but their 14th century precursors, bent on individual accumulation through daring and invention are equally important, simultaneously shocking and delighting different segments of their society. The innovators held center-stage, if not with the clergy, then with the common people as well as with many lords, who began leaning heavily upon Italian, French, Hanseatic and English merchant capital to finance their wars and public works. Men like Tiedemann of Limburg, Nicholas Bartholomew of Lucca, Sir Richard Whittington, and the best known of all, Jacques Coeur, began to give the clergy and the royalty alike reason to fear and admire the quickly entrenched Third Estate (78). These men and their peers began to exercise such power that by the mid-14th century, they clamored for representation in governmental operations, and with the failure of the Hundred Years War to resolve itself, they succeeded in establishing institutionalized statuses for themselves in every major country (79). It is to be emphasized that these men worked with feverish self-imposed regimen. The ideological support of the time they did not have; in fact, like all innovators, they had to operate sub rosa much of the time, being not only the originators of various techniques in trading, navigation, banking, coinage and so on, but also their own advocates in the face of suspicious and counterinsurgent mentalities in both the
First and Second Estates. They had the opportunity, the
courage, and after some wrangling, the means for opening up
trade between East and West, the Baltic and the Adriatic,
and for the most part had to rely for moral and intellectual
reward upon themselves. Although this kind of independent
alteration of social reality is not unique, there had probably
not been an instance of such great import for succeeding
generations as in the case of the merchants and bankers of
the early modern period. Their capital created urban centers,
and as is well-known, everything Western, good and bad, was
born in the ever-growing metropolis.

On the other end of the change continuum, collective
action in its most rudimentary form also flourished. In
Sicily, France, England, the Netherlands and elsewhere,
popular revolts wrought murderous havoc upon recalcitrant
and arbitrary lords. The Sicilian Vespers (from which we have
the word "mafia") was the most spontaneous and brutal, with
the massacre of the occupying French, but other attempts by
the lower class to rectify and soften their wretched condition
were longer in coming, and more difficult to subdue. The
invaluable distinction between revolution and revolt was at
this time unknown, for the first of the great democratic
revolutions, with armies, fully developed ideologies, recogniz­
ed leaders and so on, were far off. The peasant revolts were
tragic lunges by the dispossessed, futilely trying to construct
the social world more equitably, but certain to fail because
of the technology and social organization of the time.
Repression or the simple dwindling of energy and supplies invariably ended the libertarian activities (80). The notion that purposive change as possible and worthy finally reached the masses in the 18th century is only partially correct. The great revolutionists from Cromwell to Lenin shared with the early peasants and their spur-of-the-moment leaders the conviction that reality as given required rearrangement (very often in a regressive direction). What the peasants did not have was the ability to construct or reconstruct a new social fabric, only to destroy the noxious elements wholly, like children confronted with an unsolvable puzzle. But as Engels noted (81), the sheer fanatical zeal of later plebian revolutionaries was foreshadowed clearly in the suicidal battering of social structure performed in this era by the untutored masses.*

By the middle of the 15th century, the world was changing at a rate which must have seemed to many as absolutely "unGodly", which it was. The Papacy was a power, bankers ruled the fortunes of more noblemen than vice versa, the working class grew and developed appropriate sentiments (in some instances capable of being termed a distinct "class consciousness"), and the first series of large-scale, monarchically inspired national wars began in efforts to enlarge

*As is often noted, the Black Death beginning in 1348, killed one-third of Europe's population, and this put a premium on the value of individuals, if for no more enlightened reason than the need of laborers; thus, the further growth of individualism and its inevitable correlate, rationality.
treasuries and gain general esteem. And of course, the renaissance was on, the reformation around the bend. However, in keeping with my focus thus far, I will skirt the well-trodden ground of theological-intellectual history in favor of economic and social change, disregarding the endless arguments of causation: do ideas cause behavior, or reflect behavioral definition? I see in this period the minds of Fuggers and Medici fascinated far more by temporal calculation and invention than religious insights or aesthetic achievement. As a matter of fact, the more artistically inclined the Medici became, the poorer were their returns on the European market.

The impetus for mercantile and consequently social development shifted from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. Antwerp became the banking center of Europe, and economic relations were already so interdependent that a delayed galleon arriving in Lisbon (the receiving port from the East) caused banks to fail in Germany (82). To add to the modern flavor of the era, prices began climbing as gold and silver reached Spain and Portugal in huge quantities, while wages for many remained fixed as relics of feudal agreements. (Tawney documents this phenomenon along with other problems in his *The Agrarian Problem of the 16th Century*.) There is speculation that inflation was also a work of manipulation by the gold-hoarding Spanish government, but the debate is unresolved (83). Meanwhile, technological and navigational innovations of the Portuguese brought misery to Arab middlemen who for years had exacted gigantic taxes and carrying
charges (often over 50%) on the exotic imports from India and China.

However, "spectacular as were the changes caused in the long run by the enlargement of the scope of commerce, it must be emphasized that the discovery of America and the sea route to the Indies did not all at once revolutionize the economic organization of Europe" (84). This was due to the type goods being imported: only the finest and most expensive luxuries, spices and jewels, to name the most popular. Although the upper class clamored for increasing quantities, for the common 16th century participant in economic relations, changes were slow and indirect. But because of the great distance between exorbitant prices and fixed wages, many of the bourgeois merchants had the opportunity to amass wealth, and this capital created the search for investment possibilities of all types. Hunger for the new and profitable in whatever form was fed by innumerable mechanical devices and innovational techniques, especially in "money and banking" and related industrial areas. This is a prime example of the sociological truism that "both/and" explains more accurately than "either/or" when considering cultural change. "Both" cultural milieu, social forces, etc. "and" the presence of independent, untrained and noninstitutionalized innovative talent assured the birth of industrialism during the early 16th century.

The figures concerning industrial growth are staggering. Thanks to Gutenberg, the production of books repr-
sented the first mass production item, and silk, alum mining, ship-building in Venice, among others, followed quickly as factory-based capitalist ventures (85). Strikes among "unionized" journeymen began almost immediately (86), in response to conservative tactics of masters clinging to the dying guild idea of limited membership and the correlate, high prices for goods. As an example of the maddening rush for factory production, Louis XI in 1466 imported 16 Italian silk masters and set them up in Lyons. The city bourgeoisie protested because of preferred treatment given the workers and also out of provincial distrust of foreigners. After being moved to Tours four years later, the business began to explode, and by 1500, more than 800 masters and 4000 workers produced silk for the French nobility in order to keep the King's gold within the borders of France and not in Italy as had been the case before (87). By mid-century, these numbers doubled. The same magnitude of operations obtained in Papal alum mines near Volterra to name but one of the many other European "manu-factories".

Naturally, with industry of this type came the urban proletariat, powerful high-finance tactics, attempted monopolies and cartels, and most of the other incursions into medievalism which have become "natural" in our day. But it is wise to cite still more statistics: out of the 70 million European inhabitants in 1500, only 2 or 3 million labored in capitalist enterprises, and less than a third of these worked in factories, the rest in crafts or home-based
What did occur however, in spite of the figures, was the birth of a new kind of human, the industrial proletariat, whose life in every way differed, in major qualitative terms, from the lives of anyone who preceded them. And this small, cancerous cell of antimedievalism was the joint product of innovating talent in enterprising merchants, bankers, visionary lords, and not least of all, those whose genius made mass production possible. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that nebulous social forces or *Zeitgeist or Mind* coerced or even aided in any way those relatively few individuals* from whose hands came the thousands of technological and organizational changes that would inexorably finalize the death of medieval social structure, and begin the move Maine has described, from status to contract. There is no period so crucial to an understanding of what followed than this period, the renaissance of not only intellectual and antidogmatic fireworks, but the small and barely sustained maneuvers of the few to make changes in centuries-old traditions, or even more difficult, to formulate and institute entirely new procedures.

*I tended to think of history run by impersonal forces. But when you see it in practice you see the differences that the personalities make*, could have been the words of a Medici, Fugger, Chigi or Welser (bankers), of kings, lords, merchants or traders, all of the 16th century; they were spoken by Henry Kissinger in January, 1974. If one substitutes for "personalities" the phrase "innovative actions and thoughts of specific people", my position is capsulized. (*Time*, Feb. 4, 1974, p. 24.)
aimed at unorthodox ends.

A note contra economic determinism: all the evidence points to the royalty and nobility being the actual decision-makers of the period, and the existence of a strangely impotent wealthy class of financial leaders. Apparently the jump from successful businessman to power-wielder was still beyond the conceptual limits of even the most ambitious money-lender. Jacques Coeur and the Fuggers both collapsed at the hands of dynastic monarchs, who without their funds could not have amassed sufficient power to end their benefactors' enterprises!

But this situation was soon to change when revised ideas regarding self, the state, and God began permeating the manipulated bourgeoisie.

As previously stated, the 16th century generally was a time of monumental increase, in population (88), total wealth (89), industry, trade, and size of the known world, emigration within and very soon outside of Europe, and so on. And, as traditional history teaches, the reformation was also a logical philosophic and religious outgrowth of renaissance secularism. Luther is in most estimates considered not only a "great man" but also an innovator of the first rank. With his "discovery" that salvation need not be earned through the application of sacraments performed by a priest, the self-conceptions of the masses altered radically. As the notable, still respected Preserved Smith put it,

Columbus burst the bounds of the world, Copernicus those of the universe; Luther only broke his vows. But...the repudiation of religious vows was the hardest to do at the time, a feat infinitely more impressive to the masses
than either of the former. (90)... That the Reformation strengthened the state was inevitable, for there was no practical alternative to putting the final authority in spiritual matters, after the pope had been ejected, into the hands of civil government. Congregationalism was tried and failed as tending to anarchy. (91)

No matter what motivation is attributed to Luther and Calvin in their world-changing activities, the fact remains that nothing could have pleased the bankers and industrialists more than the demoting of the Papacy and a concurrent boost for individualism and the work ethic. (Cf. Nisbet's Quest for Community.) However, the speedy growth of monarchy and nationalism proved that reformation sentiment was a mixed blessing. The Pope had been much less vigilant about mercantile activities in the most creative, ruthless, accumulating practitioners than the civil governments were to become. It is easy to picture an early 16th century "liberal" trader in his old age blaspheming Luther and the development of states, because of a rise in the sin of sins, the "death of initiative and individualism".

From this point forward in the history of Western social change a subtle blend of individual and collective action is noticeable, but not like the Peasant Rebellions two hundred years earlier. The difference lies in effectiveness, and with the growing secularism destroying Papal Europe, all of the same cloth, with the growth of life's variety, industry, urbanization and numerous other indicators, the value of the individual skyrocketed—formally expressed as humanism, coupled with and mutually supportive of capitalism.
The brief period between 1610 and 1660 is known as both the baroque era and the "age of giants", alleged by more than a few historians to be the two most fruitful and exciting generations of European history (92). Whether or not this enthusiasm is shared, there is little doubt that Spinoza, Milton, James I, Charles I, Cromwell, Hobbes and other of like stature gave a fresh, though often conflicting, tone to an era which saw the irrevocable climax to the drama of medieval dissolution, a phenomenon which began several centuries before. With the crumbling of all feudal restraint, the state by 1660 had become sufficiently reified in common thought that discussions of its "possibility", held in earnest at the beginning of the century, seemed very dated. Although the liberation of intellectual leaders and artistic developments of the era receive more emphasis by historians than the life of the commoners, there is much evidence which illustrates the growing pride of urbanized masses, flaunting ties with the church or the nobles, and turning instead to the state for authority and reward. The very word "statistics" comes from Italy during the 16th century, when it became necessary to tabulate such data, both for taxation and out of general curiosity about population growth (93). The spectacular rise of vernacular literature, from popular drama to penny narratives and the Newgate Calendar records, demonstrates the degree to which commoners partook of "modern" culture and its many outlets, relative to feudal society, for learning and entertainment.
However, Europe at the time was still predominantly nonurbanized (94), and forces behind changing attitudes and behavior originate, of course, in the cities. Only 13 or 14 cities had over 100,000 people, the trading centers still walled in from medieval days, the capitals beginning the familiar urban sprawl. A truly "metropolitan economy", in 1610 barely noticeable, had by 1660 become recognized as an important, advancing mode of financial development. Along with other outcomes of this period, the capitals began for the first time to outdistance trading centers in size and importance, a function of the growing significance of centrally-managed political and economic activities (95).

Patterns which are familiar today originated in this time, the joint-stock companies, trade wars between nations, dare-devil expeditions with solely mercantile ends, and most important, the new and apparently permanent bonds between companies and state military organization were forged. No more was one merchant vying with others in the marketplace; now the finances, prestige and finally, the military might of royalty stood behind the buccaneers. Drake's rape of Spanish shipping in the preceding century was the adventure of a single man, but similar encounters 50 years later a wholly new situation: the English government and its rogues pillaging goods of the Spanish king. In these terms it was difficult to avoid the growth of national sentiment in the populace since the state proved to be the most exciting, honored and fruitful benefactor thus far in European history.
The innovators had torn from the middle ages a social structure dependent upon fealty and trust, man to man, and with their intellectual advances, merchant ventures and industrial inventions, they had perpetrated the formation of central governments with developed bureaucracies.

Three countries, each developing vastly differing modes of social organization, dominate histories of the 17th century - France, England and Holland. The rest of Europe was either in eclipse (Spain and Italy) or in more primitive stages of coalescing (the East). The study of this period provides for the modern sociologist an exercise in revaluation. The absolutism of Louis and William both served the interests of their countries superbly (Louis so much so that France under him became the most powerful nation of Europe, and the first truly modern one); religious sentiments (in no way attached to economic or other secular incentives) were so virulently alive that Germany was devastated during the Thirty Years War and its opponents' treasuries were emptied in the conflict, a war in which modern scrutiny has all the leaders "doing the wrong things", i.e., operating nonrationally; modern science and the discoveries of those luminaries who motivated Whitehead to label the period "The Century of Genius" (96), had almost no effect upon everyday life. (Newton, the undisputed genius of them all, was absolutely unconcerned about practical applications of his insights, and only in the early 18th century were the implications of his formulations appreciated widely.) To put it succinctly,
this century constitutes the birth of the modern era. With the exception of some obvious technological advances, the Europe of 1700 displayed all the elements of society that had come to typify the West two centuries later. But the incredible variety of the period, both in terms of cultural diversity and intellectual confusion makes problematic any effort at brief characterization. The century of Newton also saw Pascal, Milton, and Locke (each of differing impact upon their contemporaries); the birth of science and scientism shared the period with merciless discrimination against heretics and Dissenters (revocation of the Edict of Nantes, etc.) and the high point of blind faith in absolutistic monarchs; radically innovative literature and popular thought (whether in Shakespeare or the Levellers) in 1600 had by the close of the century degenerated into highly formalized, tedious patronage of the powers that be (Racine, Corneille, etc.); and most astonishing, as late as 1683, civilization in the West was threatened by an overwhelming Turkish invasion (200,000 strong) attacking Vienna, the unified response to which has been labeled the "first" world war. The transitions in every field of human endeavor stand out as amplifications and logical extensions of those in both later medieval and the 16th century renaissance-reformation era. Tawney informs us that life for the common man changed relatively little between 1485 and 1640 in England (97) - in spite of the enclosure controversy and related dilemmas growing out of an agricultural economy changing from subsistence to commercial
scale. But with technological advance (inter alia, the telescope, microscope, thermometer, barometer, pendulum clock, air pump (93)) and the new-born fetish for measurement; with such ambivalent personalities as Lord Praise-God Barebone (99) trying to rationalize Cromwell's Protectorate over Britain, thereby offering into history a unique British construct: the loyal opposition; with feudal remnants all around and modern genius refusing to allow time to stand still, life became so relativized and under-structured for many as to make 18th century absolutism a "logical" outcome.

Holland was peculiar insofar as her hardy and unrestrained bourgeoisie lived with the protection of governmentally-assured freedom to a degree otherwise unheard of at this time. The most limited knowledge of painting in the period tells the tale: court portraits and religious motifs in France and Spain, as opposed to the matchless bourgeois-inspired realism of Rembrandt (1606-1669) and many lesser men in Amsterdam. The burghers' hard-headed acquisitiveness continued unabated, which directly or indirectly assured a degree of popular freedom and democratic achievement unparalleled in Europe; and not emulated until the founding of this country. (The un-Godly behavior of these merchant folk so infuriated the more pious Spanish that in 1568, the entire "heretical" population of the Netherlands was condemned to death by Philip II (100).) But, alas, with only 2 million people, the tendencies of the Dutch did not effect a sea change in governmental and civil rights practices throughout the continent.
At this point it becomes necessary to review in brief the place of the innovator in what had become an ever "complexing", persistently enriched cultural milieu. As I stated in the beginning of this section, innovational activities have met with varying degrees of success in the distinguishable epochs of Western history, although their unorthodox quality has met with less automatic disapproval here than in the East. We remember that the individuals who reshaped Europe between 400 and 1000 worked against intolerably poor odds, and only with the growth of the Church in the 11th century did civilization in Europe find a stalwart and permanent influence regarding its survival. In the 13th and 14th centuries, apparently no-one stood to have lasting influence. Incessant wars and the Crusades plus the Black Death and gross insecurity among most societal members, make those few innovators who did produce significant change seem uncommonly lucky.

However, as every schoolboy once knew, what made renaissance man different from the medieval mold was the astoundingly high opinion he held of himself. This courage to institute alterations in all levels of existence - which later reached epidemic proportions - boosted Luther and friends into revaluating the place of a staid Church in the spiritual (and consequently, secular) lives of men. The ideology of the reformation produced high levels of literacy so necessary to later developments in history, along with
sundry other monstrously important changes, all of which were of course outside Luther's purview. Subsequent victories for the individual were less sweet, for the birth of personal rationalism and the scientific method came hand in hand with increasingly depersonalized governments, so that as Fromm (perhaps exaggerating) noted, man in the medieval "felt himself secure and safe" (101), and the birth of nation states and intense bureaucratization minus feudal obligations created general malaise. Again the individual innovator tread sensitive soil when propounding the new: Galileo was forced to retract his findings, "Lutherans hounded the pious Kepler, Calvinists exiled Grotius, Jews excommunicated Spinoza, Anglicans silenced Hobbes and burned his books, Jesuits got the works of Descartes put on the Index" (102).

With the beginning of the 18th century, the aberrant creative soul began to find himself once again in workable surroundings, after a tenuous century and a half of arbitrary response from the powerful, religious, and small-minded - in many cases one in the same. The history of the democratic revolutions and the results of those mass movements in the 19th century are common enough: that I will not enumerate details, even to the slight degree I have done so thus far. What needs to be mentioned in reference to developments over the following 250 years are several broad trends, each of which affected innovative talent thoroughly.

Our knowledge of the past three centuries is in most instances copious, especially when compared to the eras just
surveyed. The history of invention alone occupies many volumes, even excluding the cataract of achievements in this century. But as mentioned before, technological innovation came into its own as a prized and laudable activity shortly after the "Century of Genius", and henceforth has met with far more acceptance than earlier innovators would have thought possible. Our attention therefore shifts (and in this we differ somewhat from LaPiere's fascination with material improvements) to ideological and (especially) organizational innovation.

The English Puritans and their spiritual allies, the Dissenters and related free-thinking religious groups hit upon the then shocking conception of life as purposively improveable, and not necessarily dictated by royalty. When Charles I lost his head in 1649, the first utterly secular government went into rocky operation for slightly more than a decade, protesting all the while its Godfearing intentions. But when Cromwell died and the Restoration came, the newer line of monarchs realized that levels of expectation among the people (for the time being most catered to in the nobility) were such that pigheaded absolutism was no longer a healthy practice. The line of Georges, famed for their ineptitude and lack of tact, were all the British needed to begin utilizing, almost by chance, the services of a Prime Minister and cabinet. In France the excesses of Louis XIV had begun to wear upon the patience of both the merchants and noble butterflies, compelled to spend lavishly in their court
existences, so that his death marked the beginning and the end of his inimitable style. Changes in values forced the ruling powers, whether the King, Parliament, clergy or nobility, to continuously offer demonstrable proof to their subjects that their authority was legitimate. This concern with mass approval ("consensus formation"), if even at first of a nominal variety, was something antithetical to the teaching of Louis XIV. and his able ministers, and while England had never suffered under such bombastic absolutism, even for Elizabeth, the concept of "accountability" would have been repugnant. Whether or not one agrees with Weber and many others that ideas are capable of propelling individuals to social action, or adheres to the opposing Marxist-Mannheim understanding of ideological justifications, this fact is clear, without establishing causality: by the beginning of the 18th century, the bourgeoisie in all countries (except Spain), the increasingly literate masses of both the urban proletariat and peasant class, and many of the nobles whose fortunes languished because of outmoded restraints on their activities, all conceived of the monarch and the central government in increasingly rational terms. Newton’s formulations, which to him seemed irrelevant to larger issues, had begun the usual process of filtering down to mundane levels, to such an extent that Voltaire as spokesman of rationality enjoyed a readership in the hundreds of thousands, beginning in 1733 with his outrageous Letters on the English. The people, not only the idle rich, found time to read and idolize
the author of Candide, and his influence on popular issues - often religious or political - reached a height unknown to any other writer, past or present, with the qualified exception of Mao. He produced 15,000 words per day at times and his hyper-rationalism, free of any shred of doubt about the possibility of men shaping their existences, has thoroughly permeated the French to this day, not to mention the rest of the Western "democracies".

History from this point is neatly divided into major conflicts, either between nations or between classes or interests within individual countries (external vs. internal wars). The politically dormant but intellectually bright period of the first half of the 18th century, as we all know, finally culminated in the most innovative of all collective behavior, the violent overthrow of a government too slow in recognizing the liabilities inseparably linked with feudal Weltanschauungen. The study of the French Revolution alone tells one a great deal about the dynamics of this style change. First, there must be urban centers filled with semi- or non-literate, manipulable, disenfranchised masses, whose patience with piecemeal reform has been exhausted and who have suddenly felt the agony of yet another setback to improving their lives. Secondly, there must exist intellectual leaders and spokesmen of the masses, who almost invariably originate in the bourgeoisie, and whose movement and speech are for whatever reasons permitted by the incumbent rulers. Finally, there must obtain an incredibly obtuse governmental bureaucracy or oligarchy
whose skills and resources in both co-optation or oppression are unequal to the task of any longer containing the wrath of the collective, and whose claims to legitimacy have time and again been shown to be unfounded. Only with these conditions as a minimum can the large-scale (or inclusive) political revolution (as opposed to palace coups, etc.) meet with success. As is well known, the vast majority of revolutions have failed even in an attempt to gain control, to say nothing of their ideologically utopian goals for rectifying wrongs of the society. No matter whose analytical framework one uses in assessing the etiology or lasting effects of revolutions, whether Brinton, Lyford Edwards, Leo Gotteschalk, Davies, Gurr, or Eckstein (103), inter alia, for the typical societal member, the chances are good that immediate benefits from upheavals will not be in the offing. Collective social change of the revolutionary sort "devours its own children", and in its efforts to fully institutionalize its "challenge ideology", no-one is safe from arbitrary repression. The enormous literature on revolution attests to at least this much.

After Napoleon's demise, Europe's leaders (particularly Castlereagh and Metternich) were very quick in taking steps to prevent another Bastille (104). Counter-revolutionary tactics of every nature were employed all over Europe between Waterloo and the general continental revolutions of 1848, the most wide-spread and glorious of failures in collective action. An anomalous situation prevailed: on the one hand there was
an almost universal disgust and fear over the wanton destruction during the later stages of the French Revolution; on the other, factions from different strata of the social structure and for diverse reasons were strident in their support for liberalism and the "sensibility" of gradual eradication of social ills. Out of this dizziness, bastard ideologies grew, romanticism, methodism, and pietism (105) all gaining large support, along with a generalized reactionary mood in favor of royal restoration. But the dialectic of European modernization see-sawed with amazing speed between extremes, and by 1830 revolutions again shook Europe, for much the same reasons that the late 18th century American and French internal wars had come about. However, because of the strength of the still viable aristocratic landowners and other reactionary elements (particularly in Britain), these upheavals of the mid-revolutionary period met with failure. (One historian has claimed that the only difference between the 1830 and 1848 revolutions was this lingering ability of the conservative elements to fight back (106).)

By this time the liberal humanitarian doctrine had gained such a following (and concurrently, radically-inspired bloodshed of earlier years was still repugnant) that members of the ruling classes began piecemeal reforms which were the precursor to the modern art of co-optation, in draining off from the revolutionary factions both leadership and popular support (107). At this point and for the next century and a quarter, somehow the notion entered the minds of leaders and
followers alike that French-style revolution had become a no-win game, or at best, one of diminishing returns. Political organization on the part of rulers grew much tighter and their techniques of coercion and repression advanced in sophistication geometrically while social improvements for the disenfranchised lumbered along the gradualist route. Nevertheless, a new mode of change became necessary.

The enormous growth of urban centers and the expansion of communication (for example, the repeated attempts to establish in England a radical, working-class newspaper between 1810 and 1830, finally culminating in cheap Sunday papers around 1840 (108)), along with the ever increasing interest in socio-economic matters among the traditionally dormant lower classes, gave rise to the social movement (or segmented revolution), the tool of the collectivity for social change. The prerequisites for successful social innovation of this type are several: (1) a high level of general frustration and dissatisfaction, but of such a nature that the potential participants recognize the (Mills') connection between personal problems and public issues; (2) this frustration must become focalized - pure anomic despondency has been in evidence throughout history, but social movements have not; (3) urban concentration of a literate and politicized mass; (4) at least a rudimentary understanding of secondary behavior; the most essential move from Gemeinschaft- to Gesellschaft-thinking, necessary to an acceptance of complex organization; (5) rapid and efficient mass communication
(certainly one of the handicaps of the earliest attempts at such organization was the lack of telecommunications); (6) the capacity to create a separate definition of social reality and out of this, a hypothetically rearranged social organization; (7) the early emergence of strong leadership. The real key however, as mentioned before, is also the reluctance of the conservative interests to utilize brute repression (the predominance of "foxes"), the use of which would doom any social movement in its infancy. (This formulation is a composite of the findings of Hadley Cantril, Hans Toch, Brinton and other well-known interpreters of collective political action.)

Even if the social movement can formulate an appealing "challenge ideology" - as opposed to the institutionalized ideology (or simply, "institution") of the status quo - it faces a multitude of organizational problems. The mortality rate for movements is extremely high, as it proceeds through each of the four basic stages: social unrest, popular stage, stage of formalization, and institutionalization. Without going into detail, a few remarks may be in order regarding each of these stages (again, drawn from prominent theorists). Most movements fail to emerge from the first stage of social unrest, since one or more of the prerequisites listed above are not in evidence.

The popular stage is characterized by the focalization of general distaste for the status quo, very often through the "discovery" - by the emergent leadership - of a scapegoat.
A martyr at this point is almost essential in order to garner support among the uncommitted, but interested, masses. (The powers that be if of any sophistication will naturally do everything possible to avoid creation of martyrs, and will go so far as to disallow the opposition to fabricate one—a tactic not unknown to enterprising movement leaders.) The infighting will become extremely heated and through something of a Darwinian selection process, the most adept will rise to the top and immediately begin pamphleteering, beginning dissemination of "The Word", usually in capsulized slogans. The leaders make certain that the impression is left with the followers of overwhelming external popular support for their cause(s). Rostering begins and the "historical invincibility" of the movement is proclaimed. Coinciding with these aggressive moves, the establishment is provoked into confrontation. An initial defeat usually ends the future of the movement, either due to leadership loss, or because (as Bismarck did with such skill) the ideological position of the challengers is neatly included in the program of the dominant interests. If the actual aims of the movement are purely ideological (as the anti-war movement of the 60's apparently was), then eradication of the issue dissolves the movement; but often radicals in search of a cause merely gravitate to another of the (many) possible areas which require rectification.

The movement during the formalization stage has already been more successful than most, and its ideological line
changes from the inclusive, all-encompassing demands which typify revolutions, to the more tractable segmental definition: change of one particular social evil or institution. The choice of this stolid institution is a delicate one and not always so simple as one might think, for if the institution is a paper tiger and insufficient moral indignation is aroused by its obtuseness, then the movement will founder for lack of a detestable enemy. Additional factors come under consideration: for instance, high social mobility or simple geographic mobility are both bad for any movement. Captive audiences tied to distasteful statuses and locations make the best movement personnel — which is one of the reasons for the poor organizational qualities displayed by the student activists of the last decade. Also in the minds of the leaders is the necessity to reformulate the movement line in more absolutistic, personalized and simple terms so that complex problems can be relegated to easy solutions. Large and nonpersonalizable evils (e.g. population problems) are nearly impossible to use as bases for movement activity. At this point too those intellectuals and others with non-standardized information become disenchanted with the simplistic panaceas offered by the leaders, and defect. An officially prescribed ideology is formulated along with a multitude of procedural regulations pertaining to the movement members, referred to by this time as the "elect". Goals are made specific and time-tables set.

The leader of the formalized movement will have about
him two types of assistants, the philosophers of the movement and the instrumental lieutenants. Below these are the regional and cell leaders, who are trained in the art of managing mass demonstrations. They do this in such a way as to completely avoid the possibility of members conversing, seminar style, so they might not discover (to their amazement!) that their supposedly shared goals and values are not so homogeneous as the leadership would like them to believe. An assumption of tremendous camaraderie is allowed to build up among the membership, and the meetings of members take on a carnival, good-time atmosphere, utterly foreign to the extreme rationality going on in the small leadership enclaves. One of the leaders' major concerns is of course funds, with which they purchase regalia helpful in creating consensusformation among the members, plus other obvious expenses, and without which the entire operation collapses.

A subtle shift begins within the ranks. Those fiery, effusive types for whom the movement in its infancy was an emotional outlet give way to more bureaucratic souls, willing to take orders and whose intellectual-emotional commitment to the movement is of a more predictable sort. The maintenance of cell conformity across the board is essential, otherwise factional strife will sap the movement of its combative strength. Therefore discipline must be maintained, and to do so, some fratricidal techniques are employed.

Finally, the movement will meet with success and gain the changes as originally conceived, or modified along
the way, thereby reaching institutionalization; or it will meet the established order in final confrontation and be crushed.

In order to appreciate adequately the impossibility of another "classical" social movement taking place in this country or in parts of Europe, the individual personality of the cell participant requires examination. Even in the days of a relative abundance of social movements, leaders (who typically are extremely intelligent and capable men, not the raving lunatics portrayed popularly) had a devilish time maintaining internal cohesion within the movement, especially as it grew. Those who participate in the cells are constantly reminded of their ingroupness, ethnocentrism and general rightness in the ways of the world. The member must buy the national or regional ideology at the cell level, so it must become at once highly personalized, but general: i.e., simple and sloppily applicable. As Cantril put it, the cell is the "microcosmic element of the movement", and the internal discipline and social control - usually through peer-pressure - is rewarded with heavy emotional payoffs as to being "in the know" and correctly aligned with ultimates. In brief, the "true believer" is as much at home in the cell meeting as he would be in prayer meeting.

It is at once obvious that the marginally informed, or more ably phrased, the "selectively informed" individuals who fill the rosters must adhere in thought and action to definitions of reality (at least regarding those segments
Social movements do not traffic in moral and intellectual gray areas. The remarks of the leaders are in keeping with strong value positions on every issue or possible issue (something Nixon does naturally) in an effort to avoid dealing with the specific and controversial: the mouthing of slightly programmatic abstract sentiments. The point of my thesis then is largely concerned with the degree to which a leader (who must be simultaneously "one of us" and "above it all") can elicit from his personnel unthinking absolutistic behavior; and correlative, how much the modern mentality will accept prefabricated, highly subjectivistic and empirically inaccurate assessments of reality.

The last real social movement in this country was King’s civil rights movement. A man of great intelligence and consummate organizational skills, even he finally failed (long before his death) to knit together a thoroughly effective collective mode of social change. To begin with, the opposition had, at least at the outset, everything going its way: the laws, moral sentiments of the populace, social control agencies, etc. But even more problematic than King’s enemies were some of his allies, the white intellectual spokesmen who worked for understanding on the part of middle America. In order to retain their aid (which certainly effected change, in the same way Victorian female crusaders aided in the reeducation of patrician England vis a vis the poor) King had to concur with their intellectual notions of
equality. But in order to simultaneously retain his black followers' zeal and self-sacrifice, he was forced to assume the ministerial posture of simplistic emotionalism. Towards the end of his work he faced more and more the accusation of absolutists (on both sides): "two-faced", which of course he was out of plan and necessity.*

*Closely related to these observations about the "last real social movement in the U.S." are current speculations about the situation of blacks today and what, if anything, they are doing en masse. To answer this, I attended recently a brilliant sermon-lecture by the acknowledged "leader" of blacks today, Jesse Jackson, whose topic at Amherst College (March 6, 1974) was "Black Capitalism: Myth or Reality".

His hortatory techniques were flawless and extremely reminiscent of his mentor and patron, Martin Luther King (whose daughter, Yolanda, was in the audience - she attends Smith college nearby) but his ideological line was utterly different. In brief: the civil rights movement is completely dead since "civil rights are a foregone conclusion". What is needed now is hard work, thrift, investment, the study of economics, control of media through ownership of outlets, cessation of senseless consumerism by exploited blacks, an end to the black bourgeoisie pseudo-African heritage cult, etc. Jackson had recognized two facts which he did not reveal directly to the audience: (1) repression by the state has ended the possibility of violent black revolution, as in the assassination of Panthers, to cite the most blatant case. (2) The black population is too well educated and becoming increasingly attracted to American material existence to be sincerely attracted to a King-styled quasi-religious movement. Jackson's brilliance as a demagogue took these two severe liabilities vis a vis a social movement and turned them to an advantage, all the while continuing his use of movement lingo and the inextinguishable message of black pride: "God didn't send us over here to be the slaves of white folk; we were sent over here to save humanity from the foolishness and incompetence and greed and emptiness of the white man's practices. Only the black people can save the system. We are chosen to be the saviors of humanity and we will not allow the white man to drive the car over the cliff with his wife in the front seat, his children in the back seat and the black folk locked in the trunk".

Increasingly atomistic Weltanschauungen have enveloped the most capable blacks in the U.S. and they no longer need or desire pseudo-Gemeinschaft camaraderie within constraining movement apparatus. They seek segmented lives as much as their class peers who are white. No-one knows this better than Jackson.
Speaking from experience, I may add to these reflections some "data" concerning student political activism of the recent past. Many an intelligent and eager undergraduate had severe problems with himself and his peers when he tried sincerely to "go active" and yet maintain some sense of individual intellectual and moral autonomy. SDS meetings and the like were exercises in unanimous frustration: on one hand, everyone cared very much for intellectually vigorous and sophisticated political behavior, but on the other, were faced with the necessities for collective action. The old organizational route was immediately repellent given the history of party politics in this and other countries, but no serious substitute was discovered, thus the birth of politics-by-antics in Rubin et al.

Moreover, in conversation with a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts visiting from Free University in Berlin, the situation in Europe has taken the next logical step. Rather than dissolve the concept of change through collective behavior (as I suggest), the German collegiate population has renewed its efforts to "unlearn what it already knows to be true", an unenviable and probably impossible task. It seems a renewed dogmatism is being foisted upon the student body by radical leftist leaders, and recalcitrant nonbelievers in the straight Marxist formula for modern living, paradoxically, flee to the U.S. to find less regulated intellectual air!

Thus in the past 600 or so years, social change through
innovation has come full circle, from the early, damnable merchants and bankers of the late medieval and the independent renaissance-reformation individualists combatting both Church and royalty, to the successful collective change instituted by Cromwell's group and subsequent mass movements of either the inclusive or segmental variety, and finally back to the reappearance of the relatively unattached innovative member of post-modern culture.

I have concentrated upon political change in the last few pages. To use Raymond Williams' trichotomy, "democratic" and "industrial" revolutions have both been subject to changes and study of them has continued relevance regarding the limits of social change on the large scale. More difficult to deal with are "cultural" revolutions, traditionally involved with modulations in quantity and quality within the realm of Kultur. As Williams' own work illustrates (109), the sociologist can shape a methodology suitable to the examination of art (serious and pop) within social structure with much profit. However, I would like to expropriate his term and redefine "cultural revolution" to mean not only change within the aesthetic institution, but far more broadly, to include change in the educational, recreational, kinship and supernatural institutions as shaped by the innovator in ways described above. As mentioned earlier, the problems for innovation within these major structural components of post-modern culture reside not so much in external pressures for conformity as in
the individual inertia socialized into societal participants and seldom brought to the level of "critical consciousness". It is clear that innovative behavior within kinship relations, for example, is relatively free from severe external threat which of course did obtain in premodern and early modern periods.

However, as Marxists and the like are quick to point out, the ability of people to innovate within both these institutions and the remaining ones (economic, political-governmental, stratificational) very often hinges upon the ability to perfect inequities and irrationalities within the system (e.g., funds, power, prestige are necessary to some types of innovation). It is one thing to recombine existing cultural traits into a revised approach to religion (something which has been done incessantly since man's beginning), but something else to independently restructure the social control forces already in the hands of centrally-managed governments.

This and related arguments in favor of large-scale social change (or its frequent correlate, sabotage and terror), suffer from the illusion of establishment size and strength typical of left-wing and right-wing organizational thinking, the product of minds bent upon magnifying the evil of their opponents through reification in order to enhance their zeal or sense of accomplishment (cf. Lipset and Raab, The Politics of Unreason). Complex organization is both strong and weak, and one of the first lessons to be learned by the modern innovator when dealing with these three institutions (which
serve as the Marxists' nemesis) is to locate the many weaknesses and quietly begin work in those quarters. While emotional satisfaction may be gained by confronting armed employees of the established order, those interested in genuine change are found more often (if discovered at all!) operating through "approved" channels, but with personally-defined subversive, rational ends. They have discovered that life is too short to allow the use of any other technique. (The innovative process is of course more complex and difficult to characterize than is apparent in the above sentences, but for purposes of broad distinction, it will suffice at this point.)

As for the "cultural revolution" as defined by scholars in the sociology of art, knowledge and beliefs: the changes in the arts over the past 300 years have very closely followed (or anticipated) historical events, as closely that is as art can emulate social change without becoming state-sponsored propaganda. But as popularizers such as Toffler and scholars like Milton Albrecht, Wylie Sypher and Raymond Williams have shown (110), alterations within the arts have recently sped up at an ever increasing rate, so that for instance, the novel (first conceived in the early 18th century and only in the last 25 years coming under severe critical attack as being anachronistic) lasted 250 years; entire schools of today come and go along with their unique definitions of art in one or two seasons. The complete works of Balzac or Dickens or Trollope run easily over 30 volumes and required maniacal
dedication to produce; the complete works of our greatest current writers seldom exceed a half-dozen books and are usually the product of one "stage" in his life (before he went into film, painting or race-car-driving). The guitar has replaced the piano and violin as the most popular musical instrument in the U.S. A moderately talented soul can perform impressively on the guitar within months; violin and piano technique come after years, and sometimes not even then. (For examples ad nauseum, see Toffler.)

But here again, and perhaps more here than in any other institution, individual innovation consistently produces the fresh, new and imitated. It is intriguing to speculate if other institutions (those "more critical" to the continuance of the social system, to paraphrase Parsons (111)) were as relatively unstructured and unbureaucratized as the aesthetic, would the paucity of innovative productions be alleviated somewhat.
CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS OF CULTURE-WIDE INNOVATION

There are currently many innovators of the type described here operating quietly within post-modern cultures. But their numbers are not yet large enough to eclipse in importance the great mass of societal members who willingly, "unreflectively" buy the legitimated ideological and material package offered them from earliest socialization. Since this is the case in even the most enlightened populations, in those sectors of the world still in primitive and neo-modern stages, the number of innovators is probably negligible. However, with the growth of education (as opposed to indoctrination) and the concomitantly sophisticated culture which develops in league with it, there will be more and more individuals selectively rejecting those prescriptions for thought and behavior which they find personally objectionable. That this should someday become the norm seems entirely reasonable, unless technological advance is further shackled by capitalist interests, and the continuing fraud of "scarcity" is forced ad nauseam upon the consumer. Whether this development is only "reasonable" or also "reasonable and good" will now be examined from a variety of positions: from that of the individual trying to make the transition from societal member to social actor; from that of the "social system", approached
necessarily in slightly reified form; and from this writer's viewpoint as the product of thinking and reading over some time on what has come to be an exciting and perplexing theoretical area.

The distinction I am making between the societal member and the social actor is of enormous consequence for the persons involved in the actual transition. There are a multitude of dichotomies which might be offered by way of illustrating this crucial series of mental and emotional changes which precede alterations of actual behavior. Of all the possible antipodes, the clearest is the difference between a life of predictable and anxietyless regularity versus an existence which is constantly under the scrutiny of the innovational mind, a life of experimentation, institutional modification and what can become a threatening amount of ambiguity about "selves" in various settings. Recently when I taught a group of undergraduates the rudiments of the theory, many of them balked at this point, not understanding how one could possibly extricate himself from the "web of beliefs" and behaviors which any culture imposes as a matter of course. In order to cross finally this gap in understanding, I used the blackboard and drew in enormous letters the word "EGO", explaining to them that I intended this to be understood in the popular sense, that an individual is "egotistic". Although egocentricity, selfishness and the many related terms are used almost exclusively in this culture with pejorative connotations, it must be understood that the prime qualification for any
innovator is an unshakable belief in the value of his actions and the relative "dys-value" of alternatives. That this behavior, in no great need of consensual validation, requires a resilient and self-reliant ego, is so basic to the theory that it may easily be overlooked, understressed and therefore not appreciated sufficiently.

Robert S. Lynd in *Knowledge for What* used to much advantage the work of Karen Horney. If I may copy him now, it could help clear the necessity for complete understanding of this idea, that the innovator is "self"-ish, meant etymologically. According to Horney, "Human behavior institutionalizes itself in four paths of attempted escape from anxiety", either by (1) rationalizing anxiety in the Freudian sense of blaming someone else; (2) denying the existence of anxiety; (3) narcotizing anxiety "by drowning it in hard work, slogans, drink, excitement, or by purchasing a shiny new car"; and (4) avoiding anxiety. If these subterfuges fail, then we utilize four alternatives: (1) "We seek reassurance through affection; (2) submissively seek the cover of identification with some traditional source of authority; (3) have recourse to power-tactics and redoubled aggression; or (4) we may withdraw within ourselves". Although composed in 1937, that description is still quite useful when considering American societal members. It is less useful in the consideration of social actors, as I intend the term. All of the above tactics in the interest of emotional self-preservation and a shot at the American dream of happiness, assume (in the traditional
psychiatric mode) that the individual must "adjust" to the
social environment with some success in order to insure a
"healthy" self-image and to gain contentment. I counter this
conservative bias with the thought that "adaptation" is more
to the liking of the innovator. In precise terms, the innov­
ator serves no institutions above himself, and, when the
conditions are amenable, he will reverse the usually relation­
ship of power and prerogative between himself and the sanc­
tioned social processes. Institutions are ways of getting
certain necessary jobs done by the supposedly efficient
organization of behavior. The innovator in almost all cases
was in mind redefinitions of those "ways" to suit his partic­
ular and (to the degree possible) unique socio-historical
position and personality. When an individual steps outside
the positively sanctioned mental constructs of his culture,
then steps back in long enough to announce the bankruptcy
and incorrectness of its major institutions, he is implying,
to put it mildly, that his perception of the inadequacy (as
a function of his knowledge and experience) is better than
the perceptions of anyone else. "Better" in this case means
the doing of something with minimum irrationality built into
the process.

What is being emphasized here is the undeniably high
regard in which the innovator holds himself, at least when
the process of innovation itself is at stake. There can be
no subtle disclaimers or qualifications associated with a
newly proposed life-style, invention or other type innovation.
(The innovator's proposed contribution must of course be susceptible to objective assessment; for his "high regard" for self is based on a willingness to view himself and his work in terms of accuracy and feasible applicability. He is more than a free-wheeling eccentric.) To those societal members of tender sensibilities, the self-assertiveness and downright brashness for which innovators historically are known will largely nullify his effect upon them. This is where the advocate (in LaPiere's terms) serves his indispensable purpose, making palatable for the unenlightened what in its raw form very often approaches treason, vulgarity and the acme of bad taste. The innovator whose target is a distorted structure of social relations, is by definition "bad taste" personified. (However, at least in some instances, the innovator is forced to serve as his own advocate when no-one else is available for the unenviable task.) So, by extension, if a societal member decides however gradually to move into the position of social actor, the first and most important step is the development of a powerful ego (which has little to do with egotism). To quote Saul Alinsky on this point, keeping in mind however his tangential usefulness as a model of all innovators since his area is exclusively collective action, he writes under "Ego" in Rules for Radicals:

Throughout these desired qualities is interwoven a strong ego, one we might describe as monumental in terms of solidity. ...Ego is unreserved confidence in one's ability to do what he believes must be done. (112)

Although this has the religious quality one would expect from a "crusading" organizer, it nonetheless underscores my point.
Movement leaders, however, must incorporate into their self-as-leader a heavily nonrational component with which to "stir" the masses, etc., which would be diminished or nonexistent in many other types of innovators.

As in many things, the development of such a durable self-image is much easier discussed than implemented. It is a common tenet in most schools of psychology and psychiatry that our personality or its important components are well developed at an early age. Some of the transactional theorists now speculate that the "Adult" may be firmly ensconced by the age of 10 months (!), while other writers suggest prenatal influences on personality (113). Connected with this belief is the correlate that personality is very difficult to change significantly after childhood, the basic capabilities of the individual being somewhat immutable, that later socialization will affect only the tip of the iceberg. While for the sake of polemics, I could argue exactly the opposite tack, I will instead embrace the "middle way". It would seem that some of our basic characteristics go unchanged throughout major situational and maturational variation. But there is still enough crucial "material" left beyond those relatively minor areas to facilitate the development and operation of an innovator through resocialization of whatever method. (This assumes the exclusion of that very uncommon childhood, one in which a wide range and diversity of stimuli were presented as "normal" from the earliest point in the development of personality, e.g., progeny of artist-intellectuals whose
home(s) is often filled with obviously innovational types.) This does not so much dodge the issue as give credence to both views, the overly psychologistic and the overly sociologistic, neither of which alone satisfactorily explain human behavior.

But beyond "inherent" limitations and the further lacunae created by early socialization, there remains the monumental problem of convincing the societal member that much of what he has viewed as given is only as given as he is reticent in questioning it, in not viewing it historically and in not thinking of its givenness in relativistic terms. Then and if the member crosses the conceptual barrier between "personal problems" and "public issues" (Mills), that moment can signal the birth of his action-centered existence. With a highly personal understanding of the fact that men create their society, the societal member begins the shift from passive congruence to active incongruence (to modify LaPiere), and the possibility of his becoming an apostle of change is heightened.

Besides this initial perception of the possibility of social change through personal effort, there remain other key necessities to the development of the innovator. He must have extended periods of leisure time in which to work on plans, literally or mentally, other time in which to test his hypotheses (in many cases a process taking years), and to varying degrees, he might require the assistance of significant others (often other innovators, a source of
scarce, new ideas). It becomes obvious why this theory does not apply to premodern cultures in which the necessities of life still take center stage in the allocation of energy. The idea of "post-modern" culture holding within it the seeds for intense creativity stems from this rudimentary fact, that the hungry, tired and worried man does not sit idly for hours and reflect or ponder over "problems", either personal, aesthetic or social, which only he or a few others consider problematic to begin with. But the fallacious assumption that affluence is not only necessary but also sufficient for creativity is too often made. Mentioned much earlier was the high incidence of paradox concerning innovators. This is another: their richest field of possible endeavor is in post-ascetic culture, but that same culture has to date succeeded in producing "the lonely (uncreative) crowd" along with much parlor talk about "creativity", as in the case of missus matching the blue wall-to-wall with the yellow drapes. A culture of Michelangelos we are not. However, to reshape society into more rational and satisfying patterns requires a different sort of creativity than reshaping marble into the "Pieta", so all is not lost.* With the ever increasing complexity of culture, the ideas necessary for far-reaching, significant change become proportionately less magnificent in scope or intensity without losing their effectiveness.

* To proceed dialectically, I do not embrace the "technophobic" view, e.g. Ellul's Technological Society, although as the poetry of individualistic protest against absurd rationalization, such books have uses.
The invention of the cog was a footnote to the wheel, and certainly easier, less grand, less intense an application of intelligence. But the effect over time has certainly been as great for the "footnote" as for the original statement of genius.

The societal member moving towards an active life of change must temporarily forego the standardized "positive reinforcement" dished out by the culture at various levels for more or less conforming behavior. The aforementioned "ego-strength is indispensable of course, but more than that there must be a healthy conception of self which transcends the most basic of socially concocted needs: for approval.

Harry Stack Sullivan defined schizophrenia as the holding of a world-view which required or made possible for its holder "consensual validation" from one's peers and associates. For at least a brief time, while working in the white-heat of "rationality", the innovator will be subject not only to a lack of warmth and companionship (if his innovation is genuinely radical) but also to the inverse, dislike and suspicion. The social dialectic, between the conformity necessary to the maintenance of a social order, and nonconformity every bit as necessary for the generation of radical perception and action, is the central problem for the innovator. If the transactional analysts are even close in their assessment of how the personality operates, we see that the prohibitive, parent-centered nature of social control practically assures the death or diminution of child-produced excitement, and
the correlated adult-controlled innovation, which grows from an unhampered enthusiasm for the new. There has never been a culture which championed innovation, any more than there has ever been a war fought in the interests of kindness. But the post-modern scenario unintentionally does make possible more innovation at more levels than any previous culture, if those who would experiment with the untried can extricate themselves sufficiently from the socially-constructed needs which typify the societal member. To further complicate the matter, there is this issue: if the innovator is not directly impeded by his peers, he must remember to allow them the privilege of bestowing their approval upon his work. This does not actually gratify the innovator very much - his gratification is mostly self-generated when and if he is successful - but this kind of behavior does keep open possible lines of communication to the outside world, something critical for the acceptance of the new formulation.

Given the nature of higher education at some of the best schools, along with an increasingly relativistic orientation permeating the entire culture, the production of innovating minds should reach "record levels" unless the post-modern situation suddenly and irrevocably regresses. And from all indicators, that is unlikely, even given the temporary shortages, real or contrived. With organized religion, the Protestant Ethic, traditional family structure, community, the almost monarchical absolutism of central governments all on the wane throughout the more sophisticated ranks of
the culture, it becomes at least more possible for some societal members (e.g. a New York male of Jewish background whose father is a professor of sociology, mother a social worker, who attends Columbia, etc.) to enter the role of actor, that is, when compared with the heroic energy and cunning which had to be utilized by would-be innovators in previous times. Frederick Douglass might serve as an example of the latter case. The cry of conservatives, that times are too easy and in the old days one really had to work, etc., is the happy announcement to the innovator that his machinations will be allowed, perhaps encouraged, in a period of relaxed absolutes. Affluence it seems has brought more than the Edsel or the Raper Bahn of Hamburg. It has given the favored areas of civilization something no culture has provided before: room for thoughts and feelings which differ from the prevailing modes.

What amazes me is how few disenchanted societal members are aware of this fluidity and how even fewer do something creative with it, although the education-marriage-children syndrome does succeed in curtailing activities of potential innovators (a facet of "traditional existence" which historically has served the status quo quite well). Hopefully one important role of education in the future will be in instructing students that obedience is no longer the dominant cultural motif, that increasing rewards, emotional and otherwise, make innovation an appealing activity.

While there remain other relatively minor hurdles
before the individual who seeks a life of diversity (relative, that is, to the gigantic hindrances just detailed), I will not pursue them at this juncture.

I made the point above that no society has yet been constructed so as to maximize opportunities for individually inspired alterations of its structures, processes and/or values. Also I stated that the current culture of the advanced areas of the world more closely approaches this optimum situation than any to date. For analytical purposes, let us imagine the prospects and dilemmas of a society in which "culture-wide innovation" was encouraged. If we begin with conditions much like our own, the immediate problem to surface would be that involved with enforced rationalization, especially along economic lines. The innovators would set out to rid their lives of as much tedium, meaninglessness and regulation as they could. This would leave most of industry and many services employeeless. Thus it is clear that a genuinely post-ascetic environment would call for the emancipation of workers from the noxious tasks they now perform, without however destroying an economy capable of producing affluence. Automation comes to mind as a probable partial solution.

To those familiar with the production systems now employed in post-modern culture, it comes as something of a shock to envision a society full of innovators. Under its current organization, post-modern industrialization would have to institute far-reaching changes, for instance in
assembly line format, so that all plants would more resemble the modern beer factory, in which a handful of skilled machinists and several nonskilled button-pushers suffice. Unless this could be done, the economy would regress severely, so much so that the freedoms gained by participants in the culture through individual innovation would be lost in large part due to a general primitivization of life.

An entirely different tack is taken by Galbraith in his famous series of books on modern economic arrangements. He and his followers scoff at the supposed difficulty of liberating people from dead-end jobs. According to his understanding of the problem, we are already creating many make-work jobs (the more reactionary component of union ideology) and destroying energy and resources hand over fist in a lame effort to resuscitate the work ethic. Naturally, the ruling "capitalist" interests and financial leaders work together in order to insure illusory, fabricated scarcity, but they have very nearly cooked their own goose.

The problem is no longer to deconsumerize the culture or automate all the plants, but to junk a terribly expensive ideology of work, in order to preserve the ecology, the supply of natural resources and as a fortunate byproduct, to procure the emancipation of make-work laborers. Total recyclibility is technologically feasible, so the necessary conservation of materials could become a built-in part of the economic world. What would have to change is either an ideology which demands constant energy destruction (human and otherwise), or one which retains the work-ethic but skillfully avoids the destruction of irreplaceables. Thus the growth of service industries.

I have not utilized this view (with which of course I have no complaints theoretically or politically) because of Galbraith's uncertain standing among many of the mainstream American economists and other social scientists. No less an "authority" on the nature of work, etc. than Ely Chinoy dismissed this set of assumptions out of hand when I broached the topic in a current seminar, "The Working Class". Also, see for example Paul Samuelson's latest revision (9th, 1973) of his classic text, in which he writes "Galbraith: The Iconoclastic Vision".

Since I claim no expertise in the area of economics, I have adhered (slavishly perhaps) to the generally accepted views (what Galbraith calls the "neoclassical model") rather than those of an innovator: a rather strange turn of events!
But more effective over time would be a redefinition of goods and services, pushed more and more in the direction of the latter as opposed to the consuming culture now in existence. Self or selves would need to be defined not as acquisitive, but more as inquisitive, in search of novel, stimulating, educational and entertaining activities. Three color televisions in one household produce little more than programmed monotony, while consuming vital materials and manpower in their production. The accumulated trappings of those who aspire towards a prestigious existence become comic and grotesque, while the depletion of resources (both mineral and human) continues. In a truly innovational culture, people and not things would become the best toys an adult could have. Boundary expansion would be the by-word.

Two mistaken attempts at change now being instituted with some frequency are the communal living situations practiced by those of the counter-culture, and at the other extreme, the much touted "team-production" system being used in the manufacture of Saabs and other goods. Both of these are incorrect in terms of the innovator's future, the former because it steps back into preindustrial times, depriving its adherents of liberating technological developments and often of stimuli, the other because it suggests that an occupation should be of prime significance in one's life as a source of interpersonal meaning and self-definition. While a job may have strong appeal for the individual, it is fallacious and dangerous to suggest that work for gain should ever be expected
to fulfill any but the smallest portion of the infinite capabilities of men. We arrive then at the prerequisite of liberation: the genuine, not quasi-liberation of laborers (taken broadly) from routinized tedium.

If the economy were set up correctly, it could be operated (to the degree necessary for a deconsumerized culture) so that it required far less time from the workday of any given individual. This is hardly a novel or revolutionary idea; Marcuse for one has been harping on it for decades. But more than just free time is needed in the creation of an innovative society. An entirely recast appreciation for what life is or could be is as necessary, and to my thinking, a much more difficult enterprise. The vision of "liberated" workers finishing their 20 hour work-week, only to rush off to their "second" job seems at this point in history almost an inevitability. If I may quote the media: on a recent newscast from an American Motors plant in Minnesota, two workers discussed the idea of mandatory vs. optional overtime. The first said "The more I work the more useful I am to my family". The second, from a slightly less noble position, said "It's mighty hard to turn down seven and a half dollars an hour". Though a small "sample", I suggest that their understanding of the relationship between work, life and money is consistent with that of most laborers, and not a few professionals. About these ideas - man as object vs. man as subject - both Marx and Sartre have written persuasively. Liberation begins with more leisure,
a less constraining definition of self, and the knowledge and skill necessary to use one's moments to the fullest.

Society would have even more dramatic problems with innovators or social actors than those having to do with modification of work. On the international scene, if other less fortunate nations became pugnacious for whatever reason or lack thereof, it would be difficult to arouse a culture of relativists into anything approaching nationalistic fervor. The whole idea of nationalism is anathema to the innovator since it carries with it countless feudal obligations and demands, many of which have historically served no-one but people like the Krupps. Nationalism is as dead and unappealing today as human sacrifice (with which it bears some resemblance), and as anachronistic as the traditional family or the Catholic church. If post-ascetic culture were accosted by more primitive nations, it would have to generate enthusiasm for resistance among its citizens with purely rational "propaganda", which would bear no resemblance whatever to the tripe usually administered to the masses by the ruling elite. More likely however is that old-style international confrontation will be avoided by the use of the most effective tool yet developed in league with managerial enterprise and big business: co-optation. Why waste resources in subduing aggressive smaller nations when the input of commodities will do the same thing. The power of goods and industrialization has done in part what the Second World War could not, bring relative peace to the world. If big business concerns have
enough money tied up in foreign markets, rest assured they will do as much as they can to preserve international equilibrium, as much as they have done traditionally to encourage imperialistic wars. The multinational empires can operate in no other way.

It will take more than abstract sentiments mouthed at election times to gain the cooperation of a populace most of whom are capable of informed, rational thought. Although this condition is still of the future, the relative disgrace the recent Washington scandals have brought upon the administration now in office compared to other equally heinous but less publicized crimes attributed to former administrations, indicates the increasing sophistication of both the public at large and those who shape public opinion. However, as pointed out in the historical documentation, the skills with which evil-doers manipulate the laws and their enforcement to suit specific interests increase in complexity and effectiveness relative to the advancing skepticism of the public. But the key point here is that in the past, political leaders have had little difficulty in mobilizing public opinion and action on the basis of very flimsy propaganda, thereby bringing to the modern world some of its worst scourges in the name of national security or whatever. This could not happen among the more enlightened groups of post-modern culture today, and it will become increasingly difficult to gain from the traditionally unreflective masses the degree of cooperation elites have come to take for granted. This observation goes
back to the early days of the enlightenment and the birth of liberalism, the tracts of which offered "education" as the panacea for neo-modern ills.

The only catch to that basically accurate view was in not realizing to what degree vested interests determine what is and what is not "educational". The current castration of HEW funding, specifically of most controversial sociological research, is a modern example of an age-old truth about authority: those with it do not care to have it known how badly they abuse it, and the critics without it find it very difficult to speak and be heard without the permission of their targets and adversaries. But in countless subtle ways, including those that are being described as "quasi-legal", damaging information finds itself before the public attention. In short, when Nixon says "cynicism", read "politically informed". As with most features of post-modern culture, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that this brand of awareness should manifest itself less in the future. Although some writers, notably Philip Slater (114) foresee in American culture the possible development of neofascist government, with heavy support from the less enlightened and easily threatened lower middle class, I find this position difficult to accept. Even within the traditional bulwark of conservatism, the southern middle classes, there is today surprisingly strong support for some of the catch phrases of the sixties, "Do your own thing", probably most popular of all. The use of these cliches is not an indicator
of a Harrington or Alinsky-styled "radicalization" of the middle class. Yet, without knowing it, the people who espouse these basically atomistic sentiments are making a profound political statement, to the effect that Big Brother a la 1984 would be the ultimate evil, worse even than hippies, communists or college professors. The fact is, praise be to the Enlightenment, that education in the form of schools, travel, the media or otherwise, does have ameliorative effects upon provincial hatreds and prejudice, the stuff out of which nationalism and similar political notions are created.

We see then that the difficulties brought upon the "state" through the increasing sophistication and experimentation of its participants have to do with cohesion, integration and united action. Ever since prefeudal Europe, many men of the West have sought after individual liberty to live their brief spans in the style they chose. The Crusades are best understood as a mass adventure for otherwise unemployed, bored men-of-arms whose usefulness to a rapidly modernizing social structure had diminished. The explorations of the mid-millenium are also expressions of men seeking room and socio-political, emotional space, removed from the incestuous fratricide which had become Europe. Our entire history is one of moving to new ground, and now that all the grounds are known, and until space travel is a commonplace for citizens, the time has come that external exploitation of existence give way to something which has never been allowed to prosper:
interpersonal exploration. More and more of the liberated middle and upper classes (meaning those whose material well-being is assured) have found their acquisitions lacking for life-long fascination, so quite logically they have given up the third home in the mountains for the yearly month-long fling on alien turf, with the intention of learning the folkways of the specific situation, and seeing just how successfully they can adapt to the new scenario.

In more ways than one, the popular book of the 1950's, _Nation of Sheep_, is showing its age. Social actors are politically wiser, more sensitive to the value of cosmopolitanism and much less easily shackled by neo-feudal restraints. The much discussed move in this culture from prescriptive to proscriptive law will find vehement resistance among the many whose time is too precious to be eaten up by state-designed trivia, whether it be in filling out forms or waiting in lines to fill out forms. Ingenious, quasi-legal methods of circumvention or sabotage are and will be developed in the avoidance or irrationally constructed regulation of thought (e.g. pornography) or action (e.g. marijuana smoking).*

*For a thorough exposition of "rationality" as I am using the term, see Martin Jay's masterful _The Dialectical Imagination_, his newly famous history of the Frankfurt School. Also of use is Trent Schroyer's _Critique of Domination_. Of basic interest is Horkheimer's early statement, "Traditional and Critical Theory" (Critical Theory). While I was aware of my debt to Marcuse's conceptions (in all his work), until reading Jay, the congruence of Horkheimer's and Adorno's notions of rationality with Marcuse's (and thus, mine) had escaped me. But for limitations of time, I would rewrite much of this section so as to include the powerful insights of these German philosopher-social scientists.
As in the case of the Kansas law prohibiting extended kisses in public, there will be great sections of enacted law which will not be enforced due to wide-spread refusal or obstruction, both on the part of enforcement agencies and their constituents. That this type large-scale "innovation" could produce a fascist or totalitarian response in the form of a reactionary government seems only slightly more probable than a group of Weathermen successfully taking over the White House with carbines. Both views make good romantic drama and poor analysis of how people of post-modern culture behave (not to mention ignorance of this country's socio-political heritage).

The social system will begin to look much less like Parsons's version than like Mill's, at least in terms of the individual. In the economic realm (which after all served as Parsons's model), there will be even greater rationalization and centralized planning, but in the interest of using as few men for as few hours as possible without jeopardizing necessary output. But in all other aspects, especially involving human values and social control, "integration" will mean nothing. In the world of a Cooley, value integration made some sense; the world of Alvin Toffler does not expect or permit any type of holistic interpretation of reality, for both in social and physical terms, it is much too complex to lend itself to such premodern evaluations. Like it or not, diversity and change will displace Parson's emphasis on continuity and system-maintenance just as surely.
as the auto replaced the carriage. The purpose of the system will be to insure sufficient goods and services to its members so that their self-imposed schedule of living will be expedited and not interrupted as is now usually the case. And that this vision is not construed as the latest nonworkable utopia, it should be emphasized that just this kind of life-style is already approached by a great many social actors, who in most instances occupy professional positions within the upper middle and upper classes. The divorce rate, singles' housing, the rate of job-changing and the decreasing importance of stability throughout life which now are beginning to permeate these classes are some of the better known indicators. With more time, education, and money, the remaining strata will doubtless follow suit.

What was described in an earlier time as chronic social disorganization or disintegration is more properly characterized today with the phrase, "business as usual".

As promised, the chapter will now be concluded with my personal reservations about culture-wide innovation as predicted by this theory.

Depending upon the critic's viewpoint, the theory may be said to utilize a conception of man which is either "radically empirical and rational" or "naively positivistic". Since the theory has been offered with the implication that it is of scientific value, I will only for the sake of argument consider seriously the latter characterization.
The 20th century has produced a conception of man which is for some uncomfortably ambiguous: he is calculatingly cool and precise enough to produce unending technological wizardry, yet with the same gray matter he has come close to self-annihilation in the interests of ill-conceived, ill-defined abstract sentiments. Jung and like thinkers have suggested repeatedly that we are more subject to the dark, unfathomable and treacherous whims of the "unconscious" than to the pull of the 18th century's favorite, reason. The existentialists have tried to make the case for radically aggressive individualism, to the exclusion of an understanding of what "culture and the individual" is all about. However, even the most sociologistic rationalists can be awed at least momentarily by the incredible irrationality which apparently pervades post-modern existence at some levels. But this senselessness stems not of course from anything so indistinct as the unconscious, but from an irrationally constructed social order. We are as instinctless as the bees are instinct-ridden, thus what we get out of the social order is pretty much what goes in as far as rationality is concerned. But, so that I do not seem utterly blind to nonrationalist perspectives, it must be admitted that people tend to behave in their own best interests with not quite the frequency and predictability Adam Smith supposed they would, and they do tend to embrace nonsensical, emotionalistic appraisals of reality somewhat more readily than J. S. Mill would have thought possible. However, since this theory concerns
it is important that a measure of the stupidity evidenced by populations historically will henceforth be avoided due to the democratization, the general diffusion of social knowledge. Just because the 16 year old girl next door "believes in" astrology does not mean that she won't "believe in" birth control pills rather than relying on magical amulets and chants. Try as some might, the modern social actor cannot very easily unlearn what he knows to be true, on behalf of romantic attachments to the primitive. Sullivan's insight about the richness of a child's small, intense vocabulary as compared to the watered-down, precise words and phrases of the adult world does not impune the value of precision and a modern understanding of causality. Historical examples of gross irrationality have also been connected, ever since Hegel, to societal irrationality at the structural level. Presumably (a basic tenet of Critical Theory), increased rational input into structure would produce, in an unstated dialectical fashion, similarly demystified social behavior.

When the modes of perception which grew out of 350 years of science, producing relatively exact formulations and theories, can be transferred to the masses regarding their understanding of not only physical but also social phenomena, then the richness and luxuriously interesting imprecision of premodern thought will no longer prevail. (That 80% of those polled believe in Nixon's culpability
while only 20% approve his removal is typical of the contradictions inherent in a worldview based more on emotion than reason, if I may use a mildly accurate dichotomy.)

Connected with the problem of just how rationally men can be expected to behave is an analog: how adventurous will they be? The innovator would wish that experimentation in a variety of settings could not jeopardize an individual's life-chances in other nonrelated areas of life, as is now the case. Somehow the British politician who enjoys prostitutes ipso facto becomes unqualified for office. The point of his having been elected, to provide capable government, is connected only tenuously with his bedchamber behavior, yet time and again a minor "indiscretion" concerning one area of existence becomes nefariously linked to the "whole man" (recalling my objections to Gestalt theories), and he suffers out of all reasonable proportion. That Byron and Pushkin "violated" literally thousands of damsels somehow did not diminish their stature as poets; but when the venerable Justice Douglas took a young wife to fit his young mind and body, he won the lasting disapproval of the sturdy middle class. Likewise in the financial world, one major blunder spells the end of a burgeoning career, whether the disaster was a function of poor business sense or some totally unrelated iniquity. In order to make innovation the norm, the individual's protection against negative labelling would have to be assured so that he would not have to consider his "good name" when taking innovative steps in
whatever direction. What is needed is a move to a "segmented" world, a series of disparate, mutually irrelevant, noncontiguous roles-situations, the behavior within any one area not threatening the individual's status in another.

It is a common assumption among many writers that humans "by their nature" seek the familiar, predictable and therefore unthreatening, that undue amounts of fresh stimuli can precipitate near "traumatic" reactions. This again makes the mistake of turning historical actuality, the chronicled behavior of man, into a non sequitur, that man is "essentially" fearful of change. My reading of history, especially in this century, shows just the opposite: men working feverishly to overstep, widen and modify institutional, structural constraints upon their lives in the interest of maximizing uncommon opportunities. What history does show is that men have subjected themselves and each other to the ordeal of unending monotony, mind-numbing repetition and generally senseless rounds of highly-predictable, unexciting behaviors.

However, in allowing the conservative position its due, I am in something of a quandry regarding the limits - defined by the nature of the animal, by our neurological and physiological condition - beyond which innovational energies will bring more sorrow than joy. And the reason this question escapes answer for the time being is that any good data on the subject is not to be had. Societies have done such a marvelous job of incarcerating their members into unthinking boredom that the data on the effects of tedium is relatively
good: people don't like it for long. Although there may well be some naturally defined limitations to radical behavior, until a culture of innovators becomes a reality, there will be no definitive answer to the problem except for supposition based for the most part on the way noninnovating man thinks he might react to a hyperfluid life-style. And as many "social science prophets" have pointed out, thinking about tomorrow with only slightly modified mental constructs of today is folkish and comforting, but in all likelihood, utterly unreliable. (Another possibility of course is to rearrange the physiological capabilities of men to suit a more demanding existence, but that transcends somewhat the scope of this thesis.)

Another problem is that of resources. This entire exposition uses as an a priori an unremitting affluence for more and more people, along with other necessities for innovating performances. The current misuse of the ecology, if continued, as described by the more pessimistic (realistic?) writers, will not only disallow wide-spread affluence in the future, but will also deplete the earth's supplies of necessary ingredients to the point that subsistence will be in question. The more scientistic prophets foresee in technological development a certain cure for the problem. Everything I have read on the subject seems to be overwhelmingly in favor of the pessimists, especially when added to the ecological difficulties is the spector of phenomenal population growth in those areas most dependent for survival on
post-modern donors. As one critic was overheard to say, "My vote for the most evil man in the world today goes to the Pope", obviously because of his medieval appreciation of the intimately connected problem, population growth. Again, because of the inconclusive data - and its manipulation, either by the Club of Rome or Standard Oil - I do not know where to stand, except to say that without the creation of an anti-consumer ethic (as outlined above) growing concomitantly with scientific advances, the power of this thesis to predict change in the future will diminish at the same rate that affluence declines. The theory is predicated upon the possibility of tremendous human freedom growing out of advanced technology; obviously, without the latter we are back to neo-modern or premodern times, and the days of milk and honey are no more (Galbraith notwithstanding).

As I mentioned before, were the culture of innovators and social actors to exist (for more than one generation), then provision must be made for the handling of children. Their nurturing, according to authorities like Piaget, Sullivan and Erikson, is an extremely sensitive "skill" which most "mothering ones" develop only partially. That our current mode of childbearing is less than might be desired requires little debate. We expect a young, often immature and uneducated female with almost no qualifications, either formally or informally garnered, to act as child psychologist, nutritionist, educator, to the degree necessary, sociologist, to mention only the most elevated of her responsibilities.
When her relationship with the offspring begins to interfere substantially with the antecedent "romantic" involvement with the progenitor, the situation for the child becomes entirely dysfunctional to its development. Much more informative and terrifying in its implications than Spock is Sullivan's treatment of the child in the very earliest stages, the focus being on the relationship between its consciousness of well-being and not-well-being as a function of the mothering one's behavior, overt or covert. Many writers since Sullivan have found empirical validation for his hunches that tension in the child is quickly converted to anxiety of varying degrees if the mothering one does not behave in ways which could curtail or alleviate somewhat the initial tension. While a certain amount of physiological tension is normal and necessary in the young human, the amount sustained by the infant is very often excessive resulting in long-term emotional problems. New developments in transactional analysis owe a lot to Sullivan, but in their undisguised optimism over the rapidly changeable self-concepts of adults, they have closed the barn door many years after the horse's departure. This is not to say that later resocialization cannot be of extreme use (of course, it happens every day and is not regarded as noteworthy), but my concern is that whatever methods or agencies are devised to handle the early socialization of children which the parents wish not to bother with, have to be very sound. The reports of Bettelheim and others on the kibbutz are not encouraging. Apparently,
placidity and complacence mark the kibbutz "product", and there would be no sense whatever in constructing an excitingly innovational social structure, only to people it with persons unable to use it, or undesirous of anything but the ordinary.

I do not want this reservation to be construed as an addendum to all sorts of conservative arguments about the efficacy of severe, tension-filled upbringing. In more cases than not, one who is brought up by excessively parent-centered adults, generates an I'm-not-OK that distorts and destroys most of what is good in life ad infinitum. (Our president's public image is such a "person".) But there must be considered the other end of the continuum: just how much tension is sufficient to produce a rebellious, innovative individual. And if determined, could this degree of attention and restriction be administered to the millions of progeny which will fall to agencies in the wake of the final destruction of the traditional family. Obviously, the home as now understood does a first rate job of almost nothing, but it does a barely sufficient job of a lot. One way or another, substitutes must be found so that those social actors who do not care for parental shackles may feel personally at ease in transferring their children to professionally-run agencies. Of course, I am not suggesting an enforced abduction of children from the parents by the state or any such related plan. But apparent in my own generation of college-educated innovators is a marked distaste for "doing the family thing" as it was done for, to and (somewhat) by them. Whether they
are, as their parents hint, egotistic and self-centered to the point of being unable to care for children, or if they have assessed the problem of childrearing, material and emotional, and found the entire 20-year experience not to their liking, is beside the point. The fact is that right now many would-be parents won't be, because of an enormously complex, demanding, and anxiety-producing package, promulgated incessantly by the culture as the ultimate good which they can imagine to be nothing but trouble. If the role of parent could be redefined towards a looser model — that is being parent, and also freedom-seeking adult — the first step of which liberation would involve a restructuring of property needs and relationships, then perhaps this generation would not religiously eschew parenthood. It is sadly ironic that this generation of students is by far the best informed in so many ways, childrearing included, and it is the most reluctant in history to discover whether there is any congruence between theory and practice. Moreover it is of small comfort to know that recently the U.S., following Japan, attained zero-growth in population while premodern societies reproduce as if there were no tomorrow.

The final question as to the relationship between population, affluence and innovation on a cultural basis comes to this: just how many bodies can the world sustain in a post-modern cultural condition? That becomes a function of improved technology, deconsumerized values and less children. But those variables may succumb to the detestable nationalism
which still appeals to some of the less modern political minds of the era. Yet it would seem that a finite "n" would be determinable and my guess is that world population will have to stabilize at a smaller figure than now obtains if culture-wide innovational opportunities are to be extended to the international realm. That could be done humanely and otherwise, and if history is any guide, the latter course would almost certainly be followed if an optimum world population were deemed internationally desirable by the controlling elites.

Moving now from the macro to the micro-cosmic level, see in the theory the easy possibility of misinterpretation as far as "ultimate" human values are concerned. Recently Raymond Aron studied Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason with extreme care - not of the disciple but of the critic - and found that if Sartre's doctrine were adhered to strictly and without regard for the writer's larger intentions (domain assumptions), then Stalinist terrorism could be defended by it (115). If the spirit of the current theory is misinterpreted, or assumed to be other than it is, the theory can be construed as a defence of hedonistic epicureanism and little more. Although a concern for maximum pleasure from life is central to the theory, there is as important to it the assumption that cultural innovation will provide loosely-structured opportunities for learning; that this learning should sometimes prove displeasing for all concerned is an accepted part of the package. What should not be thought
however, is that the theory is so utterly atomistic in intention that "significant others" and less important people are to be utilized in a radical instrumentalism by the innovator, and "discarded when empty". Although some of this is only wise - and much practiced now - this would not be the hallmark of the culture. Rather, instead of forced, fraudulent "duty" binding people together long after they would prefer separation, the glue of the culture would be composed of mutual interest and affection stemming from a variety of sources, perhaps in the very dissimilarity of backgrounds, personalities and aspirations. Put anecdotally, the uneasiness the professor feels when in the elevator with the bemeked and destroyed middle-aged janitor, that the white fraternity boy feels when in the forced or unexpected company of an alluring black girl, and so on, would dissolve into a generalized and refreshing curiosity. There may be too much Pollyanna in this vision, but given the status quo vis a vis interpersonal "communication" - if it can be even be called that - some positive hyperbole will not harm.

As to the underlying values of the innovator: he would regale in the diversity of culture and the inevitable relativism which grows from such knowledge; he would, to put it very briefly, be adamant and absolutistic in only one sense - in his strictest avoidance of narrow and life-diminishing definitions of what is "suitable for consumption" and otherwise "fitting and proper" in the social world. Lest visions of the Marquis de Sade immediately arise, it is also
assumed that the innovator during socialization would somehow come to embrace the standard liberal definition of freedom for all: that one's action does not destroy the possibility that another may be able to behave in a chosen manner, given the limitations of resources. (The ability of societies to inculcate into their young "charges" practically anything they want is well documented. Thus the spector of "Clockwork Orange" morality is less than worthy of consideration.) However the role of judge ideally conceived does not consider the possibility of graft, and likewise those who so wish could easily bastardize the preferred situation of mutual respect and the kind usage of people. Yet the joy of deceit when taken out of its typically financial setting would become another historically defunct behavior pattern, much less relevant within post-modern culture.

I am all too aware that this vagueness lends itself to misunderstanding, but for me to posit a series of absolute "goods", and by implication, their opposites, would be to say more about the future than I know. I think the theory can explain a great deal of future social change, but I am aware that our current cynosures do not in most instances satisfy the qualifications of the innovator. In spite of his enormous contribution to sociology, Mannheim has been repeatedly attacked because of his use of Alfred Weber's unfortunate phrase, "the socially unattached intelligentsia", more often expressed as "free-floating elite". His critics attach to his thinking the same fallacies common to all utopians from
Plato to Harrington: the belief that some men will scrupulously adhere to the "good" and remain mentally and emotionally incapable of abusing their ruling authority. The conservatives are right in laughing at this position, since historically, such abuse has been the rule. But in as much as my presentation is "beyond Marx", concerning itself with post-scarcity existence and the relative paradise which becomes possible (when compared to the scenario Marx described), many of the motives for past abuses are no more. Mannheim was in many things ahead of his time and perhaps his desire to invest with tremendous power a select group of intellectuals was more than his period could take; but today it is obvious that most of the best minds in the culture rigorously avoid public office (Kissinger notwithstanding). They would far rather spend their life in personally meaningful activities and leave the crass tedium of governing to others. Times have changed*, and the fears of men gone wild with power are as anachronistic in some areas of the world as a Nazi flag. As outlined in the historical chapter, the opportunity for strong-men and tyranny

*I was extremely gratified to find Barrington Moore (in his latest work, Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery...) supporting several of my central contentions connected with the realization that "the times have changed", and the related impact on modes of social change. More elaborate treatment of his book (in some ways incompatible with my views) was not possible due to practical limitations. However, concerning the preeminence of individual vs. collective change in the future, see pp. 146, 178-9, 189. Regarding the limitations of traditional revolution and its likelihood in this country, see pp. 168-174.
came at an earlier stage of civilization, the move from feudal to modern social organization. A Hitler arising in the United States or Germany at this time - at least in anything like the method used by the Fuhrer - is out of the question, for the same kinds of reasons that social movements no longer work.

My point then is this: in times when there was much to be gained (in terms of personal enrichment of life) from amoral and abusive behavior, of course that type of interaction prevailed. But the post-modern situation makes exploitation of other people much less profitable and in many instances extremely costly, so that the need for a strict code of "goods" and "bads" is not as necessary to the operation of an innovating populace. However, the most basic "commandments" would still be matters for socialization of course, not to kill, steal, willfully harm, and so on. But the nature of situational ethics is so much tied to particular sets of circumstances and particular groups of social actors that immutable statements about the morals of the future make little sense. Any such attempt is another example of projecting today's understanding of social reality into a future which will be more unlike the present than like it. That there will be personal and social disorganization because of overly ambitious or otherwise unrealistic attempts at social innovation seems assured, but the damage inflicted will not be of the sort traditionally imposed upon people by others more powerful than they. It will be the pain of
inaccuracy and not of "evil".

This leads to my final consideration of the theory as problem. I have dispensed with any extended comment about the morality of innovation to this point for reasons already stated. But there is in fact a basic a priori which would I think dominate a culture of change, experimentation and rationality: that is, a quest for the accurate, for what is true as far as we can know it. We now know that the Biblical explanation of the earth's development is untrue; we also know that the monogamous relationship is not "natural, good and true" any more or less than polyandrous or polygynous kinship arrangements. We know a great many more things to be either in accord with or not in accord with empirically understandable reality, physical and/or social. But to date most of our major institutions remain in their original state, that is built around and for the sake of quasi-mythological testaments of faith which have no more connection with what is real than did the Biblical explanations of physical phenomena. The sloppiness of primitive social organization is no longer feasible or sensible in a world too fast and complicated for positively sanctioned incompetence to be protected. We know that racial prejudice and the attendant authoritarian personality are based on inaccurate appraisals of reality, so moves have slowly been made in the direction of its eradication. The same type of institutional house-cleaning is now consistently in evidence throughout the culture for a myriad of reasons, all the way from simple
sentiment for the traditional to the iron-hand of financial interests maintaining an irrational social order to maximize profits. But as subsistence becomes less and less an issue, then the innovator is left with considerable resources in both time and money, and his targets for institutional change will probably focus on those areas of life which can be most personally constricting and irritating: kinship, the supernatural, education, recreation and to some degree the aesthetic.

The economic, governmental and stratificational systems are the most firmly protected by social control devices and therefore least subject to outright personal modification, although they undergo change yearly as more and more people seek alternative positions in relation to these hierarchies. Change as chronicled by historical and sociological writers has usually depicted as interesting and significant only those manifestations which occurred in the last three mentioned institutions. But, again, while this was a defensible scholarly position at one time, such limited foci are insufficient for an adequate understanding of post-modern change. The cultural revolution of the 1960's had and will continue to have long-term effects on all institutions although its most dramatic successes came in the educational, kinship and recreational. The Today's Army campaign, along with other major alterations of the status quo, can be interpreted as a product of the liberating climate of the 60's and the adverse effects upon the traditional military. Whether a redistribution of goods took place or a radical rearrangement of power relations for the most part
remains to be seen. But to limit to these criteria an assessment of the cultural revolution and the part of the innovators within it is to miss the point. There was a great deal more going throughout that decade of turmoil than analysis of the vulgar Marxist variety is capable of analyzing.

Whether men in society will be able to handle accuracy and rationality in their lives, or rather to what degree they will be able to include more of it, is a question; I am not prepared to answer.* But the fact that more realistic and voluntaristic attitudes are producing an increasingly rational social order means that in the future the joys and sorrows of mythology will give way to more calculated innovation. Values will move in the direction of empirically established truth (the rapid change in kinship today reflect increasing awareness of the failure of the standard models), and "regularized" innovation throughout the culture will as much become the norm then as emotionalistic conformity is today.

*My doctoral dissertation will deal with that issue.
This addition to the text is offered as a response to Professor Kerner's reservations about the thesis. The form of an appendix is used for purely technical reasons so that typing could be carried on in the main body while these answers to Prof. Kerner were formulated. Time was of the essence.

The first objection has to do with lines on page 27, specifically, "it has begun in some minor ways to correlate with reality", referring to Parsons' system theory and modern society. Dr. Kerner rightly observes that this remark contradicts one made earlier to the effect that "the nature of change is itself changing", thus leading me into a hypothetically confusing position. The explanation is rather straightforward: the phrase "in some minor ways" refers not to the culture broadly, but more specifically to the inordinate growth of complex organization in the West, culminating in the production of "organization and conglomerate men", and the well-documented conformity rampant in some of the more affluent sectors of the society. Thus in contrast to the socio-economic chaos of the thirties, when Parsons began dreaming up the system theory under L.J. Henderson, the post-war era (even given the putatively disruptive late 60's) is better approximated systemically, again, "in some minor
ways", than earlier eras. As for the relationship with social change, the innovators do not operate pro but rather contra the status quo, so that change is changing, but the culture in some of its manifestations - like organization - continues to churn out the relatively predictable and uninspired societal member. Whereas Parsons looked ridiculous in 1969, he's beginning to seem less so the more repressive the political situation becomes.

Secondly, Prof. Kerner is concerned that my "presentation is overly simplified" and "a vast array of phenomena is included in a relatively brief space", which "leads the reader to question how logically interrelated the material really is". This methodological-stylistic problem faced me from the beginning and was never satisfactorily resolved. When trying to say something "new" about social change - a subject which, as I note in the first paragraphs, can be practically equated with sociology - the emphasis must shift from tight, logical, puncture-proof arguments, to highly generalized formulations which support the thesis. The most trying section to compose was the historical chapter. The nature of historiography itself, the very bulk of data available, and the limits of time and talent on my part made a seemingly haphazard selection inevitable. Before doing the thesis, I studied some major works in the philosophy of inquiry, and came to the conclusion that my "argument" was not destined to be a debater's dream. Everything that went into the thesis seemed absolutely necessary to its author and
the many items and paths of thought omitted simply "seemed" less crucial. Obviously, I have no defense, if one is required, for the fact that it is a sprawling effort. It was a sprawling subject.

More personally disturbing, Prof. Kerner objects to my "categorical casting aside of numerous works with often glib comments as opposed to sound logical justifications". I frankly do not find in the thesis the source of this remark. I do lambast, for various reasons, Popper, Hirsch, Martindale, Boskoff (the latter three for negative reviews of LaPiere's book), but I also praise and exploit dozens of other authors throughout the thesis for their learning, sociologically and historically. Also "sound, logical justifications" are not always necessary or sufficient reasons for criticizing an author. Some works fall short of serious consideration long before the level of logic: they simply are not well conceived or executed.

The most important and serious of Prof. Kerner's notes is this: "there must be something going on out there that has been documented in a more empirical manner. Any evidence to that effect would only confirm your thesis". My approach to this issue has been two-fold: first, an examination of journals and books in the hope of finding good information about innovation as a process of cultural change, and second, a philosophical-methodological inquiry as to the likelihood of finding good supporting analyses. As for the first, the amount and quality of material is amazingly sparse
and poor. Most innovation studied has to do with modernization processes and other economic topics (see, e.g., Fritz Redlich, "Innovation in Business" and "The Role of Innovation in a Quasi-Static World", both reprinted in Steeped in Two Cultures (Harper Torchbooks, 1971) and Galbraith, Economics and the Public Purpose, pp. 146-54.), which though interesting, do not usually have much application to the thesis. Also, I felt in some sense justified in not seeking out every possible fragment of data since both LaPiere and Barnett surveyed the field with care, and my work depends on theirs. As for the logic of the situation, it is completely unsurprising that the processes of innovational change as I project them have not been studied, first because the study of individual behavior is extraordinarily difficult and always post facto in the case of the true innovator, and secondly, because this form of post-modern behavior is so new — in its current manifestation — that it has had insufficient time to enter the reluctantly accepting arms of academe.

Prof. Kerner was also bothered by my "weak" economic analysis, appropriately I believe. As a partial remedy I have studied Galbraith more carefully, and am now of the belief that the footnote on page 144 of the thesis is more accurate as economics than the relatively conservative arguments incorporated into the text. But for lack of time, an entire rewriting would be performed on the section. However, in keeping with my essentially Marxist orientation to the problem, I still feel that Galbraith's plan for
Reform as expressed in his latest writing, is marvelous to contemplate and unlikely to be implemented. The relations of power and financial strength are such that the individual innovator may be able to feather his own nest (see Harry Browne on this issue, any of his books), but an essential alteration of economic arrangements will remain problematic. Remember that when a recent president sought to make Galbraith a ranking government economic advisor, Wall Street erupted in fury and made it plain that his "iconoclastic" view of economic reality was completely indigestible.

Connected with this, Prof. Kerner recognizes that "there are all kinds of international economic issues that could be raised", which I assiduously did not raise due to their horrible complexity and also since the thesis was designed to explain change in the most advanced sectors of the world only.

I hope these responses have clarified somewhat the muddier sections Prof. Kerner was good enough to elucidate for me.
NOTES

1. There has existed for nearly two decades within the discipline a publicized debate between the remnants of the old functionalists versus conflict theorists and the newer "radical caucus" adherents (not to mention the even more recent "radical functionalists"). Their basic disagreements stem from major methodological differences, resulting of course in equally major substantive battles. The old problems of objectivity, social causation, values and the researcher, etc. have come to the fore in books like Vidich and Stein's Sociology on Trial, Friedrichs' Sociology of Sociology, Reynolds and Reynolds' Sociology of Sociology and Myrdal's Objectivity in Social Research, among dozens of others. It seems at times that American sociologists, perhaps due to pressure from French, British and German colleagues, publish as many self-conscious, self-critical articles and books as original research or theory pieces. While there may be great utility in professional "soul-searching", my attention to the debate remains small, for another thesis or two on the subject itself would be entirely possible. However, within my scope there immediately arise the same problems with which these authors concern themselves, well-summarized for example in Norman Birnbaum's Toward a Critical Sociology. I have taken cognizance of our self-appraising colleagues and wish this to be
understood: I write with the knowledge that my methodology is anything but airtight vis a vis questions of history and sociology, valuation and research, the efficacy of grand theory, that is, theory treating great spans of time and huge groupings of variables in "untangleable plethoras". But since much valuable research of this type has been done in the past, I write also with the conviction that protracted theorizing, if based on a careful reading of history with sociological insight, is not only advisable but indispensable to a discipline overloaded with unrelated print-outs.

At one point in my research, I compiled a bibliography and made notes toward a methodological statement (akin to those in all of Myrdal's works) the focus of which centered around historical/social causation and its "detection", value processes versus structural manifestations regarding the phenomenon of social change, the value-free motif in current research, and key epistemological problems growing out of the Kant-Marx-Mannheim-Habermas tradition and its many offshoots. But after toying with the problems of authoritative writing in this uncharted field, I carefully retreated, not with the admission that I was thereby forced to produce less sound research, but simply to get on with the actual project at hand. I began to feel like an airplane at the end of the runway, revving the engines for six hours preparing for a ten minute flight! Thus, all the fascinating, sometimes momentous, often trivial ramifications of the sociology of
sociology will have to wait for proper attention. (See brief bibliography of works consulted at the end of this note.)

I have relied on several major theoretical texts in this study of social and cultural change, those of LaPiere, Barnett, Toffler and to a less noticeable degree, Brecht and Etzioni (see general bibliography). These books were selected from a large field due to their intensity, originality and usefulness to my method. Within social psychology I have used to some advantage Mills and Gerth's classic for like reasons. Of even more use however has been the synthetic, far-reaching thought of Marion Vanfossen whose probing into the future of post-modern culture is as sophisticated and original as any being done by social scientists at this time.

Partial bibliography of the sociology of sociology:


2. Gouldner, op. cit., p. 29 ff.


5. Ibid., p. xii.


11. LaPiere, *Social Change,* p. vi. (Hereafter, SC.)

12. Relying heavily in research of an extended nature upon a single major work would seem at best optimistic, at
worst disastrous, depending of course upon the quality of the source and the use made of it. Therefore, it seems advisable to defend such a technique.

The study of social change has been intermittently popular with professionals for decades, and theories of change at both micro and macro levels abound. I have examined many of these theories, either directly or through comprehensive studies. After having discerned in most of them debilitating weaknesses which render them only somewhat useful, it was with great delight and relief that LaPiere's work came to my attention. Characterized in social-psychological terms, he seems to be an old wizened liberal whose desire for heightened human freedom pervades his work, yet who, through many years of study has found that standard change theories come up short for reasons he makes clear. However, in a book of 542 pages, it is not possible to offer lengthy refutations of other theoretical positions simply for the glorification of one's own thoughts. It is more important to delineate carefully and document as much as possible the theory being offered. This LaPiere has done, and this is what I shall seek to do in the following.

Out of academic curiosity I studied reviews of Social Change in the major journals. Don Martindale (AJE, 71: 203-4, Sept. '65), Walter Hirsch (Social Forces, xlv, #1: 135-7, Aug. '65) and Alvin Boskoff (ASR, XXX: 639-40, Aug. '65) all made slightly differing but equally imperceptive, inade-
By way of sample illustration, both Martindale and Hirsch extract one line from LaPiere's Preface ("The theory upon which the following is based, and which for reasons of personal preference is kept more implicit than explicit, constitutes a sharp break with the traditional theories that...") — although both reviewers succeed in misquoting him or out-of-contexting the line beyond recognition — neither writer understood the point of the sentence. LaPiere wanted simply to acknowledge his use of Barnett's theory, but was not going to footnote every instance. Both reviewers seized upon the sentence, claiming for it meanings which were clearly not intended. It seems neither gave their reading the same dedication and care LaPiere gave his writing, which upon reflection is not surprising.

Also of interest is LaPiere's treatment of both Martindale and Hirsch in an extended footnote to page 34 of Social Change in which he writes: "Don Martindale's Social
Life and Cultural Change (1962) is only an elaboration of certain aspects of Max Weber's theory of the role of religion in the determination of social stability and change...

Regarding Hirsch, "Of the hundreds of books that were published over the past decade by American sociologists about sociological matters, only nine are specifically on social change. Of these, two (...Explorations in Social Change, 1964, eds. Walter Hirsch and George Zollschan) are collections of discrete essays and articles". Martindale wrote the introduction to Hirsch's book so we realize that the negative reviews were another example of sociology-fraternity back-balling.

Hirsch's reader, Explorations..., in spite of its 800 pages is predominantly pompous and protracted mediocrity. The few articles which rise above the trivial or bombastic concern such old standards as Sorokin's work. Sorokin's piece in the book is by far the most readable and sociologically sensitive. That the antiseptic Purdue "thinkers" would eschew LaPiere's vision of reality does not come as a shock.

Finally, Zollschan wrote an article on Freud's "reality principle", and the book in toto is supposedly constructed around that marvelously chic term, "the dialectic". Naturally, LaPiere regards Freud as the world's worst sociologist, and he frowns on elevating a simple cognitive tool to the position of "school"-ishness.

Boskoff's review is only slightly less inadequate in
this realm of proto-scholarship. He attacks LaPiere's polemics as "out of place" i.e. in poor taste, etc., without discussing the possible validity of the author's arguments. The book for him is a "disquieting mixture" of elements, "not text nor reference nor tract". By God, sounds like an innovation!


18. SC, p. 4.


22. SC, p. 29.

23. SC, pp. 35n-36n.


25. SC, p. 38n.


28. SC, pp. 59-64.
(Notes to pages 28 - 33)

29. SC, p. 41.


32. Some of the most useful books in this area are:
   Brecht, Arnold. *op. cit.*

   There are bits and pieces of insightful material throughout the well-known “Philosophy of Science” literature, notably Karl Popper’s *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*.

33. SC, p. 50.

34. SC, p. 57.

35. e.g. *Freedom, Power and Democratic Planning* and *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*. 
(Notes to pages 34 - 51)


38. SC, p. 69.


40. SC, p. 99.


43. Ibid., p. 97.

44. SC, p. 103.


46. SC, p. 108.

47. SC, p. 109.

48. SC, p. 110.


50. SC, p. 112.


52. SC, p. 116.

53. SC, p. 117.

54. SC, p. 118.

55. SC, p. 120.


57. SC, p. 138.
(Notes to pages 51 - 98)

58. SC, pp. 139-73.

59. SC, pp. 174-211.


63. e.g. Friedrich Heer, Norman Cantor, G.R.Coulton, Henri Pirenne, Marc Bloch, etc. See general bibliography.

64. Muller, op. cit., p. 32.


66. Muller, op. cit., p. 36.


68. Ibid., p. 49.

69. Bryce in Muller, op. cit., p. 49.


72. op. cit., passim.

73. Ibid., p. v.


75. Muller, op. cit., p. 51.


77. Muller, op. cit., p. 56.


79. Ibid., pp. 64-109.
80. Ibid., pp. 110-47.


83. Ibid., p. 47.
84. Ibid., pp. 47-8.
85. Ibid., pp. 49-56.
86. Ibid., pp. 52-3.
87. Ibid., pp. 52-3.


89. Ibid., pp. 460-61.
90. Ibid., p. 749.
91. Ibid., p. 747.


93. Ibid., p. 3.
94. Ibid., p. 4.
95. Ibid., pp. 3-5.


98. Muller, op. cit., p. 239.

100. Muller, op. cit., p. 173.

(Notes to pages 113 - 163)

102. Muller, op. cit., p. 255.


105. Ibid., pp. 50-63.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


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