An exploratory study of the effects of bankruptcy on the susceptibility of small businessmen to Right-Wing ideology

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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY ON THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF SMALL BUSINESSMEN TO RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Sociology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

By
Rayford Kytle III
1975
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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Approved, January 1975

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ABSTRACT

The literature on the etiology of assent to right-wing political ideology in America suggests that downward intra-generational mobility is a possible source of rightist support which has received little research attention. A feeling of dispossession appears to be strong among rightists. Because small businessmen in America experience a high rate of business failure they would seem to be a group experiencing much dispossession. Small businessmen have been disproportionately supportive of right-wing movements in America and elsewhere. To explore the effects of downward intra-generational mobility on assent to right-wing ideology, small businessmen who had filed for bankruptcy were compared with small businessmen still in business on a scale measuring acceptance of rightist ideology.

A correlation of .47 was obtained for the relationship between bankruptcy and acceptance of rightist ideology. Variables which correlated .30 or better with Rightist Scale scores were partialled out. The .47 held up fairly well except when three intellectual indices were, separately, held constant. The .47 is reduced to .17 when the Cultural Sophistication Index is held constant, and to .09 when the Degree Level measure is held constant. A third order partial was figured on the .47, holding these two variables and Years of Education constant, which reduced it to .01. The multiple correlation with all other variables held constant, between acceptance of rightist ideology, Years of Education, Degree Level, and the Cultural Sophistication Index is .421. The correlations between the intellectual level measures and Rightist Scale scores were not significantly reduced when Bankruptcy was held constant. All the correlations between the intellectual measures and Rightist Scale scores are significant at the .002 level.

Ruling out sampling error as an explanation for the fairly strong correlations between the intellectual measures and Rightist Scale scores leaves four other generic causal possibilities. First, cognitive skills may produce lowered Rightist Scale scores. Second, high Rightist Scale scores may produce low cognitive skills. Third, the relationship between cognitive skills and Rightist Scale scores may be a two-way relationship. Fourth, there may be some other factor causing the existence of high cognitive skills and low Rightist Scale scores. The second, and therefore the third, possibility does not seem likely. The first and the fourth seem reasonable explanations of the data. An interesting possibility for the fourth would be that the more schooling one has, the more one is exposed to and acculturated into, a subculture which has an anti-rightist ideology.
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF BANKRUPTCY ON THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF SMALL BUSINESSMEN TO RIGHT-WING IDEOLOGY
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The focus of this paper is the etiology of assent to right-wing ideology in America. Over the past ten years many studies have been done which suggest "marginality" as a possible cause of support for the right. There are two main approaches to the effects of "marginality" on political attitudes, "status inconsistency" studies, and "vertical mobility" studies. This chapter will provide some background on where these two approaches have led and how the literature suggests that intragenerational downward mobility among small businessmen seems a worthwhile research topic in attempting to find more about what determines assent to rightist ideology in the United States.

STATUS INCONSISTENCY STUDIES

Lenski's work is the foundation of status inconsistency studies. He defines "status inconsistency" as a situation that exists for an individual when he has different levels of status on several different hierarchies, such as education, income, race, and ethnicity.
Such a situation produces stress because, presumably, individuals like to think of themselves in terms of their higher statuses and to think of others with whom they interact in terms of those persons' lesser statuses. Lenski concluded that status inconsistency commonly produces antipathy towards the social order, which is perceived by the individual as responsible for his stress. One manifestation is his support of the political party advocating change. Lenski found that inconsistency between ascribed and achieved statuses is the kind of inconsistency most likely to manifest itself politically. Although in America, there has been little opportunity to vote for extreme change to the right, Lenski feels that status inconsistency could produce desire for change in either direction.

Follow up studies on Lenski's work have tried to be more specific as to what kinds of status inconsistency produce what kinds of effects. Kelly and Chambliss found a very weak relationship between status inconsistency and conservatism. They used a combination of achieved statuses rather than achieved and ascribed ones to measure status inconsistency. It is interesting to note that each of the three class criteria which Kelly and Chambliss used -

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occupation, education, and income—correlated more highly with political attitudes than did status inconsistency.

Gary Rush examined studies by Lenski and Elton Jackson which had found that high education or occupation combined with low racial-ethnic status predisposed individuals with status inconsistency towards a liberal political stance. Rush found low education more related to acceptance of right-wing attitudes than low occupational or income status. Rush decided that possibly "under given conditions, a combination of high income and low education may predispose right-wing attitudes, whereas a combination of low income and high education may predispose left-wing attitudes." Rush, then, feels that education may be the determining factor regarding which way status frustrated individuals will go on the political spectrum.

Olsen and Tully give a useful summarization of the status inconsistency research up to 1972. They point out that since Lenski acknowledged in his 1967 study that the political effects of status inconsistency are apparently

manifest only when the inconsistency exists between achieved and ascribed statuses, there has been a fair amount of follow-up research supporting this view. The argument has developed that only the specific combination of high achieved status and low ascribed status will compel an individual to seek broad-scale social change through political action. The reasoning is that in any other status combination an individual could alter his situation through mobility. Treiman supported this argument by pointing out that the three statistically significant relationships in Lenski's original 1954 data all combined high socioeconomic with low ethnic status.

There are three empirical tests of this hypothesis. First, Broom and Jones found weak supporting data for the status inconsistency concept in Australia. Their data showed high-SES Catholics were disproportionately supporting the liberal party, though low-SES Protestants were not. (Catholics are viewed as of lower social status than Protestants.) Their data did not support the usefulness of the status inconsistency concept in any other way. Broom and Jones even suggest that this one supporting finding may be due to the peculiar situation of Catholics in Australia rather than due to some general influence of

status inconsistency.

Second, Laumann and Segal analyzed survey data on a white native-born Detroit sample. They classified subjects according to the specific country from which their ancestors had come. They found "no overall pattern of statistical interaction between ethnoreligious group membership and education with regard to either political attitudes or social participation." Olsen and Tully criticize this study for its method of classification. Research has been done by Segal and others to support the contention that status inconsistency leads to political activity only when the individual's ascribed status is clearly defined, visible, pertinent to the specific political situation being examined, and relatively disadvantaged. Some of the ethnoreligious categories used by Laumann and Segal, such as German Methodists, do not seem to Olsen and Tully to meet these criteria.

Third, Olsen and Tully's own research in Indianapolis found weak support for the hypothesis that low ascribed and high achieved status inconsistency is associated with political liberalism, but only for the two political

variables of liberal economic attitudes and Democratic voting. Although these two relationships are statistically significant, status inconsistency explains only about one percent of the variation in these dependent variables. For this reason, added to the weak findings in the other two studies, they suggest discarding status inconsistency as an explanation for preferences of political change.

Much of the early research on the political effects of status inconsistency was criticized by Blalock and others because there was no distinction made between the additive effects of an individual's statuses and the interaction effect of their combination. The three studies mentioned above utilized dummy variable regression analysis or a variation of analysis of covariance to make this separation.

VERTICAL MOBILITY STUDIES

The approach to understanding the etiology of support for the ideology of the right wing that uses status inconsistency has not proven to be particularly helpful. The literature suggests looking for other explanations. The second direction which studies attempting to link "marginality" to support for rightist ideology has taken is examining the effects of vertical mobility on the political

8. Ibid., pp. 571-572
behavior of individuals.

Jackson and Curtis point out similarities between research on the effects of status inconsistency and research on the effects of vertical mobility. They decide that the essential difference between the two is that they sometimes suggest different mechanisms to account for the effects of stratification on individual behavior. A mobility theory might suggest hindered interaction in primary groups as the intervening mechanism, while a status inconsistency theory might suggest a process of socialization and resocialization. Mobility and status inconsistency have been thought to produce similar kinds of responses in individuals, such as prejudice and withdrawal from social participation. They both are defined by the possession of two or more different rank positions held either sequentially or simultaneously. This creates something of a similar situation with regard to the statistical problems in separating the additive effects of the separate ranks from the interaction effects of the mobility or inconsistency.

Lipset and Zetterberg, in a study presented in 1956, concluded that Americans moving up into the middle class are slightly more conservative than those born into it.

Specifically, they found that "middle-class men with fathers who were manual workers, i.e., the upwardly mobile, were 4% less 'left-wing' (Democratic) in their 1948 party choice and 8% less so in 1952 than the middle-class respondents who had middle-class fathers."

Ira Rohter's research in 1965 in the Pacific Northwest found that rightists undergo much more status mobility than non-rightists: at the lowest level of occupations 38% of the rightists' status declined sharply from that of their fathers, compared to 6% of the non-rightists; at the middle level, rightists were more mobile both up and down than the non-rightists; only 14% stayed at the same level as their parents, compared to 29% of the non-rightists; at the highest level of occupations, the rightists were more upwardly mobile, 69% moved up three or more positions compared to 46% of the non-rightists.

Lopreato's research in Italy found upwardly mobile male family heads less likely to be conservative than the middle-class stables. He concluded that status rejection is the key to the political attitudes of the upwardly mobile group. Those upwardly mobiles who perceived class relations as restricted were significantly more likely to be left-wing in political orientation than those who did.

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not. To account for the difference between the political behavior of Italians and Americans, as described by Lipset and Zetterberg, Lopreato suggests that in America there exists such an emphasis on success and achievement that the upwardly mobile express their gratitude to the system in which they have prospered by "over-conforming" to the political norms of the middle class.

During the past several years a number of studies have been done which challenge the finding of Lipset and Zetterberg. Kenneth Thompson's analysis of five nationally-representative American samples found that the upwardly mobiles were consistently more likely to be more conservative than the working-class stables, but less conservative than the middle-class stables. Comparing these data with Lipset and Zetterberg's, Thompson points out that his data included men and women while the other did not. Aggregating the results from the six elections he studied, Thompson found that working-class stable men were 30% Republican, the women 31%. Upwardly mobile men were 55% Republican, the women 44%. Middle-class stables were 57% Republican, women 58%. These findings are, of course, still in opposition to Lipset and Zetterberg's.

Mary Jackman reanalyzes Lopreato's data on upwardly mobiles and data of Lopreato and Chafetz on the downwardly

mobile in Italy. Using a more sophisticated statistical procedure, she concludes that the data from the two studies support an "acculturation" model, i.e. the mobiles are politically mid-way between the class of origin and the class of destination. The acculturation approach postulates that the experience of mobility, upward or downward, has no special effect on a person's political orientation other than to move his primary social interaction from one group to another; where the groups differ in attitude, his attitude will gradually change. Such a model predicts that the attitudes of both the mobile and the occupationally stable can be accurately represented by simply adding the effects of father's status and respondent's status, without recourse to special interaction effects associated with the mobility experience itself.\footnote{15}

Jackman has done some research of her own using a representative sample of the non-institutionalized adult population of the United States. This research also concludes that the acculturation model is the best explanation for the data.\footnote{16}

Jackson and Curtis's research also supports the acculturation model. They interviewed male heads of household in three Indiana and three Arizona communities, roughly matched in size. They looked at both career and intergenerational mobility, six forms of inconsistency, and forty-three dependent variables, including most of the


\footnote{16. Mary Jackman, "Social Mobility and Attitude Toward the Political System," Social Forces 50(June, 1972), p. 471.}
variables suggested in previous research as consequences of mobility or inconsistency. The few relationships which did not appear to be additive did not fit any pattern which would suggest an interaction effect due to mobility of status inconsistency. The dependent variable "domestic political liberalism," of particular interest here, did not appear to be related to any form of status inconsistency or mobility.

Andrew Hopkins reviewed the literature on political behavior of upwardly mobile men and found no solid evidence to support the theory of overconformity espoused by Lopreato. Hopkins says the Lipset-Zetterberg data are statistically insignificant.

Not much has been done to examine the political effects of downward mobility on individuals. The Lopreato and Chafetz study criticized by Jackman is one of the few. Lopereato and Chafetz concluded that the political orientation of "skidders" depends on their perception of the opportunity structure in the society: if they see it as open and their downward mobility as their own fault, they will identify with the middle class politically; if they see the opportunity structure as closed then they tend to identify with the working class politically.

The figures from Ira Rohter's study cited earlier show rightists in his sample experienced significantly greater mobility, especially downward, than the non-rightists.

Kessin's study of adult males in a Washington, D.C. suburb examined the effects of mobility on family relationships, interpersonal and communal relationships, and emotional adjustment. He found that those who moved two or more status levels up had lower levels of community integration and primary affiliation, higher levels of manifest anxiety and psychosomatic symptoms than an additive model would predict. This confirms the Midtown Manhattan findings that higher levels of less serious emotional disturbances are more characteristic of the upwardly mobile. Downwardly mobiles, on the other hand, experienced moderately higher levels of interaction. The data do not confirm the hypothesis that downward mobility leads to a dissociative pattern of interaction. Kessin concludes that if mobility is to be disruptive it must break the bounds of a stable system, be highly visible and uncommon, for instance among minority group members.

Lopreato and Hazelrigg point up the distinction between intergenerational and intragenerational mobility.

They show a confusion in the literature as to the definition of intergenerational mobility. Some researchers use the career-entry job and others use the current job of an individual to compare with father's job while the individual is in school. Using the father's job/career-entry job to define intergenerational mobility and the career-entry job/current job to define intragenerational mobility, Lopreato and Hazelrigg found that in Italy upwardly mobile intragenerational achievers were more resistant to re-socialization into middle-class political perspectives than were the intergenerational achievers. To explain this they refer to the importance of early socialization on political attitudes, and to barriers against newcomers existing in the middle class.

The main body of literature on the political effects of vertical mobility suggest that mobility per se does not have a particularly significant influence. It is important to recognize, however, that many of these studies on status inconsistency and vertical mobility do not specifically deal with assent to rightist ideology, but rather use some liberal-conservative measure. Some, such as Lipset and Zetterberg's study are concerned with voting for Democrats or Republicans. Compared to a study like Rohter's, which is specifically concerned with the right-wing, these studies seem less reliable as indicators of what is associa-

ted with assent to rightist ideology. The fact that Rohter found the rightists he studied to be disproportionately mobile seems more significant to the present study than does the work of Jackman and others who suggest that mobility is not particularly helpful in understanding political behavior, that is, that mobility does not seem to have an interaction effect, and that mobiles seem to be politically somewhere in the middle between their class of origin and their class of destination. Because little attention has been paid to downward mobility, and because Rohter's study found rightists to be more mobile, particularly downwardly mobile than his non-rightist sample, it seems useful to research downward mobility more thoroughly.

Another factor suggesting the usefulness of researching the influence of downward mobility on assent to rightist ideology is the importance of a feeling of dispossession among right-wing supporters, which Daniel Bell and others have emphasized. Downward intragenerational mobility would seem to be particularly worthy of attention, as a possible source of feelings of dispossession.

SMALL BUSINESSMEN

Feelings of dispossession, status anxiety, and generalized insecurity are perhaps more widespread among certain occupational groups in particular economic situations. The

situation of small businessmen in increasingly industrialized nations suggests that they are such a group. The high rate of business failure for small businesses presumably breeds insecurity, dispossession, downward mobility, and status frustration. John Bunzel's study of the American small businessman concluded that small businessmen tend to see themselves as marginal. Alienated from the corporate systems of power which have revolutionized the social and economic order in the past one hundred years -- the business corporation, the labor union, and the federal government -- small businessmen have been dispossessed of much of their institutionalized power base. Feeling powerless to prevent their whole way of life from being undermined, they would seem prone to suspicion, insecurity and frustration. Sherif and others have pointed up the susceptibility of individuals in such a condition to manipulation by demagogues and participation in extremist politics. Martin Trow found that those who were both anti-big business and anti-union were much more likely to express support for Senator Joseph McCarthy in Bennington, Vermont in 1954. Further, small businessmen were much more likely to be anti-big business and anti-union than were

manual workers or salaried employees. At each of four different levels of education small businessmen showed distinctly higher proportionate support for McCarthy than did the salaried employees of similar education, and among those who had not attended college the small businessmen were even more likely to be pro-McCarthy than the manual workers. Lipset reports that a Roper poll in 1952 showed small businessmen to be the most pro-McCarthy occupational group in the country. More recent studies have backed these findings. Rohter's 1965 study of rightists found a tendency for more rightists to be self-employed businessmen and independent professionals. Nolan and Schneck's study in Canada in 1969 found support for "the substantive hypothesis that small businessmen are relatively more susceptible to political sentiments that support right-wing extremism than are bureaucratic managers." Schneck and Nolan found no significant correlation between support for the right-wing and age (.03), as well as a very slight negative relationship between educational level and support for the right-wing (.10).

30. Ibid., p. 98.
They also point out evidence that small businessmen have been supportive of rightist movements in other countries. Analysis of voting patterns in Germany during the 1920s and 1930s has led several researchers to conclude that "small businessmen, especially in the rural areas of Germany, were one of the earliest and most important social bases of Hitler's rise to power." Studies of the Poujadists in France during the 1950s show that this right-wing movement drew heavy support from small businessmen.

The literature on the relationship between marginality and support for rightist ideology suggests that intragenerational downward mobility is a comparatively unexplored area worthy of further attention. The situation of small businessmen in industrialized societies such as the United States offers a good opportunity to examine this relationship between downward intragenerational mobility and support for rightist ideology. The evidence that small businessmen have been disproportionate supporters of rightist movements in several countries at different times makes them a particularly attractive group for this purpose.

One way to approach this research problem would be to find a group of unsuccessful small businessmen and compare their political attitudes with those of a group of successful small businessmen. The unsuccessful ones would presumably be intragenerationally downwardly mobile, and in a

31. Ibid., p. 92.
32. Ibid., pp. 92-93.
very real sense, dispossessed. If the unsuccessful group appears more accepting of rightist ideology, this would support the hypothesis that intragenerational downward mobility is positively associated with acceptance of rightist ideology. This would suggest that the unsuccessful small businessmen, presumably feeling dispossessed are perhaps projecting their sense of loss at the individual socioeconomic level to the national level, in light of the emphasis in rightist ideology on the loss of a golden past of America. Lipset and Raab note this strong sense of dispossession in the radical right and call it "The Quondam Complex." The Quondam Complex "describes the condition of those who have more of a stake in the past than in the present, ...describes a preponderance of symbolic investment in the past, related to some past group identity which has declined in symbolic significance." Lipset and Raab see this investment in the past as a key strain in the right wing.

The research for this paper intends to explore this relationship between dispossession and acceptance of rightist ideology by looking at intragenerational downwardly mobile small businessmen and comparing their political attitudes with those of small businessmen who are comparatively successful.

34. Ibid., pp. 472-473, 482.
CHAPTER II

METHODS AND TECHNIQUES

One way of locating unsuccessful small businessmen is through the Court of Bankruptcy, whose files are public record. Although some individuals are able to use the bankruptcy laws to their advantage, most bankrupts seem to be damaged financially before they file. There is a certain amount of stigma attached to going bankrupt among the wider society. Financially and socially bankruptcy seems a good means of locating small businessmen who are unsuccessful and intragenerationally downwardly mobile. The chief goal of this research is to explore the relationship between bankruptcy and acceptance of rightist ideology. The research method decided upon was an attitude survey using a questionnaire, including several scales and background information questions. Due to time and money considerations the methodology had to adapt to the situation as it developed and the study must consequently be viewed as exploratory. The chief problem was locating the bankrupt small businessmen and getting their cooperation.

The names and addresses of all those who file for bankruptcy in the Richmond, Virginia area are available to the public at the District Court of Bankruptcy in Richmond. The study focused on white male entrepreneurs living in the Richmond metropolitan area. This was partly due to time and money considerations and partly to avoid getting involved in sex and race questions. The files are kept in Richmond for three or four years and then sent to the National Archives outside Washington, D. C. There were 2,537 bankrupts in the Richmond area between 29 September 1971, and 31 December 1973. Of these, 111 were male entrepreneurs in the metropolitan Richmond area. The others were women, corporations, or individuals not self-employed. These 111 were the target sample.

A letter of introduction on College of William and Mary stationery was mailed to the first fifty bankrupt entrepreneurs. After a week, the researcher visited these people at their homes between 7 and 9 in the evening. This proved to be highly unproductive. Most of the intended subjects had moved away from the address given on their bankruptcy application. Several complained that the time was inconvenient, and for this or some other reason refused to fill out the questionnaire at any time. This prompted the researcher to make phone contact before going to the bankrupts' homes, in order to save time and money. Of the
Ill bankrupt entrepreneurs, 24 refused to participate, 12 had moved away from Richmond (according to their relatives or the people living at their previous address), 52 could not be reached by phone: they either had no phone number listed in the directory or with information, or were never home when called. Fourteen requested the questionnaire to be mailed to them. Only three of these mailed it back. Two people requested the questionnaire be left with them to fill out at their convenience, and they both returned the questionnaire. Seventeen people were administered the questionnaire by the researcher. Thus 22 bankrupt entrepreneurs completed the questionnaire.

Tracking down the bankrupts took a good deal more time and effort than anticipated. The original research plan called for fifty, and fifty entrepreneurs still in business, referred to hereafter as "successes." Having gone through the bankruptcy files back into the fall of 1971, however, with increasingly diminishing returns, it seemed reasonable to stop. The small sample of course means that the research can only be considered exploratory. It is impossible to know what kinds of biases exist in the sample due to the large refusal rate and the large number of intended subjects who were unreachable. It is conceivable that those bankrupts who have recovered financially and socially would be disproportionately willing to talk to the researcher.
The bankrupts were not informed that they were being interviewed because they had filed for bankruptcy. This was to avoid setting up a response set and to encourage as normal a response as possible. If the subject asked how he was chosen, he was told that his name was on a list of small businessmen obtained from the Chamber of Commerce, made up by them some years earlier. Those subjects who expressed interest in the research were told exactly how they were chosen and what the research was about after they had completed the questionnaire. Only three people expressed this kind of interest. None of the three expressed feelings of antipathy towards the researcher or feelings of invasion of privacy.

An attempt was made to match the bankrupts with successful entrepreneurs, with regard to the part of town in which they lived and worked, the kind of business they owned, and, as much as possible, the size of their business. The researcher drove around town looking for suitable businesses for this second sample. Approximately sixty "successful" small businessmen were contacted before the twenty-two bankrupts were matched. Six of the "successes" were willing to fill out the questionnaire at the researcher's initial visit. Sixteen requested that the questionnaire be left with them to fill out at their convenience. This is, of course, a possible source of bias in the study because only five of the bankrupts were left the
questionnaire. This is dealt with in the next chapter. It does not seem to present a serious problem, particularly considering the exploratory nature of this study.

**THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

The first part of the questionnaire is composed of four scales. Directions for filling out this section preceded the scale items.

1. The first scale was composed of the sixteen most discriminating items selected from all of the Politico-Economic Conservatism Scales published in The Authoritarian Personality.

2. Next came a five item "F" Scale intended to measure predisposition to authoritarianism. This scale was used by the National Opinion Research Center in a 1953 national survey and used by Lipset. The five items were taken in part from the longer scales developed in The Authoritarian Personality studies.

3. A Religious Fundamentalism scale followed. This is a Guttman scale of ten items developed by Edmonds at Florida State University. Protestant Fundamentalism is often linked to the politics of radical right movements. Fundamentalism

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appears to be related to support for the radical right independent of education.

4. Finally, there was a twenty-five item scale devised by Edmonds to measure acceptance of rightist ideology. Edmonds defines rightist ideology as "an intensely patriotic orientation aimed at restoring a 'Golden Past' by immobilizing internal enemies of the people and the nation and by restoring discipline, strength, courage, and patriotism."

The main themes in the scale are: Super-Patriotism; The Golden Past; The Fall and Tarnished Present; The Impending Apocalypse; and Return to Old Ways, such as Discipline, Patriotism, Strength, and Courage.

The scale items, except the Fundamentalism ones, are Likert type items, scored from one to six depending on the degree of agreement the subject expresses with each item. Although the Fundamentalism scale is a Guttman scale it was treated like the other Likert ones in scoring. Some items in each scale except the "F" Scale, were negatively scored to counter possible compliance response sets among the subjects. To aid content validity the items forming the Rightist Ideology scale were retained and weighted in proportion to their contribution to the total variance in test scores on a William and Mary student sample.

The second part of the questionnaire consists of a series of background information questions for use as control variables:

1. Age -- this has been found to be positively associated with intolerance and conservatism.

2. Rural-Urban -- Those living in rural areas have often been disproportionately supportive of rightist movements. Edmonds believes that rightist ideology is closely associated with a rural mentality, or with being isolated from cultural criticism. Rural folk are socialized into radical rightism as part of the predominant world-view. For these reasons questions were included in the questionnaire asking the subjects how many years they had been living in the Richmond area, and the population of the area they spent most of their youth, if not Richmond.

3. Generation in America -- Lipset suggests that recent immigrants have a tendency sometimes to over-conform to what they view as "the American way" to alleviate their frustrations at not being treated as full Americans by those who have lived here longer. This could lead to support for rightist movements.

4. Ethnic Origin -- Those from Catholic countries or countries in close physical proximity to Communist countries show more support for rightism than those from other countries, no doubt partly due to the real threat of Communist aggression to their homelands. Anti-Communism is of course the focal issue for many rightist movements.

5. Religion -- Generally, Catholics tend to be more conservative on most issues than Protestants, and Jews tend to be more liberal than Protestants. Subjects were asked their religion, and the religion of their parents to find what kind of religious environment the subject had while growing up.

6. Intellectual Level -- Indicators of intellectual competencies are most important to control for in a study of political attitudes. The less educated and culturally unsophisticated tend to be disproportionately supportive of rightist causes, generally intolerant of people and ideas which are different. Three measures were used to inquire into the subjects' intelligence and cultural awareness:

a) Years of education.
b) Highest degree attained.
c) Cultural sophistication -- This measure was adapted from a test used by Lipset and Raab in The Politics of Unreason. It was originally developed by Gertrude Selznick and Stephen Steinberg in The

Tenacity of Prejudice (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). The test was composed of ten names of individuals of some note in various fields. The subjects were given from one to four points for recognizing four famous American authors. The test was found by Selznick and Steinberg, and by Lipset and Raab to be useful in distinguishing between culturally intolerant college graduates and tolerant ones.47

7. Occupation -- Warner's scale of occupational prestige was used to rank the current occupations of the bankrupts. Although some of the bankrupts had switched jobs or fields since their bankruptcy, the kind of business they engaged in prior to bankruptcy was usually on the bankruptcy form. This question was included to explore the possibility that those bankrupts who had best recovered from their bankruptcy, or were perhaps hurt the least by it to begin with, would be less supportive of rightist ideology than those bankrupts who were more downwardly mobile, presumably more status frustrated, and dispossessed.

8. Income -- The bankrupts were asked to give their current income, and, if they were willing to talk about their bankruptcy, the income they had the last successful year before they were bankrupt. The income for the last successful year was put into 1973 dollars and compared with the present income of the "successes." The income for the bankrupts' question on the current income for the bankrupts was included, as was the current occupation one, to explore the possible effects of recovery on the bankrupts' attitudes.

9. Those who said that they were or had been in business for themselves were asked how many years they had been in business. One would expect bankruptcy to mean something different to a man who had been in business for many years from what it would mean to a man in business for only a short while. Two of the twenty-two bankrupts did not admit having been in business for themselves. Seven other bankrupts were engaged in the same business despite their previous bankruptcy.

10. Bankrupts admitting being or having been in business for themselves, and the "successes," were asked the number of their employees in order to get an idea of the size of their operation and to control for it. Bankrupts were asked the average size of their operation over the years they were in business for themselves. Those currently in business for themselves were also asked to give the average size of their business.

11. The most sensitive question concerned whether the bankrupts considered their lack of success in business as due to their own inadequacies or to some external factor such as inability to get a bank loan, accidents, health problems, crooked partners, etc.. It was felt that those who saw their failure as due to their own failings of some sort would experience a greater loss of self-esteem than those who saw their failure as due to something or someone outside their control. This question was included
to explore what effects this difference might have on acceptance of rightist ideology. Thirteen of the twenty-two bankrupts responded to this question. Of the remaining nine, two did not admit to having been in business for themselves, and seven, being in the same business at present that they were engaged in at the time of their bankruptcy, were not questioned about their bankruptcy. The researcher was unable to tactfully broach the subject. This is a problem that could and would be worth remedying in future research.

12. The last part of the questionnaire was intended to be a check on the attitudes expressed in the earlier scales, i.e., to see if the subjects acted out their attitudes by voting for the seemingly appropriate candidate in particularly divided elections. One point was given for voting for Nixon in 1960, one point for Goldwater in 1964, one for Nixon in 1968, in the Presidential elections; one point for voting for Scott for U. S. Senator from Virginia in 1972, and one point for voting for Godwin for Virginia Governor in 1965. Two points were given for voting for Wallace for President in 1968, two points for Wallace in 1972, and two points for voting for Storey for Virginia Governor in 1965. These points were totaled for a general score for conservative voting. Eight people, four in each sample group, said that they had never voted.

13. The subjects were asked if they were familiar with five organizations with various political connotations, ranging
from the American Civil Liberties Union to the Minutemen. If they were familiar with the groups, they were asked to give their opinion of them. Only one person out of the forty-four subjects responded substantially to this section.

Several points were stressed in conversation with those subjects visited and in letters accompanying those questionnaires which were mailed. First, the anonymity of the questionnaire was stressed. Second was the importance of answering all the questions. Third, the request that the questions be answered without assistance was emphasized. Few subjects visited had questions regarding the questionnaire. Many subjects expressed dissatisfaction with the nature of the questionnaire, feeling that the statements in the scales required fuller responses than a number designating degree of agreement or disagreement, however, there was no overt hostility on the part of any of the subjects.
CHAPTER III

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The hypothesis of main concern here is: bankrupts will score higher on the Rightist Ideology Scale than the "successes." Bankruptcy and Rightist Scale are the two most important variables for this study.

First it is important to establish the comparability of the two groups, the bankrupts and the "successes." Table 1 shows the occupation of each subject and the side of town of his business.

There seems to be a rough comparability between the two groups. Two bankrupts did not admit to having been in business for themselves. They had stated that they had been in business for themselves on the bankruptcy form but not exactly what kind of business. To match these two the researcher found small businesses similar to the others in the sample on the side of town where these two lived.

Table 2 shows the mean scores on all the variables for the two groups separately and combined, as well as the standard deviations. The difference between the two groups on the Rightist Scale score is nearly one standard deviation, and in the hypothesized direction, with the bankrupts' mean of 90.27, as compared with the "successes'" 73.54. The only
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bankrupts</th>
<th>&quot;Successes&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Side of Town</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Radio-TV Repair</td>
<td>South Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Carpet Service</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Restaurant</td>
<td>South Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Security Service</td>
<td>North Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Public Relations</td>
<td>North Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Business Machines Sales</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Service</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Pipe Line Construction</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. General Contractor</td>
<td>South Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Carpet and Tile Store</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Jeweler</td>
<td>South Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Real Estate</td>
<td>East End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Bookkeeping and Tax Serv.</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Auto Parts</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Lighting Supplies</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Unknown*</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Pen Distributor</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Unknown*</td>
<td>South Side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Real Estate</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Private Investigator</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. Sporting Goods</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. Dry Cleaners</td>
<td>West End</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Unknown refers to the business that went bankrupt, not the current occupation of the "bankrupt."
Table 1A
Comparability of the Two Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bankrupts</th>
<th>Successes</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West End</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East End</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Side</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Mean Scores on All Variables for the Two Groups, Separately and Combined

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bankrupt (N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>&quot;Successes&quot; (N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Combined (N)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politico-Economic Conservatism</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65.54</td>
<td>11.73</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63.14</td>
<td>12.06</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>63.34</td>
<td>11.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Scale</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11.27</td>
<td>4.29</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11.84</td>
<td>4.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38.45</td>
<td>12.97</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30.38</td>
<td>11.23</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34.51</td>
<td>12.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>90.27</td>
<td>20.03</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>73.54</td>
<td>22.09</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>81.90</td>
<td>22.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Ideology Scale</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>40.86</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38.41</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>39.64</td>
<td>11.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12.91</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14.64</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13.77</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13.07</td>
<td>11.85</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20.32</td>
<td>12.49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17.38</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income*</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.52</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sophistication Index</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16.18</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.23</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Lived in Richmond</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10.09</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.73</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Town of Youth</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generations in America</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Degree Obtained</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20.45</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.86</td>
<td>27.34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18.05</td>
<td>33.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Employees</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Voting Index</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Income For Bankrupts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.68</td>
<td>8.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Occupation Of Bankrupts</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bankrupts' Years In Business</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8.41</td>
<td>11.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Income for "successes" = present income; for bankrupts, income last successful year - in thousands of dollars.
other major difference between the two groups is their scores on the intelligence level measures. The years of education mean for the bankrupts is 12.91 compared to the "successes'" mean of 14.64. This is important because it reflects more exposure to college education in the "successes." Edmonds believes that the crucial factor in education, with regard to its effects on support for the right wing, is exposure to cultural criticism which the individual views as valid. This type of education is much more likely to take place in college than in high school. The bankrupts' mean score on the "degree" measure of 1.91 shows that many of them did not receive high school diplomas, signified by "2." The "successes" had a mean score of 2.54 on this measure, reflecting more exposure to college. A Bachelor's degree is represented by a "3" in this measure. The bankrupts' mean score of 2.52 on the Cultural Sophistication Index as compared with the "successes" mean of 3.62 further points up the intellectual level differences between the two groups. This is, unfortunately, a serious problem. It means that the encouraging difference in scores between the two groups on the Rightist Scale may be due to differences in education and intellectual level rather than due to bankruptcy.

To find out what is most closely associated with support for rightist ideology, correlations were run between all the variables and Rightist Scale scores. Table 3 presents these data.
Table 3
Correlations Between Rightist Scale Score and All Other Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bankrupts</th>
<th>&quot;Successes&quot;</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=22 Except Where Noted)</td>
<td>(N=22 Except Where Noted)</td>
<td>(N=44 Except Where Noted)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Bankruptcy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.47+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Politico-Economic Conservatism</td>
<td>.40++</td>
<td>.54++</td>
<td>.47+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. &quot;F&quot; Scale</td>
<td>.55++</td>
<td>.67+++</td>
<td>.60+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.29+ (N=21)</td>
<td>.57++</td>
<td>.49+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Age</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.44+</td>
<td>.33+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Years of Education</td>
<td>-.64++</td>
<td>-.32+</td>
<td>-.55+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cultural Sophistication Index</td>
<td>-.44++ (N=18)</td>
<td>-.65++</td>
<td>-.57+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Income*</td>
<td>.25 (N=18)</td>
<td>.03 (N=40)</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Number of Years in Richmond Area</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Size of Town of Youth</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.41++</td>
<td>.30+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Number of Employees</td>
<td>.01 (N=20)</td>
<td>.17 (N=42)</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Conservative Voting Index</td>
<td>-.06 (N=18)</td>
<td>.69++ (N=36)</td>
<td>.39+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Years in Business</td>
<td>.34+ (N=20)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Present Occupation</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Present Income</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Highest Degree Obtained</td>
<td>-.48++</td>
<td>-.40++</td>
<td>-.56+++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Generation in America</td>
<td>-.22 (N=21)</td>
<td>.29+ (N=43)</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Ethnic Origin**</td>
<td>.14 (N=20)</td>
<td>.39+ (N=40)</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*"Income" refers to 1973 income for the "successes" and to income the last successful year of their business for the bankrupts - in 1973 dollars.

**Individuals whose families originated in Catholic countries or in countries in close physical proximity to Communist countries were scored "1," all others were scored "0."

+Significant at .1 or greater.
++Significant at .05 or greater.
+++Significant at .001 or greater.
DISCUSSION

1. Bankruptcy -- The figure ".47" represents a correlation between bankruptcy and score on the scale measuring acceptance of rightist ideology. This correlation was figured by giving the 22 bankrupts a score of 5 on the bankruptcy item and the "successes" a score of 1, making bankruptcy an ordinal measure. This was correlated with the interval measure of acceptance of rightist ideology measured by the Rightist Scale. This compares with a bi-serial of .54 obtained by Morrison, who did a study of this relationship for Edmonds as her senior thesis at the College of William and Mary in 1971. Morrison's study was done in the Newport News, Virginia area.

2. Politico-Economic Conservatism -- Lipset and others feel that this is a main strain in the ideology of the right. The Rightist Scale correlates .47 with the PEC scores of the two groups combined, .54 for the "successes," and .40 for the bankrupts. This suggests that the "successes," whose income mean is 20.32 (in thousands of dollars) compared to 13.07 for the bankrupts, perhaps approach rightist ideology more from an economic perspective than do the bankrupts. The right has always had the problem

of uniting followers who have disparate economic conditions. Anti-communism has been the chief tool for this purpose in recent history.

3. "F" Scale -- The higher correlation between Rightist Scale scores and "F" Scale scores among the "successes," .67, as compared to .55 for the bankrupts, suggests support for Edmonds' hypothesis that the better educated rightists tend to score higher on certain personality traits, such as paranoid tendencies and extrapunitiveness, than the less educated rightists, who pick up rightist ideology as part of the predominant world-view of much of rural America. Perusal of the content of the items in the "F" Scale used in this study, however, suggests that it is not sufficiently logically distinct from the Rightist Ideology Scale. Although there is a noticeable slant in the "F" Scale towards personality factors, it does not seem to qualify as a good enough measure to test the hypothesis. It would be useful to include a personality inventory in future research along the lines of this study in order to test the hypothesis more directly.

4. Fundamentalism -- The stronger relationship between fundamentalism and support for rightist ideology among the "successes," who are better educated on the whole, suggests that, for this group, fundamentalist leanings play
a larger role in acceptance of rightist ideology than for
the less educated group. The "r" is a .29 for the bank-
rupts and .57 for the "successes," although the bankrupts
have a higher mean on the Fundamentalist Scale; 38.45,
than do the "successes," 30.38. This suggests that there
are more fundamentalists among the less educated, but
that the better educated who are fundamentalist would be
more prone to acceptance of rightist ideology than the
less educated fundamentalists, or that fundamentalism
distinguishes better between rightists and non-rightists
among the better educated.
5. Age -- This appears to be more important for the
"successes," .44, than for the bankrupts, .15, in deter-
mining support for rightist ideology. This appears to
counter Lipset's finding that high age is more associated
with support for the right wing at low education levels,
since the "successes" are generally better educated than
the bankrupts.
6. Years of Education -- This is fairly strongly nega-
tively correlated with support of rightist ideology for
both the bankrupts, -.64, and the "successes," -.32. It
is interesting, however, that the relationship is con-
siderably stronger for the bankrupts. Perhaps this
suggests that impact of education on political attitudes
is less among the higher income, "successful" group.

50. Ibid., p. 463.
7. Cultural Sophistication Index -- This is also strongly negatively correlated with support for rightist ideology for both the bankrupts, -.44, and for the "successes," -.65. This stronger relationship for the "successes" may be explained by the reputed usefulness of this measure in distinguishing rightists from non-rightists among the better educated, as the "successes" are, compared to the bankrupts.

8. Income -- This does not appear to be very influential in determining support for the right wing in this sample. The correlation between support for rightist ideology and income for the "successes" is .03, and the correlation between income the last successful year for the bankrupts and support for rightist ideology is .25. This is a slight suggestion that those bankrupts who were making the most money, who perhaps lost the most, and are the most "dispossessed," are more likely to support the right.

Gary Rush's study, mentioned earlier, concluded that high income combined with low educational background tends to produce support for the right. Eitzen's study of Wallace supporters in Kansas in 1968 came to the same conclusion. In order to test out this hypothesis on this data a scatter-plot was made to show the relationship between scores on the Rightist Scale, on the x-axis, and the difference between income and education for each subject,

put into standard deviation units, on the y-axis. The scatter-plot shows no substantial relationship, so the data from this study do not offer confirmation of the Rush hypothesis.

9. Number of Years in Richmond Area -- Although this did not seem to be a significant factor for either the bankrupts, -.08, or for the "successes," .15, the related variable, "size of town of youth" (10.) shows a strong relationship with Rightist Scale scores among the "successes," .41. This is not the case for the bankrupts, for whom the relationship is .01. This is perplexing because it suggests that for the "successes" the larger the city they grew up in, the more likely they are to support rightist ideology. Due to the size and nature of the sample it does not seem worth very much agonizing about at this time.

11. Number of Employees -- This does not appear to be a significant factor for either the bankrupts, .01, or the "successes," .17.

12. Conservative Voting -- There was very little evidence of conservative voting: the mean for the bankrupts was 1.83, and for the "successes," 2.54. The insignificant -.06 correlation between conservative voting and acceptance of rightist ideology for the bankrupts is contrasted, however, to the .69 for the "successes." Evidently among the better educated group, the few who do vote conservatively
are expressing support for their ideology.

13. Years in Business -- The .34 correlation with Rightist Scale score for the bankrupts suggests that the longer the bankrupts were in business the more likely they are to accept rightist ideology. This suggests that the bankrupts who had the most invested in their business, psychologically, socially, perhaps economically, and were, therefore, more "dispossessed" by bankruptcy, are the ones most likely to support rightist ideology. Or, assuming that entrepreneurs are disproportionately "right," this indicates a modest socialization effect.

Seven of the twenty bankrupts included in this correlation are still in the business they were in before they went bankrupt. Rather than contaminating this finding, the ones still in business may just have a heavier commitment to their business and a heavier psychological investment in their business, so that it would mean more to them to go bankrupt. If it did not mean much to them they seemingly would have left town and/or gone into some other line of work.

14. Present Occupation -- This and the next variable, "Present Income," (15.) were included to see if those bankrupts who had recovered the most would be different from those not so well recovered, in regard to their support for rightist ideology. The low correlations
for both these variables with Rightist Scale scores, .08, for present occupation, and -.01 for present income do not offer any evidence of such a difference.

In order to get more closely at the possible difference between the bankrupts who are worse off economically, and presumably socially, due to their bankruptcy, the bankrupt group was divided according to whether their income at present is less or greater than their income (in 1973 dollars) the last successful year of their business. These data are presented in Table 4.

This picture is, if not supportive of the research hypothesis of this paper, seemingly understandable. The group whose income is greater, who have recovered more from their bankruptcy, has a higher mean score on the Rightist Scale than the group whose income is less, but this seems to be explained by the differences on the three intellectual level measures: those whose incomes are less have slightly higher mean scores on "Years of Education" (13, compared to 12.8 for the group whose incomes are higher), "Highest Degree Attained" (2, compared to 1.9), and on the Cultural Sophistication Index (3, compared to 2.4).

It appears then that this sample does not support a hypothesis suggesting that the downwardly mobile are more
Table 4
Bankrupts' Mean Scores by Whether Their Present Income Is Less or Greater Than Their Income the Last Successful Year of Their Business (Figured in 1973 Dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Present Income Less (N=4)</th>
<th>Present Income Greater (N=11)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (N=22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Ideology</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>20.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politico-Economic Conservatism</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Scale</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Degree Obtained</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sophistication Index</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
susceptible to rightist ideology than are the upwardly mobile. Due to the small "N", however, and the fact that the difference between the Rightist Scale means for the two group in Table 4 is only a little more than a quarter of one standard deviation, Table 4 offers only very weak disconfirming evidence for the hypothesis.

Table 5 presents the bankrupts' mean scores on several variables broken down according to whether the bankrupts saw their bankruptcy as due to some fault of their own: mismanagement, ignorance, health, etc., or due to some external factor such as business conditions, inability to get bank loans, crooked partners, etc..

There is a curious picture here. The bankrupts who view their bankruptcy as due to personal failings have a somewhat higher score on the Rightist Ideology Scale although they have somewhat higher education and cultural sophistication. One might expect this situation to be explained by the possibility that the "internal" group are more downwardly mobile and dispossessed in the sense of loss of status and self-esteem due to bankruptcy. This does not appear to be the case, however, as evidenced by the higher income and occupational level of the "internal" group. ("2.6" for present occupation is a higher status level than "3.0": in this scale "1" signifies the highest level occupations.) The higher mean score for the "internal"
Table 5
Bankrupts' Mean Scores
By Their View of the Cause of Their Bankruptcy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Bankruptcy Externally Caused (N=8)</th>
<th>Bankruptcy Internally Caused (N=5)</th>
<th>Standard Deviation (N=22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rightist Ideology Scale</td>
<td>87.60</td>
<td>96.7*</td>
<td>20.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sophistication Index</td>
<td>2.75</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>13.8**</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highest Degree Obtained</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Income</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>19.4***</td>
<td>8.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present Occupation</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.6*</td>
<td>.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politico-Economic Conservatism</td>
<td>59.75</td>
<td>74.2***</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;F&quot; Scale</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>5.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Difference of means significant at .01 or greater.
** Difference of means significant at .05 or greater.
*** Difference of means significant at .001 or greater.
group on the Politico-Economic Conservatism Scale suggests that this group's higher rightist score is linked to political and economic concerns associated with their higher income. Again, the small "N's" for this table preclude drawing any but the most tentative conclusions from it.

16. Highest Degree Attained -- The fairly high negative correlations for both the bankrupts, -.48, and the "successes," -.40, echo the negative correlations of the other two intellectual level measures although there is no substantial difference between the two groups on this measure as there was on the other two. The direction of the difference makes sense, since it is in the same direction as the difference regarding the years of education.

"Degree," "Generation in America," "Voting," and "Ethnic Origin," are ordinal measures. Spearman correlations were figured for these variables as they relate to the interval measure of Rightist Scale scores. The other correlations, except for the bi-serial for the relationship between Rightist Scale scores and bankruptcy, are Pearson product-moments.

17. Generation in America -- Although there was no strong relationship here with Rightist Scale scores for either the bankrupts, -.22, or the "successes," .29, the difference between the two groups is interesting. This suggests that there is a stronger relationship between being from old
stock and being rightist among the higher income, better educated group. Among the less educated, lower income, downwardly mobile group, there is some indication that being of old stock would seem to dissuade subjects from supporting the right.

18. Ethnic Origin -- Countries with Catholic majorities such as Ireland and those taken over by the Communists such as Rumania, were scored one point and all others scored zero. The .39 correlation between "Ethnic Origin" and "Rightist Scale" scores for the "successes" suggests this had a greater influence with that group than with the bankrupts, for which the correlation was .14.

The information on religion is presented in Table 6. The mean scores on the four ideology scales for the different religious groups are presented as well as the mean years of education.

The small sample size only permits some comparison of Protestants and Catholics. The bankrupt sample presents a uniform picture of Catholics showing greater conservatism on all four scales and slightly less education. This fits the expected picture found in survey data, cited by Lipset and Raab and others. The "successes," however, present a somewhat reversed picture. The Catholics in the "successes" are a little less educated, slightly more funda-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>(N)</th>
<th>Rightist Ideology Scale</th>
<th>&quot;F&quot; Scale</th>
<th>Político-Economic Conservatism</th>
<th>Fundamentalism</th>
<th>Years of Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bankrupts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>64.80</td>
<td>44.60</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>60.13</td>
<td>37.13</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>101.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>86.00</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Successes&quot;</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>44.00</td>
<td>33.60</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>66.80</td>
<td>31.20</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atheist</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>60.70</td>
<td>21.70</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mentalistic, and considerably less politico-economically conservative, slightly less authoritarian, and somewhat less supportive of rightist ideology. The "N" for the Catholics is so small that it does not seem worthwhile to attempt an explanation of this confusing picture.

The .47 bi-serial correlation between bankruptcy and acceptance of rightist ideology is the chief finding presented thus far. This lends support to the basic hypothesis that the intragenerationally downwardly mobile are more acceptant of rightist ideology than are the comparatively stable. To check out this relationship further, partial correlations were computed, partialling out the influence on this relationship of the variables which correlated .30 or greater with Rightist Scale scores of the two groups combined. Nine variables had such correlations. The Politico-Conservatism Scale and "F" Scale were considered to tap part of the rightist ideology package. For this reason they were not partialled out. The voting measure was considered to be a product of support for rightist ideology rather than a possible causative factor, so it was not partialled out. Table 7 presents the partials figured holding constant each of the other six variables separately.

The relationship between support for rightist ideology and bankruptcy holds up fairly well except when the Cultural
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalism</td>
<td>.34+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.46++</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Education</td>
<td>.31+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sophistication Index</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree Level</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of Town of Youth</td>
<td>.43++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ Significant at .1 level or greater.
++ Significant at .05 level or greater.
Sophistication Index and the Degree Level are, separately, held constant. A third order partial figured on the .47, holding all three intellectual level measures constant reduces the figure to .01. The multiple correlation with all other variables held constant, between acceptance of rightist ideology, Years of Education, Highest Degree Attained, and score on the Cultural Sophistication Index is .421.

It appears then that the chief hypothesis of this study is disconfirmed by the data. The relationship between bankruptcy and support for rightist ideology is effectively wiped out when the intellectual level measures are controlled.

The correlations between the intellectual level measures and Rightist Scale scores were not significantly reduced when Bankruptcy was held constant: the -.57 for CSI and RI is reduced to -.38, the -.55 for EdYr and RI to -.44, and the -.56 for Degree and RI to -.40. All the correlations between the intellectual measures and Rightist Scale scores are significant at the .002 level, signifying that there are two chances in a thousand that the correlations are due to sampling error.

Ruling out sampling error as an explanation for the fairly strong correlations between intellectual measures and Rightist Scale scores leaves four other possibilities.
First, the development of cognitive skills, presumably measured by the intellectual measures, can be viewed as producing lowered Rightist Scale scores. Second, high Rightist Scale scores, or high acceptance of rightist ideology, can be viewed as producing low cognitive skills. Third, the relationship between cognitive skills and acceptance of rightist ideology can be viewed as two-way, i.e., both feed off the other. Fourth, there may be some other factor causing the occurrence of high cognitive skills and low Rightist Scale scores.

It does not seem likely that the second possibility is the explanation. There might be an anti-intellectual bias among some rightists, but this would not seem likely to inhibit development of cognitive skills. If the second possibility is ruled out, then the third must be ruled out. The first possibility seems a reasonable explanation of the data, although it would be interesting to check out one possibility of the fourth. It might be that the more schooling one has the more one is exposed to and acculturated into a subculture which has an anti-rightist ideology.

It was mentioned earlier that some of the subjects had the questionnaire mailed to them or left with them. Others were visited and filled out the questionnaire in the presence of the researcher. Because the Cultural Sophistication Index required knowledge that could be obtained from
books or other people, there is a possible contamination of the measure. In order to check out this possibility, mean scores on the CSI were figured for the group left or mailed the questionnaire, and for the group administered the questionnaire by the researcher. The mean CSI score for those left or mailed the questionnaire was 3.5 (N=18), compared to a mean score of 2.7 (N=24), for those administered the questionnaire by the researcher (CSI scores are missing for one bankrupt and one "success"). A bi-serial correlation of .46, significant at the .001 level was obtained for this relationship between CSI scores and leaving or not leaving the questionnaire. To see if educational differences could account for the correlation, mean scores on Years of Education and Degree Level were obtained for those nineteen who were left the questionnaire and the twenty-five who were administered it by the researcher. Those left or mailed the questionnaire had a mean of 13.95 Years of Education, and a mean of 2.21 on Degree Level, compared to a mean of 13.64 Years of Education and a mean of 2.24 on Degree Level for the subjects administered the questionnaire by the researcher. These educational differences were so slight that the .46 bi-serial was not reduced significantly when the education measures were partialled out. There is, therefore, a reasonable possibility that the CSI score is contaminated.
due to the differing methods of administering the question-
naire. The three measures of intellectual competence, however, support each other. The Degree Level appears more significant in wiping out the relationship between bank-
ruptcy and Rightist Scale scores than the CSI. The conclusion reached, therefore, that either intellectual and educational differences, or differential exposure to a subculture which has an anti-rightist ideology, accounts for the higher scores on the Rightist Scale by the bank-
rupt group, seems justified by the data despite the con-
tamination due to differing methods of administering the questionnaire.
CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The purpose of this study was to explore the relationship between intragenerational downward mobility and assent to right wing political ideology among small businessmen. Many problems were encountered in attempting to use bankruptcy as a measure of downward intragenerational mobility, chief of which was the difficulty in locating bankrupt small businessmen and then getting their cooperation. Because of time and money considerations and the difficulty in acquiring the sample, the sample is quite small and possibly biased. The conclusions, therefore, based on these data must be viewed as tentative and merely suggestive of further research.

The data from this study point to education, degree level, and cultural sophistication, as the chief factors, or at least an index of the most influential variable or variables, determining support for rightist ideology among small businessmen, rather than a sense of dispossession brought on by bankruptcy and intragenerational downward mobility. It may be that education has an effect on success in business, but success or failure in business seems to have no impact upon rightist ideology in subjects
similar to the ones included in this study.

The literature on the right wing shows awareness of education as a significant factor in determining support for rightist ideology. Stouffer's study of tolerance of non-conformists found that the better educated in all the age groups tend to be more tolerant. Lipset found Stouffer's data also showed that "although higher occupational status within each educational level seems to make for greater tolerance, the increases in tolerance associated with higher educational level are greater than those related to higher occupational level, other factors being constant."

Chesler and Schmuck point out that the radical right organizations show great concern over education and worry that children are being subverted from the old values and being directed towards anti-Americanism and disregard for authority. Progressive theories of education and progressive schools are particularly suspect to the right. Lipset and Raab see the radical right focusing on intellectuals and the educational system as the main enemy, and see the Birch Society and other rightist groups spending a major part of

their resources on the surveillance of school and library systems, attacking teachers, librarians, and books which they see as politically or morally subversive.

Fred Grupp's study of the national membership of the John Birch Society found that 64% of their membership had exposure to at least some college as compared to the United States national average of 24%. Grupp says this is not surprising because political activists tend to have a better developed ability to translate content into political terms that are meaningful to them, than do the majority of Americans. This capability is related to increased education. Grupp goes on to point out, however, that Birchers tend to have a particular kind of education. Less than a fifth of the college-educated Birchers majored in a social science or the liberal arts, while 69% of them majored in the natural sciences or technical fields, fields which are not likely to challenge the political predispositions with which students enter college. Birch members, Grupp says, discount or are unaware of the impact of impersonal social forces, because they cling to the individualism associated with the Protestant Ethic and other traditional American values which stress that the individual alone is responsible for his behavior and achievements. The lack of exposure to social science explanations of political phenomena has increased their susceptibility to

conspiratorial explanations of social events, which are both personalized and attractively simple.

Grupp also points out that the quality of education among Birchers is low: 62% of the college-educated Birchers attended colleges in the fourth and lowest quality level. This is compared to 28% of the college-educated members of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action. Birchers with college degrees had only 10% graduates from the highest level compared to 40% for the ADA.

Lipset and Raab feel that despite the anti-intellectual bias of the right which focuses on intellectuals and the educational system as the main enemy, the right wing publications show evidence of some belief in the high status and value of education and academic learning. Lipset and Raab see this in the elaborate footnoting of books published by the Birch publishing houses and in the biographies of authors of articles in Birch publications, which stress the educational achievements at some length. Lipset and Raab conclude from all this that for many on the right their education is a source of status frustration. Although often well-educated in comparison to the national population, rightists seldom have the educational backgrounds

59. Ibid., and Lipset and Raab, op. cit., pp. 322-323.
which would enable them to easily become part of the leading social and power circles of their communities.

Lipset and Raab emphasize the significance of the kind of education, as well as the amount and quality, in determining political attitudes. Using the cultural sophistication index developed by Selznick and Steinberg, they found as many unsophisticated college graduates as sophisticated grade-school graduates who were likely to agree with the "F" scale item, "Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse." This cultural sophistication index, measuring as it does, the knowledge of certain major literary figures in America, suggests to Lipset and Raab the importance of a certain kind of education in raising the level of commitment to democratic principles, "at the same time that many 'progressive' educators seem willing to abandon those aspects of 'middle class' sophisticated education which seems so closely tied to an ideological democratic commitment as offensive to the self-esteem of those reared in brutalizing poverty."

Although Lipset and Raab suggest that education may lead to status frustration which then leads to support for the right, evidence from this study of bankrupt small...
businessmen, as well as evidence from Kelly and Chambliss, who found education correlated higher with political attitudes than did status inconsistency, and evidence from Gary Rush's study which found low education more related to acceptance of right-wing attitudes than were differences in occupation or income status, suggests that the education itself may be more important than feelings of status frustration.

The fact that the less educated usually score higher on rightist scales, combined with the information about college-educated Birchers, suggests that due to the quality and kind of education of these college-educated ones, they have something in common with the less educated in terms of quantity. On the other hand, it might be the case that certain personality factors enter in among the better educated that do not enter so much in determining support for the right among the less educated. Both possibilities should be taken into account in future research.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The most important factor for further research suggested by this study is education in the broad sense of the term. Many studies on political attitudes pay perhaps too little attention to the kind of education and the quality of education of the subjects. Research should focus on determining exactly what kind of education, what sorts of ideas and subjects have what kinds of influence on individuals'
political attitudes and behavior. The cultural sophistication index used in this study seems crude and yet has proved surprisingly useful here and in research done by Lipset and Raab, and Selznick and Steinberg. Indices such as this one need to be developed and used more widely in studies of political attitudes. It is not easy to include a test of intellectual sophistication and ability in an attitude survey such as this one. Researchers like to assure subjects that they are not being graded in order to put the subjects at ease and secure their cooperation. Crude measures of intellectual ability, however, such as asking for years of education or highest degree attained, are highly subject to bias due to subjects' lying in the direction of social desirability. Care must be taken to avoid this. The best way of course seems to be to use some sort of index such as the one used here, perhaps more elaborate, and have it administered by the researcher so that there is no question as to whether or not the subject received aid in filling it out. It would be more informative to find out where the subject went to school, what he studied, and to get some indices of his knowledge in several areas, particularly politics.

As for research into downward intragenerational mobility, as evidenced by bankruptcy, a much larger sample less subject to bias than the one obtained for this study is needed. This would
probably take a good bit of time and money, but in order to avoid unknown biases it seems necessary. Many of the bankrupts intended as subjects for this study had moved away. These should be contacted. One way of dealing with this problem, and the problem of locating many of the bankrupts, which was also encountered, would be to get in touch with the bankrupts at the court while they are going through the proceedings. With evidence that the researcher is not in any way connected with the creditors and really doing research, the bankrupts might be persuaded to cooperate. At least the researcher would get some idea of why they were refusing, and some information might be obtained from those involved in the bankruptcy proceedings, information such as the economic and social consequences of the proceedings for the subject. There would be a new problem, however, in that immediately following the court proceedings, the bankrupt subject may not have felt the impact of bankruptcy. There would be no way of knowing whether or not and to what degree the bankrupt would recover financially and socially in the future.

More data are needed as to exactly what bankruptcy means to the subject. It may be that bankruptcy is not as good an indicator of downward intragenerational mobility for some individuals as it is for others. This information could only be acquired with the cooperation of the subject, because only he would know how he felt about it. Some
indication of what the bankruptcy's effects would be on the individual could perhaps be obtained from the creditors and lawyers involved in the court but it would be best to get the subject's cooperation. Kessin's study of the effects of mobility concluded that in order for it to be disruptive, it must break the bounds of a stable system and be highly visible and disruptive. To find out if this is the case for an individual would require some knowledge of the individual's situation and how he sees it, and some knowledge of the community in which he lives, how bankruptcy is viewed by his friends and business acquaintances. It might be that some communities are less shocked by bankruptcy than others. It would seem that some knowledge of the economic and political background of small business in a community being studied would be helpful. The historical perspective would add to the information acquired from the individual subjects to make a fuller study.

APPENDIX I

LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
August 17, 1973

Dear Sir:

In recent years, as you may well know, the values of such traditions as patriotism, religion, free enterprise, and so on, have been hotly debated in our society. The American people seem to have many varied opinions on these subjects. As a candidate for a Masters degree at the College of William and Mary, I have chosen for my thesis project to try to learn more about public opinion in this region.

You have been chosen through random selection to be one of those interviewed in my study. I can assure you definitely that your responses to the questions will be completely anonymous. I am only interested in your opinions insofar as they represent those of the general public.

The interview will not take long -- thirty or forty minutes at the most. My assistant and I will be doing the interviews in the early evening and on weekends through October. I hope it will be possible to meet with you. I would deeply appreciate your participation in my study, since the success of my work depends upon your cooperation.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

Rayford Kytle
APPENDIX II

QUESTIONNAIRE
This form is part of a Master's thesis in sociology for the College of William and Mary. This is not an intelligence test. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. The best answer is your personal opinion. You can be sure that whatever your opinion may be on certain issues, there will be many people who agree and many who disagree. That is the purpose of this poll -- to determine how public opinion is divided on each of these socially important topics.

Please be sure that you: 1) Read each statement carefully and mark it according to your first reaction. It is not necessary to take a lot of time for any one question. 2) Answer every question. 3) Give your personal point of view. Do not talk the questions over with anyone until you have finished. 4) Be as sincere, accurate, and complete as possible in the limited time and space.

Please mark each statement in the left-hand margin according to whether you disagree or agree with it, as follows:

+ 1 if you agree slightly with the statement - 1 if you disagree slightly with the statement
+ 2 if you agree moderately with the statement - 2 if you disagree moderately with the statement
+ 3 if you agree strongly with the statement - 3 if you disagree strongly with the statement

_____ 1. A child should learn early in life the value of a dollar and the importance of ambition, efficiency, and determination.

_____ 2. Depressions are like occasional headaches and stomach aches; it's natural for even the healthiest society to have them once in awhile.

_____ 3. In general, the best way of aiding our fellow men is to give time or money to some worthy charity.

_____ 4. The businessman, the manufacturer, the practical man -- these are of much greater value to society than the intellectual, the artist, the theorist.

_____ 5. The best way to solve social problems is to stick close to the middle of the road, to move slowly and to avoid extremes.
6. It is the responsibility of the entire society, through its government, to guarantee everyone adequate housing, income, and leisure.

7. The only way to provide adequate medical care for the entire population is through some program of socialized medicine.

8. It is essential to maintain or increase the income taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals.

9. Labor unions should become stronger and have more influence generally.

10. In general, full economic security is bad; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need the money for eating and living.

11. It is a fundamental American tradition that the individual must remain free of government interference, free to make money and spend it as he likes.

12. Men like Henry Ford or J. P. Morgan who overcame all competition on the road to success, are models for all young people to admire and imitate.

13. The government should own and operate all public utilities (transportation, gas and electric, railroads, etc.)

14. Character, honesty and ability will tell in the long run; most people get pretty much what they deserve.

15. America may not be perfect, but the American Way has brought us about as close as human beings can get to a perfect society.

16. Poverty could almost entirely be done away with if we made certain basic changes in our social and economic system.

17. The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.

18. Any good leader should be strict with people under him in order to gain their respect.

19. Prison is too good for sex criminals. They should be publicly whipped or worse.
20. There are two kinds of people in the world: the weak and the strong.

21. No decent man can respect a woman who has had sex relations before marriage.

22. Jesus was God’s only Son sent into the world by God to save sinful men.

23. Jesus of Nazareth was a very good man and teacher, but it is questionable that he was a divine being.

24. Jesus raised Lazarus from the dead.

25. The only benefit one receives from prayer is psychological.

26. The story of the creation in the Old Testament is true.

27. We should attempt to understand and explain, rather than accept on faith all Biblical miracles.

28. I believe that there is a physical Hell where men are punished for the sins of their lives.

29. I believe there is a supernatural being, the Devil, who continually tries to lead men into sin.

30. The “fall of man” in the Garden of Eden story is a myth symbolizing the problem of good and evil in the world.

31. The Bible in the original manuscript was infallible, i.e., without error.

32. In these days, patriotism and loyalty to established American ways are the most important requirements of a good citizen.

33. The average citizen does not show enough respect for the U. S. flag.

34. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for our flag.

35. Obedience and a proper respect for authority should be the very first requirements of a good citizen.
36. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.

37. What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to fight for family and nation.

38. Minor forms of military training, obedience and discipline, such as drill, marching and simple commands, should be made a part of the elementary school educational program.

39. Present treatment of conscientious objectors, draft evaders, and subversives is too lenient and mollycoddling. If a person won't fight for his country he deserves a lot worse than just a prison or a work camp.

40. We need more leaders like MacArthur, who have the morals and the strength to put our national honor above appeasement.

41. In the long run, it would be to our best interest as a nation to spend less money for military purposes and more money for education, housing and other social improvements.

42. The only way peace can be maintained is to keep America so powerful and well armed that no other nation will dare to attack us.

43. While we should give military aid to countries which are prepared to fight our enemies, we ought to cut down on foreign economic help, or else the other countries will just play us for a sucker.

44. In these troubled times, if we are to be strong and united against our common enemy, we must have more laws and safeguards against the spreading of dangerous ideas.

45. One main trouble with American foreign policy today is that there is too much concern with military force and too little concern with political negotiation and economic reconstruction.

46. The American way of life is superior in nearly all respects to any other.

47. The most important task in America is to restore the morals, strength, discipline and patriotism that made America the greatest nation on earth.
48. Communists and their fellow travellers have infiltrated just about every nook and cranny of the United States.

49. No flag, including the flag of the United Nations, should ever be flown above the flag of the United States.

50. The problems that currently plague America are largely the result of evil men plotting against America.

51. There were probably as many personal and social problems in the earlier days of this nation's history as there are now.

52. Americans will soon be forced to either fight for their freedom or become the slaves of Communists.

53. The greatest threat to the American way of life consists of the many important people inside this country who secretly work to subvert and destroy the American way of life.

54. The early Americans, who founded and settled this country, probably had no better morals, everything considered, than do modern Americans.

55. The true American way of life is disappearing so fast that force may be necessary to preserve it.

56. People who complain about things in the U. S. should be sent out of this country if they don't like it.
GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Age last birthday.

2. Number of years in Richmond area.

3. Size of town where you spent your youth, if different from Richmond.

4. Number of generations of family in America - 1 2 3 or more.

5. Ethnic origin.

6. Religious affiliation.

7. If none, that of parents.

8. Years of education completed.

9. Highest degree obtained.

10. CSI

11. Present occupation.

12. Present income.
13. Have you ever been in business for yourself?
   Occupation? Years?

14. Number of employees.

15. Income last successful year.

16. Last successful year.

17. If unsuccessful, to what do you attribute your lack of success with this business venture?

Voting History:
18. 1960 President: Nixon Kennedy Other
19. 1964 President: Johnson Goldwater Other
20. 1968 President: Nixon Humphrey Wallace McCarthy Other
21. 1972 President: Nixon McGovern Other
22. 1972 U.S.Senator: Spong Scott Other
23. 1965 Virginia Governor: Godwin Holton Storey Other
24. Do you belong to any organized political groups?

25. Degree of participation.

Are you familiar with any of the following groups, and if so, what is your feeling towards the groups?

26. ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union).
27. Common Cause

28. ACA (Americans for Constitutional Action)


30. Minutemen.
This part of the questionnaire is intended to find out if you are familiar with various famous Americans. Some of the following people are sports personalities, some are entertainers, some are literary figures, and some are politicians. Put a check in the appropriate column to indicate in which category the person on the left belongs.

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<th>Sports Entertainer</th>
<th>Personality</th>
<th>Politician</th>
<th>Literary Figure</th>
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<td>1. Arnold Palmer</td>
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<td>2. James Taylor</td>
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<td>3. William Faulkner</td>
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<td>4. Lawrence O'Brien</td>
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<td>5. Joe Namath</td>
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<td>6. Herman Melville</td>
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<td>7. Robert Dole</td>
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<td>8. John Prine</td>
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<td>9. Mark Twain</td>
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<td>10. Robert Frost</td>
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In September, 1968, the author entered the College of William and Mary as a special student in Sociology. The following year he was admitted as an M.A. candidate in Sociology. He was a graduate assistant in Sociology 1970-1971; a research assistant in Sociology during the summer of 1970; went on active duty as a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Army Reserve Signal Corps during the summer of 1972; taught Introductory Sociology to Non-Commissioned Officers at Fort Eustis, Virginia, during the fall of 1972.

All the requirements for the M.A. have been met and it is expected to be awarded in June, 1975.