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The Emerging Republican South: Is Kevin Phillips Correct?

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THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN SOUTH:
IS "KEVIN PHILLIPS 'CORRECT'?

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Government
College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Martin Michael Walsh
1975

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

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PREFACE

Several years ago the writer decided to come to the College of William and Mary for undergraduate, college training. During the first year he joined the Young Republicans organization at the college, and was active in the 1968 political campaigns. From that time until his departure from Williamsburg, there were few political campaigns in Williamsburg in which he was not active. Nearly every year he attended statewide Young and College Republican functions. In June 1972 he attended the state senior Republican Party convention in Roanoke, and later, the National Republican Convention in Miami Beach. All of this has this writer vitally aware of and concerned with the development of the Republican Party in the South.

A few years ago two books attracted national attention: The Emerging Republican Majority, by Kevin Phillips, and Scammon and Wattenberg's The Real Majority. The Phillips book is a development on a large scale of some ideas that were mentioned in passing in M. Stanton Evans' The Future of Conservatism. Phillips expounded the idea that the country is heading for a conservative revolt which would break the back of the Democratic coalition that governed the country from 1932 to 1968. Phillips saw the 1968 election of Richard Nixon as ushering in this new era.

Phillips viewed the political history of the United States as divisible into neat periods of nearly complete one-party rule, broken by

short terms for the other party. Each of these extended thirty-six years, with the opposition party holding the presidency for only eight years. Thus, from 1824 to 1860 the Jacksonian Democrats reigned, yet finally succumbed on the question of slavery. The period from 1860 to 1896 was the first period of Republican rule. It was not a time of easy victories, but the victories did come. Then, from 1896 to 1932, came the era of nearly complete Republican dominance. This lasted until 1932 when Roosevelt ushered in the new Democratic era. As the Civil War brought to an end the first period of Democratic hegemony, so the Great Depression ended the Republican era. Now the unrest of the 1960s would bring the Republicans back to power.

Scammon and Wattenberg argued that no such traumatic experience as the Civil War or the Great Depression had occurred during the 1960s to bring about the new Republican majority. The old New Deal coalition could still be made to work so long as the Democrats, liberal on economic issues, paid heed to the conservatism of the nation on the "social issue"--i.e., a general term covering such topics as crime, abortion, "busing," and most other noneconomic "domestic" issues. The majority of the country, contrary to what the followers of Senator Eugene McCarthy might believe, is "unyoung, unpoor, and unblack." No coalition of the poor, the young, and the blacks could provide a majority if catered to solely.

While the books differed on many points, there were certain points of agreement. For the purpose of this thesis, the most important agreement was a consensus that the South was entering a period where it would become more and more Republican in national elections. In

Phillips' map of the country at the end of his book, where he plots the future of the nation's politics, and in the scheme of political geography presented by Scammon and Wattenberg, the South appears as a solid sea of Republicanism, replacing the old Democratic Solid South. While there is strong reason to doubt that local southern Democratic parties are as dead as the National Democratic Party appears to be in the South, that subject is beyond the scope of the aforementioned two books. They are concerned only with national politics.

As a Republican, the writer has naturally followed this continuing drama to see how well it has followed the script written for it by these authors. In searching for a thesis topic, it was decided that attention was warranted in this area. It is also an area in which the writer is interested. Therefore, a combination of business and pleasure has been chosen.

It is the thesis of this study that the South is moving into the Republican orbit in presidential elections. Indeed, most of the South's electoral votes can now be safely counted by Republican presidential candidates. Further, the trend is toward support of the Republican Party in congressional elections, though at a much slower pace than in presidential elections. Finally, state and local politics will move, or perhaps "inch," in the Republican direction, though it will probably not be before the end of the century that these areas will be "safely" Republican in the majority of instances. Below the presidential level, then, "evolutionary," not "revolutionary," movement in the Republican direction may be expected.

The writer would like to conclude this section by saying a few

words about the relationship of "Watergate" to this thesis. Some pressure to include such a discussion of effects on this study has been felt; however, this writer has decided to pass up the opportunity to do so. There are several reasons for this. First, the paper ends prior to Watergate's full impact and disclosure. Indeed, since the main point of the thesis covers presidential elections, the year 1972 serves better than any possible date before 1976. Second, in the overwhelming majority of cases there just is not enough data. As a former professor once pointed out, "You can't have a 'trend' with only one election." It would take until 1980 to have enough data to detect a trend. Therefore, the election of 1972 concludes the writer's discussion.

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the political South, especially as it was seen by political strategist and historian Kevin Phillips in his The Emerging Republican Majority, in light of the 1972 elections, and, thus, hopefully, find out if Phillips and others, who have felt the South was emerging as a Republican stronghold, were correct. To accomplish this purpose the writer has examined each of the eleven states of the South individually, as well as in their natural groupings of "Outer South" and "Deep South," with particular emphasis on the more recent elections. For each state, for both subregions, and for the entire region, tables were constructed showing the year-by-year breakdown of the partisan positions in the governorships, United States senatorships, United States Congressmen, and both houses of the state legislature from 1947 to 1973. In addition, separate tables demonstrate the growth of popular support for the Republican candidates for President in each presidential election from 1948 through 1972.

The results are varied. On the presidential level, the level that Phillips was most concerned about, a great growth in the Republican presidential voting is observable in both subregions. This growth began first in the Outer South, developing as early as 1952. In the Deep South the trend did not set in until 1964.

At other levels the trend has been slower to develop, and has always come first in the Outer South, only later in the Deep South. There is a fairly strong and developing Republican contingent in the federal offices and the governorships. However, for the most part Republican growth has been relatively slow at the local levels.

The results seem to suggest that the degree of Democratic support is in direct proportion to the voters' apparent ability to control nominations to that office, and the policies of it. Thus, at the presidential level, the South has long since ceased to have veto power over Democratic nominees, and has increasingly lost its control over presidential policy.

Similarly, as the northern Democrats became the real power in Congress following the 1964 elections, the southern revolt against congressional Democrats began. It has not, in the main, been so much a matter of defeating incumbent Democrats, as replacing retiring Democrats with Republicans.

In the states the same battle has raged. The governor's chair has appeared more remote than the legislative seat. Accordingly, a majority of the southern states has elected Republican governors, while none have produced a Republican legislature. It is, therefore, the state legislatures that show the highest proportion of continued Democratic support.

THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN SOUTH:
IS KEVIN PHILLIPS CORRECT?

INTRODUCTION

Kevin Phillips in his book has already put forward what could be considered a glimpse of the main thesis of this paper, what might be called, for lack of a better term, the cyclical theory of American presidential elections. Now, the earlier discussion of that main thesis will be expanded. The 144-year period from 1824 through 1968 has been divided into four thirty-six year periods by Phillips. The first of these began in 1824 when Andrew Jackson, the plurality victor, was denied the presidency by the "corrupt bargain" which resulted in the election of John Quincy Adams. Jackson was successful in 1828 and again in 1832. His party, the Jacksonian Democrats, held the presidency from then until 1860, except for eight years when the Whigs captured the presidency in the elections of 1840 and 1848. These victories were forged, for the most part, by a western and southern coalition in revolt against the old "Eastern" and New England states.

By 1860 the Whig party was dead and the Democrats were badly split over the questions of slavery and the right of secession. The Republican Party, organized only six years earlier, and named after Jefferson's old party, succeeded in electing Abraham Lincoln President. New England, aided by the increasingly populous Midwest, now regained the ascendancy. Civil War broke out and the slavery question was settled decisively by the force of northern arms. The

Republicans continued to win narrow victories for most of the next thirty-six years, but because of numerous third parties, no one was able to get an absolute majority of the vote. This was also the period when the solid South was born in answer to Yankee reconstruction. Only Cleveland's election in 1884 and 1892 marred the Republican string.

Then came the election of 1896. Cleveland was rejected for renomination as his party united behind William Jennings Bryan, the "Orator of the Platte." Bryan's populism proved popular in the West and South, but McKinley swept the nation's populous areas, and finished as the first president in forty years to gain an absolute majority. The Republicans were to maintain a solid grip on the White House, nearly always getting an absolute majority, until 1932. The only break in the chain came when Wilson won against a badly divided Republican Party in 1912 when Teddy Roosevelt finished in second place on the Bullmoose ticket. Wilson, who "kept us out of war [sic]. . ." won again in 1916, but then the country returned to "normalcy" and Harding.

In 1929 the Great Depression began, and with it the Republican hegemony collapsed. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) swept the nation in 1932 and went on to be reelected three times. Democrats continued to hold the presidency until 1968, except for the eight years under Eisenhower. Then, in 1968 the wheel had turned again. Richard Nixon, rejected in 1960 by the narrowest of margins, was elected, also by a narrow margin, and reelected in 1972.

This, then, is Phillip's grand scheme of the national

presidential elections. But what makes it work? According to Phillips the whole system is triggered by an interaction between the South and the Northeast. The South reacts, usually in tandem with the West, against the Northeast. This happened in 1824, in 1860, in 1896, and again in 1968 and 1972. In 1824 the South was successful in ousting the Northeast from power. In 1860, and again in 1896, the South lost. In 1932 the South won, and in 1968 it looked as if it would win again. In Phillips' view the South (and West) represent the radicals fighting for change in the political system, and the Northeast represents the status quo and those opposing change in the power structure of the nation. In 1896 the Northeast stood as a reactionary bulwark against the populism of Bryan. In 1968 it stood as the bulwark of New Deal style liberalism against the growing conservative forces of the South and West.

Phillips points out, as every politically aware person knows, that the South has been the backbone of the Democratic Party since before the Civil War whereas the Northeast has been the base of the Federalists, Whigs, and eventually, the Republicans. But the Democratic Party broke the southern hold on that party's nominating procedure in 1936 and shifted more and more toward a big-city party dominated by the Northeast. As this happened, the Democrat hold on the South deteriorated. This happened first, and most notably, at the national level, because that was where southerners first lost the ability to control candidacies. The Democratic power at the state and local levels has been slower to evaporate because white southerners still retain the dominant role in choosing

candidates at these levels.

Thus, in the majority of the South, where the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASP) votes still predominates, the southern retreat from the national Democratic Party is already complete. According to Phillips, the Democratic Party can now hope to prevail only in southern areas with majority black, chicano, Latin or Jewish populations, for example, the "black belts," southern Texas, and Miami Beach, Dade County in Florida.

A note might be appropriate on the method of investigation employed. What the writer has to say here applies throughout this paper. Therefore, it is very important to pay attention to it now. This will prevent the necessity of asking later where unfootnoted charts came from and what their sources are. If these charts were footnoted, every number shown on them, in some cases perhaps 100 or more, would have to be footnoted separately.

Phillips' study forms the basis of this paper. Those who have read it will recall that it is full of charts which purport to demonstrate certain facts which he is trying to prove. He has selected several counties and/or cities, which, he explains, are representative of a trend. This writer has chosen to go back to those counties whose performance Phillips has so thoroughly charted in past elections to see what happened to their vote totals in the 1972 presidential elections to see if they performed as Phillips predicted. These comparisons can be found in the last subchapters at the end of Chapters II and III, where one finds groups of counties from the several states placed together under appropriate headings.

In doing this the World Almanac has been a reliable source for vote totals, and from these totals the writer has worked out the percentages. This source is very good in supplying a county by county, and in some cases city by city, breakdown of the vote totals. This book is also the source for the charts of the number of Republican officeholders in each state.

When this thesis proposal was first presented, some fellow students criticized the use of the same counties as Phillips. It was argued that it would prove nothing if the same counties came out with similar results. Therefore, it was suggested that counties should be chosen by random selection and utilized to compare with Phillips' lists and findings. This suggestion has been rejected because the goal of any follow-up investigation, is to disprove, not prove, the previous hypothesis. If one disproves the old hypothesis using different data sources, he may very well wind up proving nothing. However, if one winds up disproving the same hypothesis using the same data sources, then one has accomplished something.

There is also a practical reason for doing this. When making a comparison, one has to use the old counties or he will have nothing with which to compare the voting statistics of the newly chosen counties. It would be like trying to compare apples and oranges. Drawing up a second list of counties would only make checking for trends more difficult. The original counties were selected because they represented something, for example, black belt voting. While it is true that a random sample is likely to produce as many black belt counties, they would be different ones. Lacking an intimate

state by state, county by county breakdown of the whole region, it would be difficult to tell which of the new counties were black belt and which represented something else. Therefore, a problem in comparing which counties with which would arise in comparing voting patterns in the southern black belts. Finally, there is the problem that some counties are unique--Winston County, Alabama comes to mind as an example. It is the only traditionally Republican county in Alabama. Therefore, the chances of finding a suitable county with which to compare it by random selection would be a hopeless task.

As has been pointed out, Phillips' study was concerned only with presidential elections. It is here, Phillips believes, that the trend to Republicanism has been and will continue to be the strongest. However, the writer has elected to use other indices to measure the movement at other levels, namely a breakdown of the people holding various offices: governors, United States (U.S.) senators, U.S. congressmen, state senators, and state assemblymen. Once again, as was mentioned earlier, the World Almanac has been used as a source. Using almanacs back to 1948, in the case of the first three categories, and 1950 for the last two (it did not carry a partisan breakdown of state legislatures before then), fourteen tables have been prepared: one for the South as a whole, one for the Deep South, one for the Outer South, and one for each of the eleven states of the region.

Finally, using the same source, the actual partisan vote has been determined for every election for president back to 1948. For

this, the following calculations have been made: actual percentages for each election, percentages of total vote increases over the previous election, and percentage of the vote increase going to each party.

This thesis will consist of a preface, an introduction, and four chapters. Chapter I is intended to introduce the reader to the position of the Republican Party in the South and the state of southern politics in general from the period following the Civil War to the inception and collapse of the Dixiecrat movement. The Dixiecrats were the first in a series of southern third-party movements designed to provide an alternative for people who were growing fearful of the increasing liberalism of the national Democratic Party, but who had too much of the "conservatism" of tradition in them to bring themselves to jump all the way to the Republicans. Chapter I ends at the point at which the movement collapsed since at that point much of the southern electorate was in "suspension," caught between two parties, and it was not entirely clear whether tradition would win out or whether the break was irreparable. Only one thing was clear--that the old southern ties to the Democratic Party had worn very thin.

Chapter II deals with the development of the Republican party in the Outer South: Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, and Texas. This was the region that had, as early as 1928, shown signs of breaking with tradition and going Republican. The depression had brought a halt to the process, and all five states had remained in the Democratic column in 1948, largely due to the split

in the anti-Truman vote. This was also the area that fell to the Republican forces in 1952, as the disgruntled Dixiecrats, knowing that their third-party ideas were impractical, closed ranks behind Eisenhower. It was a foregone conclusion that the subregion would retain its Republican predilection in 1956, but the election of 1960 proved that Republicanism, and not merely Eisenhowerism, had come to stay as Virginia, Tennessee, and Florida remained in the Republican camp, and only the presence of Vice-Presidential Candidate Lyndon Johnson kept Texas Democratic.

Chapter III deals with the growth of Republicanism in the Deep South: South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. This, too, will begin with the 1948 election and move forward. As will be seen, the Deep South, the core of the Solid South, persisted much longer in its third-party schemes and its allegiance to the Democratic Party. Whereas the Outer South had room for some other considerations, such as economics, the politics of the Deep South centered solely on the role of the Negro. It was, after all, a Republican Chief Justice who presided over Brown v. The Board of Education, and it was a Republican President who sent federal troops into Little Rock. It would take John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson's support for attacks on the remaining vestiges of segregation in the South to produce the unprecedented results of 1964, when five of the six states voting Republican were those of the Deep South. However, the Deep South was not through with its third-party flirtations, as George Wallace's American Independent Party (AIP) was to prove. This left the political future of the

Deep South in question.

Chapter IV will attempt to summarize all that has been said in the second and third chapters, tying together the two strands into one coherent whole that will enable the reader to follow the development across the whole region, seeing how developments in one subregion fit into and reflect developments in the other. Starting with the smallest level, the states, the thesis will be built through the two subregions to the whole region.

CHAPTER I

THE DIXIECRATIC SOUTH

Section 1: Background

In discussing any topic, it is best to start with a definition of key terms. Therefore, this definition of the South is offered: the eleven states that seceded from the Union to form the Confederate States of America--Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Sometimes the South is defined more broadly to include West Virginia, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Maryland. These are really border states, and, as such, are not, strictly speaking, a part of this topic.

There is a great deal of controversy over what to use as an index of Republican strength. Some suggest Party Identification; others' actual recorded vote totals; yet others would count officeholders or party registration figures. While these all merit consideration, they are not all equally easy to find. Party identification has only recently been treated thoroughly and can only be compared to earlier times by guesswork. Many states do not register people by party (Virginia, for example). Therefore, two standards have been chosen to measure the rise and fall of Republican sentiment: presidential voting figures, and total number of Republican officeholders.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine Kevin Phillips' findings presented in his book The Emerging Republican Majority in light of the experience of the last five years. This being the case, his ideas concerning the future of politics in the South should be reviewed and compared with reality. Phillips' primary axiom is that:

Presidential Politics ebb and flow in rational (socio-economic) cycles and . . . can thus be projected with a fair degree of accuracy, . . . [but] . . . non-presidential races--state and Congressional races do not necessarily (although they may) follow the presidential pattern.¹

Thus, it is primarily, although not exclusively, with presidential elections that this thesis is concerned. It is, after all, in the realm of presidential politics that Phillips must be proved either true or false. On the other hand, if movement toward Republicans at all levels can be demonstrated, it will go a long way toward showing a genuine groundswell for the Republicans, and not merely a reaction against some temporary leadership elements of the Democratic Party or toward the same in the Republican Party. Therefore, this thesis will be looking carefully at the growth, or lack thereof, of the number of elected Republican governors, senators, congressmen, state senators, and members of the lower houses of the several state legislatures by whatever name they may be called.

Section 2: The Traditional South

In its grand outline the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro.

V. O. Key, Jr.

In the Civil War the so-called Black Belts supported

secession and war; the hill and mountain country opposed it.

Immediately following the war, the political participation of blacks, union men, and farmers increased and the prewar and wartime dominance of the Black Belt was broken. After the election of 1876, however, the Black Belts regained their ascendancy, and ". . . became the bulwark of Democratic strength."² In the years that followed the Republican victory of 1876, southern leaders systematically destroyed the Republican Party in the South. All potential political leaders either already were, or turned, Democrat. Those who would not convert were socially ostracized or economically coerced.³

The reasons for the hatred of the Republicans were many. At first the primary reasons were emotional--a response to the reconstruction policies of the Radical Republicans. Even after the emotional appeal wore off, practical reasons kept the South solidly Democratic. From its inception, the Republican Party had been the party of high tariffs, while the Democratic Party was the party of low tariffs. The natural southern interest in low tariffs kept the South in the Democratic camp.⁴

By the 1920s the old loyalties were beginning to break down. In 1928, with Al Smith, an Irish Catholic from New York running on the Democratic ticket, the South showed signs of bolting. The Republicans carried five southern states: Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Republican voting varied inversely with the proportion of blacks in the population, Smith carrying the Black Belts, and Hoover most of the rest.⁵ The Black Belts were

. . . the hard-core of the political South--and the backbone

of Southern political unity Here . . . the problem of governance is . . . one of the control by a small white minority of a huge, retarded, colored population.⁶

Where absolute unity was needed to maintain control, the white population could not tolerate anything that threatened to split its vote and which might encourage bidding for black votes, thereby threatening white rule.

The year 1928 marked the highwater mark for the Republican Party in the South for the next quarter of a century, as the New Deal set in returning the South to its ancestral loyalties. Table 1, originally appearing in Key's masterpiece on southern politics, and later reproduced in Phillips' book, demonstrates the degree to which the presence of large numbers of blacks affected the southern voting patterns in 1928.⁷

Section 3: Southern Republicans

While the Democratic Party ruled the South for nearly seventy-five years almost completely unchallenged, there were some Republicans to be found. The strongest and most established of these were the highlanders who inhabited the Appalachians and the Ozarks. When one thinks of the Republican Party in the South following the Civil War, one naturally thinks of the other large group of southern Republican voters, the blacks. Other groupings included descendents of the old Populists, religious minorities who had opposed slavery, and transplanted Yankees.⁸

Nevertheless, no Republican leader in the South ever seriously entertained the idea that his party would gain control of his state government during his lifetime. During the interim, Republicans

TABLE 1
SOUTHERN VOTING PATTERNS IN 1928

| State | Counties 50 percent or more black | Counties for Smith | Counties less than 5 percent black | Counties for Hoover |
|----------------|---|--------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| Alabama | 18 | 18 | 6 | 5 |
| Arkansas | 9 | 9 | 29 | 8 |
| Florida | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| Georgia | 48 | 46 | 11 | 8 |
| Louisiana | 16 | 16 | 0 | 0 |
| Mississippi | 35 | 35 | 0 | 0 |
| North Carolina | 9 | 9 | 14 | 13 |
| South Carolina | 25 | 25 | 0 | 0 |
| Tennessee | 2 | 2 | 37 | 26 |
| Texas | 4 | 4 | 150 | 137 |
| Virginia | 21 | 16 | 18 | 13 |
| Total | 191 | 184 | 266 | 187 |

SOURCE: Key, V. O. Southern Politics in State and Nation.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. P. 319.

exerted ". . . themselves only to keep the party weak in the South, in order that there . . ." would be ". . . fewer faithful to reward . . ." when the national party controlled the presidency. Many came to believe that the Republican party in the South had only two functions: ". . . delivery of convention votes and allocation of patronage, . . ." and actively came to dislike those who desired a two-party system in the South. A suggestion for a presidential Republican primary in the southern states caused a furor because it would reduce boss control of delegations and might increase the number of party followers. "Republican organizations in the South--save perhaps those of Virginia and North Carolina--make little effort to get people into the habit of voting Republican, . . ." and, worse yet, the national organization, until recent times, ". . . has been no more concerned than the patronage-minded state leaders in building up the party in the South."⁹

During the 1940s there was a sharp drop in the number of people in the labor force needed on the farms to harvest crops. From 1940 to 1952, on the other hand, one million new jobs were created in manufacturing, and a similar number in "trade." Bank savings deposits quadrupled; average income per capita tripled.¹⁰ Although arriving late, this industrial growth has changed the face of the South. "Expanding markets," and "cheap labor" attracted business from all sections of the country. The South has changed from an area dominated by poverty, " . . . to one of material adequacy for most, abundance for many, and . . . luxury for some." In the agricultural realm, cattle are replacing cotton "more and

more."¹¹ Many of these economic changes quickly became translated into changes in "political balloting." Cosman notes:

Other political changes were also taking place in the composition, size and quality of the electorate; in the recruitment and training of candidates; in the opportunities available to political parties and in the constraints which the system imposes on them¹²

Section 4: Why the Southern Vote Totals Were Low

One of the most conspicuous features of southern elections was the very small percentages of the total available electorate that participated in general elections from the time just before the turn of the century when the aristocratic southern "Bourbons" won their battle against the Populists, until the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948. The reasons for this are complex, and not at all limited to the voting restrictions imposed on blacks in the South. The whites of the populist school of politics were as much the targets of the disenfranchisement schemes as the blacks.¹³ Low voting percentages were common even in the white areas of southern cities. This was largely due to the effects of the poll tax on wage workers, but also stemmed from the impersonality of the city. For country dwellers, the "hometown boy" was a real flesh and blood person everyone knew, whereas a candidate from one of the cities was only a name in a newspaper--not someone to inspire a heavy turnout to try to elect him.¹⁴

In addition to the better known system of the poll tax used by Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia; and the literacy test used by Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,

North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia (Tennessee and Florida having neither);¹⁵ party loyalty oaths provided another source of Democratic control. Voters in primaries, meaning Democratic primaries, since Republicans held none, were required to sign an oath to support party nominees. This was hard to enforce among mere voters, but if one encouraged others to bolt the party--and this was much the greater danger--it became known and thus easier to enforce. This effect was particularly great and important against office-holders. Their defections were the worst danger of all. They could carry sufficient prestige to swing a number of other voters. Thus those with political ambitions were tied to the Democratic Party.¹⁶

Another reason for the poor showing compared to other sections has already been the absence of a strong Republican opposition. As has been pointed out, no one, be he Democrat or Republican, was interested in building up the Republican Party in the South. Democratic leaders and faithfuls would not be expected to be. Republican leaders were more interested in staying leaders. Republican rank and file were small in numbers and uninterested in throwing off the southern Democratic rule. For conservative Republicans it was hard to imagine any Republican who would be more to their liking than Harry F. Byrd, Sr., or Richard Russell. While they might vote for a "conservative" Republican for President, there was little desire or need for local organization. Republicans simply felt satisfied with conservative Democratic rule. The liberals, on the other hand: (1) were few, (2) were loyal to the Democratic Party at the national level, and (3) simply would not feel at home with the

national conservatism of the Republican Party.¹⁷

As a result of all this, elections were decided in the Democratic primaries and general elections were simply not close. The closer the expected vote, the higher the turnout. Southern whites were not, strictly speaking, disenfranchised. They just failed to vote because of the lack of issues and election interest.¹⁸ As for the blacks, there was little choice anyway between Segregationist A and Segregationist B, even where they could manage to register to vote.¹⁹ The mere proximity of numbers of blacks caused white unity where "class divisions" might otherwise have appeared.²⁰

Key argued, "Decline in electoral interest generally operates to a much higher degree among the less prosperous, than among the more substantial members of the community. . . ." Lack of education and poverty, which always seem to result in low participation, were particularly common in the South.²¹ Nowhere in the South was this more true than among the blacks. The majority of blacks in the South at the time were of the lowest social classes with comparatively small incomes and only little formal education. Thus, it would seem, even without discrimination acting to restrict their turnout, their voting would have been smaller than average.

Section 5: The Coming of the Republicans

For many years following the Civil War the Deep South Republican parties were almost entirely Negro. Before Franklin D. Roosevelt it was felt that the Grand Old Party (GOP) could keep the northern black vote by having black southern delegates. At the

same time, and throughout the 1930s, some white Republicans wanted to adopt a "traditional southern position" on race to attract Democratic voters. Nevertheless, the national party depended on southern black conventioners to keep the loyalty of the blacks in the North. As late as 1949, no less prominent a political scientist than Key reasoned that the real key to attracting disgruntled Democrats in the South and winning control of the governments of North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia would be for the mountain Republicans in the South to advocate radical populist ideas. But, this would mean departing from the national party ideals, and, as such, could not be done. Therefore, he felt, no large scale party realignment was possible.

Roosevelt's landslide in 1936 obscured three facts that were ultimately to have disastrous consequences for the Democratic Party in the South, remaking the political face of the South. The first of these occurred in the Republican National Convention of 1936. The New Deal having caused many Negro voters in the North to shift party allegiance from the Republican to the Democratic Party, and many of those who just began to vote having opted to label themselves Democrats, the Republican Party was no longer obliged to choose southern black Republicans as delegates and alternates to attract these northern black votes. Key reports:

In 1936, Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia had no Negroes in the National Convention delegations. Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee had a total of 43 Negro delegates and alternates.

Four years later Alabama, South Carolina, and Virginia had completely

white delegations, and the other eight states had a total of only twenty-seven Negro delegates and alternates, including ". . . eleven from Mississippi."²²

The year 1936 also saw the disappearance of the southern hegemony in the Democratic Party.²³ This was accomplished when the Democratic Party voted to rid itself of the rule requiring a two-thirds majority to nominate presidential candidates, which had given southerners great power in the selection of candidates for national offices. Roosevelt's nonsouthern strength removed to some degree the Democrat's need of southern votes, and he actively sought the black vote.²⁴ This proved effective as the black vote went Democratic for the first time in a national election.²⁵ Signs of the coming storm could be seen when South Carolina Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith marched out of the convention and Gene Talmadge called his "Grass roots convention" in Macon, Georgia to protest against Roosevelt's policies.²⁶

Following the 1936 triumph, the New Deal pushed together politically, the Black Belt in the South and the nation's industrialists, both of whom opposed its pro-labor stands.²⁷ The old southern Bourbon regimes were distrustful of organized labor's growing influence, labor legislation challenged the South's competitive advantages over the rest of the country in the "labor market." While the Supreme Court had vetoed such measures, there was some hope, but after 1937 even that disappeared. Then, in 1938, came Roosevelt's unsuccessful attempt to purge Congress of his political opponents, many of whom were conservative southerners.

It was only the outbreak of World War II that prevented an earlier break of the South with the Democrats.²⁸

World War II, causing sweeping changes from old patterns, fanned the flames of the aspirations of southern blacks. "Price controls, labor shortages, rationing, and a hundred other petty vexations reinforced the winds of conservatism . . . ," observed Tindall.²⁹ Particularly disliked were the World War II price ceilings on cotton and tobacco.³⁰ The Interior Department, under Harold Ickes, officially abolished intradepartmental segregation and, worse yet, Roosevelt himself established a Fair Employment Practices Commission by executive order.³¹ In April, 1944, the United States Supreme Court, in Smith v. Allwright, declared the whites only southern primaries to be invalid. At that time there were roughly 250,000 blacks registered to vote in the South's eleven states. By 1947 this figure had more than doubled. Five years later, the figure stood at four times the 1940 level.³²

These figures fail to show the wide range of differences between the states. Prior to Smith v. Allwright, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana had less than one half of 1 percent of their black voters registered, compared to Tennessee's 16 percent. In the years that followed the slowest increases came, not surprisingly, in Tennessee, Texas, and North Carolina, the three leading states in percentages of blacks registered prior to the Smith case. An example of the kind of increases this produced may be seen by observing Louisiana's record. In 1942 there were 958 Negroes registered in all of Louisiana; in 1944 there were 1,672;

in 1946, 7,561.³³ The end of the whites-only primaries helped bring an end to one-party rule in the South. As Lubell states in his classic The Future of American Politics:

While the Democratic party was exclusively a "white man's club" it retained the aristocratic glamour of the Old South. Voting Democratic and being respectable were synonymous, a feeling which was justified by the fact that the few Negroes who voted in the South were Republicans. The fact that almost one million Negroes were registered in the Democratic primaries in the South [served] as a powerful pressure upon the Southern whites to drive themselves out of the Democratic party.

Opening up the primaries to blacks also served as an impetus for further white registration. For example, in the 1950 Florida primary election 31,000 more Negroes signed up to vote, but 89,000 more whites did the same.³⁴

The New Deal labor allies in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) were not going to take chances of letting the South become a part of an anti New Deal conservative coalition. In 1946, the war having ended, the CIO launched a drive for one million southern members. However, an expense of six million dollars and four year's time, the "Operation Dixie" found southern unionism weaker, not stronger, than before the movement started.³⁵

Converse notes, "[T]he emigration [from the South] and immigration [to the South]. . . ," following World War II, were ". . . geographically concentrated in ways that give them maximum visibility, and in the long run may have maximum political implications." The emigrants have gone mostly from the ". . . poor and backward interior uplands . . . ," while the immigrants have moved into the coastal and "urban industrial areas."³⁶ Indeed, it is to

such people that the development of urban centers such as Houston, Dallas, Atlanta, Durham, Baton Rouge, and Nashville owe much of their flavor. The centers are comfortably middle class with a fair number of oilmen, stockbrokers, bankers, industrialists and cattlemen who lean toward the Republicans. Many of these are relocated Yankees who have brought not only their Republicanism and their greater inclination to vote with them, but who also have found fertile southern ground for their conservative ideas.³⁷

In February, 1948, President Truman asked Congress to pass a civil rights program calling for a full-time Fair Employment Practices Commission, abolition of segregation in interstate commerce, the elimination of the poll tax, and a declaration making lynching a federal crime.³⁸ The 1948 National Democratic Convention endorsed this civil rights platform which upset southern delegates, and with the old party loyalty oaths no longer applying to presidential candidates in the South outside of Alabama, many southern leaders, heretofore bound to support the whole ticket, felt free to break with Truman.³⁹ The result was the Dixiecrat movement which presented a convenient bridge for many southerners to use to cross over in two steps to voting Republican, when they were unwilling to take the chilling plunge all at once.⁴⁰

Actually, the civil rights program was not the sole factor in forming the Dixiecrat movement. Steamer observed:

[All] analyses of the Dixiecrat movement indicate that the ideological position of the Democratic party as the home of labor, liberals, and welfare-staters was as much a road to rebellion as the fear of civil rights legislation. . . .⁴¹

With the National Democratic Party deciding to back civil rights for blacks, the South began to vote according to what it believed were its economic interests.⁴²

Between 1948 and 1950 the Dixiecrats received a series of reverses, making it clear that the movement was dead. By 1950 Senator Richard Russell was prepared to endorse the idea of a very strong Republican Party in the South.⁴³ "The key to building a Southern Republican following," Heard states, "had always lain in the race for President. This provides a big drawing card around which other candidates can build"⁴⁴ The old liberal-conservative disputes in local Democratic Party politics were, even by 1948, being converted into interparty splits in the national election.⁴⁵ This was inevitable. Since 1945 the national Democrats had come to depend for ". . . so many of its votes on minority groups, organized labor, and urban party machines . . . ," that it was inconceivable that the Roosevelt coalition could hold together indefinitely.⁴⁶

As Key noted in his 1949 classic Southern Politics in State and Nation, many southerners voted (and still do) Democratic locally, but Republican nationally. Some just vote in the Democratic primaries out of a sense of "civic duty." Often these are immigrant Republicans from other areas of the country who represent a substantial reservoir of voters ". . . if the Republican organization had anything to offer in the way of candidates," as Key put it.⁴⁷ Lubell noted in his Future of American Politics that by far the heaviest Republican increases came in the urbanized states--Texas, Florida, Virginia, and

North Carolina--and in the cities of those states. Roanoke, Staunton, and Winchester in Virginia also went Republican in 1948, while Alexandria, Fredericksburg, and Charlottesville almost did.⁴⁸ Nor was it any longer taboo to admit to being a Republican in the South. The Junior Chambers of Commerce were filled with young men proud to be identified as Republicans. In addition, there are the traditional Republican "Yankee émigrés" who had already busied themselves establishing new southern voting patterns.⁴⁹

Not only politics, but also demographics was working against the Democrats in the South. If, as mentioned before, it was true that the newly enfranchised black voters were voting Democratic, there were fewer areas where they constituted an available majority than in the past, as Table 2 shows. Thus, by the time the black vote in the South began to trend Democratic, the number of areas it could control had been greatly reduced.

Not only had the Democratization of the black vote failed to substantially aid the national Democratic Party in the South, but it had served to alienate many southern voters. A new revolution was beginning in the South. The Dixiecrat movement of 1948 appeared as only the tip of an iceberg to show what was ahead. As Lubell said:

Southern politics are usually pictured as a conservative-liberal struggle, with liberals representing the wave of the future, and the conservatives resisting all change. This widely held theory hardly explains what is going on. The strongest single force for political change in Dixie Land today is the newly developing urban middle class who, by Northern standards, would be classed conservative. . . . The revolution reshaping Dixieland has been making the South more, not less, conservative politically.⁵⁰

TABLE 2
COUNTIES WITH BLACK MAJORITY POPULATION

| State | 1900 | 1920 | 1940 | 1970 | Total counties |
|----------------|------|------|------|------|-------------------|
| Alabama | 22 | 18 | 18 | 10 | 67 |
| Arkansas | 15 | 11 | 9 | 5 | 75 |
| Florida | 12 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 67 |
| Georgia | 67 | 58 | 46 | 19 | 159 |
| Louisiana | 31 | 22 | 15 | 5 | 64 |
| Mississippi | 38 | 34 | 35 | 21 | 82 |
| North Carolina | 18 | 12 | 9 | 5 | 100 |
| South Carolina | 30 | 32 | 22 | 9 | 46 |
| Tennessee | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 95 |
| Texas | 12 | 4 | 3 | 0 | 254 |
| Virginia | 36 | 23 | 18 | 7 | 96 |
| Total | 284 | 221 | 180 | 85 | 1,105 |

SOURCES: Key, V. O. Southern Politics in State and Nation.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. P. 29.

Murphy, Reg, and Gulliver, H. The Southern
Strategy. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. 11-12.

There are three aspects of the "conservative revolution," as Lubell saw it: ". . . labor's failure to organize the South, urban middle class political insurgency; and expanding 'Negro rights' in the intensification of the race issue." In 1951 he wrote:

Instead of a militant labor movement, the first fruits of increasing industrialism have been a rising urban middle class, which is virtually Republican in political sympathies. It is this new middle class, the branch plant managers and their college trained supervisors, merchants, doctors and lawyers, newspaper publishers, and realtors, all seemingly so conservative, who are the real political rebels in the South today.

From this middle class are coming the strongest pressures for two-party politics. The liberals, themselves weak, are actually hugging the one-party system with might and main. Their sole hope for gaining power locally lies in the possibility that a premature conservative bolt will leave them to crow with the Democratic rooster.⁵¹

In 1969, Phillips noted the following:

The Emerging Republican majority of the Nineteen-Seventies is centered in the South, the West, and in the "middle American" urban-suburban districts. . . . It has been the seat of every popular, progressive upheaval in American politics--Jefferson, Jackson, Bryant, and Roosevelt. . . . Together with the Heartland, the South is shaping up a pillar of a national conservative party. . . . The extraordinary 1968 debacle of the Democratic party--a collapse never before experienced by the Democrats throughout the entire region--bespoke a sharp Republican trend in Dixie. At the same time, liberal fragments of the South--Miami, Tampa, Gulf Coast and Mexican Texas, elements of French Louisiana and Black Belt areas dominated by Negro electorates--disassociated themselves from the emerging national conservative grouping.⁵²

What happened to these areas in the interim? Wallace's effect on the 1968 southern showing was proclaimed by Phillips to be equitable with people who would later vote Republican nationally, if not locally. Where did they go in 1972? Has the South continued in its patterns described by Phillips in 1968, or was 1968 in some way peculiar? These are questions the writer hopes to answer in the

chapters which follow.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I

¹Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and Co., 1969), p. 22.

²V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 10.

³*Ibid.*, pp. 551-52.

⁴Charles O. Lerche, Jr., The Uncertain South (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1964), pp. 37-38.

⁵Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 318.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 292-96 *passim*.

¹⁰Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), p. 100.

¹¹Robert J. Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 152-53.

¹²Bernard Cosman, Five States for Goldwater (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 55.

¹³Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 542.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 510.

¹⁵Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Negro Voter Registration in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 139.

¹⁶Alexander Heard, The Two Party South? (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 137-38.

¹⁷Dewey Grantham, Jr., The Democratic South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1963), pp. 81-90.

¹⁸Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 655.

¹⁹Matthews and Prothro, "Negro Voter Registration in the South," p. 140.

²⁰Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 655.

²¹*Ibid.*

²²*Ibid.*, p. 289.

²³Grantham, The Democratic South, pp. 81-90.

²⁴Heard, The Two Party South? pp. 150-51.

²⁵Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 156.

²⁶George B. Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 31.

²⁷Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 329.

²⁸Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," pp. 158-59.

²⁹Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South, p. 35.

³⁰William C. Havard, The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 545.

³¹Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 175.

³²Matthews and Prothro, "Negro Voter Registration in the South," p. 123.

³³Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 158.

³⁴Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 126.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 109-10.

- ³⁶Phillip Converse, "A Major Political Realignment in the South?" Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 211-12.
- ³⁷Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," pp. 152-53.
- ³⁸Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," p. 176.
- ³⁹Heard, The Two Party South? pp. 150-51.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 29.
- ⁴¹Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 159.
- ⁴²Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," p. 175.
- ⁴³Heard, The Two Party South? pp. 164-65.
- ⁴⁴Ibid., p. 137.
- ⁴⁵Grantham, The Democratic South, pp. 81-90.
- ⁴⁶Lerche, The Uncertain South, pp. 47-48.
- ⁴⁷Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 278.
- ⁴⁸Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 113-14.
- ⁴⁹Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 154.
- ⁵⁰Lubell, The Future of American Politics, p. 113.
- ⁵¹Ibid.
- ⁵²Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority, pp. 23-24.

CHAPTER II

THE OUTER SOUTH: 1948 to 1972

There are, perhaps, many ways in which one could define the Outer South. Of these, however, none is quite as satisfactory as describing it as those southern states casting their electoral votes for the Republican presidential candidate during at least one election from 1880 through 1952. Thus, the Outer South would include the following states: Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, North Carolina, and Texas.

To aid in the analysis which follows, several tables have been prepared--one for each state; one for the entirety of the Outer South; and one for all of the Deep South; and one for the Whole South. These tables contain the following information: the party of the Governor (D = Democrat, R = Republican), the partisan congressional breakdown for both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the breakdown of the state legislatures by party. The first three begin with the year 1947, the last two with the year 1950. The tables were compiled from the World Almanac for that period. This explanation is given now so that footnoting each table, one figure at a time, will not be necessary.

Another set of tables has also been prepared which shows the vote totals for each election for President from 1948 through 1972. They are broken down by party, as well as being totaled to show the

entire vote. Figures are also supplied showing percentage gains or losses over the last election for each party and for the entire vote.

In confirming, or disproving, Phillips' thesis, it is, as should be pointed out, only the presidential election results that are important. But the other data may help in understanding the depth of change, and the likelihood of its reversal. There are those who feel that the loss of southern votes by the Democrats is only a temporary aberration. Thus, Eisenhower's twin victories occurred because of his enormous popularity. Nixon did win votes, but rather Kennedy lost them because of his Catholicism. The proof for these first two statements is supposed to be Johnson's victories in the Outer South in 1964, while the loss of the Deep South is explained as temporary due to the racial appeals of Barry Goldwater. The 1968 results are said to confirm this since Goldwater's states (South Carolina excepted) swung behind George Wallace. The rest of the South went Republican because Wallace drew sufficient Democratic votes away from Humphrey to assure Nixon a victory. Had Wallace not been in the race, it is explained, these voters, being Democratic party identifiers, would have supported Humphrey. As for 1972, it was aberrant because McGovern was a complete fiasco throughout the nation. The following demonstrates a survey of the Outer South states.

Virginia has traditionally been one of the three southern states (North Carolina and Tennessee being the other two) where the Republican Party has been an actual political force.¹ (See Table 3.) Nevertheless, until the late 1940s there was an absence of interparty

TABLE 3
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR VIRGINIA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|----------------------|--------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D ^a | OR ^b --2D | OR--9D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 9 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 9 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 9 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | 2R--38D | 8R--92D | 10 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | 2R--38D | 8R--92D | 10 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | 3R--37D | 7R--91D | 10 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | 3R--7D | 3R--37D | 7R--93D | 13 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | 3R--7D | 3R--37D | 6R--93D | 12 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 6R--93D | 11 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 11 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 11 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 11 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 6R--94D | 11 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 2R--38D | 4R--96D | 8 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 2R--38D | 4R--96D | 8 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 2R--38D | 5R--94D | 9 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 2R--38D | 4R--95D | 8 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 11R--89D | 16 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 3R--37D | 11R--89D | 16 |
| 1966 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 5R--35D | 11R--89D | 16 |
| 1967 | D | OR--2D | 4R--6D | 5R--35D | 11R--89D | 20 |
| 1968 | D | OR--2D | 4R--6D | 6R--34D | 14R--86D | 24 |

TABLE 3--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1969 | D | 0R--2D | 5R--5D | 6R--34D | 15R--85D | 26 |
| 1970 | R | 0R--1D | 5R--5D | 6R--34D | 15R--85D | 27 |
| 1971 | R | 0R--1D | 6R--4D | 6R--33D | 15R--75D | 28 |
| 1972 | R | 0R--1D | 6R--4D | 7R--33D | 24R--75D | 38 |
| 1973 | R | 1R--0D | 7R--3D | 7R--33D | 25R--71D | 41 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

competition throughout most of the state, even in presidential elections. The large mountain Republican vote could have been used as a basis for forming a substantial opposition party in statewide and local races if party leaders had been so inclined, but they were not interested in much except Washington patronage.² Only in the "fighting ninth" district was there genuine two-party competition.³ Here, genuine mountain Republicans obliged the Democratic candidates to campaign fairly strongly, and controlled wide areas of southwest Virginia even before the Eisenhower era.⁴

In 1946 the Republican Party of Virginia, for the first time, employed a "full time" Executive Director, in preparation for the 1948 election. He began to prepare the local party organizations for the contest eighteen months in advance of the election. This came as a result of a new group entering the party who were actively interested in contesting elections.⁵

As pointed out earlier, 1950 saw the end of the Dixiecrats as a viable political force in the South. At the time Table 3 begins, Republicans held only nine seats in the state legislature. The two U.S. Senate seats, all of the House seats, and the governor's chair were safely in Democratic hands. In the 1951 elections, the Republicans picked up one state senator.

In 1952 Eisenhower swept through Virginia, more than doubling Dewey's 1948 totals (172,070 to 348,037). Stevenson, too, increased his absolute figures over Truman, but slipped from Truman's 48.2 percent to 43.4 percent. Of the new voters entering the Virginia electorate between 1948 and 1952, 72.2 percent voted for the Republican presidential candidate. Three new Republican Congressmen, the first in many years, won election, capturing seats in the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth districts. Two vacancies in the House of Delegates went to the Democrats. Nevertheless, in 1953 the Republican Party in Virginia achieved a hold on more elective offices than they would again until 1964.

In the 1953 governor's race, the Republicans, fresh from Eisenhower's smashing victory of the year before, had high hopes. In that election, the Republican candidate Ted Dalton took 44 percent of the vote, coming closer to victory than any Republican candidate of this century had before, and closer than anyone else would again until A. Linwood Holton.⁶ However, any hopes for Republican statewide victories, which had seemed so bright after Ted Dalton's narrow defeat in 1953, ". . . were shattered by the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision. That decision revived race as Virginia's primary political issue."⁷ Dalton's percentage in 1957, after the Brown decision, and after Eisenhower's move against Little Rock, fell from 44 percent to

37 percent. Nevertheless, by 1959, the victor, Governor Almond, was forced to capitulate and announce "massive resistance" dead.⁸

In 1954 another Republican seat in the House of Delegates became vacant, and was eventually filled by a Democrat. In Congress, Pat Jennings defeated Republican Congressman William Wampler in his reelection bid in the Ninth District. The Brown decision had done much to place the local southern Republican Party back where it was before 1952. Even Eisenhower's massive repeat triumph in 1956 did little to revive the party. It was more or less a personal triumph and Stevenson's loss--with the lowest Democratic percentage in this century, and an actual overall decrease in votes from 1952--was more or less a personal debacle.

From the (temporary) highpoint of 1953, the Republicans were forced to fight a holding action to avoid further losses. No new gains were made during the rest of the 1950s, and, in 1959, one-third of their state legislative seats were lost in a statewide version of the 1958 congressional debacle. In 1961, however, the Republicans began to climb back by making a one-seat gain in the House of Delegates. In 1954 and 1957 a Republican President had been blamed by the South for the Brown decision, and the intervention at Little Rock. In 1962 it was the Democratic President John F. Kennedy who nationalized the Mississippi National Guard, and sent some of its units and Regular Army troops to force integration on "Ole Miss." In August of 1963 came the March to Washington in support of the Kennedy administration's Civil Rights Bill.⁹ In November of 1963, one new Republican state senator, and seven new Republican members of the House of Delegates were elected in Virginia. The deluge of Republican sympathy that was to inundate the

Deep South a year later had already begun to manifest itself in Virginia.

The presidential election in 1960 in Virginia proved that the two Eisenhower sweeps had not been flukes. Virginia again went Republican. Richard Nixon improved his vote total by 16,000 over Eisenhower's 1956 showing, although his percentage was not as high, only 52.7 percent. Kennedy's total of 362,327 was nearly 95,000 votes better than Stevenson's, but still fell more than 40,000 votes short of Nixon.

When in January of 1964 the Twenty-Fourth Amendment took effect, barring the poll tax as a voting requirement in federal elections, it signaled an upturn in the projected vote for the 1964 Presidential election.¹⁰ More than 35 percent more voters came to the polls in 1964 than in 1960;¹¹ nearly equalling the 1948 to 1952 increase of 47.8 percent.¹² Black votes proved crucial to Democratic victories in both 1964 and 1965. With 90 percent plus black support, Lyndon Johnson was able to defeat Barry Goldwater in Virginia by a scant 77,000 votes, with black voters numbering 160,000. In the 1965 governor's race, Godwin came out 57,000 votes ahead due to a 75 percent plus vote among black voters.¹³ But times were changing in Virginia. Godwin was destined to be the last of the Byrd machine governors. The rift in the Virginia Democratic Party had begun in 1964 when the state Democratic Convention bolted the influence of Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., and endorsed President Johnson for reelection. This was an open challenge to Senator Byrd's "golden silence" doctrine. Under the direction of Sidney Kellam of Virginia Beach, Johnson was to become the only presidential Democratic victor in the Old Dominion since 1948.¹⁴

In 1966, the rift developed into near civil war. Both Senate

seats were up, as well as all ten House seats. Because of the resignation of Senator Byrd in 1965, his son, who had been appointed to replace him, had to face election for the remainder of the term. The other seat, held by A. Willis Robertson, was due for reelection. Both Byrd and Robertson met stiff primary opposition from the liberal wing of the party. Byrd won narrowly, but Robertson's old age (seventy-nine) proved a handicap allowing "moderate" William B. Spong, Jr. to emerge the winner by a scant 611 votes.¹⁵

Nor was this all. The Byrd organization suffered another setback when Delegate George Rawlings pulled off a surprising 645-vote victory over nationally known Eighth District Congressman Judge Howard W. Smith, Chairman of the Rules Committee. This victory proved of little personal benefit, however, as Rawlings was easily defeated by William Scott, a Republican, in the general election. For Smith, like Robertson, age had been an important factor. He and his supporters joined with the normal Republicans in the district to give Scott a 57 percent margin. Nor was that all the Republicans had to celebrate. In the "fighting ninth," former Congressman William Wampler regained his old seat in Congress defeating incumbent Pat Jennings, who had gained himself somewhat of a reputation for being something of a liberal and a political maverick.¹⁶ At the same time, two new faces joined the Republican delegation in the State Senate. These were joined in 1967 by another new state senator and three new Republican members of the House of Delegates.

The outcome of the 1968 elections in Virginia was somewhat suspense-filled, due to the very strong third-party candidacy of George Wallace. Although most of Wallace's support was supposed to be from rural, southside Democratic Party identifiers, who had been,

in past elections, the bedrock of the Democratic Party in Virginia, it was widely argued that, in Wallace's absence, these voters would have gone for Nixon over Humphrey. But Wallace was present. Who would win by his presence? Whom would he hurt the most? That is hard to say, but Nixon carried the Old Dominion, increasing his vote totals by 109,000 over Goldwater's figure, and 186,000 over his own 1960 figure. Humphrey finished with 442,387 votes, 80,000 votes ahead of Kennedy, but 116,000 votes behind Johnson, and more important, 148,000 votes behind Nixon. Wallace finished third with almost a quarter of the votes.

Although Wallace support failed to reach expected levels in southside, his margins in the Tidewater cities were surprisingly high. Indeed, the votes he siphoned from Humphrey here were responsible for the size of his loss. Wallace actually did better in Norfolk than in conservative Henrico County.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the results of 1968 were marred by the lack of a clear majority for Nixon. The degree of Republican strength was seriously questioned. The 1968 election thus set the stage for the 1969 governor's race. The Republican candidate was again Linwood Holton. Every spot on the Democratic ticket was being contested in the primary. With the defeat of the regular Byrd machine candidates in the primary, "Conservatives . . . announced themselves to be Republicans . . . ," and went forth to work for the candidates of their new political home. Not a few "independents" and new Republicans made large donations to Holton's campaign. Holton emerged the victor with 52.5 percent of the vote.¹⁸

Many have attributed the feud within the Democratic Party for Holton's victory. The University of Virginia's late Ralph Eisenberg

concluded otherwise:

It is too simple a conclusion to argue that Battle's loss resulted solely from the splintering of the Democratic Party and as such was merely an aberration of Virginia's historic Democratic dominance. Holton's triumph followed too many successes in Presidential and Congressional elections for the argument that it was a personal triumph to be convincing. . . .¹⁹

The move to Linwood Holton came from both ends of the Democratic political spectrum. Some of Henry Howell's followers, disappointed at his defeat in the primary, moved to Holton. But another large segment came from the ranks of Democratic conservatives. Thus, Lubell reports in his The Hidden Crisis in American Politics that one Richmond housewife who had voted for Wallace in 1968 told him shortly after the election, "'I'm glad he didn't get in. He's so headstrong. I regret not voting for Nixon. I'm beginning to lean Republican.'" In the 1969 race, Wallace neighborhoods split, voting for Holton for Governor, and Reynolds for Lieutenant Governor. As Lubell puts it:

The younger Wallace backers often have little sense of party identification. Their shift to Nixon on election eve was marked. . . . Over the long run . . . a Republican appeal to their individualistic economic drive would probably provide a more lasting basis of political identification than the race issue.²⁰

Of course, the most important component of Holton's strength was the traditional and recently Republican urban-suburban vote. It is noted that:

The Republican performances in Virginia's suburbs had steadily improved over the years. The suburban vote had been an important ingredient in President Nixon's triumph in Virginia in 1968, and it was very adeptly exploited by Virginia Republicans in 1969.²¹

In 1970 Virginia entered what might be termed the era of the independent. Her senior Senator Harry Flood Byrd, Jr. declared that

he no longer considered himself a Democrat, possibly in fear of another close primary fight, possibly in response to Holton's victory. The Democratic Primary attracted only minimal excitement as George Rawlings, conqueror of Judge Smith four years earlier, gained the nomination. At the same time, the Republican convention split over whether to nominate a candidate at all. Only Holton's prestige proved sufficient to force a favorable vote on the issue. Many Republicans went to work for Senator Harry Byrd rather than their own candidate Ray Garland. The White House was appalled that anyone had been nominated. The result was all that could have been expected; the Senator breezed to an easy reelection, carrying nine of ten congressional districts. The Republican finished a dismal third. The only bright spot came when Kenneth Robinson captured the Seventh District seat, giving the Republicans a clear majority of six of the ten congressional seats from Virginia, the first time in this century any southern state in the Outer South had done so.

When in 1971 Lieutenant Governor Reynolds died suddenly, an election was called to fill the vacancy. Both parties called conventions to nominate candidates--the first time in many years the Democrats had not used a primary to select a candidate. State Senator Henry Howell, a liberal Democrat from Norfolk, announced his candidacy for the post as an independent. The Democrats nominated George Kostel, an obscure state legislator of uncertain ideology. At the Republican Convention George Shafran, a "Holton Republican," overcame the challenge of conservative George Mason Green to gain the nomination. Conservatives of both parties could agree only on not

wanting Henry Howell. Whom they did want was largely a matter of personal choice, centering around the question of who was believed to have the better chance of victory. Without a name like Byrd's in the race, this was not clear. When the votes were counted, Howell emerged the winner by a narrow margin over Kostel, with Shafran running a poor third. But all was not lost. The elections added a new Republican State Senator, and many new members of the House of Delegates.

With two consecutive third-place finishes for Republican candidates, the situation looked bad for Republican chances in statewide elections. Only one man wanted to take a chance to run against incumbent Senator Bill Spong. That man was Bill Scott, Eighth District Republican Congressman. Scott had been thrown into the Tenth District when the Democratic legislature redistricted Virginia. This left Scott with the choice of moving, running in a primary against Joel Broyhill, the Tenth's incumbent Republican Congressman, retiring, or running into nearly certain defeat by taking on Spong in the Senate race. Scott chose the last alternative. No one else wanted the job. Indeed, Joel Broyhill refused the efforts of a "Draft Broyhill" group.

Meanwhile, within the party, all was not well. Holton, as party leader, was blamed for the two consecutive losses, both by wide margins, that the party had suffered. Conservatives felt that no candidate should have been run in 1970; that Byrd was (1) unbeatable, and (2) completely acceptable anyway. It was more important, they felt, to avoid defeat than to run a candidate. Holton felt that

the party must be saved from the menace of having the Byrd machine take it over, while conservatives argued that an allegiance with the Byrd machine would result in a new coalition capable of governing the state. In 1971 all wings of the party had wanted a candidate run, but conservatives had wanted Mason Green, not George Shafran. Green, they felt, was clearly identifiable as a conservative, and could have run a much stronger race. They felt that both losses were due to the fact that neither candidate, Garland or Shafran, was a conservative, rather than to the fact that both were Republicans. Accordingly, they wanted a change of party leadership. Since Governor Holton could not be touched, the chosen victim was Warren French, party chairman, and a leading Holton strategist. His opponent was Richard Obenshain, a young (thirty-six in 1972), articulate conservative Richmond lawyer, and Holton's 1969 Attorney General running mate.

Thus, the stage was set for the Roanoke convention. According to the rules of the convention, delegations were forbidden from employing "unit rule." Several key blocks of Obenshain supporters were from "instructed delegations," however. These were groups which had received "instructions" from the mass meetings at city, county, or precinct levels back home to vote a certain way on a certain vote, in this case, for Obenshain as party chairman. Realizing this, French had offered to withdraw from the contest shortly before the convention. The Governor, however, convinced him to stay in.

At the convention, Holton supporters claimed that "instructed delegations" were in effect on unit rule. The chair so ruled. The

ruling of the chair was immediately appealed. On that vote hung the election. The chair was overruled by a very wide margin. The final vote was anticlimactic. Obenshain won easily. The Republican Party had become the Party of the Right in Virginia. Scott was nominated without opposition. A conservative candidate easily won the National Committeeman's post. Mrs. Cynthia Newman, a Holton follower, was permitted to retain her post, as National Committeewoman so that party unity could be maintained.

The Democratic State Convention, also held in Roanoke, completed the political shift. As the Republicans elected to make a definite and clear shift to the right, the Democrats elected to give the voters a clear choice by shifting to the left. Joseph Fitzpatrick, a long-time associate of liberal independent Democrat Henry Howell, became party chairman. George Rawlings became National Committeeman, and Ms Ruth Charity of Danville completed the liberal sweep. "Moderate" Bill Spong was renominated for the Senate.

The Senate race was expected to be an easy victory for Spong, who had run ahead of Harry Byrd, Jr. when they both ran in 1966. Spong tried to show the people that he had been progressive, but not radical. Bill Scott kept hammering away at his theme that Spong did not fit in with the rest of the Virginia delegation, producing a scorecard of the very Conservative Americans for Constitutional Action to prove it. Perhaps Spong's biggest error was in not taking Scott seriously. What many consider to be the turning point in the campaign came when Spong, who until that time had refused to admit that he would vote for McGovern for President, admitted to a student,

following a speech at Ferrum Junior College, that he would indeed vote for McGovern. Spong reportedly thought that no reporters were listening. It was the most costly miscalculation of his career. After this story broke, even the endorsements of most of Virginia's most prominent newspapers helped little. It confirmed the suspicions of many voters. Bill Scott proved that a conservative Republican could win as he swept the state, carrying seven of ten congressional districts.

On the presidential front, Richard M. Nixon drew nearly a million votes in defeating his opponent, Democrat George McGovern by over 400,000 votes, a better than two-to-one margin. McGovern's 30.9 percent was less than Humphrey's, while Nixon's 69 percent exceeded the combined totals for both Wallace's and his own 1968 percentages. McGovern's total vote was less than Humphrey's had been four years earlier. In addition to the six seats already held, Republicans picked up southside Fourth Congressional District when one-time Democratic State Chairman Watkins Abbitt retired (see Table 4).

Havard notes:

The increasing size of the electorate made it more and more difficult for the organization, and later for the Democratic party to win elections, as the growing proportions of urban votes caused fundamental changes in the political balance.

The constructive product of the enlarged electorate was the rapid development of the Republican party. It must be concluded that there was more than a coincidence between the large turnouts and Republican successes. . . . Undoubtedly spurred by Senator Byrd's "golden silence" and conservative Democratic defections to Republican candidacies, the early Republican presidential victories legitimized Republican voting habits for many Virginians and aided the development of the Republican party organizations. [Emphasis added.]

The new suburban vote proved more Republican than any other

TABLE 4
VIRGINIA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 172,070 | 200,786 | 43,393 | 41.3 | 48.2 | 10.4 |
| 1952 | 349,037 | 268,677 | . . . | 56.5 | 43.4 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 386,459 | 267,760 | 42,964 | 55.4 | 38.4 | 6.1 |
| 1960 | 404,531 | 362,327 | . . . | 52.7 | 47.2 | 0.0 |
| 1964 | 481,334 | 558,038 | . . . | 46.3 | 53.6 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 590,319 | 442,387 | 320,372 | 43.6 | 32.6 | 23.7 |
| 1972 | 982,792 | 439,546 | . . . | 69.0 | 30.9 | 0.0 |

area of the state, except the Shenandoah Valley. Moreover, ". . . rising proportions of the total metropolitan vote were suburban." While the central cities began to dominate Democratic primaries, the suburbs dominated the November elections.²²

Traditionally, Tennessee, like Virginia, has been one of the few southern states with more than minimal Republican support.²³ Indeed, Key referred to it as "a double one-party state."²⁴ At the time this study was started in 1947-1948, Tennessee was the only southern state to have a Republican delegation in Congress (see Table 5). In eastern Tennessee the mountain Republicans regularly vote straight Republican tickets, and even at that early date

TABLE 5
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR TENNESSEE

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 18R--79D | 24 |
| 1948 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 18R--79D | 24 |
| 1949 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 19R--80D | 25 |
| 1950 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 19R--80D | 25 |
| 1951 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 19R--80D | 25 |
| 1952 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--8D | 4R--29D | 19R--80D | 25 |
| 1953 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 18R--81D | 25 |
| 1954 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 18R--81D | 25 |
| 1955 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 19R--80D | 26 |
| 1956 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 19R--80D | 26 |
| 1957 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 6R--27D | 21R--78D | 29 |
| 1958 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 6R--27D | 21R--78D | 29 |
| 1959 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 17R--82D | 24 |
| 1960 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 5R--28D | 17R--82D | 24 |
| 1961 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 6R--27D | 19R--80D | 27 |
| 1962 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--7D | 6R--27D | 19R--80D | 27 |
| 1963 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--6D | 6R--27D | 21R--78D | 30 |
| 1964 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--6D | 6R--27D | 21R--78D | 30 |
| 1965 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--6D | 8R--25D | 24R--75D | 35 |

TABLE 5--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--6D | 8R--25D | 24R--75D | 35 |
| 1967 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--5D | 8R--25D | 41R--58D | 54 |
| 1968 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--5D | 8R--25D | 41R--58D | 54 |
| 1969 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--5D | 13R--20D | 49R--49D | 67 |
| 1970 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--5D | 12R--20D | 49R--49D | 66 |
| 1971 | R | 2R--0D | 4R--5D | 13R--19D | 43R--56D | 63 |
| 1972 | R | 2R--0D | 4R--5D | 13R--19D | 43R--56D | 63 |
| 1973 | R | 2R--0D | 5R--3D | 13R--19D | 49R--50D | 70 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

controlled local governments and sent their representatives to the state legislature.²⁵ Tennessee was one of the states of the 1928 "Hoovercratic" South. Dry Protestant Democrats augmented the normal Republican vote against Smith. Urban areas like Nashville went Republican and even Chattanooga and Memphis were more Republican than surrounding rural areas.²⁶

Table 6 depicts rather graphically the slow growth of Republican voting in Tennessee from 1892 to 1928, and the effect of the depression on Republican fortunes. From 1892 to 1932 West Tennessee gained only slightly, while middle Tennessee was the

TABLE 6
SLOW GROWTH OF REPUBLICAN VOTING IN
TENNESSEE FROM 1892 TO 1928

| Region | 1892 (%) | 1928 (%) | Gain (%) | 1932 (%) | Loss (%) |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| East Tennessee | 57.8 | 63.3 | 5.5 | 51.5 | -11.8 |
| Middle Tennessee | 30.8 | 38.3 | 7.5 | 22.8 | -15.5 |
| West Tennessee | 32.5 | 34.1 | 1.6 | 15.6 | -18.5 |

biggest gainer, edging out Republican East Tennessee. But in 1932 the West suffered the largest loss with the East still retaining a slim majority for Hoover.²⁷

Despite a large reserve of Republican strength in the East, little success was met in statewide races. In 1952, Heard explained this lack of success:

The pusilanimous campaigns of Republican candidates reveals the reluctance of the party hierarchy to have its hegemony of party affairs upset. Especially in Tennessee, Republican candidates recite the shoddy treatment they have received at the hands of party officials. They speak as though they had two fights, one within their own party and one against the Democrats. Candidacy for state office, asserts one venerable Tennessee Republican, is used as a sidetrack by the professionals to take care of overambitious upstarts.²⁸

As the figures of the opening table show, Tennessee Republicanism was in pretty much of a static state, at least from 1947 to 1962. Throughout that entire period the First and Second Congressional Districts of East Tennessee remained solidly Republican,



as did four to six seats of the State Senate and seventeen to twenty-one seats of the Lower House of the legislature. True, there were slight variations--the Republicans picked up one State Senate seat in each of Eisenhower's two races and suffered a significant, but temporary, loss of legislative strength in the nationally disastrous year of 1958, but as a whole, the situation remained remarkably static.

In the Presidential races, Truman managed a plurality victory in 1948, defeating Dewey 49.4 percent to 37 percent, and managing a 68,000-vote margin. Both of Eisenhower's victories were extremely tight, finishing with a bare 3,000-vote margin in 1952, and winning with a mere 50.1 percent. In 1956, due to the presence of an independent candidate, Eisenhower managed only a 49.2 percent plurality and a margin of under 6,000 votes.

Surprisingly, it was neither of the two Eisenhower elections that moved Tennessee clearly out of the Democratic orbit. That task remained for Richard Nixon to complete. Even the presence of Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus on a third-party line did not detract from Nixon's showing. Nixon won a higher percentage, 53 percent, than Eisenhower had managed in either 1952 or 1956. While Kennedy drew only 25,000 more votes than Stevenson had in 1956, the Republican total increased by 94,000 votes. Republican strength in the legislature, which had reached a low point following the 1958 election, increased by one in the upper house, and two in the lower.

In 1962, after two years of the return of the Democrats to power, the Republican surge continued forward. Two more seats in the

lower house of the legislature fell to the Republicans, boosting their levels equal to the high point following Eisenhower's 1956 victory. For the first time during the period of this study, a Congressional seat switched hands when William Brock won a close race in the Third District.

The year 1964 has been generally conceded not to have been a Republican year anywhere outside of the Deep South. While failing to carry Tennessee, the first time a Republican candidate had failed to do so since 1948, Goldwater's total vote was higher than either of Eisenhower's, although it was down considerably from Nixon's 1960 figure. Nevertheless, the loss of the presidential race probably postponed the gain of at least one, if not both, of the Senate seats which were contested in 1964. However, if it were not a Republican year in the federal elections, such was not the case in the state contests. Two new state senators were elected and three new house members.

The Republican revolution, begun in 1960, and somewhat sidetracked in 1964, pushed forward dramatically in 1966. Following a bitter primary fight between incumbent Senator Ross Bass, and Governor Frank Clement, through which Clement secured the Democratic senatorial nomination, Republican Howard Baker, a staunch conservative and a racial moderate, emerged the victor in the general election by nearly a 100,000-vote margin. For the second time in the decade a House seat changed hands as the Ninth District (Memphis) elected Republican Dan Kuykendall. There were seventeen new Republicans who won election to the lower house in the legislature, nearly doubling

the number present.

The 1968 election continued to show the newly discovered unpopularity of the Democrats. Nixon won the state with a slight plurality (even though his vote total was less than Goldwater's--making 1968 the second election in a row in which the Republican vote had fallen) over, not Democrat Hubert Humphrey, who finished third, but American Independent Party candidate George Wallace. In addition to the presidential victory, Republicans elected five new state senators and eight new members to the state house. They now attained an even split in the lower house of the state legislature and about 40 percent membership in the upper house.

Table 7 helps explain the changing source of Republican strength in Tennessee. While West Tennessee had suffered the heaviest losses of Republican support between 1928 and 1932, it also rebounded better than either of the other two regions. As Havard puts it:

The change in the Western Division may be one of the most pronounced changes in the South. What is perhaps more problematic for West Tennessee and the state's political leaders, is whether their remarkable change in the area is becoming well enough institutionalized to afford the Republicans a new and reasonably secure party base.²⁹

The 1970 elections offered mixed results in Tennessee as in the nation as a whole. For the first time in twelve years strength was lost in the legislature. The precarious balance was lost in the lower house, as the Republicans lost six seats leaving them at a forty-three to fifty-six disadvantage. However, both statewide races--the Governorship and the Senate seats previously held by Albert Gore--fell to the Republicans. Dr. Winfield Dunn of Memphis

TABLE 7
PRESIDENTIAL REPUBLICAN VOTE PERCENTAGES
IN TENNESSEE BY REGION

| Region | 1928 (%) | 1932 (%) | 1968 (%) | Comparison | |
|------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| | | | | 1968 to 1928 (%) | 1968 to 1932 (%) |
| East Tennessee | 63.3 | 51.5 | 59.1 | - 4.2 | 7.6 |
| Middle Tennessee | 38.3 | 22.8 | 36.5 | - 1.8 | 13.7 |
| West Tennessee | 34.1 | 15.6 | 46.8 | 12.7 | 31.2 |

became the new Governor, and William Brock the new Senator, thus giving the Republicans their first, and as yet, only two-man Senate delegation from the South.

This brings 1972 as the first year that Tennessee had a presidential primary. Under the ground rules delegates and alternates to the national conventions were supposed to be bound by the outcome of the primaries--at least on the first ballot. This was the Tennessee state law. Under convention rules, however, the delegations to the convention of the Democratic Party had to reflect the population as a whole, in several key categories: women, blacks, and youth being the most important.

Alabama Governor George Wallace swept the Democratic primary with approximately 70 percent of the vote, thus entitling him to the

entire Tennessee convention vote on the first ballot. However, followers of South Dakota Senator George McGovern, who were much more adept at stacking conventions in Tennessee than in producing primary votes, and who were much more concerned about playing by the convention rules of the Democratic National Convention than in obeying the state laws of Tennessee, were not people to be deterred by minor technicalities. Several of them decided that Tennessee's laws were not applicable to them, at least not when they were in Florida. Therefore, they "did their own thing" and voted for the candidate of their choice, George McGovern. In the days before television, they might have been able to get away with it without the voters back home finding out. However, they chose to disregard Tennessee's laws over nationwide television.

While it would not be fair to say this was the sole reason for the result, this activity certainly did not do Senator McGovern any good. The result was a complete disaster: Richard M. Nixon 812,484; George McGovern 355,841 (see Table 8). Expressed in percentages, that comes to: Nixon 69.5 percent; McGovern 30.4 percent. Equally important, Senator Baker won reelection, and Republicans solidified control over the congressional delegation. Tennessee lost one seat as a result of the 1970 census. The four previously elected Republicans all returned and a fifth Republican, Robin Beard, was elected for the first time, thus giving the Republicans an absolute majority of five out of eight of Tennessee's congressmen. Tennessee thus joins Virginia as the only two southern

TABLE 8
TENNESSEE PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|
| | | | | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| 1948 | 202,914 | 270,402 | 73,815 | 37.0 | 49.4 | 13.5 |
| 1952 | 446,147 | 443,710 | . . . | 50.1 | 49.8 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 462,288 | 456,507 | 19,820 | 49.2 | 48.6 | 2.1 |
| 1960 | 556,577 | 481,453 | 11,304 | 53.0 | 45.8 | 1.1 |
| 1964 | 508,965 | 635,047 | . . . | 44.4 | 55.5 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 472,592 | 351,233 | 424,792 | 37.8 | 28.1 | 34.0 |
| 1972 | 812,484 | 355,841 | . . . | 69.5 | 30.4 | 0.0 |

states with a Republican majority in Congress.

In 1949 Key reported that "Florida has a large migrant Republican population which has not been well activated by the Republican organization. . . ." With sufficient initiative, Florida Republicans could parlay the presidential "pulling power" into a strong state party.³⁰ However, Table 9 amply demonstrates there was not one Republican U.S. Senator, Congressman, state senator, member of the state house, or governor in Florida before 1952, and the Republicans in Florida were far from a dynamic organization.

One of the problems, as Key noted, was that the Republican following was spread too thin over the state. In Florida, Dewey

TABLE 9
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR FLORIDA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 1R--94D | 1 |
| 1948 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 1R--94D | 1 |
| 1949 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 1R--94D | 1 |
| 1950 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 0R--95D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 0R--95D | 0 |
| 1952 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--6D | 0R--38D | 3R--92D | 3 |
| 1953 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--8D | 1R--37D | 5R--90D | 6 |
| 1954 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--8D | 1R--37D | 5R--90D | 6 |
| 1955 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 5R--90D | 7 |
| 1956 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 6R--89D | 8 |
| 1957 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 6R--89D | 8 |
| 1958 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 6R--89D | 8 |
| 1959 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 3R--92D | 5 |
| 1960 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 3R--92D | 5 |
| 1961 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 7R--88D | 9 |
| 1962 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--7D | 1R--37D | 7R--88D | 9 |
| 1963 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--10D | 1R--37D | 5R--90D | 8 |
| 1964 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--10D | 2R--43D | 16R--109D | 20 |
| 1965 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--10D | 2R--41D | 11R--101D | 15 |

TABLE 9--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--10D | 2R--41D | 11R--101D | 15 |
| 1967 | R | 0R--2D | 3R--9D | 11R--37D | 37R--81D | 51 |
| 1968 | R | 0R--2D | 3R--9D | 20R--28D | 40R--78D | 64 |
| 1969 | R | 1R--1D | 3R--9D | 16R--32D | 42R--77D | 63 |
| 1970 | R | 1R--1D | 3R--9D | 16R--32D | 42R--77D | 63 |
| 1971 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--9D | 15R--33D | 38R--81D | 57 |
| 1972 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--9D | 15R--33D | 38R--81D | 57 |
| 1973 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--11D | 14R--35D | 43R--77D | 68 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

managed 29.7 percent of the vote against Roosevelt in 1944. At the same time he took 29.8 percent in Arkansas. But in comparing the difference, Dewey did not get a majority in Florida, not even in one county, and in only twelve of sixty-seven counties drew as much as 35 percent. In Arkansas four counties produced Republican majorities, and eighteen of the remaining seventy-one gave Dewey 35 percent plus. Arkansas had a small concentration of Republican strength which could guarantee a base of support which Florida, at the time, lacked.³¹

In 1950 the modern Florida Republican Party got its beginning,

when a young Harvard Law School graduate by the name of William Cramer seized control of the Saint Petersburg Republican organization. Under his direction Republican candidates took control of a majority of local offices and the seats in the legislature. In 1954 Cramer became the district's congressman. Not long thereafter, the Republicans had nearly complete control of Broward, Orange, and Sarasota counties as well.³²

At the beginning of the 1952 campaign, the Republican National Executive Committee announced that it would ". . . make the most determined drive in [its history] . . . to crack the solid South." They announced their readiness to fight on for twenty years, if necessary, in order to attain their objective.³³ In Florida, at least, the effort paid off. Eisenhower's vote nearly tripled Dewey's 1948 showing, as he beat Stevenson 544,036 to 444,950. Eisenhower thus drew 55 percent--more than twenty percentage points more than Dewey. Nevertheless, few gains came at the local level. The victory was merely a personal triumph.

Florida Republicanism, after its first victories in the early 1950s, managed pretty much of a holding action for the next decade with only slight increases in the lower house of the legislature until 1958. The 1950 Democratic senatorial primary between Claude Pepper and George Smathers witnessed a shift in the balance of power in the state's Democratic Party. Pepper had also been well-known as one of the South's most liberal congressmen, but by 1950, liberalism was going out of fashion in Florida as Smather's victory over the incumbent proved. Thus, following the (Republican) Warren Supreme

Court decision in the Brown case in 1954, the 1957 Little Rock incident, the passage of the Republican 1957 Civil Rights Act, in addition to the nationwide effects on the Republican Party of the recession in 1958, it was little wonder that Republican fortunes were running so low.

It was only in the Presidential contests that Florida showed continual Republican growth. Eisenhower's 1956 vote was nearly 100,000 votes ahead of his tremendous 1952 showing. His 57.2 percent showing was comparable with his national percentage. In 1960 Richard Nixon became the first Republican to carry Florida and lose the nation. Despite a tremendous increase in Democratic turnout for Kennedy--his total exceeded Stevenson's 1956 figure by nearly 270,000 votes--Kennedy still fell more than 46,000 votes short of victory.

The Republicans added a second seat in the Florida congressional delegation in 1962, and shortly thereafter began to grow in legislative support. Much of this increase was due to an increase in the number of candidates run which, in turn, was due to an increase in the size of the legislature itself. In 1963 the number of Republican candidates elected increased by over 100 percent and went up again in 1967. In 1964 the number of Republicans in the Florida House rose to eleven. It rose again to thirty-seven in 1966, and to forty in 1967.³⁴

Florida swung temporarily out of the GOP column in 1964 as Goldwater narrowly lost Florida by a mere 43,000 votes. Lyndon Johnson's 51.1 percent showing was a full ten percentage points behind his nationwide figures.

The year 1966 was a big year for Florida Republicans. A third Congressman, J. Herbert Burke, was elected to the House of Representatives, nine new state senators and twenty-six new members were elected to the state house. Also, 1966 saw Claude Kirk win the Republican nomination for Governor and the subsequent election, thus becoming Florida's first Republican governor of this century. But Kirk did not limit himself to statewide goals. He wanted to become the Republican Vice-Presidential Candidate in 1968. He began to spend up to two-thirds of his time outside the state trying to gain support for that objective. Further, Kirk, in his attempt to gain control of the Florida Republican party, alienated the Cramer faction. Much of the funds he raised, supposedly for the Republican Party, went to his own vice-presidential campaign.³⁵

Unhappily for the party, the Kirk years produced a wide split in the party between the Kirk faction, supported by U.S. Senator Edward Gurney, and the William Cramer faction. The wounds could not be healed. Kirk's people convinced G. Harrold Carswell, a rejected Nixon nominee for the Supreme Court, to run for the Senate seat being vacated by retiring Spessard Holland, and, in retaliation, Cramer put up a candidate against Kirk. The result was a complete debacle in 1970. The Republicans lost the Senate seat, the governor's chair, and a number of other offices.³⁶

Republican fortunes thus suffered a considerable downturn from 1968 when Nixon had taken Florida by a significant 210,000-vote margin over Humphrey, who barely edged out Wallace for second place, and Congressman Gurney had captured the Senate seat of retiring Senator

George Smathers. Thus, things did not augur well for 1972. With the victories of Lawton Chiles for Senator and Rubin Askew for Governor, both of whom were viewed as moderate-to-liberal, the chances looked very good for Democratic frontrunner Muskie in Florida in 1972 against incumbent Richard Nixon. However, with the vote splintered among a number of candidates, George Wallace took the March 14th Primary with 42 percent. George McGovern, the eventual party nominee, finished very nearly dead last with 6 percent of the vote, running just behind John Lindsay (7 percent), and just ahead of Shirley Chisholm (4 percent).

In the summer of 1972, both major parties held their conventions in Miami Beach, Florida. George McGovern won the Democratic nomination; Richard Nixon, as expected, walked away with renomination by the Republicans. From that point on the only question was what the margin of victory would be. As it turned out, Nixon drew a larger percentage than the combined Nixon and Wallace figure for 1968 in beating McGovern by more than 1,000,000 votes. His 1,751,433 was more than three times Eisenhower's 1952 figure, and represented a nearly ten-fold increase over Dewey's 1948 figure, while McGovern's vote total did not even equal that of John Kennedy in 1960. In addition, a fourth Republican was elected to the House of Representatives.

How can this Republican trend that set in about the time of the 1966 elections be explained? One author presents the information contained in Table 10 as a partial response to this question.³⁷ These figures show Republican registration, Democratic registration, and

TABLE 10
PARTY REGISTRATION IN FLORIDA

| Year | Republican | | Democratic | | Repub- licans as per- cent of Demo- crats (%) |
|------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|----------|---|
| | Regis- tration | Change | Regis- tration | Change | |
| 1950 | 60,665 | . . . | 1,006,580 | . . . | 6.0 |
| 1952 | 116,794 | + 56,129 | 1,215,085 | +208,505 | 9.6 |
| 1956 | 210,797 | + 94,003 | 1,384,447 | +169,362 | 15.2 |
| 1960 | 338,390 | +127,593 | 1,656,023 | +272,576 | 20.4 |
| 1964 | 458,156 | +119,766 | 2,009,842 | +353,719 | 22.9 |
| 1966 | 465,605 | + <u>7,449</u> | 1,964,533 | - 45,309 | 23.7 |
| 1967 | 472,966 | + <u>7,361</u> | 1,966,371 | + 1,838 | 24.1 |
| 1968 | 619,062 | + <u>146,056</u> | 2,090,787 | +124,416 | 29.6 |
| 1970 | 711,090 | + 96,028 | 2,024,387 | - 66,400 | 35.1 |

the changes in each since the previous reported figure, and the Republican registration expressed as a percentage of the Democratic registration. Before 1966 the Democrats always increased their registration, in absolute figures, more than the Republicans did. Since 1966, however, the Republicans have been consistently registering a greater number of new voters in Florida in absolute numbers.

Presidential politics in Florida from 1952 to 1968 have been dominated by what has been termed a conservative "horseshoe." This area which:

. . . starts at Fort Lauderdale and Palm Beach, goes up the east coast to Daytona Beach, then across to Orlando, then to the west coast at St. Petersburg, and then down the west coast to Fort Myers and Naples . . . ,³⁸

could be seen as early as the now famous Democratic Senatorial primary of 1950. In that election, Pepper carried the northern ". . . panhandle, and the extreme Southern end of the state as well as Tampa and Pensacola." Smathers carried the urban horseshoe.³⁹ The horseshoe was not needed in 1972. Nixon carried every county in the state, including normally heavily Democratic Dade. But for future Republican candidates, who may not have a George McGovern to run against, it will be a comfort to realize that the greatest concentrations of Republican voters is in the rapidly growing areas of the horseshoe;⁴⁰ thus, probably assuring Republican control for the foreseeable future.

But what of nonpresidential elections? As Lubell notes:

In many of the urban areas there is now an overall majority which favors moderate conservatism. But what does the term mean in Florida? It means, in addition to economic conservatism, some resistance to integration, but not to the point of support

for a Eugene "Bull" Connor, . . . or a Wallace. But the conservative vote is now divided as to actual party affiliation. Almost all the Republican vote is conservative. In the Democratic party, on the other hand, the major share of the urban vote is liberal.⁴¹

However, as Wallace's primary victory showed, there is still considerable conservative support among the state's Democratic voters, particularly in rural areas. The result seems likely to assure that Republicans will consistently nominate conservatives, while Democrats may have ideologically pitched battles in their primaries. If the Republicans can hold their own voters in line, and pick up enough Democratic defections, they can look forward to success. Table 11 examines the distribution of party strength in the presidential elections.

North Carolina--similar to the two other states discussed, Virginia and Tennessee--has always had a substantial number of local Republicans. The party has consistently been a real political party. The "Mountain Republicans" in the western half of the state have long been a threat to Democratic hegemony in the hill country. Since at least 1920, North Carolina had the strongest Republican Party in the South--at least until the late 1960s.⁴² North Carolina was one of the southern states that went for Hoover in 1928 when the normally substantial Republican vote was swelled by a large number of Democratic defections. Urban areas, such as Durham and Winston-Salem, went heavily Republican.⁴³

Throughout the 1940s the Democratic Party in North Carolina had been a little more liberal than in neighboring states. North Carolina enjoyed a good record in the field of race relations, but in

TABLE 11
FLORIDA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 194,280 | 281,988 | 89,755 | 34.3 | 39.8 | 15.80 |
| 1952 | 544,036 | 444,950 | . . . | 55.0 | 44.9 | 0.00 |
| 1956 | 643,849 | 480,371 | . . . | 57.2 | 42.7 | 0.00 |
| 1960 | 795,476 | 748,700 | . . . | 51.5 | 48.4 | 0.00 |
| 1964 | 905,941 | 948,540 | . . . | 48.8 | 51.1 | 0.00 |
| 1968 | 886,804 | 676,794 | 624,207 | 40.5 | 30.9 | 28.50 |
| 1972 | 1,751,433 | 690,440 | . . . | 71.7 | 28.2 | 0.00 |

the 1950s a battle for control of the party emerged between the liberal and conservative wings. In 1950, the North Carolina senatorial primary offered voters a clear choice between incumbent Senator Frank P. Graham, former president of the University of North Carolina, and a member of the President's Commission on Civil Rights; and Willis Smith, past president of the American Bar Association, and a well-known moderate conservative. Graham narrowly missed the necessary clear majority in the first primary. In the interim period, the race issue was introduced in a big way. Smith emerged the victor in the second primary.

In the 1952 primary battle for Governor, there was again a

liberal-conservative contest. Herbert Olive was the candidate of liberal Governor Kerr Scott. He was defeated by ailing, former Senator William Omstead. The newly elected governor was to serve only twenty-three months in office before his death.⁴⁴

Upon the deaths of both Senator Smith and Senator Hoey, Governor Omstead appointed State Senator Alton Lennon to fill one post, and State Supreme Court Judge Sam Ervin to fill the other. In 1954, ex-Governor Kerr Scott defeated Lennon for renomination. Terry Sanford, later a governor, first gained statewide prominence as Scott's campaign manager in that race.⁴⁵

All during the period, the local Republican Party was showing signs of following the presidential coattails. Although Eisenhower never carried North Carolina (the only Outer South state that went for Stevenson), he did increase his vote totals by 300,000 votes over Dewey's 1948 figure, and in 1956 fell only 15,000 votes short of the mark.

Before the 1952 election North Carolina had ten Republicans in the lower house of the state legislature; four new members were pulled in on presidential coattails. In 1954, possibly due to the Brown decision, and possibly due to the normal mid-term lull, this number was again reduced to ten. Despite a stronger Eisenhower showing in 1956, the number rose by only three in that year's elections. In the elections of 1958 North Carolina participated in the general trend against the Republicans, reducing their representation to only four, probably from a combination of factors including Little Rock, the 1957 Civil Rights Act, the recession, and normal

mid-term losses (see Table 12).

The story was pretty much the same in the state senate. Although no new Republican senators won in 1952, one Republican lost in 1954, thus lending support to the idea that it was the Brown decision, and not normal processes balancing themselves, which had been the cause. Two new seats were won in 1956, but both disappeared in 1958.

In other elections there was little variation. Republican Charles Jonas carried the Charlotte House seat by riding Eisenhower's "mountain coattails" in 1952, and held it throughout the decade.

An analysis of the Republican vote for the period shows two main sources of Republican strength. One was, of course, the traditional Republican areas. The other was the metropolitan areas. In 1948 Dewey had taken 33 percent of the vote in the cities and suburbs. In 1952 Eisenhower took a bare majority of 50.1 percent; in 1956 he walked away with 55.5 percent of the city vote. Even Richard Nixon held on to a 51.1 percent majority in 1960.⁴⁶ The urban vote actually ran ahead of the percentages in traditional Republican areas in 1952, and only narrowly behind in 1956 and 1960. These figures do much to debunk the idea that the Eisenhower votes were somehow a "fluke" or a personal tribute to "the General."⁴⁷

In 1960 Nixon's coattails proved even longer than Eisenhower's in North Carolina. Nixon pulled a larger percentage than Eisenhower had in 1952, and a total of 80,000 votes more than he had in 1956. Where Eisenhower had pulled in no more than five new state legislators with him, Nixon's coattails added eleven new members to the lower

TABLE 12
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR NORTH CAROLINA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 13R--107D | 15 |
| 1948 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 13R--107D | 15 |
| 1949 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 11R--109D | 13 |
| 1950 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 11R--109D | 13 |
| 1951 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 10R--110D | 12 |
| 1952 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--12D | 2R--48D | 10R--110D | 12 |
| 1953 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 2R--48D | 14R--106D | 17 |
| 1954 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 2R--48D | 14R--106D | 17 |
| 1955 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 1R--49D | 10R--110D | 12 |
| 1956 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 1R--49D | 10R--110D | 12 |
| 1957 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 3R--47D | 13R--107D | 17 |
| 1958 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 3R--47D | 13R--107D | 17 |
| 1959 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 1R--49D | 4R--116D | 6 |
| 1960 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 1R--49D | 4R--116D | 6 |
| 1961 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 2R--48D | 15R--105D | 18 |
| 1962 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--11D | 2R--48D | 15R--105D | 18 |
| 1963 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--9D | 2R--48D | 21R--99D | 25 |
| 1964 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--9D | 2R--48D | 21R--99D | 25 |
| 1965 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--9D | 1R--49D | 14R--106D | 17 |

TABLE 12--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | OR--2D | 2R--9D | 1R--49D | 14R--106D | 17 |
| 1967 | D | OR--2D | 3R--8D | 7R--43D | 26R--94D | 36 |
| 1968 | D | OR--2D | 3R--8D | 7R--43D | 26R--94D | 36 |
| 1969 | D | OR--2D | 4R--7D | 12R--38D | 29R--91D | 45 |
| 1970 | D | OR--2D | 4R--7D | 12R--38D | 29R--91D | 45 |
| 1971 | D | OR--2D | 4R--7D | 7R--43D | 24R--96D | 35 |
| 1972 | D | OR--2D | 4R--7D | 7R--43D | 24R--96D | 35 |
| 1973 | R | 1R--1D | 4R--7D | 14R--36D | 35R--85D | 55 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

house, and one new member to the upper house of the state legislature.

The growth of presidential and gubernatorial Republicanism has depended on the Republican candidate's ability to hold the traditional mountain Republican voters and add the urban and middle-class voters. Interparty competition for the presidential and congressional seats came as early as the late 1940s, but it was not until 1960 that the Republicans made a serious bid for the governorship.⁴⁸ In two successive primaries in 1960, Terry Sanford captured the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. But for the young Kennedy follower that was only the first hurdle. The other came in November

when he defeated his Republican opponent with 54.4 percent of the vote.⁴⁹

In 1962 a peculiar thing happened. For the first time during this study, the Republicans actually picked up representation in an off-year election. Not even in 1950 had that occurred; six new members were elected to the lower house of the legislature, and a new Republican, James Broyhill, a brother of Joel Broyhill, Tenth District Virginia Republican Congressman, carried the North Carolina Tenth Congressional District.

Except for Texas, Lyndon Johnson's home state, North Carolina gave the Democratic nominee more support in 1964 than any state in the South with 800,139 (56.1 percent) of the votes. Goldwater's figure declined by 31,000 votes from Nixon's 1960 level. Nor was that all; seven seats were lost in the lower house and one in the upper house in the state legislature. The Democratic gubernatorial candidate Dan Moore, who had refrained from active support for the Johnson-Humphrey ticket out of fear for the results at the polls, need hardly have concerned himself.⁵⁰ Only Harry S. Truman had done better since 1948.

The year 1966 proved itself to be a good year in North Carolina just as it did throughout the Outer South--and, indeed, nationally--for the Republican Party. The number of Republican officeholders, in the levels of government being observed, more than doubled. Republicans took six new seats in the state senate, thus giving them the largest number of state senate seats they held in recent times. Additionally, twelve seats were picked up in the

state house, more than offsetting their 1964 losses, and also establishing a new high. A third congressman joined the Republican congressional delegation when James Gardner won a closely contested race.

In 1968, North Carolina returned to the Republican column for the first time since 1928. Nixon ran better than ten percentage points and 150,000 votes ahead of Humphrey, who finished in third place in North Carolina behind both Nixon and Wallace. As had his predecessor Dan Moore, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Robert W. Scott, son of former Governor Kerr Scott, ran his race disassociating himself as much as possible from the national Democratic ticket. Unlike 1964, when this had been an unnecessary precaution, it proved the margin of difference as Scott beat back the tough challenge of Congressman Gardner in the general election with a small 52.7 percent majority.⁵¹

Two new Republican faces appeared in Congress. Wilmer "Vinegar Bend" Mizell, well-known as a professional baseball pitcher, carried the Fifth District which includes the city of Winston-Salem, and Earl Ruth, the Mayor of Salisbury, captured the newly created Eighth District which includes some of the state's most heavily Republican counties. At the state legislative level, three new members were elected to the lower house, and five new members were elected to the state senate by the Republicans. In the 1970 election, however, five Republican members in each house failed to return.

Havard reported:

Of the 31 house and senate seats which Republicans held in

the 1971 General Assembly, 16 were in the Piedmont Crescent [which includes the counties of Gaston, Mecklenburg, Cabarrus, Rowan, Davie, Davidson, Forsyth, Guilford, Alamance, Orange, Durham, and Wake], nine others in counties adjoining the crescent, and only six in the traditionally Republican counties. . . . In the 1970 election Republicans elected 22.4% of county commissioners, and among the 22 county governments dominated by the Republicans, 6 were in the Piedmont Crescent, including the metropolitan counties of Mecklenburg, Forsyth, and Guilford.⁵²

Altogether in 1971 Republicans held 266 elected offices including ". . . 24 sheriffs, 90 county commissioners, 64 school board members, and 31 state legislators."⁵³

In 1968 the Republicans had made a breakthrough in North Carolina. In 1972 everything fell together perfectly for the GOP. Nixon carried the state with 70.6 percent of the vote and a more than 600,000-vote margin. At the same time state Republican Party Chairman James E. Holshouser, Jr. became the new governor. The Senate race, however, provided the real excitement. The Democratic incumbent, B. Everett Jordan, who was seventy-four in 1972, and who had run a surprisingly weak race in 1966, was being challenged by Fourth District Congressman Nick Galifianakis of Durham. Galifianakis had been becoming more and more liberal since his first election in 1966, and had barely survived two "cliff-hangers" in his reelection bids of 1968 and 1970. The loss of Chapel Hill, a liberal bastion in his district, following the redistricting, made his position in the house highly tenuous, and there was much doubt he could win again. Therefore, he decided to gamble everything on a primary race against Jordan. However, Jordan himself had been moving rapidly left, perhaps in an attempt to cut the rug out from under Galifianakis' feet.

Clearly Jordan's advanced age proved a handicap, perhaps the decisive factor. At any rate, Galifianakis had his work cut out for him staying to the left of Jordan. His success at doing so in beating Jordan probably accounted for his undoing.

The Republican nominee was Jesse Helms, a Raleigh newscaster. There was no doubt where he stood on the issues. Many conservatives predicted that if he won he would be the most conservative man in either house of Congress, and that included Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, and John Tower. The question was the extent to which his Republican label would prove a handicap in North Carolina. Another serious question was how much Administration support he could get when he went around criticizing Nixon for being too liberal. The answers came in November. Helms became the first Republican Senator from North Carolina in modern times.

With everything else going Republican, it would be curious if the legislature did not also register gains for the GOP. It did. Republicans doubled the number of state senate seats they held and added almost 50 percent to their house delegation.

Because of the large Democratic margins in statewide races, until recently, many people who are "ideological Republicans" have failed to register under that party label so that they could have a say in Democratic primaries which have usually chosen the ultimate victor. With elections becoming closer, and with a new presidential primary, it is possible that many of these people will switch their registrations.⁵⁴ (See Table 13.)

Texas is the most western state in the South. As such, it

TABLE 13
NORTH CAROLINA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| | | | | | | |
| 1948 | 258,572 | 459,070 | 69,652 | 32.8 | 58.3 | 8.8 |
| 1952 | 558,107 | 652,903 | . . . | 46.0 | 53.9 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 575,062 | 590,530 | . . . | 49.3 | 50.6 | 0.0 |
| 1960 | 655,420 | 713,136 | . . . | 47.8 | 52.1 | 0.0 |
| 1964 | 624,844 | 800,139 | . . . | 43.8 | 56.1 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 627,192 | 464,113 | 496,188 | 39.5 | 29.2 | 31.2 |
| 1972 | 1,051,707 | 437,311 ^a | . . . | 70.6 | 29.3 | 0.0 |

^aIt is interesting to note that Senator McGovern's vote total is the lowest Democratic figure on the Table, even being surpassed by Truman's 1948 figure. Indeed, one would have to go back to 1928 to get a lower figure for a Democratic candidate.

has always had far fewer blacks than the other southern states.

However, it has a considerable number of Mexican Americans--a reminder of the days when Texas was a part of Mexico. Together, these two groups total about 27 percent of the population and make up the backbone of support for the national Democratic Party. Texas, like the other states in the Outer South, bolted the Democratic Party in 1928 to cast its electoral votes for Hoover. East Texas, where most of the state's Negroes live, supported Smith, while West Texas went

for Hoover. Of the "white counties" staying Democratic, most were as a result of large Mexican votes. As in more recent years, the cities trended more heavily Republican than the countryside.⁵⁵

In 1948 Truman swept Texas in a big way, pulling a 65.8 percent majority--his largest margin in the South--and winning by more than 400,000 votes. In 1952, however, the Texas Republican Party began to stir and try to organize for victory. The growth of Texas immigrant Republican population, plus the victory of the supporters of Governor Shivers, the so-called "Shivercrats," over the "loyalists" in the state Democratic Party battle, resulted in a Republican "miracle."⁵⁶ Eisenhower's vote was more than three times Dewey's 1948 figure, having increased by more than 800,000 votes. Despite Stevenson's 200,000 plus increase over Truman's 1948 figure, he ran nearly twenty percentage points behind Truman. Havard concludes:

Thus conservatives in Texas . . . had really two organizations--the Republicans being the more conservative of the two, and the majority faction among the Democrats consisting of a coalition of conservatives and moderates. . . .⁵⁷

The Republicans by themselves would not have been sufficient. The active support of Governor Shivers, spurred on by Eisenhower's support for state control of offshore oil fields, was required to turn the trick.

Despite the tremendous increase in presidential Republicanism in 1952, no gains at all were registered in legislative campaigns. Indeed, the one seat Republicans had held in the state House of Representatives was lost in 1952. The victory had been strictly a

personal one for Eisenhower in Texas. Strangely enough, the only Republican gain of the decade came in the 1954 campaign when, despite heavy odds, one Republican managed to enter the House of Representatives. Even a second top-heavy Eisenhower majority in 1956 produced no results. (See Table 14.)

In 1960 the story was somewhat different. The Democratic Vice-Presidential Candidate was Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson. Moreover, the power and prestige of Shivers had waned. Nevertheless, the race was very, very close. Both parties polled over 1,100,000 votes, with the Kennedy-Johnson ticket narrow winners with 50.6 percent of the vote.

In the early 1960s, breakthroughs began to appear. When running for Vice-President, Johnson, who did not believe in taking chances, succeeded in having the law changed in Texas to allow him to run for reelection to the Senate at the same time. His opponent, conservative Republican college professor John Tower, ran a surprisingly strong race, but lost. Having won both posts, Johnson had to resign from one. He was replaced in the senate seat by a conservative Democrat. John Tower was again the Republican nominee in 1961. He benefitted from the "double exposure," and a large defection of liberal Democrats, in being elected the first Republican Senator from the South in modern times.

Starting in 1962, in Texas, there was a sharp upturn in the number of Republican candidates for state legislature, approaching 50 percent. The Republican state organization had hired one paid staffer to concentrate on trying to find legislative candidates in

TABLE 14
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR TEXAS

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | 1R--149D | 1 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--21D | OR--31D | 1R--149D | 1 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--22D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--22D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 0 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | 1R--21D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 1 |
| 1962 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--20D | OR--31D | OR--150D | 2 |
| 1963 | D | 1R--1D | 2R--21D | OR--31D | 7R--143D | 10 |
| 1964 | D | 1R--1D | 2R--21D | OR--31D | 7R--143D | 12 |
| 1965 | D | 1R--1D | OR--23D | OR--31D | 1R--149D | 2 |

TABLE 14--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | House of Dele- gates | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 1R--1D | 0R--23D | 0R--31D | 1R--149D | 2 |
| 1967 | D | 1R--1D | 2R--21D | 1R--30D | 3R--147D | 7 |
| 1968 | D | 1R--1D | 2R--21D | 1R--30D | 3R--147D | 7 |
| 1969 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--20D | 2R--29D | 8R--142D | 13 |
| 1970 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--20D | 2R--29D | 8R--142D | 14 |
| 1971 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--20D | 2R--29D | 10R--140D | 16 |
| 1972 | D | 1R--1D | 3R--20D | 2R--29D | 10R--140D | 16 |
| 1973 | D | 1R--1D | 4R--20D | 4R--27D | 17R--133D | 26 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

1962. As a result, seven members were elected to the lower house.⁵⁸ For the first time since 1954 a new Republican was elected to the national House of Representatives. Texas Republicans looked like they were on the move.

On November 22, 1963 a shot rang out in Dallas, Texas, which was to make Lyndon Baines Johnson the President of the United States. The victims were John F. Kennedy and the Republican Party of Texas. In the 1964 elections the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson of Texas, swept his home state winning by more than 700,000 votes. Both Republican Congressmen and all but one of the Republican

delegation to the Texas House of Representatives were defeated.

In 1966 the Texas Republican Party was resurrected. John Tower was running for reelection. Because of the need for funds for that race the number of legislative candidates was cut in half.⁵⁹ Tower increased his victory margin from a mere 51 percent to a healthy 56 percent; two new Republican Congressmen were elected--George Bush from Houston, and Bob Price from the Panhandle. Two seats in the lower house, and, for the first time, one in the upper house, of the state legislature fell to the Republicans.

With this new life breathed into the Texas Republican Party, hopes were high for 1968. In that year, Texas provided a very close race. Despite running 22 percent behind Johnson's 1964 vote percentages, and despite the strong Republican upswing, Humphrey managed to hold onto Texas, the only state he was to carry in the once solidly Democratic South. Unlike previous Republican presidential candidates, Nixon, even in losing, did prove to have some coattails. There were five new Republicans elected to the lower house, and one new Republican to the upper house in the state legislature. James Collins was elected as a new Republican Congressman from Dallas.

In 1970 Texas Republicans were gunning for Democratic Senator Ralph Yarborough, one of the South's most liberal Senators. Unfortunately for the Republican candidate, Houston Congressman George Bush, so were the conservative Democrats. Yarborough failed to survive the primary, losing to Lloyd Bentsen, a moderately conservative former congressman. Bush, very popular in his home area

of Houston where no Democrat had been willing to run against him in 1968, had planned to attack Yarborough's anti-war record and present him as a liberal before the conservative Texas voters. Now he found himself faced not with liberal Yarborough, but with conservative Lloyd Bentsen, who declared that the only way Bush could get ". . . to the right of me is by going clear off the edge of the earth." Bentsen, who enjoyed the support of both Johnson and John Connally, kept hammering away at his theme "Texas needs a Democrat in the Senate." Bush was left without an issue except that of party, and for a Republican in Texas that would not work. His loss came as little of a surprise. In other races, William Archer replaced Bush as Republican Congressman from Houston, and two new Republicans gained seats in the Texas House of Representatives.

By 1972 Eisenhower's two victories had been relegated to the position of "ancient history" in light of three straight Democratic triumphs in Texas. Still, Richard Nixon remained very determined to take Texas and its twenty-six electoral votes--the biggest single block in the South. To achieve this objective he entered into an "unholy alliance" with former Texas Governor John Connally.

With the aid of the Johnson-Connally moderates, who had supported Humphrey in 1968, Nixon easily carried the Lone Star State. His victory margin was over 1,000,000 votes as he became the first presidential candidate to go over the 2,000,000 mark in Texas. His 66.2 percent exceeded both Truman's 1948 figure and Johnson's 1964 percentage. McGovern's 1,091,970 was the lowest Democratic figure since 1956, and his 33.7 percent was over seven

percentage points behind Humphrey's 1968 showing. (See Table 15.) Alan Steelman, a Republican from Dallas, won the newly created Fifth District seat. In the Thirteenth District, where Democrat Graham Purcell and Republican Bob Price were thrown together by redistricting, Price emerged the victor. In elections to the legislature, seven new Republicans were elected to the house and two more to the state senate.

The beginning of a new political order in the South was hinted at as early as 1936. Because of the magnitude of Roosevelt's victory, this was hidden. It was not until 1948 that things once again began to stir in the Outer South, after a twenty-year lull. (See Tables 16 and 17.) Even then the Dixiecrats were still essentially loyal Democrats who just considered Harry Truman's civil rights planks more than they could stand. It was not until the complete death of the Dixiecrats as a viable third party that change begins again. What the Dixiecrats did was to get people to think of voting for someone other than a Democrat in the South. Thus, in the Outer South about 10 percent of the voters were shaken loose from their old ties to the Democratic Party. But it was not until 1950 that they began to complete the transition to "presidential Republicanism." One would, thus, probably have to trace the origins of the new era to that year. Two liberal Democratic incumbents, Senators Frank Graham of North Carolina and Claude Pepper of Florida, were denied renomination at that time in their party primaries. Lubell describes the cause of this as "trial runs of a Republican-Southern political alliance."⁶⁰

TABLE 15
TEXAS PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 282,240 | 750,700 | 106,909 | 24.7 | 65.8 | 9.4 |
| 1952 | 1,102,878 | 969,228 | . . . | 53.2 | 46.7 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 1,080,619 | 859,958 | 14,591 | 55.6 | 43.9 | 0.4 |
| 1960 | 1,121,699 | 1,167,932 | 18,169 | 48.6 | 50.6 | 0.7 |
| 1964 | 958,566 | 1,663,185 | 5,060 | 36.2 | 63.3 | 0.4 |
| 1968 | 1,227,844 | 1,266,804 | 584,269 | 39.8 | 41.1 | 19.0 |
| 1972 | 2,147,970 | 1,091,970 | . . . | 66.2 | 33.7 | 0.0 |

TABLE 16
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR OUTER SOUTH

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 9R--183D | 38R--525D | 49 |
| 1948 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 9R--183D | 38R--525D | 49 |
| 1949 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 9R--183D | 37R--526D | 48 |
| 1950 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 8R--184D | 38R--526D | 48 |
| 1951 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 8R--184D | 37R--527D | 47 |
| 1952 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 2R--56D | 8R--184D | 40R--524D | 50 |
| 1953 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 6R--55D | 11R--181D | 43R--521D | 60 |
| 1954 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 6R--55D | 11r--181D | 43R--521D | 60 |
| 1955 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 10R--182D | 40R--524D | 57 |
| 1956 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 10R--182D | 41R--523D | 58 |
| 1957 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 13R--179D | 46R--517D | 66 |
| 1958 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 13R--179D | 46R--517D | 66 |
| 1959 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 10R--182D | 30R--532D | 47 |
| 1960 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 9R--183D | 28R--534D | 44 |
| 1961 | OR--5D | OR--10D | 7R--54D | 11R--181D | 45R--517D | 63 |
| 1962 | OR--5D | OR--9D | 7R--54D | 11R--188D | 46R--518D | 65 |
| 1963 | OR--5D | 1R--9D | 11R--50D | 11R--188D | 57R--505D | 80 |
| 1964 | OR--5D | 1R--9D | 11R--50D | 13R--186D | 68R--494D | 93 |
| 1965 | OR--5D | 1R--9D | 9R--52D | 14R--186D | 69R--483D | 93 |

TABLE 16--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|----------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | 0R--5D | 1R--9D | 9R--52D | 14R--185D | 60R--492D | 84 |
| 1967 | 1R--4D | 2R--8D | 16R--45D | 32R--161D | 88R--464D | 139 |
| 1968 | 1R--4D | 2R--8D | 16R--45D | 42R--151D | 123R--429D | 184 |
| 1969 | 1R--4D | 3R--7D | 18R--43D | 49R--144D | 133R--419D | 204 |
| 1970 | 2R--3D | 3R--6D | 19R--42D | 48R--145D | 133R--419D | 205 |
| 1971 | 2R--3D | 4R--5D | 20R--41D | 44R--149D | 139R--413D | 209 |
| 1972 | 2R--3D | 4R--5D | 20R--41D | 44R--149D | 139R--413D | 209 |
| 1973 | 3R--2D | 6R--3D | 23R--38D | 44R--149D | 139R--413D | 215 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

TABLE 17
OUTER SOUTH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 1,110,076 | 1,962,946 | 383,524 | 32.1 | 56.7 | 11.1 |
| 1952 | 3,000,205 | 2,779,368 | . . . | 51.9 | 48.0 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 3,148,277 | 2,210,738 | 77,375 | 57.9 | 40.6 | 1.4 |
| 1960 | 3,533,693 | 3,473,543 | 29,473 | 50.2 | 49.6 | 0.2 |
| 1964 | 3,469,650 | 4,884,016 | 5,060 | 41.5 | 58.4 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 3,804,751 | 3,201,331 | 2,449,828 | 40.2 | 33.8 | 25.9 |
| 1972 | 6,746,286 | 3,015,108 | . . . | 69.1 | 30.8 | 0.0 |

As proof of his contention that there was more than a coincidence between anti Graham and anti Pepper forces and Republican-Dixiecrat strength, Lubell cites the following figures. In Wilmington, North Carolina, the two precincts Dewey won in 1948, and the eleven precincts where Dewey and the Dixiecrats had combined totals exceeding Truman's, were all lost by Graham. In Guilford County Graham lost seventeen precincts. Of these, thirteen had gone for Dewey and two others had produced larger totals for Dewey and the Dixiecrats together than for Truman

alone. Dewey won all ten Florida counties--Pepper lost--also he won the twelve Dewey precincts in Jacksonville, all fourteen Dewey precincts in Tampa, and twenty of twenty-two precincts in Miami. Pepper also lost all three Dixiecrat counties and thirty-five of the thirty-eight precincts in Miami where the combined Dewey-Dixiecrat vote topped Truman's.⁶¹

Lubell concludes:

Not race, but economics explains Charlotte's anti Graham vote. . . . Graham's worst showing in the city, hardly 25%, came from Myers Park, unquestionably the most culturally progressive part of Charlotte. . . .⁶²

Tindall remarks:

The election of 1952 marked a turning point in Republican fortunes; the beginnings of a Southern Republicanism that would contest elections, first at the presidential level, then at state and local levels, evolving gradually into a credible opposition party everywhere, except the inner core of the Deep South. The candidacy of the "nonpolitical" Eisenhower in 1952 made it respectable, even modish to vote Republican in the South.⁶³

He continues:

Traditionally, the Republican vote peaked at high altitudes, and in the mountain strongholds Eisenhower overwhelmed Stevenson. . . . But an avalanche of Republican votes swept down the mountainsides into the foothill cities and on beyond into the flatland black belts. There the Dixiecrats of 1948 had loosened the inhibitions against bolting the Democrats and the candidacy of a "nonpolitical" hero eased the reluctance to vote Republican.⁶⁴

Eisenhower's 1952 victory was not only a personal triumph, but, in the words of Cosman, ". . . also reflected the translation of socioeconomic change into changing patterns of political balloting,

especially in the larger cities." While he ran well throughout the region, he received his largest margins in the cities, ". . . and within the cities, from the more prosperous white urbanites."⁶⁵

Bartley puts it this way:

The presidential election of 1952 clarified developing trends and demonstrated the fact that, while Southern voter sentiment was swinging to the right, the racial reaction was centered in the Deep South, Like their Northern peers, Southern business conservatives were concerned about Communism, Corruption, and Korea, and liked the "good Government" brand of conservatism that Eisenhower personified.⁶⁶

Again, to quote Tindall:

To some extent it represented an issue vote against Democratic policies; to some extent in 1952, and increasingly in subsequent elections, a status vote. Republicanism became the style and the fashion of the "conservative chic" swept through the white suburbs. . . . The most overwhelmingly Republican were the upper income white residential areas. The areas most heavily for Adlai Stevenson were the black precincts and, to a lesser degree, the low income white precincts.⁶⁷

Governor Byrnes of South Carolina, in speeches before the Georgia and Virginia legislatures, assailed Truman and his civil rights ideas. Byrnes warned that now was the time to put "principle above party." "No other man did so much to make Republicanism respectable in the South. . . ."⁶⁸

While Eisenhower's vote was nearly three times that of Dewey's in 1948, the movement on the subpresidential level was minute. The largest gains occurred in the Congressional House elections where the Republican Outer South delegation was tripled. On the state level practically nothing happened, and those gains that were made in

1952 were as rapidly lost in 1954.

In 1956 still further urban gains were made by Eisenhower, offsetting losses in rural areas due to displeasure with the Brown decision. Metropolitan centers yielded a median advantage of 7.2 percent in Republican votes over rural counties. In the small towns, he did less well than in the large cities, but much better than in the rural areas. In the region as a whole, Republican sentiment rose faster than the rest of the areas. While it is true that much of the gain came from large numbers of Yankee Republican émigrés, it is equally true that a great many native-born southerners were changing voting behavior.⁶⁹

As the political participation of blacks, union members, and small farmers increased, the dominance of the black belts was broken, and division developed. The "Eisenhower victories" of 1952 and 1956, Grantham observes, can be seen more clearly as Republican victories, albeit only at the presidential level. "Republican successes represent what Key calls 'the political fulfillment of demographic and economic trends South of the Potomac.'" While the number of presidential Republicans was on the rise during the 1940s, the ". . . election of 1952 was the event that set off the explosive forces long building up there." The 1956 election assured there would be no going back.⁷⁰

Despite the landslide nature of Eisenhower's 1956 victory in the Outer South, little gains were made during the entire decade of the 1950s in lower levels. Southerners seemed to want a Republican president, but were content, for the most part, to keep their local

Democratic officeholders in office. The only notable gain that occurred was in the national House of Representatives, and that was almost all achieved in 1952. Indeed, there were actually less Republican officeholders, in the five categories sampled in 1960 than there were in 1950, if one totals all the areas together.

In 1960 Nixon pulled out a thin majority in the region as a whole, winning 50.2 percent of the Outer South's vote. At the lower levels, he showed enough coattails despite the closeness of the vote, to return Republican officeholder levels almost back to the peak levels under Eisenhower. Possibly this was due to a belief on the part of some southerners at least that they had now become complete presidential Republicans and a desire to make their other voting conform to their presidential voting. In 1961 John Tower became the region's first Republican U.S. Senator, and surprisingly from Lyndon Johnson, the Democratic Vice-President's home state. In 1962 the increase in gain of Republican officeholders in the region began to quicken.

The 1964 election saw the Outer South once again revert to its old Democratic voting habits in reaction to Barry Goldwater. Still, there was nothing too unusual about that, as even such hard-core Republican states as Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire were also turning to Johnson. Republican growth at the lower levels also stalled and even fell back slightly during the 1964-1965 period.

But the Republican Party came bouncing back from the depths of 1964. From a low point just before the 1966 elections the number of Republican officeholders in the five categories more than doubled

by 1968, and after the 1968 elections achieved a level almost five times that of their 1960 level. Florida elected a Republican governor in 1966, and Tennessee added a Republican Senator the same year. Also in the 1968 elections the Outer South's congressional delegation nearly doubled. Republican gains at the state legislative levels were not very far behind.

In 1968 Nixon carried the region as a whole, losing only Texas to Humphrey. For the first time the number of elected Republicans in the five categories broke the 200 level. The following year, Virginia followed Florida's lead in electing a Republican as its chief executive. The Republican Party had begun to move.

But thereafter, the pace of Republican growth slowed. The Republican organization in Florida came apart at the seams, and the governor's chair was lost and Republicans failed to pick up the senate seat in 1970. In Tennessee, however, Republicans made a major breakthrough, taking both the governor's mansion and the other Senate seat. Meanwhile, sensing the changing winds of southern politics, Virginia's Senior Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. announced his intention to run for reelection as an independent. He smashed two opponents, one Democrat and one Republican, in the general election, and polled an absolute majority in a three-way race.

In 1972 the stage was set for what could have been a big year for southern Republicans on all levels. George Wallace had pulled something more than 20 percent of the electorate probably permanently out of the Democratic orbit in the Outer South's presidential politics in 1968. This added on to the 10 percent the Dixiecrats had

pulled out should have given the Republicans a solid majority of about 60 percent of the region's voters in any event. But with the emergence of George McGovern as the Democratic standard bearer, that figure swelled to close to 70 percent. With this impetus the Republicans should have swept everything in sight, but they did not. The major gains occurred at the statewide and congressional levels. North Carolina elected a new Republican governor and a new Republican Senator. Virginia, too, responded by electing a Republican to the Senate. Republicans controlled both the Virginia and Tennessee congressional delegations. But at the local level practically nothing happened. The legislatures remained almost unchanged.

In retrospect by the time of the close of the study, Republicans had held governorships in every state in the Outer South except Texas, controlled two congressional delegations, and held a majority of the region's senate seats. Gains at the local level had been only modest, only about 20 percent of the state senate seats, and a quarter of the state house seats.

The importance of the growth of urbanism, wealth, and increased voter registration to presidential Republicanism during this time period has been touched upon. Tables 18, 19, and 20 demonstrate these changes.

Where did the votes come from that made up the Republican successes? Phillips divides this part of the region into several categories: Black Belt, Traditional GOP, Metropolitan areas, and Texas Mexican-American Vote. The data from the 1972 election will be compared with that given by Phillips for preceding elections

TABLE 18
PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE OUTER SOUTH

| State | Percentage of the national average | | |
|----------------|------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | 1948 (%) | 1968 (%) | Change (%) |
| Florida | 81.8 | 93.2 | 11.4 |
| North Carolina | 68.0 | 77.9 | 9.9 |
| Tennessee | 66.0 | 75.4 | 9.4 |
| Texas | 83.8 | 88.5 | 4.5 |
| Virginia | 79.0 | 89.7 | 10.7 |

SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

TABLE 19
GROWTH OF URBANISM IN THE OUTER SOUTH

| State | Percentage urban | | | |
|----------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| | 1950 (%) | 1960 (%) | 1970 (%) | Change (%) |
| Florida | 48 | 67 | 67 | 19 |
| North Carolina | 22 | 31 | 37 | 15 |
| Tennessee | 42 | 50 | 52 | 10 |
| Texas | 47 | 65 | 67 | 20 |
| Virginia | . . . | 50 | 58 | 8 |

SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

TABLE 20
VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE OUTER SOUTH

| State | Black | | | White |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| | 1960 (%) | 1964 (%) | 1970 (%) | 1970 (%) |
| Tennessee | 58.9 | 69.6 | 76.5 | 88.3 |
| Florida | 38.9 | 63.8 | 67.0 | 94.2 |
| North Carolina | 38.1 | 46.8 | 54.8 | 79.6 |
| Texas | 34.9 | 57.7 | 84.7 | 73.7 |
| Virginia | 22.8 | 45.7 | 60.7 | 78.4 |

SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972.

in Tables 21, 22, 23, and 24.

From all that has been discussed to this point about the Outer South, it would seem that the theory was correct, that it may now be considered solidly Republican in presidential contests. Again, the other national offices are running somewhat behind the presidential level in development. Congress was the next level to develop, really beginning to move only about a decade behind the presidential level, or in other words about 1962. By 1966 Republican power was beginning to sift into every level, with the state legislatures still the least developed. But this is to be expected.

TABLE 21

DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
IN THE BLACK BELT

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | Change 1932- 1972 |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Gadsden, Florida | 76 | 95 | 51 | 60 | 63 | 54 | 47 | 36 | 39 | -56 |
| Madison, Florida | 74 | 88 | 52 | 57 | 67 | 64 | 43 | 29 | 28 | -60 |
| Bertie, North Carolina | 84 | 98 | 96 | 90 | 88 | 87 | 78 | 45 | 39 | -59 |
| Halifax, North Carolina | 85 | 95 | 87 | 80 | 77 | 79 | 65 | 32 | 32 | -63 |
| Fayette, Tennessee | 90 | 96 | 13 | 53 | 33 | 32 | 47 | 40 | 39 | -57 |
| Haywood, Tennessee | 92 | 95 | 49 | 72 | 73 | 56 | 49 | 30 | 39 | -56 |
| San Jacinto, Texas | 63 | 98 | 66 | 68 | 57 | 71 | 83 | 54 | 55 | -43 |
| Waller, Texas | 57 | 93 | 50 | 46 | 39 | 49 | 68 | 49 | 33 | -60 |
| Brunswick, Virginia | 79 | 96 | 49 | 60 | 43 | 66 | 42 | 38 | 41 | -55 |
| Dinwiddie, Virginia | 74 | 90 | 64 | 59 | 49 | 64 | 51 | 30 | 36 | -54 |

TABLE 22
 REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
 IN TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN AREAS

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | Change 1932- 1972 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Avery, North | | | | | | | | | | |
| Carolina | 89 | 73 | 75 | 79 | 81 | 80 | 64 | 86 | 86 | +13 |
| Floyd, Virginia | 77 | 60 | 73 | 72 | 71 | 70 | 62 | 79 | 78 | +18 |
| Sevier, Tennessee | 93 | 77 | 84 | 87 | 87 | 85 | 70 | 89 | 88 | +11 |

TABLE 23
 REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE^a
 IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | Change 1932- 1972 |
|--------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Dade, Florida | 61 | 34 | 47 | 49 | 51 | 40 | 48 | 66 | 63 | +29 |
| Broward, Florida | 65 | 34 | 64 | 69 | 72 | 59 | 56 | 71 | 73 | +39 |
| Duval, Florida | 65 | 24 | 52 | 48 | 50 | 46 | 51 | 67 | 72 | +48 |
| Pinellas, Florida | 75 | 42 | 65 | 71 | 73 | 64 | 45 | 73 | 71 | +29 |
| Mecklenburg, North Carolina | 55 | 22 | 57 | 57 | 62 | 55 | 48 | 71 | 70 | +48 |
| Guilford, North Carolina | 63 | 32 | 51 | 53 | 60 | 58 | 47 | 70 | 70 | +38 |
| Forsyth, North Carolina | 67 | 36 | 51 | 52 | 65 | 58 | 49 | 71 | 69 | +33 |
| Buncombe, North Carolina | 57 | 32 | 45 | 52 | 54 | 55 | 38 | 69 | 72 | +40 |
| Wake, North Carolina | 49 | 25 | 27 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 79 | 71 | +46 |
| Shelby, Tennessee | 40 | 14 | 63 | 48 | 49 | 48 | 47 | 65 | 67 | +53 |
| Davidson, Tennessee | 53 | 25 | 44 | 41 | 39 | 46 | 36 | 67 | 63 | +38 |
| Knox, Tennessee | 48 | 48 | 59 | 62 | 60 | 61 | 50 | 73 | 73 | +25 |
| Hamilton, Tennessee | 65 | 38 | 44 | 55 | 53 | 56 | 51 | 72 | 74 | +36 |

TABLE 23--Continued

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | Change 1932- 1972 |
|--------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Dallas, Texas | 61 | 19 | 50 | 63 | 65 | 62 | 45 | 66 | 70 | +51 |
| Harris, Texas | 56 | 16 | 52 | 58 | 61 | 52 | 40 | 61 | 62 | +76 |
| Tarrant, Texas | 69 | 14 | 40 | 58 | 60 | 55 | 37 | 58 | 62 | +48 |
| Bexar, Texas | 48 | 16 | 46 | 56 | 58 | 46 | 33 | 49 | 61 | +45 |
| El Paso, Texas | 50 | 20 | 29 | 58 | 55 | 48 | 37 | 53 | 54 | +34 |
| Norfolk, Virginia | 59 | 33 | 49 | 54 | 54 | 44 | 36 | 59 | 60 | +27 |
| Richmond, Virginia | 51 | 28 | 53 | 60 | 62 | 60 | 43 | 52 | 58 | +30 |

^aFigures for 1948 include the States Rights Party and figures for 1968 include the American Independent Party.

TABLE 24
REPUBLICAN SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE^a
IN TEXAS, MEXICAN-AMERICAN

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 | Change 1932- 1972 |
|----------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------------------------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Duval | 26 | 3 | 3 | 17 | 32 | 18 | 7 | 5 | 16 | +30 |
| Starr | 10 | 5 | 8 | 17 | 17 | 7 | 14 | 25 | 43 | +38 |
| Zapata | 6 | 8 | 40 | 46 | 42 | 28 | 12 | 21 | 48 | +40 |
| Jim Hogg | 29 | 11 | 19 | 23 | 31 | 15 | 10 | 14 | 47 | +36 |

^aFigures for 1948 include the States' Rights Party and figures for 1968 include the American Independent Party.

It had been reasoned before that the presidential level was to be the first to fall away from Democratic control, because it would be the first sphere in which the South would realize its growing impotence within the Democratic Party. Realizing that they could no longer have an effect on the nominating process within the Democratic Party, or on its national platforms, the old loyalty was removed. Congress was the next level to begin shifting, probably due to the greater numbers, more frequent elections, and the need for smaller numbers to win congressional elections. It is, after all, easier to command a majority in just one district than across a state. Next, the Republicans moved in the statewide races, the governorships, and senatorships, and only slowly at the state legislative level. Part of the reason for the shift which may continue over the long run

and which will result in majorities at all levels, is that there is a certain internal conflict within a man who believes himself a Democrat, but who consistently votes for Republican presidential candidates. After a while he must move to considering himself an independent. And the longer this goes on the smaller the pull of loyalty to his old party will be. Eventually it no longer would make sense to vote for executives of one party, but give them representatives of another party to have to work with so that they can never achieve anything. When there are sufficient political battles between Republican governors, and Democratic legislatures, then the shift will become complete and the legislatures will shift as well. As with Congress, it is doubtful that many incumbents will be defeated. This rarely happens. Rather it will be shown that as Democrats retire, they are being replaced by Republicans.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER II

¹V. O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 277.

²*Ibid.*, p. 34.

³*Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 280-81.

⁵Alexander Heard, The Two Party South? (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1952), pp. 111-12.

⁶William C. Havard, The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), p. 53.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹John A. Adams and Joan Martin Burke, Civil Rights (New York: R. R. Bowker Co., 1970), pp. 143-69.

¹⁰Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 58-59.

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²Ralph Eisenberg, "The 1964 Presidential Election in Virginia: A Political Omen?" University of Virginia Newsletter, April 15, 1965, p. 38.

¹³Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 59.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 68-72.

¹⁷Ralph Eisenberg, "1969 Politics in Virginia: The General Election," University of Virginia Newsletter, May 15, 1970, pp. 33-35.

¹⁸Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 74-80.

- ¹⁹Eisenberg, "1969 Politics in Virginia: The General Election," p. 36.
- ²⁰Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), pp. 153-54.
- ²¹Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 80.
- ²²*Ibid.*, pp. 85-87.
- ²³Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 277.
- ²⁴Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 173.
- ²⁵Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, pp. 280-88.
- ²⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 320-22.
- ²⁷Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 176-77.
- ²⁸Heard, The Two Party South? p. 104.
- ²⁹Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 144.
- ³⁰Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 280.
- ³¹Heard, The Two Party South? p. 56.
- ³²Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 144.
- ³³Heard, The Two Party South? p. 115.
- ³⁴Malcolm E. Jewell, Legislative Representation in the Contemporary South (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), p. 108.
- ³⁵Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 144.
- ³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 111.
- ³⁸*Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ³⁹*Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰*Ibid.*
- ⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 139.
- ⁴²Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 283.

⁴³Ibid., p. 320.

⁴⁴Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 373-76.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 376-78.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 400.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 435.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 396.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 384.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 387-91.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., p. 411.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 412-13.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 414.

⁵⁵Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, p. 320.

⁵⁶Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 213-14.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 214.

⁵⁸Jewell, Legislative Representation in the Contemporary South, p. 108.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 100-08.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 108-09.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³George B. Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 49.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁵Bernard Cosman, Five States for Goldwater (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1966), p. 27.

⁶⁶Numen V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), p. 57.

⁶⁷Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South, p. 52.

⁶⁸Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance, pp. 50-51.

⁶⁹Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 179-80.

⁷⁰Dewey Grantham, Jr., The Democratic South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1963), pp. 81-100.

CHAPTER III

THE DEEP SOUTH

The Deep South states form the heart of the old Democratic South. Up until 1964 only one of them, Louisiana, had ever given its electoral votes to a Republican candidate since Reconstruction, and then only in one election--1956. Even the "wetness" and Catholicism of Al Smith, the tremendous popularity of General Eisenhower, and the Catholicism of Kennedy had not proved sufficient to dislodge these states from the Democratic column. Then came 1964 and Barry Goldwater. While the Outer South, like the rest of the nation, voted Democratic--Vermont doing so for the first time since the formation of the Republican Party--the Deep South threw aside tradition, a very powerful factor anywhere and especially so in this region, and voted for Goldwater. The Republican candidate carried five of the six states of the region: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, missing only Arkansas.

Goldwater's success in the Deep South has been compared to Al Smith's success in the cities in 1928. Both candidates were badly defeated nationally--in the case of Smith by what proved to be "the last hurrah" of a decaying, and soon to be dead, Republican majority coalition--in the case of Goldwater what may later prove to have been the final fling of the once dominant Roosevelt coalition of New Deal days. In 1928, Smith carried the cities, but little

heed was paid to the omen in light of his disastrous defeat. It was precisely these same cities that delivered many of the electoral votes that were needed to put Franklin Roosevelt in the White House. In 1964 the loss of the Deep South caused little stir among Democratic sages who considered Goldwater's achievement only a temporary aberration, solely the result of his "extremist" positions. They failed to look beyond to see the underlying factors producing the break.

In 1968 the Deep South again turned away from the Democrats and into the waiting arms of George C. Wallace. But, for the first time in history, both sections of the South turned away from the Democrats at the same time, as most of the Outer South followed Richard Nixon into the Republican camp. While Wallace carried the Deep South states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi, Nixon carried Florida, Virginia, Tennessee, and the two Carolinas. Only Texas remained loyal to the Democrats, and then only by a very narrow margin.

Many Democratic pundits--those who looked on the Goldwater defections as a temporary aberration--viewed the 1968 results as confirmation of their contention that the loss of the Deep South was only temporary. Without Wallace they reasoned, rightly or wrongly, the heavy Democratic registration in the Deep South would have guaranteed those electoral votes for Humphrey. It remained for 1972 to disconfirm that belief.

Before 1948 South Carolina had been one of the South's most Democratic states, never giving the presidential candidate of that party less than seven-eighths of its popular vote in this century.

In 1948, however, the situation was somewhat different. The governor of that state, Strom Thurmond, was a candidate for President on the third-party Dixiecrat ticket. Thurmond swept the entire state, polling 72 percent of the vote. In the next three presidential elections the Democrats again captured South Carolina. However, in those three races, they never managed to muster even 52 percent of the vote.¹ Thus, there had been a permanent shift of something more than a quarter of the state's voters. (See Table 25.)

In 1948 Governor Dewey had managed to poll only 5,386 votes, or 3.7 percent of the total number cast. As southern discontent with the racial policies of the Truman administration increased, and as it became increasingly clear that a third-party attempt would do little good, many southerners decided to support Eisenhower. Because the loyalty pledge had been abandoned at the 1952 Democratic National Convention, such people as South Carolina's Governor James F. Byrnes could feel free to bolt the party to work for Eisenhower. The result was a near victory for Eisenhower in 1952.² The General failed by less than 5,000 votes.

This was purely a personal triumph for Eisenhower, though, as the table shows. No Republicans were carried into office on his coattails in South Carolina, as they were elsewhere, nor were any to be elected for the rest of the decade. Indeed, 1952 was the high point of Republican support during the 1950s. Following the unpopular (in South Carolina) Brown decision of the Warren Court, Eisenhower, while sweeping the rest of the nation easily, finished in third place in the presidential voting in South Carolina in 1965,

TABLE 25
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR SOUTH CAROLINA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | 1R--123D | 1 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 0 |
| 1965 | D | 1R--1D | OR--6D | OR--46D | OR--124D | 1 |

TABLE 25--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 0R--46D | 0R--124D | 2 |
| 1967 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 6R--40D | 17R--107D | 25 |
| 1968 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 6R--40D | 17R--107D | 25 |
| 1969 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 3R--43D | 3R--121D | 8 |
| 1970 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 3R--43D | 5R--119D | 10 |
| 1971 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 2R--42D | 11R--113D | 15 |
| 1972 | D | 1R--1D | 1R--5D | 2R--42D | 11R--113D | 15 |
| 1973 | D | 1R--1D | 2R--4D | 2R--44D | 21R--103D | 36 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

running behind Stevenson, and a third-party candidacy of Virginia Senator Harry F. Byrd. In 1960, Richard Nixon ran another tight race, running 20,000 votes ahead of Eisenhower's 1952 figures. The final percentages were Nixon 48.7 and Kennedy 51.2.

With the Republicans out of power, it was up to the Democratic Administration under John Kennedy to show what it could do about South Carolina's number one issue--the race question. John Kennedy was in a rather precarious political position. Had he lost the southern states he carried in 1960, he would not have been President. On the other hand, without major black and liberal white support in the

North, he could not carry the big city states in that region that most presidential aspirants consider the sine qua non of victory. When faced with this dilemma, Kennedy had to make a decision. His decision was to count heavily on the power and prestige of his running mate Lyndon B. Johnson to keep his fellow southerners in line, while he himself proceeded with a liberal civil rights program. It is doubtful how successful this strategy would have been if John Kennedy had had to face reelection. This is, however, a moot point, because he was "relieved" of that problem. Lee Harvey Oswald, a pro Castro Marxist, assassinated Kennedy, perhaps in an attempt to preserve Castro's hold on Cuba (quite pointless, it would seem in retrospect, since the U.S. had no further plans to attack Cuba, under Kennedy, without further provocation).

When John Kennedy died, Lyndon Johnson became the first southerner to sit in the White House since Woodrow Wilson, a native of Virginia. Goldwater strategists soon realized that it would take a miracle to put into action the battle plan that they had intended to use against Kennedy and make it work. All hope of victory was gone, but most seemed to feel it was better to go down with Barry than to let anyone else get the nomination. Probably the best comparison could be made with that of Roosevelt and the Progressive Party in 1912. In both cases victory was far less important than the great moral crusade being brought forward to be viewed by the American public who were to be educated. Strangely, Lyndon Johnson, the southerner, the first southern President in years, was the first Democratic nominee to lose the Deep South to a Republican. Goldwater

increased Nixon's 1960 figures by ten percentage points and 120,000 votes in South Carolina.

Despite the great swell in the number of "presidential Republicans," the GOP had little to show for its pains. No new Republicans had been elected to office. The only gain that Republicans could claim was the conversion of Democratic Senator and former Dixiecratic presidential candidate Strom Thurmond, to the Republican cause, the first, and, as yet, only Republican Senator from the Deep South. There was good cause, therefore, to believe that in South Carolina at least, the Goldwater triumph had been only a temporary setback for the Democratic Party.

However, cause for cheering was short-lived. The following year, 1965, Democratic Congressman Albert Watson, stripped of his seniority by Democratic caucus because of his support for Barry Goldwater's 1964 drive, followed Thurmond's lead by declaring himself a Republican, resigning his seat, running in the subsequent special election under the label of his new party, and winning. This success proved that, perhaps, party labels were wearing thin in even the Deep South. In the following year, 1966, further proof was added when Republicans captured seventeen seats in the lower house of the state legislature and six in the state senate.

In 1968, the election was different from other recent presidential elections in South Carolina. (See Table 26.) What made the difference was the presence of George Wallace on the ballot and the effects of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The most constant source of Republican and independent voting from 1948 to 1964 in

TABLE 26
SOUTH CAROLINA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 5,386 | 34,423 | 102,607 | 3.7 | 24.2 | 72.0 |
| 1952 | 168,082 | 173,004 | . . . | 49.2 | 50.7 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 75,700 | 136,372 | 88,509 | 25.1 | 45.3 | 29.5 |
| 1960 | 188,558 | 198,124 | . . . | 48.7 | 51.2 | 0.0 |
| 1964 | 309,048 | 215,700 | . . . | 58.8 | 41.1 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 254,062 | 197,486 | 215,430 | 38.0 | 29.6 | 32.3 |
| 1972 | 463,366 | 187,375 | . . . | 71.2 | 28.7 | 0.0 |

South Carolina had been the "Coastal Plains" counties (excluding Aiken, Charleston, Lexington, and Richland--the "urbanized" areas). The twenty counties of the Piedmont region were the best Democratic counties. In the cities, Greenville gave heavy Republican support every year from 1952 to 1964, while Charleston and Columbia did so every year but 1956, when the conservative vote split between Eisenhower and a third-party bid under Harry Byrd. In 1968 this pattern turned 180 degrees. Humphrey did relatively better in the Coastal Plains region while Nixon and Wallace swept the Piedmont. Nixon carried an absolute majority of the vote in Greenville and Columbia, and a plurality in Charleston.³

At the same time, however, it should be noted that 1968 was not the kind of year for Richard Nixon in South Carolina that 1964 had been for Barry Goldwater. Nixon's percentage was more than twenty points behind Goldwater's. Indeed, had 20,000 Nixon votes switched to Wallace, the Alabama Governor would have carried the state. All but three of the Republican members in the lower house lost their seats, as did half of the Republican state senators elected in 1966. In the final analysis, it was probably the strong support of Strom Thurmond that kept South Carolina from going to Wallace, and saved it for Nixon.

In 1970 Republicans picked Congressman Watson as their gubernatorial nominee, while the Democrats chose Lieutenant Governor John West. For the first time in memory the Republican candidate had a fighting chance of victory. West squeaked by with 52 percent of the vote. The Republicans lost one state senate seat, but increased their house holdings to eleven seats. More importantly, Floyd Spence, a Republican, managed to retain Watson's old seat in Congress for the GOP.

It was really only in 1972 that the Republicans were able to get everything together for a good year across the board. Nixon, without Wallace in the race, ran over 200,000 votes ahead of his 1968 figures, while McGovern was not aided in the least--his figure declined by more than 10,000 votes from Humphrey's already low levels. Nixon carried every county in the state in accumulating 71.2 percent of the vote--more than the combined Nixon-Wallace percentages of four years earlier. Thurmond, too, romped to an easy

victory--much easier than many had predicted. There were ten new Republicans elected to the state legislature, while Edward Young captured the Sixth Congressional District seat held by seventeen-term Congressman John McMillan until his primary defeat in 1972.

When, following the renomination of Harry Truman in 1948, many southerners temporarily withdrew from the party to nominate Governor Thurmond of South Carolina on the Dixiecrat line, a few southern Democratic parties even went so far as to deny Truman any place on the ballot. Many in Georgia would have liked to follow suit. However, acting Governor M. E. Thompson, a political opponent of the powerful Talmadge family, acted to call a special legislative session to ensure President Truman a place on the Democratic line on the ballot. Truman won the state, but Thompson was not so lucky. He was defeated for the gubernatorial nomination by Herman Talmadge who maintained the Talmadge tradition of appealing to white voters who opposed such racially liberal policies as Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC), and other Truman civil rights planks.⁴

The Republican Party demonstrated steady growth in the presidential elections of the 1950s. From a third place finisher with under 20 percent in 1948, the party increased its voting percentages to 30 percent in 1952, 33 percent in 1956, and 37 percent in 1960. As in much of the rest of the South, the urban vote was the key to this growth. In 1952 Eisenhower took Savannah and Augusta, Chatham and Richmond counties. In 1956 he added Columbus and Muscogee counties. In both years his urban percentages had been 40.5 percent. In 1960 Nixon upped this figure to 48.5 percent, nearly

equal to Kennedy's.⁵

Meanwhile, the local Republican Party had been able to make slight inroads by riding Eisenhower's coattails. A new Republican member was elected to each house of the Georgia legislature in 1952. Although both of these were immediately wiped out in the 1954 elections--victims of the Brown decision--the loss was only temporary as 1956 saw them replaced by a Republican gain of one in the state senate, and three in the lower house. (See Table 27.)

Georgia Republicans managed to hold their own throughout the remainder of the decade; two Republican seats became vacant in 1961 and 1962, one being filled by a Democrat. In the 1962 elections, however, Republican strength hit new heights, this time without the aid of coattails. They added three new members to their lower house delegation and a new state senator. In 1963 a third state senator was added, while two of the four Republican members of the house were defeated.

In 1964 Barry M. Goldwater became the first Republican to carry Georgia. He received 54.1 percent of the vote. There was a great deal of "racial voting." It is estimated that Goldwater carried 66 percent of the white vote and virtually none of the black vote. Much of the credit for the Goldwater victory should go to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Except for Fulton County, Goldwater carried all of the urban counties, drawing 53.7 percent of their votes.⁶ (See Table 28.) The 1964 elections also gave Georgia its first Republican Congressman in modern times as "Bo" Calloway, a multimillionaire textile king, carried Georgia's Third District.

TABLE 27
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR GEORGIA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 1R--204D | 2 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 1R--204D | 2 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | OR--54D | OR--205D | 0 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | OR--54D | OR--205D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | OR--54D | OR--205D | 0 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | OR--54D | OR--205D | 0 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 1R--204D | 2 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 1R--204D | 2 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | OR--54D | OR--205D | 0 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 3R--202D | 4 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 3R--202D | 4 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 3R--202D | 4 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 3R--202D | 4 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 3R--202D | 4 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 2R--202D | 3 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 1R--53D | 1R--203D | 2 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 2R--52D | 4R--201D | 6 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--10D | 3R--51D | 2R--203D | 5 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | 1R--9D | 9R--51D | 23R--203D | 33 |

TABLE 27--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | OR--2D | 1R--9D | 9R--44D | 23R--182D | 33 |
| 1967 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 8R--44D | 22R--182D | 32 |
| 1968 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 8R--45D | 22R--183D | 32 |
| 1969 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 6R--48D | 26R--168D | 34 |
| 1970 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 7R--48D | 26R--169D | 35 |
| 1971 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 6R--50D | 22R--173D | 30 |
| 1972 | D | OR--2D | 2R--8D | 6R--50D | 22R--173D | 30 |
| 1973 | D | OR--2D | 1R--9D | 8R--48D | 28R--151D | 37 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

Republican representation in the legislature increased dramatically, climbing to twenty-three in the house, and nine in the state senate.

In 1966 the name of Lester Maddox burst onto the Georgia political scene. Maddox had run twice before for political office, both times unsuccessfully. In the 1961 Atlanta mayoral election Maddox lost to Ivan Allen, Jr., losing the city's majority black precincts 31,224 to 179, thus losing 99.4 percent to 0.6 percent in those areas.⁷ In 1962 he lost the primary for Lieutenant Governor. Of the six candidates in the 1966 primary, four were conservatives, one a moderate, and one a liberal. Ellis Arnall, although liberal, was well known as a former governor, and was expected

to win. He was very well financed and had a good record in the state. However, he failed to secure enough votes (getting only 29 percent) to avoid a runoff. His opponent was to be Lester Maddox, a man with little formal education and only moderate finances. As has been pointed out, Maddox also had the reputation of being a loser.⁸

But much had changed since 1962. Maddox had received much publicity when he sold his Atlanta restaurant rather than obey the 1964 Civil Rights Act requirement that he integrate. His reputation for being a teetotaler and a deeply religious man may have cost him votes in sophisticated Atlanta, but it endeared him to the rest of the state. Maddox carried 137 counties and 54.3 percent of the vote.⁹ In the general election Maddox was faced with the opposition of Republican Congressman Bo Calloway, and a large write-in effort in behalf of Arnall. Calloway actually received a 3,000-vote plurality. However, due to the large number of write-ins and a lack of a clear majority, the election was thrown into the General Assembly, where Maddox prevailed.¹⁰ One seat in each house of the legislature changed hands, as did Calloway's Third District congressional seat. However, Republicans Ben Blackburn and Fletcher Thompson won the Fourth and Fifth District congressional seats based in Atlanta.

In 1968 the Republican vote receded to the lowest point since 1952. However, with George Wallace on the ballot, this gave the national Democrats little to cheer about. Hubert Humphrey fared much worse than even Johnson had four years earlier. If one may honestly add Wallace and Nixon votes together, as Phillips is wont to

do, it can be seen that the combined anti Great Society vote ran to 73.2 percent--a considerable change from 1952.¹¹ No new Republicans entered Congress, and two Republicans lost seats in the state senate, but four new Republicans gained seats in the state house.

In 1970 Governor Maddox was unable to succeed himself. The primary victor, and winner of the general election, was peanut farmer Jimmy Carter. Maddox became Lieutenant Governor. The four state house seats picked up in 1968 were lost again. Nevertheless, the retention of twenty-two house seats out of a smaller total number of seats, demonstrates the lasting effects of the 1964 sweep.

In the opening days of 1971, Senator Richard B. Russell, twice a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, respected as a statesman throughout Washington, and long a leader of the southern senatorial bloc, died. Governor Carter's replacement for Senator Russell, David Gambrell, immediately became a target for all the anti Carter forces within the Democratic Party in Georgia. When he ran for election, Gambrell was forced into a runoff primary with the eventual winner, Sam Nunn. Nunn had the backing of a rather diverse group including both Lester Maddox and black leader Julian Bond, both of whom opposed Carter. Republican Fletcher Thompson, a conservative Republican Congressman from Atlanta, hoped to be able to take advantage of the Democratic feuding to win the seat. He proved unsuccessful in this effort, however, as he narrowly lost the 1972 general election. Thompson's own seat in the House of Representatives reverted to Democratic control.

As was expected, Richard Nixon easily won Georgia's electoral

votes in the presidential election. Nixon ran nearly 350,000 votes ahead of his 1968 levels, polling over 69 percent. McGovern ran almost four percentage points ahead of Humphrey's figures, despite the fact his vote totals were actually less than Humphrey's. Many Wallace voters sat out the 1972 election, but almost all of those who did vote appear to have voted for Nixon. (See Table 28.) Republicans added two new state senators, and six new members to their house delegation.

In 1948 when much of the South bolted the national Democratic Party, Alabama followed suit. Harry Truman, the candidate of the national party, not only failed to get the Democratic line on the November ballot, but did not appear at all. In a contest between Dewey, the candidate of the "Northeast Establishment" of the Republican Party, and Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond, the candidate of the Deep South, the outcome was a foregone conclusion, with the only possible source of wonder being the margin. Thurmond ultimately polled 80.7 percent of the vote, not as high as Roosevelt had been accustomed to, but higher than any winning percentage since.

In 1952 there no longer existed the Dixiecrat alternative. The Republican nominee, General Eisenhower, was personally very popular, but the Democrats were particularly sensitive to the growing signs of rebellion in the South. No southerner, not lucky enough to inherit the presidency, as Johnson was to do in 1963, could win the presidential nomination as Richard Russell had so well proved, but it was hoped that the selection of John Sparkman, a Senator from Alabama, as the vice-presidential nominee, would help pacify the South.

TABLE 28
GEORGIA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 76,691 | 254,464 | 85,055 | 18.4 | 61.1 | 20.4 |
| 1952 | 198,979 | 456,823 | . . . | 30.3 | 69.6 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 222,778 | 444,388 | . . . | 33.3 | 66.6 | 0.0 |
| 1960 | 274,472 | 458,638 | . . . | 37.2 | 62.7 | 0.0 |
| 1964 | 616,600 | 522,557 | . . . | 54.1 | 45.8 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 380,111 | 334,440 | 535,550 | 30.4 | 26.7 | 42.8 |
| 1972 | 729,221 | 321,650 | . . . | 69.3 | 30.6 | 0.0 |

Both parties increased their vote totals by more than 100,000 votes (if one takes Thurmond's 1948 showing as the 1948 Democratic vote in Alabama), with the result being a comfortable, if somewhat reduced, margin of 64.8 percent.

Even before Eisenhower's 1952 campaign Alabama had a token Republican in its lower house. Even the drawing power of Senator Sparkman had been insufficient to remove him. However, in May of 1954, the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Earl Warren, an Eisenhower appointee, handed down the group of decisions in school desegregation cases referred to under the joint title of the Brown decision. In the fall of 1954 Alabama voters returned an all

Democratic delegation to the state legislature. It would not be until 1963 that another Republican would sit in the Alabama legislature.

In 1956 Eisenhower improved his 1952 showing, pulling to within 100,000 votes of Stevenson. This was the first time since 1928 that a Republican candidate had come within the 100,000 vote figure. Nevertheless, there was still a considerable margin separating the two parties. And, a set of electors running on an uncommitted line drew about 20,000 votes.

In 1960 Richard Nixon further improved the Republican showing, increasing the party's percentage to 42 percent. His 237,981 votes marked the first time a Republican candidate had received 200,000 votes in a presidential election in Alabama. As Eisenhower had been the first Republican since 1928 to get closer than 100,000 votes to his Democratic opponent, Nixon bettered that mark moving to within 90,000 votes. Still, the Democratic percentage had been nearly the same in both elections--57.3 percent in 1956 and 57.2 percent in 1960.

It was in 1961 that the Republicans began to organize in Alabama in earnest. Soon every county was organized. The first real test of the new machinery came in the 1962 Senate race when Republican Jim Martin ran against incumbent Lister Hill. Martin missed by the narrowest of margins, reversing the normal voting patterns, by doing best in the black belt and worst in the traditional areas of Republican "strength." At the same time, Republicans entered eighteen legislative races and won two.¹²

Much money and effort had gone into this endeavor. For the first time in history Alabama Republicans had, in 1962, elected not to send money raised in Alabama to the "more important" races being fought by Republicans in the North, rather choosing to keep it in Alabama. Further, they asked for three full-time "field men" from the national committee to use in the state's elections. As Strong concludes, "Clearly, refusal to [send money to the national organization] is the first step toward a substantial grass roots party in the state. . . ." ¹³

But, 1962 was just the beginning. In preparation for the 1964 presidential race, "a permanent professional staff" was organized in 1963 by the state's Republicans. ¹⁴ It is doubtful that the effort was necessary, however. With the passage of the Johnson-backed 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the Republican nomination of "hard-core" conservative Barry Goldwater, the result was as inevitable as any election can ever be said to be. Goldwater polled more votes than any other candidate for president had ever polled in Alabama--more, indeed, than the combined figures for Eisenhower and Stevenson in 1952. His 69.5 percent represents the largest winning percentage in Alabama for a presidential contest for any year after 1948 and prior to 1972. In Alabama, at least, white bloc voting was clearly visible. In white precincts in the cities, Goldwater carried 76 percent and up. Republicans gained five of the eight congressional seats, narrowly missing a sixth, the Fifth District, where its candidate polled 47 percent. Many other minor offices were captured in the Goldwater tidal wave. ¹⁵

Republican spirits were high in 1966. They fielded candidates in an unprecedented number of races--Senator, six of eight house seats, eight-five state house of representatives, and twenty-wix of the thirty-five state senate seats. Jim Martin ran for Governor. Out of all this hope, work, and expense emerged only three successful house candidates where there had been five (these represented Birmingham, Mobile, and Montgomery--urban areas of comparative Republican strength), and one state senator.¹⁶ Martin's old house seat was lost, but only one of the other four Republican incumbents lost. (See Table 29.)

Before getting to the 1968 race for president, it should be recalled that George Wallace had been elected Governor of Alabama in 1962 as something of a segregationist on racial matters, and a populist elsewhere. Indeed, in Alabama, one might almost say he was a complete populist, without treating racial matters separately. Being unable, legally, to succeed himself in 1966, he successfully ran his wife Lurleen, to take his place. Everyone understood that she would be only a figurehead. She won. His Alabama base of operations thus secured, Wallace set forth to do battle with the "pointy-headed intellectuals" and other such enemies of Alabamians.

The mere appearance of Wallace on the ballot in Alabama guaranteed the outcome, just as much as Goldwater's appearance had four years earlier. Wallace polled more votes than the combined totals for Goldwater and Johnson in 1964--indeed, more than the combined totals of any previous election in Alabama history. Humphrey's 196,579 votes was the lowest figure for a Democratic

TABLE 29
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR ALABAMA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | 1R--105D | 1 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--9D | OR--35D | OR--106D | 0 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--35D | 2R--104D | 2 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--35D | 2R--104D | 2 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | 5R--3D | OR--35D | 2R--104D | 7 |

TABLE 29--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 0R--2D | 5R--3D | 0R--35D | 2R--104D | 7 |
| 1967 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 1R--34D | 4R--102D | 8 |
| 1968 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 1R--34D | 4R--102D | 8 |
| 1969 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 1R--34D | 0R--106D | 4 |
| 1970 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 1R--34D | 0R--106D | 4 |
| 1971 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 0R--35D | 2R--104D | 5 |
| 1972 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--5D | 0R--35D | 2R--104D | 5 |
| 1973 | D | 0R--2D | 3R--4D | 0R--34D | 2R--100D | 5 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

candidate since 1928 (if 1948 is excluded when there was no such candidate). Nixon's figure, too, was small, being exceeded by every Republican candidate since Eisenhower in 1952. (See Table 30.)

But, if Wallace did well in Alabama, he failed in his national objective of deadlocking the presidential election and throwing it into the House of Representatives. This failure seems to have had the effect of driving him back to the world of two-party politics. Wallace succeeded in regaining the Governor's chair in 1970, and in 1972 started campaigning actively for the Democratic presidential nomination. Whether he ever seriously believed he could win the

TABLE 30
ALABAMA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 40,930 | . . . | 171,443 | 19.2 | 0.0 | 80.7 |
| 1952 | 149,231 | 275,075 | . . . | 35.1 | 64.8 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 195,694 | 290,844 | 20,323 | 38.6 | 57.3 | 4.0 |
| 1960 | 237,981 | 324,050 | 4,367 | 42.0 | 57.2 | 0.7 |
| 1964 | 479,085 | 209,848 | . . . | 69.5 | 30.4 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 146,923 | 196,579 | 691,425 | 14.1 | 18.9 | 66.9 |
| 1972 | 692,480 | 215,792 | . . . | 76.2 | 23.7 | 0.0 |

nomination is doubtful. More probably he hoped for a deadlock at the convention and the chance to play balance of power, perhaps in return for the vice-presidential nomination. Whatever the case, he failed in his objective as George McGovern emerged with sufficient convention votes not to have to compromise with anyone.

Alabama voters were treated to a spectacle of raw political power during the platform fight at the Democratic National Convention. McGovern supporters, so long the "outs," proved unwilling to compromise anywhere. They had the votes and they knew it. Their doctrine would be pure no matter what it cost in November. In a dramatic performance, Wallace appeared before the convention to argue for some

planks he wished in the platform. He warned the convention of the dangers of not adopting his proposals. Very few of those assembled paid heed to him. In Alabama, however, they watched and listened.

The outcome of the fall elections in Alabama was as to be expected. Nixon swept the state, polling 76.2 percent of the vote--higher even than Goldwater's 1964 figure, and nearly equal to Strom Thurmond's 1948 margin. His total vote exceeded even Wallace's 1968 figure, and he ran 475,000 votes ahead of McGovern. Despite the fact that Alabama lost one house seat by redistricting, all three Republicans were returned to Congress, contrary to what many had predicted, that the lost seat would be at the expense of one of them.

It was in 1948 that the prestige of the national Democratic Party began to wane in Mississippi. Strom Thurmond got his highest percentage in Mississippi in that year, just as Goldwater was to do in 1964, breaking the 87 percent mark. In comparison, Dewey drew only 5,043 votes (2.6 percent) and Truman 19,384 (10 percent). Only in 1952 and 1956 did Mississippi back the candidate of the national Democrats before going to an independent slate in 1960, Goldwater in 1964, and Wallace in 1968.¹⁷

When the Supreme Court handed down the Brown decision in 1954, it set the stage for Democratic politics for the next ten years. In the 1955 Democratic gubernatorial primary, the main issue was who could best preserve segregation. Of only secondary importance was the influence of "Big Labor." One candidate accused the other of being the "labor candidate." Havard says, "Liberalism was

becoming a despised word throughout the state . . . ," and support for labor and integration, as everyone knew, were the hallmark of liberalism. Segregation and labor remained the big issues in 1959 as well. In 1963 another issue was added: who supported John Kennedy and why--with each candidate in the Democratic primary trying to accuse the other of being a Kennedy man and each trying to deny it. In 1967 with 190,000 black voters on the registration rolls, most due to the 1965 Voting Rights Act, overt racism dropped from the political lexicon. The eventual winner, Congressman John Bell Williams, while maintaining his Democratic registration, emphasized his support for Goldwater (in a state voting better than 87 percent for Barry Goldwater), and his subsequent martyrdom at the hands of the Democratic congressional caucus.¹⁸

The Republican Party began to stir in Mississippi only in 1960 and came fully to life in 1963 when its gubernatorial candidate broke the 38 percent mark;¹⁹ and two Republicans were actually elected to the lower house of the legislature. (See Table 31.) In 1964 Mississippi not only turned in the highest Goldwater percentage in the nation, but also elected Prentiss Walker, its first Republican Congressman in modern times. All of the hopes of 1964 were dashed in 1966, however, as four Republican candidates went down to defeat in house races, and Walker lost a bid to unseat Senator Eastland. In 1967 the entire Republican delegation in the state legislature went down to defeat.

Nevertheless, times were changing in Mississippi. Even here, time refused to stand still. In 1967 a poll of Mississippi voters

TABLE 31
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR MISSISSIPPI

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--2D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--5D | OR--49D | OR--140D | 0 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--5D | OR--52D | OR--122D | 0 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | 1R--4D | OR--52D | 2R--120D | 3 |

TABLE 31--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--4D | 1R--51D | 2R--120D | 3 |
| 1967 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 1R--51D | 2R--120D | 33 |
| 1968 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 0R--52D | 0R--122D | 3 |
| 1969 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 0R--52D | 0R--122D | 0 |
| 1970 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 0R--52D | 0R--122D | 0 |
| 1971 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 3R--49D | 1R--121D | 4 |
| 1972 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--5D | 3R--49D | 1R--121D | 4 |
| 1973 | D | 0R--2D | 2R--3D | 0R--52D | 0R--121D | 2 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

showed 39 percent terming themselves Independents, an extraordinarily high figure. Most of these seemed to resemble Republicans elsewhere, when one examines their socioeconomic history. They tended to be better educated, better paid people, holding good jobs. As a whole they were "city" dwellers and relatively young compared to Democratic partisans. They were also more "conservative on the issues of domestic and foreign policy than identifiers with either party." Because these respondents, identifying themselves as Independents, tended to resemble national Republicans in their socioeconomic background, and because of their negative image of the Democratic

Party, they may represent future Republicans in Mississippi, especially as the stigma of being a Republican declines within the state. Havard argues:

. . . [And] despite their hesitancy to identify as Republicans, the regular Democrats may be forced to do so. The national party seems well on its way of denying them any benefits from identifying themselves as Democrats. If the national Republicans offer hope for the disenchanted, the numbers of leaders and followers identifying themselves as Republicans is likely to change radically. . . .²⁰

Change, however, takes time, especially in Mississippi. The 1968 elections, while clearly demonstrating George Wallace's strength, showed several other results. The effect of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was clearly evident. Hubert Humphrey, a northerner, drew over 150,000 votes--nearly three times the number fellow southerner Lyndon Johnson had four years earlier, and, indeed, more votes than any Democratic nominee since Stevenson in 1952. At the same time, Nixon's vote totals plummeted from the Goldwater heights. (See Table 32.)

In the 1970 elections Mississippi elected three new Republican state senators and one Republican to the state house. It began to look like the change was beginning to set in. In 1972, Mississippi lost seventy-four years of congressional seniority when two of its long-time congressmen chose to retire at the same time. Thomas Abernathy, Democratic Congressman for thirty years, Chairman of the Cotton Subcommittee of the Agriculture Committee; and William Colmer, Chairman of the powerful Rules Committee, and an incumbent since the time of Franklin Roosevelt's first presidential victory; both decided that the strain had become too much for them and retired. A third

TABLE 32
MISSISSIPPI PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 5,043 | 19,384 | 167,538 | 2.6 | 10.0 | 87.3 |
| 1952 | 112,966 | 172,566 | . . . | 39.5 | 60.4 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 60,685 | 144,498 | 42,966 | 24.4 | 58.2 | 17.7 |
| 1960 | 73,561 | 108,362 | 116,248 | 24.6 | 36.3 | 39.0 |
| 1964 | 356,528 | 52,518 | . . . | 87.1 | 12.8 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 88,516 | 150,644 | 415,349 | 13.5 | 23.0 | 63.4 |
| 1972 | 502,330 | 125,739 | . . . | 79.9 | 20.0 | 0.0 |

Democratic Congressman Charles Griffin, an incumbent of only four years, and not seeking retirement, nevertheless lost in a surprising upset. Abernathy's seat went to David Bowen, a Democrat. Republican Thad Cochran was the victor over Griffin, and Colmer's Administrative Assistant, Trent Lott, ran successfully as a Republican for his boss's old seat, with Colmer's full endorsement. Thus, Mississippi now had two Republican Congressmen.

In the general elections for president in Mississippi in 1972, the result, from what has been said previously, was easily predictable. Richard Nixon polled his best showing in Mississippi with approximately 80 percent of the vote. His 502,330 votes nearly

equalled the combined totals for Wallace and himself in 1968. McGovern ran 25,000 votes behind Humphrey.

In Louisiana, from 1932 to 1944, the Democratic percentage of the vote fell from 88.6 percent of the vote to "only" 80.6 percent. In making an analysis, a comparison of the 1940 vote with that of 1944 is instructive. The northwest and central sections of the state raised their Republican vote shares by 15 percent to 27 percent. This area, representing one-third of the parishes, is overwhelmingly Protestant, with a high concentration of Negroes. At the same time, the largely Catholic and largely white southeastern section, which had heretofore been slightly more Republican than the rest of the state, upped its support for Roosevelt, probably in response to clear U.S. support for France, by 5 percent. In 1948 the central and northeast sections went heavily for Thurmond, and in several parishes the Democrats finished last. In 1956 Eisenhower was to carry this area with 65 percent of the vote.²¹

While presidential Republicanism has been common in Louisiana, Table 33 shows the local Republican Party has been the slowest to develop anywhere in the South--even slower than Mississippi's. Part of the explanation may be in Louisiana's uniqueness. One thinks immediately, of course, of the French Catholic versus Protestant English split. While it is true that Louisiana has more Catholics than any other southern state, Louisiana also has a higher proportion of its population engaged in nonfarm employment than any other southern state. Even as early as 1948, 90 percent of its work force was engaged in nonagricultural employment, ahead, even, of the

TABLE 33
LOUISIANA PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 72,657 | 136,344 | 204,290 | 17.5 | 32.9 | 49.5 |
| 1952 | 306,925 | 345,027 | . . . | 47.0 | 52.9 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 329,047 | 243,977 | 44,520 | 53.2 | 39.5 | 7.2 |
| 1960 | 230,980 | 407,339 | 169,572 | 28.5 | 50.4 | 21.1 |
| 1964 | 509,225 | 387,068 | . . . | 56.8 | 43.1 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 257,535 | 309,615 | 530,300 | 23.4 | 28.2 | 48.3 |
| 1972 | 746,493 | 371,998 | . . . | 66.7 | 33.2 | 0.0 |

national average.²²

Louisiana's disenchantment with the national Democratic Party had been building for some time. As early as 1943, Governor Jones offered his opinion that the Solid South should cease support for Democratic presidential candidates. He stated that he thought the South had gotten better treatment from the Republicans. The following year the Shreveport Times endorsed Dewey to protect the Constitution and the Republic, pointing out that Roosevelt constantly referred to the "'New Deal' or 'we'" and never the Democratic Party. It was not, however, until four years later that Louisiana broke to support the Dixiecrats. Even liberal Governor Earl Long could not,

or would not, speak out for Truman.²³

In 1952 Louisiana returned temporarily to the Democratic column as Stevenson mustered a slim 53 percent majority, down considerably from Roosevelt's last victory of 81 percent. In 1956 Louisiana became the only Deep South state to go Republican, giving Eisenhower 53 percent. He managed to poll 56 percent of the city vote--the first time they had backed a Republican candidate in Louisiana. Democratic fortunes had hit a new low.²⁴

In 1951 the Republicans had one Parish Committee formed out of a possible sixty-four. There were forty State Central Committee members out of a possible 101. By 1957 the year following Eisenhower's victory, these figures were up to twenty-two of sixty-four committees and all 101 Central Committee seats were filled.²⁵

Although many people have tried to project Republican and Democratic differences from religious differences, the true basis for the ongoing Republicanism in Louisiana, as in the rest of the South, is concentrated in the "urban-industrial" parishes in the state. These parishes cast roughly 50 percent of the state's presidential vote in 1960, and nearly 60 percent of the Republican totals. This urban Republican trend has bordered on the miraculous, having only been derailed by occasional third-party attempts since 1948.²⁶

(See Table 34.)

In 1960 the Democrats once again emerged victorious as the anti Democratic vote was split two ways. Kennedy's Catholicism enabled him to poll an absolute majority with 50.4 percent of the statewide vote.²⁷ An examination of the vote in the four Catholic

TABLE 34
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR LOUISIANA

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--101D | 0 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |

TABLE 34--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1967 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1968 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1969 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1970 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 0 |
| 1971 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | 1R--38D | 1R--103D | 2 |
| 1972 | D | OR--2D | OR--8D | 1R--38D | 1R--103D | 2 |
| 1973 | D | OR--2D | 1R--7D | OR--39D | OR--105D | 1 |

^aD--Democrat.

^bR--Republican.

parishes of Cameron, Evangeline, Saint James, and Saint John the Baptist shows clearly what happened. In 1956 the first two had gone for Eisenhower, and the last two for Stevenson with about 60 percent of the vote. In 1960 all four of these parishes went over 80 percent for Kennedy.²⁸

In 1964 Louisiana again returned to the Republican camp, carrying for Senator Goldwater with 57 percent of the vote, the highest percentage anyone had drawn in Louisiana since 1944. The Republican candidate for Governor, Charlton Lyons, a Shreveport businessman, proved a tough campaigner. Having scored major gains

in the cities, he polled 39 percent, the largest GOP vote for governor in modern Louisiana history.²⁹ Still, the victory remained in all things a personal triumph for Goldwater as Louisiana, alone of all the Deep South states carried by Goldwater, showed no Republican gains at all.

The 1968 presidential race was hard fought in Louisiana. "Sammy" Downs of Alexandria, executive counsel for the governor, managed the Wallace campaign. New Orleans state senator Mike O'Keefe ran Humphrey's. A host of dignitaries, including ex-governors Jones, Kennon, and Noe, Democrats all, and Administrative Assistant to the Governor, Carlos Spaht, were backing Nixon. All acknowledged Wallace to be the front runner. In the end, Wallace emerged the victor, but lacked a clear majority, polling only 48 percent.³⁰

In 1968 the eight urban parishes (Caddo, Ouachita, Rapides, East Baton Rouge, Lafayette, Calcasieu, Jefferson, and Orleans) provided about 79 percent of the Republican voters (since the Republicans have only 2 percent of Louisiana's registered voters, this is not as significant as it may, at first, seem) and provided about 60 percent of Nixon's totals for the state in the election. This was roughly the same percentage as in 1960.

Table 35 breaks down the vote in just one of these areas. Baton Rouge shows where the primary strength of the three candidates lies. Nixon's 54 percent demonstrates genuine Republican sympathy in the upper-income, urban, white areas. If one totals the latter two categories, it will be noted that Humphrey received only 13 percent of the urban white vote.³¹ Clearly, the Democratic candidate's

TABLE 35
TYPE OF PRECINCT

| Candidate | Black (%) | Upper class white (%) | White labor (%) |
|-----------|--------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Humphrey | 96 | 18 | 12 |
| Nixon | 1 | 54 | 18 |
| Wallace | 3 | 28 | 70 |

greatest strength was in the black areas. Surprisingly, Wallace did better than Nixon in the black precincts, but Wallace's strongest support came from precisely the areas one would expect to find it--the white laboring class.

For a time it looked as if the Republican Party in Louisiana was going to be born dead. Hope came alive again, however, when one Republican was elected to each house of the state legislature in the 1970 elections. With the nomination of Senator McGovern hope increased. Nixon swept the state polling two-thirds of the vote. The first Republican Congressman in modern times was also elected.

Arkansas presents a paradox. At no time has it been totally lacking in Republican strength as Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama have, but, on the other hand, it was the last of all the southern states to break from the Democratic Party. When much of the rest of

the Deep South was breaking loose in the 1948 Dixiecrat rebellion, Arkansas stayed loyal to the Democratic Party. The Dixiecrats drew only 16.7 percent of the vote, less even than the Republicans' 21.1 percent share.

The strength of the Republican Party in the state has gone through two cycles. Thus, Arkansas' sole Republican legislator in 1950 was joined by another in the elections of that year, and a third came in on Eisenhower's coattails in 1952. This delegation held together until one of their seats became vacant in 1956. Then events transpired to temporarily wipe out all vestiges of Republican strength in the state. (See Table 36.) At the beginning of the 1954-1955 School Year, two Arkansas school systems began to desegregate in accordance with the principles handed down in the Brown decision. The next year eight more followed suit. At the same time, all but one of the state-financed white colleges admitted blacks.³²

When Little Rock's Central High School prepared to integrate in the fall of 1957, trouble seemed likely. To prevent the possibility of violence, and, incidently, to prevent the planned integration, Governor Faubus, heretofore considered a "liberal," called out the National Guard. On September 13th, Faubus met with President Eisenhower, and, although he expressed his willingness to obey the Supreme Court's ruling, he did nothing. On September 20th, a federal court ordered the admission of blacks. Riots broke out on each of the next two days. On the twenty-third Eisenhower issued a proclamation demanding that the mob leave the area surrounding the school. On

TABLE 36
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR ARKANSAS

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 3R--97D | 3 |
| 1948 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 3R--97D | 3 |
| 1949 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1950 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1951 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 2R--98D | 2 |
| 1952 | D | OR--2D | OR--7D | OR--35D | 2R--98D | 2 |
| 1953 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 3R--97D | 3 |
| 1954 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 3R--97D | 3 |
| 1955 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 3R--97D | 3 |
| 1956 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 2R--97D | 2 |
| 1957 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 2R--98D | 2 |
| 1958 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 2R--98D | 2 |
| 1959 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1960 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | OR--100D | 0 |
| 1961 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1962 | D | OR--2D | OR--6D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1963 | D | OR--2D | OR--4D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1964 | D | OR--2D | OR--4D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1965 | D | OR--2D | OR--4D | OR--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |

TABLE 36--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|--------|--------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | D | 0R--2D | 0R--4D | 0R--35D | 1R--99D | 1 |
| 1967 | R | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 0R--35D | 3R--97D | 5 |
| 1968 | R | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 0R--35D | 3R--97D | 5 |
| 1969 | R | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 1R--34D | 3R--97D | 6 |
| 1970 | R | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 1R--34D | 3R--97D | 6 |
| 1971 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 1R--34D | 2R--98D | 4 |
| 1972 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 1R--34D | 2R--98D | 4 |
| 1973 | D | 0R--2D | 1R--3D | 1R--34D | 1R--99D | 3 |

^aDemocrat.

^bRepublican.

the twenty-fourth, Federal troops came in to enforce the decree.³³
 In the 1958 elections Faubus easily won reelection, but not so for his opponents. Liberal, eight-term, Democratic Congressman Brooks Hays, who had arranged the meeting with Eisenhower, and whose districts included Little Rock, lost his bid for reelection. So did all of the Arkansas Republican legislators.³⁴

Arkansas' vote remained remarkably stable in the three Presidential elections from 1952 to 1960. The Republican vote vacillated between 177,000 votes and 186,000 votes, a difference of only 9,000 votes. The Democratic vote varied from 213,000 to

226,000. Thus, it is clear, if the point needed making, that the Republican vote was genuine Republicanism, and not a personal tribute to Eisenhower.

The election of 1960, however, was closer than it might have been because of a large number of votes for the national States' Rights Party (SRP), which drew nearly 7 percent of the vote. These defections threatened Kennedy with the loss of a clear majority. Had this occurred, it would have been the first time the Democratic candidate had so failed in modern times. Nevertheless, he managed a very slight majority, polling 50.1 percent. The Republican was returned to the lower house of the legislature. Another cycle had begun.

In 1964 with Senator Goldwater at the head of the party, Republicans were coming to life all over the Deep South. Goldwater was to win five of the states in the region with little difficulty. Only in Arkansas was he rebuffed. But, look what an effort it took to keep Arkansas in the Democratic column. In 1964 Goldwater polled 243,264 votes in Arkansas--more votes than the Democratic Party was to draw in Arkansas in any presidential election, except the 1964 race. In 1964 Goldwater's vote ran to 43.4 percent of those cast, compared to Eisenhower's 1952 mark of 43.9 percent, and Nixon's 1960 figure of 43 percent. Republican representation in the state remained unchanged. (See Table 37.)

Governor Faubus, first elected in 1954, kept right on winning until he voluntarily retired in 1966. His organization's candidate, Frank Holt, lost the Democratic nomination to James Johnson, an

TABLE 37
ARKANSAS PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 50,959 | 146,659 | 40,068 | 21.1 | 62.1 | 16.7 |
| 1952 | 177,155 | 226,300 | . . . | 43.9 | 56.0 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 186,287 | 213,277 | 7,008 | 45.8 | 52.4 | 1.7 |
| 1960 | 184,508 | 215,049 | 28,954 | 43.0 | 50.1 | 6.8 |
| 1964 | 243,264 | 413,197 | 2,965 | 43.4 | 56.0 | 0.5 |
| 1968 | 189,062 | 184,901 | 235,627 | 31.0 | 30.3 | 38.6 |
| 1972 | 427,014 | 190,598 | . . . | 69.1 | 30.8 | 0.0 |

arch-segregationist and political opponent of Faubus. The Republican nominee was Winthrop Rockefeller, a resident of the state since 1953. He had been active in building the state's Republican organization since that time. Faubus' camp, having lost the primary, provided only lukewarm support for Johnson. Not only Rockefeller, but also Maurice Britt, Republican Lieutenant Governor candidate, proved victorious. Nor was that all. Congressman Trimble, long known as a prominent southern liberal, met defeat at the hands of Republican John Paul Hammerschmidt. As in the presidential elections, it was largely the urban Republican rural Democrat split that determined the results. Similarly it was the upper- and middle-class precincts

within the cities that accounted for the majorities.³⁵ Two new Republicans gained state house seats.

With the successes of 1966 under their belt, Republicans were confident going into the 1968 elections. The results were as mixed as it was possible for them to be. The voters cast their ballots for candidates of three different parties for each of the three major offices. Wallace, candidate of the American Independent Party, won Arkansas' electoral votes by polling 38.6 percent--his lowest winning percentage. Senator Fulbright, a Democrat, won reelection to the U.S. Senate. Finally, Governor Rockefeller, a Republican, won reelection to the governorship. In the presidential race, Nixon edged out Humphrey for second place. For the first time, Arkansas elected a Republican to the state senate.

In the 1970 elections Winthrop Rockefeller was once again the Republican gubernatorial candidate. Sterling Cockerill, one-time Speaker of the Arkansas House of Representatives, withdrew from the Democratic Party to run as Republican candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Rockefeller lost his bid for reelection to Democrat Dale Bumpers, a racial moderate, like Rockefeller. Republicans lost one seat in the state house.

The omen of 1968 proved truly prophetic for 1972. For the second straight election the Republican candidate out-polled the Democrat. In 1968, when George Wallace had been on the ballot, it had only been by 4,000 votes. Now Wallace was gone, and the margin had increased to over 236,000, more than Wallace's entire 1968 vote in Arkansas. Arkansas had at last gone Republican in a

presidential election.

Development of the Republican Party in the Deep South has traditionally lagged behind its development in the Outer South. Comparing Tables 16 and 38 will show that for the Outer South and the Deep South, respectively, that the movement to the Republican Party in the firmer region is running about twelve years ahead of the movement in the latter region. While it is true that the result of the Dixiecrat movement seems to have been to have more or less permanently shifted between 20 and 30 percent of voters away from the Democrats in the presidential years after 1950, only about two-thirds of these shifted immediately to the Republican Party. The others spent several years in experiments with third parties. Furthermore, while a somewhat smaller shift in the Outer South was enough to swing most of the states in that region into the Republican orbit, this shift in the Deep South only resulted in putting the states of the Deep South on about a par with the level the states of the Outer South had been on before. (See Table 39.)

Still, the Democrat's victories were not as easy as they had been used to. In Louisiana, in 1952, Governor Robert F. Kennon, heading a "business-conservative, neo-bourbon coalition," cited Stevenson's support for Federal ownership of offshore oil and FEPC laws as major factors in his support of Eisenhower. He campaigned long and hard throughout his state for Eisenhower.³⁶

In 1956 Eisenhower slipped somewhat in the voting as a result of the unpopular, at least in the Deep South, Brown decision. This did not help Stevenson very much, however, because most of the

TABLE 38
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR DEEP SOUTH

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|---------|---------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1948 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1949 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | OR--258D | 2R--773D | 2 |
| 1950 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | OR--258D | 2R--773D | 2 |
| 1951 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | OR--258D | 3R--772D | 3 |
| 1952 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--47D | OR--258D | 3R--772D | 3 |
| 1953 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1954 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1955 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | OR--258D | 3R--772D | 4 |
| 1956 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1957 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1958 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 5R--770D | 6 |
| 1959 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 3R--772D | 4 |
| 1960 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 3R--772D | 4 |
| 1961 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 3R--772D | 4 |
| 1962 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--45D | 1R--257D | 3R--775D | 4 |
| 1963 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--41D | 2R--256D | 7R--772D | 9 |
| 1964 | OR--6D | OR--12D | OR--41D | 3R--258D | 5R--774D | 8 |
| 1965 | OR--6D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 3R--258D | 7R--772D | 18 |

TABLE 38--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | 0R--6D | 1R--11D | 8R--33D | 9R--251D | 28R--751D | 46 |
| 1967 | 1R--5D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 16R--244D | 49R--730D | 74 |
| 1968 | 1R--5D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 15R--245D | 42R--737D | 66 |
| 1969 | 1R--5D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 10R--251D | 32R--747D | 51 |
| 1970 | 1R--5D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 12R--249D | 35R--744D | 56 |
| 1971 | 0R--6D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 13R--247D | 39R--738D | 60 |
| 1972 | 0R--6D | 1R--11D | 7R--34D | 13R--247D | 39R--738D | 60 |
| 1973 | 0R--6D | 1R--11D | 10R--30D | 12R--248D | 40R--737D | 63 |

^aRepublican.

^bDemocrat.

TABLE 39
DEEP SOUTH PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 251,666 | 594,456 | 771,001 | 15.5 | 36.7 | 47.7 |
| 1952 | 1,113,338 | 1,648,795 | . . . | 40.3 | 59.6 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 1,070,191 | 1,473,356 | 203,326 | 38.9 | 53.6 | 7.4 |
| 1960 | 1,190,060 | 1,711,567 | 319,141 | 36.9 | 53.1 | 9.9 |
| 1964 | 2,513,750 | 1,691,988 | 2,965 | 59.7 | 40.2 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 1,316,209 | 1,373,665 | 2,623,681 | 24.7 | 25.8 | 49.4 |
| 1972 | 3,560,904 | 1,413,152 | . . . | 71.5 | 28.4 | 0.0 |

vote was drawn off by Andrews' independent candidacy. Nevertheless, the fact that Eisenhower's vote did not fall back to pre-1952 levels was a hopeful sign for Republicans. It indicated that change was there to stay. As Strong mentions:

Residents of suburban Birmingham voted strongly for Eisenhower, just as did residents of suburban Chicago. Since similarly situated people outside the South are most pronounced in their Republican loyalties, it must be concluded that in the elections of 1952 and 1956 prosperous Southern urbanites acted like Yankees. . . . Moreover, after the 1956 election, even a cautious observer might have predicted this vastly expanded Presidential Republicanism was here to stay. . . . Presidential Republicanism is growing most rapidly where population is growing most rapidly.³⁷

The Democratic Party had hoped that the "defections" of the

1950s were just personal tributes to General Eisenhower, a popular military "hero," but Nixon's narrow loss of South Carolina and his ability to actually increase the Republican tally in Mississippi, ". . . made it clear that Southern Republicanism was embedded in something more substantial than charisma, a father image, and military generalship."³⁸ Even regaining Louisiana did little to settle Democratic fears.

Just as 1952 was the year Presidential Republicanism began to move in the Outer South, so 1964 was the year of the Republican presidential breakthroughs in the Deep South. Goldwater's southern strength showed itself early when he captured 271 of the 278 votes of the delegations of the old Confederacy at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco.³⁹ Senator Goldwater was the first presidential candidate of the Republican Party to base victory in the South as the key factor for overall victory. First, Goldwater's conservatism was expected to be translated into Republican presidential votes; and second, this victory was expected to sweep many other Republicans into office.⁴⁰ The results in the nation as a whole were bitterly disappointing to Goldwater's followers, but in the Deep South they were quite satisfactory. As with Eisenhower's first race, breakthroughs were made at the congressional level. There were seven new congressmen elected by the Republicans from the states of the Deep South--the first to represent their party from these states since Reconstruction days. In addition, the Republicans picked up their first, and, as yet, only U.S. Senator from that region when the old Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond switched parties.

In the cities, however, 1964 proved a complete reversal of the previous trend in the South. The GOP had hit rock bottom in 1936 in the southern cities, increased moderately through 1948, skyrocketed in 1952, went up slightly in 1956, and dipped slightly in 1960. When Goldwater lost the cities of the South in 1964, he was the first Republican to do so since 1948.⁴¹ What was true of a part of the South, was not true of all of it. While incumbent President Johnson was sweeping the rest of the country, Goldwater cracked the Deep South in a big way by making major inroads in the South's countryside, and carrying five states. "These states were of a region that for almost a century had provided the Democratic party with its most reliable bloc of electoral votes. . . ." ⁴²

Up through 1944 the Democratic Party had been agreeable to southerners on the question of race. When, in 1948, Truman began to advocate more for blacks, the Dixiecrats swept the Deep South and especially its black belts. After their collapse, the black belts were in search of a home. Kennedy and Johnson's civil rights policies pushed them into the waiting arms of the GOP.⁴³

Under the Goldwater impetus the Republicans, as Tindall puts it, ". . . for the first time in history played the role of the 'traditional' party of the South." What had long been the bedrock of the Democratic Party in the South gave the Republicans 59.7 percent of its vote--representing a gain of over thirty percentage points over Nixon in the black belt. True, Eisenhower had gained as much over Dewey, but then Dewey had had only around 5 percent of the vote in the black belts, so that Eisenhower had gotten only to

37 percent.⁴⁴ Thus, Cosman summarizes the effects of the 1964 campaign as follows:

One very dynamic element that the Goldwater candidacy left behind in the Deep South was a number of state and local Republican parties demonstrably stronger than at any time in the past, whether measured by votes, contests entered and won, organization, money, motivation, or even conversion of Democratic office holders to Republicanism. . . .⁴⁵

In 1963 Heard could write with honesty that he did not think the South would become as solidly Republican as it once was Democratic. The only issue capable of causing the switch, he felt, was "the Negro problem." For this to have an effect would require ". . . that the alternatives offered by the parties be clear cut in the public eye." Both sides must be "left with no doubt" as to where the parties stand--who is their friend and who is their foe.⁴⁶ In 1963 these conditions were not present. In 1964 one of these conditions was met with the Goldwater takeover of the Republican Party; southerners of both races knew where he stood. It was not to be until 1972, with the McGovern seizure of the Democratic Party, that the circle was to be completed. Southerners knew where he stood, too.

Between 1964 and 1972 were the events of 1968. In that year George Wallace, the Governor of Alabama, ran for president for his American Independent Party. He easily carried the total vote in the region, winning 49.4 percent, just short of an absolute majority, and carried five of the six states in the region, missing only South Carolina. He should also probably be credited with making sure that many of those voters who bolted the Democratic Party to support Goldwater in 1964 stayed away long enough to become somewhat

accustomed to voting for non-Democrats for president. That Humphrey did as well as he did is probably due to the 1965 Voting Rights Act and the considerable increase in the registered black voters it produced. Those black voters will probably guarantee a large enough base that the Democratic Party will never be as much of a minority party in the South as the Republicans once were.

What caused the trend toward the Republicans in the presidential elections of the Deep South? That question is, of course, hard to answer. However, if the same factors are responsible as in the Outer South, i.e., increases in urban population and in wealth, the following Tables 40 and 41 may prove instructive.

Table 42 depicts the increase in black registration and demonstrates that the tremendous increase in this area would probably guarantee a substantial base of support for the Democrats in the future--at least enough to prevent them from ever becoming as much of a minority party as the Republicans had been.

Turning now to Phillips' breakdown of the patterns of the voting in the various areas: black belt, traditional GOP, Deep South Upcountry, and French Catholic Louisiana, changing party fortunes can be seen more clearly. One should pay particularly close attention to the movement in the black belts. Notice how the Democratic share, after peaking in 1932, begins a slow slide downward until, in most cases, it hits rock bottom in 1964. Then, as the effects of the 1965 Voting Rights Act take hold, the Democratic percentages move somewhat up again, in most cases. (See Tables 43, 44, and 45.)

If it can be said truthfully that the Deep South is travelling

TABLE 40
PER CAPITA INCOME IN THE DEEP SOUTH

| State | Percentage of the national average | | |
|----------------|---------------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | 1948 (%) | 1968 (%) | Change (%) |
| Alabama | 60.5 | 68.3 | 7.8 |
| Arkansas | 61.1 | 68.2 | 7.1 |
| Georgia | 67.7 | 81.2 | 13.5 |
| Louisiana | 72.2 | 76.9 | 4.7 |
| Mississippi | 55.2 | 60.8 | 5.6 |
| South Carolina | 62.3 | 69.6 | 7.3 |

SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 14-15.

TABLE 41
GROWTH OF URBANISM IN THE DEEP SOUTH

| State | Percentage urban | | | |
|----------------|------------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|
| | 1950 (%) | 1960 (%) | 1970 (%) | Change (%) |
| Alabama | 33 | 48 | 51 | 18 |
| Arkansas | 10 | 31 | 35 | 25 |
| Georgia | 45 | 48 | 52 | 7 |
| Louisiana | 38 | 54 | 55 | 17 |
| Mississippi | 7 | 10 | 18 | 11 |
| South Carolina | 30 | 42 | 45 | 15 |

SOURCE: Havard, William C. The Changing Politics of the South. Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972. Pp. 20-21.

TABLE 42
VOTER REGISTRATION IN THE DEEP SOUTH

| State | Percentage Black | | | Percent- age White |
|----------------|---------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------------|
| | 1960 (%) | 1964 (%) | 1970 (%) | 1970 (%) |
| Arkansas | 37.3 | 49.3 | 71.6 | 80.3 |
| Louisiana | 30.9 | 32.0 | 61.8 | 88.2 |
| Georgia | 29.3 | 44.0 | 63.6 | 89.6 |
| South Carolina | 15.6 | 38.7 | 57.3 | 73.3 |
| Alabama | 13.7 | 23.0 | 64.0 | 96.1 |
| Mississippi | 5.2 | 6.7 | 67.5 | 86.9 |

TABLE 43
DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
VOTE IN THE BLACK BELT

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Dallas, Alabama | 73 | 97 | 0 | 45 | 40 | 44 | 11 | 32 | 37 |
| Wilcox, Alabama | 79 | 98 | 0 | 58 | 53 | 67 | 8 | 36 | 14 |
| Lowndes, Alabama | 82 | 98 | 0 | 56 | 66 | 67 | 17 | 35 | 23 |
| Lee, Georgia | 86 | 98 | 46 | 66 | 86 | 68 | 19 | 39 | 30 |
| Burke, Georgia | 73 | 95 | 24 | 55 | 63 | 53 | 29 | 34 | 27 |
| Miller, Georgia | 88 | 100 | 79 | 88 | 78 | 95 | 14 | 7 | 8 |
| Terrell, Georgia | 93 | 98 | 64 | 79 | 86 | 83 | 22 | 35 | 26 |
| Claiborne, Louisiana | 86 | 98 | 16 | 35 | 21 | 13 | 11 | 26 | 31 |
| Tensas, Louisiana | 79 | 96 | 23 | 50 | 32 | 20 | 10 | 32 | 48 |
| Sunflower, Mississippi | 97 | 98 | 5 | 51 | 51 | 30 | 6 | 32 | 25 |
| Holmes, Mississippi | 94 | 97 | 3 | 52 | 41 | 25 | 3 | 52 | 52 |
| Leflore, Mississippi | 95 | 98 | 5 | 43 | 49 | 26 | 6 | 38 | 23 |
| Jefferson, Mississippi | 93 | 97 | 1 | 47 | 70 | 63 | 5 | 63 | 44 |
| Edgefield, South | | | | | | | | | |
| Carolina | 100 | 100 | 2 | 31 | 26 | 37 | 25 | 13 | 32 |
| Clarendon, South | | | | | | | | | |
| Carolina | 99 | 98 | 7 | 32 | 25 | 44 | 22 | 45 | 45 |
| Dorchester, South | | | | | | | | | |
| Carolina | 97 | 98 | 5 | 27 | 27 | 40 | 24 | 36 | 31 |

TABLE 43--Continued

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Crittenden, Arkansas | 84 | 98 | 25 | 61 | 44 | 52 | 50 | 32 | 28 |
| Saint Francis, Arkansas | 69 | 93 | 47 | 58 | 50 | 54 | 52 | 36 | 28 |

TABLE 44

DEMOCRATIC SHARE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
IN FRENCH-CATHOLIC LOUISIANA

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Assumption | 75 | 80 | 37 | 58 | 41 | 72 | 59 | 34 | 39 |
| LaFourche | 89 | 88 | 34 | 59 | 36 | 76 | 66 | 26 | 31 |
| Saint Charles | 91 | 94 | 43 | 71 | 40 | 71 | 65 | 34 | 31 |
| Saint James | 92 | 88 | 52 | 61 | 49 | 82 | 74 | 45 | 46 |
| Saint John the Baptist | 89 | 82 | 53 | 76 | 47 | 80 | 70 | 44 | 44 |

TABLE 45
DEMOCRATIC SHARE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE
IN THE DEEP SOUTH UP-COUNTRY
AND TRADITIONAL REPUBLICAN

| | 1928 | 1932 | 1948 | 1952 | 1956 | 1960 | 1964 | 1968 | 1972 |
|-----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) | (%) |
| Deep South Up-Country | | | | | | | | | |
| Itawamba, Mississippi | 72 | 98 | 37 | 80 | 87 | 63 | 35 | 7 | 10 |
| Limestone, Alabama | 82 | 96 | 0 | 87 | 87 | 81 | 56 | 9 | 24 |
| Anderson, South Carolina | 98 | 99 | 64 | 78 | 77 | 78 | 58 | 22 | 40 |
| Traditional Republican | | | | | | | | | |
| Winston, Alabama | 24 | 50 | 36 | 41 | 34 | 33 | 29 | 5 | 11 |
| Fewton, Arkansas | 29 | 64 | 50 | 39 | 36 | 32 | 51 | 30 | 30 |
| Fannin, Georgia | 32 | 41 | 43 | 40 | 36 | 34 | 45 | 21 | 19 |

along the same path as the Outer South, but about twelve years behind it in time, then the retarded development of the Republican Party in the Deep South at the local level begins to be understandable and somewhat acceptable. There is good reason to make this statement. In 1952 Eisenhower broke through in the Outer South capturing every state in that region except North Carolina and sweeping in several new Republican Congressmen. In 1964, twelve years later, Barry Goldwater took all the states of the Deep South except for Arkansas, and carried in with him the first Republican Congressmen since Reconstruction. In neither case were major breakthroughs achieved on the local level. It was not until 1966 that the Republican Party began to make noticeable gains in the Outer South at all levels. The Republican Party in the Deep South is now roughly in the same position as it was in the Outer South in the early 1960s. Following the same time frame, the same kinds of gains that were made in the Outer South in 1966 should not be expected until approximately 1978 in the Deep South.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III

¹William C. Havard, The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 607-08.

²George B. Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 39.

³Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 607-11.

⁴Ibid., pp. 315-16.

⁵Ibid., p. 336.

⁶Ibid., pp. 336-39.

⁷Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Negro Voter Registration in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 120.

⁸Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 340-46.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 351.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 351-52.

¹²Ibid., pp. 437-40.

¹³Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 189.

¹⁴Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 437-40.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 455-58.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 495.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 506-10.

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 495-96.

²⁰Ibid., p. 501.

²¹Robert J. Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," Change in the Contermporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 163.

²²Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 526.

²³Ibid., pp. 545-48.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 550-66.

²⁵Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 168.

²⁶Ibid., p. 165.

²⁷Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 550-66.

²⁸Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 165.

²⁹Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 550-66.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 580-85.

³¹Ibid., p. 538.

³²Ibid., pp. 271-72.

³³Ibid., p. 273.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 273-78.

³⁵Ibid., p. 291.

³⁶Numen V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1969), pp. 50-51.

³⁷Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," pp. 184-85.

³⁸Steamer, "Southern Disaffection with the National Democratic Party," p. 150.

³⁹Bernard Cosman, Five States for Goldwater (University, Alabama: University of Georgia Press, 1966), pp. 39-40.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 40-41.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 56.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 37-38.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 61-66.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 55.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 128.

⁴⁶Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, pp. 14-15.

CHAPTER IV

SUMMARY

At the beginning of the time period under discussion in this thesis, and as can be seen by examining Tables 46, 47, and 48, the Democratic Party was in a near monopoly position in southern politics. In 1948 President Truman had carried 61.6 percent of the entire southern vote in a three-way race against both a Republican and a Dixiecrat opponent. As of 1950 the Republicans had not a single governor or U.S. Senator, and only 1.9 percent of the whole region's congressional delegation, 1.7 percent of its state senators, and 3 percent of its members of the lower houses of the various state legislatures.

Then came Eisenhower in 1952, and the situation changed somewhat. As observed, the first, and as yet the most impressive change, came in the numbers of presidential Republicans. Looking at the figures, approximately 30 percent of the electorate shifted to Eisenhower. This shift was composed of virtually all of the Dixiecrat voters, and about one-sixth of Truman's. Eisenhower became the first Republican since 1928 to carry any southern state, as he captured four: Virginia, Tennessee, Florida, and Texas. No new state executives were elected by the Republicans, or U.S. Senators, but modest gains were made elsewhere. Thus, the Republican

TABLE 46
PARTISAN BREAKDOWN 1947 TO 1973
FOR WHOLE SOUTH

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1947 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 10R--440D | 43R--1,295D | 55 |
| 1948 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 10R--440D | 43R--1,295D | 55 |
| 1949 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 9R--441D | 39R--1,299D | 50 |
| 1950 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 8R--442D | 40R--1,299D | 50 |
| 1951 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 8R--442D | 40R--1,299D | 50 |
| 1952 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 2R--103D | 8R--442D | 43R--1,296D | 53 |
| 1953 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 6R--100D | 12R--438D | 48R--1,290D | 66 |
| 1954 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 6R--100D | 12R--438D | 48R--1,290D | 66 |
| 1955 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 10R--440D | 43R--1,295D | 60 |
| 1956 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 11R--439D | 46R--1,293D | 64 |
| 1957 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 14R--436D | 51R--1,289D | 72 |
| 1958 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 14R--436D | 51R--1,289D | 72 |
| 1959 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 11R--439D | 33R--1,305D | 51 |
| 1960 | OR--11D | OR--22D | 7R--99D | 10R--440D | 31R--1,307D | 48 |
| 1961 | OR--11D | OR--21D | 7R--99D | 12R--438D | 48R--1,290D | 67 |
| 1962 | OR--11D | 1R--21D | 7R--99D | 12R--445D | 49R--1,293D | 69 |
| 1963 | OR--11D | 1R--21D | 11R--94D | 13R--444D | 64R--1,278D | 89 |
| 1964 | OR--11D | 1R--21D | 11R--94D | 16R--441D | 73R--1,282D | 101 |
| 1965 | OR--11D | 2R--20D | 16R--89D | 17R--441D | 76R--1,269D | 111 |

TABLE 46--Continued

| Year | Gov- er- nor | Senate | House | State Senate | State House | Total Repub- licans |
|------|--------------------|---------|----------|-----------------|----------------|---------------------------|
| 1966 | 0R--11D | 2R--20D | 17R--88D | 23R--433D | 88R--1,257D | 130 |
| 1967 | 2R--9D | 3R--19D | 23R--83D | 48R--412D | 137R--1,206D | 213 |
| 1968 | 2R--9D | 3R--19D | 23R--83D | 57R--403D | 165R--1,178D | 250 |
| 1969 | 2R--9D | 4R--18D | 25R--81D | 59R--401D | 165R--1,178D | 255 |
| 1970 | 3R--8D | 4R--17D | 26R--80D | 60R--400D | 168R--1,175D | 261 |
| 1971 | 2R--9D | 5R--16D | 27R--79D | 57R--403D | 178R--1,165D | 269 |
| 1972 | 2R--9D | 5R--16D | 27R--79D | 57R--403D | 178R--1,165D | 269 |
| 1973 | 3R--8D | 7R--14D | 33R--73D | 56R--404D | 180R--1,162D | 279 |

TABLE 47
SOUTHERN PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

| Year | Repub- licans | Demo- crats | Inde- pen- dents | Repub- licans (%) | Demo- crats (%) | Inde- pen- dents (%) |
|------|------------------|----------------|------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1948 | 1,161,742 | 3,716,230 | 1,154,525 | 19.2 | 61.6 | 19.1 |
| 1952 | 4,113,543 | 4,428,163 | . . . | 48.1 | 51.8 | 0.0 |
| 1956 | 4,218,468 | 3,684,094 | 280,701 | 51.5 | 45.0 | 3.4 |
| 1960 | 4,723,753 | 5,185,110 | 348,614 | 46.0 | 50.5 | 3.4 |
| 1964 | 5,983,400 | 6,236,004 | 8,025 | 48.9 | 51.0 | 0.0 |
| 1968 | 5,120,960 | 4,574,996 | 5,073,509 | 34.6 | 30.9 | 34.3 |
| 1972 | 10,307,290 | 4,428,260 | . . . | 69.9 | 30.0 | 0.0 |

TABLE 48
SOUTHERN BLACK POPULATION

| State | 1940 (%) | 1950 (%) | 1960 (%) | Net loss (%) |
|----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------------|
| Florida | 27.2 | 21.8 | 17.9 | -9.3 |
| South Carolina | 42.9 | 38.9 | 34.9 | -8.0 |
| Mississippi | 49.3 | 45.4 | 42.3 | -7.0 |
| Georgia | 34.7 | 30.9 | 28.6 | -6.1 |
| Alabama | 34.7 | 32.1 | 30.1 | -4.6 |
| Louisiana | 36.0 | 33.0 | 32.1 | -3.9 |
| Virginia | 24.7 | 22.2 | 20.8 | -3.9 |
| Arkansas | 24.8 | 22.4 | 21.9 | -2.9 |
| North Carolina | 28.1 | 26.6 | 25.4 | -2.7 |
| Texas | 14.5 | 12.8 | 12.6 | -1.9 |
| Tennessee | 17.5 | 16.1 | 16.5 | -1.0 |

SOURCE: Spengler, Joseph J. "Demographic and Economic Change in the South, 1940-1960," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966. P. 27.

congressional delegation increased to 5.7 percent of the regional total, the state senatorial delegation to 2.7 percent, and the state house delegation to 3.6 percent.

In 1956 Eisenhower was reelected, this time carrying an absolute majority of the southern presidential vote, and carrying Louisiana in addition to the four states he had carried four years earlier. However, little else was accomplished throughout the decade, and indeed until the elections of 1962. Still no governors' chairs, or senate seats had changed hands. The high point for Republican control of the other offices followed the 1956 election, but these high points were none too high, only consisting of 6.6 percent of the southern members of Congress, 3.1 percent of their state senators, and 3.8 percent of the members of the lower houses of the southern legislatures. In 1960 the Republicans again fell below the 50 percent mark in southern presidential votes, and retreated to their base of the Outer South, this time losing Texas, probably due to the presence of Texas Senator Lyndon Johnson on the Democratic ticket.

The face of the South had changed a great deal by 1960. From 1945 to 1960 farm population in the South had declined from 35 percent of the population to about 20 percent.¹ In 1960 for the first time in American history, more blacks lived in the North than in the South, and more and more of those that were left were becoming concentrated in the cities.² Table 48 shows the decline of Negro population in the South from 1940 to 1960.

The 1960 election emphasized the importance of winning every state possible. If Nixon had carried the whole South he could have

been President. Eisenhower could have won without the South; Nixon did not. Thus, the need for active, large grass-roots organization in every state became visible. Further, to build such an organization for a fight only once in four years avails little. The more often it is utilized the better it gets. It is for that reason that growth of most of the state parties, where they were not already functioning, during the 1960s.³ The result was a bouncing back from the depths of 1958-1959, which had seen the number of Republican-elected officials in the region, in the categories under study, cut by one-third. Thus, by 1964, though there were still no Republican governors, the first U.S. Senator had been elected, the Republican congressional delegation had jumped to 10.5 percent of the region's total, the Republican state senate delegation had inched up to 3.5 percent of a larger regional total, and the Republican members of the state houses had climbed to 5.4 percent.

In 1964 the South turned upside down. The Outer South, heretofore the most Republican of the two subregions, went Democrat, as did almost all the rest of the country. However, the Deep South went Republican for the first time since the end of Reconstruction. Overall, Goldwater pulled 48.9 percent of the region's vote, more than the 48.1 percent Eisenhower had pulled in 1952. Republicans gained another Senator when Strom Thurmond of South Carolina switched.

During the 1950s and early 1960s southern Democratic congressmen had been in a serious dilemma. As the people in Congress with the most seniority, they had the most to lose by switching parties. Moreover, they needed the election of northern Democrats,

most of whom were liberals, to Congress to be sure their party held sufficient strength to assure them chairmanships. But these northern liberals were out to defeat their policy goals. To change their party would have meant, during the 1965-1966 period, handing over the important chairmanships to northern liberals. This factor greatly hampered the willingness of southern Democratic congressmen to jump parties.

Nevertheless, if the Democratic leaders in the South were in no position to switch, there were many rank-and-file members who had already begun to shift party allegiance, first at the presidential level, more slowly at the congressional level, and only at a snail's pace on the local level in most southern states. Following the 1966 elections the Republicans had elected their first southern governors since Reconstruction, controlling 18.2 percent of the southern governorships, 13.6 percent of the U.S. Senate seats from the South, 21.7 percent of the House seats, 10.4 percent of the state senators, and 10.2 percent of the state house seats.

In the 1968 election for president, the South provided an ominous omen for the national Democratic Party. Hubert Humphrey, the presidential candidate of that party, finished in third place in the region-wide voting, carrying only 31 percent of the southern vote, and only 237 of the region's 1,105 counties, and of those he carried, 154 were in Texas, the only state he carried. Both Richard Nixon, who carried 35 percent of the vote, 297 counties, and five states, and George Wallace, who carried 571 counties, 34 percent of the vote, and five states, ran ahead of the Democratic candidate.⁴

In their book The Real Majority, Scammon and Wattenberg offer the following thoughts on the results and meaning of the 1968 presidential election in the South:

But the handwriting was already on the wall in the election of 1964, although it was obscured in part by the strange nature of the Goldwater candidacy and the Democratic landslide. . . . What happened in 1968 confirmed, intensified, and probably ended the bulk of the Southern shift. The Democrats received only 30.9% of the Southern vote--less than either Republicans (34.6%) or American Independents (34.3%).

So, in the course of twenty-four years--from Roosevelt to Humphrey--the Democratic vote in the South has plummeted from 72% to 31%, a massive party movement in a land where people supposedly "vote the party of their fathers" or "vote by habit." The era of the Brass Collar Democrat is over.

Of all the states of the Old Confederacy, only Texas and its 25 electoral votes were to be found in the Democratic column. And Texas only gave Humphrey a 41% to 40% margin over Nixon with Wallace getting 19%. Had Wallace not been in the race, it is likely Texas, too, would have gone Republican. . . .

The defection of the South is clearly a staggering blow to the Democratic party of the future. For the "political South," defined as the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, is a potent bloc of political real estate. In 1968 it involved 128 electoral votes and 20% of the popular vote. When we look backward it is significant to note that had not at least some of the Southern states gone for John F. Kennedy and Harry Truman, they would not have gained enough electoral votes to be elected. . . . In a close election even a slight shift can change the result, and the South is more than "slight." . . .

When the Democratic vote goes from 72% in 1944 to 31% in 1968, something has happened, and it has been something tidal. In the case of the South the basic issue has been racial, although the other pressures of the Social Issue have also been present. John Kennedy could still take half of the southern vote in 1960, when it was Dwight Eisenhower who had sent the troops to Little Rock. But when the sixties came, when it was John Kennedy who sent the troops to Oxford, Mississippi; when in 1968 Lyndon Johnson, after passing the Civil Rights and Voting Rights bills, could call a group of black lawyers, in honesty, "soul brothers," the marriage between the Democrats and the South was sundered--and sundered as far ahead as the psephological eye can see.

The Democrats in the South were hurt by being perceived (correctly) as a pro-black national party, but they were also hurt by the other non-racial aspects of the Social Issue that had become identified with liberal Democrats: soft on crime, "kidlash," moral, and disruption. . . . In the South today, the Democratic Party--in terms of national elections--is most

often perceived as the party of blacks, plus a comparative handful of white Southern liberals. In no Southern state are there enough Presidential Democrats to put together a statewide majority.⁵

This, then, was the view of the South, as two leading Democratic strategists saw it following the 1968 election.

As Havard observed, "V. O. Key indicated that two major crises had occurred in Southern politics: one was the Civil War and its aftermath, the other the populist movement of the 1890's. . . ." To the first two, a "third major crisis in Southern politics" must be added: the Civil Rights revolution of the 1950s and 1960s.⁶

This new third crisis led to the adoption of a new campaign strategy by the Republican Party, first accepted in 1964, and brought to fruition in 1968. Tindall, in his The Disruption of the Solid South, describes it thus:

Rutherford B. Hayes had a Southern policy, Richard Nixon has . . . a Southern Strategy. The Southern Strategy, like the Southern Policy, dictated a policy of benign neglect toward the aspirations of black Americans. It betokened, therefore, a cycle of reaction and repression. It foretokened, moreover, a new Solid South, this time Republican instead of Democratic.⁷

In his The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, Lubell has analyzed the goals and methods of the southern strategy of Richard Nixon, as it was being played out during the opening period of the Nixon years:

The central aim [of Nixon's strategy] has remained to divide the Democratic party, this time with finality, by developing racial policies acceptable to at least the majority of white Southerners. While doing this, Nixon has been careful to keep open the possibility of future gains among Negroes.⁸

Nixon thus hoped to seize the middle ground, leaving the Democrats two ways to go. The one way, admittedly highly unlikely, would be

to turn to racial demagoguery in hopes of winning back the white votes in the South. No one, with the possible exception of Alabama's George Wallace, of prominent Democratic presidential contenders would even consider, let alone put into practice, this possibility. It would force black voters, the key to any Democratic hopes in the northern big city states, into the arms of the Republicans. The other course of action is to continue along the path already taken. This path is what has so dearly cost the Democrats in the South already. The 1972 election indicates that it may have had an adverse effect on the Democratic hopes for the northern blue collar votes as well. This, in short, was Nixon's goal.

To carry out this strategy, Nixon nominated Haynesworth and Carswell, two southerners, to the Supreme Court, thus dramatizing "one crucial fact"--that he was the one man who could alter the constitution of the Court to make its views closer to those of the South.⁹ As Lubell argues:

This prospect of a changed Court is Nixon's strongest asset in the South. The one battle most white Southerners feel they [have been] fighting is with the Court, and Nixon has effectively identified himself with that cause.¹⁰

Thus, he predicted in 1970:

In 1972, I believe, most Southerners will vote for the man who can change the Court, rather than for any third party candidate, even if he puts on a truly terrific demagogic show. . . .¹¹

In a related battle, then Attorney General Mitchell and (former) Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) Secretary Robert Finch took conflicting stands on school integration, in the summer of 1969. In August Finch asked for a delay of desegregation of thirty-three

Mississippi school districts.¹² Presumably, if enough Nixon Administration spokesmen came up with enough differing stands on the "civil rights" issue, no one would be able to figure out just what the Administration stand was, and everyone would think what he chose to believe.

The President, too, surrounded the issue. Lubell states:

In public utterances he stressed consistently the importance of the "neighborhood school," with a "minimum" of school busing. In private talks with intimates he has also been [reportedly] inclined to favor "freedom of choice," which, in theory, permits white and black students to pick the school they want to attend.¹³

Northern liberals have seemed very happy to oblige Nixon's southern campaign. On October 29, 1969, the Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Black, himself a southerner, but nonetheless quite liberal, ordered desegregation of the South's schools "at once," thus driving home the need for a reconstituted court in southern eyes. Lubell continues:

Much of the pro-Nixon feeling in the South has to be credited to the attacks of northern liberals and Negro leaders on Nixon's policies, and by the Senate's rejections of the nominations of Judges Clement Haynesworth and G. Harold Carswell to the Supreme Court. . . .¹⁵

At least through the 1968 election, Lubell maintains:

The main thrust of the Republican upsurge in the South [had] been borne by the expanding, business-minded middle class in the cities, the well-educated and generally respected management types. . . . Wallace supporters were of the lower-income . . . [Bible Belt populations].¹⁶

But where would the Wallace voter go was the crucial question to be answered by the 1972 election. The "anti-tax and anti-government" thinking of the Wallace followers would seem to be at odds with the

policy directions of the black community. With new black voters registering Democratic, the home of the Wallace supporters would seem to be found in the Republican camp. As Lubell said:

The pro-Wallace injection would stimulate the acquisitive hormones in Republicanism, even perhaps to rejuvenating McKinleyism, and weakening the restraining sense of social responsibility. . . .¹⁷

And Havard adds:

Added to the unrelenting emphasis on the capacity of free enterprise and Social Darwinism to provide a naturalistic solution to almost all the problems of a contemporary centralized society in an attitude which seems almost to deny the need for any regulative public institutions or even any concern for the general, as opposed to the private, welfare. . . .¹⁸

"The militancy in the South," say Matthews and Prothro, "is most apparent among the region's young people--of both races" the young blacks adamantly for integration balanced by the young whites' intransigence--an intransigence outweighing even that of their parents. Thus, they write, in their book *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*:

If the young [white] adults of the South represent the hope of the future, they may be the hope of the strict segregationists rather than anyone else . . . [for] the youngest Southern whites include more segregationists at every level of education, . . . [than the older generation].

In a poll of white southern school-age children nearly 60 percent were unconcerned about the death of Martin Luther King. Some were even reported to be happy about it.¹⁹

At the outset of the 1940s only about 5 percent of all eligible southern blacks were registered to vote. In 1968 62 percent were registered, and 66 percent in 1972. Since 1960 white registration has increased 5 to 10 percent, hitting the 80 percent mark in

1968. In 1968 52 percent of the southern blacks actually voted; 72 percent of the southern whites did the same. Of the new black registrants, 90 percent have registered as Democrats.²⁰

Many northern Democratic liberals have seen this rapid increase as a sign that the South may shortly return to the Democratic roost. Dutton, however, warns against this:

First, Negroes make up a declining proportion of the Southern populace--one-third at the turn of the century, just under twenty percent now. Second, in more specific political terms, in the great majority of contests, black voters are not decisive at all . . . when strong Negro support for a particular candidate becomes apparent, more white voters are likely to be driven off than black voters gained. . . .²¹

Dutton's analysis of this is a bleak one for Democratic partisans:

[T]he Republican party is developing fairly rapidly in the South. Its leaders are generally rather young--the average age of the Republican state chairmen in the region in 1968 . . . was just under 40. The Republican party is building a local base first of all in the region's growing metropolitan areas, using a number of well targeted Congressional districts. It increased its hold every two years throughout the sixties. . . . The Republicans now hold one-fourth of all Southern and Border districts and could readily capture 10-20 more during the . . . seventies. . . .

[T]he Republican party is building a solid base in more and more communities, developing a lengthening roster of regional figures . . . [including both conservative Strom Thurmond, and "liberal" A. Linwood Holton]. More important, the economics of the area are raising up an ambitious new middle-class which is Republican in outlook. The region's per capita income in 1950 was only two-thirds of the national average; by 1960 it had climbed to three-fourths, and by 1970 to 80 percent. . . . Even among lower-middle-income whites, improving economic levels are beginning to provide take off points for GOP converts; and the longer the race issue remains agitated, as it likely will for the foreseeable future, the less compelling are the group Democratic ties. In a region that has always been acutely status-conscious and is now most desperately looking for new badges of special standing, the Republican party offers a refurbished respectability [A] whole new economic complex particularly sympathetic to Southern Republicans is emerging. . . .

The Northern Democratic Party probably must either write

off the region in Presidential elections for some years to come or quickly help to build a new foundation there. The development of a more liberal Democratic Party in the area would almost certainly accelerate the emergence of the GOP at the state and local level. . . . [T]he South can look ahead to expanding influence within the national GOP. . . .

The underlying political reality, nonetheless, is that the Republican Party is moving into a position to put together a North-South coalition such as the Democrats maintained for over a century and a half. In the Presidential politics of the early and middle 1970's the principle alternative to Republicanism for some of the South will be provided not by the Democrats, but by George Wallace's third way. . . .²²

Although the Republican Party had fallen to its lowest point, in terms of percent of the vote captured in 1968, gains continued to be made so that by 1970 the Republicans could boast 27.3 percent of the southern governorships, 19 percent of southern U.S. Senators, and 24.5 percent of the southern delegation to the national House of Representatives. For instance, at the local level, Republicans hit their high point in that year in the number of state senators with 13 percent, a figure running ahead of their 12.5 percent of the members of the state houses.

As pointed out previously, presidential Republicanism was the first to develop in the South with its first real breakthrough in 1952. Up until that time the Republicans had controlled only Tennessee's First and Second Congressional Districts; four more congressmen were pulled in on Eisenhower's coattails in 1952, but after that little more was achieved for a decade. Congressional Republicanism in the South did not really begin until 1962 as Table 49 will show. Thus, in a decade the southern Republican membership in the house had more than tripled.

But of more interest than the mere growth of southern

TABLE 49
SOUTHERN CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANISM

| Year | Percentage of seats contested (%) | Number won | Number lost | Total |
|-------------|--|---------------|----------------|-----------|
| 1950 | 27.6 | 2 | 27 | 29 |
| 1952 | 29.5 | 6 | 25 | 31 |
| 1954 | 34.3 | 7 | 29 | 36 |
| 1956 | 39.0 | 7 | 34 | 41 |
| 1958 | 20.0 | 7 | 14 | 21 |
| 1960 | 39.0 | 7 | 34 | 41 |
| 1962 | 50.5 | 11 | 42 | 53 |
| 1964 | 64.8 | 16 | 52 | 68 |
| <u>1966</u> | <u>55.2</u> | <u>23</u> | <u>35</u> | <u>58</u> |
| 1968 | 63.2 | 26 | 41 | 67 |
| 1970 | 59.4 | 27 | 36 | 63 |
| 1972 | 67.6 | 34 | 39 | 73 |

Republicanism is this growth in the context of the national picture. In 1968 Phillips, in his Emerging Republican Majority, put forward his belief that the southern states and the states of the Yankee Northeast, traditional enemies since at least the Civil War, were realigning politically. The old New England Republican states were swinging away from the party of Lincoln, and the southern States were moving into the Republican orbit according to his thesis. His hypothesis extended only to presidential elections, but Lubell demonstrates that although it may be primarily manifested there, it is by no means restricted to the race for the Presidency.

The East and the South can be seen to have been realigning for some time, and the process is not yet complete, but the direction of the movement is obvious. (See Table 50.) Party coalitions are under continuing stress. Nevertheless, this stress has been in existence for a long time. As Lubell argues ". . . The conflict that ultimately breaks apart a majority coalition is present at the very inception of the coalition." It just takes some crisis to begin the break.²³

By 1972 the steady erosion of Democratic presidential strength in the South became an avalanche. Nixon's vote in the South hit the 69.9 percent level, higher even than the total vote for Wallace and himself in 1968. As Schlesinger concedes, "The Wallace vote had obviously moved to the President en masse" ²⁴ In 1972 the Republicans picked up six southern house seats, splitting these gains evenly between the two subregions, and made strong bids at all levels. The cities were especially strong Republican

TABLE 50
PERCENT OF REPUBLICAN HOUSE
SEATS BY REGION

| Region | 1936 (%) | 1946 (%) | 1952 (%) | 1958 (%) | 1962 (%) | 1964 (%) | 1966 (%) | 1968 (%) | 1972 (%) | Net |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-----|
| East | 52 | 37 | 34 | 37 | 30 | 27 | 23 | 23 | 24 | -28 |
| South | 2 | 1 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 18 | +16 |
| Midwest | 38 | 41 | 41 | 39 | 43 | 41 | 42 | 41 | 36 | - 2 |
| Pacific | 6 | 9 | 13 | 14 | 12 | 12 | 11 | 11 | 12 | + 6 |
| Border | 2 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 5 | + 3 |
| Mountain and southwest | 0 | 4 | 4 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 6 | + 3 |

bastions with Atlanta, Houston, and Miami suburbs turning in top-heavy Republican majorities. ". . . Nor was there much change," Schlesinger concludes, "that the trend would be easily reversed."²⁵

If some movement could be seen at the lower levels, it is at the Presidential level that the movement to realignment is most apparent. Table 51 compares the ten best (by percentage) states for each party for the following selected years since the formation of the Roosevelt coalition in 1936. Observe the change between 1936 and 1972. Not one of the top ten states for either party is still listed in the top ten states of the same party in both years; two of the best Republican states of 1936, Massachusetts and South Dakota, are now found in the ten best Democratic states (although it

TABLE 51
TEN BEST STATES FOR EACH PARTY AT
PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL

| Rank | Democratic | Republican |
|------|----------------|---------------|
| 1936 | | |
| 1 | South Carolina | Vermont |
| 2 | Mississippi | Maine |
| 3 | Louisiana | New Hampshire |
| 4 | Georgia | Kansas |
| 5 | Texas | Delaware |
| 6 | Alabama | Idaho |
| 7 | Arkansas | South Dakota |
| 8 | Florida | Indiana |
| 9 | North Carolina | Massachusetts |
| 10 | Nevada | Pennsylvania |
| 1948 | | |
| 1 | Texas | Vermont |
| 2 | Oklahoma | Maine |
| 3 | Arkansas | Nebraska |
| 4 | Georgia | Kansas |
| 5 | Missouri | North Dakota |
| 6 | North Carolina | New Hampshire |

TABLE 51--Continued

| Rank | Democratic | Republican |
|------|---------------|--------------|
| 7 | Rhode Island | South Dakota |
| 8 | West Virginia | Pennsylvania |
| 9 | Kentucky | New Jersey |
| 10 | New Mexixo | Delaware |

1952

| | | |
|----|----------------|--------------|
| 1 | Georgia | Vermont |
| 2 | Alabama | North Dakota |
| 3 | Mississippi | South Dakota |
| 4 | Arkansas | Nebraska |
| 5 | North Carolina | Kansas |
| 6 | West Virginia | Maine |
| 7 | South Carolina | Idaho |
| 8 | Kentucky | Iowa |
| 9 | Tennessee | Wyoming |
| 10 | Missouri | Wisconsin |

1960

| | | |
|---|---------------|----------|
| 1 | Rhode Island | Nebraska |
| 2 | Georgia | Kansas |
| 3 | Massachusetts | Oklahoma |

TABLE 51--Continued

| Rank | Democratic | Republican |
|------|----------------|--------------|
| 4 | Connecticut | Vermont |
| 5 | West Virginia | South Dakota |
| 6 | New York | Maine |
| 7 | North Carolina | Iowa |
| 8 | Nevada | Arizona |
| 9 | South Carolina | North Dakota |
| 10 | Pennsylvania | Wyoming |

1964

| | | |
|----|----------------------|----------------|
| 1 | District of Columbia | Mississippi |
| 2 | Rhode Island | Alabama |
| 3 | Hawaii | South Carolina |
| 4 | Massachusetts | Louisiana |
| 5 | Maine | Georgia |
| 6 | New York | Arizona |
| 7 | West Virginia | Idaho |
| 8 | Connecticut | Florida |
| 9 | Michigan | Nebraska |
| 10 | Alaska | Virginia |

TABLE 51--Continued

| Rank | Democratic | Republican |
|------|----------------------|----------------|
| 1968 | | |
| 1 | District of Columbia | Nebraska |
| 2 | Rhode Island | Idaho |
| 3 | Massachusetts | Utah |
| 4 | Hawaii | North Dakota |
| 5 | Maine | Wyoming |
| 6 | Minnesota | Arizona |
| 7 | New York | Kansas |
| 8 | West Virginia | South Dakota |
| 9 | Connecticut | Iowa |
| 10 | Michigan | Vermont |
| 1972 | | |
| 1 | District of Columbia | Mississippi |
| 2 | Massachusetts | Alabama |
| 3 | Rhode Island | Oklahoma |
| 4 | Minnesota | Florida |
| 5 | South Dakota | South Carolina |
| 6 | Wisconsin | Nebraska |
| 7 | Michigan | Georgia |
| 8 | Oregon | North Carolina |

TABLE 51--Continued

| Rank | Democratic | Republican |
|------|------------|------------|
| 9 | New York | Wyoming |
| 10 | Illinois | Arkansas |

is possible that South Dakota is only a reflection of the candidacy of its own Senator George McGovern). At the same time, no less than seven of Franklin Roosevelt's ten best states of 1936 ranked in Richard Nixon's ten best thirty-six years later. Arkansas, for a century a hold out from the Republican camp, produced a larger percentage than the old faithful Vermont.

Now the Republicans have the South, at least in terms of presidential politics. But what exactly is the significance of that? In 1952 Heard asked roughly the same question: the Republicans wanted the South, but what good, and by itself, had it done the Democrats? The first part of Table 52 was his answer, and the second part represents the writer's update of it.

Heard did not believe that the South was all that important. He argued that of the previous eighteen presidential elections, only four could have been reversed had the South switched the party it was supporting. This was not a particularly high percentage he reasoned. Therefore, why should there be so much effort? The second half of Table 52 shows why. Of the six elections since Heard's study, two could have been reversed by a switch in the southern vote.

TABLE 52
EFFECT OF THE SOUTH ON PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS

| Year | Southern electoral votes | | | Vote plurality of winner | | Years in which the south could have effected the outcome |
|------|-----------------------------|-----------------|----------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|---|
| | Demo- crat | Repub- lican | Third party | Demo- crat | Repub- lican | |
| 1880 | 95 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 59 | |
| 1884 | 107 | 0 | . . . | 37 | . . . | 1884 |
| 1888 | 112 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 65 | |
| 1892 | 112 | 0 | . . . | 110 | . . . | 1892 |
| 1896 | 112 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 95 | |
| 1900 | 112 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 137 | |
| 1904 | 120 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 196 | |
| 1908 | 120 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 159 | |
| 1912 | 126 | 0 | . . . | 347 | . . . | |
| 1916 | 126 | 0 | . . . | 23 | . . . | 1916 |
| 1920 | 114 | 12 | . . . | . . . | 277 | |
| 1924 | 126 | 0 | . . . | . . . | 246 | |
| 1928 | 64 | 62 | . . . | . . . | 357 | |
| 1932 | 124 | 0 | . . . | 413 | . . . | |
| 1936 | 124 | 0 | . . . | 515 | . . . | |
| 1940 | 124 | 0 | . . . | 367 | . . . | |
| 1944 | 127 | 0 | . . . | 333 | . . . | |
| 1948 | 88 | 0 | 39 | 75 | . . . | 1948 |

TABLE 52--Continued

| Year | Southern electoral votes | | | Vote plurality of winner | | Years in which the south could have effected the outcome |
|------|--------------------------|-----------------|----------------|--------------------------|-----------------|--|
| | Demo- crat | Repub- lican | Third party | Demo- crat | Repub- lican | |
| 1952 | 71 | 57 | . . . | . . . | 353 | |
| 1956 | 61 | 67 | . . . | . . . | 384 | |
| 1960 | 95 | 33 | . . . | 84 | . . . | 1960 |
| 1964 | 82 | 46 | . . . | 434 | . . . | |
| 1968 | 25 | 58 | 45 | . . . | 111 | 1968 |
| 1972 | 0 | 130 | . . . | . . . | 504 | |

Moreover, recent elections without incumbent presidents seeking reelection have proved to be close. Of three such elections since 1950, two were in a position to be swung around by a reversal of the southern vote.

In 1952, it will be recalled, the Republican National Committee had called for a determined effort to take the South, vowing to fight on for twenty years, if necessary, to achieve the objective. In the 1950s the Outer South began to crack loose from the Democratic coalition in response to the economic and social conservatism of the Eisenhower presidential drives. The Deep South, although no longer being carried by the landslides of old, still held firm behind the Democratic candidates. As early as 1962 a change was beginning to show up even there. The Goldwater onslaught, though a monumental

failure everywhere else, swept through the Deep South carrying with it every state in the region, except Arkansas. Although Goldwater lost the Outer South by narrow margins at the presidential level, minor Republican gains were still recorded at the lower levels. Nowhere was it the disaster it was in the North. Goldwater, however, while gaining the black belts, lost the cities of the South. In 1968, for the first time, all segments of the South deserted the Democrats at once. However, because of the division of the vote between Wallace and Nixon, the anti Democratic column split in two with Nixon carrying the cities and Wallace the black belt and rural areas. By 1972 the twenty-years war was over, and the Republicans, at least at the presidential level, which is all that Phillips was concerned with, had won. All of the South, city and countryside, was pulling in one harness, this time a Republican one. For the first time since the Roosevelt years the South was solid again.

FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER IV

¹William C. Havard, The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), pp. 13-15.

²Ibid., p. 16.

³Donald S. Strong, "Durable Republicanism in the South," Change in the Contemporary South, ed. Allan P. Sindler (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), pp. 191-92.

⁴Samuel Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1970), p. 145.

⁵Richard M. Scammon and Ben J. Wattenberg, The Real Majority (New York: Coward--McCann, 1970), pp. 174-81.

⁶Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 23.

⁷George B. Tindall, The Disruption of the Solid South (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1972), p. 2.

⁸Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, p. 155.

⁹Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 155-56.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 74-75.

¹²Ibid., pp. 156-59.

¹³Ibid., p. 158.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 162.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 157.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 145.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁸Havard, The Changing Politics of the South, p. 25.

¹⁹Frederick G. Dutton, Changing Sources of Power (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), pp. 79-80.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid., p. 86.

²²Ibid., pp. 87-95 passim.

²³Lubell, The Hidden Crisis in American Politics, p. 273.

²⁴Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., History of the United States Political Parties, vol. 4 (New York: Chelsea House Publishing, Co., 1973), p. 2855.

²⁵Ibid., p. 2857.

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